Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics [2 ed.]

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KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS-Second Edition BY

PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP NORTHWESTERN

UNIVERSITY

with a foreword by

H. J. PATON White's Professor of Moral Philosophy (Emeritus) Oxford University

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS EVANSTON

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Copyright ©, I96o, I938 by Northwestern Uniu1)tSity Px_ess

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Printed in the United States of America ·

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To HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART

Teacher

Scholar

Kant-Critic

Philosopher Friend

Foreword The re-issue of Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, after an interval during which it has been out of print, should be welcome to all students of -Kant's moral philosophy. On its chosen topic Professor Schilpp's book is without a rival in the English language. It shows a rare insight into Kant's early ethical training-an insight supported by exact scholarship and enlivened by a clear and vigorous style. Kant is treated throughout as a human being, not as an intellectual machine; and the traditional caricatures of his character and distortions of his doctrine have their absurdities exposed by a fresh and powerful survey of the evidence available for the early period. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Professor Schilpp's work is valuable merely as an account of Kant's early thinking: its greatest value is as an introduction to the ethical. system developed later. An examination of the steady evolution in Kant's thought does much more than explain the way in which his ethical concepts were formed-this would be a matter of minor historical importance: it illuminates these concepts themselves and shows that, unless Kant suffered at the very height of his powers from an amazing loss of judgment, he could not possibly have held the fantastic beliefs so often attributed to him even, I regret to say, in recent years. This is why, when The Categorical Imperative was published in 1947, I expressed the wish that Professor Schilpp's book might be widely used as a companion to my own. I have the same wish no less strongly today. Professor Schilpp has done a great service by editing his wellknown "Library of Living Philosophers"; but Kantian scholars cannot but feel some regret if this heavy task has prevented him from going on to a critical examination of Kant's mature ethical treatises. I should like to think that the_enterprise to which his early work looked forward has been postponed rather than abandoned. If he were to undertake it afresh, he would once more place us deeply in his debt.

H. Corpus Christi College, Oxford University

J. Paton

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From the Preface to the First Edition Immanuel Kant's mora~ philosophy has long occupied a place of pre-eminence among the great ethical systems of modern times. This is true despite the fact that the Kantian ethics has been as much an object of attack as of defense. Hi.s sa-called ethical formalism has had to bear the brunt of the fight waged by the ethical hedonisms of the nineteenth century. Even the ethical realists and perfectionists have by no means found it possible to build out their ethical structures from the ethical foundations laid by Kant. Rather, friend and foe alike have found much in Kant's ethical theory which they could not accept. More than that: ethicists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have never stopped w~n'­ dering at what appeared to them to be very obvious pitfalls into which Kant fell all too easily. It has, in fact, long been the custom to quote the "Categorical Imperative" with awed respect and then dismiss the main body of Kant's ethic;:al thought as a tissue of "patent whimsies." The coiner of this phrase, William James, goes on to say: "With Kant, complication, both of thought and of statement, was an inborn infirmity, enhanced by the musty academicism of his Konigsberg existence." 1 James was far from being the only one thus to wave Kant aside with a gesture of the hand, and who, at the same time, found it impossible to pass him by unnoticed. Indeed, it has been just as impossible to ignore Kant in ethics as in epistemology or metaphysics. Despite this generally recognized fact, there is very little material on Kant's ethics available in English. There is, of course, the Abbott translation of the more important parts of Kant's definitive ethical treatises, 2 but this work makes no attempt to offer an explanation of the precise nature of Kant's ethical position. This also holds true of Louis Infield's translation of Paul Menzer's edition and arrangement of Eine Vorlesung Kants uber Ethik, which has appeared under the title: Lectures on Ethics. 8 There is a little volume by Noah Porter, entitled Kant's Ethics, which can hardly be called even a handbook. It was obviously produced because of 1

Principles of Psychology, I, New York, 1890; pp. 365-366. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other W ork.r on the Theory Thomas Kingsmill Abbott; new impression, London, 192.3. 3 London, 1930. 2

of Ethics•, trans. by

PREFACE

X

the complete absence, at that time, of any treatment of Kant's ethics in the English language; but its content has no particular value for the Kant student. In 1924, at last, appeared J. W. Scott's volume Kant on the ]Yforal Lije,4 simply-to quote its sub-title-"An Exposition of Kant's Grundlegung," which proceeds to explain this earliest of Kant's definitive ethical treatises along the same lines laid-down by a century or more of accepted interpretation. Finally, there is a Columbia University doctoral dissertation, The Formal and Material Elements of Kant's Ethics/ by William Morrow Washington, which again follows in the almost universally accepted grooves. With the exception of Abbott's and Infield's translations of Kant himself, only Scott's work is appreciably in use today in the English-speaking world. When we come to the questions of how Kant's ethical treatises came to be written and of what moral conceptions occupied Kant's mind prior to the appearance of the Grundlegung in 178 5 or even of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, there is nothing at all to be found in the English language. Yet we know that Kant began to lecture on ethics as early as 1756 and continued to offer his ethics course to the·very end of his academic career. This fact alone would not permit us to assume that Kant's interest in ethics was a comparatively late development, following only after he had set his mind at rest on epistemological and metaphysical problems by writing his monumental works of the first Critique and the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. There are, however, innumerable other evidences of Kant's very early interest in the problems of moral philosophy, e.g., both in his works as well as in many of his letters. Indeed, as we shall see later, there is evidence to the effect that his primary and major interest was early directed to moral philosophy even in preference to problems of an epistemological or metaphysical character. This is so true that it is no exaggeration to assert that the first Critique and the Prolegomena are more nearly an outgrowth of Kant's ethical interest than to say that his ethical treatises are the result of his epistemological and metaphysical studies. In view of these facts, it is nothing short of amazing that not even a monograph can be 'London, 192+ 6 New York, 1898.

PREFACE

XI

found in English that makes Kant's pre-Critical period the locus of search for the origin and development of his ethical thought. It is the express purpose of the present work to fill this unfortunate gap in English literature on the philosophy of Kant. In German, Kant's mother-tongue, it is true, there is no such dearth of material on Kant's pre-Critical ethics. The last six years of the nineteenth century were particularly prolific in producing works on this subject. In 1894, Friedrich W. Foerster published Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik bis zur Kritik der Reinen J7ernunft. 6 This was followed a year later by Osias Thon's Die Grundprinzipien der Kantischen Moral-Philosophie in ihrer Entwicklung. 7 Finally, just before the turn of the century, Paul Menzer published his work, "Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren I76o--I785'' in the Kant-Studien. 8 Of these, Menzer's is by far the most scholarly and thorough piece of work. This is so generally recognized that all the subsequent major treatments of Kant's ethics, in so far as they refer at all to the development of Kant's thought in the pre-Critical period, simply fall back upon Menzer's work as the accepted and authoritative treatment of the early period. 9 I shall, for the most part, follow the lead taken at this point by German scholars, especially in the matter of dating certain early Kantian documents, a task to which Professor Menzer appears to me to have brought great care and painstaking analysis. In the matter of the interpretation of Kant's thought, however, I have found it necessary to examine the sourcematerial not only freshly but also independently of any published treatises on Kant's pre-Critical ethics. The validity of my interpretation must rest on the evidence presented. It is, of course, no secret that the absurdity of the usual interpretation of Kant's ethical ideas is no longer dt::nied by most 6

Berlin, r 894. Berlin, 1895. Kant-Studien, II (1898), pp. 29o-322, and III (1899), pp. 41-104. 9 Take, for example, August Messer's important work on Kants Ethik (Leipzig, 1904), which devotes the second chapter to an historical sketch entitled "Die Entwicklung der Ansicht Kants vom Wesen des Sittlichen." A footnote (p. II, footnote r) in this chapter informs us that its author has largely followed the admittedly "standard" study of the development of Kant's pre-Critical ethical thought made by Paul Menzer. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that such an impressive treatise on Kant's ethics as Hermann Cohen's Kants Begrundung der Ethik' (Berlin, 1910), a work which runs to 557large pages, contains no discussion whatever of Kant's ethical ideas in the pre-Critical period. 7

8

PREFACE

Xll

ethicists. This is decidedly hopeful. It is strange, nevertheless, that the growing admission of the irrationality of that position should not have led philosophical thinkers to examine the validity of their interpretation of Kant's ethics. If absurdity there is, it is at least thinkable that its major source may be found in the interpretations rather than in Kant himself. Yet such a possibility does not seem to have occurred to philosophers. There is, I am happy to state, at least one notable exception to this last remark. In an article on "Kant's Ethical Formalism"10 0. C. Jensen has recently attempted to make sense out of Kant's ethical position. After re-stating the usual interpretation of Kant's position (pp. 195-196), Mr. Jensen proceeds, "If this conventional interpretation of Kant's theory be correct, then Kant's ethics is ludicrous" (p. 196). Granted; but instead of remaining satisfied with a merely negative result, he undertakes to give to Kant's theory what he calls "a fresh interpretation" and, at the same time, "to criticize his commentators" (p. 196). As the result of this fresh interpretation, Mr. Jensen comes to the conclusion that the core of Kant's ethical formalism consists in the regard for "impartiality, the objective attitude, or the will to do good, as itself the only objective value" (p. 2o6), a conclusion which is probably far more nearly on the right track than the conventional interpretations. Before Mr. Jensen gets through, however, he seems to find it necessary to admit that Kant "upheld a particular moral code as the only true one" despite the fact that his ethical theory as such was very far from providing any "rule of thumb." Thus he is led to the admission that the ethical theory of Kant, "or at least a certain phase of it, is an attempt to find 'bad reasons for what he already believed on instinct'" (p. 207). Although I find it difficult to concur with Mr. Jensen in these last remarks, his attempt at areinterpretation of Kant's ethical position serves at least a double purpose: it brings to our attention the real need for a fresh analysis and new clarification of Kant's ethics, and, secondly, it demonstrates that it is possible to give a version quite different from the universally accepted one. It is, frankly, my purpose in this work to furnish both the factual data and the interpretative intimations upon which a new and 10

In Philosophy, IX, (r934), pp. I95-2o8.

PREFACE

Xlll

more rational interpretation of Kant's ethical thought might be based. A careful re-examination of Kant's moral philosophy of the Critical period, however, requires as a prior demand an analysis and interpretation of the development of his moral ideas during the pre-Critical period. This latter is the task to which I am addressing myself here. I realize, of course, that in so far as the ultimate validity of my interpretation of Kant's ethics is concerned, the final proof will have to be found in Kant's definitive ethical treatises of the Critical period. It is my intention, therefore, to furnish in the not too distant future just such a detailed study and analysis of the Critical ethics. Until then, it is to be hoped that the present work may cause other students of the great Sage of Konigsberg to undertake a renewed reading and study of Kant. This is the more devoutly to be desired, since the conventional interpretation of Kant's ethics is recognized as making Kant too ludicrous to be taken seriously.

* * * It is a privilege and a joy to dedicate this work to the philosopher, teacher and friend who first aroused my interest in Immanuel Kant and who, throughout the years of labor on the present undertaking, has never lost interest in it but has been a· constant source of advice and criticism, of encouragement and inspiration to me: Henry Waldgrave Stuart, professor emeritus of philosophy in Stanford University.

P. A. S. Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois February, 1938.

Preface to the Second Edition This second edition of Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics differs from the first edition in the following ways . . It contains, first of all, a Foreword from the pen of Professor H. J. Paton, the famous Kant-scholar of Oxford University, to whom the author wishes here to express his deep gratitude and appreciation for this service. Secondly, whereas, in the first edition the author found it expedient to send the philosophical reader for whom the ethical point of view developed in this analysis of Kant's ethics might be wholly novel to an article published in (what was at that time) The International Journal of Ethics, he is happy to provide such readers in this second edition with a reprinting of the said article as an Appendix to this volume, under the title, "On the Nature of the Ethical Problem." It might, in fact, be advisable to begin this book with the reading of that Appendix. The author wishes to thank The University of Chicago Press and the Editor of Ethics for granting him the right to republish that article h~re. In the third place, the Bibliography at the end of the book has been brought up to date with the kind assistance of Professor John R. Silber of the University of Texas, whose aid is hereby most gratefully acknowledged. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to the Director and Board of Northwestern University Press for their decision to put this book into print again after it had been out of print for almost a decade. P.A. S. Department of Philosophy Northwestern "Qniversity October 15, 1959

Remarks upon a Third Printing In all fairness to authentic Kantian scholarship I find it · necessary, as this book is being prepared for a third printing, to call the reader's attention to several facts. First: because of having undertaken to bring into existence and then edit the volumes in The Library of Living Philosophers, the author has (most unfortunately) not been able to keep up his former Kant studies. Consequently he has not been able to study the materials from Kant's Nachlass which have appeared since 1938. Nor has he found it possible to keep up with most Kant studies that have appeared in the interval. This is a mere statement of fact. More importantly, however, the author did finally (i.e., in 1963 or two years after its original appearance in 1961) come across Professor Josef Schmucker's treatise on Die Ursprunge der Ethik Kant.J., (Meisenheim), which, in its first 277 pages undertakesamong other things-a very thorough critical analysis of the position developed and maintained in Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics. Without having been able personally to go into and check Kant's original data upon which Professor Schmucker bases his rejection of my (major) thesis, I am, obviously, in no position to take a definite stand, one way or the other. I can only say that I have found his Die Ursprunge der Ethik Kants fascinatingly interesting and immensely worthwhile. So much so, in fact, that I would not be at all surprised if ultimate Kant scholarship in the ethical field were to prove him correct and my own position both premature and superseded. Certainly no serious student of Kant's ethics· in the pre-critical period can afford not to familiarize himself with Professor Schmucker's book. P.A.S. Department of Philosophy Southern Illinois University Spring, 1966

Abbreviations, Translations, etc. Most of the quotations are from the Prussian Academy's edition of Kants Gesammelte Schrijten, Berlin, 1905-1936, 2.1 vols. This edition is abbreviated KGS. The articles by Paul Menzer, "Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren 1760-1785" in Kant-Studien, II (1898), pp. 2.90-32.2. and III (1899), 41-104, are abbreviated by Entwicklungsgang; and are referred to as either Part I or Part II. Writings of Kant are often referred to by a single word of the title. Thus Beobachtungen uber das Gejuhl des SchOnen und Erhabenen is referred to as Beobachtungen. All quotations of importance for the argument appear in English translation from the original German or Latin. Where standard translations of Kant's works are available, as in the Dissertation of 1770 and the Vorlesung, they have been used (although even in such cases the translation has been checked). For the most part, however, Kant's writings prior to 1781 have not yet been trans, lated. Unless otherwise specified, therefore, the translations are my own. Where it has seemed necessary, for the clear expression of Kant's idea, to insert my own words in quotations, I have put them in square brackets. Within the quotations from Kant, italics are always to be taken as Kant's own unless otherwise specified.

Contents Chapter I. THE EARLY KANT AND His GROWING INTEREST IN ETHICS A. Kant's Philosophical Goal r. The spirit of the age 2. Kant's early home-life and discipline 3· Kant's character B. The Concerns of Ethics r. Lectures on ethics 2. Early writings 3· Letters C. Priority of the Epistemological and Metaphysical Problem I. Letters 2. Preface to the Grundlegung 3· Critique of Pure Reason

I I I 2

3 7 7 9 9 Io ro I3 I3

II. THE GROWTH oF KANT's OPTIMISM CoNCERNING MAN r. The attraction of natural science 2. The Allgemeine Naturgeschichte 3· The Betrachtungen uber den Optimismus 4· The Physische Geographie

I5 I6 I8 I9 20

III. THE PRIZE-EssAY AND KANT's RELATION TO THE BRITISH MoRALISTS I. The British moralists and Rousseau 2. The Prize-Essay IV. WRITINGS OF I763: Negative Grossen AND Beobachtungen r. The Negative Grossen 2. The Beobachtungen

v.

A FRAGMENT (!764-!]65)

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22 24 4I 4I 45 63

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CONTENTS

Chapter VI. WRITINGS OF I765: Nachricht AND Trliume I. The N achricht 2. The Trliume 3· Summary of writings 176o-J769 VII. THE INAUGURAL DISSERTATION (I770) VIII. LETTERS AND REFLECTIONS L Letters (I770-1772! 2. Reflections (1769-I773) 3· Letter (1773) 4· Reflections (1775-178o)IX. A FRAGMENT (ca. 1775), Racen der Menschen, AND Philanthropin EssAYS L Fragment 2. Racen der Menschen 3· The Philanthropin Essays 4· Summary: I77o-178o

PAGE 75 75 78 87 89 107 107 109 120 12.2. 127 127 138 139 I4o

X. THE VoRLESUNG L The "Philosophia Practica Universalis" 2. The "E thica" 3· Summary XI. CoNcLUSIONs APPENDIX: On the Nature of the Ethical Problem

I75

BIBLIOGRAPHY

187

INDEX

CHAPTER I

The Early Kant and His Growing Interest in Ethics A.

KANT's PHILOSOPHICAL GoAL

From the beginning, Kant wanted to lay definite and lasting foundations for the philosophical disciplines. Such, at any rate, appears to have been the underlying motive of all his major philosophical works. Probably the sudden awakening occasioned by the .reading of David Burne had much to do with Kant's basic motive. 1 This is all the more likely because Burne's philosophy stood in glaring contrast to that of Leibnitz and Wolff, on whose epistemological and metaphysical points of view Kant had been largely dependent until about the seventeen fifties. 2

The Spirit of the Age There were other reasons re-enforcing Kant's tendency to find permanent philosophical foundations. One of these is to be found in the spirit of the time. It was the age of enlightenment, the age when the powers of reason were considered unlimited. 3 It was inevitable that a man even of the originality of Kant should be affected by the Zeitgeist, and because of his great faith in the power of reason he may truly be called a child of his period. Such confiI.

1 Our first information of Kant's acquaintance with Hume comes from a letter ad. dressed by Johann Georg Hamann to Kant on July 27, 1759, in which certain ofHume's doctrines are referred to and discussed (KGS, X, p. r5). The first reference by Kant himself is in the essay, Beobachtungen uber das Gejuhl des SchOnen und Erhabenen (KGS, II, p. 253, line 2) and in a Fragment which, as we sha)l see later, appears to come from the years 1764-1765) (Hartenstein, Immanuel Kants Sihnmtliche W erke, VIII, p. 638, line 22). Kant's next reference to Hume is in the announcement of his lectures for the wintersemester r765-r766 (KGS, II, p. 311). 2 Note, however, that Kant's first published essay (1747) takes issue with Leibnitz. 3 How much the enlightenmerit meant the age of reason, even to Kant's mind, becomes clear from a reading of Kant's essay, Was ist Llufkliirung? (r784), from which I quote the following sentence: "Nothing but freedom is necessary for this enlightenment: for, in fact, the least harmful of anything that can be called freedom at all, is to make unreserved use of one's reason in all circumstances" (KGS, VIII, p. 36).

I

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

dence in the capacities of reason was bound to lead to the assumption that it is possible to lay ultimate and unguestion~ foundations, not only for morality, but also for metaphysics and aesthetics. At the same time, as we shall see later in detail, it is not certain that Kant ever worshipped a mere deductive, categorical, absolute reason. Rather, Kant seems, practically from the first, to have thought of reason as a tool to be used and shaped according to the requirements and exigencies of changing situations in a never static world. This fact, which should be kept clearly in mind, has generally been overlooked when Kant's position has been treated as a product merely of the "Age of Reason." 2.

Kant's Early Home-Life and Discipline

Kant's up-bringing and early environment constitute another element favorable to the development of the basic motive in his work. Kant was reared in a rather poor, rigidly Pietistic home in East Prussia. We know something of the very strict discipline of such homes in religious matters as well as in every other way. In our present-day realization of the lasting power of such early influences, it should go without saying that Immanuel Kant was never able to free himself entirely from his childhood milieu. At the same time, it is not possible to dismiss the Pietistic influence upon Kant with such a sweeping generalization. To do so fails to bring out the fact that Kant might have remained a faithful Wolffian all his days, or certainly much longer than he did, had it not been for this Pietism, which kept him constantly alive to the concept of duty as of central importance. Wolff, a teleological moralist, took the basis of his philosophy of self-realization largely from Leibnitz. The Wolffian ideal of perfection was a static ideal. For Wolff, good moral conduct was the full expression of thecapacities of rational beings as members of a kingdom of ends which was conceived as timeless and absolute. Such a position is far from ~Pietism. By his very insistence upon the goodness of the inner attitude, the Pietist saved himself from commitment to a merely descriptive definition of the good and freed himself from preoccupation with particular so-called intrinsic goods. His ~t:t~ngth lay in his readiness to act by way of a general attitud~. The Pietist's moral command to himself might be briefly paraphrased thus: Whatever may come along, let your action be controlled by your

THE EARLY KANT

3

attitude of love for the persons toward whom you are acting. In brief, the fundamental difference between the Leibnitz-Wolff ethics and that of the Pietists was the difference between a static absolutistic teleology and the morality of free reaction to everyday situations. Absolutistic teleology was not interested in matters. of personal decision> whereas the morality of Pietism was concerned with the free reactions of persons prompted by the proper kind of attitude and inner spirit. The conflict between these two positions must have been present in Kant almost from his :first acquaintance with Leibnitz and Wolff. Moreover, as will appear shortly, it is doubtful whether Kant ever was a real disciple of the Leibnitz-Wolff tradition in the realm of ethics. The austerity of Kant's daily life as well as of his philosophical theories undoubtedly has a strong temperamental foundation in the strictness and rigor of his early Pietism. Another cause of this unvaried mode of living was his physical weakness, which caused him much trouble throughout his life, forced him from his early youth to watch his diet and habits carefully, and necessitated a life of routine and self-discipline. These facts combined give a natural setting for what has since come to be almost universally spoken of as the "rigor" of Kant's philosophical theories. 3. Kant's Character These influences, none the less, have been over.,estimated by Kant scholars. The Pietistic up-bringing of Kant offers a comparatively easy explanation for certain rigoristic features of his philosophy, but hardly justifies a caricature of Kant's personality that falsifies his real character. On this point, it can now be asserted definitely that Kant was not the pure Verstandesmensch for whom he has too often been taken on the evidence of his later writings. Much is to be said for the position-which has gained a number of adherents in recent decades-that, far from being a mere Verstandesmensch, Kant was quite melancholy in his early years. August Schricker (r88r), J. H. W. Stuckenberg (r882), Paul Menzer (r897), and Hans Vaihinger (r883-I898), each independently of the others, reached this same conclusion.4 There is good reason to accept their combined judgment that Kant's faT ...

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Cf. "Kant als Melancholiker" by Hans Vaihinger, Kant-Studien, II (1898), pp. 139-

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

4

mous passage concerning the melancholy temperament is largely autobiographical. The passage, which occurs in the Beobachtungen uber das Gejuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen, is important enough to be given here in full. It reads as follows: The person whose feeling leans toward melancholy is called melancholy, not because he broods in morose heaviness of heart robbed of all the joys of life, but because, if his emotional reactions were to be enhanced beyond a certain measure or were to be misdirected for any reasons, they would more easily tend towards that condition than to any other. He has a specialfeelingjor the sublime. Even beauty, for which he also has a feeling, must not merely charm but also move him, inasmuch as it fills him at the same time with admiration. The enjoyment of pleasures is more serious, but is on that account no less enjoyable. All emotions of the sublime contain more enchantment for him than all the deceitful enticings of the beautiful. His well-being will be closer to contentment than to gaiety. He is steadfast. For that reason he regulates his emotions by principles. The more general the principle of regulation, the broader the high feeling which comprises the lower one within itself, the less these emotions yield to unsteadiness and change.... The person of melancholy frame of mind cares little for what others think, what they consider good or true; he trusts entirely to his own insight. Since his grounds of motivation take on the nature of principles he is not easily brought to other ideas; occasionally his steadfastness degenerates even into wilfulness. He looks upon the change of fashions with indifference and upon its glamour with contempt. Friendship is sublime and is therefore agreeable to his temperament.... Affable conversation is beautiful, thoughtful silence is sublime. He is a good keeper of his own secrets as well as of those of others. Veracity is sublime; he hates lies and pretense. He has a high regard for the dignity of human nature. He esteems himself and regards any man as a creature deserving respect. He will endure no depraved submissiveness and breathes freedom in a noble breast. He abominates all chains, from the gilded ones worn at court to the heavy irons of the galley-slave. He is a severe judge of himself and of others and not rarely is disgusted with himself as well as with the world. 5

Certainly, what little we know about the inner life of Kant as it showed itself outwardly makes it natural for one to think of Kant himself as one reads this passage. There is, moreover, the circumstantial evidence of the description itself; this is so full of intimate knowledge and understanding of the type of temperament and of its problems and difficulties that one can only suppose its author to be speaking from personal experience. Furthermore, attention ought to be directed to the rather care5

KGS, II, pp.

ZZQ---22-I.

THE EARLY KANT

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ful description of melancholia which Kant gives in his Versuch uber die Krankheiten des Kopjes, an essay which appeared, significantly enough, in the same year (1764) as the Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen, from which we have just quoted. That Kant wrote so much upon this subject at this particular time may be considered as evidence of his directly personal concern with it. Such an inference is not rendered less probable by Kant's wellknown good humor and cheerfulness of manner; for, as Vaihinger aptly points out, 6 these in themselves cannot be made to prove anything except that the author of the essay, Von der Macht des Gemuths, durch den blossen Vorsatz seiner krankhaften Gefuhle Meister zu sein, was also master over himself in this regard, able to conquer his own moods by showing himself to others always happy and in good spirits, whether inwardly he was so or not. This idea is re-enforced by Kant's opening sentence in this essay, where, after restating, the topic, he proceeds: "I cannot take the examples, which confirm the possibility of the realization of the intent of this declaration, from the experience of others, but in the first place only from that observed in myself, because my experience arises from self-consciousness .... " 7 Be this as it may, so much can be asserted with considerable assurance: Kant was neither originally nor at any time a cold and emotionless V erstandesmensch. Although he has acquired the epithet "rigoristic" because of the supposed rigorism of his definitive system, such writings as his already quoted Beobachtungen (r764) and his Triiume eines Geistersehers (r766) are themselves an undeniable refutation of any such views about Kant. Nor are these two writings the only indications of a profound emotional strain in Kant's character. Certainly none of Kant's ethical treatises could be accused of being coldly intellectualistic. No matter what rationalistic course the argument seems to be taking in these writings, ever and again the deep feelings of their author concerning these subjects surge up to the surface. 8 It is not surprising, there• In the article to which reference has already been made in the footnote on p. 3 above. 1 From Part III of Der Streit der Fakultiiten (1798) (KGS, VII, p. 98). 8 We need not burden this study with numerous or lengthy quotations to prove this statement; even a cursory survey of Kant's ethical writings will convince the reader of its truth.

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KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

fore, to read the following impressions of one person who heard Kant's cc;mrse of lectures on ethics: More than anything else, ... you should have heard his Morals. In this Kant was not merely a speculative philosopher but also a spirited lecturer who carried heart and emotions along with him as much as he satisfied the intellect. Yes, it gave heavenly rapture to hear this pure and lofty theory of virtue with such powerful philosophical eloquence from the mouth of its own creator. Ah, how many times he moved us to tears; how often he violently stirred our hearts; how many times he lifted our spirits and emotions out of the shackles of selfish eudaimonism to the high self-consciousness of the pure freedom of the will, unconditional obedience to the law of reason, and to the noble feeling of the unselfish fulfillment of duty. The immortal sage appeared to us then to be inspired by heavenly power and he also inspired us as we, full of amazement, listened to him. His hearers certainly never departed after an hour of his moral philosophy without having become better men. 9

In the light of such evidence concerning the great emotional eloquence of the moral philosopher, it is impossible to make of Kant a cold and emotionless Verstandesmensch. Just as Kant was not a Verstandesmensch; so he was very far from being a mere "cloistered academician." The very titles, let alone the content, of some of his essays bear witness to this fact. There is abundant evidence, both in Kant's letters and in his learned treatises, of his never-ceasing interest in the world about him. He lived in the midst of one of the most turbulent periods of European history. The Seven Years' War occurred during the early part of his teaching career. The reign of Frederick the Great, contemporaneous with the career of Kant, was one of unparalleled Prussian activity and expansion in politics, diplomacy, industry, education, and scholarship. Kant lived in the midst of all this and drank of its spirit to the fullest extent. When, moreover, he began to read the writings of the British moralists of the time, he found himself directed to the great period of industrial revolution which England was then experiencing. All this could not help exerting a profound influence upon the life and thought of a man who, like Kant, identified himself so much with the spirit and activities of his age. Nevertheless, for a century and a half, we have been taught that ~ So writes R. B. J achmann, Kant's pupil and biographer, in Immanuel Kant geschildm in Briejen an einen Freund (r8o4); quoted by Paul Menzer in his "Einleitung" to Eine Vorlesung Kants uber Ethi!c (Pan-Verlag, Berlin, 1924), p. 323.

THE EARLY KANT

7

Kant violently attacked all ethical theories built on mere emOtional content. It is natural, accordingly, to inquire whether the emotional aspects of Kant's character may not have been a positive influence in his attempt to construct a strictly formal theory of ethics. In other words, it is not impossible that the rigor so universally emphasized in Kant's ethics was due in part to what the twentieth-century psychologist calls a "defense mechanism." Having once seen the need for an universally valid foundation for morality, Kant may have been afraid that his own emotional nature might obstruct the discovery and formulation of such a law. It is conceivable that he came to distrust.his own emotions. 10 This fear probably was more subconscious than conscious, but if it was a defense-reaction, as we may assume, it is a vital factor in accounting for the vigorous onslaught which Kant directs against any merely emotional determinant of morality. However this may be, the fact remains that from the beginning of his philosophical work, Kant never deviated from his basic motive of laying definite and universally valid foundations for all the philosophical disciplines.

B.

THE CoNCERNS oF ETHICis

This basic philosophical motive must be kept in mind if one desires to understand Kant's approach to the problem of ethics. How does the moral interest function? What does it accomplish? These were the comprehensive questions tp which he addressed himself in his investigations of moral philosophy. To these questions the present study will attempt to :find the answers in Kant's works and letters written prior to the appearance of the first Critique; for Kant was working on the problems of ethics long before either the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 11 or the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft appeared. I.

Lectures on Ethics

Kant began his work as Privat-Dozent at the University of Konigsberg in the winter-semester of 1755-1756 and gave a course 10 We shall have many opportunities to note that he actually came to look with disgust upon all ethical theories builtpurery upon emotion. 11 This Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, which appeared in 1785, was Kant's first distinctively ethical treatise.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

8

in ethics as early as the winter-semester of 1756-1757·12 At the close of the little essay, V ersuch einiger Betrachtungen iiber den Optimismus/3 three years later, we have Kant's own announcement of his course on ethics among the announcements of his other proposed courses for the winter-semester of 1759-176o. From Arnold's list14 we know that he lectured regularly on ethics through all the years of his university career. The first outline of his course on ethics appears in the announcement of his lectures for the winter-semester of 1765-1766, which I quote in full b-ecause of its interest for our present purposes. ETHICS. Moral philosophy, even more than metaphysics, has the peculiar fate of taking on the appearance of a science and the air of profundity, although neither is to be found in it. The reason lies in this, that the distinction between good and bad in actions, and the judgment concerning moral righteousness can be easily and correctly known by the human heart through what is called sentiment, and that it can be known directly and without the circumlocution of proofs. Therefore, since the question is mostly settled in advance of any grounds of reason-which is not so in metaphysics-it is no wonder that one is indifferent to letting reasons pass as fit which have only an appearance of soundness. Because of these facts there is nothing commoner than the title of a moral philosopher, and nothing rarer than to deserve that name. For the present I shall lecture on the Universal Practical Philosophy and on Ethics, both according to Baumgarten. The attempts of Shciftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, which, although unfinished and deficient, have none the less progressed farthest in the search for the first principles of all morality, will receive that precision and supplementation which they now lack. And, since in ethics I always consider historically and philosophically what happens before I point out what ought to happen, I shall make clear the method by which one must study man-not that man who, through the variable form which his chance condition impresses upon him, is distorted and as such has almost always been misjudged even by philosophers, but the abiding nature of man and its unique position in creation. So that one may know which perfection is proper to him in the state of pure simplicity and which in the state of wise simplicity; and, on the other hand, what is the precept for his behavior when, going beyond the limitations of both, he aims to reach the highest point of physical and moral excellence but more or less deviates from both of them. This method of ethical investigation is a pretty discovery of our times and, if one considers it in its entire plan, was altogether unknown to the ancients.15 12

As we know from the complete list of Kant's university courses assembled by

E. Arnold. Cf. his Kritische Exkurse im Gebiete der Kantforschung (1894). 13 KGS, II, pp. 27-35; the announcement of his lecture-courses is on p. 35· 14

u

Cf. footnote 12, above. KGS, II, pp. 3II-312.

THE EARLY KANT

9

The first definite idea of the content of these lectures we get from reconstructed lecture-notes taken down by three of Kant's students and edited (in 1924) by Paul Menzer under the title: Eine Vorlesung Kants uber Ethik. 16 These notes were taken in the courses in ethics which Kant gave probably between the years 1775 and 178o. 2.

Early Writings

There are many other proofs of Kant's early interest in problems of morality. In the first place, several of his earlier writings show, either directly or indirectly, a concern with moral issues. Among these are: Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755); Entwuif und Ankundigung eines Collegii der Physischen Geographie (I] 57); Versuch einiger Betrachtungen uber den Optimismus (1759); Versuch den Begrijf der negativen Gross en in die Weltweisheit einzujuhren (1763); Untersuchung uber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsiitze der naturlichen Theologie und der Moral (r764); Beobachtungen uber das Gejuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen (1764); the already quoted Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre von I765-I766; Triiume eines Geistersehers (1766); his inaugural dissertation at the occasion of the beginning of his full professorship of logic and metaphysics at the University of Konigsberg, De Mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (r77o); and finally a certain Fragment which appears to date from 1763, 1764, or 1765.U

3· Letters Another rich source showing Kant's early and growing interest in the problems of moral philosophy is to be found in his letters. Since in tracing the development of Kant's early ethical thought I shall later quote most of the letters which have any ethical content, I mention here merely the recipients and the dates of the more important ones. The first letter is one to Lambert, dated December JI, 1765; there follow another to Lambert of date September 2, I]7o; one to Marcus Herz of June], I]]I; another to Herz 16 The English translation of the Vorlesung, arranged by Louis Infield, appeared under the title Lectures on Ethics by Immanuel Kant (London, 1930). 17 Cf. Hartenstein, Kants Siimmtliche Werke, VIII, pp. 6o9-64o.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

IO

of February 21, 1772; a third one to Herz coming from near the end of 1773; and finally one to Mendelssohn of August r6, 1783. During this period, Kant also received from his correspondents certain letters which have significant references to his ethical ideas as well as to certain writings which Kant was planning at the time.l 8

C.

PRIORITY OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM

It is equally clear that, whatever may have been his interest in ethics before I78 5, Kant never permitted himself to write in detail on ethical problems until he had cleared the ground for his ethical work by giving his answer to the problems of metaphysics and especially to those of epistemology. He realized that until he had determined what was the nature of knowledge and what it was possible for man to know, it was useless to try to answer questions requiring ethical knowledge. I.

Letters

The evidence for this conviction is to be found in several letters preceding the completion of the first Critique. Since the postponement of the actual ethical treatises to such a comparatively late date in Kant's career can only thus be explained, it will be best to cite the most important of these epistolary passages in order that we may see what Kant's idea was of the relation of epistemology to the foundations upon which alone a consideration of moral problems could safely proceed. I therefore quote here the relevant passages from four important letters. In a letter to Jahann Heinrich Lambert, dated December JI, I765, Kant wrote: For several years I have turned my philosophical deliberations in every conceivable direction. After a number of failures in which I was forever seeking the sources of error or insight in the type of procedure, I finally attained to the point where I considered myself assured of the method which one must observe if he wishes to escape that illusion of knowledge which forever causes him [falsely] to believe that he has reached the conclusion and so obliges him each time to retrace his steps; this also causes the destructive disagreement among pseudophilosophers, inasmuch as there is no common standard to make their efforts harmonious. Since that discovery I see every time, from the nature of each under18

All these letters are to be found in Vol. X of KGS.

THE EARLY KANT

II

taking before me, what I must know in order to discover the solution to the special problem, and what degree of knowledge is required by whafis given to begin with, so that [the result] becomes more specific and certain than it usually does. All these efforts aim chiefly at the peculiar method of metaphysics and by means of it also at the method of philosophy in general. ..• None the less I have de_f>arted so far from my first intention that I am desirous of deferring, for a while at least, the work which is the chief aim of these views. This postponement I desire for the following reason: in working with this problem I noticed that, although I did not lack examples of erroneous judgments by which to illustrate my statements of the incorrect procedure, I did decidedly lack examples by which I could show this peculiar procedure concretely. In order, therefore, that I may not be accused of simply making some new philosophical projects, I must first wor5: out some smaller compositions..•. 19

Under date of September znd, 1770, Kant wrote to Lambert as follows: I flatter myself that about a year ago I came to a concept which I do not fear ever having to change, though I shall probably have to expand it. By means of it, all types of metaphysical questions can be examined according to easy, certain criteria, and it determines with certainty how far they are or are not soluble. In so far as a sketch of this entire science contains [an analysis of] its nature, i.e., the original sources of all its judgments and the method by which one can easily proceed alone, it could be laid before you for a thorough and instructive critical examination in fairly brief space, that is to say, in a very few letters; from which, indeed, I would expect an excellent result; and I hereby ask your special permission to do so. None the less, in view of the fact that in an undertaking of such importance some little expenditure of time is no loss, especially in so far as one will then be able to deliver something finished and durable, I must still ask you to keep your good intention to cooperate in these efforts unchanged for me, and meanwhile to grant me some further time for carrying them out..•• 20

Toward the end of 1773 Kant wrote to Marcus Herz: ••• I have come so far in my intention to transform a science treated as yet fruitlessly by half the philosophical world, that I see myself in possession of a theory which completely solves the former riddle and brings the treatment of the self-isolating r~ason under certain and easily applied rules; therefore I will remain henceforth obstinate in my intention to allow myself to be misled [by] no vanity of authorship into seeking fame in an easier and more popular field, before I have cleared the hard and thorny ground and made it free for general treatment. I do not believe that many have sought to outline an entirely new science acu 2

KGS, X, pp. SZ-53·

° KGS, X, p. 93·

12

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

cording to a [definite] idea and at the same time to carry it out completely. What labor this causes in considering the method of classification of [things] exactly and appropriately designated and how much time must be expended thereupon, you will scarcely be able to imagine. But I am inspired by a hope, which I disclose to no one, except to you, without apprehension of becoming suspected of vanity; namely, to give philosophy a direction which is of a more permanent kind and which is much more advantageous for religion and morals, and to give to it at the same time a form which will tempt the disdainful mathematician to make it fit for and worthy of his treatment. I still hope sometimes to complete the work by Easter.21

To the same correspondent Kant wrote under date of November

24, 1776: From all sides I receive objections against the inactivity in which I seem to have been for a long time, yet actually I have never been more systematically and perseveringly busy than during these years in which you have not seen me. The materials through the preparation of which I can expect to obtain a passing approbation, grow under my hands, as generally happens when one has posseSsion of some fruitful principles. However, they are all held back by a principal circumstance, as it were by a dam, from which I hope to gain a lasting benefit that I believe already to be actually in my posession and that henceforth requires not so much to be thought out as only to be carried out. After finishing this work, which I am only now really beginning after having overcome the last hindrances just this past summer, I shall have a free field the cultivation of which will be nothing except pleasure. It is proper to follow steadily a plan like this one with obstinance, if I may say so, and often I have been enticed by difficulties to devote myself to other more agreeable subjects, from which inconstancy however I have ever been drawn back partly by surmounting some hindrances and partly by the importance of the affair itself. You know that the sphere of pure reason, i.e., the sphere of judging independently of all empirical principles, must be susceptible to examination because it lies in ourselves a priori and does not need to await disclosures from experience. In order to indicate according to certain principles the whole extent of the sphere of pure reason, the divisions, the boundaries, the whole content of it, and to place the landmarks so that hereafter one may know with certainty whether he is upon the ground of reason or of sophistry, there is necessary a critique, a discipline, a canon, and an architectonic of pure reason, therefore a formal science for which one can use nothing from the now existent sciences, and which needs, for its foundation even, an entirely peculiar technical expression. I do not think I shall be finished with this work by Easter, but I shall use a part of next summer for it, so far as my interrupted health will permit me to work; still with respect to this intention I entreat that no expectations be aroused, which are wont to be sometimes inconvenient and often diSadvantageous.22 21 KGS, X, p. 137• .. KGS, X, pp. I85-I86.

THE EARLY KANT 2.

13

Priface to the Grundlegung

Even though the present work stops short of a consideration of Kant's major ethical treatises, I venture to cite yet another passage, this one in the Preface to the Grundlegung; it is the most unequivocal statement because it voices Kant's conviction of the necessity for a metaphysical foundation of morality, at the very point where he is actually writing a treatise on morality and not on metaphysics. It reads: "It is only in a pure philosophy that we can look for moral law in its purity and genuineness (and, in a practical matter, this is of the utmost consequence): we must, therefore, begin with pure philosophy (metaphysics), and without it there cannot be any moral philosophy at all." 23 In these passages we can see how firmly Kant held himself to the task which he had recognized as essential, in spite of his increasing interest in ethical problems the solving of which he anticipated with so much pleasure. In fact, some of these epistolary remarks give considerable weight to the suggestion-by no means new-that Kant's primary interest lay in ethics, not in metaphysics or epistemology. This suggestion implies that the first Critique was not written because of any primary interest in its subject, but rather because Kant found the solution of its metaphysical and epistemological problems necessary before he could deal in any adequate fashion with the ethical question.

3· Critique of Pure Reason If additional evidence for the definite suggestions contained in these letters were needed, one might turn to a paragraph in the Critique of Pure Reason itself, where Kant says: Essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view of the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can be so described. Essential ends are therefore either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are necessarily connected with the former as means. The former is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy. On account of this superiority which moral philosophy has over all other occupations of reason, the ancients in their use of the term 'philosopher' always meant, more especially, the moralist.... 2' I 23

From the Preface to the Grundlegung, Abbott's translation, p. 5, lines 6-ro. "Norman Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 658. Italics mine.

KANT'S PRE--CRITICAL ETHICS

This tribute to the "superiorit y" (Vorzug) of moral philosophy in Kant's major treatise on metaphysic s and epistemolog y speaks even more weightily than the passages in his letters. These facts are all the more interesting because the first Critique is universally credited with having brought about the so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy rather than the second, and because the relative places of importance of the two Critiques during the past century and a half are hardly to be compared, the Practical Reason having been constantly overshadow ed by the Pure Reason. The whole question offers a problem of considerabl e interest to every. serious student of Kant, but the present undertakin g is not the place for a detailed discussion of the point. At anyrate, the evidence for Kant's early and growing interest in ethical problems is conclusive. To have established this fact is to have achieved the purpose of this chapter.

CHAPTER II

The Growth of Kant's Optimism Concern ing Man We shall now proceed to a detailed investigatio n of the development of Kant's earliest ethical thought. Did Kant commence with the view that to be "moral" is to be in the enjoyment of a state of feeling? Was there a time in his pre-Critica l period when he considered that the criterion or ground of moral preference is a specifically moral feeling which alternative prospects may or may not evoke? Or did he from the beginning regard the moral life as independen t of any state of feeling, as his definitive ethical thory is commonly supposed to teach?1 What was Kant's view of the specific place of happiness in and for the moral life, and what developme nt or progress, if any, did his views undergo during the early years of his thinking on the subject of ethics? Such are the questions which we shall seek to answer. The answers will be seen to be important not merely for a better understand ing of the early Kant and a better comprehen sion of his later ethical ideas, but also for a more adequate grasp of the real issues involved in any logical view of the ethical problem. In tracing the developme nt of Kant's thought on these questions, we must keep in mind that throughout his early period we are dependent upon more or less isolated passages which occur in writings primarily concerned with other subjects, and that we have as yet no specific treatment of morality on its own account from the pen of Kant. At the same time, it may be surprising to persons not familiar with Kant's earlier writings to discover what fundament al insights they reveal in the most improbable and unexpected places. 1 The question is valid whether such "independence " be thought of in the sense (I) of being devoid of feeling content, or (z) of not being determined in its successive stages by a feeling.

15

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS I.

The Attraction of Natural Science

A first view of Kant's three earliest publications2 impresses us with his obvious preoccupation with physical problems. In his celebrated treatment of the development of Kant's early ethical thought, Menzer suggests that this preoccupation was in part at least the effect of a "general pessimistic world-view," and that this general pessimism explains in turn what he is pleased to call Kant's "lack of interest in man." Kant's pessimism Menzer ascribes to three major reasons: (r) his Pietistic up-bringing, as a natural result of which Kant is said to hive had a much exaggerated sense of the sinfulness of human nature; 3 (2.) his somewhat disparaging comparison of man with the supposed inhabitants of other planets; 4 and (3) Kant's deficient health. These three influences are supposed to have induced in Kant an attitude of resignation and "retreat into his inner life" away from contact with and concern for his fellow-beings. 6 I see nothing in this early preoccupation with physical problems which would necessitate going so far afield for an explanation. One need not be a pessimist about life and the universe in order to be a student of physical nature; nor, because a scholar gives himself to a study of physical nature, must he therefore "lack interest in man." All the less is this true when this early interest of Kant's is seen in its proper historical setting. We must not forget that Continental ethics of the seventeenth century had been essentially Stoic, trusting that human welfare and the right direction of the 2 They were: Gedanken von der Wahren Schatzung der Lebendigen Kriifte (1747); Untersuchung der Frage, Ob die Erde in Ihrer Umdrehung um die Llchsc, wodurch sie die Llbwechslung des Tages und der Nacht heroorbringt, einige V eranderung seit den Ersten Zeiten ihres Ursprungs erlitten habe (1754); and Die Frage, Ob die Erde Veralte, Physikalisch Erwogen (1754). 3 In chapter I, I have already had occasion to call attention to the inadequacy of such a · narrow view of Pietism. 4 In the conclusion to his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755), KGS, I, pp. 351-368, and especially pp. 353-360, where we find among other remarks the comparison of men to lice, and where Kant tells us that man "among all creatures achieves the purpose of his being the least." If "at least in the eyes of true Wisdom" man is not actually "the most despicable of all creatures," it is only because of "the hope of the future" and the possible "complete development" of man's "hidden powers" in another period. 5 Paul Menzer, Entwicklungsgang, Part I, p. 291.

KANT'S OPTIMISM CONCERNING MAN

17

will could be assured by knowing what is, i.e., by knowing propositions about the nature of existence. This is definitely the teaching of Spinoza's Ethics, for example. The first step in this direction has been to find a sure method of knowing, and then by use of this method, to find a body of sound knowledge about the ultimate nature of the universe and of man as comprised within it. 6 On the basis of results in the fields of epistemology and ontology the ethical problems were almost expected to solve themselves: If we only understand what is, we shall know what to do. The eighteenth century, on the other hand, had gone beyond this. It had become disillusioned about the possibility of determining what one ought to do by a mere consideration of the nature of things. 7 It had begun to see that morality is a thing which has to be studied in a way appropriate to its own peculiar type of problems. Kant could not help being aware of this shifting point of view in ethics. Indeed, as one schooled in the Wolffian ethics, he may well have found the shift somewhat disconcerting. Now to be aware of great difficulties in the treatment of distinctively human problems, and for that reason to refrain from discussing them immediately, is very far from a total "lack of interest in man." From any point of view, Kant's initial interest in physical science was most natural, and hardly needs so labored a defense as Menzer has made for it. 8 Although, in view of the general world situation at the time, which made a treatment of social and political issues not too inviting to a young writer, physical problems 9 appeared more attractive to Kant than some others, this would hardly justify the inference that he was in~ terested exclusively in such problems. Perhaps when he turned 6 Descartes' Discourse on Method, Spinoza's On the Improvement of the Understanding and even Locke's On the Conduct qf the Understanding, are relevant examples. 7 Some of the social and economic causes of this disillusionment are clearly brought out by James Hayden Tufts in his monograph, "The Individual and his Relation to Society as Reflected in the British Ethics of the Eighteenth Century," in The Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, VI, No. 2 (May 1904). 8 In this connection it is important to remember that the professor at Konigsberg who had the greatest influence upon Kant as a young student, viz., Martin Knutzen, lectured not only on philosophy and religion but also on mathematics and the natural sciences. Thus even in his student days, Kant had been accustomed to a rather intimate connection among these various fields and interests. i Two of these papers on problems of physics appeared in 17 54, when the Seven Years' War, which was to break out in the spring of 1756 and to rage in three continents, was already brewing.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

later to ethics as a field of direct inquiry, Kant saw something of self-indulgenc e in this early limitation of his intellectual efforts.

The Allgemeine N aturgeschichte not pessimistic Upon close inspection, the passage from the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte· which Menzer uses as one of his three reasons for Kant's general "pessimism" at this time does not appear to bear such interpretation or to prove much of anything concerning Kant's attitude toward man. Even if the so-called "pessimistic tenor" of the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte were granted, for the sake of argument, it is strange that Menzer should use the expression of pessimistic sentiments as itself one of the "reasons" or "causes" for Kant's pessimism. By no logic is it permissible to use an effect as the cause initiating the process which produced that effect. Rather than indicating the "pessimism" in this passage as a reason for Kant's "lack of interest in man," does not the fact that he appended a pessimistic conclusion concerning man to an essay about the natural history of the heavens indicate a certain ethical and human interest on Kant's part? The very wording of that pessimistic view10 shows that Kant's remarks were not of a contemptuous nature implying an aversion to ethics, but were rather made in sadness and exhortation, and thus quite possibly reflected a germinating affirmative ethical interest. I have already adduced reaons for a view of Kant's life during this period entirely different from that given by Menzer and others. Menzer does not seem to have reflected that a youthful scholar cannot discuss everything in his initial publication. Also worthy of note is Kant's hope for an appointment as PriuatDozent, which very likely had something to do with his first choice of topics. Surely all these factors should be kept in mind in this connection, but none of them should be made to carry too much weight.. Menzer's suggestions are entirely too one-sided to offer an acceptable explanation, although we may concur in his conclusion I that Kant hardly thought of himself, at this time, as "the educator of mankind." Even this observation might be considered super-

2.

1

° Cf. the quotations given in footnote 4 on p. r6 above.

KANT'S OPTIMISM CONCERNING MAN

fluous when it is remembered that we are here concerned with a young man in his late twenties and early thirties. It is hardly conceivable, from any point of view, that so young a man should think of himself as "the educator of mankind." Of course, it may be that during this period Kant permitted himself to be ruled more by his emotional reactions than by his reason. If so, this may explain why Kant, once he became aware of it, may have felt moved to throw off this domination. It may, in fact, have been one of the decisive factors in making him suspicious in after years of mere emotional criteria or goals for the moral life. 3· The Betrachtungen uber den Optimismus Interpreters who make so much of the so-called pessimism of Kant as late as 1755 are hard put to it to explain the decided note of optimism which comes from his pen within the brief period of four years. Kant's installation as Privat-Dozent at the University of Konigsberg in 175511 could hardly explain so radical a change. It is true that in connection with his teaching at the university, Kant naturally assumed certain social duties and found himself thrown into daily contact with a growing number of students, It is also true that Kant seems to have entered into these new duties and opportunities with unexpected gusto. That su~h contacts must have affected Kant's general outlook and point ofview need not be doubted; but by themselves these facts appear insuffic~ent to account for any such great change as must have come to pass if the Kant of the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte really had been a veritable misanthrope and pessimist. In I759 we :find him exultantly exclaiming: "I rejoice to see myself as a citizen in a world which could not possibly have been better ... I cry out to every creature ... 'Hail to us, we exist! And the Creator is pleased with us'." 12 It is a fact that the enthusiasm of this passage is not equalled by anything we have from Kant's pen before this time, but it would be absurd to assume that, by sheer intellectual determination, Kant had raised hims'elf to the pitch of this particu11 With his dissertation on Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova t/ilucidatio, (Konigsberg, 1755); in KGS, I, pp. 385-416. 12 From Kant's V ersuch einiger Betrachtungen uber den Optimismus, KGS, II, pp. 34-35.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

2.0

larly enraptured passage. It is hardly necessary to point out its distinctly Leibnitzian flavor-a consideration which makes the alleged chasm between 1755 and 1759 all the less plausible, since the influence upon Kant ofLeibnitzian optimism may be assumed to have been the stronger the farther back we go. Probably Kant happened to be feeling particularly well while writing the Betrachtungen uber den Optimismus. The passage may therefore be considered as an interesting "mountain-top" experience, but hardly as of any specific significance for the growth of Kant's ideas.

4· Physische Geographie We know from the Entwurf und Ankundigung eines Collegii der ' Physischen Geographie that as early as 1757 Kant had made in some of his regular university lecture courses analyses of man and of human characteristics. Here, in the second part, which he entitled "Der physischen Geographie besonderer Theil," we find the following description of his proposed lectures: The Animal Kingdom, in which man will be viewed comparatively with regard to the differences of his natural form and color in different regions of the earth .... I shall lecture on this first of all in the natural order of classes and finally cover in geographic survey all the countries of the earth, in order to display the inclinations of men as they grow out of the particular region in which they live; the variety of their prejudices and types of thinking, in so far as all of this can serve to make man more intimately acquainted with himself; and in order to give a brief idea of their arts, commerce, and science, an enumeration of the ... products of the various regions, their atmospheric conditions, etc.: in a word, everything which belongs to physical geography.13

Including under "physical geography" even more of the anthropological, social, and economic features than would today be included under "economic geography," Kant was evidently concerned with everything that can improve man's knowledge of himself. This aim of making man "more intimately acquainted with himself" reveals a most interesting hint of reflective selfcriticism and appraisal of impulses at their real value as distinct from apparent value. It is an exceedingly interesting suggestion, . to say the least. Beginning :his third semester in the university in 1756, Kant found himself called upon to offer a course of lectures on ethics. 13

KGS, II, p. 9·

KANT'S OPTIMISM CONCERNING MAN

21

This fact had much to do with Kant's rapidly growing interest in man and in human relationships and activities. From the announcement of his courses for the winter-semester I759-I76o, with which he closes his paper on Optimismus,l4 one may judge that by that time, Kant's offering of a course on ethics had come to be taken for granted. 15 · Nevertheless, of the eleven essays published by ~ant between the years 1755 and 1759, nine deal almost altogether with problems of physics. Although some of these eleven studies give evidence of Kant's increasing interest in man, not one of them contains any treatment of moral issues or problems. A change was soon to come, however. Nearly all Kant's writings of the sixties show a decided undertone of moral interest. 14 KGS, II, p. 35· This paper was intended to announce his various lectures for the approaching semester---an advance sample to arouse the reader's interest. · l1i In announcing his courses for the approaching semester Kant says with reference to them: "As I am in the habit of doing .•. " (KGS, II, p. 35, lines ro-n).

CHAPTER III

The Prize-Essay and Kant's Relation to the British Moralists and to Rousseau The British Moralists and Rousseau Beginning with the middle of the eighteenth century, two great ethical movements began to make themselves strongly felt in Europe. I refer to the doctrines of the British moralists, on the one hand, and to those of Rousseau, on the other. Virtually all of Kant's remarks on the subject of morality, during the sixties, reflect in one way or another his acquaintance with these writers. Although such influence is freely admitted-for it would be undeniable even if Kant had not made his acknowledgments to these writers by name--it is nevertheless possible to build entirely too strong a case upon it. For one thing, we must remember that a person is not likely to be influenced by any ideas which are totally foreign to his own general direction of thought. The influence of fructifying ideas is most often in direct proportion to their harmony with ideas which are already cherished. One is "influenced" by what feeds a fire already burning. If Kant had ever been the complete rationalist and formalist in ethics that he is commonly said to have been by his interpreters and critics/ any acquaintance with the doctrines of Rousseau and of the British moralists would have had the opposite effect from that of enticing him. In view of this, it would seem unjustifiable to assume that Kant was completely swept off his feet by their doctrines as something wholly novel, not to say foreign to his own ethical point of view. 2

I.

1 It is not only the later Kant who is, in general, thought of as a rationalist and formalist. It must not be forgotten that Kant was not "awakened" from his "dogmatic slumber" until he read Hum e. In other words, the period of the influence of the British and of Rousseau is usually treated as a "strange interlude" in Kant's intellectual life. Both before and after that interlude he is supposed to have been rationalistic and formalistic. It is against this notion that my remarks above are directed. 2 There seems to be no more reason for assuming that Kant would have been swept off his feet by the supposedly startling character of the ethical ideas of the British moralists

zz

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The foregoing remarks are in no way intended to rob either the British moralists or Rousseau of credit which properly belongs to them as factors in the shaping of Kant's ethical ideas. That such influence is present no one would care to deny. It is wise to enter caution in advance against an exaggerated estimate, however, because, for an understanding of the development of Kant's ethical thought, it is important to trace this influence. Within the limits of this study, it is not possible to offer a detailed treatment of the doctrines of either the British moralists or of Rousseau~ For an understanding of their influence upon Kant, however, it is necessary to bear in mind the dominant characteristics of their moral philosophies. Both opposed the one-sided emphasis of the .dujkliirungsphilosophie upon reason; the British moralists with their doctrine of the "moral sentiment" and Rousseau with his of the "natural man." They were determined to establish the emotions in their "rightful" place in human life, and built practically their entire moral philosophies around this aim. Although the British moralists3 did not agree among themselves, they may rightly be taken together since they did agree upon the idea of a substantive moral "sense" as a separate and additional faculty in the same way in which sight and hearing are "senses" or "faculties." They are also more or less alike in that they take this "moral sense" or "sentiment" largely as a separate and distinct "feeling" or "emotion." Rousseau~s 4 doctrine of the "natural man" is largely a demand for a "return" of man to what he calls the "state of nature," to man as he is while still unspoiled by the superficialities, encumbrances, and insincerities of civilization. Although this view contains a new respect for man in his "original nature," it is more an interpretation of man based upon an intuitive emotional rethan that the startling epistemological ideas ofHume should have made a Humian skeptic out of him. 3 By these are meant principally Hutcheson (1694-1746), Shaftesbury (r67I-1713), and Hume (17II-1776); to these Kant refers most often. In Kant's correspondence there are also references to Adam Smith (I7Z3-1790). There is a reference also to Samuel Clarke (r675-1729) in a letter addressed to Kant by Lambert, dated October 13, 1770. This reference is of such a character that one must assume a direct acquaintance of Kant with Clarke's Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion (London, 1717; in German: Frankfurt, 17zo); cf. KGS, X, p. Ib3, and XIII, p. 50. Clarke, however, was a rationalist and intellectualist different in type from the rest of these British moralists. ' Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778•

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

action, or more precisely, upon sentimentalism, than it is an articulate theory arrived at by rational procedure.

The Prize-Essay Kant's first published treatise which undertook to deal with definitely moral issues shows clear traces of the relationship of his thought to that of the British moralists. This is the Untersuchung ilber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der natilrlichen Theologie und der Moral, 5 written towards the end of 1762 for a prize offered by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin, and published by the Academy in 1764. Even here only the last three or four pages deal directly with ethics. Kant begins the discussion of morality with the notion of obligation which, in one form or another, was to become one of the corner-stones of his mature ethics. He says: " ... I want to show how little even the primary concept of obligation is as yet known and how far, therefore, we are from being able to render the basic concepts and principles of practical philosophy with the precision and certainty necessary for evidence." 6 And he loses no time in justifying his initial assertion in this connection, that the concept of obligation is the "primary concept." Without arguing the point, he proceeds to illustrate the principle. "One ought to do this or that and leave the other undone; this is the formula by which every obligation is expressed." 7 This statement taken for granted, Kant goes on to show that "every ought expresses a necessity of action,'' 8 a statement which, as we shall see, is of considerable importance for the further development of Kant's ethical thought, but which in its present bald form is far from being proved. From a Pietistic point of view, however, the statement may be said to be obvious. This does not excuse it from the necessity of other and more general "proof''; but one should reflect that a ratiocinative proof may be neither possible nor desirable. At the same time, from a critical point of view it is not at all clear what "necessity of action" means. No reasons are adduced by Kant to show why "ought" and "necessity of action" should be or even can be 2.

5

KGS, KGS, 7 Ibid., 8 Ibid.,

6

II, pp. Z73-30I. II, p. Z98, lines 4-8. lines 8-ro. line ro.

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zs

synonymous. Nor are these difficulties obviated by what follows. Each "ought," we are told, admits of a double meaning. For either I ought to do something (as a means), iji desire something else (as an end), or I ought immediately to do something else and realize it (as an end). The first could be called the necessity of means (necessitatem problematicam), the second the necessity of ends (necessitatem legalem). The first type of necessity indicates no obligation at all, but gives merely the prescription for the solution of a problem, [indicating] which are those means which I must use if I wish to accomplish a certain end. Whoever prescribes to someone what actions he must perform or omit if he wishes to further his own happiness, might perhaps be able to bring all doctrines of morality under this [requirement]. In this case, however, these doctrines are no longer obligations ... , but merely directions for behavior suitable to achieving an end. And since the use of means has no other necessity than that which applies to the end, all actions which morality prescribes as subservient to certain ends are accidental and can not be called obligations so long as they are not subordinated to an end necessary in itself. 9

In these sentences we have, if not the actual language, certainly the germ of Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The demand of the former, i.e., the hypothetical, is wholly dependent upon the end which one wishes to reach, whereas categorical imperatives are dependent upon nothing else whatever, but command unconditional obedience. This passage contains another idea closely related to the one just mentioned. When Kant says that "all actions which morality prescribes as subservient to certain ends are accidental and cannot be called obligations," he recognizes clearly the principle that acts required for the realization of accepted substantive standards or already adopted ends are not of primary ethical significance.10 They become of primary import when they raise issues on their own account apart from their subservience to ends already adopted. In other words, Kant is definitely turning from a consideration of the specific content of action. Only "ends" which are "necessary in themselves" are unqualifiedly "obligatory." This emphasis fits in with Kant's next point. He undertakes to carry over to fundamental moral principles what he has already established regarding epistemological principles in the major g

10

Ibid., lines Io-3 I.

Of course, an act discovered to be requisite may re-open the main reflective process, because, like surgical abortion, it may seem to be itself the doing of moral evil.

KANT'S PRE-CRIT ICAL ETHICS

26

portion of the essay, namely, that both formal and material fundamental concepts, in any field, are beyond demonstr ation or proof. He says: Here we find that such an immediate supreme rule of all obligation would have to be absolutely indemonstr able. For from no inspection of any concept or thing is it possible to know or to conclude what one ought to do, unless what is presupposed is an end, and the action is a means. But this it must not be; for in such a case there would be no formula of obligation but only one of skill to be used as needed.U

This, certainly, is a clear and unqualifie d recognitio n that "an immediat e supreme rule of all obligatio n" is "absolute ly indemonstrable," and that there are reasons for this indemons trability. If a proof were possible in terms of another rule of obligation beyond the first immediat e supreme rule, then obviously that first immediate supreme rule would be neither immediat e nor supreme. If the proof is found in its indispens ability for specifically desired consequences of action, the rule is neither supreme nor obligator y, since it is then not the rule which obligates, but the consequences desired and held in view. The action determin ed upon is merely a means towards the achievem ent of an end already pre-deter mined. But "from no inspection of any concept or thing," Kant tells us, "is it possible to know or to conclude what one ought to do." The supreme rule of obligation , supposing that there is one, must be immediat ely12 embraced , self-evide nt in its own right, and its obligator y character must be a wholly indemons trable finality. A- moral choice, in other words, is not a choice for the sake of somethin g else, but for its own sake. It would seem that Kant meant by this that, in the nature of the case, such a "supreme rule" could not be suscepti'ble of proof, being essentiall y misconceived if thought of as itself still standing in need of proof. The prize-essay thus permits no demonstr able supreme moral principle or "rule." Rather, on this point of view, it would be enough to say that in reflectively weighing alternativ es a method13 must be employed in which de facto and direct prefer12 I.e., directly. KGS, II, p. 299, lines 1-7. A method, that is to say, which is controlled by the principle of self-transcendence in one's self as well as in others concerned. The meaning and significance of this will become increasingly evident. 11 13

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ences of the self play no determinative part. This, for Kant, is the meaning of the principle of the "irrelevancy of consequences," a principle which is very common in Kant's ethical thought, but the significance of which has been no less misunderstood and misinterpreted than has Kant's ethics in general. Yet it is difficult to comprehend or explain such misunderstanding at this point, where Kant's precise meaning can not be in doubt. His language is unequivocal: neither from a pre-determined and therefore already accepted goal, nor from any desire for specific co~­ sequences, is it possible either to deduce or to demonstrate any "supreme rule of moral obligation." This is precisely the significance of Kant's doctrine of "ends in themselves" as members in an inter-communicative "kingdom of ends." Yet, despite the clear statement of the principle, the full implications of it appear by no means to have been clear to Kant's mind at this time. Perhaps this is not so surprising when the early date (1762.) of this passage is remembered. None the less, it is remarkable to find such acute suggestions in the first treatise in which Kant deals with any specific ethical issues. The originality of Kant's analysis here can not be questioned. The passage is noteworthy also because the ideas obviously present in it run completely counter to the common interpretation given to Kant's early ethical views. Recent interpreters consider the prize-essay to have been so greatly influenced by the British moralists that the specific and original discovery by Kant of the principle just discussed has been completely overlooked. These interpreters have never recognized its real purport at all. Even so thorough a study of the development of Kant's early ethical ideas as Menzer's does not find it necessary even to refer to this particular passage, but is satisfied to credit the entire section of the prize-essay to the direct influence of the British moralists. 14 If, on the other hand, our interpretation of the passage be at all correct, no statement could very well be farther from the doctrines of the British moralists than is the one here under consideration. I shall 14

Cf. Entwic!dungsgang, Part I, especially pp. 302.-303 and middle of p. 305.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

z8

return to this problem of Kant's relation to the British moralists again in a moment. Despite the fact that Kant definitely lays his finger upon an important ethical problem, he does not seem able to offer at this point a definite and detailed solution of the problem which he enVlsages. Having thus rather summarily laid the logical foundation, Kant proceeds to enunciate confidently his principle. And now I can indicate in a few words that I have become convinced, after long reflection on this subject, that the rule: "Do the most perfect [deed] that you can," is the primary formal ground of all obligation to act; as also the rule: "Omit that whereby you hinder the greatest possible perfection," is, with respect to duty, [the primary formal ground of all obligation] to abstain. 15

Here we have evidence not only of Christian Wolff's tutelage but also of Kant's own originality of thought. On the one hand, Kant, so far from having freed himself from the sway of Wolff's concept of the ethical summum bonum, that of perfection, is convinced that it is necessary in any formal statement of the moral law. On the other hand, Kant's statement goes definitely beyond Wolff, for Wolff had aimed at the completeness or perfection of the "agent," whereas Kant is clearly talking about the perfection of the "act." Wolff's ethics of self-realization was not, after all, based on a "formal" principle. On the other hand, Kant, definitely announces this principle as "the primary formal ground of every obligation to act." So far as the statement of the principle itself is concerned, it may help us to understand it better if we translate its meaning freely into the language of today. Stated thus it would read simply: "Do the best you can." By adding to this counsel of perfection its negative corollary, that is, to abstain from doing what hinders the greatest possible perfection, Kant was again following Wolff's example, but at the same time was,applying a principle which he soon worked out in a separate essay. 16 This is the principle that a negative statement, even in philosophy, is never equivalent to saying merely nothing, any more than the statement "minus four" in mathematics, to 15

KGS, II, p. 299, lines 8-13. In his V er.ruch den Begriff der Negativen Gro.r.ren in die Weltwei.rheit einzujuhren, 1763 (KGS, II, pp. I65--'l04). 16

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use Kant's illustration, says nothing. The negative statement of the primary formal principle of morality is also noteworthy for another reason, since there occurs in it a word which was destined to play an important rClle in Kant's ethical theory. The word is "duty." At this point, however, it turns out to be relatively unimportant, merely being used interchangeably with "obligation," which has already been treated by Kant in the passages discussed above. With reference to his positive and negative statement of obligation, the question cannot but arise whether Kant has not in his counsel of perfection re-introduced a substantive principle as the primary basis of every obligation, despite his claim that the principle is purely "formal." I think we must answer: either he has done precisely that or else the principle is devoid of any assignable meaning. If it is not possible to fill the purely formal counsel of perfection with meaningful content, then, obviously, it means nothing. And if you do give determinateness to the concept of perfection by giving it some specifiable content, then you have, just as obviously, another substantive standard. Kant's statement of these two positive and negative principles, following hard upon his recognition of this very dilemma, offers conclusive proof that he has not yet found the solution for the problem which he himself had so clearly stated. And his falling back upon the doctrine of perfection is simply another instance of the old story that we are all prone to rely upon traditional formulae instead of devising our own. Immediately following his positive and negative formulation of what he calls the "primary formal grounds of moral obligation," Kant makes a remark of great importance. It has been treated17 as making a definite "concession" to "materiai principles of practical knowledge." Its possible significancefor the development of· Kant's ethical thought has been overlooked, however, just because attention has been focussed too much upon the so-called "concession." The sentence reads: Just as nothing comes from the primary formal principles of our judgments of 17 By Menzer, for example, who discusses it, although he does not actually quote this particular sentence, in connection with the very next passage further developing this same idea (quoted by me on p. 31 below). Cf. Entwiclclungsgang, Part I, p. 303.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

30

truth unless material primary grounds are given, likewise no specifically determined obligation comes from these two rules of the good by themselves, unless unprovable material principles of practical knowledge are joined thereto.I 8

It is easy to see how this sentence might cause rejoicing as showing that Kant, thus early in the development of his ethical ideas, had not yet been wholly led astray by his evil genius of ethical formalism. It is easily asserted that Kant, if he had remembered the lesson here taught, would never have fallen into the "contradiction" of his critical theory. He gives us, it is contended, an excellent warning here against any attempt at a purely formal ethics. It is true, of course, that the quoted sentence contains a definite reference to "material principles of practical knowledge," without which "no specifically determined obligation" can come "from the two rules of the good." This supposed concession to the necessary presence of material principles is actually no more than a reference to the obvious, implying nothing in the least extraordinary. Nor, on any reasonable interpretation, did Kant later recede from his assertion at this point. In fact, the real significance of the passage has been completely overlooked. It lies not in the reference to "material principles of practical knowledge"-though their necessity for the specific determination of any particular action is evident enough-but in the words "specifically determined obligation" and "unprovable." Specific obligation can, obviously, spring only from specific, actually given, situations. If Kant had ever "receded" from such a statement of obvious and necessary fact, he would have made himself absurd. The absurdity, however, really lies in the interpretation put upon Kant's later critical teaching. After all, moral action is called for only in a world of actual happenings and occurrences. This being the case, it is difficult to see how "specifically determined obligations" could arise out of anything else but specific, material situations. In the attempt to make the alleged errors of Kant's later ethics seem the more deplorable because he once knew better, the real import of the passage has been completely missed. The "unprovable" doctrine contained in the sentence is of still greater significance. The phrase containing this word makes the ls

KGS, II, p. 299, lines 13-18.

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31

definite assertion that proximate objectives, in each separate instance of moral choice, must be taken as standing on their own ground; they are beyond demonstration or proof. Certain "material principles of practical knowledge" are thus said to be their own final justification. Inasmuch, moreover, as Kant at once19 refers to these final material principles of practical knowledge as being "an irreducible feeling for the good," it seems to be clear that what Kant is contending for here is nothing more or less than that the good is ultimately satisfying, but that it is not good merely qua satisfying. The good is directly felt as good rather than known as such by deduction from some still higher principle or dogma. It is for this reason that any comparison of it with any thing or absolute is a wholly impossible procedure. Its obligatory character lies in its immediately felt claim upon us. This fact puts the primary material principles wholly beyond the pale of proof, thus reiterating and further strengthening a thought which we have already had occasion to note in an earlier passage from the prize-essay. 20 In the light of the later development of Kant's ethical thought, this idea will be seen to be of far-reaching importance. Yet Kant's commentators have completely overlooked it. 21 In the next sentence of his essay, Kant turns to an acknowledgment of the sources whence he has drawn much of his conviction of the need, for ethics, of material primary principles. "For," he goes on to say, it is only in our own day that we first began to realize that the capacity of perceiving the true is knowledge, whereas that of sensing the good is feeling, and that the two must, under no circumstances, be confused. Just as there are indivisible concepts of the true, i.e., of that which is found in the objects of knowledge viewed in themselves, so too there is an irreducible feeling for the good (never found in a thing simply, but always in relation to a feeling creature).22

The reference in this passage to the British moralists and to their 10 KGS, II, p. 2.99, lines 2.4 and zs; a passage to the further consideration of which we shall turn next; cf. the quotation on this page. 20 In connection with the discussion of the passage quoted on p. z6 above. 21 This passage and the treatment which it has been accorded offer an excellent instance of what happens, even to philosophers, when they forget a due suspicion of their "blind spots." Even the "absent treatment" accorded it by Menzer speaks clearly enough. The fact that in his scholarly treatment of the development of Kant's early ethical ideas he did not even consider the passage significant enough to quote, shows how completely its significance has been overlooked. 22 KGS, II, p. 2.99, lines I:;-2.7·

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

doctrine of the "moral sentiment" is quite evident. Even if Kant had not taken the trouble of mentioning Hutcheson by name forty lines further down, 23 there could have been little doubt as to whom he was referring. Having given, then, both in his positive and negative statements, the primary formal grounds of moral obligation, Kant now turns for the needed material ground to feeling. At this point Kant is quite ready to get what aid he can from the British moralists. Nor is he at all unwilling to give credit to whom credit is due. "Hutcheson and others," he writes, 24 "under the name of the moral feeling have made of this the occasion for some splendid remarks." This comment and the one under consideration in the preceding paragraph show that Kant considers the British moralists' doctrine of the "moral feeling" as ably supporting. at least certain aspects of his own views on this particular point. Just when Kant first became familiar with the writings of Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, and Hume cannot be stated precisely, but we have a reference to both Hutcheson and Hume in one of 5 Hamann's letters to Kant, dated July 27th, 1759/ in which it is taken for granted by the writer that both names are familiar to Kant. It is very likely that Kant made the acquaintance of these British moralists as early as 1756,26 when he was looking forward to giving his first university course on ethics during the approaching winter-semest er. It is certain, at any rate, that for the greater part of a decade Kant gives evidence of a considerable interest in their contributions to ethical science. 27 Despite these facts, it is absurd to jump to the conclusion that, because Kant himself acknowledges his indebtedness to the Ibid, II, p. 300, line 23. KGS, II, p. 300, lines 23-25. 26 KGS, X, pp. 9 and 15; the references are, none the less, too incidental and unim-

23

24

portant in character to make quotation of them here worth while. 26 So far as Burne is concerned, Norman Kemp Smith states definitely that Kant read Burne's Enquiry between 1756 and 1762. Sulzer's German translation of Burne's Essays (including the Enquiries) appeared in 175+-1756. (Cf. Kemp Smith's A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," second, revised and enlarged ed.: London, 1923; p. xxviii of the Introduction; also footnote 2 on the same page.) 27 As does Menzer, for example, who professes to find Kant in this specific passage to be "in complete agreement with the Englishmen" (Entwicklungsgang, Part I, p. 303). The actual words of the passage do not seem to me to warrant such an assertion, for reasons which I give in the course of the argument above.

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33

British moralists, he must, in his reference to "feeling," mean precisely the same thing that the British moralists meant by their "moral sense" or "sentiment." It does not seem at all necessary to assume that Kant's recognition of the presence of an "irreducible feeling for the good" is the equivalent of the substantive "moral sense" of the British moralists. In fact, if it were not clear from the German phrase itself-"ein unauflosliches GefUhl des Guten"-, it becomes clear from the context2 8 that by the "irreducible feeling for the good" Kant does not mean that such feeling is a criterion by which the "good" is distinguished from the "bad," but is merely the peculiar quality of our appreciation of the good, whenever the good (however it may originally have been distinguished from the bad) is in fact presented. We shall see this in more detail as we proceed. Menzer,2 9 however, because of the recognition of the indemonstrability of moral feeling on Kant's part and because of the equally asserted finality of the "moral sense" on the part of the British philosophers, has permitted himself to be misled into assuming that Kant's doctrine of an "irreducible feeling for the good" is actually the same thing as the separate "moral sense" of the British moralists. We should assert emphatically that there is no inner evidence here of identity of meaning. That Kant has been aided at this point by the ideas of the British moralists, we have already admitted. This is far from saying, however, that he is "in complete agreement" with them. As a matter of fact, all that Kant seems to mean here by his "material principles" is the whole sensory and affective nature of experience30 at large. The term "principles" in the phrase, "material principles," must, therefore, be either a mere Wolffian reminiscence or else a concession to Wolffian habits of thought in others, for it is perfectly clear that Kant holds here that there is no such thing as a summum principium. 28 Especially in lines 30 to 32 of the same page, where Kant says: "Whenever the sensation of the good is simple, thejudgment, 'This is good,' is completely unprovable and an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of pleasure accompanying the perception of the object." KGS, II, p. 299. 29 And with him all interpreters of Kant who follow Menzer's leadership in the analysis of Kant's pre-Critical ethical thought. 30 Experience, that is·to say, in the sense which comprises the "reflective" as well as the primarily perceptual and intellectual (cognitive and ratiocinative).

34

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

Let us, however, look at the passage a little more closely. It contains not only a recognition of the place of feeling in and for the moral life, but several assertions about feeling which stand in need of further scrutiny. This is necessary because it is too easy to read ideas into this passage which a more careful examination might not justify; and because it is equally easy to fail to find in it ideas which a more careful examination would discover. To begin with, it is true that the ultimate experience of the good as such has its feeling side, as does, I suppose, any other conscious human experience. And it may be admitted, with Kant, that feeling is irreducible. So, indeed, is the qualitative aspect of any experience. But even this early, Kant seems to recognize that this fact is of no particular ethical import. He says that the good is always "in relation to a feeling creature." This very assertion would seem to imply, however, that this "feeling creature" is something more than merely a "feeling creature." Feeling has its place in human experience, but it neither defines nor exhausts human nature. Nor, as a matter of fact, is it possible to use feeling as a criterion for the judgment of the good, a proposition from which Kant never departed, even during the period of his greatest interest in the British. moralists. From a critical point of view, moreover, it is really superfluous to say that morality as the appreciative feeling for the good is indemonstrab le. No one wants it proved that a red-hot stove is hot or that pleasure is pleasant. Such things are obvious. They simply are what they are. Now if good really were just a matter of feeling, the case would be the s·ame. The real meaning of the proposition that good is known by a moral sense is that I can rely upon my moral sense when I want to know what is good. This reliance might seem to need proof, but Kant here had made the remarkable declaration that even this reliance of mine can never be justified by proof. This is most interesting, butit is at the same time disappointing to have Kant break off the argument just as he is on the track of significant discoveries. If h~ had continued the argument at this point, it would seem that he could not possibly have escaped the necessity of recognizing that no reliance of mine upon anything whatsoever can be justified by proof beforehand. Beforehand I have

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35

to affirm reflectively, i.e., judge or deem, and this is experimental or inductive. The proof comes in action. The goodness is predicated ex post facto. At any rate" it is clear even from the prize-essay, the first of Kant's writings to show the influence of the British moralists, that from the beginning Kant did not accept the moral theories of the British moralists uncritically. No sooner has he admitted moral feeling as a necessary "material principle" in the determination of specific moral obligations, than he proceeds to emphasize the necessity of determining the precise nature of the concept of the good by reflective reason. "It is the business of reason to dissolve and make clear the complex and confused concept of the good, by showing how it emerges out of simpler feelings of the good." 31 It is true, the application of reason will lead to the discovery that the complex notion of the good is made up of simple sensations,S2 but it is nevertheless worth noting that reflective reason is needed to make this discovery. In other words, the concept of good (as distinct from the experience or possession of something that is good) is reflective. How strongly Kant is convinced of the importance of feeling in morality notwithstanding his introduction of reflective reason into the argument, can be judged from the following passage. However, whenever [this sensation of the good] is simple, the judgment, "this is good," is completely unprovable and is an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of pleasure accompanying the perception of the object. And since there are to be found in us quite certainly many simple sensations of the good, there are many such irreducible perceptions. Consequently, when an action is immediately perceived as good, without its containing in a concealed way a certain other good which can be discovered in it by analysis and because of wh!ch the action is called perfect, the necessity of this action is an unprovable material principle of obligation. For example, "love him who loves you," is a practical maxim, which, although it stands under the supreme formal and affirming rule of obligation, nevertheless stands under it immediately. Since it cannot be further shown by analysis why a specific perfection should lie in reciprocated love, this rule is not proved practically, i.e., by way of tracing it back to the necessary KGS, II, p. 299, lines 27-29. This way of putting it is clumsy and difficult for a clear comprehension of the meaning, but it is essentially the way Kant puts it. Stated more simply it probably means that whatever is judged good must be some experience of man's, ultimately involving and denending upon sense-perception. a1

32

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS character of another perfect action, but is subsumed immediately under the general rule of good actions. 33

This is a remarkable passage. Alongside the assertion of the existence of "many simple sensations of the good," there is Kant's categorical assertion of the necessity of any action which is immediately perceived as good. Any such "unprovable material principle of morality" is a practical maxim and stands directly under the supreme rule because its obligatoriness is not conditioned by reference to any "other good which could be recognized in it by analysis." These unprovable material or contentful maxims are therefore not subject to any practical proof either; that is to say, they do not derive their justification from results or from any other substantive standard.34 Such, then, is Kant's explanation of what he means by his irreducible feeling for the good. Part of the interest in this passage lies in the use of a concrete instance to illustrate the conception of irreducible and unprovable material principles of practical knowledge. The principle of the obligation of reciprocated love, Kant says, is such a material principle; it presents itself as an immediate obligation and does not need proof. It contains nothing within itself to which it can be reduced, nor can it be traced to anything else behind or beyond it, not even to the question of its possible or likely consequences. It is itself simply an immediate feeling for the good, not in the sense of a criterion or basis of discrimination from bad, but in the sense of vital and thorough-going appreciation of the good as possessed and experienced. When a rational being confronts himself with this particular maxim, Kant says, he immediately senses or feels its claim upon him, and reacts to it as an immediate obligation, without reference to any other thing or concept whatsoever. We have here the definite continuation of the same train of thought already noted in two or three other passages in the prize-essay. We may accordingly be sure that in our interpretation we have not permitted ourselves to depart from the true meaning of these passages. Although the present passage, then, does not provide any step forward in doctrine, the illustration used in it is 33

KGS, II, p. 299, line 30, to p. 300, line 9· The decisive importance of this contention has already been discussed on pp. 3o-31 above. 34

THE PRIZE-ESSAY

37

of special interest because of its reference to an experience which is distinctly one of happiness and satisfaction. It is unfortunate that after stating in this same paragraph the ethical problem so well Kant forsakes his brief at the very last moment by talking about "subsuming" the maxim; especially after he has just emphatically argued against the possibility of applying the deductive principles and practices of "analysis" to the ultimate material phases of obligation (practical maxims). Such a lapse is hardly surprising, however, when we remember how committed the thinking of his age was to the deductive or ratiocinative pattern. 35 A simple irreducible feeling for the good, then, an immediate sensing of the good, being subject only to the formal (both positive and negative) supreme principle of obligation (i.e., that which bids us to "do the best we can"), is the basic material ground of all morality. That is to say, this immediate feeling for the good is a necessary phase of every material good belonging to the indefinite pluralism of possible immediate and intrinsic goods. Thus it would seem that the prize-essay is too critical in its appreciation of the British moralists to be read as a mere echo of their ethical ideas.36 But in order that no possible doubt can remain at this point, I quote from the closing paragraph of the essay. Here Kant not only insists that the supreme principle of obligation stands in need of more definite determination than he has here been able to give or than has ever been given, but also asserts that it will still need to be decided whether the first principles are to be determined by knowledge alone or by feeling. "From this, one can see," he concludes, that, although it must be possible to reach the highest degree of philosophical certainty with regard to the primary foundations of morality, still the supreme 35 It is too bad that such lapses on Kant's part are taken to be the main burden of his teaching. 36 Menzer, as we have already seen (cf. footnote 2.1 on p. 31 and footnote 2.7 on p. 32 above), makes precisely such a contention. How else, for example, is one to interpret the following sentence, introducing the last paragraph in which Menzer deals with the prizeessay? "If Kant was going to maintain that the supreme rule must have a purely formal character then he could not possibly continue in the standpoint of the English philosophy." (op. cit., Part I, p. 307, lines 2o-22). Still more specific is his remark in connection with his discussion of the material principle of reciprocated love. After quoting Kant's "Love him who loves you," Menzer proceeds: "It is the moral judgment theory of the English which returns here as the material principle of practical knowledge." (Op. cit., Part I, p. 306, lines 27-31; here, as in all quotations of Menzer's work, the translations are my own).

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS principles of obligation need first a more precise determination; the lack of"which is even greater in practical philosophy than in speculative, since it must first be decided whether finally the knowledge faculty or feeling (the first, inner ground of the faculty of desire) determines the primary principles. 37

If the prize-essay had been unequivocally dominated by British influence, Kant would have left us no such remarks to explain. That it ends on this note of uncertainty and indecision shows conclusively that, even in his early ethical ideas, Kant had not been swept off his feet by the plausible theories of the British moralists. He was willing to acknowledge and to utilize, in some measure, the particular contribution which he felt they had made to the ethical thought of the time, especially as a contrast to the barren rationalistic theories on which he himself had been brought up, but it is clear that· he was far from realizing the full implications of the position he had taken. 38 Before leaving our discussion of the closing paragraph of the prize-essay we must raise the critical question: Had not Kant himself already made it plain that the relative place and function of reason and feeling in morality is not a problem of "either-or?" Why then does he raise once again this false dichotomy in the last sentence? He had shown clearly enough that there cannot be satisfaction without something substantive that satisfies. If Kant at this time had fully grasped the meaning of his formalism, he would have seen that for the elaboration of a new conception of concrete good there must be freedom from the dominance of appreciating congenial old goods. Despite the uncertainty of its final paragraph, the prize-essay may be said as a whole to have established the following conclusions: The basic principles of metaphysics and of morality can be found only by analyzing the confused and complex concepts of actual experience into their irreducible elements. In making this analysis, both metaphysics and ethics discover two kinds of irreducible minimal principles: one formal, the other material. The formal first principles of metaphysics are the laws of identity and contradiction. Corresponding to these in morality are the positive and negative expressions of the formal principle of obligation (the 37 38

KGS, II, p. 300, lines 26-33 Cf. the passages we have quoted on pp. 26 and 3I above.

THE PRIZE-ESSAY

39

obligation to the perfection of the act, both positively and negatively stated). Metaphysics and morality have also a large number of irreducible material concepts, of which those in metaphysics, constitutive of truth, are percepts, whereas those in ethics, forming the substance of our chosen goods, are feelings. Thus what knowledge is to metaphysics, feeling is said to be to morality. With regard to Kant's relation to the British moralists, an analysis of the prize-essay admits only of the following conclusions: Kant was undoubtedly grateful to the British moralists for having re-enforced his own conviction of the necessity and vital rClle of feeling in any moral experience. This conviction is implied in their doctrine of a moral sense, and recognition of it is clearly to be found in the prize-essay. No evidence in the prize-essay, however, shows that Kant accepted the most characteristic feature of the doctrine of the British moralists, namely the claim of the existence of a separate and distinct moral "sense," as a criterion or touchstone alongside other substantive senses. Kant is sure, moreover, that his tentative formulations in the prize-essay are inadequate and contain unsolved difficulties which he frankly admits. Such an admission would hardly justify the statement39 that Kant, in the prize-essay, is involved in a conflict between the claims of reflective reason and those of feeling. All that is indicated by the inner evidence of the essay, taken as a whole, is that Kant sees the necessity of both factors in any moral situation and is trying to determine the place and function of each, with a final admission that he has not yet succeeded. Perhaps, had Kant dared to carry out his suggested program 40 to its logical conclusions, he might, even this early, have found the only solution of the problem possible in the light of all the given facts, from a rational and from an empirical point of view. What is really surprising in the prize-essay, however, is not the tentative and unfinished character of the ethical ideas in it, but rather the novelty and exceptional acuteness of many of its ethical suggestions. It needs to be seen, finally, that Kant continually tries to carry 39 40

Made, for example, by Menzer; cf. op. cit., Part I, pp. 302.-307. As it is stated, for example, by Kant in the passages quoted on pp. 2.6 and 3I above.

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

the methods and types of solution of his speculative philosophy over into his moral and practical philosophy, and that as a rule he wants to solve the problems arising in the latter in terms of the methods and insights which he has gained in the former. It has been important for the further development of our argument, therefore, to indicate the parallel way in which Kant deals with the respective problems of metaphysics and morality in this very first of his metaphysical and moral treatises. For both metaphysics and morality, the problem is: how can one unite formal and material principles and maxims? Or, to state the specifically moral issue more precisely: how can the basic principles of obligation, being purely formal in character, becotne the driving force to action, and how can simple material feelings take on the character of obligation? Here, in embryo form, lies the major problem of the Kantian ethics.

Writings of 1"'63: Negative Crossen and ?eobachtungen The Negative Grossen

I.

A few months after the rize-essay, Kant wrote and published (1763) an essay to introdu :e the concept of negative quantities into philosophy. In this ess,ay, Versuch den Begrijf der negativen Grijssen in die Weltweishei t einzujuhren, 1 the discussion of the principle turns among othe ·realms also to that of morality. The passages dealing with morals are of interest to us, for they again show Kant's interest in "noral feeling." They bring out also Kant's use of the idea of an "inner law" (whether as conscience or the consciousness of a positive law) in connection with that of the "moral feeling" (or feeling nr morality, as we have seen); in fact, the phrase "inner law" is u ed almost synonymously with "moral feeling." These passages ap )ear, moreover, to contain Kant's first clear statement of the doct ine that the morq.lity of a person cannot be judged by his conduct. Let us look at Kant's own words. They show that Kant's analysis proceeded along psychological lines, following in this respe :t the method of the British moralists. The question is: whether displeas ue is merely a lack of pleasure, or is in itself not merely the contradictory opposite, but a positive cause depriving us of pleasure ... that is to say, wheth!r displeasure might be called a negative pleasure. Now the inner feeling teach 3 at the very outset that displeasure is something more than a mere negation. For whatever of pleasure one may have, some possible pleasure is always stillla:king so long as we are limited beings. When one takes medicine which tastes I ke pure water, he may perhaps have pleasure in view of the anticipated health; but in the taste itself he feels no pleasure. But this lack is not yet displeasure. H 1wever, give him some wormwood as medicine and the sensation is very positiv . Here there is not a simple lack of pleasure, but something that is a real cause )f the feeling which is called displeasure.2 1 2

KGS, II, pp. r65-2o4. KGS, II, p. r8o, lines ro-2-4-

4'2

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

Having thus argued that displeasure is not merely the absence of pleasure but a definite substantive affective state, Kant goes further and asserts that this substantive feeling of displeasure is the direct opposite of pleasure. He uses mathematical equations by way of illustration,3 after which he proceeds: · The condition of the mind wherein unequal amounts of opposing pleasure and displeasure result in a remainder of one of these two feelings is the preponderance of pleasure or displeasure (suprapondium voluptatis vel taedii). By the use of such concepts Herr v. Maupertuis, in his attempt at moral philosophy, tried to estimate the sum of the happiness of human life. Now .this cannot be estimated in any other way, but the task is insoluble for men, because only similar feelings can be summated; yet feeling, in the very complex condition of life, appears to differ very greatly according to the variety of ways in which we may be moved.4

We have here Kant's actual effort to compare happiness, pleasure, and displeasure. Even though he rejects the attempt to estimate the total happiness of human life by way of mere addition and subtraction-inasmuch as only affective states of the same kind can be added up into sum totals-he admits that no other way of estimating human happiness is possible. In fact, Kant seems to hold that when we weigh happiness, we identify happiness with pleasure, putting it on a merely quantitative basis. In the next passage of interest to us, Kant uses the phrase Moralisches Gefii.h/. 5 It is simple enough to try to interpret this phrase as a mere borrowing and translation of Hutcheson's "moral sentiment." Actually, there is no more reason for identifying the two phrases here than in the case of the prize-essay. Kant now uses the phrase in a way which justifies the statement that its meaning has definitely shifted from any possibility of identification with Hutcheson's concept. In the prize-essay, the term was used merely to refer to an unanalyzable moral feeling (or feeling for morality), but in the present passage Kant seems to relate this moral feeling to an indigenous inner law, with which, in the end, ·it is used interchangeably. I quote: Demerit (demeritum) is not simply a negation, but a negative virtue (meritum 3 Similar to the one we used on pp. 28 f. above. It must not be forgotten, however, that the whole essay proceeds from the application of a mathematical principle to a wider circle of philosophical and general problems. 4 KGS, II, p. r8r, line 28, top. r82, line r. 6 KGS, II, p. r83, line 7·

WRITibms OF 1763

43

negatiuum). For demerit can exist only in so far as there is within a being an inner law (either merely the conscience or the consciousness of a positive law), against which one is acting. This inner law is a positive cause of a good action .... There is a deprivation here, a real co~tradiction, and not merely a lack. One must not imagine this to apply only to faults of commission (demerita commissionis) and not at the same time to faults of omission (demerita omissionis). An unreasoning animal practices no virtue. But this omission is not a demerit (demeritum). For there has been no action against any inner law. The animal was not driven to any good action by an inner moral feeling .... 6

It is true that neither the inner law nor the moral feeling is defined, but either (or both) is taken as a natural driving-power to action. Did Kant, by any chance, consider this identification of law and feeling as the answer to the basic moral questions which he had raised but failed to solve in the prize-essay? Thereby he would at one and the same time give the needed drive to law7 and the needed definition and validation of its ethical rele to feeling. 8 In the light of the materials available at this point, it is not possible to give a definite answer. Perhaps Kant is merely thinking aloud, suggesting a possibility and not expressing a settled conviction. Interesting in the last quotation is the appearance in thought, though not in actual words, of the first faint notion of responsibility as an essential aspect of moral behavior. Demerit, we are told, can accrue only to a being who acts against an inner law, i.e., against better knowledge. A being possessing such an inner law and conscious of it finds himself responsible to it. This responsi-· bility is applied by Kant as much to good acts omitted as to evil acts committed. The difference between the two, so he tells us, is not one of kind, but only one of degree. 9 It is hardly possible to mistake the Pietistic Llnklang in this passage. 8

KGS, II, p. I 8z, line 30, to p. I 83, line 8. In other words, to show some intelligible reason, seated in law, to validate its claim to obedience. 8 For, only such satisfaction as can be called happiness (because given by a good, the conception of which is brought as a possibility by the "law") can be. relied on as a sign of an unanalyzable material'principle of obligation. Hutcheson makes moral feeling a specific kind of feeling, failing to see wherein the true ground of specificity must consist. Hume tries to put "law" into moral feeling (as Kant does), but the only law he can put into it is the utilitarian version of hedonism, which virtually amounts to a logical circle in exponendo. g "From a moral point of view, therefore," he writes, "sins of commission differ from those of omission not in kind, but only in degree." KGS, II, p. I 83, lines ZI-zz. 7

44

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

By again using mathematical calculations (measuring degrees of passion. and of conformity to obligation), Kant tries to show10 that the moral worth of an action depends not so much upon what one :finally succeeds in doing as upon how much contradictory desire or passion one has to overcome. This, he says, makes it practically impossible for one person to judge "surely" of "the virtuous disposition of others from their actions."11 The problem is too briefly touched to permit the drawing of very definite conclusions about the precise intent and purpose of the passage. Before leaving the Negative Crossen, we must notice two more brief passages. "Man never has a desire for an object," says.Kant, "without positively detesting its opposite, so that the intention of his will is not the mere contradictory opposite of desire, but its actual contradictory (disgust), and thus is an effect of positive displeasure."12 And again: It is for this reason that the Stoic sage had to eradicate all such urges as contain a feeling of great sensual pleasure. In these lie the grounds of great discontent and displeasure, which, in the changing course of world-events, can take away all their value.13

Is Kant beginning to waver about the rCile of feelings and emotion in morality? I think not. These lines show at most a realization of the need for critical analysis of the whole problem. It was logical that having once granted that "in the changing course of worldevents" even the best desires contain within themselves the grounds for possible discontent or for evil desire, Kant should want to investigate the :fitness of emotional factors so dangerous to a working method of ethics. Kant's reference, in this connection, to "the changing course of world-events" seems to indicate that his suspicion of pleasures was not of pleasures as such but of the control oflife by pleasures to which one stands already committed. Such opposition to pleasures (in this sense) is clearly demanded by a methodological point of view. He does not wish a static 1 ° Cf. ibid., p. zoo, lines 4--zz. This passage is, by the way, a clear foreshadowing of the doctrine satirized as teaching that any satisfaction one takes in a good act is to be deducted from its moral worth. u Ibid., p. zoo, lines 19--21; viz., "Wherefore it is impossible for men surely to conclude the degrees of virtuous dispos; ~0n of others from their actions." Cf. on this same issue what Ka!lt says in his Grundlegung, pp. z3--24. 12 KGS, II, p. zor, lines z---6. 13 KGS, II, p. 196, footnote, lines 34-37.

WRITINGS OF 1763

45

commitment to pleasures already enjoyed to put one out of step with the changing times. It is doubtful, none the less, whether the full implications of this argument against desire, etc., were at this time consciously present to Kant's mind. The fact that he brings up these matters in this fashion, however, indicates that questions were beginning to arise which seemed to call for a new consideration of the whole problem presented by the obvious presence of emotional factors in the issues of morality. With reference to the development of his moral philosophy, the most important result of this treatise lay in Kant's attempt to equate "moral feeling" and "inner law." Although this maintained moral feeling as the dynamic force and substantive material, it left open the possibility of achieving lawfulness of moral action. 2.

The Beobachtungen

We turn our attention next to Kant's Beobachtungen itber das Gr:jithl des SchOn en und Erhabenen, 14 which was written by October, 1763, although it did not appear in print until 1764. This essay is of special interest. It is that one of Kant's pre-Critical works which concerns itself most directly with an analysis and discussion of feeling. In its reference to the problems of morality, it shows the greatest influence of the British moralists and especially of Rousseau. The same psychological emphasis which we find in the British moralists is evident in the opening sentence of Kant's essay. "The various sensations of enjoyment and vexation," he tells us, "rest not so much upon the constitution of the external things which arouse them, as upon that feeling peculiar to each man whereby he is moved to pleasure or displeasure." 15 Particular feelings, that is to say, depend not so much upon the different natures of external things as upon a human faculty of feeling. All human beings are susceptible to such value-experience. The psychological approach to the problem here is quite obvious. That Kant was encouraged in this type of approach by the work and achievements of the British moralists may readily be granted. He might have 1'

:u;

KGS, II, pp. zos-zs6. KGS, II, p. zo7, lines 4-'7·

KANT'S PRE-CRITICAL ETHICS

used this method independently , however, even if he had never become conversant with the writings of the British philosophers. Although Kant was familiar with their work, it does not follow that it was because of this familiarity that he used the psychological method to deal with the problem under consideration in this essay. After all, what other method, if not the psychological, could Kant have used to discuss the feelings of the beautiful? Be that as it may, it is certain that the Beobachtungen not only contains Kant's :first definite reference to Rousseau/ 6 but has many remarks which point definitely to a certain amount of influence, positive and negative, by the latter. It must not be overlooked that we have an early letter (of December, 1759) by Hamann to Kant, 17 which, if it did not :find Kant already acquainted with Rousseau's earlier writings, must at least have called his attention to them. A direct reference to Rousseau occurs almost immediately after the composition of the Beobachtungen, in Kant's notice, dated February ro, 1764, concerning the adventurer Jan Pawlikowicz Zdcmonyrskic h Komarnicki. 18 From a certain Fragment/ 9 however, it would appear that the really strong influence of Rousseau upon Kant began to make itself more particularly felt soon after the completion of Negative Grossen, 20 in which we find Kant remarking: "They [the masses] know nothing, they understand nothing; but they talk about everything.... " 21 In the Fragment just mentioned, obviously referring to this early remark, Kant says: "There was a time ... when I despised the masses, which know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This blind prejudice disappears; I learn to honor men .... " 22 Apparently this change of heart had come over Kant by the time he was :finishing the Beobachtungen; such passages as the following show the way in which Rousseau affected Kant at this time: "[man] feels the dignity of his own nature." 23 "When, 10

Cf. KGS, II, p. 247 (footnote), line 33· Cf. KGS, X, p. z8, line 4· Cf. Hartenstein, Kants Sammtliche W erke, II, pp. 207-'1.09. u Ibid., VIII, p. 624. 20 Recorded in the Acts of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Konigsberg on June 3, 1763, therefore the latest possible date for its publication. Cf. KGS, II, p. 478. 21 KGS, II, p. zoo, line 33· 22 Hartenstein, Kants Sammtliche Werke, VIII, p. 624, lines zz-z6. 23 KGS, II, p. za, line II. 17 18

WRITIN~rS OF 1763 i

47

however,. general benevolent dis~osition toward the human species has become a principle in you,J.according to which you regulate your actions at all times, ... " ·· " ... the dignity of human nature"-a phrase which may bel found several times repeated. 25 "He [the melancholy man] esteetfl.l.S himself and deems man a creature that deserves respect." 26 "Ir we do not appear in good taste, it is never because we are beha1ring naturally but rather because we are seeking to reverse natur9." 27 Even the phrase occurring in the last sentence of the Beoba~·htungen, about "the still undiscovered secret of education" 28 need not be taken as proof of Kant's unfamiliarity with Rousseau's ;~mile. It suggests rather the reverse; the recognition of the pr~blem of education finds at least plausible explanation on the ass1~mption that the Emile had made its impress on Kant's mind, desfite his insistence that the secret of education is still undiscovere