Geschichte u. Kultur Roms im Spiegel d. neueren Forschung ;2. Principat. Bd. Bd. 36. Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik [Reprint 2014 ed.] 3110103923, 9783110103922

Table of contents :
Inhalt
PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTEN, TECHNIK: PHILOSOPHIE (PLATONISMUS [FORTS.]; ARISTOTELISMUS)
PLATONISMUS (FORTS.)
Porphyrian Studies Since 1913
Porphyry and Vegetarianism: A Contemporary Philosophical Approach
Amélius: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa doctrine, son style
Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240-325 A. D.)
Scepticism and Neoplatonism
Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the ‘Categories’
Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One. A Reappraisal
Bonum est diffusivum sui. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum
Numenius
ARISTOTELISMUS
Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD
Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation
Il ‘De fato’ di Alessandro. Questioni di coerenza
Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Book of Ethical Problems
NACHTRÄGE ZU BAND II. 16.3 UND BAND II. 36.1:
In the Light of the Moon: Demonology in the Early Imperial Period
An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia

Citation preview

AUFSTIEG U N D NIEDERGANG DER RÖMISCHEN WELT BAND II. 36.2

RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ROMAN WORLD VOLUME II. 36.2

AUFSTIEG U N D NIEDERGANG DER RÖMISCHEN WELT (ANRW) RISE A N D DECLINE OF THE ROMAN WORLD HERAUSGEGEBEN V O N / EDITED BY

WOLFGANG HAASE UND/AND

HILDEGARD T E M P O R I N I

TEIL II: P R I N C I P A T BAND 36.2

PART II: PRINCIPATE VOLUME 36.2

w DE

G

WALTER DE GRUYTER · BERLIN · NEW YORK 1987

AUFSTIEG U N D NIEDERGANG DER RÖMISCHEN WELT (ANRW) GESCHICHTE U N D KULTUR ROMS IM SPIEGEL DER N E U E R E N F O R S C H U N G

TEIL II: PRINCIPAT

BAND 36: P H I L O S O P H I E , WISSENSCHAFTEN, T E C H N I K 2. TEILBAND: PHILOSOPHIE (PLATONISMUS [FORTS.]; A R I S T O T E L I S M I )

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON

WOLFGANG HAASE

W DE G WALTER DE GRUYTER · BERLIN · NEW YORK 1987

Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier (alterungsbeständig — p H 7, neutral) Printed on acid-free paper (ageing resistant - p H 7, neutral)

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme

der Deutschen

Bibliothek

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: (ANRW) ; Geschichte u. Kultur Roms im Spiegel d. neueren Forschung = Rise and decline of the Roman world / hrsg. von Wolfgang Haase ; Hildegard Temporini. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter Teilw. hrsg. von Hildegard Temporini u. Wolfgang Haase ISBN 3-11-005837-5 N E : Haase, Wolfgang [Hrsg.]; Temporini, Hildegard [Hrsg.]; PT Teil 2. Principat. Bd. 36. Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik / hrsg. von Wolfgang Haase. 2. Teilbd. Philosophie (Piatonismus [Forts.]; Aristotelismus). — 1987. ISBN 3-11-010392-3

© 1987 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 30 Alle Rechte, insbesondere das der Ubersetzung in fremde Sprachen, vorbehalten. Ohne ausdrückliche Genehmigung des Verlages ist es auch nicht gestattet, dieses Buch oder Teile daraus auf photomechanischem Wege (Photokopie, Mikrokopie) zu vervielfältigen. Printed in Germany Satz und Druck: Arthur Collignon G m b H , Berlin 30 Einbandgestaltung und Schutzumschlag: Rudolf Hübler Buchbinder: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin 61

Inhalt P H I L O S O P H I E , WISSENSCHAFTEN, T E C H N I K Band II. 36.2: Philosophie (Piatonismus [Forts.]; Aristotelismus) Piatonismus [Forts.] A. (Dublin) Porphyrian Studies since 1913

717—773

A. (Omaha, Nebraska) Porphyry and Vegetarianism: A Contemporary Philosophical Approach

774-791

L. (Paris) Amélius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa doctrine, son style

793—860

(Dublin) Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240-325 A.D.)

862-909

R. T . | (Norman, Oklahoma) Scepticism and Neoplatonism

911—954

Κ. (Pittsburgh, PA) Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the 'Categories'

955-974

(Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada) Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One. A Reappraisal

975-993

(Trier) Bonum est diffusivum sui. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum

994—1032

SMITH,

DOMBROWSKI, D .

BRISSON,

DILLON, J.

WALLIS,

STRANGE, S .

CORRIGAN, Κ .

KREMER, K .

(Princeton, Numenius

FREDE, M .

N.J.)

1034-1075

VI

INHALT

Aristotelismus GOTTSCHALK, H . B . ( L e e d s )

Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD 1079-1174 (London) Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation . . . . 1176—1243

SHARPLES, R . W .

DONINI, P . L . ( T o r i n o )

Il 'De fato' di Alessandro. Questioni di coerenza

1244—1259

MADIGAN, Α., S . J . (Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts) Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Book of Ethical Problems . . . . 1260—1279 N A C H T R Ä G E Z U B A N D II. 16.3 U N D B A N D II. 3 6 . 1 : BRENK, F . E . , S . J . ( R o m e )

Index to Contribution on In the Light of the Moon: Demonology in the Early Imperial Period 1283-1299 BRENK, F . E . , S . J . ( R o m e )

Index to Contribution on An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia 1300-1322

Band II. 36.1: Vorwort

V-VII Philosophie (Historische Einleitung; Piatonismus) Historische Einleitung

ANDRÉ, J . - M .

(Dijon)

Les écoles philosophiques aux deux premiers siècles de l'Empire

5 — 77

Platonismus WHITTAKER, J . (St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada) Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire . . . DEITZ, L .

81 — 123

(Konstanz)

Bibliographie du platonisme impérial antérieur à Plotin: 1926— 1986

124-182

INHALT

VII

FROIDEFOND, C H . ( A i x - e n - P r o v e n c e )

Plutarque et le platonisme

184—233

HERSHBELL, J . P . ( M i n n e a p o l i s , M i n n e s o t a )

Plutarch's 'De animae procreatione in Timaeo': An Analysis of Structure and Content

234-247

BRENK, F . E . , S. J . ( R o m e )

An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia BIANCHI, U .

248-349

(Rom)

Plutarch und der Dualismus TsEKOURAKis, D .

350—365

(Thessaloniki)

Pythagoreanism or Platonism and Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch's 'Moralia'

366—393

HIJMANSJR., B. L . (Groningen)

Apuleius, Philosophus Platonicus

395—475

MORESCHINI, C . ( P i s a )

Attico: una figura singolare del medioplatonismo SCHROEDER, F. M. (Kingston, Ontario, Canada) Ammonius Saccas BLUMENTHAL, H . J .

477—491

493 — 526

(Liverpool)

Plotinus in the Light of Twenty Years' Scholarship, 1951-1971

528-570

CORRIGAN, Κ . ( S a s k a t o o n , S a s k a t c h e w a n , C a n a d a ) — O ' C L E I R I G H , P .

(Guelph, Ontario, Canada) The Course of Plotinian Scholarship from 1971 to 1986 . . . .

571-623

HADOT, P. (Paris)

Structure et thèmes du Traité 38 (VI, 7) de Plotin SCHROEDER, F. M. (Kingston, Ontario, Canada) Synousia, Synaisthaesis and Synesis: Presence and Dependence in the Plotinian Philosophy of Consciousness BUSSANICH, J . ( A l b u q u e r q u e , N e w

677—699

Mexico)

Mystical Elements in Plotinus' Thought [Hinweis auf den Nachtrag in Bd. II. 36.4] DOMBROWSKI, D . A . ( O m a h a ,

624-676

700

Nebraska)

Asceticism as Athletic Training in Plotinus

701 — 712

VIII

INHALT

Band II. 36.3: Philosophie (Stoizismus) (South Bend, Indiana) Religion and Philosophy in Roman Stoicism

CHESNUT, G . F .

KIDD, I. G. (St. A n d r e w s )

Prolegomena to a Study in the Influence of Posidonius. I. Principate (Columbus, Ohio) Posidonius' Theory of Historical Explanation in the 'Histories' and its Relation to his Stoic Philosophical Position

HAHM, D . E .

(Vancouver, B.C., Canada) Stoic Physical Theory: Sources and Problems in the Literature, 1st cent. B . C . - 3rd cent. A . D .

TODD, R . B .

M. (Cambridge) Stoic Cosmology and Roman Literature: First to Third Centuries A.D.

LAPIDGE,

AUJAC, G. (Toulouse)

Stoïcisme et hypothèse géocentrique (Mannheim) Stoische Symmetrie und Theorie des Schönen in der Kaiserzeit

HORN, H . - J .

(Honululu, Hawaii) „Meditatio mortis": Theory and Practice in Imperial Stoicism (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius)

NEWMAN, R . J .

C. E. (Christchurch, New Zealand) Stoicism and Slavery in the Roman Empire

MANNING,

(Paris—Créteil) Quarante ans de recherche sur les œuvres philosophiques de Sénèque: bibliographie 1945 — 1985

CHAUMARTIN, F . - R .

J. (Paris) La production littéraire de Sénèque sous les règnes de Caligula et de Claude, sens philosophique et portée politique: les 'Consolationes' et le 'De ira'

FILLION-LAHILLE,

(Paris) La pensée politique et sociale de Sénèque de l'avènement de Néron à la retraite du philosophe I. Les idéaux stoïciens et les premières responsabilités politiques: le 'De dementia'

MORTUREUX, B .

INHALT

(Paris-Créteil) La pensée politique et sociale de Sénèque de l'avènement de Néron à la retraite du philosophe II. Les désillusions de Sénèque devant l'évolution de la politique néronienne et l'aspiration à la retraite: le 'De vita beata' et le 'De beneficiis'

CHAUMARTIN, F . - R .

ANDRÉ, J . M . (Dijon)

Les rapports entre vie active et vie contemplative dans l'œuvre philosophique de Sénèque: le 'De brevitate vitae', le 'De constantia sapientis', le 'De tranquillitate animae' et le 'De otio' (Madrid) La physique de Sénèque: Ordonnance et structure des 'Naturales quaestiones'

CODOÑER, C .

(Pavia) Le 'Epistulae ad Lucilium' ed il 'De Providentia' di Seneca: aspetti filosofici e letterari

MAZZOLI, G .

M. (Augsburg) Senecae operum fragmenta: Ubersicht und Forschungsbericht

LAUSBERG,

GRIMAL, P. (Paris)

Sénèque et le stoïcisme romain

M. (Toronto) Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy

RIST, J .

MOST, G. W. (Ann Arbor, Michigan) Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis FREDE, M . (Princeton, N . J . )

Chairemon von Alexandreia

R. (Napoli) Musonio, il maestro di Epitteto

LAURENTI,

(Minneapolis, Minnesota) The Stoicism of Epictetus

HERSHBELL, J . P.

JAGU, A . (Angers)

La morale d'Epictète et le christianisme D. M. (South Hamilton, Mass.) Cebes, 'Pinax'

SCHOLER,

M. (Roma) Ierocle stoico. Oikeiosis e doveri sociali

ISNARDI PARENTE,

ASMIS, E . (Chicago, I L )

The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius

IX

X

INHALT Band II. 36.4:

Philosophie (Epikureismus; Skeptizismus; Kynismus u.a.; einzelne Denker; allgemeine historische und systematische Themen) FERGUSON, J . (Walton, Bletchley, G . B . ) Epicureanism under the Roman Empire, I. Principate ASMIS, E . (Chicago, I L )

Philodemus of Gadara and the History of Epicureanism DORANDI, T . (Napoli)

Filodemo: gli orientamenti della ricerca attuale DORANDI, T . (Napoli)

Filodemo storico della filosofia antica e dell'Epicureismo ISNARDI PARENTE, M .

(Roma)

Diogeniano. Ricuperi epicurei della 'tyche' contro la Stoa CLAY, D . (Baltimore, M D ) The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, New Discoveries ( 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 8 5 ) GOULET-CAZÉ, M . - O .

(Paris)

Le cynisme d'époque impériale TIELSCH, E .

(Berlin)

Sextus Empiricus und seine Stellung in der Geschichte des antiken Skeptizismus KRENTZ, E . (Chicago, I L )

(zu Sextus Empiricus) CORTASSA, G . (Torino)

Il programma dello Scettico: struttura, spirito e stile del primo libro delle 'Ipotiposi Pirroniche' di Sesto Empirico HAHM, D . E. (Columbus, Ohio) The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus MANSFELD, J . (Utrecht)

(zu Areios Didymos und Aetios)

CITRONI MARCHETTI, S . ( F i r e n z e )

Filosofia e ideologia nella 'Naturalis historia' di Plinio

INHALT

J. P. (Minneapolis, MN) Plutarch and Stoicism

HERSHBELL,

P. (Minneapolis, MN) Plutarch and Epicureanism

HERSHBELL, J .

WESTMAN, R .

(Âbo)

'Adversus Colotem' revisited (Amsterdam) - D E B L O I S , L . (Nijmegen) Plutarch und die politische Philosophie der Griechen

AALDERS, G . J . D .

DONINI, P. (Torino)

Galeno e la filosofia

MANULI, P. (Pavia)

Galeno e lo stoicismo (Montreal) Galen's Eclecticism

HANKINSON, J .

STEKELER-WEITHOFER, P .

Galen und die Logik

(Konstanz)

MEJER, J . (Copenhagen)

Diogenes Laertios

M. G. (New Brunswick, NJ) Diogenes Laertios, Book 5, On the Peripatetics: Analysis of Structure, Content and Sources

SOLLENBERGER,

(Paris) La structure du livre VI de Diogène Laërce

GOULET-CAZE, M . - O .

M. (Napoli) Il decimo libro di Diogene Laerzio: Epicuro ed il epicureismo

GIGANTE,

I. (Chicago, IL) Heterodoxy and Doxography in Hippolytus' 'Refutado'

MUELLER,

H. W. (Dallas, TX) Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire

ATTRIDGE,

Cox, P. (Chicago, IL) The Ideal of the Holy Philosopher in Pagan and Christian Biographies (2nd—4th Centuries) S. (Firenze) Il 'sapiens' in pericolo. Aspetti psicologici del motivo dell'invulnerabilità del saggio (da Cicerone a Marco Aurelio)

CITRONI MARCHETTI,

XI

XII

INHALT

KLASSEN, W. (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada) The Simple Life as an Ethical Ideal in the First Century SCHALL, J . V . ( W a s h i n g t o n ,

DC)

Post-Aristotelian Political Philosophy I. Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity (before Constantine) MITSIS, P . ( I t h a c a ,

NY)

Natural Law and Natural Rights in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy B O N D , R . P . ( C h r i s t c h u r c h , N e w Z e a l a n d ) — MANNING, C .

E.

(Christchurch, New Zealand) Popular Philosophy and the Philosophy of the Schools EMILSSON, E . K . ( R e y k j a v i k — P r i n c e t o n ,

NJ)

Soul-Body Dualism in Post-Hellenistic Ancient Philosophy (1st to 4th Centuries A.D.) DUMONT, J . - P .

(Lille)

Sensation et perception dans la philosophie d'époque hellénistique et impériale LESZL, W .

(Pisa)

(Problemi lessicali e concettuali della resa in latino della terminologia filosofica greca) GUTAS, D. (Rethymno, Crete) Philosophical Material from Early Empire in Arabie: Gnomologia, Platonica, Pythagorica, Stoica, Epicurea DAIBER, H .

(Amsterdam)

(zu: Philosophica Graeca aus Späthellenismus sowie früher und hoher Kaiserzeit in orientalischer Uberlieferung) ZIMMERMANN, F .

(Oxford)

(desgleichen)

N A C H T R A G Z U B A N D II. 36.1: FREDE, M . ( P r i n c e t o n ,

NJ)

Celsus philosophus Platonicus

BUSSANICH, J . (Albuquerque, New Mexico) Mystical Elements in Plotinus' Thought

PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTEN, TECHNIK: PHILOSOPHIE (PLATONISMUS [FORTS.]; ARISTOTELISMI^)

PLATONISMUS (FORTS.)

Porphyrian Studies Since 1913 by A N D R E W SMITH, Dublin

Contents I. Life of Porphyry II. Contradiction and Change

719 722

1. Literal and metaphorical interpretation of Hades

723

2. Transmigration of souls

725

3. The O n e and N o u s

727

4. Demiurge — N o u s or Soul?

729

III. Superstition and Criticism

730

1. Introduction

730

2. The 'Philosophy from Oracles' and the ' D e regressu animae'

731

IV. Metaphysics V. Exegesis

737 742

1. Introduction

742

2. H o m e r

744

VI. P o r p h y r y ' s Relationship to other Philosophers and Movements

747

Introduction

747

1. Citation of earlier authors

748

2. Plato

749

3. Aristotle

754

4. Plotinus

755

5. Middleplatonists, Neopythagoreans and Stoics

760

6. Gnostics, Chaldaeans and Indians

762

VII. Tracing Porphyry's Ideas in Later Authors

764

49

1. T h e western tradition

765

2. Arnobius and Cornelius Labeo

766

3. Ambrose

768

4. Augustine

768

5. Others

771

6. Influence and transmission in the East

772

A N R W II 36.2

A N D R E W SMITH

718

T h e p u b l i c a t i o n in 1913 o f J . BIDEZ'S ' V i e d e P o r p h y r e ' 1 m a r k e d a n e w s t a g e in the s t u d y of P o r p h y r y . T h e b o o k , w h i c h w a s a b y - p r o d u c t of BIDEZ'S c o l l e c t i o n o f P o r p h y r y ' s f r a g m e n t s that w a s d e s t i n e d n e v e r t o b e c o m p l e t e d , a r o u s e d n e w i n t e r e s t in P o r p h y r y a n d its a c c o u n t of his life a n d intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t set the s t a g e f o r s u b s e q u e n t r e s e a r c h e r s . Its i m p o r t a n c e m a y b e g a u g e d f r o m the m a n y t i m e s w e will r e f e r to it, b u t its c o n c l u s i o n s m a y n o t , in the light o f r e c e n t s c h o l a r s h i p , b e left u n c h a l l e n g e d . I d o n o t , h o w e v e r , i n t e n d t o give in this article a n e w , d e f i n i t i v e a c c o u n t o f P o r p h y r y ' s life a n d p h i l o s o p h y , b u t h a v e a t t e m p t e d the m o r e l i m i t e d t a s k o f d e s c r i b i n g a n d a s s e s s i n g r e c e n t r e s e a r c h o n P o r p h y r y in o r d e r t o c l a r i f y the s t a g e w e h a v e n o w r e a c h e d in u n d e r s t a n d i n g this i m p o r t a n t b u t still e n i g m a t i c f i g u r e . N o r c a n I h o p e t o r e c o r d e v e r y c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the

Abbreviations : ANRW ARW ByZ CCAG CQ CR Entretiens Études Class. JbAC Jb.f.Kl.Phil. JThS MH OCD RE REA REAug. REG REL Rend. Acc. Arch. Lett. Belle arti Napoli RhM RPh SVF ZNW

1

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Archiv für Religionswissenschaft Byzantinische Zeitschrift Catalogue Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum I—XII, Bruxelles 1898-1953 The Classical Quarterly The Classical Review Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres — Genève Études Classiques Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum Jahrbücher für Klassische Philologie Journal of Theological Studies Museum Helveticum Oxford Classical Dictionary PAULYS Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft Revue des Études Anciennes Revue des Études Augustiennes Revue des Études Grecques Revue des Études Latines Rendiconti dell'Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli Rheinisches Museum für Philologie Revue de Philologie Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche

Gent 1913 (Hildesheim 1964). Since then there has been only one general book devoted to Porphyry — F. ROMANO, Porfirio di Tiro. Filosofia e Cultura nel III secolo d.c., Catania 1979. But attention should also be drawn to the important accounts of E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen III 2, Leipzig 1923 s , pp. 693 - 735; R. BEUTLER, R E 22,1 (1953) coll. 275—313 s.v. Porphyrios; A. C. LLOYD, The later Neoplatonists, in: Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H . ARMSTRONG, Cambridge 1967, pp. 272 - 2 9 7 ; R. T. WALLIS, Neoplatonism, London 1972, pp. 94f.

P O R P H Y R I A N S T U D I E S S I N C E 1913

719

study of Porphyry since 1913, but have tried to make mention of the most important work which of itself will lead the reader deeper into the subject. A full list of Porphyry's writings and of the sources for his fragments has been purposely omitted as it would duplicate what will be found in my forthcoming Teubner edition of the fragments. If further progress is to be made in writing a new, balanced account of Porphyry's life and work it is essential that the many individual insights gained are not forced into any preconceived but insufficiently grounded model of Porphyry's life and work. A careful distinction must therefore be made and continually borne in mind between what is certain and what is highly probable or even just likely. The exploration of this theme will be the Leitmotiv of our exposition.

I. Life of Porphyry

We may begin by pointing out how few certain dates we have for Porphyry's life and work. The most reliable source of facts for reconstructing Porphyry's life must be his own introduction to the 'Enneads', the 'Vita Plotini'. 2 If we accept the chronological interpretation of R. GOULET3 Porphyry would have been born in 234 A.D. and would have first met Plotinus in the summer of 263 A.D. after studying with Longinus in Athens. He stayed with Plotinus for a comparatively short period 4 before taking an extended leave in Sicily on Plotinus' advice5 to

2

3

4

5

49*

edd. P. HENRY and H . - R . SCHWYZER, Plotini Opera I, Bruxelles 1951. (editio minor, Oxford 1964.) R . GOULET, Le système chronologique, Porphyre: la vie de Plotin I , Brisson, L . etc., Paris 1982, esp. pp. 210—211, has examined carefully the sort of schémas which could have been used by Porphyry for dating the reigns of emperors. The only one which seems to fit is calculated according to Roman calender years i.e. the year begins on 1st. Jan. In working out the first year of an emperor's reign the transition year is given to the emperor who reigned longest in that year. Thus, since Gallienus' accession was in September 253 A . D . the year 253 A . D . is counted as the last year of the reign of Philip and 254 A . D . as the first year of the reign of Gallienus. Therefore the tenth year of his reign will be 263 A . D . (cf. vit. Plot. 4,11). It seems unlikely that the horoscope in Hephaestio, Apotelesmatica 11.10 (I p. 1 1 2 , 1 6 - 3 2 PINGREE), which is dated to 5th. O c t . 234 A . D . by O . NEUGEBAUER (A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy, II p. 944, Berlin 1975), is Porphyry's own horoscope since it is the horoscope of an άτροφος — a child destined to be exposed or die young. This example may, however, belong to Porphyry's 'Introduction to the Tetrabiblos of Ptolemy' which survives only partially and in a probably contracted form — cf. BOER and WEINSTOCK, C C A G V pars 4 pp. 1 8 7 - 8 . Six years according to Porphyry himself (vit. Plot. 5,1—6), probably including the year of his arrival and that of his departure counted as a full year. vit. Plot. 11,11 — 19 but Eunapius, vit. soph. IV.1.7—8 p. 7, lOf. GIANGRANDE, has a different version, that Porphyry fled to Sicily where Plotinus found him and administered advice either in person or through an agent.

720

A N D R E W SMITH

r e c o v e r f r o m a fit o f m e l a n c h o l y . 6 H o w l o n g h e r e m a i n e d h e r e is u n c e r t a i n , b u t at least f o r t h e t w o y e a r s b e f o r e P l o t i n u s ' d e a t h . 7 B u t P o r p h y r y ' s m e n t i o n is t o o v a g u e t o a l l o w u s t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r h e r e m a i n e d in R o m e o r r e t u r n e d t o S i c i l y after P l o t i n u s d i e d . E u n a p i u s s a y s t h a t P o r p h y r y t a u g h t p u b l i c l y in R o m e 8 a n d r e c o r d s a t r a d i t i o n 9 that h e d i e d t h e r e . B u t it is p r u d e n t n o t t o rely o n t h e a c c o u n t o f E u n a p i u s w h o appears t o h a v e h a d t o h a n d n o reliable s o u r c e o t h e r t h a n P o r p h y r y ' s 'Vita P l o t i n i ' . 1 0 It s e e m s l i k e l y that P o r p h y r y v i s i t e d T y r e s o m e t i m e after 2 6 8 A . D . a n d b e f o r e 2 7 3 A . D . s i n c e L o n g i n u s , in a letter a s k i n g h i m t o c o m e t o P h o e n i c i a f r o m S i c i l y , a letter t o b e d a t e d b e t w e e n 2 6 8 a n d 2 7 3 A . D . , refers t o a p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n w h e n t h e y h a d d i s c u s s e d P l o t i n u s ' p h i l o s o p h y in T y r e . 1 1 W h e r e d i d P o r p h y r y live a n d t e a c h after t h e d e a t h o f P l o t i n u s ? T h e s e are n o t q u e s t i o n s e a s y t o a n s w e r . W e h a v e s o m e e v i d e n c e that t h r e e w o r k s w e r e w r i t t e n in S i c i l y . T h e Ε ι σ α γ ω γ ή ' a n d Έ ί ς τ ά ς ' Α ρ ι σ τ ο τ έ λ ο υ ς Κ α τ η γ ο ρ ί α ς κ α τ ά π ε ΰ σ ι ν κ α ι ά π ό κ ρ ι σ ι ν ' w e r e c o m p o s e d in S i c i l y a c c o r d i n g t o A m m o n i u s a n d E l i a s 1 2 as w a s t h e ' C o n t r a C h r i s t i a n o s ' , if t h i s is t h e w o r k E u s e b i u s m e a n s in H i s t . E c c l . V I , 1 9 , 2 . 1 3 In t h e latter case w e m a y also b r i n g t h e date o f c o m p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e b a l a n c e . A . CAMERON has a r g u e d p e r s u a s i v e l y f o r a date after 2 7 1 A . D . 1 4 If

6

Was this a mental, physical or psycho-somatic disorder? cf. vit. Plot. 19,12 — 13 του σώματος άσθένειαν, Celsus III 18,17f. alterum insaniae genus . . . constitit in tristitia, quam videtur bilis atra contrabere — in bac utilis detractio sanguinis est. 7 vit. Plot. 2,12 έπανελθόντι. 8 vit. soph. I V . 1 . 1 0 p. 8, 9—11 G I A N G R A N D E αυτός μεν οΰν έπί την 'Ρώμην έπανήλθε, και της περί λόγους ειχετο σ π ο υ δ ή ς ώστε π α ρ ή ε ι και εις το δημόσιον κατ' έπίδειξιν. 9 Ibid., IV.2.6 p. 10,10 έν 'Ρώμη δέ λέγεται^" μ ε τ α λ α χ ε ϊ ν | τον βίον. 10 In addition to the reports in notes 5, 8 and 9 above only two other pieces of information in Eunapius' account of Porphyry cannot be derived (legitimately or by distortion) from Porphyry's vit. Plot, or other extant works of P o r p h y r y — viz. the remark at IV. 1.1 p. 6, 10 on Porphyry's ancestors (πατέρες δε ουκ άσημοι) and the comment at IV.2.6 p. 10, 7—10 π ο λ λ ά ς γ ο ϋ ν τοις ήδη π ρ ο π ε π ρ α γ μ α τ ε υ μ έ ν ο ι ς βιβλίοις θ ε ω ρ ί α ς ε ν α ν τ ί α ς κατέλιπεν, περί ών ο υ κ εστίν ετερόν τι δ ο ξ ά ζ ε ι ν , ή ότι π ρ ο ι ώ ν ετερα έδόξασεν. O n the latter cf. below p. 722f. ΐ 1 vit. Plot. 19. The letter refers to Porphyry's illness and is, therefore, post 268 A . D . Longinus died in 273 A . D . , having resigned his chair in Athens (267/8 A . D . ) and moved his domicile to the East as a minister to Zenobia of Palmyra. The earlier meeting may, of course, have been a time when Longinus was visiting Tyre from Athens. Porphyry's visit to Carthage, mentioned in abst. III.4 p. 191,26f. NAUCK, need not have been made during his Sicilian stay, although it fits in well with a sojourn at Lilybaeum. 12 Ammonius, in Porph. Isag., p. 27,12—22; Elias, in Porph. Isag., p. 39,8 — 19. 13 τί δει τ α ϋ τ α λέγειν οτε καί ό κ α θ ' ήμάς έν Σ ι κ ε λ ί α κ α τ α σ τ ά ς Π ο ρ φ ύ ρ ι ο ς σ υ γ γ ρ ά μ μ α τ α κ α θ ' ημών ένστησάμενος καί δι' α υ τ ώ ν τ ά ς θείας γ ρ α φ ά ς διαβάλλειν π ε π ε ι ρ α μ έ ν ο ς . . . έπί το λ ο ι δ ο ρ ε ΐ ν τ ρ έ π ε τ α ι . . . t. II.2 p. 558,2—7 SCHWARTZ. 14 The Date of the κ α τ ά Χ ρ ι σ τ ι α ν ώ ν , C Q 17 (1967) pp. 382—4, based on Porphyry's use of Callinicus' History of Alexandria. T. D . BARNES, Porphyry, Against the Christians, JThS 24 (1973) pp. 4 2 4 - 4 4 2 argues for as late as 300 A . D . from the silence of Lactantius and Eusebius' eclogae propheticae, a date which might connect it more with the persecution of Diocletian. Cf. A. MEREDITH, Porphyry and Julian against the Christians, A N R W 11.23,2 (1980, ed. W . HAASE) p. 1126.

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CAMERON is right and if Eusebius is referring to 'Contra Christianos', Porphyry

must have returned to Sicily after the death of Plotinus for some time at least. The only accurately dateable work of Porphyry is the 'Vita Plotini', to be put at 301 A . D . 1 5 The 'Letter to Marcella' has been dated recently to 300— 303 A . D . 1 6 But would a man of sixty-six still describe himself as εις το γήρας άποκλίνοντι? 1 7 His death we may put at 305 A . D . at the latest since according to the 'Suda' he lived up to the time of Diocletian. The following works may be ascribed to the six years he spent with Plotinus: 'Περί έρωτος τοΰ έν Συμποσίω', 'De Eubuli quaestionibus Platonicis', 'Προς τους ά π ό του νού χωρίζοντας το νοητόν' ('Περί τοΰ νου καί τοΰ νοητού'), 'Προς το τοΰ Ζωροάστρου βιβλίον', "Ο ιερός γάμος' and a letter to Longinus. 'Περί τοΰ έφ' ήμϊν' with its address to Chrysaorius probably also belongs to the period after the meeting with Plotinus since Chrysaorius belongs to the Roman circle. 'De Abstinentia' probably belongs after his meeting with Plotinus in 263 A . D . since the dedicatee, Castricius, he most likely met in Plotinus' circle. Whether one can soundly date it after Plotinus' death is more doubtful. 1 8 The 'Sententiae' with their obvious Plotinian reminiscences and paraphrases as well as his commentary on the 'Enneads' must be post 263 A . D . and probably after 270 A . D . Lastly, the commentary on the 'Timaeus' must be post 263 A . D . 1 9 These are the only firmly fixed items in the biography of Porphyry. All else must be fitted in on grounds of probability and/or supposed doctrinal development. Since, as we shall see in the next section, the accepted picture of Porphyry's 15 16

17

vit. Plot. 23,13 ετος ά γ ω ν εξηκοστόν τε καί δ γ δ ο ο ν . By Ε. DES PLACES (ed.), Porphyre. Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella, Paris 1982, p. 89, tentatively connecting Porphyry's journey and the της τ ω ν Ε λ λ ή ν ω ν χ ρ ε ί α ς (p. 275,19 NAUCK) with the preparations for the Diocletian persecution of 303 A . D . Marc., p. 2 7 3 , 1 3 N A U C K . The reading of the sole ms. is α π ο κ λ ί ν ο ν τ α . M A I and DES PLACES correct to ά π ο κ λ ί ν ο ν τ ι , N A U C K and P Ö T S C H E R to ά π ο κ λ ί ν α ν τ ι . Cf. W . P Ö T S C H E R , Porphyrios Π Ρ Ο Σ Μ Α Ρ Κ Ε Λ Λ Α Ν , Philosophia Antiqua XV, Leiden 1969, p. 40 „Eine Entscheidung (i.e. pres. or aorist) wird auch dadurch erschwert, dass wir über die Lehensdaten des Porphyrios nicht genau unterrichtet sind." P Ö T S C H E R opts for the aorist as P o r p h y r y appears to have married „ziemlich spät" and supports the emendation by Eunapius' comment, vit. soph. I V . 2 . 6 p. 1 0 , 6 - 7 G I A N G R A N D E , that P o r p h y r y φ α ί ν ε τ α ι δε ά φ ι κ ό μ ε ν ο ς εις γ ή ρ α ς βαθύ. But this remark does not refer to the marriage but to his life in general and need not have been inspired by the phrase in 'Marc.'

18

Firmus Castricius was a member of Plotinus' school (vit. Plot. 2,33) w h o had estates at Minturnae (vit. Plot. 2,22), thus making it likely that Porphyry came in contact with him after his arrival in Rome. J . B O U F F A R T I G U E and M. P A T I L L O N , Porphyre de l'Abstinence, Paris 1977, t. I p. xviii argue more precisely for a time after the death of Plotinus when Porphyry was in Sicily, pointing out 1) that the contact with Castricius is at a distance — τ ω ν π ρ ο ς ημάς ήκόντων p. 85,2 NAUCK, 2) P o r p h y r y refers (p. 191,26) to a sojourn in Carthage which is near Lilybaeum where he resided in Sicily, 3) Castricius' abandoning of vegetarianism m a y be connected to a crisis, such as the death of Plotinus, 4) Porphyry's admonitions to Castricius have an authoritative air — was P o r p h y r y now head of the Plotinian circle? It can be readily appreciated that these arguments, though interesting, form no firm basis for dating the work precisely.

19

Cf. P o r p h . in Tim., F 51 S O D A N O (Proci, in Tim. I 394,2—4) where he defends the Plotinian doctrine that the intelligibles are not outside Intellect.

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development has been challenged, it is all the more important to have a clear grasp of the certain landmarks in his biography to avoid building an edifice on sand.

II.

Contradiction and

Change

The generally accepted outline of Porphyry's philosophical development as pioneered by J. BIDEZ in his 'Vie de Porphyre' sees an early stage in his career when he was prone to superstition and an uncritical enthusiasm for religion as evidenced in the 'Philosophy from Oracles'. During his stay with Longinus he acquired an approach to learning and philology which earned him the title of polymath. His time in the seminar of Plotinus was a turning point in his intellectual development and promoted the ascendency of philosophy over religion and superstition. After the death of Plotinus he again fell J>rey to superstition, though to a more limited extent. 2 0 Such a schema is not easily extracted from the few surviving works and fragments, most of which seem to come from the less weighty writings and appear to contain little original thought or metaphysical depth 2 1 except, perhaps, for the 'Sententiae'. Moreover, the conflicting statements about his ideas made in later sources and the sometimes apparently contradictory nature of extant fragments have led scholars to take, perhaps, too seriously the ancient charge that he constantly changed his views or contradicted himself, a charge which can all too conveniently suggest the modern concept of development. The most striking and, as far as I can see, the only firm evidence that Porphyry ever changed his views on a philosophical topic comes admittedly from his own pen. In Vit. Plot. 18 Porphyry recalls that when he first came to Plotinus he found difficulty in following the complexities of Plotinus' presentation and so wrote a paper against his doctrine that the objects of thought do not exist outside the Intellect. Amelius was given the task of replying "in answer to Porphyry's difficulties". Only after two further exchanges did Porphyry admit that "with difficulty I understood the doctrine, changed my mind and wrote a recantation". O n another occasion 2 2 he recalls that he once went on for three days asking Plotinus questions on the soul's connection with the body. Now I wonder if too much was later (and still is) made of these incidents recorded by Porphyry with the result that any apparent dogmatic contradiction is referred to Porphyry's changeability or development? 20

21

22

Cf. J. H . WASZINK, Porphyrios und Numenius, in: Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, t. XII, Vandoeuvres—Genève 1965, pp. 45; 71. H . - C . PUECH, Numenius and Ammonius — Discussion, in: Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique V, Vandoeuvres—Genève 1960, p. 39. Hence the judgement of J. BIDEZ, Vie de Porphyre, p. 133 (and repeated by E . R. DODDS, O C D p. 864, s.v. Porph.) «Dans tout ce qui nous reste de ses écrits, il n'y a pas une pensée, pas une image dont on puisse affirmer à coup sûr qu'elle est de lui.» vit. Plot. 13.

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There are three other explicit statements by ancient authors to the effect that Porphyry changed his mind or hesitated. Iamblichus accuses Porphyry of hesitating, sometimes strongly distinguishing soul and nous and sometimes confusing them. 2 3 I have argued elsewhere that Iamblichus seems to have misunderstood Porphyry's perhaps unclear exposition. 2 4 Eunapius complains of the "many speculations that conflict with the books he had previously published" and concludes that he must have changed his opinions as he grew older. 2 5 But it is very likely that Eunapius is relying on Porphyry's 'Vit. Plot.' and on Iamblichus who seems to have kept up a fairly relentless polemic against Porphyry. 2 6 Finally Augustine describes Porphyry as "wavering with contradictory positions". 2 7 He has in mind a wavering between superstition and philosophy, between accepting theurgy as purifying the soul or saying that it is of no use in reaching the divine level. But is he looking for a coherence which Porphyry never intended? And is he, obviously not without partiality, seeking out contradictions? Before too readily accepting this picture of doubt, change or contradiction we might ask whether such assertions could be a result of: (i) a tendency to hostile or, at least, prejudiced interpretation in the ancient sources. (ii) a lack of familiarity with or failure to understand the complexity of a particular Porphyrian idea — and, in our case, the availability of only summary and, for us, misleading accounts of Porphyry's doctrines. (iii) a general failure to understand and appreciate the style of his thinking, e.g. his way of presentation by paradox or alternative viewpoints. We will now examine a number of instances where these factors could have played a role. The last tendency mentioned may be most aptly illustrated by Porphyry's 'De antro nympharum' which is discussed below under 'Exegesis'. 2 8 The others may be seen to varying degrees in the following instances.

1. Literal and metaphorical interpretation of Hades Porphyry held apparently divergent views on the nature of Hades, sometimes using the idea of Hades in a metaphorical sense as an image for moral disorder of the soul in this world and sometimes seeing it as a real p l a c e where 23

24

25 26

27

28

de anima, in Stob. I 365,17—19 Πορφύριος δέ ένδοιάζει περί αυτήν, Jtfj μεν διατεταμένως αυτής άφιστάμενος, πή δε συνακολουθών αύτη, ώς παραδοθείση άνωθεν. Α. SMITH, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition. A study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism, The Hague 1974, p. 47. vit. soph. IV.2.6 p. 1 0 , 7 - 1 0 . Cf. n. 10. On Iamblichus' polemic against Porphyry cf. J. M. DILLON, Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Piatonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, Philosophia antiqua X X X I I I , Leiden 1973, p. 55 n. 2. civ. X . 9 t. I p. 415,20—22 DOMB. ut videas eum inter vitium sacrilegae curiositatis et philosophiae professionem sententiis alternantibus fluctuare. See p. 742 below.

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souls are actually punished. A similar divergence of views may be found in Plotinus. 2 9 These two views could be regarded as incompatible. But neither Porphyry nor Plotinus saw themselves as undermining the realist view of H a d e s by their sometimes understanding it in a metaphorical sense. A realist view of H a d e s may be found in Sent. 29 where the shades of the traditional H a d e s are interpreted as the pneuma or quasi-corporeal entity which acts as a link between b o d y and soul, and to which the soul of the worldly man still clings when he has departed this life and left behind his b o d y of flesh and blood. The material nature of the pneuma is a neat way of explaining how H a d e s can be a place, how an incorporeal soul can be 'located'. In the fragments of a work called O n the Styx' Porphyry cites the words of Apollodorus who gives a rather metaphorically slanted H a d e s exegesis. 3 0 H e then, in his own words, interprets the traditional punishments of mythology as φ α ν τ α σ ί α ι . 3 1 In a sense this is a partially metaphorical or allegorical approach. But, in fact, when Porphyry says that the punishments are φαντασίαι he is referring to φαντασίαι a f t e r this earthly life. In other words he does not accept in a literal sense the traditional physical punishments of H a d e s , but he does think that wicked souls really do undergo punishment through their φαντασίαι a f t e r death. Sent. 29 tells us how this happens. In another fragment, also preserved by Stobaeus and which may come from the ' Π ε ρ ί Στυγός', both a real H a d e s and a metaphorical Hades in this life are expressed virtually side by side in the context of the transmigration of human souls into animals. 3 2 Porphyry begins with a purely metaphorical interpretation — we should be careful in life that we don't find ourselves becoming beasts. 3 3 This is surely metaphorical since the process referred to is envisaged as occurring during our life here. 3 4 But a few lines later he says that all of this is " n o longer myth or poetry, but truth and physical l a w " 3 5 and it is clear that he is now talking about what happens after death in a real Hades. Thus Porphyry can make use of traditional ideas in differing and potentially contradictory ways even in the same work. Interestingly Macrobius, in a section of his commentary on the 'Somnium Scipionis' which is much influenced by Porphyry, has much the same amalgam of

29

30

31 32 33 34 35

Cf. SMITH, Porph. (op. cit. η. 24), pp. 72f. ; 79, though Η . DÖRRIE, Die Schultradition im Mittelpiatonismus und Porphyrios, in: Porphyre, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, t. X I I , Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres —Genève 1965, p. 180, repr. in: ID., Platonica Minora, Studia et testimonia antiqua I X , München 1976, pp. 406—419, claims that Hades is always metaphorical. Stob. I 418,8—420,20. A good example of the way in which Porphyry often cites extensively from other authors. A careless reading or attenuated transmission in doxographical form of such passages could easily lead to their thought being ascribed directly to Porphyry. Stob. I 4 2 1 , 2 2 - 4 2 7 , 3 ; 427,4 - 429,6. Ibid. 4 4 5 , 1 4 - 4 4 8 , 3 . Ibid. 446,4 μή λάθη θηρίον γενομένη. ZELLER, Phil. d. G r . 5 , III 2 p. 713, however, takes it in a literal sense. Stob. I 446,9 οϋκέτι ταύτα μΰθος οΐιδε ποίησις, άλλα άλήθεια καί φυσικός λόγος.

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ideas. There is the interpretation of Hades in a purely metaphorical sense referring to this life 36 (an idea which may well go back to the Apollodorus citation in Porphyry and Porphyry's own metaphorical usage at Stob. I 446,4). There is also the same dual approach to transmigration. 3 7 For Macrobius refers firstly to becoming a beast in this life with the qualification quodam modo i.e. not literally. H e then makes the transition much as in the Porphyry fragment to life a f t e r death — sed nec post mortem — when the soul, with difficulty, releases itself from the body 3 8 and may then be reincarnated even into an animal body. 3 9

2. Transmigration of souls Whether human souls could be reborn into animals seems to have become quite a problematical topic to the later neoplatonists and it has usually been assumed that Porphyry began by accepting the idea but ended up rejecting it or that he always rejected it. These views have often coloured the interpretation or ascription of possible Porphyrian influence in later authors. 4 0 There is now, however, a good case to be made that Porphyry's view has been misunderstood, that his presentation of the issues was far more subtle and complex than can be adequately conveyed in the meagre evidence which survives. 41 Despite the explicit statement of Augustine that Porphyry rejected reincarnation of humans into animals 42 the evidence from Porphyry texts that he accepted such trans-

36

37 38

39 40

41

42

Macr. somn. 1.10,9. The allegorical interpretation of Hades was an influential idea. It is found again, for example, in Eriugena, Περί φύσεων, V.35—36 (953B—972A, esp. 959D; 971C; 971B) where hell is seen as the φαντασίαι of natural things in the memory. Eriugena cites Ambrose (971 A—B) speculating on the meaning of Acheron as άχος, a traditional point also made by Apollodorus in the passage cited by Porphyry in his 'Περί Στυγός' (Stob. I 418,16f.). Macr. somn. 1.9,4-5. There is an oblique reference here (1.9,5) to the ghosts of those who have led a too materialist life and which haunt their tombs — aut suum oberrat cadaver (sc. anima). This ultimately goes back to Plat., Phd. 81 de, a passage which was frequently interpreted by the later neoplatonists as referring to the soul vehicle and which contains much of the vocabulary used by Porphyry in sent. 29. 1.9,5 aut novi corporis ambit habitaculum, non humani tantum modo, sed ferini quoque. E.g. Κ. MRAS, Macrobius' Kommentar zu Cicero's Somnium. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts n . C h r . , Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. KI. 3, 1933 (pp. 232—286) p. 253, has argued that Macrobius somn. 1.9,5 must reflect Plotinus rather than Porphyry since the latter rejected transmigration of humans into animal bodies. P. COURCELLE, Les lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore, Paris 19482 p. 222, tried to solve the problem by claiming that Porphyry changed his mind, pointing to Porph. in Stob. I 446,9f. as evidence that Porphyry did accept transmigration into animals in a literal sense at some period of his life. A. SMITH, Did Porphyry reject the transmigration of human souls into animals?, RhM 127 (1984) pp. 276-284. civ. X.30 t. I p. 451,32 f. in solos homines humanas animas praecipitari posse sentirei. The presentation of Porphyry's and Iamblichus' doctrine by Aeneas of Gaza (Theophr.

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migration in a literal sense and sometimes used both literal and metaphorical presentations together, 4 3 that the basic elements which contributed to Proclus' compromise solution 4 4 can be traced back at least as far as Iamblichus, 4 5 strongly suggest that a nuanced, compromise position was already advocated by Porphyry on the lines that a human rational soul could never b e c o m e irrational but might actually be linked, if only indirectly, to an irrational being. W. DEUSE 46 has also argued persuasively that Porphyry probably spoke of both literal and metaphorical transmigration into animals, but that his harmonisation of the two approaches was later distorted or misunderstood. His complex exposition throws a great deal of light on the verbatim fragments of Porphyry's essay Ήερί τοϋ έφ' ή μ ι ν ' 4 7 and on the Porphyry passages akin to the Ή ε ρ ί Στυγός' mentioned above. 4 8 DEUSE bases his conclusion on an interpretation of the two lives (πρώτος and δεύτερος βίος) mentioned by Porphyry in the Ήερί τοϋ

43

44

45

46

47 48

893 Α - B ) which Η . DÖRRIE (art. cit. n. 44) interprets as a metaphorical theory seems to me to be literal. C f . SMITH (art. cit. n. 41) p . 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 . Porph. abst. I l l 21 f. (citing Plutarch); III 1 p. 1 8 7 , 1 4 - 1 7 NAUCK; III 9 p. 1 9 8 , 2 1 - 2 3 NAUCK; Porph. in Stob. I 445f. in Tim. ILL 294,21 f . ; in Rem. II 309,28f. misleadingly interpreted by H . DÖRRIE in his otherwise informative article, 'Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Piatonismus', Hermes 85 (1957) pp. 414—435 (and in: ID., Platonica minora, Studia et Testimonia antiqua I X , München 1976, pp. 420—440). Iamb. myst. 24,4 εξωθεν δ ' αυτών ήγεμονεΰει refers to the transcendent presence of δαίμονες, but the concept supplies the basic key to the transmigration problem and was so used by Sallust., 20 ει δ ε ε ί ς άλογα (αί μετεμψυχώσεις) εξωθεν Ιπονται ώσπερ και ή μ ϊ ν οί είληχότες ήμάς δαίμονες, ού γαρ μήποτε λογική άλογου ψ υ χ ή γένηται. W. DEUSE, Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre, Akad. d. Wiss. u. Lit. zu Mainz, A b h . d. geistes- u. sozialwiss. K L , Einzelveröffentlichg. 3, Wiesbaden 1983, pp. 129—167. This-book also contains a useful bibliography. Stob. II 1 6 3 , 1 6 - 1 7 3 , 2 . Stob. I 445,14—448,3. C f . n. 32. The authorship of both this and a subsequent excerpt (448,4—16) has been disputed. SANDBACH includes them in his uncertain fragments of Plutarch as F200—201. DEUSE discusses the problem clearly (Unters., op. cit. n. 46, pp. 135 — 148) and though he hesitates to use the passages as evidence in his argument, they do not contradict his final conclusion. The considerations which led to their ascription to Plutarch are as follows: Stob, presents three excerpts, the first (445,1 — 13) with the lemma Π ο ρ φ υ ρ ί ο υ , the second (445,14—448,3) and the third (448,4—16) each with the lemma τοϋ αύτοϋ. The third passage seems to belong closely with the second — it begins πάλιν αίνιττόμενος without mentioning the subject, H o m e r , whose name must be understood from what has gone before in the second passage. It is this third passage which has been suspected and thus drags the others with it. Firstly the interpretation of H o m e r δ 5 6 3 - 4 on Elysium differs from that given by Porphyry in the Ή . Σ τ υ γ ό ς ' (Stob. I 422,5f.). Secondly, Stob. I 448,4—16 shows remarkably similar ideas to Plut.'s de fac. in orb. lun. 9 4 2 E f . Neither of these is proof positive that this passage (and hence the second passage also) are falsely ascribed to Porphyry and indeed both the remoulding of a Plutarchan text and alternative allegorical interpretations are hallmarks of Porphyry's general approach. A s DEUSE notes (Unters., p. 141 n. 45), most neoplatonic scholars have never doubted the attribution and I have included them in my collection of the fragments.

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έφ' ήμίν' fragments. 49 He rightly sees that this cannot refer, as FESTUGIÈRE supposed, to a distinction between the first embodiment and subsequent embodiments of the soul, but rather to two stages of the embodiment of soul — its choice of a human or animal life and, secondly, its choice of mode within this. Before the first choice is made one cannot strictly speak of human souls, but could speak of souls choosing to enter animals or men, a version which would preserve the concept of transmigration into animals in the traditional Platonic sense. Once this initial choice is made further transmigration is only possible within one branch or the other, thus presenting us with the limited view of transmigration. Once a soul has freed itself entirely from the body it is again free to make a fresh primary choice into either a human or animal body. These studies give strong indications that Porphyry continued even after 263 A.D. to exploit pre-neoplatonic material, that the later reports of his doctrine of transmigration oversimplify or distort a complex series of considerations, and lead us to doubt or even radically revise the idea that he changed his mind in this regard.

3. The One and Nous Another area in which we might detect a misunderstanding is Porphyry's treatment of the relationship between hypostases and particularly between the One and Nous. In the 'Sententiae' Porphyry made clear distinctions between these hypostases 50 and in a fragment of his 'Hist. Phil.' 5 1 he severely distances the One from Nous by denying any coordination between them. They are on separate τάξεις or levels of reality. In his 'Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles', however, he seems to have adopted a diametrically opposed position and to have identified, in some way, the One with Nous. The principle of all (the One), we read, is identified with the "Father of the noetic triad" (i.e. Nous). The

49

50

51

See also the earlier attempts to understand these passages: — F. BOLL, Jb. f. Kl. Phil. Suppl. XXI (1894) 114f.; D. AMAND, Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque, Louvain 1945, pp. 1 6 3 - 9 ; H.-R. SCHWYZER, RE 21, 1 (1951) col. 582,13f. s.v. Plotinos, and the translation and commentary of A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, Paris 1 9 4 4 - 5 4 , t. ILL pp. 3 4 9 - 3 5 7 . sent. 10 p. 4,8—10 έν ν φ μεν γαρ νοερώς . . . εν δε τω έπέκεινα άνεννοήτως τε καί ΰπερουσίως. 12 p. 4 , 7 - 8 άλλη (sc. ή ζωή) νου, άλλη του έπέκεινα. 13 ρ. 5,10 π ά ν το γεννών τη ούσίςχ αΐιτοϋ χείρον έαυτοϋ γεννςι. 25 p. 15,1—2 περί τοΰ έπέκεινα τοϋ ν ο υ κατά μεν νόησιν πολλά λέγεται, θεωρείται δε άνοησίςι κρείττονι νοήσεως. 43 p. 5 4 , 7 - 8 πολλά γάρ έστιν ό νους, προ δε των πολλών άνάγκη είναι το ëv. p. 56, 1 4 - 1 5 κείται δε προ τών πολλών εν, ώστε άνάγκη προ τοϋ νου είναι το έν. F X V I I I p. 1 5 , 8 — 1 2 N A U C K ώσπερ δε Ó θεός Ó πρώτος, εις καί μόνος άεί, κάν άπ' αΰτοΰ γένηται τά πάντα, τφ μή τούτοις συναριθμείσθαι μηδέ την άξίαν αυτών συγκατατάττεσθαι δύνασθαι τη έκείνου υπάρξει, οΰτω καί ó νους αιώνιος μόνος καί άχρόνως ύποστάς.

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words and interpretation are those of Damascius 5 2 w h o is very critical of Porphyry's stance, seeing it as a weakening of the One's transcendence. Once again w e have an apparent contradiction in our evidence on an important topic and sharp criticism from a fellow neoplatonist. N o w P. HADOT has recently attributed to Porphyry the substantial fragment of an anonymous commentary on the Tarmenides' which was found in a Turin palimpsest. 5 3 H e has also traced in the works of Victorinus the influence of ideas similar to those in the commentary. 5 4 The nexus of ideas here goes far to explain h o w Porphyry might have been trying to reconcile transcendence and coordination at the level of the O n e and N o u s . Although HADOT does not seem to me to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Porphyry is the author of the anonymous commentary 5 5 I think that the starting point at least of some of its ideas can be detected in the attested evidence of Porphyry's metaphysics, meagre though it is. According to the commentary N o u s is found in two ways, N o u s proper which can return on itself and N o u s which cannot return on itself and is, in some way, identical with the O n e . 5 6 In the light of this theory w e can now begin to make sense of some baffling remarks of Porphyry. Proclus tells us 5 7 that N o u s according to Porphyry is αιώνιος, but that it also has something pre-eternal in it which links it with the One. And in the same fragment of the 'Hist, phil.' which so strongly asserts the transcendence of the O n e we find a reference to a pre-eternal phase of N o u s . 5 8 HADOT 59 links these with the theory

52

53

54

55 56

57

58 59

Dam. princ. I 86,9f. κατά δέ τον Πορφΰριον έροΰμεν την μίαν των πάντων αρχήν είναι τον πατέρα της νοητής τριάδος; . . . ούκούν ή άσύντακτος αιτία και πάντων μία κοινή καί πάντη άρρητος πώς αν συναριθμοίτο τοις νοητοίς και μιας λέγοιτο τριάδος πατήρ; Ρ. H A D O T , Fragments d'un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide, REG 74 (1961) pp. 410—438. The palimpsest, since destroyed, was first edited by W . K R O L L , Ein neuplatonischer Parmenidescommentar in einem Turiner Palimpsest, RhM 97 (1892) pp. 599— 627. P. H A D O T has further developed the implications for Porphyry's metaphysics in: La métaphysique de Porphyre, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, t. XII Porphyre, Vandœuvres—Genève 1966, pp. 127—157. Porphyre et Victorinus, Paris 1968. In t. II he has reedited and translated the anonymous commentary together with a collection of 'neoplatonic' texts from Victorinus. See p. 740 below. Anon. XIV,7—8 κατά άλλο άρα ëv έστιν άπλοϋν, κατ' άλλο δε αυτό εαυτοί διαφέρει. 10—16 εν μεν ούν έστιν και άπλοϋν κατά τήν πρώτην . . . ίδέαν . . . ούχ εν δέ οΐιδέ άπλοϋν κατά τήν ϋπαρξιν και ζωήν (καί) τήν νόησιν. 26—34 καί κατά τοΰτο εστηκεν άμα καί κινείται καί έν έαυτω έστιν καί έν άλλω καί όλον έστίν καί μέρη εχει καί ταύτόν έστιν καί έτερον, κατά δε ψιλόν αύτοϋ το εν καί οίον πρώτον καί όντως το εν οϋτε εστηκεν οϋτε κινείται οϋτε ταύτόν έστιν οΰτε ετερον οϋτε έν έαυτω έστιν οϋτε έν άλλω. Plat, theol. 1.11 p. 51,4—11 SAFFREY—WEST., Πορφϋριος δέ αύ μετά τοϋτον (sc. Πλωτίνον) έν τή Περί άρχων πραγματεία τον νουν είναι μεν αίώνιον έν πολλοίς καί καλοίς άποδείκνυσι λόγοις, εχειν δέ όμως έν έαυτω καί προαιώνιόν (τι· καί το μεν προαιώνιον) του νου τω ένί συνάπτειν (έκείνο γάρ ην έπέκεινα παντός αιώνος), το δέ αίώνιον δευτέραν έχειν, μάλλον δέ τρίτην έν έκείνψ τάξιν. F XVIII p. 15,1—3 N A U C K προήλθε δέ προαιώνιος άπ' αιτίου του θεού ώρμημένος, αύτογέννητος ών καί αύτοπάτωρ. Cf. H A D O T , Entretiens XII p. 146.

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found in the anonymous commentary and Victorinus. It looks very likely that it is a version of this attempt to harmonise transcendence and coordination which led to Damascius' criticism.

4. Demiurge — Nous or Soul? Much has been made of Porphyry's identification of the demiurge now with Nous, now with Soul. B I D E Z 6 0 and, following him, DES P L A C E S 6 1 date the 'Hist, phil.' to the preplotinian period on the mistaken view that the identification of the demiurge with Nous found in one fragment 6 2 is unplotinian, whereas this is in fact the orthodox plotinian doctrine. 63 But does Porphyry's alternating ascription of the demiurgic role represent a change of view, a hesitation or again rather a more complex view which has been misinterpreted? Apart from the two passages already cited Porphyry is said to identify the demiurge with Nous in three passages of Proclus 'In Tim.' 6 4 N o w in the same work Proclus elsewhere gives the impression that Porphyry identified the demiurge with Soul. 65 After a very careful examination of all the evidence W. DEUSE66 concludes that Porphyry was probably struggling with Plotinus' interpretation of Timaeus 39 e 7—9 at III 9.1. and that his interpretation was one which, like Plotinus elsewhere, affords Nous the primary demiurgic role i.e. he lays a greater stress on the continuity of 60 61 62

63 64

65

66

Vie de Porphyre p. 34 η. 2. Porphyre (op. cit. η. 16) p. 10. F XVI p. 14,4—6 NAUCK είναι δε τον μεν άνώτατον θεόν τάγαθόν, μετ' αυτόν δέ και δεύτερον τον δημιουργόν. BIDEZ, Vie de Porphyre p. 34 n. 2, applies the same reasoning to date the 'Περί άγαλμάτων'. Cf. Eus., praep. evang. III 9.3 t. I p. 127,17—18 MRAS, Ζευς δε καθό νούς, άφ' ου προφέρει πάντα και δημιουργεί τοις νοήμασιν. Cf. also Stob. I 31,7-10 Ζευς δέ καί (ó θεός), καθό νους άφ' οΰ προφέρει πάντα, ότι δημιουργεί τοις νοήμασιν. Cf. Plot. II.3 [52] 18,15 νους δημιουργός. V.8 [31] 7,25. Porph., in Tim. F 51 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 391-6 esp. 394,2-9; 395,11-12; 396, 5—6); ibid. F 55 (Proci., in Tim. I 439,30-440,4) τφ μεν ούν νοητώ παντί ούκ άλλο έχορήγει την ύλην — αυτό γαρ αυτήν ύφίστη. ibid. F 40 (Proci, in Tim. I 300,1—3) Πορφύριος δέ φησιν, cm πατήρ μεν έστιν ό άφ' εαυτού γεννών το ολον, ποιητής δέ παρ' άλλου τήν ΰλην λαμβάνων. Cf. Porph., Comm. on the Chaldaean Oracles, in Lydus, mens. 110,18f. ό μέντοι Πορφύριος εν τω ΰπομνήματι των λογίων τον δίς έπέκεινα τουτέστι τον των όλων δημιουργόν τον παρά Ιουδαίων τιμώμενον είναι άξιοι, ôv ό Χαλδαίος δεύτερον άπό του άπαξ έπέκεινα, τουτέστι τού άγαθοΰ, θεολογεί. Porph., in Tim. F 41 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 306,32-307,2) μετά δή τον Άμέλιον ό Πορφύριος οίόμενος τω Πλωτίνω συνςιδειν, τήν μεν ψυχήν τήν ύπερκόσμιον άποκαλεϊ δημιουργόν, τον δέ νουν αυτής, προς ôv έπέστραπται, το αύτοζωον, ώς είναι το παράδειγμα τού δημιουργού κατά τούτον τον νούν. ibid. F 42 (Proci., in Tim. I 322, 1 - 3 ) . . . τήν μεν ψυχήν . . . δημιουργόν ύπέθετο τήν άμέθεκτον, το δέ παράδειγμα τον νούν. ibid. F 43 (Proci., in Tim. 431,20—23) τούτω δέ (i.e. Atticus) άπ' εναντίας ό Πορφύριος ύφειμένην τω δημιουργώ δίδωσι τάξιν παρά το νοητόν ψυχήν γαρ ύπερουράνιον θέμενος τφ κόσμω ποιητικήν έν τω νω το παράδειγμα τίθεται των γιγνομένων. Der Demiurg bei Porphyrios und Iamblich, in: Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus, ed. C . ZINTZEN, W e g e d e r F o r s c h u n g t. C C C C X X X V I , D a r m s t a d t 1977, p p . 2 3 8 - 2 7 8 .

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the unfolding of the noetic world as opposed to the more stepped schema of Iamblichus and P r o c l u s . 6 7 T h e different versions which Proclus presents in his T i m a e u s ' commentary may be due to the different points of view from which Proclus and Iamblichus read Porphyry. F o r in at least the passages identifying Soul and demiurge Proclus is probably relying for his information on Iamblichus' commentary on the 'Timaeus' and thus reflecting Iamblichus' criticism of Porphyry's telescoping of hypostases, but employed to his own purpose of locating the level of the demiurge according to previous thinkers. 6 8 A further complication regarding the demiurge has been the occasion of speculation. In a text reporting on Porphyry's ' C o m m e n t a r y on the Chaldaean Oracles' cited above 6 9 Porphyry identifies the Hebrew god with N o u s — the demiurge. In the 'Philosophy from Oracles', h o w e v e r , 7 0 according to WASZINK71 and HADOT 72 he puts the Hebrew god at a higher level, thus once more presenting us with a change of attitude. B u t in the 'Philosophy from Oracles' Porphyry is firstly taking, as his starting point, an oracular text which identifies god with the creator, secondly he is not here distinguishing O n e , N o u s and Soul but making a distinction between the transcendent god of the Hebrews and the Christian immanent Christ, a polemical point. Porphyry often speaks loosely in this w a y 7 3 and it is no surprise that he can make a more precise distinction when the occasion demands it. I see no reason to find a doctrinal change here.

III.

Superstition

and

Criticism

1. Introduction T w o important questions have frequently been embroiled in the chronological disputes. Firstly there is the attempt to demonstrate a 'middle-platonic' 67

68 70

71 72

73

Cf. DEUSE, Demiurg (op.cit. η. 66) p. 252 „Wir sehen, wie Iamblich und Proklos das dynamische Kontinuum der Geistesentfaltung in starre Seinsstufen umgedeutet haben und dadurch zu den anfechtbaren Hypostasengleichungen Seele = Demiurg, Geist = Vorbild im Porphyrios-Referat gelangt sind. " 6 9 Cf. η. 64. Cf. DEUSE, art. cit. pp. 2 7 2 - 3 . Eus. praep. evang. IX.10.4 t. I p. 496,14-15 MRAS, citing an oracle: μοΰνοι Χαλδαΐοι σοφίην λάχον ήδ' άρ' Εβραίοι, αύτογένεθλον άνακτα σεβαξόμενοι θεόν άγνώς. Cf. Aug., civ. XIX 23,30—37 t. 11 394,8-16 DOMB. in deum vero, inquit (Porphyry citing an oracle of'Apollo), generatorem et in regem ante omnia, quem tremit et caelum et terra atque mare et infemorum abdita et ipsa numina perhorrescunt; quorum lex est Pater, quem valde sanai honorant Hebraei. Cf. ibid. XX 24,8—26 t. II 467,7—26 DOMB. Porphyrios und Numenios, Entretiens XII p. 57. Citations de Porphyre chez Augustin, REA 6 (1960) p. 214 n. 36 where he concludes, »je crois devoir conclure à une évolution de Porphyre vis-à-vis du Dieu des Hébreux» and uses this as an argument against O'MEARA'S identification of phil. orac. and regr. an. Cf. HADOT, in: Entretiens XII p. 133 «Ce changement révèle l'influence plotinienne». E.g. the use of θεός in 'Marc.' or of xò öv (soul/no»i) in sent. 34—36.

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phase in Porphyry's development and, secondly, the vexed question of his religious beliefs — was an early superstitious phase later tempered, even extirpated, by contact with Plotinus? Did he relapse again into superstition after the death of Plotinus? The picture which recent research is now allowing to emerge seems to me more complex than any of these alternatives. In the first place we must ask ourselves how much middle-platonic speculation Porphyry carried through with him into his post-plotinian period to work into and integrate with his plotinian neoplatonism. It also begs the question about the position of Plotinus himself. His own method was deeply exploratory and questioning. Much of what he taught rested on earlier tradition too. And, paradoxically, since he was an outstanding thinker he also stands to a certain extent outside the continuum of tradition and is, therefore, a misleading standard by which to judge the development of the tradition, especially when the work of other contemporaries and near contemporaries of Porphyry (men like Amelius, Theodorus and Iamblichus) scarcely survives. Secondly we must beware of applying today's categories to our judgment of what constituted 'superstition' in antiquity. Recent studies of ritual and magic, and in particular of their role in late antiquity, have made it easier for us to understand how theurgy and critical philosophy could exist side by side.74 It is to this area that I would now like to turn and to begin by examining a recent controversy which centres on the identification of the 'Philosophy from Oracles' and the 'De regressu animae'. 2. The 'Philosophy from Oracles' and the 'De regressu animae' There has for some years now been a considerable argument about the status of a mass of material "on the return of the soul" — de regressu animae — which Augustine refers to in his 'Civitas Dei'. It is clearly ascribed by Augustine to Porphyry, but it remains unclear whether the words de regressu animae are meant to be the title of a whole work, a volume, a chapter or even just a general designation of contents (a phrase applied by Augustine himself). 75 In this 'work' 74

75

E.g. P. BROWN, Religion and Society in the A g e of Saint Augustine, L o n d o n 1972, pp. 1 1 9 - 1 4 6 . Augustine uses the phrase de regressu animae twice: civ. X 29,61—3 t. 1 4 4 9 , 2 5 — 2 6 DOMB. intuentes Porphyrium in his ipsis libris, ex quibus multa posui, quos de regressu animae scripsit. . . . ibid. X 32,5—6 t. I 455,3—4 DOMB, dicit Porphyrins in primo iuxta finem de regressu animae libro. The first of these is ambiguous, the second looks v e r y much like the title of a b o o k since it w o u l d be odd phraseology if Augustine meant it to apply to only part of a b o o k . In this case w e w o u l d lack the name of the w o r k as a w h o l e even though its first volume had been specified — 'in the first volume, on the return of the soul'. W e are then left asking 'first volume of w h a t b o o k ? ' if de regressu animae refers only to the title of this volume. O'MEARA, Porph. 1 9 5 9 (op. cit. η. 78) pp. 15FF., is w r o n g to claim that Augustine's references to V a r r ò are similar to the P o r p h y r y reference and show that Augustine might even here be referring only to part of a larger w o r k (the 'phil. orac.'). A l t h o u g h Augustine refers to the last three books of the antiquitates of

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Porphyry limited the efficacy of magic (theurgy) to the lower part of the soul and thought that it was at times dangerous and not necessary for the salvation of the higher soul or higher self. 7 6 In it he tried to find a common way of liberating the soul which would unite Platonism and theurgy, the philosopher and the ordinary man. But, according to Augustine, he failed to find it. 7 7 J . O'MEARA 78 has argued that the 'De regressu animae' is just part of a larger work, the 'Philosophy from Oracles', also cited by Augustine in his 'Civitas Dei' but surviving in other sources as well. 7 9 The importance of this attempted identification, which has been generally rejected, 8 0 is that, if correct, it disturbs 8 1 the accepted picture of Porphyry as established by BIDEZ according to which: (i) The 'Philosophy from Oracles' belongs to an early, uncritical and superstitious phase in Porphyry's career and the 'De regressu animae' to a more critical phase influenced by Plotinus. (ii) There is a development in Porphyry's attitude to religion and its relationship to philosophy. These themes are not unimportant — the establishing of the pattern of Porphyry's development and the working out of the relationship between philosophy and religion which was to become vital in the next two centuries not only in a purely theoretical context but also in its practical application to the attempted pagan revival of the emperor Julian. Although J . O'MEARA has made an important contribution to this debate, he has not, I believe, proved that the 'De regressu animae' is part of the 'PhilosVarro in such a way as to make them appear to constitute a separate work de dis selectis (civ. VII 5 t. 1281,14—15 DOMB. in hoc libro quem de dis selectis ultimum scripsit; ibid., 17 p. 295,22—3 in tertio porro isto de diis selectis; ibid., 23 p. 301,21—2 in eodem extremorum de diis selectis libro) he makes it clear (ibid., 17, p. 295,13—4 nam trium primum de diis certis cum absolvisset librum) with extremorum that the three books form the last part of the whole work he has been constantly citing, the antiquitates. 76

77 78

A u g . , civ. X 27 t. I 444,9—10 DOMB. tibi tamquam superiorum capaci esse inutilia confiteris; X 9 t. I 415,23—4 banc artem tamquam fallacem et in ipsa actione periculosam. Ibid. X 3 2 , 5 - 1 6 t. I 4 5 5 , 3 - 1 5 DOMB. Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine, Paris 1959; ID., Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica and Augustine's Dialogues of Cassiciacum, in: Recherches Augustiniennes 6 (1969) pp. 103 — 139, Paris 1969. For bibliography on 'phil. orac.' cf. J . HAUSSLEITER, Prolegomena zu einer Neuherausgabe der Orakelphilosophie, Helikon 1 8 - 1 9 ( 1 9 7 8 - 9 ) pp. 4 3 8 - 4 9 6 .

79

Cited by Augustine by name. C f . civ. X I X 23 t. II 393,4 nam in libris quos έκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας appellai. There is one possible trace in an earlier b o o k , X 27.37—9 t. I 444, 31—2 DOMB. It is cited extensively by Eusebius in his 'praep. evang.' (also in 'dem. evang.'), by Firmicus Maternus (de err. prof, relig. X I I I , 4—5) and by Philoponus, op. mundi p. 200ff. O n e large fragment is preserved in an oracle collection edited by ERBSE, Fragmente griechischer Theosophien, H a m b u r g 1941, p. 173,17—174,22.

80

Particularly detailed and constructive criticism may be found in P. HADOT, Citations de Porphyre chez Augustine (à p r o p o s d'un ouvrage récent), R E A 6 (1960) pp. 205—244, printed with a short reply by J . O'MEARA, ibid. pp. 2 4 5 f f . C f . also the review by H . DÖRRIE, G n o m o n 32 (1960) p p .

81

C f . H A D O T (art. cit. η. 80) p p .

320—6. 206-7.

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ophy from Oracles'. His arguments rely in the end on similarity of theme and expression. But similarity does not prove identity. 82 However it also seems to me that his critics have not p r o v e d beyond all doubt that the two works are different. And although O ' M E A R A has not demonstrated the identity of these two works, he has shown that they are much closer in tone (and content) than had been allowed by B I D E Z ' S view. 83 The argument for a development in Porphyry's attitude to religious rites rests on three main factors: (i) An early dating of the 'Philosophy from Oracles' (and a late dating for 'De regressu animae'). (ii) Discernible plotinian influences in 'De regressu animae' and their absence in 'Philosophy from Oracles'. (iii) A difference in tone between 'Philosophy from Oracles' and 'De regressu animae' — uncritical of theurgy in the former, critical in the latter. (The 'Letter to Anebo' may be brought in here.) With regard to dating the 'Philosophy from Oracles' the only external evidence that is put forward comes from Eunapius. 84 BIDEZ85 uses this as evidence that the 'Philosophy from Oracles' was written early in Porphyry's life. But it is not at all certain that Eunapius is here referring to the 'Philosophy from Oracles'. And we also note Eunapius' use of ίσως and ώς εοικεν. He is clearly guessing. Either he had not read in toto the work he is referring to or, if he had, it gave no clear indication of date. It is equally impossible to extract a later date from this passage as O ' M E A R A seeks to do. 86 The detection of plotinian influences in 'De regressu animae' would help at least to date it. But the evidence of such influences is far from certain. Most of these so called influences could just as well have come from the middle-platonic tradition e.g. the rather vaguely drawn distinction between Nous and a higher principle or the release of the soul through θεωρία. 8 7

82 83

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50

A point also made by DÖRRIE (art. cit. η. 80), p. 322. Cf. DÖRRIE (art. cit. η. 80), p. 322. But note also DÖRRIE'S distinction of the two, pp. 325—6, arguing that 'phil. orac.' moves from the gods down to men, 'regr. an.' in the opposite direction. HADOT also recognises this but is inclined to see a greater difference, a difference in tone, than DÖRRIE. vit. soph. IV.1.11 p. 8,18—20 GIANGRANDE αυτός μεν ούν φησι (νέος δέ ών ίσως ταύτα εγραφεν, ώς εοικεν), έπιτυχεϊν χρηστηρίω μηδενί των δημοσίων έν δε αύτφ τ φ βιβλίω καταγράφει. Vie de Porphyre p. 15. Porphyry 1959 (op. cit. n. 78) pp. 33—4 where he argues that μεν and δε (έν δε αύτω) contrast two periods of writing. But this cannot be as we are dealing with the same book — this surely being the force of αύτφ τώ βιβλίω "in the book itself", referring back to φησι. O'MEARA further understands καταγράφει to mean "register what has previously been recorded". But this may mean no more than copying out an oracle from a written version given to him. Cf. BIDEZ, Vie de Porphyre pp. 88—97; H. LEWY, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire, Cairo 1956, p. 452. Whether A N R W II 36.2

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Even more precarious is the argument from silence, that 'Philosophy from Oracles' does not display distinctively plotinian doctrines. It would be difficult enough to find them in the 'Letter to Marcella' which is more fully preserved and certainly post-plotinian, as Porphyry married late in life. As important as the evidence for dating is the assessing of the tone, method and aims of the extant material. I think it is important to distinguish these three since it is perfectly possible for two separate works to be different in aims and method but express a similar basic attitude to a particular topic. The 'Letter to Anebo', for example, contains a series of critical questions on the nature of religion and religious practices. It could be maintained that this letter displays an objectively critical attitude, particularly towards theurgy, that is largely similar to that of 'De regressu animae'. 88 But its method is quite different in that it questions and poses problems rather than makes positive statements. It is difficult to compare attitudes when the method of enquiry is so different. And in such a situation it is all too easy to read in a change of tone. The purpose of one treatise and its method of presentation might easily give the impression of changed attitude (rather than different viewpoint) when compared with a quite differently presented work. 8 9 The case for difference of attitude between 'Philosophy from Oracles' and 'De regressu animae' rests largely on the impression given in 'Philosophy from Oracles' of intense interest in the minutiae of cult practice 90 and the absence of criticism. But none of this detail need be incompatible with neoplatonic ideas. 91 And we must bear in mind that, although the 'Philosophy from Oracles' is concerned

88

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90 91

'regr. an.' contained texts from Plotinus (cf. C O U R C E L L E Lettres [op. cit. η. 40] p. 26; HADOT, Citations [art. cit. n. 80] p. 213) remains only a speculation. HADOT, Citations (art. cit. n. 80) p. 225, sees a difference in attitude even between 'regr. an.' and 'ad Aneb.' which is more critical, a difference which he claims surfaces in Aug. civ. X 27 t. I 445,26f. DOMB. DÖRRIE, however, (art. cit. η. 80) p. 325, resolves the apparent contradiction in Porphyry by ascribing the two elements which conflict here and at civ. X 9 t. I 415,20f. to 'phil. orac.' and 'de regr.' respectively. For 'ad Aneb.' see now: Lettera ad Anebo a cura di A. R. SODANO, Napoli 1958. I am deliberately arguing here the opposite case to HADOT, Citations (art. cit. η. 80) p. 227, who argues that subject matter may be the same but attitude different, thus expressing a different doctrinal view. That may be true and one cannot argue from similarity of subject matter to similarity of interpretation. Equally, however, there is a case to be made for caution in assigning doctrinal differences where the presentation is different. In this context note the remark of D Ö R R I E (art. cit. η. 80, p. 321) „Immer philosophiert Porphyries auf zwei Ebenen, der diskursiven und der allegorischen. Nur wo er sich auf der diskursiven bewegt, ist es sinnvoll, ihn zu Plotin in Beziehung zu setzen." E.g. Porph. in Eus., praep. evang. IV.8.4-9.2 t. I p. 178,13ff. M R A S . Amelius, after all, did frequent temples (vit. Plot. 10). Plotinus is, perhaps, exceptional in this. Porphyry even during his time with Plotinus could still produce highly-wrought 'mystical' poetry, an incident which he mentions without embarrassment in the vit. Plot. 15. He also includes the oracle of Apollo on Plotinus (vit. Plot. 22). It is interesting here to compare Plotinus' comment (evidently approved of by Porphyry) at vit. Plot. 15,4—6 εδειξας όμοΰ καί τον ποιητήν και τον φιλόσοφον καί τον ίεροφάντην with the judgement of Damascius, in Phd. I 172 Greek Commentators t. II p. 105,8—10 W E S T E R I N K ότι oí μεν την φιλοσοφίαν προτιμώσι, ώς Πορφύριος καί Πλωτίνος καί άλλοι πολλοί

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with salvation, the reassurance it seeks to provide is not a sacramental one of theurgic rites but an informational one consisting of revelation through oracles. The securely attested fragments of 'Philosophy from Oracles' offer us no information on Porphyry's attitude to theurgic rites of salvation. Moreover 'Philosophy from Oracles' displays three further features which suggest a much closer unity of attitude with c De regressu animae' and the 'Letter to Anebo'. Firstly, we have the statement of a spiritualised attitude to religion — nam Deus quidem, utpote omnium Pater, nullius indiget; sed nobis est bene, cum eum per iustitiam et castitatem aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso, inquisitio enim purgat, inquit, imitatio deificai affectionem ad ipsum operando.91 Secondly, a critical attitude to oracles may be seen in the references to false oracles and their deceipt and to the weakness of the gods when they 'descend' below their own proper level to that of men. 9 3 Thirdly, in the surviving prologue Porphyry stresses that he will say comparatively little about ή χρηστική πραγματεία - ritual practices - and speaks specifically of θεωρία-contemplation. 9 4 The oracles are to provide c o n f i r m a t i o n of philosophical doctrines 95 and thus to assist in salvation. 96 We have here a clear warning that the extant fragments probably distort somewhat our view of the original contents, that the oracular (and we might extend this to the ritual) material was a δεύτερος πλους to aid the weaker brethren in their advance to θεωρία. And this seems precisely to fit in well with the guarded acceptance of religious ritual granted in 'De abstinentia' and the 'Letter to Marcella'. But the purpose of each of these works is different from that of the 'Philosophy from Oracles'. In 'De abstinentia' he wishes to defend the Pythagorean ban on killing and eating animals. This naturally involves animal sacrifice which is seen as a perversion of

92

93

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50"

φιλοσόφοι· οί δε την ίερατικήν, ώς Ίάμβλιχος καί Συριανός καΐ Πρόκλος καί οι ιερατικοί πάντες. Aug., civ. XIX 23 t. II 3 9 7 , 1 6 - 2 2 DOMB. Cf. Porph., abst. II 34 pp. 163,22-164,3 N A U C K δει άρα συναφθέντας καί όμοιωθέντας αΐιτφ την αυτών άναγωγήν θυσίαν ίεράν προσάγειν τφ θεώ, την αυτήν δέ καί ϋμνον οΰσαν καί ημών σωτηρίαν, reflecting a long tradition going back through the neopythagoreans (cf. Apollonius of Tyana in Eus., praep. evang. IV 13 t. I 185,5—9 MRAS, a passage which Eusebius may well have culled from Porphyry — cf. E. NORDEN, Agnostos Theos, Leipzig 1923 2 , pp. 343—6) to Theophrastus 'Π. εύσεβείας'. Cf. E. FERGUSON, Spiritual Sacrifice in Early Christianity and its Environment, A N R W II 23.2 (1980, ed. W. HAASE, pp. 1151-1189), pp. 1 1 5 3 - 6 ; F. M. YOUNG, The Idea of Sacrifice in Neoplatonic and Patristic Texts, Studia Patristica 11 (1972) pp. 2 7 8 - 2 8 1 . Eus., praep. evang. VI 4 . 3 - 5 . 1 t. I 2 9 8 , 2 0 - 2 5 MRAS; Philop., op. mundi p. 2 0 0 , 2 0 - 2 6 ; Eus., ibid. VI 5 . 2 - 4 t. I 299,If.; Philop., op. mundi p. 2 0 1 , 1 - 1 7 . Eus., ibid. IV.7.2. t. I 177,13—14 έπ' όλίγον δέ καί της χρηστικής άψόμεθα πραγματείας, ήτις πρός τε την θεωρίαν ονήσει καί τήν άλλην κάθαρσιν του βίου. Cf. ibid. 1 5 - 1 7 it will benefit those δσοιπερ τήν άλήθειαν ώδίναντες ηυξαντό ποτε τής έκ θεών έπιφανείας τυχόντες άνάπαυσιν λαβείν τής άπορίας δια τήν τών λεγόντων άξιόπιστον διδασκαλίαν. Ibid. IV 7.1 t. I 1 7 7 , 4 - 5 τάς ελπίδας του σωθήναι. IV 8.1 t. I 178,6 προς τήν τής ψυχής σωτηρίαν.

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the true original type of sacrifice. The concessions made to ritual must be seen entirely from the general approach adopted which concerns itself with a philosophical ideal 97 whereas in 'Philosophy from Oracles' his purpose is to see what help can be afforded from religious oracles. We may recall here the details of sacrificial animals discussed in 'Philosophy from Oracles' 98 but ask ourselves whether the utility of such oracular revelations was seen by Porphyry to lie not so much in any prescriptions for actual ritual practice as in the information which they give about the nature of the gods who reveal themselves δι' αινιγμάτων. 9 9 Mantic too is a subject which is cautiously approached in both works. In De abst. II 52 we learn that the philosopher does not need diviners. But in 53 a concession is made. A general balance is suggested at II 61 where the internal disposition is paramount, but a moderate yet full-hearted external dedication is also required. 1 0 0 The sanction of Plato is also invoked with its emphasis on the need for the right disposition. 101 The primacy of the disposition is stressed in the 'Letter to Marcella' 23 with the same antithetical balance. 102 In the same work, after many traditional warnings that ritual and prayer without virtue is useless and that a good man honours and becomes like god even without prayer, 1 0 3 Porphyry, nevertheless, enjoins on his wife respect for traditional piety — ούτος γ α ρ μέγιστος καρπός εύσεβείας τιμάν το θείον κατά τα πάτρια. 1 0 4 It is, however, a piety severely reduced to a second order — βωμοί δε θεοϋ ίερουργούμενοι μεν ουδέν βλάπτουσιν, άμελούμενοι δε ουδέν ώφελοϋσιν. 1 0 5 In this antithesis Porphyry seems to hedge his bets. Here are no formally positive statements about the utility of ritual but no denials either. Whatever positive worth there is in ritual is expressed negatively. But there is no contradiction between this and the injunction to respect the tradition or the προθυμία which we are asked to display in 'De abstinentia' if we recall the underlying emphasis on the internal and the inevitably

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Thus at abst. II 3 animal sacrifice is permitted by implication for the ordinary man έν τφ πόλεως βίψ and explicitly ή τε αποχή των έμψυχων . . . ούχ άπλώς πάσιν άνθρώποις παραγγέλλεται, άλλα τοις φιλοσόφοις. Cf. ibid., I 27. Cf. D. A. DOMBROWSKI, Porphyry and Vegetarianism: A Contemporary Philosophical Approach, below in this same volume (ANRW II 36,1) pp. 774-791. Eus., praep. evang. IV 8 . 4 . - 9 . 7 t. I 178,13-181,23 M R A S . Phil. orac. in Eus., ibid. IV 8.2 t. I 178,8—9 ουδέ γαρ oí θεοί φανερώς περί αυτών έθέσπισαν, άλλα δι' αινιγμάτων. II 61 p. 1 8 5 , 1 - 4 N A U C K θεοίς δε άριστη μεν άπαρχή νοϋς καθαρός καί ψυχή άπαθής, οίκείον δε καί το μετρίων μεν άπάρχεσθαι των άλλων, μή παρέργως δέ, άλλα συν πάση προθυμίςι. Ibid.', 185,11-15; Plat., Laws 7 1 6 d 6 - e 2 . Ibid., 289,10—12 ει δε έξ άμφοΐν (i.e. external and internal) το θείον θεραπευόμενον ήδεται, ίερείοις μεν κατά δύναμιν, διανοίς» δε ύπέρ δΰναμιν αυτό τιμητέον. Marc. 16 p. 284,24—5 N A U C K ή δέ όμοίωσις εσται δια μόνης άρετής. 285,12—13 σοφός γαρ άνήρ καί σιγών τον θεόν τιμφ. Marc. 18 p. 286,3—4 NAUCK. τα πάτρια may here be meant in a restricted or purified sense; cf. abst, II 59 p. 183,21 N A U C K where it is used of the original non-animal sacrifices. Cf. PÖTSCHER, Marc. (op. cit. n. 17) ad loc.

105

Marc. 18 p. 2 8 6 , 6 - 8 NAUCK. Cf. ibid., 23 p. 289,12 εϋχεσθαι θεφ οΰ κακόν.

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sharp and often paradoxical quality of the traditional maxims which he is fitting together in his mosaic of advice to Marcella. In this context it is worth recalling the differing ways in which Plotinus reacts towards astrology. Bitter and hostile attacks combine with a grudging acceptance of some of its basic tenets — an acceptance overcome only by recourse to the plea that the higher self is outside and beyond its influence. It was not easy for Porphyry and Plotinus to avoid entirely some recognition of magical powers which were built into their inherited concept of the universe. Their attempts to overcome this problem could never be free from contradiction. Where Porphyry differs from Plotinus is in his greater interest in certain aspects of cult. This should not, however, blind us to the gulf which separates him from Iamblichus' and Proclus' more wholehearted integration of these elements into neoplatonism. 1 0 6

IV.

Metaphysics

Unfortunately little survives of Porphyry's output on specifically metaphysical topics. Of course much can be gleaned from his commentaries, particularly those on Plato. But these, too, survive only in fragments. 1 0 7 We know that he wrote on the relationship of N o u s and t ò νοητόν, 1 0 8 two books on principles, 1 0 9 on incorporeals, 1 1 0 on matter, 1 1 1 on the differences and the unity between Plato and Aristotle. 1 1 2 N o r must we neglect the 'Sententiae'. Psychology, too, is well represented 1 1 3 and information on Porphyry's views in this area is quite extensive. But, as in the case of the upper reaches of metaphysics, survival

106 107 108

109

Cf. SMITH, Porph. (op. cit. n. 24) pp. 81-144. Cf. below p. 749f. VI.2. Προς τους άπό τοΰ νοΰ χωρίζοντας το νοητόν (περί τοΰ νοΰ καί τοΰ νοητού). Cf. vit. Plot. 18,4-5; 8 - 1 9 ; 20,89-96; Timaeus Sophistes, lex. voc. Plat. p. 168; Ibn alNadïm, Fihrist, ed. FLÜGEL I 253; Ibn Sïnâ (Avicenna), Ishärät, ed. FORGET, Leiden 1892, t. I p. 180; id., Kitäb al-Shifä', ed. J. BAKOS, Praha 1956, p. 236. Suda IV p. 178,19 ADLER Περί άρχων β'. One fragment in Proci., theol. Plat. I 11 p. 51, 4-11

110 111 112 113

SAFFREY-WEST.

Suda IV p. 178,21 Περί άσωμάτων. Ibid., 20 Περί ϋλης ς'. One fragment in Simplic., in Arist. Phys. pp. 230,34—231,24. Cf. n. 218. There survives the treatise 'Προς Γαΰρον περί τοϋ πώς έμψυχοΰται τα έμβρυα 1 . Cf. Κ. KALBFLEISCH, Reliquias libri Galeno false adscripti ed., Abhandl. d. pr. Ak. d. Wiss. 1895 pp. 33—62. There are fragments (largely doxographical in content) of 'Περί των της ψυχής δυνάμεων' and also of 'Περί ψυχής προς Βόηθον ε " (probably not to be identified with the Suda entry IV p. 178,24—5 'Προς Άριστοτέλην (περί) τοϋ είναι την ψυχήν εντελέχειαν' — cf. p. 754 below). Η. DÖRRIE has edited and commented on the main surviving section of the 'Σύμμικτα ζητήματα 1 : Porphyrios' "Symmikta Zetemata", Zetemata X X , München 1959. A reference περί αίσθήσεως (Nem., nat. hom. 182,4—10) and 'The book of Sleep and Awakening' (Ibn al-Nadïm, Fihrist 1316 FLÜGEL) may belong to the 'Symmikta Zetemata' or form a separate work on perception.

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tends to be determined by the needs of the author who preserves the report and by the usefulness of doxographical or ethical content. With the renewed philosophical examination of the 'Enneads' more attention has been given recently to a discussion of Porphyry's metaphysical views in an attempt to correct BIDEZ'S overemphasis of the ethical-religious side of his writings. Although the fragmentary nature of our information on this aspect of Porphyry's work makes reconstruction of his metaphysical views a hazardous and largely speculative enterprise, the result has done much to rehabilitate Porphyry's stature as a philosopher. And even if one does not accept HADOT'S portrayal of Porphyry as a great creative innovator, the more humble picture of a thorough, questioning and penetrating working through traditional philosophical problems is impressive enough. Particular attention has recently been paid to stressing the continuous nature of the hypostases in Porphyry (and in Plotinus) as opposed to the more rigid hiérarchisation in Iamblichus and Proclus. 1 1 4 The tendency of Porphyry to 'telescope' hypostases has sometimes been overstressed. 115 For Porphyry certainly can at times mark off the hypostases in a clear manner. It is, however, important to note that we do not have a simple polarisation of approach to the problem of unity-plurality amongst neoplatonists, Porphyry stressing unity and the later neoplatonists division. But just as the later neoplatonists, though stressing divisions, are equally intent on restoring continuity by inserting mediators between levels, 1 1 6 so Porphyry not only stresses continuity but also tries to express the divisions between levels of reality. Whether he did this with the full panoply of sophisticated metaphysical structures which HADOT ascribes to him we must now examine more closely. HADOT, as we have already noted, 1 1 7 has tried to reconstruct Porphyry's metaphysics from the evidence of the anonymous Tarmenides' commentary and Marius Victorinus. H e concludes that at the head of Porphyry's metaphysical system there was an ennead or three triads, each designated ΰπαρξις, δύναμις, νοϋς. This ennead expressed the transition between the O n e and Nous, the O n e being equated with the first triad in which ΰπαρξις is dominant and δύναμις and νοϋς are present in a seminal way whilst Nous is to be found in the third triad in which νοϋς predominates. The second triad, in which δύναμις predominates, represents the moment of unbounded movement away from the O n e before it returns and is defined in Nous. The only two separate, identifiable levels are, strictly speaking, the O n e and Nous. A further complication is that 114

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Cf. most recently W . DEUSE, Demiurg (op. cit. η. 66) p. 251 „Porphyrios versteht also den Schöpfungsakt des Demiurgen als einen kontinuierlichen Entfaltungsprozess des Geistes". Cf. ibid., p. 277. Cf. A. C. LLOYD, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (op. cit. η. 1) p. 288£. and my criticisms, Porph. (op. cit. η. 24) p. 5f. Cf. DEUSE, Demiurg (op.cit n. 66) p. 276 ,Jamblich differenziert innerhalb der Hypostasen und nähert sie so einander an; dieser Differenzierungsprozess verlangt aber erneute Zusammenfassung der Teile zur Einheit, so dass der Annäherung die Abgrenzung folgt. Sie wiederum wird abgeschwächt durch Zwischenstufen, die neue Verbindungen herstellen". See pp. 7 2 8 - 9 .

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the members of this ennead were also identified with various entities from the 'Chaldaean Oracles'. 1 1 8 Many of the elements of this system had already been noted by W. T H E I L E R 1 1 9 in his work on the Porphyrian influence in the hymns of Synesius. But even though H A D O T ' S thesis confirmed THEILER'S work and went further in explaining some of the peculiarities and anomalies he had detected, THEILER never accepted the ascription of the anonymous Tarmenides' commentary to Porphyry. 1 2 0 We might begin by seeing what evidence we have from attested Porphyrian sources (i.e. where the name of Porphyry occurs). Firstly, there are the hints of a préexistent level of Nous in the passages we cited earlier from the 'Hist, phil.' 1 2 1 We also have clear evidence from Lydus 1 2 2 that Porphyry put an ennead at the head of his metaphysics in a Chaldaean context. From Damascius 123 we learn that he identified in some way the One and the Father of the noetic triad. To complete the picture we must assume that Porphyry made similar correspondences between his noetic ennead and that of the Chaldaeans 124 as were made by Proclus later. 125 Using the parallel with Proclus 126 we can then equate the Chaldaean entities άπαξ and δίς έπέκεινα with the πατήρ of the first triad and the Nous of the third triad respectively, knowing that Porphyry identified the δις έπέκεινα with the demiurgic Nous (i.e. the second hypostasis) in his 'Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles'. 1 2 7 O n the same parallel with Proclus it is also likely that Porphyry identified the second triad with Hecate. If we take Proclus In Parm. 1070,15f. as referring to Porphyry a n d if we understand that the subsequent interpretation of triads is being ascribed by Proclus to the τινών έν θεολογία πρωτευσάντων 1 2 8 we could then add that the first triad consists of 118

119

120 121 122

123 124

125

126

HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus I, Paris 1968, p. 337f., goes on to apply the same type of structure to the level of soul. But the evidence here is even less certain. Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswiss. Kl. 18,1, Halle 1942 (repr. in: ID., Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus, Berlin 1966, pp. 252—301). Cf. Entretiens XII p. 160. Cf. n. 5 7 - 5 8 . Lydus, mens. p. 159,5—8 θειος ό της έννάδος άριθμός έκ τριών τριάδων πληρούμενος καί τάς άκρότητας της θεολογίας κατά την Χαλδαικην φιλοσοφίαν, ώς φησιν ó Πορφύριος, άποσώζων. Cf. n. 52. As far as we can tell from the fragmentary remains of the 'Chaldaean Oracles' (see the edition of E. DES PLACES, Oracles Chaldaïques, Paris 1971) it was the neoplatonists who read these triads into the Oracles. Bearing always in mind the additional complication that Proclus demoted to a lower level the Chaldaean entities which Porphyry identified with the noetic triads. Cf. H A D O T , Porphyre et Victorinus I p. 263 — 5. In Crat. p. 59,14 PASQ. and theol. Plat. V.21 p. 290,33 PORTOS; V . l l p. 2 6 5 , 4 0 - 4 5 PORTUS.

127 128

Lydus, mens. p. 110,18f. cited in n. 64. πολλοΰ άρα δεήσομεν ήμείς του νοητού την άκρότητα λέγειν τον θεόν τον πρώτον, ώσπερ άκοΰω τινών έν θεολογίςι πρωτευσάντων, και τον έκεί πατέρα ποιείν τώ πάντων αίτίω τον αυτόν, referring, according to HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus I p. 259, to Porphyry.

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πατήρ, δύναμις and νους. This would then be the πατρικός νους of the Oracles, while the N o u s of the third triad would be the second N o u s of the Oracles. This seems about as far as we can stretch the attested evidence. We might finally mention the work being done on arabic sources which may be derived from Porphyry and which appear to contain doctrines about the first principle similar to those found in the anonymous commentary and Victorinus' passages discussed by HADOT. 129 This brings powerful corroborative support to HADOT'S picture of Porphyry's metaphysical doctrines but does not necessarily prove his authorship of the anonymous 'Parmenides' commentary. T w o important issues must be raised at this point. Firstly, was this complex interpretation of the 'Chaldaean Oracles' employed by Porphyry as a hermeneutic for the Oracles alone or did he then apply the interpretation of the Oracles to his metaphysical system in general? We note that, in the attested evidence, Porphyrian triadic metaphysics occurs only in an oracular context. We may, then, further ask whether our evidence derives from his 'Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles' or also from casual citations (with interpretation) of the Oracles in otherwise straight metaphysical expositions. Another question to be raised in this context is whether Porphyry's enneadic interpretation of the Oracles was inspired by a solution to the purely metaphysical problem of transcendence or whether the Oracles themselves prompted the notion of such a complex structure or did some cross fertilisation of ideas take place. These are questions which it is unlikely we will be able to answer given the state of the evidence, but which could, nevertheless, be important to bear in mind. Secondly we must ask how far we are to accept the thesis of P. HADOT which ascribes the anonymous commentary on the Tarmenides' to Porphyry. One certainly cannot dispute the light which this and the neoplatonic sections of Victorinus have thrown on the general nexus of metaphysical relationships at the level of the One and N o u s . But HADOT'S arguments, in particular, for the ascription of the anonymous commentary are not entirely conclusive. Moreover there remain some puzzling factors. It does seem odd, for example, that there should be no strongly discernible trace of the theories of the commentary in Proclus' 'Commentary on the Parmenides', which, though itself not fully extant, does deal with the metaphysical level discussed in the anonymous commentary. 1 3 0 And we know that Proclus used Porphyry's 'Commentary on the Parmenides'

129 130

C f . n. 239. Proclus deals with the O n e and just begins to deal with those sections of the 'Parmenides' (143 a) which the anonymous refers to nous when our text breaks off. See the comments of J . DILLON and G . R. MORROW, Proclus' C o m m e n t a r y on the Parmenides of Plato, Princeton 1986, intr. pp. xxvii—xxxi, w h o can find little echo of the ideas of the anonymous in Proclus' treatment where the comments of both on a particular passage are extant. I would add that I find it hard to imagine that the a n o n y m o u s ' ascription of a kind of γνώσις to the O n e — IV 32—3 μηδ' έν άγνοίςι μένει ποτε τών έσομένων. V 1 0 - 1 1 ότι φ η μ ί ε ί ν α ι γνώσιν εξω γνώσεως και άγνοιας άφ' ής ή γνώσις — would have escaped the attention of Iamblichus and Proclus.

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even if only indirectly through Iamblichus. Then the enneadic structure is not found in the anonymous commentary itself, but comes out clearly only in Victorinus. 1 3 1 H A D O T partly settles on Porphyry as the author by exclusion. But is it not possible that the commentary comes from the hand of someone influenced by Porphyry? 1 3 2 Proclus and Iamblichus speak of οί περί Πορφύριον and Augustine speaks vaguely of Platonici.133 It is not improbable that philosophical activity continued in Rome even after Porphyry's death. And what could be more natural than to study the 'Parmenides'? Might we not have in the anonymous commentary a rethinking, in a Platonic context, of a doctrine which Porphyry had expressed primarily in an Oracle context? 134 It does not seem impossible, indeed even quite likely, that some followers of Porphyry should, in carrying on the tradition, have absorbed much of Porphyry's vocabulary, expressions and ideas, have lectured on Porphyrian themes and shared his thought with others in the form of a commentary. In the present state of the question I think it methodologically wise to suspend judgement on the actual ascription of this commentary to Porphyry. H A D O T has, nevertheless, achieved two things. He has shown the existence of a complex metaphysical approach (leaning partly on an interpretation of the 'Chaldaean Oracles') which sought to clarify the relationship between the (plotinian) hypostases. The nucleus of ideas involved in this system, whether derived from one author (Porphyry?) or through several, may be recognised in Victorinus, Synesius and the anonymous commentary. Secondly, although this system, in all its complexity, cannot with certainty be ascribed to Porphyry, it does accord with some of the attested material, helps to explain it and further clarifies the notion that Porphyry contradicted himself. In particular it serves to highlight an important concern of Porphyry, the relationship of hypostases to each other and especially of the One to Nous. But I would be inclined to think that the sort of speculation that H A D O T ascribes to Porphyry was, in various forms, more widespread than has been supposed. 135

131

132

133 134

135

C f . V i c t o r i n . , adv. A r . 1.54,8; I V . 5 , 4 1 ; 2 1 , 2 6 - 3 1 ; h y m n . ILL 2 4 8 . HADOT, P o r p h y r e et

Victorinus I p. 267, uses the enneadic structure to explain certain anomalies in the anonymous commentary as, for example, the two minds at IX 5. The three theories (reported and criticised by Proci., in Parm. 1105,32 — 1106,1) attempting to explain ways in which the One contains in a transcendent mode what follows and for which parallels may be found in Victorinus, derive according to HADOT (Porphyre et Victorinus I p. 371 f.) from Porphyry even though they are ascribed by Proclus to three different (unnamed) sources. Did Proclus find all these views reported in Iamblichus' commentary or, if in Porphyry's, why does he ascribe them to three different groups? HADOT himself admits (ibid. p. 372) «il est toujours possible qu'il ait existé entre Piotiti et Proclus des commentateurs du Parménide inconnus de nous». See below § VII.4 p. 769. We note, in this regard, the preference which the anonymous commentator shows for the negative way as opposed to oracular revelations, particularly about the nature of the One. Cf. IX 8 - 2 0 . E.g. see the report of Proclus cited in n. 132 and on gnosticism in section VI. 6 below.

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Exegesis

1. Introduction That so much of Porphyry's output consisted of commentaries need cause no surprise when one considers the way in which later Greek thinkers worked within the confines of tradition, sometimes remoulding and reshaping it in a way that might almost suggest that they had broken out of it. Porphyry's successors were even more obviously dependent on the commentary format for the working out of their own ideas. Where they appear to differ from Porphyry is firstly in their systematic combination of different representatives of authority, whether Plato, Homer, Pythagoras or the 'Chaldaean Oracles', to express a single system and, secondly, in their hierarchical exegesis of individual texts. Whilst Porphyry acknowledged the role of all these authorities, he would not appear to have attempted to produce a cohesive system. Nor in his interpretation of individual texts did he attempt to smooth over all the difficulties by assigning different levels of meaning corresponding to different ontological levels. PRAECHTER136 who was one of the first to trace this line of development from Porphyry to Proclus did, however, overstate the case when he characterised Porphyry's method as unsystematic. J. PÉPIN137 has corrected this view by pointing out that the 'pluralism' of, for example, Porphyry's allegorical exposition of the Homeric cave of the nymphs 138 in his 'De antro nympharum' is far from unmethodical. It is true that Porphyry interprets the cave as a symbol, firstly of the sensible world, then of invisible powers and finally of the intelligible world. But it is equally clear that he retains only the first of these, that he is conscious of the pluralism of explanations139 — it is, therefore, deliberate — and that he has a distinct method. For he picks out three elements in Homer's picture of the cave — the darkness, the hardness of the rock and the flowing water — and by actually running through the possible interpretations comes to the conclusion that only the first interpretation gives an adequate meaning to all three elements. 140 Such a method could well accord with the exegetic principle of the εις σκοπός which, though developed more inclusively and systematically by Iamblichus, can be traced back at least to Origen 1 4 1 and may be mentioned by Porphyry. 142 The

136

137 138 139

140 141 142

Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus, Genethliakon für Carl Robert, Berlin 1911, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 5 6 ( = ID., Kleine Schriften, ed. H . DÖRRIE, Hildesheim 1973, pp. 1 6 5 - 2 1 6 ) . Porphyre, exégète d'Homère, Entretiens X I I pp. 231—266. Horn, ν 1 0 2 - 1 1 2 . Cf. p. 62,12—13 NAUCK έκ διαφόρων μέντοι και ον των αυτών έννοιών όρμώμενοι. 6 6 , 2 3 - 6 7 , 1 κέχρηνται δε τω μέλιτι οί θεολόγοι προς πολλά καί διάφορα σύμβολα δια το έκ πολλών αυτό συνεστάναι δυνάμεων. Ibid. 6 3 , 1 - 5 . De princ. IV.2.9 p. 3 2 1 , 1 1 - 1 2 KOETSCHAU του προηγουμένου σκοπού. antr. p. 79,19 NAUCK ού γαρ άπό σκοπού . . .

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judgement of Proclus that Porphyry interpreted the 'Timaeus' μερικώτερον and Iamblichus έποπτικώτερον seems to refer to a similar procedure. 1 4 3 This approach must, perhaps, be borne in mind when w e are trying to assess those fragmentary works (e.g. 'Περί Στυγός') where Porphyry cites or reports extensively from earlier writers. It is often difficult for us to avoid condemning this as prolixity or learned compilation. But w e must not exclude the possibility of an intelligent ordering which with just a little guidance from the author could reveal a logical train of thought. N o r must w e forget that the useful citation or summarising of the views of others could not be conveniently relegated to a footnote but, as for example in the case of Eusebius' Traeparatio evangelica', has to be worked into the text itself. PÉPIN 144 has pointed out that the 'Περί άγαλμάτων' often gives a plurality of interpretations without any apparent order, a feature of the work which PÉPIN puts d o w n to its early date as argued for by BIDEZ and BEUTLER. But an early date can be accepted only with great caution 1 4 5 and other factors, such as the possibility that our excerpts have been tailored, 1 4 6 143

in T i m . I 2 0 4 , 2 6 - 7 . C f . PÉPIN, E n t r e t i e n s X I I p p . 2 4 8 - 9 a n d ID.,

ΜΕΡΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ-

ΕΠΟΠΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ - Proclus en in Tim. I 204,24-27. Deux attitudes exégétiques dans le néoplatonisme, Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à H.-C. Puech, Paris 1974, pp. 3 2 3 - 3 3 0 . B u t P . HADOT ( E n t r e t i e n s X I I p . 267) u n d e r s t a n d s this as r e f e r r i n g t o t h e 144 145

146

different levels of philosophy. Entretiens XII p. 246. BIDEZ, Vie d e P o r p h y r e p p . 2 5 - 6 ; BEUTLER, R E 22,1 (1953) col. 2 9 5 s . v . P o r p h y r i o s ,

based on: 1) the identification of the demiurge with Nous rather than with Soul (Eus., praep. evang. III.9.3 t. I 127,17-18 and Stob. I 31,7-10. Cf. η. 62). But we have already seen (pp. 729—730 above) that these two views are not necessarily contradictory. 2) the use of myth and symbol to express the highest principles, e.g. Nous, whereas in an allegedly later period Porphyry restricted myth to Soul and below, allowing only analogy for the One and Nous. The evidence for this (Porphyry's name does not occur) is Macr. somn. 1.2.13 — 14 p. 6,18 — 7,4 sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophes admitiere fabulosa vel licita; sed his uti soient cum vel de anima vel de aeriis aetheriisve potestatibus vel de ceteris dis loquuntur. ceterum cum ad summum et principem omnium deum, qui apud Graecos ταγαθόν, qui πρώτον αίτιον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere, vel ad mentem, quem Graeci vovv appellant . . . nihil fabulosum penitus attingunt, sed siquid de his adsignare conantur quae non sermonem tantum modo sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines et exempla confugiunt. This may well reflect Porphyry's commentary on the 'Republic'; cf. COURCELLE, Lettres (op. cit. η. 40) p. 23 η. 5. But must we accept the incompatibility of the two views? Plotinus hinself could occasionally employ such symbols (Zeus as Nous, III.5.8,11-20; as the One, VI.9.7,21-26). A strong negative theology can coexist with very positive statements about the One as we can see in Plotinus and in the anonymous commentary on the 'Parmenides'. Particular context and circumstances may also have required a special emphasis and we know that Porphyry, in his commentary on the 'Republic', concerned himself particularly with the attacks of the Epicurean Colotes on Plato's 'Republic' and escpecially on the myth content (cf. Proci., in Rem. II 105,23ff.; Macr., somn. 1.1.5—6; 2,4-6; 17). F. BÖRTZLER, Porphyrios' Schrift von den Götterbildern, Diss. Erlangen 1903, pp. 12; 16—17, argues that Eusebius, though exact in his citations, often omits phrases or severely shortens passages. It is clear also that Porphyry is frequently drawing on traditional sources which wire themselves probably already overcompressed in many cases.

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should not be overlooked. In the last analysis, however, Porphyry's own scholarly and antiquarian bent must have played its part. One has the impression that he found it difficult to suppress any piece of information which interested him. Despite our caution it is hard to deny that this trait comes through in the fragments of 'Περί άγαλμάτων' e.g. in the three alternative symbolic meanings of the golden orb in the hand of the Egyptian statue of the moon. 1 4 7 But ritual symbolism of itself often proliferates interpretations — i.e. it need not have been Porphyry who compiled the different meanings — and the same trait is found in 'De antro nympharum' too, where Porphyry, despite his final preference for one interpretation, could not resist giving us all his research notes. When attacking the Christians Porphyry criticises their method of allegorical interpretation. Whether his criticisms of the Christian writers are always consistent with his own practice is unclear. 148 Didymus reports a Porphyrian reductio ad absurdum where he interprets Homer's Achilles as Christ and Hector as the devil, presumably a dig at the sometimes gratuitous allegorical interpretations of writers like Origen. 1 4 9 In 'Contra Christianos' F 6 9 1 5 0 criticism is levelled against the allegorical interpretation of passages where the literal meaning is scurrilous or repugnant. 151 A prerequisite for allegory is an unobjectionable literal meaning. In F 3 9 of the same work 1 5 2 he again attacks Origen's allegorical method, but for its inappropriateness (άναρμόστους τοις γεγραμμένοις).

2. Homer Like Iamblichus and Proclus later, Porphyry, too, seems to have regarded Homer as a 'philosopher'. But it is clear that in this, as in his general treatment of Homer, Porphyry was no innovator, but stood in a long tradition. 153 His

147

E u s . , praep. evang. I I I . 1 1 . 3 7 t. I 1 4 3 , 1 1 - 1 3 MRAS επί δε της κεφαλής σ φ α ί ρ α ν εχει χ ρ υ σ ή ν δ ι α τ ο μή μεταβαίνειν καί δ ι α την τών ά σ τ ρ ω ν ποικίλην φύσιν και οτι σ φ α ι ρ ο ειδής ó κόσμος.

148

E . g . in his interpretation of the H o m e r i c cave of the nymphs P o r p h y r y finds odd elements which can o n l y be explained symbolically (p. 5 7 , 1 7 — 2 0 NAUCK). This is a method of overcoming a literal difficulty which has a long history. C f . Z e n o , SVF I 2 7 4 p. 6 3 , 9 — 1 5 . P o r p h y r y himself ascribes it to C r o n i o s (antr. p. 5 6 , 6 — 9 NAUCK).

149

Papyrus fragment of his c o m m e n t a r y on 'Ecclesiastes', edited and discussed by G . BINDER, Eine Polemik des Porphyrios gegen die allegorische Auslegung des Alten Testaments durch die Christen, Zeitschr. f. Papyrologie u. Epigraphik 3 ( 1 9 6 8 ) pp.

150

81—95.

But drawn from Macarius Magnes, the ascription of whose pagan arguments must remain uncertain. Cf. S. PEZZELLA, Il problema del Κ α τ ά Χ ρ ι σ τ ι α ν ώ ν di Porfirio, E o s 5 2 . 1 ( 1 9 6 2 ) pp. 8 7 - 1 0 4 ; J . BARNES, P o r p h y r y , Against the Christians, J T h S 2 4 ( 1 9 7 3 ) pp. 4 2 5 - 4 4 2 ; A . MEREDITH, A N R W II 2 3 . 2 pp. 1 1 2 6 - 7 ( A r t . cit. n. 14).

151

Cf. PÉPIN, Entretiens X I I pp. 2 3 5 - 6 .

152

Hist. eccl. V I . 1 9 . 2 f f .

153

E . g . P s . - P l u t . , vit. et poesi H o r n . ; Heracleitus, allegoriae; Maximus of T y r e and Longinus. T h e tradition probably goes back to the Pythagoreans.

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work 'Περί της Ό μ η ρ ο υ φιλοσοφίας' does not survive 1 5 4 and his 'Quaestiones Homericae' are almost entirely philological in content. 1 5 5 Yet they do seem to contain occasional remarks which go beyond this description and suggest, if not a fully fledged allegorical approach, at least that allegorical interpretation was not alien to Porphyry when he composed the w o r k . 1 5 6 But these passages may, in fact, come from other works of Porphyry, the obvious candidate being the treatise on the philosophy of Homer mentioned above. If they do come from the 'Quaestiones Homericae' we might have to revise our views of it. There seem also to be no solid and water-tight arguments for dating these 'Quaestiones' to an early phase, although it seems likely that he would have concentrated on such matter in his days with Longinus. 1 5 7 Even if we do assign the work to the 250's must this also indicate an earlier stage of doctrinal development? I see no philosophical incompatibility between a work of mainly or entirely philological commentary and an essay of allegorical interpretation such as 'De antro nympharum'. If we judge from the clearly post-plotinian works Porphyry has a remarkable capacity for compartmentalisation. H e can be most Plotinian when, as in the 'Sententiae', he is dealing directly with metaphysical and Plotinian themes, but elsewhere hardly betrays it when keeping close to the demands of another genre or area of study. Only the first book (or part of it) of the 'Quaestiones Homericae' has survived in its original f o r m , 1 5 8 in a Vatican manuscript. Among the various Homeric scholia some are parallel to those of the Vatican manuscript. SCHRÄDER, who edited all of this, 1 5 9 not only used late manuscripts for his edition, but thinking, 154

155

156

Title only in Suda IV p. 178,24. Of another work 'Περί της έξ Ό μ η ρ ο υ ώφελείας των βασιλέων' we have only the title from the Suda, ibid. 178,27. A. R. SODANO, Prolegomeni primi alle fonti delle 'Quaestiones Homericae' di Porfirio. Un capitolo sulla storia dell'antica critica e filologia omerica, Pontificio Instituto Superiore di scienze e lettere 'S. Chiara', Napoli 1964, and his remarks in Entretiens XII p. 270. In II. O 13 p. 200,13 SCHRÄDER φητέον δε οτι φιλοσοφεί Ό μ η ρ ο ς , ibid. Α 399 p. 1 3 , 8 14,11 SCHRÄDER. C f . PÉPIN, Entretiens X I I p . 2 5 2 ; F . BUFFIÈRE, L e s mythes d ' H o m è r e

et la pensée grecque, Paris 1956, pp. 173—6. 1 5 7 The name of the dedicatee, Anatolius, gives us little help in dating the work. It seems likely that this is the same Anatolius who is referred to by Eunapius (vit. soph. V.1,2 p. 10,21 f. GIANGRANDE) as being a teacher of Iamblichus and τω μετά Πορφύριον τά δεύτερα φερομένω. (Does this mean 'standing in for Porphyry' who was in Sicily or 'who ranks next after'? — cf. DILLON, Iamblichus [op. cit. n. 26] p. 8.) But whether this Anatolius is to be identified with the Anatolius who was an Aristotelian scholar and later became bishop of Laodicea must remain speculation, although that this is not as impossible as ZELLER (Phil. d. Gr. III.2 p. 612 n. 1) believed has been shown by J . DILLON (op. cit. pp. 8—9). It is also plausible that the christian Anatolius could have been in Athens during the 250's. iss Vaticanus graecus 305 which may possibly be dated to 1314. 1 5 9 Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquiae, Leipzig 1880, and Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquiae, Leipzig 1890, ed. H. SCHRÄDER. It should be noted that SCHRÄDER did not include a number of scholia on Iliad bk. two ascribed to Porphyry, but edited them separately, Porphyrios bei Eustathios zur Β Ο Ι Ω Τ Ι Α , Hermes 14 (1879) pp. 2 3 1 - 2 5 2 . But H . ERBSE, Beiträge

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almost certainly erroneously, that the Porphyry material had already been distributed into scholia in late antiquity and concluding that the scholia material presented an earlier and better textual tradition, divided all the material, including the Vatican manuscript containing book one, into 'Iliad' and O d y s s e y ' scholia. The inadequacies of S C H R A D E R ' S treatment were pointed out by E R B S E 1 6 0 who thinks that the original form was still available in the late Byzantine period when it was first excerpted. The latest edition of the text by A. R. S O D A N O limits itself to a reconstruction of book one based on the Vatican manuscript. 161 In a column beside the Vatican text he prints a conjectural reconstruction from the scholia of the recensio of the original (called by him χ) from which the scholia were derived. One important result is to show how the Byzantine excerptors worked. Porphyry deals with individual problems, usually based on a single text, but often drawing in parallels from other texts, both 'Iliad' and O d y s s e y ' , on the principle of Aristarchus enunciated at the beginning that Homer is to be explained by Homer. 1 6 2 The excerptors then divided and redistributed the comments to the relevant places in the 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'. Is it possible to apply the reverse method to the remaining material where no check corresponding to the Vatican manuscript exists? This would be a task fraught with difficulties. For a start there seems to be no particular order or rationale in the problem areas which come up for discussion in book one. And since book one contains purely philological material are we, then, to reject from our reconstruction any philosophical material in the scholia? Should a future editor wait until more work has been done on the difficult textual tradition of the scholia? Probably the most useful work which could be done at the moment would be to try to identify possible nuclei ζητήματα around which Porphyrian material could be assembled. Such work would, of course, be highly speculative and any new edition of the remaining material would serve its purpose best if distributed as S C H R Ä D E R had done it but with extensive cross references. I see little prospect of either reconstructing the rest of the 'Quaestiones Homericae' or of disentangling material that may well come from other Porphyrian works on Homer. In this context it is worth considering that Porphyry himself describes the Quaestiones as a προγύμνασμα and says that he has postponed more serious examination. 163 A more philosophical treatment of Homeric material is to be found in the apparently independent essay ' O n the Styx', the title and fragments of which

160 161

zur Uberlieferung der Ilias-Scholien, Zetemata XXIV, München 1960, pp. 17—77, has shown that they, too, probably belong to the 'Quaestiones Horn. 1 Cf. also M. VAN DER VALK, Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad, Leiden 1963, t. I p. 63. loc. cit. n. 159. Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum Liber I, testo critico a cura di A . R . S O D A N O , Napoli 1970, and now Porfirio, Questioni Omeriche, Libro primo. Traduzione a cura di A . R. SODANO, con prefazione di A . GARZYA, N a p o l i 1973.

162 163

p. 1 , 1 2 - 1 3 S O D A N O αυτός μεν έαυτόν τα πολλά Ό μ η ρ ο ς έξηγείται. p. 1 , 2 4 - 2 8 S O D A N O τάς μεν μείζους εις Ό μ η ρ ο ν πραγματείας ύπερτιθέμενος εις καιρόν σκέψεως τον προσήκοντα, ταυτί δε οίον προγύμνασμα των είς αυτόν άγώνων.

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are preserved by Stobaeus. 1 6 4 PÉPIN has discussed in detail the theme of Heracles

and his reflection which occurs in these fragments. 165 Similar in vein are the unplaced fragments which we have mentioned in the context of transmigration of souls. 1 6 6 Although it seems likely that these fragments formed independent essays or even ζητήματα other occasional references to Porphyrian Homeric interpretation cannot be so easily placed. For example a Porphyrian reference in Macrobius to dreams 167 has been ascribed either to his work on the philosophy of Homer, 1 6 8 to the 'Quaestiones Homericae' 169 or to the 'Commentary on the Republic'. 170 Of course there is also no reason why such a topic might not have been treated in more than one work.

VI. Porphyry's Relationship

to other Philosophers and

Movements

Introduction Porphyry's immense learning and indefatigable curiosity have ensured that his lifework was deeply influenced in many different ways by other thinkers and traditions. He would have seen himself, of course, primarily as a Platonist. He did, after all, spend many years in the Academy under the direction of Longinus and then in the basically Platonic seminar of Plotinus. H e composed several commentaries on Plato and displays in his other works a Platonic spirit. 171 H o w

164

Stob. II 1 4 . 9 - 1 5 , 3 ; I 418,8-420,20; 4 2 0 , 2 1 - 4 2 1 , 8 ; 4 2 1 , 9 - 2 1 ; I 6 6 , 2 4 - 7 0 , 1 3 ; 4 2 1 , 2 2 427,3; 4 2 7 , 4 - 4 2 9 , 6 ; V 9 4 4 , 3 - 9 ; 8 7 3 , 1 0 - 1 5 . 165 PÉPIN, Héraclès et son reflet dans le néoplatonisme, in: Le Néoplatonisme, Paris (CNRS) 1971, pp. 1 6 7 - 1 9 2 . Cf. Horn, κ 6 0 1 - 4 ; Porph., π . Σ τ υ γ ό ς in Stob. I 423,21 £.; sent. 29. 166 Stob. 1 4 4 5 , 1 - 1 3 ; 445,14-448,3; 4 4 8 , 4 - 1 6 . Cf. n. 48. Although some of the same Homeric texts occur as in ' Π . Σ τ υ γ ό ς ' it is unlikely that these fragments belong to that work since they are not used to illuminate the Styx theme. E. KAISER, Odyssee-Szenen als Topoi II. Der Zauber Kirkes und Kalypsos, M H 21 (1964) pp. 1 9 7 - 2 2 4 , has put Porphyry's Circe interpretation (Stob. I 445,14f.) into its background (pp. 205—6). 167 Somn. 1.3.17 p. 12,11 — 12: auctore Porphyrie, qui in commentariis suis haec in eundem locum dicit ab Homero sub eadem divisione descriptum . . . 168 Β. L. GILDERSLEEVE, D e Porphyrii studiis Homericis, Diss. Göttingen 1853, p. 6; Η . SCHRÄDER, Quaest. Horn, in II., p. 352. 169 K. MRAS, Kommentar (op.cit. n. 40) p. 251. 170 COURCELLE, Lettres (op.cit. n. 40) p. 24 n. 2 referrring to Plato, resp. 383a where he mentions the dream of Agamemnon ( H o m e r Β 5 6 - 8 3 ) . The Agamemnon dream is mentioned by Macr., somn. 1.3.15 and later at 1 . 7 . 4 - 6 . It also appears in Proci., in Rem. I 115. Cf. J. FLAMANT, Macrobe et le néoplatonisme latin à la fin du IV e siècle, Études Préliminaires aux Religions orientales LVIII, Leiden 1979, pp. 162—3. 171 E.g. the concept of soul in ' Π . ψ υ χ ή ς π ρ ο ς Βόηθον', ' Π ρ ο ς Γαΰρον, συμμικτα ζητήματα', Ή . τ ω ν της ψ υ χ ή ς δυνάμεων', the defence of providence in ' Π ρ ο ς Νημερτιον', the theme of ' Π . τού Γνώθι σ α υ τ ό ν ' and the Platonic interpretation in ' Π . τοΰ έφ' ήμϊν'. O n e might add the metaphysical dimension given to universals in the treatment of Aristotle's logic.

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much are we to make of the fact that his 'Hist. Phil.' which significantly lays great stress on Pythagoras apparently ends in book IV with Plato? 1 7 2 This might, of course, have no further significance than the arbitrary limitation imposed by shortage of time or perhaps expresses the need of some colleague or pupil. Unassailable as his Platonism is, it caused him no lack of receptiveness to the ideas of other traditions, an outlook seen clearly in his judgment that Plotinus' writings are full of Stoic and Peripatetic teaching. 1 7 3 This receptiveness may be seen not only in Porphyry's scholarly interest in other traditions but in his exploitation and integration of some of their ideas and terminology.

1. Citation of earlier authors This is a topic we have already touched upon and which is fundamental to an understanding of Porphyry's relationship to tradition. It is also important for our understanding of the nature of those of his writings which survive only in fragments when these consist largely of citations or paraphrases of earlier authors. Further research in this area may also help us to decide with greater certainty how much of the early material cited by post-porphyrian authors who are known to have used Porphyry as a source may be drawn from Porphyry himself. 1 7 4 Insights into Porphyry's method of composition and use of sources must, however, begin with the more extensively surviving works. W. PÖTSCHER175 has shown that the 'Letter to Marcella' is not as random a set of heaped up aphorisms 1 7 6 as K. GASS 177 and R. BEUTLER178 had previously supposed. N o t only is there a clear plan and progression in the work, indicated by content and formal Unless some of the historical material in the Arabic tradition is to be traced back to this work. Cf. F. ROSENTHAL, Arabische Nachrichten über Zeno den Eleaten. Orientalia 6 (1937) 21—67; F. ALTHEIM and R. STIEHL, Porphyrios und Empedocles, Tübingen 1954. 1 7 3 vit. Plot. 1 4 , 4 - 7 . 1 7 4 E.g. the citation in Simplic., in Phys. of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Adrastus at 122,33 f. which P. MORAUX, Der Aristotelismus II, Berlin 1984, pp. 317—323, thinks was quoted by Porphyry himself. 175 PÖTSCHER, Marc. (op. cit. η. 17) pp. 103—4. 1 7 6 The source of these aphorisms, particularly the so-called 'Sentences of Sextus', has been a subject of debate for many years and still remains unresolved. J . GILDEMEISTER, Hermes 4 (1870) p. 84, put Sextus, despite the christian elements, before Porphyry. H . CHADWICK, The Sentences of Sextus, Cambridge 1959, supposes a common source for both 'Sextus' and Porphyry. K. GASS (op. cit. η. 177) was uncertain. G. ROCCA-SERRA, La lettre à Marcella de Porphyre et les sentences des Pythagoriciens, in: Le néoplatonisme, Paris 1971, pp. 193 — 199, suggests (p. 195) a double source, one used by Porphyry and some later collections, the other by Sextus. He rightly stresses (p. 199) the importance of providing a new edition of these various Pythagorean sententiae and an examination of their sources, attitudes and tendencies which would help to date them. This would greatly assist our understanding of Porphyry's relationship to the philosophical tradition, e.g. to what extent were Platonic meanings already implied in the collections?

172

177

178

Porphyrius in epistula ad Marcellam quibus fontibus et quomodo eis usus est, Diss. Bonn 1927, p. 46. R E 22.1 (1953) col. 293, s.v. Porphyrios.

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structural devices (repetition of words, balance of sentence etc.), but the many aphorisms are carefully built into the f l o w by, for example, the use in his o w n comments of words and concepts drawn from the aphorisms. These in turn are sometimes paraphrased or their wording slightly altered to fit into the verbal context. 1 7 9 In the 'De abstinentia' he also manipulates a wide variety of sources. J. 180 B O U F F A R T I G U E and M. P A T I L L O N have studied this in their Budé edition. Very often Porphyry can cite an author without giving any reference or warning. 1 8 1 Elsewhere quotations are utilised for his o w n argument by being taken out of context and even distorted. 1 8 2

2. Plato Porphyry possibly wrote commentaries on seven of Plato's dialogues — 'Phaedo', 'Cratylus', 'Sophist', 'Philebus', 'Timaeus', Tarmenides' and 'Republic', 1 8 3 an essay o n the 'Symposium' 1 8 4 and a review of the writings of Eubulus on certain Platonic enquiries. 1 8 5 It is unlikely that such works appealed to or reached a wide audience. T h e y are not, for example, mentioned in the list of Porphyry's writings in the 'Suda', which generally omits the commentary work of the later Platonists. 1 8 6

179

Cf. GASS, op. cit. η. 177, p. 70£f. and Porph., abst. pp. 134,23 —135,2 N A U C K for Porphyry's comment on his method - και ολως πάν το παρακείμενον, τα μεν αυτοί έφευρίσκοντες, τά δε παρά των παλαιών λαμβάνοντες άναγράφομεν, τοΰ συμμέτρου καί οικείου τη υποθέσει στοχαζόμενοι κατά δύναμιν. Did he sometimes introduce doctrinal changes? The answer to this question is complicated by our ignorance of the state of the sententiae when Porphyry drew on them. But cf. R O C C A - S E R R A , art. cit. n. 176, p. 198 comparing Sextus 134 and Marc. 13 p. 283,3 N A U C K where Porphyry adds καί εστίν αυτός, and Sextus 136 and Marc. 13 p. 283,4 where Porphyry converts ψυχή to τίς. leo Porphyre de l'abstinence livre I, t. I, Paris 1977, pp. xxv—xxxvii; 9—41; livres II et III, t. II, 1979, pp. 9 - 5 0 ; 138-151. 181 E.g. Plut., de soll. anim. 964A—C in abst. I 4—6. This should warn us against the overhasty ascription of the Stobaeus excerpts (I 445,14—448,16) to Plutarch because of Plutarchan phraseology and ideas. Cf. above n. 48. 182 Cf. P Ö T S C H E R , Theophrastus Π. εύσεβείας, Philosophia antiqua XI, Leiden 1964, pp. 120 ff. 183 All of these were also commented on by Proclus and Iamblichus (except, in the latter's case, for the 'Republic') and all except the 'Republic' were recommended for study in the developed neoplatonic school curriculum. Cf. the list in Anon., Prol. in Phil. Plat. 26 ed. W E S T E R I N K ; W E S T E R I N K , ibid., pp. xxxvii—xxxviii; Proci., in Ale. 11,11; D I L L O N , Iambi, (op. cit. n. 26) p. 264. 184 Ί Ί . έρωτος τοΰ έν Συμποσίω'. Cf. Etymologicum Magnum Genuinum, 'Ωκεανός. This is probably the same work as the defence of Plato against Diophanes referred to in vit. Plot. 15,6-17. 185 Cf. Porph., vit. Plot. 15,18-21. 186 In this regard it is interesting to note that his 'Timaeus' commentary was still available to Macrobius (cf. somn. II.3.15 p. 107,1—2 Porphyrias libris . . . quibus Timaei obscuri51 ANRW II 36.2

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Of these works only the 'Timaeus' commentary is adequately attested. 187 In the other cases there remains considerable doubt as to whether what survives formed part of full scale commentaries, essays on particular topics or sections of the relevant dialogue of Plato, or are even just casual references to Platonic passages which Porphyry may have made in separate monographs dedicated to specific topics. There are, however, in all the remaining six at least some grounds for accepting them as independent works even if their extent and scope remain unknown. In two cases we do have titles. Boethius refes to a 'Commentary on the Sophist' 188 and it seems likely that the bulk of his c De divisione' (i.e. excluding the Latin/Roman exempla) goes back to Porphyry who himself probably cited the views of Andronicus. 1 8 9 The term υπόμνημα is used by Damascius of a work on the 'Phaedo', 1 9 0 although the surviving two references could theoretically come from a more general treatise such as 'De regressu animae'. They deal with the interpretation of the φρουρά (Phd. 62 b4) where Porphyry rejects the interpretation of Numenius, Paterios and others whilst accepting that of Xenocrates 191 and with the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as harmony (Phd. 92e8—95a6) which he interprets as suggesting the mediating role of the soul. 192 A Thilebus' commentary is suggested by the references which Damascius gives us which are all closely bound to the text of the Thilebus'. 1 9 3 Moreover the phrase used by Simplicius έν τω Φιλήβω 1 9 4 must mean "in his (i.e. Porphyry's) Thilebus'" i.e. his commentary on the Thilebus' — and cannot here mean "in the Thilebus' of Plato". But a similar phrase, in an anonymous lexicon, 195 referring to the 'Cratylus', is, I think, too condensed to allow us to draw the same conclusion and affirm with confidence that Porphyry wrote a 'Cratylus' commentary. A T a r menides' commentary is never mentioned by name, but a reference in Damascius 196 is to such a detailed point of exegesis that it seems likely to have come from a commentary. The marginal glosses to a passage in Proclus' Tarmenides'

187

188

189

tatibus non nihil lucis infudit), though in what form (translation, excerpts?) we do not know. The title occurs in Philop., aet. mundi p. 126,13 — 14 έν τοις εις τον Τίμαιον νπομνήμασι. Cf. ibid. pp. 154,5—6; 521,26; 546,6 and Macr., somn. n. 186 above. Boethius, de divisione 876 D: in libri Piatonis qui Sophistes inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrie repetitur. M. PLEZIA, De Andronici Rhodii Studiis Aristotelicis, Kraków 1946, pp. 1 0 - 1 2 ; COURCELLE, Lettres (op. cit. n. 40) p. 265; P. MORAUX, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, t. I, Berlin 1 9 7 3 , p p .

190

191 192 193 194 195

196

120-132.

In Plat. Phd. 1.2 Greek Comm. t. II p. 29,5 WESTERINK οΰτω δε καί Πορφύριος προυπενόησεν έν τφ ύπομνήματι. Dam., in Phd. 1.2 Greek Comm. t. II p. 2 9 , 1 - 5 . Ibid. 11.59 t. II p. 319,9-12. Dam., in Phlb. 1 0 , 1 - 9 WEST.; 130,1-6; 134,1-18. Simplic., in Phys. pp. 453,25-454,19. BEKKER, Anecdota Gr. III p. 1374 Επιστήμη ώς εις έπίστασιν άγουσα τον νουν, φησίν ó Πορφύριος έν Κρατύλω. Dam., princ. II 238 p. 112,13 — 19 RUELLE. Porphyry discusses the meaning of τι in the phrase εν γέ τι (Parm. 144c5).

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commentary, 1 9 7 whilst not referring specifically to a 'Parmenides' commentary do secure for Porphyry a significant piece of Tarmenides' interpretation. Although Proclus alludes frequently in his own commentary to the views of his predecessors he rarely cites a name and those passages which J. DILLON 198 has conjecturally ascribed to Porphyry must unfortunately remain conjectural. Lastly we may turn to Porphyry's treatment of the 'Republic'. May we assume that Porphyry wrote a full commentary on this dialogue? All his references to the 'Republic', which could come from a commentary, deal with the myth of Er and it is perfectly possible that Porphyry, like Proclus after him, wrote an essay (or essays) on certain topics or parts of the dialogue. If the discussion of Agamemnon's dream in Proclus In Tim. I 155,14f. is derived from Porphyry a n d if it is from a 'Republic' commentary, it would provide the only topic dealt with outside the myth of E r . 1 9 9 The brief and tentative evidence we have of Porphyry's activity as a Platonic commentator gives us little real chance of assessing the scope of his work in this field. A few points can, however, be ventured which will also give us a good idea of the formidable problems involved in any kind of reconstruction or assessment. The 'Timaeus" commentary being the most extensively preserved provides the best starting point. 2 0 0 But it must be constantly borne in mind that, although many points of similarity may be discerned between this commentary and the remains of his other commentaries, this does not allow us to assume that the other commentaries followed the same pattern. O n e need go no further than Proclus' commentaries on the 'Timaeus' and 'Republic' to appreciate the different formats which a neoplatonic commentary could adopt. Porphyry's 'Timaeus' commentary seems almost certainly to have been a line by line commentary rather than a series of ζητήματα. He was also one of the first to think the first section (up to 2 7 b ) worth commenting o n . 2 0 1 Whereas the middleplatonic tradition in general would have taken the introduction at face value 197

P r o c i , in Parm. 1 0 5 3 , 3 6 - 1 0 5 4 , 3 7 .

198

Ibid.,

1089,30-1090,13;

1106,31-1107,9;

1114,1-19;

1118,19-25;

1140,26-1141,13;

1 1 5 0 , 2 - 2 1 ; 1 1 7 3 , 7 - 1 1 7 4 , 3 ; 1 2 1 6 , 1 5 - 3 7 ; 1 2 2 6 , 6 - 1 5 ; P r o c i , l a : . , in P a r m . p . 6 4 , 2 5 - 6 6 , 2 4 KLIBANSKY. C f . D I L L O N ( o p . c i t . n . 1 3 0 ) p . x x x i .

Cf. n. 170. 200 Fragments in A. R. SODANO, Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta, Napoli 1964. Cf. also SODANO, I frammenti dei commentari di Porfirio al Timeo di Platone nel De aeternitate mundi di Giovanni Filopono, Rend. Acc. Arch. Lett. Belle arti Napoli X X X V I I (1962) pp. 9 7 - 1 2 5 ; ID., Per un'edizione critica dei frammenti del commento di Porfirio al Timeo di Platone. La problematica e la metodologia critica delle fonti, Atti dell'Accademia pontaniana Napoli N.S. 12 (1963) pp. 9 1 - 1 3 7 ; ID., Quid Macrobius de mundi aeternitate senserit quibusque fontibus usus sit, Antiquité classique 32 (1963) I, pp. 4 8 - 6 2 . 2 0 1 Cf. in Tim. F 27 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 204,24f.). I think that SODANO ought to have included the previous lines (16—24) in which we are told that Severus did not consider the prooemium worthy of comment and Longinus used to connect 20 c to 27a (είώθει συνάπτειν) as the section between (Atlantis and the conversation with the Egyptian priest) he considered superfluous. This sounds like a reminiscence of Porphyry's personal experience with Longinus. Cf. DILLON, Iambi, (op. cit. n. 26) p. 295. 199

51*

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P o r p h y r y read i n t o it an ethical m e a n i n g . 2 0 2 B u t this is a far cry f r o m the sort of m e t a p h y s i c a l m e a n i n g s read i n t o the i n t r o d u c t i o n s of P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e s b y P r o c l u s ( e . g . in his T a r m e n i d e s ' c o m m e n t a r y ) . W h e n it c a m e t o the s t o r y o f the w a r b e t w e e n the A t h e n i a n s and t h e m e n of Atlantis P o r p h y r y t o o turned t o m e t a p h y s i c a l interpretation, t h o u g h here he w a s certainly f o l l o w i n g a tradition already represented b y N u m e n i u s and o t h e r s . 2 0 3 Similarly in the ' R e p u b l i c ' c o m m e n t a r y he interprets m e t a p h y s i c a l l y certain features o f the m y t h o f Er — the c o l u m n of light is the vehicle of the w o r l d - s o u l and the p r o p h e t is a lunar m i n d . 2 0 4 W h e t h e r he c o m m e n t e d o n the w h o l e 'Timaeus' w e c a n n o t s a y . 2 0 5 A n d a l t h o u g h the w o r k w a s a c o n t i n u o u s c o m m e n t a r y it is likely that m o r e extensive treatment w a s g i v e n t o certain s e c t i o n s w h i c h p r o m p t e d particular t h e m e s e . g . the topic of p r a y e r 2 0 6 or t h e h a r m o n y of t h e s p h e r e s . 2 0 7 A similarly grand treatment of the w h o l e role of m y t h m a y be seen in the 'Republic 5 c o m m e n t a r y , a l t h o u g h this m a y have b e e n a separate e s s a y . 2 0 8 A g o o d illustration o f his m e t h o d m a y be seen in his c o m m e n t o n T i m a e u s 3 0 a 2 0 9 w h e r e h e is stimulated as s o o f t e n , 2 1 0

202

203

204

205

206 207 208

209 210

E.g. according to Porph., in Tim. F 5 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 29,31 f.) Timaeus 1 7 a 6 - 7 teaches a lesson in φιλία. All of this fits in with the idea that the 'Tim.' discussion in following on from the 'resp.' points to the need for practical before theoretical virtues. Grantor (Proci., in Tim. I 76,1) called the introduction ιστορία ψιλή, Calcidius considered all up to 31 c as simplex narratio (comm. IV 71 p. 58,27). Porphyry refers to the metaphysical interpretation of Origen and Numenius at F 10 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 77, 6-24). Cf. Proci., in Rem. II 196,22-197,16; Simplic., in Phys. 615,32-5; Proci., in Rem. II 2 5 5 , 4 - 9 . . . 256,9-14. The clearly attested fragments take us up to 41 e. It is likely that he went further — we can trace Iamblichus at least up to 52 ab (F 90 D I L L O N ) . If we accept WASZINK'S late dating for Calcidius (Comm., praef. pp. ix-xvii) and his selective use of Porphyry as S O D A N O does, Porph. in Tim. Frag. (op. cit. n. 200) p. xiv, we may find evidence for comment on Tim. 45—6. But D I L L O N ' S (The Middleplatonists. A study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A . D . 220, London 1972, pp. 401-404) doubts about WASZINK'S dating and his warnings on the dangers of presuming that we can always easily distinguish middle and neoplatonic doctrines should lead us to exercise caution here and not exclude the possibility that Calcidius is pre-Porphyrian. p 2 8 - 2 9 S O D A N O (Proci., in Tim. I 207-209,1. F 6 5 - 6 8 S O D A N O (Macr., somn. I I . 1 . 5 - 7 ; 1 4 - 2 5 ; 2 . 1 - 2 0 ; 3 . 1 - 3 ) . SODANO, Porfirio Commentatore di Platone, Entretiens XII pp. 198ff., wishes to take the reference to Porphyry on myth in Proci., in Rem. I 105f. beyond 107,14. Cf. also THEILER, Der Mythos und die Götter Griechenlands, in: Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur, Berlin 1970, pp. 130—147. HADOT, in: Entretiens XII p. 227, referring to S O D A N O ' S comparison of Proclus and certain passages in Macr., somn. 1.2, notes the coherence of 1.2. as a whole and suggests that it may derive from a Porphyrian grand treatment of myth in his Republic commentary. F 51 SODANO (Proci, in Tim. I 391,4-396,26). E.g. by Longinus' problems (in Tim. F 6 SODANO / Proci., in Tim. I 51,9-13), the criticisms of the Epicurean Hermachus (ibid. F 29 / Proci, ibid 216,18—25), Atticus again (F 53 / Proci. I 431,20-3), those who posit many worlds (F55 / Proci. I 439,29-440,16), those who put soul spatially in the centre of the universe (F61 / Proci. II 104,30— 105,6) and in the 'Republic' commentary his treatment of myth derives from the defence against the attack of Colotes.

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by the comment of a predecessor, in this case Atticus. It is clear that Porphyry frequently reports the views of others, accepting or rejecting their interpretations and probably often citing them extensively. 211 In this instance it is interesting to see how he begins with general metaphysical arguments against Atticus. He then moves to citing supporting texts from other works of Plato. In this argument he mentions Resp. 508c; Ep. 312e; Phlb. 23c; Soph. 238ff. to support the idea of one principle against dualism. In explaining how the incorporeal works an external effect by inner power he gives as examples the λόγος in man's seed, the working of φαντασία and appeals to the theologians' theories of how daemones can effect φωταγωγίαι. Elsewhere 212 we have a reference to Indians and Chaldaeans. A similar warning against introducing a form of dualism by making ΰλη independent of the One comes again under the lemma 31b 1—3.213 If, as seems more likely, Porphyry and not Proclus is responsible for making the remark under this lemma, it becomes clear that Porphyry did not put all his arguments together, essay style, in one place, but added to the points made in a major comment as and when he reached further relevant texts. A final couple of remarks may help to give such commentary work a more meaningful and human face. The comment on prayer reminds us in its vocabulary, ideas and tone of earnestness 214 of the pious exhortations of the 'Letter to Marcella'. This should serve as a warning that such passages of moral and religious character need not be restricted to particular genres. And then there is the occasional revelation of Porphyry's character and the inner working of a neoplatonic school as, for example, when he tells us 215 how he once came into a seminar where Amelius was interpreting the Timaeus' and disagreed on a textual point that had caused a philosophical difficulty. Porphyry notes that Amelius was somewhat put out by this intervention. Indeed there was probably a certain amount of rivalry betwen them. 2 1 6 But it is a nice touch when Porphyry remarks

211

212

E.g. F 28 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 207,24—6) on prayer — διοριζόμενος τίνες μεν των παλαιών προσηκαντο την εύχήν, τίνες δε οϋ, περιήγαγεν ημάς έπ' άλλας και άλλας δόξας. Cf. Porph., in Phd. in Dam., in Phd. 1.2. Greek Comm. II p. 2 9 , 1 - 5 WEST., choosing the interpretation of Xenocrates rather than that of Numenius and Paterios. The doxography in Proci., in Rem. II 96,10—15, probably comes from Porphyry's 'Republic' commentary (cf. THEILER, Forsch, [op. cit. n. 119] p. 83) and Porphyry reviewed and rejected several interpretations of the number twelve in the myth of Er (Proci., in Rem. II 120,15-24). F 28 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 208,18F.). Daemones also appear in F 17 (Proci., in Tim. I 152,10—28) and are brought in as examples in F 57 (Proci, in Tim. II 11,8 —18), testimony enough that Porphyry took such things seriously through his Plotinian days. It is likely too that we can detect the influence of the 'Chaldaean Oracles' in F 79 (Proci., in Tim. III 64,5f.). Cf. DILLON, Middleplatonists (op.cit. n. 205) p. 403.

213

F 5 6 SODANO ( P r o c i . , in T i m . II 4 5 6 , 3 1 - 4 5 7 , 1 1 ) .

214

F 28 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 207,23—209,1) esp. 208,12f. ώς παιδας πατέρων άποσπασθέντας εϋχεσθαι προσήκει περί της προς τους άληθινούς ημών πατέρας, τους θεούς, άπανόδου. ibid. 25 σωτηρίαν. F 74 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. II 300,23-301,2). Cf. the criticism of Amelius in vit. Plot. 4,5f.

215 216

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that he later came across a supporter of Amelius' reading, which, he says, would have pleased him had he been still alive. This anecdote should also alert us to the fact that some of Porphyry's reports of the doctrines of those with whom he had enjoyed personal contact may derive from his own lecture notes and memory of what they had said rather than from their written works.

3. Aristotle Hierocles' simple classification into separate groups of those who stood by Plato and those who maintained the essential harmony of Plato and Aristotle surely oversimplifies many a more nuanced standpoint. 2 1 7 Porphyry's own stance is not easy to determine. It is unfortunate that nothing but the title is recorded of two works which bear on this problem. 2 1 8 And from these alone it is unclear whether they refer to the same work and whether Porphyry took an essentially negative or positive approach to the question. R. WALZER219 has drawn attention to the compilation of Plato and Aristotle texts by the tenth century Arabic philosopher Al-Amirî which gives the impression that they held non contradictory views, a compilation which may go back to Porphyry. These texts have, however, remained unexamined. Porphyry could certainly show hostility to some doctrines of Aristotle e.g. in psychology, becoming even vehement in his work against Boethus. 2 2 0 H e probably also wrote a further work attacking Aristotle on this point. 2 2 1 Although HENRY, SCHWYZER and BEUTLER have all argued that the title of this work derives from the book against Boethus and does not constitute a separate w o r k , 2 2 2 their arguments are not fully convincing. Proclus, too, in attacking a specific instance of Peripatetic contamination clearly does not include Porphyry in his strictures. 2 2 3

217

218

219

220

221 222

223

Hierocles, Ή . προνοίας 1 in Phot., bibl. 173a 18—32; 171 b 3 3 f f . Cf. DÖRRIE, A m m o n i u s , der Lehrer Plotins, Hermes 83 (1955) pp. 462f. Cf. Elias, in Porph. Isag. 39,6—8 ου γαρ μόνον ή παρούσα πραγματεία αύτω γ έ γ ρ α π τ α ι προς Χ ρ υ σ α ό ρ ι ο ν , άλλα καί άλλαι, οιον το Π ε ρ ί διαστάσεως Πλάτωνος και 'Αριστοτέλους. Suda IV p. 1 7 8 , 2 1 - 2 Π ε ρ ί τοΰ μίαν ε ί ν α ι την Πλάτωνος καί 'Αριστοτέλους α ϊ ρ ε σ ι ν ζ'. If we examine the usual practice with titles expressed in this way we usually find that they are positive i.e. the author accepts the idea embodied in the title. Porphyry and the Arabic Tradition, Entretiens X I I pp. 2 7 5 - 2 9 7 . E s p . pp. 2 8 6 - 2 9 4 . Further on Porphyry in the Arabic tradition cf. WALZER, Greek into Arabic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy, O x f o r d 1962; art., Furfüriyüs, Encyclopaedia of Islam II 9 4 8 - 9 , L o n d o n / L e i d e n 1965. C f . fragments of the work 'Π. ψ υ χ ή ς προς Β ό η θ ο ν ' , esp. E u s . , praep. evang. XV.10—11 t. II 3 7 3 , 2 3 - 3 7 5 , 4 MRAS and the particular vehemence at t. II 3 7 4 , 2 1 - 2 2 πώς γ α ρ ουκ αισχρός ó έντελέχειαν τ ι θ ε ί ς την ψ υ χ ή ν λόγος σώματος φυσικοΰ ο ρ γ α ν ι κ ο ύ ; C f . Suda IV p. 178,24—5 Π ρ ο ς Ά ρ ι σ τ ο τ έ λ η ν ( π ε ρ ί ) τοΰ ε ί ν α ι την ψ υ χ ή ν έντελέχειαν. HENRY, Études Class. 6 (1937) pp. 1 6 1 - 2 ; SCHWYZER, R E 21.1 (1951) col. 582 s . v . Plotinos, 19f. BEUTLER, R E 22.1 (1953) col. 289, s . v . Porphyrios. Theol. Plat. II 89 t. II p. 31,21 f. SAFFREY-WEST.

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O n balance it looks as if Porphyry did try to effect a bridge, 224 though doubtlessly critical on many points. In pursuing such a course it is difficult to determine to what extent he went beyond the lead that had already been given. Certainly in logic his work finally secured for Aristotelian logic a fixed place in the neoplatonic curriculum. 225 Interesting in this field is his commentary on the 'Sophist' in which the Platonic methods of division and definition are discussed in Aristotelian terminology. 226 But how much of this is due to Andronicus and how much to Porphyry is open to dispute. It is to be remembered, too, that those nearer to the time of Aristotle would have been more aware of the common heritage with Plato than we tend to be and Diogenes Laertius does record the titles of books by both Aristotle and Theophrastus devoted to division. 227 Little basic work has been done on Porphyry's Aristotelian commentaries. Athough I have assembled in my forthcoming edition the named fragments of Porphyry's larger commentary on the 'Categories', more unnamed material could probably be collected by carefully comparing the work of the Greek commentators. 2 2 8 A start has, however, been made. The 'Isagoge' has now been translated and annotated by E. W. WARREN229 and the fragments of the commentary on the 'Physics' translated into Italian with a lengthy introduction by F. ROMANO.230

4. Plotinus However strong and fundamental was the influence of the work of Plato, which Porphyry and Plotinus shared, or the legacy of middleplatonism, the contact with Plotinus' thought must have had a profound impact on Porphyry. It may be seen in three areas, each of which has been greatly illuminated in recent times. Firstly there is the edition of Plotinus' 'Enneads' which Porphyry published some thirty years after his death, 2 3 1 secondly his commentaries on the Έ η 224

225

226

227 228

229

230

231

Cf. HADOT, L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le Commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories, Plotino e il Neoplatonismo, Roma 1974, pp. 3 1 - 4 7 , assigns Dex. 40,13—42,3, commenting on Arist. met. Λ , to Porphyry rather than to Iamblichus. Cf. A. C. LLOYD, Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic, Phronesis 1 (1955—6) pp. 48—72; 146-159. MORAUX, Aristotelismus I pp. 120—132, speaks of a „Verschmelzung des Porphyries und Aristoteles". Diog. Laert. V 23; 46. Cf. P. HENRY, Trois apories orales de Plotin sur les Catégories, in: Zetesis. Album amicorum aangeboden aan E. de Strycker, Antwerpen 1973, pp. 234—265. Porphyry the Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and N o t e s , The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1975. Porfirio e la fisica aristotelica. In appendice la traduzione dei frammenti e delle testimonianze del 'Commentario alla Fisica', Università di Catania 1985. For which see the preliminary work to the major edition of the 'Enneads' (edd. P. HENRY and H . - R . SCHWYZER, Plotini Opera, t. I—III, Bruxelles 1951 — 1973) by P. HENRY, Études Plotiniennes, t. I Les États du texte de Plotin, Paris/Bruxelles 1938; t. II Les manuscrits

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neads' and thirdly the general Plotinian influence which may be observed most intensely in the 'Sententiae'. Porphyry testifies himself to a c o m m e n t a r y . 2 3 2 The problems begin with the attempts to connect various arabic material with this commentary and to interpret the precise meaning of the κεφάλαια and επιχειρήματα composed by P o r p h y r y 2 3 3 and how they might relate to the Arabic material. The so-called T h e o l o g y of Aristotle' must certainly owe something to Porphyry who is named twice as interpreter in the introduction, 2 3 4 the second time just after a mention of 'the heads of the problems which the philosopher promised to expound'. It has been plausibly argued 2 3 5 that the headings which follow (reproduced by LEWIS on the relevant page of the Greek text of the 'Enneads') reflect in some form Porphyry's κεφάλαια and perhaps also the έπιχειρήματα. The exact difference between the two is unclear, the latter being probably more discursive. K. WILKENS and M . - O . GOULET-CAZÉ have explored the usage of these terms elsewhere in order to throw light on their meaning in P o r p h y r y . 2 3 6 It has long been surmised that the 'Theology of Aristotle' derived from Porphyry's commentaries. 2 3 7 P. THILLET 238 has recently adduced evidence to

232

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des Ennéades, Paris/Bruxelles 1941 (19482), and now: Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin, I Travaux préliminaires et index grec complet, L. BRISSON et al., Paris 1982, esp. pp. 280—327 'L'édition Porphyrienne des Ennéades. État de la question', by M . - O . G O U L E T - C A Z É . vit. Plot. 26,29-37. Cf. Eunapius, vit. soph. III.4 p. 6,5 GIANGRANDE (cf. also ibid. IV. 1.9 p. 8 , 4 - 9 and the discussion of this evidence by GOULET-CAZÉ, op. cit. pp. 307ff. However, it is still not clear to me that Aeneas of Gaza, Theoph. 961A p. 45,4—9 COL., is referring to two works, a Chaldaean commentary and a commentary on Ennead 1.8, as G O U L E T — C A Z É thinks, or to just a Chaldaean commentary in which he referred to Plotinus). vit. Plot. 26,29-37. See the English translation based on a new text by G . LEWIS in: Plotini Opera II pp. 486 and 488. The main text, which consists largely of paraphrases, interspersed with elaboration, of parts of Enneads IV.3; 4; 7; 8; V.l; 2; 8; VI.7 is printed in an English translation opposite the relevant texts of the 'Enneads' in HENRY—SCHWYZER, t. II. Cf. H.-R. SCHWYZER, Die pseudo-aristotelische Theologie und die Plotin-Ausgabe des Porphyrios, RhM 90 (1941) pp. 216-236, esp. 218. Cf. Κ. WILKENS, Zwei Anmerkungen zur Plotinausgabe des Porphyrios, Hermes 105 (1977) pp. 275-289. GOULET-CAZÉ, Porphyre (op. cit. n. 231) pp. 315ff. E.g. W. THEILER, ByZ 41 (1941) p. 170; R. WALZER, Encyclopedia of Islam II (1965), pp. 948—49, s.v. Furfüriyüs; ID., Entretiens XII p. 297; DÖRRIE, Gnomon 36 (1964) p. 464. An indirect attempt to prove Porphyrian authorship was made by P. KUTSCH, Ein arabisches Bruchstück aus Porphyrios (?) περί ψυχής und die Frage des Verfassers der Theologie des Aristoteles, Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph, Beyrouth t. 31 (1954) pp. 263—286, who argued for Porphyrian authorship of the arabic 'Dicta Sapientis Graeci' (which partially overlaps and supplements the Theology — relevant texts translated by LEWIS in Plot. Opera t. II edd. H . - S . ) by identifying the sapiens with Porphyry (rather than with Plotinus, for which see F. ROSENTHAL. As-Sayh al-Yünäml and the Arabic Plotinus source, Oriental« 21 (1952) pp. 461-492; 22 (1953) pp. 370-400; 24 (1955) pp. 42—66). But because Porphyry is referred to twice as γέρων (Socr., hist. eccl. 440A; Liban., XVIII 178 p. 314,4 FOESTER) and once as πρεσβύτης (Dam., princ. I 292,10, though Porphyry's name does nor occur here) seems flimsy evidence for identifying all similar arabic references with Porphyry. KUTSCH also makes the interesting suggestion

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support its Porphyrian origin by pointing out the use of such Porphyrian terms as σχέσις and όντότης and themes such as transmigration (avoided in the paraphrase), causal explanation of relationship of hypostases and the notion of ανοησία κρείττων νοήσεως (cf. sent. 29). Important as such researches are, and one would like to see more work on these lines, it could be unwise to accept their results as definitive when we recall that the 'Theology' is a translation twice removed (it appears to have been transmitted through Syriac as T H I L L E T himself admits), that the position of Porphyry on certain doctrines (e.g. transmigration) is far from clear to us, and that Porphyry's exclusive proprietorial rights to certain terms cannot be established. Nevertheless the need for further study of the Arabic tradition cannot be overstressed and we may hope to cast new light on the history of neoplatonism from this source. An example of this is the important connection with the doctrine of the anonymous commentator on the 'Parmenides' which has been established by S. PINÈS,239 in a tantalisingly fruitful line of research. In my 'Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition' I tried to show that Porphyry was basically loyal to Plotinus in a number of central issues, but sometimes differed from him in temperament and emphasis so that, for example, he did not share Plotinus' more radical eschatology. One of the sources discussed was the 'Sententiae' which furnishes one of the most obvious means of assessing the relationship of Porphyry's metaphysics to that of Plotinus since in this work Plotinian phrases, references and ideas abound. Two difficulties, however, must be taken into account if we wish to assess Porphyry's relationship to Plotinus in the 'Sententiae': 1. The work as it survives is almost certainly incomplete and the ordering of the chapters in places uncertain. 2. The purpose of the work and its models, if any, are all matters of conjecture. It seems clear, however, that it is not to be confused with the commentaries, κεφάλαια and επιχειρήματα mentioned in the 'Vita Plotini'. 240 Porphyry, per-

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that the 'Theology of Aristotle' may have derived from an 'Aristotelian Theology' by Porphyry (much like the later 'Platonic Theology' of Proclus), since the 'Ennead' passages are split up to follow an Aristotelian plan. This does not, however, explain w h y the work follows the 'Enneads' so closely. Indices Porphyriens dans la Théologie d'Aristote, Le néoplatonisme, Paris 1971, pp. 293-302. S. PINÈS, Écrits 'plotiniens' arabes et tradition Porphyrienne, in: Le néoplatonisme, Paris 1971, pp. 303—313 (dealing also with the 'Dicta Sap. Gr.', and the 'Epistola de scientia divina'). In these texts he recognises several doctrines which seem similar to those in HADOT'S Victorinus-anonymous material e.g. the first cause is το είναι; it is cause of the being of things and their form whereas Intellect is cause only of form; it acts by its existence. Cf. Β. MOMMERT pp. XXX—xxxii of his edition of the 'Sententiae', Leipzig 1907; H . - R . SCHWYZER, P l o t i n i s c h e s u n d U n p l o t i n i s c h e s i n d e r Ά Φ Ο Ρ Μ Α Ι

des P o r p h y r i o s , in: Plo-

tino e il Neoplatonismo, Roma 1974, (pp. 221—252) p. 222 n. 2.

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haps, modelled himself on such collections as the 'Κύριαι δόξαι' of Epicurus, the "Εγχειρίδιον' of Epictetus or even the 'Διδασκαλικός των Πλάτωνος δογμάτων' of Albinus. It has also been suggested that the miscellaneous collection of Plotinian items gathered together by Porphyry in Ennead III.9. might have prompted the sort of brief dogmatic treatment of the 'Sententiae'. 241 It is also worth remembering here the common working method of Porphyry by which he incorporates citations and indirect references to other authors as, for example, in 'De abstinentia' or the 'Letter to Marcella'. Any attempt to relate the 'Sententiae' to the 'Enneads' must begin with the important parallels adduced in E. L A M B E R Z ' S edition of the Sententiae 242 and the article of H.-R. S C H W Y Z E R already referred to. Although S C H W Y Z E R discovers many differences of vocabulary, expression and formulation he concludes that the thought remains substantially identical to that of Plotinus. It is, perhaps, of interest that although Porphyry sometimes seems to avoid Plotinian neologisms he introduces a considerable number of his own. 2 4 3 Here, then, is no slavish copying of an original. S C H W Y Z E R produces many detailed examples of apparent differences from Plotinus. But these, on closer inspection, turn out to be philosophically insignificant. One could, however, make more of a general tendency which S C H W Y Z E R notes towards systématisation, frequently leading to distortion of the starting point in Plotinus. Of the details I would mention, for example, the use of μετριοπάθεια 2 4 4 which does not occur in Plotinus. This is a Peripatetic term aimed at Stoic άπάθεια. 2 4 5 But Plotinus does use the c o n c e p t in the context of the classic slave/servant contrast. 246 In Sent. 18 the ascription of το πάσχειν to άσώματα seems unplotinian. But doesn't Porphyry really mean 'socalled πάσχειν'? And when he refers to reciprocal influences when discussing incorporeals and corporeals in Sent. 35 247 it is not the extremes which suffer but το δ' εν μέσφ. Distortion caused by systématisation may be illustrated by three examples. In Sent. 37, as often, he systématisés by producing neat (and memorable?) antitheses which in this case produce the odd and redundant notion ουδέν έπεισελθόν άσώματον διέκοψε την ενωσιν as a parallel, one presumes, to ουδέ σώμα

241

242

243 244 245 246 247

SCHWYZER, art.cit., p. 232. The first chapter of III.9 is, however, more exploratory than the rest. Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. E. LAMBERZ, Leipzig 1975. This edition builds on the material gathered by MOMMERT (Leipzig 1907). LAMBERZ gives copious references to modern discussions and improves MOMMERT'S text by a new assessment of the manuscript tradition and the incorporation of recent work on the textual tradition of Plotinus. There is n o w also an Italian translation and commentary by A. R. SODANO, Porfirio, Introduzione agli intelligibili, Napoli 1979. And there is much useful comment in the unpublished Ph. D . dissertation of MARGARET CURTIS, The philosophical interpretation of Porphyry's Sententiae in relation to its sources, Manchester 1979. They are listed by SCHWYZER, art. cit. n. 240, pp. 2 5 1 - 2 . sent. 32: p. 23,4; 25,7; 29,14; 34,19. D i o g . Laert. V.31. IV. 4.34,3 μέτρια π α ρ ' α υ τ ο ί π ά σ χ ε ι ν . p. 40,20f.

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συνεμπεσόν αποκόπτει τήν ενωσιν 2 4 8 which is a standard Plotinian idea. In the two other instances, however, the effect is different. What was fluid and flexible in Plotinus is hardened in the 'Sententiae'. Thus in Sent. 22 the term μερικός νους is employed, 2 4 9 a term not found in Plotinus. Moreover Porphyry speaks of νοερά ουσία as being όμοιομερής whereas Plotinus is much more cautious, even negative, in his use of this term for incorporeals, going only so far as to debate its use and, even then, qualifying it with οίον. 2 5 0 Yet although Plotinus seems to avoid μέρος words when speaking of νους (he is much freer when it comes to soul) he does admit this sort of vocabulary on one occasion. 251 In the third case 252 we see a form of systematising which seems to distort not only Plotinus' thought but Porphyry's own thought as attested elsewhere. Here Porphyry, in very abbreviated form, summarises three ways in which producers relate to their products. The first could refer to the One (or Nous), the second and third seem equally applicable to soul, but in its different aspects. For soul can look up or down, but looks down only in its lower phase 253 whilst the higher soul always looks up. The third category may include the forms or soul when it has fettered itself totally to body. In this formulation the rather fluid position of soul, which both Porphyry and Plotinus accepted, fits uncomfortably into the straight)acket of this brief rubric which could lead to distortion if one were to build up one's neoplatonic philosophising from this concise description and use it as a sort of fixed definition, rather than as a mnemonic to serve a more flexible presentation. We must ask ourselves how far such distortions reflect a tendency in Porphyry's thought that would have found equal expression in a longer format and how far they are a product simply of the confines of the concise style he adopted in this particular work. Finally a few words must be said about the longest chapter in the work, 32 on virtue, where, without the constraints of brevity, he still manages to alter the import of Plotinus' exposition in Ennead 1.2. which he follows very closely. This distortion which has long attracted attention J. DILLON254 would attribute not to Porphyry's misunderstanding Plotinus but to the fact that "he feels he is 248 249 250

251

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253 254

p. 4 4 , 2 - 3 and 9. Cf. also sent. 30 p. 20,17 μερισταΐς ύποστάσεσι. V . 3 . 5 , 3 - 4 χί ούν, ει π ά ν τοιούτον οίον όμοιομερες είναι, ώστε το όρων μηδέν διαφέρειν τού όρωμένου; VI.2.20,lf. Cf. SMITH, Potentiality and the Problem of Plurality in the Intelligible world, in: Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in honour of A. H . Armstrong, ed. by H . J . B L U M E N T H A L - R . A. M A R K U S , London 1 9 8 1 , (pp. 9 9 - 1 0 7 ) p. 1 0 1 . sent. 13 p. 5,11—6,4 των δε γεννώντων τ α μεν ο ύ δ ' όλως επιστρέφει π ρ ο ς τ α γεννηθέντα, τ α δε καί έπιστρέφει καί ουκ επιστρέφει, τα δε μόνον έπέστραπται π ρ ο ς τ α γεννήματα εις έαυτά μή έπιστρέφοντα. IV.3.12,28-30. Cf. Ο . ScHissEL, Marinus von Neapolis und die neuplatonischen Tugendgrade, Texte und Forschungen zur byzantin.-neugriech. Philologie 8, Athen 1928; W. T H E I L E R , G n o m o n 5 (1929) pp. 3 0 7 - 3 1 7 ; J. DILLON, Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue, in: Piatonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für H . Dörrie, hrsg. v. H . - D . B L U M E - F . M A N N , Jahrb. f. Antike u. Christentum, Erg.bd. 10, Münster 1983, pp. 92-105.

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introducing an improvement - ironing out an anomaly in Plotinus' thought." DILLON rightly points out the difference in method and purpose of each writer. The aporetic questioning nature of the Plotinus treatise in which he seeks to reconcile a number of Platonic statements is totally absent in Porphyry. This leads him, in omitting the argumentative, enquiring dimension and in picking out the apparent conclusions, to distort the dynamically presented view of Plotinus. This is particularly true of the άπορία raised by Plotinus in ch. 4 that virtue understood simply as purification would lead to the conclusion that the soul is the good and thus induce the question of how the good came to take on evil. What Porphyry elevates to the status of a distinct rank of virtue appears in Plotinus merely as a qualification resulting from the discussion of a problem. It has, of course, to be added here that Porphyry was, on other occasions, no stranger to the aporetic style of presentation. After all he uses it to good effect in the 'Letter to Anebo' and the exegetical method of e De antro nympharum' could also be described as exploratory.

5. Middleplatonists, Neopythagoreans and Stoics Since Porphyry received part of his initial philosophical education in the Academy under Longinus it is natural to attempt to identify middleplatonic doctrines in his thought and to assign these to a middleplatonic period in his development. There has also shown itself the occasional tendency to stress the continuing influence of preplotinian Platonism after his contact with Plotinus. Unfortunately the matter is complicated not only by the paucity of evidence, but by Porphyry's own highly academic bent which allowed the ideas of earlier thinkers to surface more obviously in his thought — often in the form of extended quotations — than in that of Plotinus, thus, perhaps, giving a distorted impression of their influence. H . DÖRRIE has examined the extensive range of Porphyry's knowledge of preplotinian philosophy 2 5 5 but his ascription to Porphyry of a theory of philosophical development in which the basic truth (λόγος) is seen in Plato but may appear elsewhere too, he does not support by firm evidence. The notorious remark of Proclus which seems to overstress the influence of Numenius on Porphyry 2 5 6 is rightly interpreted by J . H . WASZINK as having a more limited application. 2 5 7 WASZINK suggests the doctrinal influence of Numenius in the area of dreams, 2 5 8 the status of barbarian wisdom, 2 5 9 allegorical

255 D i e Schultradition im Mittelplatonismus und Porphyrios, Entretiens X I I p p . 3—25. 256

257 258

259

in T i m . I 7 7 , 2 2 - 3 Π ο ρ φ ύ ρ ι ο ς ôv κ α ι θ α υ μ ά σ ε ι ε ν άν τις, ει ετερα λ έ γ ε ι τ η ς Ν ο υ μ η ν ί ο υ παραδόσεως. Porphyrios und N u m e n i o s , Entretiens X I I (pp. 35—78) p. 35. C o m p a r i n g vit. Pyth. p . 22,20—23 NAUCK and N e m e s . , nat. h o m . p. 201 MATTHAEI which m a y come f r o m P o r p h y r y . C f . further Calcid., c o m m . C C L V I p. 2 6 4 , 1 8 f . WASZINK. Although P o r p h y r y certainly had other sources such as A p o l l o d o r u s and Bardesanes. C f . abst. IV. 17.

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interpretation, 2 6 0 the hypostases 2 6 1 and matter. 2 6 2 But it is only in the area of allegory that one can point to direct contact. Elsewhere we can prove no more than a certain similarity which could be accounted for by both drawing on a common tradition. Porphyry was also familiar with the extensive ten or eleven book work of Moderatus which he cites in his 'Life of Pythagoras'. 2 6 3 HADOT has suggested that the idea of Nous préexistent in the One may owe something to the N e o pythagorean idea (found in Moderatus and Nicomachus) that the monad contains everything potentially. 2 6 4 However scanty our evidence for Porphyry is we know that the metaphysical speculations of the Neopythagoreans had made a deep impression, whether directly or indirectly, on the metaphysical structure of the system of hypostases in Plotinus. 2 6 5 It is, therefore, of the greatest interest to see the continued interest of Porphyry in this tradition. It is probable, too, that Porphyry was influential in establishing the late tradition which gave a fixed place to Pythagoreanism as a philosophical propaedeutic. 2 6 6 Porphyry does not seem to have incorporated Pythagoreanism into a formal course, but the prominence of the life of Pythagoras 2 6 7 in the 'Hist, phil.' and the many Pythagorean echoes in ' D e abstinentia' and particularly in the 'Letter to Marcella' show clearly the important role which Porphyry attached to Pythagoreanism in moral and spiritual formation. Did a Pythagorean school or community exist in Rome? Was Porphyry a member of such a group? We know that there must have been an active Pythagorean group in Rome in the first century B . C . 2 6 8 but we have no information for the later period. It could be that members of Plotinus' school (and even Plotinus himself 2 6 9 ) attached themselves to Pythagorean teaching. J . BOUFFARTIGUE and M . PATILLON suggest that Castricius (the addressee of 'De abstinentia') and Porphyry could have been members, pointing, in Porphyry's case, to his

260 Particularly the interpretation of the war between Athens and Atlantis in Tim. 24eff. Numenius was also used in 'antr.' 261

C f . WASZINK, a r t . c i t . η . 2 5 7 , p . 6 3 f .

262

Cf. ibid. pp. 70—71. But WASZINK himself is not too sure of his ground here —„so ist es doch keineswegs ausgeschlossen". vit. Pyth. cap. 48—53. The citation by Porphyry preserved in Simplic., in Phys. 230,34f. may also come from the same work. Porphyre et Victorinus I p. 311—2. Cf. E . R. DODDS, The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One, C Q 22 (1928) pp. 1 2 9 - 1 4 2 . On the connection of Pythagoreanism and Platonism cf. J . DILLON, The Middleplatonists, London 1972, pp. 341 f. On the later role of Pythagoras cf. Iambi., protr. p. 6,18f.

263

264 265

266

PISTELLI a n d D I L L O N , I a m b i , ( o p . c i t . η . 2 6 ) p p . 267

268

269

19—20.

See the new edition, Porphyre: Vie de Pythagore; Lettre à Marcella, ed. E. DES PLACES, Paris 1982. For his life of Pythagoras Porphyry drew on Nicomachus, Moderatus, Antonius Diogenes and an Alexandrian life of Pythagoras. Cf. DES PLACES, op. cit. pp. 13 — 16. On the Pythagorean 'basilica1 at the Porta Maggiore cf. J . CARCOPINO, La basilique pythagoricienne de la Porte Majeure, Paris 1926; FESTUGIÈRE, Révélation I p. 15. Cf. vit. Plot. 2 on vegetarianism.

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use of the vow of secrecy though admitting the possibility of literary convention here. 270 The influence of Stoic thought on Plotinus 271 and particularly on Porphyry has often been noted — in the sense usually of a transposition to a metaphysical and incorporeal level of Stoic physical concepts. Indeed Porphyry himself recognises this influence of Stoicism in Plotinus. 272 But transformation of this kind had probably already been effected in many cases. 273 P. H A D O T has noted a number of metaphysical doctrines which betray Stoic influence. 274 A more obvious critical reuse of Stoic ideas may be seen in the 'Symmikta Zetemata'. 2 7 5 Although Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, is credited with the adaptations of the Stoic concept of σύγχυσις as a metaphysical principle to explain the relationship of soul to body, 2 7 6 yet another indication that this critical reuse of Stoic ideas was well underway before Plotinus, 277 the formal critique and application of the Stoic concepts sounds distinctly Porphyrian.

6. Gnostics, Chaldaeans and Indians That Porphyry had come into contact with gnostics is clear from his own description of their presence in Plotinus' school, 278 though they probably did not penetrate the inner circle. Castricius may, at a later date, have been moved to abandon his vegetarianism by gnostic influences. 279 But Porphyry's comments on gnostic views in this context might be based on report rather than direct

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271

272 273 274 275

276 277

278 279

Porphyre. D e l'Abstinence t. I, Paris 1977, pp. xxii—xxiii; abst. II.1 p. 133,1 NAUCK; 11.36 p. 165,24. C f . THEILER'S c o m m e n t s i n ' P l o t i n s S c h r i f t e n ' , e d . H A R D E R , BEUTLER, THEILER, p a s s i m ;

THEILER, Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa, Entretiens V pp. 6 5 - 8 6 . Cf. η. 173. Cf. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus I p. 312. HADOT, ibid. pp. 2 2 5 f . ; 235; 240. See the edition of the fragments with introduction and commentary by H . DÖRRIE (op. cit. η. 113) w h o also discusses other material from Nemesius which may go back to Porphyry, but with exemplary caution. This sort of double treatment is a model of its kind. N e m . , nat. hom. p. 129,9f. (DÖRRIE, Zet., op. cit. η. 113, p. 54). That Ammonius can really be credited with the idea is disputed by DODDS, N u m e n i u s and Ammonius, Entretiens V p. 25. I would agree with DODDS that Ammonius probably wrote nothing, but it seems to me unlikely that so careful a scholar as Porphyry would have attributed a doctrine to Ammonius without some grounds — probably through Plotinus. ( N o w cf. F. M. SCHROEDER, A m m o n i u s Saccas, above in this same volume [ A N R W II 36,1], pp. 4 8 3 - 5 2 6 . ) vit. Plot. 16,1 f. abst.

1.42.

Cf.

H.-C.

PUECH, i n : E n t r e t i e n s V p p .

1 8 6 — 8 ; J . BOUFFARTIGUE a n d

M.

PATILLON, Porphyre, D e l'Abstinence, t. I pp. xxiii—iv; 36—37 and ad. loc. Porphyry may be making only the general point that Castricius' reasons for abandoning vegetarianism may be s i m i l a r to those of the libertine tendency in certain gnostics.

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contact. 2 8 0 The gradual publication of the Nag Hammadi coptic gnostic texts (1945—) has given us much more information about gnosticism, including two treatises which bear the same titles as the ones mentioned by P o r p h y r y , 2 8 1 though whether they are identical is uncertain. Their dating, too, must remain somewhat vague. 2 8 2 If they are preplotinian (or even contemporary with or just after Porphyry) they give us new insight into a number of metaphysical-religious views which exercised the minds of Plotinus, Porphyry and other contemporary neoplatonists. O f particular interest for Porphyrian studies is the role of the triad Being-Vitality-Mentality, which seemingly acts as a connective between the First Principle and the First Thought (neoplatonic Nous) and appears to operate very much like the second triad — dominated by δύναμις - in HADOT'S reconstruction of Porphyry's metaphysics. 2 8 3 ABRAMOWSKI284 has examined the link in more detail, adducing similar texts in those parts of Victorinus's c Adv. Arium' which according to HADOT are derived from Porphyry. Whilst such arguments must remain inconclusive for the present, the Nag Hammadi texts certainly are an important new factor in our assessment of the development of Platonism at the time of Plotinus and Porphyry. And in any case the 'neoplatonic' strands 2 8 5 in these texts show clearly how those with such gnostic views could have worked with, influenced or have been influenced by Plotinus and Porphyry. We have already had occasion to mention Porphyry's interest in the Chaldaean Oracles on which he wrote a commentary. 2 8 6 Whether he also introduced Chaldaean concepts and entities into his metaphysics generally is difficult to prove. O n the actual practice of theurgy Porphyry's position is equally unclear to us. In the light of our main argument it now seems to me unlikely that he consciously wavered or changed his position even though he himself may not have been entirely clear where he stood. 2 8 7 280 281

282

abst. 1.42 p. 1 1 7 , 1 6 τίνων άκήκοα is vague enough to rule out any close association. The N a g Hammadi Library in English, Leiden 1977, ed. M . M . MEYER, V i l i , 1 Zostrianos; X I , 3 Allogenes. C f . vit. Plot. 16,6—7. The identification is 'very probable' according to J . D . TURNER, The Gnostic Threefold Path to Enlightenment — the Ascent of the Mind and Descent of W i s d o m , N o v . Test. 22 (1980) pp. 3 2 4 - 3 5 1 . TURNER (art. cit. n. 2 8 1 ) dates these treatises along with the ' A p o c r y p h o n of J o h n ' and the 'Trimorphic Protennoia' to the second century A . D . B u t the datings are based on references in Irenaeus to parallel doctrines from the latter two only. Moreover 'Allogenes' and 'Zostrianos' have a different, more Platonic and metaphysical flavour. Must it not remain at least a possibility that the versions we have of them now were composed after the time of Plotinus and P o r p h y r y and were influenced by them? C f . L. ABRAMOWSKI, Marius Victorinus, Porphyrius und die römischen Gnostiker, Z N W 74 (1983) pp. 1 0 8 128, who (p. 124) while accepting the thesis of a preplotinian date admits this possibility.

283

Cf. TURNER (art. cit. n. 2 8 1 ) , pp. 3 3 4 f f .

284

art. cit. n. 2 8 2 .

285

E . g . negative theology: X I 5 9 , 3 0 " t h e O n e w h o m if y o u should know him, be ignorant of h i m " ; omnipresence: X I 5 7 , 2 0 " t h e y are everywhere and they are n o w h e r e " ; mystical ascent in three stages; three hypostases, esp. the O n e : X I 4 7 , 3 4 'nonsubstantial substance'.

286

Suda IV p. 1 7 8 , 2 2 ; Marinus, vit. Proci. 2 6 ; D a m . , princ. I 8 6 , 3 - 1 5 ; Lydus, mens. 110, 1 8 - 2 5 ; 1 5 9 , 5 - 8 ; Aen. G a z . , Theophr. 961 A .

287

See m y discussion in Porph. (op. cit. n. 2 4 ) pp. 81 — 150.

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J . GEFFCKEN, 288 in placing Porphyry's attitude to statues in philosophical context, detects a change in approach between the 'Philosophy from Oracles', which mentions the magical preparation of statues to receive the power of the god, and the more symbolic presentation of Ή ε ρ ι άγαλμάτων'. But does this reflect just a difference in purpose between the two works rather than some profound change in his understanding of the situation? May we conclude from this difference that he now r e j e c t s the magical view or just that his interests have changed their focus? After all he still seems to admit the power of the occult in the later period. 2 8 9 What is at issue for him is the extent of that power and its relevance to salvation, subjects about which the fragments of 'Philosophy from Oracles' have nothing to say either way. Porphyry shows interest in the Indians not only in c De regressu animae' in the context of his search for a universal way of liberating the soul, but his interest in asceticism and vegetarianism also brings them to mind. 2 9 0 Their lore is invoked again in the context of allegorical interpretation of the Styx where he is looking for comparative material. 2 9 1 J . J . O'MEARA has recently dealt with these contacts of Porphyry with Indian philosophy. 2 9 2 But the contexts in which the extant Porphyrian material makes reference to Indian thought are somewhat restricted in scope and almost certainly dependent on secondary sources than through direct contact. We might be tempted to see Porphyry as the source behind a more general Platonic context (the first principle as cause of being, knowledge, and the end of striving) in which the Indians are mentioned by Augustine. 2 9 3 But O'MEARA 294 has rightly pointed out that Augustine could have had an independent source for this view of Indian philosophy.

VII. Tracing Porphyry's Ideas in Later

Authors

Introduction N o account of Porphyry would be complete without some reference to the vast influence which he exercised on both western 2 9 5 and eastern philosophical 288

D e r B i l d e r s t r e i t d e s h e i d n i s c h e n A l t e r t u m s , A R W 19 ( 1 9 1 9 ) p p . 2 8 6 - 3 1 5 a n d e s p . 3 0 5 - 6 .

289

GEFFCKEN'S treatment of Porphyry, in: Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums, Heidelberg 1920, pp. 56 ff. is useful, if not somewhat hard on Porphyry for superstition. As may be seen from the fragments of 'regr. an.' See also n. 212. abst. IV. 1 6 - 1 8 . Stob. I 66,24—70,13. Porphyry's source here as in 'abst.' is Bardesanes. Indian Wisdom and Porphyry's Search for a Universal Way, Neoplatonism and Indian

290 291 292

T h o u g h t , e d . R . BAINE HARRIS, N e w Y o r k 1 9 8 2 , p p . 5 - 2 5 . O ' M E A R A o m i t s t h e S t o b ,

passage (cf. η. 291). 293

civ. V I I I 9. t. I 3 3 4 , 4 - 1 8

294

art. cit. (Η. 292) pp. 18 - 2 0 .

DOMB. 29S

In general see COURCELLE, Lettres (op. cit. Η. 40).

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and theological thinking. It is this area more than any other that has attracted the attention of scholars who have been enticed by the prospect of reconstructing Porphyry's thought from his later influence. It is this aspect I shall deal with rather than with the more creative impact which Porphyry had on subsequent philosophers, theologians and logicians.

1. The western tradition The western tradition seems to be far more dependent on Porphyry than the eastern because of the geographical and language factors. Porphyry's expository gifts 296 would have ensured his success, particularly when allied to problems of translation which must have been formidable in the case of the 'Enneads'. Since the influence of Iamblichus and later eastern neoplatonists seems excluded, or at least limited, in the west, 2 9 7 it looks reasonable to assume that Porphyry lies behind any neoplatonic doctrine which deviates from Plotinus. One of the weaknesses, however, of such a theory is that it excludes the possibility of other western neoplatonic influence by assuming that Porphyry is the only source of neoplatonic philosophising in the west. Add to this that our knowledge of what happened intellectually in Italy after Porphyry is very hazy. We do not even know whether Porphyry became head of the school of Plotinus or a school of his own. 2 9 8 Whatever may be the case with this, it seems to me very likely that a Porphyrian tradition built itself up, of people who reissued or revamped Porphyrian treatises, translated them, cited them, even perhaps developed and applied his ideas in new ways. This seems to me the most likely background for the Platonici of Augustine. 299 In this context I would not dismiss so lightly the phrase οί περί Πορφύριον which occurs a number of times. 300

296

297

298

299

300

Cf. Eunapius, vit. soph. IV. 1 p. 8,7—8; 15 GIANGRANDE. But see R. TURCAN, Martianus Capella et Jamblique, REL 36 (1958) pp. 2 5 3 - 4 .

I do not find the arguments of BOUFFARTIGUE—PATILLON, Porphyre, De l'abstinence, t. I. p. xix altogether convincing. They argue that Porphyry's admonitory tone (abst. 1.1) to Castricius has the stamp of authority and suggests that he was head of the school. But note how he seems to organise Plotinus at an earlier stage (vit. Plot. 5,6—7)! See below p. 769 and the statement of Augustine, ep. 118.5.33 tunc Plotini schola Romae floruit, habuitque condiscípulos multos acutissimos et solertissimos viros. sed aliqui eorum magicarum artium curiositate depravati sunt, aliqui Dominum Jesum Christum ipsius veritatis atque sapientiae incommutabilis, quam conabantur attingere, cognoscentes gestare personam, in eius militiam transierunt. One might be tempted to regard this as derived from the 'vit. Plot.', but the last remark can hardly be found there, which suggests that the whole picture here might reflect an independent tradition. Iamblichus, 'de anima' in Stob. I 370,5; 458,12; Proci., in Tim. I 382,12-13; III 234, 18 — 19; in Eucl. 323,7; Simplic., in Cat. 414,33—4. Cf. DEUSE, Unters, (op. cit. η. 46)

p. 213 η. 311. But DILLON, Iambi, (op. cit. η. 26) p. 311 — "oí περί being merely sophistical embellishment" —, refers to Proci., in Tim. I 382,12-13 οί περί Πορφύριον και Ίάμβλιχον. 52

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2. Arnobius and Cornelius Labeo Since it would be impossible to give a full account of all the work done in tracing Porphyry's influence I shall concentrate on a few authors beginning with Arnobius because he is a near contemporary of Porphyry. Arnobius nowhere mentions Porphyry by name but P. COURCELLE has argued strongly that the anti-christian arguments and the philosophical position behind them which Arnobius combats in Adv. nationes II may be paralleled in Porphyry's 'Contra Christianos' and 'De regressu animae'. 301 However, these anti-christian arguments are all known at least as early as Celsus. COURCELLE singles out in particular the question as to the fate of those who came before Christ if salvation came with Christ. But this argument may already be found in Celsus, 302 although it is clearly still being voiced in Augustine's day by opponents of Christianity who cite Porphyry's 'Contra Christianos'. 303 Some of the general parallels with 'De regressu animae' are impressive. 304 The most important key to an identification of the sources which Arnobius was using is II 13 p. 80,11 f. vos, vos appello, qui Mercurium, qui Platonem Pytbagoramque sectamini, vosque ceteros, qui estis unius mentis et per easdem vias placitorum inceditis unitate. FESTUGIÈRE interprets the ceteri as a separate group and understands the phrase unius mentis not in the banal sense of 'of the same opinion (as the former)' but in the metaphysical sense of 'originating in the same mind' — a meaning suggested by II 15 p. 83.11 quia uno ex fonte omnium nostrorum defluunt animae, idcirco unum conveniensque sentimus, non moribus, non opinionibus discrepamus. Deum omnes novimus nec, quot in orbe sunt homines, non sunt sententiae totidem neque infinita varietate discretae.305 It looks very much as if the viri novi referred to at II 15 p. 82,24 are the same as the ceteri of II 13. 306 It is, however, difficult to say which of the doctrines expressed afterwards can be assigned to them. FESTUGIÈRE inclined

301

Les sages de Porphyre et les 'viri novi' d'Arnobe, REL 31 (1953) pp. 257—271; ID., AntiChristian Argument and Christian Platonism, in: The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, ed. A. MOMIGLIANO, Oxford 1963, pp. 151 — 157. But cf. FESTUGIÈRE, La doctrine des 'viri novi' sur l'origine et le sort des âmes d'après Arnobe II. 11—66, Mémorial Lagrange, Paris 1940, pp. 97—132; ID., Arnobiana, Vig. Chr. 6 (1952) pp. 2 0 8 - 2 5 4 . FESTUGIÈRE argues that Arnobius used several sources (including Porphyry) and therefore reflects the views of several pagan groups. W . KROLL, D i e Zeit des Cornelius Labeo, RhM 71 (1916) p. 356, had already seen Porphyrian influence in bk. I I .

302

Orig., c. Cels. IV. 7.

303

F 8 1 HARNACK.

304

We note the following: I 5 p. 7,7 Chaldaeorum; I 52 p. 48,6 Julianus; II 25 p. 9 5 , 1 0 - 1 4 anima . . . post deum principem rerum et post mentes geminas locum optinens quartum; 33 p. 1 0 5 , 1 1 - 1 3 ; 62 p. 1 3 8 , 6 - 1 3 ; 62 p. 1 3 9 , 6 - 7 (cf. p. 8 1 , 1 0 - 1 3 ; p. 6 6 , 1 6 - 1 9 ) ; 66 p. 1 4 3 , 1 7 - 2 1 and flight from this world is mentioned at II 13 p. 8 0 , 1 7 - 2 0 ; 62 p. 139,5. Cf. ibid. II 45 p. 118,22 unius esse se fonds, unius genitoris et capitis. O n the viri novi see also P. MASTANDREA, Cornelio Labeone. U n Neoplatonico Latino, Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain L X X , Leiden 1979, pp. 127ff.

305 306

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to ascribing the whole of chapters 11—66 to them and concluded that their philosophical views were far from being unius mentis! C O U R C E L L E thinks that Arnobius refers here to common doctrines of the three groups mentioned in II 13, but also at times to doctrines individual to each. Intriguing is the contrast Platonici — viri novi. If we are to associate the Porphyry parallels with the viri novi we appear to have the first hint of the modern term 'neoplatonist', used here by Arnobius in the disparaging sense of comparing the modern Platonists with Plato (and the older Platonists?) to the disadvantage of the former. 3 0 7 The way of these viri novi would appear to be the way of the philosopher which leads to immortality without the necessity of theurgic rites. Is there a contradiction here if we understand vias at II 13 to refer to ways of salvation, since the viri novi evidently had their own way? 308 C O U R C E L L E tried to avoid this in three ways: by taking vias as meaning doctrines in a general sense; 309 by noting that references to ritual ways (the Etruscans and the Magi) come outside the sections to be ascribed to the viri novi;310 or by suggesting that 'De regressu animae' did discuss the other ways. 311 Of course it did, but in the context of finding a universal way. If Arnobius was using 'De regressu animae' or a Porphyrian tradition and if the phrase easdem vias is the judgement of his source and not his own, could this, perhaps, suggest that Porphyry did find a compromise (ieasdem and yet not una via) despite the fact that 'De regressu animae' as we know it from Augustine gives the upper hand to the way of philosophy. 312 Despite the fact that Arnobius is a virtual contemporary of Porphyry there is no reason to doubt the possibility of Porphyry's ideas influencing him. Arnobius had been a pagan and Africa was not far from Sicily. We recall that Porphyry actually visited Carthage. Further investigations on the basis of the researches of F E S T U G I È R E and C O U R C E L L E might lead to fruitful results. What is required is a careful reexamination of Arnobius' own methods of composition (and use of sources) and a more open reassessment of the relationship of the pagan ideas these sources expressed and the attested doctrines of Porphyry. Whilst such investigations will scarcely yield the certainty required to attribute new doctrines to Porphyry, they will cast more light on the intellectual climate amongst western pagan circles. And this will help us to understand Porphyry better. For it is hardly likely either that Porphyry himself worked out his ideas in an intellectual vacuum or that those in the Porphyrian milieu did not add, reexpress or present differing viewpoints. In looking at influences one tends to narrow the field to the

307

It is more likely that Arnobius is here making a purely polemical point rather than speaking from a conviction of Christian Platonism based on a primitive Platonism which disowns his later interpreters. Cf. COURCELLE, Conflict (op. cit. η. 301) p. 157. 308 per easdem vias: used here probably in the technical sense of ways to salvation. Cf. II 62 p. 135,5f. vias . . . ad caelum contendentibus and the via universalis of 'regr. an.' 309 REL 31 (1953) pp. 260-261. 310 Ibid. p. 264. 311 Ibid. p. 271. 312 Reflected in Arnobius, too, by the fact that the magi are said to reach the caelum whereas the philosopher achieves immortalitas. 52"

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influence of single books. It is more realistic to understand influence as the result of half-reading, perhaps from anthologies, hearsay, personal contact and discussion. Another author who has not infrequently been invoked as a source for Porphyrian ideas is Cornelius Labeo whose dates are so uncertain that he has been variously placed either before or after Porphyry. P. MASTANDREA,313 dealing very evenhandedly with the scanty evidence, has now made Labeo a virtual contemporary of Porphyry and placed him in the Porphyrian circle as one who applied Porphyry's Greek ideas to the Roman situation.

3. Ambrose P . COURCELLE 3 1 4 has pointed out parallels between the ' E n n e a d s ' and ' D e Isaac' and ' D e b o n o m o r t i s ' o f A m b r o s e . B o t h COURCELLE 3 1 5 and A . SOLIGNAC 316

think that Ambrose used Plotinus directly, a view contested by W . THEILER 317 and queried by P. HADOT 318 who asks whether Platonic/Plotinian parallels in 'De Isaac', 'De bono mortis' and ' D e J a c o b ' were chosen by Ambrose himself or came from a work of Porphyry such as ' D e regressu animae' which may have cited them and dealt with such themes as separation of soul from body, flight from the corporeal and the state of contemplation. 3 1 9

4. Augustine The works of Augustine have also proved a fertile field for the source hunters. W . THEILER was the first to challenge the usually held thesis that Augustine's neoplatonism was primarily or entirely derived from Plotinus. 3 2 0 THEILER argued

313 314

315

op. cit. η. 306, pp. 193ff. Plotin et Saint Ambroise, RPh 76 (1950) pp. 29—56; ID., Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin, Paris 1950, pp. 1 0 6 - 1 3 8 . Nouveaux aspects du Platonisme chez saint Ambroise, R E L 34 (1956) (220—239) p. 224; ID., Litiges sur la lecture des 'libri Platonicorum' par saint Augustin, Augustiniana 4 (1954) pp. 2 2 5 - 2 3 9 , esp. 2 2 9 . COURCELLE does, however, admit ( R E L 34 [1956] pp. 2 2 4 - 6 ) that

Ambrose does sometimes use Porphyry, and Porphyry and Plotinus together. Nouveaux parallèles entre saint Ambroise et Plotin: le De Jacob et vita beata et le Περί ευδαιμονίας (Ennèade 1.4), Archives de Philosophie 1956, pp. 148 — 156, esp. p. 156. 3 1 7 Gnomon 25 (1953) p. 117. 3 1 8 Platon et Plotin dans trois sermons de S. Ambroise, R E L 34 (1956) pp. 2 0 2 - 2 2 0 . 3 1 9 Cf. H . DÖRRIE, Das fünffach gestufte Mysterium. Der Aufstieg der Seele bei Porphyrios und Ambrosius, in: Mullus. Festschrift für Th. Klauser, J b A C Erg.-Bd. 1, Münster 1964, pp. 79—92, repr. in: ID., Platonica Minora, München 1976, pp. 474—490. 320 Porphyrios und Augustin, Schriften d. Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswiss. Kl. 10,1, Halle 1933 ( = ID., Forsch, pp. 1 6 0 - 2 5 1 ) . 316

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that Augustine never read Plotinus and that reminiscences of the 'Enneads' found in his works had been transmitted to him through Porphyry. He furthermore tried to identify specifically Porphyrian doctrines by applying the principle that a doctrine is Porphyrian if it appears in Augustine and in a later neoplatonist, but not or not to the same degree in Plotinus. 321 On this basis he identified a large amount of Porphyrian influence in 'De vera religione', De trin. X, Civ. dei X I X 12 — 17 and the 'Confessions'. This work was extremely valuable and important but must still be applied with caution. The criticisms of E. R. DODDS322 are still valid, that the Arbeitssatz itself dangerously excludes the influence on Augustine of other neoplatonists. D O D D S instances Iamblichus. 323 It also seems to me unwise to exclude the possibility of a continuing western tradition (which might, of course, have been relatively unoriginal and derivative). H. DÖRRIE324 is rightly criticised by G. MADEC325 for his overemphasis of the role of Porphyry in the west to the exclusion of any other pagan thinkers. And one calls to mind here the circle around Macrobius and the tradition which fostered their activity. D O D D S stresses that Augustine refers to the libri Platonicorum and not libri Platonici.326 Of course this might mean no more than just Porphyry and Plotinus which could be reduced even further to mean Plotinus excerpts edited and presented in some way by Porphyry. But equally it does not of necessity exclude the notion of other authors. In the 'Civitas Dei' there is evidence that the Platonici are not a cover for Porphyry but represent a distinct group. In X.29 he begins with Porphyry, then addresses vos who are said to read Porphyry — intuentes Porphyrium. At XXIV. 26,1—2 we have sed Porphyrins ait, inquiunt . . . corpus esse omne fugiendum. The immediate source here for Augustine are the Platonici (inquiunt). In 28,33 — 7 it is clear that these include contemporaries — Plato et Porphyrins, velpotius quicumque illos diligunt et adhuc vivunt. The difficulty here is that we are just not clear how much of Augustine's knowledge of Porphyry came through these Platonici327 and how much might have been already altered and transformed by them.

The famous Arbeitssatz runs as follows (ibid. p. 4 = ID., Forsch, p. 164) „Erscheint bei einem nachplotinischen Neuplatoniker ein Lehrstück, das nach Inhalt, Form und Zusammenhang sich mit einem solchen bei Augustin vergleichen lässt, aber nicht oder nicht im selben Mass mit einem bei Plotin, so darf es als porphyrisch gelten". 3 2 2 C R 49 (1935) pp. 7 1 - 2 . 323 Cf TURCAN, op.cit. n. 297. 3 2 4 Porphyrios als Mittler zwischen Plotin und Augustin, in: Antike und Orient im Mittelalter, Vorträge der Kölner Mediaevistentagungen 1956—59, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 1, Berlin 1962, pp. 2 6 - 4 7 . 3 2 5 Augustin, disciple et adversaire de Porphyre, R E A u g 10 (1964) pp. 365—369. 3 2 6 conf. VIII.2. p. 154,16-19 SKUTELLA. Cf. ibid. VII.8 p. 137,13; 20 p. 149,1; beat, vit. 1.4; c. Acad. 11.2,5. 3 2 7 In civ. X . 29 fortasse suggests that his knowledge of Porphyry is independent and that the Platonici were not citing Porphyry directly. Elsewhere the ease with which he slips from singular to plural and back suggests strongly that he mentions Porphyry partly by comparing what he knows directly of Porphyry with the 'Porphyrian' doctrines of the 321

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It n o w s e e m s u n l i k e l y that the exact nature o f the libri Platonicorum which he m e n t i o n s as having furthered his c o n v e r s i o n t o Christianity and w h i c h he read in the translation o f V i c t o r i n u s will ever be c l a r i f i e d . 3 2 8 B u t it is clear that t h e y n e e d n o t have i n c l u d e d the w o r k s o f P o r p h y r y w h i c h he m e n t i o n s later in the 'Civitas D e i ' i.e. the 'Letter t o A n e b o ' , ' D e regressu animae' and the ' P h i l o s o p h y f r o m Oracles'. A s e c o n d criticism w h i c h can be levelled against the T H E I L E R thesis is that he t o o readily identified as u n p l o t i n i a n ideas f o r w h i c h a P l o t i n u s parallel can in fact be f o u n d . 3 2 9 It s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t also that m u c h o f this ' P o r p h y r i a n material' d o e s n o t add greatly t o o u r k n o w l e d g e of P o r p h y r y ' s doctrines s o m u c h as illustrate and c o n f i r m w h a t w e already k n o w 3 3 0 and can also, t o s o m e extent, distort the picture since A u g u s t i n e w a s naturally m o r e interested in certain t h e m e s s u c h as salvation, attitude to the w o r l d etc. In further d e v e l o p i n g T H E I L E R ' S thesis s o m e scholars have a t t e m p t e d t o i d e n t i f y the particular w o r k of P o r p h y r y inv o l v e d . F o r e x a m p l e B . R . V o s s 3 3 1 w i s h e s t o i d e n t i f y a P o r p h y r i a n i n f l u e n c e in ' D e vera religione', X I I I . 3 9 , as c o m i n g f r o m ' D e regressu animae' b u t w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y that P o r p h y r y m i g h t repeat a t h e m e or e x p r e s s i o n in m o r e than o n e w o r k . 3 3 2

328

Platonici and partly from the Platonici directly. E.g. civ. X.26,10f. ipse Platónicas , . . voluht (cf. BALTES, Weltentstehung [op. cit. η. 347] I p. 167 η. 307); Χ. 9. vocant . . . dicunt . . . volunt . . . nam et Porphyrins . . .; serm. 212 15Af. and civ. XXII.12,56—64 where he speaks of Platonists who follow either Plato or Porphyry. Cf. COURCELLE, Litiges (art. cit. η. 315) pp. 225-237; HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus I pp. 2 2 - 2 4 ; 86; ID., Marius Victorinus, Paris 1971, pp. 201-210. P. HENRY, Plotin et l'occident, Louvain 1934, argued against T H E I L E R that Augustine read Plotinus directly. A. SOLIGNAC, Réminiscences plotiniennes et porphyriennes dans le début du 'de ordine' de Saint Augustin, Archives de Philosophie 20 (1957) pp. 446—465, argues that Augustine had read Enneads III.2; VI. 6; 9, the latter two accompanied in some way by Porphyrian material which is very close to sent. 37 and 40—42 which might have been incorporated together by Victorinus. These could have been the έγχειρήματα of Porphyry's edition of the 'Enneads'.

329

See DODDS, C R 49 (1935) p .

330

The usefulness of such work often lies in the light it throws on the way in which Augustine absorbed and used neoplatonic ideas which can only tentatively be attributed to Porphyry or else add little to our knowledge of his thought. In this category cf. C. W . W O L F S K E E L , 1st Augustin in 'de immortalitate animae' von der Gedankenwelt des Porphyrios beeinflusst worden?, Vig. Chr. 26 (1972) pp. 130-145. Spuren von Porphyrios De regressu animae bei Augustin De vera religione, Μ Η 20 (1963) pp. 2 3 7 - 9 . When comparing Augustine with Porph., 'regr. an'., in Aug., civ. X.9.24f., C O U R C E L L E ' S argument, Lettres (op. cit. n. 40) p. 167, which Voss cites, that there is evidence for 'regr. an.' in the early works of Augustine, invites the same criticism. The themes of 'return' and 'omne corpus est fugiendum could have been frequently invoked by Porphyry in different works. E.g. επάνοδος in Porph., in Tim. F 28 SODANO (Proci., in Tim. I 208,14). The return theme in Augustine might even at times be a reminiscence of Cicero.

331

332

72.

C f . SOLIGNAC ( a r t . c i t . n . 3 2 8 ) p . 4 6 1 n . 2 8 .

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In the area of psychology a vast array of Porphyrian reminiscences has been detected with varying degrees of probability. J. PÉPIN333 finds parallels in c De immort.', 'De trin.', 'De quant, anim.' which can be associated with Porphyry's 'Symmikta Zetemata'. DÖRRIE334 had already expressed his conviction that much of 'De immort.' derived from Porphyry, that the matter here may have formed a section of the 'Symmikta Zetemata' between the arguments about the nature of the soul and those about the mode of its combination with the body (Nem., nat. hom. II and III) since Nemesius refers to immortality arguments at the end of chapter II. One cannot deny that distinctive themes appear in this material 335 and the fact that a whole nexus of arguments may be paralleled in Nemesius together with D Ö R R I E ' S observation lend P E P I N ' S thesis considerable weight. 3 3 6

5. Others Other authors who have been the subject of this kind of enquiry include: Calcidius whom we have had occasion to mention before; Macrobius on whom one should now consult the work of J. FLAMANT337 w h o whilst giving ample reference to previous research on his sources has brought the matter into perspective by stressing the way in which Macrobius moulded his sources to his own purposes; Firmicus Maternus w h o cites from the 'Philosophy from Oracles' 338 and may have

333

U n e nouvelle source de saint Augustin, le zétéma de Porphyre sur l'union de l'âme et du corps, REA 66 (1964) pp. 5 3 - 1 0 7 . 334 Zetemata (op. cit. n. 113) p. 10 n. 4. 335 E.g. independence of the soul from body in sleep and when thinking. Cf. immort. anim. 14,23-15,24; Porph., ap. N e m . , nat. hom. p. 131,6-133,2 (DÖRRIE p. 63). 336 Further in this area cf. S. PINÈS, Saint Augustin et la théorie de l'impetus, Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 44 (1969) pp. 7—21, tracing Aug., quant, an. 22,37 back to P o r p h y r y ; C. W . WOLSKEEL, Augustin über die Weltseele in der Schrift de imm. an., Θ Π 1 (1972) pp. 81 — 103; on π ν ε ύ μ α / φ α ν τ α σ ί α cf. J. H . TAYLOR, The meaning of spiritus in St. Augustine's de Genesi XII, The M o d e m Schoolman 26 ( 1 9 4 8 - 9 ) pp. 2 1 1 - 2 1 8 . 337 Macrobe et le Néo-Platonisme Latin, à la fin du IVE siècle, Leiden 1977. Cf. esp. his summary of scholarship on the 'Saturnalia' (pp. 658—661) dealing particularly with F. ALTHEIM (AUS Spätantike und Christentum, Tübingen 1951, pp. 1 - 5 8 , 1 3 8 - 1 5 2 ; I D . , Porphyrios' Schrift über die Sonne, in: Die Araber in der Alten Welt Bd. 3 Anfänge der Dichtung, Berlin 1966, pp. 198-243) w h o goes too far in ascribing most of Sat. I 1 7 - 2 3 to Porphyry's treatise on the sun. 338 d e e r r prof, relig. X I I I 4 - 5 . H e also names P o r p h y r y at math. V I I . 1 . 1 perhaps from the same source. O n the sources of Firmicus see the edition of G . HEUTEN, Bruxelles 1938; ID., Le Soleil de Porphyre, Mélanges F. C u m o n t I, Bruxelles 1936, pp. 253—9; and now the edition of R. TURCAN, 'Firmicus Maternus, L'erreur des religions païennes', Paris 1982. TURCAN, Mithras Platonicus. Recherches sur l'Hellénisation philosophique de Mithra, Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain VII, Leiden 1975, pp. 90—104, suggests that some aspects of Firmicus' report on Mithraism derive from Porphyry.

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known other works of Porphyry, though probably not at first hand but already fused together in the work of intermediaries; Claudianus Mamertus who reflects in his 'De statu animae' themes from 'De regressu animae'; 3 3 9 and lastly we mention Boethius. 3 4 0

6. Influence and transmission in the East The legacy of Porphyry in the Greek East is more easily documented. But there is little point in my giving here a list of where Porphyry was cited in Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius and Damascius. For these later neoplastonists, and we may include here the Christian Aristotelian Philoponus, the work of Porphyry was familiar, if not always in the original at least through its absorption into the commentaries of Iamblichus. The interesting thing is that the Plotinian-Porphyrian version of neoplatonism did continue to survive, in some ways at least, as a separate influence in the east and Proclus, Damascius and Olympiodorus were well aware of differences between Porphyry and other neoplatonists. We tend to think of post-plotinian neoplatonism in the east as dominated from the start by Iamblichus. But it could be that the actual dissemination and influence of Porphyry's work in the east was larger than we think. E. EVRARD has argued 3 4 1 that Plutarch, the first known figure of Athenian neoplatonism, was scarcely influenced by Iamblichus, but developed a Plotinian-Porphyrian legacy which had been transmitted to Athens by Porphyry in the time of Longinus. The influence of Iamblichus, he argues, entered later with Syrianus and Proclus who had studied elsewhere before coming to Athens. Both EVRARD and BEUTLER are inclined to locate the anonymous commentary on the 'Parmenides' in an Athenian context, either as the work of Plutarch himself or of some unknown predecessor, thus seeing it as a link with Porphyry. However this might be — and we may wonder whether Porphyry, in his later years, kept up his contacts with the east or even lived there - the influence of Plotinian and Porphyrian neoplatonism has also been traced in Christian thinkers who did not belong to the inner core of professional philosophers, men

339

C f . COURCELLE, L e t t r e s ( o p . cit. Η. 4 0 ) p p . 2 2 6 — 2 3 4 ; PÉPIN, a r t . c i t . Η. 3 3 3 , p p .

68-9;

84 Η. 1; 100 Η . 2 . 340

341

Cf. HADOT, Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les Catégories d'Aristote dans le codex Bernensis 363, Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 34 (1959) pp. 11—28; J. SULOWSKI argues that Boethius used Porphyry's 'Timaeus' commentary: J. S., Les sources du De consolatione philosophiae de Boèce, Sophia 25 (1957) pp. 76—85; ID., The source of Boethius' De consolatione philosophiae, Sophia 29 (1961) pp. 6 7 - 9 4 . Le maître de Plutarque d'Athènes et les origines du néoplatonisme Athénien, L'Antiq. classique 29 (1960) pp. 108-133 and 391-406.

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like Basil, 3 4 2 Gregory of N y s s a , 3 4 3 Synesius, 3 4 4 Nemesius, 3 4 5 Aeneas of Gaza 3 4 6 and Zacharias. 3 4 7 342

343

344

345 346 347

Cf. W. THEILER, review of HENRY'S Études Plot. I, ByZ 40, 1941 pp. 1 6 9 - 1 7 6 and esp. 171—5 for Porphyry parallels in Basil and Simplicius. Cf. COURCELLE, Grégoire de Nysse, lecteur de Porphyre, R E G 80 (1967) pp. 402—6; ID., Témoins nouveaux de la 'région de dissemblance' (Plat., Politique 273d), Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes 118 (1960) pp. 20—36; DANIÉLOU, Plotin et Grégoire de Nysse sur le mal, in: Plotino e il Neoplatonismo, Roma 1974, pp. 485—494. Cf. W. LANG, Das Traumbuch des Synesios, Tübingen 1926; W. THEILER, Die chaldaïschen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswiss. Kl. 18,1, Halle 1942 ( = ID., Forsch, pp. 2 5 2 - 3 0 1 ) ; HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus I pp. 461—474; G. PFLIGERSDORFFER, Der Schicksalsweg der Menschenseele nach Synesius und nach dem jungen Augustinus, Grazer Beiträge 5 (1976) pp. 147—179, arguing for a common source for Synes., 'de ins.' and Aug. 'dialog. Cassie'. Cf. DÖRRIE, Zetemata (op. cit. η. 113). Theophr. 8 9 2 A - 8 9 3 B ; 896B; 9 3 7 B ; 961 Α. Disp. de mundi op. (PG 85) coll. 1 0 2 9 , 9 - 1 0 3 3 , 7 . Cf. M. BALTES, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, Teil I, Leiden 1976 (Philosophia antiqua X X X ) pp. 1 9 2 - 2 0 7 .

Porphyry and Vegetarianism: A Contemporary Philosophical Approach b y DANIEL A . DOMBROWSKI, O m a h a ,

Nebraska

Contents I. T h e Argument f r o m Marginal C a s e s

774

II. B o o k 1 of ' D e abstinentia'

777

III. B o o k s 2—4 of ' D e abstinentia' . . .

782

IV. T h e Moral Status of Vegetarianism .

787

I. The Argument from Marginal

Cases

It is well known that many of the philosophers from antiquity were vegetarian : Pythagoras, Empedocles, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and others. 1 And Plato, although p e r h a p s not a vegetarian, was nonetheless greatly impressed by vegetarian thought. 2 What is not so well known by classicists is that there has been a rebirth in philosophical vegetarianism in the last decade that has generated an enormous debate of at least one hundred articles and books. 3 As may be suspected, this debate has also rekindled some interest in ancient vegetarian thought, 4 one inadequacy of which I shall treat below. 1

2

3

4

See m y book 'The Philosophy of Vegetarianism' (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984) for a full treatment of the vegetarian thought of these thinkers. Published in Great Britain as 'Vegetarianism: T h e Philosophy Behind the Ethical Diet' (Wellingb o r o u g h : T h o r s o n s , 1985). See, e . g . , the ideal diet at Republic 3 6 9 D — 3 7 3 E ; the vegetarianism of the golden age in the Statesman 269 - 274; and L a w s 7 8 1 E - 7 8 3 B and Epinomis 9 7 4 D - 9 7 4 B . See m y 'Was Plato a Vegetarian?', Apeiron X V I I I (June, 1984): 1 - 9 . See, e.g., STEPHEN R . L . CLARK, The Moral Status of Animals ( O x f o r d : Clarendon Press, 1977); the many articles of TOM REGAN and perhaps most important, PETER SINGER, Animal Liberation ( N . Y . : N . Y . Review, 1975). ROBERT S. BRUMBAUGH, Man, Animals, and Morals: A Brief H i s t o r y , in: O n the Fifth Day,

ed.

b y RICHARD

KNOWLES MORRIS ( W a s h i n g t o n ,

D.C.:

Acropolis

Press,

1978);

M . DÉTIENNE, L a cuisine de Pythagore, Archives de Sociologie des Religions 29 (1970):

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VEGETARIANISM

77 5

The aforementioned ancient thinkers were vegetarians for at least four different reasons, three of which have been noticed by several recent commentators. (1) Many of the ancient vegetarians believed in t r a n s m i g r a t i o n , leading them to spare animals in the belief that animals were, or will be, human beings. The famous story, in Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 36), of Pythagoras asking a man to discontinue beating a dog because he recognized the voice of a deceased friend in the yelp of the animal is indicative of this tendency. (2) Another reason for ancient abstention from meat was the belief that flesh-eating was i n j u r i o u s t o t h e h e a l t h of either body or soul. The former belief was tied to ancient medical thought whereas the latter was often associated with a more general commitment to moderation or asceticism. (3) But there was also among the ancients a c o n c e r n f o r a n i m a l s themselves: since animals suffer when they are killed (or are deprived of a life which is theirs if killed painlessly), 5 and since we can live healthy lives on vegetal food, eating meat is cruel and ought to be avoided. There is a fourth reason, however, that at least one ancient philosopher used. Porphyry's use of this argument has never, to my knowledge, been mentioned before, which is curious since this argument is perhaps the most important and forceful one in the contemporary debate. This argument, from marginal cases, is described by SINGER as follows: " T h e catch is that any such characteristic that is possessed by all human beings will not be possessed o n l y by human beings. For example all humans, but not only humans, are capable of feeling pain; and while only humans are capable of solving complex mathematical problems, not all humans can do this. So it turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at least some members of other species are also 'equal' — equal, that is, to some humans." 6 Theological statements of a human being's privileged status cannot be philosophically justified. But to say that we can legitimately eat animals because human beings are rational, or autonomous, or just, or language-users, etc., is not true

141 — 162; M. DÉTIENNE, Entre bêtes et Dieux, Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse 4 (Fall, 1972): 230—246; U . DIERAUER, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike, Studien zur antiken Philosophie 6 (Amsterdam, 1977); J. DONALD HUGHES, Ecology in Ancient Greece, Inquiry 18 (1975): 115—125; J . DONALD HUGHES, The Environmental Ethics of the Pythagoreans, Environmental Ethics 3 (1980): 1 9 5 - 2 1 3 ; GARETH B. MATTHEWS, Animals and the Unity of Psychology, Philosophy 53 (Oct., 1978): 437—454; JOHN PASSMORE, The Treatment of Animals, Journal of The History of Ideas 36 (1975): 1 9 5 - 2 1 8 ; JOHN RODMAN, The Other Side of Ecology in Ancient Greece: Comments on Hughes, Inquiry 19 (1976): 1 0 8 - 1 1 2 ; P. VIDAL NAQUET, Plato's Myth of the Statesman, the Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 98 (1978): 1 3 2 - 1 4 1 . All of these studies add to the work done decades ago by JOHANNES HAUSSLEITER, Der Vegetarismus in der Antike, Religionsgeschichtl. Versuche und Vorarbeiten 24 (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1935). 5

6

See PLUTARCH'S O f Eating the Flesh' in his 'Moralia' for a clear expression of compassion for animals as a basis for vegetarianism. PETER SINGER, Animal Liberation, op. cit., p. 265.

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of many human beings. These 'marginal cases' include infants, the mentally enfeebled, and the like. If we 'lower' our standard to that of sentiency (e.g., the ability to experience pain) so as to protect these people, 7 we must also protect many animals, including those that we eat. Or, as R E G A N puts it, 8 if an animal has characteristics, a, b, C . . . Η but lacks autonomy (or reason or language) and a human being has characteristics a, b, c . . . η but lacks autonomy (or reason or language), then we have as much reason to believe that the animal has rights as the human. N o w let us consider Porphyry's 'De abstinentia', 9 which is a book length letter to a Firmus Castricius, a former vegetarian and fellow student of Plotinus who had fallen away from vegetarianism. Porphyry intends his arguments to bring Firmus back within the fold. The relevant text can be found at III. 19: " T o compare plants, however, with animals, is doing violence to the order of things. For the latter are naturally sensitive (aistbanesthai), and adapted to feel pain, to be terrified and hurt (kai algein kai phobeisthai kai blaptesthai)·, on which account also they may be injured (adikeisthai). But the former are entirely destitute of sensation, and in consequence of this, nothing foreign, or evil (kakon), or hurtful {biabe), or injurious (adikia), can befall them. For sensation is the principle of all alliance (Kai gar oikeioseos pases kai allotrioseos arche to aistbanesthai) . . . And is it not absurd (alogon), since we see that many of our own species (anthropon) live from sense alone (aisthesei monon), but do not possess intellect (noun) and reason (logon) . . . that no justice is shown from us to the ox that ploughs, the dog that is fed with us, and the animals that nourish us with their milk, and adorn out bodies with their wool? Is not such an opinion most irrational and absurd?" Indeed. Zeno and the Stoics are the ones who held such an opinion, but the continued popularity of meat-eating indicates that Porphyry's followers still have their work cut out for them. Zeno and his followers assert that alliance or intimacy (oikeiosis) is the principle to be used in determining which beings deserve justice, but for Porphyry this begs the question. What is needed is some criterion for alliance, some way of determining how we will group nature into the various households of edible and 7

8

9

A n d we d o surely want to protect these people, although not all of the ancients did, as is evidenced by the practice of infanticide. TOM REGAN, F o x ' s Critique of Animal Liberation, Ethics 88 (Jan., 1978): 126—133; also see DALE JAMIESON and TOM REGAN, Animal Rights: A R e p l y to Frey, Analysis 38 (Jan., 1978): 32—36. Critics of the argument f r o m marginal cases include R . G . FREY, Animal Rights, Analysis 37 (June, 1977): 186—189; and JAN NARVESON, Animal Rights, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (Mar., 1977): 1 6 1 - 1 7 8 . See the recent edition of J . BOUFFARTIGUE and M . PATILLON, Porphyre de l'abstinence (Paris, 1977), 3 vols., with French and Greek on facing pages, and helpful notes and introductions. A l s o , a new edition of the THOMAS TAYLOR translation is available: P o r p h y r y , O n Abstinence f r o m Animal F o o d ( L o n d o n : Centaur Press, 1965). T h e following q u o t e is taken f r o m this translation.

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inedible beings. For all those beings who think that unnecessary suffering ought to be avoided (i.e., for at least all rational human beings) sensation (aisthanesthai) is a principle of alliance that must be considered. Porphyry's comparison of plants and animals on this criterion is instructive. If we suggest that sentiency is an insufficient condition for being treated with justice we eliminate many of our own species that live from sense alone, without reason (alogon). And if we "lower" our standards so as to include all human beings, we must therefore be willing to include animals capable of sensation. 10 At this point the defender of the Stoics would either have to admit his inconsistency or give up an opposition to infanticide, 'mercy' killings of the retarded, etc. Hardly a nice position to be in! In any event, Porphyry's status as the discoverer of the vegetarian argument from marginal cases ought to be acknowledged. And his views on vegetarianism ought to be treated in a Nietzschean way as thoughts worthy of consideration for us living in the present, not just for the purpose of antiquarian lore.

II. Book 1 of 'De abstinentia

Without a doubt, the most comprehensive and subtly reasoned treatment of vegetarianism by an ancient philosopher is Porphyry's 'De abstinentia', the only extant work that deals precisely with the topic from antiquity in addition to Plutarch's O f Eating the Flesh'. The text itself has played its own part in the history of animal rights. The English translator of the work, THOMAS TAYLOR, borrowed from Porphyry in his 1792 book, Ά Vindication of the Rights of Brutes', which is not a panegyric to the brutes but an acerbic reply to MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT'S Ά Vindication of the Rights of Women'. TAYLOR suggests that if women are given rights, eventually even the beasts will receive them, thereby, he thinks, reducing the women's case to absurdity. The fact that TAYLOR'S (at times misleading) translation is still in use indicates the need for classicists to become familiar with modern vegetarianism, especially now that women do have rights. 11 Like his teacher Plotinus, Porphyry was a vegetarian. As before, the occasion for the book is the defection from the ranks of vegetarianism of a fellow student of Plotinus in Rome, Firmus Castricius. WILLIAMS thinks that Firmus was lured away by the 'fruits' of Christianity. 12 But it is unclear why he defected. BOUFFAR10

These would include cows, pigs, chickens, fish, and others all the way 'down' the evolutionary scale until we reach beings like mollusks. See PETER SINGER, Animal Liberation, op. cit., pp. 183 — 189. Also see my Vegetarianism and the Argument from Marginal Cases in Porphyry, Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (Mar., 1984): 141 — 143.

11

Concerning TAYLOR, see PASSMORE and SINGER. My comment can go both ways. SINGER'S failure to note that TAYLOR translated 'De abstinentia' indicates that modern vegetarians might profit from a reconsideration of Greek philosophy. HOWARD WILLIAMS, The Ethics of Diet (London: Richard James, 1907).

12

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TIGUE and PATILLON hold out the possibility that Firmus was opposed to patriotism, in that Porphyry wrote this work in Sicily, the ancient home of the Pythagoreans, where vegetarianism may still have contained political overtones. 1 3 In the final analysis, we just do not know why Firmus gave up vegetarianism. Being the encyclopaedist that he was, Porphyry wrote a work containing every possible reason why Firmus ought to remain vegetarian. 14 The work is divided into four books, each dealing with a different concern. The first book deplores his friend's defection and treats the topic of moderation. Porphyry refuses to believe that Firmus makes his switch for reasons of health; only the vulgar {idiotes) would say that vegetarianism is unhealthy (2)! Rather, Firmus has deceived himself into thinking that vegetarianism makes no difference with respect to the acquisition of wisdom (phronesin). We should note that (Stoic?) indifference (adiaphoria) to the issue of vegetarianism is not only Firmus's problem, as WILLIAMS is quick to point out. 1 5 Porphyry starts to deal with the members of those antivegetarian traditions that may have led Firmus away: the Peripatetics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics. His objections to these traditions are numerous. For example, he makes it clear that unnecessary suffering must not be inflicted (11 — 12). Like Plutarch he realizes that dangerous animals and those which are redundant in the extreme (rats?) may have to be killed. Sheep and oxen, whose numbers are regulated by human beings, are not found in these categories. A first century A . D . rhetorician, Claudius the Neopolitan, opposed vegetarianism and wrote a treatise against abstinence. Unfortunately, it is lost to us, except for Porphyry's summary of it (13—25). Apparently Claudius collected the common man's 'arguments' against vegetarianism, with which Porphyry is concerned because he constantly notes the general absence of vegetarianism in the daily, mythological, and official life of culture (BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 1, p. lxvi). These common men (polus kai demodes anthropos) hold the following views: the ancients (in the golden age) abstained from meat not out of piety, but because they did not know how to use fire (13). Eating meat became natural only when men could cook their food, and when some people from every nation began to eat meat. There is an innate and just war (polemos) planted in us against brutes : some (lions and wolves) attack us voluntarily, some (snakes) only when trampled on. Other animals destroy the fruits of the earth. Therefore, we have a legitimate case against them. We can spare those animals that associate with us (dogs), but a hog is not useful (chresimon) for anything but food. Anyway, why should we abstain from eating animals (15)? Even animals eat animals, the most sagacious of which are hunters themselves. Eating flesh hinders neither soul nor body; in fact, athletes and physicians have testified to the healthiness of eating meat. N o t only do we help ourselves by eating meat, we preserve ourselves against the takeover of our earth by those endlessly re-

13

BOUFFARTIGUE a n d PATILLON, v o l .

14

WILLIAMS, p .

1, p .

xxii.

15

Ibid., p. 64. See M . J . BOYD, D e abstinentia I, 7 - 1 2 , Classical Q u a r t e r l y 30 (1936): 188 — 191, on Porphyry's treatment of Epicureanism.

62.

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producing swine and hares (16), whose death will produce putrefied flesh which carries disease. Furthermore, one can legitimately ask how many men will not be cured if animals are not consumed (17); e.g., the blind are aided by eating vipers. And even if the case for abstention is a good one, does it not of necessity also apply to plants, thereby jeopardizing our very existence (18)? The vegetarian is an inconsistent thinker when one considers that he believes in transmigration yet refuses to eat meat, when this practice would liberate souls trapped in animals so that they could return to a human body all the more quickly (19). The meat eater can have his 'cake' and eat it too: if animals are not worthy of respect we can kill them, and if they are worthy of respect (because they are frustrated human beings) we do them a favor by killing them (20). If the vegetarian persists, then he should also avoid milk, wool, and honey, for to use these would be stealing a calf's food, a sheep's vestment, and the bee's own nourishment (21). Even the gods demand animals to be killed (22—25). They have sense, for they realize that if animals were not killed, serpents would dominate the earth. And no more of the Pythagorean nonsense: killing and eating animals does not induce us to do the same to human beings. Porphyry's intellectual honesty leads him not only to offer the best possible reasons f o r vegetarianism, but also — and he considers it a duty — to collect the best reasons a g a i n s t it. Without him we would hardly know anything about Greek antivegetarian thought. The remarkably modern tenor of many of Claudius' points encourages me to respond to him as if he were a contemporary: (1) It is purely conjecture on Claudius's part that primitive men were vegetarians because they lacked fire. (2) The cultural appropriation of nature found in the suggestion that it is natural to eat c o o k e d flesh is part of a more general anthropocentrism that can be called into question. 16 (3) The fact that some people in all nations eat meat (if in fact this is true) does not in itself establish the legitimacy of meat-eating; to think otherwise is to stumble into the argumentum ad populum. (4) Porphyry is more than willing to admit that it is sometimes necessary to kill animals in order to save ourselves (e.g., Claudius's lions), but this does not support the case for an all-out war on animals, much less a just (ιdikaios) one. 1 7 (5) To see pigs only as "locomotor meals", as C L A R K puts it, denies them not only sentience but also the ability to associate with us; pigs have been known to be pets before. 1 8 'Graciously' elevating Claudius's arguments to the status of jewels, we might ask whether it is worthwhile to cast such swine before 'pearls.' (6) Although eating meat can be one of the sufficient conditions for a healthy diet, this does not establish the case, as Claudius thinks, for its being necessary. (7) It is not necessary for the vegetarian to build his case

16

See CLARK, p . 117.

17

Claudius is not the last person to use just war theory as a cover for other interests. Ibid., pp. 23, 28, in reference to III, 18, where God only forgives our necessities. Ibid., p. 15. Also see TOM REGAN and PETER SINGER, Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 144, for HENRY SALT'S treatment of swine and pearls.

18

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on transmigration; assuming that Porphyry accurately reports his arguments, Claudius fails to see that animals may be worthy of respect even if they are not really human or useful to humanity. (8) Claudius may well be correct, however, that the vegetarian should also be careful in his use of milk, wool, and honey, but not because of Claudius's supposed concern for theft. Rather, gathering these materials can (but does not necessarily) cause pain to the animals involved. (9) Obviously Claudius is correct that eating animals does not make us more likely to eat human beings; whether this applies to killing is open to doubt. And finally, (10) the issues of animals eating other animals, killing animals for cures, and the extension of the vegetarian's argument to plants are weak and need not detain us. Porphyry realizes that whatever he says will probably not convince those who are occupied in a life of labor, or those who are athletes, in that their standards are largely informed by tradition. 1 9 Rather, he would criticize Claudius or Firmus or others who have the time and inclination to consider how they ought to act and why (27); if they develop a body of akousmatikoi who can change tradition, all the better. Porphyry's overall goal is to obtain the contemplation of real being (29), which is obviously hindered in no mysterious way when human beings are fettered by the realization that they have killed sentient beings for no reason. Ignorance, of course, is bliss in that it can eliminate fetters. Dwelling in foreign (i.e., meat-eating) land we seek an escape from barbarism (30) so that we may "enter the stadium naked and unclothed, striving for the most glorious of all prizes, the Olympia of the s o u l " (31). The point here is that pleasure and pain are the streams which irrigate the current by which the soul is linked to the body (32—34). For Porphyry, the soul is dyadic (unlike Plato's triad): (1) nous or logos is the rational part confronting (2) an irrational, passionate element (alogon or pathetikon — see BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 1, p. xlvii). T o eat meat only because it tastes good is to delay our return to our 'home', the road to which is paved with reason and restraint rather than with the Bacchic fury needed to slaughter animals. The goal is to transmute body into soul, not the other way around. The modern novelist KAZANTZAKIS ably grasps Porphyry's point in the novel 'Zorba the Greek', where (the Dionysian) Zorba says to his (Neoplatonic) boss: "Tell me what you do with the food you eat, and I'll tell you who you are. Some turn their food into fat and manure, some into work and good humor, and others, I'm told, into G o d . So there must be three sorts of men. I'm not one of the worst, boss, nor yet one of the best. I'm somewhere between the two. What I eat I turn into work and good humor . . . As for you, boss . . . I think you do your level best to turn what you eat into G o d . But you can't quite manage it, and that torments y o u . "

19

Porphyry's vegetarianism is not an ivory tower affair, however. See BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 1, pp. liv, xxxv. True theoria consists in reasons (logoi) and action (erga). A s in B o o k Six of the 'Republic' the job of the philosopher is to both glance in the direction of the G o o d and to try to reform the city.

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T o be purified of meat-eating is not easy (35), as it may require changing one's lifestyle, and avoiding those places where a 'hostile' crowd might ridicule vegetarianism. This is why some Pythagoreans dwelt in solitary places (36), although even in the cities there were sacred groves where solace could be found. Plato's Academy was not far removed from the center of things, yet Plato above all others knew of the seductive nature of a banquet (36—37). The irrational part of the soul, compared to the wayward steed of Plato's 'Phaedrus', is not capable of judging which foods ought to be eaten; only the reasoning charioteer is fit to judge (43—44). Today, it seems, this wild horse goes under the name of 'taste.' Reason, for Porphyry, rejects what is superfluous and circumscribes what is necessary within narrow boundaries (46). Modern vegetarians might learn from Porphyry that it is not their job to show that one can still dine elegantly, although gourmet vegetarian dishes often enable some to make the break with meat more easily. Nearly every ancient philosopher (48), including some who were not vegetarian, preferred frugality — as opposed to asceticism — to luxury. In this respect vegetarianism was a quintessential Greek trait that acted as a paradigm (often unrealized) for all Greeks. The 'wealth' of nature is easily obtained, but that which proceeds from vain opinions is procured with difficulty (49). Porphyry is not so much suggesting that vegetarianism is more 'natural' than other diets, but that flesh consumption is a cultural phenomenon; eating meat is not built into the structure of things as is the law of gravity. N o r does he want to build his vegetarianism on half-baked scientific ideas. The connection between vegetarianism and medicine is dependent on the connection between vegetarianism and philosophical reflection (50). 2 0 The multitude, however — that group defended not too altruistically by Claudius — will incessantly labor to obtain more (beef?) even if their possessions are abundant (51). All to no avail. For Porphyry, variety of animal foods does not even increase the pleasure of eating, much less its morality. This pleasure often enough is terminated as soon as pain or desire is removed. O u r activities ought to follow a boundary or measure (54) such that the contemplative philosopher (theoretikos) is not even capable of desiring luxuries (56): " F o r no one who can easily liberate himself from all perturbations, will desire to possess silver tables and couches, and to have ointments and cooks, splendid vessels and garments, and suppers remarkable for their sumptuousness and variety; but such a desire arises from a perfect uselessness to every purpose of the present life . . . and from immense perturbations." (55) In short, adopting the language of SINGER, animal liberation can also be human liberation, because our contest, for the Neoplatonist, is for immortality and an

20

53

See: HERMANN SCHÖNE, Hippokrates Περί φαρμάκων, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 73 ( 1 9 2 0 - 2 4 ) , 4 3 4 - 4 4 8 (about Porphyry, de abstinentia I, 34, see: 4 4 3 - 4 4 8 ) . ANRW II 36.2

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association with divinity (56), an adhering to G o d as if fastened by a nail (57). Simplicity in eating is a mirror of, above all else, the simplicity, purity, and self sufficiency of the O n e . 2 1

III. Books 2—4 of'De

abstinentia

Book T w o seems quite removed from present-day concerns in that it deals with the issue of animal sacrifices. Porphyry's point is that even if animals must be sacrificed, it does not follow that we should eat them (2,44). This is the same sort of reasoning that applies to ferocious animals when they must be killed (4) and to human sacrifices as they have occurred in Greek history (53 ff.). Originally human beings sacrificed grass and the like (barley, honey, etc.), but when an ancient famine caused hardship, animals were called into service to placate the gods (5—9; also see Porphyry's treatment of Theophrastus). Although Porphyry is tied to the religious beliefs of his age, one can sense his struggle to elevate religious discourse. The gods care more for the disposition or intention of those who sacrifice than for the sorts of things sacrificed (15). CLARK sees even more significance in Book T w o . 2 2 As he views it, all meateating is a corrupt application of symbolic processes. In Porphyry's day one's eating meat was connected with the symbols of subservience to the gods; in ours, meat-eating is symbolic of our supposed superior status in the world, our level of economic achievement, etc. Flesh-eating has been a metaphor, a sacrament, a secular feast; not to eat with one's fellows is often a denial of those symbols which cause consanguinity. For Porphyry a religious symbolism more appropriate than meat-eating is Quaker-like silence (33), a sacred sacrifice of our intellect, an offering of a pure soul (61). Porphyry spends much of his time in this book with daemons, the souls of dead bodies, and the like. Yet even VOLTAIRE realized that Porphyry's vegetarianism was not based on metempsychosis; and modern scholars at least recognize that metempsychosis is a difficult problem in Porphyry, not to be automatically alluded to in order to explain vegetarianism (BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 1, p. li). 2 3 21

22

23

See WILLIAMS, p. 66, where it is held that for Porphyry the one who extends his sympathies to all life is nearest the divine. The extent to which this works against divine simplicity and self-sufficiency, however, is not at all clear. CLARK, p. 177. Also see D e abstinentia, IV, 21, where Porphyry suggests that X e n o crates was also opposed to animal sacrifices in favor of the fruits of the earth. See WILLIAMS, p. 67, for the relationship between VOLTAIRE and P o r p h y r y ; according to BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 2, p. 4, Porphyry is heavily influenced by Theophrastus in B o o k T w o . But BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON do so see some major differences between these two, p p . 19—20. F o r example, Porphyry's vegetarianism is oriented toward the individual in an atemporal way, whereas Theophrastus's analysis is social (like SINGER'S) and historical. Porphyry is interested in combating perversion of the soul,

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Book Three turns to a more familiar topic: justice. Vegetarianism is conducive not only to moderation (Book One) and piety (Book Two), but also to justice. T o extend justice to animals, PASSMORE holds that Porphyry begins by showing that animals are rational. 2 4 In a way this is true, but it is not necessary for Porphyry to start this way; he does so only because his opponents deny animals the capacity to receive justice because they are irrational. Although Porphyry denies that animals are irrational, it is by no means clear that we could not be just to them even it they were. In any event, two sorts of reason (logos) can be considered, even from a Stoic point of view (2): internal and external, the latter of which is exhibited by speech. BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON (vol. 2, p . 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 ) n o t e that A r i s t o t l e delin-

eates three categories of 'speech': (1) inarticulate noises and groans, e.g., the sounds of insects (psopbos); (2) organized sounds, as in the chirping of birds {phone); and (3) language per se, organized by semantic rules (dialectos).25 Porphyry does not distinguish carefully between (1) and (2), and at times wants to say that animals have (3). Why does he think this is the case? When a Greek hears an Indian or a Scythian, he does not understand him any more than he would understand a crane; only a clangor of long and short syllables is heard, without significance (3). Having once learned the language this person speaks, we should wonder whether the organized sounds of animals, which obviously have some communicative function among animals themselves, indicate a reasoning ability. The ancients (of a golden age?) were said to have understood the speech of animals. Before the reader assumes this was fantasy, he should consider the extensive scientific research efforts today to understand the sounds of whales and many other animals. Skeptics will be bolstered by the realization that some in antiquity were also doubtful: " A n associate, also, of mine informed me that he once had a boy for a servant, who understood the meaning of all the sounds of birds, and who said that all of them were prophetic, and declarative of what would shortly happen. H e added that he was deprived of this knowledge through his mother, who, fearing that he would be sent to the Emperor as a gift, poured urine into his ear when he was asleep." (3) Omitting this story through the passion for incredulity, Porphyry points to other phenomena. The fact that animals understand each other's sounds is important to notice (4), as LORENZ and other ethologists have done. Some animals even imitate human speech (e.g., parrots); the fact that not all do so does not Theophrastus in combating perversion of custom. These contrasts, however, should not be overemphasized, especially when one sees the diversity of Porphyry's approaches. Also a bit too strongly put is the position of U . DIERAUER, pp. 286—290. H e distinguishes between two types of vegetarianism: (1) that which wants to spare animals; and (2) that which is concerned with the soul of man. Porphyry is placed in the second category, with s o m e justification, but Porphyry's belief in the rationality of animals and his sympathy for their suffering indicate that the first category is not outside his grasp. 24

PASSMORE, p .

25

H i s t o r y of Animals, IV, 9; and D e anima II, 8.

53»

211.

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necessarily indicate their lack of rationality, for we do not think of ourselves as lacking rationality if we do not know all languages. What is noteworthy is not the communication that does not occur but that which does, most of which is not mnemonic 'parrot talk'. Animals often understand across species lines, e.g., when birds indicate distress to mammals, or when human beings learn about the movements of a hare from a barking dog. Cowherds and shepherds know the wants of their animals from their lowing and bleating (5). For every example of our understanding the sounds of animals, there is an example of their clearly understanding us (6). They not only hear a voice as if it were a mere sound, but they also grasp our meaning (15). Dogs, horses, and the like obey commands, and it certainly seems to be stretching the case a bit too far to suggest that these commands are learned and interpreted "instinctively" or " b y nature" (phusei). Curiously enough, when human beings do the things some animals can do, we are more than willing, on the same evidence, to attribute dialectic or at least syllogistic reasoning to them. A meat-eating human being, therefore, is not just ignoring animals through indifference (6): " F o r how is it possible that he should not defame and calumniate animals, who has determined to cut them in pieces, as if they were stones?" The evidence animals offer of external reason through speech leads Porphyry to conclude that their internal reasoning ability is different only in degree, not in kind, from that of human beings (7). 2 6 Animals certainly can sense and are intelligent. Following Plutarch, Porphyry notices that the fact that human beings are more intelligent does not deny animal intelligence — the fact that hawks fly higher than partridges does not mean that partridges cannot fly (8). 2 7 Further, to designate animals as 'mad' only makes sense against a background of rationality (again, a la Plutarch, 7,24). Some will think that Porphyry has legislated animal rationality into existence here, but Porphyry could always make the same charge regarding those who so quickly dismiss animal intelligence and communication as not being rational. In any event, Porphyry also sees animals exhibiting prudence (phroneseos — 9); that is, animals are capable of certain types of awareness through nature (or instinct). Yet other types are learned from other animals or from men through discipline (10), which is a necessary condition for prudence. 28 Porphyry indicates that

26

27

28

BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 2, p. 135, deal with the 'all or nothing' Aristotelian conception of reason; p. 139 deals with the influence of Philo on Porphyry's conception of animal rationality. See BERNARD E. ROLLIN, Beasts and Men: The Scope or Moral Concern, The Modern Schoolman 55 (1978): 241—260, where the author treats a different conception of reason found in KANT. Although, for KANT (p. 248), there are different degrees of actualizing the rational faculty, there is only one (i.e., human) reason. ROLLIN notices (p. 253) that KANT'S argument is circular; from the outset reason can only apply to beings that use language and make judgments like human beings. See R. G. COLLINGWOOD, The Idea of History (New York: Galaxy Books, 1956), p. 227, for a discussion of how cats show the beginnings of historical understanding in the way they teach their young.

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animals may have vices, like envy. Anticipating LORENZ, Porphyry realizes that it is the gregarious character of animals that allows us to see them in the social context required by this quasi-moral discourse (11). 2 9 T o call animals savage does for moral discourse what calling them mad does for discourse about rationality (12). If men were reduced to brutish behaviour with respect to food, how much more savage would we become? War is an indication of the lengths to which human beings will go when desires are frustrated, and the warrior has often been called immoral, especially when he kills the innocent. O n the other hand, benevolence is not unknown among animals or human beings (13). But could all of this be irrelevant to the real issue? Even if animals do not have what can strictly be called language or rationality, or be described in moral terms, do they not deserve our respect? The key to modern philosophical vegetarianism, sentience, can operate as a heuristic which illuminates the heart of Porphyry's theory, which Porphyry (and Plutarch) may have been only dimly aware of as the heart of their theories (see Porphyry's use of the argument from marginal cases). For Porphyry (21), everything animated (empsychon) is adapted to be sensitive (aisthetikon) and imaginative (phantastikon). T o kill animals painlessly is almost unheard of, but even to do this would still be to deprive them of those ends they are capable of attaining. Expectation, memory, design, preparation, fear, indignation, and the like force Porphyry once again to slip yet another end into an animal's purview: reason. Plutarch's presence is clear here (22), especially when Porphyry responds to those who say that animals " a s it were" are afraid, hear, or live. Opponents to vegetarianism often use as a standard of reason a perfect reason that the beasts fail to meet; but so do human beings (23). A man is more rational than a dog, who is more rational than a sheep, etc.; but a tree cannot be rational at all, in that it lacks the necessary condition of sentience. In short, because justice for Porphyry consists in not injuring anything, it must be extended as far as every animated nature — or else we would have to deny justice not only to animals but to many human beings. However, a crude utilitarian calculus of pleasure (contrast with SINGER'S more sophisticated utilitarianism) cannot preserve justice (26—27). The cosmic scope of justice is exhibited in the following quote which in a way transcends the peculiarly Neoplatonic slant of Porphyry's words: " B u t if an assimilation to divinity is the end of life, an innoxious (i.e., innocent — ablabes) conduct toward all things will be in the most eminent

29

KONRAD LORENZ, On Aggression, trans. M. KERR (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966) ( = ID., Das sogenannte Böse. Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression [Wien: Borotha—Schoeler, 1966]). Also see CLARK, p. 155, where the author holds that it is because we are animals that we display parental and familial care; and as Aristotle notices (Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 1155 a and passim) it is out of family realtionships that our sense of justice arises. Finally, see CLARK'S The Nature of the Beast: Are Animals Moral? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

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degree preserved. As, therefore, he who is led by his passions is innoxious only towards his children and his wife, but despises and acts fraudulently towards other persons, since in consequence of the irrational part predominating in him, he is excited to, and astonished about mortal concerns; but he who is led by reason, preserves an innoxious conduct towards his fellow citizens, and still more so towards strangers, and towards all men, through having the irrational part in subjection, and is therefore more rational and divine than the former character; thus also, he who does not confine harmless conduct to men alone, but extends it to other animals, is more similar to divinity; and if it was possible to extend it even to plants, he would preserve this image in a still greater degree. As, however, this is not possible, we may in this respect lament, with the ancients." 3 0 Vegetarianism, for Porphyry, is thus not the dessert of the Neoplatonic meal, but a part of the main course. Book Four, like Book Two, is not of great interest to modern readers, as it deals with the relationship between Greek vegetarianism and other ancient cultures, like those of Greece in the golden age (1—2), Lacedaemonia under Lycurgus (3 — 5), Egypt (6—10), and the culture of the Jews (11 — 13). Relying on Josephus, Porphyry pays particular attention to the Essenes, whose description resembles that of the original Pythagorean sect: common ownership of goods, frugality, etc. Although not vegetarian, they were at least somewhat sober in their eating of meat. 3 1 The point of these cultural histories is that there have been many examples of vegetarian practice in different times and places. 3 2 Porphyry's treatment of Indian vegetarianism (17—18) is of interest in that it gives some indication of how this ancient center of vegetarianism may have influenced (directly or indirectly) Greeks like Pythagoras and Plotinus. The Greeks called the wise men of India Gymnosophists, one division of which was the Brahmin class, who ate fruits, milk, and herbs. The fertility of the Ganges region makes India sound like a paradise, sustaining the belief that the golden age still existed in remote parts of the world. Another class of Gymnosophists, the Samanaeans, ate rice, bread, fruit, and herbs, making both classes vegetarian. Porphyry obviously feels a kinship for these men who sound like Neoplatonists in that they willingly endure their present life so as to be liberated from their bodies later. The task now is to understand the rest of this incomplete Book Four.

30

31

32

See BOUFFARTIGUE and PATILLON, vol. 1, p. lviii, where the authors show that for Porphyry union with G o d is possible without death. See E. WYNNE-TYSON, in: Porphyry, O n Abstinence from Animal Food, p. 163, for some notes on the Jews. Also see Porphyry's treatment of the Syrians (15), Persians (16), and the Eleusinian mysteries (16).

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IV. The Moral Status of Vegetarianism

Philosophers tend to discriminate four types of moral action, although these discriminations are sometimes implicit: (1) Some actions are morally neutral, hence morally permissible. (2) Some actions are morally wrong, hence we ought not to perform them. (3) Some actions are duties we ought to perform. And (4) some actions are above and beyond the call of duty, thus are morally permissible, but are not morally neutral; these praiseworthy actions are called supererogatory. 33 What sort of action is vegetarianism? All will agree that vegetarianism is not morally wrong, so we are left with alternatives (1), (3), and (4). To say that choosing a vegetarian diet over a meateating diet is a morally neutral decision, like choosing to eat with a fork or a spoon, is to beg the question as to whether animals deserve our respect. In fact, those who try to justify or allow meat-eating often do so on m o r a l grounds, either implicitly or explicitly (e.g., Claudius the Neopoli tan). The enormous attention recently paid to philosophical vegetarianism indicates that not even most antivegetarians perceive it as morally neutral. To do so is to trivialize it. We are left with the question, Is vegetarianism (3) or (4)? One might suspect that the status of philosophical vegetarianism would be more exalted if it were supererogatory. But if it is a practice above and beyond the call of duty it would not necessarily have any implications for those of us who are mere mortals. If one assumes that one is not duty-bound to abstain from animal flesh, then philosophical vegetarianism would indeed appear supererogatory. Inasmuch as most philosophers from the end of the classical period until rather recently have made this assumption, it is not surprising that the vegetarian is popularly perceived as having gone beyond the call of duty in his dietary regimen. Yet as a famous American vegetarian, THOREAU, once put it, there are continents and seas in the moral world yet unexplored, and each person is an isthmus to that

33

I am relying to a large extent here on t w o articles by J . O . URMSON: Saints and H e r o e s , in: Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A . I. MELDEN (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1 9 5 8 ) : and ID.: Aristotle's D o c t r i n e of the Mean, in: Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Obviously category (4) is the most controversial, but in that ultimately I do not place vegetarianism in this category, no harm will be done b y examining it. Opponents to URMSON'S treatment of supererogation include ELIZABETH M . PYBUS, Saints and H e r o e s , Philosophy 57 ( 1 9 8 2 ) : 1 9 3 - 1 9 9 ; and SUSAN WOLF, M o r a l Saints, Journal of Philosophy 79 ( 1 9 8 2 ) :

419-439.

PYBUS tries to collapse (4) into (3), and WOLF criticizes the very idea of moral excellence. Defenders of URMSON include MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD, Self-Regard and the Supererogatory, in: Respect for Persons, ed. Ο . H . GREEN ( N e w Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1 9 5 8 ) : and ID., Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean, in: Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Aristotelian Society 79 ( 1 9 7 8 — 7 9 ) ; and DAVID HEYD, Supererogation (Cambridge: C a m bridge University Press, 1982).

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world. But "How worn and dusty, then, must be the highways of the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and conformity!" 34 My readers should not get the impression that contemporary philosophers are flocking to vegetarianism. Rather, the debate regarding philosophical vegetarianism has been heated. Nonetheless, the mode of argument used by contemporary philosophical vegetarians is a standard one. It does not begin with a definition of ethical concepts and high-level pronouncements. The method is to: "Identify what seem to be the major outlines of our considered moral beliefs, and then to bring logical analysis to bear on these to see whether they square with our apparent unconsidered attitude toward the particular matter under investigation." [My emphasis]35 In the case of our treatment of animals, the contemporary philosophical vegetarian holds that our considered moral belief (or moral truism, as N I E L S O N puts it 36 ) that unnecessary suffering should be avoided does not square with our unconsidered eating of animal flesh, leading many meat-eating philosophers into a highly casuistical 'anthropodicy,' a term C L A R K invents to parallel the theist's problem with theodicy. 37 The approach of Greek philosophical vegetarians like Porphyry was slightly different. They were not so much concerned with "considered moral beliefs" as with excellence (arete), or with what some Romans would call the ideal of humanitas. It is this striving to become the best human being one can become that differentiates Greek vegetarianism from its contemporary counterpart, not the primitive belief in transmigration or the like, whose importance has been overemphasized by several commentators. An arete-based approach to vegetarianism is not necessarily supererogatory. Six possible states of moral character can be imagined, which may help us locate what sort of action vegetarianism is, with the most moral character at the top. 38 A. Heroic excellence (arete): when one wants to act well, and does so heroically. Η1 : nonsupererogatory heroism. H2: supererogatory heroism. 34

Reform and the Reformers, in: Reform Papers, ed. WENDELL (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 3 2 3 . JAN NARVESON, Animal Rights, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March, 1977): 164. KAI NIELSON, Persons, Morals and the Animal Kingdom, Man and World 11 (1978): 233. HENRY D A V I D THOREAU, GLICK

35 36 37

STEPHEN R . L . C L A R K , o p . c i t . i n n . 3 , p .

38

This list is loosely based on URMSON, Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean, p. 158. The fact that we are using Aristotle for the purpose of defending vegetarianism should not bother us because, as Theophrastus shows, Aristotle may have been an inadequate interpreter of his own theories on animals. Also, A L A S T A I R MACINTYRE has argued in 'After Virtue' (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) that an arete-based ethics includes duties as one component (p. 141). There is no reason in MACINTYRE'S book why refusal to eat animal flesh cannot be such a duty.

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PORPHYRY A N D VEGETARIANISM

789

B. Ordinary excellence (arete): when one wants to act well, and does so. C. Self-control (enkrateia): when one wants to act badly, but controls oneself. D. Lack of self-control (akrasia): when one wants to act badly, tries to control oneself, but cannot. E. Badness of character (kakia): when one wants to act badly, does so without resistance, thinking it to be good. F. Brutishness (aiscbros): a diseased moral character, inhuman. "To act well" with respect to animals means — at the very least, if Plutarch and Porphyry are right — avoiding unnecessary suffering of killing. In civilized society where vegetal food is abundant, this means that to attain (B) or (C) one m u s t be a vegetarian. This in turn means that opponents to vegetarianism exhibit moral characters (D), (E), or in extreme cases of animal torture, (F). Moral character (D) is more prevalent than many suspect. Philosophical vegetarians often hear their colleagues admit that the vegetarian's case is probably right (thereby indicating that vegetarianism is not a morally neutral practice), but nonetheless jokingly talk about cows or pigs as they eat their roast beef or ham sandwiches. Nervous laughter usually follows. The existence of moral character (E) probably indicates that there are some basic disagreements about the moral status of animals, the status of rights claims, or some other issue. I hope that a consideration of Porphyry can clear up at least some of these disagreements. If Plutarch, Porphyry, et al., are right in implying that the attainment of (B) or (C) would require dutiful vegetarianism, then of what would heroic excellence (A) consist? Two sorts of heroism could be imagined. 39 One could be a heroic vegetarian if he did his duty — not causing animals to suffer or be killed unnecessarily — regularly under conditions in which desire or self-interest or some other reason would prod most people not to do it, even though vegetal food was in abundance — H I . O r one could be a heroic vegetarian by refusing, above and beyond the call of duty, to make animals suffer or be killed even if it might be deemed 'necessary' as in times of drought, etc. — H 2 . That is, moral excellence in the form of (B) or (A) can be attained without supererogation, although (A) can also be supererogatory, as in H 2 . Another example of a nonsupererogatory heroism would be the case of a doctor who stayed by his patients in a plagueridden city when all of his fellow doctors fled; and supererogation can also be seen in the case of a doctor who v o l u n t e e r e d to go to a plague-ridden city. If the first doctor were interviewed after the plague he might well say, "I only did my (Hippocratic) duty". But only a modesty so excessive as to appear false

39

See: U R M S O N , Saints and Heroes, pp. 200—201. I am compressing U R M S O N ' S three types of heroism or sainthood into two types. It should also be noted that in 'Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean,' art. cit. in n. 33, p. 158, U R M S O N admits that we cannot distinguish (B) from (C) either by their actions or beliefs, but only by their desires.

790

D A N I E L A. D O M B R O W S K I

could make the second doctor say the same. So also, vegetarians in a predominantly meat-eating and affluent culture may be nonsupererogatory heroes merely by doing their duty. T o quote URMSON: "While life in a world without its saints and heroes would be impoverished, it would only be poor and not necessarily brutish or short as when basic duties are neglected. If we are to exact basic duties like debts, and censure failure, such duties must be, in ordinary circumstances, within the capacity of the ordinary man . . . A line must be drawn between what we can expect and demand from others and what we can merely hope for and receive with gratitude when we get i t . " 4 0 N o t e that from the perspective of animals raised for the table, life i s brutish and short. The key question seems to be, Is vegetarianism "within the capacity of the ordinary m a n " ? If not, Plutarch's and Porphyry's claim that it is a duty would be in danger, for vegetarianism would slip into the category of supererogation, thereby rendering it largely irrelevant for those who are not moral heroes in the sense of H 2 . Porphyry himself admits in 'De abstinentia' (IV, 8) that the law grants to the general population many things which cannot be granted to the philosopher. They can legitimately associate with prostitutes or spend all of their free time in a tavern; today we would say that it is their right as free agents to do these things. But the legitimacy of civil liberties in the political arena is not always an accurate guide regarding questions of what we ought to do in the moral arena. Porphyry's claim that those things which are permitted to the multitude cannot be permitted to the philosopher is not a defense of the supposed sagelike, disembodied character of thought in the Hellenistic era; rather, it is an affirmation of the primacy of reason in the philosopher's life. REGAN comes close to Porphyry's point here when he holds that it is not irredeemably wrong (for the multitude?) to eat meat, but most of those (philosophers?) who read his essay are meat eaters who ought to change. 4 1 Or, as Porphyry has it (IV, 20): " A s water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, because it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted." Both Porphyry and REGAN (perhaps also Plutarch) imply that vegetarianism is a duty for philosophers, but supererogatory for the multitude. The problem with this dichotomy is not that it expects too much from the philosopher, but that it expects too little from the multitude. In our egalitarian, or somewhat

40 41

URMSON, Saints and Heroes, pp. 211, 213. TOM REGAN, The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975): 182.

PORPHYRY AND VEGETARIANISM

791

egalitarian, culture why is it not possible to encourage all human beings to pursue arete? Both Porphyry and REGAN could have benefited from the distinctions I have made above. Perhaps what they are trying to discern could be stated more accurately as follows: vegetarianism is a duty (see the arguments from sentiency and marginal cases). In the present state of culture, however, and this applies to Porphyry as well, a certain heroism is required from philosophers, but especially from the multitude, in order to meet this duty. This heroism need not be supererogatory; that is, one only need H I to fulfill one's duty.

Amélius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa doctrine, son style* par L u c

BRISSON,

Paris

Table des matières 1. Origine et nom

795

2. Q u e l q u e s dates

797

3. Rapports d'Amélius avec ses prédécesseurs et ses contemporains

800

3.1. Lysimaque

800

3.2. N u m é n i u s 3.2.1. Pythagore 3.2.2. Platon

801 802 803

3.3. Cronius

803

3.4. Plotin 3.4.1. Rapports sur le plan intellectuel 3.4.2. U n e édition des œuvres de Plotin due à Amélius 3.4.3. Rapports sur le plan religieux 3.4.3.1. Pratique religieuse 3.4.3.2. Textes sacrés

803 804 805 810 810 811

3.5. Porphyre 3.5.1. Rapports sur le plan intellectuel 3.5.2. Rapports sur le plan religieux 3.5.3. L'édition des œuvres de Plotin

812 812 813 813

3.6. Autres membres de l'École 3.6.1. Cartérius 3.6.2. Castricius 3.6.3. Adelphius et Aquilinus

814 814 814 815

* J e tiens à remercier tout d'abord le père HENRI-DOMINIQUE SAFFREY et ALAIN SEGONDS dont les remarques et les suggestions ont considérablement enrichi cette mise au point sur A m é l i u s . JEAN-LOUIS CHERLONNEIX, L O U I S - A N D R É D O R I O N , RICHARD G O U L E T et JEAN-

MARC NARBONNE ont lu le manuscrit de ce travail et m'ont ainsi évité bien des erreurs de toutes sortes. Il me faut enfin reconnaître ma dette envers l ' É . - R . 76, dirigée d'abord par JEAN PÉPIN, puis par DENIS O'BRIEN; ce travail n'aurait pas été possible sans toutes nos discussions qui, pendant plus d'une dizaine d'années, ont accompagné la traduction commentée de la 'Vie de Plotin', dont la publication ne saurait tarder. Par ailleurs, D . O'BRIEN a bien voulu me faire de nombreuses remarques sur ce texte. Et SYLVAIN MATTON m'a aidé à corriger les épreuves.

794

L U C BRISSON

3.7. Longin

815

3.8. Hostilianus Hésychius

816

3.9. Jamblique

817

3.10. Théodore d'Asiné

818

4. L'œuvre d'Amélius

819

4.1. Copie des oeuvres de Numénius

820

4.2. 'Scholies' composées à partir des cours de Plotin

820

4.3. 'Contre les apories de Porphyre' (+ la réponse à la réfutation de cet écrit par Porphyre) 821 4.4. 'Sur le problème de la justice chez Platon'

822

4.5. 'Contre le livre de Zostrien'

824

4.6. 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius'

825

4.7. Commentaires sur les dialogues de Platon 4.7.1. 'Commentaire sur le Timée' 4.7.2. 'Commentaire sur la République' 4.7.3. 'Commentaire sur le Parménide' 4.7.4. 'Commentaire sur le Philèbe'

826 826 827 827 828

4.8. L'Oracle d'Apollon

828

5. Doctrine

830

5.1. Métaphysique 5.1.1. L'Un 5.1.2. L'Intellect 5.1.2.1. La structure de l'Intellect 5.1.2.1.1. Le premier intellect démiurgique 5.1.2.1.2. Le second intellect démiurgique 5.1.2.1.3. Le troisième intellect démiurgique 5.1.2.2. Place et contenu de l'intelligible 5.1.3. L'âme 5.1.3.1. Le nom de l'âme 5.1.3.2. Le domaine de l'âme 5.1.3.2.1. L'âme du monde 5.1.3.2.2. Les âmes particulières 5.1.4. Le corps du monde

831 831 831 832 832 832 833 833 836 837 838 840 843 847

5.2. Éthique 5.2.1. Fatalité et libre arbitre 5.2.2 Le plaisir

849 849 850

6. Style

852

7. Conclusion

854

Annexes: 1. Sources des témoignages sur Amélius

855

2. Stemma des sources des témoignages sur Amélius

859

3. Références aux exégèses d'Amélius sur le 'Timée' de Platon dans le 'Commentaire sur le Timée' de Proclus 860 4. Références aux exégèses d'Amélius sur la 'République' de Platon dans le 'Commentaire sur la République' de Proclus 860

AMÉLIUS: SA VIE, SON ŒUVRE, SA DOCTRINE, SON STYLE

795

O n peut comparer l'œuvre d'Amélius à un vaste édifice tombé depuis longtemps en ruine, et dont, au fil des ans, les débris ont été réemployés à la construction d'autres édifices. Enchâssés dans la texture d'oeuvres étrangères, les fragments qui subsistent de l'œuvre d'Amélius s'y retrouvent dans des contextes radicalement différents qui en faussent la perspective; quelquefois même, la polémique les rend méconnaissables. Aussi la mise au point que j'ai voulu faire ici a-t-elle un triple but: exhumer les témoignages sur la vie, l'œuvre, la doctrine et le style d'Amélius, les décaper en les interprétant pour et par eux-mêmes et leur restituer, dans la mesure du possible, une cohérence qui les rende intelligibles. La chose n'est pas simple en raison même de la nature de nos sources (cf. Annexe 2 [p. 859]). Amélius ne fut connu personnellement que par Plotin, P o r phyre et Longin; peut-être Jamblique et Théodore d'Asiné entrèrent-ils en c o n tact avec lui à la fin de sa vie, mais ce n'est pas sûr. O r , il est impossible de déterminer, à partir d'une lecture des 'Ennéades', quel type d'influence exerça Amélius sur Plotin et quel jugement le maître portait sur son disciple. Par ailleurs, on sent chez notre principal informateur, Porphyre (cf. 3 . 5 [p. 812 — 814]), sinon de l'animosité, du moins un fort sentiment de rivalité à l'égard du plus ancien disciple de Plotin. Enfin, le jugement porté par Longin (cf. 3 . 7 [p. 815—816]) sur Amélius nous a été conservé par Porphyre qui en cite des extraits dans sa 'Vie de Plotin': ce qui ne va pas sans susciter une certaine méfiance. T o u t porte à croire par ailleurs que Jamblique et Théodore d'Asiné eurent entre les mains un (ou plusieurs) écrit(s) d'Amélius. Cela dit, l'œuvre de T h é o dore d'Asiné (cf. 3 . 1 0 [p. 818 — 819]), sur qui s'exerça fortement l'influence d'Amélius, a connu un sort similaire à celle de ce dernier; il n'en reste plus que des fragments. E t , pour sa part, Jamblique (cf. 3 . 9 [p. 8 1 7 - 8 1 8 ] ) adopte à l'égard d'Amélius une attitude de critique systématique, qui s'explique, en partie du moins, par son opposition à Théodore d'Asiné, lequel fut, pour un temps, son disciple. O u t r e Plotin, Porphyre, Longin, Jamblique et Théodore d'Asiné, seul, semble-t-il, Eusèbe de Césarée eut un accès direct à un (ou plusieurs) écrit(s) d'Amélius. Par ailleurs, plusieurs indices nous amènent à penser que l'École d'Athènes ne connut l'œuvre d'Amélius qu'à travers le témoignage de Porphyre et celui de Jamblique, qui pas plus que Porphyre n'appréciait Amélius. Bref, dès le début du Vème siècle, soit un peu plus d'un siècle après la mort de son auteur, l'œuvre d'Amélius était déjà en voie de disparition.

1. Origine

et nom

Lorsque, au chapitre 7 de la 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre donne une liste c o m mentée des disciples de Plotin les plus importants, il met bien évidemment en tête Amélius, dont il dit: « D e s auditeurs, il en eut beaucoup, mais comme disciples fervents et qui suivaient son enseignement pour la vie philosophique, il eut d'abord A m é -

796

LUC

BRISSON

lius, originaire d'Étrurie, dont le 'vrai nom' était Gentilianus; Plotin cependant voulait l'appeler Amérius, avec un r, car, disait-il, il lui convenait de tirer son nom de 1' 'indivisibilité' (améreia) plutôt que de Γ'insouciance' (,améleia).» (VP 7 . 1 - 5 ) Que peut-on tirer de ces quelques lignes1 sur l'origine et le nom d'Amélius? On y apprend d'abord qu'Amélius était originaire d'Étrurie 2 ; et il n'y a aucune raison de mettre en doute la validité de cette information. En revanche, les informations que nous donne Porphyre sur le nom d'Amélius sont loin d'être claires. Comment en effet interpréter ce membre de phrase: «le 'vrai nom' (d'Amélius) était Gentilianus»? Nulle part ailleurs Porphyre n'évoque ce nom, qu'en revanche Longin mentionne quatre fois: une fois dans le titre (VP 20.15) et trois fois dans la préface (VP 20.33, 71, 88) de son livre 'Sur la fin'. En VP 20.88, il se contente de parler de Gentilianus, alors que, dans les trois autres occurrences, il utilise l'expression Gentilianus Amélius. Bref, tout porte à croire que Gentilianus était le 'vrai nom' d'Amélius, c'est-à-dire son cognomen3. Longin parle d'Amélius, ne fût-ce qu'une fois (VP 20.88), en l'appelant Gentilianus; or, souvent, on appelait un individu par son seul cognomen. De plus le suffixe -ianus a servi à former beaucoup de cognomina. E n ce qui concerne Amélius, les recherches de I. KAJANTO4 ont permis

d'établir qu'il s'agit là d'un nom d'origine grecque, Άμέλιος, employé dans la partie occidentale de l'Empire romain comme un signum, une espèce de supernomen.

1

Tout le problème est de savoir si, en VP 7.4 et en 7.5, il faut lire αύτόν et αύτω ou αύτόν et αύτω. Dans le premier cas, c'est Plotin (se. αυτός) qui aurait voulu appeler Amélius «Amérius» alors que, dans le second, c'est Amélius luit-même (se. αυτός) qui aurait voulu changer de nom. En ce domaine, je suis HENRY—SCHWYZER qui lisent αυτόν et αύτω. La chose a été discutée par LEONARDO TARAN, Amélius-Amérius: Porphyry Vita Plotini 7 and Eunapius Vitae Soph. 4.2, American Journal of Philology 105, 1984, p. 4 7 6 - 4 7 7 .

2

Les Romains appelaient Etruria ou Tuscia (gr. Τουσκία) la partie centrale de l'Italie située au nord du Tibre, entre l'Apennin et la mer, c'est-à-dire la région qui correspond à la Toscane moderne. L'étymologie de ces deux noms reste incertaine. II semble en effet qu'il faille comprendre l'expression TO όνομα . . . το κΰριον comme désignant le cognomen d'Amélius. La chose se voit confirmée par le témoignage d'Hérodien: «à son Vrai nom = cognomen (τω τε κυρίψ αύτοϋ [sc. Gordien I] ονόματι)', ils apposèrent l'épithète 1''Africain', lui donnant ainsi le nom qui était le leur; voilà comment en effet, dans le Sud, sont appelés les Libyens par ceux qui parlent la langue des Romains» (Hérodien, V I I 5, 8). Par ailleurs, il est à noter que les suffixes -anus et -ianus ont beaucoup servi à former des cognomina, cf. sur le sujet, IIRO KAJANTO, The Latin cognomina, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, vol. 36, no 2, Helsinki—Helsingfors 1965, p. 32—35.

3

4

IIRO KAJANTO, Supernomina. A study in Latin epigraphy, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, vol. 40, no. 1, Helsinki—Helsingfors 1966. LEONARDO TARAN (article cité dans la note 1), qui reconnaît lui-même sa dette à l'égard d ' A L A N CAMERON ( a r t i c l e de TARAN, p . 4 7 9 , n . 1 1 ) m ' a m i s s u r c e t t e p i s t e . I l e s t à n o t e r

qu'un supernomen

peut être considéré comme un second cognomen

(cf. notre note 3).

A M É L I U S : SA V I E , S O N Œ U V R E ,

SA D O C T R I N E ,

S O N STYLE

797

Un supernomen est un nom personnel distinct des autres noms d'un individu. Les supernomina peuvent être divisés en deux classes: les agnomina et les signa. Un agnomen est un nom donné tard dans la vie pour une raison quelconque et qu'on ajoute aux autres noms en le faisant précéder de qui!quae. Par ailleurs, un signum est un nom qu'on ajoute aux autres noms d'un individu en le faisant précéder du terme signum ou signo. Or, ont aussi été considérés comme des signa des noms qui, sans être précédés du terme signum ou signo, jouent le même rôle et sont formés au moyen du suffixe -ius\ il s'agit des signa autonomes. Ce type de signa fut utilisé à une époque se situant à la charnière entre le Ilème et le Illème siècle et il peut être interprété comme un sobriquet, équivalant à une épithète et formé sur le modèle des acclamations qu'on trouve couramment dans les inscriptions grecques et latines. Il est impossible de déterminer pour quelles raisons et dans quelles circonstances Amélius fut affublé de ce sobriquet qui, dans la vie de tous les jours, lui servait de nom usuel. En revanche, Porphyre nous apprend que Plotin voulait substituer à ce signum peu flatteur, le sobriquet plus positif d'Amérius, qui vient de l'adjectif άμερής, adjectif qui chez Plotin qualifie la forme, είδος (Enn IV 4 [28], 23.17; I 6 [1], 3.9), le concept, νόημα (Enn IV 7 [2], 6.23; IV 4 [28], 23.17) ou même l'Un(-Bien) Έ ν (Enn VI 7 [38], 18.39; VI 9 [9], 2.21; VI 9, 5.19, 41; VI 9, 6.5 — 6, 9). La chose semble confirmer, par choc en retour, l'interprétation d "Amélius' comme un signum5.

2. Quelques

dates6

Les précisions chronologiques qu'on peut tirer de la 'Vie de Plotin' par Porphyre nous permettent de situer dans l'histoire universelle une partie importante de la vie d'Amélius, et même d'attribuer une date assez précise à certains événements de son existence. Les renseignements sur Amélius qui proviennent d'autres sources présentent beaucoup moins d'intérêt: ils sont trop vagues7.

5

L'usage du sobriquet, répandu dans l'École de Plotin:

Gentilianus—Amélius/Amérius

( V P 7 . 3 - 5 ) ; Porphyre—Malchos/Basileus ( V P 1 7 . 6 - 1 5 , cf. 2 0 . 9 1 , 2 1 . 1 4 ) ; M i k k a l o s - P a u linus ( V P 7.6—7) remonte, suivant le témoignage de P o r p h y r e , au moins jusqu'à N u m é nius, qui aurait appelé un certain Maximus, Mégalos ( V P 1 7 . 1 3 — 14). Cf. aussi Castricius Firmus (n. 2 9 ) et Hostilianus Hésychius (n. 33). 6

Sur l'ensemble des données chronologiques dans la 'Vie de Plotin' par P o r p h y r e ,

cf.

RICHARD GOULET, L e système chronologique de la 'Vie de Plotin', dans: P o r p h y r e , ' L a Vie de Plotin', I: Travaux préliminaires et index grec complet, par L u c BRISSON, MARIEODILE GOULET-CAZÉ, RICHARD GOULET et DENIS O'BRIEN, Paris (Vrin) 1982 (cet o u vrage sera par la suite cité sous le sigle P V P I, 1982), p. 187—217, et n o t a m m e n t le tableau p. 2 1 3 . 7

Dans ses 'Vies des Sophistes' (écrites après 3 9 6 ) , Eunape écrit: « E n fait, c o m m e il ( = P o r phyre) l'écrit lui-même, furent ses condisciples certains hommes très fameux: Origène, Amérius et Aquilinus. E t , si des traités de ces auteurs ont été conservés, aucun de leurs

54

ANRW II 36.2

798

LUC

BRISSON

Amélius se lia à Plotin très peu de temps après l'arrivée de ce dernier à Rome. En 243, Plotin, qui voulait faire l'expérience de la philosophie pratiquée chez les Perses et de celle qui était en honneur chez les Indiens, se joignit à la cour de l'empereur Gordien III qui avait organisé une expédition contre les Perses (VP 3.15—21). Mais l'empereur trouva bientôt la mort à Zaitha; et Philippe II (l'Arabe), qu'on accusa d'être responsable d'une façon ou d'une autre de cette mort, prit la suite des opérations. L'hypothèse de l'assassinat de Gordien III à l'instigation de Philippe II se trouve renforcée par le fait que, raconte Porphyre, Plotin, qui faisait partie de l'entourage de Gordien III, «s'enfuit à grand peine à Antioche où il trouva le salut (μόλις φεύγων εις την Άντιόχειαν διεσώθη). Puis, lorsque Philippe se fut emparé de l'empire [entre février et mars 244], Plotin, qui a quarante ans, vient à Rome» (VP 3.21—24). Plotin dut donc arriver à Rome dans la première moitié de 244. Or, un peu plus de deux ans plus tard, Amélius s'attache à Plotin: « Car Amélius vint le trouver alors que Plotin était à Rome pour la troisième année, dans la troisième année du règne de Philippe, et comme il y resta jusqu'à la première année du règne de Claude, il suivit son enseignement vingt-quatre années en tout. » (VP 3.38—42)

discours ne l'a été, car, bien que leurs doctrines soient correctes, un m a n q u e de grâce important est répandu sur leurs discours. N é a n m o i n s P o r p h y r e loue ces h o m m e s p o u r leur talent . . . »

(Vitae S o p h . I V 2 , 1—2, p. 9 , 4—9 GIANGRANDE). C e t t e notice, que

je ne suis pas sûr d'avoir bien comprise et surtout bien traduite, présente

plusieurs

anomalies. O r i g è n e est un disciple d ' A m m o n i u s (Sakkas), et un condisciple de Plotin et d ' É r e n n i u s ( V P 3 . 2 4 — 3 2 ) ; il n'est d o n c pas possible d'en faire un disciple de P o r p h y r e et d ' A m é l i u s , et cela m ê m e si P o r p h y r e raconte q u ' O r i g è n e assista au moins une fois à un cours de Plotin ( V P 1 4 . 2 0 — 2 5 ) . Par ailleurs, P o r p h y r e nous apprend qu'Adelphius et Aquilinus étaient des G n o s t i q u e s chrétiens qui, si o n interprète en ce sens l'expression ο ι π ε ρ ί ( V P 1 6 . 3 ) , avaient des disciples, et que c'est c o n t r e eux que polémiqua P l o t i n , à qui d'ailleurs Amélius êt P o r p h y r e prêtèrent main f o r t e ; il n'est d o n c pas impossible qu'Aquilinus ait suivi l'enseignement de Plotin en m ê m e temps q u ' A m é l i u s . E n f i n , il est à n o t e r q u ' E u n a p e désigne Amélius par son s o b r i q u e t , A m é r i u s (sur le sujet, cf. L . TARAN, A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f P h i l o l o g y 105, 1 9 8 4 , p. 4 7 6 — 4 7 7 ) . P a r ailleurs, dans son ' C o n t r e J u l i e n ' ( P . G . 7 6 , V I I I 9 3 6 a ) écrit entre 435 et 4 4 0 , Cyrille d'Alexandrie fait c o r r e s p o n d r e Γ ά κ μ ή d ' A m é l i u s avec celle de Plotin et celle de Gentilianus. Il s'agit là manifestement d ' u n e c o n f u s i o n , car « G e n t i l i a n u s » et « A m é l i u s » désignent le m ê m e individu. E n f i n , ne présentent pas beaucoup plus d'intérêt les N o t i c e s de la Souda sur A m é l i u s : « A m é l i u s , d ' A p a m é e , p h i l o s o p h e , disciple de P l o t i n , maître de P o r p h y r e , un c o n t e m p o rain d ' A m m o n i u s (Sakkas) et d ' O r i g è n e » ( s . v . Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς , t. I , p. 1 3 8 . 1 6 — 1 7 ADLER); sur P l o t i n : « P l o t i n , de L y c o p o l i s , philosophe, d ' a b o r d disciple de cet A m m o n i u s qui fut avant [d'être p h i l o s o p h e ] porteur de sacs, puis maître d ' A m é l i u s » ( s . v . Π λ ω τ ί ν ο ς , t. I V , p. 1 5 1 . 2 3 — 2 4 ADLER); et sur P o r p h y r e : « P o r p h y r e , celui qui a écrit ' C o n t r e les C h r é t i e n s ' ; son 'vrai n o m ' était Basileus; originaire de T y r , p h i l o s o p h e , disciple d ' A m é l i u s , le disciple de P l o t i n » ( s . v . Π ο ρ φ ΰ ρ ι ο ς , t. I V , p. 1 7 8 . 1 4 — 1 5 ADLER). Prétendre q u ' A m é l i u s fut le maître de P o r p h y r e n'est pas véritablement une erreur, mais il n'est pas possible d'en faire un c o n t e m p o r a i n d ' A m m o n i u s (Sakkas) et d ' O r i g è n e .

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La brièveté de l'écart temporel entre le moment où Plotin s'établit à Rome et le moment où Amélius s'attache à lui amène à penser qu'Amélius devint le disciple de Plotin dès le moment où celui-ci commença à enseigner à Rome, ou très peu de temps après. Et, puisqu'il faut placer la troisième année de Philippe II (l'Arabe) en 246, et que la première année de Claude tombe en 269, Amélius resta donc bien auprès de Plotin 24 années non pas «entières», mais «prises en bloc», c'est-à-dire «en tout» (όλα) 8 . Par suite, lorsque Porphyre arrive à Rome au cours de l'été 263, Amélius se trouve dans sa 18ème année d'étude auprès de Plotin (VP 4.3—4). Porphyre va passer un peu moins de 6 années complètes auprès de Plotin, de l'été 263 à la fin de 268 au maximum (VP 5 . 1 - 2 ) . O r , c'est au cours de cette période qu'il faut placer la plupart des événements de la vie d'Amélius sur lesquels nous sommes renseignés: — polémique avec Porphyre sur la place de l'Intelligible par rapport à l'Intellect (cf. 3.4.1 [p. 804]) et rédaction de deux ouvrages: 'Contre les apories de Porphyre' et une réponse à la réfutation de cet écrit par Porphyre (cf. 4.3 [p. 821 — 822]); — polémique avec Longin (cf. 3.7 [p. 815]) sur le problème de la justice chez Platon, et rédaction d'observations 'Sur le problème de la justice chez Platon' (cf. 4.4 [p. 822-824]); — polémique avec les Gnostiques (cf. 3.4.1 [p. 805]) et rédaction du 'Contre le^livre de Zostrien (cf. 4.5 [p. 824]); — polémique contre ceux qui, venant d'Athènes, accusent Plotin de plagier Numénius (cf. 3.4.1 [p. 805]) et rédaction, à la demande de Porphyre, de 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius' (cf. 4.6 [p. 825—826]). Cela dit, c'est forcément avant 246 qu'Amélius suivit l'enseignement du Stoïcien Lysimaque (VP 3.42—43). Et ce dut être entre le moment où il quitta Lysimaque et celui où il s'attacha à Plotin qu'Amélius recopia et assimila les écrits de Numénius (VP 3.43-45, cf. VP 20.76-78). À partir de 246, Amélius compose des scholies (σχόλια) à partir des notes qu'il prend aux cours de Plotin (cf. 4.2 [p. 820—821]); or, l'ampleur du recueil qui en résulta amène à penser qu'Amélius poursuivit ce travail tant et aussi longtemps que Plotin donna des cours à Rome, c'est-à-dire jusqu'en 269. Par ailleurs, Porphyre (VP 2.32—33) nous apprend que, à la mort de Plotin en 270, Amélius se trouvait à Apamée en Syrie. Il est bien difficile de savoir pourquoi Amélius quitta Plotin, gravement malade, en 269. L'assassinat de Gallien, empereur auquel étaient très liés Plotin et son Ecole (VP 12), à la fin de 268, y est peut-être pour quelque chose. O r , entre le moment où, en 269, il quitte Plotin qui, délaissant Rome, se retire sur la propriété de Zéthus «à six bornes milliaires avant Minturnes» (VP 7.17—24) et le moment où il s'établit à Apamée, Amélius, qui lui apporte des exemplaires de traités de Plotin (VP 19.32), rencontre Longin, lequel se trouve 8

54*

Sur le sens de ce terme, cf. RICHARD GOULET, Le système chronologique de la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 190.

800

LUC

BRISSON

probablement à Tyr auprès de Zénobie, dont il fut le conseiller à partir de 267/8; peut-être même Amélius resta-t-il alors quelque temps auprès de Longin, comme le laisse supposer VP 19.22—24. En 270, Amélius se trouve donc à Apamée en Syrie. C'est là qu'on perd la trace de celui qui, un quart de siècle plus tôt, était devenu, à Rome, le disciple de Plotin. O r , si on suppose qu'il s'est attaché à Plotin entre l'âge de 20 et de 30 ans, Amélius a dû naître entre 216 et 226. En 270, il devait donc avoir dans la cinquantaine. Et, si on comprend que l'épithète Ά π α μ ε ύ ς , qui dans la Souda (s. ν. Ά μ έ λιος, t. I, p. 138.16 ADLER) le qualifie, signifie «citoyen d'Apamée», on peut penser qu'Amélius vécut encore longtemps à Apamée — pendant 20 ou 30 ans — ce qui amène à situer la date de sa mort entre 290 et 300. De toute façon, Amélius mourut un certain temps avant Porphyre (cf. In Tim II 300.23—301.2, texte cité p. 805).

3. Rapports d'Amélius avec ses prédécesseurs et ses contemporains

Au cours de sa vie qui, semble-t-il, fut longue si on la compare à la durée de vie moyenne de l'époque 9 , Amélius entra en contact direct ou indirect avec un certain nombre de personnages plus ou moins connus. Voici une liste commentée de ces personnages.

3.1. Lysimaque 1 0 Dans sa 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre, après avoir indiqué qu'Amélius avait commencé à suivre l'enseignement de Plotin dans la troisième année du règne de Philippe II (l'Arabe), poursuit en écrivant: «Lorsqu'il vint chez Plotin, il possédait une formation qui lui venait de l'enseignement de Lysimaque (εξιν μεν εχων . . . ά π ό της Λυσιμάχου συνουσίας)» (VP 3.42—43). Tout porte à identifier ce Lysimaque avec celui que, dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', Longin (VP 20.47) nous présente comme un Stoïcien du milieu du Illème siècle. Malheureusement, nous ne savons pratiquement rien d'autre sur ce philosophe qu'Amélius fréquenta avant de devenir le disciple de Plotin, c'est-à-dire avant 246. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'Amélius semble, sur certains points, avoir subi une profonde influence stoïcienne, notamment lorsqu'il parle du Λόγος et des λόγοι (5.1.3 [p. 836-837]), et lorsqu'il définit la Fatalité (5.2 [p. 849-850]).

9

10

IIRO KAJANTO, On the problem of the average duration of life in the Roman empire, Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Ser. Β, vol. 153, no 2, Helsinki (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia) 1968. Sur ce Lysimaque, cf. Luc BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 95—96.

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3.2. Numénius 1 1 Alors que Porphyre se trouvait à l'École, c'est-à-dire entre 263 et 268, Plotin, dans ses cours, faisait lire les commentaires (υπομνήματα) de Numénius (VP 14.10-12). Par ailleurs, à Athènes où il était professeur, Longin, dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', qui fut écrit aux alentours de 265, compare l'interprétation par Plotin des principes pythagoriciens et platoniciens à celle de Numénius (VP 20.74-76). Et, toujours au cours du séjour de Porphyre à l'École, Amélius écrivit un ouvrage intitulé: 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius', pour défendre la réputation de son maître contre l'accusation lancée contre lui par «des gens venant d'Athènes» qui lui reprochaient d'avoir plagié Numénius (VP 17). Tout cela indique donc que, dans la seconde moitié du Illème siècle, tant à Rome qu'à Athènes, Numénius était considéré comme le philosophe platonicien par excellence, celui auquel on se référait pour apprécier et discuter les interprétations de Platon, et notamment celle de Plotin. Dans ce contexte, ce témoignage de Porphyre sur Amélius prend un relief particulier: «. . . il (= Amélius) surpassait tous ses contemporains par son acharnement au travail, parce qu'il avait copié et rassemblé presque tous les écrits de Numénius et en avait appris par cœur la plupart. » (VP 3.43—45) Après s'être frotté au Stoïcisme chez Lysimaque, Amélius devient platonicien en recopiant et en assimilant presque toute l'œuvre de Numénius. Mais, à cette interprétation du Platonisme, Amélius va préférer celle de Plotin, comme l'écrit Longin dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin': «Pour sa part, Amélius a préféré (προαιρούμενος) marcher sur les traces de Plotin et il s'en tient sur la plupart des questions aux mêmes doctrines . . . » (VP 20.76-78) Cependant, le nom d'Amélius continuera dans les décennies suivantes d'être rapproché de celui de Numénius. Jamblique (cf. 3.9 [p. 818]) 12 intitula un

11

Pour tout ce qui concerne cet auteur, cf. Numénius, Fragments, texte établi et traduit par ÉDOUARD DES PLACES, Paris (Les Belles Lettres) 1973. Et sur le fait que, au Illème siècle, Numénius représentait l'autorité suprême en matière de Platonisme, cf. H . D . SAFFREY, U n lecteur antique des œuvres de Numénius: Eusèbe de Césarée, dans: Forma futuri. Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Pellegrino, Torino (Bottega d'Erasmo) 1975, p. 145 — 153; et ID., Les extraits du 'Περί τάγαθοϋ' de Numénius dans le livre XI de la 'Préparation Evangélique' d'Eusèbe de Césarée, dans: Studia Patristica 13, ed. by Ε. Α. LIVINGSTONE, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Band 116, Berlin (Akademie-Verlag) 1975, p. 46—51. Voir aussi M. FREDE, Numénius, ci-dessous dans se même volume ( A N R W II 36,2), p. 1 0 3 4 - 1 0 7 5 .

12

Sur les problèmes que pose le titre de ce chapitre, cf. HENRI-DOMINIQUE SAFFREY, Le 'philosophe de Rhodes' est-il Théodore d'Asiné? Sur un point obscur de l'histoire de l'exégèse néo-platonicienne du Parménide, dans: Mémorial André-Jean Festugière, Genève (Patrick Cramer) 1984, p. 69.

LUC BRISSON

802

chapitre de l'un de ses livres: 'Réfutations d'Amélius et aussi de Numénius' (Proclus, In T i m II 2 7 7 . 2 8 - 3 2 ) . Et Eusèbe de Césarée cite le commentaire que fit Amélius du Prologue de l'Évangile de saint Jean (cf. 5 . 1 . 3 . 2 . 1 [p. 840—843]) dans le cadre de son exposé sur Numénius, pour lequel d'ailleurs il constitue notre principale source; un tel constat amène à penser qu'Eusèbe aurait pu connaître les deux auteurs en même temps, ou mieux l'un par l'autre, c'est-à-dire Numénius par Amélius. C o m m e une mention de Clément d'Alexandrie (Stromates I, 22, 150, 4 , p. 9 3 . 1 0 - 1 1 STÄHLIN—FRÜCHTEL—TREU 1985 4 ) amène à situer Numénius dans la seconde moitié du I l è m e siècle, Amélius, né entre 216 et 2 2 6 , ne put évidemment pas rencontrer celui qui le 'convertit' au Platonisme. Mais il n'est pas absurde de penser que, si Amélius se retire à Apamée, c'est parce que s'y était développée une École dans la tradition de N u m é n i u s 1 3 , école à laquelle aurait pu appartenir son fils adoptif Hostilianus Hésychius, à qui il légua la centaine de livres de notes qu'il avait prises au cours de Plotin.

3.2.1.

Pythagore

L'influence profonde et durable de Numénius sur Amélius et sur Plotin permet d'expliquer leur rapport à Pythagore et à Platon. À l'instar de Plotin, Amélius est, avant tout, un platonicien, même si le Platonisme auquel il adhère est tout imprégné de ce (néo-)Pythagorisme, dont l'influence était déterminante à cette époque 1 4 . O n en voudra pour preuve le jugement que, dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', Longin porte sur Plotin et Amélius: « . . . le premier a fourni des principes pythagoriciens et platoniciens, ainsi qu'il les entendait, une explication plus claire que ses prédécesseurs: car ni les écrits de Numénius, de Cronius, de Modératus ou de Thrasylle n'approchent un tant soit peu, pour l'exactitude, ceux de Plotin sur les mêmes sujets. Amélius, de son côté, a préféré marcher sur les traces de Plotin et il s'en tient sut la plupart des questions aux mêmes doctrines . . . » (VP 2 0 . 7 1 - 7 8 ) Voilà donc dans quel contexte il faut situer la doctrine des trois intellects démiurgiques qu'on ne peut pas ne pas rapprocher de celle des trois Rois dans la 'Lettre I I ' (312d—e), dont on sait à quel point elle a servi à élaborer cette image d'un Platon pythagoricien.

13

Cf. H . D . SAFFREY, A b a m o n , pseudonyme de Jamblique, dans: Philomathes. Studies and essays in the humanities in m e m o r y of Philip Merlan, La H a y e (Nijhoff) 1971, p. 2 3 1 ; J . DILLON, The middle Platonists. A study of Platonism 80 B . C . to 2 2 0 A . D . , L o n d o n (Duckworth) 1977, p. 361.

14

Sur le sujet, cf. l'Introduction à Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, livre II, texte établi et traduit par H . D . SAFFREY et L . G . WESTERINK, Paris (Les Belles Lettres) 1974, p. X X LIX.

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3.2.2. Platon Quelle que soit l'interprétation qu'il propose de Platon, Amélius se sent et se veut platonicien. Un détail montre bien qu'il revendiquait son appartenance au courant platonicien. En tête (VP 17.16) de la lettre de dédicace qu'il adresse à Porphyre au début de son livre intitulé: 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius' (cf. 4.6 [p. 825—826]), Amélius écrit: Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς Βασιλεΐ εύ πράττειν. Or, la formule εΰ πράττειν, qu'on retrouve en tête des treize lettres attribuées à Platon, et notamment en tête de la Vllème, dont on a de très bonnes raisons de croire qu'elle est authentique, était considérée dans l'Antiquité comme typiquement platonicienne 15 . 3.3. Cronius 1 6 Par ailleurs, dans sa 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre nous apprend: «Dans ses cours, il ( = Plotin) se faisait lire les commentaires, par exemple ceux de Sévère, de Cronius, de Numénius, de Gaius ou d'Atticus, et parmi les Péripatéticiens ceux d'Aspasius, d'Alexandre, d'Adraste, ou d'autres auteurs en fonction du sujet.» (VP 14.10—14) La formulation de ce passage ne permet pas de savoir si, dans l'École de Plotin, on possédait de ce Cronius, présenté par Porphyre (De antro Nympharum, 71.1 NAUCK) comme un έταίρος de Numénius, d'autres écrits que le 'Περί παλιγγενεσίας' (Némésius d'Émèse, Nat Horn, p. 117.1—3 MATTHAEI), le seul ouvrage de cet auteur dont on connaisse le titre et auquel devaient appartenir les exégèses sur le passage de la 'République' relatif au nombre nuptial (VII 545 c—547 a), et sur le mythe d'Er (X 613 e—621 d) qu'évoque Proclus dans son 'Commentaire sur la République de Platon' (II 22.20sq.; 110.4). O r , tout porte à croire que l'interprétation que propose Amélius de ces deux célèbres textes (cf. 4.7.2 [p. 827] et 5.1.3.2.2 [p. 843—847]) s'inspirait de l'exégèse de Cronius. Par ailleurs, Syrianus (In Met 109.12sq. KROLL, cf. p. 833-834) attribue conjointement à Cronius et à Amélius la thèse suivant laquelle et le sensible et l'intelligible participent des formes intelligibles. Or, si Cronius fut effectivement un εταίρος de Numénius, et si on accepte de l'identifier au dédicataire du sketch de Lucien, 'La mort de Pérégrinus' écrit peu après 165, Amélius, qui serait né entre 216 et 226, ne put le rencontrer. 3.4. Plotin Comme on l'a vu plus haut, c'est en 246 qu'Amélius se lia à Plotin, soit un peu plus de 2 ans après l'arrivée de ce dernier à Rome, et il resta à ses côtés 15

16

Sur cette formule de salutation, cf. Platon, Lettres, traduction, introduction, notices et notes par L u c BRISSON, Paris (Flammarion) 1987, p. 10, n. 2. Sur Cronius, cf. JOHN DILLON, The middle Platonists. A study of Platonism 80 B . C . to A . D . 220, London 1977, p. 3 7 9 - 3 8 0 .

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jusqu'à son départ de Rome, en 269. Bref, Amélius fut le disciple de Plotin pratiquement pendant toute la période au cours de laquelle Plotin exerça une activité d'enseignement. 3.4.1. Rapports sur le plan intellectuel Dès le début, on peut le penser, Amélius prit, aux cours de Plotin, des notes qui lui permirent de composer des 'scholies' (σχόλια) 17 , dont le recueil, lors de l'arrivée de Porphyre à Rome, à l'été 263, se composait d'environ cent livres (VP 4.3—6). O r , il semble bien qu'Amélius poursuivit ce travail (cf. VP 3.47—48) jusqu'à la dissolution de l'École en 269. Voici d'ailleurs un tableau qui permet, en un seul coup d'œil, de situer, dans le temps et en fonction des activités de Plotin, le travail d'Amélius:

activités de Plotin lieu Rome Rome Rome Rome environs de Minturnes

présence

période

cours

traités

d'Amélius

de Porphyre

246-253 253-263 263-268 268-269

oui oui oui oui?

0 21 24 5

oui oui oui oui

non non oui non

269-270

non?

4

non

non

Si Amélius a bien pris des notes aux cours de Plotin pendant une période de 24 ans, il n'est pas étonnant que le recueil des 'Scholies' composées à partir de ces notes ait rempli cent livres. Prendre des notes au cours de Plotin ne devait pas être chose facile, si on en croit cette confidence faite par Amélius à Porphyre, qui devait en être alors à ses débuts dans l'École de Plotin: «Le cours, du fait qu'il (= Plotin) exhortait les disciples à questionner, était plein de désordre et de maint bavardage, comme Amélius nous le racontait.» (VP 3.35-38) D'ailleurs l'anecdote relative à la polémique que déclencha Porphyre sur la question de la place de l'Intelligible par rapport à l'Intellect (VP 18, et surtout 18. 8 — 19), et celle concernant Thaumasius (VP 13.10—17) montrent que la méthode d'enseignement de Plotin resta la même entre 263 et 268. Cela dit, trois anecdotes racontées par Porphyre dans sa 'Vie de Plotin' illustrent ce fait: Plotin associait étroitement ses disciples, et notamment Amélius, aux activités de l'École, notamment dans le cadre de polémiques. 17

Sur les sens de σχόλια, cf. M A R I E - O D I L E 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 270-272.

GOULET-CAZÉ,

L'arrière-plan scolaire de la

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Plotin chargea en effet Amélius de répliquer à Porphyre qui, au début de son séjour auprès de Plotin, avait produit contre le maître un écrit pour montrer que les intelligibles se trouvaient hors de l'Intellect (VP 18), thèse soutenue par Longin (VP 20.92—95) qui avait été son maître à Athènes. Un peu plus tard, Amélius fut avec Porphyre associé par Plotin à la grande polémique de l'École contre les Gnostiques (VP 16). Par ailleurs, c'est Amélius qui, à la suggestion de Porphyre lui-même, défendit Plotin contre une accusation lancée par des gens venant de Grèce, et suivant laquelle Plotin aurait plagié Numénius (VP 17). Qui plus est, une anecdote rapportée, sur la foi de Porphyre, par Proclus dans son 'Commentaire sur le Timée', fait apparaître sans l'ombre d'un doute qu'Amélius, en plus de prêter main forte à Plotin en certaines circonstances, assurait, dans le cadre de l'École, une charge d'enseignement. C'est en effet ce que laisse entendre Proclus qui, alors qu'il commente Timée 37 a 2 —7 et plus précisément a 6—7, raconte cette anecdote qu'il tient de Porphyre: «Mais ne laissons pas nous échapper ici ce que Porphyre a rapporté touchant les leçons 'elle dit' (λέγει) et 'elle cesse de5 (λήγει). Étant entré une fois, dit-il, chez Amélius alors que celui-ci expliquait cette phrase comme portant, au lieu de 'au cours de son mouvement elle dit' (λέγει κινούμενη), 'elle cesse de se mouvoir' (λήγει κινούμενη), et qu'il se trouvait en difficulté car il ne pouvait ajuster quelque explication que ce soit à 'elle cesse de se mouvoir', puisque, comme il a été dit tout juste auparavant (36 e 4), l'Âme est continuellement mue sans jamais de cesse, Porphyre lui dit qu'il faut écrire 'elle dit' et non pas 'elle cesse de', causant ainsi bien du chagrin à Amélius; il découvrit plus tard que Sosicrate usait de la même leçon qu'Amélius, et sans doute l'excellent Amélius se serait-il grandement réjoui s'il avait su qu'un autre aussi approuvait cette leçon, mais il s'était trouvé qu'il était mort avant. » (In Tim II 300.23—301.5) D'ailleurs, dans la préface d'un livre écrit aux alentours de 265 et intitulé: 'De Longin, contre Plotin et Gentilianus Amélius, Sur la fin' (VP 20.14—15), Longin parle ainsi de Plotin et d'Amélius: « . . . ceux qui, jusqu'à présent, dispensent à Rome un enseignement public (οι τε μέχρι νυν εν τη 'Ρώμη δημοσιεύοντες), Plotin et Gentilianus Amélius, son disciple (ό τούτου γνώριμος) 1 8 . » (VP 20.32—33) Et, tout naturellement, il y associe souvent leur nom (VP 20.32—33, 71, 75 et 76). 3.4.2. Une édition des œuvres de Plotin due à Amélius Lorsque, après avoir terminé le récit de la vie de Plotin, il se met à parler de l'édition qu'il vient de réaliser, Porphyre écrit: 18

Sur le sens à donner à δημοσιεύοντες cf. MARIE-ODILE GOULET-CAZÉ, L'arrière-plan scolaire de la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 244—246. En revanche, je préfère donner à γ ν ώ ρ ι μ ο ς un sens plus précis que celui que lui donne MARIE-ODILE GOULET-CAZÉ (article cité, p. 236, n. 2).

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« C o m m e il ( = Plotin) m'a confié le soin de mettre en ordre et de corriger ses livres (je le lui ai promis de son vivant et j'ai également annoncé aux autres disciples que je le ferais), je n'ai pas voulu laisser les livres édités dans l'ordre chronologique n'importe comment (τα βιβλία ού κατά χρόνους έάσαι φύρδην έκδεδομένα) . . . » (VP 2 4 . 2 - 6 ) L'édition systématique des œuvres de Plotin, dont Porphyre va décrire les principes et les particularités avait donc été précédée par une autre édition, chronologique celle-là, où l'ordre des traités, dont par ailleurs les titres n'étaient pas les mêmes (VP 4.16—18), correspondait à celui de leur parution 1 9 . Mais à qui était due cette édition? Une scholie à Enn IV 4 [28], 29.55 atteste qu'il exista «des manuscrits d'Eustochius», où les traités de Plotin avaient des titres différents de ceux que leur donna Porphyre, et qui devaient être divisés autrement que dans les 'Ennéades': « C'est jusqu'ici qu'allait dans les manuscrits d'Eustochius (έν τοις Εύστοχίου) le second traité 'Sur l'âme' et à cet endroit commençait le troisième traité. Dans les manuscrits de Porphyre au contraire ( Έ ν δέ τοις Πορφυρίου), ce qui suit est rattaché au second traité. » Cet Eustochius peut-il être considéré comme un véritable éditeur, ou doit-il être seulement tenu pour un relais dans la diffusion des traités? Il est impossible de prendre parti avec une absolue certitude. Mais, comme Plotin ne fit la connaissance de ce médecin, originaire d'Alexandrie, qu'à la fin de sa vie (VP 7.8), il faut bien faire cette hypothèse: quelqu'un d'autre a dû, dès le moment où Plotin s'est mis à écrire, s'occuper de mettre au point, à partir des autographes et à mesure que les traités étaient composés, un exemplaire de référence de chacun de ces traités, exemplaire destiné à être mis à la disposition des disciples et amis dans le cadre de l'Ecole pour être lu et la plupart du temps recopié; exemplaire sur lequel étaient prises les copies qu'on envoyait à l'étranger, et notamment à Athènes, à ceux qui pouvaient en faire la demande. Une telle hypothèse paraît incontournable, et cela pour deux raisons au moins. Les autographes de Plotin exigeaient un travail de correction considérable, car ils étaient remplis de fautes de toute sorte (VP 8.1—6). D e plus, on ne voit pas très bien que Plotin ou un autre membre de l'École ait été obligé de se dessaisir

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Sur l'ensemble des problèmes que posent l'existence et la nature d'une (ou de plusieurs) édition(s) des traités de Plotin, antérieure(s) à celle de Porphyre, cf. MARIE-ODILE GOULETCAZÉ, L ' é d i t i o n p o r p h y r i e n n e des ' E n n é a d e s ' , P V P I, 1982, p . 280—294. MARIE-ODILE

GOULET-CAZÉ ne retient cependant pas l'hypothèse d'une édition due à Amélius, hypothèse qu'avance PAUL HENRY dans: Études Plotiniennes I: Les états du texte de Plotin (Museum Lessianum, Section philosophique no 20, Paris [Desclée de Brouwer])—Bruxelles [L'Édition Universelle] 1938, I960 2 , p. 30). Pour qualifier la situation qui prévalut entre 253 et 270, elle préfère utiliser l'expression «commerce d'amitié». Pour ma part, je crois que la complexité des rapports entre les membres de l'École et des rapports de l'École avec l'extérieur exigeait un niveau plus élevé d'organisation en ce qui concerne les traités de Plotin. Je m'explique sur la question dans les pages qui suivent.

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de son exemplaire personnel chaque fois que quelqu'un voulait lire tel ou tel traité. Or, à qui d'autre qu'Amélius aurait pu échoir la tâche de mettre au point cet exemplaire de référence de chacun des traités de Plotin, qu'on peut considérer comme 'l'édition de l'École'? Comment concevoir que celui qui eut un rapport privilégié avec l'homme Plotin, n'ait pas aussi eu un rapport privilégié avec son oeuvre? Ce qu'il avait fait pour Numénius, dont il avait copié et rassemblé presque tous les écrits (VP 3.44—45), pourquoi ne l'aurait-il pas fait pour Plotin? D'ailleurs, le travail devait être beaucoup plus ardu dans le cas de Plotin, dont les autographes étaient très fautifs. Mais reprenons les choses par le détail. Entre 246 et 253, Plotin se borne à dispenser un enseignement oral. Or, durant cette période, Amélius compose des scholies à partir des cours de Plotin, activité qu'il dut poursuivre même après que Plotin se fut décidé à écrire; comment, autrement, expliquer que le recueil de ces scholies ait pu avoisiner le nombre cent (cf. 4.2 [p. 820—821])? Ce faisant, Amélius donnait une existence écrite à un enseignement qui aurait dû rester exclusivement oral (VP 3.24—34). À partir de 253, Plotin écrit. Et, lorsqu'il arrive à Rome en 263, Porphyre découvre que Plotin a écrit 21 traités, qui ne sont pas aisément communiqués: « . . . lorsque, pour la première fois, moi, Porphyre, je fus admis à faire sa connaissance, il s'avère qu'il a écrit vingt et un livres, dont je constate en outre qu'ils sont communiqués à un petit nombre. Car la communication n'en était pas encore facile, elle ne se faisait pas dans la bonne conscience ni simplement et ni très facilement, mais en sélectionnant rigoureusement ceux qui les recevaient. » (VP 4.9—16) Cependant, il semble que, par la suite, la communication des traités de Plotin ait été plus facile. Trois indices le suggèrent. Longin n'aurait pu écrire, aux alentours de 265, un livre intitulé: 'De Longin, contre Plotin et Gentilianus Amélius, Sur la fin' (VP 20.14—15), s'il n'avait eu entre les mains la copie d'au moins un traité, en l'occurrence le traité 'Sur les Formes' (VP 20.89), c'est-à-dire très probablement Enn V 5 [32] (cf. 4.4 [p. 823]); et, au moment où, entre 270 et 272, il écrit à Porphyre la lettre citée au chapitre 19 de la 'Vie de Plotin', Longin possède pratiquement tous les traités de Plotin (VP 19.19-21), sauf les quatre que Plotin a écrits en dernier. Par ailleurs, si, aux alentours de 265, Plotin est accusé par des «gens venant de Grèce» de plagier Numénius, c'est que des copies de certains de ses traités sont déjà parvenues à Athènes. Comment enfin expliquer que, entre 263 et 268, Eubule, le diadoque platonicien d'Athènes (VP 20.39—40), ait envoyé à Plotin des ouvrages traitant de questions platoniciennes (VP 15.18), s'il n'avait pas lu au moins un traité de Plotin? Entre 263 et 268, Porphyre se trouve auprès de Plotin. Et, «pendant ces six années donc, comme on procède dans les réunions à l'examen de nombreuses questions, et qu'Amélius et moi (= Porphyre) lui (= à Plotin) demandons d'écrire, il écrit» (VP 5.5—7) 24 traités dont les titres sont énumérés au chapitre 5 (8—58) de la 'Vie de Plotin'. C'est aussi au cours de cette période qu'Amélius écrit, pour défendre Plotin contre l'accusation de plagiat lancée contre lui, le traité intitulé: 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius' (VP 17.1—6). O r ,

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l'ouvrage en question devait, suivant le v œ u même de Porphyre, qui en était en quelque sorte le commanditaire, prendre la forme d'un exposé général de la doctrine de Plotin et servir d'aide-mémoire en ce domaine (VP 17.16—44). Bref, il aurait très bien pu servir d'introduction générale à une édition des œuvres de Plotin. Pour ce qui est des neuf derniers traités, la situation se complique. Cinq (5) d'entre eux (46 à 50) sont écrits à R o m e après le départ de Porphyre en 268; ils lui sont envoyés par Plotin — auprès duquel se trouve encore Amélius—, en Sicile, en 269 (VP 6.1—4). Les quatre derniers, Plotin semble les avoir écrits dans sa retraite près de Minturnes, alors qu'il est séparé et d'Amélius et de Porphyre (VP 6.15 — 17). C e sont ces quatre titres, tout porte à le croire, que Longin réclame à Porphyre dans une lettre (VP 19.7—41) qu'il lui adresse de T y r en 270/1 très probablement; et, on peut le penser, ce sont les cinq traités précédents, les derniers que Plotin ait écrits en sa présence, qu'Amélius a apportés à Longin sur le chemin qui le mène à Apamée, où il se trouve en 270, à la mort de Plotin. Q u i plus est, et Longin et Porphyre s'accordent chacun à sa façon pour reconnaître la compétence d'Amélius à l'égard de l'œuvre de Plotin. Dans la lettre qu'il adresse à Porphyre qui se trouve alors en Sicile, Longin déplore le fait qu'Amélius, qui se rendait à Apamée, n'ait pas eu le temps de corriger les copies des traités de Plotin qu'il possédait déjà: « Et je les possède tous autant qu'il semble (et même ceux que tu m'as maintenant envoyés), mais je ne les possède qu'à moitié; ils étaient en effet par trop fautifs; je pensais cependant que notre compagnon Amélius allait réparer les erreurs des copistes; mais il avait d'autres tâches plus importantes que de veiller à un tel travail. » (VP 1 9 . 1 9 - 2 4 ) O r , et le fait mérite d'être relevé, Porphyre, dans les premières lignes du chapitre suivant, prend la défense d'Amélius: « L e s copies qu'il avait acquises à partir des exemplaires d'Amélius, il les croyait fautives parce qu'il ignorait la manière habituelle de s'exprimer du personnage. Car, s'il y avait des copies bien révisées, c'était bien celles d'Amélius, pour avoir été prises sur les autographes. » (VP 20.5—9) Tout cela n'a rien que de très naturel si l'édition des œuvres de Plotin disponible dans le cadre de l'École jusqu'à la mort de Plotin était due à Amélius. C'est d'ailleurs en la replaçant dans ce contexte que pourrait prendre sens l'anecdote racontée par Porphyre dans le premier chapitre de sa 'Vie de Plotin': « Plotin, le philosophe qui vécut à notre époque, donnait l'impression d'avoir honte d'être dans un corps. C'est en vertu d'une disposition de cette nature qu'il refusait de rien raconter sur son origine, sur ses parents ou sur sa patrie. Supporter un peintre ou un sculpteur lui paraissait indigne au point même qu'Amélius, qui le priait d'autoriser que l'on fît son portrait, reçut de lui cette réponse: 'Il ne suffit donc pas de porter ce reflet dont la nature nous a entourés', mais voilà qu'on lui demandait encore de consentir à laisser derrière lui un reflet de reflet, plus durable celui-là, comme si c'était

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là vraiment l'une des œuvres dignes d'être contemplées? Aussi, devant le refus de Plotin qui, pour la raison évoquée, n'acceptait pas de poser, Amélius, qui avait pour ami Cartérius, le meilleur des peintres de l'époque, l'introduisit et le fit assister aux réunions — qui en avait le désir pouvait en effet fréquenter les réunions — ; Cartérius s'habitua à recueillir des impressions visuelles plus marquées grâce à une attention soutenue. Puis, lorsqu'il eut dessiné son ébauche à partir de l'image déposée dans sa mémoire, et qu'Amélius eut corrigé avec lui l'esquisse pour parfaire la ressemblance, le talent de Cartérius permit la réalisation, à l'insu de Plotin, d'un portrait de lui, très ressemblant.» (VP 1) À l'époque, on mettait en tête de ses œuvres complètes, le portrait de l'auteur 2 0 . Dans cette perspective, c'est un portrait destiné à servir de frontispice à son édition des œuvres complètes du maître qu'Amélius aurait donc demandé à Cartérius de faire. Et si Porphyre raconte cette anecdote au tout début de sa 'Vie de Plotin', c'est probablement pour se distinguer d'Amélius et justifier, par le refus de Plotin lui-même, le fait que sa propre édition des œuvres du maître était dépourvue d'un portrait de l'auteur. L'hypothèse suivant laquelle il exista, dans le cadre de l'École, une édition des œuvres de Plotin, dont Amélius fut le maître d'oeuvre, permet encore d'expliquer pourquoi Porphyre n'a réalisé son édition systématique qu'en 301, soit plus de 30 ans après la mort de Plotin; il aurait attendu la mort d'Amélius. La même hypothèse permet en outre de résoudre un problème qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre ces dernières années. Constatant qu'Eusèbe de Césarée, dans sa 'Préparation Évangélique' (XV, 10 et 22), cite le traité qui deviendra Enn IV 7 en le subdivisant comme s'il s'agissait de deux traités différents dotés de titres propres, et en nous conservant un long passage absent de la plupart des manuscrits des 'Ennéades', P. HENRY et H . R. SCHWYZER ont fait une double hypothèse: Eusèbe avait entre les mains une autre version de cet écrit que celle des 'Ennéades', et cette autre version était celle de 'l'édition d'Eustochius'. La première hypothèse s'impose, mais pas la seconde. S'il exista une 'édition de l'École', dont le maître d'œuvre fut Amélius, ce serait une copie de cette édition qu'aurait eu entre les mains Eusèbe, qui par ailleurs, comme on l'a vu plus haut (cf. 3.2 [p. 802]), semble avoir connu Numénius par l'intermédiaire d'Amélius; dans ce contexte, on peut même se demander si les exemplaires des œuvres de Numénius et de celles de Plotin qui se trouvaient à la Bibliothèque de Césarée n'étaient pas des copies des exemplaires d'Amélius. Dès lors, la seconde hypothèse de HENRY—SCHWYZER devient inutile, les 'manuscrits d'Eustochius' étant soit une copie de l'édition de l'École, soit les autographes à partir desquels aurait été établie cette édition, et que Plotin aurait légués sur son lit de mort au seul de ses disciples qui se trouvait alors auprès de lui.

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Sur le sujet, cf. L . FRIEDLÄNDER, Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte R o m s in der Zeit von Augustus bis z u m Anfang der Antonine, Band III [Leipzig—Berlin 1923 1 0 ], Aalen (Scientia Verlag) 1979, p. 56; références: Martial X I V 186, I X 47 et Galien III, p. 776 KÜHN.

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Cela dit, et il convient de le noter, Amélius posa deux actes qui ne pouvaient entraîner qu'une désapprobation, au moins partielle, de Plotin: (1) il rédigea des scholies à partir des cours d'un Plotin qui s'était interdit d'écrire aux termes d'un pacte avec Origène et Erennius (VP 3.24—35, cf. 14.20—25); (2) et il fit faire par Cartérius un portrait de Plotin qui s'y était expressément refusé, en justifiant d'ailleurs son refus (VP 1). 3 . 4 . 3 . Rapports sur le plan religieux Par ailleurs, Amélius entretint avec Plotin des rapports pour le moins ambigus sur le plan religieux, qu'il s'agisse de pratique ou de textes. 3 . 4 . 3 . 1 . Pratique religieuse Alors que la religion de Plotin était tout intérieure, intellectuelle et spirituelle, Amélius semble avoir accordé une grande importance aux observances religieuses traditionnelles ou étrangères. L'anecdote suivante est très révélatrice à cet égard: «Amateur de sacrifices, Amélius allait faire le tour des célébrations de la nouvelle lune et des fêtes; c o m m e il voulait un jour prendre avec lui Plotin, ce dernier dit: ' C ' e s t à eux de venir vers moi, non à moi d'aller vers eux'. Quelle sorte de pensée le poussa à des paroles aussi hautes, c'est ce que nous n'avons pu comprendre nous-mêmes et sur quoi nous n'osâmes pas l'interroger. » (VP 1 0 . 3 3 - 3 8 ) Il peut paraître présomptueux de vouloir interpréter cet apophtegme que ne purent comprendre les disciples les plus immédiats de Plotin. Cependant le paragraphe 19 de la 'Lettre à Marcella' pourrait bien nous apporter un début de réponse: « Q u a n d je m'exprime ainsi, tu ne croyais pas que j'exhorte à révérer D i e u ; ridicule serait pareille exhortation, c o m m e s'il pouvait y avoir doute à ce sujet; mais ce n'est pas parce que nous faisons ceci ou cela à propos de Dieu que nous le révérons dûment. N i larmes ni supplications ne retournent Dieu, 'ni sacrifices ne l'honorent, et ce n'est pas l'abondance des offrandes qui le grandit; une pensée pleine de Dieu, solidement établie, voilà ce qui nous attache à Dieu. C a r le semblable nécessairement se porte vers le semblable'. ' E t les sacrifices des fous ne sont que pâture du feu, leurs offrandes fournissent aux pilleurs de temples les moyens de leurs excès'. Q u e pour toi, je le répète, 'le temple de Dieu soit l'intellect qui est en toi (νεώς μεν εστω ό έν σοί νους); c'est lui qu'il faut préparer et orner pour le rendre apte à recevoir Dieu. Mais que ces ornements, ces apprêts de la réception ne soient pas éphémères: ce seraient de nouveaux rires, folies, le domicile du mauvais démon'. » (trad. É . DES PLACES, Paris [Les Belles Lettres] 1982) L'idée exprimée par Porphyre se fonde sur un jeu de mots entre νεώς (temple) et νους (intellect), jeu de mots intraduisible en français. O r , si l'intellect de l'homme

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est le temple des dieux, c'est aux dieux de venir vers l'homme, le devoir de l'homme étant, dans cette perspective, de préparer pour les dieux un temple digne d'eux. Étant donné l'attitude qui était la sienne en matière religieuse, il serait bien étonnant qu'Amélius n'ait pas assisté à l'évocation du démon de Plotin à l'Iséum (VP 10.15-28). Enfin c'est Amélius qui, ayant demandé à Apollon où était allée l'âme de Plotin, aurait reçu comme réponse l'oracle de 51 vers, cité in extenso au chapitre 22 (13—63) de la 'Vie de Plotin'. Je reviendrai plus loin sur les redoutables problèmes que pose cet oracle (cf. 4.8 [p. 828—830]). 3.4.3.2. Textes sacrés Amélius semble s'être intéressé aux Oracles Chaldaïques' au point d'en faire un instrument d'interprétation: c'est du moins ce que laisse entendre ce passage du 'Commentaire sur le Timée' de Proclus, où se trouve enchâssée dans un témoignage sur la doctrine des trois Intellects démiurgiques, sinon une citation des Oracles', du moins une allusion à une expression qui s'y trouve: « E n sorte que, si Amélius (cf. supra 306.1 ss., 309ss.) avait entendu ses trois Démiurges en ce sens-là, s'il avait considéré cette triade dans le seul Démiurge unique, il eût parlé correctement. 'L'un, dit-il, est créant en mettant la main à la pâte; le second, par un commandement seulement; le troisième, par un acte de volonté seulement. L'un se range dans la catégorie de 'l'artisan qui travaille de ses mains' (αύτουργόν τεχνίτην, cf. frag. 33 DES PLACES), le second existe auparavant dans la catégorie de l'architecte, le troisième est établi avant ces deux dans la catégorie du roi. » (In Tim I 361.26—362.1) La chose va de soi, si on accepte l'hypothèse généralement admise suivant laquelle c'est Numénius qui fut à l'origine de l'intérêt porté par les Néo-platoniciens aux Oracles Chaldaïques' 21 . Q u i plus est, Amélius aurait, toujours, selon Proclus, établi une correspondance entre ces trois démiurges et les trois rois d'Orphée: Phanès, Ouranos et Kronos : «Ces trois Intellects donc, ces trois Démiurges, Amélius assume que ce sont aussi les trois Rois dont parle Platon (Lettre II, 312e 1—4) et les trois d'Orphée (frag. 96 KERN), Phanès, Ouranos et Kronos, et celui qui à ses yeux est le plus démiurge est Phanès.» (In Tim I 306.10—14)

21

Sur N u m é n i u s et les O r a c l e s Chaldaïques', cf. N u m é n i u s , Fragments, texte établi et traduit par ÉDOUARD DES PLACES, 1973, p. 17—19. Et plus généralement, H . D . SAFFREY, Les Néo-platoniciens et les O r a c l e s Chaldaïques', Revue des Études Augustiniennes 27, 1981, p. 209—225, surtout p. 224—225; M . FREDE, N u m é n i u s , ci-dessous dans ce même volume ( A N R W II 36,2), p. 1 0 3 4 - 1 0 7 5 ; ÉD. DES PLACES, Les Oracles chaldaïques, dans: A N R W II 17,4, hrsg. v. W. HAASE, B e r l i n - N e w Y o r k 1984, p. 2306, 2308.

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Si, dans ce passage, Proclus n'extrapole pas, Amélius serait bien l'un des précurseurs de ce courant d'exégèse qui atteint son apogée à l'École d'Athènes, et qui se fonde sur l'établissement du réseau de relations le plus serré possible entre la 'théologie' de Platon, celle des 'Rhapsodies Orphiques' 2 2 et celle des O r a c l e s Chaldaïques' notamment. Or, les rapports de Plotin avec ces deux textes sacrés semblent avoir été particulièrement ténus. Un seul passage des 'Ennéades' (le début de I 9 [16]) pourrait être considéré comme une allusion aux Oracles Chaldaïques' 2 3 . Par ailleurs, un certain nombre d'indices permettent certes d'induire que Plotin connaissait les 'Rhapsodies Orphiques'; mais il n'en fit pas un usage systématique 2 4 .

3.5. Porphyre Les rapports d'Amélius avec Porphyre sont pétris d'ambiguïté, et cela aussi bien sur le plan intellectuel que sur le plan religieux. 3.5.1. Rapports sur le plan intellectuel Sur le plan intellectuel, c'est Amélius qui 'initia' Porphyre à la doctrine de Plotin dans ce cadre de la grande controverse sur la situation de l'Intelligible par rapport à l'Intellect, controverse racontée au chapitre 18 (8 — 19) de la 'Vie de Plotin'. Et, comme c'est à la suite de cette rétractation définitive que Porphyre eut accès aux écrits de Plotin (VP 18.20), on peut penser que, en ce domaine, l'intervention d'Amélius fut décisive. Pour ne pas être en reste, Porphyre profite d'ailleurs de l'occasion pour faire cette double remarque: « . . . et j'amenai le maître lui-même à se faire un point d'honneur de marquer les articulations de ses doctrines et de les écrire de façon plus extensive. Il n'est pas jusqu'à Amélius à qui je n'aie donné le désir de composer des traités.» (VP 1 8 . 2 1 - 2 4 ) Ainsi Porphyre se 'déculpabilise'-t-il à l'égard de Plotin, dont le mode d'exposition oral et écrit l'avait déconcerté, et à l'égard d'Amélius que son intervention avait amené à écrire.

22

23

24

Cf. L u c BRISSON, Proclus et l'Orphisme, dans: Actes du Colloque Proclus: Proclus, lecteur et interprète des Anciens, Paris (éd. du C . N . R . S . ) 1987, p. 43-104. Sur Plotin et les Oracles Chaldaïques', cf. Oracles Chaldaïques, texte établi et traduit par ÉDOUARD DES PLACES, Paris (Les Belles Lettres) 1971, p. 18. Pour les allusions aux 'Rhapsodies Orphiques' chez Plotin, cf. O. KERN, Orphicorum fragmenta [Berlin 1922], Dublin/Zürich (Weidmann) 1972, Fontes Fragmentorum, s.v. Plotinus. En général, cf. JEAN PÉPIN, Mythe et allégorie [Paris 1958], Paris (Études Augustiniennes) 1976, p. 190—209; et plus spécialement, ID., Plotin et le miroir de Dionysos (Enn IV 3 [27], 12, 1 - 2 ) , Revue Internationale de Philosophie 24, 1970, p. 304-320.

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À partir de ce moment, les relations entre Amélius et Porphyre furent, semble-t-il, bonnes, sinon excellentes. Plotin les invita, l'un et l'autre, à le seconder dans sa polémique contre les Gnostiques (VP 16). Et c'est à Porphyre, qu'il appelle Basileus, qu'Amélius dédie l'ouvrage dans lequel il prend la défense de Plotin contre ceux qui l'accusent de plagier Numénius; ouvrage qu'avait lui-même sollicité Porphyre, et dont il avait peut-être même suggéré le titre: 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius' (VP 17.1—6)25. Ce livre était précédé d'une lettre dédicatoire d'Amélius à Porphyre, lettre citée dans la suite du chapitre (VP 17.16-44). Toutefois, il devait exister, chez Porphyre, sinon de l'animosité, du moins un certain agacement. L'opposition systématique mêlée d'ironie que manifeste Proclus à l'égard de l'interprétation de certains passages du 'Timée' par Amélius trouve certainement sa source dans le 'Commentaire sur le Timée' de Porphyre, que Proclus devait avoir sous les yeux, et dont il tire la plupart de ses informations sur les interprétations des Médio-platoniciens notamment. Enfin, il est à noter que Porphyre reprend à son compte le jugement sévère de Longin sur la forme des écrits d'Amélius (VP 21.3, 9, 16). 3.5.2. Rapports sur le plan religieux Même s'il devait partager l'intérêt d'Amélius pour ces textes sacrés que sont les 'Rhapsodies Orphiques' 2 6 et les Oracles Chaldaïques' 27 , et même s'il cite in extenso l'oracle qu'avait sollicité Amélius, on ne peut s'empêcher de voir dans l'anecdote racontée au chapitre 10 (33—38) de la 'Vie de Plotin', une critique du comportement d'Amélius en matière religieuse. 3.5.3. L'édition des œuvres de Plotin Comme on l'a vu plus haut, la 'Vie de Plotin', ou plus précisément l'ouvrage ayant pour titre: 'Sur la vie de Plotin et l'ordre de ses livres' fut écrit aux alentours de 301, peu avant l'édition des œuvres de Plotin par Porphyre, édition qui fut donc réalisée plus de 30 ans après la mort du maître, à une époque où Amélius était déjà mort. Peut-être Porphyre attendit-il la disparition de son condisciple 25

26

27

55

Cette hypothèse exige qu'on accepte la leçon έπεγράψαμεν, qui est celle des manuscrits, et donc qu'on refuse la correction suggérée par N A U C K (secundum K I R C H H O F F ) qui a proposé de lire έπέγραψε μεν. H E N R Y — S C H W Y Z E R , qui avaient imprimé έπεγράψαμεν dans leur editto maior (1951), ont préféré έπέγραψε μεν dans leur editio minor (1964). Sur l'intérêt porté par Porphyre aux 'Rhapsodies Orphiques', cf. O . KERN, Orphicorum Fragmenta [1921], 1972, Fontes Fragmentorum, s.v. Porphyrius. Sur la sympathie de Porphyre à l'égard des Oracles Chaldaïques', cf. Oracles Chaldaïques, texte établi et traduit par E D O U A R D DES PLACES, 1971, p. 1 8 - 2 4 ; É D . DES PLACES, Les Oracles chaldaïques, dans: A N R W I I 17,4, hrsg. v. W. H A A S E , B e r l i n - N e w York 1984, p. 2308—2311. Cf. aussi H . D . SAFFREY, Les Néo-platoniciens et les O r a c l e s Chaldaïques', Revue des Études Augustiniennes 27, 1981, p. 209—225, p. 215—217; A. S M I T H , Porphyrian Studies since 1913, ci-dessus dans ce même volume ( A N R W I I 36,2), p. 731-737, 763. ANRW 11 .IF).2

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avant d'entreprendre un travail destiné à supplanter une édition, dont, on peut le penser, Amélius fut le maître d'oeuvre. L'attitude de Porphyre à l'égard d'Amélius était condamnée à l'ambivalence. D'un côté, Porphyre ne pouvait pas ne pas entrer en compétition avec le plus proche collaborateur de Plotin, dont le comportement en matière de pratique religieuse et les prises de position en matière d'exégèse philosophique suscitaient chez lui sinon la critique, du moins l'ironie. Cependant, dans la mesure où il devait ménager Plotin qui avait fait d'Amélius son homme de confiance, Porphyre devait se garder d'être trop virulent dans son opposition à celui qui l'initia à la doctrine du maître et qui lui permit d'avoir accès aux écrits de ce dernier.

3.6. Autres membres de l'École Dans le cadre de l'École de Plotin, Amélius semble avoir eu des relations privilégiées avec Cartérius et Castricius; et il polémiqua contre Adelphius et Aquilinus. 3.6.1. Cartérius 28 Sur Cartérius, on ne sait rien d'autre que ce que nous en dit Porphyre au début de la 'Vie de Plotin'. C'était un ami (φίλον, cf. VP 1.11) d'Amélius, et il était considéré comme « le meilleur des peintres de l'époque » (τον άριστον τών τότε γεγονότων ζωγράφων, cf. VP 1.11 — 12); voilà pourquoi Amélius le pria de réaliser le portrait de Plotin, à l'insu du maître aux cours duquel il vint assister pour mener à bien sa tâche. 3.6.2. Castricius 29 Parmi les disciples de Plotin, Amélius entretenait des relations privilégiées avec un certain Castricius, qu'on appelait Firmus et dont on ne sait presque rien en dehors de ce que nous en dit Porphyre au chapitre 7 de sa 'Vie de Plotin': « . . . ce dernier, des hommes de notre temps le plus cultivé (άνδρών τών καθ' ημάς φιλοκαλώτατος γεγονώς), vénérait Plotin, secondait Amélius en toutes choses comme un bon serviteur (καί Ά μ ε λ ί φ οία οικέτης άγαθός έν πάσιν ύπηρετούμενος) et, à moi-même Porphyre, demeura attaché comme à un véritable frère. En somme, lui aussi vénérait Plotin, même s'il avait choisi la vie politique (καί ούτος οΰν έσέβετο Πλωτίνον τον πολιτικόν ήρημένος βίον). » (VP 7.24-29)

28 29

Sur Cartérius, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, P V P I, 1982, p. 8 8 - 8 9 . Sur Castricius, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, P V P I, 1982, p. 90—91. « F i r m u s » dojt probablement être considéré c o m m e un supernomen.

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Ce Castricius était donc un homme politique, qui se distinguait par sa culture, c'est-à-dire très probablement par son goût pour les belles lettres 30 . 3.6.3. Adelphius et Aquilinus 31 Les Gnostiques mentionnés au chapitre 16 de la 'Vie de Plotin', c'est-à-dire Adelphius et Aquilinus, pourraient bien avoir assisté aux cours de Plotin; en effet, en Enn II 9 [33], 10.3, Plotin exprime l'embarras qu'il éprouve à devoir «s'attaquer à des amis » (πρός τινας των φίλων), et cela même si, semble-t-il, il s'agit là d'une époque révolue. Si c'est le cas, Adelphius et Aquilinus peuvent être considérés comme les condisciples d'Amélius; peut-être même furent-ils ses auditeurs (cf. le témoignage d'Eunape cité n. 7).

3.7. Longin 32 Tout en le critiquant sur le plan de la doctrine et sur celui du style, Longin entretint avec Amélius des rapports sinon amicaux, du moins sereins. Sur le plan de la doctrine, Longin ne pouvait entretenir avec Amélius que des rapports d'opposition; le premier semble avoir soutenu une interprétation de Platon assez conservatrice où se faisait sentir une forte influence stoïcienne, alors que le second se voulait le porte-parole de Plotin, dont on peut mesurer l'originalité en ce qui concerne l'interprétation de Platon. Dans la préface de son livre écrit aux alentours de 265 av.J.-C. et qui s'intitule: 'De Longin, contre Plotin et Gentilianus Amélius, Sur la fin' (VP 20.14—15), Longin évoque deux polémiques qui l'opposèrent à Amélius à une époque qu'il est difficile de préciser, même si tout porte à croire qu'elle n'est pas très éloignée par rapport à la date de composition de ce livre. Longin a contredit Amélius sur le problème de la justice chez Platon (VP 20.88 — 89). Mais c'est surtout sur la question de la situation de l'Intelligible par rapport à l'Intellect que la polémique fut la plus vive (VP 20.90—104).

30

Le sens de Képithète φιλοκαλώτατος n'est pas facile à cerner. Il varie suivant le sens qu'on donne à son deuxième terme. Compte tenu du contexte, j'ai tendance à donner à cet adjectif un sens voisin de celui qu'il prend chez Grégoire de Naziance et chez Epiphane. Chez Grégoire de Naziance (Discours 45, 10), le verbe φιλοκαλέω et l'adjectif φιλόκαλος renvoient à des travaux de recherche; voilà pourquoi φιλόκαλος est associé à φιλομαθής. Epiphane (Panarion 42, 11 et 76, 13) associe φιλόκαλος et d'autres termes de la même famille à des mots qui expriment l'idée de rassemblement, de mise en ordre de document^. Si l'on veut garder quelque chose de son étymologie, on peut dire que φιλόκαλος qualifie quelqu'un qui collectionne les «belles pages». Sur le sujet, cf. Origène, Philocalie, 1 —20. Sur les Écritures, introduction, texte, traduction et notes par MARGUERITE HARL, Sources Chrétiennes 302, Paris (Cerf) 1983, Introduction, p. 34.

31

Sur Adelphius et Aquilinus, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 61—62. Cf. aussi le début de la n. 7. Sur Longin, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 91—95.

32

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Toujours dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', Longin porte sur les écrits d'Amélius ce jugement particulièrement négatif: «Amélius, de son côté, a préféré marcher sur les traces de Plotin et il s'en tient sur la plupart des questions aux mêmes doctrines, mais il est long dans le développement et par la prolixité de son expression il est entraîné vers un style opposé à celui de Plotin. » (VP 20.76—80) Bref, Longin condamne le style d'Amélius qu'il considère par ailleurs comme un épigone de Plotin. Et, au début du chapitre suivant, Porphyre reprend à son compte ce jugement sévère de Longin qu'il considère comme «le premier en matière de critique et qui passe encore pour tel jusqu'à maintenant (καί έν κρίσει πρώτος ών και ύπειλημμένος άχρι νυν)» (VP 21.19—20), pour l'opposer bien évidemment au jugement que ce même Longin, qui avait été son maître à Athènes, porte sur lui, Porphyre: « . . . il a pourtant fait mention de moi, Porphyre, qui n'en étais encore qu'au début de mon séjour auprès de Plotin, en disant: 'Basileus de Tyr, leur ami et le nôtre, avait déjà composé plus d'un traité à l'imitation de Plotin'; il écrivait ainsi parce qu'il avait bien remarqué que je me gardais complètement de la prolixité d'Amélius, si étrangère à la philosophie, et que, dans mes écrits, j'avais pour modèle le style de Plotin. » (VP 21.12 — 18) Alors que Porphyre est fidèle à Plotin sur le fond et sur la forme, Amélius ne l'est que sur le fond, son style présentant même — et la remarque est particulièrement sévère dans ce contexte — une prolixité étrangère à la philosophie. Ces critiques de Longin n'avaient pas, semble-t-il, blessé outre mesure un Amélius qui resta en bons termes avec lui. En effet, au cours du voyage qui le mène à Apamée, Amélius s'arrête à Tyr pour remettre à Longin des copies de traités de Plotin qu'il lui a apportées de Rome; et Longin laisse entendre qu'il comprend qu'Amélius n'ait pas eu le loisir de réviser les exemplaires des traités qu'il possédait déjà et qu'il croyait extrêmement fautifs (sur tout cela, cf. VP 19).

3.8. Hostilianus Hésychius 33 Sur ce personnage, on ne sait que trois choses: il était Ά π α μ ε ύ ς (VP 3.48), c'est-à-dire très probablement «citoyen d'Apamée»; Amélius en avait fait son fils adoptif (VP 3.48); et c'est à lui qu'Amélius légua la centaine de livres de 'scholies' qu'il avait composées à partir des cours de Plotin (VP 3.46—48). Si on

33

Sur Hostilianus Hésychius, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 85 et 102. Hostilianus devait être son cognomen et Hésychius, qui vient du grec ήσυχος, ήσυχία, son supemomen ou plutôt son "signum proper" (cf. I. KAJANTO, Supernomina. A study in Latin epigraphy, 1966, p. 55). Cela dit, il faut noter que, en VP 3.47, un certain nombre de manuscrits portent en marge Ίουστίνω.

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en savait plus sur son compte, on pourrait, selon toute vraisemblance, expliquer pourquoi, en 269, Amélius quitte Rome pour aller s'installer à Apamée.

3.9. Jamblique Lorsqu'il s'établit à Apamée, Amélius est âgé d'une cinquantaine d'années. Jusqu'à quel âge vécut-il? Quelles furent ses activités et ses relations entre 270 et le jour de sa mort? On n'en sait rien. Voilà pourquoi ce passage de la préface de la 'Théologie Platonicienne' de Proclus est si difficile à interpréter: « Ces exégètes de l'époptie platonicienne qui ont déployé pour nous les très saintes explications concernant les principes divins parce qu'ils avaient reçu une nature toute pareille à celle de leur guide, je tiendrais volontiers que ce furent Plotin l'Égyptien, et ceux qui de lui ont reçu la tradition de cette doctrine, Amélius et Porphyre, et en troisième lieu, me semble-t-il, ceux qui furent leurs disciples et qui ont atteint une telle perfection que n o u s p o u vons les c o m p a r e r à des s t a t u e s , Jamblique et Théodore d'Asiné, et les autres, quels qu'ils soient, qui à leur suite . . . » (Théol Plat I 1, p. 6.16-24) Proclus range les Néo-platoniciens qu'il nomme dans trois générations successives : (1) Plotin, (2) Amélius et Porphyre, (3) Jamblique et Théodore d'Asiné. Il s'agit là de générations intellectuelles, mais, d'un point de vue purement chronologique, il semble que la distinction tienne. En fait, le problème fondamental posé par ce texte réside dans la question de savoir s'il y eut entre Amélius et Porphyre d'un côté, et Jamblique et Théodore d'Asiné de l'autre, une relation de maître à disciple; l'expression utilisée par Proclus άπό τούτων [παραδεξάμενος την θεωρίαν] ne permet pas d'en décider. Voyons ce qu'on peut arriver à savoir par ailleurs. Jamblique fut-il le disciple de Porphyre comme le prétendent Eunape (Vitae Soph V 1 , 2 , p. 1 0 . 2 3 - 1 1 . 1 GIANGRANDE) et des témoins postérieurs? Il est difficile d'en décider. Toutefois un certain nombre de témoignages font apparaître que Porphyre et Jamblique étaient très liés34. Par ailleurs, si le Jamblique mentionné dans la 'Vie de Plotin' peut, comme tout porte à le croire, être identifié à Jamblique de Chalcis, dont il faut placer la naissance entre 245 et 250 et la mort aux alentours de 325, ce Jamblique entretint des relations avec l'École de Plotin à Rome. En effet, aux alentours de 285—290, Aristón, le fils de Jamblique, épousa Amphiclée, l'une des femmes qui faisaient partie de l'entourage de Plotin (VP 9.3 —5)35. Dans les conditions, il se peut qu'Amélius ait personnellement connu Jamblique, plus jeune que lui d'une trentaine d'années. 34

35

Cf. R I C H A R D G O U L E T , L'Oracle d'Apollon dans la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 4 0 6 407; et les références bibliographiques en notes. Sur tout cela, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 88; et les références bibliographiques.

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Cela dit, c'est bien à Apamée, semble-t-il, que Jamblique dirigea jusque vers les années 320, son école néo-platonicienne. Or, l'un de ses disciples, Sopatros, lui succéda, qui nous est présenté comme présidant à la succession de Plotin (Sozomène, Hist Eccl I 5, 1); ainsi se voit établi un lien entre l'École de Jamblique à Apamée et celle de Plotin à Rome. Voilà pourquoi on a pensé qu'Amélius avait à Apamée sinon fondé, du moins repris — si elle existait du temps de Numénius — une école philosophique dont des archéologues croient avoir retrouvé la trace sous une cathédrale, et qui fut ornée, sans doute sous Julien, de plusieurs mosaïques grâce au zèle de Sopatros le jeune, le fils ou plus vraisemblablement le gendre du Sopatros qui succéda à Jamblique 36 . Voilà pourquoi on a pu écrire: « Il semble donc que Porphyre à Rome, puis Amélius à Apamée furent les maîtres de Jamblique et que ce dernier succéda à Amélius dans l'école fondée par lui37. » Il ne s'agit là que d'une hypothèse, mais qui doit être prise en considération, même s'il est bien difficile de faire, en tout cela, la part de ce qui relève de la réalité et de ce qui assouvit un désir bien compréhensible chez un historien de la philosophie: celui d'établir une continuité entre chefs d'École. Quoi qu'il en soit, Jamblique connaissait la doctrine d'Amélius, puisqu'il intitula un chapitre de l'un de ses livres: 'Réfutations d'Amélius et aussi de Numénius (Προς τους άμφί Άμέλιον καί Νουμήνιον άντιρρήσεις)' (In Tim II 277.28—32). Mais les remarques embarrassées de Proclus, qui s'en remet sur le sujet exclusivement à Jamblique, laissent entendre que Proclus n'avait alors entre les mains que l'ouvrage de Jamblique.

3.10. Théodore d'Asiné 38 Théodore d'Asiné semble s'être beaucoup inspiré d'Amélius dans ses spéculations sur l'âme (Test 6 DEUSE= Proclus, In Tim II 2 7 7 . 2 6 - 2 7 8 . 1 ) et dans sa description de la figure du démiurge (Test 12 DEUSE = Proclus, In Tim I 309. 14—20). Mais les deux hommes se rencontrèrent-ils, et Théodore d'Asiné fut-il le disciple d'Amélius? Théodore d'Asiné fut d'abord le disciple de Porphyre (Test 1 DEUSE = Vita Isid § 166, p. 230.1—2 ZINTZEN), dont on pense aujourd'hui qu'il a pu vivre jusqu'en 31039. Si, par ailleurs, on suppose que Théodore d'Asiné a été son 36

37

Sur tout cela, cf. RICHARD GOULET, L'Oracle d'Apollon dans la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 407—408; et les références bibliographiques en notes. Cf. l'Introduction à Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, Livre I, texte établi et traduit p a r H . D . SAFFREY et L . G . WESTERINK, 1 9 6 2 , p .

XLIV.

38

Sur Théodore d'Asiné, cf. Theodoras von Asine, Sammlung der Testimonien und Kommentar von WERNER DEUSE, Palingenesia 6, Wiesbaden (Steiner) 1973; et H . D. SAFFREY, Le 'philosophe de Rhodes' est-il Théodore d'Asiné? dans: Mémorial André-Jean Festu-

39

J. M. RIST, Basil's 'Neoplatonism', its background and nature, dans: Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic, by F. J. FED WICK, Toronto (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies) 1981, p. 137-220, et en particulier p. 151 et 180.

gière, 1984, p . 6 5 - 7 6 .

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disciple à la fin de sa vie, on est amené à placer la naissance de ce dernier entre 275 et 280, compte tenu de la différence d'âge de 20 à 30 ans qui sépare habituellement le maître du disciple. Peut-être même est-ce Porphyre qui, comme il l'avait, peut-on le penser 40 , déjà fait pour Anébon, envoya Théodore d'Asiné poursuivre ses études à l'École de Jamblique (Test 3 DEUSE = Eunape, Vitae Soph V 1, 4—5, p. 11.10—16 GIANGRANDE). Si Jamblique, qui, comme on l'a vu plus haut, serait né entre 245 et 250, a vécu jusqu'en 325-330, on peut penser que Théodore d'Asiné resta en relation avec celui qui fut son maître une bonne vingtaine d'années, très probablement à Apamée en Syrie. Enfin, on peut penser que la vie de Théodore d'Asiné se prolongea jusqu'au milieu du IVème siècle. Si on en croit Proclus, les rapports entre Théodore d'Asiné et Jamblique ne furent pas de tout repos; le disciple s'opposant au maître en soutenant des doctrines venant de Numénius (Test 6 DEUSE = Proclus, in Tim II 2 7 4 . 1 0 — 2 7 7 . 2 6 ) et d'Amélius (Test 12 DEUSE = Proclus, In Tim I 309.14—20) notamment. Dès lors, on comprend que Jamblique ait pu intituler un chapitre de l'un de ses livres: 'Réfutations d'Amélius et aussi de Numénius' en visant Théodore d'Asiné. Vers 357—358 en tout cas, l'empereur Julien (Test 4 DEUSE = Epist 12, p. 19.7—9 BIDEZ = p. 1 5 . 1 2 - 1 4 BIDEZ-CUMONT) et Libanius (Test 5 DEUSE = Opera X , Epist 487, p. 4 6 3 . 6 — 8 , 1 1 —20 FOERSTER) font état d'une polémique entre partisans de Théodore et partisans de Jamblique à Athènes. La chose est d'importance, car elle fait apparaître que, au milieu du IVème siècle, c'était la doctrine de Théodore d'Asiné, et, à travers elle, celle d'Amélius qui prévalait à Athènes. Priscus, le disciple de Jamblique, dut déployer beaucoup d'efforts pour retourner la situation en faveur de la doctrine de son maître 41 . Cela dit, si on pense que Théodore d'Asiné a vécu entre 275 ou 280 et 350, et qu'il a été le disciple de Porphyre à Rome un certain temps entre 300 et 310, avant de devenir tout de suite après le disciple de Jamblique à Apamée, il est non pas impossible, mais très peu vraisemblable qu'il ait rencontré Amélius à Apamée avant la mort de ce dernier, survenue entre 290 et 300.

4. L'œuvre

d'Amélius42

Ce que nous savons de l'œuvre d'Amélius vient pour l'essentiel de la 'Vie de Plotin'. 40

41

42

H. D. SAFFREY, qui avait avancé cette hypothèse dans 'Abamon, pseudonyme de Jamblique' (dans: Philomathes. Studies and essays in the humanities in memory of Philip Merlan, 1971, p. 227—239; en particulier p. 232—233), la reprend dans 'Le 'Philosophe de Rhodes' est-il Théodore d'Asiné?' (dans: Mémorial André-Jean Festugière, 1984, p. 66). Cf. l'Introduction à Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, livre I, texte établi et traduit par H. D. SAFFREY et L. G. WESTERINK, Paris (Les Belles Lettres), 1968, p. X L I I - X L I I I . Pour une liste raisonnée des titres des ouvrages attribués par Porphyre à Amélius dans la 'Vie de Plotin', cf. RICHARD GOULET, Liste des auteurs et des ouvrages cités ou mentionnés dans la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 42.

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4.1. Copie des œuvres de Numénius À la fin du chapitre 3 de sa 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre écrit: « . . . il surpassait tous ses contemporains par son acharnement au travail, parce qu'il avait copié et rassemblé presque tous les écrits de Numénius, et en avait appris par cœur la plupart. » (VP 3.43—45) O n peut penser qu'Amélius accomplit cet immense travail après s'être détaché du Stoïcisme auquel l'avait formé Lysimaque (cf. VP 3.42—43) et avant d'avoir «préféré» (VP 20.77, προαιρούμενος) Plotin à Numénius comme interprète de Platon. Quoi qu'il en soit, on peut à peine considérer le résultat de ce travail comme faisant partie de l'œuvre d'Amélius.

4.2. 'Scholies' composées à partir des cours de Plotin Au début du chapitre suivant, Porphyre poursuit en racontant que, à son arrivée à Rome, il «trouve Amélius, qui en était à sa dix-huitième année d'études auprès de Plotin, mais n'avait encore rien osé écrire, si ce n'est ses scholies, dont le recueil n'avait pas encore atteint le nombre cent. » (VP 4.3 — 6) Porphyre reprend là une information qu'il a donnée à la fin du chapitre précédent: « . . . il ( = Amélius) avait composé aussi des scholies à partir des cours de Plotin, et il les disposa en une centaine de livres, qu'il légua à Hostilianus Hésychius d'Apamée, son fils adoptif. » (VP 3 . 4 6 - 4 8 ) C'est pour la période allant de 246 à 253 que ces notes devaient présenter le plus grand intérêt; pour cette période, en effet, elles constituaient le seul témoignage sur l'activité intellectuelle et pédagogique d'un Plotin qui, en pleine possession de ses moyens — il avait alors entre 41 et 48 ans —, s'abstenait cependant d'écrire. Par ailleurs, si on en croit le témoignage de Proclus, ces notes présentaient, sur certains points, un état de la pensée de Plotin différent de celui des 'Ennéades': «D'abord Amélius. Celui-ci, estimant que la doctrine qu'il rapporte à Plotin comme ayant été livrée en des leçons non écrites a été suffisamment réfutée par les successeurs de ce philosophe, a refusé de l'inclure dans ses vues et essaie d'expliquer d'une autre manière le présent texte (Tim 35 b 4—7).» (In Tim II 2 1 3 . 9 - 1 3 ) O r , cet état de la pensée de Plotin, qu'il est impossible de situer dans le temps, était assez connu, très probablement par l'intermédiaire des scholies d'Amélius, pour avoir été pris en considération par d'autres philosophes; bien plus, Amélius était en mesure de tenir compte des objections émises par ces philosophes, qu'il

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est impossible d'identifier avec certitude. C e témoignage suggère donc que ces scholies eurent une certaine diffusion, du vivant d'Amélius en tout cas 4 3 . Par ailleurs, il est à noter que, dans ce genre d'écrit, il est bien difficile de déterminer la part du disciple et celle du maître. Prendre des notes à un cours ne se réduit pas à un simple exercice de sténographie. U n e telle activité implique une part d'interprétation, dont l'importance croît quand le disciple revient sur ses notes, pour les retravailler. C'est probablement ce problème d'attribution qui retient Porphyre de considérer ces scholies c o m m e une oeuvre d'Amélius, à part entière.

4 . 3 . ' C o n t r e les apories de Porphyre' ( + la réponse à la réfutation de cet écrit par Porphyre) Dans la 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre se présente en effet comme l'instigateur du premier véritable ouvrage d'Amélius. L'anecdote mérite d'être citée en entier: « C ' e s t d'ailleurs une impression semblable que j'éprouvai, moi Porphyre, quand je commençai d'être son auditeur. Aussi écrivis-je une réfutation pour l'attaquer en essayant de montrer que l'intelligible subsiste hors de l'intellect. Il en fit donner lecture par Amélius et, une fois la lecture faite, sourit: 'c'est toi, Amélius, dit-il, qui devrais résoudre les apories dans lesquelles il est tombé par ignorance de nos positions'. Après qu'Amélius eut écrit un livre, qui n'était pas court, ' C o n t r e les apories de Porphyre', et qu'à mon tour j'eus fait une réfutation, après avoir dans un troisième temps compris à grand-peine ce que l'on disait, moi, Porphyre, je changeai d'avis et j'écrivis une palinodie que je lus dans le cours . . . » (VP 18.8—19) L'incident doit se situer fin 2 6 3 , début 264. Dans cette hypothèse, on peut légitimement penser que le 32ème traité de Plotin, auquel fut donné ce titre: 'Sur l'intellect et que les intelligibles ne sont pas hors de l'intellect et sur le Bien', c'est-à-dire Enn V 5, le l l è m e des 23 traités écrits au cours de la période allant de la fin de 263 à 2 6 8 , n'est pas étranger à cette polémique 4 4 .

43

PAUL HENRY (Vers la reconstitution de l'enseignement oral de Plotin, Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Belgique [Classe des Lettres] 5ème série, 23, 1937, p. 320—326) a pensé que la 'Théologie' du pseudo-Aristote avait pour sources ces scholies d'Amélius. Pour une liste des prises de position ultérieures — généralement négatives — sur le sujet, cf. MARIE-ODILE

GOULET-CAZÉ,

L'édition

Porphyrienne

des

«Ennéades»,

PVP

I,

1982,

p. 312—313; et plus récemment, Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The 'Theology' and other texts,

ed.

b y J I L L KRAYE,

W.

F.

RYAN a n d C .

B.

SCHMITT, W a r b u r g

Institute

Surveys and Texts XI, London (Warburg Institute. University of London) 1986: p. 110— 288 sur la pseudo-'Théologie d'Aristote'. 44

Sur le problème du rapport entre l'Intelligible et l'Intellect dans le Mèdio- et le NéoPlatonisme, cf. JEAN PÉPIN, Eléments pour une histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez Platon et dans le néo-platonisme, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger, 146, 1956, p. 3 9 - 6 4 = Étude I dans: De la philosophie ancienne à la théologie chrétienne, London (Variorum reprint) 1986. On trouve peut-être une allusion à la

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Et quelques lignes plus bas, Porphyre conclut: «Il n'est pas jusqu'à Amélius à qui je n'aie donné le désir de composer des traités» (VP 18.22—23). Que, par cette remarque, Porphyre ait cherché à la fois à se justifier et à se mettre en valeur importe peu; l'essentiel réside dans le fait que, pour Porphyre, 'Contre les apories de Porphyre' et la réplique à la réfutation que lui-même avait faite de ce livre peuvent être considérés comme les deux premiers véritables ouvrages d'Amélius.

4.4. 'Sur le problème de la justice chez Platon' Mais les choses n'en restèrent pas là, car Plotin et Longin semblent être intervenus dans la polémique. Voici en effet ce qu'écrit Longin dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin': «Aussi bien l'avons-nous fait déjà dans d'autres écrits, lorsque par exemple nous avons contredit Gentilianus sur le problème de la justice selon Platon ou que nous avons examiné le traité de Plotin 'Sur les Formes'. En effet, quand leur ami et le nôtre, Basileus de Tyr, auteur d'un bon nombre de traités à la manière de Plotin dont il avait choisi l'école de préférence à la nôtre, entreprit de prouver par un ouvrage que ce dernier avait sur les Formes une doctrine meilleure que celle qui nous agrée, nous croyons avoir suffisamment montré dans notre écrit contre lui qu'il eut tort de composer sa palinodie; dans cet ouvrage, nous avons mis en question bon nombre des doctrines de ces philosophes; de même également dans notre lettre à Amélius, qui a la longueur d'un ouvrage, mais ne fait que répondre à certaines observations qu'il nous avait adressées de Rome. Alors qu'il avait donné pour titre à cette lettre 'Du caractère de la philosophie de Plotin', nous nous sommes contenté du titre ordinaire de ce genre d'ouvrages, l'ayant déjà appelée 'Réponse à la lettre d'Amélius'. » (VP 20.86-104) 4 5

45

palinodie de Porphyre dans le 'Lexique' de Timée le Sophiste (début du IVème) (cf. Piatonis Dialogi, vol. VI, ed. C. F. HERMANN, Leipzig [Teubner] 1870, p. 404, s.v. οΰχ ήκιστα: πάνυ, ώς Πορφΰριος έν τώ προς τους ά π ό τοΰ νοΰ χωρίζοντας το νοητόν . . .). La construction et la traduction des lignes 97 à 104 sont très difficiles. En fait, le problème fondamental est le suivant. À qui faut-il attribuer l'écrit intitulé 'Περί του τρόπου της Πλωτίνου φιλοσοφίας' (cf. 101)? Il s'agit d'une lettre (ήν . . . έπιστολήν, cf. 100). La traduction que je viens de proposer suppose que cette lettre, qui a la longueur d'un ouvrage (ΤΤ| προς τον Ά μ έ λ ι ο ν επιστολή, μέγεθος μεν έχοΰση συγγράμματος, cf. 97— 98), est celle dans laquelle Longin répondait à certaines observations qu'Amélius lui avait adressées de Rome. C'est donc cette lettre que Longin préfère intituler 'Προς την Ά μ ε λίου έπιστολήν', cf. 103). Reste à savoir sur quoi portait la lettre d'Amélius. Comme les lignes 90 à 97 explicitent le του δε Πλωτίνου το 'Περί των ιδεών' έπισκεψάμενοι (cf. 89 — 90), je pense que les lignes 97 à 104 explicitent τω μεν Γεντιλιανψ περί της κατά Πλάτωνα δικαιοσύνης άντειπόντες (cf. 88-89). Mais on a compris autrement ce passage. Puisque la réponse de Longin a pour titre 'Προς την Ά μ ε λ ί ο υ έπιστολήν', on a pensé que c'était la lettre d'Amélius (cf. 100,

A M É L I U S : SA V I E ,

SON

ŒUVRE,

SA D O C T R I N E ,

SON

STYLE

823

Dans ces lignes, Longin fait allusion à deux de ses ouvrages, dans lesquels il soumit à examen des écrits d'Amélius et de Plotin. L'un de ces ouvrages porte sur un traité de Plotin que Longin intitule 'Sur les Formes', et qui pourrait bien être Enn V 5 [32], traité auquel, 35 ans plus tard, Porphyre donna pour titre: 'Sur l'Intellect et que les Intelligibles ne sont pas hors de l'Intellect et sur le Bien'; cet ouvrage fut, on peut le supposer, composé de même d'ailleurs que Enn V 5 [32], à l'occasion de la polémique sur la situation de l'Intelligible par rapport à l'Intellect, dont Porphyre fut l'instigateur dans le cadre de l'Ecole de Plotin. L'autre ouvrage de Longin qui, en fait, est une lettre (τη . . . επιστολή) ayant la longueur d'un ouvrage (μέγεθος μεν εχούση συγγράμματος) répond à certaines observations que, de Rome, Amélius avait adressées à Longin; or, étant donné la structure du passage qui vient d'être cité, cette longue lettre devrait correspondre à l'écrit dans lequel Longin contredisait Amélius sur le problème de la justice chez Platon. Et, comme c'est de Rome qu'Amélius adresse ces considérations à Longin, lequel fait mention de la chose dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', écrit aux alentours de 265, l'écrit 'Sur le problème de la justice chez Platon' ne peut être de beaucoup postérieur au premier écrit d'Amélius: 'Contre les apories de Porphyre'. Cela dit, c'est probablement dans cet écrit qu'Amélius soutenait cette thèse que, au début de son 'Commentaire sur la République de Platon', Proclus semble reprendre à son compte: « Par ce qui a été dit, tu pourrais aussi tirer le corollaire qu'a vu le premier Amélius, que, d'une injustice plus grande, résultent des maux moindres, d'une injustice moindre, des maux plus grands. » (In Remp I 24.7—9)

επιστολήν) qui avait pour titre 'Περί ι ο ί τρόπου της Πλωτίνου φιλοσοφίας'. Cette interprétation est illustrée par la traduction de Bréhier: «J'ai fait de même dans une lettre à Amélius qui est aussi longue qu'un traité; c'est une réponse à une lettre qu'il m'avait envoyée de Rome, et qu'il avait intitulée: 'Du caractère de la philosophie de Plotin'; mais je me suis contenté d'un titre plus général, et je Γ (= ma lettre qui répondait à celle d'Amélius) ai appelée: 'Réponse à la lettre d'Amélius'»; et par celle, moins ambiguë, d'ARMSTRONG: ". . . in my letter to Amelius, which is as long as a book, and answers a number of the points in the letter which he adressed to me from Rome, which he entitled 'On the Method of the Philosophy of Plotinus'. I was satisfied to give my treatise the ordinary title, calling it 'In answer to the Letter of Amelius'." C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi RICHARD GOULET (Liste des auteurs et des ouvages cités ou mentionnés dans la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 42) range 'Περί του τρόπου της Πλωτίνου φιλοσοφίας' dans la liste des ouvrages attribués à Amélius. Reste une troisième solution, celle illustrée par la traduction de R. HARDER: „und ebenso in dem Sendschreiben an Amelius, welches den Umfang eines Buches hat und auf einige Fragen antwortet, die er mir von Rom aus mit Sendschreiben gestellt hatte; er betitelte dies sein Schreiben 'Die Eigenart der plotinischen Philosophie', während wir unserseits es genug damit sein ließen, unsere Gegenschrift mit dem allgemeinen Titel 'Gegen das Sendschreiben des Amelius' zu benennen." Mais il me semble très difficile de ne pas donner le même réfèrent à (έπ)εγραψεν (une conjecture de WEISKE, les manuscrits ayant εγραψεν) et à επιστολήν. Je supprime le αυτό μόνον de la ligne 102.

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On remarque, en effet, que ce témoignage diffère sensiblement des autres témoignages de Proclus sur les exégèses proposées par Amélius de certains passages célèbres des livres Vili et X de la 'République' de Platon (cf. 4.7.2 [p. 827]). À cette période, qui va de la fin de 263 à 268, appartiennent les deux autres ouvrages attribués à Amélius par Porphyre dans sa 'Vie de Plotin'.

4.5. 'Contre le livre de Zostrien' 46 Un peu plus tard, Amélius fut avec Porphyre associé par Plotin à la grande polémique de l'École contre les Gnostiques: «Il y eut de son temps, parmi les chrétiens, à côté de beaucoup d'autres, ces hérétiques venus de l'ancienne philosophie qu'étaient Adelphius, Aquilinus et leurs disciples: ayant en leur possession les multiples ouvrages d'Alexandre de Libye, de Philocome, de Démostrate et de Lydus, et mettant en avant les révélations de Zoroastre, de Zostrien, de Nicothée, d'Allogène, de Messos et d'autres figures du même genre, ils égaraient beaucoup de monde, égarés qu'ils avaient été eux-mêmes, dans la pensée que Platon n'avait pas approché la profondeur de l'essence intelligible. De là vient que lui-même les réfutait souvent dans ses cours et qu'il alla jusqu'à écrire un livre que nous intitulâmes 'Contre les Gnostiques'; à nous, il laissa le soin d'examiner le reste. Amélius a étendu jusqu'à quarante livres sa riposte au livre de Zostrien. Quant à moi, Porphyre, j'ai développé contre celui de Zoroastre toute une suite de réfutations, où je montre comment ce livre est inauthentique et récent, forgé par les fondateurs de la secte pour faire accroire qu'appartiennent à l'antique Zoroastre les doctrines qu'ils ont euxmêmes choisi de professer.» (VP 16) Comme l'a montré R. H A R D E R , il est possible, à partir des 'Ennéades', de reconstituer un dossier antignostique formé de 4 écrits continus d'un point de vue chronologique: III 8 [30]; V 8 [31]; V 5 [32]; II 9 [33], lesquels furent les 9ème, lOème, l l è m e et 12ème rédigés durant une période allant de 263 à 268. Par voie de conséquence, cette polémique, à laquelle prit part Porphyre, doit se situer peu de temps après sa controverse avec Amélius sur la place de l'Intelligible par rapport à l'Intellect, controverse à laquelle, on vient de le voir, pourrait bien faire écho Enn V 5 [32], le troisième des traités formant l'écrit de Plotin 'Contre les Gnostiques'. Cela dit, il n'est pas interdit de penser que c'est à cet ouvrage polémique contre la révélation de Zostrien qu'appartiendrait le commentaire que fit Amélius du Prologue de l'Évangile de saint Jean (cf. 5.1.3.2.1 [p. 840—843]). Dans les quelques lignes citées par Eusèbe, on trouve en effet une allusion au Docétisme.

46

Sur Zostrien, cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 84—85; et JOHN H . SIEBER, An introduction to the tractate 'Zostrianos' from Nag Hammadi, Novum Testamentum 15, 1973, p. 223-240.

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4 . 6 . 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius' U n e autre polémique fournit à Amélius l'occasion d'écrire un autre ouvrage: « C o m m e ceux qui venaient de Grèce disaient que Plotin pillait les doctrines de Numénius, et comme le stoïcien et platonicien T r y p h o n en faisait part à Amélius, ce dernier écrivit un livre que nous intitulâmes 'Sur la différence doctrinale qui sépare Plotin de Numénius'. » (VP 17.1—6) L'ouvrage était précédé d'une lettre de dédicace que cite Porphyre dans les lignes qui suivent. «Amélius à Basileus, [com-]porte-toi bien. Pour eux, ces gens de grand renom, dont tu dis qu'ils t'ont rebattu les oreilles en essayant de rapporter à Numénius d'Apamée les doctrines de notre compagnon, je n'aurais pas fait entendre ma voix, sache-le clairement. Il est en effet manifeste que cela encore procède de leur prédilection pour la belle langue et le beau style: en disant contre lui, maintenant qu'il est un grand bavard, ailleurs qu'il est un pillard, une troisième fois qu'il pille jusqu'aux plus vils des êtres, — c'est manifestement pour se moquer de lui. E t pourtant, puisque tu penses qu'il faut utiliser ce prétexte à la fois pour que l'on ait nos thèses plus disponibles pour la mémoire et, même si elles ont été répandues depuis longtemps, pour que l'on en ait une connaissance plus globale, en l'honneur d'un c o m pagnon tel que le grand Plotin, je t'ai obéi et je viens donc t'apportant ce que je t'avais promis, fruit d'un labeur de trois jours, comme tu le sais toimême. Puisqu'il ne s'agit ni d'une compilation ni d'un développement à partir d'une collation de leurs ouvrages, mais d'une simple remémoration issue de mon commerce d'autrefois et dont les éléments ont été rangés ici dans l'ordre où chacun s'est présenté à mon esprit, il faut qu'elle obtienne maintenant une juste indulgence de ta part, d'autant plus que l'intention de cet homme, que d'aucuns veulent amener à l'accord avec nous, n'est vraiment pas facile à saisir puisqu'il s'exprime, à ce qu'il semblerait, tantôt d'une façon tantôt d'une autre sur les mêmes sujets. Q u a n t aux doctrines venues de notre propre foyer, si un aspect quelconque s'en trouve déformé, je sais bien que tu corrigeras avec bienveillance. Pointilleux comme je le suis, nécessité m'est faite, à ce qu'il semble, ainsi que le dit quelque part la tragédie, par leur éloignement des doctrines de notre chef d'école, d'opérer rectifications et rejets. Voilà donc quelle était ma volonté de te plaire en tout. Porte-toi bien. » (VP 1 7 . 1 6 - 4 4 ) Cette lettre recèle nombre d'informations intéressantes sur la forme et le contenu de l'ouvrage auquel elle fait référence. Q u i sont «ces gens de grand r e n o m » (VP 17.16—17) qualifiés au début du chapitre par l'expression «ceux qui venaient de G r è c e » (VP 17.1—2) et qui accusent Plotin de plagier Numénius? Il est impossible de le dire avec certitude, même si, tout naturellement, on serait enclin à penser qu'il s'agit des « diadoques »

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platoniciens d'Athènes, Eubule et Théodote 4 7 et/ou de leurs disciples. Q u o i qu'il en soit, Amélius nous apprend que cet ouvrage fut composé à la demande de Porphyre (VP 17.29), et dans un délai de trois jours (VP 17.29-30). Le fait que Porphyre en ait été le commanditaire expliquerait d'ailleurs qu'il ait eu son mot à dire dans le choix du titre (VP 17.4, cf. n. 25). Par ailleurs, Amélius nous donne une idée du contenu de cet ouvrage. Ouvrage non systématique, cet écrit d'Amélius ne se réduisait pas à une réfutation de l'accusation de plagiat aux dépens de Numénius, lancée contre Plotin. Cet écrit était aussi et surtout un aide-mémoire, où se trouvait exposée de façon globale la doctrine de Plotin, mise en relation d'une façon ou d'une autre avec les points fondamentaux de la doctrine de Numénius.

4.7. Commentaires sur des dialogues de Platon Restent une série d'exégèses de passages du 'Timée', de la 'République', du Tarménide' et du 'Philèbe' de Platon qui ont été attribuées à Amélius, mais dont on ne peut pas savoir si elles se trouvaient dans un véritable commentaire de chacun de ces dialogues ou dans un autre ouvrage d'Amélius inconnu de nous. Peut-être même s'agit-il là pour l'essentiel de témoignages sur l'enseignement oral d'Amélius dans l'École de Plotin, que Porphyre aurait consigné par écrit dans les commentaires qu'il consacra à chacun de ces dialogues de Platon 4 8 . 4.7.1. 'Commentaire sur le Timée' Dans son 'Commentaire sur le Timée de Platon', Proclus fait une vingtaine d'allusions à l'interprétation de passages de ce dialogue par Amélius (cf. Annexe 3 [p. 860]). Ses informations, Proclus semble les tirer pour une part de Porphyre (cf. par ex. In Tim II 300.24—301.2) et pour une autre de Jamblique (cf. par ex. 47

48

Sur ces « d i a d o q u e s » , cf. L u c BRISSON, Notices sur les noms propres, PVP I, 1982, p. 8 0 - 8 1 ; p. 86. Sur le sujet, cf. RUDOLF BEUTLER, R E X X I I , 1 (1953), s. v. Porphyrios, 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 . Sur le commentaire du 'Parménide', cf. PIERRE HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus, Paris (Etudes Augustiniennes), t. II, 1968, p. 59—120; sur le commentaire sur le T i m é e ' , cf. Porfirio, I frammenti dei commentari al 'Timeo' di Platone, trad, a cura di ANGELO RAFFAELE SODANO, Portici (Napoli) (Centro Bibliotecario) 1974. Cela dit, je n'ai pu classer un témoignage de Proclus sur Amélius: « E t peut-être ici Platon nous enseigne-t-il les deux exégèses du nom des Titans au niveau des principes, que Jamblique et Amélius ont consignées: le premier dit que Titans vient de 'étendre' το διατείνειν ses puissances sur toutes choses, tandis que, selon l'autre auteur, le nom vient de τι αιομον, en tant que le fractionnement et le discernement du Tout en parties tirent leur origine des Titans» (In Crat 56.13 — 19). Il est impossible de savoir, à partir de ce seul témoignage, s'il exista un véritable commentaire d'Amélius sur le 'Cratyle'. Mais ce témoignage, qui suivant toute probabilité évoque le démembrement de Dionysos par les Titans, tel que le racontent les 'Rhapsodies orphiques', aurait tout aussi bien pu se retrouver dans son 'Commentaire sur le Timée' ( O F 210 = In Tim II 145.18sq.; II 197.24sq.).

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In Tim II 277.26—32) 4 9 . Mais, comme nous venons de le voir, il n'est pas impossible que Jamblique dépende de Porphyre qui, dans son 'Commentaire sur le Timée', aurait évoqué la lecture commentée de ce dialogue faite par Amélius dans le cadre de l'École. Q u o i qu'il en soit, Proclus manifeste à l'égard des exégèses d'Amélius une désapprobation systématique, jugement qu'il a dû emprunter à ses informateurs: Porphyre et Jamblique. Q u i plus est, Proclus qualifie Amélius d'un ironique γενναίος (In Tim I 76.26, 309.21); et il caractérise l'une de ses interprétations d'un péjoratif θαυμαστόν (In Tim II 214.5), s'étonnant, en passant, que Porphyre n'ait pas pris la peine de la réfuter, comme le fit Jamblique (In Tim II 277.26— 278.25) 5 0 . 4.7.2. 'Commentaire sur la République' C o m m e nous l'avons vu plus haut (cf. p. 8 2 3 - 8 2 4 ) les témoignages de Proclus dans son 'Commentaire sur la République' sur les exégèses proposées par Amélius de divers passages de la 'République' de Platon ne forment pas un tout homogène. Le premier de ces témoignages pourrait bien appartenir à l'écrit d'Amélius 'Sur le problème de la justice selon Platon' (cf. 4.4 [p. 822-824]), alors que les autres paraissent ressortir à un commentaire des livres VIII et X . Proclus ne semble être d'accord qu'avec une seule de ces exégèses: celle relative à Rép VIII 546 a 8. Pour le reste, il exprime un désaccord qui prend une forme ironique (In Remp II 275.30: ó γενναίος Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς ) ou même franchement désapprobatrice (In Remp II 30.6: οτι [ό Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς ] παραδόξως έξηγήσατο: et In Remp II 32.25—26: ταΰτα δε οράς όπως πλάσμασιν εοικεν). 4.7.3. 'Commentaire sur le Parménide' Amélius proposa-t-il une exégèse de la seconde partie du 'Parménide' de Platon? Oui, si on en croit deux gloses marginales à des manuscrits du 'Commentaire sur le Parménide' de Proclus: l'un dans le Laurentianus graecus, Pluteus L X X X V 8, fol. 188 v, et l'autre dans l'Ambrosianus A 167 sup., fol. 157 r (manuscrit principal de la traduction de G . de Moerbeke) 5 1 . Ces gloses attribuent à Amélius une division de la seconde partie du 'Parménide' en huit hypothèses mises en rapport avec les différents ordres de la réalité, division qui reste anonyme chez Proclus (In Parm VI 1052.31-1053.9). 49

Sur le sujet, cf. CARLOS G . STEEL, The changing self. A study on the soul in later N e o platonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Künsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang X L , 1978, nr 85, Brussels (Royal Belgian A c a d e m y ) 1978, p. 29, n. 23.

50

Sur la connotation ironique de γενναίος, cf. A . - J . FESTUGIÈRE, traduction du ' C o m m e n taire sur le Timée' de Proclus, Paris (Vrin), t. I, 1966, p. 112, n. 1; sur θαυμαστόν, ID., ibid., t. III, p. 260, n. 1. Sur tout cela, cf. l'Introduction à Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, livre I, 1968, p. LXXX-LXXXI.

51

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1ère 2ème 3ème 4ème 5ème

hypothèse: hypothèse: hypothèse: hypothèse: hypothèse: aux Formes 6ème hypothèse: 7ème hypothèse: 8ème hypothèse:

l'Un l'Intellect les âmes rationnelles les âmes irrationnelles la matière qui possède une disposition à la participation la matière mise en ordre la matière pure la forme unie à la matière

Contre cette interprétation, dont par ailleurs il reconnaît les mérites, Proclus (In Parm VI 1053.9—35) soulève deux critiques. Cela dit, tout porte à croire qu'Amélius avait aussi commenté la première partie du 'Parménide'. En effet, si Amélius accepte l'existence de formes intelligibles des choses mauvaises (cf. Proclus, In Parm III 833.13sq.), c'est probablement dans le cadre d'une exégèse de Parm 130 c—d, et plus précisément pour répondre à la question: τίνων έστί και τίνων ουκ εστί. τα είδη; 4.7.4. 'Commentaire sur le Philèbe' Restent les exégèses de ces deux passages du 'Philèbe' que mentionne Damascus (In Phil § 2 9 . 1 - 5 [comm. à Phil 12 d 7 - e 2]; § 152 [comm. à Phil 33 b 10—11]). Comme l'explique L. G. WESTERINK52 dans sa préface, le Commentaire de Damascius sur le 'Philèbe' démarque celui de Proclus aujourd'hui perdu. Or, c'est dans ce commentaire que Damascius a dû trouver toutes les références aux commentaires néoplatoniciens antérieurs: celui de Porphyre (§ 10, 130, 134), celui d'Amélius (§ 29, 152), celui de Jamblique (§ 5, 10, 57, 105, 130, 243) et celui de Syrianus (§ 5, 244, 253).

4.8. L'oracle d'Apollon Au chapitre 22 de sa 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre, après en avoir rappelé l'occasion, cite un long oracle d'Apollon, qu'il commente au chapitre suivant. Or, tout récemment, la composition de cet oracle a été attribuée, en tout ou en partie, à Amélius. R I C H A R D G O U L E T 5 3 commence par rappeler que, dans sa 'Vie de Plotin', Porphyre présente l'oracle d'Apollon suivant le même schéma que celui qu'il applique pour présenter les nombreux oracles qu'il cite dans le 'De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda' et ceux que lui a empruntés l'auteur de la "Théosophie de Tübingen': 52

53

Introduction to Damascius, Lectures on the 'Philebus', wrongly attributed to Olympiodorus, text, translation, notes and indices by L. G. WESTERINK, Amsterdam (NorthHolland Publishing Company) 1959, p. XXI. RICHARD GOULET, L'Oracle d'Apollon dans la 'Vie de Plotin', PVP I, 1982, p. 3 6 9 - 4 1 2 ; pour la citation qui suit, cf. p. 405.

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a) présentation de l'oracle, souvent sous forme d'apophtegme ( V P 2 2 .

1-12); b) citation textuelle de l'oracle ( V P 2 2 . 1 3 - 6 3 ) ; c) commentaire faisant ressortir l'enseignement essentiel de l'oracle (VP 23). Dans les chapitres qui précèdent immédiatement ( V P 2 0 et 21) ceux-ci, Porphyre a cité et commenté le jugement porté sur Plotin par Longin, le plus grand critique de son temps (VP 20.1—2); ce témoignage humain, il va maintenant le compléter par celui d'un dieu, Apollon. Mais, avant de citer l'oracle rendu par Apollon sur Plotin, Porphyre explique de quelle manière et dans quelles circonstances cet oracle fut demandé et obtenu: «Tandis qu'Amélius lui demandait où était allée l'âme de Plotin, ce même Apollon en effet, qui, à propos de Socrate, s'était borné à dire: "De tous les hommes, Socrate est le plus sage', a prononcé sur Plotin un oracle long et d'une grande beauté que je t'invite à écouter. » (VP 2 2 . 8 — 12) Suivent alors 51 hexamètres dactyliques d'un oracle dont le plan révèle une structure en miroir. A

D

Prélude 1 3 - 1 9 — objet de l'hymne 1 3 - 1 5 — invocation aux Muses 16—19 Ordre de départ donné au c h œ u r 20—22 Interpellation hymnique initiale: exposé du thème général («autrefois»/ «maintenant») 23—30 Autrefois 31—44 (trois variations):

D' C' B' A'

1. 3 1 - 3 4 2. 3 5 - 3 9 3. 4 0 - 4 4 Maintenant 4 5 - 5 8 a Interpellation finale: rappel du double thème 58 b —60 O r d r e d'arrêt donné au c h œ u r 6 1 - 6 2 a Conclusion 6 2 b - 6 3

Β C

RICHARD GOULET fait d'abord remarquer que ce texte n'est pas homogène. Le chœur d'Apollon et des Muses n'est évoqué que dans les premiers vers (13—22) et dans les tout derniers (61—63), où se trouve mentionné le nom de Plotin; ce chœur disparaît du corps du poème (23—60) qui constituerait un hymne. C e t hymne, suivant RICHARD GOULET, serait une production du Néo-platonisme théurgique de Syrie, et sa transformation d'hymne théurgique en oracle d'Apollon s'expliquerait par un usage cultuel. E t , concernant les vers qui encadrent cet hymne, RICHARD GOULET déclare: «Resterait à rendre compte des vers du début et de la fin de l'oracle, lesquels concernent plus directement Plotin. Ici nous croirions volontiers qu'Amélius lui-même, le consultant à qui fut accordé l'oracle selon Porphyre, s'est fait le chresmologue ou le chresmographe de l'expérience cultuelle oraculaire dont il avait bénéficié. Ces vers ne font que traduire en langage poétique la conviction intérieure éprouvée par le consultant d'avoir rencontré la 56 ANRW II 36.2

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Parole dans la proclamation cultuelle des vers de l'hymne religieux» (cf. n. 53). Or, pour donner une base réelle à cette double hypothèse, RICHARD GOULET essaie de trouver des indices de caractère historique sur l'existence à Apamée d'une tradition néo-platonicienne théurgique, à laquelle aurait pu contribuer Amélius. Pour sa part, c'est l'oracle dans son ensemble que JESÚS IGAL54 attribue à Amélius. Le plan qu'il propose de ce texte recoupe dans ses grandes lignes celui de RICHARD GOULET, même s'il s'en distingue essentiellement en ce qu'il est attentif plus au contenu qu'à la forme de l'oracle. I II

Proème ( 1 3 - 2 2 ) Hymne ( 2 3 - 6 0 ) 1. Invocation: mort et démonification de Plotin (23—30) 2. Narration intermédiaire (31—58 a) A. Mérites en cette vie (31—44): a) fuite de la vie végétative (31—34) b) conversion du monde de la doxa vers le monde noétique (35—39) c) application à la vie contemplative (40—44) B. Récompenses dans la vie d'outre-tombe: vie bienheureuse en compagnie des démons (45—58a) 3. Makarismós final: résumé de A et B (58b—60)

III

Épilogue ( 6 1 - 6 3 )

À la suite d'une analyse littéraire et philosophique de ce texte, JESÚS IGAL arrive à ces conclusions: l'oracle fut composé par quelqu'un qui non seulement connaissait admirablement la poésie grecque dans son ensemble et la rhérotique de son époque, mais qui de plus était familier avec les doctrines de Platon, de Maxime de Tyr et surtout de Plotin. Mais JESÚS IGAL va plus loin en faisant cette hypothèse supplémentaire: l'oracle d'Apollon fut composé par Amélius. Il ne s'agirait pas là, à proprement parler, d'un faux, mais d'un poème oraculaire soumis à l'approbation des prêtres de Delphes et attribué, après coup, à Apollon. Il est très difficile de prendre parti dans ce débat, et cela d'autant plus que, dans un article récent, H . - R . SCHWYZER55, propose de revenir à l'hypothèse suivant laquelle Porphyre serait le véritable auteur de cet oracle.

5.

Doctrine

Les fragments qui nous restent de ces ouvrages, quelle que soit par ailleurs leur nature véritable, permettent de se faire une idée de ce que pouvait être la 54 55

JESÚS IGAL, El Enigma del Oráculo de A p o l o sobre Plotino, Emerita 52, 1984, p. 8 3 - 1 1 5 . H A N S - R U D O L F SCHWYZER, πλείων in der Bedeutung plenm, dans: O-o-pe-ro si. Festschrift für Ernst Risch zum 75. Geburtstag, hrsg. v. ANNEMARIE ETTER, Berlin/New York (de Gruyter) 1986, p. 5 4 6 - 5 5 7 .

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doctrine d'Amélius surtout en métaphysique, mais aussi dans le domaine de l'éthique.

5.1. Métaphysique Dans la métaphysique d'Amélius, on retrouve la triade plotinienne: U n , Intellect, Âme, mais interprétée de façon originale. 5.1.1. L ' U n Sur la place de l'Un chez Amélius, il ne subsiste chez Proclus qu'un seul témoignage, et encore indirect: «Après Jamblique, Théodore, prenant la suite d'Amélius, dit qu'il y a trois Démiurges, cependant il ne les range pas immédiatement après l'Un (το εν), . . . » (In Tim I 309.14—16). L e second membre de phrase laisse entendre que Théodore, tout en s'accordant avec Amélius pour admettre l'existence de trois démiurges (cf. 5.1.2.1 [p. 832 — 833]), s'en distingue sur la place à leur donner dans la hiérarchie des premiers principes. Pour Théodore d'Asiné, en effet, la triade démiurgique n'arrive qu'en 4ème position: (1) L'indicible, (2) l'un, triade intelligible, (3) la triade intellective, (4) la triade démiurgique, (5) la triade des âmes 5 6 . Pour Amélius, en revanche, les trois intellects démiurgiques devaient suivre immédiatement l'Un, principe ultime comme chez Pio tin. 5.1.2. L'Intellect 5 7 Amélius est surtout connu pour sa doctrine des trois intellects qui correspondent à la sphère de l'Être (In Tim I 431.26—28; cf. aussi Damascius, D e principiis I 133.25—134.8 RUELLE). La tripartition de l'Intellect a dû faire l'objet de discussions dans l'École de Plotin. D'ailleurs, Plotin lui-même paraît avoir varié sur ce point de doctrine essentiel. Commentant Timée 39 e 7—9 en Enn III 9 [13] 1, il semble, dans un premier temps (c'est-à-dire entre 253 et 263), prêt à introduire dans l'Intellect une distinction entre celui qui « e s t » , celui qui « a » et celui qui « v o i t » . Mais, en Enn II 9 [33], 1.25sq. (cf. II 9 , 6 . 1 7 - 1 9 ) , il refuse toute idée de division dans l'Intellect, craignant vraisemblablement une multiplication des hypostases comme chez les Gnostiques, contre qui polémique l'École aux alentours de 265 (cf. 4.5 [p. 824-826]).

56

57

56s"

C f . H . D . SAFFREY, Le 'Philosophe de Rhodes' est-il Théodore d'Asiné, dans: Mémorial André-Jean Festugière, 1984, p. 70. Le texte de référence est Proclus, In Tim II 274.10— 277.26 = frag. 6 DEUSE. Sur le sujet, cf. MASSIMO MASSAGLI, Amelio Neoplatonico e la metafisica del nous, Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 74, 1982, 2 2 5 - 2 4 3 . C f . aussi H . - D . SAFFREY, L a T h é o logie platonicienne' de Proclus et l'histoire du Néoplatonisme, dans: Actes du C o l l o q u e : Proclus et son influence, Zurich (éd. du Grand Midi) 1987, 29—44 et surtout 35—36.

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LUC BRISSON 5.1.2.1. La structure de l'Intellect

Pour Amélius, il y a trois intellects, qui sont trois démiurges, trois dieux mis en rapport avec les trois rois de la 'Lettre II' (312 e 1—4, cf. Proclus, In Tim I 306.11 — 12) et avec les trois rois: Phanès, Kronos, Zeus, des 'Rhapsodies Orphiques' ( O F 96 KERN [pour les trois], cf. Proclus, In Tim I 3 0 6 . 1 2 - 1 3 ; O F 170 [pour Phanès], cf. Proclus, In Tim I 3 3 6 . 2 2 - 2 3 ) ; le troisième démiurge semble même, pour sa part, être mis en rapport avec une entité des Oracles Chaldaïques' (frag. 33 DES PLACES, cf. Proclus, In Tim I 361.29-30). Cette doctrine trouve sa source dans une exégèse de cette phrase du 'Timée' de Platon: 'ξίπερ οΰν νους ένούσας ιδέας τω ο εστίν ζφον, οιαί τε ενεισι καί οσαι, καθορα (Timée 39 e 7—9), comme le fait d'ailleurs remarquer Proclus (In Tim III 103.18—28); et elle pourrait bien avoir été inspirée à Amélius par Numénius, comme invite à le penser Proclus qui, immédiatement après avoir évoqué les trois Intellects d'Amélius, fait mention des trois Dieux de Numénius (In Tim III 103.28-32 = Numénius, frag. 22 DES PLACES).

5.1.2.1.1. Le premier intellect démiurgique Le premier intellect, «celui qui est» (In Tim I 306.2), est réellement ce qu'il est (όντως έστίν ö έστιν, cf. In Tim I 306.4). Amélius le nomme «Intellect de l'ordre de l'Essence» (τον ουσιώδη νουν, cf. In Tim I 309.17). Identique à l'Intelligible, ce démiurge est par définition indivisible (άδιαίρετον, cf. In Tim I 309.18); on peut même dire qu'il joue le rôle de 'Modèle' intelligible du démiurge (τό[ν] μεν (παράδειγμα) νοητόν του δ η μ ι ο υ ρ γ ο ί , In Tim I 3 0 9 . 2 3 - 2 4 , cf. 336.19-20). Le premier intellect correspond au premier démiurge, celui qui a voulu (ó βουληθείς, In Tim I 398.22), parce qu'il est celui qui crée seulement par son vouloir (τη βουλήσει, In Tim I 361.29). De ce démiurge qu'il identifie à l'Intelligible (In Tim I 431.26-27), Amélius dit: «le troisième est établi avant ces deux dans la catégorie de roi» (In Tim I 362.1—2). Tout cela se voit résumé en ces quelques lignes: « D è s lors donc, en tant que le Démiurge est Intellect, il produit toutes choses par ses intellections; en tant qu'il est un Intelligible, il crée par sa seule existence; en tant qu'il est dieu, il crée par son seul vouloir. » (In Tim I 362.2-4)

5.1.2.1.2. Le second intellect démiurgique Le second démiurge, «celui qui a » (In Tim I 306.2—3; III 103.21), « e s t l'Intelligible qui est en lui, mais il a l'Intelligible qui le précède et de toute façon participe (μετέχει) seulement à celui-ci, d'où vient aussi qu'il est second» (In Tim I 306.4—6). Voilà pourquoi Amélius le nomme «Substance intellective» (νοεράν ούσίαν, cf. In Tim I 309.17). O r , c'est à ce dieu intermédiaire qu'appartient la «puissance » (ή δύναμις γεννητική, In Tim I 309.24).

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Alors que le premier démiurge veut, le second calcule (λογιζόμενος, cf. In Tim I 398.22—23), car c'est «par l'intellection et le fait de penser» (xfj νοήσει και τώ νοείν, In Tim I 398.24) qu'il crée, c'est-à-dire «par un commandement seulement» (επιτάξει μόνον, cf. In Tim I 361.29); voilà pourquoi il peut être rangé «dans la catégorie de l'architecte» (κατά τον άρχιτέκτονα, cf. In Tim I 361.30-362.1).

5.1.2.1.3. Le troisième intellect démiurgique Le troisième intellect, celui qui voit (In Tim I 306.3; III 103.23), Amélius le nomme «Source des âmes» (πηγή ψυχών, cf. In Tim I 309.18, cf. 309.25—26). C'est ce troisième intellect qui produit et intellige l'infinité des âmes; voilà pourquoi on peut dire « qu'il opère sa division jusque dans les êtres particuliers » (In Tim I 309.19—20). Dès lors, Amélius va jusqu'à admettre, semble-t-il, que c'est parce qu'on trouve en lui «les modèles des parties», qu'on peut dire qu'il se divise «dans les parties» (εις τα μέρη, cf. In Tim I 425.21). Or, c'est ce dieu qu'Amélius considère comme «celui qui est réellement l'Intellect démiurgique» (τον δε όντως δημιουργικόν νουν, cf. In Tim I 309.24—25). Cet intellect démiurgique, «celui qui a reçu en transmission» (ό παραλαβών) (In Tim I 3 9 8 . 2 3 ) , crée «par le fait de mettre la main à l'ouvrage» (τή μεταχειρίσει, In Tim I 398.24—25, cf. I 3 6 1 . 2 8 sq. = Oracles Chaldaïques, frag. 33 DES PLACES), «car c'est le troisième qui place l'Intellect dans l'Âme, l'Ame dans le Corps du Monde (Tim 30 b 5), et qui ainsi 'apporte sa contribution à la construction de l'Univers' (Tim 30 b 6 ) » (In Tim I 3 9 8 . 2 4 - 2 6 ) . Voilà pourquoi il peut être rangé « dans le catégorie de l'artisan qui travaille de ses mains (κατά τον αύτουργόν τεχνίτην)» (In Tim I 3 6 1 . 2 9 - 3 0 ) .

5.1.2.2. Place et contenu de l'intelligible Amélius reprend à son compte le postulat néo-platonicien suivant lequel l'intelligible est indissociable de l'intellect, point de doctrine que Plotin le chargea de défendre lorsque voulut le remettre en cause Porphyre qui, venant d'arriver dans l'École, restait sous l'influence de celui qui avait été son maître à Athènes, Longin (cf. 4.3 [p. 821]). Pour Amélius, l'intelligible se trouve dans les trois intellects démiurgiques sous des modes différents. Le premier intellect démiurgique est i d e n t i q u e à l'intelligible (In Tim 1431.26-27, cf. 306.3-4). Le second p a r t i c i p e à l'intelligible (In Tim 1306.4—6), dans la mesure où ili'a en lui. Et le troisième voit seulement l'intelligible (In Tim I 306.6-8). De ces prémisses, on peut, à la suite de Numénius et de Cronius, son έταιρος, tirer la conclusion suivante: il doit y avoir participation non seulement dans le monde sensible, mais aussi dans le monde intelligible: «L'opinion de Numénius, Cronius et Amélius, c'est que non seulement les intelligibles, mais aussi tous les sensibles participent aux Formes; l'opi-

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nion de Porphyre, c'est que seulement les sensibles en participent. » (Syrianus, In Met 109.12-14 = frag. 46b DES PLACES) O r , suivant Proclus, une telle conclusion entraîne cette conséquence: «Si d'autre part, comme l'écrivent Amélius et avant lui Numénius, il y a aussi participation chez les Intelligibles, on devrait trouver aussi parmi eux des images (εικόνες).» (Proclus, In Tim III 3 3 . 3 3 - 3 4 . 3 = frag. 46c DES PLACES)

C'est Proclus qui tire cette conséquence, semble-t-il, et non Amélius ou Numénius. Cependant, il faut bien admettre que, pour tous ceux qui introduisent une véritable hiérarchie dans le monde intelligible, la question se pose de savoir quel type de rapports entretiennent entre eux les différents niveaux de réalités intelligibles. De toute façon, il est bien difficile de savoir ce que signifierait le terme εικόνες dans ce contexte. Seul un passage des 'Ennéades' (V 8 [31], 3.12) pourrait nous fournir des indications sur le sujet; mais il est trop difficile à interpréter pour être utile 58 . Q u o i qu'il en soit, c'est Jamblique qui, si on en croit Proclus (In Tim III 32.32—34.13 et surtout 33.1—32 pour la citation de Jamblique), a donné à ce point de doctrine la formulation la plus adéquate. Par ailleurs, c'est peut-être cette participation en chaîne qui contraignit Amélius à accepter l'idée que les formes intelligibles étaient en nombre infini: «Cette argumentation (cf. Aristote, Met M 8, 1084 a 7) atteint davantage la réalité [intelligible]. Contre cette argumentation aussi ceux qui défendent la thèse suivant laquelle le nombre des modèles (παραδειγμάτων) est infini soutiennent que ce n'est pas en même temps que le monde sensible reçoit la totalité des formes intelligibles (ούχ άμα πάντα τα ε'ίδη . . . ύποδέχεσθαι); mais certains d'entre eux déclarent que, même dans un temps infini, le monde ne reçoit pas les images de toutes les causes formelles (πάντων των είδητικών αιτίων εικόνας ύποδέχεσθαι). Telle est en effet le genre de thèse qu'ose soutenir dans son audace juvénile Amélius, le Plotinien (οί περί Ά μ έ λ ι ο ν τον Πλωτίνειον νεανιεύονται).» (Syrianus, In Met 1 4 7 . 2 - 6 ) 5 9 En fait, les dernières lignes de ce témoignage laissent supposer une autre explication à cette prise de position. D e façon à rendre compte de l'infinie diversité du monde sensible tout en maintenant que les Formes et les âmes sont en nombre fini (Enn V 7 [18], 3.11 — 58

59

PIERRE THILLET (Notes sur le texte des 'Ennéades', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 92, 1970, p. 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) manifeste son embarras devant cette phrase. Sur ce passage particulièrement intéressant je ne ferai que deux remarques d'ordre sémantique. La première concerne πραγματειώδες. C h e z Syrianus, et donc chez Proclus, ce terme signifie « q u i concerne les π ρ ά γ μ α τ α » . C o m m e les πράγματα, ce sont les νοητά, il faut traduire π ρ α γ μ α τ ε ι ώ δ ε ς par 'qui atteint davantage la réalité [intelligible]'. Dans son commentaire à la 'Métaphysique', Syrianus reproche à Aristote de s'en tenir à un point de vue trop 'logique'; mais, de temps en temps, comme c'est le cas ici, il lui arrive de s'intéresser vraiment aux πράγματα. Par ailleurs, le verbe ν ε α ν ι ε ύ ο μ α ι est aussi appliqué à Amélius par Jamblique dans son ' Π ε ρ ί ψ υ χ ή ς ' cité par Stobée (Eel I 372.25).

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13), Plotin s'inspirant du Stoïcisme 60 , soutient la doctrine suivant laquelle l'histoire du monde sensible est faite d'une succession de cycles cosmiques, au cours desquels se répètent indéfiniment les mêmes événements (IV 3 [27], 12.12 — 19; V 7 [18], 3.13 — 18). Le postulat sur lequel se fonde cette doctrine trouve une formulation remarquablement claire et concise dans un passage du 'Commentaire sur le Phédon' attribué à Olympiodore: «La doctrine relative à la métempsychose et à la métensomatose est une nécessité, si on admet ces deux autres doctrines: l'éternité du monde et l'immortalité de l'âme. Car, si on veut tenir ces deux doctrines, il faut qu'il y ait métempsychose pour que l'infini n'existe pas en acte. » (In Phaed 10 § 1. 1 - 5 , p. 137 WESTERINK)

Une telle formulation permet de situer avec précision la position d'Amélius. Amélius accepte bien évidemment la doctrine de l'immortalité de l'âme, puisque, de toute façon, il accepte l'idée de métensomatose (cf. 5.1.3.2.2 [p. 846— 847]). Il devait aussi accepter la doctrine de l'éternité du monde, puisqu'il soutient que c'est dans un temps infini que le monde reçoit les images des formes, et cela en dépit de son interprétation du θείω γεννητφ de Rép III 546 b 3 (cf. 5.1.4 [p. 847—849]). En revanche, il ne semble pas avoir reculé devant l'éventualité de l'existence d'un infini en acte, éventualité explicitement rejetée par Aristote (Phys III 5, 204 a 20—21), puisqu'il admet que les Formes sont en nombre infini. Or, si les Formes sont en nombre infini, les âmes peuvent aussi l'être. Par suite, rien n'oblige chaque âme particulière à se réincarner dans chacun des cycles cosmiques qui scandent l'infinité du temps; ce qui implique qu'il est possible pour certaines âmes de sortir du cycle des réincarnations, définitivement. Enfin, Amélius admettait l'existence de formes intelligibles de choses mauvaises, c'est-à-dire l'existence d'anti-Formes en quelque sorte: «Je ne sais pas ce qui a poussé Amélius à soutenir qu'il y a chez le démiurge des logoi des choses mauvaises» (Asclépius, In Nie Arith I 44) 6 1 . Comment expliquer la chose? Peut60

61

Sur ce point, cf. H. J. BLUMENTHAL, Plotinus' psychology. His doctrine of the embodied soul, The Hague (Nijhoff) 1971, p. 1 1 6 - 1 2 0 ; et R. T. WALLIS, Neo-platonism, Classical life and Letters, London (Duckworth), 1 9 7 2 , p. 9 4 - 9 5 . Voici le texte grec: Ζ1 έξελιγμοί. άντί του περίοδοι· ταϋτα γαρ πάντα / 2 καί ό ουρανός και ó χρόνος καί άστρα εξ εκείνων τών / 3 λόγων προήλθον. Άμελιος δε, ουκ οιδα πόθεν όρμη- / 4 θείς, καί τών κακών οιεται λόγους είναι παρά τώ δη- / 5 μιουργώ. (Asclépius I μδ', dans: Asclepius of Tralles, Commentary to Nicomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic, edited with an introduction and notes by LEONARDO TARAN, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, N.S., vol. 59, part 4, 1969, Philadelphia [American Philosophical Society] 1969.) Dans une note à ce passage, L. TARAN écrit: "In lines 3—4, Asclepius reports the opinion of Amelius, the student of Plotinus, according to whom even the λόγοι τών κακών are in the mind of God; this text is also reported by Philoponus I με' 2—3, but there is a misprint in H O C H E ' S edition which has άμέλει in line 2, instead of Άμέλιος (the misprint is noticed by H O C H E himself at the bottom of p. 52 of the first book). This misprint is probably the reason why the commentary of Philoponus on Nicomachus was not quoted by Z O U M P O S as the source of fr. XXXVIII of Amelius, cf. Amelii Neoplatonici Fragmenta.

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être s'agissait-il, par là, d'expliquer comment le troisième intellect, le Démiurge, pouvait connaître l'existence du mal, et en reconnaître les diverses manifestations dans le monde sensible. 5.1.3. L'Âme Tout naturellement, l'Âme se trouve sous l'Intellect, et plus précisément immédiatement après le troisième intellect, celui qui, véritable démiurge, est appelé la «Source des âmes», «car c'est ce troisième qui a placé l'Intellect dans l'Âme, l'Âme dans le Corps du monde (Tim 30 b 5) et qui 'ainsi apporte sa contribution à la constitution de l'Univers' (Tim 30 b 6)» (In Tim I 398.25—26). Pour comprendre le sens de ce témoignage, il faut faire un détour par Plotin, qui assimile jusqu'à un certain point l'âme au Logos et qui fait jouer, au niveau de la Nature, un rôle essentiel aux logoi qu'elle recèle 6 2 . La position d'Amélius sur le sujet semble donc bien recouper celle de son maître, à cette différence près que l'influence stoïcienne devait se faire sentir avec plus de force chez celui qui avait été le disciple du stoïcien Lysimaque, avant de devenir celui de Plotin. Si Plotin reprend la doctrine stoïcienne du Logos et des logoi en l'interprétant dans une perspective platonicienne comme Philon l'avait fait à sa manière, c'est pour rendre compte du passage du domaine de l'Être, celui de l'Intellect et de l'Intelligible, au monde du Devenir, celui de la Nature, par l'intermédiaire de l'Âme considérée en général comme troisième hypostase et en particulier comme âme du monde, instance qui, face à son activité contemplative, représente son activité productrice. L'Âme universelle, troisième hypostase, peut, si on la considère dans l'acte qui la caractérise en priorité, c'est-à-dire le raisonnement discursif, être identifiée au Logos. En tant que Logos discursif, elle est l'interprète de l'Intellect, tout comme, chez l'homme, le logos parlé est l'interprète du logos intérieur à l'âme Collegit A. ZOUMPOS, Pars Prior (Athenis 1956). ZOUMPOS gives as his source for this fragment A. MAI'S Spicil. Rom. Il 20, which contains a selection of texts taken from Philoponus' commentary. " Et, concernant les rapports entre les commentaires d'Asclépius et de Philopon, L. G. WESTERINK écrit: «Les phrases qu'Asclépius et Philopon ont en commun prouvent qu'ils reproduisent un seul et même cours d'Ammonius; mais, même si l'on pouvait penser que les cours des professeurs alexandrins prenaient la forme d'une dictée très lente, cela n'expliquerait pas pourquoi cet accord s'étend jusqu'à des détails qui ne peuvent provenir d'Ammonius lui-même (. . .). Il faut donc bien que l'un dépende de l'autre et, ceci établi, le choix n'est pas difficile: c'est de toute évidence Philopon qui a révisé et amplifié l'original peu soigné d'Asclépius. » (L. G. WESTERINK, Deux commentaires sur Nicomaque: Asclépius et Jean Philopon, Revue des Études Grecques 77, 1964, p. 530; repris dans: IDEM, Texts and Studies in Neoplatonism and byzantine literature, Amsterdam [Hakkert] 1980, p. 105.)

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Par ailleurs, comme seul Amélius semble avoir soutenu qu'il existe des Formes des choses mauvaises, c'est lui que, sans le nommer, critique Proclus dans l'In Remp I, 32.13 — 33.7, l'In Parm III 8 2 9 . 2 3 - 8 3 1 . 2 4 (cf. résumé, 8 3 3 . 1 3 - 1 4 ) et dans la Théol Plat I 87.22—24 et 98.16—20 (le pluriel doit ici être interprété comme un effet de style). Sur le sujet, cf. R. E. WITT, The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic basis, Classical Quarterly 25, 1931, 1 0 3 - 1 1 1 ; J. M. RIST, Plotinus: the road to reality, Cambridge (Univ. Press) 1967, chap. 7, p. 8 4 - 1 0 2 .

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(Enn I 2 [19], 3.27—30). Mais l'Âme peut aussi être perçue comme cette force qui produit, anime et ordonne le monde sensible, que l'Intellect appelle à l'existence; dans cette perspective, il faut parler d'un Logos créateur qui engendre les réalités inférieures à l'Âme (Enn V 1 [10], 7.42—49), et que Plotin désigne par le terme Nature (Φύσις). Sous l'un et l'autre de ces aspects, discursif et créateur, le Logos est donc assimilé à l'Âme. Mais Plotin va plus loin, en établissant, à la façon de Philon 63 , un lien entre cette doctrine du Logos et celle de l'Intelligible, par l'intermédiaire de la pluralité des logoi. L'Intellect démiurgique fournit à l'Âme les logoi (Enn V 9 [5], 3.30— 32), dont elle se sert pour façonner le monde sensible. O r , comme la création résulte de la contemplation, ces logoi immatériels doivent être d'abord considérés comme les formes intelligibles contemplées par l'Âme; mais, dans la mesure où ils sont réfléchis dans la partie inférieure de l'Âme, ces logoi entrent en contact avec la matière qu'ils informent pour engendrer la Nature. Les âmes individuelles correspondent donc chacune à un intelligible moins divisé qu'elles-mêmes (Enn IV 3 [27], 5.8-14). Par ailleurs, l'Âme en tant que troisième hypostase est la somme de tous les logoi (Enn VI 2 [43], 5.10—14) qui y occupent la même place que celle qu'occupent les formes intelligibles dans l'Intellect. Bref, les logoi, ce sont les Formes considérées comme causes de la production et de l'organisation de la Nature. O n comprend, dès lors, que, pour tenir compte du mal dans le monde sensible, Amélius ait été amené à admettre l'existence de logoi des choses mauvaises. 5.1.3.1. Le nom de l'Âme Commentant Timée 36 d 2 — 7, Proclus (In Tim II 274.10-277.26) rappelle de quelle façon Théodore d'Asiné interprétait la psychogonie du 'Timée' en se fondant sur les lettres, les caractères et les nombres intervenant dans le terme grec ψυχή. Ce terme est formé de quatre lettres ψ υ χ η , ce qui permet d'associer l'âme à la τετρακτύς pythagoricienne. En outre, si on affecte à chacune de ces lettres le nombre que par ailleurs elles désignent dans la notation numérique en Grèce ancienne: ψ ' = 700, υ' = 400, χ' = 600, η' = 8, on peut, grâce à une série d'opérations, tirer toute une série de conséquences, toutes plus «merveilleuses» les unes que les autres. Enfin, dans le nom de l'âme, on trouve ce χ, auquel fait allusion Platon, lorsqu'il parle de l'inclinaison du cercle de l'Autre par rapport à celui du Même dans le 'Timée' (36 b 8). Il est impossible de savoir à quel titre Jamblique associait à ces spéculations les noms d'Amélius et de Numénius. D'ailleurs, Proclus qui nous informe de la chose ne semble pas le savoir, puisqu'il écrit: « Cependant le divin Jamblique a fustigé toute la doctrine de Théodore dans un chapitre intitulé: 'Réfutations d'Amélius et aussi de Numénius', soit qu'il fasse dépendre Théodore de ces deux-là, soit aussi qu'il ait lu quelque 63

Cf. E M I L E B R É H I E R , Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie, Paris (Picard) 1907, chap. II, p. 83-111.

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part chez ces deux-là quelque opinion semblable sur le sujet, je ne puis me prononcer là-dessus.» (In Tim II 277.26—278.1) Il semble peu vraisemblable qu'Amélius ait été, comme Théodore d'Asiné, un adepte de la gématrie 6 4 . Il n'en reste pas moins qu'il semble n'avoir pas hésité à développer certaines spéculations numérologiques. 5.1.3.2. Le domaine de l'Âme C'est en effet en se fondant sur sa structure mathématique de base, c'est-àdire sur la série des sept nombres: 1 ( = l 1 · 2 ), 2 ( = 2 1 ), 3 ( = 3 1 ), 4 ( = 2 2 ), 9 ( = 3 2 ), 8 ( = 2 3 ), 27 ( = 3 3 ), obtenus à partir d'une progression géométrique de type n 1 ' 2 (cf. Timée 35 b 4—c 2), qu'Amélius définit le domaine de l'Âme, en s'écartant alors d'une doctrine qu'aurait exposée Plotin oralement et qui aurait pu être consignée dans ses notes de cours (cf. 4.2 [p. 820—821]): « D ' a b o r d Amélius. Celui-ci, estimant que la doctrine qu'il rapporte à Plotin comme ayant été livrée en des leçons non écrites a été suffisamment réfutée par les successeurs de ce philosophe, a refusé de l'inclure dans ses vues et essaie d'exprimer d'une autre manière le présent texte (Tim 35 b 4—7). Puisque l'Âme comprend tous les êtres encosmiques, dieux, démons, hommes, animaux, Amélius dit ceci. Selon la m o n a d e , l'Âme contient toute la classe encosmique des dieux. — Il n'y a pas d'ailleurs à s'étonner si l'Âme est dite contenir des dieux, ceci soit dit du moins parce que déjà l'un des successeurs d'Amélius l'a attaqué sur ce point 6 5 : 'dieu' se dit en bien des sens, et il n'y a pas seulement le Dieu superessentiel et l'Intellect, mais encore les âmes divines et les corps divins; ces dieux-ci donc, admettons que l'Âme de l'Univers les contienne aussi enveloppant la somme du divin selon ce qu'il y a en elle monadique —. Selon la d y a d e et la t r i a d e , l'Âme contient la classe des démons. En effet, puisque les démons et sont suspendus aux dieux et prennent soin de nous, l'Âme suscite leur providence selon la dyade, elle fait s'accomplir leur conversion vers les dieux selon la triade: car, comme nous l'avons dit, la relation des démons est double, parce qu'ils sont mitoyens entre les dieux et nous. Selon la t é t r a d e et l ' e n n è a d e , l'Âme prend soin de toute la vie humaine: car celle-ci aussi est double, divisée selon le meilleur et le moins bon, et, par l'ennèade, l'Âme dispose la vie meilleure, par la tétrade, elle met en ordre la vie inférieure. Selon l ' o c t a d e et l ' e i k o s i h e p t a d e , l'Âme s'avance en général et jusqu'aux derniers êtres, elle perfec64

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Sur le sujet, cf. FRANZ DORNSEIFF, Das Alphabet in Mystik und Magie, Σ Τ Ο Ι Χ Ε Ι Α . Studien zur Geschichte des Antiken Weltbildes und der Griechischen Wissenschaft, Heft 7, Berlin/Leipzig (Teubner) 1922; et sur Théodore d'Asiné, p. 117—118. II doit s'agir de Jamblique comme le pensent JOHN DILLON (Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Piatonis Dialogos commentariorum fragmenta, Philosophia antiqua 23, Leiden [Brill] 1973, p. 333, η. 2) et CARLOS STEEL (The changing self. A study on the soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Bruxelles, 1978, p. 28, n. 21). Cf. aussi J. DILLON, Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240—325 A.D.), ci-dessous dans ce même volume ( A N R W II 3 6 , 2 ) , p . 8 6 2 - 9 0 9 .

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tionne, par l'impair, les animaux domestiqués, par le pair, les animaux sauvages: car elle dispose chaque chose par des puissances appropriées, elle ordonne partout l'inférieur par les puissances paires, et par les impaires ce qui a plus de poids et d'importance et qui a plus de rapport avec les choses divines. » (In Tim II 2 1 3 . 9 - 2 1 4 . 4 ) O n peut illustrer ce texte à l'aide du schéma suivant: = = = =

l1·2 21 3' 22

9 = 32 8 = 23

27 = 3 3

dieux: classes encosmiques dieux démons: providence ι démons démons: conversion > vie humaine: met en ordre la vie hommes inférieure vie humaine: dispose la vie meilleure derniers êtres: animaux sauvages I bêtes derniers êtres: animaux domestiques

partie rationnelle ame partie irrationnelle

Avant de tirer les conséquences d'une telle classification, il pourrait être intéressant de noter que le domaine de l'âme se subdivise ici en deux sous-domaines correspondant respectivement à la 3ème et à la 4ème hypothèses dans l'interprétation de la seconde partie du 'Parménide', qui aurait été celle d'Amélius (cf. 4.7.3 [p. 8 2 7 - 8 2 8 ] ) . Par ailleurs, il semble que les distinctions établies par Amélius entre le niveau 1 d'une part, et les niveaux 2 et 3 d'autre part n'aient pas été aussi rigoureuses que l'auraient souhaité Proclus et très probablement Jamblique, dont Proclus paraît s'inspirer dans sa critique: « M a i s nous ne louerons pas non plus ceux qui font de certains dieux des démons, comme les dieux planétaires, ainsi que le fait Amélius; mais nous en croirons Platon qui dit que les dieux sont les chefs du tout (cf. Pol 271 d 5—6; Proclus, In Tim III 312.20sq.) et place sous leur ordre les troupes des démons, et nous sauverons intégralement le discours de Diotime (cf. Banquet 202 d—203 a) qui assigne la place médiane au démonique, entre la totalité des êtres divins et les êtres mortels.» (In Aie 70.11 — 18) Dans une note à ce passage, A . PH. SEGONDS66 a raison de rapprocher ce témoignage de Proclus d'un passage du 'Commentaire sur le Timée' relatif à l'exégèse proposée par Amélius de la guerre entre l'Athènes ancienne et l'Atlantide: «Parmi ceux-ci, les uns expliquent la chose par référence aux astres fixes et aux planètes, en ce sens que les Athéniens sont considérés comme analogiques aux astres fixes, les Atlantins aux planètes, et qu'ils sont en lutte parce qu'ils tournent en sens contraire (cf. p. 845), mais que les premiers l'emportent à cause de la révolution unique du monde. D e cette opinion-ci

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Proclus, Sur 'le premier Alcibiade' de Platon, texte établi et traduit par A. PH. SEGONDS, I, Paris (Les Belles Lettres) 1985, p. 159, n. 6 de la p. 57.

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du moins est le valeureux Amélius, et il est si exagérément appliqué à montrer qu'il en est ainsi du fait que, dans le 'Critias' [113 e 7sq.], l'île Atlantide est dite clairement avoir été divisée en sept certains cercles que je ne sais si nul autre n'a jamais autant combattu cette doctrine. » (In Tim I 76.21—30) Comme le contexte de cette interprétation nous manque, il est bien difficile de savoir ce qu'a réellement voulu dire Amélius. Mais on peut penser qu'Amélius assimilait les Athéniens, mis en rapport avec les astres fixes, à des dieux, et les Atlantins, mis en rapport avec les planètes, à des démons. O r , pour un N é o platonicien, les planètes doivent être considérées, d'une façon ou d'une autre, comme des êtres divins. D'où une contradiction. 5.1.3.2.1. L'âme du monde Dans la mesure où l'on accepte l'hypothèse selon laquelle le terme Logos désigne chez lui comme chez Plotin ce pouvoir qui, trouvant sa source dans l'Intellect, permet à l'âme du monde de produire le monde sensible et d'y maintenir un ordre acceptable (cf. 5.1.3 [p. 836—837]), la doctrine d'Amélius sur l'âme du monde peut être partiellement reconstituée à partir du commentaire qu'il a proposé du Prologue de l'Évangile de saint J e a n 6 7 : «Au principe il y avait le Verbe (Λόγος), et le Verbe était tourné vers Dieu, et le Verbe était Dieu. Il était au principe avec Dieu. Tout a été fait par lui, et sans lui rien n'a été fait de ce qui a été fait. En lui était la vie, et la vie était la lumière des hommes . . . Et le Verbe s'est fait chair et il a séjourné parmi nous, et nous avons contemplé sa gloire, la gloire que, Fils unique, il tient de son Père. » (Cité par Eusèbe, Prép Évang X I 19,3) Si Eusèbe de Césarée cite le commentaire d'Amélius, c'est pour montrer que, en ce qui concerne la doctrine du Logos, Platon a été devancé par les « Sages Hé-

67

Dans cette section j'ai généralement suivi HEINRICH DÖRRIE, Une exégèse néoplatonicienne du Prologue de l'Evangile de saint Jean (Amélius chez Eusèbe Prép. év. 11, 19, 1—4), publié d'abord dans: Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou, pubi, par JEAN FONTAINE et CHARLES KANNENGIESSER, Paris (Beauchesne) 1972, p. 75—87; et repris dans: HEINRICH DÖRRIE, Platonica minora, Studia et Testimonia Antiqua 8, München (Fink) 1976, p. 4 9 1 - 5 0 7 . Il est à noter que Théodoret de Cyr (396—466), dans sa 'Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques' (II 87—89) et Cyrille d'Alexandrie (mort en 444), dans son 'Contre Julien' (P.G. 76, 936 a—b, témoignage non recensé par ZOUMPOS) citent pratiquement le même texte que celui cité par Eusèbe de Césarée (Prép Évang X I 19, 1). Par ailleurs, Basile de Césarée (330—379), fait allusion à l'exégèse d'Amélius dans son 'Homélie sur 'Au commencement était le Verbe" (P.G. 31, 472c, cf. l'Introduction à Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, Livre V, texte établi et traduit par H . D. SAFFREY et L. G. WESTERINK, 1987, p. L X I I — LXIII). Enfin, comme le note H . DÖRRIE (art. qui vient d'être cité, p. 75 ou 491), peu avant l'époque de saint Augustin (Civ. Dei 10, 29), un Platonicien demandait que les premières phrases de l'Évangile de saint Jean fussent gravées en lettres d'or dans toutes les Églises, de façon à détourner les Chrétiens de leur 'superstition' pour les amener à la vénération du vrai Logos sûrement.

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breux». En cela, Eusèbe suit Numénius, alors considéré comme l'autorité suprême en matière de Platonisme qui, dans son 'Περί τάγαθοϋ', aurait écrit: «Qu'est-ce en effet que Platon, sinon un Moïse qui parle grec? (Τί γαρ έστι Πλάτων ή Μωσής άττικίζων;)» (Prép Évang X I 10,14 = frag. 8 DES PLACES): « Q u a n t à Platon, qu'il ne soit pas le premier adepte de cette doctrine, mais a été devancé par les Sages hébreux, l'exposé l'a prouvé; et c'est à juste titre qu'Amélius, lui qui s'est illustré parmi les philosophes récents et qui est aussi un partisan zélé s'il en fut de la philosophie platonicienne, même s'il n'a pas jugé bon de citer par son nom Jean l'Évangéliste quand il désignait du nom de Barbare le théologien hébreu, se porte néanmoins garant de ses expressions, en écrivant mot pour mot ce qui suit: 'Et c'était donc le Verbe, l'être éternel aurait dit Héraclite, par lequel naissaient les êtres du devenir, celui-là aussi, par Zeus, dont le Barbare dit que, placé dans le rang et la dignité de principe, il est tourné vers Dieu, il est Dieu; que par lui absolument tout est entré dans l'existence; qu'en lui le devenir a été fait vivant, vie, être; qu'il descend dans les corps, que revêtant la chair il prend apparence d'homme, montrant ainsi la grandeur de la nature; évidemment aussi qu'une fois détruit, il est à nouveau divinisé et Dieu, tel qu'il était avant de descendre dans le corps, la chair, l'homme'. » (Eusèbe, Prép Évang X I 18, 26 — 19, 1) Pour Amélius, le Verbe (Λόγος), dont parle saint Jean, doit donc être identifié à l'âme du monde, telle qu'elle est décrite dans le T i m é e ' de Platon. Reprenons membre de phrase par membre de phrase ce commentaire néoplatonicien au Prologue de l'Évangile de saint Jean, pour tenter de voir comment Amélius conçoit la nature et la fonction de l'âme du monde. Καί ούτος άρα ήν ό λόγος καθ' ôv αίεί όντα τα γινόμενα έγίνετο, . . . Étant identique à l'âme du monde, le Verbe (Λόγος) est la cause ultime de ce monde, sa cause exemplaire (καθ' öv). ώς αν και ó 'Ηράκλειτος άξιώσειε . . . En bon connaisseur de la philosophie grecque, Amélius fait tout naturellement remonter cette doctrine du Verbe (Λόγος) à Héraclite ( D K 22 Β 1). και νή Δ ι ' ôv ó βάρβαρος άξιοι έν τη της άρχής τάξει τε καί άξίςι καθεστηκότα . . . Si on identifie Verbe (Λόγος) et âme du monde, il faut donner au Verbe le rang et la dignité de principe. Par suite, le terme άρχή ne peut plus désigner un 'commencement' temporel; il doit être interprété dans un sens exclusivement causal. De là suit, comme corollaire, qu'on ne parle plus d'un événement dramatique où serait impliqué un individu, le Fils de Dieu, le Christ, mais d'une entité générique, l'âme du monde, qui s'insère à la place qui est la sienne dans un système dont la hiérarchie est pré-déterminée. προς θεόν είναι και θεόν είναι" . . . En tant qu'âme du monde, le Verbe (Λόγος) peut être appelé « D i e u » ; mais, en tant qu'il est orienté vers le Dieu supérieur dont il tire son origine, c'est-à-dire l'Intellect, on peut le dire en relation avec Dieu.

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δ ι ' ού πάνθ' άπλώς γεγενήσθαι· . . . Puisque l'âme du monde est l'instrument de l'Intellect en général, et du troisième intellect démiurgique en particulier, le Verbe (Λόγος) peut aussi être considéré comme la cause efficiente (δι' ού) de ce monde. εν φ το γενόμενον ζών και ζωήν και öv π ε φ υ κ έ ν α ι ' . . . Alors que, pour les Stoïciens, le L o g o s a une fonction purement biologique en distribuant ses λόγοι σπερματικοί, l'âme du monde des Néo-platoniciens n'est pas seulement dispensatrice de Vie. Parce qu'elle émane de l'Être, le monde du devenir (το γενόμενον), qui vient à l'être à partir d'elle, se trouve en elle sous le mode de l'être (το öv). Par suite, le Verbe (Λόγος) peut enfin être considéré comme la cause matérielle (εν ω) de ce monde. Cette triade de principes platoniciens: forme (καθ' öv), agent (δι' ού) et matière (έν φ ) ressortit moins au Néo-platonisme qu'au Médio-platonisme (cf. Albinus, Epit V i l i — I X ) , et s'inspire d'une lecture du 'Tirnée' (έν ώ: 49 e 7, 50 d 6, 52 b 4; δ ι ' ο ύ : 41 a 7; καθ' öv: 41 a 4, 51 c 1, d 4). και είς τα σώματα π ί π τ ε ι ν καί σάρκα ένδυσάμενον φαντάζεσθαι ανθρωπον . . . À partir de là, Amélius ne peut qu'être en désaccord avec saint Jean. Pour un Platonicien comme lui, le Logos ne peut s'individualiser dans la chair d'un être humain, car, dans la mesure où tous les êtres humains en participent, il ne peut être réservé à un individu. Voilà d'ailleurs le problème qu'essaie de tourner l'expression φαντάζεσθαι άνθρωπον. U n e telle expression laisse entendre que le Logos, c'est-à-dire le Christ, le Fils de Dieu, ne s'est pas réellement incarné, qu'il n'a pris que l'apparence d'un homme. Dans cette perspective, le Christ incarné serait un Christ resté Dieu, tel que se le représente le Docétisme 6 8 . D ' o ù l'hypothèse que j'ai proposée (cf. 4.5 [p. 824]), suivant laquelle cette exégèse appartiendrait à la réfutation de 'l'Apocalypse' de Zostrien faite par Amélius à la demande de Plotin dans le cadre de la polémique de l'Ecole contre les Gnostiques. μετά του καί τηνικαϋτα δ ε ι κ ν ύ ε ι ν της φύσεως το μ ε γ α λ ε ϊ ο ν . . . L'âme du monde descend dans les corps pour montrer la grandeur de la nature. Rien, dans le Prologue de l'Évangile de saint Jean, ne correspond bien évidemment à une telle affirmation qui, en revanche, fait apparaître l'incompatibilité radicale du Christianisme et du Platonisme. Pour un Platonicien, toute notion de grâce doit être écartée: l'opération du Logos qui se propage à travers toute la nature peut, en quelque sorte, être déduite nécessairement d'une analyse de ce qu'est l'âme du monde. άμέλει καί άναλυθέντα πάλιν άποθεοϋσθαι καί θεόν είναι, . . . Tout comme le membre de phrase précédent occultait l'Incarnation du Christ, celui-ci annule le mystère de la Rédemption et de la Résurrection. Suivant l'interprétation proposée plus haut, il est tout à fait logique que le Logos, une fois délié, libéré

68

Sur le Docétisme et ses références à l'Évangile de Jean, cf. SIMONE PÉTREMENT, Le Dieu séparé. Les origines du Gnosticisme, Paris (Cerf) 1984, p. 207—224.

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de ses obligations naturelles, se divinise et redevienne Dieu au terme d'un processus cyclique pratiquement automatique qui mène à 1'άποκατάστασις. οιος ήν προ του εις το σώμα καί την σάρκα και τον άνθρωπον καταχθήναι. Ce dernier membre de phrase conclut en résumant ce qui vient d'être dit. Ce que l'Évangile de saint Jean présente sous forme d'un drame: l'Incarnation du Fils de Dieu pour racheter les hommes, sa Mort sur la Croix et sa Résurrection, il faut l'interpréter comme un processus cyclique de type πρόοδος—επιστροφή qui se déroule de façon pratiquement automatique dans un système parfaitement clos et fortement hiérarchisé. Et, dans ce contexte, il n'y a bien évidemment aucune place pour la notion de grâce.

5.1.3.2.2. Les âmes particulières La plupart de nos renseignements sur les positions d'Amélius concernant les âmes particulières viennent du 'Περί ψυχής' de Jamblique cité par Stobée 69 . Les âmes particulières ne sont pas distinctes de l'âme universelle (Stobée, Eel I 372.9—12 et 2 3 - 2 6 ) ; bien plus, elles ressortissent à cette substance incorporelle qui est celle du monde intelligible, des dieux, des démons, du Bien et de toutes les réalités supérieures (Stobée, Eel I 365.7—17). D'ailleurs, l'harmonie qu'établissent, en l'âme, médiétés et conjonctions se fonde sur une harmonie intelligible pré-existante (Stobée, Eel I 364.25—365.2) que l'âme doit apprendre à percevoir. Mais cette essence de l'âme qu'il considère comme numériquement une, Amélius la plurifie au moyen de positions et de degrés (σχέσεσι και κατατάξεσιν, cf. Stobée, Eel I 376.2—4), d'où cette hiérarchie psychique qu'évoque Proclus dans son 'Commentaire sur le Timée' (cf. supra, p. 838—839). Par suite, à la question: «Sommes-nous tout entiers dans chacun de nos actes?» Amélius non seulement répond affirmativement (Stobée, Eel I 372.9—12), mais se voit forcé d'ajouter cette précision: puisqu'elle est, de quelque façon, présente dans toutes les âmes particulières, l'âme universelle est totalement présente dans chacune des activités de n'importe quel vivant particulier (Stobée, Eel I 372. 23—26). Sur tous ces points, Amélius se montre fidèle à la doctrine de Plotin (Enn IV 3 [27], 1 - 8 ; IV 9 [8]). C'est à partir de l'âme du monde qu'Amélius fait passer les âmes dans les corps, toutes sur un pied d'égalité (Stobée, Eel I 377.13 — 15). Cette descente, Amélius en donne une description qui découle d'une exégèse du passage sur le «nombre nuptial» au livre VIII de la 'République' (545e—546c) de Platon:

69

La plus grande partie du 'Περί ψ υ χ ή ς ' de Jamblique nous a été conservée par Stobée (Ecl I 362.33—458.22 WACHSMUTH); ce long extrait de Stobée a été traduit par A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE dans: La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, t. III: Les doctrines de l'âme, Paris (Gabalda) 1953, Appendice I, p. 177—248, cf. aussi la note complémentaire III, p. 252 — 257. Pour un exposé de la doctrine de Jamblique sur l'âme, cf. CARLOS G. STEEL, The changing self. A study o n the Soul in later N e o p l a t o n i s m : Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Bruxelles, 1978, Part I, p. 2 1 - 7 5 .

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«Amélius dit que la doctrine ici exprimée concerne les descentes des âmes. Quand elle reste en haut en effet, l'âme est toutes choses sous forme monadique et sous forme cyclique, sous forme monadique en tant qu'elle contient une pluralité de rapports (λόγοι), sous forme cyclique en tant qu'elle est continue et unie avec elle-même et convertie vers elle-même. Quand elle descend, elle engendre un nombre et un triangle. En tant qu'elle s'écoule comme à partir de sa monade, elle produit le premier nombre le t r o i s — car le d e u x consiste dans l'écoulement lui-même en tant qu'elle prend une position, elle produit la verticale, tombe ainsi dans la sphère des fixes, et dans la partie de cette sphère qu'est le cercle oblique du zodiaque — car ce cercle est le point de départ de la génération — ; puis, après avoir produit la verticale qui correspond au nombre trois, elle traverse l'étendue dans laquelle elle est tombée, comme si elle était mue horizontalement, et produit ainsi, correspondant au nombre q u a t r e , l'autre des côtés qui entourent l'angle droit; enfin, comme elle désire d'avoir un dedans, elle produit l'hypoténuse en tant que, sans se quitter elle-même, elle se tourne de nouveau vers le point de départ de la verticale. » (In Remp II 31.22—32.9) Voici une première figure susceptible d'illustrer cette exégèse qui se fonde sur la τετρακτύς (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10), 'symbole' qui joue un rôle si important dans la tradition [néo]-pythagoricienne 70 .

70

Sur la τετρακτύς pythagoricienne et le rôle qu'elle joua dans la tradition philosophique, cf. WALTER BURKERT, Lore and science in ancient Pythagoreanism, transi, from the German by EDWIN L. MINAR JR., Cambridge (Mass.) (Harvard University Press) 1972, p. 72sq. (cf. ID., Weisheit und Wissenschaft. Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Piaton, Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwiss. 10, Nürnberg 1962, p. 63 sq.).

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Mais il faut aller encore plus loin en situant cette figure à l'intérieur d'une construction plus complexe représentant la structure et le mouvement de l'âme du monde dans le 'Timée' 7 1 .

Remarques — — —

— —

A B est un diamètre du Tropique du Cancer C D est un diamètre du Tropique du Capricorne Le mouvement du Même est le mouvement de la sphère dans son ensemble de la gauche ( = de l'Est) vers la droite ( = vers l'Ouest dans le plan de l'Equateur ( = EF) le mouvement de l'Autre se fait en sens inverse dans le plan de la diagonale C B , qui constitue le diamètre de l'Écliptique. Dans ce contexte, le Zodiaque peut être représenté par une large bande, où se succèdent les 12 signes formant un anneau qui a pour centre celui de l'Écliptique, dont par ailleurs elle suit la circonférence.

Bref le parcours d'une existence humaine peut être ainsi décrit. Avant son incarnation, l'âme effectue des révolutions sur la sphère des fixes qui correspond au cercle du Même. Puis elle tombe dans le Zodiaque — lequel correspond au cercle de l'Autre —, puisque c'est à partir du Zodiaque que s'effectue l'incarnation. La vie terrestre de l'homme correspond à une droite, conçue comme le grand côté de l'angle droit d'un triangle rectangle ( C A B ou B D C ) , dont le petit côté représente l'incarnation. Et la remontée de l'âme après la mort vers son point de départ s'effectue le long de l'hypoténuse du triangle rectangle en question.

71

L'illustration s'inspire de celle proposée par F. M. CORNFORD, Plato's cosmology. The T i m a e u s ' of Plato translated with a running commentary, London (Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1937, p. 7 3 - 7 4 .

57 ANRW II 36.2

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La chose semble confirmée par ces considérations d'ordre astrologique: «Après avoir ainsi constitué le triangle, Amélius juge bon d'établir que, sous la présidence des Chefs de la cité, l'on commence à procréer au Capricorne. Les autres vivants en effet et les plantes, c'est la Nature qui les meut à engendrer; mais, quant aux hommes, il faut que ce soit la raison, laquelle voit le bon moment, qui les pousse à procréer comme il se doit. O r , en tant qu'il marque le point de départ de la remontée de la lumière solaire, le Capricorne est propre à la conception, et, à partir de lui, le groupe des trois signes Capricorne, Verseau, Poissons est égal à la verticale. Il dit que le temps le plus adapté à la grossesse est depuis les Poissons, en tant qu'ils sont féconds, dans les quatre signes suivants, Bélier, Taureau, Gémeaux, Cancer — c'est dans ces signes en effet que la terre fait le moins paraître la force fécondante qui est en elle —, et que le temps de la naissance est dans les autres signes. Les grossesses de sept mois, dit-il, s'achèvent au Lion — car les sept mois prennent quelque chose en outre du signe qui suit — et elles donnent un bon fruit. Les grossesses de huit mois s'achèvent à la Vierge, et ne donnent pas de fruit à cause de la Vierge; les grossesses de neuf mois s'achèvent à la Balance et donnent un bon fruit. » (In Remp II 32. 10-25) Ces considérations astrologiques doivent être reportées sur le triangle rectangle de la p. 844. i'tt

rSa

Capricorne Verseau Poissons

Bélier

Taureau

Gémeaux

Cancer

Comme le signale A. J . FESTUGIÈRE dans une note à sa traduction de ce passage, on trouve des parallèles entre ce témoignage de Proclus sur Amélius et ce qu'enseignent certains astrologues de l'époque, et notamment Vettius Valens (Ilème siècle), sur les qualités des signes mentionnés. Cela dit, l'ensemble de cette doctrine semble avoir été inspiré à Amélius par Numénius (frag. 31—35 DES PLACES) et p a r C r o n i u s (cf. N u m é n i u s , f r a g . 31 DES PLACES).

Q u o i qu'il en soit, Amélius, en Platonicien orthodoxe, croyait en une métensomatose s'insérant dans le cadre d'un système de rétribution: «Plotin et Harpocration, Amélius et Boéthus et Numénius, ont trouvé le milan chez Platon et le transmettent milan; pour eux son loup reste un loup, son âne un âne, le singe n'est rien d'autre que singe et le cygne rien d'autre que cygne; selon eux, en effet, avant même d'entrer dans le corps l'âme peut

A M É L I U S : SA V I E , S O N Œ U V R E ,

SA D O C T R I N E ,

s'infecter de perversité et se rendre s e m b l a b l e t o u t cas, quel q u e soit le vivant auquel l'âme revêtu l'aspect, elle se c o m p o r t e à s o n image. » p. 1 2 B O I S S O N A D E = p. 1 2 . 5 — 1 1 C O L O N N A =

S O N STYLE

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aux animaux sans raison; en s'est assimilée et d o n t elle a ( E n é e de G a z a , T h é o p h r a s t e , N u m é n i u s , frag. 4 9 DES P L A -

CES)72

À la d i f f é r e n c e de P o r p h y r e et de J a m b l i q u e , A m é l i u s , qui suivait sur ce p o i n t P l a t o n ( T i m 4 2 a — b ) et P l o t i n (cf. n. 72) dans u n p r e m i e r t e m p s d u m o i n s , croyait que l'âme de l ' h o m m e , d o u é e d ' u n e partie rationnelle, p o u v a i t s'incarner m ê m e dans des corps d ' a n i m a u x , d o n t , en principe, l'âme est d é p o u r v u e de t o u t e rationalité. Par ailleurs, puisqu'il a d m e t q u e les f o r m e s intelligibles s o n t en n o m b r e infini, A m é l i u s s e m b l e avoir admis q u e l'âme h u m a i n e p o u v a i t se libérer de f a ç o n définitive d u c y c l e des réincarnations 7 3 .

5 . 1 . 4 . Le c o r p s d u m o n d e C o m m e o n l'a v u p l u s haut, c'est le t r o i s i è m e d é m i u r g e qui place l'Intellect dans l ' Â m e et l ' Â m e dans le C o r p s d u m o n d e (In T i m I 3 9 8 . 2 5 — 2 6 ) . À ce niveau,

72

Énée de Gaza, un disciple de Hiéroclès, le Néo-platonicien d'Alexandrie (cf. Annexe 2 [p. 859]), passa la plus grande partie de son existence à Gaza, où il fut professeur de rhétorique; il s'efforça de concilier sa foi chrétienne avec la pensée de Platon. Dans son 'Théophraste' ou 'Sur l'immortalité de l'âme et la résurrection du corps', dialogue dont les interlocuteurs sont un Égyptien d'Alexandrie, Théophraste d'Athènes et Euxithéos de Syrie, Énée rejette la doctrine platonicienne de l'âme et essaie d'élaborer une nouvelle doctrine fondée sur celles d'Aristote et de Grégoire de Nysse sur l'âme. Dans la première phrase de la réplique de Théophraste ici citée, je lis Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς και Βοηθός, comme le conjecture BARTH (éd. 1655) et non άμελει καί Βοηθός, qui se trouve dans tous les manuscrits et qu'impriment BARTH (éd. 1655), BOISSONADE (éd. 1836) et COLONNA (éd. 1958). Ce Boéthus doit être celui contre lequel Porphyre a écrit son Ή ε ρ ί ψυχής (cf. RE III [1899], s.v. Boëthos 8), 603 [VON ARNIM]). Ce texte est truffé d'allusions à Platon et se termine sur une référence à Plotin. Les textes platoniciens évoqués par Énée de Gaza sont le 'Phédon' (81e—82 a) et la 'République' (VIII 566a; X 620a—c). L'expression κακίας έμπίμπλασθαι est empruntée aux 'Lois' (I 641 c 5; cf. aussi Phédon 66 c 3, 67 a 5). Enfin, la dernière phrase reprend les propres termes de Plotin à la fin de Enn IV 3 [27], 12.38—39: εκεί γάρ, φ αν όμοιωθεϊσα ή, φέρεται, ή μέν εις άνθρωπον, ή δέ εις ζωον άλλη άλλο. Toutefois, dans son avantdernier traité, Plotin semble avoir changé d'avis, qui déclare: «Et les bêtes? En quel sens ont-elles la vie? — S'il y a en elles, comme on dit, des âmes humaines qui ont péché, la partie supérieure et séparée de ces âmes ne vient jamais jusqu'aux bêtes; elle les assiste, sans leur être présente; leur conscience atteint seulement le reflet de l'âme qui est uni au corps; et leur corps reçoit ses qualités de ce reflet de l'âme. Si ce n'est point une âme humaine qui s'est introduite dans les bêtes, leur vie est alors issue de l'illumination du corps par l'âme universelle» (Enn I 1 [53], 11.8 — 15, trad, de É. BRÉHIER). C'est là une position qui se rapproche de celle des Néo-platoniciens postérieurs (cf. sur le sujet, H . DÖRRIE, art. cité dans la note qui suit). Cela dit, son monopsychisme permettait à Amélius de soutenir la position platonicienne traditionnelle sans trop de problèmes.

73

Sur le sujet, cf. HEINRICH DÖRRIE, Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Piatonismus, Hermes 85, 1957, p. 414-435; repris dans: ID., Platonica Minora, 1976, p. 420-440.

57:>

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nous n'avons plus aucune information sur la position d'Amélius, à l'exception du témoignage de Proclus sur l'exégèse proposée par Amélius du θείω γεννητφ de Rép III 546 b 3: «Amélius a interprété de façon bien bizarre (ότι παραδόξως) 'Engendré divin'. Il n'y voit pas, comme tous, le Cosmos ou le Ciel, mais, bien qu'il ait nommé 'dieu' tout l'Intelligible, 'divin' tout le céleste, il dit que, par 'Engendré divin', a été désigné tout le monde subcéleste, car il a pris 'engendré' au sens propre. » (In Remp II 30.6 — 10) De ce témoignage, on peut déduire cette hiérarchie ontologique: dieu (θεόν) tout l'intelligible (το νοητόν) divin (θείον) tout le céleste (το ούράνιον) engendré divin (θείον γεννητόν) tout le monde subcéleste (το ύπουράνιον) Une telle interprétation laisse percer une influence aristotélicienne. Dans le 'De Cáelo' (I 3, 270 a 12—23) en effet, Aristote soutient que ce qui se meut circulairement, c'est-à-dire le Ciel au sens strict, ne peut, parce qu'il est quelque chose de divin (τι θείον), être engendré; or, comme ce qui est engendré est nécessairement corruptible, il ne peut y avoir de génération que dans le monde subcéleste (De Caelo III l s q . ) . Il s'agit là d'une critique d'une interprétation du 'Timée', suivant laquelle la création du cosmos se serait déroulée dans le temps (De Caelo I 10, 279 b 17—280 a 11). Pour éviter cette interprétation du 'Timée', tout en reconnaissant que le κόσμος dans son entier est γενητός, on doit donner à cet adjectif un sens purement causal, comme le fait d'ailleurs Proclus. Etant donné l'absence de contexte, il est bien difficile de savoir comment Amélius interprétait vraiment le θείω γεννητφ de Rép III 546 b 3. Mais on peut penser qu'un néoplatonicien comme Amélius ne pouvait soutenir la thèse suivant laquelle le monde n'était pas éternel. Cela dit, Syrianus explique comment Amélius concevait la participation des choses sensibles à l'Intelligible, et cela jusqu'aux limites du sensible, c'est-àdire jusqu'à la matière: « Il n'y a rien d'absurde à ce que les dernières de toutes les choses participent de celles qui les précèdent, même si, selon le très renommé Amélius, elles sont dites d'abord participer à proprement parler des logoi de la nature, ensuite recevoir les reflets des formes de l'âme, et enfin ressembler plutôt aux causes intelligibles elles-mêmes.» (In Met, p. 119.12 — 15) Bref, la matière participe des logoi que recèle la nature, et qui viennent de l'âme, laquelle reçoit, sous ce mode, les formes intelligibles qui ressortissent à l'Intellect (5.1.3 [p. 8 3 6 - 8 3 7 ] ) . Dans cette perspective, un Platonicien comme Amélius est forcé de rejeter l'idée que les choses sensibles sont, par elles-mêmes, dotées de réalité: « Bref, ceux qui admettent que les sensibles existent et qu'ils existent réellement rendent à leur insu l'âme plus vile que la matière, comme le dit aussi quelque part le valeureux Amélius.» (In Met, p. 88.32—34)

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Cette ré-affirmation de la pré-éminence de l'âme, qui se veut une allusion au Timée' (34c), ne se conçoit que dans le cadre de cette hiérarchie ontologique où chaque niveau de réalité participe de celui qui le précède:

Intellects

celui qui est celui qui a celui qui voit

est l'Intelligible participe à l'Intelligible voit l'Intelligible

Âme

recèle l'Intelligible sous forme de logoi

Nature

reçoit les logoi de l'Âme

Matière

participe aux logoi de la Nature

Il n'y a rien là qui s'écarte sensiblement de la doctrine plotinienne, que reprendront, sous une forme ou sous une autre, les Néo-platoniciens postérieurs.

5.2. Éthique Proclus et Damascius nous ont conservé des témoignages relatifs à certaines positions d'Amélius dans le domaine de l'éthique. 5.2.1. Fatalité et libre arbitre En ce domaine, le témoignage le plus intéressant est certainement cette exégèse du terme σοφοί en Rép VIII 546 a 8, où sont mises en rapport éthique, épistémologie et cosmologie: «Amélius, qui a dit à merveille (ότι δαιμονίως) que la vertu est double, l'une ayant vigueur au-dedans comme la contemplation, l'autre au-dehors comme la vertu pratique, dit que d'une part les Gardiens ont été nommés 'sages' (546 a 8) à cause de la contemplation, et que d'autre part, quand ils commettent des erreurs dans leurs activités pratiques, c'est parce qu'ils joignent au calcul la sensation, qui est un critère incertain. 'Par la contemplation', dit-il, 'les Gardiens sont sur le même plan que la Fatalité, mais, par la vertu pratique, ils vivent en liaison avec elle et entrelacent avec elle notre libre arbitre. Et de même que le libre arbitre n'agit pas ad extra sans la Fatalité, de même, en bien des cas, la Fatalité non plus sans le libre arbitre: car celui-ci est lui aussi une partie du Cosmos; quant à la Fatalité, elle est une concaténation des causes partielles et universelles'. Selon Amélius donc, Platon combine avec la révolution céleste la causalité due au libre arbitre. Et comme on traitait ici de 'Sages', c'est aux activités pratiques de ces sages qu'il rapporte l'échec, à ces activités non pas dirigées par le raisonnement, mais par la sensation. Le raisonnement sans doute avait été éduqué en eux, mais non la sensation — car elle n'est pas naturellement disposée à l'être —, et ainsi elle produit un acte moins bon que ce qui convenait, à cause du manque de certitude et de clarté des sens. » (In Remp II 29.5-22)

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En parlant de la vertu contemplative et de la vertu pratique, Amélius reprend une distinction explicitée par Aristote ( E N I 3, 1103sq. et E E II 1, 1220 a 5sq.), mais esquissée par Platon (cf. le commentaire de GAUTHIER—JOLIF à E N I 13, 1103 a 3-10). La vertu contemplative doit être située du côté du raisonnement, et la vertu pratique du côté de la sensation. C'est d'ailleurs par ce biais qu'Amélius arrive à rendre compte de cette apparente contradiction: les gardiens, même s'ils sont déclarés «sages», peuvent commettre des erreurs. Comme leur raisonnement a été éduqué, on peut les dire «sages»; mais, comme, dans leurs activités pratiques, ils joignent au raisonnement la sensation qui, par nature, ne peut être éduquée et qui, de ce fait, constitue un criterium de vérité incertain, ils sont susceptibles de se tromper. Encore faut-il échapper au déterminisme universel. Reprenant là une doctrine stoïcienne, Amélius maintient qu'il n'y a pas de mouvement sans cause. Cela admis, il distingue deux types de causalité: une causalité extérieure et antécédente, celle de la Fatalité (ή Ειμαρμένη), qui se manifeste en priorité dans le mouvement des corps célestes, et une causalité intérieure, celle du libre arbitre (το έφ' ήμϊν). Distinctes, ces deux types de causalité ne sont pourtant pas irréductibles. Une intervention du libre arbitre sur des réalités extérieures n'est possible que si elle s'inscrit dans une chaîne de causes ressortissant à la Fatalité. Pour sa part, la Fatalité englobe le libre arbitre, puisque d'une part tout individu n'est qu'une partie de ce tout qu'est l'Univers, et que de l'autre la Fatalité peut être définie comme «une concaténation des causes partielles et universelles», définition typiquement stoïcienne (cf. SVF II n os 9 1 7 - 9 2 0 ) . Bref, pour rendre compte de la possibilité de l'erreur, Amélius fait intervenir deux éléments: (1) une causalité, celle du libre arbitre, qui, sans être dissociée de celle de la Fatalité, en est cependant distincte; (2) et l'intervention en l'homme, au niveau de ses activités pratiques, de la sensation, qui, contrairement au raisonnement, ne constitue pas un criterium de vérité absolument sûr. Aussi, lorsqu'il déclare «qu'il n'y a rien d'étonnant à ce que la vertu soit sans maître» (In Remp II 276.1), Amélius parle-t-il forcément de la «vertu pratique», celle où intervient le libre arbitre. Une fois de plus, on peut mesurer l'importance de l'influence du Stoïcisme sur un Amélius qui cependant reste avant tout un commentateur de Platon.

5.2.2. Le plaisir Par ailleurs Damascius nous a conservé deux témoignages sur la position d'Amélius relative aux plaisirs. Pour Amélius, des plaisirs peuvent être dits contraires, dès là qu'ils résultent de causes contraires (Damascius, In Phil § 29). Quoi qu'il en soit, Amélius se monter très sévère à l'endroit sinon du plaisir physique dans son ensemble, du moins du plaisir cinétique: « O n doit absolument rejeter comme indigne le plaisir cinétique, comme le dit Amélius avec une emphase tragique (ώς Άμέλιος έκτραγωδεΐ), s'il est vrai que le choc qu'il provoque écarte la sagesse, entrave l'opération de la

AMÉLIUS: SA VIE, SON ŒUVRE, SA DOCTRINE, SON STYLE

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raison en général et détruit même, peut-on dire, l'être; qu'il force à bondir et à crier, non comme des hommes, mais comme des bêtes: si on se représente une ville entière ainsi affectée, cette ville ne serait-elle pas au comble du malheur, en se comportant comme si elle était chatouillée et comme si elle émettait les cris de plaisir de ceux qui sont chatouillés; si (ce plaisir) ressemble à un état d'assoupissement et d'impuissance — car le plaisir est un relâchement (χύσις γαρ ή ήδονή) —, qu'y a-t-il de grand là-dedans? si le plaisir est quelque chose que nous avons en commun avec les animaux dépourvus de raison, qu'offre-t-il d'admirable? s'il ne nous donne même pas le moyen de porter un jugement sur lui, s'il rend notre jugement aveugle, on ne sait même pas si c'est un bien; bien plutôt, le plaisir semble s'esquiver devant l'accusation d'infamie.» (In Phil § 152) Pour bien comprendre ce témoignage, il faut rappeler la doctrine épicurienne du plaisir, à laquelle s'attaque ici Amélius. Dans son écrit 'Sur les passions', dont Galien cite de longs extraits dans son traité 'Sur les dogmes d'Hippocrate et de Platon', Chrysippe se pose notamment la question suivante sur la nature des passions: sont-elles des jugements ou des phénomènes accompagnant le jugement? Selon Galien, la première réponse serait celle de Chrysippe, alors que la seconde aurait été faite par Zénon et par Epicure: «Dans ces définitions bien évidemment, il s'imagine que les passions sont des tendances, des opinions et des jugements; mais dans certaines des définitions qui suivent immédiatement celles-là, il écrit des choses qui viennent d'Épicure et de Zénon plutôt que des choses qui découlent de doctrines qui sont les siennes. En effet, en définissant la douleur, il déclare que c'est une contraction devant ce qui paraît être quelque chose à éviter, et (,en définissant) le plaisir, (il déclare que c'est) une expansion vers ce qui paraît quelque chose à rechercher. Et, en fait, contractions et expansions, resserrements et relâchements (καί αί συστολαί και αϊ διαχύσεις) - car quelquefois il fait mention de ces termes — sont des affections de la puissance irrationnelle qui accompagnent les opinions (της άλογου δυνάμεως έστι παθήματα ταΐς δόξαις έπιγιγνόμενα). Or, telle est la nature des passions selon Epicure et Zénon, et non pas selon Chrysippe. » (De Hipp, et Plat. dogm. IV 2, 4—6, t. I, p. 2 4 0 . 1 - 9 DE LACY [CMG V 4, 1, 2 , Berlin 1981 2 ] = Epicurea, frag. 410 USENER; cf. aussi De Hipp, et Plat. dogm. IV 3, 2 - 3 , t. I, p. 2 4 6 . 3 8 2 4 8 . 3 DE LACY et ibid. V 1, 4 - 5 , t. I, p. 2 9 2 . 1 8 - 2 0 DE LACY = SVF III, nos 4 6 2 - 4 6 3 . Cf. aussi Proclus, In Tim III 2 8 7 . 2 0 - 2 1 ) Bref, pour Epicure comme pour Zénon, le plaisir peut être ramené à un relâchement de la partie désirante de l'âme; irrationnel, il n'est donc pas de l'ordre du jugement. Voilà les points de doctrine auxquels s'attaque la seconde partie du témoignage de Damascius (In Phil § 152.7—11). Pour sa part, la première partie (In Phil § 152.1—7) s'en prend à un type de plaisir particulier: le plaisir cinétique. Epicure, en effet, distingue deux sortes de plaisir: le plaisir catastématique (καταστηματική) ou en repos, celui qui résulte

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d'un état de complète absence de douleur (άπονία) et de trouble (άταραξία), et le plaisir cinétique ou en mouvement (έν κινήσει ou κατά κίνησιν): « L'absence de trouble et l'absence de douleur sont des plaisirs catastématiques, au contraire la joie et la gaieté sont regardées pour leur activité (ένεργείςι) comme des plaisirs cinétiques. » (Diogène Laërce X 136) Ce en quoi d'ailleurs Épicure diffère des Cyrénaïques: «Car ceux-ci ( = les Cyrénaïques) n'admettent pas le plaisir catastématique, mais seulement le plaisir cinétique. Lui ( = Épicure), au contraire, admet les deux, pour l'âme et pour le corps. » (Diogène Laërce X 136) D ' o ù cette double dichotomie: du corps, ex. le plaisir de boire en mouvement de l'âme, ex. la joie du corps, ex. absence de douleur

plaisir en repos

de l'âme, ex. absence de trouble Mais quelle place Épicure accordait-il dans son système au plaisir cinétique? À la fin d'un article où il essaie de répondre à cette question, GABRIELE G I A N N A N TONI74, qui vient de mettre en rapport le système des plaisirs avec celui des désirs conclut: «Ainsi, le système des plaisirs devient parfaitement symétrique à celui des désirs: le plaisir catastématique est celui qui satisfait les désirs naturels et nécessaires; le plaisir cinétique est celui qui satisfait les désirs naturels mais non nécessaires; les désirs ni naturels ni nécessaires ne peuvent être satisfaits puisqu'ils naissent de κενοδοξία et pour cette raison sont αόριστοι ou, comme l'explique Sénèque, infinitae . . . et quo magis implentur et magis inexplebiles; par conséquent, comme il n'est pas possible de les satisfaire, ils n'engendrent pas le plaisir. » Mais il faut rappeler que, dans son ensemble, cette attaque d'Amélius contre Épicure, qui passe par une dénonciation du plaisir cinétique, s'inspire du Thilèbe' ( 4 6 a - 4 7 b ) . Cela dit, la remarque liminaire de Damascius sur 1'«emphase tragique» d'Amélius m'amène à aborder la question du style sur un plan général.

6. Style

Dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', Longin porte un jugement très sévère sur le style d'Amélius: 74

GABRIELE GIANNANTONI, Le plaisir cinétique dans l'éthique d'Épicure, dans: Histoire et structure. À la mémoire de Victor Goldschmidt, Paris (Vrin) 1985, p. 213—227, p. 223.

A M É L I U S : SA VIE, S O N Œ U V R E , SA D O C T R I N E , S O N STYLE

853

«. . . il (= Amélius) est long dans le développement et par la prolixité de son expression il est entraîné vers un style opposé à celui de Plotin. » (VP 20. 78-80); jugement que, au chapitre suivant (VP 21.10—12), Porphyre s'empresse de reprendre à son compte. Il est très difficile de se faire une idée exacte sur le sujet. Seuls trois des passages que A. N . Z O U M P O S range sous la rubrique 'Fragmenta' peuvent être considérés, sans l'ombre d'un doute, comme des citations expresses (Eusèbe, Prép Évang XI 19,1; In Remp II 2 9 . 9 - 1 5 ; In Tim I 361.28-362.2). Et, même si on estime que l'oracle d'Apollon (VP 22.13—63) a été composé par Amélius, il faut bien admettre qu'il s'agit là d'un pastiche volontairement archaïsant. Reste la lettre de dédicace citée par Porphyre au chapitre 17 (16-44) de sa 'Vie de Plotin'. Que dire de cette lettre? Amélius emprunte à Platon sa formule de salutation εύ πράττειν (VP 17.16). Il y fait référence à une œuvre tragique qu'on ne peut identifier (VP 17.41). Le début de cette lettre (VP 17.16—24) donne une impression de grandiloquence, et on y note une recherche du mot rare et insolite; mais est-ce là un tic d'Amélius, ou tout simplement le reflet du style des accusateurs de Plotin, qui ont une «prédilection pour la belle langue et le beau style» (VP 17.20—21)? La suite, moins recherchée, est assez confuse. Les lignes 27 & 28 peuvent être comprises en deux sens différents au moins; et un certain nombre d'allusions rendent la compréhension des dernières lignes difficile. À l'instar des six lignes citées par Proclus dans son 'Commentaire sur la République' (In Remp II 29.9—15), les quatre lignes citées dans le 'Commentaire sur le Timée' (I 361.28—362.2) ne présentent aucune particularité notable à une exception près: l'expression τον αύτουργόν τεχνίτην semble bien être une réminiscence des 'Oracles Chaldaïques'. En revanche, le commentaire d'Amélius au Prologue de l'Évangile de saint Jean, .que nous a conservé Eusèbe (Prép Évang XI 19, 1), en insistant bien sur le fait qu'il s'agit là d'une citation expresse: αύτά δή ταύτα προς φήμα γράφων (Prép Evang XI 18, 26), présente beaucoup plus d'intérêt. Amélius y fait preuve d'une grande sobriété dans le choix des termes et dans le développement de l'argumentation. Mais trois effets de style méritent d'être relevés. L'exclamation νή Δία 7 5 qui vient après une comparaison au conditionnel donne plus de force à l'affirmation à l'indicatif qui suit. O r , comme le fait d'ailleurs remarquer H . DÔRRIE, il est très rare qu'un texte philosophique soit interrompu par une exclamation de ce genre. D'habitude, un philosophe se garde de manifester ainsi ses émotions. Qui plus est, cette exclamation est suivie par un ó Βάρβαρος qui, métonymiquement, désigne saint Jean. D'ailleurs, Eusèbe reproche à Amélius cette réticence:

75

Sur l'usage de cette expression — qu'on retrouve assez souvent chez Platon — dans les siècles qui ont immédiatement précédé Amélius, cf. WILHELM SCHMID, Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern. V o n Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus, 5 vol., Stuttgart (Kohlhammer) 1 8 8 7 - 1 8 9 7 .

854

LUC BRISSON «Ces mots, ce n'est plus de façon voilée, mais directement maintenant et à visage découvert qu'ils apparaissent transposés à partir de la théologie du Barbare; et ce Barbare, qui était-il pour l'auteur, sinon l'évangéliste de notre Sauveur, Jean, Hébreu, fils d'Hébreux, . . .?» (Prép Évang X I 19, 2)

En escamotant le nom de saint Jean, Amélius use d'un détour mûrement réfléchi, qui lui évitait la critique et lui apportait des avantages importants. S'il avait ouvertement (γυμνή xf) κεφαλή, cf. Phèdre 243 b 6) cité un texte chrétien, Amélius aurait pu choquer ses lecteurs platoniciens farouchement opposés au Christianisme en général et au Gnosticisme en particulier. Par ailleurs, Amélius renvoie à cette Βάρβαρος σοφία, dont même Platon a fait un éloge ambigu. Amélius est conscient de cette ambiguïté, puisqu'il s'empresse d'en atténuer la portée. Certes les Barbares ont depuis longtemps conscience de l'influence du Logos, mais à cette conscience, qui ne fut jamais claire, se mêlent superstition populaire et ignorance. Voilà pourquoi une doctrine plus récente, comme celle d'Amélius ou celle de Plotin, attestée par une longue tradition, présente une supériorité indéniable. Enfin, on trouve à la fin du passage cité par Eusèbe un άμέλει, qui est à proprement parler la forme impersonnelle de la troisième personne du singulier de l'indicatif présent du verbe άμελέω, mais qui, en fait, joue ici le rôle d'un adverbe. D'un point de vue purement doctrinal, Amélius en use pour imposer brutalement son interprétation néo-platonicienne en écrasant le drame sous le poids du système. Mais n'est-ce pas là aussi, pour Amélius, l'occasion de faire un effet de style? Mais j'arrête là une analyse conjecturale, qui ne porte en effet que sur une petite partie de l'œuvre d'Amélius qui dut être considérable. Dès lors, on peut dresser ce bilan sur l'importance d'Amélius dans l'histoire de la philosophie.

7. Conclusion

Amélius joua certainement un rôle important dans la diffusion de l'œuvre et de la doctrine de Numénius. O n peut même se demander si ce n'est pas par son intermédiaire qu'Eusèbe de Césarée, qui nous a conservé le plus grand nombre de fragments de son œuvre, aurait connu Numénius. Amélius reste surtout le personnage-clé pour connaître Plotin. Disciple de la toute première heure, c'est en fait l'associé de Plotin, même si, aux alentours de 265, Longin, dans la préface de son livre 'Sur la fin', le présente systématiquement comme son second: dans le cadre de l'École, Amélius assume une charge d'enseignement, et participe aux polémiques où est impliqué le maître. Qui plus est, il compose, à partir des cours de Plotin, des scholies, qui, si elles avaient été conservées, nous auraient renseigné sur le développement de la doctrine du

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maître entre 246 et 253, et sur l'écart entre son enseignement oral et son œuvre écrite entre 253 et 270. Enfin, un faisceau convergent d'indices nous amènent à penser qu'Amélius fut le maître d'oeuvre d'une édition chronologique des traités de Plotin, édition qui, jusqu'à la première moitié du IVème siècle à tout le moins, permit la diffusion de l'œuvre de Plotin; d'ailleurs on peut penser que c'est cette édition que cite Eusèbe de Césarée dans sa 'Préparation Evangélique'. L'œuvre d'Amélius paraît avoir été considérable, si on prend pour point de référence les 100 livres de scholies composées à partir des cours de Plotin et les 40 livres qu'il écrivit contre la'Révélation'de Zostrien, ouvrages qui ne représentent qu'une petite partie de sa production. Par ailleurs, sa doctrine qui s'inspirait beaucoup de celle de Numénius, tout en restant fortement imprégnée par le Stoïcisme, auquel l'avait formé son premier maître Lysimaque, dut exercer une profonde influence à Apamée et à Athènes, influence qui se prolongea à travers celle de Théodore d'Asiné et de ses disciples. Au milieu du IVème siècle en effet, c'était, si on en croit l'empereur Julien, la doctrine de Théodore d'Asiné, et, à travers elle, celle d'Amélius, qui triomphaient à Athènes, avant que Priscus, un disciple de Jamblique, ne reprenne les choses en mains. Comment alors expliquer la médiocre postérité de ce philosophe? De façon un peu brutale on peut dire: si ses œuvres sont perdues, c'est qu'Amélius fut considéré comme un perdant dans le courant néo-platonicien. Et si on le tint pour un perdant, c'est parce que ceux qui furent ses interlocuteurs — Porphyre surtout et Jamblique —, et qui marquèrent profondément de leur empreinte le Néo-Platonisme post-plotinien adoptèrent à son égard une attitude défavorable. Dès lors, cette défaveur ne pouvait manquer d'être partagée par l'École d'Athènes, dont les membres ne crurent pas nécessaire de faire référence à une doctrine si discutable; ainsi le naufrage devenait-il inéluctable. Si l'œuvre d'Amélius avait été conservée, l'histoire du Néo-platonisme n'en serait pas bouleversée. Mais les perspectives ne seraient plus les mêmes. L'importance accordée à Jamblique, à Porphyre et à Plotin et leur originalité respective devraient certainement faire l'objet d'une profonde réévaluation.

Annexe 1: Sources des témoignages sur Amélius Asclépius de Tralles In Nicom. Arith. (éd. TARAN) I 44.3-5 Basile de Césarée Homélie sur 'Au commencement était le Verbe' (P.G. 31) 472 c Cyrille d'Alexandrie Contre Julien (P.G. 76) VIII, 936 a - b

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Damascius De principiis (éd. COMBÉS-WESTERINK, inédite, trad. COMBÉS, inédite), I 1 3 3 . 2 5 - 1 3 4 . 8 RUELLE

In Philebum (ed. WESTERINK) § 29.1-5 §152

Enée de Gaza Théophraste (éd. BOISSONADE; COLONNA) p. 12 BOISSONADE; p. 1 2 . 5 - 6 COLONNA = Numénius, frag. 49 DES PLACES, trad, DES PLACES Eunape Vitae Sophistarum (éd. GIANGRANDE) IV 2, 1 - 2 , p. 9 . 2 - 9 Eusèbe de Césarée Préparation Évangélique (éd. DES PLACES), trad. FAVRELLE XI 18,26-19,1

Jamblique Περί ψυχής, cf. Stobée, Eel I 372.33-458.22 (éd. WACHSMUTH), trad. A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, t. III, Appendice I, p. 147-248 Philopon In Nicom. Arith. (éd. HOCHE) I 45.2-3

Porphyre Vie de Plotin (éd. HENRY-SCHWYZER), trad. É . R . 76, C . N . R . S . , inédite 1 2.31-34 3.35-48 4.1-6 5.1-7 7.1-7 22-28 10.33-38 16.1-14 17.1-6 16-44 18.11-23 19.21-24 29-31

AMÉLIUS: SA VIE, SON ŒUVRE, SA DOCTRINE, SON STYLE 20.5-15 29-33 68-81 86-104 21 22 Proclus I n AIE. ( é d . SEGONDS), t r a d . SEGONDS

70.11-13 In Crat. (éd. PASQUALI), trad. SEGONDS, inédite 56.13-19 I n P a r m . ( é d . C O U S I N 2 ) , t r a d . CHAIGNET

III 829.23-831.24 = trad. Moerbeke III 168.35-169.70 STEEL VI 1052.31-1053.9 = trad. Moerbeke VI 350.38-48 STEEL I n R e m p . ( é d . K R O L L ) , t r a d . FESTUGIÈRE

I II

24.7-9 29.3-30.5 30.6-21 31.22-32.9 32.10-33.9 275.30-276.3

I n T i m . ( é d . D I E H L ) , t r a d . FESTUGIÈRE

I

12.4-10 76.21-30 306.1-14 306.31-307.4 309.14-15 309.20-310.2 336.16-26 3 6 1 . 2 6 — 3 6 2 . 6 = O r a c l e s C h a l d a ï q u e s , f r a g . 3 3 DES PLACES

II

III Théol. Plat. I I I V

398.16-26 425.16-19 431.26-28 213.9-214.4 277.26-278.1 300.23-301.5 301.29-302.10 33.33-34.3 = Numénius, frag. 46c DES PLACES 103.18-28 (éd. SAFFREY-WESTERINK), trad. SAFFREY-WESTERINK 1, 6 . 1 6 - 2 4 18, 87.22-24 21, 98.16-20 5, 2 3 . 9 - 1 2

857

858

LUC BRISSON

S o u d a ( é d . ADLER)

s . v . Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς , t. I, p. 1 3 8 . 1 6 - 1 7 s.v. Πλωτίνος, t. I V , p. 1 5 1 . 2 3 - 2 4 s.v. Π ο ρ φ ύ ρ ι ο ς , t. I V , p. 178.14—15 Stobée E c l o g a e ( é d . WACHSMUTH)

I 364.19-365.4 365.5-21 372.4-14 372.23-26 376.2-4 377.13-15 Syrianus In Arist. Met. (éd. KROLL, C A G V I 1) 88.32-34 109.12—14 = Numénius, frag. 4 6 b DES PLACES, trad, DES PLACES 119.12-16 147.2-6 Théodoret de C y r Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques (éd. CANIVET), trad. CANIVET II 8 7 - 8 9 J'ai pris pour point de départ de mes recherches sur Amélius le recueil de fragments réalisé par A . N . ZOUMPOS, qui a eu l'amabilité de me faire parvenir gracieusement une copie de: Amelii Neoplatonici Fragmenta, collegit A . N . ZOUMPOS, A t h e n i s 1 9 5 6 .

J e n'ai cependant pas fait référence aux numéros de ce recueil pour les raisons suivantes. (1) J ' a i ajouté un certain nombre de témoignages où, même si son nom n'est pas cité, il est question d'Amélius. (2) Le découpage des témoignages relevés par A . N . ZOUMPOS correspond rarement à celui que j'ai retenu; j'ai voulu donner aussi le contexte où apparaissait chaque fragment. (3) J e n'accepte pas les grandes rubriques de A . N . ZOUMPOS: A . Testimonia: I. Vita; I I . Scriptura; I I I . Doctrina: Β . Fragmenta. (4) Pour plusieurs auteurs, de nouvelles éditions ont été publiées qui modifient le texte cité, quelquefois sur des points importants. O u t r e les articles d e D Ö R R I E ( c f . n . 6 7 ) , d e MASSAGLI ( c f . n . 5 7 ) e t d e TARAN

(cf. n. 1), il n'existe aucun travail portant spécifiquement sur Amélius, en dehors de celui de A . N . ZOUMPOS, Amélius von Etrurien. Sein Leben und seine Philosophie. Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neuplatonismus, Athen 1956 (bibliographie mentionnant les travaux antérieurs, p. 11); l'auteur m'a aussi offert gracieusement une copie de ce livre.

AMÉLIUS: SA VIE, SON ŒUVRE, SA DOCTRINE, SON STYLE

859

LUC BRISSON

860 Annexe

3: Références aux exégèses d'Amélius sur le 'Timée' dans le 'Commentaire sur le Timée' de Proclus

Références dans l " I n T i m ' de Proclus I

12.4—10 76.21-30 306.1-14 306.31-307.4 309.14-15 309.20-310.2 336.16-26 361.26-362.6 398.16-26 425.16-19 431.26-28 II 2 1 3 . 9 - 2 1 4 . 4 277.26-278.1 300.23-301.5 301.29-302.1 III 3 3 . 3 3 - 3 4 . 3 103.18-28

Annexe

24.7—9 29.5-30.5 30.6-21 31.22-32.9 32.10-33.9 275.30-276.3

Platon

Passages visés dans le 'Timée' de Platon le sous-titre περί φύσεως 2 0 d 7—e 1 28 c 3 - 5 „ 29 29 30 30 30 35 36 37

„ b e b c d b d a

1-2 1-2 1-3 5-7 1-31 4-6 2-7 2-7

al

37 d 3 - 7 39 e 7 - 9

4: Références aux exégèses d'Amélius sur la 'République' dans le 'Commentaire sur la République' de Proclus

Références dans Γ ' I n R e m p ' de Proclus I II

de

Passages visés dans la 'République' de Platon sur la justice V I I I 546 a 8 546 b 3 546 a 5 s q . X 617 e 3 s q .

de

Platon

Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 2 4 0 - 3 2 5 A. D.)* b y JOHN DILLON, D u b l i n

Contents I. Life II. Works III. Philosophy 1. Physics

863 875 878 880

A. The One

880

B . The Intelligible Realm a) The Intelligible Realm b) Aeon c) The Paradigm d) The Intelligible Triad e) Other Triads Ó The Demiurge

885 885 887 887 888 888 889

C . The Psychic Realm a) Time b) Space c) The Individual Soul d) The Vehicle (όχημα) of the Soul

890 891 892 893 898

D . Nature and Matter

898

E. The Gods and Daemons

899

2. Ethics

902

3. Logic

904

IV. Influence

907

Bibliography

908

I. Texts 1. Iamblichus 2. Other Relevant Ancient Texts II. Secondary Works

908 908 908 908

This essay is an expanded and emended version of the Introduction to my 'Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Diálogos Commentariorum Fragmenta', Philosophia Antiqua, Vol. 23, Brill, Leiden, 1973.

IAMBLICHUS

OF

CHALCIS

863

I. Life

Any biographer of Iamblichus must begin with the complaint that we know virtually nothing about the subject. 1 We chiefly rely on a biography by Eunapius, in his 'Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists', 2 from which solid information can be extracted only with difficulty and in small amounts. Nevertheless, by examining each passage of this meagre source with care, certain data of value can be amassed. Let us begin at the beginning (457): πατρίς δέ ήν αύτω Χαλκίς - κατά την Κοίλην προσαγορευομένην εστίν ή πόλις. 3 "His native place was Chalcis; this city is situated in that part (of Syria) which is called Coele." Syria in the time of Iamblichus' birth (c. 245 A. D.) had behind it almost 300 years of peaceful prosperity under Roman rule. 4 The Romans, following on Pompey's conquest in 64 B . C . , imposed initially a loose control over the collection of statelets which sprang from the collapse of the Seleucid Empire. The Roman governor in Antioch preserved peace and collected tribute, but there was a large measure of self-government for Greek cities, and numerous local potentates were allowed to maintain an autonomous existence. The client kings were absorbed into the imperial structure around the beginning of the 2nd century A. D., when the period of Syria's greatest prosperity begins. For our purpose it will be enough to consider the north of Syria and the valley of the Orontes. The Orontes valley, when properly drained and irrigated, is an extremely rich and fertile area, and during the Roman age it seems to have been intelligently cultivated. The cities of the Orontes valley, Emesa, Apamea, and Antioch, enjoyed a prosperous and intellectually lively existence during this period, culminating in the latter half of the 2nd century. The accession to the Imperial throne of a native of Emesa, Varius Avitus Bassianus ('Elagabalus') in 1

2

3

4

58'

E. g. MAU, in: RE IX 1 (1914), col. 648, s. v. 'Iamblichos'; ZELLER, Phil. d. Gr. III 2 , p. 613, n. 2. See also B. D. LARSEN, Jamblique de Chalcis, Exégète et Philosophe, Aarhus, 1972, pp. 3 3 - 6 5 . Pp. 457—61 BOISSONADE. Most recent editions are W. C. WRIGHT, Loeb Classical Library (with Philostratus, 'Lives of the Sophists') and G. GIANGRANDE, Rome, 1956. Many editors, including WRIGHT, insert ( Σ υ ρ ί α ν ) after Κοίλην. Syria must certainly be understood, but it is not necessary, I think, that Eunapius wrote it. It could be understood, at least by an East Roman reader. For detailed studies see E. S. BOUCHIER, Syria as a Roman Province, Oxford, 1916; F. M . H E I C H E L H E I M , 'Syria', in: An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, ed. T E N N E Y 2 F R A N K , Baltimore, 1938; F R A N Z C U M O N T , The Frontier Provinces of the East, in: C A H XI (1936), ch. 15. For further bibliographical information see, e.g., B. LIFSHITZ, Etudes sur l'histoire de la province romaine de Syrie, in: A N R W I I , 8, ed. H . T E M P O R I N I — W. HAASE, Berlin—New York, 1977, pp. 3—30 and W. VAN RENGEN, L'épigraphie grecque et latine de Syrie. Bilan d'un quart de siècle de recherches epigraphiques, ib. pp. 31—53.

864

JOHN

DILLON

218 A . D . was a curious accident, perhaps, but not really disproportionate to the distinction of this part of the Roman world. Antioch was one of the most brilliant cities in the empire, and Apamea had in the century before Iamblichus produced, among other men of letters, the distinguished philosopher Numenius. Iamblichus was born, as Eunapius tells us, in Chalcis "in Coele Syria". This is a potentially ambiguous statement, as the name Coele Syria referred to different areas at different times, in each of which there is a town Chalcis. Originally it took in southern Syria, but when Septimius Severus divided up the Syrian command in 194 A. D., he termed the northern province Coele, the southern Phoenice. Eunapius, then, writing towards the end of the 4th century, could mean by 'Coele' only one thing. Iamblichus' home town is therefore Chalcis ad Belum, modern Qinnesrin, a strategically important town to the east of the Orontes valley, on the road from Beroea (Aleppo) to Apamea, and from Antioch to the east. 5 The limes of Chalcis played an important part in Roman defensive strategy. 6 In 256 A. D. in Iamblichus' childhood, the Persian king Sapor broke through the Roman defenses here, το λίμιτον Χαλκίδος, and pillaged the whole north of Syria, including Antioch (Malalas, Chron. 295—6). We do not know how Iamblichus' family weathered this onslaught. They may well, if they were pro-Roman, have retreated before it temporarily. The 3rd century was a disturbed period in which to grow up, particularly in northern Syria. Iamblichus was an honourable name in this region, first borne (to our knowledge) by our Iamblichus' remote ancestor (see below, p. 865), the phylarch of Arethusa and Emesa (Cie. ad fam. XV, 1,2), slain at the battle of Actium in Antony's fleet. His son of the same name was restored by Augustus to Emesa in 20 B. C. In the second half of the second century (c. 165 A. D.) flourished the novelist Iamblichus, also of Syrian extraction, author of 'Babyloniaca'. O u r philosopher, says Eunapius (loc. cit.), "was of illustrious birth, and belonged to the well-to-do and fortunate classes" (ήν κατά γένος μεν επιφανής καΐ των άβρών καί των εύδαιμόνων). It is remarkable that this Semitic name 7 should be clung to by a distinguished family when so many of the rest of the well-to-do known to us had long since taken Greek names. 8 There were in fact ancestors of which the family could be 5

6

7

8

That Eunapius means by "Coele" N o r t h e r n Syria is confirmed by his description of Antioch, at p. 495 Boiss., as ή της Κοίλης καλούμενης Συρίας πρώτη πόλεων. See R. MOUTERDE and Α. POIDEBARD, Le Limes de Chalcis (Bibliothèque archéologique et historique 38), Paris, 1945. The original form of his name is Syriac or Aramaic, ya-mliku. The second element is plainly the root meaning "rule" or "king". The first element is probably simply the third person singular of the indicative or jussive, the whole meaning "(El) is king" or "May he rule". Porphyry, admittedly, had a Phoenician name, Malchos, which Amelius 'translated' into Greek for him, probably playfully, when Porphyry came to Rome, as 'Basileus' (VPlot. 17). H e must then have taken the name 'Porphyrios' on the basis of its connexion with kingship. Among prominent Syrians, only the Palmyrenes seem to have clung to their

IAMBLICHUS O F

CHALCIS

865

proud. We learn from Photius (Bibl. cod. 181) that according to Damascius, Iamblichus traced his ancestry to Sampsigeramos and Monimos, άνδρας τα πρώτα της είδωλολατρούσης άσεβείας άπενεγκαμένους. These are both distinguished names in the Syrian region. Sampsigeramos was the founder of the line of priest-kings of Emesa (Str. X V I , 2 , 1 0 ) , active in the 60s of the 1st century B. C. and later. He is the father of the first Iamblichus mentioned above. Sampsigeramos was not necessarily the first of his line, merely the first to assert independence from the collapsing Seleucids. His descendants continued to rule Emesa until the reign of Domitian, and even thereafter were dominant in the area (v. inscrr. in: Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de la Syrie V, 2212 — 2217; Malalas, Chron. 296). Monimos is more difficult to identify, although it was a common Syrian name ( = Arabic Mon'eim, e. g. I G L S V, 2079, 2382, 2382). N o suitable Monimoi come to view, however, in the royal line of Emesa. There was a g o d Monimos worshipped in Emesa, as we learn from Julian (Or. IV, 150 D), who declares that he has all his information from Iamblichus, but the truth lies, perhaps, in another direction. Stephanus of Byzantium records, under the rubric Χάλκις, τετάρτη, πόλις εν Συρία, κτισθείσα υπό Μονικοΰ του "Αραβος. Monikos is not a name which I find recorded elsewhere, and I am much tempted to emend this to Μονίμου. The alteration is small, and would provide Iamblichus with a very suitable ancestor, none other than the founder of his native city. It has proved difficult to decide when Iamblichus was born, but the tendency has been, in the most recent discussion of the subject, to push his birth back much earlier than the tradition date of c. 265—280. 'Suidas' fixes his floruit in the reign of Constantine (306—337 A. D . ) which assuming a conventional floruit-age of 40, puts his birth at 265 A. D. at the earliest. However, two important articles, one by JOSEPH BIDEZ,9 the other by ALAN CAMERON,10 have enabled us to reach more definite conclusions about Iamblichus' lifespan. BIDEZ, writing in 1919, demonstrated that since Iamblichus' pupil Sopater, who left for the imperial court at Constantinople after his master's death, was already established at the court in 326/7, Iamblichus can hardly have died later than, say, 326, instead of the 330 previously postulated. Then BIDEZ puts to excellent use the letters to Iamblichus that have come down to us among those of the Emperor Julian, which had formerly been declared spurious. BIDEZ argues that the letters are not necessarily spurious productions, just misattributed to Julian. Perhaps he preserved copies of them among his papers. They are addressed to Iamblichus by an unknown admirer, seem to be written in the early 320's, and imply that he is now an old man. This leads BIDEZ to push his birth-date back to about 250. This conclusion is confirmed by CAMERON, who points out that we have a reference in Porphyry's 'Life of Plotinus' (ch. 9) to a s o n of Iamblichus,

9 10

Semitic names (cf. G. BARBIERI, L'albo senatorio da Settimio Severo a Carino [193—285] [Studi pubblicati dall'Istituto italiano per la Storia antica 6], Rome, 1952, p. 451). R E G 27 (1919), pp. 2 9 - 4 0 . Hermes 96 (1968), pp. 3 7 4 - 6 .

866

JOHN

DILLON

Aristón (perhaps so named after Plato's father!), who married a lady disciple of Plotinus, Amphicleia. The Iamblichus referred to can hardly be taken to be another, unknown, Iamblichus (Porphyry refers to him as someone we should know), and to make such a union credible Iamblichus' birth-date would require to be pushed back to around 240. A life span of about 85 years, then, from c. 240 to c. 325 A. D., seems the best estimate on the evidence. This leaves Iamblichus not much younger than Porphyry, and that is not without significance for their relationship. Eunapius continues (457—8): οΰτος Ά ν α τ ο λ ί ω τω μετά Πορφύριον τα δεύτερα φερομένω συγγενόμενος, πολύ γε έπέδωκε και εις άκρον φιλοσοφίας ήλασεν" ειτα μετ' Ά ν α τ ό λ ι ο ν Πορφυρίω προσθείς έαυτόν, ουκ εστίν ö τι Πορφυρίου διήνεγκεν, πλην οσον κατά συνθήκην και δύναμιν τοΰ λόγου. "As a pupil of Anatolius, who ranks next after Porphyry, he made great progress and attained to the highest distinction in philosophy. Then leaving Anatolius he attached himself to Porphyry, and in no respect was he inferior to Porphyry except in harmonious structure and force of style." Z E L L E R (loc. cit.) assumes that he came to Rome, began studies under Anatolius, "perhaps during Porphyry's stay in Sicily", and then continued under Porphyry on his return. This account, which has been challenged, 11 would be made more certain if we were to take τα δεύτερα φερομένω as meaning "standing in for", rather than merely "who ranks next after", as W R I G H T , the editor of the Loeb edition, takes it. In the former case Anatolius would have been the acting head of Porphyry's school when Iamblichus arrived in Rome. However, I cannot find this phrase used in this manner elsewhere, and so assume that Eunapius merely means that he was second only to Porphyry in distinction. Eunapius is, on his own confession (VP 455), very ill-informed on the details of Porphyry's life, and it seems clear enough that this lack of information extends to events concerning Iamblichus. It seems to me to be worth reopening the question, apparently closed for subsequent scholars by the authority of Z E L L E R (who himself was following G U S T A V WOLFF), as to the possible identity of Anatolius, the teacher of Iamblichus, Anatolius the recipient of the dedication of Porphyry's 'Ομηρικά Ζητήματα, 1 1 3 and Anatolius the Aristotelian scholar and Bishop of Laodicea. The arguments of WOLFF 1 2 and ZELLER 13 appear to be based chiefly on faulty chronology, but also betray an unwillingness to believe that a man who

11

E . g . MAU in his R E article, and Η . I. MARROU, Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Neoplatonism, in: The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, e d . A . M O M I G L I A N O , O x f o r d , 1 9 6 3 , p . 1 3 3 n . 1.

111

12 13

Cf. A. SMITH, Porphyrian Studies since 1913, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,2), pp. 7 4 4 - 7 4 7 with n. 157. Porph. Phil, ex O r . p. 17f. Phil. d. Gr. III 2 p. 612 n. 1.

IAMBLICHUS OF

CHALCIS

867

became a Christian Bishop could have entered into the relationships presupposed by these identifications. It seems to me that in spite of the authority of ZELLER there is no chronological reason why the Bishop of Laodicea could not have been the teacher of Iamblichus. Iamblichus' birth-date has now, I feel, been satisfactorily pushed back to before 245, while it is plain from Eusebius' chronicle 14 that Anatolius cannot have succeeded Eusebius (not the author) as Bishop of Laodicea until at least 274 and probably later. ZELLER'S date of 270 for his assumption of the bishopric is the result of placing too much faith in Eusebius' garbled account in H E VII, 32,21. Since Anatolius was ordained Bishop by Theotecnus of Caesarea in order to succeed him (Theotecnus) in the diocese (Eus. loc. cit.) it seems to me necessary that he must have lived some time in the city, in order to earn the confidence of Theotecnus. I suggest that Anatolius did in fact attend the Council at Antioch in 270 to condemn Paul of Samosata, as Eusebius tells us, but that it was at Caesarea, rather than at Laodicea, that he tarried. The devastation of Alexandria, and of the Broucheion in particular, in 271 14a would constitute a powerful motive for his settling down in the centre of learning which flourished in Caesarea, very much as the great Origen had done some forty years before. Caesarea in the 270s, then, seems to me a very possible place for a student of good family from Chalcis to come to study under an established Aristotelian philosopher, be he Christian or no. 1 5 The fact of a teacher's Christianity, except in times of active persecution, was not a matter of vital interest to potential students. It did not deter non-Christians from frequenting Origen, and Origen was a much more aggressive Christian than Anatolius seems to have been. I suggest, then, that we should not multiply Anatolii unnecessarily. Anatolius' ordination would constitute a good reason for Iamblichus to move on, perhaps with wife and child, to Rome, in search of Porphyry, whom Anatolius will have known at Athens in the '50s, if indeed he is the same Anatolius to whom Porphyry dedicated the 'Homeric Investigations', a work of his Athenian period. Once again, the identification should not be dismissed without good cause. It is perfectly reasonable that Anatolius should have gravitated to Athens in his youth to study under Longinus, the greatest scholar of his day, even as Porphyry did.

14 14a

15

Eusebius, flor. 4th year of Aurelian: Anatolius, flor. 2nd year of Probus (Jerome's trans.). Cf. C. ANDRESEN, "Siegreiche Kirche" im Aufstieg des Christentums. Untersuchungen zu Eusebius von Caesarea und D i o n y s i o s von Alexandrien, in: A N R W II, 23,1, ed. W. HAASE, B e r l i n - N e w York, 1979, pp. 442 ff. There is a persistent assumption, put forth first by C. E. RUELLE in the last century, and adopted by LARSEN (op. cit. pp. 3 6 f f . ) , that Iamblichus must have studied for some time in Alexandria. While this is not improbable, it must be said that there is no evidence for it, either in Eunapius or elsewhere.

J O H N DILLON

868

We d o not know when Porphyry returned from Sicily to Rome. Eusebius, writing some time after his death (c. 305 A . D . ) , describes him 1 6 as ό κ α θ ' ημάς έν Σικελίςι καταστάς, which must denote at least a considerable stay. BIDEZ 17 takes this as referring only to the time of the publication of Porphyry's work 'Against the Christians'. H e refers to himself as having returned to R o m e in Vit. Plot. 2, but precisely when we cannot tell. 1 8 That he should have already returned by the early 280s, however, is a proposition with which few would disagree, although nothing that Eunapius says forces us to assume that Iamblichus studied with Porphyry at R o m e , and not at Lilybaeum. Whichever is the case, the only direct evidence we have of their association is the dedication to Iamblichus of Porphyry's work Π ε ρ ί τού Γ ν ώ θ ι σαυτόν. 1 9 What the relationship between the two may have been we cannot judge with certainty. In later life Iamblichus was repeatedly, and often sharply, critical, of his master's philosophical positions. We can see this in his 'Timaeus C o m mentary', where, of 32 recorded fragments in which Porphyry is mentioned, 25 are critical, only 7 signifying agreement. The e De Mysteriis' is a point-by-point answer to and refutation of Porphyry's 'Letter to A n e b o ' , and Iamblichus' references to Porphyry in the ' D e Anima' are often less than reverent. 2 0 N o doubt Iamblichus' Π ε ρ ί άγαλμάτων (now lost) had a good deal to say in confutation of the work of Porphyry of the same name. 2 1 However, we must not conclude from this that Iamblichus learned nothing from Porphyry, or that they parted on bad terms. This refutation of one's predecessors was a necessary part of staying afloat in the scholastic world, then as now, and Iamblichus was enough of an original mind to have many modifications and elaborations to introduce into Porphyry's relatively simple metaphysical scheme. Also, contact with Plotinus was a personal experience for Porphyry, which he could not pass on, and Iamblichus' tendency to theurgy, a tendency of Porphyry himself in his youth, was not something which contact with Porphyry was sufficient to suppress. When Porphyry wrote his 'Letter to Anebo', very much of a recantation of his 16 17 18

19

H E VI, 1 9 , 2 . Vie de Porphyre, p. 103 n. 1. See on this matter ALAN CAMERON, The Date of Porphyry's 'Kata Christianön', C Q 17 (1967), pp. 382—4. C f . A . MEREDITH, Porphyry and Julian Against the Christians, in: A N R W II, 23,2, ed. W. HAASE, B e r l i n - N e w Y o r k , 1980, p. 1126, and also A . SMITH, Porphyrian Studies since 1913, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,2), pp. 7 2 0 - 7 2 1 . Unless we take Iamblichus' statement in the ' D e Anima', p. 375, 24 WACHS: ώς δ ' έγώ τίνων άκήκοα Π λ α τ ω ν ι κ ώ ν , οίον Π ο ρ φ υ ρ ί ο υ και άλλων πολλών as evidence of personal acquaintance. Unfortunately, however, άκοίιω + gen. came to be used in peculiar ways in later Greek, e . g . Julian, O r . 5, 1 6 2 C , speaks of " h e a r i n g " Xenarchus, a philosopher of the time of Augustus, and Proclus, In Tim. 1 1 1 , 2 5 , 2 DIEHL, tells us: τ ο ι α ύ τ α γαρ ήκουσα του Θ ε ο δ ώ ρ ο υ φιλοσοφοϋντος, which he cannot possibly have done in the normal sense.

20

E . g. Stob. I 365 WACHS. H e also loses no opportunity to dispute with Porphyry in his ' C o m m e n t a r y on the Categories', as one can see from Simplicius, 'In C a t . ' , e. g. p. 2, 9—15;

21

O f which BIDEZ has assembled the fragments, Vie de Porph. A p p . p. 1.

129, 1 - 4 ;

302,25-27.

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own early beliefs, as evidenced in the 'Philosophy from Oracles', Iamblichus was ready to spring to the defence with well-forged arguments. As we do not know when (or even where) Iamblichus studied under Porphyry, so we do not know when he left him, to return to Syria and found his own school. From the very fact that he returned to Syria, as opposed to staying on in Rome as successor to Porphyry (he was, after all, so far as we know, his most distinguished pupil), I conclude that Iamblichus left Porphyry some time before the master's death (circa 305 A. D . ) perhaps owing to an increasing divergence of their views about the role of philosophy, or θεωρία, vis-à-vis θεουργία. Such hypotheses, however, can hardly be insisted upon. For Iamblichus' activity upon his return to Syria we are dependent upon Eunapius' account, which, with all its fantastic anecdotes, is claimed by its author to rest on an oral tradition descending to him from Iamblichus' senior pupil Aedesius, via his own revered master Chrysanthius. Certain stories, Eunapius tells us, he forebore to repeat, so as not to introduce elements of fantasy into a factual narrative — an admirable sentiment indeed! 2 2 This account is amplified and supplemented by BIDEZ in his article 'Le Philosophe Jamblique et son É c o l e ' . 2 3 Though Eunapius is not specific, it seems from other sources that it was either to Apamea, or to Daphne, the suburb of Antioch, rather than to his native Chalcis, that Iamblichus returned to found his School. 2 4 If one accepts into evidence (as I feel one must) the letters of PseudoJulian, one might gather that Iamblichus had by the 320s been long established in Apamea, not far from Antioch, when this correspondent was writing to him. For instance, Letter 40 HERTLEIN (184 BIDEZ-CUMONT), probably to be dated 326 A. D . (see WRIGHT, Loeb ed. p. 254 note), is given in charge to a royal hypaspist named Julian, son of Bacchylus, Ά π α μ ε ύ ς το γένος, φ δια τούτο μάλιστα την έπιστολήν ένεχείριζον, οτι και προς υμάς ήξειν και σε ακριβώς ειδέναι καθυπισχνεΐτο. N o w Apamea is some distance from Chalcis, so that it would be unlikely that this soldier would know Iamblichus if Chalcis was his place of residence. Further, why send an Apamean at all, and stress the Ά π α μ ε ύ ς , if Apamea were not the destination of the letter? Again, Libanius, in a letter, 2 5 describes Apamea as την Ίαμβλίχου τε έρωμένην καί Σωπάτρου μητέρα, while in a speech 2 6 he speaks " o f a choir of philosophers of Apamea, of whom the chorus-leader (Iamblichus) resembled the gods".

22

23 24

VS 460: σφαλερόν τι καί θεομισες πράγμα ηγούμενος εις συγγραφήν στάσιμον καί πεπηγυϊαν έπεισάγειν άκοήν διεφθαρμένην καί ρέουσαν. Quoted above, n. 8. PRAECHTER, Richtungen u. Schulen, p. 108, assumes Chalcis, and MAU, in R E , is, as about so much else, uncertain.

25

E p . 1 3 8 9 FOERSTER.

26

Or. 52, 21 (ed. FOERSTER). A passage in O r . 18 (the Funeral Oration for Julian), sect. 187, is even clearer. The Apameans are taking pride in Iamblichus and Sopater: των δε έν μεσόγεια (sc. the Apameans) ξένου τε καί πολίτου, τού μεν (Iamblichus) ταύτην προκρίναντος (Sopater).

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Apamea, after all, was the native place, and presumably place of work, of the great Numenius in the 2nd century, and recently 27 Plotinus' senior pupil Amelius had settled there, no doubt because of his own admiration for Numenius. Amelius was dead by the time Porphyry wrote his 'Commentary on the Timaeus' 28 (perhaps by 290), but he had left his library and possessions to his adopted son, Hostiiianus Hesychius (Porph. Vit. Plot. 3), who presumably continued to live in Apamea. O n the other hand, the evidence of Malalas, Chronographia XII, 312,11 — 12, would indicate that in fact Iamblichus was established, with a school, at Daphne, near Antioch, in the reigns of Maxentius and Galerius (305—312):29 'Επί ôè της αύτοϋ βασιλείας Ίάμβλιχος ó φιλόσοφος έδίδασκεν οίκων έν Δάφνη εως της τελευτής αύτοϋ. Malalas in fact conflates Maxentius and Galerius (μετά τό άποθέσθαι την βασιλείαν Μαξιμιανόν έβασίλευσε Μαξέντιος ό καί Γαλέριος ετη γ')· Are we then to take this as referring to the reigns of both rulers? This hardly matters, perhaps, but to whom does αύτοϋ refer? I take it to refer most naturally to Iamblichus, who will thus have continued teaching in Daphne until his death. We cannot credit this notice with any greater accuracy than the rest of Malalas' work, but it is at least evidence of some sort, which must be given a certain weight. It is not, perhaps, a great issue whether Iamblichus fixed his school at Daphne or at Apamea. The two places are not far apart, and we are quite free to suppose that he at least visited Apamea frequently, and perhaps had originally established himself there on his return from Rome. His chief pupil, Sopater, was after all an Apamean, and a prominent one, who would have accorded him lavish hospitality (cf. n. 27 above). If we find Iamblichus in 320 as an enormously revered figure, it is reasonable to suppose that he had been by then active for some time. I have suggested that he did not necessarily stay with Porphyry until the latter's death. He was already, if my postulates are correct, a man of mature years and views when he came into contact with Porphyry, and not a young and reverent disciple. It seems probable to me, indeed, that the 'De Mysteriis' is a relatively early work, written as it is in answer to Porphyry's 'Letter to Anebo', which is considered to date from his period with Plotinus (263 — 8), 30 on the basis of its place in his development from 'The Philosophy of Oracles', to say, the 'De Abstinentia'. An answer, it seems to me, would be in order as soon as Iamblichus read the work. The device of replying under the guise of the pompous figure of Abammon, Anebo's superior in the priestly college, seems a sign of youthful intellectual exuberance, as does the tone and structure of the work itself. It is well argued, certainly, but it is not well arranged, and displays a much simpler 27 28 29

30

In 269, Porph. VPlot. 3. Proci. In Tim. II, 300, 24ff. See on this A. S C H E N K VON STAUFENBERG, Die römische Kaisergeschichte bei Malalas, Stuttgart, 1931, p. 407. Cf. A. R. SODANO, Porfirio: Lettera ad Anebo, Naples, 1958, Intro, p. xxxiv—xxxvi.

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theology and metaphysics than do the 'Commentaries', and, presumably, than the vast work on the 'Chaldaean Oracles'. Although Chaldaean references can be discerned, 3 1 the main influence seems to me to be Gnostic-Hermetic. I suggest that Iamblichus wrote it not long after 280, and that it was the first public indication of his position in defence of theurgy. I do not see that this controversy would make contact with Porphyry impossible. It is a normal enough school controversy, with much heat expended and many debating points scored, but no mortal enemies made. O n the other hand, it seems to me probable that Iamblichus returned to Syria in the 290s, anxious to start up on his own. What the context of instruction was, we can only conjecture. From Eunapius we learn only marvellous tales. Nevertheless, in spite of himself, he may be able to tell us something: πλήθος μεν ήσαν oí όμιλούντες, πανταχόθεν δε έφοίτων οί παιδείας επιθυμούντες' ήν δε εν αύτοΐς το κάλλιστον δύσκριτον. Σώπατρος γαρ ήν ό έκ Συρίας, άνήρ ειπείν τε και γράψαι δεινότατος, Αίδέσιός τε καί Ευστάθιος έκ Καππαδοκίας, έκ δε τής Ε λ λ ά δ ο ς Θεόδωρος τε καί Εύφράσιος, οί κατ' άρετήν υπερέχοντες, άλλοι τε πλήθος, ού πολύ λειπόμενοι κατά τήν έν λόγοις δύναμιν, ώστε θαυμαστόν ήν ότι πάσι έπήρκει. " H e had a multitude of disciples, and those who desired learning flocked to him from all parts. And it is hard to decide who among them was the most distinguished, for Sopater the Syrian was of their number, a man who was most eloquent both in his speeches and in his writings; and Aedesius and Eustathius from Cappadocia; while from Greece came Theodorus and Euphrasius, men of superlative virtue, and a crowd of other men not inferior in their powers of oratory, so that it seemed marvellous that he should satisfy them a l l . " 3 2 Sopater met a violent death by getting mixed up in Imperial politics, and it was left to Aedesius to carry on the School after the master's death, in a period of repression, during which the School had to go underground. H e moved the School to Pergamon (VS 465), and was succeeded on his death by Eustathius. Eustathius is the recipient of a letter from St. Basil (Letter 1) in 357, showing him normally established at Caesarea in Cappadocia. The letter refers to travels by Eustathius, specifically to Egypt and to Persia. If Theodorus may be assumed to be the well-known Theodorus of Asine, he later founded a school of his own, and his followers, if not himself, are found in the 350s casting aspersions on Iamblichus' character. 3 3 Euphrasius cannot be traced further.

31

Cf. DES PLACES, Jamblique, Les Mystères d'Égypte, Budé ed., Intro, pp. 14ff.; F . W . CREMER, Die Chaldäischen Orakel und Iamblich 'De Mysteriis' (Beitr. zu klass. Philologie 26), Meisenheim, 1969, gives a most useful and comprehensive survey of the Chaldaean elements in the 'De Mysteriis'.

32

VS 458, WRIGHT'S trans. Julian, Ep. 12 BIDEZ (to Priscus).

33

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In addition to these, we may reckon as pupils Dexippus, the author of an extant Commentary on the 'Categories', 34 on the basis of the evidence of Simplicius 35 (indeed Dexippiis' Commentary constitutes good evidence for the content of Iamblichus' own); and Hierius, master of Maximus of Ephesus (Ammon. In Anal. Pr. 31, 16). 36 What was the content of instruction at the School? I suggest, on the evidence of the elementary and pedagogic form of what we may term the Pythagorean Sequence (Συναγωγή των Πυθαγορείων δογμάτων), ten volumes of introduction to Pythagoras and his philosophy, of which we still have four 3 7 (and probably the content of a fifth in the Theologumena Arithmeticae', that Iamblichus led his pupils to the higher reaches of philosophy through Pythagoreanism. He may in this be following the method of his teacher Anatolius, and certainly the inspiration of Nicomachus of Gerasa, from whom, indeed, much of the material in these volumes seems to be taken. Following upon this, it is plain that there was study and exegesis of the works of Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle serving as an introduction to Plato, particularly in Logic and Physics. We have evidence of Commentaries by Iamblichus on the 'Categories', on the 'De Interpretatione', on the 'Prior Analytics', and possibly on the 'De Anima'. As for Plato, Iamblichus, building on earlier, Middle Platonic systems of instruction (such as described in Albinus' 'Isagoge'), prescribed a definite number and order of dialogues to be studied. We find in the 'Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy', 3 8 ch. 26, a course of ten dialogues — 'Alcibiades I', 'Gorgias', 'Phaedo', 'Cratylus', 'Theaetetus', 'Sophist', 'Statesman', 39 'Phaedrus', 'Symposium', and 'Philebus' — which led to the two crowning heights of Platonic philosophy, the 'Parmenides' and the 'Timaeus', the former 'theological', the latter 'physical'. Of these, we have fragments or evidence of commentaries by Iamblichus on the 'Alcibiades', 'Phaedo', 'Sophist', 'Phaedrus', 'Philebus', 'Parmenides' and 'Timaeus', the most extensive being those on the 'Timaeus'. We may suppose, then, that formal exegesis played a significant part in the curriculum of the School. One must also take into account the reputation which Iamblichus acquired in later times (mainly, I feel, because of the excesses of epigoni such as Maximus of Ephesus in the 350s) for magical practices. He must have used the Chaldaean Oracles in lectures, if we may conclude this reasonably from his enormous 'Commentary on the Oracles', 4 0 and his inter34

C A G V o l . I V , Pars II, e d . BUSSE.

35

In Categ. p. 2, 25 C A G . Δ έ ξ ι π π ο ς δε ó Ίαμβλίχειος. It is interesting, in this connexion, that Plutarch of Athens called a son of his Hierius, which might suggest at least a spiritual connexion between him and this Hierius. Cf. Iamblichus II, grandson of Sopater (Dam., V. Isid. p. 122.8 ZINTZEN). See section on Works, below. Ed. L. G. WESTERINK, Amsterdam 1962. This sequence of dialogues was linked to a progression through the three higher levels of virtue, political, kathartic and theoretic, on which see below, pp. 902f. Cf. WESTERINK'S Introduction, pp. X X X I X - X L . These supplied by WESTERINK, but with virtual certainty. At least 28 Books, Damascius, Dub. et Sol. ch. 43, Vol. I p. 86, 5F. RUELLE.

36

37 38

39 40

IAMBLICHUS

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pretation of them in accordance with Plato is no doubt the source of Proclus' interpretation. There is only one story relayed by Eunapius in which Iamblichus is alleged to have performed a magical act. 41 During a visit (of the whole school?) to the hot springs at Gadara, Iamblichus, in response to insistent requests, conjured up two spirits in the form of boys, Eros and Anteros, from two adjacent springs. O n another occasion, 42 however, he is recorded as dismissing with a laugh rumours that during prayer he was wont to rise ten cubits into the air, and that his body and clothing took on a golden hue. His attempts to suppress hagiographical tendencies, however, were, given the climate of the times, doomed to scant success. Two other stories seem to contain helpful insights. One concerns the visit to the school of a rival philosopher, Alypius: Ίαμβλίχου δε το έπερωτηθήναι μάλλον ύπομείναντος ή το έπερωτάν, ó Ά λ ύ π ι ο ς π α ρ ά πάσαν ύπόνοιαν άφείς άπασαν φιλόσοφον έρώτησιν, τοϋ δέ θεάτρου γενόμενος, " Ε ί π έ μοι, φιλόσοφε," προς αυτόν εφη "ό πλούσιος ή άδικος ή άδικου κληρονόμος, vai ή οΰ; τούτων γαρ μέσον ουδέν." " N o w Iamblichus was waiting to have questions put to him rather than to ask them, but Alypius, contrary to all expectation, postponed all questioning about philosophy and, giving himself up to making an effect with his audience, said to Iamblichus: 'Tell me, philosopher, is a rich man either unjust or the heir of the unjust, yes or no? For there is no middle course.'" Iamblichus disliked the catch of the question and replied: "άλλ' ούχ ούτός γε," εφη "θαυμασιώτατε πάντων άνδρών, ό τρόπος της ημετέρας διαλέξεως, εΐ τω τι περιττόν έστι κατά τα έκτός, άλλ' εϊ τι πλεονάζει κατά την οίκείαν άρετήν φιλοσοφώ καί πρέπουσαν." "Nay, most admired of men, this is not our method, to discuss anyone who more than other men possesses external things, but rather only one who excels in the virtue that is peculiar and appropriate to a philosopher." 4 3 We have a glimpse of Iamblichus here, seated in the midst of his disciples, awaiting questions. Presumably in more formal discourses he propounded the questions, perhaps picking on an interlocutor, but probably answering them himself. We may note that Iamblichus came to have a high opinion of Alypius, and after his death even wrote his biography. Readers of his 'Life of Pythagoras' will be interested in Eunapius' evaluation of this work (460): τα γεγραμμένα δέ υπό της συνθήκης έμελαίνετο, καί νέφος αύτοΐς έπέτρεχε βαθύ, ου τι δι' άσάφειαν των γενομένων, άλλα διδασκαλικόν είχε 41 42 43

VS 459. ibid. 458. ibid. 460, WRIGHT'S trans. Presumably Alypius was making a provocative allusion to Iamblichus' own position as scion of a wealthy family.

874

JOHN DILLON τον Ά λ υ π ί ο υ λόγον μακρόν τινα, καί διαλέξεων ού προσήν μνήμη λόγον έχουσών. " T h e narrative was obscured by its style and it was hidden by a thick cloud, though not because of any lack of clearness in the subject matter, for his authority was a long discourse of Alypius; moreover, there was no mention of discourses that maintained an argument." (WRIGHT'S t r a n s . ) .

Eunapius expands on this at some length. It is useful testimony to Iamblichus' style and literary practices, which is borne out by his surviving works. 4 4 There is one other incident reported that throws interesting light on the activity of the school (again, relayed by Aedesius, via Chrysanthius, V P 458—9): ήλιος μεν έφέρετο προς του Λέοντος ορια, ήνίκα συνανατέλλει τ ω καλουμένω Κυνί, και θυσίας καιρός η ν ή δέ εύτρέπιστο εν τινι των έκείνου προαστείων. " T h e sun was travelling towards the limits of the Lion at the time when it rises along with the constellation called the Dog. It was the hour for sacrifice, and this had been made ready in one of the suburban villas {proasteia) belonging to Iamblichus." The story concerns a marvellous premonition which came to Iamblichus as he and his companions were walking back to the city after the rites had been duly performed, that a corpse had recently passed by that road. H e then, with his most faithful disciples, turned aside to another road, while the more sceptical went on, including Aedesius. And, lo and behold, not long afterwards they met mourners coming back from a funeral. The story itself must fall under suspicion, if only because it resembles a similar tale told of Socrates by Plutarch in the 'De Gen. Socr.', 580. The circumstances, however, are interesting. We find Iamblichus celebrating the heliacal rising of Sirius (when the Sun is entering Leo), an important feast in Syrian sun worship. It was a movable feast, occurring about July 23rd, 4 5 and the sacrifices probably took place at dawn. It is interesting to note Iamblichus' possession of not one, but several, proasteia, and the Pythagorean abhorrence of death which is part of the point of the story. From the remains of Iamblichus' correspondence preserved by Stobaeus, we can observe a further circle of acquaintances, or admirers, (some at least,

44

And yet Iamblichus did not ignore the question of style. Syrianus (In Hermog. I, 9 , 1 I f f . ) quotes him as follows, from his work Περί κρίσεως τοΰ άριστου λ ό γ ο υ : " T h e striving for brevity should not conflict with clarity, nor should the search for clarity lead one to vulgarity; dignity of style should not lead to outlandish expression, nor the search for the c o m m o n touch be such as to breed contempt, but a certain distinctive superiority should be retained. It is this well-rounded style, adorned with all the beauties of language, that is conspicuously present in the works of H o m e r and Plato and Demosthenes." Admirably put, but alas, no one will ever rank Iamblichus with any of the above-mentioned authors!

45

It is mentioned by Aratus, Phaen. 149—54; cf. Hipparchus, In Arat. et Eudox. II, 1 , 1 8 .

I A M B LI C H U S O F

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prominent in the Imperial administration) 46 to whom discourses, mostly ethical, in epistolary form, might be addressed. As we have seen, by Libanius' time Apamea had acquired fame as a haunt (at least) of Iamblichus, and even in the master's lifetime he is addressed by his unknown correspondent (the Pseudo-Julian), in terms of extravagant reverence. H o w much 'magic' actually went on under Iamblichus' own presidency is not clear, but he does seem to have started a trend which had most mischievous results in later years, until the Athenian School recalled Platonism to some sort of sanity towards the end of the Fourth Century.

II. Works Any attempt to arrange the works of Iamblichus in definite chronological order at the present stage of research is rash in the extreme, and the same may be said of any attempt to trace his philosophical development. In the introduction to my commentary (Iamblichi Fragmenta pp. 18—25), I ventured, nevertheless, to make certain provisional chronological distinctions for the sake of argument, postulating a growth in Chaldaean influence, from the 'De Mysteriis' (which I ranked as early) and the 'Pythagorean Sequence', through the commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, to the 'Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles'. I do not now feel that such a scheme is justified on the evidence. There is Chaldaean influence in the 'De Mysteriis', as FRIEDRICH CREMER has shown, 4 7 and at least the 'Parmenides Commentary', among the Platonic commentaries, shows extensive use of Chaldaean theology as well. Either the 'De Mysteriis' is a relatively late work, then, or Iamblichus was always influenced by the Oracles', even though this does not show in the surviving fragments of his other commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, or in his Pythagorean works. Here I will simply list briefly the more important of his works, in no chronological order: A sequence of ten books on Pythagoreanism, of an introductory nature, beginning with a 'Bios Pythagorikos' — not exactly a life of Pythagoras, but a 'life according to Pythagorean principles' — and continuing with an Exhortation to Philosophy ('Protreptikos'), a work 'On the General Principles of Mathematics', and a commentary on Nicomachus of Gerasa's 'Introduction to Arithmetic', a

46

Dyscolius, recipient of a letter on Ruling, may probably be identified with a man w h o was governor of Syria in c. 323 A . D . (JONES, P L R E I, 275), and the mysterious PseudoJulian was prominent in the entourage of Licinius in the same period ( e . g . 'Julian' E p p . p. 4 0 , a n d 53 HERTLEIN).

47

In the work quoted in n. 31. C f . also É . DES PLACES, Les oracles chaldaïques, in: A N R W II, 17,4, ed. W. HAASE, B e r l i n - N e w Y o r k , 1984, pp. 2 3 1 1 - 2 3 1 3 .

876

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DILLON

work very popular in late antiquity. These are all that now survive, but there were also volumes (planned, at least) on Physics, Ethics, Music, Geometry and Astronomy. 4 7 2 We also have a curious compilation called 'The Theology of Arithmetic', which as it has come down to us is largely a cento of passages from a lost work of Nicomachus' of the same title and of that of Anatolius, Iamblichus' teacher, O n the Decade and the Numbers within It', which survives. This may in fact be, in summary or unfinished form, the work which Iamblichus intended to be seventh in his Pythagorean sequence, as he tells us at In Nie. p. 125, 15ff. PISTELLI. Very little in these books is original to Iamblichus. They are chiefly centos of passages from earlier writers, including Plato and Aristotle, and they have been found useful mainly on that account (large parts of Aristotle's T r o trepticus' have been discerned, with great probability, in Iamblichus' work of the same title, and a nameless 5th century B . C . Sophist is discernible in the same work). All Iamblichus contributes is introductory and bridge-material, useful chiefly from the stylistic and terminological standpoint. For a view of Iamblichus' distinctive philosophy we must turn rather to the remains of his commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, his reply to Porphyry's 'Letter to Anebo', commonly entitled O n the Mysteries of Egypt', 4 8 his treatise O n the Soul' (large fragments of which are preserved by Stobaeus), the 'Chaldaean Theology', in at least twenty-eight books (only a few fragments of which are preserved), a work O n the G o d s ' (which is probably the basis for such works as Sallustius' O n the Gods and the World' and Julian's Fourth and Fifth Orations'), and to a lesser extent his 'Letters', many fragments of which are also preserved by Stobaeus. The fragments of the commentaries on Plato have been collected by B. D . LARSEN ('Jamblique de Chalcis'; 'Appendice') and by myself ('Iamblichi Fragmenta'); those on Aristotle by LARSEN (op. cit.). The 'De Mysteriis' is edited most recently in the Budé series by E. DES PLACES (1966). The fragments of the other works still await collection. Among the commentaries, those on Plato's 'Timaeus' (preserved chiefly by Proclus), and on Aristotle's 'Categories' (preserved by Simplicius) are by far the greatest in extent and importance, though the 'Timaeus Commentary' is much the more important of the two for Iamblichus' philosophy. The 'De Anima', though most of what is preserved is doxographical, contains some important doctrine, as will be seen in the next section. We have fragments of nineteen letters, preserved by Stobaeus, addressed to eleven different recipients, at least three known to be pupils, Sopater, Dexippus and Eustathius, and one, Anatolius, being presumably his old teacher. Of the 'Letters', that to Macedonius 'On Fate' is of greatest phil-

47a

48

For probable extracts from the fifth, sixth and seventh b o o k s , see now D . J . O'MEARA, . N e w Fragments from Iamblichus' Collection of Pythagorean Doctrines, A J P 102 (1981), pp. 2 6 - 4 0 . The actual title in the manuscripts is 'The Reply of the Master A b a m m o n to the Letter of Porphyry to Anebo and the Solutions to the Problems raised therein'. The modern title is actually MARSILIO FICINO'S contribution, and is not an accurate description of the contents.

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osophical importance, followed, perhaps, by that to Sopater O n Dialectic'. There is nothing in these letters to suggest the theurgist or magician; simply the teacher of philosophy giving rather hackneyed advice of a moral nature. As regards the commentaries, it should be said that it is Iamblichus who establishes in its developed form the Neoplatonic commentary as known to us primarily from Proclus. Porphyry had gone a long way in this direction, and is obviously the source of much of the doxographical information found in his successors (we learn from Simplicius [In Cat. p. 2, 9 f f . ] , for example, that Iamblichus in his ' C o m m e n t a r y on the Categories' borrowed wholesale from Porphyry, though frequently criticising his conclusions), but Porphyry did not, it seems, develop fully the doctrine that each source work, particularly in the case of Plato's dialogues (Pr. In T i m . I, 1 9 , 2 4 f f . DIEHL), must have one basic subject matter, or σ κ ο π ό ς , to which all parts of it are related. This leads to bizarre consequences, particularly in relation to the introductory portions of the dialogues, which all now assume an allegorical significance. T h e introductory portions of the 'Timaeus' and the T a r m e n i d e s ' , for instance, are given most elaborate allegorical treatment in Proclus' commentaries, and it is plain that it was Iamblichus who began this. Whence he derived the idea is less clear, though it is possible that Numenius had toyed with it (he wrote a work, after all, on 'The Secret Doctrines of Plato'). T h e remote ancestor of the practice is, of course, the Stoic allegorical exegesis of H o m e r , of which Philo's exegesis of the Pentateuch is another offshoot. It is not quite clear on how many of the works of Plato and Aristotle Iamblichus wrote commentaries. W e have clear attestation only for commentaries on the 'Timaeus' (frequent quotations in Proclus, and a few significant ones in Simplicius 'In Physica'), the 'Parmenides' (ref. by Syrianus, In Met. p. 38, 38) and the 'Phaedrus' (ref. in Proclus Theol. Plat. p. 2 1 5 , 2 7 and quotations of Iamblichus on detailed points in Hermeias' commentary), and fairly clear use by Damascius in the latter part of his ' D u b . et Sol.'), but there are references to comments on points of detail in the 'First Alcibiades' (in Proclus' and O l y m p i o dorus' commentaries) which seem to point to his having commented on this dialogue also. T o these we may add somewhat more general references in Olympiodorus' commentary on the 'Phaedo' and Damascius' commentary on the 'Philebus', and an account of Iamblichus' view of the σ κ ο π ό ς , or subject, of the 'Sophist', in the scholia to that dialogue. In my edition I have ventured to list these as fragments of commentaries, but I recognize that all we can safely speak of is 'comments' on these dialogues, which may have occurred in some more general work. As regards Aristotle the situation is similar. W e have overwhelming evidence (in Simplicius) of a commentary on the 'Categories' (LARSEN has assembled 136 passages), and good evidence for one on the 'Prior Analytics' (in Philoponus and Ammonius), but as regards the ' D e Interpretatione' and the ' D e C á e l o ' the evidence is less clear, though Iamblichus is quoted on points of some detail by Stephanus in his commentary on the ' D e I n t . ' and Simplicius gives us Iamblichus' view of the σ κ ο π ό ς of the ' D e Cáelo' (In D e Cáelo p. l , 2 4 f f . ) . References to Iamblichus by Simplicius and Philoponus in their commentaries on 59

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the 'De Anima' are pretty certainly to Iamblichus' own 'De Anima' rather than to any commentary. 4 9 At any rate, irrespective of the number of works he wrote formal commentaries on, Iamblichus is of basic importance for the development of the forms of later Neoplatonic scholasticism. That he was also of basic importance for the development of its doctrine will be demonstrated in the next section.

III.

Philosophy

Iamblichus' system of philosophy is essentially an elaboration of Plotinus' Platonism, though strongly influenced by Neopythagorean writings and the 'Chaldaean Oracles'. Besides his teacher Anatolius, the writings of the Neopythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa (c. 150 A . D . ) influenced him greatly. We find him making much use of the writings of 'Archytas', for instance, in his 'Commentary on the Categories' and in the 'Protrepticus', and of other Neopythagorean apocrypha. He believed, with Moderatus of Gades, that Plato was essentially a Pythagorean, and he pays great respect to Speusippus for the same reason. Following on the new direction given to philosophy by Plotinus, a sequence of scholastic elaborations of doctrine arose by a sort of natural process. Plotinus' successors, Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Theodorus, are normally dismissed as second-rate and unoriginal. In comparison with Plotinus, certainly they were, but to condemn them absolutely for this is to condemn in the same breath the vast majority of philosophers of all eras and schools who have carried on and elaborated the thought of one great master or another, ironing out inconsistencies in his thought and bringing out in a salutary way various tendencies latent therein. The remarkable method of philosophising favoured by Plotinus was not, so far as we can see, followed by his pupils, at least in their written works. They returned to the business of exegesis, commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, and essays on such ancient subjects as 'The Soul', 'Freewill and Necessity' and 'The Gods', although fortified in their work by the insights gained from contact with Plotinus. As compared with Middle Platonism, the chief developments were the doctrine of the Transcendent One, distinct from and superior to nous, the doctrine of the Hypostases, and the doctrine of Emanation. We say this on the basis of our knowledge, which is incomplete, but pending evidence to the contrary, we may accept it. 5 0 As regards the interpretation of Plato, a far greater

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See on this H . BLUMENTHAL, Did Iamblichus write a commentary on the 'De Anima'?, Hermes 102 (1974), pp. 5 4 0 - 5 5 6 . The concept of the Supreme G o d in Albinus, Didaskalikos ch. 10, and certain doctrines of Philo, Plutarch (particularly the Myth of 'De Genio Socratis'), and Celsus (ap. Origen, C . Celsum VII, 45), as well as a doctrine of emanation which I discern in Nicomachus

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freedom of symbolic interpretation is immediately apparent, together with a concern to make Plato agree, not just with Aristotle or Pythagoras, but with H o m e r , Hesiod, Orpheus and the 'Chaldaean Oracles'. It becomes absolutely necessary that Plato be consistent both with all these inspired authorities, and also with himself. This last had always been a necessity for Platonists; but it becomes a much more strenuous problem now, when the w h o l e of each dialogue becomes infused with higher significance, and especially when, on the authority of Iamblichus, a single, consistent σ κ ο π ό ς is established for each dialogue, to which even the introductory and apparently casual portions must conform.51 W e see the Neoplatonist philosophers, then, working on the basis of a number of sacred, 'inspired' books. T h e Dialogues of Plato, the ' T h e o g o n y ' of Hesiod, the 'Iliad' and O d y s s e y ' , the O r p h i c Poems (probably), the ' Ι ε ρ ό ς Λ ό γ ο ς of Pythagoras, and the 'Chaldaean Oracles'. Within the framework of the consensus of this corpus, one might manoeuvre at will, interpreting, reinterpreting, refining concepts, and refuting one's predecessors. T h e most damning accusation was that of being un-Platonic. Iamblichus accuses Porphyry of this intellectual crime on a number of occasions. 5 2 O n e might also fail to make correct symbolic interpretations, 5 3 and one might confuse concepts, or fail to discriminate them with sufficient finesse. Iamblichus himself is frequently refined further, though rarely contradicted flatly, by Syrianus and the Athenian S c h o o l . 5 4 In this process of dialectical in-fighting, Iamblichus is found in a curious position. O n the one hand he frequently appears as a conservative, repudiating the 'barbarous' innovations of P o r p h y r y 5 5 or the triadic or numerological fantasies of Amelius 5 6 (who was later to be followed, against Iamblichus, by T h e o -

of Gerasa, must make us aware of the limitations of our knowledge (see my 'Middle Platonists', London, 1977, pp. 155ff. [Philo]; 214f. [Plutarch]; pp. 282ff. [Albinus]; p. 356 [Nicomachus]). There are large gaps in our knowledge of the doctrine of Numenius; and the 'Chaldaean Oracles' and the Hermetic corpus were, after all, based on contemporary Platonism of some sort, as LEWY, Chald. Or. Ch. VI, and FESTUGIÈRE, Rév. d'H. T., have argued. On these questions see also DODDS, The Parmenides of Plato and the Neoplatonic One, CQ 22 (1928), pp. 129—42, and my discussion of Moderatus of Gades in 'Middle Platonists', pp. 3 4 6 - 9 . 51

52

53 54

55 56

59"

Indications of Iamblichus' doctrine may be found in his comments recorded at In Tim. Frs. 1 and 25, In Phaedr. Fr. 1, and In Soph. Fr. 1. The doctrine of the skopos presented in Anon. Prol. to Platonic Philosophy, ch. 9 almost certainly goes back, via Proclus, to Iamblichus. See on this the useful discussion of B. D. LARSEN, Jamblique de Chaléis, I pp. 4 3 5 - 4 4 6 . ibid. Fr. 70: άλλοτρίως του Πλάτωνος είσαγομένας; also at Proci. In Tim. I, 307,4, the criticism of Porphyry is probably Iamblichean. Cf. the corresponding accusation of infidelity to Aristotle at Simpl. In Cat. 3 0 2 , 2 5 - 7 ( = Fr. 85 LARSEN). Not preserving the analogia, In Tim. Fr. 21, cf. Fr. 19. E . g . Proci. In Tim. 1,153, 28; 218,13; 441,15; for contradiction, I, 153,28, following Iambi. Fr. 16; I, 218, 11, following Fr. 27; I, 230,17, following Fr. 29; etc. E. g. In Tim. Fr. 16: βαρβαρική άλαζονεία. E. g. In Tim. Fr. 39 (Amelius' triad of demiurges); Fr. 54 (numerological calculations); Fr. 71 (exegesis of Tim. 39E).

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dorus of Asine). O n the other hand, it is plain that Iamblichus devised in many ways a more elaborate theology and metaphysics than Porphyry, and in all important respects laid the foundations for the philosophy of the later Athenian School. One important ideological difference, at least vis-à-vis the l a t e r - P o r p h y r y , author of the 'Letter to Anebo', is Iamblichus' defence and intellectualisation of the practice of 'theurgy' (θεουργία) to supplement 'theology' (θεολογία). We find a defence of his views in his reply to the 'Letter of Anebo', the book 'On the Mysteries of the Egyptians' (usually termed the 'De Mysteriis'). The doctrine that acts, as well as philosophical theorising, are necessary for the freeing of the soul from the bonds of the cosmos, is an obviously magical conception, and as such normally not considered worthy of a philosopher. It is on the basis of Iamblichus' defence of, and practice of, theurgy that he has so often been condemned. What is more worthy of attention, however, is the philosophical justification which he employs in defence of theurgy, and the importance which this has for the sacramental theology of the later Greek Christian Fathers. Let us turn now, however, to consider the chief features of his philosophy, following the ancient division of topics into Physics (including Metaphysics), Ethics, and Logic, and beginning with his doctrine of the supreme principle.

1. Physics A. The One Iamblichus, alone, so far as we know, of the Neoplatonist philosophers, postulated two Ones, or first principles. We find in Damascius, Dub. et Sol. 43 (I p. 86 RUELLE), the following notice: Μετά δε ταύτα έκεϊνο προβαλλώμεθα εις έπίσκεψιν, πότερον δύο είσίν a t πρώται άρχαί προ της νοητής πρώτης τριάδος, ήτε πάντη άρρητος και ή άσύντακτος προς την τριάδα, καθάπερ ήξίωσεν ó μέγας Ίάμβλιχος έν τφ κη ω βιβλίψ της Χαλδαικής τελειότατης θεολογίας, ή ώς οι πλείστοι των μετ' αυτόν έδοκίμασαν, μετά την άρρητον αίτίαν και μίαν είναι την πρώτην τριάδα των νοητών - ή καί ταύτης ύποβησόμεθα της υποθέσεως, κατά δέ τον Πορφύριον έρούμεν την μίαν των πάντων άρχήν είναι τον πατέρα της νοητής τριάδος; "After this let us bring up the following point for consideration, whether the first principles before the first noetic triad are two in number, the completely ineffable, and that which is unconnected to the triad, as is the view of the great Iamblichus in Book 28 of his most excellent 'Chaldaean Theology', or, as the great majority of those after him preferred to believe, that the first triad of the noetic beings follows directly on the ineffable first principle; or shall we descend from this hypothesis and say with

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Porphyry that the first principle of all things is the Father of the noetic triad?" 57 The evidence presented here for Iamblichus' theory is not easy to interpret. Damascius tends to support Iamblichus' view himself, as against Porphyry. What is at issue is the necessity of a second 'first principle' which will preside actively over the generation of everything else. The majority of later philosophers considered that only one principle was necessary. Porphyry indulged in greater economy, and considered the first element (πατήρ) in the noetic triad to be sufficient as a first principle. 58 Damascius thinks that such a principle of generation must be either the εν πάντα, or κοινότερόν τι, and that it is better to adopt Iamblichus' view. He does not explicitly state that Iamblichus was the only one to postulate two first principles, but he fails to mention any other, as he well might have had there been such. What then, did Iamblichus envisage? The problem, I think, stems from the contradiction between an absolutely transcendent One, arrived at by negative contemplation, which can have no direct effect on anything, and a creative first principle. In Plotinus these two aspects of the One are merged, with inevitable tensions; in Porphyry the active first principle, as we see, is made the head of the noetic triad; Iamblichus simply distinguishes two Ones, preserving the first as πάντη άρρητος and postulating a second, presiding over, but not correlated to (άσύντακτος) the noetic triad. This would in effect be the έν πάντα, the subject (for some Neoplatonists) of the Second Hypostasis of the Tarmenides'. 5 9 This seems relatively clear, but in cc. 50 and 51 (I p. 101, l l f f . , and p. 103, 6ff. RUELLE), Damascius reveals that Iamblichus postulated also a dyad, πέρας — άπειρον, between the second One and the noetic realm. In section 50 he is discussing the correctness of postulating a Dyad as the second principle after the Monad, and he quotes various authorities to support this - Orpheus, the 'Chaldaean Oracles', Plato (Philebus 23 C), and Philolaus. He then brings in Iamblichus: δειν ούν φησί τις ίσως προϋποτιθέναι τάς αιτίας καί τοΰ ένός οντος καί της èv αύτω δυαδικής φύσεως των στοιχείων είναι τοίνυν την δ υ ά δ α των άρχων προδιηρημένην τής είρημένης δυάδος αΐτίαν, ώσπερ καί το προ τής δυάδος εν, όπερ ó Ίάμβλιχος τίθεται προ άμφοϊν τοΰ οντος ένός αίτιον προυπάρχειν.

57 58

59

Or "the Father of the noetic triad is the first principle of all things"? This is important evidence for a triad — πατήρ (öv) - ζωή (δύναμις) — ν ο ϋ ς — within the noetic realm already in Porphyry. See also Proci. In Tim. Ill, 64,8ff., where Porphyry's elaborate scheme of interpretation is dependent on this triad. See the first section of Book VI of Proclus' Comm. in Parm. and Proci., Theol. Plat., Intro, to Vol. I, p. LXXXII SAFFREY—WESTERINK. For Plotinus the second hypothesis chiefly describes N o u s , but he uses some of its formulations to describe the One in its positive aspect. See DODDS, The Parmenides of Plato . . ., C Q 22 (1928).

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. . . (101,21) τοιαύτα γαρ ελεγε και ó την Ίαμβλίχου πρεσβεύων άρχήν μέσην τιθεμενην των τε δυείν και της άρρητου παντελώς. "One may perhaps say that one must assume as preliminary the causal principles of both the One-Existent and the dyadic structure of the elements inherent in it; the dyad of first principles has, then, a distinct existence, prior to the dyad which had just been mentioned, even as there exists also the One before the Dyad, which Iamblichus postulates before both, to be the cause of the One-Existent." . . . "For such would be the argument of one who accepts the first principle proposed by Iamblichus, which is situated between the two (principles) and the totally ineffable (One)." In ch. 51, still on the same subject, but concentrating now more on the One prior to the Dyad, Damascius writes as follows (I p. 103, 6ff. RUELLE): και γαρ ή μία αρχή προ των δυείν, αΰτη μεν ούν το άπλώς εν, ô μέσον ó Ίάμβλιχος τίθεται των δύο άρχων καί της παντάπασιν απορρήτου έκείνης, αί δε δύο, πέρας φέρε καί άπειρον, ή και εί βούλεταί τις, εν και πολλά, άλλα το άντικείμενον εν τοις πολλοίς, ού το προ άμφοϊν καί άναντίθετον. "For indeed the one first principle is prior to the two; and this is the 'simply One', which Iamblichus postulates in between the two first principles and that absolutely ineffable (first principle). These two principles may be termed Limit and the Unlimited, or, if one wishes, One and Many, the O n e ' here to be taken as O n e ' as opposed to 'Many', not the One which is prior to both these and has nothing opposed to it." It looks from this very much as if we must fit in two further principles, derived primarily from the πέρας and άπειρον of the 'Philebus' (17Cff.) between the Second One and the noetic realm. On this scheme, the εν öv or άεί öv at the summit of the noetic realm will be the μικτόν resulting from the concerted action of these two principles, the Second One serving as the mixing agent, while the First One sits in unspeakable splendour above all this. 60 The Realm of the One in Iamblichus' metaphysics is now, I think, complete. In contrast with the simplicity of Plotinus' One, 6 1 we seem to have the following elaborate scheme:

60

61

The second O n e and the D y a d of peras and apeiron appear in Fr. 7 of Iamblichus' 'Timaeus Commentary' (Proci. In Tim. I, 78, 6f. έπεί γαρ πάντα καί έκ τοΰ ένός έστι καί έκ της μετά τό εν δυάδος). The above references to Iamblichus do not seem to be from his 'Parmenides Commentary', but rather from his 'Chaldaean Theology' or his 'Platonic Theology'. What scheme Iamblichus used in his exegesis of the First Hypothesis of the 'Parmenides' we cannot be sure. C f . A . H . ARMSTRONG, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Cambridge, 1940 (repr. Amsterdam, 1967), esp. chs. I and II.

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The First One (παντελώς άρρητον) The Second One (το άπλώς εν, προ της δυάδος, άσύντακτον προς την [νοητήν] τριάδα)

Limit (πέρας)

The Unlimited (το άπειρον)

The One Existent (το εν öv) It is an interesting question how far Iamblichus is responsible for the elaborate system of henads which make their appearance in Proclus (e.g. ETh. prr. 113 — 165). Proclus' account of Iamblichus' interpretation of the first hypothesis of the 'Parmenides' (In Parm. 1054, 34ff. and 1066, 16ff. COUSIN) would seem to indicate that Iamblichus in fact postulated henads in the realm of the One, with which he equated the gods. 62 What Proclus actually accuses Iamblichus of is postulating that the First Hypothesis concerns not just the One, but 'God and the gods'. These 'gods' Proclus then proceeds to refer to repeatedly as 'henads' (1055,1; 1066,22; 1067,4—5, etc.). This could be just loose talk, but we can gather from this evidence, as well as that of Damascius in Dub. et Sol. ch. 100 (I p. 257, 20ff. RUELLE), that Iamblichus saw the gods as ύπερούσιοι, above the realm of Being, and so in the realm of the One. They therefore qualify as henads in at least one later sense, whether he used that term for them or not. SAFFREY and WESTERINK (op. cit. supra, n. 62) are prepared to admit that Iamblichus probably used the term, but they produce powerful evidence to show that he also regarded the gods as νοητά, objects of intellection, and thus not henads in the strict (Syrianic) sense. The evidence of Damascius (Dub. et Sol. sects. 59, 67, 68, 69, 99) is particularly clear on this point. I would, therefore, retreat from my earlier confident assertion that Iamblichus invented the doctrine of henads. All he can be regarded as doing is paving the way for it, and his referring to the gods as 'henads' must, as SAFFREY and WESTERINK suggest

62

See on this question my article 'Iamblichus and the Origin of the Doctrine of Henads', Phronesis 17 (1972), pp. 102—6 (repr. as Appendix Β of 'Iamblichi Fragmenta'), and contra, SAFFREY and W E S T E R I N K , Intro, to Vol. Ill of Proclus, Theol. Plat., pp. X V I I XL.

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(op. cit. p. X L ) , be taken in a non-technical sense, as 'unities'. The placing of the objects of intellection above the realm of Being, however, is a distinctive development. One may see in all this a scholastic working-out of the implications of the Plotinian scheme — the contradiction between what ARMSTRONG (loc. cit.) calls the Negative and the Positive One, and the necessity for fitting in the Pythagorean-Platonic Unlimited Dyad at some point in the scheme of first principles in such a way as to be inferior to the One. As regards the supreme principle, we find a somewhat simpler scheme set out in the De Mysteriis V I I I , 2, presented as the wisdom of Hermes (although it does not reflect the teachings of any of the surviving works of the 'Hermetic Corpus'). It does not necessarily represent Iamblichus' own doctrine in its fullest complexity, even at an earlier stage of his development. Nevertheless, we find here too a distinction between two gods, one absolutely transcendent, the other still a primal cause, but in a more active relationship with the rest of existence. The passage is worth translating: Π ρ ο των όντως όντων καί των όλων άρχων έστι θ ε ό ς εις, |πρώτιστος+ καί του πρώτου θεοϋ καί βασιλέως, άκίνητος εν μονότητι της έαυτοϋ ένότητος μένων. Ο ΰ τ ε γαρ νοητόν α ύ τ ώ έπιπλέκεται οΰτε άλλο τι" παράδειγμα δε ιδρυται τοϋ αύτοπάτορος αύτογόνου καί μονοπάτορος θεοϋ τοϋ όντως άγαθοϋ" μείζον γάρ τι καί πρώτον καί πηγη των πάντων καί πυθμήν τών νοουμένων πρώτων ιδεών όντων. " P r i o r to the true realities and the universal principles (sc. the Forms), is One God, pre-cause 63 of the primal God and King, remaining motionless in the aloneness of his own oneness. For no object of intellect (νοητόν) is attached to him, nor is anything else; he is established as the model for the self-fathering, self-generating and only-fathered G o d who is the true G o o d ; 6 4 for he is something greater, and primal, and fount of all things, and the base for the primal objects of intellect, which are the Ideas." From this primal entity proceeds (έαυτόν έξέλαμψε) the ruler of all, described as "self-sufficient, self-father and self-ruler (άυτοπάτωρ καί αύτάρχης), first cause and G o d of Gods, monad from the One, prior to existence (προούσιος) and cause of existence". Both these Gods are prior to what one would identify as a Demiurge in the Middle Platonic sense. This role is filled in the next section by the ruler of the celestial gods, whom 'Hermes' terms 'Emeph.'. H e is "mind thinking itself and turning its thoughts towards itself", the Aristotelian self-thinking nous of Middle Platonism. This entity plainly presides 63

64

I read προαίτιος with SCOTT, against DES PLACES' πρώτιστος, as being actually nearer the mss. πρωτιος (some scribe might conceivably have contracted προαι — into πρω or πρω), and giving better sense. I preserve the turgid jargon. I am suspicious of the conjunction of epithets αύτοπάτορος αύτογόνου καί μονοπάτορος θεού τοϋ όντως άγαθοϋ. Μονοπάτορος in particular seems difficult. Perhaps μονοπάτωρ, referring to the primal entity, would make better sense. However, the theological situation is not affected.

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over the intelligible realm, drawing inspiration from its own άμερές, which is declared to be το πρώτον νοούν καί το πρώτον νοητόν. This might be taken to correspond to το εν öv of Iamblichus' more developed scheme, or the monad of the intelligible realm (see below). We seem to have in fact, then, in B o o k VIII of the ' D e Mysteriis', a system of three entities, more or less corresponding to the First and Second O n e s outlined above, and to the Demiurge whom we shall meet in a moment. There is also mention of a πρώτον νοητόν, which can be taken as the Intelligible Monad. All that is missing is the dyad of Limit and Unlimitedness, and any mention of henads. But Iamblichus is professing to interpret Egyptian theology here, not to give his own doctrine.

B . The Intelligible Realm 6 5 a) The Intelligible Realm Following upon the realm of the O n e , we come to that of N o u s . The first principle to be noted is the following (In Tim. Fr. 54 DILLON): πάσης τάξεως ή άμέθεκτος ή γ ε ι τ α ι μονάς προ των μετεχομένων. " E v e r y order is presided over by the unparticipated monad, prior to the participated entities". Once again, contradictions kept in solution in the more vital philosophy of Plotinus are brought into the open by the more scholastic minds of his successors. There is a necessity, on the one hand, for participation of the lower orders in the higher, that the process of πρόοδος — επιστροφή may take place, and on the other for the higher orders to be essentially pure and unmixed in themselves. B y employing the formula that the higher orders can give of themselves to the lower without themselves being affected, as the sun gives off its heat and light, Plotinus staved off the problem. M o r e vigorous analysis, however, created the necessity for three aspects or 'moments' of each hypostasis which represented (a) the hypostasis in its purest form, as opposed to (b) the hypostasis as participated in by a lower level of being, and (c) the hypostasis as reflected in the lower level of being; the three levels were termed άμέθεκτος (unparticipated), μετεχόμενος (participated) and κατά μέθεξιν or εν σχέσει (in participation or relation). In the realm of N o u s , Iamblichus postulates, as his 'ruling', unparticipated Monad,, το εν öv. This he also terms το άεί öv, and identifies it with Aeon and the Paradigm. In In Tim. Fr. 29, discussing the passage 'τί το öv άεί' κ. τ. λ. (Tim. 2 7 D ) Iamblichus gives his view of το άεί öv as κρεϋττον καί τών γενών του οντος καί τών ιδεών, positioned έπ' άκρω της νοητής ουσίας, and πρώτως μετέχον του ενός. F o r this entity he draws support from the second hypothesis of the

65

I have chosen " r e a l m " as a technical term to translate the words kosmos or

diakosmos.

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Tarmenides' (142 Β ff.), and from the 'Sophist 5 (244Bff.). It is important that there be some aspect of each realm that partakes πρώτως, "primarily", of the prior realm, in order to provide as smooth a transition as possible in the procession of Being. It is, indeed, a striving for the clarification of the steps in this invincibly mysterious πρόοδος that is the chief cause for the multiplication of entities in post-Plotinian Platonism. Iamblichus' view of this monad of the intelligible world requires some elaboration. In Damascius' 'Dub. et Sol.' we have a remarkable reference to his doctrine on its knowability, whether from his Tarmenides Commentary' or not is unclear to me. (Dub. et Sol. Ch. 70 = I p . 1 5 1 , 1 8 F F . , RUELLE):

ότι μεν τοίνυν οΰτε δόξη οΰτε διανοία οΰτε ν φ τω ψυχικφ, ούτε νοήσει μετά λόγου περιληπτόν, άλλ' ούδε τή τοϋ νου παντελει περιωπή, οΰτε τω άνθει τοϋ νου αίρετόν, οΰτε επιβολή όλως, οΰτε κατά έπέρεισιν ώρισμένην, οΰτε κατά περίληψιν, οΰτε τινά τοιούτον τρόπον έκεινο γνωστόν, συγχωρητέον ταϋτα άξιοϋντι τ ω μεγάλω Ίαμβλίχω. This is disconcerting, particularly the denial that it is beyond the grasp even of the άνθος τοϋ νοϋ, which one would have thought to be precisely the faculty which could grasp it. That was what the 'Chaldaean Oracles' declared, after all: εστι γάρ τι νοητόν, ο χρή σε νοεΐν νόου άνθει: ( F r . 1 DES PLACES)

Iamblichus faced this objection (ibid. 154, 7ff.). He claimed that the Oracle meant that the νοητόν was before the mind as an object of striving (έφετόν), not of knowledge, and that it did not fill the mind with knowledge, but with being and with 'complete and intelligible perfection' (όλη καί νοητή τελειότης). This determined denial of knowability to the noeton is the result of Iamblichus' firm distinction of the roles of the three elements of the noetic triad. Knowing could only really begin with nous proper (see below). A fragment of his 'Phaedrus' Commentary throws light on his doctrine here. In Phaedr. Fr. 6 identifies the "helmsman" of Phaedr. 247 C with the 'One' of the Soul. It is presumably this faculty, τό εν τής ψυχής, that is able to achieve an intuition of the intelligible monad. Iamblichus does not actually state this, but says that it is by the One of the Soul that we achieve unity with the Gods (τό γαρ εν τής ψυχής ένούσθαι τοις θεοίς πέφυκεν). If it can grasp the Gods, however, it should be able to deal with the noeton. A good deal of Damascius' doctrine in Dub. et. Sol. cc. 55—69 on the εν öv probably derives from Iamblichus. He has a number of references to Iamblichus in this section, and ends (c. 69, p. 151, 5ff.) with an assertion κατά τον Ίάμβλιχον τα σεμνότατα των είρημένων άνατεθείκαμεν. It seems as if the One Existent or monad of the intelligible realm is in fact identical with the lowest entity of the realm of the One, the μικτόν, also termed εν öv, and they are to be distinguished only for the purposes of exposition. In general, it is an Iamblichean principle that the monad or highest element in any realm is situated equally in the realm above that which it presides

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over (this would accord with the fact that he regarded the class of gods or 'henads' as νοητά, as we have seen above). The O n e Existent is prior to both oneness and existence, which it dispenses to the first intelligible triad, to which we will turn in a moment. First, however, we may consider the O n e Existent as Aeon, or Eternity. b) Aeon A s Aeon (Αίών), το εν öv serves as a measure (μέτρον) for the noetic realm (In Tim. Fr. 65) in the same way that Time (Χρόνος) is a measure for the psychic and material realms. We may suspect that the definition of Aeon owes much to the definition of Time in relation to the Soul, but in the system Time is, of course, the image of Aeon (see In Tim. Frr. 63 and 64). DODDS, in discussing prop. 53 of Proclus' 'Elements of Theology', makes the suggestion that there may have been another influence at work, besides abstract scholastic tidiness, in the hypostatisation of A e o n : " A deified Α ί ώ ν (probably in origin a Hellenised form of the Persian G o d Zervan) has a prominent place not only in Gnostic and Hermetic speculation 6 6 and in the magical papyri, but in the sacred b o o k of later Neoplatonism, the O r a c u l a Chaldaica' (cf. In Tim. I l l 14.3); and Proclus accordingly calls αίών 'an intelligible g o d ' (ibid. I l l 1 3 . 2 3 ) . " DODDS goes on to admit the likelihood that "the immediate source of much of what Proclus has to say (at the beginning of B o o k IV) about Time and Eternity is Iamblichus", particularly in view of Fr. 64. The honour accorded to Aeon (and Time) would certainly seem to support the suggestion that some such influence is at work. The Egyptian concept of ma at, as the timeless condition in which the gods live, also comes to mind as a possible influence.

c) The Paradigm Whatever about Aeon, the Paradigm is a purely Platonic entity, although subject to varying interpretations throughout later Platonism. With the Paradigm, in Iamblichus' metaphysics, is bound up the question of the identity of the Demiurge, a problem which was much debated in later Platonism. 6 7 In In T i m . Fr. 35, in the exegesis of Tim. 2 8 C f f . , he defines the Paradigm as αυτό το όπερ ov, only το εν being above it. The Paradigm, then, is the highest element in the noetic world, seen in another light. This habit of referring to the same principle in different ways to suit different contexts (or, in a commentary, different lemmata) is a feature of Neoplatonic exegesis which can prove bewildering.

66

67

Cf. Corpus Hermeticum XI, 2, where we find aion and cbronos presiding over kosmos and genesis respectively. Also Asclep. 10. See my article Tlotinus Enn. Ill 9,1 and Later Views of the Intelligible World', TAPA 100 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 63 — 70 a n d WERNER D E U S E , D e r D e m i u r g bei P o r p h y r i o s u n d I a m b l i c h ,

in: Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus (WdF 436), ed. C. ZINTZEN, Darmstadt, 1977, pp. 2 3 8 - 2 7 7 .

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d) The Intelligible Triad This entity is also the first element in the 'intelligible triad'. Even in Plotinus 68 we find mention of ov, ζωή, and νους in conjunction, but they are not formalised into three hypostases (or m o m e n t s of an hypostasis). Already in Porphyry, however, it seems that they were so formalised. 69 In Iamblichus, we see the three moments clearly distinguished in In Tim. Fr. 65 (on Tim. 38 A) where χρόνος is said to derive different qualities from ov, ζωή, and νους respectively, and also in In Ale. Fr. 8 (= Olymp. In Ale. 110, 13ff. C R E U Z E R ) , where an interesting doctrine of the extent of the influences of three moments is propounded. The prompting for this distinction, to the scholastic mind, comes from a much-quoted passage of the Sophist, 248E, where the Eleatic Stranger says: τί δέ προς Διός; ώς άληθώς κίνησιν και ζωήν και φρόνησιν ή φαδίως πεισθηοόμεθα τω παντελώς οντι μή παρεϊναι, μηδέ ζήν αυτό μηδέ φρονεΐν, άλλα σεμνόν καί αγιον, νουν ουκ εχον, άκίνητον έστός είναι; H o w can one have Absolute Being without Life and Mind? And how, therefore, can one have Mind without Absolute Being and Life? It is not improbable, indeed, that a stimulus to the hypostatisation of ζωή came from the Gnostic and Hermetic systems, where it appears as a divine Principle, 70 but, as we see, a source could be found in Plato. In Damascius' 'Commentary on the Philebus', sect. 1 0 5 , p. 5 1 W E S T E R I N K (Comm. In Phileb. Fr. 4) we find the statement that Iamblichus located in the καθαρός νους, the first element of the noetic triad, the m o n a d s of the Forms, by which he meant το έκαστου (εϊδους) άδιάκριτον, not the Forms themselves, which would reside properly in the third element, Nous proper. This seems to be his position in the treatise Περί Θεών, as quoted by Proclus, Plat. Theol. 1 , 1 1 , p. 5 2 S A F F R E Y — W E S T E R I N K . It also appears from In Phileb. Fr. 7 that Iamblichus held that the three aspects of the Good, as described in Philebus 64A—65A, Beauty, Symmetry and Truth, manifested themselves in, or 'adorned', the πατρικός νους. What distinction Iamblichus made between the monad of the intelligible world and the first element of the intelligible triad is not always clear, to me at any rate. He did, however, distinguish them. e) Other Triads In the extant portions of his commentaries, Iamblichus gives no indication that he had developed the more elaborate structuring of reality exhibited later in the Athenian School, but there is some indication of this in an essay of his to which Proclus makes reference, ' O n the Speech of Zeus in the Timaeus', which 68 69 70

Enn. I, 6,7; V, 4,2 fin. ; V, 6,6. Cf. Proci. In Tim. Ill, 64,8ff., a most remarkable passage (see also n. 54 above). See D O D D S , Elements of Theology, p. 253.

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gives a glimpse of more complicated structurings. Iamblichus, in his 'Timaeus Commentary' (Fr. 34), had declared the Demiurge to encompass the whole intelligible realm (see below). Proclus, at In Tim. I 308,18ff. quotes against him his position in this essay, in which "he allots to the Demiurge the third rank among the Fathers in the intellectual hebdomad (νοερά έβδομάς), after the noetic triads and the three triads of the intelligible-intellectual gods". 7 1 It is plain from this that Iamblichus, at least in this essay, and presumably in his 'Chaldaean Theology', both of which may belong to a later stage of his development than the 'Timaeus Commentary', had developed a theological scheme, based on the Chaldaeari Oracles, hardly less elaborate than that of the Athenian School. According to this we have, following on (three) intelligible triads, three further triads of an intermediate realm, termed (by later philosophers, at least) the intelligible-intellectual, and then an intellectual hebdomad. These triads seem to arise out of the three moments of the hypostasis of Nous, Ό ν , Ζωή and Νους, by a process analogous to that of mutually reflecting mirrors, each moment itself splitting into moments. Proclus here states that Iamblichus placed the Demiurge as third among the 'Fathers', the first triad of the intellectual hebdomad. This implies that Iamblichus recognised also the triad of gods called άμείλικτοι, and below these a curious entity termed 'the membrane', ó ύπεζωκώς, identified in Chaldaean theology with Hecate. All this is hard to accept, perhaps, as it has always been considered a distinctive development of the Athenian School, but Proclus here seems unequivocally to attribute the whole doctrine to Iamblichus. f) The Demiurge In some way encompassing all this triad (or these triads) is the Demiurge. This was a distinctive theory of Iamblichus, in which he looks back to Plotinus. Amelius postulated three demiurges, and Porphyry wishes to make the Demiurge the hypercosmic soul, with nous as the 'Paradigm'. 7 2 In In Tim. Fr. 34, however, we find the following statement by Iamblichus: την όντως ούσίαν και των γιγνομένων άρχήν καΐ τα νοητά τοΰ κόσμου παραδείγματα, ον γε καλούμεν νοητόν κόσμον, και ο σας αιτίας προυπάρχειν τιθέμεθα των εν τη φύσει πάντων, ταύτα πάντα ó νυν ζητούμενος θεός δημιουργός εν ένί συλλαβών ύφ' έαυτόν εχει. "Real Existence and the beginning of created things and the intelligible paradigms of the cosmos, which we term the intelligible cosmos, and such causes as we declare to pre-exist all things in Nature, all these things the Demiurge-God whom we are now seeking gathers into one and holds within himself." 71

72

That we should supply (νοητών καί) before ν ο ε ρ ώ ν is made clear by the remarks of the scholiast ad. loc. FESTUGIÈRE, in his trans. (II p. 164, n. 3), suggests more extensive emendations, τάς ν ο η τ ό ς (τρεις) τριάδας, and εν τη νοερφ έ β δ ό μ ( η τ ρ ι ) ά δ ι , but this latter phrase is rather peculiar Greek, as well as philosophically unnecessary. For all this see my article, 'Plot. Enn. ILL 9 , 1 . . cit. (n. 67) and DEUSE, op. cit. n. 67.

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Proclus takes this as meaning that Iamblichus calls the whole intelligible realm the Demiurge (πάντα τον νοητόν κόσμον άποκαλεΐ δημιουργόν, I 307, 17f.), but the quotation before us does not seem to warrant such a judgement. Iamblichus declares that the Demiurge "gathers into one and holds in subjection to himself" the intelligible realm. From Iamblichus' point of view, it was necessary that the creator of the material world should have under his control all the forces of the intelligible world. Νους by itself, on this scheme, can only create the Intelligence of intelligent beings. It must be left to ζωή to create Life, and to το öv to be responsible for mere Being. This idea, that the higher on the scale of being an hypostasis or entity is, the lower down on the scale is its extension, is first formulated clearly by Proclus, in Ε. T. Prop. 57 (πάν αίτιον καί προ του αιτιατού ενεργεί καί μετ' αυτό πλειόνων έστίν ύποστατικόν), but it can be traced back to Syrianus, In Metaph. 59,17 (see D O D D S , Ε. T. p. 230—1). In speaking of the relation to the One to Being, he says: το γαρ εν ΰπερ το [μή] ôv καί συν τω οντι καί έπί τάδε του οντος, ώς έπί της υλης καί της στερήσεως. "For the One is both higher than Being and co-ordinate with it and extends beyond it, as for instance to Matter and Negativity." (The μή is to be deleted, with KROLL, as absurd; έπί τάδε, of course, has the signification "on this side", "in our direction".) In Comm. In Ale. Fr. 8 (ap. Ol. In Ale. 110) we can see Iamblichus' version of this theory, applied within the hypostasis of Nous. He held that the higher principles do not extend f u r t h e r than the lower down the scale of Being, for all the principles extend to the ultimate depths, but the influence of the higher principles is 'more piercing' (δριμυτέρα). We learn from Damascius Dub. et Sol. ch. 278 (II, p. 149, 25f. RUELLE = In Parm. Fr. 6 A) that Iamblichus situated τα γένη του οντος in the Demiurge.

C. The Psychic Realm Before considering the Soul itself, I wish to examine two passages (In Tim. Frr. 55 and 56) in which Iamblichus discusses the relation of Intellect to the psychic realm. In the exegesis of the passage Tim. 36 C (καί τή κατά ταύτα εν ταύτω περιαγομένη κινήσει πέριξ αύτάς έλαβεν), Iamblichus takes the motion here described not as referring to the Soul, as had his predecessors, but to Intellect. Soul participates 73 Intellect καθόσον έστί νοερά, and through it is joined to the Divine Intellect. The Intellect which Soul participates is participated or non-separable Intellect (νους μεθεκτός, άχώριστος). It is a necessary intermediary between Soul and the 'separate' Intellect, νους χωριστός, with which 73

In this transitive use of "participate" I follow the precedent of DODDS (see p. 4 n. 1 of the 'Elements of Theology'). Thus used, it is a convenient technical term.

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the Soul can have no direct contact. This is made clearer in Fr. 56 74 where the νους χωριστός is depicted as enclosing the two Souls, while the participated Intellect mingles with them and directs them, and is the intermediary through which Soul is united to the Demiurge. We see here again the three moments of any hypostasis in post-Plotinian metaphysics (the third moment of Intellect, νους κατά μέθεξιν, is merely the second moment, νους μεθεκτός, considered as operating in Soul). In Fr. 50 (ad Tim. 34B: ψυχήν δε είς το μέσον αύτοϋ θείς, κ. τ. λ.) we find Iamblichus interpreting the Soul described in this passage as the άμέθεκτος ψυχή, έξηρημένη και ύπερκόσμιος και απόλυτος και πάσιν ένεξουσιάζουσα, a characteristically Iamblichean string of epithets. This Soul is set above all the souls in the cosmos as a monad (ύπερ πάσας τάς έγκοσμίους ώς μονάδος τεταγμένης), this monad being the transcendent source of both the Soul of the Cosmos and the individual souls (cf. In Tim. Fr. 54). a) Time The internal structure of the psychic realm has also to accommodate Transcendent Time (ό έξηρημένος χρόνος), which holds the same position in the psychic realm as Aeon holds in the noetic. Time is the subject of In Tim. Frr. 62—68, of which 62, 63, 67 and 68 are from Simplicius. Here we see Iamblichus concerned primarily with the essence of t r a n s c e n d e n t time. Fr. 62 is simply an argument against the Aristotelian definition of Time as Motion. In Fr. 63 we find him identifying Time 'in activity' with the διακόσμησις which is the immanent agent of the ordering of the universe. In a phrase which caught the attention of Proclus (III 30, 30ff.) he declares that it can be described as a τάξις, not as ταττομένη, but as τάττουσα, not as the ordered thing, but as the ordering force. He lays stress on its creation s i m u l t a n e o u s l y with the heavens (διακόσμων άμα ούρανόν π ο ι ε ί . . . Tim. 37D). Time proceeds not άπό της ψυχής κινήσεως ή ζωής but άπό τής προϊούσης άπό του δημιουργού νοερός διακοσμήσεως. It is not a subjective phenomenon, but a real hypostasis. The last statement is amplified in a most interesting manner by fr. 65, where the three separate qualities which Time derives from the three hypostases of the noetic world's ov, ζωή, and νούς (all of which are encompassed by the Demiurge), are enumerated, albeit in a somewhat strained interpretation of the lemma Tim. 38 A. Fr. 64 describes in some detail how Time reflects Aeon, whose image (είκών) in the extended world it is. Time, indeed, is the first, the highest image, since Aeon itself cannot be an image of the One, of which there can be no image. Frr. 67 and 68 add to this discussion of time as an Image. 75

74

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Ad Tim. 36C: και τον μεν εξω, τον δε έντός έποιεϊτο των κύκλων, την μεν ούν εξω φοράν έπεφήμισεν είναι τής ταύτού φύσεως, την δέ έντός τής θατέρου. On Iamblichus' doctrine of Time, see S . SAMBURSKY and S . P I N E S , The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism (The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities), Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 12 — 17, where the matter is well set out.

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b) Space The discussion of Time raises the problem of Space, since Time operates in spatial extension. We know Iamblichus' views on Space not only from In Tim. Fr. 90, from Book V of his 'Timaeus Commentary' (preserved by Simplicius), but also from his 'Commentary on the Categories' (ad. Ar. Cat. 9, 11 b 10— 16), preserved once again, by Simplicius (in Cat. p. 361, 7—364, 35). In the 'Timaeus' Iamblichus seems to have declined to recognise any reference to physical space, or to the material world before the introduction of the υποδοχή in Tim. 48Eff. Space, in its essence, is συμφυής τοις σώμασιν. It is therefore reasonable that Timaeus should introduce the discussion of it along with the first creation of bodies. Space should not be considered apart from its αιτία, apart from the Demiurgic plan. Iamblichus thus dismisses the theories of Space of Aristotle and the Atomists. What definition, then, he asks, would best express its essential character? (ή) ή δύναμιν αυτόν σωματοειδή τιθεμένη τήν άνέχουσαν τα σώματα και διερείδουσαν καί πίπτοντα μεν άνεγείρουσαν διασκορπίζοντα δέ συνάγουσαν, συμπληροϋσαν δε αυτά άμα καί περιέχουσαν πανταχόθεν. This is a description of Space as a δύναμις σωματοειδής (but not itself material), which maintains, separates and surrounds σώματα. Τόπος is not actually mentioned in the 'Timaeus' until 52 Α (γιγνόμενόν τε εν τινι τόπω) and I tentatively take fr. 90 as a comment on that passage. In the 'Categories Commentary', Iamblichus presents, in respect of Space as of everything else, what Simplicius calls a νοερά θεωρία (pp. 2,13; 361,7), an 'intellectual interpretation' (though 'transcendental' might better, I think, catch the force of this epithet here). 76 Basing himself here, as he does throughout his commentary, on the authority of 'Archytas', he declares that Space, as being the force encompassing (περιέχων) bodies, is superior to them, even as Soul is superior to the physical world, and Intellect to Soul. Iamblichus even seems prepared to state (363, 34ff.) that space is a manifestation of divinity (that is, of the One) at the level of the physical world, "since it has the form of unity (ένοειδής) and holds all things together in itself, as well as perfectly limiting the universe according to one measure" (trans. SAMBURSKY). This concept of Space is remarkable, and in stark contrast to the doctrine of Aristotle and the Stoics, which indeed Iamblichus sharply criticises. It owes its origin, probably, to creative exegesis of Plato's presentation of the Receptacle in the 'Timaeus' as being both the "place" (χώρα) of things, and at the same time (under the guidance of the Demiurge) the structuring principle of them. The entity which Plato portrays both as receptacle and as nurse — a remarkable blend of passive and active — certainly lends itself to such developments as that of Iamblichus here. His doctrine in turn was influential in shaping those of Syrianus and Proclus, as SAMBURSKY shows (op. cit. pp. 18-21).

76

O n Iamblichus' doctrine of Space, see now S. SAMBURSKY, The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 15 — 17, and texts, pp. 42 — 51.

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c) The Individual Soul Before leaving the psychic, or intellectual realm, we must examine Iamblichus' theory of the individual soul, and its relation to the body. In this matter, the surviving evidence of the Platonic Commentaries will be considerably clarified by that of the 'De Anima'. There we see Iamblichus firmly setting himself in opposition, on a number of questions, to a group in which are included Plotinus and Porphyry. The first passage (ap. Stob. I p. 365, 7ff. WACHS.) concerns the nature of the Soul: είσί δή τίνες, oí πάσαν την τοιαύτην ούσίαν όμοιομερή και την αυτήν καΐ μίαν αποφαίνονται, ώς καί έν ότωούν αυτής μέρει είναι τα ολα" (. . .) καί τάγαθόν καί πάντα τα πρεσβύτερα γένη αυτής ένιδρύουσι καί έν πασιν ωσαύτως πάντα είναι αποφαίνονται, οίκείως μέντοι κατά τήν αυτών ούσίαν έν έκάστοις. raí ταύτης τής δόξης άναμφισβητήτως μεν έστι Νουμήνιος, ου πάντη δε ομολογουμένως Πλωτίνος, άστάτως δέ έν αυτή φέρεται Άμέλιος. Πορφύριος δε ένδοιάζει περί αυτήν, πή μεν διατεταμένως αυτής άφιστάμενος, πή δέ συνακολουθών αυτή, ώς παραδοθείση άνωθεν, κατά δή ταύτην νού καί θεών καί τών κρειττόνων γενών ούδεν ή ψυχή διενήνοχε κατά γε τήν όλην ούσίαν. Having thus put all his immediate predecessors in one camp, basically asserting that the Soul is in no way different from the classes of Being higher than it, Nous, the gods and daemons, and even The Good, he attaches himself, though in a somewhat oblique way, to the contrary view (p. 365, 22ff.): Ά λ λ α μήν ή γε προς ταύτην άνθισταμένη δόξα χωρίζει μεν τήν ψυχήν, ώς άπό νού γενομένην δευτέραν καθ' έτέραν ύπόστασιν, το δέ μετά νού αύτής έξηγεϊται ώς έξηρτημένον άπό τοΰ νού, μετά τού κατ' ιδίαν ύφεστηκέναι αυτοτελώς, χωρίζει δέ αύτήν καί άπό τών κρειττόνων γενών ολων, 'ίδιον δέ αύτή τής ούσίας ορον άπονέμει ήτοι τό μέσον τών μεριστών καί άμερίστων (τών τε σωματικών καί ά)σωμάτων γενών, ή τό πλήρωμα τών καθόλου λόγων, ή τήν μετά τάς ιδέας ύπηρεσίαν τής δημιουργίας, ή ζωήν παρ' εαυτής εχουσαν τό ζήν τήν άπό νού νοητού προελθούσαν, ή τήν αύ τών γενών όλου τού όντως οντος πρόοδον εις ύποδεεστέραν ούσίαν. "The doctrine opposed to this, however, makes the soul a separate entity, inasmuch as it is generated second after Intellect as a different hypostasis, and that part of it which is accompanied by Intellect is explained as dependent on the Intellect, along with the power of subsisting independently on its own, and it separates the soul also from all the classes of being superior to itself, and assigns to it, as the particular definition of its essence, either the mean between the divisible and indivisible, the corporeal and the incorporeal, beings or the totality of the universal reason-principles, or that which, after the ideas, is at the service of the work of creation, or that Life which has life of itself, which proceeds from Intellect, or again the procession of the classes of Real Being as a whole to an inferior substance." 60

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This, says Iamblichus, is the doctrine of Plato himself and Pythagoras, and of Aristotle and άρχαΐοι πάντες, if one interprets their statements μετ' επιστήμης. The long, Iamblichean, list of alternative definitions amount to a separate, subordinate rank for the Soul in the hierarchy of Being. The controversy with his predecessors comes to the surface in Fr. 87 of the 'Timaeus Commentary', an exegesis of Tim. 43 C D (= Proci. In Tim. 111,334, 3ff.). The point of dispute is as to whether any part of our soul remains άπαθές καί άεί νοούν. The protagonist of this view is named as Plotinus (cf. Enn. Ill, 4,3; IV, 1,10; IV, 8,8). Iamblichus enters upon an eloquent argument against him to demonstrate that n o part of the Soul remains permanently in this state. One point is particularly worth quoting: ει δέ οταν το εν ήμϊν κράτιστον τέλειον η, καί το ολον ημών εΰδαιμον, τί κωλύει καί νύν ήμάς εύδαίμονας είναι ανθρώπους άπαντας, εί το άκρότατον ήμών άεί νοεί καί άεί προς τοις θείοις εστίν, εί μεν γαρ ó νοΰς τούτο, ουδέν προς την ψ υ χ ή ν εί δέ μόριον ψυχής, ευδαίμων καί ή λοιπή. "But if when the best part of us is perfect, then the whole of us is happy, what would prevent us all, the whole human race, from being happy at this moment, if the highest part of us is always enjoying intellection, and always turned towards the gods? If the Intellect is the highest part, that has nothing to do with the soul; if it is a part of the soul, then the rest of the soul also must be happy." It was certainly Plotinus' view that there was within us a hidden divine element, which we could uncover by contemplation. 77 Iamblichus contends that if this hidden generator, so to speak, was continually humming away, how could we not feel the effects? Another point of dispute with Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry concerns the relation of the individual to the universal soul, and the question of different grades of soul (De An. ap. Stob. I, 372). Here Plotinus and Amelius are on one side, and Porphyry on the other. Neither side, however, satisfies Iamblichus. Πότερον οΰν πασών τών ψυχών τα αυτά εργα άποτελεϊται, ή τα μεν τών όλων τελεώτερα, τα δέ τών άλλων ώς εκασται διειλήχασι την προσήκουσαν έαυταϊς τάξιν; " D o all souls", asks Iamblichus, "accomplish the same acts, or are those of universal souls more perfect, while those of other souls correspond to the appropriate rank of which each partakes?" καί που Πλωτίνος καί Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς επί ταύτης είσί τής δόξης (ενίοτε γαρ (ούχ) ώς όλλην την μεριστήν ψυχήν π α ρ ά τήν ολην, μίαν δέ αυτήν προς

77

See ARMSTRONG, Arch, of Intell. Univ., cit. (n. 61), ch. VI, for a good discussion.

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έκείνην είναι άφορίζονται) - ώς δ' αν εΐποι Πορφύριος, πάντη κεχώρισται τα της ολης ψυχής παρά την μεριστήν ένεργήματα. For Plotinus this can be documented from Enn. IV, 3, 4. For Amelius, and for Porphyry's contrary view, this is useful information, not elsewhere attested. Iamblichus produces a third view, a kind of synthesis of those of his predecessors, which from the method of its introduction we know to be his own ( 3 7 2 - 3 ) : γένοιτο δε καν άλλη δόξα ουκ άπόβλητος, ή κατά γένη καί ε'ίδη των ψυχών άλλα μεν τα των όλων παντελή, άλλα δε τα των θείων ψυχών άχραντα και άυλα, ετερα δέ τα τών δαιμονίων δραστήρια, τα δε τών ηρωικών μεγάλα, τα δέ τών εν τοις ζώοις καί τοις άνθρώποις θνητοειδή καί τα άλλα ώσαύτως έργα διαιρούμενη. The 'acts', then, of divine, daemonic, heroic, human and animal souls are suitably distinguished, each with an Iamblichean epithet, and if the acts are different, the souls are different. οί μεν γαρ μίαν καί την αυτήν πανταχού ψυχήν διατείνοντες ή τοι γένει ή εΐδει, ώς δοκεϊ Πλωτίνω, ή καί άριθμώ, ώς νεανιεύεται ουκ όλιγάκις Ά μ έ λ ι ο ς , είναι αυτήν έροϋσιν άπερ ένεργεϊν. (Amelius, it seems, went even further than Plotinus, in identifying n u m e r i c a l l y the individual souls with the Universal Soul.) οί δ' άσφαλέστερον τούτων διαταττόμενοι καί προόδους πρώτας καί δευτέρας καί τρίτας ουσιών τής ψυχής διισχυριζόμενοι προχωρεΐν εις το πρόσω, οίους άν τις θείη τους καινώς μεν άπταίστως δέ άντιλαμβανομένους τών λόγων, τα μεν τών ολων ψυχών καί θείων καί άύλων ένεργήματα έρούσιν ούτοι πάντως δήπου καί εις ούσίαν άποτελευτάν, τα δέ τών μεριστών κρατουμένων εν ένί εΐδει καί διαιρουμένων περί τοις σώμασιν ουδαμώς συγχωρήσουσιν εύθύς είναι ταύθ' άπερ ένεργούσι. "Others make a more prudent distinction, and insist that it is in a downward sequence of primary, secondary and tertiary processions that the different essences of soul continually proceed, as one would expect of those who enter upon the discussion (of these matters) with arguments which are unfamiliar but unshakeable, and will say that the operations of universal and divine and immaterial souls inevitably issue in the production of essence; but they will by no means agree that individual souls, confined as they are in one single form and divided out among bodies, produce anything that has real existence." If one penetrates the jargon here, it will become apparent that Iamblichus' distinctive position is that there are various grades of soul, about which different truths can be predicated. Divine souls, for instance, perform acts which result in the production of essential being (this seems to be the meaning of the obscure 60®

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phrase και εις ούσίαν άποτελευτάν), whereas in the case of human souls, their acts are not such as to produce essential being. 78 This has some bearing on Iamblichus' interpretation of the Return to the Mixing-bowl in Tim. 41D (In Tim. Fr. 82). For him, the mixing-bowl is ζψογόνος τις αίτια, putting forth creative λόγοι which penetrate all of life and all the orders of souls (ψυχικαί τάξεις). These "allot to each soul within its proper sphere suitable measures of coherence (μέτρα της συνοχής πρέποντα), to the original souls p r i m a l measures because of their first mixture, and to those who are mixed in the second session s e c o n d a r y measures; for according as is their rank relative to each other, such is the procession (πρόοδος) from the mixing bowl which they are allotted, receiving thence the defining laws of life." έν οικεία δε λήξει διεκλήρωσαν έκάστη ψυχή μέτρα τής συνοχής πρέποντα, ταϊς μεν έξ αρχής πρώτα δια τής πρώτης κράσεως, ταϊς δε είσαϋθις συγκερασθείσαις δεύτερα" ην γαρ έχουσι προς άλλήλας τάξιν, τοιαύτην άπό του κρατήρος λαγχάνουσι πρόοδον τους τής ζωής ορούς έκεϊθεν παραδεχόμενοι. The distinction here seems to be between divine and human souls. What precisely the μέτρα τής συνοχής are is not clear, but they are probably the proportions of each of the three elements which go to make up souls. We see mention of 'primary' and 'secondary5 measures, and of a πρόοδος from the Bowl, which seem to connect us with the passage from the 'De Anima'. We can see from In Tim. Fr. 83 (III, 257, 24ff.), that Iamblichus was noted for allotting a transcendent superiority (έξηρημένη υπεροχή) to 'those classes which make up divine souls', so that his opposition to the more optimistic Plotinian view was quite marked. The same difference with his predecessors, though from another angle, appears in a passage from Nemesius of Emesa (De Nat. Horn. sect. 51, p. 117 MATTHAEI). The question here concerns interchange between, and therefore, the essential homogeneity of, the souls of men and of irrational animals. Κρόνιος μεν γαρ έν τω περί παλιγγενεσίας (οΰτω δέ καλεί την μετενσωμάτωσιν) λογικός πάσας είναι βούλεταΐ" όμοίως δε και Θεόδωρος ó Πλατωνικός èv τω "Οτι ή ψυχή πάντα τα είδη εστί, καί Πορφύριος όμοίως" Ίαμβλιχος δε τήν έναντίαν τούτοις δραμών, κατ' είδος ζώων ψυχής είδος είναι λέγει, ήγουν, εϊδη διάφορα, γέγραπται γοϋν αΰτφ μονόβιβλον έπίγραφον, "Οτι ουκ άπ' άνθρώπων είς ζώα άλογα, ούδε άπό ζφων άλογων είς άνθρώπους αί μετενσωματώσεις γίνονται, άλλα άπό ζφων είς ζφα, καί άπό άνθρώπων εις άνθρώπους.

78

In Stob. p. 373, 13 f. he speaks of the acts of (human) souls as being like the putting forth of fruit by plants (έοικέναι ταίς των καρπών άπογεννήσεσιν), i.e. separable from their essences.

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Iamblichus is here figured by Nemesius as opposing Cronius, Theodoras (of Asine), 79 and Porphyry in the matter of the homogeneity of the souls of men and animals. From the title of his essay, we can see that he was opposed to the idea of metempsychosis into and from animals, still preserving his grades of soul. Man was not to be ranked with the gods and angels, but he was not down among the pigs and wolves either. 80 The significance of this development of Iamblichus', particularly his separation of the soul from the classes above it, is well summed up by DODDS, in his Introduction to 'The Elements of Theology' (p. xx): "This change is a natural corollary to the humbler cosmic status assigned by Iamblichus and most of his successors to the human soul. As the ancient world staggered to its death, the sense of man's unworthiness grew more oppressive, and the mystical optimism of Plotinus came to seem fantastic and almost impious: not by the effort of his own brain and will can so mean a creature as man attain the distant goal of 'unification'." This is very much the spirit which informs Fr. 88 of the 'Timaeus Commentary'. Iamblichus asserts that it is not possible for us to comprehend how the Gods create the body, or its life, and how they link them together: ταύτα γαρ άγνωστα ήμϊν υπάρχει, καί οτι μέν άπό θεών ύφέστηκε πάντα, είς την άγαθότητα αυτών άποβλέποντες και την δύναμιν διατεινόμεθα, πώς δε εκείθεν πρόεισιν, ημείς γιγνώσκειν ούχ οιοί τέ έσμεν. αίτιον δε, οτι το προνοεΐν καί το γεννάν έξαίρετόν έστι της θείας υπάρξεως άγνωστον έχούσης ύπεροχήν. "For these things are by nature incomprehensible to us. That everything takes its existence from the Gods, we firmly maintain, looking to their goodness and power, but how things proceed from them, we are not competent to comprehend. And the reason for that is that the power of providence and generation is the peculiar province of the divine level of existence, which possesses a superiority that is incomprehensible to u s . " Pious sentiments indeed! This attitude must provide a fertile' groiiftid "for theurgy. D O D D S in the same passage quotes a passage of the 'De Mysteriis' (II, 11: 96 — 7), which suitably sums up Iamblichus' attitude. I give D O D D S ' translation: ουδέ γαρ ή έννοια συνάπτει τοις θεοϊς τους θεουργούς' έπεί τί έκώλυε τους θεωρητικώς φιλοσοφοΰντας εχειν την θεουργικήν ενωσιν προς τους 79

80

We may note that Iamblichus cannot, if we preserve the chronology, have contradicted Theodorus, who wrote somewhat after him. What is probably the case is that Iamblichus contradicted Amelius, whom Theodorus is following, as is often the case in the 'Timaeus Commentary'. Who, then, is Nemesius' immediate source for this doxography? Syrianus? O r perhaps nobody. N o t Porphyry, at any rate. It is also Chaldaean doctrine that there is not metempsychosis into animals ( O r . Chald. Fr. 160 DES PLACES), and this doubtless influenced Iamblichus.

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θεούς; νυν δ' ουκ εχει τό γε άληθες ούτως - άλλ' ή των έργων των άρρητων καί ύπέρ πάσαν νόησιν θεοπρεπώς ένεργουμένων τελεσιουργία ή τε των νοουμένων τοις θεοϊς μόνον συμβόλων άφθέγκτων δύναμις έντίθησι την θεουργικήν ενωσιν. "It is not thought that links the theurgist to the gods: else what should hinder the theoretical philosopher from enjoying theurgic union with them? The case is not so. Theurgic union is attained only by the perfective operation of the unspeakable a c t s correctly performed, acts which are beyond all understanding; and by the power of the unutterable symbols which are intelligible only to the gods." d) The Vehicle (όχημα) of the Soul The history of this concept has been adequately set out by DODDS, 'Elements of Theology', App. II, pp. 313ff., and I will not go into the subject here. 8 1 The composition and fate of the όχημα was a point of dispute between Iamblichus and his predecessors, particularly Porphyry (cf. In Tim. Fr. 84 = Pr. In Tim. Ill, 266, 24ff.). Briefly, what was in dispute between Iamblichus and his predecessors was the precise composition of the 'vehicle', and its fate after its separation from the body. O n the latter point, Iamblichus believes, strangely, that the 'vehicle' did not dissolve after death, as Porphyry would maintain, but survived in some way within the cosmos, following in this, it would seem, Chaldaean doctrine.

D. Nature and Matter Iamblichus certainly rejected, as did the general consensus of Platonists, the belief of Plutarch and Atticus in the creation of the world in Time, and the previous existence of an evil World-Soul. He does, however, have a strong sense of the power of Fate (ειμαρμένη), which is in fact the power of the material world (φύσις) over the human soul. His fullest surviving discussion of this occurs in his 'Letter to Macedonius on Fate', 8 2 though the same subject also comes up in the 'De Mysteriis'. 83 Although his view of the power of the Soul is less optimistic than that of Plotinus or Porphyry, he grants Fate power only over the second or lower soul, and recognises that the pure soul may free itself by the practice of theurgy. To create the world, Matter is given form by the Demiurge, whose λόγοι penetrate it unceasingly. The characteristic of Matter is έτερότης, which may be

81

See also R. C .

KISSLING, T h e Ο Χ Η Μ Α - Π Ν Ε Υ Μ Α

of the N e o p l a t o n i s t s and the

De

Insomniis of Synesius of Cyrene, AJP 43 (1922), pp. 318ff. 82

F r a g m e n t s in S t o b a e u s , I, 8 0 ; II, 173FF. WACHS.

83

VIII, 7 and X, 5. Cf. also In Phaedr. Fr. 6 A ( = Hermeias, In Phaedr. p. 200, 28ff. COUVREUR).

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traced back to the Dyad in the realm of the One. 8 4 In In Tim. Fr. 9 we find a reference to the power of Matter to introduce έτερότης into the λόγοι: . . . καί οί αυτοί λόγοι πόσην έξαλλαγήν έ π ι φ α ί ν ο υ σ ι ν , . . . εσχάτως εν υλχι γεγονότες καί αΰ περί την ΰλην μετά της όμοιότητος παμπόλλην την ετερότητα δεικνύντες. This 'differentiating quality' is proper to the whole cosmos, above and below the Moon. Iamblichus takes issue with Porphyry in In Tim. Fr. 46 for Porphyry's suggestion that έτερότης and multiplicity was characteristic only of the sublunary sphere. The most that Iamblichus will grant is that some forms in the cosmos 'rejoice in sameness' (τα μεν των ειδών ταυτότητι χαίρει καί στάσει). What he is combatting is the setting up of any too sharp distinction between the higher and lower parts of the material cosmos. There is a useful passage on Matter from Book One of Iamblichus' 'Chaldaean Theology' preserved by Johannes Lydus (Mens. 175, 8ff. WÜNSCH), in which Iamblichus reconciles the Chaldaean epithet of Matter, πατρογενής, 'born of the Father', with orthodox Platonism. Matter is eternal, he says, but there was never a time when its existence was not dependent upon the ordering power of the Demiurge (whom, as in the passage from the 'Speech of Zeus in the Timaeus', quoted above, pp. 888 f., he places in the πατρική τριάς). He here rejects what seems in fact to have been the doctrine of the 'Oracles', that Matter too was a creation of the first principle.

E. The Gods and Daemons We can see from In Tim. Fr. 74 that Iamblichus was opposed to any rationalisation of the gods of a Euhemeristic nature, as well as to any identification of them with the 'elements', but he certainly did not believe in the Olympians in their traditional forms. The curious series of identifications which he gives for the gods mentioned in Tim. 40E (In Tim. Frr. 75—8) show that he envisaged them as immaterial forces operating at various levels above and within the universe. Sallustius' division 85 of Gods into (1) έγκόσμιοι and ύπερκόσμιοι, (2) of the ύπερκόσμιοι a threefold division into those who make the ουσία, the νους and the ψυχή of Gods, and (3) of the εγκόσμιοι, a fourfold division into οί ποιούντες (τον κόσμον), oí ψυχούντες, οί άρμόζοντες and οί φρουροϋντες, 8 6 and Proclus' division in props. 151—9 of ET of the classes of gods into το πατρικόν, το γεννητικόν, το τελεσιουργόν, and το φρουρητικόν, we may suspect of being Iamblichean in origin.

84 85 86

The cosmic έναντίωσις goes all the way up to ή μετά το εν δυάς, In Tim. Fr. 7. De diis, ch. 6; Sallustius' work is probably based on Iamblichus' Περί Θεών. Sallustius actually uses verbal phrases (οί μεν είναι ποιοΰσι τον κόσμον etc.), but I follow DODDS (ET p. 278, n. 2), in constructing participial phrases out of them, as being more convenient.

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Much work needs to be done before one can confidently declare how much of Proclus' theory of Gods can be traced back to Iamblichus. I feel that the systematic formulation of the theory of different manifestations of the same god at successive levels of reality is to be attributed to Syrianus rather than to Iamblichus, but Iamblichus seems at least to have envisaged certain gods, such as Asclepius, as being emanations of certain others, such as Apollo (In Tim. Fr. 19), and the identifications in In Tim. Frr. 75 — 8 seem to involve a descending series of gods ending in a tetrad Zeus—Hera—Poseidon—Hades, the number proper to physical creation. O n the question of Daemons, one should begin with the system of daemons given in the 'De Mysteriis', presuming this to be Iamblichus' doctrine. We are introduced in D e Myst. 1 , 5 : 15 — 17 to a fourfold distinction in the physical world, modelled, perhaps on Plato's distinction of the four elements in the 'Timaeus'. The highest place is held by the gods, the lowest by 'pure' souls (ψυχαί άχραντοι). Between the άκρα are two μεσότητες, one, the heroes, being more akin to souls, the other (daemons) more akin to the gods, though still far inferior to them. The daemons serve the will of the gods, make manifest their hidden goodness, and give form to their superior formlessness ( 1 6 , 1 3 f f . ) ; they also serve to pass on the graces in which they participate to the classes of being below them (παρέχουσαν δ ' αυτήν άφθόνως τοϊς μεθ' έαυτήν γένεσι και διαπορθμεύουσαν, with a reminiscence of the Symposium 2 0 2 E ) . " T h e median classes (daemons and heroes) fill out the common bond (τον κοινόν σύνδεσμον) between the gods and souls, and render indissoluble their connexion, and bind together one continuous link from highest to lowest and make indivisible the community of the universe (των όλων)" and so on (17,8ff.) We find, then, in B o o k I, a four-layer spiritual universe, with the daemons, if we may so express it, taking the place corresponding to air in the material universe, and, with the heroes, helping to bind the whole together. In the 'De Mysteriis', as in the 'Timaeus Commentary', heresies of Porphyry are being combated. Porphyry, in framing his questions, has failed to distinguish properly between the ούσίαι, δυνάμεις and ένέργειαι of the superior beings (1,4:11). He erroneously tries to introduce a distinction between those which are subject to passions (εμπαθές) and those which are not (άπαθές) (I, 10:34) which 'Abammon' rejects. T o none of the κρείττονα γένη, he maintains, can either of those terms be properly applied; they are above such distinctions. Generally, daemons are revealed as active principles of the gods, while heroes are more concerned with saving souls and leading them upwards. The distinctions are fairly artificial, and inevitably tend to overlap, but Iamblichus must preserve his four-fold hierarchy. He also (II, 2 : 6 5 , 8ff.) gives an analysis of the nature of ψυχαί άχραντοι, the lowest class in the hierarchy. These are a somewhat free-ranging class of beings, and exhibit a number of peculiarities. They are endowed with very partial powers, but on the other hand are able to associate themselves with, and withdraw themselves from, whom they please, joining themselves to the gods κατ' άλλας

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άρμονίας ουσιών καί δυνάμεων ή καθ' οίας δαίμονες τε καί ήρωες προς αυτούς συνεπλέκοντο. They are deficient to these latter in eternity of uniform life (το άίδιον της όμοιας ζωής) but on the other hand can ascend ανωτέρω, even to the rank of angel (επί μείζονα τάξιν τήν άγγελικήν) through the goodwill of the gods. This is the first mention of angels, and the first intimation that the four-fold division hitherto prevailing is about to be invaded by archangels, angels and two varieties of archon. The souls thus described seem to retain about themselves something of the universal potentialities of the human soul according to Plotinus; they range widely about the spiritual world. The more elaborate distinction may be partly Porphyry's fault. At the beginning of II, 3 (70) he is made to ask how one is to recognise apparitions: τί το γνώρισμα θεοϋ παρουσίας ή αγγέλου ή αρχαγγέλου ή δαίμονος ή τίνος άρχοντος ή ψυχής; But of course Iamblichus could have denied separate existence to such beings, had he been so inclined. Instead, he answers the question in detail. The new order which emerges (71) is: gods, archangels, angels, daemons (in a new four-fold grouping), heroes, sublunary archons (or cosmocrators), hylic archons, 87 souls. What seems to have taken place is a further unveiling of μεσότητες, between gods and daemons on the one hand, and between heroes and souls on the other. At the beginning of II, 5 (79, 7ff.), we get a useful summary of the activities proper to each class of being: καί μην τό γε άποκαθαρτικόν των ψυχών μέν έστιν έν τοις θεοίς, έν δέ τοις άρχαγγέλοις ά ν α γ ω γ ό ν άγγελοι δε λύουσι μόνον τών δεσμών της ΰλης, δαίμονες δ' εις τήν φύσιν καθέλκουσιν ήρωες δέ κατάγουσιν εις τήν έπιμέλειαν τών αισθητών έργων, άρχοντες δ' ήτοι τήν προστασίαν τών περικοσμίων ή τήν τών ένύλων έπιστασίαν έγχειρίζουσι, ψυχαί δ' έπιφαινόμεναι κατατείνουσί πως επί τήν γένεσιν. A somewhat simpler account of daemons is given by Iamblichus in an unidentified work quoted by Lydus (Mens. 83, 13ff. WÜNSCH): "According to Iamblichus, the tribe of daemons below the moon is divided into three classes. Of these that nearest to the earth is punitive (τιμωρόν), that in the air is purificatory (καθαρτικόν), and that nearest to the zone of the moon is concerned with salvation (σωτήριον) — this class we know also as heroes. All these are said to be ruled over by a certain supreme daemon, who is probably to be identified with Pluto." This identification of Pluto or Hades with the sublunary demiurge is an old one in Platonism, attested by Plutarch (De E. ap. Delph. 394 A), and going back, perhaps, even to Xenocrates (Fr. 18 HEINZE). Iamblichus had a good deal to say about the sublunary demiurge in his commentary on the 'Sophist', since he identifies this figure with the Sophist. A summary of his introduction is preserved 87

These ενυλοι άρχοντες might seem to introduce a dualistic element into Iamblichus' cosmos, but they are presented as simply presiding over Matter, not as positively evil.

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in the Platonic scholia (In Soph. Fr. 1 DILLON). W e also learn from Lydus that Iamblichus, like many of the Gnostics, identified the Jehovah of the O l d Testament with this sinister sublunary figure (Mens. 1 1 0 , 2 2 ) .

2. Ethics N o treatise of Iamblichus' specifically concerned with ethics survives, so that we have to piece together his doctrine from what evidence we can derive from other works. A treatise such as the Trotrepticus' might be thought to give evidence of his ethical doctrine, and it is in fact useful, but not as much as might be expected. F o r one thing, it is largely a cento of quotations, so that one can only deduce Iamblichus' views from the authorities he uses. F r o m these, however, one may conclude that, like Plotinus and Porphyry, he inclined to the more austere tradition of Platonism, influenced by Stoicism and Pythagoreanism rather than by Peripateticism, which favoured extirpation of the passions rather than their moderation, and held that virtue alone was sufficient to happiness, independent of bodily and external goods. T h e 'end of life' is "Likeness to G o d " (όμοίωσις θεώ), which is to be attained by γνώσις. "Knowledge of the gods is virtue and wisdom and perfect happiness, and makes us like to the gods", he says in Protr. ch. 3 (p. 11, 14f. PIST.), in the course of commenting on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras. H e also later, in ch. 14, quotes the famous passage of Theaetetus 176 B C , on the same theme. There is nothing distinctive about this, within the tradition of later Platonism, but it is perhaps worth specifying none the less. O f the three principal bases for an ethical theory produced by the Greek philosophical tradition, harmony and good order of one's own constitution (Atomists and Epicureans), concordance with the order of the universe (Stoics), and assimilation to the supreme principle or deity (Plato, Aristotle, and allegedly Pythagoras), Iamblichus, hardly surprisingly, adopts the last. M o r e distinctive is his contribution to the theory of the grades of virtue, though this is really only a scholastic elaboration on his immediate predecessors. The ' B ' Commentary on the Phaedo', in the collection attributed to O l y m p i o dorus, at p. 113, 14ff. NORVIN, gives us a summary of the contents of Iamblichus' treatise O n the Virtues', which seems to have formed the basis for the later Neoplatonic theory of the virtues. Plotinus, in Enn. I, 2 , makes a distinction between the "civic virtues" (πολιτικαί άρεταί), or the 'civic' level of virtue and the "purificatory virtues" (καθαρτικοί άρεταί)· T h e civic virtues, as described particularly in the 'Republic', are excellent indeed, and are the norms according to which we should act in life, but they are not the activities in virtue of which we attain likeness to G o d . These are those exercises in purification and freeing oneself from the body which are particularly discussed in the 'Phaedo'. Porphyry elaborates somewhat on this distinction in the Ά φ ο ρ μ α ί προς τα νοητά, sent. 32, which is virtually a transcription of E n n . I, 2 , but formalises the distinction between " c i v i c " and "purificatory" virtues, and adds two other grades, the " t h e o r e t i c " and the "paradigmatic", the former being that of " t h e soul which

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beholds nous within itself and is fulfilled by it", the latter being the virtue proper to Nous itself. Iamblichus elaborated this scheme further, adding grades at both ends, and arriving at a total of seven grades of virtue, as follows: (1) N a t u r a l (φυσικαί) approximately what in Middle Platonist theory were termed εύφυίαι, e. g. by Albinus, Did. ch. 30. These are common to us and to the beasts, e. g. lions are courageous, oxen prudent, storks just and cranes wise. These virtues are closely involved with one's physical make-up, and may be mutually opposed. They are dealt with in the 'Politicus' (306 A) and the T a w s ' (VII, 8 0 7 C ; X I I , 963 E). (2) E t h i c a l (ήθικαί). These are acquired by practice (εθισμός) and correct belief (ορθοδοξία), and they are proper to well brought-up children and also to animals. They are also dependent on one's physical make-up, and conflict with one another. They are a joint product of the reason and the unreasoning element in the soul (λόγος and άλογία). These are also discussed in the 'Laws' (VII to VIII, 842 A). (3) C i v i c . These are products of the reason (λόγος), for they involve knowledge (έπιστήμη), but of reason as administering the unreasoning element as its instrument, i. e. using wisdom to bring order to the knowledge-acquiring element, courage to the spirited element, self-control to the libido, and justice to all of them. The civic virtues do not oppose, but rather complement each other. They are discussed in the 'Republic' (e. g. IV, 441 A), and are the subject of the 'Gorgias'. (4) P u r i f i c a t o r y . These are the virtues proper to the reason alone. They are the virtues of one who has turned towards himself and cast aside all material instruments and the activities connected with them. These are primarily discussed in the 'Phaedo'. (5) T h e o r e t i c (θεωρητικοί). These are the virtues of a soul which has already abandoned itself and turned to what is above it. These are the converse of the 'civic' virtues, inasmuch as the latter concern the reason in so far as it directs itself towards what is inferior to it, whereas the former are concerned with the reason's striving towards what is superior to it. These are the subject of the 'Theaetetus' ( 1 7 2 C - 1 7 6 E ) . (6) P a r a d i g m a t i c (παραδειγματικοί). These are the virtues of the soul when it is no longer c o n t e m p l a t i n g the Intellect (for this implies separation), but is united with it. These virtues are properly those of the Intellect. It is not clear from Olympiodorus' account in which dialogue these virtues are discussed, but I suspect the 'Phaedrus' (247 E ff.), with its account of the heavenly ride and the ύπερουράνιος τόπος. (7) H i e r a t i c (ίερατικαί). These come into being in the godlike (θεοειδές) elements of the soul, surpassing all the aforementioned virtues, as being proper to the One (ένιαίαι), whereas they are proper to Being (ουσιώδεις). It seems probable that these were thought to have been discussed in the 'Philebus'. In this elaborate hierarchy of virtues one can catch at least a glimpse of the order and tendency of Iamblichus' ethical teaching, which was obviously an

904

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important part of instruction in his school. The final grade, in particular, added on as it is to cap the highest grade of Porphyry's scheme, is an assertion of the superiority of theurgy over purely theoretical philosophy. The hieratic virtues are those of the accomplished theurgist. This whole scheme, adopted by the Athenian School, provides a structuring principle later for Marinus' hagiographical 'Life of Proclus'. Most of the surviving extracts from Iamblichus' 'Letters' deal with ethical themes, but they contribute little but generalities. H e wrote to Sopater on Virtue, to Asphalius on phronesis, to the lady Arete on Moderation, to Olympius on Courage, and to Anatolius on Justice. The letter to Olympius (ap. Stob. Eel. I l l , 319—20 HENSE) makes the distinction between άνδρεία ή κυριωτάτη, which is the "sameness and stable condition of the intellect in itself", and that courage which derives from this higher kind, which is concerned with the control of the passions in the area of what is and what is not to be feared. This is a distinction which the Neoplatonists all sought to make, and is in accord with Iamblichus' distinction of the various levels of virtue.

3. Logic Iamblichus' contributions to the development of logic are not of great significance. H e wrote nothing comparable even to Porphyry's 'Isagoge'. Such contributions as he makes come chiefly in his 'Commentary on the Categories', and here he is primarily concerned with defending Aristotle's coherence and correctness against the attacks of the hostile tradition, of whom the most notable representatives were Nicostratus, in the 2nd Century A. D . , and Plotinus himself, in Enneads V I 1—3. Iamblichus is himself, on Simplicius' evidence (In Cat. p. 2, 9ff.), in large part simply transcribing Porphyry's large commentary, and his commentary, for what it is worth, is largely recoverable from Simplicius. For the first part of it one can also take into evidence the short commentary, in dialogue form, of Iamblichus' pupil Dexippus, who intimates (p. 5, lOff.) that he is basing himself on the work of his master, and who exhibits frequent verbal coincidences with Simplicius. According to Simplicius, Iamblichus's chief contributions were the introduction of the treatise of Archytas, Περί του καθόλου λόγου (actually a pseudepigraphon of perhaps the 1st Century B . C . ) into the exegetical tradition (on the pretext that it was the source from which Aristotle borrowed); and his employment of νοερά θεωρία ("transcendental exegesis") throughout his commentary. O f both of these features Simplicius in fact preserves much evidence. The first issue arising, as we would expect from what we know of Iamblichus' method of commentary, is the definition of the skopos, or essential subject matter, of the treatise. In the case of the 'Categories', Iamblichus had before him a long history of controversy as to the subject-matter, the main representatives of which are Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry (though their positions become curiously confused in our sources). The prevailing view was a nominalist one: the 'Categories' provide an analysis of either words (φωναί,

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Alexander) or concepts (νοήματα, Porphyry), 8 8 not of things (πράγματα). Iamblichus, taking a more realist line, declares the subject of the 'Categories' to be " w o r d s in so far as they signify things, through the medium of concepts" — to adopt John Philoponus' version of his doctrine (ap. In Cat. p. 9 , 1 2 — 15 = Fr. 6 LARSEN), as making the best sense. In this Iamblichus is actually in agreement with the best modern opinion, as expressed by G . E. R. LLOYD, in: Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought, p. 113: " T h e Categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality, of the things signified by terms, rather than of the signifying terms themselves." 8 9 It will not be possible to deal individually with the many points of detail on which Iamblichus expresses an opinion, but some particularly significant ones can be considered, as giving an idea of his noera tbeoria. First of all, why, in a treatise on categories, does Aristotle begin with a discussion of homonyms and synonyms? Precisely, says Iamblichus (Simp. In Cat. p. 2 2 , 1 - 9 and 2 3 , 1 9 - 2 4 , 5 = Frr. 1 0 - 1 1 LARSEN), because the word 'category' is itself a homonym, since the various categories have nothing in common with one another except the name, although they have in common synonymously the characteristic of characterising those things that fall under them. This is perhaps as good a guess as any, but in any case it demonstrates Iamblichus' concern to accord Aristotle the same honour that he would accord to Plato, that of assuming him to be relating every aspect of a given treatise to its overall skopos. Another question of perennial interest to commentators was whether Aristotle's definition of substance in Cat. 4 a l 0 ("that which, being numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries") was applicable to intelligible as well as physical substance. Plotinus, of course, would think not (Enn. VI, 1,2); Iamblichus — proceeding, as Simplicius says, Πυθαγορικώτερον (p. 116,25 = Fr. 33 LARSEN) — is able to discern the co-existence of contraries in intelligible substance as well, to wit, Motion and Rest, Sameness and Otherness, the very μέγιστα γένη of the 'Sophist' which Plotinus adopted as the categories of the intelligible realm. The only difference is that on the intelligible plane the contraries are present, not successively, but simultaneously. H e goes on to discern the coexistence of contraries also in the substance of the heavenly bodies, the distinction from the intelligible realm being that there the contraries coexist in a simple entity, while in the celestial realm they exist in different parts at different times (ibid. p. 1 1 7 , 2 7 - 3 0 ) .

88

89

Though these attributions are curiously reversed by Olympiodorus, In Cat. p. 19, 28ff. I follow Simplicius, In Cat. p. 10, lOff. (with whom Philoponus and Elias are in agreement). Cf. also S. K. STRANGE, Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the 'Categories', above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,2), pp. 9 5 5 - 9 7 4 , and R. W. SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, below in this same volume, pp. 1176—1243. Cf. also J. L. ACKRILL, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1963, pp. 7 8 - 9 .

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This passage is a good example of the noera theoria at work. Iamblichus' focus of interest is ontological rather than logical, and he delights in seeing the same feature — in this case, the ability to receive contraries — manifested analogically at various levels of reality — το ιδίωμα τούτο της ουσίας κοινόν κατά πάσαν ούσίαν, as he says (ibid. p. 118,2). 9 0 In the category of Quantity, his argument in favour of weight (ροπή) being classed as a third type of quantity, along with μέγεθος and πλήθος (representing continuous and discrete quantity respectively) is another interesting example of his method (ibid. p. 128,16-129,7 = Fr. 36 LARSEN). First of all, he claims Archytas as his authority for this triadic division (against Porphyry, Cornutus and presumably Alexander). Then, he straightway relates this to ontology by seeing a distinction between weighted and weightless quantities at various levels of reality: the four elements having relative weight and lightness, as against the heaven, which is weightless; among types of motion, the rectilinear ones involving weight, as against the circular, which is weightless; and then, rising to the level of immaterial essence, the soul, which has an inclination (ροπή) towards what is below it or what is above it, as against intellect, which is motionless, and thus άρρεπές. A little further on (Simpl. p. 135, 8ff. = Fr. 37 LARSEN), he gives us a 'transcendental' explanation of the fact that "of quantities, some are discrete, others continuous" (Cat. 6, 4b 20): επειδή γαρ ή τού ενός δύναμις, άφ' ού π ά ν το ποσόν άπογεννάται, διατείνεται δι' ολων ή αύτη καί ορίζει εκαστον προϊούσα ά φ ' έαυτής, η μεν δι' όλων διήκει παντάπασιν άδιαιρέτως, το συνεχές ύφίστησιν, καί ή την πρόοδον ποιείται μίαν καί άδιαίρετον καί άνευ διορισμού η δέ προϊούσα ϊσταται καθ' εκαστον των ειδών καί ή ορίζει εκαστον καί εκαστον εν ποιεί, ταύτη το διωρισμένον παράγει' κατά δέ τήν περιέχουσαν άμα τάς δύο ταύτας ενεργείας μίαν κυριωτάτην αίτίαν τά δύο ποσά παράγει. "Since the power of the One, from which all quantity derives, extends identically through all things, and demarcates each thing in its procession from itself, in so far as it penetrates totally indivisibly through all things, it generates the continuous, and in so far as it performs a single and indivisible procession without interval; whereas in so far as it halts in its procession at each of the Forms and defines each and makes each of them one, in this aspect it produces the discrete; so in virtue of being the single dominant causal principle of these two activities it produces the two types of quantity." This is the sort of exegesis which characterises Iamblichus' whole commentary. 9 1 It reveals considerable acuity of mind and a close acquaintance with Aristotle's

90

91

Cf. his interpretation of the Atlantic! War in the 'Timaeus', preserved by Proclus, In Tim. I, 77. 24ff. ( = Fr. 7 DILLON), where he sees the conflict as reflecting analogically oppositions at all levels of reality, all the way up to the Dyad following on the One. For some other good examples, Simpl. In Cat. p. 216, 6—219, 35 ( = Fr. 65 LARSEN);

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other works, especially the 'Physics' and the 'Metaphysics', the doctrines of which he adduces frequently in support of his interpretation of the 'Categories', but, as I have said, it pertains much more to metaphysics than to logic. It does not, I think, add anything of significance to what we can learn about his metaphysics from other sources, apart from the interesting discussions of Time and Space, which I have discussed earlier (pp. 891 f.), but it does provide a fleshing-out of our view of his philosophical system. O u r few reports of his commentary on the 'Prior Analytics' (Frr. 137—45 LARSEN), on the other hand, do concern more properly logical questions. H e is on record as disputing with Alexander over the proper form of a 'dialectical' question, discussed by Aristotle at An. Pr. 2 4 a l 6 f f . ; 9 2 as supporting Boethus in his assertion that the second and third figures of the syllogism are 'perfect' despite Aristotle's view that they are not, and as supporting Aristotle in his belief expressed in An. Pr. ch. 9, that in a mixed syllogism, with a necessary major proposition and a general minor one, the syllogism follows the mode of major. 9 3 In all these views we must, alas, account him incorrect, but his interventions at least show a detailed knowledge of, and interest in, the Aristotelian logical corpus.

IV.

Influence

Respect for Iamblichus as a philosopher has increased somewhat in recent years, as his distinctive contribution to the doctrine of the later Athenian School of Neoplatonism has been made clearer. H e is an influence of prime importance on Syrianus, and hence on Proclus, as both of them freely acknowledge. In this way he inaugurated a scholastic tradition of Platonism which, becoming more ramified in the writings of such men as Damascius and 'Dionysius the Areopagite', descended to later Byzantine writers like Michael Psellus, and, through the translations of William of Moerbeke and, later, of Marsilio Ficino, to the West. Iamblichus' commentaries seem not to have long survived the closing of the School in 529 A. D . Damascius, Olympiodorus and Simplicius can all quote from them, as can John of Stobi from his 'De Anima' and 'Letters', but Psellus and the Byzantine scholars after him can be seen to be dependent for their references to Iamblichus on Proclus. O n l y his 'exoteric' works, the Pythagorean Sequence, and the 'De Mysteriis', survived into later Byzantine times, as they still do, to give a distorted and inadequate view of his philosophical achievement.

p . 2 7 1 , 6 - 2 7 3 , 4 ( = F r . 7 8 LARSEN); p . 3 7 4 , 7 - 3 7 6 , 1 2 ( = F r . 1 1 7 LARSEN); p . 3 9 4 ,

12-

3 9 5 , 3 1 ( F r . 121 LARSEN). 92

Stephanus, In De Int. p. 50, 1 3 - 2 6 , and Ammonius, In De Int. p. 202, 3 - 1 0 ( = Fr. 1 3 7 - 8

93

Ps.-Ammon. In De Int. p. 38, 3 3 - 3 9 , 21; 40, 9 - 2 3 ; 40, 3 7 - 4 1 , 4 ( = Frr. 1 4 3 - 5 LARSEN).

LARSEN).

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Bibliography I. Texts 1. Iamblichus De Vita Pythagorica Liber, ed. L. DEUBNER (corr. ed. U. KLEIN, 1975), Leipzig, 1937 (Teubner). Protrepticus, ed. H. PISTELLI, Leipzig, 1888 (Teubner). De Communi Mathematica Scientia, ed. Ν . FESTA (corr. ed. U. KLEIN, 1975), Leipzig, 1891 (Teubner). In Nicomachi Arithmeticam Introductionem Liber, ed. H. PISTELLI (corr. ed. U. KLEIN, 1975), Leipzig, 1894 (Teubner). Theologoumena Arithmeticae, ed. V. DE FALCO (corr. ed. U. KLEIN, 1975), Leipzig, 1922 (Teubner). Les Mystères d'Egypte, ed. and trans. E. DES PLACES, Paris, 1966 (Budé). Iamblique de Chalcis, Exégète et Philosophe, B. D . LARSEN, Aarhus, 1972 (Vol. II: Appendice — Testimonia et Fragmenta). In Piatonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, with text, trans, and comm. by J . M. DILLON (Philosophia antiqua 23), Leiden, 1973. De Anima, trans. A. J . FESTUGIÈRE (ap. Vol. I l l of 'La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste', pp. 177ff.), Paris, 1953.

2. Other Relevant Ancient Texts Eunapius, Vitae Sophistarum, ed. G. GIANGRANDE, Rome, 1956. - trans. W. C. WRIGHT, Harvard, 1921 (Loeb. CI. Libr., with Philostratus). Plotinus, Enneades, ed. P. HENRY and H . - R . SCHWYZER, Paris—Brussels-Leiden, 3 vols. 1951-1973.

Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, ed. E. DIEHL, Leipzig, 1906 (Teubner). Hermeias, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. P. COUVREUR, Paris, 1901 (repr. with index by C. ZINTZEN, Hildesheim, 1971). Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorías, ed. C. KALBFLEISCH, Berlin, 1907 (CAG, Vol. VIII). Stobaeus, Anthologium, ed. C. WACHSMUTH and O . HENSE, 4 vols. Berlin, 1 8 8 4 - 1 9 1 2 .

II. Secondary works BIDEZ, J . Le philosophe Jamblique et son école, R E G 32 (1919), pp. 29—40. BIELMEIER, Α. Die neuplatonische Phaidrosinterpretation, Paderborn, 1930. BOYANCÉ, P. Sur la vie pythagoricienne, R E G 52 (1929), pp. 36—50. BURKERT, W. Weisheit und Wissenschaft (Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft 10), Nürnberg, 1962. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. ARMSTRONG, Cambridge, 1967 (chs. 1 7 - 1 9 , by A. C. LLOYD). CAMERON, A. The Date of Iamblichus' Birth, Hermes 96 (1968), pp. 3 7 4 - 6 . CREMER, F. W. Die chaldäischen Orakel und Iamblich De Mysteriis (Beitr. ζ. klass. Philol., Heft 26), Meisenheim am Glan, 1969. DES PLACES, É. La religion de Jamblique, in: De Iamblique à Proclus, Entr. Fond. Hardt 21, Vandoeuvres —Genève, 1975, pp. 69—102.

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DES PLACES, É. Les Oracles chaldaïques, in: A N R W I I , 17,4, ed. W. HAASE, Berlin-New York, 1984, pp. 2299-2335. DEUSE, W. Der Demiurg bei Porphyrios und Jamblich, in: C. ZINTZEN (see below), pp. 2 3 8 277. DODDS, E . R . T h e u r g y and Its Relation to N e o p l a t o n i s m , J R S 37 (1947), p p . 55—69 (repr.

in: ID., The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley, 1951). Entretiens de la Fondation Hardt 21: De Jamblique à Proclus, Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1975 ( c o n t r i b u t i o n s b y Β . D . L A R S E N , R . E . W I T T , É . DES P L A C E S ) .

FESTUGIÈRE, A. J. La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, vol. III, Paris 1953. FESTUGIÈRE, A. J . Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus, Mus. Helv. 20 (1963), pp. 77-100. FOWDEN, G. The Platonist Philosopher and his Circle in Late Antiquity, Philosophia 7 (1977), pp.

359-382.

GEFFCKEN, J. Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums, Heidelberg, 1929. GERSH, S. From Iamblichus to Eriugena, Leiden, 1978. KROLL, W. Iamblichos in: R E X , 1 (1914), 649-651. LARSEN, B. D . La place de Jamblique dans la philosophie antique tardive, in: Entr. Fond. Hardt. 21, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1975, 1—34. LEWY, H. Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Cairo, 1956 (new ed. by M. TARDIEU, Paris, 1978). MAU, G. Iamblichos, in: RE IX, 1 (1914), 648. MERLAN, P. From Platonism to Neoplatonism, Den Haag, 1953 (3rd ed., revised, ibid., 1968). O'MEARA, D. J . New Fragments from Iamblichus' 'Collection of Pythagorean Doctrines', AJP 102 (1981), pp. 2 6 - 4 0 . PRAECHTER, K. Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus, in: Genethliakon für Carl Robert, Berlin, 1910 (repr. in: ID., KL. Sehr. [ed. by H. DÖRRIE] [Collectanea 7], Hildesheim-New York, 1973, pp. 165-216). ROHDE, E. Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras, RhM. 26 (1871), pp. 554-76, and 27 (1872), pp. 2 3 - 6 1 ( = ID., Kleine Schriften II, Tübingen, 1901, pp. 102 - 72). SAMBURSKY, S. and PINES, S. The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism, Jerusalem, 1971. SAMBURSKY, S. The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism, Jerusalem, 1982. SICHERL, M. Die Handschriften, Ausgaben, und Ubersetzungen von Iamblichos De Mysteriis, Berlin, 1957. THILLET, P . J a m b l i q u e et les m y s t è r e s d ' E g y p t e , R E G 81 (1968), p p . 1 7 2 - 1 9 5 .

WALLIS, R. T. Neoplatonism, London, 1972. WHITTAKER, T . T h e N e o p l a t o n i s t s , C a m b r i d g e ,

2

1928.

WITT, R. E., Iamblichus as a Forerunner of Julian, in: De Iamblique à Proclus, Entr. Fond. Hardt 21, Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1975, pp. 35—68. ZELLER, E. Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung III. 2 2 , Leipzig, 1868 (new ed. and Italian trans, by R. MONDOLFO, Florence, 1961). ZINTZEN, C. (ed.), Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus (WdF 436), Darmstadt, 1977.

61

ANRW II 36.2

Scepticism and Neoplatonism by

R.

T.

W A L L I S F>

Norman, Oklahoma

Contents Introduction

911

I. The Sceptics' Epistemological Critique

913

II. Plotinus' Reply; His Doctrine of Νους

917

III. The Sceptical Critique of Contemporary Theology; the Problem of Divine Virtue . . 925 IV. The Problem of Divine Rationality

931

V. The Stoic Reply: Reason and Nature

936

VI. The Sceptics and Pre-Plotinian Theology VII. Plotinus on Divine Virtue

942 944

VIII. Plotinus on Divine Deliberation

945

IX. The Sceptics and the Negative Theology Bibliographical Note

952 954

Introduction It is curious that modern researchers into Plotinus' sources have given virtually no attention to the Sceptics. The only work on the subject still appears to be M O N R A D ' S article, published nearly a hundred years ago 1 , which discusses, mostly in general terms, their influence on Plotinus' conception of Νούς and of the One. Their influence on the former point is also noted in BRÉHIER'S notices to Enn. V . 3 and V . 5 2 and in the H A R D E R — T H E I L E R — B E U T L E R edition's notes on the opening chapters of these works 3 , while the latter edition's note on III. 6.1.29 also alludes to Sceptical influence on Plotinus' doctrine of the Impassib-

1

2 3

61 ••

M. J. MONRAD, Uber den sachlichen Zusammenhang der neuplatonischen Philosophie mit vorhergehenden Denkrichtungen, besonders mit dem Skepticismus, Philos. Monatshefte 24 (1888), pp. 156-193. Plotin, Ennéades (Budé Series) V, pp. 37ff., 83ff. Plotins Schriften, Band I l l b , pp. 401-402 (on V.5.1.12ff.) (1964); V b , p. 371-372 (on V.3.1.Iff.) p. 375 (on ibid. 5.1) (1960).

912

R.

T.

WALLIS

ility of Incorporeals 4 . For the rest there is almost total silence, for instance in the 'Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy'. Similarly, despite the precise anticipations of Plotinus' discussion of divine virtue to be found in Sextus Empiricus, these receive only the briefest of mentions in the 'Fondation Hardt' colloquium on Plotinus' sources, and that from O . GIGON, not one of the principal contributors to the symposium 5 . Even more significantly, the most conspicuous example of Sceptical influence on Plotinus' theology, the denial that G o d deliberates, has been discussed only in my 'Neoplatonism', where I had space for only a summary account 6 . Previous to that JEAN PÉPIN, while rightly emphasising Aristotle's influence on Plotinus' position, had failed to note the Sceptics' role as intermediaries between the two philosophers 7 . The reasons for this neglect of the Sceptics, and indeed for their general neglect by students of ancient philosophy, cannot be considered here. T w o reasons, however, derive from the nature of our sources. First, as Sextus admits, in its zeal to demolish the dogmatists, the school was wont to grasp any argument, strong or weak, that came to hand 8 . Hence our sources contain an amazing jumble of brilliant critical insights and outrageous logical quibbles, along with several arguments combining both elements. The same, however, is true of Plato. Like him the Sceptics have frequently touched on a point of fundamental philosophical importance, disguised under a verbal sophistry, of which they have failed to grasp the full implications. Yet when these implications are brought out, it becomes very difficult to withstand them. We shall see this in particular in our discussion of the Sceptics' anti-theological polemics, which, while explicitly directed against contemporary, especially Stoic, views, can be developed, as notably in HUME'S 'Dialogues', into a polemic against any theology whatever 9 . In fact, as ZELLER observes, Carneades' theological arguments are essentially the same as those of modern critics of the notion of divine personality 1 0 . Even so, we shall find points at which the Hellenistic systems are more vulnerable to the Sceptics than some later philosophies. Yet even these are of interest, both in illustrating the climate of thought in which Neoplatonism arose, and for the echoes of many of them which survive in later debates 1 1 .

4 5 6 7

8 9

10

11

Ibid. Band l i b , p. 440 (1962). Entretiens Hardt V, 'Les Sources de Plotin', pp. 225—226 (Vandœuvres—Genève, 1960). Neoplatonism, pp. 26—27. Théologie C o s m i q u e et Théologie Chrétienne. Ambroise, E x a m . I 1,1—4, pp. 502 — 504 (Paris, 1964); cf. below notes 151 and 156. Pyrrh. H y p . III. 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 . C f . below, pp. 925, 926. For the influence on HUME'S 'Dialogues' of Cicero's ' D e N a t u r a D e o r u m ' cf. N . KEMP SMITH'S introduction to his edition of the 'Dialogues' ( L o n d o n , e . a . , 2 1947), esp. pp. 60—61; also C . W. HENDEL, Studies in the Philosophy of David H u m e (Princeton, 1925), esp. pp. 3 2 f f . Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, transi, by O . J . REICHEL, new and revised ed. ( L o n d o n , 1892), p. 546; cf. below p. 928. C f . e . g . , CLARKE'S criticism of LEIBNIZ, q u o t e d b e l o w , p . 9 3 9 a n d n.

192.

SCEPTICISM A N D

NEOPLATONISM

913

A second problem results from the abridgment of the Sceptics' arguments by our sources, principally Cicero and Sextus 12 . In view of the jumble of arguments bequeathed them by their predecessors, we may regard this as in principle a wise decision and one in their readers' interests. The trouble is, first, that they have frequently abridged the arguments that interest us and, more fundamentally, that they do not seem always to have chosen the most telling ones. Thus Cicero devotes less than two paragraphs (l'/ 2 Loeb pages) to the important critique of divine virtue 1 3 ; yet he elaborates the wearisome sorites argument against the popular gods — (if Zeus is a god, so is Poseidon, so is Achelous, so is each local watercourse) — at incredible length (10 paragraphs = 5 Loeb pages) 14 . It is some compensation that he reports others of Carneades' theological arguments, notably those attacking the world's alleged rationality, more fully than does Sextus 15 . O u r account will therefore be selective, concentrating on those arguments which appear to have influenced Plotinus, and arranging these in a logical order, while bringing out the full implications of some of the seemingly less conclusive among them. We shall deal first with the Sceptics' epistemological critique and its influence on Plotinus' conception of Νοϋς; we shall then turn to their anti-theological polemics and see their influence on Plotinus' doctrine of the Impassibility of Incorporeals, his account of divine virtue and, especially, his denial of divine deliberation. We shall conclude with a few remarks on possible Sceptical influence on the Neoplatonic O n e . We shall ignore points, such as Carneades' criticism of astrology 1 6 , that are indeed echoed by Plotinus, but had become commonplace long before his time. Sceptical influence on the above Plotinian doctrines was no doubt equally indirect; but our extant sources suggest that knowledge of the Sceptics' arguments on these points was less widely diffused. It is on them therefore that we shall concentrate.

I. The Sceptics' Epistemological

Critique

From the Sceptics' critique of contemporary epistemology two points concern us, first, their demonstration that knowledge of the external world is impossible; secondly, their arguments against the possibility of self-knowledge. Their essential argument on the former point is already found in Pyrrhon 1 7 ,

12

13 14 15 16 17

Cf. Math. IX. 1—3, where Sextus claims to have concentrated on the fundamental points of his predecessors' critique. N.D. III.38—39. Ibid. III.43—52. Ibid. III.20—28; Acad. 11.121; cf. Sextus Math. IX.96, 108, and below, pp. 940-941. Math. V passim. Cf. A. A. LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 80ff., CHARLOTTE L. STOUGH, Greek Skepticism, Ch. 2 passim.

914

R. T.

WALLIS

and had been laid down even earlier by the Cyrenaics 18 . According to this we can apprehend only the affections (πάθη) of our sense-organs and these alone are infallible19; and though there may indeed be external objects which produce these, neither apprehensibility nor, a fortiori, infallibility, applies to them 20 . For we can affirm that we experience a sensation of sweetness or whiteness, but it is impossible to affirm that the cause of that sensation is sweet or white 21 . In support of this view the Cyrenaics appeal to well-known delusions, such as the yellow impressions received by sufferers from jaundice 22 ; hence our sensations, though in themselves infallible, reveal nothing more than themselves. Indeed we can be sure only of our own private sensations, for, though all men use such common terms as 'white', whether they all mean the same by these must remain uncertain23. The Sceptics' role was merely one of refining this position. The essence of their critique is summarised in the second book of Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism' and expounded at greater length in Adversus Mathematicos VII 2 4 . The arguments in question, like the anti-theological polemics to be considered later, were principally the work of the Academic Sceptics Arcesilaus and Carneades and were primarily directed against the Stoa, though, as Sextus observes, Carneades had so formulated his arguments as to demolish the views of all his predecessors alike25. The Stoics had seen the criterion of truth in the so-called "apprehensive presentation" (καταληκτική φαντασία), which they defined as a presentation "imprinted and impressed by a real object and according to that object itself, of such a kind as would not be produced by a non-existent

18

Math. VII. 1 9 0 - 2 0 0 .

Cf. W . Κ. C . GUTHRIE, H i s t o r y of Greek Philosophy, vol. Ill

(Cambridge, 1969), pp. 4 9 5 — 4 9 7 for a defence of the view that this position was already maintained by Aristippus. 19

Math. V I I . 1 9 1 : φασίν ουν o í Κ υ ρ η ν α ί κ ο ί κ ρ ι τ ή ρ ι α είναι τ α π ά θ η και μ ό ν α κ α τ α λ α μ β ά ν ε σ θ α ι καί α δ ι ά ψ ε υ σ τ α τ υ γ χ ά ν ε ι ν , των δε π ε π ο ι η κ ό τ ω ν τ α π ά θ η μηδέν είναι κ α τ α λ η π τ ό ν μηδε ά δ ι ά ψ ε υ σ τ ο ν .

20

Ibid. 194: τ ο γ α ρ περί η μ ά ς σ υ μ β α ί ν ο ν π ά θ ο ς έ α υ τ ο ΰ π λ έ ο ν ο υ δ έ ν ήμΐν ενδείκνυται, ένθεν καί, εί χ ρ ή τ ά λ η θ έ ς λέγειν, μόνον τ ο π ά θ ο ς ήμίν έστί φαινόμενον. τ ό δ ' έκτος καί τ ο υ π ά θ ο υ ς π ο ι η τ ι κ ό ν τ ά χ α μέν έστιν δν, ού φαινόμενον δέ ήμίν.

21

Ibid. 191: οτι μεν γ α ρ λ ε υ κ α ι ν ό μ ε θ α , φασί, καί γ λ υ κ α ζ ό μ ε θ α , δ υ ν α τ ό ν λέγειν ά δ ι α ψ ε ύ σ τ ω ς καί άνελέγκτως. οτι δε τ ό έμποιητικόν τ ο υ π ά θ ο υ ς λευκόν έστιν ή γ λ υ κ ΰ έστιν, ο ΰ χ οίόν τ ' ά π ο φ α ί ν ε σ θ α ι .

22

Ibid. 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 ,

23

Ibid.

198.

24

P y r r h . H y p . I I . 7 2 - 7 5 , Math. V I I . 1 5 9 - 1 6 5 ,

25

Math. V I I . 1 5 9 . Some of the arguments to be considered are, at least in essence, older

195-198. 263-446.

than Carneades, as we have already seen regarding those against the reliability of the senses. O f Carneades' anti-theological arguments, that attacking the world's rationality at Math. I X . 108 (cf. below, p. 9 4 0 ) is explicitly stated to go back to the Megarian Alexinus, while that concerning the relation between G o d and virtue (ibid. I X . 1 7 6 —177) derives from Plato (cf. below, pp. 925 — 9 2 6 ) . Cf. also notes 41 and 43 for the argument against self-knowledge.

SCEPTICISM A N D

NEOPLATÓNISM

915

object," 2 6 and which, like light, reveals both itself and the object causing it 27 . A "presentation" in ancient psychology, is a mental image, formed, in the Stoic view, in the soul's "ruling part" (ήγεμονικόν) and derived through the senses 28 . Cleanthes had crudely compared it to the impression of a seal on wax; Chrysippus had more cautiously defined it as an "alteration of the soul" 2 9 . Thus far the soul's role is wholly passive; her activity consists in assent (συγκατάθεσι,ς) to the presentation and apprehension (κατάληψις) of it 30 . An apprehensive presentation is one whose truth is so self-evident that the soul cannot refuse assent to it. Of the other systems discussed by Sextus we need merely observe two points. First (and the relevance of this will become clear in a later section) sensation and φαντασία are conceived by all of them in passive terms. The Epicurean view is as materialistic as that of the Stoics, and, though Plato and Aristotle had been more ambiguous, a similar position could be extracted from some of their writings 31 . Secondly, the origin of knowledge is something self-evident (εναργές), sensation for Epicurus, sensation and intellectual apprehension for the Platonists and Peripatetics, and on this all inference, and hence the construction of a coherent body of knowledge, depends 32 . It is from these views that Carneades' criticism starts. Of the arguments reported by Sextus we need note only those relevant to Plotinus. Against the Stoics' "apprehensive presentation" the Sceptics had the easy task of showing that no true presentation exists which could not be mistaken for a false one. Part of this consists in elaborating the examples of illusion raised by the Cyrenaics 33 . More fundamental, however, was the Cyrenaics' basic 26

27 28

29

30

31

32

33

Math. VII.248: ή ά π ό υπάρχοντος και κατ' αύτό το υπάρχον έναπομεμαγμένη καί έναπεσφραγισμένη (sc. φαντασία), όποια ούκ αν γένοιτο ά π ό μή υπάρχοντος (cf. ibid. VII.402), Cicero Acad. 11.18 ( = SVF. 1.59). Sextus Math. VII.162-163 (= SVF. 11.63), Aet. Plac. IV.12.1 ( = SVF. 11.54). Cf. further A. A. LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 126ff., F. H . SANDBACH, Phantasia katalëptikë, in: A. A. LONG (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, ch. I (London, 1971), pp. 1 — 19, and the discussions cited in n. 2 to the latter paper. On φαντασία in general cf. further Aristotle De An. III.3 and the discussion in Ross's edition (Oxford, 1963), pp. 38—39. For Cleanthes' view cf. SVF. 1.484 = Sextus Math. VII.228, 372, VIII.400, Pyrrh. H y p . 11.70; for Chrysippus cf. SVF. 11.55 (= Diog. Laert. VII.50), 56 ( = Sextus Math. VII.227, 372). Chrysippus' argument that Cleanthes' crude view makes memory, and hence the accumulation of knowledge, impossible (cf. Pyrrh. H y p . 11.70) is echoed at Enn. IV.7.6. 38-49. Cf. Cicero Acad. 1.41-42 (= SVF. 1.60), 11.144 ( = SVF. 1.66) and the discussions cited above, n. 28; also Sextus Math. VII.237. From Plato cf. the tablet image at Theaet. 191 cff., for Aristotle De An. 416b 32ff. and the more expressly materialistic De Mem. 450a 25ff. (cf. Ross, Aristotle [New York, 1959], pp. 136-137, De anima pp. 24—25). BRÉHIER'S notice to Enn. IV.6 shows that the treatise is primarily an attack on the materialistic implications of Aristotle's theories of sensation and memory. Cf. also Sextus Math. VII.203 (on Epicurus), 220 (on the Peripatetics), 251 (on the Stoics). Cf. below, pp. 917-925. Cf. Enn. V . 5 . 1 . 6 - 8 (discussed below, p. 918). For the Platonists cf. Sextus Math. VII. 141, 200, for Epicurus ibid. 203 (cf. Ep. H d t . 52, LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 21 ff.), for Theophrastus, among the Peripatetics, Math. VII.217—218. Math. VII.152, 163-164, 402ff„ cf. Cicero Acad. 11.79-96.

916

R. T . W A L L I S

contention that our senses receive only their own several impressions (πάθη) and have no way of grasping external objects themselves. For just as the pain caused by a whip differs from the whip itself, so the fact that fire produces a sensation of heat affords no guarantee that fire is itself hot 3 4 . N o r does it help to suppose that external objects are similar to the sensations they cause, any more than a man who is shown a picture of Socrates, but does not know Socrates himself, can tell how far the former resembles the latter 35 . N o more can we tell how far our sensations resemble external objects. Furthermore, as we have seen, the senses are regarded in ancient epistemology as receiving impressions like wax, whereas active attention and seeking after truth is a function of the mind 3 6 . Hence sense-knowledge is even more restricted than was at first apparent. For the senses perceive only the attributes of body (e.g. colour), whereas it is the mind that combines these several impressions into the notion of a " b o d y " ; in fact, apprehension even of some of the body's attributes, like length and depth, is beyond the power of the senses 3 7 . Finally, if we suppose that the mind grasps external objects through the senses, we not only face the previous difficulties regarding sense-knowledge; we are also making thought into a sense, since that which receives visual forms is sight, and so on. Otherwise, we have to explain the relation of the images contemplated by the mind to impressions of the senses 3 8 . H o w , in other words, can a sensation be translated into a thought, or a mental image? The above difficulties, we may observe, though explicity presupposing a sensualist theory of knowledge 3 9 , are in fact fatal, as Plotinus was to see, to any theory setting the object of knowledge outside the knowing subject, e.g. to an interpretation of the 'Timaeus' that sets the forms outside the Demiurge. Hence Plotinus' insistence that the objects of Νοϋς cannot be exterior thereto. N o r could he rest content with the Middle Platonic doctrine of the forms as God's thoughts. As ARMSTRONG observes, he goes far beyond this; for him " T h e Ideas are Intellect or Intellect is the Ideas" or "Real Being is Ideas and Intellect; they are one reality described from different points of view" 4 0 . This reason lay, at least in part, in another Sceptical doctrine, their denial of the possibility of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge, they argued, must be of whole by whole, or of one part by another. But, if we regard man as knowing himself as a whole, he must be wholly either the knowing subject or the known object. In the former case no object is left to be known; in the latter, conversely, no subject will remain. If we suppose him 34

35 36 37

38 39 40

Pyrrh. H y p . 1 1 . 7 2 - 7 3 , Math. VII.354, 357, 3 6 5 - 3 6 8 , 3 8 3 - 3 8 5 , cf. STOUGH, o p . c i t . , p. 49, also pp. 20, 118ff. Pyrrh. H y p . 1 1 . 7 4 - 7 5 , Math. V I I . 3 5 7 - 3 5 8 , 3 8 5 - 3 8 7 . Math. VII.283—300; cf. ibid. 344. Pyrrh. H y p . 11.30, Math. VII 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 . C f . ibid. 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 for the role of m e m o r y in senseperception. Math. V I I . 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 ; cf. ibid. 165, 3 0 3 - 3 3 9 , 3 8 1 - 2 8 2 . C f . STOUGH, o p . c i t . , pp. 4 1 f f „ 148ff. Entretiens Hardt V, p. 395. O f course, as ARMSTRONG rightly insists, the basis of Plotinus' doctrine is in Aristotle and especially in Alexander of Aphrodisias' interpretation of his doctrine of Νοϋς (ibid. p. 408; cf. below, pp. 923—924).

SCEPTICISM A N D NEOPLATONISM

917

to be at one time the subject, at another the object, both difficulties will apply, albeit at different times 41 . As regards knowledge of part by part, Sextus attempts an exhaustive demonstration that body, senses and intellect can know neither themselves nor one another 42 . Since many of his arguments are sophistical and since we are in any case concerned only with those which appear to have influenced Plotinus, most of these may be passed over. Aristotle's arguments that self-apprehension is possible for both senses and intellect are rejected 43 . The possibility that the senses apprehend either themselves or one another is roundly dismissed by a simple appeal to experience 44 , while self-knowledge on the part of the intellect as a whole encounters the same objections as those to human self-knowledge considered earlier 45 . If, on the other hand, we assume that intellect knows itself through part of itself, we must ask how that part apprehends itself. If as a whole, the previous difficulties arise once more; if that in its turn apprehends itself through part of itself, we are faced with an infinite regress 46 . It is interesting that Sextus nowhere raises the objection that apprehension of one part by another is n o t self-knowledge in the strict sense of the term 4 7 . But the upshot of his criticism is clear. First, all knowledge is of the external; hence we grasp only images of the objects perceived, not the objects themselves, which remain forever unknowable. Hence nothing, apart from our own sensations, is self-evident 48 ; therefore, since any criterion of truth must rest upon a proof, and since that proof in turn needs a criterion to justify it, we are caught in a vicious circle 49 . Knowledge is therefore impossible.

II. Plotinus' Reply; His Doctrine

of Νοϋς

Plotinus' answer to the Sceptics' first objection, that knowledge of the external is impossible, occupies the first two chapters of the treatise V.5, while his answer to their critique of self-awareness comes in the first five chapters of 41

42 43

44 45

46 47 48 49

Math. VII.284—286. The possibility of self-knowledge had already been queried by Plato, Charmides 1 6 4 - 1 6 9 . Math. VII.287—309. For self-knowledge on the part of the senses, cf. De An. 425 b 12 ff., of the intellect ibid. 430a 2ff„ Metaph. 1072b 19ff„ 1074b 35ff. Cf. further below, pp. 9 2 3 - 9 2 5 . Math. VII.301 —302, cf. Plato, Charmides 1 6 7 C - D . Math. V I I . 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 : εΐπερ γαρ ó νους εαυτόν καταλαμβάνεται, ήτοι ολος εαυτόν καταλήψεται, ή όλος μεν ουδαμώς, μέρει δέ τινι έαυτοϋ προς τοΰτο χρώμενος. και ολος μεν έαυτόν καταλαμβάνεσθαι οΰκ αν δυνηθείη. ει γαρ όλος έαυτόν καταλαμβάνεται, ολος εσται κατάληψις και καταλαμβάνων, όλου δ' οντος του καταλαμβάνοντος ουδέν ετι εσται το καταλαμβανόμενον. των δέ άλογωτάτων έστί το είναι μέν τον καταλαμβάνοντα, μή είναι δέ το ου εστίν ή κατάληψις. Ibid. VII.312. • Cf. below, p. 921 and section II n. 78. Math. V I I . 3 6 4 - 3 6 8 . Ibid. VII.341—342, 369.

918

R. T. WALLIS

the late work V.3. In reporting his account we shall concentrate on these points which appear specifically to answer surviving Sceptical arguments. V.3.1 begins with a firm declaration that true Νους can never be deceived or subject to falsehood; otherwise we should face the absurd notion of an "unintelligent Intelligence". Its knowledge must therefore be eternal, free from forgetfulness, and not a matter of doubt, conjecture or external derivation50. Plotinus' arguments in the first part of the chapter, as B R É H I E R observes, appear primarily to confront an Epicurean-style theory of knowledge, while those further on have the Stoics rather in mind 51 . In fact, however, his arguments, like those we have reported from Sextus, are sufficiently general to overthrow any view of knowledge as derivai from an external source 52 . It follows from the principles enunciated at the start of the chapter that even if, per impossibile, we supposed Νους to derive its knowledge through demonstration, that demonstration must start from something initially selfevident53. This we have seen in the systems attacked by the Sceptics; what then is the source of this 'self-evidence' and in what does its reliability consist 54 ? To those, especially the Epicureans, who had regarded sense-perception as the most reliable, and ultimately the only source of knowledge, Plotinus repeats the Sceptical objection that the senses receive only their own particular affections, and hence need reason to judge these55 (something the Sceptics had considered essential and at the same time impossible)56. For even if the perceived quality is really in the external object, our senses receive not that object itself, but merely an image thereof 57 . Moreover if the objects of Νους are likewise external, we must explain how it encounters them. Clearly it may fail to do so, or at any rate its knowledge of them will not be eternal58. (The Epicurean view of presentation

50

V. 5 . 1 . 1 - 5 : τον νουν, τον άληθή νουν καί όντως, άρ' αν τις φαίη ψεύοεσθαί ποτε και μή τα όντα δοξάσειν; ουδαμώς, πώς γαρ αν ετι νους άνοηταίνων εΐη; δει άρα αυτόν αεί είδεναι και μηδέν έπιλαθέσθαι ποτέ, την δέ εϊδησιν αύτώ μήτε είκάζοντι είναι μήτε άμφίβολον μηδ' αν παρ' άλλου οίον άκούσαντι.

51

Notice (Budé V pp. 8 3 - 8 5 ) . Cf. above section I, n. 25. V.5.1.6—8: οϋ τοίνυν ουδέ δι' άποδείξεως. και γαρ εϊ τινά τις φαίη δι' αποδείξεως, άλλ' ούν αύτόθεν αύτώ έναργη τιν' είναι. Cf. above n. 32: for the Sceptics' refutation ibid. n. 48 V . 5 . 1 . 9 - 1 2 : άλλ' ούν, & συγχωροΰσιν αύτόθεν, πόθεν φήσουσι τούτων το έναργές αύτώ παρειναι; πόθεν δέ αύτφ πίστιν, ότι ούτως εχει, παρέξεται; Ibid. 12—15: έπεί καί τα επί τής αΐσθήσεως, ά δή δοκεϊ πίστιν εχειν έναργεστάτην, άπιστειται, μή ποτε ούκ έν τοις ύποκειμένοις, άλλ' έν τοις πάθεσιν εχει την δοκούσαν ύπόστασιν, καί νου δει ή διανοίας των κρινούντων. Cf. above, pp. 915—917. For the Epicurean view cf. also Sextus Math. VIII.9 and Epicurus K.D. X X I V .

52 53

54

55

56 57

58

Cf. above section I, p. 916 and ns. 37 and 38. V . 5 . 1 . 1 5 - 1 9 : έπεί καί συγκεχωρημένου εν τοις ύποκειμένοις είναι αίσθητοΐς, ών άντίληψιν ή α'ίσθησις ποίησεται, τό τε γινωσκόμενον δι' αίσθήσεως τού πράγματος είδωλόν έστι καί ούκ αυτό τό πράγμα ή αίσθησις λαμβάνει, μένει γαρ έκεϊνο εξω. For εϊδωλον as an Epicurean technical term cf. e.g. Sextus Math. VII.209, LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 22, 47. V.5.1.19-23.

SCEPTICISM

AND

NEOPLATONISM

919

and judgment as 'conjoined' with each other explains nothing 5 9 .) And if Νους resembles the senses in receiving 'impressions' from outside, we must explain their nature. Must we suppose they are like sense-impressions, only smaller 60 ? H o w , most fundamentally, can Ν ο υ ς be sure that it has really grasped its objects? Goodness and other moral Forms will be external and must be judged by an external standard of truth 61 . Moreover the Intelligibles are either (a) devoid of sensation, life and intelligence or (b) endowed with these. If (a), it is they that constitute Primal Intelligence, and we must once again ask how subject and object are related there 62 . If (b), what is their nature? Certainly not 'premisses, axioms and statements', the objects of Stoic logic; for these are mere abstractions predicating one external object of another 63 . But to predicate e.g. nobility of justice makes nobility and justice two separate things (the Stoics, as is well known, had regarded moral qualities as spatially extended and therefore spatially separable). Once again, therefore, we must explain how Νους encounters them, and how it remains a unity 64 . If its objects are 'graven images', as in Stoic thought, Νους must be identical with perception and its grasp of moral qualities remains inexplicable 65 . And the fundamental objection remains, that if its objects are external, its whole contemplation will rest on error, since it will perceive not those objects themselves, but mere images of them 66 . Then

59

60

61

62 63

64

65 66

Ibid. 23—24: For this view, cf. Sextus Math. VII.203: δυοίν όντων ι ώ ν συζυγούντων άλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καί της δόξης . . . V.5.1.24—28: επειτα καί αί νοήσεις τύποι έσονται, εί δέ τούτο, καί έπακτοί καί πληγαί. π ώ ς δέ καί τυπώσεται, ή τίς των τοιούτων ή μορφή; καί ή νόησις τοΰ εξω, ώσπερ ή αίσθησις. καί τί διοίσει ή τ φ σμικροτέρων άντιλαμβάνεσθαι; Ibid. 2 8 - 3 2 : π ώ ς δε καί γνώσεται, οτι άντελάβετο δντως; πώς δέ ότι άγαθόν τούτο, ή οτι καλόν ή δίκαιον; εκαστον γάρ τούτων άλλο αύτού, καί ούκ έν αύτω αί τής κρίσεως άρχαί, αίς πιστεύσει, άλλα καί αύται εξω, καί ή άλήθεια εκεί. Ibid. 3 2 - 3 7 . Ibid. 3 7 - 4 1 : ει δ' άνόητα καί άνευ ζωής, τί οντα; ού γ α ρ δη προτάσεις ούδέ άξιώματα ούδέ λεκτά. ήδη γ α ρ αν καί αυτά περί έτερων λέγοι, καί ούκ αυτά τα οντα ειη, οίον το δίκαιον καλόν, άλλου του δικαίου καί τού καλού οντος. The opening lines may contain an allusion, as BRÉHIER suggests, to the Stoic distinction between 'truth' (identical with the universal λόγος) and 'the true', equated with abstract concepts (Math. VII.38ff. = SVF 11.132; for further explanation and some parallel passages cf. A. A. LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 130; ID., Language and Thought in Stoicism, in: ID. (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, Ch. 5, pp. 98 — 101). Προτάσεις ("premises") are already a technical term at Aristotle An. Pr. 24 a 16, etc.; for άξιώματα and λεκτά cf. also Math. VIII.12 = SVF 11.166; on λεκτά cf. also SVF. 11.167—192. LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 135ff.; on άξιώματα SVF. 11.193-220; LONG, ibid., p. 140. V.5.1.41—46, an allusion to the Stoic distinction between simple material objects (including the virtues) and complex incorporeal statements about these (cf. Seneca Ep. 117. 13, discussed by LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 136—137). Cf. above section I, ns. 29 and 31. V.5.1.50-58: μέγιστον δέ πάντων εκείνο, εί γ ά ρ καί οτι μάλιστα δοίη τις ταύτα εξω είναι καί τον νούν αύτά οΰτως έχοντα θεωρεϊν, άναγκαίον αύτω μήτε το άληθές αυτών εχειν διεψεύσθαί τε έν άπασιν οϊς θεωρεί, τα μεν γ ά ρ άληθινά αν ειη έκείνα. θεωρήσει τοίνυν αύτά ούκ εχων αύτά, είδωλα δε αυτών έν τη γνώσει τη τοιαύτη λαβών.

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it must either be aware of its deception or ignorant of it, in which case its error will be doubled 6 7 . It is just because their objects are external, Plotinus claims, that the senses (in Plato's view) attain only opinion instead of truth 6 8 . Hence if Ν ο υ ς is in a similar condition, it too will lack the truth, and indeed will not be Ν ο υ ς at all; but if truth is not in Ν ο υ ς , it is nowhere 6 9 . Hence, Plotinus argues, after recapitulating the conclusions of his first chapter 70 , if we are to preserve the knowability and the very existence of the Intelligibles, and not to abolish Ν ο υ ς altogether, w e must grant Ν ο υ ς knowledge of the essence (το χί) of its objects and not merely of their quality (το π ο ι ό ν χι), the latter being the consequences of making its contemplation dependent on images. Hence true Ν ο ΰ ς must contain all Reality 7 1 , if it is to possess true knowledge without forgetting or needing to seek it. It is thus the seat of truth and reality; for, as Aristotle had argued, the noblest and most blessed Being must possess life and intelligence 72 . Its o w n truth is thus self-evident to it, and needs no demonstration or proof 7 3 ; for "real truth consists in agreement not with another, but with itself, and says nothing beyond itself, and is what it says and says what it is" 7 4 . Such truth, Plotinus replies to the Sceptics, is irrefutable; for anyone seeking to refute it must go to it for the premisses of his refutation. For one can find nothing else truer than the truth 75 .

67 68 69

70

71

72

73

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75

το τοίνυν άληθινόν ουκ έχων, είδωλα δέ τοΰ αληθούς παρ' αύτφ λαβών τα ψευδή έχει καί ούδέν άληθές. Ibid. 58—61; cf. Socrates' famous claim at Apol. 21 d, etc. V.5.1.62—65; for Plato's association of δόξα with sense-world cf. Tim. 51 d—e. V.5.1.65—68: εί οΰν μή άλήθεια έν τω νφ, ούτος μεν ó τοιούτος νους οΰτε άλήθεια έσται οΰτε άληθεία νοϋς οΰτε ολως νους έσται. άλλ' ούδέ άλλοθι που ή άλήθεια έσται. Ibid. 2.1-4: ου τοίνυν δεί οΰτε έξω τα νοητά ζητείν, οΰτε τύπους έν τφ νφ των όντων λέγειν είναι, οΰτε τής άληθείας άποστερούντας αυτόν άγνωσίαν τε των νοητών ποιείν και άνυπαρξίαν καί έτι, αυτόν τον νούν άναιρείν. Ibid. 4—9: άλλ' εϊπερ καί γνώσιν δει και άλήθειαν είσάγειν καί τα όντα τηρεϊν καί γνώσιν τού τί εκαστόν έστιν, άλλα μή τοΰ ποιόν τι εκαστον, οτε είδωλον αύτοΰ καί ίχνος ϊσχοντας, άλλα μή αύτά έχοντας καί συνόντας καί συγκραθέντας αύτοϊς, τφ άληθινφ νφ δοτέον τα πάντα. For the highest form of knowledge as grasping το τί instead of το ποίον cf. Plato Ep. VII.343b—c; cf. Enn. V.3.1.24—26, 4.19—20, discussed below, pp. 921-922. V.5.2.9—13: οϋτω γαρ αν καί είδείη, καί άληθινώς εΐδείη, καί ούδ' άν έπιλάθοιτο ούδ' αν περιέλθοι ζητών, καί ή αλήθεια έν αύτφ καί εδρα εσται τοίς ούσι καί ζήσεται καί νοήσει, πάντα περί τήν μακαριωτάτην φΰσιν δεί ύπάρχειν. ή ποΰ τί τίμιον καί σεμνόν εσται; cf. Aristotle Met. 1074 b 17. This does not, however, apply for Plotinus to the one beyond being (cf. section 9, below). V.5.2.13-18: καί γαρ αΰ ούτως ούδ' άποδείξεως δεί ουδέ πίστεως, δτι ούτως αυτός γαρ οϋτως καί εναργής αυτός αύτώ - . . . καί ουδείς πιστότερος αύτφ περί αύτού καί δτι έκεί τούτο καί οντος. Cf. Ch. 1.6—8, cited above n. 53. Ibid. 2.18-20: ώστε καί ή όντως άλήθεια ού συμφωνούσα άλλψ, άλλ' έαυτή, καί ούδέν παρ' αύτήν άλλο λέγει, άλλ' ô λέγει, καί έστι, καί δ έστι, τούτο καί λέγει. V.5.2.20—24: τίς άν ούν έλέγξειε; καί πόθεν οϊσει τον ελεγχον; εις γαρ ταΰτάν ó φερόμενος έλεγχος τφ προειπόντι, κάν κομίση ώς άλλο, φέρεται εις τον εξαρχής εΐπόντα καί έν έστιν. ού γαρ άλλο άληθέστερον άν εϋροις τού άληθούς.

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In propounding this answer Plotinus, like other opponents of the Sceptics 76 , regards them as dependent for their criticism on the principles they seek to refute. In V. 3 he turns to justify the corollary of this answer, that Intelligence possesses perfect self-awareness. He first inquires whether self-awareness is possible only for composite entities, by grasping one part of themselves by another; for, as we have seen, the Sceptics had regarded simple entities as incapable of self-knowledge 77 . His reply is that simple entities, and indeed only they, can know themselves, since knowledge of part by part, e.g. of the body by the senses, is not true self-awareness; for it does not embrace the self as a whole, since the subject does not know himself qua subject. Hence he will be seeking not himself, but something else. Therefore, if self-knowledge is possible, it must be so for simple beings 78 . To abandon the notion, Plotinus argues, entails many absurdities; it is difficult enough on the level of soul, but quite absurd to ascribe Νους knowledge of other things, but not of itself 79 . For it is not Νους, but perception and, as we shall see, discursive thought and opinion, that grasp external objects 80 . And since it is agreed that Νους grasps the Intelligibles, does it also know itself and, if so, is it (a) merely aware that it knows its objects or (b) does it also know its own nature 81 ? We must thus examine the nature and extent of its selfknowledge. Soul's claim to self-knowledge is disposed of briefly. Sensation, Plotinus observes, deals with the external world and, even when it perceives the body's internal processes, these are still external to the perceiving subject 82 . Discursive reason, on the other hand, the faculty of soul par excellence, is based on mental images, derived either from the external world of the senses or from the internal Intelligible order, and it is by combination and comparison of these that her 76 77 78

79

80

81

82

Cf. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.13-17, II.185ff., Math. VII.463ff. V.3.1.1-4; cf. Math. VII.284-286, 310-311, discussed above section I, p. 917 and n. 45. V.3.1.4—12: ή οίόν τε και μή σύνθετον öv νόησιν ισχειν έαυτού. το μεν γαρ διότι σύνθετον λεγόμενον νοεϊν εαυτό, ότι δή ένί των εν αύτφ τα άλλα νοεί, ώσπερ άν εί τη αίσθήσει καταλαμβάνοιμεν αύτών την μορφήν καί την άλλην τοΰ σώματος ψύσιν, ούκ άν εχοι το ώς άληθώς νοεϊν αυτό. ού γαρ το πάν εσται έν τω τοιούτω έγνωσμένον, μή κάκείνου του νοήσαντος τα άλλα τα συν αύτφ καί εαυτό νενοηκότος, εσται τε ού το ζητοΰμενον το αυτό έαυτό, άλλ' άλλο άλλο. Cf. above section I, ns. 42 and 47. V.3.1.15-19: άποστήναι μεν ούν της δόξης ταύτης ού πάνυ οίόν τε πολλών τών άτοπων συμβαινόντων, καί γαρ εί μή ψυχή δοίημεν τούτο ώς πάνυ άτοπον όν, άλλά μηδέ νου τή φύσει διδόναι, παντάπασιν άτοπον, εί τών μεν άλλων γνώσιν έχει, έαυτοϋ δε μή έν γνώσει καί επιστήμη καταστήσεται. Ibid. 19-20: καί γαρ τών μεν έξω ή αΐσθησις, άλλ' ού νους άντιλήψεται, καί, εί βούλει, διάνοια καί δόξα. Cf. 1.1. 2.25-26 for the dependence of διάνοια and δόξα on the senses. Ibid. 22—27: όσα δε νοητά, νους δηλονότι γνώσεται. άρ' ούν αύτά μόνον ή καί έαυτόν, δς ταϋτα γνώσεται; καί άρα ούτω γνώσεται έαυτόν, ότι γινώσκει ταύτα μόνον τίς δέ ών ού γνώσεται, άλλ' ά μεν αύτοΰ, γνώσεται οτι γινώσκει, τίς δε ων γινώσκει ούκέτι; ή καί τά έαυτού καί έαυτόν; Ibid. 2.2—5: το μεν ούν αΐσθητικόν αύτής αύτόθεν άν φαίμεν τοΰ εξω είναι μόνον, καί γαρ εί τών ένδον έν τω σώματι γινομένων συναίσθησις εϊη, άλλα τών έξω έαυτοϋ καί ενταύθα ή άντίληψις.

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k n o w l e d g e is built u p 8 3 . P l o t i n u s ' e x a m i n a t i o n of this p r o c e d u r e c a n n o t b e c o n sidered h e r e 8 4 . H i s f u n d a m e n t a l p o i n t s , h o w e v e r , are (a) that s o u l differs f r o m Ν ο ύ ς in p r o c e e d i n g b y discursive as o p p o s e d t o intuitive t h o u g h t 8 5 and (b) that s o u l ' s o b j e c t s , u n l i k e t h o s e of Ν ο υ ς , are external t o her ( i . e . , as w e have s e e n , are m e r e i m a g e s , n o t the o b j e c t s o f s e n s e or I n t e l l i g e n c e t h e m s e l v e s ) 8 6 . W e can t h e r e f o r e c o n f o r m t o Ν ο υ ς in o n e of t w o w a y s , either b y m e a n s of the " w r i t i n g s e n g r a v e d in us like l a w s " ( i . e . , b y the i m a g e s c o n t e m p l a t e d b y s o u l ) o r b y b e c o m ing "filled w i t h Ν ο ύ ς and able t o p e r c e i v e it in p r e s e n c e " (i.e. t o c o n t e m p l a t e it d i r e c t l y ) 8 7 . T h e m e c h a n i s m s of this and its relation t o o u r "true s e l f " c a n n o t be d i s c u s s e d h e r e 8 8 . A l l w e can o b s e r v e is that P l o t i n u s is c o n t e n t t o assign t o discursive t h o u g h t the f o r m e r of the t w o t y p e s of s e l f - k n o w l e d g e d i s t i n g u i s h e d earlier, i.e. the k n o w l e d g e that it k n o w s its o b j e c t s b y the criteria it derives f r o m Ν ο ύ ς and that its s o u r c e is s u p e r i o r t o it; i.e, it k n o w s " w h a t sort of t h i n g " it is v i z . , a p r o d u c t and i m a g e of Ν ο ύ ς , b u t w i t h o u t directly a p p r e h e n d i n g " w h a t it i s " 8 9 . W e m u s t n o w return t o the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r N o û ç ' s s e l f - k n o w l e d g e c o n s i s t s in that of o n e part b y a n o t h e r . B u t this is n o t true s e l f - k n o w l e d g e , since subject and o b j e c t w i l l be d i f f e r e n t 9 0 . N o r can w e restore their i d e n t i t y b y s u p p o s i n g Ν ο ύ ς t o c o n s i s t of h o m o g e n e o u s parts. F o r (a) w e m u s t explain h o w s u c h a

83

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85

86

87

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90

Ibid. 2 . 7 - 1 3 : το δ' έν αυτή λογιζόμενον π α ρ ά των έκ της αίσθήσεως φαντασμάτων παρακειμένων την έπίκρισιν ποιουμενον και συνάγον καί διαιρούν, ή και επί των έκ τού νού ιόντων εφορςι οίον τους τύπους, καί έχει καί περί τούτους την αυτήν δύναμιν. καί σύνεσιν ετι προσλαμβάνει ώσπερ έπιγινώσκον καί έφαρμόζον τοις έν α ύ τ φ έκ π α λ α ι ο ύ τ ΰ π ο ι ς τους νέους καί άρτι ήκοντας. It is in this sense (ibid. 13—14) that Plotinus interprets Platonic άνάμνησις (cf. IV.3.25.27ff.). Cf. especially V . 3 . 3 . 1 - 1 2 . As Bréhier's note observes, Plotinus appears to have the 'Theaetetus" account of memory especially in mind. Cf. also 'Philebus' 33 ff. Ibid. 3.14; cf. V . l . 4 . 1 0 - 2 5 . For the problems posed for the divine souls by this distinction, cf. Neoplatonism, pp. 81 — 82. V.3.2.23—24: τοΰτο τοίνυν το διανοητικόν της ψυχής ά ρ α επιστρέφει εφ' έαυτό καί αυτό; ή οΰ· άλλα ών δέχεται τ ύ π ω ν έφ' έκάτερα τήν σύνεσιν ϊσχει. Ibid. 4.1—4: Βασιλεύομεν δε καί ημείς, όθεν κατ' εκείνον, κατ' έκεϊνον δέ διχώς, ή τοίς οίον γράμμασιν ώσπερ νόμοις έν ήμίν γραφείσιν, ή οίον πληρωθέντες αυτού, ή καί δυνηθέντες ίδείν καί αίσθάνεσθαι παρόντος. O n the two stages here distinguished cf. Neoplatonism, pp. 85 — 86. O n the latter problem cf. most recently G. J. P. O ' D a l y , Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 40ff., 5 0 - 5 1 , 57—58, 76—78; on these chapters in general, and their possible Peripatetic sources P. M e r l a n , Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (Arch, int. d'hist. des idées, 2 [The Hague, 1963]), pp. 77ff. V . 3 . 4 . 1 4 - 1 9 : το δή διανοητικόν οτι διανοητικόν ά ρ α ουκ οίδε, καί ότι σύνεσιν των εξω λαμβάνει, καί οτι κρίνει α κρίνει, καί ότι τοίς έν έαυτω κανόσιν, ους π α ρ ά τοϋ νοϋ εχει, καί ώς εστι τι βέλτιον αυτού, ö ου ζητεί, άλλ' εχει π ά ν τ ω ς δήπου; άλλ' ά ρ α τί έστιν αυτό ουκ οίδεν έπιστάμενον οίόν έστι καί οία τα έργα αυτού; The rest of the chapter, in distinguishing discursive reason from Νοΰς answers this question firmly in the negative. Plotinus thus ascribes to Soul only the Power of the two kinds of self-awareness distinguished above ns. 71 and 81. Ibid. 5 . 1 - 3 : άρ' οΰν άλλω μέρει εαυτού άλλο μέρος αυτού καθορςί; άλλ' ούτω το μεν εσται όρων, το δέ όρώμενον. τούτο δέ ουκ αυτό έαυτό.

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division into parts can come about 91 ; and (b) the part with the role of subject, in knowing the part that is object, will still be ignorant of itself qua subject, and hence will not know itself in its entirety — in other words, once again, it will attain knowledge not of itself, but of another 92 . But (c) if its knowledge includes itself qua subject, it must also include its objects of contemplation, i.e. (to repeat another familiar argument) not mere images of these. And (for reasons which should by now be clear) this excludes any division between subject and object; rather Νους must exercise self-contemplation prior to any supposed division. Hence, as in Aristotle's concept of Νους, subject and object of contemplation are identical; and (once again) truth cannot be concerned with anything external but "is what she proclaims" 93 . Hence Primal Intelligence contains, or rather, is identical with its object, Primal Being 94 . In other words, the Middle Platonic view of the Forms as God's thoughts is unsatisfactory as an answer to the Sceptics; for this we must assert the Peripatetic conception of Νους in its full rigour 95 . Unfortunately Aristotle's observations on self-awareness had been extremely fragmentary. In his view self-awareness had depended on the subject's identification with the form contemplated; hence he had maintained the identity of subject and object not just on the level of Νους, but on that of sense-perception 96 . Moreover, as Aristotle had admitted, such awareness appears to be primarily of the object contemplated and only incidentally of the knowing subject 97 , though he had ultimately dismissed this objection as far as the knowledge of immaterial objects is concerned and, a fortiori, regarding God's self-contemplation 98 . Hence, perhaps, Plotinus' query whether the identity of knower 91 92

93

94

95 96 97

Ibid. 3 - 9 . Ibid. 10—15: είτα πώς εαυτόν γνώσεται ó θεωρών έν τω θεωρουμένψ τάξας εαυτόν κατά το θεωρείν; ού γαρ ήν έν τω θεωρούμενα) το θεωρεϊν. ή γνοΰς εαυτόν ούτω θεωρούμενον, άλλ' ού θεωροϋντα, νοήσει, ώστε ού πάντα ουδέ όλον γνώσεται έαυτόν. ôv γαρ είδε, θεωροΰμενον, άλλ' ού θεωροϋντα είδε. καί οΰτως εσται άλλον, άλλ' ούχ έαυτόν έωρακώς. Ibid. 15—26: ή προσθήσει παρ' αύτοΰ καί τον τεθεωρηκότα, ίνα τέλεον αύτόν fj νενοηκώς. άλλ' εΐ καί τον τεθεωρηκότα, όμοΰ καί τα έωραμένα. εί ούν έν xfj θεωρίςι υπάρχει τα τεθεωρημένα, εί μεν τύποι αύτών, ούκ αύτά έχει. εί δ' αύτά έχει, ούκ ίδών αύτά εκ του μερίσαι αύτόν εχει, άλλ' ήν πριν μερίσαι έαυτόν καί θεωρών καί έχων. εί τούτο, δει την θεωρίαν ταύτόν είναι τώ θεωρητώ, καί τον νούν ταύτόν είναι τω νοητφ. καί γαρ, εί μη ταύτόν, ούκ άλήθεια εσται. τύπον γαρ εξει ό έχων τά όντα έτερον τών δντων, όπερ ούκ έστιν αλήθεια, την άρα άλήθειαν ούχ έτερου είναι δει, άλλ' ô λέγει, τούτο καί είναι. For the identity of truth with its object cf. above n. 74; for the identity of Νοΰς with its object in Aristotle cf. the passages cited above section I, n. 43; also De An. 431 a iff., b 20ff.; in Alexander, cf. De An. 8 7 - 8 8 (cited by MERLAN, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness, p. 17. n. 1; Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 ) , De An. Mant. 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 (all passages noted by ARMSTRONG, Entretiens Hardt V, p. 408). V . 3 . 5 . 2 6 - 2 8 : έν άρα οϋτω νοϋς καί το νοητόν καί το öv καί πρώτον öv τούτο καί δη καί πρώτος νοΰς τα όντα εχων, μάλλον δε ό αύτός τοις ούσιν. Cf. ARMSTRONG'S distinction in the passage cited above, p. 916, and section I, n. 40. For Aristotle cf. above section I, n. 43; cf. Alexander De An. Mant. 108.10, etc. Metaph. 1074 b 35—36: φαίνεται δ' άεί άλλου ή έπιστήμη καί ή αισθησις καί ή δόξα καί ή διάνοια, αύτής δ' έν παρέργω. Cf. Alexander De An. Mant. 109.15ff.

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and known does in fact assure self-awareness". His reply follows Alexander of Aphrodisias' development of Aristotle's doctrine (and also Plotinus' o w n interpretation of Plato's 'Sophist') 1 0 0 . Intelligible Reality, he argues, must be the Primary Actuality, and hence free from any potentiality; it cannot therefore be lifeless, like a stone, or possess life or Intelligence as incidental acquisitions. Intelligence must rather be its very essence, and it is thus itself the primary Ν ο υ ς 1 0 1 . Alexander's arguments to this effect had rested on the Peripatetic, anti-Platonic, view that Intelligences are the only substantial Forms outside matter; w e may also recall Plotinus' challenge to his opponents to explain the nature of their supposedly lifeless Forms 1 0 2 . The conclusion of Chapter 5 applies a similar argument to the subjective side of Ν ο υ ς . If primal Ν ο ύ ς is fully actual, without any potentiality, as Aristotle maintains 1 0 3 (and as is, of course, necessary if its knowledge is to be perfect), then, Plotinus argues, it must be identical both with its object and with its activity. All three will thus be one and "it will k n o w by the knowledge that is itself, and k n o w the object that is itself." O n both grounds, therefore, it must possess self-knowledge 1 0 4 . With the next four chapters, which further establish the necessity of such a self-cognizing principle underlying soul's contemplation 1 0 5 , w e cannot deal.

98

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102 103 104

105

Ibid. 1074 b 38ff. : ή έπ' ένίων ή έπιστήμη το πράγμα, έπί μεν των ποιητικών άνευ ΰλης ή ουσία καί το τί ήν είναι, έπί δε των θεωρητικών ό λόγος το πράγμα καί ή νόησις; ούχ έτέρου ούν οντος του νοουμένου καί του νου, οσα μή ϋλην εχει, το αύτό εσται και ή νόησις τω νοουμένω μία. V.3.5.30-31: ή μεν γαρ νόησις οίον περιέξει το νοητόν, ή ταύτόν τω νοητώ εσται, οΰπω δέ ό νους δήλος εαυτόν νοών. Cf. Alexander De An. 87.24 — 88.3 (cited above, n. 93), especially the conclusion . . . άλλα μην το κατ' ένέργειαν νοητόν ταύτόν τώ κατ' ένέργειαν νψ, εί γε ταύτόν το νοοΰμενον τφ νοοϋντι. το άρα άϋλον είδος νους ó κυρίως τε καί κατ' ένέργειαν. De An. Mani. 108ff., 110.25ff.; Plato, Sophist 248-249. On Plotinus' interpretation of the 'Sophist' cf. P. HADOT, Entretiens Hardt V, pp. 107-157. V.3.5.31-39: άλλ' ει ή νόησις καί το νοητόν ταύτόν - ένέργεια γάρ τις το νοητόν ού γαρ δη δύναμις ούδέ γ' άνόητον ουδέ ζωής χωρίς ούδ' αΰ έπακτόν το ζήν ούδέ το νοεϊν άλλω οντι, οίον λίθω ή άψυχα) τινί — καί ουσία ή πρώτη το νοητόν. ει ούν ένέργεια καί ή πρώτη ενέργεια καί καλλίστη δη, νόησις αν εϊη καί ουσιώδης νόησις. καί γαρ άληθεστάτη. νόησις δη τοιαύτη καί πρώτη ούσα καί πρώτως νους αν εϊη ό πρώτος. Cf. Enn. V.5.1.37-41, cited above, n. 63. Metaph. 1074 b 19ff„ De An. 430a 18. V.3.5.39—48: ούδέ γαρ Ό νους ούτος δυνάμει ούδ' ετερος μεν αύτός, ή δέ νόησις άλλο. ούτω γαρ αν πάλιν το ούσιώδες αύτοϋ δυνάμει, εί ούν ένέργεια καί ή ούσία αύτού ένέργεια, !ν καί ταύτόν τή ενεργείς αν ειη. εν δέ τή ένεργείςι το δν καί το νοητόν. εν άμα πάντα εσται, νους, νόησις, το νοητόν. εί ούν ή νόησις αύτοϋ το νοητόν, το δέ νοητόν αύτός, αύτός άρα έαυτόν νοήσει, νοήσει γαρ τή νόησει, όπερ ήν αύτός, καί νόησει το νοητόν, όπερ ήν αύτός. καθ' έκάτερον άρα έαυτόν νόησει, καθότι καί ή νόησις αύτός ήν καί καθότι το νοητόν αύτός, δπερ ένόει τή νοήσει, ô ήν αύτός. Similarly in II.9.1.33ff. Plotinus rejects even a conceptual distinction between Νους and the knowledge that it thinks (cf. O'DALY, op. cit., pp. 75 — 76). BRÉHIER, Ennéades V p. 41.

SCEPTICISM

A N D

925

NEOPLATONISM

We have seen, however, both how Plotinus insists on the Aristotelian view of Νούς and how, in contrast to Aristotle, he establishes a hierarchy of degrees of self-awareness, ranging from sensation through discursive reason to pure Νους. On both points, as we have seen, the Sceptical criticisms were a decisive influence.

III.

The Sceptical Critique of Contemporary the Problem of Divine Virtue

Theology;

The section of the Sceptics' theological critique that concerns us deals with the question whether the gods have virtues, a problem apparently raised as early as the Old Academy 106 . In his well-known conclusion to the 'Nicomachean Ethics' upholding the divinity of the contemplative life Aristotle had denied the gods moral virtue 107 , and it is his arguments that form the starting-point for the Sceptics' attack on the Stoic view of God as the archetype of all virtues without distinction 108 . But despite this Peripatetic basis, the Sceptical criticisms not merely go beyond anything specifically stated by Aristotle, but, as Plotinus was to see, can at some points be used against Peripatetic theology 109 . It might at first appear that the arguments in question, starting as they do from the premiss that a rational being must be either virtuous or vicious, are valid only against the Stoics, who had excluded any mean between the two 110 . But while in strict logic this is so, too much should not be made of this restriction. Even those theologians who recognise a mean between virtue and vice would usually recoil in horror at the suggestion that God might be in such a mean state, while even paradoxical thinkers like Eckhart, who deny that God can be called good 111 , commonly mean only that his perfection transcends human conceptions of goodness, not that he falls somewhere between virtue and vice. In other words, if in the scale of values we set the maximum degree of vice at zero and the highest perfection conceivable to man at 100, it is orthodox to set divine perfection at infinity, but flat blasphemy to place it at 50. But divine goodness once admitted, can we regard it as including moral virtue? From the standpoint of a common-sense theology, like Stoicism or popular Christianity, it would seem reasonable to ascribe at least some virtues,

106 107 108

109 110 111

62

Cf. DODDS' observations in: Entretiens Hardt V, p. 227. Ν . E . 1178 b 8ff. O n God as possessing all virtues cf. SVF. 1.529 = Sextus Math. IX.88 (to which VON ARNIM compares Cicero N . D . 11.33—36); on the similarity of divine and human virtue in the Old Stoa cf. SVF. 1.564, I I I . 2 4 5 - 2 5 4 (listed by POHLENZ, Die Stoa, II [Göttingen, 2 1955], p. 73). Cf. our suggestions in section IX below, pp. 952—954. For the Stoic denial of such a mean cf. SVF. 1.566, I I I . 5 3 6 - 5 3 9 . Cf. sermon 84 of PFEIFFER'S edition of Eckhart's works. ANRW II 36.2

926

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T.

WALLIS

like justice and benevolence, to the deity 1 1 2 , and it is thus not unfair for the Sceptics to begin from this position 1 1 3 . The first argument of theirs to be considered is of a more general type than the others and stands rather apart from them 1 1 4 . If we ascribe virtue to the gods, it runs, can we regard their situation as parallel to that of other beings? A man or a horse is said to possess excellence by reference to an external standard; the man or horse is one thing, its excellence another, and it is the latter which gives perfection to the former. But if God's case is similar, his perfection will likewise derive not from his essential nature, but from without, and there will be something (i.e. virtue) superior to G o d . G o d will therefore be in a deficient state, and hence liable to perish. As ZELLER observes 1 1 5 , the argument is sophistically phrased; yet it nevertheless raises more than one genuine theological difficulty. First there is the dilemma posed by Plato in the 'Euthyphro', whether moral actions are good solely because G o d wills them, or whether he has himself to refer to an external standard 1 1 6 . Medieval thinkers were to confront the problem that the former view appears to make his will arbitrary, the latter to restrict both his supremacy and his freedom 1 1 7 . Secondly, the conclusion of the argument, by prompting reflection on the prerequisites for divine perfection, leads to the medieval conception of G o d as a Necessary Being who, in contrast to his creation, is free from any potentiality for change or destruction 1 1 8 . More recent critics of the concept, from HUME and KANT onwards, have objected that the idea of a Necessary Being rests on a confusion of logical categories 1 1 9 . The Sceptics, of course, antedated both the development of the doctrine and the conceptual clarification necessary to attack it in this way, but they would clearly have maintained that to posit such a being is illegitime on the simple grounds that no individual being can be free from the potentiality for change and hence for destruction. We therefore find most of Sextus' arguments terminating, with varying degrees of effectiveness, in the charge that his opponents' conception of G o d involves him in imperfection and hence destructibility, while Cicero 112 113

114 115 116 117

118

119

C f . our distinction of two classes of virtue (below, pp. 930—931). Sextus' actual starting-point is once again strictly ad hominem, since it involves the Stoic view that ευδαιμονία (which we must attribute to G o d ) cannot be perfect when any virtue is lacking (Math. I X . 152); he has, however, already quoted Cleanthes' explicit ascription of all virtues to the gods (Math. I X . 8 8 , cited above n. 108). Math. IX.176—177. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 548, n. 2. Euthyphro 9 eff. The dilemma is well summarized by LOVEJOY, The Great Chain of Being ( N e w York, I960), pp. 69 - 70. That G o d must be free from change had already been asserted by Plato (Rep. 380—381) and Aristotle (περί φιλοσοφίας fr. 16 R o s s ) . For

HUME'S criticisms cf. ' D i a l o g u e s

Concerning Natural

Religion1,

ed.

KEMP

SMITH,

pp. 1 8 8 - 1 9 2 ; for those of KANT, 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed. KEMP SMITH, pp. 500ff. More recent discussions are listed in CHARLES WORTH's introduction to his edition of Anselm's 'Proslogion' (Oxford, 1965), p. 7 n. 3 and p. 75 n. 1. From Antiquity, cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1072 b 10 and, for a partial Stoic anticipation of the notion, Math. I X . 134-135.

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NEOPLATONISM

927

devotes a whole section of his work to arguments expressly designed to prove this conclusion 1 2 0 . Some of these, resting as they did on an explicitly corporealist conception of deity, did not touch the Neoplatonists, rejecting, as they did, any form of materialism 1 2 1 . Others, however, were more generally phrased, and it was reflection on these that led to a doctrine as fundamental to Plotinus' system as that of a Necessary Being to Scholasticism, the concept of the Impassibility of Incorporeals (απάθεια των ασωμάτων), with its stress on the total dissimilarity of corporeal and Incorporeal Being. A living being, the Sceptics argued, must have sensation and must therefore feel pleasure and pain; but pain being a change for the worse, all such beings, the Stoic God included, must be perishable 1 2 2 . Moreover in sensation the soul is modified from without, a view, as we have seen, that could be extracted not just from the Stoics but also from Plato and Aristotle. Therefore beings exercising sensation must be subject to substantial change and hence to destruction 1 2 3 . The Neoplatonists, of course, were unwilling to ascribe conscious sensation to divine beings 1 2 4 and still less disposed to accept the view, ascribed to the Stoics, that a being must be more perfect the more senses he has 1 2 5 , and were thus far immune to this objection. But they had still to consider the nature of intellectual acts 1 2 6 , including those of the gods, while over the individual soul their problems were much graver. Applying the Sceptical criticism to the human soul, the Stoic Panaetius had inferred the latter's mortality from its susceptibility to pain and emotional disturbance 1 2 7 . Hence Plotinus' warning, in the first chapter of his treatise on the Impassibility of Incorporeals, that by ascribing πάθη to the soul we do not unwittingly imply her mortality 1 2 8 . The resulting doctrine is developed both in the treatise in question (III.6, of which chapters 1—5 deal with the soul), in chapters 18—29 of the second treatise on the Problems of the Soul (IV.4) and

120 121

122 123 124

125

126 127 128

62*

Sextus Math. I X . 1 3 8 - 1 4 7 , 151, 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 , 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 , Cicero N . D . I I I . 2 9 - 3 4 . The traditional Platonic arguments for soul's incorporeality are set out in Plotinus' early work IV. 7, O n the Immortality of the Soul' and remain fundamental for all later Platonists. Math. IX.139—143, N . D . III.33. Math. IX.146—147, N . D . III.29. C f . above section I, ns. 21, 2 9 - 3 1 . Cf. IV.4.30ff. (esp. chs. 41—42), where the stars' sensation is a mere involuntary reaction of their lower soul, of which their conscious self knows nothing; also III.4.4.12 —13, where the αίσθητικόν "πάρεστιν . . . ού π α ρ ό ν " . With this contrast the crude view of divine omniscience in Epictetus 1.14. C f . further below, p. 946 and section VIII, ns. 239—241. The view in question is not expressly ascribed to the Stoics by Sextus, but presented rather as a logical extension of their views leading to absurdity (Math. I X . 140). O n the other hand, SVF 11.1058 ( = Clement, Strom. VII.7) shows that the Stoics regarded the gods as having sense-perception. Contrast Enn. 1.1.4.5—7, IV.4.24.9—12, etc. For the distinction of intellectual acts from 'impressions' cf. e.g. III.6.1.10—12. Cicero Tusc. 1.79. Enn. I I I . 6 . 1 . 2 8 - 3 0 : εί δέ έστιν ούσία άμεγέθης και δεϊ και το άφθαρτον αύτη παρεϊναι, εύλαβητέον αύτη πάθη διδόναι τοιαύτα, μή καΐ λάθωμεν αυτήν φθαρτήν είναι δίδοντες.

928

R. T . W A L L I S

in the late work 1.1 on the Animate Being. In sensation, he emphasises, the passive "impression" (τύπος) affects only the ensouled body; the soul has merely to direct her awareness toward this impression, and such awareness is an activity, not a passive modification 129 . Likewise pain is an affection of the living body; the soul's function is to know this and take steps for its cure 1 3 0 . Following Aristotle, Plotinus ascribes the soul's so-called "movements" to the living body 1 3 1 , and it is likewise on a hint of Aristotle that he builds in order to preserve the soul from substantial change 132 . Soul's activities, he declares, involve only the actualisation of a potency previously dormant and, if we describe her as 'altered' by such activities, we must take care to distinguish such 'alteration' from the passive changes undergone by bodies 1 3 3 . To go further into Plotinus' analyses, the shrewd psychological observations they involve and the difficulties they entail, would lead us too far afield from our main subject, the influence of the Sceptics' theological criticisms 134 . T o these criticisms we must now return. Before examining their arguments about individual virtues, it will be best to clarify these by a logical schématisation of their contents. These may be formulated thus. Either God is virtuous or he is vicious. The latter view is evidently impious; the former equally so in implying the presence of human weaknesses in God. The application of this dilemma to the case of practical wisdom raises the more general question whether God is a rational being. An affirmative answer implies anthropomorphism; a negative one makes him hard to distinguish from a blind force, like the Peripatetic Nature (φύσις) 1 3 5 . But if we reject either alternative, can we give any intelligible account of God at all? Are we not simply abusing language by using the term 'God' of a non-significant abstraction? The issue will be clearer if, as ZELLER suggests, we rephrase it in terms of the modern dispute about the personality of God 1 3 6 . The difficulties in conceiving God as a person are only too familiar; yet one is equally familiar with its defenders' counter-objection that the alternative is to degrade God to the status of a 'force' or a 'thing'. One line of escape might be to admit the gravity of the problem, but counter by appealing to the world's excellence and order as evidence of an intelligent designer. This once admitted, it could be argued, we must ascribe the resulting paradoxes to the incomprehensibility of the divine nature to finite minds like our own. But here another Sceptical argument comes into 129

Ibid. I I I . 6 . 1 . I f f . , I V . 3 . 2 6 . 1 ff., I V . 4 . 2 2 . 3 0 - 3 2 , I V . 6 . 2 passim, etc. A similar distinction between 'active' and 'passive' alterations of the ήγεμονικόν is ascribed to the Stoics at Sextus Math. V I I . 2 3 7 , where, however, in contrast to Plotinus, φαντασία is ranked in the latter class; cf. also above section I, n. 2 9 .

130

Ibid. I I I . 6 . 3 - 4 , I V . 4 . 1 8 . 6 f f . , 19 passim, etc. Ibid. I I I . 6 . 3 . 6 f f . , 1.1.3. passim, etc.; cf. Aristotle De An. 405 b 3 1 f f „ esp. 408 a 34ff. D e An. 4 1 7 b 2ff. Enn. I I I . 6 . 2 . 4 5 f f . Cf. further my 'Neoplatonism', pp. 74—79; also the relevant sections of H. J . BLUMENTHAL, 'Plotinus' Psychology'. Cf. below, pp. 9 3 4 f . , 9 3 7 f . , 941.

131 132 133 134

135 136

'Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics', p. 546. Even if we reject as inadequate Boethius' definition of a person as " a n individual substance of rational nature", it seems hard to deny that a "rational being" forms an e s s e n t i a l c o n s t i t u e n t of what we mean by a " p e r s o n " .

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AND

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929

play. Even admitting the world's perfection, it runs, it is a mark of confusion and anthropomorphism to regard perfection as entailing rationality. Likewise, whatever order the world contains may just as well be due to some inherent principle as to an intelligent God. It is hoped that the above analysis will facilitate the understanding and evaluation of the arguments that follow, to which we must now turn. The present criticism, like the one considered earlier, starts from the premiss that a god must be either virtuous or vicious. The latter view is evident blasphemy. But if we accept the former alternative, we are faced with Aristotle's arguments in Nicomachean Ethics X against ascribing moral virtues to the gods. Such virtues, Aristotle claims, presuppose either a human type of society or, at least, an external environment and inherent psychological imperfections that it would be incongruous to ascribe to a deity. Thus, if we consider justice and liberality, are we to suppose that the gods enter into covenants among themselves or even employ some kind of currency 1 3 7 ? O r what dangers can we visualise as confronting them to give them an opportunity to display their courage 1 3 8 ? As regards temperance, it is absurd even to contemplate the possibility of their being troubled by unwholesome desires, and hence equally absurd to eulogize them on their absence 1 3 9 . T o the Stoics, by contrast, Aristotle's conclusion that contemplation alone is worthy of the gods, with its corollary that they can exercise no creative activity 1 4 0 , was quite unacceptable. H o w on such a view can moral virtue make the sage the equal of Zeus 1 4 1 ? And what becomes of divine providence 1 4 2 ? The views in question were thus evidently bound up with the Stoics' most fundamental theological and ethical convictions, and it is these views that the Sceptics now proceed to attack, basing themselves on Aristotle, but expanding and deepening his arguments into a polemic against theology as a whole. In considering this polemic we may take Sextus' examination of two or three virtues as typical. This procedure is to examine the standard definitions of the virtues, with the aim of showing that they all imply an external source either of danger or of temptation, together with, in at least some cases, a tendency to succumb to such temptation. Let us, for instance, consider the standard definitions of continence (εγκράτεια) and fortitude (καρτερία). The latter is defined as "the science of things endurable and unendurable, or that virtue which makes 137 140

141

142

N . E . 1178b 10—15. "β ^ ¡ j . 12-13. " 9 ibid. 1 5 - 1 6 . Ibid. 20—22: χω δέ ζώντι τού πράττειν άφαιρουμένου, ετι δέ μ ά λ λ ο ν τ ο υ π ο ι ε ί ν , τί λείπεται πλην θεωρία; On the similarity of divine and human virtue cf. the texts listed above, n. 108. RIST, Eros and Psyche (Phoenix. Journ. of the Class. Ass. of Canada. Suppl. vol. 6 [Toronto, 1964]), pp. 160ff., rightly observes that, while the specific notion of όμοίωσις θεώ seems absent from the Old Stoa, the idea expressed therein is basic to its ethics. On Aristotle's attitude to providence cf. Ross (Metaphysics, pp. C X L I X - C L I V ) and PÉPIN (op. cit., pp. 472—473), who agree that those passages in Aristotle's "mature works" implying divine providence are incompatible with those that contain his serious convictions and can therefore be only expressions of popular views. On the Neoplatonic view of providence as a mean between Aristotelianism and Stoicism cf. Proclus Th. Pl. 1.15 (SAFFREY—WESTERINK I, p. 76. lOff.), in Parm. 921; also DODDS' note on Proclus El. Th. 122.

930

R. T. WALLIS

us superior to things which seem hard to e n d u r e " 1 4 3 . Since it is thus meaningless to speak of a man's fortitude unless he has at some time encountered hardship, the same must be true of G o d . Therefore — turning to the argument against divine impassibility — if there are situations which G o d finds hard to endure, he must be subject to change for the worse and hence even to utter destruction 1 4 4 . Likewise, taking up the definition of continence as a "state of mind incapable of transgressing the rules of right reason, or a virtue which makes us superior to the things which seem hard to abstain f r o m " 1 4 5 , one can evidently not call a man continent unless he is subject to sensual temptation, but controls it. We commend a man's chastity if he abstains from a beautiful courtesan, not if he merely refrains from seducing an old woman with one foot in the grave. Hence to ascribe moral virtue to the gods can only mean that they are confronted by external objects of temptation and by an inner tendency to succumb thereto. Therefore, since, if the gods exist, they must be either virtuous or vicious, and since neither alternative is consistent with their perfection, they must be nonexistent. T w o possible answers to this criticism are suggested by Sextus, one in the section on courage, the other in that on temperance. The former, that the knowledge on which the gods' courage depends is a knowledge of what o t h e r s find fearful, is rightly dismissed by Sextus as invalid 1 4 6 . The other suggestion, that the gods' 'temperance' may simply denote their total freedom from unwholesome desires, raises a more serious point. The Sceptical reply is that such an application of the term conflicts with the necessary prerequisites for its use. If the mere absence of unwholesome desires were a sufficient criterion of temperance, a pillar could be called temperate. It is an equal abuse of language to apply the term to G o d 1 4 7 . Even admitting the initial premiss that divine perfection involves moral virtue, the above arguments are plainly inconclusive. The fact is rather that, if all unwholesome tendencies must be excluded from the divine mind, it is necessary to distinguish two classes of virtue. Thus self-restraint, by definition, entails the existence of vicious tendencies needing restraint. It is not quite so clear that it is meaningless to speak of courage in the absence of fear, though powerful arguments can evidently be offered in support of that view. But here the Sceptics can adduce their other objection, that manifestation of courage entails the presence of danger, something inconceivable in the case of a deity. The question whether virtues of this type should be ascribed to the gods would thus seem in the last resort a verbal one and, as long as we adhere strictly to everyday usage, 143

144 145

146 147

Math. IX. 154 (SVF III 274): εγκράτεια γάρ εστί διάθεσις άνυπέρβατας των κατ' ορθόν λόγον γιγνομένων, ή άρετή ύπεράνω ποιούσα ημάς των δοκοΰντων είναι δυσαποσχέτων. — For the Stoic definitions of the virtues, including έγκράτεια and καρτερία cf. also SVF. III.264—265. Math. IX. 154-157. Ibid. 153: καρτερία δέ εστίν επιστήμη ύπομενετέων καί ούχ ύπομενετεων, ή άρετή ύπεράνω ποιούσα ημάς των δοκοΰντων είναι δυσυπομενήτων. Ibid. 159. Ibid. 174-175.

SCEPTICISM

AND

NEOPLATONISM

931

we shall presumably refrain from doing so. If, on the other hand, we extend our terminology to speak of divine 'courage' or 'temperance', we must be clear that such terms have no positive content and refer merely to the god's freedom from any inclination to the opposite vices. In neither case is there any situation in which one could meaningfully speak of God as exercising such virtues. But the case is very different as regards justice, wisdom and benevolence. Here too God can have no tendency to the opposite vices, but it is possible, on the other hand, to conceive him as exercising virtues of this latter class, in his providential government of the world. For to regard God as displaying the highest wisdom, justice and benevolence in this task would not appear prima facie to generate the same absurdities as would arise if we conceived him as displaying courage in the face of danger. An account of divine benevolence along these lines is given in Seneca's 'De Beneficiis' 148 . It is a fallacy, he argues, to refuse to ascribe benevolence to the heavenly bodies on the grounds that their supposed beneficence can never cease. Not merely does benevolence not imply the possibility of cessation; on the contrary, it is all the more perfect if the will has no temptation to cease from its exercise. If we describe the stars as "necessarily" beneficent, we must distinguish such necessity, the expression of an unchangeable disposition of the will, from mere external compulsion 149 . And that the stars are beneficent, Seneca argues, is proved by the benefits they convey to men. Provided that this last premiss is accepted (together, of course, with the traditional PlatonicStoic arguments for the stars' rationality), this seems an adequate answer to the above dilemmas. But either premiss is obviously open to question. One can either attack the alleged evidence of the world's benevolent government or challenge the whole notion of God as a rational being, and hence one in whom virtue could arise. The latter challenge is implicit in the Sceptical analysis of divine φρόνησις.

IV. The Problem of Divine

Rationality

That the divine ruler of the world is a mind essentially similar to our own had been asserted both by the Stoics 150 and in the Platonic dialogues. Even if we dismiss the 'Timaeus' references to the Demiurge's deliberation as mythical, 148

149

150

VI.20ff. Aquinas' views on ascribing moral virtue to God follow the lines we have suggested (Contra Gentiles 1.92—93). De Benef. VI.21.3. Cf. LEIBNIZ' distinction of 'metaphysical' and 'moral' necessity, discussed by LOVEJOY, Great Chain of Being, pp. 172FF. On divine will cf. further below, p. 945ff. On the rationality of the cosmos cf. SVF 1.110—114, 11.633—645; on the similarity of divine reason to its human counterpart cf. Cicero N . D . 11.79 = SVF 11.1127: sequitur ut eadem sit prudentia in iis (sc. dis) quae humano in genere ratio . . . cumque sint in nobis consilium ratio, necesse est deos baec ipsa habere maiora. Cf. also below, section V, n. 179.

932

R. T.

WALLIS

w e have still t o explain Plato's use o f similar e x p r e s s i o n s in b o t h t h e 'Sophist' and the ' L a w s ' 1 5 1 . H e n c e P l o t i n u s w a s o n s h a k y g r o u n d in reading i n t o Plato his o w n v i e w that divine s o u l s , and purified h u m a n s o u l s , are c o n t e n t w i t h pure i n t u i t i o n and have n o n e e d of discursive t h o u g h t 1 5 2 . A n d w h i l e A r i s t o t l e had u n q u e s t i o n a b l y maintained the latter v i e w , at least in his 'mature' p e r i o d , he had also c o n f i n e d the divine m i n d t o k n o w l e d g e of its o w n essence and b y i m plication d e n i e d that the w o r l d is the object of providential care 1 5 3 . T h e Stoics, m o r e o v e r , s e e m t o have a b a n d o n e d even t h e distinctions (in t h e m s e l v e s far f r o m clear-cut) d r a w n b y P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e b e t w e e n intuitive and discursive t h o u g h t , and w e r e h e n c e at a considerable disadvantage in a t t e m p t i n g to c o n c e i v e a m i n d w i t h o u t the latter f a c u l t y 1 5 4 . H o w vulnerable their p o s i t i o n actually w a s w e shall s h o r t l y see. F o r the present w e m u s t return t o o u r Sceptical texts. In the relevant s e c t i o n of their critique the Sceptics again build, t h o u g h less directly, o n hints d r o p p e d b y Aristotle. In his v i e w , reflected in the c o n c e p t i o n o f φ ρ ό ν η σ ι ς o n w h i c h Sextus bases his a r g u m e n t , practical w i s d o m had i n v o l v e d skill in deliberation ( ε υ β ο υ λ ί α ) 1 5 5 . B u t P É P I N has rightly e m p h a s i z e d that f o r A r i s t o t l e deliberation had b e e n a sign o f i m p e r f e c t i o n 1 5 6 . N o t o n l y are there 151

152

153

154

155

156

For the relevant texts cf. PÉPIN, op. cit., pp. 504—506. CROMBIE, however (An Examination of Plato's Doctrines; I: Plato on Man and Society [London, 1962], pp. 340—341), notes that other passages, especially, if genuine, Epinomis 982, imply a less anthropomorphic view. For Plotinus' interpretation of the 'Timaeus' see the opening chapters of Enn. VI.7; for a summary justification of his view cf. Enn. IV.8.4.38ff. Cf. also below, section VIII, p. 947. F. A. W I L F O R D ' S attempt (The status of reason in Plato's Psychology, in: Phronesis 4 [1959], pp. 54—58) to show that Plato came to hold a similar view of the discarnate soul must be pronounced inconclusive. Discursive thought and memory are excluded from the discarnate intellect at De An. 408 b 24—29 (cf. ibid. 430 a 20—25, where the meaning is, however, less clear). O n Aristotle's attitude to providence cf. above section III n. 142. That God knows only himself is explicitly affirmed at E.E. 1245 b 1 7 - 1 9 . Cf. M. HEINZE, Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie (Oldenburg, 1872), pp. 148 — 149: „Von intuitiver Erkenntnis wissen die Stoiker demnach ebenso wenig etwas wie von angeborenen Ideen, sondern alles, auch die tiefste und unmittelbarste, soll discursiv zur Gewissheit werden." For the Stoics' resulting difficulties cf. below, p. 937. We should, however, note that the argument for the world's rationality ascribed to Zeno by Sextus (Math. IX.104 = SVF. I . I l l ) implies a distinction between λογικός and νοερός. O n discursive and intuitive thought in Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus see my paper 'Nous as Experience', published in: The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. by R . B . H A R R I S (Albany, Ν . Y., 1976), pp. 121 — 155; also, more briefly, Neoplatonism, p. 53. Math. IX. 167 = SVF. III.274: ειπερ τε πανάρετόν έστι το θείον και την φρόνησιν εχει, εχει καί την εύβουλίαν, παρόσον ή ευβουλία φρόνησίς έστι προς τα βουλευτά; for ευβουλία as a sub-species of φρόνησις cf. SVF. III.264, 265, 268, 295. For Aristotle's view cf. E.N. 1141 b 8—10: ή δε φρόνησις περί τα ά ν θ ρ ώ π ι ν α καί περί ών εστίν βουλεύσασθαι- του γ α ρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοϋτο Ιργον είναι φαμεν, το ευ βουλεύσασθαι. Op.cit. p. 502. For Aristotle's restrictions on deliberation, e.g. to the sphere of practical action and, within this, to ends rather than means, and to the less accurate among the arts cf. E . N . III.3 (1112 a 1 8 - 1 1 1 3 a 12). Note also his remark at ibid. X.7. 1177 a 2 6 27 that the enjoyment of knowledge is more pleasant than its pursuit — the corollary

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serious restrictions on its field of operation; even more fundamentally, it consists in a search for what was previously unknown, the corollary being evidently that an omniscient deity could have no need of it. Hence, the Sceptics' claim that to ascribe φρόνησις to God implies that there are things of which he is ignorant 157 . And while Aristotle had confined deliberation to the field of practical affairs 158 , it is clear that the argument logically covers any form of reasoning from premisses to conclusion. Neither Platonists nor Stoics (nor, in J A E G E R ' S view, the early Aristotle) had distinguished theoretical and practical wisdom as sharply as had the 'Nicomachean Ethics', while even there Aristotle had specifically noted the parallel between deliberation and some forms of mathematical inquiry 1 5 9 . We may therefore infer from Cicero's use of the terms ratio and intelligentia in his summary of the argument that Carneades had given it the more general application 160 . Sextus' attempts to show that φρόνησις, like other virtues, entails divine passibility may be passed over 161 . We may rather turn to the continuation of his argument, which we shall first report without comment, proceeding afterwards to a more general analysis and evaluation of its bearing on our problem. The obvious reply to the above criticism, and one which we shall find to have been actually put forward by some of the Stoics, is that God has no need to deliberate, since he is omniscient by nature 162 . In that case, Sextus replies, we have no right to ascribe his actions to art, which deals with matters which are not naturally self-evident, but need to be sought out. He is rather to be compared to a frog or a dolphin, whose ability to swim derives not from art, but from nature. Sextus' exact words which we shall see to be of great importance, are as follows: και άλλως, εί μηδέν άδηλόν έστι θεώ, άλλ' αύτόθεν έκ φύσεως πάντων καταληπτικός καθέστηκεν, ουκ εχει τέχνην, άλλ' δν τρόπον ουκ άν εΐποι-

157

158

159 160

161

162

being that the search for knowledge, in which deliberation consists, is inferior to its actual, and hence inconsistent with perfect happiness. Math. IX. 168: εί δε βουλεύεται, εστι τι α δ η λ ο ν αύτω. εί γ α ρ μηδέν έστιν ά δ η λ ο ν αύτώ, ο ύ β ο υ λ ε ύ ε τ α ι ο ύ δ ε την ε ύ β ο υ λ ί α ν εχει τω την β ο υ λ ή ν ά δ η λ ο υ τινός εχεσθαι, ζήτησιν ο ύ σ α ν περί τοΰ π ώ ς έν τοις π α ρ ο ϋ σ ι ν ο ρ θ ώ ς δ ι ε ξ ά γ ο μ ε ν . Cf. Cicero N . D . III.38. E . N . 1112 a 30ff. For Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical w i s d o m cf. ibid. 1139 a 6 f f . For the contrast with Plato and the Stoics cf. RIST, Eros and Psyche, pp. 157—160. For Plotinus' rejection of the doctrine cf. ARMSTRONG'S comment on Enn. III.8.7.15ff. (Loeb vol. I l l pp. 3 8 2 - 3 8 3 ) . That the distinction is less sharp in the c Eudemian' than the 'Nicomachean Ethics' is well k n o w n ; cf. JAEGER, Aristotle, pp. 6 5 f f . , 234 ff. Cf. however Aristotle, Protrepticus, fr. 12 a R o s s (a paraphrase of Cicero's T i o r tensius'), where the inhabitants of the Isles of the Blessed need theoretical, but not practical reason. E . N . 1112 b 2 0 - 2 1 . N . D . III.38: Quid autem ratione, quid intelligentia (sc. deo opus est)? Quibus utimur at obscurum deo nihil potest esse. ad earn rem, ut apertis obscura adsequamur; Math. IX.169—170: The argument is that, if God's knowledge is imperfect, he cannot k n o w whether there is anything capable of destroying him; therefore he must fear that there is; therefore he cannot be impassible, etc. Cf. below, pp. 936ff.

934

R. T.

WALLIS

μεν π ε ρ ί τον βάτραχον ή τον δέλφινα, φ ύ σ ε ι ν η κ τ ι κ ο ύ ς οντάς, τέχνην είναι νηκτικήν, τον αυτόν π ρ ό π ο ν ο ύ δ ε π ε ρ ί τον θ ε ό ν εκ φ ύ σ ε ω ς π ά ν τ α καταλαμβανόμενον εϊποιμεν αν είναι τέχνην τ ω ά δ η λ ο υ τινός και αύτ ό θ ε ν μή κ α τ α λ α μ β α ν ό μ ε ν ο υ έ φ ά π τ ε σ θ α ι την τέχνην. " H e r e , too, is another argument: If nothing is nonevident to G o d , but he of his own nature is capable of apprehending all things, he does not possess art, but just as we should not say that there exists in the frog or the dolphin, which swim by nature, an art of swimming, in the same way we should not say of G o d , who of his own nature apprehends all things, that he has art, since art has to do with a thing that is nonevident and not apprehended of itself."163 Neither the Stoic answer nor the further Sceptical criticism thereof features in the ' D e Natura D e o r u m ' . Instead Cicero presents an alternative conclusion, that a G o d without either reason or virtue is simply inconceivable 1 6 4 . T o rephrase the debate once more in modern terms, if we wish to avoid anthropomorphism, we must beware of falling into atheism, either by degrading G o d to the subpersonal level of an irrational force, or alternatively by eroding our conception of deity of any intelligible content. And it would seem hard to dispute the Sceptics' initial point, that deliberation is inconsistent with divine perfection. O n e might tentatively suggest that divine rationality consists in the power to deliberate, should the need arise, but since in fact it never does, we should follow Plotinus in seeking a more satisfactory answer 1 6 5 . Aristotle had in fact observed that it is meaningless to speak of potentialities that are never actualised 1 6 6 . Therefore, if the Sceptics' dilemma is to be challenged, it would seem necessary to do so at one of its later stages. Granted that G o d must possess omniscience from all eternity, the most promising line of escape seems to lie in Aristotle's conception of τέχνη. N o t all art, in his view, had had to resort to deliberation 1 6 7 . O n the contrary, insofar as the principles of an art have been more perfectly formulated, its practitioners resort to deliberation less, as can be seen if we compare the case of gymnastics, an art of this kind, with the unpredictable environment in which navigation has to operate. A yet greater contrast with the latter is provided by those arts, like spelling, which need hardly any deliberation. Deliberation thus being a mark of imperfection either in an art or at least in its individual practitioner, there would seem no reason w h y divine art should have to resort to it at all. There seems thus no need to accept the premise that art involves deliberation and uncertainty, on

163

Math. IX. 1 7 1 . - Transi. : R. G. BURY, Sextus Empiricus III. Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists = Math. I X - X . XI, Loeb (London-Cambridge, Mass., 1936, repr. 1953), p. 89.

164

N.D. Ill 39: nec ratione igitur utentem nec virtute ulla praeditum deum intellegere possumus?

165

Enn. IV.3.18.8ff. Metaph. Θ.4.1047 b 3ff. Phys. 199 b 26ff., E . N . 1112 a 3 4 - b 8.

166 167

qui

SCEPTICISM

AND

NEOPLATONISM

935

which Sextus bases his rejection of the Stoic reply to his initial dilemma. The trouble for the Stoics was that in Aristotle's view the operation of such a perfect art would coincide, in its lack of deliberation, with that of φύσις, the unconscious, teleologica] force inherent in and governing the sublunary world. And this the Stoics had emphatically placed on a lower level than reason. Reason is higher than an άφάνταστος φύσις, they had argued, and we are aware of reason's presence in ourselves. Therefore, since the world is the most perfect of beings, we can take its rationality for granted 1 6 8 . A further incentive to such an evaluation of φύσις was provided by Aristotle's observation that its presence is most conspicuous in the instinctively teleological operations of the lower animals, which are the product neither of art nor of reasoning or deliberation 1 6 9 . Hence Sextus' malicious allusion to frogs and dolphins, which was calculated to make any Stoic recoil in horror. But a very careful formulation of terms seems requisite if any theology is to escape this dilemma. For if we say that God operates by superrational intuition rather than sub-rational instinct, can we consistently keep the two apart? Even Plotinus, for all his usual concern to do so, appears sometimes virtually to maintain that absence of deliberation is i n v a r i a b l y an excellence and that φύσις is therefore superior to reasoning 1 7 0 . Is there not therefore much to be said for Carneades' claim that only anthropocentric prejudice leads us to rate reason higher than φ ύ σ ι ς 1 7 1 ? Turning to another line of criticism, we might ask whether there is any sense in speaking of a mind that never deliberates. HUME'S Cleanthes was to maintain that " a mind whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple and totally immutable, is a mind, which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure or number without composition" 1 7 2 . Admittedly to deny that God deliberates does not ipso facto exclude him from all change. That the Neoplatonists and Scholastics came to do so was largely the result of reflection on Aristotle's Metaphysics Λ. But even without going so far, we have clearly taken a considerable step towards rarefying our conception of deity, and when the further rarefactions necessary to safeguard divine impassibility have been made, we shall evidently be very close to the Scholastic view of God. A theologian must therefore either (a) admit the justice of Cleanthes' criticisms or (b) justify the 'abuse of terms' to which exception is taken or (c) halt the process of rarefaction at some prior point (in which case there will evidently be

Sextus Math. IX. 114. 169 phys. 199 a 20—21: μάλιστα δε φανερόν επί των ζώων των άλλων â οντε τέχνη οΰτε ζητήσαντα οΰτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεί. 1 7 0 Cf. below, pp. 938, 948ff. 1 7 1 Cicero N . D . I I I . 2 1 - 2 8 , on which cf. below pp. 9 4 0 - 9 4 1 . 168

172

' D i a l o g u e s ' , ed. KEMP SMITH, p.

159.

936

R. T. WALLIS

further Sceptical criticisms to be met) 173 . But with such hints, which have been given only in the hope of making the Sceptical criticisms more intelligible and showing that the problems they raise are serious ones which still merit discussion, we must rest content. Returning now to our ancient texts, we must first examine the Stoic answer to the Sceptics which we found Sextus formulating and rejecting.

V. The Stoic Reply: Reason and Nature

The first relevant passage to be considered comes from the 'De Natura Deorum'. We read there that the gods natura boni sapientesque gignuntur, quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constansque174. The same principle, applied to divine virtue as a whole, appears in two passages of Seneca's 95th 'Epistle'. The gods, we there read, do not have to acquire their virtue by instruction, since virtue is part of their nature. This being the source of their beneficence, we cannot say that they do not will to do wrong; they c a n n o t do wrong: (36: nam ut di immortales nullam didicere virtutem cum omni editi et pars naturae eorum est bonos esse . . .48: Quae causa est dis bene faciendi? natura. Errat, si quis illos putat nocere nolle; non possunt.). The latter section evidently echoes the view of benevolence taken by the 'De Beneficiis' 175 , while the thought and language of both sections anticipate some of Plotinus' most characteristic conceptions. At III.2.2.8 —15 he emphasises that True Being creates without reasoning or deliberately seeking to create, and thus contrasts with human craftsmen, whose art does not come by nature, but has to be acquired by learning (ibid. 12-15: ήδη γάρ αν αύτόθεν ουκ είχεν, ει έζήτει, ούδ' αν ήν έκ της αύτού ουσίας, άλλ' ήν οίον τεχνίτης, άπ' αυτού το ποιείν ουκ εχων, άλλ' έπακτόν, έκ του μαθεϊν λαβών τούτο). The contrast with human art, the absence of deliberation and the use of αύτόθεν all echo phrases from Sextus' criticism, just as the denial that divine art needs to be learned echoes Seneca's remarks. Similar views are expressed in a passage of Philo anticipating two more of Plotinus' fundamental ideas. First, creation, as well as doing good, derives from the divine nature; secondly, the process is compared to the natural production of heat by fire and cold by snow 176 , a comparison repeated by Clement of Alexandria 177 , though the 173

174 175 176

177

C . A . FLEW'S reference to the "death by a thousand qualifications" menacing theological discourse ( A . FLEW and A . MACINTYRE [eds.], N e w Essays in Philosophical Theology [London, 4 1963], p. 97). N . D . 11.34. Cf. above, p. 931. Leg. Alleg. 1.5: παύεται γαρ οΐιδεποτε ποιών ó θεός. άλλ' ώσπερ ίδιον το καίειν πυρός καί χιόνος το ψύχειν, οΰτως και θεοΰ το ποιεϊν. On emanation in Plotinus cf. my Neoplatonism, pp. 61 ff., and the passages cited there. On its late Stoic source cf. A. H. ARMSTRONG'S article in Mind 46 (1937) pp. 6 1 - 6 6 . Strom. 1.17.86.3 (I.55.25ff. STÄHLIN = SVF. 11.1184), where, however, it is God's nature not just to do good, but also to correct evil.

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latter author, like Seneca, elsewhere introduces safeguards to preserve the voluntary nature of divine creation 1 7 8 . In propounding such answers the Stoics were vulnerable on several grounds. Any attempt on their part to distinguish the sub- from the super-rational necessarily clashed with some of their philosophy's basic preconceptions. Fundamental among these was a sharp distinction between the community of rational beings on the one hand and the level of sub-rational Nature on the other. The former community was restricted to men and gods, whereas animals, being governed by φύσις alone, were regarded as produced solely for the benefit of the cosmos' rational inhabitants 1 7 9 . And, whereas Plotinus' elaboration of the distinction between νους and δ ι ά ν ο ι α enabled him to affirm that the former is as superior to the latter as is the latter to animal instinct 180 , so clear-cut a distinction, as I have shown elsewhere, was made possible only by separating the two facilities more sharply than had the earlier philosophers and resolving, in consequence, the ambiguities inherent in the term " ν ο υ ς " 1 8 1 . Until this was done, it was hard even for Platonists and Aristotelians who wished to separate divine wisdom from our own to find the vocabulary to maintain the distinction coherently 1 8 2 . For a Stoic it was well-nigh impossible. Hence the 'De Natura D e o r u m ' can find no better words to describe divine wisdom than ratio recta constansque193, a vagueness which makes relapse into anthropomorphism hard to avoid, a relapse, in fact, shown elsewhere in the book. But the only alternative, to deny reason in God altogether, was, of course, quite unthinkable for the Stoics. And their difficulties were by no means at an end even here. We have already noted Aristotle's view that φύσις is especially exemplified in the teleological operations of the lower animals, which are performed without any premeditation by a wholly automatic instinct. A similar view is expressed in late Stoic thought, especially by Seneca in Epistle 121. What is of particular interest for our own study is the way his account of animal instinct echoes Epistle 95's description of divine virtue. Both come by nature without any instruction. An animal's 'art', we read nascitur . . . non discitur. Furthermore, while admitting the weakness of an animal's intelligence, Seneca emphasises the superiority of animal instinct to the stumblings and hesitations that plague human

178 179

180

181 182

183

Ibid. VII.7.42.4 (III.31.3ff. STÄHLIN), on which cf. further section VI n. 211. O n the superiority of reason to φύσις cf. above, p. 935. O n the community of rational beings, from which animals are excluded cf. SVF. 11.528, III.333—339, 3 6 7 - 3 7 6 ; on the similarity of divine and human reason cf. above section IV n. 150. A point especially emphasised in Enn. VI.7.9, where Plotinus argues, against those w h o would exclude animals from the Intelligible world, while admitting man thereto, that man's discursive reaon is no more appropriate to the realm of Ν ο υ ς than is an animal's sense-perception. Cf. above section IV, n. 154 and the paper referred to there. O n the difficulties of pre-Plotinian Platonists cf. A . J. FESTUGIÈRE, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, vol. IV. Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose (Paris, 1954), pp. 1 3 8 - 1 3 9 . N . D . 11.34. For more naive views cf. ibid. 11.79, 133, 154ff.

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craftsmen 184 . Such passages prefigure Plotinus' references to Nature's "sleeping comtemplation," whose automatic acts yet proceed more perfectly than those dependent on deliberation 185 . But our immediate concern is to note how they plunge the Stoics into a double danger. On the one hand they risk reducing God to the level of an animal; on the other they raise the danger of elevating animal instinct above human reasoning. And identification of divine wisdom with φύσις could likewise be deduced from another line of thought within the school. For the naive anthropomorphism implied by the Sceptical criticisms was not the only tendency in Stoic theology, though, as both ancient and modern critics have observed, it is hard to see how the two lines of thought can be reconciled 186 . The implication of their less anthropomorphic statements is to identify God with the law of Fate governing the world 187 . And this view, the Hermetic 'Asclepius' suggests, had been used to counter the Sceptical arguments against divine deliberation. The passage in question first affirms that the gods' perfection exempts them from the need to resort to reasoning and then describes the external law of Fate as contrived by the Demiurgi to serve as a substitute for reasoning in their case: (Asci. 2 2 = NOCK—FESTUGIÈRE I I . 3 2 4 . 6 f f . ) Diis vero, utpote ex mundissima parte naturae effectis et nullis indigentibus rationis disciplinaeque adminiculis, quamvis inmortalitas et unius semper aetatis vigor ipse sit eis prudentia et disciplina, tamen propter unitatem rationis pro disciplina et pro intellectu, ne ab his essent alieni, ordinem necessitatis lege conscriptum aeterna lege constituit. It is true that only the celestial gods are here in question, but it does not seem rash, in the light of our previous discussion, to wonder whether some Stoics had applied the principle to the supreme God as well. It should therefore not surprise us that late Stoic texts differ as to whether God should be identified with Fate or with its cause, while the texts of Seneca maintaining the latter view qualify divine transcendence by regarding God as having eternally bound himself by his own law 188 . What is beyond question is that the

Ep. 121.21. sine ulla cogitatione, quae hoc dictet, sine Consilio fit quidquid natura praecipit . . . 23 nascitur ars ista, non discitur. On the dimness of animal intelligence cf. ibid. 9—13; on the superiority of Nature to art ibid. 6, 20, 23. 1 8 5 On Nature's "sleeping contemplation" cf. Enn. III.8.4.22—24; also below, section VIII, n. 270. F o r Plotinus' hesitation concerning the relative value of Nature and art cf. below, pp. 947 ff. 1 8 6 Among ancient criticisms we may note that of the Epicurean at N . D . 1.36: quam legem quo modo efficiat animantem intellegere non possumus; deum autem animantem certe volumus esse. Among modern scholars cf. ARMSTRONG'S reference to their "crude, if rather likeable, inconsistency" in combining personal and impersonal conceptions of God (Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy, p. 14). 1 8 7 Some texts expressing this view are quoted by C . J . DE VOGEL, Greek Philosophy, Vol. Ill (Leiden, 1959), n° 918; cf. also SVF. 1.162, indicating that it goes back to Zeno, and Enn. V . 9 . 5 . 2 8 , which argues that Νους should be termed νόμος rather than νομοθέτης. ISS p o r t e x t s 0 f Seneca taking the former view cf. THEILER, Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (Quellen und Stud. ζ. Gesch. d. Philos. 10 [Berlin, 1966]), p. 56; for those describing God as having bound himself by fate (including De Benef. VI.23.1) cf. ibid. 184

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939

Stoic conception of Fate at least led to a considerable attenuation of anthropomorphism — though at considerable risk to their basic ideas - and thereby, directly or indirectly, was a major factor in moulding Plotinus' theology. In the first book of Cicero's 'De Divinatione' the doctrine of Fate is used to answer Sceptical objections to divination, which, like others of their arguments, had found favour with Panaetius within the Stoic school itself. To his repetition of Carneades' ironical query whether Jupiter deliberately commands a crow to croak on the right and a raven on the left 189 , the orthodox Stoa replies that this presupposes a naive view of providence's modus operandi. God need not keep intervening at every event in the world's history; the truth is rather that events unfold automatically from the world's general laws laid down at its outset, a process later compared to the unwinding of a rope 190 . While the 'De Divinatione' applies this view only to divination, it is clear how it could be more widely used, especially against Epicurean objections to providence. For the idea is in fact a development of the answer given by Plato in the 'Laws' to those predecessors of the Epicureans who maintained that exercising providence would be a burden to the gods. If divine justice had to give special attention to each individual case, Plato concedes, it would be faced with an unending task. But as things are, God has merely laid down the law that each individual tends to his appropriate place and left this law, with the aid of man's free will, to work itself out 1 9 1 . Both this view and, even more, the Stoic development thereof, anticipate L E I B N I Z ' pre-established harmony. To this doctrine C L A R K E was to object, in a significant echo of ancient controversy, that if God is needed only to get this process started, we might just as well make it eternal and exclude God altogether. "And by the same reason that a philosopher can represent all things going on from the beginning of the creation without any government or interposition of providence, a sceptic will easily argue still further backward and suppose that things have from eternity gone on (as they now do) without any true creator or original author at all, but only what such arguers will call all-wise and eternal nature"192. But at least L E I B N I Z ' Christian belief in a temporal creation meant that he needed God to get things started. Whether Plato's ascription of a temporal origin to the world should be taken literally is still a matter of controversy 193 . But the Stoics' answer is unequivocal, that the sequence of worldp. 58. F o r the elevation of G o d above F a t e cf. also Posidonius frs. 103 ( = A e t . Plac. I. 2 8 . 5 ) and 107 ( = C i c e r o D e Div. 1 . 1 2 5 ) EDELSTEIN-KIDD. 189

D e Div. 1.12.

190

Ibid. 1.118,

191

Laws 9 0 3 E f f . F o r Epicurus' view cf. K . D . I; for the Neoplatonists' answer cf. Enn. IV.

125-127.

4 . 1 2 . 3 9 f f . , Sallustius D . M . 192

IX.3.

'The Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence', ed. H . G . ALEXANDER p. 14. It is significant that BAYLE had recently suggested reviving Strato's naturalism as an alternative to theism (cf. Ν . KEMP SMITH, H u m e ' s Dialogues, pp. 3 5 - 3 6 , 8 0 f f . ; HENDEL, o p . c i t . , pp. 3 0 f f . ) .

193

F o r ancient views on the question, dating from X e n o c r a t e s ' claim (ap. Aristotle

De

Cáelo 2 7 9 b 3 2 f f . , Plutarch de A n . P r o c r . 1 0 1 3 a ) cf. the commentaries of Proclus and A. E . TAYLOR on Timaeus 2 8 b. T h e almost universal modern acceptance of X e n o c r a t e s ' view has been powerfully challenged in recent years by G . VLASTOS, T h e disorderly

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R. T. WALLIS

cycles had no beginning and that the chain of causation governing them has been laid down from all eternity 1 9 4 . So not merely is there no need of a separate G o d to get things started; there is no time at which he could have intervened to do so. Fate, it seems, can work perfectly well without him. The Stoic position, it is true, is somewhat eased by the doctrine of cosmic cycles, according to which the universe is re-absorbed into G o d at the end of each cycle and sent forth by him again at the start of the next one. But this doctrine came under increasing attack as the school developed, and some prominent Stoics abandoned it 1 9 5 . Moreover, since each world-cycle, being governed by the law of Fate, exactly repeats the events of the previous one, G o d can exercise no innovation, nor can he ever have done so. H e thus seems subject to the control of Fate and therefore, once again, a superfluous addition to the system 1 9 6 . As we have seen, not all Stoics would have been unwilling to accept this conclusion, insofar as it merely denied the existence of a G o d transcendent to Fate. Where they were emphatic was in maintaining the rationality of the world's governing principle, whether identified with Fate or with its cause. And here some further Sceptical objections become relevant. We have already noted the Stoic argument for the rationality of the cosmos on the ground that what is rational is better than what is not. T o this the Sceptics reply that we might on similar grounds assign the world the art of reading or of grammar 1 9 7 . The Stoic counter-argument is that, unlike the individual arts, rationality constitutes a perfection in an absolute sense. Thus Archilochus may have been a better poet than Socrates, but it was the latter who was the wiser and more virtuous, and thus in absolute terms the better of the two 1 9 8 . Such a reply, the Sceptic quite correctly counters, begs the question by failing to define its terms and regarding human standards of perfection as the only ones. For what do the Stoics mean when they speak of the world's perfection? It is indeed supremely beautiful and orderly, and to value oneself more highly than the universe is therefore rightly condemned by the Stoics as a mark of arrogance. But to deny reason to the world and the stars, while ascribing it to oneself, is a mark not of arrogance, but of common sanity 1 9 9 . motion in the Timaeus, C Q 33 (1939), p p . 71—83, reprinted in: R . E . ALLEN (ed.), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics ( L o n d o n , 1965); ch. X V I I I , pp. 379—419, and in a posth u m o u s article of R . HACKFORTH, Plato's c o s m o g o n y (Timaeus 27 D f f . ) , in: C Q N . S . 9 (1959), p p . 17—22. [ C f . also J . - P . HERSHBELL, Plutarch's ' D e animae procreatione in T i m a e o ' . A n Analysis of Structure and Content, in: A N R W II 36,1 ( B e r l i n - N e w Y o r k 1987), pp. 237ñ., 241 ff. - W. H . ] 194

195

196 197 198 199

C f . the definition of Fate at D e Div. 1.125 ( = fluens Veritas sempiterna·, also the passages cited by T h e doctrine was rejected by Panaetius (fr. 65 VAN probably not by Posidonius (cf. EDELSTEIN, T h e in: A J P 57 [1936], p p . 2 9 3 f f . and the discussions Posidonius fr. 99 b).

S V F . 11.921) as ex omni aeternitate THEILER, Forschungen, p. 56, n. 44. STRAATEN) and Boethus of Sidon but Philosophical System of Posidonius, cited in EDELSTEIN—KIDD'S note to

F o r Plotinus' answer, cf. below, section V I I I , n. 250. Sextus Math. I X . 108. Cicero N . D . III.23. Math. IX.109—110. Cicero N . D . 11.21, 26.

SCEPTICISM A N D

NEOPLATONISM

941

If the Stoic in answer adduces the world's order as evidence of its rationality, his opponent replies that such order could just as well be due to φύσις as to a rational G o d . In support of this claim the Sceptics appeal to the system of the Peripatetic Strato, who had dispensed with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover and made over the government of the world to φύσις alone, apparently conceiving even this principle in materialistic terms 2 0 0 . Such a principle, Carneades argues, would suffice to produce even the degree of order implied by the Stoics' cosmic sympathy 2 0 1 . Opinions will no doubt differ as to whether a conception as materialistic as Strato's seems to have been would be sufficient for such a task. But since the Sceptics were concerned solely to demolish rival systems and not to uphold any of them in particular, they were not restricted to any special view of φύσις. Sextus' comparison with animal instinct rather implies Aristotle's teleological conception, or even the vitalistic φύσις of Stoic and Neoplatonic metaphysics. The only point on which the Sceptics are emphatic is that there is no need to ascribe rationality to the world's governing principle. They thus prefigure HUME'S claim that only prejudice leads us to compare the world to a work of art rather than to an animal or vegetable, and to stress the incongruities of the latter view, while ignoring those of the former 2 0 2 . N o t only this, but the Sceptics can triumphantly point out that they have already shown such a conclusion to be logically implicit in the views of the Stoics themselves. HUME was likewise to conclude that theist and atheist are really disputing about nothing, that the theist must admit the dissimilarities between the divine mind and our own, the atheist that "the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal and the structure of human thought probably bear some remote analogy to each other" 2 0 3 and that both can thus agree that "the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence" 2 0 4 . But though we have found the Stoics to be particularly vulnerable to such arguments, HUME'S use of them shows that it would be naive to regard the Sceptics' dilemmas as of merely historical interest. We have already noted the difficulties that arise for the theist's attempt to avoid anthropomorphism 2 0 5 . And it is evidently equally incumbent on him to explain what merits his own world-view has over others that seem to be just as plausible and to involve no greater difficulties. With these observations we must return to the ancient Sceptics and their influence.

200 Cicero Acad. 11.121. For modern accounts of Strato cf. ZELLER, Aristotle and the Older Peripatetics II, pp. 4 5 0 - 4 7 2 ; MERLAN, Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 111 — 112. For the Stoic argument from design, cf. SVF. II. 101 I f f . 2 0 1 N . D . III.28. 2 0 2 'Dialogues' ed. KEMP SMITH pp. 170ff. ; for Strato's influence on HUME cf. the discussions cited above, n. 192. 2 0 3 Ibid., p. 218. 2 0 4 Ibid., p. 227. 2 0 5 Above, pp. 928 ff. 63

A N R W II 36.2

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R. T . WALLIS

VI. The Sceptics and Pre-Plotinian Theology

What is clear, at least as far as concerns extant texts, is that the need to distinguish God from φύσις was at least as keenly felt as the need to avoid anthropomorphism. First of all, there was the need to uphold the view of providence as a voluntary act. Thus the very text of Seneca which we have seen exempting the divine will from any possibility of change stresses that the worldorder has been contrived deliberately and with full knowledge on the Gods' part for the benefit of mortal beings 2 0 6 . Plotinus, on the other hand, while agreeing in distinguishing the "necessity" of an unchangeable will from one due to external compulsion 2 0 7 , boldly concludes that choice between opposites is itself a sign of deficiency 2 0 8 and makes providence a wholly automatic process, whereby one Hypostasis proceeds and receives order from its prior without any concern, or even any knowledge, on the latter's part. The gravity of the dilemma regarding divine will became apparent, as LOVEJOY has shown, in Medieval and Renaissance theological debates 2 0 9 ; on one side lay the risk of depriving God of choice in any meaningful sense, by making the divine will infallible; on the other that of making God's will wholly arbitrary or questioning his perfection by implying that he could have made a better world than he actually has. Similarly in Antiquity we find Origen agreeing with Seneca that G o d is more perfect for his "inability" to abandon the good 2 1 0 whereas Clement, Basil and Philoponus all stress the voluntary nature of providence and hence the limitations of the StoicNeoplatonic emanation similes 211 . O n the narrower question of divine delibera-

206

Contrast, e.g., Enn. I V . 4 . 3 0 - 4 5 with De Benef. VI.23.3—4, in prima autem ilia constitutione, cum universa disponerent, etiam nostra viderunt rationemque hominis babuerunt . , . adice quod ex destinato iuvant ideoque obligati sumus, quia non in beneficium ignorantium incidimus, sed haec quae accepimus, accepturos scierunt; et quamquam maius illis propositum sit maiorque actus sui fructus, quam servare mortalia, tarnen in nostras quoque utilitates a principio rerum praemissa mens est et is ordo mundo datus, ut appareat curam nostri non inter ultima habitam. The contrast is also striking with IV.4.8.34ff.'s claim that, since the stars' attention is set on higher matters, they need give the sensible world no attention. Most significant of all is a comparison of De Benef. VI.23.5, where the god's deliberate production of mortal beings is contrasted with human procreation, which often occurs unintentionally, and IV.4.37.21 ff. where the analogy with animal procreation is used to support the view that the stars' benefits are conferred automatically.

207

V I . 8 . 4 . 4 f f „ cf. Seneca De Benef. VI.21.3. Enn. VI.8.21. Cf. LOVEJOY, Great chain of Being, pp. 6 7 - 8 2 , on Medieval attitudes to this controversy;

208 209

ibid. pp. 210 211

144-182,

o n SPINOZA a n d

LEIBNIZ.

Contra Celsum III.70. Clement Strom. VII.7.42.2 (III.31.3ff. STÄHLIN), Basil Hexaem. I . 7 . 1 7 B - C , Philoponus Aet. M. 7 8 . l l f f . Clement, however, may simply be protesting against a materialistic conception of emanation; cf. Enn. III.2.16.17—20. The link between 'will' and 'deliberation' was strengthened (a) by the resemblance between the words βούλευσις and βούλη-

SCEPTICISM

A N D

NEOPLATONISM

943

tion, I have found only two pre-Plotinian texts explicitly denying divine deliberation, one that already quoted from the 'Asclepius' 2 1 2 , the other from the Gnostic Basilides, whose view appears due rather to his radically negative theology than to the influence of the Sceptics 2 1 3 . While to some extent the contrast with the post-Plotinian period may be due to the fact that it is mostly popular philosophers from the earlier period whose works survive, it is doubtful whether this can be the complete explanation. Whereas even a popular Neoplatonic theologian like Sallustius is thankful to use the denial of divine deliberation to answer Epicurean objections to providence, so serious a Middle Platonic school work as Albinus' 'Epitome' remains silent on the question, being content, in its summary of the 'Timaeus', to reflect Plato's anthropomorphisms 2 1 4 . And while L O E N E N has shown that Albinus cannot have taken everything in the 'Timaeus' literally 2 1 5 , we can only conclude that problems not discussed by him, even in a mere summary of Platonic doctrine, cannot have been regarded by him as of first importance. Other texts are more explicit in affirming divine deliberation. A good example of these is Marcus Aurelius' declaration that it is impious to deny divine deliberation, at least about the world's general plan, if not over all its details 2 1 6 . Perhaps, if pressed, he would have distinguished such 'deliberation' from its human counterpart. What is significant is that his additional remark that it is hard even to imagine a G o d who does not deliberate (αβουλον γαρ θεόν ουδέ έπινοήσαι ράδιον) echoes the observation of Cicero's Sceptic about the inconceivability of a god without reason or virtue — made, of course, only after showing the difficulty of believing in any such g o d 2 1 7 ! Even more significant are the Middle Platonist Atticus' anti-Aristotelian polemics. T w o surviving fragments of these attack the Peripatetic views of the sublunary world as governed

212 213

214 215

216

217

6311

σις (cf. below, n. 217) and (b) by Aristotle's definition of προαίρεσις as βουλητική ορεξις των εφ' ήμϊν ( Ε . Ν . 1112 a 11). Asclepius 22, quoted above, p. 938. Hippolytus Ref. VII.21 ff. Philosophical influence on Basilides is minimised by R. M. GRANT, Gnosticism and Early Christianity (Lectures on the history of religions 5 [New York, 1959]), pp. 142ff. But while Sceptical influence on him appears minimal, he exhibits strong similarities to Stoicising passages from the 'Enneads'; cf. especially Hippolytus VII.24.5 and Enn. IV.3.13.5ff. Sallustius, D . M . IX.3; Albinus, Epitome X I I f f . J. H . LOENEN, Albinus' Metaphysics, an Attempt at Rehabilitation (Mnemosyne ser. 4, 9 [1956], pp. 2 9 6 - 3 1 9 , 10 [1957], pp. 3 5 - 5 6 ) . The older view of Albinus as a confused eclectic is presented in R. E. WITT'S 'Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism' (Cambridge, 1937) and defended, against LOENEN, by THEILER (Entretiens Hardt, V, p. 415) and MERLAN (Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness, p. 62, n. 1, Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 64—70). LOENEN'S views are largely, though not wholly, followed by ARMSTRONG (Entretiens Hardt, V, pp. 402— 405) and in my 'Newplatonism', pp. 30—31. VI.44. Divine deliberation is also upheld by Maximus of Tyre (IV.9 pp. 50—51 HOBEIN) and Epictetus (fr. 3 ap. Stob. IV.44.60). N . D . 111.39, quoted above section IV, n. 164. Note how the ambiguity of αβουλον, which can be translated either as "without deliberation" or "without will," shows the close connection of the two notions for a Greek (cf. above, n. 211).

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R. T. WALLIS

by φύσις alone. Fragment 8 accuses Aristotle of deserting Plato's identification of 'nature' with 'rational soul' (an allusion to Laws 892 B ) 2 1 8 , while fragment 3 upholds the view of the universe as due to θεού λογισμός as the only one possible for an orthodox Platonist 2 1 9 . Perhaps Atticus was subtler in his Platonic commentaries, but our extant fragments envisage only the two alternatives that had led the Stoics into the Sceptical trap. We may further observe that the 'Asclepius', while denying reasoning in the celestial gods, regards them as thereby not superior, but inferior to man 2 2 0 . Small wonder then that the treatise preserves a prudent silence regarding the demiurge. A final proof that anthropomorphism seemed to many pre-Plotinians the less dangerous answer to the Sceptics is the fact that a character in Plutarch's 'De Defectu oraculorum' 2 2 1 conceives the god governing this world as exhibiting moral virtue, not in his care for mortal beings, but in his relations with the gods governing other worlds. In other words, he regards the gods as forming an essentially human type of society — the very view which Aristotle had regarded as the most absurd of all 2 2 2 .We may thus conclude that few, if any, pre-Plotinian thinkers had faced the full import of the Sceptics' theological criticisms, and consider his answer to them.

VII.

Plotinus on Divine

Virtue

Plotinus' answer to the problem of divine virtue comes in his discussion, in Enn. 1.2, of how virtue can assimilate man to God, where he omits Plato's qualification "as far as possible" and thus has to defend the Stoic view of the sage's divinity without falling into the difficulties of their position 2 2 3 . His answer, that virtue can assimilate us to a God beyond virtue, based as it is on an "interesting and important doctrine of analogy" 2 2 4 , cannot be expounded here, since it involves his answer to the Tarmenides" query whether the Forms are selfpredicating 225 and would thus lead us too far from our main subject. In any case, Aristotle had criticised the notion of divine virtue so thoroughly 2 2 6 that Plotinus would have had to deal with the question even without the Sceptics'

218

219 220

221 222 223 224

225

226

Fr. 8 (BAUDRY) ap. Euseb. P . E . X V . 1 2 . 8 1 4 A f f .

Ibid. XV.5.798Cff. Asclepius 22 (cf. above, p. 938): Et sic compositum est per voluntatem Dei hominem constitutum esse meliorem et diis, qui sunt ex sola immortali natura formati, et omnium mortalium. Cf. the view noted above, p. 927 that possession of more senses makes a god more perfect. Def. Or. 423D. Cf. above, p. 929. Theaet. 176B: όμοίωσις θεψ κατά xò δυνατόν. ARMSTRONG, Loeb, vol. I, p. 124.

For Plotinus' answer cf. his account of Ideal Magnitude, discussed by J. M. RIST, Eros and Psyche, pp. 59—60 and, briefly, in my Neoplatonism, p. 49. Cf. above, p. 929.

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945

intervention. We may, however, single out a few points from his discussion. The first is his attack on a view expressed in Albinus' 'Epitome', that since the supreme God transcends virtue, we should seek assimilation not to him, but to the celestial god (i.e. the world-soul) 227 . This view Plotinus rejects as solving nothing. For, on the one hand, the arguments against ascribing the "civic" (πολιτικαί) virtues - i.e. those of the active life — to the gods can be applied to the world-soul as well; for the latter has nothing to inspire it with fear or lust, and thus no occasion to exercise courage or temperance 228 . Conversely, since even on Albinus' view the world-soul's virtue comes from imitating the order of Νους, our own imitation of the former must enable us indirectly to imitate the latter 229 . And, since it is unreasonable to deny the "civic" virtues any role in assimilating us to gods who can at most possess only the higher virtues, there is little greater difficulty in supposing that virtue can assimilate us to beings who transcend virtue altogether 230 ' 1 . The second point of interest is Plotinus' suggestion that fire may heat another object (thereby assimilating the latter to itself) without itself being heated — an analogy which, as he recognises, entails the "refined" Stoic view that virtue is "innate" (σύμφυτος) in the gods, like heat in fire, but acquired (έπακτός) by man. Plotinus, however, is emphatic in refusing to attribute virtue even in this sense to Νους, employing, in defense of this position, a principle fundamental to his system, that of "need" (χρεία). At each stage of the Neoplatonic Hierarchy the descent into greater multiplicity constitutes a weakness that can be rectified only by the development of new powers and activities unnecessary on a higher level 232 . Thus in the present case the simplicity of Νους excludes the need for virtue, whereas Soul's greater complexity requires such an additional principle of order 2 3 3 . The doctrine of χρεία is even more fundamental to Plotinus' denial of divine deliberation.

VIII. Plotinus on Divine

Deliberation

The question whether discarnate human souls resort to reasoning is first faced by Plotinus in IV.3.18, where in answer he invokes the Aristotelian con227

Epit. XXVIII.3; Contrast Enn. I.2.1.5ff.; cf. further H. DÖRRIE, Entretiens Hardt, V, pp. 214-216, 224-225. 228 1.2.1.10-13. 229 Ibid. 1 3 - 1 5 , an allusion to Epit. X . 2 - 3 . 230/1 ibid. 23—31; on the classes of virtue distinguished in Enn. 1.2 and in later Neoplatonism (Pophyry Sent. 32, Macrobius in Somn Sc. I. 8, Marinus V. Pr. ch. 3, Olympiodorus in Phd. 4 5 - 4 9 N O R V I N [ = L . G. WESTERINK, The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, I. Olympiodorus, Amsterdam 1976, pp. 117-125], 113-114 N O R V I N [ = WESTERINK, Greek Commentaries, II. Damascius, 1977, pp. 85-89]), cf. P. HENRY, Plotin et l'Occident (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 15 [Louvain, 1934]), pp. 154—164, J. TROUILLARD, La Purification Plotinienne (Bibl. de philos, cont. 92 [Paris, 1955]), pp. 186-203. 232 Cf. below, pp. 946ff. On the principle, cf. esp. Enn. VI.7.9.38-46. 233 1.2.1.46-49.

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R. T. W A L L I S

ception of τέχνη. Even on earth, he observes, we resort to reasoning only when in doubt and perplexity. Hence the need for deliberation is a sign of weakness and only when in difficulty do craftsmen resort thereto; otherwise, the relevant craft (conceived in Aristotelian terms as a form immanent in the mind) controls its matter without difficulty 2 3 4 . But how then can pure souls be termed "rational"? Their "reason", Plotinus replies, consists in the "rational disposition" they derive from Νους (in other words, in contemplation of their internal reflections of the pure forms) 2 3 5 . Whether in IV.3 and IV.4 Plotinus leaves more than a logical distinction between pure Soul and Νους I have discussed elsewhere 2 3 6 . Here we must confine ourselves to his view of the conditions in which reasoning can arise, and here the doctrine of χρεία plays a fundamental part. As we have already observed, the principle is operative on every level of Plotinus' universe; each psychological faculty has value only as an inferior substitute for beings incapable of a higher awareness, and even Νους is only an "eye for the blind" 2 3 7 in comparison with the simple self-awareness of the O n e 2 3 8 . Hence Plotinus not merely opposes the Stoic view, implied also by the 'Asclepius', that possession of more faculties constitutes an excellence; he also rejects the suggestion, which could claim Platonic and Aristotelian authority, that sensation is pleasant and valuable even apart from its practical use 2 3 9 . Conscious perception, in his view, either serves the practical purpose of assisting an animal's survival, or is at best a source of knowledge for beings who have lost their intellectual cognition 2 4 0 . For where the latter retains its clarity, there is no need to resort to the partial knowledge of the senses, except to handle some practical task 2 4 1 . And this is unnecessary for the world-soul or the stars, whose manner of controlling their bodies is superior to our own 2 4 2 . 234 235

236 237 238

239

240

241

242

IV.3.18.2—7; for the doctrine' Aristotelian source cf. above, p. 934. Ibid. 1 0 - 1 3 : έπεί εϊ τις λογισμόν λαμβάνει την έκ νου άεί γινομένην καί ούσαν έν αύταίς διάθεσιν, καί ένέργειαν έστώσαν καί οίον έμφασιν οΰσαν, είεν αν κάκεϊ λογισμώ χρώμεναι. Neoplatonism, pp. 8 1 - 8 2 . VI.7.41.2—3. O n the One's simple self-awareness cf. esp. RIST, Plotinus — the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), ch. 4, pp. 3 8 - 5 2 . For the Stoics, cf. above, p. 927 and section III, n. 125; for the Asclepius above, p. 944. Cf. also Plato Tim. 4 7 a - b , Aristotle Metaph. 980 a 2 l f f „ 1072 b 17. IV.4.24.9—12: εί δή τοϋτο, προς χρείαν άν είεν αί αισθήσεις, καί γαρ εί καί προς γνώσιν, τω μή έν γνώσει όντι, άλλ' άμαθαίνοντι δια συμφοράν, καί ϊνα άναμνησθή δια λήθην, οι) τω μήτε έν χρεία μήτε έν λήθη. Such deficiencies apply only to conscious perception, whereas the divine soul's sensations, as we have seen, are wholly unconscious (cf. above, section III, n. 124). This view, implied in the last section of IV.4, e.g. IV.4. 42.1—6, is prefigured by Plotinus' earlier statements (a) that sensation may result automatically from having a body (IV.4.24.4—6) and (b) that sensations of no practical concern fail to reach consciousness (ibid. 9.8—20). For sensation's origin as a practical faculty cf. Aristotle D e An. 434 a 32 ff. ; also below, n. 243. IV.4.8.3—7: ών τε ή νόησις καί ή γνώσις εναργεστέρα, εί ταύτα αισθητώς γίγνοιτο, ουκ άνάγκη παρέντα την γνώσιν αυτών τώ κατά μέρος α ί σ θ η τ φ την έπιβολήν ποιείσθαι, εί μή τις ε ρ γ ψ οίκονομοίτό τι, τών έν μέρει, τή γνώσει, του όλου έμπεριεχομένων. C f . below, n. 248.

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947

The difference is connected with the type of body each class of being has to control 2 4 3 . The distinction is already explicit in the early treatise IV.8, O n the Descent of the Soul', where Plotinus, though more briefly than in IV.3.18, alludes to Aristotle's view of τέχνη 2 4 4 . Our own bodies, he argues, form an unstable combination of elements, subject to dangers from without and unpredictable changes within, and needing constant replenishment. Hence care for them requires our constant attention, while the need to plan for their continually changing circumstances prevents our enjoying the changeless tranquillity of the divine souls 2 4 5 . By contrast the world's body is all-complete, and therefore neither encounters any external danger nor contains any internal principle that is unnatural to it, while the stars' bodies, in turn, are composed of the subtlest form of sensible matter 246 . Discursive reasoning is thus unnecessary to them; no less than sensation it originates as a practical faculty and, with regard to contemplation, is only a second best 247 . These notions Plotinus expounds at length in Enn. IV.4's discussion of providence, where he explicitly confronts the Sceptical challenge. The relevant section (IV.4.6—17) deals primarily with the question whether divine souls have memory ( I V . 4 . 6 - 7 ) and is at times rather repetitive, perhaps owing to Plotinus' desire to stress the inadequacy of popular views. His own position he summarises in chapter 6, at the beginning of his account, where he reaffirms that divine souls, being free from doubt, have no need to resort to reasoning, either to acquire knowledge previously lacking or to exercise providence 248 . In Plotinus' view the World-soul orders her products automatically, 243

In his distinction between the simple souls of the heavenly bodies and the multiplicity of faculties needed by terrestrial beings, Plotinus seems to have been anticipated by Alexander of Aphrodisias ('Principles of the All', trans. A. BADAWI [La Transmission de la Philosophie Grecque au Monde Arabe (Et. de philos, méd. 56 [Paris, 1968]), pp. 122 — 123]). O n these grounds Alexander had concluded that the celestial souls lack φαντασία, a view opposed by Avicenna, but followed by Averroes (cf. Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut 495ff., and R. W A L Z E R ' S discussion in I. D Ü R I N G and G. E. L. O W E N [ed.], Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century [Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 12 (Göteborg, I960)], pp. 105-112). Cf. Plotinus' reference at IV.8.2.12-13 to the πολλής καί όχλώδους προνοίας needed to preserve human bodies; on the problem of φαντασία in the divine souls cf. below, p. 950f. For a similar contrast between the simple souls and bodies of plants and those of more complex organisms cf. Alexander De An. 37.4ff. [Cf., as far as Alexander is concerned, R. W. SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, below in this same volume (ANRW II 36,2), pp. 1202ff. — W. H . ]

244

IV.8.8.13 —16: the text is corrupt, but the general sense is clear. 246 Ibid. 2 . 1 - 1 4 . Ibid. 2.14ff. O n the celestial souls cf. ibid. 38ff. In addition to the Sceptics' claim that perfect beings have no need of deliberation and the Peripatetic views cited above ns. 240 and 243, we should recall the views of the Sophists and Democritus, that necessity has forced man to d e v e l o p his reason by founding civilisation and the practical arts (cf. GUTHRIE, History of Greek Philosophy, II [Cambridge, 1965], pp. 473 - 474; III [Cambridge, 1979], pp. 60ff.). But none of these authors is known to have acribed the o r i g i n of reasoning to practical need. IV.4.6.10-16: εί ούν μήτε ζητοΰσι μήτε άποροϋσιν — ούδενός γ α ρ δέονται — ούδε μανθάνουσιν, ά πρότερον ουκ ήν αύτοϊς έν γνώσει — τίνες άν λογισμοί ή τίνες συλ-

245 247

248

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R. T. WALLIS

through contemplation of the order she perpetually receives from Νούς. In this order all is eternally laid down; hence no uncertainty arises, which could cause her to resort to reasoning 249 . And since the world had no temporal beginning, there was no time when its creator could have deliberated about its production; hence we must take Plato's references to divine "reasoning" as meaning simply that the world-order is as perfect as the best possible reasoning could have contrived it 250 . Since the world-plan is all-inclusive, its ruler encounters no external source of perplexity; nor can divine beings arbitrarily change their will or cease from contemplation, since in God will and wisdom are identical 251 . Nor, finally, can the world's multiplicity be a source of difficulty, unfolding automatically as it does from the causal principles contained in Soul's contemplation 2 5 2 . It follows that Soul's operation should be compared to Nature's moulding and government of bodies from within, rather than to the art of a craftsman, who has to deal with his materials from without. Hence whereas Nature begins from the body's causal principle and extends her influence outwards, a craftsman, by contrast (for instance, a doctor treating a patient), starts from ignorance of the relevant causal principles and has to infer these from the partial details sensation may afford him. Hence, in contrast to Nature, and still more to the World-soul, he is subject to perplexity and needs frequent resort to deliberation 253 . So for them, Plotinus has boldly accepted the Sceptical challenge, that the World-soul's operations are indeed more like those of Nature than those of human art. But he thereby obviously risks impaling himself on the other horn of the

249 250

251

252 253

λογισμοί αϋτοίς γίγνοιντο ή διανοήσεις; άλλ' ούδέ περί τών άνθρωπίνων αύτοίς έπίνοιαι καί μηχαναί, έξ ών διοικήσουσι τα ήμετερα ή δλως τα της γης. άλλος γάρ τρόπος της είς το πάν παρ' αυτών εύθημοσυνης. Ibid. 10.eff. Ibid. 7 - 1 0 : εί ούν καί αϋτη μη έν τφ λογίζεσθαι έχει το ζην, μηδ' έν τψ ζητεΐν ö τι δει ποιείν. ήδη γαρ έξεύρηται καί τέτακται & δεϊ, ού ταχθέντα . . . For the world's eternity as excluding reasoning on God's part cf. III.2.1.15ff., VI.7.3.iff.; for Plotinus' interpretation of the 'Timaeus" references to divine deliberation cf. III.2.14.1—6, VI. 2.21.32-38, VI.7.1.28—32, VI.8.17.1-12, also above section IV, n. 151. Plotinus' view of the world as unfolding eternally (through the medium of Soul) from a transcendent Intellect avoids the errors of supposing either that the World-soul has to give continuous attention to rectifying the world's evils (cf. II.3.16.29—38) or that divine activity was limited to an initial act of creation, followed by idleness (III.2.13.25—27, cf. above, p. 939f.; at the same time, unlike the Stoics, Plotinus safeguards divine transcendence). If Posidonius held a more transcendent view of God than the orthodox Stoa, he may have partially anticipated Plotinus' position (cf. above section V, n. 188). For a (probably exaggerated) view of Posidonius as anticipating Plotinus' conception of Νοϋς, cf. ch. 2 of THEILER'S Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Problemata 1 [Berlin, 1930]), pp. 61 ff. On the changelessness of divine activity cf. IV.4.10.13ff., 12.32ff. On the identity of will and wisdom cf. ibid. 12.45-46: τψ γαρ τοιούτφ ή βούλησις φρόνησις. Ibid. 10.20-26, II.14-28, 12.36-49. Ibid. II.Iff.

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Sceptical dilemma. This objection he faces in IV.4.12. The account of providence just given, an opponent objects, is indeed appropriate to Nature (φύσις) but incompatible with wisdom (φρόνησις) which involves reasoning and memory 2 5 4 . This, Plotinus replies, is a purely human standard of judgment, which confuses the search for wisdom with its actual possession. Reasoning is a search for the knowledge already possessed by the wise, and acquisition of knowledge brings the reasoning process to an end 255 . Since, therefore, human wisdom consists in the possession of knowledge after reasoning has ceased, we can ascribe reasoning to the World-soul only if we rank her with the apprentice rather than the master of a craft 256 . To reinforce this argument Plotinus develops the implications of the Stoic view of divine causal knowledge. Since God knows the world as its cause, he argues, he must foresee and have full confidence about its future development, and therefore need give it no further consideration. His knowledge of the "future" is thus no different from his knowledge of the "present", since both are contained in a single unchanging vision, and his foreknowledge thus contrasts with the partial inferences of diviners (a point already made in Cicero's 'De Divinatione') 257 . The only alternative, Plotinus once more argues, is to regard God as acting at random 258 . For all these reasons the World-soul needs no external assistance, and has thus no need of reasoning or memory, which deal with the external world 259 . 254 255

256

257

258 259

Ibid. 12.1-3. ibid. 3—13: εστι δέ τούτο άνθρώπων το φρονεϊν έν τφ μή φρονείν τιθεμένων και το ζητεΐν φρονείν το αύτό τφ φρονεϊν νενομικότων. το γαρ λογίζεσθαι τί άλλο άν εΐη ή το έφίεσθαι εύρείν φρόνησιν και λόγον άληθή και τυγχάνοντα τοΰ δντος. όμοιος γαρ ó λογιζόμενος κιθαρίζοντι είς κιθάρισιν και μελετώντι είς έξιν καί δλως τω μανθάνοντι εις γνώσιν, ζητεί γαρ μαθείν ó λογιζόμενος όπερ ό ήδη έχων φρόνιμος, ώστε έν τφ στάντι το φρονείν. μαρτυρεί δε καί αύτός ó λογισάμενος. δταν γαρ εϋρη δ δεί, πέπαυται λογιζόμενος, καί άνεπαύσατο έν τω φρονήσαι γενόμενος. Ibid. 13-17: εί μεν ούν κατά τους μανθάνοντας το ήγούμενον του παντός τάξομεν, λογισμούς άποδοτεον καί άπορίας καί μνήμας, συμβάλλοντος τα παρεληλυθότα τοίς παρούσι καί τοίς μελλουσιν. εί δε κατά τον εΐδότα, έν στάσει δρον έχούση νομιστέον αύτού είναι την φρόνησιν. - That the Gods and those already wise have no need to seek wisdom is stressed by Plato at Symp. 203e —204a. IV.12.18-39: είτα εί μεν οϊδε τα μέλλοντα - το γάρ μή είδέναι λέγειν άτοπον - δια τί ουχί καί δπως εσται ουκ είδήσει; εί δέ είδήσει καί δπως εσται, τί έτι δεί τοϋ λογίζεσθαι καί τοϋ τά παρεληλυθότα προς τα παρόντα συμβάλλειν; καί ή γνώσις δε τών μελλόντων, εϊπερ αύτφ συγχωρείται παρείναι, ού τοιαύτη άν εϊη, οϊα τοίς μάντεσι πάρεστιν, άλλ' οϊα αϋτοίς τοίς ποιοϋσι τοίς πεπιστευκόσιν δτι έσται. τοΰτο δέ ταύτόν τοίς πάντα κυρίοις, οις ούδέν άμφίβολον ούδέ άμφιγνοούμενον. οϊς δ' άρα άραρεν ή δόξα, τούτοις παραμένει, ή αύτη άρα καί περί μελλόντων φρόνησις, οϊα καί ή περί παρόντων, κατά το έστάναι. τούτο δέ λογισμού έξω. Cf. De Div. 1.127 (cited above section V, p. 939 and n. 190). On divine causal knowledge cf. ibid. 1.82. IV.4.12.29ff. Ibid. 46-49: ούδενός άρα δεί τω τοιούτψ είς το ποιείν, έπειδή ούδ' ή φρόνησις άλλοτρία, άλλ' αύτός ούδενί έπακτφ χρώμενος. ούδέ λογισμφ τοίνυν ούδέ μνήμη, έπακτά γάρ ταύτα. Hence Plotinus rejects Epicurus' charge that providence would be a burden to the gods (ibid. 39ff., cf. above, p. 939 and Sallustius D.M. IX.3). For the use of έπακτός cf. above, p. 945.

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But the Sceptics' charge that such "wisdom" is indistinguishable from Nature remains unanswered. Plotinus' reply, presented in chapter 13, is that to identify the two in this way is to confuse opposite ends of the metaphysical spectrum. Divine wisdom and Nature are indeed alike in not deliberating, but the former transcends the level of deliberation, the latter lies beneath it 260 . Similarly, while intuitive contemplation and irrational "magical attraction" both involve surrender of our ordinary consciousness, and can be described in very similar terms 261 , it would be a gross blunder to confuse the two. Psychologically, therefore, we must distinguish three levels, that of Nature, that of discursive reasoning, based on mental imagery (φαντασία) and that of Νους. Among these Nature is a mere shadow of divine wisdom, situated on the lowest level of Soul 262 . Hence its creative activity occurs without will or consciousness; like the transmission of heat 263 . The "sleeping contemplation" elsewhere ascribed to Nature therefore lacks φαντασία 2 6 4 and thereby contrasts with the pure self-awareness of Νους, which, as the source of its own knowledge, a reflection of which is perpetually received by the World-soul, transcends the need for φαντασία 2 6 5 . Finally φαντασία, on the intermediate level, affords its possessor knowledge of the external world 2 6 6 . Needing no such knowledge, the world's governing principle is indeed

260 IV.4.13.2-3: ή μεν φρόνησις πρώτον, ή δε φΰσις εσχατον. Cf. ibid. 11 — 17, quoted below, n. 264. 261

Cf. especially IV.4.1.6—9 on intuitive contemplation with ibid. 40.28-31 on magical attraction,: also V.3.17.21—28's account of mystical experience and the ambivalent status of the experiences discussed at 1.4.10.21 ff. We may also note that Soul and Matter, though at opposite extremes of the sensible world, are yet compared in III.6. as incorporeals (cf. III.6.6.3—4) and that the One and Matter are alike in their formlessness and absolute simplicity (VI.7.13.3—4). O n the whole problem cf. Neoplatonism, pp. 58, 91,155-157, and DODDS' note on Proclus Et. Th. 5 8 - 5 9 . 262 Indeed at IV.4.13.19—20, Nature is merely "the image cast by Soul on Matter": το έξ αυτής (sc. ψυχής) έμφαντασθεν είς ύλην, whereas at ibid. 3—4 she is at least ψυχής εσχατον. Cf. Plotinus' hesitation at ibid. 2 0 - 2 1 as to whether Nature can be ranked among 'True Beings'. 263 Ibid. 7—11: όθεν ούδε οιδε, μόνον δε ποιεί, ö γ ά ρ εχει, τω εφεξής δίδουσα άπροαιρέτως, τήν δόσιν τω σωματικω καί ύλικω ποίησιν εχει, οίον και το θερμανθεν τω εφεξής άψαμένω δεδωκε το αύτοϋ είδος, θερμόν έλαττόνως ποιήσαν. 264 Ibid. 1 1 - 1 7 : δια τοΰτό τοι ή φΰσις ούδε φαντασίαν εχει. ή δε νόησις φαντασίας κρεϊττον. φαντασία δε μεταξύ φύσεως τύπου καί νοήσεως, ή μεν γε ούθενός άντίληψιν ούδε σύνεσιν εχει, ή δε φαντασία σύνεσιν έπακτού. δίδωσι γ ά ρ τ φ φαντασθέντι είδέναι α επαθεν. — J. Ν . D E C K ' S claim that Plotinus does not commit himself to the Stoic view of φύσις as άφάνταστος (Nature, Contemplation and the One [Toronto, 1967], p. 71, n. 6; cf. Α. GRAESER, Plotinus and the Stoics [Philos. Antiqua 22 (Leiden, 1972)], pp. 53-55) is clearly contradicted by this passage, cited by D E C K himself only a page before (ibid. p. 70). For Nature's "sleeping contemplation", cf. III.8.4.22ff. and below n. 270. 265 IV.4.13.16—19: ή δέ (sc. νόησις) γεννά αύτή, καί ένέργεια έξ αυτού τού ένεργήσαντος. νούς μεν ούν εχει, ψυχή δέ ή τού παντός έκομίσατο εις άεί καί έκεκόμιστο, καί τοΰτό έστιν αύτή το ζήν, καί το φαινόμενον άεί σύνεσις νοούσης. 266 Ibid. 14 — 16, quoted above, n. 264; cf. also above, n. 261.

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ά φ ά ν τ α σ τ ο ς , as the Stoics feared, but it is nevertheless at the opposite extreme from irrational φύσις. The chapter in question, it must be admitted, is far from clear on the contents of the World-soul's contemplation 2 6 7 . But at least Plotinus seems emphatic in distinguishing intuitive wisdom from unconscious φύσις, and situating them at opposite ends of the psychological hierarchy. The trouble is that relegation of φύσις to a level inferior to φ α ν τ α σ ί α and discursive reasoning conflicts with statements elsewhere in the 'Enneads'. Thus IV.4.11, discussed above, is typical of several affirmations of the superiority of Nature over human art and reasoning 2 6 8 . O n e has the impression that in such passages Plotinus' association of deliberation with imperfection has led him to ignore the safeguards of his more considered theory. The most open contradiction of all comes in the treatise III.8 O n Contemplation'. At 3.12ff. of that work Nature is denied discursive reasoning on the grounds that the latter involves a previous absence of knowledge, a lack not present in Nature 2 6 9 . By contrast chapter 4 implies that Nature's contemplation is inferior to our o w n , to which it is related as sleep is to waking 2 7 0 . And in chapter 6 our soul's contemplation is regarded as more tranquil than that of Nature on the grounds that it possesses its objects of contemplation more perfectly than does the latter, although, Plotinus adds, since even this possession is not perfect, our souls still have to resort to learning and inquiry 2 7 1 . And though the application of the term 'soul' in III.8.5 and 6 is not always clear, the present 267

268

269

270

271

The phrase το φαινόμενον άεί σύνεσις νοούσης is particularly obscure. On the difficulty of distinguishing pure Soul from Νούς cf. the discussion cited above, p. 922. E.g. II.9.12.17-18, VI.2.21.32-38, III.2.14.4-6, and most provocation of all, IV.3.10. 14—19, echoing the Sophistic formula quoted (and subsequently rejected) by Plato, Laws 896C—D. The recognition at V.8.1.32ff. that art may rise superior to Nature, by basing its work on the λόγος whence the principles operative in Nature derive, does not really conflict with these passages: for (a) Plotinus is here concerned with the fine arts, whereas most of the others deal with the practical crafts; (b) Plotinus evidently supposes that artists like Phidias can proceed by pure intuition, whereas the arts ranked inferior to Nature are unable to do this. That art may rise to a higher level we saw to be recognised at IV.8.8.15-16 and IV.3.18.5-7 (cf. above, p. 947). III.8.3.12-16: πώς δε αύτη (sc. φύσις) εχει θεωρίαν; την μεν δή έκ λόγου ούκ εχει (λέγω δ' έκ λόγου το σκοπεϊσθαι περί των έν αύτη), δια τί ούν ζωή τις ούσα καί λόγος καί δύναμις ποιούσα; άρ' δτι τό σκοπεϊσθαι έστι τό μήπω εχειν; ή δε εχει, και δια τούτο ότι εχει καί ποιεί. Ibid. 4.22—31: καί είτε τις βούλεται σύνεσίν τινα ή αϊσθησιν αύτη διδόναι, ούχ οϊαν λέγομεν επί των άλλων την αϊσθησιν ή την σύνεσιν, άλλ' οίον ει τις την καθύπνου τη έγρηγορότος προσεικάσειε. θεωρούσα γάρ θεώρημα αύτής άναπαύεται γενόμενον αύτη έκ τοΰ έν αύτη καί σύν αύτη μενειν καί θεώρημα είναι, καί θεωρία άψοφος, άμυδροτέρα δε. έτέρα γαρ αύτής εις θέαν έναργεστέρα, ή δε ειδωλον θεωρίας άλλης, ταύτη δή καί τό γεννηθεν ύπ' αύτής άσθενες παντάπασιν, δτι άσθενούσα θεωρία άσθενες θεώρημα ποιεί. In the question whether Plotinus means to compare Nature to a man dreaming or to one fast asleep cf. DECK, op. cit., pp. 70—71. That Nature lacks φαντασία (above, n. 264) suggests the latter view. Ibid. 6.30-34: καί τω μέν μάλλον εχειν ή ή φύσις ήσυχαιτέρα, καί τω πλέον θεωρητική μάλλον, τω δέ μή τελέως έφιεμένη μάλλον εχειν την τοΰ θεωρηθέντος καταμάθησιν καί θεωρίαν τήν έξ επισκέψεως.

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context, dealing with action in the external world, shows that the fallen human soul is here in question 272 . In other words, whereas Nature's contemplation was earlier ranked as more perfect and tranquil than that of the incarnate human soul, the reverse is now the case. H o w can such conflicting statements be reconciled? The best way to restore a measure of harmony to Plotinus' position is by reflecting that, while both higher soul (reason) and lower soul (nature) are possessed both by us and by the World-soul, in the latter both 'reason' and 'nature' are concerned with the administration of the self-sufficient world and therefore able to operate in a manner superior to their equivalents in us. By contrast, not merely is our reason forced to deliberate, but our "nature" (i.e. our irrational soul) 273 becomes filled with the disturbance caused by the passions (πάθη), and is therefore inferior to our reason, which is immune to these. In other words, considered from the viewpoint of its m e t a p h y s i c a l level, our discursive reason is superior to Universal Nature, whereas, if we consider the t y p e of being in which each exists and their consequent manner of operation, both Universal Reason and Nature are superior to our own reason. Admittedly in IV.4.11 it is the Nature governing an i n d i v i d u a l body that is ranked as superior to discursive reason. But here it is merely the unconscious natural processes within us that are in question, considered at the stage where they are not fully individualised, but follow Universal Nature 2 7 4 . N o r does our solution remove all contradiction from III.8. But it goes far towards reconciling most of Plotinus' other observations and we may therefore conclude that, if he does not always succeed in distinguishing the sub- and super-rational, he at least makes a valiant attempt to do so and achieves as much success as any philosopher who has faced the problem, perhaps as much as is consistent with the psychological facts.

IX. The Sceptics and the Negative

Theology

The possibility of Sceptical influence on Plotinus' negative theology has of late received virtually no attention and has indeed never, to my knowledge, been discussed in more than general terms 275 . Sufficient sources of that theology seem available in other quarters, notably the nature of mystical experience itself 276 , 272

273 274 275

276

Cf. especially ibid. 29—30; έν ôè τοις πρακτικοις έφαρμόττει, ά εχει τοις 6ξω; also ibid. 34ff. On the problem cf. also DECK, op. cit., pp. 68 — 72. For the use of the term φύσις of man's irrational soul cf. IV.4.20.15ff. On the origin of man's lower soul, cf. BLUMENTHAL, op.cit., pp. 27ff. From earlier discussions cf. especially MONRAD'S remarks, op. cit., p. 1 6 4 , followed by DODDS', Proclus: Elements, p. 312. Students of Neoplatonism have perhaps given insufficient attention to the tendency of mystical experience to issue in a negative theology. The texts quoted e.g. in STACE'S 'Teachings of the Mystics' (New York, 1960) show how widespread the tendency is among schools of mysticism where mutual influence is hardly conceivable. [Cf. J. BUSSANICH, Mystical Elements in Plotinus' Thought, in: A N R W II 36,4 (in preparation). — W. H.]

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the influence of Platonic and Neopythagorean interpretations of the 'Parmenides' 277 , and Plotinus' own critical reflections on Aristotle's self-contemplating Intellect 278 . Yet one chapter in particular suggests that this reflection was in part prompted by the Sceptics' theological critique. As we have seen, it is hard to distinguish the sources of the Plotinian principle of χρεία 2 7 9 . But at least the Sceptics' claim, that a divine being has no need of reason and intelligence may have helped suggest to Plotinus that even the latter faculty is merely an "eye for the blind" and unworthy of the supreme principle 280 . VI.7.37, in particular, contains two passages echoing the Sceptical arguments. One of these starts from Aristotle's claim that, if God's knowledge had an external object, he would thereby be inferior to that object 281 . Plotinus goes a stage farther and turns this argument against Aristotle's own view that God will not be perfect unless he exercises νόησις 2 8 2 . In that case, Plotinus replies, it will be his νόησις and not his essence that gives him perfection, with the consequence that he will be essentially imperfect. If, on the other hand, it is his essence that gives him perfection, he has no need of νόησις 2 8 3 . N o w although this argument could be derived simply from critical reflection on Aristotle, it obviously echoes the Sceptical dilemma over whether, if God has virtue, it is his virtue or his essence that gives him perfection 284 . And another Sceptical reminiscence occurs later in the chapter, when Plotinus returns to the charge that to deprive the One of νόησις would reduce it to a state of ignorance. Such a reproach, he answers, is justified only of beings who have the capacity to exercise νόησις, but fail to do so; whereas the One transcends the level where such notions are applicable. In fact, he adds, we might just as well call the One ignorant because it does not possess the medical art, an observation echoing the Sceptics' jibe that to ascribe reason to the world on the grounds of its perfection is as silly as endowing it with one of the individual arts 28S . In view of such remarks, it does not seem unreasonable to see a Sceptical influence (along with many others) on Plotinus' negative theology.

277

278

279 280 281 282 283

284 285

On this cf. especially DODDS' article 'Plato's 'Parmenides' and the Original of the Neoplatonic One', in: C Q 22 (1928), pp. 129-143, and the observations of H.-R. SCHWYZER, R.E. article, 'Plotinos', Band XXI. A 1 (1951), cols. 553-554, A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, vol. IV, pp. 1 — 140, H. D . SAFFREY and L. G . WESTERINK, Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne, I, pp. LXXVff. Cf. especially ARMSTRONG'S discussion, in: Entretiens Hardt V, pp. 410—411 and the ensuing discussion, pp. 419—421, 424. Cf. above, section VIII, p. 946f. and ns. 240, 243, and 247. VI.7.41.1-3; cf. Cicero N . D . III.38, quoted above section IV, n. 160. Metaph. 1074 b 1 8 - 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 4 . Ibid. 1 7 - 1 8 . VI.7.37.3-10, cf. esp. lines 7 - 1 0 : τίνι γαρ το τίμιον εξει, τη νοήσει ή αύτφ· ει μεν xfj νοήσει, αύτφ οΰ τίμιον ή ήττον, ει δε αύτφ, προ της νοήσεώς έστι τέλειος καί ού τή νοήσει τελειοΰμενος. Sextus Math. ΙΧ.176, discussed above, pp. 925 - 927, cf. p. 914 and n. 25. VI.7.37.24-28, cf. specially line 28: οίον ει άνίατρον αυτόν τις λέγοι; cf. Sextus Math. IX. 108-110, Cicero N . D . III.23, discussed above, pp. 940-941.

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Finally, can Plotinus meet the charge that by stripping the supreme G o d of all attributes he makes him as good as non-existent? His answer, it seems, would be twofold. First, the basic Neoplatonic axiom of an ultimate unity underlying the world shows that we must conceive its basic principle as a unity so total that it transcends all distinct characteristics. If this argument seems of mainly historical interest, his other approach may have more relevance today 2 8 6 . According to this, the final guarantee that the G o d whose anthropomorphic characteristics we have abstracted is not simply non-existent lies in the mystical experience. It is this that confirms that the G o d required by logical argument actually exists at the heart of things. Hence a G o d without moral or intellectual virtue is indeed inconceivable to the intellect, but in mystical union with him we can nevertheless be sure of his existence 2 8 7 .

Bibliographical

Note

As stated at the beginning of this paper, studies of the relation of Scepticism amd Neoplatonism, with the few exceptions listed there, have been conspicuously lacking. A bibliography of works dealing with Scepticism, and the Hellenistic systems criticised by the Sceptics, will be found in A. A. LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974); among recent works CHARLOTTE L. STOUGH'S Greek Skepticism (Berkeley und Los Angeles, 1969) discusses the Sceptics' epistemological critique. Among older works cf. especially V. BROCHARD, Les Sceptiques Grecs (2nd ed. repr. Paris, 1959). Major works on Neoplatonism are listed in the bibliography to my 'Neoplatonism' (London and N e w York, 1972). Among more recent works mention should be made of V. CILENTO'S Plotino: Paideia Antignostica (Florence, 1971), an annotated edition of Enn. III.8, V.8, V.5 and II.9), of two recent studies in English, H . J . BLUMENTHAL'S Plotinus' Psychology: His Doctrine of the Embodied Soul (The Hague, 1972) and G . J . P. O'DALY'S Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), and of three important collections of papers from Neoplatonic colloquia, 'Le Néoplatonisme' (Paris, 1971), 'Plotino e il neoplatomismo in Oriente e in Occidente' (Rome, 1974) and 'Neoplatonism, Ancient and Modern' (Proceedings of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Vol. I) (Norfolk, Va., 1976). 286

C f . ARMSTRONG'S distinction of the 'Mathematico-logical' and 'positive transcendence' aspects of the negative theology and his conclusion that only the latter has permanent value (Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, pp. l l S -

287

C f . STACE'S suggestions, Mysticism and Philosophy, ch. 3 (pp. 134—206).

lló).

Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the 'Categories' b y STEVEN K . STRANGE, Pittsburgh, P A

Contents I. Plotinus and Porphyry on the 'Categories'

955

II. Porphyry's Platonizing Interpretation of the 'Categories'

957

III. Plotinus' Objections to the 'Categories'

964

IV. Some Implications of Plotinus' Reading of the 'Categories'

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I. Plotinus and Porphyry on the 'Categories' The claim is often made that the most extensive of Plotinus' treatises, O n the Genera of Being' (Περί των γενών τοϋ οντος, Enn. VI. 1—3), contains a polemical attack on Aristotle's theory of categories. 1 This claim would seem to be well-grounded, given that in the first part of the work (VI. 1.1—24), 2 Plotinus proceeds through the list of categories given by Aristotle and systematically raises a series of powerful objections to claims Aristotle makes about them in the text of the 'Categories'. At the same time, Plotinus' student Porphyry is rightly given credit for establishing Aristotle's 'Categories', along with the rest of the Aristotelian logical treatises usually referred to as the 'Organon', as the fundamental texts for logical doctrines in the Neoplatonic scholastic tradition, and through this tradition later for medieval philosophy, by means of his 'Isagoge' 3 or intro-

1

See, for example, E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung III.2 4 (Leipzig, 1904), p. 578, n. 4, p. 698; É. BRÉHIER, Les Ennéades de Plotin (Paris, 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 3 8 ) , introduction to Enn. V I . 1 - 3 , pp. 9 - 1 0 ; A. C . LLOYD, Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic, Phronesis 1 (1955 — 1956), pp. 58—72, 146—160, at p. 58; P. MERLAN, in: Α. Η . ARMSTRONG, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967), p. 38. R. WALLIS, Neoplatonism (London, 1972), p. 45, makes the work part of Plotinus' "anti-Aristotelian polemic".

2

The Enneads will be cited by chapter and line number of the editto and H . SCHWYZER (Oxford, 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 8 2 ) .

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duction to the 'Categories' and his commentaries on that work. Taken together, these two propositions tend to give the impression that there was deep and substantive disagreement between master and pupil about the value of the theory found in the 'Categories'. This impression is reinforced by the implication in the introduction to the extant commentaries on the 'Categories' of Dexippus 4 (5.1 — 12) and Simplicius5 (2.3—8) that Porphyry, in the massive commentary on the 'Categories' which he dedicated to Gedalius, probably one of his students, replied in detail to Plotinus' objections against the 'Categories'.6 Indeed, in Porphyry's extant catechism-commentary7 and throughout Dexippus' and Simplicius' commentaries, both of which seem to be following closely either Porphyry's lost 'To Gedalius' or Iamblichus' lost commentary, itself based on T o Gedalius', we can see Porphyry doing precisely this. Moreover, it is clear from the text of Simplicius that many of the objections Plotinus raises against the 'Categories' in O n the Genera of Being' he got from a work or works of Lucius and Nicostratus, who were certainly hostile to Aristotle. 8 Nevertheless, I am convinced that this simple way of putting the matter is more than a little misleading: it both misrepresents the nature and originality of Porphyry's contribution to the history of logic and metaphysics and distorts our view of the fundamental Neoplatonic problem of the relationship between Plato and Aristotle. My purpose in the following essay will be to try to sharpen the statement of the historical situation by examining some of the connections between Porphyry's interpretation of the 'Categories' and Plotinus' discussion of the problem of the 3 4 5 6

7 8

Ed. A. BUSSE, Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca IV. 1 (Berlin, 1887). Ed. A. BUSSE, Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca IV.2 (Berlin, 1888). Ed. C. KALBFLEISCH, Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca VIII (Berlin, 1897). Cf. especially Simplicius' words Πλωτίνος δε ó μέγας έπί τούτοις [i.e. Lucius and Nicostratus: see below, η. 7] τάς πραγματειωδεστάτας έξετάσεις έν τρισιν δλοις βιβλίοις τοις Περί τών γενών τοϋ δντος έπιγεγραμμενοις τω των Κατηγοριών βιβλ(φ προσηγάγε. μετά δέ τούτους 6 πάντων ήμϊν τών καλών αίτιος Πορφύριος έξήγησίν τε έντελή τοϋ βιβλίου καί τών ένστάσεων πασών λύσεις ούκ άπόνως έν έπτά βιβλίοις έποιήσατο τοις Γεδαλείω προσφωνηθείσι κ.τ.λ. Ed. Α. BUSSE, Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca IV.1 (Berlin, 1887). Simpl. In Cat. 1.18-22 refers to them as σχεδόν τι προς πάντα τα εΐρημένα κατά το βιβλίον ένστάσεις κομίζειν φιλοτιμούμενοι, καί οιιδε εύλαβώς, άλλα καταφορικώς μάλλον καί άπηρυθριακότως. I follow Κ. PRAECHTER, Nikostratos der Platoniker, Hermes 57 (1922), 481-517 (= IDEM, Kleine Schriften [Collectanea 7, Hildesheim, 1973], 101 — 137), in taking Nicostratus at least to have been a Platonist, not a Stoic as affirmed by ZELLER, op. cit. (n. 1), III. 1, pp. 716—717 n., even if he is not identical with the otherwise known second-century A.D. Platonist as PRAECHTER argues. If Lucius was a Stoic, Nicostratus' dependence on him might help to account for the Stoic elements found in his fragments. Certainly Lucius at Simpl. In Cat. 64.18—19 seems to be following a line of objection due to the Stoics Athenodorus and Cornutus, based on the assumption that the 'Categories' is about different kinds of words; cf. Simpl. In Cat. 18.27—19.1, Porph. In Cat. 59.9-14, 86,22-24. At Simpl. In Cat. 48.1-34, Porphyry is quoted as using a Stoic distinction to refute an objection of Lucius', which may be evidence that Lucius was a Stoic. On the other hand, Nicostratus'assumption that Forms exist (Simpl. In Cat. 73.15—28, where however his name is linked with that of Lucius) as well as immaterial mathematical objects (429.13—20) seems conclusive for his having been a Platonist.

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nature of the categories, especially the category of substance, in O n the Genera of Being'. I will be suggesting that Plotinus' and Porphyry's attitudes toward the 'Categories' are much closer to one another than has previously been supposed, and that in particular Porphyry's position on the nature of categories has been deeply influenced by Plotinus' arguments. The consequence of this is that Plotinus ought to be accorded a much more prominent place than he standardly has been in the history of the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle, in which the problem of the proper interpretation of the 'Categories' plays an important role. My discussion will fall into four parts. In the next section, I will look at some of the more important features of Porphyry's interpretation of the 'Categories' that enabled him to downplay the evidently anti-Platonic metaphysical elements that the work contains and to turn it into a basic textbook of logic for his revived school-Platonism. Here I will be relying heavily upon an important and seminal paper by A. C . LLOYD.9 Then I will turn to the main arguments that Plotinus employs against what was in his day the standard interpretation of Aristotle's 'Categories', and their implications for his view of the nature of that work and its relation to Platonism. 1 0 In the final section of the paper, we will be able to see some important connections between Plotinus' position and Porphyry's which throw light on the metaphysical issues connected with the important Neoplatonic thesis of the fundamental harmony of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

II. Porphyry's Platonizing Interpretation

of the

'Categories'

Prima facie, it is hard to see how the 'Categories' could ever have come to serve as a basic introductory text for a Platonist philosophical school. There are a number of ways in which it seems to be an explcitly anti-Platonist work. This is most clear in chapter 5 of the 'Categories', the chapter on substance or ουσία. Aristotle takes over the philosophical use of the term ουσία from Plato and transforms it. The fundamental meaning of ουσία in both Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics seems to be "primary or basic kind of being". In the 'Phaedo' (78d) and the 'Timaeus' (29c), Plato uses ουσία to refer to the separate Forms, and Aristotle's adoption of the term as the name of his first category is connected with his denial, in conscious opposition to Plato's middle-period Theory of Forms, that non-substantial items such as qualities and quantities have being in the primary sense, even considered as universals. This denial does not by itself necessarily constitute unorthodox Platonism, however, since in the 'Timaeus' at least Forms seem to be only of natural kinds, i.e. in Aristotelian terms, of substances. What is fundamentally anti-Platonist about Categories § 5 is its 9

10

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Here I am deeply indebted to another of LLOYD'S papers: Genus, Species, and Ordered Series in Aristotle, Phronesis 7 (1962), pp. 67—90. ANRW II 36.2

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argument that less universal substance is ontologically prior to more universal substance, and that particular substance is primary. Aristotle claims at Cat. 2 b 6 that unless first or particular substances exist, nothing else can either: so universal substances, corresponding to the Platonic Forms or ούσίαι of man, animal, and so forth of the 'Timaeus', cannot exist apart from their instances, as separate Forms. 1 1 In the Academic terminology that Aristotle sometimes employs, this means that particular substances are "prior in nature" or "prior in being" to universal substances (cf. Meta. 1 0 1 9 a l - 4 , Cat. 14a29-35, 1 4 b l l —13, 25-33). Priority in nature corresponds to the notion of ontological dependence. X is prior to Y in this sense if either (a) X can exist without Y but not vice versa, or (b) X is the cause of the being of Y. Note that (b) appears to be a somewhat weaker condition than (a): at least Aristotle remarks at Cat. 14bl 1 —13 that it does not entail (a). Nevertheless, Aristotle certainly seems to want to deny in the 'Categories' not only the separation of the Forms from sensibles, but also the fundamental tenet of the Theory of Forms that the universal F is the cause of the being of particular F's. The being of universals in the 'Categories' seems to consist entirely in their being predicated of particulars, in accidental categories as well as in the category of substance. Aristotle's later metaphysical views represent a further development of this position. The 'Metaphysics' indicates that it was Aristotle's mature considered view that less universal being is prior in nature to more universal being, even that universals have no real as opposed to abstract existence at all (cf. the sixth and seventh aporiai of Meta III in Ross' numbering 12 with their resolution in the central books), and though this issue seems to have been a matter of controversy within the Academy, 1 3 it seems clear that Plato himself took the opposite view, that what is more universal is naturally prior. 1 4 The 'Categories', then, seems to contain an attack on orthodox Platonism, in that it denies the separation of Forms and the ontological priority of the universal. Moreover, Aristotle uses the theory of categories as the basis of one of his main objections to the Theory of Forms (Eudemian Ethics 1.8, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6). So how can Porphyry, who not only considers himself to be an 11

For this interpretation of Aristotle's view of the nature of the alleged 'separation 1 (χωρισμός) of the Platonic Forms, see G. FINE, Separation, in: J. ANNAS, ed., Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), pp. 3 1 - 8 7 . I have not been convinced by D . MORRISON, Separation in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1986), pp. 125—157, that FINE'S interpretation is incorrect, though the issue is certainly far too complex to be discussed fully here. (See also FINE'S reply to MORRISON and his response in v. 4 of O x f o r d Studies', pp. 159—165 and 167—173, respectively.) MORRISON argues that separation for Aristotle consists instead in the numerical distinctness of t w o things or sorts of things from one another. O n this view, if the Forms are conceived as in the 'Categories' as the genera and species of substance, then they cannot be separate from the individual substances that fall under them, since a thing is included within its genus and species. But in that case Aristotle would not need the argument against separation of the Forms that on my view he gives in Cat. § 5.

12

W. D . Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1923). Cf. S. PINES, A N e w Fragment of Xenocrates and its Implications, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. v. 51, pt. 2 (Philadelphia, 1961), especially pp. 19—20. Cf. Meta. III.3 with Ross' notes.

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orthodox Platonist but wants to interpret Aristotle as being one as well, manage to deal with these apparently obvious facts about the metaphysics presupposed in the 'Categories'? H o w does he think he can fit the Aristotelian theory of categories into a Platonist metaphysics? It will only be after we have examined Plotinus' reply to Aristotle's argument in the Έ Ε ' and ' N E ' that we will be able to suggest an answer to the more general problem of how Porphyry could have handled Aristotle's main objection to the Theory of Forms based on the theory of categories. For now, let us restrict ourselves to the question of how Porphyry can read the 'Categories' itself as not inconsistent with orthodox Platonism. Porphyry's approach to interpreting the 'Categories' is determined by a specific view of the nature and purposes of that work. Notoriously, it was a matter of controversy among the ancient commentators what the 'Categories' was about and to what branch of philosophy it belonged. This issue is covered most fully in extant texts in an extended passage of the preface to Simplicius' commentary on the 'Categories' (9.5 — 13.26), where the various positions on the question that had been taken by previous commentators are laid out. Simplicius is there discussing the problem of what the σκοπός or subject-matter of the 'Categories' is, i.e. that which it is Aristotle's intention to discuss in the work. The fundamental disagreement among the commentators was over whether the 'Categories' was a logical work, concerning either simple terms or the simple concepts they represent, or whether it was a work of metaphysics, concerned with the classification of simple entities or concepts by genera. There is more at stake here than merely what the text of the 'Categories' says, but there are certainly textual grounds for the dispute. Unlike most of Aristotle's other treatise, the 'Categories' fails to be explicit about the field of philosophical activity into which it falls. This may be, as MICHAEL FREDE has suggested, 1 5 because the work as we have it is fragmentary and missing its original beginning, where this question would have naturally been addressed. The abruptness with which Cat. § 1 begins is indeed striking, as is its lack of apparent connection with what follows it. It may also be that the 'Categories' is a very early work of Aristotle, written at a period of his development at which he had not yet become self-conscious about the departments of philosophical inquiry, in particular about the distinction between logic and metaphysics. But more importantly, Aristotle is quite unclear in the 'Categories' about whether he is discussing entities or linguistic items. H e slides in a loose way back and forth between the material and formal modes of speech, and presents the list of categories of § 4 as a classification of uncombined λεγόμενα or "things said", but as signifying either substances, quantities, qualities, and so forth. The things signified here are presumably entities, but one can certainly understand the temptation to see the work as a whole as being concerned with the λεγόμενα, the terms that are used to talk about entities — particularly if one is already inclined to think, from reading the

15

64:>

Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift, in: P. MORAUX and J . WIESNER, eds., Zweifelhaftes im C o r p u s Aristotelicum (9th Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 1983), pp. 1 - 2 9 .

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'Metaphysics 5 for instance, that Aristotle does not allow any sort of real existence to universal entities. Porphyry, of course, does want to have Aristotle admit the existence of universals, but nevertheless adopts on this point an earlier Peripatetic line of interpretation that sees the 'Categories' as principally about terms or linguistic items, which Porphyry calls "predicates" (κατηγορίαι, Porph. In Cat. 57.19— 5 8 . 2 0 ; κατηγορούμενα, Simpl. In Cat. 1 0 . 2 1 — 2 2 ) . 1 6 According to Porphyry, this accounts for the title 'Categories' or " p r e d i c a t i o n s " . 1 7 Here Porphyry is agreeing with the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1 8 which Simplicius gives in an important fragment (10.11 — 19), probably quoting Porphyry's own quotation of it in ' T o Gedalius'. 1 9 Alexander's view is a sort of compromise among the various alternative interpretations listed above. According to this view, Aristotle does indeed in his metaphysics divide simple entities and their corresponding concepts into ten genera, but as Porphyry puts it (58.27—29), the 'Categories' itself, which is the first of the logical works of Aristotle, is only incidentally concerned with things thus differing in genus: primarily it is about simple significant expressions, qua significant (cf. also Porph. In C a t . 5 8 . 5 — 6 ) . 2 0 O n this interpretation, the 'Categories' is a work of logic, not a w o r k of metaphysics. This was clearly also the view of the ancient editor of Aristotle's corpus (perhaps Andronicus of R h o d e s ) 2 1 w h o was responsible for the traditional ordering of the treatises, since he made the 'Categories' the first of the logical works, and perhaps also gave it its present title. (There were various other titles current in antiquity; cf. e.g. Porph. In Cat. 56.18—19.) This placement of the 'Categories' in the Aristotelian corpus predates Alexander, who defended it as the correct one (Simpl. In Cat. 10.10). T h e rationale for the traditional ordering of the treatises of the ' O r g a n o n ' is pretty clearly that they are supposed to deal successively with increasingly complex subject-matters (cf. e.g. Porph. In Cat. 56.25—28, Simpl. In Cat. 9.9—13): the 'Categories' with simple terms, ' D e Interpretatione' with simple propositions, the 'Prior Analytics' with syllogisms, the 'Posterior Analytics' with demonstrations, and the 'Topics' and 'Sophistici Elenchi' with dialectical practice. In turn, the ' O r g a n o n ' as a whole is supposed to serve as the 'instrument' by which one investigates the various theoretical and practical 'parts' (μέρη) of philosophy, i.e. physics or natural philosophy, metaphysics or first philosophy, and ethics. This picture, enshrined as it is in the traditional ordering of the treatises of the Aristotelian corpus, and defended by Porphyry following Alexander of

16 17 18 19 20

21

Cf. Simpl. In Cat. 11.2—3 for the technical distinction between these two terms. Porph. In Cat. 59.18; cf. also Herminus apud Porph. In Cat. 5 9 . 2 7 - 2 9 . Alexander is himself following his teacher Herminus; cf. previous note. Cf. also Porph. In Cat. 58.10 with Simpl. In Cat. 1 0 . 1 3 - 1 5 . For a contemporary defense of a similar 'linguistic' interpretation of the 'Categories', see M. MATTHEN, The Categories and Aristotle's Ontology, Dialogue (Canadian Philosophical Review) 17 (1978), pp. 2 2 8 - 2 4 3 . See P. MORAUX, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. 1 (Peripatoi, Bd. 5, Berlin-New York, 1973), p. 149.

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Aphrodisias, suggests that the 'Categories' is the right place to begin the study of Aristotle's philosophy, and that is why it is placed first in the traditional order of the corpus. 2 2 Porphyry, following the Peripatetic Herminus (59.21—22), believed that Aristotle had deliberately intended the 'Categories' as a work for beginners in philosophy. 2 3 This is a strange view, for as anyone who has begun an introductory course on Aristotle with it can attest, beginning students tend to find the 'Categories' extremely rough going. Porphyry must have been aware of this as well, for he is supposed to have written the 'Isagoge' as an introduction to the 'Categories' for his student Chrysaorius, a Roman senator who found himself befuddled by Aristotle's terminology in the work. 2 4 It is worth emphasizing that the 'Isagoge' is an introduction to the 'Categories' and to the 'Organon' as a whole, not merely to the 'Topics'. Porphyry is often and quite unfairly taken to task for having made the species a 'fifth predicable' in the 'Isagoge', i.e. adding it to the list of four predicables discussed in Topics 1.5—9, but the είδος is one of the basic sorts of predicates in the 'Categories', though it is a predicate of individuals, and lies therefore outside the purview of the 'Topics' discussion, which concerns dialectical propositions involving only universale. We should take a brief look at the famous preface to the 'Isagoge' (1.3 — 16), for it will help illuminate Porphyry's attitude toward the metaphysical problems raised by the 'Categories'. Since he is writing an introductory work, Porphyry says there, he will avoid going into the deeper problems (τα βαθύτερα ζητήματα, 1.8—9) concerning the existential status of genera and species — as is well known, his brief summary of the various possible views on this that follows (1.9—14) served as the starting point for the medieval controversies over the problem of universals — but will stick instead to expounding the λογικώτερον opinions of the ancient philosophers, especially the Peripatetics (i.e. Aristotle) concerning the kinds of predicates. The word λογικώτερον here may well mean, as it is usually taken, "more pertaining to the subject of logic"; 2 5 this would fit with Porphyry's official view of the 'Categories' as principally a logical work. It is just possible, however, that it means, in accordance with Aristotle's standard usage of λογικώς, " m o r e dialectical". 26 (Boethius translates it, incorrectly, as probabiliter, which shows however that he has the latter sense in mind). W h y Porphyry might want to call these opinions "dialectical" will become apparent in a moment. In any case, Porphyry is suggesting here that the 'Categories' can be adequately understood by a beginner without going into the deeper metaphys-

22 23

24

25

26

Cf. Simpl. In Cat. 5 . 5 - 1 5 . Cf. Dex, In Cat. 42.5 — 8, probably following Porphyry; cf. P. HADOT, L'Harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories, in: Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di scienze e di cultura, 198 (Rome, 1974), pp. 31—47. Cf. Ammonius In Isag. 22,13—22 (ed. A. BUSSE, Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3, Berlin, 1891). Cf. Ammonius In Isag. 45.3—22, David In Isag. (ed. A. BUSSE, Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.2, Berlin 1904) 120.19-121.2; Plot. 1.3.4,19. This possibility was suggested to me by Prof. ALEXANDER NEHAMAS.

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ical problems concerning the ontological status of universals, e.g. whether or not there are separate Platonic Forms. Porphyry conceives the 'Categories' as being a dialectical work in the sense that it begins the study of substances and their properties from the logical analysis of ordinary language that even non-philosophers use to signify everyday things, and hence introduces the study of ontology, as a sort of subtext, from the point of view of those entities that are most knowable with respect to us, not those most knowable in themselves. N o w we are in a position to see how Porphyry can deal with the seemingly obvious anti-Platonism of the 'Categories'. This issue is addressed directly in an important passage of his extant 'Categories' commentary (90.12—91.27). The question is put there, why does Aristotle in the 'Categories' say that particular substance is primary and prior to universal substance, when actually it is the universal that is primary (i.e. according to Platonism)? We recall that it is precisely on this point that the anti-Platonism of the 'Categories' is most apparent. In reply to this question, Porphyry correctly remarks that Aristotle does not mean that a single particular substance taken by itself is prior to its universal, but that the whole class-extension of a universal predicate is prior to it. (Aristotle, in the 'Categories' at least, does seem to assume that there can be a universal one over above the many.) This latter claim, however, says Porphyry, is true: we cannot conceive a universal predicate as existing apart from its extension (90.29—91.7). Aristotle calls particular substances primary substances in the 'Categories', according to Porphyry, because he is there discussing the classification of significant expressions, and these apply primarily to sensible individuals, and only secondarily to the abstracted universals that are predicated of them. For the primary purpose of language is to communicate about ordinary things and their individual properties (91.8—9). 27 Abstracted universals for Porphyry, unlike the real universals, the Platonic Forms, have a merely conceptual existence, and are indeed posterior to sensible things. 28 Hence the 'Categories' on Porphyry's interpretation does turn out to have certain ontological commitments, but from the Platonist standpoint they can be defused. A student reading the 'Categories' through Porphyry's spectacles will find in it mention only of those entities that are signified by terms of ordinary prephilosophical discourse. But since the 'Categories' is not primarily concerned with metaphysics, there is nothing restrictive about its ontological commitments: they can be incorporated within a wider, richer ontology. In particular, this ontology can be an orthodox Platonistic one, as long as allowance is made in it for the entities that ground the semantics of ordinary language, the fundamental referents of ordinary terms. Thus the Aristotelian abstractable universals that are

27 28

Cf. Porph. In Cat. 57.20-28. In his discussion of abstracted or abstractable universals, Porphyry is following Alexander of Aphrodisias' view of the nature of universals: cf. A. C. LLOYD, Form and Universal in Aristotle (Area. Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs, v. 4, Liverpool, 1981), ch. IV; M. TWEEDALE, Alexander of Aphrodisias' Views on Universals, Phronesis 29 (1984), pp. 279-303.

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the referents of general terms can be included in our ontology alongside the Platonic Forms: they are immanent universals, the Forms are transcendent universale and the causes both of sensibles and of immanent universals. 2 9 Sensible individuals are primary with respect to us, i.e. they denote the sensible objects that we refer to in our ordinary discourse (cf. Porph. In Cat. 91.19—27), but posterior in the order of nature to the universals involved in scientific demonstration, which involves an extension of ordinary language; these universals are more knowable in themselves and causes. Here Porphyry can rely for his interpretation of Aristotle on a well-known passage of Posterior Analytics 1.2 (71 b29— 72a5), which certainly seems foreign to the anti-Platonism of the 'Categories', since it states that universals are prior in the order of nature. 3 0 This is the sort of apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's texts that a modern commentator would probably try to account for by recourse to a developmental hypothesis. Porphyry, of course, does not do this, but rather exploits the inconsistency for his own purposes, to show that Aristotle in the 'Categories' is really a Platonist, though he appears not to be. Porphyry's interpretation will obviously be comforting for a Platonist who is confronted with the 'Categories'. But besides comforting the orthodox, it is philosophically significant as well. For whatever sorts of things the Platonic Forms are supposed to be, it is hard to see how they could be the p r i m a r y referents of terms in ordinary discourse. For apart from some talk about, e.g.. mathematical entities such as numbers and about psychological states, what we are concerned with in ordinary speech are things we can see, hear, or otherwise directly experience, i.e. s e n s i b l e objects and their properties, whereas the Forms are supposed to be i n t e l l i g i b l e objects, grasped only by a special sort of thought, namely scientific understanding. The Forms are supposed to be the causes of sensibles, but that is a matter that need not fall within the purview of a semantic theory of ordinary language, which according to Porphyry is all that is at issue in the 'Categories'. Porphyry's interpretation of the 'Categories' thus effects a restriction of its subject-matter to the purely 'logical' relations, as opposed to the more general ontological relations, in which sensible objects participate.

29

30

Simpl. In Cat. 79.30 — 80.7 is probably an amplification, not a criticism, of the position of Porphyry stated just before (79.22—30), pace J . PINBORG, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1972), p. 39, so that the abstractable universal immanent in the subject is what is predicated of a subject in essential predication, and not the Form. A. C. LLOYD, Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic (above, n. 1), n. 1, p. 59, correctly locates the Neoplatonists' source for the concept of immanent form in Plato himself, primarily the Receptacle passage of the 'Timaeus'. Cat. § 13, 15 a4—7 (part of the so-called 'Postpraedicamenta') also seems to contradict the view of Cat. § 5 that the universal is posterior in nature, for it says that the genus is prior in nature to its species. Meta. VII.3 fin., 1029b8 —12, also makes the point that what is prior with respect to us is posterior in the order of nature, but with no implication that the latter is also more universal, which would be inconsistent with the view argued for elsewhere in Meta. VII, that universals have no real existence.

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III. Plotinus' Objections to the

'Categories'

Whereas Porphyry claims that the 'Categories' is a purely logical work, his master Plotinus takes it to be a work of metaphysics. This can be seen from the opening chapter of Plotinus' own treatise on categories, Ennead VI.1—3, O n the Genera of Being'. As the title indicates, this is a work of ontology, and it treats Aristotle's 'Categories' as being about the same subject. Indeed, Aristotle's 'Categories' was sometimes in antiquity also given the title ' O n the Genera of Being', obviously by commentators who understood it to be a work of metaphysics, and Simplicius (In Cat. 16.17—18) takes it for granted that Plotinus was one of the ones who thought that the work should be given this title. In VI. 1.1, Plotinus rightly gives the theory of categories as Aristotle's preferred answer to the fundamental ontological question, " H o w many and what sorts of beings are there?" Both Plato (Sophist 242c, Philebus 17b) and Aristotle (e.g. Metaphysics 9 8 3 b l 8 - 2 0 , 9 8 8 b l 6 —17; cf. Physics 1.2) take this to be the central problem of metaphysics, and Metaphysics V I I . l , 1029b2 —7 shows that Plotinus is right in thinking that the categories are supposed to provide Aristotle's response to it. 3 1 The puzzles that Plotinus subsequently raises about Aristotle's theory of categories show that he takes the book 'Categories' to be Aristotle's definitive statement of the theory; there are of course grounds for this, as no other text in the corpus discusses the theory in any detail, apart from the puzzling Topics 1.9. Plotinus takes the book 'Categories' to be giving a general ontology, an exhaustive classification of simple entities into kinds. From VI. 1.1 fin. through VI. 1.24, Plotinus presents a critique of Aristotle's theory of categories interpreted in this way. The nature of this critique is generally misunderstood. 3 2 It is not necessarily hostile criticism of Aristotle. To see this, we must consider briefly Plotinus' philosophical method. Porphyry tells us in his 'Life of Plotinus' (§ 14) that Plotinus taught by expounding and criticizing the standard commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. Plotinus' method in his writings, obviously inspired by Aristotle's own, is similarly a dialectical one, in that he tends to develop his own positions as ways of solving what he sees as the most important problems raised by his predecessors' views, that is, the classical difficulties of interpretation raised in the commentary tradition. Plotinus' method differs from Aristotle's chiefly in the respect Plotinus accords to certain of his predecessors, those he calls the "ancient ones" (παλαιοί), mainly Plato and the older Academics, but including, I would say, Aristotle and the older Peripatetics. H e is certainly very heavily indebted to the Aristotelian commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias. (This would mean that Plotinus has a conception of the " O l d Academy" something 31

32

De An. 4 0 2 a 2 3 - 2 6 (cf. 412a6) explicitly treats the categories as the genera or kinds of being. This was the standard Peripatetic interpretation of them: c.f. e.g. Alex. In Top. 65.8—9. Plotinus almost certainly has Alexander's interpretation in mind here. For references, cf. η. 1 above.

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like the one advocated by Antiochus of Ascalon.) In his most explicit statements about his method, in chapters 1 and 7 of the treatise O n Eternity and Time', Ennead I I I . 7 , Plotinus says that we ought always to assume that at least some of the ancient philosophers have managed to find the truth on any given matter of inquiry: our task, then, is not to come up with any original insights but to come to understand the views of the ancients in such a way that we can see how they are true. In actual practice, Plotinus does not revere the views of anyone but Plato (he tries to be an orthodox Platonist). H e is always ready to criticize anyone else, and particularly Aristotle, especially if he thinks they are disagreeing with Plato. But he always treats Aristotle's opinions with great respect. It follows from this view about method, according to Plotinus, that we should not merely defend the truth of what we take to be Plato's doctrines: though they are true, they tend to be extremely obscure (cf. I V . 8 . 1 , 2 7 ; 1 1 1 . 6 . 1 2 , 9 - 1 1 ; IV.4.22,13). Hence the difficulties that are raised about the views of the ancients will for the most part turn out to be either verbal or deep but confused, rather than substantive; nevertheless, raising the difficulties is a necessary part of the task of reconstructing what they were (really) trying to say. The treatise O n the Genera of Being' is an excellent example of Plotinus' method at work. Plotinus raises difficulties about Aristotle's theory of categories in the first part of this treatise not so much to attack it and refute it as to help reconstruct a true theory on the basis of a proper interpretation of it or using it. H e constantly brings up the hostile objections of Lucius and Nicostratus, as can be seen by comparing the passages where Simplicius refers to them with Plotinus' text, 3 3 but he is careful to point out where these objections are not wellfounded. 3 4 The later Neoplatonist commentators who are following Porphyry, and thus in all probability Porphyry himself, are quite aware of the constructive nature of Plotinus' criticisms of Aristotle's categories (Dex. In Cat. 5.2—3 with 6 . 7 - 8 ; Simpl. In Cat. 2 . 3 - 5 ) . As I said before, Plotinus most readily criticizes Aristotle when Aristotle's theory appears inconsistent with Plato's. A good example of this is the principal objection that Plotinus raises against the categories considered as the genera of being (VI.1.1,15—30). Plotinus' argument here can be paraphrased as follows. If the ten genera are supposed to include everything that exists, the whole of being, then they will have to include both sensible and intelligible entities. But, Plotinus argues, the first of these two alternatives is impossible. N o term can be synonymously predicated of items in both the sensible and the intelligible realms, for sensibles and intelligibles are so ontologically disparate that language cannot apply to them in the same way. (I shall explain shortly why Plotinus thinks this is so.) If the same term is used of both sensibles and intelligibles and in a way that is not merely homonymous, its use in one realm must be an extension by analogy or προς εν or focal equivocity from its primary application to the other. (Plotinus does not distinguish analogy from focal equivocity.) But 33 34

Cf. the apparatus fontium to v. 3 of HENRY and SCHWYZER'S editto maior (Paris, 1973). For instance, compare Plotinus' argument at V I . 3 . 5 , 7 - 2 3 that essential properties are not in a subject with Lucius apud Simpl. In Cat. 48.1 ff.

966

S T E V E N Κ. S T R A N G E

a genus is synonymously predicated of items falling under it, which means that no genus can span both the sensible and intelligible realms. The point is only made explicitly in VI. 1.1 for the genus of substance, but would apply equally well to any other category. Plotinus' point is that an Aristotelian category cannot be a highest genus in an exhaustive classification of what there is. It could only be a highest genus if 'being' applied univocally to coordinate items within the category, i.e. items of the same level of generality. 3 5 Plotinus' leading objections in his discussion of each of the main categories in VI. 1 are intended to show that their names are not predicated univocally in this way. 3 6 Occasionally he can point to explicit Aristotelian texts as evidence, for instance Aristotle's admission in the 'Categories' itself that quality is a πολλαχώς λεγόμενον (8b26; cf. V I . 1 . 1 0 , 4 - 5 ) . (This statement by itself is good reason for thinking that when Aristotle wrote the 'Categories' he had not yet come to the view that the categories are the genera of being.) Elsewhere Plotinus argues for the conclusion that the category-names cannot be synonymously predicated of items in each category. These arguments all use as a premise a principle that Plotinus found in Aristotle and that Aristotle himself endorses, the principle that there can be no synonymous universal over a series of items ranked as prior and posterior. Aristotle attributes this principle to Academics who had used it to argue that there can be no Form of number apart from the series of positive integers and no Form of shape apart from the various figures. This principle is fundamental to Plotinus' metaphysics. Following A. C . LLOYD, 37 I will refer to it as the Pprinciple and such series as P-series. A P-series need not be linearly, but only partially ordered, so that the same item may have several immediate successors, but only one immediate predecessor. It must also be closed at the top, i.e. have a (single) first element. The P-principle appears in Aristotle in two forms, a Platonist version which Aristotle uses dialectically against certain Academic theses, and a stronger form which he himself accepts and puts to positive use. 3 8 The weaker form is attributed to Platonists, and perhaps to Plato himself, in the objection against the Form of the G o o d that appears in two different versions in E E 1.8 and in N E 1.6. The 'Nicomachean Ethics' passage says that the Platonists refused to posit a Form over a series of prior and posterior elements, for instance no Form of number over and above the sequence of positive integers. Since, however, there are good things in both the category of substance and in secondary categories, and substance is prior in nature to the items in the other categories, there can be no 35

36

37 38

C f . G . E . L. OWEN, Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of the F o r m s , in: ID., ed., Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics (3rd Symposium Aristotelicum, O x f o r d , 1968), p. 109, n. 1, reprinted in: ID., Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, ed. M . NUSSBAUM (Ithaca, 1986), p. 225, η. 16; LLOYD, Genus, Species, and Ordered Series in Aristotle, p. 80. Substance, VI.1.2, passim; quantity, 4 , 5 0 f f . , 5 , 2 5 - 2 6 ; relative, 8 , 1 7 f f . , 9 , 2 7 f f . ; quality, 1 0 , 4 - 5 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 11,30, 12,48ff. Genus, Species, and Ordered Series in Aristotle, p. 67. LLOYD, op. cit., pp. 68 — 72.

PLOTINUS,

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unitary Form of Good. The 'Eudemian' version of this argument, strangely, omits the minor premise and the conclusion, but does not differ significantly in its formulation of the P-principle, except for further characterizing the Form as what is at once common to and separable from its participants. It is clearly also this Platonist version of the P-principle that Aristotle employs against taking being as a genus at Meta. III.3,999a6—12, where the examples are again numbers and shapes. The 'Eudemian' passage gives what is apparently the Platonists' own justification of the P-principle: if F-things form an ordered series, then the Form of F, if there was one, would be both an F-thing ('self-predication') and prior to the first term of the series of F-things, which is impossible. Aristotle himself accepts an even stronger version of this principle: not only is there no s e p a r a t e universal over a P-series (cf. επί τούτων, π α ρ ά ταύτα at Meta. 999a6—9), there is no well-defined universal at all for such a series. In some sense there is a universal, but it differs in account in its application to the successive terms of the series, hence it cannot be a genus. This is said briefly at Politics 1257a33—38, and explained more fully in the discussion of the definition of soul in De Anima 414b20ff. 3 9 Aristotle claims there that the different types of soul constitute a P-series and that therefore the term "soul" is strictly undefinable. He illustrates this with the example of shapes. There cannot be a definition of "rectilinear figure" in general which is not identical with the definition of any of its subtypes, as the definition of a genus must be: e.g., "surface bounded by lines" is incomplete; it means, "surface bounded by η lines" for some value of n, which is the definition of one of its species and therefore cannot be the definition of the genus. The same is true in the case of soul, according to Aristotle. The sort of priority involved in both versions of the P-principle is the Academic priority in nature or ontological dependence. This is explicit in the ' N E ' passage, but holds also for the standard Academic examples of numbers and shapes. We can see why from the 'De Anima': each term of the series exists in its successor (έν τω έφεξής υπάρχει), at least potentially (414b29—30), so that removing the former also removes the latter. 40 Thus smaller integers, thought of as collections of units, exist in larger ones, and any rectilinear figure can be produced from one of one side less by addition of a triangle. Hence larger integers divide potentially into smaller ones and rectilinear figures into collections of triangles. Aristotle seems to assume that the natural priority of preceding terms over succeeding ones is a general characteristic of P-series. Plotinus also conceives of the ordering of P-series as involving natural priority. But he understands natural priority in a more restricted sense than does Aristotle: not merely as ontological dependence, but also as causal priority. 4 1 N o t 39

40 41

Cf. LLOYD, op.cit., pp. 7 2 - 7 6 ; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaest. (ed. I. BRUNS, Supplementi™ Aristotelicum II.2, Berlin, 1892), 22.22-24.22. Cf. also Protrepticus fr. Β 33 DÜRING. There are textual grounds for this in Aristotle: cf. Cat. § 12, 14 b 1 1 - 1 3 (sense (b) above). Note however that Aristotle does not require that the cause be ontologically independent of or separate from that of which it is the cause; since Plotinus wants to uphold that the Form as cause of sensible phenomena is separate from sensibles, he must conceive of natural priority differently than does Aristotle.

968

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only do terms of the series have to be ontologically independent of their successors, but causes of their being as well. 4 2 For the P-series of F-things, this means the cause of their being F ; for the P-series of beings, it means the cause of their being simpliciter, i.e. of their existence. Successive terms of series of both types 'get their being' from their predecessors. There is a difficulty here, for Plotinus wants to speak of this sort of causal priority in P-series whose terms are eternal entities. This is, in fact, what I think so-called Plotinian "emanation" amounts to. It is difficult to see how we can talk about the production of an eternal entity, for it cannot by definition come into being. Nevertheless, though Plotinus admits the difficulty of the conception, he insists on positing such causal relations (cf. V . l . 6 , 1 9 — 2 2 ) . 4 3 Perhaps, however, some sense can be made of this conception. Triangles, for example, can be said to be prior to other sorts of rectilinear figures because all other rectilinear figures can be constructed out of triangles. Hence all the properties of, say, a given rectangle can be derived geometrically from the properties of its constituent triangles (including, of course, the relational properties they stand in to one another). But the being of the rectangle just is the properties it has, so in this sense it gets its being from triangles. Plotinus likens the causal priority between successive terms of a P-series to the relation between an archetype and an image, so that the P-series becomes a succession of images, each mirroring the previous one, of a single original (1,4.3, 23). Successive images are progressively less clear representations of the original; as Plotinus puts it, they differ with respect to clarity and confusedness (ibid., 21—22). There archetype-image relation is Plotinus' standard model for the relation between successive hypostases in his metaphysical hierarchy. He also uses it to describe the relation between a Form and its participants, here following Plato. In VI.4.10, he takes steps to clarify the model: he wants to single out those cases where the archetype itself is directly responsible for producing its image, such as mirror images, reflections in water, and shadows, as opposed to painting or sculpture (ibid., 11 — 15). At VI.2.1,23—24 Plotinus says it is absurd to want to put an archetype and its image under a single genus; obviously he would justify this claim on the basis of the P-principle. His target here is those, including the Piatonist Severus (cf. Proclus In Tim. 1.227,15), 4 4 who, following the Stoics (cf. Enn. VI. 1.25,6), posit a single genus τι or 'something' over all entities, intelligible and sensible. Plotinus does not think that intelligibles and sensibles are in any way comparable as entities, not even as both being 'some42

Cf. VI.2.13,7—8,

reading the old conjecture ύστερον (not noted in the apparatus

HENRY and SCHWYZER'S editio minor) 43

of

for the Mss. ύστερος.

P o r p h y r y is probably the Platonist w h o m Augustine quotes in the ' C i t y of G o d ' (ed.

Β.

DOMBART and

Α.

KALB, 4th edn., C o r p u s Christianorum, T u r n h o u t ,

1955), X.31,

as

having tried to clarify the notion by the following analogy: if a foot had been implanted in sand from eternity, one would still say that the foot was the cause o f the footprint, though it was not temporally prior to it (si pes ex aeternitate semper nec

ei subesset

alterum

altero

vestigium, prius

quod

esset,

tamen

quamvis

vestigium alterum

semper

a calcante

ab altero

fuisset

factum

factum

E d . E . DIEHL (Leipzig,

1903-1906).

in

pulvere, dubitaret,

esset)·, just so,

world is supposed to depend causally but non-temporally upon G o d . 44

nemo

the

PLOTINUS, PORPHYRY, AND T H E 'CATEGORIES'

969

things' in any single sense. Hence he makes the Platonic doctrine of the degrees of reality rest on the P-principle. In the argument of VI.1.19—30, Plotinus turns the P-principle against the Aristotelian categories considered as the genera of being. If the ten categories are the genera of being, then any entity of whatever kind must fall under some one of them. N o w Aristotle as well as Plotinus recognizes the existence of intelligible entities, but where, Plotinus asks, are these supposed to fit into the scheme of classification of the 'Categories'? 4 5 Aristotle, he notes, makes no special mention of intelligibles in connection with the categories (VI. 1.1,28—29). Plotinus considers various possible answers to his question. Perhaps there are both sensible and intelligible items in every category, or perhaps only some of the categories contain intelligibles. He rejects out of hand that there might be categories that contained only intelligibles. It has been suggested that the reason for this is that Plotinus holds that the intelligible realm, being prior to the sensible one, must be simpler than i t , 4 6 but it is more likely that he is assuming that the Aristotelian categories are concerned primarily with sensibles and that some are clearly not applicable to intelligibles, e.g. affection. 4 7 The two remaining possibilities both require that there can be a common genus over intelligibles and sensibles, since by hypothesis the categories are genera. If, for example, substance is not synonymous over intelligible and sensible substance, then there would have to be more than one genus of substance, since a genus-term is univocal. But this would mean that there were more than ten genera of being (VI. 1.1,24—25). Plotinus claims that "substance" does have to be taken as homonymous, by the Pprinciple, since intelligible substance is prior to sensible substance. The same would hold for any other category that contained both intelligible and sensible items. Hence if the categories were genera, there would have to be entirely different categories in the intelligible and sensible realms: no category could span both (cf. V I . 3 . 1 , 3 - 6 , 1 9 - 2 1 ; V I . 1 . 1 2 , 5 1 - 5 3 ) . Thus each of the categories can apply to only one of the two sorts of entities, sensibles and intelligibles. Plotinus assumes that what they are meant to apply to is sensibles. H e complains that Aristotle neglects to discuss intelligibles in the context of the categories; this means that he thinks that what Aristotle is dis-

45 46

47

Cf. Porph. In Cat. 9 1 . 1 4 - 1 7 . K. WURM, Substanz und Qualität: Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate V I . l , 2 und 3 (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, Bd. 5, Berlin-New York, 1973), p. 149. Note that VI. 1.1,19—30 is adapting an argument of Lucius and Nicostratus (apud Simpl. In Cat. 7 3 . 1 5 - 2 8 ) , and that they seem to have explicitly considered the possibility that the Aristotelian categories are concerned only with sensibles (73.15 — 16). The view that the 'Categories' leaves intelligible substance out of account had been present in the Peripatetic commentary-tradition from very early on (cf. Boethus of Sidon apud. Simpl. In Cat. 78.5: μη . . . είναι περί της νοητής ουσίας τον λόγον) and seems already to have been accepted by the first Platonist commentator on the 'Categories', Eudoros of Alexandria, in the first century B.C. (cf. Simpl. In Cat. 206.14—15 and T. A. SZLEZÁK, PseudoArchytas, Uber die Kategorien. Texte zur griechischen Aristoteles-Exegese [Peripatoi, Bd. 4, Berlin-New York, 1972], p. 105).

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STEVEN Κ. STRANGE

cussing in the 'Categories' is sensibles. Here he is following a clearly established antecedent tradition in the interpretation of the 'Categories', 4 8 and opposing another, that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, that takes the Aristotelian categories to be a complete classification of all the types of being. 4 9 Plotinus thus opts for the most charitable interpretation of Aristotle's intentions in the 'Categories' available to him that is consistent with his own Platonist principles. Moreover, it agrees with Porphyry's position. We can pass over the other puzzles Plotinus raises about the Categories in VI. 1, which is devoted entirely to the dialectical examination of the Aristotelian and Stoic theories of categories. In the remainder of O n the Genera of Being', Plotinus develops his own doctrine of categories, though still in his characteristic dialectical manner. In VI.2, he presents his own theory of the categorial structure of the intelligible realm of Forms, based on Plato's 'Sophist'. But in VI.3, when he comes to give his account of the properties and nature of sensible substance — which he insists should be called γένεσις rather than ουσία, in accordance with Plato's strictures in the 'Timaeus' (VI.3.2,1—4; cf. Tim. 27d6—28al) — we find him turning back to Aristotle, to the 'Categories' and to the discussion of sensible substance in the central books of the 'Metaphysics', as the source for many of his doctrines. Plotinus' interpretation of Aristotle here attempts to deal with several major difficulties in Aristotle's account which have also disturbed modern commentators on the 'Categories'. I shall say briefly what some of the more important of these are and how Plotinus attempts to deal with them. First, there is the difficulty of reconciling the 'Categories' account of substance with that of the 'Metaphysics'. The two seem to be clearly incompatible. The primary substances of the 'Categories', particular organisms, are not those of the 'Metaphysics'. What corresponds in the scheme of the 'Metaphysics' to the unanalyzed particular substance of the 'Categories' is the σύνολον (which Plotinus calls the συναμφότερον), the compound of the είδος and matter. The particular substance, i.e. the compound, is no longer primary substance in the 'Metaphysics' account, but rather it is the είδος that is primary substance, which in the 'Categories' was secondary substance. (This really rather major interpretative difficulty is usually masked in English translations of Aristotle by rendering είδος as "species" in the 'Categories' and " f o r m " in the 'Metaphysics'.) Plotinus, however, has a neat way of reconciling this inconsistency, without appealing to any sort of development in Aristotle's doctrine. 5 0 It is based on an interesting interpretation of a passage in the 'Categories' that has recently again become controversial, 5 1 the distinction in § 2 between what is in a subject and

48 49 50

51

See preceding note. See above, n. 31. For a developmental account, cf. M. FREDE, Individuen bei Aristoteles, Antike und Abendland 24 (1978), pp. 16-39. C f . G . E . L . OWEN, I n h e r e n c e , P h r o n e s i s 10 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , p p . 9 7 - 1 0 5 ,

r e p r i n t e d i n : IDEM,

Logic, Science, and Dialectic, pp. 252-258 (op. cit. in note 35); R. E. ALLEN, Individual Properties in Aristotle's 'Categories', Phronesis 14 (1969), pp. 31—39; B. JONES, Individuals in Aristotle's 'Categories', Phronesis 17 (1972), pp. 104—123; J. ANNAS, Individuals

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971

what is said a subject. 52 Aristotle explains his expression "X is in Y as a subject" as meaning X is in Y not as a part of Y and is incapable of existing apart from it (la24—25). Plotinus understands this as the specification of a dichotomous division of all the cases where X is in Y, where X and Y range over the entities considered in the 'Categories'. That is, if X is said of Y as of a subject, then X is in Y as a p a r t (ώς μέρος, VI.1.3,17—18), so e.g. the είδος is a part of the particular substance. Now if we consider particular substance in the sense of the 'Metaphysics', the είδος is indeed a part of that, since the paticular substance is just the compound of matter and form (VI.3.4,16; VI.3.5,7-13). That particular substance is said to be primary in the 'Categories', whereas the είδος is primary in the 'Metaphysics', need present no real difficulty, for the είδος and the particular substance are not to be formally distinguished from one another: Plotinus paraphrases what he takes to be the doctrine of Meta. VII.6, "the είδος of man and the man are the same" (VI.3.4,17; cf. also Meta. VII.11, 1037a28-29 and IX.3, 1043 bl —4). Higher genera will therefore also be parts of the particular, and of the είδος as well, since parts of parts are themselves parts. Note that on this interpretation everything that is truly predicated of a substance is in the substance in one of the two specified ways, either in it as a subject or as a part of it. Hence this interpretation implies something like the praedicatum inest subjecto criterion of truth advocated by LEIBNIZ: a simple proposition is true if and only if its predicate term is somehow present in the subject. This conception of 'logical parts' of a substance seems to be connected with one of the key technical terms Plotinus uses, namely συμπληρωτικόν, "complement", used of the definitional attributes of a thing. Often Plotinus speaks of the συμπληρωτικά της ουσίας or του είναι of something, the elements that help to fill out its essence, the parts of the essence. 53 A particular whole of parts cannot be the whole that it is unless all its parts are present; similarly, the thing cannot be what it is without having all its essential parts. This captures the notion of the necessity of a thing's essential attributes. Further, the είδος is thought of as being composed of parts in the same sense: the είδος is the sum of its differentiae, the elements in its account. This position is well-known from its appearance in Porphyry's 'Isagoge' (10.9—10, 18.16—19.3). But Plotinus has a similar view. He argues that the differentiae, since they are part of the substantial essence, must themselves be substantial, else only part of the substance will be substance (VI.2.6,4—5; VI.3.8,18 —19). So 'two-footed', not 'two-footedness', is the proper differentia of man (VI.3.5,25-29). This saves the principle that the differentiae should be non-accidental to what they are differentiae of, but at the expense of the principle that the differentiae should come from outside the category; but one of these principles must be given up in any case. But for

in Aristotle's 'Categories': Two Queries, Phronesis 19 (1974), pp. 146—152; M. FREDE, op. cit., pp. 52

53

17—31.

Again, this interpretation itself is not original with Plotinus: cf. Alex. Quaest. 17.7—19.15 and Lucius apud Simpl. In Cat. 4 8 . 1 — 3 . He may have adopted this terminology from Lucius and Nicostratus: cf. Simpl. In Cat. 48.1-11.

972

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Κ.

STRANGE

Plotinus, the fact that substantial differentiae fall under the category of substance does not keep them from having an essentially qualitative character - a view worked out at some length in his treatise O n Quality', I I . 6 . It is the dissolution of the είδος into its constituent qualitative differentiae that allows Plotinus to claim that the particular sensible substance, the Aristotelian compound, is a conjunction of qualities and matter (VI.3.8,19—23). These qualities, the constituents of the substantial form, are the Plotinian ποιότητες ουσιώδεις, "substantial qualities" (cf. Porph. In Cat. 95.21—35). That they are qualitative and not purely substantial reflects in Plotinus' eyes their inferior status as sensible, immanent forms (VI.3.8,30—37; cf. 11.6.2,2 — 7), mere images of the transcendent Platonic Forms, which are all substances (11.6.1,7—8; cf. V.9.10,10—11). So Plotinus manages to turn even the notorious problem of the nature of the Aristotelian differentiae to his own Platonist purposes.

IV. Some Implications of Plotinus' Reading of the 'Categories' Plotinus' critique of Aristotle's 'Categories' has important implications both for his own Platonism and for the later tradition. It provides him with answers to Aristotle's main criticisms of the Platonic Forms, and thus a justification of his own use of a 'purified' Aristotelian metaphysics. The Third Man Argument against the existence of the Forms cannot even get off the ground, since it requires that the term F be synonymously predicated of the Form F and sensible F's, but we have seen that according to Plotinus this is impossible. 5 4 The truth conditions differ in the respective cases: if F is truly predicated of a sensible, it will be in it in one of the two senses specified by Plotinus' interpretation of Cat. § 2 ; if it is truly predicated of an intelligible, it will be an ενέργεια of it. Plotinus would object to the criticisms of the Forms in the 'Ethics' that they illegitimately assume that the categories are the genera of being (cf. V I . 1 . 1 , 1 8 —19); besides, following the 'Timaeus', Plotinus insists that Forms are what are substances in the primary sense, the most fundamental of the kinds of being. As we have seen, Porphyry uses the results of Plotinus' critique of the 'Categories' to defend Aristotle against the charge of anti-Platonic heresy, and thereby makes Aristotle's logical doctrines safe for use by Platonists. Plotinus' critique is also metaphysically important because it requires a new view of the status of the language of metaphysics. I shall close with some remarks about this.

54

H. F. CHERNISS, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, v. 1 (Baltimore, 1944), p. 298, n. 197, seems to have been the first modern scholar to have recognized that this is Plotinus' principal answer to the Third Man Argument. Plotinus has another answer to the second version of the Third Man Argument found in the 'Parmenides', against treating the Forms as paradeigms for sensibles (Parm. 1 3 2 c - 1 3 3 a ) : cf. BRÉHIER'S edition (above, n. 1), v. 1, p. 50 n. 1, ad 1 . 2 . 2 , 3 - 1 0 .

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Let us take for example the most notorious case of saying something about the Platonic Form F , namely saying that it is F - self-predication. On Plotinus' view, at least part of the difficulty of understanding the sense of self-predications will be due to the fact that it is impossible to explicate talk about intelligibles in the terms of ordinary language. Terms of ordinary language, the normal use of which is to speak about everyday sensible experience, must have new meanings if they are to be applied to Forms. 5 5 Talk about Forms can only be 'analogical'. So Plotinus' arguments oblige him to impute a special status to the language of metaphysics. It will only be capable of being understood by initiated Platonist metaphysicians, who alone can know of what it speaks. (This may be connected with Plotinus' claims about direct experience of νους or the Forms.) If we grant that Plotinus is aware of this implication of his arguments, we will be better able to understand his constant use of metaphors and analogies in describing the intelligible world. O n his own principles no more literal sort of description is possible. 5 6 It is interesting to compare this view with the one that WITTGENSTEIN expresses in his lecture on ethics, 5 7 that any meaningful metaphor must be capable of being fully cashed out literally. In contrast, Plotinus thinks that the highest and most important kind of reality can o n l y be spoken of using metaphors. Hence language about Forms must be sharply distinguished from language about the sensible items whose existence and properties the Forms are postulated to explain. If F denotes a common attribute of sensibles, in general there will be a Form F. (Possible restrictions on the population of Forms need not concern us here.) The Form F will itself be said to be F, but this cannot mean what it does when applied to sensibles, precisely because the Form is nothing sensible. Plotinus shows this distinction by paraphrasing the sentence " T h e F-itself is F " as " T h e F-itself is F in the p r i m a r y s e n s e " (πρώτως or κυρίως). As we have seen, this means that the Form is F in the o n t o l o g i c a l l y primary sense, since the F-itself is F in the p r i m a r y s e n s e " (πρώτως or κυρίως). As we have seen, meant, that " T h e F-itself is F " just means that the F-itself is the cause of F-ness for things that are F. But this cannot be all that it means. This analysis of selfpredications only has them attributing an external relation to the Form, its causality with respect to sensibles. But there are cases, e.g. Forms corresponding to abstract properties, where the self-predication is clearly supposed to attribute an intrinsic property to the Form, e.g. "Being itself is". A purely causal analysis of self-predication will not do; talk about Forms, though necessarily involving metaphor, must have some content in its own right. 55

C f . Porph. In Cat. 5 5 . 8 - 1 4 : . . . ή μεν συνήθεια [ordinary usage] των προχείρων ούσα πραγμάτων παραστατική, π ε ρ ί τούτων και τάς δ η λ ω τ ι κ ό ς λ έ ξ ε ι ς έν τή πολλή χρήσει παρέλαβεν, οί δε φιλόσοφοι των τοις πολλοίς άγνωστων πραγμάτων έξηγηταί οντες καινότερων δεηθέντες ονομάτων ε ι ς παράστασιν των ύ π ' αυτών έξευρεθέντων πραγμάτων . . . τ α ί ς κειμένας κατεχρήσαντο εις δήλωσιν των ύπ' αύτών έξευρεθέντων πραγμάτων.

56

Cf. R. FERWERDA, La signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin (Groningen, 1965), p. 1. Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics, The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), pp. 3—27, at p. 10.

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It is worth noting the ironic use to which Porphyry puts this implication of Plotinus' position. Porphyry, unlike Plotinus, is not out to criticize Aristotle's anti-Platonist claims. He thinks the 'Categories' is not about ontology but about the semantics of terms that apply primarily to sensibles; intelligibles, to which ordinary terms can be applied only homonymously, according to Porphyry Aristotle purposely leaves out of account. Porphyry is forced to say that Aristotle deliberately conceals the Forms in the 'Categories' because he is addressing beginners who are not yet ready to be exposed to deeper metaphysical issues. 58 Simplicius, following Porphyry, gives a defense of Aristotle's 'Categories' on the grounds that Aristotle knows that language is primarily about sensibles, and ignores intelligibles, i.e. the Forms, in the 'Categories' because he is aware that they cannot be spoken about without shifting the normal meanings of words (In Cat. 73.72ff.). Presumably Porphyry, like Simplicius, would have said that Aristotle's apparent criticisms of the Theory of Forms are only puzzles or meant to ward off misunderstandings of the theory. We can now see that both Porphyry and Simplicius here are working back from the results of Plotinus' critique in Enn. VI. 1. The defense they give would be impossible without Plotinus' pioneering work. In this way Plotinus' discussion of the Aristotelian categories in ' O n the Genera of Being' helps lay the groundwork for later Neoplatonic attempts to reconcile Plato and Aristotle. 59 58 59

Cf. especially Porphyry apud Dex. In Cat. 40.19-25, 4 2 . 3 - 8 , with Isag. 1 . 9 - 1 6 . A previous version of this paper was read at the Institute for Classical Studies of the University of London. I am grateful for the helpful comments of A. C. LLOYD and R. W. SHARPLES on that occasion.

Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One. A Reappraisal. b y KEVIN CORRIGAN, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Contents I. The different positions of Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, the Demiurgic Intellect and the One 975 II. Being and the Demiurgic Intellect. A comparison between Amelius and Plotinus . . 977 III. Being and the One in the commentary on the 'Parmenides' ascribed to Porphyry . . . 984 IV. Being, Intellect and the One. A comparison between Plotinus and Porphyry . . . . V. The Affinity between the three thinkers

986 991

I. The different positions of Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, the Demiurgic Intellect and the One One of the most important notions in the transmission and development of thought from Plato and Aristotle through the principal Middle and NeoPlatonists, pagan and christian, to the Mediaeval world is that of being — being not simply in the sense of this or that individual being (and/or its being), but the being of the Intelligible world itself. Is being identical with, or in some sense, transcendent of, Intellect? How is it related to the transcendent First and to the Demiurge of the Physical world? To these questions — bequeathed in part by the speculation of Middle Platonists (especially Moderatus, Albinus and Numenius) and their reflections upon key Platonic passages (most important for our purposes are Timaeus 39 E and the first two hypotheses of the Tarmenides') and upon Aristotle's Intellect and Theology — Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry, despite their long association and even friendship, seem to have given very different answers. Amelius, who appears in the 'Vita Plotini' as "a pious, longwinded and rather pompous person" 1 and whose thought we can only patch 1

65!i

The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy, ed. A. H. ARMSTRONG, Cambridge 1970), Connecting Note. Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry, p. 264 (hereafter CHLGEMP).

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t o g e t h e r f r o m a c c o u n t s in later writers i n t o an i n c o m p l e t e and rather c o n f u s e d picture, differed f r o m P l o t i n u s m o s t significantly in splitting the D e m i u r g i c Intellect i n t o three distinct intellects (he w h o is, he w h o has and h e w h o s e e s ) . 2 It has b e e n t h o u g h t 3 that A m e l i u s w a s incapable o f grasping the s u b t l e t y of P l o t i n u s ' a c c o u n t s o f Intellect and that h e w a s m u c h c l o s e r t o N u m e n i u s than t o P l o t i n u s . In fact P l o t i n u s t o y s w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y o f splitting Intellect i n t o t w o or three in an early treatise in w h i c h b e i n g , p o s s e s s i n g and seeing p l a y s o m e r o l e , 4 b u t ultimately being (το ö v ) and substance ( ο υ σ ί α ) are f o r h i m f i r m l y r o o t e d in the u n i t y - d u a l i t y o f the s e c o n d h y p o s t a s i s , Intellect. P o r p h y r y , b y contrast, identifies t h e D e m i u r g e w i t h the h y p e r c o s m i c s o u l , claiming P l o t i n u s as his a u t h o r i t y . 5 O n the o t h e r h a n d , h e tends t o t e l e s c o p e the h y p o s t a s e s , blurring the distinction b e t w e e n Soul and Intellect, and this t e n d e n c y takes o n a n e w perspective in the fragments of a c o m m e n t a r y o n the 'Parmenides', ascribed b y P. H A D O T t o P o r p h y r y , 6 w h e r e P o r p h y r y g o e s s o m e

2

Proclus, In Tim. I 306,2—3. Amelius also held that all soul was numerically one, but temporarily pluralised by its σχεσεσι και κατατάξεσιν (Stobaeus, Eel. 1,49.38 [376 WACHSMUTH]; cf. Proclus, In Tim. II 213, 9 - 2 1 4 ) . He also maintained that there was an infinite number of Forms of individuals which could not be reproduced even in infinite time in the finite universe (Syrianus, In Metaph. 147,1 ff. KROLL). It seems impossible that the two positions could be held simultaneously. However, A R M S T R O N G suggests that Amelius' thought might have been somewhat like that of the mediaeval scholastics: though there is an infinite number of Ideas, they are all one thing, the single and simple divine essence ( C H L G E M P , p. 265). This would be consistent with the way Amelius thought of the one soul pluralised by the multiplicity of functions it performs in the physical universe. This suggestion, though purely speculative, is plausible; for the numerical unity of all soul may have expressed little more than soul is substance "one in number" and the "infinity of the paradigms" mentioned by Syrianus might have committed Amelius to no more than the intelligible infinity which Plotinus explores in VI, 6 [34] (espec. 18, 5 — 6), an infinity which can not be covertly circumscribed by thought. For the collected testimonies and fragments of Amelius, see A. N . ZOUMPOS, Amelii Neoplatonici Fragmenta, Athens 1956. A discussion of Amelius' λόγοι των κακών π α ρ ά τω δημιουργώ (Asclepius, In Nie. Arithm. 4 4 , 3 - 5 , p. 32 TARAN) might well be important for this topic, but it requires a separate treatment.

3

See, for example, E . Z E L L E R , Die Phil, der Griechen III, 2 , Leipzig, 1 9 2 3 S , 6 8 7 - 6 9 2 , and also below. III, 9 [13], 1 (espec. 12—21). Any hypostatic division of Intellect is firmly rejected later, II, 9 [33], 6. Proclus, In Tim. I 3 0 6 , 3 2 - 3 0 7 , 4 . For Plotinus, III, 9 [13], 1 and the interpretations of Amelius and Porphyry, see J. N . DILLON, Plotinus, Enn. 3.9,1 and Later Views on the Intelligible World, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 100, 1969, 63 — 70. See also more generally ID., The Concept of Two Intellects. A Footnote to the History of Platonism, Phronesis 18, 1973, 176—185. For a comparison of Porphyry and Iamblichus, see W. DEUSE, Der Demiurg bei Porphyrios und Jamblich, in: Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus, hrg. C. ZINTZEN, Darmstadt 1977, 238—278. For the major work of interpretation see principally: Porphyre et Victorinus, t. I, Paris 1968; La métaphysique de Porphyre, in: Porphyre, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, t. XII, Vandoeuvres—Genève 1966, 125 — 163. For text and notes see: Porphyre et Victorinus, t. II, and W. KROLL, Ein neuplatonischer Parmenidescommentar in einem Turiner Palimpsest, Rhein. Mus. 4 8 , 1 8 9 2 , 5 9 9 - 6 2 7 . See also P . H A D O T , Être, Vie, Pensée chez

4

5

6

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way towards annulling the difference between Intellect and the One. He distinguishes between undetermined Being (Being — infinitive, το είναι) and determinate being (Being — participle το öv) and ascribes the former to the One, the latter to Intellect. But for Porphyry in contrast to Plotinus the first moment of Intellect is a moment of identity in the One, and the One is even called "idea of being." 7 This has led to a similar, but much more positive evaluation of Porphyry, viz. that, perhaps misunderstanding Plotinus' thought, he here makes a radical departure from (and partial development of) Plotinian metaphysics. 8 In this article I shall take a critical look at Amelius' theory of the three intellects and also at Porphyry and Plotinus on Being/being, the states of Intellect and the One. I shall suggest that there is a much deeper affinity than has been generally recognised between these thinkers. The clear differences must be admitted. But the Plotinian theory of Intellect is also reflected in Amelius in a less developed and much more awkward fashion, which is what we might expect given what is known about Amelius. I shall also argue that Porphyry, in the commentary on the 'Parmenides', is developing ideas fundamental to an interpretation of the 'Enneads' and that he is doing this in a creative fashion. My intention is to highlight the continuity and flexibility of the notion of being in these three thinkers in order to give a further precision to the notion and to its significance for later thought.

II. Being and the Demiurgic Intellect. A comparison between Amelius and Plotinus

In line with the Middle Platonist identification of Plato's Demiurge and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover/Intellect, a thinker such as Albinus equates Ideas, Living Creature and Demiurgic Intelligence (Didask. 164 HERMANN). By contrast, Numenius and Amelius recognise that there must be some separation between Intellect and its objects. For Numenius, Living Creature and Ideas in it constitute a first god or intellect which is at rest and does not think (frr. 22,15 DES PLACES). The second intellect, in motion, is what thinks by contemplating the First, which is its 'idea' (fr. 20). First and second 'gods', therefore, form a duality in which the second participates in the First (frr. 20, 21) and the first intelligises by 'utilising' the second (fr. 22). Similarly, the second god forms a lower duality in which, while contemplating the first, on a third level as a third intellect or soul

7 8

Plotin et avant Plotin, in: Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, t. V, Vandoeuvres—Genève, 1960, 107—157; ID., Fragments d ' u n commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide, Revue des études grecques, 74, 1961, 410—438; ID., La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le ' D e Hebdomadibus' de Boèce, in: Miscellanea Mediaevalia, II, Berlin, 1963, 147—153; ID., 'Forma Essendi.' Interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d'une formule de Boèce, Les études classiques, 38, 1970, 1 4 3 - 1 5 6 . Porphyre et Victorinus, t. 11,106. t. 1,482—483. O n the 'Oracles' see also E. R. DODDS (ed.), Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963, 2 8 5 - 2 8 7 .

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CORRIGAN

he creates and administers the physical world (fr. 11). Three things are striking: (1) the distinction between three gods really amounts to three moments and functions of one or two gods (cp. fr. 11 and fr. 21). (2) A clear dividing line between three different levels of reality (Transcendent 'intellect', demiurgic intellect, world soul/physical creation) is not drawn. (3) The status of being is unclear. The first intellect is called 'being itself, but is also described as prior to being and form (frr. 17,2). 9 Amelius' theory was, in part, an interpretation of Tim. 39E, for Proclus tells us that he termed the first intellect "he who is", from the "really existing Living Creature", the second "he who has" from the phrase "dwelling in" (ένούσας) and the third "he who sees" from the word καθοράν (In Tim. Ill 103, 18ff.). Iamblichus criticised Amelius on the grounds that the ο έστι ζωον was not different from ó εν φ ενεισιν αί ίδεαι (ibid., 23—28); and indeed in Amelius the precise function of a "possessing" intellect which "does not exist, but they (i.e. the indwelling ideas) exist in H i m " (ov γαρ εστίν ó δεύτερος, άλλ' εϊσεισιν έν αύτω) remains obscure. In another passage Proclus gives the following explanation (In Tim. I 306, Iff.): "The first intellect is really what he is, the second is the object of thought in him, but he has the object which is before him and participates altogether in that and for this reason is second; and the third is also the object of thought in him — for every intellect is the same as the object of thought linked to it; but he has the object of thought in the second intellect and sees the first. For the more remote is the principle, the dimmer is the possession." 10 Proclus goes on to state that these three intellects Amelius identified with the three kings of Plato's 'Second Letter' (312E) and also with the Orphic triad, Phanes, Uranos and Cronos, and that of these Phanes is the Demiurge in the fullest sense. This already complicated position is further complicated by another passage (In Tim. I 398, 15ff.) where we find that Amelius derived an apparently

9

10

For analysis and discussion of Numenius see E. R. DODDS Numenius and Ammonius, in: Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique V, Vandoeuvres — Genève 1960, 3 - 6 1 ; J. DILLON, The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A . D . 220, London 1977; H. J. KRÄMER, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Piaton und Plotin, Amsterdam 1967, 63 ff. (and bibliography 64, η. 142). N o w see also M. FREDE, Numenius, below in this same volume (ANRW II 36,2), 1034-1075. In Tim. I 306,Iff. (= test. XLIV, ZOUMPOS): Άμέλιος δε τριττόν ποιεί τον δημιουργόν καί τρεις νοΰς, βασιλέας τρεις, τόν όντα τον έχοντα, τον όρώντα. διαφέρουσι δέ ούτοι, διότι ό μεν πρώτος νοΰς όντως έστίν δ έστιν, ό δέ δεύτερος εστι μεν το έν αύτω νοητόν, έχει δε το προ αυτοί καί μετέχει πάντως έκείνου καί δια τούτο δεύτερος, ό δέ τρίτος εστι μέν το έν αύτφ καί ούτος· πάς γάρ νούς τω συζυγοΰντι νοητω ό αύτός έστιν έχει δέ το έν τω δευτέρψ καί όρφ το πρώτον, δσφ γάρ πλείων ή άπόστασις, τοσούτω το εχειν άμυδρότερον.

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different triad - ó βουληθείς, ό λογιζόμενος, ó παραλαβών - from Timaeus 30 Α. What are we to make of this? The history of interpretation would indicate four major lines of interpretation. 1) For J . SIMON,12 Amelius' thought depends equally upon Plotinus and Numenius, but in his theory of the demiurges he has instead followed Numenius. The demiurges are the three hypostases — King, Intellect and Soul —, each containing a triadic structure within itself and constructed according to will, contemplation and demiurgic action, stricto sensu. 2) E. VACHEROT13 stresses the enduring influence of Numenius on Amelius, despite the latter's lengthy association with Plotinus. Against SIMON (implicitly), VACHEROT argues that the demiurges are all i n t e l l e c t s . Therefore SIMON'S hypothesis is untenable. What we have in Amelius are not just three points of view, but three noetic hypostases, a theory far removed from that of Plotinus. Related is the view of E. ZELLER, 14 according to whom Amelius was an inferior thinker (unclear, like Numenius) who could not grasp the rich unity-in-diversity of being, thought and life in the Plotinian theory and, therefore, multiplied the Plotinian Noüs into three distinct hypostases. 3) A more subtle, and realistic view (given the lack of information), is held by ARMSTRONG and WALLIS who avoid committing themselves to a theory of three hypostases by speaking instead of a "tripartition" of Intellect or of "fresh logical distinctions within each hypostasis." 1 5 The variety of these interpretations betrays the difficulty of assessing Amelius through the hostile accounts of Proclus, Syrianus and Damascius. 4) However, a notable attempt has been made by M. MASSAGLI16 to show that the three intellects are really three different levels of a single hypostasis which betrays a unity in diversity reminiscent of the Plotinian Intellect. Despite Amelius' identification of the intellects with Plato's three kings, Proclus speaks of o n e τριάς των δημιουργικών νόων (In Tim. III 1 0 3 , 1 8 — 2 3 ) , 1 7 in other passages clearly envisages a unity of demiurgic activity (I 3 6 1 , 2 6 - 3 6 2 , 4 ) 1 8 or identifies one of the levels of intellect as demiurgic stricto sensu (I 3 0 6 , 1 3 — 1 4 ;

11

Cp. Proclus' own use of the being-having-seeing distinction: νοίις μεν γάρ έστι το νοητόν, αίσθησις δε όρςι το αίσθητόν, διάνοια δε έχει έν έαυτη το διανοητόν (In Tim. I 242,28).

12

Histoire de l'école d'Alexandrie (2 vols.), Paris 1 8 4 3 - 1 8 4 5 , II, 6 3 - 8 1 . Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie (3 vols.), Paris 1846—1851 (repr. Amsterdam 1965) II, 1 - 1 1 .

13

14

15 16

F o r ZELLER see n o t e 3 . C p . J . FREUDENTHAL, R E II ( 1 8 9 4 ) , c o l l . 1 8 2 2 - 1 8 2 3

Amelios;

A. N . ZOUMPOS, Amelius von Etrurien. Sein Leben und seine Philosophie. Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neuplatonismus, Athens 1956. ARMSTRONG (see note 1); R. T. WALLIS, Neoplatonism, New York 1972, 94. Amelio Neoplatonico e la Metafisica del Nous, Rivista di Filos. Neo-Scolas. 74, 1982, 2 2 5 — 2 4 3 . See also H . J . KRÄMER, G e i s t m e t a p h y s i k ,

17

Test. LV, ZOUMPOS.

18

Fr. I X ,

ZOUMPOS.

87—88.

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336,22—23) 19 and even reproaches Amelius for obscurity in treating the three as one subject. 20 And from a philosophical point of view M A S S A G L I argues that Amelius must have affirmed the unity and identity of νούς, νοητόν and το öv, without the one being annulled in the expression of the other. Analysis of In Tim. I 306,1 — 10, in particular, shows that while there is noetic priority of being over having and seeing, there is in the activity of the third intellect an i d e n t i t y with the object in the second and the being of the first (ό δε δεύτερος εστί μεν το έν αύτω νοητόν . . . π ά ς γαρ νοϋς τω συζυγούντι νοητω ό άυτός έστιν). 21 M A S S A G L I also demonstrates that there is good reason to suppose that the three levels of intellect were placed immediately after the One. Z O U M P O S omits an essential sentence from test. XL VI (In Tim. I 309,14—16: Θέοδωρος μετά τούτον τρεις μεν Ά μ ε λ ί ω συνεπόμενος είναι φησι δημιουργούς, τάττει δε αυτούς έκ ευθύς μετά το εν). This hypothesis would also appear likely from Proclus' negative assessment at In Tim. 1362, 4—6 (again omitted by Z O U M P O S ) : εί ôè διασπώη τούς τρεις δημιουργούς άπό τού ένός, ουκ άνεξόμεθα τω Πλάτωνι συνακολουθούντες. M A S S A G L I concludes that Amelius did not fail to understand Plotinus nor was he simply following Numenius. Rather, the structure of Intellect in Amelius is generally Plotinian: unity-in-diversity, being-thought-contemplation, the appearance of procession fundamental to the organisation of the Amelian noetic, culminating in the individuation of Intellect at the third level. 22 Providing one admits that Amelius' expression is more akin to that of Numenius or to the logical realism of later Neoplatonism, M A S S A G L I ' S thesis is convincing. Amelius' long-winded obscurity might well account for his bad press. However he was not only the specialist on Numenius (cf. Vita Plot. 17,1—6; 3, 43—45), but the valued colleague of Plotinus, entrusted as a matter of course to refute Porphyry's own objections against a s h a r e d doctrine, that the object of thought existed inside Intellect. 23 But there are difficulties in M A S S A G L I ' S comparison of Amelius with Plotinus. M A S S A G L I refers only to two texts, to III, 9 [13], 1 whose apparent duplication of intellect — one at rest, one in motion — Plotinus later in II, 9 [33], 6 rejects, 19

See test. XLIV and XLVIII, ZOUMPOS. MASSAGLI identifies this as the lowest level of Intellect (233-237).

20

In T i m . 1 3 9 8 , 1 5 - 2 5

21

( = test. X L I X ,

ZOUMPOS) e s p e c . , Ό

μεν Ά μ ε λ ι ο ς

θαυμαστώς

διατείνεται τον Πλάτωνα τάς διαφόρους αιτίας είδότα της δημιουρίας έπ' άλλην καί άλλην συνεχώς μεταπηδάν άψόφψ κελεΰθω, μηδέν ένδεικνΰμενον δια την συνεχειαν αυτών τών θείων αιτίων, άλλ' ώς περί ένός καί ταύτού διαταττόμενον δια την ενωσιν την έν άλλήλοις τών δημιουργών· καί γαρ οί πάντες εις είσι καί ό εις πάντες, έπεί καί νυν άλλος μεν ό βουληθείς, άλλος δε ό λογιζόμενος, άλλος δε ό παραλαβών, κ. τ. λ. In Tim. I 306, 4 - 8 (test. XLIV); cp. I 431, 2 6 - 2 8 (test. L) and 362, 2 - 4 (fr. IX). See also the assessment of Proclus, In Plat. Theol. ed. PORTUS, liber V, 257 (which contains fr. 12 ZOUMPOS) a n d of D a m a s c i u s , D e P r i n c . , 1 133, 2 5 - 1 3 4 , 8 RUELLE ( = test. X X X V I I ) .

22 23

See MASSAGLI'S summary, 239-240. V. P. 18,8 ff. espec. τών ήμίν δοκοΰντων (14). Compare the assessment of Longinus, ibid. 2 0 , 6 8 - 8 0 ; 21.

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and to VI, 5 [23], 4, 20, which mentions "first, seconds and thirds" in the intelligible world. Neither passage in itself can support MASSAGLI'S comparison. I shall, therefore, propose three areas in which a comparison might legitimately be developed. 1) Amelius' theory is closely related to intellectual p r o c e s s i o n from being as unity 2 4 through an inchoate duality (in which the total objective content of intellect is present, but the subject is yet unspecified) to a full subjective-objective unity of apprehending intellect which holds the content of the second and sees the first. We may conjecture that Amelius posits three levels of intellect in order to explain how the third intellect can both know itself and its content as a whole (demiurge-ideas-model) and yet see its content as coming to it from a transcendent object (the model). However, the second, double moment, where intellect is defined as object, but is indefinite still as subject, is very familiar in Plotinus where it is a moment of burgeoning content, objectively being filled, subjectively "splitting u p " unity or unified being, "filling itself." 25 In certain passages a bi-partition (111,9 [13], 1,14—21) or an apparent tri-partition (ibid. 21 ff.; V, 4 [7],2: noeton-noesis-noüs\ VI, 6 [34], 9; 10.15: unified being - substantial number-beings / being-intellect-living creature) are more readily reminiscent of the Amelian schema. But Plotinus tends to avoid the hypostatisation of being (perhaps Amelius does, too, for he makes it a subject) and speaks instead of the unformed vision, of the shock of the vision of the One or of two different ways of seeing: intellect does not yet think, it looks without thought, it must go behind itself, become foolish and not altogether intellect. 26 Yet even here the tenses of a three level structure are not far away: πληρωθείς μέν, tv' εχη, ô οψεται VI, 7 [38], 16, 20—21). However, they are no longer artificially described, distinct levels, but there is a vivid interlacing of concept, tense and logic which holds all three levels dynamically together in one unified conception: καί γαρ εχει ο νοήσει, οτι άλλο προ αυτής - καί οταν αυτή αυτήν, οίον καταμανθάνει α εσχεν εκ της άλλου θέας έν αύτη. 2 7 Hence, the structure of the Amelian intellect is evidently Plotinian, but the Plotinian Intellect is not Amelian. What is different in Plotinus is his elimination of any abstract "he who is" at the top of Intellect. Being at its highest for Plotinus is more akin to a pure activity than an abstract apprehension or solidification of reality. It is a shock for the self, a logical displacement (VI, 9 [9], 10,20—21) rather than a noetic level, it is even a perplexity (IV, 8 [6], 1, 5—8; V, 5 [32], 7,33—34). One example which combines something of Plotinus' own vision with language akin to Amelius and even a verbal hint of Timaeus 39E is VI. 7 [38], 35, 30—33: και γαρ όρων εκείνον εσχε γεννήματα καί συνήσθετο καί τούτων γενομένων καί ενόντων καί ταύτα μεν όρων 24

25

26

27

Despite Proclus' charge that there is no monad in which to ground the triad (In Tim. I 306,21-22). See especially V, 1 [10], 5 , 7 - 1 9 ; V, 2 [11], 1,10 and 19-20; VI, 7 [38], 15,18-22; 1 6 , 1 0 35; VI, 6 [34], 15, 30-31. Cf. VI,9 [9], 22-23; III, 8 [30], 9, 2 9 - 3 2 ; VI, 7 [38], 16,13-14; 35,23ff.; V, 3 [49], 1 1 , 1 16; V, 5 [32],619; 8,22. VI, 7 [38], 40,49-51.

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λέγεται νοεϊν, εκείνο δε fj δυνάμει έμελλε νοεϊν. In its transcendent vision intellect is already being for itself; in its having the progeny of that vision it has a con-perception of the multiple realisation of its content (cf. V, 1 [10], 7,12 — 13 συναίσθησιν της δυνάμεως, οτι δύναται ούσίαν) and in its vision of these objects it has intellection. 28 2) Amelius, like Numenius, introduces participation into the noetic world. 2 9 The second intellect "participates" in the first. This appears far removed from Plotinian or Porphyrian thought. However, two passages in the 'Enneads' suggest just such a participation. At VI, 5 [23], 4,17—24 το μετέχον participates both in the One and in το μετ' αυτό. That Plotinus is thinking of intelligible reality is confirmed by the "firsts, seconds and thirds" (τα όντα) "in the intelligible" in the line immediately following and by the circle analogy of chapter 5, where each radius is an extension of its centre in all the centres. Similarly in VI, 6 [34], 10,13-15 ήδη οντος άριθμοΰ μετέσχε τα γενόμενα του τοσαϋτα. In this context τα γενόμενα must refer to all beings, sensible and intelligible, for the focus of the discussion hitherto has been upon the movement of essential number from unity to multiplicity among real beings (and so τοσαϋτα at lines 10,12,13 is specified by τα οντα at line 9 and αίτιος προών at line 13). 30 Again in VI, 7 [38], 32, 30ff. το μετέχον is νους, and in participating in Beauty it is shaped. Beauty itself remains shapeless, but unshaped Beauty is not just the One, but even αυτό το γενόμενον which is not " i n " Intellect, but in itself. It would seem, therefore, that we cannot altogether dismiss an 'Amelian' type participation in being/number in Plotinus. Additional confirmation might be adduced from the fact that archetype and image can cohere within one hypostasis. For example in VI, 8 [39], 18 (as also in VI, 5 [23], 5, espec. 12 — 14) the transcendent unity of intelligible being is ultimately grounded upon the pure identity of the One itself: the centre of the circle, τον οίον εν évi νουν ού νοϋν οντα (21), is the archetype, and the radius, Intellect in the full sense, the image. And apart from the transcendent unity which Intellect, Soul or Self can attain, there is also a closely related self-generating power of thought in Intellect which is primarily "in itself" and only secondarily the perfection " o f " Intellect (see VI, 7 [38], 40, 5 — 17; 46—51). The idea, then, that Intellect is in a sense an image of itself, expressed also in III, 9 [13], 1,15—21 and V, 4 [7], 2,18 —19, is not easily erased from the 'Enneads'. This, together with Plotinus' more usual thinking on the priority of being to thought and intellect, 31 or of the object

28

29

30 31

See also VI, 7 [38], 35,19—23 where the higher p o w e r of Intellect is one by which it sees τ α έ π έ κ ε ι ν α α υ τ ο ύ έ π ι β ο λ η τινι καί π α ρ α δ ο χ ή . For the (implicit) intimate connection between unity and being see V, 5 [32], 5,16—19. According to Syrianus the intelligibles participate in the highest ideas (In Metaph. 109,12 ff. KROLL). Cf. Proclus, In Tim. III 3 3 , 3 1 — 3 4 , 7 and commentary by J. DILLON, Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Piatonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, Philosophia Antiqua X X X I I I , Leiden 1973, 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 . For quantity in the Intelligible World see VI, 2[43], 2 1 , 1 6 f f f . For the priority of being and substance see V, 9 [5], 8, 8; VI, 6 [34], 8 , 1 7 ; V, 6 [24],2 etc. For other viewpoints see V, 1 [10], 4 , 2 7 - 2 8 ; V, 2 [11], 1, l l f f .

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of thought to the intellect which "takes and holds i t " (V, 6 [24], 2, 7 - 1 2 ) or of the self-dependent generating power of thought within intellect, distinguishable from pure vision (because it culminates in i n t e l l e c t ) but not reducible simply to the intellectual subject (VI, 7 [38], 40,10—13) — this priority indicates that there is a genuine parallel here between the Amelian and Plotinian Intellects. 3) Concerning the Demiurge and physical creation, how are we to relate the two triads in Amelius, the noetic and the discursive (will, reasoning/intellection, 3 2 execution of the work)? We might conjecture that if Amelius regards all demiurgic activity as fundamentally intelligible and intellectual, then the unfolding of the vision of Intellect is perhaps a sort of depth-description of the generation of the physical universe in Soul. O n e complication is the identification of Phanes : ZELLER thinks Phanes is the highest level of Intellect, MASSAGLI argues cogently that he is the lowest. 3 3 Whichever solution one adopts, it seems clear from Proclus that Amelius sees Intellect as including from within all that follows it, namely Soul and the physical world; 3 4 however, if one looks back to the source, the model or paradigm is the highest moment of Intellect, which is implicitly, as in Plotinus, Intellect's vision of the O n e in Intellect itself. Perhaps, we might suggest that Amelius is fond of preserving ambiguities: Intellect implicitly includes not only Soul, but o u r intellects and souls. DILLON has observed a similar ambiguity in Numenius. 3 5 Plotinus offers two solutions to the problem in I I I , 9 [13], 1: either the Demiurge is Intellect and includes model, ideas and planning element or the Demiurge latiori sensu includes Soul which extrapolates the content of Intellect and stretches down even into the realm of discursive thought (cf. 29—37). A similar schema is indicated in IV, 4 [28], 10 and VI, 6 [34], 8 and 9 (το öv - νους — ζωον). 3 6 It depends upon the point of view one adopts. This intimate inclusion of the physical in the Intelligible World, which itself is grounded upon the implicit identity of the O n e is a characteristic feature

32

33 34

35

36

For the ranging of reasoning with noesis at the second level of Intellect see Proclus In Tim. I 398, 2 2 - 2 5 . See MASSAGLI, 233—237. In Tim. I 3 9 8 , 1 6 - 2 6 , espec. 2 5 - 2 6 : τίθησι μεν γαρ νουν έν ψυχή, ψυχήν δε έν σώματι καί οϋτω συντεκταίνεται το πάν. J . DILLON (note 9), section on Numenius. In Amelius (apart from exegesis of the relevant Platonic texts or of Neopythagorean doctrine) do we perhaps have a reflection upon the Aristotelian triad, dynamis-hexis-energeia, and even more upon the character of Aristotle's or Alexander's noüs? Amelius omits all mention of potentiality, passivity or materiality from the second and third intellects, but clearly behind the debate somewhere must be a concern to interpret the process language of e.g. Metaph. 1 0 7 2 Β 13—24 in which a) Intellect thinks itself κατά μετάληψιν τοΰ νοητού, b) becomes intelligible and identical to the intelligible in virtue of being the recipient of substance and intelligible object, and thus acts in having them (το γαρ δεκτικόν τοΰ νοητού καί της ουσίας νοϋς, ένεργεί δε Ιχων); and c) the activity is "seeing" (θεωρία). As so often in Plotinus and probably in Amelius, so also in Aristotle human mind and divine Mind converge implicitly into one discourse. Cf. also VI, 2 [43], 2 2 , 1 - 1 0 .

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o f V I , 4 — 5 [ 2 2 — 2 3 ] , especially V I , 5 . 3 7 P e r h a p s this c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n

between

B e i n g a n d the O n e ( t h e L i v i n g C r e a t u r e in I n t e l l e c t a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t O b j e c t o f I n t e l l e c t ' s v i s i o n ) c a n also b e seen in t h e real parallel b e t w e e n the r o y a l will o f t h e highest I n t e l l e c t in A m e l i u s a n d P l o t i n u s ' i n n o v a t i v e t r e a t m e n t o f the d y n a m i c f r e e d o m a n d will o f t h e O n e in V I , 8 [ 3 9 ] . P o r p h y r y , b y c o n t r a s t , a d o p t s t h e o b v e r s e side o f t h e s a m e c o i n as A m e l i u s . H e identifies b o t h h y p e r c o s m i c soul a n d its intellect a n d e v e n I n t e l l e c t itself w i t h t h e D e m i u r g e . I n the a s s e s s m e n t o f W . DEUSE, I n t e l l e c t a n d S o u l are at r o o t identical f o r P o r p h y r y . 3 8 A s DILLON has o b s e r v e d , b o t h s o l u t i o n s are in accord with Plotinus.39 H e n c e , w e m a y c o n c l u d e a) t h a t t h e A m e l i a n t h e o r y o f Intellect reflects t h e P l o t i n i a n I n t e l l e c t in significant a n d p r e c i s e w a y s , a n d b ) t h a t e v e n o n the q u e s t i o n o f d e m i u r g i c a c t i v i t y , S o u l a n d t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d , t h e r e is at least a definite p a t t e r n w h i c h c a n b e t r a c e d t h r o u g h t h e t h r e e t h i n k e r s , A m e l i u s , P l o t i n u s and P o r p h y r y .

III.

Being

and

the

One

in the

commentary

on

the

'Parmenides'

ascribed

to

Porphyry

I n P o r p h y r y ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e ' P a r m e n i d e s ' ( a n d e l s e w h e r e ) , despite a significant e m p h a s i s in t h e earlier f r a g m e n t s u p o n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f t h e O n e 37

Where is the transcendent One in το 6v öv (in VI, 4—5)? The transcendent O n e is often only one step of discourse away (e.g. VI, 2 [43], 8 , 1 8 - 2 0 ; 9, 3f£.; 1 1 , 2 5 - 2 7 etc.), the implicit underpinning of the whole argument who sometimes, nonetheless, shines through explicitly. Take VI, 5 , 1 . Plotinus makes the startling statement that all men spontaneously recognise that the God in each and every one of us is one and the same. This can help us, he suggests, to reflect upon the omnipresence of real Being. The principle upon which he bases this is Aristotle's law of non-contradiction, which Plotinus correctly understands (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1 0 1 0 B 1 9 - 3 7 , but see W . D . Ross ad loc.) to be a law of intelligible identity. Anticipating St. Thomas, he stresses that this principle is prior to all particulars and even to the first postulate of practical reason which states that all things desire the good. For this latter is founded upon unity and the desire for this. He then goes on to make the transition from unity to identity explicit: το γαρ êv τούτο προϊόν μεν έπί θάτερα, έφ' όσον προελθεϊν ούτω οίόν τε, πολλά άν φανείη τε καί πως και εϊη. ή δε άρχαία φύσις, καί ή ορεξις του άγαθοΰ, όπερ έστίν αύτού, εις εν όντως άγει, καί έπί τοϋτο σπεύδει πάσα φύσις, έφ' έαυτήν ( 1 4 - 1 8 ) . Clearly, this unity which proceeds into the appearance of multiplicity, is not just the unfolding unity of the Intelligible World in itself and in the physical world, but also the presence of the transcendent Unity which is that World's fundamental identity (cf. 1 8 - 2 1 ) .

38

W . DEUSE (note 5), 276—277. O n Porphyry's equation of Intellect and Demiurge see: Histor. Philos. Fragm. X V I , Cyrill, c. Julian V I I I , 2 7 1 A (NAUCK) and DEUSE, 253 f. Cf. Iamblichus, Stobaeus 1365,14—19 (WACHSMUTH). Cp. A. SMITH, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition. A study in Post-plotinian Neoplatonism, The Hague 1974, 47ff.

39

J . DILLON (note 5).

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and the superiority of negative theology over positive affirmations about God, the One is also "the only true Being" (το μόνον όντως öv) and everything apart from the One is unreal. 40 It is a real self (όντως εαυτός). 4 1 However, the most striking departure from Plotinian metaphysics appears in the final fragments whose subject is the One-Being, the second hypothesis of the Tarmenides'. The One-Being is in one sense identical to the One, in another not. For as a product and image of the One it has something of the One's nature; but as a One-Being it is no longer purely One. Parmenides 142B, "if the One is, it participates in Being (ουσία)," is interpreted to mean that the One, in its pure action, is itself Being (το είναι), prior to determinate being (προ του όντος). The One then becomes the idea of the Second One. In the words of HADOT, it becomes «sa pré-existance, son être et, puisque le second Un est l'Etant, le premier Un devient l'Être absolu, conçu comme un pur agir qui engendre la Forme» ( H A D O T I, p. 484). 42 As H A D O T sees it, this new development, so foreign to Plotinus, helps to reconcile the absolutely simple Plotinian First Principle with the First God of the 'Chaldean Oracles', who contains within Him a Power and an Intellect, pre-existence; and it is supplemented by a distinction between two states of Intellect, one in which Intellect is perfectly unified and another in which it is deployed as an intellectual triad, existence (ϋπαρξις) — life (ζωή) — thought (νόησις). The first of these states is above the distinction between subject and object and is identical with the First One. The second is no longer one and simple, except in the first moment of the triad, existence, which is identical to the One itself (110,5-111,34 HADOT). Of course, both Plotinus and Porphyry posit two states of Intellect, corresponding to Numenius' First and Second Gods. But the difference, according to HADOT, is that in Plotinus these states are never intended to explain the generation of Intellect, whereas in Porphyry «il s'agit de montrer que l'Intelligence pré-existe dans l'Un avant de se distinguer de lui» (I, p. 484). H A D O T even goes so far as to claim (ibid. 482—483) that Porphyry did not understand Plotinian doctrine or that he took the impression that Plotinus and the 'Chaldean Oracles' were teaching the same thing under different formulae. For HADOT, then, the distinction between το είναι and το öv (into which is transposed the Stoic relation between hyparxis and hypostasis [p. 489] and the Aristotelian distinction between the being of a thing and the thing itself [489 — 490]) is not yet a distinction between essence and existence because «l'être est indissolublement agir et idée» (ibid.), but it has nonetheless led human thought «vers cette découverte de l'Être comme actualité transcendante» (p. 493). On the 40

41 42

P. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus II, p. 76. But note Porphyry's qualification (ει άκούσεις ώς λέγω), 76, 27-28. De Abstinentia III, 27, p. 226,16; I, 29, p. 107,7,8 (NAUCK). For Porphyry's identification of the One with the Father of the intellectual triad, FatherPower-Intellect, see Damascius, Dub. et Sol. I 86, 9 RUELLE; Proclus, In Parm. 1070,15 COUSIN. Related is the notion of self-generation, in Marius Victorinus (see HADOT, I), in which the one-Being (exsistentialiter unum) co-extensive with Life is produced from the One (inexsistentialiter unum) co-extensive with Being (Adv. Ar. I, 50—51). Cf. Porphyry, Hist. Philos. Fragm. XVIII, p. 1 5 , 1 - 3 (NAUCK).

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other hand, for J . R I S T it is the identification of the One as undetermined Being, effectively non-being, which undermines the true Plotinian doctrine of the One as infinite Being beyond Being itself; Porphyry's ΰπαρξις, Victorinus' exsistentia, are simply indefinite Being. Victorinus, who needs a God of infinite Being is thus misled by Porphyry; and Iamblichus, who posits a further nameless and unnameable One beyond the One, reacts against Porphyry, but totally misunderstands Plotinus. Thus, "it was only to be expected that when the Neoplatonic idea of Being was rendered into Latin the difficulties would be insufferable. In the 'Liber de Causis' there occurs the phrase Prima rerum creatarum est esse. It is not surprising that this word esse was taken to mean existence simpliciter by those mediaeval thinkers who could not have had any idea of the implications of finitude built into the Greek το είναι." 4 3 H A D O T ' S great work rightly draws attention to the originality and importance of these fragments. But a better argument for attributing them to Porphyry than that they represent a break with Plotinus is that they exhibit a creative continuity with an implicit, but fundamental strand of Plotinus' thought. At the same time a comparison with Plotinus will help us to see more clearly that the idea of Being should not be emptied of significance or be taken to mean bare existence, hardly distinguishable from non-being. And in our conclusion we shall point out that it was not so understood.

IV. Being, Intellect and the One. A comparison between Plotinus and Porphyry

In Plotinus the One is sometimes conceived as Absolute Being or Real Self, not only in VI, 8 [39] where Plotinus stresses the positive, unrestricted Being, Activity and Selfhood of the One, but also in more orthodox passages, against the background of a stricter negative theology. For example, VI, 8 [39], 14, 42: κ α ΐ γ ά ρ πρώτως αυτός καί ύπερόντως αυτός, VI, 7 [38], 40, 41 : καθαρόν δέ öv νοήσεως είλικρινώς έστιν δ εστίν, V, 5 [32], 9 , 1 3 - 1 5 : ώστε εστι καί ούκ εστι, τω μεν μή περιέχεσθαι ουκ ούσα, τω δ'ειναι παντός ελευθέρα ούδαμού κωλυόμενη είναι. 44

43

44

J. RIST, P l o t i n u s : T h e R o a d t o R e a l t y ( C a m b r i d g e 1 9 6 7 ) , 3 3 - 3 7 ; c p . WALLIS ( n o t e 15),

p. 117. VI, 8 [39], 21 32 (δντως αυτό), 15,26—28 (εστίν αύτό μόνον, τα μεν ούν μονούμενα ούκ εστίν αύτοϊς αύτάρκη είναι εις το είναι κ. τ. λ.), 16,20—29 (το άρα είναι όπερ έστίν ή ένεργεια ή προς α υ τ ό ν τοΰτο δε έν καί αυτός), 16, 32, 35, 36 (έγρήγορσις, ύπερνόησις, αυτός άρα έστίν ένεργεια, παρ' αύτοϋ άρα αύτω καί έξ αύτοϋ το είναι). All of these passages suggest a transcendent Self of unlimited, infinitival Being, which must, even if because of the poverty of our thought, be conceived of as pure activity. Cp. V, 3 [49], 10, 4 7 - 4 8 (προ γαρ του νοήσαι υπάρχει όπερ εστίν έαυτφ), V, 6 [24], 6, 3 - 1 1 , VI, 9 [9], 6, 5 2 - 5 5 (cp. VI, 7 [38], 37,15-16). The One is unrestrictedly what it is, it is pure activity.

AMELIUS, PLOTINUS AND PORPHYRY ON BEING

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Just as mystical ascent requires the experience of pure activity, for the O n e is not only source of light, but also light itself, which the mystic intellect or soul becomes, so too the logic of generation requires a statement of the O n e ' s transcendence and some note of its overflowing power. Hence, the order of generation in Porphyry is significant. (1) T h e O n e is utterly transcendent ( 1 0 4 , 2 3 — 2 5 ) , but (2) it is pure unrestricted activity (25—26), (3) with the consequence that there is a duality: undetermined Being prior to determined being ( 2 6 - 2 7 ) ) . 4 5 Q u a o b j e c t , therefore, there is completeness. Here there is an affinity with the priority of being-object and content in Amelius, and also with the locus classicus of emanation in Plotinus, V , 2 [11], 1, 7—9. 4 6 What is new in the distinction between Being and being is also, however, a necessary implicit part of Plotinus' theory. T h e superabundance of the O n e which is experienced by Intellect as the shock of purest intensity and identity, is, in the O n e , pure identity and unrestricted Being, but f o r I n t e l l e c t it is the highest, defined object which makes and constitutes its intellectual being. This is entailed by Plotinus' notion of intelligible light. Light is different from the form and cause of the form's being seen, but it is seen " i n " and " u p o n " the form (V, 5 [32], 7,1 — 6). Even, however, when it is grasped intuitively on its own without an accompanying object, it is seen because it is founded upon something else (ibid. 8—9). O n l y when it is alone (μη π ρ ο ς ε τ έ ρ ω ) does it escape perception. Light, pure seeing, or transcendental identity of subject and object, is Pure U n i t y itself. Light 'based' on another is B e i n g . 4 7 In itself it is supra-intelligible, but for N o ü s it is substance. 4 8 There are, therefore, two coincident moments: the unrestricted activity of the O n e , the pure unity of Intellect, and the one as object of being for an as yet undefined second s u b j e c t . Porphyry next turns to the subject. 4 9 T h e reference of ού (in ού μετασχόν) is simultaneously α υ τ ό τ ο είναι, ιδέα τ ο υ οντος, το ôv (cf. 104,18—20). Here the moments of Being/being, participation/content ( 1 0 4 , 2 7 — 2 8 έ ξ α υ τ ο ύ εχει) and derived being are again comparable to Plotinus V , 2 [11], 1, 9 - 1 2 . 5 0

45

46

47

48 49

50

Porphyre et Victorinus, 1 0 4 , 2 3 - 2 7 : το εν το έπέκεινα ουσίας καί δντος ôv μεν ούκ εοτιν ούδέ ουσία ουδέ ενεργεία, ενεργεί δέ μάλλον και αυτό το ένεργεϊν καθαρόν ώστε καί αυτό το είναι προ του οντος. (1) The One is so perfect (2) that it overflows (3) and its superabundance has made another (V, 2 [11], 1, 7—9: δν γαρ τέλειον τω μηδέν ζητείν μηδέ εχειν μηδέ δεϊσθαι οίον ύπερερρΰη καί το υπερπλήρες αύτοΰ πεποίηκεν άλλο). έπερειδόμενον (V, 5 [32], 7, 9). Cp. VI, 2 [43], 8,13: εις δ οίον έπερείδετο, öv, 18: Ό δέ το πάντων έδραιότατον καί περί δ τα άλλα κ.τ. λ. Cp. VI, 6 [34], 9, 3 9 - 4 0 . V, 6 [24], 2, 8 - 1 0 (το νοητόν . . . έτέρω). 104, 27—28; 106, 33—35. . . ώστε καί αυτό το είναι το προ τοΰ δντος- οΰ μετασχόν το ( Ι ) ν άλλο έξ αύτοΰ εχει έκκλινόμενον το είναι, όπερ έστί μετέχειν δντος. "Ωστε διττόν το είναι, το μέν προϋπάρχει τοΰ δντος, το δέ ô έπάγεται έκ τοΰ δντος τοΰ έπέκεινα ένός τοΰ είναι οντος το άπόλυτον καί ώσπερ ιδέα τοΰ οντος, ού μετασχόν άλλο τι εν γέγονεν, ω σύζυγον το άπ' αύτοΰ έπιφερόμενον είναι· ώς ει νοήσειας λεΰκόν ε ί ν α ι . . . . 104,19—22: έξ αύτοΰ γάρ πως τοΰ δευτέρως γεγονέναι εν προσείληφε το είναι Ιν. Cp. VI, 2 [43], 9, 5 - 9 ; 3 9 - 4 3 ; VI, 5 [23], 1 , 1 4 - 2 1 . Conversion, being filled and coming to be as noüs: το δέ γενόμενον εις αύτό έπεστράφη και έπληρώθη καί έγένετο προς αύτό βλέπον καί νοΰς ούτος (V, 2 [11], 1, 9 - 1 1 ) .

988

KEVIN CORRIGAN

T h e same is true for the O n e as "idea of b e i n g . " In V I , 7 [38], 32 Plotinus argues that the generator of all beauty is itself the bloom of beauty, a beauty which makes beauty (καλού άνθος εστί, κάλλος καλλοποιόν). άνθος is reminiscent of the 'Chaldean Oracles'. Plotinus goes on to explain what he means. T h e O n e both generates beauty and makes it more beautiful by the abundance of beauty from itself. T h e two steps here, therefore, are 1) self-dependent beauty and 2) creative effulgence. T h e next phrase confirms this: ώστε άρχή κάλλους καί πέρας κάλλους, arche refers to originative creativity,peras to b o u n d a r y . Therefore, the O n e , as creative effulgence or illumination appears in Plotinus as the limit of N o ü s (cf. V , 1 [10], 5 , 7 - 8 : εκείνο όριστήν εχει, 7 , 2 4 - 2 7 : το δε öv δει ο ύ κ έν άορίστω . . . άλλ' ο ρ ω πεπήχθαι και στάσεί' στάσις δέ τοις νοητοϊς ορισμός και μορφή, οίς καί την ύπόστασιν λαμβάνει), and since the limit of N o u s is also ή ιδέα έν στάσει ( V I , 2 [43], 8 , 2 3 - 2 5 : . . ή μεν ιδέα έν στάσει πέρας ούσα νου, ó δέ νους αυτής ή κίνησις), the commentator's ώσπερ ιδέα του οντος is hardly an innovation, but a natural Porphyrio-Plotinian interpretation of a difficult Platonic passage, giving creative explanation of why the G o o d is both (e. g. in the 'Republic') έπέκεινα ουσίας, νου, and yet the supreme I d e a (cf. V , 5 [32], 5 , 1 0 - 1 1 οΰτω καί ένταϋθα εκαστον μεν των μετά το πρώτον εχει τι έκείνου οίον είδος έν αύτώ). Further, if the O n e is pure light and N o ü s is itself a n d the light from the O n e , where should we draw the boundary between them? In one sense N o ü s draws the boundary itself, but really (and supereminently) it is the O n e which defines N o ü s ; and thus the O n e is for N o ü s , so to speak, the idea of its being. In the section on the states of Intellect Porphyry treats first of the Intellect which " c a n not enter into itself" (μή δυνάμενον εις εαυτόν είσελθείν, cp. Plotinus V , 3 [49], 1, 3 : . . . ώς του άπλού παντάπασιν οντος ου δυναμένου είς εαυτό έπιστρέφειν κ . τ . λ . , HADOT, 107, n. 5). This is a perfectly unified act, transcendent of all other acts, but in contact with them all ( 1 0 6 , 1 3 : κατά το αυτό και έν ούδενί ούσα). It has no form or name or substance. It is not even shaped by anything (ουδέ μορφούται υπό τίνος [ 1 0 8 , 1 8 ] ) . It is truly impassible, inseparable from itself; it is neither thinking, nor object of thought, nor substance, but the transcendent, uncoordinated cause of everything (όντως ούσα άπαθής καί όντως άχώριστος έαυτής ού νόησις ούσα, ού νοητόν, ούκ ουσία, άλλ' έπέκεινα πάντων καί πάντων αιτία ( ά ) σ ύ ζ υ γ ο ς , ibid. 1 8 - 2 3 ) . Like the sensus communis in relation to the special sensibles, it is a transcendent and unique power (δύναμις) in virtue of which Intellect sees. It is one and simple under one aspect, but under another it differs from itself and is, therefore, no longer simple (110, 7 - 1 0 : κατά άλλο άρα έν έστιν άπλούν, κατ' άλλο δέ αύτό εαυτού διαφέρει, το γαρ τού ενός διαφέρον ούχ έν καί το τού άπλού έτερον ούχ άπλούν). It is one κατά τήν πρώτην καί 'αύτό τούτο' αύτοϋ τ ο { α } ύ τ ο υ ίδέαν, and not one κατά τήν ύπαρξιν καί ζωήν καί τήν νόησιν. According to existence (ύπαρξις) the thinking subject is the object thought. But when N o ü s passes from hyparxis to the thinking subject in order to come back up again to the intelligible object and see itself, the thinking subject is life; which is why it is indefinite according to life (110,17—21 : το δ έ νοούν, ήν ό νού[ς μετε]ξ[έλθη] άπό της υπάρξεως είς το νοούν, ϊνα έπανέλθη είς το νοητόν καί έαυτόν

AMELIUS, PLOTINUS AND PORPHYRY ON BEING

989

ίδη, εστίν ζωή. δ ι ό άόριστος ( ó ) κατά την ζωήν). And so existence, life and thought are all acts; according to existence, the act is immobile (κατά μεν την ϋπαρξιν έστώσα αν εΐη ή ένέργεια), as thought, the act is turned to itself (κατά δε την νόησιν εις αύτήν στραφείσα ένέργεια), and as life it is an act moving out of existence (κατά δε την ζωήν έκ της υπάρξεως έκνεύσασα ένέργεια). H o w true is it that the pure identity of the First O n e is never presented in Plotinus as the original starting point of the Second O n e and that there is no first moment, a state of repose and self-conversion, according to which Intelligence pre-exists itself in the O n e ; that in Plotinus there is no real triadic structure of Intellect, but simply procession or conversion? It is true that the full schema presented in the commentary never appears as such in Plotinus, but any interpretation of the 'Enneads' as a whole must include these four moments in the generation of Intellect (and Soul or self within or even above it): pure identity/stable object as being-for-intellect/movement (-life-fillingsplitting-) into/the subject-object duality of Intellect. T h e theory of intelligible light outlined in V . 5 [32], 7 (discussed above) requires these moments. Here Intellect appears as a continuum between (1) pure self-identity in the O n e , (2) closely related self-dependence — which is Being-object for Intellect ('resting' on another), (3) indefiniteness as subject in which it can incline more towards (4) the nature of the illumined object (in which case, like the final 'intellect' of Amelius, it sees less: νεύουσα μέντοι προς τήν των καταλαμπομένων φύσιν ήττον αυτό όρά). And indeed this structure is also reflected in the sensible o b j e c t . S 1 Without the ultimate identity of the immaterial form in noüs (II, 7 [37], 3 ; V I , 7 [38], 2), even the bundle theory of qualities in matter loses what little coherence it has ( V I , 3 [44], 1—8). This original identity of the Second O n e in the First O n e is a necessary feature of mystical experience (cf. V I , 9 [9], 4 , 2 8 — 2 9 ; V I , 7 [38], 3 5 , 1 0 — 1 6 ) , but it is also the generating source of intellectual multiplicity. 5 2 I have argued elsewhere 5 3 (against a simple identification of the O n e and noeton in V , 4 [7] 2) (a) that the context of Plotinus' argument is intellectual and this changes the status of the discourse (in much the same way, I believe, that the context in the final fragments of the 'Parmenides' commentary, determines a new universe of discourse in which the transcendent O n e has to "enter i n t o " the intellectual discourse of generation); and (b) that for this discourse the first moment of Intellect must as yet be indistinguishable from the O n e , for it is only when Intellect is fully realised that a proper distinctness between source and product can be established. O n l y in this way can one avoid the unresolved contradiction, that an object which contains everything in V , 4 [7], 2 , 1 2 — 1 9 is transcendent of everything in lines 3 7 f f . In later works Plotinus might modify the expression of this, but the theory remains, for we find it implicitly in a later

51

Cp. the analysis of V, 5 [32], 7 (object/colour — light making object visible — pure light based on sun — pure light/sun) with II, 7 [37], 3 (matter/indwelling form — logos embracing all the qualities — immaterial logos — separate form/Noüs).

52

Cf. VI, 6 [34], 15, 2 9 - 3 2 ; V, 5 [32], 5 , 1 6 - 1 9 . See also note 36. See: Plotinus, Enneads V, 4 [7], 2 and related passages, Hermes 114, 1986, 195—203.

53

66

A N R W II 36.2

990

KEVIN

CORRIGAN

work. 5 4 However this may be, the perplexity or shock of mystical union finds its analogue in an ambiguity of the travelling subject in the logic of generation, a subject which specifies itself and its whole structure in the course of the argument. VI, 7 [38], 13,16—21 is an example of a complex argument where an ambiguity founded upon identity, and difference, is a fundamental part of the oscillation and generation of Intellect. If a simple moves, it holds that alone, Plotinus argues, and either it is the same and has not proceeded or, if it has proceeded, another remains, so that there are two. And if " t h i s " is the same as " t h a t , " it remains and has not gone forward; but if different, it has gone forth with difference and made from something same and something different a third One. In this argument not only is the travelling subject self-creative, but the highest moment of identity with, and distinction from, the First is a necessary facet of the self-articulating subject whose fullest development as a second principle is unspecified until the conclusion (cf. V, 3 [49], 10,21—29). It is in the light of this ambiguity that I should also wish to interpret the apparent conversion of the One at V, 1 [70], 6,17—18 and 7, 5—6, and the ambiguity of subject (The One or Intellect) in 7, 7 - 1 7 . The major reasons for accepting a conversion of the One to itself are (1) έκείνος is used so many times to signify the One in chapter 6 that a change of subject is too harsh (IGAL); 55 (2) the context deals with the immobility of the One; therefore, mention of Intellect's conversion would be otiose; and if Intellect is to convert, it must already be engendered, for it is only after having been generated that Intellect converts to the One in order to complete itself (HADOT). 56 Against (1), while the change of subject might be sharp, the One is on three occasions in two lines signified by αυτό, which certainly makes a change of subject for έκείνου (line 18) very plausible. Against (2), firstly, generation of intellect is the context of the whole chapter (see lines 2—8); secondly, a fully realised Intellect has not been engendered, but an implicit second certainly is at lines 17—18: άλλ' ει τι μετ' αυτό γίνεται. There is, therefore, no reason at all to suppose a conversion of the One here. In V, 1 [10], 7, 5—6 HADOT argues that these lines give us no answer to the question: πώς οΰν νουν γεννά; But Plotinus' argument turns precisely upon the a m b i g u i t y . See 7,2—3: (to speak more clearly δει π ω ς είναι εκείνο τό γενόμενον) "in some sense the product must be T h a t . " The translation need not be watered down in order to give "in gewissem Sinne ein Jenes";57 for the point is that there has to be an intimate likeness (as of light to the sun) for the

54

55

56

57

VI, 7 [38], 39—5—9, espec.: Ε α υ τ ό ν τε γαρ ού διακρίνει άπό τοϋ νοητού τη προς αύτό έτερου σχεσει τά τε πάντα ού θεωρήσει, μηδεμιάς έτερότητος γενόμενης εις τό πάντα είναι· ουδέ γαρ αν ούδέ δύο. J. IGAL, La Genesis de la Inteligencia en un Pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino V, 1, 7, 4—35, Emerita 39, 1971, 129 ff. P. HADOT, Review of HENRY-SCHWYZER, Plotini Opera II, Revue de l'histoire des religions 164, 1963, 94—96. Cf. H. R. SCHWYZER, Nachlese zur indirekten Uberlieferung des Plotintextes, Museum Helveticum 26, 1969, p. 260. R. HARDER, Plotins Schriften, Hamburg 1956.

AMELIUS, PLOTINUS A N D PORPHYRY O N BEING

991

following sentence ('Αλλ' ού νους εκείνο) to have its force. 5 8 Thus the implicit question posed is: how does the One generate Intellect if Intellect is in some sense the One. In order to answer this question Plotinus returns to a preintellectual level of discourse in which an ambiguous, unspecified duality ( Ή οτι τή επιστροφή κ.τ. λ.) becomes only at the end of the second sentence explicit as Noüs. Intellect, therefore, is produced by the One because it takes the vision of another in itself. 59 This conclusion would make of the notion of epistrophe a most intimate moment situated as it were between the One and Intellect, 60 but it would not necessitate any conversion upon the part of the One. A similar view would also make sense in the interpretation of the lines following. Finally, Plotinus divides the generative process into only two phases, procession and conversion, but at the heart of both is contained the further extrapolation of intellect, not simply the recognition of otherness and sameness, and an implicit duality (e.g. V , 2 [11], 1 το υπερπλήρες . . . άλλο), but the conversion and fulfilling and becoming (V, 2 (11), 1) which are in other passages regarded as the self-fulfilling procession or movement which perfects the subject, Intellect (cf. VI, 7 [38], 16; 40 etc.). Herein is the movement of thought and life, number co-generating multiplicity (VI, 6 [34], 10), self-dependent power of noesis begetting intellectual substance (VI, 7 [38], 40), blepsis (pure vision or, implicit subject, άτύπωτος οψις taking "another" in itself) separating itself into το ά φ ' οΰ (i. e. That, but object for itself) and εις ö, and splitting up the suprasubstantial identity into "That" and "Itself" and joining the two together in its movement (VI, 2 [43], 8). This triadic structure is sufficiently evident. Furthermore, the example of the sensus communis in the commentary bears an echo of this activity (of, for example, the self-dependent noesis of VI, 7 [38], 40 or also synaesthesis) and could easily have been suggested by Plotinus' centre, circle and radii analogy, proposed first by Aristotle (De An. Ill, 2, 427 A) and developed by Alexander (De An. p. 61), where also is to be found the terminology "one simple - not one, not simple" (cf. V, 6 [24], 1,13 — 14).

V. The Affinity

between the three thinkers

To sum up: while the explicit schema and distinctions of the commentary are new, the thought behind them is very close to that of Plotinus. The One as transcendent self/unrestricted Being/pure activity, the original identity of 58

59

60

66»

έκεΐνο (2) makes better sense than έκείνου (VITRINGA, BRÉHIER, VOLKMANN and MCKENNA). Cf. V, 2 [11], 1,14; 2, 3 - 4 ; VI, 2 [43], 8,18FF. (where the One is implicit). 6—7: το γαρ καταλαμβάνον άλλο ή αισθησις ή νοϋς. For crux and reconstruction see IGAL (note 57) and M. ATKINSON, On the three principle hypostases, Oxford 1983 ad loc. Cf. VI, 8 [39], 21, 3 2 - 3 3 ; VI, 7 [38], 40, 50-51; V, 3 [49], 11, 2 - 4 ; 7 - 8 . Conversion may be a conversion into duality (V, 8 [31], 11, 7) or even into a radical identity or stasis (VI, 9 [9], 7,16-20; cp. V, 8 [31], 11, 8 - 9 ) .

992

KEVIN

CORRIGAN

Intellect in the One, and its highest moment for itself (being and self-dependent, generating activity) — all of these notions we find in both thinkers. A comparison between the two suggests that the distinction between unrestricted Being and determinate being is a part of the logic of generation of Intellect and also the fundamental displacement/discovery of the self as other, and other as self, which remains at the heart of Intellect's structure. Thus, in Plotinus and Porphyry we can see the development of a dialectic, which, on the one hand, unites the O n e beyond Being and the One-Being and yet, on the other, is part of the exercise of the most radical negative theology. As A. H. ARMSTRONG points out this is a dialectic "which leads the mind exercising it, not to total negativity or super-affirmation or higher synthesis, but to fruitful and illuminating silence before that for which the mind is not big enough, that which is absolutely beyond u s . " 6 1 A glance at some of the ambiguities of the self-articulating subject in Plotinus (and also Plato's Tarmenides'!) and the importance of context suggests that Porphyry's rapprochement of Intellect and the O n e (at least in the commentary) has to be understood in the light of its context: what is unthinkable in the discourse of the transcendent One, h a s to become thinkable, if Intellect is to come f r o m the One. Iamblichus and Damascius, in positing a O n e beyond the O n e , are, in a way, taking this line of thought to its logical, if unforeseen, conclusion. In all three philosophers, Amelius, Plotinus, Porphyry, we find not a pure idealism, but as H A D O T has shown, « une métaphysique, une physique trans-

cendante, projectant dans un monde intelligible des schémas élaborés primitivement pour concevoir la réalité corporelle» (P. et V. I, p. 485). The dynamic

structure of the physical universe finds its completion and origin in the intelligible universe. For Amelius and Plotinus (as also for Aristotle and Plato) it is perception which has its analogue and its ultimate ground in intelligible seeing. For Amelius the Demiurge is Intellect (highest or lowest), for Porphyry the hypercosmic Soul, for Plotinus both. But, in all three, Soul and the physical universe are contained from within by the power of Intellect which is grounded in the pure identity of the O n e . In all, the intensity of being and having is diminished the further one moves from the source. Explicitly in Amelius, cryptically in Plotinus and Porphyry, there is a participation of Intellect in Being. Given the apparent proliferation of intellectual entities in the case of Amelius, I think it makes good sense to interpret him (with MASSAGLI) as the often obscure, but trusted colleague and friend of Plotinus. If Amelius is like Plotinus, then perhaps we shall also discover Numenius in the implicit substructure of the Amelian Intellect, but in the testimonies we possess there is more affinity with Plotinus. And in the self-existent, royal will at the source of Intellect's

61

The Negative Theology of Nous in Later Neoplatonism, in: Piatonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie, hrsg. v. H . - D . BLUME und F. MANN ( = Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 10), Münster 1983, p. 32. See also: Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation in: Les Cahiers de Fontenay. Mélanges Offerts à Jean Trouillard 1981, p. 51.

AMELIUS, PLOTINUS A N D PORPHYRY O N BEING

993

"procession" in Amelius we seem closest to Plotinus' extraordinarily positive treatment of the unrestricted will of the O n e in VI, 8 [39]. However, when we turn to Plotinus, we see a range of thought and a dynamic interlacing of concept, logic and tense which is not painted with the same vibrant colours by either Amelius or Porphyry. Here being stretches to and from the shadowy 'substance' of sensible realities, enlivened by the self-dependent presence of soul, to "primary" substance in Intellect and to the object which is Intellect's highest vision of the O n e in itself, but which, as resting more and more in the One, is already, as for Porphyry, pure unrestricted activity and Being, an awakening into or out of existence, a perplexity "afterwards." Whatever the outcome of Porphyry and Victorinus' ascription of non-being to the One, the sense of unrestricted, infinitival Being, which we have in the commentary on the Tarmenides' and find presaged in Plotinus, has little in common with indeterminate being or intelligible matter. N o r was it understood as existence simpliciter by the most famous of Mediaeval commentators, St. Thomas Aquinas. For Thomas, when Proclus speaks of esse (In Lib. de causis IV, p. 29, 8 - 1 2 SAFFREY) he means neither separated Being, nor Being participated communally by all existents, but Being participated 'in primo gradu entis creati.' While Being in this sense possesses some formal content, it is also in Plotinus and Porphyry an unrestricted activity which generates form and intellect and in its movement enters into composition with Intellect. This is a theory which bears much affinity with St. Thomas' thought. 6 2 The distinction, then, between τό είναι and τό öv, drawn by Porphyry, presaged in Plotinus and developed by Boethius, is of the greatest importance to later thought and especially to the distinction between esse and essentia. 62

Cf. my article Ά philosophical precursor to the theory of essence and existence in St. Thomas Aquinas,' The Thomist 48, 1984, 219-240.

Bonum est diffusivum

sui.

Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum* von

K L A U S KREMER,

Trier

Inhalt I. Einleitung

994

II. Piaton

997

III. Plotin

998

1. Alles Vollkommene bringt ein Anderes hervor

999

2. Freigewollte Emanation?

1005

3. N o t w e n d i g e Emanation?

1011

IV. Proklos und Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita V. Augustinus

1017 1023

VI. Thomas von Aquin

1026

I.

Einleitung

Zu den hervorstechendsten Merkmalen der christlichen Schöpfungslehre gehört der Begriff der freigewollten Schöpfung. Nicht aus irgendeiner Naturnotwendigkeit (necessitate naturae), sondern aufgrund von Weisheit und Freiheit hat Gott die Welt ins Sein geführt. Darüber, d. h. was die quaestio facti betrifft, gibt es bei den christlichen Autoren, mögen sie theologisieren oder philosophieren, nicht den leisesten Zweifel. So schreibt etwa Clemens Alexandrinus (f215) bei seiner Erklärung, daß es zum Wesen Gottes gehöre, Gutes zu tun (άγαθοποιειν), daß Gott nicht unfreiwillig gut sei (άκων άγαθός), sondern daß er freiwillig seine Güter verteile (εκούσιος δέ ή των άγαθών μετάδοσις) 1 . HipD e r Beitrag stellt die wesentlich überarbeitete Fassung des Aufsatzes dar, der 1965 bei Minerva in Frankfurt am Main in der Festgabe 'Parusia' für JOHANNES HIRSCHBERGER unter folgendem Titel veröffentlicht wurde: 'Das "Warum" der Schöpfung: "quia bonus" vel/et "quia voluit"? Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis v o n Neuplatonismus und Christentum an Hand des Prinzips "bonum est diffusivum sui'" (241—264). 1

Strom. VII 4 2 , 4 ; vgl. VII 6 9 , 5 ; Protrept. IV 6 3 , 3 ; XII 120,2; Paed. 1 2 7 , 2 (STÄHLIN).

ZUM

VERHÄLTNIS

VON

NEUPLATONISMUS

UND

CHRISTENTUM

995

polyt erklärt: εις γαρ θεός εστίν, φ δει πιστεύειν, άλλ5 άγέννητος, άπαθής, άθάνατος, πάντα ποιων ώς θέλει, καθώς θέλει, οτε θέλει 2 . Und Basilius der Große 3 verkündet in seiner ersten Homilie ins Hexaëmeron: τη ροπή τού θελήματος μόνη εις το είναι παρήγαγε τα μεγέθη τών όρωμένων. Von Augustinus stammt jenes für die christliche Schöpfungslehre ungemein bezeichnende Wort: Qui ergo dicit, quare fecit Deus caelum et terram? Respondendum ei, quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est caeli et terrae et ideo maior est voluntas Dei quam caelum et terra. Qui autem dicit, quare voluit facere caelum et terram? maius aliquid quaerit quam est voluntas Dei. Nihil autem maius inveniri potest4. Nach J. P. MÄHER erblickt daher Augustinus im Willen Gottes den Grund für die Schöpfung der Welt 5 . Ebenso akzentuiert Boethius (|524) die Freiwilligkeit der Schöpfung 6 . Gottes freies Schöpfertum gehört zu dem Repertorium eines Albert des Großen 7 , eines Bonaventura 8 , eines Thomas von Aquin 9 , eines Meister Eckhart 1 0 und eines Nikolaus von Cues 1 1 , um einige von den Großen des Mittelalters zu nennen 12 . Allein, so selbstverständlich die quaestio facti ist — man

2

3

4

5 6 7

8

9

10

11

12

Contra Noetum c. 8; P G 1 0 , 8 1 6 B ; ferner c. 10; 8 1 7 A . Vgl. auch Orígenes, bei Eusebius, Praep. Evang. VII 20; P G 2 1 , 5 6 5 Α Β. Horn. 1 1 , 2 ; P G 2 9 , 8 C . Vgl. dazu M. BERGER, Die Schöpfungslehre des hl. Basilius des Großen. Programm des Kgl. humanistischen Gymnasiums Rosenheim für das Jahr 1896/97. Teil I (Rosenheim 1897) 16, 33 f., 40, 43 ; Teil II (Rosenheim 1898) 3. De Gen. contr. manich. I 2, 4; PL 3 4 , 1 7 5 . Ferner Ad Orosium I 3; PL 42, 671. De div. quaest. 83, q. 28; P L 40, 18. Enarr. in Ps. 134, 10; C C L 40, 1945. Saint Augustine's Defense of the Hexaemeron against the Manicheans (Rome 1946) 52. Vgl. De Hebd., Ausg. v. STEWART-RAND (London 6 1953) 4 6 , 1 2 0 ; 4 8 , 1 5 2 ; 5 0 , 1 5 9 . Vgl. die ausgezeichnete Studie von J . SCHNEIDER, Das Gute und die Liebe nach der Lehre Albens des Großen: Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Instituts zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie, N . F . , Bd. 3 (München 1967), bes. 5 6 , 5 7 , 6 0 f . , 62, 6 9 , 9 8 mit den dort angegebenen Belegen. Ferner die nach wie vor gute, wenn auch schon ältere Studie von H. KÜHLE, Die Entfaltung des Gottesbegriffes zum Begriffe des höchsten Gutes nach Albert dem Großen (Münster 1931), bes. 59, 65, 66f., 72 , 75, 76 (ebenfalls mit Belegen). In I Sent. d. I. dub. X I I I (I 44); in I Sent. d. X L I V 1, 2 ad 4um (I 785); in I Sent. d. X L V 2 , 1 conci. (I 804); in I Sent. d. X L V 2 , 1 ad 3um, ad 4um (I 805). - Die römischen Ziffern in Klammern bezeichnen den 1. Band der Ausgabe von Quaracchi, die arabischen Ziffern die Seiten dieser Ausgabe. Nach dieser Ausgabe wird zitiert! De pot. Dei III 1 ad 9um; III 4 c . ; III 13, c.; III 15, c.; V 3 ad 5um; S. th. I 14,9 ad 3um; I 1 9 , 4 , c.; I 19,10, c.; I 4 5 , 6 , c.; I 4 6 , 1 , c. u. ad 6um; I 6 1 , 2 ad l u m ; De ver. X X I I I 2 ad 3um; X X I I I 4 ad 6um; I Sent. 35, 1 , 1 ; in D N nnr. 88; 271 (PERA) et passim. Vgl. etwa L W I 5 0 , 1 9 ; 5 2 , 8 - 1 5 ; 1 8 9 , 7 - 1 5 ; 2 9 9 , 1 0 ; 1 9 4 , 1 - 4 ; 3 1 4 , 6 - 1 5 ; 5 1 0 , 1 2 - 5 1 2 , 6 ; II 4 7 , 1 — 11 et passim. De dato 4 (h IV, N . 109, Z. 15f.); De vis. 8 (p I, Fol. 102 v , Z. 10); Ven. sap. 27 (h X I I , Ν . 81, Ζ. 12; Ν . 82, Ζ. 1 0 - 1 2 ) . Sehr eindrucksvoll belegt dies L. SCHEFFCZYKS weit ausholendes Buch 'Schöpfung und Vorsehung': Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, hrsg. ν. M. SCHMAUS U. A. GRILLMEIER, Bd. II 2 a (Freiburg/Br. 1963).

996

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konnte sich dafür einfach auf die hl. Schrift (vgl. etwa Ps. 113,11; 1 3 4 , 6 ; Jak. 1 , 1 8 ; Apoc. 4 , 1 1 u . a . ) und später auf das Florentinum und Vaticanum I berufen

(vgl. D 706; 1783; 1805) —, die quaestio iuris ist um so schwieriger. Wie ist näm-

lich diese Freiheit Gottes „nach außen" {ad extra) zu verstehen? Auch wenn Gott aus Freiheit des Willens schafft, bedarf er eines „motivierenden Grundes". Gottes Tun ist nicht grundlos. Die gesamte christliche Tradition hat diese Notwendigkeit von Anfang an ebenso gesehen und gewürdigt wie die göttliche Freiheit. Kein geringerer als LEIBNIZ hat erklärt, nicht zuletzt im Hinblick auf die Cartesische Position, wonach die ewigen Wahrheiten der Metaphysik und der Geometrie und folglich auch die Regeln der Güte, der Gerechtigkeit und der Vollkommenheit nichts als Wirkungen des göttlichen Willens sind 1 3 : „Außerdem hat es den Anschein, daß jeder Wille einen Grund des Wollens voraussetzt, und daß selbstverständlich dieser Grund dem Willen naturgemäß vorhergeht" 1 4 . Das trifft natürlich auch auf den göttlichen Willen zu. „Denn zu glauben, Gott handele in irgendeinem Falle, ohne einen Grund für seinen Willen zu haben, das ist, abgesehen davon, d a ß es u n m ö g l i c h s c h e i n t , eine Ansicht, die seiner Herrlichkeit wenig angemessen ist. Nehmen wir beispielsweise an, Gott wähle zwischen A und Β und entscheide sich für A , ohne irgendeinen Grund zu haben, es Β vorzuziehen, so sage ich, daß diese Handlung Gottes zumindest nicht lobenswert wäre; denn alles L o b muß einen vernünftigen Grund haben, der hier ex hypothesi nicht zu finden ist. Ich hingegen glaube, daß Gott nichts tut, wofür er nicht des R ü h m e n s wert i s t " 1 5 . Das hat auch Augustinus empfunden. Drei Dinge sind es vor allem, so stellt er fest, die man über die Kreatur wissen

soll: quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit16? Daß Gott die Welt ge-

schaffen habe, weil er es wollte (quia voluit), ist darum nicht sein letztes Wort in dieser Frage. In ' D e civitate Dei' erklärt er nämlich: „Man kann keinen besseren Grund angeben als den, daß das Gute durch den guten Gott geschaffen werden sollte, was auch Piaton für die beste Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Warum der Schöpfung gehalten h a t " 1 7 .

13

14

15 16 17

DESCARTES, Meditationen über die Grundlagen der Philosophie mit den sämtlichen Einwänden und Erwiderungen. Hrsg. V. A. BUCHENAU. Philos. Bibliothek Meiner (Hamburg 1954) 374 f. LEIBNIZ, Metaphysische Abhandlung § 2 (HERRING). Philos. Bibliothek Meiner (Hamburg 1958). In seinem Kommentar zu c De coelesti Hierarchie' von Dionysius schreibt Albert der Große: Quando autem aliquid producitur non per necessitatem naturae, sed per libertatem voluntatis, non sufficit ad productionem scientia et potentia agentis . . . sed oportet, ut appetitus voluntatis inclinetur ad productionem rei . . . id autem quo inclinatur voluntas ad agendum, est bonitas primi agentis; et ideo proprium est bonitatis eius educere res per creationem (c. IV § 1 d. 1 sol; X I V 99 BORGNET). Vgl. ferner bei J . SCHNEIDER, a . a . O . (Anm. 7) 57, 62, 104. ebd. § 3. Hervorhebung von mir! Vgl. auch § 19. De civ. Dei X I 21 u. 24; C C L 48, 340 u. 343f. Nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono. Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent (De civ. Dei X I 2 1 ; C C L 48, 340).

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Wird aber jetzt die Freiheit Gottes nicht wieder illusorisch gemacht? Denn wenn Gott aufgrund seiner Güte und Vollkommenheit geschaffen hat, scheint sein Tun eben doch in die Nähe der Naturnotwendigkeit gerückt, wenn nicht gar mit ihr identifiziert zu werden. Gott ist mit metaphysischer Notwendigkeit gut und vollkommen; das Gegenteil bedeutete einen Widerspruch. Verlegt man nun den Grund der Schöpfung in eben diese Güte, dann scheint er mit derselben Notwendigkeit schaffen zu müssen, durch die er auch gut ist. Außerdem kennen wir einen hochinteressanten Präzedenzfall. Im Neuplatonismus ist der Topos von der schöpferischen Güte Gottes beheimatet. Aber gerade im Neuplatonismus erblickte man von jeher den Prototyp einer Philosophie, die Gott der schöpferischen Freiheit beraubt 1 8 . Oder wäre das Wort von der schöpferischen Güte Gottes anders zu interpretieren, so, daß Gott zwar schafft, weil er gut ist, aber dies dennoch o d e r gerade deshalb aus Freiheit tut?

II. Piaton

Der Versuch einer Deutung dieses Wortes muß von jenem Piatonzitat des Timaios 1 9 ausgehen, das den geistes- und problemgeschichtlichen Hintergrund dafür abgibt: „ E r war voller Güte (αγαθός ήν); wer aber gut ist, für den gibt es niemals und nirgends Neid (άγαθώ δε ουδείς . . . φθόνος). Völlig unberührt davon wollte er, daß alles ihm so ähnlich wie möglich sei. Darin also nach der Lehre der einsichtigsten Männer den eigentlichen Grund des Werdens und des Weltalls zu sehen, dürfte wohl am richtigsten sein". Die Neuplatoniker, allen voran Plotin, berufen sich ebenso sehr darauf wie Augustinus. Für das Verständnis dieses Piatonwortes ist zu beachten, daß es

18

Repräsentativ dafür sind die Studien von: L. GRANDGEORGE, Saint Augustin et le N é o platonisme (Paris 1896, Nachdruck Frankfurt/M. 1967) 102, 103, 107; M. BERGER, a . a . O . (Anm. 3) 1 2 9 — 4 5 ; J. PÉGHAIRE, L'axiome " b o n u m est diffusivum sui" dans le néoplatonisme et le thomisme: Revue de l'université d'Ottawa 1 (1932) 5*—30*; G. M. MANSER, Das Wesen des Thomismus (Fribourg 3 1 9 4 9 ) 582—586; C . TRESMONTANT, La métaphysique du christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie Chrétienne (Paris 1961). Auch W . BEIERWALTES, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik: Philosoph. Abhandlungen, Bd. 24 (Frankfurt/M. 2 1 9 7 9 ) 143f., erblickt in der freien bzw. notwendigen Schöpfung einen der grundlegenden Unterschiede zwischen christlichem und griechischem Denken. Ferner J. SCHNEIDER, a. a. O . (Anm. 7) 56, 70, 298. L. SWEENEY, Basic Principles in Plotinus' Philosophy: Gregorianum 42 (1961) 506—516, bes. 512; J . BARION, Plotin und Augustinus. Untersuchungen zum Gottesproblem (Berlin 1935) l l l f . und 1 2 5 f . ; L . SCHEFFCZYK, Einführung in die Schöpfungslehre (Darmstadt 2 1 9 8 2 ) 32 f.

19

2 9 e 1 - 3 0 a 2. Vgl. auch Phaidr. 247 a 7.

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KREMER

überhaupt nicht aus der Problemlage heraus geboren ist: notwendige oder freiwillige Schöpfung. E s ist weder auf einen Determinismus noch auf einen Voluntarismus festgelegt, sondern entsteht und liegt außerhalb dieser Problematik, es sei denn, man wollte in dem έ β ο υ λ ή θ η (29 e 3) bereits einen freien schöpferischen Akt des Demiurgen erblicken. Aber der Text dürfte dies kaum hergeben 2 0 . D e r angemerkte Sachverhalt ist von großer Bedeutung für Plotin, der auch nicht von der Fragestellung, notwendige oder freiwillige Schöpfung, ausgeht, sondern nach einem G r u n d für das Dasein der Welt sucht. Er findet ihn ebenso wie Piaton, sein Lehrer A m m o n i o s Sakkas 2 1 und dessen Schüler Orígenes der Christ 2 2 in der Güte und Vollkommenheit Gottes. O b Freiheit damit vereinbar ist, und wie christliche Denker dieses Problem gelöst haben, soll die hier versuchte Interpretation zeigen.

III.

Plotin

Plotin selbst gilt als Vertreter einer notwendigen Schöpfung bzw. Emanation. ( O b die plotinische Emanation bereits eine Schöpfung aus dem Nichts darstellt, ist eine Frage für sich, der hier nicht weiter nachgegangen werden soll. Ich verweise dafür auf meine Arbeit: 'Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf T h o m a s von Aquin', Leiden 2 1971.) Diese Lesart ist derart verbreitet, daß eine weitere Anführung von Belegen sich erübrigt 2 3 . O b sie haltbar ist, ist dadurch freilich nicht bewiesen. Versuchen wir, ihr im folgenden etwas nachzuspüren. Wir greifen zu diesem Zweck die einschlägigen Texte heraus und gliedern sie gleichzeitig in drei Textgruppen auf.

20 21

Vgl. die Kommentare v. CORNFORD U. TAYLOR ZU Piatons 'Timaios'. Für Ammonios Sakkas vgl. W. THEILER, Ammonios der Lehrer des Orígenes: Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, hrsg. ν. P. WILPERT, Bd. X (Berlin 1966) 1 — 45. THEILER glaubt, aus dem Alexandriner Hierokles (um 420 n. Chr.) das System des Ammonios Sakkas wiedergewonnen und die ammoniscile Schülerschaft des Kirchenlehrers Orígenes zum erstenmal strikt bewiesen zu haben (ebd. 39). Grund der Schöpfung nach Ammonios ist Gottes Güte (Belege bei THEILER, ebd. 22). Vgl. jetzt aber zu Ammonios F. M. SCHROEDER, Ammonius Saccas, ob. in diesem Bd. ( A N R W II 36,1) 493—526.

22

Vgl. D e princ. III 5,3; 272, 25 (KOETSCHAU). Ferner der von Orígenes beeinflußte Basilius der Große: Horn. 1,7; P G 2 9 , 1 8 C . Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. V I 1 6 ; 5 0 4 , 1 - 4 (STÄHLIN 1939). Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 113; C C L 1, 477f.; 114; C C L 1, 478f. Für Avicenna, Wilhelm von Auvergne, Albert den Großen u. Ulrich von Straßburg vgl. J . SCHNEIDER, a . a . O . (Anm. 7) 30f., 33f., 56f., 62, 101, 296 u. passim. In der Predigt 23 sagt Meister Eckhart: „ E i n Meister sagte: Daß alle Grashalme so ungleich sind, das kommt vom Überfluß der Güte Gottes, die er im Überfluß in alle Kreaturen gießt, auf daß seine Herrlichkeit um so mehr offenbart werde" Q. QUINT, Meister Eckhart, Deutsche Predigten und Traktate, Regensburg 5 1978, 259,3—5).

23

Vgl. oben Anm. 18 u. unten Anm. 7 0 - 7 9 .

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1. Alles Vollkommene bringt ein Anderes hervor Da ist zunächst einmal eine Textgruppe, in der das platonische Motiv quia bonus erat dominiert. Hierher gehören IV 8,5f. (6) 24 ; V 4,1 (7); VI 9,6 (9); V 1,6 (10); V 1,7; V 2,1 (11); V 5,12 (32); II 9,3 (33); V 3 , 1 5 f . (49). In diesen und anderen Texten wirft Plotin stets die Frage auf, warum das Eine nicht bei sich stehengeblieben sei, sondern ein Anderes hervorgebracht habe, wie aus dem Einen das Viele hervorgegangen sei 25 . Dies sei die Grundfrage 2 6 . Einem möglichen Mißverständnis ist hier a priori vorzubeugen. Plotins Frage nach dem Warum und Wie der Emanation könnte den Anschein erwecken, als maße Plotin es sich an, auf der „ H ö h e " Gottes zu stehen, um von hier aus das Warum und Wie beurteilen zu können. Das wäre jedoch eine Täuschung. Plotin ist sich bewußt, daß wir nur von unten nach oben und nicht umgekehrt von oben nach unten steigen können. Hier gibt es für den menschlichen Geist keine Deduktion, sondern nur einen Aufstieg vom Sinnlichen zum das Sinnliche ermöglichenden Intelligiblen. Plotin hat dies eigens angemerkt bei der Frage, wie wir um Gott wissen können 2 7 . Er läßt es ebenfalls unmißverständlich durchblicken bei der Frage nach dem Warum der Welt 28 . W e i l die Welt in ihrer Vielfalt und Schönheit existiert, erhebt sich für den menschlichen Geist sozusagen spontan die Frage, was den Schöpfer „veranlaßte", sie hervorzubringen. Plotin antwortet: „Wenn das Erste vollkommen ist, das Vollkommenste von allem, und auch die erste Kraft (δύναμις), dann muß es von allen Dingen das Kraftvollste sein und die anderen Kräfte, insofern sie kräftig sind, nur ein Abbild von ihm. N u n sehen wir aber, wie von den übrigen Dingen alles, was zu seiner Reife kommt, zeugt und sich nicht zufrieden gibt, in sich zu verharren, sondern ein anderes hervorbringt, und zwar nicht nur was bewußten Willen (προαίρεσιν) hat, sondern auch was ohne bewußten Willen aus sich wachsen läßt, ja selbst das Unbeseelte gibt, soviel es kann, von seinem Wesen ab; so erwärmt z.B. das Feuer, der Schnee kältet, die Arzneien üben eine ihrem Wesen entsprechende Wirksamkeit auf andere Dinge, alle ahmen sie damit nach Kräften den Urgrund nach in bezug auf Ewigkeit der Existenz und Güte. Wie sollte da das Vollkommenste, das Erste Gute bei sich selbst stehenbleiben, gleichsam mit sich kargend oder aus Schwäche (ώσπερ φθόνησαν εαυτού ή άδυνατήσαν), welches doch aller Dinge Kraft ist (δύναμις πάντων)? Wie könnte es dann noch Urgrund sein? Es muß mithin auch etwas aus ihm hervorgehen, wenn anders es auch noch die anderen Dinge geben soll, welche doch von ihm her ihre Existenz haben; denn daß sie sie von ihm haben, ist notwendig" 2 9 . 24 25

26 27 28

D i e Zahlen in Klammern meinen die chronol. Folge der Schriften. V 1, 6 , 1 f. 4 f . ; V 1, 7 , 5 ; V 2 , 1 , 3 ; V 9, 14,4; III 9 , 4 , 1 ; V 3 , 1 5 , 3 . 3 5 ; V 3, 1 6 , 1 6 - 2 0 ; V 4 , 1 , 2 3 ; V 4 , 2 , 1 2 etc. Vgl. auch H . R. SCHWYZER, Artikel Tlotinos': RE-Band X X I , 1 (1951) 5 6 9 , 1 - 1 6 . V 1 , 6 , 3 f. V 3 , 1 4 , 1 - 8 ; auch VI 9 , 5 , 3 4 ; VI 8 , l l , 7 f . 29 Vgl. V 4, 1; IV 8 , 5 u. 6; V 1,6; III 2 , 1 ; III 2 , 2 ; II 9 , 8 . V 4,1,23-39.

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V 1,6 bringt im Grundriß dasselbe; auch die gleichen Beispiele sind da, mit Ausnahme der Arzneien, an deren Stelle die wohlriechenden Stoffe gerückt sind. Im gleichen Rahmen bewegen sich V 1,7, V 3,15f. und IV 8,5f. In letzterem wird als neuer Gedanke hervorgehoben, daß im Falle der Nicht-Schöpfung alle Dinge verborgen geblieben wären, da sie im Einen der Gestalt ermangelten. Einem jeden Wesen wohnt nämlich das Streben inne, das ihm Nachgeordnete hervorzubringen und sich zu entfalten. Das Motiv vom neidlosen Geben und der überströmenden Fülle und Vollkommenheit findet sich ebenfalls in V 5,12, sodann in V 2,1, mit dem wichtigen Zusatz hier, τω μηδέν ζητείν, μηδέ εχειν, μηδέ δεΐσθαι, und erfährt in II 9,3 eine letzte Steigerung. Die Seele, die in der Schau des Nus verharrt, wird dadurch erleuchtet und gibt dies Licht weiter an das unter ihr Liegende 30 . „So wird, wenn irgendwo ein Feuer brennt, rings alles erwärmt, was dazu überhaupt imstande ist. Dabei ist das Feuer dem Maß unterworfen; Kräfte aber, die kein Maß ermißt, sollen sein, ohne daß sie von ihrer Kraft mitteilen? . . . Nein, eine jede muß notwendig von ihrem Eigensein auch einem Anderen mitteilen; sonst kann das Gute nicht gut sein (ή το αγαθόν ουκ αγαθόν εσται), sonst der Geist nicht Geist, die Seele nicht, was sie ist, wenn nicht . . . auch etwas zu zweit lebt . . ." 3 1 . Die dargestellte Textgruppe veranschaulicht folgende Grundgedanken: a) Es ist die Tatsache der Existenz der Welt, die nach ihrem Schöpfer und dem Warum ihrer Existenz fragen läßt. Dieses Warum ist die absolute und daher neidlose Güte Gottes, seine unendliche Vollkommenheit und sein Überfluß an schöpferischer Kraft. b) Zur Erläuterung dieses Motivs greift Plotin auf folgende Beobachtung zurück. Im Reiche des Sinnlichen und Werdens bringt jedes vollkommene Wesen ein sich Ähnliches hervor. Kein Ding behält das Gute für sich, sondern teilt es mit: das Feuer die Wärme, der Schnee die Kälte, die wohlriechenden Stoffe den Duft usw. Dann kann natürlich auch das Allervollkommenste und Beste, das Gute schlechthin, nicht bei sich stehenbleiben. Man müßte ihm sonst Neid oder Unvermögen zuschreiben! — Verkehrt wäre es jedoch, die Notwendigkeit, die in den von Plotin zur Illustration angeführten Beispielen zum Ausdruck kommt, auch auf Gott, das Eine oder Gute, übertragen zu wollen. Bei den genannten Dingen vollzieht sich die diffusio bonitatis tatsächlich notwendig; aber nicht darum ist es Plotin zu tun, sondern einzig um die Tatsache, daß die diffusio bonitatis in a l l e n Seinsregionen stattfindet. Auch dort, wo freier Wille herrscht; denn in V 4,1,29 sagte er ausdrücklich, daß jedes, was zu seiner Vollendung komme, zeuge, und zwar nicht nur was b e w u ß t e n Willen habe (προαίρεσις) 3 2 . 30 31 32

II 9 , 2 , 1 0 - 1 8 . II 9 , 3 , 4 - 1 1 . Gemeint ist damit bewußtes Wollen, überlegtes Streben, ein Vorsatz. Vgl. Arist., E N III, 5; 1113 a 10. Dazu den Kommentar von F. DIRLMEIER, Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung. Bd. 6. Nikomachische Ethik (Berlin 1956, 71976) 327f.

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Also auch der freie Wille teilt sein bonum mit, frei natürlich und nicht notwendig wie die vernunftlosen Dinge. c) Nicht die absolute Notwendigkeit, daß das Eine sich mitteilen muß, soll betont werden, sondern die unbedingte Notwendigkeit, daß alles Seiende auf das Eine oder Gute zurückzuführen ist. Besonders markant in V 4,1,1 : „Wenn es etwas nach dem Ersten gibt, so muß es notwendig aus Jenem stammen". Ferner V 4 , l , 3 8 f . ; V 1,6,8; II 9 , 1 - 3 ; V 3 , 1 6 , 1 0 - 1 6 ; V 5 , 4 , 1 - 6 . d) Von größter Bedeutung sodann ist die Feststellung Plotins, daß das Eine oder Gute nicht deshalb überströmt, um dadurch zu sich selbst zu kommen. Die Emanation darf nicht als notwendige Ergänzung oder Bereicherung des Einen aufgefaßt werden. Das wäre ein grobes MißVerständnis ! Das Eine nimmt den Weltprozeß nicht deshalb in Kauf, um in und durch ihn sein eigenes Wesen zu verwirklichen bzw. zu vollenden. Nichts bedürfend, nichts suchend hat es den Nus hervorgebracht33. „Der Urgrund aber ist nicht bedürftig der Dinge, die nach ihm sind, sondern der Urgrund aller Dinge ist aller Dinge unbedürftig" 34 , weil er sich selbst in jeder Hinsicht genügt35. Auch hier gilt es zu sehen, was Plotin tatsächlich geschrieben hat. Für ihn ist Gott das Allervollkommenste; als solcher steht er bereits am Anfang, nicht erst am Ende des Weltprozesses. Seine Schöpfungen beeinträchtigen seine eigene Realität in keiner Weise. Denn die Emanation ist nicht so zu verstehen, als ob das Emanierte aus Gott herausflösse und daher eine Minderung seiner Substanz bedeutete 36 . Diesem Gott kann aber auch, eben aufgrund seiner ewigen Selbstvollendung, durch die Emanation nichts mehr zuwachsen 37 . Es ist bei Plotin nicht anders als bei allen Vätern und Scholastikern, wenn sie lehren, Gott könne durch seine Schöpfung weder etwas verlieren noch etwas gewinnen. Diese Anschauung ist bereits bei Plotin zu einem Topos ausgebildet. Die Schöpfungen des Einen bedeuten daher für Plotin bloß eine O f f e n b a r u n g der Herrlichkeit Gottes und der geistigen Welt 38 , nicht mehr und nicht weniger, was die Welt ja auch für die Patristik und Scholastik ist. — Die absolute Unbedürftigkeit Gottes gegenüber allem von ihm Hervorgebrachten, die bei Plotin als Selbstverständlichkeit erscheint, wird bei den christlichen Denkern

33

V 2 , 1 , 7 f . ; V 4 , 1 , 1 2 ; V 5 , 1 2 , 4 0 - 4 9 ; I 8 , 2 , 2 - 7 ; III 8, 1 1 , 1 5 f .

34

VI 9 , 6 , 3 5 ; V 3 , 1 1 , 1 6 - 1 9 ; I 7 , 1 , 2 0 - 2 4 ; V 5 , 9 ; III 8 , 1 1 , 9 - 1 1 ; VI 8 , 2 1 , 2 3 - 2 6 .

35

VI 9 , 6 , 4 5 ; VI 9 , 6 , 2 7 - 3 4 ; VI 8 , 1 1 , 3 2 ; VI 8 , 1 5 , 2 7 f . ; II 9 , 1 , 8 - 1 2 ; I 8 , 2 , 4 f .

36

VI 9 , 9 , 1 - 7 ; V 1 , 3 , 9 - 1 2 ; III 8 , 8 , 4 6 ; VI 9 , 5 , 3 7 ; VI 5 , 3 , 5 ; V 5 , 5 , 1 f. I 6 , 7 , 2 5 - 2 7 ; V 5 , 1 2 , 4 0 - 4 3 ; III 8 , 9 - 1 1 ; V 1 , 6 , 1 6 - 2 7 ; VI 8 , 1 5 , 1 1 ; VI 9 , 6 , 2 8 ; V 1 , 4 , 1 3 .

37 38

IV 8 , 6 , 2 3 - 2 8 ; IV 8 , 5 , 3 3 - 3 8 ; II 9 , 8 , 9 - 2 9 ; II 9 , 4 ; II 9 , 1 6 ; III 2 , 1 - 3 . Proklos, in Tim. I 3 6 8 , 2 - 1 1 (DIEHL); Prop. 140 der Stoich. theol. - Ü b e r den gesamten Problemkomplex der Emanation vgl. meine Arbeit: 'Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin': Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie, hrsg. v. J . HIRSCHBERGER in Verb, mit B . LAKEBRINK, Bd. I (Leiden 2 1 9 7 1 ) , bes. 3 0 3 - 3 0 8 , 3 2 1 - 3 2 4 , 4 1 9 - 4 2 4 , 5 3 0 - 5 3 5 ; ferner meinen Artikel 'Emanation': Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, hrsg. v. J . RITTER, Bd. II (Basel 1972) 4 4 5 - 4 4 8 .

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einen der Hauptgründe für den Beweis von Gottes freiem schöpferischen Wirken bilden 39 . Hält man sich diese vier Grundgedanken auf dem Hintergrund der plotinischen Darstellungen vor Augen, ebenfalls die hervorgehobene Notiz, daß Plotin nicht von der Alternative „freiwillige oder notwendige Schöpfung" ausgeht, dann dürfte sich folgende Interpretation des Axioms bonum est diffusivum sui ergeben. Denn daß dieses Axiom, wofür alle auf den Pseudo-Areopagiten sich berufen 40 (Der Wortlaut läßt sich bei ihm jedoch nicht belegen41. Er geht auf einen früheren christlichen Autor zurück, der ebenfalls von Plotin beeinflußt ist. Ich hoffe, dies in einer gesonderten Studie zeigen zu können.), in seiner prägnanten Formulierung Plotins quälende Frage nach dem Warum und Wie der Emanation trifft, ist aus dem Gesagten ersichtlich42. Sein Inhalt besagt nach dem Dargelegten: Zur Natur des Guten gehört es, sich mitzuteilen, sich auszugießen und zu verströmen. Sonst kann, wie Plotin treffend bemerkt, das Gute nicht gut sein 43 . Im Reiche des Vollkommenen herrscht die Vollkommenheit nur dann, wenn das Vollkommene sich mitteilt. Ganz in Plotins Sinne wird Proklos später die Formulierung prägen: αγαθού γαρ ή μετάδοσις είς πάν το μετέχειν δυνάμενον, και το μέγιστόν έστιν ού τό άγαθοειδές, άλλα το άγαθουργόν 44 . Und noch Nikolaus von Cues schreibt in 'De visione Dei' von Gott: Sed scio quod visus tuus est bonitas illa maxima, quae se ipsam non potest non communicare omni capaci45. Die res naturales wie etwa das Feuer, der Schnee, die Arzneien usw. teilen ihr bonum notwendig mit, aufgrund ihrer Natur. Man kann diese Notwendigkeit mit LEIBNIZ46 die physische Notwendigkeit heißen. Sie liegt in der Mitte zwischen der moralischen und der metaphysischen Notwendigkeit. Hier gibt es keine Freiheit. Anders im Reiche des Geistes, wo das Axiom ebenfalls gilt, die Mitteilung des Guten aber nunmehr aufgrund von Freiheit und nicht mehr aus Notwendigkeit erfolgt. Hier gibt es keine physische Notwendigkeit, geschweige denn metaphysische, sondern bloß moralische Notwendigkeit. Aber diese hebt, wie LEIBNIZ gezeigt hat, die Freiheit nicht auf. Sie besagt nämlich weder innere Nötigung noch äußeren Zwang, sondern das Gesetz, das dem Vollkommenen und insbe39 40 41

42 43

Vgl. unten S. 1026f. Bes. De div. nom. PG 3; 693 B; 697; 7 1 6 B C ; 717f.; De coel. hierar. PG 3; 177C. Vgl. auch TH.-A. AUDET, Approches historiques de la Summa Theologiae: Études d'Histoire littéraire et doctrinale XVII (1962) 17 u. 17 Anm. 1. Das hat PÉGHAIRE, a.A.O. (Anm. 18) 11, richtig beobachtet. II 9 , 3 , 8 f .

44

S t . t h . , Pr. 122; p. 1 0 8 , 1 9 - 2 1

45

De vis. 4 (p I, Fol. 100 r , Z. 32f.); vgl. auch De dato 2 (h IV, N. 97, Z.12): Optimum est sui ipsius diffusivum; (N. 100, Z. 8). M. Eckhart, Predigt 9 (QUINT): DW I 1 4 9 , 1 - 1 3 . Die Theodizee. Übers, v. A. BUCHENAU. Einf. Essay v. M. STOCKHAMMER (Hamburg 2 1968). Einl. Abhandl. 34 (§ 2); Anhang 416f. (III. Einwand). Vgl. auch unten S. 1013.

46

(DODDS).

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1003

sondere dem Vollkommensten auferlegt ist. Versuchen wir, es an einem Beispiel zu erläutern. Eine Mutter, die wirklich gut ist, wird sich in Liebe und guten Taten für ihre Familie verströmen. Warum? Eben deshalb, weil sie gut ist! Eine andere und bessere Antwort könnte man gar nicht geben. Würde man ihr entgegenhalten: Dann tust Du das Gute also nicht mehr aus Freiheit, sondern weil Deine gute bzw. vollkommene Natur Dich dazu nötigt, dann würde sie antworten: Keineswegs! Eben weil ich gut und vollkommen bin, bin ich auch zum Guten frei. Hinter meinem Tun steht keine blinde Notwendigkeit, sondern größte Freiheit. Schon J . W O L F hat in seinem Plotinbuch mit einem richtigen Gespür für Plotins Denken unterschieden zwischen einer „Naturnotwendigkeit" auf der einen und einer „moralisch-ästhetischen Notwendigkeit" auf der anderen Seite. Letztere allein liege dem Emanationsprozeß Plotins zugrunde47. Auch CH. TH. WAGNER kommt in seiner Plotinstudie zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Notwendigkeit, mit der das Eine sich überallhin ergießen muß, keinen Mangel an Freiheit bedeute48. In ähnlicher Weise wie Plotin wird später Philipp de Grève, Kanzler der Pariser Universität (fl236), der nicht im entferntesten daran denkt, Gottes freies schöpferisches Wirken in Frage zu stellen, erklären: Item altera ratio ipsius boni, secundum quam dicitur: Bonum est diffusivum aut multiplicativum esse, data est per posterius, per proprietatem consequentem bonum. Bonum enim, quod bonum est, communicativum alicuius esse, ut summum bonum communicat esse et bene esse omnibus aliis entibus. Similiter et cetera entia communicant inter se esse alicuius modi, secundum quod invicem unum indiget altero49. W i e ist die diffusio bonitatis zu verstehen? Aus den Beispielen, die Plotin anführt, geht hervor, daß die genannten Dinge wie Feuer, Schnee usw. etwas von ihrem eigenen Wesen abgeben, wobei sie einen Realitätsverlust erfahren. Das gilt nicht mehr für das Mitteilen beim Einen, beim Nus und bei der Seele. Plotin hat eigens Verwahrung dagegen eingelegt. Aus dem Guten, schreibt er in VI 9,9, 1 ff., geht das Leben, der Geist, das Sein . . . hervor; „nicht als flössen diese Dinge aus ihm und verringerten ihn damit; er ist ja keine Masse. Dann müßten diese Hervorbringungen vergänglich sein, sie sind aber ewig, weil ihr Urgrund unverändert bleibt und sich nicht in sie zerteilt, sondern ganz bleibt" 50 . Beim Hervorgang der Seele aus dem Geist, der zweiten Hypostase, merkt er an: Die Seele ist „die ganze Wirkungskraft, die der Geist ausströmt, um ein anderes zur Existenz zu bringen; so wie beim Feuer zu scheiden ist die ihm innewohnende und die von ihm gespendete Wärme — nur daß man beim Geist die Wirkungskraft nicht als

47 48

D e r Gottesbegriff Plotins ( F r e i b u r g / B r . 1 9 2 7 ) 57 f. Die vielen Metaphern und das eine Modell der plotinischen Metaphysik (Heidelberg 1 9 5 7 ) Dissertation, ungedruckt, 76.

49

S u m m a de b o n o , zitiert bei J . SCHNEIDER, a . A . O . ( A n m . 7) 3 5 A n m . 7 6 . E b d . S. 3 3 —

50

Vgl. auch V I 9 , 5 , 3 6 f . ; V 5 , 5 , 1 f.; VI 7, 3 2 , 2 0 f .

35 auch die Auffassung des Wilhelm von Auvergne.

1004

KLAUS KREMER

Ausfließendes (ουκ έκρέουσαν) denken muß, sondern die Wirkungskraft beharrt in ihm, während die äußere als eine gesonderte in die Existenz tritt" 5 1 . Was aus dem Einen oder Nus hervorgeht, ist jeweils Abbild (είκών), Nachahmung (μίμημα), Spur (ϊχνος) von ihm, eine Teilhabe an ihm, daher ein wahrhaft Anderes, das seinem Prinzip nur noch ähnlich (ομοιον), aber nicht mehr identisch mit ihm ist 52 . Insofern also Gott, Geist und Seele ein Ebenbild ihrer hervorbringen, gehört unser Axiom in den Bereich der causa efficiens53, wenn man diesen Ausdruck ungeachtet aller ihm anhaftenden Aporien einmal beibehalten will; richtiger jedoch in den Bereich der allerdings dynamisch gefaßten und mit dem finis identischen Formursache. Denn die diffusio meint Setzung des Seienden durch Ausstrahlung des Seins, Konstituierung alles Seienden aufgrund von Teilhabe des Prinzipiats an dem Prinzip, so daß dieses in jenem sich zwar abbildet, nicht aber sich selbst komplementiert. Trifft die hier gegebene Interpretation des Axioms ins Schwarze, dann wäre der Gedanke einer freiwilligen Schöpfung bzw. Emanation bei Plotin nicht ausgeschlossen. Das Prinzip als s o l c h e s involviert jedenfalls keinen Determinismus, und i n s o f e r n Plotin den Hervorgang des Vielen aus dem Einen damit zu deuten sucht, entgeht er dem Vorwurf der notwendigen Schöpfung. Das wird noch deutlicher werden, wenn wir später auf Augustinus und Thomas zu sprechen kommen werden, die, wie fast alle anderen christlichen Autoren, in diesem Axiom den Grund für die Schöpfung der Welt erblicken, ohne dadurch die Freiheit von Gottes schöpferischem Wirken gefährdet zu sehen. So erklärt z.B. Albert der Große in seinem Kommentar zu 'De divinis nominibus' : . . . cum primum non agat necessitate naturae, sicut sol illuminât, ne moveatur ab aliquo quod in nobis sit, sed tantum sua bonitate . . . J . S C H N E I D E R , der diesen Text zitiert 54 und im

51 52

53

54

V 1 , 3 , 8 - 1 2 . Ferner VI 5,3,5.21; Proklos, in Tim. I 3 9 0 , 9 - 2 1 (DIEHL). V 1,3; V 1,6; V 1,7; V 2,1; V 3,7; V 3,12; V 3,16; V 4,1; V 4,2; III 2 , 1 - 3 ; IV 8,6; VI 7,32; VI 9,3; VI 8,18; VI 9,6. Das Beste hierüber in der Synthese von causa efficiens u. finalis bei Bonaventura: in I Sent, d. 45,2,1 conci. (I 804): Hinc est, quod cum intelligimus, vere voluntatem esse in Deo, et proprietas voluntatis sit producere ea quae exeunt per modum liberalitatis, quod dicimus Deum, in quantum voluntas est, esse causam rerum. Ratio autem, quare voluntati attribuitur causalitas, haec est: quia ratio causandi est bonitas et in ratione effectivi et in ratione finis. Nam „bonum dicitur diffusivum", „et bonum est propter quod omnia"; effectivum autem non fit efficiens in effectu nisi propter finem. Illud ergo, quod dicit coniunctionem principii effectivi cum fine, est ratio causandi in effectu; sed voluntas est actus, secundum quem bonum reflectitur supra bonum sive bonitatem; ergo voluntas unit effectivum cum fine. Et hinc est, quod voluntas est ratio causare faciens in effectu; et ideo attribuimus Deo rationem causalitatis sub ratione voluntatis, non sic sub aliis rationibus. Et hoc colligitur ex verbis Dionysii in quarto de Divinis Nominibus, ubi dicit, quod 'bonitatem ut principium et ut continentiam et ut finem omnia appetunt; ut principium, a quo sunt; ut continentiam, per quam salvantur; ut finem, in quem tendunt'. Vgl. auch in II Sent. d. 1 pars II dub. I (II 51). a.a.O. (Anm. 7) 60 Anm. 98. Ulrich von Straßburg in seiner Summa de summo bono II tr. 3 c. 2 (ed. COLLINGWOOD) 303: Sed summum bonum non operatur per potentiam differentem a sua essentia producendo res, sed per suam essentiam. Etformalis ratio huius operis est ipsa bonitas, ut dicunt Boethius ('De hebdomadibus') et Plato ('Timäus' 29), quia eius

ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NEUPLATONISMUS U N D CHRISTENTUM

1005

Gegensatz zur Notwendigkeit der neuplatonischen Emanation die Freiheit der Schöpfung bei Albert dem Großen betont, sah sich aufgrund dessen zu der Äußerung veranlaßt: „Das Licht als Bild der göttlichen Wirksamkeit wird von der naturhaften Art der Lichtstrahlung abgegrenzt durch die Betonung der Freiheit der Hervorbringung, die a u f g r u n d des A u s g a n g s v o n d e r g ö t t l i c h e n G u t h e i t angenommen wird, während der W a h r h e i t n a c h A l b e r t s Auffassung eine solche f r e i e Verursachung nicht zukommen würde. Auch hier wird also der durch die Gutheit bestimmte Wille als Ursprung angenommen" 5 5 . Albert der Große und sein Interpret J. SCHNEIDER erblicken daher in der bonitas divina keinen notwendigen, sondern einen freien Grund für Gottes schöpferisches Wirken, ja Albert erblickt in der bonitas die Alternative zur necessitas naturae. Bei Plotin jedoch müssen noch zwei weitere Textgruppen untersucht werden, von denen die eine den Gedanken einer gewollten Emanation tangiert, die andere dagegen diesen Gedanken auszuschließen scheint.

2. Freigewollte Emanation? Erwähnt wurde bereits jenes Wort, daß alles Vollkommene zeuge; auch das, was bewußten Willen habe (V 4,1,29) 5 6 . In V 5,12 (32) wird ausgeführt, daß das Gute nicht des aus ihm Entstandenen bedarf. „Er bleibt nämlich der gleiche, der er war, ehe er dies hervorbrachte. Es wäre Ihm ja auch gleichgültig, wenn es nicht entstanden wäre (έπεί ούδ' ctv έμέλησεν αύτω μή γενομένου). Auch würde Er nicht mißgünstig sein (έφθόνησεν), wenn noch ein Anderes die Möglichkeit hätte, aus Ihm zu entstehen" 57 . Die Schöpfung wird hier derart in das Belieben Gottes gestellt, daß sie für ihn geradezu zur Gleichgültigkeit und Indifferenz herabsinkt. Von Notwendigkeit kann also keine Rede sein. In VI 7,8,13 f. (38) findet sich ebenfalls eine überraschende Äußerung vom Nus, der zweiten plotinischen Hypostase: „Wer hätte zum Stehen bringen können eine Kraft, welche bei sich zu bleiben sowohl wie aus sich hervorzutreten vermochte" (τίς γαρ αν εστησε δύναμιν μένειν τε καί προϊέναι δυναμένην). Voraus geht freilich die Bemerkung, daß die Welt nicht bei den jenseitigen Dingen stehenbleiben konnte 5 8 . Das ist jedoch nichts anderes als die Überlegung des bonum diffusivum, die die Freiheit nicht aufzuheben braucht. Die Schrift II 1,1 (40) bringt sodann den Gedanken, daß es zwar keine deutliche Vorstellung (σαφήνειαν) vermittle, wenn man die βούλησις Gottes als Ursache für die ewige Welt ansetze, dies aber

55 56 57

58

ratio est esse diffusivum sui et esse ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo in omnia creata diffundit similitudinem suae bonitatis. ebd. 61 f. Hervorhebungen von mir! S. oben S. 1000f. V 5,12,43-45. Z. St. J. WOLF, a . a . O . (Anm. 47) 58: „Von Anfang an also stellte sich das Eine an sich insofern indifferent zu der Frage, ob Etwas oder nichts, ob dieses oder ein andres entstehe. ' J e t z t freilich, wenn man sich auf den Bod^n der Wirklichkeit stellt, ist die Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen, daß nichts entstehe . . .'". VI 7,8,13. Vgl. auch II 9 , 8 , 2 0 - 2 2 .

67 ANRW II 36.2

1006

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KREMER

dennoch wahr sei 59 . (Nach III 8,9,16—18 sagen wir auch nichts Deutliches — σαφές —, wenn wir das erste Prinzip als das Gute und das schlechthin Einfache bezeichnen, obgleich dies wahr ist.) Die Existenz der ewigen Welt wird auf den Willen Gottes zurückgeführt, wofür Plotin sich nach T H E I L E R auf seinen Lehrer Ammonios Sakkas berufen konnte. Denn dieser habe eine von Ewigkeit her durch den Willen Gottes geschaffene Welt gelehrt 60 . Daß dies nach Plotins Ansicht keine deutliche Vorstellung vermittelt, könnte an dem bereits eingangs erwähnten Umstand liegen, daß Gottes Tun nicht grundlos ist, es daher nicht genügt, alles einfach bloß auf den Willen Gottes zu schieben. Der beste Beweis dafür sind wiederum Augustinus und Thomas, wie wir noch sehen werden. In V 3,15 plagt Plotin sich mit dem Gedanken, wie das Eine alle Dinge hervorbringen konnte. Es konnte sie nicht zuvor in sich enthalten, weil es dann Vielheit wäre. Also ist es bloß das Vermögen aller Dinge, δύναμις πάντων, freilich nicht τω πάσχειν, sondern τω ποιεϊν 6 1 . „Also wie kann Es eigentlich hervorbringen, was Es nicht in sich trägt? Denn Es kann ja nicht aufs Geratewohl und ohne daß Es überlegt, was Es hervorbringen will, trotzdem hervorbringen" (ού γαρ ώς ετυχε, μή δ' ένθυμηθείς Ô ποιήσει, ποιήσει ομως) 62 . H A R D E R 1 , V 88, und H E N R Y - S C H W Y ZER weichen in Text und Interpunktion von HARDER2 ab, so daß bei ihnen die Überlegung gerade negiert wird 6 3 . Gibt man HARDER2 recht, wozu wir neigen, dann geschähe das Hervorbringen des Einen aufgrund von Denken und Freiheit. Schließlich ist die tiefsinnige Schrift VI 8 zu erwähnen, wo Plotin die Identität von „Sein", Willen und Freiheit in Gott (βούλησις, θέλησις, έλεύθερον, αύτεξούσιον, αιρεσις) herausarbeitet 64 , ohne jedoch die freie Schöpfung zum Thema seiner Reflexionen zu machen. In VI 8,17,20ff. und VI 8 , 1 8 , 3 8 - 4 3 finden sich jedoch deutliche Aussagen. Auf letztere Stelle hat nach mir auch T H . K O B U S C H aufmerksam gemacht 65 . Er bezeichnet sie allerdings „als Fremdkörper" im plotinischen Denken. Im „Rahmen eines genuin platonisch-plotinischen Denkens" sei „eine seinsetzende βούλησις undenkbar" 6 6 . K O B U S C H vermutet daher christlichen Einfluß 67 .

59

60 61 62

II 1 , 1 , 2 - 4 ; vgl. auch II 1 , 1 , 3 4 . 3 7 . - Vgl. dazu HARDER2, IV b, 399f. - In der zeitlich vorangehenden Schrift VI 8 , 1 7 , 1 ff. sieht Plotin die Welt geordnet w i e v o m Willen ( π ρ ο α ί ρεσις) eines Schöpfers. Vgl. dazu die nun folgenden Ausführungen. Vgl. a . a . O . ( A n m . 21) 2 2 - 2 4 . V 3 , 1 5 , 2 7 - 3 5 (49). V 3 , 1 5 , 3 5 f . S o H A R D E R 2 , V a, 1 6 4 u . d i e A n m . i n V b , 3 8 7 .

63

S o a u c h CILENTO U. MACKENNA-PAGE i n i h r e n U b e r s e t z u n g e n .

64

Bes.

wichtig VI 8 , 1 3 , 5 - 1 1 .

25-40.

43f. 5 0 - 5 8 ; VI 8 , 1 5 , 1 9 - 2 4 ;

VI 8 , 1 8 , 3 8 - 4 3 ;

VI

8 , 2 0 , 1 7 - 1 9 . 2 8 - 3 9 ; V I 8 , 2 1 , 1 - 1 9 . 3 0 - 3 3 . F e r n e r P . HENRY, L e p r o b l è m e d e la l i b e r t é c h e z Plotin: R e v u e n é o - s c o l a s t i q u e de P h i l o s o p h i e 33 (1931) 5 0 - 7 9 ; 1 8 0 - 2 1 5 ; bes. 3 1 8 - 3 9 .

H . R. SCHVYZER, a . a . O . (Anm. 25) 561; V. CILENTO, La radice metafisica della libertà nell'antignosi plotiniana: La Parola del Passato 82 (1962) 94—123; É. BRÉHIER, 'Notice' z u V I 8 in s e i n e r E n n e a d e n a u s g a b e ( 1 1 9 - 1 3 2 ) . J . BARION, a . A . O . ( A n m . 1 8 ) 81 — 8 5 . 65

66 67

Studien zur Philosophie des Hierokles von Alexandrien. Untersuchungen zum christlichen Neuplatonismus: Epimeleia. Beiträge zur Philosophie, Bd. 27 (München 1976) 80. ebd. 81. ebd. 7 7 , 7 9 , 8 0 .

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In VI 8,17 legt Plotin gemäß dem Grundgedanken von VI 8 dar, daß man schon vom Geist, der aus einer Vielheit von rationalen Formen besteht, das Ungefähr und den Zufall (ώς ετυχε και ώς συνέβη) fernhalten muß. Wenn aber der Geist noch ein Prinzip über sich hat, dann kann es bei diesem erst recht kein Ungefähr geben und „dann ist einleuchtend, daß dieses (Prinzip) dem so aus rationaler Form Bestehenden nahesteht, und daß kraft Seiner das so aus rationaler Form Bestehende ist und an Jenem teilhat und so ist, w i e J e n e s w i l l , und das Vermögen von Jenem ist" (και μετέχον έκείνου καί οίον θέλει εκείνο καί δύναμις έκείνου). In VI 8,18,38—43 stellt Plotin zunächst fest, daß Jenes (= das Eine) so ist wie das im Geist, nur viel größer (32 f.). Der Geist ist Abbild des Einen, und es herrscht bei ihm in jedem Stück Vernunft und Ursache (λόγος καί αιτία). Ursache aber der Ursache ist Jenes Wesen (αίτιον δέ εκείνο τοϋ αιτίου). „Es ist folglich in größerem Maße Ursache, da es gleichsam das Ursächlichste, die wahrere Ursache ist (αίτιώτατον καί άληθέστερον αιτία), es enthält ja zusamt alle geistigen Ursachen, die einmal aus ihm hervorgehen werden; es bringt hervor nicht das Ungefähr, sondern das, was n a c h s e i n e m e i g e n e n W i l l e n ist (γεννητικόν τοϋ ούχ ώς έτυχεν, άλλ' ώς ήθέλησεν αυτός); und dieser Wille (θέλησις) ist nicht vernunftwidrig, noch zielt er auf das Beliebige oder wie es ihm einfiel, sondern wie es sich gebührt" (ούδ'ώς έπήλθεν αύτω, άλλ' ώς εδει). Auffallend ist, daß beide Stellen in völliger Kohärenz mit der oben behandelten Stelle in V 3,15,35f. es ablehnen, daß das Eine aufs Geratewohl hervorbringt (ούχ ώς ετυχεν). Greift man den Zentralgedanken von VI 8 auf, wonach das Eine nicht ist, „wie es sich traf" (ώς συνέβη), sondern wie Es selber wollte (ώς ήθέλησεν) und frei ist in seinem Tun, nicht der Notwendigkeit (άνάγκη) unterworfen 6 8 (VI 8,7,11 — 15), dann ergibt sich folgende Parallelität: Wie das Eine nicht von ungefähr ist, sondern wie Es will, so bringt Es auch nicht von ungefähr hervor, sondern wie Es will. Die Schrift VI 8 insgesamt verdiente eine sehr ausführliche Behandlung, die ich mir aus Raumgründen hier leider versagen muß. Wie Thomas so könnte auch Plotin sagen: sed divinum esse est eius intelligere et velie; et ideo quod per suum esse facit, facit per intellectum et voluntatem69. 68

E. BRÉHIER, 'Notice' zu VI 8 in seiner Enneadenausgabe, sieht das Grundproblem von VI 8 folgendermaßen: « Ce discours contient deux assertions liées ensemble concernant l'origine de l'Un et son mode d'action: 'L'Un n'a d'autre origine que le hasard et n'existe que par accident; l'Un ne tenant pas son être de lui-même n'est pas libre et fait nécessairement tout ce qu'il fait'y (119). Ähnlich HARDER2, IV b, 357: „Mehr beschäftigt Plotin, um das Oberste zu fassen, nicht etwa der Zwang — der Zwang kann ja nur unterhalb des Obersten Platz haben; er ist vielleicht (2,14) Naturzwang, άνάγκη φύσεως (neben dem Geist zur Wahl gestellt schon bei Euripides Tro. 886) —, sondern der Zufall (von VI 8 , 7 , 1 2 . 3 2 an immer wieder vorgeführt) . . . Die immer wieder anvisierte Lösung ist die: das oberste Wesen fällt mit seinem Wirken . . . und seinem Willen zusammen". Zwang erst nach dem Einen: VI 8,9,11 ff.

69

In D N , nr. 271 (PERA). In VI 8 , 1 3 , 7 f . ist erstmals die Identifizierung von Wollen und 'Seinsheit' im Einen vollzogen: ή βούλησις αύτοΰ καί ή ουσία ταύτόν εσται. Vgl. dazu auch HARDER2, IV b,

67*

382.

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Plotin ist also, so viel zeigt diese Ubersicht, der Gedanke einer freigewollten Schöpfung nicht ganz fremd; er berührt ihn, ohne ihm jedoch einen wirklich zentralen Platz in seinem System zuzuweisen. Das wird erst bei den christlichen Denkern geschehen. Dennoch lehnt die überwiegende Mehrheit der Interpreten Plotins und des Neuplatonismus einen freigewollten Hervorgang der Dinge aus dem Guten ab. In seiner großen Besprechung der ersten Auflage meiner Arbeit 'Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin' (1966) und der ersten Fassung des vorliegenden Aufsatzes erklärt L. ELDERS, daß es im plotinischen Einen weder Wahlfreiheit noch wahrhafte Liebe zur Welt gebe. Weder wolle noch liebe das Eine seine Wirkungen, denen gegenüber es sich völlig indifferent verhalte 7 0 . Auch E . - W . PLATZECK legt in der Besprechung meiner beiden genannten Arbeiten dar, daß das plotinische Eine in der Setzung der Emanationsstufen nicht frei sei. „Denn das Eine und das Gute sind identisch, und die Gutheit kann wegen dieser Identität nach Plotin unmöglich nicht w i r k e n " 7 1 . R . HARDER, der bahnbrechende Plotinforscher in unserem Jahrhundert, schreibt in seinem Aufsatz 'Plotins Leben, Wirkung und Lehre': „Einen göttlichen Entschluß zur Schöpfung kann es nicht geben" 7 2 . W . THEILER stellt in seinem Aufsatz über 'Ammonios und Porphyrios' fest 7 3 : „Die Allmacht göttlichen Willens bei Ammonios . . . imponierte Porphyrios, während Plotin dem obersten Gott das Wollen genommen hatte, V 1 , 6 , 2 6 7 4 , oder in V I 8 , 1 3 , 2 1 nur als Selbstwollen gelten ließ". Genauso urteilt E. R . DODDS in seiner Abhandlung 'Tradition und persönliche Leistung in der Philosophie Plotins' 7 5 , dem sich H . R . SCHWYZER anzuschließen scheint 7 6 . Und TH. KOBUSCH kommt zum selben Ergebnis 7 7 wie nach ihm auch M. ATKINSON78. Eindringlicher noch als L. ELDERS hat sich F. RICKEN mit meiner Auffassung auseinandergesetzt 79 . E r kommt zunächst auf die von mir im vorhergehenden genannten und im folgenden Abschnitt 'Notwendige Emanation?' zu nennenden Plotinstellen zu sprechen, ohne indessen auf die von mir herausgestellte Eigenart des λογισμός und der προαίρεσις einzugehen. Seine Endüberlegung lautet, daß es für das plotinische Eine zwar keinen ihm „äußeren G r u n d " bzw. keine ihm „äußere Ursache" gebe, daß es aber dennoch „aufgrund

70 71 72 73

74 75

76

77 78

79

Revue Thomiste 67 (1967) 616. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 75 (1967) 192. In: R. HARDER, Kleine Schriften, hrsg. v. W. MARC (München 1960) 271. In: Porphyre. Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique: Tome XII (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960) 115; DERS., a . a . O . (Anm. 21) 158. Zur Interpretation dieser Stelle vgl. den folgenden Abschnitt: 'Notwendige Emanation?' In: Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus, hrsg. v. C. ZINTZEN: Wege der Forschung, Bd. 436 (Darmstadt 1977) 63 f. Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins: Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vorträge G 260 (Opladen 1983) 75. - Wichtig f. THEILER, a . a . O . (Anm. 21). a . a . O . (Anm. 65) 74, 7 9 - 8 1 . Plotinus: Ennead V. 1. On the three principal hypostases. A Commentary with Translation (Oxford 1983) 142f. Emanation und Schöpfung: Theologie und Philosophie 49 (1974) 483—486.

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einer inneren Notwendigkeit" schaffe 80 . Es fragt sich allerdings, was mit dieser „inneren Notwendigkeit" gemeint ist. RICKEN scheint diesen Begriff an zwei Gegebenheiten verdeutlichen zu wollen: an der Tatsache des zwar nicht durch fremde Ursachen genötigten, aber dennoch notwendigen Wollens, wie es im Streben aller Menschen nach dem Guten vorliegt (Das malum als malum kann nicht erstrebt werden!), und an der Tatsache, daß, unter Berufung auf Aristoteles, das Glück als letztes Ziel des menschlichen Wollens Gegenstand „einer notwendigen βούλησις" ist. Diese beiden Arten von innerer Notwendigkeit treffen sicher auf das plotinische Eine zu. Auch es will, wie jedes Wesen, notwendig das Gute, das es selbst ist, und als die „Quelle aller Vollkommenheiten" (VI 9,5,36) will es sich notwendigerweise. Es ist „Liebe zu sich selbst" — αύτοΰ ερως - (VI 8,15,1; 16,13 f.). Mit diesen beiden Arten von innerer Notwendigkeit haben wir aber noch nicht die Wirksamkeit des Einen „nach außen" berührt, das Problem, ob und in welcher Weise das Eine von sich Unterschiedenes und Anderes will. Wenn bei diesem Wirken „nach außen" innere Notwendigkeit das Geschehen bestimmen soll, wie RICKEN meint, was könnte das für eine innere Notwendigkeit sein? RICKEN selbst äußert sich dazu nicht weiter! M. RAST, der vor mehr als 30 Jahren das verdienstvolle Buch geschrieben hat 'Welt und Gott. Philosophische Gotteslehre' 81 , kommt bei der Begründung sowohl der Freiheit Gottes als auch des Motivs Gottes in der Weltschöpfung 82 auf die Möglichkeiten einer inneren Notwendigkeit zu sprechen. Es heißt bei ihm: „Eine Nötigung zur Weltschöpfung ließe sich nur herleiten entweder aus einem inneren blinden Drang oder aus einer bewußten Sehnsucht nach dieser Welt, die den göttlichen Willen ganz in ihren Bann zöge" (149). „Die erste Möglichkeit ist im Ernst undenkbar. Denn sie setzte in Gott ein Bedürfnis voraus, eine Ergänzungsfähigkeit, die durch die Schöpfung erfüllt würde. Das ist mit seiner Unendlichkeit und Unbedingtheit unvereinbar. Außerdem bedeutet ein blinder Drang bei einem reinen Geist einen innern Widerspruch; wo reines Licht der Erkenntnis alles durchleuchtet, wo dieses Licht das Wesen selbst ausmacht, kann es keinen blinden Drang, keine Sehnsucht geben, die das Verborgene erst ans Licht bringen müßte. In Gott gibt es kein 'dunkles Prinzip', das 'verklärt' werden sollte in der Offenbarung durch die Welt. Die Welt ist nicht eine Offenbarung Gottes für ihn selbst. Als 'in sich stehendes Erkennen', als unendlicher Geist benötigt Gott einer solchen nicht, weil es für ihn nichts Verhülltes gibt. Man kann nur von einer Offenbarung Gottes an die vernünftigen Geschöpfe sprechen; diese aber ist seine freie Tat" (149f.). Dazu ist zu sagen, daß Plotin eine Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit des Einen durch dessen Emanationen bzw. Schöpfungen nicht nur nicht kennt, sondern stets ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen hat. Ist das plotinische Eine auch nicht „reiner Geist", weil mehr und höher als der reine Geist (VI 8,18,32f.), so gibt es in ihm und für es weder erst ans Licht zu bringendes Verborgenes noch sonst ein irgendwie 80 81 82

ebd. 485. (Freiburg/Br. 1952). ebd. 149f. u. 177f.

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„dunkles Prinzip", das in der Offenbarung durch die Welt „verklärt" werden müßte. Plotin lehrt expressis verbis, daß das Eine nichts als reines Licht ist (z. B. V 3,17,28-38). Seine Lehre in VI 9,6,43—47, daß das Eine nichts erkennt, selbst sich nicht, zieht gerade nicht die scheinbar unvermeidliche Konsequenz nach sich, daß das Eine um das, was es in sich hat bzw. richtiger: was es in sich ist, nicht „weiß". „Denn es ist eines und bei sich selbst und bedarf nicht des Denkens seiner selbst" (VI 9,6,49f.). Es gibt nämlich noch eine höhere Art des Erfassens seiner selbst, als sie in Wissenschaft und Vernunft vorliegt 83 . Sie trifft sowohl für das Eine als auch für die menschliche Seele in der unio mystica zu. „Der zweite Grund für eine notwendige Weltschöpfung wäre", fährt RAST fort (150), „daß Gott die Geschöpfe aus einer bewußten Sehnsucht notwendig bejahen müßte wie sich selbst. Das aber würde ihn wiederum von etwas abhängig machen, was nicht er selbst ist. Es wäre wiederum ein Zeichen, daß er der Welt zu seiner Vollendung bedürfte, was seiner Unendlichkeit widerstreitet". Ebenso bedarf das plotinische Eine, wie schon mehrmals gesagt, nicht der Welt zu seiner Selbstvollendung. Die Worte von RAST, im Zusammenhang mit dem Schöpfungsmotiv formuliert, gelten für den plotinischen Gott nicht weniger als für den christlichen: „Das letzte Motiv (zur Schöpfung) kann nur Gott selbst sein; nicht seine Selbstverwirklichung oder Selbstoffenbarung; er ist auch ohne die Welt die Fülle des Seins, die 'reine Wirklichkeit'; er ist sich auch ohne die Geschöpfe wegen seiner vollendeten Geistigkeit bis in seine letzten Tiefen offenbar" (177f.). Auch L. SCHEFFCZYK versteht die Freiheit Gottes bei der Schöpfung „als Freisein Gottes von jedem Zwang äußerer Ursachen" und als Freisein von „inneren Notwendigkeiten". Bei „innerer Notwendigkeit", die von ihm nicht näher bestimmt wird, die jedoch im Neuplatonismus vorliegen soll, ergäbe sich folgende Gott-Welt-Beziehung: „Die Welt gehörte notwendig zu Gott und Gott zur Welt, der Pantheismus und der Monismus wären nicht mehr abzuwehren" 8 4 . Den Pantheismus gibt es jedoch im Neuplatonismus, vor allem bei Plotin, überhaupt nicht! Wenn SCHEFFCZYK die „altchristliche Tradition" für die „innere Freiheit" Gottes mit Augustinus zusammenfaßt 85 : „Gott schuf das alles, was geschaffen ist, nicht aus irgendeinem Zwang, nicht aus irgendeiner Bedürftigkeit, sondern aus reiner Güte allein (De civitate Dei XI 24)", so fragt man sich, wo denn hier der Unterschied zu Plotin liegen soll. Es bleibt die Frage, was das für eine innere Notwendigkeit sein könnte, aufgrund derer das Eine den Geist und mittels des Geistes die Seele und alles übrige hervorgebracht haben soll 86 . Werden wir hier nicht wiederum auf jene angeblich absolute Notwendigkeit zurückgeworfen, die in dem Prinzip bonum est diffusivum sui enthalten sein soll? Wie können sich dann aber die christlichen Denker dieses Prinzips bedienen u n d gleichzeitig an der Freiheit Gottes im Schöpfungsakt festhalten? 83 84 85 86

Vgl. z . B . III 8 , 9 , 1 9 - 2 3 ; VI 7 , 3 5 , 1 9 - 2 5 ; VI 9 , 4 , 1 - 3 . a . a . O . (Anm. 18) 32. ebd. 33. Vgl. auch den folgenden Abschnitt u. unten A n m . 209.

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Sicherlich, bei Plotin sind die Anklänge an ein freigewolltes Schaffen sehr wenige und sehr schwach. Im Zentrum seiner Überlegungen steht der Gedanke vom bonum diffusivum. Werden die wenigen und schwachen Anklänge eines freigewollten Schaffens nun nicht vollends zum Verstummen gebracht durch eine Reihe von Texten, die von einem notwendigen Hervorgang sprechen?

3. Notwendige Emanation? Das Eine kann nicht geschaffen haben, indem Es sich bewegte. Denn alles, was sich bewegt, muß etwas haben, zu dem es sich hinbewegt. Folglich kann das, was aus ihm entstand, nur dadurch entstanden sein, indem „jenes unbewegt war, sich nicht zu ihm neigte oder einen Entschluß faßte . . . " (ού προσνεύσαντος ουδέ βουληθέντος) 87 . Trotz der klar ausgesprochenen Negation des Willens ist man versucht, darin nicht eine Ablehnung des Willens überhaupt zu erblicken, sondern jener Form von Willen, die eine Veränderung im Wollenden hervorruft. Plotins Philosophie kreist um das Eine 88 , näherhin um das Bemühen, jede Art von Bewegung aus ihm herauszuhalten, ohne es jedoch zu einem bewußtlosen oder gar toten Sein zu machen 89 . Wie er ihm nun die νόησις abspricht, um ihm dafür eine Art ύπερνόησις zurückzugeben 90 , so könnte er ihm auch die βούλησις absprechen wollen, um sie ihm modo eminentiori zuzusprechen. Die zitierte Stelle wäre dann eher ein Beleg für Plotins negative Theologie als für eine Negation des göttlichen Willens. Dafür spricht ferner, daß das hier negierte προσνεύω in VI 8,16,24 in Form von νεύσις ausdrücklich für das Eine in Anspruch genommen wird. — Äußerst scharf scheint aber dann die Notwendigkeit der Schöpfung in folgenden Texten akzentuiert zu werden: Das Dasein des mundus sensibilis beruht nicht auf Überlegung und Klügelei (εκ διανοίας καί έπιτεχνήσεως), sondern auf Notwendigkeit 91 . „Es ist aber dies Weltall zur Entstehung gelangt nicht aufgrund einer Überlegung (ού λογισμω), . . . sondern weil es zwangsläufig noch eine weitere Wesenheit geben muß te" (άλλα φύσεως δευτέρας άνάγκτι) 92 . Die Schönheit unseres Weltalls führt sich auf den intelligiblen Kosmos zurück 93 . Folglich darf niemand mit dem Urheber seines Daseins hadern, schon darum nicht, „weil es zwangsläufig (έξ άνάγκης) ins Dasein getreten ist, nicht

87

88

89 90 91 92

93

V 1,6,15—27; auf diese Stelle beziehen sich vorrangig die meisten Autoren. Vgl. auch VI 9,6,40 u. unten S. 1017-1021, zu Proklos. Vgl. III 8 , 9 , 1 - 3 ; III 8,10; III 8,11; V 1,6,4 etc. Nach É. BRÉHIER, 'Notice' zu VI 8 seiner Enneadenausgabe (123 f.), ist die einzige Frage, die Plotin in diesem Traktat beschäftigt: « comment la notion de 'choses qui dépendent de nous' ou de liberté peut-elle s'appliquer aux dieux?». Mit diesen Göttern sind der N u s und das Eine gemeint. Vgl. auch ebd. 124, 125, bes. 126, 129, 130, 131. V 4 , 2 , 1 5 - 1 9 ; VI 8 , 7 , 4 6 - 5 1 ; VI 8,18,32 etc. VI 9 , 6 , 4 3 - 5 7 ; VI 7,39; VI 8,16,33; VI 8,16,16. II 9,8,20f.; vgl. auch 23.27; III 2,1,18; I 8,7,21; IV 8 , 3 , 2 7 - 3 0 . III 2 , 2 , 8 f . HARDER2, V b, 337 bemerkt: „An die autonome Wirkung eines Naturgesetzes ist gedacht". III 2 , 3 , 1 - 3 .

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aufgrund einer Ü b e r l e g u n g ( ο υ κ έκ λ ο γ ι σ μ ο ύ ) , s o n d e r n w e i l die h ö h e r e W e s e n heit nach d e m G e s e t z der N a t u r ihr E b e n b i l d h e r v o r b r a c h t e " 9 4 . A u f den ersten Blick hin scheint P l o t i n d a m i t einer g e w u ß t e n u n d g e w o l l t e n E m a n a t i o n eine klare A b s a g e erteilt z u haben. N i c h t W i s s e n u n d W o l l e n , s o n d e r n N o t w e n d i g k e i t ist der G r u n d der S c h ö p f u n g . O d e r w ä r e P i o tins W o r t anders z u interpretieren? Sicherlich, P l o t i n hat den λ ο γ ι σ μ ό ς bei der S c h ö p f u n g gestrichen; aber n i c h t deshalb, w e i l er j e d w e d e A r t geistigen E r k e n n e n s bei G o t t u n d d e m N u s eliminieren w o l l t e , s o n d e r n lediglich die u n v o l l k o m m e n e A r t des D e n k e n s , die d e m λ ο γ ι σ μ ό ς anhaftet. D a s ergibt sich eindeutig aus I V 3 , 1 8 , 1 — 13 u n d V I 7 , 1 , 2 8 f f . 9 5 , w o der λ ο γ ι σ μ ό ς als eine d e f i z i e n t e A r t des E r k e n n e n s u n d daher als b l o ß z u r diesseitigen W e l t g e h ö r e n d hingestellt w i r d . D a s gleiche gilt für die π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς , die m a n nach V I 8 , 1 7 , 1 — 12 e b e n s o w i e die π ρ ό ν ο ι α n o c h nicht einmal auf den N u s übertragen darf, g e s c h w e i g e d e n n auf das E i n e 9 6 , d e s s e n W i r k s a m k e i t ja ü b e r G e i s t , V e r n u n f t u n d L e b e n hinausliegt (VI 8 , 1 6 , 3 5 f . ) . A l s o nicht die geistige W i r k s a m k e i t v o n „ D e n k e n " u n d „ W o l l e n " überhaupt soll d e m E i n e n g e n o m m e n w e r d e n , s o n d e r n nur die u n v o l l k o m m e n e n F o r m e n dieser Tätigkeiten in der diesseitigen W e l t . S c h o n für die s c h ö p f e r i s c h e W e l t s e e l e k o m m t , w i e P l o t i n in seiner A b h a n d l u n g g e g e n die G n o s t i k e r herausarbeitet, nicht ein Schaffen a u f g r u n d v o n

94 95

96

III 2 , 3 , 3 - 5 ; vgl. auch III 2 , 1 4 , 1 - 4 ; III 2 , 3 , 5 f . ; VI 8 , 1 7 , 1 - 9 ; VI 8,14,30. Ebenso IV 3 , 1 3 , 1 7 - 2 0 ; IV 4 , 1 0 , 7 - 2 9 ; III 2 , 1 4 , 2 f . ; VI 2,21,34; VI 9,5,-8f.; IV 8 , 1 , 7 f . ; VI 8,14,30f.; VI 8,17,4; V 3,3,14: ή ότι ψυχήν δεϊ έν λογισμοϊς είναι. Auch διάνοια, διέξοδος und διανόησις gehören nicht in den Bereich von Hen und Nus. Vgl. V 3,9,20—22; V 3,17,23f.27; V 8 , 6 , 7 - 1 9 . Ferner H . R. SCHWYZER, Bewußt und Unbewußt bei Plotin: Les Sources de Plotin. Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, Tome V (Vandoeuvres —Genève 1960) 373. Auch H . R. SCHLETTE, Das Eine und das Andere. Studien zur Problematik des Negativen in der Metaphysik Plotins (München 1966) 83 Anm. 111, kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß man weder beim Einen noch beim Nus von einem λογισμός sprechen kann. Sogar die νόησις εαυτού ist dem Einen abzusprechen (VI 9,6,46—57). Ferner W. B E I E R WALTES, Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte (Frankfurt/M. 1985) 84 Anm. 26. Vgl. auch SCHWYZER, a . a . O . (Anm. 95) 372; HENRY, a . a . O . (Anm. 64) 339, hat dies zu wenig beachtet. Als unzulänglich müssen auch die Bemerkungen von ELDERS, a. a. O . (Anm. 70) 616, angesehen werden, der seine These von der Notwendigkeit der Emanation mit einigen der von mir zusammengestellten Belege über die φύσεως άνάγκη begründet, ohne das bei Plotin in aller Breite vorhandene quia-bonus-Motiv zu diskutieren und ohne auf die besonderen Ausdrücke von λογισμός und προαίρεσις zu achten, die selbstverständlich weder dem Einen noch dem Nus zukommen können. Die Alternative zu dem eliminierten λογισμός stellt daher nicht die von ELDERS behauptete «nécessité naturelle» dar, sondern die höchste Form von „Denken" und „Wollen" überhaupt. - Untersucht man die in dem von J. H . SLEEMAN U. G. P O L L E T erarbeiteten 'Lexicon Plotinianum' (Leiden 1980) angeführten Stellen zu προαίρεσις, so zeigt sich, daß diese im Bereich der menschlichen Seele und der Gestirnseelen anzusiedeln ist. Nach IV 4,35,24—26 hat zwar das Weltwesen einen Willen (προαίρεσις), aber nach IV 4,36,24—26 bedarf das All dieses Willens nicht, da es höher als die προαίρεσις steht. Was schon vom All negiert wird, muß daher erst recht vom Schöpfer des Alls negiert werden (vgl. III, 3,3,19), erst recht vom Nus und vom Einen.

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διάνοια in Frage 97 , sondern nur aufgrund der Schau (θέα) der Ideen in dem ihr vor- bzw. übergeordneten Geist 98 . Lehnt Plotin daher an diesen Stellen ein Schaffen der Weltseele aufgrund von „Planen und Sinnen" (διάνοια) bzw. aufgrund von „Berechnen und Uberlegen" (λογισμός) ab, weil er das Schaffen in die Natur der Weltseele verlegt — „das Schaffen lag in ihrer Natur, ihre Kraft war das Schöpferische" (II 9,4,15f.) —, so bedeutet dies mitnichten einen Gegensatz zum Schaffen aufgrund der Schau des Geistes. Denn gerade die Kraft zum Schaffen kommt der Weltseele aufgrund dieser Schau zu. „So weit sie sich dieser Schau hingibt, um so weit ist sie schöner und mächtiger" 99 . Wie sollte daher das Eine anders schaffen können als eben dadurch, daß es sich selbst in seinem „über-denkenden Erkennen" (ύπερνόησις) erblickte 100 und in seinem Wollen bejahte 101 . Das sind die beiden Wirksamkeiten im Einen 102 . Der Traktat VI 8 arbeitet die Wirksamkeit (ενέργεια) des Ersten in einer Kühnheit ohnegleichen heraus. „Denn man darf sich nicht scheuen, ihn als erste Wirksamkeit (ένέργειαν την πρώτην) ohne Seinsheit (ουσία) anzusetzen, sondern in eben dieser Wirksamkeit hat man so etwas wie seine Existenz (ύπόστασιν) zu erblicken. Wollte man ihn als E x i s t e n z o h n e W i r k s a m k e i t ansetzen, so wäre der Urgrund unvollständig und unvollkommen der vollkommenste aller Gründe. Und wenn man die Wirksamkeit erst hinzusetzte, so beließe man ihm nicht seine Einheit. Wenn nun die Wirksamkeit vollkommener ist als die Seinsheit, das Erste aber das Vollkommenste ist, so muß Er die erste Wirksamkeit sein" 103 . VI 8,16,30—36 versucht dann, den geheimnisvollen Charakter dieser Wirksamkeit ein wenig zu erhellen. „Wenn nun seine Wirksamkeit nicht geworden ist, sondern immer da war und gleichsam sein Erwachen ist (έγρήγορσις), wobei das Erwachte nicht von ihr verschieden ist, ein immerwährendes Erwachen und ein Denken über dem Denken (ύπερνόησις), dann ist er das, zu dem er erwachte. Und dies Erwachen ist 'jenseits der Seinsheit' (έπέκεινα ουσίας), des Geistes, des vernunftgemäßen Lebens (καί νου και ζωής εμφρονος), das aber ist er selbst. Mithin ist er selbst eine Wirksamkeit, die über Geist, Vernunft und Leben hinausliegt". Er ist also Energeia 104 , besser verharrende Energeia 105 , weil er nicht auf etwas außer, sondern in ihm blickt 106 , mag diese Energeia auch über νους, 97

II 9 , 2 , 1 4 ; II 9 , 4 , 1 5 ; II 9 , 8 , 2 0 f . In IV 8 , 8 , 1 5 präzise von der Weltseele: μηδ' έκ λ ο γ ι σ μ ο ύ . II 9 , 2 , 1 4 - 1 6 ; II 9 , 4 , 8 f . ; dazu HARDER2, III b, 4 1 9 , 4 2 3 . Entsprechend in IV 8 , 8 , 1 5 : Durch „reinen Geist" (νψ) wirkt sie. "119,2,16. 100 Bes. VI 8 , 1 6 ; auch VI 8 , 1 8 , 3 2 - 4 3 ; V 4 , 2 , 1 8 . 3 5 ; VI 9 , 6 , 4 6 - 5 0 . 101 S . o . A n m . 64. Er ist „Liebe zu sich selbst": VI 8 , 1 5 , 1 ; 1 6 , 1 3 f . 102 Vgl. auch R. ARNOU, Le Désir de D i e u dans la Philosophie de Plotin (Paris 1 1921, R o m 2 1967) 143 A n m . 1: « L ' U n se connaît en quelque sorte; il s'aime en quelque manière; il y a là un effort pour concevoir ce que peut être la vie intime de Dieu». 103 VI 8 , 2 0 , 9 - 1 5 . Hervorhebung von mir! 104 VI 8 , 1 6 , 1 5 . 2 5 . 3 0 . 3 1 . 3 5 ; VI 8 , 1 2 , 2 2 - 2 6 ; VI 8 , 1 3 , 5 - 8 ; VI 8 , 1 5 , 2 0 f . ; VI 8 , 2 0 , 7 - 1 5 ; V 4,2,35. 105 VI 8 , 1 6 , 1 5 . 106 VI 8 , 1 6 , l l f . 2 0 f . 2 5 — 3 0 ; VI 8 , 1 7 , 2 5 f . 98

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φρόνησις und ζωή hinausliegen 107 . Alle unsere Begriffe müssen nämlich bei ihrer Anwendung auf Gott mit einem οίον versehen werden 108 . Nach V 1,6,16— 19 und V 1,7,5 f. entsteht der Nus dadurch, daß das Eine sich auf sich selbst zurückwendet und sich dabei „erblickt" 109 . Nimmt man die beiden Stellen von VI 8,17,20f. und VI 8,18,38—43 hinzu, wo die Hervorbringung des Nus dem Willen des Einen zugeschrieben wird, dann haben wir ein auf Denken und Wollen beruhendes Erzeugen des Nus! Auch der Geist 110 , ebenso die Seele111, wird schöpferisch tätig durch das Erkennen (νοεΐν) seiner selbst. In III 8,8,25f. wird darum erklärt, daß alles Seiende ein Nebenprodukt (πάρεργον) von Betrachtung (θεωρία) sei 112 . Der Nus schafft, erklärt Proklos später 113 , indem er sich selbst erkennt (τω νοεΐν έαυτόν). Bedenkt man all dies, vor allem den von Plotin immer wieder hervorgehobenen Gedanken, daß das Erste das Vollkommenste sei, dann scheint es kaum möglich, das Erste bei der Hervorbringung und Zeugung des Nus der Freiheit beraubt sehen zu wollen. Albert der Große wird später schreiben : perfectissimum agens non agit per necessitatevi naturae, sed per voluntatem et sapientiam: sapientiae autem perfectio consistit in ordine secundum optimum modum universi114. Immerhin, das Wort von der ohne λογισμός und προαίρεσις stattfindenden Emanation war gefallen. Wer nicht auf seinen Sinn achtete, konnte und mußte darin die Ablehnung einer freigewollten Schöpfung erblicken. Besonders anstößig wirkte es natürlich auf christliche Kreise, die in der Welt das Ergebnis göttlicher Weisheit und göttlichen Willensentschlusses sahen. Das Wort von der φύσεως ανάγκη 1 1 5 tat ein übriges und letztes dazu. Denn damit war ja die Notwendigkeit der Schöpfung in aller Form ausgesprochen und geradezu sanktioniert. In der necessitas naturae, die etwa Albert der Große, Thomas, Eckhart und Cusanus so leidenschaftlich bekämpfen, bekämpfen sie diese von Plotin datierende φύσεως ανάγκη. Gemeint war aber, 107 108

109

110 111 112 113

114

115

VI 8 , 1 6 , 3 1 - 3 7 ; VI 7 , 3 9 , 1 6 - 3 4 . VI 8 , 1 3 , 4 7 - 5 0 . In VI 8 , 9 , 4 4 - 4 7 schreibt Plotin: indem Es das ist, was Es will; oder vielmehr, auch dies 'was Es will' hat es von sich gestoßen hinab ins Reich der seienden Dinge, Es ist seinerseits größer als alles Wollen (θέλειν) und weist dem Wollen einen Platz unter sich an". Vgl. zur Deutung der beiden Stellen jetzt: H . R. SCHWYZER, Nachlese zur indirekten Uberlieferung des Plotin-Textes: Museum Helveticum 26 (1969) 259f. und ebd. die Anm. 15 u. 16. V 3,7,18-26. V 3 , 7 , 2 6 - 3 4 ; II 9,4. Vgl. dazu III 8 ganz. In Tim. I 3 3 5 , 2 2 - 2 4 ; 3 3 5 , 2 9 - 3 3 6 , 3 ; 3 9 6 , 5 - 2 6 (DIEHL); vgl. in Parm. 791,14.21 f. (COUSIN2): τω νοεΐν έαυτόν ποιητής εσται πάντων. Vgl. auch DODDS, Proclus. The Elements of Theology (Oxford 21963) 290f. In II Sent. 1,3 ad 3um; XXVII 12 (BORGNET). In S. Th. I qu. 54; XXXI 553 (BORGNET) heißt es: Agere propter finem non habitum in seipso, qui non est nisi per opus acquiratur, indigentiae est; et sic non agit Deus. Agere autem ut nihil agenti acquiratur opere operato, largitatis et magnificentiae summae est. Et hoc modo Deus agit. — Zur Textergänzung und Verbesserung dieser Stelle vgl. H . KÜHLE, a . a . O . (Anm. 7) 61 Anm. 45. III 2 , 2 , 8 f . ; vgl. ferner III 2,3,35; II 9 , 8 , 2 0 - 2 9 ; II 9,3,8.

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wie wir jetzt wissen, bloß das Gesetz, daß jedes Vollkommene ein sich ähnliches Ebenbild hervorbringt; die res naturales notwendig, die geistbegabten Wesen dagegen bewußt und gewollt, aufgrund bloßer m o r a l i s c h e r Notwendigkeit. Diese war intendiert, nicht die physische und metaphysische. An dieser moralischen Notwendigkeit setzt der zweite Kritikpunkt von F. RICKEN ein 1 1 6 . Für diesen Begriff berufe ich mich, wie RICKEN richtig sieht, auf LEIBNIZ. Unter moralischer Notwendigkeit versteht LEIBNIZ das Gesetz, wonach das vollkommenste Wesen auf die vollkommenste Weise handeln und darum das Beste wählen „ m u ß " , bzw. wonach weise und tugendhafte Personen ihrer Weisheit und Tugendhaftigkeit entsprechend handeln „ m ü s s e n " 1 1 7 . Die moralische Notwendigkeit setzt Erkennen und Wollen, in welcher Form auch immer, im handelnden Prinzip voraus, ist jedoch der Freiheit, wie LEIBNIZ darzulegen nicht müde wird, gerade nicht entgegengesetzt. Denn sie stempelt das vom Besten Unterschiedene keineswegs zur Unmöglichkeit, so daß das von Gott Unterlassene einen Widerspruch einschlösse 1 1 8 . Wäre letzteres der Fall, läge die metaphysische Notwendigkeit vor, die mit Freiheit unverträglich ist. So kann LEIBNIZ schreiben: „ F ü r Gott gibt es also eine Freiheit, die nicht nur vom Zwange, sondern auch von der Notwendigkeit unabhängig ist. Ich rede hier von metaphysischer Notwendigkeit; denn der Zwang des Weisen zur Wahl des Besten ist eine moralische Notwendigkeit" 1 1 9 . Eben diesen Begriff von moralischer Notwendigkeit, den ich hier zugrunde lege, mißversteht RICKEN 120 , weil er darin „eine absolute N ö t i g u n g " erblickt: „Dieser Begriff der moralischen Notwendigkeit ist geeignet, das Wollen von Pio tins Einem bei der Erzeugung des Geistes zu erklären. Für die christliche Schöpfungslehre ist er dagegen unbrauchbar . . . Läge für Gott eine solche moralische Notwendigkeit vor, die Welt zu schaffen, so könnte er nicht wollen, die Welt nicht zu schaffen, d. h. er wollte das Dasein der Welt notwendig" 1 2 1 . Diese Folgerung ist jedoch nach LEIBNIZ gerade nicht zutreffend, weil, wie schon gesagt, das durch die Wahl des Besten Ausgeschiedene dadurch nicht unmöglich gemacht wird. „ N u n ist nichts notwendig", lautet ein Grundsatz von LEIBNIZ 122 , „dessen Gegenteil möglich ist". Gegenüber BAYLE bemerkt er daher: „Diese vorgebliche . . . Notwendigkeit ist nur moralischer Natur, wie wir dargetan haben: sie berührt die Freiheit gar nicht, sondern hat im Gegenteil ihre beste Anwendung zur Voraussetzung; sie bewirkt nur, daß die Gegenstände, die Gott nicht wählte, möglich bleiben" 1 2 3 . Die moralische Notwendigkeit kommt nach LEIBNIZ bei Gott in zweifacher Form zum Ausdruck, die er so beschreibt: „ . . . die Güte hat Gott 116 117

118 119 120 121 122 123

a . a . O . ( A n m . 79) 485f. a . a . O . ( A n m . 46) II. Teil, 257i. ( § 2 0 1 ) ; vgl. auch §§ 1 9 1 , 2 0 0 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 0 , 2 3 1 , 2 3 3 ; ferner Einl. Abhandlung 34 (§ 2); Betrachtungen 428f. Vgl. auch oben S. 1002f. ebd. II. Teil, 279 (§ 230). ebd. a. a. O . ( A n m . 79) 486. ebd. a . a . O . ( A n m . 14) 31 f. (§ 13). a . a . O . ( A n m . 46) II. Teil, 280 (§ 231).

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zum Schaffen getrieben, damit er sich mitteilen konnte; und dieselbe Güte treibt ihn im Verein mit seiner Weisheit zur Erschaffung des Besten; darunter ist alles folgende, die Wirkung und die Mittel, verstanden. Sie treibt ihn an, ohne ihn zu nötigen, denn sie macht das, was sie nicht erwählte, keineswegs unmöglich" 124 . Was ergibt sich daraus für Plotin? Bisher wurde gezeigt, daß es in dem Einen, dem Allervollkommensten, zumindest Erkenntnis in Form eines „Überdenkens" (bzw. eines Selbstbewußtseins) und daß es Willen in ihm gibt. Durch beide Tätigkeiten ist das Eine auf sich selbst bezogen, und sie machen sein Wesen aus 125 . Ferner wurde gezeigt, daß das grundlegende Schöpfungsmotiv bei Plotin die Güte des Einen bzw. Gottes ist. Auch die Stellen, die von einem notwendigen Hervorgang sprechen, enthalten zugleich das Motiv vom bonum diffusivum126. Ausgeschlossen hat Plotin beim Hervorbringen des Einen bzw. Geistes ein „Uberlegen" und „Ausklügeln", wie es in der diesseitigen Welt angetroffen wird. Dies zu Recht! Aber damit muß eben nicht Denken und Wollen in jedweder Form beim Hervorbringen ausgeschlossen sein, wenn es dafür auch nur schwache Anklänge im plotinischen Schrifttum gibt. ATKINSON weist in seinem Kommentar 127 darauf hin, daß die für die Negation eines freigewollten Schaffens stets in Anspruch genommene Stelle V 1,6,26f. neben der βούλησις auch eine πρόσνευσις des Einen beim Hervorbringen ablehne. Letzteres wohl deshalb, weil Plotin das von den Gnostikern angenommene „Herabsinken" (νεϋσις/νεϋσαι) 128 der schöpferischen Seele beim Erschaffen bekämpft und es deshalb erst recht vom Einen in bezug auf die Hervorbringung des Nus fernhalten wolle. Wichtig ist Plotin einzig die Einsicht, daß das an sich und reine Gute das Gute nicht für sich behalten kann, sondern einem anderen mitteilen „muß", wenn dies doch schon die dem Einen nachgeordneten Dinge tun, wie die Erfahrung lehrt. Aber dieses „muß" bedeutet eben keine absolute Nötigung bzw. absolute Notwendigkeit, wie das oben angeführte Zitat des LEIBNIZ belegt und die unten noch zu behandelnden christlichen Autoren zeigen werden. KOBUSCH hat sehr zutreffend erkannt, daß „das άγαθοποιείν . . . ein nicht determinierender Wesenszug Gottes" ist 1 2 9 . ,,'Αγαθότης nötigt nicht, sondern befähigt allererst zur Tätigkeit ad extra" 1 3 0 . Aufschlußreich ist ein Vergleich mit SPINOZAS Erklärung des Hervorganges der Dinge aus Gott. Er notiert in seiner 'Ethik', die zugleich seine Metaphysik ist, in der Anmerkung zu Lehrsatz 17: „Ich glaube jedoch klar genug gezeigt zu haben (siehe Lehrsatz 16), daß aus der höchsten Macht Gottes oder seiner unendlichen Natur unendlich vieles auf unendlich viele Weise, das heißt Alles, notwendig geflossen ist oder immer mit der gleichen Notwendigkeit folgt; auf dieselbe Weise, wie aus der Natur des Dreiecks von Ewigkeit und in Ewigkeit folgt,

124 125 126 127 128 129 130

ebd. 278 (§ 228). Vgl. VI 8 , 1 3 , 6 f . u. 1 6 , 3 0 - 3 4 . V l , 6 , 3 0 f f . ; II 9 , 8 , 2 1 - 2 6 ; III 2 , 2 , 9 - 1 2 ; III 2 , 3 , 4 f . a . a . O . (Anm. 78) 142. II 9 , 4 , 6 - 1 0 ; II 9,11,13; II 9 , 1 2 , 3 9 - 4 3 ; vgl. aber oben S. 1011 zu VI 8 , 1 6 , 2 4 . a . a . O . (Anm. 65) 77. ebd. 78.

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daß seine drei Winkel gleich zwei rechten sind" 1 3 1 . Das Beispiel vom Dreieck verdeutlicht in aller Form die absolute Notwendigkeit, die LEIBNIZ auch die geometrische bzw. logische und metaphysische Notwendigkeit nennt. Jetzt ist das Gegenteil unmöglich geworden, weil es einen Widerspruch involvierte. LEIBNIZ hat sich immer wieder gegen diese absolute Notwendigkeit beim Hervorgang der Welt aus Gott gewandt und beim Notwendigkeitsbegriff aus guten Gründen eine dreifache Differenzierung vorgenommen: die schon genannte absolute (= metaphysische, logische, geometrische) Notwendigkeit, die physische Notwendigkeit, wie sie etwa in den Naturgesetzen vorliegt und die auch schon das Gegenteil zuläßt, und schließlich die moralische Notwendigkeit, die die Freiheit nicht aufhebt, sondern voraussetzt 132 . Nirgendwo gibt es bei Plotin Andeutungen dafür, daß sein Grundgedanke vom bonum diffusivum diese absolute Notwendigkeit meint, so daß das Eine deshalb den Geist hervorgebracht habe, weil das Gegenteil auf einen Widerspruch führte. Das pio tinische bonum diffusivum meint nicht eine solche Widersprüchlichkeit, sondern die Eigenart und das Proprium des Guten, sich mitzuteilen. Das Gegenteil bleibt möglich, wie aus V 5,12,43—45 und VI 7,8,13 f. zu ersehen ist. Hätte das Eine das Gute für sich behalten, dann wären „alle anderen Dinge verborgen geblieben", heißt es in IV 8,6,1—6 133 . Im selben Kapitel derselben Schrift hebt Plotin ebenfalls hervor, daß der sinnenhafte Kosmos nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger als „eine Offenbarung des vollendeten Guten im geistigen Reich, seiner Kraft und seiner Güte ist" 1 3 4 . Damit hat Plotin der Freiheit Gottes im Wirken „nach außen" Raum gelassen, wenngleich er selbst diese Freiheit kaum gelehrt hat. In seinem Augustinusbuch bemerkt E. GILSON, gestützt auf die maßgeblichen Augustinustexte: „Die Güte Gottes hat nicht zugelassen, daß eine gute Schöpfung im Nichts bliebe" 13S .

IV. Proklos und Dionysius

Pseudo-Areopagita

Sowohl sachlich wie terminologisch gesehen stoßen wir bei Proklos zunächst noch auf die unveränderte Position Plotins. Das Gute schafft aufgrund seiner Güte 1 3 6 , kennt keinen Neid 1 3 7 , weil es darüber wie über jede Bedürftigkeit (ενδεια) erhaben ist 138 . Spricht man ihm den Willen ab (βούλησις), so ist das nicht

131

132 133 134 135 136

137 138

Die Ethik, nach geometrischer Methode dargestellt. Ubers., Anmerk. und Register von O . BAENSCH: Philos. Bibliothek, Bd. 92 (Hamburg 1955) 22f. a . a . O . (Anm. 46) Einl. Abhandlung 34 (§ 2). Vgl. auch II 9 , 8 , 2 4 f . ; vgl. oben S. 1000. IV 8 , 6 , 2 3 - 2 6 . Ähnlich in der Schrift gegen die Gnostiker: II 9 , 4 , 2 2 - 3 2 u. II 9 , 8 , 8 - 2 0 . Der heilige Augustinus. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre (Hellerau 1930) 334. St. th., PPr. 25; 27 (DODDS); in Tim. I 3 6 2 , 2 8 - 6 3 , 7 ; 3 6 5 , 2 0 - 2 6 ; 381,20; III 7 , 8 - 1 7 (DIEHL). Beide Schriften im folgenden nach diesen Ausgaben zitiert. PPr. 98; 122; 131. In Tim. I 3 6 3 , 9 - 1 1 ; 3 6 3 , 2 6 - 6 4 , 7 ; 3 6 4 , 2 3 - 6 5 , 3 ; 3 6 5 , 2 6 - 6 6 , 2 .

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als einfache Negation, sondern im Sinne der negativen Theologie aufzufassen 1 3 9 . Es ist ja auch „nicht Vermögen", „sondern das Maß allen Vermögens", nicht Sein, sondern Prinzip des Seins, „daher auch nicht Willen, weil dieser erst von ihm stammt" 1 4 0 . Erst recht transzendiert es die Sphäre des λογισμός 1 4 1 . Im Unterschied zu Plotin kommt aber nun das voluntative Moment viel stärker zum Vorschein: Der Demiurg, der nicht mit dem Guten überhaupt, sondern mit dem νους νοερός zusammenfällt 1 4 2 , übt seine schöpferische Tätigkeit nämlich aufgrund von überlegtem und freiem Entschluß (βούλησις) aus 1 4 3 . Repräsentativ für viele Texte mag eine Stelle stehen, die zugleich als Quelle für das dionysische Sonnengleichnis in IV 1 von 'De Div. N o m . ' 1 4 4 in Frage kommen könnte und daher für dessen Interpretation von größter Relevanz ist: „Wenn der Demiurg nämlich immer gut ist, w i l l er (βούλεται) immer allen Dingen das Gute geben. Wie nämlich die Sonne durch ihr Sein (εν οσω εστί) alles erleuchtet, und wie das Feuer erwärmt — aufgrund ihres Wesens ist sie nämlich erleuchtend, das Feuer dagegen erwärmend (κατ'ούσίαν γάρ έστιν ô μεν φωτιστικός, το δε πυρ θερμαντικόν) —, so w i l l (βούλεται) auch das ewig Gute immer das Gute. Wenn er aber immer das Gute w i l l , vermag er es auch immer, damit er nicht, zwar wollend, aber unvermögend, das Schicksal der dürftigsten Dinge erleide. Denn auch der sittlich Gute will nichts anderes, als was er vermag. Wenn er aber immer das Gute zu schaffen vermag, tut er es auch immer, damit er nicht vergeblich (άτελής) das Vermögen (δύναμις) besitze . . . " 1 4 S . „ D i e Uberfülle, das Tätig- und Erzeugendsein machen die Eigentümlichkeit der βούλησις a u s " 1 4 6 . Auch im Neuplatonismus ist die Schöpfung also nicht „unwilled", wie DODDS meint 1 4 7 . W. BEIERWALTES hat in seiner Proklosarbeit mit Recht auf die Bedeutung des Willens bei Proklos aufmerksam gemacht, jedoch mit der kaum zulässigen Einschränkung, daß der Wille des Demiurgen die Welt nicht in ihrem „ D a ß " 139 140 141

142

143

144 145 146 147

In T i m . I 3 6 4 , 1 0 - 1 6 . ebd.; ferner in Tim. I 4 1 2 , 5 - 1 0 . St. th., Pr. 122 (p. 108,11); vgl. auch Pr. 189 (von der Seele; wie Plotin IV 3 , 1 3 ) . Der Ausdruck λογισμός bereits bei Piaton, Tim. 34 a 8. In T i m . I 3 1 7 , 1 7 - 1 9 ; 21; 3 6 0 , 1 6 - 2 8 ; 3 6 1 , 1 9 - 2 6 ; 3 6 2 , 2 - 9 ; 3 6 5 , 1 0 - 3 6 6 , 2 ; 3 6 8 , 2 3 f . ; St. th., Pr. 34 (p. 3 8 , 3 f . ) . In Tim. I 3 1 8 , 3 - 8 ; 3 6 2 , 2 - 9 ; 3 6 6 , 2 - 4 ; 3 6 7 , 2 - 6 . 1 2 . 2 0 - 2 9 ; 3 6 8 , 1 ; 3 7 1 , 4 - 7 . 1 3 - 1 9 ; 3 7 2 , 1 3 - 2 0 ; 3 7 9 , 2 6 - 3 8 0 , 2 ; 3 9 4 , 1 2 - 2 5 ; 3 9 6 , 5 - 2 5 ; 4 1 2 , 1 - 1 0 ; III 2 0 9 , 1 5 f . Β ο ύ λ η σ ι ς bei Arist., N E III 6; 1113 a 15. D a z u den Kommentar von DIRLMEIER, a . a . O . (Anm. 32) 332. Bei Proklos von π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς unterschieden, die dem Demiurgen nicht z u k o m m t , in T i m . I 390, lOf. (wie Plotin VI 8 , 1 7 , 1 - 9 ) , wohl der Seele, in Parm. 7 8 7 , 2 f . (COUSIN 2 ). N a c h dieser Ausgabe wird der Parmenideskommentar zitiert. Vgl. unten S. 1022. In T i m . I 3 6 7 , 2 0 - 3 6 8 , 1 ; vgl. auch 3 7 1 , 9 - 3 7 2 , 1 9 ; 372,19 - 31; 3 8 1 , 8 - 1 0 . 1 5 f . In T i m . I 3 7 1 , 1 7 - 1 9 ; 3 7 2 , 8 - 1 0 . a . a . O . (Anm. 113) 290.

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setze, sondern nur in ihrem „Wie" gründe, daß sie nämlich gut sei 148 . KOBUSCH hat sich ihm angeschlossen 149 . Bei Proklos müssen folgende Momente zusammen gesehen werden: 1. Wirken (ποιεϊν) durch Sein (αύτφ τω είναι) und Wirken durch Denken (νοεΐν) schließen einander nicht aus. Denn der demiurgische Nus schafft, indem er durch sein Sein schafft, gerade durch sein Denken 1 5 0 . Dieses macht ja sein Sein aus. Völlig zutreffend schreibt BEIERWALTES: „Der denkende Vollzug des Seins von Geist in ihm selbst aber ist zugleich wirkendes Schaffen ad extra" 151 . Nikolaus von Cues wird später bei der Gegenüberstellung von göttlichem und menschlichem Erkennen erklären 152 : Conceptio divinae mentis est rerum producilo; conceptio nostrae mentis est rerum notio. Si mens divina est absoluta entitas, tunc eius conceptio est entium creatio; et nostrae mentis conceptio est entium assimilatio. 2. Ebenso wie der Nus alles durch sein Denken schafft, schafft er alles durch sein Wollen bzw. seinen Willen 153 . Dabei fallen folgende Einzelmomente auf: a) Für die Tätigkeit des Schaffens bzw. Hervorbringens, die dem Willen zugeschrieben wird, werden fast dieselben Ausdrücke verwandt wie für das Schaffen, das dem Denken des Nus zugeschrieben wird. Es sind dies, wenn man bloß die in den Anmerkungen 143 und 150 angegebenen Textstellen einmal zugrunde legt, folgende Worte:

148 149 150

151 152 153

Bereich der Willenstätigkeit

Bereich der Denktätigkeit

- δημιουργεί - γεννητικόν - γίνεται - ενεργεί - κατασκευάσαντα - παράγει - ποιεί - προήλθεν - το είναι χορηγών - ύφίσταντα

-

δημιουργικόν γεννώσιν γίγνεται

παραγει ποιεί

ύφίστησιν, ύποστατικόν

a . a . O . (Anm. 18) 144f., 145 Anm. 86. a. a. O. (Anm. 65) 79. Klassisch hierfür der Text in St. th., Pr. 174 (p. 152,10—15): εί γαρ νοητόν έστι και νους ταύτόν και το εινα έκαστου τη νοήσει xfj εν έαυτω [ταύτόν], ποιεί δε α ποιεί τω είναι, καί παράγει κατά το είναι ο έστι, καί τω ν ο ε ΐ ν άν παράγοι τα παραγόμενα, το γαρ είναι καί το ν ο ε ΐ ν εν αμφω. και γαρ ó νους και [πάν] το öv το έν αύτφ ταύτόν. εί ούν ποιεί τω είναι, το δε είναι ν ο ε ΐ ν έστι, ποιεί τω νοεΐν. Ferner in Parm. 7 9 1 , 1 4 - 1 6 . 21 f.; 8 4 3 , 3 1 - 8 4 4 , 4 ; in Tim. I 3 3 5 , 1 9 - 2 5 ; 3 5 2 , 5 - 1 0 ; 390,10; 3 9 6 , 3 - 2 6 ; 4 2 1 , 2 7 - 4 2 2 , 1 ; Theol. Plat. V 16; 276,45f. (PORTUS). a . a . O . (Anm. 18) 146. De mente 3 (h V, S. 57, Ζ. 1 3 - 1 6 ) . Vgl. oben Anm. 143.

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b) Der Wille bzw. das Wollen des demiurgischen Nus wird von Proklos konsistent mit βούλησις bzw. βούλεσθαι und θέλημα wiedergegeben, nicht mit προαίρεσις, ebenso das Denken mit νοεϊν, nicht etwa mit λογίζεσθαι und λογισμός. Die im Parmenideskommentar von Proklos aufgeworfene Fragestellung, ob die Ursache dieser Welt durch προαίρεσις und λογισμός oder durch ihr Sein selbst das All hervorbringe 1 5 4 , kann daher nur im Sinn der zweiten Möglichkeit entschieden werden. Denn προαίρεσις und λογισμός kommen dem Nus nicht zu, wohl aber Wollen und Denken in Form von βούλεσθαι und νοειν. So Schloß auch Plotin ein Hervorbringen der Welt durch die schöpferische Weltseele zwar aufgrund von διάνοια und λογισμός aus, nicht aber aufgrund der der Weltseele eigentümlichen „Schau" (θέα) des Geistes l s s . Der Nus muß „durch sein Sein wirken", heißt es im 'Timaioskommentar', damit wir ihn nicht „dem Vorsatz (προαίρεσιν) und der zweideutigen Entscheidung (άμφίβολον ροπή ν ) " unterwerfen 1 5 6 . Gemäß προαίρεσις schaffen bedeutet an der angegebenen Stelle des Parmenideskommentars ebenfalls, daß das Wirken dann „unbeständig (άστατος) und zweideutig (άμφίβολος) sei, zu jeweils anderer Zeit sich anders verhalte und der Kosmos vergänglich sein werde" (786,22—24). c) Wie stark der voluntative Faktor für das schöpferische Wirken des Nus bestimmend ist, zeigt das im 'Timaioskommentar' erörterte Problem, ob der Demiurg noch gut sein könne, wenn er auch das Böse und Übel gewollt habe 1 5 7 . Hat er es andererseits nicht gewollt, wie kann es dann sein? V o r allem aber: „Dann gibt es etwas, was gegen den Willen (ακουσίως) des Vaters von allem geworden i s t " 1 5 8 . Mit anderen Worten: Weder das Übel noch die Welt überhaupt kann „unfreiwillig" durch den Nus geworden sein. d) Zu erinnern ist ferner an das schon genannte Proprium des Willens, Uberfülle zu sein, tätig zu sein und zu erzeugen 1 5 9 . 3. Die drei Momente, nämlich Schaffen durch Sein, durch Denken und durch Wollen, die sich schon bisher als einander zugeordnet erwiesen haben, faßt Proklos dann in folgendem Satz zusammen: „Insofern der Demiurg Nus ist, bringt er alles durch seine Gedanken hervor, insofern er Noeton ist, schafft er durch sein Sein, insofern er Gott ist, allein durch seinen W i l l e n " 1 6 0 . KOBUSCH war auf der richtigen Fährte, als er diese Stelle neben zwei anderen 1 6 1 als „ver-

160

In Parm. 7 8 6 , 1 6 - 7 8 8 , 1 ; vgl. in Tim. I 2 6 8 , 6 - 1 3 . Vgl. oben S. 1012f. In Tim. I 3 9 0 , 9 - 1 1 ; vgl. oben Anm. 143. In Tim. I 3 7 3 , 2 8 - 3 8 1 , 2 1 . ebd. 374,1 f. Vgl. oben Anm. 146. In Tim. I 3 6 2 , 2 - 4 : . . . καθό μεν νοΰς ό δημιουργός, παράγει τα πάντα ταϊς έαυτοΰ νοήσεσι, καθό δε νοητόν έστιν αύτω τω είναι ποιεί, καθό δέ θεός, τω βούλεσθαι μόνον. Vgl. dazu oben S. 1007 den Text des Thomas von Aquin, wo wir auch die drei genannten Momente haben. Genauso Albert der Große in seinem Kommentar zu 'De divinis nominibus': Unde cortcedimus eum agere ex ordine suae sapientiae et per libertatem suae voluntatis et tarnen secundum suam essentiam, non tarnen secundum necessitatem essentiae (zitiert bei SCHNEIDER, a . a . O . [Anm. 7] 62, Anm. 105).

161

Nämlich in Tim. I 3 1 8 , 6 u. 362,7.

154 155 156 157 158 159

ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NEUPLATONISMUS U N D CHRISTENTUM

1021

dächtige(n) Stellen" im Sinne einer seinsetzenden Tätigkeit des göttlichen Willens bezeichnete 1 6 2 . Dennoch blieb er bei seiner Auffassung, daß der göttliche Wille lediglich eine das Seiende in seiner Wiebeschaffenheit bestimmende Instanz sei. 4. D e r Wille des demiurgischen N u s wirkt nicht losgelöst von der Güte, sondern in Abhängigkeit von ihr, durch sie bestimmt und motiviert 1 6 3 : „ A u f grund seiner Güte schafft er durch seinen Willen alles". Die Triade von Vorsehung, Wille und Güte, die beim Hervorbringen wirksam ist, muß nach Proklos so verstanden werden, „ d a ß die Vorsehung am Willen hängt, der Wille jedoch am G u t e n " 1 6 4 . BEIERWALTES bemerkt richtig: „ E s kann also im Horizont dieses Denkens nie gesagt werden, daß der Wille allein das bewegende Element des Hervorgangs sei, sondern die Einheit von Gutheit, Wille und Vordenken (πρόνοια)"165. 5. Keinen Zweifel mehr darüber gibt es bei Proklos, daß auch die H y l e selbst kein vorgegebenes Prinzip mehr, sondern daß sie geschaffen ist. Mehrfach hat er dies geäußert 1 6 6 , und im Kreis heutiger Interpreten herrscht darüber Einigkeit 1 6 7 . 6. Schließlich hat Proklos wie schon Plotin vor ihm nur zu deutlich gesehen, daß Ewigsein und dennoch gleichzeitig Geschaffensein einander nicht widersprechen 1 6 8 . Man wird daher DODDS darin zustimmen, daß im Gegensatz zu einer zeitlich anfangenden Schöpfung im Christentum die Neuplatoniker nur eine von Ewigkeit her bestehende Schöpfung kennen, nicht jedoch darin, daß die neuplatonische „emanative creation" ungewollt und das Denken die einzig schöpferische Kraft ist 1 6 9 . Wir verdanken Proklos sodann die schöne und aufschlußreiche Formulierung, daß zum Guten die Mitteilung seiner selbst gehöre, und daß das Größte nicht das Gut-Sein (άγαθοειδές), sondern das G u t - T u n sei (άγαθουργόν) 1 7 0 , womit Plotins quaestio vexata nach dem Warum der Schöpfung aufs beste beantwortet ist.

162 163 164 165 166

a . a . O . (Anm. 65) 79. In T i m . I 3 6 2 , 7 f . : καί δια την άγαθότητα βουλήσει πάντα π ο ι ε ί . . . In T i m . I 3 7 1 , 6 f . ; 4 1 2 , 2 - 5 . a . a . O . (Anm. 18) 145. St. th., Pr. 72 (p. 6 8 , 2 4 - 2 7 ) ; Pr. 59 (p. 5 6 , 3 6 f . ) ; in T i m . I 3 7 3 , 3 - 5 ; 3 8 4 , 3 0 - 3 8 5 , 1 7 ; 3 8 6 , 4 - 3 8 7 , 2 5 ; 3 9 2 , 2 4 f . ; 3 9 3 , 2 1 - 3 9 4 , 3 1 ; 4 4 0 , 4 ; II 1 0 2 , 6 - 1 1 ; in R e m p . I 3 7 , 2 7 f f . (KROLL).

167

168 169 170

Vgl. etwa DODDS, a . a . O . (Anm. 113) 232 u. 239; meine Arbeit, a . a . O . (Anm. 38) 532; BEIERWALTES, Identität und Differenz: Philosophische Abhandlungen, B d . 49 (Frankf u r t / M . 1980) 95 A n m . 39; DERS., a . a . O . (Anm. 95) 190. S t . t h . , Pr. 34 (p. 3 8 , 5 ) . Für Plotin III 2 , 1 , 2 0 - 2 6 u. II 9 , 3 , 1 1 - 1 8 . a . a . O . (Anm. 113) 290. In Parm. 8 0 2 , 2 0 - 2 2 ; C o d . C u s . 186, Fol. 41 r . Pr. 122 (p. 1 0 8 , 1 9 - 2 1 ) ; griech. Text oben S. 1002. Ferner: In T i m . I 3 7 2 , 3 3 - 7 3 , 5 : το γ α ρ θ ε ί ο ν άγονον ε ί ν α ι πώς άγαθόν; . . . 373,29—31: άγαθοΰ γ α ρ το πάν άγαθύνειν, φ κατ' ούσίαν το άγαθόν, ώσπερ καί θ ε ρ μ ο ί το θ ε ρ μ α ί ν ε ι ν , φ κατ' ούσίαν το θ ε ρ μ ό ν .

68 ANRW II 36.2

1022

KLAUS KREMER

Im plotinisch-proklischen Fahrwasser segelt nun auch noch D i o n y s i u s , der Pseudo-Areopagite. Grund der Schöpfung ist negativ die Neidlosigkeit 171 , positiv daher der Charakter des Guten als eines schlechthin Guten und die περιουσία an Vermögen 172 . Gott, das Allursächliche, ist τέλειος nicht nur, weil er in sich vollendet und übervollkommen ist, . . . sondern auch weil er weder vermehrt noch vermindert werden kann, insofern er alle Dinge im voraus in sich enthält (προέχων) und gemäß einer unaufhörlichen, stets mit sich identischen, übervollen und nicht verminderungsfähigen Darreichung überströmt 1 7 3 . Darum kann Dionysius die Behauptung wagen, daß es die Natur des Guten sei, hervorzubringen und zu retten (φύσις γαρ τω άγαθω το παράγειν καί σώζειν), wie es ja auch zum Feuer gehöre, zu wärmen und nicht zu kälten 174 . Dionysius mag den Vergleich von Proklos entlehnt haben 175 , während das Beispiel vom Feuer über Plotin 176 letztlich auf Piaton 1 7 7 zurückgeht. Gerade dieser Vergleich suggeriert natürlich wieder den Gedanken, daß alles derart notwendig aus dem Guten hervorgehe wie die Wärme aus dem Feuer. Das gleiche gilt von dem berühmten Sonnengleichnis in D N IV l 1 7 8 : So wie unsere Sonne, nicht überlegend oder wollend (ού λογιζόμενος ή προαιρούμενος), sondern bloß durch ihr Sein 179 alles erleuchtet . . ., so sendet auch das Gute (τάγαθόν) . . . durch sein Sein allem Seienden in analoger Weise die Strahlen seiner ganzen Gutheit zu. In beiden Stellen ein Bekenntnis zum Determinismus erblicken zu wollen, wäre jedoch verkehrt. Zum Ausdruck kommen sollen lediglich der Gedanke Plotins, daß das Gute nicht gut sein kann, wenn es seine Güte nicht mitteilt, und der Gedanke des Proklos, daß es größer ist, Gutes zu tun als es bloß zu sein. Das muß, wie der Parallel text bei Proklos es auch zeigt 180 , Denken und freien Willen nicht ausschließen, weil die Mitteilung des Guten sich zwar in j e d e r Seinsschicht, aber dem arteigenen Charakter der jeweiligen Seinsschicht entsprechend vollzieht. Der Aquinate hat mit einem ausgezeichneten Sensorium für diesen Sachverhalt in seiner Interpretation von IV 1 die freie Willenstätigkeit Gottes ausdrücklich für Dionysius vindiziert 181 . Clemens Alexandrinus ist ebenso wie Dionysius der Ansicht, daß es zum Wesen Gottes gehöre, Gutes zu tun, wie es zum Feuer gehöre zu wärmen — unser platonisches Beispiel — und zum Licht zu

171

172

173 174 175

176 177 178 179 180 181

De div.nom. PG 3; 893 D; 956 B. - Im folgenden mit der Abkürzung D N und unter Angabe der Kolumnenseite in PG, Bd. 3, zitiert. D N 893 D; vgl. zum Ausdruck Proklos, St. th., Pr. 27 (p. 30,25); in Tim. I 381,20; Plotin, IV 8,6,11.14; V 2,1,14; V 4 , l , 2 4 f . ; VI 7,32,33. D N 977 B. D N 716 BC. In Tim. I 373,29-31 (Text oben Anm. 170); bes. 375,23-25: ού γαρ πυρός, φασί (sc. Plat. Rep. 335 D), το ψύχειν ούδέ χιόνος xò θερμαίνειν ουδέ τοΰ παναγάθου το κακύνειν. IV 7,4,29; IV 3,10,30. Rep. 335 CD. D N 693 Β. Wohl von Proklos abhängig: St. th., PPr. 174; 189. S. oben S. 1018. I n D N n n r . 8 8 u . 2 7 1 (PERA).

ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NEUPLATONISMUS

UND

CHRISTENTUM

1023

erleuchten 182 . Aber, so wurde bereits erwähnt 183 , er tut dies nicht unfreiwillig wie das Feuer, sondern aufgrund von Freiheit. Betrachtet man allerdings die Beispiele, an Hand derer und in deren Milieu Gottes schöpferische Tätigkeit zu erläutern versucht wird, dann kann man, verführt durch diese Beispiele, nur allzu leicht auf den Gedanken einer notwendigen Schöpfung kommen. Und diese Konsequenz ist denn auch tatsächlich gezogen worden 184 . Der dionysische Gott hat aber nicht nur Wissen und Erkennen seiner selbst 185 — Dionysius ist in diesem Punkt nicht so zurückhaltend wie Plotin —, sondern auch Willen. Die Ideen im Geiste Gottes stellen keine bloßen intelligiblen Formen mehr dar, sondern zugleich göttliche und gute Willensäußerungen (θεία καί άγαθά θελήματα) 186 . Damit ist die Voluntarisierung der Gottesidee vollzogen, die im paganen Bereich von Plotin 187 eingeleitet wird, dem christlichen Denken jedoch von Anfang an gegeben war 188 .

V. Augustinus

Sehr temperamentvoll stellt Augustinus verschiedentlich den Willen Gottes als die letzte ratio für die Schöpfung heraus 189 . Aber ebenso häufig antwortet er mit dem quia-bonus-Motiv190. Man hat darum bei Augustinus zwei Traditionen unterschieden191; eine theologische, die von der Offenbarung herkomme und das voluntative Moment betone, so sehr, daß Augustinus unter die Voluntaristen zu geraten schien; eine philosophische, die vom Neuplatonismus, ins-

182

Strom. I 8 6 , 3 (STÄHLIN).

183

Strom. V I I 4 2 , 4 (STÄHLIN); S. oben S. 9 9 4 .

184

D a z u PERA in seiner Ausgabe von D N (S. 166).

iss Vgl b e s 186

Djsj 8 6 9 Α - C : είδέναι, γνώσις, γινώσκειν έ α υ τ ό ν , επιστήμη.

D N 8 2 4 C . Ferner 716 Α ( β ο υ λ η θ ε ί ς ) ; 733 A ; 736 A ; 9 1 7 A ; D e eccl. hier. P G 3 ; 3 7 3 D ; 3 7 6 B ; Epist. 8, P G 3 ; 1085 D . F ü r das Willensmoment bei Dionysius vgl. n o c h O . SEMMELROTH, Gottes ausstrahlendes L i c h t : Scholastik 2 8 ( 1 9 5 3 ) 483 — 8 8 ; R . ROQUES, L'univers dionysien. Structure hiérarchique du m o n d e selon le P s e u d o - D e n y s : Théologie, T o m e 2 9 (Paris 1954) 101 f.; L . SCHEFFCZYK, a . a . O . ( A n m . 12) 67.

187

Bes. die Schrift VI 8. S. oben S. 1 0 0 6 f . - THEILER, a . a . O . ( A n m . 2 1 ) 2 3 , führt sie bereits auf die Gaiusschule und A m m o n i o s Sakkas zurück.

ISS VG[ G BENZ, Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendländischen Willensmetaphysik: Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte, B d . 1 (Stuttgart 1932) 3 2 7 f f . 189

S. oben S. 9 9 5 A n m . 4.

190

Vgl. oben den T e x t S. 9 9 6 . Ferner D e civ. Dei X I 22 ( C C L 48, 3 4 0 ) : Hanc sam, -id est ad bona creanda neam,

quae

originem

diligenter

terminât

bonitatem

considerata

Dei,

hanc,

et pie cogitata

inquam, omnes

causam

controversias

tarnen

tarn iustam atque quaerentium

cauidomundi

. . .; X I 21 ( 3 4 0 ) ; X I 2 3 ( 3 4 0 ) ; X I 2 4 ( 3 4 3 f . ) ; C o n f . X I I I 1 , 1 ; X I I I 2 , 2 ;

X I I I 4 , 5 ; Epist. V 15 ( P L 3 3 , 7 2 7 ) ; D e Trin. X I 5 , 8 ( C C L 5 0 , 3 4 4 ) ; D e doctr. christ. I 3 2 , 3 5 ( C C L 3 2 , 2 6 ) ; D e Gen. ad litt. I 7 , 1 3 ( P L 3 4 , 2 5 1 ) . 191

R . - H . COUSINEAU, Creation and F r e e d o m . A n Augustinian P r o b l e m : " Q u i a v o l u i t " a n d / o r "quia b o n u s " : Recherches Augustiniennes II (Paris 1962) 2 5 3 — 71.

68'-

1024

KLAUS KREMER

besondere von Plotin herrühre und Augustinus eher zum Deterministen zu stempeln scheine. Durch diesen neuplatonischen Strom sei die auf einen freien Willensentschluß zurückgehende Schöpfung zutiefst bedroht 192 . Augustinus selbst habe die Schwierigkeit zu beheben versucht, indem er das bonum diffusivum der Platoniker in einen amor diffusivus umgewandelt habe 193 . C o u siNEAU zweifelt jedoch, ob diese Transformation die im pio tinischen System liegenden latenten Konsequenzen wirklich unschädlich gemacht habe. Das System des Augustinus sei aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach an tinomisch, weil er teilweise miteinander unverträgliche Begriffe aufstelle und das Ganze zugleich als wahr ansehe 194 . Um ihm gerecht zu werden, müsse man zur dialektischen Aussage greifen 195 . Da das Christentum auf eigenen Quellen fußt und Augustinus andererseits vom Neuplatonismus beeinflußt ist, lassen sich tatsächlich diese beiden Traditionsströme bei ihm unterscheiden. Die Betonung der voluntas ist natürlich in erster Instanz auf das Konto der Offenbarung zu buchen. Alle christlichen Denker sind hierin den nichtchristlichen überlegen. Aber das quia-voluit-Motiv braucht keineswegs mit dem quia-bonus-Motiv in Konflikt zu geraten, weil letzteres auch für die Freiheit geöffnet ist. Die diffusio bonitatis kann sich notwendig wie auch frei vollziehen; von Hause aus ist sie weder einseitig deterministisch noch einseitig voluntaristisch zu verstehen. Nur wenn man in dem quia-bonus-Motiv Notwendigkeit erblickt, wozu C O U S I N E A U neigt 196 , ergibt sich die augustinische Antinomie mit ihrer Zuflucht zur Dialektik. Daß Plotin nicht ganz unschuldig ist an einer solchen Auslegung seines Schöpfungsmotivs, haben wir in dieser Untersuchung gezeigt. Interessant ist jedoch die Bemerkung von CH. BOYER197, Augustinus habe bis zu seinem Ende Plotin in einem orthodoxen Sinne verstanden. Es verdient registriert zu werden, daß im Zusammenhang mit dem Schöpfungsmotiv das augustinische Schrifttum keinerlei Polemik gegen die Neuplatoniker, wohl aber gegen die Manichäer aufzuweisen hat. Gegenüber diesen wird das quia-bonus-Motiv verteidigt. Augustinus empfand darum auch keine Schwierigkeit, beide Motive, wie auch Bonaventura später 198 , im selben Text unterzubringen, Gott d e s h a l b frei zu heißen, weil er gut sei 1 9 9 :

192 193 194 195 196 197

198

199

ebd. 253,255,258,268f. ebd. 262. ebd. 270. ebd. 271. ebd. 255,258,264,269. Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin (Paris 1920, 31953) 112. Vgl. auch P. HENRY, Plotin et l'Occident: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, vol. 15 (Louvain 1934, 21954) 90 ff. In II Sent. d . i . pars II dub.I (II 51): quia bonus est Deus, vult se diffundere; et quia vult se diffundere, vult creaturam producere; et quia Deus vult creaturam producere, vult creaturam esse; et ita, quia bonus est, sumus. Vgl. auch in II Sent. d. 1,1, q. 1 conci. (II 40): quia summae bonitatis, multa vult producere et se communicate. In I Sent. d. 44,1, q. 2 ad 4um (I 785); in I Sent. d. 1 dub. XIII (I 44). Enarr. in Ps. 134,10 (CCL 40, 1945). Vgl. auch F.-J. THONNARD, Caractères platoniciens de l'ontologie augustinienne: Augustinus Magister I (Paris 1954) 322.

ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NEUPLATONISMUS UND CHRISTENTUM

1025

Non omnia quae fecit, coactus est facere, sed omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit: causa omnium quae fecit, voluntas eius est. Facis tu domum, quia si nolles facere, sine habitatione remaneres; nécessitas cogit te facere domum, non libera voluntas . . . omnia haec necessitate facis. Deus bonitate fecit, nullo quod fecit eguit; ideo omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit. In 'De civ. Dei' X I 24 erscheint darum genauso wie hier und in dem bereits von Albert dem Großen zitierten T e x t 2 0 0 als Alternative zur necessitas die bonitas, worin Augustinus die libertas nicht gefährdet, sondern gerettet sieht: 'Vidit Deus, quia bonum est', satis significatur Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est201. N o c h FRANZ VON BAADER wird später so argumentieren 2 0 2 . Die Freiheit vom Anderen begründet hier zugleich die Freiheit zum Anderen. Darum dürfte es auch nicht von Erfolg gekrönt sein, wenn man an die Stelle des bonum diffusivum den amor diffusivus setzt, weil darin das freiheitliche Moment viel stärker zum Ausdruck komme (Ganz abgesehen davon, daß es eines solchen Auswegs gar nicht bedarf!). Denn wenn Gott diese Welt geschaffen hat, weil er sie liebte, taucht unweigerlich nach Art eines Regresses die zurückgreifende Frage auf, warum Gott diese Welt überhaupt liebe. Darauf gibt es keine bessere Antwort als die mit seiner summa bonitas. Nach Thomas von Aquin liebt Gott alles propter excessum suae bonitatis203, und nach Richard von St. Viktor ist die Liebe Folge der G ü t e 2 0 4 .

200 Vgl. oben S. 1004. Ebenso in seinem Kommentar zu Dionysius' 'De coelesti Hierarchia' (vgl. oben Anm. 14). LEIBNIZ in seiner 'Theodizee': „Der Entschluß zur Schöpfung ist freiwillig: Gott ist keinem Gut abgeneigt; das Gut, ja sogar das größte Gut, treibt ihn zu Handlungen, zwingt ihn aber nicht; denn seine Wahl stempelt das vom Besten Unterschiedene keineswegs zur Unmöglichkeit; sie bewirkt durchaus nicht, daß das von Gott Unterlassene einen Widerspruch einschließt" (a.a.O. [Anm. 46] Teil II, § 230). 201

CCL 48, 343. Vgl. auch ST. J. GRABOWSKI, The All Present God. A Study in St. Augustine (St. Louis and London 1954) 255f.: Die Dinge gehen aus Gott hervor nicht aufgrund von Notwendigkeit, sondern aufgrund seiner Güte, die die Freiheit beinhaltet. Auch É. GILSON, a.a.O. (Anm. 135), erblickt keine Schwierigkeit darin, den Voluntarismus der ersten Textgruppe mit dem Piatonismus der zweiten Textgruppe in Einklang zu bringen (539). Nur darf man nicht einzig den Voluntarismus der ersten Textgruppe auf den Grund des Daseins der Welt und den Piatonismus der zweiten Textgruppe bloß auf die Frage, „weshalb der Wille Gottes eine solche Welt, wie die unsere, gewollt haben könne", beziehen (333f.). Denn in beiden Textgruppen geht es um die Kardinalfrage, warum überhaupt noch Seiendes außer Gott sei. Die Identität dieser Frage in beiden Textgruppen ist von Augustinus durch das jeweils verwendete quare verbürgt. Die vorläufige Antwort auf diese Frage ist die voluntas Dei, die definitive der durch die Güte motivierte Wille.

202

Dazu HEMMERLE, Franz v. Baaders philosophischer Gedanke der Schöpfung: Symposion

203

I n D N n r . 4 0 9 (PERA).

204

V g l . J . SCHNEIDER, a . a . O . ( A n m . 7) 3 7 .

13 ( F r e i b u r g / B r . 1 9 6 3 ) 1 1 7 - 1 4 4 , bes. 1 4 4 .

1026

KLAUS

VI. Thomas

KREMER

von

Aquin

Im Vergleich zu Plotin und Proklos wird bei Thomas, wie schon bei D i o nysius und besonders bei Augustinus, die Freiheit des göttlichen Schöpfungsaktes forciert 2 0 5 . Sie gehört zu den Standardsätzen der christlichen Denker. M i t Plotin und Proklos ist Thomas sich darin einig, daß G o t t nicht aus irgendeiner Bedürftigkeit oder N o t heraus geschaffen h a t 2 0 6 . W o aber jede Bedürftigkeit und jeder Mangel fehlt, da gibt es auch keine, so hatte schon Augustinus argumentiert 2 0 7 , Notwendigkeit. Viele L e h r b ü c h e r 2 0 8 haben diese Argumentation zur Sicherung der Freiheit Gottes aufgegriffen, polemisieren aber gleichzeitig von hier aus gegen die neuplatonische N o t w e n d i g k e i t 2 0 9 ! ! ! Eine weitere thomanische Begründung für die freigewollte Schöpfung lautet: D a die bonitas Dei vollkommen ist und ohne die geschaffenen Dinge zu sein vermag, aus denen ihr nichts an Vollkommenheit zuwachsen kann, will sie diese Dinge nicht n o t w e n d i g 2 1 0 . Diese Voraussetzungen für eine freiwillige Schöpfung erfüllt auch das plotinische 205 206

207

208

209

210

Vgl. oben Anm. 9. De ver. 23,4,c. (fin.); De pot. Dei I 5,c.; III 15 ad 12um; III 17 ad 14um; I Sen:. 45,1,2, so; II Sent. 15,3,3 ad 2um; C . G . I 93 § Amplius. De div. quaest. 83 (PL 40,16): Ubi nulla indigentia, nulla nécessitas; ubi nullus defectus, nulla indigentia; nullus autem defectus in Deo; nulla ergo necessitas. Ferner Athenagoras, De resurrect. 12 (PG 6,995). Vgl. G. M. MANSER, a.a.O. (Anm. 18) 598; É. GILSON, Le Thomisme (Paris 5 1948) 179-86; F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, Ontologie: Philos. Lovan. IV (Einsiedeln 2 1953) 340—45; PÉGHAIRE, a.a.O. (Anm. 18) 28; J. BRINKTRINE, Die Lehre von der Schöpfung (Paderborn 1956) 50f. u. 55f. Vgl. auch TH. SPECHT, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik I (Regensburg 3 1925) 196-203; M. SCHMAUS, Katholische Dogmatik II 1 (München 5 1954) 8 0 - 8 2 u. 87—90; M. PREMM, Katholische Glaubenskunde I (Wien 1951) 359f. ; P O H L E — G U M M E R S BACH, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik I (Paderborn 10 1952), bes. 501 u. 517f.; D I E K A M P - J Ü S S E N , Katholische Dogmatik II (Münster 10 1952) 1 2 - 1 8 u.a. Auch Handbuch theol. Grundbegriffe II (München 1963) 510F. ; J . P. JOSSUA, L'axiome "bonum est diffusivum sui" chez S.Thomas d'Aquin: Revue des Sciences Religieuses 40 (1966) 127—153, bes. 152. — Abweichend von den Genannten: W. KERN, Zur Theologischen Auslegung des Schöpfungsglaubens: Mysterium salutis. Grundriß heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik, hrsg. v. J. FEINER U. M. LÖHRER, Bd. II (Einsiedeln 1967) 464-545, bes. 500. Dabei wäre einmal zu klären, was für eine Notwendigkeit das sein soll: 1. Jede Art von Notwendigkeit des Bedürfens haben die Neuplatoniker abgelehnt, damit also auch die Notwendigkeit des Bedürfnisses, sich im Emanationsprozeß entweder offenbaren oder gar erst vollenden zu müssen. 2. Auch die sog. metaphysische, logische oder geometrische Notwendigkeit scheidet aus, da weder Plotin noch Proklos erklärt haben, es sei widersprüchlich, wenn das Gute sich nicht mitteile. 3. Bliebe also noch die Notwendigkeit, mit der etwa die Sonne ihren Glanz oder das Feuer seine Wärme ausstrahlt, die man mit Leibniz am besten als physische Notwendigkeit bezeichnet und die im Reich der vernunftlosen Dinge anzutreffen ist. Kann Plotin jedoch im Ernst daran gedacht haben, diese Art von Notwendigkeit dem Einen zuzuschreiben, dessen Natur im „Uber-Denken" und „Wollen seiner selbst" besteht? S. th. I 19,3, c.; ad 2um; ad 4um; De ver. 23,4, c. (fin.); C.G. I 80; De pot. Dei Χ 2 ad 6um; III 15 ad 12um; III 17 ad 14um; Com. in Ephes. I 5 - 6 a ; lect. 1, nr. 11-12.

ZUM

VERHÄLTNIS

VON

NEUPLATONISMUS

UND

CHRISTENTUM

1027

Eine. Begründet man ferner die Freiheit der Schöpfung damit, daß Gott Erkennen zukommt 2 1 1 , dann müßte auch dem plotinischen Einen die Freiheit zugebilligt werden, da es ja eine Art ύπερνόησις besitzt. In diesen drei Punkten gibt es zwischen den neuplatonischen und christlichen Denkern keinen Unterschied. Thomas ist sich aber m i t Plotin noch in einem weiteren und zwar entscheidenden, ja dem entscheidenden Punkt überhaupt einig 212 . Diese Übereinstimmung soll im folgenden herausgearbeitet werden. Sehen wir uns deshalb die Beantwortung der Frage an, utrum Deus velit alia a se (S. th. I 19,2). Bereits P É G H A I R E konstatierte hier «un écho très net de Plotin»213, ohne indessen die nötigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. T H . A. A U D E T hat in seiner historischen Untersuchung zur 'Summa Theologiae' des Aquinaten gezeigt, daß alle großen Themen der thomanischen Summa wie Trinität, Inkarnation, Schöpfung — dabei wird ausdrücklich S. th. I 19,2 genannt — und gubernatio rerum von dem neuplatonischen Prinzip bonum est diffusivum sui beherrscht sind 214 . Das steht im Gegensatz zu L. ELDERS, der in der zitierten Besprechung meiner Arbeit den Einfluß des Neuplatonismus auf das Schöpfungsmotiv bedeutend verringern möchte, um dafür den der Hl. Schrift zu erhöhen 215 . Um die Tragweite dieses Textes zu ermessen, stellen wir einige pio tinische Parallelen daneben. 1. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a simili prius216 introducto. 2. Res enim naturalis non solum habet naturalem inclinationem respeau proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in ilio cum habet; sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat secundum quod possibile est.

2. V 1,6,30—37: Καί πάντα τα οντα, εως μένει, έκ της αύτών ουσίας άναγκαίαν την περί. αύτά προς το εξω αύτών έκ της παρούσης δυνάμεως δίδωσιν αύτων έξηρτημένην ύπόστασιν, εικόνα ούσαν οίον άρχετύπων ών έξέφυ. Πυρ μεν την π α ρ ' αύτού θερμότητα. καί χιών ούκ εϊσω μόνον το ψυχρόν κατέχει. μάλιστα δε οσα εύώδη μαρτυρεί τούτο, εως γάρ έστι, πρόεισί τι έξ αύτών . . . IV 8,6,7f.: εΐπερ εκάστη φύσει τούτο ενεστι το μετ' αυτήν ποιειν και έξελίττεσθαι . . .

3. Unde videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu etperfectum, fa-

3. V 1 , 6 , 3 7 - 3 9 : K a i πάντα δέ οσα ήδη τέλεια γεννά. το ôè άεί τέλειον άεί καί άίδιον γεννά, καί ελαττον δέ έαυτοϋ γεννά.

211

212 213 214 215 216

S.th. I 19,4, e. (fin.); D e pot. Dei III 15, c. (3. ratio); C . G . II 23 § Item; I Sent. 4 5 , 1 , 3 ; D e subst. sep. nr. 100 (SPIAZZI): A quolibet enim agente procedit effectus secundum modum sui esse. Esse autem primi principii est eius intelligere et velie. Procedit igitur universitas rerum a primo principio sicut ab intelligente et volente. Intelligentis autem et volentis est producere aliquid non quidem ex necessitate, sicut ipsum est, sed sicut vult et etiam intelligit. Gemeint ist natürlich bloß eine sachliche Ubereinstimmung! a . a . O . (Anm. 18) 20 A n m . 48. a . a . O . (Anm. 41) 19. a . a . O . (Anm. 70) 616. S.th. I 19,1.

1028

KLAUS KREMER

cit sibi simile. Onde et hocpertinet ad rationem voluntatis, utbonum... communicet secundum quod possibile est.

V 4 , 1 , 2 6 - 3 0 : ο τι δ' αν των άλλων είς τελείωσιν ϊη, όρώμεν γεννών καΐ ουκ άνεχόμενον εφ' έαυτού μένειν, άλλ' ετερον ποιούν, ου μόνον ö τι αν προαίρεσιν εχτ), άλλα και δσα φύει άνευ προαιρέσεως, και τα άψυχα . . .

4. Et hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinum, a qua per quandam tudinem derivatur omnis perfectio. 5. Unde, si res naturales, inquantumperfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magispertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est.

simili-

5. V l , 6 , 3 9 f . : Ti ούν χρή περί του τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδέν άπ' αυτού ή τα μέγιστα μετ' αυτόν. V 4 1,34—36: πώς οΰν το τελεώτατον καί τό πρώτον αγαθόν εν αύτω σταίη ώσπερ φθόνησαν έαυτοΰ ή άδυνατήσαν, ή πάντων δύναμις; πώς δ' άν ετι άρχή ειη;

6. Sic igitur vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam participare217.

finem,

Versuchen wir, die wichtigsten Gedanken herauszuheben. 1. Beide Denker lehren übereinstimmend, daß jede res naturalis, die zu ihrer Vollkommenheit gelangt ist, zeugt, d.h. ein sich Ähnliches hervorbringt. Thomas spricht von einer inclinatio naturalis, Plotin von einem Streben, das jedem Wesen innewohnt, wofür er auch Notwendigkeit setzen kann, was sich sachlich von der inclinatio des Thomas nicht unterscheidet. Dieses Streben nach der diffusio proprii boni gehört auch zur ratio voluntatis. 2. Aus dieser prinzipiellen Überlegung heraus, daß jedes Seiende aufgrund seiner Vollkommenheit ein ihm Ähnliches erzeuge, folgern beide Denker wiederum übereinstimmend: Dann kann man auch von Gott, dem Vollkommensten, nichts anderes als die diffusio seiner bonitas erwarten. 3. Die diffusio bonitatis erfolgt bei Thomas wie schon bei Plotin, Proklos, Dionysius und Augustinus über den Weg der Partizipation. Secundum quod possibile est, wie Thomas ausführt, auch damit das plotinische καθόσον δύναται überraschenderweise treffend (V 4,1). 4. Obwohl Thomas von einer inclinatio naturalis, von einem pertinere ad rationem voluntatis spricht und den Schluß von den vollkommenen res naturales auf den absolut vollkommenen göttlichen Willen vollzieht, genauso wie Plotin,

217

S.th. I 19,2. Vgl. auch S.th. I 19,4 ad 3um; I 106,4,c.; III l,l,c.; De pot. Dei II 1,c.; III 17 ad lum; C.G. I 37; II 6; I 75; III 24 (fin.); I Sent. II 1,4 contra; in DN nnr. 306, 3 0 8 , 3 0 9 , 3 1 2 , 4 0 9 (PERA).

ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NEUPLATONISMUS U N D CHRISTENTUM

1029

erblickt er darin keine Aufhebung der göttlichen Willensfreiheit. So verstanden wir auch Plotin. Die Ausführungen des Aquinaten dürften eine gewisse Bestätigung unserer Interpretation Pio tins bilden. Mit dieser Analyse von S. th. I 19,2 hat L. E L D E R S sich nicht einverstanden erklärt. Der Artikel 2 sei im Gesamtkontext der quaestio 19 zu sehen, was zweifelsohne richtig ist. Auf die Frage, welche Abhängigkeit die von Gott gewollten Dinge in bezug auf Gott haben, antworte Thomas in dieser Weise: «Les choses ne peuvent venir de Dieu par un processus nécessaire, car s'il en était ainsi les effets seraient infinis comme leur cause216. La production des créatures est donc déterminée par la volonté divine, par un véritable choix (electio: S. th. I 19,4 ad lum), motivé par la bonté de Dieu: bonitas est ei ratio volendi omnia alia (I.e. ad 3um)» 2 1 9 . N u n , daß Thomas im Unterschied zu Plotin die voluntas Dei bei der Schöpfung besonders hervorhebt, ist oben vermerkt worden. Aber hinter der voluntas Dei steht nach Thomas die bonitas als Grund der freigewollten Schöpfung. Zur Begründung dafür, wie die bonitas divina ratio volendi omnia alia ist, gibt Thomas in dem genannten ad 3um den Rückverweis auf S. th. I 19,2, wo die Schöpfung eben mit der diffusio bonitatis begründet wird 2 2 0 . Darin liegt die vollkommene Ubereinstimmung mit Plotin. Er unterscheidet sich von ihm durch die Betonung des Willens, was im Hinblick auf Plotin wiederum beweist, daß die diffusio bonitatis nicht ins Reich der Notwendigkeit gehört. Für die Thomasinterpretation ergibt sich aus der Analyse von S. th. I 19,2 sowie der übrigen einschlägigen Stellen 221 noch eine wichtige Erkenntnis. Das Prinzip bonum est diffusivum sui wird bei Thomas durchaus nicht nur im Sinne der causa finalis interpretiert, wie mehrere Stellen es nahezulegen scheinen 222 und viele Autoren im Anschluß daran behaupten, sondern gerade auch im Sinne der Mitteilsamkeit, also nicht nur final, sondern auch kausal (causa efficiens)223. J. P.

218

Demnach dürften wir bei Plotin im Gegensatz zu der von E L D E R S vertretenen Ansicht gar keine notwendige Emanation haben, da das Emanierte eben nicht mehr unendlich wie seine Ursache, sondern geringer ist. Ähnliches ergibt sich aus SCHEFFCZYK, a. a. O. (Anra. 18) 32: s. oben S. 1010.

219

ELDERS, a . a . O . ( A n m . 7 0 ) 6 1 6 .

220

Damit erledigt sich die weitere Behauptung von E L D E R S (ebd. 616f.) von selbst: «Pour saint Thomas le principe que le bien se répand ne fournit pas l'explication ultime de la création; il y a place pour le mystère de la liberté souveraine et transcendante de Dieu». Natürlich gibt es diesen Platz für das Geheimnis der souveränen und transzendenten Freiheit Gottes, aber nicht im Gegensatz zum bonum diffusivum, sondern gerade seinetwegen. — Auch H . K Ü H L E kommt in seiner zitierten Albertstudie (a. a. O . [Anm. 7 ] ) zu dem Ergebnis, daß sowohl für Albert wie für Thomas der neuplatonische Gedanke von der diffusio bonitatis den Grund darstelle, warum Gott geschaffen habe. Ebenso J. SCHNEIDER, a. a. O . (Anm. 7) 105.

221

S. oben Anm. 217. Z.B. S.th. I 5,4 ad 2um; De ver. 21,1 ad 4um; I Sent. 34,2,1 ad 4um. Belege dafür sind S.th. I 19,2 und die dazu oben Anm. 217 angeführten Stellen. Daß wir beide Interpretationen auch bei Bonaventura haben, wurde oben (Anm. 53) bereits angemerkt. Für Albert den Großen und dessen Schüler Ulrich von Straßburg hat J . S C H N E I D E R

222 223

1030

KLAUS K R E M E R

JossuA hat in seinem sehr umsichtigen Aufsatz 224 ausdrücklich notiert, daß man bei der Interpretation dieses Prinzips bei Thomas viel zu wenig auf die beiden komplementären Aspekte (den finalen wie kausalen) geachtet habe, die bei Thomas vorliegen 225 . Ohne die kausale Bedeutung der diffusio dürfte die finale zudem nicht verständlich werden. Denn damit das Erste Gute sich im Sinne des finis den Geschöpfen mitteilen kann, ist vorausgesetzt, daß diese Geschöpfe bereits existieren. Das aber setzt seinerseits die diffusio im kausalen Sinn voraus, wodurch die Geschöpfe allererst ihr Sein und Gutsein vom primum bonum und damit ihre Ähnlichkeit mit ihm haben, um danach streben zu können 226 . In diesem Sinne ist die kausale Bedeutung der diffusio sogar früher als die finale. Wir gewinnen daher eine Kreisbewegung, die vom summum bonum als „Wirkursache" ausgeht und sich ihm wieder als Finalursache zuwendet. Eine bisher unbeachtete Aporie muß jedoch noch zu lösen versucht werden. Plotins Anschauung über das Gute gipfelte in dem Satz: Das Gute ( = Gott) kann nicht gut sein . . ., wenn es nicht von seinem Eigensein einem Anderen mitteilt 227 . Ähnlich Proklos 228 und Dionysius 229 ! Hier schleicht sich nun leicht folgende Überlegung ein: Wie das Gute nicht nicht gut sein kann, sondern mit absoluter Notwendigkeit gut sein muß, so müßte es sich auch mit derselben metaphysischen Notwendigkeit mitteilen. Diese sozusagen unterschwellige Folgerung dürfte ebenfalls mit schuld daran sein, daß die Neuplatoniker mit dem Verdikt der notwendigen Schöpfung belegt wurden. Aber nirgendwo hat Plotin diese Folgerung gezogen, so nahe sie doch lag. Seine Notwendigkeit meint stets nur die physische Notwendigkeit, die sich in den res naturales ausdrückt, und jene moralische Notwendigkeit, die den mit Willen begabten Wesen auferlegt ist. Dieselbe Problematik, sogar noch verschärft, finden wir bei Thomas: Einerseits haben wir da die forcierte Freiwilligkeit der Schöpfung, andererseits die plotinische Überlegung, daß alles Vollkommene sein bonum mitteile. Es sei dies eine inclinatio naturalis der res naturalis, gehöre zur ratio voluntatis230, ja Thomas erklärt: quia de ratione boni est, quod ab eo procédant effectus per eius communicationem231. Hat Plotin etwas anderes gemeint? Oder muß man umgekehrt deshalb es trefflich herausgearbeitet ( a . a . O . [Anm. 7] 2 3 , 3 7 , 4 4 , 5 5 - 5 7 , 5 9 f . , 63,65,71-74,102, 104f., 296); vgl. auch K Ü H L E , a . a . O . (Anm. 7) 61 f., 75f. Für Augustinus hat G I L S O N , a . a . O . (Anm. 135) 539, darauf hingewiesen. Für Thomas von Aquin vgl. J . S C H N E I D E R , a . a . O . (Anm. 7) 105; TH. A. AUDET, a . a . O . (Anm. 41) 16. 2 2 4 a . a . O . (Anm. 208) 125-153. 2 2 5 ebd. 145. 226 Vgl. auch die diesbezüglichen guten Bemerkungen von J. S C H N E I D E R bei der Darstellung von Alberts Lehre ( a . a . O . [Anm. 7] bes. 67f., 72f., 74f.). 2 2 7 II 9 , 3 , 7 - 9 (oben S. 1000). 2 2 8 St.th., Pr. 122 (oben S. 1002). 2 2 9 D N PG 3; 977 Β u. 716 B C (oben S. 1022f.). 2 3 0 S.th. I 19,2, c. 2 3 1 In D N nr. 136; nr. 36: cum de ratione boni sit quod se aliis communicet . . .; nnr. 213; 227; 229; 269; S. th. 1 II 1,4 ad lum: . . . de ratione boni est, quod aliquid ab ipso effluat; 2 II 117,6 ad 2um; I 106,4,c.: nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis communicet·, C . G . II 6; I 37 (fin.); III 24; I Sent. IV 1,1,so.; II 1,4 contra; S.th. III 1,1,c.; I 62,9 ad 2um; 103,6,c.

ZUM VERHÄLTNIS V O N NEUPLATONISMUS U N D CHRISTENTUM

1031

auch von Thomas konstatieren, wie PLATZECK es gegenüber Plotin tut 2 3 2 , daß sein Gott unmöglich nicht wirken könne, womit die Freiheit endgültig aufgehoben wäre? Ratio meint in diesem Zusammenhang wohl das Wesen, und Wesen bedeutet notwendige Sachverhalte. Urgiert man diesen Begriff der ratio, dann kann es keine freigewollte, sondern nur noch eine notwendige Schöpfung à la S P I N O Z A geben. Dann würde Gott mit der gleichen Notwendigkeit schaffen, kraft welcher er auch existiert und gut ist. Allein, diese Texte aufgrund ihrer Vokabeln im Sinne einer notwendigen Schöpfung interpretieren zu wollen, wo Thomas sonst mit aller Vehemenz die freigewollte Schöpfung vorträgt 233 , scheint doch schlechterdings unmöglich zu sein. In den beiden Aussagereihen einen nicht gelösten oder gar nicht einmal bemerkten Widerspruch entdecken zu wollen, dürfte eine kaum annehmbare Überlegung sein. Die Lösung liegt anderswo! Das Wort bonum est diffusivum sui234 zählt zu den ersten Gegebenheiten des menschlichen Geistes, stellt also ein erstes Prinzip im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes dar, das daher weder bewiesen noch erklärt, sondern nur umschrieben und an Beispielen erläutert werden kann. Keiner hat dies deutlicher gesehen als Plotin! Darum sein ständiger Rückgriff auf die — freilich immer irgendwie defizienten — Beispiele und seine wiederholten Ansätze, um des Problems Herr zu werden. Obwohl diese ersten Prinzipien unvermittelt und durch sich selbst evident sind, leuchten sie uns nicht alle mit der gleichen Evidenz entgegen. Es hängt dies davon ab, inwieweit wir Subjekt und Prädikat eines solchen Prinzips durchschauen 235 . So zeigt Thomas im Anschluß an Boethius, daß der Satz incorporalia non sunt in loco zwar ein indicium per se notum ist, aber bloß für die sapientes, denen die Bedeutung von S und Ρ bekannt ist 236 . Etwas Ähnliches gilt für unser Axiom, dessen Selbstevidenz nicht derart gegeben ist wie etwa die des Kontradiktionsprinzips, sondern intensiverer Reflexion bedarf (vgl. oben Anm. 190, Augustinus: bonitas Dei. . . quae diligenter considerata et pie cogitata omnes controversias quaerentium mundi originem terminât . . .). Dieser Umstand sowie sein Axiomcharakter machen es aber verständlich, warum wir solche N o t haben, die Wahrheit dieses Prinzips aufzuzeigen. Hierin ist der Grund zu suchen für unsere unangemessene und inadäquate Sprache, für die man das einst von Bonaventura auf Augustinus gemünzte Wort anführen möchte: plus dicens et minus volens intelligi. Daher kann es passieren, daß ein Riß klafft zwischen dem, was wir sagen, und dem, was wir sagen wollen. Plotin und Thomas sind die Kronzeugen dafür.

232

233

234 235 236

a . a . O . (Anm. 71) 192. PLATZECKS Behauptung, daß das plotinische Gute wegen seiner Identität mit dem Einen unmöglich nicht wirken könne, stimmt einfach nicht. Denn nicht aufgrund dieser Identifizierung teilt sich das Gute mit, sondern weil es das Erste Gute und das Allervollkommenste ist. Charakteristisch für diese scheinbare Doppelgleisigkeit auch: in D N nnr. 269 u. 271. Ferner De pot. Dei III 15 ad 12um. Uber seinen Ursprung vgl. die Bemerkung oben S. 1002. S.th. I 2, l , c . ; De pot. Dei VII 2 ad l l u m . S.th. I 2, l , c .

1032

KLAUS KREMER

Plotins quaestio vexata nach dem Warum und Wie der Emanation ist also nicht mit einem „Entweder-Oder", sondern mit einem „Sowohl-Als-Auch" zu beantworten: Weil Gott gut war und nichts bedurfte, darum hat er die Welt hervorbringen w o l l e n . Thomas: Optima ratio, qua Deus omnia facit, est sua bonitas et sua sapientia, quae maneret, etiam si alia vel alio modo faceret237. 237

De pot. Dei I 5 ad 14um.

Numenius von

MICHAEL FREDE,

Princeton, Ν. J.

Inhalt I. Die Bedeutung des Numenius

1034

II. Sein Leben und seine Schriften

1038

III. Die Schrift „Uber den Abfall der Akademiker"

1040

IV. Die Schrift „ Ü b e r das Gute"

1050

1. Die Ontologie des Numenius

1050

2. Die Theologie des Numenius

1054

3. Die Psychologie des Numenius

1070

V. Abschließende Würdigung

I. Die Bedeutung

1074

des Numenius

In der Geschichte des frühen Piatonismus der Spätantike scheint Numenius eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt zu haben. Vor allem scheint er der bedeutendste Vorläufer Plotins gewesen zu sein und einen nachhaltigen Einfluß auf dessen Schule ausgeübt zu haben. Ob die Art und Weise, wie Nemesius (fr. 4 b 1 ; De nat. hom. p. 69 MATTHAEI) auf die Ansichten des Ammonius, des Lehrers Plotins, und des Numenius verweist, schon die Annahme widerspiegelt, bereits Ammonius folge Numenius, muß dahingestellt bleiben. Tatsache ist, daß sich die wichtigsten Schüler des Ammonius als mit den Schriften des Numenius wohlvertraut erweisen. Von dem heidnischen Orígenes sagt Porphyrius (bei Eusebius, H.E. VI, 19, 8), daß er sich ständig mit den Schriften Piatons und einer Reihe von pythagoreisierenden Piatonikern befaßte, von denen an erster Stelle Numenius und Cronius genannt werden (Cronius war wohl ein etwas älterer Zeitgenosse des Numenius, der sich aber weitgehend den Ansichten des Numenius anschloß und häufig mit ihm zusammen erwähnt wird, so als bildeten beide eine Einheit). Von 1

Im folgenden werden die Fragmente des Numenius nach der Ausgabe von DES PLACES, Numénius, Paris 1973, zitiert.

NUMENIUS

1035

dem christlichen Theologen Orígenes wissen wir aus seinem eigenen W e r k , welche Bedeutung er Numenius beimaß; einige unserer wichtigsten Zeugnisse über Numenius stammen aus Orígenes' ' C o n t r a Celsum' (fr. 1 b ; 1 c; 10a; 2 9 ; 53). Longinus war mit dem Werk des Numenius bestens vertraut, wie wir aus dem Widmungsbrief einer Schrift des Longinus ersehen können, welchen Porphyrius zitiert ( V . P . 20, 17ff.). D o r t heißt es (20, 7 4 - 7 6 ) , daß Plotin an Schärfe und Klarheit Numenius und Cronius, Moderatus und Thrasyllus bei weitem übertraf. Was nun Plotin selbst angeht, so wundern wir uns nach dem Gesagten nicht, daß in seinem Seminar unter platonischen Autoren vor allem auch Numenius und Cronius gelesen wurden (Porphyrius, V . P . , 14, 10—12). Longinus (Porphyrius, V . P . , 20, 74 — 76) und Porphyrius selbst (ebenda, 21, 6 f f . ) sehen Plotins Denken anscheinend als den Gipfel einer Tradition im Piatonismus, die sich über N u menius und Cronius auf Moderatus und Thrasyllus zurückverfolgen läßt, sind also bereit, Numenius als den unmittelbaren Vorgänger des Plotin in der besonderen Tradition des Piatonismus anzusehen, der sie Plotin zurechnen. Andere Zeitgenossen des Plotin gingen weiter: sie behaupteten, Plotins Gedanken fänden sich im wesentlichen schon bei Numenius, und bezichtigten ihn des Plagiats (Porphyrius, V . P . 18, 2 - 3 ; 17, 1 - 2 ; 17, 2 2 - 2 3 ; 21, 4 - 5 ) . Amelius, ein älterer Schüler des Plotin, nahm den Vorwurf so ernst, daß er (vielleicht auf Drängen des Porphyrius; vgl. ibid. 17, 17; 17, 2 5 f f . ; 17, 43) eine Monographie verfaßte 'Wie sich die Ansichten des Plotin von denen des Numenius unterscheiden' (ibid. 17, 2—6). Porphyrius geht mit einiger Ausführlichkeit auf den Vorwurf ein (ibid. 17; 18; 21), und vielleicht verbirgt sich auch hinter der oben erwähnten Bemerkung des Longinus über die Art und Weise, in der Plotin Numenius und seine V o r gänger übertroffen hat, eine Antwort auf diesen Vorwurf. W i r werden diesen Vorwurf für grundlos halten. Aber, daß er erhoben wurde und daß die Schüler und Freunde des Plotin es für nötig hielten, so ausführlich auf ihn einzugehen, spricht doch dafür, daß die Lehre des Plotin bemerkenswerte Ähnlichkeit mit der des Numenius aufwies. Hierbei zu berücksichtigen ist die Tatsache, daß das plotinische Denken selbst eine Entwicklung durchgemacht hat. Betrachten wir die frühen Überlegungen Plotins darüber, wie T i m . 39 E zu interpretieren sei (Enn. I I I , 9, 1; N r . 13 in Porphyrius' chronologischer Folge), dann sehen wir leicht, wie vor allem einige frühe Äußerungen des Plotin Anlaß zu diesem V o r wurf geben konnten, in jedem Fall eine Abhängigkeit des Plotin von Numenius zeigten. Das Interesse des Plotin an Numenius teilten seine beiden wichtigsten Schüler Amelius und Porphyrius. V o n Amelius berichtet uns Porphyrius ( V . P . 3, 4 4 f f . ) , daß er eifrig die Schriften des Numerius sammelte und mehr oder minder auswendig lernte. In seinen Lehren hing Amelius, wie uns selbst dessen spärliche Fragmente noch deutlich zeigen, stark von Numenius ab. So richtete Iamblich einen Aufsatz gegen die Ausführungen des Amelius zum W o r t psyche, der zwar, wie Proclus (In T i m . II, 277 2 6 f f . ) sagt, in seinem Titel nur auf Amelius Bezug nahm, in Wirklichkeit aber gegen Amelius und Numenius gerichtet war. Amelius folgte Numenius in der Lehre von der Teilhabe von Intelligiblem an Intelligiblem (fr. 4 6 b ; 4 6 c ; Proci., In T i m . I I I , 33, 3 3 f f . ; Syr., In Met. 109, 12ff.). O f f e n kundig ist auch seine Lehre von den drei demiurgischen Intellekten von Numenius

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beeinflußt. Auch, daß sich Amelius später in Apamea niederließ, wird einen Zusammenhang mit Numenius haben (vgl. Porphyrius, V . P . 2, 3 2 - 3 3 ; 3, 4 7 - 4 8 ) . U b e r Porphyrius, der sogar auch als Schüler des Amelius bezeichnet wird, läßt sich zumindest soviel sagen, daß ein guter Teil unserer Zeugnisse über Numenius, direkt oder indirekt, auf Porphyrius zurückgeht; offenkundig hat Porphyrius ausgiebigen Gebrauch von den Schriften des Numenius gemacht (vgl. J . H . WASZINK, Porphyrius und Numenius [s. u.]). An einer bekannten Stelle (fr. 37, In Tim. I, 77 22—23) sagt Proclus, daß Porphyrius eine bestimmte Auffassung in der Dämonenlehre vertritt, und fährt dann mit der Bemerkung fort, daß man sich ja auch hätte wundern müssen, wenn Porphyrius hier von der Lehre des Numenius abgewichen wäre. Damit will Proclus natürlich nicht behaupten, daß Porphyrius ganz allgemein dem Numenius folgt, aber er unterstellt eine starke Abhängigkeit zumindest in der Dämonenlehre. Auch wenn wir über den engeren Kreis der Schule des Ammonius und dann der Schule des Plotin hinausgehen, wird Numenius bei den Piatonikern als Autorität betrachtet. Proclus führt ihn als eine der Koryphäen unter den Piatonikern auf, die sich zum Mythus des Er geäußert haben: „Numenius, Albinus, Gaius, Maximus von Nicaea, Harpocration, Euclides, und vor allem Porphyrius" (In rem. pub. II, 96, 11 ff.). Vielleicht läßt sich schon ein Einfluß auf Atticus feststellen (vgl. DILLON, S. 361—362 [s. u.]; vgl. auch weiter unten S. 1039). Er liegt ganz sicher bei Atticus' Schüler Harpocration vor (vgl. Proci., In Tim. I, 304, 22ff.); ebenso bei Theodorus von Asine, wie Proclus bemerkt (fr. 40, In Tim II, 274, 11 ff.). Selbst späte Autoren wie Philoponus und Syrianus, Olympiodorus und Aeneas von Gaza verweisen noch auf ihn. Aber Numenius ist nicht nur von platonischen Philosophen, sondern auch von christlichen Theologen gelesen worden. Die Berührungspunkte zwischen platonischer Lehre, so jedenfalls, wie sie in der Spätantike aufgefaßt wurde, und christlicher Doktrin waren auffallend eng. Man konnte diese Nähe als bedrohlich empfinden und die andere Seite bekämpfen, indem man sich auf die Unterschiede konzentrierte. Man konnte sich aber auch durch die überraschenden Ähnlichkeiten in seinen eigenen Anschauungen bestätigt sehen. Numenius galt offenkundig als ein Vertreter der platonischen Lehre, bei dem die Ähnlichkeiten mit der christlichen Lehre bis hin zur Trinitätslehre besonders deutlich hervortraten. Überdies mußte Numenius als besonders anziehend erscheinen, weil er schon selbst auf die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen platonischer Lehre und der Lehre der Heiligen Schriften großen Wert gelegt hatte, ja sogar einmal auf Jesus selbst angespielt hatte (fr. 10a). Für Autoren, die an eine Offenbarung glaubten, drängte sich der Gedanke auf, daß die Ähnlichkeiten auf einer Abhängigkeit Piatons von Moses beruhen müssen. Das früheste Zeugnis für Numenius überhaupt findet sich bei Clemens von Alexandria (Strom. I, 150, 4). Clemens zitiert den berühmten Satz von Numenius „Was sonst ist Piaton als ein Moses, der Attisch spricht". Eusebius wiederholt die Äußerung (fr. 8, P . E . X I , 10, 14), wohl aus Clemens (vgl. P . E . I X , 6, 9), Theodoret stützt sich auf sie in polemischer Absicht (Therap. II, 114), und in der Suda (s. ν. Numenius) dient sie vollends als eigenes Eingeständnis der Platoniker, daß Piaton seine Lehre von Gott und der Entstehung der Welt aus der Genesis entlehnt habe. Aber die Art und Weise, wie Orígenes und Eusebius auf

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Numenius eingehen, zeugt von einem ernsthaften sachlichen Interesse an dessen Ansichten. Und das Interesse des Eusebius gerade an der numenischen Theologie wirft die Frage auf, ob nicht umgekehrt Numenius einen Einfluß auf die Ausformung der christlichen Trinitätslehre ausgeübt hat (vgl. DES PLACES, S. 31—32, und die dort aufgeführte Literatur). Es nimmt also nicht Wunder, wenn die Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung dem Numenius ihre besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet hat. Trotz einer großen Reihe von vorzüglichen gelehrten Studien 2 wissen wir aber leider immer noch viel zu wenig über Numenius, um uns ein klares Bild von seiner Lehre auch nur in ihren Grundzügen und von ihrer wahren historischen Bedeutung zu machen. So etwa glauben wir zu wissen, daß Numenius einen erheblichen Einfluß auf Plotin ausgeübt hat, aber worin sich dieser Einfluß im Einzelnen zeigt, darüber können wir nur vage Vermutungen äußern (vgl. DODDS, S. 18—20). 2

Wir besitzen fünf Fragmentsammlungen: I. F. W. A. MULLACH, Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum, vol. 3, Paris 1881, S. 1 5 2 - 1 7 4 ; vgl. auch S. 1 7 5 - 1 8 4 ; II. F. THEDINGA, De Numenio philosopho platonico, Bonn 1875; III. K . S. GUTHRIE, Numenius of Apamea, London 1917; IV. E.-A. LEEMANS, Studie over den Wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea, Acad. roy. de Belgique, Mémoires, Cl. des Lettres, 37, 2, Brüssel, 1937; V. E. DES PLACES, Numénius, Paris 1973; An Literatur ist vor allem zu erwähnen: R . B E U T L E R , S. v . N u m e n i u s , R . E . S u p p l . 7 , 1 9 4 0 , c .

664-678;

W. BOUSSET, Göttingische Gel. Anz. 1914, S. 6 9 7 - 7 5 5 , hier bes. S. 716ff. (Rezension zu: J . KROLL, Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos, Münster 1914); G . CALOGERO, S.V. Numenio, Enciclopedia Italiana, Bd. 25, Rom 1935-43, S. 24; J . DILLON, The Middle Platonists, London 1977; E. R. DODDS, Numenius and Ammonius, Entretiens, Fondation Hardt 5, Vandœuvres — Genève 1960, S. 3 - 3 2 ; P. DONINI, Le Scuole, l'anima, l'impero. La filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino, Sintesi 3, Turin 1982, S. 1 4 0 - 1 4 6 ; A. J . FESTUGIÈRE, La révélation d'Hermès Trimégiste, Paris, 1, 1944; 2, 1949; 3, 1953; 4, 1954, besonders 4, S. 1 2 3 - 1 3 2 ; H . J . KRÄMER, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Piatonismus zwischen Piaton und Plotin, Amsterdam 1964; G. MARTANO, Numenio d'Apamea, Neapel I960 2 ; P. MERLAN, Drei Anmerkungen zu Numenius, Philologus 106, 1962, S. 137ff. P. MERLAN, Numenius, in: A. H . ARMSTRONG (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967, S. 9 6 - 1 0 6 ; H . - C . PUECH, Numénius d'Apamée . . . , Mélanges Bidez, Bd. 2, Brüssel 1934, S. 7 4 5 - 7 7 8 ; H . TARRANT, Numenius Fr. 13 and Plato's Timaeus, Antichthon 13, 1979, S. 19ff. J . H . WASZINK, Plato Latinus 4, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus, London 1962, besonders S. X X X V I I I f f . ; J . H . WASZINK, Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius 1, Leyden 1964 (Philosophia antiqua 12); J . H . WASZINK, Porphyrius und Numenius, Entretiens, Fondation Hardt 12, Vandœuvres— Genève 1966, S. 3 5 - 7 8 ; E . ZELLER, D i e Philosophie der Griechen, 3, 2, L e i p z i g 1923S, S. 2 3 4 — 2 4 1 ;

E. ZELLER; R. MONDOLFO; R. DEL RE, La filosofia dei Greci, 3, 4, Florenz 1979, S. 2 4 3 256. 69

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II. Sein Leben und seine Schriften

Schon über das Leben und die Lebenszeit des Numenius wissen wir sehr wenig. Amelius (bei Porphyrius, V.P. 17, 18; vgl. auch Suda, s.v.) nennt Numenius einmal 'Apameer'. Vermutlich also stammt Numenius aus Apamea in Syrien. Joannes Lydus spricht an einer Stelle von 'Numenius dem Römer' (De mens. IV, 80). Vielleicht wirkte Numenius eine Zeit in Rom. Man übersieht leicht, wie viele der uns bekannten Philosophen jedenfalls zeitweilig in Rom gelebt haben. Numenius zeigt eine gewisse Vertrautheit mit römischen Vorstellungen und Gebräuchen (vgl. Porph., De antro nympharum 72, 3—16, NAUCK2, fr. 31, 28—40; Joannes Lydus, De mens. IV, 80, fr. 57, 3), die er freilich auch so hat erwerben können. Dies ist alles, was wir über das Leben des Numenius wissen. Der früheste Autor, der Numenius erwähnt, ist, wie gesagt, Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. I, 150, 4. Clemens' Leben fällt in die Zeit von etwa 150 bis höchstens 215. Andererseits scheint der Skeptiker Mnaseas der jüngste Autor zu sein, den Numenius selbst erwähnt. Bei diesem wird es sich kaum um den im Index Academicorum 34, 36ff. erwähnten Schüler des Antiochus handeln, sondern um den methodischen Arzt, dessen Wirken in die zweite Hälfte des 1. J h . fällt. Auch in die zweite Hälfte des 1. Jh. fällt Moderatus von Gades, der dem Numenius voraufgegangen zu sein scheint (vgl. die Aufzählung bei Longinus, Porph., V.P. 20, 7 4 - 7 5 ; 21, 7 - 8 ; sicher ferner weiter unten S. 1052 und S. 1064). Wir können also mit einiger Zuversicht sagen, daß Numenius dem 2. J h . angehört. Zwar gibt es weitere Indizien für eine genauere Datierung des Numenius; diese aber führen sämtlich zu keinem sicheren Schluß: (i) Numenius hat offenkundig einem Maximus eine Schrift gewidmet (Porph., V.P. 17, 14); man denkt an Maximus von Tyrus, dessen floruit von Eusebius auf 152 angesetzt wird und der nach der Suda unter Commodus (180—191) in Rom gewesen ist; aber es mag sich bei diesem Maximus auch um den bei Proclus (In rem pub. II, 96, 12) erwähnten hervorragenden Platoniker Maximus von Nicaea handeln, über den wir sonst nichts wissen. (ii) Numenius dürfte ein jüngerer Zeitgenosse des Cronius gewesen sein; denn zwar scheint Cronius sehr stark in seinen Ansichten von Numenius abzuhängen und wird auch einmal dessen hetairos genannt (Porph., De antro nymph. 71, 1 Ν . 2 ) , weswegen unsere Quellen oft von „Numenius und Cronius" sprechen (Porph., V.P. 20, 74 ; 21, 7; fr. 43, 9 - 1 0 , Iamblich bei Stob., Eel. I, 375, 1 4 - 1 5 ; fr. 46b, Syrianus, In Met., S. 109, 12; Porph. bei Eusebius, H . E . VI, 19, 8), bisweilen aber ist in Aufzählungen in einer Weise von „Cronius und Numenius" die Rede (Arnobius, Adv. nationes, II, 11, Porph., V.P. 14, 1 1 - 1 2 ; fr. 48, 1 3 14, Iamblich bei Stob., Eel. I, 380, 18), welche nahelegt, daß Cronius älter als Numenius ist. Aber wir haben keine klaren Anhaltspunkte für die Datierung des Cronius. 3 3

DILLON (S. 362) denkt an den Cronius, an den sich Lukians 'Peregrinus' richtet.

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(iii) Numenius geht sicher Harpocration vorauf, der seinen Ansichten in entscheidenden Punkten folgt (vgl. Proci., In T i m . I, 3 0 4 , 2). U n d in der Suda, s.v., heißt es, Harpocration habe dem Haushalt des Caesar angehört; tatsächlich wird auch ein Harpocration als Lehrer des jungen Verus erwähnt ( H . A . , Verus I I , 5), aber bei diesem kann es sich kaum um unseren Philosophen handeln (vgl. DILLON, S. 258). Andererseits ist Harpocration ein Schüler des Atticus, dessen floruit von Eusebius auf 176—180 angesetzt wird. (iv) Manches spricht dafür, daß Numenius bereits dem Atticus selbst voraufgeht. DILLON (S. 3 6 1 - 3 6 2 ) und DES PLACES (Atticus, Paris 1977, S. 19) verweisen auf die lebhaften Bilder vom Zerrissenen Pentheus und dem Tintenfisch, die zuerst bei Numenius belegt sind, aber, wenn auch in veränderter Anwendung, wieder bei Atticus auftauchen. Ferner ist zu bedenken, auf welche Weise Proclus in Timaeuskommentar (I, 303, 2 7 f f . ) die Ansichten der älteren Platoniker über die Stellung des Demiurgen referiert; zuerst gibt er die Ansichten des Numenius wieder, dann die des Harpocration, des Atticus, des Plotin, des Amelius, des Porphyrius und des Iamblich. Mit Ausnahme von Harpocration folgt er der Chronologie, was er auch bei Plotin (305, 16), bei Porphyrius (306, 32) und bei Iamblich (307, 14) ausdrücklich anzeigt. D i e Ordnung wird nur durch Harpocration gestört, der auf Atticus folgen müßte. A b e r die Erklärung dafür ist einfach. Harpocrations Auffassung wird unmittelbar nach der des Numenius wiedergegeben, weil Harpocration in diesem Punkte Numenius und nicht seinem Lehrer Atticus folgte (vgl. 304, 2 4 f f . ) , obschon Atticus gute Gründe hatte, eben nicht die Meinung des Numenius zu teilen (vgl. 305, 7), und Harpocration vernünftigerweise seinem Lehrer Atticus hätte folgen müssen. Es liegt also auf Grund dieser Stelle nahe, anzunehmen, daß Numenius auch schon dem Atticus voraufgeht. In der Regel nimmt man für Numenius ein floruit um 150 oder in der 2. Hälfte des J h . an. BEUTLER ( R . E . Suppl. 7, c. 665) und WASZINK (Plat. Latinus 4 , S. L X X X V I n. 2) ziehen eine Datierung in die erste Hälfte des Jahrhunderts in Betracht, wobei freilich die Gründe, welche sie dafür anführen, wenig überzeugend sind. Andererseits ist festzuhalten, daß einer solchen früheren Datierung nichts im Wege zu stehen scheint. D a ß Numenius dem Atticus voraufgeht, spricht eher für sie (vgl. auch DES PLACES, Atticus, S. 19—20). BOUSSET (S. 754 n. 3) hat sogar versucht, Numenius noch dem 1. J h . zuzuordnen. Dafür spricht nichts, dagegen die T a t sache, daß Numenius auf Mnaseas und Moderatus folgt. Diese Unsicherheit in der Datierung des Numenius macht es nicht nur schwierig, seinen O r t in der Reihe der großen Platoniker des 2. J h . , etwa sein Verhältnis zu Albinus, zu bestimmen; sie erschwert es uns auch, offenkundige Ähnlichkeiten etwa zwischen den Chaldäischen Orakeln und Numenius oder den Gnostikern und Numenius zu beurteilen. O b wir annehmen, daß die Chaldäischen Orakel von Numenius beeinflußt sind oder umgekehrt Numenius von den Chaldäischen Orakeln oder beide eine gemeinsame Quelle haben, hängt u. a. auch davon ab, ob Numenius der ersten oder der zweiten Hälfte des 2. J h . zuzurechnen ist. Dasselbe gilt für sein Verhältnis zu den Gnostikern wie etwa Isidorus. Auch von den Schriften des Numenius ist uns leider keine erhalten, vermutlich, weil späteren Piatonikern Numenius durch Plotin und Porphyrius über69»

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holt zu sein schien, zumal gerade Porphyrius ausgiebigen Gebrauch von Numenius' Schriften gemacht zu haben scheint. Was wir haben, sind allerdings eine ganze Reihe zum Teil längerer wörtlicher Zitate und eine beträchtliche Zahl von Testimonien. Die Fülle und Breite dieser Nachrichten spiegelt das Interesse wider, welches man Numenius im Vergleich zu anderen frühen Piatonikern wie Eudorus, Severus, Gaius oder Moderatus entgegenbrachte. Die wörtlichen Zitate finden sich sämtlich in Eusebius' 'Praeparatio evangelica', und sie stammen mit einer Ausnahme aus zwei Schriften des Numenius; einmal aus einer Schrift 'Uber das Gute' in wenigstens sechs Büchern (vgl. Eus., P . E . X I , 22, 6, fr. 19,1), zum anderen aus einer Abhandlung 'Uber den Abfall der Akademiker von Piaton' in wenigstens zwei Büchern (vgl. Eus., P . E . X I V , 4, 16, fr. 24, 3). Die Ausnahme bildet ein Zitat aus einer Schrift 'Uber die Dinge, die Piaton ungesagt ließ' (Eus., P . E . X I I I , 4, 4 — 5, 2, fr. 23). Hinzukommen, wie gesagt, eine Fülle von Zeugnissen, einige zur Abhandlung 'Uber das Gute', eines zu einer Schrift 'Uber die Unvergänglichkeit der Seele' (Orig., Contra C . V, 27, fr. 29); aber die meisten Zeugnisse lassen sich keiner bestimmten Schrift zuordnen. Von Orígenes (Contra C . IV, 51, fr. l c , 4—5) erfahren wir noch, daß Numenius auch Schriften mit den Titeln 'Epops', 'Uber die Zahlen' und 'Uber den O r t ' verfaßt hat.

III. Die Schrift 'Über den Abfall der Akademiker

Numenius ist, seiner Lehre nach, ein Platoniker. Gewöhnlich wird er als Neopythagoreer eingeordnet. O b und inwiefern das berechtigt ist, werden wir noch zu untersuchen haben. O f t wird er auch unter die sogenannten Mittelplatoniker eingereiht. Das ist der Sache nach ohne Zweifel richtig, aber es scheint mir besser zu sein, auf den Ausdruck 'Mittelplatonismus' zu verzichten. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Mittelpiatonikern und Neoplatonikern ist vor allem aus dem etwas unglücklichen Verlauf der Historiographie des antiken Platonismus zu verstehen (vgl. DONINI, S. 9ff. [s.u.]). Im 18. J h . wurden die Platoniker einschließlich Plotins als Eklektiker aufgefaßt. Dies Bild wurde zunächst dadurch korrigiert, daß man Pio tin und seine Nachfolger als Neoplatoniker einordnete. Dann aber zeigte es sich auch, daß die platonischen Vorgänger Plotins eher als Platoniker denn als Eklektiker zu betrachten seien. Da aber der Begriff des Neoplatonismus schon für Plotin und seine Nachfolger vergeben war, wich man auf den Ausdruck 'Mittelplatonismus' aus. Gerade eine Figur wie Numenius aber zeigt, was auch ansonsten immer klarer wird, daß die Unterscheidung zwischen Mittelpiatonikern und Neuplatonikern künstlich ist. Plotin bedeutet keinen radikalen Neubeginn und wird auch von den späteren Piatonikern nicht als solcher betrachtet, die ohnehin im allgemeinen Plotin nicht die herausragende Bedeutung beimessen, die wir ihm zugestehen. Vielmehr knüpfen diese in vielen Punkten bei Plotins Vorgängern, eben etwa Numenius, an, wie wir bei Amelius und Porphyrius und, in anderer Weise, etwa bei Hierocles sehen. Statt dessen können

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wir, mehr oder weniger dem antiken Sprachgebrauch folgend 4 , zwischen 'Akademikern' und 'Piatonikern' unterscheiden, wobei die Akademiker die Mitglieder der platonischen Schule bis zu ihrer Auflösung im frühen 1. Jh. v. Chr. sind, die Platoniker aber die Philosophen, die sich nach der Auflösung der akademischen Skepsis mit Antiochus und dem Zerfall oder der Auflösung der Schule als Institution um die Wiederherstellung der wahren Philosophie durch eine Rekonstruktion der platonischen Lehre bemühen. In diesem Sinne ist Numenius ohne Zweifel Platoniker. Als solcher wird er auch von späteren Piatonikern betrachtet. In der 'Vita Plotini' (14, 12) führt Porphyrius Numenius unter den platonischen Autoren auf, die bei Plotin gelesen wurden, Iamblich führt ihn unter den platonischen Autoren auf (bei Stob., Eel. I, 374, 2 1 - 2 5 W.), Proclus (In rem. pubi. II, 96, 11) spricht von ihm als einem der hervorragenden Vertreter des Piatonismus. Aber auch Eusebius (z. B. P.E. X I , 21, 7) und Theodoret (Therap. II, 82—85), die ihn als 'Phythagoreer' bezeichnen, verweisen auf ihn als einen Vertreter platonischer Lehre. Alle Platoniker haben ein gemeinsames Problem. U m die Philosophie des Aristoteles zu rekonstruieren, braucht man nur die Schriften des Aristoteles zu lesen. U m sie zu verstehen, bedarf es vielleicht eines guten Maßes an Gelehrsamkeit, an Scharfsinn und an philosophischem Verständnis. Aber kein Maß an Gelehrsamkeit, Scharfsinn und philosophischem Verständnis scheint auszureichen, um den platonischen Dialogen eine einheitliche platonische Lehre zu entnehmen. Akademische Skeptiker konnten dies Phänomen leicht erklären: sie konnten behaupten, daß es keine platonische Lehre gab, die man hätte rekonstruieren können. Dagegen aber sprach das Zeugnis der Piatonschule und die Philosophie seiner Schüler, die offensichtlich von der Lehre Piatons ihren Ausgang genommen hatte und die folglich auch zur Rekonstruktion der ursprünglichen Philosophie Piatons herangezogen werden konnte. Die Frage war nur, inwieweit man damit rechnen konnte, daß die Schule Piatons und ihre Nachfolger, der Peripatus und die Stoa, das platonische Erbe bewahrt hatten. Hier galt es, sich nicht nur ein Urteil über die Alte Akademie zu bilden, sondern auch über Aristoteles und die frühen Peripatetiker, aber auch über die Alte Stoa, die sich von der Alten Akademie abgespalten hatte, aber insofern (jedenfalls in dogmatischen Augen) ihr Erbe übernahm, als die Akademie selbst sich der Skepsis zugewandt hatte. So kam es dazu, daß schon Antiochus, als er die akademische Skepsis aufgab und eine platonische Lehre entwickelte, seinen stark stoisch eingefärbten, aber sich auch weitgehend auf Aristoteles stützenden Dogmatismus mit dem Entwurf eines entsprechenden Bildes von der Geschichte der auf Piaton zurückgehenden Schulen, vor allem der Akademie, zu rechtfertigen suchte. Wie sich Antiochus die Geschichte vorstellte, können wir noch recht gut, vor allem aus Ciceros 'Académica', rekonstruieren. Der Dogmatismus wurde mit der Behauptung gerechtfertigt, die Skepsis in der Akademie seit Arcesilaus stellte einen völligen Bruch mit der akademischen Tradition dar, die bis auf Cran tor und Polemo 4

Der antike Sprachgebrauch ist u . a . deshalb nicht ganz einheitlich, weil zumindest zunächst die Platoniker selbst in ihrer Einstellung zur skeptischen Akademie schwankten; man denke etwa an Plutarch.

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an der platonischen Lehre festgehalten habe (daher auch die Aufforderung, von Arcesilaus an von einer 'Neuen Akademie' zu reden). Die peripatetischen, vor allem aber die besonders auffälligen stoischen Elemente in seiner Lehre rechtfertigte Antiochus mit der Behauptung, die Unterschiede zwischen Piaton und Aristoteles fielen nicht ins Gewicht und die Neuerungen der Stoa seien in erster Linie terminologischer Art; auf diese Weise verdeckten die Stoiker die Tatsache, daß es sich bei ihrer Lehre im wesentlichen um eine Weiterentwicklung der alten akademischen Lehre handele. Den Nachfolgern des Antiochus schien seine Lehre recht wenig platonisch zu sein. Schon Eudorus in der zweiten Hälfte des 1. Jh. vor Chr. machte sich ein ganz anderes Bild von der wahren Lehre Piatons. Entsprechend entwickelten spätere Platoniker ihre eigenen Vorstellungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, die recht unterschiedlich ausfielen, je nachdem, wie sie die Rolle der skeptischen Akademie einschätzten und wie sie die Distanz der wahren platonischen Lehre zur Stoa und zum Peripatus beurteilten. Manche Platoniker, wie Plutarch, waren keineswegs bereit, in der skeptischen Akademie einen völligen Bruch mit der platonischen Tradition zu sehen. N o c h am Ende der Spätantike wird selbst von Piatonikern die Frage noch zumindest diskutiert, ob Piaton ein Skeptiker gewesen sei (vgl. Anonymus, Prolegomena, S. 21, Iff. WESTERINK). Dann gab es die Platoniker, welche sich eher auf Aristoteles stützen wollten. Atticus (Eus., P.E. X I , 1,2) schrieb eine Abhandlung gegen die, welche die Lehre Piatons aus den Lehren des Aristoteles zu rekonstruieren versprachen. Ammonius Saccas nahm nach Hierocles (bei Photius, Bibl. cod. 251,461 a 24ff.; vgl. auch cod. 214, 171 b 33ff.) die grundsätzliche Ubereinstimmung zwischen Piaton und Aristoteles an. Für die Folge war vor allem wichtig, daß Porphyrius einen langen Traktat darüber schrieb, daß die Lehre Piatons und Aristoteles' eine sei (Suda, s.v. Porphyrios), wenn er auch gleichzeitig, vielleicht als Teil derselben Schrift, 'Uber den Unterschied zwischen Piaton und Aristoteles' schrieb (Elias, In Porph. Isag. 39, 6ff.). Aber Atticus spricht auch bisweilen so, als stellten sich Peripatetiker selbst als die natürlichen Verbündeten des Piatonismus dar (vgl. Euseb., P.E. X V , 4 , 6 ; 8; 16; 17; 19; X V , 5, 3). Es gab eine Tradition im Peripatus, die einer Annäherung der beiden Schulen entgegenkam. So schrieb schon Clearchus ein 'Encomium Piatonis' ( W E H R L I fr. 2; vgl. auch fr. 3). Andere Platoniker stützten sich eher auf die stoische Lehre, so wie es, umgekehrt, in der Stoa vor allem seit Panaetius und Posidonius eine Richtung gab, die sich an Piaton orientierte. Selbst im dritten Jahrhundert war es Porphyrius noch möglich, von „Tryphon, dem Stoiker und Platoniker" (V.P. 17, 3) zu sprechen. Umgekehrt meinten manche Platoniker, sich in erster Linie von den Stoikern abgrenzen zu müssen. Plutarch etwa schrieb 'De Stoicorum repugnantiis'. Andere wiederum sahen in Aristoteles den Hauptgegner. So versuchte Atticus in der erwähnten Schrift, von der uns zahlreiche Fragmente bei Eusebius erhalten sind, vor allem die Gegensätze zur aristotelischen Lehre in aller Schärfe herauszustellen. Aber Atticus scheint damit bereits einer Tradition in Piatonismus zu folgen. Simplicius' Kommentar zur Kategorienschrift des Aristoteles belegt uns eine ganze Reihe von Piatonikern, die offenkundig Aristoteles ablehnten, vor allem Lucius und Nicostratus. Andere wiederum meinten, die wahre platonische Lehre sei nur in klarer Abgrenzung sowohl von

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der Stoa als auch vom Peripatus wiederzugewinnen. In diesem Gedanken mochten sie auch durch zwei miteinander zusammenhängende Entwicklungen bestärkt werden, die sich schon im 1. J h . v . C h r . abzeichnen: (i) man bemühte sich, zur ursprünglichen Lehre der Schule zurückzukehren, zur Lehre der alten Schulautoritäten, (ii) die Debatte zwischen Stoikern und akademischen Skeptikern hatte die philosophische Diskussion dominiert; mit dem Zerfall der akademischen Skepsis und der Wiederbelebung des Aristoteles und des Piatonismus entstand auch natürlicherweise eine erneute Rivalität zwischen Stoikern, Aristotelikern und Piatonikern, die durch ihre gemeinsame Ablehnung des Epikureismus keineswegs gemildert wurde. Jedenfalls glaubten viele Platoniker, man müsse sowohl die Unterschiede zum Peripatus wie auch die zur Stoa klar herausstellen. So schrieb Calvisius Taurus nicht nur eine Abhandlung ' U b e r den Unterschied in den Ansichten zwischen Piaton und Aristoteles' (Suda s . v . ) , sondern auch eine Abhandlung, die sehr wohl den Titel ' D e Stoicorum repugnantiis' hätte tragen können (Gellius X I I , 5, 5). Bei diesem Geschichtsbild, durch welches die Platoniker auch ihre eigene Position definierten und rechtfertigten, hatten sie noch einem anderen Phänomen Rechnung zu tragen. V o m 2. J h . v. C h r . an, aber vielleicht schon früher, tauchen zunehmend Schriften auf, die vorgeben, die pythagoreische Lehre zu vertreten, oft sogar, selbst alte pythagoreische Schriften zu sein. In Wirklichkeit handelt es sich um Texte, die in erster Linie auf die Lehre Piatons und die der alten Akademie zurückgreifen, oft sogar erkennbar auf die platonischen Dialoge selbst, etwa auf den 'Philebus'. Diese Abhängigkeit freilich wird verdeckt. Es wird nämlich nicht nur nicht der Anspruch erhoben, die platonische Lehre zu vertreten, es wird vielmehr umgekehrt nahegelegt, daß sich die platonische und altakademische Lehre von der pythagoreischen herleite. In der Tat ist ja das Interesse an den Pythagoreern bei Piaton und Xenocrates, aber auch bei Speusipp und Aristoteles auffallend groß, und der Einfluß auf Piaton und die Alte Akademie liegt klar zutage. So etwa entsteht der Traktat des Timaeus Locrus, der sich offenkundig als Vorlage für Piatons 'Timaeus' darstellen soll. Hier handelt es sich um ein komplexes Phänomen, aber ein Faktor bei seinem Entstehen ist ohne Zweifel dieser: das im zweiten Jahrhundert wiedererwachende Interesse an der Lehre Piatons konnte in der skeptischen Akademie selbst nicht verfolgt, geschweige denn offen vertreten werden. Überdies hätte jeder, der den Anspruch erhoben hätte, die Lehre Piatons zu vertreten, einen schweren Stand gehabt. E r hätte sich mit der Akademie auseinandersetzen müssen, die einerseits Piaton für sich beanspruchte, aber deshalb andererseits die Vorstellung von einem dogmatischen Piaton mit all ihrer Autorität, ihrer Gelehrsamkeit und ihrem dialektischen G e schick bekämpft hätte, weil es um ihr eigenes Selbstverständnis ging. Ein Wiederaufleben der alten platonischen Lehre schien also am ehesten unter einem fremden N a m e n möglich zu sein, eben dem des Pythagoras, zumal, wenn man meinte, es gäbe so etwas wie eine pythagoreisch-platonische Lehre. Eine Parallele dazu ist später, im ersten J h . v . C h r . , das Wiederaufleben des radikalen akademischen Skeptizismus bei Aenesidem, aber nun unter dem N a m e n des Pyrrho. D o c h in dem M o m e n t , in dem die akademische Skepsis sich auflöste, war es auch wieder möglich, die platonische Lehre als solche zu vertreten. N u r war da das Bild

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von einer pythagoreisch-akademischen Philosophie bereits vorgezeichnet, und das schien der philosophischen wie der historischen Wahrheit weit näher zu kommen als der stoisierende Piaton des Antiochus. Überdies kam dieses Bild der Tendenz entgegen, sich von dem hellenistischen Piatonbild, wie es uns bei Antiochus begegnet, zu befreien, aber auch einer allgemeineren Tendenz, auf die Alten zurückzugreifen. Schon Eudorus nahm einen pythagoreisierenden Piaton an (vgl. Simplicius, In phys. 181, 10ff.). Bei Numenius nun sind wir in der glücklichen Lage, uns ein recht differenziertes Bild von seiner Auffassung der Geschichte der Philosophie zu machen. Wie bereits bemerkt, verfaßte er eine Schrift 'Uber den Abfall der Akademiker von Piaton'. Von dieser sind uns durch Eusebius genügend Fragmente erhalten, um Numenius' Einstellung zu den verschiedenen relevanten Fragen wenigstens in ihren Grundzügen zu rekonstruieren. So, wie sich Numenius die Geschichte darstellt, war Piaton im Besitz der wahren Philosophie, hat es aber für unangebracht gehalten, diese in der Öffentlichkeit und in den Dialogen klar darzulegen. Dadurch hat er zu MißVerständnissen und Unklarheiten Anlaß gegeben, die zu Sreit und zur Verfälschung der wahren Lehre unter seinen Nachfolgern führten. Daher der Titel der Schrift 'Uber den Abfall der Akademiker von Piaton'. Allerdings meint Numenius, daß dieser Verlust der wahren Philosophie schon früher einsetzt, nämlich bei den Schülern des Sokrates, von denen die 'kleineren' sokratischen Schulen, die Socratici minores, abhängen (fr. 24,47—51). Er erklärt das so (fr. 24, 51 ff.): Sokrates habe drei Götter angenommen und über jeden dieser drei auf die ihm angemessene Weise philosophiert. Dies freilich hätten seine Schüler, außer Piaton, nicht gesehen. So hätten sie seine Lehre für inkohärent gehalten und sich auf je verschiedene Aspekte seiner Lehre gestützt, um ihre eigenen Ansichten daraus zu entwickeln. (Vermutlich denkt Numenius vor allem auch an die Lehre des Euklid von Megara vom Einen und Guten, welches zugleich auch ein Intellekt ist; jedenfalls spricht Numenius ausdrücklich von den Megarikern). N u r Piaton habe Sokrates verstanden, weil er als Pythagoreer (vgl. 24, 57) den Ursprung der sokratischen Lehre kannte und so in der Lage gewesen sei, diese Lehre in ihrer Gesamtheit zu erfassen und zu bewahren. A n dieser Schilderung ist zunächst befremdlich, daß Sokrates eine Dreigötterlehre vertreten haben soll. Offensichtlich schließt Numenius das aus einer K o m b i nation zweier Stellen im 2. Piatonbrief, w o Piaton 312 E drei Götter unterscheidet und 3 1 4 E seine Ausführungen dem Sokrates zuzuschreiben scheint (vgl. H . - C . PUECH, S. 760—761; P. MERLAN, Numenius, S. 97). Aber Numenius stützt sich zwar auf diesen Brief, um Piaton und Sokrates eine Lehre von drei Göttern zuzuschreiben, doch er meint auch, daß diese Lehre nicht auf Sokrates zurückgehe, sondern ursprünglich pythagoreisch sei. D a s wußte Piaton, und so ist er durch die scheinbar inkohärenten Reden des Sokrates nicht in die Irre geführt worden. Aber warum wußten es die anderen Sokratesschüler nicht? E s wird zwar, wohl absichtlich, nicht gesagt, aber der Schluß wird uns aufgedrängt, Sokrates habe seine Schüler darüber im unklaren gelassen, daß er in Wirklichkeit nur die pythagoreische Lehre vertrat. N u r Piaton, der den wahren Ursprung der sokratischen Lehre erfaßte, konnte sie bewahren. Aber auch er ließ sich davon abhalten, diese

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pythagoreische Lehre eindeutig zu vertreten. So setzte er diese Lehre zunehmenden Verfälschungen aus. Gelingt es uns, die ursprüngliche Lehre Piatons von diesen späteren Verfälschungen zu befreien, dann stellt sich Piaton als reiner Pythagoreer heraus (fr. 24, 70). Zwei Dinge stechen hier ins Auge: (i) nach Numenius waren also Sokrates und Piaton Pythagoreer, aber (ii) Sokrates ließ seine Schüler über den Ursprung seiner Lehre im unklaren, und auch Piaton deutete seine Lehre und ihren U r sprung, zumindest in seinen Schriften, nur an. Offenkundig neigt Numenius der Ansicht des Moderatus zu, wonach Piaton und seine Nachfolger, Aristoteles, Speusipp, Xenocrates und Aristoxenus, es verstanden, sich die pythagoreische Lehre auf eine Weise zu eigen zu machen, die den wahren Ursprung ihrer Philosophie verschleierte und den Pythagoreern in erster Linie nur solche Auffassungen als ihnen eigen zugestand, die als unhaltbar erschienen (Porphyrius, V. Pyth. 53). Für Numenius ist also die wahre Philosophie die Lehre des Pythagoras, und wenn es ihm darum geht, die platonische Lehre zu rekonstruieren, dann deshalb, weil er sich auf diese Weise Zugang zu der pythagoreischen Lehre verspricht. Hier liegt also der Grund, warum Numenius gewöhnlich als Neopythagoreer betrachtet wird. Man könnte es dabei bewenden lassen, wenn nicht etwas an dem Vorgehen des Numenius überaus merkwürdig wäre. W i e kann Numenius auf den G e danken verfallen, die Lehre des Pythagoras ausgerechnet aus Piaton zu rekonstruieren? W i r können leicht verstehen, warum ein Historiker meinen könnte, man müsse die Lehre des Aristoteles heranziehen, um die Lehre Piatons zu rekonstruieren. Das versuchen wir bis auf den heutigen Tag. A b e r während die Lehre des Aristoteles vergleichsweise zugänglich ist, bestand das Problem im Falle Piatons, wie Numenius selbst betont, eben darin, daß seine Lehre nicht direkt zugänglich war, weil Piaton sich nicht offen erklärte, sondern seine Auffassung erst mühsam aus seinen Andeutungen erschlossen werden mußte. Ü b e r dies würde ein Historiker nicht versuchen, die Lehre des Piaton allein aus Aristoteles abzuleiten. Numenius dagegen stützt sich fast ausschließlich auf das Zeugnis des Piaton. N i c h t nur sagt er ausdrücklich, daß man zunächst von Piaton auszugehen habe (fr. l a , 3—4), sondern er scheint auch genau so zu verfahren. W o es um die Klärung von einzelnen Punkten geht, verweist er auf ganz bestimmte platonische Lehren, oft mit Angabe des Textes, in der Regel so, daß wir den platonischen T e x t identifizieren können. V o n Pythagoras ist relativ selten und immer nur auf vage und allgemeine Weise die Rede. Das ist um so verwunderlicher, als es zur Zeit des Numenius bereits eine Fülle von pythagoreischer Literatur gab. Aber auf diese verweist er nie als Indiz für die pythagoreische Lehre. Man würde auch von einem Platoniker, der Piaton aus Aristoles zu rekonstruieren versucht, erwarten, daß er annimmt, daß Aristoteles bestimmte Lehren Piatons mißverstanden oder zu Unrecht verworfen habe. A b e r nur an einer Stelle zieht Numenius ganz abstrakt die Möglichkeit in Erwägung, daß sich in einer bestimmten Hinsicht die wahre Lehre nicht mit der tatsächlichen Auffassung Piatons decken könnte (fr. 7, 5 — 6). Wie sich aber herausstellt, ist Numenius selbst in diesem Punkte der Meinung, daß man Piaton so zu interpretieren habe, daß er auch hier die wahre Lehre vertritt. Nirgends wird bei Numenius eine

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platonische Lehre kritisiert oder zurückgewiesen. Die Lehre des Numenius ist die des Piaton, so wie Numenius sie versteht. Fast durchweg sucht Numenius auch für die Einzelheiten seiner Lehre irgendeinen Beleg bei Piaton. Es fällt auch auf, daß Numenius ausdrücklich sagt, Piaton sei zwar kein größerer Philosoph als Pythagoras, aber wohl auch kein geringerer (fr. 24, 18—20), so wie er auch an anderer Stelle von den beiden als ebenbürtig spricht (fr. 7, 5—7). Er weigert sich also, Piaton als bloßen Epigonen des Pythagoras zu betrachten. Aus all dem drängt sich der Schluß auf, Numenius müsse gemeint haben, allein Piaton habe die philosophische Größe gehabt, die pythagoreische Lehre in ihrer ganzen Tiefe zu erfassen, er sei deshalb letztlich der einzige zuverlässige Zeuge für diese Lehre, so schwer es auch sein mag, aus Piatons bewußt vagen Andeutungen (fr. 24, 60—62) seine Lehre zu erschließen. In Anbetracht dessen fragt es sich, ob es nicht irreführend ist, Numenius einen Neupythagoreer zu nennen. Spätestens seit Eudorus im 1. J h . v . C h r . , d. h. praktisch von Anfang an, gibt es eine Richtung im Piatonismus, welche das 'pythagoreische' Element in Piatons Lehre betont. Damit reagierte man wohl vor allem auf das hellenistische, stark stoisierende Piatonbild des Antiochus, machte sich aber auch die bereits entwickelte neopythagoreische Lehre zu Nutzen, die ja weitgehend in Wirklichkeit auf Piaton und der Alten Akademie beruhte. Daß Piaton von pythagoreischem Gedankengut stark beeinflußt ist, war nicht zu bezweifeln. In dem Moment, in dem man sich den Schriften Piatons, den Zeugnissen über seine Lehre und den Schriften der Alten Akademie wieder zuwandte, um aus ihnen die Lehre Piatons zu rekonstruieren, mußte die Ubereinstimmung mit dem neopythagoreischen Schrifttum, das ja weitgehend auf denselben Quellen beruhte, ins Auge fallen und den Eindruck erheblich verstärken, Piaton hänge von Pythagoras ab, zumal einige Schriften, wie die des Timaeus Locrus, eben diesen Eindruck zu erwecken suchten. Schon Eudorus nahm, wie gesagt, eine Abhängigkeit Piatons von Pythagoras an. Es gab also von Anfang an im Piatonismus die Tendenz, starke pythagoreische Elemente in Piatons Lehre zu sehen. Es war lediglich die Frage, wie weit man dabei ging. Es gab eine Richtung, welche an die wesentliche Einheit der platonischen und der pythagoreischen Lehre glaubte und die platonische Lehre nach pythagoreischen Prinzipien zu rekonstruieren versuchte. So sagt Longinus von Plotin, den er in eine Reihe mit Thrasyllus, Moderatus und Numenius setzt: „ E r stützte sich auf die pythagoreischen — und zugleich auch platonischen — Prinzipien, um zu einer klareren Darlegung als seine Vorgänger zu gelangen" (bei Porphyrius, V . P . 20, 71 ff.). Porphyrius widerspricht weder dieser Einordnung noch der Behauptung, Plotin gehe von pythagoreischen Prinzipien aus (vgl. V . P . 21, 4—9). Was aber unterscheidet Numenius (und Moderatus) von Thrasyllus und Plotin, oder von Longinus (vgl. Porph. bei Euseb., H . E . V I , 19, 8), die man sicher nicht als Neopythagoreer bezeichnen wird? Nicht seine Lehre, nicht die Art, wie er zu dieser Lehre gelangt, nicht seine Verwendung von pythagoreischen Prinzipien, noch auch seine Berufung auf die Autorität des Pythagoras. Was ihn allenfalls unterscheidet, ist, daß er die Möglichkeit überhaupt in Betracht zieht, Piaton könne in einem wesentlichen Punkte fehlgegangen sein (fr. 7, 5 — 6), vielleicht auch, daß er bereit ist, Piaton für den Verlust der wahren Lehre mit-

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verantwortlich zu machen (fr. 24, 62ff.). Aber auch das kann kein hinreichender Grund sein, Numenius nicht als Platoniker zu betrachten. Auf der anderen Seite besteht ein klarer Unterschied zwischen Numenius und der G r u p p e von Philosophen, welche die pythagoreische Lehre wiederzubeleben versuchen, sich dabei aber nicht auf Piaton als die Autorität stützen, wie es Numenius tut. Folglich scheint es mir am wenigsten irreführend zu sein, wenn wir den Ausdruck 'Neopythagoreer' auf die Pythagoreer beschränken, welche sich nicht auf Piaton als die Autorität für die pythagoreische Lehre stützen und welche sich nicht verpflichtet sehen, eine Lehre zu rekonstruieren, die, soweit wie möglich, aus den platonischen Schriften belegt werden kann und jedenfalls nicht im Widerspruch zu ihnen steht. Statt dessen mag man bei Philosophen wie Numenius von 'pythagoreisierenden Piatonikern' reden. In diesem Zusammenhang hat man sich oft darauf berufen, daß Numenius schon in der Antike in der Regel als 'Pythagoreer' bezeichnet worden sei. Diese Bezeichnung findet sich zuerst bei Clemens (Strom. I, 150, 4), dann auch bei Orígenes (Contra. C . 1,15; IV, 51 ; V, 38; V, 57), Eusebius (P.E. I X , 7,1 ; X I , 9 , 8 ; X I V , 4 , 1 6 ) und Nemesius (II, 8, S. 69 M . ) D a s freilich hält Eusebius nicht davon ab, Numenius als Repräsentanten der platonischen Lehre einzuführen. E r muß also meinen, daß die Bezeichnung 'Pythagoreer' nicht ausschließt, daß es sich um einen Platoniker handelt. Es ist aber auffällig, daß es sich bei den erwähnten Autoren durchweg um christliche Schriftsteller handelt und Platoniker selbst im Falle des Numenius den Ausdruck T y t h a g o r e e r ' vermeiden. Nicht einmal Longinus oder Chalcidius (wie man vielleicht aus LEEMANS test. 4 schließen könnte) nennen Numenius einen Pythagoreer. Einmal führt Porphyrius ihn mit Cronius unter 'Pythagoreern' auf (Euseb., H . E. VI, 19, 8), so, wie er auch sonst Cronius einmal einen Pythagoreer nennt (bei Stob., Eel. II, 1 4 , 1 7 W.) Aber das scheint auch für Porphyrius nicht mehr zu heißen, als daß Numenius 'pythagoreisierte', und keineswegs auszuschließen, daß für ihn Numenius Platoniker war. Schließlich führt er in der Liste von Pythagoreern bei Eusebius neben Numenius und Cronius auch seinen eigenen früheren Lehrer Longinus auf, einen eher konservativen Platoniker. U n d wie wir bereits gesehen haben, rechnet Porphyrius N u menius und Cronius zu den platonischen Autoren, die bei Plotin studiert wurden (V.P. 1 4 , 1 — 12), neben Severus, Gaius und Atticus. In ähnlicher Weise hat Iamblich keine Schwierigkeit, nicht nur von Piatonikern und von Pythagoreern, sondern auch von „Piatonikern und Pythagoreern" zu reden (Stob., Eel. I, 356, 3—4 W.), so, als ob sich das nicht ausschlösse. Jedenfalls ist soviel klar, daß der Ausdruck 'Pythagoreer' selbst für einen Platoniker nicht ausschließt, daß es sich bei der bezeichneten Person um einen Platoniker handelt, als der N u menius ja auch von späteren Piatonikern nicht nur behandelt, sondern auch bezeichnet wird (vgl. Iamblich bei Stob., Eel. I, 3 7 4 , 2 1 W . ) . Für die Position des N u m e n i u s ist freilich noch ein anderer Zug seines Geschichtsbildes wesentlich, der in den Fragmenten der Schrift 'Uber den A b fall' nicht zutage tritt, aber auch weiteres Licht auf seinen Pythagoreismus wirft. Numenius meint nämlich keineswegs, Pythagoras sei der einsame Entdecker der wahren Lehre gewesen. So, wie er die Stellung Piatons durch die Autorität des Pythagoras relativiert, so relativiert er seinerseits die Stellung des

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Pythagoras, indem er dessen Weisheit die Weisheit der Alten, die Weisheit nicht nur der alten Griechen, sondern der angesehenen Nationen überhaupt zur Seite stellt, etwa die der Inder, der Juden, der Perser und der Ägypter (fr. l a , Euseb., P.E. I X , 7,1). Dies Interesse an der Weisheit der Barbaren war nichts Neues. Es zeigt sich schon bei Piaton und bei Aristoteles, dann vor allem in hellenistischer Zeit, in der ja die Philosophen selbst zunehmend nichtgriechischen Ursprungs sind, und erst recht in der Kaiserzeit, wovon, um nur ein Zeugnis zu nennen, das Proemium des Diogenes Laertius beredte Auskunft gibt. Bemerkenswert ist allenfalls zweierlei. D a ist erstens das vergleichsweise große Interesse, welches Numenius den Juden und ihren Schriften entgegenbringt. Zweitens ist die Tatsache wichtig, daß Numenius gerade nicht behaupten wollte, die Weisheit der griechischen Philosophen, die Lehre Piatons und des Pythagoras, sei ihrerseits auf die Weisheit des Orients oder gar auf Moses zurückzuführen, obschon die Christen seinen Satz von dem attisch sprechenden Moses so verstehen wollten. Aber es gibt keinen Hinweis darauf, daß Numenius für die Weisheit der Alten eine einzige historische Quelle annahm, geschweige denn, daß er sie in Moses sah. Wenn er den Juden besonderes Interesse entgegenbrachte, dann wohl deshalb, weil ihm ihre Weisheit, im Vergleich zu der der Ägypter, der Chaldäer und der Brahmanen, vernachlässigt zu sein schien. Die Auffassung des Numenius wird sich nicht wesentlich von der eines anderen Platonikers des 2. Jh., nämlich der des Celsus, unterschieden haben. Orígenes (Contra C . 1,14) berichtet, daß Celsus eine alte Lehre annahm, die schon immer von den weisesten Völkern, den weisen Städten und den weisen Männern vertreten worden sei, bei den „Ägyptern, Assyrern, Indern, Persern, Odrysiern, Samothrakern und Eleusinern". Wie wir sehen, ist hier von den Juden keine Rede, was Orígenes auch dem Celsus zum Vorwurf macht; also beginnt er das nächste Kapitel (I, 15) mit der Bemerkung „ U m wieviel besser als Celsus ist da doch Numenius", „welcher die Juden unter die weisen Völker zählte und nicht zögerte, in seinem Buch die Sprüche der Propheten zu zitieren und sie allegorisch zu interpretieren." Orígenes fährt fort „ E s wird auch gesagt, Hermippus habe im ersten Buch seiner Schrift über die Gesetzgeber berichtet, Pythagoras hätte seine Philosophie von den Juden zu den Griechen gebracht." Offenkundig war nichts dergleichen, auch bei aller Anstrengung, aus Numenius zu entnehmen. Sonst hätte sich Orígenes auf ihn und nicht auf einen Bericht über Hermippus gestützt. Numenius findet diese alte Lehre auch bei den Griechen, bei Homer (fr. 33, fr. 34,16), bei Hesiod (fr. 36, 11), den Orphikern (fr. 36,11), Pherecydes (fr. 36,12), Heraklit (fr. 52,60) und Parmenides (fr. 31, 27), in den eleusinischen Mysterien (fr. 55, 2), im archaischen Griechisch (fr. 54, 4), in der griechischen Mythologie (fr. 58). Was also nach seiner Auffassung Pythagoras und Piaton auszeichnen muß, ist das klare Erfassen und die logische Artikulation dieser alten Lehre. U n d Numenius Anliegen ist es, diese Lehre in ihrer klaren Artikulation zu rekonstruieren. N u menius unterscheidet sich also ganz wesentlich von den Autoren der hermetischen Schriften oder der Chaldäischen Orakel und überhaupt von den Autoren, die einen ägyptischen oder chaldäischen oder mosaischen Ursprung der Weisheit annehmen, und das nicht nur darin, daß er einen orientalischen Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie bestreitet, sondern auch darin, daß er offen-

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kundig der philosophischen Artikulation dieser Weisheit einen eigenen Wert beimißt. Aber unsere Schrift 'Uber den Abfall' ist dem Teil der Geschichte dieser Weisheit gewidmet, der mit Piaton beginnt, und so gilt es, zu Piaton und seinen Nachfolgern zurückzukehren. Der wesentliche Zug des numenischen Bildes hier ist die Annahme, daß die platonische und damit die wahre Lehre in der Akademie fast restlos verkommen sei. Numenius meint, die Alte Akademie bis auf Polemon habe gerade noch mehr oder minder die platonische Lehre zu bewahren gewußt. Das 'fast' (fr. 24, 8) läßt eine gewisse Kritik durchklingen, und die Bemerkung, er wolle nicht Xenocrates kritisieren, sondern über Piaton reden, drückt schon erhebliche Vorbehalte gegenüber Xenocrates aus. Doch ist sich Numenius anscheinend mit allen Piatonikern seit Antiochus, die sich wieder Speusipp und vor allem Xenocrates zuwenden, darin einig, daß die Alte Akademie noch am ehesten Rückschlüsse über die wahre platonische Lehre zuläßt. Vor allem H . J. KRÄMER (Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, Amsterdam 1964) hat sich bemüht, den Einfluß des Xenocrates im Piatonismus, gerade auch auf Numenius, herauszuarbeiten. Aber während Numenius, in Grenzen jedenfalls, das Zeugnis der Alten Akademie gelten läßt, weist er, anders als Antiochus, den Gedanken weit von sich, daß Aristoteles noch Zeugnis von der wahren platonischen Lehre gebe (vgl. fr. 24, 68). Die Nachricht, daß Cephisodorus unter anderem des Aristoteles Ideenlehre angegriffen habe, kann er sich nur so erklären, daß Cephisodorus Aristoteles Werk überhaupt nicht kannte, ihn aber fälschlich für einen Anhänger der platonischen Lehre hielt (fr. 25, 107—117). Diese anti-aristotelische Tendenz findet sich bereits bei Eudorus und dann, wie wir gesehen haben, besonders ausgeprägt bei Atticus. Wieder im Gegensatz zu Antiochus und vielen späteren Platonikern sieht aber Numenius in Zeno und seinen stoischen Nachfolgern mit ihrer Leugnung der intelligiblen Welt erst recht Gegner der wahren Philosophie. Während er in den uns überlieferten Fragmenten und Testimonien sich nirgendwo eigens mit den Lehren des Aristoteles auseinandersetzt, geht er wiederholt kritisch auf die Lehre der Stoiker ein (vgl. z . B . fr. 3; fr. 4 b ; fr. 5 2 , 2 ; 24; 35; 46; 79). Einig ist sich Numenius mit Antiochus darin, daß die Neue Akademie die platonische Position verraten habe. Geschichten, wonach Arcesilaus zumindest im kleinen Kreis der Schüler die wahre Lehre vertreten habe, mag er nicht glauben (fr. 25, 75ff.). Aber er glaubt auch nicht, daß Antiochus zur Lehre der Alten Akademie zurückgekehrt sei. Antiochus scheint ihm die platonische Lehre durch fremdes, vor allem stoisches Gut verfälscht zu haben (fr. 29, 12 — 15). Die Schrift meldet also gewisse Vorbehalte gegen die Alte Akademie an, ist aber vor allem durch ihre antiskeptische, antiaristotelische und antistoische Einstellung gekennzeichnet. In dem von peripatetischen und stoischen Elementen gereinigten Piatonbild soll uns der reine, pythagoreisierende Piaton entgegentreten (fr. 24, 66 — 70). Aber, wie für Antiochus und die anderen Platoniker, so gilt auch für Numenius, daß seine Sicht der verschiedenen Schulen und ihrer Ferne von der wahren Lehre nur in begrenztem Umfang von seiner eigenen Position widergespiegelt wird. Stoische und peripatetische Anschauungen waren so tief in das allgemeine philosophische Denken eingedrungen, daß man sich ihres Ursprungs

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nicht mehr bewußt war. So weist auch die Lehre des Numenius eine Reihe von peripatetischen und von stoischen Zügen auf, etwa in der Lehre vom göttlichen Intellekt, vom (periodischen?) Weltbrand (fr. 12,21), von der rationalen Seele mit acht Teilen. Noch von Plotin sagt selbst Porphyrius (V.P. 14, 4—5), daß seine Lehre von stoischen und von aristotelischen Elementen durchsetzt gewesen sei, ohne daß sich Plotin dessen bewußt war. Es gäbe noch viel über diese Schrift des Numenius zu sagen, die für uns eine wesentliche und noch kaum erschöpfte Quelle für den antiken Skeptizismus darstellt und vielleicht schon dem Altertum als solche gedient hat (vgl. Diogenes Laertius I X , 68 und 102). Hier soll nur bemerkt werden, daß es eben nicht eine Schrift über den Abfall von Pythagoras, sondern eine Schrift über den Abfall von Piaton ist, so wie auch die beiden anderen Schriften, über die wir Näheres wissen, 'Uber das Gute' und 'Uber das, was Piaton ungesagt ließ 5 , schon durch ihre Titel auf Piaton verweisen. Ferner fällt auf, daß die Geschichte, jedenfalls nach unseren Fragmenten zu urteilen, mit Antiochus aufhört. Mit Eudorus beginnt wohl für Numenius die Rückkehr zu Piaton.

IV. Die Schrift 'Über das Gute'

1. Die Ontologie des Numenius Wenn wir uns nun der eigentlichen Lehre des Numenius zuwenden, dann befinden wir uns wieder in der glücklichen Lage, uns auf eine ganze Reihe von wörtlichen Zitaten aus seiner Schrift 'Uber das Gute' stützen zu können, die durch eine Reihe weiterer Zeugnisse ergänzt werden. Auf Grund der Zitate hat man gemeint, es müsse sich um einen Dialog gehandelt haben. Dem freilich stehen eine Zahl von längeren Fragmenten entgegen, die keine Spur eines Dialogs aufweisen. Vermutlich handelt es sich lediglich um das in der späteren Antike ausgiebig verwendete alte Stilmittel, bisweilen die Entwicklung eines Gedankengangs lebendig und gleichsam dramatisch in der Form von Fragen und Antworten zu gestalten. Ein Beispiel dafür bietet uns etwa das Fragment aus Maximus 'Uber die Materie' bei Eusebius (P.E. V I I , 2 1 , Iff.). Nach den uns überlieferten Titeln der Schriften des Numenius und nach der Beachtung zu urteilen, welche gerade diese Schrift in der Antike gefunden hat, dürfte es sich um Numenius' Hauptwerk handeln, in dem er die Grundzüge seines Systems darlegt. In dieser Schrift, deren Titel wohl an Piatons programmatische Vorlesung erinnern soll, verfolgt Numenius die Frage „Was ist das Seiende?" (fr. 3 , 1 ; fr. 2 , 2 3 ; vgl. fr. 5 , 5 ; fr. 7,12 — 13). Numenius meint, dies sei die Frage, die im 'Timaeus' gestellt wird. Fr. 7, 8 ff. zitiert und interpretiert er Tim. 27 D 6 ff. entsprechend. Wie wir sehen werden, glaubt er auch, daß Piaton diese Frage im 'Timaeus' wenigstens in Andeutungen beantworte. Jedenfalls meint er, seine Antwort auf die Frage aus dem 'Timaeus' entnehmen zu können. Aber die Frage

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nach dem Seienden ist auch die Frage der zentralen Bücher der aristotelischen 'Metaphysik 5 , und es ist schwer, in fr. 6, 5—6 (το πάλαι ζητούμενον) nicht eine Anspielung auf Aristoteles, Met. Ζ 1, 1028 b 2 - 3 , zu sehen. D i e Untersuchung ist also für Numenius eine metaphysische Untersuchung. U n d so, wie Aristoteles in der 'Metaphysik' mit einer Untersuchung der wahrnehmbaren Gegenstände beginnt, um über ihre F o r m letztlich zu G o t t als dem primär Seienden geführt zu werden, so beginnt auch Numenius seine Untersuchung bei den wahrnehmbaren Körpern, um über ihre Seele zu G o t t und letztlich dem ersten G o t t , der Idee des Guten, geführt zu werden (vgl. fr. 2, 19—23). Daher der Titel der Schrift. D e r Gedankengang läßt sich bis zu einem bestimmten Punkt in seinen Grundzügen relativ klar erkennen. Numenius beginnt die eigentliche U n t e r suchung der Frage nach dem Seienden negativ. Als Seiendes können weder ein einzelnes sogenanntes Element wie das Feuer noch die Elemente in ihrer Gesamtheit bezeichnet werden (fr. 3, I f f . ) . Dies ist dadurch ausgeschlossen, daß selbst die sogenannten Elemente dem Werden und Vergehen unterworfen sind. D e n n wir sehen, daß sie auseinander entstehen und ineinander vergehen (fr. 3, 5—7). Warum das gegen die Annahme spricht, die Elemente seien seiend, wird hier nicht gesagt, aber im folgenden Fragment 4 a wird behauptet, nichts, was sich wandele, dürfe als seiend betrachtet werden ( 4 a , 7—9). U n d aus Fragment 5 (5, 13 — 16) kann man wenigstens ersehen, wie Numenius dafür argumentieren würde: jedes Werden und Vergehen, jeder Wandel des Seienden setzte voraus, daß das, was seiend ist, zugleich auch nichtseiend ist, und umgekehrt; das aber wäre ein untragbarer Widerspruch. Daraus, daß die sogenannten elementaren Körper wegen ihres Wandels nicht als seiend angesehen werden können, glaubt Numenius verallgemeinernd schließen zu dürfen, daß Körper überhaupt nicht seiend sein können (fr. 3 , 8 ; vgl. 4 b , 5 f f . ) . Offenkundig betrachtet er Körper als solche einfach als Aggregate der sogenannten Elemente. Numenius argumentiert dann weiter, daß, wenn schon Körper nicht als Seiendes betrachtet werden können, die Materie selbst erst recht keinen Anspruch auf diese Bezeichnung hat (fr. 3, 9 f f . ) . D e n n sie ist unbeständig und fließend (fr. 3 , 1 0 - 1 2 ; vgl. auch 4 a , 1 - 1 0 ) . W i r wissen nicht, inwieweit Numenius in der Schrift ' U b e r das Gute' auf die Einzelheiten seiner Lehre von der Materie eingegangen ist. Insbesondere wissen wir nicht, ob das umfangreiche Zeugnis über Numenius' Lehre von der Materie bei Chalcidius, welches wohl durch Porphyrius vermittelt sein dürfte, auf unsere Schrift zurückzuführen ist. So setzt DES PLACES dieses Testimonium als mögliches Fr. 1 0 b an, druckt es aber als F r . 52. D a aber diese Einzelheiten seiner Lehre von der Materie für die Einordnung und für das Verständnis des Numenius von großer Bedeutung sind, sei hier kurz auf fr. 1 0 b ( = fr. 52), das Chalcidiuszeugnis, eingegangen. Numenius erklärt, die Materie als solche sei ungeworden (vgl. fr. 52, 7). Indem er sagt, die Materie sei ein G o t t gleichursprüngliches Prinzip (fr. 52, 13 — 14), wendet er sich gegen jede F o r m des Monismus, wonach auch das materielle Prinzip letztlich auf G o t t oder die Einheit entweder gänzlich zurückgeführt werden oder doch von einem solchen ersten und obersten Prinzip ab-

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hängig gemacht werden müsse. Solche Formen des Monismus finden sich vor allem in pythagoreisierenden Kreisen, wenn auch die ältere pythagoreische Lehre, wie sie uns bei Piaton und bei Aristoteles entgegentritt, dualistisch gewesen zu sein scheint. So lassen diese Pythagoreer sowohl in dem Bericht des Alexander Polyhistor (ap. D . L . VIII, 25) als auch in dem Bericht des Sextus Empiricus (A.M. X , 261) die Materie oder unbestimmte Zweiheit aus der Einheit hervorgehen. Diese Vorstellung findet sich auch noch bei Nicomachus von Gerasa, wenn der entsprechende Abschnitt in den "Theologoumena arithmeticae' (p. 5 , 4 DE FALCO) denn auf Nicomachus zurückgeht. Mit dem Platoniker Eudorus nahm die pythagoreische Lehre allerdings eine komplexere Form an (vgl. Simpl., In phys. 181,10ff.). Danach sind zwei Einheiten zu unterscheiden: eine erste Einheit, die das oberste Prinzip darstellt, der dann eine zweite Einheit und eine unbestimmte Zweiheit untergeordnet sind, welche die Prinzipien für alles übrige bilden (eine ähnliche Auffassung liegt vielleicht bei Ps. Archytas, 'Uber die Prinzipien', Stob., Ecl. 1,279,12 — 18, vor). Eudorus glaubt, Aristoteles folgend, zeigen zu können, daß ein Paar von entgegengesetzten Prinzipien eines ihnen vorgeordneten Prinzips bedarf. Bei Moderatus von Gades ist die Ableitung der Materie noch komplexer. Nach dem Bericht des Porphyrius bei Simplicius (In phys. 281, 5ff.) zu schließen, scheint Moderatus ebenfalls eine erste und eine zweite Einheit anzunehmen und der letzteren die unbestimmte Zweiheit ('Das Quantum') als weiteres sekundäres Prinzip gegenüberzustellen, aber er läßt diese Zweiheit aus der Einheit entstehen, indem diese Einheit sich ihrer Eigenart entledigt und zurückweicht (ibid. p. 231, 8—9; vgl. DILLON, S. 348). Wenn nun Numenius nach Chalcidius (fr. 52,15ff.) ausdrücklich die Meinung der Pythagoreer zurückweist, welche die Zweiheit aus der Einheit entstanden wissen wollen, die von ihrer eigenen Natur zurückweicht und die Art der Zweiheit annimmt, so mag er vor allem Moderatus im Auge haben, zumal sich die Pythagoreer des Sextus und Nicomachus, bzw. der Anonymus der 'Theologoumena arithmeticae', das Entstehen der Zweiheit aus der Einheit anders vorstellen, nämlich durch Addition bzw. Verdoppelung. Für Numenius nun ist die ursprüngliche Materie, die Materie an sich, ungeworden und Gott gleichursprünglich. Aber er meint (fr. 52,15ff.), die entgegengesetzte Auffassung einiger Pythagoreer beruhe auf einem MißVerständnis. Anscheinend kennt Numenius autoritative Texte, in denen von gewordener oder gezeugter Materie die Rede ist, und meint, diese seien mißverstanden worden. In der Tat finden sich genug Texte, in denen von gewordener oder gezeugter Materie die Rede ist (vgl. z . B . Ps. Philolaus, D K I, 418, 5). Aber diese beziehen sich nach Meinung des Numenius nicht auf die ursprüngliche Materie, die eben ungeworden ist, sondern auf das Material, aus dem in unserer bereits geordneten Welt die Dinge entstehen und in das sie wieder vergehen, die vier Elemente und Mischungen aus den Elementen. Aber, wie wir aus dem 'Timaeus' ersehen können, enthält die ursprüngliche Materie nur Spuren der Elemente. Diese selbst und der Stoff, der sich aus ihnen zusammensetzt, sind bereits Teile der geordneten Welt, die dadurch entstanden sind, daß die ursprüngliche Materie einer Ordnung unterworfen worden ist. In diesem Sinn will auch Numenius selbst zwischen ungewordener und gewordener oder gezeugter Materie unterscheiden (fr. 52, 7—8).

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D i e ursprüngliche Materie ist also kein bestimmter Stoff, hat keine bestimmten Qualitäten (fr. 52, 34). Diese erhält sie erst durch die Weltordnung. Darin ist sich Numenius mit den Stoikern und den Peripatetikern einig. N o c h auch ist die ursprüngliche Materie quantitativ bestimmt und begrenzt (fr. 52, 2 5 f f . ) . Darin ist Numenius mit den Stoikern uneins. E r argumentiert, die Stoiker nähmen eine begrenzte Materie an, weil sie die grundlegende Weltordnung auf die Natur zurückführen, die Natur aber ihrer Ansicht nach nicht eine unbegrenzte Materie ordnen könne. D a aber der Demiurg eine viel größere Macht als die Natur habe und daher auch eine unbegrenzte Materie ordnen und so begrenzen könne, gibt es keinen Grund, anzunehmen, schon die ursprüngliche Materie sei begrenzt. Wodurch sollte sie auch begrenzt sein? D i e ursprüngliche Materie ist also qualitativ und quantitativ unbestimmt, formlos (fr. 52, 9; 44—45). Es wäre aber ein Fehler, daraus zu schließen, sie sei völlig bestimmungs- und substanzlos (fr. 52, 93), wie die meisten annehmen. D i e Materie hat so etwas wie eine eigene 'Natur' und 'Substanz': sie befindet sich in ständiger, aber regelloser, ungeordneter, chaotischer Bewegung. D e n n , wo sonst sollte die Unordnung, Unregelmäßigkeit und Instabilität in der Welt herkommen, wenn von G o t t nur Ordnung, Regelmäßigkeit und Stabilität k o m men können? So hat Piaton ganz zu Recht im 'Timaeus' eine sich sinn- und regellos wandelnde Materie angenommen (vgl. fr. 52, 8 7 f f . ) . Weil die Materie letztlich für alle Unordnung und Regelwidrigkeit verantwortlich gemacht werden muß, ist sie böse (fr. 5 2 , 3 7 ) , die Quelle aller Ü b e l (fr. 52, 6 3 - 6 4 ) . D a die Materie aber eine gleichsam natürliche Bewegung aus sich selbst heraus hat, sich von selbst bewegt, hat sie auch so etwas wie eine Seele, die allerdings jeder Rationalität bar ist. Diese Seele ist letztlich die Quelle alles Bösen. So hat Plato zu Recht neben der guten Weltseele in den Gesetzen eine böse Weltseele angenommen (Leg. X , 896 E ; fr. 52, 6 4 f f . ) . D a ß diese Annahme richtig ist, kann man daran sehen, daß die Stoiker, die lehren, die Materie sei indifferent, moralisch neutral, in größte Schwierigkeiten geraten, wenn es darum geht, den Ursprung des Bösen zu erklären (fr. 52, 35 — 53). Es wäre freilich ein Irrtum, zu meinen, die Materie sei das, was durch diese Seele beseelt und belebt wird. 'Materie' nennen wir vielmehr das, was bereits diese Seele mit einschließt; deswegen kann man auch nicht sagen, die Materie werde erst dadurch schlecht, daß sie von einer schlechten Seele beseelt wird. Weil die ursprüngliche Materie schlecht und völlig unvernünftig ist, wäre es auch absurd, zu versuchen, sie auf G o t t , ein gutes und vernünftiges Prinzip zurückzuführen. Soweit Numenius über die Materie. In der Annahme einer dem Demiurgen vorgegebenen, ursprünglich ungeordneten Materie und einer schlechten Weltseele folgt Numenius der Interpretation Plutarchs, so wie Atticus Plutarch und N u menius folgen wird. Dies verdient deshalb festgehalten zu werden, weil man sieht, daß Numenius fest in die platonische Tradition eingefügt ist. Einerseits folgt Numenius dieser Tradition selbst in einem Punkte, in dem das Vorbild von Pythagoreern und pythagoreisierenden Piatonikern eigentlich einen anderen Weg nahegelegt hätte. Statt dessen kritisiert Numenius diese Pythagoreer. Andererseits orientieren sich, offensichtlich schon im 2. J h . , andere Platoniker wie Atticus und wohl auch Celsus an ihm. 70

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U m aber zum Grundgedankengang unser Schrift zurückzukehren: nicht die Materie also, noch auch die wahrnehmbaren Körper, die gewordene Materie sind, können als Seiendes, geschweige denn als das Seiende betrachtet werden. Wir haben also in anderer Richtung nach einer Antwort auf unsere Frage nach dem Seienden zu suchen. Doch die Reflexion über die wahrnehmbaren Körper führt uns einen Schritt weiter (fr. 4a, 15ff.; 46). Die wahrnehmbaren Körper weisen eine gewisse Einheit und Beständigkeit auf. Es muß also etwas geben, was sie zumindest zeitweise zusammenhält. Dabei kann es sich nicht seinerseits um einen Körper oder Materie handeln. Denn wie sollte etwas in sich Unbeständiges dem Unbeständigen Beständigkeit verleihen? Überdies erhielten wir einen Regress, weil wir zu erklären hätten, was denjenigen Körper eint, welcher dem wahrnehmbaren Körper seine relative Einheit und Beständigkeit verleiht. Wir müssen also, um die relative Beständigkeit der wahrnehmbaren Körper zu erklären, annehmen, daß es neben dem Körperlichen und Materiellen noch etwas anderes gibt, etwas Unkörperliches, welches den Körpern ihre Einheit und Beständigkeit verleiht. Insofern hatten die Stoiker mit ihrer Lehre von der Seele und der causa contentiva ganz recht, nur daß sie den Fehler begingen, diese für etwas Körperliches zu halten. Es gibt also neben der Materie noch etwas anderes, etwas Unkörperliches, Unveränderliches, Unvergängliches, nicht der Wahrnehmung, sondern nur dem Intellekt Zugängliches. Dämit aber haben wir auch eine erste, vorläufige Antwort auf unsere Eingangsfrage nach dem Seienden (fr. 6 , 1 — 7 ) : das Seiende ist das unkörperliche Intelligible, dem die Welt und die Dinge in ihr ihre relative Einheit, Beständigkeit und Ordnung verdanken (vgl. fr. 6 , 1 4 — 15; 7 , 2 ) .

2. Die Theologie des Numenius An dieser Stelle erlauben uns die Fragmente nicht mehr, den Gedankengang im Einzelnen weiterzuverfolgen; denn bei den nächsten Zitaten sind wir bereits bei Gott angelangt, ohne den wir die Ordnung der wahrnehmbaren Welt nicht erklären können, da die Materie an sich ungeordnet ist und daher ihre vernünftige und im ganzen guten Ordnung auf ein vernünftiges und gutes Prinzip zurückgehen muß. Damit sind wir bei der traditionellen platonischen Lehre von zwei Prinzipien der wahrnehmbaren Welt angelangt, Gott und der Materie. Traditionell identifizieren die Platoniker diesen Gott mit einem göttlichen Intellekt, der auch die Welt erschafft, und diesen wiederum, wie nicht anders zu erwarten, mit dem Demiurgen des 'Timaeus'. Es ist klar, daß Numenius diese Auffassung nicht teilt. Denn es ist sicher, daß Numenius meint, man dürfe Gott nicht einfach mit dem göttlichen Intellekt identifizieren, der die Welt erschafft, sondern müsse statt dieses einen demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekts, der unter Umständen zugleich auch absolut einfach und das Gute an sich sein soll, zwei göttliche Wesen annehmen, einen ersten Gott und einen demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt. Umstritten ist, ob Numenius sich mit der Annahme dieser beiden göttlichen Wesen begnügt, oder ob er in einem weiteren Schritt auch meint, diesen demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt wieder

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in zwei göttliche Wesen aufteilen zu müssen, einen eigentlichen göttlichen Intellekt und einen eigentlichen Demiurgen, so daß wir eine Reihe von drei Göttern erhielten. Die Schwierigkeit entsteht so: einerseits ist in der doxographischen Uberlieferung einhellig von drei Göttern des Numenius die Rede. Proclus geht wiederholt von drei Göttern bei Numenius aus (fr. 21; fr. 22), und das tun auch Eusebius und die von ihm abhängigen christlichen Autoren, z . B . Theodoret. Überdies zeigt seine Verwendung des 2. Piatonbriefs zumindest, daß N u m e n i u s von einer Dreigötterlehre Piatons ausgeht. Andererseits scheinen seine eigenen Worte eher gegen einen Annahme von drei Göttern zu sprechen. Denn (i) ist in ihnen, von einer Ausnahme abgesehen, nur von einem ersten und einem zweiten Gott die Rede, (ii) Gerade die einzige Ausnahme scheint die Auffassung zu stützen, wonach Numenius nur zwei Götter annimmt. Denn es handelt sich um eine Stelle, (fr. 11, 13 — 14), an der Numenius behauptet, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien eines, so als wollte er die Annahme von drei Göttern gerade bestreiten. (iii) Man sieht nicht recht, wenn man den Zitaten folgt, w o neben dem dort erwähnten zweiten G o t t , der sowohl als göttlicher Intellekt als auch als Demiurg geschildert wird, noch systematisch Raum für einen dritten G o t t sein soll. Man hat versucht, diese Schwierigkeit dadurch aufzulösen, daß man angenommen hat, Numenius kenne zwar eine platonische Dreigötterlehre, kritisiere sie aber (so BEUTLER, C. 671, 4). Verbreiteter ist die Meinung, daß Numenius zwar, aus Respekt vor der platonischen Tradition, willens ist, von drei Göttern zu reden, aber selbst meint, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien in Wirklichkeit nur einer. Schließlich mag man meinen, N u m e n i u s ' eigenes Denken führe nur zu zwei G ö t tern, aber er mache den Versuch, in seinem System einen Platz für einen dritten Gott zu finden, um der platonischen Tradition, bzw. dem 2. Piatonbrief, Rechnung zu tragen. Mir scheint, daß man der Annahme einer Dreigötterlehre bei Numenius kaum entgehen kann. Denn, wie wir bereits oben bemerkt haben, schreibt Numenius eine Dreigötterlehre nicht nur Sokrates, sondern auch Piaton und Pythagoras zu. Er stützt sich auf Piatons 2. Brief und geht davon aus, daß Piaton die somatische Auffassung teilt. Er führt die Dreigötterlehre des Sokrates überhaupt nur an, um zu zeigen, wie die wahre Philosophie schon in der Schülergeneration des Sokrates verlorenging, weil Sokrates seine Schüler darüber im Unklaren ließ, daß er die pythagoreische Götterlehre vertrete; er muß also annehmen, daß es sich bei der Dreigötterlehre auch um pythagoreische Lehre handelt. Aber es wäre nicht nur ohne Parallele, wenn Numenius eine Lehre des Piaton zurückwiese; es ist recht undenkbar, daß er eine Lehre erst dem Pythagoras, zumindest implizit, zuschreibt, um sie dann selbst zurückzuweisen, zumal die Stelle im 2. Piatonbrief als solche ihn ja nicht dazu zwang, die Lehre dem Pythagoras zuzuschreiben. Sie zwang ihn nicht einmal dazu, Piaton die Dreigötterlehre zuzuschreiben. Denn wir haben auch zu bedenken, daß die Stelle in 2. Piatonbrief zwar später oft als Beleg für eine Dreigötterlehre Piatons herangezogen worden ist, aber es kann keine Rede davon sein, daß Numenius bereits eine allgemein akzeptierte Tradition vorfand, welche ihn dazu zwang, den 2. 70*

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Piatonbrief als Beleg für Piatons Dreigötterlehre heranzuziehen. Es ist vielmehr umgekehrt so, daß Numenius vermutlich der erste uns bekannte Autor ist, der von dem Brief in dieser Weise Gebrauch macht (der Gnostiker Valentinus und Justinus Martyr scheinen den Brief in ähnlicher Weise benützt zu haben, aber es ist unklar, wer früher anzusetzen ist). Das schließt natürlich nicht aus, daß der Brief schon vor Numenius so verwendet worden ist, aber es zeigt, daß es kaum zutreffen kann, daß Numenius auf Grund einer festen Tradition gar nicht anders konnte, als diesem Zeugnis Rechnung zu tragen. Auch ist zu bedenken, daß andere Platoniker trotz der Stelle keineswegs meinten, bei Piaton drei Götter annehmen zu müssen. Numenius' Verwendung der Stelle spricht also eher dafür, daß er in ihr einen willkommenen Beleg für seine Auffassung fand, daß Piaton eine Dreigötterlehre vertreten habe. Wie aber haben wir uns dann zu erklären, daß Numenius selbst, jedenfalls in den uns überlieferten Fragmenten, nur von zwei Göttern spricht, mit Ausnahme von jener Stelle, an der er den dritten Gott mit dem zweiten zu identifizieren scheint? Mir scheint, daß wir hier nicht vergessen dürfen, daß die Zitate aus N u menius aus den Abschnitten bei Eusebius stammen, in denen Eusebius Belege für die platonische Lehre vom ersten und vom zweiten Gott gibt. Es darf uns also schon wegen der Auswahl des Eusebius nicht wundern, daß in diesen Texten der erste und der zweite Gott, aber nicht der dritte, im Vordergrund stehen. Eusebius mag sogar Stellen vermieden haben, an denen vom dritten Gott die Rede ist, weil hier vielleicht die Parallele zwischen christlicher und platonischer Lehre am schwächsten erschien. Weiter müssen wir bedenken, daß es Numenius selbst in erster Linie darauf angekommen sein muß, die Unterscheidung zwischen erstem und zweitem Gott zu klären. Und dies nicht nur aus dem trivialen Grunde, daß der erste und der zweite Gott, wie schon ihr N a m e besagt, wichtiger und grundlegender sind als der dritte, sondern vor allem, weil es das Hauptanliegen des Numenius gewesen zu sein scheint, uns davon zu überzeugen, daß wir von dem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt einen ihm vorgeordneten ersten Gott zu unterscheiden haben (vgl. fr. 1 1 , 3 f f . ; fr. 17). Alle weiteren Unterscheidungen wie die zwischen einem eigentlichen göttlichen Intellekt und einem eigentlichen Demiurgen mögen ihm vergleichsweise nachgeordnet und unbedeutend erschienen sein. Jedenfalls fällt auf, daß er in den uns erhaltenen Fragmenten nicht nur nicht positiv von einem dritten Gott spricht, sondern von dem göttlichen Intellekt und dem Demiurgen wiederholt so redet, als sei das eine Sache, als gäbe es der Welt vorgeordnet überhaupt nur diese beiden göttlichen Wesen, den ersten Gott und den demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt. Aber die Erklärung dafür dürfte darin liegen, daß er nicht nur meint, die Unterscheidung vom zweiten und dritten Gott sei relativ unbedeutend, sondern auch überdies die Auffassung vertritt, diese beiden göttlichen Wesen seien auf eine Weise eines, die es ihm erlaubt, vom göttlichen Intellekt als Demiurgen und vom Demiurgen als Intellekt zu reden. Auf diese Weise entsteht der Eindruck, daß es neben dem ersten Gott bei Numenius nur noch den einen demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt geben kann. Schließlich haben wir daran zu denken, daß es hier um eine Untersuchung über das höchste Prinzip, das Gute an sich, geht. Numenius

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selbst macht darauf aufmerksam, daß es ihm hier nicht auf eine Untersuchung des demiurgischen Prinzips, sondern das Aufweisen des ersten Gottes ankommt (fr. 1 2 , 4 - 8 ) . Folglich kann auch die Analyse des demiurgischen Prinzips in einen zweiten und einen dritten Gott im Hintergrund bleiben. Eine Schlüsselstellung bei dieser ganzen Frage nimmt aber ohne Zweifel die schon erwähnte Stelle ein, an der Numenius den dritten mit dem zweiten Gott zu identifizieren scheint. Sollte diese Stelle in der Tat so zu verstehen sein, daß kein wirklicher Unterschied zwischen dem zweiten und dem dritten Gott besteht, dann ist das ganze Problem im Sinne einer Zweigötterlehre des Numenius entschieden. Sollte die Stelle aber so zu verstehen sein, daß der zweite und der dritte Gott zwar nicht identisch sind, aber dennoch eine Einheit derart bilden, daß der dritte Gott in gewisser Hinsicht nichts anderes als der zweite Gott ist, dann ließe sich auch leicht erklären, warum Numenius in den uns erhaltenden Fragmenten nur von einem ersten und einem zweiten Gott spricht, obschon er annimmt, daß man auch noch in einem weiteren Schritt, bei genauerer Analyse, zwischen einem zweiten und einem dritten Gott zu unterscheiden habe. Der fragliche Satz bei Numenius lautet einfach: „ D e r zweite und dritte Gott aber ist zwar einer" (fr. 11,13—14: ó θεός μέντοι ó δεύτερος και τρίτος εστίν εις). Dieser Satz löst die erwähnten Schwierigkeiten nur deshalb aus, weil er zu besagen scheint, daß der zweite und der dritte Gott in Wirklichkeit nur einer sind (vgl. DILLON, S. 367 " The Second, and Third God, however, are in fact one"·, vgl. auch DES PLACES' Ubersetzung). Aber muß der Satz so verstanden werden? Mir scheint, der Satz könnte auch so aufgefaßt werden, daß er nicht die Einheit oder Identität des zweiten mit dem dritten Gott behauptet, sondern die Einheit dessen, was hier als „zweiter und dritter G o t t " bezeichnet wird: der Gott aber, der zweiter und dritter Gott ist, ist einer. Sprachlich und sachlich scheint mir diese Möglichkeit sogar wesentlich näher zu liegen, wenn wir den Zusammenhang des Satzes beachten. Eusebius zitiert die Stelle, um Numenius' Ansichten über den zweiten Gott wiederzugeben (vgl. 11,1—2). Das Fragment selbst beginnt mit der Bemerkung, daß man, um zu einem rechten Verständnis des ersten und des zweiten Gottes zu gelangen, sie erst einmal richtig zu unterscheiden habe (11, 3—5). Gott wird angerufen, und 11,11 soll diese Unterscheidung beginnen. Ein Gegensatz wird nun tatsächlich festgestellt: der erste Gott ist eines und zwar eines auf die Weise, nämlich einfach, daß er keinerlei Teilung zuläßt. N u n sollten wir erwarten, daß Numenius damit fortfährt, etwas über den zweiten Gott zu sagen, was den Unterschied zwischen dem ersten und dem zweiten Gott klar hervortreten läßt. Statt dessen aber sagt er etwas über den Gott, der als zweiter und dritter bezeichnet wird. Doch, was er über ihn sagt, erfüllt unsere Erwartungen: auch dieser Gott ist eines, aber offenkundig nicht so, daß er nicht geteilt werden kann; denn er wird von der Materie geteilt. Wenn wir also den argumentativen Zusammenhang des in Frage stehenden Satzes beachten, dann sollte das 'ist eines' (έστίν εις) die Funktion haben, die, wenn auch teilbare, Einheit des Gottes zu behaupten, der als „zweiter und dritter" bezeichnet wird, nicht aber die Funktion, die Identität des zweiten mit dem dritten Gott zu behaupten.

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Warum aber spricht Numenius hier von „dem zweiten und dritten Gott", wo wir erwarten sollten, daß er vom zweiten Gott redet, von dem allein bisher in diesem Fragment die Rede war? Die Antwort liegt auf der Hand: der dritte Gott ist ursprünglich nicht vom zweiten Gott geschieden, er wird eben erst durch diese Spaltung des zweiten Gottes von ihm geschieden, bei der sich der zweite Gott in einen zweiten und einen dritten Gott teilt. Der einzige ersichtliche Grund, warum Numenius hier von „dem zweiten und dritten G o t t " statt bloß vom „zweiten G o t t " spricht, ist der, daß er klarmachen will, daß die Spaltung, von der die Rede ist, die in den zweiten und den dritten Gott ist. Folgten wir dieser Interpretation, dann wäre klar, daß Numenius hier drei Götter unterscheidet. Aber selbst, wenn wir der gewöhnlichen Interpretation des fraglichen Satzes folgen, bringt uns der Satz immer noch keine Bestätigung der Annahme, daß Numenius hier behauptet, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien in Wirklichkeit nur einer. Denn wenn Numenius hier behaupten sollte, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien eines, so hätten wir uns nach der Art dieser Einheit zu fragen, und diese Frage erlaubte verschiedene Antworten. Von diesen scheint mir vor allem eine erwägenswert zu sein. Wir wissen aus Iamblich (fr. 42), daß Numenius die Lehre von der Einheit und Identität der Seele mit ihren Prinzipien vertrat. Wir dürfen daraus wohl schließen, daß Numenius folglich auch die Einheit und Identität der Seele mit dem zweiten Gott vertrat. Ist dies aber selbst für die einzelne Seele der Fall, so muß es erst recht für den dritten Gott gelten, der dem zweiten nachgeordnet, den einzelnen Seelen aber wohl vorgeordnet ist. Folglich müßte auch der dritte Gott mit dem zweiten auf dieselbe Weise eines und identisch sein, wie die Seele es mit ihren Prinzipien ist. Aber daraus folgt natürlich noch längst nicht, daß überhaupt kein Unterschied zwischen dem zweiten und dem dritten Gott besteht; denn Numenius will ganz sicher auch nicht behaupten, daß keinerlei Unterschied zwischen der Seele und ihren Prinzipien besteht; dies hieße ja, den Prinzipiencharakter der Prinzipien aufzuheben. Selbst wenn der strittige Satz also so aufgefaßt werden müßte, daß er besagt, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien einer oder eines, können wir daraus immer noch nicht schließen, daß Numenius hier behaupten will, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien in Wirklichkeit nur einer. Darüber, wie wir uns diese Einheit und Identität vorzustellen haben, die nicht auf vollständige Ununterscheidbarkeit hinausläuft, gibt uns Iamblich in einem anderen Testimonium (fr. 41) Auskunft. Dort schreibt er Numenius die Ansicht zu, daß unkörperliche Wesen wie Götter oder Seelen homoeomer sind, d.h. daß dasjenige, in welches sie geteilt werden, untereinander und mit dem Geteilten wesensgleich ist (41, 3ff.); ferner schreibt er ihm die Auffassung zu, daß sich die Seele in ihrem Wesen nicht vom Intellekt, den Göttern und anderen höheren Wesen unterscheidet. Daraus wird man vielleicht schließen dürfen, daß der dritte Gott, der durch Teilung aus dem zweiten entsteht, mit diesem insofern eines und dasselbe ist, als er ihm wesensgleich ist. Die Einheit ist vielleicht sogar noch enger, wenn wir unterstellen, daß der zweite Gott mit seinem eigenen Wesen identisch ist, so, wie das Gute an sich mit dem Wesen des Guten identisch ist. Denn in diesem Fall ist der zweite Gott das Wesen des dritten, ist der dritte Gott wesentlich der zweite Gott. Aber die Umkehrung gilt nicht: der zweite Gott ist nicht wesentlich der dritte

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G o t t . Folglich haben wir auch zwischen dem zweiten und dem dritten G o t t zu unterscheiden, selbst wenn der dritte G o t t wesentlich der zweite ist. Man mag dieser Erklärung, warum Numenius den dritten G o t t mit dem zweiten in gewisser Hinsicht ein-und-dasselbe sein läßt, skeptisch oder gar ablehnend gegenüberstehen; sicher aber ist soviel, daß diese umstrittene Stelle nur für sich genommen nicht so verstanden werden muß und vermutlich auch nicht so verstanden werden darf, daß sie die völlige Identität des zweiten mit dem dritten G o t t behauptet. Berücksichtigen wir nun, daß es ohnehin eine Fülle von Zeugnissen für eine Dreigötterlehre bei Numenius gibt, welchen im wesentlichen nur der fragliche Satz entgegensteht, dann scheint mir klar zu sein, daß wir uns dem antiken Verständnis des Numenius anzuschließen haben, wonach dieser drei G ö t t e r postulierte. Warum nun meint Numenius, man dürfe G o t t nicht mit einem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt identifizieren, sondern müsse statt dessen drei göttliche Wesen annehmen, nämlich (i) einen ersten G o t t , (ii) den eigentlichen göttlichen Intellekt, und, schließlich, (iii) den eigentlichen Demiurgen? Betrachten wir zunächst, warum Numenius einen ersten G o t t von dem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt unterscheiden und ihm vorordnen will. U m das zu verstehen, muß man noch ein weiteres Detail der vor Numenius gängigen platonischen Lehre vom demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt berücksichtigen. Platoniker unterscheiden sich von Stoikern und Peripatetikern vor allem auch darin, daß Platoniker neben G o t t und der Materie auch die Existenz von Ideen annehmen, während diese von Stoikern und Peripatetikern bestritten wird. Deshalb ist auch in platonischen Texten bisweilen von drei Prinzipien die R e d e : G o t t , Materie und Ideen. Damit aber stellt sich das Problem, in welcher Beziehung wohl G o t t und die Ideen zueinander stehen. D a der göttliche Intellekt als Intellekt par excellence verstanden wird, die Ideen aber das Intelligible im strikten Sinne des Wortes sind, war man sich darüber einig, daß die Ideen den Inhalt des Denkens des göttlichen Intellekts bilden müssen. Damit aber blieb die Frage offen, ob die Ideen nicht nur Inhalt göttlichen Denkens, sondern auch ihm vorgegebener Gegenstand sind. Diese Frage wurde verneint, weil man meinte, daß dies unverträglich mit der Annahme sei, G o t t sei höchstes Prinzip alles Seienden, was er offenkundig nicht sein kann, wenn er wesentlich Intellekt ist und die Ideen seinem Denken bereits vorgegeben sind. Folglich nahm man an, daß die Ideen überhaupt erst als Inhalt göttlichen Denkens existieren, und nicht bereits als dem göttlichen Denken vorgegebener Gegenstand. Ferner neigte man dazu, den göttlichen Intellekt mit seinem Denken der Ideen und damit auch mit den Ideen selbst zu identifizieren, die ja nun erst als Gedanken Gottes existieren. Damit waren die Ideen G o t t nicht vorgeordnet, sondern gleichgeordnet oder, unter bestimmten Umständen, sogar nachgeordnet. Dies ist die Auffassung, welche wir etwa bei Plutarch und später dann bei Atticus, Orígenes und Longinus finden. Numenius hielt eine solche Vorstellung für unhaltbar, weil er zwei A n nahmen machte, die mit einer solchen Vorstellung vom höchsten Prinzip unvereinbar zu sein schienen, (i) E r nahm an, daß das oberste Prinzip die Idee des Guten ist, die nicht selbst eine unter vielen Ideen ist, sondern gleichsam die Idee der Ideen, die Quelle alles Seins und aller Intelligibilität, damit aber auch

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Prinzip des Intelligiblen und somit auch des Intellekts, (ii) Er nahm an, daß das oberste Prinzip das Eine ist. Das Eine ist absolut einfach und in keiner Weise oder Hinsicht teilbar. Denn sonst wäre es zugleich auch Vieles. Wäre es aber Vieles, so hätte es seine Einheit nicht aus sich heraus, sondern von einem höheren Prinzip, welches ihm Einheit verliehe. Aus diesen beiden Annahmen folgt ferner, daß die Idee des Guten das Eine selbst sein muß. Auf Grund dieser Annahmen fällt es Numenius leicht, zu zeigen, daß das höchste Prinzip, der erste Gott, nicht mit dem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt identisch sein kann. Vor allem verweist er darauf, daß der Demiurg zwar gut ist, aber nur gut im gewöhnlichen Sinne des Wortes, d.h. durch Teilhabe an der Idee. Folglich kann er nicht das Gute selbst sein. Folglich muß das, durch dessen Teilhabe er gut ist, das Gute selbst sein (fr. 20; fr. 1 9 , 8 - 1 1 ; fr. 16, 8 - 1 0 ) . Aber er verweist auch darauf, daß der erste Gott einfach und unteilbar ist, während der demiurgische göttliche Intellekt zwar eine gewisse Einheit hat, aber teilbar ist und auch geteilt wird (fr. 11, 1 1 - 1 5 ) . Fr. 1 6 , 1 - 3 behauptet er, bereits gezeigt zu haben, daß wenn die ousia, d.h. die Ideen, intelligibel ist, es ein ihr vorgeordnetes Prinzip, nämlich die Idee des Guten, geben muß. Offensichtlich verläßt er sich hier auf die Annnahme, daß die Idee des Guten Quelle aller Intelligibilität und damit alles Intelligiblen und somit der Ideen ist, folglich also ihnen vorgeordnet sein muß. Fr. 12, 1—9, sagt er, es wäre blasphemisch, vom ersten Gott zu sagen, er sei als Schöpfer tätig. Was daran blasphemisch sein soll, wird nicht ganz klar, aber der Gedanke mag der sein, daß die Schöpfung kein angemessenes Werk der Idee des Guten wäre (dazu reicht ein bloß durch Teilhabe guter Schöpfer), daß ein solches Werk einem Bedürfnis des Schöpfers entspricht, die Idee des Guten aber in keiner Weise bedürftig ist. In jedem Fall verbirgt sich hier ein weiteres Argument, wonach der Schöpfer selbst nicht die Idee des Guten sein kann. Es ist auch leicht zu sehen, wie Numenius meinen kann, mit dieser Unterscheidung fest auf dem Boden platonisch-pythagoreischer Lehre zu stehen. Das Eine ist natürlich das pythagoreische letzte Prinzip, welches Numenius aber auch in Piatons Thilebus', vor allem aber im Tarmenides' gefunden haben wird. Und für die Idee des Guten, die jenseits des wahrhaft Seienden und Quelle alles Verstehens ist, beruft er sich natürlich auf die 'Republik' und vielleicht den Thaedo'. Jedenfalls ist Numenius sicher, daß schon Piaton einen ersten Gott vor dem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt angenommen hat (fr. 17). Nicht ganz so leicht ist zu sehen, wie Numenius glaubte, diese Antwort dem "Timaeus' entnehmen zu können. Aber auch dafür gibt es eine Reihe von Indizien. Das erste liefern uns die Numeniusfragmente selbst. Im Fragment 20 weist Numenius darauf hin, daß Piaton im 'Timaeus' (29E1) den Demiurgen nur gut im gewöhnlichen Sinne des Wortes nennt, ihn also von der Idee des Guten unterscheidet. Daß dem noch später eine gewisse Bedeutung zugemessen wurde, sehen wir an der Art und Weise, wie Proclus (In Tim. I, 303, 27ff.) zunächst die Position des Numenius, dann die des Harpocration und schließlich die des Atticus schildert. Numenius nimmt statt des einen Demiurgen einen ersten und einen zweiten Gott an (304, 1—2), von denen er den ersten mit der Idee des Guten identifiziert (304, 5), Harpocration folgt ihm darin (304,24—26), Atticus

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dagegen weigert sich, den Demiurgen von der Idee des Guten zu unterscheiden, und das, so sagt Proclus, obschon Piaton den Demiurgen nur gut, aber nicht das Gute nennt (306, 6—9). Aus Proclus' Kommentar ergeben sich auch zwei weitere Hinweise darauf, wie Numenius im 'Timaeus' nach Anspielungen auf einen ersten Gott gesucht hat. An der gerade erwähnten Stelle kommentiert Proclus folgenden Text aus dem 'Timaeus': „ D e n Schöpfer und Vater dieses Alls herauszufinden, ist schon eine gewaltige Aufgabe; das Gefundene aber allen mitzuteilen, ist vollends unmöglich" (28 C). Uns ist klar, daß hier nur von einem Gott, dem Demiurgen, die Rede ist, und so versteht es auch Proclus. Numenius aber bezieht 'Schöpfer' hier auf den zweiten Gott, den demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt, 'Vater' aber auf den ersten Gott. Proclus nämlich sagt (fr. 21, In Tim. I, 3 0 3 , 2 7 f f . ) : „ N u menius nun spricht von drei Göttern; den ersten nennt er 'Vater', den zweiten 'Schöpfer', den dritten 'Geschöpf'. Denn der Kosmos ist bei ihm der dritte Gott 5 . Folglich ist bei ihm der Demiurg ein zweifacher, nämlich der erste und der zweite Gott, während das Geschaffene der dritte ist. Es ist besser, diese Ausdrucksweise zu verwenden, als jene, welche er benützt, wenn er etwas theatralisch von einem Großvater, einem Sohn und einem Enkel redet." Wir wissen nicht, was für einen Timaeustext Numenius vor sich hatte. Vielleicht las er einen bestimmten Artikel auch vor 'Vater'. Vermutlich aber sah er hier nicht einen offenen Hinweis, sondern eher eine versteckte Andeutung auf den ersten Gott. Auf jeden Fall aber müssen wir ihm zugute halten, daß die uns offenkundig erscheinende Interpretation, wonach sich der ganze Ausdruck „der Vater und Schöpfer" auf den einen Demiurgen bezieht, ihm ganz unplausibel erschienen sein muß. Denn er meint, die Schwierigkeit liege, auch in Piatons Augen, nicht darin, den Menschen die Existenz des Schöpfers begreiflich zu machen, sondern die Existenz des ersten Gottes. Denn er sagt (fr. 17,2—5), daß Piaton gewußt habe, daß der Demiurg den Menschen bekannt, der erste Gott aber ihnen gänzlich unbekannt sei. Es ist nicht der Demiurg, sondern der erste Gott, der alles Verstehen übersteigt und in gewisser Hinsicht unsagbar ist. Folglich mußte Numenius annehmen, daß Tim. 28 C nicht nur vom Demiurgen, sondern auch vom ersten Gott die'tlede ist. Eine dritte Stelle im 'Timaeus' schließlich, auf die sich Numenius stützte, ist 39 E I f f . : „ E r (d.h. der Demiurg) bedachte sich die Sache so, daß auch diese Welt so viele und so beschaffene Ideen haben sollte, wie der Intellekt sie in dem Lebewesen, welches ist 6 , als vorhanden erfaßt". Hier wird der demiurgische, göttliche Intellekt in Beziehung zu den Ideen gesetzt. Deshalb spielte die Interpretation dieser Stelle auch eine Schlüsselrolle im Piatonismus. Wir nehmen wohl zu Recht an, daß es sich bei dem Lebewesen einfach um den Kosmos der Ideen handelt und daß diese hier so eingeführt werden, als seien

5 6

Vgl. dazu weiter unten S. 1068 f. Vgl. F . M. CORNFORD, Plato's Cosmology, N e w Y o r k 1937, S. 117; A . J. FESTUGIÈRE, Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée, Bd. 4, Paris 1968, S. 136 n. 2, vor allem den Verweis auf Proclus, In Tim. III, 103, 2 0 ; vgl. auch Proclus, In Tim. I, 306, 2 ; 306, 4.

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sie dem göttlichen Intellekt vorgegeben. Denn sie dienen ja dem Demiurgen als Vorbild bei der Schöpfung. Die Platoniker freilich, die Gott mit dem göttlichen Intellekt identifizieren, mußten die Stelle so interpretieren, daß der göttliche Intellekt die Ideen als Inhalt seines eigenen Denkens erfaßt, also in sich selbst schaut, wenn er ein Vorbild für die Schöpfung sucht. Numenius dagegen folgte der natürlichen Interpretation der Stelle und nahm an, Piaton müsse sich hier auf etwas dem göttlichen Intellekt Vorgegebenes und Vorgeordnetes beziehen, wenn er von dem Lebewesen redet, welches die Ideen enthält. Proclus nämlich berichtet: (fr. 22, In Tim. III, 103, 28ff.): „Numenius aber setzt den ersten Gott in Entsprechung zu dem Lebewesen, welches ist, an . . . , den zweiten Gott aber in Entsprechung zum Intellekt . . .". Wir können gut verstehen, warum Numenius meint, diese Stelle zeige, daß Piaton etwas dem göttlichen Intellekt vorgeordnet sein läßt. Aber die Tatsache, daß Piaton dies mit dem Lebewesen identifiziert, welches ist und welches die Ideen enthält, stellt Numenius vor die größten Schwierigkeiten. Denn wie soll das Lebewesen, welches ist und welches die Ideen enthält, mit der Idee des Guten identisch sein? Wenn das Lebewesen mit den Ideen identisch ist, kann es nicht selbst die Idee des Guten und das Eine sein. Denn es wäre vieles und nicht absolut eines, und überdies müßte die Idee des Guten ihm vorgeordnet sein. Also muß Numenius die Behauptung, das Lebewesen enthalte die Ideen, so interpretiert haben, daß das Lebewesen durch diese Behauptung nicht mit den Ideen identifiziert wurde. In dieser Annahme können wir uns dadurch bestärkt sehen, daß Amelius seine Theorie auf eine differenzierende Interpretation des Ausdrucks 'die Ideen enthalten' stützte (vgl. Proci., In Tim. III, 103, 18££.; I, 306, Iff.). Numenius muß angenommen haben, daß die Idee des Guten implizit alle Ideen in ihrer undifferenzierten Einheit in sich einbeschließt, und zwar so, wie jede Idee das, was unter sie fällt, bereits implizit enthält, und so, wie, ganz allgemein, jedes Prinzip schon all das, dessen Prinzip es ist, irgendwie enthält. Daher, so mochte Numenius meinen, der betonte Verweis auf die Zahl und einzelne Beschaffenheit der Ideen. Die Ideen sind sämtlich in der Idee des Guten enthalten, aber in einer undifferenzierten Einheit. In ihrer differenzierten Vielheit treten sie erst im intuitiven Denken des göttlichen Intellekts auf, wenn dieser auf das Lebewesen schaut. Das hieße, daß sich die Idee des Guten im intuitiven Denken des göttlichen Intellekts in der differenzierten Vielheit der Ideen darstellt. In diesem Sinne ist es richtig, daß die Ideen überhaupt erst als Inhalt des intuitiven Denkens des göttlichen Intellekts existieren. Aber es ist falsch, daraus zu schließen, dieses Denken habe keinen ihm vorgegebenen Gegenstand. Dieser ist die Idee des Guten. Dem Einwand, daß in diesem Falle das intuitive Denken seinen Gegenstand verfälsche, kann Numenius mit der Antwort begegnen, daß in der Tat das intuitive Denken der Idee des Guten nicht adäquat sei, aber sie auch nicht verfälsche, da sie implizit die Ideen enthalte. Aber es bleibt immer noch ein Problem, wie wir die Idee des Guten mit dem Lebewesen, welches ist, identifizieren können. Die Idee des Guten ist jenseits der ousia und damit des wahrhaft Seienden. Wie also kann sie selbst etwas sein, was ist? Dieses Problem ist relativ leicht zu lösen. Numenius, auch darin von Amelius gefolgt, nimmt ganz zu Recht an, daß nicht nur Wahrnehmbares an

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Intelligiblem teilhat, sondern auch Intelligibles an Intelligiblem (fr. 46b, Syrianus, In Met. 1 0 9 , 1 2 - 1 4 ; fr. 46c, Proclus, In Tim. III, 33, 33ff.). Damit steht es ihm frei, zu sagen, die Ideen hätten an der Idee des Guten teil, genauer gesagt, sie seien wahrhaft seiend, indem sie an der Idee des Seienden teilhätten, die mit der Idee des Guten identisch ist (fr. 17, 4). Aber so, wie die Idee des Menschen in einem primären, wenn auch ungewohnten Sinn Mensch ist, während der einzelne Mensch nur in einem abgeleiteten, sekundären Sinn Mensch ist, so ist auch die Idee des Seienden, bzw. die Idee des Guten, in einem ungewohnten, aber primären Sinne seiend, der sie über das abgeleitete, sekundäre Sein der Ideen erhebt. Aber inwiefern ist die Idee des Guten ein Lebewesen? Darin dürfte Numenius eine Anspielung auf die Tatsache sehen, daß auch die Idee des Guten, der erste Gott, ein lebendiger Intellekt ist. Jedenfalls behauptet Numenius wiederholt, der erste Gott sei ein Intellekt (fr. 16, 3; fr. 17, 3 - 4 ; fr. 17, 7;). Warum er auch den ersten Gott als Intellekt betrachtet, ist nicht ganz klar. Eine Fülle von Möglichkeiten bietet sich an, die sich nicht gegenseitig ausschließen. Die Idee des Guten ist zwar eine Idee ganz besonderer Art, aber eben doch eine Idee. Es mag sein, daß Numenius aus Piaton, Soph. 2 4 8 D schließt, daß Ideen ganz allgemein belebt sind, insbesondere aber Soph. 248 E 8 ff. entnimmt, daß das völlig Seiende, d. h. eben die Idee des Guten, lebendig sein muß. Es heißt dort: „Sollen wir uns so leicht davon überzeugen lassen, daß Bewegung, Leben, Seele, Weisheit (phronesis) dem völlig Seiendem abgehen, daß es weder lebe noch auch weise sei, sondern erhaben und heilig, ohne Intellekt, unbeweglich verharre?" Es fällt jedenfalls auf, daß Numenius dem ersten Gott all diese Prädikate zuspricht: Bewegung (fr. 15, 8 - 9 ) , Leben (ft. 15, 2), Intellekt (fr. 17, 7 - 8 ) , Weisheit (phronein, fr. 1 9 , 2 — 5). Er mag auch dem Prinzip folgen, daß die Idee des Guten als Idee irgendwie intelligibel sein muß, wenn auch nicht genau in dem Sinn, in dem die anderen Ideen intelligibel sind, es also auch einen ihr adäquaten Intellekt geben muß, selbst wenn dieser nicht Intellekt im gewöhnlichen Sinn sein kann, da er sonst der Idee des Guten nicht adäquat wäre. Dieser Intellekt aber wäre wiederum mit dem Gedanken, der Idee des Guten, und damit der Idee selbst, identisch, eben weil er ihr adäquat ist. Schließlich mag Numenius einfach nicht dazu in der Lage gewesen sein, sich einen Gott vorzustellen, der nicht zumindest in irgendeinem Sinn Intellekt ist. Dem Einwand, daß die Idee des Guten Quelle der Erkenntnis sein soll (Rep. VI, 509 Β 6 - 7 ) und so jedem Intellekt vorgeordnet sein muß, kann Numenius damit begegnen, daß es sich bei dem ersten Gott nicht um einen Intellekt oder ein Intelligibile im gewöhnlichen Sinne handelt und daß es Piaton um die Erkenntnis der ottsia, d. h. der Ideen im gewöhnlichen Sinn geht, die nur im Lichte der Idee des Guten verstanden werden können. Man kann also sehen, wie Numenius selbst diese Timaeusstelle so interpretieren konnte, daß sich aus ihr ein Verweis auf die Idee des Guten ergibt, die dem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt vorgeordnet ist. Vermutlich lassen sich weitere Hinweise darauf finden, wie Numenius den 'Timaeus' in diesem Sinne interpretiert hat, aber für uns mag es reichen, festgestellt zu haben, wie Numenius die Lehre von einem ersten und einem zweiten Gott auch aus dem 'Timaeus' selbst zu gewinnen glaubt.

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Diese Unterscheidung zwischen einem ersten Gott und dem eigentlichen göttlichen Intellekt ist Numenius' wichtigstes Anliegen (vgl. fr. 17 und fr. 11). Sie mußte Numenius um so wichtiger sein, als seine platonischen Vorgänger und Zeitgenossen sie in der Regel nicht machten. Zwar ist die Unterscheidung in der pythagoreischen Literatur, aber auch schon bei Eudorus und bei Modernus vorbereitet. Sie findet sich auch bei Albinus (Didask., Kap. 10), aber wir können nicht sicher sein, daß nicht Numenius dem Albinus voraufgeht. In jedem Fall dürfte Numenius wesentlich dazu beigetragen haben, daß später eine solche Unterscheidung zur Regel wurde. Aber Numenius glaubt nicht nur, daß man einen dem göttlichen Intellekt vorgeordneten Gott einführen muß, sondern auch, daß die Identifizierung Gottes mit einem demiurgischen, göttlichen Intellekt überdies noch insofern irreführend ist, als man zwischen einem eigentlichen göttlichen Intellekt und dem eigentlichen Demiurgen unterscheiden muß, so daß wir nach dem göttlichen Intellekt noch ein weiteres, drittes göttliches Wesen anzusetzen haben. Auch diese weitere Unterscheidung ist bei Eudorus und bei Moderatus vorgebildet und findet sich, jedenfalls in Ansätzen, bei Albinus. Aus den oben angeführten Gründen sind die Zitate aus Numenius selbst für diese zweite Unterscheidung relativ unergiebig. Mehr noch, was sie zu sagen haben, bereitet dem Verständnis schon sprachlich die allergrößten Schwierigkeiten. D a ist einmal der Satz „ D e r zweite und dritte Gott aber ist zwar eines" (fr. 11, 13 — 14), über den wir schon gesprochen haben. D a ist zweitens der Satz „ D e r zweite Gott nämlich, der zweifach ist, bringt sowohl seine eigene Idee als auch den Kosmos hervor, da er Demiurg ist" (fr. 16,10—12). Schließlich gibt es- noch eine dritte Stelle, die vielleicht auf diese Unterscheidung anspielt, nämlich fr. 12,4 — 7: „Wenn sich unsere Untersuchung auf das demiurgische Prinzip bezöge und wir dann behaupteten, es sei notwendig so, daß der, welcher im vorauf existiert, deshalb auch in der Lage sei, auf eminente Weise (διαφερόντως) tätig zu sein, dann wäre das ein passender Weg, sich an die Verfolgung der Frage zu machen." Wenden wir uns zunächst dieser letzten Stelle zu, die in diesem Zusammenhang bisher nicht beachtet worden ist. Es geht an dieser Stelle darum, daß es ein Fehler wäre, anzunehmen, der erste Gott betätige sich als Schöpfer oder Demiurg. Man könnte meinen, wenn irgendetwas Schöpfer sei, dann müsse es der erste Gott auf eminente Weise sein, weil die letzte Ursache oder das letzte Prinzip all das, dessen Ursache oder Prinzip sie ist, auf eminente Weise selbst sein muß. So ist das Gute an sich nicht nur Ursache alles Guten, sondern auch selbst auf eminente Weise gut; desgleichen gilt für das Seiende an sich, das Eine an sich, aber auch für alle Ideen: das Schöne an sich ist nicht nur Ursache alles Schönen, sondern auch selbst auf eminente Weise schön. Dieses Prinzip aber soll nun nicht uneingeschränkt gelten. Es gilt, z . B . , nicht für das erste Prinzip als Ursache oder Prinzip des Schöpfers. Daraus, daß die erste Ursache Prinzip und Ursache des Schöpfers ist, folgt nicht, daß sie auch selbst in eminenter Weise schöpferisch tätig sein muß. Denn der Schöpfer hat zwar an der Idee des Guten teil, aber nicht als Schöpfer, sondern nur insofern er gut und weise ist (fr. 19). Noch ist der Schöpfer Teil des ersten Gottes derart, daß das, was primär vom Ganzen gilt, in abgeleiteter Weise sich auch vom

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Teil sagen läßt. In diesem Zusammenhang nun sagt Numenius, daß, wenn es hier um die Klärung des demiurgischen Prinzips ginge, es sehr wohl angebracht wäre, von dem, der vorab existiert, zu sagen, er sei auf eminente Weise schöpferisch tätig. Worauf bezieht sich Numenius, wenn er von dem spricht, „der im vorauf existiert"? E r kann sich kaum auf den ersten G o t t beziehen, denn selbst im Zusammenhang einer Untersuchung über das demiurgische Prinzip wäre es falsch, anzunehmen, der erste G o t t sei schöpferisch tätig. Zwar ist der erste G o t t letztlich auch Prinzip und Ursache der Schöpfung, aber dies ist er nicht dadurch, daß er selbst schöpferisch tätig wird. Numenius muß sich also auf ein vorgeordnetes Wesen im Bereich des demiurgischen Prinzips beziehen. Numenius sagte demnach: wenn unsere Untersuchung dem demiurgischen Prinzip gälte, dann wäre es angebracht, davon auszugehen, daß das vorgeordnete demiurgische Prinzip in eminenter Weise schöpferisch tätig sei. Damit ist, genau genommen, noch nicht behauptet, daß es ein solches vorgeordnetes und ein entsprechend nachgeordnetes demiurgisches Prinzip gibt. Aber die Sprache legt doch sehr nahe, daß Numenius davon ausgeht, daß es einen Demiurgen gibt, der in eminenter Weise die Welt schafft, und einen Demiurgen, der im gewöhnlichen oder eigentlichen Sinn schöpferisch tätig wird. Dies scheint sich auch aus dem Zusammenhang der ersten der drei erwähnten Stellen in Numenius selbst zu ergeben, fr. 1 1 , 1 3 — 14. D o r t heißt es, daß der zweite G o t t gespalten wird, indem er sich ordnend, also demiurgisch tätig, der ungewordenen Materie annimmt. W i r haben bereits gesehen, daß die Spaltung, von der die Rede ist, vermutlich die Spaltung in einen zweiten und einen dritten G o t t ist. D e r zweite G o t t wird zum dritten G o t t , insofern er sich tätig der Ordnung der Materie annimmt. Es ist also der dritte G o t t , welcher im landläufigen Sinn von 'tätig' schöpferisch tätig ist. D e r zweite G o t t ist nur auf eminente Weise schöpferisch tätig. An der zweiten Stelle schließlich, w o es vom zweiten G o t t heißt, er sei zweifach (fr. 16, 10—11), wird der zweite Aspekt des göttlichen Intellekts wieder mit seiner Schöpfung der Welt assoziiert. Auch hier also scheint der zweite G o t t der dritte G o t t zu sein, insofern er tatsächlich tätig die Welt ordnet. A b e r auch der zweite G o t t kann Demiurg der Welt genannt werden, nur eben nicht auf dieselbe Weise. D i e N o t i z des Proclus (fr. 22, 3—4, In T i m . I I I , 103, 31) weist in dieselbe Richtung: nach Numenius bediene sich der zweite G o t t des dritten, um schöpferisch tätig zu sein. In irgendeinem Sinn ist der zweite G o t t schöpferisch tätig, aber das tatsächliche W e r k der Schöpfung fällt dem dritten G o t t zu. W e n n wir also nach Gründen suchen, aus denen heraus Numenius meinte, einen dritten von einem zweiten G o t t trennen zu müssen, dann legen seine eigenen W o r t e jedenfalls die Auffassung nahe, daß man vom göttlichen Intellekt als solchem nicht sagen könne, er erschaffe im gewöhnlichen Sinne des Wortes die Welt. Einen Hinweis darauf, warum Numenius das meinen könnte, und zugleich auch einen Hinweis darauf, warum er meinen könnte, darin lediglich Piatons 'Timaeus' zu folgen, gibt uns Proclus, wieder in seinem Kommentar zu T i m . 39 E . Piaton spricht dort, wie wir gesehen haben, von (i) dem Lebewesen, welches als Vorbild dient, (ii) dem göttlichen Intellekt und (iii) dem Demiurgen, der bedachte (διενοήθη), daß auch diese Welt alle Ideen verwirklichen sollte. W i r neigen dazu, den Intellekt einfach für den Intellekt des D e -

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miurgen zu halten und so zu meinen, es sei allenfalls von zwei Dingen die Rede, dem Vorbild und dem Demiurgen, der mit einem Intellekt begabt ist. Aber wir müssen zugeben, daß die Stelle zunächst einmal von drei Dingen zu sprechen scheint und es der Interpretation bedarf, wenn man den Intellekt, von dem die Rede ist, mit dem Demiurgen identifizieren will. Numenius wählt diese Interpretation nicht, wie Proclus berichtet (fr. 22, In Tim. III, 103,28ff.): „Numenius aber setzt den ersten Gott in Entsprechung zum Lebewesen, welches ist, an, . . . den zweiten in Entsprechung zum Intellekt, . . . den dritten aber in Entsprechung zu dem 7 , was bedenkt." Und Proclus erklärt uns auch, warum Numenius die Stelle so auffaßt: er nimmt an, daß es das Wesen göttlichen Intellekts ist, intuitiv zu denken (νοεΐν). Die tatsächliche tätige Erschaffung der Welt aber setzt planendes, vorhersehendes, kurzum diskursives Denken (διανοεϊσθαι) voraus, wenn es eine gute Welt werden soll. Also kann es sich bei dem tatsächlichen Demiurgen nicht um den göttlichen Intellekt handeln. An der Timaeusstelle ist noch ein anderes Element wichtig, von dem leider nicht ganz klar ist, ob und auf welche Weise es in das Denken des Numenius eingeht. Das διενοήθη an der Platonstelle hat nicht nur ein kognitives, sondern auch ein voluntativ-desideratives Element: der Demiurg überlegt nicht nur, wie er die Welt nach dem Vorbild des Lebewesens ordnen kann, sondern kommt auch zu dem Entschluß, sie so zu ordnen. N u n wird dies zwar bisweilen übersehen, aber bei Piaton und bei Aristoteles hat die Vernunft nicht nur eine kognitive, sondern auch eine motivierende Funktion, sie hat ihr eigenes Begehren oder Wollen, das mit dem der irrationalen Seele in Konflikt geraten kann. Das Begehren oder Wollen ist kein irrationales Element in der Vernunft, sondern wesentlicher Teil der ratio selbst. Diese Doppelfunktion der Vernunft tritt noch ausgeprägter in der stoischen Philosophie hervor, die unsere Verantwortung sowohl für unser Meinen als auch für unseren Affekt, also auch für unser Begehren, dadurch hervorzuheben versucht, daß sie beides von der Zustimmung unserer Vernunft abhängig macht, unsere Meinung von unserer Zustimmung zu einer Art von Vorstellung, unseren Impuls (όρμή) von unserer Zustimmung zu einer anderen Art von Vorstellung. Die Vorstellungen mögen sich uns aufdrängen, aber ob sie zu Meinungen oder Impulsen, Zuneigungen oder Abneigungen, werden, hängt von unserer Vernunft ab; wenn sie stark und vernünftig ist, stimmt sie nur den vernünftigen Vorstellungen zu, und unser Leben wird von vernünftigen Meinungen und Impulsen geleitet. N u n hat uns der Zufall ein Zeugnis bewahrt (fr. 45, Porphyrius bei Stob., Eel. I, 349,19ff.), wonach auch Numenius ein Zustimmungsvermögen annimmt, dem er sogar das Vorstellungsvermögen unterordnet. Wir werden von diesem Zeugnis noch zu reden haben, wenn wir uns Numenius' Lehre von der Seele zuwenden. Hier ist nur wichtig, daß es also durchaus Teil der Vorstellung des Numenius vom diskursiven Intellekt sein kann, daß dieser nicht nur einen kognitiven, sondern auch einen voluntativ-desiderativen Aspekt hat. Dies wird durch fr. 18 bestätigt, wo Numenius ausdrücklich

7

Wie Plotin 1 1 1 , 9 , 1 , 2 4 zeigt, ist es gleichgültig, ob wir το oder τον lesen; das Gemeinte bleibt dasselbe, solange wir nur το δ ι α ν ο ο ΰ μ ε ν ο ν nicht passivisch verstehen.

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dem eigentlichen Demiurgen sowohl Erkenntnis, bzw. ein Erkenntnisvermögen, als auch Impuls, bzw. ein Antriebsvermögen zuschreibt ( 1 8 , 1 2 — 13). So kann dem Demiurgen auch Sorge um die Materie zugeschrieben werden (fr. 1 1 , 1 8 ) , welche ihn dazu motiviert, sich ihr sorgend zuzuwenden, um eine geordnete gute Welt zu schaffen. N u n kann man zwar verstehen, daß man formal zwischen einem Intellekt, der die Ideen intuitiv denkt, und einem Intellekt, der die Weltordnung theoretisch und praktisch diskursiv bedenkt, unterscheiden kann. Was damit noch nicht klar wird, ist, warum wir deshalb auch real zwei Intellekte annehmen sollen und nicht einfach einen Intellekt, der beides tut. Proclus erklärt, daß Numenius den Fehler begeht, das Wesen des Intellekts mit der jeweiligen Tätigkeit zu identifizieren, also auch zwei Intellekte annehmen muß, weil es sich um zwei wesentlich verschiedene Tätigkeiten handelt. W i r könnten uns auch eine Erklärung vorstellen, wonach diskursives Denken und erst recht diskursives praktisches Denken und tatsächliche schöpferische Tätigkeit mit dem göttlichen Intellekt unvereinbar wären. Vielleicht geht Numenius auch von der Annahme aus, die sich z . B . bei Plotin findet, daß das diskursive Denken der Seele eigen ist, so daß wir einen Intellekt und eine Seele erhalten. Restlos befriedigend sind diese Erklärungen deshalb nicht, weil, wie wir gesehen haben, der zweite und der dritte G o t t ursprünglich und wesentlich ein G o t t sind, der erst durch die Materie gespalten wird. D i e Erklärung für die Unterscheidung des zweiten und des dritten Gottes kann also nicht allein in ihrer verschiedenartigen Tätigkeit liegen, sondern muß etwas mit der Spaltung zu tun haben, wenn unsere Vermutung zutrifft, daß der zweite und der dritte G o t t erst durch die Spaltung aus dem zweiten entstehen. D i e folgende freilich reichlich spekulative Lösung des Problems bietet sich an. D e r göttliche Intellekt hat die Realität zum Gegenstand, das heißt aber in diesem Stadium der Ableitung der göttlichen Wesen den ersten G o t t ; der Intellekt denkt also den ersten G o t t . Was er dabei in seinem intuitiven Denken sieht, sind die Ideen. A b e r als göttlicher Intellekt muß er auch der ungeordneten Materie gewahr sein. W e n n er nun die Ideen sieht, kann er sie auf zwei Weisen betrachten, als Abbild des ersten Gottes bzw. der Idee des Guten, oder als mögliches Vorbild für eine geordnete Welt. E r kann sich also auch als möglichen Nachahmer des ersten Gottes insofern sehen, als er sich in der Welt ein A b bild seiner selbst, nämlich der Ideen, schaffen kann, so wie der erste G o t t ein Abbild seiner selbst in dem göttlichen Intellekt, nämlich den Ideen, hervorgebracht hat. D i e Materie, welche der Ordnung dringend bedarf, bietet dem göttlichen Intellekt die Möglichkeit an, sich in ihr seinerseits ein eigenes Abbild zu verschaffen. A b e r indem sich der göttliche Intellekt dazu entschließt, die Welt zu ordnen, entsteht ein neues göttliches Wesen, welches planend und vorhersehend die Weltordnung diskursiv bedenkt und sie realisiert. Denn der göttliche Intellekt, welcher nur die Möglichkeit einer Weltordnung in den Ideen sieht, kann durch den Entschluß, die Welt zu ordnen, nicht seine Existenz verlieren, da er als intelligibles Wesen unvergänglich ist. E r kann sich auch nicht von einem Intellekt, der nur die bloße Möglichkeit einer Weltordnung sieht, in einen Intellekt, der die Weltordnung planend und vorhersehend realisiert, verwandeln. Denn intelligible Wesen sind unwandelbar. E r kann sich also nur in einen In-

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tellekt, der die Möglichkeit einer Weltordnung sieht, und einen Intellekt, welcher diese Möglichkeit aktiv verfolgt, spalten. Aber trotz dieser Spaltung bleibt der dritte Gott wesentlich göttlicher Intellekt, eben göttlicher Intellekt, der die Welt ordnet und nicht nur die Möglichkeit einer solchen Ordnung sieht. Insofern also ist der dritte Gott dem zweiten G o t t wesensgleich. So kann man vielleicht verstehen, warum Numenius meint, man müsse, dem 'Timaeus' folgend, drei Götter annehmen, die Idee des Guten, den göttlichen Intellekt und einen abgespaltenen göttlichen Intellekt, der die Welt tätig ordnet, aber dem Wesen nach mit dem zweiten Gott eines ist. Die Identität des dritten Gottes wirft allerdings noch zwei weitere Probleme auf. Wir wissen aus dem Bericht des Chalcidius (fr. 52, 65), daß Numenius auch eine gute Weltseele annimmt. Wie verhält sich diese Weltseele zum eigentlichen Demiurgen? Manches spricht dafür, daß N u m e n i u s sie mit dem Demiurgen identifiziert. Denn einerseits heißt es bei Chalcidius nicht nur, daß die wahrnehmbare Welt aus F o r m und Materie besteht (fr. 52, 40), wobei die F o r m die Seele sein muß, die in der Verbindung mit der Materie die Welt zu einem Lebewesen macht, sondern es heißt auch, die Welt setze sich aus G o t t und Materie zusammen (fr. 52, 74; 98; 127), überdies einem vorsehenden Gott (fr. 52, 95—98). Dies scheint aber der dritte G o t t zu sein. U n d andererseits wird der dritte Gott von Numenius selbst wie eine Seele dargestellt, welche die Materie zusammenhält (fr. 18, 6ff.). Später heißt es denn auch bei Plotin, daß das diskursive Denken Sache der Seele und nicht des Intellekts ist (III, 9 , 1 , 3 5 ) . In der Tat ist es ja auch die Weltseele, welche tätig die Materie ordnet. Numenius mag sich dabei auch auf Epinomis 984 C stützen, w o von der demiurgisch tätigen Seele die Rede ist. Eine andere Möglichkeit wäre die, den dritten Gott nicht schlechtweg mit der Weltseele zu identifizieren, sondern zunächst mit der universellen Seele, dem Seelenprinzip, welches sich dann in Weltseele und Einzelseelen aufspaltet. Aber unsere Zeugnisse geben keinen Anhaltspunkt für eine solche Auffassung bei Numenius. Aber damit ergibt sich ein weiteres Problem für Numenius. Denn nach dem 'Timaeus' ist es der Demiurg, welcher die Weltseele schafft oder hervorbringt. Dies also dürfte der Grund sein, warum Numenius daran festhält, daß in gewisser Hinsicht auch der göttliche Intellekt Demiurg ist, freilich auf besondere Weise. Er bringt die Welt hervor, indem er die Weltseele hervorbringt. Er bedient sich ihrer, um die Welt zu schaffen (fr. 22, 3—4, Proclus, In Tim. III, 103, 31). Die Weltordnung als Gedanke, die Idee der Welt, erscheint zuerst in seinem Denken. Eine weitere Schwierigkeit bei der Identifikation des dritten Gottes bildet ein anderes Zeugnis des Proclus. Während er an einer Stelle (fr. 22, 4—5, In Tim. III, 103, 31—32) den dritten G o t t mit dem diskursiven Intellekt identifiziert (vgl. auch 104, 5 — 8), behauptet er an anderer Stelle (fr. 21,2—3, In Tim. I, 303, 2 9 f . ) , der dritte G o t t sei die Schöpfung, der K o s m o s . So wird denn auch in der älteren Literatur oft angenommen, der dritte G o t t des Numenius sei die sichtbare Welt selbst (vgl. UBERWEG—PRAECHTER, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums, Berlin l o 1909, S. 585; G . CALOGERO; aber auch noch G . MARTANO, N u m e n i o d'Apamea, S. 47). Aber die wahrnehmbare Welt, die der Veränderung unterworfen ist, kann für N u m e n i u s kaum, strikt genom-

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men, als göttliches Wesen in Frage kommen. So hat man auch an diesem Bericht des Proclus Anstoß genommen (vgl. C. J . DE VOGEL, Greek Philosophy, Bd. 3, Leiden 1 9 5 9 , S. 4 2 7 ; DILLON, S. 3 6 7 ; vgl. auch BEUTLER, C. 6 7 2 ) . DODDS (S.

14) scheint es für möglich zu halten, daß sich Proclus an der zweiten Stelle durch den Ausdruck 'διανοούμενον' hat irreführen lassen, diesen passiv verstanden und so auf die geplante Welt statt auf den die Welt planenden Intellekt bezogen hat. Eine Möglichkeit, das Zeugnis des Proclus zu retten, scheint darin zu liegen, daß man unter 'Kosmos' hier nicht die Welt, sondern die Weltordnung versteht und diese ihrerseits mit der Weltseele identifiziert, die ein Geschöpf des göttlichen Intellekts ist, der ja in diesem Zusammenhang bei Proclus auch von Numenius 'Schöpfer' (ποιητής) genannt wird (fr. 2 1 , 2 , In Tim. I, 303,29). Andererseits ist zu bedenken, daß Piaton selbst im Timaeus' die Welt einen Gott nennt, daß Harpocration, der ja Numenius in der Theologie folgen soll, die Welt als dritten Gott annimmt (Proclus, In Tim. III, 304, 3 7 - 3 8 ) , und daß Orígenes (Contra Celsum V, 7) behauptet, Platoniker nähmen die Welt als zweiten Gott an, einige sogar als dritten. Man muß aber auch die Möglichkeit in Betracht ziehen, daß Numenius tatsächlich in irgendeiner Schrift von der Welt als drittem Gott sprach. Dies kann nicht in der Schrift 'Über das Gute' gewesen sein. Denn, da er in dieser Schrift sagt, der zweite und der dritte Gott seien eines, kann er hier unter dem dritten Gott nicht die Welt verstehen, die nicht mit dem göttlichen Intellekt in irgendeiner Weise eines sein kann. Es ist aber sehr wohl möglich, daß Numenius, dem es in erster Linie um die Unterscheidung von erstem Gott und göttlichem Intellekt ging, der aber auch wegen des 2. Piatonbriefs von drei Göttern bei Piaton ausging, zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt, dem 'Timaeus' folgend, einfach die Welt zum dritten Gott gemacht hatte. Es kann nicht behauptet werden, daß damit die Götterlehre des Numenius geklärt sei. Vor allem auf ein wichtiges Detail sind wir noch nicht eingegangen. Proclus berichtet, daß Numenius bisweilen etwas theatralisch von einem Großvater, einem Kind und einem Enkelkind spricht (fr. 21, 7, In Tim. I, 304, 4—5; vgl. auch 305, 5—6). Auch nennt Numenius den ersten Gott 'Vater' des Demiurgen (fr. 12,3—4; vgl. auch fr. 21,1—2, In Tim. 1 , 3 0 3 , 2 7 ) . Das legt nahe, daß der zweite Gott irgendwie von dem ersten Gott abstammt, so wie der dritte Gott aus dem zweiten hervorgeht. Oder sollen wir annehmen, der erste Gott werde lediglich 'Vater' genannt, weil er Prinzip auch des zweiten Gottes ist? Falls man eine Entstehung annimmt, wofür die Redeweise des Numenius spricht, so wird man sie sich vielleicht so vorzustellen haben: Numenius sagt ausdrücklich, daß der erste Gott die Ideen hervorbringt; es heißt sogar, er sei Demiurg der ousia (fr. 16, 9). Nur deswegen kann ja auch der göttliche Intellekt durch die Schöpfung der sichtbaren Welt den ersten Gott mit seiner Schöpfung der intelligiblen Welt nachahmen. Damit aber schafft er den zweiten Gott, der ja mit den Ideen identisch ist. Soviel ist klar, aber wie wir uns das im Einzelnen vorzustellen haben, ist ganz unklar. Vermutlich bringt die Idee des Guten die Ideen hervor und damit einen ihnen adäquaten Intellekt und nicht umgekehrt einen Intellekt und damit die Ideen. Denn in diesem Fall wären die Ideen in gewisser Hinsicht ein Produkt des göttlichen Intellekts und nicht des ersten Gottes. 71

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Aber gewisse Andeutungen bei Numenius selbst, in den Zeugnissen über Numenius und in Plotin III, 9 , 1 lassen vermuten, daß Numenius' Theorie wesentlich komplizierter war. Es mag sein, daß Numenius annahm, daß der erste Gott gleichsam den ganzen intelligiblen Raum füllt. Das Wesen des ersten Gottes ist die Idee des Guten. Aber auch diese ist eine Art von Intellekt, der sich selbst zum Gegenstand hat und weise ist (fr. 19, 4—5). Aber diese Weisheit verbreitet sich wie das Licht oder das Feuer (vgl. fr. 14,1 — 11 und fr. 14,11 — 14), ohne sich dabei wie irdische Güter zu erschöpfen. Aber indem sich diese Weisheit verbreitet, wird sie, wie das Licht, schwächer und nimmt niedere Formen wie das intuitive Denken der Ideen an. Auch dieses Denken ist also eine Realität, die vom ersten Intellekt ausgeht (vgl. Plotin III, 9,1,15—18), in gewisser Hinsicht eine energeia des ersten Intellekts. Aber durch sie konstituiert sich der zweite, intuitive Intellekt, der sich seines Denkens bewußt wird und sich damit in gewisser Hinsicht vom ersten Intellekt als eigener Intellekt abspaltet. Damit mag die ansonsten völlig dunkle Notiz des Proclus (fr. 22, 2, In Tim. III, 103, 28—30) zusammenhängen, Numenius behaupte, der erste Gott bediene sich des zweiten, um intuitiv zu denken, so wie sich der zweite des dritten bedient, um schöpferisch tätig zu sein. U n d in diesen Zusammenhang mag auch die rätselhafte Bemerkung des Numenius gehören, der zweite Gott bringe die Idee seiner selbst hervor (fr. 16,11). Damit kann nicht gemeint sein, daß die Idee des zweiten Gottes vom zweiten Gott selbst hervorgebracht wird, denn Numenius sagt selbst (fr. 20, 6), der erste Gott sei die Idee des Demiurgen, und der zweite Gott kann nicht den ersten Gott hervorbringen. Aber es mag sich darauf beziehen, daß der zweite Gott als getrenntes, eigenes göttliches Wesen erst dadurch entsteht, daß er sich selbst als Idee, d. h. als mögliches Vorbild für die Welt denkt 8 , an die Möglichkeit denkt, daß das, was in der Ordnung auf ihn folgt, nämlich zu diesem (logischen) Zeitpunkt noch die Materie, auf ihn so ausgerichtet sein könnte, wie er auf seine Idee, d.h. die Idee des Guten. Das dritte göttliche Wesen entsteht dann aus dem zweiten, indem der göttliche Intellekt diese Möglichkeit zu realisieren sucht.

3. Die Psychologie des Numenius Wie wir freilich die Frage nach dem Seienden letztlich zu beantworten haben, hängt auch davon ab, welchen Platz wir der Seele einräumen. Die Frage ihres Ursprungs und ihres Geschicks scheint im Mittelpunkt von Numenius' Interesse zu stehen, und ein guter Teil unserer Zeugnisse über Numenius ist dieser Frage gewidmet. Dennoch lassen sich die Grundzüge der Psychologie des Numenius nur schwer und undeutlich durch diese Zeugnisse hindurch erkennen. Auszugehen haben wir von der Nachricht des Porphyrius (bei Stob., Ecl. I, 3 5 0 , 2 5 f f . , fr. 44), daß Numenius nicht zwei oder mehr Seelenteile annimmt, sondern zwei Seelen, eine rationale und eine irrationale. Offensichtlich geschieht 8

Vielleicht ist αύτοΰ zu lesen und auf den K o s m o s zu beziehen; das ändert den ins Auge gefaßten Gedankengang kaum.

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das in Parallele zu den beiden Weltseelen, der guten, rationalen Weltseele, welche mit dem eigentlichen Demiurgen identisch ist, und der bösen, irrationalen Weltseele, die der Materie schon ursprünglich innewohnt. Wenn wir nun zu verstehen suchen, worum es sich bei der rationalen und der irrationalen Seele handelt, dann sollten wir der Versuchung widerstehen, an die zwei Seelenteile der platonisch-aristotelischen Tradition zu denken und anzunehmen, daß Numenius diese beiden Teile als je eigene Seele verselbständige. Denn, wie die Parallele zu den beiden Weltseelen nahelegt, sollte es sich bei der einen Seele um etwas handeln, was der Materie oder dem Körper innewohnt, während es sich bei der anderen Seele um das handelt, was zu diesem Körper derart hinzutritt, daß wir einen belebten Körper, ein Lebewesen erhalten. Dabei aber handelt es sich nicht um das, was nach platonisch-aristotelischer Tradition als der rationale Seelen teil betrachtet wird. Denn das ergäbe noch kein Lebewesen; dazu bedarf es vielmehr einer ganzen Seele. Eher einschlägig ist die stoische Unterscheidung von rationalen und irrationalen Seelen. Rationale Seelen sind die Seelen von Menschen oder überhaupt von rationalen Lebewesen, irrationale Seelen die von Tieren. Rationale menschliche Seelen sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß sie eine Reihe von Teilen haben, nämlich die Sinne, das Sprachvermögen und ein Fortpflanzungsvermögen, die sämtlich von einem Hauptteil beherrscht und gesteuert werden, dem hegemonikon, d.h. der Vernunft oder ratio. Es ist diese Vernunft, die denkt, fühlt, aber auch wahrnimmt, indem sie entsprechenden Vorstellungen, die sich ihr präsentieren, ihre Zustimmung gibt, die sie aber auch verweigern kann. Die menschliche Seele ist also im wesentlichen eine Vernunft, die über anderen ihr untergeordneten Seelenteilen thront, von denen sie im Falle des Weisen beim Tode sogar ablösbar sein mag, und mit denen zusammen sie den menschlichen Körper zu einem menschlichen Lebewesen macht. Aber es sind erst diese Teile zusammen, und nicht die Vernunft schon für sich, welche die rationale Seele ausmachen. Es scheint nun, als habe Numenius eine Vorstellung von der rationalen Seele, welche der stoischen in vieler Hinsicht entspricht. Die Rolle des stoischen hegemonikon nimmt ein Intellekt an, der aber, wie die stoische ratio, wesentlich ein Zustimmungsvermögen ist und so sowohl einen kognitiven wie auch einen voluntativ-desiderativen Aspekt hat (fr. 45). Aber anders als die stoische ratio ist dieser Intellekt überweltlichen Ursprungs. Numenius selbst sagt (fr. 12, 14—16): „Durch diesen (d. h. den Himmel) führt auch uns der Weg, wenn der Intellekt herabgesandt wird . . . zu allem, was bestimmt ist, seiner teilhaftig zu werden". Da dieser Intellekt sich auf den Weg macht, sich eines Körpers anzunehmen, werden wir wohl annehmen dürfen, daß es sich, wie bei der guten Weltseele, um abgespaltenen göttlichen Intellekt handelt. Uber den Grund der Spaltung wissen wir nichts, aber er wird dem bei der Weltseele ähneln. Wir werden erwarten, daß auch dieser Intellekt, indem er sich dem Körper zuwendet, in einer Weise tätig wird, in der er als göttlicher Intellekt nicht tätig ist, wie ja auch die Weltseele diskursiv denkend tätig wird. So erfahren wir denn auch aus einem Bericht bei Macrobius (In somnium Scipionis 1 , 1 2 , 1 4 , test. 4 7 LEEMANS), der sich ansonsten eng mit der Lehre des Numenius berührt (vgl. DODDS, S. 8 ff.), daß die Seele bei ihrem Abstieg nicht nur Astralmaterie annimmt, sondern auch 71»

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in der Sphäre des Saturn das berechnende und theoretische Denken, in der Sphäre des Juppiter das praktische Denken, bzw. die Handlungsfähigkeit, in der Sphäre des Mars den T h y m o s , in der Sphäre der Sonne das Wahrnehmungsund Vorstellungsvermögen, in der Sphäre der Venus die Begierde, in der Sphäre des Merkur das Sprachvermögen und, schließlich, in der Sphäre des Mondes das vegetative Vermögen (vgl. auch Proclus, In Tim. 111,355,13ff., w o freilich 3 5 5 , 1 4 'πρακτικόν' statt ' π ο λ ι τ ι κ ό ν ' zu lesen ist). D a s erste, was wir zu der Liste feststellen können, ist, daß sich aus ihr ergibt, was die Seele ist, bevor sie als erste die Sphäre des Saturn durchquert. D a sie dort als erstes das diskursive Denken sich aneignet, muß sie zuvor bereits intuitiver Intellekt gewesen sein, der nun erst durch die Annahme neuer Funktionen zur Seele wird. Auf diese Weise erhalten wir, wie bei der stoischen rationalen Seele, so etwas wie acht Seelenteile, den Intellekt und die verschiedenen in den 7 Sphären erworbenen Vermögen, die zwar nicht sämtlich mit den stoischen Seelenteilen identisch sind, aber die doch, wie man gerade am Ende der Liste sieht, ihnen weitgehend entsprechen. Die rationale Seele reicht also herab bis zu den vegetativen Funktionen wie Zeugung und Wachstum. Auf diesem Hintergrund haben wir wohl auch die N o t i z des O l y m p i o d o r u s (fr. 46a, In Phaed. 124, 13ff.) zu verstehen, nach der Numenius die Seele bis herab zu den elementaren Lebensfunktionen unsterblich sein ließ. Dies, wie wir sehen werden, ist nicht ganz korrekt. Aber soviel ist richtig: die rationale Seele des Numenius umfaßt den vegetativen Teil, und so wie sie sich als ganze des Körpers annimmt, um ihn zu beleben, so überdauert sie auch als ganze seinen T o d . Wenn uns das verwundert, weil uns diese Funktionen wenigstens zum Teil an den Körper gebunden zu sein scheinen, dann dürfen wir zweierlei nicht vergessen: (i) man kann Fähigkeiten haben, ohne sie ausüben zu können, ζ. B . weil einem ein Körper fehlt; (ii) wir dürfen nicht übersehen, daß, wie angedeutet, die Seele bei ihrem Abstieg durch die Sphären nicht nur die verschiedenen Vermögen oder Funktionen annimmt, sondern auch entsprechende Astralmaterie, so daß sich ein Astralkörper gebildet hat, bevor die Seele sich des irdischen Körpers annimmt; vermutlich bildet dieser die materielle Grundlage für ihre Vermögen, wenn sie den Körper verläßt. Aber umgekehrt scheint es auch so zu sein, daß, wenn die rationale Seele wieder aufsteigt und die Welt verläßt, sie wieder Intellekt wird. Bei Proclus (fr. 3 5 , 2 1 ff.) heißt es nämlich, daß die Seele, die aus der Welt heraufgeführt wird, von dem Menschenleben (την έν άνδράσι ζωήν) befreit wird, da nur die unsterbliche und göttliche Seele durch die Himmelspforte Eingang in die Überwelt findet. D a s heißt, daß die erwähnte N o t i z des O l y m p i o d o r , genau genommen, falsch ist. Die rationale Seele überlebt zwar als ganze den T o d , ist aber nicht als Ganze unsterblich. Sie wird beim Verlassen der Welt von den Lebensfunktionen befreit, die sie beim Abstieg angenommen hat und die dem so beseelten Menschen ein irdisches Leben ermöglichten. Wenn ihr aber diese Funktionen abgenommen werden, dann verbleibt nur ein Intellekt mit den ihm wesentlichen Funktionen. Wir können all dies schärfer fassen, wenn wir nochmals die schon mehrfach erwähnte N o t i z des Porphyrius über das Zustimmungsvermögen bei N u menius (fr. 45, bei Stob., Eel. I, 3 4 9 , 1 9 f f . ) betrachten. A u s dem Zusammenhang scheint sich zu ergeben, daß für Numenius das Zustimmungsvermögen das

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zentrale Vermögen der rationalen Seele und damit des Intellekts in der Seele ist. Von diesem heißt es nun, daß er zwar allerlei Tätigkeiten auf sich nehmen könne, daß aber etwa das sich etwas Vorstellen nur etwas sei, was diesem Vermögen zufalle, nicht seine Funktion und das, was es natürlicherweise vollbringt, sondern etwas, was sich aus etwas anderem für ihn ergibt. Numenius scheint also zu meinen, der Intellekt habe eine Funktion, die ihm wesentlich ist, nämlich die Art von Zustimmung, die einen unmittelbar etwas für wahr oder für gut halten und daran festhalten läßt. D e r Intellekt kann auch alles mögliche Andere tun, sich Sachen vorstellen, sich Meinungen bilden, Dinge wahrnehmen, trauern, hassen, sich auf etwas freuen. Aber all dies ist ihm nicht wesentlich. Er tut dies, er übernimmt diese Funktionen, weil es sich so aus etwas Anderem für ihn ergibt, etwa daraus, daß er sich eines Körpers annimmt, der es ihm materiell ermöglicht, aber es ihm auch geraten scheinen läßt, wahrzunehmen. Er kann diese verschiedenen Funktionen übernehmen, weil er schon seinem Wesen nach sowohl einen kognitiven wie auch einen voluntativ-desiderativen Aspekt hat. Von N a t u r aus erkennt er nicht nur das Gute, sondern ist ihm auch zugeneigt. U n d diese Erkenntnis und diese rationale Zuneigung nehmen die verschiedensten neuen Formen an, wenn der Intellekt zur Seele wird. Anders ausgedrückt: der rationalen Seele, welche diese Formen der Tätigkeit angenommen hat, sind sie nicht wesentlich; wesentlich ist und bleibt ihr die wesentliche Tätigkeit des Intellekts. D a s aber heißt, daß sie wesentlich mit dem Intellekt eines ist, so wie auch der dritte G o t t , die Weltseele, wesentlich mit dem zweiten Gott eines ist. Daher die Lehre, daß alle rationalen Seelen einschließlich der Weltseele miteinander und mit dem göttlichen Intellekt wesentlich eines sind, nämlich göttlicher Intellekt. So heißt es denn auch bei Chalcidius (fr. 52 , 73 — 74), daß der rationale Seelenteil, d . h . hier die rationale Seele, ihren Ursprung im göttlichen Intellekt habe. U n d so kann auch Porphyrius (fr. 31,25—26) sagen, daß die Seele bei Numenius ihrem Wesen nach unsterblich ist; sie ist wesentlich Intellekt und als solcher unsterblich. N u n sagt aber Iamblich, daß nach Numenius das Böse seinen Ursprung in dem habe, was der Seele von außen her zuwächst (fr. 43, 7 - 9 , bei Stob., Eel. I, 3 7 5 , 1 2 f f . ) . Überdies berichtet uns Clemens (Strom. 1 1 , 1 1 3 , 3 — 114,2), daß der Gnostiker Isidorus, Sohn des Basilides, eine Schrift 'Uber die hinzugewachsene Seele' (offensichtlich eine böse Seele) verfaßt und daß er entsprechend zwei Seelen angenommen habe. D a ß Clemens sagt, diese Lehre sei pythagoreischen Ursprungs, läßt uns vermuten, daß es sich um eine Lehre handeln mag, die der des Numenius ähnlich ist. N u n mag man aber auf den Gedanken kommen, bei dieser Seele, die der rationalen Seele zuwächst, müsse es sich einfach um die Vermögen handeln, welche der Intellekt bei seinem Abstieg zur Erde ansammelt und welche zusammen dem traditionellen irrationalen Seelenteil entsprechen (vgl. DILLON, S. 376). Aber das kann einfach deshalb nicht zutreffen, weil sich unter den Vermögen, welche der Seele zuwachsen, auch rationale Vermögen befinden. Überdies würde die Parallelität zur Weltseele zerstört, die diskursiv denkend wird, aber durch und durch rationale Seele bleibt. Eben auch dadurch unterscheidet sich die gute Weltseele des Numenius von der Weltseele des Plutarch oder des Atticus, die einen irrationalen Teil hat. Schließlich ist an

1074

MICHAEL FREDE

der rationalen Seele als solcher, selbst an den fälschlich für irrational gehaltenen Teilen von ihr als solchen, nichts Schlechtes. Sonst könnte sie nie zum H i m m e l aufsteigen. Das 'Hinzugewachsene' und 'die hinzugewachsene Seele' müssen sich vielmehr auf etwas anderes beziehen. U n d aus dem Bericht des Iamblich geht auch ziemlich klar hervor, um was es geht. Das Böse hat seinen Ursprung in der Materie, die der Seele zuwächst. U n d da Iamblich die Ansicht des Numenius ausdrücklich von der des Harpocration unterscheidet, der den Ursprung des Bösen im irdischen Körper sieht, muß Numenius vor allem an die Astralmaterie denken, welche der rationalen Seele zuwächst. Deshalb legt Numenius so großen W e r t auf die Feststellung, daß nicht nur die sublunare Materie, sondern auch die Astralmaterie böse ist (fr. 52, 83—85). Diese Materie enthält die hinjçugewachsene irrationale, böse Seele, so, wie die Materie überhaupt die böse Weltseele enthält. So, wie es ein Fehler wäre, die rationale Seele des Numenius einfach' mit dem traditionellen rationalen Seelenteil zu identifizieren, so sollte man auch umgekehrt nicht voreilig die irrationale Seele des Numenius mit dem traditionellen irrationalen Seelenteil gleichsetzen. Es ist eher so etwas wie eine Tierseele. A b e r wir haben zu bedenken, daß selbst Stoiker die Frage diskutierten, o b nicht auch Tiere in irgendeinem Sinne denken. W i r sollten uns auch daran erinnern, daß der Demiurg des 'Timaeus' sich bei der Ordnung der Materie auf seine U b e r zeugungskraft stützt, was Numenius in seine Überlegungen miteinbezieht (fr. 5 2 , 1 2 8 ) . Das aber setzt voraus, daß die irrationale Weltseele zumindest rationalen Überlegungen zugänglich ist, wenn es ihrer begehrlichen Natur so paßt. Eine ganze Reihe von Zweiseelentheorien nehmen an, daß die Materieseele ihre eigene Art von Überlegung und sogar Weisheit hat, „die Weisheit des Fleisches und der M a t e r i e " , wie sich Orígenes ( D e princ. 1 1 1 , 4 , 2 , S. 2 6 6 , 1 7 - 1 8 KOETSCHAU) ausdrückt. Erst so wird verständlich, wie sich die rationale Seele so verändern kann, daß sie sich zwar noch metaphysisch, ihrem Ursprung und ihrem Wesen nach, aber nicht mehr in ihrer Tätigkeit grundlegend von einer irrationalen Seele unterscheidet, der sie sich so angleicht, indem sie sich die Weisheit des Fleisches zu eigen macht, daß sie auch einen Tierkörper beseelen kann (fr. 49, Aeneas Gazaeus, Theophrastus, p. 12 BOISSONADE).

V. Abschließende Würdigung

W i r sind nun in der Lage, die Antwort zu sehen, die Numenius auf die Frage nach dem Seienden gibt. Als Frage nach der Idee des Seienden ist die Antwort das Eine, die Idee des Guten, der erste G o t t . Als Frage nach dem, was ist, ist die A n t w o r t : alles, was göttlicher Intellekt ist. A b e r hier müssen wir unterscheiden: es gibt den göttlichen Intellekt, den zweiten G o t t , der mit den Ideen und somit dem wahrhaft Seienden identisch ist, und es gibt den abgespaltenen göttlichen Intellekt, der Seele ist und sich der Materie annimmt, entweder als Weltseele oder als Einzelseele. D i e Einzelseele aber ist nur wirklich

NUMENIUS

1075

Seiendes, insofern sie abgespaltener göttlicher Intellekt und dairiit wesentlich göttlicher Intellekt ist. W i r können nun auch besser verstehen, warum Longinus Plotin in eine Tradition mit Numenius stellte, Numenius als zwischen Moderatus und Plotin stehend sah, aber auch meinte, Plotin habe wesentlich größere Klarheit erreicht. Denn schon Moderatus hatte drei immaterielle Prinzipien unterschieden, das erste Eine, welches über der ousia und dem Wahrhaft Seienden steht, das zweite Eine, welches die Ideen, das wahrhaft Seiende und das eigentlich Intelligible ist, und ein drittes Eines, welches das seelische Prinzip ist; und er hatte behauptet, dies sei die Lehre des Pythagoras, der Piaton folge (Simpl., In phys. 2 3 0 , 41 ff.). Wie sehr Plotin in der Tradition des Moderatus und des Numenius steht, wird erst richtig deutlich, wenn wir seine Ansichten mit denen der anderen A m m o n i u s schüler, vor allem denen des heidnischen Orígenes und des Longinus vergleichen, die daran festhalten, G o t t mit dem demiurgischen göttlichen Intellekt zu identifizieren. A b e r Plotin ist auch ohne Zweifel viel klarer, vor allem, was das Verhältnis von Seele, Weltseele und Einzelseele zueinander und zum Intellekt angeht. U n d das wird wohl daran liegen, daß Plotin sich weniger durch die vorphilosophische Weisheit der alten Völker als durch abstrakte philosophische Überlegungen leiten ließ und sich dabei auf seine eigene Beobachtung der G e gebenheiten des menschlichen Bewußtseins stützte, deren Kraft und Schärfe wir immer wieder nur bewundern können.

ARI STOTELISMUS

Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century A D b y H . B . GOTTSCHALK, L e e d s

Contents Introduction

1079

I. The revival of Aristotelianism

1083

II. The 'early commentators'

1097

III. Compendia and compilations

1121

IV. The impact on other schools

1139

V. Aristotelians of the later first and second centuries A D VI. Ptolemy and Galen

1151 1164

VII. Conclusion

1172

Introduction In philosophy, the first two centuries of the Roman Empire were an age of transition. During the earlier part of this period the Hellenistic systems, Stoicism and Epicureanism, were dominant. Towards its end emerged the scholastic restatement of Aristotelianism culminating in Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Platonism by Plotinus and his followers, the second of which was to absorb and supersede all other philosophies. This was no sudden event but the result of a development which began with the revival of Aristotelianism and dogmatic Platonism about the middle of the first century B C . The intervening time was one of confusion and controversy, as these philosophies struggled to establish their place in the intellectual life of their age. In the process they underwent a degree of modification, borrowing from each other and from the Hellenistic systems; for attitudes had changed and new problems had come to the forefront. But their adherents were all the more anxious to maintain their distinct character and this led to frequently acrimonious controversy, not always stopping short of personal abuse. In the sketch which follows I shall consider the elucidation of Aristotle's writings and the development of his philosophy by the members of his school and the impact of his ideas on outsiders, whether

1080

Η . Β.

GOTTSCHALK

adherents of rival schools or scientists and litterateurs who belonged to no school and avoided direct controversy. A particular difficulty for our study is the almost complete loss of the relevant literature. This is in large measure due to the character of that literature, much of which consisted of commentaries on Aristotle's works or discussions of problems arising out of them. Such writings were by their very nature liable to be superseded as each generation reread Aristotle in the light of its own needs and preoccupations. The only writings by professed Aristotelians of this era to have survived in their original form are a commentary on parts of the 'Nicomachean Ethics' by Aspasius (second century A D ) and the 'De mundo' wrongly attributed to Aristotle himself, to which one can doubtfully add the pseudo-Aristotelian 'De virtutibus et vitiis' with its doublet, falsely ascribed to Andronicus of Rhodes. In addition two treatises by Nicolaus of Damascus, originally perhaps parts of the same work, have survived through being translated into Syriac or Arabic. 1 Besides these we only have fragments quoted by later writers; the chief sources are the commentaries on Aristotle's works written by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century and by Ammonius (the son of Hermeias), Philoponus and Simplicius in the fifth and sixth. 2 The last-named is especially generous with quotations and sometimes gives a synopsis of the views of earlier interpreters on particular problems; 3 the introduction of his commentary on the 'Categories' (pp. 1—2) includes a survey of the work of earlier commentators. The information they provide is sufficient to give us an idea of the problems which interested the earlier Aristotelians and the kind of answer they gave, but usually not to reconstruct their arguments in full. What little is known about the external history of the Aristotelian school during this period is soon told. Andronicus and Boethus, both active about the third quarter of the first century B C , are described as scholarchs by Ammonius and one of his followers; their authority is not strong, but in the absence of other evidence we are not justified in rejecting it. 4 N o scholarchs at all are named for any period after this; the names of some have been inferred by modern scholars, but the grounds on which their conclusions rest are of the flimsiest. 5 When salaried chairs of philosophy were established under the 1 2

3 4 5

All these works will be discussed below. This and the other ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle have been excellently edited in the series 'Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca' ( C A G ) , published under the auspices of the Prussian Academy (Berlin 1883 — 1909); other relevant works, notably the treatises and essays of Alexander of Aphrodisias, have been published in the same format in the 'Supplementum Aristotelicum' (Berlin 1885 — 1903). They will be quoted by page and line of these editions. E . g . In Cat. 62 — 7, on whether Aristotle was right to posit ten and only ten categories. See below, p. 1093. See J. P. LYNCH, Aristotle's School (Berkeley etc. 1972) 213 ff., who effectively criticises the purported "Succession of Aristotelian scholars" established by H . ZUMPT, Uber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen und die Succession der Scholarchen, Abh. Akad. Berlin (1844) 9 5 f f . ; his table has been reprinted in: F. UEBERWEG—Κ. PRAECHTER,

ARISTOTELIAN

PHILOSOPHY

IN

THE

ROMAN

WORLD

1081

Antonine emperors, the Peripatetics received the same quota as the other schools, 6 but we do not know how these posts were related to the scholarchate or even if the latter continued to exist. N o r do we know the names of any holders for certain; of the possible candidates, Alexander of Damascus, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias have the strongest claims. 7 But if we consider the literary remains, we can see that there were two active periods of Aristotelian philosophy, one in the time of Cicero and Augustus when, under the influence of Andronicus, Aristotle's thought was actively studied by professed members of his school such as Boethus, Aristón, Xenarchus and Staseas and by members of other schools such as the Platonist Eudorus and the Stoics Athenodorus of Tarsus and Areius Didymus, the other in the second century AD, especially in its second half, associated with such names as Aspasius, Sosigenes and Herminus; the astronomer Claudius Ptolemaeus and the physician Galen are evidence of the influence of Aristotelian ideas on active minds outside the school. In the intervening period there are no Peripatetics who are more than names to us, 8 and the impact made by Aristotelianism on the wider world must be gauged from the works of writers like Seneca and Plutarch. There has been little scholarly study of the Aristotelians of this period. In 1 8 3 4 A D . STAHR published, under the title 'Aristoteles bei den Römern', a general account of Aristotle's influence on those philosophers and scientists who wrote in Latin; a useful work which collected the information available in his day but has inevitably been outdated. 9 After that there were chapters in the larger histories of Greek philosophy, notably those of Z E L L E R and UEBERWEG-PRAECHTER,10 and a few articles and dissertations. 11 It is only in

6

Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums, 1 Ith ed. (Berlin 1920) 688ff., 12th ed. (ib. 1926) 663 ff. According to ps-Capitolinus (Hist. Aug.) Ant. Pi. 11, Antoninus Pius instituted salaried chairs for rhetors and philosophers per omnes provincias, a term which must surely include Athens, but nothing is said here about posts for representatives of particular schools. U n d e r Marcus Aurelius, however, posts for each of the four schools — apparently two for each — existed at Athens (Philostr. Vit. Soph. 2. 2. 566); Lucian's 'Eunuchus' is a satire on the selection of a professor of Peripatetic philosophy. Cf. E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung III l 4 (Leipzig 1909) 707ff.

7

S e e ZELLER I I I 1, 8 0 7 n . , 8 1 7 n . 2 ; LYNCH 2 1 4 f .

8

What information we have about them has been collected by

ZELLER

and

UEBERWEG-

PRAECHTER. See n . 10 b e l o w . 9

10

AD. STAHR, Aristoteles bei den Römern (Leipzig 1834). Some of the material, especially for Cicero, is presented more fully in the same author's 'Aristotelia' (Halle 1830—32), especially II 134 ff. E . Z E L L E R , Die Philosophie der Griechen I I I L 4 , 6 4 1 - 6 7 1 , 8 0 4 - 8 1 7 ; F . U E B E R W E G / K. PRAECHTER, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums, n 5 6 8 f f . , 1 2 556ff. See also K. O . BRINK, Peripatos, RE Suppl. VII (1940) 938ff., and the very brief sketch by P. M E R L A N , Greek Philosophy f r o m Plato to Plotinus, in: A. H . A R M S T R O N G (ed.), The Cambridge History of later Greek and early Mediaeval Philosophy (Cambridge 1970) 114 ff. ; P. DONINI, Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino (Torino

1082

Η . Β.

GOTTSCHALK

the last decades that interest has been reawakened under the influence of Prof. P. MORAUX, who has established an 'Aristoteles-Archiv' at the Free University of Berlin 1 2 and in 1973 published the first volume (of a projected three) of a comprehensive treatise entitled 'Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias'. 1 3 This was preceded and accompanied by many studies of special points and some briefer general surveys in the form of lectures designed for non-specialists. 1 4 There have been two attempts to trace the fortuna in antiquity of particular works of Aristotle: of the 'De anima' by MORAUX and of the 'Ethics' by A. KENNY. 15 Slightly more work has been done on contemporary philosophers belonging to other schools, many of whom took part in discussions involving Aristotle and his ideas. The most important for our purpose were the so-called Middle Platonists, who are the subject of a comprehensive study by J . DILLON, and the Stoics, on whom M. POHLENZ has written a standard work which is far more than a history of one philosophical school. 1 6

11

12

13

14

15

16

1982) 21 I f f . For logic, see C . PRANTL, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande I (Leipzig 1855) 5 2 8 - 6 1 6 and W. and M . KNEALE, The development of logic ( O x f o r d 1962) 181 ff. A very full bibliography up to the time of the first world war is given in the 11th edition of UEBERWEG-PRAECHTER, a more selective one in the twelfth. DONINI'S book (cited in n. 10) includes an interesting survey of previous work (pp. 9—30). Its activities are fully described in Aristoteles-Archiv, F U Pressedienst Wissenschaft 2 (Berlin 1971) 3 - 5 0 . In Peripatoi 5 (Berlin—New York 1973); henceforward cited as 'MORAUX, Arist.'. C f . the review by L . TARAN, G n o m o n 53 (1981) 7 2 1 - 5 0 . Other books by MORAUX cited by short titles are Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exégète de la Noétique d'Aristote (Bibl. de la Fac. de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège 99, Paris 1942) (cit. as 'Alexandre') and Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote (Louvain 1951) (cit. as 'Listes'). M y debt to Prof. MORAUX' writings will be obvious on every page of this survey. See the bibliography in: Aristoteles-Archiv (above, η. 12) 46ff. I. DÜRING'S survey, entitled: Von Aristoteles bis Leibniz, Antike und Abendland 4 (1954) 118—54, is marred by factual errors. T w o new papers by MORAUX have been published posthumously while this article was in p r o o f : 'Les débuts de la philologie aristotélicienne', in: G . CAMBIANO (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica (Torino 1986) 127—47; and 'Diogène Laerce et le Peripatos', in: Elenchos 7 (1986) 2 4 7 - 9 4 . P. MORAUX, Le ' D e anima' dans la tradition grecque: quelques aspects de l'interprétation du traité, de Théophraste à Thémistius, in: G . E . R . LLOYD and G . E . L . OWEN (edd.), Aristotle on the mind and senses (Cambridge 1978) 281—34. A . KENNY, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978) c. 1. Also C . A . BRANDIS, U b e r die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Aristotelischen Organons und ihre griechischen Ausleger, A b h . Akad. Berlin (1833) 249-299. J . DILLON, The Middle Platonists (London 1977); Μ . POHLENZ, Die Stoa (Göttingen 1948, 1955) (two volumes). Much useful material, especially on Middle Platonism, can also be found in H . DÖRRIE, Platonica Minora (Studia et Testimonia Antiqua 8, München 1976) (with a detailed bibliography on p. 533 ff.) and K . PRAECHTER, Kleine Schriften, ed. H . DÖRRIE (Collectanea 7, Hildesheim—New York 1973). N o w see also J . WHITTAKER, Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire, above in this same volume ( A N R W , II 36,1) 81 —123 and L . DEITZ, Bibliographie du platonisme impérial antérieur à Plotin (1928— 1985), ib. 124—183. The second volume of MORAUX, Aristotelismus bei den Griechen (Berlin 1984) reached me as I was preparing the final typescript of this survey; it deals

ARISTOTELIAN P H I L O S O P H Y I N T H E R O M A N W O R L D

I. The revival of

1083

Aristotelianism

It is a well-known fact, already noted in antiquity, 1 7 that the school founded by Aristotle's pupils to continue his teaching lost its intellectual vitality about fifty years after his death. The reasons are obscure and probably complex, but Strabo and Plutarch offer a simple explanation: 1 8 for more than two centuries the Peripatetics at Athens were deprived of Aristotle's writings. When Theophrastus, his most eminent pupil and the first head of the Peripatos after it was formally constituted as a school, died in 288 BC, he bequeathed his library, which included Aristotle's books as well as his own, to a certain Neleus of Scepsis, a long-standing member of the school and one of the few still alive who had been taught by Aristotle in person. This man, it is claimed, took the whole collection to his home town; after his death it passed to his heirs, who did not appreciate its importance and later, when the Attalid kings established the Pergamene library, hid it in a cellar in order to escape the attention of their agents. There it remained, a prey to damp and worms, until it was found by a certain Apellicon of Teos, a book-collector and admirer of Aristotle, who bought it and took it to Athens; this must have happened in the last quarter of the second century B C . 1 9 H e had fresh copies made and tried to fill some of the gaps in the damaged originals, but since he was more of a bibliophile than philosopher, he met with little success and the edition he published was full of mistakes. Apellicon died shortly after Sulla's siege and capture of Athens (86 BC); his library was seized and taken to Rome, probably in 84. There various booksellers had copies made for sale, but since they employed incompetent scribes and did not have the copies properly checked against the originals, the results were poor. In 71 Tyrannio of Amisus, a famous grammarian, was brought to Rome as a prisoner after the capture of his home town; he was soon freed and settled in Rome. An admirer of Aristotle, he

with the Aristotelians of the first and second centuries A D and the reactions to Aristotelianism by members of other schools during this period. I have been unable to make systematic use of it, but have added occasional references; most of MORAUX' views on the topics covered by this volume were known to me from his earlier publications. Readers wishing to compare his treatment with mine will be able to find the relevant passages easily enough with the help of the index and list of contents. I have reviewed this volume in Liverpool Classical Monthly 10 (1985) 1 2 2 - 8 . 17 18

19

Cie., Fin. 5. 5. 13, cf. 3. 12. 41, Tuse. 4. 5. 9, and η. 18 below. Strabo 13. 608, Plut., Sulla 26, reprinted by I. DÜRING, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Göteborgs Universitets Arsskrift 63. 2 = Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 5, Göteborg 1957; henceforth abbreviated AB) as Τ 66b—c. For other relevant material see ibid. pp. 383f., 412ff. For Apellicon's date and career see my article 'Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs', Hermes 100 (1972) 340 ff.

Η. Β. GOTTSCHALK

1084

gained access to the papers " b y cultivating the l i b r a r i a n " 2 0 and was able to put them in order. T h e factual part of Strabo's account stops at this point, but Plutarch adds that Tyrannio made copies (good ones, we must presume, although this is not stated explicitly) and passed them to Andronicus of Rhodes, who edited them for publication and made the catalogues (of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' works) current in his (Plutarch's) day. B o t h agree, however, that the loss of the greater and more important part of Aristotle's writings made it impossible for the Peripatetics after Theophrastus to teach or develop his philosophy in a serious way and reduced them to thinking and writing of a more popular, superficial kind; but Plutarch expresses this judgment less harshly than S t r a b o . 2 1 This romantic story has given rise to a large b o d y of scholarly literature, much of which has obscured rather than illuminated the central issues. 2 2 It is generally agreed that Strabo's account cannot be anything like the literal truth. It contains one obvious self-contradiction: why should Neleus' heirs have taken the trouble to hide the papers from Attalus' agents, if they did not know of their importance? A different writer reports that Neleus, after returning to Scepsis, sold all the books in his possession to Ptolemy (Philadelphos) for the Alexandrian library, and that other collections were bought for the same library at Athens and R h o d e s . 2 3 Attempts to reconcile these reports by supposing that Neleus retained part of the collection, including some or all of Aristotle's unpublished w o r k s , 2 4 ignore the fact that Athenaios specifically says that he sold all his books, and it is inherently unlikely, from what we know of Ptolemy's methods, that Neleus would have been allowed to retain any material thought

20

Θεραπεύσας τον έπί της βιβλιοθήκης, a beautiful touch. N o t e the implication: Tyrannio neither owned the papers n o r was he in charge of the library, as is sometimes said. The library would have passed to Faustus Sulla, the Dictator's son, after the latter's death in 78.

21

See MORAUX, Arist. 2 3 n. 5 7 .

22

T h e most recent and fullest study is that of MORAUX, Arist. 1—94, which includes a full discussion of earlier w o r k . I have dealt with some of the problems in m y ' N o t e s on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs', H e r m e s 100 ( 1 9 7 2 ) 3 3 5 — 3 4 2 , but there I was chiefly c o n cerned with what happened to the books between Theophrastus' death and the arrival o f the library in R o m e . See also TARAN, G n o m o n 53 ( 1 9 8 1 ) 7 2 1 — 7 3 0 .

23

Athenaios

1.3a

=

DÜRING, A B Τ 4 2 d ; cf.

GOTTSCHALK, H e r m e s

100 ( 1 9 7 2 )

339.

P. M . FRASER, Ptolemaic Alexandria ( O x f o r d 1 9 7 2 ) II 4 7 3 n. 100, cf. n. 148, suggests that Athenaios misunderstood Strabo's report. 24

SCHWEIGHÄUSER, on A t h .

I . e . ; STAHR, Aristotelia II 5 5 f f . ; O .

REGENBOGEN,

Theo-

phrastos v. Eresos, R E Suppl. VII ( 1 9 4 0 ) 1 3 7 7 f . ; I. DÜRING, Aristón o r Hermippus? A N o t e on the Catalogue of Aristotle's Writings, Diog. L . v. 2 2 , Classica et Medievalia 17 ( 1 9 5 6 ) (Mèi. C . H ö e g ) 13. O n e line of escape, adopted by STAHR and others, is to argue that Neleus only sold Aristotle's library, i . e . the books he collected, not those he w r o t e himself; but (1) our authorities do not distinguish between his βιβλία and his βιβλιοθήκη, as STAHR claims, but use both words indiscriminately (see, as well as those cited above, Posid., ap. A t h . 2 1 4 d = A B Τ 6 6 a ) , and (2) Athenaios goes on to say that P t o l e m y combined the books he bought off Neleus with others acquired in Athens and Rhodes. Since these cannot have been books collected by Aristotle, Athenaios must have been thinking o f copies of his o w n writings in the possession of Eudemus and other Peripatetics.

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to be important. O n the other hand, if it is suggested that Neleus only kept the papers which did not interest the Alexandrians, because they were regarded as unimportant or duplicated material already at Alexandria, this would be enough to falsify most of Strabo's claims. There is however a contradiction in Athenaios' report which shows that, in spite of its brevity (perhaps due to the epitomator), it is a conflation of two originally independent accounts. Ptolemy, it is claimed, bought Aristotelian books at Scepsis, Rhodes and Athens. The Rhodian ones would presumably have been those belonging to Eudemus, which could have come onto the market after his death. But what about those from Athens? If the main collection of the Peripatetic school had been taken to Scepsis, nothing would have remained at Athens except for odd copies made for their private use by other followers of Aristotle, which would hardly have been worth mentioning in the same breath as the official collections of the two chief Aristotelian schools. 25 Thus it appears that Athenaios knew a tradition according to which Ptolemy bought copies of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus at Athens and Rhodes, the two most important centres of Aristotelian studies at that time, and tried to harmonise it with the story reported by Strabo and Plutarch in such a way as to maintain the pre-eminence of the Alexandrian library. His version is corroborated by evidence that many if not all of Aristotle's works were known and used during the Hellenistic age, although it must be said that this is weakest for the philosophical school-treatises: most of the writers known to have referred to them before the time of Andronicus were old enough to have consulted them at the Lyceum before their putative removal to Scepsis. 26 Even so there was enough material at Alexandria for Hermippus to compile a catalogue of Theophrastus' works which was still cited as authoritative after the results of Andronicus' researches had become available, 27 and Diogenes Laertius' lists of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus, which are certainly Hellenistic in origin, include many school-treatises, especially on logic, rhetoric and ethics, though not always in the form in which they have come down to us; 28 if the Aristotelian catalogue goes back to Aristón and lists the books available in the Peripatos in his time, this would be conclusive. 29 25

26

27

28 29

72

FRASER (I 325, with n. 148) has suggested that Athens and Rhodes were only mentioned because they were centres of the book trade, but Aristotle's 'esoteric' works would not have been obtainable through ordinary trade channels. The material has been collected by STAHR, Aristotelia II 92ff. and ZELLER II 2, 144ff., who give references to other literature. Cf. I. DÜRING, Notes on the transmission of Aristotle's writings (Göteborgs Högskolas Ârsskrift 56 [1950] 3, 37—64) and ID., Aristoteles, RE Suppl. XI (1968) 192ff., and F. H . SANDBACH, Aristotle and the Stoics, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, Suppl. 10, Cambridge 1985, especially pp. 1 - 1 5 . Hermippus and Andronicus are both referred to in a scholium found in two mss (PH) at the end of Theophrastus' 'Metaphysica' ( = Hermippus fr. 54 WEHRLI). Diog. L. 5. 2 2 - 2 7 , 4 2 - 5 0 ; see MORAUX, Listes 313ff. This is the view of MORAUX, Listes 237ff. Traditionally this catalogue was ascribed to Hermippus, and this view was maintained by DÜRING and others after the publication of MORAUX' book. The question has not yet been settled; see MORAUX, Arist. 4 n. 2 for the current state of play. A N R W II 36.2

1086

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GOTTSCHALK

Yet the testimony of Strabo and Plutarch is not to be rejected lightly. Of the facts or purported facts they both report, two receive some support from other sources: 1. That Theophrastus bequeathed "all his books" (τα βιβλία πάντα) to Neleus is proved by his will, preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.52). His reasons have been much debated, but the most plausible explanation is that he intended Neleus to be his literary executor. 30 2. Posidonius, in a fragment from his 'Histories' on the events leading to Athens' involvement in the Mithridatic War, describes the career of Apellicon and mentions that he had bought Aristotle's library, but says nothing about its provenance .31 It is fair to conclude that Apellicon's library must have contained some quite important Aristotelian material, but nothing compels us to believe that he had obtained it from Neleus' heirs at Scepsis. In the nature of things the sources of a book-collector's acquisitions are only known to himself; only Apellicon can have originated this story, unless it was fabricated by Tyrannio or Andronicus or some librarian at Rome. But Apellicon, as I have shown elsewhere, is an unreliable witness, and the implications of his tale are so bizarre that it must be rejected. Probably the books inherited by Neleus never left Athens at all but reverted to the Peripatos (or to Strato as its head) when Neleus died or retired from his editorial work. 32 None of this affects Strabo's and Plutarch's account of events after Apellicon's death. There is only one reason for doubting it, Cicero's silence. This is all the more surprising because Cicero had access to the library of (Faustus) Sulla and was well acquainted with Tyrannio, even employing him to supervise the arranging of his own library. 33 But Strabo also knew Tyrannio personally, as well as Boethus, a pupil of Andronicus. In these circumstances we have to accept as true what he says about the fate of the papers at Rome: that they were in bad condition — this could be true even if they had never been to Scepsis, for papyrus grows brittle with age, Sulla's siege of Athens caused a great deal of destruction, and the library could have suffered further damage while being transported to Rome; that some books at least were copied for sale in Rome, but the copies were bad ones; and that Tyrannio was given access to them and succeeded in putting them in order. Up to this point our authorities agree so closely that it has often been supposed that Plutarch copied Strabo, 34 but the most important information 30 31

See further GOTTSCHALK, Hermes 100 (1972) 336 ff. Posid., ap. Ath. 5. 214 d (a verbatim quotation) = fr. 253 EDELSTEIN-KIDD = F G H 87 F 36 = F 2 4 7 THEILER; cf. J . MALITZ, Die Historien des Poseidonios (Zetemata 79, München 1983) 3 4 6 - 3 5 6 ; DÜRING, A B T 6 6 a .

32

See Hermes 100 (1972) 340 ff. In my earlier paper I suggested that Apellicon may have stolen the papers in his possession from the Lyceum and invented the story of the cellar at Scepsis as a cover for his theft. This is, of course, pure speculation and it would be easy to think of alternative scenarios.

33

See the passages quoted by DÜRING, A B Τ 7 4 c . ZELLER II 2, 139 η. 2, DÜRING, A B p. 394f.

34

ARISTOTELIAN P H I L O S O P H Y I N T H E R O M A N W O R L D

1087

of all has been preserved by Plutarch alone: that Tyrannio made copies of Aristotle's treatises and handed them to Andronicus for publication. 35 The truth of this has been doubted, and it is certainly strange that Strabo should have failed to mention it, in spite of his connections with Tyrannio and, through Boethus, Andronicus. If Plutarch borrowed the earlier part of his account from Strabo, he could have made up the last sentence in an attempt to harmonise it with the well-known (and well-attested) fact that the standard edition and catalogues were the work of Andronicus. 3 6 But Plutarch's testimony cannot be dismissed on a mere suspicion, and he must have had access to reliable sources. Strabo could have told the story of Tyrannio and Andronicus more fully in his 'Ιστορικά υπομνήματα, which Plutarch cites immediately after this passage as his authority for a different point, 3 7 or Plutarch could have obtained his information from Andronicus' book about Aristotle's writings. 38 One may ask why Tyrannio should have handed his copies to Andronicus rather than complete the edition himself, but he may have felt that this would require a greater knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy than he possessed — he was interested in Aristotle, but not a professional philosopher — and perhaps there was other relevant material already in Andronicus' hands. Nothing compels us to believe that the new edition was based exclusively on the Apellicon papers; Andronicus is said to have discussed variant readings of different manuscripts, 39 and Ptolemy's catalogue, which is founded on his, includes a separate heading 'Books found in the library of a man named Apellicon'. 40 Before we leave Strabo and Plutarch, a word must be said about their claim that the decline of the Peripatos after Theophrastus' death was due to the 35

36

Plut., Sulla 26 = DÜRING, AB Τ 66c λέγεται δε κομισθείσης αυτής (sc. της Ά π ε λ λ ι κ ώ ν τ ο ς βιβλιοθήκης) εις 'Ρώμην Τυραννίωνα τον γραμματικόν ένσκευάσασθαι τα πολλά, και π α ρ ' αύτοΰ τον 'Ρόδιον Ά ν δ ρ ό ν ι κ ο ν εύπορήσαντα των αντιγράφων εις μέσον θεϊναι καί άναγράψαι τους νυν φερομένους πίνακας. This is the view of H . DIELS, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin 1879) 216, F. SUSEMIHL, Die Lebenszeit des Andronikos von Rhodos, Neue Jahrb. f. cl. Philologie 151 (1895) 226 f. ; cf. MORAUX, A r i s t . 48 f.

37

38

39 40

72"

F G H 91 F 8. The rather abrupt ending of the version in the 'Geography', which breaks off with the words περί μεν οΰν τούτων άπόχρη, almost suggests that there has been some curtailment. H . USENER, Unser Platon text, in: ID., Kleine Schriften III (Leipzig-Berlin 1914) 150 (first ed. in: Nachrichten v. d. K. G. D . W. zu Göttingen [1892] N . 2 pp. 2 5 - 5 0 , Ν . 6, pp. 1 8 1 215), M. PLEZIA, De Andronici Rhodii studiis Aristotelicis (Archium Filologiczne 20, Cracow 1946) 141 and DÜRING, AB p. 383f. think that both Strabo and Plutarch used Andronicus' book; but if this were true, Strabo's failure to mention his edition would be very strange indeed, and Strabo's explanation of the decline of the Peripatos differed from Andronicus', as we shall see. See below, p. 1088. N o . 92, AB p. 230. In his commentary (p. 245) D Ü R I N G suggests that this is a sectionheading embracing items 93 — 99. Even if this is correct, these titles only represent a small fraction of Aristotle's output and include no properly philosophical works at all. Perhaps the heading refers to works found in Apellicon's library and nowhere else. For older discussions see MORAUX, Arist. 26 n. 61.

1088

Η.

Β.

GOTTSCHALK

loss of Aristotle's books. It has often been suggested that Strabo took it from Andronicus, but he seems to have given a different account. Far from saying that Aristotle's school-treatises were lost, he asserted that Aristotle published them himself, but in a form in which they could only be understood by those who had attended his lectures; he claimed to find his thesis confirmed by a (spurious) letter supposedly written by Aristotle to Alexander. 4 1 N o r is it easy to see what Strabo means by his distinction between earlier and later Peripatetics. Later commentators on Aristotle sometimes make a similar distinction, but for them "earlier" and "later" seem to mean pre-Andronicean (perhaps excluding Aristotle and Theophrastus) and post-Andronicean. 4 2 But Strabo apparently wants to distinguish between the Peripatetics who came before and after the supposed rediscovery and inaccurate publication of Aristotle's " l o s t " writings by Apellicon. There is, however, no other evidence for a revival of Aristotelianism towards the end of the second century B C ; we only hear of one such revival, a short-lived one during the scholarchate of Critolaus two generations earlier. Strabo's claim looks like a fiction invented to support his explanation of the decline and recovery of Aristotle's school. N o w this explanation is based on the assumption that serious philosophising must start from written texts. While it anticipates an attitude which predominated among Aristotelians 4 3 in the following centuries, it has no parallel in the earlier philosophical tradition and would be more appropriate in the mouth of a grammarian than a philosopher. Everything points to Tyrannio as its originator and as the source of Strabo's account. One might object that it shows too much hostility to contemporary Peripatetics, 44 but there is no real inconsistency in an admirer of Aristotle having a low opinion of the Hellenistic Aristotelians who, for whatever reason, had deserted their master's teaching. On the other hand, the remark that Tyrannio gained access to Apellicon's papers by "cultivating the librarian" who had charge of them, looks like a personal reminiscence. Perhaps Strabo repeated an aside from a lecture of Tyrannio's, or even from his table-talk; that would explain both the makeshift character of his theory and the incompleteness of his facts.

41

42

43

44

Aulus Gellius 20. 5 = AB Τ 76f.; cf. M. PLEZIA, Aristotelis Epistularum fragmenta cum Testamento (Warsaw 1961) 42f., 127ff. Aspasius, In E N 44. 20ff. των δέ έκ τοΰ Περιπάτου των μεν παλαιών παρ' ούδενί εΰρίσκομεν όρισμόν τοΰ πάθους· των δέ ύστερων 'Ανδρόνικος μεν εϊρηκε . . . Βόηθος δέ . . . Cf. Boethius, De Divisione (MIGNE, Patrol. Lat. 64) 892; this book is strongly influenced by Andronicus (ibid. 875) and may reflect his view of the history of the school; cf. F. LITTIG, Andronikos v. Rhodos II (Progr. Gymn. Erlangen 1894) 12f., 27f., and PLEZIA, Andronikos 13 f. Even Plutarch seems to use the terms in this sense. And to some extent in the other schools as well, as is shown by the writings of Albinus and even Seneca. So MORAUX, Arist. 51, who supposes that both Strabo and Plutarch follow an antiAristotelian source, Plutarch with considerable modifications. But there is no room for a literary source between Tyrannio and Strabo, and it is difficult to see from what quarter it could have emanated.

ARISTOTELIAN

PHILOSOPHY

IN

THE

ROMAN

WORLD

1089

Andronicus' edition was only one part of a larger scheme aimed at making Aristotle's writings available in a form which contemporary philosophers would find suitable to their needs and interests. In one sense it was selective: it included the main philosophical school-treatises of Aristotle 45 and some by Theophrastus, but not, it seems, the purely factual writings and collections of material or the published 'exoteric' works by which he was chiefly known to Cicero and his contemporaries. 46 But it was accompanied by commentaries on some treatises and a catalogue which, in the tradition of Callimachus' 'Pinakes', included not only a detailed enumeration of Aristotle's (and Theophrastus') writings, but a certain amount of biographical and other material helpful for understanding Aristotle and his work. Our most important information about the character of the edition comes from a passage of Porphyry's 'Life of Plotinus': "Since Plotinus had entrusted to me the task of arranging and emending his books . . . I decided first of all not to allow them to remain in a random chronological order as they had been issued; but following the example of Apollodorus of Athens and Andronicus the Peripatetic, of whom the first collected (the works of) the comic writer Epicharmus into ten volumes and the other grouped the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing together those on related subjects, in the same way I grouped the fifty-four books of Plotinus I had into six Enneads." 47 The result can be seen by comparing the catalogue of Aristotle's writings preserved in some Arabic sources, 48 which is derived from that of Andronicus, 45

Excluding the 'De interpretatione', which Andronicus thought spurious (Ammon. In de interpr. 5. 28 ff., cf. Philop., In de an. 27. 21 f.) and 'Metaph. ä ' . O n the collection of Aristotle's letters he is said to have made see below, p. 1091.

46

C f . MORAUX, A r i s t . 63.

47

Porph. Vit. Plot. 24 = AB Τ 75g; see also c. 26 fin, about the summaries he added to his edition. JACOBY has doubted the existence of Andronicus' edition, arguing that Porphyry here refers only to his catalogue (Comm. on F G H 244 F 213—218, p. 795), but Porphyry was using Andronicus as a precedent for his own edition of Plotinus. Cf. MORAUX, Arist. 59, R. PFEIFFER, History of Classical Scholarship (Oxford 1968) I 264. On Porphyry's editorial work see now M . - O . G O U L E T - C A Z É , in: E A D . , L. BRISSON, D. O ' B R I E N et al., Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin, 1. Travaux préliminaires (Histoire des doctrines de I'ant. class. VI) (Paris 1982) 280ff., and D. O'BRIEN, ibid. 350ff.; on the character of his life in general, H . J. BLUMENTHAL, Marinus' Life of Proclus: Neoplatonist Biography, Byzantion 54 (1984) 471.

48

This catalogue formed part of a 'Life' of Aristotle by a certain Ptolemy-al-Garib (P. the Stranger or the Unknown) which until recently was only known from excerpts in later Arabic compilations (edited by DÜRING, AB 185ff.)I A complete Arabic version has recently turned up in a manuscript at Constantinople, cf. I. DÜRING, Ptolemy's 'Vita Aristotelis' rediscovered, in: R . B. PALMER, R . H A M E R T O N - K E L L Y (edd.), Philomathes: Studies . . . in Memory of P. Merlan (The Hague 1971) 2 6 4 - 9 , and M. PLEZIA, De Ptolemaeo Pinacographo, Eos 63 (1975) 3 7 - 4 2 (Prof. PLEZIA has kindly informed me that he and Prof. J . BIELAWSKI hope to publish a complete edition in the next three years or so). In the preface to this life, published in translation by D Ü R I N G 1. c., the writer refers to the work of Andronicus but states that he did not have it to hand at the time of writing (and presumably had to rely on memory and notes made earlier). The writer of the Greek original seems to have

1090

Η. Β. GOTTSCHALK

with the Hellenistic catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.22ff.). Ptolemy includes, as items 29—56, nearly all the school-treatises extant to-day, with the same titles and, except for the 'Poetics' and 'Metaphysics', the same number of books. Diogenes lists many of the same writings, but usually as short works of from one to three books, with different titles from those known to us. For example, instead of our eight-book 'Physics', Diogenes has a three-book Περί φύσεως (no. 90), one book entitled Φυσικόν (no. 91) and one Περί κινήσεως (no. 115); probably all three were books later incorporated in the 'Physics'. Diogenes' 'Ηθικά in five books (no. 38) may be our 'Eudemian Ethics' without the three books common to it and the EN; 4 9 Ptolemy has the 'Eudemian Ethics', under that name, in eight books (no. 36). O u r 'Rhetoric' in three books is catalogued by Ptolemy (no. 39), but Diogenes has a Τέχνη ρητορική in two books (no. 78) and the third book separately under the title Περί λέξεως, divided into two books (no. 87). A particularly striking case is that of the 'Prior Analytics', which Diogenes describes as having no fewer than nine books; it must have consisted of quite short sections which Andronicus collected into the two long books we still have to-day. 5 0 Some at least of Theophrastus' writings were treated in the same way. A subscription at the end of book 7 of the 'Historia Plantarum' tells us that Andronicus gave it the place and title it has to-day, while Hermippus knew it (presumably together with book 6) by the title, ' O n under-shrubs and grasses'. 51 This process of consolidation did not originate with Andronicus, but can be traced back to the beginning of the Peripatetic school. Andronicus himself, when considering the place of the 'Postpraedicamenta' in the 'Corpus', referred to earlier attempts to arrange the logical treatises. 52 In Diogenes' catalogue we find the 'Politics' already collected into eight books (no. 74), although there can be no doubt that this work consists of parts written at widely different been a Platonist of the fourth century A D ; see PLEZIA I.e., A. DIHLE, Der Platoniker Ptolemaios, Hermes 85 (1957) 314ff. ( = ID., Antike und Orient. Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. V . P Ö S C H L - H . PETERSMANN [ H e i d e l b e r g 1 9 8 4 ] 9 f f . ) , M O R A U X , A r i s t . 6 0 n . 6 . B u t

49

50 51

52

see

now M. PLEZIA, De Ptolemaei Vita Aristotelis, in: J. WIESNER (ed.), Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet I (Berlin 1985) 1 — 11; here he argues persuasively that the author of the Vita was a Peripatetic, not a Platonist, and repeats his earlier proof that he was not the main source of the extant Neoplatonic 'Lives' of Aristotle. The identification with P. Chennos, a grammarian and mythographer active in the second century A D , has now been exploded. Cf. below, p. 1093 and now D. GUTAS, The spurious and the authentic in the Arabic Lives of Aristotle, in: J. KRAYE et AL. (edd.), PseudoAristotle in the Middle Ages (London 1986) 1 5 - 3 6 . This is the traditional view (MORAUX, Listes 80f.), but recently KENNY (The Aristotelian Ethics [Oxford 1978] 39ff.) has suggested that it may be books 1 - 5 of the extant EE, while the titles Περί φιλίας (no. 24) and Περί παθών όργης (no. 37) represent our books 7(—8) and 6 respectively. On the E N , which is found in neither catalogue, see below, p. 1101. Cf. MORAUX, Listes 87f., Arist. 60ff., with more examples. Περί φρυγανικών καί ποιωδών; the title is taken from the opening words of bk. 6. The subscription is found in the oldest ms, U, and two later ones; in the Aldine edition it has been transferred to the beginning of bk. 8. See further REGENBOGEN, RE Suppl. VII (1940) 1373f., 1451 f., with references. Simpl., In Cat. 379. 8ff., cf. MORAUX, Arist. 99 n. 12.

ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY

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times, and since the author of the catalogue seems unsure whether to attribute it to Aristotle or Theophrastus, it may have been Theophrastus who first brought them together. Eudemus seems to have done the same for the 'Physics'; in his own 'Physics' he treated the same topics as Aristotle in much the same order. 5 3 N o doubt they were following lines laid down by Aristotle himself; the crossreferences still found in his works, most if not all of which must go back to him, show that he meant them to be seen as parts of a comprehensive scheme. But for whatever reason, the following generations of Peripatetics did not continue the work, and it was left to Andronicus to complete it. The justification of what he did was contained in his book about Aristotle's writings. Its exact title is not known, but it was a substantial work in at least five books. Its main feature was a catalogue of Aristotle's works, genuine and spurious, which is said to have enumerated no fewer than a thousand b o o k s . 5 4 This part of the work occupied at least three books; bk. 3 is quoted as the source of a discussion of Aristotle's 'Physics' 5 5 and bk. 5 seems to have contained the list of 'hypomnematic' writings. 5 6 The logical works will have been dealt with before the physical, either in bk. 2 or the earlier part of bk. 3. In addition Andronicus' book contained a transcript of Aristotle's will and is quoted as the source of a pair of letters, almost certainly spurious, said to have passed between Aristotle and Alexander the Great; 5 7 they could have been part of the collection of 'Letters of Aristotle found by Andronicus' listed as item 96 of Ptolemy's catalogue. 5 8 The presence of these items suggests that the book may also have included a biography of Aristotle, or at least a summary of the main facts of his life, presumably in bk. I . 5 9 While there is no direct evidence for this in the form of quotations, the parallels favour the inclusion of some biographical data; even if Porphyry's 'Life of Plotinus' is not admitted as evidence, some material of this kind seems to have been included in Callimachus' 'Pinakes', 6 0 and the neoplatonic 'Lives' of Aristotle contain some very valuable information not preserved anywhere else, e. g. the chronological discussion taken from Philochorus (Vit. Marc. 9, 12). Since it is unlikely that its author studied the Hellenistic historians himself, this must have come from a good intermediate source, and Andronicus is the only respectable source he is known to have used. 53

See especially Eudemus fr. 98 and WEHRLI'S commentary, p. 88F.; C . BRANDIS, Ü b e r die Schicksale der aristotelischen Bücher, R h . Mus. 1 ( 1 8 2 7 ) 281 ff.

54

Elias, In Cat. 113. 17ff., cf. 107. l l f f . = A B Τ 7 5 p ; also the introduction of the Arabic 'Life', cited above, n. 48. F o r discussion of the content of Adronicus' book see LITTIG II 18FF., PLEZIA, Andronicus 2 6 - 3 5 , MORAUX, Arist. 6 3 - 9 4 .

55

Simpl., In Phys. 9 2 3 . 7ff.

57

Will: Vita Aristotelis Marciana 43 ( A B p. 105). Letters: above, n. 41 and below, p. 1 0 9 2 f . See PLEZIA, Arist. Epist. Fr. p. 18, 84ff. According to the Arabic version of Ptolemy, the collection was in twenty 'parts' or 'sections', and PLEZIA argues that this means that there were twenty letters, not twenty books of letters.

58

56

It is referred t o under item 97 of Ptolemy's catalogue.

59

LITTIG II 18; PLEZIA, Andronikos 18—26 attempts a detailed reconstruction of this biography. B u t DÜRING, A B p. 422 has denied that Andronicus wrote a Life of Aristotle in any form.

60

Call. fr. 4 2 9 , 438 PFEIFFER; PFEIFFER, Hist. Cl. Schol. I. 129.

1092

Η.

Β.

GOTTSCHALK

But the main emphasis was undoubtedly on Aristotle's writings, their authenticity, internal structure, the connection between them and their place in the Aristotelian corpus. Andronicus' purpose must have been to explain his grouping of shorter treatises in pragmateiai and the sequence of pragmateiai in his edition, and also the relationship of these works to the literary dialogues and the large mass of hypomnematic writings, collections of material and so on, which were listed in his catalogue but apparently not included in his edition. The details, unfortunately, are obscure. We are told that in his view the study of philosophy should begin with logic, 6 1 and it is reasonable to infer that the logical works, which he first organised as a corpus, stood at the beginning of his edition and headed the list of pragmateiai in his catalogue, as they do in Ptolemy's. Attempts have been made to recover more details from the introductions to some of the extant commentaries on Aristotle, particularly from the classification of Aristotle's writings found at the beginning of certain sixth-century commentaries on the 'Categories'. But while the questions raised by these commentators and many of the answers they suggest clearly belong to an older tradition, all we can really say about Andronicus is that he probably discussed some of the same topics; we know hardly anything of his treatment or the internal arrangement of his work. 6 2 We can still see, however, that he employed the techniques of Hellenistic scholarship. His catalogue included incipits and information about the length, in lines, of the works he listed, and letters and personal writings were listed at the end. 6 3 N o doubt he compared different manuscripts, although positive evidence is rare. 6 4 But he also used the available indirect evidence, both internal and external. He condemned the 'De interpretatione' as spurious because it contains what appears to be a false reference to the 'De anima', 6 5 and in connection with books 5 and 6 of the 'Physics' he cited Eudemus' 'Physics' and correspondence with Theophrastus as well as the cross-references in Aristotle's other writings. 6 6 He also quoted a pair of spurious letters said to have passed between Aristotle and Alexander the Great, with

61

P h i l o p . , In C a t . 5. 1 8 f f . , Elias, In C a t . 117. 2 4 = A B Τ 7 5 n , 7 7 a (p. 4 5 5 ) .

62

See further DÜRING, A B 4 4 4 f f . , MORAUX, Listes 1 4 6 f f . , ID., A r i s t . 5 8 f f . , with references.

63

See item n o . 97 in P t o l e m y ' s catalogue ( A B p. 2 3 0 ) .

64

T h e m o s t definite evidence would be D e x i p p u s , In C a t . 2 1 . 18 f f . , o n C a t . l a i , but c o m p a r ison with Simplicius' c o m m e n t s on the same passage (29. 2 9 f f . ) suggests that D e x i p p u s may have been mistaken and it was P o r p h y r y w h o compared manuscripts at this p o i n t ; cf. PLEZIA, A n d r o n i k o s 7, MORAUX, A r i s t . 102. A variant at P h y s . 2 0 2 a 14 reported by S i m p l . , In P h y s . 4 4 0 . 14 as f r o m A n d r o n i c u s may have been due to c o n j e c t u r e o r carelessness, cf. MORAUX, Arist. 113 ff. T h e o t h e r passages m e n t i o n e d by BRANDIS, U b e r die Reihenfolge der B ü c h e r des Aristotelischen O r g a n o n s und ihre griech. Ausleger, A b h . A k a d . Berlin ( 1 8 3 3 ) 2 7 3 are n o t concerned with textual criticism.

65

A m m o n i u s , In de interpr. 5. 2 8 f f . , cf. A n o n . ap. C . BRANDIS, Scholia gr. in Aristotelem (Berolini 1836) 9 4 a 21 f f . , P h i l o p . , In de an. 2 7 . 2 1 ff. T h e passage in question is D e interpr. 16 a 8, but as the later c o m m e n t a t o r s point o u t , A n d r o n i c u s seems to have misunders t o o d it. C f . MORAUX, L a critique d'authenticité chez les c o m m e n t a t e u r s

d'Aristote,

Mélanges Mansel ( A n k a r a 1 9 7 4 ) 2 7 4 f f . , ID., A r i s t . 1 1 7 f f . 66

See Simpl., In P h y s . 9 2 3 . 7 f f . ; E u d e m u s fr. 6 and 98 WEHRLI, A B Τ 7 5 m . C f . PLEZIA, A n d r o n i k o s 3 3 f f . , MORAUX, Arist. 115F.

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the intention, seemingly, of emphasising the importance of the 'esoteric' writings comprised by his edition in comparison with the well-known 'exoteric' literary works. 6 7 The emphasis throughout was on higher rather than lower criticism, and we can see why Tyrannio left the work to him; only an Aristotelian with a full philosophical training could have completed it successfully. Andronicus is said to have been the eleventh Peripatetic scholarch. The authority for this is Ammonius, writing in the fifth century A D , and unfortunately the same Ammonius also tells us that Boethus, Andronicus' pupil, was eleventh scholarch. 6 8 The discrepancy has led DÜRING to reject Ammonius' testimony altogether, but it is unreasonable to forego the only evidence we have about Andronicus' position in life for what may be a mere slip, 6 9 and Ammonius' information may have come from a good source: he used the 'Life of Aristotle' and catalogue of his writings compiled by Ptolemy, who for his part used Andronicus' b o o k . 7 0 So Andronicus, who must have said something about the history of the Peripatetic school (if only to explain why the school-treatises had been allowed to fall into oblivion), may have mentioned his scholarchate himself. If Ammonius and Elias are right to this extent, it follows that he did his work in Athens, and this would explain why he had to rely on Tyrannio for copies of the Apellicon manuscripts. DÜRING'S assertion that he prepared his edition at Rome is baseless. 7 1 A fiction also is the 'Roman edition' of Aristotle so beloved by compilers of handbooks, 7 2 unless we want to dignify the bad commercial copies of Apellicon's manuscripts, about which Strabo tells us, with this title. 7 3 However, the very existence of the Peripatos at this time has been called into question in two recent books, in which it is argued that all the philosophical 67 68

See above, n. 41. A m m o n i u s , In de interpr. 5.24 (Andronicus) ός ενδέκατος μεν ήν από του Αριστοτέλους; ID., In Anal. Pr.31. 11 Ό δε Β ό η θ ο ς ένδέκατος ΆΠΌ 'Αριστοτέλους γενόμενος. Ammonius' statement about Andronicus is repeated by Elias and others (AB Τ 75p), but their testimony has no independent value; cf. DÜRING, A B 416ff., 420f. LYNCH (Ar.'s School 204) claims that the second Ammonius passage is " a n obviously apocryphal and harmonising list of diadochoi" and that Ammonius "went on to list as Boethus' followers such men as the N e o Platonists Porphyry and Iamblichus". It is clear that he has misunderstood A m m o n i u s ' ήκολοΰθησεν and knows no more of his text than the brief extract printed by DÜRING.

72

O n e way of reconciling both statements would be to suppose that Ammonius included Aristotle in his count in the first passage and excluded him in the second; cf. ZELLER III 1, 642 n. 5. C f . Elias, In Cat. 107. l l f f . = A B Τ 75 p 3 ; Ptolemy's catalogue item 9 6 - 9 7 , etc. A B p. 420 and elsewhere. It was swallowed by LYNCH (203 ff.), whose vaunted critical faculty works in a curiously intermittent fashion. It was invented by H . USENER (Ein altes Lehrgebäude der Philologie, in: ID., Kl. Schriften II [ L e i p z i g - B e r l i n 1913] 306f. [first ed. in: Sitzungsber. d. philos.-philolog. und hist. Kl. d. Bayer. A k . d. Wiss. [1892] pp. 5 8 2 - 6 4 8 ] ; Kl. Schriften III 150ff. [see. n. 38 above]), who claims that the main part of the editorial work was done by Tyrannio, acting as literary adviser to Cicero's publisher friend Atticus, for publication by Atticus. For appropriate comment see A. E. HOUSMAN in the introduction to his edition of Lucan, pp. xiii—xviii; also LITTIG, Andronikos II 8 ff.

73

A s is done by LITTIG, Andronikos I 12 f.

69

70 71

1094

Η . Β.

GOTTSCHALK

schools, with the possible exception of the Epicurean, ceased to exist after Sulla's siege of Athens caused the destruction of their buildings and the dispersal of their members. 7 4 Thereafter the schools continued in an ideological sense only, with no permanent institutional centre, and their most important representatives spent their working lives in places other than Athens, especially in Rome and the great cities of Syria and Asia Minor. LYNCH has succeeded in demonstrating that we have no positive evidence for the existence of the Peripatos in the imperial age and that the men described as scholarchs in modern accounts of this period have no identifiable claim to the honour. 7 5 But while it is right to suspend judgement where no evidence exists, there is some evidence for the first century B C : not only the report that Andronicus and Boethus were scholarchs, but also a remark in the 'Index Academicorum Herculanensis' that Aristón and Cratippus "abandoned the Academy and became Peripatetics". 7 6 This cannot mean merely that they showed an interest in Peripatetic philosophy or that Aristón made a name as a commentator on Aristotle, for Eudorus the Academic and Athenodorus the Stoic did the same without losing their membership of their repective schools. Moreover, since the school of Antiochus recognised no fundamental distinction between Academic and Peripatetic beliefs, it would have been pointless to describe any of its members as apostates for teaching Peripatetic doctrines. The report only makes sense if there was some organisation recognised by contemporaries as the legitimate successor of Aristotle's school and official representative of his teaching, for Aristón and Cratippus to join. Undoubtedly the school's activity must have been interrupted for a time by the siege of Athens and its aftermath, 7 7 and Andronicus may not have been able to work in the old buildings near the Lyceum, outside the city-wall. But the life of a learned institution does not depend on buildings or even administrative continuity; what matters is that there should be an identifiable body of men whose members feel that they are the heirs and representatives of an intellectual tradition and that their claim should be admitted by those contemporaries who are sufficiently interested to hold any decided view on the matter. 7 8 74

75 76

77

78

LYNCH, Ar's School 163 ff. ; J . GLUCKER, Antiochus and the Late Academy ( H y p o m n e m a t a 56, Güttingen 1978) 9 8 f f . , 3 3 0 f f . See above, η. 5. Index Acad. Here. col. 35. 10ff., p. 112 MEKLER (ών) ' Α ρ ί σ τ ω ν (μεν) καί Κράτ(ιπ)πος . . . έγενοντο Π ε ρ ι π α ( τ η τ ι ) κ ο ί ά(ποστα)τήσα(ντες) της Ά κ α δ η μ ε ί α ς . GLUCKER 9 9 f f . discusses this passage at some length and tries to alter the accepted reading in such a way as to support his contention that Antiochus' ' A c a d e m y ' was something different from the school founded by Plato. This does not concern us here, but he also says (96, 113) that D i o of Alexandria, w h o is named a few lines previously (col. 35 line 8) went over to the Peripatos with the other two, and this is clearly wrong. Perhaps this was what induced Andronicus to devote himself to literary work, much as the forced closure of the Neoplatonic school at Athens some six centuries later induced Simplicius to write his invaluable commentaries. C f . H . WEISSERT, Über Universitätsjubiläen, Ruperto-Carola 64 (1980) 5—8, w h o points out that many Universities which claim a history of several centuries have not in fact been continuously active throughout these periods.

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A more difficult question is the date of Andronicus' edition. DÜRING puts it between 40 and 20 B C ; 7 9 his chief reason for putting it so late is Cicero's silence, which would indeed be inexplicable if the work was done in Rome during his lifetime. But as we have seen, Andronicus almost certainly worked at Athens, and most of the evidence points to an earlier date. Apellicon's library came to Rome about 84 B C , Tyrannio about 71; Sulla's library seems to have been accessible to Sulla's friends, including Cicero, and Tyrannio was highly regarded in their circle; 8 0 so the rediscovery of Aristotle's manuscripts can hardly have happened later than 60 B C . Andronicus must have been considerably older than Strabo, who was born about 63 B C . Strabo says that he himself was an associate, possibly a pupil, of Boethus, a pupil of Andronicus, 8 1 and in his enumeration of eminent Rhodians places his name between those of Stratocles, a pupil of Panaetius, and Leonidas, possibly a pupil of Posidonius; 8 2 he does not name him among his own contemporaries. All this would tend to make Andronicus roughly contemporaneous with Cicero, and one piece of evidence points to an upsurge of activity in the Peripatetic school about 60 B C . N o t long after the death of Antiochus of Ascalon, when his brother Aristus was head of the Academy, two of its members, Aristón of Alexandria and Cratippus of Pergamum, went over to the Peripatos; the exact date is unknown, but Antiochus died in 68 B C and Cratippus was an established Peripatetic teacher when Cicero met him in Ephesus in 51. 8 3 Each later became eminent in his own way, Aristón as one of the first generation of commentators on Aristotle, Cratippus as a popular teacher whose pupils included Cicero's son Marcus. 8 4 They must have had a good reason for transferring their allegiance, and it is a plausible guess that what attracted them was the renaissance of Aristotelian studies which seemed likely to result from Andronicus' researches; such a move would have been a natural outcome of Antiochus' advocacy of a return to the 'ancient' (we might almost say 'classical') thinkers of the fourth century. Eudorus and Athenodorus, who must have written their commentaries on the 'Categories' after Andronicus' edition had come out, flourished in the middle of the first century B C ; the latter was an old man when he

79

80 81

DÜRING, A B p. 421; for earlier proponents of this view see BRINK, R E Suppl. VII (1940) 938. See the passages quoted in A B Τ 74 c. Strabo 16. 757 = A B Τ 75 b καθ' ημάς δ ε έκ Σ ι δ ώ ν ο ς μεν ένδοξοι φιλόσοφοι γεγόνασι Β ο η θ ό ς τε, Ω συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν η μ ε ί ς τα ' Α ρ ι σ τ ο τ έ λ ε ι α . MORAUX, Arist. 54 argues that σ υ μ φ ι λ ο σ ο φ ε ϊ ν with the dative always means " t o be a pupil o f " , but the available evidence is not sufficient to allow a firm conclusion. But since Strabo does not refer to anyone else as his teacher, most scholars have understood him to mean that he was a pupil of Boethus; s e e ZELLER I I I 1 , 6 4 6 n. 2 , BRINK 9 3 8 . 6 2 f . , F . SUSEMIHL, G e s c h i c h t e d e r g r . L i t . in d e r

Alexandrinerzeit (Leipzig 1892) 307 n. 354. 82 83

Strabo 14. 655. C f . ZELLER 590n, 606n. Index Acad. Here. 35. 8 f f . , p . 110 ff. MEKLER. M o s t of the other evidence has been collected in M E K L E R ' S n o t e s a d l o c .

84

Cie. D e off. 1. 1. 1, etc; see below.

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1096

returned t o his native city n o t long after the battle of A c t i u m . 8 5 All this w o u l d indicate that A n d r o n i c u s began his w o r k in the sixties and published his edition and catalogue, n o t necessarily all at once, during the following d e c a d e s . 8 6 O n e difficulty remains. It is often said that Cratippus was head of the Peripatos in the mid-forties, w h e n Marcus C i c e r o was his pupil at A t h e n s . 8 7 T h e evidence is supposed t o be a remark of C i c e r o ' s , w h o had a high regard for Cratippus and w r o t e of him as Peripateticorum audierim,

meo indicio facile

princeps.88

omnium,

quos quidem

ego

B u t if C i c e r o meant t o c o n v e y that he

was scholarch, this expression w o u l d be strangely inappropriate, like saying that a man is "easily V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r of his u n i v e r s i t y " , and all the o t h e r evidence is against this s u p p o s i t i o n . 8 9 W h e n C i c e r o first met him in 51, he resided at Mytilene, and he was still there in 4 8 , w h e n he met P o m p e y fleeing after his defeat at Pharsalus. B y 4 4 w e find him at A t h e n s . T h r o u g h C i c e r o ' s g o o d offices he obtained R o m a n citizenship, but at the same time C i c e r o persuaded the C o u n c i l of the A r e o p a g u s to pass a special m o t i o n requesting him t o remain at A t h e n s . These facts do n o t suggest that he had an official position there, but that he seriously considered moving on t o R o m e and was with difficulty persuaded t o s t a y . 9 0 E v e n at this time, w h e n M a r c u s C i c e r o was under his care, his associates were m e n he had brought with him f r o m Mytilene; and w h e n C i c e r o ' s friend C . T r e b o n i u s invited M a r c u s t o a c c o m p a n y him t o Asia, he

85

86

Strabo 14. 674. For the chronology of Aristón and Eudorus see P. M. FRASER, Ptolemaic Alexandria (Oxford 1972) I 488ff. (text), II 707ff. (notes), who points out that both men must have been considerably older than Strabo. Unfortunately he is inclined to accept DÜRING'S late date for Andronicus (n. 97) and this forces him to suggest that Aristón and Eudorus may have written their commentaries on the 'Categories' b e f o r e Andronicus. But this is very unlikely, as we shall see. This would be confirmed if it were certain that Cie., Orator 192 refers to Andronicus' edition of Ar., Rhet. 3. 1408b32ff., as USENER claimed (Kl. Sehr. II 306); but since he does not give a title, it is not certain that the reference is to this book (cf. DÜRING, Göteborgs Ârskkr. 56 [1950] 3, 38 f.), and even if it is, Cicero might have used an earlier version, perhaps even one of the bad commercial copies of which Strabo speaks. The earliest extant writer to quote from a certainly Andronicean text of Aristotle seems to be Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who cites passages from Rhetoric bk. 3 as standing èv xfj τρίτη βίβλψ των φητορικών τεχνών (Comp. c. 25, cf. Epist. ad Amm. 1. 8). Cf. F. H. SANDBACH, Plutarch and Aristotle, Illinois Class. Stud. 7 (1982) 229. Recently MORAUX (Arist. 57f.) has suggested that Andronicus may have begun even earlier, "soon after the death of Apellicon and the confiscation of his library". This is not impossible, although MORAUX is inclined to discount Plutarch's story that Andronicus received help from Tyrannio; he could have started his work before learning of the papers in Rome, and then asked Tyrannio for copies.

87

E . g . FRASER I 4 8 9 ; c f . L I T T I G , A n d r o n i k o s I 7 f f .

88

Cie., Tim. 1; cf. Off. 3. 2. 5: Cratippo nostro, principi huius memoriae philosophorum·, 1. 1. 2:principe huiusaetatisphilosophorum. For Cratippus'career, see A. O ' B R I E N - M O O R E , M. Tullius Cratippus, priest of Rome, Yale Class. Stud. 8 (1942) 2 5 - 2 8 and MORAUX,

89

For the non-specific use of princeps qualified by an adverb cf. Epist. ad fam. 13. 78. 1. LYNCH 204 ff., MORAUX, Arist. 223 ff. ; GLUCKER, Antiochus 114ff., has a different and to my mind far-fetched explanation of this episode.

Arist. 90

223-256.

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proposed to take Cratippus as well so that Marcus' studies would not be interrupted. 9 1 These passages are enough to indicate what his position was: he was head of a private school of philosophy existing side by side with the official Peripatos, perhaps with a special following among young Romans finishing their education in Athens. 9 2 His relations with Andronicus and his followers may have been strained. Unlike his fellow-convert Aristón, he took no part in the work on Aristotle's school-treatises, but seems to have been a Peripatetic of the Hellenistic type, teaching rhetoric as well as the more popular kind of philosophy. 9 3 O n the other hand Andronicus must have thought his own work much more important than retailing moral uplift to the gilded youth of Rome. As for Cicero, his predilection for Cratippus and silence about Andronicus can be explained on both intellectual and personal grounds. In spite of his strictures on the Hellenistic Peripatos, the Hellenistic tradition was the one in which he had been brought up. 9 4 Philosophy for him was a gentlemanly accomplishment, and he knew Aristotle almost entirely from his elegant dialogues. H e would have found the school-treatises barely comprehensible and Andronicus' detailed editorial labours abhorrent. A t ' t h e same time he was a very grand personage. When he visited Greece he did not expect to call on philosophers in their studies — they were expected to wait on him. Cratippus made it his business to wait on eminent visitors from Rome and to tell them what they wanted to hear; 9 5 Andronicus, it seems, did not.

II. The 'early

commentators'

Andronicus performed his task well. H e not only established the form and canon of Aristotle's writings which, with comparatively slight modifications, we still use to-day, but initiated a way of doing philosophy which was to predominate among Aristotelians to the end of antiquity and to spread to the adherents of other schools. Their work was firmly centred on the Aristotelian writings. Much of it consisted of straight exegesis and even where they disagreed with Aristotle's doctrine or were dealing with different problems from his, 91 92

93

94

95

Marcus Cicero, in Epist. ad fam. 16. 21. 5; Trebonius, ibid. 12. 16. 2. It is tempting to speculate that one motive for his migration to Athens was the hope of becoming scholarch, but that he was defeated. In that case the man who vacated the scholarchate in 47 or 46 must have been Andronicus, and his successor Boethus. But this is very uncertain. Cf. Cicero, Brutus 250, MORAUX, Arist. 227ff. This need not invalidate the suggestion made above, that he and Aristón were attracted to the Peripatos by Andronicus' work on the school-treatises; it may only mean that Cratippus found he had bitten off more than he could chew. His approval of Cratippus may be evidence that he took his opinion of the Hellenistic Peripatos at second hand, perhaps from Antiochus. Cie., Tim. 1, Plut., Pomp. 75.

1098

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they often chose to present their views as an interpretation or development of his ideas. Philosophical debate could take the form of an argument over the authenticity or meaning of a text. 96 Andronicus presented Aristotle's philosophy as a system like those of the Stoics and Epicureans, which his adherents were expected to understand and propagate, with such additions as might be needed from time to time. It has been suggested that this entailed a distortion of Aristotle's thought. 9 7 But while it is true that many of Aristotle's books were not originally written for the context in which Andronicus placed them, and Andronicus ignored and probably had no means of knowing the dates at which particular books were composed, a systematic tendency was inherent in Aristotle's philosophy from the start. This is not only shown by the elaborate cross-references and the summaries and synopses by which his writings are articulated, but by his use of a limited number of well-established principles to solve the problems presented by his investigation of different areas of reality. In making these tendencies explicit, Andronicus continued a development begun by Aristotle's earliest pupils, as we have seen, and adopted the only way to make Aristotle's teaching fruitful in the circumstances of his time. One result was to throw up a new set of problems concerning the interrelation of Aristotle's works. They could take several forms. Real or apparent differences of doctrine or terminology between various parts of the Corpus had to be explained and harmonised; this was done in the commentaries written under Andronicus' influence, especially those of Boethus. 98 But there was also the more general question of the way in which the parts of philosophy were connected and the order in which they should be studied. Such questions had long exercised the Stoics, and their tripartite division of philosophy into logic (το λογικόν), natural philosophy (το φυσικόν) and ethics (το ηθικόν) was the position from which the Aristotelians began; they could do so the more readily because Aristotle occasionally used the same classification. 99 In general, however, 96

97

98

99

Cf. R. B. TODD, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (Philosophia Antiqua 28, Leiden 1976) 2 f f . , 8ff. The same approach can be found among Platonists; see DÖRRIE, Platonica Minora 308, H . J. BLUMENTHAL, Plotinus in later Neoplatonism, in: ID., R. A. MARKUS (edd.), Neoplatonic and Christian Thought (Essays in honour of P. H . Armstrong) (London 1981) 213f., with references, and D . A. RUSSELL, Plutarch (London 1973) 64. It is criticised by Seneca, Epist. 108.23. DÜRING, AB p. 422f., ID., Aristoteles (Heidelberg 1966) 42, ID., RE Suppl. XI (1986) 199, 319 ff. ; his insistence that Aristotle was a 'Problemdenker seems to be derived from N . HARTMANN (whose historical essays have been collected in vol. II of his 'Kleinere Schriften' [Berlin 1957]), but I am not sure that DÜRING has understood his meaning fully. Cf. J. L. ACKRILL, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford 1981) i f f . There is some evidence that such harmonisation may sometimes have led to textual interpolation: see J. BRUNSCHWIG, Observations sur les manuscrits parisiens des 'Topiques', in: G. E. L. OWEN (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic (Oxford 1968) 16ff. (on Top. 120 a 6 - 1 1 ) . Ar., Top. 105 b 19 Έ σ ι ι . . . των προτάσεων και των προβλημάτων μέρη τρία· αί μεν γ α ρ ήθικαί προτάσεις είσίν, αί δέ φυσικαί, αί δέ λογικαί. Cf. Alex. Aphr., ad loc., p. 93.20ff. The same division is attributed to Plato by writers from Cicero (Acad. Post. 1.5.19) to Aristocles of Messene (fr. 1 HEILAND = Euseb., PE 1 1 . 3 . 6 ; cf. F. TRABUCCO,

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Aristotle approached the problem in a different way. His distinction between theoretical, practical and productive "sciences" was not a division of philosophy only but of all types of intellectual endeavour. 1 0 0 Leaving the last aside, the first two coincide reasonably closely with the Stoics' physical and ethical branches of philosophy; but since Aristotle's subdivision of theoretical science (into First Philosophy, Natural Philosophy and Mathematics) left no obvious place for logic, his followers felt free to place it in a separate class, as the Stoics had done. The omission was explained by saying that logic was not a part of philosophy coordinate with the other two, but a tool used in both theoretical and practical philosophy. 1 0 1 There is no direct evidence for attributing this argument to Andronicus, but an indirect link can be established. On the related question of the order in which Aristotle's works should be read, Andronicus held that the logical works should come first, on the ground that neither of the other branches of philosophy could be learned properly without a grasp of the basic rules of argument. 1 0 2 This implies that he held, and probably originated, the view of logic as a tool. Boethus may have disagreed; he argued that the study of philosophy should begin with physics because it is closest to everyday experience. 1 0 3 When he wrote, it seems, opinion in the school was still fluid, but later Andronicus' view became canonical. As this example shows, Andronicus' decisions were not always taken as the last word, and several additions were made to the Aristotelian canon by his immediate successors. The last six chapters of the 'Categories', the so-called Tostpraedicamenta', which Andronicus did not regard as belonging to that treatise, were treated as part of it by most subsequent commentators, including Boethus; 1 0 4 the only exception of which we know is the anonymous writer Il problema del 'De philosophia' di Aristocle di Messene e la sua dottrina, Acme 11 [1958] 136f.), and to Xenocrates by Sext. E m p . , Adv. Math. 7.16 ( = Fr. 1 HEINZE = 82

IsNARDi

100

101

102 103 104

PARENTE).

For Aristotle's classification of the sciences and the problems it raises see H . H . JOACHIM'S commentary on the E N (Oxford 1951) i f f . Alex. Aphr., In T o p . 7 4 . 2 6 f f . ; 94. 8ff., quoting Ar. 104 b 2 f - ; A m m o n . , In Cat. 4 . 2 8 f f . ; Simpl., In Cat. 4 . 2 2 f f . ; Olympiod., In Cat. 7 . 2 4 f f . ; Philop., In Cat. 4 . 2 3 f f . ; Elias, In Cat. 115.14ff.; Anon., D e arte logica (in the preface of BUSSE'S ed. of Olympiod., In Cat.) p. X I f . All these writers describe logic as an όργανον of philosophy and logical writings as οργανικά, but the use of O r g a n o n 1 as a collective title for Aristotle's logical works seems to have no ancient authority. The summary of Aristotle's philosophy given by Diogenes Laertius 5.28ff. (see below, p. 1129) has a different scheme, based on bipartition: philosophy is divided into practical and theoretical, practical into ethics and politics, and theoretical into physics and logic; but the writer adds that logic is a tool, not a part of philosophy in its own right. C f . MORAUX, L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce V, 28—34, Rev. Philos, de Louvain 47 (1949) 7ff. Philop., In Cat. 5 . 1 8 f f . , cf. Elias, In Cat. 117.22ff. Philop., In Cat. 5 . 1 6 f . , cf. MORAUX, Arist. 143ff. The evidence is indirect. Boethus included these chapters in his commentary on the Categories (see Simpl., In Cat. 4 3 3 . 2 8 f f . , on 15 b 1), while Andronicus is not quoted on this part of Aristotle's work (Simplicius' reference on p. 3 8 5 . 3 f . is to his views about the categories 'Action 1 and 'Passion', cf. ibid. 332.15). Cf. PLEZIA, Andronicus 42, MORAUX, Arist. 99, 163, and ID., Mélanges Mansel (above, n. 65) 276.

1100

Η.

Β.

GOTTSCHALK

oí two pseudo-Archytean tracts which together repeat the content of the extant 'Categories', with minor modifications. 105 The 'De interpretati one', which Andronicus declared spurious, was accepted as genuine by all who came after him. 1 0 6 Nicolaus of Damascus, active in the reign of Augustus, referred to two books which Andronicus apparently did not know, Theophrastus' 'Metaphysica' and the short essay which to-day forms the second book (ά elatton) of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', but which must have gained its present place after the formation by Andronicus of the thirteen-book 'Metaphysics' listed in Ptolemy's catalogue. 107 It is not known how Nicolaus obtained his extra material. He may have found some manuscripts in the libraries of eastern Mediterranean cities, as D R O S S A A R T L U L O F S has suggested (p. 28); his diplomatic activity on behalf of Herod the Great involved much travelling and may have presented him with good opportunities. But it is also possible that Andronicus' work was continued by members of his school after his death and Nicolaus simply reflects a later stage in its progress. At the level of textual criticism we hear of Andronicean readings which were not accepted by the majority of later commentators. 1 0 8 Nevertheless Andronicus' edition was the foundation of all subsequent work, much as I. B E K K E R ' S edition of 1831 has been the basis of the scholarly activity of more recent times. N o less important was his example. In the ensuing centuries, philosophical discussions among Aristotelians took place against a background of philological and historical criticism. Aristotle's writings were not all studied with equal intensity. The biological works were almost entirely neglected; the only writer known to have given them more than a passing mention was Nicolaus of Damascus, who included compendia of the zoological works and the 'De Plantis' in his summary of Aristotle's philosophy, 1 0 9 and no full commentaries were written on any of them 105

106

107

See below, p. 1131 ff. The fact that ps-Archytas wrote up both sections of the 'Categories' is some evidence (but by no means conclusive) that Andronicus accepted both as genuinely Aristotelian, even if he did not believe that they formed a single work. Cf. M O R A U X , Arist. 99 against P L E Z I A , Andron. 35; but in Mel. Mansel 272 M O R A U X still accepts the older view that Andronicus probably regarded the 'Postpraedicamenta' as spurious. See also Boethius, In Cat. 1, M I G N E PL 64.162 A. A m m o n . , In de interpr. 5 . 2 8 f f . , and the parallels cited by MORAUX, Arist. 117 n. 3; cf. P R A N T L , Gesch. d. Logik I 547, Z E L L E R II 2, 69 η. 1. See the subscription to Theophr. Metaph. = Nie. Damasc. Τ 7 . 1 (ed. Η . J . D R O S S A A R T LULOFS, Nicolaus Damascenus on the Philosophy of Ar. [Philosophia antiqua 13, Leiden 2 1969]) and for Ar., Metaph. et, Nicolaus F 21, with D R O S S A A R T L U L O F S ' comments (p. 30, 137, 139). It is not likely that Andronicus knew ä as part of his version of the 'Metaphysics', as W . W . JAEGER suggests (Studien zur Entstehungsgesch. d. Metaphysik d. Aristoteles [Berlin 1912] 178); even if the later commentators, faced with the fait accompli that the books of the 'Metaphysics' were labelled A—N, occasionally treated ά as a mere appendage of A, there would have been no reason for Andronicus to do so when he originated this arrangement. Cf. PLEZIA, Andron. 53 f. The scholia of m s . P a r . Gr. 1853 on the opening of Metaph. à have been discussed by S. BERNARDINELLO, Gli scoli alla Metafisica di Aristotele nel F 234 r del Parisinus Graecus 1853, Elenchos 3 (1982) 3 9 - 5 4 .

108

See above, η. 64 and below, p. 1112.

109

See DROSSAART LULOFS, p . 9 f f .

ARISTOTELIAN P H I L O S O P H Y I N T H E R O M A N W O R L D

1101

in antiquity. T h e Politics received little attention, perhaps because it w a s t o o r e m o t e f r o m the political realities o f t h e t i m e . T h e 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics' w e r e i g n o r e d b y the p h i l o s o p h e r s ; their i n f l u e n c e , and that of T h e o p h r a s t u s ' rhetorical w o r k s , has t o be traced in the writings o f p r o f e s s i o n a l r h e t o r i c i a n s . 1 1 0 T h e fortuna o f the 'Ethics' is curious. P t o l e m y ' s catalogue ( n o . 35—6) lists the ' E u d e m i a n Ethics' in eight b o o k s (i. e. i n c l u d i n g the three b o o k s c o m m o n t o it and the E N ) and the 'Magna Moralia', b u t o m i t s the ' N i c o m a c h e a n Ethics'. T h i s m a y be due t o an accident of t r a n s m i s s i o n ; A r e i u s D i d y m u s refers t o the tenth b o o k of the E N and A t t i c u s in the s e c o n d c e n t u r y A D enumerates all three v e r s i o n s , 1 1 1 and f r o m this t i m e t h e Aristotelian c o m m e n t a t o r s c o n c e n t r a t e o n the E N (to w h i c h the c o m m o n b o o k s are n o w assigned) t o the e x c l u s i o n of t h e others. B u t a recent s t u d y has s h o w n that until then t h e ' E u d e m i a n Ethics' w a s q u o t e d m o r e o f t e n and s e e m s t o have e n j o y e d higher e s t e e m than the 'Nicomachean'.112 B e s i d e s this t h e O r g a n o n ' , the p h y s i c a l w o r k s , i n c l u d i n g the ' D e anima' and at least s o m e of t h e 'Parva Naturalia', and the ' M e t a p h y s i c s ' w e r e studied systematically. B u t a b o v e all it w a s the 'Categories' w h i c h attracted m o s t attention. Simplicius enumerates five "early c o m m e n t a t o r s " w h o w r o t e a b o u t this

110

Cf. C. A. BRANDIS, Uber Ar.'s Rhetorik u. d. gr. Ausleger derselben, Philologus 4 (1849) 34ff. ; F. SOLMSEN, The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric, AJP 62 (1941) 3 5 - 5 0 , 1 6 9 - 9 0 = ID., Kleine Schriften II (Hildesheim 1968) 178-215; R. B. TODD, Alex, of Aphr. on Stoic Physics (Leiden 1976) 12 ff. Some of these omissions were not made good until the twelfth century, when Michael of Ephesus wrote commentaries on the PA, I A, MA, GA, 'Politics' and 'Rhetoric', as well as parts of the 'Organon', 'Ethics' and 'Parva Naturalia', apparently in a deliberate attempt to fill the gaps left by earlier commentators; see his commentary on the 'Parva Naturalia' (CAG 22.1) 149. R. BROWNING, An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena, Proc. Cambr. Philol. Soc. 188 (1962) 6 ff., has shown that this was "part of a cooperative scholarly undertaking conceived and guided by Anna Comnena". Cf. A. PREUS in the introduction to his translation of Michael's commentary on MA and IA (Hildesheim 1981) p. 8ff. ; H . HUNGER, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner (München 1978) I 34 f.

111

Areius Did. ap Stob. 2 p. 52.10 (cf. η. 248 below); Atticus fr. 2.9 DES PLACES, cf. MORAUX, Listes 307. The paraphrase of the E N ascribed to Andronicus belongs to a much later period; see MORAUX, Arist. 136ff. K E N N Y , Ar. Ethics c. 1 ; his conclusions have been qualified in a review by D. C H A R L E S , JHS 1 0 0 ( 1 9 8 0 ) 2 2 4 f . ; see also below, n. 1 9 3 . According to K E N N Y ( 2 9 f f . ) the change was due to Aspasius, who believed that the EE, including the common books, was the work of Eudemus, but transferred the common books to the E N because they seemed necessary to fill a gap whose existence Aspasius inferred from a cross-reference at E N 1 1 5 5 b 1 5 ( K E N N Y gives the reference wrongly as 1 1 3 5 b 1 3 — 1 6 ) . But KENNY appears to have misread Aspasius (see below, p. 1158 and n. 375) and as we have seen, Areius already knew the ten-book form of the E N . KENNY'S attempt (p. 2 1 f.) to discredit this evidence by attributing the introduction of Areius' 'Epitome' to Stobaeus himself, runs counter to everything we know about Stobaeus' method; cf. C. H . KAHN, in: W. W. F O R T E N B A U G H (ed.), O n Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: the work of Ar. Did. (New Brunswick 1983; a collection of papers presented of a symposium in 1981) 4 n. 1. — See also R. BODÉUS, Contribution à l'histoire des oeuvres morales d'Aristote: les Testimonia, Rev. Philos, de Louvain 71 (1973) 451 ff.

112

73 ANRW II 36.2

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tract and the problems it raised in the years immediately following its publication by Andronicus; they include Eudorus the Academic and Athenodorus the Stoic as well as the Peripatetics Andronicus, Boethus and Aristón. 1 1 3 N o t much later an unknown hack compiled a version of the 'Categories' in the Dorian dialect which he attributed to Archytas of Tarentum, a Pythagorean active in the early fourth century B C . 1 1 4 Subsequently almost every Aristotelian of note wrote a commentary or interpretative essay; some Platonists incorporated Aristotle's doctrine into their philosophy, 1 1 5 others, notably Plotinus, attacked it. 1 1 6 All these efforts were summed up in the great commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry; 1 1 7 through the latter this work entered the mainstream of the Neoplatonic tradition and went on to become one of the basic philosophical texts of the Middle Ages. What is remarkable about this is that Aristotle's earliest followers seem to have attached much less importance to this tract. We are told, on late and somewhat dubious authority, that Theophrastus and Eudemus wrote 'Categories' in imitation of their master. 118 But since no quotations have come down to us, it seems that any writings of theirs on this subject were regarded as relatively unimportant, and that they did not develop this aspect of Aristotle's teaching to the same extent as other parts of his logic. 1 1 9 There is also the fact that the 'Categories' is not mentioned in the original versions of the Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle's writings, unless it is hidden under the mysterious title

113 114 115

116

117

118

119

Simpl., In Cat. 159.32; cf. BRANDIS, A b h . Akad. Berlin (1833) 272 i f . See below, p . 1131 ff. E.g. Albinus (Alcinous), Didascalicus 6.10 p. 159fin HERMANN; A n o n . , In Plat. Theaet. 20.34, 40.10, 68. lOff. Cf. Philo, D e Decaí. 30; DÖRRIE, Platonica Minora 300. Plot., E n n . 6 . 1 - 3 , cf. Simpl., In Cat. 2 . 3 . See H . J. BLUMENTHAL, Plotinus in the Light of T w e n t y Years' Scholarship, 1951 — 1971, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,1) 547ff.; K. CORRIGAN—P. O'CLEIRIGH, T h e Course of Plotinian Scholarship f r o m 1971 to 1986, ib. 579 ff. and S. K. STRANGE, Plotinus, P o r p h y r y and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the 'Categories' ( A N R W II 36,2) 955 ff. See Simpl., In Cat. 1 . 1 3 f f . , 2 . 5 f f . , w h o goes on to say something about later commentators d o w n to his o w n day. The commentary of P o r p h y r y here referred to is the one dedicated t o Gedalius, n o w lost; his surviving commentary is a much shorter w o r k intended for beginners (cf. A. SMITH, Porphyrian Studies since 1913, above in this same volume [ A N R W II 36,2] 755 and S. K. STRANGE, Plotinus, P o r p h y r y and the N e o p l a tonic Interpretation of the 'Categories', ib. 956f.). Philop., In Cat. 7 . 2 0 f f . ; O l y m p i o d . , In Cat. 1 3 . 2 4 f f . ; David, In P o r p h . Isag. 102.4ff. = Theophrastus fr. 1—2 REPICI, Eudemus fr. 7—8 WEHRLI (the second passage cited here has been omitted in both editions). C f . L. REPICI, La logica di Teofrasto (Bologna 1977) 179f.; M . FREDE, Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift, in: P. MORAUX and J. WIESNER (edd.), Zweifelhaftes im C o r p u s Aristotelicum (Peripatoi 14, Berlin 1983) 22 ff. Cf. BRANDIS (1833) 268ff. I. M . BOCHEÑSKI, La logique de Théophraste (Fribourg en Suisse 1947) 31 f., 37 thinks that Theophrastus did not write a 'Categories' and this is an argument against the authenticity of the Aristotelian w o r k . H e is probably right on the first point, but the second does not necessarily follow.

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Τ ά προ των τόπων a ' . 1 2 0 It would appear to have fallen into even deeper oblivion than most of the other books of the Aristotelian corpus, until Andronicus brought it into prominence by placing it at the head of his edition. It would be interesting to know why the 'Categories' came to exercise so much fascination, but there is no evidence. What we can do is to see what kind of question the early commentators asked and how they set about answering them. Many of their queries concerned points of detail and some were trivial and even perverse, but they also raised the problems which later generations of interpreters regarded as important and anticipated many of the solutions they proposed. 1 2 1 Perhaps the most fundamental is the one with which the student is faced at the outset: what is the subject-matter of the 'Categories'? Is Aristotle saying something about terms, or the things signified by terms? There are good arguments on both sides: Aristotle's language is ambiguous, and while most of the distinctions he makes are more appropriate to things than verbal expressions, he arrives at his classification by analysing the expressions which can be meaningfully applied to things. 1 2 2 A minority of ancient interpreters came down decisively on one side or the other; thus Plotinus insisted that the 'Categories' deals with the classification of real things and his critique was given the title ' O n the classes of being'. 1 2 3 O n the other hand the Stoics, Athenodorus and Cornutus seem to have treated the essay as an attempt to analyse language and criticised Aristotle for not including some parts of speech, such as conjunctions, and grammatical distinctions in his discussion. 1 2 4 This is in accord with their formalistic view of logic 1 2 5 as well as their nominalist interpretation of Plato's F o r m s , 1 2 6 but implies that they regarded Aristotle's system of categories as something very different from their own, which they certainly looked upon as a classification of real things. 1 2 7 These are the extreme positions. Most interpreters accepted a compromise which seemed to do justice to all the arguments: the 'Categories' is about simple terms considered not as terms (i.e. in a way appropriate to grammatical science) but as signifying things. This solution was given its classical formulation by Porphyry, but was already hit upon by Boethus

Diog. L. no. 59 = Hesychius no. 57; cf. MORAUX, Listes 58ff., ID., Arist. 99ff. Its occurrence among the collections of material near the end of the list is the result of a late interpolation, cf. MORAUX, Listes 131, DÜRING, AB p. 69. 1 2 1 The main source of our knowledge is Simplicius' commentary on the 'Categories 1 , occasionally supplemented by those of Porphyry, Dexippus and Ammonius. On their interrelationship see PRAECHTER, Nikostratos der Platoniker, in: ID., Kleine Schriften, ed. by H. DÖRRIE (Collectanea 7, Hildesheim-New York 1973) 1 2 3 - 1 2 8 (first published in: Hermes 57 [1922] 4 8 1 - 5 1 7 ) . 1 2 2 The controversy is summarised by Simpl., In Cat. 9—13. 1 2 3 Περί των γενών τοϋ δντος = Εηη. 6.1—3; the title was devised by Porphyry, but is amply justified by the opening words of the treatise. Cf. Simpl., In Cat. 2 . 3 , 16.17ff. 1 2 4 Porph., In Cat. 59. lOff., 86.20ff., Simpl. 18.26ff. 1 2 5 E.g. Galen, Inst. Log. c. 3 . 5 , 4 . 6 . 1 2 6 Syrian., In Metaph. 105.21 ff. = SVF 2.364. 127 s v F 2.369ff.; cf. J. M. RIST, Categories and their uses, in: A. A. LONG (ed.), Problems in Stoicism (London 1971) 38ff., who refers to other discussions. 120

73,s

1104

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and accepted b y such eminent Peripatetics as H e r m i n u s ,

Alexander of

Aigai

and Alexander of A p h r o d i s i a s . 1 2 8 C o n n e c t e d w i t h this w a s a n o t h e r c o n t r o v e r s y , as t o h o w m a n y

categories

w e r e t o b e p o s t u l a t e d a n d t h e o r d e r in w h i c h t h e y w e r e t o b e p l a c e d . 1 2 9

In

general, those w h o favoured a verbalist interpretation tended to regard Aristotle's a n a l y s i s a s i n c o m p l e t e , b e c a u s e it m a d e n o p r o v i s i o n f o r g r a m m a t i c a l i n f l e c t i o n s and

such

words

as

conjunctions.

Besides

Athenodorus

and

Cornutus,

this

c r i t i c i s m is a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e P l a t o n i s t s L u c i u s a n d N i c o s t r a t u s . 1 3 0 B u t a l t h o u g h it p e r s i s t e d i n t o t h e s e c o n d c e n t u r y , it w a s a l r e a d y r e f u t e d b y B o e t h u s ,

who

p o i n t e d out that the parts of speech omitted b y Aristotle w e r e irrelevant because t h e y o n l y f u n c t i o n in s e n t e n c e s a n d d o n o t s i g n i f y a n y t h i n g b y

themselves.

P r e s u m a b l y his o b j e c t i o n s w e r e d i r e c t e d at A t h e n o d o r u s ; w e d o n o t k n o w C o r n u t u s a n d t h e rest m o d i f i e d his p o s i t i o n in o r d e r t o m e e t B o e t h u s ' m e n t s . 1 3 1 O t h e r s w a n t e d to reduce the n u m b e r of categories. T h u s

if

argu-

Andronicus

is s a i d t o h a v e h e l d t h a t t h e t e n c a t e g o r i e s c o u l d b e r e d u c e d t o t w o , t h e s e l f subsistent and the relative.132 A c c o r d i n g to Simplicius,

Andronicus

was

here

f o l l o w i n g t h e l e a d o f X e n o c r a t e s , b u t w h e r e a s h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n is c o n n e c t e d w i t h his derivation of existing things f r o m the O n e

and Indefinite D y a d , 1 3 3

it is

128

Porph., In Cat. 5 8 . 5 f f . , 5 9 . 5 f f . ; Simpl., In Cat. 1 0 . 2 0 f f . , 1 1 . 2 3 f f . , 1 3 . 1 3 f f . , 4 1 . 2 8 f f . ; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 148ff. Different aspects of the problem are discussed by K . v. FRITZ, D e r U r s p r u n g der aristotelischen Kategorienlehre, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 40 (1931) 449— 496 (revised: ID., Schriften zur griechischen L o g i k , II: L o g i k , Ontologie und Mathematik [Problemata 71, Stuttgart 1978] 9—52) and A . C . LLOYD, Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic, Phronesis 1 (1956) 58 — 79.146 — 160. It is instructive to compare the ancient discussions with their counterparts in modern textbooks and commentaries; while opinions differ on many points, the arguments used and the range of possible views have not changed significantly.

129

Simpl., In Cat. 1 8 . 2 2 f f . , 6 2 . 2 4 f f . Simpl., In Cat. 1 8 . 2 8 f f . , 6 2 . 2 4 f f . , 6 4 . 1 3 f f . F o r Nicostratus, see PRAECHTER, Kleine Schriften 101 f f . ; Lucius is only known through his association with him. Simpl., In Cat. 1 1 . 2 3 f f . MORAUX, Arist. 150 thinks that Athenodorus wrote after Boethus and Boethus' criticism is directed against an earlier Stoic or even Andronicus. But if Athenodorus is to be identified with the son of Sandon and teacher of Octavian, as is generally believed, he was an old man when he returned to his native Tarsus and entered local politics there shortly after the battle of Actium (Strabo 1 4 . 6 7 4 f . ) ; so his philosophical activity must have fallen into the years 60—30 B . C . and be contemporaneous with that of Boethus. MORAUX' reasons for thinking that Andronicus favoured a verbalist interpretation are quite insufficient.

130

131

132

oí γ α ρ π ε ρ ί Ξ ε ν ο κ ρ ά τ η καί Ά ν δ ρ ό ν ι κ ο ν πάντα τω κ α θ ' αύτό καί τω π ρ ό ς τ ι π ε ρ ι λ α μ β ά ν ε ι ν δοκοΰσι, ώστε π ε ρ ι τ τ ό ν ε ί ν α ι κατ' αυτούς το τοσούτον των γενών πλήθος, S i m p l . , In C a t . 6 3 . 2 2

=

Xenocr.

f r . 12 H E I N Z E =

9 5 ISNARDI P A R E N T E ; c f .

MORAUX,

Arist. 103f. The last clause (ώστε — πλήθος) seems to be Simplicius' o w n conclusion. DILLON, Middle Platonists 133 and DÖRRIE, Plat. Min. 300 claim that E u d o r o s took the same view, but the passages they adduce (Simpl., In Cat. 1 7 4 . 1 4 f f . , DILLON; 2 5 6 . 1 6 f f . , DÖRRIE) do not bear them out, and elsewhere E u d o r o s writes as if he accepted all ten categories; see below, p. l l l O f . The same division is used in the anonymous commentary on Plato's 'Theaetetus', col. 20. 34 and 40. 10; contrast 68. lOff. 133

In their commentaries HEINZE (p. 3 7 f f . ) and ISNARSI PARENTE (p. 3 2 7 f f . , 4 3 9 f f . ) refer to H e r m o d o r u s ap. Simpl., In Phys. 2 4 8 . 2 f f . ( = H e r m o d o r u s fr. 7 ISN. PARENTE) and

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impossible that it should have had the same metaphysical significance for Andronicus. It is not even certain that Andronicus was directly influenced by Xenocrates at this point, for the connection between them may have been made by Simplicius himself or an intermediate source, perhaps Porphyry. In another part of his commentary (p. 342.24) Simplicius admits that Andronicus "maintained the tenfold number of genera", and he has much to say about his detailed modifications of Aristotle's teaching about particular categories. So it appears that Andronicus did little more than point up the fundamental distinction, clearly drawn by Aristote himself, 1 3 4 between the category of Substance, whose members subsist in their own right, and the remaining categories, which depend on substances for their being, without wishing to obliterate the differences between the latter. Indeed, he seems to have made an attempt to order them according to the degree to which they were essential to substances, and to have placed Relation last because its connection with Substance was loosest. 1 3 5 His treatment could have been influenced by Stoic notions 1 3 6 and seems to imply a 'realist' interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine. The other fragments of Andronicus' commentary are concerned with details. 137 In his paraphrase he tried to clarify Aristotle's thought by expanding his text where it seemed unduly compressed or by slight changes of wording;

Sextus. Emp., Adv. math. 10.263ff. Cf. Κ. GAISER, Piatons Menon und die Akademie, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 46 (1964) 2 4 3 F . (repr. in: J . W I P P E R N [ed.], Das Problem der ungeschriebenen Lehre Piatons [Wege der Forschung 186, Darmstadt 1972] 329—393). The twofold division of όντα is also found in the 'Divisiones Aristoteleae' (Diog. Laert. 3. 108F. = Cod. Marc. no. 67, p. 39f. MUTSCHMANN); here substances are said to differ from relatives inasmuch as the terms denoting the latter, but not the former, "require some explanation" (δείταί τίνος ερμηνείας) to make them meaningful, e.g. "larger" must be larger than something. TARAN, rev. of MORAUX, Arist., Gnomon 53 (1981) 741 thinks that Andronicus was influenced by the Stoics as well as Xenocrates and offers a different interpretation of his doctrine, but the balance of the evidence does not support his view. 134

Ar., Cat. 2 a 34, etc., cf. Anal. Po. 83 a 25ff. The same point is made very clearly by ps-Archytas Περί τώ καθόλου λόγω p. 31.6ff. THESLEFF, cf. p. 32. 7f. and Boethius, De Trin. c. 4. Cf. Κ. v. FRITZ, Der Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorienlehre, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 40 ( 1931 ) 462,478 ff., 487 ff. ; revised : ID ., Schriften zur griechischen Logik, II : Logik, Ontologie und Mathematik [Problemata 71, Stuttgart 1978] 20, 35ff., 43ff.); H . W. 2 B . J O S E P H , An Introduction to Logic (Oxford 1916 etc.) 49ff. P R A N T L I 564 claims to find a similar doctrine in Galen, Meth. Med. 2.7 (X 129 K), but Galen is not concerned with the doctrine of categories at this point; in the 'Institutio Logica' he refers to all ten categories and even claims to have discovered an eleventh; see below, p. 1170. 135 Simpl., In Cat. 157.18ff.; his reasoning is based on Ar., E N 1096 a 21 ff., cf. Metaph. 1 0 8 8 a 23; J O S E P H 51 n. 1, M O R A U X , Arist. 107ff. Similar reasoning was used by Eudoros ap. Simpl. 206. lOff. and ps-Archytas p. 23.17ff. TH.; cf. T. A. SZLEZÁK, Ps.-Archytas über die Kategorien (Peripatoi 4, Berlin 1972) 110. 136 Cf. Simpl., In Cat. 166.8ff. = SVF 2.403. 137 L I T T I G ' S collection (Andronikos III 14ff.) is almost complete; additional passages are Simpl., In Cat. 154.3ff. and 332.14f. For a full discussion see MORAUX, Arist. 101 ff.; cf. P R A N T L I 537ff., P L E Z I A , Andron. 6ff., 36ff.

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occasionally he replaced a loose expression by a more formally correct one. 1 3 8 O n occasion, however, he can interpret Aristotle more freely. T w o instances deserve mention here. One concerns the difference between substance and attribute. Aristotle distinguished between the two kinds of predication of which "Socrates is a m a n " (or "animal") and "Socrates is a philosopher" are instances: the first tells us the species or genus to which Socrates belongs, and the univ e r s a l , " m a n " or "animal" themselves belong to the category Substance; the second states one of his attributes and belongs to Quality. Aristotle tries to describe the difference by saying that the first kind of universal, the "second substance", is predicated of (κατά) the concrete individual while the second inheres in (έν) the individual. 1 3 9 But according to Simplicius, Andronicus claimed that some attributes are predicated of their subject, e.g. 'philosopher' of Socrates. 1 4 0 We are not told the reasoning which led Andronicus to adopt this position or the criteria by which he decided which attributes fell into this class, but it is clear that it entailed some blurring of the distinction between "second substances" and qualities. We shall find a similar tendency in Boethus; it may be the result of Stoic influence. The second innovation of Andronicus I shall consider here concerns the categories which modern writers generally call Time and Place. Aristotle did not use nouns to designate them, but the adverbs " W h e n " (πότε) and "Where" (που) and treated time and place as kinds of extension belonging to the category Quantity (Cat. 5 a 6ff.). Andronicus, however, decided that time and place exist in their own right and 'when' and 'where' are their attributes; he therefore renamed the categories " T i m e " (χρόνος) and " P l a c e " (τόπος) and assigned 'when' and 'where' subordinate places within them. 1 4 1 His view is discussed and criti-

138

139 140 141

E.g. at 8 a 31 f., where Aristotle defines τα πρός τ ι as οις το είναι ταύτόν έστι τω πρός τί πως εχειν, Andronicus objected that his definition contains the definiendum and proposed to substitute έτερον for τι, using the term employed by Aristotle at 6 a 37 (there is no need to invoke Stoic influence here, with TARAN 742). H e was followed by Boethus and Aristón; Achaicus, a Peripatetic probably of the second century A . D . , tried to show that the change was unnecessary, but formally Andronicus is right, although the point is trivial. The source for all this is Simpl., In Cat. 2 0 1 . 3 4 f f . C f . G . E. L. OWEN, Inherence, Phronesis 10 (1965) 97ff. Ar., Cat. 1 a 2 0 f f „ cf. 2 a 18ff.; Simpl. 5 4 . 8 f f . ; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 104f. Simpl., In Cat. 347.6: 'Αρχύτας δέ και 'Ανδρόνικος ιδίαν τινά φύσιν την τοΰ χρόνου θεμενοι όμού τούτω συνέταξαν το ποτέ ώς περί τον χρόνον ύφιστάμενον. αυτά γαρ τα προηγούμενα της υποστάσεως πρώτα γένη, περί α τα άλλα υφίσταται, πρόκειται αύτώ ώς άρχηγικώτατα λαμβάνειν· έπεί τοίνυν ó μεν χρόνος τού ποτέ, ó δε τόπος τοΰ που κατ' αύτό το είναι προτέτακται, είκότως αύτοϊς ώς προηγουμένως γένεσι χρήται παραλιπών τα έν αύτοϊς περιεχόμενα ώς δεύτερα έκείνων οντα. δέδεικται ούν έκ των είρημένων, όπως μεν 'Αριστοτέλης έν άλλη κατηγορία το ποτέ τίθεται ταϊς διαφοραίς των σημασιών προσέχων, όπως δε 'Αρχύτας τω χρόνω συνέταξεν το ποτέ πρός την κατά τα πράγματα συγγένειαν άποβλέπων. 357.28: 'Αρχύτας μεν καί 'Ανδρόνικος συνέταξαν τω μεν χρόνω τό ποτέ, τω δέ τόπφ το πού, καί ούτως εθεντο τάς δύο κατηγορίας, 'Αριστοτέλης δέ τον μέν χρόνον και τον τόπον τοΰ ποσού τέθεικεν δια τάς εΐρημένας έμπροσθεν αιτίας, τού δέ ποτέ καί τού πού άλλας ύπεστήσατο κατηγορίας· " A r c h y t a s " here means ps-Archytas Περί τώ καθόλου λόγω p. 2 6 . 1 0 f f . THESLEFF; cf.

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cised by Simplicius (pp. 342 — 64) at considerable length, but it is not certain how much of his argumentation goes back to Andronicus himself. One point, however, is clearly made by Simplicius: here as elsewhere Andronicus inclined towards a realist interpretation of the categories; he and ps-Archytas differed from Aristotle because they were thinking primarily of the relationships between things falling under the categories, whereas Aristotle concentrated on the meanings of the terms used to denote them. The most elaborate of the early commentaries was the one written by Boethus of Sidon which, as well as line-by-line exegesis and textual criticism, included in-depth examinations of some of the problems Aristotle raised; Boethus devoted a whole book to the category of Relation, but we are not told whether this was part of his commentary or a separate essay. 142 Apparently his intention was to set the 'Categories' in the context of Aristotle's philosophy as a whole and of the Academic-Peripatetic tradition. He quoted extensively from Aristotle's writings and those of other Academics and Peripatetics. 143 Where Aristotle's treatment was or appeared to be incomplete, he tried to fill the gap with material drawn from other parts of the corpus; thus his commentary on the categories Time, Action and Passion, which Aristotle did not discuss in detail, includes a great deal of matter based on the 'Physics' and 'Metaphysics'. 144 In general his attitude was conservative. He rejected many of Andronicus' innovations and refuted many of the objections which had been brought against Aristotle, especially by Stoic writers. 145 His counter-arguments were not always accepted by Aristotle's opponents, and many of the criticisms he refuted were repeated by later writers, including Plotinus, to be refuted again by others reusing many of Boethus' arguments. 146 We cannot usually tell what modifications, if any, the arguments on both sides underwent in the course of this process, but there can be no doubt that Boethus was largely responsible for the scholasticism which is such a marked feature of subsequent Aristotelian philosophy. Work of this kind does not lend itself to detailed discussion in a survey such as the present one, but two examples may serve to illustrate Boethus' SZLEZÁK, ad l o c . , p . 126F.; LITTIG I I I 2 5 f f . , MORAUX, A r i s t . ILLFF. T h e s a m e t e r m i n o l o g y 142

143

144 145 146

is used by Philo, Decaí. 30; cf. Eudoros ap. Simpl., In Cat. 206.13ff. Simpl., In Cat. 1.17, 163.6. For a full discussion see MORAUX, Arist. 147-164, PRANTL I 540ff. Textual variants or conjectures are mentioned by Simpl. 29.29ff., 58.27ff., cf. MORAUX 150, 153. A full edition of Boethus' fragments is a desideratum of scholarship. Aristotle: ap. Simpl., In Cat. 65.21 (Anal Post.); 50.2ff., 302.15ff. (Physics); 78.6, 302. 15 (Metaphysics); 42.1 (De anima). Plato: 159.14, 163.6. Speusippus: 36.28, 38.19 (cf. L. TARAN, Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy, Hermes 106 [1978] 75ff.). He also used the writings of Theophrastus and Strato. Besides this it is of little significance that he missed some passages in Aristotle which might have been relevant to his argument: see Porphyry ap. Simpl., In Cat. 36.27 (cf. MORAUX 151). A misquotation of Pl., Rep. 438a noted by Simpl. 159.16 may be due to his quoting from memory. Ap. Simpl., In Cat. 348.22ff., 433.28ff. See Simpl., In Cat. 167.22 , 373.7, and above, n. 131. See, besides the passages quoted in the last note, Simpl., In Cat. 25.1 Off., 58.15ff., 187.24ff„ 302.5ff., 338.21 ff., 433.20ff.; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 147f„ 150, 160f„ 163f.

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way of thinking. One is his extraordinarily subtle treatment of time and its relationship to both movement and rest. Aristotle's dictum that the contrary of movement as such is rest, but the contrary of any particular movement is movement in the opposite direction, gave rise to a fair amount of controversy, some points of which were taken up later by Plotinus. Boethus tried to explain it by introducing the notion of time as a coordinate of both movement and rest. Time, he argued, being in constant flux, is a concomitant (συμπαρήκει) of both movement and rest; when objects are in movement, they stand in the same relationship to time as to the space they traverse (or, if the movement is one of qualitative change, to the spectrum of qualities within which the change takes place), but when they are at rest, their relationship to time is the contrary of their relationship to space etc, in that the former is still changing while the latter is not. Thus movement and rest can be seen as contrary relationships to time. 1 4 7 This implies a certain view of time: not as the "number" or "measure" of movement, but as the quantitative or extensional aspect of movement and rest — a view similar to that of Theophrastus' successor Strato or of the Stoics. 1 4 8 It follows that time is an objective reality, independent of the existence of a subject to perceive it, 1 4 9 and belongs, together with place, in the category Quantity. Boethus agreed with Aristotle, against Andronicus, in making When and, by analogy, Where, into separate categories. 150

147

148

149

150

Ar., Cat. 15 b I f f . , Simpl., ad loc. p. 432.24ff.; Plotinus' view (Enn. 6.3.27) is quoted at p. 433.20ff., Boethus at 433.28ff. Cf. MORAUX, Arist. 163f. Strato fr. 7 6 - 7 8 F. WEHRLI (Die Schule d. Aristoteles V [Basel 1952 etc.]), and ap. Simpl., In Cat. 346.14 (omitted by WEHRLI) Στράτων . . . το πόσον της κινήσεως ειπών τον χρόνον άχώριστόν τι αΐιτόν ύπέθετο της κινήσεως. Stoics: SVF 1.93, 2.509—516. Themistius, In Phys. 160.26f., 163.6ff. = Simpl., In Phys. 759.18ff., 766.18ff. Here Boethus contradicted Ar., Phys. 223 a 21 ff.; later Alexander of Aphrodisias tried to defend Aristotle's position (ap. Simpl., In Phys. 759.20ff.). Cf. MORAUX, Arist. 170f. Simpl., In Cat. 348.2ff. A similar doctrine is found in an essay Περί της τοϋ ποτε κατηγορίας preserved in a Florentine manuscript (Laur. 71.32) and printed by W A I T Z in the introduction of his edition of the Organon (Leipzig 1844) I 1 9 - 2 3 and by P. M. HUBY, Boethus of Sidon's Commentary, C Q n.s. 31 (1981) 398ff., who claims that it is nothing less than an excerpt from Boethus' commentary on the 'Categories'. This is an attractive hypothesis, but there are difficulties. Simplicius (In Cat. 437.22—36), in a passage apparently borrowed from Iamblichus, defines the category 'When' as the relation between time and the things in time. The same definition is found in the anonymous work (p. 22 init. WAITZ), where it is illustrated by means of an example which Simplicius ascribes to Boethus a few lines later (348.2); but since he introduces his quotation with the words και Βόηθος δε . . . υποτίθεται, it does not look as if he found the definition and the illustration together in his source. Furthermore the anonymous writer tries to reconcile his theory with the notion that time is the number of movement, but our authorities seem to imply that Boethus refused to do this; see Simpl., In Cat. 434.18f. ( H U B Y 407 takes a different view of this passage) and Themistius, In Phys. 163.6 = Simpl., In Phys. 766.18. While the anonymous tract contains much that can be traced back to Boethus, it would not be safe to ascribe anything to him which is not attributed to him by name in an ancient source.

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Even more revealing is his discussion of Substance. He began by denying the relevance of a question raised by a previous writer, perhaps Eudorus, 1 5 1 whether the category Substance was meant to embrace intelligible as well as sensible substances, but then went on to raise a problem of his own. In the 'Categories' (2 a l l f f . ) Aristotle distinguished two kinds of substance, concrete individuals and the species or genera to which they belong; the second kind he refers to here, but nowhere else, as "second substances" (2 a 14). In the 'Metaphysics' (1028 b 33ff. etc.), however, he says that "substance" can mean one of three things: matter, form or universal, or the concrete individual composed of both. Boethus asked how these classifications are related and pointed out that the definition of substance given in the Categories (2 a 11), "That which is neither in something else nor predicated of something else", fits matter and concrete individuals but would exclude the form or universal, because it is predicated of the individual. Therefore, he concluded, forms or "second substances" do not belong to Substance but to a different category, such as Quality or Quantity. 1 5 2 Consistently with this view he held that the unity of individuals is due to their form "in as much as the form is limited and made numerically one" by being included in matter. 1 S 3 In this way Boethus, as Dexippus says, affirmed the priority of the concrete individual over the universal. He could have found support for his opinion in such passages as Cat. 3 b 15 or Metaph. 1033 b 22 and his interpretation points forward to that of Alexander, but one cannot avoid the suspicion that it was influenced by Stoic doctrines. 154 But Boethus' intention was not to mediate, and in other contexts he shows himself a true Aristotelian. For example, he refuted those who wanted to subsume Action and Passion under a single category Movement by pointing out that the distinction is required by Aristotle's doctrine of a first mover who is active but not moved; 1 5 5 the view he refuted was taken up again later by Plotinus (Enn. 6.1.15), but originated among Stoic opponents of Aristotle. 156 Boethus wanted nothing more than to be a faithful exponent of

151

152

153 154 155

156

Simpl., In Cat. 7 8 . 4 f f . , cf. SZLEZÁK, Ps-Archytas über die Kat. 105. The problem was taken up again by Nicostratus and Plotinus (Enn. 6.1.2, cf. Simpl., In Cat. 76.13ff.) and is presupposed by ps-Archytas, Περί τώ καθόλου λόγω p. 22.31 ff. THESLEFF, cf. Simpl., 7 6 . 1 9 f f . , 7 7 . 8 f f . Simpl., In Cat. 7 8 . 4 f f . , Dexippus, In Cat. 45.27ff. ; cf. Ps-Archytas, Π ε ρ ί τ ώ καθόλου λόγω p. 2 4 . 1 7 f f . TH. See further PRANTL I 541 ff., MORAUX, Arist. 155ff., G. MOVÍA, Anima e Intelletto (Padua 1968) 194 ff. The question whether the specific differentia qualifies the genus or species (ap. Simpl., In Cat. 9 7 . 2 8 f f . ) , which PRANTL connects with this doctrine, belongs to a different discussion. Simpl., In Cat. 1 0 4 . 2 6 f „ cf. Dexippus 4 5 . 2 2 f f . SVF 2.369ff., cf. PRANTL I 4 3 0 f f „ ZELLER III 1, 95ff., RIST (above, η. 127) 43ff. Simpl., In Cat. 3 0 2 . 1 2 f f . , cf. 3 0 6 . 1 3 f f . ; cf. SZLEZÁK, Ps-Archytas über die Kat. 126, MORAUX, Arist. 160. N o t e the implication: in this case, at least, Boethus applied the doctrine of categories to an intelligible substance. However Aristotle himself names Κίνησις as a category at Metaph. 1029 b 25, and at EE 1217 b 29 has two categories κινεϊν and κινεΐσθαι. Cf. v. FRITZ, Der Ursprung der

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Aristotelianism. He tried to keep the discussion within an Aristotelian framework and saw his main task as explaining the real or apparent discrepancies he found in Aristotle's writings. But he could not altogether escape the influences which had established themselves in the centuries after Aristotle's death. The other 'early commentators' on the 'Categories' are less important, at least for their contribution to the knowledge of Aristotle. Only one, Aristón of Alexandria, was a professed Aristotelian. T w o of his comments are recorded, both concerned with Relation; one echoes a remark of Andronicus and Boethus, 1 5 7 the other raises the question whether 'cosmos' is a relative term and what its correlate might be. It has been variously interpreted and may have been distorted in the course of transmission, but the problem seems to hinge on the ambiguity of the expressions κόσμος and το έν κόσμω. 1 5 8 Eudorus, his fellow Alexandrian and rival, 159 tried to determine the correct order in which the categories should be placed. Arguing that every substance must have some properties and extension, he placed Quality and Quantity immediately after Substance; after these came Time and Place which, though extrinsic to substances, are necessary for their existence. 160 This is something to which Aristotle seems to have attached little importance; the order in which the categories are enumerated at Cat. 1 b 26 f. differs from that in which they are discussed in the

157 158

aristotelischen Kategorienlehre, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 40 (1931) 451, 465, 484 (revised: ID., Schriften zur griechischen Logik, II: Logik, Ontologie und Mathematik [Problemata 71, Stuttgart 1978] 11, 24, 40). See above, η. 138. SimpL,

In

159

160

Cat.

1 8 8 . 3 1 ff.

=

fr. 2

MARIOTTI.

See ZELLER I I I

1,

649,

PRANTL I

546,

Arist. 1 8 3 - 1 8 5 ; I. M A R I O T T I , Aristone d'Alessandria (Bologna 1 9 6 6 ) 4 8 - 5 7 tries to explain it by reference to the Stoic distinction between το όλον and ι ό πάν, but this is far-fetched. The difficulty arises from the fact that the terms employed by Aristón in this context include three neologisms whose exact meaning is not clear (κοσμωτός, γεωτός, άερωτός), as well as the ambiguous το έν κοσμώ. According to Strabo 17.790 C, both published books about the source of the Nile whose content was so similar that Eudoros accused Aristón of plagiarism. See further Z E L L E R III 1, 633ff., DILLON, Middle Platonists (London 1977) 115ff. (on the 'Categories', 133ff.); H . DÖRRIE, Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandreia, Hermes 79 (1944) 2 5 38 = ID., Plat. Min. 297-309; PRAECHTER, Kl. Sehr. 130f. (see n. 121); FRASER, Ptolem. Alexandria I 489, II 708 f. Simpl., In Cat. 206. lOff.; cf. ps-Archytas, Π. τ. καθ. λογ. p. 2 3 . 1 7 - 2 4 . 1 6 TH., with SZLEZÁK'S notes, p. 108 — 118; this is the earliest extant attempt to fix the order of the categories and clearly owes much to Eudorus, although their conclusions differ in some respects. W. T H E I L E R , Unters, zur antiken Lit. (Berlin 1970) 489f., followed by SZLEZÁK 116, claims that Eudoros also influenced the lists of categories given by Philo Alexandrinus, De Decalogo 30 and Boethius, De Trinitate c. 4 init, although both, like Ar. 1 b 26, place Relation fourth, after Substance, Quality and Quantity, Philo puts Time and Place last, and Boethius retains the terms Ubi and Quando. T H E I L E R ' S assertion that Boethius placed Relation last is wrong; his order is Substantia, Qualitas, Quantitas, Ad aliquid, Ubi, Quando, Habere, Situm esse, Facere, Pati, i.e. essentially the same as in Aristotle 1 b 26. MORAUX,

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body of that work, and different arrangements are found in his other writings. It is characteristic both of Eudorus and the intellectual climate in which he worked that he should have devoted so much effort and ingenuity to this task. His decisions may have been influenced by Aristotelian and perhaps even Platonic precedents, 1 6 1 or by metaphysical considerations like those used by ps-Archytas for the same purpose, 1 6 2 but it is worth bearing in mind that the Stoics apparently regarded this question as important; 1 6 3 indeed Aristotle's seeming neglect of it may have been one of their reasons for interpreting his doctrine as a classification of terms rather than things. — The other comments on the 'Categories' ascribed to Eudorus are petty and pedantic to the point of captiousness; most of them are concerned with the sub-divisions of the category Quality, one with a detail in Relation. 1 6 4 The last of the 'old commentators' was a Stoic, Athenodorus, who wrote a book entitled 'Against Aristotle's Categories'; he is generally quoted together with Cornutus, another Stoic active in the middle of the first century A D . 1 6 5 As we have seen already, they thought that the 'Categories' is concerned with language and criticised Aristotle for unduly restricting the scope of his analysis (above, p. 1103). Their remaining comments were less far-reaching. Athenodorus held that weight should be regarded as a third subdivision of the category Quantity, together with number and extension; Cornutus disagreed, preferring to place weight, i.e. heaviness and lightness, in the category Q u a l i t y . 1 6 6 Both agreed in denying that objects such as heads or wings could fall into the category Relation, although they gave different reasons for this. 1 6 7 Probably it was Athenodorus who suggested substituting a single category Movement for the

161

SZLEZÁK 110 thinks that Eudoros placed Quality next to S u b s t a n c e because he was influenced by the Platonic distinction between ουσία or τί έστιν and ποιόν τι (on which see K. GAISER, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 243f.), but this would at most account for the placing of one category, and the same order is found at Metaph. 1017 a 25.

162

SZLEZÁK 116 has some interesting speculations on this point.

163

C f . RIST (above, η. 127)

164

See the index to Simpl., In Cat.; PRANTL I 539f., ZELLER III 1, 633. See the index to KALBFLEISCH'S edition of Simpl., In Cat. The title of Athenodorus' book, Προς τάς 'Αριστοτέλους Κατηγορίας, is given by Simpl., 62.25; Cornutus' book was entitled Προς Ά θ η ν ό δ ω ρ ο ν καί Ά ρ ι σ τ ο τ έ λ η ν (ibid. 62.28, Porph., In Cat. 86.23), but we only hear of one substantial disagreement; Cornutus also criticised Aristotle's 'Categories' in a Τέχνη 'Ρητορική. See further BRANDIS (1833) 275, PRANTL I 538f., ZELLER III 1, 607f., PRAECHTER, Kl. Sehr. 128 (see n. 121); for Athenodorus' date see above, n. 131.

165

54f.

166

For Athenodorus see Simpl. 128.7; he is associated with ps-Archytas (p. 25.1 —3 TH.) and Ptolemy the astronomer; cf. SZLEZÁK 120f., S. SAMBURSKY, The physical world of Late Antiquity (London 1962) 83. For Cornutus see Simpl. 129. i f f . ; he is joined with Porphyry. The statement of BRANDIS and PRANTL (539 n. 20) that Cornutus agreed with Athenodorus on this point is based on a wrong reading in the old editions of Simplicius' commentary.

167

Simpl., In Cat. 187.28ff.

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Aristotelian Action and Passion, the idea refuted by Boethus. 1 6 8 Some remarks about Time and Place are attributed to Cornutus alone. 1 6 9 I have discussed the early commentaries on the 'Categories' together because they illustrate the interest aroused by Andronicus' edition and the reactions, friendly or hostile, to Aristotle's writings. In what follows I shall consider the other work of these men, in as far as it pertains to Aristotle's philosophy, individually. Athenodorus and Cornutus are not known to have done any other relevant work. Most of Eudorus' work also falls outside the scope of this survey, although he seems to have made a careful study of the 'Metaphysics' and we hear of one interesting contribution he made to the criticism of the text. 1 7 0 But the three who were members of Aristotle's school all worked in other fields besides the 'Categories'. From Andronicus we have a suggestion that, although physical movement is caused by a mover outside the moved object, the real agent of change is something in the object itself: "Even though the mover is outside, the moved object, being brought to actuality from the potentiality that is in it, seems to be moved by itself"; "The nature (of the object), being itself predisposed, diposes the object from inside in each kind of movement, as Andronicus said; for even if the water is heated by fire, yet the nature inherent in the water becoming hot first, then heats the object (water) or rather brings is up to the same heat as itself" 1 7 1 . In the absence of a context, these remarks must be interpreted cautiously; they may have been nothing more than an attempt to make sense of a reading in his text of the 'Physics' for which Andronicus presumably had or thought he had some authority, but which has been rejected by subsequent editors and commentators. What we can say is that, in his account of natural movement, Andronicus emphasised the part played

168

169 170

171

See above, p. 1109. Since Aristotle himself seems to do this at Metaph. 1029 b 25, this may be evidence that Athenodorus had read the 'Metaphysics'. Simpl., In Cat. 3 5 1 . 2 1 f f . , 359. I f f . , 15ff. See Alex. Aphr., In Metaph. 58.31 ff. (on 988 a 9ff.). This passage has been thoroughly analysed by P. MORAUX, Eine Korrektur d. Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text d. Metaph. d. Ar., in: Beiträge zur alten Geschichte u. deren Nachleben (Festschr. F. Altheim), ed. R. STIEHL und H . E . STIER (Berlin 1969), I 492ff. His findings supersede all previous discussions, including those of ZELLER III 1, 634 η. 1 and DÖRRIE, Plat. Min. 306 f. Simpl., In Phys. 440.12: ίστέον δέ ö n έν τ ο ύ τ ψ τω χωρίω (204 a 14) οί μεν πολλοί σαφέστερον ούτω γράφουσι ταΰτην την λ έ ξ ι ν έ ν τ ε λ έ χ ε ι α γ ά ρ έ σ τ ι τ ο ύ τ ο υ ύ π ό τ ο ύ κ ι ν η τ ι κ ο ύ , ό δε 'Ανδρόνικος ούτως· ε ν τ ε λ έ χ ε ι α γ ά ρ έ σ τ ι τ ο ύ κ ι ν η τ ο ί κ α ί ύ π ό τ ο ύ τ ο υ , καί εξηγείται δτι καν εξωθεν η το κινούν, έκ της ένούσης δυνάμεως εις ένέργειαν άγόμενον, ΰφ' έαυτού κινεϊσθαι δοκεί το κινούμενον. 450.16: ή δέ φύσις καί προδιατιθεμένη διατίθησι το ύποκείμενον ενδοθεν καθ' εκαστον κινήσεως είδος, ώς καί ó 'Ανδρόνικος έλεγε, καν γάρ θερμαίνηται ύπό πυρός τό ύδωρ, άλλ' ή έν τω ϋδατι φύσις πρώτη θερμή γενομένη, ούτως θ ε ρ μ α ί ν ε ι ή συνθερμαίνει τό ύποκείμενον. The reading on which Andronicus comments in the first passage is not found in any extant manuscripts; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 113 f.

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by forces immanent in the moving object. There is nothing surprising in this; similar tendencies appear in Stoicism and in the fragments of some of Aristotle's early followers, notably Strato. 172 But Andronicus tried hard to reconcile this approach with adherence to Aristotle's conceptual framework. 1 7 3 The same tendency can be seen in his psychology. According to Galen he said that the soul is "the mixture (of the bodily constituents) or a power arising from the mixture." 174 Galen's report is less precise than it might have been; at first sight, it suggests that Andronicus offered two alternative definitions of soul, as the mixture of the bodily constituents or as a power arising from the mixture. But since Galen proceeds to criticise Andronicus for his use of the term δύναμις (in the singular), we can be sure that it occurred in his definition; and since the alternative, that the soul is simply identical with the mixture, was previously claimed by Galen as his own (p. 44.6 M), it is at least very likely that Andronicus did not regard it as a serious contender. 175 We are again hampered by the absence of a context, but it is reasonable to connect this fragment with Andronicus' explanation of physical movement: just as the movement of simple natural bodies is governed by their inherent δύναμις or φύσις (e.g. a stone falls because of its intrinsic weight), so the behaviour of a complex, organic body is determined by the interplay of the 'natures' of all its constituents, which together constitute its 'vital force' or 'soul'. Such a view was developed at length by Alexander of Aphrodisias 176 who, if my interpretation 172

173

174

Fr. 32FF. WEHRLI; cf. my article Strato of Lampsacus, Diet, of scientific Biography 13 (New York 1976) 92. Applied to 'unnatural' local movement, e.g. of a heavy body thrown upwards, Andronicus' doctrine would have provided the basis for a theory of 'impetus' close to modern views of momentum. Such a theory had been formulated by the astronomer Hipparchus (ap. Simpl., In de Cael. 264.25ff.) and perhaps by Strato (ap. H e r o , Pneum. p. 14 init. S C H M I D T , 1 1 1 . 5 F F . G O T T S C H A L K ) and was used later by Pliny, Epist. 6.16.6 and Philop., In Phys. 642.3ff. But there is no evidence that Andronicus made such an application. See further SAMBURSKY, Phys. World of Late Antiquity 71 ff.; S. PINES, A refutation of Galen by Alex, of Aphr. and the theory of motion, Isis 52 (1961) 48f.; G O T T S C H A L K , Strato of Lampsacus: some texts, in Proc. Leeds Philos. & Lit. Soc. 11 (1965) 149f. Galen "Οτι ταίς του σώματος κράσεσιν αί της ψ υ χ ή ς δυνάμεις έπονται, c. 4, 4. 783 ότι δ' ήτοι κράσιν ειναί φησιν (Andronicus) ή δ ύ ν α μ ι ν έπομένην τή κράσει, μέμφομαι τη προσθέσει της δυνάμεως. The text is corrupt and the clause in which this doctrine is ascribed to Andronicus is omitted in the extant Greek manuscripts, but it is found in the Arabic translation and the restoration is regarded as certain; cf. M Ü L L E R ' S apparatus criticus and M O R A U X , Arist. 134 n. 9. The literature on this fragment is extensive: H . SIEBECK, Gesch. d. Psychologie I 2 (Gotha 1884) 166; Z E L L E R I I I 1, 645f.; L I T T I G , Andron. I I I 2 f f . ; M O V Í A , Anima e intelletto 185ff.; P. L . D O N I N I , L'anima e gli elementi nel 'de anima' di Alessandro di Afrodisia, in: Atti della Accad. delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze Morali etc. 105 (1971) 1 0 2 f f . ; M O R A U X , Arist. 133 ff. K Ü H N , 2. 4 4 . 1 8 MÜLLER

175

176

Even if Andronicus wrote κράσιν ή δύναμιν έπομένην τη κράσει, the ή could mean something like " o r rather"; cf. Η . BONITZ, Index Aristotelicus (Berlin 1870) 313 a 26f. Alex. Aphr., De an. 7.9—11.13, especially 9.11; also in a tract O n the principles of the whole' extant in Arabic, published by Ά . BADAWÏ, Aristote chez les Arabes (Cairo 1947) 253ff.; French translation in ID., La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde

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is correct, would have been continuing a line of thought derived from Andronicus. Similar ideas are attributed to two fourth-century Peripatetics, Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, and as later commentators point out, there is a clear affinity between them and Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is the form of the organic body. 1 7 7 We are also told that Andronicus tried to defend Xenocrates' definition of the soul as a "self-moving number" against Aristotle's criticism, interpreting him to mean by this that the soul is what causes the constituents of an organism to blend harmoniously. 1 7 8 It would appear from this that he regarded Xenocrates' teaching as not very different from his own, although he makes Xenocrates say clearly that the soul governs the mixture of bodily constituents rather than being governed by it. With the evidence at our disposal we are not entitled to ignore this difference, but it is possible that Galen tried to bring Andronicus' opinion more into line with his own view. The last fragment I shall discuss spans psychology and ethics and throws an interesting light on the way in which Andronicus entered into the school controversies of his time. Aspasius, a second-century commentator on Aristotle, tells us that Andronicus and Boethus were the first Peripatetics to give a definition of 'passion', earlier members of the school having neglected to do so; Andronicus defined it as "an irrational movement of the soul owing to a perception of good or bad; taking irrational not to mean that which is opposed to the reason, as the Stoics did, but a movement of the irrational part of the soul". 1 7 9 Here

177

178

179

arabe (Paris 1 9 6 8 ) 1 2 1 ff. See f u r t h e r s . P I N E S , Isis 5 2 ( 1 9 6 1 ) 4 2 ff. R . W . SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, below in this same volume ( A N R W II 3 6 , 2 ) 1 2 0 2 ff. and my paper 'Boethus' psychology and the Neoplatonists', Phronesis 3 1 ( 1 9 8 6 ) 2 5 0 ff. Dicaearchus fr. 5 — 12 WEHRLI, Aristoxenus fr. 118—121 WEHRLI; note especially Die. fr. 8i ( = Atticus ap. Euseb., PE 15.9.10), where Atticus (the Platonist of the second century A.D.) makes the point that Dicaearchus drew the logical conclusion from Aristotle's teaching. Others to whom similar ideas are attributed are the Academics Xenocrates (fr. 71 H E I N Z E = fr. 207 ISNARDI P A R E N T E ) and Heraclides of Pontus (fr. 72 W E H R L I ; cf. my Heracl. of P. [Oxford 1980] 108ff.) and Asclepiades of Prusa, a medical practitioner active in Rome in the first century B.C. (see my Heraclides 55 n. 58 for references). See further MOVÍA, Anima e intelletto 7 1 - 9 3 and my article 'Soul as Harmonía', Phronesis 16 (1971) 182ff. Themist., In de an. 3 2 . 1 - 3 4 = Xenocr. fr. 61 H = 262 IP, criticising Ar. 408 b 32. Cf. L I T T I G , Z E L L E R and D O N I N I I.E. (Η. 174), M O V Í A 190ff., M O R A U X , Arist. 1 3 2 f . D O N I N I understands the last sentence of the quotation to contain Andronicus' own doctrine, but it may be nothing more than his interpretation of Xenocrates. Aspasius, In E N 44.20: των δε εκ τοϋ Περιπάτου των μεν παλαιών παρ' ούδενί εΐιρίσκομεν όρισμόν τοϋ πάθους· των δέ ύστερον 'Ανδρόνικος μεν ειρηκε π ά θ ο ς είναι της ψυχής κίνησιν άλογον δι' ύπόληψιν κακού ή άγαθού, άλογον λαμβάνων ού το ύπεναντίον τω όρθώ λόγω ώσπερ οί έκ της Στοάς, άλλα το του άλογου της ψυχής μορίου κίνημα - Βόηθος δε το π ά θ ο ς τής ψυχής κίνησιν άλογον εχουσάν τι μέγεθος, άλογον μεν λαμβάνων και αυτός την τοϋ άλογου της ψυχής μορίου κίνησιν, τό δε μέγεθος προστιθείς, έπειδή γίνονται τίνες καί αλλαι κινήσεις τοϋ άλογου τής ψυχής μετ' οίκειώσεως τής πρός τινας και άλλοτριώσεως βραχείας· τάς ούν μετά βραχείας ουκ άξιον ήγείτο όνομάζειν πάθη. Cf. L I T T I G I.e., P O H L E N Z , Stoa II 174f., M O V Í A 188f., MORAUX, Arist. 305ff. and below, p. 1157. The same definition reappears at the beginning of the tract Περί π α θ ώ ν wrongly ascribed to Andronicus and may be the reason

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we see Andronicus rejecting the strict psychological monism of the early Stoics and making a distinction between rational and irrational parts of the soul, as Aristotle had done, with some reservations, when writing about ethics; 1 8 0 we do not know how Andronicus combined this with the ideas reported by Galen. But it has important ethical implications as well. Almost the same definition is quoted by Areius Didymus at the beginning of his 'Epitome of Ethics', but ascribed to Aristotle. 1 8 1 The only substantial difference is that Areius adds the epithet πλεοναστική, "liable to grow to excess", after κίνησις; he then goes on to say that the Stoics defined 'passion' as an "impulse grown to excess" 1 8 2 and point out that, although both definitions are very similar, there is one vital difference. For the Stoics, any 'passion' is by its very nature excessive and therefore morally wrong; for the Peripatetics it is liable to grow excessive and therefore dangerous, but as long as it remains within bounds, it may be legitimate. This continues Aristotle's view that certain desires and emotional responses are morally right and justifies the Peripatetic belief that morality consists in moderating the passions by imposing the control of reason, not in eradicating them, as the Stoics advocated. 1 8 3 Thus the substance of Andronicus' teaching is in accord with the Peripatetic tradition, although the form of his definition is clearly modelled on that of the Stoics, and the whole difference between them has been compressed into a single word — a model of philosophical sophistication. The debate was continued by Boethus, who made one addition to Andronicus' definition: according to him the passions were "irrational movements of the soul h a v i n g a c e r t a i n m a g n i t u d e " . 1 8 4 At first sight this might seem like a concession to the Stoics, but Boethus agreed with Andronicus that these movements took place in a non-rational part of the soul and did not constitute a threat to the reason by their very existence. His purpose was to exclude short-lived reflexes which he did not regard as a moral problem. Here Boethus was in the mainstream of contemporary thought. The status of such reactions was keenly debated among the later Stoics and most Roman members of the school tended to the same conclusion as he. 1 8 5 Finally Andronicus wrote a book 'On division' which was destined to have a considerable influence; its teaching was incorporated into the introduction of Porphyry's commentary on Plato's 'Sophist', on which Boethius based his own for the attribution, although this has been denied by the latest editor, A. G L I B E R T (p. 30f.); see further, for this and other texts wrongly attributed to Andronicus, MORAUX, Arist. 136-141 and below, p. 1130f. 1 8 0 E N 1102 b 14ff., etc. Posidonius took a similar view of πάθη, e.g. fr. 152 Ε. —K. 1 8 1 Ap. Stob. 2.7.1, p. 38.18ff. WACHSMUTH; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 305ff. 1 8 2 όρμή πλεονάζουσα, p. 39.5; for parallels, see SVF 3.377ff. 1 8 3 Ar., E N 1111 a 30£f.; cf. I. MARIOTTI, Aristone di Alessandria (Bologna 1966) 34ff. For the controversy over apatheia and metriopatheia see P O H L E N Z , Stoa I 150f., II 82, 87, with references. 1 8 4 Aspasius, In E N 44.24 κίνησιν άλογον εχουσάν τι μέγεθος. The word πλεονάζουσαν seems to be deliberately avoided; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 176f. POHLENZ, Stoa II 174 tries to supplement Boethus' definition from Nemesius, Nat. Horn. p. 216 MATTHIAE, but this is speculative. iss § E E POHLENZ, Stoa I 307, with the references in II 154. THIRRY

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'Liber de divisione'. 1 8 6 Andronicus' intention was to formulate rules for using the method of division to arrive at correct definitions, and much of his material was older. As Cicero points out, this method was developed in the early Academy and Peripatos. 1 8 7 But in a different place (Tusc. 4 . 5 . 9 ) Cicero tells us that the Peripatetics had come to neglect the practice of accurate division and definition, leaving these "thorny matters" to their Stoic rivals; presumably he is referring to the generations after Theophrastus. N o w a very similar judgment appears near the end of Boethius' 'De divisione' (P.L. 64, 892 A), where it is said that the "later Peripatetics" studied the rules of division with great care, but earlier ones handled them badly. Here the "later" Peripatetics seem to be those who came after Andronicus, and the "earlier" ones must be identical with those criticised by Cicero in the 'Tusculans'. 1 8 8 These sentences cannot go back to Andronicus in their present form, but they may be an echo of a criticism by Andronicus of his immediate predecessors similar to the one made by Cicero. Andronicus accepted the unfavourable judgement of the Hellenistic Peripatos current in the first half of the first century B C and set out to meet it by reestablishing Aristotelianism as a rigorous philosophy. Although it had no immediate connection with Aristotle's writings, his book O n division' was part of that effort of restoration, no less than his edition and commentaries. Boethus, as we have seen, read widely in the Aristotelian corpus and seems to have attached particular importance to natural philosophy. But the record of his opinions is scanty, and some of his most interesting suggestions, e. g. on time, seem to have been advanced in his commentary on the 'Categories'. 1 8 9 Apart from this we hear of two innovations in the theory of the syllogism: he acknowledged that the Stoic hypothetical syllogism is logically prior to Aristotle's categorical one, 1 9 0 and he differed from Aristotle in holding that the syllogisms of the second and third figures are "complete" (τέλειοι). We are not told his reasons, but according to our authority Aristotle's view was first questioned by Theophrastus, and the controversy was still alive in the fourth century A D . 1 9 1 In natural philosophy we hear that he discussed the concept of matter and distinguished between completely unqualified matter, which he called ΰλη, and 186

187

188 189 190 191

MIGNE, Patr. Lat. 6 4 . 8 7 5 - 8 9 1 . C f . MORAUX, Arist. 1 2 0 - 1 3 2 , who traces its influence and has a full discussion of earlier scholarship; PRANTL I 558f. Cie., Fin. 4.4.8; much the same thing is said by Galen 10.26, 137; cf. I. v. MÜLLER, Über Galens Werk v. wiss. Beweis, Abh. Akad. München X X 2 (1895) 449f. See above, n. 42. See above, p. 1108. Galen, Inst. log. 7.2, cf. KIEFFER, ad loc. 93f.; MORAUX, Arist. 168ff. A m m o n . , In Anal. Pri. 31.11 ff., cf. Theophr., fragm. log. 20 GRAESER, 25 REPICI; MORAUX, Arist. 165 ff. BOCHEÑSKI, Logique de Théophraste 64 f. expresses some doubt as to the correctness of Ammonius' report concerning Theophrastus. Some additional evidence about Boethus' arguments is found in Themistius' 'Reply to Maximus concerning the reduction of the second and third figures of the syllogism to the first 1 , extant in an Arabic version; the text has been published by Ά . BADAWÏ, Aristü 'inda-l-'Arab (Cairo 1947) 3 0 9 - 3 2 4 , and a French translation by the same scholar, in: ID., La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe (Paris 1968) 166—180, there especially 176 ff.

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matter as it exists in actual things, endowed with form and limit, which he called "substrate" (ύποκείμενον). 1 9 2 Probably he meant to do no more than clarify Aristotle's use of these terms, but his anxious search for precision here is another symptom of the incipient scholasticism we noticed in his work on the 'Categories'. In ethics, as we have seen already, he slightly modified Andronicus' account of the passions, and in another respect also he apparently tried to bring Peripatetic ethics into line with contemporary views. We are told that Boethus and another Peripatetic, Xenarchus, interpreted certain passages of the 'Nicomachean Ethics' as meaning that Aristotle held a doctrine of oikeiosis, i. e. that each individual has a natural self-love, a primary appetition whose object is his own being. 1 9 3 In the passages they adduce Aristotle says nothing of the kind, but we may infer that Boethus and Xenarchus held such a belief themselves. This idea is a central part of Stoic ethics, but it is attributed to "the Peripatetics" by Areius Didymus, and this gave rise to the opinion, earlier in the present century, that it might have originated in the Peripatos, with Theophrastus if not with Aristotle. More recently this has been denied, and it is now generally thought that oikeiosis came into the first-century Peripatos under the influence of Antiochus of Ascalum. 1 9 4 This leaves a series of fragments whose authorship is disputed between our Boethus and his Stoic namesake, who lived in the second century B C . Eusebius has preserved nine fragments of a work by Porphry entitled 'Against Boethus on the Soul' and Simplicius has another which, though untitled, almost certainly comes from the same w o r k . 1 9 5 A long work in five books, it seems to have fallen into two main sections, an exposition of the 'Phaedo' and defence of its arguments against Boethus, and a more general vindication of Plato's psychology against opponents of all schools. In spite of their comparative bulk, the fragments preserved by Eusebius are less informative than we might have hoped, in fact only one of them contains an explicit statement of Boethus' view: this comes from his discussion of Plato's third proof (79—80), and shows that Boethus was prepared to concede, at least for the purposes of argument, that the soul is the most divine thing in us, because it is endowed with ceaseless 192

Themist., In Phys. 2 6 . 2 0 f f . , Simpl., In Phys. 2 1 1 . 1 5 £ f . , both from Alexander; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 170f. T h e distinction is implicit in A r . , G C 3 2 0 a 2 f f . , and a similar one between ΰλη and στοιχείον in Cael. 302 a 16; cf. BONITZ, Index Arist. 7 0 2 a 5 3 f f .

193

(Alex. A p h r . ) De anima libri mantissa 1 5 1 . 3 είναι π ρ ώ τ ο ν οίκεϊον ήμϊν ημάς α υ τ ο ύ ς κτλ. T h e passages to which Boethus referred were E N 1155 b 17ff. and 1168 a 35ff. C f . MORAUX, Arist. 178ff., 2 0 8 f f . , with references, and S. G. PEMBROKE, O i k e i o s i s ' , in: Problems in Stoicism, ed. by A . A . LONG ( L o n d o n 1974) 114f£.

194

Areius Did. ap. Stob. 2 . 7 , p. 1 1 8 . 1 l f f . W ; see below, p. 1 1 2 7 f . , and cf. PEMBROKE 132ff., who refers to earlier discussions.

195

P o r p h y r y Π ρ ο ς Β ό η θ ο ν περί ψυχής ap. Euseb., Ρ Ε 1 1 . 2 8 . 1 - 6 , 1 4 . 1 0 . 3 , 1 5 . 1 1 . 1 - 4 , 1 5 . 1 6 . 1 - 2 ; Simpl., In de an. 2 4 7 . 2 3 f f . F o r Boethus the Stoic, see SVF 3 p. 2 6 5 - 2 6 7 and Index Stoic. Herculanensis col. 5 1 . 8 (p. 69 TRAVERSA); v. ARNIM has included the Simplicius fragment in his collection as no. 11, but has ignored the material in Eusebius. See further MORAUX, Arist. 172 — 176, w h o enumerates other passages thought to have been influenced by Porphyry's book and refers to earlier discussions. See now m y article 'Boethus' psychology and the Neoplatonists', Phronesis 31 ( 1 9 8 6 ) 243 ff.

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motion and because it contains the power of mind, but did not admit that this entails its immortality. 1 9 6 But the fragments of the more general part of Porphyry's work include, among the rebuttals of Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, one fragment not firmly attached to any of the well-known schools, and it is a reasonable guess that it may refer to the teaching of Boethus; it contains a criticism of those who draw an analogy between the soul and the active powers of inorganic bodies, such as the heat of fire or the weight of earth, which cause movement in these bodies without being themselves moved. 1 9 7 Finally Simplicius tells us that Boethus claimed that the soul might be immortal in the sense of not dying when the organism composed of soul and body dies, but might still be destroyed subsequently; from the context it is clear that this was meant as an argument against the last proof of immortality in the Thaedo'.198 M O R A U X ascribes this argument to the Stoic Boethus, because he thinks that it commits its proponent to the Stoic doctrine of a limited survival of the soul after death. H e has overlooked that it is not only an ad hominem argument against Plato, but actually a reworking of one already used by Strato of Lampsacus; a comparison with his version helps to explain Simplicius' rather obscure wording and reveals the dialectical character of the argument, whose essential point is not so much that there may be a lapse of time between the death of the organism and the soul's dissolution, but that these can be regarded as separate events. 1 9 9 This would favour Peripatetic authorship; and if the analogy between the soul and the 'powers' of inorganic natural substances belongs to Boethus (although this must remain speculative), it would point in the same direction. Porphyry discussed it immediately after Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is the form of the organism and seems to have regarded it as a variant of Aristotelianism, and in fact it is at the basis of Alexander's theory; we have seen already that Andronicus held very similar views and it would not be surprising if his successor thought along the same lines. His distinction between 'matter' and 'substrate' could have been used in this context, as a similar distinction was later by Alexander. 2 0 0 This attribution is further supported by one piece of external evidence. Porphyry and Simplicius knew the work of Boethus the Peripatetic well and refer to it often, usually by his name alone without any further qualification; but the Stoic is only known from doxograph-

196

AP. Euseb., P E 11.28.6-10,

197

Ibid. 1 5 . 1 1 . 2 - 3 , p. 3 7 4 . 8 - 1 8 M R A S . Simpl., In de an. 247.23: καλώς γαρ και το ά ί δ ι ο ν προστέθεικεν (Aristotle, De an. 430 a 23), ώς ό Πλάτων το άνώλεθρον έν τω Φαίδωνι, 'ίνα μή ώς ό Βοηθός οίηθώμεν την ψυχήν ώσπερ την έμψυχίαν άθάνατον μεν είναι ώς αύτήν μή ίιπομένουσαν τον θάνατον έπιόντα, έξισταμένην δέ έπιόντος εκείνου τω ζώντι άπόλλυσθαι. Cf. Pl., Phaedo 106 c. See Damascius (Olympiodorus) In Plat. Phaed. C II 190, D 78, pp. 233, 333 WESTERINK = Strato fr. 123 — 124 W E H R L I = 16a—b G O T T S C H A L K (see above, n. 173); cf. my commentary ad loc., p. 167, and MOVÍA, Anima e intelletto (Padova 1968) 198. For the Stoic doctrine of limited survival of the soul, see SVF 2.809ff. Alex. Aphr., De an. 7.14ff.; cf. above, pp. 1113f. and 1116f.

198

199

200

II p . 6 3 . 2 6 - 6 4 . 1 0

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ical compendia and sources which copy them, and there is no independent evidence that his writings were extant in the third century A D . 2 0 1 On balance, therefore, these fragments should be attributed to the Peripatetic; and while they teach us little about his psychological theory that we could not have guessed, it is interesting to find him paying so much attention to Plato's arguments. Boethus' view of oikeiosis was shared by Xenarchus of Seleucia, who taught philosophy successively in Alexandria, Athens and Rome, numbering Strabo the geographer among his pupils, and was a friend of Areius Didymus and the emperor Augustus. 202 We also have his definition of the soul, in which he maintained that it is a form but emphasised its closeness to and dependence on the body, 2 0 3 and we hear that Alexander criticised his eccentric interpretation of Aristotle's "passive reason", which he is said to have identified with pure matter. M O R A U X thinks that this must have been an attempt to reduce Aristotle's doctrine ad absurdum, but he may have been feeling his way towards an interpretation like that later given by Aristotle of Mytilene; this would certainly accord with the materialistic tendency of his teaching about the soul. 2 0 4 But his most interesting work seems to have been a critique of Aristotle's belief that the heavens were composed of a 'fifth substance' with properties fundamentally different from those of the elements found in the sublunary world. 205 His arguments were aimed at Theophrastus as well as Aristotle and had a considerable influence on later thinkers. One of his suggestions, that rectilinear movement 'up' or 'down' is natural to sublunary elements only as long as they are not 201

Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. 1 . 1 4 . 2 0 , where we are told that Boethus held that the soul consists o f air and fire, is a case in point. This report certainly refers to the Stoic ( = fr. 10 in S V F ) and comes near the end of a jejune doxographic list derived from the 'Vetusta Placita', i.e. a layer o f the tradition strongly influenced by Stoicism. It has nothing whatever to do with P o r p h y r y . Cf. DIELS, D o x o g r . G r . 2 1 3 .

202

Strabo 1 4 . 5 . 4 p. 6 7 0 C ; see above, p. 1 1 1 7 ; also DIELS, D o x o g r . G r . 100, MORAUX, Arist.

203

Aetius 4 . 3 . 1 0 ( D o x o g r . G r . p. 3 8 8 ) Ξεναρχος . . . την κατά το είδος τελειότητα καί

197 ff. εντελεχειαν καθ' έαυτην οΰσαν άμα καί μετά του σώματος συντεταγμένην. N o t e that this comes in the chapter devoted to theories which make the soul a material entity; Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is entelecheia

is included in the previous chapter (p. 3 8 7 .

1 ff.), in which non-materialistic theories are enumerated. 204

Alex. A p h r . ap. Philop., In de an. (versio Latina) ed. G . VERBERE ( C o r p u s

Latinum

C o m m e n t a t o r u m in Aristotelem G r a e c o r u m 3, Louvain—Paris 1 9 6 6 ) 15 line 6 5 : autem

Alexander

deceptum

quod, Aritoteles

potentia

solum

intellectum

fuisse ab his et suspicatum fuisse quodprimam

dicit esse . . .

materiam

diceret Ar.

Dicit

Xenarchum intellectum.

F o r Aristotle of Mytilene see below, p. 1 1 6 0 f f . C f . MOVÍA, A n i m a e Intelletto 2 0 4 f f . , MORAUX, Arist. 2 0 7 f . 205

It

w a s

contained in a b o o k entitled Π ρ ο ς την πεμπτην ούσίαν, extracts of which have

been preserved in Simplicius' c o m m e n t a r y on Aristotle's ' D e Cáelo' (see the index for references); an isolated quotation occurs in Julian I m p . , O r . 8 (5) c. 3. X e n a r c h u s ' interpretation o f an obscure sentence of Plato's 'Timaeus' (30 c 5 —7), mentioned by Proclus, In T i m . I 4 2 5 . 2 3 ff. DIEHL, may have c o m e from the same w o r k . See further MORAUX, Arist. 1 9 8 f f . , SAMBURSKY, Physical W o r l d of Late Antiquity ( L o n d o n 1956) 124ff. 74' 1

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in their natural place, but that after they have attained it, they either remain at rest or move in a circle, was adopted by Alexander, Plotinus and Claudius Ptolemaeus (the astronomer); later his objections were taken up and embellished by Philoponus in a book in which he set out to refute Aristotle's notion of the eternity of the world. 2 0 6 But while this makes it reasonably certain that Xenarchus believed that the heavenly bodies are composed of fiery stuff, most of his arguments are negative, a point-by-point refutation of those used by Aristotle in the 'De Cáelo' (1.2 ff.) to establish the existence and character of the 'fifth substance'. Xenarchus' own views are only mentioned incidentally, as possibilities. 2 0 7 The same characteristics are found in Strato's arguments against Plato's proofs of the immortality of the soul, 2 0 8 and since Strato also abandoned the doctrine of the fifth element, it is at least possible that Xenarchus was under his influence. Alternatively we may suppose, with MORAUX, that Xenarchus was influenced by Stoics. T w o features of his thought point in this direction: he seems to have accepted the concept of 'natural places' and the notion that fire and air have a natural upward movement, and the existence of void outside the universe. Both ideas had been rejected by Strato but incorporated into the Stoic system. 2 0 9 The last of the 'early commentators' was Aristón of Alexandria, 2 1 0 originally a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalum and his brother Aristus, who subsequently transferred to the Peripatos. Apart from his comments on the 'Categories', only one fragment remains which is universally agreed to be his: a report in the Apuleian 'De interpretatione' that he introduced five 'subaltern' moods of the syllogism, three in the first figure and two in the second, by substituting particular for universal conclusions in those moods which can yield universal conclusions. 2 1 1 His innovation implies a knowledge of the 'indirect' moods

206

207

208

209

210

211

Simpl., In de Cael. 20. lOff., 2 5 . 2 3 f f . , 42.17ff. On Xenarchus' influence see further MORAUX, Arist. 212ff., with references to ancient sources and modern discussions. This is true even of the argument reported by Julian, Or. 8 (5) 3 : the point seems to be that Aristotle and Theophrastus postulated both a "fifth substance" endowed with natural circular movement and an "incorporeal intelligible substance" to explain the rotation of the heavens, but each renders the other superfluous. Xenarchus himself seems to have believed in neither and his argument is purely dialectical. Strato fr. 1 2 2 - 1 2 7 WEHRLI =

13-16

GOTTSCHALK; see m y c o m m e n t s

ad loc. (p.

165)

and above, p. 1118. Some of Strato's arguments against the Atomist conception of void (fr. 61 — 72 WEHRLI) seem to have had the same dialectical character. Xenarchus ap. Simpl., In de Cael. 20. lOff., 2 1 . 3 2 f f . , etc.; 2 8 6 . 2 f f . Strato fr. 5 0 - 5 3 , 5 4 - 5 5 WEHRLI; SVF 2.434, 555 etc.; 534ff. See above pp. 1094f., 1110. Comprehensive treatments by I. MARIOTTI, Aristone di Alessandria (Bologna 1966), with a collection of testimonia and fragments, MORAUX, Arist. 181 — 193, and, for the background, FRASER, Ptolemaic Alexandria (Oxford 1972) I 489, II 7 0 8 . Apul., D e interpr. 13 ad fin., p. 1 9 3 . 1 6 - 2 0 THOMAS = Aristón fr. 4 M . ; cf. MARIOTTI p. 59ff., PRANTL I 557, M. W. SULLIVAN, Apuleian Logic (Amsterdam 1967) 96f., 165f., MORAUX, Arist. 186ff.; MORAUX and SULLIVAN, refer to other literature and alternative interpretations. The text is defective: the best manuscripts give the name of the author of

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of the first figure discovered by Theophrastus; like the other early commentators, Aristón used the work of Aristotle's early followers as well as the master himself. Much more questionable is the attribution to Aristón of the list of nineteen valid moods in the last chapter of Apuleius' b o o k ; 2 1 2 it takes no account of the extra moods he introduced, and it is inherently unlikely that the author should have taken the whole of his concluding chapter, which sums up his own teaching on the syllogism, from an earlier source. Very doubtful too is the attribution to our Aristón of two definitions, of 'art' and 'grammar', ascribed to an unspecified Aristón by Marius Victorinus. 2 1 3 Lastly a fragment dealing with the nature of the soul, previously attributed to the Stoic Aristón of Chios or the third-century B C Peripatetic Aristón of C e o s , has recently been claimed for our philosopher by A . G R I L L I . 2 1 4 TWO faculties of the soul are distinguished, sensation, dependent on the sense-organs, and intellect, operating independently of any physical organ. This is certainly not Stoic, and G R I L L I has demonstrated that it belongs to a Platonic or Peripatetic ambience. But Aristón is a common name, and while the attribution to the Alexandrian philosopher is attractive, it cannot be regarded as certain.

III. Compendia

and

compilations

The explosion of Aristotelian studies following the publication of Andronicus' edition was succeeded by a lull. While we know the names of many so-called Peripatetics, few are associated with any notable contribution to Aristo-

212

213

214

this theory as A r i s t o t e l e s instead of A r i s t o , and something seems to have dropped out after suggérant in line 17; see MORAUX 186 for a possible emendation. C . 14 p. 193.21 ff. THOMAS, printed continuously with the last part cf. c. 13 as fr. 4 by MARI OTTI; cf. MARI OTTI p. 66 ff., SULLIVAN 140, MORAUX, Arist. 190f. In the manuscripts Aristotle is named as the authority, but the name has been changed to A r i s t o by PRANTL (I 590 n. 23) and the latest editor, P. THOMAS. Even if the change is correct, it would not justify our attributing more than this one sentence (lines 24—27) to Aristón. Marius Victorinus, Ars gramm. 1, G r a m m . Lat. IV 3 . 7 f f . = fr. 6 - 7 M . ; cf. MARIOTTI p. 75ff. The ascription is supported by V. DI BENEDETTO, Demetrio Cloro e Aristone di Alessandria, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Lettere, Storia e Filosofia) II 35 (1966) 323f., but denied by MORAUX, Arist. I92f., who finds that the definitions in question are based on Stoic formulae; the fragments have been claimed for Aristón of Chios (the Stoic) by W. SCHMID, Nachtrag zu den Fragmenta Stoicorum veterum, Philologus 69 (1910) 440ff. and Α. Μ. IOPPOLO, Aristone di Chio e lo Stoicismo antico (Coll. Elenchos 1, Napoli 1980) 279ff. From Porphyry, O n the faculties of the soul, ap. Stob. 1.49.24, p. 348 W. See A. GRILLI, U n frammento d'Aristone Alessandrino in Porfirio, Giorn. It. di Filologia 23 (1971) 292—307; note that the introductory sentence (p. 347.21—24) belongs to Porphyry, not Aristón. Earlier attributions: Aristón of Chios, v. ARNIM, S V F 1.377; Aristón of Ceos, ZELLER II 2, 926 η. 3, L . EDELSTEIN, rev. of WEHRLI (ed.), Demetrios v. Phaleron etc., A J P 76 (1955) 418f., MOVÍA, Anima e Intelletto 150ff., IOPPOLO, Aristone 272ff.

1122

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GOTTSCHALK

telianism until well into the second century AD. From the intervening period we have some sporadic remarks, preserved in the late commentaries on Aristotle, which may have come from fairly elementary lecture-courses 215 — they would have been inept in any other context — and several compendia of Peripatetic doctrine which are still extant, wholly or in part. A few are by known authors, but most are anonymous or have come down under false names; the 'De mundo' even gained admission to the corpus of Aristotle's works. From these and the writings of outsiders, Stoics, Platonists or interested non-philosophers like Claudius Ptolemaeus and Galen, we can learn something of the Aristotelianism of the time. These sources present us with a different view from those we used in the last section. Instead of the technical debates taking place within the school they show its outward face and the impression it made on contemporaries. The most wide-ranging of these compendia was one written by Nicolaus of Damascus, who lived from c. 64 until after 4 B C . 2 1 6 A courtier and adviser to Herod the Great, Nicolaus is best known to-day as a historian, but most ancient sources refer to him as a philosopher and Peripatetic, and only his philosophical writings continued to circulate in the Near East after the collapse of the Roman empire. We can learn something about the man from his autobiography which, although stylised to present the conventional image of the Philosopher, includes some revealing details. 217 Thus he tells us that he was attracted to Aristotle by the variety of his learning (F 132.2), a statement borne out by the wide range of Nicolaus' literary production. One of his works in particular, the 'Ethon Synagoge', a collection of strange tribal customs, belongs to a genre much cultivated in the Hellenistic Peripatos, and much of its material may have been derived from the Aristotelian Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά. His view of his own character, too, was to some extent modelled on Aristotelian principles; many of the virtues which he liberally attributes to himself were taken from 215

E . g . that of Apollonius of Alexandria quoted by Simpl., In C a t . 1 8 8 . 1 6 f f . See further ZELLER III 1, 8 0 5 f f . η. 2, where the information we have about Apollonius and many others w h o will not be mentioned here has been collected.

216

T h e testimonies for his life and historical fragments, including the Έ θ ώ ν συναγωγή ( F 103 — 124) and autobiography ( F 131 — 139) have been collected by F . JACOBY, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ( F G r H i s t ) (Berlin 1923) c. 9 0 . The remains of the first five books of his Π ε ρ ί της 'Αριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας have been edited by H . J . DROSSAART LULOFS, Nicolaus Damascenus on the Philosophy of Aristotle (Leiden

2

1 9 6 9 ) ; testimonies for

Nicolaus' philosophical writing are given on p. 7—14 and a survey of the oriental sources on pp. 6, 3 5 f f . and 171ff. The fullest edition of the A r a b o - L a t i n version of the ' D e plantis', wrongly attributed to Aristotle, is by E . H . F . MEYER (Leipzig 1 8 4 1 ) and there is another by BUSSEMAKER in vol. 4 p. 16—44 o f the Didot edition of Aristotle (Paris 1857). T h e Arabic version was discovered in 1 9 2 3 ; see MORAUX, Arist. 4 8 7 f . , n. 4 and 8, for details o f publication. A bastard Greek version, a retranslation of the A r a b o - L a t i n one made in the 14th century, is printed as Aristotle's in most of the collected editions of his works and in APELT'S Teubner edition o f his minor works (Leipzig 1888). See further MORAUX, Arist. 4 4 5 - 5 1 4 , w h o gives references to other literature. 217

It has been analysed by G . MISCH, Gesch. d. Autobiographie I 3 ( F r a n k f u r t / M .

1949)

3 2 1 — 3 2 9 . Some of its themes, e.g. " y o u t h f u l p r o m i s e " , reappear in Nicolaus' biography of Augustus ( F 132 ~

F 127 init.).

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the descriptions of good characters in Aristotle's 'Ethics'. 2 1 8 But his self-praise also contains another element belonging more nearly to his own time. He lays considerable stress on his endurance of toil (πόνος), both in literary composition and generally in bearing life's burdens, and boasts that he preferred the company of good simple folk to that of the rich aristocrats of Rome, who were led into evil ways by their wealth. This reflects Stoic and Cynic rather than Peripatetic attitudes, but would have found a favourable hearing in many circles in the early years of the Roman empire. 219 Nicolaus' most important philosophical work was a compendium of Aristotle's teaching, of which a brief epitome has survived in a Syriac manuscript at Cambridge, as well as sundry fragments from both Greek and oriental sources. 220 Since the Syriac version has suffered severely both from compression and interpolation, it is not easy to gain a clear idea of the original, but basically it was a systematic summary of Aristotle's natural philosophy, including the psychological and biological writings, and metaphysics. In general Nicolaus followed the order of Andronicus' edition, but there were some divergences: the 'Metaphysics' was dealt with immediately after the 'Physics', in books 2—3; then came the 'De cáelo', G C and 'Meteorologica' (books 4—7), followed by the HA, PA, 'De anima', some of the 'Parva Naturalia' and the GA (books 8 — 13); the extant 'De plantis' may have come at the end of the same work. 2 2 1 A certain amount of simplification, shortening and rearrangement were necessitated by the character of the work. If Aristotle discussed a point in several different places, Nicolaus combined all the relevant material in one treatment; in particular the definitions collected in Metaph. Δ were inserted as appropriate in the summaries of other books. 2 2 2 Where Aristotle's discussion was incomplete, Nicolaus tried to find extra material elsewhere in the Corpus or in the works of 218 219

220

221

222

F 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 ; cf. MISCH 326, w h o quotes parallels from Aristotle. π ό ν ο ς και καρτερία, F 137.2, cf. 135; dangers of wealth, F 138. In Aristotle's writings the word π ό ν ο ς is never used with any moral significance and καρτερία means the power to resist temptations of pleasure and pain ( E N 1145a35ff., 1150 a 9ff.); for the wider meaning it has in Nicolaus' fragments, see SVF 3.264—265, 269 etc.; Musonius ap. Stob. 3.29.75 (p. 643ff. H ) etc.; cf. Cie., Tuse. 2.35; POHLENZ, Stoa I 301 etc. In ps-Ar., W 1250 b 6ff. we find an interesting double usage: at b 6, φ ι λ ο π ο ν ί α and καρτερία are coupled as forms of courage (ανδρεία); a few lines later, at b 8 το καρτερεϊν καί το ύπομονητικόν είναι της κατά φύσιν ένδειας καί λύπης are said to be effects of èvκράτεια. These passages are repeated by ps-Andronicus Περί π α θ ώ ν p. 249.94, 253.22 GLIBERT-THIRRY; the second comes close to Aristotle's genuine usage, while the first is a Stoicising addition. The virtue of hard labour in literary composition is a commonplace among Latin writers. The first five books of the Syriac compendium have been edited by DROSSAART LULOFS (see above, n. 216), with the other extant fragments inserted in their proper place. U n fortunately these books have suffered even more from compression than the later ones. These and some other known fragments are still unedited. The evidence for this is that the Cambridge manuscript ends with a single leaf containing some sentences from the 'De plantis'; unfortunately the leaf containing the heading of the book to which this fragment belonged has been lost. S e e DROSSAART LULOFS 3 0 f f .

1124

Η . Β. G O T T S C H A L K

other members of the school, especially Theophrastus, to fill it out. His work reveals a thorough knowledge of Aristotle's writings, and we have already seen that he used at least two books unknown to Andronicus, the so-called 'Metaphysics' ά and Theophrastus' 'Metaphy sica'. 223 The purpose of these additions was to allow the exposition to flow smoothly. Nicolaus tried to bring out Aristotle's meaning by paraphrasing and where necessary simplifying the original, 224 but there is hardly any direct exegesis, at least in the Syriac epitome. We have only one fragment in which Nicolaus tries to interpret Aristotle, preserved, in Greek, by Porphyry; here he asks what is meant by "parts" of the soul and concludes that this expression must refer to the soul's "powers" or faculties, because the soul is not a magnitude which can be literally divided into parts. 2 2 5 The question was important to Platonists in particular, 226 and Nicolaus may have been acquainted with their debates, but his motive for raising it need have been nothing more than a desire to explain Aristotle's use of the term, and his answer is orthodox. Even his readiness to treat thinking as on a par with other psychic activities like sensation and desire, has parallels in the fragments of Theophrastus and Strato, as well as Andronicus, Boethus and later Peripatetics. 227 Averroes, who objected to Nicolaus' rearrangement of Aristotle's arguments in the 'Physics' and 'Metaphysics' (T 7), admitted that the account he gave of the mind was faithful to Aristotle's teaching (T 9.2), and contrasts him with Alexander in this respect. Nicolaus' intention was to give a true account of Aristotle's doctrine and he made no attempt to modernise or reinterpret it. Most of the other philosophical titles attributed to Nicolaus in ancient or mediaeval sources seem to refer to portions of this work which had become detached and circulated separately. 228 Probable exceptions are an ethical work entitled Περί των έν τοις πρακτικούς καλών of which we are only told that it was bulky and diffuse, 2 2 9 one entitled Περί των θεών from which two doxographical remarks are extant, concerning the views of Xenophanes and Empedocles, 230 and one called Περί του παντός, presumably a description of the universe, of which only the title survives (Τ 1). Finally two Arabic sources mention

223

See above, n. 107. A reminiscence of Theophrastus' 'Metaphysica' occurs in the opening chapter of Nicolaus' book, cf. DROSSAART LULOFS 98 f. Some of the later, as yet unpublished, books may contain more non-Aristotelian additions, and this is certainly true of the 'De plantis', most of which is based on Theophrastus' H P and CP; see H . J. DROSSAART LULOFS, Aristotle's π. φυτών, JHS 77 (1957) 75ff. and MORAUX, Arist. 487ff.

224

C f . DROSSAART LULOFS 1 5 3 f . , o n F 2 9 .

225

Ap. Stob. 1.49.25 a, p. 353.12 - 354.4 W = Τ 9.1; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 481 ff. It is generally assumed, but not quite certain, that this fragment comes from the Περί της 'Αριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας. Aristotle refers to μόρια της ψυχής at D e an. 402 b 9 f f . , etc. 226 See Porph. ap. Stob. 1 p. 3 5 0 . 9 f f . , and MORAUX I.e. 227 Stob. p. 354.1; cf. Theophr. fr. 53 WIMMER, Strato fr. 74 WEHRLI, both from Simpl., In Phys. 964.30ff., and above, p. 1113ff. 228 The testimonia have been collected by DROSSAART LULOFS 7ff.; see his comments, 14ff. 229 γ 2 D—L, cf. his comments, p. 16. 230

Τ 4 , c f . DROSSAART LULOFS 1 7 , M O R A U X , A r i s t . 4 5 1 f f .

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a polemical work against 'Those who claim action to be identical with being acted upon' or T h o s e who claim the intellect to be identical with the intelligible'; 2 3 1 it is not clear how this work was related to the O n Aristotle's philosophy.' These fragments do not alter our opinion of Nicolaus. H e was a savant rather than a philosopher, but with a genuine interest in Aristotle's thought. While he evidently had no taste for formal logic, his enthusiasm embraced the scientific and biological treatises which his contemporaries tended to ignore and led him to undertake some independent research into the Aristotelian canon and the history of philosophy. H e may have helped to reestablish the tradition of learned studies which had been so important in Aristotle's school, and which was continued by several later Peripatetics. While Nicolaus' compendium was the work of a professed follower of Aristotle and no doubt had a propagandistic purpose, the summary of Peripatetic doctrine compiled by Areius Didymus was part of a wider scheme, nothing less than a digest of the teaching of the three main schools of philosophy, Academy. Peripatos and Stoa, and possibly of the Epicureans as well. Areius, a native of Alexandria, was a Stoic who inherited something of the eclecticism of Antiochus of Ascalum; he was also a friend of the Peripatetic Xenarchus. Much of his life was spent at Rome, where he was tutor, in literature as well as philosophy, to Octavian. His dates are not known exactly, but since his sons joined in the tutorials he gave the future emperor, he must have been a generation older, and he was still alive in 9 B C , when he wrote a consolation for Livia on the death of D r u s u s . 2 3 2 His 'Epitome' consisted of a preface on the parts of philosophy and their sub-divisions, followed by a summary exposition of the doctrines of each of the schools under the heads of logic, natural philosophy and ethics. Only a small part has survived: 2 3 3 a fragment on Plato's Ideas (fr. 1 DIELS), seventeen from the section on Peripatetic physics (fr. 2 — 17, + 1 4 a) and twenty-three on Stoic physics (fr. 1 8 — 4 0 ) ; that part of the preface which dealt with ethics (Stob. 2 pp. 3 7 — 5 7 ) and the sections on Stoic and Peripatetic ethics (pp. 5 7 — 1 1 6 — 1 5 2 ) . These sections, as found in Stobaeus, are continuous and complete in themselves, but it is not known how much, if anything, Stobaeus has omitted. There are some obvious differences between the parts dealing with Stoics and Peripatetics; Areius often cites the opinions of different Stoics on the same subject, but attributes all Peripatetic doctrines to Aristotle or his followers as a whole, with only occasional references to

231

Τ 5 . 4 c , 5 c (DROSSAART LULOFS

10).

Suet., Aug. 89, Seneca, Cons, ad Marc. 4 . 2 f f . , Strabo 14.5.4 p. 6 7 0 C . For general information on Areius see DIELS, Doxographi Graeci 69—88; ZELLER III 1, 635—639; MORAUX, Arist. 259—443, with a very full discussion of earlier literature; FRASER, Ptolemaic Alexandria I 490f., II 710ff.; W. W. FORTENBAUGH (ed.), O n Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: the work of Ar. Did. (New Brunswick 1983) (a collection of papers presented at a symposium in 1981). 233 The physical fragments have been edited by DIELS, Doxogr. 447— 472, and analysed by MORAUX, Arist. 277—305, who discusses the Aristotelian and other parallels. The ethical excerpts are in Stobaeus 2.7 p. 37—152 W. 232

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Η. Β. GOTTSCHALK

Theophrastus. Yet there is evidence that he must have used s o m e later sourcematerial. T h e difference may be due to his source or to the fact that, as a Stoic, he t o o k a greater interest in the development of the teaching of his own school. N o r is the relationship of the extant fragments to Aristotle's treatises uniform. Some of them, especially the long fragments on meteorology (fr. 11 — 14), are very close to the corresponding chapters of Aristotle and include passages that have been virtually transcribed w o r d for w o r d ; the only changes are those due to compression and the need to fit Aristotle's doctrine into a systematic h a n d b o o k , and s o m e modernisation of the technical vocabulary, including the use of s o m e terms which can be traced to P o s i d o n i u s . 2 3 4 O t h e r fragments reflect Aristotle's teaching accurately enough, but have been ruthlessly abbreviated. B u t when dealing with subjects which Aristotle had not discussed in detail, Areius was prepared to take his material f r o m others, especially T h e o p h r a s t u s , 2 3 5 and m o s t interestingly, s o m e doctrines which are basically Aristotelian have been given a f o r m Aristotle w o u l d not have accepted. This applies particularly to matters of philosophical rather than purely scientific interest which continued to be debated in the Hellenistic and R o m a n eras. Examples are the doctrine of mixture in fr. 4 2 3 6 ; the description of the First M o v e r of the universe as " A rational and blessed living being, sustaining the heavenly bodies and exercising providence on their b e h a l f " , 2 3 7 a c o m p r o m i s e between Aristotelian and Stoic notions sometimes ascribed to Critolaus; and s o m e of the fragments about sensation and phantasia (fr. 15—7). In one of these it is said that sensation and intellect are the " c r i t e r i a " , respectively, of sensible and intelligible objects. A s a general statement of Aristotle's position this is true enough, but Areius has formulated it in the

T h e attempt of P. STEINMETZ, D i e Physik des Theophrast (Bad H o m b u r g etc. 1964) 196 ff. to show that there are substantial differences between Areius and Aristotle, and that they are due to the influence of Theophrastus, has not been successful; see m y review of his b o o k in G n o m o n 39 (1967) 22 and MORAUX, Arist. 289 ff. 235 § e e especially fr. 14a, on the flavours of water; cf. STEINMETZ 2 7 4 f f . , GOTTSCHALK, G n o m o n I.e. and MORAUX, Arist. 2 9 7 f f . , with reservations.

234

236

T h e fragment is over-compressed and textually corrupt, but MORAUX, Arist. 280 ff. has shown that it can be regarded as a reasonable account of Aristotle's teaching as seen through the eyes of a Stoic. H o w e v e r , it may contain a reminiscence of the idea developed by Theophrastus and Strato, that interactions between bodies can only take place if they first interpenetrate, i.e. the particles (μόρια) of one enter the 'pores' of the other; cf. GOTTSCHALK, The Authorship of Meteorologica, B o o k IV, C Q 55 (1961) 6 8 f f . and Strato (see above, n. 173) 145 f.

237

Fr. 9 p. 4 5 0 . 1 5 D ζωον λογικόν καί μ α κ ά ρ ι ο ν , σ υ ν ε κ τ ι κ ό ν καί π ρ ο ν ο η τ ι κ ό ν των ο υ ρ α ν ί ω ν . MORAUX, Arist. 286 n. 46 cites parallels from later authors, w h o say explicitly that the supreme g o d ' s providence extends only to the heavenly spheres and does not embrace the sublunary part of the world; one of them, Epiphanius, A d v . Haeres. 3. 31—35 ( D o x o g r . p. 592) attributes this view to Theophrastus, Praxiphanes and Critolaus, as well as Aristotle. This interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine has a wide currency in the doxographical tradition, f r o m Aetius (2.3.4) to Calcidius (In T i m . 250, p. 2 6 0 . 7 f f . WASZINK), and a m o n g Christian writers. A similar conception of god is f o u n d in (Ar.) D e m u n d o c. 6, but here his providence is said to extend to the sublunary regions, although in an attenuated f o r m ; see below, p. 1133 ff.

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terminology used in the debates of the Hellenistic schools. 2 3 8 We shall meet many of these formulations again; in spite of Andronicus' edition of the original texts, they remained current throughout the period with which we are concerned. The same tendency can be observed in the compendium of ethics. 2 3 9 It contains virtually nothing that Aristotle would not have countenanced and much of what Areius says has close parallels in the writings of the Aristotelian corpus. The system of thought he expounds is not only Peripatetic but specifically Aristotelian in most essential points, and he not only excludes the doctrines of other schools but even rejects some late Peripatetic innovations, e. g. a definition of happiness due to Critolaus which seemed to give too exalted a status to material goods; 2 4 0 the only authority besides Aristotle to be quoted with approval is Theophrastus (p. 140.7). But the form in which this doctrine is presented is quite unlike anything in the genuine works of Aristotle. Much of the terminology belongs to the Hellenistic period and some is clearly of Stoic origin. Many pages are taken up with lists of definitions or elaborate classifications of terms; one similar collection, the 'De virtutibus et vitiis', is found in the Aristotelian corpus, but this work is certainly spurious, a school product of the Hellenistic or Roman era. 2 4 1 More significant is a shift of perspective. Many of the questions to which Areius gave a central place were treated as marginal or not raised at all by Aristotle. W e have seen already how Areius attributes a formal definition of pathos to Aristotle. 2 4 1 a Another case in point is the doctrine of oikeiosis. In the most elaborately argued chapter of the whole treatise, an attempt is made to derive morality from the instinctive self-love and desire for the preservation of its own self and for the fullest development of its potentialities innate in every human being. This was a central doctrine of Stoic ethics and several

238

F r . 16, cf. MORAUX, Arist. 3 0 2 . T h e same position, with some embellishments, is attributed to Aristotle and Theophrastus by Sextus E m p . , A d v . Math. 7 . 2 1 7 — 2 2 6 .

239

Stob. 2 p. 1 1 6 — 1 5 2 . It has been the subject of much scholarly debate in this century, the most recent and fullest analysis being that of MORAUX, Arist. 3 1 6 — 4 3 4 , w h o gives full references t o earlier discussions. T h e most important o f these are by H . v. ARNIM, Arius D i d y m u s ' A b r i ß d. peripatetischen Ethik, SBWien 2 0 4 ( 1 9 2 6 ) no. 3 ; M . POHLENZ, Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie, A b h . d. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen (phil.-hist. Kl. III) 2 6 ( 1 9 4 0 ) 2 7 f f . ; F . DIRLMEIER, Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts,

Philologus

Suppl. 3 0 . 1 ( 1 9 3 7 ) 7 9 f f . ; M . GIUSTA, I dossografi di etica (Turin 1 9 6 4 - 6 7 ) I 2 7 6 f f . etc. See also the volume edited by FORTENBAUGH (above, n. 2 3 2 ) . M o s t of these and other scholars have concentrated on trying to determine Areius' sources, a question which belongs to the history of the Hellenistic Peripatos and falls outside the scope of the present survey. 240

Stob. 2 p. 46. lOff. ( =

Critolaus fr. 19 WEHRLI), 1 2 6 . 1 2 f f . , cf. 1 2 9 . 1 9 f f . See further

MORAUX, Arist. 3 2 8 with n. 2 8 and the literature he cites. 241

See below, p. 1 1 2 9 f . A n o t h e r w o r k o f the same kind is the so-called 'Aristotelian divisions', on which see V . ROSE, Arist. Pseudepigraphus (Leipzig 1863 etc.) 6 7 7 f f . ;

H.

MUTSCHMANN, in the preface of his edition (Leipzig 1 9 0 7 ) ; P. BOUDREAUX, U n nouveau manuscrit des 'Divisiones Aristoteleae', Rev. de Philol. 33 ( 1 9 0 9 ) 2 2 1 — 2 2 4 ; and P. MORAUX, Témoins méconnus des Divisiones Aristoteleae, L'Antiquité Classique 4 6 ( 1 9 7 7 ) 100-127. 24la

A b o v e , p. 1115.

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attempts have been made to trace it back to the Peripatos. T w o contemporaries of Areius, Boethus and Xenarchus, claimed to find it in the 'Nicomachean Ethics' and more recently some scholars have argued that its originator was T h e o p h r a s t u s ; 2 4 2 but this remains uncertain. Another question given greater prominence than in Aristotle's writings is that of the status of bodily and external goods, health, wealth etc.: all Peripatetics agreed, against the Stoics, that there can be no happiness (ευδαιμονία) without them, but are they an integral part of the happiness which is the end of life, as Critolaus thought, or merely a necessary pre-condition? 2 4 3 In the chapter on politics Areius recognised the 'mixed' constitution in addition to the six types, three good and three bad, acknowledged by Aristotle. This kind of constitution, although mentioned by Dicaearchus, only became prominent in political theory during the later H e l lenistic period, particularly in the work of Polybius, who saw the R o m a n state as its perfect embodiment; his view was taken up by C i c e r o . 2 4 4 Its mention here could be due to Areius himself, perhaps in deference to his R o m a n audience. In all these ways Areius adapted Aristotle's ideas to the preoccupations of his own time, but he did not try to obliterate the differences between the Aristotelian and other philosophies. T h e questions he posed and the form in which he stated the answers were Hellenistic and largely Stoic, but the essentially Aristotelian character of the answers is not in doubt, and in some cases the difference between Peripatetic and Stoic views is stated explicitly. 2 4 5 T h e only important exception seems to be a passage where Areius suggests that Aristotle would have countenanced suicide in some circumstances. 2 4 6 T h e Hellenistic character of Areius' compilation is borne out by its resemblance to the summary of Peripatetic ethics in Cicero's ' D e finibus', which is so close that it has often been thought that both may be derived from the same s o u r c e . 2 4 7 While Areius almost certainly wrote after the publication of

242

Areius p. 1 1 8 - 1 2 4 . Stoics: S V F 1 7 8 f f „ C i e . , Fin. 3 . 5 . 1 6 f f „ cf. POHLENZ, Stoa I I 6 4 f f . F o r Boethus and X e n a r c h u s see above, p.

1117. T h e doctrine of oikeiosis

has been

attributed to Theophrastus by v. ARNIM 131 ff., DIRLMEIER 7 9 f f . , REGENBOGEN R E Suppl. V I I ( 1 9 4 0 ) 1 4 9 4 ; contra POHLENZ, Grundfragen 2 7 f f . See further MORAUX, Arist. 3 1 6 f f . ; H . GÖRGEMANS, in FORTENBAUGH (above, Η. 2 3 2 ) 1 6 5 f f . , with the c o m m e n t s o f B . INWOOD, ibid. 1 9 0 f f . ; also N .

P. WHITE, ibid. 72 and ID., T h e basis of Stoic ethics,

H S C P 83 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 1 4 3 f f . , w h o tries to distinguish between a peripatetic doctrine of

oikei-

osis found here and in C i e . , Fin. 5 . 9 . 2 4 f f . , and a Stoic one found in C i e . , Fin. 3 . 5 . 1 6 f f . and elsewhere. 243

See above, n. 2 4 0 .

244

Areius p. 1 5 1 . 1 ; cf. Dicaearchus fr. 71 WEHRLI; Polybius 6 . 3 ,

10, l l f f . ; C i e . ,

Rep.

I . 2 9 . 4 5 , 4 5 . 6 9 f f . ; some Stoics also favoured this kind of constitution, according to Diog. Laert. 7 . 1 3 1 . Cf. MORAUX, Arist. 4 2 7 f f . w h o refers to modern literature in n. 3 6 6 . 245

E . g . p. 3 8 . 1 8 f f . on the definition of πάθος (see above, p. 1115). M o r e examples can be found by comparing the discussions of the same topics in the Stoic and Peripatetic sections of Areius' b o o k . O n 'contamination' in Areius cf. WHITE in: FORTENBAUGH 71 f.

246 247

P . 1 2 6 . 2 f f . , cf. MORAUX, Arist. 3 2 7 f . C i e . , Fin. 5 . 9 . 2 4 f f . , cf. 4 . 7 . 1 6 f f . ; see the commentaries ad loc. and MORAUX, Arist. 3 3 3 f f . , w h o refers to other literature. Cicero's source seems to have been Antiochus of Ascalum.

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Andronicus' edition and probably had some first-hand acquaintance with Aristotle's writings, 2 4 8 his use of them was at best sporadic, as one source among others and not necessarily the most important. In itself this is hardly surprising. His work was not a historical or critical essay but a handbook giving a comparative account of the current teaching of the chief schools of philosophy, written for a general audience. Some degree of systématisation was inevitable in the circumstances, and it was only natural that Areius should use the doctrine and method of his own school as the norm. What is interesting for our purpose is that summaries of this kind continued to circulate widely after Andronicus had made Aristotle's genuine writings accessible. The brief summary of Aristotelian philosophy included in Diogenes Laertius' 'Life of Aristotle' is based on similar material, 2 4 9 and many centuries later Stobaeus, who reproduced large extracts from Plato's dialogues in his anthology, relied on compilations of the same kind for most of his knowledge of Aristotle. It seems that Andronicus' rediscovery made a limited impact outside the circle of committed Aristotelians. The subject-matter of the other compendia is more limited. Two concerned with ethics have some affinity with Areius' 'Epitome', as well as being intimately linked: the pseudo-Aristotelian 'De virtutibus et vitiis' and the pseudo-Andronicean Περί παθών are catalogues of definitions similar to those which occupy a large part of Areius' work. The W contains nothing more than this. It begins with a list of eight cardinal virtues and the vices opposed to them; after they have been defined there follow chapters describing the behaviour consequent on each of them and listing their subordinate virtues or vices. 2 5 0 Most of the material is Aristotelian, although there are a few traces of Stoic influence, 2 5 1 but the work gives nothing like a full picture of Aristotle's ethics or even of his view of what constitutes virtue. The doctrine that virtue is a mean is not mentioned; 248

E . g . p. 52.10, where he gives a correct reference to the E N (1117 b 9) as his authority for saying that Eudoxus regarded pleasure as the end of life; contrast Cie., Fin. 5 . 5 . 1 2 and Diog. Laert. 8.88, both of whom refer to Nicomachus as the author of this work; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 313. Some of Areius' meteorological fragments could also be based on a direct reading of Aristotle's works.

249

Diog. Laert. 5 . 2 8 - 3 4 , cf. DÜRING, A B p. 50ff., 69ff. and P. MORAUX, L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristotle chez Diogène Laërce V, 28—34, Rev. Philos, de Louvain 47 (1949) 5 - 4 3 . Its most striking Hellenistic features are the ascription to Aristotle of the views that the intellect and the senses are the "criteria" for the knowledge of their respective objects, and that there is a providence limited to the heavenly spheres. Cf. Areius fr. 16 and 9 DIELS, and above, p. 1126. See also n. 14 above.

250

This tract has found its way into the Aristotelian corpus (p. 1249 a 26 —51 b 39 BEKKER) and is reproduced entire in Stobaeus' 'Anthology' (3, p. 137—148 HENSE); the best edition of the Greek text is by F. SUSEMIHL in the appendix to his Teubner edition of the 'Eudemian Ethics' (Leipzig 1884) and there is a German translation with full commentary by E. A . SCHMIDT (Berlin and Darmstadt 1965, in vol. 18 pt. 1 of the series published by the Deutsche Akademie); cf. the review by MORAUX, L'Antiquité Classique 36 (1967) 272 —274. Previous scholarly work is discussed by SCHMIDT 18ff. ; cf. GIUSTA, I dossografi di etica I 167 and GLIBERT-THIRRY (see below, n. 254) p. 5ff.

251

See above, n. 219.

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instead the virtues and vices are classified according to whether they concern the whole soul or one of its parts, on the basis of Plato's tripartition into reason, 'spirit' and appetite. 252 Its date is uncertain. ZELLER placed it in the "age of eclecticism", i.e. the first century BC or AD, and has been generally followed; SCHMIDT argues for a much earlier date, in the time of Theophrastus or his immediate followers, but his reasons are not entirely convincing and have not found acceptance. 253 The compilation ascribed to Andronicus is more complex. It falls into two parts, the Περί π α θ ώ ν proper, a catalogue of passions and εύπάθειαι, the good emotions which, according to the Stoics, a wise man might feel; and a considerably longer section on virtues and vices. 254 The first part is entirely Stoic, as is shown not only by the inclusion of εύπάθειαι, but by many close parallels in other sources. The second is a strange mixture of Peripatetic and Stoic material. It consists of a version of the 'De virtutibus et vitiis', with some rearrangements and a few verbal modifications. First come the chapters on the virtues, with lists of Stoic definitions intercalated between them; there follows a chapter headed Κατά Χρύσιππον, giving Chrysippus' definitions of phronesis and its subordinate virtues, 255 and then come the chapters on vices from the W , rearranged in the same way as those on virtues, but with no Stoic additions. The most interesting feature is the last chapter, which has been published by GLIBERT-THIRRY for the first time. It restates, very briefly, the doctrine that virtue is a mean, giving some examples and a reference to book two of the 'Nicomachean Ethics' (c. 2—6). Assuming that this chapter is genuine, 256 it tells

252

1 249 a 31 ff.

253

ZELLER I I I 1, 6 7 0 f . ; SCHMIDT 1 8 f . , 2 3 f f . e t c . O .

REGENBOGEN,

R E Suppl.

VII,

1546

finds that the purely descriptive method of this tract resembles that of Theophrastus' 'Characters' and seems inclined to posit a similar early date, but does not commit hims e l f . C o n t r a M O R A U X i n h i s r e v i e w o f SCHMIDT'S w o r k 254

255 256

a n d GLIBERT-THIRRY p .

7f.

Editions: pt. 1 by X. KREUTTNER (Heidelberg 1884); pt. 2 by C. SCHUCHHARDT (Darmstadt 1883); both with introductions and commentaries. The Greek text of both parts, together with the Latin version by Robert Grosseteste, has been reedited by A. GLIBERT-THIRRY (Leiden 1977) (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Arist. Graecorum, Suppl. 2); this edition includes a long introduction with very full information about the manuscripts, Greek and Latin, and a list of parallels. GLIBERT-THIRRY prints, for the first time, the final chapter of the work which SCHUCHHARDT unaccountably omitted. For other literature see GLIBERT-THIRRY 320ff.; cf. MORAUX, Arist. 138ff., GIUSTA II 236ff., 436ff. This chapter is omitted in the oldest manuscripts and bracketed by GLIBERT-THIRRY. It is only found in one Greek manuscript, Par. Coisl. 120 (C), dating from the tenth century, but this, as well as being the oldest extant manuscript, is the only one containing the last section (on vices) of our text. Grosseteste's version includes the first two lines of this chapter attached, without a break, to the end of the previous one, and then goes on to translate the last chapter of W (1251 b 2 6 - 3 9 ) , a piece of conventional uplift not found in any extant Greek manuscript of pseudo-Andronicus. The most likely explanation of this state of affairs is that the last chapter was mutilated (by mechanical damage) in the hyparchetype from which Grosseteste's exemplar was derived and some

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us s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e author. E v i d e n t l y h e w a s an Aristotelian w h o felt s o m e q u a l m s a b o u t the Stoic matter i n c l u d e d in his c o m p i l a t i o n , and perhaps e v e n about t h e sheer m i n d l e s s n e s s o f w r i t i n g o u t lists o f virtues w i t h o u t a n y reference t o the principles o n w h i c h t h e y d e p e n d . F o r this at least he deserves s o m e credit.257 W e have already m e n t i o n e d a r e w o r k i n g of the 'Categories' falsely attributed t o A r c h y t a s , a P y t h a g o r e a n o f the early f o u r t h c e n t u r y B C . T h e author divided his w o r k i n t o t w o separate essays, o n e c o v e r i n g t h e s a m e g r o u n d as the ' C a t e gories' p r o p e r ( i . e . cc. 1—9), the other that o f the 'Postpraedicamenta' (cc. 10—15); this m a y have b e e n d u e t o the i n f l u e n c e o f A n d r o n i c u s . 2 5 8 B u t different parts of his w o r k s h o w that he w a s also i n f l u e n c e d b y the o t h e r early c o m m e n tators, B o e t h u s , A t h e n o d o r u s and E u d o r u s . 2 5 9 Like t h e m , h e tried t o fill o u t the gaps in Aristotle's 'Categories' w i t h matter f r o m his o t h e r w r i t i n g s , 2 6 0 a l t h o u g h he d o e s n o t a l w a y s f o l l o w h i m exactly, and t o present his teaching in a clear and s y s t e m a t i c w a y , even if this i n v o l v e d s o m e rearrangement. H i s o w n standp o i n t c o m e s o u t m o s t clearly t o w a r d s the e n d w h e r e , after c o m p l e t i n g his s u r v e y

257

258

259

260

scribe, noticing the closeness of the text to W , substituted its last chapter in order to provide a more satisfactory ending. Cf. G L I B E R T - T H I R R Y p. 112ff. Some later manuscripts interpolate genuine Aristotelian sentences into the lists of later definitions; see G L I B E R T - T H I R R Y ' S apparatus criticus and lists of parallels on p. 231.81, 239.9 ( ~ Grosseteste p. 236.32ff.), 245.65f. These have no authority, but seem to have originated in marginal notes added by readers. Other interpolations in the same manuscripts read like typically inept Byzantine scholia: e.g. p. 257.51 f. Cf. G L I B E R T - T H I R R Y p. 107ff. See above, pp. 1099 ff., 1106 ff. They were entitled, respectively, Περί τώ καθόλου λόγω and Περί αντικειμένων; they were originally written in the Doric dialect, but all that is extant to-day is a koine version of the first and substantial fragments in Doric of both, the latter preserved by Simplicius and other commentators on the 'Categories'. The fragments of the Περί αντικείμενων have been edited by H . THESLEFF, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A: Humaniora. Humanistiska-Vetenskaper, Socialvetenskaper, Teologi 30,1, Abo 1965) 15—19; the Περί τώ καθόλου λόγω by T H E S L E F F 21—32 and T . A. SZLEZÁK, Ps-Archytas über die Kategorien, 34—57. T H E S L E F F tries to fuse the koine version with the Doric fragments in one text, but SZLEZÁK prints them separately on facing pages, and also has a detailed introduction and commentary, with full references to earlier discussions. See also P R A N T L I 615f., H . THESLEFF, An introduction to the Pyth. writings of the Hellenistic period (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A, 24, 3, Âbo 1961) 9 et passim. Another short work on the Aristotelian 'Categories' attributed to Archytas, entitled Καθολικοί λόγοι δέκα, edited by T H E S L E F F 3—8 and SZLEZÁK 61—68, is much later and falls outside the scope of this survey. S E E p R A N T L ; L . C . ; SZLEZÁK 14ff. His relationship with Eudorus needs further consideration: SZLEZÁK 17 and T H E I L E R , Unters, zur antiken Lit. 488ff. argue that it was close, but DÖRRIE, Platonica Minora 300f., points out that Eudorus seems to have been opposed to the introduction of Aristotelian doctrines into Platonism; cf. DILLON, Middle Platonists, 134f. These influences are the only real evidence for the date at which the work was composed: it must have been shortly after the time of the early commentators (cf. SZLEZÁK 153 ff.). T H E S L E F F ' S dating, on linguistic grounds, of this and all other pseudo-Pythagorica in the Hellenistic age, is untenable. E.g. on time and place, p. 29.5ff. TH., cf. SZLEZÁK, ad loc. 137f.

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Β.

GOTTSCHALK

of the categories, he allows himself a few more general reflections. First he says that the subjects of all the categories are concrete individuals, not (Platonic) Forms; only Substance can be used with reference to these. Here he takes a stand on an issue which seems to have troubled Platonists from the time they rediscovered the 'Categories' and was still debated by Plotinus and Porphyry. 2 6 1 Then, after a few remarks about affirmation and negation (i. e. the subject-matter of Aristotle's 'De interpretatione'), he goes on to say that man is the standard of knowledge, since he is endowed by nature with the capacity to enumerate the principles by means of which all things are known. All knowledge seeks to apprehend the infiniteness of reality by means of principles limited in number, and all number is comprised in the number ten, so it is reasonable that there should be ten kinds of being and predication, and that men should have ten fingers to count them with. 2 6 2 The author seems to be trying, in a rather muddled way, to use Pythagorean number mysticism to tie together Aristotle's doctrine of Categories and the notion that man has an innate capacity to know reality. Yet in spite of its mediocrity, this compilation has a twofold interest: as a reflection, however inadequate, of the results of the first phase of Aristotelian scholarship after the Andronicean revival, and as the earliest extant attempt to integrate Aristotelian logic with popular Platonism. The most interesting of all these compendia is the 'De mundo' which, like the 'De virtutibus et vitiis', gained admission to the corpus of Aristotle's writings. Like the rest it seems to have enjoyed considerable popularity; the greater part is reproduced in Stobaeus' anthology and there is a free Latin translation attributed to Apuleius, as well as Armenian, Syriac, three Arabic and two mediaeval Latin versions. 2 6 3 Unlike them, it has some merit to justify 261

262

263

P. 3 0 . 1 7 f f . TH.; the same point is made less forthrightly on p. 22.31 ff. Cf. Plot., Enn. 6.1.1—2; other ancient authorities are reported by Simpl., In Cat. 7 3 . 1 5 f f . , 7 6 . 1 3 f f . , who sums up the controversy. Cf. SZLEZÁK 104f., 141; MORAUX, Arist. 155, DÖRRIE I.e. P. 31.32 ff. TH. The text is corrupt and the argument unclear, but this seems to be the gist of it. There are three important modern editions: by W. L. LORIMER (Paris 1933), with a very full critical apparatus taking account of both the direct and indirect tradition (see also his preliminary studies, 'The text tradition of ps-Ar. D e mundo' and 'Some notes on the text of ps-Ar. D e mundo' [Oxford 1924 and 1925]); the Loeb edition by D . J . FURLEY (1955); and an edition reproducing LORIMER'S text, with Italian translation, introduction and detailed notes by G . REALE (Naples 1974). Also a German translation and commentary by H . STROHM (Berlin and Darmstadt 1970), in the 'Deutsche Akademie' series. For the Arabic tradition, see REALE, p. 284f.; the other non-Greek versions are fully discussed by LORIMER, Text tradition 19ff. REALE has a critical bibliography of modern work on the treatise (to 1971) on pp. 2 8 1 - 3 1 3 ; some additional items are given by STROHM, p. 270f. The version attributed to Apuleius has been edited by P. THOMAS in vol. 3 of the Teubner edition of his works (Leipzig 1908); its authenticity was doubted by many nineteenth-century scholars but is generally accepted to-day (see LORIMER, Text tradition p. 20, edition p. 18). The view of A . STAHR (Ar. bei den Römern [Leipzig 1834] 172) and others that the Greek text is a translation of Apuleius' Latin version has long been exploded (see REALE p. 9, 295f., ZELLER III 1, 657ff.). The most important general discussions are those of ZELLER III 1, 653—670, H . STROHM, Studien zur Schrift von der

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this; if not a profound work of philosophy, it is lucid and pleasantly written. Its subject is the structure of the physical world and its approach unashamedly theological; the author describes his purpose as being to "theologise about" the world (391b4). Its plan is determined by this theme. An introductory chapter in the form of an address to Alexander, "Greatest of leaders" (presumably Alexander the Great is meant), praises philosophy as the science which sees the world as a whole and makes it possible for man's soul to attain a vision of God. Chapters two and three contain a description of the universe, divided into two spheres, that of the unchanging aither, "seat of the gods", in which the moon, sun and stars perform their revolutions, and the sublunary zone, comprising the four elements, each endowed with its peculiar properties, with the earth at the centre; this section ends with a comprehensive sketch of terrestrial geography. Chapter four deals with the "most noteworthy phenomena of the earth" and its atmosphere — those studied by "meteorology" as the ancients understood it. We are told at the outset that most of these are caused by two exhalations, dry and wet, arising respectively from the earth and the moisture it contains, and later (395 a29) a distinction is made between "real" phenomena and optical ones like rainbows. But most of this chapter, like the two preceding ones, is purely descriptive; its purpose is revealed in its last sentence (396a28ff.), where the constant change to which the parts of the universe are subject is contrasted with the permanence of the whole. This leads straight into the fifth chapter, in which the underlying stability of world is said to be due to the harmonía uniting the conflicting forces in an ordered whole. The point is illustrated by parallels drawn from other spheres — human societies, the arts — but not further explained; we are only told that it is produced by a "power penetrating all things" which compels the opposed forces to "come to terms" with each other; it can do this because they all have an "equal share" in the whole, so that no one can prevail over the rest. 2 6 4 In the next chapter, the culmination of the whole book, we are told what this power is: the world is sustained by God. He is not immanent in the world, but while his substance (ουσία) dwells outside the highest sphere of heaven, uncontaminated, he sends his power (δύναμις) throughout the universe; as it passes from the outermost sphere to

264

75

W e h , Mus. Helv. 9 (1952), 1 3 7 - 1 7 5 and A . J . FESTUGIÈRE, L a révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II (Paris 1949) 460—518, which includes an annotated French translation of a large part of the treatise. N o w also see B. L. HIJMANS, Apuleius, Philosophus Platonicus, above in this same volume ( A N R W I I 3 6 , 1 ) 395 ff., esp. 428 ff. 3 96 b 23 : Ούτως ούν και την των όλων συστασιν, ουρανού λέγω καί γης του τε σύμπαντος κόσμου, δια της των έναντιωτάτων κράσεως άρχων μία διεκόσμησεν άρμονίαξηρόν γαρ ύγρφ, θερμόν δέ ψυχρώ, βαρεί τε κοϋφον μιγέν, και ορθόν περιφερεί, γήν τε πάσαν καί θάλασσαν αιθέρα τε καί ήλιον καί σελήνην καί τον όλον ούρανόν διεκόσμησε μία [ή] δια πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις, εκ των άμίκτων καί έτεροίων, αέρος τε καί γης καί πυρός και ύδατος, τον σύμπαντα κόσμον δημιουργήσασα και μια διαλαβοϋσα σφαίρας επιφανείςι τάς τε εναντιωτάτας έν αύτω φύσεις άλλήλαις άναγκάσασα όμολογήσαι και έκ τούτων μηχανησαμένη τω παντί σωτηρίαν. Αιτία δε ταύτης μεν ή των στοιχείων όμολογία, της δέ όμολογίας ή ισομοιρία καί το μηδέν αυτών πλέον έτερον ετέρου δύνασθαι. ANRW II 36.2

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those below, each causes the next to move "in the way proper to its natural constitution". 2 6 5 In this way a single impulse from above gives rise to the manifold movements of the universe, just as one trumpet-signal will cause the members of an army to perform their various tasks. But God, unlike a human commander, rules without effort or fatigue; "seated in the immovable he causes all movement and every revolution by his power, where and in what way he wishes, in different kinds and natures" (400b 11). He is invisible but can be known through his works. The seventh and last chapter is in the nature of an appendix: here the author shows that, although God is one, he is known by many names. The teaching I have summarised is Aristotelian in all essentials: the transcendence of God, seated beyond the confines of the universe and moving it without being moved; the idea that the movement he causes is passed from the outermost celestial sphere to those below and from them to the sublunary world (398a20ff.); that the physical world is uncreated and everlasting (396a31); its division into two zones, the celestial spheres composed of aither and the sublunary one of fire, air, water and earth; 2 6 6 the double exhalation, dry and wet, as the cause of meteorological phenomena (394a9ff.); even the old ('Pythagorean') planetary system, in which the orbit of the sun is situated immediately above that of the moon and not, as in the later "Chaldaic" system, above those of Venus and Mercury. But it is Aristotelianism with a difference. Not only are there some subsidiary ideas and many formulations which have closer parallels in Stoic and other Hellenistic sources than in the extant writings of Aristotle (some of these will be mentioned later), but even the concept of God differs from that found in Aristotle's school-treatises. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is turned away from the world, his activity is thinking about his own activity and he is a cause of movement only "as an object of desire", i.e. as the only perfect instantiation of the state of "actuality" which it is the object of every physical movement to attain. The god of the 'De mundo' is called the "saviour and creator" of the world; he "passes his power" from one sphere to the next and moves things "as he wishes"; 2 6 7 one might say, an Unmoved

265

3 98 b 2 0 : ή θεία φύσις άπό τίνος άπλής κινήσεως του πρώτου την δύναμιν εις τά συνεχή δίδωσι και άπ' εκείνων πάλιν εις τά πορρωτέρω, μέχρις αν δια τού παντός διεξελθί)· κινηθεν γαρ ετερον ύφ' έτερου και αυτό πάλιν έκίνησεν άλλο συν κόσμω, δρώντων μεν πάντων οΐκείως ταϊς σφετέραις κατασκευαϊς, ου της αυτής δε όδοΰ πάσιν οΰσης, άλλα διαφόρου και έτεροίας, εστι δέ οίς και έναντίας, καίτοι τής πρώτης οίον ένδόσεως εις κίνησιν μιας γενομένης.

266

3 91 b 14ff., 392 a 31 ff. But to speak of five e l e m e n t s ( 3 9 2 a 8 , b 35) is a solecism, for the aither cannot enter into compounds with the other simple bodies, the elements proper. REALE p. 102ff. tries to save the author's credit, but the only other example of this blunder he can find is in pseudo-Clement, Recogn. 8.15 = A r . , De philos, fr. 2 7 R o s s ; cf. M. UNTERSTEINER, Arist., Della filosofia. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento esegetico (Temi e testi 10, Rome 1963) 2 7 8 f . , who points out another terminological inaccuracy in the same fragment. REALE wrongly ascribes this passage to Cicero.

267

3 97 b 2 0 : Σωτηρ μεν γαρ όντως άπάντων έστι καί γενέτωρ των όπωσδήποτε κατά τόνδε τον κόσμον συντελουμένων ό θεός, ου μήν αυτουργού καί έπιπόνου ζφου κάματον

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Mover with a human face. Another difference has been pointed out by S T R O H M : 2 6 8 in the genuine treatises the aither, although sharply differentiated from the four elements, is integrated into the system to an extent that it is not in the 'De mundo': since simple bodies and simple movements correspond, there must be a body naturally endowed with circular movement as well as those with rectilinear movement. Much the same point could be made about the Unmoved Mover himself: In 'Physics' VIII and 'Metaph.' A this concept is reached as the conclusion of an elaborate analysis of movement and its causes, whereas in the 'De Mundo' the existence of God is stated as self-evident and his transcendence is asserted on the ground of fitness, supported by analogies with human rulers. 269 Elsewhere in the school-treatises, Aristotle goes to a good deal of trouble to explain how the uniform rotation of the outermost sphere is translated into the various movements observed in the rest of the world; 2 7 0 the author of 'De mundo' claims that the impulse coming from God will give rise to different movements according to the natures and structures of the moved objects, but makes no attempt to explain what these are or how material things come to have what appears to be a degree of self-determination. 271 All these differences seem to have the same cause: the relationship between God and the universe is viewed in religious, not in metaphysical terms. Until the publication of R E A L E ' S edition in 1 9 7 4 , it was generally agreed that the 'De mundo' is spurious and its date was put somewhere between the middle of the first century B C and the second century AD. But R E A L E has argued that it was written by Aristotle himself while he was tutor to Alexander the Great, i.e. between 342 and 336 BC, and represents a relatively early phase of his philosophy. He has succeeded in finding parallels for many of its peculiarities in undoubted writings of Aristotle himself, including the fragments of his 'exoteric' works, or in those of his predecessors, and claims that the Stoic parallels pointed out by others are either illusory or due to borrowing by Stoics from the 'De mundo'. Such arguments are difficult to refute and this is not the place to discuss them in detail. Yet there are some points at which R E A L E ' S view leads to obvious difficulties. The author of the 'De mundo' emphatically denies that God is in the physical world, but in the 'De philosophia' Aristotle used language which suggested to some readers at least that he identified God with

268 269

270 271

75"

υπομένων, άλλα δυνάμει χρώμενος άτρύτω, δ ι ' ής και των πόρρω δοκούντων ε ί ν α ι π ε ρ ι γ ί γ ν ε τ α ι . 400 b 11 : εν ά κ ι ν ή τ ψ γαρ ιδρυμένος δυνάμει πάντα κ ι ν ε ί και π ε ρ ι ά γ ε ι , όπου βούλεται καί οπως. C f . 398 b 20 (above, n. 265). Studien 141 f., cf. his commentary p. 279f. 3 98 a I f f . These arguments have a slight affinity with those of Metaph. Λ 1072 b 14ff., but the differences are as important as the resemblances. J . P. MAGUIRE, The sources of ps.-Ar. ' D e mundo', Yale Class. Stud. 6 (1939) 149f., reads too much into this passage. Planetary motions, Metaph. Λ 8; generation and destruction, G C 2 . 1 0 etc. 398 b 23 ff., 400 b l l f f . ; as usual these propositions are not argued for but illustrated by analogies, one of which bears a striking resemblance to one used by the Stoics in connection with an argument about fate and freewill (398 b 28ff. ~ SVF II 974, 979 etc.; see the commentators ad loc.).

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the world. 2 7 2 In the 'De mundo' (396a25) the connection between tides and the phases of the moon is mentioned as an established fact; R E A L E maintains (p. I l l £.) that Aristotle could have learned about it from Pytheas, but apart from the chronological problems — Pytheas is generally dated to the reign of Alexander or a little later — it would be odd that Aristotle did not mention this phenomenon in his later school-treatises if he knew of it before 336 B C . The discussion of aither and the meaning of its name in the 'De mundo' closely resembles that in the 'De Cáelo', but whereas Aristotle states his view rather tentatively in the latter, it is asserted much more confidently in the former. 2 7 3 All these points, however, are peripheral and do not amount to a conclusive proof; for this we must go back to the central feature of the book, its theology. The first thing to note is its rigorous monotheism: there is one G o d who exists outside the universe but sustains and governs it by means of his power. Nothing is said about the subordinate gods or daimones who play such a large part in the Platonic tradition, from the 'Symposium' (202dff.) onwards. The world itself and some of its parts are occasionally spoken of as divine, but never as gods in their own right; in fact it derives what divinity it has from the power of G o d which permeates it, and its parts share in the divine attributes in proportion to their spatial proximity to God. Aristotle, however, in his 'exoteric' works, spoke of the world and heavenly bodies as "visible g o d s " ; 2 7 4 the substance of their teaching may not be very different, but it is remarkable that the 'De mundo' avoids this kind of language. 2 7 5 Secondly, while the author of the 'De mundo' is at pains to refute the belief that God is immanent in the world, the only representative of it which he quotes is the ancient dictum of Thaïes, that "all things are full of g o d s " . 2 7 6 It is inconceivable that Aristotle should have done this. In his day Thaïes' teaching was of antiquarian interest only, and the problem whether the physical universe is governed by an immanent or a transcendent power was seen differently: the alternative to a transcendent god was not an

272

M u . 397 b 17ff., Cie., N a t . deor. 1.13.33 = A r . , D e philos, fr. 26 R o s s . REALE'S treatment of the latter passage is inconsistent. O n p. 63 he asserts that there is no conflict between it and the ' D e m u n d o ' , because the world, conceived as ungenerated and indestructible, deserves to be called divine, and much the same terms are used in the ' D e m u n d o ' to praise the cosmos and to praise G o d (397 a 8ff. ~ 399 b 2 0 f f . ) . But on p. 7 9 f f . , where his object is to refute ZELLER'S view that the ' D e m u n d o ' tries to mediate between Aristotelian and Stoic beliefs, he lays greater emphasis on the transcendence of G o d there and insists that his " p o w e r " , which alone is found in the world, emanates from but is in no way identical with G o d himself.

273

M u . 392 a 6 f f . , cf. Cael. 270 b 21 ff. C f . UNTERSTEINER, on Arist. D e Philosophia fr. 21 (p. 236) and GOTTSCHALK, Heraclides 107. M u . 400 b 6 f f . seems to presuppose Metaph. 1075 a l l f f . , but here the relationship is more complex. M u . 391 b 16, 392 a 30, cf. 397 a 8 f f . ~ 399 b 2 0 f f . ; 397 b 3 0 f f . όρατός θεός: A r . , D e philosophia fr. 1 8 - 1 9 R o s s , cf. Pl., T i m . 40 d. The w o r d θεός occurs five times in the plural (always in the genitive, see REALE'S index s.v.), but only in contexts where older beliefs or practices are referred to. M u . 397 b 17, cf. Thaies, F V 11 A 22 D . - K . = A r . , D e an. 411 a 8. N o t e that Aristotle, like Plato, w h o alludes to the same dictum at L a w s 10. 899b, takes it to mean that the world is possessed of soul.

274

275

276

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immanent god but "nature" (φύσις), often equated with "what happens spontaneously" (το αύτόματον). 2 7 7 It was only the Stoics who, by identifying god and nature, established the notion of an immanent god; the form taken by the problem in the 'De mundo' presupposes their doctrine, and the allusion to Thaies was put in to give an antique colouring to the controversy. Lastly, the arguments of the 'De mundo' are different in kind from those normally used by Aristotle; description and analogy take the place of analysis and deductive argumentation, and the whole work is not so much a philosophical argument as a rhetorically embellished statement of the conclusions of such an argument. 2 7 8 Aristotle employed such devices occasionally, especially in his 'exoteric' writings, but it is not easy to conceive of him using them to fill a whole treatise. This leaves two questions open, the date of the 'De mundo' and the philosophical allegiance of its author, who has been claimed by different historians for every school except the Epicurean. 279 Its most striking feature, apart from the basically Aristotelian character of its teaching, is the frequency of Stoic ideas and formulations; chapters 2—3 especially contain many definitions which have exact parallels in the Stoic section of Areius' 'Epitome' (fr. 3 1 D I E L S ) and other Stoic sources. 280 But most of these are commonplaces or concern matters of little philosophical import and may mean no more than that the author took his cosmology from handbooks, while a close examination shows that he avoided anything which would have committed him to a specifically Stoic view on any important point. 2 8 1 O n the other hand, the thrust of his theology is anti-Stoic, as we have seen, and this is enough to exclude the view that he tried to fuse or mediate between Aristotelian and Stoic (orthodox or Posidonian) doctrines. 282 More recently M A G U I R E has tried to prove that the teaching of the 'De mundo' was derived from Neopythagorean sources, and has shown up a number of parallels; in particular, the analogies used to illustrate the relationship between God and the world in c. 6 are also found in various Neopythagorean texts. But as he himself admits, most of this material can be traced back to Plato or Aristotle or their immediate followers, and it is peripheral

277 278

279

280

E.g. Pl., Soph. 265c, Laws 10. 888eff., 891 eff.; cf. S T R O H M ' S commentary, p. 267. The style and rhetorical technique of the 'De mundo' are thoroughly analysed by FESTUGIÈRE 477—511; see especially 499f. ; cf. S T R O H M ' S commentary p. 266. According to S . H E I B G E S , De clausulis Charitoneis (Diss. Halle 1911) 101 ff., quoted by M A G U I R E 133, an analysis of the rhythmic clausulae supports a date in the first century A.D. For a detailed summary of earlier views see R E A L E pp. 3—23 and 295—309. S E E FESTUGIÈRE 4 9 4 f f . and REALE p. 1 1 8 f f . ; also FESTUGIÈRE 4 8 2 f f . for parallels with Cleomedes. The meteorological chapter (c. 4) has been examined for Posidonian influences by W. THEILER, Poseidonios, Die Fragmente (Texte und Kommentare 10, Berlin 1982) I p . 2 5 5 f f . , II p . 2 2 0 f f .

281

282

E.g. see S T R O H M ' S commentary p. 279, on the definition of κόσμος at 391 b 9. Cf. J. P. MAGUIRE, The sources of ps-Ar. 'De mundo' 112f. This was the commonest opinion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; its most notable advocates were ZELLER and W . C A P E L L E Die Schrift von der Welt . . ., Neue Jahrbücher für das kl. Altertum 15 (1905) 529-568.

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to the main argument. T h e real differences b e c o m e apparent when w e l o o k b e y o n d the rhetorical platitudes, and one of the m o s t important is clearly put in a p a s s a g e of p s - O n a t a s which in other respects closely resembles one in the ' D e m u n d o ' ; " I t seems to me that G o d is not one, but there is one w h o is greatest and supreme and ruler of the universe, and m a n y others differing in p o w e r . . . T h o s e w h o say that there is one g o d and not m a n y , are w r o n g , for they fail to see the greatest m a r k of divine s u p r e m a c y ; I mean to rule and lead others of the same kind and to be m o s t p o w e r f u l and superior to the r e s t " . 2 8 3 H e r e w e see that the disagreement between them was n o accident, but that they s t o o d on o p p o s i t e sides on a question which was recognised as controversial. A similar objection can be m a d e to STROHM'S opinion that the ' D e m u n d o ' was inspired by c o n t e m p o r a r y Platonism and tried to reconcile it with a Peripatetic point of view. It is true, of course, that the religious side of Aristotelianism w a s derived f r o m Plato and never lost contact with the Platonic tradition, and this applies to the ' D e m u n d o ' n o less than early 'exoteric' Peripatetic writings. B u t the Platonists, while monotheists with their heads, remained polytheists with their h e a r t s . 2 8 4 There is in fact only one source in p a g a n G r e e k literature f r o m which the of Aristotle; these theology of the ' D e m u n d o ' can be derived, the pragmateiai must have been the writer's starting-point, and the w o r k m u s t therefore have been c o m p o s e d after the publication of A n d r o n i c u s ' e d i t i o n . 2 8 5 B u t he has modified Aristotle's concept in order to m a k e it into a m o r e suitable object of devotion and i m b u e d it with a religious fervour belonging to his o w n age. H e m a y have had s o m e precedents for this in earlier Peripatetic traditions; Areius D i d y m u s describes the U n m o v e d M o v e r as "sustaining the h e a v e n s " and " p r o v i d e n t " . 2 8 6 In addition he b o r r o w e d m u c h of the language and imagery of contemporary p o p u l a r t h e o l o g y ; it is p r o b a b l y unnecessary, and has certainly proved unprofitable, to look for m o r e specific s o u r c e s . 2 8 7 T h e changes he m a d e

283

Ps-Onatas, Π ε ρ ί θεού και θ ε ί ο υ 1 p. 1 3 9 . l l f f . THESLEFF, from Stobaeus 1 p. 4 8 . 1 5 f f . W. MAGUIRE 154ff., claims that the fragment from which my quotation is taken is the only extant complete parallel to M u . 399 a 30 —b 25. M . POHLENZ, Philon von Alexandreia, N a c h r . A k a d . Wiss. Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. 1942, 485 n. 2 ( = ID., Kl. Sehr. [Hildesheim 1965] I 381 η. 2) thinks that ps-Onatas' criticism is directed specifically against the ' D e mundo'.

284

E . g . Albinus, Didasc. c. 15 init., and of course Plutarch. O n e reason may be that the Platonists never ceased to take the traditional cults seriously; cf. Pl., L a w s 10. 887d. In spite of the doubts of D . J . FURLEY, in the introduction to his L o e b edition, p. 340. Fr. 9 DIELS, see above, p. 1126 and n. 237. C f . FESTUGIÈRE 517. O n e suggestion which deserves to be briefly mentioned is that of M . POHLENZ, N a c h r . A k a d . Wiss. Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. 1942, 4 8 0 f f . , cf. 442 ( = ID., Kl. Sehr. Ι 3 7 6 f f . , cf. 338), that the simile of the Great King at M u . 398 a l l f f . (but not the underlying doctrine of G o d ' s dynamis, which P O H L E N Z regards as genuinely Peripatetic) was taken from a Jewish source. In view of the parallels in pagan literature, this is hardly necessary; cf. MAGUIRE 149f. and STROHM'S commentary, p. 338f. The view of RAVAISSON, w h o holds that the d o c t r i n e of c. 6 is borrowed from Alexandrian Judaism, is best consigned, together with other aberrations, to the decent oblivion of REALE'S bibliography.

285 286 287

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entailed some loss of philosophic coherence, but they were an interesting attempt to supply a deficiency in Aristotle's system which has been noticed by many students of his thought. 2 8 8

IV. The impact on other schools

We now have to consider the reactions of the other schools to the revival of Aristotelianism. The Epicureans seem to have taken no notice at all; Aristotle is mentioned once in the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, in a passage which gave rise to a good deal of controversy earlier in this century, but it is now generally accepted that he took his information from a book by Colotes, a follower of Epicurus who lived in the third century B C . 2 8 9 Relations between the Sceptics and the Peripatetics were definitely at arm's length. Sextus Empiricus mentions Aristotle and his followers quite often and attributes an elaborate doctrine of the "criterion" of knowledge to them, 2 9 0 but his work shows no signs of a deep study of their writings and his knowledge of them seems to come from handbooks. In many places he writes as if their teaching hardly differed from that of the Stoics, and when he does acknowledge a difference in order to exploit the contradictions between dogmatic schools for his own ends, he tends to state their position in a terminology strongly influenced by Stoicism. 2 9 1 Favorinus of Arelate may be a partial exception. We are told that he admired Aristotle and "allowed the Peripatetics the greatest part of probabili t y " , 2 9 2 but his claim to be a philosopher is doubtful and there is no evidence of a first-hand knowledge of the school-treatises in his extant remains. The converse is also true. The Peripatetic Aristocles of Messene included a long critique of Scepticism in his survey of current philosophies, but his arguments are con-

288

C f . W. D . R o s s , Aristotle ( L o n d o n 1923 etc.) 183ff.

289

D i o g . O e n . fr. 4 WILLIAM, CHILTON; see CHILTON'S c o m m e n t a r y ( O x f o r d 1971) p. 4 0 f f . ,

290

with references. T h e article by E . BIGNONE which started the discussion ( N u o v e ricerche e testimonianze sulla prima dottrina e sulle opere perdute di Aristotele attraverso gli scritti degli Epicurei, Riv. di Filol. 61 [1933] 16FF., 155£f.) later became chapter 1 of ID., L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di E p i c u r o (Florence 1936, 2 1973); see p. 3 ff. of the second edition. A d v . Math. 7 . 2 1 7 f f . ; the same doctrine is attributed to Aristotle by Areius D i d y m u s fr. 16 and Diogenes Laertius 5.29; see above, p. 1126 and 1129 with notes 238 and 249 respectively.

291

See L .

292

Scetticismo Antico (Napoli 1983) 6 9 1 - 7 1 1 . Plut., Q u . conv. 734f. = Favorinus Testim. 21 BARIGAZZI; cf. the introduction of BARIGAZZI'S edition (Florence 1966) p. 2 4 f .

REPICI CAMBIANO, Sext. E m p .

e i Peripatetici,

in: G .

GIANNANTONI (ed.),

Lo

1140

Η. Β. GOTTSCHALK

ventional and he does not seem to have tried to gain a real understanding of their position. 2 9 3 The case is little better with the Stoics after the age of Augustus. In the generation immediately following Andronicus, Athenodorus wrote about the 'Categories' and Areius made a reasonably thorough study of Aristotelian doctrine, but their successors showed less interest. Comutus, active under Nero, left some comments on the 'Categories' which seem to have been strongly influenced by Athenodorus, 2 9 4 but he had no imitators in his school. Marcus Aurelius never mentions Aristotle or Peripatetic philosophy; he quotes Theophrastus once (2.10), but his source is probably a popular, 'exoteric' work. Epictetus refers to Peripatetics only to contrast the laxness of their ethics with the rigour of Stoicism; the same point is repeatedly made by Cicero in much the same language, and it looks as if Epictetus' mental picture of Aristotelianism was little different from that current in the early part of the first century B C . 2 9 S The same is true of Seneca, although he quotes Aristotle and Theophrastus quite often, especially in the 'Naturales Quaestiones'; his quotations seem to be taken from handbooks or compendia of various kinds. 2 9 6 One long quotation from a book by Theophrastus 'On marriage', preserved by St. Jerome, may have been borrowed by him from a lost work of Seneca; but this has been disputed, and in any case it was derived from an 'exoteric' w o r k . 2 9 7 Yet Seneca was widely read 293 294

295

296

See further below, p. 1163. His chief work on the subject was entitled Προς Ά θ η ν ό δ ω ρ ο ν καί Άριστοτέλην, but he also raised some of the same points in a 'Ρητορική Τέχνη (Porph., In Cat. 86.23). Cf. above, p. 1111 and n. 165. Epict. 2 . 1 9 . 2 0 f f . , cf. Cie., Tuse. 4.38, 5.75, Off. 3.20, and POHLENZ, Stoa I 354, II 173. The same conventional picture of the Peripatetic outlook is found in Aulus Gellius 18.1 = Favorinus Testim. 44 BAR. = 14 MENSCHING. S e e t h e i n d e x o f F R . HAASE'S e d i t i o n ( L e i p z i g 1 8 5 2 ) a n d f o r t h e N a t . Q u . , OLTRAMARE in

the Budé edition (Paris 1929) vol. I p. X V I I f f . and 4f. F. P. WAIBLINGER, Senecas Naturales Quaestiones (Zetemata 70, München 1977) p. 22 ff. P. GRIMAL, La critique de l'Aristotélisme dans le 'De Vita Beata', Rev. Ét. Lat. 45 (1967) 396ff., argues that Vit. Beat, c. 15, a critique of those who couple pleasure and virtue as constituents of the supreme good, is directed against Aristotle and presupposes a direct knowledge of the E N . But not all the parallels he claims to find are convincing. Seneca does not refer to Aristotle by name in this chapter, and his statement of his opponent's views would not represent Aristotle's position exactly: for him the τέλος was πράξις κατ' άρετήν, and pleasure was only something supervening on that (έπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, 1174 b 33); this is closer to Stoic teaching than to the doctrine criticised by Seneca. Therefore if Seneca thought that he was criticising the E N , his reading must have been superficial, biased and perhaps partial. However I do not want to exclude altogether the possibility that Seneca may have had some first-hand acquaintance with some of Aristotle's schoolwritings; this would not invalidate my main point. 297

Hieron., Adv. Jovian. 1.47(MIGNE, Patr. Lat. 23.288—291), attributed to Seneca as fr. 47 by HAASE; but E . BICKEL, Diatribe in Sen. Philos, fragmenta I (Leipzig 1915) 18ff. has claimed that Jerome took this extract from Porphyry, not from Seneca. His view has been rejected by REGENBOGEN, R E Suppl. V I I (1940) 1487 and others, but accepted by P. COURCELLE, Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources (tr. H . E. WEDECK) (Harvard 1969) 71 f. ( = P . C . , Les lettres grecques en occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore [Paris 1948] 60f.);

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and shows some knowledge of contemporary Platonist metaphysics; 298 this suggests that the Aristotelian pragmateiai did not circulate outside a narrow group of specialists. We also have reports about controversies between Stoics and Peripatetics which turn out on inspection to be based very largely on older material. The earliest is in Philo's O n the Indestructibility of the Universe', probably written barely two generations after the appearance of Andronicus' edition; 299 the latest Stoic philosophers whose views are referred to are Boethus of Sidon and Panaitios, both active in the second half of the second century BC, while on the Peripatetic side Philo quotes Critolaus, Theophrastus and some passages of Aristotle, probably from the 'De philosophia'; 300 the material was probably taken at second hand and there is no sign of any direct use of Aristotle's school-treatises. In logic there was an unending dispute as to which of the two main types of syllogism was prior to the other; the Aristotelians claimed priority for the categorical, the Stoics for the "hypothetical" (propositional) syllogism. We know of this and other disagreements mainly from sources leaning towards the Peripatetic side, but while some distinguish "younger Peripatetics" of the period after Androni-

298

299

300

H . HAGENDAHL, Latin Fathers and the Classics (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Göteborgs Universitets Arsskrift 64.2 = Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 6, Göteborg 1 9 5 8 ) 150ff.; and C . S C H M I T T , Theophrastus, in: P. O . KRISTELLER and F. R. C R A N Z (edd.), Catalogue translationum et commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin translations and commentaries II (Washington 1971) 312ff., who gives more references. Theophrastus' book ' O n marriage' may not have been an independent work but part of his three-book Περί βίων. Epist. Mor. 58.16ff., 65.4ff.; see W. THEILER, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Berlin 1934 etc.) c. 1, and E. BICKEL, Senecas Briefe 58 und 65, Rh. Mus. 103 (1960) 1—20. According to BICKEL, the summary of Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes at Epist. 65.4ff. indicates that Seneca's library contained some of Aristotle's works, including the 'Physics', but not that Seneca had read them himself; his knowledge of them was mediated by his librarian, Annaeus surnamed Amicus (a freedman, presumably), who would appear to have been a good deal more learned than his master. For appropriate comment see Seneca's own words ad Epist. 27.5. Apart from its intrinsic absurdity, B I C K E L ' S thesis is undermined by a crass misinterpretation of the Aristotelian passage he thinks that Seneca quoted (Phys. 194 b 23ff. = Metaph. Δ 1 0 1 3 a 2 4 f f . ) and his own admission that the closest extant parallel to Seneca's supposed paraphrase is Aetius I.11.4. Possible Platonist influences on Seneca's 'Nat. Q u . ' are discussed by P. D O N I N I , Problemi del pensiero scientifico a Roma, in: G . G I A N N A N T O N I and M . V E G E T T I (edd.), La Scienza Ellenistica (Coll. Elenchos 9, Napoli 1984), 353 ff. For the controversies which have surrounded this work, see the introductions of the editors - C O H N (Berlin 1915) vol. VI p. XXXIff., C O L S O N (Loeb ed. vol. IX) p. 172ff., R. A R N A L D E Z (Paris 1969) p. l l f f . ; also M. U N T E R S T E I N E R , Arist. De Philos. (Rome 1963) 21 I f f . ; BIGNONE, Arist. Perd. II 2 , 113 η. 41; W. WIERSMA, Der angebliche Streit des Zeno und Theophrast über die Ewigkeit der Welt, Mnemosyne III 8 (1940) 235 — 243; J. B. MCDIARMID, Theophrastus on the Eternity of the World, TAPA 71 (1940) 239-247; POHLENZ, Nachr. Akad.Wiss. Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. 1942, 415ff. (ID., Kl. Sehr. I 31 Iff.). Fr. 1 8 - 1 9 WALZER—Ross; cf. U N T E R S T E I N E R ' S commentary, p. 2 1 1 ff., with references. Philo does not specify his source and the attribution is conjectural.

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cus, none refers to any Stoic later than Antipater.301 Other evidence for our period is less clear, but such as it is, it points in the same direction. Plutarch in the 'De virtute morali' uses Peripatetic material to refute the Stoic position, but the opponents he names are Zeno, Chrysippus and others of the Hellenistic age. This is particularly interesting because some features of the work link it with the Aristotelianism of Plutarch's own day. In the very first paragraph, Plutarch says that moral virtue has the passions for its matter and logos for its form; a similar view is argued for by Aspasius, but it is not found clearly expressed in any earlier source. 302 It would appear that the contemporary Aristotelians concentrated their polemics on the founders of Stoicism rather than the Stoics of their own time 303 . Aristocles of Messene included a brief summary of Stoic doctrine in his treatise O n philosophy', using Zeno as his authority.304 A polemic against the Stoic teaching about fate by a certain Diogenianus criticises the arguments of Chrysippus' book Περί ειμαρμένης at considerable length, but refers to no later member of the school; this writer is generally said to be an Epicurean to-day, but our only source calls him a Peripatetic and we have no right to go against it. 305

301

302

303

304 305

Antipater: Apuleius, Peri hermeneias 7, p. 184.20 THOMAS, Alex. Aphr., In Top. 8.16 ( = Antipater fr. 26, SVF 3 p. 248). 'Younger Peripatetics': Apuleius 13 p. 193.16. For the controversy on priority, see I. MUELLER, Stoic and Peripatetic logic, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 51 (1969) 173 — 187. Each school used a different terminology: see Galen, Introd. log. c. 3, 14, Alex., In Anal. Priora 262.28ff. etc. Plut. 440D, moral virtue differs from theoretical τω το μεν π ά θ ο ς ΰλην εχειν τον δέ λόγον είδος; cf. Aspasius, In E N 42.17ff. and below, p. 1156. Much the same view is stated baldly in a pseudo-Pythagorean tract, "Metopus" Περί άρετης fr. 1 ap. Stob. 3 p. 71.13ff. H . (p. 119.8 THESLEFF), and something like it may be hinted at by Areius Did. ap. Stob. 2 p. 3 9 . l l f f . and 142.11. Cf. Μ. PINNOY, Metopus en Plutarchus over de ethische deugt, L'Antiquité Classique 50 (1981) 655-663. XHE view of M. P O H L E N Z (Uber Plutarchs Schrift περί άοργησίας, Hermes 31 [1896] 322; Stoa I 225, II 132) that the 'De virtute morali', or a large part of it, is based on a treatise by a follower of Andronicus who in turn borrowed from Posidonius as well as Aristotelian sources, has been shown to be untenable; see D. BABUT, in the introduction to his edition of the treatise (Paris 1969) p. 44ff.; S. G. ETHERIDGE, Plutarch's De V. M.: A Study in Extra-Peripatetic Aristotelianism, HSCP 66 (1962) 252—254 (a summary of an unpublished P h . D . dissertation, some of whose arguments are more fully discussed by BABUT); F. BECCHI, Contributi allo studio del De v. m. di Plutarco, Stud. It. di Fil. Cl. 46 (1974) 129-147; ID., Aristotelismo e Antistoicismo nel De v. m. di Plutarco, Prometheus 1 (1975) 160—180; ID., Aristotelismo funzionale nel De v. m. di Plutarco, ibid. 4 (1978) 261-275; D I L L O N , Middle Platonists 193ff. BABUT and B E C C H I give references to other literature. For Plutarch's attitude to Aristotle in general see below, p. 1146f. Fr. 3 H E I L A N D = Euseb., PE 15.14; see below, p. 1163. Ap. Euseb., PE 4.3, 6.8; he is called a Peripatetic in the heading to bk. 6 c. 8 (I p. 321.1 M R A S ) ; cf. ZELLER I I I 1, 807f. n. But on p. 170.25 he promises to adduce arguments used by Epicurus, and this, together with some weaker arguments, led A. G E R C K E to describe him as an Epicurean (Chrysippea, Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl. 14 [1885] 701 f.). He has been followed by nearly all those who expressed an opinion in this century, but E. A M A N D DE M E N D I E T A (Fatalisme et Liberté dans l'Antiquité Grecque. Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Cameade chez les philosophes

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Even Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was aware of differences within Stoicism, aimed his anti-Stoic polemics almost entirely at the leaders of the school, Zeno and Chrysippus; when he mentions younger Stoics who, he claims, modified their doctrines under Aristotelian influence, he refers to such men as Sosigenes, a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus who lived in the second century B C . 3 0 6 F r o m all this it would appear that, once the sensation caused by Andronicus' edition subsided, there was little real interaction between Stoics and Peripatetics. N o doubt the Stoics learned something of Peripatetic doctrines as students and were drilled in the traditional counter-arguments of their school. But in the first and early second centuries A D , when Stoicism was still the prevailing orthodoxy, its betterknown adherents were more concerned with practical ethics than logical or metaphysical theory and felt little need either to refute or learn from the Aristotelian pragmateiai which Andronicus had made available. After that it was too late. 3 0 7 The only outside school to make creative use of Aristotelian ideas were the Platonists. 3 0 8 In itself, this is hardly surprising. Aristotle's philosophy was rooted in Platonism and one of the ancestors of Middle Platonism was Antiochus of Ascalon, who attached great importance to this relationship. The Platonists were very conscious of it and of the problems it raised. L. Calvinus (or Kalbenos) Tauros, who headed a school in Athens in the second quarter of the second century, wrote a book O n the doctrinal differences between Plato and Aristotle', 3 0 9 and a generation later Atticus wrote one entitled 'Against those who try to ex-

306 307

308

309

grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles [Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie 3, 19, Louvain etc. 1945] 120 n. 4, 124 n. 1, 126) has expressed a reservation: Diogenianus seems to admit that some events may be caused by ειμαρμένη (ap. Euseb. 6.8.20, p. 325.13 MRAS), something no orthodox Epicurean could accept, but quite in accordance with Peripatetic beliefs, e.g. Metaph. 1075 a 18ff.). GERCKE and those who follow him may have been unaware that Eusebius calls Diogenianus a Peripatetic, because the chapterheadings are omitted in the nineteenth-century editions (by GAISFORD, DINDORF and GIFFORD) on which they will have relied; they have been restored in MRAS' edition (1954), and in his preface he has shown that these headings go back to Eusebius himself (vol. I p. VIII) and that his citations are generally reliable (p. LVff.). In these circumstances we must accept his testimony, although it is certainly surprising to find a Peripatetic adduce Epicurus, even in a purely ad. hominem argument like the present one. Cf. Ν. WALTER, Der Thoraausleger Aristobulos. Untersuchungen zu seinen Fragmenten und den pseudepigraphischen Resten der jüdisch-hellenistischen Literatur (Texte und Untersuchungen 86, Berlin 1964) 9f. n. 3. De mixtione 216.12, cf. SVF 3 p. 258; cf. TODD, ad loc. and p. 21 ff. Cf. PRAECHTER, Kl. Sehr. 103 n. 3 who points out that Stoicism began to fall behind in the competition with other schools, notably Platonism, from the second quarter of the second century A.D. For what follows see, besides the relevant sections of ZELLER (Ph. d. Gr. III 1,831 ff., III 2,175ff.), the works of DILLON, DÖRRIE and PRAECHTER cited in n. 16 above, and A. C. LLOYD, Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic, Phronesis 1 (1955 — 56) 58 — 72, 146—160. Also P. DONINI, Le scuole (see above, n. 10) 103 ff. Suda Τ 166, vol. IV p. 509.12 ADLER; nothing is known of this work except the title. On Taurus in general see DILLON 237ff., DÖRRIE 310—323, PRAECHTER 101 ff.

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plain Plato's philosophy by means of Aristotle'. 310 Nor were Aristotelian borrowings ever allowed to obscure the essential features of Platonism, its dualism and belief in a transcendent deity and the immortality of the individual human soul. They were only admitted to fill gaps which Plato had left at the margins of his system (perhaps one should say, of the system which his adherents tried to construct out of his philosophy), and authority was sought for them in Plato's writings. They are mostly found in two areas, logic and practical ethics. Aristotle's logic was taken over in its entirety, together with some Stoic additions. The ten categories, it was claimed, were prefigured in the 'Timaeus' (37aff.) and 'Parmenides', and syllogisms of various figures were discovered in the 'Parmenides' and elsewhere. 311 In ethics three Peripatetic theses gained a wide currency: that virtue is a mean, that virtue is not sufficient for happiness without a measure of 'bodily' and 'external' goods, and that passions should be moderated rather than eradicated (metriopatheia as opposed to Stoic apatheia). Since all three were prominent in the doctrine of the Peripatos during the Hellenistic era and featured in Antiochus' teaching and Areius' handbook (and no doubt many similar productions now lost), and metriopatheia had been preached by Crantor and other members of the Old Academy, 312 the presence of any of them in Platonist or Neopythagorean writings of our period cannot be taken as evidence of a direct acquaintance with Aristotle's works; the doctrine of the mean, in particular, had become a commonplace. 313 But the last two especially, which were violently opposed by the Stoics and those who adhered to the more rigorous Pythagorean and Platonic traditions, do imply at least some degree of acceptance of Aristotelian attitudes. There was less room for Aristotelian elements in Platonist physics or metaphysics (one or two will be discussed below), but one important example must be mentioned here. From the early first century AD, it seems, Platonists distinguished the Platonic Form, "eternal pattern of natural objects", from a Form immanent in particulars. The second comes straight from Aristotle and was designated by the term είδος which had been used by both Plato and Aristotle,

310

311

312

313

See below, p. 1149f. On the whole question see now P. DONINI, LO scetticismo académico, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica secondo Plutarcho, in: G. CAMBIANO (cited above, η. 14) 203f., 214ff. and cf. C. MORESCHINI, Attico, una figura singolare del medioplatonismo, above in this same volume (ANRW II 36,1) 479ff. Categories: Plut., An. Procr. 1023E (cf. J. P. HERSHBELL, Plutarch's 'De animae procreatone in Timaeo'. An Analysis of Structure and Content, above in this same volume [ANRW II 36,1] 234ff.), Albinus, Didasc. c. 6 . 1 0 ; Albinus does not give precise references, but DILLON 279 enumerates some passages he could have had in mind. Syllogism: Albinus c. 6 . 5 ; some rather dubious examples in the anonymus commentary on the 'Theaetetus' (16.14ff., 66.14ff.) are discussed by MORAUX, Arist. II 487ff. Cie., Acad. Prior 2.44.135, etc.; cf. Κ. PRAECHTER, Krantor und Ps.-Archytas, in: ID., Kl. Schriften 3 3 - 3 7 (first ed. in: Arch. Gesch. Phil. 10 [1897] 1 8 6 - 1 9 0 ) . The situation has been well described by D. A. RUSSELL, Plutarch 84: "Plutarch's Moral Virtue . . . Platonist in substance, Aristotelian in much of its terminology, testifies to the fact that the detail of moral theory and the norm for its presentation were inherited not from the Academy but from the Lyceum". Most of these motifs reappear in an even more diluted form in various pseudo-Pythagorean writings; these have been exhaustively studied by MORAUX, Arist. II 603—683, especially 642ff.

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while the purely Platonic word ίδέα was reserved for the first. 3 1 4 Other Aristotelian notions found in Platonist writings, such as the concepts of by le, dynamis and energeia, or the belief that the physical world is uncreated, are less significant. The former had long been common property, used by all schools as a matter of course; the eternity of the world was already taught by Speusippus, Xenocrates and Crantor, who reinterpreted the Timaeus' in accordance with their view. 3 1 5 These borrowings show how deeply Aristotle's ideas had permeated all subsequent philosophy, but are not evidence of direct contact of the Middle Platonists with Aristotle or contemporary Aristotelianism. Philo's use of Peripatetic material in the 'De aeternitate mundi' has already been discussed (above, p. 1141) and little more need be said about him here. The cast of his mind was fundamentally different from Aristotle's; his thinking was directed to the philosophical defence of Jewish religious beliefs and his conceptual apparatus was drawn predominantly from Platonic and Stoic sources. While Peripatetic ethical ideas sometimes appear in his writings, they are counterbalanced by passages in which he follows the more rigorous Stoic line. 3 1 6 Occasional traces of Aristotelian influence can be found in the more central parts of his work; for example, his concept of God may owe something to Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. 3 1 7 Philo seldom touched on logical questions, but one passage, which has attracted a certain amount of scholarly attention, is relevant to my argument. Here he enumerates the Aristotelian categories as Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Action, Passion, State (εχειν), Position (κεΐσθαι), Time and Place. 318 The terms used in this list and their order differ from Aristotle's in some respects; several of these changes may go back to Andronicus and Eudorus, although Philo's list is not identical with either of theirs, and the explanations which follow (§ 31), brief though they are, show signs of Platonic and Stoic influences. But it can hardly be the work of Philo himself, as the context shows. This is not a discussion of logical or metaphysical problems but a disquisition on the perfection of the number ten, and the list is introduced by the words, "Those who study the doctrines of philosophy say that the so-called categories in nature 314

Seneca, Epist. Mor. 58.19FF., 6 5 . 7 ; Albinus, Didasc. 4 . 7 (p. 155 fin. HERMANN), 9. I f f . (p. 163 H . ) . They made a further distinction between the form existing within the mind that apprehends it and the form existing independently (e.g. Albinus c. 9 init., p. 163 H . ) ; the ancestry of this notion is complex, but it clearly o w e s a good deal to Aristotle (e. g. Metaph. 1032 a 32) as well as the Stoa. Cf. THEILER, Vorbereitung d. Neoplatonismus l O f f . , P . KRAUS a n d R . WALZER ( s e e b e l o w , n . 4 1 5 ) 9 , LLOYD 5 9 f f . F o r m o d e r n a t t e m p t s

to find a doctrine of immanent forms in Phaedo 102 d ff. and some other passages of Plato's dialogues see W. K. C. GUTHRIE, A History of Greek Philosophy IV (Cambridge etc. 1975) p. 3 5 3 f f . , with references; they have an ancient precedent in Damascius (ps.-Olympiodorus), I n P h a e d . 4 2 1 , p . 2 2 7 WESTERINK. 315

S e e t h e p a s s a g e s c o l l e c t e d as X e n o c r a t e s f r . 5 4 H E I N Z E ( =

1 5 3 - 1 5 8 ISNARDI PARENTE);

P r o c l u s , I n T i m . 1 2 7 7 . 8 f f . D I E H L ; ZELLER II l 4 , 1 0 4 7 . 3,6 317

318

Cf. KENNY, Aristotelian Ethics 2 4 f . The case for this has been argued by P. BOYANCÉ, Le Dieu très haut chez Philon, in: P. LÉVY, E. WOLFF (edd.), Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions offerts à H . - C . Puech (Paris 1974) 1 3 9 - 1 4 9 . D e Decal. 3 0 f . ; see DILLON 178ff. and above, p. 1110.

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are ten only". In fact it is nothing more than a patch taken from a compendium of some kind, and no evidence for any deep knowledge of or interest in Aristotle's works on Philo's part. For the history of Aristotelianism the most interesting thing to emerge from this is that the doctrine of Categories had already been incorporated in sub-philosophical handbooks at the time when Philo wrote. 3 1 9 Plutarch's interest in Aristotle and his school went deeper. Four of the titles listed in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue of his writings have a special bearing on Aristotelian philosophy: 'Lecture on the ten Categories' (no. 192), 'Aristotle's Topics', eight books (no. 56), O n the Fifth Substance', in five books (no. 44) and O n Theophrastus' Προς τους καιρούς πολιτικά', in two books (no. 5 2 - 3 ) . The genuineness of the first two has been doubted, 3 2 0 and it must be admitted that Plutarch shows little interest in formal logic in his extant works (they contain only one reference to the 'Topics' and none to the rest of the O r g a n o n ' ) , 3 2 1 but he evidently believed that the Aristotelian Categories were part of the Platonic heritage 322 and the book on the 'Topics' could have been a hypomnema made for his private use, perhaps in his youth. The other two titles fit easily into his known interests; this is obvious in the case of Theophrastus' 'Pragmatism in Politics', 3 2 3 and while Plutarch did not accept Aristotle's doctrine of a 'fifth substance', it was relevant to much of his work on cosmology and eschatology. In ethics he was less of a rigorist than Philo and the Peripatetic teaching on moral virtue and metriopatheia were in full accord with his outlook on life. But these Peripatetic elements

319

3 2 0

One detail may be worth noting: Philo's source (presumably Pythagorean or Platonic) must have included a proof that there can be no more or less than ten Categories; it would be the earliest example of such a proof for which we have any evidence. A similar argument is found at the end of ps-Archytas, Περί τώ καθόλου λόγω (p. 37,17ff. TH.); see p. 1132 above. For Philo's reliance on compendia see J . MANSFELD, Heraclitus, Empedocles and others in a Middle Platonist cento in Philo of Alexandria, Vigiliae Christianae 39 (1985) 131-56. By

ZELLER

III

2,180

η.

1;

SANDBACH,

and

RUSSELL

(Plutarch

19).

F.

Η.

SANDBACH

suggests (in his edition of the Lamprias Catalogue, in the Loeb edition of Plutarch's 'Moralia' vol. X V pp. 6 and 12, and in: Plutarch and Aristotle, Illinois CI. Stud. 7 [1982] 212) that item no. 56 was included because a copy of Aristotle's 'Topics' had been wrongly placed among Plutarch's works in the library on whose inventory the Lamprias Catalogue is based; but since Aristotle's name is included in the title (Τών Ά ρ . Τοπικών βιβλία η ) this should have precluded such an error. For the form of the title cf. e.g. Theophrastus' Τών Διογένους συναγωγή α', ap. Diog. Laert. 5.43. One manuscript apparently has a variant πολιτικών for τοπικών (reported by SANDBACH in the Loeb edition, but not in his Teubner text (Plut., Mor. vol. 7 [1967]); if this were correct, it would solve the difficulty. 321

SANDBACH I . e . , w h o m o d i f i e s t h e e n u m e r a t i o n o f W . C . HELMBOLD a n d E . N .

O'NEILL,

Plutarch's Quotations (Philological Monographs of the American Philol. Ass. 19, Baltimore—Oxford 1959) 8. The standard general accounts of Plutarch are by K. ZIEGLER, Plutarchos no. 2, R E X X I (1951) 6 3 6 - 9 6 2 (also published separately) and D. A. RUSSELL, Plutarch (London and New York 1973); for his philosophy see ZELLER III 2, 175—218 and DILLON 1 9 2 f f . 322 323

See above, n. 311. This paraphrase of the title is meant to avoid the pejorative loading of SANDBACH'S "Opportunist Statesmanship", which is absent from the Greek word καιρός.

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PHILOSOPHY

IN THE

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are found for the most part in his popular ethical works and did not affect the core of his beliefs about the nature of the world and the human soul. H o w much he really knew of Aristotle's school-treatises is a moot point. References and allusions to Aristotle abound in his writings 3 2 4 and in one place he even suggests that Aristotle's views may have changed in the course of his life, 3 2 5 but many of his apparent quotations turn out on examination to be illusory. SANDBACH, who has made the most recent and most thorough study of the question, concludes that "Plutarch or his sources" had some knowledge of the T o p i c s ' , 'Metaphysics', E N , 'Historia Animalium', Rhetoric III and probably of the 'De cáelo' and 'De anima', but "direct acquaintance with the contents is certain only for H A and Rhet. I I I " . In addition he had probably read many of the popular 'exoteric' writings of Aristotle and his chief followers. Naturally his understanding of them will have been affected by his own presuppositions and those of his contemporaries and perhaps even by commentaries now lost. The most complete absorption of Aristotelian ideas into a Platonist framework is found in the 'Didascalicus' of Albinus, an elementary handbook of Platonic philosophy compiled in the middle of the second century A D , although much of its material seems to be older. 3 2 6 In logic, it incorporates the ten Categories and Aristotle's theory of the categorical syllogism, as well as some of the theories about the hypothetical syllogism developed by some of Aristotle's followers and the Stoics. 3 2 7 In ethics, he accepts that the virtues are means and that the passions should be moderated, not eradicated (c. 30, 32). He recognised the existence of immanent as well as transcendent F o r m s . 3 2 8 But more interesting than these conventional borrowings is the use he makes of Aristotelian ideas in his description of the supreme deity, which combines features of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover and Active Reason with others taken from Plato's Demiurge and Form of the G o o d : he is an eternally active mind and arouses the activity of "the mind of the universe" (i. e. the Platonic world-soul), acting on it without being moved, as the sun acts to wake vision or like an object of desire; his thinking must have the noblest of all objects and this can only be himself; "therefore he must always think himself and the contents of his own thinking, and this 324

T h e list o f them occupies 8 V2 columns in W . C . HELMBOLD and E . N . O ' N E I L L , Plutarch's Q u o t a t i o n s (n. 321 above). T h e y have been subjected to a critical examination by F . H . SANDBACH, Plutarch and Aristotle, Illinois Classical Studies 7 ( 1 9 8 2 ) 2 0 7 — 2 3 2 , w h o gives references to other literature; cf. KENNY, Aristotelian Ethics 2 6 .

325

Virt. M o r . 442 Β , on the 'parts' of the soul. This passage has been the subject of much scholarly discussion; see BABUT, ad loc., DÜRING, A B p. 3 5 3 £ f . , SANDBACH 2 1 7 f f . and F.

BECCHI, Aristotelismo

ed antistoicismo nel D e v. m.

di Plutarco,

Prometheus 1

( 1 9 7 5 ) 1 6 0 f f . , with the literature cited in n. 3. 326

Edited by C . F . HERMANN in vol. VI of the Teubner Plato ( 1 8 5 3 etc.) pp.

152-189,

and by P. L o u i s (Paris 1 9 4 5 ) ; analysed by DILLON 2 7 2 — 3 0 4 . O n e section (c. 12 § 1) agrees very closely with a fragment of Areius D i d y m u s ' s u m m a r y of Plato's doctrine (fr. 1 DIELS, D o x o g r . G r . p. 4 4 7 ) . T h e authorship of this tract is not quite certain; cf. DILLON 2 6 8 f . , MORAUX, Arist. II 441 ff. and J . WHITTAKER, Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 3 6 , 1 ) 8 3 f f . ; the last-named comes to a different conclusion from the one adopted here. 327

See n. 311 above.

328

See n. 3 1 4 above.

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activity of his is an I d e a " . 3 2 9 Here Albinus is wrestling with a problem which seems to have troubled a number of Middle Platonists: 3 3 0 how to explain the 'demiurgic' function of a god who is conceived as a transcendent mind (this notion goes back beyond Aristotle to Plato and the early Academy). 3 3 1 The same problem was raised in the 'De mundo', but whereas it has little to offer beyond pious platitudes, Albinus tried to bridge the gap by means of some basic Aristotelian concepts — that potentiality is actualised by an agent itself fully actual and that thinking involves the subject taking on the form of the object. But in admitting that God's thinking includes other objects than itself he sacrificed the consistency of Aristotle's approach, while leaving the relationship between Forms and the supreme mind unclear. The solution he offered can hardly be called a success, but it is a serious attempt to apply Aristotelian ideas to problems arising in a different system of philosophy. A generation later Apuleius wrote a summary of Platonic doctrine which on the whole contains fewer visible Peripatetic borrowings, but one point is worth mentioning. When discussing the structure of the human body and the causes of disease, he distinguishes three kinds of substance in the body, the four elements, tissues "consisting of similar parts" such as entrails, bone and blood, 3 3 2 and the members, head, limbs etc. In the corresponding passage of the 'Timaeus' (82) Plato only speaks of two classes of substance, the elements and the tissues composed of them, such as marrow, bone or veins. Apuleius' tripartite division comes from Aristotle, as his description of the intermediate category proves, and is one of the rather few passages to show clear evidence of the diffusion of Aristotle's scientific ideas in our period; Apuleius' source may have been a commentary on the 'Timaeus' written by someone with medical interests. His interest in Aristotelianism is further revealed by his Latin version of the ' D e mundo', which he regarded as genuine or at least as early Peripatetic, 3 3 3 and an elementary

Albinus c. 1 0 . 2 - 3 , p. 164 med. Η : έπεί δε ó π ρ ώ τ ο ς νους κάλλιστος, δεί καί κάλλιστον α ύ τ ω νοητόν ύ π ο κ ε ϊ σ θ α ι , ο ύ δ ε ν δε αύτοϋ κάλλιον· έαυτόν άν οΰν καί τ α έ α υ τ ο ϋ νοήμ α τ α άεί νοοίη, και α ϋ τ η ή ενεργεία α ύ τ ο ϋ ιδέα υπάρχει. Cf. FESTUGIÈRE, Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste IV (Paris 1954) 9 7 ; DILLON 2 8 2 ; MORAUX, L e ' D e anima' dans la tradition Grecque (see n. 15 above) 2 8 7 f f . seems to overestimate the Aristotelianism of this passage; he has modified his position in Arist. II 4 6 0 ff. 330 S E E P L DONINI, Motivi filosofici in Galeno, L a Parola del Passato 35 ( 1 9 8 0 ) 3 3 7 f f . , 329

w h o r e f e r s t o N u m e n i u s f r . 1 2 DES PLACES ( f r . 2 0 — 2 1 LEEMANS) o n w h i c h c f . M .

FREDE,

Numenius, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 3 6 , 2 ) 1059ff. 331

See C i c e r o , N a t . D e o r . 1 . 1 2 . 3 0 f f . , with the parallels adduced in PEASE'S commentary, and m y Heraclides 96 f.

332

Apul., D e Platone 1 . 1 7 , p. 1 0 1 . 1 2 THOMAS aliam (partem corporis vult videri) ex consimilibus partibus viscerum, ossiculorum, cruoris et ceterorum. O n Apuleius' Platonism in general see DILLON 306—338 and B. L . HIJMANS, Apuleius, Philosophus Platonicus, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 3 6 , 1 ) 3 9 5 - 4 7 5 .

333

Apul., D e mundo p. 1 3 7 . 1 THOMAS (nos Aristotelem . . . et Theophrastum auctorem secuti), 1 4 2 . 1 . T w o additional chapters on the names of winds (c. 13 — 14, p. 148 — 150 T . ) were taken from Favorinus (Testim. 2 7 BARIGAZZI = Aulus Gellius 2 . 2 2 ) ; they include a few references to Aristotle (Meteor. 2 . 6 ) but do not reproduce his thought as a whole. In general see Β. L . HIJMANS, Apuleius etc. (n. 332 above) 3 9 5 f f . , esp. 4 2 8 f f .

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b o o k on formal logic entitled Π ε ρ ί έρμηνείας. This little work contains an account of assertorie propositions and the categorical syllogism which is Aristotelian in essentials, although it includes modifications made by other Peripatetics from Theophrastus onwards; here as elsewhere Apuleius' immediate source seems to have been a textbook or other compilation or, as DILLON has suggested, a course of elementary lectures. 3 3 4 Stoic doctrines are mentioned occasionally, for the most part critically. But Apuleius does not identify himself with the Aristotelians and always speaks of Aristotle and his followers in the third person. A n interesting historical point is that he distinguishes between older and younger Peripatetics; the second group includes Aristón (of Alexandria) and those w h o came after him (p. 193. 16 T). N o such distinction is made between Stoics, and the youngest member of this school to be mentioned by name is Antipater of T a r s u s . 3 3 5 A different tendency in Middle Platonism is revealed in the fragments of Atticus, w h o was active under Marcus Aurelius. His best-known work, gleefully exploited by Eusebius, was entitled 'Against those who interpret Plato's philosophy by means of Aristotle'. 3 3 6 The eight long fragments preserved by Eusebius criticise Aristotle's doctrine of the telos, his disbelief in providence, his teaching on the eternity of the physical world, on the 'Fifth Substance' and on the movement of the heavens, and his denial of the immortality of the human soul, of the existence of the world-soul and of the Platonic F o r m s . Many if not all the arguments Atticus used seem to be older. A few make interesting points, the best being those against the existence of a b o d y with a natural movement of rotation, 3 3 7 but for the most part his argumentation is at a low level, and when reasoning fails him, as it does all too often, he is happy to make do with strident rhetoric and abuse. However, his primary purpose was not so much to refute Aristotle as to show that his teaching was fundamentally at odds with Plato's and irrelevant to a true understanding of Plato; this is said explicitly several times and explains why in some passages Atticus simply contrasts the views of Aristotle

334

DILLON 336; the work has been thoroughly analysed by M. W. SULLIVAN, Apuleian Logic (Amsterdam 1967); c. 5 (p. 139 — 169) contains a discussion of the sources. Cf. PRANTL I 5 7 8 - 5 9 1 , A . SCHMEKEL, D i e Positive Philosophie I (Berlin 1938) 5 4 0 - 5 4 9 ;

335 336

D. LONDEY and C . JOHANSON, Apuleius and the Square of Opposition, Phronesis 29 (1984) 165 — 173, with some interesting remarks on the way in which Apuleius translates Aristotle's terminology into Latin on p. 168ff., also B. L. HIJMANS, Apuleius etc. (n. 332 above) 408 ff. P. 148.20 T ; cf. n. 301 above. Euseb., PE 11.1, 15.4—9, 12 —13. The fragments have been collected (with some omissions) by E. DES PLACES (Paris 1977). See further DILLON 2 4 7 - 2 5 8 ; DÜRING, A B p. 325ff.; M . BALTES, Z u r P h i l o s o p h i e d. Platonikers Α . , in: H . - D . BLUME and F . MANN (edd.),

337

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Piatonismus und Christentum (Festschr. H . Dörrie), Jahrb. f. Antike u. Christentum, Ergänzungsband 10 (Münster 1983) 38—57 and C . MORESCHINI, Attico, una figura singolare del medioplatonismo, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,1) 477—491. Fr. 6 . 7 f f . = Euseb. II p. 367.16ff. MRAS. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De mixtione 226. 34 ff. refers to Stoic arguments against the Fifth Substance and possibly Atticus borrowed something from them. A N R W II 36.2

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and Plato, without giving any reason for preferring one to the other. 3 3 8 Bearing in mind that Atticus favoured a very literal interpretation of Plato's text, 3 3 9 this suggests that his opposition to Aristotle was connected with a debate among Platonists as to the proper way to approach their master's writings, and the real target of his strictures were 'eclectic' Platonists like Albinus. The alternative favoured in some recent studies, 3 4 0 that his opponents were contemporary Peripatetics, would presuppose the existence of a reasonably prominent group of them devoted to the exegesis of Plato and especially the 'Timaeus'; but the only one known to have done this is Adrastus. Even if there was such a group, the issue raised by Atticus would have been marginal to them, but vitally important to other Platonists. Eusebius quotes nothing from Atticus on logical theory, but other sources ascribe two remarks to him concerning Aristotle's definitions of homonyms and synonyms at the beginning of the 'Categories' 3 4 1 . The first is a footling criticism, but the second raises a question about the relationship of the analogical and metaphorical use of terms which, while only remotely connected with what Aristotle says, is not without interest. The first one is said to be an elaboration of an objection by Nicostratus, who seems to have been about a generation older than Atticus. This philosopher, who is known from a Delphian honorific inscription and from the pages of Aulus Gellius, is said by Simplicius to have been the author of a treatise containing objections to nearly everything said in the 'Categories', written in a "hostile and impudent" manner; it was based on a similar work by an otherwise unknown Lucius 3 4 2 . They are quoted together half a dozen times, Lucius alone three times and Nicostratus alone twelve times; eight of these quotations are in the section dealing with the 'Postpraedicamenta', and it looks as if Lucius may not have included these chapters in his purview. But it is generally assumed that most of the other criticisms of Aristotle's doctrine, which are mentioned and refuted by Simplicius and the other commentators without their 338 339 340

341

342

Fr. 4.10, 5. 3, 7.12; cf. 5 passim, 6 . 1 - 5 . See fr. 14, 15, 18, all from Proclus; cf. DILLON 257f., BALTES 38f. This is the view of DILLON 249f. and BALTES 38 η. 2. BALTES claims that Atticus often describes his opponents as Peripatetics, but in the passages he quotes this term refers to Aristotle and those who hold his doctrines, not to a school of Platonic exegetes. DILLON thinks that his immediate target was Aristocles of Messene, but there is no evidence that he did enough detailed work on Plato to deserve such treatment. Simpl., In Cat. 3 0 . 1 6 f f . ; 3 2 . 1 9 f f . ~ Porph., In Cat. 6 6 . 3 4 f f . , incompletely reported as fr. 4 1 - 4 2 DES PLACES. DES PLACES takes these fragments as evidence that Atticus wrote a commentary on the 'Categories', but no comments on the doctrine of Categories itself, or on any other question of logic, are attributed to him, and there is nothing in his extant fragments to suggest that he had studied any Aristotelian treatise at first hand. Simpl., In Cat. 1 . 1 8 f f . ; for other quotations see the index of the Berlin ed. s.v. See further, for Nicostratus, K. PRAECHTER, Nikostratos der Platoniker, Hermes 57 (1922) 4 8 1 - 5 1 7 = ID., Kl. Sehr. 1 0 1 - 1 3 7 ; Κ. v. FRITZ, Nikostratos no. 26, R E X V I I 1 (1936) 5 4 7 - 5 5 1 ; DILLON 2 3 3 - 2 3 6 . For Lucius, W. CAPELLE Lukios no. 1, R E XIII 2 (1927) 1791 — 1797; PRAECHTER, op.cit., 502 η. 1. C f . L. DEITZ, Bibliographie du platonisme impérial antérieur à Plotin: 1926—1986, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,1) 154 (Lucius) and 154 (Nicostratus).

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authors being named, were taken from Nicostratus, and that his book was nothing less than a collection of all possible objections to Aristotle's teaching on this subject. 3 4 3 Nicostratus for his part used older material, including Stoic arguments which he sometimes misunderstood. 3 4 4 Like Athenodorus and Cornutus, Lucius and Nicostratus complained that Aristotle's list of Categories omitted some terms which should have been included, and claimed that weight should be counted as a third sub-division, with number and extension, of the category Quantity (this point was also made by ps-Archytas). 3 4 5 Like ps-Archytas again Lucius (and probably Nicostratus also) argued that Quality should come before Relation, as it does in Aristotle's list of Categories at 1 b 26, but not in his detailed treatment in the body of his work (c. 7—8); here Simplicius admits that they have a case. 346 They also raised a problem which would have appeared fundamental to Platonists, whether the Categories are found in the intelligible as well as the sensible world; this was already considered by ps-Archytas and was later taken up by Plotinus, and it is impossible to tell for certain how much Lucius and Nicostratus contributed to the discussion. 3 4 7 The other criticisms attributed to either are minor quibbles about Aristotle's use of particular words 3 4 8 or other details. In one place Nicostratus pointed out a discrepancy between the accounts of movement given in the 'Categories' and the 'Physics', showing that he was acquainted with this w o r k . 3 4 9 Nevertheless it seems that his critique was entirely destructive and neither he nor his predecessor made any positive suggestions; the best that can be said for them is that they raised difficulties which it was useful to clear up once and for all. But the trouble they took to refute Aristotle suggests that they must have regarded his teaching as a serious threat to the Platonist position.

V. Aristotelians of the later first and second centuries AD

To return to the Peripatetics of the later first and second centuries A D , the situation is tantalising. We are told the names of many men who called themselves 343

344 345

346 347

348 349

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Many of the arguments attributed to Lucius and/or Nicostratus by Simplicius are quoted anonymously by the other commentators, Porphyry, Dexippus and Ammonius, and are also found in Plotinus (Enn. 6.1); see PRAECHTER 501 ( = 121 ff.). Porphyry seems to have made a point of refuting all of them in his lost large commentary on the 'Categories'; cf. Simpl. 2 1 . 4 , 2 9 . 2 9 etc. See PRAECHTER 488 ( = 108ff.) on Simpl., In Cat. 4 0 6 . 6 f f . Simpl. 6 2 . 2 8 f f . , 6 4 . 1 3 f f „ 1 2 8 . 5 f f . ; Ps-Archytas p. 2 5 . 2 , 28.4 TH. For Athenodorus see above, p. 1111. Nicostratus, ap. Simpl. 368.12ff. criticises Aristotle for not providing a discussion of the category εχειν which would include all the uses of that word enumerated in the 'Postpraedicamenta' (15 b 17ff.). Simpl. 156.16ff., cf. ps-Archytas p. 23.21 ff. TH.; above, p. l l l O f . Simpl. 7 3 . 2 8 f f „ 7 6 . 1 4 f f . ; cf. Plot., Enn. 6 . 1 . 1 - 2 , ps-Archytas p. 22.31 ff., 30.19ff. TH., with SZLEZÁK, ad loc.; above, p. 1109 (with n. 151) and 1132. E.g. π ό σ ο ν , Simpl. 127.30; διάθεσις, 231.20. Simpl. 4 2 8 . 3 f f . , comparing Cat. 15 a 13 with Phys. 225 a 25ff.

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Aristotelians and a number of personal details, including the illness of which one of them died, 3 5 0 but very little about their philosophical activity and any innovations they may have made. It is clear that by the middle of the first century the school, whatever this may mean in the context, prospered and was regarded as the equal of the other great schools. Peripatetic teachers were found in all important cities of the empire; its adherents included men of high social position such as the Cn. Claudii Severi, father and son, consuls in 146 and 163 respectively, of whom the first was one of Marcus Aurelius' teachers and the second became his son-inlaw, and the consular Flavius Boethus, an acquaintance of Galen; a century earlier the Peripatetic Alexander of Aigai was a teacher of the emperor N e r o . 3 5 1 Some members had other interests besides Aristotelian philosophy. Alexander of Damascus, apparently the first holder of the Peripatetic chair at Athens, is said to have had a thorough knowledge of Plato as well as Aristotle, and Galen tells us of an occasion on which he adopted, or professed to adopt, a position closer to that of the Sceptics. 3 5 2 Others took an interest in rhetoric or in grammatical, historical and scientific studies, 3 5 3 and some scientists who were not primarily philosophers, such as Galen and the astronomer Ptolemy, were profoundly influenced by Aristotelian ideas. Among the professed philosophers there were some who devoted all their energies to teaching but wrote nothing and presumably did not claim to have made any great contribution to the advancement of philosophy. Thus we hear of two "Peripatetics", Ammonius and another Ptolemy, who were among the most cultured men of their age but left no "technical" writings, only " p o e m s and discourses written for display" and not intended to be preserved. 3 5 4 Galen also tells us that there were some differences of doctrine between Peripatetics, but that they were smaller than those in other schools. 3 5 5 350 351

352 353

354

355

Galen, Περί έθών II p. 11 f. MÜLLER, on Aristotle of Mytilene. See Longinus ap. Porphyry, Vita Plotini 20.17ff., and the many scattered references in Galen, e.g. XIV 613 KÜHN (Cl. Severus), 627 (Flavius Boethus); for Cl. Severus the elder, Marcus Aurelius, Ad seipsum 1.14.1 with F A R Q U H A R S O N ' S note; for Alexander of Aigai, Suda s.v. A 1128. These and many other names are listed in a long note by Z E L L E R III 1, 805-808; cf. v. M Ü L L E R , Ober Galens Werk v. wiss. Beweis, Abh. Akad. München 20.2 (1895) 411 f., TODD, Alex. Aphr. on Stoic Physics p. 2ff. and, for the social and literary background, G. W. BOWERSOCK, Greek sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford 1969) passim. Galen, De praenot. 5 (XIV 627f. K.), cf. TODD p. 4ff. and below, p. 1159f. See below, on Favorinus and Aristocles. A certain Ptolemy, described as a Peripatetic, criticised the grammarian Dionysius Thrax for defining grammar as an empeiria and not a techne (Sextus, Adv. Math. 1.60, 72; Schol in Dion. Thrac. p. 165.16 H I L G A R D ) ; cf. A. DIHLE, Der Platoniker Ptolemaios, Hermes 85 (1957) 314f. ( = ID., Antike und Orient. Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. V. P Ö S C H L — H . PETERSMANN [Heidelberg 1984] 9f.), R E P I C I C A M B I A N O (above, η. 291) 697ff. and, for a similar criticism attributed to an Aristón who may be the Peripatetic Aristón of Alexandria, above p. 1121. Longinus ap. Porph., V. Plot. 20.49f. This Ptolemy may be identical with the one mentioned in the last note, although this is quite uncertain, but it is not likely that either of them was identical with Ptolemaeus Chennos; cf. DIHLE, Hermes 85 (1957) 314 (above, n. 48) against A. CHATZIS, Der Philosoph u. Grammatiker Ptolemaios Chennos (Paderborn 1914) XIVf. Galen, Propr. Libr. 11 p. 1 1 7 . 1 1 M Ü L L E R .

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Putting all this together and bearing in mind that the 'exoteric' writings of Aristotle and his followers were still being widely read, we can infer that much of the day-to-day work of the school consisted of lectures of a fairly popular kind. T w o surviving textbooks of logic, Apuleius' 'Peri hermeneias' and Galen's 'Introductio logica,' give us some idea of what was taught in this field, and we can see how far the process by which Aristotle's doctrine was turned into 'traditional logic' had already gone. Both writers regularly state syllogisms as inferences, whereas Aristotle stated them as implications; on the other hand Apuleius informs us that the Peripatetics were still in the habit of stating their premises in the form " B is predicated of A " , as Aristotle usually did in the 'Prior Analytics,' instead of " A is B " , which Apuleius evidently regarded as the standard usage of his d a y . 3 5 6 By this and other terminological peculiarities they tried to preserve a distinct identity for their teaching at a time when the various school doctrines were being merged in a single body of accepted theory. There were also controversies with rival schools, especially the Stoics. Most of these went back to Hellenistic times and on most subjects, e.g., the notion of a "fifth substance" or the eternity of the world, both sides were content to restate their traditional views and arguments against their traditional opponents, 3 5 7 but one subject proved more troublesome and led to some development of the Aristotelian position. This was the question of fate and providence, which was thought to have important moral and religious implications and on which the Peripatetics were opposed by Platonists as well as Stoics. Aristotle did not deal with this problem directly and it was only brought into prominence by the Stoics, who held that all events in the universe are governed by an ineluctible destiny in accordance with a providential divine plan. This was something the Aristotelians could not accept, and the greater part of their writings on the subject is filled with anti-Stoic polemics, using arguments many of which are only valid if their own presuppositions are accepted. But they were unwilling to do without fate and providence altogether and tried to accommodate these notions within an Aristotelian framework by identifying fate with 'nature' (φύσις), i. e. the structured process by which things come to be and perish, and providence with the influence exercised by the First Mover on the celestial spheres and through them on the rest of the world. This had the effect of limiting their power to regular natural phenomena and left room for contingent events and actions on the part of individuals. But there is no evidence to suggest that any Peripatetic of our period had worked out a comprehensive theory of fate and providence, and in one place Alexander of Aphrodisias claims to be the first Aristotelian to tackle the subject. 3 5 8

356

357 358

C . 13 p. 192.30ff. THOMAS; cf. SULLIVAN, Apuleian Logic 142f., 149f., and J . LUKASIEWICZ, Aristotle's Syllogistic 2 (Oxford 1957) 1 ff. ; also p. 1122 above and below p. 1170ff. C f . Galen, Propr. Libr. 11 p. 118f. M . on the elementary character of the commentaries on the 'Categories' of Adrastus and Aspasius. See above, p. 1141 £f. Q u a e s t . 2 . 2 1 p. 70.25 BRUNS; the Aristotelian character of Alexander's teaching has been emphasised by P. DONINI, Stoici e Megarici nel 'de fato' di Alessandro di Afrodisia?, in: G . GIANNANTONI (ed.), Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica (Bologna 1977) 173ff. O u r sources for the earlier Peripatetics are very scanty. Apart from isolated

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However, the main activity of the school was still to expound and comment on Aristotle's school-treatises, including the Organon', the chief works of natural philosophy, the 'Metaphysics' and the 'Nicomachean Ethics'. Probably the commentators of this period anticipated many of the innovations found in the writings of Alexander Aphrodisias and his successors, but this can only be known for certain in the relatively few instances in which they are cited by name. The earliest member of this group who can be dated is Alexander of Aigai, the teacher of the emperor Nero, who must have been active about the middle of the first century. To him are attributed three comments on the 'Categories' and 'De cáelo', all exegetical and unimportant in themselves. 359 What is interesting is that he is quoted together with earlier commentators such as Boethus and later ones like Herminus and Alexander of Aphrodisias; thus he takes his place among those who helped to form the scholastic Aristotelianism chiefly known to us from the works of the last-named. The same could be said of two others whose dates are quite uncertain but who seem to belong to the first rather than the second century, Sotion and Achaicus. The first is credited with remarks on the 'Categories' and 'Topics', the second on the 'Categories' alone. In addition Achaicus seems to have been the author of an 'Ethics' from which a couple of anecdotes have been preserved, and Sotion has been identified with the writer of a short paradoxical work about rivers, springs and lakes and of a collection entitled Κέρας Άμαλθείας, from which Gellius (1. 8) reproduces an anecdote about Demosthenes and Lais. 360 If these identifications are correct — and there is room

doxographical reports (see n. 237 above), the fragments of Diogenianus (see above, p. 1142) and what we can read between the lines of the De mundo c. 6—7 (especially 397 b 27ff. ~ Alex., De fato 169.23ff., Quaest. 2.3 p. 47.30ff.; 401 b 9ff.), we only have the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias: the 'De fato', the closing section of bk. 2 of the 'De anima' (p. 179—186) and several of the 'Quaestiones naturales' (the authenticity of the last two works is not beyond dispute, but they probably represent the views of Alexander and his school); see further MORAUX, Alexandre 195-202 and R. W. SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate (London 1983) 23ff., with references; ID., Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, below in this same volume (ANRW II 36,2) 1177ff., 1189ff., 1218 ff., and especially P. D O N I N I , Il 'De fato' di Alessandro. Questioni di coerenza, below 1244—1259, with references. Although Alexander does not name any predecessors, attempts have been made to connect some of his suggestions with earlier members of the school: thus P. MORAUX (Al. v. Aphr. quaest. 2, 3, Hermes 95 [1967] 163 n. 3) tries to link the doctrine of Quaest. 2.3 p. 48.15ff., according to which the differences between animate and inanimate and rational and irrational beings are the work of providence acting trough the movements of the heavenly bodies, with Aristotle of Mytilene (on whom see below, p. 1160ff.); and DONINI (p. 181-183, cf. ID., below p. 1244-1249) has suggested that the theory according to which fate is to be identified with the nature of the individual rather than the species, found in Fat. 6 p. 170.9ff. and De an. 2 p. 185. 12 ff., belonged to earlier Peripatetics, including Galen. 359

360

Simpl., In Cat. 10.19, 13.16, In De cael. 430.29ff., all apparently from Alexander of Aphrodisias. See also n. 351 above. Achaicus: Simpl., In Cat. (see the index in the Berlin edition); Ethics: Diog. Laert. 6. 99, Clem. Alex., Strom. 4.8.56.2. Sotion: Simpl., In Cat. 159.24 (with Achaicus); Alex. Aphr., In Top. 434.3; Paradoxographorum Graecorum Reliquiae, ed. A. GIANNINI (Milan 1965) p. 167f., cf. A. GIANNINI, Studi sulla paradossografia greca, Acme 17 (1964)

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f o r d o u b t , especially in the case of S o t i o n - it means that these Peripatetics, like their Hellenistic p r e d e c e s s o r s , c o m b i n e d their scholarly activity with lecturing and writing of a m o r e p o p u l a r kind. In the f o l l o w i n g century A d r a s t u s exemplifies the philological interests of m a n y Aristotelians. While he w r o t e c o m m e n t a r i e s on the ' C a t e g o r i e s ' and ' P h y s i c s ' , 3 6 1 the main weight of his w o r k lay elsewhere. O n e treatise of his w a s entitled ' O n the order of Aristotle's w r i t i n g s ' ; to j u d g e b y Simplicius' q u o t a t i o n s , his views on the ' P h y s i c s ' were conventional, but in the O r g a n o n ' he w a n t e d to place the ' T o p i c s ' immediately after the ' C a t e g o r i e s ' at the head of the Aristotelian c o r p u s ; he also coined o r revived the title Τ ά π ρ ο τ ω ν τ ό π ω ν f o r the ' C a t e g o r i e s ' and claimed to k n o w a s e c o n d version of this w o r k . 3 6 2 H e also w r o t e o n the ' E t h i c s ' of Aristotle and T h e o p h r a s t u s ; not philosophical c o m m e n t a r i e s , h o w e v e r , but explanations of the literary and historical allusions they contained. N o q u o t a t i o n s attributed to this w o r k are extant, but MORAUX has conjectured that the erudite d i s c u s s i o n of such matters f o u n d in the otherwise jejune anon y m o u s c o m m e n t a r y on E N 2 — 5 m a y be derived f r o m this s o u r c e 3 6 3 . T h e only w o r k of his of which w e have substantial remains w a s a d i s c u s s i o n of the mathematical and a s t r o n o m i c a l sections of Plato's ' T i m a e u s ' ; it is n o t clear whether it w a s part of a full c o m m e n t a r y . T h i s treatise, n o w lost, f o r m e d the basis of t w o others which have survived, the astronomical (and, to a lesser extent, musical) p o r t i o n s of T h e o of S m y r n a ' s ' S u m m a r y of mathematical k n o w l e d g e useful f o r understanding Plato', and C a l c i d i u s ' c o m m e n t a r y o n the ' T i m a e u s ' . 3 6 4 A d r a s t u s '

1 2 8 . S e e f u r t h e r Z E L L E R I I 2 3 , 9 3 1 n . 3 , I I I l 4 , 8 0 5 n . 2 ; J . STENZEL, S o t i o n 2 , R E I I I A 1

361

362

363

364

(1927) 1237f. 'Categories': Galen, De libr. propr. p. 42 K.; 'Physics': Simpl., In Phys. 122.33ff. Simplicius tells us that Porphyry praised the 'Physics'-commentary, but only refers to it on this occasion, and not at all to the commentary on the 'Categories'. Simpl., In Phys. 4.11, 6.4ff.; In Cat. 15.36, 18.16ff.; Anon., Prol. in Cat. 32 b 36 BRANDIS (cf. Elias, In Cat. 132.26f.); cf. ZELLER III 1, 809 η. 3, MORAUX, Listes 58ff. Athenaeus 15.673 e: έκδόντος γαρ τούτου (s.c. Αδράστου) πέντε μεν βιβλία Περί των παρά Θεοφράστω έν τοις περί 'Ηθών καθ' ίστορίαν καί λέξιν ζητουμένων, έκτον δέ περί των èv τοις Ήθικοίς Νικομαχείοις 'Αριστοτέλους, έννοιας άμφιλαφεις παραθεμένου περί του παρά Άντιφώντι τω τραγωδιοποιώ Πληξίππου καί πλείστα 6σα καί περί αύτοϋ του 'Αντιφώντος ειπόντος. The name of the person to whom Athenaeus refers is given as Άδράντος in the manuscript and has been emended to "Αδραστος by CASAUBON. The commentary is printed in C A G 20.122-255. See P. MORAUX, D'Aristote à Bessarion (Les Conférences Charles de Köninck 1, Québec 1970) 24f. KENNY (Arist. Ethics. 37 n. 3) has conjectured that Adrastus was the author of the entire commentary, but has overlooked that the work attributed to him was not a commentary and that only one of his six books dealt with Aristotle. The commentary does, however, contain early material: on p. 248.25f. Atticus is referred to as a contemporary. See the indexes to Theo in the editions of HILLER (Leipzig 1878) and DUPUIS (Paris 1892) and the introduction to J. H. WASZINK'S edition of Calcidius (Plato Latinus IV, London and Leyden 1962, 21975) pp. X X X V - X X X V I I . WASZINK gives references to previous literature and effectively disposes of the view current in the earlier part of this century, that Adrastus derived his material from a commentary on the 'Timaeus' by Posidonius. Cf. SCHMEKEL, Posit. Philos. I 214-224.

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purpose was to explain and justify Plato's teaching by bringing it into conformity with later discoveries. Most of the authorities he used were technical writers, but he maintained Aristotle's doctrine that the heavenly bodies are carried on spheres composed of aitber — one of those attacked by Atticus. Though lacking in originality, we can still see that he combined learning with considerable skill in exposition, qualities which justify Porphyry's good opinion of him. A contemporary of Adrastus was Aspasius, author of commentaries on the 'Categories', 'De interpretatione', 'Physics', 'De cáelo', 'Metaphysics' and E N : large parts of the last-named are still extant. 365 Most of it is a paraphrase of Aristotle's text, particular attention being paid to variant readings, but some problems are discussed in greater depth in excursuses. 366 The longest of these, on the passions (p. 42. 13—47. 2), deserves a closer examination. It begins with a short paragraph (42. 13—26) asking what Aristotle meant by saying that moral virtue is concerned with (περί) pleasures and pains (EN 1104b9) and concludes that passions (of which pleasure and pain are two of the most important) are related to virtue as its matter. We have met with the same doctrine in Plutarch's 'De virtute morali', although Aspasius states it in a more tentative way. 3 6 7 After this he passes to a different question, the relationship between passions and pleasure and pain. 3 6 8 He begins by putting forward the view that pleasure and pain are the most generic subdivisions of passion, while desire (έπιθυμία) contains something of both. This is the one he will eventually adopt, with qualifications (46. 12—6), but before doing so he stops to consider some difficulties. (1) H o w can 'pleasure' in the generic sense be distinguished from 'pleasure' when the word refers to a particular emotion such as pleasure in the well-being of oneself or one's friends? The solution follows immediately and presumably Aspasius only raised this question because he thought that it might puzzle some of his less advanced students. (2) Pleasure and pain can be psychic or 365

Edited by G. HEYLBUT (CAG 19.1); cf. V. ROSE, Uber die gr. Kommentare zur Ethik d. Ar., Hermes 5 (1871) 61 — 113, especially 71 ff. Aspasius' views on the canon have been referred to above, p. 1101. For the remains of the other commentaries see ZELLER III 1, 8 0 8 ; c f . PRANTL I 5 4 5 f f .

366

367

368

I.e. it is the kind of commentary Simplicius (In Cat. l.lOff.) associates with Alexander of Aphrodisias and his teacher Herminus (probably a pupil of Aspasius; see below), in which the exposition of Aristotle's meaning is combined with ζητημάτων έφάψασθαι μετρίως. των οΰν ύποκειμένων εστί καί ΰλης λόγον έχόντων τα πάθη, 42.33; he adds that this is true of πράξεις as well. Cf. Plut. 440 D, ps-Metopus fr. 1 (cited in n. 302 above). There is one difference: Plutarch says that the passions are the material of moral virtue and λόγος its form, and both he and ps-Metopus seem to connect this with the division of the soul into rational and irrational parts, while Aspasius only says that passions (and actions) are the "material" of virtue because its activity (ενέργεια) is "about" these in the same sense as the activity of music is "about" tunes. This is almost certainly due to the context: Aspasius is not giving a systematic account of virtue but commenting on a particular sentence of Aristotle, and only says what is relevant to this. There is no disagreement of substance. For other discussions see MORAUX, Arist. II 280 and n. 190. πώς λέγεται παντί πάθει επεσθαι ήδονην ή λύπην, 42.28; the formulation comes from E N 1104 b 14f.

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bodily, but it is impossible to define psychic pleasure, the species, differently from pleasure in the generic sense (43. 16—32). (3) If pleasure and pain are the genera under which all other passions fall, it is difficult to see how both can be combined in a third entity, desire. For these reasons other interpreters insist that Aristotle regarded pleasure and pain as concomitants of the other passions (43. 33—44. 10). At this point Aspasius makes a new start by quoting and criticising the definitions of πάθος given by the Stoics, Andronicus and Boethus. The critique of the Stoic view is what one might expect: their belief that all passions are contrary to reason and therefore bad fails to take into account the fact that some emotions may be good and that the human soul contains an irrational part with its own legitimate claims. Andronicus and Boethus do not make this mistake 369 . But when Andronicus says that passions are caused by a 'perception' (ύπόληψις) of good or bad, he has failed to take into account that many occur without reflection or a 'perception' being formed. Boethus is criticised for saying that the psychic movement constituting a passion must have a certain magnitude: in Aspasius' view, a n y irrational psychic movement that reaches consciousness deserves to be called a πάθος. The rest of the excursus is of less interest. Some of the points previously raised are discussed at greater length but little is added that is important, and finally Aspasius accepts, on the authority of Plato, that it is "not unreasonable" to classify the passions under the heads of pleasure and pain. 3 7 0 Aspasius has limited his discussion to issues immediately relevant to his text and has been less generous than we might have wished in naming his authorities and opponents, but even so this excursus and others of the same kind give us some insight into the school discussions of the first two centuries AD. To begin with the authorities he used, Plato is quoted with approval and the chief Stoic doctrines are opposed, but in a less hostile spirit than one might have expected. The quotations from Aristotle range beyond the 'Ethics' to include relevant material from the 'De anima' and 'Rhetoric'. 3 7 1 Like Apuleius and others, he distinguished a group of "early" and "later" Peripatetics; the former included Aristotle, Theophrastus (who is quoted by name elsewhere in the commentary) and "Eudemus", by which he meant the author of the 'Eudemian Ethics', 372 of the latter he refers to Andronicus and Boethus by name. They are treated with respect, but not followed slavishly; membership of the same school did not preclude all differences of opinion. Other thinkers, presumably contemporaries or near contemporaries, are referred to as ενιοι; in some cases at least they must be Peripatetics, because the points at issue are the meaning of Aristotle's words and

369 370 371

Cf. above, p. 1114f. 4 6 . 1 2 - 1 6 , after quoting Pl., Laws 636d at line 8. De an. 403 a 30 ~ Asp. 46.3, cf. 43.31; Rhet. 1378 b 5ff. ~ 44.8. For quotations from other works, including the 'Physics' and various parts of the Organon', see H E Y L BUT'S index.

372

P. 44.20£f. ; for Theophrastus and Eudemus see HEYLBUT'S index. The pronoun αυτοί is sometimes used to designate this group (e.g. 2.16, 5.23, 10.30, 156.16; cf. M O R A U X , Arist. II 255f.); this does not imply that Aspasius did not regard himself as a Peripatetic, but is meant to distinguish the early from the later members of the school. Cf. above p. 1088 and n. 42, and p. 1149.

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not the kind of substantive philosophical problem which would be the subject of controversy between different schools 373 . Aspasius' criticism of their interpretations seems to be guided by a desire to free Aristotelianism from the residue of Stoic teaching which its earlier exponents had not shaken off. When Andronicus described the passions as movements caused by a 'perception' (ύπόληψις, a word which in the present context denotes an intellectual awareness or supposition) of good or ill, his definition implied an intellectualist moral psychology like that of the Stoics. And because the Stoics condemned all πάθη as a threat to the domination of "right reason", they were forced to exclude from this category such involuntary reactions as blushing or starting at a sudden noise. 374 Boethus took this over, perhaps partly through inadvertence, but the distinction was artificial and, if one accepted Aristotle's psychology, unnecessary. Purging the school teaching of these accretions was a gradual process and no doubt some Peripatetics were reluctant to press it to its logical conclusion. But the trend was towards a purer form of Aristotelianism. Aspasius also has some interesting things to say about a philological question. His commentary included the three 'disputed' books common to the 'Nicomachean' and 'Eudemian Ethics' (EN 5 — 7 = EE 4—6), but he appears to have had considerable doubts about their status. In the course of his commentary on the treatment of pleasure in E N 7, he refers to Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in E N 10 as "in the Nicomacheans", and adds that Aristotle's failure to refer back to the earlier passage makes it seem as if the book in which it occurs belongs to Eudemus rather than Aristotle; and a few pages later he says that a cross-reference in E N 8 "seems to refer" to something in "the lost part of the 'Nicomacheans'" 375 . We may infer that these books were found in the text of the E N which Aspasius had before him, but he had reason to believe that they had been transferred from the EE in order to take the place of some genuinely Nicomachean books which had been lost in transmission, and the matter was controversial in his day. The controversy would have been all the keener because at least some of the protagonists, including Aspasius himself, regarded the EE as the work of Eudemus. Aspasius' pupil Herminus, one of the teachers of Alexander of Aphrodisias, was a man of the same stamp. We have fragments of commentaries by him on all 373 374 375

E.g. 42.28. See e.g. Sen., Epist. Mor. 11, and n. 185 above. 151.21-26 (on 1153 b 9 ff.): έπεί εν γε τοις Νικομαχείοις, ενθα διείληπται και περί ήδονής, Αριστοτέλης σαφώς εϊρηκεν αύτήν μή ταϋτόν είναι τη εύδαιμονίςι άλλα παρακολουθεϊν 'ώσπερ τοις άκμαίοις την ώραν'. σημείον δέ του μή είναι τοϋτ' 'Αριστοτέλους άλλ' Εύδήμου το έν τφ * λέγειν περί ήδονής ώς ούδέπω περί αυτής διειλεγμένου - πλην εϊτε Εύδήμου ταϋτά έστιν είτε 'Αριστοτέλους, ένδόξως εΐρηται" (the reference in line 22 is to EN 10.4.1174 b 33). 161.9 εοικε δέ είρήσθαι έν τοις έκπεπτωκόσι των Νικομαχείων. Aspasius may have discussed the problem more fully at the beginning of his commentary on bk. 6, which is no longer extant. See further P . M O R A U X and D. HARLFINGER (ed.), Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik. Akten des 5. Symposium Aristotelicum, 2 1 . - 2 9 . 8. 1969 (Peripatoi 1, Berlin 1971) 45ff. and KENNY, Arist. Ethics 29ff., on which cf. n. 112 above.

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the works of the O r g a n o n ' , in which he displays a tendency to excessive elaboration of Aristotle's logical rules, and two quotations by Alexander from lectures on the 'De cáelo', in one of which at least he repeated the teaching of Aspasius. 376 The most startling innovation attributed to him is the idea that the celestial spheres (or at least that of the fixed stars) are endowed with a soul which guarantees the eternity of their rotation. Z E L L E R regards this as a borrowing from Platonism, but Aristotle and Theophrastus sometimes hint that the heavens or celestial spheres may be alive in some sense, and this notion may have continued to lead a ghostly existence in the undergrowth of Peripatetic scholasticism. 377 Herminus' contemporary Sosigenes is quoted occasionally for his comments on logical questions, but his most important work was in the field where natural philosophy and mathematics meet. 3 7 8 Some of it can only have been loosely connected with Aristotelian philosophy; his Περί όψεως must have dealt with many topics not touched on by Aristotle, although it included a discussion of some of the optical phenomena about with he wrote in the 'Meteorologica'. 379 But his Περί των άνελιττουσών (σφαιρών) contained a detailed exposition of the theory of concentric spheres used by Eudoxus, Callippus and Aristotle to explain planetary motions, followed by a critique and an explanation of why the later theories using epicycles and excentric spheres were better able to account for the phenomena. 3 8 0 This work, with its sound learning and skill in exposition, was a boon to later commentators, being extensively quoted by Alexander, Porphyry and Simplicius, but lacked originality. The best of Sosigenes' criticisms of the Eudoxan system were borrowed from others, including Ptolemy the astronomer (Simpl. 506. 16), and we are told that he was no better pleased with the later systems, because they failed to satisfy all the conditions laid down by Aristotle (ibid. 509. 19ff.). An inability or unwillingness to make up his mind seems to have been characteristic of the man. One of the logical questions he raised was what is meant by "that which is said" (το λεγόμενον): is it a sound (φωνή), a thing (πράγμα, i. e. the object referred to) or a concept (νόημα)? We hear that he set out the arguments in favour of each of these possibilities, but did not choose between them. 3 8 1 This way of writing is usually associated with a sceptical out-

376

Simpl., In D e cael. 4 3 0 . 3 2 f f . The fragments have been collected by H . SCHMIDT, D e H e r m i n o Peripatetico (Diss. Marburg 1907); the references are also given by ZELLER III 1,

377

Simpl., In D e cael. 3 8 0 . 3 f f . ; cf. Ar., Cael. 285 a 29, 292 a 18ff.; Theophr., Metaph. 8.

8 0 6 n . a n d 8 1 2 f . , a n d PRANTL I 5 4 5 f f . 5 b 2 . A e t i u s 1. 7 . 3 2 (DIELS D G 378

379 380

381

p . 3 0 5 a).

S e e ZELLER III 1, 8 1 3 , w i t h r e f e r e n c e s , a n d A . R E H M , R E III A 1 ( 1 9 2 7 ) 1 1 5 7 - 1 1 5 9 ( s . v .

Sosigenes no. 7). Alex., In Meteor. 1 4 3 . 1 2 f f . Summaries in Simpl., In de cael. 4 9 3 - 5 1 0 and (Alex. Aphr.) In Metaph. 7 0 3 - 7 0 6 ; but some of the material o n thesé pages may have been added by the writers w h o report Sosigenes, and in particular the replies to some of Sosigenes objections to Aristotle found in Simpl. 509—510, seem to belong to Simplicius. Dexippus, In Cat. 7 . 4 : καί γ α ρ Σ ω σ ι γ έ ν η ς ó Π ε ρ ι π α τ η τ ι κ ό ς π α ρ α λ λ ή λ ο υ ς επιχειρήσεις π ε ρ ί των λ ε γ ο μ έ ν ω ν ά ν τ ε ξ ή τ α σ ε ν , ο ύ μην π ε ρ ί μιας γ ε α υ τ ο τ ε λ ώ ς ά π ε φ ή ν α τ ο , άλλ'

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look. In Sosigenes it may have been a quirk, but bearing in mind that we know of at least one occasion when an eminent Peripatetic publicly adopted an apparently sceptical position, it could have been a deliberate didactic technique. 3 8 2 The third known teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias was a certain Aristotle who is mentioned by several writers quoting Alexander and once in an extant work of Alexander himself. 3 8 3 Until recently the very existence of this man was denied; the passages in which he is named were either taken to refer to Aristotle of Stagira, or the name of Aristocles was substituted for Aristotle's in the text, a change abetted by confusion in some of the inferior manuscripts. But in 1967 MORAUX reexamined the evidence and showed that there really was a Peripatetic philosopher named Aristotle in the second century A D ; Galen tells us of an Aristotle of Mytilene, an older contemporary whom he calls " a man preeminent in Peripatetic philosophy", and Syrianus refers to "the younger Aristotle and interpreter of Aristotle the philosopher". 3 8 4 MORAUX has argued persuasively that both passages refer to the same man and that he was identical with Alexander's teacher. Our knowledge of his work comes from three quotations in Simplicius, Syrianus and Alexander's essay on the intellect. They show him as a competent expositor, like his colleagues, but only the last gives us a real insight into his philosophy. 3 8 5 This falls into two main sections; in the first (p. 110. 4— 112. 5) the younger Aristotle tries to explain what motives led his namesake to postulate the active intellect, and this leads him on to say something about its character. In every process, something potential is brought to actuality by the agency of a thing

382

ίσομαχοϋντας ά φ η κ ε τους λόγους. H i s question may have been suggested by the Stoic doctrine of λεκτά. See n. 352 above. The same indecisiveness has been observed in the work of Alexander of A p h r o d i s i a s b y MORAUX, H e r m e s 95 (1967)

383

169.

Simpl., In D e cael. 153.16, Alex. Aphr., D e anima II (Mantissa) 1 1 0 . 4 ; cf. Cyrill., Contra lui. 2 . 5 9 6 A , 5.741 A . The sources and earlier literature are fully discussed in P. MORAUX' article, 'Aristoteles, der Lehrer des Al. v. A p h r . ' , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 49 (1967) 169—182 (summarised in: ID., Le ' D e anima' dans la tradition, etc. [see η. 15 above] 2 9 4 f f . ) ; this supersedes all previous w o r k on the subject, including MORAUX' own treatment in his Alexandre 143 — 149. See also P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di Mitilene, Elenchos 6 (1985) 67—74, w h o among other things has shown (p. 73 f.) that Alexander has reproduced another of Aristotle's arguments at In Metaph. 166.19-167.1.

Galen, Π ε ρ ί έθών p. 11.4 MÜLLER (cf. above, p. 1152); Syrianus, In Metaph. 100.6. The first passage was overlooked by earlier scholars, the second explained away (ZELLER III 1, 807η.). 385 Alex., I.e. 110.4 — 113.24. T h e passage has been reprinted in HEILAND'S collection of the fragments of Aristocles (see n. 394 below) pp. 78—88, with an apparatus of parallels, and analysed by MORAUX, Alexandre 143 — 164; a French translation with some textual emendations is given ibid. 189—194. C f . ZELLER 8 1 5 f f . , F . TRABUCCO, A c m e 11 (1958) 1 1 7 - 1 2 6 , MORAUX, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 49 (1967) 174ff., G . MOVÍA, Alessandro di Afrodisia (Università di Padova. Pubbl. dell'Istituto di storia della filosofia e del centro per ricerche di filosofia medioevale N . S . 8, Padova 1970) 53—59, with further references. HEILAND, ZELLER and TRABUCCO believe that the author of the doctrines referred to here was Aristocles, but this only affects their interpretations marginally.

384

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in which the same actuality has already been realised; if this law is applied to intellection, it means that the potential intellect inborn in man is brought to actualise its potentiality through the influence of an intellect which is already fully actual, i.e. the "intellect that comes in from outside". Intellection is analogous to sensation, with one difference: where sensation is the passive reception of the form of the sensible object, intellection is an active process of abstracting the form from the object and making actually intelligible what was only potentially intelligible before; 3 8 6 in this process the intelligible and the intellect become one. This is the work of the "intellect in us" in cooperation with the "intellect which exists in nature and outside", 3 8 7 which comes to be in the thinking subject by being thought; it perfects the innate mind and makes it think by being thought, as light makes the eye see by being seen itself and making other objects visible. For it is the only thing that is an object of thought by its own nature, while other things become intelligible "artificially, by its operation". 3 8 8 All this is pretty orthodox, and Aristotle seems to be reproducing traditional material; but then, Alexander goes on, he proceeded to deal with an objection — if mind comes to be in us, this implies that it changes its place, but an immaterial thing cannot do this — by putting forward some ideas of his own. 3 8 9 The (active) intellect, he asserts, always exists in all matter as a fully active substance. Potential intellect arises in the mixture of bodily elements when fire or a similar substance predominates, and is used as a tool by the active intellect; in these circumstances the active intellect acts through the passive, and the owner of the passive intellect is said to think. The active intellect undergoes no change of place, because it is always there and always active, whether or not it is associated with a passive intellect; in this sense it is divine and immortal. Moreover, he continues (p. 113. 6), this divine intellect, alone or in conjunction with the celestial bodies, governs the physical processes of the sublunary world and can be said to be the creator (δημιουργός) of the potential intellect as well as all other physical objects. 390 Alexander concludes his report with a brief critique (113. 12 ff.), of which the most important points are that the notion of a divine mind existing in permanent association with all kinds of matter is Stoic rather than Aristotelian and that, if

386

P. 111.2 ff. Cf. the description of the process by which mathematical properties are abstracted from physical things, attributed to the younger Aristotle by Syrianus, In Metaph. 99.31 - 1 0 0 . 9 . 387 συνεργός δ' άν γίνοιτο τφ έν ήμϊν ό φύσει νους και θύραθεν, 111.27. 388 εστίν ούν φύσει μεν νοητόν ό νους, τα δε άλλα τα νοητά τέχνη τούτου και τούτου ποιήματα, 111.36. 389 βουλόμενοι . . . φεύγειν τάς άπορίας . . . κατ' ιδίαν έπίνοιαν ελεγε τοιαύτα, 112.5ff. These words imply that Alexander is reporting the same authority as before, but that the opinions reported earlier were taken by that authority from others. I therefore follow MORAUX' latest opinion (in his 1967 article and Arist. II 406ff.) in attributing all this matter to the same man, Aristotle of Mytilene. In his earlier book (Alexandre 144ff.) he took a different view of this passage. 390 P. 113.6ff. The next sentence (113.9—16) is very obscure. In his original discussion MORAUX (Alexandre 153ff.) proposed several textual changes; he has now repudiated them (Arist. II 420 n. 71), but I am not convinced that he has resolved all difficulties.

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the active and passive intellect are at all times co-present in each individual, thinking cannot be voluntary. Alexander's remark about Stoicism has been taken up by modern interpreters, and his author has been described as a syncretist who tried to fuse Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines. Certainly he was no orthodox Aristotelian, but it is by no means clear that he must have been influenced by Stoicism. Galen tells us of a Platonist who suggested to him that the articulation of embryos was the work of a "soul stretching through the whole universe", 391 and whereas the immanent deity of the Stoics acted directly upon whatever matter it was contained in, and was the formative principle of natural objects at all levels of organisation, Aristotle's divine intellect interacted with one kind of matter only, that which could give rise to a passive intellect. When not in contact with such matter it pursued its own activity (thinking itself, presumably) without impinging on the surrounding matter, "like a workman without his tools" (112. 25ff.); the idea that it can have a wider demiurgic function is brought in almost as an afterthought (113. 6ff.) and this side of its activity is linked, in ways which the writer has left obscure, to the rotation of the heavenly bodies. Moreover, the active reason is immaterial — this is what gave rise to the aporia. All these features belong to the Platonist tradition more than the Stoic, and the duality of active and passive reason was adopted by at least some Platonists. 392 The idea that the passive intellect arises out of a mixture of physical substances is only a short step from the psychology of Adronicus and Boethus and not very different from Alexander's. 393 Bearing in mind that the same Aristotle was capable of giving a much more orthodox explanation of the main aspects of Peripatetic teaching, it does not seem that 'syncretism' is the right word to describe his attitude, if by this is meant a deliberate attempt to conflate the doctrines of several schools. Rather we seem to have a phenomenon we have met before: a thinker who tried to propagate correct Aristotelian doctrine but lapsed into using language and concepts more appropriate to other philosophies, particularly when faced with a tricky question with which Aristotle did not deal directly. Aristocles of Messene, to whom this account of the active reason was formerly attributed, has been generally regarded as another of Alexander's teachers. But since all the better manuscripts of the texts on which this belief was based name Aristotle (of Mytilene) and not Aristocles, and MORAUX has shown that their testimony should be accepted, the evidence for the old view has vanished, and with it the only basis for determining Aristocles' date. 394 All we can now say is 391

D e foet. format, IV 7 0 0 f . KÜHN; cf. DONINI, Motivi filosofici in Galeno, P P 35 ( 1 9 8 0 ) 3 4 9 , w h o points out the similarity of this to Stoic doctrine.

392 393

E . g . Albinus c. 10. See above, p. 1 1 4 7 f . See above, pp. 1 1 1 3 f . and 1118. T h e persistence o f such ideas among Peripatetics could have been partly due to the influence of medical thinking.

394

The testimonia and fragments have been collected by H . HEILAND, Aristoclis Messenii Reliquiae (Diss.

Gießen 1 9 2 5 ) and exhaustively studied in three long articles by

F.

TRABUCCO: (1) I l problema del ' D e philosophia' di A . di Μ . e la sua dottrina, A c m e 11 (1958) 9 7 - 1 5 0 ;

(2) L a polemica di A . di M . c o n t r o P r o t a g o r a e E p i c u r o , Atti del-

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that he probably lived in the first or second century A D . 3 9 5 H e is not known to have written any commentaries on Aristotle, unless the Η θ ι κ ά in ten books ascribed to him in the 'Suda' was a paraphrase of the 'Nicomachean Ethics'; other titles attributed to him there include handbooks of rhetoric (in the plural!), a book on Serapis and one on 'Whether Homer or Plato was superior', but some or all of these could have belonged to a namesake, as could some remarks about Plato's 'Timaeus' quoted by Proclus. 3 9 6 The only work of his of which we have any real knowledge is one entitled O n Philosophy', originally in ten books, from which Eusebius has quoted a series of long extracts. 3 9 7 It contained a critical survey of Greek philosophy, but its precise arrangement is unknown; 3 9 8 the extant fragments are taken from the seventh and eighth books, dealing with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and various sceptical and hedonistic schools, from Protagoras to Epicurus, respectively. It is a work marked more by enthusiasm than philosophical or historical acumen. Aristocles had a high regard for Plato, whom he described as the first thinker to pay due attention to all three parts of philosophy and to determine their relationship to each other. 3 9 9 The only fragment dealing with Aristotle (2 H ) is devoted to refuting attacks by various authors, from the fourth century B C onwards, on his life and character; his philosophy is not touched on. The last fragment of book 7 (fr. 3 H ) is a brief doxographical report, with no discussion or criticism, of the fundamentals of Stoic cosmology. The fragments of the following book are much more critical in tone: it dealt with philosophers who, according to Aristocles, failed to make balanced use of both sensation and reason, but emphasised one at the expense of the other. Thus Protagoras and Metrodorus of Chios relied exclusively on the senses, Xenophanes and Parmenides on reason (fr. 4—5 H ) , and the Sceptics denied the validity of either (fr. 6). The last two fragments (7—8) discuss the hedonistic schools,

l'Accademia delle Scienze di T o r i n o 93 ( 1 9 5 8 — 5 9 ) 4 7 3 — 5 1 5 ; (3) L a polemica di A . di M . c o n t r o lo scetticismo e Aristippo e i Cirenaici, Riv. Crit. di Storia della Filosofia 15 ( 1 9 6 0 ) 1 1 5 — 1 4 0 . The fragment concerned with Aristotle has been edited and c o m m e n t e d by DÜRING, A B p. 3 7 3 ff. His criticism of the Sceptics has been discussed by SCHMEKEL, Die positive Philosophie I (Berlin 1938) and F . DECLEVA CAIZZI, Pirrone (Naples 1 9 8 1 ) ; see their indices s . v . 395

MORAUX (Arist. II 8 5 f f . ) would put him early in the first century A . D . , because he refers to Aenesidemus' revival of scepticism as happening έχθές και πρώην, and Aenesidemus was active in the later first century B . C . This would fit in nicely with the traces of Antiochus' (of Ascalon) influence which TRABUCCO has found in his fragments ( R C S F 15. 138, etc.), but some of the expressions he uses, e.g. του Πλάτωνος περιπάτου (fr. 2 p. 3 5 . 3 Η . = E u s e b . , P E 15.2.1 p. 3 4 6 . 2 0 MRAS) would seem to point to a later date.

396

Suda s.v. = Test. I H . ; Proclus, In PI. Tim. 1 . 1 9 . 2 9 DIEHL. The text of the Suda entry is confused and the title Πότερον σπουδαιότερος Ό μ η ρ ο ς ή Πλάτων has clearly been inserted in the w r o n g place. F o r Aristocles' namesakes see R E s.v. and HEILAND p. 4 ; they include a grammarian and one Aristocles of Pergamum, w h o began as a student of Peripatetic philosophy but then, under the influence of H e r o d e s Atticus, became a rhetor and Sophist (cf. Philostr., Vit. Soph. 2 . 1 5 . 3 . 5 6 7 f . ; MORAUX, Arist. II 8 4 f . ) .

397

E u s e b . , P E 1 1 . 3 , 1 4 . 1 7 - 2 1 , 1 5 . 2 , 14.

398

HEILAND'S speculations on this subject (p. 9 0 f f . ) are unconvincing.

399

F r . 1 H . ; for anticipations of Aristocles' view, see n. 9 9 above.

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Cyrenaics and Epicureans; they are not criticised on ethical but on epistemologica! grounds, as sensationalists. 400 While this makes a refreshing change from the usual moral strictures, it cannot be said that Aristocles' arguments go very deep or demonstrate any consistent attempt to understand his opponents' point of view. However, his work was evidently intended for a popular readership and may have been quite effective as propaganda.

VI. Ptolemy and Galen

The efforts of the thinkers discussed in the last section were to culminate in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who is the subject of a separate chapter of this volume (R. W. SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, below pp. 1176—1243), but before concluding our survey we must look briefly at two men who, although not primarily philosophers, were interested in philosophy and whose ideas were to be more influential than those of most of the men we have considered so far: Claudius Ptolemaeus the astronomer and the physician Galen. Both are often described as 'eclectic Peripatetics', but the label is unhelpful. Their thinking was conditioned by the needs of their scientific work, using 'scientific' in its modern English sense; they were not committed to any school and believed that many of the problems of natural philosophy and theology which divided the schools were insoluble or at least not relevant to what they were trying to do. For both the way to truth lay through the sciences, of which mathematics was the paradigm — Galen tells us that it was his conviction of the certainty of mathematical demonstration which saved him from becoming a sceptic. 4 0 1 In trying to determine the Aristotelian element in their thinking, it is important to bear in mind that many of Aristotle's ideas had long been common property. Nevertheless it is true to say that the framework of Ptolemy's cosmology was Aristotelian 402 , since it included features rejected by the other schools in his day: the existence of an unmoved first cause of movement, the eternity of the world, and that the heavenly bodies, composed of an imperishable and unchanging substance, are a cause of movement (for the sublunary world) and moved themselves, the eternity of their movement being guaranteed by their 400

401

402

According to MORAUX, Arist. II 124ff., the fragments of bk. 8 should be read in the following order: 6, 7, 8, 4, 5. Ptol., Math. Synt. 1.1 p. 6.11 HEIBERG, Judie. 7 p. 11.13f. LAMMERT; Galen, Plac. Hipp, et Plat. 9.7 p. 779 K., cf. below, p. 1167; Libr. Propr. 11 p. 116.20ff. MÜLLER. See F. BOLL, Studien über Klaudios Ptolemaeus, Jahrb. f. CL. Philol. Suppl. 21 (1894) 49—244, especially pp. 66—110 and 131 — 163, and F. E. ROBBINS, in the introduction to his Loeb edition of the 'Tetrabiblos' (1948) p. vii. A recent survey with full references is contained in the article, by several authors, Klaudios Ptolemaios, R E X X I I I 2 (1959) 1788-1859.

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proximity to the unmoved mover. Even more significant is that Ptolemy classified the 'simple bodies' by their natural movements — the substance of the heavenly bodies has a circular movement while the sublunary elements were divided into active ones, endowed with a rectilinear movement away from the centre of the universe, and passive ones, whose movement is towards the centre. 4 0 3 Some typically Aristotelian distinctions are handled with a familiarity which suggests that he may have read some of Aristotle's works himself: that between 'living' and 'living well' is used to differentiate between the functions of the two 'leading parts' of the soul, the centre of vital activity situated in the parts about the heart and the intellect seated in the brain; and in the preface of the 'Tetrabiblos' Aristotle's distinction between the degrees of accuracy to be expected from theoretical and practical sciences is applied to astronomy and astrology. 4 0 4 But these elements are overlaid by matter drawn from other sources. Many of Ptolemy's cosmological presuppositions could have come to him from earlier astronomers independently of any direct Aristotelian influence, and he replaced the mechanism of concentric spheres to explain planetary motions with a system of excentrics and epicycles derived from Hipparchus and his followers. His acceptance of astrology placed him on the side of the Stoics in one of the major controversies of the time and his remarks about the moral value of astronomy have their roots in the Platonic tradition. 4 0 5 His only extant philosophical work, a short essay entitled O n the criterion of knowledge and the governing part of the soul', is, as its title shows, more Stoic than Peripatetic in inspiration. The theory of knowledge it contains is almost entirely Stoic, 4 0 6 while the psychology found in its later chapters combines strands of various origins: its notion that the soul is dependent on the physical constitution of the body is not very different from some contemporary Peripatetic teaching, but the tripartition of the soul, the location of different parts in different parts of the body, and the argument that the intellect must be placed in the head because it is the most honourable part of the soul, are Platonic. However, the closest parallel to Ptolemy's psychology as a whole seems to be in the writings of Galen, and it is possible that he borrowed it from a medical source. 4 0 7

403

Math. Synt. 1.1 p. 7 . 5 f f . , cf. 5.15 HEIBERG; these assumptions are later used to support the sphericity of the universe and the earth's position at its centre (c. 3 p. 13.21 ff., c. 7 p. 21. 9ff.). The point would be put beyond doubt if Ptolemy believed that the circles of his system represented real orbits of real bodies, as G . E. R. LLOYD has argued (Saving the appearances, CQ 72 [1978] 215ff.). For a recent restatement of the older view that Ptolemy's hypotheses made no claim to be a true representation of reality, see H . L. MEAD, The methodology of Ptolemaic astronomy, Laval Théologique et Philosophique 31 (1975) 55 — 74. The classification of bodies by their natural movements comes from Arist., Cael. 1.2.

404

Judie, c. 16, cf. Arist., P A 656 a 6 f f . ; Tetrab. 1.1, cf. E N 1.1. Math. Synt. 1.1 p. 7.17ff. HEIB.; cf. Ptolemy's epigram, Anth. Pal. 9.577. See the parallels cited by F. LAMMERT in his Teubner edition (1950, 2 1961) and the articles cited there (p. IV n. 1) and in R E X X I I I 2 (1959) 1854ff. Judie, p. 19.15 (for Peripatetic parallels see p. 1113f. and notes 1 7 4 - 1 7 6 above), 2 1 . 2 f f . , 2 2 . i f f . For Galen see below p. 1167f.

405 406

407

77 ANRW II 36.2

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Galen's attitude to philosophy was more self-conscious. He believed that every physician should have a philosophical education, from which he should gain a grounding in scientific method, a knowledge of the fundamental laws of nature and the moral training essential for the effective pursuit of his calling. H e himself began to attend philosophical lectures at the age of fourteen; he heard representatives of all four dogmatic schools and wrote numerous commentaries and essays about the teaching of all of them. 4 0 8 His own philosophical position is not easy to determine. Traditionally he has been called an "eclectic Peripatetic"; 4 0 9 more recently it has become fashionable to call him a "Platonist." 4 1 0 In his writings he shows much hostility to Sceptics and Epicureans and some to Stoicism — in his essay O n his own books' the chapter listing his writings on Stoicism is headed 'Books expressing disagreement with the philosophy of the Stoics'. 4 1 1 But although he admired Plato and Aristotle, Galen refused to commit himself to the metaphysical doctrines of either, and much of his teaching shows more affinity to that of the Stoics, including Posidonius. He was widely read in Aristotle's works, including the zoological writings which most contemporary Peripatetics ignored, but seems to have been especially attracted by his logic; all but one of the titles he enumerated in his list of 'Books concerned with Aristotle's philosophy' belong to this field. They include commentaries on all of the O r g a n o n ' except the 'Topics', Theophrastus' Περί καταφάσεως και άποφάσεως and Eudemus' Περί λέξεως. 4 1 2 But he was also prepared to differ openly from Aristotle, and some of his critiques provoked Alexander to reply. 4 1 3

408

Education: Anim. Pass. 1.8, V 42ff. KÜHN = Ser. Min. I 32f. MARQUARDT; Philosophical writings: Libr. Propr. c. 1 1 - 1 6 , Scr. Min. II 115 — 124 MÜLLER; many of these seem to have been little more than student exercises and none are extant. See further J . ILBERG, Über die Schriftstellerei des Klaudios Galenos IV, Rh. Mus. 52 (1897) 5 9 1 - 6 2 3 ; ZELLER 8 5 4 - 8 6 3 ; I. MÜLLER, Abh. Akad. München X X 2 (1895) 4 1 2 - 4 1 4 ; A. SCHMEKEL, Die positive Philosophie I (Berlin 1938) passim (see the index); R. WALZER, N e w light on Galen's moral philosophy, in: ID., Greek into Arabic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Oriental Studies 1, O x f o r d 1962) 142ff.; J . KOLLESCH, Galen und die Zweite Sophistik, in: V. NUTTON (ed.), Galen: Problems and Prospects (a collection of papers presented at a conference in 1979 and published by the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine in 1981) 1 - 1 2 .

409

ZELLER, I.e., UEBERWEG-PRAECHTER

410

P . DE L A C Y , G a l e n ' s

411

412

413

Platonism,

AJP

N

576,

12

563.

93 ( 1 9 7 2 ) 2 7 - 3 9 ;

with qualifications M .

FREDE,

Galen's Epistemology, in: NUTTON (ed.), Galen: Problems and Prospects, 65 ff.; P. DONINI, Motivi filosofici in Galeno, PP 35 (1980) 3 3 3 - 3 7 0 . Τα προς την των Στωικών φιλοσόφων διαφέροντα, c. 15 p. 123.10 Μ . ; the word διαφέροντα is also found in the headings of the chapters on Galen's writings against Erasistratus and the Empirical and Methodist schools of medicine (cc. 7, 9, 10, pp. 114ff. M.). Libr. Propr. 11 p. 118f., 14 p. 122f. M. Except for the commentary on the 'Categories', these writings were youthful efforts, probably little more than a student's notes on his reading. — Both the passages cited here should be added to F. WEHRLI'S collection of Eudemus' fragments (Die Schule des Aristoteles VIII [Basel 1955]) and the second to L . REPICI'S edition of Theophastus' logical fragments (Bologna 1977). We know of this particularly from Arabic writers, some of whom assert that their disagreement led to an exchange of insults with Alexander; see N . RESCHER and Μ . E. MARMURA, The refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of Galen's treatise on the theory

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This is not the place for a detailed examination of the philosophical presuppositions underlying Galen's medical thinking. 414 It will be enough to indicate briefly where he stood on the major issues of his day. To begin with, he believed in the teleological organisation of the world and tried to apply this principle to living things in great detail (especially in the 'De usu partium'); he regarded matter as continuous and understood biochemical processes in terms of the four basic qualities hot, cold, wet and dry, which he held to be incorporeal, although tied to material substrates. All this placed him firmly on the PlatonicAristotelian-Stoic side, against those who held atomistic and mechanistic theories, the Epicureans and, in medicine, men like the Erasistrateans or Asclepiades of Bithynia. But there is little that is specifically Aristotelian and we find Stoic concepts, such as the distinction between φύσις and ψυχή, 4 1 5 side by side with others derived from Aristotle. His thinking was not guided by adherence to a philosophical system but by the requirements of his medical study and practice, and some questions were excluded from consideration because they were not relevant to this. His attitude shows up particularly in his remarks about the soul. Different views about this are put forward in different contexts; they have affinities with Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic ideas, but nothing of what Galen says follows the orthodox teaching of any school, and he distinguished between problems relevant to the philosopher and to the physician or moralist. 416 In a late tract entitled 'That the powers of the soul follow the composition of the body' he accepted a view similar to the one adopted by Andronicus and Boethus, and later by Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to which the soul's activity is the outcome of the combined activities of all the bodily constituents of the organism. His reason was the observed fact that mental states are influenced by physiological factors, and he quoted passages from the 'Timaeus' and Aristotle's zoological writings to show that both Plato and Aristotle recognised this. But he

of motion (Islamabad, Islamic Research Institute 1965) I f f . , MÜLLER (see n. 408 above) p. 417f. ; cf. A. DIETRICH, Die arabische Version einer unbekannten Schrift des Alexander v. Aphrodisias über die Differentia specifica, Nachr. Akad. Wiss. Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. 1964.2, 96, 99 (nos. 11 and 28). 414

See, besides the works already quoted, R. E. SIEGEL, Galen's system of physiology and medicine; Galen on sense-perception; Galen on psychology, psychopathology, and functions and diseases of the nervous system (Basel and N e w York 1968, 1970, 1973) (must be used with caution, especially where they touch on Galen's relationship with Aristotle and other philosophers); P. MORAUX, Galien et Aristote, in: F. BASSIER, F. DE WÄCHTER (edd.), Images of man in ancient and mediaeval thought (Festschr. G. Verbeke) (Symb. Fac. Litt, et Philos. Louvaniensis Ser. A, Vol. I, Leyden 1976) 127—146; ID., Galien comme philosophe, in: NUTTON (ed.), Galen: Problems and Prospects, 87—116; and n o w Arist. II 6 8 7 - 8 0 8 .

415

Nat. Fac. 1.1, II I K . An interesting conspectus of Galen's use of Aristotelian and Stoic formulations in his discussions of Plato's teaching is given by P. KRAUS and R. WALZER in the introduction of their edition of his Compendium of Plato's 'Timaeus 1 (London 1951: Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi, Plato Arabus 1) p. 8ff. Plac. Hippocr. et Plat. 9 . 7 p. 779 K.; cf. ZELLER III 1, 862, MORAUX, Galien et Aristote 1 3 6 ff.

416

77*

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criticised Plato's belief in immortality as impossible to prove, and Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is the form of the body as unclear. 4 1 7 Galen's strictly philosophical work was mainly in logic, but the ancient commentators quote some remarks of his about Aristotle's teaching on place and t i m e . 4 1 8 They include one positive suggestion, that time is dependent on movement not so much because the objects by means of which we recognise time are in movement, but because our awareness of anything, even when it is not in motion, involves a movement of the m i n d . 4 1 9 Otherwise Galen's objections are concerned almost entirely with the formal validity of Aristotle's arguments, and the reason for this becomes clear when we are told that one of them stood in his chief logical work, the 'Apodictic'; presumably the others were taken from the same source, not from a work on natural philosophy. 4 2 0 The same formalism is a feature of a critique of Aristotle's doctrine that everything that is moved is moved by something else, of which we have a brief report in Simplicius and a fuller one in an essay by Alexander devoted to its refutation, of which an Arabic version has recently come to light. 4 2 1 Here Galen asserted that Aristotle's argument at the beginning of 'Physics' book 7 , 4 2 2 , in which he set out to demonstrate that every moving body is moved by another, is fallacious, while Alexander claimed that it

417

418

419

420

421

422

IV 767it. K. = Scr. Min. II 3 2 - 7 9 M. For Andronicus, see p. 782 K.; for quotations from Plato and Aristotle, p. 789ff. K. for criticism of them, p. 773ff. K. Themistius and Simplicius on Arist., Phys. 211 b 10 (cf. Philoponus, In Phys. 576.21 ff.), 218 b 21 and 219 b 5. Them., In Phys. 144.23ff. = Simpl. 708.27ff., from the eighth book of Galen's 'Αποδεικτική (on which see below). This interpretation, though rejected by Themistius and Simplicius (and presumably Alexander, from whom both probably derived their information), is based on Arist., Phys. 218 b 22. There is some evidence from an Arabic source that Galen developed a theory of his own, according to which time is self-subsistent and measured by motion, for which he claimed the authority of Plato and which was criticised by Alexander. See S. P I N E S , Beiträge zur islamischen Atomlehre (Berlin 1936) 74f.; ID., A tenth-century philosophical correspondence, Proc. Amer. Acad, for Jewish Research 24 (1955) 1 1 1 ff. = A. B. H Y M A N (ed.), Essays in mediaeval Jewish and Islamic philosophy (New York 1977) 365ff.; R. W. S H A R P L E S , Alex, of Aphr. O n Time', Phronesis 27 (1982) 72 ff. ; R. S O R A B J I , Time, Creation and the Continuum (London 1983) 82 ff. See I . v. M Ü L L E R , Über Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis, Abh. Akad. München (1. Kl.) X X 2 (1895) 467ff. This work, now lost, consisted of fifteen books; the early ones dealt with logical theory, including both formal logic and theory of knowledge, while the later ones apparently showed by means of examples how the rules there formulated could be applied to scientific problems. D O N I N I ( P P 35.369f.) takes these books as evidence that Galen regarded much of natural philosophy as falling within the scope of λογική θεωρία, but his argument is unconvincing. Simpl., In Phys. 1039.13ff. The Arabic text has been edited and translated by N. RES C H E R and M . E. M A R M U R A , The refutation by Alex, of Aphr. of Galen's treatise on the theory of motion (Islamabad, Islamic Research Institute 1965). Cf. S. P I N E S , A refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the theory of motion, Isis 52 (1961) 21—54 and R. W. S H A R P L E S , Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, below in this same volume (ANRW II 36,2) 1188 (7) (for bibliography). 241 b 3 4 - 2 4 2 a 49 ~ 241 b 2 4 - 2 4 2 a 15; cf. Ross, ad loc.

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is valid, although not demonstrative. In view of the parallels, it would be tempting to conclude that this argument of Galen also came from the 'Apodictic': but since it was apparently adressed to Herminus, 4 2 3 it must have stood in an independent essay, perhaps the treatise 'Concerning the (doctrine of) the unmoved first mover' which Galen lists among his writings connected with Aristotle's philosophy. 4 2 4 If it was a preliminary to an attack on the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover, this may explain why Alexander deemed it worthy of such a lengthy reply. T w o short logical treatises are extant, in both of which Galen's attitude to Aristotle is much more positive. O n e deals with 'fallacies due to language'. 4 2 5 It takes its starting-point from Aristotle's enumeration, in the fourth chapter of the 'Sophistici Elenchi' (165b25ff.), of six fallacious arguments "arising from language" (παρά της λέξεως), from which it develops a systematic classification of types of ambiguity in words and sentences. Galen's avowed intention was to demonstrate (against the Stoics, whose doctrines are criticised in detail in the final chapter) that Aristotle was right to posit the existence of six types of ambiguity 4 2 6 , but his classification cuts across Aristotle's in several respects. It ignores a distinction made by Aristotle in a subsequent chapter between fallacies due to ambiguity in the strict sense and those due to confusion between words or phrases which are similar but not identical; for Galen, every linguistic phenomenon capable of giving rise to a fallacy in dictione was a case of ambiguity (το διττόν). 4 2 7 Two of Aristotle's types, Composition and Division, are combined into one, and the last, Figure of speech, is divided into two. The resulting six types are divided into three classes, 'actual', 'potential' and 'apparent' ambiguity, each of which can occur either in words or sentences. Galen claims that his scheme is exhaustive and its divisions mutually exclusive and that it contains the

423 424

425

426 427

RESCHER-MARMURA 18 (C 67 a 28), 44 (E 66 b 24); cf. their comments, pp. 57ff. Libr. propr. 14 p. 123.4 MÜLLER; it is the only non-logical title included in this section. O n the source of Alexander's refutation see RESCHER and MARMURA p. 57ff. Περί των π α ρ ά την λέξιν σοφισμάτων, XIV 582—598 KÜHN; edited with introduction, English translation and commentary by R. B. EDLOW (Philosophia antiqua 31, Leiden 1977); new critical edition in S. EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi (Leiden 1981) (Corpus Latinum Comm. in Ar. Graecorum 7) vol. II p. 1—26, with discussions in vol. I pp. 14—17, 78—87, 236—239. The work is quoted with approval in ps-Alexander's commentary on the SE, pp. 2 2 . 7 and 142.29, and may have been used in other passages without mention of the author's name; see EDLOW 117ff. PRANTL'S discussion (I p. 576f.) is now superseded. C. 1 ad fin. Arist. 168 a 24ff.; cf. EDLOW p. 21. If this is a mistake on Galen's part, as EDLOW thinks, it may have arisen because Aristotle only introduces this distinction much later (it would throw an interesting light on the way in which Galen read Aristotle). But it may be deliberate; Aristotle's category of "fallacies due to confusion of language" coincides with Galen's "potential ambiguity", but in Galen's version of the scheme this only contains two, not three modes and could therefore no longer serve as one limb in a dichotomy. The distinction is also ignored by ps-Alex. p. 5 6 . 2 7 f f .

1170

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substance of Aristotle's classification, but in fact it is an independent development of his ideas. 428 Galen shows even more independence in other fields. H e retained Aristotle's ten categories and even tried to show how categorical syllogisms can be used to demonstrate propositions concerned with each of them. But he added an eleventh, Composition (σύνθεσις) which, he claimed, Aristotle had been wrong to omit. 4 2 9 This appears to have been Galen's own invention and may be connected with the Stoic distinction between natural objects, ηνωμένα, and artefacts, συνημμένα; it is not mentioned by any other writers, earlier or later. A different account, according to which Galen held that there were five categories, ουσία, ποιόν, ποσόν, πρός τι, and πρός τί πως εχον, may be a simple mistake, as PRANTL thinks. 4 3 0 But the same list is found in ps-Plutarch 'De fato' (568F) and may have been current in Platonist circles; in this case it is possible that Galen somewhere raised the question whether some of Aristotle's categories could be subsumed under others. We are better informed about Galen's views on the syllogism, to which the greater part of his 'Introductio Logica' is devoted. 4 3 1 Here the Peripatetic and Stoic systems of logic are discussed one after the other. Galen tells us something of the development of the subject and the differences between the schools, including their rival terminologies. But he makes no attempt to weld them into one comprehensive system, preferring to treat the different kinds of syllogism as alternative techniques for dealing with logical problems. 4 3 2 His attitude to his predecessors is, as usual, ambivalent; he shows a degree of asperity towards Chrysippus, but occasionally uses Stoic terminology 428

O n e point should be briefly mentioned. O n e of the authorities to w h o m Galen refers is given in the manuscript as Eudemus (p. 102.16 E D L O W = 18.16 EBBESEN = Eud. fr. 29 WEHRLI), and if this is correct, it would appear that Eudemus anticipated Galen's teaching about Figure of Speech and possibly more. But EBBESEN has emended the name to Euthydemus, arguing that Galen only meant to refer to Plato's dialogue of that name as a well-known source of examples of these fallacies. This is attractive, but we k n o w from Galen himself that he was familiar with Eudemus' Π ε ρ ί λέξεως (see above, p. 1166 and n. 412). I shall come back to this question on another occasion.

429

Inst. log. c. 1 3 ; O n Composition, § 11 (p. 3 1 . 1 4 F F . KALBFLEISCH); cf. K I E F E R and M A U , ad loc. and n. 134 above. Galen's υ π ό μ ν η μ α on the 'Categories', unlike his other writings on Aristotle's logic, seems to have been written relatively late in his life and intended for advanced students; see Libr. propr. 11 p. 42 K. Elias (formerly David), In Cat. 160.20ff.; cf. P R A N T L I 5 6 4 n. 8 5 . Ed. C . KALBFLEISCH (Leipzig 1896). Translations with notes by J. M A U (Berlin 1960) (German) and J. S. KIEFFER (Baltimore 1964) (English). This essay must belong to a late period in Galen's life; it is not listed in his ' D e libris propriis', but refers to a number of his other writings (see KALBFLEISCH'S index s.v. Galen) and at one point claims to supplement their teaching (c. 17.1). It was regarded as spurious by PRANTL (I 591 ff.) but was proved genuine by C. KALBFLEISCH, Ü b e r Galens Einleitung in die Logik, Jahrb. f. Class. Philol. Suppl. 23 (1897) 681—708 and has been accepted by all subsequent scholars. See also SCHMEKEL, Posit. Philos. I 528f., 533ff., 602ff.; W . and M. K N E A L E , The Development of Logic (Oxford 1962) 182 ff. In the same way Galen uses a Platonic-Aristotelian and a Stoic series of causes in different works without saying how the t w o sets are related; see MORAUX, Galien comme philosophe 88 and n. 6.

430 431

432

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when referring to Aristotelian doctrines, and where he tries to make an independent advance in logical theory, e.g. on paradisjunctive or relational syllogisms (cc. 14f. and 16ff.), he starts from Stoic positions. Perhaps he took the view that the theory of the categorical syllogism had been fully worked out by Aristotle and his followers, but something remained to be done in the field which the Stoics had made their own. Finally, a word must be said about the most striking innovation in logic attributed to Galen: the establishment of the 'fourth figure' of the categorical syllogism. This was ascribed to Galen by several writers of the Syro-Arabic tradition, but only by two late Greek sources; 4 3 3 on the other hand Galen himself, in the 'Institutio' (c. 12.1), flatly denies that there can be more than three figures, and refers to his own O n demonstration' for the proof. 4 3 4 Since this was his chief work on logic and the 'Institutio' is a much later work in which he revised some of his earlier views (c. 17. 1), this would seem to be decisive evidence against the attribution, and another late Greek source explains how the error could have arisen: 4 3 5 Galen, we are told, while holding that there are only three figures of the standard categorical syllogism, also investigated compound syllogisms (with three premises) in his 'On demonstration' and found that there can be four figures of these. Recently N . RESCHER, in the fullest discussion of the problem to date, has claimed to find new evidence for the traditional view in the treatise of Ibn al-Salah, who refers to a work entitled 'On the fourth figure of Galen' by a certain Dinkä the Priest, active about 800, and also claims that alKindl, who died c. 870, was told by an unnamed contemporary that he possessed a treatise by Galen on the subject. N o n e of this can stand against the thricerepeated word of Galen himself. The report about al-Kindï is no more than hearsay, and it would have been very easy for Dinkä to be mistaken, e. g. if he found a scholium on the fourth figure appended to a genuine work of Galen. 4 3 6 433 They a r e (1) a commentary, probably of the seventh century, on the T r i o r Analytics', of which the section dealing with the fourth figure has been edited by PRANTL I 572 n. 100 and KALBFLEISCH (1897) p. 707 (the salient part is more easily accessible as Eudemus fr. 18 WEHRLI); the writer seems to be uncertain of Galen's authorship, saying only that some younger writers ascribed this doctrine to Galen. (2) A reference in the Δ ι ά φ ο ρ α ζητήματα of Johannes Italus (11th century), printed from C o d . Monac. gr. 99 fol. 330 ν by PRANTL, Gesch. d. Logik II 2 (1885) 302 n. 112. 434

435

436

We learn from a recently published Arabic source that this assertion stood in the 9th book of the Π ε ρ ί αποδείξεως and was repeated in the Π ε ρ ί του τών συλλογισμών ά ρ ι θ μ ο ϋ ; see Ibn al-Salah, O n the fourth figure of the categorical syllogism, edited by N . RESCHER in: 'Galen and the Syllogism' (Pittsburgh 1966) 53. A scholion O n all the forms of the syllogism' printed in the preface of WALLIES' edition of Ammonius, In Anal. Prior. ( C A G 4 . 6 ) p. I X f f . See further J . LUKASIEWICZ, Aristotle's Syllogistic (Oxford 2 1957) 3 8 f f . ; W. and M. KNEALE 183f. RESCHER 1 ff. His assertion (p. 6) that " O f Galen's almost forty logical treatises, the majority were put into A r a b i c " by Hunain ibn Ishäq and his collaborators, is ill founded: Hunain himself includes only half a dozen of Galen's logical works in his catalogue; three of these, including the O n demonstration', were only available in mutilated copies, and only three were translated into Syriac or Arabic. See G . BERGSTRÄSSER, Hunain ibn Ishaq, Ü b e r die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Ubersetzungen (Abhandlungen

1172

Η. Β. G O T T S C H A L K

VII. Conclusion It is time to place our findings in a wider perspective. The propagation of Aristotelianism in the first two centuries A D seems to have taken place at several levels. For the committed student there was the study and exposition of Aristotle's school-treatises. Much sound and lasting work was done in this field, but it seems to have been confined to a fairly restricted circle, although some contributions were made by members of other schools or those, like Galen, who did not tie themselves to any school at all, as well as professed Aristotelians. For a wider audience there were compilations and handbooks purveying Aristotle's doctrines in a more accessible form and the 'exoteric' writings of Aristotle and his pupils, which continued to circulate in this period; the impression sometimes given that they were driven out of circulation as soon as Andronicus made the school-treatises available, is seriously misleading. 4 3 7 Lastly there was an immense production of sub-philosophical tracts, like the pseudo-Pythagorean writings, which might include some Aristotelian ideas, but always diluted and heavily contaminated with others of a different origin. We may ignore the third of these, which contributed little or nothing to the development of Aristotelianism as such. Historians naturally concentrate on the first, which so profoundly influenced the subsequent tradition, but it would be a mistake to neglect the second entirely. The eminent men of affairs who professed themselves followers of Aristotle will not have been motivated by a passionate belief in the priority of the categorical over the hypothetical syllogism or the eternity of the physical universe. What Aristotelianism had to offer them was a view of the world and a reasoned set of ethical beliefs which avoided the mechanism and hedonism of the Epicureans, the determinism and rigorism of the Stoics, and the other-worldliness of Platonism; and this is more or less what we find in the popular writings influenced by Aristotle's philosophy, whether composed by members of the school or by outsiders like Plutarch. However we rate the philosophical value of this side of the school's activity, it undoubtedly helped to establish its position in society and the claim of its members to publicly funded teaching posts and the other privileges accorded to philosophers. This dualism entered into the popular image of the school and was believed to go back to its very beginnings. Lucían in a well-known passage describes the Peripatetic as the thinker with two philosophies, the 'exoteric' and the 'esoteric', to offer, and according to Aulus Gellius, Aristotle used to give rigorous courses

f ü r die K u n d e d e s M o r g e n l a n d e s 17, 2 , L e i p z i g 1925) n o s . 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 , 1 2 6 - 1 2 9 ; cf. R . DEGEN,

437

Galen im Syrischen, in: NUTTON (ed.), Galen: Problems and Prospects, 131 — 166, who does not refer to Dinkä. — My disagreement with RESCHER on this point does not affect the value of his remarks about the logical significance and subsequent history of the Fourth Figure. A glance at the source-index of W. D. Ross' 'Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta' (Oxford 1959) will show that nearly all the sources other than Cicero are later than Andronicus. Cf. SANDBACH (cited in n. 324 above) p. 230.

ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN T H E R O M A N WORLD

1173

for specialists in the morning and more popular ones in the afternoon. 438 The diffusion of this view in the literature of the second century A D suggests that it accurately reflected the conditions of the time, but this does not mean that we need doubt its historical truth. Gellius' source was probably Andronicus, who is quoted later in the same chapter, the distinction between 'esoteric' (or 'acroamatic') and 'exoteric' writings is already found in Cicero, who probably had it from Antiochus of Ascalum, and Aristotle himself refers to the 'exoteric' works in the extant treatises. 439 The history of the Hellenistic Peripatos is to a large extent one of the tension between these tendencies in the work of the school. The same continuity is found in the school's teaching, especially at the popular level. The dialogues and handbooks read in the Hellenistic age continued in use, and the opinions about the school and its beliefs current among outsiders in the first two centuries A D hardly differed from those of the Ciceronian age. At the more specialised level, Andronicus' edition made a new start in the study of Aristotle's writings, but his way of presenting Aristotle's philosophy was a legitimate extension of the work of Theophrastus and Eudemus. Even the freedom with which he and his immediate followers suggested the need for changes in details imitated the practice of the first generation of Peripatetics. There is one difference, however. The early Peripatetics not only expounded Aristotle's philosophy, but tried to extend its scope by independent study of the natural world und human behaviour. The absence of this element from the work of Andronicus and those who came after him resulted in the growth of the bookcentred scholasticism we meet in the Imperial age. All this is not to say that the popular and scholarly traditions were isolated from one another. The popular books and lectures of professed Peripatetics were meant to give a true outline of the philosophy developed fully in the schooltreatises, and even some of the pseudo-Pythagorean books contain matter clearly derived from the extant pragmateiai, at however many removes; a few of them, notably the pseudo-Archytean reworkings of the 'Categories', reflect a stage in their understanding which can be clearly defined and connected with the names of known commentators. On the other hand, some of the commentaries on Aristotle's pragmateiai seem to have originated in elementary lecture-courses, and this may account for the superficiality of some of their contents. The specialised work of the school was based on the exegesis of Aristotle's writings. In this field its members developed a high degree of competence and its influence is not exhausted even to-day, but the thrust of their interpretation was very different from that of the modern historian of philosophy. Their aim was to present Aristotle's philosophy as a system and to elucidate his doctrines; they were less interested in the character of his arguments and not at all in the origin and growth of his ideas. New developments of his teaching took one of two directions. On the one hand, real or apparent discrepancies in Aristotle's writings had to be explained. This was part of exegesis and subordinated to the systematic 438 439

Lucian, Vit. Auct. 26, Aulus Gellius 20.5, = DÜRING, AB Τ 7 6 e - f . Cie., Fin. 5.5.12, cf. Epist. ad Att. 4.16.2, DÜRING, AB p. 426ff. For Aristotle see BONITZ, Index Arist. 104b44ff.

1174

Η . Β.

GOTTSCHALK

tendency of the school (we find no genetic explanations); some of the difficulties raised were of a kind which would only be felt by elementary students and clearly much attention was paid to their needs. But there are real loose ends in Aristotle's work, which his followers tried to tie up as best they could. Secondly, new problems had arisen in the course of philosophical debate in the period since Aristotle's death, which Aristotle had not discussed or only in a marginal way; the question of Fate and Providence is the most notable instance. Here there was a constant tension between the implications of the problem and the requirements of orthodoxy, and progress was limited. O n the whole orthodoxy prevailed, backed up by polemics against rival viewpoints. At this point we can observe a rigidity which inhibited the further development of Aristotelianism and may explain its failure to resist the encroachment of Platonism. We have already seen that many Aristotelian ideas, including the whole of his logic and a good part of his metaphysics, natural philosophy and ethics, were taken over by Platonists from the first century onwards. In spite of some opposition, from Plotinus as well as lesser figures, this process continued until all Aristotelian doctrines which could be brought into conformity with Platonic principles were incorporated in the developed Neoplatonic systems. As this happened, Aristotelianism ceased to exist as an independent philosophy. There is a Protean quality about Platonism which has allowed it at various times to absorb alien ideas without losing its essential character, perhaps precisely because its fundamental insights were not tied to a fixed system. Aristotelianism, in the systematic form it had acquired, lacked this flexibility. It was well suited to the enlightened atmosphere of the first two centuries A D , but could no longer meet the needs, especially the religious aspirations, of the centuries which followed. But it could offer the Platonists something they lacked, a ready-made set of components for building their own system. Many of the parts proved more durable than the whole; they constituted the "Erkenntnisse", in N . HARTMANN'S sense of the word, of Aristotle's thinking. 4 4 0 Within the new framework Aristotle's leading ideas retained their vigour and Aristotle became what, by and large, he has remained ever since, the philosopher's philosopher. 440

N . HARTMANN, D e r philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte, in: ID., Kl. Sehr. II (Berlin 1957) 1 - 4 8 (first ed. in: Abhandig. d. Preuß. Ak. d. Wiss. 1936, Phil.-Hist. Kl. N r . 5). Some of the problems involved by the transfer have been discussed by A . C . LLOYD, Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic, Phronesis 1 (1955 - 56) 58 - 72. 1 4 6 - 1 6 0 . C f . F. SoLMSEN, Early Christian interest in the Theory of Demonstration, in: Romanitas et Christianitas. Studia I. H . Waszink oblata (Amsterdam and L o n d o n 1973) 281 ff., especially 286 and n. 36.

Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation"' by R. W. SHARPLES, London

Contents I. Life

1177

II. Relation to other philosophical schools

1178

III. General characteristic of Alexander's works

1179

IV. Works — Commentaries on Aristotle

1182

V. Works — Other major treatises

1186

VI. Works — Collections of shorter discussions

1189

VII. Other fragments, other lost works, and spuria

1196

VIII. Forms and universale

1199

IX. Soul

1202

X . Intellect (Νους)

1204

X I . Dynamics: eternity of the universe

1214

* I am most grateful for help given, particularly in matters of bibliography, by Dr W. E. H . C O C K L E , D r C . GENEQUAND, P r o f . R . LOEWE, P r o f . RICHARD SORABJI, D r RICHARD C . T A Y L O R , D r F . W . Z I M M E R M A N N , a n d a b o v e all b y P r o f e s s o r R O B E R T B . T O D D ; a n d t o Professors

W.

W.

FORTENBAUGH,

A.

MADIGAN,

E.

MONTANARI,

A.

PREUS,

F.

M.

SCHROEDER, and Mme W. FROHN-VILLENEUVE, for giving me details of works not yet published at the time of writing. The responsibility for all errors, of course, remains my own. This paper was completed, in its essential outlines, in 1980. I have endeavoured to bring bibliography up to date to the autumn of 1986, and to take account of developments in a rapidly advancing field of study, but the structure of my discussion necessarily reflects the state of the subject at the time it was first compiled. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Alexander and to the other Aristotelian commentators are to the volumes of 'Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca' (Berlin 1883 — 1907; abbreviated C A G ) and 'Supplementum Aristotelicum' (Berlin 1885-1903). Other abbreviations are as follows: PG RE

- Patrologia Graeca, ed. J.-P. MIGNE, Paris 1857-1904. — PAULY'S Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G . Wiss o w A , Stuttgart

1893-1980.

SVF — H . VON ARNIM, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (see below, section XVI).

ALEXANDER OF

APHRODISIAS

XII. Providence

1177 1216

XIII. Determinism

1218

XIV. Influence - Plotinus and others

1220

XV. Naturalism or mysticism? . . .

1224 1226

XVI. Bibliography

I. Life

Our only direct information concerning Alexander's life and career is from the introduction to the 'de fato', dedicated to (Septimius) Severus and Antoninus (Caracalla) in gratitude for his appointment as a teacher of Aristotelian philosophy, and hence to be dated between 198 and 209 A . D . 1 . This fits in well enough with the indications from his relations with other philosophers, for which see below in this section and sections II and XIV. It is not known whether Alexander's post was in Athens; the reference could be to the Aristotelian appointment among the four philosophy 'professorships' set up by Marcus Aurelius in 176 A . D . 2 , but there were similar posts elsewhere 3 . At any rate Alexander was probably not a head of the Lyceum, for L Y N C H ' S arguments that it had ceased to exist as an institution when Sulla captured Athens seem convincing 4 . Neither is it known for certain from which Aphrodisias Alexander came, though it may well have been the city in Caria5. In a number of passages a teacher of Alexander is referred to by the name of Aristoteles 6 . Z E L L E R argued that these texts should be emended so as to refer

1

Cf. de fato I 164.1-3, Ή ν μεν δι' ευχής μοι, μέγιστοι αυτοκράτορες Σεβήρε καί Άντωνίνε, αύτω γενομένω παρ' ύμίν ίδεϊν τε υμάς καί προσειπεϊν καί καθομολογήσαι χάριν άνθ' ών επαθον εύ παρ' ύμίν πολλάκις. . ., and ibid. 164.13ff., περιέχει τε το βιβλίον την δόξαν την 'Αριστοτέλους, ήν εχει περί τε ειμαρμένης καί τοϋ έφ' ήμίν, ου τής φιλοσοφίας προΐσταμαι ύπό τής ύμετέρας μαρτυρίας διδάσκαλος αυτής κεκηρυγμέν ο ς ; TODD (1976,2) 1 n. 3; DESCAMPS; DONINI (1982) 245 n . 26; THILLET (1984) vii.

2

3

4

5 6

Cassius Dio 72.31, cf. Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 566, Lucían, Eunuch 3.8; ZELLER 709 n . 2; TODD (1976,2) 6 n . 29; THILLET (1984) x l i x - l i .

Historia Augusta, Antoninus Pius 11.6; ZELLER 708 nn. 1, 2; LYNCH 171 f. and n. 10, 214. LYNCH 193 argues from the opening of the 'de fato' that Alexander worked in Rome, but the text scarcely shows this; TODD (1976,2) points to the reference to Aristotle's statue in Athens (Alexander, in metaph. 415.29—31) as perhaps suggesting that Alexander taught there. Cf. also below, n. 21; DONINI (1982) 245 n. 26. C f . LYNCH 1 9 2 - 2 0 7 .

TODD (1976,2) 1 n. 4; THILLET (1984) viii. Among others Alexander, mantissa 2 ('de intellectu') 110.4 (below, section X); Cyril of Alexandria, contra Julianum, PG 76.61 d and 741a; Simplicius, in de cáelo, CAG 7 153. 16 (on which cf. MORAUX [1967,2] 170 n. 4, 173 n. 8). See further the discussions cited in n. 8.

1178

R. W . SHARPLES

to Aristocles of Messene 7 ; but MORAUX has argued that the text is correct and

that the reference is to Aristoteles of Mytilene, a second-century Peripatetic mentioned by Galen 8 . Also named as Alexander's teachers are Herminus 9 and Sosigenes 10 .

II. Relation to other philosophical

schools

Polemic against the S t o i c s is a feature both of Alexander's commentaries on Aristotle and of his other works; nevertheless, he is influenced by them in his terminology — even when he uses terms borrowed from Stoicism to express Aristotelian concepts which he then turns against the Stoics 11 . And Stoic doctrines, too, may have played a part in shaping some of Alexander's concerns 12 . As a s o u r c e of e v i d e n c e for Stoic doctrines, however, Alexander must be used with caution; he is often concerned with them as material on which to develop his own philosophical arguments, rather than with giving a historically accurate representation 13 . Reaction against criticisms of Aristotelian doctrine by the Athenian P l a t o n ist Atticus has been detected in Alexander's discussions of providence 14 and of the intellect 15 . Like Atticus, however, he argued for the literal interpretation of Plato's account of the beginning of the kosmos in the 'Timaeus', against Atticus' teacher Taurus; as BALTES notes, he uses Plato's text to argue against Plato's

7

Z E L L E R 8 1 4 Η. 1.

8

Galen, Περί έθών, Scripta minora 2, 11.4f. M Ü L L E R (Leipzig, Teubner, 1891). M O R A U X (1967,2), summarized by M A R T O R A N A ; M O R A U X (1984) 3 9 9 - 4 0 1 . T H I L L E T (1984) i x - x x x i however argues against MORAUX; he accepts the reading 'Αριστοτέλους in mantissa 110.4 (above, n. 6), but interprets it as, in effect, "in the works of the Stagirite" (xv—xix). See below, n. 23, and section X, especially n. 131. See also ACCATINO: below, n. 23, and section X, especially n. 131. Cf. Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de cáelo, C A G 7 430.32f.; Z E L L E R 806 η.; T H I L L E T (1984) viii η. 3. In D 2 8 (below, section V, no. 7) Alexander seems to have been replying to criticisms of Aristotle by Galen addressed to Herminus; P I N È S (1961,2) 23f.; M O RAUX (1984) 3 6 1 - 3 6 2 ; T H I L L E T (1984) xlvi-xlvii. Alexander, in meteor. 143.13; and cf. below section VII, Lost Works, no. (2). Cf. also M A R T I N ; Z E L L E R 807 n . ; M O R A U X (1984) 3 3 5 - 3 3 6 , 359; T H I L L E T (1984) v i i i - i x η. 4. Cf. M O R A U X (1942) 196, P O H L E N Z 1.356-358, 2 . 1 7 3 - 1 7 5 ; V E R B E K E 99f., T O D D (1973,2) 60ff. and η. 183, (1976,2) 27f., P R E U S (1981,1) 1 7 - 2 0 , (1981,2) 5 4 - 5 6 ; F O T I N I S 2 9 5 - 2 9 6 ; also P. MORAUX, Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote, Louvain, 1951, 5 and n. 16. For one topic where the extent of the Stoic contribution to Alexander's own positive views has been a subject of recent discussion, that of fate, see below section XIII. O n Alexander and the Stoics cf. also F O T I N I S 166—172, 209, 273. Cf. LONG (1970) 247f. and n. 4, TODD (1976,2) 2 2 - 2 9 ; and below nn. 28f. Below, n. 1 6 4 . For use of Plato cf. fr. 2 V I T E L L I ( 1 9 0 2 ) , cf. SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 2 , 2 ) 2 0 3 ff.

9

10

11

12

13 14

a n d n n . 4 8 - 9 ; a n d cf. HAPP 83 η. 47; THILLET (1984) 56. 15

Below, η. 133.

ALEXANDER OF

1179

APHRODISIAS

interpreters 16 . It is however striking that he displays no familiarity with MiddlePlatonist discussions of fate and related topics 17 . A number of Alexander's works were directed against G a l e n , whom he mentions in passing as an example of a philosopher (in top. 549.24) 1 8 . Evidence of a reaction to Galen's views has also been claimed by DONINI in Alexander's doctrine of the soul 19 and in his polemic against determinism 20 . There are accounts in Arabic sources of a confrontation between Alexander and Galen in Rome in which the former called the latter 'mule-head', but these may result from a confusion between Alexander of Aphrodisias and another Peripatetic, Alexander of Damascus 21 .

III.

General characteristics of Alexander's

works

Alexander's extant works far surpass in extent those of any earlier commentator on Aristotle; and he is the last ancient commentator to write as an Aristotelian rather than a Platonist. His commentaries were extensively used by his successors both in antiquity and subsequently, and it is to them that we owe the preservation of much material — little of which has as yet been systematically collected — from those of his commentaries which are now lost 2 2 . To his successors Alexander was 'The Commentator' par excellence23.

16

Below section X I ; BALTES (1976) 7 1 - 7 6 .

17

C f . SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 8 , 1 )

18

Cf. D 2 8 (below section V), D i l , D 1 6 and vE 31 (section V I ) , and section V I I , Lost

250-253.

W o r k s , ( 2 ) . WALZER ( 1 9 4 8 ) 4 8 η . 3 , 7 4 η . 2 , 7 5 η . 2 , BÜRGEL 2 8 2 F . , ZIMMERMANN ( 1 9 7 4 )

19 20 21

22 23

4 0 9 - 4 1 1 , THILLET (1984) xxxiii n. 2 , NUTTON 3 1 8 - 3 2 4 , GENEQUAND (1984) 113, 1 2 0 121; and, for a comment by Alexander about Galen, ZIMMERMANN (1981) lxxxi n. 2, NUTTON 320—324. Galen's ' D e captionibus' is referred to by [Alexander], in Soph. El., C A G 2 . 3 , 22.7, 142.29 (below, section IV). Below, nn. 7 9 - 8 1 . Below, n. 182. C f . also perhaps, n. 83 ad fin. C f . D I E T R I C H 1 1 3 n . 3 ; STROHMAIER; D O N I N I ( 1 9 7 4 ) 1 4 9 ; T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 5 n . 2 5 ; SEZGIN

3.68, 1 6 2 - 1 6 3 ; NUTTON 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ; THILLET (1984) x x x i i - x l i x . THILLET suggests that the confrontation was indeed with Alexander of Damascus, but that in referring subsequently to this Alexander as " n o w a public teacher of Peripatetic philosophy at Athens" Galen h i m s e l f had confused the two Alexanders. Below, section IV. C f . Simplicius, in phys., C A G 9 707.33, 10 1170.2, 13 1176.32, Philoponus, in an pr., C A G 13.2 136.20 (on Olympiodorus, in meteor. 51.27, 53.13, however, cf. G . STÜVE at C A G 12.2 ix). ZELLER, 818 η. 1; THILLET (1984) liii η. 2. The passages that were taken by ZELLER 807 η. as referring to Alexander as " t h e second Aristotle", however (Syrianus, in metaph., C A G 6.1 100.6, and David [Elias], in cat., C A G 18.1 128.13) have been interpreted by MORAUX ( 1 9 6 7 , 2 ) rather as references to Aristotle of Mytilene (above, n. 8; contra, THILLET [1984] xix—xxxi).

R. W. SHARPLES

1180

In his independent treatises, as well as in the commentaries, Alexander's approach to the issues he discusses is from Aristotle's works — and above all from the esoteric works 2 4 — as a starting point. The quaestiones, or those of them to which the title may strictly be applied 25 , attempt to answer problems within the context of an Aristotelian world-view; but this is only a part of a general tendency running throughout Alexander's work 2 6 . H e often regards himself as attempting to provide, on the basis of Aristotle's writings, a solution to a problem which Aristotle himself had not discussed; even when his own position is clearly a rejection of earlier Peripatetic theories, he regards himself as providing a more Aristotelian solution 2 7 . Alexander's interest in the theories of other philosophers is not primarily a historical one; he is rather concerned with them in the context of the elaboration of his own philosophical theories. TODD has shown that his formulation of the principle that 'body can pass through body', which he attributes to the Stoics in the 'de mixtione', is based on Aristotelian discussions, and that in elaborating his own treatment of it he discusses, for their philosophical interest, applications of it which the Stoics themselves certainly never made 2 8 . Similarly, although it is certainly the Stoics that Alexander is chiefly concerned to attack in the 'de fato', his concern is with determinism in itself as a philosophical thesis, rather than with determinism as the Stoics actually maintained it in the context of their philosophical position as a whole 2 9 . (It might of course well be argued that in treating the views of other philosophers in this way Alexander is only following Aristotle's example.) Although he does take account of the views of contemporary philosophers (above, section II), theories criticised by Aristotle are as real and important to him as more contemporary ones 3 0 . It is striking that in his treatise 'de fato' he nowhere mentions astrology 3 1 .

24

25 26 27

28 29

Alexander is said to have explained discrepancies between Aristotle's exoteric and esoteric works by arguing that the former represented not Aristotle's own views but those of others (Elias, in cat., C A G 18.1 115.3ff., in connection with the mortality of the soul [below section I X ] ; W. JAEGER, Aristotle: Fundamentals for a history of his development 2 , tr. R. ROBINSON, O x f o r d 1948, 32 n. 1). F o r Alexander's use of the exoteric works cf. below, section IV (1) (a), and RULAND (1976) 34 n. 1. Below, section VI fin. H i s aim is to explain Aristotle by Aristotle; MORAUX (1942) xvi. C f . de fato I 164.13 (above η. 1), VI 171.16Í., X X X I X 2 1 2 . 5 f f . ; de prov. 31.19, 33.1 f. (fr. 3 b GRANT, cf. his η. [f]), 9 1 . 5 f f . ; quaest. 1.25 41.10, 2.21 6 5 . 1 9 f f „ 7 0 . 2 4 f f . ; de anima 2 . 4 - 9 . THILLET (1960) 318; DONINI (1971) 6 4 f . , cf. 93f. Below, n. 170. TODD (1976,2) 2 5 f f . , 7 3 f f . , 82ff. and n. 241. Cf.

LONG

(1970),

SHARPLES

(1983,1)

19-21.

He

may

also

invent

arguments

for

the

position opposed to his own, in order to counter them; cf. DONINI (1977) 194; SHARPLES, r e v i e w o f T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 8 9 ; a n d SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 ) 1 5 9 , 1 7 7 . O n A l e x a n d e r ' s 30

31

reliability

as a source for the theories of earlier philosophers cf. AVOTINS. C f . LONG (1970) 247 and n. 3, DONINI (1977) 183ff. (on which however cf. below section X I I I ) . C f . BOUSSOULAS (1960) 200 or (1973) 290; SHARPLES (1983,1) 1 8 - 1 9 . O n Alexander's attitude to divination in general cf. BRUNS (1893) 14—17, and SHARPLES loc. cit.

ALEXANDER O F APHRODISIAS

1181

It also seems characteristic of Alexander's approach that he tends to consider particular points one by one, rather than being concerned to establish his own position on the whole of a topic in a systematic way 32 . In spite of his undoubted critical acumen, he at times takes Aristotle's text in a forced way in order to support his own views 33 ; M O R A U X has described how, in the 'de anima', he oscillates between defence of his own position and loyalty to the Aristotelian text. B O O T H has emphasised the way in which Alexander searches for solutions; sometimes he argues at the expense of oversimplification, when Aristotle's position remains aporetic34. However, many of the ideas of his own that he puts forward were of considerable importance and influence, as will be argued below. Concerning the relative chronology of Alexander's major works, little is securely established. The commentary on the 'de sensu' cites the (lost) commentary on Aristotle's 'de anima'35 and mantissa 9 3 6 , and has been argued by W E N D L A N D to be probably later than the commentaries on the 'Physics', 'de cáelo', and 'meteorologica' too 37 ; a reference to the 'de sensu' commentary has been claimed in the treatise de anima', but this seems erroneous 38 . The commentary on the 'meteorologica' appears to be later than the (lost) commentary on the 'de cáelo' 39 ; that on the 'Topics' refers back to that on the 'Prior Analytics' 40 . On the relation between the 'de intellectu' (mantissa 2) and the 'de anima' see below section X, and on the minor works in general cf. section VI fin.

32

Cf. (on the 'de anima') MORAUX (1942) xxif., 48, 56ff., 57 and η. 1; (on the 'de fato') (1980) 7 6 - 7 , (1983,1) 21. D O N I N I (1971) 13ff. points to the systematic nature of Alexander's treatment of the formation of more complex substances from less complex ones (de anima 2 — 9, in meteor. IV), but this in itself involves difficulties when related to other doctrines — cf. below, nn. 7 6 f . ; and cf. M O R A U X (1978) 318 η. 72. Below, η. 191. O n the d i a l e c t i c a l character of many of Alexander's arguments cf. MORAUX, review of DONINI (1974) 535; SHARPLES (1978,1) 248, 264, (1983,1) 21, 1 5 1 - 2 . SHARPLES

33

34 35

36

M O R A U X (1942) 99f., 108; and cf. below n. 117. MORAUX (1942) 4 3 - 4 9 , 1 6 9 - 1 7 1 . Cf. below, nn. 76, 77. BOOTH 2 9 - 3 1 . in de sensu 167.21; W E N D L A N D ν, M O R A U X (1978) 297 and η. 71. W E N D L A N D argues that the reference is to the commentary on Aristotle's 'de anima', rather than to Alexander's own treatise; in spite of the rather odd f o r m of the reference, in that case (έλέγομεν έν τοις περί ψ υ χ ή ς ; contrast below n. 39), this appears right, for there is no close parallel to Alexander's point here in his own 'de anima' (though for the general point W E N D L A N D ad loc. compares Alexander, de anima 6 2 . 2 2 f f . ) . in de sensu 3 1 . 2 9 ( W E N D L A N D , M O R A U X , locc. citt.).

37

WENDLAND, loc. cit.

38

W E N D L A N D argues that de anima 53.25f., επί πλέον δέ ειρηται π ε ρ ί τ ο ύ τ ω ν έν τ ω π ε ρ ί α ι σ θ η τ ώ ν τε και αισθήσεων, refers to Aristotle's treatise rather than to Alexander's commentary; Z E L L E R had argued otherwise in the earlier editions of his work, but the fourth edition follows W E N D L A N D ( Z E L L E R , 818 n. 2). However, M O R A U X (1978) 318 n. 71 argues that Alexander's treatise 'de anima' is later than his commentary on the 'de sensu', but without giving details. Cf. also M O R A U X (1942) 21. in meteor. 18.29ff., εν τ φ π ρ ώ τ ω Π ε ρ ί ο υ ρ α ν ο ί . . . ώ ς και έν τ ω εις αυτό ύ π ο μ ν ή μ α τ ι

39

έ π ε σ η μ η ν ά μ ε θ α . CAPELLE 232. 40

78

in top. 7.11. ANRW II 36.2

1182

R. W. SHARPLES

IV. Works — Commentaries on Aristotle

In this and the following three sections reference has only been made, in general, to editions and translations of Alexander's works published since 1700; for earlier editions and translations cf. C R A N Z ( 1 9 6 0 ) and ( 1 9 7 1 ) , also C R A N Z ( 1 9 5 8 ) . The inclusion of passages in collections such as S V F and U S E N E R ( 1 8 8 7 ) has only been noted where these contain textual notes on the passages. On MSS cf. in general W A R T E L L E ; T H I L L E T (1963,2); H A R L F I N G E R — W I E S NER. Cf. also BRUNS (1884); RUELLE (1888), (1899); D I E L S ; LABOWSKY; T H I L L E T (1976); and the reviews of CAG by USENER (1892) and PRAECHTER (1909). Alexander's language and style have not been much discussed; but cf. T H U R O T 422— 448. For a general survey of Alexander's works cf. T H I L L E T (1984) Iii—lxxiii. On Alexander's methods of commentary see T O D D (1976,2) 15, D O N I N I (1982) 221 — 222; and cf. above, section III. (1)

Extant Commentaries :

(a)

O n Aristotle's 'Metaphysics". Ed. HAYDUCK ( 1 8 9 1 ; CAG 1); also B O N I T Z , and (extracts) BRANDIS ( 1 8 3 6 ) . A new edition of Aristotle-fragments in the commentary on book A, LESZL—HARLFINGER.

The commentary on books Ε—Ν is certainly not authentic in its present form; PRAECHTER (1906) 882—896 argued that it is by Michael of Ephesus. It is uncertain how much material from the original commentary is incorporated. Numerous passages from Alexander are quoted by Averroes in his commentary on 'Metaphysics Λ' (cf. FREUDENTHAL, with German trans, of the Alexander fragments; also M O R A U X [1942] 99-101, BOUYGES 279-281, WALZER [1962] 120ff., GÄTJE [1966] 260f., A L - A L O U S I 240f.); FREUDENTHAL argued that these quotations did not correspond with the extant Greek text, and preserved Alexander's original commentary, but was challenged on these points by ZAHLFLEISCH (1900). The commentary was also utilised by 'Abd al-Latïf: cf. N E U W I R T H 2 - 6 3 . 169-172. Cf. also B O NITZ xiv-xxvii; R O S E (1854) 146-152; M A R T I N 1 8 2 F . ; HAYDUCK (1891) preface; K R O L L vi; W E N D L A N D (1903) vi NN.; M E R L A N (1935) 158; M O R A U X (1942) 14-19, and (1967,2) 181 f.; TARAN, Gnomon 53 (1981) 750; B O O T H 27 and η. 98, 151; T H I L L E T (1984) Ivi—Iviii. Much of the discussion of the commentary in modern literature has been concerned with it as a source for lost works of Aristotle, and in particular for his arguments against Plato's Theory of Ideas: cf. W I L P E R T ( 1 9 4 0 ) a n d ( 1 9 4 9 ) , A R P E , O W E N , ISNARDI PARENTE, MERLAN ( 1 9 7 0 , 2 ) , D O E R I N G , A N N A S , L E S Z L — H A R L F I N G E R , R O W E , F I N E ( 1 9 8 0 ) , ( 1 9 8 2 ) , PORAWSKI. T h e

bearing of certain passages on Aristotle's and Alexander's conception of the subject-matter of metaphysics — whether the divine in particular, or being in general — has been discussed by M E R L A N ( 1 9 5 7 ) , ( 1 9 6 3 ) 5 4 f . , 6 9 , 1 5 0 ,

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

1183

(1970,2), and GENEQUAND (1979). Cf. also MARTIN 179 (on 446.17f., 6 3 3 . I f f . ) , LUTHE, VON FRITZ (on 9 7 f . ) , LURIA 1 7 2 f . (on 3 5 f . ) , CHEVALIER

7 1 - 7 5 , WOLFSON (on 2 4 1 . 8 ) , DÖRRIE 3 4 f . , 3 8 f . (on 5 9 . I f f . ) , TRABUCCO

134 (on 740.29fî.), RIST (1962) 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 (on 510.3 and 514.27), ASPIN, MORAUX (1969) (on 59.Iff.), BERTIER (on 123.19-125.2, 8 1 3 . 2 4 - 2 9 ) , WIESNER 2 5 6 - 2 5 8 (on 558.27ff.), SHARPLES (1982,1) 92 (on 574.6-575.17), DE GROOT 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 (on p. 486), SORABJI (1983) 248 (on 721.3) and 357 (on 3 6 . 2 5 - 2 7 ) , West (on 821.5ff.), BOOTH 28 (on 190.23-24), 1 8 4 - 1 8 6 , BECCHI 86 (on 59.Iff.), MORAUX (1984) 2 4 7 - 2 4 9 (on 4 1 . 2 1 - 2 8 , 5 8 . 3 1 59.8, 378.28-379.8), GENEQUAND (1984) 1 1 3 - 1 1 5 (on 103.4-104.18), ACCATINO 70 - 72 (on 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) , 7 3 - 7 4 (on 165-167). O n Trior Analytics Γ ' . E d . WALLIES ( 1 8 8 3 ; C A G 2 . 1 ) ; extracts, BRANDIS (1836). C f . BRANDIS

(1833) 286f.; Κ. S. KONTOS, Α Θ Η Ν Α 1 (1889) 306 (on 379.34; read εύ-

π α ρ α κ ο λ ο υ θ ή τ ο υ ) ; VOLAIT; WALLIES ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; POHLENZ 2 . 2 9 f . ; BECKER (on

2 7 4 . 7 - 1 1 ) ; KNEALE 185f. (on 301.9ff., the pons asinorum); MUELLER; SHARPLES (1978,2), and (1982,1) (on various passages from pp. 37—40, 1 5 6 - 1 6 9 ) ; FROHN-VILLENEUVE (on 356.28ff.); ZIMMERMANN (1981) 182 and 243 (on 26.25ff.); SORABJI (1983) 9 1 - 9 2 (on 184.12ff.); LEE; BARNES (1983) (incl. text and Engl, transi, of 3 2 5 . 3 1 - 3 2 8 . 7 ) , (1985) (on 3 8 9 . 3 1 3 9 0 . 9 ) ; MORAUX ( 1 9 8 4 ) 3 9 1 - 3 9 3 ( o n 1 2 5 . 3 - 3 3 ) ; MIGNUCCI ( 1 9 8 5 ) 2 2 3 ( o n

1 7 3 . 2 5 f f . ) ; and S V F 2 . 2 5 7 , 2 6 1 , 2 6 4 , 3 (Antipater) 2 7 . C f . also below,

section VII, item (2). Alexander's commentary on Prior Analytics II (for which cf. Alexander, in an. pr. 7 0 . 2 0 , 110.20, and perhaps in top. 5 3 7 . 2 with WALLIES [1891] n. ad l o c . ; Philoponus, in an. p r . , C A G 13.2 8 7 . 6 ;

THILLET [1984] liv) is lost; alleged commentaries in MSS on II and on 1.17— 2 7 a r e s p u r i o u s , c f . BRANDIS ( 1 8 3 6 ) 2 9 0 , WALLIES ( 1 8 8 3 ) v .

O n the 'Topics". Ed. WALLIES (1891,1; C A G 2.2); extracts, BRANDIS (1836). The last four books are abbreviated, and in some MSS contain interpolations; cf. WALLIES (1891,1) i - x i v , (1891,2), GERCKE (1894) 1455, also BRANDIS (1833) 297f. C f . MUTSCHMANN xxivf. (on 2 4 2 . I f f . ) ; CHEVALIER 71—75; WOLFSON (on

152.7ff.); SZABÓ (on 545.Iff.); M U E L L E R ; F R O H N - V I L L E N E U V E (on 191.30ff., 567.18ff.); BOOTH 2 7 - 2 8 (on 3 2 0 . 2 1 - 2 2 ) ; LEE; MORAUX

97.22Í.,

( 1 9 8 4 ) 3 9 4 . 6 ( o n 5 6 9 . 3 - 5 , 5 7 4 . 2 2 - 5 7 5 . 7 ) ; MIGNUCCI ( 1 9 8 5 ) 8 9 - 9 0

(on

3 9 5 . 1 7 - 2 6 , e t c . ) ; USENER ( 1 8 8 7 ) f r . 4 0 4 , S V F 2 . 2 6 3 , 3 3 2 n „ a n d 3 ( A n t i -

pater) 24. For knowledge in medieval Western Europe of a commentary by 'Alexander' on the ' T o p i c s ' cf. EBBESEN (1976) 118—120; but it is not clear

whether this is the genuine Alexander (EBBESEN loc.cit., and cf. below on the commentary on 'De Sophisticis Elenchis'). 'On 'De Sensu". Ed. WENDLAND (1901; C A G 3.1); also THUROT, with the medieval Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (so THUROT 386, cf. CRANZ [1960] 91; DOD 64, 76; but by Gerard of Cremona according to THÉRY [1926] 85f.,

1184

R. W. SHARPLES

91 f.) and with commentary ( T H U R O T 395-421). C F . U S E N E R (1887) fr. 319 (24.18-22); H A S S ; M A N S I O N ; W I E S N E R 2 5 6 - 2 5 8 (on 7.25ff.); BALTES (1978) (on 14.18ff.); AVOTINS (on 56.6-58.22; text, English trans., comm.); DE G R O O T 180-182 and SORABJI (1983) 53 (both on 123.1-125.22); SoRABJI (1983) 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 (on 121.22ff„ 172.28ff.). (e)

O n the'Meteorologica". Ed. HAYDUCK ( 1 8 9 0 ; C A G 3 . 2 ) Arabic version (not extant): SEZGIN 7 . 2 2 6 , 2 7 6 , 2 8 4 . Latin translation by William of Moerbeke, ed. SMET ( 1 9 6 8 ) ; cf. T H É R Y ( 1 9 2 6 ) 1 0 0 — 1 0 4 . English trans, of book I V , and comm., C O Û T A N T . J . L . IDELER argued that this commentary was not by Alexander of Aphrodisias but by Alexander of Aegae, as citations of Alexander of Aphrodisias by Olympiodorus, in meteor. (CAG 12.2) did not correspond to our text (IDELER, Aristotelis Meteorologica, Leipzig 1834, 1. xvi—xviii, etc.). M A R T I N 183 f. argued that our version was an abbreviation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' original text cited by Olympiodorus; CAPELLE that Olympiodorus cited Alexander of Aphrodisias via an intermediary. C O Û T A N T 24 combines these explanations; cf. also HAYDUCK (1890) preface, G. STÜVE'S preface to C A G 12.2, ix, and ZELLER 805 η. 2, 818 η. 2. Cf. C U N T Z (on 152.10ff.); SMET (1959); D O N I N I (1971) 74ff. (on book I V ) ; S V F 2.661.

(f)

' O n ' D e Sophisticis Elenchis". The commentary transmitted in some MSS as Alexander's (ed. WALLIES [ 1 8 9 8 ; C A G 2 . 3 ] ; extracts, BRANDIS [ 1 8 3 6 ] ) , is certainly spurious (cf. B R A N DIS [ 1 8 3 3 ] 2 9 8 f . , M O R A U X [ 1 9 4 2 ] 1 3 ) . PRAECHTER ( 1 9 0 6 ) 8 8 2 - 8 9 6 showed that it is by Michael of Ephesus (see above, (a)); an earlier version, also by Michael, is edited by EBBESEN ( 1 9 8 1 ) 2 . 1 5 3 - 1 9 9 ) (comm. ibid. 3 . 1 2 - 8 1 ) . Cf. also W E N D L A N D ( 1 9 0 3 ) vi nn.; EBBESEN ( 1 9 8 1 ) 1. 2 6 8 - 2 8 5 , 2 9 0 - 3 2 9 . M I N I O — P A L U E L L O 247—249 argued that a genuine commentary by Alexander had been used as a source by a Latin commentary itself surviving only in fragments (ed. EBBESEN [1981] 2.331—556; comm. ibid. 3.113—261; cf. also ibid. 1.70-77, 286-289, and 3 . 4 - 7 ) . But EBBESEN argues that the 'Alexander' referred to by these texts, though probably distinct from Michael, is not identical with the genuine Alexander of Aphrodisias either. The translator into Latin was James of Venice (12th century), but it is unclear whether or not he was also the compiler. (EBBESEN [1981] 1. 286—289, 3 . 4 - 7 , also ID., [1976] 9 8 - 1 1 8 ; [1982] 108-109, 122-127). See below, Reference is made in Arabic sources to a commentary on 'de sophisticis elenchis' by Alexander; cf. Ibn al-Nadïm, Fihrist p. 601 D O D G E , ROSENTHAL (1965) 39f., PETERS (1968,1) 26, M I N I O - P A L U E L L O 299 n. 2, EBBESEN (1981) 1. 242-244, T H I L L E T (1984) lx. Cf. also C R A N Z ( 1 9 6 0 ) 1 2 4 f . ; L. M I N I O - P A L U E L L O (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus: Codices, Supplementum alterum (Bruges—Paris, 1961) 23, 40; EBBESEN

(1973,1:

MIGNUCCI (1985).

but

cf.

ID.

[1981]

1.243);

PREUS

(1981,1)

10-11;

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

(2)

1185

C o m m e n t a r i e s no longer e x t a n t :

These are extensively cited by later Greek commentators; cf. the 'Indices Nominurrì to the volumes of C A G . Here I have generally given only one reference to demonstrate their existence. In many cases they were also still known to the A r a b s . C f . in g e n e r a l STEINSCHNEIDER ( 1 8 9 3 ) ; ZELLER 8 1 9 Η.; BADAWI ( 1 9 6 8 ) 9 8 f . ; PETERS ( 1 9 6 8 , 1 ) ; T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 1 4 f . ; THILLET ( 1 9 8 4 ) l i v - l x i i ; a n d b e l o w

section 6 fin. (a)

O n the 'Categories". (Simplicius, in cat., C A G 8 1.16). Cf. BRANDIS (1833) 2 7 8 ; PRANTL 6 2 3 f . ; WALZER (1962) 72; SCHMIDT; MORAUX (1984)

365—366; THILLET (1984) lvii—lix. In this commentary Alexander also discussed Theophrastus (Olympiodorus, in an. pr., C A G 12.1 13.31 ff.). (b)

O n 'De Interpretatione" (regarded as genuine by Alexander, cf. MORAUX [1973] 117). Ammonius, in de int., C A G 4.5 14.1. Cf. PRANTL 624f.; COURCELLE 2 6 6 f . ; BEUTLER 2 8 4 ; SHIEL 2 3 1 ; T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 1 ) ;

SHARPLES

(1978,1) 258 n. 158; ZIMMERMANN (1981) lxxxvf. and 61 n. 1; MORAUX (1984) 3 7 4 - 3 7 5 . (c)

O n the 'Posterior Analytics". (Philoponus, in an. post., C A G 13.3 3.32ff., etc.). Fragments collected by MORAUX (1979); cf. WALLIES (1883) x i x - x x i i . BRANDIS (1883) 296; WALZER (1962) lOOf.; EBBESEN (1976) 8 7 - 8 9 ; MORAUX (1984) 622; THILLET (1984) lix. A supposed commentary on Posterior Analytics II is spurious; cf. CRANZ (1960) 120f., (1971) 417f. A commentary translated into Latin by James of Venice, now lost, and attributed to Alexander seems in fact either to have been, or to have been based upon, that by Philoponus; cf. MINIO-PALUELLO 4 4 5 - 4 4 8 , EBBESEN (1976) 8 9 107, (1981) 2 . 3 3 1 - 5 5 6 , (1982) 108, MORAUX (1979) If. and n. 3, and above (1) (f). The anonymous commentary on 'Posterior Analytics IP in C A G 13.3 5 4 7 - 6 0 3 derives from Alexander; MORAUX (1979) 81, 1 3 1 - 1 4 6 .

(d)

'On the 'Physics". (Simplicius, in phys., C A G 9 530.16). Cf. WALLIES (1915: on Alexander ap. Simplicius, in phys., C A G 10 1074.19ff., 26f.); TIMPANARO-CARDINI (on ibid. C A G 9 457.12ff.); PETERS (1968,1) 34; MORAUX (1973) 451 f . , 4 5 5 ; FROHN-VILLENEUVE (on C A G 9 7 9 . 1 2 f f . , 110.

13ff.); MANSFELD (on C A G 10 1 0 1 7 . 1 9 - 3 2 ) ; MAORIS 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 (on C A G 9 7 0 0 - 7 0 1 ) ; GENEQUAND (1984) 1 1 6 - 1 2 0 (on C A G 9 3 1 0 - 3 1 4 ) ; MIGNUCCI (1985) 2 2 2 - 3 (on C A G 10 1 2 9 9 . 3 6 - 1 3 0 0 . 1 0 ) . Below, section V, no. 7. (e)

' O n 'de cáelo". (Alexander, in meteor., C A G 3.2 18.32). Extensively cited by Simplicius, and by Philoponus, de aeternitate mundi 212—222 RABE; c f . BALTES ( 1 9 7 6 ) a n d b e l o w s e c t i o n X I , a l s o ZAHLFLEISCH ( 1 8 9 7 ) ; MORAUX (1973) 213, 462, (1984) 223 - 225, 242 - 243, 4 0 1 - 4 0 2 .

(f)

' O n 'de generatione et corruptione". (Philoponus, in de gen. et corr., C A G 14.2, 12.6, 15.2, 55.21, etc.) Extensively cited by Philoponus. Arabic

1186

R. W. SHARPLES

fragment, G H O R A B 81 f.; cf. K R A U S 322f., D I E T R I C H 90 η. 1 and P E T E R S (1968,1) 38. Reports in W A R T E L L E of MSS containing the Greek text are inaccurate; T H I L L E T (1963,2) 353, 355, (1984) lxi n. 4; T O D D (1976,2) 251. (g)

O n 'de anima". (Philoponus, in de an., C A G 15 2 1 . 2 0 - 2 3 , 118.27f., 159.9ff., etc.) Fragments concerning intellect collected by M O R A U X (1942) 2 0 3 - 2 2 1 . Cf. M O R A U X (1942) 21f., 137f.; (1973) 207f.; M E R L A N (1953) 124 (on Alexander ap. Philoponus, in de an., C A G 15 24.7ff.); P E T E R S (1968,1) 42f.

(h)

? Ό η 'de memoria", and perhaps on the whole of the 'Parva Naturalia'; cf. Alexander, de anima 6 9 . 2 0 , T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 1 5 η. 7 1 .

(i)

PAlexander, in top. 187.8 refers to υπομνήματα on the 'Ethics', apparently with reference to Eth. Nie., 2.8 1108 b 11 (cf. in top. 183.13; and compare quaest. 1.7 16.8ff., probi, eth. 27 155.6ff.); but the nature and extent of this work seem doubtful.

(k)

Reports of commentaries in Arabic translation on the 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics' ( F A B R I C I U S 75, W E N R I C H 274, 279, Z E L L E R 819f. n., etc.) derive from the erroneous transference in Ibn al-Qiftl's 'Ta'rih al-hukamâ" of material on Aristotle to the section on Alexander; STEINSCHNEIDER (1893) 48ff., 93. In addition, Ibn al-Nadlm misleadingly refers to A r i s t o t l e ' s works in his discussion of A l e x a n d e r (Fihrist p. 609 D O D G E ; cf. S T E I N SCHNEIDER (1893) 93 f. I am grateful to Dr. ZIMMERMANN for drawing my attention to these passages in STEINSCHNEIDER). Allegations of a commentary on [Aristotle]'s 'Physiognomica' also result from a misunderstanding; cf. T H I L L E T (1984) lxii.

V. Works — Other major treatises

(1)

'De Anima'. Ed. B R U N S ( 1 8 8 7 ) 1 - 1 0 0 . English trans., comm., F O T I N I S ; Italian trans, of extensive passages, M O V Í A . On text cf. SVF; D O N I N I ( 1 9 6 8 ) ; T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 4 ) . Arabic version, cf. SEZGIN 4 . 1 7 2 , K R A U S ( 1 9 4 2 ) 324. — Hebrew translation (from Arabic) by Samuel ben Jehuda, ed. (in part = pp. 8 2 . 1 6 — 9 1 . 1 2 B R U N S ) : G Ü N S Z 3 — 1 6 . German trans, of Hebrew by STEINSCHNEIDER extensively cited in B R U N S ( 1 8 8 7 ) (cf. B R U N S [ 1 8 8 7 ] XV, STEINSCHNEIDER [ 1 8 8 7 ] , P E T E R S [ 1 9 6 8 , 1 ] 4 3 , GUTTMANN [ 1 9 7 1 ] ) .

The

complete Hebrew text has not apparently been published. — Cf. below sections I X and X ; H E N R Y ( 1 9 6 0 ) on pp. 6 1 - 6 3 ; T O D D ( 1 9 7 7 ) , and ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 ) o n 7 6 . 1 6 ; PREUS ( 1 9 8 1 , 1 ) 8 0 - 8 3 ,

91-94,

and ( 1 9 8 1 , 2 ) 5 4 - 5 6 ;

(1982) 2 3 1 - 2 3 9 ; INVOOD 3 4 - 3 5 , 137, 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 .

DONINI

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

1187

(2)

'De Fato'. Ed. BRUNS (1892,2) 164-212, also O R E L L I , with Latin trans, by G R O T I U S (cf. C R A N Z [I960] llOf.); T H I L L E T (1984) with introduction and French translation. On text cf. G E R C K E (1885); A P E L T (1894, 1906); VON A R N I M (1900) and SVF; R O D I E R (1901); LANGERBECK (1936); H A C K F O R T H ; D O N I N I (1969); L O N G (1975). German trans., SCHULTHESS; French trans., N O U R I S S O N , BOUSSOULAS (1961); English trans., FITZGERALD; revised text, English trans, and comm., SHARPLES (1983,1). — Latin translation, ed. T H I L L E T (1963,1); perhaps by William of Moerbeke, but cf. T H I L L E T (1963,1) 62. Cf. GRABMANN (1929). - Below, section X I I I ; cf. RAVAISSON 303-312; N O U R I S S O N ; FONSEGRIVE, BRUNS (1889), PACK, A M A N D , BOUSSOULAS (1960), MASAI, V A L G I G L I O , VERBEKE, L O N G (1970), D O N I N I (1974,2) 157-end, (1977) and (1982) 225-229, H A G E R (1975), SHARPLES (1975,1) (1978,1) (1979,1), DESCAMPS, D I H L E 17-18, SORABJI (1980), PREUS (1981,2), I N W O O D 8 9 - 9 1 , 292. The 'De Fato' is extensively discussed in the literature on the Stoic doctrine of determinism; cf. (e.g.) S. SAMBURSKY, Physics of the Stoics, London 1959; A . A . L O N G , Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action, in his 'Problems in Stoicism', London 1971, 173—199; M. E. REESOR, Necessity and fate in Stoic philosophy, i n j . M. R I S T (ed.), The Stoics, Berkeley 1978, 187-202; and C. STOUGH, Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility, ibid. 203—232.

(3)

'De Mixtione'. Ed. BRUNS ( 1 8 9 2 , 2 ) 2 1 3 — 2 3 8 . German trans., comm., R E X ; revised text, Eglish trans, and comm., T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) . O n text cf. A P E L T ( 1 8 8 6 ) ; USENER ( 1 8 8 7 ) f r . 2 9 0 ; R O D I E R ( 1 8 9 3 ) ; BRINKMANN; VON A R N I M

(SVF - includes a number of passages); D I E L S ; M O N T A N A R I ( 1 9 7 1 ) , ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; — Includes, in ch. 16, an extensive discussion of the Aristotelian theory of growth. Again, extensively discussed in the literature on Stoicism; cf. e.g. SAMBURSKY, op.cit., and also RAVAISSON 2 9 6 f f . ; D O N I N I

TODD (1973).

(1982) 2 2 3 - 2 2 5 .

In addition to the above there are a number of other major treatises preserved only in Arabic. A r a b i c t r a n s l a t i o n s of A l e x a n d e r are indicated by the numbering of D I E T R I C H pp. 92—100, supplemented by VAN ESS; cf. also Ibn alNadlm, Fihrist, tr. D O D G E , 2.598-606, 608f.; W E N R I C H 273-279, 3 0 4 f . ; L E CLERC 1.216f.; STEINSCHNEIDER (1887), (1893) 9 3 - 9 7 ; T H É R Y (1926) 18-27; SWEETMAN 8 8 - 9 1 ; ROSENTHAL (1955); W A L Z E R (1962) 6 0 - 7 0 ; GÄTJE (1966) and (1971); BADAWI (1968) 9 4 - 9 9 , (1979); PETERS (1968,1); FAKHRY 7 0 - 7 1 ; ZIMMERMANN—BROWN; STROHMAIER; SEZGIN 6.99—101; T H I L L E T (1984) lxvi—lxxii. O n M S S cf. D I E T R I C H p. 92, ENDRESS (1972) 3 3 - 4 4 , ZIMMERMANN (1986) 129134, 180—183, 185, 231 η. 125; and on particulars of translation cf. ENDRESS (1966) 124—129. For the influence of Alexander on Arabic philosophy see below sections X and XIV; and for Arabic translations not listed here cf. below section VII. (The longer texts have been placed here, the shorter in section VI, though the distinction is not a hard-and-fast one.) (4)

'De Principiis' ('On the Principles of the Universe'). D I ; ed. BADAWI (1947) 253—277; French trans., BADAWI (1968) 121 — 139, and part translated into

R. W. SHARPLES

1188

German, ROSENTHAL (1965) 201-206; English, ROSENTHAL (1975) 4 4 6 449. An epitome of the treatise by 'Abd al-Latlf, N E U W I R T H 90-122, 196. - Cf. ROSENTHAL (1955) 17; PINES (1961,2) 42ff., (1963) lxvii-lxxiv; A L - A L O U S I 241 and n. 62; GÄTJE (1971) 97; T H I L L E T (1984) lxviii. D26 = the first part of D l , cf. R U L A N D (1976) 107 and n. 1; SEZGIN 6.99. PINES (1986) 252—255 questions the authenticity of part at least of the treatise on the grounds that the quwwa rûipâniyya to which it refers, and which he interprets as " s p i r i t u a l force", is reminiscent of the Stoic theory attacked by Alexander in 'De mixtione' and elsewhere (cf. below, n. 166). O n the other hand a "divine force" (theia dunamis) is referred to in quaestio 2.3 in the context of a position that seems at the very least compatible with Alexander's own (cf. below, nn. 170,172—3, and also Alexander, in metaph. 104.8, nature a "force from the gods"; G E N E Q U A N D [1984] 114). Might the Arabic phrase not be compared to this? (I am grateful to Dr. G E N E QUAND and Dr. ZIMMERMANN for discussion of this point; they are not of course responsible for the use I have made of their advice.) (5)

'De Providentia'. D18; D15 another translation of the later part of this, cf. (1976) 107ff. Both texts ed., German trans, and comm., R U L A N D (1976). Greek fragments from Cyril of Jerusalem, English trans, in G R A N T ; cf. also BRUNS (1890,2) 234f. Cf. PINÈS (1955,1) 123-131, (1955,2) 343f., (1956) 26f., (1959), (1963) lxiv-lxvii, T H I L L E T (1960), (1984) lxviii, lxx and n. 2; SEZGIN 4.172, 6.100-101; KRAUS (1942) 180, 324-325, (1943) 144—146, and below section XII. RULAND

(6)

'That a differentia may be present in several genera which are not subordinate one to another'. DIO; ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 4 7 ) 2 9 5 — 3 0 8 . French trans. BADAWI ( 1 9 6 8 ) 1 5 5 - 1 6 5 . Extracts ed. and German trans., D I E T R I C H pp. 1 3 6 — 1 4 3 . Cf. also DlOa, O n the Differentia and what it is', ed. and German trans. D I E T R I C H pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 9 , ed. G H A L I O U N G U I — A B D O U ; translated back into Greek by DEICHGRÄBER ap. D I E T R I C H pp. 1 2 8 — 1 3 5 . D I E T R I C H supposed that D 1 0 and DIO a represented two different Greek texts, but STERN argued that both were based on the same Greek text, the differences between them being due to different translators; so too VAN ESS pp. 1 5 4 — 1 5 9 , GÄTJE ( 1 9 6 6 ) 2 5 6 and n. 6 . In general cf. STERN; D I E T R I C H ; GÄTJE ( 1 9 6 6 ) 2 5 4 - 2 5 7 .

(7)

'Refutation of Galen's attack on Aristotle's doctrine that everything that moves is set in motion by a mover', D28; text, English trans, and comm., R E S C H E R — M A R M U R A . Cf. KRAUS 327f.; PINÈS (1961,2); ZIMMERMANN 409-411; SEZGIN 3.72, 4.172. ( P I N È S in: Islamic Culture 11 [1937] 73n. suggested that this work might be by Alexander of Damascus [above, n. 21]; but cf. PINÈS [1961,2] 22.) PINÈS (1961,2) 22, 29f. argues that it formed part, as an excursus, of Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's 'Physics'; R E S C H E R — M A R M U R A 60—62 argue that it was an independent work. Cf. also B R O W N ' S review of . R E S C H E R — M A R M U R A , 152f.

1189

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

VI. Works — Collections of shorter discussions

The works attributed to Alexander include a number of collections of shorter discussions — the 'second book of the 'de anima", named 'mantissa' by BRUNS ( 1 8 8 7 ) ; three books of 'quaestiones naturales'; and one book of 'Ethical Problems'. They are probably not all by Alexander himself, but nevertheless reflect the activity of his school. Limitations of space prevent a listing of the titles of every item in these collections; these can of course easily be ascertained from BRUNS ( 1 8 8 7 ) and ( 1 8 9 2 , 2 ) , cf. below. I have here given an indication of further literature in cases where this exists, before proceeding at the end of the section to a more general discussion. A number of the Arabic translations of works attributed to Alexander bear a more or less close relation to certain of these Greek texts, as indicated below; cf. in general above, section V, and on the identifications cf., in addition to the references below, especially D I E T R I C H , VAN ESS ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Z I M M E R M A N N - B R O W N , T H I L L E T ( 1 9 8 4 ) lxv—lxvi n. 3 (where 1 1 1 is a misprint for II 1 1 , 1 1 5 for I I 1 5 , and II 3 for III 3), and further details that they give. The Arabic text is sometimes close to the Greek, on other occasion less so; passages are on occasion omitted or transposed, and in some cases even the relation between the texts is disputed. Arabic translations of works attributed to Alexander which are not covered either in the list of Greek texts here, or in section V above, are listed after the Greek texts below. 'De anima libri mantissa' (BRUNS [1887] 101 — 186). The items in this collection are not numbered in BRUNS, but I have numbered them from 1 to 25 in accordance with the divisions in his text; these reflect the numbering of his principal MS, Venetus Marcianus graecus 258, except that that begins new sections also at 107.21 and 107.29, thus making 27 sections in all rather than 25. 1 (101-106) is a résumé of the opening part of the 'de anima' itself (MORAUX [1942] 27). 2 (106—113), ' O n the Intellect': cf. below, section X. French trans. M O R A U X (1942) 185—194, C A R R I È R E ; English trans., F O T I N I S 137—153; extensive passages in Italian trans., M O V Í A (1970). - Arabic trans., D 2 1 (cf. PETERS [1968,1] 43), ed. FINNEGAN (1956), BADAWI (1971), no. 5. Cf. G Ä T J E (1971) 96, Z I M M E R M A N N B R O W N 3 1 6 - 3 1 8 , BADAWI (1979) 4 - 6 , G U T T M A N N (1971), SEZGIN 4.172, KRAUS (1942) 325. — Latin trans, from Arabic by Gerard of Cremona; ed. T H É R Y (1926) 6 9 - 8 3 . - With 1 0 8 . 3 - 1 5 and 109.25-110.3 compare [Alexander], in metaph. Λ 6 9 4 . 2 7 - 3 9 , 6 9 9 . 2 - 1 1 (FREUDENTHAL 2 4 - 2 7 ) . 3 (113-118): cf. SVF 2.797, M O R A U X (1942) 28; W U R M . 5 (119-122): develops de anima 14.24-15.5, cf. quaest. 1.8, 1.17, 1.26 (MORAUX [1942] 28). C f . WURM.

6 ( 1 2 2 - 1 2 5 ) : cf.

especially xxii—xxiv, 20—35; parallels with [Galen], 'de qualitatibus incorporéis', clearly different author. WURM. 9—16 (127-150) form a group concerned with the theory of sight; cf. below, n. 83; Alexander, de anima 43.16, and BRUNS ad loc. 9 (127-130): cf. Alexander, in de sensu 31.29 ( W E N D LAND [1901] ad loc.). - Arabie translation, D13a, ed. BADAWI (1971) no. 3, cf. WESTENBERGER,

1190

R. W. SHARPLES

GÄTJE (1966) 267F.; BADAVI (1979) 7. 10 ( 1 3 0 - 1 3 4 ) : cf. S V F 2 . 8 6 4 , 868; TODD ( 1 9 7 4 , 2 ) . 11 (134—136): text, E n g l i s h trans., c o m m . , AVOTINS; cf. A l e x a n d e r , in de sensu 5 6 . 1 7 f f . (ibid., THUROT 383). 15 ( 1 4 1 - 1 4 7 ) : A r a b i c trans., D 1 3 ; text, G e m a n trans, and c o m m . of this, GÄTJE (1971) 140—172, cf. GÄTJE (1966) 2 6 7 - 270, 272F. 16 ( 1 4 7 - 1 5 0 ) : cf. A l e x a n d e r , in d e sensu 4 4 . 2 3 f f . (THUROT 383); quaest. 1.2. 17 ( 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 ) : cf. PHILIPPSON; POHLENZ I. 358, II. 174F.; MORAUX (1973) 2 0 9 ; INWOOD 219. O n Verginius R u f u s (151.30) cf. F . BUECHELER, P r o s o p o g r a p h i c a , R h . M u s . 63 (1908) 190; o n a n o m a l o u s references to b o o k s of Aristotle's ' N i c o m a c h e a n Ethics 5 , cf. A . J . KENNY, T h e Aristotelian Ethics ( O x f o r d 1978) 3 7 f . n. 4. 18 ( 1 5 3 - 1 5 6 ) : cf. BRUNS (1884), FORTENBAUGH (1984) 2 5 . 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 ; p r o b i , eth. 22. 19 ( 1 5 6 - 1 5 9 ) : cf. POHLENZ l o c . c i t . 20 ( 1 5 9 - 1 6 8 ) : cf. POHLENZ ibid., S V F 3.57, 63, 145. 2 1 ( 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 ) : cf. SHARPLES (1986). 22-25 ( 1 6 9 - 1 8 6 ) : text, E n g l i s h trans., SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 ) . B e l o w , section X I I I . 22 (169—172): E n g l i s h trans., c o m m . , SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 5 , 2 ) ; cf. MERLAN (1969) 8 5 - 8 8 , DONINI (1974) 1 6 5 - 1 6 8 , SORABJI 6 5 f . , 86. 23 ( 1 7 2 175): cf. GERCKE (1885) n o . 73, DONINI (1974) 1 6 8 - 1 7 0 ; A r a b i c trans., D 2 5 , ed. BADAWI (1971) n o . 12, ed. and G e r m a n trans. RULAND (1976). 24-25 ( 1 7 6 186): G r e e k text ed., and L a t i n trans, (of CANINIUS; cf. CRANZ [1960] 8 6 f . ) , ORELLI. 25 ( 1 7 9 - 1 8 6 ) : cf. GERCKE (1885) n o s . 108, 124, FREUDENTHAL 1 4 - 1 6 , KONTOS 5 2 3 f f . , DONINI (1977) 182 n. 16, FORTENBAUGH (1979), (1984), 44, 230—232, SHARPLES (1980). — L a t i n trans, ed. THILLET (1963), w h o attributes it t o William of M o e r b e k e ; cf. a b o v e section V , ' d e f a t o ' . ' Q u a e s t i o n e s ' (BRUNS [ 1 8 9 2 , 2 ] 1 - 1 1 6 ; cf. DIELS). 1.1: cf. BRUNS ( 1 9 8 0 , 2 ) 2 3 2 f . ; c o m p a r e [ A l e x a n d e r ] , in m e t a p h . Λ 6 8 7 . 2 3 f f . (FREUDENTHAL 13—19). 1.2: cf. mantissa 16; A r a b i c trans., D 1 2 , e d . , G e r m a n trans., c o m m . GÄTJE (1967), cf. GÄTJE (1966) 2 7 0 - 2 7 4 . 1.3: E n g l i s h trans., LLOYD (1980) 6 9 - 7 0 ; cf. APELT (1894) 70; TWEEDALE. 1.4: E n g l i s h trans., c o m m . , SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 2 , 3 ) ; cf. BRUNS (1889) 619—630, arguing that this is f o r m e d of f o u r sections not originally conceived as a u n i t y ; APELT (1894) 70; S V F 2 . 9 6 2 ; SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 8 , 1 ) 2 6 4 ; SORABJI 93, 111; MIGNUCCI (1981). 1.5: A r a b i c version, with additions, D 1 9 ; ed. BADAWI (1971) n o . 9; e d . , G e r m a n trans., c o m m . , RULAND (1981). Cf. THILLET (1960) 315, GÄTJE (1966) 2 7 4 - 2 7 6 , ZIMMERMANN-BROWN 318, RULAND (1976) 232F., BADAWI (1979) 8 - 9 . - D 1 9 translated into Latin b y G e r a r d of C r e m o n a as ' D e A u g m e n t o ' ; ed. THÉRY (1926) 9 7 - 1 0 0 , RULAND (1981) 7 2 74. — Cf. A l e x a n d e r , de mixtione ch. 16. 1.8: cf. quaest. 1.17, 1.26. — A r a b i e trans., v E 32. 1.11: this consists of t w o texts, of which 1.11 b in BRUNS ( 1 9 8 2 , 2 ) is a repetition of 1.11 a with an a d d e d p a s s a g e . E n g l i s h trans, of 1.11 a, TWEEDALE: of 1 . 1 1 b , LLOYD (1980) 72—74. - A r a b i c trans, of 1 . 1 1 a in t w o versions, D 3 and D 1 7 (cf. GÄTJE [1966] 2 6 1 - 2 6 4 ) ; D 3 ed., BADAWI (1947) 2 7 9 f „ F r e n c h trans. BADAWI (1968) 1 4 1 - 2 , f o l l o w i n g o n f r o m D 2 (cf. b e l o w on 1.21 and 1.22); D 3 and D 1 7 ed. and G e r m a n trans., RULAND (1979). — Cf. b e l o w section V I I I ; WOLFSON; MORAUX (1942) 5 0 - 6 2 ; PINÈS ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 ) 3 n. 2, 2 8 f f . ; BOOTH 2 9 - 3 3 . 1.12: A r a b i c version, with considerable m o d i f i c a t i o n and rearrangement, D 5 , ed. BADAWI (1947) 2 8 3 ; F r e n c h trans, of this, BADAWI (1968) 1 4 5 f . ; cf. PINÈS ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 ) 3 Η. 2. 1.13: cf. USENER (1887) fr. 289. 1.14: cf. quaest. 2 . 2 1 7 0 . 2 f f . ;

ALEXANDER OF

APHRODISIAS

1191

χ; SVF 3 . 3 2 . 1.16: Arabie trans., D 2 2 (but 2 8 . 2 4 - 2 9 . 1 different, Z I M M E R M A N N - B R O W N 3 1 9 ) , ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 7 1 ) no. 8 ; cf. ( 1 9 7 9 ) 7 - 8 . 1.17: cf. quaest. 1 . 8 , 1 . 2 6 , mantissa 5 . 1.18: English trans., comm., SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 2 ) ; cf. BALTES ( 1 9 7 6 ) , SORABJI ( 1 9 8 3 ) 9 2 , and below section X I . 1.19: English trans., comm., SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 ) ; cf. quaest. 2 . 1 5 . 1.20: cf. W I E S N E R 256-258. 1.21: cf. BRUNS ( 1 8 9 2 , 2 ) viii. Arabie trans, of 1.22 + 1 . 2 1 , D 2 ; ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 4 7 ) 2 7 8 f . , French trans. BADAWI ( 1 9 6 8 ) 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 . Cf. G Ä T J E ( 1 9 6 6 ) 2 6 1 f. 1.23: English trans., comm., SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 2 ) . 1.24: Arabic trans., D 2 0 , ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 7 1 ) no. 7 , cf. ( 1 9 7 9 ) 7 ; SEZGIN 4 . 1 7 2 . 1.25: cf. BRUNS ( 1 8 9 0 , 2 ) 2 2 3 — 2 3 2 , arguing that this is an inept combination of two separate discussions; A P E L T ( 1 9 0 6 ) 1 0 ; SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 2 , 2 ) . 1.26: cf. quaest. 1 . 8 , 1 . 1 7 ; A P E L T ( 1 9 0 6 ) 1 0 ; L. R E P I C I , La logica di Teofrasto, Bologna 1 9 7 7 , fr. 4 6 ; SHARPLES in: Journal of Hellenic Studies 9 9 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 1 7 9 ; M O R A U X ( 1 9 7 9 ) 17f. BRUNS ( 1 8 9 2 , 2 )

cf. A P E L T (1906) 10 (not. 2.2 as there stated); SORABJI (1983) 395. 2 . 3 : cf. (1890,1), A P E L T (1894) 70, M O R A U X (1942) 3 4 - 3 7 , (1967,1), (1984) 4 5 46. — Arabic trans., abbreviated, vE 34. 2.4—5: text, English trans., comm., SHARPLES (1983,1); cf. A P E L T (1894) 7 0 f „ SVF 2.1007. 2 . 1 1 : Arabic trans., D 7 , ed. BADAWI (1947) 2 8 6 - 2 8 8 ; French trans, of this, BADAWI (1968) 149f. Cf. W A L Z E R (1962) 62; VAN ESS 150f.; and below on D 2 7 . 2 . 1 2 : English trans., comm., T O D D (1972,1); cf. SVF 2.476. 2 . 1 4 : English trans., L L O Y D (1980) 71. 2 . 1 5 : English trans., comm., SHARPLES (1982,1). - Arabic trans., D 6 , ed. BADAWI (1947) 284f.; French trans, of this, BADAWI (1968) 147f.; cf. W A L Z E R (1962,2) 62, PINÈS (1961,1) 3 η. 2. - cf. quaest. 1.19. 2 . 1 6 : cf. SVF 3.19. 2 . 1 9 : Arabie trans., vE 33. 2 . 2 0 : English trans., comm., SHARPLES (1983,2). 2 . 2 1 : cf. A P E L T (1894) 71, (1906) lOf. (references to 2.20 and 2.22 are wrong); SVF 2.1118; M E R L A N (1969) 8 8 - 9 1 ; below, section 12. 2 . 2 2 : English trans., comm., SHARPLES (1979,2); cf. BRUNS (1892,1). 2 . 2 3 : cf. A P E L T (1906) 11. 2 . 2 4 : cf. M O R A U X (1942) 4 4 - 4 7 . 2 . 2 8 : Arabie trans., D 2 4 , ed. BADAWI (1971) no. 10; cf. G Ä T J E (1966) 2 7 6 - 2 7 8 . - cf. L L O Y D (1980) 5 9 - 6 1 ; B O O T H 3 2 - 3 3 . 2.1:

BRUNS

Arabic trans., D 1 4 ; ed. and German trans., RULAND ( 1 9 7 8 ) . — D 1 4 translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona ('De Sensu'), ed. T H É R Y ( 1 9 2 6 ) 8 3 — 9 2 , reprinted in RULAND ( 1 9 7 8 ) . (Not to be confused with the medieval Latin trans, of Alexander's c o m m e n t a r y on Aristotle's 'de sensu', above section IV). — Cf. below, section VII, Lost Works, ( 4 ) . 3 . 5 : English trans., comm., SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 9 , 2 ) . 3 . 9 : cf. H E N R Y 4 3 6 - 4 3 8 , and Alexander, in de sensu 1 6 4 . 1 3 ( T H U R O T 383). 3.11: English trans., comm., TODD (1976,1). Cf. below on vE 37, and below n. 9 3 . 3 . 1 2 : cf. U S E N E R ( 1 8 8 7 ) frr. 2 9 7 , 3 0 1 ; BRUNS ( 1 8 9 3 ) , SVF 2 . 3 5 6 , T O D D ( 1 9 8 2 , 2 ) and ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 3 . 1 3 : text, English trans., comm., SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 ) . 3.3:

'Ethical Problems' ( = Quaestiones b o o k 4 ; BRUNS [1892,2] 1 1 7 - 1 6 3 ) . 1: cf. SVF 3.165. 5 : A P E L T (1894) 71. 8: M O R A U X (1973) 126. 9 : A P E L T (1894) 71; N E U HAUSEN 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 . 1 0 : A P E L T (1906) 11. 1 2 : ibid. 2 0 : ibid. 11 F. 2 1 : A P E L T (1894) 71. 2 2 : cf. mantissa 18; A P E L T (1906) 12. 2 3 : A P E L T (1894) 71. 2 4 : on 147.12 cf. L. RADERMACHER, Griechischer Sprachbrauch, Philologus 59 (1900) 597. 2 9 : cf. A P E L T (1906) 12, D O N I N I (1974) 70, SHARPLES (1983,1) 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 .

1192

R. W. SHARPLES

Arabic translations not apparently related closely to any extant Greek text: D4

'Refutation of the assertion of Xenocrates that the species is prior to the genus'. Ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 4 7 ) 2 8 1 f.; English trans., comm., PINES ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 ) ; French trans., BADAWI ( 1 9 6 8 ) 1 4 3 F . ; German trans., VAN E S S ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; cf. K R Ä M E R ( 1 9 7 3 ) 1 3 0 - 1 4 9 ; T H I L L E T ( 1 9 8 4 ) lxix.

D8

'That form is the actuality of movement, according to Aristotle'. Ed. (1947) 289f.; French trans. BADAWI (1968) 151 f. Relates to Aristotle, Physics 3.2 202 a 7f. ( D E I C H G R Ä B E R ap. D I E T R I C H p. 95). Attached to the Arabic text is a version of Proclus, Elements of Theology 1 5 - 1 7 ; cf. S. P I N È S , Une version arabe de trois propositions de la Σ Τ Ο Ι Χ Ε Ι Ω Σ Ε Θ Ε Ο Λ Ο Γ Ι Κ Η de Proclus, Oriens 8 (1955) 1 9 5 - 2 0 3 . BADAWI

D9

'That to act is a wider [expression] than to move, according to Aristotle'. Ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 4 7 ) 2 9 3 f . , French trans. BADAWI ( 1 9 6 8 ) 1 5 3 f . Cf. DIETRICH p . 9 5 , A L - A L O U S I 2 7 7 n . 3 0 , 2 8 9 n . 7 0 , SORABJI ( 1 9 8 3 ) 5 3 .

Dil

'Refutation of Galen's interpretation of the possible'. Text (only in photograph), English trans., comm., R E S C H E R — M A R M U R A ; English trans, also in N . RESCHER, Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic (Foundations of Language, suppl. ser. vol. 2, Dordrecht 1967) Appendix Β. Only a fragment survives, giving Galen's criticism of "the followers of Theophrastus"; cf. SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 8 , 2 ) 9 0 .

D16

'Refutation of the view of those who assert that each thing can only come from another thing, and demonstration that each thing can only come from nothing'. Against Galen, cf. M Ü L L E R 434f., D I E T R I C H p. 97; SWEETMAN 116, A L - A L O U S I 303f. and η. 33; S O R A B J I (1983) 248, Z I M M E R MANN (1986) 174—5 and 178. The text as it now stands includes Neoplatonic doctrine which is hardly that of Alexander himself (nature produces only form, while God produces both form and matter; contrast quaestio 2.20 64.15—16), but if it is based on an authentic work by Alexander, an indication of the sort of context in which that might have originated is perhaps given by Alexander ap. Simplicius, in phys., C A G 9 238.6ff.

D29

'That every separate cause is present in everything as well as in nothing, according to Aristotle'. Relates to Aristotle, metaph. Β 3 999 a 17, cf. Alexander, in metaph. 21.12 ( D E I C H G R Ä B E R ap. D I E T R I C H p. 100).

D30

'Advice from the Poetry of (? on poetry by?) the philosopher Aristotle'. In fact relates rather to the 'Topics' (I owe this information to Dr ZIMMERMANN); Dr R I C H A R D J A N K O suggests a corruption Τ Ο Π Ι Κ Η to Π Ο Ι Η Τ Ι Κ Η (private communication). Cf. R O S E N T H A L (1955) 18, D I E T RICH p .

vE

31

100.

'On time', ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 7 1 ) no. 1. Latin translation ('De motu et tempore') by Gerard of Cremona, ed. T H É R Y ( 1 9 2 6 ) 9 2 — 9 7 ; English trans, (from the Latin), comm., SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 2 , 5 ) . Ibn al-Nadlm in the Fihrist (vol. 2 p. 609 DODGE) refers to a work by Alexander 'Against

ALEXANDER OF

APHRODISIAS

1193

Galen on Time and Space'; ZIMMERMANN 410 η. 49 suggests that vE 31 may be part of this. Cf. also STEINSCHNEIDER (1893) 96, PINÈS (1936) 75 n. 1, (1955,1) 111 f., BÜRGEL 282f., R E S C H E R - M A R M U R A 12 η. 8, Z I M M E R M A N N - B R O W N 315, BADAWI (1979) 6. SORABJI (1983) 2 8 - 2 9 , 82-83, 9 5 - 9 6 , 279. THILLET (1984) lxviif. vE

35

O n the [first] cause . . . and the motion of the universe'. Cf.

KRITZECK

378.

vE

36

Treatise on the conversion of premisses', ed. BADAWI ( 1 9 7 1 ) no. 11. Ess ( 1 9 6 6 ) 1 5 3 f. tentatively identified this with Alexander, in an. pr. 2 9 . I f f . , but Z I M M E R M A N N - B R O W N 3 2 0 reject this and regard it as an independent treatise. Cf. BADAWI ( 1 9 7 9 ) 9 . VAN

vE 37

O n utterances'. Ed. BADAWI (1971) no. 4. Relates to Aristotle de int. 16 a 27; cf. Ammonius in de int. 39.13—17. Z I M M E R M A N N - B R O W N 316; T O D D (1976,1) 141 n. 5. THILLET (1984) lxxi.

For other Arabic texts cf. above as follows: D1 D2 D3 D5 D6 D7 DIO, DlOa D12 D13 Dl3a D14 D15 D17 D18 D19 D20 D21 D22 [D23 D24 D25 D26 D27 D28 vE 32 vE 33 vE 34

cf. De Principiis (above, section V) quaest. 1.22, 1.21 quaest. 1.11 quaest. 1.12 quaest. 2.15 quaest. 2.11 De Differentiis Specificis (above, section V) quaest. 1.2 mantissa 15 mantissa 9 quaest. 3.3 De Providentia (section V) quaest. 1.11 De Providentia (section V) quaest. 1.5 quaest. 1.24 mantissa 2 quaest. 1.16 see below] quaest. 2.28 mantissa 23 De Principiis (section V) see below Refutation of Galen on Motion (section V) quaest. 1.8 quaest. 2.19 quaest. 2.3

1194

R.

W.

SHARPLES

D 2 3 is not by Alexander; the first part is a version of Proclus, Elements of Theology prop. 77 (ZIMMERMANN—BROWN, 318). D 2 7 is a compilation including, among various texts from Proclus, D 7 and D16 (also found elsewhere) and vE 3 2 - 3 4 . Cf. FINNEGAN (1956) 160f. and n. 3, and VAN ESS. O n the establishment of the First Cause, a discourse abstracted by Alexander from the book Theology', edited by BADAWI (1971, no. 2) is in fact based on Proclus, Elements of Theology 1 - 3 ; cf. Z I M M E R M A N N - B R O W N 318, BADAWI (1979) 6 - 7 . O n the texts from Proclus and their attribution to Alexander cf. ENDRESS (1972) 33—44, 5 1 - 5 8 , ZIMMERMANN (1986) 129-134, 180-183, 185. There is also a Syriac version of [Alexander], Problemata 1—2 (below, section VII); VAN ESS 154. BRUNS41 divided the short Greek texts in the 'mantissa', 'quaestiones' and 'Ethical Problems' into six classes: (A) problems followed by their solutions, 'quaestiones' properly so called, (B) explanations (έξηγήσεις) of particular Aristotelian texts, (C) summaries (έπιδρομαί) of sections of Aristotle's works or of doctrines on particular topics, (D) fragments, (E) collections of arguments to demonstrate a particular point, and (F) discussions of particular topics not differing in character, but only in their shorter length, from the treatises discussed above in section V 4 2 . MORAUX found that, of the texts relating to psychology, those of type (A) and (B) tended to modify positions adopted in Alexander's treatise 'de anima' or his commentary on Aristotle's 'de anima', whereas those of type (C) were in closer agreement with these; he suggested that the texts of type (C) might reflect Alexander's oral teaching, or be essays by his pupils 43 . The 'mantissa' texts differ from the 'quaestiones' in that the former seem to relate more closely to Alexander's own longer treatises (above, section V), the latter to Aristotelian texts 44 .

41

BRUNS ( 1 8 9 2 , 2 )

42

(A): quaestiones 1.4 (cf. BRUNS [1892,2] viii), 5 - 1 0 , 12, 15, 2 0 - 2 3 , 26; 2 . 3 - 9 , 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, 23 (BRUNS loc. cit.), 28, 3 . 4 - 5 ; ethical problems 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, (11), 14, 16, (21), 24, 28, 30. (Β): quaestiones 1.11 (Aristotle, de anima 402 b 7), 16 (Physics 188 a 26), 24 (ibid. 191 a 23); 2.2 (Aristotle, de anima 406 b 11), 22 (de gen. et corr. 337 b 25), 24 (de anima 412 a 6), 25 (ibid. 412 b 15), 26 (412 b 26, cf. below (D)); 3.2 (ibid. 417 b 5), 6 (ibid. 424 b 24ff.), 7 (ibid. 425 b 32), 9 (427 a 2); ethical problems 12 (Nicomachean Ethics 1110 a 2), 18 (ibid. 1095 b 16), 29 (ibid. 1114 a 34ff.). (C): quaestiones 1 . 1 - 3 , 13, 1 8 - 1 9 ; 2.1, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 27 (Aristotle, de anima 2 . 1 - 2 , cf. BRUNS [1892,2] ix); 3.3 (Aristotle, de anima 2.5; BRUNS loc.cit.), 8, 10 (Meteorologica 2.1—3), 11, 13, 14 (Meteorologica 4 . 1 - 7 ) ; ethical problems 6, 9, 13, 23, 25, 26. (D): quaestiones 1.17, 1.25, 2.21, 2.26 (cf. BRUNS [1892,2] xi, comparing quaestiones 1.17, 1.26, mantissa 5), ethical problems 19, 22 (cf. BRUNS [1892,2] xiv). (E): mantissa 3 - 1 4 , 1 8 - 2 0 , ethical problems 2, 22, 27. (F): mantissa 1.2, 15 — 17, 21—25; quaestiones 3.12. The above classification modifies that of BRUNS at certain points; the divisions between the classes are not in any case absolutely rigid.

43

MORAUX

(1942)

v - x i v , cf. MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 )

22,

cf.

BRUNS

(1892,2)

19-28.

ixf.,

TODD

(1972).

(MORAUX

however

later

r e g a r d e d s o m e o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f h i s [ 1 9 4 2 ] 1 9 — 2 4 as o v e r s t a t e d ; [ 1 9 6 7 , 1 ] 161 n. 2 . ) 44

MORAUX (1942) 24. MORAUX in (1942) 37 regarded quaest. 2.3 as later than the 'de anima', but later considered it early ([1967,1] 163 f. n. 2). O n the relation of others of these short texts to the longer treatises, with possible implications regarding the authenticity of the

ALEXANDER O F APHRODISIAS

1195

It seems improbable that all these texts are by Alexander himself, though they all seem to reflect the work of his school. The assembly of the collections was inexpertly done, texts on similar topics being separated and duplicates not recognised 45 ; some of the titles, too, are inept and seem to be the work of editors 46 . MORAUX distinguished certain groups of texts in the 'mantissa'; relating to Alexander's 'de anima' (mantissa 1 — 5), to physical topics (6—8, 14), to senseperception ( 9 - 1 3 , 1 5 - 1 6 ) , to ethics ( 1 7 - 2 0 ) and to the 'de fato' (22 - 25) 47 . In the 'quaestiones', too, there are certain groupings; texts on psychology (which mostly follow the order of the text of Aristotle's 'de anima' 48 ), on issues raised in Aristotle's 'Physics' 49 and in his 'De generatione et corruptione' 50 . Certain preoccupations also recur; with possibility and potentiality 51 , with providence and the motion and influence of the heavens 52 , with questions of form and matter, universal and particular 53 . This raises the question whether any of these texts represent extracts from Alexander's lost commentaries. Certainly in some cases this is excluded by references in the texts themselves or in their titles — if the latter can be trusted 54 . There seems much scope for further study of these short texts and of their interrelations, though the extreme shortness of many of them may restrict the usefulness of stylistic analysis 55 .

45

46

former, cf. SHARPLES (1975,2) 42 (mantissa 22), ID. (1980) (mantissa 25) and below n. 61 (quaest. 1.11). O n the question of authenticity in general cf. THILLET (1984) lxiii—lxv. Texts separated; quaest. 1.19, 2.15; 1.8, 1.17, 1.26; ethical problems 8 and 28. Duplicates; quaest. 1.11a—b; 1.14, 2.21; ethical problems 23 and 26. BRUNS (1892,2) xi. And cf. above on quaest. 1.25. quaest. 1.8, 22, 25 (cf. also 1.2, 3.3); 2.7, 27; 3.3. BRUNS (1892,2) ix, xi.

47

MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 2 4 f f .

48

q u a e s t . 1 . 1 1 a - b , 2 . 2 , 8 - 1 0 , 2 4 - 2 7 , 3 . 2 - 3 , 6 - 9 . MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 2 3 .

49

quaest. 1.16, 22, 24, 2.1, 11; cf. also D 8 , D 2 8 (above section V) and vE 31.

50

quaest.

1 . 5 , 6 , 15, 19, 2 . 1 7 , 2 2 , 3 . 4 , 5 ; D 9 .

C f . T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 19 n . 9 0 ; SHARPLES

( 1 9 7 9 , 2 ) 3 8 n . 7. 51 52 53 54

55

quaest. 1.18, 19, 23, 2.15, 19f., D i l . quaest. 1.1, 10, 14, 15, 25, 2.3, 6, 18, 21, 25, 3.4, vE 35. quaest. 1.3, 8, 11 a - b , 17, 26, 2.7, 14, 24, 28, D 4 , DIO, D17. Above, n. 46. Quaest. 1.11a 21.18 ( = l i b 22.26) refers to the commentary on the 'de anima'; and 2.22 offers a different interpretation f r o m that in Alexander's commentary on 'de gen. et corr.', at least if the title can be trusted (71.4f.). BRUNS (1892,2) viii claimed that of the 'quaestiones' only 2.2, 24, 26, 3.7 and 3.9 could have formed part of a commentary (that on the 'de anima'). THÉRY (1926) suggested that D14 might derive from the 'de anima' commentary (91; cf. above on quaest. 3.3, and below section VII, Lost Works, no. [4]); D19 from the 'de gen. et corr.' commentary (100: so too DIETRICH 98; contra, GÄTJE [1966] 275); and vE 31 from the 'Physics' commentary (97; contra, ZIMMERMANN-BROWN 314). ZIMMERMANN-BROWN 316 argue that vE 37 is from the 'de int.' commentary. Cf. above on vE 36, and section V no. 7. THILLET (1984) lxix—lxx n. 6 holds that n o n e of the short items discussed in this section are extracts from the commentaries. The longest text in the 'mantissa' occupies approximately 9 pages of the 'Supplementum Aristotelicum' (mantissa 20), the longest in the 'quaestiones' and 'ethical problems' approximately 7 pages (quaest. 3.14); the average length of the 'mantissa' texts is 3.4 pages, of the 'quaestiones' etc. only 1.6 — and some of these texts are themselves composite; cf. above on quaest. 1.4, 1.25, and below section X on the 'de intellectu'.

1196

R. W. SHARPLES

VII. Other fragments, other lost works, and spuria

Fragments: In addition to fragments already noted in sections IV and VI above, a few others from unidentified works are given by FREUDENTHAL (112f., nos. 35 and 36; these m a y be from Alexander's commentary on the 'Metaphysics', see above section I V ) ; VITELLI ( 1 9 0 2 ) , cf. VITELLI ( 1 8 9 5 ) ; BROWN 3 8 ; GHORAB 8 1 f. Lost Works: Cf. in general: 2) 17 η. 80.

FABRICIUS

76—78;

ZELLER

820f. n. 2;

COÛTANT

23; T O D D (1976,

(1)

'Against the Epicurean Zenobius', arguing that differences of direction in space are natural; attested by Simplicius, in phys., CAG 9 249.37, 489.20ff. (Perhaps not an independent work, cf. T O D D loc. cit.)

(2)

'On the disagreement between Aristotle and his associates [i.e., particularly, Theophrastus] concerning [syllogisms with] mixed premisses' [e.g., one apodeictic and one assertorie). Referred to by Alexander, in an. pr. 125.30f.; Philoponus, in an. pr., CAG 13.2 126.20 (on the same passage, 30 a 15—22) presumably refers to this (as a μονόβιβλος of Alexander's; ZELLER, loc. cit.), and states that it included an interpretation of Aristotle's argument in terms of conditional necessity by Sosigenes, Alexander's teacher — in which case it will be Sosigenes' view that is given at Alexander, in an. pr. 125.3ff. Cf. also Alexander, in an. pr. 207.35, 213.26, 238.37, 249.38; BRANDIS (1833) 287; MORAUX (1984) 339-344. BÜRGEL 283n. suggests that this work was directed against Galen, who wrote on the topic (Galen, de libris propriis 123.8 MÜLLER); cf. DIL in section VI above.

(3)

'Scholia Logica' are referred to by Alexander, in an. pr. 2 5 0 . 2 ; ZELLER loc. cit. supposed that this reference might be a gloss. MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 2 4 accepts this, but regards it as possible evidence for a colletion of material on logic by Alexander corresponding to that on the soul collected in the 'mantissa'. Cf. also, perhaps, Alexander in an. pr. 328.6.

(4)

'Explanation and summary of certain passages from [Aristotle's] De Sensu et Sensato'. Referred to by a scholion on quaest. 1.2 (which presumably indicates that the 'quaestio' did not form part of this work); BRUNS ( 1 8 9 2 , 2 ) ix. MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) again suggests that this was a collection similar to the 'mantissa'; but the singular 'Explanation and summary' is then perhaps rather odd. DIETRICH 9 6 f . suggested that D 1 4 (of the relation of which to quaest. 3.3 he was not aware) was identical with this text; cf. above on quaest. 3 . 3 , and GÄTJE ( 1 9 7 1 ) 7 2 . The subject-matter of quaest. 1 . 2 is not dealt with in quaest. 3.3; the latter might still have formed a p a r t of the

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

1197

work referred to by the scholion, but there is the further difficulty that it is clearly closely linked, n o t to Aristotle's 'De Sensu', but to his De Anima, 2.5. (5)

'De Noi'. Cited by Albertus Magnus as having influenced David de Dinant, and described either as 'De noi, hoc est de mente et Deo et materia prima' or as 'de principio incorporeae et corporeae substantiae'. From its alleged contents — God is identified with matter, and differences between forms are purely accidental — this can scarcely be a genuine work of Alexander's, and in particular cannot be identical with the 'de intellectu' (mantissa 2, above section VI; περί νου in Greek). Albertus does refer to spurious works by the name of their alleged authors even when rejecting their authenticity; THÉRY ( 1 9 2 5 ) 6 5 . Cf. THÉRY ( 1 9 2 5 ) 5 7 - 7 2 ; CRANZ ( 1 9 6 0 ) 135. Albertus also refers to Alexander as author of a 'Liber de Atomis' (THÉRY [ 1 9 2 5 ] 6 3 ) .

(6)

A work on the virtues, described as extant in MS but unpublished at FABRICIUS 77, and following him ZELLER 820f. η. 2, in fact appears identical - to judge from the title and incipit given by FABRICIUS - with probi, eth. 25 (above, section VI).

(7)

The 'Fihrist' refers to a work, not so far identified, showing 'That what exists is not homogenous with (or perhaps, emending the text, 'is not the genus of : D r ZIMMERMANN in a private communication) the ten categories' (DODGE 609).

(8)

79

A number of other reported works are almost certainly spurious: ' O n daemones' (Michael of Ephesus, in parv. nat., C A G 22.1 83.27, 84.6); 'De magicis' (reported by Agostino Nifo, cf. CRANZ [1971] 420f.); O n the powers of stones', perhaps identical with the foregoing, reported by Albertus Magnus and by Michael Psellus (PG 122.899f.; cf. FABRICIUS 78, CRANZ [1971] 420-422). [Alexander], probi. 1.87 IDELER refers to a work by its author 'Allegorical interpretations of the persuasive stories invented concerning the gods', but this is clearly not Alexander (see below). — THILLET (1984) liv—lv (cf. lxxiii n. 2) points to a number of unidentified and doubtful titles in the list of Alexander's works by Ibn Abï Usaybi'a, among them ' O n Melancholy' and ' O n Maladies of the Heart'. O n Alexander's possible interest in medicine see THILLET (1984) xlv—xlvi; other medical items are among the spuria attributed to Alexander (see below). Of the items listed by THILLET lxxiii n. 2, IAU 29, O n the generation of forms from nothing', m a y be connected with DIETRICH 16 (above, section V I ) , though the f i r s t part of the title of this appears as IAU 14; cf. SORABJI (1983) 248. IAU 31 corresponds to mantissa 6, though no Arabic version of this has so far been located; and IAU 46 could be any of quaestiones 2.22.24—27, or 3.2—3 (3.3, q.v., being the only one of these of which a Latin version is currently known; DIETRICH p. 96 identifies IAU 46 with his no. 14, which = quaestio 3.3). A N R W II 36.2

R. W. SHARPLES

1198

Spurious works: (1)

'Problemata' ('Ιατρικά άπορηματα καί φυσικά προβλήματα; not to be confused with the 'Ethical Problems' [= Quaestiones book 4], above section V I ) . Two books were edited by IDELER I 3 — 80. In addition, parts of the pseudo-Aristotelean 'problemata inedita', first published by BUSSEMAKER, have been regarded by some scholars as forming part of the same collection. (There is no suggestion by any modern scholar that the attribution, whether to Alexander or to Aristotle, is genuine, nor yet that IDELER'S two books are a genuine work of Alexander's; cf. on this FLASHAR [1962,1] 363, 366f., [1962,2].) BUSSEMAKER viii—xix argued that books 1, 2.1—38, 3.46—48 and 50—52 of his collection were originally 'Alexandrian', the rest 'Aristotelian' (but cf. P R A N T L , Münchener Gelehrte Anzeiger, 1858, no. 25). U S E N E R (1859) argued, on the basis of ascriptions in some MSS and a supposed reference back from 1.17 BUSSEMAKER to 2.70 IDELER, that books 1 and 2 of BUSSEMAKER'S collection had originally been 3 and 4 of the Alexandrian collection of which IDELER'S books were 1 and 2, and published them as such; but R O S E (1863) 216—219 argued against this that the apparent ascriptions were the result of careless copying. He was prepared to accept BUSSEMAKER'S division of his three books into those originally 'Alexandrian' and those originally 'Aristotelian', but argued that, by another error, all three had come to be regarded as 'Aristotelian' in antiquity and had been transmitted as such. Most recently FLASHAR (1962,1) has argued that BUSSEMAKER'S distinction into two classes is an oversimplification, and that the problems in his three books had been collected from a number of sources in antiquity (359—361). Further, he has argued, on the basis of the similarity between the prologue to the BUSSEMAKER collection and those to books 1 and (especially) 2 of the IDELER one, that it is unlikely that they all originally formed part of a single collection; from the evidence of the prologues he argues that both collections were probably assembled in Alexandria between the 4th and 7th centuries A.D., perhaps in the time of Olympiodorus (FLASHAR [1962,1] 361-366, [1962,2]). Evidence of the existence of some items in all these collections before the time of Alexander has been seen in alleged parallel passages; but these may often rather rest on common sources, and in any case prove nothing about the antiquity of the collections as wholes. Cf. R O S E (1863) 219f., 222, L I N K E 50 n. 6, 51 n. 4, FLASHAR (1962,1) 360, 367; in addition, ROSELLI has identified a quotation of 2.153 BUSSEMAKER (= 4.156 U S E N E R ) in a 2nd century A.D. papyrus. (Cf. also LUPPE.) There are numerous parallels between these collections and Macrobius, Saturnalia book 7, but here again the explanation may rather be a common source; cf. L I N K E 52—54, C O U R C E L L E 11 and n. 7. O n the transmission of the collections cf. also RUELLE (1892), D I E L S , and (1918), R O C H E F O R T , and on one aspect of their influence cf. L A W N . Cf. also DEICHGRÄBER 36f. (Probi. 1 IDELER, prologue); K . S. K O N T O S , Συμμικτά κριτικά, Bull, de correspondance KALINKA, W E G E H A U P T (1915)

ALEXANDER OF

1199

APHRODISIAS

hellénique 7 (1878) 235 (Probi. 1 . 4 9 IDELER); and

KELLER

(probi. 2.16

IDELER).

(2)

O n Fevers'. N o t by Alexander of Aphrodisias; possibly by Alexander of Tralles (6th cent. A.D.). Ed. SCHINAS; PASSOW (with the Latin translation of VALLA); IDELER 1.81-106. On MSS cf. DIELS.

(3)

A treatise O n Unity', translated by Gerard of Cremona, is probably to be attributed to Al-Kindï rather than to Alexander; cf. STEINSCHNEIDER (1983) 97.

VIII. Forms and universals

Alexander has generally been regarded as un-Aristotelian in claiming, not only that universals do not exist apart from particulars, but also that they are posterior to them 56 . Some critics have even described his position as close to nominalism 57 ; but it may be doubted whether t h i s is justified. It is true that, in distinguishing between intelligible forms that are embodied in matter and those that are not (below, section X) he stresses that the former depend for their existence on being intelligized, whereas the latter do not 58 . But he does nevertheless seem to hold that there is a distinction in reality (and not just one arbitrarily imposed by our intelligence) between the essence, which is common to all members of a species, and the differences between them, which are accidental and

56

57

58

79*

Cf. Simplicius in cat., C A G 8 82.22—28: ό μέντοι ' Α λ έ ξ α ν δ ρ ο ς έ ν τ α ύ θ α (sc. in commenting on Aristotle Categories 5, 2 a l l f f . ) καί τη φύσει υστέρα τ ά κ α θ ό λ ο υ τ ω ν κ α θ ' έκαστα είναι φιλονεικεϊ . . . κοινού γ α ρ οντος, φησίν, ά ν ά γ κ η καί άτομον είναι· έν γ α ρ τοις κοινοίς τ α ά τ ο μ α περιέχεται- άτομου δέ οντος o ti π ά ν τ ω ς το κοινόν, ειγε το κοινόν τοις πολλοίς υ π ά ρ χ ε ι . Cf. ibid. 85.5—9, and Dexippus, in cat., C A G 4.2 45. 1 2 - 3 1 ; Z E L L E R 823f., M O R A U X (1942) 9, 49 n. 2, M E R L A N (1970,1) 118, T W E E D A L E 2 8 5 286. See however below n. 72. Simplicius' and Dexippus' criticisms of Alexander in these passages are of course from a Platonist, rather than an Aristotelian standpoint. U E B E R W E G - P R A E C H T E R 564f., B E R T I ; but cf., contra, N A R D I and on Aristotle, L L O Y D (1980) 2. Alexander, de anima 90.2—11: επί μεν οΰν τών ένύλων ειδών, ώσπερ είπον, δ τ α ν μή νοήται τ α τ ο ι α ύ τ α είδη, ουδέ έστιν α υ τ ώ ν τι νους, ει γε έν τ φ ν ο ε ϊ σ θ α ι α ύ τ ο ί ς ή του νοητοϊς είναι ύπόστασις. τ α γ α ρ κ α θ ό λ ο υ καί κ ο ι ν ά την μεν ϋ π α ρ ξ ι ν έν τ ο ι ς κ α θ έκαστά τε καί ένύλοις εχει. ν ο ο ύ μ ε ν α δε χ ω ρ ί ς ύλης κ ο ι ν ά τε κ α ί καθόλου γίνεται, καί τότε έστί ν ο υ ς δ τ α ν νοήται. εί δε μή νοοίτο, ο ύ δ ε εστίν ετι. ώστε χ ω ρ ι σ θ έ ν τ α τοΰ νοούντος α υ τ ά νου φθείρεται, ει γε έν τ φ ν ο ε ί σ θ α ι τ ο είναι αύτοίς. δ μ ο ι α δε τούτοις καί τ ά έξ άφαιρέσεως, ό π ο ί ά έστι τ ά μαθηματικά, φ θ α ρ τ ό ς ά ρ α ó τοιούτος νούς, τουτέστιν τ ά τ ο ι α ύ τ α νοήματα. T h e context, it should be noted, is primarily concerned not with the metaphysical analysis of individuals composed of f o r m and matter, but with arguing that imperishable reason is that which knows, and is identical with, form that does not require to be abstracted from matter. Cf. L L O Y D (1980) 50—56, (1981). Genus as genus (see below) is just a name, and depends for its c o m m o n existence on being thought of (quaest. 2.28 7 8 . 1 8 - 2 0 , cf. 7 9 . 9 - 1 0 ; BOOTH, 33). Cf. TWEEDALE 2 8 1 - 2 8 3 , 2 9 7 - 2 9 8 .

1200

R.

W.

SHARPLES

attributable to matter rather than form 5 9 ; indeed the distinction between essence and accidents, it is implied, will be present even if there is only one member of the species in question. For it is not part of the essential nature of the species that it is exemplified in several instances 6 0 nor yet of the genus that it is present in several species 6 1 ; definition is of what is common, but it is not of what is comon q u a common 6 2 . Form is not in matter in the way that qualities are in a substrate, 59

quaest. 1.3, 7.23—8.5: το γάρ ζώον λογικόν θνητόν, εί μεν λαμβάνοιτο μετά των υλικών περιστάσεων και διαφορών, μεθ' ων ή ύπόστασις αυτών, αϊ είσιν άλλου άλλαι, ποιεί τον Σωκράτη και τον Καλλίαν καί τούς καθέκαστα άνθρώπους, εΐ δε χωρίς τούτων λαμβάνοιτο, κοινόν γίνοιτο, ούχ ότι μή εστίν εν έκάστω των καθέκαστα άνθρώπων (μετά τούτων γάρ τα ίδια των καθέκαστά έστιν) άλλ' οτι έν πάσιν το αυτό; de prov. 89.13 if. R U L A N D , „denn die innerhalb einer Art vorkommenden Unterschiede der Individuen, durch die sich in der Substanz etwa Sokrates und Piaton unterscheiden, kommen nicht primär, durch die Natur, zustande, sondern sind nur notwendige Akzidentien an der diesen Individuen zugrunde liegenden Materie"·, de anima 85.15 — 18, ό γαρ το είδος τοϋ ανθρώπου λαβών χωρίς τών υλικών περιστάσεων εχει τον κοινόν άνθρωπον· ή γαρ τών καθ' έκαστα άνθρώπων προς άλλήλους διαφορά παρά της ύλης γίνεται, έπεί τά γε είδη αυτών, καθ' ά είσιν άνθρωποι, ούδεμίαν εχει διαφοράν. Cf. SHARPLES (1986); T W E E D A L E 296-298. There is however a problem (cf. TWEEDALE 299-300). The passage cited in n. 58 seems to say that what is common and universal (see below, n. 72) depends, for its existence as such, on being an object of thought. If the form is not thought "it exists in many but is not the same in many, since its association with different sets of individual circumstances makes it a different thing in each individual" ( T W E E D A L E , 300). The issue is not just whether thought is needed for the form to be recognized as being shared by many particulars (if it is so shared; below, nn. 60—62), nor yet just the traditional problem of the presence of one form in many particulars, but whether the very distinction between the essence common to every member of a species as such on the one hand, and the accidental peculiarities of individuals on the other, depends on our thought. Perhaps we might argue that this distinction is only actualized, the essence only isolated, when an act of thought occurs, without therefore arguing that the distinction between accident and specific essence is one that is arbitrary or imposed upon nature by us. The passage cited in n. 58 does after all suggest that what is common and universal has some sort of huparxis in individuals even before it becomes an object of thought. One type of solution to the problem would involve making forms of material objects the eternal objects of divine thought; but that is not Alexander's position (see below, n. 124).

60

quaest. 1.3, 8.12ff. (below, n. 62). quaest. 1.11b, 23.25—31: το μεν ΰποκείμενον φ το καθόλου συμβέβηκε πράγμά τί έστι, το δε καθόλου το έκείνω συμβεβηκός ού πράγμά τι καθ' αυτό εστίν, άλλα συμβεβηκός τι έκείνψ, οίον ζώον πράγμά τί έστι καί φύσεώς τίνος δηλωτικόν, σημαίνει γάρ ούσίαν έμψυχον αίσθητικην, δ κατά μεν την αύτοϋ φύσιν ούκ εστι καθόλου, ουδέν γάρ ήττον εσται, και εί εν κατ' άριθμόν ύποτεθείη ζφον είναι, ύπάρχει δε αύτώ όντι τοιοΰτψ εν πλείοσιν είναι καί κατ' είδος άλλήλων διαφέρουσιν. M O R A U X (1942) 50—62 claimed that this is the attempt of a pupil to provide a more orthodox argument than that in 22.26—23.21 (and in Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's 'de anima'; cf. 22.26). Cf. also Alexander, in metaph. 208.31 ff. But the latter part of quaest. 1.11b does seem in accord with quaest. 1.3 and with D4 (see below); may Alexander himself not have had second thoughts? (Cf. also below, n. 82; L L O Y D [1980] 54, [1981]; T W E E D A L E 283-285, 292-293.) quaest. 1.3, 7.27Í.·. άλλ' είσίν οί ορισμοί τών έν τοίς καθέκαστα κοινών, ή τών καθέκαστα κατά τά έν αύτοίς κοινά, and 8.12—17: διό ουδέ τών κοινών ώς κοινών οί

61

62

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

1201

for matter cannot be characterized except by reference, first of all, to the forms that are present in it 6 3 ; which again stresses the metaphysical importance of forms or essences. It is true that Alexander argues that form is less able to exist independently than matter, in that, even though prime matter cannot exist independently any more than form, the proximate matter to a given form can do so 6 4 ; but since matter, other than prime matter, is itself a combination of prime matter and form 6 5 , this is evidence not so much of a lower status for form as such, but rather of an emphasis on the four primary 'elements' at the expense of more complex entities 66 . Alexander indeed argues that the individual exists only because the species does so 6 7 , and denies Xenocrates' claim that the species is prior to the genus 6 8 . H e is not however claiming that the specific form exists apart from the individuals, or the genus apart from its species. Rather, his point is that, if there were no animals, there would certainly be no horses, while if there were no horses it does not follow that there would be no animals 69 ; similarly, if the specific essence of man did not exist in any instance at all, Socrates certainly would not exist 7 0 , but h i s ceasing to exist does not mean that the specific essence of man would not

63

64

65 66 67

ορισμοί, άλλα τούτων, οίς κοινοϊς καθ' έκάστην φύσιν είναι συμβέβηκεν. καί γαρ ενός δντος έν ΰποστάσει ανθρώπου μόνου ó αυτός τού άνθρώπου λόγος· ού γαρ διότι έν πολλοίς εστίν ούτος ó λόγος αυτού, άλλα διότι κατά την τοιαύτην φύσιν ό άνθρωπος άνθρωπος έστιν, είτε πλείους είεν κεκοινωνηκότες τήσδε της φύσεως είτε μή. C£. Aristotle, de cáelo 1.9 278 a 8ff. ; cf. TWEEDALE 291-296. quaest. 1.8, 1.17, cf. 1.26; compare, in connection with Aristotle, G. E. M. ANSCOMBE and P. T. GEACH, Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege, Oxford, 1961, lOf. Cf. also Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de cáelo, CAG 7 279.5ff. de anima 4.21ff.; MORAUX (1942) 9.

Cf. de anima 5.4ff. Below, section IX. de prov. 89.5 RULAND: „Sokrates entsteht doch nur, damit der Mensch existiert, und Xanthos, Achilles' Pferd, damit das Pferd existiert." Cf. HAPP 83 n. 48, but also DONINI (1982) 222—223. On the other hand, if all individual men ceased to exist, the species man would cease to exist (below, n. 170). The species is thus prior to any particular individual but posterior to the totality of them. (Cf. Dexippus, in cat., CAG 4.2 45.16, ενός εκάστου πρώτα φύσει λέγουσι τά καθόλου, πάντως δε πάλιν ύστερα; below, nn. 69, 72.) Cf. Η. CHERNISS, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore, 1944, 348 n. 256; G. MOVÍA, Anima e intelletto. Ricerche sulla psicologia peripatetica da Teofrasto a Cratippo, Padua, 1968, 1 9 4 - 2 0 0 ; TWEEDALE 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 .

68

I n D 4 : cf. PINÈS ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 ) ; TWEEDALE 2 9 4 . A n d cf. n e x t n .

69

quaest. 1.11b, 24.19—22 (= 1.11a, 22.17—20): διό άναιρουμένω μεν ένί των υπό το κοινόν οΰ συναναιρεΐται το κοινόν, (διότι εστίν έν πλειόσιν,) ει δ' άναιρεθείη το κοινόν, ούδ' άν τών υπό το κοινόν είη τι, οϊς το είναι έν τφ εκείνο εχειν έν έαυτοϊς. Cf. 23.11 — 13: το μεν γάρ ώς γένος τινών κατήγορουμενον άναιρούμενον συναναιρεϊ αύτψ πάντα τά ύφ' αυτό, ων ούδέν άναιρουμένων συναναιρεΐται, διό πρώτον τη φύσει. The first of these passages is concerned in context with the relation between genus and species, but in its formulation applies to that between species and particular too. LLOYD (1980) 51 doubts whether it accurately reflects Alexander's view; but cf. n. 72. Cf. BOOTH 27—28, citing Alexander in top. 320.21—23; also Alexander, probi,

70

Above, nn. 67, 69.

eth. 8 and 28 (KRÄMER [1973] 135 n. 74). Cf. also TWEEDALE 283.

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exist in other instances. O n the other hand, this horse would still be an animal even if there were no other animals and no other horses 7 1 ; if a distinction is drawn between the c o m m o n (specific or generic) essence s i m p l i c i t e r and the common essence q u a u n i v e r s a l 7 2 , it is only the former, and not the latter, that is prior to the individual.

IX.

Soul

Alexander's 'de anima' opens with an extended treatment of the simple 'elements' and their more complex compounds. The forms of the more complex natural bodies are built up out of those of the simpler bodies that go to make them u p 7 3 ; and accordingly soul, as the form of the living creature, is the product of the mixture of the bodily elements 7 4 . Consequently it is perishable and cannot exist apart from the b o d y 7 5 — this not in itself being un-Aristotelian, whatever 71

Cf. above, an. 61 f., and quaest. 1.11b 24.11 — 15: καί άναιρουμένης μεν ούσίας εμψύχου αισθητικής ούδ' αν το ώς γένος ζωον εϊη (ού γαρ οιόν τε το μή δν έν πλείοσιν είναι), ει μέντοι άναιρεθείη το ώς γένος ζωον, ούκ άνάγκη καί την ούσίαν εμψυχον αίσθητικήν άνηρήσθαι, ειη γάρ άν ώς ειπον καί έν ένί. Of course, where perishable entities are concerned, this horse can only exist if other horses have existed before; but it will still be an animal even if there are no other animals left. Cf. also Alexander ap. Elias [David], in Cat., CAG 18.1 p. 167.1—2: ό καθόλου ήλιος άναιρεθείς τόν τινα

ήλιον ούκ άνεΐλε (TWEEDALE 289—290). 72

Cf. above, n. 62. Such a distinction also seems to be drawn, as far as the genus is concerned, in D4, though the terminology raises problems (cf. PINÈS [1961,1] 28—30, and RAHN'S review, under PINÈS [1961,1] in the Bibliography). PINÈS suggests a distinction

drawn by Alexander between what is common and what is universal. TWEEDALE 296 argues that the distinction is not so much a verbal one as one between two uses of "universal", in effect (1) the universal in the sense of that which excludes individual peculiarities, and (2) the accidental entity which exists just so long as (1) happens to have the property of being exemplified in more than one instance. This distinction is similar, if I understand aright, to that which I attempted to draw between "universal*" and "universal" in: Form in Aristotle — Individual or Universal?, Liverpool Classical Monthly 5 (1980) 223—229. A terminological distinction is drawn in D4 between animal as common or universal and animal as genus (cf. n. 68); but that is not the same as a terminological contrast between (e.g.) the nature common to every man and man as a (specific) univ e r s a l . C f . KRÄMER (1973) 135 n. 74; BOOTH 2 9 - 3 2 . 73

74

75

de anima 8.8—12: φ δη πλείω και διαφέροντα είδη τα μετά τής ϋλης υποκείμενα, έξ άνάγκης τούτου καί ή φύσις καί το είδος ποικιλώτερόν τε καί τελειότερον, εκάστης φύσεως των έν τοις ύποκειμένοις αυτή σώμασιν συντελούσης τι προς το επί πάσιν κοινόν είδος αύτοίς. Cf. FOTINIS 189-191; Η. Β. GOTTSCHALK, Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD, above in this same volume (ANRW II 36,2) 1113 f. (with n. 176). De anima 24.21—23: ού γαρ ή τοιάδε των σωμάτων κράσις ή ψυχή, δπερ ήν άρμονία, άλλ' ή έπί τή τοιφδε κράσει δύναμις γεννωμένη. Cf. ibid. 10.14—19, 24.3f., mantissa 1 104.28ff., de princ. 123.19-21, 25-26; MORAUX (1942) 32, PINÈS (1961,2) 45. de an. 17.9f. MOVÍA, op. cit. in n. 67 above, 200, sees the influence of Boethus here, citing de an. 22.2ff.; but the doctrine is not unorthodox (cf. BAZÁN 485).

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may be said about Alexander's treatment of the 'active intellect' (below, section X). Alexander has been criticised by MORAUX for failing to do justice here to the role played by form in Aristotle's philosophy, for stressing mechanistic rather than teleological causation, and for deriving form from matter which is in itself only potential76. DONINI has pointed out that Alexander is well aware elsewhere that Aristotle does not hold that complex structures can be explained purely in terms of the primary opposites 77 . His doctrine of soul can however be explained, DONINI argues, as a misinterpretation of Aristotle de anima 1.4 4 0 8 a 24 — 26 78 and as a reaction to contemporary views. Galen had argued that soul is the mixture of the bodily elements, simply 79 , whereas Andronicus had apparently been undecided between this and the view that it is the p r o d u c t of this mixture80; Alexander, in arguing for the latter view, should be seen as upholding a position m o r e in accordance with Aristotle's text, as he interpreted it, than was the rival theory 81 .

76

(1942) 2 9 - 6 2 , cf. 95f. Cf. also RAVAISSON, 2.301; D O N I N I (1971) 7 7 - 8 2 . M O argues that Alexander characteristically adheres to the letter of Aristotle's description of soul as είδος σώματος φ υ σ ι κ ο ί δυνάμει ζωήν έχοντος (de anima 2.1 412 a 20) even while failing in practice to give form the importance that it has in Aristotle's own thought (MORAUX [1942] 43—49); cf. above, section III. Given Alexander's treatment of form, it is not clear how he can explain the permanence of species; the influence of the heavenly motions alone (below, section XII) may not be adequate to ensure this (MORAUX [1942] 38 n. 3). M O R A U X connected these features of Alexander's thought with the influence of Strato ( M O R A U X [1942] 5 - 1 1 , 49, 166ff., cf. Z E L L E R 830. F O T I N I S 191-192 accuses Alexander of materialism). Cf. however D O N I N I (1971) 97f. and below nn. 79—81. For possible influence of Strato on Alexander in another context cf. TODD (1972) 302—305. Alexander, in meteor. 2 2 6 . 1 0 - 2 3 ; D O N I N I ( 1 9 7 1 ) 7 9 — 8 1 . For a similar discrepancy in MORAUX RAUX

77

a n o t h e r c o n t e x t cf. MORAUX (1942) 56—59, o n q u a e s t . 1 . 1 1 b 22.26—23.21 ( b u t a b o v e , 78

79

80

81

n. 61). εί δ' εστίν ετερον ή ψ υ χ ή της μίξεως, τί δή ποτε άμα τ φ σακρί είναι άναιρεϊται καί το τοις άλλοις μορίοις τοΰ ζώου; cf. Alexander ap. Philoponus, in de an., C A G 15 151.27— 152.10; DONINI (1971) 8 2 - 9 3 , (1982) 231-233. Galen, quod animi mores, in: Scripta minora 2 , 3 7 . 5 — 2 6 , 4 4 . 1 8 — 4 5 . 3 M Ü L L E R (Leipzig, Teubner, 1891). D O N I N I (1971) 98ff. Galen, op.cit. 44.12ff., cf. 44.18: ότι δ' ήτοι κράσιν είναί φησιν ή δΰναμιν έπομένην τή κράσει, μέμφομαι τή προσθέσει τής δυνάμεως. That the reference is to Andronicus was questioned by D O N I N I (1971) 101-104, but cf. M O R A U X (1973) 132-134 and n. 9, (1978) 285 and n. 6. De anima 24.15-26.30; D O N I N I (1971) 105f„ cf. ID. (1974) 150-156; M O R A U X (1978) 198f., (1984) 741—742; F O T I N I S 175—176. Alexander may however be reacting, not directly to Galen, but to general tendencies of the time; cf. D O N I N I (1971) 104—106, T O D D (1977) 123-128 (but also D O N I N I [1982] 246 n. 47), M O R A U X (1978) 294. Alexander's teacher Aristoteles of Mytilene identified the material intellect as επιτήδειος τις δΰναμις έπί τή τοιςχδε κράσει των σωμάτων γινομένη (Alexander, mantissa 2 [de intellectu] 112.15; cf. below, section X , and M O R A U X [1984]) 4 1 8 - 4 1 9 ; but also nn. 8, 131). T H I L L E T (1981) 8 — 14 argues that the mixture of the bodily elements produces not the essence of soul but its dynamic functioning; he compares de anima 9.11 — 12. Cf. however M O R A U X (1984) 783 n. 399. Alexander's account of soul is also compared with Aristotle's by C H A R L T O N , especially pp. 134—8.

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MORAUX also criticised Alexander for reducing soul to its lowest common denominator, the faculty of nutrition and growth, and regarding the other faculties of soul as soul only by analogy 8 2 . Alexander's theory of sight has been the object of considerable discussion 8 3 ; the topic was of interest to his teacher Sosigenes 8 4 .

X. Intellea (Νοϋς) Alexander's theory of the intellect has been perhaps the most influential aspect of his thought 8 5 . It is presented in two accounts, in the 'de anima' (80—92) and in the 'de intellectu' (mantissa 2), which present certain divergences (see further below). Following Aristotle, Alexander of its objects, without their matter; as concerns their f o r m 8 6 . In order to not itself possess any f o r m 8 7 ; and so

82

83

argues that our intellect receives the forms intellect and its objects are identical, as far be receptive of all forms, our intellect must our intellect, as it is at our birth, is likened

MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 5 0 - 6 2 (cf. FOTINIS 2 1 3 - 2 1 9 ) ; de anima 1 7 . 5 - 8 , cf. 2 9 . 5 - 1 0 . (It m a y

be doubted, however, whether the former passage does in fact identify soul with its lowest common element, nutritive soul; rather, Alexander is insisting that the definition of soul (above, n. 76) is only a general, outline one (cf. 16.18, 17.2). de anima 42.4-46.19; mantissa 9 - 1 6 , quaest. 1.2, 1.13. Cf. ZAHLFLEISCH (1895-1896), HAAS, SCHROEDER (1981), DE GROOT 180—182. On sensation cf. also MORAUX (1973) 301, 305, FOTINIS 223-284; and on Alexander's theory of the soul cf. WALZER (1962) 208f., FOTINIS 160—222. FOTINIS 281 points out that Alexander lays more emphasis than Aristotle on the role of the nerves, no doubt because of intervening medical discoveries.

84

Themistius, in de an., C A G 5.3 61.23—34; Alexander, in meteor. 143.12—14. MORAUX

85

On Alexander's theory of the intellect and its influence cf., in addition to references

(1978) 294.

b e l o w , GÜNSZ; ELFES; KURFESS; THÉRY ( 1 9 2 6 ) 2 7 — 6 7 ; GILSON; WILPERT ( 1 9 3 5 ) ; RAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) ,

(1978) 2 9 9 - 3 0 5 ;

NARDI; HAMELIN-BARBOTIN

xviif.,

31-37;

MO-

WALZER

( 1 9 6 2 ) 2 0 9 F . , ( 1 9 7 4 ) especially 4 2 8 - 4 3 0 ; MERLAN ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; TOGNOLO; MAHONEY; MOVÍA, w i t h the review b y FEDERICI VESCOVINI; STABILE; FOTINIS 2 8 5 — 3 3 9 ; DONINI

(1982)

233-239. 86

de anima 84.22—24, προ γαρ τοϋ νοείν ουδέν ών ενεργεία, όταν vofj τι, το νοούμενον γίνεται, εϊ γε το νοείν αύτφ έν τφ το είδος εχειν το νοούμενον; 86.14f., έστιν ó κατ' ένέργειαν νοϋς ούδεν άλλο ή το είδος το νοούμενον; 86.29ff.; 90.If.; 90.10f. (above, n. 58); 91.7ff.; de intellectu 108.3-15. Aristotle, de anima 3.4 429b 10-22, cf. 3.7 431 a 31, b 17, 3.8 431 b 20ff. Hence the intellect can know itself; de anima 86.14ff., de intellectu 109.4-23, cf. Aristotle, de anima 3.4 430a2ff. Cf. MORAUX (1942) 82-87,

87

de anima 84.13-22, de intellectu 106.19-107.19; cf. Aristotle, de anima 3.4 429 a 18ff. Alexander thus follows Aristotle in quoting with approval the description of the soul as "the place of forms" — only potentially, not in actuality; de anima 85.6, cf. Aristotle, de anima 3.4 429 a 7.

174f.; NORMAN 72; FOTINIS 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 .

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to matter and referred to as the 'material' or 'potential' intellect 8 8 . Alexander goes so far as to say that it s h o u l d be likened, n o t to a tablet n o t y e t written o n , but to the absence of writing o n the tablet 8 9 . A s an individual g r o w s up, the material intellect m a y advance to a state w h e r e it is capable of independent t h o u g h t , n o t merely abstracting its objects f r o m their material e m b o d i m e n t s w h e n these are presented to it, but considering t h e m as already contained w i t h i n itself 9 0 . It has then d e v e l o p e d f r o m being material intellect to being ν ο υ ς èv ε ξ ε ι 9 1 or ν ο υ ς έ π ί κ τ η τ ο ς 9 2 . A l l m e n possess the potentiality for this d e v e l o p m e n t , but it is n o t fully realised in all 9 3 . W h i l e f o r m s e m b o d i e d in matter are made intelligible b y the intellect, w h i c h abstracts t h e m f r o m their matter, any forms there m a y be w h i c h are not e m b o d i e d in matter but exist independently m u s t be intelligible in their o w n right, in actuality and n o t potentially. But since w h a t is intelligible in actuality is identical w i t h intellect in actuality, f o r m w h i c h exists w i t h o u t matter will be intellect in its o w n right 9 4 .

88

de anima 8 1 . 2 2 — 2 5 , 8 4 . 2 8 , de intellectu 1 0 6 . 1 9 — 2 6 . Intellect's potentiality for taking on the forms of the objects of thought, and its potentiality for becoming intellect èv εξει are really two sides of the same coin; cf. M O R A U X ( 1 9 7 8 ) 3 0 3 f . Cf. however below, nn. 144—

89

de anima 84.24—27: έπιτηδειότης τις άρα μόνον εστίν ό υλικός νοϋς προς την των ειδών ύποδοχήν έοικώς πινακίδι άγράφω, μάλλον δε τω της πινακίδος άγράφω, άλλ' ού τη πινακίδι αύτη. αυτό γαρ το γραμματειον ήδη τι των δντων εστίν. Contrast Aristotle, de anima 3.4 429 a 31 ff. As M O R A U X (1942) 75f., 110-119 points out, the notion of material intellect which is pure potentiality performing the task of abstraction is problematic. Cf. nn. 102, 145, 148 below, and above n. 76; also M O R A U X (1973) 486, (1978) 287. However S C H R O E D E R (1982) argues that the material intellect is a first actuality, potential only in relation to intellect έν εξει (below, n. 148). Cf. also T H I L L E T (1981) 14—17 (the passive intellect is like matter in its function, not in its essence) and 19—20. de anima 85.20-86.6; compare de intellectu 107.21-28 (but cf. nn. 102, 144f.). Cf. Aristotle, de anima 3.4 429 b 9; N O R M A N 64f. on Aristotle. The intellect which has reached this stage is completely identified with its contents — it is the collection of latent forms, any of which may actively be thought of: ó γαρ κατά εξιν νοϋς άποκείμενά πώς έστιν άθρόα και ήρεμοϋντα τα νοήματα, de anima 86.5f. M O R A U X (1942) 77f.,

145, a n d SCHROEDER ( 1 9 8 2 )

90

121-123.

MERLAN (1963) 14 a n d n . 5. 91

92 93

94

de anima 82.1. Intellect έν εξει, as the developed capacity for independent thought, is distinguished from the actual activity of such thinking; de anima 85.25 — 86.5, cf. Aristotle de anima 2.5 417 a 2 2 - b 2, 3.4 429 b 8f. ibid. 82.1. (Contrast below, n. 112.) de anima 81.13 — 83.2; the state of development reached by all who are not incapacitated (πεπηρωμενοι) is κοινός intellect, 82.12—15. (The contrast between natural endowment and its development is often discussed by Alexander, in various contexts; cf. de fato XXVIII, mantissa 23 175.12ff., probi, eth. 29 160.32ff., quaest. 3.11, and ap. Ammonius in de int., CAG 4.5 39.17-32; D O N I N I [1974] 168-170, T O D D [1976,1].) de anima 87.24—88.16, especially 88.2—5: το άρα άυλον είδος νοϋς ό κυρίως τε καί κατ' ένέργειαν. καί ό νοών άρα τοϋτο νοϋν νοεί ού γινόμενον νουν οτε νοείται, ώς έπί των ένύλων ειδών εχει, άλλα δντα νοϋν καί χωρίς τοΰ υπό τοϋ νοϋ νοεϊσθαι. (Cf. below, n. 128.) Cf. also de intellectu 108.2ff., 16ff.; Principles of the Universe 133. 15-135.27 BADAWI (1968) (part also in R O S E N T H A L [1965] 201-206).

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W.

SHARPLES

It is at this p o i n t that A l e x a n d e r i n t r o d u c e s the distinction b e t w e e n active and passive intellect f r o m A r i s t o t l e de anima 3 . 5 9 5 . Since there is a material intellect, there m u s t also be an active intellect, w h i c h is the cause of the έ ξ ι ς w h i c h the material intellect acquires 9 6 . B u t this active intellect m u s t be pure f o r m , n o t e m b o d i e d in matter; f o r it is this that is s u p r e m e l y intelligible, and it is a l w a y s that w h i c h p o s s e s s e s a p r o p e r t y m o s t f u l l y that is the cause of o t h e r things p o s s e s s i n g it — light, w h i c h is s u p r e m e l y visible, m a k e s o t h e r things visible, and it is in virtue of their c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the s u p r e m e g o o d that other things are j u d g e d g o o d 9 7 . T h i s pure f o r m (being the cause o f o t h e r things' being intelligible) is the cause o f the ε ξ ι ς o f o u r intellect 9 8 . M o r e o v e r , this pure f o r m w h i c h is itself intellect is separate f r o m matter, impassive and u n m i x e d w i t h a n y t h i n g else. T h u s it is identical w i t h the First C a u s e , the U n m o v e d M o v e r of M e t a p h y s i c s Λ ; and so "in this w a y t o o " it is active, being t h e cause of b e i n g o f all the things that are objects o f intellect 9 9 .

95

96

97

98

99

de anima 88.17ff., cf. Aristotle, de anima 3.5 430 a lOff. (In fact Alexander does not speak of π α θ η τ ι κ ό ς νοΰς here, but of υλικός νοϋς; cf. the discussion at de intellectu 111.2ff., and Aristotle, de anima 3.4 429 a 15ff., b 22ff.) de anima 8 8 . 1 7 - 2 4 , especially 88.23f.: καί έπεί έστιν υλικός τις νοϋς, είναι τινα δει καί ποιητικόν νουν, δς αίτιος της εξεως της του ϋλικοϋ νου γίνεται; de intellectu 107. 3 1 - 1 0 8 . 2 (below, n. 1 0 3 ) , llO.óff. (? Aristoteles of Mytilene, below n. 1 3 1 ; cf. 1 1 3 . 4 — 6 ) . Ross ( 1 9 6 1 ) 4 1 — 4 3 argues that Alexander distorts Aristotle's meaning in making the active intellect act o n t h e p a s s i v e i n t e l l e c t to produce a third type of intellect. Aristotle refers to the active intellect itself as έξις τις (de anima 3.5 430 a 15), not to a έξις which it causes in the passive intellect; H I C K S 5 0 1 , M O V Í A 6 4 and n. 1. The example of light occurs in Aristotle, de anima 3.5 430 a 15 — 17, but not the point that light is itself supremely visible; M O R A U X (1942) 89f. (However, the general principle that what makes something potentially X to be actually X must itself be actually X is Aristotelian, as L L O Y D reviewing M O V Í A points out; cf. below, n. 100.) That light is itself supremely visible is stated, together with reference to the supreme Good, at Plato, Republic VI 508c; it has been suggested Alexander may have this in mind (MORAUX [1942] 39f., 92, M E R L A N [1963] 39, D O N I N I [1974] 45 n. 107, F O T I N I S 326-327), though the goodness of the first principle could also have been derived from Aristotle, Metaph. Λ (cf. L L O Y D [1976] 151 and BLUMENTHAL'S review of D O N I N I [1974]). Cf. also M O RAUX' review of D O N I N I (1974), 533 and n. 3. D O N I N I (1974) 46f. argued that Alexander's reference to other goods as c o n t r i b u t i n g to the supreme Good reflected a reluctance to follow Plato completely (cf. D O N I N I [1982] 238); but S C H R O E D E R ([1981], cf. also [1984]) has argued that for Alexander, light being the actuality of the illuminable q u a illuminable, things that are made visible by light contribute to the actuality of light, and so too things that are potentially intelligible contribute to the act of intelligizing. H e points out ([1984] 246) that Alexander, unlike Plato and Plotinus, only speaks of l i g h t here and not of the sun as the source of light. de anima 88.24—89.8. The step in parentheses is not in the text, but is easily supplied, intellect έν εξει being identical with its objects (above n. 90). de anima 89.9—19; cf. especially 9—11, ε τ ι , ει ό τοιούτος νοϋς το πρώτον αίτιον, ô αιτία καί άρχή τοϋ είναι πάσι τοις άλλοις, εϊη άν κ α ί τ α ύ τ η ποιητικός, ή αυτός αίτιος τοϋ είναι πάσι τοις νοουμενοις. LLOYD, reviewing MOVÍA, argued that πάσι τοις άλλοις might refer to 'intellects' rather than to 'beings'; but cf. below, n. 110. O n the identification of the active intellect with the Unmoved Mover here cf. M O R A U X (1942)

ALEXANDER OF

APHRODISIAS

1207

A l e x a n d e r has b e e n criticised f o r a p p e a l i n g in t h e first o f t h e s e a r g u m e n t s t o t h e p r i n c i p l e propter

quod

alia,

id maximum

tale,

w h i c h he himself elsewhere

criticises as u n - A r i s t o t e l i a n 1 0 0 . H o w e v e r , as LLOYD p o i n t s o u t , h e is u s i n g it n o t t o a r g u e f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u p r e m e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e p u r e f o r m s , a l r e a d y asserted, b u t rather t o a r g u e that it is w i t h s u c h f o r m that t h e a c t i v e i n t e l l e c t o f A r i s t o t l e d e a n i m a 3 . 5 is t o b e i d e n t i f i e d 1 0 1 . B u t it is n o t at all clear h o w t h e active i n t e l l e c t o p e r a t e s as an a g e n t o r c a u s e in t h e ' d e a n i m a ' . B o t h t h e r e a n d in t h e ' d e i n t e l l e c t u ' it is o u r i n t e l l e c t that p e r f o r m s t h e task o f abstracting f o r m s f r o m m a t t e r : t h e a c t i v e i n t e l l e c t d o e s n o t p e r f o r m t h i s task itself, b u t s o m e h o w e n a b l e s o u r i n t e l l e c t t o d o s o 1 0 2 . T h e ' d e i n t e l l e c t u ' appears t o regard t h e a c t i v e i n t e l l e c t as o p e r a t i n g d i r e c t l y o n o u r , material i n t e l l e c t 1 0 3 ; b u t this p o i n t is n o t s o c l e a r l y

100

101

102

103

93 f. MERLAN (1963) 39 brings out that 89.9 introduces a new argument, but interprets it differently (cf. below, n. 121). in metaph. 147.2-148.19; MORAUX (1942) 9 0 - 9 2 . MORAUX points out that Aristotle metaph. α 1 993 b 24—27 and an. post. 1.2 72 a 29—32 support the principle only given the further premisses (1) that one of the things in question is the cause of the others, and (2) that both cause and effect do indeed possess the property in question. But as LLOYD (1976) 150f. points out, the Aristotelian principle that what is potentially X is brought to actuality by something that is actually X — the principle actually used in the parallel arguments at de intellectu 110.15f., 111.28f. - at once shows that there must be a cause for what is potentially X becoming actually X, and that cause must itself be X, and be X actually whereas the effect is only so potentially; though it does n o t follow that the cause must be s u p r e m e l y X. Cf. next n. LLOYD ( 1 9 7 6 ) 150; c f . MERLAN ( 1 9 6 3 ) 3 9 η . 1; D O N I N I ( 1 9 7 4 ) 4 3 F . ; SCHROEDER ( 1 9 8 1 )

222. The points in this conclusion that are n o t justified by the considerations in n. 100 are (1) that what causes other things to be intelligible must itself be, not only actually intelligible, but eternally so with no element of potentiality; and (2) that there is just one such cause. But Alexander has already envisaged the existence of pure forms which are eternally intelligible in actuality (87.24—88.16); and (1) and (2) might well seem natural to him on grounds of economy and simplicity. As was stressed by MORAUX (1942) 7 0 - 7 6 , 88f., 1 2 2 - 1 2 5 ; in both works it is o u r intellect that does the abstracting, even though they differ over whether it has already acquired its εξις by the time it does this (cf. below, nn. 144—145; LLOYD [1980] 56). Cf. de anima 84.19—21, ποιεί γ ά ρ ό ν ο ϋ ς και τ α α ι σ θ η τ ά α ύ τ φ ν ο η τ ά χ ω ρ ί ζ ω ν α υ τ ά της ύλης καί τί ποτέ έστιν α ύ τ ο ϊ ς τ ο είναι θ ε ω ρ ώ ν ; de intellectu 108.19-22, τ ο ύ τ ο δη το νοητόν τε τη α ύ τ ο ύ φύσει καί κ α τ ' ένέργειαν νοϋς, αίτιον γινόμενον τ ω ύ λ ι κ ω ν φ τοϋ κ α τ ά την π ρ ο ς το τοιούτο είδος ά ν α φ ο ρ ά ν χ ω ρ ί ζ ε ι ν τε καί μιμεϊσθαι καί νοειν καί τ ω ν ενύλων ειδών εκαστον καί π ο ι ε ΐ ν νοητόν αύτό, θ ύ ρ α θ ε ν εστι λεγόμενος ν ο ύ ς ό ποιητικός. Cf. MORAUX (1942) 119—132; de intellectu 1 0 7 . 3 1 - 3 4 , ώ ς γ α ρ το φ ω ς αίτιον γίνεται τοίς χ ρ ώ μ α σ ι ν τοϋ δυνάμει ούσιν ό ρ α τ ο ί ς ένεργείςι γίνεσθαι τοιούτοις, ο ύ τ ω ς καί οΰτος ό τρίτος ν ο ΰ ς τον δυνάμει καί ύλικόν ν ο υ ν ενεργεία ν ο υ ν ποιεί εξ ιν εμποιών α ύ τ φ την νοητικήν. And cf. also de intellectu 111.29—32 (? Aristoteles of Mytilene; below n. 131) τ ο ύ τ ο δή τη αύτού φύσει νοητόν ôv . . . θ ύ ρ α θ ε ν ν ο ε ί τ α ι . . . καί έντίθησιν την εξ tv τω ύ λ ι κ φ ώστε νοείν τ ά δυνάμει νοητά. (BAZÁN, however, argues that direct action is not involved in the 'de intellectu' any more than in the 'de anima'; below, n. 108.) Cf. further n. 144. MORAUX (1942) 126f. notes that de intellectu 107.31-34 makes no reference, in its use of the light-analogy, to the actualization of the o b j e c t s of intellect (contrast de anima 89.4f., above n. 97); but cf. de intellectu 111.27—36 (Aristoteles), with n. 98 above.

1208

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made in the 'de anima' 104 . M O R A U X argued that the active intellect, the Unmoved Mover, by causing the motion of the heavens, acted indirectly as dator formar um to sublunary material things, thus giving them intelligibility 105 . This fits in well with Alexander's doctrine of providence (see below, section XII), but goes beyond what is explicitly stated in the 'de anima' itself 106 . Others have argued that we should here think not of efficient (or final) causation, but of a logical relationship, comparing Neoplatonic doctrine 107 . B A Z Á N has argued that, both in the 'de anima' and in the 'de intellectu', the active intellect provides the light in which our intellect performs the task of abstraction 108 ; but, as M O R A U X has pointed out, this runs up against the difficulty that, in the 'de anima' at least, our intellect must already have acquired its εξις before it can conceive of the active intellect 109 . Regrettably, it seems that Alexander has simply presented two arguments for the identification of active intellect with pure form, without considering how their detailed implications are to be worked out. He has appealed to a general principle concerning causation to argue that what is supremely intelligible is the cause of other things' being intelligible, but without indicating h o w this principle is to be applied in this particular case. And similarly, in the second argument he appeals to the fact that the Unmoved Mover is the first cause of everything else, without going into the details of how this is so; M O R A U X has spelled this out 1 1 0 , but the significant thing is that Alexander himself in the present context shows no interest in doing so. If Alexander is only concerned with proving his point rather than with examining its implications, the question whether "in this way too" at de anima 89.10 is to be understood as introducing a second mode of causation, or only a second argument for the presence of causation, becomes irrelevant. Alexander goes on to argue that, when our intellects apprehend the active intellect, they become identical with it and so immortal 111 . But this is not a 104

A s MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 8 8 f . insists; cf. DONINI ( 1 9 7 4 ) 4 2 n. 99, against ZELLER 8 2 6 and

105

MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 9 2 f . , appealing especially t o quaest. 2 . 3 . C f . THILLET ( 1 9 8 1 ) 2 0 - 2 2 .

GRABMANN—GIACON 2 2 . BAZÁN 471 Η. 2, 478F. 106

C f . also the c o m m e n t s of LLOYD in his review of MOVÍA. Below, n. 110.

107

MERLAN ( 1 9 6 3 ) 3 8 f . ; LLOYD ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; DONINI ( 1 9 4 7 ) 4 1 - 4 6 .

108

BAZÁN 4 7 8 - 4 8 5 . Cf. also SCHROEDER (above n. 97).

109

MORAUX ( 1 9 7 8 ) 3 0 0 f . and n. 86, citing de anima 8 8 . 5 Ó εν ήμίν νους, ούτος δέ εστίν ό καθ' εξιν, δταν ταύτα τά ε'ίδη (sc. the pure forms) vofj, ό αυτός έκείνοις τότε γίνεται, and 9 1 . 3 ή έξις, καθ' ήν εξιν ό δυνάμει νους τά τε άλλα καί τούτον νοεί. C f . below, n. 145, and on the de intellectu cf. n. 144.

110

Above, n. 104. MORAUX' interpretation given there will thus represent the thought behind Alexander's

second

argument (de anima 8 9 . 9 f f . ) , but going beyond what Alexander

himself says here. B y being the cause of all m o t i o n the U n m o v e d M o v e r will be the cause of the existence o f perishable sublunary entities; as to whether it is the cause o f the continued existence of the universe as a whole (DAVIDSON, 2 5 ) cf. below, n.

178,

and SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 3 ) . — Alexander's failure to clarify the details of his argument in the 'de anima' is recognised by MERLAN ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 4 0 . 111

de anima 8 9 . 2 1 f f . , especially 9 0 . 1 1 — 2 0 : έν οϊς δε το νοούμενον κατά την αίιτοίι φύσιν εστί τοιούτον, οίον νοείται . . . έν τούτοις καί χωρισθεν του βοεϊσθαι άφθαρτον μένει,

ALEXANDER

OF

1209

APHRODISIAS

personal i m m o r t a l i t y ; A l e x a n d e r explicitly stresses that it is not the material intellect that b e c o m e s i m m o r t a l w h e n w e think of the active intellect, but only "intellect in a c t u a l i t y " 1 1 2 . Indeed f o r A l e x a n d e r o u r intellect is nothing in itself, but b e c o m e s identical with its o b j e c t s 1 1 3 ; a c c o r d i n g l y , w h e n it a p p r e h e n d s the pure and imperishable f o r m of the divine active intellect it b e c o m e s identical with that f o r m , but this seems to s h o w n o m o r e than the i m m o r t a l i t y of the concept of the active intellect in u s 1 1 4 . Aristotle, on the other hand, s e e m s to envisage the imperishability of the active intellect as ensuring the p e r s o n a l survival of at least a part of the individual's s o u l 1 1 5 ; this is s o m e w h a t i n c o n g r u o u s in his s y s t e m , and w o u l d be even m o r e s o given A l e x a n d e r ' s treatment of s o u l 1 1 6 . A l e x a n d e r seems to be f o r c e d to distort the meaning of Aristotelian texts at several p o i n t s by his desire to rule o u t personal s u r v i v a l 1 1 7 . A feature of A l e x a n d e r ' s discussion in the ' d e anima' that has a r o u s e d considerable interest is his references in the plural to p u r e f o r m s , transcendent

και ό νούς άρα ό τούτο νοήσας άφθαρτος έστιν, ούχ ό υποκείμενος τε και υλικός . . . άλλ' ό ενεργείς τούτω, οτε ένόει αυτό, ό αυτός γονόμενος . . . καί εστίν ούτος ό νοΰς ό θύραθεν τε έν ήμϊν γινόμενος καί άφθαρτος. This point is absent from the 'de intellectu', though MORAUX (1942) 149 argued that this might be the result of a l a c u n a . C f . A r i s t o t l e d e a n i m a 3 . 7 4 3 1 b 1 7 - 1 9 ; M O R A U X ( 1 9 4 2 ) 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 ; SORABJI ( 1 9 8 3 ) 147-148. 112

de anima 90.11—20 (last n.), 91.2—4. — The Arabic tradition, however, was to refer to the active intellect, when it comes to be in us, as 'acquired intellect' (contrast Alexander's use of the term in 'de anima1, above n. 92). It has been suggested that this implies rather more that it is a part of us that is immortal; but BADAWI (1972) 440—444 (cf. [1979] 4—5) argues that "from outside" (θύραθεν) is to be understood; cf. de intellectu 108.22. GILSON 14f„ 19-22; MORAUX (1942) 100 n. 1; FINNEGAN (1956) 171-178; MERLAN ( 1 9 6 3 ) 1 4 f . n. 6 ; DAVIDSON. -

113 114

MOVÍA, 115

116 117

C f . THILLET (1981) 1 8 - 1 9 and

24.

Above, nn. 86, 90; cf. MORAUX (1942) 178, (1978) 304. MORAUX here speaks of Alexander's "naive realism"; God is immmortal, and so the concept of him in our minds is immortal too ([1942] 98). Cf. F. VESCOVINI, review of 106.

Cf. Aristotle, de anima 1.4 408 b 29, 2.1 413 a 3—7, and the 'Metaphysics' passages in n. 117 below; MORAUX (1942) 100 n. 4. Cf. also Theophrastus ap. Themistius, in de an., C A G 5.3 108.18-28 (MORAUX [1942] 3). On the relation between the individual's intellect and the divine in Aristotle cf. D. J. ALLAN, The Philosophy of Aristotle 2 , Oxford, 1970, 95f., citing Eudemian Ethics 8.2 1248 a 25-33. Cf. above, section IX; MORAUX (1942) xix, 95f. Notably, whereas Aristotle in de anima 3.5 refers to the distinction between active and passive έν τί) ψυχή, Alexander, de anima 88.22 refers to the presence of this distinction έ π ί τ ο ύ ν ο ύ (MORAUX [1942] 88, DONINI [1974] 3 8 f . ; but cf. also MAMO 168). C f . also in metaph. fr. 14 FREUDENTHAL, on A 3 1070 a 2 5 f . , and fr. 21, on Λ 5 1071 a 2 f .

Alexander supports his interpretation by appealing, as had his predecessors (below, n. 135), to the reference to νούς θύραθεν in Aristotle, de generatione animalium 2.3 736 b 27ff. (de anima 90.19ff„ cf. de intellectu 108.22, 30, 110.5, 24). But as MORAUX (1942) 104-108 points out this refers to the introduction of personal intellect into the individual as an embryo, not to the apprehension of a suprapersonal active intellect by our intellect once developed. Cf. also FOTINIS 331.

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intelligibles 1 1 8 . A r i s t o t l e himself asserts the existence of such b e i n g s 1 1 9 , naturally to b e identified with the U n m o v e d M o v e r s of the series of heavenly s p h e r e s 1 2 0 . MERLAN has argued that A l e x a n d e r regards the p u r e f o r m s as the eternal objects of the divine intellect 1 2 1 , thus in part anticipating Plotinus' doctrine of I n t e l l e c t 1 2 2 ; and DONINI has argued that the alternations between singular and plural in d e anima 87—90 s h o w that A l e x a n d e r already holds the view that there are a plurality of intelligences, each of which thinks all the others and hence is identical with t h e m 1 2 3 — the difference f r o m Plotinus being that these intelligences, which are p u r e f o r m s , are not the f o r m s of perceptible individuals in the s u b l u n a r y w o r l d 1 2 4 . H o w e v e r , it is not clear either that the alternations between singular and plural are significant o r even that A l e x a n d e r is c o n c e r n e d , i n t h e ' d e a n i -

118

Cf. above, n. 94. MERLAN regards the renewed emphasis on the distinction between transcendent and enmattered forms as Alexander's greatest contribution to thought ([1963] 14-17, 38-47, cf. [1967] 117ff.; DONINI [1974] 26ff., 42f., 52 η. 115, 55, [1982] 235f.;

119

M e t a p h . Ζ 17 1041 a 8. C f . MORAUX r e v i e w i n g DONINI (1974) 5 3 2 f . a n d η . 2.

FOTINIS 3 1 7 - 3 1 9 ) . 120

121

122 123 124

Aristotle, Metaph. Λ 6 1071 b 21; cf. Alexander, in metaph. 179.If., και εί εστίν ολως άυλά τι/να είδη, όπόσα ταΰτά έστι, περί άν, ώς προεϊπον, ποιήσεται λόγον έν τη περί άνελιττουσών θεωρίςι. (However, as DONINI [1974] 34 and n. 78 points out, Aristotle himself refers to the Unmoved Movers as ούσίαι rather than as εϊδη [Metaph. Λ 8 1073 a 34ff., etc.].) The Active Intellect of de anima 3.5 will constitute another type of pure form for Aristotle — but for Alexander it is identical with the Unmoved Mover (above, n. 99). Cf. Ross (1924) ci; MERLAN (1963) 17, 47 and n. 1; MORAUX loc.cit. MERLAN (1963) 17, 38f.; (1967) 118. So, for Aristotle himself, KRÄMER (1964) 159-173. MERLAN (1963) 38 f. further suggests, tentatively, that the Active Intellect produces the transcendent intelligibles by intelligizing them, while recognizing that these are "not Alexander's own words", and stressing that the transcendent intelligibles are not s u b o r d i n a t e to the Active Intellect (cf. ibid. 44f.; and cf. below, n. 210). However, it may be doubted whether at de anima 89.9—11 (above n. 99) Alexander has the production of a plurality of transcendent intelligibles in mind at all; cf. below, at n. 130. [Alexander], in metaph. 721.32, on Λ 10 1076 a 4, relates the subordinate Unmoved Movers to the supreme one: τα γαρ των πλανωμένων αϊτια θεοί μεν, άλλά μεθέξει και τω βουλήματι τοϋ πρώτου καί μακαριωτάτου έξήρτηνται νόος (sic: νοού?); cf. Ross (1924) cxxxvi n. 5. MERLAN further suggests ([1967] 118) that our intellect, by apprehending the divine intellect, also apprehends its eternal objects; the relevance to Plotinus' theory of Intellect is evident, but, again, this may be to construct, on the foundations which Alexander provides, a theory which he did not himself clearly envisage. Cf. LLOYD (1980) 19 f. and 20 n. 1. Cf. below, section XIV. DONINI (1974) 2 9 - 3 5 ; cf. below, n. 222. MERLAN (1963) 41; DONINI (1974) 28. Alexander's whole account is dominated by the contrast between objects of intelligence that require abstraction from matter and those that do not; cf. SCHROEDER (1981) 224—225, arguing that it is only in the human soul that the divine Active Intellect enters into a relation with the potential, enmattered intelligibles. Alexander points out that Aristotle's God might be open to the same charge of not knowing everything that Aristotle himself brings against the Sphere of Empedocles (Alexander, in metaph. 220.26, on Aristotle, Metaph. Β4 1000 b 3ff.). The claim that the divine has some knowledge of its effects on the sublunary world does however seem to be important in Alexander's doctrine of providence; cf. below, n. 177.

ALEXANDER

OF

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1211

m a ' 1 2 5 , to m a k e the p o i n t that t h e p u r e f o r m s a r e t h e eternal objects of the d i v i n e intellect. T h e d i s c u s s i o n of the pure f o r m s at 8 7 . 2 4 — 8 8 . 1 6 p r e c e d e s a n y m e n t i o n of the active i n t e l l e c t 1 2 6 , and s e e m s i n t e n d e d t o i n t r o d u c e the n o t i o n of pure f o r m in a g e n e r a l w a y , preliminary t o the a r g u m e n t at 8 8 . 1 7 f f . that the active intellect is a pure f o r m . T h e references t o pure f o r m s in this passage are generally in the p l u r a l 1 2 7 ; b u t b o t h these and the e x c e p t i o n s in the s i n g u l a r 1 2 8 s e e m to be abstract generalizations, s o that it is n o t e v e n clear that A l e x a n d e r is c o m m i t t i n g himself h e r e t o the existence of a p l u r a l i t y of p u r e f o r m s 1 2 9 . S u b s e q u e n t l y , w h e r e the active intellect itself is u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n , the references t o pure f o r m are generally in the singular, and the o n e plural reference s e e m s s i m p l y t o be a generalization130. T h e 'de intellectu' falls i n t o three parts. In the first author e x p o u n d s his t h e o r y of intellect in propria persona. 4 - 1 1 2 . 5 ) h e gives an a c c o u n t of the explanation that he o f M y t i l e n e 1 3 1 of the m o t i v e s that led A r i s t o t l e (i.e. the 125

126

127 128 129

130

131

( A , 1 0 6 . 1 9 - 1 1 0 . 3 ) the In the s e c o n d (B, 110. heard f r o m A r i s t o t e l e s Stagirite) t o i n t r o d u c e

That the active intellect d o e s have a plurality of eternal transcendent objects is apparently indicated by fr. VI MORAUX (1942), semper enim actu sunt in ipso (the active intellect) species, where species = είδη in the sense of 'forms', not with reference to sublunary species; cf. fr. U l e 12.6f. and fr. X l l l a . But the point is hardly made explicit in the 'de anima'. Cf. also below, n. 152. MERLAN (1963) 17 n. 2 recognizes this, but argues that it is already assumed that the material intellect, when fully active, becomes identical with the active intellect. The contrast between practical and theoretical intellect at de anima 80.24—81.13, 81.20ff., is clearly distinct from that between material intellect and intellect έν έξει. The objects of theoretical intellect are άίδια καί ομοίως έχοντα άεί (82.18, cf. 81.7), but even if this meant they were confined to pure forms (as opposed to the e n m a t t e r e d heavenly bodies; and for Aristotle, Metaph. E 1 1026 a 6 φυσική επιστήμη is θεωρητική) this is still far removed from a claim that the d i v i n e intellect has pure forms as its eternal objects. (Cf. on this FOTINIS 291-292, 296-297.) de anima 87.26ff., 88.6, 9. de anima 8 8 . 3 - 5 (above, n. 94). The hypothetical form of the statement at 87.25 — if there are any forms without matter — should not be taken to imply doubt about the existence of a n y pure forms; compare de intellectu 108.16. But it does give some support to the view that Alexander is not h e r e concerned to assert the existence of a plurality of transcendent intelligibles. de anima 90.11 f. (èv οίς . . . έν τούτοις; but cf. τούτο, 90.13. So too, it would seem, quaest. 1.25 39.29f.). O n the whole question cf. MORAUX (1978) 299f.; DONINI (1982) 247f. n. 57. The 'de intellectu' makes no reference to a plurality of pure forms (contrast, especially, 108.16 with de anima 87.25) and stresses that the active intellect is alone its own object (109.24ff.); cf. DONINI (1974) 60f. ZELLER 815 n. 3 emended the text to refer to Aristocles (of Messene); cf. above, n. 7. MORAUX (1942) 143-149 argued that the pantheistic doctrine of C I (below, n. 132) was not likely to have been put forward by Aristocles, and that π α ρ ά 'Αριστοτέλους referred to the Stagirite, in the sense of "a tradition claiming to be Aristotelian". TRABUCCO argued that this interpretation of the phrase was impossible (119f.) and claimed points of similarity between Β and Aristocles' doctrines (121f., 126). MORAUX (1967,2) accepted the criticism of his earlier interpretation of π α ρ ά 'Αριστοτέλους, but argued that the reference was to Aristoteles of Mytilene (above, n. 8). (It may be noted that π α ρ ά 'Αριστοτέλους also occurs in the titles of mantissa 22 and 23 — texts which differ

1212

R. W. SHARPLES

the doctrine of ν ο υ ς θ ύ ρ α θ ε ν 1 3 2 . T h i s is f o l l o w e d b y an account of o n e , p a n theistic, attempt to answer the objection that, if intellect c o m e s " f r o m o u t s i d e " , it m u s t m o v e spatially t h o u g h immaterial ( C 1, 112.5—113.12) and the author's objections to this and advancing of his o w n alternative solution ( C 2 , 113.12— 2 4 ) 1 3 3 . T h e p r o p o n e n t of C I is not n a m e d , but is naturally taken in the context to be identical with that of B , i.e. Aristoteles of M y t i l e n e 1 3 4 ; attention has been d r a w n to discrepancies in doctrine between C I and B 1 3 5 , but these are p r o b a b l y to be explained on the g r o u n d s that in C I Aristoteles is presenting his o w n solution to a particular p r o b l e m , while in Β he is presenting the general doctrine of his s c h o o l 1 3 6 . If this is correct, it is clear that Aristoteles of Mytilene anticipated A l e x a n d e r in the identification of the active intellect with G o d 1 3 7 ; and even b e f o r e Aristoteles himself, if Β represents not his o w n theory but established tradition, it had been argued that the active intellect w a s intelligible in its o w n nature and w a s ν ο υ ς θ ύ ρ α θ ε ν 1 3 8 . W h a t is absent f r o m both Β and C I , h o w e v e r , is any explicit connection between the active intellect and the U n m o v e d M o v e r of M e t a p h . Λ 1 3 9 .

132 133

134

135

136

137

138

139

considerably between themselves in their viewpoint — though without the ήκουσα of de intellectu 110.4.) The original of the Arabic had Άριοτοτέλους; BADAWI (1972) 445. Cf. however above, n. 8; THILLET'S interpretation would leave the origin of the doctrine in C I once more obscure. On sections Β and C cf. also MORAUX (1984) 412—425. Cf. above, nn. 96, 117. DONINI (1974) 49 f. compares this objection with the Platonist Atticus' attack on Aristotle's theory of intellect (fr. 7.75ff. DES PLACES), and sees Alexander's own view that the human soul, in itself, has no immortal part as a response to this same attack (ibid. 48ff., 56). Cf. above, section II. On C l cf. MORAUX (1942) 151-164, TRABUCCO 123-125; MORAUX (1942) 156f. points out that, though pantheistic, it does not follow the Stoics in making God corporeal. Cf. also GILSON 7—19. MORAUX (1942) suggested that the name of the proponent of C I might have been lost in a lacuna, and was prepared to allow that Alexander might be the author of C even if not of A and Β ([1942] 149, 163). But cf. below n. 136. MORAUX (1942) 145 — 147; Β agrees with A in its view of the relation between the divine active intellect and our intellect, whereas in C our intellect is simply an aspect of the divine intellect. (There are however certain differences between Β and A; in particular, B, rather confusingly, describes our intellect [èv εξει], as well as the divine intellect, as 'active', in that it makes enmattered forms intelligible by abstracting them [111.2ff., cf. 111.23, and above n. 95], And cf. n. 103.) C f . κ α τ ' ι δ ί α ν έ π ί ν ο ι α ν , 112.8; TRABUCCO 120—123, MORAUX ( 1 9 6 7 , 2 ) 175.

Cf. MORAUX (1942) 158, MOVÍA 58f., and above n. 117. MORAUX in (1942) 162-164 stressed the origin of Alexander's own theory in the Stoicizing theory of C I , as part of his criticism of Alexander's claim to be an orthodox interpreter of Aristotle; on the other hand DONINI (1974) 51f. n. 115 stresses the d i f f e r e n c e between the theory of C I and Alexander's in his 'de anima', emphasizing the role of the transcendent intelligibles in the latter (but cf. above). On the latter phrase cf. above n. 117. It is also implied in Β that the active intellect is supra-personal (for it is contrasted with our intellect, 110.17, 111.27); and the references to it in the singular (110.23, etc.) suggest that it is a single supra-personal entity. Β does however refer to the active intellect as intelligible in its own nature (111.29; cf. 1 1 0 . 1 3 - 1 5 , 111.1, 1 1 2 . 3 ; cf. MORAUX' review of DONINI [1974], 532). D e intellectu A

ALEXANDER OF

APHRODISIAS

1213

As MORAUX observed, the theory of CL is not so much Alexandrian as Averroist, for it does not contrast the suprapersonal active intellect with o u r personal material intellect, but regards our intellect itself as the combination of a suprapersonal intellect with the instrument our body provides for it 1 4 0 . The author of C 2 objects to the theory of C I both on these grounds 1 4 1 and because of its direct involvement of the divine in the sublunary world 1 4 2 ; his own answer to the problem of intellect's motion is that the active intellect is spoken of as separate from us not because it moves spatially, but when it is not being thought o f 1 4 3 . As for the theory of intellect put forward in A, it differs from that of the 'de anima' in a number of respects, notably in that it appears to regard the active intellect as acting d i r e c t l y upon the material intellect; it is by apprehending the active intellect that the material intellect acquires the εξις which enables it to abstract other forms from their matter 1 4 4 , whereas in the 'de anima' it is the abstraction of forms from matter that is the process leading to possession of the ε ξ ι ς 1 4 5 . The implication of the 'de intellectu', that thought of God is the first abstract thought we have, seems problematic; in the 'de anima' such apprehension of the divine appears, more naturally, as the culmination of our intellectual development and as requiring effort 1 4 6 . MORAUX in 1942 argued that the 'de intellectu' was not by Alexander himself, and that its variations from the 'de anima' resulted from misunderstandings of obscurities in the latter 1 4 7 . BAZÁN, on the other hand, saw the 'de intellectu' as Alexander's own attempt to improve

140

141 142 143 144

itself does not explicitly identify the Active Intellect with the Unmoved Mover, but it does refer to its eternal self-thinking (109.24ff.; cf. MORAUX [1942] 125). Cf. MERLAN (1963) 46 f. 1 1 2 . 1 6 - 3 0 ; MORAUX (1942) 157f. However, BAZÁN 486 points out that C l differs from Averroes in that it makes our potential intellect corporeal, and does not regard the p o t e n t i a l intellect as a transcendent supra-personal unity. 113.16-18. 1 1 3 . 1 2 - 1 6 cf. below, section X I I . 113.18-24. Cf. de intellectu 1 0 7 . 3 1 - 3 4 (above, n. 103) and 1 0 8 . 1 9 - 2 2 (above, n. 102). As the latter passage indicates, the role of the active intellect in the 'de intellectu' seems to be a paradeigmatic one; our knowledge of it provides us with an example of what form, as opposed to the combination of form and matter, is. (Cf. MORAUX [1942] 125—132; LLOYD'S review of MOVÍA; BAZÁN 4 8 1 ; DONINI [ 1 9 7 4 ] 6 0 f . ; THILLET [ 1 9 8 1 ]

22-3.)

145

de anima 85.10—13: καί τοιούτος μεν ό ύλικός νούς, ó δε ώς εξις λεγόμενος είδός έστι [καί δύναμις] καί τελειότης τούτου, ήτις εξις έν αύτφ γίνεται εκ τε της τοϋ καθόλου περιλήψεως καί εκ τοϋ τα είδη χωρίζειν άπό της ϋλης [δύνασθαι], & τρόπον τινά ταΰτά έστιν άλλήλοις; de anima 85.20—22: έγγίνεται δε ή τοιάδε εξις τφ νω την άρχήν κατά μετάβασιν άπό της περί τα αισθητά συνεχοϋς ένεργείας. Cf. MORAUX (1942) 65—78; FOTINIS 3 2 2 - 3 2 3 ; above, n. 89. And for other differences between the 'de anima' and de intellectu A cf. nn. I l l , 130, 139.

146

Cf. especially de anima 91.5f., οίς μέλει τοϋ εχειν τι θείον έν αΰτοίς, τούτοις προνοητέον τοϋ δύνασθαι νοείν τι καί τοιούτον; MORAUX (1978) 301 (but cf. below, n. 230); THILLET ( 1 9 8 1 ) 1 7 - 1 9 and 2 4 . A n d cf. a b o v e n.

147

MORAUX (1942) 1 3 2 - 1 4 2 .

80

A N R W II 36.2

109.

1214

R.

W.

SHARPLES

o n t h e ' d e a n i m a ' a n d t o r e m o v e t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e task o f a b s t r a c t i o n b e i n g p e r f o r m e d b y a material i n t e l l e c t w h i c h w a s p u r e p o t e n t i a l i t y 1 4 8 . M o r e r e c e n t l y MORAUX h a s i n d i c a t e d that h e n o w regards t h e ' d e i n t e l l e c t u ' as an a u t h e n t i c w o r k of Alexander's p r e c e d i n g the 'de anima'149; the divergences b e t w e e n the t w o w o r k s are n o t in all r e s p e c t s as c l e a r - c u t as h e p r e v i o u s l y

XI.

Dynamics:

eternity

A l e x a n d e r argues that t h e h e a v e n l y aether

of the

thought150.

universe

is e n s o u l e d 1 5 1 , a n d t h a t its m o t i o n

is c a u s e d b y its d e s i r e t o e m u l a t e t h e c h a n g e l e s s n e s s o f t h e U n m o v e d

Mover,

eternal circular m o t i o n b e i n g t h e nearest it c a n attain t o eternal c h a n g e l e s s n e s s 1 5 2 . I n t h e case o f t h e h e a v e n s , n a t u r e a n d s o u l are i d e n t i c a l 1 5 3 . T h e s u b l u n a r y ele-

148

149 150

151

152

153

476—478. However, S C H R O E D E R (1982) argues that this difficulty is not in fact present in the 'de anima'; cf. above, η. 89. M O R A U X (1978) 304f. (but cf. above η. 38); cf. D O N I N I (1974) 6 0 f . M O R A U X (1978) 302—304. The 'de intellectu' is also regarded as authentic by B R U N S (1892,2) xii, T R A B U C C O 117f., and M E R L A N (1963) 46 η. 3. Cf. M O V Í A , 52ff. η. 2; and on the first part of the 'de intellectu' cf. G I L S O N 7—15. F O T I N I S 322 minimizes the difference in the role of the active intellect in the two works. T H I L L E T (1984) lxiii—lxiv n. 4 is in favour of authenticity. Alexander ap. Simplicius, in phys., C A G 10 1261.30f.; quaest. 1.1 3.10ff., 1.25 40.10; Principles of the Universe p. 122 BADAWI (1968) = P I N E S (1961,2) 43f. M E R L A N (1943) 181. Cf. below, η. 153. Z E L L E R 827f. η. 5 regards this as un-Aristotelian, but it seems likely that Aristotle does regard the heavenly spheres, though not the planets themselves, as ensouled, in the 'Metaphysics' at least; cf. Ross (1924) cxxxvif., also W . K. C . G U T H R I E , Aristotle: O n the Heavens (Loeb, 1939) xxxv, and Aristotle, de cáelo 2.2 285 a 29, 2.12 292 a 1 8 - 2 1 . quaest. 1.25 4 0 . 1 0 f f „ especially 1 7 - 2 1 ; 2.18 62.27ff.; Principles 1 2 4 . 9 - 1 1 , 130.2ff. BADAWI (1968). Cf. also quaest. 1.1 3.14ff.; 2.19 63.18ff. M E R L A N (1943) 181. Alexander does appear to recognise a plurality of Unmoved Movers, one for each sphere; cf. Principles 132.1 I f f . BADAWI (1968) with ibid. 131.13ff., Alexander ap. Simplicius, in phys. 1261.33. BADAWI (1972) 821. Above, nn. 118ff. Cf. further SHARPLES (1982,2) 2 0 8 - 2 1 0 . The U n moved Mover(s) are apparently located in the sphere(s) (Alexander ap. Simplicius, in phys. C A G 10 1261.33, 1354.22, in de cael., C A G 7 116.31); but they are clearly distinct f r o m the sphere-souls (Simplicius, in phys., C A G 10 1262.If., 1354.29; Alexander, quaest. 1.1 4 . I f f . , 1.25 4 0 . 8 - 1 0 . Cf. Z E L L E R 817 η. 1, 827f. η. 5, 828 η. 2; W . J A E G E R , Aristotle 2 , tr. R . R O B I N S O N , O x f o r d , 1948, 381 and n. 1; M E R L A N (1942) 181; and SHARPLES (1982,1). For the background cf. F E S T U G I È R E 232f., 260; and on Aristotle himself cf. R o s s cxxxvi. BAZÁN

Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de cael., C A G 7 380.29, in phys., C A G 10 1219.Iff.; Principles p . 122 BADAWI (1968) = PINES (1961,2) 4 3 f . MERLAN (1935) 156f., PINÈS (1961,2)

47. Alexander is here proposing an alternative position to that of Herminus, for w h o m the nature of the heavenly spheres causes their motion to be circular, while their souls cause it to be continuous, Simplicius, in de cael., C A G 7 380.3; M E R L A N (1935), (1943).

ALEXANDER O F APHRODISIAS

1215

m e n t s , u n l i k e the aether, are n o t e n s o u l e d 1 5 4 ; b u t the p r o b l e m o f t h e application t o their natural m o t i o n of the principle that e v e r y t h i n g that m o v e s is m o v e d b y s o m e t h i n g 1 5 5 is r e s o l v e d b y the claim that t h e y have in t h e m s e l v e s principles of m o t i o n w h i c h are a n a l o g o u s t o the souls o f living t h i n g s 1 5 6 . P I N E S has p o i n t e d o u t h o w this explanation in terms of the "natural i n c l i n a t i o n " o f the e l e m e n t s w a s taken o v e r b y P h i l o p o n u s 1 5 7 , and suggests that this m a y have p r o m p t e d P h i l o p o n u s t o explain the m o t i o n o f p r o j e c t i l e s in terms o f a " f o r c e d inclination" or i m p e t u s imparted to t h e m b y the t h r o w e r 1 5 8 . A l e x a n d e r argued against t h e Platonist T a u r o s that Plato did, in the ' T i m a e u s ' , intend an actual b e g i n n i n g o f the w o r l d 1 5 9 . B u t , w h i l e arguing that this w a s i n d e e d Plato's v i e w , A l e x a n d e r h i m s e l f regards it as untenable; w h a t c o m e s t o be c a n n o t b u t perish, and it is n o t p o s s i b l e f o r w h a t is perishable in its o w n nature t o be preserved eternally b y the divine w i l l 1 6 0 — this b e i n g s u p p o r t e d b y an appeal t o the principle that w h a t is i m p o s s i b l e in its o w n nature is i m p o s s i b l e e v e n f o r the g o d s , P l a t o himself in the 'Theaetetus' being cited in s u p p o r t o f this161.

154 155 156

157 158

159

160 161

Principles loc. cit.; Simplicius, indecael., C A G 7 489.12. Aristotle, Physics 7.1 241 b 2 4 f f „ cf. 8.4 254 b 24. Refutation of Galen on Motion p. 17 fin. R E S C H E R - M A R M U R A = P I N E S (1961,2) 42; and cf. Principles loc. cit. For the analogy between soul and the heaviness or lightness of natural bodies cf. also de anima 22.7ff., mantissa 1 106.5—8 (PINES [1961,2] 46 n. 121); it is in accord with Alexander's derivation of soul from the mixture of inanimate elements (above, section IX) and represents an attempt to give a unified account of nature both animate and inanimate (PINÈS [1961,2] 45f.). However, Alexander is concerned to stress the difference between animate and inanimate when the issue is that of freedom versus determinism; de fato ch. 14, P I N È S (1961,2) 50 η. 137. Characteristically, Alexander is in the 'Refutation of Galen on Motion' adapting an Aristotelian idea; Aristotle had spoken of nature as a principle of motion in things (Physics 2.1 192 b 1 - 3 2 , de cael. 2.3 301 b 17f.; P I N È S [1961,2] 43 η. 89. Cf. also phys. 8.1 250 b 14 [ID. 47 n. 130], de cael. 3.2 301 a 2 0 - 2 6 [ID. 41]), while not appealing to it to answer this particular problem (cf. phys. 8.4 254 b 33ff., especially 255 a 5ff.; PINÈS [1961,2] 39f.). Philoponus, in phys., C A G 16 195.24ff.; P I N È S (1961,2) 42, 48. Philoponus, in phys., C A G 17 642.3ff.; P I N È S (1961,2) 4 8 f „ SAMBURSKY (1962) 70 - 76. O n the later influence of these ideas cf. P I N È S (1961,2) 51—54; B R O W N , especially 38—43. Alexander himself held loyally, where p r o j e c t i l e motion was concerned, to Aristotle's explanation in terms of the setting in motion of air behind the projectile (ap. Simplicius, in phys., C A G 10 1346.37ff.; SAMBURSKY loc.cit.). ap. Simplicius, in de cael., C A G 7 297f., and Philoponus, de aet. mund. 213—216 RABE (Leipzig, Teubner, 1899). P R A E C H T E R (1934) 68; BALTES (1976) 7 1 - 7 6 ; SORABJI (1983) 271, 275. Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de cael., C A G 7 358.30ff.; quaest. 1.18. BALTES (1976) 7 6 - 8 1 . Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de cael., C A G 7 359.20ff.; quaest. 1.18 32.3ff., 14ff.; Plato, Theaetetus 176a. Cf. also Alexander, de fato 30 200.19ff. (below n. 194), de prov. 15.Iff. R U L A N D (1976), Principles 138.9f. B A D A V I (1968). W A L Z E R (1948) 28ff. THILLET(1960) 323.

80*

1216

R. W. SHARPLES

XII.

Providence

In the second century A.D. Aristotle was generally regarded as allowing that divine providence governed the heavens, but denying that it extended to the sublunary world 162 ; the influence of the heavenly motions on the sublunary is entirely accidental 163 . In attempting to formulate a different position Alexander was probably reacting to criticism of Aristotle on these lines by the Platonist Atticus 164 . Aristoteles of Mytilene had already extended providence to the sublunary, but at the cost of a Stoic type of pantheism which involved God directly in the humblest parts of the sublunary world 165 ; and this Alexander rejects, as unworthy of the divine 166 . He presents his theory of providence as a tertium quid between the Epicurean denial of providence and the Stoic view that providence is concerned with sublunary individuals, the latter view being unacceptable because of the ocurrence of evils 167 , because of the impossibility for the divine of attending to a multiplicity of details simultaneously 168 , and because it implies that the divine exists for the sake of the sublunary and that the latter is of more worth than the former 169 . Providence is rather to be found in the effect of the regular heavenly motions on the sublunary world, in preserving the continuity of coming-to-be and passing away and hence of sublunary species; but it does not extend to the fortunes of individuals170.

162

163

164

165

166

167 168

169

170

Cf. e.g. Aëtius 2.3.4, Diogenes Laertius 5.32; and below, n. 164. FESTUGIÈRE 224—262; MORAUX (1949) 3 3 f „ (1970) 54ff.; HAPP 7 7 - 8 1 . Aëtius loc. cit. ; Adrastus of Aphrodisias ap. Theon Smyrnaeus, expositio rerum mathematicarum 149.14f. HILLER (Leipzig, Teubner, 1878). Atticus fr. 3 . 5 6 f „ 69ff. DES PLACES (Paris, Budé, 1977). MERLAN (1969) 9 0 f . ; cf. also Κ . MRAS, ZU Attikos, Porphyrios und Eusebius, Glotta 25 (1936) 187f. ap. Alexander, de intellectu 1 1 3 . 6 - 1 2 ; cf. MORAUX (1942) 1 5 3 - 1 6 2 , and above section X fin.; cf., however, also nn. 8 and 131 above. Cf. also Alexander, quaest. 2.3 48.19—22; MORAUX (1967,1) 163£. η. 2. Alexander, de intellectu 113.12ff.; cf. de mixtione 10 226.24ff. (against the Stoics); [Aristotle], de mundo 6 397 b 20ff., 398 a 5ff. TODD ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 226f. (Cf. however GENEQUAND [1984] 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 . ) Below, η. 169. de prov. 11.6ff., 25.18ff. RULAND (1976); cf. fr. 36 FREUDENTHAL. de prov. 15.15ff. RULAND (1976); cf. fr. 36 FREUDENTHAL. Contrast the Neoplatonist view at nn. 196f. below. de prov. 19.3ff„ 25.Iff. RULAND (1976); cf. ibid. 53.Iff., 6 3 . 8 f f „ quaest. 2.21 68.19ff. (below, η. 175). de prov. 33.Iff., 59.6ff., 87.5ff. RULAND (1976); quaest. 1.25 4 1 . 8 f f „ 2.19 63.15ff.; fr. 36 FREUDENTHAL. Cf. quaest. 1.3 8 . 2 2 - 2 4 ; Principles 128.5ff. BADAWI (1968). The species would not indeed exist if none of the individuals did so; „das Allgemeine und sein Bestand liegen allerdings in dem Einzelwesen; denn die dem Werden und Vergehen unterliegenden Wesen haben, da sie keine rotierenden Himmelskörper sind, ihre — durch die Art gegebene — Unvergänglichkeit nur durch die Fortpflanzung", de prov. 89.7ff. RULAND (1976). But the existence of the species does not depend on that of any p a r t i c u l a r individual. Cf. above, n. 67; TWEEDALE 298—299. — Characteristically, the preservation of the continuity of sublunary coming-to-be by the regularity of the heavenly motions

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

1217

This doctrine of providence resolves the problem of the occurrence of evils — particulars being outside the scope of providence — and fits in well both with the general Aristotelian notion of nature as what happens for the most part but not always, and in particular with Alexander's doctrine of fate 1 7 1 . Nature is described by Alexander as the effect of the heavenly motions 1 7 2 , which implies that it is the product of divine providence 1 7 3 . But, as MORAUX has observed, this is a very mechanistic conception of providence 1 7 4 ; and a number of points remain unclear. In particular, Alexander is concerned to argue that providential concern for the sublunary is neither the primary concern of the divine — for that would imply that it existed for the sake of the sublunary — nor yet purely accidental 175 ; but it is not clear h o w this difficulty is to be resolved. Regrettably, quaestio 2.21, which is devoted to this question, is incomplete, breaking off after some dialectical suggestions just at the point where the substantive treatment is about to start 176 . Other points that are not entirely clear are the nature of the knowledge of the sublunary that the divine is supposed to have 1 7 7 , and the parts played

171

172

173

is a central theme in Aristotle himself (cf. de gen. et corr. 2.10 336 b 31 ff., meteor. 1.2 339 a 21; [Aristotle], de mundo 6 398 a 3, b 8; Alexander, in meteor. 6.15, Principles 138.24ff. BADAMCI [1968], and ap. Philoponus, in de gen. et corr., CAG 14.2 291.18ff.); what is new is Alexander's application of it to the problem of divine providence. Cf. nn. 156, 182. Alexander throughout conducts his discussion in terms of what he describes as 'Aristotle's theory'; quaest. 1,25 41.10 (where κατ' 'Αριστοτέλη should not be deleted with BRUNS [1890,2] 230; cf. ibid. 234), 2.21 65.19ff„ 70.24ff.; de prov. 31.19, 33.Iff. RULAND (1976). Cf. THILLET (1960) 318, and below n. 182. MORAUX (1942) 199. Cf. also below, n. 194. On the problem of evils cf. de prov. 101.3ff. RULAND (1976). Cf. also MIGNUCCI (1985). de fato 6 169.23, mantissa 23 172.17ff., quaest. 2.3 47.30ff., 49.29, in meteor. 7.9, de prov. 77.12. TODD ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 2 2 4 ; cf. d e p r o v . loc. cit., ZELLER 828, MORAUX (1942) 198. P r o v i d e n c e

will not however be identical with fate; for fate is individual nature differing from one man to another and affecting the course of each man's life (below, n. 182), while providence is not concerned with differences which fall below the level of species. (However, the distinction is not always as clearly observed as it might be. Cf. DONINI [1977] 182 n. 16, [1982] 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 ; SHARPLES [1980] 78, 8 1 - 8 2 , [ 1 9 8 3 , 1 ] 27. -

T h e r e is a m i s p r i n t in t h e

last-mentioned reference: at p. 27 line 13, for "it is easy", read: "it is less easy".) The problem of the exact contribution of the heavenly motions and of the relation between it and the nature of the sublunary elements is examined in quaest. 2.3. On Alexander's conception of nature cf. GENEQUAND (1984) 113 — 120. 174

175

176

177

MORAUX (1942) 1 6 9 - 2 0 2 ; cf. RAVAISSON 315. It is characteristic that Alexander never-

theless attacks the determinists in the 'de fato' on the grounds that their position does not allow the gods freedom of action; 17 188.1—6. de prov. 63.2ff. RULAND (1976); quaest. 2.21 65.25ff„ 68.19ff„ 70.9ff. Cf. PINÈS (1955,2) 3.93f., (1956) 26f. quaest. 2.21 70.4ff. Cf. de prov. 67.7ff. RULAND (1976); RULAND (1976) 136, cf. 142; below, n. 179. Cf. de prov. 65.9ff. RULAND (1976); Principles 130.42ff., 135.27-29 BADAWI (1968). The latter, apparently attributing knowledge of the effect of the heavens on the sublunary to the Unmoved Mover itself, is an isolated passage, and even if authentic is a statement of a position to be adopted rather than an explanation of how it can be upheld. Cf. above, n. 124; LLOYD (1980) 56-59.

1218

R.

W.

SHARPLES

in t h e t h e o r y of p r o v i d e n c e b y t h e s o u l s of t h e s p h e r e s o n t h e o n e h a n d and t h e U n m o v e d M o v e r o n t h e o t h e r 1 7 8 . B u t there is n o t s p a c e t o d i s c u s s t h e s e t o p i c s here179.

XIII.

Determinism

A l e x a n d e r ' s 'de f a t o ' is d e v o t e d p a r t l y t o e x p o s i t i o n o f his o w n ,

non-

d e t e r m i n i t i c t h e o r y of fate, and partly t o a r g u m e n t against a d e t e r m i n i s t p o s i t i o n w h i c h is p r i n c i p a l l y that o f t h e S t o i c s , t h o u g h p r e s e n t e d i n a s e l e c t i v e

and

t e n d e n t i o u s w a y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n 1 8 0 . H e f r e q u e n t l y appeals t o w h a t is o b v i o u s a n d t o c o m m o n u s a g e — this t e n d i n g in practice, as LONG has o b s e r v e d , t o m e a n A r i s t o t e l i a n d o c t r i n e 1 8 1 . A s w i t h p r o v i d e n c e , s o here A l e x a n d e r p r e s e n t s as A r i s t o t e l i a n a t h e o r y o n a t o p i c t o w h i c h A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f had d i r e c t e d little a t t e n t i o n ; a n d h e r e t o o h e adapts a central A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n as the basis f o r his t h e o r y , i d e n t i f y i n g fate w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l nature o f each t h i n g , w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s w h a t h a p p e n s t o it f o r t h e m o s t part b u t n o t a l w a y s 1 8 2 . In m a n t i s s a 25 p a s s a g e s f r o m A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f a n d f r o m T h e o p h r a s t u s 178

(1890,2) 230 argues from quaest. 1.25 41.4—18 that it is the souls of the spheres, rather than the Unmoved Mover(s), that exercise providence; so too H A G E R (1975) 179 η. 34. Problematic too is the question whether the heavens are the object of divine providential care; quaest. 1.25 loc. cit. seems to rule this out as far as the p r o p e r application of the term 'providence' is concerned, and it is repeatedly asserted that the heavens, being eternal, have no need of providential care (de prov. 3 3 . I f f . R U L A N D [1976] = fr. 3(b) G R A N T , de prov. 61.7ff. R U L A N D [1976]; cf. quaest. 2.19 63.15ff.). But cf. de prov. 5 9 . 6 - 1 2 R U L A N D (1976) with R U L A N D ' S notes on pp. 5 8 - 6 0 , and R U L A N D (1976) 136. See next note.

179

I have discussed the questions raised in nn. 1 7 6 — 1 7 8 more fully in SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 2 , 2 ) . O n Alexander's theory of providence cf., in addition to the literature cited above, RAVAIS-

BRUNS

SON 2 . 3 1 3 - 3 1 5 ; N O U R R I S S O N 9 6 £ £ . ; Z E L L E R 8 2 7 - 8 3 0 ; M O R A U X ( 1 9 4 2 ) 1 9 5 - 2 0 2 , 54FF.; H A P P 8 1 - 8 3 ; 180

181

182

MOVÍA 7 7 - 8 0 ; T O D D ( 1 9 7 6 , 2 ) 212 - 214; DONINI (1982)

(1970)

230-231;

and above section V no. 5. Cf. L O N G (1970) 247 and n. 3, 266ff.; SHARPLES (1983,1) 1 9 - 2 1 . D O N I N I (1977) 183f. seeks to relate the argument of de fato ch. 9 rather to the Megarian position attacked in Aristotle, Metaph. Θ 3 1047 a 10—17; but Alexander gives no indication that the position he intends to attack in ch. 9 is different from that which is his target elsewhere in the work. Cf. however above, n. 30. F R E D E (1982) 2 7 6 - 2 7 7 and 298 n. 38 argues that Alexander has a specific target w h o may be the Stoic Philopator (SVF 2.991); cf. LONG (1970) 268. V E R B E R E 99 and n. 99; L O N G (1970) 250ff.; SHARPLES (1983,1) 18 and nn. de fato 6 169.18ff., especially 170.9ff.; mantissa 25 1 8 5 . l l f f . In particular, the natural psychic endowment of each individual determines the course and end of his life for the most part, but not always; D O N I N I (1974) 157—173 argues that Alexander is here reacting against the psychological determinism put forward by Galen, quod animi mores, 73. 13ff. M Ü L L E R (Galeni Scripta Minora II, Leipzig, Teubner, 1891). Cf. T H I L L E T (1984) ci—civ. For Alexander's presentation of his theory as Aristotle's cf. de fato 1 164.13, 39 212.5; and for his adaptation of established Aristotelian doctrine cf. V E R B E R E 81, SHARPLES (1975,1) 271 and n. 71, and above nn. 156, 170.

ALEXANDER

OF

APHRODISIAS

1219

are appealed to in support of this theory 1 8 3 . It is uncertain how far Alexander's theory had been c o n s c i o u s l y anticipated by Peripatetics before him 1 8 4 ; at any rate it seems likely that his interest in the question was, directly or indirectly, to a large extent a reaction to Stoicism 1 8 5 , though as DONINI has stressed the a r g u m e n t s by which he establishes his doctrine in the 'de fato' are purely Peripatetic 1 8 6 . As an alternative to determinism, however, his theory suffers from his failure to realise that variations and exceptions to what is usual may well be the inevitable results of additional factors operating on each particular occasion; his failure to allow for this reflects his Aristotelian background, but it vitiates several of his arguments against determinism 1 8 7 . It is a merit of those arguments that Alexander clearly distinguishes his own, libertarian position from the 'soft-determinist' view of the Stoics, that human responsibility is compatible with determinism 1 8 8 . H e nevertheless claims to escape the determinists' charge, that their opponents introduce motion without a cause, by arguing that human agents are themselves the causes of their actions 1 8 9 , and that chance events have causes, albeit accidental ones 1 9 0 . H e replaces the Stoic derivation of the unity of the universe from the unbroken nexus of causes and effects by the claim that it is caused by the continuous rotation of the heavens — which leaves room for minor exceptions 1 9 1 . The emphasis on the influence of the heavens is in accordance with his theory of providence (not explicitly mentioned in the 'de fato'), and the notion of occasional exceptions to a regular pattern is in agreement with his own positive doctrine of fate; but the question of how those exceptions are caused, and of their relation to the free choices of human agents, is left without an explicit answer. It is a general feature of the 'de fato', resulting from the fact that the greater part of it is devoted to polemic 183

184

mantissa 25 186.13ff.; Aristotle, Physics 5.5 230 a 32, meteor. 1.14 352 a 28. C f . THILLET (1984) c i v - c v i . C f . DONINI (1974) 1 5 9 - 1 6 1 , (1977) 182 n. 16; SHARPLES (1980) 79. Although it may be doubted how far Alexander's statement of his position actually draws on arguments put forward by Theophrastus, it seems probable that the latter's position was, at least by implication, not dissimilar to that of Alexander; cf. Aëtius 1.29.4, FORTENBAUGH (1979) 3 7 2 f f . , and SHARPLES (1980) 82.

185

VERBEKE 8 1 ; cf. FREDE (1982) 2 7 6 - 2 7 9 .

186

DONINI (1977) 1 7 3 - 1 8 2 , cf. (1974) 161 η. 61. This does not mean, however, that Alexander's perspective on these issues is not somewhat affected by his concern to counter Stoicism; FREDE (1982) 289.

187

c h s . 6, 9, 2 4 ; cf. SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 5 , 1 ) p a s s i m , a n d ( 1 9 7 9 , 2 ) 3 4 . C f . , h o w e v e r , F R E D E ( 1 9 8 2 )

188

286 and n. 22, and in particular FREDE (1984) 282—285, arguing that I have over-emphasized this aspect. I hope to return to this issue elsewhere. de fato 13 181.7ff., 34 206.22, 36 207.27, 38 211.30; SHARPLES (1975,1) 2 5 6 f f . nn. 22, 24, (1983,1) 2 1 - 2 2 , FREDE (1982) 2 8 8 - 2 9 5 , (1984) 2 8 6 - 2 9 1 .

189

ch.

190

ch. 24 194.15ff., cf. ch. 8; SHARPLES (1975,2) 4 6 - 4 9 . Mantissa 22, on the other hand, is prepared to assert the existence of uncaused motion, and is led to the paradoxical position that it is in choices reflecting the weakness of human nature that responsibility is most fully present. C f . SHARPLES (1975,2) passim; FREDE (1982) 2 8 0 - 2 8 8 .

15; SHARPLES ( 1 9 7 5 , 2 ) 4 4 - 4 6 .

191

de fato ch. 25; cf. de prov. 9 5 . 4 f f . RULAND (1976) de mixtione 10 2 2 3 . 6 f f . , Principles 136.40 f. BADAWI (1968).

1220

R. W. S H A R P L E S

against Alexander's determinist opponents, that his own position is not systematically worked out 1 9 2 ; and this may be parallelled elsewhere in his work too 1 9 3 . Alexander argues in 'de fato' ch. X X X that the gods cannot have foreknowledge of future contingent events; the impossible is impossible even for God 1 9 4 . This position was adopted by Porphyry 195 , but rejected by Proclus, whose view, very influential subsequently 196 , that God has definite foreknowledge of what is in its own nature indefinite and contingent, is expressly advanced as an alternative on the one hand to the Stoic view that everything is both predetermined and foreknown, and on the other to the 'Peripatetic' view which is clearly Alexander's 197 . Alexander does not in the 'de fato' directly discuss the related topic of the truth of future contingents, his references to it being ad homines against the Stoics; however, the last section of 'quaestiones' 1.4 (cf. above, section VI) is of importance as being perhaps the first suggestion of the view that predictions of future contingent events are true or false, but only indefinitely 198 .

XIV.

Influence — Plotinus and others

Porphyry mentions Alexander's commentaries among the works studied in Plotinus' school 199 , and much attention has been devoted to tracing possible influences of the former on the latter — though, as R I S T and B L U M E N T H A L have stressed, there are pitfalls here in our relative ignorance of the other possible

192

193 194

C f . above, n. 173. A s DONINI (1974) 171 f. points out, a different view of the relation of nature to behaviour f r o m that in de fato ch. 6 (above η. 182) is taken in ch. 27, where Alexander is closely following Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics' (especially 2.1, 3.5). C f . also DONINI (1982) 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 ; THILLET (1984) c x v - c x x i . A b o v e , n. 32. A b o v e , n. 161; SHARPLES (1978,1) 260. This again is in g e n e r a l agreement with Alexander's doctrine that providence is confined to species; but the details are not worked out. Alexander indeed does not mention his own theory of providence at all in the 'de fato' (as opposed to attacking his opponents on the topic; above, n. 174). C f . also MIGNUCCI (1985).

195

ap. Proclus in T i m . 1.352.12 DIEHL (Leipzig, Teubner, 1903); cf. Calcidius in T i m . ch.

196

Iamblichus ap. A m m o n i u s , in de int., C A G 4.5 135.12ff.; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 5.3—6; St. T h o m a s Aquinas, S u m m a Theologiae I q. 14 art. 13. C f . HUBER; WALLIS 2 9 f „ 1 4 9 f „ 165. Proclus, de Providentia 6 3 . I f f . , de decern dubitationibus q. 2 6 3 . 3 f f . BOESE ( P r o d i Diadochi Tria Opuscula, Berlin 1960); Elements of Theology 124. C f . HAGER (1975); SHARPLES (1978,1) 2 6 0 - 2 6 2 . quaest. 1.4 12.16, 18, 13.5. C f . FREDE (1970) 26; SHARPLES (1978,1) 263f. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 14. (BECCHI 90, however, argues that this refers to Alexander of Aegae.)

162, 1 9 5 . 2 2 f f . WASZINK. D E N B O E F T ,

197

198 199

53ff.

A L E X A N D E R O F APHRODISIAS

1221

sources f o r Plotinus' d i s c u s s i o n s , b o t h Peripatetics and o t h e r s 2 0 0 , and in the fact that w e p o s s e s s only a small part of A l e x a n d e r ' s w o r k s 2 0 1 . MERLAN stressed the significance f o r Plotinus of A l e x a n d e r ' s belief in a class of transcendent intelligibles which are the eternal objects of the divine intellect 2 0 2 ; but, as a r g u e d a b o v e , it is not clear h o w far A l e x a n d e r actually asserts such a theory in the 'de a n i m a ' (though Plotinus might well have been p r e d i s p o s e d to find it t h e r e ) 2 0 3 . M o r e o v e r , as ARMSTRONG p o i n t e d o u t , although Plotinus' statements of the Aristotelian principle of the identity of intellect and its object seem to s h o w A l e x a n d e r ' s i n f l u e n c e 2 0 4 , the principle itself had already been connected with the doctrine that the Platonic F o r m s are G o d ' s t h o u g h t s b y the M i d d l e Platonist A l b i n u s ( A l c i n o u s ) 2 0 5 . A l e x a n d e r ' s influence has also been seen in Plotinus' relation of o u r intellects to the divine intellect 2 0 6 ; and it has been suggested that he is influenced b y A l e x a n d e r ' s doctrine of the Active Intellect in m a k i n g his o w n s u p r e m e principle, the O n e , p r o d u c t i v e (in a w a y that A l b i n u s ' s u p r e m e g o d , f o r instance, is n o t ) 2 0 7 . B u t it m u s t here be stressed, firstly, that A l e x a n d e r w a s n o t the first to regard the Aristotelian Active Intellect as a s u p r a - p e r s o n a l p r i n c i p l e 2 0 8 , and s e c o n d l y that he d o e s not clearly explain h o w the Active Intellect is a cause or h o w it is

200

201

202 203 204

RIST ( 1 9 6 6 ) 82, BLUMENTHAL 2 5 4 ; cf. SCHWYZER 5 7 3 f . , DONIMI ( 1 9 7 4 ) 9 f . ,

MORAUX

(1978) 320 η. 100, and his review of DONINI (1974), 532 and η. 1. As HENRY 441f. points out, the use Plotinus makes of Alexander's discussions is governed by his own concerns, which are not always co-extensive with Alexander's. On the general question of Alexander's influence on Plotinus cf. also SZLEZÁK 135 — 143; SCHROEDER (1984) 240—242. Cf. also now DONINI (1982) 248 n. 60. BLUMENTHAL loc. cit. Porphyry after all refers to "commentaries", υπομνήματα (above n. 199). MERLAN (1963) 3 9 f „ (1967) 120. Above, section X , nn. 118-130. Plotinus V 3, 5, cf. Alexander, de anima 87.43-88.15, de intellectu 108.7-9, 16-19, 109.23-110.13; ARMSTRONG 408. ARMSTRONG 411 connects Plotinus V 4, 2, with Alexander, de anima 88.24-89.5. Cf. also Plotinus V. 9, 5.13ff.; MERLAN (1963) 44. So too on the selfknowledge of the divine intellect; VI 7, 37 is tentatively linked with de int. 109.23-110.3 by RIST, and VI 7, 39.8-15 with de anima 88.25, 90.22, and de int. 109. 2 3 - 1 1 0 . 3 b y HAGER (1964). C f . MERLAN (1963) 82f.

205

206

ARMSTRONG (1960) 402 ff. Emphasis is also laid on the Middle Platonists, rather than Alexander, as sources for Plotinus by KRÄMER, 306 n. 430. ARMSTRONG (1960) 406-408, comparing 1.1, 7.8, and V.3, 3.4, to de int. 112.18113.2, and especially the analogy of the craftsman and his tools, 1.4, 16.20—29, with de int. 112.24—30. Similarly the significance for Plotinus of Alexander's linking of the active intellect of Aristotle de anima 3.5 to the Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics Λ (above, n. 139) is stressed b y MERLAN (1967) 117; MOVÍA 72.

207

RIST ( 1 9 6 6 ) 9 0 ; P l o t i n u s V I . 8 , 1 9 . 1 6 - 1 9 . C f . BOOTH 8 3 - 8 4 o n the relevance o f this t o

the merging of Alexander's influence and the Platonic tradition in Islam. Cf. SCHROEDER (1984)

208

244-248.

Above, nn. 137ff. The passage cited by ARMSTRONG (above n. 206) is after all from the section of the 'de intellectu1 ( C I ) where the author is stating not his own view but that of Aristoteles of Mytilene (above, n. 136); ARMSTRONG (1960) 407 n. 1.

1222

R. W. SHARPLES

related to our intellects 2 0 9 ; even if he influenced Plotinus here, what is most striking is the contrast between his unsatisfactory treatment and Plotinus' statement of a theory which simultaneously explains both the universe as a whole and the levels of consciousness in each individual. ARMSTRONG also saw Plotinus' stress on the absolute simplicity of the O n e and placing of it a b o v e Intellect as a reaction to Alexander's Active Intellect, this not being truly simple for Plotinus in that the very presence of thought implies a duality 2 1 0 . Plotinus refers to Intellect in his o w n theory as ποιητής όντως καί δημιουργός 2 1 1 , and this has been seen as an allusion to Alexander's Active Intellect 2 1 2 or as an implicit criticism of Alexander for not making intellect truly productive of soul 2 1 3 . Many other parallels between passages in Plotinus and in Alexander have been noted, in connection with the application to the soul of the Delphic precept 'know thyself' 2 1 4 , the relation between soul and body 2 1 5 , the theory of vision 2 1 6 and of mixture 2 1 7 , free-will and determinism 2 1 8 and questions of ethics 2 1 9 . 209

Above, section X, nn. 103-110; cf. also n. 121.

210

ARMSTRONG (1960) 4 0 9 - 4 1 1 ; P l o t i n u s V . 3 , V . 4 , 2, V . 6 , 2, c o m p a r i n g especially d e i n t . 1 0 9 . 2 8 - 1 1 0 . 3 . C f . RIST (1966) 84, 86. HAGER (1964) 1 7 5 - 1 8 0 o d d l y t o o k A l e x a n d e r ,

de anima 88.2—5 and 90.22 to show that for Alexander too the highest principle was above intelligence. But in both passages the point is only that pure form, the active intellect, does not depend on being intelligized to be intelligible and intellect; not that it is n o t t h e o b j e c t of its o w n i n t e l l e c t i o n . C f . RIST (1966) 8 4 f . ; MOVÍA 7 3 f f . ; a n d t h e

discussion in ARMSTRONG, 420 f. 211 212

V.9, 3.26; cf. II.3, 18.15. ARMSTRONG (1960) 401. MERLAN (1963) 46; MOVÍA 72. (However, THEILER reviewing MERLAN [1963] connects

this rather with Numenius.) 213

DONINI (1974) 18 f. DONINI h e r e r e c o g n i z e s , f o l l o w i n g RIST (1966) 83, t h e a b s e n c e of

explicit reference to Alexander's three types of intellect (above, section X) in Plotinus, but points to other parallels in terminology. Cf. however SCHROEDER (1984) 242 n. 16. 214

P l o t i n u s I V . 7 a n d I V . 3 , 1 . 5 - 1 0 ; A l e x a n d e r , d e a n i m a 1 . 4 - 2 . 4 . BRÉHIER I V . 6 4 n . 1,

IV.183; HENRY 435f.; DONINI (1974) 15. However, others have related this rather to Plato, Alcibiades I 129aff.; cf. discussion at HENRY 448; BOYANCÉ, review of KRÄMER; 215

MORAUX, review of DONINI (1974), 532 n. 1.

Plotinus IV.3, 20f.; Alexander, de anima 13.9-15.26 (BLUMENTHAL; but cf. MORAUX loc.cit.). IV.7, 1; mantissa 115.2-14 (BRÉHIER IV.189 n. 1). IV.7, 8; de anima 11.20f. (DONINI [1974] 9-14) and mantissa 116.5-13 (BRÉHIER IV.201 n. 1). V.l, 10; de anima 84.10f., 88-91, 94.7—end (DONINI [1974] 19-23, but cf. SCHROEDER [1984] 241-242). V.9, 3; de anima 2 - 1 0 (DONINI [1974] 15-18; cf. especially V.9, 3.9f. and de anima 2.25-27; V.9, 3.11-14 and de anima 3.4-7). Cf. also VI.3, 4.29-31, and VI.3, 5-12, with mantissa 119.32f. and quaest. 1.8 17.8; VI.3, 4.16 with quaest. 1.8 18.1 (HENRYSCHWYZER ad l o c c . ) .

2,6

Plotinus II.8; mantissa 130 (MERLAN [1967] 121). Plotinus IV.5, 2; mantissa 128.16, etc.

217

Plotinus II.7, 1.5; Alexander, de mixtione 2 214.18 (SCHWYZER). II.7, 1.53f.; Alexander, de mixtione 6 220.14f. (ibid.; SCHWYZER also observes that Plotinus II.7 deals with the subject of Alexander, quaest. 2.12). II.7, 2; de mixtione 3 216.14 (MERLAN [1967] 121). Plotinus III. 1, 2.30ff., and Alexander, de fato 22 192.1-15, 25 195.3f., and mantissa 185.1-5; III.l, 7.14ff„ and de fato 13 181.15ff.; VI.8, 1.33f., and de fato 14 183.27-30, 15 185.13; VI.8, 2.3-9, and de fato 14 183.30-184.9, probi, eth. 29 159.27-32; VI.8,

(BRÉHIER 4 . 1 5 6 n . 1, 158 n . 1) a n d d e a n i m a 4 2 . 1 9 - 4 3 . 1 1 (SCHROEDER [1984] 2 4 2 - 2 4 8 ) .

218

ALEXANDER

OF

1223

APHRODISIAS

HENRY has argued, following SCHWYZER, that Plotinus followed Alexander in using the centre of a circle as an analogy for the common sense — and that he went back from Alexander's text to the Aristotelian original 2 2 0 ; MERLAN that he follows Alexander in holding that the circular motion of the heavens is caused by their desire to emulate the Unmoved Mover, though rejecting the doctrine of ether 2 2 1 . Finally, DONINI argues that Plotinus' discussion of the problem of the plurality of Unmoved Movers is influenced by what he sees as Alexander's treatment of the same question; but as argued above DONINI'S interpretation of Alexander here seems doubtful 2 2 2 . There is not space here to discuss Alexander's influence on other later thinkers in detail; but the following references to the secondary literature, though not exhaustive, may serve as a guide. For further bibliography cf. CRANZ (1960), ( 1 9 7 1 ) , a n d c f . a b o v e s e c t i o n s I V — V I I , X I , X I I I f i n . C f . a l s o in g e n e r a l MERLAN

(1963) — who, however, is not exclusively concerned with actual historical influences 2 2 3 . (1) Later Greek commentators, etc. (Cf. also above, n. 23.) LINKE; SWITALSKI; THÉRY ( 1 9 2 6 ) 1 6 - 1 8 ; MORAUX ( 1 9 4 2 ) 1 3 7 - 1 4 0 ,

180f.;CouR-

CELLE 3 8 , 6 0 , 2 6 6 f f . ; BEUTLER; SHIEL 2 3 1 ; WASZINK; DONINI ( 1 9 6 8 ) ; EBBESEN

(1973,1); HAGER (1975); SHARPLES (1978,1) 2 5 3 - 2 6 6 ; LLOYD (1980) 62ff.; PREUS (1981,1) 11, 1 7 - 2 0 , 8 0 - 8 3 , 9 1 - 9 4 ; ZIMMERMANN (1981) lxxxvf.; FOTINIS 3 3 2 - 3 3 4 ; TWEEDALE 3 0 1 ; BOOTH 6 9 - 7 2 ;

KOVACH 5 0 - 5 2 ;

MIGNUCCI

(1985)

237ff. (2) Medieval Arabic and Jewish philosophy. GUNSZ; STEIN; THÉRY ( 1 9 2 6 ) 3 5 - 6 7 ; GILSON; GUTTMANN ( 1 9 3 5 ) , ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; KRAUS

(1942) 3 2 0 - 3 2 5 ; FINNEGAN (1956), (1957); PINÈS (1961,1), (1961,2), 1963) l x i v I x x i v ; WALZER ( 1 9 6 2 ) 2 0 8 f . , ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; A L - A L O U S I ; PETERS ( 1 9 6 8 , 2 ) ; MOVÍA

219

24-

2 . 2 1 - 2 5 , and de fato 14 1 8 4 . 1 5 - 1 9 . Cf. SCHWYZER; HENRY-SCHÜTZER ad locc.; SHARPLES (1978,1) 254, 256. THILLET (1960) 322 suggests the possibility of a link between Plòtinus III.2—3 and Alexander's 'de Providentia'. Plotinus 1.2, 7; Alexander, probi, eth. 22 (MERLAN [1967] 121). 1.4, 5; mantissa 159.18, 1 6 2 . 4 (THEILER a p . H E N R Y 4 4 5 ) .

220

221

Plotinus IV.7, 6.11 — 14; Alexander, de anima 63.8 — 13 (and the whole context). Cf. also BRÉHIER IV. 195 η. 2, 196 η. 1. MORAUX however argues that the comparison is traditional (review of DONINI [1974], 532 η. 1). Plotinus II.2 and IV.5, 2; above, n. 152. MERLAN (1943), cf. (1967) 120. (MERLAN however stresses the way in which Plotinus emphasizes the symbolic aspect of what is primarily a physical point in Alexander; [1943] 184.) MERLAN (1967) 121 also cites Alexander's distinction between two matters in quaest. 1.15 as influencing Plotinus' in II.4; but Alexander's distinction between the matter of sublunary and heavenly physical bodies is scarcely the same as Plotinus' between sensible and intelligible matter (cf. MERLAN [1967] 27). On intelligible matter in Plotinus and Alexander cf. also RIST (1962) 1 0 3 - 1 0 7 (but in metaph. 510.3 and 514.27 are pseudo-Alexander).

222

Plotinus V . l , 9; DONINI (1974) 2 9 - 35. Above, section X , nn. 1 2 3 - 1 3 0 . F o r other parallels between Plotinus and Alexander cf. HENRY—SCHWYZER'S index, III.436f. Cf. also FOTINIS 1 5 6 - 1 5 8 .

223

MERLAN ( 1 9 6 3 ) 2 f .

1224

R.

W.

SHARPLES

2 7 ; G Ä T J E ( 1 9 7 1 ) e s p e c i a l l y 6 9 - 7 3 , 9 6 f . ; B R O W N ; G H O R A B ; BADAWI ( 1 9 7 2 ) , e s p .

4 2 5 - 4 4 6 , 840ff.; ZIMMERMANN (1974), (1981) c i - c v etc.; RULAND (1976) 144ff.; SEZGIN 3.238, 4.53, 101, 172, 1 8 4 - 1 8 8 , 6.133, 201; FOTINIS 3 3 4 - 3 3 5 ; BOOTH; MORAUX (1984) 4 2 3 - 4 2 4 ; GENEQUAND (1984) 1 2 0 - 1 2 9 ; ZIMMERMANN (1986) 129-134. (3) Medieval Western philosophy. T H É R Y ( 1 9 2 6 ) 1 0 5 - 1 1 6 ; M I C H A L S K I ; GRABMANN ( 1 9 2 9 ) , ( 1 9 3 6 ) ; W I L P E R T ( 1 9 3 5 ) ; SMET ( 1 9 5 9 ) ; T O G N O L O ; MAHONEY ( 1 9 6 8 ) 2 7 0 , ( 1 9 7 6 ) 1 5 2 , ( 1 9 8 2 ) 6 0 5 , 6 1 4 , 6 2 2 ; NARDI;

POPPI;

FOTINIS

335-337;

KOVACH

50-52;

CRAEMER-RUEGENBERG

186-187.

(4) Renaissance. CRANZ ( 1 9 5 8 ) ,

(1960),

( 1 9 7 1 ) ; KRISTELLER; RANDALL; T O G N O L O ;

N A R D I ; M O V Í A 2 8 - 3 0 ; LAWN; F O T I N I S

XV.

MAHONEY;

158-159.

Naturalism or mysticism?

ZELLER and MORAUX (1942) emphasized the naturalistic tendencies in Alexander's thought, calling attention to his doctrine of universale 224 , his derivation of the soul from the bodily elements 2 2 5 , his denial of personal immortality 2 2 6 , and the mechanistic nature of his doctrine of providence 2 2 7 . MERLAN, however, while conceding the naturalism of Alexander's doctrine of e n m a t t e r e d forms and of the m a t e r i a l intellect 2 2 8 , stressed his belief in a class of transcendent intelligibles 229 and the apprehension of the divine intellect by our human intellects — which he interprets, against MORAUX230, in terms of mystical experience, connecting the statement that our intellects become 'like' the divine intellect with the Platonic όμοίωσις θεφ 2 3 1 . And MERLAN thus sees Alexander as reviving

224 225 226 227

Above, section VIII. Above, section I X . Above, section X , nn. 1 1 2 - 1 1 7 . ZELLER 8 2 5 - 8 2 7 , 830; cf. MERLAN (1967) 122f. η. Above, η. 174. RAVAISSON similarly stressed materialistic elements in Alexander's thought, seeing him as only partly returning to an authentic Aristotelian position from the Stoicinfluenced materialism of the intervening period (294—319, especially 317f.).

MERLAN (1967) 122. Above, n. 118. 230 MORAUX (1942) argued that the relation of god to man in Alexander's theory is mechanistic, the Active Intellect only being introduced to accord with Aristotle's text (178f., cf. 176). H e then dismissed de anima 9 1 . 5 f . (above, n. 146), the only apparently mystical passage, as a gloss absent from the Hebrew translation; but he appears to accept its authenticity at (1978) 301 and n. 87. 228

229

231

de anima 9 0 . 1 6 - 1 8 ; Plato, Theaetetus 176b. MERLAN (1963) 16, 3 5 f f „ cf. (1967) 122f. A more explicit mystical emphasis has been detected in [Alexander], in metaph. Λ ; cf.

ALEXANDER OF

APHRODISIAS

1225

elements in Aristotle's own thought which had been obscured in the intervening period 2 3 2 . DONINI argues that Alexander's naturalism is not scientific or empirical in

the way that Aristotle's is 2 3 3 ; physics for him is subordinate to metaphysics 2 3 4 . In so far as the latter statement rests on emphasizing the doctrine of transcendent intelligibles in Alexander, it m a y be overstated 2 3 5 . DONINI is however surely right to reject MERLAN'S mystical interpretation of our apprehension of the

active intellect 236 . Alexander's statements here, like those concerning the transcendent intelligibles, seem to reflect above all a reaction to the l o g i c a l requirements and possibilities of the problem or the text with which he is immediately concerned 2 3 7 and there is a danger of seeing implications and drawing connections which were not consciously intended. Conversely, while Alexander's doctrine of the human soul certainly has materialistic implications 2 3 8 , and while he seems at o n e p o i n t to deny the reality of universale even in re 2 3 9 , other texts suggest that his position is very far from being a nominalist one 2 4 0 . In the course of his elucidations of what he everywhere presents as the Aristotelian view, Alexander advances many novel doctrines, some of which had great historical influence; but it is not always clear when a particular text reflects a central theme in his own thought, and when it is simply the incidental product of an attempt to elucidate a particular aspect of Aristotle's writings.

696.35f., 714.15-34; FREUDENTHAL 22, MERLAN (1963) 3 5 - 3 7 , (1970,1) 118, but, contra, MORAUX (1942) 103 f. 232

MERLAN (1963) 3 0 - 3 5 , (1967) 123; LLOYD (1967); MOVÍA 70F.; DONINI (1974) 2 3 - 2 5 ,

5 5 - 5 9 . Above, η. 227. MERLAN (1967) 119 cites in this connection Alexander's doctrine of the motion of the heavenly spheres; cf. above, n. 151. 233

DONINI (1971) 9 4 f . ; cf. ZORZETTI.

234

DONINI (1974) 5 5 - 5 9 , cf. (1971) 94 - 96. Above, section X , nn. 118-130. DONINI (1974) 36f., arguing that όμοιοϋσθαι (de anima 90.17, above η. 231) is only Alexander's normal language for expressing the Peripatetic theory both of perception (cf. de anima 39.1, 12) and of intelligence, and that the tone of de anima 91.5f. (above, nn. 146, 230) is less religious than that of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10. (It may be noted, though, that Alexander in the 'de Providentia' describes contemplation of G o d as the highest good and as setting man apart from the animals; 99. l l f f . RULAND [1976], cf. fr. 4 GRANT.) THILLET (1981) 17 and n. 44, too, argues that 'mysticism' is not an appropriate term in connection with Alexander's theory of intellect; cf. also ibid. 24. Cf. also DONINI (1982) 2 3 8 - 2 4 1 .

235 236

237

238

239 240

Above, section X . MERLAN (1963) 71 f. comments on the 'Platonic' tone remarked in the 'de Providentia' by THILLET (1960) 316f., 322 (who suggested it might be due to the translators); but similar considerations may apply here too — as indeed they may in some of the passages with a 'naturalistic' tendency; cf. nn. 233, 239. Above, section IX. (The term 'materialistic', however, is rejected by THILLET [1981] 24; see n. 81 above.) de anima 9 0 . 2 - 1 1 ; above, η. 58. Above, section VIII, and cf. DONINI (1982) 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 .

1226

R. W. S H A R P L E S

XVI.

Bibliography

(Reviews have been cited selectively, only those that appear particularly important and relevant to Alexander being listed under the author of the work reviewed [not under the reviewer]). P . ACCATTINO HUSÂM MUHÎ

ELDÎN

Alessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di Mitilene, Elenchos 6 (1985) 67-74. The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought, Baghdad 1968.

AL-ALOUSI D . AMAND (E. AMAND DE M E N D I E T A ) J . ANNAS O.

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Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque, Louvain 1945 (Univ. de Louvain, Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie, 3.19); reprinted Amsterdam 1973. Forms and first principles, Phronesis 19 (1974) 257—283. Die Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die Mischung, Philologus 45 (1886) 8 2 - 9 9 . Die kleinen Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Rhein.Mus. 49 (1894) 5 9 - 7 1 . Kritische Bemerkungen, Jena 1906 (Jahresbericht des Gymnasiums Carolo-Alexandrinum). The background of the doctrine "that the intelligibles are not outside the intellect", in: Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt, 5), Geneva 1960, 3 9 1 - 4 2 5 ; reprinted in: A. (H.) ARMSTRONG, Plotinian and Christian Studies, London 1979. Textkritik zum Alexander von Aphrodisias, Wiener Studien 22 (1900) 1-10. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (SVF), Leipzig 1903—1905; vol. IV, index, by M. ADLER, Leipzig 1924. Das Argument τρίτος άνθρωπος. Hermes 76 (1941) 171—207. The Interpretation of Anaxagoras' doctrine of νους by Plato, Aristotle, and the later commentators on Aristotle, Ph.D. Diss., University of Nottingham 1969, 2 8 9 - 3 2 1 . Alexander of Aphrodisias on Vision in the Atomists, Classical Q u a r terly 30 (1980) 4 2 9 - 4 5 4 . Aristü 'inda l-'Arab (Diräsät islämlya, 5), Cairo 1947. La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe. Paris 1968 (Etudes de philosophie médiévale, 56). Commentaires sur Aristote perdus en grec et autres épîtres, Beirut 1971 (Dar el-Machreq, [Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institut de Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, n.s. A. Langue arabe et pensée islamique, t. 1] 18). Reviewed in: ZIMMERMANN—BROWN, q.v.; G . VAJDA, A r a b i c a 21 (1974) 2 1 9 - 2 0 .

M . BALTES

Histoire de la philosophie en Islam, Paris 1972 (Etudes de philosophie médiévale, 60). N e w philosophical texts lost in Greek and preserved in Islamic translations, in: Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. P. MOREWEDGE, Albany, N . Y . 1979. Die Weltentstehung des Platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, I, Leiden 1976 (Philosophia Antiqua, 30), 70—81.

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Die Zuordnung der Elemente zu den Sinnen bei Poseidonios und ihre Herkunft aus der Alten Akademie, Philologus 122 (1978) 183-196. Terms and sentences, Proc. British Acad. 69 (1983) 279-326. Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic, in: Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet, ed. J. WIESNER, Berlin 1985, 1. 557-576.

Β . C . BA2ÁN F . BECCHI O . BECKER E . BERTI J . BERTIER R . BEUTLER Η . J . BLUMENTHAL Η . BONITZ E.BOOTH Ν . - I . BOUSSOULAS

L'authenticité du 'de intellectu' attribué à Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Revue philosophique de Louvain 71 (1973) 468-487. Aspasio e i peripatetici posteriori, la formula definitiva della passione, Prometheus 9 (1983) 83-104. Formallogisches und Mathematisches in griechischen philosophischen Texten, Philologus 100 (1956) 108-112. art. 'Alessandro di Afrodisia' in: Enciclopedia filosofica l 2 , Florence 1967, 171 f. Une hénadologie liée au stoïcisme tardif, in: J. BRUNSCHWIG (ed.), Les stoïciens et leur logique, Paris 1978, 41 — 57. art. Torphyrios (21)', RE 22.1 (1953), 284. Plotinus Ennead IV. 3.20—21 and its sources — Alexander, Aristotle and others, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1968) 254-261. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis commentarius in libros Metaphysicos Aristotelis, Berlin 1847. The Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology (Cambridge 1984). Notes sur la pensée antique; II, Études faites au centre de recherches sur la pensée antique à la Sorbonne, 1952—1956, (no. 4 ) , Le traité du destin d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, ' Α Ν Α Λ Ε Κ Τ Α ([ετησία] έκδόσις τοϋ 'Ινστιτούτου των 'Ανατολικών σπουδών της πατριαρχικής βιβ λ ι ο θ ή κ η ς Α λ ε ξ α ν δ ρ ε ί α ς ) , e d . T . D . MOSCHONAS, 9 (1960) 2 0 0 -

211; = ID., Μελέτες π ά ν ω στην άρχαία φιλοσοφία, XIII, ή πραγματεία Περί ειμαρμένης τοϋ 'Αλεξάνδρου τοϋ Άφροδισιέως, Ε Π Ι ΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΗ ΈΠΕΤΗΡΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗΣ ΣΧΟΛΗΣ ΤΟΥ ' Α Ρ Ι Σ Τ Ο Τ Ε Λ Ε Ι Ο Υ Π Α Ν Ε Π Ι Σ Τ Η Μ Ι Ο Υ Θ Ε Σ Σ Α Λ Ο Ν Ι Κ Η Σ 12 (1963) 2 9 0 - 2 9 9 .

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E . BRÉHIER Α . BRINKMANN Η . V . Β . BROWN

I . BRUNS

Recherches philosophiques; II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, traité du destin et de ce qui dépend de nous, ' Α Ν Α Λ Ε Κ Τ Α (cf. previous item), 10 (1961) 8 0 - 1 3 5 and 144. La métaphysique d'Aristote chez les latins du 13e siècle, Revue du moyen âge latin 8 (1948) 279-281. Über die Reihenfolge der Bücher des aristotelischen Organons und ihre griechischen Ausleger, Abh. der königlichen Akademie der Wiss. zu Berlin, 1833, phil.-hist. Kl., 249 - 2 9 9 . Scholia in Aristotelem (in I. BEKKER etc., eds., Aristotelis Opera, vol. IV), Berlin 1836. (ed.) Plotin: Ennéades (7 vols.), Paris (Budé) 1924-1938. Ein Schreibgebrauch und seine Bedeutung für die Textkritik, Rhein. Mus. 51 (1902) 488-491. Avicenna and the Christian philosophers in Baghdad, in: Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays presented to Richard Walzer, ed. S. M. STERN etc., Oxford (Cassirer) 1972 (Oriental Studies, 5) 3 5 - 4 8 . Un chapitre d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur l'âme, Mélanges Graux, Paris 1884, 567-572. (ed.) Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1, Berlin 1887.

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-

(1890,1) (1890,2) (1892,1)

-

(1892,2)

J. C .

BÜRGEL

U. C.

BUSSEMAKER

W.

CAPELLE

Β.

CARRIÈRE, J.

DESAULTES,

J.

OUELLETTE,

J.

TuRGEON

W.

CHARLTON

I . CHEVALIER

P . COURCELLE V . C . COÛTANT

Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias — I, Der Begriff des Möglichen und die Stoa, Rhein.Mus. 44 (1889) 613-630. Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias — II, Quaestiones II. 3, Rhein. Mus. 45 (1890) 138-145. Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias — III, Lehre von der Vorsehung, Rhein.Mus. 45 (1890) 223-235. De Dione Chrysostomo et Aristotele critica et exegetica, Kiel, 1892. Reviewed by Κ. PRAECHTER, Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift 14 (1894) 714f. (ed.) Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.2, Berlin 1892. Interpretationes variae, Kiel 1893. Averroes 'Contra Galenum', Nachr. der Akademie der Wiss. in Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl., 1967, 263-340. (ed.) Aristoteles, Opera Omnia, vol. IV. 1, Paris (Didot) 1857. Die Alexandercitate bei Olympiodor, in: Charités: Festschrift F. Leo, Berlin 1911, 220-248. Le περί νοΰ attribué à Alexandre d'Aphrodise: introduction, traduction, et notes. Diss. Montréal 1961 (Faculté de théologie et philosophie, L'Immaculée Conception, Montréal). Aristotle and the Harmonía theory, in: Aristotle on Nature and Living Things. Philosophical and Historical Studies presented to D. M. Balme, ed. A. G O T T H E L F , Pittsburgh, PA, 1 9 8 6 , 1 3 1 - 1 5 0 . Le relatif « selon l'être » chez quelques témoins de la renaissance hellénistique, Divus Thomas (= Jahrb. für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie, 3 . sér., Fribourg-en-Suisse) 16 ( 1 9 3 8 ) 6 7 — 8 4 . Les lettres grecques en occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore, Paris 1943. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Book IV of Aristotle's Meteorologica, diss. Columbia University, N e w York, N . Y . 1936. C f . review b y B. EINARSON, Classical W e e k l y 31 (1937) 33.

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KOVACH (q.v.), A l b e r t the G r e a t , 4 9 - 6 2 .

BERG F . E . CRANZ

O.

CUNTZ

H . A.

DAVIDSON

J . CHRISTENSEN DE

GROOT Κ.

The priority of soul as form and its proximity to the first mover, in:

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The Prefaces to the Greek editions and Latin translations of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1450 to 1575, Proc. American Philosophical Society 102 (1958) 510-546. art. 'Alexander of Aphrodisias' in: Catalogue Translationum et Commentariorum, ed. P. O . KRISTELLER, vol. I (Washington, D . C . , 1960), 77-135. Addenda et Corrigenda, in: KRISTELLER op. cit. vol. II (Washington, D . C . , 1971), 411-422. Q . Aelius Tubero, der Schiiler des Panaetius, als Verfasser eines astronomisch-meteorologischen Werkes, in: Σ Τ Ρ Ω Μ Α Τ Ε Ι Σ . Grazer Festgabe zur 50. Versammlung Deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner, Graz 1909, 4 9 - 5 7 . Aristotle and Avicenna on the Active Intellect, Viator 3 (1972) 109— 178. Philoponus on De anima 2.5, Physics 3.3, and the Propagation of Light, Phronesis 28 (1983) 177-196. Galen als Erforscher des menschlichen Pulses, Sitz.ber. der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Kl. f. Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, 1956, no. 3.

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J . DEN B O E F T Β.

DESCAMPS

H.

DIELS

A.

DIETRICH

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DIHLE

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DOD

B. DODGE Κ.

DOERING

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Calcidius on Fate; his doctrine and sources, Leiden, 1970. (Philosophia Antiqua, 18). (Mémoire inédit sur le 'De Fato ad Imperatores' d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, déposé à l'université de Bruxelles: cf. M. BASTAIT'S, Scriptorium 73 [1979] 133). Die Handschriften der antiken Ärzte, II, Abh. der königl. preuß. Akademie der Wiss. Berlin, 1906, phil.-hist. Kl. no. 1, pp. 9f. Die arabische Version einer unbekannten Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die Differentia specifica, Nachr. der Akademie der Wiss. in Göttingen, 1964, phil.-hist. Kl., 8 5 - 1 4 8 . Die Probleme der Entscheidungsfreiheit in frühchristlicher Zeit, in: F . VON L I L I E N F E L D and E. M Ü H L E N B E R G (eds.), Gnadenwahl und Entscheidungsfreiheit in der Theologie der alten Kirche, Erlangen 1980 (Oikonomia, vol. 9). Aristoteles Latinus, in: K R E T Z M A N N (q.v.) 4 5 - 7 9 . (ed.) The Fihrist of Al-Nadîm, N e w York and London, 1970. Uber den Sophisten Polyxenos, Hermes 100 (1942) 29—42. Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandria, Hermes 79 (1944) 2 5 - 3 9 . Il 'De Anima' di Alessandro di Afrodisia e Michele Efesio, Riv. di Filologia e di istruzione classica 96 (1968) 316—323. Note al Περί ειμαρμένης di Alessandro di Afrodisia, ibid. 97 (1969) 298-313. L'anima e gli elementi nel 'De Anima' di Alessandro di Afrodisia, Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 1 0 5 ( 1 9 7 1 ) 6 1 - 1 0 7 . Cf. Z O R Z E T T I . Crisippo e la nozione del possibile, Riv. di filologia e di istruzione classica 101 ( 1 9 7 3 ) 3 3 3 - 3 5 1 .

Tre studi sull'Aristotelismo nel II secolo d . C . , Turin 1974 (Histórica, Politica, Philosophica, 7). Cf. reviews by H . J. B L U M E N T H A L , Journ. of Hellenic Studies 97 (1977) 195f., and by P. M O R A U X , Gnomon 50 (1978) 532-536. Stoici e megarici nel de fato di Alessandro di Afrodisia?, in: Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica, ed. G. GIANNANTONI, Bologna 1977 (Pubbl. del Centro di studio per la storia della storiografia filosofica, 4) 174-194. Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco à Plotino, Turin 1982 (Alexander discussed at 220-248). S . EBBESEN

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(1973,1) (1973,2)

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(1982)

81

ANRW II 36.2

Anon. Bodleiani in 'Sophisticos Elenchos' Aristotelis Commentarii fragmentum, Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin, Copenhagen, 8 (1972) 3 - 3 2 . Ό Ψελλός καί oí Σοφιστικοί Έ λ ε γ χ ο ι , Byzantina 5 (1973) 429 —444. Paris 4720a, a twelfth-century compendium of Aristotle's 'Sophistici Elenchi', Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin, Copenhagen, 10 (1973) 1 - 2 0 . Anonymus Aurelianensis II, Aristotle, Alexander, Porphyry and Boethius; Ancient Scholasticism and twelfth-century Western Europe, ibid. 16 (1976) 1 - 1 2 8 . Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, Leiden 1981 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 7.1—3). Ancient scholastic logic as the source of medieval scholastic logic, in: K R E T Z M A N N (q.v.) 101-127.

1230 A. ELFES

G. ENDRESS

J . A. FABRICIUS M. FAKHRY A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE G. FINE —

R. W. SHARPLES Aristotelis doctrina de mente humana ex commentariorum graecorum sententiis eruta: I. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis et Joannis Grammatici Philoponi commentationes, diss. Bonn 1887. Die arabischen Ubersetzungen von Aristoteles' Schrift De Caelo, diss. Frankfurt am Main, 1966. Proclus Arabus, Beirut—Wiesbaden 1972 (Beiruter Texte und Studien, 10).

Bibliotheca Graeca, 3rd ed., pt. IV ch. 25, vol. 4 pp. 65—88 (Hamburg 1723). A History of Islamic Philosophy, New York 1970. L'idéal religieux des Grecs et l'évangile, Paris 1932. The One over Many, Philosophical Review 89 (1980) 1 9 7 - 2 4 0 . Aristotle and the more accurate arguments, in: Language and Logos: Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen, e d s . M . SCHOFIELD a n d M . C . NUSSBAUM, C a m b r i d g e 1 9 8 2 , 1 5 5 — 1 7 7 .

J . FINNEGAN

Texte arabe du 'Peri Nou' d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph (Beirut) 33 (1956) 157-202. Al-Farabi et le 'Peri Nou' d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, in: Mélanges L. — Massignon, Institut français de Damas, Damas 1957, 133—152. A. FITZGERALD (tr.) Alexander of Aphrodisias On Destiny, London 1931. Cf. review by G. CATAUDELLA, Athenaeum 10 (1932) 211. H. FLASHAR (1962,1) Aristoteles: Problemata Physika, Berlin 1962 (Aristoteles Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung, ed. E. GRUMACH, vol. 19), 3 5 9 - 3 6 7 . — (1962,2) Beiträge zur spätantiken Hippokratesdeutung, Hermes 90 (1962) 402— 418. G. L. FONSEGRIVE Le Libre Arbitre, Paris 1887, 2 1896; references to first edition. Pt. I ch. 6 pp. 70—80, which includes discussion of Alexander's 'De Fato', is largely identical to FONSEGRIVE'S Les traités 'de fato', Annales de la faculté des lettres de Bourdeaux, n.s. 2, 7me année (1885) 311—320. W. W. FORTENBAUGH Theophrastus on Fate and Character, in: Arktouros: Hellenic Studies (1979) presented to Bernard W. M. Knox, Berlin 1979, 3 7 2 - 3 7 5 . — Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts, Amsterdam 1984 (Studien zur antiken Philosophie, 12). A. P. FOTINIS The 'De Anima' of Alexander of Aphrodisias: a translation and commentary, Washington, D . C . 1980. - With pp. 3 2 0 - 3 3 1 cf. ID., Alexander on Aristotle's notion of the intellect as agent, in: Proceedings of the World Congress on Aristotle, Thessaloniki August 7—14, 1978, Athens 1981, 160-167. D. FREDE Aristoteles und die „Seeschlacht", Göttingen 1970 (Hypomnemata, — — J. FREUDENTHAL

Κ. VON FRITZ

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Logic and omniscience: Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985) 2 1 9 - 2 4 6 . Opuscula: the Latin Aristotle, Amsterdam 1972 ( 2 4 1 - 2 4 9 = Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 46 [1954] 2 2 3 - 2 3 1 , and 4 4 2 - 4 4 8 = ibid. 54 [1962] 1 3 1 - 1 3 7 ) . Per un'edizione del Περί κράσεως di Alessandro di Afrodisia, Atti e memorie dell'Accademia toscana di scienze e lettere La Colombaria, Florence, 36 (1971) 1 7 - 5 8 . Il primo capitolo del Περί κράσεως di Alessandro di Afrodisia, Prometheus 7 (1981) 6 9 - 7 2 . Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote, Liège and Paris 1942 (Bibliothèque de la faculté de phiosophie et lettres de l'université de Liège, 99). L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce, Revue philosophique de Louvain 47 (1949) 5—43. Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'De Cáelo' d'Aristote, Hermes 82 (1954) 1 4 5 - 1 8 2 . Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3, Hermes 95 (1967) 1 5 9 - 1 6 9 . Aristoteles, der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967) 1 6 9 - 1 8 2 . Einige Aspekte des Aristotelismus von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, in: Antiquitas Graeco-Romana et tempora nostra, eds. J . BURIAN and L. VIDMAN, Prague 1968 (Acta congressus internationalis habiti Brunae, 12 — 16 April 1966). Eine Korrektur des Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, in: Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben: Festschrift für Franz Altheim zum 6. 10. 1968, Berlin 1969, 1 . 4 9 2 - 5 0 4 . D'Aristote à Bessarion: trois études sur l'histoire et la transmission de l'aristotélisme grec, Laval, Quebec, 1970. Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. I: Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v.Chr., Berlin 1973 (Peripatoi, 5). Review by L. TARAN, Gnomon 53, 1981,

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R . A . PACK F . PASSOW F . E . PETERS ( 1 9 6 8 , 1 )

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R . PHILIPPSON S. PINÈS

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(1955,2)

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Uber Galens Werk vom Wissenschaftlichen Beweis, Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-philol. Kl. 20.2 (1897) 4 0 3 - 4 7 8 . Stoic and Peripatetic Logic, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51 (1969) 173-187. (ed.) Divisiones Aristoteleae, Leipzig (Teubner) 1906, xxivf. arts. 'Alessandrismo', Enciclopedia Cattolica (Vatican City, 1968) 1. 778f., and 'Alessandro di Afrodisia', ibid. 1.780f. De voluntarii notione Platonica et Aristotelica, Wiesbaden 1967 (Klass. Philol. Stud., 34). 'Abd al-Latïf al-Bagdädl's Bearbeitung von Buch Lambda der aristotelischen Metaphysik, Wiesbaden 1976. Aristotle's philosopher-God, Phronesis 14 (1969) 6 3 - 7 4 (reprinted in: J . BARNES etc., Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, London 1979). De la liberté et du hasard: essai sur Alexandre d'Aphrodise suivi du Traité du Destin, etc., Paris 1870. Galen in the eyes of his contemporaries, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 58 (1984) 3 1 8 - 3 2 4 . (ed.) Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de fato quae supersunt, etc., Zurich 1824. A proof in the Περί ιδεών, Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957) 103-111; reprinted in: R. E. ALLEN, ed., Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London 1965, 293—312, and in: G . E. L. OWEN, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy, London 1986, 165-179. A passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias relating to the study of tragedy, American Journal of Philology 58 (1937) 4 1 8 - 4 3 6 . (ed.) Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de febribus libellus, Bratislava 1822. Aristoteles Arabus: the Oriental translations and commentaries of the Aristotelian corpus, Leiden 1968. Aristotle and the Arabs, New York 1968 (New York University Studies in Near Eastern Civilisation, 1). Das „Erste Naturgemäße", Philologus 87 (1932) 4 4 7 - 4 6 6 . Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre, Berlin 1936. A tenth century pilosophical correspondence, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 24 (1955) 103 — 136; reprinted in: A. HYMAN, ed., Essays in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy, New York 1977, 3 5 7 - 3 9 0 . Un fragment inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe, Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres (1955) 387—395. U n texte inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge 31 (1956) 5—43 = PINÈS (1986) 157-195. Addenda et corrigenda to the preceding item, ibid. 34 (1959) 2 9 5 299 = PINÈS (1986) 196-200. A new fragment of Xenocrates and its implications, Transactions of the A m e r i c a n P h i l o s o p h i c a l Society 51 (1961) n o . 2 = PINÈS (1986) 3 - 9 5 ; reviewed b y H . RAHN, O r i e n s 16 (1963) 3 0 1 - 3 0 6 .

Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri: a refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the theory of motion, Isis 52 (1961) 2 1 - 5 4 = PINÈS (1986) 2 1 8 - 2 5 1 .

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J . H. RANDALL F. RAVAISSON N . RESCHER and M. MARMURA

F. REX J. M. RIST — G. ROCHEFORT G. RODIER — V. ROSE — A. ROSELLI F. ROSENTHAL

—

W. D . Ross —

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(tr.) The Guide of the Perplexed (by) Moses Maimonides, Chicago 1963. Studies in Arabic versions of Greek texts and in medieval science (The collected works of S. PINES, vol. 2), Jerusalem—Leiden 1986. Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, Göttingen, 1948 — 1949; Italian revised translation, La Stoa: storia di un movimento spirituale, V. E. ALFIERI etc., Florence 1967 (Il pensiero filosofico, 3.1—2). Saggi sul pensiero inedito di P. Pomponazzi, Padua 1970. Pròba rekonstrukcji pierwszej ksiçgi traktatu Arystotelesa Ό Ideach', Eos 68 (1980) 7 7 - 9 4 . Review of C A G 22.2 (Michael of Ephesus in de part, an., etc.), Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 168 (1906) 861-907. Review of C A G , Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909) 516-538, repr. in: ID., Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim-New York 1973, 282 - 304. art. Tauros 1 , RE 2. Reihe 5.1 (1934) 5 8 - 6 8 . Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Leipzig 1927, I. 620—626. Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus on the Motion and Progression of Animals, Hildesheim 1981 (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 22). Aristotle and the Stoics on intention and impulse, Apeiron 15 (1981) 48-58. The School of Padua and the emergence of modern science, Padua 1961. Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote, Paris 1837—1846. Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Refutation of Galen's treatise of the theory of motion, Islamabad (Islamic Research Institute), 1969. Reviews by H . V. B. BROWN, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1972) 152-154; J . VAN ESS, Erasmus 24 (1972) 580-583. Chrysipps Mischungslehre und die an ihr geübte Kritik in Alexanders von Aphrodisias De mixtione, diss. Frankfurt am Main, 1966. The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus, Class. Quart, n.s. 12 (1962) 99-107. On tracking Alexander of Aphrodisias, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1966) 82-90. Une anthologie grecque du l i e siècle, le Parisinus Suppl. Gr. 690, Scriptorium 4 (1950) 3 - 1 7 . Corrections au texte du Περί μίξεως d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, Revue de Philologie 17 (1893) 10-13. Conjectures sur le texte du 'De Fato' d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, ibid. 25 (1901) 6 6 - 7 1 . De Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate, Berlin 1854. Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, Leipzig 1863. Ps.-Aristotele Problemata Inedita 2.153 in P.Oxy 2744, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 33 (1979) 9—12. From Arabie Books and Manuscripts V: a one-volume library of Arabic philosophical and scientific titles in Istanbul, Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955) 14-23. Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam, Zurich 1965; English trans, by E. and J. MARMORSTEIN, The Classical Heritage in Islam, London 1975. Aristotle: Metaphysics, Oxford 1924. Aristotle: De Anima, Oxford 1961.

1238

R.

C. J . ROWE C . - E . RUELLE — — H.-J. RULAND

—

— —

S. SAMBURSKY D. G.

SCHINAS

E. G.

SCHMIDT

F. M.

SCHROEDER

J. G.

SCHULTHESS

H. R.

SCHWYZER

F . SEZGIN R. W .

-

SHARPLES

(1975,1) (1975,2)

(1978.1) (1978.2) (1979.1) (1979.2)

(1980)

(1982,1)

W.

SHARPLES

The proof from relatives in the 'Peri Ideön': further reconsideration, Phronesis 24 (1979) 2 7 0 - 2 8 1 . Sur un 4me MS grec exécuté par le copiste du Platon de Paris no. 1807, Revue des Études grecques 1 (1888) 326f. Alexandre d'Aphrodise et le prétendu Alexandre d'Alexandrie, ibid. 5 (1892) 1 0 3 - 1 0 7 . Sept codices vetustissimi, ibid. 12 (1899) 38f. Die arabischen Fassungen zweier Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias: Uber die Vorsehung und über das liberum arbitrium, diss. Saarbrücken 1976. Die arabische Ubersetzung der Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die Sinneswahrnehmung, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, phil.-hist. KL, 1978, no. 5. Zwei arabische Fassungen der Abhandlung des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die universalia, ibid. 1979, no. 10. Die arabische Ubersetzung der Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über das Wachstum (Quaestio 1.5), ibid. 1981, no. 2. Physics of the Stoics, London 1959. The Physical World of Late Antiquity, London 1962. ed. of ps.-Alexander of Aphrodisias 'De febribus', Museum Criticum Cantabrigiense 2.7 (1821) 359ff. Alexander von Aphrodisias in einem altarmenischen KategorienKommentar, Philologus 110 (1966) 2 7 7 - 2 8 6 . The analogy of the active intellect to light in the De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Hermes 109 (1981) 2 1 5 - 2 2 5 . The potential or material intellect and the authorship of the De Intellectu: a reply to B. C. Bazán, Symbolae Osloenses 57 (1982) 115-125. Light and the active intellect in Alexander and Plotinus, Hermes 112 (1984) 2 3 9 - 2 4 8 . Bibliothek der griechischen Philosophie IV, Zurich 1782. art. 'Plotinos', R E 21.1 (1951), 573 f. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, vols. 1 — 8, Leiden 1967—1982. Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of necessity in the De Fato of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Phronesis 20 (1975) 2 4 7 - 2 7 4 . Responsibility, chance and not-being (Alexander of Aphrodisias mantissa 169—172), Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London) 22 (1975) 3 7 - 6 3 . (Addenda, ibid. 13 [1976] 72). Alexander of Aphrodisias, 'De Fato': some parallels, Classical Quarterly 28 (1978) 2 4 5 - 2 6 6 . Temporally qualified necessity and impossibility, Liverpool Classical Monthly 3 (1978) 8 9 - 9 1 . Dr John Fell - editor of Alexander of Aphrodisias?, ibid. 4 (1979) 9-11. " I f what is earlier, then of necessity what is later"?: some ancient discussions of Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione 2.11, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London) 26 (1979) 27—44. Alexander of Aphrodisias' second treatment of fate? (De anima libri mantissa, pp. 179—186 Bruns), Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London) 27 (1980) 7 6 - 9 4 . Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones on Possibility, I, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London) 29 (1982) 9 1 - 1 0 8 .

ALEXANDER O F APHRODISIAS -

(1982,2)

-

(1982,3)

-

(1982,4)

-

(1982,5)

-

(1983,1)

-

(1983,2)

-

(1983,3)

-

(1986)

J,

SHIEL

A . J . SMET

R.

SoRABJI

K. E.

STABILE

L . STEIN

M.

STEINSCHNEIDER

S . M . STERN G.

STROHMAIER

Alexander of Aphrodisias on divine providence: two problems, Classical Quarterly 32 (1982) 1 9 8 - 2 1 1 . An ancient dialogue on possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias, quaestio 1.4, AGPh 64 (1982) 2 3 - 3 8 . Alexander of Aphrodisias on the compounding of probabilities, Liverpool Classical Monthly 7 (1982) 7 4 - 7 5 . Alexander of Aphrodisias O n Time, Phronesis 27 (1982) 58—81. Alexander of Aphrodisias O n Fate, London 1983. Reviewed by FREDE ( 1 9 8 4 ) q . v .

Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones on Possibility, II, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London) 30 (1983) 9 9 - 1 1 0 . The Unmoved Mover and the Motion of the Heavens in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Apeiron 17 (1983) 6 2 - 6 6 . Species, Form and Inheritance: Aristotle and after, in: Aristotle on Nature and Living Things. Philosophical and Historical Studies presented to David M. Balme, ed. A. GOTTHELF, Pittsburgh, PA, 1986, 1 1 7 - 1 2 8 . Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958) 2 1 7 - 2 4 4 . Alexander van Aphrodisias en S. Thomas van Aquino. Bijdrage tot de Bronnenstudie van de Commentaar van S. Thomas op de Meteorologica van Aristoteles, Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 21 (1959) 108 — 141. (ed.) Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Commentaire sur les Météores d'Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Louvain and Paris 1968 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 4). Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's theory, London 1980. Time, Creation and the Continuum, London 1983. The origin of the problems of the medieval noetic: Aristotle or Alexander of Aphrodisias, diss. Fordham University, New York, N . Y . , 1974. Die Continuität der griechischen Philosophie in der Gedankenwelt der Araber, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 11 (1898) 3 1 1 334. Zu Alexander von Aphrodisias, Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums 14 (1887) 1 9 0 - 1 9 5 . Die arabischen Ubersetzungen aus dem Griechischen, Leipzig 1893 (Centraiblatt für Bibliothekwesen, Beiheft 12). — Reprinted, Graz 1960. A collection of treatises by 'Abd al-latïf al Bagdädi, Islamic Studies (Karachi) 1.1 (1962) 5 3 - 7 0 . art. 'al-Iskandar al-AfrüdlsF, in: Encyclopedia of Islam 2 , ed. G . VAN DONZEL etc., vol. 4, L e i d e n 1 9 7 8 ,

J. W.

SWEETMAN

B. W.

SWITALSKI

A. SzABÓ T . A . SZLEZÁK G . THÉRY

1239

129f.

Islam and Christian Theology, vol. I, London 1945. Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's 'Timaeus', Münster 1902 (Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philos, des Mittelalters, ed. C. BAEUMKER, etc., 3-6). Ein Beleg für die voreudoxische Proportionslehre?, Aristoteles, Topik Θ 3, 158b29—35, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 9 (1964) 1 5 1 - 1 7 1 . Piaton und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins, Basel-Stuttgart 1979. Autour du décret de 1210: I, David de Dinant. Étude sur son panthéisme matérialiste, and II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Aperçu sur

1240

R. W. SHARPLES

P . THILLET

(1963,1)

-

(1963,2)

C . THUROT

M . TIMPANARO CARDINI R. Β. TODD

(1973.1) -

(1973,2)

-

(1974,1) (1974.2)

-

(1976,1)

-

(1976,2)

-

(1976,3)

-

(1976,4)

(1982.1) (1982.2)

l'influence de sa noétique, Paris 1925 and 1926 (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 6 and 7). Un traité inconnu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur la providence dans une version arabe inédite, in: L'homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du moyen âge, Actes du 1er congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Louvain 1960, 313—324. Alexandre d'Aphrodise, De Fato ad imperatores, version de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Paris 1963 (Études de philosophie médiévale, 51). Reviews by P. COURCELLE, Revue des Études anciennes 65 (1963) 471 f.; J. MONFIN, Revue des Études latines 41 (1963) 546. Les MSS grecs d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs, Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé (1963) 351—355. Insertions d'onciales et abbréviations dans le cod. Ven. Marc. gr. 258 (668), Miscellanea Marciana di Studi Bessarionei (Medioevo e Umanesimo 24), Padua 1976, 387-406. Matérialisme et théorie de l'âme et de l'intellect chez Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger 106 (1981) 5 - 2 4 . Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Traité du Destin, Paris, Budé, 1984. Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, Commentaire sur le traité d'Aristote 'De Sensu et Sensibili', édité avec la vieille translation latine, Notices et extraits des MSS de la Bibliothèque Nationale 25 (1875) no. 2. Una dottrina pitagorica nella testimonianza aristotelica, Physis 3 (1961) 105-112. Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Alexandrian Quaestiones 2.12, Philologus 116 (1972) 293-305. Alexander of Aphrodisias De mixtione 11.226.13: an emendation, Hermes 101 (1973) 278 - 282. The Stoic Common Notions: a reexamination and reinterpretation, Symbolae Osloenses 48 (1973) 4 7 - 7 5 . Lexical notes on Alexander of Aphrodisias' philosophical terminology, Glotta 52 (1974) 207-215. Συνέντασις and the Stoic theory of perception, Grazer Beiträge 2 (1974) 251-261. Alexander of Aphrodisias on De interpretatione 16 a 26—29, Hermes 104 (1976) 140-146. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, Leiden 1976 (Philosophia Antiqua, 28). Reviews by F. H . SANDBACH, Classical Review 28 (1978) 362f.; R. W. SHARPLES, Phoenix 31 (1977) 8 6 - 9 0 ; M. BASTAIT'S, Scriptorium 73 (1979) 133f.; E. MONTANARI, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, ci. di lettere e filos., 3. ser. 10 (1980) 1438-1449; P. MORAUX, Gnomon 53 (1981) 641-646; J. MANSFELD, Mnemosyne ser. 4, 35 (1982) 388-392. The four causes: Aristotle's exposition and the ancients, Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976) 319-322. Two displaced passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias' 'De Anima', Eranos 74 (1976) 2 8 - 3 1 . Galenic medical ideas in the Greek Aristotelian commentators, Symbolae Osloenses 52 (1977) 117-134. Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima 76.16: Michael of Ephesus' text defended, Liverpool Classical Monthly 7 (1982) 4 8 - 4 9 . Infinite Body and Infinite Void. Epicurean Physics and Peripatetic Polemic, ibid. 8 2 - 8 4 .

A L E X A N D E R O F APHRODISIAS

A . TOGNOLO F . TRABUCCO M . M . TWEEDALE

F. UEBERWEG— K. PRAECHTER H. UsENER —

E. VALGIGLIO J. VAN Ess —

1241

Alexander of Aphrodisias and the case for the infinite universe, Eranos 82 (1984) 185-194. art. 'Alessandrismo', Enciclopedia filosofica l 2 , Florence 1967, 167— 171. Il problema del 'De philosophia' di Aristocle di Messene e la sua dottrina, Acme 11 (1958) 97-150, especially 117-126. Alexander of Aphrodisias' views on universale, Phronesis 29 (1984) 279-303. Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, I. Die Philosophie des Altertums, Berlin 1926, 564f. and supplement p. 179*. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis quae feruntur Problematorum libri 3 et 4, Berlin 1859. Epicurea, Leipzig 1887. Review of C A G , Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 26 (1892) 10011022 = USENER'S Kleine Schriften, III, Leipzig 1914, 193-214. II fato nel pensiero classico antico, Rivista di studi classici 15 (1967) 305-330 and 16 (1968) 5 6 - 8 4 , especially 309-319. Ober einige neue Fragmente des Alexander von Aphrodisias und des Proklos in arabischer Ubersetzung, Der Islam 42 (1966) 148 — 168. Appendix to KRÄMER (1973), Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 55 (1973) 1 8 8 - 1 9 0 .

G. VERBERE G. VITELLI — G. VOLAIT

M. WALLIES —

(1891,1)

—

(1891,2)

—

Aristotélisme et stoïcisme dans le 'De fato1 d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 50 (1968) 73-100. Frammenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia nel cod. Riccard. 63, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 2 (1895) 379-381. Due frammenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia, in: Festschrift Theodor Gomperz, Vienna 1902, 9 0 - 9 3 . Die Stellung des Alexander von Aphrodisias zur Aristotelischen Schlußlehre, diss. Bonn, 1907. Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium ( C A G 2.1), Berlin 1883. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentarla ( C A G 2.2), Berlin 1891. Die griechischen Ausleger der aristotelischen Topik, Progr. Berlin, 1891.

—

Alexandri quod fertur in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos commentarium (CAG 2.3), Berlin 1898. Zur doppelten Rezension des 7. Buches der aristotelischen Physik,

—

Zur Textgeschichte der 'ersten Analytik', Rhein. Mus. 72 (1917) 626 —

R. T. WALLIS R. WALZER

Neoplatonism, London 1972. Galen on Jews and Christians, London 1949 (Oxford Classical and Philosophical monographs). Greek into Arabic, Oxford (Cassirer) 1962 (Oriental Studies, 1). (60—113 = WALZER, New light on the Arabic translations of Aristotle,

R h e i n . M u s . 70 (1915) 1 4 7 - 1 4 9 . 633.

—

O r i e n s 6 [1953] 91 f f . ; 1 1 4 - 1 2 8 = WALZER, O n the A r a b i c versions

of books Α, α and Λ of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Harvard Studies in Classical P h i l o l o g y 63 [1958] 2 1 7 - 2 3 1 ; 2 0 6 - 2 1 9 =

Al-Fârâbî's

1242

A.

WARTELLE

J. H . H.

R.

WASZINK

WEGEHAUPT

P . W E N D LAND

J. G . M.

L.

WENRICH WEST

J.

WESTENBERGER

J.

WIESNER

P.

WILPERT

H.

A.

K.

WURM

J.

WOLFSON

ZAHLFLEISCH

—

—

E.

ZELLER

W.

SHARPLES

theory of prophecy and divination, Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 [1957] 142-148). Aristotle's active intellect (νους ποιητικός) in Greek and early Islamic philosophy, in: Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente, Rome 1974, 423—436 (Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di se. e di cultura, quaderno no. 198). Inventaire des MSS grecs d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs, Paris 1963. Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus (Plato Latinus IV), London—Leiden 1962. Zur Überlieferung der Problemata des sogenannten Alexanders von Aphrodisias, Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift 35 (1915) 95f. Zur Überlieferung der pseudo-Aristotelischen προβλήματα άνέκδοτα, Philologus 75 (1918) 469-473. (ed.) Alexandri in Aristotelis librum De Sensu commentarium (CAG 3.1), Berlin 1901. Michaelis Ephesii in Parva Naturalia commentarla (CAG 22.1), Berlin 1903. De auetorum Graecorum versionibus et commentariis Syriacis Arabicis Armeniacis Persicisque, Leipzig 1842. The Orphic Poems, Oxford 1983. Galeni qui fertur de qualitatibus incorporéis libellus, diss. Marburg, 1906. The Unity of the 'De Somno', in: Aristotle on Mind and the Senses (cf. above under M O R A U X [1978]), 241-280. Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom 'Intellectus agens' bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts, in: Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien M. Grabmann (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Suppl.bd. 3.1), 1935, 446-462. Reste verlorener Aristotelesschriften bei Alexander von Aphrodisias, Hermes 68 (1940) 369-396. Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre, Regensburg 1949. The amphibolous terms in Aristotle, Arabic philosophy and Maimonides, Harvard Theological Review 31 (1938) 151-173. Substanz und Qualität: ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der Plotinischen Traktate VI. 1—3, Berlin 1973 (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, 5), 181-193.

Die Polemik Alexanders von Aphrodisias gegen die verschiedenen Theorien des Sehens, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 8 (1895) 373 - 3 8 6 , 498 - 509 ; 9 (1896) 149-162. Die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander und andere in dem Commentar des ersteren zu der aristotelischen Schrift 'De Coelo', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 10 (1897) 191-227. Einige Gesichtspunkte für die Auffassung und Beurtheilung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 13 (1900) 8 5 - 8 9 . Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 3.1 4 , ed. E. WELLMANN, Leipzig 1903; English trans, of third edition b y S. F . ALLEYNE, L o n d o n 1883.

ALEXANDER OF F.

W . ZIMMERMANN

— —

F . W . ZIMMERMANN

and H.V.B.BROWN N . ZORZETTI Α. Ν . ZOUMPOS

APHRODISIAS

1243

Al-Farabi und die philosophische Kritik an Galen von Alexander zu Averroes, Akte des 7. Kongr. der Arabistik, Göttingen 1974 ( = A b handlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, phil.hist. Kl., 3. Folge, no. 98), 4 0 1 - 4 1 4 . (tr.) Al-Färäbl's commentary and short treatise on Aristotle's ' D e interpretatione', London 1981. The origins of the so-called Theology of Aristotle, in: PseudoAristotle in the Middle Ages, eds. J I L L KRAYE, W . F. RYAN and C . B . SCHMITT, London 1986 (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, 11), 110-240. N e u e arabische Ubersetzungstexte aus dem Bereich der spätantiken griechischen Philosophen, Der Islam 50 (1973) 313—324. Review of D O N I N I (1971), q.v., Studi Medievali 12 (1971) 2 6 3 - 2 6 8 . Observations on Alexander from Aphrodisias, 2iva Antika 21 (1971) 18.

Il c De fato' di Alessandro. Questioni di coerenza di P. L. DONINI, T o r i n o

Sommario I. Il fato come natura

1244

II. Excursus: le fonti di Alessandro

1247

III. La „libertà di fare anche l'opposto"

1249

IV. La pluralità dei criteri di azione

1253

V. Lo scopo del trattato

1258

VI. Bibliografia

1259

I. Il fato come natura I numerosi studi 1 che sono apparsi nel corso degli ultimi venti anni sul trattato 'De fato' di Alessandro di Afrodisia, piuttosto ingiustamente trascurato dalla storiografia filosofica e dalla filologia dell'ottocento e dei primi cinque o sei decenni di questo secolo, hanno messo in discussione la coerenza argomentativa e dottrinale dello scritto a proposito di un certo numero di questioni di rilievo. Innanzitutto è parsa contestabile 2 la concezione stessa del fato che Alessandro presenta come quella aristotelica nella prima parte (capitoli I—VI) del libro. Alessandro vuole qui identificare il fato con la natura, aristotelicamente intesa come agente che opera non „di necessità", ma „per la maggior parte dei casi", ammettendo cioè anche eccezioni. In un primo tempo (VI 169.18—170.8) l'ambito di ciò che è „naturale" e pertanto „fatale" sembra da lui ristretto alla ciclicità delle generazioni, a sua volta collegata al movimento dei cieli e del sole secondo 1

2

Sulla recente fioritura di studi sul c De fato 1 cf. D O N I N I (1982) 246 n. 41. Bibliografia in SHARPLES (1983,1) 286sgg.; T H I L L E T (1984) C X L V I I I - C L V I I I . Si veda inoltre, in questo stesso volume ( A N R W I I 36,2), la bibliografia generale annessa al saggio di R . W . S H A R P L E S (pp. 1226-1243 and p. 1187). Cf. specialmente D O N I N I ( 1 9 7 4 ) 1 6 3 - 1 6 5 , ( 1 9 7 7 ) 182sg.

IL ' D E FATO 1 D I A L E S S A N D R O

1245

una nota dottrina aristotelica espressa soprattutto in 'De generatione et corruptione' II 10 336 a23—337 a 15: sicché sembrano oggi cadute le obiezioni inizialmente mosse 3 a questa argomentazione, già accusata di confusioni con la dottrina stoica; fino a quando limita l'ambito del fato al ciclo della generazione naturale e al livello delle specie Alessandro non dice nulla che sia incompatibile con la filosofia di Aristotele e semplicemente dà il nome, certo non aristotelico, di ειμαρμένη a qualcosa che è effettivamente teorizzato dallo stesso Aristotele. Ma improvvisamente (170.9) la natura che sarebbe da identificarsi con il fato diviene quella individuale, esemplificata con riferimenti alla „naturale costituzione" sia del corpo (170.14) che dell'anima (170.17): poiché non è in alcun modo spiegato da Alessandro come la naturale costituzione fisica e psichica dell'individuo potrebbe eventualmente essere collegata alla generazione delle specie e al movimento dei cieli, il passaggio dall'una all'altra accezione di „natura" (dal generale all'individuale) appare totalmente ingiustificato e la contraddizione sembra stridente. Negli studi più recenti questa contraddizione è stata da alcuni 4 riconosciuta, aggiungendo tuttavia l'importante suggerimento 5 che l'opuscolo 'De fato' conservato alla fine della 'Mantissa' potrebbe rappresentare un tentativo di soluzione; da altri si è invece cercato di attenuarla, osservando che l'esemplificazione nell'ultima parte di p. 170 chiamerebbe in causa tipi umani (come il temerario, l'intemperante, l'incontinente . . .) piuttosto che individui 6 . Tuttavia questa proposta non sembra convincente: è difficile capire come si potrebbe ragionevolmente parlare di „naturale costituzione" del corpo o dell'anima per classi o tipi umani piuttosto che per singoli individui all'interno di una filosofia aristotelica e, più ancora, nei limiti della dottrina alessandrista dell'origine dell'anima dalla mescolanza degli elementi 7 . L'insistenza di Alessandro sul pronome έκαστος (170.10, 17; ancora più chiaramente 171.9) non può non far pensare al singolo individuo e l'ultimo esempio addotto mette infatti in scena direttamente Socrate (171.11 —17). Del resto, anche se si trattasse di tipi umani, continuerebbe a mancare un collegamento chiaro con il livello della specie e con il ciclo delle generazioni. Ma l'introduzione di una nozione del fato come identico alla natura individuale ha suscitato anche altre e forse ancor maggiori difficoltà 8 . Riconoscendo al carattere naturale la possibilità di determinare „per la maggior parte dei casi" la vita, le azioni e la fine stessa dei singoli individui (170.19—20) Alessandro sembra abbandonare la dottrina aristotelica espressa nelle 'Etiche' come nella 'Politica' che vede il carattere morale essenzialmente come il risultato dell'educa-

3

VERBEKE ( 1 9 6 8 ) 8 1 . C o n t r a , s p e c i a l m e n t e D O N I M I ( 1 9 7 7 ) 1 7 3 - 1 8 2 ; c f . SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 ) 23.

82

4

SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 0 ) 7 7 s g . , ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 )

5

SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 0 )

6

THILLET ( 1 9 8 4 )

7

Per questa dottrina si veda il saggio di SHARPLES in questo stesso volume, cap. IX, con la bibliografia citata nelle note.

8

R i a s s u m o q u i l ' a r g o m e n t a z i o n e di D O N I N I ( 1 9 7 4 ) ANRW II 36.2

23sg.

81. CV.

164—173.

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P.

L.

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zione e delle abitudini contratte in un lungo processo formativo; e si pone inoltre nella peggior situazione pensabile come base di partenza per una difesa del concetto di t ò έφ' ήμϊν contro i deterministi, difesa cui sarà destinata tutta la seconda parte del trattato, dal capitolo VII in poi: perché, come aveva riconosciuto Aristotele (Eth. Nie. X 9 1179 b 21), „le doti naturali non sono evidentemente in nostro potere, ma è chiaro che si trovano in chi è veramente fortunato grazie a una qualche causa divina". Ma se il carattere naturale determina per lo più le nostre azioni, allora lo spazio di quel che è in nostro potere si ridurrà a qualche rara situazione in cui, paradossalmente, saremo liberi perché agiremo contro la nostra stessa natura. Tuttavia, Alessandro si ricorderà poi benissimo delle reali convinzioni di Aristotele nel cap. XXVII 197.17sgg., dove ridurrà correttamente l'apporto delle doti naturali alla sola „attitudine a ricevere la virtù" assegnando il peso decisivo nella formazione del carattere morale all'esercizio, all'educazione e all'insegnamento 9 . L'identificazione del fato con la natura individuale non solo, dunque, non è aristotelica, ma sembra dover preparare gravi imbarazzi a chi si accinga alla difesa di una tesi indeterministica; e Alessandro è inoltre del tutto incongruente nella valutazione delle doti naturali, diversamente interpretate nelle due parti del suo scritto. Anche a proposito di questa difficoltà i lavori più recenti sul 'De fato' non hanno potuto addurre una valida giustificazione a favore di Alessandro. Ma, mentre alcuni studiosi riconoscono francamente il problema 10 , l'ultimo editore del trattato 1 1 ritiene invece di poter sostenere l'unità del pensiero nell'opera richiamando il duplice senso che può avere la parola „natura" nel linguaggio aristotelico: da una parte la „natura prima", il temperamento, che non fornirebbe agli uomini se non delle attitudini, dall'altra la „natura seconda" che sarebbe il carattere frutto delle abitudini. Alessandro si concentrerebbe sulla prima natura nella prima parte e sulla seconda nella seconda parte del libro. Per conto mio non avrei dubbi sulla correttezza di questa distinzione a proposito di Aristotele, ma non vedo a che giovi ricordarla quanto ad Alessandro. Il problema è appunto che nella prima parte del 'De fato' (nel cap. VI) il commentatore non tratta la natura prima come semplice attitudine e le attribuisce tutto, o quasi, quel che dovrebbe appartenere, aristotelicamente, alla seconda natura: in sostanza, la determinazione del carattere morale. Così, se noi potessimo dire che a 170.19, nell'interpretazione del detto di Eraclito, ήθος è identificato con φύσις intesa come natura seconda, potremmo sostenere anche che per Alessandro la natura individuale intesa come il carattere pienamente formato dalle abitudini e dall'educazione determina per lo più le azioni e gli esiti della vita di un uomo, il che mi sembrerebbe conforme sia alla dottrina generale dell'etica aristotelica, sia alle considerazioni dello stesso Alessandro nel cap. XXVII e la contraddizione fra le due parti dello scritto sarebbe eliminata (ma non così ogni problema a proposito di ciò 9

10 11

II caso di Galeno mostra bene come l'accentuazione dell'importanza delle doti naturali comporti di per sé una limitazione dell'ambito di ciò che è in potere dell'uomo: D O N I N I (1974) 129-132, 165; MORAUX (1984) 794. SHARPLES (1980) 78, (1983,1) 130. THILLET (1984) C X V - C X X I .

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che è έφ' ήμΐν: ritornerò su questo punto). Ma poiché il riferimento al carattere, „cioè alla natura", come demone negli uomini è immediatamente illustrato con l'esempio delle φυσικαι κατασκευαί καί διαθέσεις (170.20: notare γάρ nella linea precedente), che si estende fino a 171.4; e poiché nell'esempio conclusivo di Socrate e Zopiro φύσις è chiaramente contrapposta all' „esercizio proveniente dalla filosofia" (171.16) che ha reso Socrate migliore della sua natura, non può più restare il minimo dubbio circa il significato di φύσις in tutto il passo delle pp. 170—171 e circa l'assoluta identità di φύσις con le doti naturali e perciò anche, nell'interpretazione del detto di Eraclito, con il carattere naturale. Socrate è per l'appunto l'eccezione 12 che illustra come, contro la determinazione del carattere naturale — e cioè del fato — che opererebbe nella maggior parte dei casi, sia qualche volta possibile che avvenga anche ciò che è contro natura e cioè contro il fato.

II.

Excursus:

le fonti

di

Alessandro

Sembra dunque che l'identificazione del fato con la natura individuale comporti una serie di incongruenze gravi: sia di Alessandro con se stesso, sia con Aristotele. L'idea che l'origine di queste incongruenze sia da spiegare semplicemente con l'influenza di una dottrina di origine non aristotelica, che Alessandro non avrebbe saputo armonizzare bene con le riflessioni ispirategli dai testi di Aristotele, è perciò già a prima vista molto attraente. Di fatto, nel corso degli studi sul 'De fato' sono state proposte due fonti possibili come quelle da cui sarebbe pervenuta ad Alessandro la dottrina del fato identico alla natura individuale: una possibilità è che su Alessandro abbia influito una tradizione di origine postaristotelica, ma pur sempre peripatetica e risaliente a Teofrasto; l'altra è che l'ispiratore di Alessandro sia da indicare piuttosto in Galeno. Si noti tuttavia che queste due ipotesi non sono fra loro totalmente incompatibili né veramente alternative 13 ; si potrebbe pensare infatti che la dottrina in questione sia stata ispirata in realtà ad Alessandro proprio da Galeno, con le cui opere sono possibili alcuni

12

II che THILLET (1984) C X V I I e n. 4 non sembrerebbe disposto a riconoscere, ma non

direi che i suoi argomenti arrivino a smentire l'evidente fatto che la natura è presentata da Alessandro come agente che opera ώς έπί xò πλείστον e che, se Socrate riesce a essere migliore della sua natura, introduce così soltanto una delle eccezioni, previste dalla teoria, rispetto alla regola generalmente valida. Del resto, migliorare la propria natura è cosa che è riuscita a Socrate, non a un qualsiasi Caio o Sempronio. Si potrebbe forse sostenere che sia Socrate a rientrare nella norma e Caio e Sempronio rappresentino invece le eccezioni? Sul paradosso che siano soltanto i casi rari ed eccezionali a sfuggire alla determinazione c f . a n c h e FREDE ( 1 9 8 2 ) 2 8 0 . 13

82s-

Rispondo così alla garbata critica di SHARPLES (1980) 92 n. 92, che devo riconoscere fondata in quanto non mi ero mai preoccupato, nei miei precedenti lavori, di chiarire esplicitamente la possibile complementarità delle due ipotesi intorno alle fonti di Alessandro.

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precisi riscontri 1 4 , mentre il riferimento a Teofrasto — che è esplicitamente citato 1 5 al termine dell'oposculo sul fato conservato nella 'Mantissa'— potrebbe esprimere semplicemente l'opinione dell'autore dell'opuscolo stesso (sia egli Alessandro o altri) che in Teofrasto si trovasse qualcosa di interpretabile nel senso dell'identificazione del fato con la natura individuale: il che serviva comunque per coonestare con il nome di un'autorità peripatetica di grande prestigio l'introduzione di una dottrina la cui effettiva concordanza con il pensiero aristotelico poteva sembrare piuttosto discutibile (come era veramente, secondo quanto si è detto qui sopra). Il guaio è che sappiamo troppo poco per decidere a favore di una delle due ipotesi, o anche, eventualmente, a favore della combinazione delle stesse secondo la linea di argomentazione ora proposta: non sappiamo infatti niente di preciso circa le idee intorno al fato dell'autorità che l'opuscolo cita, Teofrasto 1 6 , mentre, inversamente, non possiamo pretendere di stabilire con certezza assoluta che Alessandro aveva davvero presente l'autore che con lui mostra coincidenze effettive, vale a dire Galeno. Sulla questione rimane largo spazio per ulteriori ricerche. In ogni caso, temo che non si possa facilmente accettare la più recente ipotesi avanzata a proposito dei rapporti personali fra Galeno e Alessandro 1 7 . Secondo questa teoria — che vuole tenere conto sia delle informazioni di tradizione arabica le quali parlano di una conoscenza personale fra i due e di un loro incontro in Roma, sia delle notizie che lo stesso Galeno fornisce a proposito di un altro peripatetico di nome Alessandro, ma originario di Damasco, che Galeno aveva anche frequentato a Roma — Galeno e Alessandro di Afrodisia si sarebbero davvero potuti incontrare a Roma; sennonché Galeno parla 1 8 anche di Alessandro damasceno come del peripatetico il quale ,,ora" (cioè al momento di una revisione dei 'Procedimenti anatomici' fra il 193 e il 199 1 9 , ma in realtà, direi, necessariamente nel 198 o nel 199, visto il sicuro terminus post quem per la nomina di

14

DOMINI ( 1 9 7 4 ) 1 5 1 - 1 5 6 , 1 6 3 - 1 6 5 . T O D D ( 1 9 7 7 ) 1 2 6 - 1 2 8 h a c e r c a t o di l i m i t a r e o e s c l u -

dere ogni influenza di Galeno su Alessandro quanto alla teoria dell'anima come risultante della mescolanza degli elementi, ma i suoi argomenti non mi sembrano conclusivi. Il fatto, per esempio, che Galeno non parli dell'armonia nello scritto ' Q u o d animi mores . . mentre è l'armonia che Alessandro respinge nel 'De anima1 non comporta in realtà alcun elemento contro l'ipotesi dell'utilizzazione del medico da parte del commentatore. Alessandro non poteva, infatti, non parlare dell'armonia, dottrina tradizionalmente concorrente della psicologia aristotelica; ma avrebbe potuto benissimo non parlare della κράσις, che non è concetto così preminente nello scritto psicologico di Aristotele: e invece ne parla ampiamente nel 'De anima' (24.18—26.30). Non è questo, allora, precisamente un indizio a favore dell'influenza di Galeno? TODD non dice nulla, inoltre, dell'argomento di De anima 26.7—11, che, in mancanza di dimostrazione in contrario, continua a sembrarmi una risposta alle posizioni di Galeno (DONINI [1974] 152sg.); e non esamina il 'De fato'. 15 16

'Mantissa' 186.29. La citazione dell'altrimenti ignoto Polizelo non ci aiuta in nulla. La fiducia con cui THILLET (1984) CIVsg. dà per certa l'equazione destino-natura in Teofrasto e quindi la dipendenza di Alessandro da questo autore è forse eccessiva. Cf. SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 ) 2 4 e n. 1 6 2 .

17 18 19

THILLET (1984) X X X I I - X L I X . Su Alessandro di Damasco cf. anche DONINI (1981). De anatom. administr. II 218 K. C o s ì THILLET (1984) X L s g .

IL 'DE FATO' DI ALESSANDRO

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Alessandro di Afrodisia alla cattedra imperiale 20 ) „ o r a " appunto l'Alessandro damasceno sarebbe stato chiamato alla cattedra ateniese di filosofia peripatetica: in questo caso però Galeno confonderebbe i due peripatetici di nome Alessandro già da lui conosciuti e attribuirebbe al damasceno la nomina che era invece realmente quella dell'afrodisio. La combinazione dei dati mi sembra piuttosto macchinosa; inoltre, l'ipotesi che la notizia dei 'Procedimenti anatomici' sia un'aggiunta posteriore e contenga per di più un errore di Galeno, di per sé sospetta e indimostrabile, diviene ancora più implausibile quando si pensa che a Galeno sarebbe anche dovuta sfuggire l'assoluta inverisimiglianza della nomina alla cattedra ateniese di un personaggio il quale presumibilmente ormai (se la notizia è aggiunta nel 198—199) avrebbe dovuto trovarsi nella più estrema vecchiaia, dato che nel 163 era già un filosofo tanto rinomato da essere incaricato di insegnare la filosofia a un ex-console romano, come risulta dall'altra notizia nel 'De praenotione ad Posthumum' 2 1 . In conclusione, sembra preferibile continuare ad ammettere che ci furono in Atene, a distanza di parecchi anni l'uno dall'altro 2 2 , due professori peripatetici di nome Alessandro, prima il damasceno e poi l'afrodisio, e che le notizie di tradizione arabica circa l'incontro romano fra il grande commentatore e il medico sono in realtà il frutto di una confusione fra i due peripatetici omonimi 2 3 . Nessuna conferma, nemmeno indiretta, giunge per questa via all'ipotesi che Alessandro abbia potuto nutrire un particolare interesse per le opere di Galeno: rimaniamo con una serie di paralleli fra i testi dei due autori e i paralleli possono sempre essere giudicati non assolutamente probanti.

III. La „libertà di fare anche l'opposto"

Tutti gli altri problemi rilevanti nascono nel 'De fato' dalla discussione contenuta nella seconda parte del trattato (di gran lunga la più estesa: dal cap. VII alla fine), in cui Alessandro polemizza contro i deterministi 24 contrapponendo loro quella che a lui sembra la corretta posizione aristotelica. Nei miei precedenti lavori 25 avevo negato che la polemica indeterministica di Alessandro fosse sempre 20 21

22

Cf. sopra, in questo stesso volume, SHARPLES, cap. I, p. 1177sg. XIV 627sg. K . , testo ricordato anche dallo stesso T H I L L E T ( 1 9 8 4 ) XLIsg. Devo riconoscere che l'obiezione che rivolgo nel testo contro la teoria di T H I L L E T mi è ispirata da questo stesso autore (cf. p. XLII), il quale la usa (credo con ragione) contro l'identificazione eventuale di Alessandro di Afrodisia con l'Alessandro già attivo in Roma nel 163 presso Flavio Boeto. Curiosamente, gli sfugge però che Galeno avrebbe facilmente potuto fare lo stesso ragionamento a proposito dell'Alessandro damasceno. La nomina di Alessandro di Damasco ad Atene si dovrebbe datare fra il 178 e il 180. Cf. DONINI (1981) 680 e n . 6.

23 24

25

Così anche SHARPLES, in questo volume, cap. II, p. 1178 sg. Preferisco continuare a indicare così, genericamente, gli avversari di Alessandro nel 'De fato'. Sul problema, cf. anche qui sotto, cap. V, p. 1258sg. Soprattutto D O N I N I (1974) 170-185 e, più brevemente, (1982) 228sg.

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coerente in sé e con la dottrina aristotelica, specialmente quella dell''Etica Nicomachea', poiché essa mi appariva eccessivamente sbilanciata in senso indeterministico (non insisto più sull'incongruenza di questa polemica con le premesse, tendenzialmente deterministiche, poste dall'identificazione del fato con la natura individuale: si veda qui sopra il cap. 1). Le mie obiezioni più gravi si possono, credo, riassumere sotto due capi principali: a) la pretesa che si possa scegliere fra tre criteri diversi delle azioni 2 6 è estranea ad Aristotele; b) altrettanto estranea ad Aristotele è l'altra pretesa di Alessandro 2 7 che si possa scegliere, per ogni azione, fra quella che poi effettivamente si compie e il suo opposto. Ma avevo anche chiarito che Alessandro stesso mostrava qua e là (specialmente nei capitoli XXVII—XXIX, in cui parla dell'uomo perfettamente virtuoso, il φρόνιμος) di sapere benissimo quale fosse in realtà la posizione aristotelica su questi problemi: la sua violenta avversione al determinismo lo avrebbe indotto ad azzardare affermazioni a favore di un indeterminismo outré, che egli stesso doveva sapere non perfettamente in linea con le tesi di Aristotele. Ora io credo che le mie precedenti obiezioni fossero, certo, non del tutto immotivate, ma che debbano essere limitate con alcune precisazioni importanti, cosicché le argomentazioni del commentatore finiscano per apparire molto più interessanti e più meditate di quanto in precedenza sembrava di dover riconoscere. Tratterò in primo luogo del problema qui sopra accennato come secondo, b), che è in certo modo il più immediatamente scandaloso se è visto nel contesto dell'etica aristotelica. N o n mi pare dubbio che la definizione di το έφ' ήμίν, „ciò che è in nostro potere", come „ciò di cui è possibile fare anche l'opposto", utilizzata da Alessandro come fondamento della sua polemica contro i deterministi 28 , sia del tutto priva di paralleli in Aristotele. Lo è sicuramente, direi, quanto alla formulazione letterale; si potrebbe tuttavia pensare che sia lecito indurne 2 9 almeno la sostanza da Ethica Nicomachea III 5 1113 b 7sgg., insistendo in particolare sulla contrapposizione καλόν — αίσχρόν e attribuendo così ad Aristotele l'idea che si possa sempre agire scegliendo fra „fare il bene" e „fare il male" (un altro eventuale punto di partenza si potrebbe forse vedere in Phys. VIII 4 255 a 9sg.). Ma chi facesse questa illazione compirebbe un passo molto imprudente per due buone ragioni almeno, perché si tratta di un passo che anche Alessandro non si sente di compiere fino in fondo dato che, quando ragiona ricollegandosi strettamente alla dottrina aristotelica della virtù, si astiene molto prudentemente da esso (ne diremo ancora in seguito qualcosa); e perché Aristotele stesso mette chiaramente in guardia contro ogni tentazione, almeno per quanto riguarda il comportamento degli uomini in possesso di disposizioni stabili del carattere come sono le virtù,

26 c 27 28

29

de fato' XV 185.21-28. Cf. DONINI (1974) 176-179. 'de fato' XII 180.20-23. Cf. DONINI (1974) 175sg. Cf. in particolare De fato 196.13—25 e Mantissa 170.1. Quanto scrivevo in DONINI (1974) 175 n. 82 aveva bisogno di essere meglio precisato. Come fa SHARPLES (1983,1) 145. Gli altri passi aristotelici da lui citati mi sembrano meno rilevanti. SORABJI (1980) 234 cita anche Phys. VIII, ma usa formulazioni molto caute ("it is up to us to perform the action . . . or to refrain").

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che sono appunto εξεις, quando nega 30 che da una εξις possano procedere comportamenti fra loro contrari. Di conseguenza, tutto quel che si può prudentemente attribuire ad Aristotele sulla base del passo di Eth. Nie. III 5 è una concezione di το έφ' ήμϊν come quel che è in nostro potere di fare o di astenerci dal fare — il che è, si noterà, esattamente il cauto punto di partenza di Alessandro nella discussione di De fato XII 180.4sgg. Ma nell'immediato seguito della stessa discussione Alessandro slitta ben presto dalla nozione iniziale di τό έφ' ήμίν come „ciò che siamo padroni di fare o di non fare" all'altra, molto più contestabile, della „facoltà di fare anche l'opposto" (la prima volta a p. 180.20). Ora, questo slittamento sembra tanto più pericoloso in quanto avviene all'interno della concezione della βούλευσις (deliberazione), che Alessandro sta appunto illustrando in quella pagina: e le conseguenze rischiano allora di essere assurde perché distruttive della stessa nozione aristotelica della deliberazione. Un uomo che delibera, infatti, delibera in vista di un fine ed è condizionato per ciò stesso dalla necessità (aristotelicamente: necessità ipotetica) di raggiungere il fine: non è dunque realmente libero, a ogni passo della sua riflessione, di scegliere fra un'azione e il suo opposto e può eventualmente scegliere soltanto fra le azioni che siano comunque coerenti con il fine; ma a volte accade persino che ci sia una sola azione coerente da compiere 31 e perciò non c'è più nessuna scelta reale. Se Alessandro avesse creduto davvero senza limitazioni al suo concetto allargato di τό έφ' ήμϊν avrebbe anche abbandonato la concezione aristotelica della deliberazione e, con questa, lo schema fondamentale indicato da Aristotele per la razionalità applicata alla prassi (e anche alla produzione tecnica). Tuttavia, rimanendo pur sempre vero che Alessandro non ha simpatia per il concetto della necessità ipotetica 32 , anche se ovviamente lo conosce benissimo, ci sono alcune cose da suggerire a suo discarico. La più importante è forse questa, che il termine di cui egli si serve per definire la libertà dell'agente (τό άντικείμενον, „poter scegliere o fare anche l ' o p p o s t o " ) è, nel linguaggio aristotelico, carico di ambiguità: le assurdità diventano subito gravissime se si pensa all'opposto c o n t r a r i o (Cat. l i b 21: ci sono opposti contrari come il bene e il male), ma possono invece essere in buona parte superate ammettendo che Alessandro pensasse agli opposti nel senso dell'affermazione e della negazione (come: è seduto - non è seduto, Cat. l i b 23). In tal caso, la dichiarazione che si è liberi di fare anche l'opposto, pur avendo il vantaggio di conservare, a prima vista, una fortissima carica polemica contro il determinismo e apparentemente presentandosi come l'affermazione di un punto di vista estremamente indeterministico, sarebbe in realtà interpretabile in un senso molto più compatibile con la dottrina di Aristotele: Alessandro vorrebbe infatti dire soltanto che si è sempre 30

31 32

Eth. N i e . V 1 1129a 1 1 - 1 6 , da leggere con il c o m m e n t o di STEWART I 3 7 6 - 3 7 9 . Mi pare un passo importante, singolarmente trascurato nella recente discussione su Alessandro, Aristotele e il determinismo. Eth. N i e . III 3 1112 b 17, δι' ένός. H o cercato di illustrare questa situazione in: Aristotelismo e indeterminismo in Alessandro di Afrodisia, in: Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet, II (Berlin—New York: D e Gruyter, 1987), 7 2 - 8 9 .

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L.

D O N I N I

liberi di scegliere fra l'azione X e quella non-X, dove non-X può essere inteso semplicemente come ogni azione appena leggermente diversa da X, così leggermente diversa da rimanere sempre compatibile con la necessaria subordinazione al fine voluto e con la stabilità del carattere dell'agente, il quale evidentemente non potrebbe, se è un uomo buono, scegliere un'azione moralmente del tutto riprovevole (il male invece del bene, l'opposto contrario). Così, per richiamare un esempio familiare ad Aristotele e ai suoi lettori (e non importa affatto che esso prospetti un caso di deliberazione tecnica e non tipicamente riferibile alla sfera dei comportamenti morali) il medico che ha scoperto che quel che manca al suo paziente per recuperare la salute è l'uniformità e che l'uniformità presuppone un riscaldamento del corpo, o di una sua parte, il quale riscaldamento può essere ottenuto subito praticando un massaggio 33 , non potrebbe certamente „fare anche l'opposto" nel senso che sia libero anche di prescrivere al paziente un bagno gelato; ma potrebbe farlo invece nel senso che sarebbe libero di produrre il riscaldamento del paziente anche con un altro mezzo diverso dal massaggio: p.es.con l'applicazione di impacchi caldi. Questa è, credo, un'interpretazione accettabile (e oggi abbastanza condivisa 34 ) della posizione aristotelica; non eliminerebbe forse completamente ogni difficoltà (a meno, infatti, che l'uso di una qualsiasi delle alternative prospettabili sia assolutamente indifferente quanto al pieno, facile e rapido conseguimento del fine, ci si dovrebbe ancora domandare perché mai un agente dovrebbe scegliere — fra due alternative non assolutamente indifferenti — quella che è meno razionale o perché è la meno facile, o perché è la meno rapida e diretta: perché mai prescrivere l'applicazione di impacchi, che bisogna ancora preparare riscaldando acqua ecc., probabilmente impegnando anche altre persone, quando si potrebbe subito praticare il massaggio? Forse soltanto per dare soddisfazione ai filosofi che difendono l'indeterminismo e la libertà?): ma, tacendo di ogni ulteriore complicazione, l'interpretazione ora esposta presenterebbe anche il vantaggio di spiegare bene che cosa può essere inteso da Aristotele quando parla in Eth. Nie. III 5 della possibilità di fare una certa azione o anche di astenersene (e che cosa può essere inteso dallo stesso Alessandro, quando parla nella medesima maniera di Aristotele). N o n si tratterà certamente (fatti salvi casi del tutto particolari) di abbandonarsi all'inerzia o di rinunciare a un corso di azioni già deliberato, ma semplicemente di non fare una certa particolare azione per compierne invece un'altra che sia ugualmente compatibile, è ovvio, con il fine da raggiungere e con il carattere morale dell'agente. Ma è ragionevole attribuire precisamente questo senso alla formula usata da Alessandro, alla „libertà di fare anche l'opposto"? Poiché sembra evidente che Alessandro doveva conoscere perfettamente l'ambiguità del termine άντικείμενον di cui si serviva e la distinzione delle 'Categorie', a me pare effettivamente ragionevole interpretare la sua polemica in favore del concetto di το έφ' ήμΐν come un'affermazione di principio certo fortemente ostile al determinismo, senza tuttavia che essa implichi realmente la sconfessione di alcune fondamentali concezioni dell'etica di Aristotele quali la teoria della stabilità del carattere morale e quella della deliberazione. M

Metaph.

Ζ

7 1032 b 6 - 2 1 .

34

Cf.

SORABJI

(1980) 232;

SHARPLES

(1975,2) 43.

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Forti indizi a favore di questa interpretazione della posizione di Alessandro mi sembra che si possano trovare nei capitoli XXVII—XXIX. In essi infatti si parla esplicitamente di coloro che sono ormai nel pieno possesso della virtù e di un carattere morale completamente formato, i φρόνιμοι; Alessandro si astiene allora con estrema circospezione dal proclamare che costoro avrebbero la libertà di fare qualsiasi azione a loro arbitrio: si accontenta semplicemente di suggerire che essi potrebbero n o n f a r e alcune delle azioni che pur discenderebbero coerentemente dalla loro disposizione (199.30, 200.3 sgg.). Sembra dunque chiaro che, nel caso particolarmente delicato dell'uomo perfettamente virtuoso, a cui sarebbe impossibile non attribuire una disposizione stabile ad agire in coerenza con il fine buono, Alessandro è con molta ragionevolezza ritornato, per evitare ogni equivoco, ad attenersi all'interpretazione più sicuramente aristotelica del concetto di „ciò che è in nostro potere": è ritornato, insomma, all'interpretazione restrittiva di Eth. Nie. III 5 1113b 7—11 (e si p u ò notare anzi che egli è persino ulteriormente restrittivo rispetto alla lettera del testo aristotelico: il φρόνιμος ha, secondo lui, solo la possibilità di non fare a l c u n e delle azioni che sarebbe ragionevole aspettarsi da lui. Solo alcune, dunque, e nemmeno molte). Rimane infine vero anche il fatto che pur nella formulazione apparentemente più ampia della sua nozione di libertà, come „ciò di cui è possibile fare anche l'opposto", egli evita di violare anche solo verbalmente il divieto di Eth. Nie. V 1, dato che, come si è detto, questo si applica ai contrari, mentre ci sono molti opposti che non sono affatto contrari. Difficilmente un grande conoscitore del testo aristotelico come era Alessandro può aver usato a caso certe formulazioni come quelle che abbiamo ricordato: è forse troppo azzardato suggerire che doveva averci pensato bene? In conclusione: l'esemplificazione e le motivazioni addotte da Alessandro per spiegare i casi in cui l'uomo virtuoso si asterrebbe dall'agire non sono probabilmente le più convincenti e le più felici 35 , ma è importante la chiara consapevolezza che egli mostra di avere delle implicazioni della teoria aristotelica: un saggio, un uomo compiutamente virtuoso, non è veramente libero di scegliere qualsiasi comportamento a suo arbitrio, ma è doppiamente vincolato, sia dal fine propostogli 3 6 — e per definizione questo non può essere che il bene — sia dalla stabilità delle sue tendenze e del suo carattere morale.

IV. La pluralità dei criteri di azione

Rimarrebbe tuttavia la contraddizione fra questa presentazione dell'uomo compiutamente virtuoso, tutt'altro che una sfrenata rivendicazione indetermi35

36

C o m e è argomentato in DONINI (1974) 182sg.; SHARPLES (1983,1) 163sg. sembra condividere sostanzialmente questa opinione. II legame delle azioni con il fine è riconosciuto almeno una volta chiaramente da Alessandro, in D e fato XV 185.21—28, passo che prendo in esame immediatamente di seguito nel testo.

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nistica, e la pretesa del capitolo XV 185.23—28 secondo cui si può agire a volte facendosi guidare dal criterio di quel che è moralmente onesto, a volte dal criterio dell'utile, a volte da quello del piacevole: è la difficoltà sopra segnalata al capo a). Nel corso della recente discussione di questo problema 37 c'è stato forse qualche malinteso: a me pare infatti di dover ancora, nonostante tutto, ribadire che „Alessandro, quando afferma la possibilità di orientare le azioni secondo tre criteri diversi, si colloca in una prospettiva che non è quella della teoria aristotelica della virtù" 3 8 — dove è però molto importante precisare l'ambito a cui si riferisce l'obiezione. All'interno della teoria aristotelica della virtù non è possibile sostenere che sia data all'agente la facoltà di scegliere fra tre criteri diversi su cui orientare le azioni, perché per il φρόνιμος il bene morale (καλόν) unifica in sé anche i momenti dell'utile e del piacevole. Tuttavia la stessa coincidenza dei tre criteri non sarebbe più data in un agente che non fosse (ancora) φρόνιμος: gli argomenti di M. BURNYEAT39, a cui è stato fatto riferimento nella discussione di questi ultimi anni, giovano invece a ricordarci che sarebbe corretto anche dal punto di vista aristotelico assumere la presenza di una pluralità o di un'alternanza dei criteri, tra loro anche conflittuali, negli agenti che non siano ancora compiutamente formati nella loro persona morale, o che siano, per esempio, degli incontinenti. Il problema della formazione del carattere morale è allora appunto quello di superare la conflittualità dei criteri, che si manifesta con la maggior evidenza nel caso degli incontinenti, e di far coincidere nel bene ogni altro possibile criterio di orientamento 40 . Ora la tesi di BURNYEAT mi sembra senz'altro corretta come interpretazione dell'etica di Aristotele; ma ci si può domandare se essa valga a spiegare qualcosa a proposito della difficoltà in precedenza segnalata nel 'De fato' relativamente alla teoria dei tre criteri. Ebbene, forse serve davvero a qualcosa. Perché è un fatto indiscutibile che dovunque Alessandro parla della possibilità di cambiare il criterio di orientamento delle azioni, e del resto anche della „possibilità di fare l'opposto", non è allora mai esplicitamente in questione il comportamento del φρόνιμος: non c'è la minima possibilità di affermare che nei capitoli XV (dove si parla dei tre criteri) o XII (dove è questione della possibilità di fare anche l'opposto) Alessandro abbia in mente o soltanto o specialmente il comportamento degli uomini perfettamente virtuosi; si ha piuttosto la netta impressione che egli intenda parlare dell'umanità comune e della generale esperienza degli uomini, fra i quali è notoriamente rarissimo incontrarne anche uno solo che sia davvero irreprensibile, come Alessandro riconosce a 198.20. Inversamente, è anche un fatto che là, dove sposta il suo discorso sul φρόνιμος, cioè nei capitoli XXVII—XXIX, Alessandro non solo si astiene dalle rivendicazioni estreme di libertà ricorrenti nei capitoli precedenti, ma, come si è già visto, abbastanza esplicitamente riconosce che simili rivendicazioni non possono qui avere luogo. Se è questa la situazione, ci si può domandare se allora il discorso di Alessandro non sia consapevolmente inteso 37 38

Si vedano le obiezioni di SHARPLES (1983,1) 149. Così DONINI (1974) 179.

39

A BURNYEAT si r i f e r i s c e SHARPLES ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 ) 149.

40

Cf. specialmente BURNYEAT 87sg.

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nel 'De fato' a distinguere le due classi di agenti che la teoria aristotelica stessa gli suggerirebbe di distinguere, lasciando in un primo tempo in ombra la classe dei φρόνιμοι — un modello quasi inattingibile dalla comune umanità e per il quale non avrebbe senso la rivendicazione estrema di libertà che si può fare a favore dell'altra classe — e insistendo invece sulla classe infinita degli uomini comuni, che non sono né saggi, né virtuosi ma, al massimo e nel migliore dei casi, sono in via di faticoso conseguimento della virtù secondo un processo di formazione morale che non sarà mai perfettamente concluso fino al termine della vita. Per costoro, e solo per costoro, varrebbe dunque l'accanita rivendicazione di una libertà che può appellarsi a più criteri differenziati di azione e che può (forse) oscillare persino fra gli estremi del bene e del male. Se questo è il senso (implicito, bisogna ammettere) del discorso di Alessandro nel 'De fato', ci sono allora conseguenze molto interessanti da segnalare: non tutte positive, naturalmente; ma si può cominciare a parlare di quelle positive. La difficoltà sollevata a proposito del capitolo XV cade: non è sul metro della concezione aristotelica della perfetta virtù che si deve giudicare il riferimento ai tre criteri delle azioni. Ai due livelli etici ammissibili nella teoria aristotelica corrisponderebbero due linee argomentative diverse, ciascuna in sé abbastanza coerente: la decisa difesa di un indeterminismo estremo nel caso dell'umanità comune, il riconoscimento (un po' imbarazzato, ma in sostanza chiaro) di forti limitazioni poste invece alla scelta e all'azione dei φρόνιμοι. Ma è notevole, allora, la molto maggior attenzione che Alessandro dedica al livello inferiore, quello dell'umanità comune; in un senso, questa maggiore attenzione è spiegabile con il fatto che è più facile difendere la libertà come possibilità di scegliere e di agire anche diversamente se si ragiona di questo livello piuttosto che di quello dei φρόνιμοι, per i quali nascerebbero immediatamente grosse difficoltà, volendo mantenersi coerenti con la dottrina aristotelica. Tuttavia questa spiegazione mette in luce forse soltanto una parte delle motivazioni che potevano agire in Alessandro; è difficile sottrarsi all'impressione che la concezione aristotelica della virtù compiuta e del φρόνιμος, così legata al mondo e alla società della polis, dovesse apparire a un uomo intelligente del secondo secolo della nostra era come una specie di reliquia archeologica ormai assolutamente improponibile al pubblico del tempo. L'attenzione di Alessandro al mondo dell'umanità comune potrebbe testimoniare, dunque, di uno sforzo di aggiornamento dell'aristotelismo, di un tentativo di adattare una dottrina venerabile, ma vetusta, alle esigenze e alle concezioni correnti del tempo; si può notare, a questo proposito, che, quando difende il concetto di το έφ' ήμϊν come „possibilità di fare anche l'opposto", Alessandro non manca di far notare 41 che esso corrisponderebbe alla concezione generale degli uomini e non è questo certamente uno dei casi in cui si può sospettare che egli presenti come nozione comune semplicemente quella che è dottrina di Aristotele 42 . Questa sarebbe allora un'operazione veramente notevole, paragonabile a certi aspetti dell'opera di Panezio, di Seneca o di Plutarco, oppure (per citare un autore in tutti i sensi più vicino ad Alessandro), 41 42

P. es. De fato 196.13. Cf. Mantissa 170.1 sgg. Come altre volte accade: LONG (1970) 250-252.

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di Galeno, nel quale è stata recentemente segnalata 43 la ripresa e la riformulazione in chiave nuova di antiche tematiche dell'etica di Aristotele. Ancora una volta si possono esemplificare la ponderazione e l'acume con cui Alessandro ha composto il 'De fato' riferendosi ai capitoli dedicati al caso del φρόνιμος. Se si legge l'invettiva contro i deterministi del cap. XXVIII 199.7sgg. 44 senza un'attenzione particolarmente concentrata, potrebbe sembrare che si tratti della solita rivendicazione della libertà di fare e di non fare, di fare ogni cosa e anche il suo opposto. Ma a una considerazione più attenta del testo non può sfuggire il fatto che la rivendicazione è limitata alle sole azioni che p r e c e d o n o la genesi del carattere stabile: i deterministi, dice infatti Alessandro, non ci lasciano la libertà di fare o non fare quelle azioni mediante le quali diveniamo tali quali effettivamente poi siamo. Poiché d'altra parte nello sviluppo immediatamente successivo dell'argomento (XXIX 199.24sgg.) questa rivendicazione non è più avanzata a proposito del φρόνιμος se non con fortissime ed esplicite limitazioni (il φρόνιμος non ha più il potere di deporre il suo abito etico; inoltre, può al massimo non fare alcune delle azioni che pur sarebbe ragionevole che egli compisse), è molto difficile, mi sembra, negare che Alessandro era perfettamente consapevole della difficoltà e che, distinguendo accuratamente le due diverse rivendicazioni secondo un punto di vista genetico e cioè in relazione al diverso grado di sviluppo del carattere morale degli agenti, non solo è riuscito per una volta a collegare molto felicemente i due livelli del suo discorso, ma anche ci ha dato l'indizio più chiaro che questi livelli sono appunto due e che non tutto quel che è rivendicato o affermato per l'uno vale senza riserve anche per l'altro 45 . Così, in definitiva, si può ammettere che l'indeterminismo estremo di certe affermazioni del 'De fato' rimane sostanzialmente coerente sia nel contesto argomentativo dell'opera, sia con l'etica aristotelica stessa, in quanto questa consenta la distinzione di due modi di discorso in corrispondenza di due momenti diversi nella genesi del carattere morale.

43

VEGETTI 1 4 7 . 1 5 0 s g .

44

Su cui cf. DONINI (1974) 181 sg. SHARPLES (1983,1) 22 n. 145, che inserisce il passo in una serie di altri testi di diverso significato è potenzialmente fuorviarne (ma in realtà egli sa benissimo che il senso del testo in questione è altro; si veda il suo commento in [1975,1] 44). Aggiungerei che l'argomento di D e fato 1 9 9 . 3 1 - 2 0 0 . 2 , fortemente criticato da DONINI (1974) 183 sg. è allora probabilmente da spiegare nel modo sopra proposto quanto alla „possibilità di fare anche l'opposto". Anche il φρόνιμος deve avere la possibilità di fare qualcosa di d i v e r s o (ma pur sempre orientato al bene) soprattutto dato che le situazioni della vita pratica non ricadono sotto alcuna regola precisa. Si veda anche il commento del passo in SHARPLES (1983,1) 163, di cui tuttavia non potrei condividere totalmente l'ulteriore obiezione {"both generally and in particular in the context of character development") se la parola "generally" implicasse un riferimento anche alla situazione del φρόνιμος: per costui il problema non si pone più, infatti, nei termini di una scelta fra agire da coraggioso e agire da codardo. N e l caso di chi non sia ancora in pieno possesso di un carattere stabile si tratterebbe ancora di riuscire a spiegare come e perché la scelta possa orientarsi su criteri diversi, e allora anche la teoria dei tre criteri non provvede una risposta adeguata. Qui ha ragione SHARPLES (1983,1) 149.

45

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Naturalmente, è vero però che nemmeno così tutto va completamente a posto nel 'De fato'; nuove difficoltà possono sorgere in luogo di quelle che si era creduto di superare, e forse non sono meno formidabili. Per fare un solo esempio in diretto riferimento al testo 46 , si pensi alla discussione di XXXIY 206.12sgg., dove Alessandro tenta di definire che cosa si debba propriamente intendere per „azione retta" (κατόρθωμα, κατορθούν). N o n basta, egli spiega, fare in qualsiasi modo qualche cosa di buono, ma bisogna che uno, avendo la facoltà di fare il peggio, scelga invece e faccia quel che è meglio; si giudica infatti l'azione retta non semplicemente da quel che è effettivamente compiuto, ma molto più dalla disposizione (έξις) e dalla capacità da cui l'azione procede e lo stesso argomento varrebbe se si volesse definire con precisione l'azione malvagia. L'argomento di Alessandro ha una certa somiglianza con quello di Aristotele in Eth. Nie. II 4 1105 a 28—b 9 47 , sicché sembra molto probabile che il richiamo di Alessandro alla disposizione da cui procede l'azione debba avere in principio esattamente il medesimo senso della richiesta avanzata da Aristotele, che cioè l'atto compiuto sia la manifestazione di un proposito saldo e immutabile. Ma, allora, è anche evidente che la pretesa di Alessandro che, perché si possa parlare di azione retta, l'agente abbia il potere di scegliere fra il meglio e il peggio (una pretesa, è appena il caso di notare, di cui non c'è la minima traccia nell' 'Etica Nicomachea') rischia di entrare in conflitto con l'altra idea che l'azione è retta solo quando discende da una disposizione stabile del carattere come è la εξις: Alessandro stesso aveva già infatti concesso, parlando di chi è tipicamente in possesso di una siffatta disposizione nei capitoli XXVII—XXIX, che un simile potere di scelta non è dato, in quel caso, se non molto raramente e con restrizioni severissime. Perciò o si ammette che l'antitesi meglio-peggio sia nel cap. XXXIV da intendere soltanto come la contrapposizione fra azioni più o meno facilmente o razionalmente finalizzate allo scopo comunque buono, al modo che si è sopra proposto per la formula „fare anche l'opposto" usata altrove da Alessandro (e questo è evidentemente meno facile da ammettere che nell'altro caso, dato che l'antitesi in questione sembra molto meno equivoca e molto più esplicitamente sbilanciata verso il significato morale che non l'ambiguo termine άντικείμενον), oppure si concede che questa volta Alessandro non ha saputo dominare i termini del difficile problema in cui si è trovato. Ma, anche se si fosse disposti ad adottare ancora una volta, per questo ultimo caso discusso, la spiegazione più favorevole ad Alessandro, credo che si debba insistere alla fine sul fatto che l'idea fondamentale che, secondo l'interpretazione che ho proposto, governerebbe l'argomentazione del 'De fato' — la distinzione fra una classe di agenti umani per i quali avrebbe senso la rivendicazione indeterministica nei termini più larghi e un'altra classe, per la quale alla pretesa indeterministica occorrerebbe invece opporre limitazioni piuttosto drastiche — è destinata in ultima istanza a suscitare difficoltà gravissime e, per quanto mi è 46 47

Ma si veda anche la nota precedente. Altri riferimenti a testi aristotelici in SHARPLES (1983,1) 169; mi sembrano però meno significativi come paralleli al 'De fato 1 . A VERBEKE (1968) 98 n. 95, citato da SHARPLES, sfuggiva, a mio avviso, il problema di fondo.

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dato di vedere, insuperabili nei limiti di una filosofia che voglia continuare a essere aristotelica. La libertà nel senso più largo, come possibilità di fare anche l'opposto muovendosi con criteri di azione alternativi, riguarderebbe sì la grandissima parte degli agenti, ma, dato che nello stesso tempo continuerebbe a essere accettata la teoria aristotelica della virtù, rimarrebbe collocata su un piano moralmente inferiore e, non appartenendo più all'uomo divenuto perfettamente virtuoso, dovrebbe essere progressivamente limitata e, alla fine, sostanzialmente cancellata al termine dell'auspicabile processo di formazione morale (non importa quante volte questo processo abbia davvero raggiunto il suo fine compiuto nella storia dell'umanità). E, se è soltanto ai caratteri non ancora pienamente formati che appartiene la possibilità di scegliere secondo criteri diversi e alternativi di azione, è evidente che la libertà così intesa non dovrebbe poter denotare alcuna particolare dignità morale degli agenti; per di più, il segno da attribuire a tale libertà diverrebbe ancora più negativo se si tenesse conto — il che molto avvedutamente Alessandro non fa, evitando così di rendere esplicite le assurdità più gravi — dell'unico caso palese di oscillazione fra criteri alternativi di azione che la dottrina aristotelica sembrerebbe autorizzare, quello dell'incontinenza 4 8 . Pare assurdo (dal punto di vista aristotelico, beninteso) che si intraprenda una battaglia per difendere la libertà degli incontinenti; eppure, lungi dal riconoscere carenza di valore morale alla possibilità di scegliere secondo criteri oscillanti, Alessandro parla a volte, nella sua appassionata polemica, come se questa possibilità costituisse la natura stessa e la dignità dell'uomo 4 9 : il che introduce una contraddizione assolutamente insanabile dell'ideale della perfetta virtù umana come sarebbe realizzata nel φρόνιμος aristotelico (né, per la verità, ogni difficoltà sarebbe caduta nemmeno se Alessandro avesse compiuto nel 'De fato' il passo inverso, quello che si arrischia a fare l'autore — chiunque egli sia — di 'Mantissa' pp. 169—172, il quale associa esplicitamente il „potere di fare anche l'opposto" con il non-essere e con la fragilità del mondo sublunare, arrivando così a paradossi e a incongruenze che sono stati finemente analizzati da SHARPLES50).

V. Lo scopo del trattato

Nessuno dei problemi maggiori di coerenza filosofica posti dal 'De fato' — i problemi che ho creduto di dover illustrare nelle pagine precedenti — ha direttamente a che fare con lo Stoicismo o con la discussione di tesi stoiche. Tutti nascono invece dal confronto fra Alessandro e la filosofia di Aristotele. Se si tiene conto del notevole sforzo (fino a un certo punto, come si è visto, anche felicemente riuscito) di reinterpretare le dottrine aristoteliche al fine di trovare loro una sistemazione coerente all'interno della discussione sul determinismo, 48

Su cui cf. BURNYEAT 8 2 s g g .

49

Particolarmente in De fato 178.17sgg., 183.30sgg., 184.20. (1975,1) 4 9 - 5 2 .

50

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meno che mai dovrebbe risultare adeguata alla situazione l'opinione comune che vede nel 'De fato' sostanzialmente uno scritto di polemica contro lo Stoicismo e negli stoici gli avversari che costantemente Alessandro avrebbe presenti. Ovviamente, so bene che sarebbe follia negare che lo Stoicismo abbia larghissima parte nello scritto e nella polemica di Alessandro; ma, accanto alla polemica contro lo Stoicismo, dovrebbe essere evidente un'altra preoccupazione preminente di Alessandro: quella, appunto, di riuscire a dar conto in modo coerente dell'aristotelismo come di una filosofia indeterministica. Più della ripetizione degli argomenti usuali 5 1 , credo che valgano le considerazioni sopra svolte a confortare l'idea che lo scritto di Alessandro è una riflessione complessiva e generale sul problema del determinismo, in cui, come era logico che accadesse, gli Stoici ottengono certo gran parte (non la totalità) dell'attenzione polemica dell'autore, ma in cui la polemica non è comunque tutto: almeno altrettanto importante era per Alessandro venire a capo di quelli che a lui parevano (quasi sempre a ragione) gli aspetti problematici della filosofia di Aristotele nel confronto con la grossa e ormai inevitabile questione.

VI.

Bibliografia

Per i lavori citati in questo saggio si fa riferimento alla bibliografia generale su Alessandro di Afrodisia annessa al contributo di R . W. SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation (in questo stesso volume [ A N R W II 36,2], pp. 1226-1243 and p. 1187. Si elencano qui di seguito unicamente i pochi titoli non compresi nella bibliografia del s a g g i o di SHARPLES.

M. BURNYEAT P. L. DONINI (1981) J . A. STEWART M. VEGETTI

Aristotle on Learning to be G o o d , in: Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, edited by A. OKSENBERG RORTY, B e r k e l e y - L o s A n g e l e s - L o n d o n 1980, 69—92. Scetticismo, scettici e cattedre imperiali, in: L o scetticismo antico, a cura di G . Gì ANNANTONI, Napoli 1981, 6 7 7 - 6 8 7 (Elenchos, VI). Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, O x f o r d 1892. La terapia dell'anima. Patologia e disciplina del soggetto in Galeno, in: Galeno. Le passioni e gli errori dell'anima. Opere morali a cura di M . MENGHI e M . VEGETTI, V e n e z i a

51

1984.

Per i quali si veda soprattutto DONINI (1977), specialmente 1 8 8 - 1 9 4 . Mi dispiace che quegli argomenti non abbiano convinto SHARPLES; alle obiezioni che egli in particolare muove (in [1983,1] 21) alla mia interpretazione del cap. IX dovrei rispondere ripetendo quanto scrissi in (1977) 188sg. e n. 26.

Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Book of Ethical Problems by

ARTHUR M A D I G A N , S . J . ,

Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

Contents I. Introductory

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II. Virtue

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III. Responsibility

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IV. Choiceworthiness

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V. Pleasure

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VI. Conclusions

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I.

Introductory

The book of Alexander's ethical problems has been edited by I. BRUNS. 1 Its thirty "problems" vary in form; R . SHARPLES, basically following BRUNS, distinguishes: (A) problems, followed by solutions; (B) explanations of Aristotelian texts; (C) summaries of Aristotelian texts or doctrines; (D) fragments intended for inclusion in longer works; (E) collections of arguments. 2 The distinctions between these classes are not to be regarded as absolute; but there is a clear difference between texts which raise a genuine difficulty and seek to solve it, and texts which simply defend a thesis. Given that the book has received comparatively little study, 3 and given the aims of ANRW, it seems best to present an analytical acount of its contents, as an invitation to and an instrument of future research, which would include a study 1 2

3

Supplementum Aristotelicum II 2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), 117—63. Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation, above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,2), p. 1194 and n. 42. Cf. BRUNS, Supplementum Aristotelicum II 2, pp. ν—xiv, especially xiii—xiv; P. MORAUX, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote (Liège and Paris, 1942), pp. 19—21. SHARPLES also recognizes a sixth type (F), discussions similar in character to Alexander's full-length treatises, only shorter; but none is found in the present work. Cf. the bibliographical references in SHARPLES, p. 1191.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS: ETHICAL PROBLEMS

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of Alexander's terminology and of the background (Peripatetic, Stoic, other) of each of the problems, and eventually yield a full commentary. 4 While the book is far from being an epitome of Peripatetic doctrine in the manner of Arius Didymus, its treatments of virtue and of pleasure are fairly detailed, its treatments of responsibility and of the objects of choice somewhat less so. As widely separated texts treat of the same or allied themes, and as there is no need to suppose that the order found in our texts comes from Alexander, I will group the problems under these main headings.

II.

Virtue

25, the long έπιδρομή or essay on the constitution of virtue, is fundamental. Happiness, the human good, consists in activity according to the virtue proper to us as humans, that is in living and acting according to the virtue of our rational soul. The rational soul has a twofold power: (i) a power irrational in itself, but rational in its ability to obey and be harmonized by reason, and (ii) a power rational in itself. Each has its proper activity and virtue, each its contribution to happiness. The appetitive power is concerned with actions that have to do with pleasures and pains. Here excess and deficiency are possible, and the good and virtue depend on due proportion in actions and feelings. Thus moral virtue lies in a mean, not a mean without qualification or determined in some chance way, but by practical wisdom and right reason. Alexander then (150.23) distinguishes scientific knowledge of the eternal from deliberative knowledge of things that can change. The latter, the virtue concerned with deliberation and changeable objects, follows right appetite and is called practical wisdom (φρόνησις). The former, concerned with eternal things, is contemplative rather than practical; it involves intellection of first principles, demonstration of what follows, and the resultant wisdom; these intellectual virtues make the principal contribution to happiness. Now to 24. If the virtues and their corresponding activities are choiceworthy insofar as they prevent sufferings, how can they be choiceworthy on account of themselves? We choose, or appear to choose, courage or temperance in order to keep some feeling or action within bounds, or justice in order to preserve our natural human community; their choiceworthiness appears to derive from their results. The reply, signaled by the conjunction ή (146.29), is that if virtue and that on account of which it is chosen were two distinct things, that would do away with virtue's being choiceworthy in itself; but if they are the same, then virtue is choiceworthy in itself. But it is clear that the virtues are the things on account of which they are choiceworthy, because they are the means between excess and deficiency of feelings and actions, and each of these means is choice4

An important step in research on the book will be the publication of an English translat i o n b y SHARPLES.

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worthy for itself. If human community is choiceworthy for itself, then justice is choiceworthy for itself; but community is choiceworthy for itself, being natural to humans, as is made clear by their distinctive property of speech (λόγος); human beings find it natural and choiceworthy to preserve community, and this is justice. The thesis of 10 is that man is for the sake of the virtues, not vice-versa. Natural things have an end, and the end is superior to that whose end it is. Man has an end, to become virtuous, and that is superior to man. One cannot have the virtues unless one is first a man; so man exists for the sake of acquiring the virtues, not the virtues for the sake of man. A man with the virtues is superior to a man without them. The virtues do not come to be; or better: virtues are not acquired in the way that slaves or houses are; their coming to be consists in someone's acquiring them. They are goals or ends, and so are superior to us humans, whose goal is to acquire them. The thesis of 22 is that the virtues reciprocate or mutually imply one another (άντακολουθοϋσιν). 5 The first argument is from choice. If virtue is judged by choice, and correct choice proceeds from practical wisdom and moral virtue, if deliberation is a matter of practical wisdom and moral virtue 6 , then choice cannot be correct apart from practical wisdom and virtue: the latter setting the end, the former making us do what leads to the end. The second argument is from practical wisdom: if everyone who has any moral virtue has practical wisdom, and if moral virtue is a matter of doing what is determined by practical wisdom and right reason, then one who has practical wisdom must have moral virtue, i.e., as a whole, given that it is proper to practical wisdom to seek that goal which it belongs to moral virtue to determine; this is the difference between practical wisdom and mere cleverness: the former seeks what makes for the correct end, the latter what makes for any end. BRUNS and SHARPLES consider 15 to be a fragment intended for inclusion in a longer work. Its thesis: senselessness (αφροσύνη) is ignorance of those things of which there is practical wisdom. This point itself is quickly established on the basis of etymology: if φρόνησις is knowledge of what is to be done, then αφροσύνη is ignorance of what is to be done. Thus error in theoretical matters does not make one senseless; as knowledge of theoretical matters belongs to another virtue than φρόνησις, so error in these matters pertains to another vice than αφροσύνη.

8 is a genuine problem, and a rather technical one. It appears that virtue is neither a genus nor a totality (όλον). Not a genus, because doing away with one species of a genus does not do away with the genus, whereas doing away with one virtue means doing away with all virtue, given that the virtues mutually imply one another, or rather, that all consist in right reason, which 5

6

This is also argued in the 'Mantissa' or second book on the 'De Anima', Supplementum Aristotelicum II 1, 153.28-156.27. I accept BRUNS'S proposal (καί ήθικης άρετης) εί ye το at 142.25.

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derives from φρόνησις. N o t a totality, because in non-uniform totalities (and one could not imagine virtue's being a uniform totality) a part does not admit the definition of the whole, whereas particular virtues do admit the definition of virtue as such. The first solution begins at 128.12: series such that doing away with one member does away with the whole series belong to things said in many senses (πολλαχώς λεγόμενα); if doing away with one virtue does away with virtue in general, then virtue is of this type. The second solution begins at 128.17: the definition of virtue, which seems to be predicated univocally of the virtues, is really more general, i.e., is n o t proper to virtue taken as a whole, of which the virtues are parts. The formula of virtue as a whole would be: "optimal state of every rational soul," which would not be applicable to each particular virtue. Aristotle, the text notes, seems to call complete virtue a whole of some kind (όλον τι), not a genus, apparently referring to E N V 1, 1130a 9, VI 12, 1144a 5. Problem 28 goes back over this ground. Is virtue to be conceived of as a genus with species, or as a totality with the virtues as parts? Some hold that virtue is predicated, as a genus, of the virtues. But this would mean that removal of one species, practical wisdom, would remove the genus, an absurdity. Others hold that virtue is a totality of parts; but this would lead either to the absurdity that the virtues would be non-uniform parts of the totality (and virtue would not be predicated of them) or to the absurdity that the virtues would be all alike and uniform. The solution begins in 157.19. 7 If a uniform whole is predicated univocally of its parts, and all virtues are alike, then virtue as a totality would be predicated univocally of each virtue. For one who has virtue as a totality has all the virtues, is spoken of as virtuous in respect of courage, temperance, and so on. As bodies with diverse constituents are combined in a uniform mixture, so with virtues and habits; they only differ with regard to their peculiar subject matter. This is clear from the development of the natural virtues into the developed virtues, which is due to the complete mixture of each with the others. The virtues make a uniform totality; each virtue appears to have a distinct activity, corresponding to its distinct subject matter, but in reality each virtue does not act according to that activity alone; because of the mixture, the virtues are like one another, and it is reasonable for virtue to be predicated univocally, for it is these (the developed, mixed virtues, in contrast to the natural virtues) that we call virtues in the principal sense. While agreeing with 8 that virtue is a kind of totality, 28 uses a physical conception, mixture, to explain the kind of totality involved, and concludes that virtue is predicated univocally of the complete or fully mixed virtues. Thus 28 appears to contradict 8; but perhaps 8 is not speaking of the complete virtues. 27 is a collection of objections and replies in support of the thesis that the moral virtues are means (μεσότητες), beginning from a brief sketch of that doctrine. Every virtue puts in a good state the thing whose virtue it is, and makes

7

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proposal (μήτε ώς γένος μήτε ώς όλον δεί κατηγορεϊσθαι). ή εί . . .

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it function well. T h e virtue of a human being will be that which puts him in good condition and makes him carry out his function in the best possible way. But in everything that admits of addition and subtraction, excess and deficiency are to be shunned, while equality, symmetry, proportion, the mean are to be chosen. Virtue lies in a mean between excess and deficiency, a mean determined by practical wisdom and right reason, and reaching the peak of goodness. O b j e c t i o n ( 1 5 4 . 1 6 ) : some say that virtue cannot be a mean, because a mean has to be defined by its extremes, and to be equidistant from them, whereas with feelings and actions the extremes are not determinate, e . g . , there is no ultimate extreme in feelings of fear and confidence. R e p l y : the objectors fail to notice the "relative to u s " in the definition of moral virtue. A mean relative to objects requires definition of the extremes, but a mean relative to us does not, nor does it consist in equidistance from extremes; on the contrary: it is discovery of the mean that makes it possible for us to recognize departures from the mean in either direction. O b j e c t i o n ( 1 5 5 . 6 ) : virtue cannot be a mean; if it were a mean, it would not be contrary to vice, because contraries are at the greatest distance from one another in a genus, while the intermediate is not at the greatest distance from either extreme. R e p l y : the objection does not affect the thesis, because the thesis is not that virtue is identical with the intermediate feelings and actions, only that virtue is concerned with these intermediate feelings and actions. T h e essence of virtue lies in its being determined by right reason, and consists in due proportion, i . e . , not in intermediacy as such. O b j e c t i o n ( 1 5 5 . 1 9 ) : virtue is not a mean, because this would require the virtuous man to concern himself with the intermediately good rather than with the extremely good. R e p l y : a mean with regard to feelings and actions is an extreme in respect of goodness. An extreme in one respect can lie in a mean between extremes in some other respect. H e n c e too the reply to the objection that if virtue is an extreme as regards the rational soul it cannot be a mean. O b j e c t i o n ( 1 5 5 . 2 9 ) : if virtue is intermediate between two vices it must be composed of them, because intermediates are composed of contraries. Reply: not all intermediates are composed of contraries, e. g., quantitative intermediates. T h e intermediate and proportionate in acts and feelings derives not from a synthesis of the excessive and the deficient but from an avoidance of both. O n e would not say that a person making progress was composed of virtue and vice. N o r is it right to say that if virtue is a mean one who goes from deficiency to excess must pass through virtue (the virtuous mean) on the way. This might be true if virtue were identical with the intermediate feelings and actions; but virtue consists in the determination of feelings and actions by right reason; one can have an intermediate feeling or do an intermediate action, without doing so under the direction of right reason. O b j e c t i o n ( 1 5 6 . 1 9 ) : if virtue is a mean, then virtue is part of vice, e . g . , courage is just a remainder, rashness minus an excess, while cowardice is produced from courage by subtraction. R e p l y : Aristotle has dealt sufficiently with this in E N II 6, 1107a 8—27, Aristotle's discussion of actions and feelings that do not admit of a mean, which Alexander quotes in full to conclude 2 7 .

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Akin to these discussions of the mean is 3, which BRUNS and SHARPLES take to be a fragment. Its thesis is that there is an intermediate state (εξις μεταξύ, μέση έξις) between justice and injustice, and more generally between virtue and vice. If, on the opposing view (κατ' αυτούς, presumably Stoics), justice and injustice are stable states, then one could not go from unjust to just or from just to unjust. But people do become just or unjust who were not so before. Hence they must come to justice or injustice from some other state. But whatever comes to be does so either from a contrary or from an intermediate between contraries. So people become just or unjust either from the contrary or from an intermediate. N o t from the contrary; hence from the intermediate. The state from which people come to be just or unjust is intermediate between justice and injustice. Likewise with every virtue and vice. If the opponents admit that vices are not stable states, and are capable of being changed, then we ask, whence do people change t o vice? If they reply that vice is in humans by nature, that we are born that way, then vice is natural to us, and justice and virtue are against our nature. But if this is absurd, then a person is not born unjust, but rather must b e c o m e unjust, as a person must become just. And this would take place from the intermediate state. But if they say that children are neither just nor unjust nor in an intermediate state — because children are not yet rational, and all three of these are states of a rational being 8 — and that on arrival at reason children are immediately evil, i.e., do not go through a process of becoming evil, they would be conceding that injustice and vice were natural to a rational being, and that virtue was contrary to the nature of a rational being. Presumably they would regard this as absurd. Further, if the change is directly from vice to virtue (as it must be, if there is no intermediate), then the opponents will have to say either that vice is easily changed or that it is hard to change. If vice is easily changed, why is the change to virtue not easy? If it is hard to change, then it is clear that the first step in change is to dispel the difficulty of change, a process which takes place by way of learning and practice, not instantaneously. But if vice first becomes easily changed, and if its essence involves its being hard to change, then we no longer have vice, and we do not yet have virtue, but rather an intermediate state. Further, there is a reply to the contention that children, being irrational, cannot be in the intermediate state. The irrational that is capable of reason differs from the irrational in the strict sense. Children are irrational, but capable of reason, and so of virtue and vice. They are thus in an intermediate state: in potency they are both virtuous and vicious, in actuality they are neither. 30 sets out to deal with a related issue: how, if contraries come from contraries, injustice does not come from justice, justice from injustice, and generally, how virtues do not come from vices, vices from virtues. We find a general discus-

8

I take it that the parenthesis in 121.33 — 122.3 is meant to express the reasoning of the opponents.

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sion of contrariety, privation, and change, used to ground a distinction between easy change and difficult change. Someone becoming just changes either from injustice, the contrary, or from an intermediate condition. Things that change from an intermediate to an extreme change from the intermediate as though from a contrary. F o r an intermediate partakes of both extremes, but is neither extreme in its pure form. Change from an intermediate is change from a contrary, because the thing changing changes from things belonging to the intermediate (i.e., from the properties of the opposed contrary that persist in the intermediate), things which prevent the thing changing from being already in the extreme to which it is changing. But if everything that changes proceeds to a certain state or condition, from the privation of that state or condition; and if this privation is contrary to the state or condition towards which the change takes place, then justice and injustice would come to be from contraries, viz., from the privation of justice and from the privation of injustice. There follows a discussion of change in terms of form, matter, contrariety, privation, laying the groundwork for a contrast (163.1 ff.) between " e a s y " and " d i f f i c u l t " changes. When states and contrarieties are easily changed into one another, the change from contrary forms takes place like a change from the (mere) privation of that to which the change takes place. But when the contraries are stable, not easily changed, coming-to-be takes place from privations and intermediates, as though these themselves were contrary to the form-to-which. In short, in easy change the contrary form is weak, like a privation; in difficult change the privation is strong, like a contrary. The original issue is not explicitly settled, but the clear implication is that the solution is to postulate an intermediate state. We may conclude the study of virtue-related texts with 21, on shame (αιδώς), not a philosophical problem as such, but an intriguing attempt to reconcile two Aristotelian texts with one another and with experience. According to E N II 7, confirmed by IV 9, shame is a feeling, not a habit or a virtue. But in II 7 shame is considered praiseworthy, while in IV 9 Aristotle says that it is appropriate for the young, but alien to the adult, because it is fear of disgrace due to the commission of base acts, which adults should avoid. In a rare appeal to experience Alexander says that we should draw distinctions, since even we adults are aware (σύνισμεν αύτοϊς) of feeling shame often and over many things. If Aristotle meant that we should despise ill repute, there would be no need for argument; but this is not what he means. Rather he means that we should guard against ill repute (for repute and honor are the greatest of external goods), and says that those who do not do base things do not incur ill repute. But ill repute, we find, is due not only to things ill done, but also to things suspected of or defamed as being ill done. So one who has done nothing base can nonetheless incur ill repute. N o w if it is right to fear such disgrace, then shame, i.e., fear of and self-protection against ill repute, is by no means alien to the virtuous adult. Further, really good people have a greater fear of ill repute, and take greater care to prevent it; hating the base most intensely, they feel the most shame. Shame is not simply fear of ill repute; it is, prior to that, a being alien or foreign (άλλοτριότης) to the base; this is why the good fear ill repute

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arising from base actions (the object of the fear is the base, not ill repute as such). If so, shame is not just a feeling, but the habit and condition on which this feeling follows.

III.

Responsibility

9, 12, and 29 deal with the familiar Aristotelian theme that the vicious are responsible for their vice. The thesis of 9 is that not all who do wrong do so in ignorance of the evil and harmful character of what they are doing. This is clear from the case of those who are aware that they are doing wrong but who do not resist themselves: they know that what they do is wrong, they feel shame and try to escape notice, they do bad actions as though they would not do them twice, aware that they will suffer harm, but yielding to pleasure. N o t that they believe pleasure to be more choiceworthy; they do not take the trouble to resist it. They know (have πρόληψις) that these things are bad, first of all, from nature, from the natural and common notions (εννοιαι), and then from common opinion, from laws, from teachers. Could they be acting under compulsion? N o : they are the ones who do these things, on their own impulse (όρμή), after deliberation and choice; if those who choose to do something are compelled to do it, who is not compelled? What if they do not suppose the evils in question to be evils? This does not render their actions involuntary, for they are responsible for being in such a condition that they do not recognize these evils as evil; if these things, which did not appear beneficial at the outset, now appear beneficial, that is the fault of the agents themselves, who are responsible for the appearance (φαντασία). People in this situation are loathed and punished as though acting voluntarily. And the fact that such people feel no regret or repentance confirms that their actions are not involuntary. The whole matter is treated at greater length in 29, a long exegesis of E N III 5, 1114a31 — 1114b 12, on the details of which there is no need to dwell. 12 is an exegesis of E N III 1, 1110b 15-17: the compulsory is that whose principle is outside the agent, the agent contributing nothing. Alexander refines Aristotle's position by distinguishing between final and efficient causes. Aristotle is talking about the efficient or productive principle (ποιητική άρχή) of the action; the final principle always lies outside the agent. There is no final cause in cases of compulsion. 9 Those forced to move in a certain way do not, qua forced, contribute to the result; they contribute if they act according to their own impulse and purpose. The issue is not simply whether a person moves his own limbs. One who throws cargo overboard in a storm acts freely, not because he does so with his own hands, but because he does so as a result of his own choice to do so. Those who act due to pleasure are not 9

132.32-33 are difficult; I accept BRUNS'S suggestions, which give the sense that the coercer has a τέλος, but that the person coerced does not.

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compelled; the efficient cause does not lie outside them; if the pleasure or the pleasant object lies outside them, that does not matter, for it is the final cause, not the efficient cause. 11 advances a related thesis: that the fact that there are two causes of involuntariness, compulsion and ignorance, does not mean that the term involuntary is said in many senses. This is a rather technical matter, going beyond Aristotle's discussion of the involuntary in E N III 1, and doing so in a somewhat surprising way: we are accustomed to find Aristotle insisting on this or that as being said in many senses, rather than insisting on univocity. Alexander begins by arguing from parallel cases. The term "animal" is not said in many senses, just because there are rational and irrational animals; "vice" is not said in different senses, just because there are excess and deficiency. The two types of involuntariness are parts (species) of the involuntary, not different senses of the term. 131.23—26 are difficult; I render as follows: "If the involuntary is not said in many senses, the commonplace that says 'if one of a pair of contraries is said in many senses, the other is said in many senses' could not thereby be impugned; nor is the voluntary said in many senses on the ground that its contrary, the involuntary, is said in many senses." 10 Vice is not said in many senses, just because there are vices of excess and deficiency; rather they are species of vice. N o one could have both vices, and there is no pair of virtues (διπλή άρετή), one opposed to excess, the other to deficiency; for virtue, it is not sufficient not to be excessive, or not to be deficient; both are necessary. Likewise one who acts voluntarily both has the principle of action in himself and knows the relevant particulars. Thus the voluntary is opposed to both parts of the involuntary parts which cannot coexist, for it is impossible for someone both to be compelled to do wrong and at the same time to do wrong on account of ignorance; neither ignorance nor knowledge of particulars contributes anything to action in cases of compulsion. The commonplace (that if one of a pair of contraries is said in many senses the other is also said in many senses) is not done away with by the fact that love is said in many senses, while its contrary, hate, is not said in many senses. If hate were contrary to every form of love, and were not spoken of in many senses, the commonplace would be done away with. But if hate is contrary to love in one particular sense, that of a condition, not to love in another sense (καταφιλείν, perhaps "to kiss"), then the commonplace is not impugned. The commonplace would be impugned if there were not, for every πολλαχώς λεγόμενον, a contrary, also πολλαχώς λεγόμενον, e.g., for white, said in many senses, there is black, also said in many senses; black is contrary to all the things signified by the various senses of white, to white sand as well as to white color; if it were contrary to only one of these senses, it would not be said in

10

I differ from BRUNS in restricting the τόπος to the principle that if one contrary is said in many senses so is the other, on the strength of 132.7ff., where that is clearly the commonplace under discussion, and in construing ού πολλαχώς δε . . . as a distinct sentence, which is then justified by the following sentence ουδέ γαρ ή κακία πολλαχώς . . .

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many senses. If I get it right, the idea is that each πολλαχώς λεγόμενον has a contrary πολλαχώς λεγόμενον, but that a univocal may be contrary to a πολλαχώς λεγόμενον, if it is really contrary only to one sense of the πολλαχώς λεγόμενον.

IV.

Choice-worthiness

In 1, 4, and 20 Alexander speaks about the choiceworthiness of various objects. 1 is directed at those who hold that life is not a good. The problem is posed: if sailing well is a good, and sailing poorly is an evil, then to sail is neither good nor evil, and so with life. Alexander replies that potentialities for opposites are not indifferent but rather good; they have the good as their goal, while evil takes place by mischance. As with the arts, e. g., sailing is for the sake of sailing well, sawing for the sake of sawing well, so with nature. To things that nature does not give immediate completeness, it gives potency for completeness; but that potency involves potency for the contrary. Hence potencies are principally potencies for the better. Judgment is to be based on the principal factor, hence, in the case of life, on the potency for living well. To live well is the highest good; but it is not possible to live well without first living. It is absurd to say that we are adapted (οίκειώσθαι) for life by nature, do all for the sake of our preservation, and then to deny that nature fits us for it as for a good. That we are fitted for life as for a good is clear from the care we take over children, as though we would continue to live through them, and from the special fear we have of anything that is likely to cause our death. That judgment of intermediates is from the better is also clear from the agreement that man is better than other animals, because capable of virtue; if judgment were based on the worse, man might be judged the worst of animals, because capable of vice. 4 poses the following difficulty: there is no contrary to an instrument; there is a contrary to riches, viz., poverty; hence riches are not an instrument. The implicit thesis is that riches are, or can be, an instrument. Alexander says that if we take the first premiss universally, then we cannot accept the second premiss; but if we take the first premiss as particular then we have two particular premisses and no conclusion follows. He then attacks the universal form of the first premiss, claiming that it is frequently but not always true. In 123.15 he says that neither premiss is well stated. Against the first premiss, there is a contrariety, if not at the level of instruments themselves, at the level of their qualities. Against the second: poverty is not contrary to wealth, but is rather an absence or privation of wealth. 20 asserts that one should not seek the useful (χρήσιμον) in all cases. Given that the useful is for the sake of something else, one who seeks only

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the useful does away with there being anything good and choiceworthy for itself. Further, he does away with the useful t o o , if the useful is chosen for the sake of the good, and if there is no good. T o do away with that on account of which the useful is choiceworthy, is to do away with the useful. If we say that the useful causes other things to be useful, then we have an infinite regress in useful goods. Unless something is choiceworthy in itself, the things that lead to it are not choiceworthy; if the useful is not choiceworthy in itself, neither are the things that lead to it choiceworthy. In addition, if useful things are to deal with needs and difficulties, but the end is to be free of difficulties, or rather, being free of difficulties, to carry on activities which are proper to men, then (filling in an apparent lacuna in 1 4 0 . 3 1 u ) it is slavish not to do so. F o r it is slavish to do everything to avoid difficulties, and otherwise to occupy oneself with play, never doing anything worthwhile in itself. I f we differ from other animals in knowledge and perception, it is clear that our end must be in line with these distinctive features, which are the principal determinants of our humanity: knowledge and truth, which reside neither in play nor in the useful. 2 4 , on the choiceworthiness of virtue, and 10, on man's being for the sake of virtue, could also have been classified under the heading of choiceworthiness. T h e same could be said of many of the problems bearing on pleasure, to which we n o w turn.

V.

Pleasure

Perhaps the most prominent single topic in the b o o k of ethical problems is that of pleasure, accounting for no fewer than twelve of the thirty problems, including some of the most technical and sophisticated in the b o o k . W e may begin with 1, 13, and 19, in which Alexander defends the thesis that pleasures are not the same in kind (μή όμοειδεϊς), or, as I shall refer to it, the pluriformity thesis. In 1 he argues as follows. First, from desire: if desires are for the pleasant, and if this is their essence, and if desires differ, some being choiceworthy and others deserving to be avoided, then the difference must stem from differences between the pleasures involved. B u t things cannot be the same in kind if they differ by nature. Secondly, from activities: if every pleasure is occasioned by an activity, and there is a correspondence (οίκειότης) between pleasures and activities, pleasure being their completion, then it is clear that pleasures should be distinguished as activities are. But some activities are choiceworthy, others to be avoided. So too pleasures. B u t if so, they are not the same in kind, if desire is further removed from pleasure than activity is, and if pleasures are divided according to desires, so much the more so are they distinguished according to activities. That pleasures really correspond to activities, and differ in

11

An alternative would be to delete εί in 140.27.

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kind, and not merely insofar as they are occasioned by diverse activities, is clear from the fact that pleasures occasioned by one activity cannot be occasioned by another activity, e.g., the pleasures of the intemperate are not pleasant to the temperate. Further, if pleasures from different activities hinder or interfere with pleasures from other activities, e.g., if pleasure in flute music hinders some people from taking pleasure in listening to stories, then pleasures are destructive of pleasures, and so are related to other pleasures as contraries. Pleasure is not like health: the same health can be secured by different activities, but the pleasure deriving from one activity cannot be had from another activity. In 13 Alexander argues that pleasures differ as the activities that cause them differ; they are not one in kind, differing only numerically. Aristotle has shown this by showing that proper pleasures augment the activities that occasion them; if pleasures were the same in kind, one would not augment one activity, another another. Again, the pursuit of pleasure is not like the pursuit of money. People who want money do whatever activities get them money, the activities themselves being indifferent, whereas people do not pursue pleasure as one thing to be obtained from certain activities; rather they pursue certain pleasures, which go with certain activities; they are pained by other activities, and by other pleasures, which deter them from these activities. Again, if all pleasures were the same in kind, and we chose activities for the sake of pleasures, then the activities which produced the most pleasure would be the most choiceworthy; but if the choice of activities does not depend on the pleasure they produce, if on the contrary we assess pleasures in terms of the activities that produce them, then the choiceworthiness of activities could not derive from pleasure, nor could pleasures be the same in kind. Further, there is a parallel between activities different from the activity we are engaged in, with their attendant pleasures, and pains: both impede the activity we are engaged in; thus it is clear that pleasures are akin to or proper to activities. Again, if base actions bring pain to the temperate and temperate actions bring pleasure to the temperate, and vice-versa for the intemperate, then the pleasures deriving from base and from fine actions cannot be the same in kind. Again, returning to the model of money: it is not that brothel-keeping makes good people poor but bad people rich; it would make good people just as rich, if they could bear to engage in it. It is not only that base activities are to be avoided (because they are base); besides bringing no pleasure to the temperate, they bring pain. 19 is a brief contribution to the same theme. Things the same in kind do not destroy one another. N o w pleasure is destroyed by pain. But pleasure from things done more intensely destroys pleasure from things done less intensely, e.g., pleasure from one playing comedy destroys pleasure from eating sweetmeats. But if one pleasure does to another pleasure what the contrary pain does to that pleasure, then the two pleasures could not be the same in kind or differ merely numerically. Further, if pleasures, being the completions of activities, are akin to activities differing in kind, they too would differ in kind. Further, if the temperate cannot be pleased by the pleasures of the intemperate, or vice-versa, then pleasures could not all be the same in kind; but the first, hence the second.

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18 and 23 discuss the distinction between pleasure and happiness. 18 sets out to answer the question, why Aristotle termed those who located the end in pleasure "most vulgar"; it is in effect an explanation of E N I 5, 1095b 16. Three brief answers are followed by rebuttals of various opposed positions. First answer: because they place happiness in bodily enjoyments, in which slaves and animals share. Second answer: because those who say that pleasure is the only thing choiceworthy, and pain (πόνος) 1 2 the only thing to be avoided, do not recognize the fine as choiceworthy, the base as to be avoided. If only pleasure is fundamentally choiceworthy, then things productive of pleasure are also choiceworthy, and also good; and if things productive of pain are to be avoided, but some fine things, e. g., courageous activities, produce pain, then these fine things are to be avoided (which is absurd). Third answer: some say that nothing is fine or base by its own nature, but only seems such according to human πρόληψις, because of which we avoid the base as evil. On this view we would be punishing ourselves with regard to pleasures, fleeing the greatest pleasures to protect ourselves again the base — something which no irrational animal does — so that our being rational would be for us a source of evil. To say (138.20) that we think we should not choose base pleasures, on the ground that the base is to be avoided on account of itself, would be well said; but if the opponents give this reason they cannot maintain that only pain is to be shunned for itself. But if their appeal is not to baseness as such but to legal punishments, they are faced with a dilemma: if punishments are appointed well, then the base things are evil by their own nature (i.e., right assignment of penalties reflects the intrinsic evil of the acts punished); but if not well (i.e., if punishments are assigned without regard to intrinsic evil), then once again it is a punishment for humans to be rational, at least if reason leads us to regard things not evil as evils, and to deprive ourselves of true goods. To say (138.28) that everything we choose we choose qua pleasant, and to use this to show that pleasure is the greatest good, will not work — if in fact we choose the things we choose either as fine, or as useful, or as pleasant. To say (138.31) that the advantageous is also pleasant is false. "We often choose the advantageous despite its being unpleasant; and if it sometimes happens that the fine, as fine, is pleasant, still it is not chosen because it is pleasant, but because it is fine. And we often avoid the pleasant as base; if we flee the pleasant as base, we would be choosing the pleasant (when we do) because it was fine. To say (139.5) that nothing is fine or base by its own nature, that these things are said with reference to personal views, and to demand that the fineness of things be established by argument, is like demanding argument to show that something is white. Nothing evident needs proof; that there are such things as fineness and baseness is evident to those not blinded in the eye of their soul. That we know by nature that certain things are base or fine, is clear from the

12

Πόνος seems to be taken in a more general sense than in problem 6, where it is physical, in contrast to psychic λύπη.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS: ETHICAL PROBLEMS

1273

fact that we blush at the very mention, not only the actual doing or occurrence, of certain things. 1 3 23 tries to answer the question, if pleasure is, according to Aristotle, unimpeded activity according to a thing's natural condition, how is it that happiness is not, on Aristotle's view, pleasure? In other words: if pleasure is defined as activity, and happiness is defined as activity, why is pleasure not happiness, why are not pleasure and happiness the same thing? Alexander's reply is developed in considerable detail, but its core is that if unimpeded natural activity is pleasure and all things strive for pleasure, this does not make pleasure the goal of life. The first argument begins at 143.15. The source of the u n i m p e d e d character of activity is the source of living pleasantly. If pleasure were the cause of unimpeded activity according to virtue, then pleasure would be the principal good. If the source of unimpeded activity is not pleasure but virtue, that would be the principal good. So if it is natural for man qua man to be happy because of his proper activities 14 , if they are unimpeded, then virtue (not pleasure) would be the principal cause of happiness, the cause of man's doing his proper activities and doing them in an unimpeded way. Second argument (143.25): if pleasure is an activity insofar as it follows on an activity taking place in this manner (i.e., without impediment), then pleasure would be a sign of the presence of happiness, not happiness itself. Aristotle calls pleasure an activity, not as being an activity on its own account, but as having its existence in activity, not being able to take place apart from activity. Pleasure is unimpeded activity in the same sense as pleasure is happiness: it is unimpeded activity in the sense that it accompanies such activity; it is happiness in the sense that it accompanies happiness and is a sign of its presence. 1 5 Third argument (144.4): Aristotle has shown that it is slavish to locate happiness in pleasure and enjoyment, by way of the argument from slaves' and animals' so doing, and by way of his reference to Sardanapalus. It is clear that the activities of the soul are not for the sake of pleasure but vice-versa. For if activities according to virtue are most pleasant, still they are not objects of interest for the sake of pleasure, but vice-versa. We choose activities according to virtue, even if, as in the case of courage, they bring pains, and it is never reasonable to choose base pleasures. So, if activities according to virtue are choiceworthy even when accompanied by pain, and if pleasure is never choiceworthy if accompanied by the base, then it is clear that we choose pleasure on account of activities according to virtue. Fourth argument (144.17): the best way to decide this question is to consider, following nature, which of the two nature has given for the sake of which, activity or pleasure. It is clear that pleasure is given to animals for the sake of

13 14 15

C p . problem 21 on shame. Accepting BRUNS'S suggestion ( κ α ι ) καθό άνθρωπος έστι, ο ί κ ε ί α ι ς at 143.22. I am unable to determine the exact meaning of 144.1—4, or its relevance to the argument.

1274

ARTHUR MADIGAN

activity, so that they may be preserved, e . g . , the pleasure that they take in nourishment. It is absurd to say that we take nourishment not to survive but for pleasure. Likewise sexual pleasure, considered from the viewpoint of nature, has no other purpose than procreation and perpetuation of the species and the maintenance of the universe in similarity with itself. If pleasure is for the sake of activities in these cases, it is reasonable that it be so in all cases. Fifth argument (144.33): where the fine and pleasure are both present, it is clear that pleasure is for the sake of the fine, not vice-versa. If the fine were choiceworthy as productive of pleasure, then the base would also be choiceworthy as productive of pleasure — the pleasure produced would be the norm of choice among means of production. F o r either we restrict the term pleasure to the results of fine actions, or the base will be as choiceworthy as the fine. But if the former is absurd, then it would be advisable for us to choose base actions as no worse than fine actions, or even b e t t e r , 1 6 if they give people more pleasures, even if the fine is also choiceworthy as productive of pleasure. But if either the fine is choiceworthy for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of the fine, and not the former, then the latter. Pleasure and the fine are not to be identified on the basis of cases where they exist together and simultaneously; if their essence were the same, they would have to reciprocate: the fine would always have to be both fine and pleasant, the pleasant both pleasant and fine. But if it is false to say that all pleasure is fine — because we see pleasures taking place as a result of base activities — then not even those pleasures occasioned by fine activities could be identical with those activities. F o r to say, at one time, that pleasures are the only things choiceworthy for themselves, that other things are choiceworthy insofar as they contribute to pleasure, and at the same time that the fine is choiceworthy as productive of pleasure, while denying that the base is choiceworthy on account of the resultant pleasure, is inconsistent — the unconvincing position of people whose choices conflict with their professions. In 1 4 5 . 2 8 f f . Alexander counters a more nuanced hedonism, a hedonism that distinguishes between fine and base activities, but still on a hedonistic basis. T o say that fine activities are pure, unmixed with contrary pains, and so choiceworthy as productive of pleasure, while pleasures due to base acts have little delight and many causes of pain, so that such activities are not choiceworthy, is in effect to distinguish pleasures according to activities, to concede that pleasures are not the same in kind. (Alexander suggests, in effect, that acceptance of the pluriformity thesis means in principle the rejection of hedonism.) F o r if pleasures due to fine acts are fine and pleasures due to base acts are base, then fineness and baseness would be the ground of distinction among pleasures. Choiceworthiness would flow not from pleasures to activities but from activities to pleasures; and fine and base pleasures would differ in kind — if all those pleasures deriving from fine activities are pure, unmixed, causing no pain or regret, being given their form by such activities, while all pleasures deriving from base activities are mixed and involve regret. If this is the relation of pleasures to activities, then choiceworthiness does not accrue from pleasures to activities, but rather from activities 16

Accepting ή καί μάλλον from Β 2 , on the basis of 151.29.

ALEXANDER

OF

APHRODISIAS:

ETHICAL

PROBLEMS

1275

to pleasures. — There is no need for a separate consideration of 26, which is all but identical with the latter part of 2 3 ( 1 4 4 . 3 4 to end). 17 asks under which of the goods pleasure is to be found: things prized (τίμια), things praised (έπαινετά), capacities (δυνάμεις), things beneficial (ωφέλιμα). If all pleasures were good and alike in kind the question would admit of a single answer. But if, as is the case, not all pleasures are good, and pleasures differ according to activities, then pleasures corresponding to choiceworthy activities are choiceworthy and those corresponding to activities to be avoided are to be avoided. Pleasures fall under that species of goods under which the corresponding activity falls: if certain activities, e.g., those according to virtue, fall under things praiseworthy, then the corresponding pleasures are praiseworthy; if some activities, e.g., nourishment, sexual activities, fall under goods as capacities, then the corresponding pleasures fall under goods of this type. While B R U N S is formally correct in saying that 5 is really three problems rather than one, 1 7 there is a unity, or better, a progression from problem to problem. The paradoxical thesis of the first part ( 1 2 4 . 3 — 1 8 ) is that pleasure, taken generically, is neither good nor bad nor indifferent. If some pleasures are good, and some bad, and some indifferent, then the genus, pleasure, cannot be any one of these things ranged under it. The same should be true of the genus activity, if some activities are good, some bad, some indifferent. But everything has to be good or bad or indifferent. Alexander's solution is that this last statement refers to actual or to potentially independent (καθ' αυτό) being; it does not apply to anything common or universal. For example, every animal is rational or irrational, but that does not make the genus animal rational or irrational. Thus even though each pleasure and each activity is one of the three, the genera are none of the three. Second problem ( 1 2 4 . 1 8 ) : what about the corresponding case of pain? Will pains attendant on good activities be bad, pains attendant on bad activities good, pains attendant on indifferent activities indifferent? It seems odd to call a pain attendant on bad activity good. Alexander suggests that while pleasures are divided according to activities, pains are signs of άλλοτριότης, of something alien to the activity. Then either (i) it is reasonable to call pain attendant on good activities bad, pain attendant on bad activities good, because each is alien to the activity involved, i.e., it is the foreignness to bad activity that is being characterized as good; or (ii) it is completely absurd to divide pain in this way, because pain is by its very nature an evil. But if pain is evil, then its contrary, pleasure, must be good or evil; but not every pleasure is good or evil, for some pleasures are indifferent. This opens the way to the third problem ( 1 2 5 . 5 ) : is there good pleasure opposed to pain as good to evil, and bad pleasure opposed to pain as evil to evil? If so, what about indifferent pleasures? It looks as though indifferent pleasure will be 17

Supplementum Aristotelicum II 2, p. xiv: „. . . ita ut tres plenae iunctae sint."

quaestiones

hic con-

1276

ARTHUR MADIGAN

contrary to evil pain, which is absurd. A distinction is suggested: pleasures should be divided into natural pleasures and those against nature, according to the activity involved; and the pleasures that are against nature are only termed pleasures equivocally, are not genuine pleasures. Man, i.e., the good man, is the standard of pleasure; what is painful to him is not pleasant, even if some people enjoy it. Of the natural pleasures, some are more proper to man, some less so. So pleasure in the strict sense is good, and is contrary to pain as evil. Unnatural pleasures are neither pleasures without qualification nor good (and so are not opposed to pain as good to evil 18 ). Likewise with the indifferent pleasures, for things indifferent are not to be classified among things natural. The contrary to pleasure, then, is not bodily pain (πόνος) but pain (λύπη), if πόνος is a kind of λύπη, not λύπη simpliciter. 19 Λύπη signifies a condition of soul arising from bodily pressure (θλϊψις) or from psychic condition, as pleasure is psychic as well as physical. Pain in general is contrary to pleasure in general; but counter-natural pleasure, which destroys natural pleasure, as proper pain does, is contrary to pain as evil to evil. 20 Alexander's conclusion: every pain is evil; natural pleasure is opposed to pain as good to evil; unnatural or counter-natural pleasure is opposed to pain as evil to evil. Closely linked with 5 are 7 and 16, both of which deal with the Eudoxan 2 1 argument for hedonism: if all pain is evil, is not all pleasure good? As 7 poses the problem: if every pain is evil by nature, why is not every pleasure good by nature? We face a dilemma: either every pleasure is evil and is contrary to pain as evil to evil, or, if every pleasure is not evil, pleasure is opposed to pain as good to evil, so that every pleasure is a good. For if some pleasure is an evil, pleasure would be among pains (!), all of which are evils, though pleasure is contrary to pain, as evil to evil or as good to evil. 22 A solution is begun at 127.8: not every pain is evil, if virtue aims at the mean, and there are psychic (?) pains (λύπαι) and physical (?) pains (πόνοι) proper to the virtuous man. Πόνος is more general than λύπη, λύπη a kind of πόνος. 2 3 As the choiceworthiness or avoidance-worthiness of pleasures follows on that of the corresponding activities, so with pains: we should shun pains associated with good actions, 24 accept those associated with bad actions. If there are λύπαι and πόνοι to be chosen, their contrary pleasures are to be avoided; and so, if not every pain is an evil, then not every pleasure is good. Even for those who posit 18 19 20

21 22

23 24

The parenthesis is an attempt to fill in the lacuna indicated by B R U N S at 125.31. This distinction is also discussed, in a rather different way, in problem 6. 2 I take εναντίον ώς κακόν κακώ, the reading of B a and S P E N G E L at 1 2 6 . 2 , as a reliable guide to the sense. Cf. E N X 2, 1172b 1 8 - 2 0 . B R U N S points out that B 2 contains a marginal comment to the effect that the solution is inexact. Cp. problem 6, where λύπη seems to be broader than πόνος. This is only apparently contradictory to Alexander's references (138.13 — 14, 144.11 — 12) to the pains involved in courage; we do not regard these pains as good, but we should not let them deter us from courageous action. Cp. also 137.9—10, where Alexander refers to pains that are not evil.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS: ETHICAL PROBLEMS

1277

that all pain is evil it does not follow, on the assumption that pain is contrary to pleasure, either that every pleasure is good or that every pleasure is bad. In the case of activities in which excess is a possibility, there are both choiceworthy pleasures and pleasures to be avoided: the intermediate are to be chosen, the excessive, which are bodily pleasures, are bad. As for those activities for which there is no excess, e.g., contemplative activities (which, when they increase, remain choiceworthy), all these are choiceworthy. There are counter-natural pleasures, e.g., beastly and pathological pleasures; these are neither strictly human nor choiceworthy. Thus (127.31) pain is opposed, as an evil, to all pleasures; but of pleasures, the counternatural are opposed to pain as evil to evil; and of those which admit of excess, some are contrary to pain as good to evil, viz., those in the mean determined by right reason, while others, those actually in excess, are opposed to pain as evil to evil; and those pleasures not subject to excess are contrary to pain as good to evil. 16 faces the same question: if all pain is evil, how is it that not all pleasure is good? If every pain is evil, and pleasure is contrary to pain, and if the contrary to evil must be good or evil, then why is not every pleasure good or every pleasure evil? Once again, the assumption underlying the problem is that there must be an across-the-board solution; the relevance of the pluriformity thesis is clear. First answer (137.1): it would be so, if all pleasures were the same in kind; but this is not the case: pleasures are divided, according to the activities which occasion them, into good and bad. Some pleasures are opposed to pain as good to evil, others as evil to evil. The contrary of evil is good or evil, and not every pain (πόνος) is an evil; pain for the sake of fine things is choiceworthy. Second answer (137.10): pleasure is good and pain is evil in similar fashion. One could say that all pleasure is good, but then some pleasure is good by nature and without qualification (the pleasure of the virtuous), other pleasure is good to a person in a certain condition but not good without qualification (the pleasure of the vicious). Pains occurring due to genuine evils are evil without qualification; other pains are evil but not without qualification, e.g., poverty or sickness suffered by a good man. The things which pain a good man are evils (but not necessarily evil without qualification). N o w to more technical questions. 5 and 7 have distinguished or contrasted λύπη and πόνος. In 6 Alexander argues that the contrary of pleasure is not πόνος but λύπη. Πόνος is defined as a pressure (θλΐψις) concerning the body, λύπη as a concentration (συστολή) concerning the soul. Pleasure is a relaxation (διάχυσις) of soul, not through the body nor occurring in body alone; hence its contrary is not, speaking generally, bodily πόνος but psychic λύπη; but for some pleasures the contrary is πόνος. Λύπη and ηδονή apply both to soul and body, πόνος to the body alone. The so-called πόνος of the soul (suggested by the term φιλόπονοι, "lovers of toil") is not contrary to pleasure, because it is accompanied by pleasure. If one experiences λύπη while in πόνος, it is the λύπη, not the πόνος, which is opposed to ηδονή. Hence every λύπη, being contrary to ήδονή, is evil and to be avoided. But not every pleasure is good: excessive pleasures, such as bodily 84

A N R W II 36.2

1278

ARTHUR MADIGAN

pleasures, are evil. Moderate pleasures, such as the necessary bodily pleasures, are choiceworthy. Λ ύ π η concerning these, as a dificiency concerning these pleasures, would be evil, as would excess; moderate pleasures, in the mean between these extremes, would be good. Some pleasures have no excess, viz., those arising from activities whose choiceworthiness increases with addition, such as activities according to the virtues; such pleasures are good of their own nature and choiceworthy. A further technical issue is the matter of 14, which maintains the proposition that there is an intermediate between pleasure and pain. If pleasure is by definition unimpeded activity, 2 5 and impeded activity is painful, then freedom from pain seems inseparable from pleasure; for in what activities would freedom from pain be found without pleasure? Neither in the impeded nor in the unimpeded. 2 6 A similar problem: every sense-perception and intellectual activity has its pleasure, in proportion to the quality of the object and the condition of the sense (or other faculty) involved. 2 7 But it seems that there is a middle condition between pleasure and pain. 2 8 If pleasure and pain consist in activities, then in inactive states such as sleep and rest we are neither in pleasure nor in pain. Further, absent proper conditions of object and faculty, the activities are not extremely pleasant (ήδισται), even if they are still pleasant; but if we go further we recognize activities which are neither pleasant nor painful. 2 9 Alexander quotes E N X 4, 1175a 3 — 10, which he sees as implying a doctrine of intermediate activities ( έ ν έ ρ γ ε ι α ι μέσαι); the passage deals with the way that neither pleasure nor pain continues indefinitely, rather the pleasure (and presumably the pain) tapers off. The intermediate, painless but without pleasure, is to be found in relaxations or remissions, slack activities, dullings or obscurings of pleasure. We perceive some things without pleasure or pain: if smell is defective because one smells either with pleasure or with pain, 3 0 then the other senses, not defective in this respect, must include that which is neither pleasant nor painful. A n d sense awareness of the privation of proper sensibles is without pleasure or pain. The problem ends here, somewhat abruptly for Alexander, i.e., without a restatement of the thesis.

25 26

27 28

29

30

Cf. E N VII 12, 1153a 1 4 - 1 5 . This may seem to imply that there is no middle state; but strictly all it implies is that there is no intermediate activity; one could still raise the question about the status of an inactive state. Cf. E N X 4, 1174b 1 4 - 2 3 . Alexander says that it seems to them, αΐιτοϊς (135.13), that there is an intermediate state between pleasure and pain. This might suggest that it is the view of opponents or objectors. But Alexander clearly endorses the thesis in question, and his citations of E N and 'De Anima' indicate that he takes the doctrine to be Peripatetic. It is difficult to be sure of the reading in 135.25; but the reference appears to be to the merely useful activities of the senses, e . g . , for protection, for mere recognition. C f . D e Anima II 9, 421a 1 0 - 1 3 .

ALEXANDER O F APHRODISIAS: ETHICAL PROBLEMS

VI.

1279

Conclusions

As SHARPLES has pointed out, Alexander's work is a blend of scholasticism and innovation. 31 The argumentation summarized above presents few if any surprises to the reader who is familiar with Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics'. Yet one finds questions not explicitly addressed by Aristotle; and the discussion of even familiar Peripatetic questions is sometimes carried on from different perspectives and with different conceptual tools from those which shaped Aristotle's own discussions, e.g., the pervasive application of contrariety theory to ethical matters, the presentation of the virtues in terms of the physical notion of mixture, the use made of the physical theory of change in the explanation of moral change, the appeal to the order of the universe to explain the superiority of activity to pleasure. If it is difficult to draw the line between exposition of Peripatetic doctrine and polemic against Stoic or Epicurean doctrine with exactness, or to say precisely what Alexander owes to the Stoics — these would be tasks for a full commentary — it is nonetheless clear that Alexander's Book of Ethical Problems reflects both his assimilation of Peripatetic tradition and his encounter with opposing positions. If some of Alexander's arguments, or even some of his questions, strike a modern reader as artificial, the book as a whole witnesses to the vital and self-questioning character of Aristotelian thought, carried on in Alexander's study and schoolroom, as the second century of our era gave way to the third. 31

84*

Above in this same volume (ANRW II 36,2), pp. 1176ff.

NACHTRÄGE ZU BAND II. 16.3 U N D BAND II. 36.1:

Index to Contribution on

In the Light of the Moon: Demonology in the Early Imperial Period* b y FREDERICK E . BRENK, S . J . , R o m e

Contents I. Authors and Texts Cited

1283

II. Historical Persons

1289

III. Subjects

1290

IV. Technical Terms

1294

V. Modern Authors

1296

I. Authors and Texts

Aëtios (Aëtius) Placita II 30,1 2096 (56) Aischylos (Aeschylus) 2082 Persai 354 2082 Agamemnon 1501, 1508 2082 Prometheus 275 2112 (72) Ambrose (Ambrosius) 2141—2142 Antiochos of Askalon 2090 Antonios Diogenes 2096 Apollodoros I 20 2085 (32 a) Apollonios of Tyana 2136—2141 Epistolai 45 2136 (103)

50 52

Cited

2136 (103) 2136 (103)

Appian (Appianus) Bella Civilia IV 134 2145 (92) Apuleius 2 1 3 0 - 2 1 3 5 Apologia 1 0 - 1 1 2133-2134 De deo Socratis 95 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 2135 150-153 2134 153 2135 155-156 2135 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 2135 De Platone II 23,252ff. 2131 (95) Metamorphoses I 1 2 - 1 9 2132

* In: W. HAASE, ed., A N R W II 16.3, B e r l i n - N e w York 1986, pp. 2068-2145.

1284

FREDERICK

Timaeus XI 38 p. 177b. 15ff. 2134 (100) Aratos 2120 Artemidoros Oneirokritika II 56 2140 (108) Aristotle (Aristoteles) Frgm. 192 (ROSE) 2095 (51) Frgm. 196 2096 (55) Eudemos Frgm. 44 2095 (53) Frgm. 192 2097 (59) Ps. Aristotle Peri Kosmou 2127 (87) Aristotle, Commentators on (see Michael of Ephesos, Olympiodoros) Augustine (Augustinus) De civitate dei VII 6 2090 Aurelius, Marcus (see Marcus Aurelius) Chrysippos 2089, 2097, 2128 Cicero 2089, 2134 De natura deorum II 2090 Somnium Scipionis 2097 (60), 2098 (61) Clement of Alexandria Stromateis V 14.127 2084 Demokritos (Democritus)

2085, 2097 (60)

Diogenes Laertios De clarorum philosophorum vitis VIII 8.23 2097 (59) Dio Cassius (see Kassios Dion) Dion of Prousa (Prusa)

2072 (6)

Empedokles (Empedocles) 2095 (50), 2096, 2118, 2136, 2140 Purifications (Katharmoi) DK 31 Β 21.12 2085 Β 115.5 2085 Β 115.3 2085 Epicharmos Frgm. 165 (KAIBEL) 2097 (59) Frgm. 258 2084 (31) Epiktetos (Epictetus) 2090 Eudoros 2100, 2133 (97) Euripides Bakchai (Bacchae) 2144 (to 29) 84 2083

E.

BRENK

182 2083 190 2083 194 2083 199 2083 200 2083 219 2083 242 2083 256 2083 272 2083 298 2083 333 2083 417 2083 477 2083 498 2083 1325 2083 First Hippolytus Frgm. 444 (NAUCK) 2084 Eustathios In Iliadem p. 1067, 58, 59ff. 2096 (55) Galen (Galenos) De placitis Hippocratis et Piatonis 5.6 = Poseidonios Frgm. 187 (EDELSTEIN— KIDD)

Germanicus

2097

2120

Herakleides Pontikos (Heraclides Ponticus) 2097 Frgm. 97 (WEHRLI)

2096 (58)

Herakleitos (Heraclitus) Frgm. 119 (DIELS-KRANZ) Hermotimos 2097 Herodotos History I 132 2112 II 145 2143

2084 (31)

Hesiod (Hesiodos) 2082 , 2124 - 2 1 2 5 Works and Days (Opera) 102ff. 2112 (72) Ps. Hippokrates De morbo sacro (JONES [Loeb] 2, pp. 146— 147) IV 20 2112 (72) Homer 2071 - 2 0 8 2 , 2130, 2142-2143, 2144 (to 4) Iliad I 222 2075 II Iff. 2114 III 420 2073, 2076-2077, 2080 IV 7 5 - 8 4 2079 (23) IV 275 2073

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD V 437 2074, 2078 (20) V 443 2114 V 459 2078 (20) V 884 2078 (20) VI 115 2075 VII 291 2074, 2076 (13) VII 377 2074, 2076 (13) VII 396 2074 Vili 166 2078, 2077 (15) IX 600 2073, 2076 (13) Χ 521 2112 Χ 564 2112 Χ 572 2112 XI 480 2076 (13), 2077 (14) XI 792 2073, 2076, 2077 (15) XV 418 2073, 2076 (13), 2077 (14) XV 403 2073 XV 468 2076 (13) XV 599 2078 (19, 20) XVI 705 2078 (20) XVI 786 2078 (20) XVI 845-846 2081 XVII 98 2074, 2077 (15), 2078 XVII 104 2077 (15), 2078 XIX 188 2077 (15), 2078 XX 87 2079 (21) XX 447 2078 (20) XX 493 2078 (20) XXI 18 2078 (20) XXI 82-84 2080 XXI 92-93 2080 XXI 93 2073 , 2076 (13) XXI 227 2074 XXIII 65 2114, 2076 (13) XXIII 391 2078 (19) XXIII 595 2075 XXIV 564 2080 Scholion Τ in Iliadem XVI 408 2096 (55) Odyssey II 134 2074, 2Q76 (13), 2078 (19), 2079

IX 381 2074, 2076 (13) Χ 64 2074, 2076 (13), 2077 (16) XI 61 2074, 2077 (16), 2079 (22) XI 587 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XII 169 2076 (13), 2079 (21), 2111 XII 295 2074, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XIV 386 2073, 2076 (13), 2078 (19), 2079 (21) XIV 488 2074, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XV 261 2077 (16), 2079 (22) XVI 64 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XVI 194 2074, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XVI 370 2073, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XVII 243 2074, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XVII 446 2076 (13) XVIII 146 2074, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XVIII 256 2074, 2076 (13) XIX 10 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XIX 38 2079 (21) XIX 129 2076 (13) XIX 138 2076 (13) XIX 201 2074, 2076 (13), 2079 (21) XIX 512 2074, 2076 (13) XIX 87 2076 (13) XXI 201 2079 (21) XXIV 149 2073 , 2076 (13), 2078 (19) XXIV 306 2074, 2076 (13) XXIV 501 2078 (19) Homeric Hymns Aphrodite I 256 ff. 2096 (56) Demeter 300 2079 (22) Dionysos 31 2078 (19) Hermes (Mercurius) 138 2078 (19) Pan 22 2078 41 2078

(21)

II 416 2078 (19) III 27 2076 (13) III 166 2074, 2076 (13), 2078 (19), 2079 (21) IV 275 2073, 2076 (13) V 396 2075 (11), 2076 (13), 2078 (19), 2079 (21) V 421 2074, 2076 (13) VI 172 2073 , 2076 (13) VII 248 2073, 2076 (13) VII 248-251 2076 (13), 2079 (21)

1285

Iamblichos De vita pythagorica 20, p. 18.1 2095 (51) 82 p. 47, 14-15 2096 (58) 100 2097 (59) 144 2097 (59) 175 2097 (59) Protreptikos (Protrepticus) 112,18 2095 (53) Irenaeus

2142

1286

FREDERICK E. BRENK

Josephus (Iosephos) Antiquitates Iudaicae V i l i 4 4 - 4 8 2116 (75) Justin (Iustinus) 2142

Paulinus Vita Ambrosii 8.28; cf. 9.43

Kassios Dion (Cassius Dio)

2145 (to 105)

Kastor (Castor) of Rhodes FgrHist, 250 F 16

2097 (58)

Krates (Crates) of Mallos Kronios (Cronius)

2102

2097 (60)

Livy (Livius) Ab urbe condita I 1 6 , 5 - 8 2114 Lucían (Loukianos) 2 1 3 0 - 2 1 3 5 Icaromenippean Satires 13 57 Philopseudes 4 5 2112, 2130 16 2112, 2131 17 2112, 2131 22 2131 29 2131 Macrobius Somnium Scipionis I 12 2097 (60) Marcus Aurelius 2090 V 27

2090

Maximus of Tyre 2090 Menander (Menandros) F r g m . 7 1 4 (SANDBACH)

2084, 2129, 2141

Epitrepontes F r g m . 2 5 8 (KAIBEL) 1091 ff.

2084 (31)

2084 (31)

Michael of Ephesos In Aristotelis De generatione animalium p . 1 6 0 (HAYDUCK, 1 9 0 3 )

Noumenios (Numenius) F r g m . 3 7 (DES PLACES)

2096 (56)

2092 (46) 2092 (46)

Olympiodoros In Aristotelis Meteorologica 3 8 2 a 6 (STUEVE)

Origen 2135, 2142 Contra Celsum I 68

2135 (102)

Ovid (Ovidius) Parmenides

2069

2097 (60)

2096 (56)

2142 (110)

Paulos Aiginetes (Paulus Aegineta) Epitome 1 2 0 (KUEHN)

2112 (72)

Petron of Himera 2122 Petronius 2131, 2133 (96) Pherekydes (Pherecydes) 2098 (61) Philip (Philippos) of Opus(?) Epinomis 2087 (36) 984 E 2096 (56) Philo (Philon) 2 0 9 8 - 2 1 0 7 , 2125, 2144 (to 69 b) De confusione linguarum 171 2100 (66), 2105 174 2105 177 2105 De creatione mundi 146 2103 De gigantibus 6 - 1 5 2105 6 - 2 4 2102 1 2 - 1 5 2102 15 2102 16 2102 1 6 - 1 9 2105 17 2105 1 7 - 1 8 2106 19-20 2105-2106 De migratione Abrahami 137 2104 147 2104 De opificio mundi (On the Creation) 146 2103 De plantatione 1 4 - 2 2 2102 20 2103 21 2103 24 2104 De posteritate Caini 91 2100 (66) De sobrietate 65 2104 De somniis I 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 2103 I 139 2103 I 141-142 2103-2104 I 143 2104 I 1 4 6 - 1 4 9 2104 I 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 2104

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD

40 D 2087 41A 2100 41E 2096 42 Β 2096 42 E 2087 Seventh Letter 340-345 2133 (97) Epinomis (see Philip of Opus) Plato, Commentators on (see Proklos)

Heres 240 2100 Legum Allegoriae III 177 2104 178 2105 Quaestiones in Exodum I 12 2100 (64), 2104 XX 19 2099 Philolaos

2096

F r g m . 1 - 7 (DIELS-KRANZ)

Frgm. 11 Frgm. 13 Frgm. 17

1287

2 0 9 5 (51)

2095 (51) 2095 (51) 2095 (51)

Philostratos 2145 (to 106) Vita Apollonii 2136-2142 I 2 2136 I 19 2137 I 21 2137 (105) II 4 2137 (105) III 38 2140 III 43 2137 IV 10 2137 (105), 2139 IV 20 2137 (105), 2139 IV 25 2137 (105), 2139 IV 44 2137 (105), 2138 V 9 2137 (105) VI 27 2140 VII 7 2137 (105) VII 9 2137 (105) VII 32 2137 (105) Vili 7 2137 (105) Vili 9 2137 (105) Plato (Platon) Apology 2 7 C - E 2086 Kratylos (Cratylus) 3 9 7 E - 3 9 8 C 2086 Laws (Nomoi) 713D 2087 823B,1—4 2087 896 ff. 2104 Phaidon (Phaedo) 107D 2087 Phaidros 2103 Politela (República) 2103 617E 2087 620 D 2087 Symposion (Symposium) 2085, 2103 202D—203 A 2086 202 E 2118, 2125 Timaios (Timaeus) 3 9 E 1 0 - 4 0 A 2 2087

Plautus Rudens Prol. 1 - 3

2096 (58)

Pliny (Plinius) Naturalis Historia II 15 2112 (72) Plutarch (Ploutarchos) 2072 , 2082 , 2084, 2086-2089, 2091-2094, 2096-2098, 2101, 2103 (69c), 2115-2116, 2117-2130, 2138 De defectu oraculorum 415 Äff. 2118 415 D 2082 4 1 5 F - 4 1 8 A 2097, 2118 416D 2089 (38) 4 1 7 D - E 2119 417E 2118 (78) 419 A 2097 (59) 4 1 9 B - E 2120 4 1 9 E - F 2121 421E 2122 De E apud Delphos 393F 2088, 2127 De facie in orbe lunae 944 D 2126-2127 9 4 4 D - E 2127-2128 944 E 2126 De fortuna Romanorum 320 A 2128 De genio Socratis (On the daimonion of Sokrates) 568 E 2125 586A 2124 588 E 2125 590 Β 2085 (32 a) 5 9 1 C - E 2126 593 C—594 A 2125 De Iside et Osiride 360 D 2097 (59) 360 E 2089 (38), 2097 361Β 2089 (38) 361 Dff. 2123 370E 2123

1288

FREDERICK E. BRENK

De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1 0 5 1 C - D 2089 De superstitione (Peri deisidaimonias) 171 2127 De tranquillitate animae 4 7 4 B - C 2084, 2129 Erotikos (Amatorius) 2117 Plaionicae Quaestiones 1007f. 2088 Quaestiones convivales 682 F—683 Β 2085 Quaestiones Romanae 282 A 2097 Antony 2145 (to 92) 33 2128 Aratos 8 2129 (91) Brutus 2145 (to 92) 14 2128 36 2128-2129, 2139 37 2128 48 2128, 2145 (to 92) Caesar 66 2128 79 2145 (to 92) Cato Minor 54 2128 Coriolanus 32 2115 Dion-Brutus 2 2102, 2128 Dion 54 2128 55 2113 56 2128 Galba 18 2129 (91) Pompey (Pompeius) 76 2128 Romulus 28 2115 Pollio (Asinius) 2145 (to 92) Porphyry (Porphyrios) De antro nympharum 28 2097 (60) Vita Pythagorae 38 2097 (59) Poseidonios (Posidonius) 2089-2090 Frgm. 187 (EDELSTEIN-KIDD) 2090 Proklos (Proclus) In Timaeum I 7 7 , 9 - 1 3 2089 (38)

Pythagoras

2085, 2094-2098, 2136, 2140

Scholia (see Homer, Iliad) Sextos Empeirikos (Sextus Empiricus) I 74 2089 (38) IX 71 2090 IX 86 2089 Sophokles (Sophocles) Oidipous Tyrannos (Oedipus Tyrannus) 28 2112 (72) 828 2083 Trachiniai (Women of Trachis) 1235 2082 Tacitus Annales I 71 2133 (96) XIII 17 2133 (96) XV 72 2133 (96) Tertullian Timaios

2116 Lokros

(Timaeus

Locrus)

2101,

2121 (81)

Valerius Maximus 2128, 2145 (to 92) I 7,7 2129 (92) Varrò 2090, 2096 Vergil 2069, 2097, 2112, 2118, 2144 (to introd.) Aeneid IV 129 2112 VI 735-743 2085 (32a) Xenokrates

2082 (26), 2 0 8 7 - 2 0 9 0 , 2094,

2097, 2118, 2130, 2134 F r g m . 18 ( H E I N Z E )

Zoroaster

2088

2092,2118,2123 (83)

Biblica Daniel 2144 (2) Genesis I 27 2103 I 48.15ff. 2104 III 2093 VI 2 2102 Exodos XII 23 2093 XX 19 2094 Enoch 8 9 2 1 1 0 ( 7 0 d) Isaiah 13.21 2093

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD 10.19 2114 13 2108 13.16 2113 24 2114 John 9.52 2113 12.31 2108 14.30 2108 16.11 2108 19.11 2110 Acts 5.16 2113 8.25 2114 11.13 2114 16 2115 19 2115 Colossians 1 . 1 3 - 2 0 2110 I Corinthians 1 0 . 1 9 - 2 1 2120 15 2108 1 5 . 2 4 - 2 7 2108 II Corinthians 6 . 1 4 - 1 8 2109 Ephesians 2.2 2108, 2109 6 . 5 - 7 2109 6 . 1 0 - 1 7 2109 6 . 1 0 - 1 8 2110 Galatians 4 . 8 - 1 0 2110 I John 2108 I Timothy 2 . 1 - 2 2110 Apocalypse (Revelations) 12 2110 13 2110 17.9 2110

30.6 2093 31.13 2093 II Kings 19.35 2093 Psalms 77.49 2105 91.10 2093 Tobias 6 - 8 2093 Matthew 1.20 2114 1 . 2 3 - 2 8 2113 2.19 2114 4 2113 8.17 2113 8.31 2107 15.22 2113 17.15 2107 28 2114 Mark 1 2113 1 . 2 3 - 2 8 2113 1 . 2 9 - 3 1 2108 1.34 2107 1 . 3 9 - 4 2 2108 3 2108 5.1 ff. 2109 (70a) 5 . 1 - 2 0 2113 7.25 2113 8.22 (cod. 1038) 2113 9 . 1 4 - 2 9 2113 9.29 2115 9.17 2108 9.42 2108 16 2114 16.9 2114 Luke 4 2113 4 . 3 8 - 3 9 2108 6.18 2113 8 2114 8.2 2114 9.39 2108 9.42 2108 10.18 2114

Kaushitaki Upanishad Yast XIX 33 2098 (61) XXIV 24.27 2098 (61) Videvat 19.33 2098 (61)

II. Historical Alexander 2121 Ammonios (friend of Plutarch)

2101, 2118

Persons

Antiochos of Askalon 2090, 2129 (93) Antony (M. Antonius) 2128

1289

1290

F R E D E R I C K E. B R E N K

Augustus (Octavius) 92) Brutus (Marcus)

2120, 2128, 2145 (to

2 1 2 8 - 2 1 2 9 , 2145 (to 92)

Kelsos (Celsus)

Mithridates 2090

Pilate

2110

Pompey (Pompeius)

Demetrios (friend of Plutarch) 2121 (80) Dion (of Syracuse) 2 1 2 8 - 2 1 2 9 Domitian 2138 2118

Herakleides (of Syracuse)

2090

Octavius (see Augustus)

Caesar (Iulius) 2128 Catulus (Q. Lutatius) 2090 Cassius 2145 (to 92) Cassius of Parma 2 1 2 8 - 2 1 2 9 Celsus (see Kelsos)

Epameinondas

Lucullus

2128

2135 (102)

Sennacherib

2128

2093

Sokrates (Socrates) 2126 Sulla 2089 Tiberius 2120 Tigellinus 2138

2086, 2100, 2118, 2 1 2 4 -

Volumnius (friend of Brutus)

III.

Abraham 2104 Academy 2090, 2126 (87) Acarnania 2143, 2144 (2) Acheloos 2091, 2143 Achilleus 2076, 2078 (20), 2079, 2114 Actium 2128, 2129 (92), 2144, 2145 (to 92) Aeneas 2097 aerial spirits 2087 Aesculapius 2135 Agamemnon 2078 Ahriman 2092 Ahura Mazda 2092 Aineias 2114 Aiolos 2111 aitherial spirits 2087, 2089, 2099 Akko 2071 Aktion (see Actium) Alexandria 2090, 2100, 2118, 2127, 2128 Alkestis 2082 (27) Allecto 2111 allegorical interpretation 2072 (6) Alphito 2071 Amor 2134 Amphiaraus 2135 angels 2 0 9 9 - 2 1 0 7 Angru Mainyu 2092 animism 2 0 9 0 - 2 0 9 1

2128

Subjects

anthropomorphism 2072 (6), 2074, 2 0 7 9 2080, 2088 Aphrodite 2073, 2077, 2087 (34), 2112 (72) apocalyptic 2097, 2110 (70c) Apollo 2078, 2082, 2112, 2122, 2127, 2136 Apostles (see John, Paul, Peter, Philip) apotropaic rites 2 0 8 8 , 2 1 1 8 Arab 2131 Archangels (see Gabriel, Michael, Raphael) Areimanios 2092, 2127 Ares 2078 (20), 2112 (72) Argeiphontes 2080 Aristotelianism 2087, 2098, 2135 Artemis 2083, 2144 Asia Minor 2128 Asklepios 2093 astrology 2120 Athena 2077, 2079, 2081, 2091, 2116 Athos (Mt.) 2166, 2139 Augustan ideology 2111 avenging angel 2100 avenging daimones 2128 Babylonia 2111 beasts 2093 Beelzebub 2106, 2108 Beykos 2143 bird epiphanies (Vogelgestalt)

2079, 2093

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD Boiotia 2082 Boreas 2093, 2111 Bosporos 2143 Boston plaque 2093 Brahmins 2138 Britain 2121 Caesarea-Paneas 2120 Capricorn 2121 Christ (see Jesus) 2115 Christianity 2107-2116, 2144 (to 70) Corinth 2131 Coriolanus 2155 creation 2096 Crete 2119 Cupid and Psyche 2133 Damis 2137, 2139 Daniel 2110, 2121 Dareios (Darius) 2082 (27) death of daimones 2119—2121 death of psyche 2 1 2 6 - 2 1 2 7 Delphi 2118 Delphic myth 2121-2122 Demeter 2123 devil 2107-2116, 2144 (to 70) Dendrites 2070 Diomedes 2078 Dionysos 2082-2083, 2091, 2123, 2144 (to 29) disease 2093, 2112 divinization 2122—2124 dreams 2123 double causality and motivation 2115 dual daimones 2084 dualism 2123 Dyrrachion 2128 Echinades Islands 2119, 2143 Egypt 2112, 2118 Egyptian imprecation 2131 Egyptian religion 2123 Elpenor 2079 (22) Emmaus 2114 Empousa 2071, 2139 Endymiones 2096 Ephesos 2115, 2139, 2145 (to 106) Ephialtes 2071 epilepsy 2116 epiphanies (see bird epiphanies) Epirus 2144 (2) Erechtheus 2093 Erinyes 2071, 2098 Eriounios 2080

1291

Eros 2086 (34), 2087 (35) erotic motifs 2094 (94), 2119 (78), 2132, 2138-2140, 2085, 2094-2097, 2 1 2 6 - 2 1 2 7 Ethiopians 2140 Eukrates 2131 Euphorbos 2081, 2136 exhalation 2123 exorcism 2094, 2107-2116, 2130-2131, 2138 fall of angels 2099, 2106, 2142 fall of souls 2099, 2106 Febris 2112 (72) folk spirits 2069-2071, 2132-2133, 2140 Formgeschichte 2144 (to 70 c) Forms (Ideas) 2088, 2127, 2133 Gabriel (Archangel) 2106 Gaza 2114 genii 2138 geometrical definitions 2087 Giants 2 0 9 1 , 2 0 9 4 , 2 1 1 1 Gnosticism 2129 Golden Age 2069, 2082, 2125 Gorgon 2070 Gorgon-Fury 2131 Great Pan (see Pan) Great Year 2122 guardian daimones 2082, 2124—2125 Hades 2088, 2127, 2130 Hekate (Hecate) 2070 Hektor 2078, 2081 Helen 2073, 2078, 2097 (58) Herakles 2119, 2123 Herakles Apotropaios 2140 Hermes (Hermeias) 2077, 2080, 2082, 2120 Hermon (Mt.) 2120 holy man 2112-2113 Holy Spirit 2108 Homeric hexameters 2112 Homeric revival 2071-2072, 2081-2082 human sacrifice 2119 Hyperborean magos 2130 hypostases 2076 hysteria 2115 Idaian Daktyls 2127 immanentism 2103 Indians 2138 inscriptions 2143 Ion 2130 Isles of Blest 2096 Israel 2110 (70d)

1292

FREDERICK E. BRENK

Iuno (Juno) 2111 Ixion 2085 (32 a) Jacob 2104-2105 Jacob's ladder 2104 Jesus (Christ) 2107-2113, 2115, 2139 Jewish angel 2121 John (Apostle) 2113 Julio-Claudians 2120-2121 Joppa 2114 Jordan 2120 Judaism 2093-2094, 2098-2107, 2110 (70c), 2113, 2144 (2) Khnum 2120 (79) Kleombrotos (friend of Plutarch) 2121-2122, 2130 Korybantes (Corybantes) 2127 Kyamites 2070

2118,

Lamia 2071, 2133, 2139, 2140 Lebadeia 2125 Leto 2082, 2114 Linear Β 2111 Lykaon 2080-2081 Macedonian kingdom 2121 magic 2 1 1 2 - 2 1 1 3 , 2 1 1 5 , 2 1 3 8 magical papyri 2114, 2116 mantic 2086, 2124-2125 Marduk-Ea formula 2094 Mary Magdalene 2114, 2139 Menelaos 2078 Menippos 2139 Michael (Archangel) 2106, 2121 Meriones 2119 messianism 2110 (70c), 2120 midday demon 2071, 2112 Middle Platonism 2085-2094, 2098-2107, 2117-2130, 2131, 2133 (97), 2136-2137 Milky Way 2096-2097 Minoan seals 2070 Minoans 2070, 2081, 2091, 2093 Minotaur 2070 miracles 2113 Mithraism 2092 mixed (hybrid) monsters 2070, 2091 Molos 2094, 2118 monsters 2114, 2139 moon 2087-2089, 2095 (51), 2096-2097, 2098 (61), 2118, 2125, 2130, 2142 Mopsos 2135 Mormo 2071 Mormolykia 2139

Muses 2095 (50), 2136 mythology 2081-2082, 2142-2143, (to 106)

2145

Near East 2081, 2089, 2091, 2094, 2108, 2111, 2140 negative valence 2091 Neoplatonism 2129 Neopythagoreanism 2094-2098,2118,2125, 2127, 2136 Nestor 2074 Nostos 2074, 2076-2077 nymph 2094, 2096 (56), 2112 (72), 2118, 2119 (78) Odysseus 2076, 2079 (22), 2080, 2111 Olympians 2111 Oromazes (Ohrmazd) 2092, 2123 Orphies 2118,2139 Osiris 2121,2123-2124, 2135 ostriches 2093 owls 2093 Palestine 2110 (70c), 2111, 2120, 2131 Palodes 2119,2143 Pan 2112 (72), 2119-2121 Pan-Capricorn 2120 Pan (celestial) 2120 Pan (Great) 2118-2120,2143,2144 Paneion 2120 Panias 2120 Paris 2078 Patroklos 2078,2081,2114 Paul (Apostle) 2108-2110,2115 Paxoi 2119,2143 Penelope 2077-2120 penology 2085 Pentheus 2083 Pergamon 2144 Perseus 2083 Persia 2092, 2108 (61) Persian kingdom 2120 Persian magi 2112 personal daimon 2089 Peter (Apostle) 2114 Pharisees 2113 Philip (Apostle) 2114 Philippi 2115 Philippos (friend of Plutarch) 2143 Phrygia 2118 Platonism 2084-2091, 2097, 2121 2130, 2133-2135, 2145 (to 111) Pluto (Plouton) 2123,2127,2129

(81),

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD poetry 2112 Poseidon 2076, 2082 Priam 2077, 2080 prince of light 2108 prophecy 2112,2123 Propaxos 2143 Proteus 2140 pseudo-philosophical literature 2122—2123, 2130 psychological projection 2076 purification 2145 (to 106) Pythagoras 2095 (51), 2096 (58), 2097 (60), 2136, 2140-2141 Pythagoras-Euphorbos 2136 Pythagoreanism 2085-2091, 2094-2098, 2100 (64), 2121-2122, 2124-2125, 2140 Pythia 2112 Python 2112, 2122, 2127 Pythones 2112 Quirinus 2115 Qumran 2110 (70c, 70d) Raphael (Archangel) 2093-2094 Red Sea 2121,2130,2138 reincarnation 2099, 2106, 2118 retribution 2125 (84) ritual 2145 (to 106) Rome 2109-2110, 2115, 2118, 2120-2121 Romulus 2115 sacrifice 2119 Satan 2106,2110,2114 satyr 2071, 2091, 2140 scapegoat 2145 (to 106) Sceptics 2135 Selenites 2096 Sennacherib 2095 Serapis 2123-2124 Shu-Adonis-Osiris 2120 (79) Sibyl 2097 sickness 2111 Silas 2115 Simmias 2125 Sirens 2071,2091,2111 snake 2093,2110 Socrates 2134-2135 solar imagery 2097 Solarium Augusti 2120 (79) Solomon 2116(75) Somnus 2144 (to 4) Sophists 2135 (102) 85

A N R W II 36.2

1293

soul 2144 (to 4) stars 2098, 2126 Stoicism 2089, 2126 (87), 2135 Strinx 2071 sublunary daimon 2088, 2097 sublunary sphere 2088, 2097, 2125-2126, 2130 succubus 2093 Sumerian incantations 2094 sun 2098 (61), 2126 sun cure 2139 superstition 2102, 2130 Sykites 2070 syncretism 2089-2090, 2134, 2141 Syria 2112,2131 Tantalos 2079 (21) Teiresias 2083 Teukros 2081 Thamous 2120 Thebes 2124 Thespiai 2117 Thessalian witchcraft 2133 Timarchos 2125 Titans 2091,2094,2111,2121 Tityos 2127 Tobias 2093-2094 triangles 2088 Tritopatores 2095 Trophoniads 2127 Trophonios 2125 Tychiades 2131 Typhon 2121, 2127 unconscious mind

2076

vampire motif 2132 Vogelgestalt (see bird epiphanies) winds 2093, 2111 witchcraft 2133 wonderworker 2141 world-soul 2088 young gods

2088

Zervanism 2092 (46) Zeus 2080-2081,2111,2120 Zeus-Ammon 2121 Zeus-Iupiter 2111 Zoroaster 2118 Zoroastrianism 2092, 2123, 2127

FREDERICK E. BRENK

1294

IV.

Technical

aion 2109 aither 2089, 2103 alastores 2082, 2119 anathymiasis 2123 angel-logoi 2099, 2 1 0 0 - 2 1 0 5 angel-logoi coaches 2104 angel-psychai 2102, 2105 mge\s-daimones-psycbai 2102, 2105 zngels-daimones-psychai 2011—2012, 2106 angebt 2104 animi 2134 apatheis 2134 apeiron 2106 arcbon 2108 arete 2145 (to 92) aristeia 2078 (20) ataraxia 2145 (to 92) ate 2079 (22) aurea aetas 2144 (to introd.) autokrator 2110 barathra 2139 barbaros sophia 2122, 2138 basileis 2110 beast-daimon 2112 btaiothanatos 2138 charakter

2103

daemon 2134 daemones 2134 daeva 2098 (61) daevas 2092 daimones epicbtbonioi 2096, 2125 daimones-psycbai 2101, 2108 daimonia 2089, 2107, 2110, 2128, 2139 daimonion 2075, 2086 (33), 2093, 2 1 0 7 2108, 2115, 2137 daimonion (to) 2075, 2124 daimonion ti 2137 daimonios 2075 daimonizomenoi 2107 daio 2071 (5) deisidaimonia 2102, 2113 demiourgos 2087, 2106, 2130 deus 2134 doxa 2105 dynameis 2104-2105 eidola 2085 eidolon 2138-2139

Terms

empatheis 2134 endymiones 2096 epicbtbonioi daimones 2096, 2125 epoche 2121 eros-daimon 2086 (33), 2117 exousia 2109 fravasis

2098 (61)

genii 2090 god-daimon-hero-man

2097 (59)

bedra 2134 heroes 2102 heros 2123 heroia 2098 bypatos 2088 hypokrites 2139 hypomnemata 2136—2137 kalokagathia 2104 karma 2071 (4) ker 2071 (4) fcer« 2071 (4), 2144 (to 4) kosmokratores 2110 kosmos 2088, 2 1 0 2 - 2 1 0 3 kosmos noetos 2105, 2122 kosmos phainomenos 2105 krasis 2123 kreittones 2121 (80) lamiai 2133, 2140 lar 2134 lares 2090, 2134 larva 2134 laudatio 2137 lemur(es) 2134 logike physis 2102 logoi 2 0 9 9 - 2 1 0 5 logoi zngel-daimones 2104 logoi-daimones 2141 logos 2090, 2103 , 2105 - 2 1 0 6 magos manes mentes moira

2130 2134 2134 2080-2081

neatos 2088 nekromanteia

2071

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD nekyomanteia 2071 nous 2088, 2103, 2125-2127, 2129, 2135, 2138 nous-daimon 2089, 2122, 2125 numen 2134 numen Augusti 2120 nymphe 2118 oikoumene 2110 on (to) 2103 ousiai physikai 2089

zoon 2103 zoon noeton

2088

άγγελοι λόγοι 2099-2100, 2105 άκραιφνές 2139 άναπετάννυσθαι 2085 (32 a) απαύγασμα 2103 άπεικονισθεϊσα 2103 απόσπασμα 2103 ατή 2079 (22) βαρύ καί κοίλον φθέγγεται

parousia 2108 pathe 2104 pax Augusta 2120, 2144 (to introd.) phantasmata 2130-2131 philanthropia 2104 philosophia 2105 physis logike 2105 pietas 2111 pneuma 2103,2108-2109, 2115, 2141 pneuma pythona 2115 pneumata 2115-2116, 2141 poneroi 2105 potestas 2134 prophetes 2130 psychai 2102 psyche 2123, 2126-2127 psyche logike 2102 purgatorium 2085 (32 a) sophia (barbaros) 2122, 2138 sophos 2121, 2130, 2138 soul-da/morz-angel 2106 soul-daimones 2105 spoudaios 2130 stoicheia 2110 sympatheia 2089 theion (to) 2124 theios aner 2096 theios logos 2104 theioteros 2136 theoi 2083, 2143 theoi daimones 2143 theos 2123, 2135 theos tis 2080 thymos 2078 topos 2145 (to 92) tyche 2083, 2125 (84), 2128-2129, 2141 tyche-daimon 2094 tyche-daimones 2084 85»

1295

2138

δαίμων 2072 (7), 2076 (12), 2137 (105) δαίμων (άλλα δε) 2072 (7), 2078 (19) δαίμων, ήθος 2084 (31) δαίμων, θεός 2072 (7) δαίμων (ό εκάστου) 2089 δαίμων δς έλαύνει 2139 δαίμονα 2078 δαίμονα (προς) 2075, 2078 δαίμονα δώσω 2078 δαίμονι 2078 δαίμονι ίσος (ίσος) 2076, 2078 (20) δαίμονος 2078 δαίμονος (προς) 2078 δαίμονος αίσα 2079 (22), 2143 τα δαιμόνια 2137 (105) το δαιμόνιον 2137 (105) δαιμόνιος 2137 (105) δαιμονίως 2137 (105) δαιμονώντες 2130 Διός αισα 2072 (7) έγγαστρίμυθος 2129 (91) ειδώλων φαντασίαι 2140 εΐρων καί ψεύστης 2139 έκμαγεϊον 2103 έκπεταννυμένη 2085 (32 a) έλελήθει δαιμόνων 2139 εμβαλε δαίμων 2129 (19) εχραε δαίμων 2129 (19) ήγαγε δαίμων 2078 (19) ήγεμών λόγος 2104 ήθος δαίμων 2084 (31) ήνυσε δαίμων 2078 (19) ήπαφε δαίμων 2078 (19) ήρχε δέ δαίμων 2078 (19) ήρχε, ήγαγε 2078 (19) Μείον καί δαιμόνιον 2123 θεός, δαίμων 2072 (7) θεών τις 2080

1296

FREDERICK

E.

BRENK

κηρες, κάρες 2144 (to 4) κρημνούς και βάραθρα 2138

όμοίωσις θεώ 2132 (95) οπαδός 2105

μακάρων νήσοι 2096 (58) μαντείαν 2086 (34) μήδετο δαίμων 2078 (19)

συνήθη, σύντροφα τοΰ θνητού βίου ποθούσαι 2103 τέταρτον

νύμφη

ύποφθέγγομαι

2119(78)

2078 (20) 2129 (91)

V. Modern Authors

ALONI, Α .

2125 (84)

ANDERSON, G . ANDRES, F .

2135 (102)

2070 (1), 2090, 2 0 9 4 , 2082 (27)

ANTON, J . P .

2 0 8 6 (33)

ARMSTRONG, A . H .

2098 (62), 2117

(76),

AUSTIN, N .

2 0 9 4 (49)

BALDWIN, B .

2135 (102)

BANNERT, H .

2 0 7 9 (23)

BAYET, J .

2131 (95)

BEEKES, R . S. P . BENVENISTE, E . BERGER, Κ .

2117 (76), 2135 (102) 2 0 7 2 (7)

BIANCO, G .

2131 (95)

BILLERBECK, P .

2142 (109) 2097 (59), 2116 (75)

BOUSSET, W .

CHAPOUTHIER, F . CHERNISS, H .

COLPE, C .

2083 (29) 2086 (34)

2 1 1 0 (70C)

2 0 7 0 (1), 2090, 2092

CONACHER, D . J . CORLU, A .

2 0 7 0 (1)

DANIÉLOU, J .

2 0 8 6 (33) 2 0 7 3 (8), 2 1 3 5

2079

2089, 2126

COLLINS, J . J .

2097 (60)

BOWERSOCK, G . W .

2 0 7 2 (7), 2 0 7 5 (9),

(23), 2080, 2081

2120

BOUSSOULAS, N .

2098, 2100 2111(71)

CLARKE, W . M .

BONNER, C .

BOULANGER, H .

2141 (109) 2135 (102)

CHANTRAINE, P .

2101 (69), 2103 (69c),

BÖCHER, O .

2 0 7 2 (7), 2 0 7 5 (10) 2083 (29)

2097 (60)

CHADWICK, J .

2094 (49)

BORGEAUD, P .

2083 (29)

CHADWICK, H .

2135 (101) BOCK, F .

2098 (61)

CASTER, M .

2101 (69)

BLUMENTHAL, H . J .

BÜCHNER, Κ.

CAQUOT, A .

2093 (47)

BLUME, H . D .

2 1 2 0 (79)

CAPELLE, P .

2137 (106)

BIANCHI, U .

2121

2101 (68)

BUCHNER, E .

CANTARELLA, R .

2092 (46), 2123 (83)

BETZ, H . D .

(76),

2112

CALHOUN, G . M .

2 1 4 4 (4)

2 1 4 4 (to 7 0 c )

BERNARD, J . L .

2094 (49), 2117

(80), 2129 (92), 2144 (to 4) BRÖCKER, W. 2072 (7)

BURNETT, A. P.

2095 (50)

BEAUJEU, ] .

2144 (to 4)

E.

BURKERT, W. 2071 (5), 2073 (8), 2077 (18), 2095 (50, 51), 2110 (70c), 2095, 2 0 9 7 2098, 2144 (to 4), 2145 (to 106)

2089, 2117

BABUT, D .

BREMMER, J .

BUCHHEIT, V .

2124, 2129 (93)

2077 (17)

BABBITT, F . C .

2 0 9 9 (62)

BROWN, P .

2099 (62)

ARNIM, H . VON

2142 (109)

BRÉHIER, E . BRENK, F .

2135 (101) ARNALDEZ, R .

BOYD, J . W .

(102),

2137 (106)

BOWIE, E. L. 2135 (102), 2136, 2144 (to 106) BOYANCÉ, P. 2095 (50), 2097 (60), 2099 (62)

2083 (29)

2117, 2124 2098, 2100, 2101

D E LACY, P .

2125

DELATTE, M .

2095 (50), 2 1 4 0

D E L CORNO, D . DEL RE, R .

2 1 2 5 (84)

2135 (95)

DES PLACES, E .

2071

(34), 2087 (35, 36)

(4), 2 0 7 2

(7),

2086

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD DÉTIENNE, M.

2095, 2096 (54, 56, 58)

DEVEREUX, G.

2093 (48)

DE VOGEL, E. J. 2097 (60), 2101 (69) DIETRICH, B. C. 2071 (4), 2072 (7), 2079 DILLON, J. 2087-2089, 2090 (43), 2092 (46), 2098, 2100 (64, 67), 2101 (69a), 2102 (69b), 2106 (69d), 2117, 2127, 2129 DION, P. E. 2094 DIRLMEIER, F. 2079 (23)

DODDS, E. R. 2072 (7), 2075, 2083, 2096 (58), 2135 (102) DÖRRIE, H. 2097 (60), 2100 (68), 2121-

ESSER, D .

ISAAC, D .

2 1 4 5 (to 106)

2087 (36), 2096 (58),

2127 (87) FIORENZA, E . S. 2110 (70C) FLACELIÈRE, R . 2094 (49), 2117, 2 1 1 9 (78), 2 1 2 9 (91) FLASCH, K . 2 0 9 9 (62) FOERSTER, W . 2070 (1), 2090 FONTENROSE, J . E . 2122 (82) FRANÇOISE, G . 2072 (7) FRIEDLÄNDER, P. 2075 FRITZ, Κ . VON 2097 (60) GERNET, L . 2070 (1) GNOLI, G . 2073 (8) GÖRGEMANNS, H . 2126 GOMME, A . W . 2084 (31) GORDON, C . H . 2072 (4) GRIFFITH, F . L. 2 0 9 7 (59) GRIFFITHS, J .

G.

2 0 9 2 , 2 1 1 7 , 2123

2131 (95), 2145 (to 83 a)

GRIMAL, P.

GROSS, Κ.

2 1 2 5 (84)

2086 (33)

GUTHRIE, W. K. C.

2072 (7), 2097 (60)

HAAG, H . 2 1 4 4 (to 70) HAAKH, H . 2144 (2)

HAASE, W.

(83),

2131 (95)

GUNDERT, H.

2090 (44), 2145 (to 111)

HADAS-LEBEL, M.

2099 (62)

HADZISTELIOU-PRICE, T .

2073

2144 (to 29)

2070 (1)

2070 (2)

JORGENSEN, O . 2072 (7), 2074 - 2 0 7 5 JONES, C . P. 2 1 3 7 (106) JONES, R . 2126 (87) JUNG, C . G . 2076 KALLIS, A . 2070 KELLY, H . A . 2144 (to 70) KINDSTRAND, J . F . 2072 (6) KIRK, G . S. 2083 KLAUSER, T . 2 0 7 0 (1) KLEIN, M . 2083 (29) KNOWLES, T . G . 2136 (104), 2 1 3 7 (105) KNOX, B . M . 2073 (8) KOLLER, H . 2095 (50) KONTOLEON, N . M . 2122 (82) KROYMANN, J . 2071 (4) KULLMANN, W . 2072 (7) KURZ, W . 2142 (111) KUSTAS, G . L.

2072 (7)

GUIDORIZZI, G .

HELLHOLM, D . 2 1 1 0 (70 c) HENGEL, M . 2110 ( 7 0 c )

HEUBECK, A . 2072 (7) HILGERT, E . 2 0 9 9 (62) HIRSCHBERGER, J . 2 0 9 9 (62) HUMBERT, J . 2096 (56)

2079

FESTUGIÈRE, A. J.

HARL, M . 2 0 9 9 (62) HAYDUCK, M . 2 0 9 6 (58) HEIM, R . 2111 (71) HEINZE, R . 2082 (26), 2 0 8 8 , 2 0 9 4 (49) HELLER, J . L. 2083 (29)

HERTER, H.

EINARSON, B . 2125 ELLIS, E . E . 2107 (70)

ERBSE, H.

HÄNDEL, P. 2121 (81) AMERTON-KELLY, R . G . 2 0 9 9 (62) AMILTON, R . 2083 (29) HANI, J . 2 0 9 2 , 2095 (50), 2117 (76), 2120 (79)

HENRICHS, A .

2 1 2 2 , 2 1 2 6 , 2130 DONNELLY, J . P. 2142(111) DOUGLAS, M . 2090-2091 DOVER, K . J . 2086 (34) DULIÈRE, W . L. 2 1 3 7 (106)

1297

2086 (33)

LACOCQUE, A . 2 1 4 4 (2) LANGTON, E . 2093 (47) LATTE, K . 2071 LATTIMORE, R . 2072 (7) LAVOIE, G . 2 0 7 9 (23) LE CLERQUE, H . 2111 (71) LESKY, A . 2072 (7), 2 0 7 4 - 2 0 7 5 LEVI, Α . 2 0 8 7 (35) MACK, B . L. 2 0 9 9 (62) MAIER, J . 2070 (1), 2093 MANN, F. 2101 (69) MANTERO, T . 2132 (95)

FREDERICK E. BRENK

1298 MARKUS, R . Α . MARTIN, Η .

2103

2126

MCHUGH, M. P. MEID, W .

(109)

(81)

2099 (62), 2117

2083, 2084 2087

Rossi, P.

MORAVCSIK, J . M . E .

Roux, J.

MORESCHINI, C .

2170

MÜLLER, C . D . G .

(70)

2070 (1)

MÜLLER, U . B .

2110

MUTH, R .

2121

(81)

NAGY, G.

2073, 2078 (20)

NAHON, G .

NORDEN, E .

SALE, W .

(4)

2071

SCHLAM, C .

2110

(28),

2096

SCHRADE, H .

(75)

2072

2137

PANAGL, O .

ScoBiE, Α.

2133 (96) 2 1 4 4 (to 2 9 )

2085 (32)

PATRONI, G . PEEK, W .

106)

2072 (7) (1)

TAGGART, B . L . TARAN, L .

2133

(97)

TATUM, J . H .

2132

(95)

TAYLOR, C . H .

PICARD, C .

2072 (7)

T E R VRUGT

POUILLOUX, J . PUIGGALI, J .

2070,

2071

(4)

THRAEDE, K .

2111-2112,

TOBIN, T . H .

2099

(62)

2073

RABINOWITZ, L . I . REGAN, F .

2082, 2144 (4)

(7)

2134 (99)

(61)

2 1 3 7 , 2 1 4 4 (to

PUTNAM, C . J .

LENTZ, J .

2099 (62), 2134 (98) 2095 (50)

2092 (46), 2123 (83) 2098

2071

POTTLE, D . B .

2072

THEILER, W . THESLEFF, H .

PHILLIPS, E . D . POLLARD, J .

(75)

TARRANT, Η .

2137 (106), 2140, 2144 (to 106)

PIGANIOL, A .

2137 (106) 2116

2087

PETZKE, G .

2095 (50), 2097 (60)

(70c)

2072 (7)

TAMBORINO, J .

PENELLA, R. J. 2136 (103), 2142 (111) PÉPIN, J . 2099 (62)

PHILIP, J. A.

2110

STELLA, L. A.

2 0 7 1 (4), 2 1 4 4 (4)

2143

2096 (58)

STEGMANN, H .

(82)

2 1 4 5 (to

2094 (49), 2117

STAEHLIN, O .

2099 (62)

PARVELSCU, A .

2070 (1), 2107-2108

SEIDENSTICKER, Β . 2083 (29) SIMON, E . 2072 (7) SMITH, J . Z. 2090-2091 SNODGRASS, A. 2073

SOURY, G .

(106)

2122

PARKER, R .

(4)

(7)

2094

SCHWEIZER, E.

SOLMSEN, F . (71)

PALMER, R . B.

(58)

2071

ZELLER, E .

SEGAL, C . 2116

OosT, S. J. 2144 (2) OTTO, R. 2090 O t t o , W. F. 2083 (29) PALM, J .

(95)

SCHÜSSLER FIORENZA, E . see FIORENZA, E . S .

2096, 2070 (1), 2083

2111

2 0 8 5 (32A)

SCHNAUFER, A .

2070, 2090, 2092 (46),

2126

2108-2109

SCHMID, W .

(70c)

2 1 4 4 (to 6 9 6 )

OESTERREICH, Κ . T .

PAGE, D .

2084,

2 1 1 0 (70 c)

2132

SCHLIER, H .

2085 (32 a)

NOWAK, H. 2090, 2143

2 1 4 4 (to 70)

SAUNDERS, T . J .

NICKELSBURG, G . W . E .

NILSSON, M. P. 2114, 2143 (1)

2117

RUSSELL, J . B .

SANDERS, E . P .

2 1 4 4 (to 696)

NIKIPROWETSKY, V .

2095 (50), 2097

SANDBACH, F . H .

(70c)

(61)

2083 (29)

RUSSELL, D . A .

2131 (95), 2134

MOULE, C . F. D .

2098

2071 (4)

ROUGIER, L .

2099 (62)

(30)

(35)

2 0 9 6 (54, 58)

RONCONI, A .

2086 (33)

(87) (50)

RIVIER, A .

MOLÉ, M . 2092 (46), 2123 (83) MONDÉSERT, C . 2 0 9 9 (62)

MOSÈS, A .

2095

ROBIN, L . ROHDE, E .

2070 (2)

MODE, H .

2126

REVERDIN, O .

2141, 2142

2121

MERLAN, P.

REINHARDT, Κ .

(69c)

(87)

2133,

2093

ΤουATI, G . 2144 (to 6 9 b ) TREU, M . 2085 (32 a) TSAGARAKIS,

(8)

2134

105)

(47)

2116

2100

TYLOR, Ε . Β .

O.

2072 (7), 2080

2090

UNTERSTEINER, M .

2073 (8), 2 0 7 5

(3,

4),

DEMONOLOGY IN THE EARLY IMPERIAL PERIOD VAJDA, G .

WHITTAKER, J. 2101 (69), 2103 (69c), 2127, 2145 (to 111)

2 1 4 4 (to 6 9 b )

VAN DAM, W . C .

2111 (71), 2116 (75)

VAN DER NAT, P . G . VELLACOTT, P . VENTRIS, M .

WINSTON, D .

VIDAL-NAQUET, P .

(61), 2117,

2118

2 0 7 2 (7)

2131 (95), 2135 (101)

(77)

2098 (61)

ZELLER, E .

WHITE, R . J .

2140 (108)

ZIEGLER, Κ .

2083

ZINTZEN, C.

2132 (95)

2079 (22)

ZAEHNER, R . G .

WEST, M . L .

WHITMAN, C . H .

2098, 2099 (62)

WRIGHT, J . R . G .

WYATT, W .

2083

2102 (69b)

WOLFSON, H. A.

2 0 7 3 (8) 2098

2072 (7), 2076

WINNINGTON-INGRAM, R . P.

2073

2 1 4 4 (4)

2142 (111)

WILFORD, F. A.

2083 (29)

VERNANT, J . P .

WALSH, P . G .

WILD, R .

2097 (60)

2111 (71)

VERMEULE, E . VERNIÈRE, Y .

WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, U .

2 0 7 0 (1)

VAN DER WAERDEN, B . L .

1299

2092 (46), 2123 (83)

2094 2117

2069, 2070 (1), 2089 (38), 2094

Missing from 2142 (111) was an intended acknowledgement to Professor H. W. ATTRIDGE of Southern Methodist University, now at Notre Dame University, for offering suggestions on the Jewish material.

Index to Contribution on

An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia::" by

FREDERICK

E. BRENK, S. J., Rome

Contents I. Authors and Texts Cited

1300

II. Historical Persons

1309

III. Subjects

1310

IV. Technical Terms

1315

V. Modern Authors

1318

I. Authors and Texts Cited

Androtion

Aelian (Aelianus) Varia Historia 13,16 320 (141) Aëtios (Aëtius) Placita II 30,1 (SVF 404,10) Aischylos (Aeschylus) Choephoroi 9 0 0 - 9 0 1 331 (166) 940 331 (166)

Antiochos of Askalon

295 265, 304 (123), 342

(to 2), 348 283 (87)

Alexander (Alexandras) of Aphrodisias 264 (25) 176,13 279 (77) Alexandras Polyhistor (Alexander Polyhistor) 339 Anaxagoras

334

Antikleides (Anticlides)

348

Andron of Halikarnassos

336

Andronikos (Andronicus)

264 (25)

Antipatros (Antipater) of Tarsos Antistius Labeo 339 Appian (Appianus) 320 Bella Civilia I 192 330 (162) I 452 313 (133) II 35 326 (151) I V 19 320 (142) I V 74 321 (143) IV 134 281 (82) X X I 149 329 (18) Apuleius 269 (44), 300 D e deo Socratis 15 279 (77) Metamorphoses 301—303

* Above in this same volume ( A N R W II 36,1), pp. 2 4 8 - 3 4 9 .

311 (131)

1301

THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT O F PLUTARCH: INDEX Archemachos of Euboia 295 Areios Didymos Compendium of Platonic Doctrine (Eusebios, Praeparatio Evangelica) XXI 23,3-6 299 (117) Aristoboulos (Aristobulus) 318 (139) Aristotle (Aristoteles) 264, 266, 278 (76), 297, 336, 339, 343 (to 76), 348 Ethika Nichomacheia II 1139 A 27 288 (99) Metaphysika 1064 A—1064 Β (= XI 7) 175 (71) 191B-192B 275 (71) Physika 188 A 19 270 (46) 191B 35—192B 275 (71) Topika II 6 (115A 32) 279 (77) VII 1(152 A 5) 279 (77) Arrian (Arrianus) 334 Anabasis VII 23 318 (139) VII 24 318 VII 30 318 Aspasios 343 (to 76) Ateius Capito 339 Artemidoros 255, 332 (145) Oneirokritika I 79 324 (148) Aufidius Modestus 254 Asinius Pollio (see Pollio) Augustine (Augustinus) De civitate dei II 25 320 (141) Bacchylides Odes 17 336 Cato 339 Chrysippos 279, 281, 295, 304 (123), 305, 339 Peri Ousias SVF II 1095 258 (12) SVF II 1178 277 (73) Cicero 266-267 (33), 268, 339, 346 (to 172) Brutus 250 310 (130) De divinatione I 44,100 334

De officiis I 1,3.2 310 (130) De república Tusculanae Disputationes 1.70 266 Verrines IV 132 309 (128) Cinna 324 (147) Clement of Alexandria Protreptikos 35P 333 Cluvius Rufus 339 Cornutus 295 Crassicius (not Crassicus), L. (Pasicles), of Tarentum

324 (147)

Curtius Rufus 334, 342 (to 3) Demetrios of Phaleron 307 (FGH 228,39) 312, 345 (to 126) Diodoros Periegetes 336 Diodoros Sikelos (Diodorus Siculus) 334, 336 Bibliotheke IV 61,2 333 IV 62,4 333 XI 50,4 333 XVII 51 334 XVII 116 318 (139) XXXI 10 312 Diogenes Laertios De clarorum philosophorum vitis I 29 334 VII 151 284 Diokles (Diodes) of Peparethos 338 Dion Chrysostomos (Dio Chrysostomus) Discourses 17,17 333 47,8 321 (143) Dionysios of Halikarnassos 339 Antiquitates Romanae XII 12,13 334 Douris (Duris) 306 (125), 331 Empedokles (Empedocles)

296, 315

Β 126 ( e d d . D I E L S - K R A N Z )

299

Epicharmos Frgm. 258 (ed. KAIBEL)

309 (128)

Epikouros (Epicurus) 328, 347—349 Epiktetos (Epictetus) 304

1302

FREDERICK E. BRENK

Eudoros 258 (12), 264 (25), 265, 267 ( 3 3 36), 270, 278, 304 (123), 342 (to 2) Frgm. 181,7-30 (Dox.Gr., ed. DIELS) 270 Eudoxos of Knidos 295 Euhemeros of Messene 295 (109), 296 Euripides 292, 316, 332 (145) Iphigeneia in Aulis 1136 306 (124)

XI 60 279 (78) XII 169 279 (78) Hyginus Fabulae 41 333 Iuba (Juba) 339 (182) Iulius (Julius) Obsequens 57 320 (141)

Frgm. 996 (ed. NAUCK2) 337 (177) 997 337 (177) Hippolytos, scholion to 11 333 Eusebios Praeparatio Evangelica XXI 2 3 , 3 - 6 299 (117)

Kallimachos (Callimachus) 296 (109) Kallisthenes (Callisthenes) of Olynthos (176) Kastor (Castor) 339 (183) Kleitarchos (Clitarchus) 334 Krantor (Crantor) 264 (25) 265

Fabius Pictor

Livy (Livius) 309, 312, 317, 388 Ab urbe condita I 16 338 I 1 8 - 2 1 338 V 16,9 334 XX 318 XXII 318 XII 1 318 XXII 55 322 XXII 5 5 - 5 7 332 (167) XL 21,1 321 XLV 8.5 345 (to 126) XLV 9 345 (to 126) Per. 88 329 (161) Lucan (Lucanus) Pharsalia I 182-203 325

332 (167), 338

Favorinus

339

Fenestella

339

Hekataios (Hecataeus) of Abdera Hellanikos (Hellanicus) of Lesbos Herakleitos (Heraclitus)

295 295

296-297

F r g m . 1 1 9 ( e d d . DIKLS-KRANZ)

309(128)

Ps. Herakleitos Quaestiones Homericae 72 - 73

299

Hermippos 334 Herodoros 339 Herodotos History IV 1 3 - 1 5 3 3 8 ( 1 8 0 ) VII 18 331 VII 1 4 0 3 3 1 V i l i 35 331 IX 3 4 3 3 1 IX 4 4 3 3 1 IX 81 3 3 1 Hesiod (Hesiodos) 279, 292, 296, 340 Frgm.

304

(edd.

MERKELBACH—WEST)

292 (105)

Homer (Horneros) 279, 281 (81), 295 (188), 296, 299 (119) Odyssey IV 275 279 (78) IV 563 299 V 396 279 (78) IX 142 279 (78) X 65 279 (78) X 2 3 9 - 2 4 0 281 (81), 299

Manethon 295 Menander (Menandros) F r g m . 59 (ed. SANDBACH)

326 (151)

Frgm. 714 309 (128) Menekrates (Menecrates) 333 Mousonios (Musonius) 304 Nepos

253 (4), 348

Nigidius Figulus Ovid (Ovidius) Metamorphoses VII 4 5 6 - 4 6 0 XV 6 3 7 - 6 4 0

339

333 335

Panaitios (Panaetius) Parmenides Frgm. Β 1.18

266 (33), 304

324 (147)

337

THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF PLUTARCH: INDEX Pausanias Periegesis (Description of Greece) 1 27,10 333 III 8,9 333 IV 26,3 325 (148) VIII 11,12 333 Phainias 343 (to 11) Philo (Philon) 264 (25), 268-270 (46), 300, 304 (123), 344 (to 99) De Abrahamo 202-204 268 (38) De aeternitate mundi 13 266 14 266 De ebrietate 133 299 (117) De gigantibus 1 7 - 1 8 288 De Iosepho 125 270 De migratione Abrahami 102 299 (117) De mutatione nominum 124 299 (117) De opificio mundi 2 268 7,25 268 De Providentia 4 - 5 266 2 8 - 2 9 266 De specialibus legibus II 5 4 - 5 5 268 (38) Philochoros 336 Philodemos 349 Phylarchos 295 Plato (Platon) 344 (to 117) Gorgias 524 A 299 Kritias (Critias) 44 C 335 (172) Laws (Nomoi) 704 A—724 Β 264 709 Β 310 (129) 716B 259 8 8 4 A - 9 1 0 C 264 896 D 297 903 E 5 - 9 0 4 A l 289 Phaidon (Phaedo) 108 A 299 Phaidros (Phaedrus) 248 A - E 259, 284 (90) 256 Β 300

Politeia (Republic) 391C 336 (174) 507-509 275 (71) 613 A—Β 259 614 300 617C 275 Symposion 302 (to 122 f.) Theaitetos (Theaetetus) 176Β 259 176E 258 Timaios (Timaeus) 2 7 C - D 263 (23) 27 D 5 264 28 C 3 ff. 273 2 9 E - 3 0 A 259 35 A 298 35 A 1 - 2 273 3 6 E 5 - 3 7 A 2 273 37C 8 269 3 7 D - 3 8 A 266 3 9 D - E 263 40 A 289 4 1 B - C 263 4 2 B - C 289 47E 4 264 68 E 263 77D 5 263 90 A 282, 290 91D 289 92 C 263,341 Pseudo-Plato Epinomis 984 A 341 Pliny (Plinius) Naturalis Historia II 106 320 (141) VII 138 330 (162) XXXIV 12,26 335 Plotinos

348

Plutarch (Ploutarchos) Ad principem ineruditum 780 E 261 780 F 275 (71) 781F 275 (71) Amatorius (Erotikos) 764 D 259 (14) 764 F 260 766 A 343 (to 71) 766 Β 284, 289, 343 (to 71) 768 Β 329 (159) 7 6 8 B - D 328

1303

1304

FREDERICK E. BRENK

770 Β 275 (71) 770 D—771D 328 An virtus doceri possit 439 Β 305 An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat 498 D 328 500 A 328 Animae an corporis affectiones sint peiores 501D 283 (86) 5 0 1 E - F 252 Bruta animalia ratione uti (Gryllos) 989 A 321 Coniugalia praecepta 145 C - D 262 Consolatio ad uxorem 611D—E 344 (to 98) 6 1 1 D - F 289 De amore prolis 493 E 2 8 3 (86) De anima F r g m . 178 (ed. SANDBACH)

289

Frgm. 200 289 Frgm. 201 284 De animae procreatione in Timaeo 1013 Β 265 1014B-C 259 1 0 1 6 C 273 (61) 1 0 2 6 E - F 265, 298

De audiendis poetis (Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat) 17C 25B

261 305

De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos 1076 F 304 De curiositate 522 D - E 252 De defectu oraculorum 415 A—C 279 4 1 5 B - C 286, 346 (to 180) 416 D 279 419 A 305 428 F 297 431C 292 431 E—433 A 322 432 C 260 432 C - D 322 De E apud Delphos 387F 256 387F-391D 294 387F—391E 294 388E-389C 304 391 E—394C 297 392 A 271

393 A - C 271 393 D 275 (71) 393 E 271 394 A 261 De esu carnium 998 C 299 De exilio 6 0 1 A - B 328 De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 942 F 284 943 C 284,289 943 D 285 943 F 280 943 F—944 C 283 944 Β 287 944 Β 285 944 D 281, 286, 346 (to 180) 944 E 258, 259, 275 (70), 285, 346 (to 180) 945 Β 285 945 D 286 De fortuna Romanorum 318B 312 3 1 9 B - D 345 (to 133) 319D 308 De genio Socratis 588 E 290 590 Β 287 (97) 590 C—591A 287 590 D 328 590 F 326 591 A - C 274 591C 289 591F 289 592 A - F 286 De Herodoti malignitate 856 Β 313 (133), 329 (159), 346 (to 159) De Iside et Osiride 360 A 296 360 E 279 360E-361D 296 361E 319 361 E - F 280 362 D 300 (120) 363 D 296 364 E 319 369 Β 296 369 E—370 C 281 370 E 297 370 F 297 372 E 275 (71) 372 E—F 275 (71), 298 (116) 372 F 299, 344 (to 117)

THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF PLUTARCH: INDEX 373 A 273 (62) 373 A - B 298 373 Β 273 (62), 299, 344 (to 117) 3 7 3 B - C 274 373 C 298 382 A—Β 261 De latenter vivendo 1 1 3 0 C - E 261 De Pythiae oraculis 342 (to 1), 348 397C 294 398 C 261 3 9 9 B - C 333 408 A 333 De recta ratione audiendi 43 Β 333 De sera numinis vindicta 522 E 253 550 D 258, 259 (13) 552 F 328 5 5 3 B - C 328, 329 555 C 5 5 4 A - 5 5 5 C 328 559 C 273 564F 261 565 E 288 5 6 5 E - 5 6 6 A 288 567E 327 567F 293 De sollertia animalium 976 C 321 (143) De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1050E 304 1051C 277 De superstitione 166F-167B 261 1 6 7 E - F 261 168C 277 171C 277 171D 257 De tranquillitate animi 465Β 283 (86) 4 6 9 D - E 311 (131) 474Β 309 4 7 7 C - F 341 De virtute morali 445 C 283 (86) 446 A - C 283 (86) 450 A 261 Gryllos (see Bruta animalia ratione uti) Mulierum virtutes 2 6 0 B - C 328

1305

Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum 1102 E 328 1102F—1103E 328 1104A—1107C 261 Platonicae quaestiones 1000E—1001C 270, 274 1001 B - C 258,273 1002Β 258, 273 (61) 1006C 298 (115) 1006F—1007A 275 (71) 1007C 264 1013 Β 265 1023 D 265 1 0 2 6 E - F 265 Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 816C 252 Quaestiones convivales (Symposiaka) 6 1 5 D - 6 1 9 B 257 62 8 F 333 6 2 9 B - 6 4 4 E 256 635E—638 A 256 7 2 0 B - C 265 728Β 257 728 D—730 D 256 728F—730F 256 740 D 305 Quaestiones Romanae 266E 339 (183) 2 7 6 F - 2 7 7 A 305 277A 281 Fragmenta 2 1 - 2 3 342 ( t o i ) 157-158 342 ( t o i ) 200 344 (to 99) Aemilius Paullus 8 330 27 305, 312 28 332 Agesilaus 3 333 6 322 (146) Alexander (Alexandres) 2 318, 322 (146) 3 318, 322 (146), 332 (169) 14 318 (139), 334, 332 (169) 17 318 18 322 (146) 24 322 (146) 26 318, 322 (146) 27 318, 321 (143) 31 318

1306

FREDERICK E. B R E N K

37 332 (169) 40 332 (169) 50 324, 332 (146) 57 318 73 321 (143) 75 318 Alkibiades (Alcibiades) 39 322 (146), 324, 329 Antony (Antonius) 16 322 (146) 17 311 20 311 22 322 (146) 24 319 30 311 31 311 33 311 60 319 68 252 70 311 75 319 87 330 Aratos 4 327 (155) 5 326 43 305 Aristeides (Aristides) 11 322 (146), 323, 331, 332 (166), 333, 335 19 322 (146) Brutus 20 322 (146) 24 310 (130) 36 282 3 7 --51 310 40 326, 327 (155) 43 329 (160) 47 310 53 330 55 310 Caesar 32 323 (146), 324 40 3 2 6 - 3 2 7 (155) 42 323 (146), 346 (to 147) 46 326 (153) 63 323 (146), 324 66 308, 313 68 323 (146) 69 282, 313, 314, 329 Camillus 4 332, 334 6 261 37 305

Cato Minor 71 330 Cicero 2 323 (146) 4 316, 321 (143) 5 334 24 310 (130) 44 323 (146) 48 320 49 331 Coriolanus 24 323 (146) 3 7 - 3 8 261 Demetrios 4 322 (146) 1 0 - 1 3 331 19 322 (146), 323 29 322 (146) Demosthenes 19 316, 331 20 326, 327 (155) 29 322 (146), 324 Dion 54 281, 326 56 281 58 328, 329 Dion-Brutus Introd. 314 Eumenes 6 322 (146), 323 19 329 Fabius Maximus 2 317 14 326 18 332 Flamininus 10 321 (143) 11 316(136) Galba 27 330 Gracchus, Gaius 1 323 (146) Gracchus, Tiberius 17 321 (143) 21 329 Kimon (Cimon) 6 328 8 333 18 322 (146) Kleomenes (Cleomenes) 7 322 (146) Lucullus 10 323 (146)

T H E R E L I G I O U S SPIRIT O F P L U T A R C H : I N D E X 12 323 (146) 23 323 (146) 39 254 Lysandros (Lysander) 18 331 20 322 (146), 323 22 333 2 5 - 2 6 331 29 333 Marcellus 8 332 28 318 Marius 8 319 36 319 39 319 45 319, 323 (146), 329 46 311 Nikias (Nicias) 1 262 (20), 335 (172) 11 327 (155) 13 331 (143), 333, 335 14 335 17 316 23 261, 317 Numa 5 337 8 261, 335 11 298 (115) 15 337 Pelopidas 20 335 2 0 - 2 2 342 (11) 21 322 (146) 35 329 (159) Perikles (Pericles) 3 322 (146) 6 317 13 322 (146), 323 39 261 Philopoimen (Philopoemen) 17 316, 345 (to 126) 21 330 Phokion (Phocion) 1 316 Pompey 24 297 25 321 (143) 32 323 (146) 42 305 46 310 68 323 (146), 346 (to 147)

73 323 74 310, 327 (155) 75 310 76 310 80 329 84 326 Pyrrhos 11 322 (146), 323 29 322 (146) Romulus 2 323 (146), 337 (178) 9 331 12 337 (178) 28 331, 337 2 8 - 2 9 338 Sertorius 5 330 27 329 Solon 4 333 9 334 (171) 14 334 Sulla 7 319 6 313 9 323 (146), 324 12 332, 333 14 330 27 319, 320 (141) 28 323 (146) 29 333 37 323 (146) Themistokles (Themistocles) 10 331 13 343 (to 11) 27 322 (146) 30 322, 323 (146) Theseus 2 336 4 337 5 337 7 337 12 337 15 333, 337 (177) 16 336 18 333 19 336 21 337, 346 (to 176) 24 336 25 336 33 337 35 336 36 333

1307

1308

F R E D E R I C K E. B R E N K

Timoleon 8 322 (146), 324 16 312 30 228, 331 37 330 Ps. Plutarch De vita et poesi Homeri 126 299 Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata 187C 313 (133) 206 C 326 (151) Pollio, Asinius 253, 324, 326 (153) Polybios 306-309, 315, 345 (to 126) Histories I 4,1 307 1 4,3 307 XXIX 21 312

377 (178)

Pyrrho (Pyrrhon) of Lipara Rusticus

339

252

Seneca 304 Simplicius In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores Commentarium 181 lOff. (Arist. p. 188a 19) 270 (46) Sokrates (Socrates) of Argos 339 Solon 334 (191) Sophokles (Sophocles) Oidipous Tyrannos (Oedipus Tyrannus) 981-982 325 (148) Suda (Souda, Suidas) 443,32 279 (77) Strabo (Strabon) 336 Suetonius 253, 324-325 Caesar 7 325 32 324, 326 (151) 3 2 - 3 3 325 81 329 (158) Tacitus 348 Agricola 2 252-253

Thoukydides (Thucydides) 262 (20) 335 History of the Peloponnesian War VII 50,4 262 (20) Timaios Lokros (Timaeus Locrus) 261 (33), 270, 271 (47) Timaios (Timaeus) of Tauromenion 311(132) Timotheos 295 Tzetzes, Iohannes Iliad p. 95 HERMANN

Poseidonios 266 (33), 271-272 , 295 (107), 297, 304, 311 (131) Promathion

Tertullian (Tertullianus) De anima 54.2 284 (89) 55.4 284 (89) Theophrastos 260 (16) Theopompos 295

333

Valerius Maximus 253 (4), 320 Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX I 1 329 (158) I 4,5 320 (142) I 6,3 334 I 7,7 282 (82) I 8,2 335 Varrò 284 (89), 347 (to 186) Vergil (Vergilius) Aeneid VI 309-312 VI 426-427 VI 739-742 Verrius Flaccus

337 (179), 338, 339 (182), 254 288 (99) 326, 328 287 (97) 339

Xenokrates (Xenocrates) 264—265, 280, 284-285, 293, 295 Xenophon Hellenika III 3,3 333 Zeno (Zenon) 271 Zonaras VII 20 334 Χ 7 326 (51) Zoroaster 279, 297 (112)

278 —

1309

T H E RELIGIOUS SPIRIT O F P L U T A R C H : I N D E X

II. Historical

Aelius (see Hadrian) Aemilius Paullus, Lucius 309, 312, 321, 332 (169), 345 (to 126) Agesilaus 323, 333 Aglaonike 262 Alexander (Alexandros) (the Great) 314, 318 (139), 323, 325, 332 (169), 345 (to 133) Alexander (Alexandros) (murderer of Pelopidas) 329 (159) Alexander, see Severus Alkibiades (Alcibiades) 323-324, 329, 335 Ammonios (friend of Plutarch) 252, 257— 258, 269-270, 292, 293, 342 (to 2) Anaxagoras 317, 348 Antiochos of Askalon 265, 342 (to 2) Antipater (Antipatros) (of Tarsos) 311 (131) Antony (Marcus Antonius) 252-253, 309, 319, 324, 330, 345 (to 140) Apollonios (teacher of Cicero) 316 Archias (tyrant) 324 Aristion 330 Attalos (II?) of Pergamon 319, 346 (to 140) Augustus (Caius Octavius) 330, 336 Autoboulos (friend of Plutarch) 256 Autolykos (Autolycus) 323 Avidius Quietus 254 Brutus (Marcus Iunius) 315, 324, 329-330

281 (82), 282, 3 1 0 -

Caesar (Gaius Iulius) 308, 310, 313, 324, 325 (149), 326 (151), 329 (159), 346 (to 147) Calpurnia 324 Camma (of Galatia) 328 Cassius (the conspirator) (Gaius Longinus) 282, 313, 324, 329 (160) Cassius of Parma (Parmensis) 282 (82) Cato Minor (Marcus Porcius Uticensis) 253, 330, 342 (to 3) Cicero, Marcus Tullius 258 (12), 266, 267 (33), 316, 320 (142), 321 (143), 329 (158), 330, 3 3 4 - 3 3 5 (172), 346 (to 172) Cinna (the conspirator) (Lucius Cornelius) 324 Cornelia 310 Crassus (Dives) (Marcus Licinius) 311, 329 Crassus, Publius 310 86

A N R W II 36.2

Persons

Demetrios (brother of Perseus) 321 Demetrios (friend of Plutarch) 280 Demetrios Poliorketes 323 Diogenes (the Cynic) 341 Dion (of Syracuse) 281, 315 (135), 328 Domitian (Titus Flavius Domitianus) 253 — 254, 302, 328 Empona 328 Eumenes (general of Alexander) 329 Eumenes of Pergamon 346 (to 140) Fausta (daughter of Sulla) 312 Favorinus (friend of Plutarch) 254 Felix (son of Sulla) 312 Flamininus, Titus 332 Fundanus, C. Minicius 254 Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius

329

Hadrian (Publius Aelius Hadrianus) 255, 330 Hannibal 316, 332 Herakleides (Heraclides) 281 Herennius (see Saturninus) Hermodoros (of Klazomenai) 293 Hippias 325 Hyrodes 329

254—

Kallippos (Callippus) 329 Klea (Clea) (friend of Plutarch) 294 Kleitos (Clitus) 324 Kleombrotos (Cleombrotus) (friend of Plutarch) 2 7 8 - 2 8 0 , 284, 291-292 Kleomedes (Cleomedes) of Astypalaia 282, (85), 332, 338 Kleopatra (Cleopatra) 311, 319, 343 (to 79, 140) Krateros (Craterus) 332 (169) Kratippos (Cratippus) (of Pergamon) 310 (130) Lais 324 Lampón 317 Lamprias (brother of Plutarch) 342 (to 2) Leochares 332 (169) Longinus (see Cassius) Lykourgos (Lycurgus) 331 Lysander (Lysandros) 331, 333 Lysippos 332 (169)

257, 278,

1310

F R E D E R I C K E.

Marcellus (Marcus Claudius) 318, 332 Marius (Gaius) 319, 323, 329, 330 (161), 345 (to 131) Marius (Iunior) 330 (161) Mestrius Florus, Lucius (friend of Plutarch) 254 Mithridates 323 Modestus, Aufidius 254 Munatius Rufus 342 (to 2) Nasica (Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica) 329 Nero (Claudius Caesar) 270 (45), 283, 302, 329-330 Nigrinus (brother of Avidius) 254 Nikias (Nicias) 261, 262 (20), 317, 335 Otho (Marcus Salvius)

330

Paccius (senator?, friend of Plutarch) Paetus Thrasea (see Thrasea Paetus) Pausanias (general) 328 Pelopidas 277, 335 Perikles (Pericles) 317, 329 Perseus 312, 321, 332, 345 (to 126) Philinos (friend of Plutarch) 257 Philip (Philippos) (the Great) 252 Philip (V) 316 (136), 330 Philippos (friend of Plutarch) 280 Philologus 329

254

Philopoimen (Philopoemen) 316, 345 (to 126) Philopappos (not Philoppapos) (Caius Iulius Antiochus Epiphanes) 254 Phokion (Phocion) 316 Pompey (Magnus) (Gnaeus Pompeius) 308, 310, 313, 315, 329 (158), 345 (to 133), 346 (to 147) Pontius Telesinus 329 (161) Priscus, Terentius 254 Ptolemy (Ptolemaios) (I) 295 Pythagoras 297, 299 Pytholaus 329 (159)

BRENK

Quietus (see Avidius) Rusticus (consul 9 2 A . D . ? )

252-253

Saturninus, Lucius Herrenius 254 Secundus, Iulius 254 Sertorius (Quintus) 330 Severus Alexander 303 (122 h) Skedasos (Scedasus) 277 Socrates 344 (to 97) Sosius Senecio, Quintus 254 Sourena (Sureña) 329 Sulla (Felix) (Lucius Cornelius) 252, 3 1 2 - 3 1 3 (133), 3 1 9 - 3 2 0 , 323, 330, 333, 345 (to 131, 133) Sulla (Felix Iunior) (Faustus Cornelius) Sulla, Sextius (friend of Plutarch) 254, (178), 338

323 337

Tarchetius 337 (178) Telesinus (see Pontius) Thebe (wife of Alexander, murderer of Pelopidas) 329 (159) Themistokles (Themistocles) 331 Theon (friend of Plutarch) 304 (123) Thrasea Paetus, Publius Clodius 252—253, 342 (to 3) Thrasymachos (character in Plato) 291 Tiberius (Iulius Caesar Augustus) 280 Timandra 324 Timokleia (Timoclea) 328 Timon (the Misanthrope) 311 Timoleon 311 (132), 312, 328, 331 Timotheos (of Athens) 313 (133) Tisamenos 331 Trajan (Marcus Ulpius Traianus) 330

254—255,

Ulpius (see Trajan) Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus) 254, 328 Volumnius, Publius (friend of Brutus) 282

III. Subjects

Abydos 314, 318 Academy 2 5 2 , 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 , 2 5 9 , 2 6 6 - 2 6 7 , 2 7 0 , 274, 315 (135), 342 (to 2), 348 Achaia (Achaea) 328 Actium 282

267, 332,

Adonis 300 (120) Aemilius monument Aeneas 337 (178) Aesculapius 340 Ahriman 297 (111)

332 (169)

T H E RELIGIOUS SPIRIT O F P L U T A R C H : I N D E X Aiaia (Aeaea) 299 Alexandria 252, 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 (12), 265, 268, 274 (68), 278, 301, 319, 342 (to 2), 345 (to 140) allegorical interpretation 292, 295 (108), 296, 298, 299 (119), 302-303, 305, 3 0 9 310, 336 (113), 339-340 Amazons 337 Ammon 323, 334, 335 angels 288 (99) anthropomorphism 264 anti-semitism 348 Antikyra (Anticyra) 252 A n t o n y - D i o n y s o s - O s i r i s 313 (133), 319 Anubis 300 (120) Aphrodite 289, 292, 333, 345 (to 140) Aphrodite of Aphrodisias 313 (133) Apollo 280, 281, 294, 298, 304, 320-321, 347 (to 186), 348 Apollo Delphinios 334 Apollo Didymeus 334 Apollonia 319, 323 apotheosis (see divinization) apotheosis of Augustus 337 (179) apotheosis of Romulus 337 (179) apotropaic rites 277, 340 Appian Way 338 Areimanios 296 Argeii 340 Argonauts 336 Aristotelianism 264-265, 278, 304 (123), 343 (to 76), 347 Artemis 292, 313 (133) Asklepios (Asclepius) 340 assimilation to God 257-258, 267, 273, 285-286, 290, 314, 337, 346 (to 180) astronomy 261 (19), 262, 284, 2 8 6 - 2 8 7 , 289, 293 atheism 264, 305 Athena 323 Athens 252, 254, 319, 336-337, 346 (to 140) Attica 336 (175) Attis 300 (120) Augustan ideology 320 Aulis 323 Bacchantes 319 Bakchos (Bacchus) 340 Beautiful 342 (to 71) Bellona 313 (133) biography 253-254, 314-316, 348-349 Boiotia (Boeotia) 252, 340 86«

336-337,

Boiotian Trophoniads Bona Dea 340 Books of N u m a 338 Bosporus 323 Britain 280, 284

1311

285

Caieta 320-321 Campus Martius 303 (122 h) Carmentalia 340 Carthage 257 Chaironeia (Chaeronea) 252, 255, 257 Chaldaean dualism 297 Christianity 273 (59, 60), 297, 300-301, 302 (122 a), 349 chronology of Plutarch's writing 255 (7, 8), 256 clairvoyancy 291 coeducation 262 computer 348 Consualia 340 Corpus Hermeticum 301 crane dance 346 (to 176) creation 263-266, 270 (46), 273, 298 Crete 3 3 6 - 3 3 7 crows 320 (142), 321 (143) Cyclic poets 336 Cynics 341 Cynoscephalae (see Kynoskephalai) daimonological interpretation 295—296 daimonology 261, 272, 295, 305-316, 3 4 7 348 death of daimones 280, 292 death of psyche 280, 285 Delos 346 (to 172) Delphi 252, 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 (8), 270 (45), 285, 294, 320, 328, 330-336, 347 (to 186), 348 Demeter 300, 323 demigods 279 demonology (see daimonology) determinism 277 (73), 305 Diana 340 Diesseitigkeit 268 Dionysiac mysteries 289, 344 (to 98) Dionysos 287-288, 292, 294, 296, 300, 318 (139), 340 (140), 345 (to 140) divine punishment 261,293, 327—330 divinization 279, 282, 286, 337, 346 (to 180) Dodona 333 dogmatism 267 double causality and motivation 308 dreams 260-261, 290, 315-316, 322-327, 346 (to 147)

1312

FREDERICK E. B R E N K

dualism 2 9 5 - 2 9 6 (110), 304, 309, 347 (to 186), 348 Dyad 270, 297 eclipses 2 6 1 - 2 6 2 , 3 1 7 ecstasy (see Plotinian ecstasy) Egeria 338 (181), 340 Egyptian religion 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 (64-67), 279, 280, 294-303, 319, 344 (to 117) Elysian plain 284, 299 emanation 278 (76) Endymiones 284 (89) Enyo 323 Epaphroditos 313 (133) Ephesos 319 Epicureanism 261, 282 (83), 313, 328, 342 (to 2), 347-349 Erinyes 281, 340 Eros 259 (14), 280, 289, 291-292, 302 (122 b) 303 (122 h) eschatology 255 - 2 5 6 , 260-261, 2 7 1 - 2 7 2 , 274, 275 (70), 283-294, 299, 315, 327-328 Euhemerism 295 (109), 296, 336 Euphrates 323 Faunus 338, 340 Felix (title of Sulla) 313 Fetiales 340 Fides 340 Flamen Dialis 340 foreign cults 262, 297 Forms (Ideas) 2 5 7 - 2 6 0 , 2 6 2 - 2 7 5 , 2 8 3 - 2 8 9 , 2 9 1 - 2 9 2 , 299 fortune (see Technical Terms : tyche or fortuna) Frashkart 297 fundamentalism 264 Galaxidoros 290 Gauls 352 Geneta Mana 340 geophysics 265 Gigantomachia 319 Gnosticism 271, 274-275, 295, 290 (103), 300 God 262-275, 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 Good 294, 298 Granikos (Granicus) 325 Great Pan 280 Great Year 280 Greece 316 guardian daimon 283, 290-291, 305 guilt 260 (16)

Hades 270, 284, 287, 289, 294, 300 (120) harmony of spheres 286 Haroueris 274 Hekate's recesses 284 Helen 337 Hercules (Temple of) 338 Herakleion at Patrai 319 Herakles 319, 336 (175), 340 hereditary guilt 329 hereditary vice 330 Hermes 2 9 8 - 3 0 0 hero cult 346 (to 180) Hestia 323, 337 (178) Heuresis Osiridos 303 (122 i) Hipponion tablet 344 (to 98) homoeostatic condition 263 Horos 298, 344 (to 117) human sacrifice 277, 323, 338 (179), 342 (to '

H) hypostases

256, 274, 287 (97a)

Ianus (Janus) 340 iconoclasm 261 Idaian Daktyloi 285 Ideas (see Forms) ideology (see Augustan ideology) immanentism 266, 269, 271—274 imperial cult 347 (to 180) incest dream 324 (148) infinity of worlds 306 inspiration 294 intelligible central fire 258 Inventio Osiridis 303 (122 i) Isis 273-274, 294-303, 344 (to 117), 345 (to 140) Isis Campestris (Campense) Isism (popular) 301—303 Isodaetes 294 Iupiter (Jupiter) 323, 338 Iupiter Feretrius 340

302

Jahweh 269 Jansenism 347 (to 186) Jewish religion 338 Judaism 268-269, 297 Julio-Claudian period 303 (122 i) Kirke (Circe) 299 Kleopatra-Aphrodite-Isis 345 (to 140) Knidos (Cnidus) 319, 346 (to 140) Korybantes (Corybantes) 285 Krommyonian sow (Crommyonian) 336 Kronos (Cronus) 2 8 4 - 2 8 5

T H E RELIGIOUS SPIRIT O F P L U T A R C H : I N D E X Kroton (Croton) 338 Kybele (Cybele) 323 Kynoskephalai (Cynoscephalae) Kypros (Cyprus) 323

316 (136)

Lares 340 Latin 254 Latin festival 334 Latin literature 254, 325 (150), 326 Larentia 340 Laurentia 338 Lebadeia (not Lebadaia) 285 (94) Lethe 288 Leuktra (Leuctra) 335, 343 (to 11) Libitina 340 Libitina—Venus 340 literalism 265 Louvre H y m n 301 Lupercalia 340 Ma 313 (133) Macedonian Empire 312, 345 (to 126) maenads 319 Manicheans 347 Marathon 325 mathematicals 265 Matronalia 340 Matuta 340 Memphis 302 metempsychosis (see reincarnation) Middle Platonism 257-260, 262-275, 2 9 2 293, 299 (117), 301-304 (123), 343 (to 71, 76), 347 (to 186), 348 Miletos 334 Milky Way 286 (96) Minos 336 Minotaur 336 (177) Mithraism 297 (113) Molossian king 336 Monad 270 Moneta 340 monotheism 305, 341 monsters 280, 314-315 moon 261 (19), 2 8 0 - 2 8 4 (89), 285-287, 289, 2 9 2 - 2 9 3 moral imitation 259 moral purity 300 moral purpose 308 Moses 269 Muses 340 mysteries 303, 341, 344 (to 98) myth 302-303, 336-341

1313

Nea Isis 346 (to 140) Naiads 292 Navigium Isidis 303 (122 i) Nekyia 327 nemesis 305 Neoplatonism 275 - 2 7 6 (72), 295, 301 Nekyia 327 Neopythagoreans (see Pythagoreans) Neos Dionysos 318 (139), 346 (to 140) N e w Academy 267 N o m a 338 (181) N u m a 336, 338 (181), 340, 347 (to 181) Numicius 338 (181) Nyktelios 294 nymphs 292 Octavian propaganda 319 (140) October equus 339—340 Okeanos (Oceanus) 300 omens (see portents) O n e 258 (12), 264, 270-271, 275, 292, 297 oracles 278, 285, 292-293, 330-336, 346 (to 172) oracular dream 322—323 oriental cults 302 Oromazdes (Ohrmazd) 2 9 4 - 2 9 7 (111), 298-301 Orphism 279, 344 (to 98) Osiris 294-303, 319 (140), 345 (to 140) Osiris-Serapis 288, 303 (122i), 344 (to 117) Oudora 285 (94) overdetermination 313 pacificism 341 palingenesis (see reincarnation) Pan 280 (80), 340 pansyncretism 300 pantheism 300 Pantheon 338 parallelization 253, 325 (150) Parilia 340 Parmenidean interpretation 269 Pasiphae 337 Paxoi 280 pederasty 340 pempad 294 Penia 302 (122f.) Pergamon 310 (130), 329, 346 (to 140) Peirithoos 336 (174) Persephone 280, 319, 323 Persian Empire 312 Persian religion 296-297, 342 (to 11)

1314

FREDERICK E. BRENK

Persian Wars 331 personal God 264, 266, 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 phenomenal world 269, 289, 341 Philippi 314, 318 (138) Phoibos (Phoebus) 294 Phrygian theology 279 Picus 338, 340 Plataiai (Plataeae) 331, 333, 335 Platonic-Pythagorean revival 257 Platonism 254, 256-260, 262-275, 2 9 5 299, 301-303, 348 (and see Middle Platonism) Plotinian ecstasy 301 Plouton (Pluto) 281, 294, 300 polytheism 341 pontífices 340 portents 305, 316-321 Poseidon 336 (174) precosmic soul 285 Proculus, Iulius 338 Prokrustes 337 prophecy 260-261,312, 322-323, 3 3 0 - 3 3 6 providence 304-305, 308, 310, 312, 341 pseudo-science 291 psychological biography 322 psychological disturbance 318, 326 psychological motivation 324—325 Pythagoreanism 255-257, 267 (33), 270, 277, 283 (87), 284 (89), 294-295, 299, 321, 338 (180, 181), 339 (183), 342 (to 11) Pythia (games) 341 Pythian Apollo 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 Python 280, 285 Pythopolis 333 Quellenforschung 290, 325 (149) Quellenkritik 321 (143) Quirinus 340 rationalism 305, 316 rebirth (see reincarnation) reductionism 280 Regia 340 reincarnation 256-257, 283-284, 2 8 6 - 2 8 8 (99), 289, 293, 299, 343 (to 71), 344 (to 97, 99) retribution 281, 283, 287, 308-309, 3 1 3 315, 327-330, 337 (179), 336-341 Roma 325 Roman calendar 303 (122 i) Roman religion 302-303, 306-307, 317, 332-334, 336-341, 345 (to 140), 347 (to 180)

Rome 252-255, 257, 261 (18), 268, 308 (127), 316, 331-332, 334, 343 (to 36), 346 (to 180) Romulus 282 (85), 331, 336-338 (179) Rubicon 325 ruler cult 346 (to 180)

sacral dimension 335—336 Salamis 342 (to 11) Salii 340 salvation 314 Samnite War 335 Saturnus (Saturn) 340 satyr 319-320 (141), 323 science 316—317 Schulplatonismus 258 Selene (meadows of) 289 Selene Enyo 323 Selene, Ma 313 (133) separation of soul 285, 290 Septuagint 269 Serapeum 303 (122 h) Serapis (Sarapis) 280, 318 (139), 303 (122 h) shamanism 293 symbolism 272, 292, 329 Sibylline books 335 Siweh 321 Silver Shields 329 Simmias 290, 344 (to 97) Skiron 337 Skyros 333 soothsaying 262 soteriology 302 soul 347 (and see precosmic soul, world soul) sources 253 (5b), 254, 295, 325 (149), 339 (182) stars 285, 293 statues 261 Stoic-Poseidonian cosmology 275 Stoicism 253 (5), 255, 271-272 , 275 - 2 7 7 (73), 284 (89), 295-296, 304 (123), 341, 342 (to 2), 343 (to 76), 345 (to 123), 3 4 7 349 Styx 286, 289 sun 259 (14) 272 , 284, 286, 299 superstition 255, 260, 276, 305 supreme God 270 symbolic creation 264-265, 289, 339 symbolism 272 , 292, 319 syncretism 301 Syracuse 333, 335

T H E RELIGIOUS SPIRIT O F P L U T A R C H : I N D E X Terminus 340 Tethys in Etruria 337 (178) Thamous 280 Theanor 290, 344 (to 97) Thebes 252, 318 (139) theism 249, 264, 271, 2 8 6 - 3 0 6 Theon 304 (123) 328 Theseus 331, 333, 336 (174, 175), 346 (to 176) Thespesios 288 Timarchos 289-290, 293, 328 Titans 277, 285 Toth 300 transformation 279-280, 285, 290, 293, 301-303 transcendentalism (not transcendentalism) 266 transcendence 249, 263, 266 - 2 6 9 , 2 7 2 - 273, 293, 341 Troglodytes 278, 285 (92) Trojan Horse 340 Tyche of Antioch 313 (133) Typhon 273 (62) 277, 285, 296, 298, 300

vegetarianism 256—257, 321 Veii 334 Veneralia 340 Venus 313, 346 (to 147) Venus of Pompeii 313 (133) Vesta 340 Vestals 340 Vicus Patricius 340 visions 281-282, 315 Vulcanus 340 witchcraft 262 world soul 263 (23), 264-265, 272, 298 Zagreus 294 Zaleukos 340 Zervanism 297 (111) Zeus 300, 332 Zeus Ammon 323, 335 Zeus Soter 323, 331 Zoroaster 279, 340 Zoroastrianism 279, 281, 2 9 5 - 2 9 6 (110), 297 (111)

IV. Technical

aera 296 aether 284 (89) A-idoneus 270 alea 326 (151) allégorisme réaliste 336 animae 284 (89) A-pollon 258 (12), 270 apatheia 305 ananke 264, 275, 277 (73) archai 274 arete 259, 315 (135), 316, 335, 346 (to 180) automaton (to) 307, 313 bakchoi 344 (to 98) bullae 340 chora 302 (122 f) choregos 341 chrematismos 322 chronos 296 creatio aeterna 265, 266 daimon 277, 279-294, 296, 298, 299, 3 0 4 306 (124), 310-315, 318 (139), 337, 339 (183), 346 (to 180)

1315

Terms

daimon souls (see soul—daimones) daimones 272, 275, 277, 279 - 2 9 4 , 296, 304, (123), 305, 308, 310, 315, 346 (to 180), 347 (to 186) daimonia 277, 281 (73) daimonion (to) 290-291, 307, 313, 315, 317, 329-331, 335 daimonios phallos 337 daimonios tyche 316 deisidaimonia 260, 281, 318 demiourgos 263-265, 268-269, 273 (61), 280 demos 314 doxa 298 dystychiai 310 ekpyrosis 304 enthousiasmes 294 epaphroditos 313 (133) ephebeia 342 (to 2) epheton 275, 286 epheton—kalon—theion—makarion epoche 282, 304, 316 eques 254

275, 286

1316

FREDERICK E. BRENK

eros 285, 302 (122f), 303 (122 h) erotikos 289 euergetes 266 eupatheia 268 (38) eusebeia 336 euthymia 309 eutychia 310-311, 315 eutbychiai 310 fata 334 fatum 306 felicitas temporum 253 felix 313 (133) fortuna 308, 312, 313 (133), 315, 345 (to 126), 345 (to 133) genesis 275 gnosis 272 , 300 gymnasion 342 (to 2) beimarmene 310 (129) heros 282 hierogamia 302, 348 horama 322 interpretado graeca 318 (139) kairos 310 (129) kalon (to) 275, 280, 286, 343 (to 71) kinesis 275 korakes 321 (143) kosmoi 292 kosmos 258 (12), 259, 262-266, 271 (47), 292, 298, 304, 341, 344 (to 117) kosmos noetos 259, 344 (to 117) krasis 322 ktistes 336 (175) kykeon 299 kykosas 299 liberti 302 logioi 317 logoi 344 (to 117) logos 258 (12), 259 (14), 262, 268, 269, 272, 274 (63), 283, 288-291, 298-300, 303 (122 g), 304, 326 luna 284 (89) magistra vitae 259 makarion 275 metabolai 345 (to 126) moira 306 (124) moirai 275, 285 monarchia 310 monas 274

mystagogos 341 mystai (not mystoi) mytboi 262 (19)

344 (to 98)

Nea Isis 346 (to 140) nemesis 312 Neos Dionysos 318 (139) noeton 270, 275, 285, 292, 344 (to 107) nous 258 (112), 262 -264, 268-271, 2 7 3 275, 282-283, 289-293, 303 (122g), 314— 315, 341 nous (divine) 273 nous-daimon 283, 289-290, 322 numen 308 ornamenta consularia 255 (6) ostentum 325 paian 294 paradeigma 258, 265, 269, 298, 342 paradeigmata 262-264 (23), 265, 269 pathos 272 patris 304 Penia 302 (122 f) philanthropic 341 phronimon (to) 298 physis 344 (to 117) pia fraus 331 Plouton 281 pneuma 278, 294 politeia 291 pompe 345 (to 140) pragmatike historia 315, 320, 335 praktike 288 (99) praktikon (to) 288 (99) pronoia 307, 315 psychai 285 psyche 258, 275, 282, 285, 290-293, 298, 314 réalisme historico-géographique 336 sanctus 252 sapientes 284 (89) soma 282, 298 seteria 271, 272 soul-daimon 274, 280, 285-286, 314-315 spoudaioi 284 (89) stasis 314 taxis 257 telete 289 teleute 289 telos 257-259, 263, 267, 303, 346 (to 180) tettix 317

T H E R E L I G I O U S SPIRIT O F P L U T A R C H : I N D E X theion (to) 264, 275, 286, 307, 328 theologia 281 (81) theos 263-264, 279 (78), 282, 346 (to 180) theos tis 307 theoretike 288 (99) thiasos 319 tolmai 326 tolme 325-326 topoi 304 (123) triodos 299 tyche 255, 277 (73), 305-316, 326, 328, 330 (162), 345 (to 126) tyche-daimon 310 tyrannos 314 venti

287 (97)

είκών 285, 299 έμφάσεις 271 τό εν 271 έξαλλαγη (άριστη) 285 εξομοίωσις 259 (13) επεσθαι θ ε φ 259 (13) έπιθυμίαι 288 ερως 285, 298 (116) ευεργέτης 266 εύεργετούμενον 266 ευθυμία 341 ευλάβεια 272 έφετόν 346 (to 180) έφετόν, καλόν, θείον, μακάριον εχει τι καί φέρεται 273 ζωή

το αγαθόν 259, 273 (62), 298 (116), 344 (to 117) άεί 264, 265 άειγενής 265 άΐδιος 265 ακάθαρτοι 289 τό άλογον 288, 322 το άλογον καί φανταστικόν 322 άναρρίψαι 326, 327 (155) άνερρίφθω κύβος 324, 326, 327 άόρατον 274 άπορροαί 344 (to 117) άρετή 259 (13) άριστη έξαλλαγή 285 άρχή 259 (13), 270 (46) άσέβεια 308 αυτού (άπ°) 273 αύτοΰ (έξ) 273 άωροι 287 βαρυδαίμων 311 βελτίονες 285-286 γένεσις 274, 288-289, 299 γεννήσας πατήρ 269 γην νεΰσις (έπί) 288 τό γιγνόμενον 299 τό γιγνόμενον άεί 264—265 δαίμονες 284 (89) δαίμων 309 (128) δόξα 335 (172) εϊδη 273, 344 (to 117) είδος 273 είδωλα 271 εικόνες 344 (to 117)

1317

285—286

274

ήθος 309 (126) Ή λ ι ο ς 284 (90) Ή λ ύ σ ι ο ν πεδίον ήμίθεοι 279 ήρωες 284 (89)

284 (90)

τά θεία 314 θεία τις τύχη 315 (135) θειασμός 262 (20) θείον 346 (to 180) τό θείον 271 τό θείον ιδέας καί άρετής (περί) θεϊός τις λογισμός 285 θειότης 286 θέμις 289 θεός 259 (13), 270, 273 (61) θεός (ό άνωτάτω) 269 θεός (ό υπεράνω) 270 τό θεωρειν 288 θεωρητικός βίος 287 (to 97)

259 (13)

ιδέα 259 ιερός 252 καθαρόν 322 τα καλά 289, 315 (135) καλά καί ά γ α θ ά 259 καλά (πάντα) 258 κάλλιστον καί μακαριώτατον 347 (to 180) τό καλόν 259, 343 (to 71) τό θείον καί νοητόν καλόν 343 (to 71) καταδαρθών 289 κίνδυνος 327 (155) κίνησις 274 κλαυθμός βρεφών 326 κλειδούχοι 275

1318

FREDERICK

κόσμος 259 (13) κράσις 322 κρείττονες 290 κύβος 326, 327 (155) λογισμός (θείός τις) 285 το λογιστικόν και φροντιστικόν λόγοι 344 (to 117) λόγος 270 (46) λόγος (θεού) 268

BRENK

παράδειγμα 259 (13) παρανομία 308 πλήρωσις 288 τό πρακτικόν 288 πρακτικός βίος 287 (97) πρώτος καί κυριώτατος πάντων πυθόχρηστος 331 (166)

322

φόθια

298 (111)

287 (97)

σαλεύω 317 (137) σκιά 288 στοιχεία 270 σκοπός 307 συμπάθεια 284 (89)

μακαριώτατον τέλος 347 (to 180) το μαντικόν 322 μεθεξις 259 (13), 269 μέρος 273 μίμημα 299 μιμήματα 341 μύησις 341 μυσταγωγός 309 (128)

τελετή τελειοτάτη 341 τέλος 347 (to 180) τραγικώτατος μύθος 377 (177) τρόπος 309 (128) τύχη (θεία τις) 315 (135)

το νοερόν 273 νοητά 273 (61), 341 νοητόν 273 (62), 343 (to 71) νοητόν καλόν 343 (to 71) νούς 273 (61) νοΰς (ό των όλων) 268

ύλη

299

τό φανταστικόν 322 φθορά 274 φθόνος 314 τό φρονούν 288 τό φροντιστικόν 322 φύσις 270 (36) φύσις (ή πάντων) 259 (13)

οικονομία 307 όμοιότης 259 (13) όμοιότητες 344 (to 117) όμοίωσις θεφ 257, 259, 267, 273 τόον 2 7 1 , 2 9 9 , 2 7 3 (62) τό ôv άεί 266 το δν καί νοητόν και άγαθόν 273 (62) όναρ 288 πάθη 322 διά παντός

E.

χάσμα 286 (96), 287 χρόνω 264 χρόνω (έν) 264

265

ψυχαί

284 (89)

V. Modern Authors

AALDERS, G . J . D . ABERNETTY, G . ACHLEITNER, H . ADAM, H .

2 5 3 (5 b )

ANDRES, F .

ATTRIDGE, H .

345 (to 126)

AUNE, D . E .

2 5 1 (1) 248 (*)

3 4 2 ( t o 1)

261 (17)

AGUILAR FERNANDEZ, R . M . ALONI, A .

ARNIM, H . VON

2 5 1 (1)

347

BABUT, D .

2 5 2 (1), 2 8 8 (99), 3 4 4 (to 97), 3 4 7 276 (72)

ANDREWES, A .

(85), 283 (87), 290, 291, 304 (123), 305, 311

262 (20)

ARMSTRONG, A . H . (44), 276 (72), 347

2 5 0 (1), 2 5 2 (1), 253 (5), 271 (50),

276 (72), 277 (73), 278 (76), 281 (81), 282

251 (1), 252 (1),

(to 1 8 6 )

(131), 347 269

BADIAN, E .

321 (143), 332 (167)

BALDASSARI, M .

347

1319

THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF PLUTARCH: INDEX BALTES, M .

251 (1), 2 6 4 (25), 2 6 6 , 2 7 0 , 271

(47)

3 4 4 (to 98)

CORLU, A .

BARIGAZZI, Α .

CORNELL, T . J .

2 5 0 (1)

BARTHELMESS, J .

2 5 0 (1), 348

329 (161)

BEARDSLEE, W . A . BEAUJEU, J . BECK, W .

261 (17) 297 (111)

Β ETZ, H. D.

257 (11), 287 (97), 342 (to 1)

BIANCHI, U .

302 (122 d), 348

BIERENS DE HAAN, J . D . BLUME, H . D .

347 (to 186)

CUVIGNY, M .

289 (109)

DANIELI, M . L .

278 (76), 343 (to 76)

BENVENISTE, M .

291 (104)

DEFRADAS, J .

341 ( 1 8 5 , 3 4 8 )

D E LACY, P . H .

DEL

RE, R.

251 (1), 255 (8), 296 (110)

DEMARGNE, P .

348

BORGEAUD, P . BOYANCÉ, P .

347 (to 180)

260 (16)

BRENK, F . E .

(72), 281 (82), 287 (97), 302 (122 b, f), 333 (170), 343 (to 11), 347 (to 180), 348, 349

BUCKLER, J .

248

DIRKSE, P . Α .

332 (169)

BUFFIÈRE, F .

299 (119)

DODDS, E. R. 347 (186)

BURICKS, A .

306 (125)

DÖRRIE, Η .

BÜCHNER, Κ .

310 (130)

BURKERT, W .

CARNEY, T . F . CAVALLI, M .

348 311 (131)

CHAMBRY, E. 336 (174)

347 (to 180)

345 (to 133) 274 (64)

CHERNISS, Η .

251 (1), 262 (19), 2 6 4 274 (63)

CHIODI, S. M . CHRIST, W .

302 (122F)

281 (82) 252 (1), 262 (20), 335 (172)

283 (88)

261 (18)

COARELLI, F .

348

302 (122D), 338 (179)

CODIGNOLA, M .

2 5 1 (1)

248 (*), 343 (76), 348,

DORANDI, T . DOREY, T . Α .

332

262

(167)

(20)

261 (18), 338

DUMORTIER, J . (24),

302 (122 c)

EDMUNDS, L .

306 (125)

EICHHOFF, Κ . J . L . M . 327

(181)

283 (88), 341

DUNAND, F .

EINARSON, Β .

(185)

2 5 0 (1)

2 5 9 (13), 287 (97), 288 (99),

(156)

EISELE, T .

251 (1), 276 (72), 2 7 8 (75)

ERBSE, H .

251 (1), 2 6 0 (16), 276 (72)

ERICSSON, H .

349

348

DUMÉZIL, G .

273 (61), 275 (71), 285 (94), 345 (to 123) CHESNUT, G . F .

(*)

2 4 9 , 251 (1), 252 (1), 257 (12),

DOVER, Κ .

CHASSINAT, E .

248

260 (16), 322 (145), 325 (148),

DONINI, P . L .

282 (85), 315 (135), 320 (142),

CHAMPEAUX, J .

257

3 4 2 ( t o 1)

DÖRING, Κ .

348

CERESA GASTALDO, Α .

(2),

258, 259, 266 (33), 266, 267 (34, 35), 2 6 7 269, 271-275, 275 (70), 278 (76), 279 (77), 286 (96), 287 (97a), 290, 295 (109)

343 (to 11), 344 (to 98)

CANDURA, C . S .

(*), 2 5 0 (1), 2 5 2

(12), 258, 259 (14), 268 (38), 270 (46), 276, 278 (76), 279 (77), 282 (84), 285 (93), 287 (97a), 289 (99), 297 (114), 298, 299 (117), 304 (123), 310 (129), 347 (to 186)

D I MARTINO, P .

343 (to 11), 346 (to 176)

BUDDE, L .

252 (1), 267 (34), 268-269

2 7 0 (46)

DILLON, J .

2 5 0 (1), 251 (1), 2 5 6 (10), 2 7 6

279 (77), 283 (87), 284, 291

(104) DE VOGEL, C. J. DIELS, H .

BRAUN, Η .

267 (34)

DÉTIENNE, M .

251 (1), 281 (81), 2 8 4 (89), 344

(to 79)

301

D E RIJK, L. M .

338 (180)

252 (1), 280 (79), (80)

BOWERSOCK, G . W .

347 (to 180)

DERCHAIN, P .

346 (to 159)

BOLTON, J . D . P .

CLERC, C .

348 333 (170)

DEN BOER, W .

BOAKE, J . W .

CiZEK, E.

259 (13), 287 (97), 288 (99),

327 (156)

DELCOURT, M .

251 (1), 269 (44), 302

(122 a)

2 5 1 (1)

DANIÉLOU, J .

DEL CORNO, D .

2 5 1 (1)

2 5 2 (1), 2 6 7 (34)

BLUMENTHAL, H . J .

CITTÌ, V .

337 (178)

COUSINS, E .

3 4 2 ( t o 1)

296 (110)

BECCHI, F .

2 5 0 (1), 2 7 6 (72), 2 8 2 (84), 2 8 3 ,

284 (90)

347, 349

BARROW, Κ . Η .

Bayet, J.

COLE, S. G .

345 (to

ETHERIDGE, S. G .

278

133) (76)

FREDERICK E. BRENK

1320 FABRICIUS, R .

2 5 1 (1)

GRILLI, A .

FERRARESE, P .

337 (176)

GROS, P .

FERRO, A .

2 5 1 (1)

FESTUGIÈRE, A. J .

3 4 4 (to 98)

GUTHRIE, W . K . C .

2 7 8 (76)

3 4 5 (to 133)

FROIDEFOND, C .

2 5 1 (1)

HAMILTON, J . R . HANI, J .

GALLO, I .

GARZE-ITI, Α . GARZYA, A .

HOHL, E .

316 (136)

348 337 (176)

GEIGER, J. 253 (5a), 312 (132a), 325 (150), 3 4 2 (to 3), 3 4 8 GELZER, M .

326 (152)

GIANFRANCESCO, L . GIANGRANDE, G . GIL, G . GIL, L.

337 (176)

325 (149)

GÖRGEMANNS, Η .

326

2 6 0 (16) 2 7 7 (73)

GRANAROLO, J .

324 (147)

2 5 1 (1)

GRIFFITHS, J . G .

2 7 8 (76)

IsNARDi PARENTE, M .

349

JENSEN, S. SKOVGAARD

2 8 3 (87)

2 5 0 (1), 2 5 2 (2), 2 5 3 (3), 2 5 4 ,

JONES, R . M .

2 5 1 (1), 2 7 8 (76)

JUNEAUX, M .

2 8 2 (85)

KAJANTO, I . KLAERR, R .

GOULD, J . Β .

349

2 7 6 ( 7 2 ) , 2 7 8 (75) 2 6 2 (20), 3 0 9 ( 1 2 8 ) ,

(151) GORDON, R . L .

318 (139)

2 5 5 (6, 7), 302 (122 b ) , 3 0 8 ( 1 2 7 ) , 3 2 8 ( 1 5 7 )

2 6 2 (19), 2 8 4 (99)

GOLDSCHMIDT, V .

GRÉARD, O .

INDELLI, G .

JONES, C . P .

342 (to 1)

GOMME, A . W .

301

HORNBOSTEL, W .

349

348

GLUCKER, J .

3 4 5 (to 126)

321 (143), 346 (to 159)

INGENKAMP, H . G .

2 6 2 (20)

GLAESENER, H .

325 (149)

HOPFNER, T . 2 5 1 (1)

3 4 5 (to 133)

2 5 6 (9), 2 7 6 (72)

HOMEYER, H.

349

3 0 6 , 313 ( 1 3 3 )

337 (176)

HOLZBERG, Ν .

3 2 5 , 3 4 6 (to 147)

GEIGENMÜLLER, P .

2 5 1 (1), 2 7 5 (71) 343 (to 11)

HERSHBELL, J .

HIRZEL, R .

3 2 1 (122F), 3 4 8 , 3 4 9

GARCÍA BRAVO, Α .

3 4 6 (to 159)

291 (104)

HILTBRUNNER, O .

342 (to 1)

320 (141)

280 (80), 283 (87), 287 (97), 295 (107), 296 (110), 300 (120), 301, 348

HERZOG-HAUSER, G .

2 8 1 (82), 3 3 7 ( 1 7 8 )

GÄRTNER, H .

2 6 7 (34)

2 5 0 (1), 3 2 1 ( 1 4 3 )

2 5 0 (1), 2 5 1 (1), 2 5 8 (12), 2 7 4 (64),

HERTER, H .

337 (176)

330

325 (149)

HAMERTON-KELLY, R .

HENRICHS, A .

250 (1), 262 (20), 325 (149),

(122 h),

2 5 2 (1), 2 8 0 (79)

HÄUSSLER, E .

HIGGINS, R . GABBA, E .

(122 d), 3 0 3

HELMBOLD, W .

300 (120)

329 (159), 348 FUSCAGNI, S.

HADAS, M . HÄNDEL, P .

HEINZE, R .

283 (88)

FRIEDRICH, W . - H .

302

(163), 345 (to 133)

HANSEN, P . A .

3 4 5 (to 140)

FRASER, P . M .

HAASE, W .

HAMMOND, Ν . G . L .

3 1 1 (32)

FONTENROSE, J. 330 (163), 331 (165), 333 (170), 334, 343 (to 11)

FROST, F. J .

2 8 4 (90)

2 4 9 , 2 5 0 (1), 2 5 1 (1), 2 5 5

FONTANA, M . J .

FRAZER, R .

322 ( 1 4 5 )

GUIDORIZZI, G . 2 5 2 (1), 2 8 8 (99), 3 4 7

(8), 256 (10), 261 (19), 262 (20), 276 (72), 278 (75), 280 (80), 281 (81), 282 (85), 289 (101), 311 (131, 132), 315 (135), 318 (139), 320 (141, 142), 331 (166), 332 (169), 336 (174), 337 (176), 338 (180), 343 (to 79), 346 (to 147, to 172), 346 - 347 (to 180), 348349

FLASCH, Κ .

2 8 1 (81), 3 4 3 (to 79)

GRUNEBAUM, G . E . VON

295 (108), 301 (122)

FEYERABEND, B . FLACELIÈRE, R .

349 2 5 1 (1)

2 5 0 (1), 2 5 1 (1), 2 5 8 ( 1 2 ) ,

274 (64), 276 (72), 281 (81), 294, 295 (107, 108, 109), 296 (110), 297 (111, 114), 298 (115), 300 (120), 303 (122h)

KOCH, G .

3 4 5 (to 133) 288 (99), 293 (106), 348 2 8 8 (98)

KORNEMANN, E . KÖRTE, G .

2 8 1 (82)

313 ( 1 3 3 )

KORNHARDT, H . KRÄMER, H . J .

3 4 5 (to 133) 2 5 8 (12), 2 7 9 (77), 2 8 7 ( 9 7 a )

LA COSTE-MESSELIÈRE, P . DE LASSELL, E .

306 (125)

3 4 6 (to 172)

T H E RELIGIOUS SPIRIT O F PLUTARCH: LATTE, Κ . 261 (18), 313 (133), 3 4 0 (184) LATZARUS, B . (not N . ) 251 (1), 2 7 6 (72), 2 9 6 (110) LAURENTI, R . 349 LE CORSU, F . 3 1 9 (140) LEHMANN, G . Α . 3 2 9 (160) LESKY, Α . 321 LEWIS, Ν . 322 (145) LICHT, KJELD DE FINE 338 (179) LIVADARAS, N . 348 LLOYD, G . E . R . 2 6 3 (22) LONGONI, V . 348 LOZZA, G . 251 (1), 2 6 0 (16), 348 MACKAY, B . 251 (1) 261 (18) MAGNINO, D . 3 2 0 (142) MALAISE, M . 302 (122 d, 122 e), 303 (122 i)

MANFREDINI, M.

334 (171), 347 (to 181), 349

MANN, F . 2 5 2 (1), 2 6 7 (34) MANSFELD, J . 2 6 7 (34) MARINONE, Ν . 348 MARKUS, R . A . 251 (1), 2 6 9 (44), 302 (122 a) MARTIN, H . 262 (19), 2 8 4 (91), 342 (to 1),

348

MAYER, W . 2 4 8 ( * ) MÉAUTIS, G . 251 (17 MEID, W . 2 5 2 (1), 2 8 0 (79) MEIER, G . A . 322 (145) MERKELBACH, R . 2 4 2 (105), 346 (to 140) MERLAN, P . 251 (1), 2 6 7 , 2 7 6 (72) MOELLERING, H . 251 (1), 261 (18), 2 7 6 (72) MOHR, R . 263 (23) MOLÉ, M . 2 9 7 (111) MOLES, J . 348 MOMIGLIANO, Α . 253 (4), 2 8 2 (83) MORAUX, P . 264 (25) MOREL, J . - ? . 251 (1), 281 (81), 343 (to 79) MORENZ, S. 2 9 7 (111) MOULE, E . F . D . 251 (1), 261 (18) MUTH, R . 252 (1), 2 8 0 (79) NILSSON,

M . P.

2 7 6 (72), 282 (82), 2 8 7

(97a), 296, 306, 311

NITSCHE, K .

NOCK, A. D .

2 5 0 (1)

318 (139), 331 (164)

OAKESMITH, J . 251 (1) OWEN, G . E . L . 2 7 8 (76) PAIS, E . 338 (181) PALMER, R . 337 (179) PALMER, R . B . 2 5 7 (12), 2 6 7 (34) PARATORE, E . 282 (83)

INDEX

1321

PARKE, H . W . 3 3 0 (161), 331 (166), 3 3 5 PELLING, C . B . R . 253 (5 b), 325 (149, 150), 326 (153), 3 3 9 (182), 3 4 6 (to 147), 3 4 8 , 349 PÉPIN, J . 281 (81), 2 9 5 (108), 2 9 9 (119) PÉREZ, JIMÉNEZ Α . 306 (125) PETTINE, E . 349 PETZOLD, K . - E . 3 4 5 (to 126) PHILIPPS, E . D . 251 (1), 2 9 7 , 3 0 6 (125) PHILLIPS, J . E . 342 (to 1) PICCIRILLI, L . 334 (171), 3 4 7 (to 181) PINNOY, M . 2 7 8 (76) PIZZAGALLI, A . M . 251 (1) PODLECKI, A . J . 329 (159) POHL, J . K . 2 5 0 (1), 2 7 6 (72) POHLENZ, M . 2 7 6 (72), 2 9 6 (110) PORTER, W . H . 2 9 6 (110) POST, L . A . 3 2 6 (151) PRICE, S. F . 3 4 7 (to 180) QUISPEL, G .

251 (1), 271 (49)

RADEMACHER, E . 336 RILEY, M . 344 (to 97) ROBINSON, T . M . 263 (23) ROLLINS, W . G . 342 (to 1) ROSE, H . J . 251 (1), 2 9 5 (109), 3 1 7 (137), 339 (182) ROULET, A . 302 (122D) ROVERI, A . 345 (to 126) RUSSELL, D . A . 2 5 0 (1), 253 (3), 2 5 4 , 2 7 6 (72), 2 7 8 (76), 281 (82), 284 (90), 2 8 7 (97) SACKS, Κ . 3 4 5 (to 126) SALZMAN, M . R . 303 (122 k) SANDBACH, F . H . 2 4 8 ( * ) , 252 (1), 261 (19),

277 (73), 281 (81), 284 (91), 299 (119), 309 (128), 317 (137), 343 (to 76), 344 (to 99)

SANDMEL, S. 2 8 9 (100) SAUNDERS, T . J . 2 8 9 (100)

SCARDIGLI, Β.

253 (5 b), 325 (149), 345 (to

131), 3 4 9 SCHAEFER, W . 251 (1) SHERWIN-WHITE, Α . Ν . 253 (3) SCHMERTOSCH, R . 2 5 0 (1) SCHMID, W . 281 (82) SCHNEIDER, C . 3 1 0 (130) SCHOTTLAENDER, R . 349 SCHREITER, T . 2 5 0 (1) SCOTT, K . 346 (to 180) SCOTT-MONCRIEF, P. D . 301 SCUDERI, R . 349 SEEL, O . 261 (17) SEILLIÈRE, E . 2 7 6 (72)

FREDERICK E. BRENK

1322 SICHTERMANN, H . SIMMS, L . J .

288 (98)

343 (to 36)

SIMON, E .

2 5 0 (1), 3 4 9

SMITH, E . W .

2 5 7 ( 1 1 ) , 3 4 2 ( t o 1)

SMITH, G . T .

261 (18)

SMITH, M . SORDI, M .

337 (176)

SOURY, G .

251 (1), 2 7 6 (72), 277, 278 (76),

STÄDTER, P . A .

262 (20)

STAMBAUGH, J .

318 (39)

STIEWE, K .

345 (to 126)

STOIKE, D . A .

2 8 7 (97)

SZYDELSKI, S.

2 5 1 (1)

TASSIER, M .

THEILER, W .

2 7 7 (72)

268 283 (87)

THRAEDE, K .

296 (109)

TIETZE, F .

3 4 5 (to 133)

TIMPE, D .

332 (167)

TOBIN, T .

2 6 6 (33), 2 7 0 (46), 271 (47)

TREVES, P . TURCAN, R .

WAGENVOORT, H .

341 (186), 349

287 (98), 297 (111)

WALSH, P . G .

VALGIGLIO, E . VALLAURI, G .

WEHRLI, F .

345 (to 131), 347 (to 182) 295 (109)

VAN DER M E E R , H . F . VERBERE, G .

2 5 2 ( 1 ) , 2 6 9 ( 4 4 ) , 3 0 2 ( 1 2 2 a) 250 (1), 262 (20)

281 (81), 295 (108), 2 9 9 (119)

WEST, M . L .

292 (105)

WESTMAN, R .

349 322 (145) 248 (*), 251 (1), 257

(11,

12), 2 6 3 ( 2 3 ) , 2 6 9 ( 3 ) , 2 7 3 WICKER, K . O .

3 4 2 ( t o 1)

WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, U . VON WILD, R . A .

306

303 (122 h)

WINSTON, D .

2 6 8 (38), 2 7 0 (46), 2 8 9 (99)

WORMELL, D. E. W. 335

251 (1), 271 (49) 295 (109)

278 (76), 311 (131)

349

ZAEHNER, R . C . ZANNATA, M .

ZIEGLER, Κ .

330 (163), 331 (166),

349

ZACHER, K . - D .

ZELLER, E .

251 (1)

VAN DEN BROEK, R .

263 (22), 307 (126)

WARDMAN, A . E .

ZEDDA, S. VALENTIN, L .

261 (18)

WALBANK, F . W .

YAGINUMA, S.

2 7 6 (72) 2 5 2 (1), 262 (20)

TSEKOURAKIS, D .

2 7 6 (72)

(124)

THESLEFF, H .

TRENCH, R .

(98),

3 0 3 ( 1 2 2 i)

VOLKMANN, R .

WHITTAKER, J .

261 (18), 282 (83), 332 (169)

TER VRUGT-LENTZ, J .

251 (1), 2 7 7 (72), 2 8 7

288 (99), 2 9 0 (102), 293 (106), 344 (to 98),

WHITE, R . J .

284 (90)

TEMPORINI, H .

VERNIÈRE, Y .

VIDMAN, L .

263, 2 8 7 (97)

296 (110)

251 (1), 271 (49), 302

(122 d)

349

2 6 0 (16)

SOLMSEN, F .

VERMASEREN, M . J .

296, 2 9 7 (111)

345 (to 123)

349 257, 2 7 6 (72) 2 5 0 (1), 2 5 2 (2), 2 5 5 (8), 2 5 6 ,

261 (19), 2 7 0 (45), 2 7 4 , 2 7 6 (72), 278 (75), 320 (141), 328 (157), 322 (168), 338, ( 1 8 2 ) , 3 4 2 ( t o 1), 3 4 6 ( t o 1 4 7 ) ZINTZEN, C .

2 7 7 (72)

339

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