Geschichte u. Kultur Roms im Spiegel d. neueren Forschung ;2. Principat. Bd.36. Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik [Reprint 2014 ed.] 3110139464, 9783110139464

Table of contents :
Vorwort
Inhalt
Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik: Philosophie (Systematische Themen; Indirekte Überlieferungen; Allgemeines; Nachträge)
Systematische Themen
Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire
Il concetto di causa nella filosofia ellenistica e romana
Il sapiens in pericolo. Psicologia del rapporto con gli altri, da Cicerone a Marco Aurelio
Peace of Mind and Being Yourself: Panaetius to Plutarch
Apatheia ancienne, apatheia chrétienne. Ière partie: L'apatheia ancienne
Sensation et perception dans la philosophie d’époque hellénistique et impériale
The Concept of ‘Phantasia’ from the Late Hellenistic Period to Early Neoplatonism
Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy. The Stoics and Their Critics
Philosophical Influence on Roman Jurisprudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law
Post-Aristotelian Political Philosophy and Modernity
Indirekte Überlieferungen: Orientalia
Pre-Plotinian Philosophy in Arabic (Other than Platonism and Aristotelianism): A Review of the Sources
Hellenistisch-kaiserzeitliche Doxographie und philosophischer Synkretismus in islamischer Zeit
Zwischen Hellenismus und Spätantike: Allgemeines zur Philosophie der römischen Kaiserzeit
School Philosophy and Popular Philosophy in the Roman Empire
Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica
Aspetti della cultura filosofica negli ambienti della Seconda Sofistica
Philosophie, littérature et droit à Rome sous le Principat
Nachträge zu Band II 36,1
Celsus Philosophus Platonicus
Longinus Platonicus Philosophus Et Philologus I. Longinus Philosophus
Mystical Elements in the Thought of Plotinus
Platonic Soul-Body Dualism in the Early Centuries of the Empire to Plotinus1
Nachtrag zu Band II 36,2
Aspasio, commentatore di Aristotele
Nachtrag zu Band II 36,3
Il ‘De Providentia’ di Seneca fra lingua e filosofia

Citation preview

AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER R Ö M I S C H E N WELT BAND II. 36.7

RISE AND DECLINE OF T H E R O M A N WORLD VOLUME II. 36.7

AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER RÖMISCHEN WELT (ANRW) RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ROMAN WORLD H E R A U S G E G E B E N VON / E D I T E D BY

WOLFGANG HAASE UND / AND

HILDEGARD T E M P O R I N I

TEIL II: PRINCIPAT BAND 36.7 PART II: PRINCIPATE VOLUME 36.7

W G DE

WALTER DE GRUYTER • BERLIN • NEW YORK 1994

AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER R Ö M I S C H E N WELT (ANRW) G E S C H I C H T E U N D KULTUR R O M S IM SPIEGEL DER N E U E R E N F O R S C H U N G

TEIL II: PRINCIPAT BAND 36: PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTEN, TECHNIK

7. TEILBAND: PHILOSOPHIE (SYSTEMATISCHE T H E M E N ; INDIREKTE ÜBERLIEFERUNGEN; ALLGEMEINES; NACHTRÄGE) HERAUSGEGEBEN VON

WOLFGANG HAASE

W DE

G

WALTER DE G R U Y T E R • BERLIN • N E W YORK 1994

© Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier, das die US-ANSI-Norm über Haltbarkeit erfüllt. © Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

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of Congress

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Data

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. Later volumes have English parallel title: Rise and decline of the Roman world. The volumes of Teil II have separate titles: Politische Geschichte, Künste, Recht, Religion, Sprache und Literatur, Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. Teil II edited by Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase. „Joseph Vogt zum 23. 6. 1970" (28 p.) in pocket of vol. I, 1. Includes bibliographies. Contents: T. I. Von den Anfängen Roms bis zum Ausgang der Republik (5 v.) - T. II. Principat. 1. Rome - Civilization — Collected works. I. Vogt, Joseph, 1895 - 1 9 8 6 . II. Temporini, Hildegard. III. Haase, Wolfgang. IV. Title: Rise and decline of the Roman world. DG209.T36 937 72-83058 ISBN 3-11-001885-3 (I, 1)

Die Deutsche

Bibliothek

—

CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt : (ANRW) ; Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung / hrsg. von Wolfgang Haase und Hildegard Temporini. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter. Teilw. hrsg. von Hildegard Temporini und Wolfgang Haase. Beitr. teilw. dt., teilw. engl., teilw. franz., teilw. ital. — Literaturangaben. — Teilw. mit Parallelt.: Rise and decline of the Roman world NE: Haase, Wolfgang [Hrsg.]; Temporini, Hildegard [Hrsg.]; ANRW; Rise and decline of the Roman world Teil 2. Principat. Bd. 36. Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik / hrsg. von Wolfgang Haase. Teilbd. 7. Philosophie (indirekte Überlieferungen; Allgemeines; Nachträge). - 1994 ISBN 3-11-013946-4

© Copyright 1994 by Walter de Gruyter Sc Co., D-10785 Berlin. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany Satz und Druck: Arthur Collignon GmbH, Berlin Buchbinderische Verarbeitung: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin Einbandgestaltung und Schutzumschlag: Rudolf Hübler

Vorwort Mit dem vorliegenden Teilband II 36,7 wird, wie im gemeinsamen Vorwort zu den Teilbänden II 36,5 und 6 angekündigt (s. II 36,5 [Berlin—New York 1992] S.V), die Publikation des philosophiegeschichtlichen Bandes II 36 der Rubrik 'Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik' ( = Bände II 36 und II 37) im Principatsteil (Teil II) dieses Werkes abgeschlossen. Der Teilband besteht aus vier Gruppen von Beiträgen, von denen drei das Programm der vorausgehenden Teilbände 1136,1 — 6 planmäßig fortsetzen und abrunden, während die vierte eine Reihe von wichtigen Nachträgen zu den Teilbänden 1136,1—3 enthält, Beiträge, die seinerzeit nicht früh genug vorlagen, um an ihrem eigentlichen Ort veröffentlicht zu werden, deren späteres Erscheinen am Schluß des ganzen Bandes II 36 aber teilweise wenigstens noch angekündigt werden konnte (s. z. B. die Hinweise Teilbd. II 36,1 [1987] S. 700 und Teilbd. 1136,3 [1989] S. 1878). Die erste und umfangreichste der hier folgenden Gruppen von Beiträgen (unten S. 4417 —4936) ist ausgewählten 'Systematische(n) Themen' in einer Behandlung über die Grenzen der verschiedenen philosophischen Schulen und Richtungen hinweg gewidmet. Diese Auswahl ist in Verbindung mit solchen Themen systematischer Art zu sehen, die in den Teilbänden II 36,1—4 aus dem Blickwinkel einzelner Schulen oder Richtungen (Piatonismus, Aristotelismus [Teilbde. 1 und 2], Stoizismus [Teilbd. 3], Epikureismus, Skeptizismus, Kynismus [Teilbd. 4]) bereits behandelt worden sind. — Darauf folgt eine Gruppe von Beiträgen (unten S. 4939 —4992) zu Tndirekte(n) Überlieferungen' kaiserzeitlicher bzw. späthellenistischer und kaiserzeitlicher Philosophie und ihrer Quellen, repräsentiert durch 'Orientalia'. Hier gibt es einen allgemeinen Übersichtsbeitrag zu den Schulen und Richtungen mit Ausnahme von Piatonismus und Aristotelismus (D. GUTAS, unten S. 4 9 3 9 - 4 9 7 3 ) und einen Beitrag zur doxographischen Tradition in orientalischer Vermittlung (H. DAIBER, unten S. 4 9 7 4 - 4 9 9 2 ) , der die Beiträge zu den direkt überlieferten Doxographica in Teilbd. II 36,4

VI

VORWORT

(1990) S. 2 9 3 5 - 3 2 4 3 (Arius Didymus, Aetius) und in den Teilbänden II 36,5 und 6 (1992) S. 3 5 5 6 - 3 7 9 2 bzw. 3793 - 4 3 0 7 (Diogenes Laertius) und S. 4309 —4402 (Hippolytus) ergänzt. — Die abschließende Gruppe von Beiträgen (unten S. 4995 — 5180) besteht aus vier Abhandlungen zu allgemeinen Aspekten der Philosophie der römischen Kaiserzeit oder der Periode 'Zwischen Hellenismus und Spätantike', wobei die historisch-philologische Perspektive gegenüber der systematischen überwiegt. Ein größerer synthetischer Übersichtsbeitrag, den MICHAEL FREDE als Abschluß beisteuern wollte, ist wegen der Übersiedlung des Verfassers von Princeton (USA) nach Cambridge (England) leider nicht mehr rechtzeitig zustandegekommen. Wie alle Beiträge dieser dritten und letzten Gruppe thematisch eine Verbindung zwischen dem philosophiegeschichtlichen Band II 36 und den literaturgeschichtlichen Bänden (II 30 — II 35) der Rubrik 'Sprache und Literatur' herstellen, so schlagen die Beiträge von P. MITSIS und P. A. VANDER WAERDT (unten S . 4 8 1 2 -

4850 bzw. 4 8 5 1 - 4 9 0 0 ) in der ersten Gruppe und der von M. Ducos (unten S. 5134 —5180) in der letzten Gruppe eine Brücke zu der Rubrik 'Recht' (Bde. II 1 3 - 1 1 1 5 [ 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 2 ] ) , besonders zu deren Band II 15 (1976) mit Beiträgen u. a. über 'Methoden' und 'Schulen' des römischen Rechts. Der systematisch-begriffsgeschichtliche Beitrag von M . SPANNEUT (unten S. 4641 — 4717) in der ersten Gruppe ist der erste, der profanen Philosophie gewidmete Teil eines größeren Ganzen, das demnächst durch den gleichen Autor seine Fortsetzung für den Bereich des frühchristlichen philosophisch-theologischen Denkens in Bd. II 28 der Rubrik 'Religion' finden wird. - Der chronologische Rahmen der Principatszeit, der Periode vom ausgehenden 1. Jh. vor bis zum ausgehenden 3. Jh. nach der christlichen Zeitwende, wird von mehreren Beiträgen dieses Teilbandes in die eine oder die andere Richtung, zumeist nach rückwärts in die hellenistische oder spätrepublikanische Zeit, gelegentlich auch nach vorwärts in die Spätantike und sogar in nachantike Perioden, überschritten. Dies hat seinen leicht ersichtlichen Grund teils in den Umständen innerantiker Zusammenhänge von Kontinuität oder Anknüpfung und Erneuerung, teils in der Einbeziehung überlieferungs- und wirkungsgeschichtlicher Gesichtspunkte. Durch die Rückgriffe werden hierbei nicht zuletzt auch einige Lücken geschlossen, die in der Behandlung der Philosophiegeschichte im I. Teil dieses Werkes ('Von den Anfängen Roms bis zum Ausgang der Republik') in Bd. 1 4 (1973) entstanden waren.

VORWORT

VII

Von den 'Nachträgen' ergänzen die ersten vier Beiträge die Behandlung des kaiserzeitlichen Piatonismus in den Teilbänden II 36,1 und 2 (beide 1987) durch umfassende Rekonstruktionen des Bildes zweier wichtiger philosophischer Gestalten ( M . F R E D E über Celsus, unten S. 5 1 8 3 - 5 2 1 3 , bzw. L. BRISSON — M. PATILLON über Longinus, unten S. 5214 — 5299) und durch die Untersuchung zweier zentraler systematischer Themen (J.BUSSANICH, unten S . 5 3 0 0 - 5 3 3 0 , bzw. E . K . EMILSSON, unten S.5331— 5362). Von dem Longinus-Beitrag von L.BRISSON und M . PATILLON erscheint hier nur der Erste Teil über „Longinus philosophus", während der Zweite Teil über „Longinus philologus" seinen Ort in Bd. II 34 der Rubrik 'Sprache und Literatur' (voraussichtlich Teilbd. II 34,4 [1995]) haben wird. Die Behandlung des Aristotelismus in Teilband 1136,2 (S. 1079 —1279) ergänzt hier der Beitrag von E. BECCHI (unten S. 5 3 6 5 - 5 3 9 6 ) um die Gestalt des Aspasios. Zur Behandlung des Stoizismus in Teilband II 36,3 (1989) trägt der Beitrag von I . DIONIGI (unten S. 5 3 9 9 - 5 4 1 4 ) eine Analyse der einzigen philosophischen Schrift Senecas ('De Providentia') nach, die dort noch keinen Bearbeiter gefunden hatte. Wie gewöhnlich (vgl. zuletzt das Vorwort in Teilbd. II 36,5 [1992] S. V) sei hier der Hinweis wiederholt, daß mit dem Gebotenen weder sachliche Vollständigkeit noch formale Einheitlichkeit angestrebt wird. Die verschiedenen Typen von Beiträgen, die auch in diesem Teilband als zusammenfassende Darstellungen, Problem- und Forschungsberichte und exemplarische Untersuchungen oder Interpretationsstudien nebeneinander stehen, sollen zusammen mit denen der vorhergehenden Teilbände ( 1 1 3 6 , 1 - 6 ) das Gebiet der Philosophie der Principatszeit repräsentativ erfassen. Der Leser als Benutzer und Kritiker sei schließlich noch daran erinnert, daß der hiermit abgeschlossene philosophiegeschichtliche Band II 36 der Rubrik 'Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik' nicht nur durch den wissenschafts- und technikgeschichtlichen Band (II 37) der gleichen Rubrik, sondern auch durch Beiträge in verschiedenen Bänden anderer Rubriken, besonders 'Sprache und Literatur' und 'Religion', vielfältig ergänzt wird. Unterstützung bei der redaktionellen Seite der editorischen Arbeit hat der Herausgeber abermals in Tübingen von EDELTRAUD D Ü R R , JOHANNES G E Y E R , GUIDO SANTALUCIA, DIETMAR VÖGELE und besonders ALEXANDER F. W E N S L E R und in Boston von JOHN DAVID HAGUE und besonders ALEXANDER INGLE erfahren. Die herstellerische Betreuung

VORWORT

VIII

dieses Teilbandes im Verlag de Gruyter hat R E N A T E STEFAN besorgt. Der Verleger HANS R O B E R T C R A M hat den Fortgang des Werkes mit konstruktivem Rat begleitet. Allen Genannten sei für ihre unentbehrliche Hilfe vielmals gedankt. W. H.

ANRW Research Center (Department of Classical Studies/ Institute for the Classical Tradition), Boston University Arbeitsstelle ANRW, Universität Tübingen im Dezember 1993

Inhalt Vorwort

V-VIII

PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTEN, TECHNIK Band II. 36.7: Systematische Themen; Indirekte Überlieferungen; Allgemeines; Nachträge Systematische Themen (Rethymnon, Crete) Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire

DRAGONA-MONACHOU, M .

4417 — 4490

A. M. (Roma) II concetto di causa nella filosofia ellenistica e romana . . . 4491 — 4545

IOPPOLO,

S. (Siena) Il sapiens in pericolo. Psicologia del rapporto con gli altri, da Cicerone a Marco Aurelio 4546 - 4598

CITRONI MARCHETTI,

GILL, C. (Exeter, G.B.)

Peace of Mind and Being Yourself: Panaetius to Plutarch

. 4599 — 4640

M. (Lille) Apatheia ancienne, apatheia chrétienne, I ere partie: L'apatheia ancienne 4641 — 4717

SPANNEUT,

(Lille) Sensation et perception dans la philosophie d'époque hellénistique et impériale 4718-4764

DUMONT, J . - P . T

(Mainooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland) The Concept of 'Phantasia' from the Late Hellenistic Period to Early Neoplatonism 4765-4810

WATSON, G .

P. (Ithaca, New York) Natural Law and Natural Rights in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy. The Stoics and their Critics 4812-4850

MITSIS,

X

INHALT

VANDER W A E R D T , P. A . ( S a n F r a n c i s c o ,

California)

Philosophical Influence on Roman Jurisprudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law 4851-4900

SCHALL, J . V. ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . )

Post-Aristotelian Political Philosophy and Modernity . . . .

4902 — 4936

Indirekte Überlieferungen: Orientalia GUTAS, D . ( N e w H a v e n ,

Connecticut)

Pre-Plotinian Philosophy in Arabic (Other than Platonism and Aristotelianism): A Review of the Sources 4939 - 4973 DAIBER, H .

(Amsterdam)

Hellenistisch-kaiserzeitliche Doxographie und philosophischer Synkretismus in islamischer Zeit 4974 - 4992

Zwischen Hellenismus und Spätantike: Allgemeines zur Philosophie der römischen Kaiserzeit MANNING, C. E. (Christchurch, New Zealand) School Philosophy and Popular Philosophy in the Roman Empire 4995-5026 DONINI, P. ( T o r i n o -

Milano)

Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica 5027 — 5100 MORESCHINI, C . ( P i s a )

Aspetti della cultura filosofica negli ambienti della Seconda Sofistica 5101-5133 Ducos, M . (Paris-Dijon) Philosophie, littérature et droit à Rome sous le Principat

. 5134-5180

N A C H T R Ä G E Z U BAND II. 36.1: FREDE, M . ( O x f o r d , U. K.)

Celsus philosophus Platonicus BRISSON, L . ( P a r i s ) - PATILLON, M .

5183 — 5213 (Paris)

Longinus Platonicus Philosophus et Philologus, I. Longinus Philosophus 5214-5299

INHALT BUSSANICH, J . ( A l b u q u e r q u e , N e w

XI

Mexico)

Mystical Elements in the Thought of Plotinus

5300 - 5330

EMILSSON, E. K. (Reykjavik, Iceland - Oslo) Platonic Soul-Body Dualism in the Early Centuries of the Empire to Plotinus 5331 — 5362

N A C H T R A G Z U BAND II. 36.2: BECCHI, F. ( F i r e n z e )

Aspasio, commentatore di Aristotele

5365 — 5396

N A C H T R A G Z U BAND II. 36.3: DIONIGI, I. ( B o l o g n a )

Il 'De Providentia' di Seneca fra lingua e filosofia

5399 — 5414

Band II. 36.1: Vorwort

V-VII Philosophie (Historische Einleitung; Piatonismus) Historische Einleitung

ANDRÉ, J . - M .

(Dijon)

Les écoles philosophiques aux deux premiers siècles de l'Empire

5-77

Platonismus WHITTAKER, J . (St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada) Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire

.

81 —123

Bibliographie du platonisme impérial antérieur à Plotin: 1926-1986

124-182

DEITZ, L . (Konstanz)

FROIDEFOND, C H .

(Aix-en-Provence)

Plutarque et le platonisme . . .

184-233

XII

INHALT

HERSHBELL, J . P. (Minneapolis, Minnesota) Plutarch's 'De animae procreatione in Timaeo': An Analysis of Structure and Content

234 — 247

BRENK, F. E . , S. J . ( R o m e )

An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia

BIANCHI, U .

248 - 349

(Rom)

Plutarch und der Dualismus

350 — 365

TSEKOURAKIS, D . (Thessaloniki)

Pythagoreanism or Platonism and Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch's 'Moralia'

366 — 393

HIJMANS J R . , B. L . (Groningen)

Apuleius, Philosophus Platonicus MORESCHINI, C . (Pisa)

Attico: una figura singolare del medioplatonismo

SCHROEDER, F. M . (Kingston, Ontario, Canada) Ammonius Saccas

395 — 475

477 — 491

493 — 526

BLUMENTHAL, H . J . (Liverpool)

Plotinus in the Light of Twenty Years' Scholarship, 1951 1971 CORRIGAN, K. (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada) — O'CLEIRIGH, P. (Guelph, Ontario, Canada) The Course of Plotinian Scholarship from 1971 to 1986 . . HADOT, P. (Paris)

Structure et thèmes du Traité 38 (VI, 7) de Plotin

SCHROEDER, F. M . (Kingston, Ontario, Canada) Synousia, Synaisthaesis and Synesis: Presence and Dependence in the Plotinian Philosophy of Consciousness

528-570

571 - 623 624 - 676

677 — 699

BUSSANICH, J . (Albuquerque, New Mexico) Mystical Elements in Plotinus' Thought [Hinweis auf den Nachtrag in Bd. II. 36.7]

700

DOMBROWSKI, D. A. (Omaha, Nebraska) Asceticism as Athletic Training in Plotinus

701-712

INHALT

XIII

Band II. 36.2: Philosophic (Platonismus [Forts.]; Aristotelismus) Platonismus (Forts.) (Dublin) Porphyrian Studies since 1913

717 — 773

A. (Omaha, Nebraska) Porphyry and Vegetarianism: A Contemporary Philosophical Approach

774-791

L. (Paris) Amélius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa doctrine, son style

793 — 860

(Dublin) Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240 - 325 A. D.)

862 - 909

(Norman, Oklahoma) Scepticism and Neoplatonism

911 — 954

(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the'Categories'

955-974

K. (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada) Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One. A Reappraisal

975-993

(Trier) Bonum est diffusivum sui. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum

994 - 1 0 3 2

SMITH, A .

DOMBROWSKI, D .

BRISSON,

DILLON, J .

WALLIS, R . T . F

STRANGE, S . K .

CORRIGAN,

KREMER, K .

FREDE, M. (Princeton, New Jersey) Numenius

1034-1075

Aristotelismus H. B. (Leeds) Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD 1079-1174

GOTTSCHALK,

XIV

INHALT

SHARPLES, R . W .

(London)

Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation . . 1 1 7 6 - 1 2 4 3 DONINI, P. L . ( T o r i n o )

Il 'De fato' di Alessandro. Questioni di coerenza

1244—1259

MADIGAN, A., S. J . (Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts) Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Book of Ethical Problems . . 1260—1279

N A C H T R Ä G E Z U BAND II. 16.3 UND BAND II. 36.1: B R E N K , F. E . , S . J .

(Rome)

Index to Contribution on In the Light of the Moon: Demonology in the Early Imperial Period 1283-1299 B R E N K , F. E . , S . J .

(Rome)

Index to Contribution on An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia 1300-1322

Band II. 36.3: Philosophie (Stoizismus) HAHM, D. E. (Columbus, Ohio) Posidonius's Theory of Historical Causation

1325 —1363

TODD, R. B. (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada) The Stoics and their Cosmology in the First and Second Centuries A. D 1365 - 1 3 7 8 LAPIDGE, M .

(Cambridge)

Stoic Cosmology and Roman Literature, First to Third Centuries A. D AUJAC, G. ( T o u l o u s e - L e Mirail) Stoïcisme et Hypothèse géocentrique HORN, H . - J .

1379-1429 1430 —1453

(Mannheim)

Stoische Symmetrie und Theorie des Schönen in der Kaiserzeit

1454-1472

INHALT

NEWMAN, R. J. (Honolulu, Hawaii) Cotidie meditare. Theory and Practice of the meditatio Imperial Stoicism (Christchurch, New Zealand) Stoicism and Slavery in the Roman Empire

MANNING, C . E .

XV

in

1473-1517 1518 — 1543

F.-R. (Paris) Quarante ans de recherche sur les œuvres philosophiques de Sénèque (Bibliographie 1945 - 1 9 8 5 ) 1545 - 1 6 0 5

CHAUMARTIN,

J. (Paris) La production littéraire de Sénèque sous les règnes de Caligula et de Claude, sens philosophique et portée politique: les'Consolationes'et le'De ira' 1606—1638

FILLION-LAHILLE,

(Paris) Les idéaux stoïciens et les premières responsabilités politiques: le 'De dementia' 1639 —1685

MORTUREUX, B.

F.-R. (Paris) Les désillusions de Sénèque devant l'évolution de la politique néronienne et l'aspiration à la retraite: le 'De vita beata' et le 'De beneficiis' 1686-1723

CHAUMARTIN,

(Dijon) Sénèque: 'De breuitate uitae', 'De constantia sapientis', 'De tranquillitate animae','De otio' 1724—1778

ANDRÉ, J . - M .

(Salamanca) La physique de Sénèque: Ordonnance et structure des 'Naturales quaestiones' 1779 — 1822

CODOÑER, C .

G. (Pavia) Le 'Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium' di Seneca. Valore letterario e filosofico 1823-1877

MAZZOLI,

(Bologna) IL 'De Providentia' di Seneca fra lingua e filosofia [Hinweis auf den Nachtrag in Bd. II. 36.7]

DIONIGI, I.

1878

(Augsburg) Senecae operum fragmenta: Überblick und Forschungsbericht 1879-1961

LAUSBERG, M .

GRIMAL, P. (Paris)

Sénèque et le Stoïcisme Romain

1962 - 1 9 9 2

(Toronto) Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy

1993—2012

RIST, J . M .

XVI

INHALT

MOST, G . W. (Innsbruck)

Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis: A Preliminary Report

. . . 2014-2065

FREDE, M . (Princeton, New Jersey) Chaeremon

LAURENTI, R .

2067-2103

(Napoli)

Musonio, maestro di Epitteto

2105 — 2146

HERSHBELL, J . P. (Minneapolis, Minnesota) The Stoicism of Epictetus: Twentieth Century Perspectives

2148 — 2163

JAGU, A. (Angers) La Morale d'Epictète et le christianisme

2164 — 2199

ISNARDI PARENTE, M .

(Roma)

Ierocle stoico. Oikeiosis e doveri sociali

ASMIS, E. (Chicago, Illinois) The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius

2201—2226

2228 — 2252

Band II. 36.4: Vorwort

V

Philosophie (Epikureismus, Skeptizismus, Kynismus, Orphica; Doxographica) Epikureismus, Skeptizismus, Kynismus, Orphica FERGUSON, J . T ( B i r m i n g h a m )

Epicureanism under the Roman Empire (revised and supplem e n t e d b y J . P. H E R S H B E L L [ M i n n e a p o l i s , M i n n e s o t a ] ) . . . 2 2 5 7 - 2 3 2 7 DORANDI, T .

(Napoli)

Filodemo: gli orientamenti della ricerca attuale

2328-2368

ASMIS, E. (Chicago, Illinois) Philodemus' Epicureanism

2369 — 2406

INHALT

XVII

DORANDI, T . ( N a p o l i )

Filodemo storico del pensiero antico ISNARDI PARENTE, M .

2407 — 2423

(Roma)

Diogeniano, gli epicurei e la TÓ^TI

2424 — 2445

CLAY, D. (Baltimore, Maryland) The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda: New Discoveries 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 8 3 2446-2559 [Index of Diogenes fragments discussed: infra, pp. 3231 — 3232]

STÜCKELBERGER, A . ( B e r n )

Die Atomistik in römischer Zeit: Rezeption und Verdrängung 2561-2580

ALLEN, J . (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) The Skepticism of Sextus Empiricus BARNES, J .

2582 - 2607

(Oxford)

Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation. Observations on the Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus 2608 — 2695 CORTASSA, G .

(Torino)

Il programma dello scettico: struttura e forme di argumentazione del primo libro delle Tpotiposi pirroniche' di Sesto Empirico 2696-2718

GOULET-CAZÉ, M . - O .

(Paris)

Le cynisme à l'époque impériale

2720 — 2833

HAMMERSTAEDT, J . ( K ô l n )

Der Kyniker Oenomaus von Gadara

2834 — 2865

BRISSON, L . ( P a r i s )

Orphée et l'Orphisme à l'époque impériale. Témoignages et interprétations philosophiques, de Plutarque à Jamblique . 2867 — 2931

Doxographica: Arius Didymus, Aetius HAHM, D. E. (Columbus, Ohio) The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus [Indices: infra, pp. 3 2 3 4 - 3 2 4 3 ] 291

A N R W II 3 6 . 7

2935 — 3055

XVIII

INHALT

(Utrecht) Doxography and Dialectic. The Sitz im Leben of the 'Placita' 3056 — 3229

MANSFELD, J .

CLAY, D. (Baltimore, Maryland) The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda: New Discoveries 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 8 3 Index of Diogenes fragments discussed 3231—3232 (Columbus, Ohio) The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus Indices

HAHM, D . E .

3234-3243

Band II. 36.5: Vorwort

V-VI Philosophie (Einzelne Autoren; Doxographica)

Varia zu: Plinius d. Ä., Dion von Prusa, Plutarch, Lukian, Galen S. (Siena) Filosofia e ideologia nella 'Naturalis historia' di Plinio . . . 3248 - 3306

CITRONI MARCHETTI,

A. (Roma) Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione 'Sulla regalità' di Dione Crisostomo: Dione e 1"Archelao' di Antistene 3308-3334

BRANCACCI,

(Minneapolis, Minnesota) Plutarch and Stoicism

3336 — 3352

(Minneapolis, Minnesota) Plutarch and Epicureanism

3353 — 3383

H E R S H B E L L , J . P.

H E R S H B E L L , J . P.

AALDERS H . W Z N . , G . J . D . F

gen)

(Amsterdam) -

DE BLOIS, L .

(Nijme-

Plutarch und die politische Philosophie der Griechen . . . .

3384 — 3404

CLAY, D. (Durham, North Carolina) Lucian of Samosata: Four Philosophical Lives (Nigrinus, Demonax, Peregrinus, Alexander Pseudomantis) 3406 — 3450

INHALT

XIX

NESSELRATH, H . - G . (Köln)

Kaiserlicher Skeptizismus in platonischem Gewand: Lukians 'Hermotimos'

3451-3482

DONINI, P. L . (Torino)

Galeno e la filosofia

3484-3504

HANKINSON, R. J . (Austin, Texas) Galen's Philosophical Eclecticism

3505 - 3522

HULSER, K. (Konstanz)

Galen und die Logik

3523 - 3554

Doxographica: Diogenes Laertius, Hippolytus MEJER, J . (Copenhagen)

Diogenes Laertius and the Transmission of Greek Philosophy 3556-3602 GIANNANTONI, G . ( R o m a )

Il secondo libro delle 'Vite' di Diogene Laerzio

3603 — 3618

BRISSON, L. (Paris)

Diogène Laërce, "Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres', Livre III: Structure et contenu 3619-3760 [Indices pp. 2 * - 2 5 * ] DORANDI, T . (Napoli)

Il quarto libro delle 'Vite' di Diogene Laerzio: l'Academia da Speusippo a Clitomaco 3761 — 3792 BRISSON, L. (Paris)

Diogène Laërce, 'Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres', Livre III: Structure et contenu (ci-dessus, pp. 3619 —3760) Indices

2* - 2 5 *

Band II. 36.6: Doxographica: Diogenes Laertius (Forts.), Hippolytus SOLLENBERGER, M . G. (Emmitsburg, Maryland) T h e Lives of the Peripatetics: An Analysis of the Contents and Structure of Diogenes Laertius' Vitae philosophorum Book 5 3793-3879 291*

XX

INHALT

M.-O. (Paris) Le livre VI de Diogène Laërce: analyse de sa structure et réflexions méthodologiques 3880 — 4048

GOULET-CAZÉ,

(Roma) I Koivfj àpÉCTKOvxa dei Cinici e la Koivcovia tra cinismo e stoicismo nel libro VI (103-105) delle 'Vite' di Diogene Laerzio 4049-4075

BRANCACCI, A .

(Columbus, Ohio) Diogenes Laertius VII: On the Stoics [Indices pp. 4404 - 4411]

HAHM, D . E.

4076-4182

B. (Roma) L'VIII libro delle 'Vite' di Diogene Laerzio

4183-4217

F. (Milano) II libro IX delle 'Vite dei filosofi' di Diogene Laerzio . . . .

4218-4240

CENTRONE,

DECLEVA CAIZZI,

(Oxford) Diogenes Laertius IX 61 — 116: The Philosophy of Pyrrhonism 4241-4301

BARNES, J .

(Neapel) Das zehnte Buch des Diogenes Laertios: Epikur und der Epikureismus 4302 — 4307

GIGANTE, M .

I. (Chicago, Illinois) Heterodoxy and Doxography in Hippolytus' 'Refutation of All Heresies' 4309 - 4374

MUELLER,

S. N. (Moscou) Hippolyte, Heraclite et Noet (Commentaire d'Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 - 1 0 ) 4375-4402

MOURAVIEV,

HAHM, D. E. (Columbus, Ohio) Diogenes Laertius VII: On the Stoics (above, pp. 4076 — 4182) Indices 4404 - 4411

PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTEN, T E C H N I K : PHILOSOPHIE (SYSTEMATISCHE T H E M E N ; INDIREKTE ÜBERLIEFERUNGEN; ALLGEMEINES; NACHTRÄGE)

SYSTEMATISCHE

THEMEN

Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire* b y MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU, R e t h y m n o n ,

Crete

Table of Contents I. Introduction

4418

1. Divine Providence in Ancient Philosophy

4418

2. Plato's Doctrine of Providence

4419

3. Aristotle and Divine Providence

4422

4. Divine Providence in Early Stoicism

4424

5. Panaetius and Posidonius

4434

II. Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire

4436

1. Divine Providence in Late Stoicism a) Seneca on Providence b) Epictetus's Doctrine of Divine Providence c) Divine Providence in Marcus Aurelius

4436 4436 4443 4447

2. Divine Providence in Pre-Neoplatonism 4453 a) General 4453 b) Philo's Doctrine of Providence 4456 c) Plutarch and Pseudo-Plutarch on Providence and Fate 4461 d) Albinus and Divine Providence 4464 e) Apuleius on the Relationship of Providence to Fate 4467 f) Calcidius on Providence and Fate 4469 g) Maximus of Tyre's view of Providence and the Problem of Evil 4472 h) Divine Providence in the Pre-Neoplatonists Atticus, Galen, Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius 4473 a) Atticus 4473 P) Galen 4474 y) Nicomachus of Gerasa 4474 8) Numenius 4475 3. Divine Providence in Neoplatonism a) Plotinus's Doctrine of Providence b) Proclus's Doctrine of Providence as Divine Justice

* Thanks to

CHRISTOPHER G E R A R D BROWN

for editing the English of the text.

4476 4486 4487

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I.

Introduction

1. Divine Providence in Ancient Philosophy It is generally held that divine providence (Greek: Pronoia; Latin: Providentia), understood as the loving care of a personal God for his creatures, is absent from ancient philosophy. Exception is sometimes made for Socrates and the Stoics, although their God (or gods) differs from the God of Christianity or that of modern and contemporary philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, the existence of cosmic order and design, the benevolent intervention of the divine order in worldly and human affairs, and even God's paternal care for the world and man, are all precepts widely held in ancient philosophy, as they are in most religions with a coherent view of God. Apart from the Epicureans, Academic Skeptics, and Aristotle, all other philosophers who believed in God held some doctrine of divine providence. Encyclopedic accounts of divine providence in the Greco-Roman world are mistaken in ascribing belief in divine providence to the Stoics alone. Given that the doctrine of providence is considered a corollary of theistic, dualistic and transcendental assumptions, it is noteworthy that Stoic materialistic monism, with its intrinsic determinism and pantheism, could accommodate this doctrine so integrally into its theology. It is a matter of debate whether Stoic doctrine has influenced patristic, scholastic and modern conceptions of providence, but its impact upon later ancient theology is undeniable. The Stoic doctrine occupies a large place in Cicero's 'De natura deorum'; in the only surviving Early Stoic text, Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus, the Stoic God is the providential cosmic God par excellence; essays on providence were composed by the Early Stoic Chrysippus and by Middle and Late Stoic authors. The same doctrine of providence persists without important modifications through five centuries of Stoicism. Together with Platonism, the Stoic doctrine (which can itself be traced back to Plato's "Laws') forms the background to the Middle-Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrines of providence that prevail in the philosophy of the Empire. With its categories of general and special providence the Stoic position amounted to the most systematic theodicy of the ancient world. New issues, such as the relation of providence to fate and of both to free will and chance, the grades of providential care, and others, arose during the Empire; these problems were often addressed with reference to the 'Timaeus' of Plato, who figured in contemporary debate in a dialectical relationship to Stoicism. It was just a generation before Socrates that the issue of divine providence came to the fore. 1 Fervent arguments were advanced against mechanistic 1

See F. SOLMSEN, Plato's Theology, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 27, New York 1942, pp. 39, 98. Cf. A. B. DRACHMANN, Atheism in Pagan Antiquity, Copenhagen 1922, p. 15 ff.

DIVINE P R O V I D E N C E I N T H E P H I L O S O P H Y O F T H E EMPIRE

4419

physicists and relativistic sophists who questioned the existence of providential gods. It is not an exaggeration to claim Plato as the founder of natural theology. The tenth book of the 'Laws' has been called "the first attempt in the literature of the world to demonstrate God's existence and moral government." 2 Plato's arguments form "a significant starting point for later theologians" — anticipating the Stoic belief in providential gods. 3 Since most doctrines of divine providence in philosophy of the emperial period were formulated along Stoic and Platonic lines in accordance with the eclectic spirit of the age, a brief summary of the Platonic, Aristotelian and Early Stoic views is not out of place in this introduction. Not until Plotinus significant innovations were made on the work of Plato and the Stoics.

2. Plato's Doctrine of Providence An implicit belief in providence can be traced back to some Presocratic thinkers. 4 Xenophanes declared God to be free from all evil;5 the teleologists Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia provided a foundation for later arguments for the existence of providential gods. 6 Yet, Socrates must have been the first to explicitly argue for divine providence, as can be gathered from both Xenophon and Plato. According to G R E G O R Y VLASTOS, 7 Socrates could not have been, as Xenophon presented him as being, a "dabbler in teleological cosmology in the style of Diogenes of Apollonia." Socrates "rationalized the gods to make them moral" and thus became the father of moral and not of natural theology. Xenophon, although not our best source for Socrates's theology, cannot be totally dismissed, particularly when in agreement with Plato. We read in Xenophon's 'Memorabilia', that, according to Socrates, God is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent (I 4, 18). The gods' benevolence is proven by their having created all things for man's sake to meet his needs (IV 3, 12). The works of the gods are signs of divine providence and prove that this wellordered universe is not a work of chance but of mind (I 4, 6 — 7). This teleology is not abstract, but rather implies a personal aspect to divine providence. As 8 D . BABUT puts it, "the insistence with which the idea of a divine mind 2 3

4

5

6

7 8

A. E. TAYLOR, The Laws of Plato, London 1934, p. 51. J. REXINE, Religion in Plato and Cicero, N e w York 1959, p. 24. Cf. A. A. LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, London 1974, p. 151. See D. BABUT, La religion des philosophes grecs de Thalès aux Stoïciens, Littératures anciennes 4, Paris 1974, p. 20 ff. See L. P. GERSON, God and Greek Philosophy. Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology, London 1990, pp. 1 7 - 2 0 . BABUT, op. cit. p. 40 ff. Cf. W. JAEGER, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford 1967, pp. 169, 246 ff., and GERSON, op. cit. pp. 28 - 32. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge 1991, p. 162 n. 26. Op. cit. p. 66.

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governing the world was associated with that of a divine providence caring for man individually and taking forethought for all his needs reflects a personalization of the divine and implies a sort of personal relationship between man and god" (14, 11 - 1 9 , IV 3, 3 - 1 2 ) . Favorinus is cited in Diogenes Laertius as claiming that Plato was the first philosopher to speak of the providence of the gods; this supposition was perhaps based on his relationship to Socrates. 9 Not only in the natural theology of the 'Laws' — which has a polemical character 1 0 — and in the "myth" of the 'Timaeus', so influential on Middle Platonism, but also in other early and middle dialogues 11 and particularly in the typoi of theology set forth in the 'Republic', Plato expounds a doctrine of providence which constitutes an integral part of his theology as a whole. The Socratic view that God is good and not the cause of any evil is the first typos of theology (Rep. 379a —380c). Because God is good and envy is alien to his nature, i.e. "because of his providence," he wished to create the best possible world, which is conceived of as "a living and intelligent animal" (Timaeus 29e —30b). The Demiurge declared the "laws of fate" to the younger gods and bid them to create man, in order to be himself untainted by evil (Timaeus 41d —42d). Plato maintains that God is by no means responsible for vice and its consequences (Rep. 617e). The famous "likeness unto god" as the moral end (Theaet. 176b) adopted by Middle-Platonists and Neoplatonists consists primarily in just behavior — in imitation of the absolute justice of God. It is mostly in terms of justice and against materialism, naturalism, and relativism that the later Plato, as the founder of philosophical theology, formulated the first explicit arguments for the existence of providential gods. The theocentric character of the 'Laws' is exemplified by the statement that "God controls everything and is the measure of all things." Justice is his "constant companion;" human happiness consists in virtue and likeness unto God. 1 2 In book X of the 'Laws' most of the theological questions that were to become central to Stoicism and late antiquity are put and answered. 13 Plato there responds to arguments against his conception of divine providence as divine justice, arguments which are comparable to those later posed to the Stoics by the Epicureans. Similar arguments were also posed by the Skeptics who, although they admitted the existence of divine providence, attacked specific arguments in its defence. Plato considers the existence of divine providence harder to maintain than the existence of the gods, in which most men are led to believe at a certain age (888c), although it is a belief understood not in terms of nature but of convention (889e). Plato argues fervently for the 9

See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum III 24. Cf. BABUT, op. cit. p. 99.

10

See GERSON, o p . c i t . p . 7 2 ff. C f . SOLMSEN, o p . c i t . p . 1 5 4 ff.

11

See particularly Apol. 21b, Philebus 28d —E, Phaedrus 247a, etc. Cf. VLASTOS, op. cit. p. 163. See R. F. STALLEY, An Introduction to Plato's Laws, London 1983, p. 166.

12 13

See SOLMSEN, o p . c i t . p . 1 5 6 .

DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF T H E EMPIRE

4421

existence of providence, in the belief that its denial amounts to the denial of divinity itself, which would be both impious and unlawful. Plato's arguments for the existence of the gods (Laws 886a —889d) do not concern us here. We should mention only those arguments proving the priority of the soul by placing art over nature and chance (893b — 897b) and proceeding from the order of the universe to the conclusion that the world is governed by a soul possessed of goodness and rationality (897b —899b). 14 It is assumed that since soul, dwelling in all living things and controlling the heavens, is the cause of both good and evil, there must be at least two souls, one benevolent and the other responsible for all evil (896d —e). This inference is important for the period under investigation because Middle-Platonists such as Plutarch took it to mean that Plato's theodicy admits both an evil and a good world soul. This view seems mistaken, 15 since Plato's bad world soul is just a theoretical assumption. The sort of rational motion displayed in the universe shows that the world is governed by the best soul (897a —898c) regarded, together with the souls of the stars, as God (899b —c). The argumentation for divine providence (899d — 905d), however, is based not on the world soul and the star-gods 16 but on divine justice. By virtue of his kinship with the divine, man concedes that there are gods; nevertheless, the prosperity of the unjust and wicked leads him to conclude that the gods scorn and neglect human affairs. However, given that the gods are perfectly good, and more or less omniscient and omnipotent, they cannot but care for small things as well as great; no neglect on their part could be justified or explained. The blame must lie elsewhere. Plato's solution is cosmological. As the supreme craftsman, far excelling mortal craftsmen such as physicians, pilots, and generals, God performs his task by taking care of the smallest things that have a bearing on the welfare of the whole (900d — 903a). Plato says: "All things are ordered systematically by him who cares for the world with a view to the preservation and excellence of the whole," since "all partial generation is for the sake of the whole and not vice versa" (903b —c). Every craftsman and physician works with a view to the common welfare (903c) and individuals participate in this welfare by virtue of their common origin. The "king" of the universe, taking care for the perfection and salvation of the whole, gives each soul its appropriate place according to its character as manifested in each reincarnation. Thus divine justice is fulfilled in the wider sphere of subsequent lives and through the service each part renders the whole (904a —905d). This broader perspective implies no divine care for individuals. Although in the form of an exhortation rather than a proof, 1 7 this approach marks a change of perspective which will 14

For details of the argument see STALLEY, op. cit. p. 169 ff., GERSON, op. cit. pp. 73 — 76. In my translation of passages of Plato and other ancient authors I use the Loeb Library translations with slight modifications, unless otherwise indicated. I mostly use the Latin titles of works cited, particularly in the notes.

15

S e e a l s o STALLEY, o p . c i t . p . 1 7 2 a n d SOLMSEN, o p . c i t . p . 1 4 9 .

16

S e e SOLMSEN, ibid.

17

S e e SOLMSEN, o p . c i t . p p . 1 5 2 -

153.

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be met in the Stoic "doctrine of the double subject". 1 8 The teleology of the whole, the restoration of balance in the afterlife and the responsibility laid on individual choices are points met with in later theodicy, although the Platonic solution seems incoherent. 19 This is not the proper place to comment at length on Plato's conception of providence, since this discussion aims only to make possible an assessment of his reading by Middle-Platonists and Neoplatonists. Suffice it to mention two recent discussions which might contribute to a fairer estimate of the Stoic contribution. D. BABUT20 remarks that "Plato's providence is never Providence: not only does it remain purely impersonal, foreign to any idea of pity or love ... but it is not even as anthropocentric as the providence preached by Socrates in Xenophon's 'Memorabilia'". The Demiurge did not create the world for man but man for the world, nor did he do so out of fatherly love for his creatures but because of his own goodness. Analysing natural theology as a scientific search for ultimate first principles, which is to say for wisdom, L. P. GERSON21 focuses on the idea of the Good in the 'Republic', on the role of Mind in the 'Philebus' and on the Demiurge of the 'Timaeus'. Because of the polemical intention of its arguments, aimed at persuading the ordinary man to adhere to religious practices, GERSON underestimates the role of natural theology in Laws X. He sees the theology of the 'Laws' as merely supplementary to that of the 'Timaeus' and the 'Philebus', although he recognizes the difficulty of ascribing to Mind the function of a producer, a problem basic to late antique philosophy. 22 GERSON'S conception of the god of Greek philosophers as "an hypothetical entity postulated as an ultimate explanation of various data" and of natural theology either "as a science of Being" or "as a science of nature" leaves little room for the providential dimension of God in Plato and particularly in Aristotle. He sees Aristotle as establishing metaphysics without natural theology, since the unmoved mover is pure actuality, object of desire and final cause. 23

3. Aristotle and Divine Providence Aristotle concerns us here primarily in view of the importance of Mind {nous) in theology of the empire period. Nous by itself cannot serve as the efficient cause of the universe without the concept of reason (logos) intermediate between the celestial and the sublunary worlds. This insufficiency has implications for the concept of providence in late antiquity. This brief account

18

S e e G E R S O N , o p . cit. p . 1 4 9 f f .

19

The coherence of Plato's argumentation and his solution have been widely questioned. See STALLEY, op. cit. pp. 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 , 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 . Cf. SOLMSEN, op. cit. p. 159. Op. cit. p. 99 ff. Op. cit. pp. 3 3 - 8 1 . Op. cit. pp. 71 - 8 1 , 227 - 230. Op. cit. pp. 2, 5 - 1 3 , 120 ff., 227, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 .

20 21 22 23

DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN T H E PHILOSOPHY OF T H E EMPIRE

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will focus on Aristotle's teleology rather than any concept of divine providence or of an over-all purpose to the universe. In what might be considered Aristotle's early "theology" there are some Platonic echoes, 24 for all his criticism of basic Platonic doctrines. His teleology is evident from the outset: "God or Nature does nothing without a purpose." 2 5 Yet, Nature for Aristotle does not work consciously or deliberately. The impassive thought of the inalterable self-contemplating God of Metaphysics XII does not seem to embrace the sensible world, as was later assumed, 2 6 and is too remote to interfere in worldly affairs. God is eternal and immutable, the prime unmoved mover (Metaphys. 1071b5 — 1072a25). He is necessarily existent, good and a first principle (1072bll —12). He is defined as "a living being, eternal and most good" (1072b29 —30). As pure actuality in perfect happiness, God is "separate from sensible things" (1073a4). After discussing difficulties involved in the concept of Mind and its thinking, Aristotle returns to the problem of the separateness of the sensible from the intelligible and to that of the immanence or transcendence of the good in particular. This issue may have some bearing on his conception, if any, of providence. Aristotle is obliged to take into consideration the sense in which the nature of the universe contains the good: "does it contain it as something separate and independent or as the orderly arrangement of its parts; or in both senses as an army?" (1075al2—15). He inclines towards the latter conclusion, although his analogy of an army emphasizes the role of the general rather than the order of the whole. All things are ordered, though not in the same way, to one end and are interconnected with each class acting according to its nature as in a household containing free persons acting responsibly and in an orderly way and slaves acting mostly at random, although everything contributes to the good of the whole ( 1 0 7 5 a l 7 - 2 5 ) . However, all this says less about providence than about true human autonomy, and hardly helps in elucidating Aristotle's position. It is noteworthy that Aristotle considers the good as "in the truest sense a principle in all things," but denies that evil can also be a principle since "there is no opposite to what is primary" (1075b22-23). He rejects many governing principles in the conviction that "the world does not want to be badly governed" (1076a4). Aristotle's God, although good, is not directly providential like that of Socrates, Plato and the Stoics, but only indirectly and globally through the internal See frgs. 1 2 a - b , 1 3 - 1 4 , 1 6 - 1 8 , 21 Ross, De caelo 279al8. Cf. BABUT, op. cit. pp. 112, 118, 119 ff., 121, 129 ff. « De caelo 271a33. 26 For example by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Thomas Aquinas. 24

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finality of nature. It is his teleology that sets Aristotle apart from Epicurus, who flatly denies the providence of the gods.

4. Divine Providence in Early Stoicism The Stoics elaborated the first systematic doctrine of providence. Providential administration of the world and providential care for man were the most important parts of the fourfold Stoic theology, implied both by the existence and the nature of the divine and by nature (Cicero, De natura deorum II 3).27 All authorities present Zeno as having explicitly spoken of divine providence. He considered providence to be the Mind of the world; he also identified providence with Fate and craftsmanlike Nature, providing for the needs of all ( S V F 1 1 7 6 ) . Cleanthes drew fervent arguments for the existence of God from the concept of providence (SVF 1 5 2 8 ) . He seems to have elaborated a coherent doctrine of providence, in the context of Stoic physics and cosmology, which is thoroughly compatible with Stoic "soft" determinism (SVF I 5 0 9 , 5 4 8 - 5 5 1 ) . The God of his famous hymn to Zeus is providential in both a Promethean and an Epimethean way (SVF I 5 3 7 = L O N G — SEDLEY 54 I).28 This text not only contains much of the Stoic doctrine of providence and theodicy, but also anticipates problems of moral evil discussed in the philosophy of the Empire. Moral evil is the only evil, according to Stoicism, for which God is by no means responsible, although he eventually turns it to good. 29 Chrysippus was the first philosopher to write a treatise on providence, a work composed of at least four books, from which only twelve fragments survive. These fragments, however, help illuminate the spirit in which the doctrine was formulated. The Middle Stoic Panaetius, for all his unorthodox views, is also reported to have written a book on providence. From late Stoic writers an essay by Seneca and three dissertations by Epictetus survive. Some differences among the Stoics are evident. Among the Early Stoics varying theological views have been recorded, as for example regarding arguments for the existence of the divine.30 Belief in providence, however, was so 27

28

19

30

Hence abbreviated as N . D. This scheme, whether conventional (H. URI, Cicero und die epikureische Philosophic. Eine quellenkritische Studie, Diss. München 1914, p.58) or of Academic origin (L. EDELSTEIN, Cicero's De Natura Deorum II, SIFC 2 [1934] pp. 131 — 183) or corresponding with the Stoic categories (P. DE LACY, The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles, TAPA 76 [1945] pp. 246 - 263), became traditional in Stoicism. In this essay I mostly use H. VON ARNIM'S, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols. (vol. IV by M. ADLER), Leipzig 1903 — 24, repr.1964, and only rarely, when referring to the notes, I use A . A . LONG 8C D. N . SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vols 1 - 2 , Cambridge 1987. For a detailed analysis of this poem see M Y R T O D R A G O N A - M O N A C H O U , Cleanthes's Hymn to Zeus and the Golden Verses, Philosophia 1 (1971) pp. 3 3 9 - 3 7 8 (in Greek). For an exhaustive survey of the arguments for the existence of God by individual Stoics see M Y R T O D R A G O N A - M O N A C H O U , The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods, Athens 1976.

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uniformly held that, had a representative of the School deviated from it, he would have hardly been considered a committed Stoic. Chrysippus's formulation became almost canonical. Against him were levelled the criticism of the Academy and the Epicureans, who flatly rejected providence, as well as that of Middle-Platonists and Neoplatonists, who examined its relation to fate. Absolute confidence in divine providence was one of the most basic tenets of Stoicism. Individual contributions, particularly of the later Stoics, cast light on important aspects of it and give hints as to how the topic was approached by Early Stoics, for whom evidence is fragmentary and comes from late and not always fair authorities. Cicero has preserved for us a full account of the Stoic view of providence, in the words of a Stoic interlocutor, that coincides in many points with information given by Philo in his cDe providentia'. This can form a solid basis for assessing additional evidence from critical sources. Consequently, although late Stoic accounts from the period of the Empire also pertain to the doctrine as held by Early Stoics, a summary of this doctrine, based mostly on Cicero, may be of value. First a few words about Cicero, our principal source. Cicero's account of the Stoic doctrine of providence covers the second and greater half of the second book of the 'De natura deorum', which is devoted to Stoic theology (N. D. II 7 3 - 1 6 7 ) . This discussion addresses the divine administration of the world (73 — 153) and then the specific care of God for man (153 — 167), although the latter section informally begins in N. D. II 133. 31 Regarding the sources of this part of Cicero's treatise, scholars are not in agreement; most consider Panaetius or Posidonius to be its main sources.32 As I have argued elsewhere33, besides vague influences of Middle Stoicism and Cicero's own contribution, this section contains early material derived probably from a handbook other than the one used by Cicero in his discussions of divine existence and nature, because much from the former sections is repeated in this part. And it is not improbable that a considerable part of it derives ultimately from Chrysippus's work on providence. Before giving a summary account of the Stoic doctrine I should take into account the following principles of Stoic theology. In contrast to the Platonic and Aristotelian gods, the Stoic god is corporeal — he is either body or bodylike (SVF II 1028 — 1035); for, othewise, he could not be understood as acting upon unqualified matter. This divine intelligence consists of matter in its finest form, fire (SVF II 1031) or pneuma, a mixture of fire and air (SVF II 1009), and is conceived as incorporeal only as the logical constituent of substance

31

32

This section begins "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood...", but N . D . 154ff. is meant to be the last chapter. See A. S. PEASE, M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum, Cambridge, Mass. 1955, pp. 47 — 4 8 o n t h e v i e w s o f REINHARDT, H I R Z E L , HEINEMANN, POHLENZ, e t c .

33

292

See DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments, pp. 2 6 - 2 8 , 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 . A NRW II 36.7

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(SVF II 299).34 Also in contrast to the Platonic and Aristotelian gods of transcendence, the Stoic God is immanent in the world, permeating it throughout as mind, soul, nature and hexis, though located in a specific part of it as its ruling principle (SVF II 642 — 44). Thus, even though pantheism replaces traditional theism, theistic language is not altogether missing: God is the soul or mind of the world (SVF I 532) and also the creator of the world (SVF II 526), continuously taking providential care of it (SVF II 1021). This ambiguity was severely criticized (SVF II 1041), but is a problem endemic in ancient thought; also both singular and plural numbers are applied to God. 35 The Stoic God is prima facie omnipotent and omniscient; evidence to the contrary, such as SVF II 1183, can perhaps be dismissed as platonising and thus unreliable. The Stoic God is primarily providential, since providence is part of God's prolepsis (SVF II 1118; Antipater 33, 34). There is a relationship of mutual affection between man and God (SVF 1537 II1123). God is defined as an "immortal, rational living being, perfect or intelligent in his blissfulness, free of all evil, providential for the world and the beings contained in it and not anthropomorphic, creator of all and like a father to everybody" (SVF II1021). The main alternative descriptions of God are as Fire, Pneutna, Nature, Logos, World-Soul, Mind, Providence, Fate, Law of Nature, Truth, and even Necessity. All these have the same reference but not the same meaning. God shares the same definition with Nature (SVF II 1133 — 1134) and is considered to be the single efficient cause of the universe (SVF II 346a). In contrast to his account of providence, Cicero's account of divine nature is not very satisfactory, since he dwells on astral gods and the gods of poetic tradition, interpreted allegorically by the Stoics. Cicero also identifies the Stoic God with Nature and the world. In this treatise God is defined as "a living being ... unsurpassed in excellence by anything in all nature ... endowed with sensation, reason and intelligence" (N. D. 1145 — 47). This account is particularly valuable as a source of arguments for the existence of God; most Stoic arguments for the existence of the divine, particularly the arguments from providence, from design, and the teleological and cosmological arguments (in which the providential aspect is fundamental) can be gathered from it. 36 Providence also figures preeminently in the section concerned with 34

35

36

See LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 154. Cf. J. CHRISTENSEN, An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy, Kobenhavn 1962, p. 15 ff., and M. LAPIDGE, Arche and Stoicheia. A Problem in Stoic Cosmology, Phronesis 18 (1973) pp. 240 - 275:243. See also M Y R T O DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Religious and Moral Monism of Zeno of Kition, Proceedings of the Ilnd Cypriological Congress, Nicosia 1985, pp. 449 - 457 (in Greek). See G. FRANÇOIS, Le polythéisme et l'emploi du singulier des mots 0eôç, 5ai|icov dans la littérature grecque d'Homère à Platon, Paris 1957. On these arguments see DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments pp. 37—128.

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divine nature, because Nature is conceived not only as artificiosa but also as artifex, which is to say, capable of providential activity. In the part concerned with providence specifically, the Stoic interlocutor identifies providence with the World Soul, not as a distinct divinity but as an aspect of God, and asserts the basic Stoic creed that "the world and all its parts were set in order form the beginning and have been governed ever since by divine providence" (N. D. II 75). The Stoic doctrine of providence is said to be threefold: "The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist; if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature, and that by it the universe is carried on in the most beautiful manner; and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from the wonder that we sense at the marvel of creation, celestial and terrestrial" (N.D. II 75). These parts are discussed in II 76 — 80, 81 — 90 and 91 — 153 respectively. The thesis to be proved in the first section is "that the world is governed by the providence of the gods." Various types of arguments are brought forward. All are based on the assumption that nothing is superior to the world, which is taken as proved in the discussion of divine nature (N.D. II 46). It is further assumed that the gods exist and perform the most excellent activity as a corollary of their nature. So, since the gods exist and are active, and nothing is more distinguished than the government of the world, the world is governed by the wisdom of the gods (N.D. II76). The simple syllogisms contained in this complex argument exemplify Chrysippus's fourth indemonstrable argument-form, reaching a conclusion through the exclusion of the one disjunct, but subject to the fallacy of the petitio principii in assuming what has to be proved. The second argument derives from God's excellence being susceptible to analysis and concludes that the world is governed by God through the reductio ad absurdum that, were the world subject to inanimate nature, something would be superior to God, which is impossible (76 — 77). The third argument, based on the omniscience and omnipotence inherent in the majesty of the divine and involving the providential administration of the world (N.D. II 77), is similar. The fourth argument is analogical, attributing properties of the part to the whole on the assumptions that the world is the absolute best and the gods are animate and rational, united together in social community and ruling the world as if it were a state. Since men possess wisdom and prudence, the gods must possess these properties to the highest degree and exercise them in the administration of the world (N. D. II 78 — 80). The last argument is based on the divinity of the visible gods, such as the stars, sun, moon, proved in N.D. II 49 — 56, whose great services and benefits to mankind show that "all things are ruled by divine intelligence and wisdom" (N.D. II 80). 37 37

292»

T h e refutation of most of these arguments in N . D. Ill is missing.

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T h e thesis that the world is governed by divine providence is also inferred analogically from the existence of providential care in man. This is the line of argument followed particularly by Philo, whose account of the Stoic arguments for the existence of providence is not unlike that of Cicero (SVF I I 1 1 1 1 —1114). Divine providence is also inferred from the notion and prolepsis of God (SVF II 1115, 1126), from the nature of the divine (SVF II 1117, 1119, 1120), from the existence of divine affection for man (SVF II 1116, 1118, 1121) and on other similar grounds. T h a t view that the world is governed by providence is further reinforced by the conclusion that everything is subject to sentient nature, and governed by it in the most excellent manner (N. D. II 81). This conclusion is reached through various - mostly analogical — arguments and on the basis of the Stoic definition of Nature as "a rational and ordered force methodically proceeding and plainly displaying the means that it takes to produce each result and the end at which it aims, possessing a skill that no handiwork of artist or craftsman can rival or reproduce" ( N . D . II 81) or as a "craftsmanlike fire proceeding methodically to the work of generation" ( N . D . II 57). Nature, generally identified with God and providence, is said to be above art, and its creative and cohesive force is displayed by signs of order and design in living beings (N. D . II 82). Thus, it is not only proved that earth, air, aether, and indeed the world as a whole, are governed by providence ( N . D . II 82 — 85), but also that the providential administration is excellent and beyond reproach and does not give any cause for blame ( N . D . II 86). This is inferred from the world's utility and beauty, which show that the world must be the product not of chance but of rationality (N. D. II 87). This inference constitutes a version of the teleological argument, or argument from design, which was also used to prove that the gods exist. 3 8 T h e world, including not only works of art but also the artists themselves, is a fortiori governed by divine providence. Thus it is firstly proved that the world has an organic structure held together by Nature and, secondly, that this Nature is rational and nothing other than providence. Cicero's account of Nature as providence can be supplemented by the evidence collected by VON A R N I M under the heading 'Naturam esse artificetn, which relies heavily on Galen. Additional information can be adduced from evidence found in those sections concerned with the best administration of the world, seen as the work of providence; these citations are taken largely from Philo (SVF II 1141 — 1151). N o significant deviations from Cicero's

38

Analogous Stoic arguments are brought forward in Sextus Empiricus to prove the gods' existence (SVF II 1 0 1 3 - 1 0 1 8 ) .

DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN T H E PHILOSOPHY OF T H E EMPIRE

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version of Stoic doctrine are evident. 39 The sum of the argumentation is encapsulated in the definition of Nature Cicero ascribes to Zeno (N. D. II 5 7 - 5 8 ) . Nature is presented as "not merely craftsmanlike but actually a craftsman whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail." Thus nature understood as the "world mind" can "correctly be designated as prudence or providence ... directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely, to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but, chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind." In the last part of Cicero's account providential care is inferred from the contemplation of the beauty and utility of the universe, seen as the work of a rational and benevolent nature. The place of the earth and the order of the elements that encircle it disclose divine providence and cannot be the result of fortuitous collisions of atoms (N.D. II 93 — 94). As the supreme artifact, the world-order is the product of the most excellent artificer, divine reason (N.D. II 97). The wonders of nature are revealed by contemplation ( N . D . II 98). The beauty of the earth and all it contains from inorganic substances to human beings, the beauty of the sea, the usefulness of the air and aether, the services of the sun and moon and the shapes of constellations, all these clearly display the art of a divine creator and an intelligence of the highest order (N.D. II 9 9 - 1 1 5 ) . 4 0 Other signs of divine providence are the stability and coherence of the world, which is adapted to endure since its parts are held together by centripetal force; the cyclical regeneration of the earth and the cooperation of the planets; the wonders of vegetal and animal life, and its adaptation both for the preservation of the individual and the perpetuation of the species. All of these aim at the preservation and convenience of man ( N . D . II 115 — 132). This vast system was contrived for the sake of gods and men, since they surpass all other creatures in possessing reason, the most excellent of things ( N . D . II 133). Man is especially cared for by divine providence, as can be seen from the perfection of his nature. He is well provided for with food, drink and air, and by his bodily structure, his stature and sense organs (N. D. II 134 — 146). But providence's best endowment to man is reason. Man's syllogistic faculty, his ability to formulate definitions and apprehend reality, his artistic creativity and the gift of speech, and particularly man's exclusive privilege of knowing and worshipping the gods, testify to the special concern of divine providence for man as part of the world (N.D. II 147 —152). 41

39 40

41

For a detailed discussion see DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments pp. 142 - 1 4 7 . Philo defends the "Stoic" view of divine providence in similar terms, but he lays emphasis on utility rather than beauty (SVF II 1 1 4 4 - 1 1 4 5 , 1 1 4 7 - 1 1 5 0 ) . This particular contention is refuted in N. D. Ill 66 — 85.

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Man, however, as the rational being par excellence, the only one living by justice and law and thus sharing the same community as the gods, has the special benefit from divine providence of having the whole world created for his own sake (N. D. II 154). 42 The earth as a whole, the inorganic world, animals and heavenly bodies, are made for man who alone can appreciate their beauty and usefulness (N. D. II 155 — 161). The existence of divine providence for man as an individual is shown through the personal apparitions of gods to men in divination. Gods attend to great matters and neglect small ones, but physical evil is no impediment to the virtuous, for whom the wealth of their own virtue is sufficient insurance (N. D. II 162 — 167). With the last few words, in addition to some hints made in N. D. II 8 6 87 where it is said that "the government of the world contains nothing that could possibly be censured; given the existing elements, the best that could be produced from them has been produced" Cicero's Stoic spokesman does away with the enormously vexing problem of evil raised by almost all rivals of Stoicism. It should be noted that Cicero's discussion of the Academic refutation of the Stoic view of providence in N. D. Ill 65 4 3 is missing from the text. However, the misfortunes of the good and the triumphs of the wicked are brought forward to refute divine providential care towards man (N.D. Ill 66 — 95: 90) as only based on the remark that gods neglect small and morally indifferent things (N.D. Ill 86). However, this was not the only reservation made by the Stoics in matters of theodicy. Chrysippus must have dwelt on the subject at length as one can assume from at least three of the preserved fragments of his fourth book on providence (SVF II 1000, 1169, 1170) in which he must have addressed the problems of both physical and moral evil. Theodicy seems to have occupied Chrysippus in other works as well, such as 'On the introduction of goods and evils', 'On Justice', 'On the Gods', 'On Nature'. He must have advanced somewhat inconsistent views on this subject, as we can gather from Plutarch (SVF II 1168, 1 1 7 5 - 1 1 7 8 , 1 1 8 1 - 1 1 8 2 ) and other polemical sources. The thesis that God should be absolved from all direct responsibility for evil is inferred analytically from his prolepsis and his nature, since God is conceived as primarily benevolent, beneficent and humane (SVF II 1115 — 1126), and providence is identical with his essence. Physical evil is only apparent and moral evil is caused by man himself (SVF II 1000) and should not be ascribed to providence or fate. According to A. A. LONG44 six types of 42

43

44

On man's welfare as the end of providence see DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments pp. 154 —159. See PEASE, op. cit. p. 3 2 and R . PHILIPPSON, S. V. M . Tullius C i c e r o , R E VII A . l , 1 9 3 9 ,

col. 1155. Some frgs. in Lactantius (Inst. div. II 3.2; 8.10) probably coincide with the expected contents of this part. The Hellenistic Philosophers I 332 - 333. Cf. by the same author, The Stoic Concept of Evil, Ph. Q. 18 (1968) pp. 329 - 342.

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explanations for cosmic evil are contemplated by the Stoics: the principle of opposition, according to which opposites are intelligible in relation to each other and come into being out of each other; blessings in disguise; individual wickedness or undeserved suffering for the overall good; necessary concomitants of the action of the divine will; oversights and evil spirits. We could add to these the justification of evil as an opportunity for the exercise of virtue (SVF II 1173), as punishment, for the sake of aesthetic variety or in accordance with "some other economy" (SVF II 1 1 7 5 - 1 1 7 6 ) . T h e explanation of evil, biased or not, in terms of necessity (SVF II 1178) and divine impotence (SVF II 1183), even as a "must and ought" (SVF II 1182) or as occurring according to the "reason of nature" (SVF II 1181) and having God as its origin (SVF II 1168), should not be overlooked. N o r should the ability of providence to turn evil into good (SVF II 1184) be underestimated. All these explanations, satisfactory or not, show that the problem o f evil was the main obstacle to any doctrine of divine providence before and after the Stoics. T h e idea of world-conflagration, a doctrine held particularly by Early Stoics, figures preeminently in some of Chrysippus's fragments on providence. J. MANSFELD45 shows that the Stoic God, "the supreme ruler of the universe is the agent both of its destruction and of its reconstruction" and tries to reconcile this "grim event" with God understood as providence. MANSFELD draws on many sources, such as S V F II 596 — 632, where it is said that during the conflagration the whole world is afire (fire being the "element par excellence"), a Zenonian fragment preserved by Alexander of Lycopolis, 4 6 and other evidence from Cleanthes and Chrysippus. He argues that, although the destruction of the world by craftsmanlike fire seems incompatible with divine providence, yet, because the effective action of fire in the cosmogony is benevolent, craftsmanlike and destructive fire are fundamentally identical for Early, though not for Later, Stoics, since the former give G o d and providence full responsibility for the total conflagration. 4 7 On the basis of Chrysippus's fragments linking providence with the state of conflagration and after much, not always convincing, speculation, MANSFELD concludes that, according to Chrysippus's view "the state of affairs during total conflagration is superior to that of the familiar, ordered universe." 4 8 And thus "the so-called destruction by total conflagration of this world is not an evil contrary to God's nature, but a boon and a blessing," since Zeus and providence become more united than ever during conflagration. 4 9 O f course, much in Chrysippus's account is metaphorical and, if such a view had prevailed, it would not have escaped the attention of the critics of Stoicism. All-encompassing prudence is not alien

45

46 47 48 49

Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, in: M . J. VERMASEREN (Ed.), Studies in Hellenistic Religions, Et. prelimin. aux relig. orient, dans Pempire rom. 78, Leiden 1979, pp. 1 2 9 - 1 8 8 , 137 ff„ 145 ff. See MANSFELD, op. cit. p. 148, n. 5 3 - 5 6 . Op. cit. p. 159. Op. cit. p. 177. Op. cit. pp. 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 .

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to the property of providence; perhaps providence in this context designates a state of forethought, although the absence of evil during conflagration amounts to a sort of purification (SVF II 598, 606, 1174). M A N S F E L D ' S view that conflagration was thought to be per se superior to the created world has been seriously questioned by A. A. LONG50 because the extension of God during the conflagration could not be a measure of its superiority to the created world. The Early Stoics in general did not explicitly regard providence as immanent justice, distributing benefits either equally or according to merits, as did the Later Stoics and the Neoplatonists, although the origin of justice is traced back to Zeus and the Common Nature, and the connection is latent in the identification of providence with Right Reason, God's Reason and Common Natural Law. 5 1 Nor was providence viewed as incompatible with fate or as prior to it, as later. The tantalizing relation of providence to fate that we meet in Middle Platonism is not generally attributed by reliable authorities to Early Stoics, who seem to have identified providence and fate, considering fate as the realization of the providential will of god. However, Posidonius is said to have established an hierarchy between God, nature and fate; 5 2 among the Early Stoics, Cleanthes is supposed to have subordinated providence to fate. 5 3 I have discussed these two relationships, quite unorthodox for Stoicism, in more detail elsewhere; 54 they are still a matter of debate. Here, I shall restrict myself to giving a summary of my conclusions because they have a bearing on later discussions of providence, not so much as a doctrine per se, but in relation to fate and free will. Divine providence and divine fate were not hypostasised by the Early Stoics as distinct entities. Providence was God's will and fate the unimpeded fulfilment of this will. So, the Stoics could maintain both that "everything happens according to fate" (SVF I 175; II 913, 9 2 4 - 9 2 5 , 9 4 3 - 9 4 4 , 959, 975) and that "everything is governed by divine providence" (N.D. II 76, 78, 80, 127, 133,162,164) without any sense of incompatibility. Providence was called into question by the existence of physical and moral evil (SVF II 1168 —1186) and fate was accused of annihilating free will (SVF II 974 —1007). 55 Hints that a certain distinction between fate and providence was made by Cleanthes can 50

51 52

53 54

55

The Stoic World-Conflagration and Everlasting Recurrence, in: R. EPP (Ed.), Spindel Conference 1984: Recovering the Stoics, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Suppl. 23, 1985, pp. 1 3 - 3 8 : 2 5 - 2 6 , n. 70. See SVF II 326, 1125, 1176. See L . EDELSTEIN a n d I. G . KIDD, P o s i d o n i u s , v o l . I, T h e F r a g m e n t s , C a m b r i d g e

1972,

F 103, 107. SVF I 551. Providence and Fate in Stoicism and Pre-Neoplatonism: Calcidius as an Authority on Stoic Theodicy, Philosophia 3 (1973), pp. 2 6 2 - 3 0 6 , and Posidonius' Hierarchy between God, Fate and Nature and Cicero's 'De Divinatione', Philosophia 4 (1974) pp. 286 — 305. See L O N G - S E D L E Y , o p . cit. p p . 3 3 1 — 3 4 3 . C f . W . C . GREENE, M o i r a : F a t e , G o o d a n d

Evil in Greek Thought, Gloucester Mass., 1968, pp. 338 — 344.

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be found in Philo (SVF I 509), but a sort of hierarchy between providence and fate is also attributed by Calcidius to Cleanthes, side by side with Chrysippus's orthodox view. This Latin commentator on Plato's Timaeus' seven centuries after Early Stoicism, in his "excursus on fate" in an account of Timaeus 41e2 - 3, having first mentioned "the foundations of the Platonic doctrine of fate," presents a refutation of Stoic arguments against the Platonic doctrine of fate with the following remarks: "Thus some believe it to be an assumption that there is a difference between providence and fate, the reality being that they are one. For providence is God's will, and furthermore his will is a series of causes. In virtue of being his will it is providence. In virtue of also being a series of causes it gets the additional name 'fate'. Consequently, everything in accordance with fate is also the product of providence, and, likewise, everything in accordance with providence is the product of fate. That is Chrysippus' view. But others, like Cleanthes, while holding the dictates of providence to come about also by fate, allow things which come about by fate not to be the product of providence" (SVF II 9 3 3 ; LONG - SEDLEY 54U).56 Cleanthes's presumed view is presented by Calcidius as the reverse of the assumed Platonic doctrine according to which providence precedes and destiny follows, since providence was born first; so "fate comes from providence but not providence from fate" (ch. 143), though for Plato "some things result from providence alone — divine and intelligible things — some from fate, some from free will." However, this is not the exact opposite of the alleged Cleanthean view. The dominant modern interpretation regards some verses of Cleanthes's hymn to Zeus as implying such a differentiation with regard to moral evil,57 but, as I have argued at length, Calcidius is not a reliable authority on Early Stoicism.58 DEN BOEFT, commenting on Calcidius's "excursus on fate," remarks: "This way of presenting matters tells us less about the Stoic doctrine, for which such a distinction does not really have much meaning, than about the authors," 59 namely Calcidius and other Middle-Platonists and Neoplatonists. Cleanthes was not the astrological determinist Calcidius presents him as having been. 60 Had he been so little faithful to Zeno, as Numenius, Calcidius's source, had suggested, 61 he could not have become head of the school. The

56

57 58 59 60 61

LONG'S translation is Doctrine and Sources, See my paper of 1973, Op. cit. pp. 2 9 8 - 3 0 0 . Op. cit. p. 14. See my paper of 1973, F r g . 2 4 (DES PLACES).

slightly different from J. DEN BOEFT'S, Calcidius on Fate. His Philosophia antiqua 18, Leiden 1970, p. 13. cited in n. 54, pp. 2 8 2 - 2 8 6 .

cited in n. 54, pp. 294 - 296.

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first distinction between providence and fate in Stoicism could be ascribed to Seneca 62 and Marcus Aurelius. 63 Both were influenced by Posidonius, but not in this regard.

5. Panaetius and Posidonius Panaetius, the first Middle Stoic, is reported to have flatly rejected any talk about the gods. 64 Nevertheless he wrote a book 'On Providence', the contents of which are unknown to us. 65 This book was requested by Cicero 6 6 as a source for his philosophical writings, and is sometimes regarded as one of the sources for his 'De natura deorum' 6 7 . Although Panaetius modified basic tenets of Stoicism, 68 he probably did not depart from the orthodox Stoic doctrine of providence, since, if he had, such a deviation would not have gone unnoticed. It is not certain whether the well-known tripartite theology derives from him. Yet, we can attribute the view of providence defended in Cicero's De divinatione II 148 —149 to him. This view is compatible with his rejection of divination, while defending teleology on the basis of the structure of the world, the natural impulse of plants, animals and men to self-preservation and man's appreciation of the beauty of the universe. All these theses are well known from Cicero's *De officiis' and from other sources. 69 A sort of hierarchy, though not concerning providence, has been ascribed to Posidonius, the second representative of Middle Stoicism. Our information on Posidonius is now somewhat more reliable than before, particularly after the demolition of "Posidonius' myth," 7 0 with its implicit "solar eschatology," 71 and the publication of the modern collection of his fragments and attested testimonies. 72 On the basis of the few surviving theological fragments 73 Posidonius, who is usually coupled with the Early Stoics, appears quite orthodox.

62 63 64 65

66 67

Seneca Ep. 16, 5 - 6 : De prov. 3, 1; 4, 1: Q . N . 2, 45, 2. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 3, 11, 4; 12, 14. Frg. 68 M. VAN STRAATEN (Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta, Leiden 1962 3 ). On Panaetius' theological views see the appendix of my book, The Stoic Arguments pp. 2 6 9 - 2 7 8 . Epist. ad Atticum XIII 8 = Frg. 33. See MAX POHLENZ, Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, Góttingen 1972 4 , v o l . 1 1 pp.

68

69 70 71 72 73

9 8 - 9 9 a n d HOBEIN, S t o a , R E VII A.L, 1 9 3 1 , col. 1 - 4 7 .

Cf. HEINEMANN,

REINHARDT, HIRZEL, FINGER and others. For bibliographical particulars see my book, op. cit. pp. 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 . Panaetius abandoned the doctrines of universal conflagration, astrology, and perhaps divination, and modified some tenets of Stoic ethics. See my book, op. cit. pp. 275 — 277. See J. F. DOBSON, The Posidonius Myth, CQ 12 (1918) pp. 1 7 9 - 1 9 5 . See R. M. JONES, Posidonius and Solar Eschatology, CPh 27 (1932) pp. 1 1 3 - 1 3 5 . See note 52. The confusion was fostered by J. BAKE'S obsolete collection (1810). F 4 - 7 , 2 0 - 27, 99a - b, 100 - 1 1 2 EDELSTEIN - KIDD. On Posidonius's theology in general see DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments pp. 161 —176.

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Yet, he was considered a precursor of Neoplatonism inasmuch as he seems to have written a commentary (or at least certain comments) on Plato's 'Timaeus' (F 85) and had adopted the Platonic psychology in contrast to Chrysippean monism (F 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 , 146). His influence on Pre-Neoplatonism 74 and Neoplatonism was also assumed from the hierarchy of God, Fate and Nature ascribed to him by Aetius and Cicero. This information would suggest that he must have renounced Stoic pantheistic monism, which is not the case. According to the 'Placita' Posidonius posited fate third from Zeus: "Zeus is first, nature is second and fate is third" (Placita I 28.5 = F 103). Cicero remarks: "It appears to me, moreover, that we should refer all the virtue and power of divination to God first, as Posidonius has done, as before observed; in the next place to fate, and afterwards to nature" (De divinatione 1125 = F 107). These fragments do not refer to providence, but have generally been treated 75 as primarily implying an hierarchy between providence and fate similar to the one met with in Middle Platonism. This alleged hierarchy in its absolute sense, which is to say, apart from divination, has admitted various, mostly platonizing interpretations. On the other hand, it is related to the kinds of divination in a way which is neither very satisfactory in itself nor consistent with Posidonius's other views. 76 Posidonius, following Chrysippus, maintained that the world is governed by mind and providence because mind pervades all its parts, in the way that the human soul more or less pervades the body (F 21). He is also reported to have held that everything happens according to fate (F 104) and to have refuted the Epicurean notion of the gods (F22a —b). He also derived the validity of divination from the existence of providence (F 105). All these facts suggest that he was too orthodox to have questioned the equivalence, if not the identification, of God (Providence), Nature, and Fate. A close survey of Cicero's 'De divinatione' allows us to see that Posidonius was not so much interested in the conventional sorts of divination derived from God, nature and fate, as in the theoretical reasons and philosophical explanations accounting for and justifying the reality of divination. So, divination reflects the existence of providential gods (Div. 182 — 83), who diffuse signs throughout sentient nature, which holds and binds all things together in

74

75

On the term see W. THEILER, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus, Problemata 1, Berlin 1930, 2nd ed., Berlin, Zürich 1964, p. 1. For a detailed discussion of almost all interpretations given to Posidonius's presumed hierarchy see my paper of 1974 referred to in note 54, pp. 288 - 294, particularly for the v i e w s o f EDELSTEIN, RIST, VERBEKE, BREHIER, GRAESER, LAFFRANQUE a n d o t h e r s w h o s e

76

particulars are given there. Particularly by MARIE LAFFRANQUE, Poseidonios d'Apamee. Essai de mise au point, Paris 1964, p. 358 ff.

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universal sympathy. These signs are interpreted as revealing future events according to the law of fate by which all things are governed (Div. 1118). What precedes and what follows Posidonius's presumed hierarchy purports to show that divination exists for the reasons stated (Div. 1125; 128). Since everything happens according to fate, "if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction, though this is the prerogative of god" (Div. 1 127—128). Thus fate accounts for the reality and the validity of divination in a secondary order, posterior to the hypothesis of the existence of providential gods. But signs of future events are also given by nature, and this constitutes another reason to believe in divination, since nature is conceived as the common "house of all", the cohesive power which accounts for the interconnection of things (Div. 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 ) . In conclusion, the view that divination must be traced firstly to God, secondly to fate and lastly to nature does not imply the absolute hierarchy which appears in the 'Placita', which is a systematic but unreliable text. 77 The distinction of providence from fate was probably made later. Posidonius's view of the summum bonum could be considered an innovation with regard to the cosmic order: "Man should live in contemplation of the universal truth and order and contribute to its construction as far as possible, being in no way led by the irrational part of the soul" (F 186). Thus man is the collaborator of God in fostering the divine dispensation in which Posidonius firmly believed.

II. Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire

1. Divine Providence in Late Stoicism a) Seneca on Providence Lucius Annaeus Seneca is perhaps the best representative of popular Stoic eclecticism during the Empire. He is a moralist with scientific interests and

77

See CHARLES H. KAHN, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, New York — London 1964 2 , p. 16.

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an intense and turbulent public life. 78 Though an adherent of Stoicism, 79 he maintains an intellectual independence and does not hesitate to adopt tenets of other schools such as Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and even Epicureanism. This eclecticism sometimes results in doctrinal incoherence and inconsistency. Seneca is perhaps the most interesting and most controversial personality of late Stoicism, yet at the core of his religious thought he is a traditionalist. 80 He follows the Early Stoics in general but is also influenced by Posidonius. He sometimes uses the technical Stoic terminology established by Cicero, but also uses popular language, as with reference to fortune and fate. Seneca did not write any specifically theological work apart from his essay 'De Providentia'. Nevertheless he discusses important theological questions in his 'Quaestiones naturales' dealing with Physics (particularly in the preambles), in other essays such as 'De beneficiis' and in letters, dealing with moral and practical matters. In his lost work 'De superstitione' he must have criticised some forms of traditional piety. 81 His theology is contained in his "natural philosophy," which he understands as contemplation of the gods. 82 His ethics are theonomic, since he believes that man cannot make sufficient moral progress without having the proper conception of God as possessing all things and allocating them to men gratuitously out of the goodness of his nature. For him, God not only does not will to do harm, but is also incapable of doing so by his very nature. He can neither receive nor inflict injury. Seneca says in an important passage recalling the fourfold 83 orthodox Stoic theology: " T h e first way to worship the gods is to believe in the gods. The next, to acknowledge their majesty and goodness, without which there is no majesty. Also to know that they are supreme commanders of the universe, controlling all things by their power and acting as guardians of the human 78

See P. GRIMAL, Sénèque. Sa vie, son œuvre avec un exposé de sa philosophie, Paris 1966; K. ABEL, Seneca. Leben und Leistung, W. HAASE (Ed.), ANRW II 32.2, Berlin, New York

79

On Seneca's Stoicism and the Stoicism of the period see JEAN-MARIE ANDRÉ, Les écoles philosophiques aux premiers siècles de l'Empire, W. HAASE (Ed.), ANRW II 36.1, Berlin, New York 1987, pp. 5 - 7 7 , 12 ££., 18, 26, 75; H.TIMOTHY, The Tenets of Stoicism, Assembled and Systematized from the Works of L. A. Seneca, Amsterdam 1973; P. GRIMAL, Sénèque et le Stoïcisme Romain, W. HAASE (Ed.), ANRW II 36.3, Berlin, New York 1989, pp. 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 9 2 and J. M. RIST, Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy, ibid. pp. 1993 -

1985, pp. 6 5 3 - 7 7 5 .

2012. 80

81

82 83

See V. ARNOLD, Roman Stoicism. Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with Special Reference to its Development within the Roman Empire, Cambridge 1911, 113 ff. For a detailed account of his theology, cf. DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments pp. 177 — 208. Frg. 33, HAASE. Cf. De clem. II 5,1. On Seneca's 'De superstitione' see M. LAUSBERG, Senecae operum fragmenta: Überblick und Forschungsbericht, W. HAASE (Ed.), ANRW II 36.3, Berlin, New York 1989, pp. 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 9 8 , on his 'De Providentia' I. DIONIGI, Il 'De Providentia' di Seneca fra lingua e filosofia, below in this volume (ANRW II 36.7) p. 5 3 9 9 - 5 4 1 4 . Ep. 88, 24; 89, 9 : 1 4 - 1 6 ; Q.N. I Pr. 1. Cicero, N. D. II 3.

4438

MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU race, even though they are sometimes careless of the individual. They neither give nor possess evil; but they do chasten and restrain certain persons and impose penalties, and sometimes punish by bestowing that which outwardly seems to be good" (Ep. 95, 50).

This passage shows that divine providence is central to Seneca's conception of the divine. However, he does allow certain modifications to the traditional doctrine, such as doubting providence in individual cases, and considering apparent prosperity as a sort of punishment. This subject is discussed at length in his essay 'De providentia', which will be analysed below (p. 4440 — 4443). Implicit questions about providence and its relation to fate and necessity, hardly apparent in the Early Stoics, are also raised in the 'Quaestiones naturales'. Here Seneca wonders who is the author and custodian of the universe; whether God keeps entirely to himself or sometimes takes consideration of men; whether he is part of the universe or is the universe itself; whether he makes everyday decisions; whether it is possible for him to repeal in part any sort of universal law or fate, or whether it is a diminution of his majesty and an admission of error to have done things which he has to change, and so forth ( Q . N . I Pr. 3). He also asks: how powerful is God? Does he form matter by himself or does he merely make use of what is already there? Does reason determine matter, or does matter determine reason? Does God do whatever he wishes? Or do the objects of his craft fail him in many cases, just as many things are poorly shaped by a great artist not because his art fails him but because the material with which he works often resists his art? ( Q . N . I Pr. 16). Such questions are never thoroughly and consistently answered, as often in such treatises. Yet they show a change of perspective and the corrosive effect of criticism levelled by antagonists of Stoicism against the doctrine of divine omnipotence. Nevertheless, Seneca is quite orthodox in his designation of God. He speaks of Jupiter as "the controller and guardian of the universe, the mind and spirit of the world, the lord and artificer of this creation." He says: "Any name for him is suitable. You wish to call him fate? You will not be wrong. It is he on whom all things depend, the cause of causes. You wish to call him providence? You will still be right. It is by his planning that provision is made for this universe so that it may proceed without stumbling and fulfil its appropriate functions. You wish to call him nature? You will not be mistaken. It is he from whom all things are naturally born, and we have life from his breath. You wish to call him the universe? You will not be wrong. He himself is all that you see, infused throughout all his parts, sustaining both himself and his own" ( Q . N . II 45). Providence, Fate, Nature and Universe are different aspects of the creative power pervading the universe. They are alternative descriptions of God, who

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is the first and general cause of everything (Ep. 65, 12), the necessary condition of whatever exists (Q.N. VII 30, 4). Yet God is not always omnipotent for Seneca, being sometimes impeded by matter (Ep. 58, 27). And, though God is fate (De benef. IV 7, 2), sometimes fate appears stronger than God or as an independent cause with astrological connotations (De benef. IV 23, 4; De prov. V 8 - 9 ) . But God is absolutely providential (Ep. 95, 50), beneficent (Ep. 95, 48; De benef. IV 5, 1 - 3 ; IV 9, 1; VII 5 - 6 ) , good (Ep. 95, 49) not only towards the good but also towards bad men (De benef. IV 28), just (De clem. 17, 2), and loves good men (Ep. 82, 1; 110, 1; De prov. I 5). Seneca bases his own version of the argument from universal consent (Ep. 117, 6) and his most personal argument from religious experience (Ep. 41, 3 - 5 ) on God's benefits and the awe inspired by the mystical beauty of nature, 84 the source of man's first insitae opiniones et praesumptionesss of God. Belief in divine providence as the moral administration of the world is also implicit in his teleological argument (De prov. 1 2 - 4 ) , in his arguments from the contemplation of the universe (Ep. 64, 6; De benef. VI 23; Consol. ad Helviam 8, 6), in his analogical argument from the providence existing in man ( Q . N . I . Pref. 15), and more explicit in his argument "from benefits" (De dementia 119, 8 - 9 ) . This latter argument is particularly emphasised in his essay 'De beneficiis'. Book IV of this essay, addressed to the Epicureans, who denied providence and saw virtue as the handmaid of pleasure, casts much light on Seneca's conception of providence. Starting from the belief that benefits are not bestowed from self-interest, for profit, or for return, but are ends in themselves, Seneca recalls that the gods bestow countless gifts, day and night, though their nature is sufficient to them for all their needs. So, "if the only reason for giving a benefit is the advantage of the giver, and if God can hope for no advantage from us, then no motive is found for God's giving a benefit" (De benef. IV 3, 3). To the Epicurean objection that god does not give benefits but is free from all care and unconcerned about men, Seneca replies by bringing forward a sort of argument from the consensus omnium or "from worship": "All mortals would not have agreed upon this madness of addressing divinities that were deaf and gods that were ineffectual, unless they were conscious of their benefits" (ibid. IV 4, 2). He continues in a lyrical manner to enumerate divine gifts far exceeding the bare necessities of life: fruits of trees, plants, food, animals of all sorts, rivers, springs of healing nature, mines, etc. God has built for man a huge mansion, 84

85

This argument is interpreted by ARNOLD, op. cit. pp. 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 as a sort of moral argument in the Kantian sense, which is peculiar to Seneca. On the Stoic prolepsis see F. SANDBACH, Ennoia and Prolepsis, in: A. A. LONG (Ed.), Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, pp. 22 — 37:23 — 24. Cicero renders the terms as praesensio and anticipatio. Cf. ARNOLD, op. cit. p. 143.

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the world, which is far more majestic than anything else. Besides other benefits useful for his life, he has given man that "light" by which he orders his life, invents arts and, as a master, has implanted the seeds of every talent (ibid. IV 5 — 6). To the objection that it is not God but nature that supplies men with all these things, Seneca replies in the manner of the Early Stoics that "nature is nothing else but God and the divine reason that pervades the whole universe and all its parts" since there is no nature without God, nor God without nature, but both are the same thing. Among other alternative descriptions of "the author of this world" he adds in thoroughly traditional terms: "If likewise you should call him fate, it would be no falsehood; for, since fate is nothing but a connected chain of causes, he is the first of all the causes on which the others depend. Any name that you choose will properly apply to him if it connotes some force that operates in the domain of heaven; his titles may be as countless as his benefits" (ibid. IV 7 - 8 ) . God bestows upon men "very many and very great benefits with no thought of any return" because benefits are desirable in themselves (ibid. IV 9) and providence is a property of God's nature. Seneca's doctrine of divine providence is given more systematic presentation in his essay 'De providentia'. This exegesis is nevertheless restricted to the problem of theodicy, since Seneca's interlocutor does not completely lack faith in providence but is vexed by the problem of evil. Seneca declares that the mighty structure of the world, with the regularity and artistry of the motion of the stars and even with its apparent irregular phenomena, cannot endure without someone to guard it, nor can it be the product of chance or matter but of reason and law. But he has to answer the question: "Why, if a providence rules the world, does it still happen that many evils befall good men?" (Deprov. I 1). It is a sign of divine providence that there is "friendship between good men and the gods brought about by virtue", a "tie of relationship and likeness" since man is a pupil, imitator and true offspring of God. Yet, like a strict father, God tests the good man, "hardens him and fits him for his own service" (ibid. 1 5 — 6). Although adversities might come to good men, no evil can befall them, no assault can weaken their spirit, because opposites do not mingle. The good man's spirit, though not insensible, is mightier than external things, it overcomes them and gives them its own colour. All adversities befalling a good man can be seen as "mere training." T h e good man does not complain about fate: he takes whatever happens in stride and turns it to the good, determining how best to endure it. It is no wonder that God, who loves good men, allots them a fortune that will make them struggle, that he may behold

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them in a contest worthy of God. The example of Cato shows how noble "the compact with fate" can be (ibid. 2, 5, 10). 8 6 Thus, for Seneca, as for the Early Stoics, apparent evils are not really evil but serve the welfare of those whom they befall and that of humanity as a whole. All things are welcome to good men because they happen "by fate" and "they rightly befall good men by the same law which makes them good." For this reason good men who may be called miserable are not really so, and should not be commiserated (ibid. 3, 1). The analogy of medicine in curing people shows that illness is sometimes for the good of those whom it befalls, while pleasant things can hurt those who delight in them. It is evil fortune that provides models of human conduct; good men 8 7 seek opportunities to test themselves. These men would never have chosen the lot of their adversaries, had fate given them a choice; they were chosen by nature to fight for a just cause. From the perspective of universal nature things that prove men worthy are not real evils (ibid. 3, 2 - 1 4 ) . For the great man it is not mere success that counts, but triumph over the calamities and terrors of mortal life, "the other part of nature." For such a man, eager for danger, it is a misfortune never to be unfortunate. In order to know himself, man must be tested, thinking rather of his goal than of what he may have to suffer. Disaster is an opportunity for virtue. God hardens, tests and disciplines those whom he approves and loves, although all men have their share in misfortune in the long run. God uses good men as worthy instruments for his purposes in order to discover how much human nature can endure. Like good teachers, the gods require greater effort from good men, in whom they place their highest hopes, and try their noble spirits, because no proof of virtue is mild. Therefore, it is to the advantage of good men "to live constantly amidst alarms and to bear with patience the happenings which are ills to him only who ill supports them" (ibid. 4, 16). In keeping with the Early Stoics, for whom only virtue is good and all other things are morally indifferent, 88 Seneca argues that the divine dispensation is useful for the common good. Through the apparently unjust treatment of good men God and wise men intend to show that those things which the ordinary man desires and fears are really neither good nor evil. Only those things bestowed upon good men are good, and only those inflicted upon bad men are evil. Apparent goods are not so if they have been bestowed on base men. For Seneca, divine justice differs radically from the ordinary man's perception of justice; it would have been unjust that brave men undertake dangerous offices and profligates rest secure. But "toil summons the best men" 8i

87

88

293

Fate here is rather used in a popular sense as in 3, 13 and not as an alternative name for God, as usually in Stoicism and Seneca himself. The cited paradigms of Mucius, Fabricius, Rutilius, Regulus, Socrates and Cato are quite eloquent. SVF III 1 1 7 - 1 6 8 . A N R W II 3 6 . 7

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and the same is true for this great commonwealth of the world; good men are summoned by toil and are willingly spent following nature even though they are willing to outstrip it (ibid. 5, 1 — 6). Here fate enters the scene, in traditional terms but with certain astrological connotations not found in Early Stoicism, and also some concessions to Platonism. Seneca says, fervently defending human autonomy within the nexus of causes in a manner reminiscent of Cleanthes 89 : "I suffer nothing against my will, and am not God's slave but his follower ... because I know that everything proceeds according to law that is fixed and enacted for all time. Fate guides us, and it was settled at the first hour of birth what length of time remains for each. Cause is linked to cause, and all public and private issues are directed by a long sequence of events. Therefore everything should be endured with fortitude, since things do not, as we suppose, simply happen - they all c o m e " (ibid. 5, 6-7). Everything was determined long ago for all and, despite the dissimilarity of individual lives, the same lot should be endured by all cheerfully, since all belong in the last resort to nature. T h e good man's part is "to offer himself to fate" and "be swept along together with the universe," since "whatever it is that has ordained us so to live, so to die, by the same necessity it binds also the gods" (ibid. 5, 8). Seneca's theodicy seems to bring forward popular or " h a r d " deterministic views as far as the omnipotence of fate in divine and human matters is concerned; he seems to conceive of fate as stronger even than God, a view which does not easily square with the orthodox Stoic doctrine of fatum divinum.90 He says: " O n e unchangeable course bears along the affairs of men and gods alike. Although the great creator and ruler of the universe himself wrote the decrees of fate, yet he follows them. He obeys for ever, he decreed but once." And to the question of why God assigned misfortunes to good men Seneca answers somewhat platonically: "It is impossible for the founder to alter matter; to this law it was submitted... It takes sterner stuff to make a man who deserves to be mentioned with consideration" (ibid. 5, 8 — 9). God does not allow evil to befall good men, since he keeps them far from sin, crime and other moral evils. Good men "despise externals" and do not require God to "guard their luggage." They voluntarily undertake hardships

89 90

SVF I 527, 537. SVF II 9 1 2 - 9 3 3 .

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in order to teach others to endure them, since in choosing righteousness "they were born to be a pattern." Men are well equipped by God to endure evils "even outstripping the gods," who are exempt from enduring evil, and are thus superior to them in this respect. Suicide remains as a last resort (ibid. 6, 1-9). Seneca considers providence to be the fundamental property of divine nature. He sees it embodied in the order and beauty of the world, but he notes that its overall purpose operates with respect to the whole rather than the individual. He does not accept the view that evil befalls good men, since what counts for the good man is virtue, and not morally indifferent external things. He considers calamities befalling good men to be a test of virtue and a form of training. Fate and matter have their part in his theodicy but do not place any impediment on divine justice. b) Epictetus's Doctrine of Divine Providence I have argued in the introduction to this essay (p. 4418 above) that it may not be fair to deny the Stoics a somewhat personified conception of divine providence, regardless of whether or not they believed in a personal God. We have already seen (pp. 4426, 4429 above) that they firmly believed in God's paternal love for man both as a species and as individuals, despite reservations expressed by Seneca. The Stoic God was defined as "the creator of the whole and a father of all in general and in particular" ( S V F II 1 0 2 1 =

54A LONG-SEDLEY).

This is particularly true for Epictetus, whose views have come down to us through his devoted pupil Arrian. 9 1 The tumultuous atmosphere of his age and his adventures both as a man and a philosopher 92 inspired Epictetus with a fervent belief in the personal providence of God for man in general and for himself personally. His prayers and hymns gratefully address God as a father (Dis. I 3, 1; I 6, 40; I 9, 6 - 7 ; I 13, 3; III 11, 5; III 22, 82; III 24, 16, etc.), a guardian (I 9, 7), an advisor (II 7, 14; III 21, 18), and a leader (II 17, 23; III 21, 12; III 24, 32). His God talks with him, commands him, and expresses his wishes to him (III 10, 8; I 14, 1;

91

92

293»

From the eight books of his 'Dissertationes' we have four, in addition the 'Enchiridion' and some fragments. The contents of the latter sometimes differ from that of the 'Dissertationes'; they are of a more pantheistic character, but we cannot judge with confidence without the context in which they were embedded. See G. GERMAIN, Epictète et la spiritualité stoïcienne, Coll. Maîtres spirituels 33, Paris 1964, A. BONHÔFFER, Epiktet und die Stoa. Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie, Stuttgart 1890. On his theology see E. G. GULIN, Die Religion Epiktets und die Stoa, in: Comment, philol. in hon. I. A. Heikel, Helsingforsiae 1926, pp. 32 — 47 and F. M. LAGRANGE, La philosophie religieuse d'Epictète et le christianisme RBi (1912) pp. 1 — 24 as well as A. JAGU, La morale d'Epictète et le christianisme, W. HAASE (Ed.), ANRW II 36.3, Berlin, New York 1989, pp. 2 1 6 4 - 2 1 9 9 .

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III 7, 36; I 29, 29). This intimacy gives him a sense of mission, service, and appointment by God (I 9, 16; I 12, 25; I 16, 21; II 7, 14; III 22, 69). Not only in the three discourses which deal with providence specifically, and thus are of particular interest for our subject, but throughout all his work Epictetus avows a strong belief in divine providential care in a manner perhaps unprecedented in Stoic literature. His numerous arguments for the existence of God 93 likewise prove the existence of divine providence, since his gods are providential. This aspect is particularly emphasised in modern scholarship 94 inasmuch as Epictetus is more specific than other Stoics about the real content of providential care for man. 95 In this regard Epictetus follows the Early Stoics more consistently than other late Stoics, who are also influenced by Middle Stoicism. He is in line with the Socratic and Platonic tradition, since, in his defence of providence he continues the apologetic and polemic stand of Plato's 'Laws' and makes extensive use, and sometimes abuse, of the teleological argument focusing on the human constitution and the world order. 96 Epictetus, in contrast to Marcus Aurelius (see p. 4452 below), has an exceptionally high view of man, the bearer par excellence of the "divine sparks". 97 Man, he says, has been generously endowed by God with moral freedom (I 1, 7:24; I 12, 32; III 3, 10; IV 1, 100; IV 7, 35, etc.). 98 This is God's most important gift and man's highest privilege, since the conventional benefits of providence, though conducive to a life according to nature and preferred to their opposites, are morally indifferent to man since they do not make him better or worse. 99 Man is made by God a creature of primary importance (I 3, 1; I 12, 27; IV 7, 31). He is a son, a partner and collaborator of God, his friend and equal, sharing with God the community of rational beings (II 10, 7; II 17, 29:33; IV 1, 100:108; I 6, 1 9 - 2 2 : 4 0 ; I 9, 1; I 12, 27; I 3, 3; III 24, 16:61 etc.). Man should trust and obey God, "be of one mind with him" and thank him gratefully for his care and protection (I 4, 32; I 6, 1; I 12, 32; I 16, 16; II 12, 2; II 16, 42; II 24, 26; II 23, 42; III 3, 37; IV 1, 172 etc.). However, Epictetus argues that both nature as a whole and the natural constitution of man render him capable of accomplishing the overall goal of divine providence, namely the contemplation and understanding of the world which constitutes true happiness. 100 93

S e e DRAGONA-MONACHOU, T h e S t o i c A r g u m e n t s p p . 2 1 8 - 2 3 1 .

94

See A. BONHÒFFER, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, Stuttgart 1894 (Repr. Stuttgart 1968) pp. 75 — 78, 90, 243, and E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, vol. 111,1, Leipzig 1923 5 , p. 770 ff. See V. GOLDSCHMIDT, Le Système stoïcien et l'idée de temps, Paris 1953, pp. 77, 103 ff. See A. JAGU, Epictète et Platon, Paris 1946, pp. 111 ff., 117. Cf. B. L. HIJMANS, Epictetus and the Teleological Explanation of Nature, PACA 2 (1959) pp. 1 5 - 2 1 . See J. M. RIST, Human Value: A Study in Ancient Philosophical Ethics, Leiden 1982, pp. 7 1 - 8 3 . See MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus, Philosophia 8 - 9 (1979) pp. 2 6 5 - 3 1 0 (in Greek, with English translation).

95 96

97

98

» 100

S e e GOLDSCHMIDT, o p . c i t . p p . 7 9 , 1 0 3 ff. C f . S V F III 2 9 - 1 1 6 . S e e HIJMANS, o p . c i t . p . 1 6 ff.

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In his three discourses 'On Providence' (I 6, 116 and III 17) Epictetus approaches the subject from several complementary angles. Although the manifestations of divine providence are evident, he seems to consider as requirements or preconditions for their recognition "a comprehensive view of what happens and a sense of gratitude" (I 6, 1) as well as "reverence" on man's part (116, 7). Only thus can man see the usefulness of events and, from the very structure of visible and invisible natural things, and particularly from mind's power of abstraction, infer inductively and by analogy from nature that the world is the product of a perfect artificer, and has not been constituted spontaneously or at random (16, 3 — 8). In addition to the advantages he shares with brute animals, man has been endowed by divine providence with the power to understand external impressions and to act appropriately and methodically according to his nature and constitution for the achievement of his ends (II 14, 7; IV 1, 128; II 10, 3 - 4 ) . Unlike other animals God "has need" of man's proper understanding of the purposes of providence, since man is not a mere spectator but an interpreter of the world. And man's proper end, as dictated by nature's purpose for him, is "contemplation, understanding and a manner of life harmonious with nature" (16, 21). In his providential care for man, God, as a father and good king, gives man control of his own affairs, leaving him free from all restraint, compulsion and hindrance. In achieving his proper end man might encounter difficulties and discomfort, which constitute what is taken as physical evil. These should be viewed as occurring to test man and allow him to exercise the powers given him by God as means of accomplishing God's end (I 6, 23 — 43). Thus physical evil is merely apparent evil and there is no reason to blame God for it. Nor should man complain that the other animals come into being ready prepared by nature to fulfill all their bodily needs, since they are not born for their own sake but to be of service to man, without requiring his care and attention. All this is orthodox Stoicism, but, unlike Chrysippus, who allows God neglect of trivial things, and unlike Seneca, who doubts providence in individual cases, Epictetus argues that a reverent and grateful man can perceive divine providence not only in nature's chief works but also in the smallest matters, even in things "nature does in passing." Everything is a sign of providence and is useful from the perspective of the whole (116, 7 — 14). From his anthropocentric perspective, Epictetus sees everything in nature as an instrument made for the welfare of man, who alone is endowed with the faculty to comprehend and make use of them. Hence it is the duty of man, as a rational being, to sing hymns to god in praise of his benefits (116, 15 21). Epictetus's theodicy is quite orthodox. Nevertheless, on Platonic and Aristotelian, meritocratic grounds, which will become still more apparent in Marcus Aurelius (p. 4450 below), he applies a sense of divine justice unknown to early Stoicism to the conventional problem of the presumed prosperity of the unjust. For Epictetus, everything happens in accordance with reason and everyone gets what he deserves; those who receive a greater share do so in accordance with their superior merits (III 17, 1). In response to the usual

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objection that the unjust man is better off than the just, he analyses the sense of "better" and concludes that the unjust man is superior to the just only in unimportant matters. Providence does nothing harmful, and actually does give better things to better man. It is "a law of nature for the superior to have the better of the inferior in the respect in which he is superior" (III 17, 6). All else is unimportant. It is merely human judgement that some things, really morally indifferent, are called evil. These are what they are and nothing else. Consequently, one ought not to consider unpleasant things, evil (III 17, 9). Although Chrysippus traced the origin of justice to Zeus and common nature (SVF III 326) and the Early Stoics in general established natural right based on the law of nature, they only indirectly (by absolving providence from any injustice) connected the doctrine of divine providence to that of immanent justice. In their theory of justice they seem to have adopted a somewhat egalitarian interpretation of the meritocratic spirit of Plato and Aristotle. 101 Yet, not before Marcus Aurelius is divine providence discussed in terms of global immanent justice. Apart from Seneca, the Aristotelian view of justice as proportional equality is also alluded to in Epictetus's remarks cited above and also in Ench. c. 31. Piety consists in regarding the gods as just administrators of the universe, a doctrine that will be met with again in Neoplatonism. This approach may be taken as an innovation of the later Stoics. Epictetus, following the Stoic tradition of the fourfold division of theology (N. D. II 3), considers belief in the existence of providential gods or in the divine dispensation of the universe to be of paramount importance to ethics (II 14, 11 —12:25). 1 0 2 As mentioned earlier, providence was for the Early Stoics a part of God's prolepsis. This term is broadly used by Epictetus, sometimes in an idiosyncratic way and perhaps occasionally with an a priori character. However, Epictetus does not expressly speak of the prolepsis of providential God, unless A. B O N H O F F E R is right in his reading of Dis. I V 1, 61. Ennoia, however, is not a prolepsis, which is a natural universal concept. 1 0 3 Nor did Epictetus argue for the existence of God from universal consent, although this would have been consistent with his belief that man has a sort of endearment to and a rational connection with God (114, 6 — 7). Yet, most of his arguments for the existence of God and his theories of religion imply that the fundamental property of the gods is their providence, both in general and in their particular providence for mankind. By establishing a father-son relationship between God and man Epictetus rejects the older view of religion as based on fear and almost identifies God with his benefits (II 20, 32 — 33). His own versions of the teleological and the analogical arguments as well as his argument from design (114, 7 — 10; I 6, 7; 1 14, 2 5 - 2 6 ; II 8, 2 0 - 2 1 ; 112, 16; 116, 9 - 1 0 etc.) turn out to be in the last resort arguments "from eutaxy", i. e., from providential administration (II 14, 8 - 9 ) . The argument "from the usefulness" of the belief in God is more 101 102 103

See my paper 'Justice and Law in Stoic philosophy', Diotima 20 (1992) pp. 37 — 42. See JAGU, op.cit. (n. 96 above) p. 112. Cf. P. DE LACY, op.cit. p. 256. Epiktet und die Stoa p. 218.

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plausible because of God's care for man (II 20, 9 - 1 0 ) . Moreover, the existence of a true philosopher, a "servant, example and witness of God" can serve as a sign that God does not neglect his creatures and witnesses, "whom alone he uses as examples to the uninstructed. to prove that he both is and governs the universe well, and does not neglect the affairs of men, and that no evil befalls a good man" (III 26, 28). Yet, as mentioned above, the greatest sign of divine providential administration is man's moral freedom, "a part of God himself." Epictetus says, "had God ... subjected to hindrance or constraint either by himself or by some other [that part of his own being which he has bestowed upon man] ... he would no longer be God nor would he care for man as he ought" (117, 27). Epictetus's God had need of man's freedom to assent willingly to the divine dispensation (IV 3, 10) 104 and accomplish the end of providence which is "the harmony of the whole" (112, 16). God placed in man's control the most excellent faculty to make correct use of external impressions, but he was unable to put everything under his control since man "is upon earth, trammelled by an earthly body and earthly associates" (11, 7). Things bound to these earthly conditions, which is to say, what is presumed to be physical evil, have no power over man (I 9, 13) and are conducive to the harmony of the whole (112, 16). According to true standards and preconceptions, presumed evils are not real evils (I 28, 27). They are materials for the moral purpose which is the essence of good and evil (I 29, 1—2). So, blame of God, fighting against God and man's "arraying himself against the administration of the universe" is a sign of ingratitude, completely alien to Epictetus (III 22, 23; III 24, 24) who altogether "acquiesces in the government of the universe" (III 26, 18), singing hymns of praise and gratitude to God (116, 21). c) Divine Providence in Marcus Aurelius Marcus Aurelius's view of providence can be deduced from his 'Meditations', in a way similar to that used for the Early Stoics, because of the nature of the work, a collection of thoughts rather than a structured treatise. Despite all attempts at reconstruction 105 the unity of the work and a definite line of argumentation escape us, and inconsistencies, even a certain skepticism, are not absent. This is why, despite the large bibliography on Marcus Aurelius 104

105

See A. A. LONG, Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action, in: LONG (Ed.), Problems in Stoicism pp. 1 9 0 - 1 9 2 . See particularly J. P. JOLY, Reflexions de L'empereur Marc Aurele Antonin, Paris 1742 and L. C. T. ROUSSEAU, Morale de Marc Aurele, empereur Romain, Paris 1798 — 9. For more details see the introduction to the edition by A. S. L. FARQUHARSON, The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, Oxford 1944, p. LX ff.

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both as philosopher and as emperor, little attention has been paid to his theology. 106 Marcus Aurelius, moreover, was not a professional philosopher, nor did he address arguments for the Stoic creed to doctrinal opponents since the sole auditor 107 of his 'Meditations' was the emperor himself, perhaps in rare moments of personal doubt. Generally speaking, he had a deep belief in a providential God, which amounted to an emotional and existential faith. 108 Marcus Aurelius follows to some extent the fourfold division of Stoic theology (Med. 2, 9; 2, 11, 3; 10, 9, 3), although he does not seem to consider it an official doctrine 109 to the same degree as do other representatives of the school. He explicitly argues for the existence of the divine and of providence in traditional terms in Med. 2, 11, 3; he also saw universal nature as the moral author of the world and a norm of conduct, a thesis that renders his ethics completely theonomic (3,13; 8,52; 9,1; 10,11 etc.). Pantheism is the prevailing trait of his theology, but panentheistic and even theistic language, more suited to divine providence, is not missing - God is often called the governor of the world. Divine providence is a firm belief of Marcus Aurelius's. He declares: "The gods exist and have concern for human affairs" (2, 11, 3).110 The "whole divine economy is pervaded by providence" (2, 3, 1). He considers "life not worth living unless there exist providential gods" (2, 11, 2), and believes that the existence of providential gods is a by far more plausible and acceptable alternative to atoms, chance or confusion (4, 3, 5; 9, 39; 10, 6; 11, 18; 4, 27; 6, 44; 12, 14:24 etc.). He uses several, mostly traditional, arguments to confirm his belief. He argues analogically from the part to the whole, considering the world a city governed by universal reason and mind (4, 4, 3; 4, 27; 9, 9; 7, 19, etc.). He argues for both the constant operation of the divine mind throughout the universe, and the unity of the whole on the basis of cosmic sympathy (4, 27; 4, 40; 4, 45; 6, 38; 6, 36, 2; 6, 40 etc.). Despite some hints of dualism, he advocates a strong monism affirmative of the order and organic unity of the whole. He says: "The world order is a unity made up of multiplicity; God is one, pervading all things; all being is one, all law is one, namely, the common reason which all thinking creatures posses, and all truth is one" (7, 9). This unity grows stronger as one proceeds from lower to higher levels of Being, and nature is also the principle of this rational unity (9, 9, 4; 10, 6). 106

His religious thought is touched upon mainly in introductions to his 'Meditations', particularly by G. H. RENDALL (1898 [see n. 107 below]), in general works such as that by A N D R É C R E S S O N , Marc-Aurèle, Sa vie, son œuvre avec un exposé de sa philosophie, Paris 19624, A. S. L. FARQUHARSON, M. Aurelius, His Life and His World, Oxford 1952 and in works on Roman religion, such as J. FERGUSON, The Religions of the Roman Empire, London 1970. 107 See RENDALL, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself, London 1898, pp. CXII. i°8 See Med. 2, 4, 2; 2, 3, 1; 2, 11, 3; 12, 26, 2, etc. 109

S e e D E LACY, o p . c i t . p . 2 5 4 f f .

110

For Marcus Aurelius I mostly use Meditations, London 19705).

M A X W E L L STANIFORTH'S

translation (Marcus Aurelius,

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So as to function as a rational principle of organic unity Nature is sentient, possesses a soul and thus constitutes, as it did for the Early Stoics, an alternative description of providence. Marcus Aurelius places particular emphasis on this aspect of providence since nature, the first mover (9, 1, 10), is for him "the oldest deity" (9, 1, 1), aiming at Zeus's welfare and even sometimes working "for the benefit of Fate" (5, 8, 2—10). Following the Stoic tradition he also makes extensive use of the teleological argument for the existence of providential gods, but in a more abstract way than his predecessors and Epictetus. He does not discuss the members of the human body in order to detect the ends for which they were made, nor does he behold the beauty and motion of the stars to discover the design they unfold. His own version contains cosmological and moral dimensions, also taking into consideration social values and looking to final ends, because the world order is for him primarily a moral order. Providential nature is the distributor of benefits, norms and rules (5, 1, 4). Divine inspirations, intimations and communications constitute for Marcus Aurelius personal manifestations of divine providence. He is deeply aware of them and grateful for the help offered him by god through divination and dreams (1, 17, 20; 9, 27, 3). Sacrifices, prayers and vows have no meaning unless addressed to beneficent gods (6, 44; 9, 40). Everyday experience of the benefits men accept from the stars and the sun (a god for Marcus Aurelius (8, 19)) reveal the divine power (12, 28), "if one is sensitive and has a deep insight into the workings of the universe" (3, 2). The most personal aspect, however, of Marcus Aurelius's doctrine is its account of providence as an expression of divine justice. Marcus is more concerned with justice than other Stoics and is more socially oriented 111 than his predecessors, perhaps because of his imperial position — he sought to govern with Tightness, respect for the rights of his subjects and with a sense of social justice. He considers it not only a Stoic but also a Roman virtue to act with righteousness and freedom, abhorring injustice as the gravest sin (2, 5:10). He counsels himself first of all to meet all claims of justice (4, 22), be a friend of justice (6, 30) and do everything out of righteousness (4, 25:33:37; 9, 22:31; 10, 11) at all costs (6, 50), and considers the principle of rationality to be one and the same as the principle of justice (11, 1). He sees tolerance as a part of justice (4, 3) and advocates equality (1, 14, 2). However, he senses an hierarchical structure of Being within the world order, but without any discrimination between rational beings, considering man equal to God (8, 2). This stand gives his meritocratic conception of justice a certain egalitarian slant. Marcus is so preoccupied with justice that he coins new terms to designate the righteous such as dikaiikos and revives the Platonic term dikaiotes (righteousness) (2, 5; 9, 22:31). He considers justice the most important virtue and ascribes its origin to nature (11,10,4), perhaps following Chrysippus (SVF I 326). 111

See MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU, God, the World and Man as a Social Being in Marcus Aurelius' Stoicism, Diotima 12 (1984) pp. 86 — 96.

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Thus one might expect him to view divine providence as immanent justice, attributing benefits equally and at the same time according to worth (8, 6 —7). 112 Providence, or "the social mind of the universe", he says, has given everything its "just due" (5, 30). Universal law allots to every creature its due (10, 25) and so this whole is good, just and beautiful (3, 2, 1). On the basis of this principle, lower forms serve the higher; all are linked together in mutual interdependence (5, 30). Nature, the origin of justice, surpassing all artistic machinery, made all lower things to serve the higher (11, 10): the inanimate for the sake of the animate, and the animate for the sake of rational beings (5, 16). Rational beings are so constituted as to serve one another (7, 55), prompted by nature to seek their own kind and eager to blend and combine with their affinities (9, 9). For this reason injustice amounts to impiety. Since nature has constituted rational beings to help one another according to their worth for their own mutual benefit, to do harm is to contravene Nature's will and to sin against the oldest of all deities. Pursuing pleasure as a good and avoiding pain as an evil is also impious, and implies blaming common nature for not making its attributions deservedly but being unfair to good men. This is not the case, because nature is impartial and makes no distinction concerning morally indifferent things. Marcus writes: "every successive generation of created beings equally passes through the same experiences in turn; for this is the outcome of the original impulse which in the beginning moved providence ... to progress from the inception of the universe to its present orderly system" (9, 10). Marcus Aurelius is firmly convinced that "whatever happens, happens justly ... in the succession of events there is not mere sequence alone, but an order that is just and right as from the hand of one who dispenses to all their due" (4, 10). Thus, whatever falls to one's lot is not only fated but is also the work of providence, understood as divine justice. Marcus Aurelius does seem to leave some room for chance (1, 17; 3, 11, 12, 24) and does distinguish between things coming from God and things coming from fate (3, 11; 4, 26:34:45; 5, 8:13; 7, 75). He sometimes assigns to fate those things that do not fall under man's control (3, 6), and also posits providence, fate and chance as disjunctive alternatives (12, 14). Nevertheless, he views both providence and fate as the reason and law of the universe; they are both expressions of the same divine justice. Marcus attributes no evil to the world order. Hence, he advises that man should accept "what happens and is alloted to him as coming from the same source that he did" (2, 17). 112

Marcus explains here that equality should not be understood as exact correspondence of one man and another, i. e. in every particular, but rather as a general comparison of them both in their entirety. I translate kat'axian sometimes as "according to merit", sometimes as "deservedly" or "according to worth", depending on the context.

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Because "the reason that directs universal matter has no motive for doing ill, since it is without malice and does nothing with intent to injure, neither is anything harmed by it" (6, 1). Fate, moreover, seems to leave room for man's free will since "the fate allotted to everyone is carried away with the whole but also carries away the whole" (3, 4). Following Stoic tradition, Marcus Aurelius considers moral evil, which is in man's power and is due to ignorance, to be the only true evil. Physical evil is not evil, strictly speaking, since it makes no man worse and is assigned to all men equally. He says characteristically: "Gods do exist and do concern themselves with the world of man. They have given men full power not to fall to any of the absolute evils; and if there were real evils in life's other experiences, they would have provided for that too, so that avoidance of it could lie within every man's ability. But when a thing does not worsen man himself, how can it worsen the life he lives? The world-nature cannot have been so ignorant as to overlook a hazard of this kind, nor, if aware of it, have been unable to devise a safeguard or a remedy. Neither want of power nor want of skill could have led nature into the error of allowing good and evil to be visited indiscriminately on the virtuous and the sinful alike. Yet living and dying, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, and so forth are equally the lot of good men and bad. Things like these neither elevate nor degrade; and therefore they are no more good than they are evil" (2, 11). All things are according to nature and according to nature nothing is evil (2, 17). All true evils come only from one's own guiding principle, from one's mind, "the part of oneself which acts as one's assessor of what is evil" and not from the things impartially allotted by nature to men (4, 39). Good and evil are entirely in man's power (6, 41). For Marcus Aurelius the divine economy is pervaded by providence. Even the works of chance are ordained by it. And to providence, the source from which all things flow, is allied necessity and the welfare of the universe (2, 3, 1). Nevertheless, he sometimes leaves it an open question whether providence or the mind of the whole confines itself to putting things in motion without controlling their consequences, or whether providence is directed to everything, or even whether the gods are concerned with the general welfare rather than the particular and personal. Yet, this does not imply that providence is blameworthy, since man is endowed with the ability to take care of himself (9, 28; 6, 44; 7, 26), and the gods offer their help even in matters that are in man's power (9, 40). So, "no one should indict the deity, which is supremely good and just and has contrived all things well and benevolently,"

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overlooking nothing that should have been in accordance with nature (12, 5). Neither matter nor universal substance could be responsible for evil; both are supple, compliant, and fully controlled by reason (6, 1). No one is to blame for the order of things: "The gods can do nothing amiss willingly or unwillingly and men's misdoings are unwilling." Everything, in Marcus' view, has been administered rightly and fairly (12, 5). Marcus Aurelius's conception of providence is not so anthropocentric as Epictetus's. The interest of the whole (6, 44; 12, 23; 10, 6), the "salvation of the whole" (10, 1), even the interest of fate and the welfare of Zeus are for him predominant and above any other purpose of providence (5, 8, 2:10). Even moral evil is necessary in order that there be an opposite to good, and it is impossible that evil persons should not exist (8, 55; 9, 42, 1—2; 12, 16). Physical evil also contributes to the world's prosperity since "even the man who is malcontent collaborates in the welfare of the world" (6, 42). In sum, nothing is harmful to the part which contributes to the whole (10, 6). Besides, physical evil trains and exercises man and makes him better and more praiseworthy by the right use he makes of adversities (10, 33, 7). Man contributes to the welfare of the whole even by his death, inasmuch as death is "something opportune, serviceable and in keeping with all else". Eventually, "whatever serves the purpose of the whole is kept always fair and blooming" (12, 23). It has been argued 113 that from Marcus's perspective of the whole, the importance of man is diminished. However, it is this strong sense of organic unity and continuity that, according to GERSON114, makes the doctrine of the "double subject" operate so effectively in Marcus Aurelius's theodicy. Marcus has such a strong belief in the organic unity of the whole that he uses the term member (melos) instead of part (meros) to show the internal connection between man and the world (6, 4; 7, 13). He has a strong sense of the organic continuity of nature: "With things formed by nature [in contrast to artifacts] the power that fashioned them is still within them and remains in them" (6, 40). In addition to his argument from design he advances other arguments that provide an effective defence of divine providence. Nevertheless, his advocacy of providence is perhaps not thoroughly persuasive. 115

113

See RIST, o p . c i t . p p . 8 0 - 8 3 .

114

Op. cit. p. 232. See R. B. RUTHERFORD, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. A Study, Oxford, 1989, p. 214.

1,5

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2. Divine Providence in Pre-Neoplatonism a) General The term Pre-Neoplatonism, coined by W. THEILER,116 is perhaps the most appropriate inclusive term for the philosophical tendencies prevailing during the first centuries of the Roman Empire, from the first century B. C. to the second A. D. It is particularly representative of Middle-Platonism, NeoPythagoreanism, the Fourth Academy, 117 Eclecticism and other currents, since this period is an amalgam too "hard to disentangle"," as E. BREHIER described it.118 It can be argued that the predominant current in this period was Middle Platonism; its main characteristic was eclecticism, deeply imbued with NeoPythagoreanism, and marked by a religious orientation. 119 Given that Epicurus and the Epicureans of the Empire, Lucretius in particular, 120 denied the existence of providence, and that the Peripatetics practically ignored it, the doctrine of providence relied for its defence in later antiquity on the Late Stoics, Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists. Apart from the Stoics, however, specific treatises on providence were written only by Philo, Plotinus and Proclus. Middle Platonists, drawing mainly on Plato, took the doctrine of providence for granted and hardly advanced any arguments to defend it. They were particularly interested in the relation of providence to fate, free will, and chance, tracing the debate back to Plato's 'Timaeus'. Their anti-Stoic spirit was shaped by their opposition to Stoic "hard" determinism. Although not a specific problem for the Stoics, who did not distinguish descriptive from prescriptive language, fact from value, since nature was also a norm of conduct, 121 the identification of providence (moral administration of the world) with fate (a brute fact) was soon regarded as a great paradox. P. M E R L A N says: "The Stoic system can be interpreted in two ways: "We see in it either a 'mundanization' and a materialization of the divine, or, on the contrary, a divinization and spiritualization of matter. Nothing exhibits this ambiguity better than the relation between Determinism (Heimarmene) and Providence (Pronoia) in the Stoic system." 122 Because, as he adds, "strict 116 117

118 119

120

See note 74 above. For the terminology see C. J. DE VOGEL, Greek Philosophy III. The Hellenistic and Roman Age, Leiden 1964, p. 340. Cf. P. MERLAN, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague 1968, p. 21. The Hellenistic and Roman Age, WADE BASKIN trans., Chicago 1971 3 , p. 148. See FREDERICK COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, vol. I part II B: Greece and Rome, The Bellarmine Series 9, London 1951 3 p. 195 ff. See frgs. 368, 388, 370 USENER. Cf. Cicero, N . D . 1 1 8 - 2 4 and Lucretius, De rerum n a t u r a II 1 6 7 - 1 8 3 ,

121 122

1090-1104; V 91-315,

e t c . S e e E. PARATORE, L a

problematica

sull'epicureismo a Roma, H. TEMPORINI (Ed.), ANRW 14, Berlin, N e w York 1973, pp. 1 2 9 ff., 1 5 9 ff. See LONG, Hellenistic Philosophy pp. 1 7 9 - 1 8 4 . Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus, in: A. H. ARMSTRONG (Ed.), The Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1970 2 , p. 124.

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determinism seems to leave no place for providence in any genuine sense of the word." This identification was a prerequisite of Stoic monism and immanentism, 123 hardly reconcilable with the dualism and transcendentalism integral to both Pre-Neoplatonism and Neoplatonism. I have argued above (p. 4432 f.) that the absolute hierarchy of providence or God and fate, ascribed to Cleanthes and Posidonius by late authorities, is rather misleading. However, the criticism of the Academy, 124 particularly with regard to the problem of evil, had more of an effect on the Stoic doctrines of providence and fate than did that of the Epicureans. The debate came to focus upon the relationship of providence to fate and, more specifically, on that of fate to free will, with which I am not concerned here. J O H N D I L L O N has remarked that the origin of the Middle Platonic doctrine of Fate, Providence and free-will "is mysterious" and that "the vague notion that it may be attributed to Gaius is rendered improbable by the fact that his only attested pupil, Albinus, in an admittedly summary account shows no trace of it". 1 2 5 This doctrine must have appeared after Cicero, since no reference to it occurs in the 'De Fato'. Nor is it certain who first inaugurated the exaltation of providence and its distinction from fate, although this tendency is already at work in Antiochus. 126 At any rate, an hierarchical priority of providence or of "higher providence" to fate occurs in many writers of this age in the context of a more fundamental hierarchy of Being, in some cases anticipating that of Neoplatonism. Eudorus, Plutarch, Albinus, Apuleius, Numenius, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Adrastus, Nemesius, Calcidius, Proclus, Boethius, Hierocles, Sallustius, and others, 127 all more or less share an hierarchical conception of the universe. On the other hand, a hierarchy of providence and fate appears in Apuleius (DePlatone 1, 2), Nemesius (Denatura hominis 38), Boethius (De consolatione philosophiae 4, 6, 14), Proclus (De Providentia et fato 148, 158) Pseudo-Plutarch (De fato 573a - b, 574) and others. All these philosophers, living in an age of "failure of nerve," 1 2 8 and deeply conscious of the evil existing in the world, from which they became all the more alienated, tried to exempt God from evil by removing him from the world and by bridging the gap between heaven and earth with intermediary beings. It was perhaps Xenocrates who showed the way for this separation

123

124

125

126 127

128

See E. ZELLER, Outlines of the History of Greek philosophy, London 1969 1 8 , p. 215 ( = ID., Grundriß der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Leipzig 1928 1 3 , p. 265). See Cicero, De natura deorum III, De fato, Academica, De divinatione. Cf. GREENE, op. cit. pp. 359 — 365. The Middle Platonists, London 1977, p. 295. This book was particularly useful to my research. But see ANDRÉ, op. cit. p. 64 on the institution of this debate by Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. VII 1 and 2. Cicero, Academica I 7, 29: prudentiam ... procurantem caelestia maxime. See J. H. WASZINK (Ed.), Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, Plato Latinus 4, Leiden 1962, p. 183 ff. See GILBERT MURRAY, Five Stages of Greek Religion, New York 1952, pp. 119ff.

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with his exaltation of divine transcendence and of the role of intermediary

daimones.

In this novel situation not only were providence and fate regarded as members of a certain hierarchy, but providence was even distinguished from God. The highest god is said to be superior to his providence; there exist also a second god or demiurge, inferior gods, and three different providences. 129 Fate, as the divine law which governs only worldly things, was expressly subordinated to providence, the hypostasised divine will. This gradation, moreover, was fathered on Plato, whose lack of dogmatism allowed such an interpretation. 130 This hierarchy was justified by an anti-Stoic theory of causation ascribed to Plato primarily on the basis of Timaeus 41e2 - 3, commented on by most Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists. As a matter of fact Plato's 'Timaeus' was the most influential Platonic text in this period and the subject of numerous commentaries. Whether Xenocrates was the first commentator or not, surely he is the father of Platonic tradition. Commentaries on the 'Timaeus' have been ascribed to Crantor, Eudorus, more tentatively to Posidonius, to Atticus, Galen, Nigidiuus Figulus, Calvenus Taurus and others, while Albinus and Apuleius represent a Middle Platonic reading of Plato imbued with Pythagorean tenets. Extremely influential for this period was the later Plato's system of the two opposed first principles (the One and the indefinite Dyad) and the tripartite division of the levels of Being, according to which the world soul was intermediate between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. 131 A fundamental problem faced by Middle Platonism is whether or not the world is eternal. The prevailing view (except for Plutarch and Atticus) was that of the world's eternity and timelessness. 132 Middle Platonists advocated transcendence of the divine, adopted likeness unto God as the moral end and believed in free will, human autonomy and personal immortality. All defended divine providence against fatalism, which was explicitly but unfairly ascribed to the Stoics in general by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, and to Cleanthes in particular by Calcidius. As already mentioned, the question of free will and necessity, "with which is intertwined God's providence," had considerable importance for Pre-neoplatonic ethics and metaphysics. J O H N D I L L O N remarks that this problem, treated by Plato in mythical form and incidentally by Aristotle, became urgent after the Stoics and "could 129

130

Numenius frgs. 20, 21, 25 LEEMANS, Pseudo-Plutarch, De fato 5 7 3 B - D , Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate 1, 12 etc. On the transformation of Platonic doctrine in this period "which would have astonished Plato", see SOLMSEN, op. cit. pp. 144, 177, 192. Cf. F. M. CORNFORD, Plato's Cosmology, London 1971, pp. 36, 171 on the lack of a dogmatic theory of causation in Plato, and A. E. TAYLOR, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford 1928, p. 256 on 41e: "confusion on this point has worked much havoc with exegesis both ancient and modern". See also K. FEEBLEMAN, Religious Platonism, London 1959, p. 139 and GREENE, op. cit. p. 368.

131

See DILLON, o p . c i t . p p . 1 ff., 8 .

132

See DILLON ibid. p . 7 ff.

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not be dismissed so easily" by Middle Platonists, who found little help in Plato and Aristotle. He says: "We cannot be quite sure what Antiochus' stance was, as the attribution of Cicero's 'De fato' is uncertain, nor can we say anything about Eudorus' position. Philo gives us the first defence of the Platonic position, which asserts both freedom of the will and the existence of providence against Stoic heimarmené with more vigor than logical force. Plutarch also touches on the theme repeatedly, though his most serious discussions of the subject have not survived. The document 'On Fate' surviving under his name is certainly not by him, but it is of great interest... All in all the Middle Platonists, though producing many scholastic formulae on the subject, failed to solve the problem, and bequeathed it in all its complexity to Plotinus, who writes a magnificent, if inconclusive, treatise on the topic in Enneads III 2 - 3 . " ' 1 3 3 As a matter of fact Antiochus is important for Middle Platonism, because he turned the Academy away from Skepticism, 134 but, as he combined Stoic, Platonic and even Aristotelian views, he could not be radical. His importance to our subject lies in his considering divine providence as "governing especially the heavenly bodies and then those things on earth that concern mankind" (Cicero, Académica 17, 29 ff.). In Pre-neoplatonism the work of Philo is of particular interest for the doctrine of providence, as is the work of Plutarch, for similar reasons, and that of Pseudo-Plutarch for the systematic character of the relationship of providence to fate. Also of interest are Albinus for his views of God and providence and Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre and Calcidius for the relationship of providence to fate and theodicy. All these authors are discussed below in more or less detail, while the views of Atticus, Galen, Nicomachus and Numenius will be given in summary form.

b) Philo's Doctrine of Providence It is a matter of debate whether Philo can be considered the founder, together with Eudorus, of Middle-Platonism; indeed it is open to question whether he is a Middle-Platonist at all, in the strictest sense of the term. The true nature of his theodicy is also unclear. It has been said 135 that Philo's doctrine of providence, and especially his theodicy, is either a continuation, a modification, or a true repetition of Stoic teaching. I have argued at length

133 134 ,3S

See DILLON ibid. pp. 44 - 45. See DILLON ibid. p. 82 ff., on Antiochus's doctrine of fate and free will. E. g. by R BARTH, Die stoische Theodizee bei Philo, in: Philos. Abhandl. M a x Heinze zum 70. Geburtstage gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern, Berlin 1906, pp. 14 — 33, 25. Cf. by the same author, Die Stoa, Frommanns Klassiker der Philophie 16c (ed. A. GOEDECKEMEYER) Stuttgart 1946 6 , p. 239 ff.

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elsewhere 136 that this claim is partly true, so far as physical evil is concerned, with regard to Philo's 'De Providentia', but not with regard to his work as a whole. With respect to metaphysical and moral evil he is rather a Platonist, although Stoic and Platonic teaching differ little in the latter regard. 137 More specifically, it appears from the c De opicifio mundi' and other exegetical treatises that Philo is closer to Plato and the Pythagoreans than to the Stoics in his evaluation of metaphysical evil as an imperfection inherent in creatures and perhaps in the resistance of matter to divine powers, and in the way he attributes moral evil to human freedom and, allegorically speaking, to the "divine powers" and to logos, but not to the "first god" himself. 138 Regarding physical evil (natural disasters, pain, presumed unjust suffering, etc.) Philo is at least methodologically much closer to the Stoics than appears from VON ARNIM'S collection of Stoic fragments and testimonies. 139 Philo's similarities to Seneca and some anticipations of Epictetus are striking, while his arguments for the existence of providence almost fully correspond to the Stoic arguments in Cicero's 'De natura deorumll'. 1 4 0 Nevertheless, Philo is eclectic even in this regard, and his approximation to Antiochus is obvious. 141 It does not seem probable that his attacks on the fatalism of astrology were levelled against orthodox Stoicism; they were rather directed towards some of his contemporary Stoics and astrologers, perhaps against the Stoic astrologer Cheremon from whom he came to know Stoicism. 142 In the c De opificio mundi' Philo more or less follows the cosmology of the 'Timaeus'. His God is close to the Platonic Demiurge and his logos is the locus of ideas, the link between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. 143 Logos is a god but not the God, 1 4 4 echoing the Platonic world-soul or Stoic fate rather than the Stoic seminal principle of the world. 145 Philo is ambivalent whether God created matter or not, but the creation of the world was basic

136

137 138

139

140 141

142 143

144

145

294

See MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Problem of Evil in Philo of Alexandria with Special Reference to the 'De Providentia', Philosophia 5 — 6 ( 1 9 7 5 - 7 6 ) pp. 306 — 352: 310 — 319 on his intellectual background (in Greek with English summary). See Cicero, De fato 39 on Chrysippus. See my last-cited paper, pp. 3 5 1 - 3 5 2 and, for detailed references and a large bibliography, pp. 323 — 333. Some passages of the 'De providentia' should have been placed by VON ARNIM among the Stoic fragments, e. g., II 99 in SVF II1170 and 1176, I 47 in SVF II1171, II103 in S VF II 1173,1 54 in SVF 2,1174, II 105 - 1 0 9 and SVF II 1175 - 1 1 7 6 , II102 in SVF II1177 and II104 in SVF II1181 and III 5 6 7 - 5 8 1 . See SVF II 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 4 , 1 1 4 1 - 1 1 5 0 . By P. BOYANCÉ, Etudes philoniennes, REG 76 (1963) pp. 6 4 - 1 1 0 . But see J. DANIÉLOU, Philon d'Alexandrie, Paris 1957, p. 57 ff. For other hypotheses see my paper cited above n. 136, pp. 347 - 350. See De cher. 3 5 - 3 7 , Quest in Ex. II 13, De conf. ling. 146, De fuga 112. Cf. E. BRÉHIER, Les idées religieuses et philosophiques de Philon d'Alexandrie, Paris 1925 2 , pp. 99 — 110. De somn. I 227 - 229. Cf. H. A. WOLFSON, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Cambridge, Mass., 1962 3 , I p. 134. De mut. nom. 135. ANRW II 36.7

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to his conception of providence; it is described in terms of the T i m a e u s ' . 1 4 6 Logos is the active element of G o d ' s creative thought, the "sum total of ideas in activity", G o d ' s instrument for the creation of the sensible world. 1 4 7 G o d is above good and evil, yet he is all goodness, like the G o o d of Plato's 'Republic', benevolent and omnipotent. H e is the cause of all things except vice, which is the sole true evil. 148 Physical evil is only apparent evil since it does not render man worse and sometimes it should be seen as a punishment for sin, 149 while metaphysical evil is integral to the imperfection of created, finite earthly things. 1 5 0 As previously mentioned, God is not responsible for moral evil because he did not generate the world in contact with it but through logos and his ideas-powers. 1 5 1 It is characteristic that in commenting on Genesis 1: 26 in his De opificio mundi 72 - 75, Philo, employing the language of Plato's 'Timaeus', says that God, having created the heavenly and physical world, composed of the most important things and the morally indifferent alike, felt the need of collaborators in order to create man. This was necessary because man is a mixed nature, subject to good and evil; G o d alone could not by his very nature be the cause of any evil, which is to say of vice and vicious actions, but only of good. So, on the analogy of Plato's Demiurge and his younger gods, Philo's G o d delegated the creation of man to the "divine powers" and to logos,152 which sometimes seem responsible for moral evil, although, strictly speaking, this is due to man himself in his own freedom. This power of free will was necessary that an opposite might exist to the involuntary and predetermined nature of the rest of creation; h u m a n autonomy was thus conceived to complete the whole of creation. 1 5 3 God knew that in creating man free he was himself absolved f r o m evil, 154 which is alien to him. 1 5 5 Evil is due either to h u m a n ignorance, to the domination of the emotions, understood as radical evil, to mortal nature itself, or to the logical necessity of the existence of an opposite to the good; logos is the cause of evil only in a symbolic sense. 156 T h r o u g h his providence and grace God is the cause only of good, and h u m a n freedom itself is one of the supreme manifestations of divine providence. 1 5 7

146

147

See DILLON, o p . cit. p p . 158 - 1 5 9 .

De fuga 6 6 - 7 1 , De conf. ling. 169. 1 7 1 - 1 7 5 , 182 etc. 148 De spec. leg. I 308, II 1 7 9 - 1 8 2 , De fuga 74, Leg. alleg. I 6 1 - 6 2 , De congr. erud. gratia 171. Cf. W O L F S O N , Philo on Free Will and Historical Influence of his View, HThR 35, (1942) pp. 1 3 1 - 1 6 9 : 1 5 3 - 1 5 5 . 149 De vita Mosis 110, Quod omnis probus liber 23, De op. mundi 80, 167. 150 De fuga 62, Quis rer. div. heres 240, De spec. leg. I 252. 151 De spec. leg. I 329, De mut. nom. 27 - 28, 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 . 152 On Logos in Philo and its several senses see my paper cited in n. 136, p. 327, n. 120. 153 De conf. ling. 179. 154 De op. mundi 75, 149. 155 De Abr. 268. 156 De op. mundi 152. " 7 Quod Deus immut. 47 - 48. Cf. De fuga 6 2 - 6 4 , 8 2 - 8 4 .

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Philo's *De providentia', partly preserved in Greek and known through a translation into Armenian (with a nineteenth-century Latin translation),158 is more germane to our subject than his exegetical work. Its authenticity has been convincingly defended, and it is no longer considered a work of Philo's youth. 159 The structure of the T)e providentia' is similar to Cicero's account of the Stoic creed in 'De natura deorum II', and the theodicy has striking similarities to Seneca's essay *De providentia', in some respects even supplementing it. 160 Philo sets out to defend divine providence and the existence of a providential God, both through logical reasoning and through evidence drawn from experience. His first argument is analogical, deducing divine providence from human prudence (11 — 4). He also uses induction (130 —32, 40, 4 9 - 5 1 , 53, 6 7 - 8 , 71, 90), reductio ad absurdum ( 3 1 - 3 2 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 5 1 52), theological (33, 42, 7 0 - 7 1 , 95) and cosmological (43, 72, 79) arguments. Providence is regarded as God's will, and in questions of punishment it functions as the instrument of corrective justice. The utility of things done according to design is also emphasised in book II (55 — 58, 62 — 68, 72 — 75, 9 8 - 1 0 6 . 1 0 etc.). Philo propounds his theodicy after demonstrating, through reason and experience, the existence of divine providential care. While the creation of the world was achieved by divine goodness, its contingent destruction depends on his justice, through which God puts an end to human vice (I 34 — 36). Physical evil can serve as a warning (138 — 45) and a pedagogical means towards virtue ( 4 6 - 4 8 ) , and so it is in accordance with providence. Even the world's conflagration is conceived as a sort of purification (I 55). Physical evil has no effect upon the virtuous and amounts to a form of therapy and an opportunity to exercise virtue and freedom (156 — 57). Providence is not unfair to good men, since it restrains them from committing injustices (158). As to the common fate shared by just and unjust men in natural disasters, Philo questions human judgement on problems of justice. He is convinced that the just man is not harmed by things conventionally considered evil, as long as he keeps himself free from emotions and vices, because happiness consists only in virtue and the just man gets what he deserves (59 — 69). The bad man is unjust in overlooking his own omissions and the wrong he does to others, and in considering only material goods as good (170 — 73). Thus, for Philo as for the Stoics, physical evil does not call into question the existence of divine providence, since the only true evil is moral evil, from which God and his providence are absolved. And with the rejection of the astrological fate in Philo's digression against astrology (177 — 88), moral evil 158

159

160

294»

See M. HADAS-LEBEL, Philon d'Alexandrie, De Providentia I et II, Paris 1973, pp. 17 117 for the whole problem regarding AUCHER'S translation into Latin in 1822. See P. WENDLAND, Philo's Schrift iiber die Vorsehung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nacharistotelischen Philosophie, Berlin 1892, pp. 38, 83. Cf. MAX POHLENZ, Philo von Alexandria, Nachr. Gesellsch. Wiss. Góttingen, Phil-hist. Klasse 1942, pp. 4 0 9 - 4 8 7 , 412-415. See the long note 157 in my above-cited paper (n. 136) for a detailed comparison.

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appears as man's reponsibility. Yet, in this digression Philo seems to face the problem of moral evil in terms of the relationship of God or man to fate, rather than that of man to God, and in relation to punishments and rewards imposed by divine justice. In the last resort, man alone is responsible for moral evil because the stars have been created by providence. This is also a Middle Platonic doctrine, upholding the superiority of providence to fate. At any rate, belief in fate cannot call into question the existence of providence, and disbelief in providence is a mortal sin (1 8 8 - 9 0 ) . God is by no means responsible for evil (92). Similar objections to providence are vehemently refuted by Philo in book II. Disorder, destruction, poverty and the welfare of tyrants are only apparent evils (II 3 — 22). In fact, although men are unable to correctly discern what is just and unjust (II 29 — 30), bad men are nonetheless punished for the wrong they do (II 28). God sends physical evil as a means to virtue (II 32). Some natural phenomena are not the main work of providence, but the incidental consequences of its main object, which is the preservation of the universe (II 79). Providence is like law in a city which, despite unlawful actions committed in contempt of the law (II 80 — 81), is nevertheless governed by law. 161 It is repeatedly said that God is the cause only of what is good and useful, and that their opposites derive either from matter or from the malignity of a disordered nature, i.e., from free will (II 82). This thoroughly Platonic thesis is also met with in Maximus of Tyre; 162 for the Stoics, on the contrary, matter is devoid of quality and thus is not the cause of evil (SVF II 1168). For Philo physical evil serves the interest of the whole (II 84 —100) and wild animals are useful for exercise (II103). Divine providence extends to irrational animals and plants, having endowed them with the instinct of self-preservation (106-108). The problem of the sources used by Philo in the composition of his 'De providentia' has been thoroughly investigated by HADAS-LEBEL and others. 163 It is probable that Cicero and Philo used the same Stoic and Academic handbooks with traditional material. Perhaps some common topoi may be traced back to Antiochus, who did not find any difference between the Platonic, Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines apart from terminology. There are references to key Platonic passages in favor with contemporary MiddlePlatonists, but most of these passages are not alien to the Stoic spirit either. 164 Philo's doctrine of providence is an idiosyncratic one, and is given somewhat different expression in his exegetical theological work than in his treatise 'De providentia'. From the methodological point of view the latter is close to Stoic doctrine, yet neither is it far from the spirit of Middle-Platonism.

161 162 163 164

Cf. SVF II 1125. Oratio 41 on which below, p. 4472. See my above cited paper pp. 344 — 347. See DRAGONA-MONACHOU, The Stoic Arguments pp. 2 1 - 2 3 for Plato's influence on Stoicism and note 182 of my above-cited paper for Platonic references.

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c) Plutarch and Pseudo-Plutarch on Providence and Fate Plutarch is a hardly original philosopher. He is an eclectic par excellence, and also an interesting intellectual and scholar. He is particularly valuable as a source, although a biased one, for Epicurus and the Early Stoics.165 He attacks the latter vehemently from the viewpoint of Athenian Middle-Platonism, faulting inconsistencies in their theodicy and their "fatalism" in particular.166 Among his numerous works of pertinence to divine providence are moral essays such as cDe sera numinis vindicta', cDe animae procreatione in Timaeo', 'Platonicae Quaestiones' and others as well as his anti-Stoic treatises.167 Also relevant would have been his lost works T)e fato' and a treatise on free-will written against the Stoics. Although the existing work 'De fato' is considered spurious on stylistic grounds, its content is consistent with its attribution to Plutarch. Plutarch has an exalted conception of God168 as an eternal being, uncontaminated by matter, directing and exercising providence over all things (De Is. 382B). God is the One and the Good (Def. Or. 423D; De E. 393BC). 169 God does not relate directly to the world, but through intermediaries and through logos, which is both transcendent and immanent (De Is. 373AB) and contains the ideas-thoughts of God. Plutarch's desire to show that God is altogether free from evil makes him a thoroughgoing dualist, attributing evil to the world-soul, understood as the maleficent soul theoretically postulated in Plato's Laws 896d (Proc. An. 1014B - 1016D).170 This is much stronger than attributing evil to matter, inasmuch as this irrational disorderly world-soul, mixed with matter, is continuously present in the world. Thus, the world-soul "is not entirely the work of God but it bears within it a share of evil and God can only organize it" (Proc. An. 1027 A). Plutarch participated in the debate on the relationship of providence, fate and free will.171 According to his reading of Plato's Rep. 614b —617d, he assumes Plato to have accepted three causes: fate, chance and free will (Quaest. Conv. 740C) while, on the basis of Laws 709b, he assumes that God, understood as either Fate or Providence, cooperates with chance and 165 p o r Plutarch's attitude to the Stoics as to « adversaires privilégiés » see the extensive monograph of DANIEL BABUT, Plutarque et le Stoïcisme, Paris 1969, a very useful book also for Plutarch's religious doctrines, pp. 276 —317, 367 — 440, and particularly with regard to our subject pp. 2 8 8 - 3 1 6 , 4 7 3 - 4 8 5 . Cf. also J. P. HERSHBELL, Plutarch and Stoicism, W. HAASE (Ed.), ANRW II 36.5, Berlin, New York 1992, pp. 3 3 3 6 - 3 3 5 2 . 166 167

See S VF II 937, 997, 1049, 1160, 1163, 1168, 1 1 7 5 - 1 1 7 8 , 1181. De communibus notitiis, De stoicorum repugnantiis. On their spirit and reliability see BABUT, o p . c i t . p p . 2 2 - 4 6 .

168

169

S e e COPLESTON, o p . c i t . p . 1 9 7 .

Cited by DILLON, op. cit. p. 199 ff. The same holds true for most references to Plutarch's w o r k . C f . BABUT, o p . c i t . p p . 2 8 6 -

170

o p . cit. pp. 171

287.

O n t h i s m a t t e r s e e DILLON, o p . c i t . p . 2 0 2 f f . , G R E E N E , o p . c i t . p . 3 6 9 f . , a n d COPLESTON, 196-197.

S e e DILLON, o p . c i t . p p . 2 0 8 - 2 1 1 . C f . BABUT, o p . c i t . p p . 3 1 1 - 3 1 4 .

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opportunity. Plutarch strongly distinguishes fate, or the order of Nature, and Providence (De Fac. 927Aff.), against the Stoic equation of Zeus and Providence with Fate and Necessity, since Providence is above N a t u r e and natural states. H e also attributes to Plato a doctrine of double causality: G o d and Necessity embrace the whole universe as its causes, while fate, chance, and free will operate in the sublunar world as "subdivisions of the material causes". For him Plato was the first to assign "the origin of all things that are in keeping with reason (kata logon)" to God, and to matter linked with logos the necessary causes of the perceptible universe. So, Necessity has the properties of matter and the universe is understood, apparently on the basis of Timaeus 48eff., as the product of logos and matter (Def. Or. 435 ff.). Plutarch accepted good daimones as instruments of Providence, 1 7 2 but did not address the role of individual freedom in a satisfactory way. 1 7 3 M o r e interesting to our inquiry is Pseudo-Plutarch's 'De fato', a product of Athenian scholarship of the early second century. 1 7 4 An amalgam of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines, its sources are still a matter of debate. 1 7 5 A brief account of this work is perhaps useful since it is the standard source for many ideas met with in Apuleius, Calcidius and others, and is very influential on later discussions. T h e author distinguishes fate as activity f r o m fate as substance, on the basis of his reading of Plato's Phaedrus 248c, Republic 617d and Timaeus 41e. His definitions of fate as "divine logos untransgressible because of inescapable causality", as "law in accord with the nature of the universe according to which what comes to be takes place," and as "divine law according to which future events are linked to past and present events" are not different f r o m the Stoic ones (SVF II 917 ff., 1000) nor f r o m those of Apuleius, Calcidius and Nemesius. Fate as substance is "the entire soul of the world divided into three portions: the portions of the fixed and of the wandering stars and the portion below the heavens around the earth" (568E). Fate as activity is conditional and has the hypothetical character of law, prescribing what will happen both in general and individual cases, and deter172

S e e COPLESTON, o p . c i t . p . 1 9 8 .

173

S e e DILLON, o p . c i t . p . 2 1 1 .

174

See DILLON, op. cit. p. 320 ff. DILLON'S account of the treatise is more detailed and somewhat different from my own; I restrict myself to Providence and Fate. See GREENE, op. cit. p. 370 ff. for a summary account, and appendix 66 for the sources of the work.

175

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mining the consequences of certain things done by human agency. Fate as activity is very important for physical, moral and dialectical matters and, though finite, it encircles everything. H u m a n action itself is not fated but its consequences follow the law of fate (568E —570B). In reference to providence the author, after discussing the "quality" and "quantity" of fate, proceeds to its relations to providence, chance, contingency and what is in man's power. He begins with things which are included in fate and examines the truth of the doctrine that "everything happens according to fate." This is both true and false. It is true, in so far as it means that "all are included in fate", even the things that concern human beings. It is false if it means that "all things occur according to fate," since only "what follows it" is according to it. Fate like law includes all actions but not all actions occur in accordance with it, since not all actions are lawful. More explicitly, events following what precedes them in the divine order are fated and in accordance with fate. Therefore, fate includes whatever happens, but of many of those events included in it and preceding it, it is not right to say that "they are according to fate" (570B —E). There is, then, room for other kinds of causality, since the possible, the contingent, chance, spontaneous choice (prohairesis) and what is in man's power are included in fate, but none of them is according to fate (570E-572F). Although providence in general includes fate (572F), a doctrine of three providences corresponds to Pseudo-Plutarch's vision of fate as a tripartite substance. He says: "The highest and primary providence is intellection or will, beneficent to all things, of the primary God; and in conformity with it all things divine are primordially arranged throughout, each as is best and most excellent. Secondary providence belongs to secondary gods, who move in heaven, and in conformity with it all mortal things come into being in orderly fashion, together with all that is requisite to the survival and preservation of the several genera. The providence and forethought which belongs to the daimones stationed in the terrestrial regions as watchers and overseers of the actions of man would reasonably be called tertiary. As providence, then, is seen to be threefold, and as primary providence is providence in the strictest sense and to the highest degree, I should not hesitate to say, even at the cost of appearing to contradict certain philosophers, that while all that conforms to fate conforms to providence (though not to nature as well) yet some things conform to providence (some to one, some to another), some to fate. And whereas fate most certainly conforms to providence, providence most certainly does not conform to fate (here it is to be understood that we are speaking of the primary and highest providence): for what is said to conform to a thing is posterior to that ... thus what conforms to fate is younger than fate, while the highest providence is eldest of all, save the one whose will or intellection or both it is" (572F-573B). This primary providence is said to be the providence of the father and Demiurge of all things as described by Plato (Timaeus 2 9 d - 3 0 a ) , and it

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includes human souls to whom the Demiurge showed the nature of the universe and proclaimed "the laws of fate" (Timaeus 41d — e). Secondary providence belongs to the "young gods," in accordance with Timaeus 4 2 d - e , while tertiary providence is said to belong to the daimones. The author makes these complicated assumptions, based on Timaeus 42d, in order that "God might not be chargeable for the future wickedness of which men would be severally guilty". In order to show that this approach is consistent with Plato he refers in this context to Phaedrus 247a and Laws 875c - d. And he attributes to Plato the view that "as providence is threefold, the first, since it has begotten fate, includes it in a sense; the second, having been begotten together with fate, is most certainly included with it; and the third, since it is begotten later than fate, is contained in it in the same way as what is in our power and chance were said to be contained in fate" (574B). This doctrine, for all its shortcomings, had a significant influence on later discussions. d) Albinus and Divine Providence Albinus is of little pertinence to our subject because his few references to divine goodness and providence (Didaskalikos X 3, 6; XII l ) 1 7 6 occur in the context of his summary account of Plato's 'Timaeus'. However, his theodicy is peculiar. He is credited with a somewhat idiosyncratic reading of Plato and is a typical representative or Middle Platonic Eclecticism, having incorporated many Aristotelian elements into his theology in a manner that foreshadows Plotinus. 177 For these reasons it seems worthwhile to give a brief account of his theology rather than of his view of providence. Albinus, a pupil of Gaius and a teacher of Galen, flourished in the middle of the second century A. D. Two works of his have been preserved: a short 'Introductio in Platonem' ('Eisagoge') and the 'Epitome doctrinae Platonicae' ('Didaskalikos'). The latter was ascribed (in the manuscripts) to Alcinoos until FREUDENTHAL in the last century showed that the attribution was the result of a corruption. 178 This view was questioned recently by M . GIUSTA1783 and, according to JOHN WITTAKER, 1 7 8 1 > "there is no evidence, whether paleographical, doctrinal or stylistic, that the author of the 'Didaskalikos' was not Alcinous but instead Albinus." So, the identity of the author remains uncertain

Edited by P. Louis, Albinus, Epitome, Paris 1945. See R. E. DE WITT, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, Cambridge 1971 2 , pp. 9 6 - 1 0 3 , 115 ff., 133, 142. 178 On the writer see DE WITT, op. cit. pp. 1 0 4 - 1 1 4 . Cf. DILLON, op. cit. pp. 2 6 7 - 271. 1783 'A^pivou 'ETCUOUTI O 'A/.KIVOOU AiSaoKaXiKoi;, Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filosofiche 95 (1960), p. 107ff. i78b Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire, W. HAASE (Ed.), A N R W II 36.1, Berlin, New York 1987, pp. 82 ff., 99, 102. 176

177

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and R . W . SHARPLES, skeptical of FREUDENTHAL'S emendation, thinks it sound practice to follow the manuscript. 178c The work is heavily influenced by the doxographer Arius Didymus's account of Platonic doctrines, and has some affinities with the 'Anonymous Theaetetus Commentary' and Apuleius's 'De Platone et eius dogmate', discussed below (p. 4467). As said above, Albinus has no particular doctrine of providence, nor does he participate in the debate on the relationship of providence to fate nor, as might have been expected from a Middle-Platonist, does he argue for the priority of providence to fate. He speaks of God in the context of Physics or Theoretic and in his account of the first principles. In chapter VIII of the 'Didaskalikos' he describes matter as the first principle (on the basis of Timaeus 49a ff.) and, in chapter IX, he discusses the ideas-thoughts of God as the second "paradigmatic" principle. He maintains that the world is not the product of chance, but that it has been modelled according to the ideas by God or Mind. In chapter X Albinus deals at length with God as the third principle. He argues for the existence of God inductively through the via eminentiae, in Stoic terms but in a neoplatonic manner (l). 179 In accord with Aristotle and anticipating Plotinus, he distinguishes the primal God from Mind and Soul, all placed in an hierarchical order. The primal God is the cause of the eternal activity of Mind in the heavens (2). He is the noblest of all things, eternal, absolutely perfect and good. He is a "Father by reason of the fact that he is the cause of all things and orders the heavenly Mind and the Soul of the world in accordance with himself and his thoughts; for, by his own will he has filled all things with himself, rousing up the Soul of the World and turning it towards himself, as being the cause of its Mind. And this latter, being set in order by the Father, itself sets in order the Whole of Nature within this world" (3).180 This does not mean that God is immanent in the world but that the world participates in God. 181 God is good not accidentally but by participation in goodness par excellence. He is in no way evil and has no accidental qualities (4). He is conceived of by abstraction, by analogy or via eminentiae (5 — 6). He can be proved to be partless, changeless and bodiless ( 7 - 8 ) . All this is a mixture of various Platonic and Aristotelian elements, and its unstoic character is obvious. Having proved the incorporeality of qualities, Albinus passes from the "theological" account of first principles (XI) to the "physical topos," following 178c

The criterion of Truth in Philo Judaeus, Alcinous, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, in: and G O R D O N N E A L (Eds.), The Criterion of Truth, London 1 9 9 0 , p. 2 5 5 , n. 2 9 . For a detailed account of his theology in comparison to that of Aristotle and Plotinus PAMELA H U B Y

179

s e e D E WITT, o p . c i t . p . 1 2 6 f f . 180

The translation of this passage is by DILLON, op. cit. pp. 283 - 284.

181

See DE WITT, o p . cit. p. 130 ff. o n the will of G o d .

4466

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DRAGONA-MONACHOU

closely Plato's Timaeus 30c ff.: since the world is the most beautiful artifact, it must necessarily have been made by God, the supreme artificer, in accordance with his providence and the goodness of his nature ( X I I 1 ) . Not in full consistency with his earlier statements, Albinus presents Plato's God as the Demiurge, taking possession of matter, which was formerly moving in disorder, and turning it into the most excellent order and thereby fashioning the body of the world (XII 2 —XIV 2). This does not mean that the world was created in time but that "it is constantly in a state of coming-to-be, and reveals a cause of its existence more sovereign than itself." In reference to the World-Soul he says: "The Soul of the World, which exists eternally, God does not create, but merely brings into order; he could be said to create it only in the sense, that he rouses and turns towards himself its Mind and itself from, as it were, a sort of trancelike sleep, that it may look upon the objects of his intellection and so receive to itself the Forms and shapes, in its striving towards his thoughts" (XIV 3). 1 8 2 This interpretation of the 'Timaeus' is somewhat idiosyncratic, but Albinus then elaborates in a manner more compatible with the Platonic text. He says that the world, as the best created thing, is animate and intelligent (4). God created the sun, the moon, the stars and the other daimones as engendered gods governing the sublunary world (XIV 5 — 7 — X V 1). These obey his orders and act in conformity with his example (2). To these gods, his sons, God the Demiurge entrusted the creation of mortal animals because, if he had created them himself, they would have been immortal. Caring particularly for the human race, God himself sowed the souls of men on earth, joined them with their corresponding stars as in a vehicle, and then showed them the laws of fate in order that God himself might not be the cause of future vice (XVI). Albinus considers it a sign of divine providence that the sons of god, entrusted with the creation of man, constructed every physical organ to serve a purpose, and moreover that the higher part of the human soul was created by the primal God himself (XVII —XXV), but he does not put forward a systematic Platonic or personal doctrine of providence, since, as a Middle-Platonist, he took the Platonic view of providence for granted. He comments, however, on the presumed platonic doctrine of fate. Without connecting providence with fate, as did most Platonic commentators and compilers, he briefly presents what he takes to be Plato's doctrine of fate as if formulated 183 by Plato himself: "All things are within the sphere of fate, but not all things are fated. Because fate has the status of a law, it does not say, as it were, 'because 182 183

Translation by DILLON, op. cit. p. 287. No text supports this view but the doctrine is deduced from several passages, particularly Rep. 617d, Laws 837c, 904c, etc.

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so-and-so has done this, he will suffer this', for that would result in an infinity of possibilities, since the actions that take place are infinite, and the results of them are also infinite. And what is within our power will disappear, and therefore praise and blame and everything like this. But, because, if a soul chooses such and such in life, it will then also perform such and such actions, and such and such results will follow from it. The soul is thus autonomous, and it is in its power to act or not, and this is not forced upon it, but what follows upon its action will be brought about in accordance with fate (XXVI 1 - 2 ) . " 1 8 4 This rather awkward version of the supposed Platonic doctrine lacks some elements common to other Middle Platonists, although the main points, such as the law-like hypothetical status of fate and the defense of free-will, are retained.185 In general, Albinus's reading is more faithful to the Platonic spirit than those readings intended to refute the alleged fatalism of the Stoics or to connect the problem of evil with fate. Albinus shares the Platonic view that God is not responsible for evil, but he does not explicitly attribute to Plato the view that evil is inherent in matter or, as for Plutarch, in the "WorldSoul,186 and he assumes that moral evil, although involuntary and the product of ignorance, is due to man himself and is subject to punishment (XXXI). e) Apuleius on the relationship of Providence and Fate Apuleius, Gaius's other pupil, seems worth mentioning briefly in this account because, in contrast to his schoolmate Albinus, whom he follows to a great extent, he explicitly attributes to Plato the Middle Platonic hierarchy of providence and fate. And, though closer to Stoicism, he shares with other Middle-Platonists the doctrine of the triadic division of providence. This occurs in his De Platone et eius dogmate', a work the authenticity of which has been disputed on stylistic grounds; it may be an early work.187 Apuleius, like Albinus, ascribes to Plato the doctrine of three first principles: God, matter and ideas. God is described as the father and creator of all things good and the source of blessedness, and the World Soul is considered to be the source of all other souls, a role analogous to that of the Demiurge in the 'Timaeus'. He refers to the World-Soul as Mind in order to emphasise its rationality, and he fills the universe with innumerable daimones of all sorts who have a mixed nature, divine and human. The tripartite division of the deity and the subsequent triadic doctrine of providence are characteristic of Apuleius's tendency to divide and classify all forms of Being. He reads into Plato three sorts of gods: first, the one, primal 184 185

Translation by DILLON slightly modified, op. cit. p. 295. For a comparison with other works see DILLON, op. cit. pp. 295 — 298.

186

See GREENE, o p . cit. p. 3 7 2 , D E WITT, o p . cit. p. 1 2 0 .

187

See DILLON, op. cit. pp. 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 . Here in matters peripheral to my main subject I f o l l o w DILLON, o p . c i t . 3 0 6 - 3 3 8 . I u s e t h e t e x t o f BEAUJEU, P a r i s 1 9 7 3 .

4468

MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU

and the sole supreme God, transcendent and incorporeal, who is the father and architect of this divine universe; second, the heavenly gods, divinities of the stars and other powers, and, third, those called by the Romans intermediary, their condition and rank placing them below the supreme gods as their inferiors but above men as their superiors (XI). For Plato, as read by Apuleius, "all things happen according to nature and, for this reason, are rightly governed by the vigilant care of providence and no cause of evil could be ascribed to G o d . " Hence Plato is presented as having held that "not all things should be referred to the lot of fate." Apuleius attributes the following definitions of providence and fate to him: "Providence is the divine decree preserving the prosperity of this for the sake of which it assumed such an office;" "fate is the divine law through which the ineluctable conceptions and projects of God are accomplished." Hence, "if something happens by providence, this also happens by fate, and what is achieved by fate should have been considered as undertaken by providence" (XII). This is an almost thoroughly Stoic position and constitutes a version of the orthodox Stoic view attributed by Calcidius to Chrysippus, in contrast to the presumed Platonic doctrine (SVF II 933). But this should not be taken to refer to all sorts of providence, as can be seen from what follows: " T h e primary providence is that of the supreme and most eminent of all gods who has not only organised the heavenly gods, whom he has distributed throughout all the parts of the world for its protection and adornment, but has also created for the whole duration of time beings mortal by nature, superior in wisdom to the rest of terrestrial animals, for whom he has established laws, and then handed over to others the duty of organising and watching over their everyday existence. These gods, then, having received charge of a secondary Providence, observe their duty so competently that everything, including those things which are visible to mortals in the heavens, preserves unaltered the order of their Father's dispensation. The daimones also, whom we may term genii and lares, he considers to be ministers of the gods and guardians and interpreters for men, if ever they want anything from the g o d s " (XII). 1 8 8 Apuleius does not discuss the relation of each sort of providence to fate as does Pseudo-Plutarch. And the above relation of providence and fate in 188

Translation of this passage by DILLON, op. cit. p. 325.

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general, in thoroughly Stoic (though not therefore unplatonic) terms is hardly representative of the Middle-Platonists's Plato, as we know also from Calcidius. Yet, Apuleius summarises the things that do not fall under the authority of fate, such as what is in man's power and chance, and concludes that divine providence has favored no terrestial being more than man (XII). Apuleius's account of providence can be seen as representing a transitory stage in the course of the debate on the relationship of providence to fate that culminates with Calcidius. f) Calcidius on Providence and Fate It seemed better to survey briefly Calcidius's views here than after Plotinus because Calcidius is closer to the Pre-neoplatonic than to the Neoplatonic spirit. Calcidius wrote a little after 400 A. D. 189 He translated Plato's 'Timaeus' and wrote a commentary on lines 31c to 53c. Until the twelfth century the 'Timaeus' was known in the West only from this translation. The question of Calcidius's sources has been much discussed;190 Numenius, Adrastus, Albinus, Porphyry, or simply a Platonist of the 2nd century A. D., greatly influenced by Stoicism, have alternately been regarded by scholars as the most probable ones. Apart from other digressions made in this commentary such as "on matter," "on the ruling part of the soul," and so forth, a long excursus on fate begins when Calcidius comes to Timaeus 41e2 —3. As DEN BOEFT remarks,191 the mere sentence on fate contained in this passage was sufficient for Calcidius to undertake a profound examination of the doctrine of fate, although Plato himself did not give an explicit account of this doctrine. Neither did Aristotle, but Alexander of Aphrodisias also ascribed such a doctrine to him, formulated in Stoic terms. The Platonic doctrine of Necessity offers more clues to a Platonic theory of causation. Although Plato does indeed touch on fate with reference to the origin of evil, Calcidius deals with it in reference to matter. Granted the devaluation of nature in Plato's metaphysics, the question of fate which was pertinent to corporeal reality and worldly things was not so important as to justify the long discussion Calcidius devotes to it. Calcidius's reasons for such a lengthy excursus on Timaeus 41e2 —3 (which he translates as legesque immutabilis decreti docuit) are stated as follows: hie jam magnam et difficilem rationem commovet [sc. Plato] de multa disceptatio habita inter veteres perseverat etiamnunc.

189

S e e WASZINK, o p . c i t . I n t r o d u c t i o n p . X V . B u t c f . J . C . M .

VAN W I N D E N , C a l c i d i u s

qua

on

Matter. His Doctrine and Sources. A Chapter in the History of Platonism, Philosophia antiqua 9, Leiden 1965 2 , p. 2. 190

See WASZINK, o p . cit. p p . X X X V - C V I ,

e s p . L X I I f f . , a n d X C f . C f . DEN B O E F T , o p . c i t .

p p . 1 2 7 - 1 3 7 a n d VAN W I N D E N , o p . c i t . p p . 5 - 1 0 , 2 4 8 191

Op. cit. pp. 3, 8.

259.

4470

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DRAGONA-MONACHOU

He thinks it therefore his duty to present the "Platonic" doctrine — "though not that of others" — as it would take him long to follow the others, some of whom believe that nothing happens according to fate, others that everything does, leaving nothing to human will and power, and others both that some things are fated and some attributable to the freedom of the human will. The problem appears to concern the relationship between fate and free will, but it turns out that the relationship of fate to providence, and of providence to evil, are also at issue. A complete treatise on fate is thus interposed in chapters 143 - 1 9 0 . This treatise, for all Calcidius's promises to write an exposition of the Platonic doctrine of Fate alone, is actually an account thoroughly consistent with Middle-Platonism and not unlike those of other Pre-Neo- and Neo-Platonists, yet with many modifications 192 and additional elements as well as many references to the Stoics in both the destructive and the constructive part of it. It has been divided as follows: chapter 142: Preface; chapters 143 —159: the basis of the Platonic doctrine of fate; 160 —175: refutation of Stoic arguments against the Platonic doctrine of fate; 175 - 1 9 0 : renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate. It may be useful to briefly discuss the problem of the direct and indirect sources of this particular section of Calcidius's commentary, since it has been much debated. 193 WASZINK, regarding Numenius as the intellectual author of the whole commentary, believed that he had found additional elements for his argument in this tractatus on fate. He also suggested that Alexander of Aphrodisias, known to Calcidius through Porphyry, was a very probable source. THEILER opted for the school of Gaius, and G E R C K E for a Platonist of the second century A. D., who was the source for Pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius as well. Posidonius, the Aristotelian Adrastus, and even Plotinus were also at times regarded as probable sources. D E N BOEFT has tried to show 1 9 4 that Porphyry is likely to have been Calcidius's direct source, and this seems very probable to VAN WINDEN195 as well, inasmuch as Porphyry was suspected of transcribing Numenius. WASZINK himself (in a paper published after his edition of Calcidius) seems to accept THEILER'S view of an author belonging to the school of Gaius, whom Calcidius might have known through Porphyry, together with Numenius and Alexander of Aphrodisias. It may thus be said that it is possible that Calcidius's tractatus on fate might have adapted a treatise of Porphyry on fate, which in all probability belonged to his hypomnemata on Plato's 'Timaeus'. Even if the material is rather preNeoplatonic, Porphyry's ultimate authorship explains both some Neo-Platonic (Ammonian) elements, such as the hierarchy of the hypostases in chapters 176 — 178, and some Aristotelian ones. D I L L O N disagrees with the above since 192 193

194 195

See WASZINK, op. cit. p. XXIV. See MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU, paper referred to in note 54, pp. 2 9 1 - 2 9 2 for a thorough discussion of the problem of sources and bibliographical particulars. Op. cit. pp. 1 2 7 - 1 3 7 . Op. cit. pp. 247 - 259.

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he does not find any traces of Neoplatonic and particularly not of any Porphyrian doctrine in Calcidius. DILLON places him in the Middle Platonic spectrum, and considers Cronius a possible source.196 For all the Stoic influence upon Calcidius or his source, even in the exposition of the "Platonic" doctrine of fate, no particular Stoic source has been detected; the indubitable influence of the Neopythagorean Numenius accounts for the antistoic position of the treatise. Having discussed this issue elsewhere, I shall restrict myself here to what concerns the Platonic doctrine of providence. Calcidius translates Timaeus 41e2 - 3 in Stoic terms as universam fatorum serietn revelasse, and understands it as implying that according to Plato providence precedes and destiny follows, which is to say that, according to Plato, providence was born first. Hence, he assumes: fatum quidem dicimus ex providentia fato (ch. 143).

fore, non tamen providentiam

ex

I shall not argue here that the implications of the Platonic text, as drawn by Calcidius, are not justified by the text itself, inasmuch as Calcidius wrongly understands here the arrangement of the universe as the work of the hypostasized Providence.197 What concerns us is the view he ascribes to Plato, repeated in chapter 147: sic fatum quidem ex providentia

est nec tamen ex fato

providentia.

This is the exact opposite of the view which he then ascribes to the Stoics and particularly to Cleanthes, which has been discussed above (pp. 4424, 4432 — 4). Calcidius also distinguishes the Platonic fate, understood as substance, from fate as activity. The latter is the unchangeable law and inevitable decree which accompanies the nature of the world and by which all things in the world are ruled, and the former the tri-partite world soul. He says in the sequel: "But Plato adheres to the principle that neither are all things according to providence nor (according to fate) for the nature of regulated things is not uniform; thus some things result from providence alone, some from destiny, some from our free will ... divine and intelligible things and those near to them are ruled by providence alone, the natural and corporeal things are according to fate..." 1 9 8 Calcidius follows closely Pseudo-Plutarch, and for this reason I shall not discuss the whole chapter in detail. What is of pertinence to our subject in the rest of the work is his hierarchical conception of the three principles, the Good, Mind and a second Mind identical to the World Soul (ch. 176). Calcidius' chapters 142 —190 are summarised by Nemesius (De Natura hominis ch. 38), whom I shall not discuss. 196

Op. cit. pp. 403 - 404.

197

S e e DEN BOEFT, o p . c i t . p p . 8 , 1 9 .

198

C h . 1 4 7 , t r a n s l a t i o n b y DEN BOEFT.

4472

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g) Maximus of Tyre's view of Providence and the problem of evil Maximus of Tyre, a Platonist of the late second century, deserves mention for his interesting responses, in the spirit of Middle Platonism, to questions relating to the doctrine of providence. 199 Maximus emphasises divine transcendence, admits inferior gods and daimones, and attributes evil to matter and free will. Among his Orationes, 11 addresses Plato's conception of God, 5 whether one should pray, 13 whether there is free will, if divination exists; of particular interest is Oratio 41, which asks, if God is responsible for good, whence comes evil? For Maximus, God is the father and logos the organiser of the universe. In Oratio 41, on the question who is the father and provider of the universe, he considers it evident that everything good comes from God and his will, which is to say, from providence (b) but nothing evil, since "envy stands out of the divine dance". Evil comes from man himself, who is weak and whose soul is full of evil diseases (c). So, the further question arises: what is the cause of human sins? The heavens are free from sin but the earth is composed of good and evil. While good comes from above, evil derives from earthly malice, due either to the passion of matter or to the freedom of the soul. Matter is subject to the good Demiurge and part of it has been set in order most artistically and justly according to the will of the divine artisan and lawgiver, who is much superior to human artists. Yet, the passions of matter follow upon the primary workings of art, which are accomplished with a view towards an end. These passions should by no means be ascribed to the art or the artist themselves, since they are "necessary and consequent natures" of the good that was intended by the artist, who is free from blame and aims at the salvation of the whole. What men consider physical evil, the artist calls the salvation of the whole for which he particularly cares. It is necessary for the whole's salvation that the part be subject to evil. In regard to the past the passions of matter are destruction, in regard to the future they are salvation (d). The human soul, on the other hand, is free and malice is inherent to it. Evil was expelled from the heavenly region and fell upon earth because man is better than the other animals but is inferior to God, and the soul cannot always dominate its passions (e). This theodicy is a mixture of Platonic and Stoic elements. The anti-Stoic position of the author addresses the presumed fatalism of the Stoics and is evident in Oratio 5 ("Whether one should Pray?") in which we find the usual Middle-Platonic scheme: "From the things for which we pray, some are directed by providence, some are compelled by fate, some change by chance and some are administered by art. Providence is the work of God, fate of necessity, art of man, and chance is spontaneous. If there were providence for the 1,9

Apart from the text (H. HOBEIN, Maximus Tyrius, Philosophoumena, Leipzig 1910) there is little information about Maximus. GUY SOURY'S, Aperçu de la philosophie religieuse chez Maxime de Tyre, Paris 1942, was not available to me.

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whole and the parts, one would pray for nothing and it is ridiculous to pray to fate, for it is tyrannical, has no master and does not change its course." Fate appears here stronger than even Zeus. h) Divine Providence in the Pre-Neoplatonists Atticus, Galen, Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius The "philosophers" discussed briefly in the last chapter on the PreNeoplatonic doctrine of Providence are not of great importance to my research, but either have something interesting or personal to say about God and providence, or take some part in the debate on providence and fate. For this reason they will be dealt with together in summary form without additional comments. 200 a) Atticus Atticus, who belongs to the Athenian school of the second century A. D., is of some pertinence. He wrote a commentary on Plato's 'Timaeus'. Some of its preserved fragments include arguments against Aristotle for having banished God from active intervention in the world (Fr. 3). He also remarks: "Plato says that the Soul organises the universe, penetrating throughout all of it ... and that Nature is nothing else but Soul ... and he concludes from this that everything happens according to Providence, as it happens according to Nature. With none of this Aristotle is in agreement" (Fr. 8).201 This view is quite Stoic and very different from Pseudo-Plutarch, who distinguishes Providence from Nature. Atticus closely relates the creation of the world to providence. He says: "First of all, in considering the question of the creation of the world, and thinking it necessary to pursue this mighty and widely useful doctrine of Providence in all its ramifications, and reckoning that that which never came into being has no need of any creator or any guardian to ensure its proper existence, in order that he might not deprive the world of providence, he removed from it the epithet 'uncreated'" (fr. 4). In this, and in the belief in a state of disorder, before the creation, moved by a pre-existing maleficent World-Soul, Atticus follows Plutarch. After the creation, the maleficent Soul becomes inferior Soul and the rational World Soul takes the active role of the Demiurge, while the Demiurge becomes supreme God, identical to the Good and Mind, father, creator and guardian of all things (Fr. 9). 200

201

In this chapter, except with reference to Galen, I follow DILLON, op. cit. pp. 247 - 258, 352-379. Translated by DILLON, op. cit. p. 252.

295 ANRW II 36.7

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p) Galen The physician Galen, a disciple of Albinus, wrote a commentary on Plato's Timaeus', from which only some fragments on psychology are preserved.202 Yet, he is of some pertinence because of his strong belief in teleology, his Stoic concept of artistic Nature and his emphasis on Nature's providential character. Though a Platonist in his psychology, siding with Posidonius against Chrysippus's monism (SVF II 841; 881 — 909), he is almost an orthodox Stoic in his conception of nature, and a valuable indirect source for Early Stoicism (SVF II 1133-1139; 1151, 1164). Galen seems to share the Stoic definition of Nature as "artistic fire proceeding methodically to the work of generation" or as "fiery pneuma creating according to seminal powers" (Definitiones medicae 95, if the attribution is correct); and in his work 'De usu partium' emphasises Nature's providence for living organisms, against Epicurean mechanism and accidentalism (De usu partium 1. XVII cp. 1 [vol. IV p. 350 K]).203 Nature in its providential care has contrived that weak animals reproduce in numbers sufficient to ensure the species's survival. Like a good founder of a city, Nature has provided every help for the preservation of its parts. His Platonism is evident in the same passage, in that he considers matter an impediment to Nature's goal of securing immortality for its creatures (ibid. 1. XIV cp. 1 [vol. IV p. 142 K]). In contrast to man, Nature never works recklessly, but with exact measure achieves optimum usefulness. Nature would have made everything without evil if it could evade the malignity of matter. Since men and the stars have not been made out of the same substance, however, it cannot do this; Nature thus aims at the best possible order. Nature tries to prepare correctives for every shortcoming (ibid. vol. IV p. 355 K). Galen seems to follow the school of philosophy and medicine that considers Nature much prior to and older than bodies, forming them artistically and providing for its creatures (De naturalibus facultatibus I 12 [vol. II p. 27 K]). This philosophy of Nature, for all its Platonic features, is also Stoic, and testifies to Galen's philosophical eclecticism. y) Nicomachus of Gerasa The Neopythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa is worth mentioning for his somewhat personal view of fate and providence in relation to the problem of evil. In his 'Theologoumena arithmeticae' he interprets the traditional threefold conception of fate somewhat peculiarly. He says: "And the Fates are stated in theology to be three, because the whole activity of the divine and human realms is governed by a process of 202

S e e DILLON, o p . cit. p p . 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 .

203

For Galen I use the edition of C. G. KUEHN, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, Leipzig 1821-33.

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emission (poiesis), reception (hypodoche) and recompense (antapodosis); the aetherial entities, so to speak, doing the sowing, the earthly ones, as it were, receiving the seed, and recompense being accomplished through the medium of those in the middle, assuming the role of an offspring between male and female" (p. 19, 5). 204 This triad stands, according to DILLON,205 either for the class of daimones or for the World-Soul situated in the moon, between the sun and earth. It also may be seen as the logos of the world or as the World-Soul. Regarding providence he says: "The Providence of the God who made the world (kosmopoios) constructed all things by taking the starting point and root of its creation from the first-born (protogonos) One, which goes forth as an impression and likeness of the highest Good" (p. 57, 20). Thus providence here assumes the role of the Demiurge. Nicomachus is perhaps one of the few figures in ancient literature to explicitly attribute evil to providence. He says: "When men suffer injustice, they are willing that the gods should exist, but when they do injustice, they are not willing; and that is the reason they suffer injustice, that they may be willing to believe in the gods. For, if they did not believe in the gods, they would not behave themselves. If then the cause of men's good behaviour is their belief in the gods, and, if they only believe in them when they are suffering injustice, and, if injustice, though an evil, yet subserves the interest of Nature, and if what subserves the interests of Nature is the work of good beings, and Nature is good, and so is Providence, then evils befall men according to Providence" (p. 42, 3). This, though also Platonic, is perfectly in accordance with Stoicism but in a more extreme sense. 5) Numenius Numenius, who directly or indirectly must have exerted an influence on Calcidius, is an eclectic in the strict sense with many Platonic and Neopythagorean features. He accepts a triadic scheme of three gods, the Father, the Creator and the Creation, i.e. the world.206 The Demiurge "is double, being both the first God and the second, and the third God is the object of his demiurgic activity" (Fr. 21). 204

2M 206

295*

I use the edition of V. DE FALCO, Theologoumena Arithmeticae, Leipzig 1922. The translation of the fragments is by DILLON, op. cit. p. 356. Ibid. See DILLON, op. cit. p. 366 f. For translation of the fragments I use the edition of E. DES PLACES, Paris 1973.

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These are also named Grandfather, Son and Grandson. Numenius makes a distinction between the Supreme god and the Demiurge, or between the second and third, as we assume from frg. 11. Here the first God is presented as simple, indivisible and above activity while the second and the third, though one, are divided in their relation with matter. The first God as the Good is the first principle of Being, and the Demiurge is the god of generation, creating out of a lust for matter (Fr. 11). Numenius considers matter to be a positively evil force. Man's lower soul derives from the evil, material soul of the world. Disorder should preexist the order imposed by the Demiurge. This "implies a force outside the range of Providence," preexisting its activity, while "God is unable to overcome entirely this force permeating the world and can only keep it in check." N o entity in the realm of generation is entirely free from vice, since vice mingles everywhere with Providence "like the infection of an inferior nature." Not even in the heavens is evil lacking, since the planetary gods, despite their unmixed essence, "have their potencies and activities mingled with matter" (Fr. 50). The beneficent World-Soul has the same function as the third god but the evil World-Soul eventually submits to the providential administration of the Demiurge. Thus, Numenius's extreme dualism remains Platonic and does not become Gnostic.

3. Divine Providence in Neoplatonism a) Plotinus's doctrine of Providence It has been argued 207 that, notwithstanding many treatises on fate, no monograph on providence is to be found in Greek and Latin literature before Plotinus. This is not true, as we have seen; but this fact does not diminish Plotinus's importance in this regard. In his treatment of providence Plotinus touches upon problems not dealt with by previous thinkers. He assimilates and modifies much traditional material to fit his metaphysical assumptions, and is original in some important respects. He exerted considerable influence on subsequent discussions of the topic by Augustine, Proclus, and others. 208 Plotinus is critical of his predecessors, but for the most part he follows the Stoic and Platonic traditions as interpreted by the Middle Platonists. Though going much further, he includes in his account the relation of providence to fate and to free will and dwells on questions of divine justice. 207

208

By CHRISTIAN PARMA, Pronoia und Providentia. Der Vorsehungsbegriff Plotins und Augustins, Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 6, Leiden 1971, p. 14. Regarding the sources cf. P. BOOT, Plotinus, Over Voorzienigheid, Enneade III 2 - 3 , Amsterdam 1984, pp. 4 7 0 - 4 8 0 . See VENANZ SCHUBERT, Pronoia und L o g o s . Die Rechtfertigung der Weltordnung bei Plotin, Epimeleia. Beiträge zur Philosophie 11, München — Salzburg 1968, pp. 12 - 1 3 . Cf. M . SCHOLL, Providentia. Untersuchungen zur Vorsehungslehre bei Plotin und Augustin, Freiburg 1960.

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Because of the metaphysical presuppositions of his system and his depreciation of the sensible world, Plotinus has special difficulties in his theodicy and in his defence of divine providence as an expression of God's relationship to the world. Scholars attribute to him both a pessimistic and an optimistic attitude on these matters.209 The pessimistic attitude is particularly evident in the treatise concerned with "What are and whence come evils" (Ennead 1, 8), in which matter is taken as the source of physical and moral evil; the optimistic one can be gathered especially from his two treatises 'On Providence' (3, 2 3) through the peculiar function he ascribes to Logos, the activity of mind, as the link between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. Here I shall restrict myself to an analysis of these latter treatises without mentioning scattered passages in the 'Enneads' referring to this matter. Plotinus's opponents in these treatises are the traditional ones: the Epicureans, who thoroughly rejected divine providential care for the world and man, and the Peripatetics, who removed divine authority from the sublunary world. Yet, there are also some new ones, such as the Gnostics, who accepted an evil maker of the material universe. However, in his investigation of the origin of evil, Plotinus has come somewhat close to them by attributing radical evil to matter in thoroughly dualistic terms. Following the Middle-Platonic tradition, Plotinus's starting point is the problematic of Plato's 'Timaeus' and the treatment of the subject which had become traditional since Chrysippus. Plotinus, like Seneca, does not dwell much on the arguments for the existence of providence. He says very little on the mode of its operation and deals particularly with the problem of evil.210 On the basis of empirical and rational assumptions, Plotinus argues that this universe cannot be considered a product of chance and accident, but is the work of divine providence, although the way in which certain things come into being, and some not rightly, has led some people either to deny its existence or to attribute creation to an evil maker. Universal providence, unlike individual providence, does not amount to calculation and foresight that things that are to come into being be as good as possible, but that they come into being in accordance with Mind, since this universe is everlasting. Mind is prior to the world not in time but in nature as its cause, archetype and model (Ennead 3, 2, 1). This universe is the natural and necessary product of the eternal universe of Mind, though it does not share its absolute unity and justice, since there is conflict and enmity in it as in a necessary secondary nature. It is not the result of reasoning or the product of a learned craftsman but of Logos, which is a part and emanation of Mind, always flowing from it as from a formative principle given to matter, analogous to the seminal reasons of individual beings. This universe, emanating from Mind and Logos,

205

See EMILE BREHIER, T h e Hellenistic a n d R o m a n A g e , p p . 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 . C f . by t h e s a m e

author 'The Philosophy of Plotinus', transl. by JOSEPH THOMAS, Chicago 1958, pp. 164 181. 210

See ANDREAS GRAESER, Plotinus and the Stoics, Leiden 1972, p. 54 f., for useful comparison with Stoic doctrine.

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in the necessary disunity and diversity of its parts, has a peculiar harmony and order worked out by Logos. Though not Mind and Logos in itself, like the intelligible universe, it participates in both and has need of a concord of Mind and necessity, although Mind controls the necessity which drags it down. So, this universe had to be a mixture of Logos and matter with Soul as its principle presiding over it and directing it all by its mere presence (3, 2, 2).

Much has been written on Plotinus's view of Logos.211 Its Stoic origin is undisputed but the evidence does not prove that Plotinus uses the term in the Stoic sense, or that he was influenced by Philo. 212 Logos is the activity of mind; it is responsible for the production and rational order of the world and functions as a bridge between the higher and the lower world, or as the representative of a superior kind of reality at a lower level — as a link between the intelligible and the sensible. 213 It is a matter of debate whether Logos can be considered a fourth hypostasis with a complex structure or not, but most scholars agree that it cannot. 214 Nor is its function in the treatises ' O n Providence' different from its function in other treatises in which Logos is presented as an aspect of Soul, conveying form into the particulars it creates, giving them being and order. Here Logos is a product of Mind, an emanation of Mind and the higher Soul, concerned with the creation and administration of the world. However, though a mixture of Logos and matter presided over by Soul, existing of necessity as a likeness of a better nature and not as the result of reasoning and deliberation, this universe as a whole is beautiful and the best of all things that have a body. It is irreproachable, when viewed as a whole; its parts must be seen in relation to that whole. Such a perspective makes clear that the universe has been made by God, perfect, above living things, self-sufficient and complete in itself; in sea, air and aether it contains gods, daimones, good and happy souls. Everything in the universe seeks after the good, but each attains it in proportion to its own power. Since this universe includes various entities, some participate only in Being, others in life in various degrees, and others in reason and thus in life to the fullest extent. Hence one should not demand equality between unequal things; everything is given what properly belongs to it, and is good and participates in the good to the proper degree (3, 2, 3). Thus, divine providence assigns each thing its due, in proportion to its role and to its quest for the good. Regarding physical and moral evil Plotinus argues as follows: the destruction of some things by others and the mutual attacks of living beings are necessary for generation; new life emerges from what perishes as individual 211

S e e SCHUBERT, o p . c i t . p . 5 2 . C f . BREHIER, T h e P h i l o s o p h y o f P l o t i n u s p. 1 6 6 f f .

212

See J. M. RIST, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, Cambridge 19772, pp. 8 4 - 1 0 2 , R. E. DE WITT, The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic Basis, CQ 32 (1938) pp. 1 9 0 - 1 9 6 . See RIST, ibid. Cf. BOOT, op. cit., p. 474 who takes logos as an activity of nous. See BREHIER, Notices in Enneads III 2 - 3 . Cf. A. H. ARMSTRONG, Introductory Note to these 'Enneads' in Loeb.

213 214

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and souls change their bodies. Bodies live through their species, and individual bodies live insofar as they are wholes, generating and nourishing living things. Living beings came into existence because Logos took hold of the whole matter. Human wrongdoing stems from the failure to attain the good, and results in just punishment according to universal law. Order is imposed from outside, and it is because of order that there is disorder, and because of law that there is lawlessness, and not vice-versa. Living beings have of themselves a movement under their own control and incline either to the better or to the worse. In the latter case punishment justly follows. Only good men deserve happiness and are happy (3, 2, 4). Physical evil is not true evil for Plotinus, as it was not for the Stoics, either, and moral evil is due to human failure to attain the good. Characteristic of the above is Plotinus's emphasis on the just punishment for yielding to bodily lust. Plotinus discusses the question of suffering from the perspective of the whole and emphasises the role of Logos in turning evil into good. He argues that unhappiness is due to human incapacity to attain virtue and be godlike. Ordinary suffering, due to the bodily condition, is nothing to the good man and may be useful for the completion and coordination of the whole through the agency of Logos. Seen from the perspective of "another chain of causation and another ordering," some troubles are useful even for those who suffer them, and moral vice is useful to the whole as an example of just punishment, which inspires consciences to seek the good. Evil is generally regarded as failure to attain the good, existing necessarily in this world because of its distance from the Good — and Logos has the supreme power to turn it into good (3, 2, 5). Here Logos functions like the Zeus of Cleanthes's hymn, harmonising opposites for the benefit of the whole. Some Stoic influences, particularly reminiscent of Seneca, are also evident in answers addressed by Plotinus to objections brought forth against divine justice. Plotinus, facing the problem of injustices occurring in this world, where good men suffer and bad fare well undeservedly, brings forth the Stoic answer that nothing is bad for the good man or good for the bad man. He uses Stoic terminology when speaking of things that are according to nature or against it. Things opposed to nature do not detract from divine justice because they add nothing to true happiness. Yet he faces further objections to the very existence of providence. A superior providence, it is said, would have distributed everything properly and proportionally, according to merit. Hence, it is immoral and dangerous that wicked men master good men and treat them as slaves. The perspective of the whole does not justify neglect of the parts, particularly when living and rational beings are concerned, inasmuch as this universe depends on Mind and should dispose of everything excellently (3, 2, 6). To these objections, Plotinus gives some unstoic, semi-stoic or purely Platonic answers: first, this is a mixed world of a second order, and one should not demand of it the excellence of the unmixed. Something comes also from the body and Logos can bestow only what the mixture can receive. Nevertheless, according to Plotinus, this fact should not diminish our wonder

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at providence. Nor should providence be blamed for the actions of souls, unless one blames the providential power for men being bad at all. Composite living beings that have movement of their own have a life corresponding to their natures. T h e comparative distribution of evils to men of opposite characters does not prove that providence does not reach the earth or that it lacks full control over it, since other things happen in a rational pattern and it is impious to suppose that the lower parts are not excellently disposed given that the universe is a single living being (3, 2, 7). Points of difference with traditional theodicy are also apparent in what follows: things of this world are not arranged badly, even though the middle and lower parts are not equal to the higher. Imperfections in men should not cause much surprise, since man is not the best kind of creature in the universe but midway between gods and beasts, and the earth occupies a central point below heaven and the stars. Men merit suffering if they are not prepared to suffer wrongs. They should not seek help from the gods if they neither follow their commands nor try to help themselves by living in accordance with universal law. Rational and natural consequences follow what has gone before, worse for the worse and better for the better. Providence would have neglected its duty if the worse really were to prevail, yet, if the wicked rule it is because of the cowardice of the ruled, which is just (3, 2, 8). Plotinus says, characteristically,: "Providence ought not to exist in such a way as to make us nothing. If everything was providence and nothing but providence, then providence would not exist; for what would it have to provide for? There would be nothing but the divine. But the divine exists also as things are" (3, 2, 9:1-5). Providence has descended to the material world to help man to live and act according to its law, ordering the lot of good and bad according to their just deserts. Man should not require God to direct his affairs in detail. He is not the best creature, but is not allowed by providence to perish; instead he is being lifted by various divine devices to the higher regions and has his share in righteousness in dealing with his fellow men, doing wrong justly to those who deserve it. M a n thus becomes, as far as possible, a noble creation, and has a better lot than the other living beings with whom he is interwoven into the All; these creatures are ultimately provided for his use (3, 2, 9:5 — 40). This emphasis on the responsibility of man was also shared by the Stoics, particularly Epictetus. For Epictetus, however, man's excellence places him far above other animals and makes him equal to God, endowed by God with an absolutely free moral purpose (prohairesis). Plotinus is specifically concerned with human responsibility. He says: "If men are unwillingly wicked and are the sort of people they are not by their own free will, one could neither blame the wrongdoers nor those who suffer wrong because they suffer it by their agency. But if there is a necessity that they should become wicked in this way, brought about

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either by the heavenly circuit or by the first principle determining the consequences that necessarily follow it, then their being wicked in this way is natural. But then surely, if it is logos itself which makes them wicked, things are unjust in this way?" (3, 2, 1 0 : 1 - 8 ) . Plotinus rejects the abolition of human responsibility such a view implies. Necesssity is a universal law, not a power external to man, and the heavenly circuit leaves something in man's power. The power of free action originates in man, who is an autonomous principle included in the chain of universal causation, but moved to noble actions by his own nature (3, 2, 10). On this account providence is not to be blamed for human injustices. Individual things, with all of their imperfections, are what they are not because of natural necessities and causal sequences. Logos accomplishes everything according to reason, because it does not wish everything to be good. Logos does so not out of meanness but in its function as a craftsman "by a reason containing all the rich variety of the intelligible world." Inequalities and variation are everywhere, even in cities with good laws and institutions, and are indispensable for the completion and beauty of the world (3, 2, 11). If then "it is Logos itself ... unlike in its parts, deriving its being this from the principle before it" that, adapting itself to matter, created all this universe, this universe would have nothing else nobler than itself. Because, if Logos were composed of alike and equal parts, this universe either would not have come into existence or the manner of construction would have been imperfect. Logos gives each soul a place appropriate to its worth (3, 2, 12). Yet, men's worth and appropriate status are themselves determined by Logos on the basis of past, present and future incarnations with a view to their own good. This world order is inevitably just and wise. Consequently it is evident that universal providence extends continually to everything, even to the smallest things of the sensible world, with wonderful artistry. Everything is made beautifully, fairly, and appropriately by the divine powers, which work in accordance with their natures, which correspond to their substance and bring forth beauty and justice (3, 2, 13). All this is both Stoic and Platonic, as is evident from Plato's 'Laws' (903b — c). It also echoes Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic 'Republic's extreme demand for unity (Politics 1261al0-1261bl5) - the true state, in order to be a state, should be composed of unequal and dissimilar parts. This ordering, which corresponds to Mind, is not the product of reason, but is accomplished as if it were made by the best reasoning, not only in universal but even in individual matters. Logos is not to blame if existent things are not like eternal things, since each form is sufficient, and there must be lesser things contained in the greater, and parts may not equal the whole, in order to serve the beauty and value of the whole itself. Man as an individual cannot be perfect (3, 2, 14), although he can achieve the greatest worth suited to his nature and thus become godlike.

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Parts of this kind of argument (without its inegalitarian connotations and the exaltation of eternal things) are Chrysippean, while hints of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are evident in the following section: given the lesser importance of individual things in comparison to the whole, a state of war between men and animals seems necessary, since nothing can stay as it is for ever, and the death of every individual is in some way useful to the whole, even though all things have their origin and substance in Logos. Life is like a stage, and what appears to be evil is not really so; only the good part of man is to be taken seriously (3, 2, 15). "What follows is extremely important for the description of Logos both as a "cause" of apparent evils, and as the necessary principle of the unity of opposites. In reference to the complaints about injustice, well known from Plato's 'Laws', and, given that everything happens according to nature, Plotinus says: "Logos is not pure Mind or absolute Mind; it is not even of the kind of pure Soul but depends on Soul, and is sort of outshining them both. Mind and Soul (that is, Soul disposed according to Mind) generated this Logos as a life quietly containing rationality" (3, 2, 16:14—18). After having argued that life, including even insignificant lives, is an artistic activity, he adds: "The Logos of this universe, which comes from a single Mind and a single life, both of them complete, is not a single life nor any kind of a single Mind and is not at every point complete, nor does it at every point give itself whole and entire to things to which it does give itself. But, by setting the parts against each other and making them deficient, it generates and maintains war and battle and so it is one as a whole even if it is not one single thing. For, though it is at war with itself in its parts, it is one thing and on good terms with itself in the same way as the plot of a play ... or better a melody which results from conflicting sounds" (3, 2, 16:28-40). So, in the universe "all are parts of the single universal living being and the All agrees with itself ... and is in accordance with its Logos, being necessarily a Logos made out of opposites" owing its structure and existence to this kind of opposition (3, 2, 16:47 — 55). This universe, however, is even less of a unity and more of a manifold than its Logos, though it aspires to unification, even by passionately destroying beloved things. Men are good and wicked, assigned by Logos to the positions they choose and that are proper to them according to nature and reason. As in a work of poetry, so is it in the universe. Souls are responsible for their good or bad actions, and are rewarded or punished accordingly. In the universal drama, however, souls have been made masters of the All and have a greater contribution of their own to honours and dishonours. They are each

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given the place which has been designed to receive them, in accordance with justice, so as to be in tune with Logos, and that the fitness, beauty and perfection of the universe be fulfilled, as in a melody composed of unequal parts. Logos is one but is divided in unequal parts (better or worse souls) both beautifully disposed and according to nature from the view of the Whole which has need of all kinds of beings (3, 2, 17). Here Logos is interpreted as the distributor of lots analogous to chance; 215 but its function as divine justice assigning everyone his due and on the basis of each being's characteristics makes this interpretation improbable. Logos can here be seen to resemble the Stoic conception of divine fate, harmonising opposites with a view to the perfection of the whole. The first treatise on Providence ends with a further elucidation of the role of Logos and of individual souls in the Plotinian theodicy: souls are better or worse either because of their initial inequality "as unequal parts" analogous to the constituent parts of Logos, or because of other causes. Souls should not take the place of Logos, but supplement its working by rationally bringing the consequences of evil deeds into a connected whole. This is so because, if souls were themselves the agents of good and evil deeds in the world, Logos would be denied the credit for good acts as well; whereas, if souls are parts of Logos, good and evil deeds are also attributed to it for the perfection of the cosmic drama — but, were this the case, the more divine souls would count for nothing (3, 2, 18). Thus moral evil may be ascribed to both the Logos, with its conciliatory function of turning evil into good for the perfection of the whole, and to the soul, which is also a cause in itself. The same theme is addressed in the next treatise of the same 'Ennead', centering upon various connections and relations of universal Logos and Providence, also going further than Platonic and Stoic theodicy. The universal Logos includes both good and evil things. Strictly speaking it does not produce evils, but is included with them. Souls and their works are also in harmony with each other, so that a unity is produced from opposites. All things which have sprung from a unity come together into a single common order by natural necessity, while remaining themselves and acting in accordance with their own nature (3, 3, 1). The good life does not arise from chance but from preceding causes, harmoniously interwoven into the chain of causation, since Logos interweaves all things. Individual things cooperate with the world order according to their nature and under the generalship of Providence, which oversees all actions and experiences and foresees their results for the best disposition of the whole, having even forces of the enemy under its control (3, 3, 2). Personal choices with their individual characteristics are included in the universal order. To the question, first addressed in Plato's 'Laws' (904b-c), whether one should blame the maker for the moral character of the individual 215

See BREHIER, Notice p. 19. For a different and shorter account of Enneads III 2 —3 see GREENE, o p . c i t . p . 3 8 2 f f .

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or the existent being itself, Plotinus responds that blame has no place here, since men are not like gods, although they have the capacity to improve themselves. Things are sufficient unto themselves, and need not be equal to others. This does not imply any measurement on the part of the creator, but is in accordance with the nature of things. Logos follows Soul, which in turn follows Mind in an hierarchical order based on merit. Logos is inferior to Soul and Soul to Mind; Mind becomes less as it tends towards matter. What precedes is better than what follows and beyond reproach inasmuch as it has given more than could be appropriated. Blame, accordingly, falls upon men; "what belongs to Providence is on a higher level" (3, 3, 3). Thus moral evil is man's responsibility. Man is not simple and the bad man is subject to blame reasonably, because he is not only what he was made, but has a principle of autonomy which is nevertheless not outside Providence or the Logos of the whole. Here Plotinus makes some important distinctions: Perfect Providence is the illumination of worse principles by better ones, which are not separated from the principles of this world. He further states: "There is one Logos which is creative and another which connects the better principles with the things which have come into being, and those higher principles are providence which acts from above, but there is another providence derived from that which is above, the other Logos connected with that higher one, and the whole interweaving and total providence results from both" (3, 3, 4:9—14). And he remarks that, although men have another principle, some use the worse principles. Though the higher principles are there, they do not act upon men who are dominated by matter, but only upon those whose life conforms to them. Thus, only the true higher self can have free will. Previous lives must be taken into account, but the question remains as to how man originally became bad and how he fell. All things are not of equal rank; what follows has a lesser nature than what precedes, and their interweaving is a sort of mixture. The inferior becomes inferior from its beginning and suffers deservedly (3, 3, 4 : 1 4 - 5 5 ) . The strictly hierarchical universe of Plotinus extends indefinitely and includes even a higher and lower Providence and a higher and lower Logos. Most of these views, besides echoing Plato's Timaeus 42e, sound Middle Platonic. Gradation of the overall Providence continues in the next chapter, which is very interesting because it extends the Stoic and Middle-Platonic problematic in a way that better connects providence with justice in somewhat Aristotelian terms. For this reason it seems worth quoting the better part of it and paraphrasing the less important: "Providence which, in its descent from above, reaches from beginning to end, is not equal in the sense of arithmetical distribution, but differs in different places according to another proportion" (3, 3, 5, 1 — 3)

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and by analogy to a living being with different activities in each of its parts. Yet, "one thing results from all, and there is one providence; but it is fate beginning from the lower level; the upper is providence alone. For in the intelligible world all things are Logos and above Logos. For all are Mind and pure Soul; what comes from these, all that comes from Mind, is providence, both all that is in pure Soul and all that comes from it to living things. Logos, however, ... is divided into unequal parts; hence the things it does are not equal either, as also in each individual living creature" (3, 3, 5:15-22). Deeds pleasing the gods, in accordance with the Logos of Providence, follow upon providence. Evil things are linked up with good ones, yet are not done by providence but result from human action. Whatever good follows upon them is taken up again by providence and so is changed and corrected, as happens in living bodies, under the direction of Logos. "Evil deeds are consequences and follow from necessity " — they are caused by men themselves, uncompelled by providence. Men, however, choose to associate them with the works of providence, without linking their consequences to the will of providence, but to their own will or "to something else in the universe" which does not act according to the will of providence. One may wonder: is that, then, anything other than fate? Plotinus does not refer to fate explicitly in this context, as did some Middle-Platonists, though none of the Stoics explicitly. He continues: the same things do not produce the same effects on everybody. Evil actions "are done neither by providence nor according to providence," while good actions "are not done by providence, because they are done by man himself, but are done according to providence" since they accord with Logos (3, 3, 5). Do we have here a distinction between Providence and Fate, i. e., lower providence, or providence at the lower level, and deeds done either in accordance with or not in accordance with providence, though taken up by providence within the universal plan? In any case, man is responsible for good and bad actions. Plotinus, like the Stoics, links the existence of providence to divination: because opposites are interwoven, diviners foretell the worst of actions by looking at the circuit of the heavens, but also contemplate the providence watching over the universe and extending over all things composed of Logos and necessity. Diviners, however, do not distinguish providence from what is according to providence. This is a privilege of godlike men. It has been written in nature that order never becomes disorder, and heavenly and earthly things are carrried along together by means of analogy, contributing to the consistency and permanence of this universe. Analogy relates the worse to the worse and the better to the better, so that Logos may remain undivided (3, 3, 6). Analogy is here as well the opposite of numerical equality, which is alien to providence. Because there are better things, there must be worse as well, in which the better give something of themselves. To blame the world order and

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to demand abolition of evil in the whole world is to demand the abolition of providence itself. Providence has meaning in relation to what is below. All things grow from a single root but flow out in divided multiplicity, with various distances from the higher reality they reflect. Those closer to the root remain for ever, the others come into being for ever having in them the Logos of those above. The principles are different but come from the same source (3, 3, 7). It does not seem necessary at this point to comment on and evaluate Plotinus's doctrine of providence, since a large number of scholars have scrutinised every detail of it. 216 Nor does the relation of Providence to Fate need further discussion, adumbrated as it is in chapter 5 of Ennead 3, 3. Very little of Plotinus's doctrine of fate can be gathered from Ennead 3, 1 'On Fate' since the greater part of it contains conventional refutations of various versions of causation, and particularly of fatalism (3, 1, 1 — 7). Plotinus is striving to establish that the individual soul is a principle in the light of which nothing is causeless, that there is sequence and order, but that nonetheless something is in man's power, although prophesy and divination are not abolished. The better the soul, the more power it has to change things and the more free it is. So, though all things happen according to causes, there are two kinds of causes: the soul as an internal cause, and external causes, such as fate. The best actions come from man himself (3, 1, 8 — 10). The tension, however, between logos and freedom of choice (regarding the reponsibility for evil) and providence and free will, remains, for all Plotinus's attempts to retain autonomy, within the scope of providence and logos. To sum up: Plotinus, in the face of objections brought forward by various opponents (the Epicureans in particular) based on the existence of apparent evils in the world, tries to justify belief in divine goodness and providence by using Platonic and Stoic arguments, but also by means of viewpoints and criteria of his own, not without their own repetitions and inconsistencies. The concept of Logos plays an important role in the doctrine of providence and theodicy in view of both cosmic and moral evil. Moral evil is due to man and "results from the laziness and arrogance of the part of the soul which is involved in the body". 2 1 7 Cosmic evil is due to matter - not to matter in itself, which is mere privation, but to its inertness and remoteness from the good. 218 Yet it subserves the good of the whole, which is more important than that of the individual, and promotes virtue. Plotinus, in distinguishing higher from lower providence and identifying the latter with fate, implicitly takes part in the debate on their relationship, following the Middle-Platonic conception of the priority of providence to fate (3, 3, 5). Plotinus's attempt to offer a monistic solution as the reverse of Stoic materialistic monism does not seem very satisfactory, 219 but was very influential on subsequent discussions such as those of Augustine and Proclus. 216

S e e PARMA, o p . c i t . p p . 1 5 7 - 1 5 9 , SCHUBERT, o p . c i t . p p . 1 3 1 -

217

S e e GREENE, o p . c i t . p . 3 7 7 .

218

See BREHIER, The Philosophy of Plotinus pp. 180—181.

219

See GREENE, o p . c i t . p . 3 8 2 ; BOOT, o p . c i t . p . 4 7 8 .

135.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMPIRE

4487

b) Proclus's Doctrine of Providence as Divine Justice Providence understood as an expression of divine justice, a concept evident already in Plato, is negatively implied by complaints about injustices endured by good men undeservingly, and is a basis for the view which justifies physical or cosmic evil as a sort of punishment. It is also latent in the Early Stoic identification of providence with Right Reason and Law. More explicitly, divine providence is conceived as immanent justice by Late Stoics, particularly by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, by Philo and by Plotinus. The latter makes many references to merit and to the inequalities of providential distribution, as we have seen, on the assumption that "cities are not composed of citizens with equal rights, even those which have good laws and constitutions" and because inequalities are necessary for the interest of the whole (3, 2, 11). Plotinus makes clear that "providence is not equal as in arithmetical distribution but differs in different places according to analogy ... each ... having its own, the better part having the better part of the activity". Nor does Logos act equally (3, 3, 5). The factors of merit, desert, dignity and worth in providential distributions play a more important role in Ploclus, with whom I shall end this essay. From the beginning of his work 'De providentia ... malo' 220 Proclus considers necessary that providence knows the worth of those under its sway (2). Providence belongs to the One and the Good, and its knowledge is above intelligence (5). As cause of both finite and infinite things (9), providence has infinite power embracing all other powers (11). The work of the best providence is that all may share in the good, but the respective shares are to be measured by the worth of the participants (20). In principle all share in providence — animate beings, inanimate, rational, irrational, eternal, and 220

See HELMUT BOESE (Ed.), Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula, De providentia, libertate, malo, latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaaci Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, Berlin 1960. The first work with which I shall deal has the title 'De decern dubitationibus circa providentiam'. I use the paragraph numbers of this edition without referring by number to the ten "doubts" about providence. The translation and summaries are mine. In this essay I do not discuss the other two works of Proclus ('De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis' and 'De malorum subsistentia') for lack of space and because they do not add much to Proclus's doctrine of providence as divine justice with which I am concerned. For a full account of Proclus's doctrine of Providence and fate and the story of the three works see DANIEL ISAAC (ed. and translator), Proclus: Trois études sur la providence, I. Dix Problèmes concernant la providence, Paris 1977, pp. 1 — 38 and for the overall argument of the work pp. 41 — 50. For the second work see vol. II, Paris 1979, pp. 9 - 22. For Proclus's theology in general see E. R. DODDS, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963 and LAWRENCE JAY ROSÂN, The Philosophy of Proclus. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought, New York 1949, pp. 131 — 192.

4488

MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU

perishable according to their capacity. The sharing does not depend on providence alone, but also on the nature of the participants who should contribute to the whole according to what is proper to them (21—22). Good fortune comes from the single activity of providence; its lack derives from the nature of those subject to providence (23), from their distance from the first principle, and their place in the scale of Being. Granted that providence exists, there arises the problem of the existence of evil in the region of Being. It is irrational to attribute it to providence, but, if evil is not according to providence, there will be two causes, one of the good and the other of evil. It remains to admit its existence without challenging "the kingdom of providence". Evil is against nature, inherent in bodies but in accordance with the reason of providence (27). If, then, evil exists in order that perishable and not only eternal things might exist for the perfection of the Whole, it is due to the providential administration of the world. For, otherwise, providence would not have been perfect nor would it have created a perfect world. The end of evil is the good and it is for the good's sake that evil enters the world, since destruction is for the sake of generation and so what is against nature turns out to be in accordance with nature. What is for the sake of the good is not entirely evil and the Whole has need of both, destruction and generation. So, it is evident that even what seems to be against nature entered the realm of Being because generation is from opposites and it eventually is complementary to what is in accordance with nature (28-29). Moral evil, which is contrary to reason, proves also to be in accordance with providence. Moral evil arises out of the concurrence of opposites when the mortal element in the soul prevails over the divine, i. e. when emotion and desire dominate reason. What is against reason is both evil and not evil, since it is in accordance with nature. Hence, in irrational animals there is no evil (30). Since, then, both good and evil are in accordance with providence, it is necessary that the coming into being of that which is contrary to reason be referred to the good, as is worthy of the providence which governs the world: because what is against reason is for the sake of what is in accordance with reason. It is because of providence that mortal nature could acquire an immortal soul (31). There remains the question of equality and inequality in providential distributions. Given that providence is necessarily linked to the criterion of merit or worth, and granted that providence exists, how is such inequality in men's lives to be explained? Here it is characteristic that the issue is not injustice but the inequality of distributions when the criterion of merit or dignity is not applied. This confusion betrays Aristotelian rather than Platonic influences. 221 The question is, how can providence be compatible with evil men being tyrants and good men slaves, with good men being miserable and bad men prosperous? Such realities seem to challenge the rationale of providence because, not only are equal shares distributed to unequals, which is 221

See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics V 1131al0-1133b28.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMPIRE

4489

also unreasonable, but even unequal shares to unequals, in inverted proportion order: the better receive the worst share and the worst the better. In questions of distributive justice, however, not arithmetical but geometrical analogy should be applied. For this reason Plato calls the latter "Zeus's judgement" (32).222 However, providence, according to Proclus, assigns everyone his due in the long run 223 , giving to good men what may foster virtue, and to bad men objects such as health and money, which they strive for, unconcerned about virtue — preoccupations which good men do not share. In this way each acquires the end appropriate to his disposition. Providence assigns to each man what convenes with his habits (32 — 33). Proclus's further arguments that providence assigns rewards according to merit are traditional Platonic and Stoic arguments: the lack of apparent goods promotes virtue, apparent injustices serve pedagogical purposes, punishments count as exercise, and so forth (34 — 37). Providence assigns different things to different men (38) and men have things either from their own free choice, or from others, or from a universal cause. Universal law allows the parts to act on choice, but justice follows those doing well and badly. Men should blame their own imperfections for what they suffer from the whole (39). Thus the criterion of merit applies even to retributive justice.224 On the question, why is arithmetical equality applied by providence in the distribution of equal lots to unequals, such as in destructions of whole cities, when good and bad men perish alike, Proclus answers that men suffer the same lot not as dissimilar but as similar beings, in having, for example, chosen to live in the same city or embark the same ship, though as dissimilar beings they behave differently in such calamities. And it is a question of fate who are to be saved and who will perish. So, if their motions are in accordance with providence, consequences happen from necessity (40). Those who blame providence for equal assignments to unequals forget that the equality of souls is different for various reasons (41). One must examine equality and inequality very carefully in similar and dissimilar things, and take into account fate and free will. This would reveal that providence always assigns lots deservedly, which is to say, in accordance with merit and the definition of justice (42 — 45). Regarding the relationship of providence to fate Proclus remarks: the whole world is governed by both providence and fate; primary things enjoy more of providence, lesser things more of fate; those in between who use free choice enjoy of both. Men have manifestly experienced providence, but they attribute some things that are under their own control to fate, as though the stars were to blame. And so some believe that fate dominates all things, others believe that human affairs are under the sway of providence. The mind within 222 223 224

296

See Plato's Laws 757b. Cf. Plotinus III, 3, 5, 1 - 3 . I. e. in subsequent world cycles, taking into consideration the collective whole. According to Aristotle arithmetical, not proportional (meritocratic) distribution holds in this case (N.E. V 1131b25-1132a6). A N R W II 36.7

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us is akin to providence and the necessity within us is akin to fate, but we live either according to our mind (autonomously) or according to our necessity (heteronomously) (46). Fate controls bodies, and what comes from providence mingles with what results from fate. Merit accrues from the character of one's life (47). In sum, "for those things that precede order, order is according to merit as well as according to order; for those that follow order, order is the principle of merit, since merit is not prior but posterior to order." The same law holds true for animals assigned unequal lots individually but equal ones collectively (48). 225 God imposes punishments according to the dignity of individual souls (54). The delay of punishment is explained by the analogy of a medical cure, which requires its proper time, and in terms of the inequality of souls, and should not be treated as an objection to providence; nor should the punishment of their descendants either ( 4 9 - 5 3 ) . 2 2 6 Angels, daimones and souls are providential, but providence is primarily exerted by God, who is the primary Good (64). 227 Proclus actually further advances Plotinus's account of Providence as divine justice in the aristocratic spirit 228 of Neoplatonism and the meritocratic spirit of the ancient tradition in general. 225

226

For more on the relationship of Providence to Fate, see De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis II —III, XII. In reference to late punishments Proclus brings forward seven arguments in defence of divine justice. See ISAAC, o p . cit. pp. 4 9 - 5 0 .

227

On providence see also GIUSEPPE MARTANO, Proclo di Atene, Napoli 1974, pp. 1 5 2 -

228

But see RIST, Human Value, p. 113, on Plotinus's view of personal value and thus of rights, on the basis of Ennead I, 1 and 6,8.

155.

Il concetto di causa nella filosofia ellenistica e romana d i A N N A M A R I A IOPPOLO, B a r i

Sommario I. Introduzione

4491

II. La concezione stoica della causalità

4494

1. L a definizione di causa

4494

2. I principi della fisica

4499

3. Il fato

4502

III. L a testimonianza di Cicerone

4505

1. L a distinzione delle cause di Crisippo

4505

2. Le causae perfectae

4511

3. L a causa principalis e il concetto di „ciò che è in nostro potere"

4514

4. Le causae adiuvantes et proximae

4517

IV. L a critica di C a m e a d e

4523

1. Le cause efficienti

4523

2. Il 5t' o

4525

3. Le cause antecedenti

4527

V. L a posizione di Cicerone nei 'Topica'

4529

VI. L a teoria della causalità in Seneca

4533

VII. Ulteriori sviluppi della dottrina della causalità: Clemente Alessandrino

I.

. . . .

4538

Introduzione

Offrire un quadro d'insieme della dottrina della causalità per la durata di un arco di tempo cosi ampio non è possibile in una trattazione di poche pagine. Mi è sembrato opportuno piuttosto affrontare uno degli aspetti più rilevanti che caratterizzano questa problematica a partire dal terzo secolo a. C., in quanto segna un cambiamento di prospettiva rispetto all'approccio filosofico precedente: la nozione di causa attiva o efficiente. Questa è la nozione di causa che si afferma con lo sviluppo delle scuole mediche e parallelamente in campo filosofico con lo Stoicismo. All'interazione e all'in296»

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ANNA MARIA IOPPOLO

trecciarsi di queste due prospettive si deve l'elaborazione di una dottrina della causalità che eserciterà una notevole influenza nelle epoche successive. Le ragioni filosofiche che hanno condotto a porsi in termini nuovi il problema della causa sono illustrate con chiarezza da Seneca. Nell'epistola 65 Seneca affronta il problema della causa secondo le varie scuole filosofiche e distingue la posizione della sua scuola, la stoica, da quella degli altri filosofi, in particolare da quella di Aristotele e di Platone. Stoicis placet unam causarti esse, id quod facit [4]. Aristotele invece ritiene che causa si dica in tre significati, ipsa materia, opifex, forma, a cui ne aggiunge un quarto, propositum totius operi. E dopo avere illustrato il significato di ciascuna di esse con l'esempio classico della statua, Seneca spiega che cos'è il fine: quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit, che di volta in volta può essere il denaro, o la reputazione, o il sentimento religioso. E conclude con una domanda: an non putas inter causas factì operis esse numerandum quo remoto factum non essetf [6]. A questa domanda Seneca risponde più avanti [14] negando che il fine possa essere considerato una causa, poiché causa in senso stretto è soltanto la causa efficiente. Il fine, pur ammettendo che sia una causa, è causa accessoria (superveniens) perché è una delle condizioni senza le quali è impossibile fare una cosa. Platone ha concepito ancora un'altra causa, il modello, l'idea, introducendo così cinque cause, id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod [8]. Ma queste cause o sono troppo numerose, o troppo poche. Infatti se consideriamo cause le condizioni senza le quali non è possibile fare qualcosa Platone e Aristotele ne hanno introdotto troppo poche, perché non hanno posto tra le cause il tempo, lo spazio, il moto, il luogo, ecc. Ne hanno invece introdotte troppe se consideriamo il fatto che non hanno saputo individuare la causa reale delle cose, vale a dire, l'agente a cui si riconducono la forma e il fine. Non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea quae facit [12 — 13]. Seneca conduce quindi una critica radicale al primato che Platone e Aristotele avevano accordato alla causa formale e finale. La forma è parte della causa, perchè non è altro che l'artista il quale impone una forma al suo oggetto. Né il modello (exemplar) a cui l'artista ha guardato nel comporre la sua opera, che Platone ha annoverato tra le cause, è causa. Senza il modello l'artista non può operare, ma esso non è né parte dell'arte né parte della causa, ma semplicemente uno strumento. La concezione che sta alla base della critica di Seneca è che non è sufficiente che la causa fornisca una spiegazione di una determinata cosa, ma è necessario che essa produca quella cosa attivamente: né la causa formale né la causa finale, concepite da Aristotele, rispondono a questa caratteristica. Sembra dunque che Seneca non riconosca neanche alla causa motrice di Aristotele di essere causa in senso stretto, dal momento che non è direttamente responsabile della produzione della cosa: per attenerci all'esempio classico della statua, è all'arte della scultura che Aristotele attribuisce questo potere 1 . 1

M. FREDE, The Originai Notion of Cause, in: Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenis t i c D o g m a t i s m , e d . M . SCHOFIELD, M . BURNYEAT, J . BARNES, O x f o r d 1 9 8 0 , p . 2 1 8 ( =

ID.,

Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford 1987, p. 126): "that it is not the sculptor working on bis sculpture who is the moving cause, but the art of the sculpture. And with the art of the sculpture we have the same problems as with ends, forms, and matter".

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DI CAUSA N E L L A

FILOSOFIA

4493

Se, a titolo esemplificativo, prendiamo in esame resoconti più tardi relativi al problema della causalità, emerge la stessa delimitazione, che abbiamo trovato in Seneca, del concetto di causa a quello di causa attiva come produttrice di qualcosa, mentre sembra rimanere in secondo piano l'aspetto che considera la causa come la spiegazione di qualcosa. Sesto Empirico (P H III 13 —14), illustrando il concetto di causa efficiente, sottolinea la Siacpcovia dei Dogmatici, che hanno reso impossibile concepirla, perché ne hanno fornito nozioni discordanti e contraddittorie. „Alcuni dicono che la causa è corpo, altri che è incorporea. Sembrerebbe che una causa, comunemente secondo essi 2 , fosse ciò a causa del quale agendo (8i° ö èvepyoùv), l'effetto si determina, come per esempio, il sole o il calore del sole è causa del fatto che la cera si liquefaccia o della liquefazione della cera. Infatti sono in disaccordo anche su questo, poiché gli uni dicono che la causa è causa degli appellativi, Ttpoariyopiràv, come per esempio della liquefazione, gli altri dei predicati, Kaxriyoprinà-ccov, come per esempio del liquefarsi". Secondo un approccio completamente diverso Clemente Alessandrino nel nono capitolo dell'ottavo libro degli 'Stromata' (26,1 S.), dedicato alla trattazione del problema della causa, ripartisce anch'egli i filosofi tra i sostenitori della tesi che le cause sono corpi, e i sostenitori della tesi che le cause sono incorporee. Tuttavia la nozione di causa alla quale tutti si riferiscono è „ciò che in senso primario, Kupicoq, produce qualcosa in modo attuale èvepynTiKÒtq". E s p i e g a :

„infatti anche noi diciamo che il ferro è capace di tagliare non soltanto quando taglia, ma anche quando non taglia. Così dunque anche ciò che produce significa due cose sia ciò che ha già agito sia ciò che non ha ancora agito, ma ha la potenza di agire". La terminologia impiegata da Clemente è di chiara derivazione aristotelica nell'uso di termini quali potenza e atto, ma la prospettiva è quella di restringere

2

A propositio dell'espressione Koivóxspov KCIT' aùxoin;, J. BARNES, Ancient Skepticism and Causation, in: The Skeptical Tradition, ed. by M.BURNYEAT, Berkeley-LOS Angeles London 1983, p. 197 n. 3, rileva come essa sottolinei l'accordo che caratterizza la posizione di tutti i Dogmatici riguardo alla causa. O. RIETH, Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik. Eine traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, Problemata, Heft 9, Berlin 1933, p. 138, ritiene invece che l'espressione faccia riferimento al significato più generale di causa distinto da quello proprio, pur rilevando che „Koivótepov bedeutet also, daß diese Bestimmung nicht auf einzelne Schulen beschränkt sei". M a nel passo di Sesto non c'è alcun accenno all'opposizione KOIVCDI; — iSiax; che distingue nella dottrina stoica un significato più generale ed uno più ristretto dei termini (un esempio è fornito da D L VII 94 in riferimento al concetto di àya6óv). E' invece legittima l'identificazione proposta da RIETH del significato più ristretto di causa nell'espressione a'moi; Ss Kupicoi; Xéyezm in Clem. ström. Vili 9, 25, 5, poiché Kupitoi; ha qui il valore di „in senso primario", ma non è poi accettabile l'identificazione da lui proposta con l'a'mov Kupiffliaiov, ma su questo problema, vedi qui nota 62 (p.4515).

4494

ANNA MARIA IOPPOLO

il concetto di causa a ciò che produce qualcosa in modo attivo, che caratterizza la problematica stoica della causa 3 . In effetti da un esame degli autori che si sono occupati di questo problema, a partire dal terzo secolo a. C. in poi, è sembrato di poter rintracciare una preponderante influenza dello Stoicismo. Del resto il concetto di causa è fortemente coinvolto nel problema del determinismo e della responsabilità morale, che è stato uno dei nodi centrali intorno a cui gli Stoici e gli oppositori libertari hanno più lungamente dibattuto in età ellenistica. E sembra naturale che gli Stoici, più di chiunque altro, si siano dovuti occupare della definizione di causa e delle sue classificazioni. Tuttavia ad un esame più approfondito ci si accorge come non sia semplice non solo stabilire quale concezione possa essere effettivamente attribuita agli Stoici, ma anche fino a che punto quei resoconti delle fonti più tarde siano debitori allo Stoicismo o quanto gli abbiano piuttosto prestato. Pertanto è necessario partire da un esame della nozione stoica di causa per poi analizzare le definizioni presenti negli autori posteriori, in modo da giungere, se possibile, ad un chiarimento del problema. A questo scopo bisogna analizzare innanzi tutto quelle testimonianze sicuramente stoiche, che non possono ragionevolmente essere sospettate di sovrapporre influenze estranee, o per motivi polemici, o per motivi dottrinali. In un primo momento dunque converrà attenersi a questo criterio che impone di non prendere in considerazione la maggior parte delle testimonianze superstiti, dal momento che, in larga misura, si tratta di testimonianze polemiche, per poi tentare di coinvolgere anche queste nella ricostruzione della dottrina stoica della causalità.

II. La concezione stoica della causalità

1. La definizione di causa L'unica testimonianza non polemica che ci parla diffusamente del concetto stoico di causa è Ario Didimo (ap. Stob. I 138, 14 e sgg. W.). Stobeo dopo aver enunciato la posizione riguardo al problema della causalità di Platone, Pitagora e Aristotele, espone il frammento di Ario Didimo che riferisce di seguito la posizione di Zenone, Crisippo e Posidonio. „Zenone dice che causa è ciò a causa del quale (8i' o), ciò di cui è causa è un attributo (cunPePT|KÓq), e la causa è corpo, mentre ciò di cui è causa è un predicato (KarriYÓpTina). E' impossibile che la causa sia 3

Questo passo è stato considerato stoico da H. VON ARNIM che lo ha incluso nella raccolta degli SVF II fr. 344. J . J . DUHOT, La conception stoicienne de la causalité, Paris 1988, ritiene che l'indiscutibile carattere aristotelico impedisca che possa essere attribuito agli Stoici.

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4495

presente e ciò di cui è causa non esista (ufi imàpxsiv) 4 . Quello che è stato detto ha la seguente forza: causa è ciò a causa del quale si determina qualcosa, come per esempio a causa della saggezza si determina l'essere saggi e a causa dell'anima si determina il vivere e a causa della temperanza si determina l'essere temperanti. Infatti è impossibile che se c'è per qualcuno la temperanza, non sia temperante, o l'anima non viva, o la saggezza, non sia saggio. Crisippo dice che causa è ciò a causa del quale e che la causa è esistente e corpo [ciò di cui è causa non è né esistente né corpo] e causa è perché (ÒTI), mentre ciò di cui è causa è a causa di qualche cosa (8ià il) 5 . Egli dice che la spiegazione (ama) è il Xóyoq della causa (arnov) o il Xóyoq della causa in quanto causa 6 . Posidonio dice così: causa di qualcosa è ciò a causa del quale si determina quella cosa, o il primo agente, o il principio dell'azione; e la causa è esistente e corpo, mentre ciò di cui è causa non è né esistente né corpo, ma attributo e predicato". A d un primo esame del passo emergono tre aspetti che caratterizzano la concezione stoica della causalità e che ritornano, talora in maniera problematica, nel resoconto di altre fonti. Innanzi tutto gli Stoici, da Zenone a Posidonio, condividevano la tesi che la causa fosse il Si' o, non discostandosi in questo né dal comune uso linguistico greco né da quello filosofico, se si pensa che lo stesso Aristotele ha espresso con TÒ 81' o una delle formulazioni della causa 4

Traduco imàpxeiv con „esistere", tenendo presente che è qui usato nell'accezione di „essere predicato di" un soggetto. In questo significato si dice che un attributo esiste per il soggetto quando può essere predicato come vero di quel soggetto. L'esempio è fornito sempre da un passo di Stob. I 106, 5 (SVF II 509) in cui è detto che „in quanto predicati soltanto gli attributi esistono, come per es. il passeggiare esiste per me quando passeggio, ma non esiste quando sono sdraiato o seduto". La traduzione adottata da A. A. LONG, D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, voi. I: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge 1987, di Ó7tàp%eiv con „io belong" nel passo di Stobeo ( = 55 A), (in italiano „appartenere") non rende in italiano immediatamente comprensibile il testo. Sull'ambiguità di mcàp/siv e sui suoi significati, cfr. A. A. LONG, Language and Thought in Stoicism, in: Problems in Stoicism, ed. by A. A. LONG, London 1971, pp. 88 — 94. Inoltre preferisco tradurre imàpxeiv con esistere, perché sottolinea la connessione che gli Stoici ponevano tra la causa e l'effetto, che non può che essere espressa da un verbo al presente, in quanto causa e effetto sono contemporanei. Ed è noto che per gli Stoici soltanto il presente imàp/ei, esiste, mentre il passato e il futuro ixpeaxaai, „sussistono", cfr. Stob. (SVF II 509), cit.

5

J. BARNES, Ancient Skepticism and Causation, in: The Skeptical Tradition, cit., p. 170: "There is nothing proprietorially Stoic about that; 8ià is the ordinary Greek preposition for expressing causality" (cf. ID., Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation. Observations on the Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus, ANRW II 36,4, ed. W. HAASE, Berlin - New York 1990, p. 2668 sg.). Seguo M. FREDE, The Originai Notion of Cause, cit., p. 222 ( = ID., Essays in Ancient Philosophy, p. 129), nell'intendere a m a come spiegazione. Sono stati sollevati dei dubbi se si possa effettivamente attribuire a Crisippo la distinzione tra a m a e arnov, dal momento che Gal. syn. puls. IX 458, 7 K. (SVF II 356) afferma di usare i due termini indifferentemente, cfr. a tal proposito, J. HANKINSON, Evidence, Externality and Antecedence: Inquiries into Later Greek Causai Concepts, Phronesis, XXXII (1987) p. 90 n. 39.

6

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finale 7 . Fin qui sembrerebbe che gli Stoici si inseriscano nella tradizione linguistica e filosofica precedente, non certo come innovatori. Ciò che invece è sorprendente è che Zenone consideri l'effetto un predicato (teatriYÓprina). Questo comporta, in base ai presupposti della fisica stoica, che esso non sia un corpo, ma un incorporeo e, come tale, non omogeneo alla causa. L'effetto viene così a far parte della sfera logico linguistica, è un A-sktóv, è ciò che viene ad essere predicato come vero del corpo su cui la causa agisce, ma che è distinto dal corpo affetto. Esso dunque non modifica in nulla la struttura sostanziale dell'ôv. Infatti poiché esso rientra nella dimensione logico-linguistica, è un ti, ma non un ov. Da questo punto di vista esso viene a condividere il modo di realtà degli incorporei che è quello di sussistere (ixpeaiàvai) e non di esistere8. In particolare, facendo parte dei A.8KTÓ, esso sussiste in relazione ad una rappresentazione razionale, ad un pensiero9. Esso così non si trova ad avere alcuna realtà tangibile e il suo modo di realtà è in dipendenza dagli uomini capaci di esprimerlo in una forma linguistica. Tuttavia la contraddizione in cui sembra cadere la relazione causa-effetto si risolve se si pensa che gli Stoici distinguevano tra il corpo disposto in un certo stato (tccûç s^ov) e lo stato considerato di per se stesso. Mentre essi consideravano l'agire e il patire che si realizza in un corpo come un corpo disposto in un certo modo, consideravano poi questo modo di essere preso di per sé come incorporeo poiché esprime ciò che è causato e ciò che è patito da un corpo 10 . Intesa quindi in questo senso, la relazione causale di un corpo che agisce su di un altro corpo non può produrre un corpo, ma qualche cosa di incorporeo, uno stato o un modo di essere di un sostrato già esistente. Tuttavia la teoria stoica della causalità non riesce ad evitare il paradosso che, pur avendo concepito la causa come corpo, e quindi come efficiente, poiché solo i corpi sono capaci di agire e di patire11, tutto ciò che poi essa produce non è qualcosa di esistente, bensì una espressione significativa di un processo che il corpo subisce. Se dunque gli Stoici hanno definito la causa come il ói' ô, „ciò a causa del quale", proseguendo una tradizione ben consolidata, hanno poi attribuito ad esso un contenuto alquanto singolare. Inoltre l'ulteriore aspetto problematico, che si presenta nella definizione di causa attribuita a Zenone, perché difficilmente

7

J. J. Duhot, La conception stoïcienne, cit., p. 144, rileva come il ôi ô stoico sia fondamentalmente diverso da quello aristotelico che designa una causa precisa, quella finale, mentre « celui du Portique se semble renvoyer à rien d'autre qu'à lui-même, dans sa tautologie insupportable en français ».

8

Plot. enn. II 4, 1 (SVF II 320): ad) |iaxa jióvov xà ôvxa etvai; Plut, de comm. not. 30 p. 1073 D (SVF II 525): ôvxa yàp |K>va xà crà|iaxa.

' Cfr. SE M VIII 70 (SVF II 187) e D L V I I 63. Significativa di questa posizione è la concezione di Crisippo del passeggiare come f|yejioviKÓv itfflç 6%ov, cfr. Sen. ep. 113, 23 (SVF II 836). La distinzione tra il corpo 'Catone che cammina' e il predicato incorporeo che esprime l'azione di camminare è ancora esemplificata da Sen. ep. 117,13. Su questo passo cfr. A . M . Ioppolo, Présentation and Assent: A Physical and Cognitive Problem in Early Stoicism, Classical Quarterly, X L (1990) p. 445.

10

11

Cfr. Cic. Acad. Post. I, 39 (SVF I 90).

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conciliabile con molte delle testimonianze polemiche, è l'enfasi sulla contemporaneità della causa e dell'effetto. Se la relazione causale, in senso stretto, è quella che lega secondo uno schema triadico, due corpi, la saggezza e il saggio, mediante un predicato incorporeo, essere saggio, che può essere predicato come vero del saggio, soltanto se, e fino a che, la saggezza è presente in lui, la nozione di causa antecedente che compare costantemente legata a quella stoica di fato, necessita di essere spiegata. Dalla struttura del passo di Stobeo sembrerebbe che tra i tre scolarchi della Stoa ci fosse un accordo sostanziale sulla definizione di causa e sulla incorporeità dell'effetto, stabilita da Zenone, ma che ciascuno di essi abbia posto l'accento su differenti aspetti della relazione causale. La posizione di Zenone viene prima enunciata e poi spiegata con una terminologia non perfettamente consona alla sua enunciazione. Infatti la simultaneità tra la causa e l'effetto espressa nella frase àSuvatov 5' eivai TÒ (lèv arnov rcapsìvai, où 5é èoTiv aixiov (if| i>Jtàp%eiv, viene poi tradotta nella frase arnov BOTI S I ' O yiyvEtal TI. Mentre nella prima si mette in rilievo che la causa è causa dell'essere di una cosa, attraverso l'uso del verbo ÓTtàpxco, che fa riferimento a uno stato che non può che essere presente; nella seconda è usato il verbo yiyvojiai, il quale si riferisce ad un processo, a un divenire, piuttosto che ad un essere. Com'è possibile dunque che dopo aver posto l'enfasi sulla simultaneità della causa e dell'effetto, Zenone spiegasse poi la relazione causale nei termini di un processo di produzione? Si pone quindi il problema di capire se la spiegazione della posizione di Zenone, introdotta dall'espressione tò 8è X.eyónevov TOIvKCtt âXoyov, dit Plutarque en exposant une thèse stoïcienne (SVF III, 459, p. 111, 1 7 - 1 8 ) . SVF II, 1021 et 1027. Selon Cicéron, Ariston de Chios, disciple de Zénon, nie in deis sensum esse (De nat. d. I, 14, 37 = SVF I, 378). Mais le texte est d'exploitation délicate: Cicéron voit dans cette opinion une erreur qui éloigne Ariston de la tradition stoïcienne. La signification de sensus prête à discussion. SVF I, 85; 493; II, 913 etc. Selon D.Laërce, qui se fie à Alcimos, Platon croit chaque «idée» àitaOéç (III, 13). Mais le terme technique peut relever du langage des historiens tardifs: rien ne prouve qu'il soit utilisé par ces philosophes anciens. H. FROHNHOFEN, qui mentionne en outre, parmi les premiers témoins de l'absence de souffrance et de besoin en Dieu, Empédocle et Mélissos de Samos, puis le sophiste Antiphon, pense aussi qu'il n'y était pas question explicitement d'apatheia (Apatheia tou Theou ..., Frankfurt am Main, 1987, pp. 7 0 - 7 2 ) .

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« sans aucun besoin w22. Il applique volontiers le qualificatif à7ta0f|ç, comme on l'a vu secondairement en jetant un coup d'œil sur la terminologie, à Dieu, à tout ce qui s'y confond ou s'en approche: le « lieu des idées », mais surtout l'éther et le noûs. Le premier moteur « ne subit ni pathos, ni changement (àna0èç KCÙ àvaM.oùoxov) » (Metaph. 1073 a i l ) . Aristote établit un lien entre inaltérabilité et impassibilité: il applique les mêmes adjectifs ensemble à l'éther (De caelo, 270 b 2 — 3J 2 3 . Le lieu des dieux est « incorruptible » et « inaccessible (à7ta0fiç) à toute détérioration mortelle » (ibid. 284 a 11 - 1 4 ) . L'intellect agent, lui aussi, même en exercice dans l'homme, est quelque chose de divin, et, par là, immortel et impassible (ànaGfiç)24. L'Ancien stoïcisme ne manifeste donc aucune originalité en matière à'apatheia divine. Bien qu'il ait certainement professé la doctrine, les textes qui nous en restent ne nous permettent pas de savoir s'il a utilisé le terme technique, si répandu que Sextus Empiricus, témoin tardif de la tradition, pouvait proclamer: « L'opinion des philosophes est que la divinité est impassible: 8óyna ânaQèç sïvai TÔ 0sîov» (Pyrrh. I, 14, 162) 2 5 .

CPIÀOCTÔCPCÛV

3. L'apatheia humaine a) Avant le stoïcisme Appliquée à l'homme, l'apatheia est littéralement l'absence de 7tà0oç, d'émotions ou « passions » 2 é . Cette doctrine est-elle l'invention des stoïciens? Cicéron le croit: les prédécesseurs de Zénon, dit-il, ne retranchaient pas de 22

23

24

25

26

Eth. Eud. 1244 b 7 - 10; 1249 b 16; De caelo, 279 a 21 - 2 2 et 35; Pseudo-Aristote, Magna mor. 1212 b 33 - 1 2 1 3 a 7. Cf. J. PÉPIN, Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu, Paris, 1971, p. 219 et 246. Les 'Placita philosophorum' dits d'Aëce mettent aussi la doctrine de l'éther àitaGfiç au compte d'Aristote (11,7,5, dans Plutarque, Œuvres morales, éd. F. DUBNER, p. 1081). Athénagore l'attribue aux péripatéticiens en général (Leg. XVI, 3, éd, W. R. SCHOEDEL, p. 32). De anima, 408 b 2 9 - 3 0 ; 430 a 1 7 - 1 9 ; cf. supra: xò vosîv Sf] KCÙ TÔ Ôscopeîv napaivetai aXXov TIVÔÇ SCTÛ) (pGeiponévou, aùxò Sè àîtaGéç èaxiv (408 b 24 — 25). Ce témoignage important se lit dans les Sexti Empirici opera, vol. I, ed. H. MUTSCHMANN — I. MAU, Leipzig, 1958, p. 4 0 , 1 . 2 2 — 23. Cicéron présente aussi comme une thèse «commune à tous les philosophes» «que jamais Dieu ne s'irrite ni ne nuit» (De off. III, 2 8 , 1 0 2 et 2 9 , 1 0 4 ) . M. POHLENZ confirme cette entente des penseurs antiques. Il traite l'apatheia divine de « dogme commun à tous les philosophes grecs », d'« attribut nécessaire», «sur lequel tous les philosophes s'entendent» (ID., Vom Zorne Gottes, pp. 5 - 6 ) . Il précise, en conclusion: «Les passions (Affekte) de la divinité étaient aussi choquantes pour la pensée grecque qu'elles apparaissaient naturelles pour le judaïsme » (ibid. p. 128). « Passion » apparaît, en français, depuis DESCARTES, comme l'équivalent le moins inadéquat du ndÔoç humain, au milieu des acceptions assez divergentes qu'a prises le terme grec selon les contextes.

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l'homme le trouble (perturbationem) de l'âme. Ils se contentaient de « le restreindre et de le ramener à l'étroit ». Zénon « voulut que le sage fût exempt des toutes ces (passions) comme de maladies » (Ac. post. I, 10, 38). Cependant un commentateur anonyme d'Aristote affirme « qu'avant les stoïciens existait cette doctrine qui situe les vertus dans Yapatheia» (SVF III, 201). Que faut-il en penser? J . M . R I S T renonce à chercher la paternité de la notion comme fin morale dernière 27 . On peut invoquer pourtant les orphiques et les pythagoriciens, par lesquels T H . RÜTHER 28 ouvre son histoire de Yapatheia, parce qu'ils ont prôné la libération de l'âme. Démocrite serait un candidat moins aléatoire. Il est l'auteur d'un Ilspi sûôu^iiriç29, qui peut être considéré, en un sens, comme le premier rcepi â7ta0£Îaç connu. A en croire Diogène Laërce, « la fin (y) est l'eî>0i)|iia, qui n'est pas la même chose que le plaisir, comme certains, faute de bien l'entendre, l'ont interprété, mais un (état) où l'âme vit calmement (yaX.T]vct»ç) et fermement (eÙCTiaÔœç) sans être troublée par aucune crainte, ni superstition, ni autre passion quelconque» (IX, 45). Cicéron avait noté, bien avant, que le terme inclut une certaine absence de passions, quand il parlait de la

Democriti securitas, quae est animi tranquillitas, quam appellauit eô0i)|iiav (De fin. V, 8, 23).

Démocrite, dit-il plus loin, proposa comme « souverain bien » bono ut esset animo, la traduction d'ei)-0i)|!ia, qu'il nomme à nouveau en grec, accompagnée d'döaußia, id est animum terrore liberum (ibid. 29, 87). Clément d'Alexandrie confirme cette interprétation: la sagesse de Démocrite «enlève à l'âme les passions » (Paed. I, 2, 6, 2). L'idéal du philosophe est bien l'absence de trouble passionnel, mais, selon le contexte, dans la mesure et l'équilibre, avec une note de joie 3 0 . Antisthène au contraire, selon Diogène Laërce, serait l'intégriste de cet étouffement des passions. Fervent disciple de Socrate, « il en hérita la force de supporter (xô KapxspiKÖv) et rivalisa avec son caractère impassible (TÔ àjtaôéç); de là, il prit l'initiative du cynisme » (VI, 2) et « ouvrit à Diogène la voie de

Yapatheia » (VI, 15). 27 28

29

30

J. M. RIST, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge, 1969, p. 56, n. 1. Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia ..., p.3. Il nomme ensuite Heraclite et Anaxagore, qui applique le mot à7ia0f|ç à Dieu (pp. 3—4). D. Laërce (IX, 45). Ce livre est utilisé par Panétius, auteur aussi d'un Ilspi eùôuniaç et cité par Sénèque dans son 'De tranquillitate animi'. Le stoïcien de l'Empire se reconnaît et dans le titre et dans la doctrine. Dans les citations apparaissent les mots d0a|ißia, àtapaÇia, mais aussi àpjiovia, xpia, netpiÔTTiç (cf. Stobée, Ecl. eth. II, p. 76). Le mot £Ù9u|iia est entré dans la terminologie du stoïcisme pour désigner une forme de la xaP une des EÙJtâôeiai ou «bonnes passions» (SVF III, 431—432), dont il sera question plus loin. Cette annexion rend compte de la « joie de vivre » qu'inclut ei>0t)|xia, comme aussi le fait que Diogène Laërce éprouve le besoin de la démarquer du plaisir.

306 ANRW II 36.7

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Platon, qu'on a vu plus haut définir Yapatheia dans l'abstrait, peut, à son tour, apparaître comme un partisan nuancé de cet idéal: « Ceux qui s'adonnent à la philosophie correctement, écrit-il dans le 'Phédon', s'abstiennent de tous les désirs qui relèvent du corps, supportent et ne s'y livrent pas » (82c). Dans la suite du dialogue, il précise les quatre passions dans la terminologie que vulgariseront les stoïciens: « L'âme du vrai philosophe s'abstient des plaisirs et des désirs, des chagrins et des craintes, autant qu'il le peut». Et Platon développe les quatre termes spécifiques en quatre verbes de même racine (83b), pour montrer que le philosophe, en évitant les méfaits des passions, en assure le calme (yaA.i|VT|v, 84a) 3 1 . Telle est la îcdGapcnç, objet du 'Phédon', où l'on se libère du corps pour ressembler à Dieu (81a) dans le « lieu pur de tout mal » (Theait. 177a) 3 2 . Il y a bien, chez Platon, le goût d'une certaine apatheia, comme absolu de morale personnelle. Mais on aura noté les réserves qu'il apporte, et l'on sait qu'il propose, pour la vie publique, une morale de mesure, qui sera examinée plus loin. En somme, la tentation d'une espèce d'apatheia est assez commune avant le stoïcisme. Mais il a fallu attendre le Portique pour qu'elle triomphe. Il y a, derrière ces options morales, des conceptions différentes de l'origine des pathè et de leur nature, qu'il est indispensable dé préciser. b) Divisions de l'âme et origine des pathè a) Avant le stoïcisme Tous les philosophes ont constaté l'existence du mal en l'homme. Il est facile d'accuser le corps, mais le mal est dans l'âme. D'où vient-il? Platon a insisté sur l'influence de « passions redoutables et inévitables » (Tim. 69c). Il en voit le siège dans une partie irrationnelle, qu'il a souvent divisée en 0u(ioei5éç et è7ci0U|iT|TiKÔv. Ainsi, l'âme est un attelage à deux chevaux, l'irascible et le concupiscible, sous la conduite d'un cocher, l'f|78(ioviKÓv ou loyiCTXiKÓv, qui est rationnel (Phaidr. 246ab) 3 3 . Quelquefois, Platon laisse au second plan cette 31

32

33

Platon cependant, par la bouche de Socrate, fait ailleurs, du mouvement, une source de bien (Theait. 1 5 2 d - 1 5 3 c où yaW|vri est image de calme corrupteur; cf. Crat. 411b — 421c, où, par une étymologie à nos yeux toute fantaisiste, il rapproche les termes désignant les vertus de racines liées à la notion de mouvement). Cette « évasion-ressemblance à Dieu » (CPUY-FI 8è ô|ioiooaiç 9e

tô 7cpáY|i.aT' e^ei ouïs àXXa Ttapé/si)121. Il n'est sujet ni à la colère, ni à la bienveillance (xápiai) 122 . C'est un fait que tous les sentiments de ce genre sont liés à la faiblesse » (DL X, 139) m . Plus haut, le texte de Diogène donnait une liste plus longue de sentiments qui « ne s'accordent pas avec la béatitude »: «préoccupations, soucis, colère, bienveillance, sentiments que créent la faiblesse, la crainte et le besoin d'autrui» (DL X 77). L'ataraxie apparaît chez Epicure comme le couronnement de l'agir humain: « Si les activités qui engendrent les plaisirs dans la débauche éliminaient les frayeurs de la pensée qui concernent les phénomènes célestes et la mort et la souffrance (...), nous n'aurions aucun motif de les blâmer, quand elles sont bourrées de plaisirs de toute origine et ne comportent aucunement ni souffrance ni chagrin, ce qui est précisément le mal » (Max. 9, DL X, 142). Mais le plaisir, qui est essentiellement non-douleur, ne réalise le bonheur de l'homme que si l'âme échappe au trouble. L'ataraxie épicurienne est un complément et une précision apportée à Yapatheia, qui, sans elle, ne pourrait être fin suprême. 120

121

122

123

Bonheur et incorruptibilité sont souvent joints dans le livre X des 'Vitae' de D. Laërce (76; 123; 139). Les 'Philosophoumena' d'Hippolyte (?) attribuent la même thèse à Epicure, exactement dans les mêmes termes (1,22,3): f|çn>xàÇetv (•••) xai |if|Te aùxôv Ttpáynaxa exexv |iT)ie âXXoiç juapéxeiv. Tertullien parle aussi d'«Epicure (...) qui libère la divinité de ses activités » et prononce le mot de passiuitas (De an. 46, 2, CCSL 2, 850, 6). II est curieux de voir Lactance reprendre les deux substantifs essentiels au sujet des stoïciens: « Ils disent que la bienveillance est en Dieu, que la colère n'y est pas » (De ira, 5,1). Tout ce texte se retrouve littéralement chez Cicéron: Quod beatum aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratta teneri, quod, quae talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia (De nat. d. I, 17, 45).

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De ces diverses attitudes contemporaines et plus ou moins voisines de Y apatheia stoïcienne, l'apatheia cynique est, à la fois, la moins fondée philosophiquement et la plus radicale, doublée d'une farouche autarcie. Au contraire l'ataraxie sceptique est d'abord intellectuelle, bien qu'elle se veuille morale: elle est abstention d'opinion et, initialement, de toute réaction aux impressions du monde extérieur; mais elle semble avoir opté assez tôt pour la modération dans le domaine de l'inévitable. L'épicurisme apparaît souvent comme un antistoïcisme: il fait du plaisir le souverain bien et vante la retraite, tandis que son rival, centré sur la raison, exclut le pathos et mène à l'action dans la mesure où les circonstances le permettent. Les deux positions morales se rejoignent pourtant sur bien des points. Leurs deux sages sont totalement affranchis de toute espèce de servitude, et cela par un travail de la raison, qui, dans le stoïcisme, supprime toute passion, dans l'épicurisme, joue avec le souvenir heureux des plaisirs ou leur anticipation séduisante (Tusc. III, 15, 33) pour anéantir la douleur, au point que Varron soupçonne leur différend d'être une logomachie (SVF III, 449). Il reste qu'on aurait tort de confondre Vapatheia stoïcienne et l'ataraxie épicurienne. La deuxième est une exploitation du pathos agréable, servie par la raison, qui la met à l'abri des autres pathè, du monde et des dieux. L'apatheia du Portique est l'œuvre et la réussite de la raison, qui élimine tout pathos, pour s'intégrer dans l'univers pleinement rationnel et divin.

III. L'apatheia passe à l'empire

romain

1. Le Moyen stoïcisme Panétius (c. 1 8 0 - c . 105) et Posidonius (c. 1 3 5 - 5 0 ) , qui ont établi le contact entre le stoïcisme et le monde romain, ont-ils été fidèles au Portique? Les stoïciens eux-mêmes n'ont pas mis en cause leur orthodoxie. Mais le médecin Galien, au Ile siècle après J . C., a vu, dans les doctrines de Posidonius, un retour au platonisme, avec de nombreux textes à l'appui, et, si l'on peut discuter le découpage et l'interprétation des citations, l'authenticité en est incontestable. Cicéron, de son côté, qui exploite beaucoup Panétius, dit qu'il a « fui la tristesse et la rudesse » du système, « ne cessant d'avoir à la bouche Platon et Aristote» (De fin. IV, 28, 79) 1 2 4 . Il ne peut, écrit-il encore, «se 124

ÎHXojrXâxcûv icai (piXapicjxoxéXriç, dit un autre témoignage rapporté par M. VAN STRAATEN, Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta, Philosophia antiqua, 5, Leiden, 1962, n° 57. Ce dernier recueil est détaché de M. VAN STRAATEN, Panétius, sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine avec une édition des fragments, Amsterdam, 1946. Il sera utilisé désormais sous le seul nom de VAN STRAATEN, avec le numéro du témoignage, pour les fragments de Panétius. Pour Posidonius, je me servirai de L. EDELSTEIN et I. G. KIDD, Posidonius, vol. I, The Fragments, Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 13, Cambridge, 1972, Part II, sous le sigle Fgt EK, avec le numéro du témoignage, et, éventuellement, l'indication des lignes.

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séparer de son Platon », « qu'il traite à tout moment de divin, et de très savant, et de très saint, et d'Homère des philosophes» (Tusc. I, 32, 79). Ces propos n'empêchent cependant pas Cicéron d'appeler son prédécesseur « le plus rigoureux des stoïciens» (De off. II, 14, 51). Qu'en est-il dans le domaine des passions et de Vapatheia? Diogène Laërce semble admettre que le Moyen stoïcisme avait adouci les exigences du Portique: « Panétius et Posidonius, dit-il, n'affirment pas l'autarcie de la vertu; ils disent qu'on a besoin de santé, de ressources, de pouvoir » (DL VII, 128). Posidonius, plus précisément, rangerait la santé et la richesse, les « indifférents », « parmi les biens » (DL VII, 103), ce qu'amplifie Epiphane de Salamine: «Posidonius d'Apamée disait que richesse et santé constituent le plus grand bien parmi les hommes » (Fgt EK 172). Pourtant, selon Sénèque, il aurait « dit que les richesses sont cause de mal (...) parce qu'elles excitent à le commettre »; et le philosophe latin lui prête ce syllogisme: « Ce qui ne donne à l'âme ni grandeur, ni assurance, ni sécurité n'est pas un bien. Or la richesse, la santé et autres choses semblables n'ont aucun de ces effets. Donc ce ne sont pas des biens » (Ep. 87, 31 — 35). Sans doute faut-il nuancer le sens du mot « biens » selon les emplois. Mais on pouvait difficilement exclure de l'accomplissement de l'homme des réalités qui répondaient aux désirs et aux besoins de certaines facultés parfaitement naturelles 1 2 5 . Or les maîtres du Moyen stoïcisme semblent bien avoir accepté comme normale la présence de l'irrationnel dans l'âme. a) Panétius L'auteur des "Tusculanes', dans une discussion, situe Panétius devant le problème de l'âme: selon Cicéron, il en récuse l'immortalité, contre Platon, parce que l'âme souffre. C'est l'argumentation, dit Cicéron, d'un philosophe «qui néglige (ignorantis), quand on parle de l'éternité des âmes, qu'il s'agit de l'esprit, toujours a l'abri de tout mouvement troublant, et non des parties où évoluent chagrins, colères et plaisirs, parties que l'homme (/s) visé dans ces propos juge éloignées et séparées de l'esprit» (I, 33, 80). Rien ne permet de supposer que Panétius, qui « néglige » dans le raisonnement cette division platonicienne, y souscrive néanmoins. Il reconnaissait cependant l'existence d'un plaisir «conforme (Katà) à la nature», à côté du plaisir « contraire (rcapà) à la nature » 1 2 6 . On peut y lire la tendance dualiste que l'on rencontre ailleurs: 125

126

G. KIDD entend qu'il juge ces réalités adaptées, propres (oîiceïa) aux akoyox Suvdneiç (Posidonius on Emotions ..., p. 208). Sextus Emp. Adu. Dogm. V, 73 = VAN STRAATEN, 112. On dirait que Cicéron commente ce texte dans De off. I, 30, 105 - 1 0 6 . I.

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« Les mouvements de l'âme sont doubles. Les uns relèvent de la pensée, les autres du désir. La pensée se mêle surtout de rechercher le vrai; l'impulsion pousse à l'action» (De off. I, 36, 132 = VAN STRAATEN, 88). « Double est la faculté (uis) des âmes et de la nature, dit-il ailleurs: une part {pars) réside dans l'impulsion, l'ôpnf| grecque, qui entraîne l'homme ici ou là, l'autre dans la raison, et elle enseigne et explique ce qu'il faut faire et éviter » 1 2 7 . A . J . VOELKE conclut sagement comme «fort vraisemblable», avec M . VAN STRAATEN, et c o n t r e M . POHLENZ, R . PHILIPPSON, L . EDELSTEIN, q u e P a n é t i u s

« incline au dualisme psychologique. Mais il ne nous paraît pas possible de préciser la nature et la portée de ce dualisme » 1 2 8 . Cicéron poursuit la dernière citation, sans doute de son propre chef: «Ainsi se fait que la raison préside et que l'impulsion obéit» 1 2 9 . On trouve de cette manière continuellement chez Cicéron, autour des bribes de Panétius, dans un contexte inspiré de lui aussi sans doute, l'obligation de soumettre les impulsions, désirs ou élans, à la raison, comme les passions proprement dites 130 . Notre stoïcien ne présentait-il pas, comme fin dernière (xéXoq), au dire de Clément d'Alexandrie, de « vivre selon les propensions qui nous sont données de la part de la nature » 1 3 1 , conformément à la tradition du Portique? Les témoignages qui nous en restent offrent quelques exemples de cette attitude raisonnable. « En termes élégants » au goût de Sénèque, il met en garde un jeune homme contre les risques de l'amour, que le sage seul pourrait courir sans danger 132 . Aulu-Gelle, donnant « une idée » du « deuxième des trois célèbres livres du philosophe Panétius 'Sur les devoirs'», imités par Cicéron, invite à être comme le lutteur, toujours prêt à parer « la violence et l'effronterie des offenses en tout lieu et en tout temps» (N.A. XIII, 28, 1—4 = VAN STRAATEN, 116). Devant la mort d'un enfant, selon Plutarque, Panétius fait redire le mot d'Anaxagore, devenu traditionnel: « je savais que j'avais engendré un mortel » 1 3 3 . 127

128

129 130

131

De off. I, 28, 101 = VAN STRAATEN, 87. Ce texte est un décalque du grec, où ôp|xf| est maintenu, où uis, dans l'expression « d o u b l e faculté», représente 86va|iiç. Pars (népoç) reprend uis, qu'il semble dépasser, mais Chrysippe révèle la même hésitation, au moins terminologique. On en resterait donc à une dualité de fonctions. L'attribution à Panétius de ces textes n'est pas explicite, mais n'est guère discutée. On y ajoute quelquefois Tusc. II, 21, 47, écarté par VAN STRAATEN, où il est question de « d e u x parts, dont l'une est participante de la raison, l'autre extérieure». L'idée de volonté ..., p. l i é . M ê m e position nuancée, mais un peu plus prononcée en faveur de la division, chez J . M . RIST, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 183 — 184. D e off. I, 28, 101; cf. I, 29, 103. Ibid. I, 20, 67 et 69; 36, 132; II, 5, 18 (VAN STRAATEN, 89). Cf. Temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus (ibid. 1 , 2 7 , 9 3 = VAN STRAATEN, 107). K a x à xàç (...) àcpopuâç (Str. II, 21, 1 2 9 , 4 = VAN STRAATEN, 96). A.-J. VOELKE, L'Idée de volonté ..., p. 116, discute ce texte de Clément contre l'interprétation d'A. GRILLI.

132

E p . 1 1 6 , 5 = VAN STRAATEN, 1 1 4 .

133

Plutarque, De coh. ira 436D = VAN STRAATEN, 115.

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Mais ce réalisme dépasse-t-il la simple sagesse? Cicerón, en soulignant son stoïcisme et sa haute autorité, rapporte qu'en « écrivant à Quintus Tubéron sur la patience dans la douleur, nulle part Panétius n'établit, ce qui eût été primordial, si la preuve était possible, que la douleur n'est pas un mal, (...) mais seulement la manière de la supporter» (De off. IV, 9 , 2 3 = VAN STRAATEN, 1 1 3 ) . Dans les nombreux textes cités plus haut comme inspirés de Panétius, il est toujours question de soumission des passions à la raison, jamais d'éradication. Aulu-Gelle fait remarquer aussi par son ami Calvisius Taurus au sujet des gémissements douloureux: « Ces choses, le sage peut les supporter et les surmonter, il ne peut pas les empêcher totalement d'atteindre sa sensibilité. 'Avcdynoia (insensibilité) et árcáOsia ont été désapprouvées et rejetées non seulement par mon jugement, dit-il, mais par le jugement de certains personnages plus avisés du même Portique, tel Panétius, un homme important et savant » (N. A. X I I , 5, 10 =

VAN STRAATEN, 1 1 1 ) 1 3 4 .

Panétius a sans doute mal supporté le « rationalisme » intégral d'un Chrysippe. Tout en célébrant l'hégémonie de la raison, il a eu tendance à ne pas refuser à l'irrationnel tout enracinement dans la nature, et, par là, à ouvrir la porte discrètement à un certain dualisme psychologique. Dans cette logique, il n'a pas souscrit à l'apatheia rigoriste, considérée essentiellement comme suppression des passions. Le Ilepi ei>0uniaç, que lui attribue Diogène Laërce (IX, 2 0 = VAN STRAATEN, 4 5 ) , assurant, au moins par le titre, le relai entre Démocrite et Plutarque, devait inclure dans une sécurité joyeuse ce «plaisir conforme à la nature », qu'il reconnaissait et que Cicéron, dans un contexte panétien, ne condamne pas, si l'on « observe la mesure dans la jouissance » (De off. I, 30, 106). En tout cas, le grand philosophe du 1er siècle qui, selon Aulu-Gelle, imita son traité 'Sur les devoirs' « avec beaucoup d'application et au prix d'un très grand travail» (N.A. XIII, 28, l) 1 3 i , au point que le lecteur distingue difficilement, dans l'ouvrage latin, la part respective de l'un et de l'autre, au moins à deux reprises, au terme d'exposés où la présence de Panétius est reconnue, parle de tranquillitas animi et securitas, l'eùGu^ia, en y associant aussitôt la constantia13é, version cicéronienne de Yeupatheia. La morale des devoirs et du convenable et la théorie de la personnalité, qui caractérisent l'œuvre de Panétius, vont dans le même sens: un souci d'harmonie, 134

135

136

On peut voir, dans ces « signes et indices d'un homme non pas vaincu et écrasé par la douleur, mais s'efforçant de vaincre et de l'écraser» ( N . A . XII, 5, 9), les Jipo7tá0siai, réactions antérieures à la prise de contrôle, acceptées par le stoïcisme tardif. Il s'agit ici plus précisément de réactions concomitantes au combat, mouvements instinctifs également inévitables. Cicéron reconnaît parfaitement sa dette envers Panétius. Il dit qu'il l'a « suivi plus qu'aucun en y apportant quelques corrections » (De off. III, 2, 7). De off. I, 20, 69 et 21, 72.

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harmonie de l'homme à l'intérieur de lui-même et avec les autres hommes. L'apatheia prend plus souvent son visage d'eupatheia, sans assumer toutes les exigences préalables de l'ascèse radicale: le stoïcisme est humanisé, mais non trahi peut-être. b) Posidonius Posidonius, toujours associé à Panétius dans l'histoire, en apparaît bien distant sur les points qui nous préoccupent. D'une part, il reprend ouvertement à son compte avec quelques nuances, l'anthropologie platonicienne que l'on soupçonnait seulement chez son prédécesseur, d'autre part, il maintient Y apatheia, deux positions qui paraissent plutôt s'exclure. La psychologie de Posidonius, surtout comme base d'une doctrine des passions, nous est bien connue grâce à son traité I l s pi rcaGcov, très abondamment cité par Galien. Personne ne conteste qu'il abandonne la rigueur du monisme psychologique de Chrysippe 1 3 7 . Il professe la présence en l'âme, d'une part, de la raison (XOYICTTIKÔV), d'autre part, du 0U|XÔÇ, 5ôva|iiç 0u|io£i8r|Ç ou « irascible », et de l'è7ti0U|iia, 8ûva|xvç è7ci0u(ir|TiKTi ou « concupiscible », deux facultés irrationnelles (TCÙÇ àÀôyoïç xfjç \J/«X"NÇ 8UVALSAI), par définition « sans raison » et indépendantes d'elle, regroupées quelquefois en TKXGTÏUKÔV. On retrouve là, dans l'ensemble, la partition platonicienne de l'âme et l'auteur adopte l'image de l'attelage, où la raison joue le rôle de cocher essayant d'imposer par un dressage sa direction à ses partenaires 1 3 8 , qui ne sont d'ailleurs pas nécessairement accordés entre eux. Cependant Galien souligne avec insistance que Posidonius ne suit pas Platon jusqu'à voir derrière ces trois fonctions des parties de l'âme. Il s'agit des « capacités (5uvd|xeiç) d'une substance unique issue du cœur » 1 3 9 . Il évite la rupture avec le stoïcisme.

137

138

139

Voir à ce sujet ce qui a été dit plus haut sur Chrysippe. Dans la bibliographie, il faut remarquer A. GLIBERT-THIRRY, La théorie de la passion chez Chrysippe et chez Posidonius, et, surtout, J. FILLION-LAHILLE, Le 'De ira' de Sénèque, qui consacre 80 pages à Posidonius (pp. 121 — 199), dont une bonne part au problème des passions. Voir, parmi les travaux qui concernent directement Posidonius: I. G. KIDD, Posidonius on Emotions, en y joignant la critique de D. BABUT, Questions stoïciennes, Rev. Et. Grecques, 86, 1973, pp. 444 — 455, surtout pp. 453 — 454; évidemment M. LAFFRANQUE, Poseidonios d'Apamée. Essai de mise au point, Paris, 1964, surtout pp. 369 - 448 (L'anthropologie stoïcienne). 'Hviôxto xivi TOÔ Çeûyooç xcov aujwpûxcov ïnrccov (...) èxointov ÊJteaGai xe KCÙ jcei0ea9ai xà> Xoyianô (Fgt EK 31). Cf. Fgt EK 32: xpicov 5uvâ(XE(ov, èjn9o|rnxiKfjç XE KCÙ 0u|xosi8oùç KCÙ XOYICTTIKRJÇ, tripartition que Posidonius attribuerait aussi à Cléanthe; pour la tripartition, cf. Fgt EK 142; 143; 144; 145. Il affirme contre Chrysippe et sa conception rationaliste de la passion que l'animal dispose de deux facultés irrationnelles, nommées à nouveau, puis groupées sous le mot 7taGr|xiKÔv en face du loyiaxiKÔv propre à l'homme (Fgt EK 33; cf. 158 et 159). Il explique, contre Chrysippe et sa définition de la passionjugement, que le dérèglement du logos ne vient pas de la raison, mais de quelque âXoyoç Sôvamç (Fgt EK 34, 10 — 19). Sur la présence du 7ta9r|xiKÔv chez l'enfant, son éducation et le développement du XoyiaxiKÔv vers les 14 ans, cf. Fgt EK 31, 10 — 21. 'O 8è 'ApicrxoxéXriç xe KCÙ Ô ITooeiScûvioç eïSr| (xèv fî (lépr) yuxnç OÛK ôvo|iâÇouaiv, Suvdneiç 8è elvai tpacri niâç oùaiaç ÊK xfjç KapSiaç ôpuconévîiç (Fgt EK 146); il écarte

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Posidonius mêle à cette psychologie d'autres notations, qui ne cadrent pas toujours avec la doctrine de Platon et qui ne sont d'ailleurs pas faciles à concilier avec ce que nous savons de ses propres thèses, peut-être parce qu'elles sont choisies et interprétées par Galien, qui se fait manifestement du stoïcien un allié, peut-être aussi parce que Posidonius entend expliquer par l'expérience140 le phénomène passionnel et non bâtir un système de l'âme. Mais il est bien certain que le logos n'est plus le tout de l'âme. Le 7ta0T|"nKÓv, qui appartient à la nature, n'est pas mauvais de soi. Il rend service, selon les « vertus irrationnelles » attachées à ses facultés (Fgt EK 31, 32 — 34), tournées l'une vers le plaisir, l'autre vers la victoire (Fgt EK 160). Mais il est influençable (Fgt EK 158; 166; 169, 77 - 82) et l'inclination qui accompagne chaque faculté peut la faire dévier, au risque de déséquilibrer dans quelque excès (jitaovâÇoucra) la raison (Fgt EK, 34, 15 - 20) et de verser dans l'ávaX,oyía (Fgt EK 187, 5). La raison, toujours fonction de l'f|yenoviKÓv, en bon aurige, doit veiller à ce que « les chevaux du désir et de la combativité (Gu^ôç), nés avec nous, ne se trouvent ni trop forts ni trop faibles, ni nonchalants, ni emportés, ni rétifs ou désaccordés ou violents, mais totalement prêts à suivre le raisonnement et à lui obéir» (Fgt EK 31, 20 — 23), une sorte de modération où viennent s'inscrire toutes les vertus. « Mais certains hommes, par erreur, s'imaginent comme convenable absolument ce qui convient aux puissances irrationnelles de l'âme, sans considérer que le plaisir et la domination d'autrui répondent à la tendance animale de l'âme, tandis que la sagesse et tout ce qui est honnête relèvent du raisonnable et du divin» (Fgt EK 161) 141 . La soumission aux puissances irrationnelles, nullement inévitable, entraîne « la maladie de l'âme », associée aux passions (Fgt EK 164, 31 — 32). Les passions ne sont, affirme Posidonius, ni les jugements erronés, comme le pensait Chrysippe, ni les phénomènes physiologiques qu'ils accompagnent selon Zénon. Il les définit, en raccourci, comme « certains mouvements des autres puissances, celles que Platon a appelées concupiscibles et irascibles »,

140

141

encore ailleurs eï8r| et (lópia (Fgt EK 145; cf. 142). L'exposé de Galien emploie tout de même áXóycav xfjç yu/fjç p.epcùv (Fgt EK 31, 33; 1 8 7 , 1 9 ; cf. 186, 15 ap. Clément d'Alexandrie) ou (lópia (Fgt EK 160, 2 et 5). Chrysippe réduit ces facultés à une ôùvaniç unique (Fgt EK 31, 36 — 40; 146, 5 — 7). M. LAFFRANQUE me paraît s'avancer trop loin dans les précisions qu'elle apporte sur les conceptions de Posidonius en ce domaine (Poseidonios d'Apamée, pp. 429 - 430). « Nous n'avons pas besoin de longs discours, ni de démonstrations trop affinées, mais du seul souvenir de ce que nous avons subi en toute occasion» (Fgt EK 156, 1 0 - 1 2 ) . A. GLIBERT-THIRRY souligne cet aspect dans l'article rappelé en tête de ce développement. Cf. Fgt EK 187, 5 1 - 5 3 . Posidonius verrait même en l'homme deux «démons»; le bon « a la même nature que le (logos) qui régit tout l'univers », et le mauvais correspond au monde « bestial », qu'il traite aussi d'« athée ». Suivre ce dernier est « cause des passions » (Fgt EK 187, 4 - 1 3 ) .

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qui sont irrationnelles (Fgt EK 152). Après avoir repoussé les deux mêmes définitions de ses prédécesseurs, il se contente ailleurs de faire, plus correctement, de l'irrationnel la cause: «Les passions naissent sous l'effet de la puissance irascible et concupiscible » (Fgt EK 157) 1 4 2 , qui n'a pas été assez fermement dressée, faute d'une raison suffisamment forte. Ce jeu de l'irrationnel résout, en bonne partie, les problèmes restés insolubles dans la théorie de Chrysippe. Posidonius n'écarte pas pour autant, du procès passionnel, l'intervention de la raison: Plutarque dit expressément que Posidonius place « désirs, craintes et colères » « dans les jugements et conceptions » (Fgt EK 154, 13). Il y a bien, même selon le témoignage de Galien, au cœur de l'action mauvaise des « conceptions fausses », causées, à la fois, par « l'affaiblissement du À o y i c m K Ô v » et par «l'entraînement du 7ta9r|TiKÔv» (Fgt EK 169, 7 2 - 8 2 ) . Posidonius, malgré son souci de mieux expliquer le phénomène passionnel par les causes, ce qui correspond à la préoccupation étiologique de toute son œuvre, n'apparaît pas, en définitive, comme l'antichrysippe que Galien semble avoir souhaité. Une telle doctrine, où l'irrationnel est apparemment aussi naturel que le raisonnable et où la santé est dans l'équilibre de trois composantes, devrait entraîner une morale de la modération. En face des « progressants », Posidonius appelle d'ailleurs incidemment les sages les nétpioi, les « modérés » (Fgt EK 163, 37 — 39). Il est cependant un partisan de Yapatheia: « C'est une évidence, lui fait dire Galien, que l'âme du sage est apathès », alors que le corps ne l'est pas (Fgt EK 163, 1 5 - 16 et 35) 1 4 3 , et il veut nuancer à ce sujet l'image de la santé que Chrysippe applique à l'âme 1 4 4 . Le témoignage serait faible, si ne s'ajoutaient en confirmation les propos de Posidonius rapportés par Cicéron, son admirateur. Comme Pompée, de passage à Rhodes, voulait voir le philosophe, mais qu'il avait scrupule à le déranger dans une grave maladie, « sous le coup des pointes de fer de la douleur», le malade insista lui-même et «dit plus d'une fois » au cours de la rencontre: « Tu travailles en vain, douleur! Si 142

143

144

En fait, la définition de la passion est un point très délicat de la doctrine de Posidonius. Selon Galien, il se démarque essentiellement de ses prédécesseurs. Mais sa théorie personnelle n'est pas toujours nette dans le détail et il semble souvent rendre à la raison, quand il définit pour son compte, ce qu'il lui enlève quand il critique Chrysippe. J. FILLION-LAHILLE tend à combler le fossé creusé entre les deux stoïciens par Galien: « La passion, pour Posidonius, reste un jugement de notre raison » (Le 'De ira' de Sénèque, pp. 156—159) et elle a le même siège que la raison (pp. 160 — 162); il a voulu compléter Chrysippe, non le récuser. J.PIGEAUD rétorque: « J e pense que Galien (...) a raison contre Mme FILLION » (à propos de la thèse de J. FILLION-LAHILLE, Le 'De ira' de Sénèque), Rev. Et. Lat., 62, 1984, p. 38. Dans une réponse à Chrysippe, dont il reprend sans doute la terminologie, il admet que « les sages, dans la pensée que la parfaite beauté constitue un bien très grand et sans mesure, n'en sont pas secoués passionnellement (èuTtaôwç) » (Fgt EK 164, 13 — 15). Posidonius parle aussi d'àox^Ticria, une notion épicurienne, qui désigne la tranquillité établie, associée d'ailleurs à f|8ovr| dans le texte où il est question des définitions inexactes de la fin morale. Il dit que «ce n'est pas le terme», le souverain bien, mais qu'elle «est en rapport nécessaire avec le souverain bien» (Fgt EK 187, 28 — 31). N'y aurait-il pas là un signe que Posidonius tendait à assouplir l'autarcie de la vertu?

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pénible que tu puisses être, jamais je ne conviendrai que tu es un mal » (Tusc. II, 25, 61). C'est Vapatheia vécue, mal accordée, en fait, avec la doctrine de la passion qui se dégage de l'œuvre écrite, quoi qu'en dise notre philosophe. En tout cas, sur ce point, plus encore que pour le reste, Posidonius maintient la tradition du Portique: « n'être mené en rien par la partie irrationnelle de l'âme» (Fgt EK 186, 1 4 - 1 5 ; cf. 187, 1 2 - 1 3 ) . 2. La terminologie latine En fait, Panétius et Posidonius, par leurs relations avec Rome, ont introduit le stoïcisme dans le monde latin. Cicéron, déjà souvent invoqué, est le grand témoin de cette première présence. Sénèque, ensuite, assure la permanence du mouvement, suivi essentiellement par Epictète et par Marc Aurèle. Si ces derniers ont produit leur œuvre philosophique en grec, comme les maîtres du Moyen stoïcisme, Cicéron et Sénèque ont présenté la doctrine en latin, la langue qui allait en être porteuse jusqu'au XVIe siècle. Il n'est pas inutile de s'arrêter un instant à la traduction du mot ànâGeia et des termes voisins dans cet univers nouveau145. On a déjà rencontré les problèmes que posait le mot 7td0oç pour Cicéron et pour les Latins: Cicéron hésite entre morbus, qu'il juge plus « littéral », et perturbatio, qu'il adopte. Dès lors, l'idée d'apatheia est exprimée souvent par la périphrase: être vide (uacare), exempt de perturbatio146. Mais ce dernier mot évoque plus directement xapa%r] et nous situe plutôt, quoi qu'en veuille Cicéron, dans une atmosphère épicurienne. Le voisinage d'eùGunia, terme illustré par Démocrite et cultivé dans le même milieu, n'est pas pour arranger les affaires. L'ei>0i)|iia, on l'a vu, selon Diogène Laërce (IX, 45), procure une âme qui «n'est troublée ni par la peur (...) ni par aucune autre passion». Cicéron, sans doute en dépendance du Ilepi sù0O|iiaç de Panétius, traduit le mot artimi tranquillitas (De fin. V, 8, 23). Ailleurs, rappelons-le, il rapproche d'eùGunia àGanPia, id est animum terrore liberum (ibid. 29, 87). Pour le dialogue qu'il consacre à la même notion, Sénèque adopte comme titre l'expression latine que donne Cicéron: 'De tranquillitate animi'. Quand il fait allusion à «l'excellent ouvrage de Démocrite», il traduit euthymian simplement tranquillitatem. Dans le contexte, il parle d'« assiette stable de l'âme », du privilège «de ne pas être troublé (concuti) », d'attitude «toujours égale», marquée par la «joie» (gaudium; cf. laetus)147. Il mêle même à l'exposé le portrait du sage stoïcien (XI) et l'on ne sait s'il parle d'euthymia ou d'apatheia.

145

146

147

P. GRIMAL signale la difficulté pour Cicéron et Sénèque, traducteurs du stoïcisme, dans: Sénèque ou la conscience de l'Empire, Paris, 1978 (éd. nouvelle, 1991), pp. 34 — 41 et passim. Omni animi perturbatione uacare (Tusc. IV, 4, 8); uacabit (...) perturbationibus (...) omnibus; uacuus animus (ibid. 17,38). De tr. an. 2, 3 — 4. Il adopte, en fait, la définition stoïcienne où l'eùGunia est une variété de la %apâ, l'une des eupatheiai (SVF III, 4 3 1 - 4 3 2 ) .

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Cette contamination ne pouvait qu'inciter les Latins à affronter le terme propre d'àji.i|vg) » (V, 2; cf. XII, 22) 2 1 8 . Cette image, doublée d'une autre, sert à traduire une profession surprenante de réelle apatheia: « La douleur (tiôvoç) est un mal, soit pour le corps — et qu'il s'exprime donc — soit pour l'âme (vux^) 2 1 9 . Mais il est possible à celle-ci de sauvegarder, en propre, une sérénité qui tient du ciel et de la mer (xt)v îôiav aîGpiav kcù yaX.f|vr|v), et de juger que ce n'est pas un mal» (VIII, 28,1).

En somme, les 'Pensées' reconnaissent à l'homme la capacité de nier la souffrance. Marc Aurèle est donc loin de méconnaître la doctrine de Y apatheia. Bien qu'il l'emploie encore beaucoup moins qu'Epictète, il n'ignore pas le terme 2 2 0 . Il soutient que « la douceur et la paix (tô Ttpçov kcù finepov) sont plus humaines et plus viriles » que l'irritation et demandent plus de courage. « Comme le chagrin est d'une âme faible, de même aussi la colère » m . Mais, poursuit-il, «plus une conduite est apparentée à Y apatheia, plus elle l'est aussi à la puissance» (XI, 18, 21 — 23). Le philosophe se réjouit que son maître Sextus « n'ait jamais présenté même l'apparence de la colère 2 2 2 , ni de quelque autre passion, mais qu'il ait toujours été à la fois et très affranchi des passions (ànaQéazaTov) et très affectueux » (I, 9, 9). Ce dernier mot dit en même temps que Y apatheia selon Marc Aurèle n'exclut pas la sensibilité. Il reste que le terme ne lui est pas familier. Veut-il se démarquer des Cyniques, dont il semble dénoncer les excès (II, 30)? En tout cas, rien n'invite à douter de sa fidélité au Portique sur ce point.

Ces mots et d'autres de même famille se trouvent à plusieurs exemplaires. Sont communs avec Epictète: yaXr]vr|, ei)Koa(iia, eùpoeîv, eùaxaOeîv. 219 surprend ici. D'après la suite, on attend un terme qui désignerait proprement la partie intellectuelle de l'homme. 220 'A7ta0T|ç est appliqué une fois aux éléments (VII, 50, 2). 221 Marc Aurèle soutient ailleurs aussi qu'il « faut garder un jugement stable (eôcrxaBoOç) », contre ceux qui cherchent à nuire, et pratiquer la douceur (jipqiôxrixoç). « Car se fâcher contre eux serait faiblesse » (XI, 9, 1 - 2 ) . Il faut se souvenir toutefois que 7tpçôxT|ç relève de la sphère de la métriopathie plutôt que de l'apatheia. 222 A la première ligne de ses 'Pensées' (1,1), il se félicite de l'àôpYT|xov de son grand-père Vérus. 218

APATHE1A

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/V. Apatheia (et ataraxie), du 1er s. avant J. C. au Ille s. après J. C., hors du stoïcisme et du christianisme 1. Cicéron et Lucrèce De Posidonius à Marc Aurèle, Yapatheia non seulement se maintient, mais reprend de la vigueur, même si la terminologie est quelque peu hésitante. En même temps, la morale stoïcienne, à partir du 1er siècle après J. C., répand ses thèses, souvent son vocabulaire, chez les philosophes étrangers à l'École. Elle devient, aux Ile — Ille siècles, tout en atténuant sa rigueur, un élément de la culture commune. La conséquence assez étonnante est que le terme àrcdGeia est bien plus présent, non sans provoquer quelques réactions ou interprétations, chez Plutarque, Philon ou Plotin, et chez certains chrétiens, qu'il ne l'est chez Epictète ou Marc Aurèle, les professionnels de la doctrine. L'ataraxie épicurienne est beaucoup moins vigoureuse, mais elle n'est pas absente. Ce dernier développement évoquera quelques manifestations de ces deux notions, en dehors du christianisme, du 1er siècle avant J. C. jusqu'au Ille siècle, chez Cicéron et Lucrèce, chez Philon et dans le judaïsme, chez Plutarque, dans le néoplatonisme latin et grec. a) Cicéron Cicéron, parmi les marginaux de Yapatheia, est le premier par les dates et par l'importance, avec son maître Antiochus d'Askalon, en qui il voyait, « à très peu d'altérations près, un très authentique stoïcien » (Ac. pr. II, 43, 132). Il est essentiellement un témoin, déjà souvent invoqué précédemment. Mais ce témoin, qui se veut « socratique et platonicien » sans se séparer d'Aristote (De off. I, 1, 2), se reconnaît des maîtres stoïciens, comme Diodote, son hôte (Brutus, 90, 309), ou Posidonius (De nat. d. 1,3,6), et se montre habituellement sympathique au Portique, en particulier à sa doctrine des passions223. Comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, dans la traduction qu'il donne du mot grec, il tient à souligner dans le pathos le trouble profond et le caractère 223

II est bien difficile, dans le genre du « dialogue » qu'il adopte habituellement, de distinguer les loci où Cicéron est témoin et ceux où il est partisan. L'attaque la plus radicale du stoïcisme figure dans le De fin. VI. Sur l'attitude de Cicéron devant le Portique et ses variations, voir par ex. P. MILTON VALENTE, L'Ethique stoïcienne chez Cicéron, thèse, Paris —Porto Alegre, 1956, mais aussi l'introduction à L'édition-trad. de J . MOLAGER, Cicéron, Les paradoxes des stoïciens, Paris, 1971, pp. 39 — 54; ou MARCIA L. COLISH, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, I, Stoicism in classical Latin Literature, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 34, Leiden, 1985, pp. 61 — 158 (l'affirmation que Cicéron adopte la théorie stoïcienne des passions et Yapatheia, pp.

153-154).

309 ANRW II 36.7

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maladif 224 . Il pourchasse continuellement la passion. Quand il définit la grandeur d'âme, il met à la base, avec insistance, que l'on « soit libre de tout trouble de l'âme » (De off. I, 20, 6 6 - 6 9 ) . Dans le Ve 'Paradoxe des stoïciens', il dénonce les grands qui sont esclaves de leurs passions: est libre tout homme qui les maîtrise. Dans les 'Tusculanes', l'œuvre où il profite le plus du stoïcisme pour édifier sa vie personnelle, il explique que « l'âme du sage est toujours affectée de telle manière qu'elle se sert au mieux de sa raison. En conséquence, elle n'est jamais troublée (perturbants) » (III, 7, 15). Il faut extirper totalement les passions (Tusc. III, 6, 13), «quand le tronc est renversé, extraire toutes les souches » (ibid. III, 34, 83), a-t-on vu. Quoi qu'en disent ses «amis péripatéticiens» avec leur juste milieu (mediocritates), «tout mal, même modéré, est un mal. Or notre affaire à nous, c'est qu'il n'y en ait pas du tout chez le sage» (ibid. III, 10, 22). Pas de «mesure dans le vice» (ibid. IV, 17, 39; 18, 41), de « modération dans les maux» (ibid. IV, 26, 57) 2 2 5 . Dans le contexte de ces principes, il considère toute passion comme inutile (ibid. IV, 20 — 21, 45 — 47) et condamne successivement la colère (ibid. IV, 21 — 23, 48 — 52), le désir et le chagrin (ibid. IV, 25, 55), même la pitié, associée une fois de plus à l'envie (ibid. IV, 26, 56) 2 2 6 . Il redit qu'il faut les «arracher et extirper à fond, non tailler et émonder» (ibid. IV, 26, 57) 2 2 7 . « Une âme vide de ces passions rend l'homme parfaitement et totalement heureux» (ibid. IV, 17, 38). Comme l'absence de passions s'identifie avec la vertu, Cicéron enseigne par là-même ce qui constitue effectivement, à très peu d'hésitations près, une des rares constantes de son œuvre, « l'autarcie de la vertu pour le bonheur » 2 2 8 , et cela en dépit de son maître Antiochus (Ac. pr. II, 44, 135). Ces déclarations sont bien une profession d'apatheia, dira-t-on. Et c'est vrai que Cicéron en est obsédé. Dans une œuvre politique comme sa 'Républi224 m

226

227

228

Cf. surtout Tusc. III, 4 - 5 , 7 - 1 1 ; IV, 11, 26 et 13, 3 0 - 3 1 . Cf. De fin. II, 9, 26 — 27: le désir ne se limite pas. « Il faut l'enlever et l'extraire jusqu'aux racines ». On n'admet pas un « juste milieu dans les vices ». Sur pitié et envie, parmi les autres passions, cf. Tusc. III, 9 — 10, 20 — 21; IV, 8, 18. Cicéron invite à secourir au lieu de gémir (Tusc. IV, 26, 56), un lieu commun. Absolu sur le principe, Cicéron apporte quelques nuances dans le texte, quand il en fait l'application à l'orateur, au soldat, au sage ... Près de vingt ans plus tôt, plaidant 'Pro Murena' indirectement contre le zèle de Caton, il disait que «toutes les vertus sont modérées par une sorte de juste milieu (mediocritate) » (30, 63). C'est le titre même du Ile 'Paradoxe des stoïciens' (cf. Parad. I: « le beau moral est le seul bien ») et celui de Tusc. V: « la vertu se suffit pour bien vivre », thèse qu'il soutient en particulier ibid. 6, 1 6 - 1 7 ; 1 3 - 1 6 , 4 0 - 4 8 ; cf. De fin. III, 16, 5 3 - 5 4 et Ac. post. I, 10 — 12, 3 5 - 4 3 ; thèse qu'il juge probable Ac. pr. II, 45, 138 — 139. Mais dans le De leg. 11 se range à l'avis d'Antiochus d'Askalon et admet la place des biens extérieurs dans la vertu (1,20 — 21, 54 — 56). C'est le lieu de rappeler que Cicéron adapte ses thèses aux circonstances.

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que', qui prête cependant aux concessions, il fait dire par Scipion, le principal intervenant: « Qui pourrait croire qu'il existât homme plus riche que celui à qui ne manque rien de ce que demande la nature, plus puissant que celui qui obtient tout ce qu'il recherche, plus heureux que celui qui est affranchi de toute passion (perturbatione animï)}» (I, 17, 27, 141-142). Cependant Cicéron hésite visiblement à en pousser les exigences jusqu'à leur terme. D'abord son réalisme semble souvent envisager la réussite de l'opération avec quelque réserve: « Pourtant il en restera quelque chose peut-être, tant sont profondes les souches de la déraison» (Tusc. III, 6,13), «une morsure de l'âme et un serrement de cœur» (ibid. III, 34, 83) 229 . Quand on objecte que « le sage ne peut pas être exempt de toute passion (animi perturbatione) », sa réfutation aboutit seulement à dire: « Si (les passions) n'atteignent pas le sage, l'esprit du sage sera toujours tranquille» (ibid. IV, 4, 8), état qui peut ne pas dépasser en rigueur le niveau de Yeuthymia. On en vient à se demander si le philosophe est vraiment partisan d'une authentique apatheia. Dans le passage des "Tusculanes' où il affirme le plus nettement que l'âme sans passions atteint le bonheur parfait, il définit cette absence de passions en des termes qu'un péripatéticien pourrait admettre: « Cet homme, quel qu'il soit, qui par sa modération et sa constance se trouve l'âme tranquille et en paix avec lui-même, assez pour n'être pas alangui par les chagrins ou brisé par la crainte, pour ne pas brûler du désir assoiffé de l'objet recherché, pour ne pas se répandre en manifestations d'une gaieté fragile, voilà le sage que nous cherchons, voilà l'homme heureux dont aucune affaire humaine, semble-t-il, ne pourra ni abattre l'âme, parce que l'événement serait insupportable, ni l'exalter parce qu'il serait trop réjouissant» (Tusc. IV, 17, 37). Il suffirait, en somme, d'éviter l'excès des passions, de les dominer pour atteindre sagesse et bonheur. Enfin, deux textes contemporains l'un de l'autre, et, pour le moins, mal accordés entre eux, trahissent bien, dans leurs divergences, l'indécision de l'auteur. Crantor, nous l'avons évoqué, condamne sans réserve une apatheia qui est indolentia, négation de la douleur et de la sensibilité, et, par là, «cruauté morale et atonie physique». Cicéron rapporte ce témoignage avec précaution: la sensibilité est chose «humaine» et «naturelle». Mais, aussitôt après, il demande plus solennellement que jamais la suppression de toutes les passions: 229

309*

II ajoute que c'est là un phénomène « naturel », qui n'est pas de la passion.

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« Prenons garde: que ce langage ne soit pas celui des gens qui flattent notre faiblesse et complaisent à notre mollesse. Pour nous, ayons l'audace non seulement de trancher les branches de nos misères, mais d'arracher toutes les fibres des racines » (Tusc. III, 6, 12 - 1 3 ) . A la même date approximativement, dans ses 'Académiques', il pose aussi le problème de l'apatheia: « Pouvons-nous approuver comme vrai que l'âme du sage jamais ne soit émue par le désir, ni soulevée par la joie? Soit. C'est bien une opinion probable. Et les affirmations suivantes aussi: ne jamais craindre, ne jamais souffrir? ». Après une allusion au même traité de Crantor, il se demande comment ces thèses, « nécessaires » au système de Zénon, dans leur « âpreté », « ont envahi l'Ancienne Académie ». « Celles-là, non, je ne puis les supporter » (Ac. pr. II, 44, 135 —136), déclare-t-il. Placé expressément devant le problème de l'apatheia, il rejette ici la position qu'un peu plus haut, ad duritiam cordis, il admet 230 . En fait, Cicéron est sincèrement convaincu, avec les stoïciens, que la passion est un mal et qu'il faut l'étouffer. Mais son appartenance à la Nouvelle Académie dans le courant antidogmatiste, son rôle personnel et surtout politique, sa profonde humanitas, et, peut-être aussi, son caractère conciliant tempèrent son idéal. Non seulement, avec le Portique, il rejette l'insensibilité, mais il oriente l'apatheia vers une simple et solide maîtrise de soi, favorable à l'action et à la relation. Il incline, presque inconsciemment, vers la métriopathie, qu'il condamne sans répit. b) Lucrèce Tandis que Cicéron exploite tout l'héritage antique de Y apatheia, Lucrèce, dont le philosophe a peut-être sauvé l'œuvre devant la postérité, reprend, dans son 'De natura rerum', la doctrine de l'ataraxie divine et humaine d'Epicure, dans un monde romain qui s'ouvrait à l'épicurisme. Beaucoup moins nuancé que son maître grec, il entend « l'aboiement de la nature »: « rien autre qu'un corps bien séparé de la douleur et un esprit qui jouisse d'une agréable sensation, loin du souci et de la crainte» (II, 1 7 - 1 9 ) . A cet effet, il explique l'origine et le développement de l'univers par un atomisme purement mécanistique. Pourquoi s'inquiéter de la mort et de l'audelà? Les dieux occupent leurs «demeures sereines» (III, 18; cf. 24), «dans une paix totale », « loin de nos affaires », « sans douleur aucune, sans péril », sans besoins, sans bienveillance ni colère (II, 647 — 651). Détruisons donc nos

230

II est vrai que l'opposition de Cicéron porte autant sur l'entrée indue de ces thèses dans la pensée aristotélicienne que sur leur contenu. Mais il exprime bien, avec beaucoup de respect pour les stoïciens, son rejet de leur position.

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préjugés 2 3 1 par un «regard raisonné sur la nature» (III, 93; cf. 31 — 93), et nous pourrons rejoindre ces dieux paisibles avec une âme tranquille et apaisée (VI, 68 — 78). La piété ne consiste pas à leur rendre un culte superstitieux dans la crainte, mais à « contempler toutes choses d'un esprit serein » (V, 1203; cf. 1161 — 1240). L'œuvre de Lucrèce est importante dans l'histoire de l'ataraxie et son rôle, tant par influence que par réaction, en particulier dans le monde chrétien, n'a pas été suffisamment étudié. Mais ce n'est pas le lieu de suppléer cette carence.

2. Philon et l'Ancien Testament On sait que l'Ancien Testament prête à Dieu les passions humaines, en particulier la colère, le chagrin et le regret, a fortiori aux hommes. On n'y trouve aucune théorie philosophique à ce sujet. Il existe cependant un IVe 'Livre des Machabées' 2 3 2 , non canonique, composé vers la naissance du Christ, qui commence par ces mots surprenants: (pi^oaocpcbtaTOv Xôyov, et qui expose très explicitement une doctrine des passions dès les premières lignes: la raison en a-t-elle la maîtrise absolue? En déclarant qu'elle a autorité sur elles, l'auteur se fait l'objection: «Comment donc (...) ne maîtrise-t-elle pas l'oubli et l'ignorance? ». Il précise: « La raison (Xoyia|iôç) ne commande pas à ses propres passions, mais aux passions ennemies de la justice, du courage et de la tempérance, et encore non pas de manière à les détruire, mais à ne pas leur céder» (1,1-7). Plus loin, il se fait la même objection et répond que « la raison ne paraît pas commander à ses propres passions, mais aux passions du corps. Ainsi, on ne peut pas nous retrancher un désir, mais la raison peut se rendre capable de ne pas être esclave du désir» (III, 1-2). « L a raison n'est pas arracheuse de passions, mais adversaire» (111,5). Encore « commandent aux passions de la chair » « seuls » ceux qui pratiquement la piété « de tout leur cœur » (VII, 18). La mort des sept Machabées sert de longue illustration, avec d'autres hauts faits bibliques. A travers certaines précisions un peu curieuses, l'auteur affirme clairement la maîtrise de la raison sur les passions, en excluant Yapatheia. Dieu « a implanté les passions » dans l'homme, lors de la création, mais il a fait trôner parmi elles « le noûs sacré » pour y exercer la royauté selon la Loi (II, 22 — 23). 231

232

Lucrèce note au passage qu'il n'est pas facile d'« arracher jusqu'aux racines (radicitus euelli) » les empreintes du passé (III, 310). L'expression évoque extrahenda radicitus de Cicéron (De fin. II, 9 , 2 7 ) . Le texte est reproduit dans les 'Septuaginta' d'A. RAHLFS, comme dernier des livres historiques.

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Au 1er siècle de notre ère, Philon, un Juif pieux d'Alexandrie, partagé entre le platonisme et le stoïcisme 2 3 3 , greffe sur la Bible la terminologie des passions de manière définitive et beaucoup plus précise, à la faveur de son exégèse allégorique. Il s'en prend d'abord au problème de Dieu. Devant les textes bibliques qui lui accordent colère ou jalousie, des passions humaines « à proprement parler», il fait appel au «sens figuré» (xpo7UKd>x8pov) (Q. Deus s. imm. 71): Moïse emploie des formules anthropomorphiques 2 3 4 , «en parfait législateur», comme moyen de rendre son enseignement plus efficace devant la multitude. Mais «telle n'est pas la nature» de Dieu (ibid. 6 0 - 6 1 ; cf. 52 — 54): «il n'offre prise à aucune passion du tout» (ibid. 52). D'ailleurs, «Dieu est sans désir (àv87tiÔef|ç), parce qu'il est sans besoin et se suffit parfaitement (aùxapicéaxaxoç) à lui-même» (De uirt. 9) 2 3 5 . Il est sans chagrin et sans crainte (De Cher. 86). Il ne fait pas de doute. Philon exclut de Dieu « toute passion » (De Abrah. 202). Il ne lui applique cependant pas — et en cela il ne manque pas à la tradition stoïcienne — les termes ànaGfiç ou àndGeia, qui lui sont très familiers en d'autres domaines 2 3 6 . Philon est beaucoup plus explicite et plus précis autour de Yapatheia humaine, qui s'inscrit dans une anthropologie. L'homme est « corps, âme et l'âme (est faite) d'irrationnel et de raisonnable» 2 3 7 . « L a (partie) rationnelle (XoyiKÔv) commande et règne dans l'âme » (Leg. ail. I, 41); elle domine « l'irascible (Bunôç) et le concupiscible (èmGunia), parties de l'irrationnel» (ibid. III, 116), sources des pathè. Les passions, avec la sensation, peuvent être des aides (POT|0OÎ) pour l'âme (ibid. 11,5; cf. De Cher. 58 — 61). Mais elles sont très souvent déviées, et Moïse, faisant allusion au sort des Egyptiens, « loue Dieu d'avoir jeté à la mer cheval et cavalier, c'est-à-dire les quatre passions et la malheureuse intelligence (voùç) » qui s'est laissé contaminer (Leg. ail. II, 102). Interprétant ainsi l'Ecriture allégoriquement, Philon y découvre souvent l'idéal de Yapatheia. Moïse, « qui

233

234 235

236

237

Sur ce problème, voir par ex. R. ARNALDEZ, dans: Les Œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie, 1, De opificio mundi, Paris, 1961, Introduction générale, pp. 70 — 88. Cf. De somn. 1; De Abrah. 4. L'idée d'un Dieu sans besoin et autosuffisant revient continuellement chez Philon: De spec. leg. II, 38 et 174; Leg. all. II, 2; De opif. m. 8; De Cher. 44 et 46; Q. det. pot. 54; 55; 56; De post. C. 4; Q. Deus s. imm. 7; 5 2 - 5 4 ; 56; 61; De plant. 35. Philon utilise beaucoup l'adjectif au sens de «non atteint», «non troublé», en dehors de tout contexte technique. Il applique 7ta0rixôv au principe « patient » et sans mouvement opposé à la cause active du noûs, dont Moïse a la révélation (De opif. m. 2; 8 — 9); de même ànadéç avec àidvTixov à l'hebdomade des intelligibles (ibid. 101). Leg. all. Ill, 2: 'Eyd) noXXâ eî|ii, yuxn ctô>H.OYOV)114. Mais le raisonnable est producteur d'action droites ou correctes, Arcésilas reprenant à son compte le concept stoïcien de KaTÔp0(O|ia pour soutenir que le sage non-savant qui suspend son jugement agit aussi raisonnablement que le sage stoïcien qui prétend disposer de la science: « Celui qui suspend son assentiment sur toutes choses réglera ses choix et ses aversions, et en général ses actions sur le raisonnable, et en usant de ce critère agira droitement; car le bonheur s'obtient grâce à la prudence, et la prudence consiste en actions droites, et l'action droite est celle qui, une fois accomplie, peut être justifiée par le raisonnable» 1 1 5 . Le lien avec le stoïcisme se renforce encore, comme nous l'indiquions plus haut, avec Carnéade. On pourrait croire que celui-ci se borne à substituer au raisonnable (suXoyov) le probable ou le vraisemblable (niGavôv). Certes, Carnéade critique lui aussi la représentation compréhensive 1 1 6 . La discussion avec l'enseignement de Chrysippe s'enrichit d'un nouveau concept: l'aparallaxie (àTtapa^a^ia), qui désigne la n o n - d i f f é r e n c e , ou mieux encore l ' i n d i s c e r n a b i l i t é entre deux représentations. Entre deux hommes, deux grains de blé, deux pigeons etc. la différence n'est pas discernable 1 1 7 . L"Hercule furieux' d'Euripide dépeint une folie consistant en l'absence totale de discernement 1 1 8 . La dialectique de Carnéade, caractérisée par la mise en œuvre de l'argument du sorite 1 1 9 , paraît être une dérivation logique du principe physique ou psychologique d'indiscernabilité. Oter un par un les grains d'un tas de sable et demander à quel moment celui-ci cesse d'être un tas, repose sur

1,2

113 114 115 116 117 118

119

Cicéron, Lucullus 24, 77 sv. et Sextus Empiricus, Contre les logiciens I, 150 —158 (Contre les mathématiciens VII, 150 — 158). Sextus Empiricus, Contre les logiciens I, 152 (Contre les mathématiciens VII, 152). Ibid. 156. Sextus Empiricus, Contre les logiciens I, 158 (Centre les mathématiciens VII, 158). Voir par exemple Cicéron, Lucullus 15, 47 sv. Plutarque, Notions communes 36, 1077 c. Sextus Empiricus, Contre les logiciens I, 405 sv. et en particulier 408 (Contre les mathématiciens VII, 405). Sextus Empiricus, Contre les physiciens I, 182 sv. (Contre les mathématiciens IX, 182) et Cicéron, De natura deorum III, 15, 43 sv.

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l'indiscernabilité entendue comme un défi contre la prétention de la représentation à être compréhensive. L'argumentation de Carnéade, notamment contre l'existence des dieux, plonge ses racines dans la thèse de l'indiscernabilité. L'essentiel de l'apport de Carnéade consiste à réfléchir sur les conditions définies par la théorie stoïcienne de la représentation, pour en examiner les difficultés et fonder la possibilité d'une connaissance approchée. Le projet de Carnéade ne doit pas être tenu pour négatif. Il serait plus exact d'envisager sa contribution au problème de la connaissance comme une critique tout à fait positive et non pas comme une entreprise de destruction. Au témoignage de Sextus Empiricus lui-même 120 , Carnéade déclare, touchant nos représentations, « que les unes sont probables (ou vraisemblables) et les autres nonprobables ». Carnéade va mettre au point une procédure d'approximation permettant autant qu'il est possible d'aller de la représentation dépourvue de tout fondement à une représentation s'approchant autant qu'il se peut de la vérité, et méritant à ce titre d'être tenue pour vraisemblable ou probable. Le juGavôv est en réalité la première esquisse, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, de la méthode expérimentale 121 . Il convient de distinguer trois degrés dans le probable qui, contrairement au raisonnable d'Arcésilas, n'est pas de l'ordre de la raison, mais bien de l'ordre de la sensation et de la représentation. Au premier rang se situe la représentation simplement probable, par exemple la représentation simplement probable que provoquerait la vue d'un serpent enroulé. Mais un examen fondé sur des rapprochements avec d'autres objets enroulés et tenant compte de l'immobilité, de la couleur et d'autres détails, permet de ramener la simple représentation probable à la représentation d'une corde, qui est dite probable et entièrement examinée. Cela conduit Carnéade à poser l'existence d'une troisième sorte de représentation probable, en quelque sorte indubitable, ancrée et indéracinable (àrcepÎCTTtaCTToç). Quand Héraclès ramenant Alceste des Enfers, la montre à Admète qui croit voir un fantôme et ne reconnaît pas la présence réelle de son épouse, il pèche par défaut d'examen et par incrédulité, alors qu'un examen complet, c'est-à-dire comparatif, l'aurait conduit à une représentation probable, entièrement examinée et tout à fait inébranlable 122 . On conçoit donc aisément qu'en prenant la vie pour guide, Carnéade entende régler ses actions sur le critère du probable ou du vraisemblable. L'influence de Carnéade allait devenir déterminante. La pratique dialectique de la division, la critique de la religion populaire, de la divination et des oracles, le rejet du destin et l'affirmation de la liberté humaine devaient influencer durablement Cicéron qui fait souvent référence à Carnéade et le

120 121

122

Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes I, 227. Voir ibid., I, 227 - 230 et Contre les logiciens I, 1 5 9 - 1 8 9 (Contre les mathématiciens, VII, 1 5 9 - 1 8 9 ) . Voir Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes, I, 228 — 229.

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connaît grâce à ses ultimes disciples: Philon de Larissa (145 — 85) et Antiochus d'Ascalon ( 1 2 5 - 6 9 ) . Ainsi, par un étrange paradoxe de l'histoire, que seuls peuvent expliquer la survie prolongée des grandes problématiques philosophiques propres aux écoles et la réalité complète de la vie intellectuelle responsable de ce que les progrès théoriques dépendent d'une dialectique formée de polémiques et d'échanges perpétuels, il est très difficile de se prononcer vraiment sur ce qu'ont été et sur ce que doivent rester pour nous Arcésilas et Carnéade. Antiochus d'Ascalon a-t-il tort ou raison de dire qu'Arcésilas a trahi Platon, dont Zénon de Citium serait le digne successeur? En tout cas Arcésilas paraît bien davantage encore être le successeur spirituel du premier Démocrite. Carnéade est-il davantage stoïcien que platonicien? La balance semblerait pencher en faveur d'un certain stoïcisme, si le critère du probable n'avait pas pour résultat de faire de Carnéade l'héritier spirituel du second Démocrite, de Protagoras et du phénoménisme de Pyrrhon. On voit avec quelle prudence il faut appliquer les modèles de la succession des problématiques à l'existence originale et singulière des maîtres qui assurent la survie des écoles. c) La théorie stoïcienne de la vision A titre d'exemple, nous voudrions examiner brièvement les thèses du Portique concernant le modèle très particulier et privilégié constitué par la vision. Il est d'autant plus légitime de lui accorder cet intérêt que la thèse du Portique concourt au début de l'Empire à former la conscience commune du public éclairé. Nous en avons trouvé la preuve dans un g r a f f i t o des thermes suburbains d'Herculanum où le croquis d'une femme, Primigenia, s'accompagne du schème encore lisible du cône oculaire sortant de l'œil et allant toucher la suscription d'un rendez-vous galant qu'elle est priée de lire. Ce g r a f f i t o ainsi conservé illustre parfaitement la manière dont est connue à l'époque, je dirais même vécue et partagée, la théorie stoïcienne de la vision 123 . Pour qu'il y ait sensation, il faut que l'organe sentant pâtisse du fait du sensible propre, qualité appartenant à l'objet sensible. Dans le toucher l'objet froid entre en contact avec la peau, dans le goût la langue entre en contact avec le miel etc. C'est pourquoi dans les explications que les Epicuriens fournissaient de la vue, les simulacres, ces membranes ou ces pellicules amnioti123

Je renvoie ici à mon étude: La stoïcienne d'Herculanum. Un regard au vestiaire des Thermes, dans: Du Banal au merveilleux. Mélanges offert à L. Jerphagnon, Les Cahiers de Fontenay 55, 56, 57, E. N. S. Fontenay, St. Cloud, Décembre 1989, p. 63 - 75. Cette étude s'accompagne de la traduction de tous les témoignages relatifs à la vision, réunis par I. v. ARNIM dans S.V.E II, 232 — 4, n° 863 — 871: 863 Chalcidius, Ad Timaeum, cp. 237 et 266; 864 Alexandre d'Aphrodise, De anima libri mant. p. 130, 14 BRUNS; 865 Galien, De Hipp. et Plat. plac. VII (642 M. K.); 866 Aétius Plac. IV, 15, 3; 867 Diogène Laërce VII, 157; 868 Alexandre d'Aphrodise, De anima libri mant. p. 131, 30 BRUNS; 869 Aétius, Plac. IV, 15,2; 870 Galien, De symptomatum causis I, 2 vol. VII p. 98 K.; 871 Aulu-Gelle, Noct. att. V, 16,2. Nous nous bornerons à indiquer entre parenthèses les numéros de S.V.F. désignant ces témoignages.

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ques enveloppant l'objet et émises par lui comme des répliques, devaient cheminer dans l'air, avec tous les risques d'altération que signale Lucrèce, pour venir déposer leur empreinte dans la pupille. Ainsi les Epicuriens disposaient-ils d'un modèle centripète de la vision qui est encore aujourd'hui le nôtre. En revanche le Portique renverse tout à fait la perspective et construit un modèle centrifuge: pour que l'objet extérieur soit perçu et senti là où il est, c'est-àdire à l'extérieur et même parfois très loin de nous, il faut que le regard sorte de nous et aille le palper, le toucher, bref le sentir à l'extérieur, là où il se trouve. Il est donc nécessaire que le regard aille de la pupille à l'objet. Or, puisque tout ce qui est réel est matériel et corporel, et puisque l'instrument corporel, ou l'organe, qui est issu de l'œil, n'est pas visible et observable, il faut que le regard soit constitué d'un matériau corporel mais invisible, ce qui correspond tout à fait à la matière de l'âme, et même de la faculté maîtresse de l'âme qui est un air très sec et même un feu, appelé par l'école fiY£|o.oviKÔv, faculté maîtresse de l'âme et support de ce que nous appelons conscience. Ce corps invisible par sa transparence, est de la même matière que le feu divin, c'est-à-dire Zeus, qui se répand à travers toutes choses: un TcveO^a Siaxsîvov ou SifjKov 124 mélangé à toutes les parties de l'univers, même les plus reculées, de sorte que Dieu lui-même voit et connaît toutes les parties du monde. Aussi les Stoïciens donnent-ils au visum le nom de Dieu (S.V.F. II, 863). L'organe du regard ne se réduit pas à un rayon visuel de nature géométrique: étant un corps, il occupe un certain volume de forme conique. Sortant de la pupille par un point, ce point est le sommet du cône, sommet formé d'un cercle infiniment petit, et il va ensuite s'élargissant d'une manière régulière en cercles de diamètre croissant jusqu'à la base plus ou moins large selon la distance, qui vient palper et épouser la forme de l'objet. Pour concevoir la figure conique de la partie oculaire de l'hégémonique issue de l'œil, le Portique fait référence aux conclusions de Démocrite, revues par Chrysippe 1 2 5 : un cône est conçu comme formé de l'empilement de cercles plats, c'est-à-dire de surfaces circulaires infiniment minces, au diamètre régulièrement croissant du sommet à la base. Le cône a, comme tout volume, une consistance poreuse élastique qui fait que la figure, quoique conservant une quantité de manière constante, est un objet déformable 1 2 6 . Cette élasticité se conjugue avec une propriété géométrique extrêmement intéressante, à savoir que, quelle que soit leur taille, les cercles dont l'empilement élastique forme le cône, contiennent tous un nombre égal de points, étant donné que, de même qu'il n'y a pas plus de parties dans le doigt que dans l'homme, la division des parties va à l'infini dans les corps, et qu'il n'y a pas d'infini qui soit plus grand ou plus petit que

Jamblique, De anima, cité par Stobée, Ecl. I p. 3 6 8 , 1 ; S.V.F. II, 826. Plutarque, Notions communes 39, 1079 E; D. K., Démocrite B 155. 126 y 0 j r m o n étude: Mos geometricus, mos physicus, in: J. BRUNSCHWIG, Les Stoïciens et leur logique. Actes du Colloque de Chantilly, 18 — 22 sept. 1976, Paris, Vrin, 1978, p. 1 2 6 - 1 3 0 . 124

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l'autre 1 2 7 . Quand un point du cercle de la base touche un objet, l'ébranlement, c'est-à-dire le TtdGoç, se transmet point par point à tous les cercles de diamètres décroissants jusqu'au sommet, c'est-à-dire la pupille elle-même. La transmission de cette sorte d'onde au sein du corps élastique, transmission inobservable par le physicien, peut se comprendre à la façon dont le poison {virus), c'està-dire la décharge électrique, peut se transmettre de l'hameçon à la main du pêcheur, par contact (contagio) à travers la ligne et la canne à pêche, quand un poisson-torpille mord l'hameçon (S.V.F. II, 863). La vision correcte suppose donc un certain intervalle entre la pupille et l'objet, mais qui ne soit pas trop excessif, car plus l'on s'éloigne de l'œil, plus se produit ce que les photographes d'aujourd'hui appelleraient un effet de grain que l'agrandissement accroît proportionnellement. Quand l'objet est lointain, par exemple un gros cargo sur la mer à l'horizon, la surface basale du cône qui le touche contient par unité de surface un nombre de points beaucoup moindre que si le bateau était à quai. C'est pourquoi les détails s'effacent et cessent d'être perceptibles (S.V.F. II, 863). En outre, de même que la cpavTaala est consciente et de l'objet et d'elle-même, le regard (ou l'hégémonique regardant) est conscient de l'affaiblissement de la force de l'impression sur le cercle de base, comme si l'intervalle infiniment petit qui sépare chacun des cercles empilés, croissait proportionnellement à l'intervalle qui sépare le même nombre infini de points dans les trois dimensions. Les conséquences de ce phénomène de diffusion sont aussi que la surface qui touche l'objet peut n'être pas parallèle à l'axe du regard. Dans ce cas l'élasticité géométrique et physique du cône entraîne une déformation et une variation dans l'effet de grain, qui fait que la partie du champ visuel la plus éloignée de l'œil produit une image plus petite que la partie la plus rapprochée. On voit que cette géométrie physique permet de rendre compte, même dans une vision monoculaire, des effets de perspective et de relief: « Une tour carrée prend la rondeur apparente d'un cylindre et en outre une enfilade de colonnes vue de biais paraît s'amenuiser du fait de la torsion des yeux (depravatio oculorum) » (S.V.F. II, 863) 1 2 8 . En fait Chalcidius par ce terme de depravatio cherche à rendre compte de l'inclinaison de la base par rapport à la normale ou à l'axe du cône. Mais en plus de l'effet de grain qui relève d'une explication physicogéométrique, un autre type d'altération peut venir troubler la sensation, selon que la matière du cône oculaire hégémonique est faite d'un air plus ou moins riche en points et en grains, et plus ou moins sec ou humide. Tout le monde peut constater en effet que par temps de brouillard, lorsque l'air est chargé d'humidité, la vision des objets est brouillée, confuse et nébuleuse. C'est ainsi que Galien (S.V.F. II, 870) a pu conserver la trace d'une pathologie stoïcienne de la vision, selon un système faisant intervenir deux variables: la densité plus

127 128

Voir Plutarque, Notions communes 38, 1079 A; S.V.F. II 484. Voir plus haut: note 88.

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ou moins grande de la matière du cône d'une part, et la sécheresse ou l'humidité de l'âme oculaire d'autre part. A une densité abondante et sèche correspond une vue exacte et à longue portée. A une densité faible mais sèche et pure correspond une myopie, vision exacte de près mais dont la netteté décroît avec la distance. A un regard abondant mais humide correspond une vision qui peut être lointaine, mais qui même de près est floue. Enfin un regard à la matière peu abondante et spécialement humide produit la quasi cécité: les objets ne sont vus que confusément et seulement s'ils sont proches. Telle paraît bien avoir été la forme la plus élaborée donnée par le Portique à son explication de la vision 129 . Il suffit, pour conclure l'exposé, d'indiquer l'originalité rationnelle de sa démarche, quelle qu'en soit l'étrangeté des conclusions: nous avons affaire ici à une construction et à une modélisation de type physico-géométrique d'inspiration tout à fait moderne. Sans doute encore un tel raffinement de la doctrine s'explique-t-il par la nécessité de combattre les hypothèses épicuriennes ainsi que les objections formulées par l'école néopyrrhonienne d'Aenésidème.

3. La résurgence du relativisme: le néopyrrhonisme Le pyrrhonisme repose sur une gnoséologie sceptique qui substitue à l'intellect d'une part et aux sens d'autre part le critère du phénomène 130 . L'expression la plus rigoureuse du phénoménisme est celle que Platon prête à Protagoras dans le 'Théétète' 1 3 1 . C'est encore ce qu'Aristote appelle «la thèse de Protagoras (xôv IIpooTayopou Xàjov) » 1 3 2 . Il est vrai qu'il n'existe nulle réalité en soi, ni d'ordre intelligible, ni d'ordre sensible (la première hypothèse excluant Démocrite et Platon, la seconde excluant le Jardin et le Portique). Il ne subsiste plus que les données mixtes et relatives constituées par les phénomènes dont la nature est double et qui tirent leur existence de l'objet et du sens qui concourt à les produire. C'est à ce phénoménisme que renvoie l'expression:

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131 132

L'espace me manque pour rendre compte des aspects touchant la vision dans l'obscurité et la sensation elle-même de l'obscurité (868 — 9). Nous renvoyons à notre étude dont la référence est donnée à la note 123. Je ne partage plus entièrement aujourd'hui, cela va presque de soi, l'interprétation soutenue dans: Le Scepticisme et le phénomène. Essai sur la signification et les origines du Pyrrhonisme, Paris, Vrin, 1972 (2e éd. 1985). Notamment il conviendrait de repréciser et de développer l'importance de la double influence de Démocrite: les disciples du Démocrite de la première période s'illustrent par un nihilisme dérivé de l'idéalisme atomique: tel est le cas de Métrodore de Chio; les héritiers du Démocrite de la seconde période, phénoméniste, comptent non seulement Protagoras, mais aussi Anaxarque, le maître de Pyrrhon, et Diotime de Tyr (D. K., Diotime A 3) qui fait du phénomène le premier critère et qui est lui aussi l'élève direct du dernier Démocrite. Voir plus haut note 27. Aristote, Métaphysique T, 4. 1007 b 22.

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«Tout échappe à la compréhension (navra êcrriv àKaT