Paul Tillich and Bonaventure: an evaluation of Tillich's claim to stand in the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition 9004042660

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PAUL TILLICH

AND BONAVENTURE

PAUL TILLICH AND BONAVENTURE AN EVALUATION OF TILLICH'S CLAil\1 TO STAND IN THE AUGUSTINIAN-FRANCISCAN TRADITION

BY

JOHN P. DOURLEY

LEIDEN

E. J. BRILL 1975

ISBN 90 04 04266 0 Copyright 1975 by E. ]. Bn"ll, Leiden, Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by pn·nt, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

To Hugh A. MacDougall

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction I. Tillich's evaluation of the thirteenth century II. The function of essence and existence m Tillich's understanding of religious man III. Essence and existence in reason and life .

1 21 50 72

IV. The basis of Bonaventure's ontology of participation in his trinitarian thought . . . . . . . . . . . .

115

V. Points of correspondence between Tillichian and Bonaventurian theology . . . . . . . . . . . .

158

Bibliography

195

Index . . .

201

INTRODUCTION Within the body of Paul Tillich's theological work are two elaborate analyses of the theological development of the thir­ teenth century. 1 Tillich calls this century "the greatest century of Christian theology. " 2 In particular he shows a keen interest in the debate which then occurred between the Franciscan adherents of a distinctly Augustinian theology and the proponents of the emerging Aristotelian theology. He locates the basis of this de­ bate in the differcnce between "the mystical point of view" which he understands as characteristic of the thought of Plato, of Augustine and of Bonaventure, and "the more rational, empirical point of view" which he understands as characteristic of the thought of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. 3 He describes the dialogue between the Platonic-Augustinian-Franciscan tradition and the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition as "the most important of the trends in the Middle Ages." 4 In his exposition of this phase of the theological process in the thirteenth century, Tillich most clearly ali gn s himself with the positions of the Augustinian-Fran­ ciscans. Moreover, he views with a certain regret the loss of this tradition in the prevalence of the Aristotelian tradition both in the outcome of the thirteenth century debate and in the conse­ quent history of religious thought in the West. He also calls for a return to certain of the central positions upheld by the mediaeval 1 The major Loe£ in which Tillich analyzes the development of the thirteenth cen­ tury are the following: A History of Chn"st£an Thought, ed. by Carl E. Braaten (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 104-121, 180-192; 'The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,' Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 10-29. Lesser but significant statements by Tillich on his relation to mediaeval Franciscanism are to be found in the following locations: Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963), I, 40-41, 85, 155; 'Interrogation of Paul Tillich,' Philosophical Interrogations, ed. by Sidney Rome and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 357-358: 'Religion and Secular Culture', The Protestant Era, trans. by James Lut­ her Adams (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957), p. 64; 'The Transmoral Con­ science,' The Protestant Era, pp. 140-141; Ultimate Concern: T£ll£ch in Dialogue, ed. by D. MacKenzie Brown (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 122; 'An Afterword: Appreciation and Reply,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. by Thomas O'Meara and Celestin D. Weisser (Dubuque: Priory Press, 1964), p. 307. 2 Tillich, A H£story of Christ£an ThoughtJ p. 111. 3 Ibid., p. 141. 4 Ibid.

2

INTRODUCTION

Franciscans in order to work a closer integration of religion and life in the twentieth century. The purpose of this thesis is to determine the validity of Til­ lich's claim to stand within the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. Though Tillich claims substantial continuity with this tradition in his own theology, he never documented textually his references to the Franciscan theologians whom he cites in his works. This thesis thus proposes to determine the validity of Tillich's claim to stand in the early Franciscan tradition by selecting Bonaventure as a representative of this tradition. Through a textual analysis of Bonaventure's theology in the light of critical interpretation, the central positions of his theology will be exposed and used as a basis of comparison with the corresponding positions in Tillich's thought. In this manner Bonaventure's theology will be used as a scholarly control to test the validity of Tillich's align ment of his own theology with that of the early Franciscan school. Bonaventure has been chosen as a representative of Franciscan theology because Tillich himself, in his references to the medi­ aeval Franciscan school, mentions by name only three Franciscan theologians. These theologians were Alexander of Hales, one of Bonaventure's teachers with whose theology Bonaventure claims a direct continuity ,5 Bonaventure himself, and Mathew of Aqua­ sparta, one of Bonaventure's disciples. 6 Among these three theo­ logians Franciscan scholarship consistently attributes a primacy to Bonaventure. He is widely credited with giving to Francis' religious experience its formal theological expression. 7 Thus Til­ lich's own references to Bonaventure coupled with Bonaventure's position of primacy among the early Franciscan theologians would seem to provide ample justification for his selection as a representative of mediaeval Franciscan theology with whom to compare Tillich's thought. Moreover, it should be noted that Tillich associates his own theological position only with "the early Franciscan school". 8 Thus his expressed affiliation with 5

See J. Guy Bougerol, O. F.M., Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, trans. by Jose de Vinck (Paterson, N.J. : St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965), pp. 60, 65. 6 See A History of Chn"stian Thought, pp. 141, 180-181, 184-86, 188; 'The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,' pp. 13, 17; Systemat£c Theology, I, 40-41, 85. 7 See Bougerol, Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, p. 8; Etienne Gilson, The Ph£losophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. by Dom Illtyd Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965), pp. 60, 65. 8 Tillich, Systemat£c Theology, I, 40.

INTRODUCTION

3

mediaeval Franciscan theology does not extend to Scotus or to Ockham. Tillich himself understands both of these later Francis­ cans to deviate substantially from the earlier Franciscan tradition on precisely those points which he finds most attractive in earlier Franciscanism. The scope of our investigation is thus confined to the relation of Tillich's theology to Bonaventure's theology as representative of this earlier phase of Franciscan theology. The thesis will thus take on the following form and content. Tillich's understanding of the thirteenth century debate between the Augustinian-Franciscan school and the Aristotelian-Thomistic school will be exposed in detail. The exposition will show that Tillich's concern with this debate focuses most directly on the question of the immediate and experiential nature of man's knowledge of God. In Tillich's view the Franciscans affirmed man's immediate and experiential awareness of God. Also in his view, the Aristotelian theologians denied this mode of immediate and experiential knowledge of God. Instead they gave to the autonomous mind the power to reason discursively to God from extramental reality. Thus Tillich's most immediate interest in the dispute between the mediaeval Franciscans and the Aristotelians is with their respective positions on man's knowledge of God, that is, with the epistemologies upheld by each school. However, every epistemology presupposes an ontology. Hence, Tillich's interest in the Franciscan-Aristotelian debate is rooted ultimately in the understanding of participation in the ontologies espoused by each school. He views with a certain dismay the demise of the Franciscan understanding of participation which grounded their understanding of the experiential immediacy of God to man's consciousness. He understands the Aristotelian tradition to have denied the Franciscan understanding of participation and so to have lost the sense of the perceptible presence of God to the mind through the acceptance of an ontology which gave to cre­ ation and to man a much greater autonomy and so a much great­ er distance from God. The exposition of Tillich's understanding of the thirteenth century will work to show that his historical presentations are closely allied with a theological thesis which culminates in a theo­ logical programme. His thesis states that once the Franciscan understanding of participation is denied then God can only be related to man and to his consciousness from without, or, in

4

INTRODUCTION

Tillich's own terms, heteronomously. Once this breach is estab­ lished, the human and the divine can be harmoniously reinte­ grated only with difficulty. His programme consists in an effort to return to an Augustinian understanding of religious man. Such an understanding of religious man would overcome the undue distancing of God from man. It would reaffirm for the modern era an understanding of participation which would revivify man's sense of the immediacy of God to his consciousness. Thus it would serve to ground a more credible understanding of God and his presence to man than was provided by contemporary deistic theologies. Tillich's systematic theology is then examined to discover how Tillich implemented his own programme of constructing a reli­ gious anthropology based on a participational ontology and epis­ temology in continuity with the Franciscan-Augustinian tradi­ tion. This is done in the first instance by examining Tillich's understanding and use of the categories of essence and existence throughout his system. The examination of essence reveals that Tillich understands it as both the principle of man's unity with God and as the basis of the intelligible and of the good in man and creation. Thus Tillich's understanding of essence implies a strong participation of the intelligible and of the good in God. The examination of existence reveals that Tillich understands it as the principle of distance between man and God and so relates it closely to alienation, to guilt and to sin. In this section the thesis works to show that Tillich's whole system derives its struc­ ture and dynamic from his understanding of the procession of unactualized essence into existence and of the return to fulfilled essentialization. The concern of this section of the thesis is to show that Tillich's system is based on his understanding of the participation of creation and man in God through the category of essence in interplay with the category of existence. The function of essence and existence in Tillich's understand­ ing of reason and revelation and in his understanding of life itself is then examined in some detail. Here again the point of the investigation is to uncover Tillich's understanding of participa­ tion in his conception of the participation of reason in God and of human life in the dynamic of divine life. The treatment of Tillich's thought on the participation of human reason and life in God culminates in Tillich's trinitarian theology. The thesis at-

INTRODUCTION

5

tempts to show that Tillich's trinitarian theology operates throughout his system through his understanding of the partici­ pation of reason and life in the structure and dynamic of the divine life process. The exposition of Tillich's theology thus ter­ minates in the contention that his understanding of participation relates man immediately though dialectically to a specifically trinitarian God. Tillich's trinitarian theology serves as a natural bridge into Bonaventure's thought. This is the case because Bonaventure also possesses a participational ontology and epistemology which re­ lates creation and man to a specifically trinitarian life process. Bonaventure's understanding of participation is even more explic­ itly and consciously trinitarian than is Tillich's. For this reason the presentation of Bonaventure's theology will take his trinita­ rian theology as its point of departure. This procedure is follow­ ed because an understanding of Bonaventures's thought on the intra-trinitarian processions is absolutely necessary to grasp his understanding of the procession of creation from intra-trinitarian life and so to grasp his understanding of the participation of creation and of man in intra-trinitarian life. Drawing largely on current criticism, the centrality of Bonaven­ ture's trinitarian theology in his whole system will be established. The sources of Bonaventure's trinitarian theology in pseudo-Dio­ nysius and Augustine will be traced out. It will be shown that Bona­ venture's trinitarian theology derives much of its inspiration from pseudo-Dionysius' principle of the diffusion of the good. Bonaven­ ture thus understands the Father in terms of that fontal plenitude from which all good proceeds. The Father perfectly expresses his goodness and so his power in the Son from which expression the Spirit proceeds as the uniting or connecting bond of love. This intra-trinitarian expressionism then provides the basis for Bona­ venture's exemplarism which works directly through the Logos but affirms a participation of all creation in the trinitarian pro­ cessions. From this exposition of his trinitarian theology, the thesis will then present Bonaventure's understanding of the tran­ scendentals as pointing to a participation of all creation in the Trinity and his understanding of man as the image of God as pointing to a more intense and conscious participation in the Trinity. Bonaventure's intra-trinitarian expressionism and his extra-trinitarian exemplarism will serve as the basis for the elabo-

6

INTRODUCTION

ration of further consequences of his doctrine of the participa­ tion of man in the trinitarian life process. His ontology and epis­ temology will be examined to bring to light his understanding of truth. The relation of his epistemology and its supporting ontol­ ogy to his soteriology will be dealt with in some detail. In close conjunction with this investigation, his understanding of the rela­ tion between metaphysics and theology will be established. In this context, the continuity which Bonaventure establishes be­ tween the orders of creation and grace through his understanding of participation will be presented. The exposition of Bonaven­ ture's thought will conclude with a treatment of his position on man's knowledge of God. Here the manner in which Bonaventure so closely relates man's innate knowledge of God to the Christian revelation of the Trinity will be developed. The point of this development will be to demonstrate the continuity which Bona­ venture's understanding of participation is capable of establishing between man's natural knowledge of God and the specifically Christian revelation on the Trinity. In general, the exposition of Bonaventure's thought will strive to establish the harmonious and intimate continuity that Bonaventure's participational ontology and epistemology enable him to establish between man and the living, trinitarian God. The conclusion will compare the expositions of Tillich's under­ standing of man's participation in God with Bonaventure's. It will seek to show that a more extensive agreement exists between the two systems than in those areas to which Tillich explicitly points. Thus it will endeavour to show that both theologians have similar conceptions of trinitarian life and of man's participation in it. In particular, it will point to a certain affinity between Tillich's religious anthropology based on essential-existential man and Bonaventure's religious anthropology based on man as the image of God. Each of these anthropologies is shown to be based on man's participation in the dynamic of trinitarian life. From these points of central similarity further points of similarity and near coincidence will be traced. The conclusion will thus strive to demonstrate that all similarities between the two systems ulti­ mately derive from similar conceptions of man's participation in God and in a specifically trinitarian God. At this point certain negative qualifications should be made to define more precisely the purpose and scope of the thesis. The

INTRODUCTION

7

thesis is not an apologetic for nor an endorsement of the theolo­ gies of Tillich or Bonaventure. The primary purpose of the thesis is to establish the degree of correspondence between the central positions in Tillich's theology and in the theology of the early Franciscan school. Through the textual analysis of his work, Bonaventure is used as a control to establish the validity of Til­ lich's association of his own theology with that of the mediaeval Franciscans. To the extent that the thesis establishes a certain degree of correspondence between Tillich's understanding of par­ ticipation and that of Bonaventure, the thesis does indicate, as a peripheral concern, that such an understanding of participation has a historical precedent in Christian thought. The thesis also indicates that the theological methodology and apologetic which Tillich built upon his understanding of man's participation in God also has a precedence in Christian thought and may be of value in the continuing effort to elaborate a cogent model of man as religious. The thesis does not imply that Tillich is exclusively indebted to the early Franciscan school or to Bonaventure for his under­ standing of participation or for the conception of God's presence to man which he builds upon it. Rather it must be clearly stated that Tillich views mediaeval Franciscanism as but one instance in the history of a much more extensive tradition wherein the im­ mediacy of God to man through a strongly participational ontol­ ogy and epistemology is affirmed as a philosophical and theologi­ cal point of departure. Tillich states this explicitly when he asserts: We can trace a line of thought from Augustine to the Franciscans in the Middle Ages, to the Reformers, to the philosophers of the seven­ teenth and eighteenth centuries, to the German classical philosophers, including Hegel, to the present day philosophy of religion, to the extent it is not empirical philosophy of religion, which I think is a contradiction in terms, but a philosophy of religion which is based on the immediacy of the truth in every human being.9

This citation shows how Tillich locates Franciscan theology in a much wider tradition of thought. It also indicates Tillich's con­ cern with the "immediacy" of truth in man. This immediacy of

9

Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, p. 104.

8

I NTRODUCTI ON

which Tillich speaks is a reference to his unders tanding o f partici­ pation and in his discussions o f the h istory of theol ogy and phi­ losophy it reappears under different formulations. S o metimes Tillich will refer to certai n traditions wh ich affirmed a strongl y participational ontology and episte m ology as asserting "the p rin­ ciple of i mmediacy. " He uses this phrase in describ ing the influ­ ence which the Platonic-Augustian- Franciscan tradition exerted on his thinking. He wri tes, "But the mentioning of Maleb ranche points in the righ t directi on : The Platon ic-Augustian- Franciscan tradition and its emphasis on the principle of 'immediacy' h ad a great i n fluence on me. " 1 0 Elsewhere he will speak o f historical traditions which affirm an unders tanding o f participation similar to his o wn as affirming " the principle o f identity. ' ' 1 1 I n his discussion of nine teent h and twentieth century philosophical and theological development, he uses the phrase i n connection wi th the though t of Spinoza and Descartes in counterp oint to Kant 's "pri nciple of distance. " 1 2 He also relates it to the thought of Nich olas of Cusa, Luther, Schelling, Hegel and Nietzsce. 1 3 I n ref­ erence to nineteenth century Romanticism he uses ano ther for­ mul ation for the principle of p articipation. Here he calls it " the pri nciple o f the infinite within the finite, the principle o f mu tual within-each-otherness . " 1 4 He sees an understanding o f participa­ tion similar to his own operative in Schleiermacher's apologetic where i t serves as the ontological basis of the latter's understand­ ing of " feeling" . 1 5 He closely relates the principle to the basis o f mysticism and t h e possib ility of an unmediated relationship with God. 1 6 Finally he sees a strong affirmation o f the principle of participation in the m ainstream of Greek thought which origi­ nated with Parmenides and in the logos doctrine o f the early Church where it was given a trinitarian form ulation. 1 7 In fact , there would seem to b e ample evidence that one o f Tillich 's m ajor Tillich, 'Interrogation of Paul Tillich,' p. 35 7. This is the phrase he uses most frequently in referring to the function of partici­ pation in Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, ed. by Carl E. Braaten (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1967). I2 Ibid. p. 7 4. ' I 3 Ibid. p. 95. ' 14 Ibid. , p. 94. 1 5 Ibid. , p. 96. 16 Ibid. , p. 100. 17 Ibid. , p. 144. 10

11

INTRODUCTION

9

interests in his reading of the history o f the development of philosophy and theology centers on the manner in which the principle of im mediacy is s trongly affirmed or relatively muted in the on- going dialectic o f thought. 1 8 Tillich ' s percep tion o f the " principle o f im mediacy" or the "prin ciple of iden tity " in so many recurring instances throughout the history of philosophical and theological speculation precludes any attempt to establish an exclusive or even decisively formative dependence of his thought on mediaeval F ranciscan theology. Rath er the m ore immediate formative in fluences in the shaping of Tillich ' s thought on participation would seem to derive from the German nineteenth cen tury an d from earlier mystical streams of thought. Nels Ferre gives this account of Tillich's personal description o f his intellectual history : It was on the same evening that he pronounced his famous dictum that his spiritual father was S chleiermacher, his intellectual father was Schelling and his grandfather on both sides was J acob Boehme. 19

This evidence would appear to corrob orate Carl Braaten 's conten­ tion that Tillich's way to mediaeval Franciscanism was through a 18 If Tillich's historical works, A History of Christian Thought, and Perspectives on 1 9th and 20th Century Protestant Theology are combined and read under the focus of how h e treats the principle of immediacy, there would appear to be great evidence for the assertion that Tillich judges philosophical and theological development under the

norm of the varying degrees of acceptance or rejection of the principle of immediacy. From the thirteenth century Tillich traces the historical development in this way. After Thomas' denial of the principle of identity, the doctrine of two positivisme developed through Scotus and Ockham. This development led the church into a heteronomous relationship to society wh ich contributed to the Reformation. Luther's use of the principle of identity led to the doctrine of th e inner light which was interpreted religiously by the pietists and rationally by the Enligh tenment. In both cases great individualism resulted. The Enlightenment, in virtue of its exaltation of autonomous reason, produced a deism which was at once a recognition of God and a denial of his effective presence to life. Kant removed this God with his critique and the quest began to understand Kant by transcending him. In this contex t, the principle of identity was affirmed in synthesis with Kant's principle of distance by Lessing and Schelling both of whom were indebted to Spinoza. Schleiermacher asserted the principle of identity in his thought on the feeling of absolute dependence. Hegel used the principle to excess and provoked its rej ection in the religious sphere by Kierkegaard and later by Barth and in the social sph ere by Marx. Ritschl abandoned the attempt to synthesize the principles of identity and distance, returned to Kant, and accepted a morality without a metaphysic. Tillich refuses to do this and in his own theological work seeks again to unite the religious and metaphysical dimensions of reality through a measured use of the principle of identity. 19 Nels S. F. Ferre, 'Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence,' Paul Tz'llich : Retro· spect and Future, (Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), p. 1 1.

10

INTRODUCTION

certain "backtracking" from his contact with nineteenth century German thought and through the sixteenth century mysticism of Jacob Boehme. 20 Yet Tillich does attribute a great significance to the thirteenth century encounter of the Augustinian- Franciscan theology with the newer Aristotelian theology. Tillich would seem to give such an important place to this encounter in the history of theology because he saw in it an archetypal test case of the affirmation and negation of the principle of immediacy or participation. He understands the Franciscans to affirm the principle and the Aris­ totelian theologians to deny it. Since, in Tillich's theology, the principle of participation grounds the possibility of religion and so of theology, any discussion in which the affirmation or denial of the principle is at stake would be of special interest to him. If the Franciscan position was accepted, the possibility of religion would be grounded on man's immediate experience of the pres­ ence of God and theonomy would be a real possibility. If the Aristotelian position was affirmed, the immediacy of God to man, which lies at the heart of Tillich's understanding of a theo­ nomous relation of God to man, would be denied. l\fan could then use his autonomous reason to arrive at the existence of God and certain of his attributes and then receive further revelation about God mediated through heteronomous authority. In short, the denial of the Franciscan understanding of participation, which Tillich sees as a forerunner of his own, could result only in an heteronomous or extrinsic relation of the divine to the hu­ man. Tillich's understanding of the issue at stake is candidly revealed almost in passing in his remarks about Troeltsch's reli­ gious a priori. Tillich presents Troeltsch's thought on the reli­ gious a priori as that form of latency in man's rational structure which, under the impact of general experience, gives rise to reli­ gious experience and categories. Then Tillich affirms: I would say that on this point he [ Troeltsch] stands in the great tradition of the Franciscan-Augustinian school of the Middle Ages. I t is impossible for me t o understand how w e could ever come t o a philosophical understanding of religion without finding a point in the

2

°

Carl E . Braa ten, 'Paul Tillich and the Classical Christian Tradition,' Perspec tives

on 1 9 th and 20th Century Pro testan t Theo logy , p. xxi.

I NTRODUCTION

11

structure of man as man in which the finite and infinite meet or are within each other. 21

Tillich is saying here that unless the finite and infinite inter­ penetrate in man then religion itself becomes difficult to under­ stand. The implication is that a loss of the Franciscan-Augusti­ nian understanding of participation results in the loss of a proper understanding of religion and injures the religious consciousness of whatever age in which this occurs. Thus Tillich feels that the thirteenth century discussion of the problem of participation between the Franciscans and Aristote­ lians had a certain timeless quality because it posed the question of man's participation in God so precisely. Tillich understands the discussion to have dealt with the two major options in con­ ceiving of God's presence to man. The Franciscans upheld a cer­ tain perceptible immediacy in God's presence to man. The Aris­ totelians gave to man a greater autonomy and so established a certain di:tance between man and God which meant that God's presence to man and to his mind was not immediately percepti­ ble. For these reasons, Tillich states that the positions these two traditions take on man's knowledge of God remain "the great problem of the philosophy of religion. " 2 2 Moreover, he feels that the undue separation of the human and the divine which followed from the widespread acceptance of an Aristotelian ap­ proach to man's relation to God remains a contemporary prob­ lem. He states simply, "It is still our problem, as it was the problem of the thirteenth century." 2 3 Tillich indicates that much of the motivation of his theological effort derives from his effort to relate God to man in such a way that a needless discon­ tinuity between God and man is overcome through the assertion of the principle of participation. He argues that, in the nine­ teenth century, both Hegel and Schleiermacher made such efforts in the face of the Kantian critique and failed. Yet he affirms that the effort must be made again and implies that he makes it. He states :

21

22 23

Tillich, Perspect£ves on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p . 2 3 1 . Tillich, A Hz'story of Christz"an Thought, p. 1 8 6. Jbz"d. , p. 1 88.

12

INTRODUCTION

From their failure [ Hegel and Schleiermacher] the orthodox groups of the nineteenth century and the neo-orthodox groups of the twentieth century have drawn the conclusion that it is impossible. But I draw the conclusion that it must be tried again, and if it cannot be tried again, then we had better abandon theology as a systematic enterprise and stick to the repetition of Bibl e passages, or at best, limiting theol­ ogy to an interpretation of the Old and N ew Testaments. 24

Tillich's theology has met with severe criticism within both Protestant and Catholic circles. A sampling of this criticism re­ veals that much of the opposition to Tillich's system is ultimately grounded on his understanding of the principle of participation which affirms the interpenetration of the finite and infinite in the structure of man. He has been criticized within Protestantism by its Barthian wing for the alleged anthropocentricism of his theological point of departure. This criticism seems to be ulti­ mately reducible to the intimacy which Tillich establishes be­ tween man and God within man. Alexander McKelway voices this line of criticism well when he writes, "And, as Tillich's 'con­ cern' and Schleiermacher's 'feeling' both include man's self-inter­ pretation, we can say that for both men anthropology is the starting place for theology. " 2 5 In Tillich's own estimation much of this opposition arises from his attempt to relate more closely religion to life through his use of the principle of identity. He states in a typical evaluation of the difference between himself and Karl Barth, "If you take a seminar on Karl Barth, you will see again protest against mysticism, against any form of the prin­ ciple of identity." 2 6 In Tillich's opinion, if this principle is de­ nied then the validity of a theological methodology which begins with questioning man and relates revelation to these questions is also denied. With it is denied the possibility of understanding God's relation to man in any other way than heteronomously or extrinsically. For these reasons, Tillich sees a diametric opposi­ tion between his point of departure and Barth's. This opposition ultimately derives from a different understanding of the nature of God's presence to man. Of Barth's point of departure Tillich writes: 24

Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 9 1 . Alexander J. McKelway , The Systematic Theology o f Paul Tillich, (New York: Dell Publishing Co. , 1 964), p. 20. 26 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 75 . 25

INTRODUCTION

13

For Kierkegaard God comes from the outside or from above. Here you see immediately the starting point of Karl Barth. According to him you cannot start with man not even in terms of questioning . . . . . The point is that you see the bridge from Kierkegaard to Barth and neo-orthodoxy in the idea of God coming to man from above and from outside him, with no point of contact in man. 2 7

Tillich's rather strong affirm ation o f this "point o f contact" established too close a link b e tween m an and God for certain sec tors of Protestant criticism . His understanding of such a "poi n t of contact " led to accusations that it provided him with the grounds for a natural theology and for a theory o f discourse ab out God which b ore a m arked resemblance to Aquinas' theory of the anal ogy of being. McKelway again formulates this criticism well when he wri tes : I t is of course Tillich's use of analogia en tis which forms his closest link with Catholic theology. For although he denied the possibility of a natural theology , Tillich's doctrine of revelation implies a natural, ontological and noetic relation between man and the divine which differs from a developed natural theology only in degree. 2 8

McKelway 's rem arks on a l atent natural theology in Tillich's use o f his participational ontology and epistem ology would seem to contain some element of truth. However, McKelway's criticism o f Tillich is from an admit tedly Barthian viewpoin t , and so does not look on Tillich 's understanding of participation with app rov­ al . Protes tant c ri ticism has also been sensitive to the possible p antheistic implications in Tillich 's metaphysics. On this issue , as wil l b e seen , Protestant criticism joins forces with a common theme in Catholic criticis m . R. A. Killen reads Tillich 's understanding of God as the ground o f being to be a derivative of Schell ing's pantheis m . 29 Moreover, he con tends that Tillich's association o f t h e dynamic o f creation with t h e intra-trini tarian dynamic places a determinism i n God as creator which cannot avoid a p antheistic understanding o f the relationship b e tween God and creation. Killen writes :

21

28

29

Ibid. , p. 1 7 3. McKelway , Systematic Theology of Pa ul Tz"llich, p. 33. R. Allen Killen, The Ontolo gz'ca l Theology of Pa ul Tz"llich ( Kampen: J.H. Kok,

1 9 56), p. 1 3.

14

INTRODUCTION

This is surely pantheism for pantheism is the only expression which truly fits such a view of God. Man and creation are posited in God, they go out from God and are separated and estranged from him, and then after being reconciled to God they return again to God. 30

Killen 's description of Tillich's understanding of the procession of creation and man from God as pantheistic is, perhaps, inevit­ able for those who stand in a tradition in which the Tillichian understanding of God's participation in nature and man is denied or muted. Killen evidences an accurate understanding of Tillich's trinitarian theology and of Tillich's manner of affirming the pres­ ence and absence of God to creation. Yet his contention that Tillich's conception of participation is pantheistic and so un­ Christian would seem to be ultimately grounded on his own philosophical-theological position which would seem to affirm a much less immediate and intense presence of God to creation and to man. To the extent that Tillich's claim of continuity with the Franciscan-Augustinian tradition was shown to be true, Killen's assertion that Tillich's theology of man's relation to God is pan­ theistic would appear to lose its validity. Within Catholicism Tillich has provoked much interest, com­ mentary and even qualified approval. George Tavard is generous in his praise of Tillich's apologetic efforts to give new life to the Christian symbols in the twentieth century. He writes : Yet whatever label we give it, and how much we may wish to rewrite his thought for the sake of orthodoxy , we should heed Paul Tillich's eagerness to interpret Christianity for the man of today, for the es­ tranged, the puzzled, the frightened man of today. 31

Tillich was able to elicit such widespread response within the Catholic theological community for a variety of reasons. Catholic theologians interested in Protestant theology appreciated his ca­ pacity to present the diverse elements operative in the history of Protestantism, both remote and recent, in a coherent and unified manner. Gustave Weigel expresses this appreciation of the uni­ tive and cohesive quality of Tillich's work when he writes :

30 31

Ibid., p. 242.

George H. Tavard, 'Christ as the Answer to Existential Anguish,' Paul Tillich in

Catholic Though t, p. 236.

I NTRODUCTION

15

Why can a Catholic theologian understand Protestantism with the help of Tillich's exposition of it? By reason of the rational coherence that he gives to a phenomenon that seems to be different to all coher­ ence. 3 2

For the Cath olic thin kers trained in systematic thought the very scope and integri ty of his system was attractive. It had a status bordering on a mediaeval Summa . 3 3 B ut perhaps the greatest reason for the rapport between Tillich and Catholic though t was the qual i ty of Tillich's metap hysics in whi ch Catholic syste m atic theologians with a back gr ound in Tho­ mistic though t could discern both a similarity to, and yet a dis­ conc erting di fference from , their native Thomism. It was noticed that Tillich's on to logy had a certain living or existential quality which was l ess apparent in Thomas . Weigel cap tures this note when he writes : This is why Tillich's ontology sounds so familiar and yet so strange to Catholic theologians. Their ontology is calmer and less involved with the emotions and feelings of the harassed mortal who thinks. This is why the Tillichian doctrine of analogy is like and unlike that of St. Thomas. 34

Kenel m Foster al s o notes the apparent common ground be­ tween Tillich and Thomas . However, he shows a keen awareness o f thei r rather pro found d i fference. Foster firs t discerns this dif­ ferenc e in their respec tive positions on man 's knowledge o f God an d goes on to locate its roo ts in their respective ontologies and epis tem ologies. He refers to their app arent similarity and their m ore profo un d differences when he wri tes: The theological writings o f Professor Tillich deserve the attention of students of St. Thomas, both for their positive content, which is of the highest interest, and because on fundamental matters they explic­ itly and sharply join issue with Thomas. They invite the presumption

32 Gustave Weigel, S.J., 'Contemporaneous Protestantism and Paul Tillich,' Theo­ logical Studies, XI U une, 195 0), p. 186. 33 /bid. Here Weigel writes that at the time of his article Tillich's "Summa' is still in

the making.' See also by the same author 'The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,'

Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 4. Here Weigel writes, 'Wherein lies the importance

of Tillich? In the fact that he has made an all-embracing system of Protestant thought and doctrine.' 34 Wei gel, 'The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,' Paul Tillich in Cathol£c Thought, p. 12.

16

INT RODUCTION

of a certain common ground, certain affinities, and at the same time · 3s throw out a chal 1 enge w h.1c h we cannot ignore.

Tillich himself gave a certain impetus to dialogue with Thom­ ism when he used the terms "analogia en tis " and "religious symbol" as close to synony m ous in his first volume of the Sys­ tematics. 36 Elsewhere he also wri tes of a close relationship be­ tween his understanding o f symb olic knowl edge and Thomas ' doctrine of analogy. 3 7 However, a series of detailed studies on Tillich 's epistem ology and i ts supporting ontology arrived at a certain consensus that on these m aj or points Tillich was not at one with Thomas . 38 In these critiques of Tillich , implicati ons o f naturalism and pantheism as qualities inherent in Tillich 's ontol­ ogy and epistemology were frequently to be read. 3 9 It was fur­ ther alleged that Tillich so closely related God to man that the point of differentiation was unduly ob scured and the indivi dual ­ ity o f both was lost. George McLean writes o f Tillich's under­ standing of participation : H e had been right in appreciating the necessity of participa tion, but wrong in attempting to realize it by " an element of pantheism ' ' . N ow his authentic demand that participation have a personal character

35 Kenelm Foster, O.P., ' Paul Tillich and S t. Thomas,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Though t, p. 9 7 . 36 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 1 3 1 , 239-40. 37 Tillich, 'Contemporaneous Protestantism and Paul Tillich,' Theological S tudies, p. 2 0 1 . Here Tillich writes in reply to Weigel, ' Usually I speak of symbolic knowledge and mean with it exactly what S t. Thomas means with analogia entis. The reason I used symbol more than analogy is a methodological di fference between S t. Thomas and mysel f. I would agree with him that every knowledge o f God has analogical character, but I do not agree with him that it is possible to develop a natural theology on this basis.' 38 See George F . McLean, O.M.I . , ' Man's Knowledge of God according to Paul Tillich,' dissertation abstract, Catholic University, Wash ington, D.C., 1 9 58 ; ' Paul Til­ lich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Th ough t , pp. 42-8 5 ; 'Symbol and Analogy : Tillich a n d Thomas,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Though t pp. 1 4 5- 1 8 3 ; Kenelm Foster, O.P., ' Paul Tillich and S t. Thomas ,' Paul Tillich in Catho­ lic Though t, pp. 9 7 - 1 08. 39 See Weigel, 'The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,' Paul Tillich in Cathol£c Though t, p. 1 7 . Here Weigel writes, 'The first feeling of uneasiness the Catholic experi­ ences on reading Tillich is that his supernaturalism (a term he does not like) is, on ultimate reduction, purest naturalism. ' McLean more frequently refers to Tillich 's pan­ theism. See ' Paul Tillich's E xistential Philosophy of Protestantism,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Though t , pp. 7 4 , 7 9 , 82 and 'Symbol and A nalogy : Tillich and Thomas,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Though t , p. 1 78.

INTRODUCTION

17

bears out the previous error for when God is a depth dimension of man the individuality of both is lost. 40

Foster draws out similar epistemological consequences o f Til­ lich ' s participational ontology when he asserts that Tillich so closely rela tes God to m an that the po ssibili ty o f cogn itively distinguishing God from that which is not God is obscured. He wri tes : Confusion about human knowledge is likely to cause confusion in one's doctrine about God. But I cannot pursue the matter here. Enough to suggest that a certain withdrawal into, or remaining in, one's awareness of the divinity adumbrated in the intuition of being and of its ' ' unconditional elements" -a refusal to analyze, rationally, 'Godness' into a clear and distinct concept-- that all this is bound to leave our idea of God imperfectly distinguished from our idea of whatever is not God. 4 1

A cri ti cism which is implicit in Foster's rem arks an d wh ich Catholic com mentato rs frequently voice point s to a certain sub­ jectivi s m in Tillich's approach to God. I t was argued that Tillich 's epistem ology deni ed or reduced the possibility of rati onal or conceptual or obj ective knowledge of God. McLean indicates the qual ity of objective knowledge which he considers necessary in m an ' s knowledge of Go d and which he finds wan ting in Tillich 's approach when he wri tes , "True kn owledge will be had only when knower and known are bound together in a union which is itsel f objective . " 4 2 McLean detects a vitiating subjectivism to be parti cularly op erative in Tillich ' s understanding of the religious symbol. He writes, "The subj ective element thus infects religious sym bols, and the death blow is dealt to any contribution symbols m i gh t have made to an obj ec tive kn owl edge o f God 's nature. " 4 3 In some sense these critiques, which have a di scernib le same­ ness ab out them, are a lit tle amb ivalent in the manner in wh ich they m i x adm iration for and yet ultimate rejection of Tillic h's underst an di ng of man ' s relati on to God through his participa40

McLean, ' Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism,' Paul Tillich in

Catholz"c Thought, p. 82.

Foster, ' Paul Tillich and St. Thomas, ' Paul Tillich in Catholic Th ought, p . 1 05. McLean, ' Paul Tillich ' s Existential Philosophy of Protestantism, ' Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 75. 43 McLean, 'Symbol and Analogy : Tillich and Thomas,' Paul Tillfrh in Cat h o lic Thought, p. I 7 9. 41

42

18

INT RODUCTI ON

tional metaphysics. Tribute is paid to the centrality of participa­ tion in Tillich's thought. McLean writes, "As noted above, Tillich fully insists on the central position of participation in the fact of religion, and in this he is quite correct. To whatever degree we are, we participate in the divine. " 44 A certain appreciation is noted of Tillich's emphasis on the inter-subjective relationship between man and God due to his insistence on the interpenetra­ tion of the divine and human in the structure of man. Thus Weigel writes : In consequence , he sees God in his own existence not because God is identified with the finite subject, but because the finite subj ect is rooted in an infinite subject who can be known only as a subject and never as an object. 45

McLean also acknowledges that Tillich's understanding of God as the ground of being and truth has a long religious history . He grants some validity to Tillich's self-understanding of his continu­ ity with Augustine, the mediaeval Franciscans and Nicholas of Cusa. 46 Thus much of the criticism seems to be accompanied by a qualified approval of Tillich's understanding of participation and the principle of immediacy. Since this criticism has such consistency and since it derives much of its consistency from its origin in Thomistic thought, it might legitimately be wondered whether or not its ultimate explanation does not derive from the absence of a strong assertion of the principle of immediacy as a point of theological departure in the thought of Thomas himself. This brief resume of some of the major lines of Protestant and Catholic criticism of Tillich reveals that much of the opposition to his thought in both quarters ultimately reduces to a certain uneasiness with his understanding of participation. Tillich's un­ derstanding of participation affirms an intense presence of God to man in each of the states of man's relation to God. Through his categories of essence and e xistence Tillich can affirm a pres­ ence of God to pre-fallen, fallen, restored and eschatological 44

McLean, 'Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism,' Paul T£llich in

Catholic Thought, p. 80. 45

Weigel, 'The Theological S ignificance of Paul Tillich,' Paul Tillich in Catholic

Thought, p. 1 9.

46 McLean, ' Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism,' Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 54. See also the reference to Nicholas of Cusa on p. 77.

INTRODUCTION

19

m an . Tillich unders tands God's presence to man to precede man 's distance from God and to m ake possible man's awareness o f this distance and o f God's otherness. Those sectors of Protes tant though t which would see God related to man to tally from with­ out could not accept Tillich 's understanding of participation wi th its accompanying assertion o f a p oint of contact with God in m an. Thus the Tillichian understanding of the im mediacy and intensity o f God's presence t o man seemed to b e too great an asserti on of this presence. It seemed to deny the radical otherness of God and the discontinuity b e tween man and God which this otherness implied. Within those sectors o f Cath olic thought which affirmed the capacity of autonom ous reason to attain dis­ cursively the exis tence and certain of the attributes of God, Til­ lich 's insistence on the experiential and immedi ate presence of God to m an as prior to an d provocative of rational discourse ab out God was not received wel l . Here also it appeared that Tillich was over-s tepping the b ounds o f a licit unders tand ing of participat>m b y b lu rring the lines between the reality of God and man. Both these cri tical responses to Tillich woul d seem to pro­ ceed fro m an instinctive rej ection of Tillich's understanding o f participation. However, i f Till ich's understanding of parti cipation is, i n fac t, in continuity with the precedents in the history of Christian th ought to which he appeals, the criticisms wh ich we have exp osed would be fo rced to examine their own presupposi­ tions when they rej ect Tillich's unders tan ding of participation and the nature o f God's presence to man which accompanies it . Such criticism would then be fo rced to ask whether Tillich's unders tanding of participation as well as the theol ogical an th ro­ pology and methodol ogy which he builds upon it has not a well estab lished history in certain mainstreams of the Christian tradi­ tion. Thus we believe that an examination of Tillich 's claim to stand in the Augustinian- Franciscan tradition th rough a comparison of his thought with that of B o naventure 's is both original and of some val ue. It could bring to light a conception of God 's presence t o m an whi ch is both trad i tionally Christian and capable of offer­ i ng an op t ion for a more compelling understanding of the inten­ sity o f God's involvement in the human si tuation.

C H A PT E R O N E

TI L LICH'S EVA LUATION O F T H E THI RTE E NTH C ENTU R Y Tillich 's though t on t h e perennial sign i fi cance o f t h e thirteenth century for Ch ristian though t is most explicitly pres ented in two m aj o r locat i ons in his work. In his his torical work, A History of Christian Thought , 1 he locates the thirteenth cen tury in conti­ nuity with the development o f Christian though t from i ts initia­ tion to the Re fo rm ation. Here the consistency o f his historical analysis is seen in the way he affirms the recurring m an i festations o f the p rinciple of i den tity from the Logos theology o f the early Church through Augustine, B ernard , Anselm , and the Victorines up t o the Franciscan Augustinians in the Middle Ages. His overall historical thesis is that Augustine gave to Western thought the basis of i ts theological anthropology until this understanding of religious m an was transplanted by the Aristotelian theology of the t h irteenth century. In his article, "The Two Types o f Philosophy o f Religion " , 2 writ ten b e fore his historical work whi ch is an edited compilation of his class ro om lectures , Tillich also presents his unders tanding o f the thirteen th c entury. In this work, however, he draws out the theol ogical sign i ficance o f the thirteen th century debate and proposes his own c reative response to what he considers to have been an unfort unate outco m e to the clash between Augustine and Aristotle which then occurred. B y presenting Tillich 's h istor­ i cal analysis of t h e thirteen th century taken largely from his A History of Christia n Though t , and b y complementing this anal­ ysis with Tillich's theological response to the outcome of the deb ate in his essay , "The Two Types o f Philosoph y o f Religion " , a p recise understan ding o f Tillich's evaluation o f the thirteenth century and o f his own sympathies in the deb ate can be drawn . Since Tillich l ocates his own theology in the Augustinian tradi1 Paul Tillich, A Hz'story of Chn·st £an Th ough t, ed. by Carl E . Braaten (New York and Evanston : Harper & Row, 1968). 2 Paul Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," Theology of Cult ure, ed. by Robert C. Kimball ( New York : Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 10- 2 9. This work first appeared in Un£on Sem£nary Quarterly, I, 4 (May, 1946), pp. 3-13 .

22

TILLICH'S EVALUATION O F THE 1 3TH CENTURY

tion and since he sees the importance of the thirteenth century in the way this tradition was then affirmed and denied, it is neces­ sary to introduce at this point those aspects of Tillich's under­ standing of Augustine which bear on the thirteenth century dis­ pute and which point to Tillich's own affinity with Augustine. For it is one of Tillich's main contentions in his analysis of history that from Augustine to Bonaventure the Christian West relied on a philosophy which was "implicitly religious or theono­ mous ''. 3 Since Tillich tends to identify Augustine as playing a key role in initiating this philosophy or, at least, in bringing it to a high degree of expression , it is of value to identify in Augustine what Tillich considers to be the religious dimension of his philos­ ophy with which Tillich himself is in great sy mpathy . For this purpose we will again draw on Tillich's presentation of August­ ine's theology in .A History of Christian Th o ugh t. For the purpose of this study, Tillich's understanding o f Augustine can best b e intersected at the point where Tillich de­ scribes the factors involved in Augustine's rejection of Mani­ cheanism. Tillich attributes Augustine's departure from l\fani­ cheanism to the influence exerted upon him by astronomy. The fixity and harmony of form and structure which astronomy and mathematics discern as omnipresent in the universe provided Augustine with a vision of reality capable of breaking for him that dualism which would sec structures of good and evil con­ tending on a more or less equal basis. 4 The structured character of creation thus became for Augustin e the basis of his assertion of the goodness of creation. Tillich himself has expressed a direct dependence on Augustine for his own concept of the essential goodness of creation based on the precedence of the goodness of created structures to their distortion in existence. He has stated that his understanding of the metaphysical maxim, esse q ua csse b o n u m est , is directly Tillich, A His tory of Christian Though t , p. 1 85. The full statement reads, "So from Augustine to Bonaventura we have a philosophy that is implicitly religious, or theonomous, in which God is not a conclusion from other premises, but prior to all concl usions, making them possible." 4 Ibid., p. 1 07. Tillich describes the influence of mathematics on Augustine in this way. "If the u niverse has a structure of regular mathematical forms which can be calculated and which are harmonious, where can you find the effect of the demonic creation in the world? The world as created in its basic structure is good; that is what he derived from astronomy." 3

TILLICH'S EVALUATION OF THE 1 3TH CENTURY

23

derivative from Augustine's understanding of the goodness of creation founded in the structures of reality. 5 Thus in his under­ standing of essence and existence Tillich locates himself squarely in the Augustinian tradition. After his departure from Manicheanism, Augustine, in Tillich's presentation, was faced with two closely related problems. The first was the problem of certitude or truth. The second was the prob­ lem of union with the ultimate, the problem of God. To antici­ pate, it might be said here, that for both Augustine and Tillich, both problems are solved when they are united in such a way as to locate man's certitude in his perception of the immediacy of his union with God in himself. However, in the course of his person­ al philosophical development, Augustine's concern with certitude was intensified by the skepticism of his age into which he him self fell for some time after his departure from Manicheanism . Ac­ cording to Tillich, skepticism was the negative pre-condition for the easier acceptance of the Christian revelation by Augustine and, inde p d, by the ancient world. However, Tillich does not believe that such acceptance of revelation mediated by the au­ thority of the Church was, at that time, a heteronomous subjec­ tion of the believer to a foreign authority . Rather, acceptance of the authority of the Church and its revelation was then more easily and graciously elicited as the salvific answer to the skepti­ cism of the times. 6 Tillich sees the skepticism of the age as the negative effect of the failure of Greek philosophy "to build a world on the basis of philosophical reason". 7 The more positive effect of this failure was the development of a Neo-Platonism which taught a certain escape from the world in terms of a progressive unity of the soul with an extraterrestrial absolute. Tillich views much of Auguss Tillich, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interrogations, ed. by Sidney and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1 946), p. 3 97. 6 Tillich, A H£story of Chn"st£an Thought , p. 1 09. Tillich goes to some length to show that Augusti ne's submission to the church was not heteronomous. He writes, "Authority for Augustine meant the impressive, imposing, overwhelming power of the church and its great representatives. The phenomenon of authority was not a proble.n of heteronomy as it is for us, that is, subjection to what someone else tells us to accept. For Augustine it was the answer to the question implied in ancien t skepticism. There­ fore, he did not experience it as heteronomy but as theonomy, and somehow rightly so at that time." 1 /bz'd., p. 108. The full statem ent reads, "The heroic Greek attempt to build a world on the basis of philosophical reason came to a catastrophic end in skepticism."

24

TILLICH'S EVALUATION O F THE 1 3TH CENTURY

tine's genius in the way that Augustine used Neo-Platonism to free himself from skepticism but in such a way as totally to reverse the thrust of Neo-Platonism by placing the absolute for which it strove not beyond man and reality but within man and reality. 8 This location of the noetic absolute and thus of God within man constitutes, in Tillich's opinion, a new epistemology and Tillich does refer to Augustine as its creator. 9 Here Tillich refers to Augustine's interiorism or introspection as epistemo­ logically similar to Descartes, although he sees in Descartes' inte­ riorism an emphasis on mathematical certitude which lacks the religious quality of Augustine's interior approach to truth. 1 0 Augustine could thus use his epistemology of the "inner man" to refute skepticism by establishing an immediate mystical union with God in man's depth which was also the answer to man's search for certitude. Thus the problems of certitude and of God are united and solved by an epistemology and its supporting on­ tology which are founded on the discern ment of God as the ground of all reality both human and subhuman. It is this epistemology and ontology which Tillich sees as the basis for Augustine's assertion that he is interested only in God and the soul and nothing else. 1 1 At this point in his discussion of Augustine , Tillich introduces a theme that is also central to his own metaphysics. If Augustine views the soul as the principle lo c us of God's presence to man

Ibid., p. 109. Tillich describes Augustine's reversal of Neo-Platonism in this way. "But now Augustine did something which later on all Renaissance philosophers also did - he turned the meaning of Neo- Platonism into its opposite. N eo-Platonism was a negative philosophy, a philosophy of escape from the world. The elevation of the soul out of the material world into the ultimate is the meaning of Neo-Platonism. Augustine changed the emphasis; he dropped the idea of degrees, and instead used Neo-Platonism for the immediate experience of the divine in every thing, but especially in his soul." 9 Ibid., p. 108. Tillich writes, " S kepticism also gave rise to a new doctrine of knowledge, a new epistemology , which A ugustine created. It starts with the inner man · instead of the experience of the external world. " 1 0 Ibid., p. 113. Tillich here refers to the similarity and difference between the Augustinian and Cartesian ideas of interiorly. He writes, "The difference is that in Descartes the self-certainty of the ego is the principle of mathematical evidence - he derives from this his rational system of nature - whereas for Augustine the inner evidence is the immediacy of having God. " For very similar statements see also "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p. 20 and "The Conquest of the Concep t of Religion," What is Relig£on, ed. by James Luther Adams (N ew York, E vanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 125. 11 Tillich, A History of Chn"stian Thought, p. 111. Tillich writes, "The purpose and the way of knowledge are expressed in Augustine's famous words: 'I wish to know God and the soul.' 'Nothing else?' 'Nothing at all.' " 8

TILLICH' S EVALUATION O F TH E 1 3TH CENTURY

25

and man's attainment of God, it means that God is m an's a priori in the sense that God is nearer to man than man is to himself. As a consequence man, in his conscious discovery of God and in the knowledge of God consequent upon this discovery, is involved in a knowing process which is quite different from that of man as a knowing subject attaining, through an act of cognition, a known object. Thus for Augustine specifically religious knowledge can­ not be described in terms of knowing subject and object known. Knowledge of God is man's knowledge of or union with God who is present to him in his human and rational structure. Thus the process of man's cognitive union with God is in a very real sense man's most meaningful cognitive union with himself. Man 's experience of God is man's most pro found experience of himself. The cognitive union of man and God is t hus better described in terms of the union of subject with subject than of human subject with God as object. Tillich, in terms highly reminiscent of his own religious epistemology, describes Augustine's understanding of man's knowledge of God in these terms : God is seen in th e soul. He is in th e center of man, before the split in to subjectivity and obj ectivity. H e is not a strange being whose exis tence or non-existence one migh t discuss. Rather, he is our own a priori ; he prec edes ourselves in digni ty , reality , and logical validity. In him the split betw een subject and obj ec t, the desire of the subject to know the object, are overcome. There is no s uch gap. God is given to the subject as nearer to itself than it is to itself. 1 2

A consequence of Augustine's introspective approach to God through an analysis of man's subjectivity which is again very visible in Tillich's own theology is the valuation which such a cognitive approach to God places on sensible or empirical knowledge and on the natural sciences which derive from such an approach to reality. Because such an emphasis is placed on man's interiority where God and thus man's meaning are to be found, sensible knowledge of the exterior world loses much of its sign ificance as a lo cus of worthwhile meaning. This devaluation of the empirical is related to and, perhaps, intensified by Augustine's psychology which places an affective dimension within the cogn itive. Thus to be cogn itively at one with sensible reality is also to love it and

12

Ibid., p. 1 1 2.

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TILLICH'S EVALUATION OF THE 13TH CENTURY

this loving knowledge of the sensible serves at best as a distraction and at worst as an obs tacle to m an 's m ore intense union with God in h imself. Knowledge o f the sensible world h as for August­ ine a value only insofar as all o f creation has the capacity to re flect the trini tari an structure o f every thing that h as structure. Such an ep istemology h as a greater innate cap acity to show the potentially sacramental character o f all created re al i ty but, at the sam e time, seems to be ill suited for the development of the natural sciences. Tillich seems to be speaking b o th for Augus tine and his own theology of the lo gos structure o f creat ion when he wri tes : The natural sciences have meaning only insofar as they show the divine causes in nature and show the traces of the trinity in flowers and animals; they have no meaning in themselves. The consequence of this is that for the greater part of the Middle Ages the natural sciences were reduced in significance and were not really furthered at all. The technical relation to nature is of no interest to Augustine, nor the ana­ lytic character of c ontrolling knowledge ... . If the people of the Mid­ dle Ages loved nature, it was because they could see in it an embodi­ ment of the trinity. 1 3

A furth er similarity b etween the interiorism which Tillich de­ scribes in Augu stine's theology and Tillich 's own theology is to be seen in the m anner in which b oth theologi ans relate philos­ ophy an d theology . I f Augustine asserts that God is present to m an as his percep tible ground b ecause God is present to all of reality as im manen t in an d yet transcending its structure and that it is in m an ' s discernment o f this presence where truth is to b e found , it would mean that man 's search for tru th i s h is search for the logos structure of reality and hence is a religious search . Consequen tly the philosopher and theologian are involved in es­ sentially the sam e endeavour. Hence the Christian has m uch in common with the pre-Christian or non-Chris tian search for the logos. For this reas on Augustine can say that Plato 's doctrine of the logos pre figures Christian trinitarian though t . However, only the Christian can affirm that the Logos h as become incarnate . It is this assertion that spec i fies the Christian affirmation and at once distances i t from p revious philosophical clai m s while, at the sam e tim e , establish ing i ts continui ty with the previ ous and on-going 13

Ibid., p. 1 14.

TILLICH'S EVALUATION OF THE 1 3TH CENTURY

27

philosophical task. Tillich sets forth Augustine's thought on the Logos as the principle of philosophy and theology in a way that again reminds one of his own thought on this matter: Philosophy makes it possible for theologians to speak of the Logos, but when theology says the logos became flesh, this is a theological state­ ment based on a religious message that distinguished Christianity from classical philosophy . . . . The Logos as the universal principle of the cosmos appears in historical form. This is a unique, incomparable historical event. 1 4

This view of the relation of philosophy and theology is again both Tillich's and Augustine's. Though it appears here in Tillich's discussion of Augustine, it functions in his own Christology to show how Christ as a paradoxical reality defies deduction but not in such a way that his appearance defies reason. Rather than disrupt reason, the appearance of Christ as the Logos is the unex­ pected appearance in existence of the human logos in its essential reality of unbroken unity with God. While the Christian may affirm and the philosopher deny that with Christ the perfect log os of man has appeared, yet in their common quest for the log os they have a common ground which precedes the denial and affirmation of Christ as the Logos. A final point to be noted in Tillich's analysis of Augustine is the importance that Tillich attributes to the absence o f a signifi­ cant formative influx of Aristotle on Augustine's mind. Tillich attributes only a peripheral influence of Aristotle on Augustine through Plotinus. Then he brings up in point form the conse­ quences of Augustine's freedom from Aristotelian influence. 1 5 Augustine was not influenced by Aristotle's effort to mediate Plato's dualism. Augustine's thought is more communitarian in relationship to Aristotle's concern with the particular and indi­ vidual. Augustine was free of Aristotle's "quasi-bourgeois" mod­ eration of thought which was suspicious of ecstatic thinking. However, in the light of the dispute that was to occur in the thirteenth century, the most important differences which Tillich notes between Aristotle and Augustine pertain to their respective cognitive approaches to reality. Tillich characterizes Aristotle's

Ibid., p. 1 1 5. s Ibid. , pp. 1 1 0- 1 1 1 .

14

1

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cogn itive concern as pri m arily with the "rational and horizontal " dimension of reality. This approach Tillich places in sharp contra­ distinction to Augustine's concern with the soul, God and their interpenetration alm ost to the point o f indi fference toward the horizontal an d rational. Tillich further identifies Aristotle as a philosopher much concerned with form al logic and contras ts this Aristotelian charac teristic with Augustine 's intuitive , voluntar­ istic and m ore vital thinking. Finally, in connection with this las t point, Tillich contrasts Aristotle 's inductive empiri cism with Augustine's intuitive and deductive approach. Here again , Tillich 's contrast of Aris totle and Augustine betray the qualities of Tillich 's own thought and show his affini ty with Augustine. Tillich implies that Augustine 's t hough t is somewhat dualistic. Tillich 's own system i s b ased on a polar vision o f reality wherein the vitality o f reality is seen in the attempt o f every being to achieve a l iving integration o f its constitut ive polarities. Thus all o f life is involved in a constant struggle to achieve inte­ gration and growth over against disintegration and death . Tillich refers to the communitarian n ote in Augustine 's th ough t. His own theology shows gre at concern for the unitive p owers in re ality even to the ex tent that the he considers Ockham 's nominalism , in so m uch as i t denies the reality o f universals and thus their uni fying power, to have b een a signi fican t factor in the breakdown of the soci al cohesion of the Middle Ages and a harb inger of m odern individ ualism with the isolation it so o ften implies . 1 6 When Til­ lich re fers to the ecstatic, intui tive and introspective quali ties o f Augustine's though t he i s again speaking o f qualities very m uch presen t in h is own theology . Finally , Tillich seems to share m uch of the Augustinian approach to nature and the Augustinian eval­ uation of scienti fic kn owledge of nature. The question of the place and th e validity of an exclusively technical or controlling knowledge of reality is one which Tillich frequently as ks. Yet, while there can be lit tle doubt o f Tillich 's sympathy with

16 Jbz'd., p. 200. Tillich w rites about the consequences o f Ock.ham's denial of the participation of the individual in the universal in these terms. "Com munity, such as we have in the Augustinian type of thinking, is replaced by social relations, by society. As a consequence of this nominalism we live today in a society in which we relate to each other in terms of co-operation and competition, but neither of these has the meaning of participation." See also ibid. p. 199. Here Tillich writes, " And as soon as nominal­ ism became successfull, this was the actual dissolution of the Middle Ages."

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Augustine's positions as Tillich contrasts them with Aristotle's, it must be noted that Tillich does not allow himself to be caught in an over simplified acceptance of Augustine's Platonism and rejection of Aristotle. He aligns himself with Augustine in the latter's phi­ losophy of religion by which he means the way in which Augus­ tine approaches God through an analysis of his subjectivity and the use of the principle of identity. However, Tillich admits a dependence on Aristotle for his Gestalt analysis of life with its emphasis on organicism and its distance from the "atomistic, mechanical and mathematical" elements that he sees in the thought of Plato and Augustine. 1 7 Nor is Tillich willing to deny the validity of the Aristotelian world view in general. He sees the thirteenth century as a time when Plato through the Franciscans and Aristotle through Thomas continued ''their eternal conversation". 1 8 In Tillich's opinion, the conversation will be eternal precisely because of the irreducible validity that is present to the positions of both partic­ ipants. Yet the assertion of the partial validity of each viewpoint must always be accompanied by the admission of their very real difference. Thus Tillich describes the conversation between Plato and Aristotle as one "which will never cease in the history of human though t because they represent points of view which are always valid and which are always in conflict with each other." 1 9 This statement contains one of Tillich's more gracious acknowl­ edgements of the validity and permanence of the Aristotelian mind. However, when Tillich's understanding of the thirteenth century debate is exposed there is much evidence to suggest that he would seriously question the innate suitability of Aristotle's /bid., p. 1 1 1 . Here we have one of Tillich's clearest statements on his relation­ ship to Plato and A ristotle. He writes, " If anyone wishes to place a label on me, he can call me an 'Augustinian' , and in this sense 'anti-Aristote lian' and 'an ti-Thomistic'. I am in basic agreement with Augustine with respect to the philosophy of religion, but not necessarily in other things. For example, as a Gestalt theologian or philosopher I am closer to A ristotle than to Augustine or Plato, because the idea of the living structure of an organism is Aristotelian, whereas the atomistic, mechanical, mathematical science is Augustinian and Platonic." 1 8 Ibid., p. 1 4 1 . Ibid. The full text reads, "One of the fundamental problems of the philosophy t9 of religion was developed when Augustine and A ristotle or when Plato and Aristotle­ since Augustine was Neo-Platonic in his thinking-m et again and continued their eter­ nal conve rsation, a conve rsation which will never cease in the history of human thought because they represent points of view which are always valid and which are always in conflict with each other." 11

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philosophy in relation to Plato's as a vehicle for religious thought and expression. This presentation of Tillich's understanding of Augustine was necessary to provide the background to the issues that Tillich sees as central to the thirteenth century and serves as an intro­ duction to his analysis of the century itself. As major formative factors on the thirteenth century, Tillich cites the crusades which forced Christianity to reflect on itself out of its contact with alien cultures, the rise of the Dominican and Franciscan orders with their conflicting theologies and the discovery of a more total Aristotle. 2 0 These last two factors are closely related since it was through Thomas that Aristotle made his greatest impact on the theological sphere. In his discussion of Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Fran­ ciscan order, Tillich refers to his standing in the Augustinian tradition as mediated through Bernard and Anselm. Like these theologians, Francis puts a certain emphasis on "personal experi­ ence" at the centre of religious thought. 2 1 Of particular import in Tillich's remarks about Francis is his assertion that Francis' religious experience of fraternity with all of created reality , hu­ man and subhuman, was theologically founded on Francis' per­ ception of the divine presence as ground of all reality . This aspect of Francis' religious thought is credited by Tillich with making possible a new theological concepti on o f nature and culture as expressive of the divine. Tillich sees Francis' insight in this regard as capable of thus bringing about a unified view of religion, cul­ ture and nature itself. Tillich gives to Francis the title "the father of the Renaissance", because of this ability to sec the religious dimension in everything natural or human. This ability Tillich attributes to the "Augustinian-Anselmian-Bemardian" tradition in which Francis stood and again refers to the possibility intrinsic to this tradition of working a "mystical union of Christianity with the elements of culture and nature. " 2 2 Tillich's remarks on Ibid., p. 181. Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 182. Here Tillich writes of Francis, "Thus F rancis became the father of the Renaissance; by his feeling of fraternity with all beings, he opened up nature for religion. He opened up nature with respect to its ground of being, which is the same as it is in man." In the next paragraph he continues, " Generally speaking, F rancis b e­ longed to the Augustinian-Anselmian-Bemardian tradition of the mystical union of Christianity with the elements of culture and nature. " 20 21

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the ontology which Francis' perception o f the divine in all of reali t y presupp oses would seem to be o f some significance in that they are re flected b y the ass ertion sometimes m ade b y Francis­ can scholarship that Bonaventure gave philosophical-theologi cal expression an d el ab oration to the religious vision that Francis lived b u t to which he never gave scholarly or system atic form . 2 3 Tillich th en addresses directly the di fferences which came to exist b etween the Augustinian Franciscans and the Aristotelian Tho m is ts . Again h e warns ab out establishing a too sharp dichot­ omy b e tween Aristotl e and Augustine. He states that all the theo­ logians o f the thirteenth century were Augustinian in substance an d , with the rediscovery o f Aristotle , Aristotelian in their philosophical categories . However, he immediately adds that a contras t did exist and that this contrast h as characterized the philosophy of religi on ever since. 24 Tillich ac kn owledges that Aris totle's scien t i fic approach was m ethodologically superi or to Augustine 's. 2 5 Moreover, when the totality of Aristotle was rediscovered, his system was found to be as ex ten sive an d inclusive as the traditional Augustinian and ec­ clesiastical world view then held. Aristotle provo ked at this time th e same challenge that the scienti fi c explosion from the seven-· teenth century till the present was later to p rovoke . Yet the most important impac t , according to Tillich , which Aris totle h ad on reli­ gi ous th ough t was the new epistem ology and ontology he intro­ duced with the new conceptual ization o f God's relation to the world i mplied in them . It is especially in Aristotle's epistemology that Tillich locates a radical novelty with farreaching religious and th eologi cal consequences . The Aristotelian theory o f knowledge S ee. J. Guy Bouge rol, O. F. M., Introduction to the Works of St. Bonaventure, trans. by Jose de Vinck (Paterson, N.J. : St. Anthony Guild Press, 1964), p. 8. Bougerol here refers to Gilson's work on St. B onaventure. See Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. by Dom Illty d Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed (Paterson, N.J.: S t. A nthony Guild Press, 1965), p. 60. Gilson here writes, "What S t. Francis had simply felt and lived, St. Bonaventure was to think ." Tillich, A History of Chris tian Th.ought, p. 183. Here, Tillich states, "The dy24 namics of the high Middle Ages are determined by the conflict between Augustine and Aristotle, or between the Franciscans who were Augustinians and the Dominicans who were A ristotelian. This contrast, however, should not be taken too exclusively. For all mediaval theologians were Augustinian in substance. A nd since the thirteenth century they were all A ristotelian with respect to their philosophical categories. Yet, these schools did have different emphases which have been reflected ever since in the philosophy of religion." 2s Ibid., p. 181. 23

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bound all knowledge to an origin in the external and sensible world. A theology using such an epistemological model was bound to stand in the world and argue to God from the extra­ mental and sensible. In diametric opposition to this Augustine and, in the thirteenth century, Bonaventure placed God and not sensible reality as that which is immediately knowable so that man judges the world from an immediate participation in God through his participation in the transcendentals and through the very structure of his mind. Rather than using the world to come to God through the use of an independent power of reason conferred in creation, man judges the world with a reason in whose structures God is present as the pre-condition of all thought. Thus it was in their religious epistemologies and the supporting ontological conceptions of God's presence to created reality, that the lines were most sharply drawn between the Franciscans and the Aristotelians in the thirteenth century. Bonaventure asserted that all of man's knowledge and especially his knowledge of God is a participation in God's knowledge of himsel f whose ontologi­ cal presupposition is the immediate participation of the mind in God himself. Tillich twice quotes Bonaventure's statement, H I-le [ God] is most truly present to the soul and immediately kno\v­ able. " 2 6 Tillich interprets Bonaventure 's statement to mean that the universal categories of the mind and the transcendentals are the presence of the divine light in man's soul and the precondi­ tion of every cognitive act since every cognitive operation presup­ poses both a participation in and a search for being, truth and goodness. 2 7 Thus the divine light is operative in all of man's knowing activity even when it functions at the empirical level but it is particularly operative in man's thought about God since without the mind's participation in God it could not ask the God question. In this connection Tillich again quotes Bonaventure to the effect that, "Being itself is what first appears in the intel­ lect". 28 This statement Tillich interprets as a strong affirmation Ibid., p. 1 85 . "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p. 1 4. Tillich , A History of Chn·stian Though t , pp. 1 84- 1 8 5 . Tillich s tates, "These prin­ ciples are present in every act of knowing. Whenever we say what s omething is, when­ ever we make a l ogical judgement about something, the ideas of the true, of the good, of being i tself are presen t." 2 8 Ibid., p. 1 85. Tillich repeats this citation in "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religi on," p. 1 4. 26

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by Bonaventure of the mind's immediate participation in God since Tillich here reads Bonaventure to be using the term "being itself" as a synony m for God. The consequence is, for Tillich, that Bonaventure is here affirming that God is present in every act of knowledge, although, of course, t he mind may not be consciously aware of this presence. As a consequence of this epistemology it becomes difficult if not impossible to conceive of a secular or scientific knowledge if such knowledge is understood to be devoid of a religious dimen­ sion. Since God is present to the knowing process itself there is no act of knowledge on whatever level which is not dependent on the mind's participation in God. Here again, in writing of the Franciscan epistemology, Tillich sounds certain notes that are very familiar in his own theology. He writes: Somehow this means that there is no such thing as secular knowl­ edge. All knowledge is in some way rooted in the knowledge of the divine within us. There is a point of identity in our soul, and this point precedes every special act of knowledge. Or, we could say that every act of knowledge-about animals, plants, bodies, astronomy, mathematics-is implicitly religious. A mathematical proposition as well as a medical discovery is implicitly religious because it is possible only in the power of these ultimate principles which are the uncreated divine light in the soul. 29

Here Tillich in speaking of "the implicitly religious" dimension in all knowledge seems to be identifying in Bonaventure's thought his own concept of the potentially theonomous nature of all reality including the reality of the mind. With Tillich him ­ self the idea of thconomy is founded on the ontological presence of God in every structured reality. In this passage Tillich seems to be clearly arguing that his concept of theonomy is also Bona\'en­ ture's. As opposed to Bonaventure's thconomous philosophy, Tillich evaluates Thomas' epistemology as proceeding from the denial of the immediately apprehensible presence of God to the mind. l\ lan reasons to God from God's created effects by applying to sen­ sible phenomena the principle of causality. The transcendental principles and the structures of the mind which Bonaventure views as the lo cus of God's presence to man become with Tho29

Tillich, A 1/iJ t o ry of Ch ristian '/1w ugh t . p. 1 8 5.

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m as created and , in comparison with Bonavent ure, autono m ous structures used by m an to argue to God from his s ensib ly percep­ tible effects . As a conseq uence, m an 's immediate, and to some extent, conscious p arti cipation in being i tsel f, truth i tsel f and goodness i tsel f is den ied. The Franciscan theologi an , Mathew o f Aquasparta, criticized Th omas ' epistemology on the grounds that i ts b o ndage to the sen ses and to sense knowledge woul d foster s cience b ut at the cost of wisdom in so much as the direction such an epistem o­ logy takes toward e x tern al reality would lead to a weakeni ng o f man 's sensitivity to t h e presence o f G o d i n h i s m in d itsel f which wisdom perceives. Tillich twice quotes l\fathew and calls his cri ti­ cism "prop heti c " . 3 0 In opposition to this , Thomas asserted that man 's knowledge o f God like all his knowledge begins in the senses. Tillich does not den y that such a p rocedure does lead to a certain knowledge o f God but such knowledge produces only a logi cal not a religious convi ction . The som ewhat formalistic knowledge of God that is attainable in such a noetic procedure eli cits an assent which must then b e rein forced by aut hority , in this c ase , t he auth ority o f the Church. 3 1 The point that Tilli ch h ere m akes ab out th e quality o f religi ous knowledge proper to the ap ­ proaches to God by the epistemologies o f Th omas and B onaven­ ture is o f great importance. Th omas ' app roach produces "scien­ ti fic" knowledge o f God but it is, in Tillich 's opinion , less than speci fically religious knowledge . The opposite is the case with Bonaven ture since in his epistem ol ogy the very q uestion o f God 30 Ibid., p. 1 86 . Here Tillich states, " One of Bonaventura's foll owers made the prophetic statem en t that the moment y ou pursue the A ristotel ian-Thomist method and start with th e external world, you will lose the pri nciples. You will gain the ex ternal world-he agreed with that because he knew that empirical reality can be gained in no other way -but y ou will lose the wisdom which is able to grasp intuitively the ul timate , principles within yoursel f. . In "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religi on," p. 1 4, Tillich identifies the follower of Bonaventure as Mathew of Aquasparta and quotes him to say, " For even i f this method builds the way of science, i t utterly destroys the way of wisdom." 31 Tillich, A History of Chn'stian Though t, pp. 1 8 6- 1 8 7 . Here Till ich states, "Th omas knew th at the conclusions reached in th is way , th ough they arc logically correc t, d o not produce a real conviction ab out God. There fore, they m ust be com­ ple ted by authority. I n other words, the church guarantees the truth which can never be fully reached merely by an empirical approach to G od. The situation is clear: I n Bonaventura we have a theonomous knowledge i n all real ms o f life ; w e have n o knowl­ edge whatsoever with ou t begi nning wi th God. In Thomas wc have autonom ous knowl­ edge, reached by the scientific method, as far as it goes. But Th omas knew that i t does no t go far enough, s o it must he completed by authority."

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presupp oses m an 's initial awareness o f God and the reasoning process is done in the l igh t o f this awareness present from the outset . This is what is m ean t by the assertion that God is the presupposi tion of the question of God and i t is also the basis of Tillich's assertions that the Franciscans were " e xperiential " theo­ logian s . The search for God begins with God . However, Tilli ch c oncedes that Th omas ' method o f arguing to God fro m the e x ternal world won the day in the thi rteenth cen­ tury . The idea o f an autonomous reason discursively arguing to God through causal categori es applied to fini tude was accepted in pre ference to Bonaven t ure 's i dea of God as the p recondi tion o f all knowledge and t h e p resupposition o f knowledge o f God . This accep t ance meant that autonomous reason becam e the norm for man 's discourse ab out God. It is in this acceptance of autono­ mous reason that Tillich sees much dam age done to m an 's under­ standing of his relation to God an d to h is religi ous cons ciousness . For th e accep tan ce o f autonomous reason as adequate for m an 's attai n m en t o f God implies , for Tillich, t he opening o f a "gap " between m an and God since auton o m ous reason denys an onto­ logical point of coincidence b etween man and God in the struc­ ture of m an 's m ind. The e ffec t of asserting man 's m ind as auton­ o m ous 1s so to distance God an d man that they come to be conceived as independent entities each cap able o f exercising their various p owers , among whi ch are knowledge , upon each other. Accord ing to Tillic h , the full consequences of this gap which Th o m as in tro duced into the conception o f man's relation to God b ecam e fully visible only with Scotus . This theologian also adopt­ ed Aristotle b ut, in so doing, denied Bonaventure 's p rinciple of i m m ediacy an d t h e Thom is ti c prin ciple that man can attain God through t h e use of autonomous reason . With Sco tus the gap be­ tween t h e in fi nite and the finite b ecomes to tally irreducible. He denies the coincidence of the finite an d infinite in the m ind and sim ultan eously denies to i n ferential reason the power to reach God. Thus Scotus is i nstru mental in formulat�ng the conception o f m an 's relation to God i n terms o f two posi tivis ms. Revelation as m ed iated by the authori ty of the church and the data of inductive science c o m e to s tand b eside one another. Each has its own validity and righ ts b ut the p ossibility of correlation or inte­ gration is gone. This dual i sm o f posi tivisms was the i n evitable

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result of the gap which Thomas introduced between man and God. Tillich credits Scotus with drawing its implications into fully conscious expression and, in so doing, setting the basic problem of the philosophy of religion for the forthcoming cen­ turies of religious thought. Tillich describes the results of Scotus' theology in this way : Now the gap of which I spoke has become visible. In Thomas it was closed ; in Duns Scotus it was opened up and has never been closed again. It is still our problem, as it was the problem of the thirteenth century. 32

The gap which Scotus made visible and Thomas made possible was intensified toward the end of the Middle Ages by Ockham's nominalism. Revelation mediated by the Church became the only means of attaining God. Grace became a non-cxperien tial "habi­ tus " in virtue of which man could submit to ecclesiastical author­ ity. With Ockham the theonomy of the Augustinian- Franciscan tradition disintegrates into a rigid scientific autonomy on one hand and an ecclesiastical heteronomy on the other. 3 3 This dis­ integration made possible the double truth theory which began to appear at this time. Tillich can thus succinctly summarize the development from Bonaventure to Ockham in these terms: I f we compare these positions on the traditional question of reason and revelation, we can say : In Bonaventura reason itself is revelatory insofar as in its own depths the principles of truth are given. This does not, of course, refer to the historical revelation in Christ but to our knowledge of God. In Thomas reason is able to express revelation. In Duns Scotus reason is unable to express revelation. In Ockham revela­ tion stands alongside of reason, even in opposition to it. 34

This marks the conclusion of Tillich's analysis of the thir­ teenth century in his historical work. The theological si gn ificance of this analysis is brought out more precisely in his essay, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion". Herc Tillich uses the thirteenth century to make the theological points that the onto-

Ibid., pp. 1 8 7-188. Ibid . , p. 188. Here Tillich describes the relation of theology and culture after Ockh am in these terms, "The original theonomy of the Augustinian- Franciscan tradi­ tion has been broken into a complete scientific autonomy on the one side, and com­ plete ecclesiastical heteronom y on the other." 34 Ibid . 32 33

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logical approach to God must precede any cosmological argu­ ment, that when it does not a schizoid cleavage between philos­ ophy and culture, on one hand, and religion, on the other, inevi­ tably ensues, and that when it does religion, philosophy and culture can be integrated. Here the debate between Augustine and Aristotle is presented under the controlling consideration of how each school relates the religious absolute, God, and the philosophical absolute, esse . 3 5 Again Tillich sees the method of the relation o f these absolutes as "the problem in all problems of the philosophy of religion." 3 6 Here too Tillich presents the Augustinian solution in terms of the union of the two absolutes in the nature of truth so that all truth and the search for truth presuppose the participation of the mind in God. Here he refers to Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and Mathew of Aquasparta as adherents of this solution in the thirteenth century in that they located a real presence of God in the structures of the mind. This position is brought out very precisely ,,,vhen Tillich writes of the mediaeval Franciscan posi­ tion: These principles are not created functions of our mind, but the pres­ ence of truth itself and therefore of God, in our mind. 3 7

God's presence to the mind is of such an immediate character that it precedes reasoning and is independent of authority. It grasps man in such a way that he is totally involved in all of his capacities. The presence o f the Unconditioned in man's self-con­ sciousness provokes an awareness and a response in which cogni­ tion and affection are inextricably and indivisibly involved. 3 8 Here Tillich first introduces a notion of the psychology of religious experience which is specifically Augustinian and in ten-

Tillich "The Two Types o f Phil osophy o f Religi on," p. 1 2. /bz'd. Tillich presents the problem in this way . "The religi ous and philosophical Absolutes, Deus and esse cannot be u nconnec ted ! What is their connection from the poin t o f vie w of being as well as o f knowing? In the simple statement, ' � od is', the connection i s achieved ; but the character o f this connection is the problem m all prob­ lems of philosophy of rel igion." 37 Ibid., p. 1 3. 38 [bid., p. 1 4. Here Tillich in an expressed dependence on Augustine's psychol ogy writes " I n relation to esse ipsum no di fference b e tween the cogn itive and the appetitive is pos�ible, because a separation of the functions presupposes a separation of subject and object." 3s

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sion with a faculty psychology in which the act of faith is ana­ lysed in terms of the interaction of intellect and will considered as separate faculties spcci fied by their respective objects. Tillich refuses to analyse the act of faith in such a way that it becomes purely intellectual, purely volitional or a product of both intel­ lect and will. His theory o f knowledge posits in every act o f cognition an affective elem ent in such a way that to separate the cognitive and affective becomes a dis tortion o f every knowing process including the religious. Though Tillich affirms that man is immediately aware of the absolute he does admit the fact that m an can turn from the absolute and in so doing tum from that which is most present to his mind as immanent in its structure yet transcending it. 3 9 But it is this immediate presence that gives to Augustine the mystical quality of his thought and to the mystics themselves the basis for the assertion that man both is and is not in a relation of identity with God. 4 0 This conception of God's presence to man is at the heart of Tillich's reservations about speaking of the "existence of God" or about "proofs for God's existence" because such terminology treats of God as an existent. Tillich in his own theology and in his interpretation of Augustine feels that the nature of God's presence to reality and to the mind is at once too immediate and yet too transcendent to justify such expressions as "the existence of God". Thus Tillich will frequently insist that the ontological argument is not really an argument wherein conclusions are drawn from premises but is really an analysis of reality in which the recognition of the absolute within the contingent, present from the first, is made more explicit. Ibid., Here Till ich ex plains man's lack of adversion to the presence of the abso­ lute in h is mind in terms of simple failure to recognize it. He writes, "We always see i t b u t w e do not alway s notice it ; a s w e see everything in t h e ligh t without always noticing th e ligh t as such. " Elsewhere in the essay he attributes this l ack of perception to defect in the indivi dual . He writes, "The fact that people turn away from this though t is based on individual defects but not on the essential structure of the mind." Cf. p. 1 5. 4 0 Ibid., pp. 1 4- 1 5. Here Tillich uses Eckhart's mysticism to show how Augus tinian ontology is naturally mystical. Tillich begins with a quotation from Eckhart and then comments. " 'There is between God and the soul neither s trange ness nor remoteness, therefore the soul is not only equal with God but it is .... the same that He is.' This is, of course, a paradoxical statement, as Eckhart and all mystics kne w ; for in order to s ta tP the identity, an elemen t of non-identity must be presupposed. This proved t o be the dy namic and critical point in the ontological approach. " 39

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The ontological argument thus functions t o bring man into a fuller self-consciousness of that point of identity in the structure of his mind wherein the infinite and finite coincide. Hence Tillich is critical of certain uses of the ontological argument which in affirming the validity of the argument have laid the grounds for its rej ection by overstepping the bounds of liceity proper to it. Thus Tillich will both agree and disagree with Anselm. 4 1 He agrees with Anselm to the extent that he feels the latter's use of the ontological argument is cogent insofar as it describes the presence of the absolute in a contingent mind but disagrees with Anselm's further step of using this insight to argue to the exis­ tence of an existent, namely God. To this extent Tillich acknowl­ edges the validity of Anselm's critics from Gaunilo and Thomas to Kant. 4 2 However, Tillich feels that in their criticism of Anselm on the ground that his thought makes an illicit transition from the ideal to the real, these thinkers over-reacted and too readily dis missed the validity of Anselm's thought on the coincidence of opposites and in so doing removed the religious basis from reli­ gious thought. Tillich argues that Thomas' rejection of Anselm amounted to the rejection of the ontological argument itself and the loss of immediate religious certitude out of which such an argument lived. In denying that God is the first known by us, Thomas, in Tillich's words, "cut the nerve of the ontological argument". 4 3 The immediacy of God to the mind was denied. Autonomous and discursive reasoning replaced immediacy of perception. The qualitive difference between science and wisdom was denied. The knowledge which man has of God through his use of an autono41 Ibid., p. 15. Tillich here writes of Anselm, " But Anselm on the basis of his epistem ological realism, transformed the pri'mum esse into an e ns realz'ssimum, the principle into a unive rsal being. " 42 Ibid. On this point see also Tillich's analysis of A nselm's theology in A Hi's tory of Ch ristian Though t, pp. 15 8-165, and particularly p. 165. 43 Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," pp. 16-17. Here Tillich quotes from the Sum m a Theologz'ca, I, q. 2, art. l , to argue that when Thomas affirms that God is fi rst known in himself but not by us Thomas is denying the Augustinian approach. The full tex t reads, "So he ! Thomas] says: 'There are two ways in which something is known: by itself and by us. The refore I say that this p roposition "God is" is known by itsel f insofar as He is in Himself, because the predicate is the same as the subject. For God is his own being .... But since we do not know about God, what he is, that proposition is not known by itself, but must be dem onstrated through those things which are m ore known with respect to us, that is through his effects.' In these words Aquinas cu ts the nerve of the ontological app roach."

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mous reason is complemented by revealed knowledge about God. This relation of philosophy and theology had the effect of driving a wedge between them. Philosophy becomes a purely autonomous activity of the mind. Theology has as its object those revealed truths which are beyond the ambit of reason and so the content of theology became heteronomously related to the autonomous philosophical mind. No distinction was made between those truths which are immediately evident and which are the common property of both philosopher and theologian and those truths which pertain to the contingencies of temporal revelation such as, for example, the Incarnation. This distinction made by Alex­ ander of Hales is absent in Thomas. In his thinking the first category of truth pertains to the realm of reason and philosophy and the second category to theology which deals with revealed truths mediated by the Church and thus to be accepted on the authority of either God revealing or the Church teaching. 4 4 This relation of philosophy and theology means that science and faith, in telligere and credere are separated. The possibility of integrating revelation with reason or culture or specifically hu­ man exigencies is greatly reduced. God himself becomes the ob­ ject of a reasoning process and his existence and attributes come to be spoken of in terms proper to that of an existent. In Tillich's thought this is to immerse God in the subject-object process common to non-religious thought and so to consider God as one being among many. Nor can this concept of God be ennobled by the greatness attributed to this being. Once God comes to be thus conceived no munificence of predication can disguise the fact that God is considered to be a being or the being over against the sum total of beings. In this article also Tillich recounts briefly how Scotus and Ockham took the Thomistic relation of God and reason to its conclusion in the doctrine of double truth based on two positivisms. 4 5 Ibid., p. 1 7. Tillich contrasts the Franciscan and Thomistic u nderstanding of the nature o f theology in this way. " A nd while the Franciscans, especial ly Alexander, distinguish between (a) those doctrines which belong to the eternal truth and are immediately evident, (as for ins tance, God as t'JH ', vcrum, bonum ) and ( b ) those d oc­ trines which are secondary , embodying the eternal t ruth in temporal forms, and are contingent and not evident, (as for instance, the Incarnation and the d octrine of t he Church ), Thomas puts all theological statements on the same l evel, namely that o f authori ty." 45 Ib id. , p. 1 9 . 44

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A fter h e was dealt with the thirteenth cent ury in terms o f the di fferent way o f relating the two absolutes , God and esse , in the theologies o f Thomas and the Franciscan A ugustinians Tillich in th is essay , th en pro p oses his own creative response to what he calls th e Thomistic dissol ution of Augus tine 's sol ution. Tillich 's solution i s really a restatement of his understanding o f Augus­ tine's m ethod of i dentifying God and being in the nature of truth through th e p rinciple of identity which points to m an's imme­ diate and p ercep tible parti cipation in God. Tillich proposes his first principle of the relati onship of union of God and m an in these term s : L

L

'

'

Man is immediately aware o f something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, theoret­ ically as well as practically. 4 6

A fter stating this p rinciple Tillich elaborates i ts terms. First he explains h is understanding of what he means by m an 's immediate awareness of the unconditional . Such awareness is less than an intuition of vision. Tillich is not s aying that m an sees God in his awareness of the unconditioned in l i fe. In this Tillich clai m s uni­ ty with St. Thomas ' denial o f the visi0n o f God i n this l i fe . Rather, such a n i mmediate awareness is better described in terms of the recogn ition o f the unconditioned as "an element, a power, as dem an d" in human real i ty i tself. 4 7 Nor is this awareness o f t h e unconditioned an " experience" i f experience is meant t o convey t h e interaction between an e xperiencing s ubject and an experienced object. Nor is this awareness " knowledge " b ecause kn owledge l i ke experience pres upposes the split b etween subject and obj e c t wh ich m an 's experience o f the uncondi tioned over­ com es an d b ec ause kn owledge frequen tl y re fers to an exclus ively theoretical tru th while man 's awareness of the unconditioned engages m an in the to tality of his powers . Tillich , after these negative qual i fiers , describes m an 's awareness of the uncondi­ tioned m ore p ositively b y saying that it is non-i n ferential , im me­ diate, and c ap able of yielding certitude when focused upon. I n t h is analysis of the awareness of the uncondi tioned which gro unds th e p ossib ility o f m an 's religio us knowledge , Tillich

46 47

Ibid., p. 2 2. Ibid., p. 23.

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again shows gre at indeb tedness t o an Augustinian p sychology which does not distinguish facul tics in the soul at l eas t in the soul 's relation to the transcendent als of b e ing, t ru t h and good­ ness . In n·l a t ion t o goodness and truth , cognition and a ffection so interp en etrate, according to Tillich , that thei r separati o n , at least for th eological p urposes , is at least fu tile an d at m ost capa­ ble o f describ ing man 's rel igious res ponse in s uch a way as to deny the to tality of man ' s involve m en t in this response . Tillich uses this concept o f the wholeness of m an 's involvement in reli­ gious awareness to distance h i m s e l f fro m any t h eol ogy that l o ­ cates man 's rel igious experi ence in on e o f h is fac ult ies . Th us he criticizes Thomas fo r describing the act of fai th in t erm s of the will's moving the intellect to an assent which lies b eyond i ts native powers . 4 8 For sim ilar reasons h e disli kes S chlei erm acher ' s descrip tion o f religious experience in t erm s o f " feeling" whi ch term is too readily suggestive of locating fai th in th e exclusively affecti ve sp here. 4 9 Both cri ti cisms p roceed fro m Tillich 's con­ cern to show how m an 's religi ous awareness pervades his b eing and de fies l ocation in any one faculty or inter-play of facul ties. Next Tillich explicates his understanding of the Uncondi­ tioned . B y the Unconditioned Tillich m eans God b ut h e m eans to use the term in such a way that neither the definite nor inde finite article can p recede it. Thus one cann ot speak o f the " 'the Uncon­ ditioned" or "an Unconditioned " , ab out " ' the God" or "a God". Rath er the term is used to re fer to God as present to all of reality as that in which or in whose power everyth ing exists. Thus the quality o f Unconditionedness runs thro ugho u t all reality and in sel f-conscious man is percep tible. But, because God is present in every thing as that in wh ich i t participates in so m uch as it exists, God him sel f cannot b e a th ing. Tillich re fers to God as that which precedes all as its ground and thus m akes p ossible the subject-object s t ru cture o f reality. Thus when God is attained he is not att ain ed as within the subject-obj ect structure o f reality but as its preceden t . This m eans t h at in m an God is at tained at th at point in man where h e is at one with God and it is this point

48 Ibid. Tillich wri tes, "Thomas i njured t h e understanding o f religion when h e dissolved the substan tial unity of the psychol ogical functions, a n d attributed to the will in isolation what the intellect alone is not able to perform." 49 /h id. , pp. 2 3-24.

TI LLICH'S EVALUATION OF TH E 1 3TH CENTUR Y

43

which Tillich calls the prius or a priori since it is the precondi tion of the split of reality into subject and object. Tillich refers to this point of identity in this way. "The prius or subject and object cannot become an object to which man as a subject is theoreti­ cally and practically related. God is no object for us as sub­ jects". so At this point Tillich touches on a problem that in his cate­ gories of thought seem to present human thought and speech about God with a seemingly insuperable difficulty. For, while God cannot be properly thought of as an object of man's think­ ing subjectivity, the fact is that when man thinks or speaks of God he must introduce God into the subject-object structures because of the exigencies of human thought and speech which conceive as real only that which can be thought or spoken of in terms of a thinking subject over against a thought object. 5 1 Til­ lich admits that this situation is paradoxical. It is a logical neces­ sity of human thought and speech but it contains always the danger thJt a logical necessity will become an ontological asser­ tion and that God will be affirmed to be an object, however great, over against the thinking subject. Such a concept of God, Tillich brands as unworthy and as inevitably provoking its own rejection with the consequent injury to religion that follows. In Tillich's second statement about the nature of God's pres­ ence to man, he contends that, if the immediate awareness of God's presence to man which is the basis of the ontological argu­ ment, is affirmed then various cosmological arguments take on a real validity as recognitions of this immediate presence in what­ ever realm of reality is being used as matter for the cosmological arguments. The consequence of this principle is that a certain bridge is again built across the chasm between religion and culture which results when the ontological argument is denied. This prin­ ciple reads:

so Ibid., p. 25. s, Ibid. O f the necessity of c onceiving o f God as beyond the s ubject-object spl it and yet the impossibility of speaking of him in any other way than through subject­ object categories Tillich writes, " But, on the other hand, we speak about him and we act upon him, and we can not avoid it, b ecause every thing which becomes real to us enters the subject-object correlation."

44

TI LLICH'S EVALUATI ON Of THE 1 3TH CENTU RY T h e Unconditioned o f wh ich w e h a v e an i m m ediate awareness, w i t h­ o u t inferen ce, c an be recognized in t h e c u l tu ral and natural uni­ verse. 52

If this principle is accepted the cosmological argument proper then becomes a recognition of the "finitude of the finite" in the light of man's immediate awareness of the infini te. This argument can be used either in its more tradit ional modes or in a new manner wherein the function of finitudc is perceived in such currently acute phenomena as anxiety, guilt and meaninglessness. The very negativities involved in these realities can be used as pointers to the answers that religion might make to these prob­ lems. The teleological argument when performed in the light of the ontological is more positive and takes on the function of per­ ceiving in man's creative expressions, whether they be political, social, esthetic, or artistic, the religious dimension that is inevi­ tably contained in these expressions. Thus the teleological argu­ ment becomes the basis of a theology of culture because it rests on the principle that man's most basic dimension is his relation to God and that this relation is unconsciously if not consciously expressed in all his most meaningful expressions. The seriousness with which Tillich takes the presence of God to man is clearly seen in his concluding remarks in this sect ion. If one is to affirm that there is in man a point of identity with the divine, it means in consequence that real atheism is ontologically impossible for the individual and that a purely secular culture is impossible for so­ ciety. 5 3 For the individual and for society, God is denied only in virtue of another absolute and, if the expressions of ei ther the individual or society are listened to, this absolute can be detect­ ed. Because man knows he is at once at one with and separat ed from the absolute he cannot refrain from expressing absolutes. Thus man constitutionally has to affirm absolutes and has to face the problem of fulfillment in union with the truly absolute or of self-destruction through an idolatrous adhesion to an absolute which is a false absolute. Ibid., p. 2 6. Ibid., p. 2 7. Till ich writes that as a consequence of the im mediacy of God to m an all his cultural activity and production can be read as revelatory of a religious dimen­ sion. He wri tes, " This, of course, is possible only on the basis o f .... the insigh t that secular culture is esse ntially as impossible as atheism, because both presuppose the unconditional element and both e xpress ultimate concerns." Sl

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45

Thus Tillich 's creat ive response to what he cons iders to have b een an un fort unate resolution o f the relat ionship of God and m an in the thirteen th cen tury takes the form o f a reaffirmation o f the p rinciple o f identity wherein a point o f unity b etween God and m an is es tablished in the very s truc ture of m an 's mind as grounding m an 's religious nature . Such a rel igious ant hropol­ ogy m akes the religious dim ension o f m an not only his mos t b asic and t ruest dimension but s o relates h i s rel igious dimension to all o ther dimen sions o f his activi ty that the former pervades the l atter. Thus m an as religious is so related to m an in his other functions t h at the tension between these dim ensions is greatly lessened. The dich otomies b etween autonom ous m an and rel i ­ gi o u s m an are resolved in t h e possibility o f m an as theonomous or in conscious union with his depths in his reli gi ous experience. In such a concep tion of man , religion, revelation and fait h are no longer seen as forei gn impos itions b u t rather as expressions o f m an 's t ruest self which p ro ceed from those depths in man where his p reser.ce to God is i m mediate. God in speaki ng to m an is really sp eaking thro ugh him fro m a presence that was real from the outset. Revelation is really a revelation to m an o f his t ruest self as i n u n ion with God. Faith b ecomes an expression o f this union. The religi o us dim ension of l i fe is thus h armoniously lo­ cated or i ntegrated in l i fe itsel f. A he teronom ous God and an autonomous m an are united i n a theological anthropology where­ in t h eonomy m eans m an's reunion with a God who is immedi­ ate! y p rese n t to him and closer to m an than he is to himself. Reli gious knowledge proceeds from that experience wherein man beco m es conscious o f his union with this presence. Tillich i s quite s trong in describing the e ffects o f a philos ophy of religion or of a theologi cal anthropology in which the prin­ cipl e of identity is denied. I n fact some o f his s tatements on this matter seem t o b e audacious. He s tates, for instance, that the de­ nial of the p rinciple of i m mediacy through the adoption of Aris­ totle's philosoph y in the thirteenth century was " the ultimate cause of the secularization of the Western world". 5 4 He does s 4 Tillich, A History of Chn·s tian Thought, p. 186. The full text reads, "The diver­ gence between these two approaches to the knowledge of God is the great problem of the p hilosophy of religion, and, as I will now show, it is the ultimate cause of the secularization of the Western world-I am using' 'cause' in the cognitive realm, for there are other causes too."

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qualify this immediately by denying that such an option was the only cause. However, such a statement is an indication of Til­ lich's feeling on the matter. Nor is this statement in isolation. He implies that the manner in which God has been related to being in the West since the thirteenth century has led to an "ever increasing loss of religious consciousness". 5 5 Against Gil­ son's presentation of the Thomistic position that God's existence as one with his essence is immediately knowable in itself but arrived at discursively by the human mind, Tillich asserts that such a concept of God's existence reduces this existence "to the level of a stone or a star and makes atheism not only possible but almost unavoidable, as the later development has proved". 5 6 He refers again to the consequence of atheism resulting from a cog­ nitive approach to God which would attain his existence as the result of a syllogistic and discursive approach. This approach he sees as motivated by a concept of God which makes of him an object whose existence might or might not be affirmed. To this effort Tillich replies, "To such a concept and to such attempts atheism is the right religious and theological reply ". 5 7 It is inter­ esting to note that in this understanding of atheism Tillich need not retract his statements about the impossibility of atheism for in the context in which he here speaks he sees atheism itself performing a religious function in rejecting a concept of God which is repulsive to the religious mind. Tillich makes much the same type of commentary in discuss­ ing Anselm's ontological argument. 5 8 Tillich argues that the per­ manent validity of Anselm's approach to God lies in his descripTillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p. 1 2. The full text reads, "The diffe rent answers given to this question are milestones on the road of Western religious consciousness ; and this road is a road towards ever-increasing loss of religious consciousness. " 56 Ibid. , p. 1 8. The text reads in full, "Gilson puts it this way: 'It is indeed incon­ testable that in God essence and existence are identical. But this is true of the existence in which God subsists ete rnally in Himself; not of the existence to which our finite mind can rise when, by demonstration, it estab lishes that God is.' It is obvious that this second concept of existence b rings God's existence down to the level of that of a stone or a star, and it makes atheism not only possible, but almost unavoidable, as the later development has proved." 57 Ibid., p. 25. 58 Tillich, A His tory of Christian Thought, pp. 1 64-165. 59 Ib id. Tillich states his own position on the ontological argument in these terms, "Those who accept the argument look at the fact that in the human mind, in spite of its finitude, something unconditional is present. The description of this unconditional element is not an argument. I am among those who affirm the ontological argument in 55

TI LLICH'S EVA LUATION OF THE 1 3 TH CENTURY

47

tion o f t h e mind's i m mediate experience o f God i n its inte rrela­ tion with ex terior reality. It is this im mediate experience o f the uncond itio ned in the conditi oned that accounts for the quali ty o f th e ontologi c al argument and i ts his torical re appearan ce in such thin kers as Augustin e , the mediaeval Franciscans and Hegel. Ho wever, Tillich sees this validity as ceasing when the description of the uncon diti oned i n the conditioned m ind becomes the bas is o f argu m entation which proceeds to the affirmation o f an uncon­ ditioned existent. This s tep then becomes the basis for the rej ec­ tion of the argument by such men as Guanilo, Aquinas , Scotus and Kan t. Tillich re fuses to concede that one group o f the a fore­ mentioned thin kers is more clever, percept ive or reli gious than the o th er. B oth are looking at d ifferent aspects of the ontological argum en t . Thus Tillich can see a certain validi ty i n the apparently diam etri c ally opposed positi on that each group takes i n relati on to the ontologi cal argu men t . The former group has a valid point i n their affirm ati on o f the presence o f the uncon d itioned within the condi tioned. The l at ter group has a valid p oint i n denying that this rec o gnition o f the unconditioned within the condi­ tioned can b e used to p rove the e xistence o f the unconditioned as an existent, o r as "a highest being who e x ists " . 5 9 The d iffere n t s tance that each group takes toward the onto­ logi c al argument i s the ultimat e determ inan t o f the two major types of the p h ilosophy of religion. Though Tillich will adm i t elements of validity in b o th p ositions , yet, when it comes to ch oosing be­ tween them , h e stands firmly with the former. In concluding his discussion o f Anselm i n which he analyses the val idity o f both the ontological argu m en t and the validity o f i ts denial he affirms that the recognition o f the unconditioned in the conditioned provides " th e only possible philosophy of religi on ". 6 0 To deny this descriptive sense. On the other hand, people like Thomas, Duns Scotus, and Kant reject the argument b ecause they say the conclusion is not valid. A nd certainly they are right. I try to fin d a way ou t of this world-his torical conflict-whose consequences are greater than indicated by th e scholastic form of it-by showing that these people are doing differe n t things. I ts advocates have the correct insight that the human mind, even before i t turns to the world outside, has within itself an experience of the uncondi­ tional. I ts opponen ts are righ t when they say that the second part o f the argument is invalid because i t cannot lead to a highest being who exists. " 6 0 /bid., p. 1 6 5. The full text reads, " I would say at th is point the two ways o f the philosophy of religion part company . The one type looks at cul ture, nat u � e, and _ history theonomously, that is, on the basis of an awareness of the uncond1 t10nal. I believe that this is the only possible philosophy o f religion."

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this im mediacy of p ercep t ible in terpene trat ion by arguing fro m ex tern al datum to G o d is to adop t a p h ilosophy o f religion which is "hop eless an d ul timatcly ruinous fo r religion ' ' . 6 1 F o r Til lich th e hopelessness an d damage t o rel i gi on consequent upon t h is second t yp e of philoso p h y of rel igion lay i n the b reach it established between God and man , fai t h and reason , and reli­ gion an d culture. These tensions were for Tillich in his time too evident and distressing to be denied. His b asic contention is that philosophy and theology on the speculative level h ad needlessly and excessively sep arated God and m an and that this separation had pen etrated the religious consciousness o f the age. Thus he calls strongly for a revival o f a theology which would take seri­ ously as a first p rinciple or point of departure the religious truth that God is closer to reality and especially to the hum an reality than it is to i tsel f. This would m ean giving new l i fe to a religi o us anthropology that was c loser to Plato and Augustine than t o Aristotle and Thomas . I t would mean a revival o f t h e ontologi cal app ro ach as the key to a unifying peace and h arm onious relation­ ship b e tween what h ad come to b e seen as the religious and non-religious segm en ts of reality at war with each other. I n his concluding p aragraph of his essay on the two types o f philos ophy o f religion he sets forth his programm e and what he hopes i t will accomplish : The ontological approach to philosophy of religion as envisaged by Augustine and his followers, as reappearing in many forms in the history of thought, if critically reinterpreted by us, is able to do for our time what it did in the past, both for religion and culture : to overcome as far as it in possible by mere thought the fateful gap between religion and culture, thus reconciling concerns which are not strange to each other but have been estranged from each other. 62

This "cri tical reinterp retation " in the sphere o f " mere though t " has as its p urp ose so to relate the religious d i mension o f l i fe with its other dimensions that the former is seen to under­ lie and find expression in the latter. Thus m an as religi ous is essen tial m an and man in his o ther functions m us t give e xpres61 Ibid. The full text reads, "The other type looks at all this-nature, h istory and the sel f- in term s of something which is given outside, from which through progressive analysis one migh t fi nally come to the ex istence of a highest being called G od. This is the form which I deny ; I think it is h opeless and ul timately ruinous for religion." 62 Till ich, .. The Two Types of Philosoph y o f Religion," p. 29.

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sion to his inescapable religious nature in these functions. We contend that this vision of religious man rests on Tillich's use of the principle of identity in his religious anthropology. Man is before all that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite and this view of man presup­ poses a point in the structure of man where the infinite and finite coincide in such a way that it can be said without contradiction that man is and is not at one with God. We further contend that Tillich's programme of presenting a vision of religious man wherein his being religious and his being human are shown to be at one provides both the vitality and the burden of his Systematic Theology . We tum now to a consideration of Tillich's theological anthrology in his systematics to show how the principle of iden­ tity is used there to mold a picture of religious man whose reli­ gion is in profound unity with his humanity.

CHAPTE R TWO

THE FUNCTION OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN TILLICH'S UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS MAN To this point Tillich's endorsement of the Augustinian-Francis­ can understanding of religious man has been shown to proceed in large part from his discernment in that tradition of its ultimate metaphysical foundation upon the interpenetration of the finite and infinite in all of created reality and in man where it becomes the condition of possibility of religious experience and discourse. It was indicated how Tillich viewed the demise of such an understanding of religious man as a factor significantly contribut­ ing to an uneasy and unintegrated relationship between the religious and non-religious dimensions of human life. It has been further shown how Tillich hoped to elaborate an understanding of religious man ontologically grounded on the experienced immediacy of God to man. This understanding would integrate religion and the totality of human life by showing the religious dimension of life as preceding and informing in a potentially harmonious way every meaningful dimension of human life. Finally it was contended that such a portrayal of religious man was a major motivating force in Tillich's theological effort which produced his systematics. The purpose of this chapter is to show that each section of Tillich's Systema tic Th eology and, indeed, every one of his maj or theological motifs are built upon an ontology in which God is conceived of as present to creation and to man in such a way that man, in his religious experience, perceives himself as, at once, at one with God, estranged from God and driving or driven to an unambiguous unity with God. For this purpose one set of Tillich's categories have been chosen, that of essence and existence. This choice has b een made because these categories operate in each section of Tillich's system and seem to provide the key to the system itself. It would thus seem tenable to affirm that these categories provide in large part, though not exclusive­ ly, the controlling structure and the dynamics of the system. They thus serve well as a medium for an initial exposition of the

TI LLICH'S UNDERSTANDING O F R E LI GIOUS MAN

51

system which exposition will focus on the nature of God's presence to created reality and to man. An entry into Tillich's thought on the nature and relation of essence and existence can best be gained through an examination of his explicit treatment of these categories in the first volume of his Systema tic Theology . 1 The point of interest to be noted here is Tillich's assertion of a certain consistent ambivalence running through the traditional understandings of the categories of essence and existence. This ambivalence centres on the predomi­ nance of an empirical , logical and rational approach, on one hand , and of a valuational approach on the other. Tillich documents this ambivalence when he presents a series of the varied meanings given to essence and existence running the spectrum from the simply empirical to the valuational. He writes: Essence can mean the nature of a thing without any valuation of it, it can mean the universals which characterize a thing, it can mean the ideas in which existing things participate, it can mean the norm by which � thing must be judged, it can mean the original goodness of every thing created, and it can mean the patterns of all things in the divine mind. 2

After listing the various meanings of essence , Tillich notes that the difference between the primarily empirical understanding of essence and the primarily valuational understanding reduces to the difference between understanding essence as a simple statement of what a thing is and understanding essence as what a thing should be but is not in its appearance in existence. The former understanding is objective and detached. The latter brings the note of the good into the philosophical domain of the nature of essence and captures philosophically something of the feeling for the fallenness of reality as experienced in the concrete. A further consequence of a valuational notion of essence is that essence, as the principle of goodness, grounds the erotic quality of creation since the good of the essence is not only its partially perceived goodness as revealed by the existent but also is the motivating power which drives the existent to fully realize its essence. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 51-1963), I, 202-204. 2 Ibid., I, p. 202. 1

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After setting forth the various meanings of essence, Tillich then presents a correlative listing of the meanings of existence which perfectly reflects the ambivalence between the empirical and the evaluative in the understandings of essence. He writes: It [existence] can mean the possibility of finding a thing within the whole of being, it can mean the actuality of what is potential in the realm of essences, it can mean the " fallen world", and it can mean a type of thinking which is aware of its existential conditions or which rejects essence entirely . 3

Here again Tillich points to the oscillation between the empirical understanding of existence which simply asserts that something is as opposed to non-being or potential being and the valuational understanding which perceives that that which is is less than it should or could be if it were to incorporate and to reveal fully "the power of its essential nature".4 Tillich can thus point to one understanding of the nature and relation of essence and existence which would base itself upon the philosophical experience that the existent, in every instance, betrays a certain falling short of its essence and that its essence stands over or within it as its sustaining ideal in virtue of whose power it exists and in virtue of whose good it strives as towards an ever greater assimilation. However, the vision of reality from which this understanding of the nature and relation of essence and existence derives is also keenly sensitive to the fact that no existent can ever fully express or fully deny its essence in the present situation of reality. Thus the goodness of creation must always be countered by its tragic quality which derives from the inability of the existent ever to assimilate and to express perfectly its unadulterated essential goodness. A deeper understanding of the issue Tillich sees at stake in the various stances taken toward the question of the nature and relation of essence and existence can be gained through the catalogues of thinkers whom he divides according to their orientation to an empirical or valuational understanding of essence and existence. The empirical approach he calls essentialist 3 4

/b£d., I, p. 203. lb£d. The full tex t reads, " Whatever exists, that is, 'stands out ' of mere potential­

ity, is more than it is in the state o f mere potentiality and less than it could be in the power of its essential nature."

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and sees t h e genius o f the minds who adop t it as focusing o n the fo rmal or essential structures o f reality while muting the pro blem of th e distortion of these struc tures and especially the human struct ure in e xis tence. A m ong such essentialist thin kers Tillich will list Anaxagoras , Dem ocritus , Aris totle, the Epicureans, Galileo , Bacon , Descartes, Liebnitz, Locke, Hume and Kant. The va) uational approach he c alls existentialist and sees its power proceeding from the recognition b y i ts exponents o f the distorted and fragmentary appearances of the essen tial in e xis tence and especially in human exis tence where the gap b e tween the real and ideal is vividly apparen t. Among these thin kers Tillich will list Parmenidcs, Heraclitus , the S toics, the Neo-Platonists , Cusanus, Pico, B runo, Boehme, Pascal , Schell ing, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. 5 Tillich will usually note that the di fferences are not exclusive. The essentialis ts will frequently address themselves to the negative or amb i gu ous in exis tence as will the existentialists to the presence of structure and goodness in reality . However, Tillic h reads Hegel as overstep­ ping the b ounds of essentialism in describing the world process as an essential and unqual i fied expression o f God and he reads Sart re as overstepping the bounds of exis tentialism by denying the reality of structures in exis tence at all . 6 Thus wh at Tillich would see at issue in this question of essence and existence is not a m at t er of academic p h ilosophy but a matter of first locating an d then stri king the righ t emp h asis between the goodness o f reality and the negativi ties which reality invariably shows forth in exis tence. Hence the wh ole question takes on a religious dimension which centres on the need or lack o f need fo r the salvation of creation which in turn is related to the admission or denial of the reality of the negative , dis torted and destruc tive . For these reasons Tillich can assert th at the question o f essence and e x istence as such is form ulated in p hilosop hical terminology 5 This list is taken from Systematic Theo logy , I II, 203. Sec also Syste matic Th eol­ o gy , II, 21-26. Here Tilli_c h analyses the inter-reaction of essentialist and existentialist though t from the Orphics to the post-Hegelians. " For Tillich's antipathy to Hegel's "metaphysical arrogance" see Perspec tives o n 1 9th and 20th Cent ury Pro testant Theolo gy , ed. b y Carl E . Braaten (New York, Evan­ ston and London: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 245 and "Philosophical Background of My Theology," unpublished lecture delivered at St. Paul's University , Tokyo, May 12 , 1960. For Tillich's opposition to Sartre's existentialism in so much as it denies all essential structure see The Co urage t o Be (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 149-150.

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but the experience behind these categories is much older and appears as the sub s t ance of myth and poetry be fore being philosophically fo rm ulated. 7 The gravity and centralit y o f the p roblem in Tillich 's mind c an be seen i n the concluding remarks o f the section o f h i s Sys tema tics fro m which his re flections on t h e ambivalen c e o f meaning o f essence and e x is tence were taken. H e states that his purpose here was to set forth the op tio ns that could be taken i n th e understanding o f essence an d e x is tence wi thout indicating h i s own position i n more than a prelim inary way . T h e n h e concludes : The distinction between essence and existenc e, which religiously speaking is the distinction between the created and the actual world, is the backbone o f the whole body of theological thought. I t must be elaborated in every p art of the theological system. 8

The necessity which Tillich feels to elaborate this distinction i n every p art o f his system w ould indicate that a n understanding o f his o w n p osition on the m atter is a key to understanding Tillich and the system. Tillich's own thought on the nature o f essence and ex istence is very much in accord with the evaluational tradi tion an d h ence wi t h the exis tentialist in so much as it is very cogn i z an t of the only p artial p resence o f the essential in existence. Moreover, it would seem, as the rest o f the chapter will attempt to estab lish , that it is in the realm o f the essent ial that Tillich seems to locate the p oint in creation and man where the i n finite and the finite coincide and where the presence and absence of G o d to re ality are to b e found. That Tilli ch's thought on essence and exis tence falls into the valuational school is mos t candidly admitted by him i n an unpublished ad dress in which he reve als the thin kers who h ave shaped his own tho ugh t and how they have shaped i t . 9 In this essay Tillich ac kn owledges the e xtent o f his dependence on Plato and Augustine for his thin king o n essence and existence. He traces to Augustine in p art icular the seminal origins of the

7 8

9

Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 2 04.

Ibid. Tillich, " Philosophical Background of My Philosophy."

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essentialist and e x is tentialist lines o f though t which were t o come t o domin ate the history o f Western thought. 1 0 He describes the essen tialist clement in Augustine in terms of Augustine's con­ ques t o f s kepticism through his uni on with the Tru th dwell ing wi thi n him and closely associates this approach wi th Cusanus ' doctrine o f the " p rinciple o f the coincidence o f the falling together of the infinit e and the finite . " 1 1 The implication is th at it is in the essen tial s truc ture o f reality that the in finite and fini te in tcrpenetrat e and t h at m an as he becomes at one wi th his own essence attai ns that p oint where God is present to him as the basis not only o f obj ec tive certi tude but also o f salvific tru th and of the religious experience of this truth . A f urthcr consequence of Tillich 's adop tion of Augus tine's essentialism is that t he way t o truth as certitude and as salvi fic is an interi or process whereb y man regains h i s lost unity with h i s essence which is the s ame as saying that he regains h i s unity with God. In such a religious epi s temol ogy the dep ths o f subjectivity are the s ource o f objectivitj-7 . Tillich sees t h i s same app roach to truth in the existentialist currents of the nineteenth century which sought "the essence o f obj ec tivity . . . in the dep th o f subj ectivity". 1 2 Having estab lished the p ossibility o f man's union with God in the i n teri ority of his essenti al b eing as the essentiali s t dimension of Augustine's and his own though t , Tillich immediately coun­ terb alan ces this aspect of his thinking by referring to Hegel's system of unqual i fied essen tialism to m ake the point that m an never s o attains his essential n ature and the union with God implied in this attainment " th at h e sits, s o to speak, in the centre

•0 Ibid., p. 3 . Here Tillich wri tes, "And now I come t o Western ph ilosophy as i t develope d u nder Christian infl uence. And I here immediately g o to A ugus tine whom I consider to be the greatest figure in the ancient Church and in whom two di fferent l ines of though t were beginning wh ich went through all Western philosophy ever since." On p. 6 he iden tifies these two lines which begin with Augustine. He wri tes, "There are two lines o f thought that I have tried to draw in this historical survey since Augustine, namely, o ne line which I will now call the essentialist line , and the other which I will call the existentialist lz'ne."

11

Ibid. , p. 4.

Tillich, " Ex istential Philosoph y : Its Historical Meaning. " Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball ( New York : O x ford University Press, 1 9 64 ) , p. 1 0 7 . The full text reads, " E x istential philosophy attempts to return to a pre-Cartesian attitude, to an attitude in which the sharp gul f between the subjective and the objective 'realms' had not yet b een created, and the essence of obj ectivi ty could be found in the depth o f subjectivi ty-in wh ich God could be best approached through the soul." 12

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of the infinite itself." 1 3 I t is this very failure of man to attain or express his essential humanity in an unambiguous way which ushers in the existentialist dimension of thought and always qualifies and subdues the essential even though the essential underlies the existential just as structure precedes its distortion. In his address on the formative influences in his own thinking, Tillich associates the existentialist side of Augustine's thought with Augustine's voluntarism. The relationship between the existentialist and voluntaristic in Augustine's thought as conceiv­ ed by Tillich is most difficult to grasp and appears to be ultimately founded on the mystical perception of a creative dialectic or tension within the Godhead. This tension is described in terms of a mystical-metaphysical understanding of the creative process wherein the creative process derives it dynamic from the union of power, which Tillich sometimes calls the abyss or depth or even demonic dimension of reality human and divine, and form, the principle of manifestation and intelligibility in all reality. This union of power and form takes place under the agency of spirit and gives rise to spirit. This conception of the creative process is also a description of intratrinitarian life. For within the divinity power and form, though always in tension, are always in perfect union through the Spirit. In that creation which proceeds from the Trinity form and power are never in perfect union for the power of God is never exhausted in creation nor are created forms ever at perfect unity with their source in God. Tillich expresses these ideas succinctly in an early work on the demonic. He writes : Form o f being and inexhaustibility o f being belong together. Their unity in the depth of essential nature is the divine, their separation in existence, the relatively independent eruption o f the " abyss" in things , is the demonic. 14

This "separation" of forms in existence from its source accounts for the existential or disruptive side of actual creation. 1 3

Tillich , " Philosophical Background of My Theology," p. 4. Here Tillich writes, " But this line of though t, the coincidence o f the infinite and the finite, h as also i ts dangers. It can give man the feeling that he sits, so to speak, in the center of the infinite itself. And this was the danger which came out most fully in Roman classic philosophy. And here especially i n Hegel." 14 Tillich, The In terpre ta tion of His tory , trans. by N . A. Rosetski and Elsa L. Talm­ sy ( New York : Scribner's, 1 9 3 6 ) , p. 84.

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It also accounts for the willful or voluntaristic dynamic in everything created and especially in man who is at once aware of the need to preserve his form as the condition of his continuing to exist but who also wishes to transcend the formations he gives his finitude and to return to the inexhaustible source of all forms. Tillich gives a powerful expression to this existentialist-voluntar­ istic vision of the life process when he writes : To come into being means to come to form. To lose form means to lose existence. At the same time, however, there dwells in everything the inner inexhaustibility of being, the will to realize in itself as an individual the active infinity of being, the impulse toward breaking through its own, limited form, the longing to realize the abyss in itself. 1 5

These citations give insight into Tillich's conception of the dynamics of actual creation and show how these dynamics derive from his understanding of essence and existence. Tillich sees all of created reality outside of the divinity as a "mixture" of essence and existence in which essence is always partially hidden, always distorted, and yet always retentive of its ability to shine through its existential distortion. 1 6 Tillich understands this notion of the relation of essence and existence to be in close sympathy with Plato's. He mentions with approval Plato's use of the term parousia to describe the presence of the essential to reality in terms of a presence which at once implies an absence. 1 7 Moreover, he equates his understanding of essence with Plato's understanding of the idea. 1 8 Thus these Platonic concepts, which Tillich sees also in such thinkers as Scotus and Boehme, provide Tillich with categories of essence and existence which always combine the notes of philosophical rationality with mystical-religious overtones. The essential becomes the principle s Ibid., pp. 84-85. Tillich, " Philosophical Background of My Theology," p. 10. Tillich here writes, " And now, the third definition of man, the only really concrete one ; the first is abstract, man's essential being-we never can find it, it only shines through-then, man's existential estrangement. There is a third one-life, with its ambiguities; that's our real being. " 17 Tillich, Systematic Theology , I. 245. 18 Tillich, " Philosophical Background of My Theology," p. 9. Tillich here writes, " Man is first what he is created essentially, this is his essential goodness. This idea, as Plato called it, this essence as I like to call it, is that which makes man, man in all his greatness and his uniqueness." 1

16

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of good b oth as realizat ion in existence and as the t eleol ogi cal dynamic o f existence and the good in both senses derives i ts go odness from a p rimal un i ty with God. The exis tential becomes the principle o f resistance, the shadow s ide o f reality, which impedes the perfect realization o f essence in e x is tence and threatens the process o f the fragmented realizat ion of essence in exis tence from at taining its unamb iguous realization in perfect unity with its divine concep tion . Tillich is of t h e opinion that such a conception o f the nature of essence and exis tence is the m eaning o f Augustine's m axim , "esse q ua esse b o num es t . " I n reply t o a question asking h i m t o make m ore p recise his unders tanding o f his s t atements that values proceed fro m " essential s t ruc tures" and that , " Value is m an's essential b eing" , 1 9 Tillich replied, "Autob iographically speaking, these sentences are inspired b y Augustine's assertions : 'esse q ua t!sse, b onum es t . ' " 2 0 I n this interp retation o f Augusti� ne , Tillich reveals that he is reading and adop ting Augustine into his own thinking in such a way that b eing, the good and the ultimately real are synonyms for the essential . Consequen tly, because the essential is only p arti ally attained i n e xi s tence, Tillich can refer t o p erfection and value in terms o f the existent's " fulfillment o f its essential nature". 2 1 With these c at egories Tillich can b uild h is ethic, which is at once philosophical and Chris tian , on the b asis of man's essential nature ret ained in existence as standing over the existential distortion o f this nature as b ot h its judge and p oten tial ful fillme n t . I lence he closely rel ates essential m an with law and conscience in the sense that law and conscience are expressions o f m an ·s essence which derive from his experience of h is p artial unity wit h his essence in existence. Ful fillment of the law and conscience then becomes man's progressive assimilation o f his essen t i al hum anity an d in this the relation to Chris tianity becomes operative in the system. For m an senses his inability to recover his essential humanity and must accept it from the Spirit who, in the s alvi fic-grace reality, Tillich, New Knowledge i n Human Values. ed. by Abraham H . Maslow ( New York : Harper & Row, 1 9 5 9 ) , pp. 1 9 3- 1 9 5 . 20 Tillich, " Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interrogations, e d . b y Sid­ ney and Beatrice R ome ( New York : Holt , R inehar t and Winston, 1 9 64 ) , p. 39 7 . 21 Ibid. Here Tillich s tates, " Bu t l may say that i f w e call a thing good, we always have the connotation of ' ful filment o f its essential nature.' " 19

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heals t h e hreach be tween m an's existence and h i s essence. 2 2 With this concep t i on or essence and e x istence Till ich is enabled to describe man's creat i on in t o time in terms of a transi tion from essence to e x is tence and man 's salvation in terms of a re turn to the fullness of un ion with his essence which fullness is lost in his p ro cession fro m God. Tillich' s locat ion of value in the esse ntial s tructures o f reality opens up another aspect o f his thin king on essence, namely, the structuring function which essences p lay. Here his concepts of essence and logos relate closely t o each other and thro w further ligh t o n the presence o f t h e in finite within fini tude. Tillich unders tands log os as the principle of intell igible mani festation both wit h in and without the divinity. 2 3 He exp resses a certain dependence for h is concept of log os on t he S to ics and asserts that the early classical tradi tion of Christianity adop ted a log os theol ogy which it sel f owed much to S toic thinking. 2 4 Tillich sees the log os ch aracter o f reali ty as p roviding the principle of structure both in mind and reality which m akes kn owlcd6 e possible since th is structure grounds the correlati on b e tween mind and real i t y . This un derst an ding of essence as logos could be used as the b asis of a h ighly rati onalistic and i ntellectual istic theory o f the knowing process wherein the struc tured m ind would ab sorb or con fo rm i tsel f to the structures of extra-mental­ ity i n the knowing p rocess . With Tillich, however, the logos-es­ sent ial ch aracter o f real i ty gro unds not only i ts rational qual ity but als o its rel i gious p ossib ility b ecause it is in these s tructures that Tillich seems to locate the p resence o f the i n finite wi thin fin i tude . That this is the case can b e seen in Tillich's reply to a question asking him t o elab o rate his understanding of the p resence of the univers al in the concrete and t o relat e i t t o his thinking on

22

F or the wav that Tillich relates essence a n d existence to a love moral i ty based on the Spirit see, Sy �tcma tic Th colo[rY , I I I , 2 66-2 76. Tillich sums up much of his thenno­ mous ethics when he writes o n p. 2 7 2 , "The Spiritual Presence shows the validity of the moral i mperative unambi �uously , just by showin g i ts law- transcending character. The Spirit elevates the person into the transcendent unity of the divine life and in so doing i t reunites the estranged existence of the person with his essence." 23 Tillich, Systematic Th eology , I , 1 5 7- 1 5 9 . See also I , 2 5 1 , where Tillich writes of logos , "The classical term logos is most adeq uate for the second pri nciple, that of meaning and structure." 24 Tillich, " Philosophical Background o f M y Theology , " p. 2.

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logos . 2 5 Tillich rep lied t h at he unders t ood the p articipati on o f the universal in the co ncrete i n te rms o f " t he ( Cusanian ) dialectical doctrine o f the coi ncidence o f the in finite and the finit e . " 2 6 He continues that his t h in king on the coincidence o f opposites direc tly relates t o his understan ding o f logos as the p rin­ ciple o f reason and structure in everyth ing. He writes , "This principle [ the coinci dence of oppos i tes ] can be applied to the logos doctrine- though with a d e finite quali ficat ion fo llowing from the exis tent ial fact of the estrangement of the in finite from the finite. " 2 7 This statement would seem, then , to m ake the point that i t is i n the essential structures of reality that God is present but these s tructures o f reality in existence arc neve r more than p artial re flecti ons or expressions of the divine presence . Tillich argues further that the p resence o f the i n fin i te in the essence-logos structures o f reali ty c an be discerned in a "d ialec ti­ cal " or "met aphysic al " process which means that they are not derive d from his Logos Christol ogy, altho ugh he certainly uses his logos metaphysic to show how Christ and God c an m an i fest themselves i n and through the s tructures of creati on without destroying these s truc tures. Tillich's understan di ng of the dialectical absence and p resence of God in the essence-logos s tructure of creation is further elucidated i n his treatm en t of the n at ure of the relati o n b et ween God and s tructure in the first volume o f his Systema tics . 2 8 Here he writes o f God's p articipat ion i n the logos s truc ture , " H e [ God] is the structure . " 2 9 When the qual i fying explanations which Til­ lich gives to these s tatements are t aken into consideration it c an be seen that h e is not here negating the p rinciple o f distance which h e always assert s as a modifier of the c oincidence of opposites. He denies t hat h e is involved i n a p an theis tic unders tan ding o f God's p resence t o creation in virtue of his understanding o f God's participation in t h e s tructures of reality. These s tatemen ts whic h s o closely associate God wi th the logos Tillich, " I nterrogation o f Paul Tillich," Ph ilosophical In t erroga tions , p. 3 70 . Ibid. F o r a further elab oration o f Tillich's unders tanding of t h e Cusanian under­ standing of the coincidence of opposites in te rms o f the interpenetration of the finitan ing and Justi fication of Religious Symb ol," p. 5 . The q uota­ tion appears in this conte x t, "In the experience of holy places, times, b ooks, words, images and ac ts, symbols of the holy reveal something of the ' Ho ly-Itself' and produce

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the theological concept failed to retain something of a symbolic overtone or a vital relation to the symbol to which it relates it would void the symbol of its "meaning and power" and theologi­ cal language would cease to have a religious correlate. 7 6 Thus the theologian, in the exercise of theological conceptualization and criticism, has to prevent the emptying of his concepts of their religious meaning and the total reduction of the symbolic to the non-symbolic. 7 7 A theological concept must, therefore, attain a degree of rationalization which is more than symbol and yet retain something of the symbolic without which it would lose its religious meaning and power of expression. Tillich points to the somewhat ambivalent nature of theological conceptualization which resides somewhere between the purely rational and the purely religious when he writes : I f we say that God is the infinite, or the unconditional, or being-itself we speak rationally and ecstatically at th e same time. These terms pre cisely designate the boundary line at which both the sym bolic and . . d e . 1s . comc1 th e non-sym b o 1 1c

The consequence is that all theological discourse about God is symbolic 79 and yet the theologian must give to this discourse a certain rationality which never divests itself entirely of religious import. Tillich himself in such theological concepts as "the New the expe rience of holiness in persons and groups. No philosophical concept can do the same thing, and theological concepts are merely conceptualizations of original religious symbols. " 76 Tillich, " Theology and Symbolism," p. 1 1 3. Speaking of one of the functions of theological cri ticism as the maintenance of religious powe r in theological concepts, Tillich states, "Theological cri ticism has to do three things. First, it has to prevent the reduction of the symbols to the level of non-symbolic thinking. The moment this happens, their meaning and thei r powe r are lost. " 7 7 Ibid. 78 Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 1 0. 79 On the question of the symbolic natu re of all discourse about God, Tillich 's thought seems to have changed between the fi rst and second volumes of h is System­ atics. In the first volume he implies that the predi cation of "being-itself" to God is non-symbolic. See Systematic Theology, I, 2 38-2 39 whe re Tillich writes, "The state­ ment that God is being itself is a non-symbolic statement. It does not point beyond itself. It means what i t says directly and prope rly ; i f we speak of the actuality of God, we fi rst assert that he is not God i f he is not being-itself. " In the second volume this position is modified i f not denied. See Systematic Theology, II, 9 where Tillich wri tes, " But, after this has been stated, the question arises (and has arisen in public discussion) as to whether there is a point at which a non-symbolic assertion about God must be made. The re is such a point, namely, the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic. Such a statement is an assertion about God which itself is not symbolic. "

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Being' ' , "the Spiri t u al Presence" and " t he Spi ritual Com m un i ty " displays the ab ility to unite reason with a religi ous dim ens i on i n h i s theological con ceptual izations. Tillich thus locates the origin o f symbol and myth i n the uni on of the structure o f reason with its depth i n religious experience and closely relates symbol to theology p roper as the m at erial wit h which th e theo logi an deals in his system atic elab oration and concep tual ization o f the symbols received in fai th. This very close relation of th e religi ous symbol to the theol ogical concept is paralleled in the intimate relationship which Tillich establishes between philosophy an d theolo gy. In his formal treatment of th e rel ati onship between philos­ ophy an d theology in his system atics , Tillich 's pres entati on is di alectical . 80 He b egins by sh owing the divergence o f philosophy and theology . Th en h e shows their convergen ce but i m m edi ately affirms that this convergence can lead neither to i rreconcilable opposition nor to synth esis in a Christian philosophy and ends his discussion by showing the common b asis o f b o t h theol ogy and philosophy in the lo g os structure . Tillich b egins b y showing the divergences i n the disciplines . The first d iverge nce is i n their respective "cognitive at ti tude" or noetic eros. 8 1 The philosopher s trives for an attitude of "de­ tached obj ectivity" . 8 2 The theologian stands in an atti tude of existen tial i nvolvement b ec ause of his faith . 8 3 The second m aj or divergence between philosophy and t heology arises from their di ffering sources. The philosopher search es for the universal logos of b eing or re al ity th rough the use of "pure reas o n " . 84 The theologian deals wi th the logos of b eing in the fai th convi ction th at the Logos has b een m an i fested i n the flesh i n hi story. This convi ction is m ediated to the theologian through his church and is assim ilated by his personal experience. 8 5 The third m aj or di­ ve rge nce is one of " con ten t " . B y this divergence, Tillich m eans that the phil osopher describes and categori zes the s truct ure o f reality largely a s h e finds i t while the t he ol ogi an looks a t the 80 Tillich, Systema tic Theology , I, 1 8-28. 8 1 Ib id. , p . 2 2. 82 Ib id. 8 3 Ibid. , P. 2 3. Ti llich simply states, " The theologian in short is determined by his faith. " 84 !hid. 8 5 JhicL , pp. 2 3- 2 4.

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structure o f reality largely to describe i ts pl igh t and i ts salvi fi c possib i lity. Thus h e docs more than documen t or describe. He secs reality in i ts rel ation of al ienation fro m and reco nciliation with God. 8 6 Havi ng s tated th es e divergences , Tillich then swings around to the other p ole of h is d i alectic an d shows their convergence. For the philosopher is als o involved in hum an exis tence and , as such , is e x i s tentially concern ed wi th his un ion with and separation fro m the absolute. Thus Tilli ch will argue that every great philos­ opher an d philosophy is mo t ivated by an ultimate concern and contains an i mplici t th eology . He writes, " E very creative philos­ opher is a hidden theologian . " 8 7 Tillich would i mply that every great ph i lo sopher is grasped by a quasi-revelatory i mpact which some dimension of the logos s truct ure has m ade upon him in vi rtue of which his philosophy lives as an expression o f the uni ­ vers al logos stru cture. Through a sim ilar reversal , t h e t heologi an , though e x isting i n t h e experi ence o f revelation, m us t detach hi m ­ sel f fro m this ex peri ence to m ake i t intelligible and to direct it at the needs o f c h urch and socict y o f his time. 88 Hence, the theolo­ gian must adopt a detachment com parable t o the philosopher's an d the p hilosopher is m otivated b y a c oncern which b orders on the religious. Tillich t h en draws p h ilosophy and theology apart b y asserting that no syn thesis or ulti m ate con flict can be es tablished b etween th e two functions of the mind. 8 9 The theologi an must not force the Logos on th e unive rs al log os with which the philosopher deals and wh ich is accessible to the mind o f philosopher and theologi an . On the other h and the philosopher mus t adm it to the presence of ele ments of passi on , the existential an d ultimate con­ cern i n his p hilosoph y and these elements give it a religious di­ mension . The p h il os opher c an thus b e asked by the the ologian t o allow " a theologi c al an alysis o f h is ideas . " 9 0 Tillich will a ffirm on the b asis of th i s conception of the relation of the phi­ losopher t o the theol ogian that th ere is "no c om m on basis ' '

86 81 88 89 90

Ibid. , p. 24. Ibid. , p. 25. Ibid. , pp. 25-26. Ib id. , pp. 2 6-28. Ibid. , p. 26.

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i n their pursuits and so n o possib ility of conflict or synthesis. 9 1 The difficulty which Tillich has in distinguishing the bound­ aries between philosophy and theology may ultimately reduce to the way he founds both in the logos structure of reality. The logos structure of mind and rcali ty makes philosophy possible but at the same time is always potentially the bearer of the infinite which appears within it when it is united with its depth beyond the subject-object structure. Thus the same structure of reality is the basis of philosophy, religious experience and theol­ ogy. The philosopher may look at the logos structure but not be introduced to its depth in a revelatory situation. However, this statement must be quali fied by Tillich's implication that most great philosophies have been grasped by or grasped some aspect of this depth. The theologian affirms that the Logos has become fully manifested through the logos structure in time and history and so is also relating his affirmations to the logos structure. Thus the theological affirmation of the Christ seems to be in direct continuity with the philosophical attainment of the logos. This logos ontology and epistemology thus enable Tillich to re­ late the L og os very closely to the more succesful human percep­ tions of the log os. He writes, " ... the same Logos who taught the philosophers and legislators is the source of final revelat ion and teaches the Christian theologians". 9 2 Tillich concludes his discussion about philosophy and theology on a similar note. He writes, "No philosophy whi ch is obedient to the universal logos can contradict the concrete logos , the Logos 'who became flesh. " ' 9 3 It would thus seem that Tillich is saying that vital philosophy which attains the depth of the log os structure has something of the revelatory about it and that the Christian revelation is a fullness in which philosophies prior to and after the Logos may have participated. With such an under­ standing of reason as logos and participating in the L ogos it is difficult to separate too rigidly the borders of philosophy and theology. Armbruster would appear to have much justification 91

/bid. , p. 2 7 . Ti llich, Sys tema tic Th eo logy , I , 1 5 3- 1 5 4. Tillich here affirms that there c an b e n o con flict be tween de tached scie ntific knowle dge and the unitive knowledge o f revela­ tion. The full tex t reads, " Gnosis does no t con tradic t cpisteme, detached scienti fic knowledge. The re can be no conflict, because the same Logos who taught philosophers and legislators is thf' source of final revelation and teaches Chris tian theologians." 9 ) !b irL , p. 2 8 . 92

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93

when h e writes that Tillich , i n the final analysis, " . . . tends to fuse rather than distinguish philosophy from theol ogy " . 94 This exam inat i on o f Tilli ch 's understanding o f the function o f reason i n ph ilosophy , theol ogy and t h e origi n o f t h e reli gi ous symbol establishes the radical part icipational nature o f reason that underlies th is un derstanding. Reason , as all of real ity and li fe , fin ds its essence in its unity with God. In e xistence reas on re tains an d denies its essen ce and so s tan ds itsel f in need o f salvation. When i t attains its essence i n e xistence i t comes into un ity with its depth wherein the absolute is present to i t as its ground. Symbol and cul t are the theoretical and pract ical modes of expression wh ich reason m us t take on to e xpress its uni on wi th its essence. These symbols are the m aterial which the theo­ logian who s tands in the revelatory power of the symbols uses when he b ri n gs concep tualization and systematic expression to these symbols. B ut bec ause the greater philosophies h ave also been b orn fro m the union of reason with its essence in the logos structure they too take on a quasi-religi ous and quasi-revel atory aspec t . Thus when the structure o f the mind i s seen as i tsel f potentially theophanous i t i s d i fficult t o distinguish a philosoph­ ical fro m a theologi c al symbol and to distinguish, t herefore, be­ tween p h ilosop h y an d theology . The nature o f God's p articipa­ tion in the m in d and o f the mind's p articipation in God makes such distinction very d i fficult. An exam ination o f Tillich 's understan ding o f the nature o f revelati on makes the p articipational character o f his ontology and epistem ology even clearer. Tillich 's understan ding o f revela­ ti on res ts on th ree i nter- connected concep ts ; m ystery , ecstasy and m i racl e . Mystery re fers , in the final analysis , to the appear­ ance of the ult i m ate in the s tructures of reason in a certain revelatory correl ation of m ind and real i t y. 9 5 Here again is evi­ dence of a close i nter-relationship between the origin of t he philo­ sophical ques tion of b eing and the revelatory situati on. Tillich re fers to the revelatory e xperi ence o f mystery i n term s of a nega94 Carl J . Armbruster, S. J ., The Vision of Paul Tillich (New Yo rk: Sheed and Ward, 1967 ), p. 36. 9s Tillich, Sys tematic Theology , I , l l 0. Tillich describes the appearance of mystery in these terms. "The genuine mystery appears when reason is driven beyond itself to its 'ground and abyss, ' to that which 'precedes' reason, to the fact that 'being is and nonbeing is not' (Parmenides), to the original fact (UrTatsache) that there is something not nothing."

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tive side and a posi t i ve s ide. Though b o th sides arc present i n every revelatory situ ation an d i t would be a d i s t ortion t o separate them over m uch , Tillich docs seem to imply that the negat ive side precedes al most as a precon dition the positive s i de o f revela­ tion . The negat ive side o f revelatory e xperience consists i n ' � the , sh ock, o f m an 's experience of his finitudc and the threat o f non-being which attaches to i t. 9 6 Thi s shock o f possible non­ being is at th e same time the origin o f the philosophi cal q uestion o f being and so � ' the b egin ning o f all genuine philos oph y " 9 7 while also being a spe c i fically religious ex perience of "the ab ys­ mal elem en t in the gro und o f being" . 9 8 This side o f t h e appearance o f mys tery in revel ation is " always po ten tially presen t" i n both individual an d co m m unal experience of fin itude. 9 9 This awareness o f finitudc i s the bas i s of man's ontological anxiety and att aches to his essen t i al condi t i on . Tillich writes , " Finitude i n awaren ess is an xiet y " . 1 00 But, d i alectical l y , m an 's very awareness of his fini tude and possible non-being i s possible only becau se o f h i s awareness of his � 'p oten t i al i n fin­ ity " 1 0 1 or o f his "belonging to that wh ich i s beyond n on-being. namely , to bei ng-itsel f" . 1 0 2 Thus the very negativity involved in man 's percep tion o f his fi nitude and his possible non-b eing i m ­ plies a relation to the i n finite . This awareness o f God i s i n some way revelatory and yet also proper to man as man . The positive side of the mystery which Tillich calls " actual " revelati on derives fro m the percep tion n o t only o f t h e abyss dimension o f God but o f God as "ground" or "the p ower of being conq ueri ng n on-being". 1 0 3 In this the abyss dimension is Ibid. Tillich here describes this shock in this way. " The ' s tigma' of finitude wh ich appears in all thi ngs and in the whole of re ality and the 'shock' which grasps the mind wh en it encoun ters the threat o f non-being reveal the negative side of the mys­ tery, the abysmal element in the ground of b eing. .. . It is a necessary element in revelation. " See also p. 1 1 3 where Ti llich writes, " The threat o f non-being, grasping the mind, produces the 'ontological sh ock' in which the negative side of the mystery of being-its abysmal element-is experienced. " 9 '1 Ibid. , p. 1 1 3. 98 /bid. , p. 1 1 0. 96

99

1 00 101

Ibid. Ibid. , p. 1 9 1 . Ibid. , p. 1 9 0. " I n order t o experience his finitude, man must look a t himsel f

from the point of view of potential infinity . " 1 02 Ibid. , p . 1 9 1 . "The power o f infinite sel f-transcendence i s a n expression o f man's belonging t o that which i s beyond nonbeing, namely, t o being i tsel f. " 1 03 Ibid. , p. 1 1 0. The full te xt re ads, " Here the my stery appears as ground and not only as abyss. It appears as the power of being conquering non being."

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never excluded so th at the myst ery al ways rem ai ns a mystery but it is now experienced as that in th e power of whi ch the negativi­ ties of e x istence are overc ome. I t would see m that Tillich ' s re ference to the negative side o f revelati o n w h i c h i s com m on to all and at the origi n o f philosophy as s o mehow distinguishable from the positive side of revelation which alon e is ac tual revelation is closely related t o the distinc­ tion he draws b e tween natural theology an d theology pro per. Tillich gran ts to nat ural t heol ogy the licit fun ction of establishing the p ossibil i ty and the i n evitability o f the question o f God. Natu­ ral theology can do this b y showing that m an 's finitudc and i ts an xieties i m ply a relationship to the i n finite and uncondi tioned in th e structure of the mind. Yet natural theology can go no furth er and reason must await its union with its ground i n revela­ tion. Tillich defi n es the area o f competence proper to nat ural theology when he wri tes : The question of God c an be as ked because there is an unconditional element in the very act of asking any question. The ques tion of God must be as ked because the threat of non-being, which man experiences as anxiety , drives him to the question of being conquering non-being and of courage conquering anxiety. 104

Thus the possib ility an d necessity of as king for revelati on as the ground in whose power essential fin itude and its an xiety is overc o m e can be estab lished by natural theology . Yet we have shown h ow Tilli ch re fers to the awareness of finitude as the negative side of the appearance of the m ys tery and as intimately rel ated to actual revel ation. Thus Tillich would seem to equate the n egative side of revelation, m an's perception o f his finitude, with the licit function of natural theology , which acts to show the p resence of the i n fi n ite within the finite as t he condition of its awareness of its fini tude. I t would then b e consistent for Tillich to l ocate th e posi tive side o f revelation, ac tual revelation, in the e xp erience o f God as ground , as supportive , and as the b asis of coll:rage i n the face o f fini tude. I n the in ter-relationship which Tillich t h us estab lish es b etween the negative s ide of revela­ tion, the gen esis of the p hilosophical question o f b eing and non ­ b eing, an d the function o f natural theology in relation to revela1 04

Ibid. , p. 208 .

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tion and theology proper, there can again be seen the interpene­ tration o f the religious, the philosophical and the theological which follow from an understanding of reason in which the finite and infinite interpenetrate. The appearance of mystery in the revelatory union o f the mind with its depth always occurs in the inter-relationship of the subjective and objective logos. Subjectively, from the view­ point of the mind, this dynamic is described by Tillich in terms of "ecstasy". 1 0 5 The objective counterpart of ecstasy in the ob­ jective logos Tillich calls "miracle" . 1 06 B u th these terms derive their meaning in Tillich's system from his participational ontol­ ogy and epistemology . Ecstasy is the state o f mind in which reason is "beyond its subject-object structure ". 1 0 7 By this phrase Tillich means to describe reason as at one with God who is the source of both the subjective and objective log os . Thus rea­ son in ecstasy attains God as source of the subject-object struc­ ture of reality and in so doing transcends both by attaining God where being and truth are one. Moreover ecstatic reason at tains God as both "abyss" and "ground" or in both his annihilating and preserving or grounding character. Tillich writes: Ecstasy unites the experience of the abyss to which reason in all its functions is driven with the experience of the ground in which reason is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth of being generally. 1 08

There is present here the first indication that the God who is revealed in ecstatic reason has always a living and so a trinitarian character. Tillich is quite insistent that ecstatic reason does not destroy the structures of subjective logos through which it appears b ut rather fulfills reason by uniting its structure with its basis in God. 1 0s

lbid. , pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 5 . lbid. , pp. 1 1 5- 1 1 8 . 1 07 Ibid. , p. 1 1 2 . The te x t reads , " Ecstasy is not a negation of reason ; i t is the s tate of mind in which reason is beyond itsel f, that is , bey ond its subjec t-objec t s tructure." 1 08 Ibid. , p. 1 1 3. In the se ntence immediately preceding the one quote d in the text, Ti llich shows a certai n similari ty to the though t of Otto in his unders tanding of the revelatory perception of God as abyss and ground. It re ads, " In revelation and in the ecstatic experience in which it is re ceived, the ontological shock is preserved and overcome at the same time. It is preserved in the annihilating power of the divine presence (mysten·um tremendu m ) and is overcome in the t:levating powe r of the divine presence (mysteriu m fascinosu m ) . 1 06

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Tillich thus d e fines revelation , " Revelation is the m ani fes tat ion o f the dep th o f reason and the ground o f Being. " 1 0 9 The possi­ b ility of revelat ion rests ul timately on the presence of God in the structures of reason as an ab iding d i mension o f these structures . Thus revelat ion can never be fo r Tillich a mat ter o f the convey­ ance by God of knowledge pertaining to the subject-object struc­ tun� o f re al i t y total ly from without. In Tillichian categories such an unders tan ding of revelation would m ean that God as revealer and saviour would vi olate his created structures and so establish a dualism be tween God as creator and revealer. For Tillich such an understanding of revelation "dehumani zes man and demonizes God " . 1 1 0 Th e obvi ous con cl us i on is that unless God parti cipates i m m ed iately in the structure of the m ind he would not be ab le to reve al hi m self to it without its des truction. The same p articipati onal ontology lies behind Tillich 's under­ stand ing of the obj ective di mension of revelation. J us t as ecstasy uni tl's subjective reason with its dep th so does m iracle uni te ob­ jec tive re ason with its dep th so that in every revelatory experi­ ence the depth o f the subjective and objective logos exist in correlat i o n . This is but an other way o f saying that in every rev­ el atory eve n t th ere is a concurrence of an objective happening received b y ecstatic reas on or fai t h . Thus in the revel atory con­ fi guration the subjective and objective logos e xist in a s tate of mutual depen dence insom uch as mind corresponds to reality at the level where b o th are groun ded in God . The relations of the mind in faith to the object o f i ts faith arc so i n t i m at el y connec t­ e d that Till i ch can discern a sense in which ecs tasy can be at trib­ uted to reali ty and miracle to the mind. He wri tes , "One can say that ecstasy is t h e m i racle of the m ind and that miracle is the ecstasy of reality ". 1 1 1 I 09

1 10

Ibid. ' p. l l 7 . Ibid. , p. 1 39 . The conte x t o f the qu otati on is that of the need o f final revela­

tion for preparatory revelation. The tex t reads in full, " He reveals himsel f to man and saves man, and, in d oing so, he dot:s not repl ace man with some th ing else created for th is purpose. This would be the method of a dt'm on and not of God. To asse rt that a revelation is fi nal revelation without pointing to a history of reve lati on in which there has been a preparation for it dehumanizes God and de monizrs man." See also ih id. , p. l 1 6 where Till ich makes much the s ame poin t. He writrs, "Miracles cannot be interpre ted in terms of a supranatural interference in natu ral processrs. If such an interpretation were true, the m anifestation of the ground of being would des troy the structure of being; God would be split within himse l f, as re ligious dualism has as­ serted. " Ill lb£d. , p. 1 1 7 .

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T h e b e s t example o f th e revelatory correlation between subj ec­ tive reason in ecstasy and objective reason in m iracle is given by Ti llich in his description of the revelatory even t of Chri s t . He wri tes , "J csus is the Christ both b ecause he could b ecome the Chri st an d b ecause he was recei vcd as the Chri s t " . 1 1 2 In a very real sen se the Christ was the Christ because he was received as such by the community in fait h . Th is recep tion accounts for the ecs tatic dimension o f the revelatory event of Christ. Y ct Christ was the Chri s t b ecause he stood in pe r fect uni on or ful l part ici pa­ tion with the ground o f b eing an d as such attained that perfect sel f-possession which alone m ade p ossible his perfect sel f-s acri­ fice. 1 1 3 Thus Chri s t as i n unbro ken unity wi th God i n the condi­ tions o f existence consti tutes the miracle o f the Christ event. His reception as such by the co m munity as capt ured i n Peter's pro­ fession o f fai t h , "Thou art the Christ " , consti tutes the ecstatic side o f the Christ event. 1 1 4 Thus Tilli ch 's partici p ational o n t ol­ ogy i s operative even i n his unders tanding o f the Christ event as the fin al revelation. Christ could be the Christ b ecause he fully participated i n the ground o f being, the Father , and because this part icipation was recogn ized by those who recei ved him out o f their parti cipation in the same ground. Having exp osed Tilli ch 's understan ding of reason an d revela­ tion , the speci fi c way in which he conceives o f revel at ion as the religious an d saving answer for reas o n i n e x i s t ence can now b e addressed . It h as b een shown i n t h e previ ous chapter h mv Tillich i n accord with his ontology equates processes of sah·ation or reunion with God with pro cesses o f the essentiali zation o f the existential . Accordi ng to the deman ds of this sam e on tology rev­ elation would b e the salvi fi c possibility o f reason insomuch as i t consti tutes a p rocess o f the cssen tialization o f reason. Christ as the fi nal revelation would also be describ ed as he in whom reas on Ibid. , p. 1 2 6. Ibid. , p. 1 3 5 . The charac teristics o f perfect union with God and the sacri fice made possi ble hy th is union seem to b e the spe c i fic di ffne ntiating n o tes which Tillich discerns i n the bib lical picture of Christ. Here he writes, ' 'All reports and interpre ta­ tions of the New Te stament concerning Jesus as the Christ possess two outstanding characteristics : the m ai n tenance of unity with God and h is sacrifice of every thing he could have gained for h i mse l f from this u n i ty . " See also ib id. , p. 1 3 7 where much the same poi n t is made. Here Tillich writes, " Bu t Christian theology affirms that he is all th is because he s tands the douhle test of finali ty : uninterrupted u n i ty w i th the ground of his being and the con tinu ous sacri fice of himself as Jesus to h imself as Ch rist." 1 14 Ibid. , p. 1 36 . 1 12

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is most fully at one with its essence. However, in Tillich's system , the processes of essentialization are coincident with the processes of integration. This is the case because the transition from es­ sence to existence not only disrupts the primal 'unity of man with God but also disrupts the vital balance of the polarities whose interaction characterizes life and reason. It is basically from the disintegration of these polarities in life that essentialization deliv­ ers man. Thus if Tillich is to present revelation as the answer to reason's fallenness he must show how revelation reintegrates the polarities of reason which in existence are in conflict. In the dimension of reason Tillich discerns three sets of struc­ tural polarities which, in existence, are in conflict. The first set of polarities in tension are those of structure and depth which lead to a conflict between autonomous reason and heteronomous rea­ son and seek their integration in theonomous reason. 1 1 5 Auton­ omous reason is reason which is in accord with the logos struc­ ture of the mind. This structure is ultimately rooted in the divine and natural law as its ground but the mind is not aware of this depth dimension of its structure. Tillich succinctly describes autonomous reason in this way. "Reason which affirms and actu­ alizes its structure without regarding its depth is autono­ mous". 1 1 6 Heteronomous reason is reason which speaks to man "from outside" yet in the name of the depth of reason. 1 1 7 Be­ cause in existence the structure of reason is separated from its depth a conflict can arise between autonomous reason rightly concerned with obedience to its structure and heteronomous rea­ son which speaks to the depth of reason but in the form of authority coming from without. Theonomous reason is reason at one with its depth and so reconciles the conflict between autonomous reason and heteronomous reason by reuniting rea­ son with its depth which reunion itself becomes an authority from within. 1 1 8 Theonomous reason which proceeds from union 1 1s

Ibid., pp. 83-86. Ibid. , p. 83. 1 1, Ibid., p. 84. Tillich writes of heteronomous reason, "It issues commands from 'outside' on how reason should grasp and shape reality. But this 'outside' is not merely outside. It represents, at the same time, an element in reason itself, namely, the depth of reason." 11s Ibid., p. 85. Tillich describes theonomous reason i n these terms, "Theonomy does not mean the acceptance of a divine law imposed on reason by a highest author­ ity; it means autonomous reason united with its own depth. " 1 16

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of structure an d dep th is really a description o f revelation and so reason in ex isten ce looks for theonomy as the reconciliation o f structure and dep th. The second set o f polarities in conflict i n existential reason is one which Tillich sees in tension in all of life . It is the tension between dynam ics or growth and form or sel f-preservation. 1 1 9 In reason in existence these poles tend toward the extrem es o f absolutism in the form o f revolution o r conservatism o r t oward a dynam ism which fails to find form in posi tivistic rel ativism or cynicism . The former denies growth in the nam e of fi xed abso­ lutes . The latter denies the absolute in the nam e o f growth and change. This con flict looks for its resolution in the concrete ab ­ solute which at once satis fi es the demand for the ab solute or static elemen t in reason yet does so in reason's adhesion to an individual wh o emb odies the abs olute. 1 2 0 The third set of polarities in conflict in existen ti al reas on is that o f formalism and emotion alism . 1 2 1 Formalism at the intel­ lectual level appears i n the controlling, logi cal , legal and objec­ tively cognitive functions o f reason. Emotionalism reacts by as­ serting the uni fying or loving dimension o f reas on itsel f. 1 2 2 This conflict looks for i ts resolution in revelation insomuch as revela­ tion attains the formal s tructure of reason but at that level where it provokes and produces a commitment by m an which is at once rational and em otive. 1 2 3 Thus these polarities which m ake up the dynam ic of reason and each pole o f which is valid if in bal anced tensi on with i ts opposite exist in m utual con flict and look for their integration in revelation. Thus Tillich writes , " It [ reason] asks for revelation , for revelation m eans the rein tegra­ tion of reason". 1 24 Christ as th e final revelation is the perfectly theonom ous m an and so resolves the con flict b etween autonomy and heteron omy in himself and th ose who participate in his theonom ous human-

1 19 1 20

Ibid. , p p . 8 6-89. Ibid. , p. 89 . Tillich sums up this conflict when he writes, "Only that which is

absolute and concre te at the same time can overcome this conflict. Only revelation can do it. " 121 Ibid. , pp. 89-94. 1 22 Ibid. , p. 90. 1 3 Ibid. , pp. 93-94. 2 1 24 Ibid. , p. 9 4.

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ity i n the Spiri t. 1 2 5 Christ's unb ro ken unity with the depth o f reason, wh ich m eans h i s unbro ken unity with t h e Father, uni tes autonomou s reason with i ts depth and b ecause Christ sacri fices the m ediu m o f his humanity in which theonomy appears in its fullness h e cannot b ecome a heteronom ous law and so replace one h etero n omy with an other. 1 2 6 Though Tillich will show that Christ is not a he teronomous figure by pointing to his sacri fice o f himsel f t o h is b eing Christ, i t would appear that he could m ake the sam e poin t by argu ing that theon omy es tablishes its own interior "law" for it is implied in these categories that the unity o f autonomous structures wi th their depth is a description o f the "law" of grace wherein man becomes a law unto himsel f because o f his unity with God . Christ as th e fin al revelation reintegrates the dynamic and ab ­ solute p oles o f revelation b ecause in him m an's essential relation to God was fully realized in exis tence and so the ab solute ap­ peared in the concreteness o f a h uman li fe. 1 2 7 Christianity cl ai ms absolu te validity for the b iblical pi cture o f Christ and yet th is p icture is of a concre te and personal l i fe . Where Tillich seems particularly to reconcile the opposites of the ab solute and the concrete in the pic ture of Christ is in the nature of Christian love. For Christ and Christianity the law of l ove is ab solute but can be applied only to the p art icular and to the concrete. Thus Tillich writes, "The l aw o f love is th e ul timate law because it is the negation of law ; it is ab solute b ecause it concerns everything concre te " . 1 2 8 Christ a s the final revelation overcomes t h e con flict between formalism and e m otionalism b ecause man's reason grasps or is grasped by Christ in i ts to tality and so in b oth its more detached or formal cap acity as well as in its em otive and uni fying capac­ ity. 1 2 9 Ultimatel y this reintegration is possible because the logos Ibid. , pp. 147-148. Ibid. , p. 148. 127 Ibid. , p. 150. Tillich describes the reconciliation o f the absolute and the con­ crete in Christ in these term s, "In the New Be ing which is manifest in Jesus as the Christ, the most concrete of all possible forms of concreteness, a personal life, is the bearer o f that which is absolute without condition and restricti on. " 1 28 Ibid. , p. 152. Tillich here writes, "The paradox of final revelation, overcoming the conflict between absolutism and relativism, is love." 1 29 Ibid. , p. 15 4. Here Tillich writes, "It is the claim of final revelation ... that that which can be grasped only with 'infinite passion' (Kierkegaard) is identical with that which appears as the criterion in every act of rational knowledge." 12S

1 26

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which detached philosophical or scienti fic reason grasps and the logos which re aso n grasps thro ugh love in its dept h di m ension are th e sam e logos which appeared without disto rtion in Chris t. It is of in terest to n ote that in the idea of reason at one with i ts dep t h through revelation , Tillich sees t h e ultimate reconciliation o f detached reason a n d in tellectual love and so o f science a n d theol­ ogy . He wri tes : Whenever it is accepted, though in many variations, the final revela­ tion is considere d to be that which conquers the conflict b etween theological and scientific knowledge , and implici tly also th e confl ict between emotion and form . 1 30

Thus, in Tillich's system , revelation is in fact the essentializa­ tion of reason in existence an d this cssentialization can only be described by the rei n tegration of reason in polar confl ict i n e xis­ tence . He sums up his thought on the relat ion of reas on and revelation when he wri tes : Reason in revelation is neither confirmed in its state of conflict nor denied in its essential structure. B ut its essen tial struc ture is re-es tab­ lished under th e conditions of existence, fragm entarily, yet really and in power. 1 3 1

I t is in teres ting t o n o te that Tillich is o f the opinion that i t was such a use o f theonom ous reason which gave to the theology o f th e m ediaeval Franciscans i ts "existenti al " character i n virtue o f which i t was called a "practical k nowledge " . 1 3 2 B y this Tillich implies th at th is school could not divorce their th eological ex­ pression fro m thei r faith experience or their philosophy fro m theology since b oth reside i n the logos structure a n d come t o ­ ge ther in the reality o f revelation. In Tillich 's system the essen tialization and reintegration o f rea­ son in existence th rough revelation is one sign i fican t i ns tance o f t h e essen tialization a n d reintegrat ion of l i fe itsel f. W h e n Tillich speaks o f th e essen tial ization and reintegration o f l i fe on a wider b asis t h an th at of reason he uses other polari ties which he con ­ siders to be o f cen tral importance and which he calls the " onto­ logical elem en ts " . 1 3 3 Each o f the three polar sets o f ontological 130

131 1 32 133

Ibid. Ibid. , p. 1 5 5. Ibid. Ibid. , pp. I 7 4- 1 8 6.

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1 03

elements contain a pole of self-relatedness and other relatedness and so reflect the subject-object division which Tillich introduces in his thought on reason. The ontological elements thus describe the dynamics of life itself in terms of a movement from self-iden­ tity to self-alteration and a return to a centred and hopefully enriched self-id entity . Tillich describes life in these terms, "It is the actualization of the structural elements of being in their uni­ ty and in their tension". 1 3 4 Thus Tillich can define life in terms of a triadic dynamic and it is this triadic movement he has in mind when he defines life as the actualization of potency. He writes : So we can distinguish three elements in the process of life : self-iden­ tity , self-alteration, and return to one's self. Potentiality becomes ac­ tuality only through these three elements in the process we call life. 1 3 5

Life ideally then would consist in a process wherein the poles of self-identity and self-alteration which constitute the life pro­ cess would exist in a vital yet harmonious balance which would always be characterized by a certain tension but not by conflict or disruption. If either pole is lost the self is lost. If the poles come in to dead identity the result is the same. Of the movement of the poles of identity and otherness in every life process Tillich writes: These elements move divergently and convergently in every life­ process; they separate and reunite simultaneously. Life ceases in the moment of separation without union or of union without separation. B oth complete identity and complete separation negate life. 1 36

The first set of polarities are those of individualization and participation. This dimension of life re fers in particular to the process of attaining self-integration through the individual's par­ ticipation in community. 1 3 7 It is in this sphere of life that Til­ lich locates morality and the moral imperative of attaining indi­ vidual centredness in relation to the other. 1 3 8 Failure to achieve

1 34 13s 1 36 1 37

1 38

Ibid. , p. 241. Tillich, Systema tic Theology , Ill, 30. Tillich, Systema tic Theology , I, 2 4 1 -242. Ibid. , pp. 1 74- 1 78 ; Systematic Theology , III, 30, 38-50, 266-2 75. Tillich, Systematic Theology , III, 38.

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ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN REASON AND LIF E

integration in this dimension of life results in disease or disinte­ gration. 1 3 9 The second set of poles, dynamics and form, or, on the human level, vitality and intentionality, are very close in meaning to the traditional meaning of potency and act. Whatever is must have form to exist but man who is related to the infinite has an infinite possibility of giving new form to his life as he tries to realize his in finite possibility in himself and his community. 1 4 0 Tillich sees this dimension of life related to self-creativity or growth and culture insomuch as man in virtue of his infinite potentiality always transcends himself in striving for the new. " Life drives toward the new". 1 4 1 Where failure to attain cen­ tredness in the dimension of self-integration produces diseased disintegration, failure to be self-creative in the dimension of growth produces destruction or death. 1 4 2 What Tillich means by this is that all growth means the chaotic loss of form in the process from which new forms arise and if chaos should not produce a new form formlessness becomes non-being. If the risk of growth is not taken death also ensues. The third set of ontological polarities are freedom and destiny . Freedom refers to man's power of self-determination as is evi­ denced in his capacity for self-transcendence, deliberation, and responsibility. 1 4 3 Destiny is the given or the basis out of which freedom proceeds. Thus only he who has freedom is capable of having a destiny. Tillich describes this inter-relationship in this way: It [ destiny] is myself as given, formed by nature, history , and myself. My destiny is the basis of my freedom ; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny. 144

Tillich relates life through this set of polarities to the function of religion in which life strives for union with the infinite and in which alone self-transcendence occurs in the proper sense. 1 4 5

139 140 141 1 42 1 43 1 44 145

Ibid. , p. 3 2. Tillich, Systemati'c Tillich, Systematic Ib£d. , pp. 3 2 , 5 1 . Tillich, Systematic Tillich, Systematic Tillich, Systemat£c

Theology� I, 1 7 8-1 8 2 ; III, 30-3 1 , 5 7 -86, 245-266. Theology , III, 3 1 . Theology , I, 1 82 - 1 86, III, 3 2, 86- 1 06, 1 62-245. Theology , I, 1 8 5. Theology , III, 3 2.

ESS ENC E AND EXISTENCE IN RE ASON AND LI F E

1 05

Failure to attain this dimension of life results in a profanizat ion of life which denies its sublimit y and holiness. 1 4 6 Thus Tillich sees life as deriving its dynamic from the actuali zation o f its potential in terms of the way in which the poles of self-identity and self-alteration are bro ught into a vital un i on which works self-integration (personal centredncss and moralit y), self-creativ­ ity ( growth and culture) and self-transcendence (religion) . The unifying of these poles into a vital balance is the trios of life and both the attainment o f spirit and the work of the Spirit. J ust as ex istential reason is disrupted in its polar dynamics by its separation from its essence, so is existential or ambiguous life disrupted in its polar dynamics for the same reason. In the same way as reason, li fe itself loo ks for its integration through its union with i ts essence. The absence of balance between the polar­ itics of Ii fe is ex peri cnced as the possibility of the loss of one's being. Tillich describes the anxiety attendant upon man's separa­ t i on from essence and from the perfect integration attained therein in these words : I t is th e anxiety of not being what we essentially are. I t is anxiety ab out disintegrating and falling into non-being through existential dis­ ru p tion. It is anxiety about th e breaking of the ontological tensions an d th e consequent destruction of the ontol ogical structure. 1 4 7

If either of the poles of individualization or participation are lost self-loss occurs through a non-participational solipsism or through an i mmersion of the individual in the collective. 1 4 8 If either of the poles of dynamics or form is lost self-loss occurs through a failure to grow in the interest of self-preservation through the maintenance of a constricting formalism, or through a chaotic dispersal which, though dynamic, is destructive because formless. 1 4 9 In the interplay between the polarity of freedom and destin y man experiences his ability to use his freedom to lose his destiny or t o be so determined by his destiny that his freedom is diminished. 1 5 0

1 46 1 47 14

a

1 49

1

so

/bz'd. , pp. 3 1, 89-9 2. Tillich, Systematfr Theology, Tillich, Systematz'c Theology, Tillich, System atz'c Theology, Tillich, Systematz"c Theology,

I, I, I, I,

199. 199 ; II, 65-66. 199-200 ; II, 64-65. 200-20 1 ; II, 63-64.

1 06

ESS E N C E A ND E XISTENCE I N REASON A ND LI F E

I n m an 's essen tial s t ate, in his pri m ord i al unity with God, t h e ontological p olarit i es exist in a state o f " tens ion b u t not in con­ fli ct ' ' . 1 5 1 Essen ti ally man 's self-loss i s a " p ossibil i ty , b u t n o t actuality " . 1 5 2 But in existence this possib ili ty b ecomes an actual­ i t y . Estrangemen t is univers al an d with i t s o m e degree of sel f-l oss . Thus Tillich would seem to describ e the si tuation from which m an looks fo r salvation in t erms o f the conflict of the ontol ogical polarities which drive ap art when essen t ial man beco mes exi sten­ tial m an . He wri tes : Self-loss as the firs t and b asic m ark o f evil is the loss o f one's det er­ mining centre ; it is the disintegration of t h e c entred s e l f by dis­ rup tive drives which cannot be bro ugh t into u n i t y . So long as t h ey arc cen tred, t h ese drives constitute the person as a whole. I f they m ove against one another, they split the person. 1 53

I f the disrup tion o f the polar tensions which cons t i t ut e the person describe man's fallcnness in Till ich's theology , then Til­ lich 's soteriology would describe t he rein tegration o f these p o l es which , in fact , seems t o be the burden o f his t h ought on cssen­ tializat ion. Christ as essen t i al m an in exis tence can b e called the New Being b ecause o f his unbroken un ion with his ground. Til­ lich seems to un ders t and New Being i n precisely the sense of a heal ing which re in tegrates in man the on t ol ogical cle m ents whi ch are in con flict in existence by res toring m an to his essence in uni ty with God . He wri tes : I n t h is sense, healing m eans reunit ing that wh ich is estranged , giving a center to what is split, overcom ing the split between G o d and m an, man and h is world , m an and h i m self. Out o f t his interpre t at ion o f salvat ion, the c on cep t o f the New B eing h as grown. 1 54

Tillich's pneumatology follows directly from his Christ ology . I f Chri s t in his essen tial humanity is the full realization o f the New Bein g, then th ose who part i cipate in this New Being through the Spi ri t part icipate in the integration and cen t rcdness which 1 51

Tillich , Systematic ThcolnKY , I I , 6 2 . Tillich, Sys tematic Theology , I, 20 1 . Herc Tillich wri tes, " Finitude is the pos­ sibility of l osing one's ontological struc ture and , with it one's self. But this is a possibil­ ity, not a necessity. To be finite is to be threatened. But threat is possibility, not actuality." 1 s3 Tillich , Sys tematic Theology , I I , 6 1 . I 54 Ibid. ' p. 1 66. 1 52

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE I N R E ASON AND L I F E

107

was fully re alized i n h im . Tillich describes the work o f the Spirit as a healing reintegration o f m an thro ugh union with the centred­ ness of the d ivine l i fe i n these terms : The basic statement, derived from all the previous considerations of this part of the theol ogical system , is that the integration o f the personal c en ter is p ossible only by its elevation to what can be called sym bolically the divine center and that this is possible onl y through the i mpact of the divine power, the Spiritual Presence. 1 5 5

In time this h ealing i s never more than fragm entary because essence is n ever perfectly real ized , e x cep t in Chri s t , in existence. Thus no o ne i s perfectly healed or integrated. 1 5 6 Yet at the sam e ti m e t h e Spiri t is active in all in tegration which m akes li fe possi­ ble and preven ts th e disin tegration which would m ean nothi ng­ nes s . Thus Till ich can hold that the Spiri t works whatever inte­ gration is p resent i n m an and yet affirm that in tim e this integra­ tion is never perfect. He wri tes : I n some degree all men participate in the healing power o f the N ew Being. O therw ise, they would have no being. The self-destructive con­ sequences of estrangem ent would have destroyed th em. B u t no m en are to tally healed, not even those who have encountered the heal ing p o wer as it appears in J esus as the Christ. 1 5 7

The perfect heal i ng or csscn tial ization thus would mean eschatological essen tiali zati on in Tilli ch 's system . It s eems to m ean that t here is preserved in eternity the degree of b ei ng that the Spirit h as wo rked in m an fragmen tarily i n time. Thus Tillich will re fer to the ful fillment or non-ful fillment o f man in eter­ nity in term s o f the "degree o f essential i zation" which has been attained in h i s temporal " l i fe process". 1 5 8 The symbols of heav­ en an d h ell are thus sy mb olic re ferents to " the am oun t of ful fi ll­ ment or non-fu l fillment wh ich goe s i n to the individual ' s essential­ izati on". 1 5 9 1 s5

Tillich, Sys tematic Theology , I I I, 280. Ibid. , p. 2 8 2. 1 s7 Tillich, Sys tematic Theology, I I, 1 6 7 . 1 58 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I I I, 4 1 6-4 1 7 . Here Tillich writes, "The whole life process, rather than a particular, moment, is decisive for the degree of essentialization." 15 Ibid. , p. 4 1 8. Speaking o f the meaning o f the symbols of heaven and hell, 9 Tillich here writes, "Third, they point t o the objective bas is of bl essedness and despair, that is, the amou n t of ful fillment or non-fulfillment which goes into the individual's essen tial ization. " 1 56

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ESS ENCE AND EXISTENCE I N REASON AND L I F E

When the Spirit works a fragmentary essentialization of man in time a certain pre-figuration is given of the situation when man is eschatologically in God as totally participating in the integra­ tion of divine life. In this situation the perfect theonomous situa­ tion will be realized and one of its consequences will be that all major functions of life, morality, culture and religion will harmo­ niously interpenetrate. 1 6 0 But such a perfect theonomy looks to "transhistorical remembrance", the unactualized unity of man and God "prior" to existence, or to "utopian anticipation", the anticipated future unambiguous unity with God. 1 6 1 In actual existence the functions of life and spirit are separated and moral­ ity, culture and religion exist in an uneasy relationship. Thus integration, growth and transcendence as well as the dynamics proper to each can be distinguished in existence. However, even in time, the Spirit in bringing about the reintegration of the polarities proper to each function of life also unites the func­ tions themselves and so brings about theonomous individuals and societies which anticipate the final theonomy. Tillich will occa­ sionally point to the high Middle Ages when a theonomous so­ ciety, in his opinion, was realized in which religion penetrated from within both social structure and cultural expression. 1 6 2 From the foregoing analysis of the integration of reason and life itself through revelation, Christ and the Spirit, it would fol­ low that Tillich understands both life itself and its reintegration in trinitarian terms. Life itself is triadic in terms of self-identity, self-alteration and the return to self. This dynamic of life is uni­ versally disrupted in existence and gains its salvific reintegration through participating in the perfect integration of trinitarian life. Tillich thus uses this triadic concept derived from human life in his understanding of divine life. He writes : I f we u se the sy mbol " divine life " , as we certainly m ust, we imply that there is an analogy between the basic structure o f experienced life an d th e ground of being in which life is rooted. 1 63

1 60 Ibid. , p. 9 5 . Here Tillich wri tes, " I n accordance with their essential nature, morality, culture and rel igion interpenetrate one another." 161 Ibid. The text reads, "The picture o f the essential relation o f the three func­ tions of the spirit is both ' transhis torical remembrance' and 'utopian antici pation'." 1 62 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 1 49, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Chn"s tian Thought, ed. Carl E. Braaten ( New York : Harper & Row, 1 9 6 7 ), p. 2 7 . 163 Ibid. , p. 1 5 6.

ESS ENCE A ND EXISTENCE IN REASON AND LI F E

1 09

I f God as living can thus be described in terms of the dynam ics of h u man l i fe , Tillich, neverth eless, shows the speci fic d i fference be tween d ivine and human l i fe in terms of the perfect integration of th e fo rm er in con tras t to the need o f integration o f the latter. For the poles of sel f-identity and sel f-al terati on in the in tra-trini­ tarian li fe are in perfec t harm on y an d arc so in virtue o f the union of power an d meaning, the firs t two principles of divine life , effe cted by the Spiri t. As a consequence, though Tillich argues that if God is to be spoken of as living he must be spoken of as tri n itari an , he posi ts the great di ffercnce in trinitarian Ii fe in the h arm ony t h ere establ ished by the Spirit. Consequently in the doctrine o f God as trini tari an because living the Spiri t has the place of pro m inence as working that i n tegration between the p ower of the Godhead and its perfect expression in the Logos which d is t ingu ishes divine Ii fr fro m hum an Ii fc and drives human li fe to look for its in tegration through a participation in the tri n i tarian Ii fe wh ich parti cipation is also worked by the Spirit. Tillich in his speculation ab out God as living will thus abstract fro m the Chris tian doctrine of Trinity in order to show that the religious affi rm ation of the Trinity is a re ference to God as living but living a l i fe which con tains the polari ties an d so the dynamic o f all li fe yet as perfectly integrated by the Spirit. Thus he wri tes : The si tuation is different if we do not as k the ques tion of the Chris­ tian doc trines b u t rath er the question of the presuppositions of these doc trines in an idea of God. Then we must speak about the trinitarian principles an d we must begin with the Spirit rather than with the Logos. 1 64

Tillich th us unders tands the principles of trini tarian l i fe in term s o f " mo rn en ts within the divine life. " 1 6 5 Every experience o f the d ivine is one o f the divine l i fe as a whole in which all t hree momen ts are at tained. Thus God is perceived as depth and m ean­ ing or fo rm in unity . The dep th di mens ion o f God is perceived as inexhaustible, ine ffab le, and as power. 1 6 6 Tillich writes o f this Ibid. , p. 2 5 0. Ibid. The ful l text reads, "God's life i s life a s spiri t, and the trini tarian principles are m omen ts with in the process of the divine l i fe. " . . 1 66 Ibid. Here Tillich writes, " Human intui tion o f the divine always has d1s tm­ guished between the ab yss o f the divine (the element of power) and the full ness of its content ( the element of meaning), between the divine depth and the divine logos. " 1 64

l6s

1 10

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE I N REASON A N D LI FE

principle, "The fi rs t principle is the b asis of Godhead that which makes God God". 1 6 7 This is the ultimate source o f divine cre­ ativity , "the inexhaustible groun d of b eing in which everything has its origin " . 1 6 8 The second principle o f trinitarian life is the Logos . I t renders th e creative dep th o f God intelli gible and meaningful . I t serves t o "make i t s full ness dis tinguishable, definit e , finite". 1 6 9 It func­ tions as th e principle of reason both within the Trinity and in God's e xpression beyond the Trini ty. Tillich writes, ' ' In the log os God speaks his ' word ' both in himsel f and beyond him sel f' ' . 1 70 The lo gos is thus the "principle o f God's sci f- obj ec t i fi cat ion ' ' both with in an d beyond trini tari an li fe . T h e Spiri t is t h e third p rinciple o f trini tarian li fe insomuch as the Spiri t is the " actualization " of the other two princi pl es. What Tillich m ean s by ac tual ization is that the Spirit effects the per­ fect union o f the inexhaustible power of the fa ther with its per­ fect expression in the Logos and so works the perfection of divine life. Tillich writes in this way o f the Spiri t 's function : I t is the Spirit in whom God "goes out from" himsel f, the Sµirit proceeds from the divine ground. He gives actual ity to that which is potential in the divine ground and "outspo ken" in the divine lo­ gos. 171

Thus Spirit means for Tillich the " unity of power and m ean­ ing. " 1 7 2 This unders tanding of spirit is cl osely rel ated to the unders tanding of l i fe as ful filled th rough the balance o f its polar­ ities or ontological elements. Thus Tillich will write, "Spiri t is the unity of the ontological clements and the t clos o f li fe . " 1 7 3 What is implied is that th e telos o f all l i fe is to b ring sel f-relat ed­ ness an d other-relatedness into b alance. In the divine l i fe t his Ibid. Ibid. 1 69 Ibid. , p. 2 5 1 . The fu ll text reads, "The logos opens the divine ground, its infinity and its darkness, and it makes its fullness dis tinguishabl e, definite, finite." 1 70 Ibid. 1 71 Ib id. 1 72 Ibid. , p. 249. Tillich here writes, "The meaning of spiri t is b uilt up through the meaning of the ontological elemen ts and their union. In terms o f both sides of the three polarities one can say that spirit is the unity o f power and m eaning." This again is evi dence that Till ich derives his understanding of spiri t from the unification o f the polari ties of sel f and other relatedness that constitute the polar dynamic o f human life. I 73 Ibid. 167

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111

telos or fulfillment is perfect b ecause God perfectly uni tes the

subj ective poles of " cen tred personalit y , sel f-transcending vi tal­ ity , an d freedom of participati on " wi th the obj ective poles o f " universal particip ation" an d mean ingful structure . 1 74 Tillich can thus write of the i n t ra- trinitarian li fe as ful filled i n the spirit and as fundam entally co incident with spiri t in these terms, "God as living is God fu l fillcd in himsel f and there fore spiri t . God is spiri t " . 1 7 5 It is such an understanding of in tegrated li fe in God that would seem to justi fy the proposi tion that Tillich secs the in tegration of m an 's reason and l i fe as structured on a participa­ tion i n the in tegration o f i ntra-trin itarian li fe . That th is is t h e case m ay be clearly seen i n Tillich 's relation o f revelation t o t h e Trin ity. H e writes , " The doctrine o f revelation i s based on a trini tarian interp retation o f t h e divine l i fe and its sel f- m an i festat ion " . 1 7 6 It is the ab yss character o f the divine l i fe which accounts for the mystery d imension of all revelat ion and insures that even in i ts revelation the m ystery rem ains a m ys­ tery . 1 7 7 I t is th e logos ch aracter o f the divine l i fe which m akes revel ati on p ossible by gi ving definition and hence m an i festory power to th e divine l i fe . As the Spiri t uni tes depth and form within the Trin ity so docs the Spiri t b ri ng about the correlation of ecs tatic reas on in the m ind and m iracle in object ive logos thro ugh which revelati on occurs . 1 7 8 Thus any percep tion or ex­ peri en ce o f God is o f th e livi ng and thus trinitari an God. J us t as the Spiri t works the integration o f human reason through revela­ tion so d oes i t work the integration o f l i fe i tself by giving to l i fe the b alan ced h armony o f the trini tarian l i fe. God as revealer and savi our is thus al way s the living God . His understanding of God as l iving lies at the b ase of Tillich 's objection to a description or de fi nition of God in terms of ac tus purus. For Tillich such an understan ding of God m eans that one o f the poles of l i fe, form ,

Ibid. , pp. 2 49-250. Ibid. , p. 250. 1 76 Ibid. ' p. 1 57. . . 1 11 /bid. , p. 1 56. Tillich explains the trinitarian dynamic of all revelat_wn m thes� terms "It is the abysmal character of the divine life which makes revelat10 n mysteri­ it ous; i� is the logical character of the divine life which makes revelati � n possi � le ; and and miracle of n correlat10 the creates which life divine the of is the spiritual character ecstasy in which revelatio n can be received ." 1 78 Ibid. 1 14 1 1s

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ESS ENCE AND E XISTENCE IN REASON AND LIF E

has swallowed its opposite, dynamics. 1 79 This would reduce God to a dead identity and leads Tillich to conclude, "The God who is ac tus purus is not the living God. " 1 80 Tillich, in his most measured treatment o f the Trinity, ascribes its foundation to three closely related processes. The first process is based on the conflict within man's religious nature or ultimate concern which demands both ul timacy and concreteness in that toward which it is directed. The drive to ultimacy results in monotheistic assertions through the perception of the innate con­ tradiction of many contending gods expressed by polytheism. 1 8 1 Yet the drive to concreteness produces the need for mediators between an absolute transcendent God and man so that God may be experienced as concretely and personally related to man. 1 8 2 Thus the Trinity points to a God who is absolute and transcen­ dent and yet is capable of manifestation through concrete media­ tors. Closely associated with this dialectic is the inevitability of a triadic understanding of God if God is to be understood as liv­ ing. 1 8 3 A living God must himself be experienced as in some way exemplifying the dynamic of life and this dynamic consists basi­ cally in the interaction of self-relatedness, self-alteration and re­ unification. Tillich writes, "The Divine Life then would be the reunion of otherness with identity in an eternal process. " 1 84 All life is thus trinitarian insofar as it successfully unites depth and form in the Spirit. The Spirit thus becomes the principle of inte­ gration in that which is integrated. Tillich can thus extend his understanding of spirit and life to everything. 1 8 5 1 79

Ib id. , p. 246. Here Tillich writes, " Pure actuality, that is, actuality free from any element of potentiality, is a fixed result ; it is not alive." 1 80 Ibid. , p. 246. 1 81 Tillich , Sys tematic Th eo logy , I I I , 2 8 3-284 ; I, 2 2 1 . 1 82 Tillich , Sys tema tic Th eo logy , l, 2 2 1 . 1 83 Til lich , Sys tem atic Theo logy , I II , 284-2 8 5 . Here Tillich gives a most precise statement of his man ner o f relating human life to trinitarian life through the triadic structure of all l i fe. He writes, " B ut the trini tarian symbols are dialectical ; they reflect the dialectics of life, namely the movement of separation and reunion. The s tatement that three is one and one is three was (and in many places still is ) the worst dis tortion of the mystery of Trinity. If it is meant as a numerical identity, it is a trick or simply nonsense. I f it is meant as the description o f a real process, it is not parado xical or irrational at all but a precise description o f all l i fe processes. And i n the tri nitarian doctrine it is applied to the Divine Life in symb olic terms." 1 84 /b£d. , p. 2 84. 1 85 lb£d. , p. 1 2. Here Tillich writes, "The ontological concept of life underlies the un£versal concept used b y the 'philosophers of l ife.' I f the actualization of the potential

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1 13

Both th ese consi derations p recede an d yet give meaning to the speci fically Christian affi rm ation of Trinity which arose in a Christological-soteriol ogical context . The problem atic dealt with the reality of Chris t' s salvi fi c power if he were not divine. 1 8 6 This e xisten tial problematic lead to the affi rm ation o f Nicea that Christ was divine and eventually to the affirm ati on o f the divin­ ity of the Spirit when it ½·as realized that t he Spirit of Christ was not his hum an spiri t b ut the divin e reality which accounts for New B eing in Christ and in those who in history participate in the New B eing. Tillich wri tes, "The divine Spirit is God himself as Spirit in the Christ and through him in the church and the Christian . " 1 8 7 It would seem in the l ight o f these considerations that while Tillich 's point o f th eological departure is decidedly anthro­ pocen tric he can introduce his thought on the Trinity at the end of his system in such a way as to show how it was operative throughout. The Trini ty becomes with Tillich both a symbol for the reali ty o f divine l i fe an d the basic answer to the predicament of h u m an l i fe . The ontological elements, in con flict in existence, are p osited in God where their con flict is overcom e in b alanced and h arm onious l i fe. The Fath er as a symbol of creative power finds perfect expression and otherness in the Logos as the prin­ ciple o f his sel f- m ani festation or objectification through the union o f the Spiri t . This p erfect life or spirit in the intra-trini tar­ ian l i fe is not fo und in actual creati on where the sel f-other polar­ ity in i ts three m aj or functions drives m an into destruct ive con­ flic t . The work of the Spirit in existence is thus anal o gous to its work in the Trinity. The Spirit by uniting m an with God unites man with himself and others by effecting in man a certain realiza­ tion of intra- trinitarian integration. Thus in Till ich ' s system m an 's essen tialization understood as a re-established uni on with God is synon ym ous with the healing integrat ion of the polar dynam ics o f hum an l i fe. Tillich can thus write, "The relation to . a func t10n . . ourse l ves 1s o f our re } at10n to G o d . " 1 8 8 is a structural condition of all beings, and if this actualization is called 'life', then the universal concept of li fe is unavoidable. Consequently, the genesis of stars and rocks, their gro w th as well as their decay , must be called a life process." 1 86 Ibid. , p. 2 8 8-290. 1 81 Ibid. , p. 289. 1 88 Tillich, Love, Po wer and justice (New York : Oxford University Press, 1 9 60), p. 1 2 2 .

ESS ENCE AND E XISTENCE IN R E ASON AND LIF E

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The root presuppos i tion o f this system i s that m an and God participate i n each other in every ontological s ituati on. I n un­ ac tualized essence, this particip ation is to tal yet, b ecause unac­ tualized, de fec tive or untested. In existence God and man in ter­ penetrate in the struct ure o f essential m an . In essenti alizcd m an this participat ion b eco mes m ore in tense as m an 's union with his essence beco mes his union wi th God and b ri ngs ab out the in te­ grat ion of h is hum anity thro ugh its participation in the divine integrati on. If th ere is a dualism in Tillich's system it is not b etween a supern atural God and a natural m an standing opposite each other. Rather th e dualism would be between superficial or shal­ low m an an d man at one with God in his depth o r essential structure wh ich union b rings ab out his integration. Superficial man co uld thus l ive in virtue o f the autonom ous s tructures o f him sel f and o f his world b ut because he never at tai ns his depth these structures b ecome " the structures o f destruction" driven into conflict in existence. Such a m an is thus not at one with his essential unity with God an d with the integration s uch unity brings ab out. Thus the presupposition which is everywhere apparent in Til­ lich 's system is that if God is not present to creation and to m an as the i m m an ent possib ility o f human i ntegration he coul d never become present without violating the structures of creation and o f m an and thus become paradoxically a further force of disinte­ gration. We will now tum to Bonaventure to establish to what extent a sim ilar understanding of divine l i fe i nterpenetrati ng human l i fe m ay b e p resent in his conception o f God's relation to m an .

CHAPTE R FOUR

THE BASI S OF BONAVENTURE'S ONTOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION IN HIS TRINITARIAN THOUGHT The treatment of Tillich's theology terminated in his trinita­ rian thought which was shown to be implicit in his understanding of life as integrated by the Spirit as the principle of union of power and meaning. When thus considered it was seen that Til­ lich's theology of the Trinity is much more extensive in his theol­ ogy than his explicit treatment would indicate. Trinitarian theol­ ogy serves as a natural bridge into Bonaventure's thought because his trinitarian thought is central and operative throughout both his theology and metaphysics. Little of Bonaventure's thought on any subject can be grasped without an understanding of his trinitarian thinking. Luc Mathieu writes of the centrality of trin­ itarian thought in Bonaventure in these terms : For him, perhaps more than for any other theologian, the mystery of the Trinity governs all belief, and finally all knowledge and human wisdom , in such a way that whoever wants to understand a point of Bonaventurian theology must begin by reviewing his Trinitarian theol­ ogy if he wants to uncover the originality of his position in subse­ quent tracts. 1

This chapter will begin with an exposition of Bonaventure's trinitarian theology in order to show how it grounds his ontology of participation through the expressionism and exemplarism which he draws from his thinking on the Trinity. It will be shown how his participational ontology as it derives from his trinitarian theology relates directly to his epistemology, to his understand­ ing of creation and fall, to his soteriology, and to his position on 1 Luc Mathieu, O. F.H., " La trinite creatrice d'apres Saint Bonaventure," (these pour le doctorat en theologie presentee devant la Faculte de theologie de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, 1960), p. 3. On the centrality o f trinitarian thought in Bonaven­ ture's system see also P. Titus Szabo, 0. F . M., De SS. Trinitate in Crcatu ris R efulgence, Doctn'ne S., Bonaventu ra (Rome: Herder, 1935), pp. 10-11. Here Szabo shows how the more recent commentaries on Bonaventure such as those by E. Longpre, A. Stoh r, E. Krebs, B. Rosenmoller and P. Pourrat all agree on the primacy of trinitarian thought in Bonaventure's system.

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man's knowledge of God. In short, the burden of the chapter will be to show how Bonaventure's theological system is co-extensive with the processions within the Trinity as a causal pattern of the procession of creation and man from the Trinity and of their return to a full participation in trinitarian life. Bonaventure's trinitarian theology is a highly personal synthe­ sis of various theological traditions. Through Alexander of Hales, one of his teachers at Paris, he was in touch with an Augustinian­ ism modified by Anselm and the Victorines, and especially by Richard of St. Victor. 2 The Victorine school itself was in touch with another significant tradition, that of pseudo-Dionysius, 3 and it is the Dionysian in fluence which gives to Bonaventure's thought on God and the Trinity its dynamic emanationism which raises it above a simple repetition of the Augustinian psychologi­ cal model, although this latter model is certainly present in Bona­ venture's thought also. 4 In fact, the Dionysian dynamic at the heart of Bonaventure's understanding of God has been called the "key" to his understanding of the Trinity. 5 For this reason the Dionysian influence on Bona\'enture's thought will be first addressed. At the heart o f Dionysian theol­ ogy is the experience of the good as self-diffusive. This experien2 For the influence of Augustine on Bonaventure's thought through Ale xander of Hales see J. Bougerol, O. F.M., Introduction to the Wu rks of BonavPntun·, trans. by Jose de Vinck ( Paterson, N.J . : St. Anthony Guild Press, 1 96 4 ) , pp. 1 5- 1 6. Of Alexan­ der's "Sum ma" Bougerol writes, "The doc tri ne is that of traditional A ugus tinianism ; that is, the Augustinianism o f St. Augus tine as recast b y Saint A nselm and enlarged with the speculations of the School of St. Victor. " On this same point see also Ma­ thieu, " La Trinite creatrice," p. 1 3 and Etienne Gilson , The Ph ilosophy of St. Bonaven­ ture, trans. by Dom Illtyd Trethowan and Frank J . Sheed ( Paterson, N.J . : St. Anthony Guild Press, 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 2 , 5 , 6. Gilson here refers to Bonaventure's self- interpretation as a "continuator" of Alexander from the text in II Sent., d. 23, a. 2 , q. 3, ad fi nem, (II, 34 7 ). See als o II Sent. , Praelocu tio, ( I I , I ). 3 Ewart H. Cousins, "Truth in St. Bonaventure," Th e Cord, X I X ( December, 1 9 69 ), p. 3 59 . This article is a complete reproduction of an address delivered before the forty-third annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, April 8, 1 9 69 , N.Y.C. It appeared in sh ortened form under the same title i n The Amer­ ican Catholic Philosophical Proceedings; Proceedings for the Year of 1969, XLIII, pp. 204-2 1 0. 4 See for a most complete study of Dionys ius ' influence on Bonaventure, Bougerol , "Saint Bonaventure et le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite," Actes du Colloque Saint Bona­ venture, Etudes Franciscaz·nes, Tome XVIII, supplement annuel, 1 9 6 8, pp. 3 3 - 1 2 3 . See also Bougerol, Introduction to Saint Bonaventure, pp. 39-49 . 5 Mathieu, " La trinite creatrice," p. 5. Mathieu writes, " Le caractere extatique, diffusif du souverain Bien, par lequel le pseudo-Denys explique la creation des essences secondes est considere par saint Bonaventure comme la clef de la theologie trini­ taire, ... "

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ce is expressed in the axion, "Bo n u m dzffusivum sui est . " 6 Bona­ venture seems to use this principle as the initial point of depar­ ture in his understanding of trinitarian life. He gives a certain precedence to the understanding of God as good over the under­ standing of God as being. 7 He fully affirms that God can be attained under either aspect, that of being or that of good. 8 To attain God under the aspect of being is to attain God in "the unity of His essence" 9 or as "pure act". 1 0 But to attain God as good is to attain God in a higher way as a living, dynamic and emanating God in whom a specifically trinitarian pattern is dis­ cernible in virtue of his being good. 1 1 Thus Bonaventure sees the attainment of God as good as relating to the attainment of God as being as the revelation of the New Testament relates to and surpasses that of the Old. 1 2 Bonaventure thus accepts the Dionysian principle of good as diffusive as the principle best suited to render more intelligible the dynamic of the intra-trinitarian processions. It should be not­ ed that Brmaventure's use of the Dionysian principle goes beyond Dionysius' own use which the latter saw as operative only in the emanation of creatures from God. 1 3 A synoptic presentation of Bonaventure's use of the Dionysian principle of the diffusion of good in the context of trinitarian life can be found in the sixth chapter of the Itinerariu m . This will serve as an introduction into the dialectic which Bonaventure uses in his treatment of the Trinity . Ibid., p. 22. Mathieu points out that though this axiom is not found textually or explicitly in the Dionysian corpus it does capture his fundamental spirit and intuition. 7 /b id., pp. 16-17. 8 /tineran·um Mentis in Deum, c. 5, n. 2. (V, 308). All citations to Bonaventure's works will include in b rackets the volume and page number in the critical edition, Doctor£s Seraphic£s S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, ed. studio et cura PP. Collegii a.S. Bonaventura ad plurimos codices mss. emendata anecdotis aucta, prolegomenis scholiis notisque illustrata (10 vols. ; Quaracchi, 1882-1902). When translations are used, they will be documented in full and then give translator and page numbers in subsequent usages. The translation of the ltinerar£um is taken from The Works of St. Bonaventure, /tinerar£um ment£s £n Deum (2 vols. ; Saint Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute 1956), Vol. II, trans. by Philotheus Boehner, O. F.M. This citation is found on p. 81. 9 Jt£nerarium, c. 5, n. 3, (V, 308). Trans. by Boehner, p. 81. 1 0 Jtz"nerarium, £bid. Trans. b y Boehner, p. 83. 11 /t£nerar£um, c. 6, n. 1, (V, 310). Trans. b y Boehner, p. 89. 12 /t£nerar£um, c. 5, n. 2, (V, 308). The text reads, " Hence St. John Damascene, following Moses, says that He who is is the first name of God; whereas Dionysius, following Christ, says that Good is the first name of God. " Trans. by Boehner, p. 81. 13 Bougerol, " Saint Bonaventure et le Pseudo-Denys l' Areopagite," p. 82. 6

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In this chapter Bonaventure begins with an Anselmian proposi­ tion which bears directly on the good rather than on being. He writes : Behold, therefore, and observe that the highest good is unqualifiedly that in comparison with which a greater cannot be thought. And this good is such that it cannot rightly be thought of as non-existing , since to be is absolutely better than not to be. 1 4

The greatest good is thus posited as necessarily existent in accord with the Anselmian dialectic. At this point Bonaventure intro­ duces his necessary reason based on the good as diffusive as the principle of intelligibility of the unity and trinity in God. He writes, "And this good exists in such a way that it cannot rightly be thought of unless it is thought of as triune and one. For the good is self-diffusive .... " 1 5 When the principle of the diffusion of good is applied to God as the supreme good the conclusion necessarily follows that, " . ... therefore the highest good is most self-diffusive." 1 6 Bonaventure then argues that the self-diffusion of the supreme good must take a triadic form in the procession of the Son from the Father and of the Spirit from both within trinitarian life. Here he is making two points. The demands of the diffusion of good in God must be triadic in structure and can only take place perfectly within the life of the Trinity. He formu­ lates his argument in this way : Unless there were in the highest good from all eternity an active and consubstantial production, and a hypostasis of equal nobility, such as is found in producing by way of generation and spiration-and this in such a way that what is of the eternal principle is also eternally of the co-principle-so that there is the loved and the beloved, the generat­ ed and the spirated, that is, the Father, and the Son , and the Holy Ghost , that is to say , unless these were present, there would not be found the highest good here, because it would not be supremely self­ diffusive. 1 7

That this diffusion of good cannot take place perfectly in extra-trinitarian creation is due to the immensity of the divine goodness whose very immensity defies its perfect communication Itineran·u m, c. 6, n. 2, ( V, 3 1 0 ). Trans. b y Bochner, p. 8 9 . The reference to Anselm is from the Proslogium c. 2-5 , 1 4- 1 5. I S Ibid. 16 Ibid. 1 7 Ibid. 14

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in cre ation. Thus th e dem ands o f the perfect ion of di ffusion o f the p erfect good necessi tates its di ffusion with in God. B onaven­ ture states this p rinciple when he writes, " F or the d i ffusion that occured in time in the creation of the world is no m ore th an a piv o t or p oi n t in comparison with the immense sweep o f the etern al goodness . " 1 8 The necessary conditions for the p erfect e xpression of the divine goodness can thus be met only if the good is substan tially com m unicated to ano ther as i ts p erfect expression and as the love which arises from this e xp ression. Thus the communication or diffusi on of go od is by i ts very n ature constitutive or p roduc­ tive o f the p ersons of Son and Spiri t . B onaventure goes on to attach a certain note of necessity to this b asic understanding o f the dynam ic and structure o f intra-trini tarian relations. He wri tes : When, therefore , you are able to behold with the eyes of your mind the purity of that goodness which is the pure act of the Principle, in charit f loving with a love both free and due and a mixture of both, a love which is the fullest diffusion by way of nature and will, which is also a diffusion by way of the Word, in which all things are said, and by way of the Gift, in which all other gifts are given, if you can do this, then you can see that through the utmost communicability of the Good, there must be the Trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. 1 9

The p er fect expression o f the good o f the first person of the Trinity is h ere described as Word in wh om the goodness and the power o f the F ath er is expressed in unqual i fied fullness. Bona­ ven ture 's use o f the term "Word " would seem to be an Augus ti­ nian usage . Sin ce th e perfect expression of the Father in the Word is a key p rinciple in Bonaven ture 's exemplarism which grounds his unders tanding of the further communication o f goo dn es s to creation, i t would seem th at B onaventure starts this synop tic p resentation o f his trinitarian theology with the Diony­ sian p rinciple of the di ffusion of good and works into i t a some­ what Augustinian concep tion of the Word so that his in tra- trini­ t arian expressionism owes much to Dionysius whil e his e x tra-trini18

Ibid. Bonaventure makes this game point in Culla t iones in Hexaemeron, coll. 11, n. 11, (V, 381). He is probably indebted for this reasoning to Alain de Lille. See Bouge rol, "Saint Bonaventure et le Pseudo-Denys l 'Areopagite," p. 94. 19 Jt£nerarium, c. 6, n. 2, (V, 311). Trans. by Boehner, pp. 91-9 2.

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tarian exemplarism adds to the initial Dionysian impulse a distinctive Augustinian note. 20 Thus he combines the vitality of the Dionysian understanding of a dynamic emanating God with the Augustinian understanding of God as the source of Logos as eternal truth and as ground of the essential structures of creation. Bonaventure's understanding of good as self-diffusive and hence of the supreme good as possessive of a primacy which precedes and grounds the procession of all good from it lies behind his earlier and yet extremely important understanding of the Father in terms of fontal plenitude which he identifies with the Father's property of innascibility or unbegottenness. 2 1 Bona­ venture takes the position that the first person of the Trinity is called Father because he generates as opposed to the position which would conceive of him as generating because of his Father­ hood. In reply to the question, "Whether generation is the reason of paternity or the converse?" , his answer is, "Generation is more the reason of paternity than the converse. " 2 2 The issue at stake in this subtle question relates directly to the affirmation of the primacy of good in the Godhead and to the reconciliation of divine simplicity with the multiplicity which the primacy of good in God demands in virtue of the diffusive nature of the good. Bonaventure argues that the very assertion of the divine simplic­ ity when considered under the formality of the good demands expression in that multiplicity which produces the other persons and ultimately creation outside of the Trinity. In this dialectic Bonaventure understands the Father's inna­ scibility or unbegottenness in a very positive sense. It means much more for him than the mere negative assertion that the Father is not from another. It means rather that the Father as unbegotten is the ultimate source or fountain from which all else flows both within and beyo1 ..d the Trinity. 2 3 Thus the Father's 20 See Bougerol, " Saint Bonaventure et le Pseudo- Denys I' /\ reopagite", p. 96. Bou­ gerol says that Bonaventure's use of the phrase .. Word in which all thi ngs are said" is distinctly Augustinian. 21 See I Sent, d . 27, p. 1 , art. un., q . 2 , ad. 3 , (I, 471 ). The text rends, " Sed i n Patre est paternitas et innascibilitas et spiratio ; sed innascibilitas non es t reducibilis ad alias ; ergo necesse est quod aliae reducantur ad innascib ilitatem quae est, sicut di xerunt, fontalis plenitudo." 22 Sen t. , d . 27, p. 1 , art. un._, q. 2, (I, 468-469 ). 23 I Sent. , d. 27, p. l , art. un. q. 2, and 3 , (I, 4 70). Bonaventure writes of t he positive meaning of innascibility in these terms, "Aliter tamen est dicendus, sicut praedictum fuit, quod innascibilitas est privati o ; quae secundum rem es t perfecta posi-

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primacy or innascibility is seen as an affirmation that he is the ultimate principle and cause of all that partakes in that o f which he is principle or cause. This seems to be the meaning of Bona­ venture's principle of primacy which reads, " Unde q u ia prim u m , idea princip iu m ; q u ia prin czpiu m ideo vel a c t u vel h a b it u est prin­ ci'p ia t u m . "2 4 When this principle is combined with the principle of the self­ diffusion of the good, the Father is then the source of both the intra-trinitarian and extra-trinitarian processions. Bonaventure writes, "The Father is the principle of the whole divinity because from no one. " 2 5 Thus the Father's paternity is to be understood in relation to his innascibility and to his fontal plenitude which properties then become assertions of the primacy o f the Father in terms of his being the ultimate source of emanating goodness. Bonaventure more than once affirms that this understanding of the Father's innascibility as grounding the procession of good from him has its roots in "ancient doctors" who referred to the Father as fontal plenitude. 2 6 Though Bonaventure does not name the doctors, contemporary scholarship points to the Greek fa­ thers and to Dionysius himself. 2 7 It should here be noted that the dynamics of fontal plenitude and the primacy of the Father as source of good point in a special way to the Father's relation in terms of production to the Son. The very notion implies productivity on the part of the Father. Making the notion more precise, Bonaventure points out that the productivity of the Father as Father does not extend to creation which owes its production to the Trinity as a whole. Nor does the productivity of the Father as Father extend to the Spirit whose production he shares with the Son. Thus the productivity of the Father's fontal plenitude refers most immediately and in its proper sense to the Father's perfect self-expression in the Son tio. Innascibilis enim dicitur Pater, quia non est ab alio; et non esse ab alio est esse primum, et primitas est nobilis positio." For a thorough discussion of Bonave �ture'_s positive understanding of innascibility see Theodore de Regnon, Etudes de Theologze II, positz've sur la Saint Trinite, Theories scholastiq ues (Paris, Retaux , 1 892), pp. 481 -493. 24 I Sent. , d. 2 7, p. 1, art. un., q. 2 , ad 3 , (I, 470). 2 s /bid. The text reads " Pater est principium totius divinitatis, quia a nullo." 26 /bid. The text read�, " Quod autem movet ad hoc dicendum, primum est antiqua positio magnorum doctorum, qui dixerunt, quod innascibilitas in Patre