Revisiting Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility 9783161558160, 9783161558252

Table of contents :
Cover
Titel
Preface
Table of Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1: Situating Weber’s ethic of responsibility
1. Introduction
2. Situating the ethic of responsibility historically
3. Situating the ethic of responsibility textually
3.1 Science as a vocation
3.2. Politics as a vocation
3.3. Brief comparison of the two speeches
3.4. How should ‘Politics as a vocation’ be categorised academically?
4. Situating the ethic of responsibility biographically
5. Conclusion
Chapter 2: Major interpretations
1. Introduction
2. Interpretations in terms of responsibility for consequences
2.1 One of the main existing ethical approaches in Western politics (Lothar Waas)
2.2. One leg of the appropriate ethical approach in politics (Nicholas Gane, Hans-Peter Müller)
2.3. A situated consequentialist ethics attuned to charismatic political leadership (Peter Breiner)
2.4. A variant of utilitarian ethics suitable not only for political ethics, but also for applied ethics in general (Wolfgang Wieland)
3. Interpretations in terms of responsibility for both conviction and consequences
3.1 The responsible ethic of conviction as the appropriate ethics of the political sphere (H. H. Bruun)
3.2. An alternative for Kant’s formal ethical theory in late modernity (Wolfgang Schluchter)
4. Conclusion
Chapter 3: Weber’s views on ethics and politics: The bigger picture
1. Introduction
2. Views on ethics
2.1. External consequences of rationalisation
2.2. Internal consequences of rationalisation
2.3. Inappropriate and appropriate responses to modernisation
3. Views on politics
3.1. Sociological views on politics
3.2. Personal political views
3.3. The solution for the problems of political leadership
4. Conclusion
Chapter 4: Towards an adequate interpretation
1. Introduction
2. A critical assessment of the major interpretations
2.1. Lothar Waas .
2.2. Nicholas Gane and Hans-Peter Müller
2.3. Peter Breiner
2.4. Wolfgang Wieland
2.5. H. H. Bruun
2.6. Wolfgang Schluchter
3. An interpretation in terms of responsibility
3.1. The emergence of the concept of responsibility
3.2. An ethical approach fundamentally qualified by responsibility
3.3. Weber and the philosophers of the ‘via media’
4. Conclusion
Chapter 5: The impact of modernisation on ethics: An appraisal of Weber’s views
1. Introduction
2. The secularisation thesis
3. The differentiation thesis
4. The ‘iron cage’ thesis
5. Conclusion
Chapter 6: Going beyond Weber’s ethic of responsibility
1. Introduction
2. Critical assessment of Weber’s ethic of responsibility
2.1. Commendable aspects
2.2. Problematic aspects
3. A proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility
3.1. Terminological clarification
3.2. Presuppositions
3.3. Features
4. Conclusion
Bibliography
Name index
Subject index

Citation preview

Perspektiven der Ethik herausgegeben von Reiner Anselm, Thomas Gutmann und Corinna Mieth

12

Etienne de Villiers

Revisiting Max Weber’s Ethic of Responsibility

Mohr Siebeck

Etienne de Villiers (born in 1945) is Emeritus Professor of the Department of Dogmatics and Christian Ethics in the Faculty of Theology, University of Pretoria. He studied Theology and Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch and was awarded a doctorate in Christian Ethics at the Free University of Amsterdam. After a stint as lecturer at the Huguenot College in Wellington (South Africa), he was appointed as professor at the University of Pretoria, where he taught Christian Ethics and Engineering Ethics. He also served as the director of two centres of the University: the Centre for Business and Professional Ethics and the Centre for Public Theology, and served as chairperson of the Theological Society of Southern Africa for a number of years. After his retirement he returned to the University of Pretoria to act as head of the Department of Philosophy. He published widely on Christian ethical and public theological issues. In recent years his main research interest has been the prospects of a contemporary ethic of responsibility.

ISBN 978-3-16-155816-0 eISBN 978-3-16-155825-2 ISSN 2198-3933 (Perspektiven der Ethik) Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2018 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany. www.mohr.de This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproduction, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was typeset by epline in Böblingen, printed by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen on non-aging paper and bound by Großbuchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier.

Printed in Germany

For Joan

Preface It is difficult not to be drawn into greater engagement with Max Weber’s thought once you have become acquainted with it. At least this is what I have experienced. I first ventured into the territory he had opened up when early in the new millennium I began writing a number of articles on proponents of a Christian ethics of responsibility. It was only in the course of conducting this research that I learned that Weber had been the first to propose an ethic of responsibility in his famous speech ‘Politics as a vocation’. The speech, when I read it for the first time, fascinated me, and in my effort to get a grip on Weber’s understanding of the ethic of responsibility, I was drawn into ever more intensive engagement with his thought. The present work developed from a growing conviction, on account of this engagement, that even today we have much to learn from Weber’s conceptualisation of this ethic, in spite of its shortcomings. I am grateful for the encouragement and support of many people. First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife Joan for acting as an important soundboard and enduring many hours of my musings on Weber’s thought as a consequence. She was not only a patient listener, but also an active interlocutor who asked critical questions and made enlightening remarks. It is only due to her firm belief in the meaningfulness of my project that I was able to persevere and complete the monograph. I would also like to thank our son, Dawid de Villiers, a lecturer in English at Stellenbosch University, for the excellent job he did in editing the manuscript. There are quite a number of academic colleagues who provided valuable input. A special word of thanks must go to professor Ernst Wolff, who was a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria when I acted as head of the Department. I had long and fruitful discussions with him on Weber and the interpretation of his ethic of responsibility. Another colleague in the Department of Philosophy with whom I discussed my research is professor Marinus Schoeman. My close friend, professor Dirkie Smit, who has been appointed at Princeton Theological Seminary since his recent retirement from Stellenbosch University, is another treasured discussion partner. Professor Wolfgang Huber, previously professor of Social Ethics at the University of Heidelberg, and more recently chairperson of the board of the ‘Evangelische Kirche Deutschland’ (EKD) and honorary professor of the Humboldt University Berlin, on several occasions formally hosted me during research stays

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in Germany as an Alexander von Humboldt stipend holder. It was through engagement with his work that I became interested in the ethic of responsibility. He also gave excellent advice after reading parts of the manuscript for the present work, which he consistently encouraged me to complete. During a research stay in 2005 at the Maximilian University in Munich, professor Friedrich Wilhelm Graf acted as my host professor and helped me, at that initial stage, to get my research on track. I have been privileged, also, in getting input in personal interviews from distinguished Weber scholars such as professors Wolfgang Schluchter and Hans Joas. Over the years I have gained much from the opportunity to lecture on aspects of my research project: at the University of Leiden, the Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Free University in Amsterdam, the University of Pretoria and the University of Gothenburg. The feedback I received from academic colleagues on these occasions proved to be inestimable in fine-tuning my views. I especially want to acknowledge the written feedback that professor Paul van Tongeren, now emeritus professor in philosophy at Radboud University, presented to me after attending one of my lectures. I want to give recognition for financial support for research stays in Berlin, Munich, Utrecht and Princeton I received from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Germany and the National Research Foundation in South Africa. Lastly I want to thank the editors of the ‘Perspectives on ethics’ series, as well as the personnel of Mohr Siebeck. I am delighted that the editors decided to publish my monograph as the first volume in English in their series after subjecting it to peer review. The personnel of Mohr Siebeck handled the publication of my monograph in the most professional and efficient manner. A special word of thanks is due to dr. Stephanie Warnke-De Nobili, the chief editor for history, philosophy, and the social sciences at the time when I first contacted the publisher, dr. Rolf Geiger, who has since then taken over from her, ms. Susanne Mang, who was responsible for seeing the publication through the press, and ms. Kendra Maeschke, who is responsible for the marketing of the monograph. Etienne de Villiers

Pretoria, November 2017

Table of Contents Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter 1: Situating Weber’s ethic of responsibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2. Situating the ethic of responsibility historically  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. Situating the ethic of responsibility textually  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1 Science as a vocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.2. Politics as a vocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.3. Brief comparison of the two speeches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.4. How should ‘Politics as a vocation’ be categorised academically?  . . . . . 31 4. Situating the ethic of responsibility biographically  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Chapter 2: Major interpretations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2. Interpretations in terms of responsibility for consequences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 2.1 One of the main existing ethical approaches in Western politics (Lothar Waas)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 2.2. One leg of the appropriate ethical approach in politics (Nicholas Gane, Hans-Peter Müller)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 2.3. A situated consequentialist ethics attuned to charismatic political leadership (Peter Breiner)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 2.4. A variant of utilitarian ethics suitable not only for political ethics, but also for applied ethics in general (Wolfgang Wieland)  . . . . . . . . . . 60 3. Interpretations in terms of responsibility for both conviction and consequences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 3.1 The responsible ethic of conviction as the appropriate ethics of the political sphere (H. H. Bruun)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 3.2. An alternative for Kant’s formal ethical theory in late modernity (Wolfgang Schluchter)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

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Chapter 3: Weber’s views on ethics and politics: The bigger picture  . . . . . 79 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 2. Views on ethics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 2.1. External consequences of rationalisation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 2.2. Internal consequences of rationalisation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 2.3. Inappropriate and appropriate responses to modernisation  . . . . . . . . . 90 3. Views on politics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 3.1. Sociological views on politics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 3.2. Personal political views  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 3.3. The solution for the problems of political leadership  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Chapter 4: Towards an adequate interpretation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 2. A critical assessment of the major interpretations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 2.1. Lothar Waas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 2.2. Nicholas Gane and Hans-Peter Müller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 2.3. Peter Breiner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 2.4. Wolfgang Wieland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 2.5. H. H. Bruun  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 2.6. Wolfgang Schluchter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 3. An interpretation in terms of responsibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 3.1. The emergence of the concept of responsibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 3.2. An ethical approach fundamentally qualified by responsibility  . . . . . . . 143 3.3. Weber and the philosophers of the ‘via media’  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Chapter 5: The impact of modernisation on ethics: An appraisal of Weber’s views  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 2. The secularisation thesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 3. The differentiation thesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 4. The ‘iron cage’ thesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Chapter 6: Going beyond Weber’s ethic of responsibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 2. Critical assessment of Weber’s ethic of responsibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 2.1. Commendable aspects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 2.2. Problematic aspects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197



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3. A proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 3.1. Terminological clarification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 3.2. Presuppositions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 3.3. Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Name index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 Subject index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Introduction If the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche has to be recognised as the herald of the decline of traditional Christian and humanist ethics, the sociologist Max Weber deserves recognition for being the first to venture a sociological explanation for this decline.1 Weber argued that the main cause for the decline of traditional Western ethics could be found in the distinctive manner in which modernisation processes played themselves out in the Western world. According to Weber the irony of it all is that Protestant ethics, especially in the Reformed version, contributed to the very modernisation that eventually came to undermine Christian ethics. More particularly, it was the distinctive ‘value-rationalisation’ processes taking place in Reformed ethics that eventually led to a new appreciation and enhancement of ‘this-worldly’ activities and to the prominence of what he called ‘purposive rationality’ (‘instrumental rationality’ in current parlance), which became one of the most distinctive features of Western modernity. What he claimed was that the form value-rationalisation took in Reformed religion  – the fact that it resulted in the distinctive ‘innerworldly asceticism’ of Reformed ethics – was instrumental in providing a spiritual climate (Geist) that enhanced capitalistic entrepreneurship and contributed to the establishment of capitalism in the Western world. More generally, Reformed ethics, on account of its emphasis on hard and effective work as an important means of serving God, also had as side effect the increase in status of activities taking instrumental rationalisation as its cue. In due time, however, such processes of rationalisation in the economy, politics, science, and technology ended up turning against the hand that had fed them, impacting negatively upon religion and ethics. This impact manifested in primarily two ways: it significantly contributed to the increasing ‘disenchantment’ (German: Entzauberung) of the world, the origins of which Weber traced back to the Old Testament prophets and Greek philosophy, and it led to an increasing restriction of the freedom of individuals to realise their personal ethical ideals. What Weber indicated by ‘the disenchantment of the world’ was the undermining of the belief that there were magical forces operating in the world. He was of the opinion that processes of instrumental rationalisation led to the increasing 1  In this book no technical distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’, ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ is made.

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Introduction

spread of the belief in the West that, in principle, there are no mysterious and incalculable powers exerting an influence on what is happening in this world, and that, in principle, human beings should be able to control everything by calculation (Weber 1968b: 594). The spread of this belief inevitably undermined the dominant position of the Christian religion and the church, resulting in widespread secularisation. It also had far-reaching consequences for the ethical domain. The general acceptance of one set of common Christian ethical values grounded in the authority of the Triune God was lost. This in turn led to the emergence of a plurality of divergent and competing ethical value systems, both religious and secular, none of which could attain the general acceptance Christian ethical values had before the dawn of modernity. The belief that prevailed in Europe even after the Reformation, that God and his commands have the highest authority, not only in religion, but also in other spheres of life, almost completely lost its legitimacy in the process. The result was the emergence of pluralism, that is, the increasing differentiation of autonomous and secularised social orders, with distinctive value systems, which – according to Weber – are also in conflict with one another (Weber 2004: 238, 244). This does not only force individuals to choose their own ultimate values from among the conflicting values available to them, but also makes it difficult for them to find common ethical ground with other individuals (Weber 1949: 18; 1968b: 508–509). For Weber it is even more difficult for those who act within the context of a specific social order – politicians, for example – to find acceptance of their ultimate values among other role-players. The processes of instrumental rationalisation, in Weber’s view, had an additional negative impact on the ethical domain, in that it severely curtailed the freedom of the individual to realise personal ethical ideals. He was especially concerned that the on-going bureaucratisation of politics was diminishing the room for political leaders to achieve their ultimate values. He regarded the fact that specialised bureaucrats had virtually taken charge of government decisions in Germany during the reign of Wilhelm II as a particularly negative development, since this put them in a position to effectively prevent political leaders from governing in accordance with their own ultimate values (Weber 1984: 450–524; Weber 1994a: 324–330). As for ordinary citizens, Weber had little faith that democratic society enabled them to promote and achieve particular ultimate values in politics and other social spheres; in his opinion they were even more severely ensnared in bureaucratic networks and the routine of everyday life. It is conspicuous that all of these phenomena identified by Weber as part and parcel of Western modernisation – the decline of traditional ethics, secularisation, the plurality of ethical values, pluralism of the value systems of differentiated social orders and the loss of freedom to live out one’s ethical beliefs – are still intensively discussed today, in philosophy, theology, sociology, and the media. This begs the important question: To what extent might Weber’s analysis of these



Introduction

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phenomena, his explanation of their origins and his prediction of future developments regarding them, be deemed still valid today? In this book I  will necessarily devote some attention to this question, yet it should be pointed out that Weber’s interest for us is not limited to the mere sociological description and analysis of the negative impact of modernisation processes on the ethical dimension of life; he also severely criticised inadequate contemporary responses to the threat these processes held for the ethical dimension. Among the bourgeoisie in Germany there were those who welcomed the fact that the dominance of Christian ethical values was undermined, seeing in it the opportunity to finally cast off its stifling hold and revert to a naturalistic lifestyle.2 This validation of instinct and desire was particularly marked with regard to sexuality, and resulted in a milieu of erotic experimentation. Conversely, personal expression also found an outlet in the form of aestheticism, which encouraged people to give creative expression to their own lives as works of art. Weber severely chastised the fashionable eroticism and aestheticism in the social circles in which he moved (Weber 2004: 231). In his view those who experimented with a naturalistic or aesthetic lifestyle in an irresponsible manner undertook a flight into subjectivism and refused to face the real and serious problems in the German society of his time. He also took to task those who thought that one could completely ignore the drastic societal changes brought about by modernisation processes, consoled by the belief that those traditional ethical values they personally adhered to could continue to be invoked indiscriminately, in all spheres of life. Their solution to the growing threat to the ethical dimension of life was a simple one: simply increase the intensity of your resolve to apply personal ethical values unconditionally across the board and strongly believe that eventually things will turn out for the best, despite any indications to the contrary. Weber called this approach to ethics the ‘ethic of conviction’ (German: Gesinnungsethik). Although in earlier publications and in personal correspondence he had already made brief critical remarks regarding this approach, he launched a decisive attack against it in his famous speech of 1919, ‘Politics as a vocation’ (German: ‘Politik als Beruf’) (Weber 1994a). In taking for granted that personal ethical values could be applied in politics in exactly the same manner as in personal relationships, adherents of the ethic of conviction turned a blind eye to the obvious fact that, given the differentiation of politics as an autonomous social order, personal ethical values are for the most part not applicable. There are other values, namely social-order-specific and cultural values, that come into play when it is a matter of making political decisions. The ethic of conviction seemed to Weber to tempt decision-makers in pursuit of

2  According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary one of the meanings of the term ‘naturalism’ is: ‘action, inclination, or thought based on only natural desires and instincts’.

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Introduction

their political goals into a careless application of personal ethical convictions and a disregard for the potential consequences of their actions. Again, one may ask to what extent these responses to the threat that modernisation holds for the ethical dimension of life Weber identified and analysed in his time can still be found and are still influential in present-day societies. Just as important is the question: Should we subscribe to Weber’s negative evaluation of these responses? It is also not the purpose of this book to address these questions. Attention will only be given to Weber’s analysis and assessment of the ethic of conviction insofar as it is relevant for his conceptualisation of the ethic of responsibility and our contemporary assessment of this ethic. Quite significant, in my opinion, is that Weber did not only provide an analysis of the negative impact of modernisation processes on the ethical dimension of life; neither did he rest with criticising those who, in his opinion, inadequately responded to these threats. He also felt himself obliged to venture beyond the familiar sphere of sociological analysis and explanation into the normative field of ethics, by proposing, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, an ethical approach in the political order that was more in tune with developments in modernity and the resultant threat to ethics than the ethic of conviction and other inadequate responses. For Weber, the ethical approach best suited to the vocation of the politician was what he called the ‘ethic of responsibility’ (Weber 1994a). Weber was the first to use the expression ‘ethic of responsibility’ (German: Verantwortungsethik). One can say without exaggeration that the speech ‘Politics as a vocation’, among others, has become famous on account of its introduction of this ethical orientation, which he contrasted with the ‘ethic of conviction’. In spite of its brevity, his proposal regarding the ethic of responsibility has since then found strong resonance in politics, philosophy, and theology. Politicians sometimes made polemical use of the depiction ‘ethic of conviction’ to characterise and criticise the political views and actions of their political opponents, while commending their own political views and actions as the outcome of an ethic of responsibility – a former chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, presenting a clear example.3 This approach has also increasingly become an important topic of discussion in philosophy. Theodor Adorno,4 Karl-Otto Apel5 and Paul Ricoeur6 are examples of philosophers who constructively engaged with Weber’s ethic of responsibility and incorporated aspects of this ethic in their own philosophies. Some researchers aver that Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s own theological ethic of responsibility was to some extent influenced by Weber, despite the lack of 3  Cf.

Schmidt (2011: 197–215) and Roth (1984: 491–511) for Helmut Schmidt. Adorno (1997: 200–201; 217–232). 5  Cf. Apel (1997: 270–305) and Wolff (2011: 206–219) for Karl-Otto Apel. 6  Cf. Ricoeur (1965: 308–312; 1991: 235–240; 1994: 240–296) and Wolff (2011: 221–266) for Paul Ricoeur. 4  Cf.

Introduction



5

acknowledgement of this on the part of the theologian.7 Philosophers like Hans Jonas8 and Emmanuel Levinas9 redeployed the term ‘ethic of responsibility’ to depict the ‘new’ approaches to ethics they proposed. The same can be said of the American theologians H. Richard Niebuhr10 and William Schweiker,11 as well as the German theologians Ulrich Körtner12 and Wolfgang Huber,13 who developed their own theological versions of the ethic. Due to the influence of these proponents the ethic of responsibility remains an important topic in contemporary ethical research in the fields of philosophy and theology, while Max Weber remains an important interlocutor in publications engaging with the approach. In this study I do not so much want to trace the influence of Weber’s proposal on these proponents of an ethic of responsibility, although I fully recognise that a research gap exists in this regard. I would rather like to explore the validity and relevancy of Weber’s own ethic of responsibility proposal from a present-day perspective. Or to formulate the research question in a different way: To what extent might we today, at this stage of modernisation, subscribe to Weber’s proposal of an ethic of responsibility as an adequate approach to ethics? What interest do we who are living in the twenty-first century have in getting an answer to this question? After all, almost hundred years passed since Weber gave his speech ‘Politics as a vocation’. In my opinion we have to acknowledge that he was not only the first social scientist who provided an incisive analysis of modernisation and its effects – an analysis that is still influential today – but also the first to propose a new ethical approach in tune with his analysis of modernisation – albeit that he restricted himself to the ethical approach appropriate to modern politics. Although we live in the twenty-first century we are still inextricably entangled in on-going processes of modernisation and its offshoot, globalisation, and in my view this makes it worthwhile to explore whether Weber’s proposal on the ethic of responsibility as the appropriate ethical approach in his time could in any way still serve us as model. Such an exploration is also prompted by the oft-repeated laments in contemporary publications regarding the threat modernisation poses to the ethical dimension of life, and calls for a new approach to ethics that is required to deal with the challenges of contemporary modernity. Of course, the only way to properly address this question – To what extent can Weber’s proposal on the ethic of responsibility serve as a model to us? – is to proceed from an adequate interpretation of this ethic itself. In this book, therefore, I start out by endeavouring to provide such an interpretation. If the pursuit 7  Cf.

Bonhoeffer (2005: 52; 220; 255; 418; 432). Jonas (1984). 9  Cf. Levinas (1969). 10  Cf. Niebuhr (1978). 11  Cf. Schweiker (1995). 12  Cf. Körtner (1996). 13  Cf. Huber (1990). 8  Cf.

6

Introduction

of an ‘adequate interpretation’ makes up the bulk of this book it is because Weber himself provided only a brief exposition of his ethic in ‘Politics as a vocation’ and did not have the opportunity to expound upon it in later publications, partly because of his death in 1920, a little more than a year and a half after giving this speech. This has left his views on the ethic of responsibility particularly open to different interpretations. There are sociologists who claim that in discussing the ethic of responsibility and contrasting it to the ethic of conviction, Weber did not in any way intend to propose a new approach to political ethics, but merely provided two ideal types of the two prevalent approaches to ethics in politics in his time, without registering any preference for either. Others recognise a preference for the ethic of responsibility as the most appropriate ethical approach in politics, but take it to mean that a utilitarian approach is for Weber more appropriate in politics than a deontological one. As for those who agree that Weber intended to formulate a new ethical approach more attuned to modernity, they nonetheless differ on whether this new ethical approach is applicable only to politics, or has a wider scope. In interpreting Weber’s ethic of responsibility I hope to avoid the shortcuts taken by some of his earlier interpreters, who rely solely on an exegesis of ‘Politics as a vocation’ in spite of the brevity of the exposition, or who, despite realising that an adequate interpretation requires also taking into account relevant extratextual factors  – e. g., historical circumstances, biographical information, the perspectives of Weber’s contemporaries, as well as views expressed in his other publications – nevertheless rely solely on one or two of these factors as decisive for the interpretation.14 In my opinion, a responsible and adequate interpretation should be as holistic as possible, drawing on the full range of relevant textual and extra-textual factors. Furthermore, such an interpretation necessarily requires that one takes note of and critically engages with the major interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility already out there. It came as something of a surprise to discover that among the many interpretations in existence, almost none meaningfully engages with earlier readings. In addressing this omission I  hope that the present study will also prove to be of use to those who primarily wish to gain a better sense of the reception of Weber’s ethic. The focus of Chapters 1 to 4 will be the interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility. 14  In his comprehensive recent biography on Max Weber, Dirk Kaesler complains that distinctions in ‘Politics as a vocation’ like living ‘for’ or ‘from’ politics and conviction and responsibility ethics have become “ […] set pieces in trivial talk about politics and politicians, without adequately relating them to the whole oeuvre of Max Weber and its context, often even without mentioning the original author […] In present social scientific research the speech ‘Politics as a vocation’ of Max Weber, this passionately political person, held in the concrete political situation of the revolutionary free state Bayern, is often stripped from its historical connections and stylized to the status of ‘key text’ of the Weberian sociology in general” (Kaesler 2014: 876, tr. from the German).



Introduction

7

In Chapter 1 Weber’s ethic of responsibility is situated in a number of ways. The first aim of this chapter is to orientate readers, especially those unfamiliar with Weber’s views. The second aim is to define more clearly the parameters within which our attempt to interpret his proposal for an ethic of responsibility should take place. For one thing, the proposal is situated historically by describing the circumstances immediately preceding the presentation of ‘Politics as a vocation’; both the factors that led to the invitation to Weber to give the speech and the prevailing political situation in Germany  – and, more specifically, in Munich, where the speech was given – are discussed. Furthermore, the speech is also textually situated in relation to ‘Science as a vocation’, its companion piece in the series on ‘Intellectual labour as a vocation’, by means of brief summaries and a comparison of the content of the two speeches. It also takes the form of an attempt to categorise his discussion of the two ethics and, more specifically, his proposal on an ethic of responsibility, in terms of academic discipline. A provisional answer is provided to the question: Did Weber have in mind a purely sociological discussion of existing ethical approaches in politics, or did he have a more philosophical, even normative ethical purpose? Finally, the proposal is also situated biographically. Attention is given to relevant biographical factors, including personal characteristics and formative relationships and experiences, which shaped Weber as a person and might be considered to have indirectly influenced his views on the distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. Chapter 2 provides a brief exposition of the major interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, the focus being not on an exhaustive overview of all the different readings generated over time, but rather on interpretations that might be deemed representative and influential. A significant distinction that emerges here is between those who interpret Weber’s ethic of responsibility exclusively in terms of teleological or consequentialist ethics, thus only in terms of responsibility for consequences, and those interpretations in terms of responsibility for both conviction and consequences. Among the former there are four interpretations I highlight for consideration. Lothar Waas interprets the ethic of responsibility as Weber’s depiction of one of the basic and existing ethical approaches in Western politics, which stands in opposition to the ethic of conviction as the other basic ethical approach. There is, in his opinion, no difference between Weber’s distinction of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility and the more contemporary distinction of deontological and teleological ethics, while he also remains convinced that Weber did not express any preference for the ethic of responsibility. Where Waas emphasises the contrast between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, Nicholas Gane and Peter Müller stress the complementarity of the two ethics in Weber’s exposition in ‘Politics as a vocation’. According to them, Weber regarded the ethic of responsibility as only one leg of the appropriate ethical approach in politics, the other indispensable

8

Introduction

leg being the ethic of conviction. Peter Breiner provides yet another perspective, arguing that Weber clearly regarded the ethic of conviction approach as unsuitable for politics and preferred the ethic of responsibility approach. He interprets the ethic of responsibility as a situated, consequentialist ethics closely attuned to charismatic political leadership. An emphatic attempt to interpret Weber’s ethic of responsibility in purely teleological terms is undertaken by Wolfgang Wieland, who presents it as a variant of utilitarian ethics, suitable not only for politics, but also for applied ethics in other social orders. Under the second rubric I first turn to the work of H. H. Bruun, who is of the opinion that Weber regarded the ethic of responsibility as the ethical approach typical of the political sphere. In a first round of interpretation he portrays the ethic of responsibility purely in teleological terms, but in a second round concludes that Weber in the last part of ‘Politics as a vocation’ introduces a responsible ethic of conviction, which also allows value axioms from other social orders than the political one to play a role in political decision making. Wolfgang Schluchter’s interpretation is also executed in two rounds. First, he provides an interpretation of the professional ethical virtues of the political leader who acts in accordance with the ethic of responsibility. He then proceeds to substantiate his claim that Weber proposes this ethic as a new type of normative ethics that can serve as an alternative for Kant’s formal ethical theory in late modernity. Chapter 3 sketches the bigger picture regarding Weber’s views on ethics and politics, incorporating views developed by him in works preceding ‘Politics as a vocation’. The primary aim of this sketch is to demonstrate that the formulation of the ethic of responsibility in this speech was the outcome of the development of his thoughts on ethics and politics over a long period of time. My own point of departure here is that the key for understanding his sociological work is to be found in his desire to fathom the impact of rationalisation processes in the Western World not only on the external institutional dimension of social life, but also on the inner dimension of social life and the life and conduct of the individual. While the emphasis in his work was on accurate sociological description he occasionally also allowed himself normative reflection on his sociological findings. Accordingly, I first pay attention to Weber’s views on the external, institutional consequences of rationalisation in the Western world, before going on to consider, not only the internal meaning of this rationalisation for the experience of life and the ethical orientation of people in modernity, but also his evaluation of different responses to the ambivalences of modernity. The discussion of Weber’s views on politics starts off by establishing that his interest in politics was not only academic, but also intensely personal – particularly in the case of German politics  – and that he had no reservations about regularly expressing his personal views in speeches and articles for the popular press. This inevitably raises the question: What, indeed, is the relation between Weber’s sociological and personal views on politics? In pursuing an answer to this question, I  elucidate



Introduction

9

what I take to be two distinct perspectives on politics to be found in Weber, the first rigorously sociological and the other personal, and proceed to show how these perspectives variously contributed to his proposed solutions to problems regarding political leadership. Chapter 4 endeavours to provide an adequate interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility. First, the major interpretations of this ethic are assessed in the light of the discussion in previous chapters of factors that influenced Weber’s view. One of the weaknesses of these interpretations, in my opinion, is that they ignore the fact that Weber used the term ‘responsibility’ to designate his preferred ethic, instead regarding it as purely coincidental that he did so, or denying responsibility any central role in his ethic. The second part of the chapter, which proffers an interpretation in terms of responsibility, therefore commences with a discussion of the emergence of responsibility as a central concept in modern Western culture, the recognition of its centrality, also in politics and philosophy, and the expansion of its meaning since the nineteenth century. This discussion indicates how Weber’s discourse on responsibility in ‘Politics as a vocation’ and in earlier works resonates with this emergence of the concept of responsibility, a concept that, I go on to demonstrate, does indeed take centre stage in his exposition of the ethic of responsibility. In my opinion Weber pertinently called his ethic the ‘ethic of responsibility’: first of all, to emphasise the special responsibility of the charismatic political leader to uphold ethics in the political order and to set the ethical course of the nation; secondly, to stress the need for a new and more appropriate ethical approach in politics that is ‘responsible’ in the comprehensive sense of the word. The ethic of responsibility in the first instance entails a professional ethics, which singles out comprehensive political responsibility  – both retrospectively and prospectively – as the most important professional virtue the political leader should exhibit. In the second instance, it also entails a formal ethics of political action, in that the political leader is expected both to select the ultimate values that form the basis of his political decisions responsibly and to take political decisions responsibly by, inter alia, estimating the foreseeable consequences of the available options for action before deciding. As such, Weber’s ethic of responsibility should not be regarded as yet another normative ethical theory addressed to the identification and justification of first-level moral principles but, rather, as a proposal for a second-level normative approach in politics, dealing with the responsible choice of ultimate values from what in late modernity becomes a plurality of moral and social-order-specific values vying with one another for recognition, as well as with the prerequisites for responsible decision-making. The third and last part of the chapter briefly highlights the remarkable correspondences between Weber’s proposal and ethical proposals of the so-called via media by philosophers who preceded him or were his contemporaries. This leaves us with the question regarding the relevancy and applicability of Weber’s ethic of responsibility today. Should we regard it as an out-dated ethical

10

Introduction

proposal that does not have any validity in the changed circumstances of contemporary modern societies? Or should we acknowledge that in at least certain respects it provides a model for us in our own search for an appropriate contemporary approach to ethics? These questions are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. Given the close correlation of Weber’s proposed ethic to his views on the distinctive character of Western modernisation, the processes of rationalisation that contributed to it, and the negative impact these processes had on the ethical dimension of life, especially in the context of the different social orders, Chapter 5 starts out by addressing the question: To what extent do these views of Weber still apply today? Attention is given to three theses that form the core of Weber’s views on modernisation and its impact on ethical living. The first thesis can be called the secularisation thesis or, more precisely, the thesis that disenchantment inevitably leads to secularisation, that is, the gradual decline of the influence of religious faith and ethics. The second thesis can be called the differentiation thesis, to the effect that modernisation resulted in the differentiation of autonomous social orders, each with its own distinctive set of values. Of special relevancy is Weber’s view that the traditional moral values of the Western world have no place in these social orders. The third thesis can be called the iron cage thesis, referring to the ethical meaninglessness of work life and the lack of freedom to act ethically in the modern workplace due to, among other things, the stifling grip of bureaucratisation. The conclusion drawn with regard to the first thesis is that although it is still true that a particular religious ethics cannot be dominant in modern societies, it is not true that religions are destined for extinction and that religious ethical values do not provide any guidance in social orders. Although modern societies today are indeed differentiated in social orders, each with its own distinctive set of values, it does not mean that moral values are excluded from these orders, including the political order. They can form part of the normative framework within which activities in a particular social order are channelled. Contrary to what Weber anticipated, the last century did not see a drastic intensification of bureaucratisation in modern societies, but, for the most part, a movement away from hierarchical organisational structures. Added to that, ethical codes agreed upon within contemporary organisations can to a large extent assure that employers are not forced to act contrary to their own moral values. In the light of the critical assessment of Weber’s views of modernisation and its impact on the scope for living ethically, I undertake an appraisal of his proposal regarding the ethic of responsibility from a contemporary perspective in the first part of Chapter 6. Attention is given, first of all, to the commendable aspects of his proposal. It is conceded that, whatever else needs to be said, one has to appreciate Weber’s recognition of the need in late modernity – given the negative impact of modernisation on traditional Western ethics – first of all, to take responsibility for salvaging the ethical dimension of life, second, to design a new approach to ethics



Introduction

11

to appropriately exercise this responsibility and, third, to conceptualise this new approach as a second-level normative ethical one characterised by comprehensive responsibility, thus as an ethic of responsibility. Problematic aspects of Weber’s proposal of an ethic of responsibility are also pointed out. The first is that Weber designates the charismatic political leader as the sole agent of the ethic of responsibility, thereby restricting the ethic of responsibility to the political order, and in an elitist manner opens the door for authoritarian abuse through the exclusion of other political role-players. Secondly, his view that there is no place in politics, or other social orders, for Western traditional ethical values, rests on his exaggeration of the conflicting relation between such traditional ethical values and order-specific sets of values. The most serious problem with his proposal, however, is the purely formal concept of ethics he departs from. By granting ethical status to values that the political leader regards as ultimate values to which he commits himself in politics, Weber opens the door for the elevation of any cultural value to an ethical value, and for defining any political action following from the total commitment to such an ultimate value as an ethical action. Such an understanding of ethics provides no guarantee against elevating to ethical status those cultural values the pursuit of which could benefit only a particular cultural group, while disadvantaging other cultural groups. In the second part of Chapter 6 a brief proposal is made on how an appropriate contemporary ethic of responsibility could be conceptualised. The proposal departs from the premise, based on the foregoing critical assessment, that the core of Weber’s ethic of responsibility that could and should be retained today is: taking responsibility for salvaging and advancing the ethical dimension of life, while adequately acknowledging irreversible social developments, and responsibly dealing with the variety of values and making ethical decisions. First of all, attention is given to a terminological clarification of the designation, ‘contemporary ethic of responsibility as second-level normative ethical approach’. Secondly, I  discuss some of the presuppositions that underpin the proposal. Lastly, some of the features of the contemporary ethic of responsibility I propose are highlighted. Special attention is given to the two main focus areas: (i) dealing responsibly with values, and (ii) dealing responsibly with ethical decision-making. With regard to the first, a distinction is made between dealing responsibly with ‘thick’ moral values in personal and communal life, and dealing responsibly with ‘thin’ moral values in social orders, organisations, professions, and public life in general.15 From the perspective of a contemporary ethic of responsibility, a number of ways are identified in which role-players could respon15  The distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ used with regard to morality and ethics was introduced by Michael Walzer (see Walzer 1994: xi). Walzer utilises the term ‘thick’ to point to a kind of moral argument that is ‘richly referential, culturally resonant, locked into a locally established symbolic system or network of meanings’. ‘Thin’ is simply the contrasting term.

12

Introduction

sibly deal with these two different types of ethical values in different spheres of life. In discussing the second main focus area, namely dealing responsibly with ethical decision-making, the need to further develop the ground-breaking work of the German theologian Eduard Tödt in identifying the steps involved in the process of responsible ethical decision-making is underlined.

Chapter 1

Situating Weber’s ethic of responsibility 1. Introduction In the effort to better understand Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility we have to start at the beginning. We have to situate this ethic, first of all, historically, by taking into account the immediate and relevant circumstances in which Weber proposed it. He made his proposal in the speech, ‘Politics as a vocation’, delivered in Munich on 28 January 1919. The first set of questions that comes to mind relates to the occasion itself: By whom was he invited to give the speech on this topic? What prompted the invitation to him? When one takes into account the date and the location of the speech, another set of questions also crops up: What were the relevant political events in Germany, but also more specifically in Munich, immediately preceding Weber’s speech? Could we identify specific persons involved in these political events, whom Weber might have had in mind when he criticised the protagonists of an ethic of conviction? In the first part of the chapter I  attempt to answer these questions by providing a brief historical reconstruction of both the relevant factors leading to Weber’s invitation to give the speech ‘Politics as a vocation’ and relevant political developments in Germany and Munich in the months preceding the speech. Weber’s proposal of an ethic of responsibility also has to be situated textually. We cannot ignore the fact that the proposal was made in the context of a speech on ‘Politics as a vocation’ and that it was made at the end of this rather long speech. Questions that need to be discussed are: How does the proposal fit into the rest of the speech? How should it be categorised from an academic point of view? What also cannot be ignored is that ‘Politics as a vocation’ is the second of two speeches focused on a particular vocation that Weber gave in Munich in a little more than one year. On 7 November 1917 he had already given a speech on ‘Science as a vocation’. A question that immediately comes to mind is: What is the relation between these two speeches? Furthermore, what are the relevant similarities and differences? I address these questions in the second part of this chapter, starting with a brief summary of ‘Science as a vocation’ as well as a more substantial overview of ‘Politics as a vocation’. To ensure an unbiased exposition of Weber’s proposal of the ethic of responsibility, an attempt is made to keep as close as possible to the wording used in ‘Politics as a vocation’. This gives readers the opportunity to formulate their own preliminary understanding before being

14

Chapter 1: Situating Weber’s ethic of responsibility

engaging with the different interpretations of his ethic of responsibility presented in following chapters. Secondly, the two speeches are also briefly compared with a view to identifying relevant similarities and differences. Thirdly, I make a provisional attempt to categorise Weber’s proposal for an ethic of responsibility in terms of academic discipline. Although a substantiated categorisation would only be possible on the basis of discussions in later chapters it would be helpful to get some clarity, from the outset, on the parameters within which the investigation into Weber’s ethic of responsibility should take place. There is yet another way in which Weber’s proposal for an ethic of responsibility can be situated, namely biographically. Although one should be careful not to draw direct and simplistic inferences regarding the interpretation of this ethic from formative personal relationships and experiences in Weber’s life and from his personal characteristics, it could be worthwhile to explore whether they do not point to an early affinity for certain approaches to ethics and a disapproval of others on his side. To facilitate such an exploration the last part of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of formative personal relationships and experiences in Weber’s life, as well as a sketch of his personality traits.

2.  Situating the ethic of responsibility historically The invitations to present the lectures ‘Science as a vocation’ and ‘Politics as a vocation’ were extended to Weber by a student organisation, the Munich Free Students Association, as part of a lecture series on the theme ‘Intellectual labour as a vocation’ planned for the latter half of 1917. The lecture series itself was provoked by an essay on ‘Vocation and youth’, written by Franz Xaver Schwab (most probably the pen name for Alexander Schwab) and published in the monthly journal Die weissen Blätter in May 1917. In the essay, Schwab renounced the idea of ‘vocation’ (profession) as an idol of the West European–American bourgeois world. In his opinion, this idol was causing the alienation of life from the spirit, and the only way to reconcile life with the spirit was to break the dominion of vocation and its accompanying world of specialists. Only when this happened would the youth be able to attain full and beautiful humanity, like the Ancient Greeks. He also accused the existing student organisations of not giving any serious attention to the problem of vocation and advised them to take note of the works of the brothers Max and Alfred Weber, because he considered them the only persons up until then who had said something important about vocation (Schluchter 1996: 32–33). It is not surprising that Weber accepted the invitation to present the two lectures. Apart from the fact that he was indeed an expert on the topic of vocation, or profession, he believed at the time that the only hope for the future of Germany lay in the youth. In a January 1919 speech on Germany’s restoration,



2.  Situating the ethic of responsibility historically

15

he pointed out that “the fatherland is not the land of the fathers, but the land of the children” (Weber 1988: 419, tr. from the German). In a letter to Otto Crusius, professor of classical philology in Munich, written in November 1918, he expressed the opinion that the resolution of the prevalent cultural problems, above all, lay in educating the youth, to regain moral ‘decency’. Only exclusive associations, that is, associations based upon the selection of persons, starting in childhood and youth, could in his opinion, successfully undertake this task. He mentioned that the first signs of such an education could be noticed in the Free German Youth (cf. Marianne Weber 1975: 647). This remark reveals how much Weber’s hope for Germany’s future was linked to the Free German Youth, with which he would also have associated the Free Students Association (Schluchter 1996: 23). The free student movement can be understood as an umbrella movement of those students who organised themselves at the beginning of the twentieth century in opposition to the exclusivist, militaristic, and divisive student fraternities at German universities with their roots in feudal Germany. At the Weimar Free Student Conference in 1906 they adopted as goal the reestablishment of the old civitas academica, the unification of all students into one self-contained, autonomous body, which is officially recognised as one unit at every university (cf. Schluchter 1996: 25). The free student movement advocated the principles of tolerance and neutrality, valued independent convictions, and limited its political activities to purely academic matters. The groups associated with this movement were united in their dedication to the classical idea of the German university and, above all, to the ideas of education through scholarship and academic freedom. However, as Wolfgang Schluchter points out, in the early twentieth century it increasingly became an open question how these ideas should be interpreted and realised within a university system that had seen a dramatic increase in student population since the establishment of the German Empire, and whose structures had undergone far-reaching changes under the pressure of the growing specialisation of academic disciplines, especially in the natural sciences (Schluchter 1996: 26). Weber had sympathy for the free student movement, and especially the Free Student Association, which was unequivocally oriented to the idea of the university as an institution for specialised scholarly education and self-development. Although as a student of law and political economy at the University of Heidelberg he joined the student fraternity Allemania in 1982, and only resigned his alumni fraternity membership in November 1918, over the years he increasingly distanced himself from such institutions. In an address, ‘Students and politics’, delivered to a student audience in Munich in March 1919, he openly criticised the exclusivity of student fraternities. In his opinion, it made democratisation impossible and created a false sense of the special position of the student and graduate. Such a position could not be based on the pretensions of an academic

16

Chapter 1: Situating Weber’s ethic of responsibility

status group, but should rather be individually earned by conducting one’s life in the manner of the aristocracy of the spirit, by means of self-determined conduct (cf. Schluchter 1996: 23–25). This does not mean that Weber was happy with all developments in Free Student circles. For one thing, he was quite disturbed by the growth of pacifist sympathies among members of the Munich Free Students Association towards the end of World War I. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, professor of philosophy and education at the University of Munich, played an important role in the spread of pacifist ideas among the students, strongly advocating a Christian pacifism, both vocally and in print. When, in 1917, he came out in his lectures for an immediate peace of mutual understanding, this led to the formation of a committee of students who protested against his ‘defeatist influence’ and organised disruptions of his lectures. Other students formed a counter-committee to defend him. The Munich Free Students Association was one of the student organisations that supported the counter-committee (Schluchter 1996: 26–27). It is therefore noteworthy that in both ‘Science as a vocation’ and ‘Politics as a vocation’, which were addressed to an audience that would have included many members of the Munich Free Students Association, Weber explicitly referred to Prof. Foerster and strongly criticised his views. The Munich controversy on pacifism is an indication that, even before Weber presented his lecture on ‘Science as a vocation’ at the end of 1917 the broader political situation in Germany and especially the devastating war against the Allied forces had a profound impact on the intellectual climate among students. This impact became even more pronounced in the period between Weber’s first and second speeches. It soon became clear that Germany would lose the war and would have no choice but to surrender unconditionally to the Allied forces. When in the closing days of World War I in October 1918 the German government sued for peace, people and parties in different parts of Germany availed themselves of the opportunity provided by the ensuing volatile situation to take matters in their own hands, forming provisional governments and councils to replace the discredited imperial government and local monarchies (Hopkins 2008: 189). In Berlin on 9 November 1918, the last imperial prime minister, Prince Max of Baden, handed over authority to the leader of the Majority Social Democratic Party, Friedrich Ebert, who immediately declared Germany a republic. On the left of the reigning party was the Independent Social Democratic Party, which had split off from the Majority Party in 1917, and had to contend with an even more radical left wing. To this radical left wing belonged revolutionary sects such as the Spartakusbund, based on a Bolshevist communist ideology, with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht as leaders. These revolutionary sects were not satisfied with the civil revolution that took place in Germany, but strived to bring about a full-scale socialist revolution. They organised a rebellion in Berlin



2.  Situating the ethic of responsibility historically

17

and tried to overthrow the Majority Socialist government. This rebellion was, however, successfully suppressed by government troops in January 1919. In the violent confrontation the leaders of the Spartakusbund, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, were killed (Hopkins 2008: 189–190; Suzuki 2003: 209–211). In ‘Politics as a vocation’ Weber does not mention Rosa Luxemburg or Karl Liebknecht, although he does refer to the political approach of the ‘Bolshevists’ and the ‘Spartacists’ as typical of the ethic of conviction. When one looks more closely at Luxemburg’s views on revolution, it is not difficult to understand why, from Weber’s perspective, such a characterisation would seem fitting. Masahito Suzuki notes her ‘illusory’ idealism with regard to the revolution of the people: “[…] though she insisted on an armed revolution like Lenin, she had an almost religious faith in people’s ability to act voluntarily. She therefore opposed Lenin’s coercive one-party rule as a means to revolution and insisted on the less coercive notion of rule by one class. She also believed that the struggle against bourgeois opportunism was not a problem of organization but of thought, and emphasized eliminating terrorism and fighting a spiritual struggle. Thus unable to take precautions against counter-revolution, she led the revolution to failure” (Suzuki 2003: 212).

The politically volatile situation in Germany at the end of the war also led to political unrest in Munich. Although the dominant political party in Bavaria was the conservative Catholic Bavarian People’s Party, there was also rivalry between the Majority Social Democrats and the smaller group of Independent Social Democrats. The Independents, under the leadership of Kurt Eisner, a journalist, had already in January 1918 promoted an anti-war strike among munition workers in Munich. As a result, Eisner and others were arrested and detained. In the pre-revolutionary situation that began to develop in Munich in the second half of October, Eisner was released from prison to contest a parliamentary by-election. It soon became clear that Eisner had plans instead to take over the government in Bavaria. First he organised a march on the 3rd of November to the Stadelheim prison in Munich to secure the release of the remaining three prisoners from the January strike. On the 4th of November students sympathetic to his cause disrupted a speech Max Weber was giving at a rally of the Progressive People’s Party on Germany’s new political order, in which he also opposed the notion of ‘peace at any price’. On the 7th of November Eisner was among the leaders of a march that managed to recruit soldiers in barracks near the Theresienwiese en route, and then proceeded to the Mathäserbräu beer hall, where soldiers’ and workers’ councils were elected. The elected representatives entered the parliamentary chambers and proclaimed a provisional government, with Kurt Eisner as prime minister. A republic was declared in Bavaria, which was given legal approval by the Bavarian high court in December 1918 (Hopkins 2008: 190–192). One of Eisner’s first initiatives as prime minister was an attempt to settle the peace. Through connections, he forwarded a peace message to President Woodrow Wilson of the USA. He tried to persuade the British and the French that

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there was now a new and progressive group of Germans who had not been involved in the outbreak of the war, did not deserve to be punished for the misdeeds of the old monarchy and military, and represented a solid chance to rebuild Germany as a good neighbour. On the 17th of November at the celebration of the revolution he gave a speech in which he, among others, proclaimed to the Allies that he and others accepted German guilt for the war, and sought expiation so that all could build together a new future in which there would be no war. He also went one step further. He instructed his staff to locate documents relating to the outbreak of the war and on the 24th of November published excerpts from four documents to show Germany’s responsibility in instigating the war (Hopkins 2008: 193–194). Eisner’s reign as prime minister of Bavaria did not last long. He increasingly came under attack from anarchists and proto-communists from the left, and from bourgeois and right wing extremists on the right. Under pressure he agreed to hold elections on 12 January 1919. The election results were unfavourable to Eisner and the Independent Social Democrats. The date for the choice of a new government was, however, delayed until the 21st of February, six weeks after the election (Hopkins 2008: 195). “When Weber gave his talk on ‘Politics as a vocation’ on the 28th of January, Bavaria was in this liminal situation, its future unclear” (Hopkins 2008: 196). The revolutionary climate and political uncertainty in Munich and Germany also had the effect that Weber had low expectations regarding the response of students to his speech. He realised all to well that his sharp criticism of pacifists and syndicalist socialists would hardly enthuse students agitated by war and revolution. He was himself deeply concerned over, and occupied by, political developments in Germany and in Munich at the time. Three weeks before the speech he wrote to Else Jaffé: “The lecture is going to be bad; something other than this ‘calling’ occupies my heart and soul” (quoted in Schluchter 1994: 17). On the 10th of February Eisner travelled with the sociologist Robert Michels to Basel, where he gave a speech to students that can be interpreted as a response to Weber’s speech. He argued that the vocation of a politically active person is to construct a new society by developing a new ‘spirit’ through education. He stressed that politics is education and should help people realise the ideas that are already present in their spirit so that the old can be cast aside (Hopkins 2008: 196). On 21 February 1919 Eisner was assassinated and his funeral became the occasion for a mass outpouring of grief. In the wake of his death, the political situation in Munich first veered to the extreme left, and included two successive attempts to build a left-wing republic in April 1919. Then it sharply veered to the right as right-wing forces at the beginning of May succeeded in overthrowing the left-wing regime in Munich. Bavaria became a model of ‘order’, rather than the vanguard of the revolution (Hopkins 2008: 196).



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Although Weber does not explicitly refer to Eisner in the published version of ‘Politics as a vocation’ (which was published after Eisner’s death), there is little doubt that he had Eisner in mind when in the speech he criticised the publication of documents to prove Germany’s guilt. Indeed, the fact that Eisner’s name does appear in Weber’s handwritten lecture notes leaves little room for doubt (Hopkins 2008: 203). It is also conspicuous that Weber, just before his speech, in an informal discussion with some of the students present, angrily accused Eisner of being responsible for the ‘bloody carnival’ of the revolution. One of the organisers of the lecture series, Immanuel Birnbaum, had no difficulty concluding that Weber saw in Eisner the type of conviction politician who has no judgement regarding the consequences of his actions (Hopkins 2008: 198, n. 24).

3.  Situating the ethic of responsibility textually 3.1  Science as a vocation1 Weber begins his speech by sketching the external academic conditions in Germany that someone who plans to pursue science as a vocation has to take into consideration. He points out the vast differences between Germany and the United States of America in this regard. While in Germany someone with the necessary academic qualifications first becomes a ‘private lecturer’ who does not receive a salary from the state, but has to make a living by giving private lessons to students until he2 is lucky enough to be appointed as a professor, the young academic in the USA is appointed as lecturer and receives a small salary from the start. Weber regards the young German academic’s prospects of being appointed as a full-time professor as hazardous, not only because such an appointment depends to a large extent on chance, but also because the academic system is structured in such a way that the academically favoured and most talented candidate is often overlooked. As a result of the fact that academic life is such a hazard, Weber finds the responsibility to advise students who are considering an academic career almost unbearable. Having dealt with these external academic conditions, Weber turns to the inner calling to science. He is convinced that one can only give a proper account of this inner calling if one takes into consideration that science has irreversibly moved into the stage of specialisation. Only through strict specialisation can the scientific worker experience the rare excitement of having achieved something 1  The German text of Weber‘s speech in Max Weber: Wissenschaft als Beruf 1917/1919. Politik als Beruf 1919 (Studienausgabe der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe Band I/17) 1994, pp. 1–23, edited by W. J. Mommsen and W. Schluchter, served as basis for this summary. 2  I have not altered in my summaries of Weber’s two speeches on the vocations of science and politics the typical early twentieth century sexist language used.

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worthwhile that will last. Someone who does not have the ability to focus, to commit to concentrated, detailed investigation, firmly believing that the destiny of his soul depends on it, should avoid a career in science. He will never experience what one can call the ‘thrilling experience’ of science; as for a human being nothing is worthwhile doing if it cannot be done with passion. Among the hazards of academic life is the fact that even the requisite passion does not guarantee results. A worthwhile result in science is almost always due to a bright idea that inadvertently comes to mind. While it is true that hard work often prepares the way for the advent of such a bright idea, it can, nonetheless, never be enforced. It depends on fate and has the nature of a gift. In Weber’s opinion, it is partly on account of this undeniable truth that it has become a popular cult among young people to exalt ‘personality’ and ‘experience’ to the status of idols. They strive to become personalities by having exciting experiences. To his young listeners Weber has this to say: Only those have ‘personality’ in the domain of science who are purely serving the cause of science. It is, of course, also true of other life domains that they have their own causes that have to be served diligently  – one can take art as an example. There is, however, an important difference between art and science. All scientific work is subject to the process of progress, while that is not the case with works of art. Works of art can become classics that have lasting value. The work of science finds its fulfilment exactly in becoming ‘out-dated’. It is not only the fate of most scientific findings that they become out-dated within a very brief timespan; it is also the goal of all scientific investigation to render the results of previous scientific investigation out-dated and to become out-dated in turn. With that we are confronted with the problem of the meaning of science. What is the meaning of such an undertaking that in reality never comes to an end and also cannot come to an end? One can, of course, point to the positive technical results of scientific investigation, for example that today people are clothed and fed better than in times past. This does, however, not answer the question: What is the meaning of science for the one who does it for its own sake? Neither does it answer the question: What is the meaning of science in the context of the whole of human life? To arrive at answers to these questions one has to take into account that scientific progress is a small, though significant, part of a process of intellectualisation or rationalisation that has been taking place over many thousands of years. This process of rationalisation has surely not brought about better general knowledge of the conditions of life. One can even say that in a certain sense the Indian or Hottentot had a much better understanding of his life-world. At least he knew exactly how the implements he was using worked. Most of us today make use of trains but do not have an inkling of how they function. What the process of rationalisation did bring about is the knowledge, or belief, that we can, if we want to, at any time experience that in principle no mysterious incalculable powers exist that have an influence on what is happening in the world, so that we



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in principle can control all things by means of calculation. What it brought about is nothing but the disenchantment of the world. In the course of history different answers have been provided to the question regarding the meaning of science in the whole economy of human life: (i) Plato in his famous parable of the cave saw the value of science in paving the way to the true being and to eternal truths by means of philosophical concepts. (ii) The Renaissance saw the value of the sciences in showing the way to true nature by means of rational experiments. (iii) In early modernity the Puritans found the value of the sciences in pointing the way to the true God. Weber in this regard quotes the anatomist Swammerdam’s famous remark: “I bring to you here proof of the providence of God in the anatomy of a louse.” (iv) In the nineteenth century, the age of the big discoveries of the natural sciences, it was optimistically believed that the sciences have their value in providing the way to true happiness. None of these answers have withstood the test of time. Weber believes that Tolstoy provided the most simple and also convincing answer: ‘Science as a vocation is meaningless, because it cannot give us an answer to the important question: What should we do? How should we live?’ The natural sciences strive to know the laws that govern physical knowledge, but cannot demonstrate the meaning of such knowledge over and above its technical usefulness. Neither can they demonstrate that the world that they describe has value, nor that it is worthwhile or meaningful to live in such a world. All natural sciences only give us an answer to the question: ‘What should we do when we want to technically control life?’ Whether we should exercise this technical control, and whether such control has any meaning, is something they ignore or presuppose. Weber maintains that it is also necessary with regard to the cultural and social sciences to sharply distinguish between taking a practical-political stance and providing a scientific analysis. He agrees with those who say that politics does not belong in the lecture hall. As an example of a lecturer whose classes were disrupted by students as a result of the pacifist political views he proclaimed in class he mentions prof. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, a colleague at the University of Munich. Although Weber admits that it is not possible to scientifically demonstrate to someone his duties as an academic teacher, he finds it irresponsible of a lecturer to use the lecture hall to indoctrinate students with his own political views under the guise of providing scientifically proven knowledge. This does not mean that the communication of scientifically proven facts cannot have any impact on the political views of students. Exposure to uncomfortable facts that contradict one’s political views can bring about a change of view. In Weber’s opinion a lecturer who exposes his students to uncomfortable facts,

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and also teaches them to take such facts seriously, has not only accomplished an intellectual, but also a moral feat. Apart from practical reasons, there is, however, a deeper reason why pressing personal political and religious views upon students in the lecture hall should be avoided. To do so is in principle meaningless on account of the irresolvable conflict in which the different value orders of the world are involved. Weber here makes use of John Stuart Mill’s simile of polytheism to describe this conflict of values. In Ancient Greece different gods were involved in a deadly and eternal struggle. Today the many gods, disenchanted and mythically disrobed by the rationalism of the ethical-methodical way of life that originated in Christianity, once more arise from their graves in the form of impersonal powers that again strive to rule our lives and are again involved in an eternal struggle. To illustrate the irresolvable conflict between the values of different social orders, Weber points to the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount that teaches: Do not resist evil! This ethic is highly valued in the sphere of religion, but in the sphere of politics amounts to an ethic of dishonour. Ethics in politics is based on the honour of men and teaches: Resist evil  – or else become co-responsible for its superiority! What is difficult for modern people, and even more difficult for young people, is to cope with such a reality on a daily basis. All their frantic striving after thrilling experiences has its origin in the disability to seriously face the fate of our time. They just have to accept that today there is no way in which science can arbitrate in the struggle between the gods and can solve the problems of life caused by this struggle. It can only establish what the godly in the one or the other social order is. For that reason, any attempt to solve problems of life in the lecture hall is also to no avail. In the end, modern people have to accept that they themselves inevitably have to choose between different conflicting views regarding the ultimate stance to life. In spite of this Weber is of the opinion that the sciences do have some positive meaning for practical and personal life. He identifies four ways in which the sciences make a positive contribution in this regard: (i) The sciences provide us with technical knowledge that can assist us in controlling life by means of calculation. (ii) They develop methods and train us methodical ways of thinking. (iii) They help us to get clarity on goal-means relationships, and on the consequences and meta-consequences of our actions. (iv) They assist us in giving account of the ultimate meaning of our own actions. They do this not by evaluating worldviews, but by showing us the consequences of our actions for our own worldview and those of others. To put this figuratively: They make us aware of the fact that our actions may serve a particular god, while doing harm to another. In Weber’s view, when a lecturer succeeds in helping students in these four ways and, especially, empowers them to give account of the meaning of their actions,



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he fulfils something like a ‘moral’ duty to provide clarity and a sense of responsibility. Weber concludes his speech by emphasising again that today science is nothing more than a vocation that is exercised in different disciplines in search of purely factual knowledge, and is not in any way a provider of salvation or answers regarding the meaning of life. We have to accept that it is the fate of our time that, as a result of rationalisation and disenchantment, the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from the public domain, either into the other-worldly kingdom of mysticism or the brotherliness of close relationships. Those who cannot endure this reality in a manly way are advised to return quietly to the bosom of the old church, which would make it easy for them to sacrifice their intellect. For those who accept the present-day reality the challenge is: to diligently do our work and face the demands of every day in our personal lives and our vocations. This would not be difficult if each of us find and obey the demon that holds the strings of our lives.

3.2.  Politics as a vocation3 At the very outset of ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber warns his young listeners that he will most probably disappoint them in their expectations for him to take a stand on topical political questions of the day. Only at the end of the speech will he take such a stand, but in a “purely formal way and in response to particular questions concerning the significance of political action within our conduct of life as a whole” (Weber 1994a: 309). He then turns to an explanation of politics, reminding his listeners that as a vocation it has to do with leadership of the modern state that can be defined as an institutional association of rule, which has successfully established the monopoly of legitimate physical violence as a means of rule within a territory. For the political rule of the state, as for any other form of rule by human beings over human beings, there are in principle three legitimating grounds: 1) the authority of custom (traditional rule), 2) the authority of the exceptional, personal ‘gift of grace’ or charisma (charismatic rule), and 3) belief in the validity of legal statute (rule by virtue of legality). What interests Weber in the context of this speech is above all the second of the three types. For it is in charismatic rule that, in his opinion, politics as a vocation in its highest form has its roots. Devotion to the charisma of the leader means that he is regarded as someone who is inwardly ‘called’ to the task of 3  The English translation of this speech in Weber: Political writings, 1994, 309–369, edited by P. Lassmann and R. Speirs, served as the basis of this summary. See for the German version of the speech: Max Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf 1917/1919. Politik als Beruf 1919, MWG I/17, 1992 or Max Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf 1917/1919. Politik als Beruf 1919 (Studienausgabe der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe Band I/17), 1994.

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leading men. The charismatic leader is someone who “lives for his cause (Sache), ‘aspires after its work’” (Weber 1994a: 312). From the charismatic political leader who is, in his opinion, the proper professional politician, Weber distinguishes categories of professional politicians in a second sense that have emerged in history, mostly entering the service of charismatic leaders. As a result two ways of making a profession out of politics can be distinguished. Either one lives ‘for’ politics or one lives ‘from’ politics. “Anyone who lives ‘for’ politics makes this his life in an inward sense, either enjoying the naked possession of the power he exercises or feeding his inner balance and self-esteem from the sense that he is giving his life meaning and purpose by devoting it to a ‘cause’” (Weber 1994a: 318). The person who lives ‘from’ politics is one whose aim is to make it into an enduring source of income. Weber points out that in modern political life politicians have to deal with the effects of general bureaucratisation. On the one hand he has appreciation for the role the growing body of specialist, professional officials (Fachbeamten) plays in running the state. It forms a strong bulwark against political corruption and is also increasingly indispensable for the purely technical performance of the state. He is, however, less enthusiastic about the fact that these officials are, especially in Germany, increasingly playing an active role in political decision-making. In terms of what he is really called upon to do, the true official should not engage in politics. He should rather ‘administer’ in an impartial way and carry out the duties of his office sine ira et studio, ‘without anger and prejudice’. “When, despite the arguments advanced by an official, his superior insists on the execution of an instruction which the official regards as mistaken, the official’s honour consists in being able to carry out the instruction, on the responsibility of the man issuing it, conscientiously and precisely in the same way as if it corresponded to his own convictions” (Weber 1994a: 331). This is the supremely ethical discipline and self-denial that the official should exhibit in order to avoid the disintegration of the whole state apparatus. The actions of the political leader are, however, subject to a quite different principle of responsibility. His honour “consists precisely in taking exclusive, personal responsibility for what he does, responsibility which he cannot and may not refuse or unload onto others” (Weber 1994a: 331). Weber sees in the systems of plebiscitary democracy that have developed in the USA and in England considerable room for the truly charismatic politician to operate. A clear example of a strong charismatic leader who emerged in England is, in his opinion, William Gladstone. Through his ‘grand’ demagogy, the firm belief of the masses in the ethical content of his politics and, above all, in the ethical content of his personality, he could lead the political machine of his party to a quick victory over the notables. He acknowledges, however, that the strong centralisation of all power in the hands of one person at the head of the party to which these systems have led, has as its downside that the caucus-machine is almost wholly unprincipled (gesinnungslos) and entirely in the hands of the



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political leader. Even so, this is the price to be paid for having a leader in charge of a party. “[T]he choice lies between a leadership democracy with a ‘machine’ and democracy without a leader, which means rule by the ‘professional politician’ who has no vocation, the type of man who lacks precisely those inner, charismatic qualities which make a leader” (Weber 1994a: 351). In contrast to the USA and England a situation has developed in Germany where politicians have no power and no responsibility. This has to do  – apart from the strong political influence of a trained professional officialdom  – with the poor leadership qualities of German politicians, the resultant weakness of the parliaments and the existence in Germany of parties of political principle (gesinnungspolitische Parteien). These parties have undermined the parliamentary system by excluding themselves from the system by means of uncooperative attitudes and actions. Having provided a comprehensive sketch of the external political context in which those of his student listeners who strive to become professional politicians would have to work, Weber turns to more personal advice on the qualities that such a professional ought to possess. The joy that a political career offers is, according to him, the feeling of power it confers. The person planning to pursue such a career has to face the question: Which qualities will enable him to do justice to this power, and thus to the responsibility it imposes on him? With that, he proposes, we move into the area of ethics, “for to ask what kind of a human being one must be in order to have the right to seize the spokes of the wheel of history is to pose an ethical question” (Weber 1994a: 352). Weber distinguishes three qualities that are pre-eminently decisive for a politician: passion, a sense of responsibility and judgement. Passion – in contrast to what Georg Simmel called ‘sterile excitement’ – is concern for the thing itself (Sachlichkeit), the passionate commitment to a ‘cause’ (Sache), to the god or demon who commands that cause. Simply to feel passion, however genuinely, is not sufficient to make a politician unless, in the form of service to a ‘cause’, responsibility for that cause becomes the decisive lodestar of all action. This requires, in turn, what is for him the decisive psychological quality of the politician, namely judgement (Augenmass), the ability to maintain one’s inner composure and calm while being receptive to realities, in other words, distance from things and people. In the possession of these three qualities lies the ‘strength’ of political ‘personality’, in his opinion. Weber does not only name the three most important political virtues. He also identifies vanity as the most important vice of politicians. It has to do with the fact that the ambition for power is an inevitable means with which they work. Although the instinct for power is quite normal for politicians, vanity creeps in when striving for power becomes detached from the task in hand (unsachlich) and becomes a matter of purely personal self-intoxication, instead of being placed entirely at the service of the ‘cause’. A lack of objectivity, which tempts the pol-

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itician to strive for the glittering appearance of power rather than its reality, and irresponsibility, which tempts him to enjoy power for its own sake, without any substantive purpose, are then the inevitable consequences. The politician who gives in to these temptations of vanity is nothing but a mere ‘power-politician’ (Machtpolitiker). The last problem Weber addresses in his speech is the relation between politics and ethics, or, as he also puts it, the problem of the ethos of politics as a ‘cause’. He takes as his starting point the fact that different politicians strive to fulfil different causes, or goals. The nature of these causes the politicians seek to serve by striving for and using power is a question of faith. These goals can, for example, be national or international, ethical or cultural. This does not, however, answer the question: What vocation can politics per se, quite independently of its goals, fulfil within the overall moral economy of our conduct of life? Where is what one might call the ethical home of politics? Weber admits that at this point ultimate Weltanschauungen collide, and that one has eventually to choose between them. This does not prevent him from presenting his own view in this regard in the last part of his speech. Before dealing more systematically with the relation between politics and ethics Weber in an interlude refers to undignified uses that are sometimes made of ethics in personal relationships, but also in politics. A  clear example of this misuse is, in his opinion, the priggish self-righteousness of some politicians who expect their government to officially admit moral guilt in instigating war and are even willing to reveal secret government documents to prove this guilt. They completely ignore that honour is central to politics and that their actions cause injury to the honour of the nation. “Instead of dealing with what concerns the politician (the future and our responsibility for it), such an ‘ethical’ approach concerns itself with politically sterile (because unresolvable) questions of past guilt. This, if anything, is what constitutes political guilt” (Weber 1994a: 356). We find two opposite views regarding the relation between politics and ethics. The one is that they have nothing to do with one another, the other that political action is subject to the same ethic as every other form of activity. Although Weber does not want to exclude ethics from politics, he is not convinced that one can uphold the thesis that any ethic in the world could establish substantially identical commandments applicable to all relationships. With regards to politics, one should ask: “Can the fact that politics operates with a quite specific means, namely power, backed up by the use of violence, really be a matter of such indifference as far as the ethical demands placed on politics are concerned?” (Weber 1994a: 357). He demonstrates his point by showing how politically absurd it would be to apply some of the absolute moral imperatives of the Sermon on the Mount directly to political action. One of these moral imperatives is: ‘Turn the other cheek!’  – unconditionally, without asking by what right the other person has



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struck you. This is, in Weber’s eyes, an ethics of indignity, except for the saint. This type of ethic is only meaningful when one strives in all things to be a saint. But not otherwise. “For while it is a consequence of the unworldly ethic of love to say, ‘resist not evil with force’, the politician is governed by the contrary maxim, namely, ‘You shall resist evil with force, for if you do not, you are responsible for the spread of evil’” (Weber 1994a: 358). The difference between the absolutist ethics of the saint and the ethics of the politician is that consequences are of no concern to the first, while the second takes the consequences of the chosen course of actions very seriously. That, to Weber, is the crucial point. We have to understand that ethically orientated activity can follow two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims. “It can follow the ‘ethic of principled conviction’ (Gesinnungsethik) or the ‘ethic of responsibility’ (Verantwortungsethik). It is not that the ethic of conviction is identical with irresponsibility, nor that the ethic of responsibility means the absence of principled conviction. Yet there is a profound opposition between acting by the maxim of the ethic of conviction (putting it in religious terms: ‘The Christian does what is right and places the outcome in God’s hands’), and acting by the maxim of the ethic of responsibility, which means that one must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one’s actions” (Weber 1994a: 359–360).

The politician who is committed to the ethic of conviction (such as the Socialist syndicalist or Christian pacifist) may realise that his political actions will have negative consequences – even for the cause he is serving. He would, however, not feel himself responsible for such negative consequences, but blame them on the shortcomings of others, or accept them as the will of God. He would rather see it as his only responsibility to ensure that the flame of pure conviction (for example, the flame of protest against the injustice of the social order) is never extinguished. The politician who subscribes to the ethic of responsibility would make allowance for the everyday shortcomings in people and would be willing to shoulder the responsibility if things do not turn out as planned. Weber emphasises that no ethics – including the ethic of conviction – can get around the fact that the achievement of ‘good’ ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or even morally dangerous means, and that one must reckon with the possibility or even likelihood of evil side-effects. Nor can any ethic in the world determine when and to what extent the ethically good end ‘sanctifies’ the ethically dangerous means and side effects. The ethic of conviction is bound to founder hopelessly on this problem. The only position it can logically take is to reject any action that employs morally dangerous means. In the real world we, however, repeatedly see that the proponent of the ethic of conviction cannot sustain the tension and suddenly turns into a chiliastic prophet who does not shy away from propagating a last act of force to create a situation in which all violence will have been destroyed forever.

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Weber goes on to ridicule the attempt of prof. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster to get around this difficulty with the simple thesis that only good can flow from good, only evil from evil. According to Weber not only the entire course of world history, but also any unbiased examination of daily experience, proclaims the opposite. The development of all the religions in the world rests, after all, on the fact that the opposite is true. The age-old problem of theodicy is the question of how a power that is said to be both all-powerful and benevolent can possibly have created such an irrational world of undeserved suffering, unpunished injustice and incorrigible stupidity. In fact, most religions have not only attempted to provide some theodicy, they have also adopted various strategies to come to terms with the fact that we are placed in various orders of life, each subject to different laws. In the Bhagavad Gita the warrior caste is instructed ‘to do what is necessary’ in conducting war. Acting in this way is not regarded as working against the salvation of the warrior, but rather serving it. In Catholic ethics a distinction has been made between the monk, who must live according to the consilia evangelica and may spill no blood, and the pious knight who may do so. In contrast to pacifist sects that try to live strictly according to the unworldly demands of the Sermon of the Mount, normal Protestantism has legitimated the state absolutely (and thus also its means: violence) as a divine institution. Luther, for example, relieved the individual of ethical responsibility for war and placed it on the shoulders of the authority, asserting that no guilt could ever be involved in obeying authority in matters other than faith. Weber warns his young listeners that anyone who wishes to make a profession of politics has to be conscious of these ethical paradoxes and of his responsibility for what may become of himself under pressure from them. He must realise that he is becoming involved with the diabolic powers that lurk in all violence. Anyone wishing to save his own soul, or those of others, should therefore not make the mistake of thinking that politics can help him to achieve it. Whether one strives to serve the Fatherland or to achieve international peace, one should realise that the salvation of the soul is endangered by each of these, whenever one strives to attain them by political activity, employing the means of violence and acting on the basis of an ethic of responsibility. Towards the end of his speech, Weber sums up the lesson to his listeners in more general terms. What matters – also in politics – is not age, but the trained ability to look at the realities of life with an unsparing gaze, to bear these realities and be a match for them inwardly. He concedes that although politics is something done with the head, it is certainly not something done with the head alone. On this point the conviction-moralists are entirely correct. This is even true of the person acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility. “[I]t is immensely moving when a mature person (whether old or young) who feels with his whole soul the responsibility he bears for the real consequences of his actions, and



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who acts on the basis of an ethic of responsibility, says at some point, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’. That is something genuinely human and profoundly moving. For it must be possible for each of us to find ourselves in such a situation at some point if we are not inwardly dead. In this respect, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility are not absolute opposites. They are complementary to one another, and only in combination do they produce the true human being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” (Weber 1994a: 367–368).

Weber concludes his speech by reminding his listeners that politics means strenuous slow drilling through hard boards, done with both passion and a sense of judgement. It cannot be denied that what is possible would never have been achieved in this world if people had not reached for the impossible. However, the person who is able to do this must not only be a leader, but also a hero. Only someone who is certain that he will not be broken when the world, seen from his point of view, is too stupid or base for what he is offering, and will be able to say ‘Nevertheless’ in spite of everything, has a ‘vocation’ for politics (Weber 1994a: 369).

3.3.  Brief comparison of the two speeches We already know that both speeches formed part of a lecture series on different vocations or, in more contemporary terminology, different professions, but it remains a question whether they have anything else in common. Also, what are the important differences between the two speeches, apart from the obvious fact that one deals with science and the other with politics as vocation? I believe that in addition some relevant similarities and differences can be identified: (i) The first similarity is that the speeches have the same triadic structure. In both cases Weber starts off with a sketch of the external context in which someone, who fills a position as a professional scientist or politician, has to operate. One might also put it as follows: In both cases he sketches the external organisation of science and politics as autonomous value spheres and social orders. In ‘Science as a vocation’ he provides a sketch of the organisation of academic life in Germany in comparison with academic life in the USA. In ‘Politics as a vocation’ he devotes a rather long discussion to the historical differentiation of different types of politicians and their role in party-political structures in different Western nations. In the second part of each of the speeches he discusses the inner, distinctive nature of the particular social order. The purpose in each speech is clearly to demonstrate that the differentiation of the two social orders under discussion had as irreversible result that each of them has its own distinctive ‘cause’ and rules that should be acknowledged by those who take up science or politics as a vocation. In the third and last part of each of the two speeches Weber works out the implications of what was said in the first and second parts for the contemporary role

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of the particular vocation in life as a whole, as well as for what is required in terms of character and conduct from those who are involved in the particular vocation (cf. Müller 2007: 203; 213). (ii) Also with regard to content we may recognise certain similarities and some overlap. Most conspicuously, it is not only in ‘Politics as a vocation’ that Weber discusses politics as an autonomous social order with its own distinctive nature; he also discusses it – albeit quite briefly – in ‘Science as a vocation’. He even uses the same example of the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount to demonstrate the illegitimacy of introducing values typical of the religious sphere into the sphere of politics. In ‘Science as a vocation’ the discussion of the distinctive nature and values of politics forms part of a broader discussion of the process of rationalisation in the Western world with the concomitant disenchantment and differentiation of different value spheres and social orders, which is not repeated in ‘Politics as a vocation’. One can, however, take it for granted that this discussion is also presupposed in ‘Politics as a vocation’. It can therefore be utilised as relevant background information for understanding and interpreting what Weber says in the latter speech.   On account of the irreversible differentiation of the social orders of science and politics, Weber in a similar way in both speeches takes a stance against those involved in the two professions who ignore this differentiation and introduce causes and values that belong to other social orders in science and politics. He criticises lecturers who proclaim personal political and religious views in class and politicians who base their policies and actions on religious values. Interesting enough, he does not explicitly refer to the introduction of scientific values in politics.   Consistent in the particular message of each of the two speeches to students is the advice to not have too high or false expectations from following a career in science or politics. They should realistically take into account the restrictions, toil, and disappointments that are an inevitable part of each of the two vocations. Although the social orders of science and politics are different in nature, Weber’s recommendation to students who plan to follow a career in either of them is to practice the necessary constraint by diligently and purely serving the cause of the particular social order. For only when they are willing to do so they will experience satisfaction, even excitement, in their work and fulfilment as persons. (iii) In my opinion the most conspicuous difference between the two speeches is that, in the case of the vocation of science, Weber consistently denounces the promotion of any personally endorsed values, whether they are of a political or a religious nature, while this is not the case with the vocation of politics. The scientist has to respect the value-free nature of scientific investigation and has to restrict himself to the objective search for facts. The politician, on the other hand, although he should not introduce religious values that conflict



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with those of politics, may introduce political goals based on ultimate values chosen by himself. Weber is clearly of the opinion that in this respect the social order of politics is different from the social order of science. However, this introduces a new problem he has to deal with in ‘Politics as a vocation’; the implication of his interpretation of politics is that there are ways of introducing personally endorsed values in politics that are acceptable, even while others are not. This raises the question: When is the introduction of personally endorsed values in politics acceptable and when not? It is precisely in attempting to provide criteria for making this distinction, I would argue, that Weber introduces his distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility.

3.4.  How should ‘Politics as a vocation’ be categorised academically? The question of how to categorise ‘Politics as a vocation’ academically is by no means a simple one; neither is it as innocent a question as may appear at first glance. The difficulty becomes clear as soon as one reads through the speech from beginning to end. The first two-thirds of the speech differs significantly from the last third part. The first and longer part of the speech resembles a university lecture in sociology and has a more impersonal and distanced style. Definitions are provided, distinctions between different categories of politicians and party systems are made and a thorough and comprehensive description of relevant historical developments regarding the profession of politician is given. In the last and shorter part of the speech the register changes. Weber’s style becomes more personal and impassioned. He addresses the students directly and shows empathy with the difficult situation faced by those who would like to follow a career in politics. He gives advice on the qualities a political leader should have and on the right approach to political decision-making. One has the impression that he strongly denounces politicians who do not have the qualities that mark a genuine political leader, or who approach political decision-making in a wrong way. The question is also not so innocent as it seems. The German political scientist Wilhelm Hennis, in his book Max Weber: Essays in reconstruction (1988), accused sociologists of not acknowledging the wide range of Weber’s academic endeavours and of categorising his academic contribution one-sidedly. As they claim him as one of the founding fathers of sociology, they tend to categorise all his serious academic work as sociology. Although some would admit that the academic work he produced before 1910 does not always fit this designation, they also claim that Weber’s final ‘breakthrough’ to a sociological approach that has value-free description as its sole aim took place round about the publication of his Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. The fact that throughout his life Weber also engaged in political speeches and writings in which he unequivocally criticised current political views, policies, and decisions in Germany, while unabashedly

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expressing his own political views, is something that has always caused some discomfort to those disciples who regard him as the preceptor of the strict valuefree approach in sociology. The solution they have found in dealing with this tension is to subdivide all of Weber’s writings into two strictly separate categories: his academic sociological work that has value-free description as its lodestar and avoids any evaluation, and his non-academic political work that goes beyond description and does not eschew evaluation (Hennis 1988: 62–69). Someone who approaches the categorisation of ‘Politics as a vocation’ with only these two categories in mind has one of two options. She could make out a case that the speech should be regarded in its entirety as either an academic sociological work or, alternatively, a non-academic political work. Or she might depict the speech as a work of a hybrid nature, consisting of a purely sociological first part and a purely political second part. It is not surprising that no sociologist can be found who includes ‘Politics as a vocation’ in the category of his personal political writings. Some of them, however, opt to classify it in its entirety as a sociological work. As a result they also regard Weber’s distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility as a purely sociological one. They regard these two ethics as nothing more than two ideal types used by Weber to describe existing ethical approaches in politics. Others have chosen the second option. The Danish sociologist H. H. Bruun, for example, characterises it as a speech in which Weber “oscillates between the level of scientific discourse and the level of personal (political or ethical) commitment” (Bruun 1972: 267). Although it cannot be denied that the first part of the speech operates mainly on the level of scientific discourse, the assertion that in the second part Weber is operating mainly on the level of personal commitment can be questioned. He is not, for the most part, expressing his personal political or ethical opinions and commitments on current political issues in Germany, as he does in his so-called ‘political’ speeches and writings. In fact, he deliberately tries, as far as possible, to avoid doing this in ‘Politics as a vocation’, contrary to the expectations of many in his student audience and in spite of the fact that he strongly expressed his personal opinions in some of his unequivocally political speeches during the same period. Right at the beginning of his speech he has this to say to the audience: “You are bound to expect a talk on the profession of politics to take a stand on the topical questions of the day. Yet that will only happen at the end of my lecture in a purely formal way and in response to particular questions concerning the significance of political action within our conduct of life as a whole. What must be completely excluded from today’s lecture […] are all questions concerning the brand of politics one ought to practise, which is to say the content one ought to give to one’s political activity” (Weber 1994a: 309).

When he does in a few instances criticise the current views of specific persons (for example prof. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster), or current actions of the government (for example the exposure of official documents implying German’s guilt in



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instigating World War I), it is done in the context of a broader critical discussion of the conviction ethical approach in politics. When he points out the ethical and intellectual qualities that a professional politician should possess and explains the difference between an ethical approach to politics based on an ethic of conviction and one that is based on an ethic of responsibility he is indeed involved with evaluative argumentation. This evaluative argumentation is, however, on a different level and of a more general and formal nature than taking a personal stance on a specific current political policy or action. Guenther Roth offers an explanation for this introduction of a different mode of evaluative argumentation in ‘Politics as a vocation’. In his opinion Weber could not in 1919 again confront his young German listeners, as he had done so often before, with the plea to commit themselves to nationalist policies under the motto of ‘our responsibility before history’. He had devoted himself to this nationalist ideal for twenty five years, but realised after the disastrous end of World War I that “[t]he old grounds of discourse had given way, and he searched for a new solution. He found it in the two ethics” (Roth 1984: 495). In the dire circumstances in Germany during the immediate aftermath of World War I  it is conceivable that Weber sought to formulate and recommend a more general ethical approach to politics that would be applicable to the radically changed political situation in Germany and probably also to other modern Western societies at the time. Evidently, then, the last part of ‘Politics as a vocation’ cannot be deemed a political speech in which Weber expresses his personal opinions on the political situation in Germany at the time. Yet neither can it be categorised as ‘sociological’, because it cannot be denied that he strongly criticises certain ethical approaches to political decision-making and clearly expresses his preference for the ethic of responsibility approach. The categorisation ‘sociological’ would at the most be applicable to the first and longer part of the speech. This leaves open the question: How should Weber’s discussion of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility approaches to political decision-making in the last part of the speech be categorised? In my opinion, the difficulties experienced in categorising ‘Politics as a vocation’ can be overcome if we do not approach the matter with only two categories in mind, but make allowance for the possibility that other categories could apply. Could it not be that the nature and purpose of the speech is different from those of both a classroom lecture on sociology and a political speech in which a stand on current political issues is taken? Could it not be that it belongs to a separate category of speech acts with its own distinctive characteristics? As we have already seen, it was the second speech given by Weber in a lecture series, ‘Intellectual labour as a vocation’, planned by a student organisation. This student organisation expected him, in both ‘Science as a vocation’ and ‘Politics as a vocation’, to advise the students, not regarding the stand they should take on specific current scien-

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tific and political issues in Germany but, among other things, on Franz Xaver Schwab’s renunciation of professionalism and the idealistic expectations many students had of these two professions. Weber accepted the invitation to present both speeches fully knowing what was expected of him. Already this framework of expectation makes it highly improbable that Weber in ‘Politics as a vocation’ would have given either a political speech on current political issues or a purely sociological lecture in which he only provided value-free description regarding the profession of the politician. What he had been called upon to do was to give a speech in which advice is given to the students on the profession of politician, a speech that would help them to decide whether they have what it takes to become politicians in Germany just after the end of World War I. What would one expect from such a speech? Given the divergent views on the role of the politician in Germany at the time, as well as Weber’s strong views on the topic, one would expect it to be provocative. It would challenge false assumptions students may have had of the profession of politician, criticising unacceptable ways of fulfilling the profession, while identifying both the right qualities the politician has to develop and the right approach to decision-making in politics. One would, in other words, expect the speech to be a unique mixture of description, evaluation, and prescription with provocative advice as the binding factor. In her commentary on ‘Politics as a vocation’, Kari Palonen highlights the undeniably provocative nature of the speech. According to her, Weber did not present the speech in a manner that would meet with general approval; in fact, it is deliberately provocative in more than one direction (Palonen 2002: 17). In her opinion, Weber even rhetorically exploits the ambivalence of the German concept Beruf (vocation) in order to provoke different groups in his audience – ‘Politics as a vocation’ can refer, either to the different historical forms the profession of politician has exhibited, or to the challenges involved with the ‘calling’ of the politician. On the one hand, Weber deliberately provoked those overly idealistic students in his audience who despised professional politicians, by describing in an objective academic manner the factors leading to the irreversible historical emergence of different types of politicians and pointing out the indispensable role professional politicians play in modern politics. On the other hand, he deliberately provoked those who supported the dominant role of technocratic government officials in German politics, by pointing out that such bureaucratic rule contradicts the calling of the political leader to give direction to politics through strong and decisive leadership (Palonen 2002: 24). Palonen’s keen observation registers how, in his speech, Weber pre-eminently made provocative use of factual knowledge to challenge the various false assumptions his student audience might have had on the profession of politician. It therefore needs not surprise us that he spent so much time on communicating factual information of a sociological nature. Sociology was for him, like the other



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social sciences, an empirical science of concrete reality, which has as its aim “the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move” (Weber 1949: 72). Although he denied that specific standpoints could be logically deduced from such factual knowledge, he regarded reliable factual knowledge as of the essence in all responsible evaluation and decision-making, since among other things it provides insight in the specific nature of the reality we have to evaluate, the options for action available to us in concrete situations and the foreseeable consequences of our actions. Weber clearly was of the opinion that it could help students who had to decide whether a career in politics was something they should aspire to, to make informed decisions if they have reliable and comprehensive factual knowledge regarding the profession of politician and its role in modern society (cf. Hennis 1988: 186–193). That the mere communication of empirical sociological knowledge could play such a provocative role in ‘Politics as a vocation’ also has to do with Weber’s careful selection of such knowledge. He deliberately selected relevant sociological knowledge that would have the necessary challenging effect on the assumptions of the students. Such selection thus had an undeniable ‘performative’ purpose. Weber would deny that such ‘selective’ use of sociological knowledge contradicts his dictum of value-free knowledge. In fact, he regarded the selection of the subject matter of the investigator as necessarily based on her values: “To be sure, without the investigator’s evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of the selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality […] And the values to which the scientific genius relates the object of his inquiry may determine, i. e., decide the ‘conception’ of a whole epoch, not only concerning what is regarded as ‘valuable’ but also concerning what is significant or insignificant, ‘important’ or ‘unimportant’ in the phenomena” (Weber 1949: 82).

What is clear from this quotation is not only that for Weber the selection of sociological subject-matter and, for that matter, of the information to be communicated, was value-related, but also that this selection could influence the understanding of the meaning and ethical obligations of life.4 Weber did not only provoke his student audience by confronting them with uncomfortable sociological information that challenged the false assumptions about the profession of politician that many of them had. He also provoked them in a more direct way, by openly taking an evaluative stance on certain developments regarding the profession of politician, especially in Germany. It is notable that examples of such an evaluative stance are found not only in the last, explicitly ethical, part of the speech. A critical stance vis-à-vis certain his4  Cf. Palonen (2002: 46–47): “Although Weber’s discussion of the politician in ‘Politics as a vocation’ throughout remains value-free, it is done from a perspective that is value-related, actualizes the discussion, ‘engages’ the audience and intentionally provokes in a situation of widespread contempt for politicians” (tr. from the German).

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torical developments is already present in the first part. It does not take long, for example, for the reader of the speech to realise that Weber is very critical of what he calls ‘rule by officials’ (Weber 1994a: 331). Already early in the speech he expresses himself in strong pejorative terms against the tendency in Germany and elsewhere to leave political rule in the hand of officials. “Precisely those who are officials by nature and who, in this regard are of high moral stature, are bad and, particularly in the political meaning of the word, irresponsible politicians, and thus of low moral stature in this sense – men of the kind we Germans, to our cost, have had in positions of leadership time after time” (Weber 1994a: 331).

In the last part of the speech Weber frequently takes a strong evaluative stance. He condemns the ‘power-politician’ on account of his vanity. “The mere ‘power-politician’ […] may give the impression of strength, but in fact his actions merely lead into emptiness and absurdity. On this point the critics of ‘power politics’ are quite correct. The sudden inner collapse of typical representatives of this outlook […] has shown us just how much inner weakness and ineffectuality are concealed behind this grandiose but empty pose” (Weber 1994a: 354).

As an example of the “morally quite calamitous role” ethics can play in politics (Weber 1994a: 355), he mentions and criticises the publication of secret government documents revealing the ‘guilt’ of one’s own nation in instigating war. “Every document that may emerge decades afterwards will stir up the undignified squabble, all the hatred and anger, once again, whereas the war ought at least to be buried morally when it comes to an end” (Weber 1994a: 356). The exposure of governmental guilt out of purely moral considerations is but one example of the conviction ethical approach in politics, against which he takes a strong critical stance in the last part of the speech. He, inter alia, calls the introduction of the Sermon of the Mount in politics an ‘ethic of indignity’ and ridicules the naïve conviction of the pacifist prof. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster that ‘only good can flows from good, only evil from evil’ by pointing out that not “just the entire course of world history, but any unbiased examination of daily experience, proclaims the opposite” (Weber 1994a: 362). However, Weber does not merely go beyond sociological description in this speech, by criticising certain developments regarding the profession of politician and certain ethical stances in politics. He also proceeds to the level of professional ethics, as one would expect from a speech giving advice to students on the profession of politician. As in ‘Science as a vocation’, he gives them advice on the virtues the politician should exhibit. It is conspicuous that when he turns to the qualities the politician should exhibit, he explicitly states that “this takes us into the area of ethical question, for to ask what kind of a human being one must be in order to have the right to seize the spokes of the wheel of history is to pose an ethical question” (Weber 1994a: 352). The qualities of passion, responsibility, and judgement are clearly not qualities politicians empirically exhibit, but rather



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desirable qualities they should exhibit in order to be good politicians. The reverse side of Weber’s message is, of course, that those students who do not exhibit such qualities, or would be unable to cultivate them, should not aspire to become professional politicians or, more specifically, political leaders. Such students may still consider becoming professional government officials, if they have the required personal characteristics. For, in Weber’s opinion, a different professional ethics applies to the government official. Only someone who is willing and able to exhibit strict obedience and self-denial in following the commands of the political leader has the characteristics required for the profession of government official. Up to this point ‘Politics as a vocation’ follows the same path as ‘Science as a vocation’, a speech in which Weber also provides advice on a particular profession to students. In ‘Science as a vocation’ he similarly provides provocative sociological information on the organisation and inner meaning of science in the modern era as a result of rationalisation in order to challenge the false assumptions of students, strongly criticises wrong uses and unrealistic expectations of science and the profession of scientist and provides some professional ethical advice on the characteristics required for the profession of the scientist. Only those students who have a passion to serve the cause of science, respect the value-free nature of scientific investigation and find fulfilment in concentrated detailed investigation have the requisite virtues to fulfil the profession of scientist. As already indicated, the two speeches differ, in that ‘Science as a vocation’ stops at giving professional ethical advice on the virtues needed for the profession of scientist, while ‘Politics as a vocation’ proceeds further by also giving advice on the right ethical approach to political decision-making. Not only is the ethic of conviction approach to political decision-making strongly criticised, but the ethic of responsibility approach is recommended as the appropriate one. In doing this Weber undeniably ventures into the academic terrain of normative ethics. Indeed, as will become clear in the next chapter, many interpreters of Weber’s ethic of responsibility would concur with this claim. However, it will also become evident there is no agreement on the implications that follow from this. Can one say – as someone like Wolfgang Schluchter does – that Weber is proposing a new general normative ethical theory that is better attuned to the circumstances in late modernity than existing normative ethical theories? In my opinion there are a number of indicators in ‘Politics as a vocation’ that point in another direction. Apart from the fact that Weber nowhere in ‘Politics as a vocation’ gives any indication that he is attempting to formulate an alternative normative ethical theory, this speech deals exclusively with the profession of the politician, and the virtues and ethical approach to political decision-making the politician should exhibit. In fact, Weber regards the political leader as the sole agent of the ethic of responsibility, explicitly denying that it also applies to the government official. Is the obvious conclusion then not that Weber is providing a specific political ethics in his exposition of the ethic of responsibility? Such a depiction would cap-

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ture its normative ethical nature, but at the same time acknowledge that it only applies to the field of politics. Wilhelm Hennis is someone who unreservedly asserts that in ‘Politics as a vocation’ Weber follows in the footsteps of great thinkers in the tradition of practical philosophy and, more specifically, of political thinkers such as Macchiavelli, Rousseau, and Tocqueville (1988: 196–197). Yet, as Gregor Fitzi points out, there are problems with such an interpretation, the most obvious being the fact that the ethic of responsibility does not deal with the leading normative question of traditional political ethics: How should society and politics be transformed, so that individuals may become virtuous citizens and ‘good politics’ may be performed? (2004: 284). Instead, it deals in a purely formal way with the right ethical approach to political decision-making that specifically the political leader should take. The only safe conclusion that can be drawn from our discussion on the categorisation of the ethic of responsibility at this point is that Weber is proposing a particular normative ethical approach to political decision-making for the political leader. What can be added is that this normative ethical approach is not based on any specific moral principle, but is rather of a purely formal nature. How this formal normative ethical approach of the political leader to political decision-making should be more specifically interpreted, is the question that will be addressed in following chapters.

4.  Situating the ethic of responsibility biographically It would be safe to say that Weber’s first encounter with an approach to life based on something resembling an ethic of conviction was in his parental home. This approach was clearly exemplified in the person of his mother, Helene. She was an intensely religious woman of Huguenot descent who “always applied absolute standards and in every situation demanded the utmost from herself. Therefore, she was never satisfied with herself and always felt inadequate before God” (Marianne Weber 1975: 29). She tried to raise her children in accordance with the same absolute Christian standards.5 By contrast, Weber’s father Max sr. was a secular man with no interest in weighty religious matters. He rather relished active involvement in party politics and did not share his wife’s serious attitude vis-à-vis life. His principle was: “let no real worries arise […]; instead, do at all times what is right and be firm in your confidence that everything will happen the way it is best for ourselves and for all” (Marianne Weber 1975: 26). According to Marianne Weber – in her biography of her husband – the contrasting characters of 5  In his autobiography one of the nephews of Max Weber jr. Otto Baumgarten mentions Helene’s “[…] passionate involvement in uplifting human activities that promoted justice and room for others and […] constant striving for the ultimate standards of justice and improvement” (cited by Kaesler 2014: 250, tr. from the German).



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Weber’s parents caused “a distinct rift in their spiritual community” (Marianne Weber 1975: 37). It would be wrong to assert that Weber’s father exemplified in his person an approach to life based on an ethic of responsibility and that therefore his son already in his parental home experienced in pure form the tension between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. Max Weber sr. did not really fulfil the requirements laid down by his son in ‘Politics as a vocation’ for the charismatic political leader whose actions are based on an ethic of responsibility. Rather, he resembled the class of politicians his son would contrast with the political leader taking his cue from an ethic of responsibility. That is, he belonged to the ranks of the professional politicians whose main motive for being involved in politics was to make a living from it and thus rather lived ‘from politics’ than ‘for politics’ (cf. Radkau 2005: 790). He was not so much driven by lofty political ideals or engaged with the big political issues of the future, but was more pragmatic in nature and involved in everyday political matters (cf. Kaesler 2014: 164). Nonetheless, the approach to life in general and to politics in particular that his father represented in contrast to his mother meant that from an early age Weber had to grapple, both emotionally and intellectually, with a fundamental contrast that eventually could have contributed to his views on the two ethics expressed in ‘Politics as a vocation’.6 It was the contrast between a primarily religiously oriented life and a primarily politically oriented life, which manifested itself in the case of Weber’s parental home also as the contrast between a strongly principled and idealistic way of living, based solely on absolute religious and moral values, and a more pragmatic and realistic way of living, in which cultural and political values, and not only moral values, played an important role. What makes the experience of this contrast so significant in the case of Weber is that as a child he could not but to a certain extent internalise it.7 There are indications that at times he experienced the need to resolve the inner tension it caused him by making a once-off and final commitment to either one of his parents’ orientation to life. Marianne Weber recorded one such a moment when he was 20 years old. He was at that time doing military service at Strassbourg and often visited his aunt, Ida Baumgarten (his mother’s elder sister), and her husband, who were living there. Like his mother, his aunt “measured all activity by the inexorable standards of Christian ethics” (Marianne Weber 1975: 82). 6  Commenting on a letter Max jr. as twenty year old wrote to his mother in Mai 1884 Dirk Kaesler writes: “One can notice that it was not easy for this young chap to decide whether he should follow in the footsteps of his successful father or of his mother” (Kaesler 2009: 190, tr. from the German). 7  Dirk Kaesler comes to a similar conclusion: “[…] the different expectations of two people – here the expectation of a strong religious person, there the ambitions of a career minded professional politician – would not only cause deep tensions between these two people, but would also find expression in the life and work of their firstborn” (Kaesler 2014: 90, tr. from the German).

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According to Marianne Weber, her husband was at that time a young man who “shared his father’s view that it was ‘eccentric’ to judge every action by a moral law and try to measure it by absolute standards. He rejected the rigorism that left no room for smiling tolerance of one’s own weakness and that, with its ‘all or nothing’, seemed to do violence to human nature” (Marianne Weber 1975: 83). According to Marianne, he said about people like his aunt: “A main characteristic of these people is their disregard of reality and their disdain for those who take it into consideration” (Marianne Weber 1975: 83–84). Therefore, to “certain basic views that prevail there I am in a very conscious and very definite opposition. I  could not abandon this opposition without changing completely” (Marianne Weber 1975: 84). He then also realised for the first time “that he had to choose between his parents […] and that this choice was less an emotional matter than a moral decision, one that would be decisive for the future of his soul and the formation of his own personality” (Marianne Weber 1975: 84). The pivotal question is, of course: Did Max Weber really succeed in making such a clear-cut choice? In one respect he clearly did, by not following his mother’s example in living a life of religious devotion, although it was less the result of strong opposition against such a life, than the fact that he just did not have any propensity for it. In a letter to Ferdinand Tönnies, February 19, 1909, he denied that he was anti-religious or even irreligious and called himself “absolutely unmusical in religious matters” (Weber 1994d: 65, tr. from the German).8 He also clearly made a choice by sharing his father’s interest in political life. But can one say that by doing that he also made a choice against strong convictions based on values in favour of a purely functional or realistic approach to life in general and politics in particular? Such a conclusion would, in my opinion, hardly be justified. All evidence rather points to the conclusion that through his whole life Weber remained someone who himself had strong convictions based on ethical, political, and cultural values, and who – in spite of the irritation they often caused him as a result of their unwillingness to take the consequences of their political actions into account – had great sympathy and a high regard for people who were willing to live up to their strong convictions (cf. Hopkins 2008: 206). In the profile of Weber’s personality drawn by some of his contemporaries and also by his wife Marianne, what stands out is the emotional intensity with which he held convictions (cf. Dreijmanis 2010: 1–20). Time and again they mention that he had strong convictions to which he committed himself unconditionally.9 The Austrian economist and diplomat Felix Somary (1881–1956), who knew 8  The fact that he had no personal affinity for religion was, however, not something that left him cold. In the same letter to Tönnies he also confided that he as a result regarded himself as a “cripple”, a “mutilated person” (cf. also Kaesler 2014: 931 and 630). 9  At the end of his biography Dirk Kaesler points out that apart from the depiction of Max Weber jr. by his contemporaries as genius and prophet, the depiction of him as heroic-daimonic is most often found. “We find the detection of the brilliant demonic character of Max Weber



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Weber personally, regarded him as a restless, nervous type of person with very strong convictions to which he committed himself with every pore in his body (Honigsheim 2000: xi; cf. also Kaesler 2014: 772). According to Marianne Weber many of his academic colleagues knew him “only as a difficult, excitable man, whose intellectual superiority was a burden, whose ethical standards were inordinate, and whose constant criticism of the political conduct of his own group was disquieting” (Marianne Weber 1975: 667). Karl Jaspers, a personal friend of Weber, also mentioned the unconditional nature of his ethical convictions, while adding that it should not be mistaken for fanaticism. According to him, Weber’s ethical demands caused discomfort in that for everyone who was not completely close-minded he was a living conscience (cf. Dreijmanus 2010: 20). Not only did Weber have a life-long personal propensity for strong convictions, including strong ethical convictions; he also never expressed the view that having strong ethical convictions necessarily contradicts being actively and successfully involved in politics. That avoiding ethical absolutism and taking concrete reality fully into account when making political decisions did not for him imply abandonment of strong ethical convictions can be illustrated by the abovementioned experience he had at his aunt’s house in Strassbourg. At his aunt’s insistence, he read the work of the English Unitarian religious leader, William Channing.10 Although he was annoyed by Channing’s pacifism and religious rigorism, especially his depiction of killing in war as murder committed in the service of the devil, he was moved by his idea “of the greatness of the ethic of brotherhood and sacrifice for one’s fellowmen.” (Marianne Weber 1975: 89). He was, however, of the opinion that regard for the greatness of this religious ethic in personal life, should be complemented in political life by regard for “the greatness of an ethic of active heroism and a spirit of patriotic sacrifice. He considered the realization of a culture pertaining to this world and transcending the individual to be just as much an indisputable ‘law’ as the perfection of an individual’s soul in the Christian sense” (Marianne Weber 1975: 89; viz. also Suzuki 2003: 202 and Radkau 2005: 53). Joachim Radkau is also of the opinion that the eschatological views of Channing and Theologe Parker (another Unitarian preacher) about a strong leader who would during their own lifetime come and prepare the way for the Saviour, inspired in Weber the idea of the strong charismatic leader in politics who convinces others by his own strong convictions and the strength of his personality to follow him in the realisation of his political vision (Radkau 2005: 52–53). in numerous reports of his contemporaries, often mentioning the extreme, excessive, heroic, aggressive, and torn nature of this Prussian German” (Kaesler 2014: 925, tr. from the German). 10  See for a sketch of Max junior’s religious aunt Ida Baumgarten, the views of William Channing she admired and the interaction between her and Max jr. during the one year of his voluntary military service from October 1883: Dirk Kaesler 2014: 243–255.

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The concept of charisma eventually became a central one in both Weber’s sociology of religion and his sociology of political leadership. For Weber the charismatic leaders par excellence were the founders of religions, the prophets of Ancient Israel and the apostles, all of them acting on the basis of strong convictions. In his study of Judaism during the years preceding his ‘Politics as a vocation’ speech, he was intensely occupied with the prophets of Ancient Israel. He clearly had a high regard for their sense of calling, their courage and heroism in delivering an extremely negative message to the people of Israel. It is conspicuous that some of his contemporaries draw comparisions between Weber and the prophets. Several of the students who attended his “Science as a vocation” speech experienced Weber as a type of prophet. Karl Löwith recorded later that, with his bearded face and the conviction with which he delivered the speech, Weber recalled the dark glow of the prophetic figures of Bamberg. In the same vein, Immanuel Birnbaum thought Weber reminiscent of a prophet driven by visions of doom (Radkau 2005: 746). That the metaphor of prophet so naturally cropped up in descriptions of Weber as a public speaker, causes Joachim Radkau to wonder whether he did not intentionally foster the image of himself as contemporary prophet (Radkau 2005: 746; cf. also Kaesler 2014: 924–925). Although he clearly despised those (false) academic prophets who claimed that their political views were scientific in nature and misused the lecture hall to propagate these views, it is quite possible that he saw himself as the more legitimate contemporary prophet who felt himself obliged to deliver an unpopular message to students with overwrought expectations of academic and political life. That spontaneous sympathy for persons who act in accordance with strong convictions and the tendency to do the same was part of Weber’s character, is illustrated not only by his affinity for charismatic figures like the prophets of Ancient Israel, but also by the close relationships he had with a number of persons who unashamedly lived in accordance with an ethic of conviction. Two such persons were Robert Michels and Ernst Toller. It is true that Weber liked to engage intellectually with persons who had views opposite to his own, because it heightened his intellectual and rhetorical performance (Radkau 2005: 742). Michels and Toller were, however, more than mere intellectual sparring partners. Robert Michels was a younger fellow-sociologist with strong socialist, more specifically anarcho-syndicalist, sentiments. Weber became his mentor and, especially through extensive correspondence, commented on his work and his views. Whenever he was in a position to do so, he tried to promote Michels’s career. But, as Wolfgang Mommsen concludes, the full scope of Weber’s interest went far beyond the role of academic mentor, extending into the existential level: “In a certain sense, Max Weber saw in Michels the personification of a conduct according to the ethic of conviction and in this respect his alter ego – someone who, from premises which were in many respects identical to his own, tended to draw moralist consequences



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which he, by his rigorous, rationalistic self-criticism (corresponding to the postulate of the ethic of responsibility) denied himself ” (Mommsen 1989: 88).

In fact, according to Mommsen, one can say that Weber “did himself constantly feel tempted to let himself be swayed by a ‘conviction ethic’ rather than to maintain the sober rein on his own passions that his ‘ethic of responsibility’ demanded” (Mommsen 1989: 99–100). One would therefore not go too far to assert that in his intense discussions with Michels, Weber was also engaging with a part of himself. Both of them at one stage supported the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Michels, however, became increasingly disillusioned by the quietist course set by the leadership of the SDP. He despised the fact that it was only revolutionary in its language and not willing to support and actively organise general strikes, which in his own view was the proper and prescribed socialist method to bring about a socialist democracy based on the principles of equality and popular sovereignty. He blamed especially the increasing bureaucratisation of the SPD for this quietism. In his correspondence with Michels, Weber ridiculed his blind and unrealistic belief in general strikes: “It is the most bizarre assertion that can ever be made to say […] that every strike works in the direction postulated by socialism, ergo, every strike is justified” (in a letter to Michels, February, 19, 1909, Weber 1994d: 61, tr. from the German). He agreed with Michels that bureaucratisation was the main cause of the unwillingness of the SPD to set a bold revolutionary course, but regarded it as an inevitable and not altogether negative development. He strongly rejected Michels’s socialist ideal of a radical democracy based on equality that has to be realised through revolutionary means: “Any idea of abolishing the domination of man over man by any socialist system whatsoever or by any sophisticated form of democracy whatsoever is Utopian […] The moment anyone who wishes to live as a ‘modern individual’, in the sense of having a newspaper every day and railways, electrical goods, etc., vacates the terrain of revolutionism for its own sake, that is, revolutionism without any goal, indeed revolutionism for which no goal is even conceivable, he necessarily renounces all the ideals that float before your eyes” (in a letter to Michels August, 4, 1908, Weber 1990: 616, tr. from the German).

Weber met Ernst Toller in 1917 at a meeting of intellectuals at Lauenstein Castle organised by the Jena publisher Eugen Diederichs. Toller was a young novelist, but also the leader of a student group propagating both socialism and pacifism. At the meeting he expressed his faith in the original goodness and solidarity of human beings, and his belief that it was possible to get the people that were murdering one another in war, at the behest of their governments, to throw away their arms. Weber rejected Toller’s pacifist propaganda, because it would, at that stage in the middle of the war, only break the national will of the Germans to self-preservation. He argued against Toller that “(t)here are two roads to peace – that of the politician and that of the Sermon on the Mount. A politician must

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make peace in such a way that all concerned can sincerely live up to it. The other way is called ‘Peace at all price!’” (Marianne Weber 1975: 627). Within two years after the Lauenstein meeting Toller, the radical pacifist, turned into a revolutionary. After Kurt Eisner, the Bavarian prime minister whose socialist views Toller strongly supported, was murdered in January 1919, communists proclaimed a Soviet Republic in Munich on 6/7 April 1919. Toller offered to work together with the communist government and even became a commander of troops that repulsed the White Army at Dachau and Rosenheim. As a consequence, Toller was accused of treason after the breakdown of the Soviet Republic. At the court hearings Weber was one of a number of influential people who were willing to testify on his behalf. He expressed his “‘deep human sympathy for the defendant’, a man ‘of an entirely upright character’, who had acted, however, without any sense of the consequences of action, but did so from an ethics of ‘ultimate ends’” (Dahlmann 1987: 370–374). At the end of his study on the relationship between Weber and Toller, Dittmar Dahlmann asks the question: “[W]hat brought about Weber’s open concern for Toller?” His answer is: “In his own political actions, Weber also tended toward an ethic of conviction although remaining perfectly aware that politics was unthinkable without compromise; therefore he shrank back from the ultimate consequences of action, just as Toller accepted them, and acknowledged in Toller the ‘ideal type’ of a consistent fundamentalist who, without regard for the possible outcome, not only proposed action but also took a leading part in revolutionary actions” (Dahlmann 1987: 376–377).11

What conclusions can be drawn from these biographical notations? Do they help us to better grasp Weber’s understanding of the distinction between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility? And do they reveal any preference on the part of Weber for one of these two ethics? The fact that Weber was a person who, on the one hand, clearly had strong ethical and political convictions and tended to act in accordance with the ethic of conviction, but, on the other hand, also acknowledged the need for realism, especially in politics, can easily tempt one to conclude that he was someone who could not choose between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility, and as a result embodied both in his own personal and political life. Such a conclusion would favour, of course, the interpretation of the distinction of the two ethics in terms of a relation of complementarity by, among others, Nicholas Gane and Peter Müller, discussed in the next chapter (cf. also for such a conclusion 11  Not only Mommsen and Dahlmann expressed the opinion that Weber tended to act in accordance with the ethic of conviction. Felix Somary was also of the opinion that Weber’s own political conduct in critical situations definitely resembled the conviction ethic model more than the responsibility ethic one (cf. Honigsheim 2000: xi). He compared Weber’s vehement political polemic against the childish enthusiasm of his contemporaries (called ‘the sway of stupidity’ by Weber) with a one-man guerrilla war (cf. Honigsheim 2000: xi).



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Suzuki 2003: 200). They believe that Weber associated the ethic of conviction with strong convictions closely correlated with value rationality and the ethic of responsibility with the consideration of consequences closely correlated with instrumental rationality and regarded a combination of these two ethics as indispensable in political decision-making. In my opinion, such an interpretation of Weber’s stance would be difficult to reconcile with the severe criticism he expressed against the conviction ethical approach of Michels and Toller. One should acknowledge that having the propensity – on account of one’s personality – to act politically in accordance with the ethic or conviction is not the same as having the view that the ethic of conviction approach is an appropriate one in politics. There is nothing contradictory in Weber’s propensity to act in accordance with the ethic of conviction, on the one hand, and his strong criticism of the ethic or conviction approach of Michels and Toller, on the other. Many, if not most, of us sometimes find ourselves in situations where we feel obliged to take an intellectual stance against a certain way of doing things, in spite of our own personal propensity to act in such a way. Instead of concluding that Weber’s appreciation for having strong convictions and his emphasis on taking account of consequences before acting support Gane and Müller’s interpretation of the complementarity of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, I believe that we should explore another avenue. Is it not plausible that someone with a resolute and creative mind like Weber, who from early in his life realised the importance of both strong convictions and the need to take consequences into account in ethical decisions, would have regarded it a challenge to develop an ethical approach in which both these elements are acknowledged? There is good reason to claim that, in his own personal struggle to resist his natural inclination to resort to an absolutist ethic of conviction without falling into the other extreme of adhering to a utilitarian ethics, which he personally despised, Weber eventually came to the conclusion that it is not only personally, but also theoretically, cogent to adhere to an in between ethics in which both strong convictions based on values and realistic consideration of the consequences of different options for action have a place. In my opinion, it is feasible to argue that Weber developed this ethic over time and presented it in ‘Politics as a vocation’ under the name ‘ethic of responsibility’ as the ethic on which political leadership should be based.

5. Conclusion In this chapter an attempt has been made to situate Weber’s ethic of responsibility historically, textually, and biographically. By situating this ethic historically we could learn that the speech ‘Politics as a vocation’, in which Weber introduced the ethic of responsibility, was the second of two lectures he gave on a particular

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vocation or profession in a series on ‘Intellectual labour a vocation’, which was provoked by an attack in a journal on the idea of professionalism. The speech was given in a politically volatile situation in Germany and Munich in the immediate aftermath of the unconditional surrender of the nation in World War I. Situating the ethic of responsibility textually has revealed relevant resemblances between the first of these two speeches, ‘Science as a vocation’, and the second, ‘Politics as a vocation’, both with regard to structure and content. The most conspicuous difference between them is that Weber denounces the promotion of any personally chosen values in the vocation of science, but to a certain extent makes allowance for it in the vocation of politics. Although he is critical of introducing religious values that clash with the distinctive nature of the political sphere, the political leader may, according to Weber, introduce political goals based on ultimate values chosen by him personally. At first glance, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber, by distinguishing between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, tries to provide more clarity on which ways of introducing personally endorsed values in political decision-making are acceptable and which not. Despite such differences, both speeches are undeniably of a provocative nature. In both, Weber challenges false assumptions students had of the profession under discussion and gives professional ethical advice on desirable personal characteristics needed in the professions of scientist and politician, respectively. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, however, he ventures further into the terrain of normative ethics by also criticising the ethic of conviction as an inappropriate approach to political decision-making while recommending the ethic or responsibility. Situating the ethic of responsibility biographically has shown that, throughout his life, Weber had a propensity for strong convictions. One may even say that he often tended to act in accordance with the ethic of conviction. Yet he was critical of the absolutist religious convictions of his mother and aunt, explicitly and severely criticised the ethic of conviction approach of his protégés Roberto Michels and Ernst Toller, and clearly acknowledged the need for realism in politics. One could conclude from this, as Gane and Müller do, that he was someone who could not really choose between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility, and harboured both in his own personal and political life. Yet, alternatively, one might also recognise that, from early in his life, Weber realised both the importance of having strong convictions and the need to take consequences into account when making political decisions. Based on this conclusion, one can argue that he was seeking to find a theoretically cogent way in which both strong convictions based on ultimate values and realistic consideration of consequences could be reconciled in one ethical approach to political decision-making. As I have suggested, his formulation of the ethic of responsibility in ‘Politics as a vocation’ could be the result of his attempt to find such a theoretically cogent ethical approach.

Chapter 2

Major interpretations 1. Introduction The close reader of the summary of ‘Politics as a vocation’ in the previous chapter would have noticed that there are certain obscurities and tensions in Weber’s exposition that render an unequivocal interpretation of his ethic of responsibility difficult, if not impossible. Since Weber, who died a little more than one year after the speech, did not have the opportunity to clarify some of the interpretation problems, the speech has been subject to the most divergent interpretations over the years. The diversity of interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility is something that never fails to surprise those who set themselves the task to obtain a better grasp of his view. Among the questions of interpretation stemming from ‘Politics as a vocation’ are the following: 1. What does Weber mean when he says that he is only taking a formal stand on political issues of the day in the last part of the speech, in which the ethic of responsibility is introduced? 2. What is the relation between Weber’s discussion of the three features of the politician and his discussion of the ethos of politics? More specifically: What is the relation between these features and the ethic of responsibility? Are these features typical of only the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility, or not? 3. What is the main purpose of Weber’s discussion of the two ethics: Just to sketch the two main existing ethical approaches in politics, or rather to denounce the ethic of conviction and to recommend the ethic of responsibility as the more appropriate ethical approach? 4. Why did Weber use the term ‘responsibility’ to designate the ethic he contrasts with the ethic of conviction? Is it because ‘responsibility’ is the distinctive feature of the ethic of responsibility, or is Weber’s use of the term merely expedient and ultimately of little consequence? Or does the fact that Weber coins a new term to depict this ethic reflect his sense that this ethic is new and distinct from all existing ethical approaches? 5. How can Weber say, on the one hand, that the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility are “two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims” and, on the other hand, that they are “not absolute opposites, but

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are complementary to one another”? Do we have to accept that he contradicted himself, or is it only seemingly a contradiction, to be resolved by proper explanation? Interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility for the most part differ in accordance with different answers to these questions and with different combinations of answers. This is not to claim that all interpreters deal explicitly with each of these interpretation problems. They often deal with them in a more implicit way, taking certain answers for granted and deciding on others without providing explicit justification for their decisions. It would be impossible to provide, in one chapter, an overview of the full range of interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility since the publication of ‘Politics as a vocation’ in 1919. An astonishing number of academics and politicians have since then discussed this ethic, presenting a whole spectrum of interpretations that sometimes sharply differ from those on the other side of the spectrum, but often only differ in small nuances from those nearest to them on the spectrum. I have therefore decided to discuss only a small and representative number of interpretations, using a combination of criteria for my selection. The most important criterion is that the interpretation should be clear-cut and distinctive, either representing a typical way of interpreting the ethic of responsibility, or providing a unique interpretation. Another important criterion is that the interpretation should be fairly comprehensive, dealing explicitly with at least some of the interpretive problems mentioned. I have also concentrated on interpretations that are fairly recent and have taken into account whether a particular interpretation has been influential. The interpretations I have selected can be divided into two broad categories: those who interpret Weber’s ethic of responsibility exclusively in terms of teleological or consequentialist ethics or – to put it differently – responsibility solely for consequences, and those who interpret it in terms of the responsibility for both conviction and consequences. Normative ethical theories of a teleological or consequentialist nature solely justify actions as ethically right in as far as they contribute to the attainment of a specific goal or good that is non-ethical or non-moral in nature. Teleological normative ethical theories are usually contrasted with deontological normative ethical theories, which insist that an action can only be justified as ethically right when it has the inherent quality of ethical rightness.



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2.  Interpretations in terms of responsibility for consequences 2.1  One of the main existing ethical approaches in Western politics (Lothar Waas) In his interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, the German political scientist Lothar Waas takes a stand against the prevalent and popular view that Weber promoted this ethic as the typical or appropriate political ethics (Waas 2006: 495–509). He agrees with Karl Jaspers that, on account of the last part of ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber should not only be regarded as a classical sociologist but also as a ‘classical thinker on politics’ (Jaspers 1988: 72). Contrary to the popular interpretation, however, the reason is not that in this speech he develops a view on the appropriate political ethics but, rather, that he provides a vivid sketch of the role played by two basic and existing ethical approaches in politics, the insolvable problems both of them encounter and the challenge this involves for those who plan to become involved in politics professionally. Waas finds justification for his understanding of the ethic of responsibility in Weber’s prefatory remark that he expected to disappoint his hearers, because he would meet their expectations to take a political stand on the turbulent political developments in Germany and Munich at the time in ‘only a purely formal way’. There are also other remarks made in the course of the speech that in Waas’s opinion clearly contravene the view that Weber promoted the ethic of responsibility as the appropriate political ethics. Taken together, the observation that the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility depart from ‘two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims’ and the claim that it is not possible to prescribe to someone whether he ‘should act as ethicist of conviction or ethicist of responsibility’ rather suggest that Weber had no such intention. His remark that it ‘is not that the ethic of conviction is identical with irresponsibility’ likewise rules out the conclusion that Weber regarded the ethic of conviction as unsuitable for politics (Waas 2006: 500–501). Waas, then, is convinced that one of the main purposes of Weber’s discussion of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is to demonstrate that there is a rationally unbridgeable chasm between these two basic ethical approaches in the way they deal with a fundamental problem in politics. They give different answers to the question: How should one respond when political actors do not behave as they ought to? May one then do something bad in order to prevent something worse? The ethic of conviction gives a negative answer, because it believes that one is only responsible for what one does oneself. It teaches that it is better to suffer oneself than to do harm to one’s own soul. The ethic of responsibility gives a positive answer, because it believes that one is not only responsible for one’s own actions, but also for what will be done, or not be done, by others in response to one’s actions (Waas 2006: 503–504).

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Waas argues that one of the roots of the distinction of the two ethics in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is the distinction of the ‘ethic of conviction’ and the ‘ethic of success’ (or ‘result ethic’) that were used by two philosophers who were not only contemporaries but also friends of Weber: the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert and Paul Hensel. According to Waas, traces of this distinction in Weber’s writings go back as far as 1905, in his use of the distinction ‘ethic of duty’ and ‘ethic of success’. In Weber’s 1917 article on ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality” in sociology and economics’, he does not only unreservedly make use of the distinction between the ‘ethic of conviction’ and ‘ethic of success’, but also remarks that it is not possible for ethics to demonstrate convincingly whether it is adequate to justify an action by reference to conviction alone, or rather in terms of responsibility for foreseeable consequences. In Waas’s opinion, the distinction between an ‘ethic of conviction’ and ‘ethic of responsibility’ in ‘Politics as a vocation’ does not add anything new to the distinction between an ‘ethic of conviction’ and ‘ethic of success’ in the value neutrality article. Simply put, Weber merely changed the name from ‘ethic of success’ to ‘ethic of responsibility’. In Waas’s opinion, there is little doubt that his reason for doing this was to avoid the negative associations the term ‘ethic of success’ had gained in Germany at the time (Waas 1995: 40–48). Although ‘ethic of success’ was an inclusive depiction for all goal-oriented ethics, it was strongly associated with utilitarianism, which, primarily as a result of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s strong criticism of ethical theories based on happiness or utility, did not have a good name with most German academics, including Weber (Waas 1995: 49). Waas identifies another negative association the ‘ethic of success’ had gained by 1919. In Germany the term was strongly associated with Realpolitik. Although Weber was in a certain sense a supporter of Realpolitik in that he advocated the active and forceful promotion of the political interests of Germany as a big nation, he detested the opportunistic power politics of Wilhelm II that exalted military success for its own sake. That the terms Realpolitik and ‘ethic of success’ came to be associated more and more with this opportunistic power politics was another reason for Weber to coin the neologism, ‘ethic of responsibility’ (Waas 1995: 53–4). If this root of the distinction of the two ethics in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is taken into account, a further conclusion is inevitable, in Waas’s opinion. This is the conclusion that there is also no difference between the distinction between an ‘ethic of conviction’ and ‘ethic of responsibility’ and the more contemporary distinction between ‘deontological ethics’ and ‘teleological ethics’, introduced by C. D. Broad in his book Five types of ethical theory in 1930 and given wide acceptance through William K. Frankena’s influential Ethics, first published in 1963 (Waas 1995: 125). Consequently, the distinction ‘ethic of conviction’ and ‘ethic of responsibility’ should be regarded  – as Weber himself indicated  – as nothing more than a purely formal distinction of the two main types of ethical approaches one finds in politics.



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Waas is of the opinion that Weber had in mind as representatives of the ethics of conviction not only Christian pacifists and socialist syndicalists, but also Plato, Kant, and the Russian authors, Dostojewski and Tolstoy. As representatives of the ethic of responsibility Weber had in mind the Italian political thinker, Machiavelli, and the utilitarian ethicists, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. There is, in his view, no reason to conclude that in ‘Politics as a vocation’ Weber denigrates the ethic of conviction, with its lofty and respectable representatives, and elevates the ethic of responsibility, with its sometimes dubious representatives, as the ethics of politics par excellence (Waas 2006: 504). Instead, the criticism that he does express is directed against certain politicians who professed to act in accordance with an ethic of conviction, but lacked the seriousness and commitment involved with it (Waas 2006: 506). What Weber wants to stress  – and with that we come to what Waas considers the second main purpose of Weber’s discussion of the distinction – is that not one of these ethical approaches can avoid or solve the fundamental problem with which all politics has to deal, namely that good goals can sometimes only be achieved by using morally ambivalent or even dangerous means, that one’s so-called good acts can sometimes have unexpected bad side-effects and that it is impossible to conclude when and to what extent the ethically good goal justifies ethically bad means and side-effects. The agent of the ethic of conviction who makes this dilemma a matter of conscience and nonetheless believes that he cannot but remain faithful to his orientation, knows what he is doing and does not act less responsibly than the agent of the ethics of responsibility who is aware of the relativity of his own position and realises that he sometimes also has to take a stand against all odds. That is why at the end of his speech Weber can say that the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility are not absolute opposites, but complement one another. However, the fundamental problem all politicians have to face and deal with, obliges Weber to at the end of his speech also warn those students who plan to become professional politicians – whether they have an ethic of conviction or an ethic of responsibility approach to politics – that they should only do so when they are sure that they have the stomach for it (Waas 2006: 506–507). On the basis of this interpretation of the distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility Waas also understands the three features of the politician discussed by Weber. After identifying the three features of passion, feeling of responsibility and judgement Weber points out a problem every politician has to deal with, namely how to force warm passion and cool judgement together in one soul. Waas is of the opinion that the feeling of responsibility is for Weber the standard for solving the tension between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. Passion is the predominant feature of the agent of the ethic of conviction, who passionately strives to change realities while serving a cause, while judgement is the predominant feature of the agent of the ethic

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of responsibility who, although also passionately serving a cause, rather tends to adapt his actions to the given realities. In other words, the agent of the ethic of conviction is the idealist, the fundamentalist or revolutionary in politics. The agent of the ethic of responsibility is the realist, the pragmatist or reformer in politics. This is, in Waas’s opinion, one more reason to conclude that Weber is not trying to present the ethic of responsibility as the typical ethics of politics. He agrees with Wolfgang Mommsen that in ‘Politics as a vocation’ the old liberal contrast between realist and idealist politics is sublimated into the contrast between ethic of responsibility and ethic of conviction (Waas 2006: 507–508).

2.2.  One leg of the appropriate ethical approach in politics (Nicholas Gane, Hans-Peter Müller) In Waas’s interpretation the emphasis is on the contrast between two legitimate, existing ethical approaches in politics. In the interpretations of Nicholas Gane and Hans-Peter Müller the point of departure is found in Weber’s remark on the complementarity of the two ethics. They also maintain that it was Weber’s intention to provide an exposition of the appropriate ethical approach in politics; however, in their opinion he regards neither of the two ethics taken on their own as adequate or appropriate. It is only in the combination of these two ethics that, for Weber, the appropriate ethical approach in politics can be found.1 As Gane and Müller have different views on the distinctive features of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, I provide brief expositions of both their interpretations. (a)  Nicholas Gane Gane’s interpretation takes as its point of departure Weber’s view on the disenchantment of religious legitimation in Western societies and the accompanying experience of both the fragmentation of modern culture and the ethical irrationality of the world. Weber sees it as the task of the political leader to face this reality and to strive both for political success and for an ethical correspondence of political means and ends, purposes and consequences. For Weber, this form of realistic but ambitious political leadership can only be achieved through the reconciliation of two opposing political ethics: an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of conviction (Gane 1997: 549–550). Gane takes his cue from Karl Löwith in depicting these two political ethics as ideal-types of political action that correspond to the ideal-types of rational 1  The Korean sociologist Sung Ho Kim provides a similar reading of Weber’s two ethics: “[…] I will first examine Weber’s ethical project and argue that […] it prescribes the symbiosis of two ethics – an ethic of subjective conviction (i. e., ethical decisionism) and an ethic of objective responsibility (i. e., ethical consequentialism) (Kim 2004: 99).



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social action outlined by Weber in the first chapter of Economy and society, namely instrumental rational social action and value-rational social action. The type of pure instrumental rational orientation gives rise to an ethic of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility, on the one hand, is characterised by a form of Realpolitik in which the relation of the purposes, means, and ends of political action are rationally evaluated and the responsibility for the predictable consequences of the action taken into consideration. On the other hand, the type of pure value-rational action gives rise to an ethic of conviction. The ethic of conviction, whether of a religious or a secular nature, demands that conviction overrides all concern for the relation of the means and ends of one’s actions, and that this unconditional commitment precludes personal responsibility for the consequences. It results in a fundamentalist ethic of political action, one in which devotion to a cause replaces concern both for the chances of realising a particular value and for the cost of such an enterprise (Gane 1997: 550–551). Gane is aware of the fact that the exact relation of these two ethics to Weber’s ideal-types of rational social action is a point of contemporary dispute. He refers to Roger Brubaker’s view that there is no direct correspondence between the ethic of responsibility and instrumental rationality, or between the ethic of conviction and value rationality, and that the synthesis of value and instrumental rationality is rather part of the ethic of responsibility. Gane admits that Weber indeed attempts to integrate passionate commitment to ultimate values with detached analysis of political means and ends. However, he denies that this synthesis in itself constitutes the ethic of responsibility. Were that the case, there would be no reason for Weber to argue for a synthesis of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, as he does when he asserts that these two ethics are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a person who has the calling for politician (Gane 1997: 552). In Gane’s opinion, it is clear that for Weber some kind of practical reconciliation must indeed take place between these two ethics and their corresponding rationalities, as neither an ethic of conviction nor an ethic of responsibility alone can guide political leadership that is both passionate and responsible. The passionate conviction of the ethic of conviction cannot drive ambitious yet responsible political action, for it cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world. It is unconcerned with the violent means of power, and thus for the consequences of political action. It is likely to deprive the political leader of the distance that a sense of objectivity requires. In contrast, the ethic of responsibility, despite giving rational consideration to the means, ends, and consequences of social action, lacks the passionate involvement that vitalises politics, and eliminates the risk of striving for success that is not readily available. As an ideal-typical form of instrumentally rational social action it ultimately eradicates this passion through rigid calculation of the chances and costs of political success (Gane 1997: 552–553).

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Politics, for Weber, thus demands conviction as well as responsibility, since politics without faith is impossible. Faith must accompany instrumental reason, not least because ethics is a sphere of value judgements, and therefore cannot be determined or prescribed by science. And, faith in the rightness of one’s values and actions must be combined with a calculated vision of the means, ends, and consequences of politics. It is therefore wrong to argue that Weber only makes provision for an either/or choice between these two ethics, as Stephen Turner and Regis Factor do, for example. They quote Weber’s words “irreconcilable death struggle, like that between ‘God’ and the ‘Devil’” in his value neutrality article to support their view that he regarded a choice between the two ethics as inevitable. However, these words, Gane counters, refer to the irreconcilable conflict between the life-orders and value-spheres of modernity, and not specifically to the two political ethics (Gane 1997: 554). Gane concludes that for Weber the success of political leadership depends on the responsible judgement of the political leader, and his/her ability not only to seek a practical reconciliation between politics and ethics, but to also take an active stand for particular values. It involves a double responsibility: to choose between conflicting values and to stand in for the consequences of the actions taken in realising the chosen values. In Weber’s opinion, very few are up to the almost impossible demands involved with the vocation of political leader. Only the person who can incorporate personal charisma based on conviction with an instrumental concern for political success qualifies for the vocation of political leader (Gane 1997: 555–556). (b)  Hans-Peter Müller Hans-Peter Müller is of the view that the two speeches Weber gave on the professions of scientist and politician should be read together and interpreted in the light of one another. It would then become clear that in both ‘Science as a vocation’ and ‘Politics as a vocation’ Weber develops, on the basis of a social philosophical analysis of his time, views on the relation between profession, professional ethics, and personality (Müller 2007: 202–223). He first provides a sociological analysis of science and politics as professions that follows the logic of value spheres and orders of life developed in the ‘Intermediate reflections’. Weber was convinced that only on the basis of such a sociological analysis of the external institutional arrangements and the internal features of science and politics one could ask which personal characteristics scientists and politicians ought to exhibit to meaningfully fulfil their professions and what meaning ‘personalities’ with such characteristics have within the total economy of social life. In the case of ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber comes to the conclusion that only someone who can discipline his passion in service of a cause and can execute his power to change things with both responsibility and objectivity has the calling to be a politician. The politician



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needs all three of these characteristics if he does not want to degenerate into either a career-oriented opportunist pretending to act out of conviction or a pure power-politician. Müller avers that in his discussion of the ethos of politics Weber not only rejects both the view that ethics plays no role in politics and the opposite view that precisely the same ethics applies to politics as in the rest of life, but also propagates the view that there is a typical political ethics that takes the distinct nature of ethics as a value sphere and life order into account. It is not irrelevant, for example, that politics has the legitimate use of violence as its typical means. It is in order to demonstrate the particular ethical difficulties the politician faces that Weber introduces the discussion of the different approaches of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. With his contrast of the two approaches he does not imply that the agent of the ethic of conviction acts without responsibility and the agent of the ethic of responsibility without any conviction. However, he does demonstrate that there is no way that even the ethic of conviction-oriented politician, who only strives to do what is morally right and ignores the consequences of his actions, can avoid dealing with unintended and unforeseen negative consequences of his actions. Followers of political leaders who instigated a political revolution with the best of intentions often in the past acted quite meanly. What also happens time and again is that the emotional revolution makes way for the conventional everyday politics of philistines and technicians. In fact, the introduction of such a matter-of-fact approach in politics is for the most part a precondition for the consolidation of the positive results of any revolution. Such an ebb and flow of a revolutionary phase in politics in which lofty ideals play a predominant role and a conventional phase in which the realities of everyday life and the consequences of political options have to be carefully weighed is part and parcel of politics. According to Müller, Weber does not in the end express his preference for either a pure conviction politician or a genuine responsibility politician. He cannot do so because earlier in ‘Politics as vocation’ he has already given preference to a ‘leader with machine’, that is, a charismatic political leader with the support of an effective political organisation. Charismatic political leaders taking the ethics of conviction as their cue are necessary for the dynamics of political life, but are dangerous for everyday politics. Responsibility politicians are effective in the everyday of politics, but in the long run become paralysed and contribute to the stagnation of politics. The politician who is inspired by the ethic of conviction, but disciplined by the ethic of responsibility, is therefore for Weber not only an ideal type, but also the ideal of political professional ethics.

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2.3.  A situated consequentialist ethics attuned to charismatic political leadership (Peter Breiner) Peter Breiner takes as point of departure of his interpretation that Weber, given his understanding of politics in terms of power as its means, and thus independently of its goals, strove to conceptualise a political ethics that is also independent of any substantive goals, and thus of a purely formal nature. It is, in his opinion, significant that Weber quickly bypasses the general question of determining the formal political ethics appropriate to both ordinary and vocational political actors in order to engage with the specific question of the appropriate political ethics for a political actor with a calling for politics. To show that this is no coincidence and that for Weber the answer to the second question automatically provides an answer to the first one as well, is what Breiner sets himself as goal in his interpretation of the ethic of responsibility (Breiner 1996: 169; 200). Breiner regards Weber’s distinction of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility as his answer to both the above-mentioned questions. On the one hand these two ethics represent ideal-types of two general ethical orientations toward political action, an attempt to understand impartially two different ways in which political actors might justify their political projects and the actions they undertake to realise these projects. On the other hand they represent the translation of Weber’s dual concept of personhood into politics. The defining feature of Weber’s notion of a person is a will with no ultimate rational guidance on the choice of fundamental ends. Rationality is exercised only in the choice of means and the weighing of consequences. As persons we are constantly suspended between choosing ultimate values on the basis of inner conviction and taking responsibility for rationally choosing the most effective means of realising them. Weber’s two ethics consist in a disaggregation of the principal components of his concept of the person into will and causal efficacy. He does eventually, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, reunite these two ethics under a concept of the person as a political actor, but only after he has tested each of them individually for their appropriateness in the field of politics (Breiner 1996: 169). This testing of the two ethics against the sociological conditions of their application does not work out favourably for the ethics of conviction. According to Breiner this ethic is the perfect translation of value rationality, or what we are apt to call deontological commitments, into political terms. There is a form of rationality appropriate to it, what we might call ‘conceptual consistency’, which entails that the agent of the ethic of conviction seeks to live in complete consistency with her ultimate values. The actions of the conviction politician express those features of a value that make commitment to it intrinsically worthy. She thus does not feel obliged to acknowledge the responsibilities that political power imposes on political actors. Ultimately, for Weber, the political actor motivated by an ethic of conviction ignores the prudential lessons of the sociology of power



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struggle and domination governing modern politics. On purely logical grounds, an ethic of conviction should in and of itself have no place in politics at all, because it foregoes the justification to which any rational ethic must submit, namely a justification of means in the light of the ends pursued. Politics can only be adequately understood under purposive or instrumental rational action, because political action is inseparable from ‘power’ in the instrumental sense of trying to get some agent to carry out one’s designs. As such, political action always requires ethically dangerous, or at least risky, means. Politics inevitably involves moral risk (Breiner 1996: 171–172). The only ethic that corresponds to the particular purposive reason appropriate to political action in the modern state is an ethic of responsibility, an ethic Weber initially intended to call an ‘ethic of power’ because it largely encompasses responsibility for the consequences of using political power. We may justify our political commitments according to the intrinsic goods we hope to realise, but the prescription for any political action taken in their name is always justified by consequences. And it is the consequences of our political actions that justify or discredit our political projects (Breiner 1996: 172–173). But what foreseeable consequences are relevant, and why indeed only ‘foreseeable consequences? According to Breiner, Weber gives more than one answer to this question. The first is provided in a general description of the existential conditions faced by all truly ‘political’ actors rooted in a conceptual account of politics and personhood. The responsible political actor must take account of the average deficiencies of people and she must scale down her ends to those that can be effectively realised. She must be aware of the frequently ironic relation between intentions (convictions) and consequences. Not only does the pursuit of ethical goals in politics often result in the realisation of their opposite, but frequently good ends can be attained in politics only by using morally questionable means. Furthermore, the attempt to introduce substantive values into politics is subject to the logic of domination that governs all social action. All ultimate values that are successfully imposed on state and society gain their initial impulse from movements organised according to charismatic domination (Breiner 1996: 173–174). An ethic of responsibility requires that the political actor be fully aware of these costs of pursuing any end in politics and to take full responsibility for any outcome that may ensue. It is in the willingness to do this that the distinctive honour of the politician lies. The upshot is that the ethic of responsibility contains, as it were, a dual responsibility corresponding to the demands of Weber’s sociological clarification of action. First, the political actor must correctly calculate the kinds of power necessary to achieve his or her fundamental projects, taking account of the desired results and the unwanted subsidiary consequences that will ensue in general, as well as in the particular historical situation. Second, he or she must decide, without relying on any ethical or prudential guidance, whether the goal

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being pursued is worth the consequences of using the particular economy of power and violence necessary to achieve it. In Breiner’s opinion, by dividing responsible political decision-making in this way Weber is pointing to the fact that the ethic of responsibility demands a responsibility greater than the ordinary conception that we are responsible only for those consequences that we have brought about voluntarily. Political actors are, in Robert Goodin’s words, ‘strictly liable’ for the outcomes of their actions, even if fortune or logics beyond the control of the actor contributed to the result. If this is so, commitment to an ethic of responsibility endangers a coherent self, for as political actors we incur praise and blame that events beyond our control impose on us (Breiner 1996: 174–177). Does this mean that Weber’s political ethic is ‘consequentialist’? In Breiner’s opinion it does, but not in the utilitarian sense of appealing to an impartial ranking of preferences or a general balance of overall happiness. Rather, his ethic might correspond to what Breiner prefers to call ‘situated consequentialism’. For Weber there is no utilitarian way to rank consequences, because what we are comparing when we compare consequences in politics are situations. Depending on how we describe a situation, we may pick different consequences as relevant and judge the consequences of a political act to be good or bad, beneficial or harmful in light of the fundamental convictions that we bring to the situation (Breiner 1996: 178). According to Breiner, Weber provides a second answer to the question regarding relevant consequences in an account of the sociological conditions in which responsible political action must take place. To understand fully why Weber denounce as conviction ethicists not only those religious pacifists in politics who naively refuse to recognise power and violence as legitimate political means, but also the socialists and radical democrats, who do recognise that the use of power and violence is inevitable for the achievement of the ideal classless or radically democratic society, one has to take his view on legitimate domination into account. It is Weber’s view that the logic of rational political action consists ineluctably in an oscillation between leaders imposing their will on the state through bureaucratically organised mass followings and the routine execution of that will through forms of rational-legal domination, both forms of domination requiring blind obedience, and in the last instance when obedience fails, violence. It is for the outcome of this logic of personality and discipline investing both plebiscitary and revolutionary attempts to transcend routine politics that we are responsible under Weber’s political ethic. For him the problem with socialist and radical democratic revolutionary leaders is that they are only capable of reactive, affectual behaviour, not value-rational or purposive-rational action. The revolutionary leader can at the most organise the resentment and vengefulness of the fickle masses under a party machine, but cannot transform it into conscious self-direction. The masses are primarily motivated by the external rewards of revolution, such as adventure, victory, booty, and spoils. The result is that the leader cannot realise the putative goals of the revolution, the eradication of injustice and



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the introduction of collective self-determination, because he must submit to the predominantly base motives of his following (Breiner 1996: 182–185). In Breiner’s opinion there is something odd about Weber’s deployment of the examples of socialism and direct democracy to support his ethic of political responsibility. According to his account of social scientific clarification of action, he is only entitled to show the inconsistency between revolutionary means and ends, and the consequences that would follow in trying to stabilise a successful mass revolution; but he cannot scientifically assess whether the choice of revolutionary action or the attempt to realise socialism is politically justified. Yet, Weber assumes that once these particular historical examples are refracted through his political sociology and his formal ethic of political responsibility, all rational individuals would agree on good and bad, justifiable and unjustifiable political consequences. He even indicates that such rational agreement could serve as the basis for determining which political projects are justifiable and which are not. In Breiner’s opinion, Weber can only assume this agreement on the basis of some hidden assumptions rooted in his account of the scientific clarification of practical political action. The most important assumption is that everyone would accept his will-centred concept of individual freedom. Our agreement with Weber’s assessment of the political consequences of socialism and direct democracy presupposes our clear rejection of a collective concept of autonomy in favour of a concept according to which only a unique individual can hold together personal responsibility and the dissipation of all will into the causal nexus surrounding our (political) acts (Breiner 1996: 189–190). Breiner proposes that Weber’s view on the impossibility of uniting mass politics and self-determining freedom provides us with a clue for understanding his famous reconciliation of his political ethic of responsibility with his ethic of pure conviction at the end of ‘Politics as a vocation’. Weber takes for granted that the political actor who is responsible for the consequences of political action accepts the necessity of not pursuing ideals that seek to realise a self-determining freedom beyond the logic of power struggle and domination in the state in order not to discredit such ideals in the future. In this way, both the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility receive their proper acknowledgement and come to complement each other. The conviction is maintained within, but responsibility for power and its results demands that we do not act on the conviction for fear of unleashing the diabolical powers of violence and rationalisation (Breiner 1996: 193–194). What value choices could then be translated into politics, according to the ethic of responsibility? As Breiner reads him, Weber gives two answers to this question. The first is the commitment to the ‘calling’ of politics itself, both as a specialised skill in the struggle for power and as an inner voice that is only confirmed by the possession of a charismatic gift for leadership. Only the full-time professional politician who strives to be a charismatic leader of a parliamentary

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party can in fact reconcile conviction with the calculation of means, ends, and ironic subsidiary consequences. Only he can take responsibility for his political actions or, more accurately, for political action as such. The second value that one can responsibly translate into politics is itself perfectly compatible with the commitment to the political calling but does not change its substance over time: this is Weber’s own well-known substantive commitment to nationalism and the nation-state. The reason why the commitment to the nation-state can reconcile both the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction is that it is the one ideal that is not injured when power backed by violence is deployed on its behalf (Breiner 1996: 194–198). Weber’s vindication of the nation as object of sentiment linked to the commitment to politics as an intrinsic value and profession provides the final backdrop for understanding his reconciliation of the two ethics. It is precisely by realising the impossibility of reversing the political expropriation process and democratically reappropriating the means of power – and by the same token by seeking to transcend the grinding business of politics within the constraints of the profession of politics – that we can finally discover those convictions that are reconcilable with an ethic of responsibility for the political consequences of using power to achieve one’s goals: commitment to vocational politics under the substantive commitment to the nation (Breiner 1996: 199). Thus, the upshot of Weber’s view on the ethic of responsibility developed in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is that this ethic is not only the appropriate political ethics for a political actor with a calling for politics, but is also the appropriate general and formal political ethics that can provide guidance to all political role-players on the most suitable political ideology.

2.4.  A variant of utilitarian ethics suitable not only for political ethics, but also for applied ethics in general (Wolfgang Wieland) Wolfgang Wieland undertakes the most emphatic attempt to interpret Weber’s ethic of responsibility as a variant of utilitarian ethics. The question he strives to answer is: Does the growing tendency, especially in Germany, to ground ethics in the principle of responsibility, point to a new phase in the development of normative ethic? As he is of the opinion that the origin of the idea that ethics should be based on responsibility as principle can be traced to Max Weber’s speech ‘Politics as a vocation’, he turns his attention to Weber’s view on the ethic of responsibility (Wieland 1999: 46). According to Wieland, the two characteristics of the agent of Weber’s ethic of responsibility most present-day proponents accentuate, are the responsibility she exhibits by justifying her actions in terms of the real context in which these actions are imbedded, including the totality of foreseeable consequences, and the responsibility she exhibits by being willing to stand in for the consequences



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of the actions she is taking. Wieland discusses both these characteristics in his attempt to find an answer to the question whether responsibility can serve as a new fundamental principle in contemporary ethics. In his discussion of the second characteristic he comes to the rather negative conclusion that there is ample evidence that responsibility in Weber’s sense of ‘personally standing in for the consequences of one’s own actions’, with its strong emotional overtones, does not function or, even, cannot function as a fundamental ethical principle in contemporary societies (Wieland 1999: 46–48). It is in his discussion of the first characteristic, which associates responsibility with the justification of actions in terms of foreseeable consequences, that Wieland comes to the conclusion that Weber’s ethic of responsibility can be interpreted as a variant of utilitarian ethics. The claim that the ethic of responsibility provides a new foundation for normative ethics thus has to be questioned. Wieland is of the opinion that it is important for the interpretation of Weber’s ethics of responsibility to distinguish carefully between the content of action norms and the ground of their validity. This distinction is important when it comes to determining the role played by the consequences of actions in the ethic of responsibility. Taking foreseeable consequences of options for action into account can lead to the formulation of norms with a specific content in order to optimally ensure favourable consequences. Such consequences can, however, also be used to justify why particular norms should be accepted as valid (Wieland 1999: 18; 20). In a first move to demonstrate that Weber’s ethic of responsibility can be regarded as a variant of utilitarian ethics, Wieland argues that it would not make sense to assert that Weber regards taking account of foreseeable consequences in determining the content of norms as a distinctive feature of his ethics of responsibility. To take foreseeable consequences into account in this sense is one of the elementary requirements of practical wisdom that is respected in most normative ethical theories, including the ethic of conviction. Weber could hardly have derided the proponents of the ethic of conviction for ignoring the consequences of their actions and highlighted taking it into account as a distinctive feature of his ethic of responsibility if he had this elementary requirement in mind. An agent of the ethic of responsibility could only be expected to stand in for the consequences of his actions on the assumption that he is convinced that these consequences justify his actions. One therefore has to conclude that Weber’s ethics of responsibility is not only oriented to consequences – as all ethics are – but is also based on consequences (Wieland 1999: 52). In a second move, Wieland provides a brief sketch of the distinction of different types of normative ethical theory that is widely accepted today, namely that between teleological and deontological ethical theories. Wieland gives special attention to the theory of utilitarianism – also called ‘consequentialism’ – not only because it provides a pure example of the teleological type of ethical theory, but also to

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demonstrate, ultimately, the close resemblance of the ethic of responsibility to it. According to him ‘utility’, which lends utilitarianism its name, can refer to either the non-moral goal to which ethical actions should be directed, or the suitability a particular action or rule has for attaining the goal (Wieland 1999: 75–77). From the beginning utilitarian ethicists have had to deal with two problems: how to oblige the agent to optimise the excess of good over bad consequences and how to establish what the fundamental non-moral goal of all ethical actions should be. The act-utilitarian view that the individual agent has the obligation in each situation of ethical decision-making to weigh the balance of consequences of all possible options for action before deciding on the right action has proven to be untenable in most real life situations. As a result the rule-utilitarian view has been developed, obliging the agent to follow rules that have proven to lead to actions that result in an over-all excess of good over bad consequences. The second problem has proven to be more difficult to overcome. Utilitarian ethicists have reached consensus neither on what the ultimate non-moral goal of ethical action should be, nor on the manner in which such an ultimate goal could be justified (Wieland 1999: 78–81). According to Wieland, a decisive turn in the development of utilitarianism took place when it was proposed that the attempt to give content to the ultimate goal and to justify it should be relinquished by the ethicist, while the responsibility for deciding on the ultimate goal should be shifted from the ethicist to the individual who has to make the ethical decision. One can even assert that, as a result of this development, there is widespread agreement among utilitarian ethicists today that the determination of the content of ultimate goals is not part of the task of utilitarian theory. This means that utilitarianism as ethical theory presupposes a theory of non-moral value judgements and can be reconciled with any such theory. It also means that the emphasis in contemporary utilitarian theory is almost exclusively on the development of logical and analytical methods that would ensure the optimal realisation of given goals (Wieland 1999: 81–82). In a third move, Wieland draws the conclusion that the ethic of responsibility can be interpreted as a variant of utilitarianism, which means that proponents of such an ethic by implication also accept the core of utilitarianism. This resemblance is clear, in Wieland’s opinion, when one looks at the two essential features of the ethic of responsibility. First of all, it is also consistently based on consequences. As with the agent of utilitarianism, the ethical decisions of the agent who acts in accordance with the ethic of responsibility are based on the totality of consequences that are foreseeable for the agent, as well as the means needed to achieve the goals. Both are obliged to optimally predict, weigh, and evaluate, with the aid of analytical tools at their disposal, the totality of all these foreseeable consequences and means needed. Only this balancing of all the elements in the action complex provides a foundation for the justification of ethical norms in both utilitarianism and the ethic of responsibility. However, in Weber’s sketch



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of the ethic of responsibility there is still no sign of the attempt of utilitarianism in its later stage of development to quantify this balancing exercise. The second essential feature of the ethic of responsibility is that, like utilitarianism, it derives the norms for decisions on actions in terms of an ultimate goal that needs not be ethically evaluated in turn. Wieland is convinced that this is quite clearly Weber’s view in ‘Politics as a vocation’. The agent of the ethic of responsibility evaluates all his action decisions in terms of an ultimate goal or goals chosen by him on account of his own worldview – Weber uses the metaphor of personal ‘daemon’ – that needs not and cannot be justified any further. These ultimate goals constitute the remainder that cannot be rationally relativised in an ethical view that shows a strong affinity for the principle of purposive or instrumental rationality. Given Weber’s expectation that the agent of the ethic of responsibility may show unflinching commitment to an ultimate goal, Wieland considers the accusation that his ethical view boils down to decisionism to be unjustified. A  consistent decisionist would not allow his freedom to change the goals to which he aspires to be curtailed by faithfulness to ultimate goals. At the most one could say that Weber adds to the utilitarian core of his ethical view decisionistic elements (Wieland 1999: 85–88). If one accepts the conclusion that the ethic of responsibility is to be seen as a variant of utilitarianism, one also has to accept that the same critical questions posed with regard to utilitarianism can also be posed to it. One of the troubling implications of utilitarianism is that it seems not to make provision for the acknowledgement and observance of any unconditional moral norms that can prevent morally despicable actions in the attempt to achieve a set goal. Given the fact that utilitarianism acknowledges only actions that optimally contribute to the achievement of the set goal, the implication seems to be that even fundamental moral principles like justice and human rights not only can, but should, be over-ridden once it becomes clear that their observance stands in the way of the effective achievement of such a goal. The same objection applies to the ethic of responsibility, in Wieland’s opinion. To accept that the ethic of responsibility is nothing but a variant of utilitarianism also means, finally, that one has to deny that the term ‘responsibility’ in the ethic of responsibility refers to a new and hitherto concealed foundational principle of normative ethics. In Wieland’s opinion it rather refers to the fundamental choice of an ultimate goal and the commitment to this goal and its realisation that play a central role in Weber’s ethical view. Although Wieland rejects the view that the ethic of responsibility can be regarded as a new normative ethics based on responsibility as principle, he does not come to the conclusion that it has become obsolete. The ethic of responsibility with its emphasis on responsibility still has, in his opinion, a valuable role to play as an ‘ethics of the second front’. Ethics of the second front regulates regions of life and activities that have already been delimited and takes for granted that its

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foundational norms have already been established. Forms of regional ethic2 like political, economic or educational ethics make use of presuppositions, which they cannot and need not justify, because the task of justification belongs to general ethics. In fact, these different forms of regional ethics can only begin their work when the task of legitimising foundational norms with unconditional validity has already been completed by general ethics. Only then is the indispensable framework for choosing goals provided, delimiting regions of activities and developing action strategies to optimise consequences. Only then, also, is it possible to allocate to the individual agent a particular manageable task field for which he bears comprehensive responsibility, so that there is no need to enumerate very specific duties. Under such conditions it becomes meaningful, in the context of a regional ethics, to anticipate and weigh the consequences of actions and to orientate one’s own decisions to balances of consequences (Wieland 1999: 95–97). In this way something with which ethics has been acquainted for very long is developed further. Ethics has already in its founding occasion in antiquity identified prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis, prudentia) as the virtue that could enable its concretisation in specific areas of life. It has been regarded the task of prudence to take note of the context of each action, to weigh its consequences and to plan its execution. Rules based on prudence can be depicted as secondary duties that gain legitimacy by enhancing optimisation, as such prudential rules always have an instrumental nature. Although the concepts of responsibility and prudence do not have the same meaning, Wieland argues that the ethic of responsibility has a meaningful role to play in exactly the same field that has been allocated in ethical tradition to prudence. Although it cannot provide the agent with ultimate goals with a specific content, it can urge him, when he identifies himself with a certain cause and its enhancement, also to take into account all the means needed and all the foreseeable consequences, and to identify with them when taking a decision to act in a certain way. The ethic of responsibility comes into its own when it provides the agent with more clarity on the reach of his actions and draws his attention to the responsibility involved with deciding on the right actions (Wieland 1999: 97–99).

2  In English and American literature what Wieland calls ‘regional ethics’ (German: regionale Ethik) is mostly called ‘applied ethics’.



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3.  Interpretations in terms of responsibility for both conviction and consequences 3.1  The responsible ethic of conviction as the appropriate ethics of the political sphere (H. H. Bruun)3 In his interpretation of the ethic of responsibility, Danish sociologist H. H. Bruun takes as point of departure Weber’s characterisation of politics as a power conflict. In his opinion, the fundamental conflict inherent in the concept of politics that Weber identifies also includes the dichotomy between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of consequences. As the conflict between different goals is a distinctive feature of politics, the fundamental problem may arise whether human activity should be guided by the wish to attain ‘outer’ goals at all, i. e., whether the interest in the teleological component of values is at all legitimate, or whether behaviour should be motivated only by axiological considerations. This dichotomy acquires a special poignancy with respect to political questions. The ethic of conviction manifests itself, among other things, in that means to a given end are judged according to their intrinsic value and are rejected regardless of their teleological status if this intrinsic value turns out to be a negative one. However, politics is characterised by its distinctive instrument, power, which has an extremely negative value in the ethical system within which Weber usually operates. This ethically negative character is above all due to the fact that physical violence is the extreme manifestation of power. But it should not be overlooked that other 3 Quite a few commentators provide interpretations similar to that of Bruun. Winfried Brugger finds Bruun’s analysis ‘convincing’, but prefers to follow Karl Jaspers’s use of the term ‘ethic of responsibility’ for what Bruun calls ‘responsible ethic of conviction’, because in Jaspers’s words, the “ethic of responsibility is the true ethic of conviction,” which seeks its way in the world neither by taking into account only the standard of success, nor by relying only on a rational principle based on conviction (Brugger 1980: 187, n. 1; 191, n. 10). Rogers Brubaker is also convinced that Weber’s ethic of responsibility is in fact a synthesis of value and instrumental rationality: “The ethic of responsibility is not identical with pure Zweckrationalität. For pure Zweckrationalität […] precludes any reference to ultimate value commitments: ends are determined by the urgency of an individual’s ‘given subjective wants’ and by the ease of satisfying them, not by their ‘worth’ from the point of view of a system of ultimate values. The ethic of responsibility, on the other hand, is not merely compatible with a commitment to ultimate values, but demands just such a commitment. For responsibility is empty to some ‘substantive purpose’ unless it is informed by ‘passionate devotion to a “cause”’. Far from being identical with pure Zweckrationalität, the ethic of responsibility can best be understood as an attempt by Weber to integrate Wertrationalität and Zweckrationalität, the dispassionate analysis of alternative means of pursuing them” (Brubaker 1984: 108). Cf. also the interpretation of Bradley E Starr, who is of the opinion that in the ethic of responsibility the two types of rational social action (valuerational and instrumental-rational) “are not seen in terms of what Weber calls ‘absolute contrasts,’ that is, rationalities that can have no relationship to each other, but in terms of a supplementary relation of opposites […] I am therefore convinced that it is the awareness of this oppositional yet supplemental form of combination that Weber is commending here as distinctive to the ethic of responsibility” (Starr 1999: 429).

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forms of power – for instance, lies – may also carry a strong negative ethical load (Bruun 1972: 255–6). Bruun identifies three variants in Weber’s treatment of the ethic of conviction. First, the religious-acosmistic variant, which departs from the prescription, ‘Do not resist evil with violence’, on the basis of an otherworldly ethics that is in opposition to the laws of the social world. Second, the pacifist-political variant, which does not reject the whole sphere of politics as long as the political ends are striven for by non-violent means. It operates on the assumption that the axiological and teleological systems are identical and that only good can come from good, and only evil from evil. Third, the radical-revolutionary variant, which does not shy away from the use of violence, but whose proponents, like the prophets of the millennium Weber describes in ‘Politics as a vocation’, act on the supposition that evil means employed in a good cause will, by virtue of the character of the latter, be cleansed of their bad side effect. Common to these three variants is their sceptical view of teleological considerations. Either they regard them as illegitimate, and reject them absolutely; or they replace the real teleological value analysis, the computation of the chance of reaching a given goal, by some kind of axiological consideration, not so much in the belief that causation does not function in the world, but rather on the basis of the view that they have no right, or at least no duty, to justify their actions by their consequences. They thus deny any responsibility for consequences and accept only a responsibility that is purely axiological (Bruun 1972: 257–260). In opposition to the ethic of conviction one can, especially in relation to the problems of politics, define an attitude corresponding to the ethic of consequences. Bruun finds it unfortunate that Weber prefers to call this ethic the ‘ethic of responsibility’, because a person committed to the ethic of conviction also feels responsible in a certain sense, namely to an ‘inner’ goal or axiological principle. One has to take into account that Weber, in using the term ‘responsibility’ in the designation of the second ethic he identifies, above all wants to highlight that the individual accepting the ethic of consequences acknowledges a responsibility for the consequences of his actions. This forms the core of his definition of the ethic of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility can be interpreted in ‘Politics as a vocation’ as purely ‘passive’, as referring to the acceptance of the right of others to judge one’s actions according to their ‘external’, ‘worldly’ consequences. The acknowledgement of such a responsibility in Weber’s speech, however, quickly leads to the acceptance of an ‘active’ responsibility, i. e., a responsibility for the state of the ‘world’ (to the extent that it is possible to influence it). Weber also alludes to such a responsibility in other writings, when he emphasises a responsibility to history and to the future generations for the world one leaves behind (Bruun 1972: 260–261). The active ethic of responsibility thus implies a demand for action, guided by knowledge of external consequences. In the political field this involves a will-



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ingness to include force, possibly even physical violence, among the means to be employed if necessary. The teleological system is acknowledged to be relevant not only for judging one’s actions, but also for the planning of these actions: the ethic of responsibility carries with it the duty of striving for the goals one has set oneself, making use of all the means adequate to the given end and, moreover, taking into account the actual consequences of the means and the relation of these consequences to the end. The active ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction are thus absolute contrasts (Bruun 1972: 261–262). Since the active ethic of responsibility involves a duty to attain external goals, while taking into account the actual consequences of the means, i. e., to perform teleological calculations before acting, this in turn implies that a politician committed to the ethic of responsibility needs knowledge. Unlike persons committed to the ethic of conviction, those accepting the ethic of responsibility need to have a comprehensive grasp of the relevant facts, since these may have an influence on their decisions. This knowledge does not only include empirical facts and the chain of causation relevant to a particular goal, but also an acknowledgement of the relation between such facts, i. e., the empirical-teleological system, and the axiological one. The comprehensive value-analyses involved in this includes recognition of the tension between the empirical sphere and a given value sphere, that is, of the value irrationality of the world. Acknowledgement of tensions between the attainment of goals in specifically the political sphere and other spheres, particularly that of ethics, concretely means to refrain from identifying an actual political advance or defeat with an ethical one. It also means recognising that the teleological and axiological analysis of ends of means may conflict. Ethically good means may have ethically bad consequences, while the use of ethically negative means may have ethically positive results. And, finally, it means recognition of what Weber calls the Machtpragma, the fact that ‘force always breeds force’. Weber seems to limit the twofold knowledge that is required, namely of empirical facts and of the axiological structure of the empirical facts, to predictable consequences. However, one also has to take into account his theory of the paradox of consequences, which poses that every action stands at the beginning of an infinite chain of consequences that can never be properly foreseen. Thus the fund of knowledge required of those respecting the ethic of responsibility necessarily includes the recognition that any action will have consequences beyond the limits of predictability (Bruun 1972: 262–266). On the one hand, Weber is of the opinion that the antagonism between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is fundamentally insoluble by scientific means. On the other hand, there are strong indications that, in discussing the alternative between the two ethical orientations in the field of politics, he accords a special prominence to the ethic of responsibility. This raises the question to what extent, in what sense, and with what justification the ethic of responsibility is claimed by him to be the specific standard of political behaviour,

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the proper ethic of politics. Many passages in Weber’s work seem to support the claim that the ethic of responsibility is the correct or legitimate norm of political behaviour. For instance, the concept ‘responsibility’ is used in ‘Politics as a vocation’ to distinguish the politician from the official. It is also clear that the ‘sense of responsibility’ is not only a central point of reference for the other two qualities of the politician (‘commitment’ and ‘sense of realities’) he discusses, but represents a kind of synthesis of them, and in that sense constitutes the true ethic of politics. There is good reason to interpret this ‘responsibility’ in the first instance as ‘power responsibility’: the politician’s responsibility for the result of his actions. Both the teleological elements of the situation as such and the predictable consequences can be identified in Weber’s concrete description of ‘sense of realities’ to which ‘responsibility’ relates (Bruun 1972: 267–269). It is, however, important to realise to what extent Weber is able to maintain that the ethic of responsibility is the legitimate ethic of politics. As long as the principle of value freedom is to be respected he cannot demand that the politician should accept this and no other ethic. The reason for the apparent dominance of the ethic of responsibility in Weber’s thought should, in Bruun’s opinion, rather be sought in his implicit characterisation of politics and in the theoretical consequences of this characterisation. Although science cannot, in Weber’s view, legitimate choices between values, it can clarify the actual causal relations connected with values. In cases where the goal implied by the value constituting a value sphere is defined by the existence of or the striving for some situation of fact, scientific inquiry can decide, with general validity, whether a certain kind of behaviour fulfils the conditions of belonging to this sphere. In this sense, science may define the ‘ethics’ of different value spheres. In a similar sense, one may talk of the ethic of responsibility as being the ethic of the political sphere (Bruun 1972: 269–270). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the emphasis laid in ‘Politics as a vocation’ on the ‘technical’, teleological aspects of the politician’s responsibility normally appears as, and always implies, a rejection of the ethic of conviction, which either ignores the teleological value analysis or identifies it with the axiological one. A person committed to the ethic of conviction would consequently be a bad politician, or at any rate a worse one than if he acted according to the ethic of responsibility (Bruun 1972: 271). The ‘responsibility’ of the politician, however, in the second instance also refers to what can be called ‘goal responsibility’: the politician’s responsibility for the maintenance of the goal. This becomes clear in Weber’s denouncement of the vanity that especially characterises pure power-politicians. Vanity does not only entail a ‘lack of a sense of reality’, the neglect of the means necessary to obtain a political goal, but also ‘irresponsibility’, the neglect of the goal that the means were supposed to attain. In the case of the power-politician the original goal, the attainment of which is the politician’s first motive for seeking to obtain



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power, recedes into the background, while the acquisition and expansion of power becomes an increasingly long-term goal. By implication the responsibility of the politician for the teleological elements in the chain of means and ends is here complemented by a responsibility for the end pursued. In contrasting the politician with the government official Weber explicitly highlights this goal responsibility as the distinctive characteristic of the politician. Whereas it cannot be expected of the government official to also set the political goals which his knowledge serves to implement, it can be expected of the politician to set political goals and to take personal responsibility, not only for the side effects resulting from the implementation of the goal, but also for the choice of the goal as such. In contrast to the ‘power responsibility’ that is specific to the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility, the ‘goal responsibility’ does not distinguish him from the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of conviction. Both of them have in common the idea of a goal that they as politician should seek to reach (Bruun 1972: 272–282). According to Bruun up to this point of the discussion Weber’s view of the responsibility of the politician, as defined by some sort of commitment and a sense of realities, has only moved within a teleological system. Although the ‘goal responsibility’ is the responsibility for the maintenance and implementation of the goal, it is discharged by the attainment of a certain factual, ‘external’ situation that represents the implementation of the goal. What is rather confusing, however, is that near the end of ‘Politics as a vocation’ Weber categorically states that one cannot prescribe to someone whether or when he should act in accordance with the ethic of conviction or in accordance with the ethic of responsibility. He follows up this remark by narrowing down the options to two ethics of conviction he distinguishes. Adherents to the first type are distinguished by their complete refusal to accept responsibility for the consequences of the actions they initiate. But when describing the person who, although acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility in taking full responsibility for the consequences, comes to the point where he takes a stand and refuses to relinquish his convictions, Weber has in mind the second type of the ethic of conviction, depicted by Bruun as the responsible ethic of conviction. He adds that in this instance the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility are not absolute opposites, but complement one another, and only together make out the true human being that can fulfil the vocation of politics (Bruun 1972: 282–284). The responsible ethic of conviction is like the ethic of responsibility in that a person committed to it accepts his responsibility for the external consequences of his actions. On the other hand, it differs from the ethic of responsibility in that it does not invariably imply that the actions of the person in question are in accordance with this responsibility, since his behaviour is sometimes guided by axiological considerations. In fact, the attitude is a combination of the type already referred to as the passive ethic of responsibility with an active ethic of conviction. Since

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the latter component must be the complementary element that is, in Weber’s view, necessary to the true politician, we can conclude that the precondition that he establishes for action in conformity with the ethic of politics is the fundamental willingness to let oneself be guided in certain cases by the value axioms of other spheres than the political one. At the same time a person committed to the responsible ethic of conviction, whether his actions be guided by the axioms of the political or of other value spheres, i. e., whether they be guided by teleological or by purely axiological considerations, should know the ‘cost’ of these actions. This means, in Bruun’s opinion, that the political ethic as defined by Weber turns out to be, in addition to political commitment and sense of realities, Klarheit, awareness of the ‘costs’ of a concrete political commitment and of its realistic implementation, not only in relation to other political goals, but also in relation to other value spheres (Bruun 1972: 284–286).

3.2.  An alternative for Kant’s formal ethical theory in late modernity (Wolfgang Schluchter) Wolfgang Schluchter, emeritus professor of the University of Heidelberg, Germany, is probably the living person who has been engaged most intensively with the interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility. He wrote his first commentary on Weber’s distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility in 1971, and modified and elaborated his interpretation in a number of subsequent publications. It was only in 1996 that he made final adjustments to his interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility.4 Schluchter’s final interpretation is executed in two rounds. In a first round he provides an interpretation of the professional ethical qualities or virtues of the political leader who acts in accordance with the ethic of responsibility. One can say that Schluchter in this first round of interpretation provides a professional ethical reading of the ethic of responsibility as ethic of the political leader. Like Müller, he stresses that the two speeches Weber gave on invitation of the Munich Free Student Association, ‘Science as a vocation’ and ‘Politics as a vocation’,

4 Schluchter‘s first monograph with a comprehensive interpretation of Weber‘s ethic of responsibility was Wertfreiheit und Verantwortungsethik: Zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Politik bei Max Weber in 1971. It was published in English in 1979 as ‘Value neutrality and the ethic of responsibility’ in W. Schluchter and G. Roth, Max Weber’s vision of history. Later publications in which he engaged with Weber’s ethic of responsibility were, among others, Religion und Lebensführung Band I: Studien zu Max Webers Kultur- und Werttheorie (1991), Paradoxes of modernity: Culture and conduct in the theory of Max Weber (1996) – in which he made final adjustments to his interpretation, Die Entstehung des modernen Rationalismus: Eine Analyse von Max Webers Entwicklungsgeschichte des Okzidents (1998), and the chapter ‘Was heist politische Führung? Max Weber über Politik als Beruf‘ in Die Entzauberung der Welt: Sechs Studien zu Max Weber (2009), pp. 88–110.



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should be read together and interpreted in the light of one another (Schluchter 1996: 25). According to Schluchter, Weber advocated the same basic idea on both occasions when he addressed the Munich Free Students: that one robs vocation of all meaning “if there (is) no exercise of that specific form of self-restraint which it demands” (Weber 1978: 73). Although the kind of self-limitation required differs, it is required in both scholarship and politics. Weber places the two concepts of vocation and self-limitation in an intrinsic relation to a third concept, that of personality. In the two speeches, he directs his opposition against a romantic-aestheticist concept of personality that discovers its sacred core in direct experience or even in the effort of shaping one’s life into a work of art. Neither the naturalist nor the aestheticist variant captures what is crucial for Weber, namely the constant and intrinsic relation to certain ultimate ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ of life that a person achieves in the unfolding of his fate, a process that at the same time is one of Bildung. Only someone who has gone through such a process has for Weber become a personality (Schluchter 1996: 36–38). According to Schluchter, Weber is of the opinion that those politicians of conviction who intoxicate themselves with romantic sensations and delude themselves about the entanglement of politics with power relations, as well as those politicians who advocate pure power and embody the qualities he detested in politics – lack of objectivity, irresponsibility, and vanity – display an utter disrespect for the outward and inner limitations involved with the vocation of politician. From the responsible politician, however, he expects clarity, a sense of proportion, inner detachment from persons and things, passion and a sense of responsibility. Clarity and a sense of proportion belong to the cognitive realm, whereas passion and a sense of responsibility belong to the emotional realm. Inner detachment from persons and things, and from oneself, appears to be the overall attitude of mind, the general stance that combines all these qualities. However, Schluchter concludes that in the end Weber does not deny that politicians of conviction can also display these features. Wherever the principled politicians are able to prove objectively the value of their ‘mission’ and to cope with their entanglement in power relations, he is willing to recognise their vocation for politics, for they are aware of the tragic element with which all action, but especially political action, is in fact intertwined. They are thus also aware of the limitations of political action, and that it demands a specific type of self-limitation. In particular, the agent of the type of formal ethic of conviction associated with Immanuel Kant exhibits the same qualities or virtues as Weber’s agent of responsibility. The agent of such a formal ethic of conviction, however, only exhibits these qualities with regard to her convictions and not with regard to the foreseeable consequences of her actions (Schluchter 1996: 97–98). Schluchter does not only discuss Weber’s ethic of responsibility with regard to his view on the virtues of the politician in ‘Politics as a vocation’. In fact,

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the main focus of his discussion is to substantiate the claim, in a second round of interpretation, that Weber proposes the ethic of responsibility as a new type of normative ethics in guiding ethical decision-making. One can say that in this second round Schluchter provides a general normative ethical reading of the ethic of responsibility. He believes that by combining Weber’s sociology of religion with certain of his political writings we can uncover a typology of ethics that in part guides Weber’s research. In reconstructing this typology it becomes clear that Weber not only envisaged the ethic of responsibility as a new type of ethics that can be differentiated from existing types of ethics, but also as a further necessary development of normative ethics in late modernity. In an effort to track the career of Weber’s distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, Schluchter deals with certain key themes related to the ‘problem of ethics’ in three phases of Weber’s work. In the first phase, which goes back to in his inaugural lecture as a professor in economics at the University of Freiburg in May 1895, Weber developed a twofold thesis: the thesis of the heterogeneity of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and the thesis of the various ‘laws governing the ought’ (Sollensgesetze)(cf. Weber 1993: 558–565). To use an expression that dates from the second phase of his work, Weber from early in his academic career defended “the particular autonomy of the ethical imperative.” Above all, he waged war against eudaemonism, the doctrine that happiness or spiritual joy has to be seen as the ultimate or highest goal of human action. In other words, he contested pre-Kantian positions in ethics, whether they tended toward egoistical (individual) happiness or toward altruistic eudaemonism, that is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In ethics, as in epistemology, Weber’s approach was, as far as the normative aspect is concerned, based on Kant’s critical turn. Whoever espouses eudaimonist ideals in ethics reduces ethics – in Kant’s terms  – to a doctrine of prudence, or  – in Weber’s terms  – naturalises ethics (Schluchter 1996: 50–53). This rejection of all forms of eudaemonism in ethics finds clear expression in the key themes in the second phase of Weber’s work. In this period, he found himself confronted by two ‘revolutionary’ processes: the political revolution in Russia and the sexual-erotic revolution in his own circle of friends and acquaintances. In commenting on the bourgeois revolution in Russia in 1905, Weber criticised the absolute rejection of a success-oriented ethic and the ‘pan-moralism’ of some Russian democrats. Pan-moralism recognises only the ethical imperative as a possible guide to positive action. It is unconditional and unequivocal, and because it has to be fully realised it demands one’s willingness to engage in a constant struggle for what is right, for justice. If this revolutionary struggle is rejected, for example, because the ethically required love, in disregarding the orders of the world, does not allow the use of force, one’s only alternative is self-denial. This alternative means the forgoing of political action: Tolstoy in his later years being a case in point. In contrast, a success-oriented ethic accepts both non-ethical and



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ethical values as possible guides to positive action. Schluchter is of the opinion that for Weber this acceptance does not mean that the former take the place of ethical values. Weber’s very concept of a success-oriented ethic, rather, implies a balancing of ethical and non-ethical imperatives (Schluchter 1996: 53–56). That for Weber no position that preaches simple adjustment to the realities of life deserves to be termed ethical can also be inferred from his reaction to the sexual-erotic revolution that occurred around 1907 in his very own circle of friends and acquaintances. The target of his criticism of this revolution was above all a particular understanding of ethics (termed by him ‘psychiatric ethics’) that relativised moral demands in terms of the ‘natural’ needs and thus turned their justification and the adherence to them into a question of psychic costs. This relativising subverts the absolute nature of the claim characteristically made by all authentic ethics, and sacrifice and responsibility are struck from ethical reasoning. For Weber an ethic in the strict sense of the word (what he termed an ‘idealistic ethic’) was unthinkable without the belief in absolute values and without the suppression of ‘natural’ needs (Schluchter 1996: 56–59). In the third phase, starting with the presentation of Weber’s own value theory to the public in the ‘Intermediate Reflections’ in 1915 and culminating in ‘Politics as vocation’, the definitive formulation of the distinction took shape. For Schluchter three points are important regarding this definitive formulation. First, the ethic that Weber described in the writings on Russia as ‘pan-moralism’ is now termed the ‘ethic of conviction’. The concept of success-oriented ethics is now replaced by the concept of an ethic of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility is – just as the ethic of conviction – an ethic of virtuosi, but it makes possible an ethically grounded Realpolitik, a ‘politics of responsibility’. In this way, the latter is now also terminologically distinguished from pure power politics. Second, Weber explicitly speaks of the convictional value and the success value of an ethical action (or refraining from an action). The maxim of an ethic of responsibility does not require that the responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of an action should be taken into account instead of the responsibility for the purity of the will. Rather, the former responsibility must be taken into account alongside of, or better, in addition to, the latter one. Consequently, there is no such thing as a moral action without convictional value. Third, the two maxims have strictly formal character and are thus independent of the particular contents of any given ethic. This implies that they can only be adopted where the convictional value of an action is already determined. Schluchter comes to the conclusion that it is clear that the terminological changes that took place also involve substantive ones. Although the stage has already been set in the second phase of Weber’s work, it is only in the third phase that the two distinctions are made that bar all misunderstanding, that is, between a success-oriented ethic and a mere ‘ethic’ of adjustment to the possible, and between a politics of responsibility and power politics. In addition, it is only in

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the third phase that the ethics of conviction and responsibility are presented as maxims of strictly formal character (Schluchter 1996: 60–61). The first result of Schluchter’s investigation into the distinction of an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility is that Weber uses the two concepts to characterise alternate rules or principles, a way to connect the convictional value to other values, especially success-values. Weber, however, also uses the two concepts to characterise different types of ethics that have played and still play a culturally significant role. They are both part of a typology of ethics. Schluchter therefore also sets himself the task of describing Weber’s typology of ethics and the place of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility in it. At the heart of Weber’s typology of ethics and his view of the historical development of ethics, in Schluchter’s opinion, is the distinction between ethics and doctrines of prudence. An ethic imposes unconditional imperatives on the conscience of the individual and requires action for its own sake. Doctrines of prudence impose hypothetical technical or pragmatic imperatives and require success-oriented action. In Weber’s view, the development of different types of ethics in history has taken place in terms of an unusually protracted and complex process, in which the realms of ethics and prudence were increasingly differentiated. First, the differentiation of religious ethics out of the world of magic took place. Weber elaborates three types of religious ethics: ritualistic ethics, legal ethics, and the ethics of conviction. The effects of the first two are similar to those of magic: they tend to stereotype conventional and legal norms by making them sacred, that is, by giving them religious sanctification. As such, they represent not two types, but two subtypes of the type ‘religious ethic of norms’. In this type moral, legal, and conventional rules remain amalgamated, and these rules are primarily secured by external guarantees. This changes only with the transition to a religious ethic of conviction. At this point, ethical norms are separated from legal norms. Moreover, ethical norms are systematised and internalised. There is a linkage of at least all ethical norms, because they are all now directed to the religious goal of salvation, an ultimate, internally consistent religious value axiom that serves as a common point of reference. The ethic of conviction is thus not an ethic of disconnected individual norms such as the ethic of norms, but an ethic of principle (Schluchter 1996: 63–72). As Schluchter is of the opinion that Weber’s concept of responsibility can only “be defined in a systematically satisfactory way” against the backdrop of the differentiation of a formal and non-religious ethic of conviction – in contradistinction to a substantive and religious ethic – he makes an effort to demonstrate that Weber indeed regarded Immanuel Kant’s ethics as such a distinctive subtype of the ethic of conviction (Schluchter 1996: 86). The principle of Kant’s ethics is established by reason and is not substantive, but formal, in the sense that it is a principle by which one can examine the rational character and thus the general lawfulness of maxims that are held by individuals to be morally valid. Out of



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categorical imperatives there arises the ‘categorical imperative’; out of ethical principles there arises a second-order principle or a meta-principle. All unconditional moral duties ‘are subject’ to this one principle. In the terminology used by Schluchter, the principles are turned into one reflexive principle (Schluchter 1996: 74–76). Schluchter believes that the ethic of responsibility that Weber introduced as a new type of ethics should also be regarded as a formal ethic, an ethic of reflexive principle. An action that aspires to moral status in terms of an ethic of responsibility has to satisfy two conditions. First, it has to result from moral conviction. Second, it has to reflect the fact that it is entangled and imbricate in an ethically irrational world, and thus register the insight that evil can result from good. In other words, such an action has to justify itself not only in terms of a moral conviction, but also in terms of an estimation of foreseeable consequences. Weber termed the first condition the ‘convictional value’, the second the ‘success value’ (Schluchter 1996: 87). Where the ethic of conviction, the formal ethic of conviction of Kant included, denies the ethical relevance of success value, success value possesses ethical relevance in terms of the ethic of responsibility. This does not mean that success values are ethical values, but it does mean that the demands arising from success values ought to be acknowledged. For this reason the following maxim holds: ‘Act according to your best conviction of your duty, and, beyond that, in such a way that you can also account for the (foreseeable) consequences of your action according to the best of your knowledge’. Whereas the adherent of an ethic of conviction takes on, as it were, a single responsibility, namely, for the convictional value of his action, the adherent of an ethic of responsibility has to carry a double responsibility, namely, for the convictional value and for its relationship to other values, especially success values, in an ethically irrational world (Schluchter 1996: 88). This provides us, according to Schluchter, with the first distinction between a formal ethic of conviction and a formal ethic of responsibility. This distinction lends precise meaning to what Weber must have had in mind when he termed the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility opposing maxims of strictly formal character. He was thinking of different bridging principles. In order to avoid terminological confusion, Schluchter suggests distinguishing between the ‘bridging principle of hierarchy’ of the ethic of conviction and the ‘bridging principle of balance’ of the ethic of responsibility (Schluchter 1996: 89). Schluchter, however, believes that one can also assert that a formal ethic of responsibility differs from a formal ethic of conviction not only with regard to the bridging principle used, but also with regard to the determination of the convictional value itself. He admits that one has to speculate when it comes to determining Weber’s view of the central role Kant in this regard allocates to the universalising principle. On the basis of what Weber wrote in a letter to Tön-

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nies on the task of ethics as a scientific discipline, he believes one may conclude that he regarded the universalising principle of the formal ethic of conviction suitable for examining the moral character of a given conviction. He does not, however, have the same understanding as Kant of the universalising principle and its role in ethics. The universalising principle in the Kantian sense is a second-level principle, a principle of justification, which is used to justify maxims. It found its classic formulation in Kant’s Critique of practical reason: ‘Act in such a way that the maxim of your will could always also hold as the principle of universal legislation’. A first-level principle would imply only that I myself am always bound to those obligations that I recognise and that I demand of others. Weber, Schluchter proposes, adopts the universalising principle in this deduced sense. He deletes the second level and thus that part of Kant’s theory that makes it, as he notes, into the archetype of a metaphysical theory of culture and personality. Weber thus does not  – as Kant  – accept that the idea that my best conviction of my moral duty is also the right conviction might be rationally grounded. It ultimately has to be believed. However, since also for Weber ethical values are connected to claims of absoluteness and general validity, he does not settle for a narrow-minded particularism. The good always has to define itself as if the possibility of a rationally acceptable ‘ought’ exists. This can be termed ‘regulative universalism’, to distinguish it from Kant’s ‘constitutive universalism’. The universalising principle for Weber is a principle of critical examination and can be formulated as such: ‘Act as if the maxim of your will as the true expression of an individual law could always also hold as the principle of universal law’. This universalising principle implies that Weber’s approach, in Schluchter’s opinion, necessarily demands a formal critique of conviction in the framework of real-life value discussions. His formal ethic of responsibility differs also in this respect from Kant’s formal ethics of conviction, in that for Kant the ideal dialogue in which maxims are grounded is actually a monologue (Schluchter 1996: 89–93). Schluchter is of the opinion that the combination of the bridging principle of balance with convictional values (critically examined by the principle of universalisation as Weber understood it) in the ethic of responsibility enables us to resolve the apparent contradiction between Weber’s statement that the maxim of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility “are in eternal conflict” with one another and his claim that they are not absolutely contradictory but complementary to each other. The last statement applies when a follower of the formal maxim of the ethic of responsibility faces circumstances in which, after careful weighing of the options, he or she finds no balance between convictional value and success value. Then convictional value has to be realised even when all the demands related to success values are violated. The moral agent is then acting just like an adherent of an ethic of conviction (Schluchter 1996: 95).



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Having established the difference between Weber’s formal ethic of responsibility and Kant’s formal ethic of conviction in terms of rules, what remains is to spell out the differences in terms of motivation and sanctions. With regard to motivation one can say that in contrast to the formal ethic of conviction moral sentiment is not limited in the formal ethic of responsibility solely to the cognitive component. It ultimately remains embedded in the emotional component, in the passion for the cause and in that increased sense of responsibility that arises from concerns regarding the consequences of one’s actions, in addition to the responsibility for the convictional value (Schluchter 1996: 98). With regard to sanctions Weber’s formal ethic of responsibility differs from Kant’s formal ethic of conviction, in that it does make provision for institutional regulation. Kant avoids all reference to institutional regulation to safeguard the freedom from compulsion of moral actions. Also for Weber entrance into a value discussion must be free of any compulsion. However, in spite of the voluntary nature of entrance into value discussion, it is an institution for real dialogue. With this institutional turn Weber takes processes of external control once again gain significance in his formal ethic of responsibility (Schluchter 1996: 99–101).

4. Conclusion What this overview of major interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility clearly demonstrates is not only that the sometimes quite disparate interpretations indeed depend to a large extent on the different answers – and combinations of answers  – given to the interpretative questions mentioned in the introduction of the chapter. They also depend on the different ways in which the ethic of responsibility is related to and explained in the light of factors external to the content of ‘Politics as a vocation’: to the relation of this speech to Weber’s ‘Science as a vocation’ speech, to the political circumstances in Munich and Germany immediately before and after the end of World War I, to Weber’s personal life and convictions, and especially to his other political and academic writings. The attempt to understand Weber’s ethic of responsibility in the light of these external factors is inevitable, given the cursory and also ambivalent nature of its exposition in ‘Politics as a vocation’. Which of the different interpretations of Weber’s ethic is the most convincing? Or even: Can one say that one of these interpretations should be regarded as the definitive interpretation of the ethic of responsibility? To adjudicate between the different interpretations one has only one recourse, namely, once again to look for clues in the external factors mentioned. Thorough adjudication would only be possible after the external factors relevant for the understanding of the ethic of responsibility have been adequately investigated. In the previous chapter the historical and political circumstances immediately preceding Weber’s presentation

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of ‘Politics as a vocation’, the relation of this speech to ‘Science as a vocation’ and relevant formative relationships and personal characteristics of Weber have already been discussed. The next chapter (Chapter 3) will be devoted to a discussion of relevant views on ethics and politics that Weber expressed in his other, mostly earlier, works. Only after that, in Chapter 4, will I undertake an evaluation of the different interpretations and propose an alternative interpretation.

Chapter 3

Weber’s views on ethics and politics: The bigger picture 1. Introduction In spite of their different readings of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, the interpreters discussed in Chapter 2 would agree that his formulation of this ethic in ‘Politics as a vocation’ did not condense out of thin air. All of them refer the formulation of the ethic of responsibility to one or more preceding extratextual factors: not only to the historical circumstances immediately preceding the presentation of the speech and to biographical factors playing a role earlier in Weber’s life, but, even more so, to views he had formed earlier and expressed in other works. For an adequate interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility we indeed have to rely for the most part on relevant views expressed by him in other works. One such set of views that obviously needs to be gleaned from his writings concerns his political views. His proposal of the ethic of responsibility is made in the context of a speech on the profession of politics, and more specifically associated by him with the charismatic political leader. In fact, the largest part of ‘Politics as a vocation’ is devoted to a sociological analysis of the distinctive nature of politics as a separate social order and to the historical emergence of different types of political parties and role-players in politics in the Western world. As the possibility should not be excluded that he did not introduce the ethic of responsibility only as an ideal type to be used in the sociological description of existing views on political ethics, but also to express his own view on the most appropriate ethical approach in politics, the potential relevancy of his personal political convictions, in addition to his purely academic work on politics, should be acknowledged. Weber was actively involved in politics up to the time of the speech and had strong personal views both on how politics in the German context should be conducted and on the efforts of certain political groups to base German politics on traditional ethical values. Weber’s views on ethics constitute a second set of relevant views. Not for nothing is the ethic of responsibility presented in the context of a discussion of the relation between politics and ethics, and contrasted with the ethic of conviction. Of interest here are not only distinctions regarding types of ethics made by Weber in his work on the ethics of world religions, and the influence of the process of disenchantment on the development of ethics in the Western world,

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but also his views regarding the appropriateness of certain responses in his time to the negative impact of modernisation on ethics. This chapter will start with a discussion of relevant views on ethics expressed by Weber in other works and will proceed to a discussion of relevant views on politics expressed in both his academic writings and political speeches.

2.  Views on ethics In his inaugural lecture as a newly appointed professor in Economics at the University of Freiburg in 1895, Weber made the following remark: “Our work is and can, in order to have meaning, only be: Care for the future, for our progeny. Also, no political economic work is done on the basis of optimistic expectations of happiness. For the dream of peace and human happiness has to reckon with the writing above the portal of the future: lasciate ogni speranza.   Not how human beings of the future will feel, but how they will be, is the question that leads us beyond the grave of the present generation, and in truth undergirds all political economic work. We should not promote the feeling of wellbeing in human beings, but those characteristics that we associate with the experience of greatness and aristocracy in human nature” (Weber 1993: 558–559, tr. from the German).

Hans-Peter Müller is of the opinion that this quote contains three messages of the young academic to other social scientists (Müller 2007: 16): 1. One’s own social scientific work should be future-oriented with future generations in mind. 2. The vision one has for human beings of the future should be with regard to their character, how they would be, and not how they would feel. What is important in human beings is human greatness. 3. Materialistic-utilitarian goals for social science such as the greatest happiness of the greatest number or material prosperity are not acceptable and also not attainable by social scientific means. There has been much debate over what the key for understanding Weber’s work is. The more orthodox view is that it is found in the process of rationalisation in the Western world. The more heterodox view is that central to Weber’s thought is the way people conduct their lives and the destiny of modern people (cf. Müller 2007: 21). However, in the light of the quote from Weber’s inaugural lecture, one may ask: Should we see these two central themes as opposing one another or in competition with one another? Or should we rather see them as complementary, even as indissolubly linked to one another? In his comprehensive sociological and historical research on Western rationalisation, Weber was not only interested in the impact rationalisation had on institutions in the Western world. He was also interested in the meaning the resultant institutional changes had for the character,

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the personality, the conduct of life, and the freedom of individuals.1 The goal of his sociological studies was to fathom the consequences of rationalisation for the external as well as the inner dimensions of social life and the life of the individual. Weber, in his own work, tried to describe both of these sets of consequences as objectively and as accurately as possible. But he occasionally also ventured beyond sociological description and allowed himself to reflect normatively on what he established in his sociological studies. In the above quotation from his inaugural lecture, he is clearly reflecting on the ultimate value that should guide political economy. The normative remarks made by Weber in his academic work are sometimes seen as occasional, rather unfortunate deviations from the limits he himself set to social science and are attributed to his volatile temperament.2 In my opinion, however, it is simply not convincing to brush off in such a manner his oft-repeated criticism of inappropriate responses to modernity found in the sub-cultures of aestheticism and eroticism, and in approaches to politics in his time based on Realpolitik and the ethic of conviction. Neither can one blame his recurrent criticism of the ideal of eudaimonism as an inappropriate ethical one on uncontrolled emotions. Taking a normative stance on inappropriate and appropriate cultural and ethical responses to modernity was clearly not the main focus of Weber’s academic work. Nonetheless, that from time to time he found it necessary also to engage in deliberate normative reflection on his own empirical findings regarding the impact of Western rationalisation, and as a result criticised what he regarded as inappropriate responses and developed views on appropriate ones, cannot be denied. In my discussion of relevant views Weber developed on ethics in the rest of his oeuvre I will start off with his views on the external, more institutional, consequences of the rationalisation of religious ethics in the Western world. I will then give attention to the internal meaning of this rationalisation process for the experience of life and the ethical orientation of people in modernity. Lastly Weber’s views on inappropriate responses to the ambivalences of modernity, as well as on the appropriate ethical response will be discussed.

1  Compare,

for example, the remark in his essay on ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality” in sociology and economics’: “Only one thing is indisputable: every type of social order, without exception, must, if one wishes to evaluate it, be examined with reference to the opportunities which it affords to certain types of persons to rise to positions of superiority through the operation of the various objective and subjective factors” (Weber 1949: 27). 2  Consider the commentary by Gregor Fitzi on evaluative remarks made by Weber in his academic work: “That now and then something of Weber’s own ethical views filter through, apparently seems to be more the involuntary result of his temperament than of theoretical intent” (Fitzi 2004: 283, tr. from the German).

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2.1.  External consequences of rationalisation What does Weber mean by rationalisation? In Economy and society he distinguishes four ways in which social action may be oriented: instrumentally rational (zweckrational), value-rational (wertrational), affectual, and traditional. According to him, instrumental rational social action is “determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends.” Value-rational social behaviour is “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success” (Weber 1968b: 24–25). He stresses that, in his terminology, value-rational action always involves ‘commands’ or ‘demands’ that, in the actor’s opinion, are binding on him. Only cases where human action is motivated by the fulfilment of such unconditional demands it will be called value-rational by him. He adds: “This is the case in widely varying degrees, but for the most part only to a relatively slight extent” (Weber 1968b: 25). In social action that is instrumentally rational, the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed. “This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends.” He adds: “The orientation of action wholly to the rational achievement of ends without relation to fundamental values is, to be sure, essentially only a limiting case” (Weber 1968b: 26). Weber’s reason for stressing that both the value-rational and the instrumentalrational orientations of social action are limiting cases is that in real life these two orientations are often combined in various ways. Choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results, for example, may well be determined in a valuerational manner. In that case, action is instrumentally rational only in respect to the choice of means. On the other hand, the actor may, instead of a rational orientation to a system of values, simply take them as given subjective wants and arrange them in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency (Weber 1968b: 26). It is clear that Weber uses the term ‘rationalisation’ in a comprehensive sense to refer to historical processes in which social action is consciously steered to be more oriented to either value rationality or instrumental rationality or to a combination of these two rationalities. This is well-illustrated by the following quote from Economy and society: “One of the most important aspects of the process of ‘rationalization’ of action is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom, of deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest. To be sure, this process by no means exhausts the concept of the rationalization of action. For in addition this can proceed in a variety of other directions; positively, in that of a deliberate formulation of ultimate values (Wert-



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rationalisierung); or negatively, at the expense not only of custom, but of emotional values; and finally, in favor of a morally sceptical type of rationality, at the expense of any belief in absolute values” (Weber 1968b: 30).

On-going processes of rationalisation have taken place in all societies over thousands of years. What distinguishes the process of rationalisation in the Western world is its unique outcome. It has resulted in modernity, in a culture dominated by relentless concentration on instrumental rationality. The spectacular achievements of modern science and technology, but also the on-going specialisation and fragmentation of life can all be attributed to it. Weber was fore mostly interested in describing the distinctive nature and in exposing the causes of modernity in the Western world by doing sociological research on the form and outcomes of the process of rationalisation in the Western world. He identified a number of factors that contributed to the distinctive twists and turns of this rationalisation process, but was convinced that the crucial factor was the distinctive and radical rationalisation of Christian ethics during the Reformation, more specifically among Protestants of a Calvinistic inclination. In The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, first published in 1904–1905, he provided a comprehensive sketch of the inner-worldly asceticism (innerweltliche Askese) that characterised the religious ethics of the Calvinists. Calvinist Christians believed that they had a calling from God to in all aspects of their lives, including their daily occupation, serve God in transforming the world in accordance with his revealed will. They also believed that only in total commitment to the service of God’s purposes in this world and the abstinence from pleasurable and vacuous activities that could stand in the way of this service to God, they could gain some certainty about their predestined salvation. According to Weber this, first of all, led to a significant elevation of the importance of occupational work (Beruf), as well as a significant intensification of the work rate. Secondly, it contributed to a ‘spirit of capitalism’, to a set of attitudes that favoured the acceptance and promotion of the emerging economic system of capitalism among Calvinist Christians. And lastly, by emphasising the importance of useful, effective work, it led to an intensification of specifically the instrumental rationalisation of life (Weber 1968a; also cf. Goldman 1988: 18–51). In the last two decades of his life Weber expanded his research project on the rationalisation of religious ethics by also devoting studies to Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam. His main purpose was to substantiate in comparative studies his claim about the crucial and unique contribution of Calvinist ethics to the spread of capitalism and to the predominance of instrumental rationality in the Western world. This enabled him to distinguish basic ways in which the tension between the world and religious ethics is overcome in the different world religions: (i) through the adaptation of religious ethics to the world (e. g. Confucianism), (ii) through their reconciliation (e. g. Hinduism), (iii) through the

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differentiation of the religious way of life and everyday life (e. g. the world flight of Buddhist monks), (iv) through a combination of the differentiation of ethics and world, and the compromise of the two (e. g. Catholicism), and (v) through the transformation of everyday life, and the interpenetration of religious ethics and the world (e. g. the pre-exilic prophets in Ancient Israel and Calvinism)(cf. Preyer 2010: 57–58). He also, as we have seen in Wolfgang Schlucher’s discussion on the background of his distinction of the conviction and responsibility ethics, developed a typology of the religious ethics that eventually emerged out of the world of magic: ritualistic ethics and legal ethics (two subtypes of the type ‘religious ethic of norms’ in which ethical, legal, and conventional rules remain amalgamated) and the ethic of conviction, in which ethical norms are separated from legal norms and the ethical norms are systematised and subordinated to the single religious principle of salvation (Schluchter 1996: 63–71). The religious ethics of Calvinism characterised by inner-worldly asceticism is for Weber one of the purest examples of such an ethic of conviction. It is conspicuous that Weber distinguishes ‘ethics’ from ‘convention’ and ‘law’, and as a result does not regard the rules of magical religion as ‘ethical’ in the true sense of the word. He also distinguishes between ‘ethical’ and ‘cultural’ values, and warns against the identification of the two sets of values (Weber 1949: 15; 52; 57–58). This raises the question: What are for him the distinctive features of an ethics? In my opinion Schluchter’s interpretation of Weber’s views in this regard in Chapter 3 puts us on the right track. Weber renounced all forms of eudaimonism, including that found in magical religion, because he was of the opinion that it undermines the particular autonomy of the ethical imperative and reduces ethics – in Kantian terms – to a doctrine of prudence, or – in his own terms – naturalises ethics and compromises its unconditional character. In doing that Weber underwrites a definition of ethics that is not purely descriptive, but undeniably normative. Even more importantly, in the light of his view on what ethics comprises, it seems rather improbable that he would have regarded the ethic of responsibility as one entirely based on instrumental rationality, on the mere prudential consideration of the inter-connection of ends, means, and secondary results of action. Ethics, for Weber, is inextricably linked to the methodical conduct of life in accordance with unconditional values. For Weber the ascetic Protestantism of the Calvinists does not only mark the culmination of the process of rationalisation in religions in that it in a systematic way links dogmatic views on the relation between God and world with conviction ethical views on the relation of the Christian to the world, but also in its radical renouncement of all magical aspects of religion (Weber 1989: 450–451). In 1920 he added this sentence to the original text of The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism: “That great historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic from the world (Entzauberung der Welt) which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought,



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had repudiated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion “ (Weber 1968a: 105). However, in Weber’s opinion the process of disenchantment did not come to an end in ascetic Protestantism. This process was also driven by a second cultural force, apart from religion, namely modern science, with its roots in Greek philosophy. The result of the process of scientific disenchantment in modernity is that science has monopolised the realm of the rational, crowded out religion from this realm and branded it as irrational or antirational (Weber 2004: 238–239). Modern science equates rationality with instrumental rationality. It departs from the belief that in principle no mysterious and incalculable forces are operating in the world, and that in principle all things can be controlled by means of calculation (Weber 1968b: 594). It denies any religious claim that the world is ordered by God, and could thus be regarded as an ethically meaningful cosmos. In fact, the empirical and mathematically oriented enquiry of the world rejects any enquiry regarding the ‘meaning’ of the historical process in the world (Weber 2004: 238). For Weber the process of disenchantment is accompanied by another process, namely the process of the differentiation of life orders or spheres with their distinctive value systems. This is a process that already surfaced in the rationalisation of religions. In the original condition of the magical world there was no tension between the religious and worldly life spheres. The process of religious rationalisation and disenchantment, however, forced into the open “a consciousness of the internal and autonomous working (innere Eigengesetzlichkeit) of the individual spheres” and of the tension between them and the ethics of the religions (Weber 2004: 219; cf. also the foreword of Weber 1968b, where he refers to the ‘autonomy of these spheres’). With the escalating scientific disenchantment in modernity the institutional differentiation of autonomous value spheres only intensified. Not only did the commands of the salvation religions increasingly come into conflict with the autonomous laws of the modern state, economy, science, and art, but did the value systems of the different spheres also increasingly come into conflict with one another. Weber uses the simile of a new ‘polytheism’, a disenchanted ‘polytheism’, to describe this pluralism of conflicting value systems that vie for recognition by the individual (Weber 2004: 281; also cf. Schluchter 2009: 13).

2.2.  Internal consequences of rationalisation We have established that for Weber the distinctive form rationalisation has taken in Western modernity has had as result scientific disenchantment with its concomitant differentiation of autonomous value spheres. In his view disenchantment and the differentiation of value spheres, however, have not only had an external, institutional impact, but also a more internal, experiential one. They have had a profound effect on how modern people experience life and on the

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manner in which they conduct their lives. More specifically, they have drastically altered the options individuals have for the ethical orientation of their lives. The ‘internal’ impact of disenchantment and the differentiation of autonomous value spheres has two dimensions: (a)  Loss of an ethically meaningful cosmos The first dimension is the loss of the belief in and experience of an ethically meaningful cosmos. This was different in the Western world for as long as the Christian religion had a dominant position in society, as “the world, for religion, is ultimately willed and ordained by God and is therefore, in whatever way oriented, an ethically meaningful cosmos” (Weber 2004: 238). What religion offers is not an ultimate intellectual or scientific knowledge about the existing or the normatively valid, but an ultimate stance taken towards the world in which its ‘meaning’ is grasped. “And it discloses this meaning not by means of understanding but through the charisma of illumination, to which it alone is party” (Weber 2004: 240). It is not that religion did not earlier in the history of the Western world experience the tension of its own beliefs and values with the emerging autonomous value spheres of this world. Inner-worldly asceticism was, however, “able to oppose the creaturely and reprehensible empirical orders of the world with an absolute and divine ‘natural law’.” It took the stance “that one should rather obey God than man; a maxim that can be found more or less generally in the rational religions” (Weber 2004: 229). With the on-going process of the disenchantment of the world and the ensuing emergence of autonomous value spheres this belief in and existential experience of the ethically meaningfulness of the cosmos was increasingly undermined. In his ‘Intermediate reflection on the economic ethics of the world religions’ (written in 1915), Weber provides a detailed sketch of the growing tension between salvation religion and the spheres of kinship, the economy, politics, aesthetics, sexual love, and intellectual knowledge. It has been the result not only of the tendency of these spheres to become more distinctive and independent, but also of the tendency of salvation religion to distance itself from these worldly spheres by becoming more other-worldly. “In this light, the whole of ‘culture’ is a stepping out from the organically determined natural course of life, and the cultural person with every further step is condemned to ever more annihilating loss of meaning. The more the service to cultural goods was turned into a sacred undertaking and into a ‘vocation’, the more it became a senseless rush into the service of worthless purposes which were, moreover, contradictory and mutually antagonistic” (Weber 2004: 244). For Weber the result is not only that the individual is confronted with a patchwork of quite distinctive values. “It is really a question not only of alternatives between values but of an irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between ‘God’



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and ‘Devil’. Between these, neither relativization nor compromise is possible” (Weber 1949: 17–18). He admits that this is for the most part not realised by contemporary people. They mostly accept that value-spheres cross and interpenetrate, and are prone to make compromises. “The shallowness of our routinized daily existence in the most significant sense of the word consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware of this […] motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values. They avoid the choice between ‘God’ and the ‘Devil’ and their own ultimate decision as to which of the conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which by the other” (Weber 1949: 18).

Weber illustrates the impact of these irreconcilable tensions in both the ‘Intermediate reflection’ and the essay ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality” in sociology and economics’ by referring to a fundamental ethical dilemma contemporary individuals have to face and which apparently cannot be solved rationally by ethics. In his opinion there appears to be no way of resolving the most basic of questions: just where in the individual case is the ethical value of an action to be decided? “Should it be located in its success (Erfolg) or from the action’s intrinsic value alone (Eigenwert) […] This is a matter of whether, and how far, the responsibility of the actor for the consequences of an action sanctifies the means; or conversely, whether the value of the conviction (Gesinnung) which the action carries should justify refusing the responsibility for the consequences, passing them over to God or the corruption and foolishness of the world which God permits” (Weber 2004: 228–229; cf. Weber 1949: 15–16).

In the ‘Intermediate reflection’ Weber mentions that the religious ethic of conviction is inclined to the second alternative: ‘The Christian does right and leaves success to God’ (Weber 2004: 229). In ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality”’ he mentions the inclination of the revolutionary syndicalist to this second alternative (or ‘ethical maxim’, as he calls it there). In this essay he mentions that ‘all Realpolitik’ is inclined to the first alternative (or ethical maxim) (Weber 1949: 16). The first alternative is still not explicitly linked to the proponent of the ethic of responsibility in either of these two writings. In both the term ‘responsibility’ does feature, however, in the description of the first alternative. Weber concludes his discussion of the irreconcilable conflict of values with the remark: “The fruit of the tree of knowledge, which is distasteful to the complacent but is, nonetheless, inescapable, consists in the insight that every single important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not permitted to run on as an event in nature but is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul – as in Plato – chooses its own fate, i. e., the meaning of its activity and existence” (Weber 1949: 18).

For him it is clear that modern individuals have no alternative but to choose between the conflicting values in order to find the ultimate foundations of their lives and actions.

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(b)  Restriction of personal freedom The second dimension of the ‘internal’ impact of disenchantment and differentiation is that it has led to the restriction of the personal freedom of individuals, especially in conducting their lives meaningfully in accordance with personal ultimate values. This can to a large extent be ascribed to the increasing dominance of instrumental rationality. Already in the concluding section of The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism Weber remarked: “The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so” (Weber 1968a: 181). According to Weber the modern capitalist economy now rests on mechanical rather than moral or spiritual foundations. Today we are “born into this mechanism” and our lives, choices, opportunities, and cultural values are constrained by the “iron cage” of material goods and acquisitiveness. Although the very idea of duty to calling or vocation still “prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs” and we still devote our lives to hard work, the religious motive for doing so has been replaced by the materialistic one of the pursuit of wealth, now mostly “associated with purely mundane passions” (Weber 1968a: 182). What partly contributed to this outcome is that the dominance of instrumental rationality in the modern capitalist culture has led to drastic specialisation to ensure the effective mastering of tasks in an increasingly complex society. In the scientific field, for example, expertise in increasingly narrower areas of research and teaching has become the norm. Other life spheres have also not escaped this drive towards more specialisation. One of the results is that it has become more difficult to experience meaningfulness in occupational work, because being a specialist entails devoting oneself exclusively to the effective execution of a very specific and purely technical task without being able to relate this devotion to the pursuit of ultimate values dear to one personally. Weber concludes his discussion of the mechanisation and specialisation of modern life with the following prophetic pronouncement reminiscent of Friedrich Nietzsche’s remark in the prologue of Also sprach Zarathrustra on those “last men who invented happiness”: “For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: ‘Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved” (Weber 1968a: 182). According to Weber instrumental rationality intrudes into the everyday lifeworld and into all spheres of culture, including even art. The dominance of abstract cognitive processes, by which instrumental rationality is characterised, can be noticed in “pervasive features of modern life such as standardization, commodification, measurement in terms of efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, legalistic administrative procedures, and bureaucratic coordination and rule” (Scaff 2000: 104). Weber gives special attention to bureaucratisation. In his opinion, the ongoing and irreversible bureaucratisation of organisations is typical of Western



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modernity.3 Bureaucratisation, for him, refers to the process in which organisations are increasingly structured on the basis of the legitimisation of domination exercised within such organisations with reference to rational rules rather than to tradition or charisma, as was the case in pre-modernity (Weber 1968b: 954). Two of the main characteristics of modern bureaucracy, according to Weber, are that it is structured in accordance with the principles of official jurisdictional areas and of office hierarchy. These principles are implemented by sets of rules that spell out the official duties of the different officials and demarcate their domain of authority (Weber 1968b: 956–958). What, as a result of this predominance of rules, is “decisive for the modern loyalty to an office” is “that, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person […] but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes” (Weber 1968b: 959). This, on the one hand, contributes to the purely technical superiority of bureaucratic organisation over any other form of organisation. “The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production” (Weber 1968b: 973). As we could see in the summary of the speech ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber does not shy away from occasionally using the metaphor of the ‘machine’ to characterise the bureaucratic structure of big political parties (Weber 1994a: 351). On the other hand, it also means that, as bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, “the more it is ‘dehumanized’, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation” (Weber 1968b: 975). All personal discretion of the official based on considerations of substantive justice, oriented toward some concrete instance and person, is likewise to be eliminated, as it collides with the formalism of bureaucratic administration. ‘Equality before the law’ and the demand for legal guarantees against arbitrariness demand a formal and rational ‘objectivity’ of administration that rules out such personal discretion (Weber 1968b: 979–980).4

3  Cf. his statement: “Once fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy […] Where administration has been completely bureaucratized, the resulting system of domination is practically indestructible” (Weber 1968b: 987). 4 Weber is the first to admit that what is typical of the ideal type of bureaucracy is not often accomplished in real-life modern organisations and is sometimes even openly resisted. He mentions in Economy and society, for example, the attack in his time on the idea of a ‘law without gaps’. “The conception of the modern judge as an automaton into which legal documents and fees are stuffed at the top in order that it may spill forth the verdict at the bottom along with the reasons, read mechanically from codified paragraphs – this conception is angrily rejected, perhaps because a certain approximation to this type would precisely be implied by a consistent bureaucratization of justice” (Weber 1968b: 979).

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2.3.  Inappropriate and appropriate responses to modernisation Normative remarks by Weber of an ethical nature in which he criticises inappropriate responses to modern culture or reveal his own positive views on the appropriate response, are scattered all over his work. It is only rarely, as in ‘Politics as a vocation,’ that he to a certain degree provides a separate, systematic exposition of his own views on inappropriate and appropriate ethical approaches. I use the words ‘to a certain degree’ because even in ‘Politics as a vocation’, as we have seen, his exposition of especially the ethic of responsibility remains sketchy and leaves many questions unanswered. In my attempt to provide a more systematic overview of his views in this regard I will first of all give attention to his criticism of a number of responses that he found lacking. These responses are indicated as the ‘objectivist’, the ‘subjectivist’, the ‘absolutist’ and the ‘adaptionist’ responses. Secondly, Weber’s views on appropriate responses will be discussed. In my opinion he in his other works identified these appropriate responses on two levels: the level of the right attitudes or virtues one ought to exhibit in fulfilling one’s occupation (professional virtue ethics) and the level of the right ethical approach one should adopt when taking decisions on policies and actions in especially politics (ethics of action). (a)  Inappropriate responses (i)  Objectivist response There were some attempts in Weber’s time to find an empirical foundation for ethics in a ‘science of ethics’ (Weber 1949: 13, 22; 52, 56). Some professors also did not shy away in their lectures from presenting to the students their own ethical and political views, claiming that they are ‘scientifically based’. Weber was extremely critical of both these academic ventures. In opposition to these value-laden approaches to the social sciences he developed his well-known and also controversial theory on the value-freedom of these sciences. Not only in his speech ‘Science as a vocation’ but also in his essay ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality”’ he chastised lecturers who used the lecture hall to promote their personal religious and political views. Such lecturers assign to the university and to themselves the task of moulding human beings, of inculcating in them political, ethical, aesthetic and cultural attitudes. Weber prefers to see the task of the university lecturer as the more modest one of specialised training (Fachbildung), which has one virtue to inculcate, namely ‘intellectual integrity’. It is conspicuous that one of his main reasons for supporting this view is to encourage the student’s own responsibility to take a stance on ethical and political matters: “one does not wish to see the student so influenced by the teacher’s suggestions that he is prevented from solving his problems on the basis of his own conscience” (Weber 1949: 3).



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What is, in his opinion, really at issue is the simple demand that the investigator and teacher should keep unconditionally apart the establishment of empirical facts and his own practical evaluations, i. e., his own evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. “These two things are logically different and to deal with them as though they were the same represents a confusion of entirely heterogeneous problems” (Weber 1949: 11). With that we come to maybe the most important reason for him to not only renounce the ‘personally’ tinted professorial type of prophecy in the lecture hall (Weber 1949: 4), but also the effort to provide an objective basis to ethics in empirical social science. Weber’s unambiguous conclusion is: “An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do – but rather what he can do – and under certain circumstances – what he wishes to do” (Weber 1949: 54). More specifically this means that the empirical sciences can only demonstrate to someone who considers acting on a certain ethical directive (i) the indispensable means, (ii) the inevitable repercussions, and (iii) the thus conditioned competition of numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences. Philosophy can add to such a ‘value-discussion’, as Weber calls it in ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality”’, the exposition of the ‘meaning’ of such an ‘ethical directive’, by delimiting its sphere of meaningful validity (Weber 1949: 18, 21). By conducting such a critical and illuminating ‘value-discussion’, the social sciences and philosophy can render an invaluable service to ethical decision-making. The facts established by social sciences regarding indispensable means and the consequences of options for action might necessitate the re-adjustment of the relations between end and indispensable means, between desired goals and unavoidable subsidiary consequences. “But whether this readjustment should take place and what should be the practical conclusions to be drawn therefrom is not answerable by empirical science – in fact it can not be answered by any science whatsoever” (Weber 1949: 23). (ii)  Subjectivist response In his sociological work, Weber did not only describe and analyse the tendency of modern culture to become more rationalised and routinised. He also commented on attempts in certain circles to escape from the harsh and stifling effects of rationalisation and routine into a subjectivist culture. In Weber’s time a specifically urban, aesthetic, ahistorical, and amoral ‘culture of feeling’ (Gefühlskultur) developed, out of which grew a special sensitivity to human feelings, psychological truths, the authenticity of emotion, and the public power of ‘personality’ and personal style (Scaff 1991: 80). Already at the first meeting of the German Sociological Society he sketched the emergence of such a culture, characterised by the effort to “escape this reality” through “the highest aesthetic abstractions, deepest dream-states, or most intensive kinds of intoxication” (Weber 1924: 453–455).

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In the ‘Intermediate reflection’ he discusses how the aesthetic and erotic life spheres as they become more differentiated tend increasingly to be absorbed into the escapist ‘culture of feeling’, pure experience, and ‘inwardness’. Art and sexual love now take on a redemptive role that brings them into competition with the salvation religions. Art “takes over the function of an innerworldly redemption […] in the face of the everyday and above all the increasing pressure of theoretical and practical rationalism” (Weber 2004: 231). Under “[…] conditions of tension from the rational everyday world, sexual life liberated from marriage became an experience beyond the routine of the everyday and appeared as if it could be the only tie that could link man to the natural source of life […] What welled up here was a powerfully accentuated valuing of this specific sensation of innerworldly salvation from the world” (Weber 2004: 235).

What Weber finds problematic is that such aestheticism and eroticism are based on the principle that the most subjective judgement is the most authentic and ‘valid’. They proclaim a subjectivist ethos that acts as a substitute for the religious and ethical spheres of value. Furthermore, aestheticism in particular seems to have invaded everywhere, threatening to subordinate independent orders, such as the ethical or political, to its own standards and forms, thus undermining the autonomy of these orders. In Weber’s view, this development, of which he clearly does not approve, can be blamed largely on a lack of moral responsibility: “in the rejection of responsibility for an ethical judgement, […] due to subjectivist demands […] there is a tendency to reformulate an ethically intended valuejudgement into a judgement of taste whose inaccessibility to appeal excludes discussion” (Weber 2004: 231). (iii)  Absolutist response In all that Weber writes about the inner-worldly asceticism of Calvinist Protestantism – according to him the earliest example of a pure ethic of conviction – one can sense a certain respect, even appreciation. It is not the same when he writes about the examples of the ethic of conviction in his own time, especially those found in the political sphere. Even when he does not explicitly denounce them one can sense his disdain. Why is this the case? In my opinion, part of the answer lies with Weber’s appraisal of the appropriateness, or lack of appropriateness, of the ethic of conviction in completely different times and cultures. The ethic of conviction of Protestant asceticism was, in his opinion, well integrated with and adapted to the cultural milieu of the sixteenth century. Not for nothing is it characterised by him as ‘inner-worldly’, as it enabled and encouraged Calvinists to actively devote themselves to useful activities in other spheres of life than the religious and to respect the sphere-specific rules that apply there. In his view, the ethic of conviction of Protestant asceticism was thus historically and culturally appropriate. In contrast, adherents of the ethic of conviction in his time tried to



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force upon modern culture, through sheer determination, an approach to ethics attuned to another time and culture, preferring to ignore the drastic cultural changes that had taken place in the meantime. In a certain sense, they were more otherworldly than adherents of the ethic of conviction of Protestant asceticism, more estranged from the concrete cultural circumstances in which they were operating. Their conviction ethical efforts were, in his view, historically and culturally inappropriate. In the letter to Michels, August 4, 1908, to which I have already referred in the biographical notations, Weber writes: “There are two possibilities here: (1) ‘My kingdom is not of this world’ (Tolstoy or a syndicalism thought through to its logical conclusions […]) or: (2) An affirmation of culture (i. e. culture that expresses itself objectively, in technical  – or other  – achievements) which goes hand in hand with an accommodation to the sociological conditions underlying all ‘techniques’ […]” (Weber 1990: 615–616, tr. from the German).

In my opinion, one can say that the religious pacifism of Tolstoy and revolutionary syndicalism were world-abnegating, in Weber’s view, in being absolutist in two crucial ways: yy By striving to achieve a utopian state of the world in accordance with some absolute ethical ideal of righteousness (non-violent brotherly love or radical equality). There is no recognition of the differentiation of autonomous social orders that is part and parcel of modern culture and the own dignity and validity of their distinctive value systems. Only the validity of one particular ethical value or set of ethical values is recognised. yy By absolutising a particular means to achieve this utopian state. In the case of religious pacifism only non-violent means were deemed acceptable, while in revolutionary syndicalism strikes were the prescribed means. There is no recognition of foreseeable negative consequences the abstinence from any violent means by the state, or the persistent instigation of strikes could have. Nor is there recognition of the fact that other means could have better results. One can conclude that Weber already in his sociological work preceding ‘Politics as a vocation’ rejected the absolutist response of conviction ethics operating in the politics of his time. It was his view that it was inappropriate and also irresponsible not to recognise the concrete nature of modern culture and to carry on as if the drastic cultural changes in modernity simply have not occurred. (iv)  Adaptionist response I will here only briefly touch upon the adaptionist response that is closely associated with the Realpolitik, especially of Wilhelm II, that Weber so despised, and that will be discussed at more length in the next section. It is worthwhile mentioning it here, however, as it is exactly the opposite of the absolutist re-

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sponse. Where the absolutist response relies only on commitment to a particular value in the belief that the right action is prescribed by it, and does not take any consequences into account in political decision-making, the adaptionist response takes the point of departure in the consequences of available options for political action and adapts both political goals and values to what promises success. Weber refers to this response in ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality”’ when he writes that, on the whole, “people are strongly inclined to adapt themselves to what promises success, not only – as is self-evident – with respect to the means or to the success that they seek to realize their ideals, but even to the extent of giving up these very ideals. In Germany this mode of behaviour is glorified by the name Realpolitik” (Weber 1949: 23). He admits that, in a sense, political action is always the ‘art of the possible’. Nonetheless, the possible is often reached only by striving to attain the impossible that lies beyond it. “I, for my part, will not try to dissuade the nation from the view that actions are to be judged not merely by their instrumental value but by their intrinsic value as well” (Weber 1949: 23–24). (b)  Appropriate responses In my opinion, already in Weber’s works preceding ‘Politics as a vocation’ can one identify the profile of the two-pronged ethical approach that Weber regarded as appropriate response to the ambivalences of modernity. One side of this approach is the development of a rudimentary virtue ethics to guide professional life in modernity. The other side is the development of a formal ethics of action to guide ethical decision-making in modernity in the different life orders, more particularly in politics. (i)  Professional virtue ethics According to Weber, ascetic Protestantism marked the end of all elements of magical religion in the process of religious rationalisation. There was no way that fulfilment of God’s calling to serve his purposes in this world could win the believer salvation. Nonetheless, as Harvey Goldman points out in his study on calling and the shaping of the self in Weber’s and Thomas Mann’s work, the calling or vocation did for Weber produce some ‘magic’ of its own. “Its magic […] transformed ‘old’ men into ‘new’ men, men who were reborn for a new set of tasks. It gave them powers that had not been seen in everyday life before; a capacity to fortify the self through self-denial; a special strength to pursue goals against resistance and to win obedience to one’s will, otherwise known only among ‘charismatic’ leaders; and a capacity and disposition for systematic rational action” (Goldman 1988: 50).

However, much of this magic has been depleted in modernity. Although modernity is still characterised by restless and innovative labour in an effort to transform the world, disenchantment has stripped it of a higher purpose and meaning,



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specialisation has fragmented occupational work, and bureaucratisation has stifled personal freedom. That Weber, despite his appreciation for the unique achievements of modern Western culture, also found these developments disturbing, can be concluded, among other things, from his rather derogatory depiction of modern culture as a ‘nullity’ in his Protestant ethic. Did Weber in his work prior to ‘Politics as a vocation’ give any indication of an appropriate ethical approach to counter and overcome these undesirable outcomes of modernity? From his criticism of inappropriate responses to the ambivalences of modern culture one can conclude that he would only find an ethical approach appropriate that does not ignore the concrete and harsh realities of modern culture, nor try to take flight into the past, or into some safe haven of subjective experience. From remarks made in other works, especially in ‘Science as a vocation’, one can also conclude that he was of the opinion that such an appropriate ethical approach must embody at least two aspects: “[F]irst, a restored understanding of work as service – that is, the right understanding and the right use of the calling in the service of our chosen ideal or object, whether in politics, science, or social life generally – and, second, the resolution of the problem of identity and inner strength through the shaping of the self in the kind of personality that service in the ‘spiritual’ discipline of the calling makes possible” (Goldman 1989: 3).5

Weber regarded ascetic Protestantism as not only the source of the modern idea of calling or vocation (Beruf), but also of what he called ‘personality’ – although the term was never used in its circles. In its doctrine of calling it transformed the self of the believer into a personality: a subjugation of the natural self and its unification from within through devotion, shaped by a life in wakeful and systematic service to its ultimate ideal, God. Towards the end of his life Weber increasingly became to believe not only that the origin of the idea of personality could be found in ascetic Protestantism, but that its conception of this idea could be revitalised in response to the problems of self and identity in contemporary Germany. He believed that the ideals of Bildung were no more adequate to meet the demands of a world dominated by rationalisation and disenchantment. Only the transformation of the self into a personality and its unification for the undertaking of service could meet contemporary needs for meaning and make possible the mastery of the rationalised orders (Goldman 1989: 116–118).

5  In his essay on Roscher and Knies and the logical problems of the school of Historical National Economics, Weber qualifies the concept of personality as follows: “[…] the ‘freer’ […] an action is, that is, the less it bears within itself the character of a natural event, the more there comes into force the concept of ‘personality’ which finds its essence in the stability of its inner relationship to certain ‘values’ and ‘meaning’ of life, which are forged into purposes and translated into rational-teleological action” (Weber 1968c: 132, tr. from the German). For a discussion of Weber’s concept of personality, see also Charles Turner’s Modernity and politics in the work of Max Weber (1992: 153–156).

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What Weber retained from the ideal of personality of ascetic Protestantism were the two formal elements of the subjugation of the affective self and the transformation and fortification of the character of the individual through the discipline of calling as a unique relation of service to an ideal or, as he puts it in his later work, to ultimate values. One can say that these two formal elements form the core of the ideal of personality that he regarded as appropriate response to the ambivalences of modernity. This merely formal sense of personality must be given content by the specific ideals, values or causes that the person makes the object of his action and interest. Whatever the value, ideal, or cause one adopts, personality lies in subjecting the self to it and taming desire, feelings and the natural self (Goldman 1989: 144). Weber demonstrates what this concretely entails with regard to science as a vocation in his speech on the topic. According to him, only those have ‘personality’ in the domain of science who are purely serving the cause of science. In other words, only those who regard objective scientific investigation as such as a value and devote themselves wholeheartedly to it have personality in the true sense of the word, and is worthy of the vocation of science. To be able to do that, they must develop certain virtues attuned to the proper task of the scientist: first of all, passion for objective scientific investigation, secondly, the discipline (or intellectual integrity) needed to abstain from using science to serve ulterior motives and to persevere in purely disinterested investigation6 and, thirdly, the responsibility to make science useful by applying, in a legitimate way, empirical knowledge and providing clarity on the consequences of our actions. As Weber is of the opinion that empirical science must be value-free and may not be used to propagate or justify personal value beliefs, there is no proper way in which the devotion to values other than scientific investigation itself can and may be served in science. In this respect, empirical science differs from politics. Where a limited virtue ethics suffices for Weber in the case of the empirical sciences, in the social order of politics an appropriate approach to ethical decision-making is also needed. (ii)  Ethics of action In scattered remarks in works prior to ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber already offers some indication of what an appropriate ethics of action guiding decisionmaking in life orders such as politics could look like. Although he does not yet give a name to this ethics of action, it is conspicuous that the term ‘responsibility’ features strongly in many of the brief descriptions of its features. If we take all the 6  Cf. this remark made by Weber in ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality”’: “In the execution of his professional responsibility a man should confine himself to it alone and should exclude whatever is not strictly proper to it – particularly his own loves and hates” (Weber 1949: 5).



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remarks together, the following features of an ethics of action that Weber would find appropriate can be identified: yy Such an ethics would, first of all, recognise the loss of ethical meaningfulness of the world as a result of disenchantment and the differentiation of a plurality of autonomous and conflicting value spheres. As a consequence, it would also recognise the validity and dignity of values other than ethical values functioning in these autonomous life orders, without concluding that it implies the denigration of normative ethics. “Nor is the possibility of normative ethics placed in doubt by the fact that ethics is not the only thing in the world that is ‘valid’; rather it exists alongside of other valuespheres, the values of which can under certain conditions, be realized only by one who takes ethical ‘responsibility’ upon himself. This applies particularly to political action” (Weber 1949: 15).

yy It would recognise the central role instrumental rationality plays in most of the differentiated social orders. As a result, it would also recognise that the successvalue (Erfolgwert) of particular options for action should be taken into account when making ethical decisions in these social orders. Even in making ethical decisions on the right actions in these social orders, optimal effectiveness in achieving set goals should be an important criterion. The implication is that the foreseeable consequences – including undesirable secondary consequences – of options for action, have to be weighed up and that there should be a constant search for the most effective means. “Since, in the vast majority of cases, every goal that is striven for does ‘cost’ or can ‘cost’ something […] the weighing of the goals in terms of the incidental consequences of the action which realizes it cannot be omitted from the deliberation of persons who act with a sense of responsibility” (Weber 1949: 53).

yy In order to retain the ethical quality of the decisions that are made even in the different social orders, it would take into account the intrinsic value (Eigenwert) of the different options for action in terms of their correspondence with recognised ultimate values. “I, for my part, will not try to dissuade the nation from the view that actions are to be judged not merely by their instrumental value but by their intrinsic value as well” (Weber 1949: 23–24). yy It would recognise that the individual agent has an unavoidable responsibility to make a number of fundamental choices when taking ethical decisions. First of all, there is the inevitability of choosing between conflicting values in order to arrive at a clear decision, but also to confer meaning on life. Different from the person conditioned by the shallow routine of every day, the agent acting in accordance with the appropriate ethical approach will be willing to make “the choice between ‘God’ and the ‘Devil’,” and take his or her “own ultimate decision as to which of the conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which by the other” (Weber 1949: 18). Secondly, there is also the inevitability of

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taking responsibility for weighing up the foreseeable consequences of different goals and means, and for deciding on whether readjustments to goals set and to means implemented should be made. The reason is that, although empirical science can assist in identifying foreseeable consequences and effective means, it cannot provide an answer to the question “whether readjustment should take place and what should be the practical conclusions to be drawn […]” (Weber 1949: 23). In more than one respect it is thus true of the individual agent that “[t]he act of choice itself is his own responsibility” (Weber 1949: 53). yy As Weber was clearly of the opinion that the choice of ultimate values guiding the ethical agent’s decisions on the right actions is a matter of faith, it is highly unlikely that he would have endeavoured to formulate a new normative ethical theory for the rational identification and justification of a set of universally valid ethical values. From his earlier works one can already conclude that the only approach to ethics in the context of social orders he would subscribe to would be one that recognises the faith-based choice of ultimate values.

3.  Views on politics Weber was passionate about politics. Throughout his adult life he followed political developments in Germany and in other countries like Russia, England, and the United States of America with keen interest. He was also actively involved in public debates on politics in Germany. In numerous articles in papers and journals, as well as in public speeches, he expressed his strong personal views on political developments in Germany. In 1919 he even embarked upon active election campaigning for the German Democratic Party and almost became a member of parliament of this party. Weber himself confided, in a letter to Mina Tobler, that politics had always been his secret love (Weber 1988: 21, n. 53). A question that has intrigued many an author is: “What is the relation between Weber’s sociological work on politics and his more personal views on politics?” In his work since the late fifties of the previous century, the German Weber scholar Wolfgang Mommsen took on the contemporary view of fellow German sociologists that the two could be divided into two separate compartments. In his own view, “[h]owever much Weber himself strove for objectivity in his scholarly work, many of its fundamental features were derived from his political experience.” Although he conceded that Weber did not wish his academic work to be diluted by political partisanship, he maintained that “it was certainly influenced by the insights into the nature of political life and the exercise of power which he acquired while being actively engaged in contemporary politics” (Mommsen 1989: vii). The crux of the matter is not whether Weber’s sociological views on politics were influenced by his personal views on German politics, but in which manner



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and to what extent. In the debate on the value-freedom of empirical social scientific research, he never denies that such research, for the most part, is value-related. In fact, he takes it for granted that the social scientist’s interest in and choice of research topics always depend on his or her personal values. What he adamantly denies, however, is that values may be justified by empirical social scientific research, or that it is acceptable for the results of such research to be based on value judgements.7 Only if it could be demonstrated that Weber’s sociological views on politics were used by him to defend, or were based on, his personal views on German politics, could he be accused of being inconsistent. In the debate between Mommsen and those German sociologists who defended the value-free nature of Weber’s sociological views on politics, the central issue was: ‘To what extent were his sociological views on politics dependent on his strong personal political support of German nationalism and imperialism?’ In the context of this book, I will only discuss this question insofar as it is relevant for the interpretation of Weber’s perspective on the ethic of responsibility. As we have seen in the discussion of the major interpretations of his ethic of responsibility, Peter Breiner is of the opinion that Weber, in spite of his claim that his account of this ethic is purely formal  – and thus not based on any substantive political ideology  – delineated it in such a way that nationalist power politics passed the test, but not certain substantive political views that he personally denounced. In this section on Weber’s political views attention will first be given to his sociological views, then to his personal views, and, lastly, to his proposal on the solution of the major problems he identified in both his sociological work and personal involvement in German politics, especially with regard to political leadership.

3.1.  Sociological views on politics It is conspicuous that Weber does not, as in the case of most classical political theories, find the distinctive feature of the political domain in a particular end or ends internal to politics, such as justice (Aristotle) or equality (Rousseau).

7  See, inter alia, the following remarks made by Weber in his essay ‘“Objectivity” in social science’: “Just as without the investigator’s conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reality is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal belief, the refraction of values in the prism of this mind, gives direction to his work” (Weber 1949: 82) and: “These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such. The ‘objectivity’ of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas” (Weber 1949: 111).

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“Whereas Machiavelli still maintains the communal and civic meaning of ‘il viver civile e liberá’, a free and civic community […] Weber detaches the calculation of means to ends in politics from the discernment of ends internal to (or constitutive of) political practice or political association” (Breiner 1999: 124–125).

His reason for denying, in effect, that there are any specific intrinsic goods in politics in terms of which it can be defined is that “[…] the political association is particularly capable of abrogating to itself all the possible values toward which associational conduct might be oriented; and there is, in fact, nothing in this world which was not at one time or another an object of communal action on the part of political associations” (Weber 1968b: 903).

If political action thus cannot be defined in terms of the kind of politics one should pursue, it can, in Weber’s opinion, only be defined by the means peculiar to politics and political associations, namely power, including physical force. “An association based on domination shall be called a political association insofar as its existence and the validity of its orders within a given geographical area are continually guaranteed through the application and threat of physical force on the part of its administrative staff” (Weber 1968b: 54). The state is defined as “that human community that (successfully) lays claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence within a particular territory, this territory being another of the defining characteristics of the state” (Weber 1994a: 310–311). Politics means “striving for a share of power or for influence on the distribution of power, whether it be between states or between the groups of people contained within a single state” (Weber 1994a: 311). This does not mean, however, that Weber reduces politics to the mere implementation of power. Although politics is defined strictly in terms of the exercise of power, it is for him a power struggle over the realisation of ultimate values, championed by different political role-players. For him the “[…] distinctive characteristic of a problem of social policy is indeed that it cannot be resolved merely on the basis of purely technical considerations which assume already settled ends. Normative standards of value can and must be the objects of dispute in a discussion of a problem of social policy because the problem lies in the domain of general cultural values” (Weber 1949: 56).

Weber carefully distinguishes between ‘power’ (Macht) and ‘domination’ or ‘rule’ (Herrschaft). Power is, for him, “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance regardless of the basis on which this probability rests,” while domination “is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of people” (Weber 1968b: 53). This distinction is crucial in more than one respect. In the first instance, power holds open the possibility that the freedom exercised in choosing ultimate purposes and seeking to find the proper means to realise them could be translated into politics. However, as the striving



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for power in the service of particular ultimate values, politics is severely restricted by the maintenance of domination in the modern state. What can be achieved by it will always be limited by the need at once to deploy and to oppose legitimate forms of domination to which large numbers of people submit. Another important difference is that power can achieve its aims even in spite of the resistance of certain individuals, groups in society, or nation states. Domination is not attainable simply through coercion. It requires a minimum of wilful obedience on the part of those who are to accept commands. This willingness constitutes the legitimation for a particular form of domination (Weber 1968b: 212). Just as with the definition of political association and politics, the forms of ‘legitimate domination’ are distinguished ideal-typically from the vantage point of instrumental rationality, not value rationality. ‘Legitimacy’ is a means of attaining obedience to commands, whatever their validity and whatever the motives of the individuals who submit to them. All that is needed for legitimate domination is that those commands are ‘believed’ to be valid by those who submit to them (cf. Weber 1968b: 213). On the basis of the different beliefs in the validity of a command structure, Weber constructs his typology of the three pure types of legitimate domination. Rational-legal domination rests on a belief in the impersonal legality of enacted rules and of the right of those who have the task to enforce the rules. Traditional domination rests on the everyday belief in the sanctity of traditionally valid rules and in those that enforce them. And charismatic domination is based on the extraordinary devotion to a person on account of his or her piety, heroism, or exemplariness, and the rules ‘revealed’ or ‘ordained’ by him (Weber 1968b: 215). In its purest form, rational-legal domination is realised in bureaucratic administration. Bureaucratisation is not limited to Western societies but, according to Weber, only in the West does the development of bureaucratic domination occur as a distinct form unencumbered by traditional domination and purely based on instrumental rational considerations (Weber 1968a: 15–16). Whereas other forms of domination legitimate their commands on the basis of some substantive end or personal relationship, bureaucratic domination legitimates its commands purely on its claim to have appropriated control through formal rules. Both the bureaucracy and its clients treat these rules as impersonal, deducible from a previously established code that has no substantive justification. The legitimacy of bureaucratic domination ultimately rests in the belief of both the administrative staff and its clients that it carries out commands and creates order in the most impartial and rationally predictable way possible. Thus, a bureaucracy functions like an efficient machine to produce obedience to commands and is available to whichever master is able to control it. Viewed this way, bureaucratic domination is at the root of all legitimate order as Weber defines it, because all legitimate order, whatever its claim to be obeyed, is merely trying to attain submission to its staff in the most efficient manner possible (cf. Breiner 1999: 132). In fact,

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Weber is of the opinion that, as a result of the efficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus as “a means of power of the first rank for the one who controls” it, bureaucratic domination, once introduced, becomes not only inescapable, but also indestructible (Weber 1968b: 987). For Weber, there is also a downside to this inescapable process of bureaucratisation in the Western world. The triumph of instrumental rationalisation achieved in it is accompanied by a complete loss of power for all those who work within it or are subject to it. With this loss of power comes a virtually complete loss of self-determining freedom. “Moral autonomy, even in Weber’s reduced understanding of it as choosing values and taking responsibility for the effects of working on them, and bureaucratic claims to legitimacy are incompatible” (Breiner 1999: 138). This aspect of rational bureaucracy poses for Weber the central dilemma for politics: “How can one possibly save any remnants of ‘individualist’ freedom of movement in any sense?” (Weber 1958: 321). Weber was convinced that, although bureaucratic domination could not be overcome, it could be countered – and individual freedom preserved to a certain extent – by a different kind of legitimate domination, namely charismatic domination. Charismatic domination constitutes the exact opposite of bureaucratic domination. Unlike traditional or rational-legal domination, charisma is a form of domination that rejects everyday routine obedience. It arises at times of crisis in traditional or rational-legal domination, usually in response to the depersonalisation of routine domination. Charisma refers to those qualities of individual leaders that are not reducible to instrumental rational explanation. Charismatic leaders are thought to possess “gifts of body and spirit” often considered to be “supernatural,” and bestowed on them to enable them to fulfil a calling to a divine mission (Weber 1968b: 1111–1112). On the basis of these imputed qualities, the charismatic leader is able to inspire faith or blind support in his following. His followers accept his claim that it is their duty to submit to his commands purely on the basis of his extraordinary personal qualities (Weber 1968b: 1113). To achieve this, the charismatic leader must display “self-imposed inner determination and inner limits,” extraordinary powers, preferably supernatural or superhuman, and “divine grace and god-like heroic strength” (Weber 1968b: 1112–1117). In short, the legitimacy of charismatic domination ultimately depends on the unusual inner discipline of the leader, and his capacity to present himself as inspired by some supra-individual end (cf. Breiner 1999: 140). How does charismatic domination endeavour to break free from the hold of the everyday routine of traditional or rational-legal domination? “Charismatic domination conducts itself in a revolutionary manner revaluing all values and in a sovereign manner breaking with all the traditional or rational norms.” For Weber the emblematic figure of this revolutionary revaluation is the prophet who announces, “It is written […] but I say unto you” (Weber 1968b: 1115). The power of charismatic domination is to will new values and ways of life into existence by



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changing the inner motives of a group, a class, or a nation, and then to organise material conditions around this new orientation toward social action. For this reason, Weber calls charisma “the specifically ‘creative’ revolutionary force of history” (Weber 1968b: 1117). It is the one means by which the split between instrumental reasoning, based on means-ends calculations, and value reasoning, based on the belief in intrinsic values, is overcome and even reversed, in that instrumental considerations are forced to follow the revolutionary revaluation of values. Paradoxically, it is exactly this reversal that is the source of the intense instability of charismatic domination. The charismatic leader is obliged to demonstrate to his followers that there is some relation between his extraordinary capacities and beneficial “effects” in everyday life. This requirement becomes the impulse for the “routinisation of charisma,” the submission of charisma to the demands of everyday (Weber 1068b: 1114). Given this inevitable routinisation of charisma, Weber comes to the general conclusion: “Charisma is a phenomenon typical of prophetic movements or of expansive political movements in their early stages. But as soon as domination is well established, and, above all else, as soon as control over large masses of people exists, it gives way to the forces of everyday routine” (Weber 1968b: 252).

For this reason, he argues, “in its pure form charismatic domination may be said to exist only in its moment of inception” (Weber 1968b: 246). A crucial question that Weber is obliged to address is: ‘Where can such charismatic leadership be found in modern politics?’ One can say that his sketch of the development of the business of politics and, more particularly, party politics in the Western world in the first part of ‘Politics as a vocation’ is, among things, an attempt to provide an answer to this question. According to this sketch, the instrumental rationalisation of the business of politics in the Western world entails that the modern bureaucratic state, the modern political party, and, above all, the modern professional politician are all the outcomes of a process of political expropriation, which distinctive characteristic is the separation of the means of political administration and power from the politician, the official and the citizen. The central administration is no longer subject to any one individual, but to the one institution that can back up its domination with force, namely the state. This means that one of the aims of a political actor who wants to realise substantive political ends has to be to gain at least partial control over the state, to become, in Weber’s words, its ‘master’. In modern politics this can only be done via political parties, which developed in response to the introduction of mass democracy, vying with one another for governmental control by striving to gain the majority vote in elections. Modern political parties, however, have developed according to an instrumental logic parallel to the one influencing the development of the modern state. One of the results has been the emergence of a class of profes-

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sional politicians, to ensure the effective organising of election campaigns and to enhance the capacity of parties to govern effectively. To Weber it is clear that the charismatic leadership needed in modern politics could only emerge from the ranks of these professional politicians, since only they could carry on the struggle for power in the modern state with skill and consistency. The problem is that many of these professional politicians clearly do not qualify as charismatic political leaders. They live ‘from politics’ rather than ‘for politics’ (Weber 1994a: 318). They are professional politicians, in the first instance, to earn a living, and not because they find inner fulfilment and meaning in being employed fulltime in politics. They serve political ends imposed on them by others and not ends they themselves have chosen, and convince others to serve. However, exceptions can be found. For Weber a clear example is William Gladstone of Great Britain, who as charismatic political leader in a resolute manner set his own political goals and effectively won over the support of his own political party and the majority of British voters. He could do so, of course, only because the British parliamentary system gave him the scope to act out his charismatic leadership qualities. There is thus also a constitutional dimension to the emergence of strong political leaders that has to be taken account of.

3.2.  Personal political views Politically, Max Weber belonged to the tradition of German national liberalism of the post-Bismarck era (Mommsen 1989: 24).8 Although he explicitly identified himself as a ‘liberal’ only once, as a young man, he liked to emphasise that he was a class-conscious bourgeois (Hennis 1988: 167; cf. Kaesler 2014: 65). His political involvement was motivated, among other things, by his desire to strengthen the political position of the bourgeoisie in Germany and to achieve liberal constitutional reform. At the end of the nineteenth century, political liberalism in Germany was in bad shape. The hope of liberals that the unification brought about by the establishment of the German empire in the 1870s would also result in more 8 Already

in his parental home, Weber was exposed to this tradition, as his father was a proponent of German national liberalism (Kaesler 2014: 28; 166). Another family member who shared the same political ideology was his uncle, the historian Hermann Baumgarten. Especially during the year when Weber was stationed in Strassburg doing voluntary military service, he often visited the house of his uncle and had many discussions on German politics with him. Dirk Kaesler is of the opinion that the meeting and discussions with his uncle had a decisive formative influence on his political thought (Kaesler 2014: 241–242). It is quite probable that this influence related not only to German national liberalism, but also to Hermann Baumgarten’s criticism that the German power politics of his time ignored political and military realities. He pleaded for a responsible Realpolitik that strove to achieve political ideas in concrete ways. He was also of the opinion that only well-trained professional people should fulfil the vocation of politician (Kaesler 2014: 238–239).



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freedom in society was dashed by the dominance of an authoritarian corporatism under the leadership of Bismarck. During his authoritarian reign as chancellor, Bismarck actively discouraged and undermined the leadership initiatives of other politicians. In Weber’s view, he left behind a nation “without any political education” and “without any political will” (Weber 1984: 449, tr. from the German). The ‘system of Bismarck’ (a designation used by Weber), as a result, had longterm negative effects, even after Bismarck’s forced withdrawal from active politics (Schluchter 2009: 92). The elected members of parliament (Reichstag) who had no experience of having real political power could not fill the political leadership vacuum left by Bismarck. This vacuum was filled, rather, by bureaucrats on the basis of their technical expertise. In Weber’s view, the problem with bureaucrats is that they do not qualify for real political leadership, because they have not learned, on battlegrounds of the word in party political and parliamentarian debates, to assert themselves. Above all, they have not learned to mobilise political followers for a supra-personal cause they have chosen themselves (Schluchter 2009: 96). In Weber’s view, constitutional arrangements in Germany were partly to be blamed for this situation. In many German states a three-class election system was used that allowed the aristocracy to wield political power out of proportion to their numbers or economic contribution. More importantly, the constitution of the empire gave priority to the sovereignty of the rulers above that of the people. The elected house of parliament (Reichstag) had very little influence on political decisions, as the final decision-making power rested with the council of ministers (Bundesrat), under the chairmanship of the king of Prussia. Weber therefore propagated drastic reform of the constitution of the German empire, to bring it more in line with the liberal constitutions of other Western nations like Britain and the USA. He thought that the three-class election system should be abolished in favour of one in which members of parliament were elected on a free and equal basis by all civilians. In addition, the political power of the parliament should be enhanced, among other things, by making the council of ministers accountable to it (Schluchter 2009: 93–95). Not only would such constitutional reforms allow the middle and worker classes to break the hold of the aristocracy on political power, but would it also allow candidates with a talent for politics to be recognised and to hone their leadership skills (cf. Weber 1984: 235). One should be careful not to conclude, on the basis of his support of such liberal constitutional reform, that Weber fully underwrote the ideas of classical political liberalism. For one thing, he did not believe that natural law could any longer provide a firm foundation for the basic ideas of political liberalism. In fact, he was of the opinion that some of these ideas had become obsolete as a result of developments in late-capitalist industrial societies. The postulate of the self-determination of the individual through democratic means, for example, had been

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undermined, in his opinion, by the emergence of modern, bureaucratic party organisations and the increasing influence of material interest on party politics. The grip bureaucrats and powerful interest groups had on party politics left very little room for the ordinary man in the street to still have an influence upon political events. Weber thought it naïve to believe that under modern conditions the people as a whole were in a position to determine their own political destiny through free elections. He expressed his position most emphatically when he wrote to Robert Michels: “How much more resignation will you still have to endure? Concepts such as ‘popular will’, and genuine will of the people do not exist for me any more. They are fictions” (in a letter to Michels August, 4, 1908: Weber 1990: 615, tr. from the German). He also did not share the optimistic and typical liberal belief in inevitable progress in society, “the idea that the liberation of individual powers through the medium of ‘free competition’ will ‘finally’ bring about a ‘harmonious’ social condition adjusting itself towards ‘equilibrium’” (Hennis 1988: 176). What liberals called peaceful competition was for him conflict, the struggle of man against man. And while he did underwrite the idea of the dignity of every human being, his individualism was not “[…] bound to the idea of equality, but rather by an interest in the representative individual, a type laden with responsibility and standing out from the mass, set apart from ‘everyman’ and expressly marked by the ‘pathos of distance’. This aspect of Weber has been called ‘aristocratic’. Only against the background of Nietzsche – and Jacob Burckhardt – is Weber’s ‘characteristic’ individualism rendered intelligible” (Hennis 1988: 177–178).

One has to agree with Wolfgang Mommsen that Weber’s support of liberal constitutional reform in Germany was probably less motivated by a firm belief in classical liberal values than by functional considerations (Mommsen 1989: 17). The introduction of a full-fledged constitutional democracy in Germany was for him more an effective means towards other ends than an end in itself. It would, in his opinion, help to break the dominance of the aristocracy in German politics and to thus strengthen the political position of the bourgeoisie. It would counter the stifling hold of bureaucracy on German politics, by introducing a parliament with the power of oversight over the bureaucrats. It would provide opportunities to identify and equip strong, charismatic political leaders in the struggle for political power in political parties and in a ‘working’ parliament. For Weber, liberal constitutional reform was finally also a prerequisite for a vigorous German imperialism. A rational imperialist policy called for the modernisation of German society, including the emancipation of the German people from the hegemony of conservative Prussian aristocracy (Mommsen 1989: 28). This points to the fact that the values of classical political liberalism were not Weber’s personal ultimate political values. These values were subordinated to, and reinterpreted in terms of, what was clearly his highest personal political value, namely a strong German nation. Weber was quite forthright about this:



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“For me, ‘democracy’ has never been an end in itself. My only interest has been and remains the possibility of implementing a realistic national policy for a strong Germany, which stands united over against the outside world” (Weber 1984: 234, tr. from the German). His nationalism had a distinctly imperialist flavour. He was convinced that in an age of imperial power conflicts it was simply the duty of the German empire to assert itself as a world power if only in order to assure a place on earth for German culture in the centuries to come (Mommsen 1989: 28).9 Weber already propagated his nationalist ideas quite clearly in his inaugural address as a young professor of economics at the University of Freiburg in May 1895. In this address he argued strongly against attempts to develop the science of economic policy or political economy on the basis of so-called scientifically objective values such as productivity or social justice. He posed to his listeners that not only should all such values be recognised as purely subjective, but it should also be realised that the “science of economic policy is a political science. It is the servant of politics, not the transient politics of today’s rulers and ruling classes, but the permanent political interest of the nation and its power” (Weber 1993: 560–561, tr. from the German). He therefore proposed that all other values be subordinated to the nation as the only valid ultimate value. “Economics as an explanatory and analytical science is international; but as soon as it involves value judgements it is linked to that expression of mankind that is peculiar to each nation […] The economic policy of a German state and the evaluative criteria of a German economic theorist can therefore only be German” (Weber 1993: 559–560, tr. from the German).

Weber emphatically stated that for German political economy “the final and decisive criterion [should be] the economic and political power interests of our nation and its carrier the German national state” (Weber 1993: 561, tr. from the German). His fellow economists should therefore be aware: “Our descendants will hold us responsible before history, not primarily for the economic organisation we hand on, but for the elbow room we achieve and leave for them in the world […] Even in the face of the terrible misery of all masses, which weighs heavily on the sensitised conscience of the new generation, we must honestly profess that more burdensome is the awareness of our responsibility before history” (Weber 1993: 560; 573, tr. from the German).

9 After discussing Weber’s political views up to World War I  Dirk Kaesler comes to the conclusion: “That before the World War I we had to do with a Max Weber who was blinded by nationalism, and mostly on account of that promoted the German Empire, cannot be denied” (Kaesler 2014: 412, tr. from the German). At the outbreak of the war Weber could not refrain himself from writing more than once in letters that “this war is great and wonderful” (Kaesler 2014: 739). Kaesler’s comment is: “For someone to whom life as such meant war and struggle, the military war was not only a normal situation, but a magnificent situation” (Kaesler 2014: 741, tr. from the German).

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For at least until the end of World War I  in 1918, thus for twenty-five years, Weber personally campaigned for a national policy under the motto of “our responsibility before history” (Roth 1984: 495). He invoked this motto, for example, when he defended the German participation in the war in an article ‘Between two laws’ against a Swiss pacifist in 1916. “Not the Danish, Swiss, Dutch, Norwegians will be held responsible by future generations […] when without any resistance political power in the world – and that means disposal over the distinctive culture of the future – is subdivided between the regulations of Russian officials on the one hand and the conventions of Anglo-Saxon society on the other hand […] Only us. And rightfully so. On account of the fact that we are a super-power and, in contrast to those small nations, have what it takes to make a difference with regard to this historical issue, we, and not they, have the duty to history, that is, to those who come after us, to prevent the overrunning of the whole world by these two powers” (Weber 1984: 95–96, tr. from the German).

Weber argued that the German empire posed a threat to these two super-powers, and that a decisive, violent clash for world supremacy could only be postponed, but not avoided. Germany could therefore not allow Austria to be overrun by the Russians in their desire for expansion, but had to enter the war to defend its own interests (Weber 1984: 96–97). Weber’s sharp criticism of the extreme nationalism of the right wing was, however, also based on his ‘policy of responsibility’ (cf. Roth 1984: 495; 498). He regarded those justifications of national power politics that made power a goal in itself – characteristic of the Wilhelmine era – as nothing but irresponsible swaggering. In a conflict between the University of Freiburg and the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1911, he distanced himself from the “entirely empty and hollow sorts of purely zoological nationalism” characteristic of German fraternity student journals of the time. That kind of nationalism led “necessarily to a lack of conscience on all great cultural questions” (quoted in Mommsen 1984: 65–66). For the same reason, he also criticised the type of Realpolitik that was conducted in the war during the reign of emperor Wilhelm II (cf. Weber 1958: 477). In the course of the war, nationalistic fervour had caused a number of strategic errors that, while apparently bringing about short-term military success, had detrimental long-term consequences for the international political position of the German nation: the invasion of the neutral Belgium, the unrestricted U-boat war that brought about the entrance of the USA to the war, the imposed peace with the revolutionary Russia in Brest-Litowsk, which preceded the support of Lenin and the Bolsheviks of the war effort against Germany, and the insistence on problematic annexations (cf. Schluchter 2009: 97). The main problem with this type of Realpolitik was, for Weber, that it tied political action exclusively to reason of state and a narrow drive for success and not to the enhancement of a genuine cultural ideal as ultimate value. On account of his own uncompromising support of state power, Weber was not averse to Realpolitik of a certain kind. As



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Wolfgang Mommsen rightly points out, however, “his ideas on power were […] firmly rooted in convictions of value of a transethical sort” (Mommsen 1984: 45). To be more specific: only the use of power that had the enhancement of the international political status of the German nation and its culture as its goal, and served this goal effectively, was for Weber acceptable. In the context of this study an important question is: How did Weber’s nationalism, with its imperialistic inflection, influence his personal views on the role ethics can and should play in politics? Was it in any way acceptable for him to base political decisions on ethical values? If we leave ‘Politics as a vocation’ aside, the overwhelming evidence seems to point to the conclusion that he was quite negative about any attempt to base political decisions on ethical considerations. We have already seen that his inaugural address in 1895 was, among other things, directed against those who based political economy on moral values. According to Wolfgang Mommsen, in this address Weber “[…] rejected the ethical approach of the older school of the Kathedersozialisten, who, under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy of government, considered justice to be the highest guiding principle of all social policy. Weber wished to substitute the concept of nation as the only valid ultimate principle, transcending all such ideal values” (Mommsen 1984: 38).

Guenther Roth is of the opinion that he also wanted to challenge the ‘Ethical Culture’ movement, which at the time was growing into an international peace movement based on the principle of a morally organised ‘Community of Humanity’. His attacks appear to be especially directed against his colleague, Gerhardt von Schulze-Gävernitz, the other holder of an economics chair in Freiburg, who published in the journal Ethical Culture (Roth 1984: 497–498).10 In a letter written to Freiburg colleagues in November 1911, Weber in a revealing way reflected on his inaugural address: “In my Freiburg inaugural address, immature though it may have been in many respects, I most outspokenly supported the sovereignty of national ideals in the area of all practical policies, including the so-called social policy, at a time when the great majority of the colleagues in my field were being taken in by the fraud of the so-called social kingdom. But even then I very deliberately emphasized that politics is not and can never be a profession with a moral foundation” (Marianne Weber 1975: 411; emphasis added).

10  Compare also Weber’s critical remarks on the proposals of the stock exchange inquiry commission in an article ‘Börsenwesen (Die Vorschläge der Börsenenquettekommission)’ in a supplementary volume of the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, published in 1895. Among other things, he asserted that there could be no “‘fundamental’ solution of economic questions based upon economic or social ‘justice’, or more generally, upon any ‘ethical’ point of view in any country as long as the state’s power interests and those of the national community are themselves contested by other communities in the struggle for political and economic hegemony” (Weber 1999: 589, tr. from the German).

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Just as revealing are some of his remarks in ‘Between the laws’, written in 1916 (Weber 1984: 95–98). In a typical way he challenged the views of the Swiss pacifist by radicalising the options one has when it comes to the evaluation of the German participation in World War I. One either has to leave the Gospel out of the equation – the obvious option to Weber – or one has to take it seriously and, every day and in everything, consistently live in accordance with its ethical demands – something that, in his view, is impossible to attain. “Whoever takes only one penny of interest from others, directly or indirectly, whoever owns or uses a commodity produced with another person’s sweat, lives off the machinery of that loveless and pitiless struggle for existence which in bourgeois phraseology is called ‘peaceful cultural labour’, but in reality is just another form of the struggle of man against man, in which not millions, but hundreds of millions of people, every year go to pieces […] Whoever does not face the consequences – and Tolstoy did so only under the shadow of death – should be reminded that he is tied to the rules of this world, and that includes for an unforeseeably long time the possibility and inevitability of war. Only under these constraints can he satisfy the ‘demands of the day’” (Weber 1984: 97–98, tr. from the German).

The conclusion Weber seemingly wants one to draw is: as it is impossible to consistently live in accordance with the ethical demands of the Gospel in modern society, the only option one has is to accept the rules of this world, that is, the non-ethical rules that apply in the differentiated social spheres, and to live one’s life in these social spheres in accordance with such non-ethical rules. When, after the end of World War I, discussions about the moral guilt of Germany regarding the war were rife, and Kurt Eisner even published secret government documents to prove the complicity of the German government in instigating the war, Weber indignantly distanced himself from the “enthusiastic burrowing into feelings of guilt” of the leftist “literati.” His indignation was stirred, not only by the negative impact such admissions of guilt could have for Germany in the peace negotiations at Versailles, but mainly because he sincerely believed that all talk of moral guilt with regard to the war and to policy matters was totally inappropriate. He believed that those who argue that the cause of the German defeat must be some sort of ‘guilt’ do not realise that the real world is different from what they believe. In the real world, the “God of battle is with the larger battalion” and the outcome of war has nothing to do with “the judgement of God” (Weber 1958: 294, tr. from the German). He passionately opposed the idea that German policy over the previous decades could be criticised on an ethical basis. In a letter to prof. Goldstein he wrote: “I have not participated in the disgusting moralizing […] This gives me the right to say now that this wallowing in guilt feelings which I encounter in a number of places is a sickness […] The policy of the past two years was an outrage […] because it was frivolous […] Our policy before the war was stupid, not morally reprehensible – it certainly cannot be called that” (quoted in Marianne Weber 1975: 602).



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What is clear from these remarks is that Weber was convinced that categories like ‘moral guilt’ and ‘moral rightness’ were not appropriate in evaluating matters political and military. “He held politics […] to be a sphere in its own right that must be exclusively defined neither in terms of class or status group interests nor in terms of brotherly ideals. The conceptual distinction in connection with politics is not useful versus harmful, nor is it true versus false or beautiful versus ugly, nor is it even good versus evil; it is honourable versus disgraceful. Failure to satisfy a political duty does not provoke feelings of discontent or guilt as much as it does those of shame” (Schluchter 1996: 13–14).

An intriguing question is: What was the impact of Germany’s disastrous defeat on Weber’s personal political views? Did he find it necessary after the end of the war in 1918, and before he presented ‘Politics as a vocation’ in January 1919, to adapt his nationalistic and imperialistic personal political views? In a letter of November 24, 1918, he conceded the end of his political vision of Germany’s responsibility in the face or history: “The self-discipline of truthfulness bids us to say that Germany’s role in world politics is over: Anglo-Saxon world rule […] is a fact” (quoted in Marianne Weber 1975: 636). Wolfgang Mommsen believes that Weber remained faithful to his nationalistic views until the end of his life (Mommsen 1984: 48; 1989: 8). Guenther Roth is of the opinion that after the end of the war Weber at least realised that he could not repeat in public his standard appeals regarding “our responsibility in the face of history”: “The old grounds of discourse had given way, and he searched for a new solution. He found it in the two ethics” (Roth 1984: 495).

3.3.  The solution for the problems of political leadership What has become clear in our discussion of Weber’s views on politics so far is that there is a strong correlation between his sociological views on politics and personal political views. The reason for that may be – as Mommsen asserts – that he gained many of his sociological insights regarding politics from his personal involvement in German politics. It is, however, also quite possible that the relation was of a more reciprocal nature, and that some of his sociological views on politics in modern societies, once they were formed, also helped to shape his ideas on German politics. Whatever the explanation may be, there is a clear correlation between his nationalism, with its imperialistic emphasis on the expansion of the international power sphere of Germany, and his definition of politics exclusively in terms of its means, namely power, including the use of physical force; between his strong denouncement of all attempts to ground politics in Germany or internationally in moral values, and his exclusion of a type of moral legitimation of political domination from his sociological discussion of types of legitimation; between his personal disapproval of the dominant and, in his opinion, stifling role

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bureaucrats played in German imperial politics, and his sociological description of the ever increasing controlling role bureaucratisation was playing in modern politics; and, lastly, between his personal aristocratic version of individualism in which the strong and exceptional individual takes the centre stage, and his sociological depiction of charismatic political leadership as the only alternative to bureaucratic domination.11 It also comes as no surprise, therefore, that in both Weber’s sociological analysis of modern politics and his personal assessment of the political situation in Germany, problems of political leadership surfaced as the main challenge in politics. This challenge can be formulated as such: To overcome the lack of political leadership in Germany in particular and Western societies in general by encouraging the emergence of charismatic political leaders who could break the stifling hold of bureaucratisation, and provide new direction and dynamics in politics. Since 1918, he worked on two proposals on how this challenge could be met. The first addressed the constitutional reform needed to enhance strong political leadership. The second was to delineate more accurately the distinctive personal characteristics, as well as the distinctive approach to politics, needed by the charismatic leader to function effectively in modern politics. Weber was convinced that the challenge regarding strong political leadership could only be met if constitutional changes were brought about to provide a political system that is conducive to the emergence and development of charismatic political leaders. In the months preceding the presentation of ‘Politics as a vocation’, he became increasingly convinced that the best political system for Germany  – and, for that matter, modern Western societies  – would be what he called a ‘plebiscitary leadership democracy’. In the period prior to the total collapse of the German empire in 1918, Weber was still convinced that a strong monarch combined with a strong parliament was the most effective form of state as opposed to limited constitutional republics. He supported such a political system mainly for functional reasons. The monarch would represent a stable charismatic element in the state, providing a stronger foundation for mass obedience than could be provided by impersonal formal legality (cf. Mommsen 1984: 289–293). Once it became clear that the monarchy was doomed, Weber shifted his functional concerns to the possibilities provided by democratic state forms. He then started to argue that the only possibility within the modern democratic state to overcome the tendency to reduce politics to incessant negotiating and bargaining and to ensure strong political leadership is provided by ‘plebiscitary leadership democracy’. 11  Cf. Mommsen’s remark: “In my view, Weber’s conception of a democratic mass leader who wins the masses for his policies with the help of his charismatic capacities can be traced to aristocratic individualism in which liberal assumptions are combined with the Nietzschean idea of the value-setting personality” (Mommsen 1984: 420).



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On the one hand, for Weber this political system represents an anti-authoritarian transformation and reinterpretation of the authoritarian personal legitimacy of the charismatic leader. The principle of legitimacy undergirding the charismatic domination of the plebiscitary leader is based on a formal process of recognition by ‘the people’ through ‘election’ in the double sense of the word. The ruler becomes the freely elected leader and the masses make or break that leader by supporting or rejecting him through elections. Charisma now becomes strictly dependent on democratic sovereignty (Weber 1968b: 267–268). On the other hand, Weber treats the principle of democratic sovereignty in this political system as a fiction hiding its authoritarian origins: “‘Plebiscitary democracy’ – the most important type of leadership democracy – is in its genuine sense a kind of charismatic domination which conceals itself under the form of legitimacy which is derived from the will of the ruled and only sustained by them […] Standing opposed to plebiscitary leadership democracy as a type […] are the types of leaderless democracy which are characterized by the striving after the minimization of domination of man over man” (Weber 1968b: 268–269).

In the political system of plebiscitary democracy, the charismatic leader is elected not so much on account of the fact that he represents the will of the people, but because he effectively uses his demagogic skills to make the majority of them believe in him as a leader and in his cause. For that reason they are also willing to follow and obey him unreservedly as their leader. The main advantage of this type of democracy is, for Weber, that it provides numerous opportunities for selecting out leaders with sufficient demagogic qualities to gain the faith of the masses. In ‘Parliament and democracy in a reconstructed Germany’ he argues that parliaments could play this role by serving, not primarily as bodies to articulate political issues, but rather to select leaders with “great political power skills” and “highly developed leadership qualities” (Weber 1984: 474, tr. from the German). Parliament could also enhance the development of political expertise, especially through the committee system. Even more than parliaments, political parties could be of service in the selection of charismatic leaders. For the leader of the political party uses elections as plebiscites in which he seeks from the voters a “profession of faith” in his “calling.” This “Caesarist principle” becomes the unavoidable attribute of democratic politics, as elections become struggles between leaders seeking popular acclamation to their unimpeded rule of the state (Weber 1984: 538–540). To enhance the Caesarist principle, Weber favoured the direct popular election of the president. He in fact vigorously campaigned for the introduction of direct popular election for president into the Weimar constitution. He insisted that such direct election would at once enhance popular sovereignty and help to overcome existing inadequacies of the parliament and political parties as instruments for training and selecting leaders with strong convictions as it would force them out of their usual preoccupation

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with bargaining and individual interest (Weber 1988: 220–224). Only through the introduction of the Caesarist principle into democracy, Weber believed, could the value-creating power of charisma be sufficiently strengthened to offset the depersonalising effects of bureaucracy and the intrusion of sectional interests through competing party apparatus (cf. Breiner 1984: 163).12 It is conspicuous that Weber, not withstanding the high expectations he had from the charismatic political leader, did not content himself in ‘Politics as a vocation’ with a mere sketch of the typical characteristics of such a leader, but found it necessary to in a detailed manner delineate the distinctive characteristics, as well as the distinctive approach to politics, of the modern political leader that he favoured. In my opinion he found it necessary to do so for two reasons. Of both these reasons we find clear indications in his other work on politics. The first reason is that the figure of charismatic leader is not a typical modern figure, but in fact a very ancient one. Weber himself regarded the pre-exilic prophet of Ancient Israel as the example par excellence of the charismatic leader. In the undifferentiated and theocratic society of Ancient Israel these religious leaders could exert considerable influence even in political matters, solely on account of the power of their convictions and personal characteristics, without having any expertise in day-to-day politics. Weber must have realised when he turned to the charismatic political leader as the counter-influence to bureaucracy needed in modern politics that he would have to reconcile the central role he granted to this type of political leader with his own account of the irreversible differentiation and rationalisation of politics in modernity. It is therefore conspicuous that already in his earlier work on politics he found it necessary to qualify the desired characteristics and approach of the modern charismatic political leader. In all his discussions of the modern charismatic political leader, this leader is not depicted only as someone who is inspired by a supra-personal cause and has the ability to convince others of his cause, but also as someone who has the necessary knowhow of modern politics and the ability to make effective use of the means provided by modern politics to further his cause. In ‘Politics as a vocation’ he draws on these earlier discussions of the desired characteristics and approach of the modern charismatic political leader, but also systematises the insights already gained and elaborates on them. There is, however, yet another reason why Weber found it necessary to delineate more clearly the desired characteristics and approach of the modern charismatic political leader in ‘Politics as a vocation’. He realised quite well that his case for the central role of charismatic leaders in modern politics could be misunderstood in the politically tense and emotionally laden situation in Ger12 Interesting enough Weber already in September 1909 at a meeting of the Society for Social Politics in Vienna raised the question about what could be done to counter the curtailment of the soul brought about by bureaucratisation (cf. Kaesler 2014: 643).



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many since the outbreak of World War I. On the one hand, there was the real possibility that his charismatic political leader could be equated with the type of political or military strongman that played such an influential role in Germany before and during the war. As political equivalent of the bully, such leaders liked to show off the military might of Germany and relished the sheer exercise of military force. Not only in ‘Politics as a vocation’, but also in other works, Weber showed his disapproval of such ‘strong’ political leaders, of whom the emperor Wilhelm II was for him the most prominent exponent. He also found it necessary to distinguish clearly the charismatic political leader he favoured from the exponent of this type of Realpolitik. More than once, he pointed out that, although the modern charismatic political leader he had in mind also found inner satisfaction in the use of political power, the decisive difference from the Realpolitiker is that the former always relates and subordinates the use of political power to the successful achievement of a cultural cause, and does not seek political power for its own sake. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, he once again clearly distinguished the ‘responsible’ charismatic political leader, whom he now distinguished as the political leader who acts in accordance with the ethic of responsibility, from the Realpolitiker or Machtpolitiker (the term used by him there). Even so, one cannot say that his main criticism in this speech was directed against the power politician. At that stage, after Germany’s devastating defeat in World War I, the influence of the power politicians in Germany had been almost completely depleted. His criticism was rather directed mainly at the pacifists and the revolutionary socialists, who were then playing an active and influential role in German politics. Weber must have realised that at that point of time chances were good that his charismatic political leader could be equated with pacifist and socialist political leaders, who exhibited the necessary demagogic skills to sway the masses. Did he himself not point out that the outstanding characteristic of the original charismatic leader was the ability to win people over to serve a supra-personal cause he had made his own? The pacifist and socialist political leaders with demagogic skills of Weber’s time also devoted themselves to a higher cause and convinced others to follow them in serving this cause. It is illuminating that Weber could not deny Kurt Eisner, whom he regarded as a typical exponent of the ethic of conviction, the status of a charismatic leader. In Economy and society, he points out that the sociologist has to treat a variety of leaders as endowed with charisma. After mentioning some examples to illustrate this variety of charismatic leaders, he adds: “Finally it includes the type of littérateur, such as Kurt Eisner, who is overwhelmed by his own demagogic success” (Weber 1968b: 242). There was, therefore, an even greater need for Weber not only to criticise charismatic pacifist and socialist political leaders such as Kurt Eisner, but also clearly to distinguish from such leaders the charismatic political leader who acknowledges the distinctive nature of modern politics and knows how to make effective use of the

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bureaucratic ‘machine’ of political parties and the state to further his personal political cause.13 In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to address the question: In ‘Politics as a vocation’, why did Weber depict the ethic in accordance with which the modern political leader he favoured conducts politics specifically as the ethic of responsibility? There is, however, an intriguing preliminary and more basic question that also needs to be answered with regard to this speech: Why did Weber find it necessary to couch the discussion of the distinctive characteristics and approach of the type of political leader appropriately attuned to modern politics in terms of ethics? In his other works on politics he did not need the reference to ethics in characterising such a political leader. More importantly, as we have seen, in these works he rather often expressed his personal disapproval of any approach to modern politics that is based on moral considerations. His strong criticism of the grounding of modern politics on moral values would seem to imply that he regarded politics and ethics as two autonomous spheres that should be kept apart. It was his personal view that modern politics should serve the attainment of goals based on cultural values rather than on ethical values. Is it possible to reconcile Weber’s denouncement of the grounding of politics on moral values with his depiction of the approach to politics of his favoured type of political leader as one in accordance with the ethic of responsibility? Or are we faced here with an inner and irresolvable contradiction in Weber’s political thought? I am of the opinion that Weber did not contradict himself. It is the case, rather, that he attached different meanings to the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ when he criticised making ethical values the foundation of modern politics and when he promoted the ethic of responsibility as the appropriate ethical approach to such politics. When he criticised the use of ethics in politics, he was referring to a specific and distinctive type of values that originated from the Christian religion and has, in the case of the Western world, been to a large extent retained in a secularised form. Although for a long time in the Western world, while the Christian religion still had dominance, these typical ethical or moral values had priority in all walks of life, Weber clearly thought that they had, as a result of the differentiation of social spheres, lost their validity in social orders like politics and the economy. These social orders have adopted their own independent and distinctive sets of values. It is not that the typical ethical or moral values of Western tradition have completely lost their validity. Their function and scope have changed, however. In late modernity their sole function is to provide guidance to particular individual persons or groups of people on how they should live their personal lives and on what they should do. Trying to apply such ethical or moral 13  Dirk Kaesler suggests: “It was especially his experiences in America that led Max Weber to the conceptualisation of the (plebiscite) leader democracy with machine […]” (Kaesler 2014: 634, tr. from the German).



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values to, for example, politics would not only be inappropriate, but also to no avail. When it comes to Weber’s endorsement of the ethic of responsibility, I am of the opinion that we have to turn to a second, a more subjective use of the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’, which became more prominent in his later works. Here these terms are used to refer to a way of life qualified by a typical attitude over against values. Any action of the individual that correlates with this way of life seems to be regarded by Weber as ‘ethical’. This use of the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ is closely related to the ideal of personality that was for him a modern alternative for the older humanist ideal of Bildung that, in his opinion, had become obsolete in modern societies. As we have seen, the ideal of personality entails for him the two formal elements of the subjugation of the affective self and the transformation of the character of the individual through the discipline of the calling to ultimate values. This merely formal sense of personality is given content by the specific ultimate values or causes the individual embraces. When the individual tenaciously subordinates and devotes himself to these self-chosen values or causes, whether they are ethical (in the traditional Western sense) or cultural in nature, he becomes a personality. I am of the opinion that for Weber, in his later life, to be a personality in this sense is the ethical ideal. Thus, to live your life consistently in accordance with self-chosen ultimate values  – whatever the nature of these ultimate values – is for him to live an ethical life. What qualifies this way of life and the actions that follow from it as ‘ethical’ is thus not so much the specific nature of the ultimate values or causes the individual has embraced, but, rather, the attitude of devotion and subjugation to these values or causes.

4. Conclusion It has become clear in this chapter that the formulation of the ethic of responsibility in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is the outcome of the development of Weber’s thought on ethics and politics over a long period. In the course of time, he became convinced that the disenchantment of life and the differentiation of autonomous social orders, as a result of rationalisation in the Western world, have profound implications for the way ethics should be conceived and politics be conducted in late modernity. The fundamental questions of ethics, as formulated by Tolstoy – ‘How should we live? What should we do?’ – can only be answered adequately if we take into account that traditional Christian morality, even in its secularised guise, no longer has priority in a social order such as politics. In Weber’s opinion, the dominant cultural values of a particular nation have a much larger guiding role to play in politics. He was also under the impression that the lives of professional people are to a large extent stamped by the social order in which they make a living. This moved him to conceive ethics in a new way: to live an ethical life in

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late modernity was no more to live in accordance with the same traditional moral values in all orders of life, but to choose as personal ultimate values the values constitutive of the particular social order you are professionally involved in, and to be a personality by diligently devoting yourself to these ultimate values. Thus, already before he gave his ‘Politics as a vocation’ speech, Weber drew the outlines of a professional virtue ethics. One could also deduce from his other writings the form an appropriate ethics of action would have to take, in his opinion. Weber was, however, of the opinion that living an ethical life, in politics specifically, was severely hindered by the on-going process of bureaucratisation in Western nations. Not only did bureaucratisation severely curtail the freedom of the individual citizen, but it also allocated a role to government officials completely attuned to instrumental rationality, thus making them unsuitable candidates for ethical renewal in politics. Therefore, Weber increasingly focussed his expectations on the charismatic political leader who could sway the voters to endorse her political vision, based on the ultimate values chosen by her. This charismatic political leader should, at the same time, have intimate knowledge of the machinery of politics and the effective means needed to set the course of a nation and successfully realise political goals.

Chapter 4

Towards an adequate interpretation 1. Introduction The cursory nature of Weber’s exposition of the ethic of responsibility in ‘Politics as a vocation’ compelled us – in our effort to arrive at an adequate interpretation – not only to examine factors internal to the text of this speech, but also external factors. In Chapter 1, attention was given to relevant historical events in Germany, but also, more specifically, in Munich, immediately preceding the speech. Account was taken of the fact that ‘Politics as a vocation’ formed part of a lecture series on ‘Intellectual labour as a vocation’ and was preceded by another of Weber’s famous speeches, ‘Science as a vocation’. A brief discussion was devoted to the content, rhetorical style and academic categorising of ‘Politics as a vocation’. Resemblances and differences between this speech and ‘Science as a vocation were also identified. A sketch followed of Weber’s personal characteristics and the formative relationships in his life. In Chapter 3, an effort was made to reconstruct Weber’s view on ethics from scattered remarks made in many of his other works. And, finally, in the same chapter I provided a brief outline of both his sociological and personal views on politics, and pointed out the close correlation between these two sets of political views. We are now in a position to conduct a thorough critical assessment of the major interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility introduced in Chapter 2. The first part of this chapter is devoted to such a critical assessment. In the second part, I  endeavour to provide an adequate interpretation of this ethic, taking as point of departure the following question: What significance can be attributed to Weber’s designation, ‘ethic of responsibility’? Is his use of the term ‘responsibility’ here of the essence, or rather of no consequence? An answer will be provided by both taking account of the emerging importance of the concept of responsibility in Western philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century and analysing the role of this concept in Weber’s own work. This leads to a brief exposition of my interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility as a secondorder normative ethical approach. Finally, some of the resemblances between Weber’s approach to ethics and that of the philosophers of the so-called via media are pointed out.

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2.  A critical assessment of the major interpretations 2.1.  Lothar Waas Lothar Waas denounces the view that Weber promoted the ethic of responsibility as the appropriate political ethics. In his view, Weber, in his discussion of the distinction of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, rather provides a sketch of the two dominant existing approaches to political ethics in the Western world. The ‘ethic of conviction’ is Weber’s depiction of the idealistic deontological approach, and the ‘ethic of responsibility’ his depiction of the realist teleological or utilitarian approach. According to this interpretation, the ‘ethic of responsibility’ thus denotes nothing more than an ideal type introduced by Weber in his description of approaches to political ethics in the Western world. In Chapter 1, a case was already argued against the view that ‘Politics as a vocation’ can be equated with a sociological lecture in which a purely descriptive exposition of Western politics is provided. It should be regarded, rather, as a ‘speech’ in which Weber both challenges unacceptable views on the profession of politician and gives professional ethical advice to his student audience. In the process, he makes provocative use of factual knowledge to question false assumptions, but also openly criticises certain developments regarding the profession of politician, especially in Germany, and gives advice on the virtues the politician should exhibit and the right ethical approach to political decision-making. Waas falls into the trap of regarding ‘Politics as a vocation’ as a sociological lecture, on account of the long first part of the written version in which Weber makes use of sociological definitions, distinctions and descriptions. As a result, he does not take adequate notice of the distinctive rhetorical characteristics and the professional ethical purport of ‘Politics as a vocation’. The first argument on which Waas rests his case against the view that Weber favoured the ethic of responsibility as political ethics is that, right at the beginning of ‘Politics as vocation’, Weber warns his student audience that he will only meet their expectations to take a stand on political developments in Germany in ‘purely a formal way’. That it was not Weber’s intention to provide a political ethical evaluation of topical political issues based on a substantive political ethics in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is an obvious conclusion. Weber made this clear by adding that “all questions concerning the brand of politics one ought to practice, which is to say the content one ought to give to one’s political activity,” would be completely excluded from the speech (Weber 1994a: 309). What Waas conveniently ignores, however, is that Weber does say that he will take a stand “in response to particular questions concerning the significance of political action within our conduct of life as a whole” (Weber 1994a: 309). What exactly this formal stand entails is something that I will explore further in this chapter. As this point I only want to stress that these words clearly indicate that Weber intended to go beyond mere



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description and to venture into normative territory. The conclusion that Weber intended to formulate and recommend to the students an ethical approach to politics that was different from current political ethical approaches in not being substantive, but formal, is in my opinion, more in line with the opening remark in the speech than Waas’s conclusion. Waas’s second argument is that, taken together, Weber’s remarks that the two ethics depart “from two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims” and that it is not possible to prescribe to someone whether he “should act as ethicist of conviction or ethicist of responsibility” also point to the conclusion that he did not promote the ethic of responsibility. Undeniably, Weber emphasised, not only in ‘Politics as a vocation’ but also in other works, that the ultimate values on which people base their ethical decisions depend on their worldview (Weltanschauung). The choice of ultimate values and, for that matter, material ethics, is thus a matter of faith. Thus, no rational demonstration of the universal validity of the principles on which one’s material ethics is based can be provided. It is not viable, therefore, to prescribe one’s own principles or material ethics to other people on account of the claim that they are universally valid on rational grounds. However, one cannot conclude from this that Weber did not have his own preferences regarding ultimate values and did not propagate these ultimate values in public. One only has to read Weber’s political speeches to see how strongly he both expressed and promoted commitment to the cause of German nationalism. Although he denied that the universal validity of such a cause could be rationally demonstrated, he clearly believed that arguments could be presented to defend it and persuade other people of its validity. The charismatic political leader in particular has the ability to convince people to accept the ultimate values and political goals he propagates, and make them their own. Neither can one conclude that Weber had no preference for the ethic of responsibility and did not try, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, to convince his student audience that an approach to politics based on this ethic is more appropriate in late modernity than one based on the ethic of conviction. Indeed, everything points to the fact that Weber was appealing to the students to adopt an ethic of responsibility approach to politics. He did this, amongst other things, by ridiculing the politically disastrous consequences of the ethic of conviction approach, and by arguing that the legitimate use of power and violence in politics makes the consideration of foreseeable consequences in political decision-making desirable or even indispensable. Waas argues that ‘ethic of responsibility’ is nothing but another name for ‘ethic of success’ (Erfolgsethik), the ethic discussed in the publications of Weber’s neoKantian contemporaries, Heinrich Rickert and Paul Hensel, and to which he also referred in some of his earlier works. Waas does not, however, provide a satisfactory explanation for why Weber did not stick to the widely used name for this ethic in ‘Politics as a vocation’, instead finding it necessary to introduce a

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new name. He argues that Weber found it necessary to change the name due to the negative associations of ‘success ethic’ with utilitarianism, which most German academics, including Weber himself, denounced, and with the Realpolitik of Wilhelm II, which he personally detested. But if Weber did not like what the term ‘success ethic’ actually referred to, it is not clear what he might have hoped to gain from a mere change of name. Neither can Waas explain why Weber specifically made use of the term ‘responsibility’ in his designation of this ethic. In fact, his insistence that, for Weber, the agent of the ethic of conviction does not act less responsibly than the agent of the ethic of responsibility and that the feeling of responsibility is therefore the common factor the two ethics share, renders Weber’s use of the designation ‘ethic of responsibility’ rather puzzling.

2.2.  Nicholas Gane and Hans-Peter Müller Whereas Waas takes as point of departure Weber’s remark about the irreconcilability of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, Gane and Müller are guided by the following remark at the end of ‘Politics as a vocation’: “They are complementary to one another, and only in combination do they produce the true human being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” (Weber 1994a: 367–368). They therefore conclude that, for Weber, the politician who can combine the two ethics in his decision-making is the ideal politician. In Müller’s words: For Weber, the politician who is inspired by the ethic of conviction, but disciplined by the ethic of responsibility, is not only an ideal type, but the ideal of political professional ethics. It is one thing, however, to assert that for Weber the ideal politician is one who combines the two ethics, but quite another to demonstrate convincingly how, according to Weber, this could be achieved. In my opinion, both Gane and Müller fail to do that. The emphasis in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is clearly on the two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims followed by the two ethics, so that Weber’s remark about the complementarity at the end of the speech comes as quite a surprise. All the proponents of the ethic of conviction discussed by Weber exhibit a resolute intention, in all their political decisions, to remain absolutely faithful to their convictions, and to take no foreseeable negative consequences of their course of action into consideration. In contrast, the proponent of the ethics of responsibility is someone who always takes foreseeable consequences seriously when making political decisions. This gives rise to the critical question: How can one and the same politician both follow an ethical approach to political decision-making in which convictions are absolutised and consequences completely ignored and one in which due consideration is consistently given to foreseeable consequences? Müller tries to overcome the problem by asserting that, for Weber, the ethic of conviction is the appropriate political ethics in the revolutionary phase of politics, while the ethic of responsibility is



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proper to the conventional phase. He does not, however, explain how and when the transition from the one ethic to the contrasting one should take place. Nor does he explain how his view could be reconciled with Weber’s severe criticism of the ethic of conviction approach in ‘Politics as a vocation’ at a time of revolutionary fervour, following the end of World War I. Gane attempts to strengthen the case for the complementarity of the two political ethics by arguing that there is a close correlation between them as ideal types of political action and the ideal types of rational social action outlined by Weber in Economy and society. The type of value-rational orientation gives rise to an ethic of conviction, while the type of pure instrumental-rational orientation gives rise to an ethic of responsibility. As such, neither of the two ethics on its own is appropriate for orienting political action, the ethic of conviction on account of its fundamentalism and the ethic of responsibility for its extreme Realpolitik. The conclusion seems inevitable that Weber could not have preferred the ethic of responsibility, but would rather have regarded the combination of the two ethics as the appropriate ethical approach to politics. In my opinion Gane, by correlating the ethic of responsibility with pure instrumental-rationality, is guilty of over-simplification. Weber, in contrasting the ethic of responsibility with the ethic of conviction in ‘Politics as a vocation’, clearly states that the first-named ethic does not mean “the absence of principled conviction” (Weber 1994a: 360). What Weber is implying, then, is that in spite of its stronger instrumental-rational orientation – in comparison to the ethic of conviction – the ethic of responsibility, as visualised by him, is also based on ultimate values. Such a conclusion is in line with Weber’s insistence, in his discussion of the two ideal types of rational action in Economy and society, that a purely instrumental-rational orientation in real-life social action is seldom found. “The orientation of action wholly to the rational achievement of ends without relation to fundamental values is […] essentially only a limiting case” (Weber 1968b: 26). It seems much more likely, then, that Weber formulated the ethic of responsibility to correlate with the optimal combination of value-rational and instrumental-rational action, rather than formulating it to correlate with the limiting case of pure instrumental action. If the ethic of responsibility should be interpreted as combining an instrumental-rational orientation with a value-rational one, there is no basis for arguing that Weber regarded the combination of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility as the appropriate ethical approach to political decisionmaking. The likely conclusion is that, for Weber, the appropriate combination of an active stand for particular ultimate values, which was for him a prerequisite for genuine ethical action, and the consideration of consequences, which was for him a prerequisite for successful political action, was part and parcel of the ethic of responsibility. Of course, this still leaves us with the question: If the interpretations of Weber’s remark about the complementarity of the ethic of conviction and the

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ethic of responsibility advanced by Gane and Müller are not satisfactory, how, then, should it be interpreted? Later in this chapter an attempt will be made to provide a more satisfactory interpretation, which will have to do justice to both the strong contrast Weber poses between the two ethics and his severe criticism of the ethic of conviction approach to politics.

2.3.  Peter Breiner In Breiner’s opinion, in ‘Politics as a vocation’ Weber, on account of his understanding of politics in terms of power as its means, thus independently of its goals, strives to conceptualise a political ethics that is also independent of any substantive goals, thus of a purely formal nature. He does it by testing, for their suitability as formal political ethics, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. The ethic of conviction, as the perfect translation of value rationality into politics, does not pass Weber’s test as, in not taking consequences into account, it ignores the prudential lessons of the sociology of power and domination governing modern politics. Only the ethic of responsibility passes the test, because it corresponds to the particular purposive reason appropriate to political action in the modern state, and encompasses responsibility for the consequences of using political power. The ethic of responsibility can thus be depicted as ‘consequentialist’ or, more accurately, as ‘situated consequentialism’, because it depends on the political situation which consequences are picked as relevant. In my opinion Breiner makes out a convincing case that for Weber the ethic of conviction approach is unsuitable for modern politics, and thus has to be substituted by the ethic of responsibility approach. In not recognising the centrality of the exercise of power and of purposive or instrumental rationality in modern politics, and in refusing to take the consequences of the politician’s decisions for the successful attainment of his political goals into account, the ethic of conviction approach disqualifies itself. To some extent, Breiner’s sketch of the ethic of responsibility as the appropriate formal political ethics in modern politics can also be commended. First of all, he recognises that Weber does not intend to provide a substantive political ethics and rightly locates the formal nature of the ethic of responsibility in the fact that no specific political goals based on a specific ultimate value are promoted. He also provides a thorough and helpful description of the foreseeable consequences the political leader acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility has to take account of. He stresses that, for Weber, these consequences depend on the existential situation in which the politician finds himself, both in a micro and macro sense. Without denying the centrality of instrumental rationality, consequences, and the role the given situation plays in Weber’s exposition of the ethic of responsibility, one may ask whether Breiner’s depiction is an accurate one. First of all, one may ask whether the ethic of responsibility is a normative ethics that fits



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nicely into the broader category of ‘consequentialism’. Breiner himself is aware of the fact that this ethic differs in important ways from other major examples of ‘consequentialism’. He denies that it is consequentialist in the utilitarian sense of appealing to an impartial ranking of preferences or a general balance of overall happiness. One can add that the most important difference between the ethic of responsibility and all the major examples of normative ethical theories classified as consequentialist or teleological is that no specific substantive ultimate value is taken as point of departure. No rational arguments are presented to defend the choice of such a substantive ultimate value, and no specific ethical principles or norms are rationally deducted and justified with reference to its contribution to the attainment of such an ultimate value. In other words, the typical feature of consequentialist normative ethical theories, of providing an adequate ethical justification of actions or principles in terms of the consequences they have for the attainment of a specific ultimate value, which in turn can be rationally justified, is lacking in the case of the ethic of responsibility. Therefore it can hardly be depicted as ‘consequentialist’ in the full sense of the word. Secondly, one may also ask whether the qualification, ‘situated’, is justified. Breiner adds this qualification to express the determining role of the given situation, or more precisely, the description of the given situation, in deciding which consequences are relevant and have to be taken into account in making political decisions. In doing this, however, he provides an incomplete picture of Weber’s account of the factors involved in deciding which consequences have to be taken seriously. For Weber, it is not so much the given situation, or the accurate description of this situation, that on its own determines which consequences count, but, rather, the interplay of the ultimate values the political leader brings into the situation, and his analysis of the situation that does that. What have to be taken account of are the consequences that available options for action in a particular political situation could have for the successful attainment of political goals based on the ultimate values of the political leader. The pivotal role played in this regard by the ultimate values of the political leader may thus not be left out of the picture. This pivotal role is not reflected in the qualification, ‘situated’, that Breiner adds to his depiction of the ethic of responsibility as ‘consequentialism’. Breiner does not stop with a description of the ethic of responsibility. He goes further than the other interpreters by also claiming that Weber’s denouncement of socialists and proponents of direct democracy depends on certain substantive assumptions, the first being his rejection of a collective concept of autonomy in favour of a will-centred concept of individual freedom. He also believes that Weber’s view regarding the impossibility of uniting mass politics and self-determining freedom provides a clue for understanding his reconciliation of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. Weber’s remark on the complementarity of the two ethics, in his opinion, refers to the political actor, acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility, who accepts the necessity of not

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pursuing ideals that seek to realise a self-determining freedom beyond the logic of political struggle and domination in the state, in order not to discredit such ideals in the future. In the end, Breiner goes still one step further by asserting that, for Weber, the only convictions that are reconcilable with an ethic of responsibility are a commitment to vocational politics subject to a substantive commitment to the nation. In my opinion, Breiner’s view on the dependence of Weber’s ethic of responsibility on certain substantive convictions and his explanation of Weber’s remark on the complementarity of the two ethics are not only unnecessarily complicated, but also not convincing. First of all, it does not make sense to regard the calling to politics, and thus a professional commitment to politics, as one of the distinctive convictions on which the ethic of responsibility is based. Weber never asserted that only the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility has a calling to politics. One could, of course, argue that to have such a calling for him involves that one should take seriously the nature of modern politics, for example, its acceptance of power and violence as legitimate means. One could thus argue that Weber thought that politicians acting in accordance with the ethic of conviction are not willing to think through the implications of having a calling to politics. But one cannot assert that he denied them a calling to politics. Secondly, it needs to be said that there is a decisive difference between asserting that Weber’s view of the ethic of responsibility relates to some of his personal substantive convictions and asserting that it depends on such convictions, as Breiner wants us to believe. In the previous chapter, it was already pointed out that Weber never denied that his own sociological views relate to his personal convictions. We noted, for example, the often-close correlation between his sociological views and his personal views on politics. In arguing in support of his sociological views, however, he diligently avoided proving these views by appealing directly to his personal convictions. He always attempted to provide evidence based on empirical research. Although Weber, in his exposition of the ethic of responsibility, goes further than just providing sociological analysis, by also arguing that the ethic of responsibility approach to politics is more appropriate in modern politics than the one based on the ethic of conviction, I am of the opinion that something similar is true in this case. It cannot be denied that there is a certain correlation between his view on the ethic of responsibility and his personal convictions, based on aristocratic individualism and nationalism. One can even go so far as to conclude that, in propagating the ethic of responsibility, he clearly wanted to create room for the promotion of these two value-based convictions in politics. But what one cannot say is that his view on the ethic of responsibility depends on these personal convictions, in that one can only accept the ethic of responsibility on the basis of Weber’s enumerated personal convictions. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, he never appeals to either of these convictions to argue his case for the ethic of responsibility. His argument in favour of this ethic



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depends, rather, on a sociological analysis of the nature of modern politics and the role-players involved, a demonstration of the inappropriateness of the ethic of conviction approach and the identification of the features of a more appropriate approach in modern politics. His appeal to those students who wanted to follow a career in politics to follow an ethic of responsibility approach is built entirely on this line of argumentation, and not on his personal convictions regarding aristocratic individualism and nationalism. There is something odd in Breiner’s explanation of Weber’s remark on the complementarity of the two ethics. If the ethic of responsibility were based on the rejection of a collective concept of autonomy and the acceptance of a willbased concept of individual freedom, why would the proponent of such an ethic ever be involved in a situation where he has to accept the necessity of having, but not pursuing, ideals that seek to realise a collective self-determining freedom? Would the proponent of the ethic of responsibility not have rejected such ideals from the outset? In any case, if the ethic of responsibility is not necessarily based on the substantive assumptions Breiner identifies, the possibility of explaining Weber’s remark on the complementarity of the two ethics in terms of these substantive assumptions also falls away.

2.4.  Wolfgang Wieland The focus of Wieland’s discussion of the ethic of responsibility is on finding an answer to the question of whether responsibility can serve as a new fundamental principle in ethics, as some contemporary proponents of the ethic of responsibility claim. In order to do this, he critically discusses two characteristics of the agent of the ethic of responsibility that most present-day proponents of this ethic accentuate, but are already found in Weber’s exposition. The one is the responsibility the agent exhibits to stand in for the consequences of the actions she is taking. Wieland comes to the rather negative conclusion that personally standing in for the consequences of one’s actions cannot serve as a fundamental ethical principle in contemporary societies. In his discussion of the other characteristic, which associates responsibility with the justification of actions in terms of foreseeable consequences, he comes to the conclusion that Weber’s ethic of responsibility can be interpreted as a variant of utilitarian ethics. The claim that the ethic of responsibility provides a new foundation for normative ethics thus has to be questioned. Wieland nonetheless believes that today the ethic of responsibility still has a valuable role to play in applied ethics, as ‘an ethics of the second front’. We have to concur with Wieland’s view that ‘personally standing in for the consequences of one’s actions’ cannot serve as the foundational first-level principle of a new ethic of responsibility. The German philosopher Kurt Bayertz – to whom Wieland also refers – has, in my opinion, convincingly argued that responsibility could only function as a second-level principle. Whether it is used in a retrospective

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or prospective sense, it always presupposes a first-level principle (Bayertz 1995: 65–66). I can only be accused of being morally responsible for a certain negative outcome if it can be shown that I transgressed a recognised moral principle or norm. And I am only morally responsible to ensure a positive outcome if a moral principle or norm is provided in terms of which I ought to strive to attain the positive outcome. But what about Wieland’s view that, on account of the association of responsibility with the justification of actions in terms of foreseeable consequences, Weber’s ethic of responsibility can be interpreted as a variant of utilitarian ethics? In my opinion, Wieland, in distinguishing sharply between taking into account foreseeable consequences in determining the content of norms and justifying actions in terms of such consequences, and in denying that the first distinguishes the ethic of responsibility from the ethic of conviction, already deviates from Weber’s sketch of these two ethics in ‘Politics as a vocation’. Wieland’s assertion that taking the consequences of action into account in the first sense is one of the elementary requirements of practical wisdom also respected by the ethic of conviction stands in contrast to Weber’s description of this ethic as one that strictly obeys action commands implicit in ultimate values, and does not take any consequences into account when deciding what to do. Wieland, in his discussion of the ethic of responsibility, steers the attention away from ethical decision-making in specifically politics to the more general normative ethical issue of the justification of actions and norms. The impression is given that Weber’s main aim in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is to express and substantiate his preference for a specific normative ethical theory regarding the justification of actions and norms. In my opinion, this is anything but the case. Weber’s main concern in ‘Politics as a vocation’ is, rather, with the appropriate ethical approach to political decision-making. Part of the issue is clearly for him: Should the foreseeable consequences of political options for action be taken into account when deciding what to do, that is, when deciding on the content of actions and norms, or not? It is conspicuous that Wieland, in presenting his case that Weber’s ethic of responsibility is a variant of utilitarianism, provides an extremely downscaled and abbreviated account of utilitarianism. The utilitarianism compared with the ethic of responsibility is one in which ‘utility’ is no longer the non-moral goal to which ethical actions should be directed. In fact, it is one that does not select and justify a particular ultimate non-moral goal, but can be reconciled with any theory of non-moral value judgements. Leaving aside the question of whether contemporary proponents of utilitarianism would find this sketch of utilitarianism convincing, one may ask whether such an abbreviated utilitarianism could still be regarded as a full-scale normative ethical theory. Wieland himself concludes that what this abbreviated utilitarianism and Weber’s ethic of responsibility have in common is that both are based, not only on consequences, but also on ultimate values that need not be ethically evaluated in turn. In other words, in both, the



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consideration of foreseeable consequences can only provide partial, incomplete justification of actions and norms. It can only demonstrate to what extent actions and norms comply with, or contribute to, the attainment of a particular ultimate value or set of ultimate values. Full justification of such actions and norms will be attained only when adequate justification is also provided for the ultimate value, or set of ultimate values, on which they are based. As this is something both the abbreviated utilitarianism and Weber’s ethic or responsibility do not provide, neither can be regarded as full-scale normative ethical theories, at least not in the sense of providing adequate justification for first-order ethical principles and norms. In my opinion, there is an important difference between the abbreviated utilitarianism sketched by Wieland and Weber’s ethic of responsibility. The abbreviated utilitarianism works with non-moral goals handed to it and establishes which options for action have the best chance of attaining these goals. It does not decide, in any way, on the ultimate values on which the goals are based. The agent of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, however, also has to decide on the ultimate values on which political goals are based. It is not that the agent first has to provide justification for his ultimate values. Rather, it is that, as a result of disenchantment and the differentiation of social spheres in modernity, she is faced with a plurality of ultimate values that all claim validity and vie for recognition. Thus, the agent of the ethic of responsibility, as Wieland himself concurs, has to take responsibility for the fundamental choice of an ultimate goal, as well as the realisation of this ultimate goal. Regarding Wieland’s relegation of the ethic of responsibility to the relatively new branch of applied ethics I would like to make two remarks. The first is that, in so doing, he undermines his initial sharp distinction between taking consequences into account in determining the content of norms and in justifying norms, and his assertion that the focus of the ethic of responsibility is on the justification of norms. He denies applied ethics the task of justification, because that is a task already completed by general ethics when applied ethics starts to do its work. The work of applied ethics is to choose specific goals, delimit regions of activities and develop action strategies to optimise consequences. In a more sophisticated and systematic way, it is doing what the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom in the tradition of ethics was supposed to do, namely to concretise ethical principles. This is the same field in which, in Wieland’s opinion, the ethic of responsibility has a meaningful role to play. By identifying with a given ultimate goal and its enhancement, and by taking into account all the means needed and all the foreseeable consequences, it can enhance decision-making on the right actions in concrete situations. With that, Wieland is placing the emphasis regarding the ethic of responsibility exactly where Weber did in his exposition of this ethic in ‘Politics as a vocation’: on the role it plays as appropriate ethical approach in decision-making in social orders such as politics.

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My second remark is that, although I agree with Wieland that the ethic of responsibility has a positive role to play with regard to applied ethics, I wonder whether he provides an adequate account of this role. Is it really the case that, in applied ethics, ethical principles passed on to it by general ethics are simply applied to typical issues in a particular social order? Does it not also have to deal with values, principles, and rules that are social-order-specific and are sometimes in competition with ethical principles? Even if we cannot agree with Weber that such sphere-specific values are always in opposition to ethical values, and that we always have to choose between them, it could hardly be denied that applied ethics often has to deal with tensions between the different types of values that apply. In providing guidelines on how the relation between social-order-specific nonmoral and ethical values should be handled and how the selection of applicable values could responsibly be made the ethic of responsibility could provide a valuable service to applied ethics.

2.5.  H. H. Bruun According to Bruun, Weber, in his discussion of the distinction between the ethic or conviction and the ethic of responsibility, is providing an answer to the question whether political actions should be guided by teleological considerations, or only by axiological considerations. Common to the three variants of the ethic of conviction Weber discusses, is scepticism of teleological considerations. The ethic of responsibility, on the one hand, shares with the ethic of conviction a ‘goal responsibility’: the responsibility of the politician for the maintenance of the goal. This is what sets politicians guided by these two ethics apart from both pure power politicians and government officials. On the other hand, the proponent of the ethic of responsibility also acknowledges a responsibility for the consequences of his actions, both in the ‘passive’ and ‘active’ sense. As an ‘active’ responsibility, i. e., a responsibility for the state of the world that can only be exercised by means of political power, this responsibility can be called ‘power responsibility’. Like Breiner Bruun is of the opinion that Weber favoured the ethic of responsibility as the ethic of politics. However, he is of the opinion that Weber, on the basis of his principle of value freedom, could not, and also did not, demand that the politician should accept the ethic of responsibility and no other ethic. Rather, he used scientific analysis of the characteristics of the sphere of politics, and of the consequences of political behaviour based on the two ethics, to point out that the ethic of responsibility fulfils the conditions of the sphere of politics. It can therefore be depicted as an ethic attuned to the political sphere. In Bruun’s opinion, Weber, near the end of ‘Politics as a vocation’, narrows down the options for the politician to two ethics of conviction: the pure ethic of conviction, which completely refuses responsibility for actions, and the responsible ethic of conviction. The proponent of the last-named ethic accepts responsibility for



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the external consequences of his actions, but does not always act in accordance with such responsibility. Rather, he sometimes acts in accordance with axiological considerations, in being willing to let himself be guided in certain cases by the value axioms of other spheres. Bruun’s thorough analysis of Weber’s distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is to be appreciated in more than one respect. He convincingly demonstrates that the proponent of the ethic of responsibility, on account of her commitment to the attainment of external goals and willingness to take into account the actual consequences of the available means, needs comprehensive knowledge of both the empirical and axiological dimensions of the world. He also makes a number of helpful distinctions regarding the two ethics, for example, between the religious-acosmistic, the pacifist-political, and the radical-revolutionary variants of the ethic of conviction, as well as between the passive and active, and the goal and power, responsibilities that form part of the ethic of responsibility. In his discussion of the different variants of the ethic of conviction, Bruun provides an explanation for why Weber also regards radical-revolutionary politicians as proponents of the ethic of conviction. As we have already noticed in the discussion of Breiner’s interpretation, it seems rather puzzling that Weber classifies them as such, since they for the most part do recognise the legitimate use of power and violence in politics, and set themselves political goals towards which they actively strive. Bruun’s explanation is that Weber regards them as proponents of the ethic of conviction because they act on the supposition that evil means employed in a good cause will be absolved of their negative sideeffects. In doing this, they do not engage in a real teleological value analysis but, like proponents of the other variants of the ethic of conviction, replace it by axiological considerations. In my opinion, one has to pinpoint more precisely than Bruun does the feature that for Weber qualifies radical revolutionists as proponents of the ethic of conviction. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, the apocalyptic tendency to resort, out of frustration, to a ‘once off’ and ‘final’ implementation of violence to bring about a condition of lasting peace and justice is not something that sets the radical-revolutionary variant apart from the other variants of the ethic of conviction. It is, rather, a tendency all of them share. Is the reason Weber classifies the radical-revolutionary approach as ethic of conviction not, rather, that in his opinion proponents have a blind faith in very specific means, and thus do not really take into account the suitability of such means for successfully achieving their goals in the given circumstances? Weber’s sharp criticism of Robert Michels’s blind belief “that every strike works in the direction postulated by socialism” points to such an interpretation (letter to Michels, February, 19, 1909: 1994d: 61, tr. from the German). The proponent of the radical-revolutionary variant thus differs from the proponents of other variants of the ethic of conviction in that she is willing to implement genuine political

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means, and does not denounce them in the name of moral convictions. However, she does share with them the tendency to absolutise a particular course of action as the only intrinsically right one. Bruun must be given credit for being the first of the interpreters discussed in this book to recognise that Weber differentiates between a ‘passive’ and an ‘active’ responsibility. According to him, both are part of the responsibility for consequences that forms the core of Weber’s definition of the ethic of responsibility. The ‘passive’ responsibility refers to the right of others to judge one’s actions according to their consequences, while the ‘active’ responsibility refers to the duty the ethic of responsibility carries of striving for set goals, making use of means adequate to the given end, while taking into account the actual consequences of the means and the relation of these consequences to the end. One might ask, however, whether the terms ‘passive’ and ‘active’ used to indicate the two responsibilities are the most appropriate. It is difficult, for example, to maintain that the politician who is willing to take the blame for the negative consequences of his actions is wholly ‘passive’. I  would argue that the terms ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective’ are more suitable, as they express the different temporal orientations at the centre of the two responsibilities. In ‘retrospective’ responsibility the orientation is to the past, to what has already been done and to the blame or praise that should be apportioned to the agent(s) involved. In ‘prospective’ responsibility the orientation is to the future, that is, to what should be done to ensure the future achievement of goals and to the requisite allocation of tasks to different role-players. It would appear to be Bruun’s view that Weber regarded both the ‘passive’ (retrospective) and ‘active’ (prospective) responsibility as distinctive of the ethic of responsibility. However, this is hardly the case, as Weber in ‘Politics as a vocation’ – and elsewhere – sharply criticises the plea of proponents of the ethic of conviction to publicly confess Germany’s guilt in instigating World War I. This indicates, first of all, that he was fully aware of the fact that proponents of the ethic of conviction propagated taking retrospective responsibility, in a specifically moral sense, for what went wrong in the past. Secondly, it clearly indicates that he had strong reservations about taking on moral blame for the negative consequences of political decisions of the past. As we have already seen in the discussion of his political views in the previous chapter, he found taking retrospective moral responsibility for the war politically dishonourable. In his opinion, the politically honourable thing would be, rather, to unapologetically stand by political decisions of the past and bravely take what comes your way as a result of these decisions. We can thus conclude that, for Weber, apart from prospective responsibility, retrospective responsibility is only distinctive of the ethic of responsibility insofar as it refers to retrospective political responsibility, which has to be sharply distinguished from retrospective moral responsibility that is rather typical of the ethic of conviction.



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In distinguishing between the goal and the power responsibilities of the proponent of the ethic of responsibility, Bruun recognises that more is at stake for Weber in the ethic of responsibility than just a responsibility for results. It also involves the responsibility for the choice, maintenance, and implementation of goals. However, what Bruun fails to recognise in his exposition of the ethic of responsibility is that, for Weber, these goals should always be based on the ultimate values of the politician. In fact, as we have seen in the discussion of Weber’s views on ethics in the previous chapter, the politician is only a personality, is only acting ethically when the political goal she sets and the political decisions she makes are based on ultimate values. This means that the most fundamental responsibility of the proponent of the ethic of responsibility is to choose her ultimate values from the conflicting value systems offered to her, to remain faithful to these ultimate values, and to strive for the implementation of them via the setting of goals. The depiction ‘responsibility for ultimate values’ would thus have been more appropriate. Bruun maintains that, with regard to goal responsibility, there is no difference between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. In a certain sense, this is true as Weber, in his depiction of the ethic of conviction, emphasises the absolute commitment of the proponent of such an ethic to particular ultimate values and the political goals based on them. However, this does not mean that proponents of the two ethics exercise this responsibility in an identical way. As we have seen in the discussion of Weber’s views on politics in the previous chapter, he was critical of the tendency of proponents of the ethic of conviction to base their political decisions purely on moral values. He would only have endorsed an approach to politics based on the ethic of responsibility if it included recognition of the fact that certain ultimate values are more suitable for the sphere of politics and in a particular historical situation than others. I am of the opinion that the main reason why Bruun finds it necessary to introduce a third, in-between, variant of political ethics, namely the responsible ethic of conviction, is that he does not take full cognisance of the ‘responsibility for ultimate values’ as part and parcel of Weber’s account of the ethic of responsibility. As he recognises only the responsibility for results and the responsibility for goals as essential elements of the ethic of responsibility, he interprets it in purely teleological terms. He thus cannot accommodate, within the ethic of responsibility, Weber’s remark about the fact that the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility sometimes finds himself in a position where he has to say: “Here I stand, I can do no other.” This remark clearly indicates that, for Weber, remaining faithful to particular ultimate values in some political situations counts more than taking consequences into account. Bruun thus introduces the responsible ethic of conviction as an ethic that in some situations gives preference to value axioms borrowed from other social spheres above pure teleological considerations to accommodate this remark. In my opinion, Bruun thereby provides

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an unnecessarily complicated reconstruction of Weber’s views that does not fit in well with Weber’s clear distinction of only two contrasting ethics. If we recognise that ‘responsibility for ultimate values’ is, for Weber, an essential part of the ethic or responsibility, a less complicated and also more convincing explanation of Weber’s remark is possible. I would argue that, in this remark, Weber anticipates a situation in which the proponent of the ethic of responsibility finds that there are no avenues left for him to successfully realise political goals based on his ultimate values. Instead of adapting and choosing ultimate values that are more realisable in the given situation, he chooses to remain faithful to his ultimate values, in the hope that the prospects for realising his ultimate values would someday become better. I believe that in the back of Weber’s mind when he made this remark was his recent realisation that his own political ideal of an internationally dominant Germany had, at least for the foreseeable future, become non-realisable. After Germany’s defeat in World War I, one could only adhere to this ideal in the manner of the ethic of conviction.

2.6.  Wolfgang Schluchter Schluchter’s interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility is elaborated in two rounds. In the first round, he provides a professional ethical reading, in which the three concepts vocation, self-limitation, and personality are linked to one another and the inter-dependent virtues that the responsible politician ought to exhibit are discussed. In the second round, he provides a normative action ethical reading, in which the ethic of responsibility is interpreted as a new type of formal normative ethic, an ethic of reflexive principle, succeeding Kant’s formal conviction ethic in late modernity. Whereas in the ethic of conviction, including Kant’s formal ethic, an action could only be justified in terms of moral conviction (its ‘conviction value’), it has, in the ethic of responsibility, also to be justified in terms of an estimation of foreseeable consequences (its ‘success value’). The maxim guiding the ethic of responsibility is: “Act according to your best conviction of your duty, and, beyond that, in such a way that you can also account for the (foreseeable) consequences of your action according to the best of your knowledge.” Whereas the ethic of conviction has a ‘bridging principle of hierarchy’, the ethic of responsibility thus has a ‘bridging principle of balance’. According to Schluchter, the ethic of responsibility is also guided by a second principle in determining conviction value itself, namely a universalising principle. This universalising principle should, however, not be equated with the universalising principle of Kant’s ethic. Whereas the universalising principle of Kant is a second-level principle used to justify maxims, the universalising principle of the ethic of responsibility is a first-level one used to critically examine maxims. It can be formulated as such: “Act as if the maxim of your will as the true expression of an individual law could always also hold as the principle of universal law.”



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In my opinion, Schluchter’s professional ethical reading of Weber’s ethic of responsibility is convincing. Weber indeed provides, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, a nominal virtue ethics for the professional politician, in which the concepts of vocation, self-limitation, and personality play a central role. One can also appreciate his very thorough and helpful examination of the three phases of the career of the distinction of the two ethics in Weber’s works. In interpreting the ethic of responsibility, one has to take into account Weber’s recognition of the autonomy of ethical imperatives and his rejection of all forms of eudaimonism. Schluchter also convincingly demonstrates that, in Weber’s earlier works, ‘panmoralism’ was the precursor of what came to be called the ‘ethic of conviction’. It makes clear that the ‘ethic of conviction’ was, to a large extent, associated with a one-sided view of moral imperatives as the only and unconditional guidelines in taking political decisions. Schluchter is also convincing in arguing that the terminological changes in the third phase involve substantive ones. Apart from the fact that, in this phase, the formal nature of the ethic of responsibility is clearly established, it is made clear that the ethic of responsibility should not be equated with a mere ‘ethic’ of adjustment to the possible and with power politics. To qualify in terms of the ethic of responsibility, a political action must have  – to use Schluchter’s helpful terminology  – both ‘conviction value’ and ‘success value’. Having said this, Schluchter’s normative action ethical reading of the ethic of responsibility as a new formal normative ethic, proposed by Weber as the successor of Kant’s formal ethic in late modernity, strikes me as less convincing. One can ask whether, in this regard, he is restricting himself to a genuine interpretation that remains faithful to what Weber says about the ethic of responsibility, or is providing, instead, a free explication or reconstruction of this ethic that goes beyond Weber. The clear impression is that Schluchter set himself the task to develop a coherent and systematic explication of Weber’s ethic of responsibility that could also be recognised today. In the process he re-interprets rather than interprets this ethic and adds elements not mentioned in Weber’s exposition. It is revealing that Schluchter assumes that Weber’s ethic of responsibility can only “be defined in a systematically satisfactory way” (1996: 86) against the backdrop of the differentiation of a formal and non-religious ethic of conviction. Schluchter has Kant’s ethic in mind when referring to the formal non-religious ethic of conviction. Kant’s formal ethic becomes the key in his interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility. In this reconstruction of Weber’s typology of ethics, Kant’s formal ethic of conviction is the highest stage in the development of ethics preceding the ethic of responsibility. He therefore takes it for granted that Weber was mainly engaged with Kant’s ethic in formulating his ethic of responsibility, taking it as model in certain respects, while adapting it in other respects to craft a normative ethics more suitable for late modernity. Based on this assumption, Schluchter portrays Weber’s ethic of responsibility as formal in the

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Kantian sense of having ‘reflexive’ principles and departing from the same view of moral duties as non-prudential and unconditional in nature. What I  find problematic about Schluchter’s interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility in a Kantian vein is, first of all, that no direct and indisputable indication can be found in ‘Politics as a vocation’ and in those earlier works crucial for understanding the emergence of this ethic, that Kant’s ethic was indeed the main formative influence. Secondly, and more importantly, one may ask whether these works do not clearly contradict some aspects of Schluchter’s interpretation. Schluchter identifies as first principle of the ethic of responsibility the ‘bridging principle of balance’ between convictional value and success values. He sees ‘convictional value’ as referring to ‘moral’ conviction in the Kantian sense of being based on a separate and autonomous set of unconditional ‘moral’ values. In his opinion, an action could only stand the test of the ethic of responsibility if it results from moral conviction in this sense of the word. This understanding of ‘convictional value’ does not, however, fit in well with Weber’s vendetta in political writings against basing political decisions on ultimate values of a moral nature that we discussed in the previous chapter. It does also not fit in well with Weber’s elevation of German nationalism to the status of ultimate value of his personal political stance. Here we have to conclude either that Weber contradicted himself, or that his understanding of ‘ethical values’ is not so Kantian after all. One can also ask how appropriate the designation ‘bridging’ is for this principle. The term seems to imply that the ethic of responsibility provides guidelines to ‘balance’, ‘correlate’, and even ‘harmonise’ moral and non-moral values in making political decisions, or decisions of a different kind. However, as we have seen in our discussion of Weber’s view on ethics in other works, he emphasised the competing, even conflicting and contradicting, nature of different value systems. Making political decisions, in his view, involves making difficult, but clear, choices between different kinds of values in different situations, rather than reconciling moral and non-moral values. Lastly, we may ask how appropriate the term ‘principle’ is in this regard. It only makes sense to call something a ‘principle’ in ethics if more specific norms can be deduced from it, or if it can be used to justify the depiction of specific norms as moral  – as in the case of Kant’s categorical imperative. It is not clear, however, how either the deduction or justification of specific norms could be achieved by means of the so-called ‘bridging principle of balance’. To mention just one problem with regard to the deduction of more specific norms from this ‘principle’: If acting in accordance with a moral conviction means unconditional compliance to it, what room is there for adapting my actions by taking account of the foreseeable consequences of my planned actions? If more clarity is not provided on how justice might be done in decision-making to both the unconditional nature of moral duties and the consideration of consequences, no specific norms can be deduced that would help to achieve the required bridging of conviction values and success values.



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Schluchter must have realised that his claim that the ethic of responsibility constitutes a full-fledged, new formal normative ethics could not be substantiated by reference to the bridging principle of balance alone. This principle is supposed to give guidance on how to facilitate between recognised moral and non-moral values. It does not, however, provide guidance regarding the choice of values that should form the basis for deciding on the right actions. One would expect a fully developed normative ethics to provide at least some guidance regarding the choice of such values. Schluchter attempts to fill this gap, in the case of the ethic of responsibility, by arguing that Weber would also have supported a first-order universalising principle that plays a critical, regulating role in the choice of values. Schluchter himself admits that one has to speculate when it comes to determining Weber’s view of the central role Kant in this regard allocates to the universalising principle. It is one thing to speculate what Weber’s views were regarding the universalising principle, but quite another to claim that one of the fundamental principles of Weber’s ethic of responsibility is nothing but a principle extracted from the results of this speculation. In my opinion, there are two main reasons why it is hard, if not impossible, to substantiate such a claim. First of all, there is absolutely no indication in ‘Politics as a vocation’, or in other writings relevant to our understanding of the evolution of the ethic of responsibility, that Weber was even thinking of proposing ‘regulative universalism’ as part and parcel of an ethics suitable to late modernity. All we know is that he opposed Kant’s idea of a ‘constitutive universalism’. Secondly, Schluchter leaves unanswered the question of how Weber’s support of a first-order universalising principle could be reconciled with his strong German nationalism, with its imperialistic overtones. In choosing an internationally powerful Germany as the ultimate value in his personal political stance, Weber was clearly not put off by the fact that this was an ultimate value that could be adopted only by German people and not by the vast majority of other people in the world. One cannot even argue that he propagated the idea that the citizens of other nations should have a similar nationalistic stance, as he denied smaller nations like Denmark and Switzerland the powerful international role of a major power like Germany. It is true that Weber criticised a fickle approach to the choice of ultimate values. In making this choice, the suitability of the options regarding ultimate values in the historical situation and the consistency with the rest of one’s own personal values should be taken account of. One should also remain faithful to the ultimate values one has chosen and should not abandon them at the first inkling of the difficulty of realising them. He could thus hardly be accused of blind decisionism when he stressed the responsibility or the individual to choose ultimate values. There is, however, little, if any, indication that he also laid down the condition that a value should only be adopted as ultimate value, in politics, for example, when it is acceptable to all other people. Schluchter goes so far as to assert that Weber’s support of the regulating universalising principle implies that his approach necessarily demands a formal critique

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of conviction in the framework of real-life value discussions (Schluchter 1996: 93). He adds that Weber, in making provision for the institutional regulation of morality, was also of the opinion that entrance into a value discussion must be free of any compulsion (Schluchter 1996: 99). One cannot overcome the suspicion that here Schluchter is reading Weber’s ethic of responsibility through the lens of Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. It is true that Weber emphasised that debates in the public sphere decided which values would be dominant in society. However, he compared such public debates to violent combats in an arena, rather that than to rational discourses free from compulsion. Which values would dominate an era is decided in a battle of words, in which some values lose public influence, while others gain public influence and become supreme (cf. Marianne Weber 1975: 325).

3.  An interpretation in terms of responsibility It is conspicuous that in none of the major interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility we discussed is responsibility considered to be the central and distinctive feature of this ethic. It is almost as if these interpreters regard the designation ‘responsibility’ as purely co-incidental, of little consequence. Perhaps the fact that, in the brief preparatory notes for his speech, Weber first wrote ‘politics of power’ (Machtpolitik), before crossing it out and writing ‘politics of responsibility’ (Verantwortungspolitik) instead, contributed to the impression that he could just as well have named this ethic differently. What definitely played a role in this regard is Weber’s admission, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, that proponents of the ethic of conviction could not be accused of a lack of responsibility. On account of this, Waas and Bruun argue that responsibility should not be regarded as a distinctive feature of the ethic of responsibility. Waas comes to the conclusion that the ‘sense of responsibility’ – one of the three ‘virtues’ of the politician listed by Weber – is not distinctive of the proponent of the ethic of responsibility, but is also shared by the proponent of the ethic of conviction (Waas 2006: 507–508). Bruun goes so far as to assert, with regard to the designation ‘ethic of responsibility’: “From a formal point of view Weber’s terminology here is […] an unfortunate one, since it does not adequately indicate where the difference from the ethic of conviction lies” (Bruun 1972: 260). Of course, it could just as well be that Weber changed the designation ‘politics of power’ to ‘politics of responsibility’ – and, as a result, ended up referring to an ‘ethic of responsibility’ and not an ‘ethic of power’  – because at some point the insight dawned on him that the ethic he preferred is qualified through and through by responsibility and could thus be described most aptly by the term ‘responsibility’. Such a possibility is not excluded by his admission that the proponent of the ethic of conviction could not be accused of a complete lack



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of responsibility. If the responsibility the proponent of the ethic of responsibility exhibits is far more comprehensive than that of the proponent of the ethic of conviction, and one could say that the ethic of responsibility is more radically qualified by responsibility than the ethic of conviction, there is much to recommend the designation Weber ultimately preferred. His implicit criticism of the ethic of conviction as irresponsible in some passages in ‘Politics as a vocation’ could then also not be regarded as contradictory, since in his opinion its proponents do not exhibit important aspects of the comprehensive responsibility acknowledged by the proponent of the ethic of responsibility. In my own interpretation, I  start out from the premise that it was not coincidental that Weber used the designation, ‘ethic of responsibility’. In my opinion, his main reason for using this designation was the realisation that this ethic is radically qualified by responsibility. However, before I set out to demonstrate the fundamental and comprehensive qualification of Weber’s ethic by responsibility, I  would first like to provide a brief sketch of how the relatively new concept of responsibility rose to prominence in Western thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This overview will show that the central place allocated to the concept of responsibility by Weber was entirely in line with the emergence of this concept already taking place in his time.

3.1.  The emergence of the concept of responsibility It is widely acknowledged that the concept of responsibility has, in the course of the twentieth century, increasingly taken a central place, not only in academic disciplines such as philosophy and political science, but also in politics, business, and even everyday life. Johannes Schwartländer expresses the consensus opinion when he points out that the word ‘responsibility’ has “[…] since gained such importance and richness of meaning that we may rightly call it a new basic term of our language […] In general consciousness responsibility has taken over the central place that duty has had up till recently. Maybe the historical change in morality is nowhere more obviously demonstrated than in the increasing curtailment, even decline, of the concept duty and the simultaneous emphasis on and enrichment in meaning of the concept responsibility” (Schwartländer 1974: 1577–1578; tr. from the German).

What makes the rapid emergence of responsibility as a central concept in the Western world so remarkable is that the English word ‘responsibility’, like the French ‘responsabilité’ and the German ‘Verantwortlichkeit’, appeared as a noun for the first time only in the final years of the eighteenth century, although the German noun ‘Verantwortung’ can be traced back to the fifteenth century. The corresponding adjectives in English, French, and German also date from earlier than the eighteenth century – but not earlier than the thirteenth century (McKeon 1957: 6–9; Bernasconi 2008: 133). The noun ‘responsibility’ is thus

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of fairly recent origin. A  clear indication that responsibility did not play any significant role in the humanities until the nineteenth century is that none of the German terms related to responsibility appear in the 1828 edition of Wilhelm Traugott Krug’s Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften. The adjective, ‘verantwortlich’, is, however, included in the supplementary volume published two years later (Bernasconi 2008: 133). In fact, sporadic systematic discussions of the concept responsibility only started to appear in philosophical writings in the second half of the nineteenth century.1 A closer analysis of the earlier uses of the terms associated with responsibility shows that such terms were, for the most part, used to replace older terms, such as ‘imputation’ and ‘accountability’ (in English) and ‘Zurechnung’ (in German), to refer to a concept that had already much earlier played a central role in legislation, but had eventually also been carried over from the legal realm into the realm of ethics (cf. Picht 1969: 318–319). In the first philosophical discussions on responsibility since the middle of the nineteenth century, conducted by Alexander Bain (1859), John Stuart Mill (1865), FH Bradley (1876) and Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1884), the word ‘responsibility’ is nothing more than a substitute for the older terms ‘imputation’ and ‘accountability’ (McKeon 1957: 6–7). As the issue of ‘accountability for past wrongs’ is an old one – already extensively discussed by Aristotle in his Nicomachean ethics – nothing new, except the use of a new term, can be traced from this retrospective understanding of responsibility. There are, however, indications that, already in the pre-twentieth century period, ‘responsibility’ developed a broader range of meaning. According to Robert Bernasconi, the development of this broader range of meaning was closely associated with the advent of representative democracy, shaped as it was by the rise of capitalism. “The radical individualism created by this new form of society destroyed the existing bonds of society and highlighted in a one-sided way the independence of each from the others. It made it necessary to formulate an answerability to others that many other forms of society have tended to take for granted” (Bernasconi 2008: 132).

Bernasconi is thus of the opinion that it was only within the context of the new institutions and pressures of bourgeois capitalism that it became necessary to articulate a notion of responsibility (Bernasconi 2008: 133). It was in France just before the French Revolution that in especially the political use made of the word ‘responsabilité’ the broader and also new meaning of this word clearly came to the fore. In Jean-Francois Feraud’s Dictionaire critique de la langue français of 1787–88, it is even asserted that a mister Necker coined the term ‘responsabilité’ in reference to the ‘responsibility of the government’. Feraud 1  In his study on the emergence of the concept of responsibility, Richard McKeon firmly states: “Prior to 1859 […] I  was able to find no philosophical treatment of responsibility” (McKeon 1957: 6–7).



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also points out that in the Journal of Geneva reference was made to the ‘responsibility of the directors’ of a company. The word ‘responsibility’ only gained currency in the wake of the French revolution, when it particularly designated the ‘responsibility of the ministers’. For example, in his speech of 14 July 1791, Mirabeau points out that it is not the king but his ministers who have the responsibility for political decisions, because the people transferred the real exercise of executive power from the king to the ministers (Stierle 1994: 853–854). In 1815 Benjamin Constant wrote an essay, “De la responsabilité des ministers,” in which the new understanding of responsibility is clearly revealed. The significance of this essay is that Constant insists on a rigorous distinction between responsibility and legal arrangements regarding accountability, thus carving out a special realm of responsibility separate from accountability. In contrast to legal accountability, responsibility is at issue only when no law is broken, but the minister exercises the executive power entrusted to him by the law. For acts executed in the legal exercise of political power, the minister thus has to answer, not to the court, but to the assembly of national representatives. Constant also emphasises that subordinate officials who act under orders legally issued by the minister have done nothing wrong, and thus cannot be held responsible for what they do. Only the minister can be held responsible for orders executed in his name (Bernasconi 2008: 134–135). In these uses of the term ‘responsibility’ is it clear that more is at stake than just retrospective responsibility regarding specific actions that contravene particular laws or moral norms. Ministers are answerable to citizens, and company directors to shareholders, regarding a broad spectrum of tasks allocated to them. ‘Responsibility’ here also has a pro-active, forward-looking connotation. Politicians and directors only act responsibly if they see to it that the tasks allocated to them are executed diligently and effectively. It is also conspicuous that ‘responsibility’ is closely associated with particular occupations. The minister, company director, and even the government official each have their own set of ‘responsibilities’. It is clear, however, that the ‘responsibilities’ of the various occupations differ in comprehensiveness and weight. Constant – like Weber later – stresses that the minister has a comprehensive responsibility regarding a wide spectrum of tasks allocated to him, to which he has to answer in his official capacity, while the government official has a much narrower occupational responsibility: to diligently execute the orders given to him by the minister. It is only when the orders given by the minister are clearly against the law that he may refuse to execute them. Thus, in the hundred and thirty years or so before Weber gave his speech, ‘Politics as a vocation’, the new term ‘responsibility’ had not only emerged to some prominence in law, politics and philosophy, but had also taken on a more comprehensive meaning. It took over the meaning of older terms such as ‘imputation’ and ‘accountability’ in law and ethics, and it could thus partly be understood as reactive, retrospective responsibility. In a more individualistic,

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anti-authoritarian, and democratic context it also took on a more pro-active, prospective, and new meaning, especially in politics, to refer to the obligation of the minister to see to it that the broad spectrum of tasks allocated to him by the assembly of the representatives of the people is executed effectively. This prospective responsibility of the political leader did not replace his retrospective responsibility, as he at some point had to answer to the assembly for the manner in which he had executed the tasks allocated to him in the past. However, the minister’s retrospective responsibility, which correlated with his prospective responsibility, was determined in the light of political, and not so much moral or criminal law, criteria. One may therefore conclude that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – in line with the increasing differentiation of social orders and specialisation – a shift away from purely moral or legal accountability to a broader political and economic responsibility was part of the development of the concept of responsibility. That such a broad and also new concept of responsibility developed in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries need not surprise us. Up till the Middle Ages, a rather static, hierarchical view of society based on natural law dominated in the Western world. The given hierarchical structures of society, with the king (or emperor) and the pope at the head of, respectively, the worldly and spiritual realms, were regarded as part of God’s creation order. In a society thus understood, a narrow concept of imputation or accountability, based on purely moral and legal duties, prescribed by the pope and the king respectively, sufficed. As there was little room for the initiative of the individual, there was also no need for a concept of pro-active or prospective responsibility. Since the Renaissance, the insight increasingly dawned that all societal structures were man-made and could be improved. This posed an enormous challenge to develop political and economic systems that would optimally improve the human condition. The development of democracy in politics and capitalism in the economy can be seen as the result of efforts to meet this challenge. Scientific inventions and technological innovations did not only open new fields of human activity, but also enormously expanded the power human beings have at their disposal to improve the human condition, or to drastically contribute to its degeneration. The expansion of the scope for human initiative brought about by all of these developments inevitably also contributed to a new awareness of the comprehensive obligation to use the available power and means to actively and effectively improve the human condition. In such a situation, the need for a new concept of responsibility, which, in the first instance, has a pro-active and prospective thrust, clearly arose. What remains to be said is that, as a result of the dominance of individualism in the Western World since the Renaissance, the individual was almost inevitably regarded as the major carrier of this predominantly prospective responsibility. At the same time, it was increasingly realised that it was impossible for an individual to take on the vast responsibility to improve human society as a whole. As a result



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the spectrum of tasks awaiting individuals was differentiated in separate social orders, each with its own nature and rules. Within the different social spheres a continuing specialisation of occupations took place, by means of which the different tasks involved were allocated to different ‘specialists’. In this way the responsibility of the individual was narrowed down to not only a responsibility of a certain type (e. g. political responsibility), but also to the role responsibility involved with a particular occupation (e. g. the responsibility of the minister or the government official), or one or the other area of jurisdiction.2 Weber’s discourse on responsibility in ‘Politics as a vocation’, but also in earlier works, clearly resonates with this history of the emergence of the concept of responsibility. Not only does he often make use of the term ‘responsibility’, but he also attaches a meaning to the term that reflects the development of the concept of responsibility in the preceding centuries. Responsibility is carried, in the first instance, by individuals: it is the charismatic political leader and not the parliament that carries the responsibility to set and realise political goals. It has a predominant prospective thrust: the political leader has the responsibility to see to it that political goals based on his ultimate value are effectively realised; the government official to see to it that the orders of the political leader are diligently executed. It is typically political and not so much moral in nature, as Weber’s denouncement of the confession of Germany’s moral guilt in instigating World War I makes clear. It is demarcated in accordance with the occupational role that a person plays in politics: comprehensive in the case of the political leader, and limited and narrow in the case of the government official. That, in the political sphere, the extent of power wielded by different political role-players correlates with the extent of their responsibility is a view that is not unique to Weber at the time. In his book Politik und Moral, published in 1917, Weber’s German contemporary, Erich Franz, writes: “The foundation of the state on the outside and on the inside is power and force. However, power includes responsibility; and the bigger the power, the heavier also the responsibility” (Franz 1917: 39; tr. from the German).

3.2.  An ethical approach fundamentally qualified by responsibility What we have established by now is that Weber’s use of the concept of responsibility, the central role he allocates to it, and his understanding of it, did not condense out of thin air, but reflects its emergence as a central concept in Western 2  Cf. Georg Picht’s discussion of the close correlation between the execution of responsibility and the demarcation of tasks in his study on ‘Der Begriff der Verantwortung’ (Eng. ‘The concept of responsibility’) in his book Wahrheit, Vernunft, Verantwortung (1969: 318–342). A central thesis of this study is: “Where-ever mention is made of responsibility, the presupposition is that our historical world has a structure that allows us to demarcate areas of responsibilities” (Picht 1969: 336; tr. from the German).

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thought. However, this does not yet answer the question: Why did he apply the concept of responsibility specifically to the ethical approach in politics he commends? The brief answer to this question is that this ethical approach is fundamentally qualified by responsibility – in two ways. That is, it is based on Weber’s conviction that, in late modernity, (a) the charismatic political leader has a special responsibility to uphold ethics in the social sphere of politics and, by doing that, also to set the ethical course of the nation, and (b) the ethical approach adopted in politics should be executed ‘responsibly’ in a comprehensive sense of the word. (a)  The special responsibility of the charismatic political leader to uphold ethics in the political sphere and to set the ethical course of the nation In Chapter 3, I discussed Weber’s view regarding the detrimental impact of the process of rationalisation on the ethical dimension of life in the Western world. According to him the disenchantment of the world and the differentiation of autonomous value spheres that resulted from it has had a twofold impact: the loss of the belief in, and experience of, an ethically meaningful cosmos, and the restriction of the freedom of individuals to conduct their lives in accordance with their own personal ultimate values. The crucial result of the loss of an ethically meaningful cosmos was that the experience of the validity of a uniform and integrated system of moral values in all spheres of life had to make way for the experience of contradictory value systems intensely vying with one another for recognition. This immensely complicated ethical life in late modernity. The individual wanting to live an ethical life was faced with the inevitable responsibility to choose between contradictory ultimate values. The restriction of the freedom to live an ethical life was, in Weber’s opinion, particularly evident in the everincreasing bureaucratic regulation of life in the political and economic spheres. Weber held that these realities of life in late modernity should be recognised in ethical thought. They should be accommodated when, for example, we reflect on the ethical considerations that ought to guide political actions. This is probably the main reason for his criticism of all efforts in his time to base politics purely on moral principles. As long as Christian morality was dominant, there was adequate consensus on the moral principles to be recognised in politics, as well as on the absolute priority such moral principles had over considerations of a purely political nature. With the demise of the dominant Christian morality, the divergence of views on the moral principles that ought to guide political actions increased; and with the differentiation of separate social orders the priority of moral principles increasingly had to make way for the social-order-specific political principles that claimed priority. To still insist, in late modernity, that politics should be based purely on moral principles was, for Weber, to ignore completely these irreversible developments.



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Why did Weber not turn to one of the major normative ethical theories of his time, for example, Kant’s deontological normative theory, based on the categorical imperative, or the utilitarian normative theory of Bentham and Mill, as an alternative for Christian morality? After all, they claimed to have overcome the growing diversity of moral convictions by providing rational justification for a universally valid morality. One of the likely reasons is that, in his opinion, they did not adequately acknowledge the severity of the fragmentation of moral values, and the extent to which the differentiation of social-order-specific value systems and the restriction of moral freedom had proceeded in late modernity. They wrongly believed that the lost universal validity of moral principles could be salvaged by a purely rational justification, and did not recognise that in the end the choice of particular ultimate values remained a matter of faith, for which the individual can provide no universal rational justification. They also believed that ethical ideals could be effectively propagated by providing convincing rational arguments and did not adequately realise, in Weber’s opinion, that “the highest and most stirring ideals can become effective for all times only in the struggle with other ideas that are just as sacred to others as our ideas are to us” (Marianne Weber 1975: 325). They still adhered to the traditional belief that moral values have absolute priority over values of a non-moral nature, and did not recognise that non-moral values have their own dignity and validity, and increasingly claimed priority in social spheres such as politics and the economy. Moreover, they naively believed that all individuals have the freedom to act strictly in accordance with his or her moral principles in all social orders, and ignored the reality that in such social orders considerations of a purely instrumental nature increasingly dominated and displaced moral considerations. Weber himself observed, described, and recognised the mentioned developments regarding the role of morality, especially in politics. To some extent, he also endorsed them. As already demonstrated in Chapter 3, his personal view was that there is not much room for traditional Western moral considerations in politics; applicable cultural values, such as an internationally strong German nation, should guide German politics, rather than moral values such as world peace or social justice. It therefore comes as a surprise that, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, he insisted that the political leader should depart from an ethic of responsibility in making political decisions. He clearly did not want to relinquish the ethical dimension of political action, and rely only on considerations of instrumental rationality, as it would rob political action of its nobility and reduce it to meaningless and arbitrary power play. As he put it in ‘Politics as a vocation’: “service to a cause” cannot “be dispensed with if action is to have any firm inner support. The nature of the cause the politician seeks to serve by striving for and using power is a question of faith […] [S]ome kind of belief must always be present,” he insisted. “Otherwise (and there can be no denying this) even political achievements which, outwardly, are supremely successful will be cursed by the

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nullity of all mortal undertakings” (Weber 1994a: 355). Or, to put it differently: political actions aimed at realising certain political goals must be based on the ethical commitment to an ultimate value, and not only on considerations of instrumental efficiency, to have any meaning and a sense of deeper purpose. I have already argued, in Chapter 3, that Weber’s seemingly contradictory stance on the role of ethics in politics can be explained if we take into account that he had a purely formal concept of ethics, which allowed him to accommodate both Christian morality (and for that matter traditional Western morality), and commitment to a particular cultural value, under the rubric of ‘ethics’. To consistently live your life in accordance with self-chosen ultimate values – whether those values were traditionally recognised as moral or, rather, cultural in nature – is for him to live an ethical live. It seems that he also accepted that this subjective and self-sacrificial devotion to an ultimate value renders the actions based on such an ultimate value ‘ethical’. Weber could, therefore, quite consistently denounce the elevation of moral values such as world peace and justice to ultimate values in politics, while regarding as ethical the commitment to a cultural value such as an internationally strong Germany. Weber allocates to politics a special role regarding the maintenance of the ethical dimension of social life (as he understood it). As a result of the differentiation of social orders and the concurrent secularisation, he was not convinced that the Christian religion and ethics could ever again play a major public role (cf. Weber 1994b: 22–23). Neither did he share the view of some of his contemporaries that a science of culture could provide the common ethical values that could serve as solid ethical foundation on which nations could be built. Scientists should acknowledge that scientific research can at best provide reliable knowledge regarding the ethical values different groups adhere to, including the actual and foreseeable consequences of their adherence to such values, but cannot justify the adherence to a particular set of values. As we have already seen, he was also not convinced that the threat to the ethical dimension of social life could be overcome by the efforts of philosophers to provide rational justification for a set of universally valid ethical principles. He was convinced, rather, that politics had the best chance to influence the ethical course of nations in late modernity. As a result of the power and means available to politicians, they at least have the potential to put their stamp on the ethical beliefs that guide the public life of a particular nation, thereby changing the ethical course of the nation. However, Weber was not convinced that the responsibility to uphold ethics in politics and, eventually, to determine the ethical course of a nation, belongs to all political role-players. In spite of his support for a democratic political system at the end of his life, he did not believe in a ‘from the bottom up’ approach when it came to the promotion and realisation of a particular ultimate value or set of ultimate values. He was simply not convinced that ordinary citizens have the ability to break out of the shackles of routine and conditioning resulting from



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the process of instrumental rationalisation, and thus to contribute effectively to the maintenance of ethics in politics and society. He also did not see the government official as an appropriate candidate for taking on such a responsibility. His restricted responsibility was, rather, to meticulously execute political orders and not to question their ethical appropriateness. It was only the exceptional individual, the charismatic political leader who has the uncommon personal qualities to win over others for the ultimate value(s) he wants to promote, who has this special responsibility, in Weber’s opinion. However, when one reads ‘Politics as a vocation’ closely, it is clear that it is not any charismatic political leader that is accorded the ability to realise his ultimate value(s) in politics effectively. This ability is found only in the leader who has an intimate knowledge of social realities in late modernity, and has developed the skills to use the available political means to realise political goals based on the ultimate value(s) of his choice. One can also put it this way: the charismatic politician to whom Weber allocates the special responsibility to uphold ethics in politics and set the ethical course of a nation, is not the one who acts in accordance with the ethic of conviction, but the one who acts in accordance with the ethic of responsibility. (b)  A new ethical approach should be adopted in politics that is ‘responsible’ in a comprehensive sense of the word In ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber criticised two approaches to politics that he regarded as irresponsible: the approach of the Realpolitiker or ‘power politician’ (Machtpolitiker) and the approach of the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of conviction. He criticises the power politician’s approach because it lacks ethical quality. It is based purely on considerations of instrumental efficiency in exercising political and military power and completely ignores considerations based on values. When making political decisions, the ‘power politician’ only takes into account the likelihood of success, in a given situation, of the available policy options or military tactics. As he does not relate his political decisions to the achievement of an ultimate value, he tends to constantly adapt political goals and actions as the circumstances change. His political decisions thus lack consistency and direction. As value considerations do not limit the range of acceptable actions, he does not hesitate to make use of any means that would guarantee immediate success, even if it causes excessive harm and, in the long run, could have very negative consequences for the political interests of the nation. Weber therefore regarded the approach of the power politician as extremely irresponsible. In contrast to the power politician, the politician making political decisions in accordance with the ethic of conviction consistently relates such decisions to ultimate values. Although it does not lack ethical quality, for Weber the problem with such an approach is that its proponents believe that they could apply their ethical convictions and achieve their ultimate values, encapsulated in their religion

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or political ideology – their Weltanschauung, to use Weber’s inclusive designation – without taking into account social developments in late modernity related to the process of rationalisation, and without making allowance for the distinctive nature and rules of politics, including the rule that the state may legitimately make use of violence under certain conditions. This means that they are either blind to the increasing differentiation of politics and the pluralism of value systems involved with it, or choose to ignore it because they believe, regardless, that they could achieve their ultimate values simply by increasing the intensity of their ethical convictions. In other words, they believe that an absolutist or fundamentalist approach – to use a contemporary term – would in the end enable them to achieve their ultimate values. Weber found such an approach irresponsible. He was willing to admit that the adherents of an ethic of conviction do exhibit a narrow responsibility in committing themselves to particular ethical convictions. They were, however, irresponsible in a more comprehensive sense. First of all, they were irresponsible with regard to the values they recognised. They often commit themselves to ultimate moral values that contravene the distinctive nature and rules of modern politics. They do not recognise the suitability of certain cultural values to serve as ultimate values in modern politics. And they do not really commit themselves to the successful achievement of their ultimate values. In spite of the fact that their approach goes against the grain of developments in modern societies, they stubbornly believe that they just have to diligently stick to their ultimate values to ensure their eventual achievement. Secondly, they are irresponsible with regard to the process of decision-making. They make political decisions and employ preconceived means without taking into account foreseeable consequences, especially failing to take into account that actions strictly complying with their moral convictions, and means blindly employed, could have very negative consequences. In addition, they do not recognise that, sometimes, morally suspect or dangerous means are necessary to achieve political goals based on ultimate values. Weber was of the opinion that such an irresponsible approach to politics could only cause havoc in modern societies, because it is not attuned to modern conditions, and should thus be abandoned. As Weber regarded an ethic of conviction approach in politics both inappropriate and dangerous, in ‘Politics as a vocation’ he proposed the ethic of responsibility as a more appropriate approach, which takes responsibility as its lodestar, striving to be responsible in a comprehensive sense. It is comprehensively responsible in that it incorporates both retrospective and prospective responsibility. Although Weber’s negative remarks, in ‘Politics as a vocation’ and elsewhere, about those who propagated the confession of Germany’s moral guilt in instigating World War I, could create the impression that he did not recognise retrospective responsibility, he in fact did recognise the retrospective responsibility of the political leader in a political sense. The political leader has to stand in for her



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political decisions and do the honourable thing by taking the political blame for poor decisions made by her.3 There can, however, be little doubt that, for Weber, the emphasis lay on the comprehensive prospective responsibility that the political leader acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility should exhibit.4 This comprehensive political responsibility – both retrospective and prospective  – should, first of all, be inculcated in the political leader as a professional virtue. She should have the willingness and ability to stand in courageously and honourably for the consequences of her political decisions when the outcome is negative. Furthermore, she should have the willingness and ability to take on the task of determining the political destiny and ethical course of her nation, and deciding on the most effective means and actions to accomplish the political goals she set. As this comprehensive political responsibility always implies, for Weber, the commitment to a particular cause or ultimate value, passion for the cause is a professional virtue that should accompany it. The same is true of judgement. Without the virtue of judgement the political leader exhibiting comprehensive political responsibility would not be able to weigh up adequately the foreseeable consequences of political options for action. In my opinion, it cannot be denied that Weber’s rudimentary virtue ethics for the vocation of politics clearly applies to the political leader adhering to an ethic of responsibility. Weber’s ethic of responsibility does, however, not only entail a political virtue ethics. It also entails a formal ethics of political action based on comprehensive prospective political responsibility. According to this formal ethics of political action, the political leader should exhibit prospective responsibility in the first instance by selecting the ultimate values that would form the basis of her political decisions responsibly. In Weber’s opinion, to select ultimate values responsibly, the political leader should not just blindly take any ultimate value based on her worldview and apply it to politics. Although he definitely did not subscribe to a teleological view of history, he thought that the political leader should select ultimate values that are attuned to the political situation at a particular point in time. She should, Weber urged, among other things be open to the call of history at that particular point of time, as he put it in some of his political writings. Before the disastrous outcome of World War I dashed all his political dreams, Weber personally believed that Germany, as a big nation, had a historical calling to play a leading 3  Cf. this remark made by Weber in ‘Politics as a vocation’: “A man who subscribes to the ethic of responsibility […] does not feel that he can shuffle off the consequences of his own actions, as far as he could foresee them, and place the burden on the shoulders of others. He will say, ‘These consequences are to be contributed to my actions’” (Weber 1994a: 360). 4  Cf. the following remark by Weber in ‘Politics as a vocation’, in which his disdain for morally blaming politicians for past guilt, his recognition of political guilt, and his emphasis on prospective responsibility become clear: “Instead of dealing with what concerns the politician (the future and our responsibility for it) such an ‘ethical’ approach concerns itself with politically sterile (because unsolvable) questions of past guilt. This, if anything, is what constitutes political guilt” (Weber 1994a: 356).

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role in international politics, among other things, to successfully promote the political ideology based on the idea that the nation (nationalism), and not the individual (liberalism) or the collective (communism), is the principle around which societies should be organised. At that point in time, Weber considered an internationally powerful Germany to be an appropriate ultimate value for German political leaders to strive to attain. The political leader should also take into account, responsibly, the particular nature of politics as an autonomous social sphere, and recognise the rules proper to it. For example, whatever her worldview may be, she should acknowledge that the use of power, including the use of violence, is regarded as a legitimate means in politics. It is the responsibility of the politician acting in accordance with the ethic of responsibility to select the combination of ultimate values she finds appropriate, and to translate it into political goals and policies that will guide her political actions. It is also her responsibility, however, not merely to pay lip service to the political goals she has set, but diligently and effectively to strive to attain them by making use of the political power, including the military power, available to her. Whenever the estimation of the costs involved in attaining a particular political goal – based on objective knowledge of the concrete political situation – shows that the cost would be too high, the political leader must consider finding a more achievable goal based on her ultimate values. It is, of course, possible that in certain extreme situations the ultimate values of the political leader cannot be translated into any achievable goals. For Weber, this does not entail the necessary conclusion that the political leader should relinquish her ultimate values and decide on ones that could be translated into more achievable goals. Rather, the final decision, whether to do so or not, remains the responsibility of the political leader herself. At the end of ‘Politics as a vocation’, he even envisages the possibility that the political leader might decide to remain faithful to the ultimate values she has chosen, even though all avenues for realising them are closed off at that particular point of time. When this happens to a political leader following the ethic of responsibility, Weber concedes, there is nothing that distinguishes her from the political leader following the ethic of conviction. It is also important that the politician adhering to an ethic of responsibility should responsibly make ethically directed decisions in politics. Her first responsibility, also in this regard, is to take the concrete political situation seriously and to analyse it thoroughly, in order to identify options for action, reliably estimate the foreseeable future consequences of different options for action, and to establish which options for action and available means would contribute most effectively to the achievement of the set political goals. Making ethically directed decisions in politics responsibly in the end also entails weighing the different options for actions and available means, and not shying away from making difficult decisions. When, for example, the only way to achieve a political goal is to use morally suspect or even dangerous means, or the political costs of refusing the use of such means are



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much higher than the costs involved with using them, the political leader should have the courage to take a decision and bear the political responsibility for it. In providing reliable knowledge about indispensable means for attaining particular political goals and the inevitable consequences of available options for political action, Weber concedes, the social sciences can be of great help to the political leader. They cannot, however, displace the responsibility of the political leader to decide on political means and actions. It is clear from this reconstruction of Weber’s ethic of responsibility that he never intended it as a new and alternative first-level normative ethical theory. His focus, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, is not on the identification of first-level ethical principles and their justification. Rather, he takes it for granted that every political leader already has her own ethical convictions based on her own worldview. For Weber all ultimate values are faith-based. There is no way to rationally demonstrate that one’s own ethical convictions ought to be universally accepted. It is also clear that he takes it for granted that each of the differentiated social orders, including politics, has its own set of recognised rules that has crystallised over time. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, he is not entering into a critical discussion about the nature of such rules. I would argue that, in formulating an approach to politics based on the ethic of responsibility, Weber is proposing, rather, a second-level normative ethical approach that befits the cultural situation in late modernity. He was convinced, in my view, that such an approach was more appropriate in a pluralised cultural situation than yet another attempt to formulate a normative ethical theory of universally valid first-level moral principles. He faced a cultural situation in which, as he saw it, there was no consensus on moral values, in which moral and nonmoral values, as well as the value systems of different social spheres, competed with one another, and in which all attempts by social scientists and philosophers to provide ethical direction in formulating universally valid ethical principles had failed. Such a situation called for a second-level normative ethical approach that could provide guidance on: yy The effective manner in which to maintain the ethical quality of politics and steer the ethical course of a nation while acknowledging value pluralism and the impossibility of overcoming it by providing rational justification of universally valid ethical principles; yy The appropriate manner in which to select the ultimate values from the variety of values that claim recognition on which action decisions in the political sphere could be based; yy The appropriate manner in which to make ethically directed action decisions in the political sphere. It is conspicuous that, in ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber does not reflect in a general manner on the second-level normative approach that would be appropriate in

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different social orders. Apart from the obvious reason that he was asked to speak on the vocation of politics and therefore concentrated on the appropriate ethical approach in politics, he clearly believed that politics was in a special position when it comes to ethics. First of all, it was his view that it is not in all social orders that participants are free to base their decisions on ultimate values of their own choice, including cultural values. In ‘Science as a vocation’, he severely criticises those academics using research and the lecture room to prove and to propagate cultural or religious values about which they feel strongly. The only ultimate value to which the scientist should commit himself is objective knowledge, based on disciplined scientific research. With the political leader it is different. She does not only have the responsibility to choose ultimate values on which to base her political actions, but, in realising these ultimate values, she also has to determine the ethical course of the nation, and in this way contribute to social cohesion in the nation. This is why the ethic of responsibility in the first place applies to the political leader. She has the special responsibility to uphold ethics in politics and, in doing so, to determine the ethical course of the nation. And she has to do it by responsibly selecting ultimate values and making political decisions.

3.3.  Weber and the philosophers of the ‘via media’ Weber’s proposal of the ethic of responsibility – as we interpret it – is without any doubt original. It does not depend on any of the major ethical theories of his time. It is, rather, the result of his reflection on the implications for ethics of his own sociological analysis of Western society in late modernity. This does not, however, mean that there is no resemblance whatsoever between his approach to ethics and that of contemporary philosophers. In his impressive comparative historical study of a number of American and European thinkers in the period 1870 to 1920, the American historian James T. Kloppenburg highlights some remarkable resemblances between Weber’s ethical thought and the ideas of the philosophers of the so-called via media.5 The designation ‘philosophers of the via media’ was first used by John Dewey to refer to contemporary thinkers, including Dewey himself, who drew from both the idealist and empiricist traditions. In his book, Kloppenburg discusses six philosophers of the via media: Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), Alfred Fouillée (1838–1912), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952). These philosophers shared dissatisfaction with the influential philosophical approaches of their time: Kantianism, neo-Kantianism, the common sense, idealist, and positivist paradigms (Kloppenburg 1986: 27). Like Weber, they were 5  James T Kloppenburg, Uncertain victory: Social democracy and progressivism in European and American thought, 1870 – 1920, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.



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intensely aware of the demise of the dominant position of the Christian religion, and worried about its negative consequences for the guiding role of ethics in society. Like him, they did not believe that science could fill the gap left by religion in providing meaning and ethical guidance to life (Kloppenburg 1986: 5). Neither were they convinced by the two major normative ethical theories of the Enlightenment, the deontological theory of Kant and the utilitarian theory of Bentham and Mill. They found Kant’s ethics too formalistic and abstract to provide ethical guidance in real life, and deemed the hedonism and psychological egoism of utilitarianism an inadequate foundation for ethics (cf. Kloppenburg 1986: 119; 121–122). More importantly: they were of the opinion that these two theories artificially separate two elements of ethics that in real life belong together: conviction and consequence, will and result, motive and intention (Kloppenburg 1986: 115; 131). Therefore, like Weber, each in his own way tried to combine the two elements in their work on ethics (Kloppenburg 1986: 123). As the consequences of action should not be ignored, they were of the opinion, like Weber, that an approach to ethical decision-making should be developed that would do justice to real-life experience in ever-changing concrete situations and would incorporate empirical evidence (Kloppenburg 1986: 37; 119). In some of them, one also detects the awareness that the freedom of the individual to live ethically in accordance with her own conscience was shrinking as a result of the expansion of the role of the state, and that political action was replacing personal conscience as locus of reform (Kloppenburg 1986: 5; 45–46; 123). According to Kloppenburg, one “of the major fault lines cutting across the philosophy of the via media divided thinkers who resigned themselves to a tragic view of life as perpetual conflict from those who saw history as epic […]” (Kloppenburg 1986: 32). It is clear that those thinkers like Dilthey, Sidgwick, and James, who entertained the tragic view of life, shared much with Weber. Like him, they were not at all convinced of the possibility of resolving the dilemmas of philosophy and politics, and the cultural conflicts between religion and science (Kloppenburg 1986: 32–33). Someone like James was also emotionally affected by the cultural conflicts of his time. “In a prolonged spiritual crisis that stretched his life to the boundary of suicide, James experienced the nineteenth century’s cultural conflict between faith and science, and its philosophical friction between idealism and positivism, as an acutely personal affliction” (Kloppenburg 1986: 37). Consistent with their tragic view of history as an open-ended process, revealing no unambiguous answers to questions of value, Dilthey, Sidgwick, and James believed that we must sacrifice some convictions to satisfy others. They maintained that moral action involves painful but inescapable choices between competing conceptions of the good (Kloppenburg 1986: 116). As James puts it in ‘The moral philosopher and the moral life’: in every moral decision “some part of the ideal is butchered” (James 1897: 154). He adds that “the stable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher asks” and in which value

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collisions, for example between self-interest and duty, might be reconciled “is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands” (James 1897: 161). Reflecting on the inevitability of making choices between conflicting values offered by different worldviews, Dilthey has this to say: “The final conclusion of the mind is not that all the world-views through which it has passed are relative but that it is sovereign over them all” (Dilthey 1976: 123). While that realisation liberates the individual to exercise his freedom, it also imposes on him the responsibility to act according to his own estimate of the optimum combination of values in each situation. While Dilthey, Sidgwick, and James, like Weber, despaired of fully harmonising contradictory values, they also resembled him in salvaging from their lack of certainty a sense of freedom and acceptance of responsibility (Kloppenburg 1986: 138). As the philosophers of the via media agreed that the burden of responsibility to choose between different values and to decide on the right actions in concrete situations in the last instance lies with the individual, they rejected attempts to prescribe an unchanging system of ethics (Kloppenburg 1986: 116). The most fundamental problem they had with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics was that these mistakenly sought to find universally applicable rules for determining the right and the good (Kloppenburg 1986: 141). As they believed that a general normative ethics could not be prescribed, they prided themselves on refusing to offer substantive guidelines for ethical action. Instead, they offered methods for making ethical decisions. “Their ethics was a mode of inquiry, as Dewey made particularly clear, rather than a set of rules […] They could discuss ethics only in formal terms, because it must take its substance from individual choices in response to specific problems” (Kloppenburg 1986: 347). In that he refused to offer a substantive political ethics, and did not proceed beyond recommending a formal, procedural approach to ethical decision-making in politics, Weber’s approach to ethics likewise resembles the approach of the philosophers of the via media.

4. Conclusion Based on information provided in previous chapters, a critical discussion of the major interpretations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, as well as a fresh interpretation of this ethic, have been undertaken in this chapter. In contrast to the other interpretations, Weber’s ethic of responsibility has been interpreted here in terms of the concept of responsibility. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that this ethic is fundamentally and comprehensively qualified by responsibility. In order to do this, the discussion has been devoted, first of all, to the conspicuous emergence of the concept responsibility in political and philosophical thought



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in the decades preceding Weber’s formulation of the ethic of responsibility. That Weber’s discourse on responsibility, in ‘Politics as a vocation’ and his earlier works, clearly resonates with the history of the emergence of the concept of responsibility, has been highlighted. Secondly, the two main ways in which Weber’s ethic of responsibility is fundamentally qualified by responsibility have been pointed out. This ethic ascribes a special responsibility to the charismatic political leader to uphold ethics in the political sphere and, in doing so, to also set the ethical course of a nation. Also, it teaches that the ethical approach adopted in politics should be executed in a comprehensively responsible manner. Weber thus conceived of the ethic of responsibility as a second-level normative ethical approach to politics, an approach, in his opinion, better attuned to late modernity than the traditional ethic of conviction approach. Although his proposal of the ethic of responsibility can be regarded as highly original, there are remarkable resemblances to the ethical approaches proposed by the philosophers of the so-called via media, who preceded him or were his contemporaries. This leaves us with the question: To what extent can Weber’s ethic of responsibility be regarded as still relevant to us today? It is Weber’s claim that the ethic of responsibility provides an ethical approach to politics that is better attuned to the context of late modernity than traditional ethical approaches. As this claim is based on his sociological views regarding the impact of modernisation on ethics, the validity of these views has to be assessed, first of all, from a present-day perspective. This is the task I turn to in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

The impact of modernisation on ethics: An appraisal of Weber’s views 1. Introduction The interpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility in the previous chapter is based on the assumption that he was convinced that it provided the most appropriate ethical approach in politics in late modernity. He was of the opinion that, in his time, as the outcome of modernisation processes in the Western world, social and, especially, political realities rendered the traditional ethic of conviction approach in politics inappropriate, which necessitated its replacement by the ethic of responsibility approach. It is conspicuous that he reached this conclusion only later in his life, after he had devoted considerable academic effort to the accurate description of the origin, processes and nature of modernisation in the Western world. The discussion, in Chapter 3, of Weber’s view on the impact of modernisation processes on ethics and politics in the Western world and, more specifically, in Germany, and the interpretation of his ethic of responsibility provided in Chapter 4 reveal the close correlation between his views on modernisation and the ethic of responsibility. Of course, he did not directly deduce his views on this ethic from his sociological description of the impact of modernisation processes. He was too acutely aware of the logical difference between description and evaluation to fall into such a trap. However, when normatively constructing the ethic of responsibility, he clearly had in mind the reduced scope for ethics playing a role in politics modernisation brought about. This close correlation of Weber’s proposal regarding the ethic of responsibility with the process of modernisation has implications for the appraisal of this proposal. The main objective of the appraisal is to determine the extent to which the proposal remains applicable and cogent in the world in which we are living today. The close correlation implies that such an appraisal cannot be adequately conducted without also undertaking an assessment of the applicability of Weber’s analysis of modernisation, and its impact on ethics and the role of ethics in modern politics. We first have to assess to what extent this analysis still applies, before an adequate appraisal of his ethic of responsibility can be undertaken.



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For this reason, the appraisal of Weber’s ethic will be undertaken in two steps. In this chapter, the question of the contemporary applicability of his view on modernisation, as well as its impact on ethics and the role it plays in politics, will be addressed first. His view on the impact of modernisation can be broken down into three theses. The first thesis can be called the secularisation thesis, or, more precisely, the thesis that disenchantment inevitably leads to secularisation, that is, the gradual decline of the influence of religious faith and ethics. The second thesis can be called the differentiation thesis, which proposes that modernisation resulted in the differentiation of autonomous social orders, each with its own distinctive set of values. Of special relevancy is Weber’s view that the traditional moral values of the Western world have no place in modern politics. The third thesis can be called the iron cage thesis, referring to the ethical meaninglessness of work life and the lack of freedom to act ethically in the modern workplace, particularly due to the stifling grip of bureaucratisation. In the light of this critical assessment of Weber’s views of modernisation and its impact on the scope for living ethically, I will then proceed, in Chapter 6, with an appraisal of his proposal regarding the ethic of responsibility.

2.  The secularisation thesis The term ‘secularisation’ should not be regarded as a synonym for the term ‘disenchantment’ (Entzauberung), as used by Weber. However, there is little doubt that he considered disenchantment to contribute to what is today generally described as secularisation. The term ‘secularisation’ has been used since the 1960s, especially by social scientists, to refer to at least two developments regarding religious faith. First of all, it refers to the exclusion of religious influences from the different social orders. In this regard, it mostly refers to the separation of church and state, or, more generally, to the separation of institutionalised religion and the state. However, it also refers to a second development, namely the general decline of faith in the Western world, or in the world at large. When used in this sense, secularisation is often associated with the inevitability of the complete demise of religious faith on account of the undermining influence of modernisation processes (cf. Casanova 2012: 19–20; Joas 2012: 25–28; Taylor 2007: 2). Weber was clearly of the opinion that secularisation, in the sense of the exclusion of the influence of Christian religion and ethics from autonomous social orders, was a feature of modernisation processes in the Western world. Once Christian ethics lost its dominant position in society as a result of disenchantment, the influence of Christian ethics in these social orders steadily decreased. Any attempt to reverse this development by trying to promote Christian ethical convictions in science and politics (as in the attempt by Prof Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster of the University of Munich to promote Christian pacifism in the lecture

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room), Weber regarded as inappropriate. There is reason enough to conclude that he was also of the opinion that secularisation, in the sense of the decline of Christian faith, was inevitable. This is implied by his view that processes of instrumental rationalisation led to the increasing spread of the belief in the West that, in principle, there are no mysterious and incalculable powers exerting an influence on what is happening in this world (Weber 1968b: 594). He also spoke sneeringly of those religious people not willing to acknowledge that the chasm between science and religious salvation cannot be bridged, and are willing to sacrifice their intellect (Weber 1992: 22). The secularisation thesis, that modernisation will inevitably lead to the complete demise of religious faith in the foreseeable future, found its strongest support among social scientists in the 1960s. Typical was the remark made by the well-known sociologist of religion, Peter Berger, in the New York Times in 1968, to the effect that in the year 2000 there would practically be no religious institutions left, but only isolated believers in a sea of secularity (New York Times 25/02/1968). Today, most social scientist experts on the influence of modernisation on religion agree that the assumption that modernisation automatically and inevitably leads to secularisation, is false (cf. Joas 2012: 16). Even Berger has distanced himself from his earlier views (Berger 2014: 18–20). One has to take into account that modernisation is not restricted to Western societies anymore, but has, since the time of Weber, dramatically spread to and impacted on many societies all over the world. It is clear that, in the interaction between modernisation processes and cultural and religious traditions in these societies, influence has not only been exerted from one side, but has been reciprocal. Although modernisation processes have had an impact on such traditions, they have in turn significantly modified and shaped these processes. As a result, it is today more appropriate to speak of ‘modernities’ than of a single entity named ‘modernity’, to acknowledge the fact that the outcomes of modernisation processes in different societies around the world are quite divergent (cf. Eisenstadt 2000: 1–29; Berger 2014: 68–78).1 This is particularly true with regard to the extent to which modernisation has brought about secularisation, in both senses of the word. Firstly, consider the thesis that modernisation inevitably leads to secularisation in the sense of a decline of religious faith. The only part of the world in which this has, to some extent, proved to be the case is Europe. Active participation in church ceremonies and 1 Weber did not acknowledge this. He was of the opinion, rather, that the processes of rationalisation that form part of modernisation are universal in scope and will eventually lead to similar results. See the conclusion Dirk Kaesler comes to after discussing Weber’s experiences during his tour of the USA: “In Weber’s picture of the history of humanity universal developments take place that are poured out from Europe as the glowing core of an active volcano over the whole of humanity. The collective term for these developments […] is ‘rationalisation’, which is for Weber initially an occidental-european, then a transatlantic and increasingly a universal phenomenon” (Kaesler 2014: 631; tr. from the German).



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church membership in most countries of Europe have significantly declined since the time of Weber, although to a lesser extent in Poland and Ireland. This does not mean, however, that the majority of Europeans have denounced the Christian faith. Many of them are still ‘nominal Christians’, in that they sometimes participate in Christian ceremonies, selectively adhere to certain Christian beliefs, and have appreciation for aspects of Christian ethics (cf. Joas 2012: 34–36; Taylor 2007: 513–514). Europe has rightly been called the exception when it comes to the decline of religious faith in the contemporary world. Although the USA has been exposed to modernisation to a no lesser degree than Europe, it has not experienced a significant decline in religious faith.2 In the period from 1800 to 1950, during which the membership of European churches steadily declined, membership of churches in the USA grew steadily. To some extent, this can be ascribed to the influx of immigrants, yet, according to social scientists, it should be ascribed in the first instance to the early separation of church and state, which encouraged freedom of religion and contributed to a vibrant and variegated religious life (Joas 2012: 36–39). In most other parts of the world, the thesis of the inevitable decline of religious faith applies even less. One of the reasons pointed out by social scientists is that traditional religious people all over the world tend to have considerably more children than those who are secularised. It can thus be expected that the percentage of religious people in the world will increase in future. This is certainly true with regard to the Christian religion. In Africa alone 23 000 persons per day, on average, are added to the number of Christians, partly as a result of birth, but also as a result of conversions. The percentage of Christians on the African continent has increased from 25 % in 1965 to 46 % in 2001. Given statistics like these, Hans Joas concludes that there is no reason to doubt about the survival chances of the Christian religion (Joas 2012: 192–195). With regard to secularisation, in the sense of the exclusion of the influence of religion and religious ethics from the different social spheres, one has to conclude that to a certain extent Weber’s view on the impact of modernity is indeed applicable to contemporary societies. In most societies in which modernisation processes have exerted a significant influence, religious convictions and ethics play an insignificant role in how the economy and scientific investigation are run. Muslim societies are the exception here, in that certain Islamic rules (e. g., the prohibition of usury) are accommodated in how business is conducted. With re2  Weber had to admit after his tour of the USA that religion still took centre stage in this society at that stage. However, as Kaesler remarks: “Different from many of his contemporaries Weber did not see in America the antithesis to Europe, but rather saw a particular synthesis taking shape: American innocence would be replaced by European refinement, American pragmatism by European intellectualism, American vigour by European melancholy and American moralism by European willingness to compromise” (Kaesler 2014: 625; tr. from the German). He already then detected signs of ‘religious indifference’ (Kaesler 2014: 626) and a certain ‘secularistion of life’ taking shape in the American society (Kaesler 2014: 629.

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gard to the role of religion in politics, the situation is more varied. In most countries with a majority of Muslim citizens, Islamic ‘sharia’ law is accommodated in politics to different degrees. Some countries with a majority of Christian citizens constitutionally warrant the privileged position of the Christian religion (e. g. Zambia).3 In most countries in the Western world, however, the separation of church and state is constitutionally warranted. Some European countries, though do allow a certain room for the exertion of religious influence in state institutions (religious education is a school subject in most regional states in Germany, for example) and some others still recognise a particular church as established church (e. g., the Church of England in England).4 When it comes to the public influence of religions one should not focus only on legal arrangements. The media – nowadays, the social media in particular – allows ample space for religious institutions and religious individuals to propagate their views, including views on political, economic and scientific issues, publicly. However, religious people using religious language and arguments in public to debate policy issues in Western societies must reckon with a strong liberal pre­ judice against doing so. The conviction on which this prejudice is based is that introducing religious arguments in debates on policy issues cannot but have a divisive influence in society. Although one has to draw the conclusion that modernisation does not inevitably lead to the decline of religious faith or to the complete exclusion of religious influences from the public sphere, it is not to be denied that it does have a significant effect on the shape of religious faith in the contemporary world. For the purposes of this study, I would like to refer to two major instances of how the impact of modernisation processes on contemporary religious faith has been registered: the first is the pluralising effect and the second the fragilising effect, on account of the dominant ‘immanent frame’ of contemporary culture. The pluralising effect of modernisation on religious faith has both a personal and an institutional dimension. The personal dimension has to do with the strong individuating effect that modernisation processes have had in the Western world, especially after World War II. Charles Taylor, in his monumental study on secularisation entitled A  secular age, refers to the “individuating revolution” experienced in contemporary Western culture during the last sixty years or so. “As well as moral/spiritual and instrumental individualisms, we now have a widespread ‘expressive individualism’” (Taylor 2007: 473). This individuating revolution brought about that, on a mass scale, the social moorings of individuals in traditional ways of living in families and local and religious communities have 3 The Christian religion is recognised as the official religion of Zambia in the amended Zambian Constitution of 1996. 4  See for a discussion of the relationship church-state-education in Germany: Monsma & Soper 2009: 189–197 and for a discussion of the establishment of the Church of England in England: Monsma & Soper 2009: 139–145.



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been severed. The causes cited are many: affluence and the continued extension of consumer lifestyles; social and geographic mobility; new family patterns, particularly the growth of the two-income household and the rise of television, to name just a few (Taylor 2007: 473). Globalisation, in particular, has played an important role in the extension of consumer lifestyles, especially among the youth, all over the world. The result of this individuating revolution has been the steady spread of what Taylor calls the culture of “authenticity.” By this, he means “[…] the understanding of life which emerges with the Romantic expressivism of the lateeighteenth century, that each one of us has his/her own way of realizing our humanity, and that it is important to find and live out one’s own, as against surrendering to conformity with a model imposed on us from outside, by society, or the previous generation, or religious or political authority” (Taylor 2007: 475).

This dominant contemporary culture of authenticity is based, not only on the fact that today we indeed have more options when it comes to ways of living, but also on the high value put on personal choice of the way of living that suits one best. When it comes to religion, the culture of authenticity urges the individual person not only to choose the religious life or practice she becomes part of, but to make sure that it really speaks to her, and makes sense in terms of her own spiritual development as she understands it (Taylor 2007: 486). The institutional dimension of the pluralising effect of modernisation on religious faith relates to this widespread contemporary need of individuals to seek authentic spiritual expression. In societies with a plurality of spiritual needs, one over-arching and authoritarian religious institution with a ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot count on strong and active support. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in Anglo-Saxon countries, and especially the USA, an ever increasing number of ‘denominations’, that is, voluntary religious institutions, have sprung up since the Great Awakening in England in the mid-eighteenth century, to answer to the ever growing plurality of spiritual needs (cf. Berger 2014: 42–49; Taylor 2007: 448–454). Peter Berger is of the opinion that the pluralising effect of modernisation on religious faith also inevitably brings about the fragilising of such faith (Berger 1994; Berger & Zijderveld 2009; Berger 2014). The reason is that pluralisation “relativizes and thereby undermines many of the certainties by which human beings used to live” (Berger 2014: 9; cf. Berger 2009: 25–48). It certainly undermines the taken-for-granted nature of one’s own personal version of religious faith, as the constant exposure to individuals and groups who have versions of religious faith different from me, or do not belief in God, inevitably brings about doubt about my own faith (Berger 2009: 89–119). Berger concludes: “In terms of religion, ours is not so much an age of unbelief as an age of doubt. Thus the management of doubt becomes an important task, both for religious believers and for religious institutions” (Berger 2014: 64).

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Charles Taylor also points out the fragilisation of religious faith brought about by modernisation. However, he has a slightly different understanding of ‘fragilisation’ than Berger: “I mean by this that greater proximity of alternatives has led to a society in which more people change their ‘positions’, that is, ‘convert’ in their lifetimes, and/or adopt a different position than their parents. Life-time and intergenerational switches become more common. But this has nothing to do with a supposed greater fragility of the faith they end up (or decide to remain with), as Berger seems to imply. On the contrary, the faith arising in this contemporary predicament can be stronger, just because it has faced the alternative without distortion” (Taylor 2007: 833–834, n 19).

The fragilising of religious faith relates for Taylor not so much to the mere existence of a greater variety of personal beliefs, but to the predominance of an ‘immanent frame’ in contemporary culture. In the ‘enchanted’ Middle Ages in Europe, faith in God was taken for granted, as the presence of God in the world was experienced as real, and everyone shared the convictions that the good of society depended on faithfulness to God, and that moral virtues and rules were prescribed by God. The different structures we live in today – scientific, social, technological, and moral, and so on – constitute, rather, an immanent frame, in that they are part of a ‘natural’, or ‘this-worldly’ order which can be understood in its own terms, without reference to the ‘supernatural’ or the ‘transcendent’. This does not necessarily imply that we are living in what Taylor calls ‘closed world systems’, in which religious faith does not make any sense, as atheists would claim. Taylor is of the opinion, rather, that the order in which we are living in today leaves the issue open whether, for purposes of ultimate explanation, or spiritual transformation, or final sense-making, we might have to invoke something transcendent (Taylor 2007: 594; cf. also: 539–556). What are the conclusions one can draw from this discussion of the present-day validity and applicability of the secularisation thesis for the space that remains for religious ethics to play a role in contemporary societies? The precise answer to this question will differ from society to society, so I am limited to a few general remarks: (a)  Modernisation has not rendered religious ethics obsolete in contemporary societies. There are still a great many people who live their lives in accordance with strong religious ethical values. Frameworks of religious beliefs about God, the world, and human beings, of which their religious ethics forms an integral part, even today help them to make sense of the world in which they are living, and provide a sense of ethical meaning to what they do in life. (b)  The pluralisation typical of modernity, however, has an effect both with regard to the content of religious ethics and the manner in which people hold religious ethical beliefs. With regard to content, one has to accept that a spectrum in terms of closeness to a particular religious ethical tradition is found. At the one end of the spectrum, there are the religious ethics of those who diligently attempt to remain faithful to a particular religious ethical tradition of the past.



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At the other end of the spectrum, one finds the religious ethics of those who have – intentionally or inadvertently – taken over ethical values from other religious or secular groups they are exposed to, to such an extent that they have great difficulty with the coherent integration of these values into their own religious ethics. In-between, we find the religious ethics of those who to a greater or lesser extent revert to ethical ‘bricolage’, that is, select certain ethical ‘bricks’ or elements from other ethical traditions, and, to a greater or lesser extent, successfully integrate them into their own religious ethics (Stout 1988: 74–78). Also, with regard to the manner in which people hold to their religious ethics, there is a spectrum in terms of certainty. On the one end of the spectrum are those religious people who are very uncertain about their ethical values, even to the extent that they experience serious doubt. On the other end of the spectrum are those fundamentalist religious people who aggressively ward off any personal doubt or outside criticism of their own religious ethical values, by declaring these values absolutely correct, and those of other religious or secular groups absolutely wrong. In its dogged, deliberate attempt to restore certainty, contemporary religious fundamentalism or neo-traditionalism differs from religious traditionalism in pre-modern societies, with its taken-for-granted certainty (cf. Berger 2014: 32). Between the doubters and the fundamentalists are those religious people who, to a greater or lesser extent, have certainty about their own ethical values, and are more or less tolerant vis-a-vis the ethical values that other groups – whether religious or secular – adhere to. (c)  One can, however, ask whether the claim that religious ethics still has validity for many people in contemporary society does not only hold for the private sphere of personal relationships. Is it not the case that, as soon as religious people operate in one of the differentiated social orders like the economy, science, and politics, and make use of modern technology, they have to leave behind their religious language and religious ethical values, compelled to switch to exclusively secular discourse? Peter Berger seems to suggest this when he writes: “Modern science and technology necessarily operate within a discourse that is strictly ‘immanent’ – ‘as if God does not exist’ […] The secular discourse exists both in the subjective minds of individuals, who have learned to deal with zones of reality without any supernatural presuppositions, and in the objective order of society, in which specific institutions also function without such presuppositions” (Berger 2014: 52).

Berger does add that, although this is happening all the time, it does not necessarily undermine the faith of contemporary religious people. They have become used to the code switching and manage to live quite comfortably in both a secular and a religious world. In my opinion, one should not, however, take this to mean that religious people alternate between two strictly separated worlds – a private religious world and a public secular world. They do not leave their religious beliefs behind in the private sphere of their personal relationships when they operate in the workplace. Their religious beliefs give meaning to what they do in

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the workplace and their ethical convictions inform their attitude and behaviour towards fellow employees and the manner in which they do their work. When asked by their superiors to do something that clearly contravenes their religious ethical convictions, they will most probably offer resistance. I agree with Nancy T Ammerman’s response to Berger’s claim for code switching: “[…] I suspect it may still draw too clear a distinction between codes and the fields they belong to. Sometimes people are aware of moving back and forth, but just as often they seem to occupy a single location that is both secular and sacred at the same time” (Ammerman 2014: 103). (d)  It cannot be denied that religious people, at least in the Western world, are confronted with sets of secular moral values in politics, in the economy, in science, in the workplace, and in the public sphere in general, and often have to comply with these values. One should, however, take into account that, in the case of the Western world, the moral values prevalent in the public sphere have to a considerable extent been shaped by the Christian religion. Even if they are shorn of religious connotations, many of these secular moral values exhibit a strong resemblance with traditional Christian ethical values. In A  secular age, Charles Taylor convincingly argues that the Modern Moral Order prevalent in the Western world today is, to a large extent, the outcome of developments within Christendom, especially since the Reformation (Taylor 2007: 159–171; 184–185; 514; 531–533). Although, over the last few centuries, there has been a retreat of ‘Christendom’ – that is, a civilisation where society and culture are profoundly informed by Christian faith – it is not surprising that moral values central to the Modern Moral Order, like justice, equality, freedom, beneficence, peace, and hard work, resemble moral values central to the Christian religious tradition. Thus, it is not so difficult, mostly, for contemporary Christians in the Western world to relate to such ‘secular’ moral values when they operate in the workplace and in the public sphere. (e) Religious ethics is restricted, in specifically contemporary liberal democratic societies, in that its use as basis for debate in the public sphere is widely denounced. The strong liberalist prejudice against the introduction of religious language and ethics in the public sphere has found strong support from influential philosophers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Neither philosopher denies the right of religious persons motivated by religious beliefs to engage in public debate, yet both hold that religious people have the obligation to translate their religious views into purely secular language and arguments when doing so. This means that they have to argue for their views on the basis of secular moral values recognised in secular democratic societies (cf. Rawls 1993: 212–254; Habermas 2005: 117). During the last decade or more, this prevalent view in liberal democracies has increasingly been questioned. Jeffrey Stout, for example, argues that religious language and arguments do have a legitimate place in the public sphere. He agrees with Nicholas Wolterstorff that it is unfair, in a society



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committed to freedom of religion and freedom of expression, not to allow religious people to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious convictions, and to defend their decisions by referring to these convictions (Stout 2004: 72). He adds: “It appears that Rawls is too caught up in theorizing about an idealized form of reasoning to notice how much work candid expression and immanent criticism  … perform in real democratic expression” (Stout 2004: 73). Stout believes that the candid expression of views based on religious convictions in the public sphere need not result in an impasse, as long as it is accompanied by the willingness to engage with conflicting views and to attempt persuading protagonists of such views by pointing out inconsistencies, by means of immanent criticism. In a recent book, Lenn E. Goodman expresses a similar criticism of Rawls’s view: “Rawls may call his program liberal, but it breeches the core liberal maxim – that individuals be free to choose (and voice!) the ground of their own choices” (Goodman 2014: 63).

3.  The differentiation thesis As we have already seen in Chapter 3, according to Weber the process of disenchantment in the Western world has gone hand in hand with the process of the increasing differentiation of social orders with distinctive sets of guiding values. Weber’s ‘Intermediate reflection on the economic ethics of the world religions’ provides a detailed sketch of the growing tension between salvation religion and the spheres of kinship, the economy, politics, aesthetics, sexual love, and intellectual knowledge (Weber 2004). For Weber, this has brought about an ever more annihilating loss of meaning. “The more the service to cultural goods was turned into a sacred undertaking and into a ‘vocation’, the more it became a senseless rush into the service of worthless purposes which were, moreover, contradictory and mutually antagonistic” (Weber 2004: 244). He was so much under the impression of the contradictory nature of the different sets of values specific to social orders between which the individual has to choose, that he did not shy away from describing the conflict between them as an “irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between ‘God’ and the ‘Devil’” (Weber 1949: 17–18). One should not conclude from this that Weber was of the opinion that religious ethics alone has no place in autonomous social orders in the Western world, while there is ample room for secular ethical traditions to exert a significant influence in these spheres. An analysis of his two speeches on vocation suffices to demonstrate that he had strong reservations regarding the introduction of any traditional ethical values – whether religious or secular – in science and politics.5 5  As demonstrated in Chapter 3, in his speeches and writings on German politics he explicitly expressed his disdain with efforts to introduce such traditional ethical values in politics.

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According to ‘Science as a vocation’, the only ethical duty the scientist has, is to diligently devote herself to value-free and objective empirical research as ultimate value, while the only ‘moral’ duty of the lecturer towards students is to provide them with clarity regarding the purely descriptive task of science and a sense of responsibility to stay true to this task. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, not only German politicians who promoted Christian pacifism are derided, but also those who for moral reasons expected the German government to admit its guilt in instigating World War I. Weber reminds such politicians that honour, and not moral rightness or wrongness, is central to politics. One thus has to conclude that in his view not only religious ethical values, but also other ethical values belonging to the tradition of Western ethics, have increasingly been excluded from social orders as a result of modernisation. Any attempt to re-introduce ethical values from this tradition in an autonomous social order has, in his opinion, to be regarded as unrealistic and inappropriate. Weber was nevertheless of the opinion that the meaningfulness of vocational work within a particular differentiated social order could only be overcome by retaining the ethical quality of such work. Given his conclusion that traditional Western ethics in late modernity lacks authority in independent social orders, he had to revert to a formal concept of ethics, by defining it in terms of the unconditional commitment to an ultimate value. This allowed him to regard the unconditional commitment to the leading value(s) of a particular social order (e. g. objective empirical research in science) as lending the necessary ethical and thus meaningful quality to vocational work. One may say that a second attempt of Weber to salvage the ethical quality of vocational work and, more generally, public life in modernity consists in the special role he allocated to politics. In his opinion, the political order differs from the other social orders in that the ultimate values to which vocational work should be committed in order to gain ethical quality are not intrinsic to the particular social order, but have to be adopted from the culture of the nation to which the politician belongs. The political leader is the one who, in the final instance, chooses from the prevalent cultural values of his nation the ultimate values and goals based on it that will guide his political actions and policies. By convincing the electorate of his choice of ultimate values, the charismatic political leader could set the ethical course of politics within a particular nation state for as long as he retains political power. In the course of the twentieth century, quite a number of well-known sociologists – Talcott Parsons, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Münch, and Jeffrey Alexander, to name but a few – subscribed to Weber’s thesis of the on-going differentiation of social orders and developed it further. However, no-one has developed such far-reaching and radical views, in this regard, as the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann.



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Two phases can be distinguished in the development of Luhmann’s functionalist systems theory of societal differentiation. In the first phase, he tried to move beyond Talcott Parsons’s view on functionalism, by addressing some of the serious criticism expressed against it. For Parsons a performance counts as functional insofar as it contributes to the maintenance of a complex structural unity, or system. However, the problem is that, in distinction from biological systems, social systems are not dependent on specific performances for their maintenance. A  specific performance can be replaced by other functional equivalents, and therefore a social system cannot be explained causally by referring only to specific performances. Luhmann responded to this problem by retaining the functionalist programme, but rejecting the ontological premises of scientific causal thinking in Parsons’s view (Luhmann 1970: 9–33). According to him, the starting point for functional analysis is the relation between problems and their solutions, and not, as in causal analyses, between causes and effects. Thus, the possible outcome of such analyses is not to establish causal linkages, but, rather, to open up a realm of possibilities for functional equivalents (Luhmann 1984: 83–84). What according to Luhmann becomes clear in such functional analyses is that in the evolution of modern society a number of different functions, constituting different subsystems of society, have become differentiated. Each of these differentiated functional systems (e. g., science, economics, and art) with its binary value code (e. g., true/false in the case of science, profitable/unprofitable in the case of economics, and beautiful/ugly in the case of art) delimits a particular terrain, within which equivalent performances serving a similar function in society fall (cf. Joas 1996: 11–13; Schwinn 2001: 58–64). In a second phase, Luhmann severed the causal link between the social systems and the outside environment even more emphatically, by describing the social systems as ‘autopoietic’ in nature. He borrowed the term ‘autopoiesis’ from the biologist Humberto Maturana, who used it in the sense of ‘the self-reproduction of a system’s network of elements from that very same network of elements’ to describe the essential feature of living systems. Rejecting the orthodoxies of the 1950s and 1960s, which viewed perception in terms of representations of the outside world or as informational ‘inputs’ into a system open to its environment, Maturana defined the nervous system as operationally closed, autonomous, and self-referential (cf. Maturana and Varela 1980: xi–xxx; 22–23; 1992: 18–23). Luhmann appropriated and generalised Maturana’s concepts of autopoiesis and operational closure in formulating a general theory of modern society as the functional differentiation of autonomous social systems. There is, according to him, no causal relationship between environment and autopoietic social system, just as there is none between environment and living system. Social systems receive no informational inputs, no directives, no instructions, and no programmes from their environments. They can be ‘perturbed’; they can react to these ‘perturbations’; but these ‘perturbations’ do not enter the system as ‘units

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of information’ that can dictate the way a system organises its own reactions (for Luhmann’s appropriation of autopoiesis, see Luhmann 1990: 1–20; 1995: 34–36; 1997: 65–68). One of the implications of the autopoietic nature of social systems is, for Luhmann, that they are also closed to one another. As William Rasch puts it: “the ‘language’ of one system cannot be adequately translated into the ‘language’ of another system. Much like Wittgenstein’s language games or Lyotard’s genres, Luhmann’s system languages are incommensurable, a fact that guarantees their autonomy …” (Rasch 2000: 145). As each system’s communication is channelled and directed by its own unique binary code, the different systems stand – to use Luhmann’s term – in an ‘orthogonal’ relation to one another, that is, they do not overlap (for Luhmann on binary codes, see Luhmann 1989a: 36–50). Luhmann’s view on the function of morality in society closely relates to his view on the orthogonal relation of the social systems.6 Already in his 1978 publication ‘Sociology of morality’ (German: ‘Soziologie der Moral’), he argued that the humanist tradition of understanding and regulating society in terms of an anthropologically based morality has become obsolete on account of the complexity of society. He instead proposed a sociological theory of morality in terms of the function of morality in society (Luhmann 1978: 28–43). From a sociological perspective, morality is defined by him as a coding process (using the binary code: good/bad) with the specific function of regulating communication between ego and alter to meet societal demands regarding esteem (Luhmann 1978: 51). In spite of the fact that morality does have a specific function in society, Luhmann is not convinced that it should be regarded as a separate and autonomous social system. One of the main reasons, in his view, is that it is too central to society and encroaches too much on the terrain of other social systems (Luhmann 1978: 58). In his later writings, Luhmann expresses himself quite negatively on this encroaching tendency of morality. In his opinion, the moral code has detached itself from its pre-modern locus in religion, and has become a self-replicating, parasitic invader of the various modern, functionally differentiated social systems. He does not shy away from describing morality as a bacterial infection (Luhmann 1989a: 431). The danger comes, according to Luhmann, when the moral binary code of ‘good/bad’ attaches itself ‘isomorphically’ to the prevailing codes of respective function systems, that is, when it seeks to impose a binding translation of ‘true’ or ‘government’ or ‘profitable’ into ‘good’ (or ‘bad’). Such a debilitating moral ‘infection’, or parasitic overlay of the good/bad grid, would paralyse the autonomous functioning of the system, eventually causing it to lose its identity and disappear (Luhmann 1989a: 421, 434–435).

6 On morality, see Luhmann 1978; 1989a: 36–50; 1989b; 1991; 1994; 1997: 241–249. 396–405, 1036–1045.



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Interestingly enough, Luhmann does foresee for ethics, as the theoretical reflection on morality, a legitimate task regarding morality in modern societies. An ethics that takes into account the nature of functional social systems, and recognises that modern societies cannot be integrated by morality any more, should set itself the task to limit the room for the application of morality. In fact, “perhaps the most pressing task of ethics is to warn against morality” (Luhmann 1991: 90). As reflection of and on morality, ethics operates with morality’s code (good/bad). Ethics should subject morality itself to this code. On account of morality’s limitation of the freedom of others, its own freedom must be limited, and because of its negative violent effects, it must undergo a civilizing process (Luhmann 1989a: 435–436). Thus, by way of ethics, morality is called upon to discipline itself for the sake of the system (cf. Rasch 2000: 149). In a comprehensive study of theories of social differentiation Thomas Schwinn comes to the conclusion that Luhmann’s functional systems theory is not convincing (for a critical discussion of Luhmann’s theory, see Schwinn 2001: 58–92). His main criticism is that the central concept of Luhmann’s theory, namely ‘society as a whole’, is vague, without content. From what Luhmann says about society, one can conclude that it is for him the sum of the different sub-systems, and the collective noun for all communication. Apart from that he does not have much to say. He does not give a clear indication of where the borders of society lie, or what its unity and identity consist of. Neither does the fact that, in one of his later writings, he concedes that today it only makes sense to talk of the borders of society in terms of the global society, add to clarity in this regard – especially if one takes into account that the scope of the fields within which the systems mainly function, differ (Luhmann 1994: 75 ff). The economy, science, and art do, for the most part, operate independently of national borders, while politics and jurisprudence still primarily operate within national borders. Luhmann also does not give any indication of how society contributes to the demarcation of the different sub-systems and allocates to them their different functions. Given the fact that Luhmann regards society as the overarching and organising system, this is a rather serious shortcoming of his systems theory. In the end, as Schwinn avers, he provides nothing more than an inadequate ‘invisible hand or black box’ explanation of society, while relying heavily on evolution rhetoric (Schwinn 2001: 72, 78, 80). Schwinn also points out a number of instances where Luhmann – in a way that is quite inconsistent with his views on the autonomous operation of the different functional systems – makes provision for inevitable human interference. This is, for example, the case when he concedes that integration and co-operation between different systems can only be achieved via organisations (Luhmann 1994: 405). By doing that he reverts to the conceptual framework of action theory. Organisations are not the result of the autonomous workings of functional systems. They are intentionally created by human beings and used by them to

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achieve certain goals. Schwinn thus concludes: “Only by making use of an action theoretical conceptual framework can light be thrown on the diffuseness and analytically unfruitful generality of the concepts of function and society.” He also adds: “In this light it becomes clear that there is no need for the conceptual framework of the systems theory, as no social phenomenon can be found that cannot be reconstructed by means of action theory operating rather with the concepts of relations and structures” (Schwinn 2001: 91, tr. from the German).7 Following his criticism of differentiation theories fully relying on a functionalist explanation, like the one of Luhmann, or doing so only partially, as with Richard Münch, Jürgen Habermas, and the neo-functionalist Jeffrey Alexander, Schwinn proceeds to demonstrate that Max Weber’s action theoretical explanation is still the most convincing. From the action theoretical perspective of Weber, it is not the complex system of society autonomously differentiating into sub-systems that provides the explanation for differentiation, but rather the typical ways actors orientate themselves to one another, according to a certain set of leading values or core meanings. Central to his theory is not the function economy, politics, religion, etc. fulfil in society, but, rather, the particular values, goals, and action strategies by means of which actors constitute social orders (Schwinn 2001: 153). In my opinion, Schwinn differs from Weber in an important respect. On the one hand, he agrees with Weber that those who operate within a particular social order tend to lend to the values of such a social order the status of a comprehensive worldview. In this respect, Weber’s description of the value systems of the different social orders in terms of polytheism does make sense. On the other hand, Schwinn does not take it for granted, as Weber seems to do, that value systems as such inevitably contradict one another and are involved in a deadly struggle for supremacy (Schwinn 2001: 319–320). Rather, he agrees with Wolfgang Schluchter that one might speak of the autonomy, but not of the autarky, of the different social orders (Schwinn 2001: 324). In his opinion, what he calls ‘material values’ in distinction from the ‘formal values’  – the leading values of the different social orders – do play an important role in integrating the social orders. These ‘material values’, which have developed in the Western world, are encompassing values, that is, values that reach out over all the social spheres and set limits to their expansive tendency: human rights, social justice, ecological sustainability, and standards of a culturally defined ‘good life’. It is true that modern differentiated social orders can rely on the principle of ‘legitimate indifference’ 7  Hans Joas comes to a similar conclusion in his criticism of neo-functionalists like Jeffrey Alexander – criticism that equally applies to Luhmann: “The neo-functionalists fail to conceive of the possibility that the degree and direction of differentiation, or indeed the very fact of further differentiation, can be made the object of collective action and social movements, in short, of the social formulation of objectives. In that case, differentiation would no longer be the inevitable outcome of an evolutionary process, but a stake in the processes of social change that have an indeterminate outcome” (Joas 1996: 230).



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in their operations to set them free from incessant and diverse normative pressure from the outside. That is, however, only the case because they already function within the framework of ‘material values’ that channel the operations of the different social orders (Schwinn 2001: 321–323). Schwinn does agree with both Weber and Luhmann that ‘material values’, including moral values, should not be allowed to upset the integrity of the social orders. The ‘material values’ should not be applied to social orders in such a manner that they replace the ‘formal values’ inherent to these orders, or set aside, or even disturb, their typical rationalities. Therefore, he does not agree with Richard Münch that, on account of the influence of material values in a particular social order, a new and different ‘rationality mix’ is created. Both the formal rationality and the material rationality should be retained, but constantly be balanced out. “The formal spheres keep the sight free for what is feasible and prevent the material values from falling prey to conviction ethical inflation. Material postulates, on their side, show the differentiated realms that they are not self-sufficient, but constantly need inputs ‘from the outside’” (Schwinn 2001: 324, 327, tr. from the German).

Moral values should, for example, not be allowed to cancel out profitability as leading value of business. They can, however, set limits to the manner in which profitability is attained, and can lead to actions and policies that alleviate gross inequalities in society as a result of free market business. From what has been said so far, one has to affirm Weber’s view that a number of social orders, each with its own leading value and peculiar rationality, have become differentiated in modernity, and that the best theoretical explanation that might be provided for the development of these social orders is an action theoretical one. From an action theoretical perspective, however, one has to question his view that values operating in these social orders are contradictory per se. It is especially not true that all moral values – and other socially recognised values – are irreconcilable with social-order-specific values. Rather, in contemporary society they play an irreplaceable regulating and integrating role, both within and between social orders. What one also has to question, from a present-day perspective, is Weber’s overly strong emphasis on politics in the nation state and the central role the charismatic political leader should play in national politics. The atrocities committed in World War II, in pursuit of the international hegemony of the German nation, under the leadership of the charismatic, but dictatorial, political leader Adolf Hitler, have made us extremely wary of condoning nationalism and adoration for the strong political leader. Moreover, the momentous social changes that have taken place since the end of World War I have undermined the centrality of the nation state, and even of politics as a social order. Weber worked at a time in which social scientists, for the most part, took for granted that politics was the dominant social

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order and that politics referred to national politics – still unaware of the pervasive influence of globalisation. Today, social scientists are much more aware of the fact that the world we live in is in the grip of a process of comprehensive globalisation, in which the political, economic, and cultural borders erected by nation states are consistently crossed and weakened. Our world is increasingly characterised by what John Tomlinson calls complex connectivity (Tomlinson 1999: 22), the result of which is that we increasingly have the experience of global-spatial proximity. It involves a sense of the shrinking of distances through the dramatic reduction in the time required to cross them, either physically (for instance, via air travel) or symbolically (via the electronic transmission of information and images) (Tomlinson 1999: 3). As this connectivity is global, we also increasingly have the experience of the unicity of the world, in the sense that for the first time in history we experience the world as a single, comprehensive social and cultural context. This global unicity should not be misunderstood as a tendency toward cultural homogeneity or political unity. It rather signifies that individuals and societies are increasingly confronted and influenced by events, products, ideas, technologies, and life styles that originated in other parts of the world (Tomlinson 1999: 10–11). In the context of the discussion of social differentiation, I would like to point out three consequences of globalisation: (a)  Globalisation has had as result that the dominance of the social order of politics, primarily understood in terms of national politics, has been weakened. People’s value preferences, but also their interests, are no longer exclusively dictated by actions and policies within the sphere of local and national politics. As many of the influences from outside the nation state, over which national politics has very little control, are generated by economic globalisation in particular, there has been a shift in dominance from the political to the economic social order. (b)  Although economic globalisation has stimulated world trade, it also has significant drawbacks. For the most part, it has not really benefited poor countries and poor people as economists predicted. Only the economies of a small number of countries have strongly benefited from it, while the economies of the poorest countries have either shrunk, or have only grown insignificantly. The number of absolutely poor people living below the breadline has increased significantly, while a very small percentage of people have become super-rich. This extreme economic inequality has not only led to increased protests against economic globalisation and the multinational companies driving it, but also re-introduced an intense ethical debate on economic justice. The predominant neo-liberal capitalist doctrine of the nineties, that the interests of people are best served when the economy is left alone to function according to its own rules, is no more taken for granted. (c)  Another social order that has become more prominent since Weber’s time is that of science and of technology. In fact, new technology, especially transport



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and communication technology, has significantly contributed to economic globalisation. Rapid technological development has drastically changed our everyday lives and, in many respects, has improved the quality of life of a significant part of the world population. However, it, too, has its serious downside. What has become clear over the last three decades is that we are increasingly living in a world in which, particularly as a result of the immense industrialisation of the last century and a half due to the introduction of new technology, human life and also non-human life on earth are severely threatened. We are increasingly faced by global risks that have the potential to impact negatively on a worldwide scale, and which can only be diminished by joint global initiatives. The most significant are the global ecological risks involved with, among other things, climate changes as a result of global warming. Other global risks, more indirectly linked to the development of modern technology, are: global economic risks like the severe worldwide recession experienced after the 2008 collapse of large international financial institutions and global terrorist risks, which we are increasingly experiencing since the dramatic terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2009 on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Thus, according to the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, global society can rightly be described as world risk society (Beck 2006: 22). One can hardly argue that, in such a global society, technological and economic developments should be allowed to proceed unabatedly and uncontrolled. Effective regulation of such developments based on, among others, moral values, is urgently needed.

4.  The ‘iron cage’ thesis As we could see from Chapter 3, Weber does not use the metaphor of the ‘iron cage’ in his Protestant ethics exclusively with reference to modern bureaucratic organisations. Rather, he has in mind the restricting impact that the whole spectrum of processes of instrumental rationalisation has had on the lives of modern people. However, it is not for nothing that, in literature on Weber’s view on bureaucratisation, this metaphor is used, in particular, with reference to modern bureaucratic organisations. There can be little doubt that, for Weber, employees of modern bureaucratic organisations bear the brunt of the restricting impact of processes of instrumental rationalisation on persons, especially on their freedom to act in accordance with their own ethical beliefs.8 Given the fact that, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an ever larger percentage of the 8  Cf. the following remark of Weber on the professional bureaucrat: “In the great majority of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks, and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top” (Weber 1968b: 988).

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workforce has been drawn into bureaucratic armies, public services, and companies, and given the fact that work and the workplace in contemporary society play such a central role in the lives of people, this is a significant conclusion. In Economy and society, Weber emphasises that the formalism and rule-bound nature of modern organisations rule out any personal discretion based on, for example, feelings of empathy for poor people, or the postulates of substantive justice. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, he emphasises that the bureaucratic nature of modern public services demands that officials strictly obey the orders they receive from the political leaders and not interfere in political decision-making. He criticises the tendency in Germany for government officials to play a leadership role in decisions on government policy. Playing such a role, in his opinion, undermines the hierarchical and formal, thus bureaucratic, nature of modern public services, as well as the decision-making power of the political leader. What is conspicuous about Weber’s discussions of the ‘iron cage’ effect of bureaucratisation is his rather ambiguous response. On the one hand, he cannot help regretting the widespread ethically restrictive and emotionally impoverishing impact it has on employees. On the other hand, he seems to regard increasing bureaucratisation as practically irreversible, on account of its undeniable technical effectiveness, and to regard the brave acceptance, even positive endorsement, of bureaucratisation as the commendable response. In his opinion, individual employees should not resist the fact that each one of them is only allowed to play a narrowly circumscribed and purely technical role in a bureaucratic organisation. Instead, they should embrace this role and fulfil it sine ira et studio. For at least the first half of the twentieth century, Weber’s analysis of bureaucratisation in the Western world seemed unassailable. Among other things, it was undergirded by the evermore prominent role played by big international companies with a tight and hierarchical bureaucratic structure, companies such as Ford, IBM, and General Electric. As a result of the expanding welfare role of governments in the Western world since the thirties, the bureaucratisation of public services also intensified. However, since the fifties, critical voices against the bureaucratic structuring of organisations were increasingly heard, reaching a climax in the nineties. The criticism was not only levelled against the identified shortcomings of the bureaucratic structuring of organisations, but also against its alleged out-datedness. Bureaucracy was regarded as inefficient, in being synonymous with inefficient business administration, pettifogging legalism, and red tape (Clegg 2011: 207). On account of its rigid hierarchical structure, and purely formal and impersonal nature, it was also accused of undermining the individuality, creativity, humanity, and commitment of employees (cf. MacIntyre 1981: 107, Peters 2003). The most incisive criticism, however, was that the bureaucratic structuring of organisations had become obsolete in a drastically changed social, technological, and economic context. A  prominent commentator, Manuel Castells, coined the concept ‘variable geometry’ to describe the extreme and



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pervasive instability inherent in globalised informational capitalism. He insists that the ‘variable geometry’ of the network economy and enterprise will generate sufficient socio-technical momentum and cultural force to generate and sustain another ‘control revolution’, in which the orthodox mode of bureaucratic control will implode under the combined weight of its internal contradictions and tensions (Castells 2000; cf. Reed 2011: 235–238). Due to changed socio-economic circumstances and cultural priorities, a decline of the welfare state and disenchantment with heavily bureaucratised public sector organisations could also be perceived during the last decades of the twentieth century (Harris, Clegg and Höpfl 2011: 2). Writing in 2005, Michael Reed came to the conclusion that there was widespread agreement, even among ideologically divergent social scientists and economists, that we are seeing the end of bureaucratic organisations: “[…] a neo-liberal management theorist such as Bennis, a neo-liberalist economist such as Schumpeter, a neo-corporalist such as Elias, a technological determinist such as Bell or Castells and a theorist of radical participatory democracy such as Illich can all agree that the underlying currents of history will, eventually, make bureaucracy an obsolete form of administrative power and organization” (Reed 2005: 115–116).

What led to the introduction of a new type of post-bureaucratic organisation was, on the one hand, a set of socio-economic factors that exerted pressure for organisational change, and, on the other hand, rapid technological development that enabled the desired organisational change. As a result of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements in the early seventies, an enormous surplus of capital for investment was unleashed on a global scale. Among other things, this brought about a shift from managerial to shareholder power in large companies. The ‘impatient capital’ of pension funds and other big investment institutions was more interested in short-term than in long-term results. The share price, rather than corporate dividends, was their main measure of success. As a result, the powerful investors exerted strong pressure on big companies to project an attractive image to potential investors. This includes having the image of being ‘lean and mean’: retaining only indispensable permanent employees and being flexible and adaptable when confronted with changes in the macro-economic environment or in customer needs (Sennett 2006: 37–43). The pressure for more economically efficient organisations coincided, during the eighties and nineties, in Western societies influenced by anti-authoritarian postmodern individualism, with the pressure on organisations to allow more space for the empowerment, self-reliance, creativity, and personal commitment of individual employees, and for peer-based teamwork controls (cf. Clegg 2011: 221). What enabled the introduction of post-bureaucratic organisations was, especially, technological innovation in a period of increased economic globalisation. The improvement of transport technology led to the exponential increase of the

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international transport of goods, enabling companies to move the manufacturing of products to developing countries with a surplus of cheap labour (Legge 2006: 308). The increased automation of production allowed them to reduce the size of their labour forces and to cut the costs of production (Sennett 2009: 90–94). However, it was the momentous improvement of communication technology that had the greatest impact. “The major advantage of digital technologies for business and organizations is their virtual possibilities for disaggregating existing designs. Increasingly, organizations are able to segment activities that are critical to their competitive advantage and to specialize elsewhere those that are not. The non-core functions, such as back office accounting, telemarketing, or programming are outsourced to parts of the world where the wage is one-third to onetenth the cost in the home market, dramatically reducing operating costs and increasing competitiveness” (Clegg 2011: 212; cf. Legge 2006: 309).

What, according to Michael Reed, distinguishes the ideal type of post-bureaucratic organisation from the ideal type of bureaucratic one is that it is based on collaboration (rather than specialisation), flexibility (rather than standardisation), and negotiation (rather than formalisation). It rests on core cultural values in which personalisation and individualisation are regarded as positive values to be embraced, rather than as negative values to be avoided at all costs to ensure the maintenance of procedural rationality and vocational probity, as in bureaucratic organisations. The much ‘looser coupling’ between the various structural components of the post-bureaucratic organisation, for example, between semi-independent teams working on different projects, is likely to make for a much higher degree of fragmentation and ambiguity than is the case with the bureaucratic organisation. Having substantially weakened the hierarchical backbone of the bureaucratic organisation, the post-bureaucratic organisation has to depend on devolved coordinating mechanisms that lack the consistency or resilience of centralised control through a strategic administrative mechanism and an elite group that takes overall responsibility for the organisation as a whole (Reed 2011: 233–234). Reed is the first to admit that, in real life, examples of this pure ideal type of post-bureaucratic organisation are seldom found. In stark contrast to his confident 2005 pronouncement that we are seeing the end of bureaucratic organisations, he conceded in 2011 that recent research has “confirmed the underlying organizational resilience and historical longevity of the bureaucratic control regime,” indicating “that key features of the bureaucratic control regime have become ubiquitous in contemporary organizations and societies” (Reed 2011: 240). According to him, this research suggests that “[…] within both public and private sector organizations […] a distinctive form of ‘neobureaucratic control’ may be emerging in which meso-level control strata and mechanisms are being rationalized out of existence, while strategic control is centralized at the macrolevel and operational control further decentralized to the micro-level” (Reed 2011: 242).



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In other words, the “neo-bureaucratic control regime attempts to blend, even achieves a partial synthesis between, selected elements of the ‘cage’ (rational bureaucratic control) and the ‘gaze’ (post-bureaucratic control)…” (Reed 2011: 245). In their introduction to Managing modernity: Beyond bureaucracy?, the collection in which Reed’s contribution is published, the editors echo his conclusion that there is growing consensus among researchers that new hybrid forms of organisational control, combining elements of both bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic control, have recently emerged (Clegg, Harris & Höpfl 2011: 2). The introduction of standardised behavioural routines and normative frameworks, in order to monitor, regulate, and govern in contemporary organisations, takes place for different reasons and on different levels. The introduction of neobureaucratic control measures is needed, especially, in big international companies that have become increasingly dependent on integrated information and communication technologies as a critical means for monitoring and regulating highly complex and mobile flows of financial, human, symbolic, and linguistic resources through spatially and temporarily extended networks (Reed 2011: 240–241). These neo-bureaucratic control measures apply, in the first instance, to the core elite, professional, ‘knowledge workers’, who play a leading role in contemporary organisations. Apart from other control measures, the introduction of a framework of values to which they have to comply is of pivotal importance. As Stewart Clegg emphasises, the hybrid control regime does not only need elite differentiation to ensure credible competition among various centres of powers (individuals and/ or sub-groups), but also “elite unification to ensure a relative consensus on basic values and on the legitimate rules of the internal political arena” (Clegg 2011: 221). By means of such unification, professionals or knowledge workers end up regulating and disciplining themselves in line with shared values, including moral values (Clegg 2011: 223). In neo-bureaucratic organisations, the introduction of sets of shared values is not only initiated from the top, to ensure control of elite knowledge workers in particular. On a decentralised level, the members of teams themselves can also introduce such sets of shared values to ensure peer control. ISE Communications, a small North American assembler of electronic circuit boards that in the eighties made a concerted effort to move away from a hierarchical bureaucratic structure to emphasise teamwork, empowerment, and increased employee discretion, provides an illuminating example. Graham Sewell and James Barker, in their discussion of this case study, point out that over a number of years ISE moved away from a familiar combination of technical and bureaucratic control, toward a new peer-based form that emulated many of the aspects of rule-based coercion, although the rules themselves were ostensibly arrived at and therefore, legitimated, through processes of mutual agreement within the teams themselves (Sewell and Barker 2006: 78). The organisation-wide ‘concertive’ control that developed from the fact that the individual teams adopted similar shared value

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systems, in terms of which team members monitored one another, in the opinion of the authors created an ‘iron cage’ even stronger and more effective than the former orthodox bureaucratic control (Sewell and Barker 2006: 80). Although the team members were quite aware of this fact, none of them was willing to contemplate a return to their previous ways of working, as they experienced peer control not only as constraining and coercive, but also as liberating and protective (Sewell and Barker 2006: 81). What are the conclusions one might draw with regard to the room provided for the adherence to ethical values and acting in accordance with these ethical values in contemporary organisations? (a)  As there is widespread agreement that elements of bureaucratic control are still part and parcel of many contemporary organisations, we first have to address the question: Does bureaucracy rule out adhering to, and acting in accordance with, ethical values within organisations based on its control logic? That Weber, at least, was of the opinion that this applies to all officials in the bureaucratic public service except the political leader, is a conclusion that is often drawn. Much of the criticism expressed against bureaucracy since the fifties has also been based on the assumption that it depersonalises employees by expecting them blindly to obey the orders of superiors and to leave ethical convictions out of the equation. This is a conclusion strongly opposed by Paul du Gay. According to Du Gay, bureaucracy was, for Weber, a historically contingent and variable ‘life-order’, constituting a distinctive ethical milieu in its own right, one whose practices of formalistic impersonality gave rise to certain substantive ethical goals and effects, such as democracy and equality. Thus, in his account of the ‘persona’ of the bureaucrat, Weber treats the impersonal, expert, procedural, and hierarchical character of bureaucratic conduct as elements of a distinctive ethos. Here office itself constitutes a ‘vocation’, a focus of ethical commitment and duty, autonomous of and superior to the bureaucrat’s extra-official ties to kin, class, or conscience. The ethical attributes of the ‘good’ bureaucrat include, among other things, a strict adherence to procedure, commitment to the purposes of the office, and the abnegation of personal moral enthusiasms (Du Gay 2011: 18). Du Gay does not shy away from calling this ethics, which formal rationality produces in the context of bureaucratic public services, “a positive, statist, ‘ethics of responsibility’” (Du Gay 2011: 27). In ‘Politics as a vocation’, Weber clearly does not himself use the term ‘ethic of responsibility’ in connection with the official, but only with regard to the charismatic political leader. Does this mean that he would deny that officials could be agents of the ethic of responsibility? One could argue, on the one hand, that at least one requirement for the ethic of responsibility is fulfilled, insofar as Weber does allow officials some discretion in deciding on the most effective ways to implement policy handed down to them. To quote him: “Independent decision-making and imaginative organizational capabilities are usually also demanded of the bureaucrat, and very often expected even in large matters. The idea that



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the bureaucrat is absorbed in subaltern routine and that only the ‘director’ performs the interesting, intellectually demanding tasks is a preconceived notion of the literati and only possible in a country that has no insight into the manner in which its affairs are conducted” (Weber 1994b: 160).

What, on the other hand, counts against identifying officials as agents of Weber’s ethic of responsibility is that they do not have the freedom that the political leader has, to independently select the ultimate values they commit themselves to in fulfilling their vocation. Du Gay may counter that they could still identify themselves with the values that constitute their vocation as officials and commit themselves wholeheartedly to these as ultimate values in the fulfilment of their duty, and in this way fulfil one of the requirements of acting in accordance with Weber’s ethic of responsibility. But what are the ultimate values officials could and should commit themselves to, wholeheartedly? Du Gay is not very clear on this. Mentioning that ‘good’ officials would strictly adhere to procedure, commit to the purposes of the office, and abnegate personal moral enthusiasms hardly allays fears that they would be expected to uncritically and enthusiastically implement the policy decisions of politicians even when they are dictatorial or corrupt in nature. Does the twentieth century not offer ample evidence of state administrations going astray on account of this? The only way to avoid such an outcome is, from the outset, to regard values that would exclude dictatorial policy-making and corruption as part of the set of values that constitute the vocation of the official – political values such as democracy, and moral values such as fairness and honesty. However, this is to go further than Weber is willing to go. Du Gay tries to argue that Weber was of the opinion that the formal rationality of bureaucratic conduct itself gives rise to substantive ethical goals such as mass democracy and social equality. This is an argument that does not hold water. Although Weber accepts that bureaucracy “accompanies modern mass democracy,” in that it encourages the levelling of economic and social differences, specifically when it comes to the appointment requirements for officials, he also warns that “the measure of its parallelism with democratization must not be exaggerated” (Weber 1968b: 983; 990). He stresses that “in this respect one has to remember that bureaucracy as such is a precision instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied interests, purely political as well as purely economic ones, or any other sort” (Weber 1968b: 990). He was also not of the opinion that bureaucracy produces social justice. He is quite adamant that the ‘propertyless’ masses especially are not served by the formal ‘equality before the law’ and the ‘calculable’ adjudication and administration demanded by bourgeois interests. “Justice and administration can fulfill this function [to equalize the economic and social life-opportunities of the propertyless masses] only if they assume a character that is informal because ‘ethical’ with respect to substantive content (Kadi-justice)” (Weber 1968b: 980). For a state administration to do this would for Weber be to act in total contradiction to its impersonal, formal bureaucratic nature.

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One may ask whether Weber’s insistence, that substantive ethical considerations should not be taken into account by the official in the fulfilment of his duties, does not follow from his conviction that all such ethical values necessarily form part of particular views of life. To take administrative decisions on the basis of such ethical values would, in his opinion, not only be to privilege unfairly a particular view of life over other life views in modern societies characterised by pluralisation, but would also inevitably lead to constant conflict within state administrations, causing them to be paralyzed and to function ineffectively. But why should all substantive ethical values be regarded as divisive? If agreement could be reached within a particular state on a set of substantive values, including moral values, and be legalised to apply to every citizen and also every official, there is no reason for such fears regarding state administrations. In fact, is it not the case in most modern states that particular substantive values, including moral values, on which sufficient agreement has been reached, form part of the legal requirements to which all citizens and officials have to comply? This certainly is the case with states in which a Bill of Rights forms part of the state constitution. One can also put it this way: substantive values, including moral values, forming part of the state constitution and the code of conduct to which state officials have to comply, do not subtract from the distinctive ethical discipline and commitment of officials in real-life bureaucracies. Rather, acting in accordance with them lends more substance to Du Gay’s claim that “office itself constitutes a ‘vocation’, a focus of ethical commitment and duty, autonomous of and superior to the bureaucrat’s extra-official ties to kith, kin, class, or conscience” (Du Gay 2011: 18), as well as to his claim that the official can be an agent of the ethic of responsibility. The same applies to bureaucratic or neo-bureaucratic companies that have reached agreement on their social responsibility and on a code of conduct with which all employees can identify, and to which they have to comply. To fulfil their jobs diligently and with commitment, in accordance with the moral and non-moral values that constitute the social responsibility and code of conduct of the company they work for, and not to allow their personal interests, preferences, and peculiar moral convictions to interfere with the execution of their duties, employees also fulfil a supra-personal ‘vocation’, and act in accordance with the ethic of responsibility – albeit that the ‘ethic of responsibility’ is then understood somewhat differently than Weber did. (b) The move toward post-bureaucratic organisation, including the hybrid neo-bureaucratic organisation, has gone hand in hand with the acknowledgement that moral values do have a place in contemporary organisations. As a result, the last forty years have seen “an explosion of explicit interest in ethics relating to work organizations, reflected in the creation of new journals, academic courses, and posts in ‘business ethics’” (Legge 2006: 299). According to Karen Legge, the intellectual roots of this explicit interest can be traced to the



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corporate social responsibility movement that emerged during the Cold War, in an attempt to show an ‘acceptable face’ of capitalism in the face of the Marxist critique, to the impact of John Rawls’s A theory of justice (1971), and to the feminist and Civil Rights movements, in privileging issues of equal opportunity at work (Legge 2006: 299). What has become clear is that business ethics relates to all three levels of economic activity. On the macro-level, there is a need for wider policy frameworks within which economic exchange, both nationally and internationally, occurs between nations. Legal and moral directives are also needed, on a meso-level, to regulate both the interactions between business organisations, on the one hand, and the state, organisations of civil society and private individuals, on the other. On a micro-level, moral guidance is needed with regard to the economic actions and decisions of individuals within organisations (Rossouw 2002: 2–3). Related to the interest in business ethics specifically, there is also, more generally, a renewed interest in professional ethics. This renewed interest is based on the widespread acknowledgement that ethical considerations do not only underpin the very content of the work of professionals (e. g., justice for the legal, altruism for the medical, and honesty for the accountancy professions), but also inform them on how the work ought to be carried out (Legge 2006: 311). One result of the recent widespread acknowledgement of the ethical dimension of business organisations and professions has been a proliferation of ethical codes, or codes of conduct. The introduction of ethical codes is, of course, not a completely new phenomenon. The Hippocratic Oath, which was drawn up more than two thousand years ago, and which for many centuries guided the behaviour of medical doctors, is an early example of a professional ethical code. Still, the scale on which ethical codes have been recently introduced in ever more professions is, however, unprecedented, while it has only been over the last forty years that ethical codes have also been introduced in business organisations. Deon Rossouw rightly warns: “They have gained such prominence that they are now often mistakenly regarded as the sole mechanism for managing ethics in business” (Rossouw 2002: 125). Unfortunately, it has been the tendency for the management of companies, and even public services, to introduce ethical codes without adequately consulting their employees, and motivating them to buy in. Once ethical codes are introduced and posted on walls, management often forgets the need for employees to engage regularly with the ethical code and its practical implications, and to regularly update the ethical code in response to new ethical issues with which employees are faced. (c)  What has also led to the increased acknowledgement of the place of ethical considerations in post-bureaucratic and hybrid neo-bureaucratic organisations, is the experience of urgent problems of an ethical nature relating to these organisations. Here I can only briefly touch upon some of these ethical issues:

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(i)  Employee issues The restructuring of organisations, to make them more flexible by means of downsizing, outsourcing, casualization, and automation, has strongly contributed to uncertainty and stress among employees. Knowledge workers have more job security than other employees, but are not immune to dismissal when the economy suffers a setback. A  general complaint among them is of heightened pressure through increasingly demanding and shifting targets in the context of restricted resources. This may lead to ‘workaholic’ lifestyles, ‘change fatigue’, ‘burn out’, and a ‘survivor syndrome’ of cynicism and mistrust (Legge 2006: 312). The uncertainty and tension experienced at lower levels of employment are even more intense. Unskilled and even semi-skilled workers in developed countries constantly face the threat of their work being shifted and outsourced to developing countries, being hired and fired at will when they are casual workers, and being unemployed on a regular basis (Sennett 2006: 48–54). Workers in developing countries are often exposed to numbing routine work and inhuman working conditions. Employees of call centres are involved in an uninterrupted and endless sequence of similar conversations with customers they never meet. The pressure they experience is intense, because they know that their work is being measured and their speech monitored, often leaving them mentally, physically, and emotionally exhausted (Legge 2006: 314). The exploitation of workers, including child workers, who are forced to work in sweatshops for long hours and in unbearable conditions, has been well publicised. These problems, experienced in particular by workers outside the permanent core of knowledge workers, attest to a more fundamental underlying problem: the restructuring of companies, and the distancing involved in both a social and geographical sense, allow the shareholders and top management of such companies to shed more easily their responsibility for employees of lower ranks (Sennett 2006: 57–62). The drastic restructuring of contemporary economic organisations has inevitably led to the increase of inequality within these organisations. Richard Sennett puts it well: “Inequality has become the Achilles’s heel of the modern economy. It appears in many forms: massive compensation of top executives, a widening gap between wages at the top and the bottom of corporations, the stagnation of the middle layers of income relative to those of the elite. Winner-takes-all competition generates extreme material inequality. These inequalities of wealth are matched within certain kinds of firms by a widening social inequality” (Sennett 2006: 54).

The increased inequality within corporations has inevitably resulted in increased inequality in national societies and the global society. As the mantra of ‘global competitiveness’ encourages governments to cut back on employee rights and welfare, they often to not contribute to the alleviation of the inequality, but rather to its exacerbation.



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(ii)  Customer issues The extreme pressure specifically put on salespersons to achieve ever-higher sales, often results in ethically dubious behaviour. Marek Korczynzki argues that the practice of paying salespersons largely by commission induces an instrumental orientation, whereby customers are perceived purely as means to an end: profit for the organisation and high reward to the salesperson. This encourages sales work that is characterised by the active stimulation of demand, rather than responding to the actual requests and needs of the customer – when selling financial products, for example (Korczynski 2002). Mostly, it is the financially vulnerable people in society who are manipulated into buying products they cannot afford. The practice of laying down specific sales targets for salespersons, and expecting them to reach such targets, can likewise tempt them to manipulate customers into buying products they do not need, or to manipulate the sales figures to create the false impression that sales targets have been achieved. In their handbook on engineering ethics, Charles Harris, Michael Pritchard, and Michael Rabins stress the importance of organisational culture. They rightly assert: “If the organization values success and productivity over integrity and ethical principles, these values will powerfully influence the decisions of members of the organisation” (Harris, Pritchard & Rabins 2009: 169). Prioritising profit margins in highly competitive contemporary organisations unfortunately often results in ethically compromised practices. Customers are usually the dupes of such practices. Many cases have been recorded of unscrupulous marketing and the selling of unsafe products. A well-publicised case is that of the Ford Pinto, which was designed in the 1960s to compete with cheap foreign-made subcompacts. Although crash tests revealed that the fuel tank installed at the rear of the car punctured in crashes in which the speed exceeded 21 mph, Ford went ahead with its marketing and selling of the car, and even continued doing so after it became known that the car had been involved in the tragic death of people (cf. Harris, Pritchard & Rabins 2009: 169; 266–267). Such outcomes can only be avoided if the protection of customers is recognised at all times as an ethical priority.

5. Conclusion What has become clear in our assessment of Weber’s views on the impact of modernisation on ethics from a present-day perspective is that a number of the conclusions he drew have to be questioned. They are either not nuanced enough, or incorrect. The first conclusion open to challenge is that disenchantment, as part of modernisation, will inevitably lead to secularisation, in the sense of the demise

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of religious ethics. Although modernisation has led to the pluralisation and fragilisation of religious ethical beliefs, religious ethics has not become obsolete since Weber’s time, and today still gives orientation and meaning to the lives of many millions of religious people. That modernisation results in secularisation, in the sense of the exclusion of religious ethical considerations from social orders, is to some extent true in contemporary societies. However, this does not take away the fact that, even today, a number of countries make allowance for the recognition of religious ethical values in the public sphere. Although religious people in liberal democracies cannot expect non-religious people to adhere to their religious ethical values in the workplace, they can still personally conduct themselves there in accordance with such values. And they have no difficulty, for the most part, to adhere to the sets of secular moral values they are confronted with in different social orders, as these secular ethical values often have their roots in religious ethical traditions and thus resemble religious ethical values. Weber’s action theoretical explanation of the differentiation of different social orders in society has to be recognised as more convincing than the functionalist theoretical explanation of Luhmann. However, one has to question his view that the different sets of values operating in the different social orders are necessarily contradictory. It is also not true that all moral values – and other socially recognised substantive values – are irreconcilable with social-order-specific values. This means that substantive values, including moral values, cannot from the outset be excluded from these orders, including the political order, as Weber does. In contemporary societies, such substantive values rather play an indispensable integrating and regulating role, both within and between social orders, in that they form the normative framework within which activities in the social orders are channelled. What has also become clear is that the dominant role Weber allocated to the sphere of national politics does not hold anymore in this era of globalisation. Not only has there been a shift in dominance to the economic and technological spheres, but the ethical issues that go hand in hand with economic globalisation and rapid technological development also often exceed the competency and jurisdiction of governments. In spite of Weber’s expectation that there would be an intensification of bureaucratisation due to modernisation, the past few decades has seen, rather, a shift away from the rigid hierarchical and tight bureaucratic structuring of organisations, allowing for more efficiency, flexibility, and creativity. This post-bureaucratic shift, however, has not resulted in the complete abolishment of bureaucratic elements in real-life organisations, but has instead led to the emergence of hybrid, ‘neo-bureaucratic’ organisations. The critical assessment of Weber’s views on bureaucracy has revealed reasons to question his conviction that a strong sense of vocation attached to office, which allows officials to transcend personal preferences, interests, and moral absolutisms in fulfilling their duty, can only be upheld by excluding all adherence to moral values from office. Moral values, which are



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applicable in the particular social order in which an organisation operates and on which agreement has been reached, can form part of the framework of values the official has to comply with – without being divisive. In contemporary post- and neo-bureaucratic organisations, there is widespread acknowledgement that such moral values not only can, but also should, form part of the normative framework with which employees comply. Given the many issues of an ethical nature confronting contemporary organisations, the inclusion of moral values in such normative frameworks is of the essence. On the basis of this assessment of Weber’s views on the impact of modernisation on ethical living we are now in a position to proceed to an appraisal of his views on the ethic of responsibility, which is the focus of the last chapter.

Chapter 6

Going beyond Weber’s ethic of responsibility 1. Introduction Due to the strong correlation between Weber’s ethic of responsibility and his views on the impact of modernisation on ethics, the previous chapter was devoted to an appraisal of the last-named views from a present-day perspective. The conclusion was that although Weber is right in asserting that modernisation has had a significant negative impact on traditional Western ethics, this impact has not been as devastating as he asserted. In the light of this appraisal a critical assessment of his view on the ethic of responsibility from a contemporary perspective can now be undertaken. The first part of this last chapter is devoted to this critical assessment, which will highlight both the commendable and the problematic aspects of Weber’s view. In the second part of the chapter, I  present a brief proposal on how an appropriate contemporary ethic of responsibility might be conceptualised. This proposal is based on the conclusion reached in the critical assessment, to the effect that the core of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, which we could, and should, retain today, is taking responsibility for salvaging and advancing the ethical dimension of life, while adequately acknowledging irreversible social developments, and responsibly dealing with the variety of values and making ethical decisions. Attention is given to a terminological clarification of the expression ‘contemporary ethic of responsibility as second-level normative ethical approach’, while the presuppositions and main features of the proposed ethical approach are also discussed.

2.  Critical assessment of Weber’s ethic of responsibility 2.1.  Commendable aspects Whatever else might be said about Weber’s ethic of responsibility proposal, one has to appreciate his recognition of the need in late modernity – on account of the negative impact of modernisation on traditional Western ethics – first, to take responsibility for salvaging the ethical dimension of life, second, to design a new approach to ethics to appropriately exercise this responsibility and, third, to con-



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ceptualise this new approach as a second-level normative ethical one characterised by comprehensive responsibility, that is, as an ethic of responsibility. (a)  The need for salvaging the ethical dimension of life In spite of our conclusion, in Chapter 5, that Weber’s views on the negative impact of modernisation on traditional Western ethics need to be strongly qualified, it cannot be denied that the negative effect it did have, and still has, poses a certain threat to ethical living in all spheres of life. Although disenchantment and differentiation have not resulted in the demise of Christian ethics and religious ethics in general as Weber predicted it cannot be denied that modernisation presents contemporary adherents of religious ethics with serious challenges. In fact, these challenges are faced not only by adherents of religious moralities, but also by adherents of ‘thick’ secular moralities related to particular views of life. They all have to deal in public life and in the workplace with sets of non-moral values and ‘thin’ moral codes they have to comply with. They are faced with new ethical problems on account of new technologies on which their own sets of ‘thick’ moral values do not always provide adequate ethical guidance. And they have to deal with the fact that ethical pluralisation makes it difficult to find common ground on ethical matters. Even within communities sharing the same religion or life view divergent views on contemporary issues such as abortion, genetic engineering, global warming and same sex marriages are found. It is often difficult to undertake joint advocacy or charity initiatives as a result of a lack of sufficient ethical consensus. It was one of Weber’s concerns that, due to the increasing influence of instrumental rationalisation in the Western world, the ethical dimension of life would be eliminated from social orders, including the political order. In his time, he identified the so-called ‘power-politicians’ (Machtpolitiker or Realpolitiker) as representatives of a purely instrumentalist, or functionalist, approach to politics, who deliberately kept all ethical considerations in politics at bay, and acted purely in terms of considerations of short-term military success. Pure ‘power-politicians’ are not exclusive to Weber’s time. In the years that separate his world from our own, the world has seen many ‘power politicians’ who have not allowed ethical considerations to hamper their militant efforts to achieve more political power for their nation and/or for themselves. Likewise, there have also been many modernday Macchiavellian ideologues of ‘political realism’, all too willing to legitimise the actions of ‘power-politicians’. It has not only been in politics that, since Weber’s day, we find a purely instrumentalist, or functionalist, approach, which denies the need for taking ethical considerations into account. In the field of economy, the influential school of ‘neoliberal capitalism’, inspired by, among others, the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, who called the ethical principle of social justice an illusion,

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propagated the idea that the economy fares best when the market is allowed to function on its own, without regulation based on ethical considerations.1 The neoliberal capitalist approach has been a driving force in the exponential growth of economic globalisation during the last few decades. In the development of new technology during the last century, one-sided technicist considerations based on the motto, “If it is possible to develop a particular new technology it should be developed,” have often overshadowed reservations based on ethical considerations. And, as we have seen in Chapter 5, in Niklas Luhmann the proponents of a purely instrumentalist or functionalist approach, banning ethical considerations from all social orders, have found an influential advocate. The diminishing role of ethical considerations in contemporary societies is, however, not only the result of deliberate efforts to undermine the influence of morality in certain spheres of life. Modernisation has also contributed to it in more inadvertent and indirect ways. Many authors have charted the almost imperialistic intrusion of free market economic values into other life spheres, including the personal lives of people and the public sphere. As a result of the powerful influence of economic values such as materialism, consumerism, and competition on family and personal life, individuals find it difficult even in their private lives to live consistently in accordance with the ethical values of their religion or view of life. As Michael Sandel has convincingly demonstrated in his book, What money can’t buy: The moral limits of the market, today purely economic considerations increasingly tend to replace moral considerations in practices in public life (Sandel 2012: 21–24). To quote Sandel on just one of the many examples he discusses: “When congressional committees hold hearings on proposed legislation, they reserve some seats for the press and make others available to the general public on a first-come, first-served basis […] Corporate lobbyists are keen to attend these hearings, in order to chat up lawmakers during breaks and keep track of legislation affecting their industries. But the lobbyists are loath to spend hours in line to assure themselves a seat. Their solution: pay thousands of dollars to professional line-standing companies that hire people to queue up for them” (Sandel 2012: 22).

The democratic and moral values on which the traditional practice of following a first-come, first-served approach to the attendance of congressional hearings in the USA was built, are fairness, equality, and transparency. The commodification of ‘queue-jumping’, as a means of gaining privileged access to congressional hearings, seriously undermines such values. 1  In his book, The mirage of social justice (1976), Hayek expresses the opinion that the conviction that the ideal of social justice can be implemented in societies dominated by the market order is logically incoherent, and therefore nothing more than an illusion. He asserts: “Strictly speaking only human conduct can be called just or unjust. If we apply the terms to a state of affairs, they have meaning only in so far as we hold someone responsible for bringing it about” (Hayek 1979:31).



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In his book, Does ethics have a chance in a world of consumers?, Zygmunt Bauman discusses the ethical implications of the fact that we are living in a global society of consumers. He demonstrates how patterns of consumer behaviour affect all other aspects of our lives, including work and family life. We are pressed to consume more, and ourselves become commodities on the consumer and labour market. He quotes J. Livingstone: “The commodity form penetrates and reshapes dimensions of social life hitherto exempt from its logic, to the point where subjectivity itself becomes a commodity to be bought as beauty, cleanliness, sincerity, and autonomy” (Bauman 2009: 58). Busy striving to earn more to buy the things they feel they need in order to be happy, people have less time for expressions of empathy and for intense negotiation, let alone resolution, of their mutual misapprehensions and disagreements (Bauman 2009:59). Thus, the result of the dominant consumer culture in our globalised world is a widespread moral blindness or loss of moral sensitivity, something Bauman and his co-author Leonidas Donskis discuss in more detail in their book Moral blindness: The loss of sensitivity in liquid modernity (Bauman and Donskis 2013). (b)  The need for designing a new approach to ethics Weber rightly stresses that the loss of the dominant position of Christian ethics as a result of the disenchantment effect of modernisation, but even more so, the differentiation of different social orders, make it inappropriate to still insist, in late modernity, on the recognition of Christian ethics in social orders such as politics or the economy. In contemporary, highly pluralised societies, to insist on the adherence, in politics or the economy, to Christian ethics or any other religious ethics, or, for that matter, any ‘thick’ ethics based on a particular view of life, would not only inevitably lead to conflict, but would also be unfair. It could also seriously interfere with the effective execution of operations in politics or the economy. A clear example would be the introduction of extreme religious pacifism as leading value in politics, to which Weber himself refers in ‘Politics as a vocation’. As pointed out in the previous chapter, this does not mean that there is no room left for religious ethical convictions to play a personal orienting role regarding the manner in which religious people do their job and treat other people in the workplace. Weber is also right in insisting that a conviction ethical or pan-moralistic approach is inappropriate in social orders, including organisations operating in these orders.2 In all social orders there are also order-specific values 2  In discussing the arguments of political realists such as Weber against introducing moral considerations in politics, C. A. J. Coady in his book, Messy morality: The challenge of politics (2008), avers that their arguments are often wrongly directed against the introduction of morality while they rather apply to certain distortions of morality that deserve the name moralism (Coady 2008: 14). What Coady describes as ‘moralism’ clearly resembles Weber’s description of ‘conviction ethics’. He distinguishes six types of moralism: moralism of scope (seeing things as moral issues that aren’t), moralism of unbalanced focus (giving an unbalance weighting to one set of

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of a non-ethical nature, which have to be recognised. Ethical considerations should therefore never be the only considerations on which decisions made in the context of a specific social order are based. A conviction ethical approach in social orders is also inappropriate in that it does not allow taking into account the foreseeable consequences of different options for action, to ensure the effective realisation of values, and to avoid harm that could be caused by a choice of actions based on even the noblest of ethical intentions. In Chapter 5 it was argued that Weber’s indiscriminate view that modernisation renders inappropriate the introduction of any ethical values derived from the tradition of Western ethics into social orders, has not been substantiated by the trajectories of modernisation since his time. The widespread introduction of ethical and professional codes that apply in different social orders, including the organisations and professions operating in them, contravenes this view. The ethical values that form part of these codes are in many instances extracted from the tradition of Western ethics and often show a strong resemblance, content-wise, with ethical values espoused in this tradition. In my discussion of the problematic aspects of his ethic of responsibility, I will have more to say about the wrong assumptions on which his view is based, in this regard. Here I would like to ask whether the fairly recent introduction of such ethical and professional codes does not at least support his view that the approach to ethics rendered necessary by modernisation should be different from traditional Western ones. In fact, one may ask whether such a different, new approach has not already been intuitively introduced and implemented in drafting these ethical and professional codes. Still lacking are an appropriate depiction and a convincing systematic exposition of this new ethical approach. It is not difficult to identify the salient features of this emerging new ethical approach. First of all, it is based on a process of consensus seeking by means of selection, discussion, and negotiation. Those who are involved in drafting an ethical code for a company or a civil service, a professional code for a particular group of professionals (e. g. engineers), or a Bill of Rights for the constitution of a particular nation, inevitably have to select guidelines from the depositories of guidelines provided by different types of ethical traditions: the fairly young tradition of similar codes drafted in the past, the traditions of the different major normative ethical theories and the ethical traditions of major religious and humanist views of life. By means of critical discussion, persuasion, negotiation and, eventually, agreement, guidelines provided by these different traditions are moral concerns over others that are just as, or more, relevant), moralism of imposition or interference (imposing moral judgements inappropriately on other people), moralism of abstraction (operating morally at a level too abstract to achieve realistic engagement with the world of action), absolutist moralism (inflexibility or rigorism in the application of moral categories), and moralism of deluded power (a distorted belief in the power of moral utterances and moral stands) (Coady 2008: 6–49).



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selected for their applicability, stripped of specific connotations they have in a particular ‘thick’ ethical tradition, and packaged in a systematic and accessible format. A second feature of the new ethical approach is that it is based on the recognition of the validity both of applicable ethical values and non-ethical socialorder-specific, profession-specific, or organisation-specific values. As a result of this, the drafted codes almost always consist of a mix of ethical and non-ethical values. A third feature is that it has both regulatory and aspirational intentions.3 Codes for the most part consist of rules of an ethical and administrative nature, which limit and regulate the actions of those involved, and to which they have to comply, as well as ethical and professional ideals they have to aspire to. There is yet another way in which developments regarding modernisation since Weber support his idea that a new ethical approach is needed. The rise in prominence of the social orders of science and technology, as well as the economy, at the cost of the political social order, has already been noted in Chapter 5. One of the results of the rapid technological developments over the last century that has drastically changed the way we live is the upsurge of a myriad of new ethical problems. Traditional approaches to ethics have, in many instances, proven to have difficulty in getting a grip on such novel challenges, and in providing clear ethical guidance. It is not only the case that ethical norms relevant to tackling such ethical problems are often not available in the repository of norms of traditional approaches to ethics. It is also that these ethical approaches are attuned to historical and cultural circumstances that no longer apply, and thus lack the contemporary mind-set required to deal with these problems adequately. In the light of new ethical problems raised by genetic engineering and the threat of nuclear extermination, the philosopher Hans Jonas asserted as long ago as the early eighties that existing ethical approaches are inadequate. Among other things, he found these ethical approaches wanting because their focus is limited to the short-term consequences of human actions, rendering them unable to deal with the long-term consequences of far-reaching technological innovations (Jonas 1984: 5). What is needed, in his opinion, is a new ethical approach that does not only recognise the enormous expansion of human responsibility correlating with the enormous expansion of human power as a result of technological development, but also provides an adequate foundation for the exercise of the moral responsibility required to ensure the future existence of humankind (Jonas 1984: 11).4 Although one has to agree with Jonas that a new approach to ethics is 3  Cf. Lon Fuller’s distinction between a ‘morality of duty’ and a ‘morality of aspiration’ in his book, Morality of law (1977). See also C. A. J. Coady’s convincing arguments against the rejection by political realists of any introduction of ideals in politics. While admitting that there are certain dangers involved with the introduction of ideals, he expresses the opinion that ideals do play an indispensable aspirational role in politics (Coady 2008: 50–75). 4 In Does ethics have a chance in a world of consumers? Zygmunt Bauman also signals the inadequacy of existing conceptual frameworks for understanding the present world and the ethical

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needed today, for the reasons he enumerates, this does not, in my opinion, mean that a complete departure from all traditional Western ethics is required – as he, like Weber, seems to suggest. Weber only raised questions regarding the need for a new ethical approach attuned to the social circumstances of late modernity in the context of politics, and never with regard to personal life. It is, however, an intriguing question whether he would have agreed that a new ethical approach is also needed in personal life. After all, he identified quite a number of ways in which modernisation has affected personal ethics: the undermining effect of disenchantment on religious ethical beliefs, the inevitability of choices the individual has to make between conflicting value systems on account of pluralisation and the increased prominence of the workplace in the lives of individuals, and the alienation from personal ethical convictions they experience in the workplace due to bureaucratisation. In my view, the developments that have occurred since Weber today compel us to ask: “Is a new approach to personal ethics needed in our time?” This is an important question for all people living today, although for those with religious affiliations it is likely to have a particular urgency. Although it has become clear that modernisation does not inevitably lead to the demise of religious ethics, the pluralising and fragilising impact that it does have on religious ethics, and the fact that religious people have to accept that the social orders in which they operate, as well as the organisations in which they work, are secular in nature, raises the question: ‘Can, or rather, may it be business as usual when it comes to the ethics religious people adhere to?’ One can break this question down into a number of sub-questions. Given the fact that today pluralisation increases the likelihood that different views with regard to ethical issues may prevail, not only within a particular religious denomination, but even within any one family, one may ask: Is it appropriate for religious people to insist, as in the past, that their own personal religious ethical views are absolutely correct? Or should they rather accept that their views are not infallible, and that there is room for consensus seeking and compromise with other religious people? And when it comes to the involvement of religious people in politics and in secular working environments: Is it still appropriate for them to insist – as was often the case in the past – on the Christianisation or Islamising of all spheres of life? Or should they rather develop a different view of the relation between their own religiously informed ethical convictions and those secular ethical values they encounter in these social spaces? In this regard, the stand religious people take against religious fundamentalism is of pivotal importance. Religious fundamentalists try to salvage the adherence of their group members to their ‘thick’ ethical beliefs in a globalised and pluralchallenges it poses. He then remarks: “We desperately need a new framework, one that can accommodate and organize our experience in a fashion that allows us to perceive its logic and read its message, heretofore hidden, illegible, or susceptible to misreading” (Bauman 2008: 2).



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ised world by completely ignoring irreversible societal changes, isolating their members from the influence of contemporary cultural developments, and reverting to authoritarian practices of bygone times. At the core of this response to modernisation lies the same sort of ethical absolutism that Weber criticised in his own context and which in our time often has disastrous consequences. (c)  The need for conceptualising the new ethical approach as a second-level normative ethic of responsibility From what has been said so far one can conclude, first of all, that Weber’s ethic of responsibility proposal might be commended insofar as it entails taking responsibility for salvaging ethical living in late modernity, to counter the undermining impact of modernisation. As this undermining impact of modernisation does not apply only to politics, but to all social orders, the responsibility to salvage the ethical dimension of human existence is a much more comprehensive one than Weber envisaged. Since it applies to all social orders, be it to different extents and in different ways, it is also a responsibility that cannot be allocated to the political leader alone, but should be extended to leaders operating in other social orders as well. In fact, one may ask whether the responsibility to promote ethical living in social orders in this anti-authoritarian, democratic, individualistic era, does not rest on all role-players. What we have also registered is that ethical living is not only under threat in the social orders, or in public life in general, but also in personal lives. This raises the question: Should the ethic of responsibility not entail also the responsibility to salvage ethical living in personal lives? One can also commend Weber’s introduction of the ethic of responsibility, as new ethical approach in politics, insofar as it is based on the recognition of the inappropriateness, in late modernity, of departing from traditional Western ethical approaches – which does not necessarily imply that it is also inappropriate to derive specific ethical values from Western ethical traditions content-wise. Again, we have to say that the need for introducing a new ethical approach for this reason does not apply only to politics, but to all social orders and to personal life. This is not a conclusion with which all contemporary philosophers would concur. Although such philosophers would probably accept Weber’s criticism of the introduction of religious ethical values in politics or, for that matter, other social orders, they would not agree with his dismissal of the relevancy for the social orders of the major secular normative ethical theories formulated by Western philosophers. They would point to the fact that, after all, some of the most influential of these secular normative ethical theories were introduced in the Enlightenment to counter the growing ethical pluralisation, by identifying and rationally justifying universally valid ethical principles that could be applied by everyone in all spheres of life. Consequently, they would also not be likely to support his conclusion that a new approach to ethics is needed in politics – or

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in other social orders – as they tend to maintain that at least one of the existing normative ethical theories could provide the necessary ethical guidance. When it comes to the claim of proponents of Enlightenment normative ethical theories, like the deontological normative ethical theory of Kant, or the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, that these theories counter ethical pluralisation effectively, I find myself on the side of sceptics like Weber and the postmodern philosophers. I do not believe that these normative ethical theories provide an effective antidote to the undermining effect of modernisation on ethical living, for the following reasons: (i) They do not really overcome the problem of increasing ethical pluralisation, but in a certain sense contribute to it. Not one of these normative ethical theories has succeeded in convincing everyone that the moral principles they have identified and justified are universally valid, applicable to all situations. As the different normative ethical theories contradict one another, those who support the search for rationally justified universal moral principles are forced to join a specific school of ethicists supporting a particular normative ethical theory, and opposing other normative ethical theories. As, in due course, different interpretations and adjustments of the different normative ethical theories have proliferated, numerous sub-schools have emerged, adding new varieties of the existing normative ethical traditions. (ii)  The main reason why the Enlightenment normative ethical theories cannot overcome the problems involved with ethical pluralisation is that they cannot substantiate their claim that indubitable foundations for moral principles can be found. In my opinion, postmodern thinkers have convincingly demonstrated that our ideas of truth are always relative to our historical and social contexts. This is also true with regard to all beliefs regarding moral values and morally right attitudes and actions we personally or collectively hold. They are derived from the traditions of the communities we belong to (cf. Van Huyssteen 2008: 492–506; De Villiers 2017: 263). A telling demonstration of the historical and social embeddedness of even normative ethical theories was provided when John Rawls, in response to criticism by communitarian philosophers, watered down his original claim for the universal validity of his two principles of justice, to the effect that these principles are only applicable in the political context of liberal democracies (Rawls 1993). (iii) With Weber, one may ask whether these theories do not have unacceptable conviction ethical traits that render them inappropriate for providing ethical guidance in social orders. Those claiming absolute priority for the moral principles they propagate do not leave much room for accommodating socialorder-specific, non-moral values. In not making allowance for the ethical relevancy of the consequences of action options, deontological normative ethical theories in particular are in still another respect susceptible to the criticism Weber exercised against the conviction ethical approach.



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(iv)  In being purely cognitive and abstract, these normative ethical theories have little chance of eliciting the necessary existential commitment and motivation in professional people and employees in general, and to thus provide effective ethical orientation to their actions in the workplace. It is, therefore, also not surprising that today people still do not turn to the first-level normative ethical theories of philosophers for ethical guidance in the workplace. From my experience of teaching professional ethics to engineering students for a number of years, it has become clear that the mere exposure of such students to the different options regarding normative ethical theories does not really help them to deal effectively with the ethical issues in their profession. Part of the problem may be that most professional ethics handbooks do not make clear choices between existing normative ethical theories, and often give the impression that they are complementary, while they actually exclude one another in many respects. However, the main problem is that the normative ethical theories, due to their abstract nature, cannot compete with, and also cannot replace, the personal ethical convictions related to particular religious or secular life-views in which employees were socialised, and to which they are existentially committed. My own teaching experience has not only strengthened my conviction that the major secular normative ethical theories are inadequate for providing ethical guidance in social orders and the organisations and professions operating within them, but has also convinced me that a new and more appropriate approach to ethics in these orders are needed. Such an approach would acknowledge that, in general, professional people and employees do not enter the workplace with minds that are tabula rasa with regard to ethics; that they already have their personal ethical convictions related to particular life views, and are not desperately in need of moral principles; and that they are already convinced about the rightness of their ethical convictions, and are therefore also not in need of the justification of moral principles by means of an abstract normative ethical theory. It should also acknowledge that, in the workplace, people are primarily in need of ethical guidance on how they could relate their own personal moral convictions to the ethical problems of the workplace, and to the ethical and non-ethical values already recognised there, in a meaningful way. In other words, the new normative ethical approach needed would not be one that strives, like existing normative ethical theories, to identify and rationally justify universally valid firstlevel moral principles as substitute for personal moral principles. Rather, it would strive to provide second-level normative ethical guidance on how people ought to deal with their own ethical convictions, as well as with moral and non-moral guidelines recognised in the workplace. To put it in a more general way: what we need today, even more than efforts in first-level normative ethics to identify rationally justified ethical principles, is a second-level normative ethics that could provide guidelines on the best approach in dealing with the existing diversity of ethical values and order-specific

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non-moral values, and on the measures that should be taken to ensure effective ethical decision-making in all spheres of life. Instead of identifying still another set of first-level moral principles, and providing an alternative rational justification for it, such a second-level normative ethical approach would rather work with the existing ethical systems, whether they are based on religious or secular lifeviews, or on philosophical, normative ethical theories, acknowledging the fact that their proponents would in any case not accept the denial of their validity. Of equally importance is that such a second-level normative approach would have to acknowledge that, in each of the social orders, and the organisations operating in them, distinctive sets of non-moral values have already found general recognition. The task such a second-level normative ethical approach would set itself, would be to strive to effectively salvage and promote ethical living in late modernity, while optimally accommodating all these different sets of recognised ethical and non-ethical values. Early in the twentieth century, Weber already recognised the need for such a second-level normative ethical approach in politics. For this he must be given credit. He should also be given credit for recognising that this second-level normative ethical approach should be called an ‘ethic of responsibility’, on account of the comprehensive responsibility it entails. Weber himself was of the opinion that this responsibility included both a retrospective and prospective responsibility, to be cultivated as professional virtue in the politician, but also shaping the formal ethics for political action that should guide politics. He regarded the charismatic political leader as the one who has to exercise both the retrospective and prospective responsibility with emphasis on the exercise of prospective responsibility. It is my contention that, also from a present day perspective, we have to agree with Weber that the second-level normative ethical approach needed – not only in politics as he judged, but also in other social orders and personal life – would be one comprehensively characterised by responsibility, both retrospective and prospective in orientation. Also, the emphasis should be on prospective responsibility, first of all for salvaging and upholding ethical living, not only in politics, but also in other spheres of life. The reason is that the threat to ethical living stemming from the undermining impact of modernisation has not subsided since Weber’s time, but has, in certain respects, even increased, due to new threats surfacing in the different spheres of life. Likewise, exercising prospective responsibility in selecting the values that should guide decisions is of pivotal importance today, as is the exercise of such responsibility in making ethically directed decisions. The reasons are that it has become even clearer, since Weber’s time, that, given the growth of ethical pluralisation, ethical principles promoted by traditional Western normative ethical approaches should not be applied in a direct, authoritarian, and unqualified manner, and that the careful analysis of the situation and the accurate estimation of foreseeable consequences of options for action in decision-making are not negotiable. In contrast to Weber, we have to insist that this prospective



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responsibility applies not only to politics, but also to other social orders and to public life in general, and should be exercised, not only by the charismatic political leader, but by all role-players involved in these spheres.

2.2.  Problematic aspects Although, in his ethic of responsibility, Weber provides us with a model of the second-level normative ethical approach we need today, we have to take into account that his conceptualisation of this approach is riddled with a number of serious problems we should avoid in our own efforts to develop a contemporary ethic of responsibility. I mention the three most significant problems: (a)  Weber‘s designation of the charismatic political leader as sole agent of the ethic of responsibility is elitist, open to authoritarian abuse, and one-sidedly political Weber’s designation of the charismatic political leader as sole agent of the ethic of responsibility is based on several presuppositions: (i)  In the Western world, social cohesion has for a long period been provided by Christian ethics as the dominant ethical value system. In modern Western nations, social cohesion cannot be provided by Christian ethics anymore, due to the loss of its dominance. The politics of the nation state has in the meantime replaced religion as dominant social order and thus also has to take over the responsibility to provide ethical cohesion and direction to the nation. (ii)  It cannot be expected of any of the role-players in politics other than the political leader to choose the ultimate values in terms of which politics should be conducted. Government officials, in particular, should not make this choice, because they are not qualified for such a role. Nor can we expect ordinary citizens to decide on such ultimate values in a democratically conducted process, as they are too caught up in and preconditioned by processes of instrumental rationalisation to initiate any effective ‘from the bottom up’ ethical renewal of the nation. The only suitable candidate for making final decisions on ultimate values in politics is the charismatic political leader, who uses his demagogic skills to achieve general acceptance by the citizens of ultimate values chosen by him. (iii)  As a result of disenchantment and differentiation there is an irreconcilable conflict between the distinctive value systems of the different social orders, and between traditional Western ethical systems and value systems of the social orders. It would therefore be inappropriate, if not futile, to try to introduce ethical values – or values from other social spheres – that are foreign to the political order and elevate them to ultimate values in making political decisions on policy and actions. Rather, the ultimate values guiding politics should be selected by the political leader from the cultural values of a particular nation that are compatible with the political order.

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(iv)  By selecting a suitable cultural value as an ultimate value in politics, the political leader could salvage the ethical dimension of politics, by basing all policy and action decisions on total commitment to such an ultimate value. I will attend to the third and fourth of these presuppositions when I discuss other problematic aspects of Weber’s proposal on the ethic of responsibility. Here I would like to restrict myself to what is problematic about the first and second of these presuppositions. As we have seen, Weber followed a strategy of eliminating a number of candidates for a leadership role in salvaging and upholding the ethical dimension of life. First to be discredited by him was the Christian religion, which, together with its ethics, lost its dominant role in the Western world due to disenchantment and was, according to him, destined for extinction. Second to be eliminated were the social sciences, which should devote themselves rather to objective and valuefree empirical research, and should not be tempted to ground or propagate a particular set of moral values. And by declaring that the choice of ultimate values from the existing pool of conflicting values is, in the end, a faith-based matter, he by implication also eliminated the normative ethical theories of the Enlightenment, which claimed to have found rational justification of universally valid moral principles. In his opinion, this leaves us with the dominant social order of politics as the only suitable candidate for playing a leadership role in providing ethical direction and cohesion to the nation. We need not, from a present-day perspective, deny the loss of the dominance of Christian ethics, the unsuitability of the social sciences for providing ethical leadership, and the failure of Enlightenment normative ethical theories to provide universally valid moral principles. Yet this does not amount to accepting that Christian ethics, and religious ethics in general, have no role to play with regard to the ethical orientation of contemporary people in their personal lives, and in their involvement in the workplace and society at large. The same is true of a variety of secular, humanist ethical systems, often manifesting a remarkable resemblance to traditional religious ethics, to which many non-religious people adhere. Even the much-derided normative ethical theories of the Enlightenment still have their adherents, albeit that they are today often interpreted and utilised differently. The adherents of these different ethical systems do not turn to political institutions when they seek ethical guidance on what has to be done with regard to the new and serious problems with which they are confronted with as a result of technological innovation and global economic developments, among other things. Rather, in seeking such guidance, they turn to their own religious denominations, humanist societies, philosophical schools, civil organisations specialising in reflecting on specific societal issues, think tanks, publications, and the media. When it comes to an ethical leadership role, one should acknowledge that the ethical reputation of the political order has been seriously tarnished since Weber’s time. The devastation brought about by two world wars as a result of



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the exultation of the nation-state, and the imperialistic promotion of nation-state interests and aspirations, has made us extremely wary of any claims that ethical leadership could be provided within the context of national politics. Besides, many of the serious ethical problems we are confronted with today, for example with regard to climate change and migration, are due to global developments, issues that nation-states often are unwilling, or unable, to deal with effectively. Nation-state politics are mostly driven by narrow national interests, and have up till now proven itself unable to effectively control a global economy run by multinational companies. It is, however, Weber’s identification of the charismatic political leader as the sole agent of the ethic of responsibility that conflicts most with presentday anti-authoritarian and anti-elitist convictions in democratic states. As he saw it, the leadership role he allocated to the charismatic leader with regard to the implementation of the ethic of responsibility should not be taken as authoritarian, in that the citizens, having been swayed by the charisma of the political leader, would voluntarily vote for him and his policies in a democratic election. German experiences with the charismatic Führer, Adolf Hitler, a little more than ten years after Weber’s death, showed how flawed his assumptions were. What became clear was that authoritarian manipulation of the opinion of the electorate by means of sophisticated and misleading propaganda could easily lead to a de­mocratic election in which it ‘voluntarily’ hands over political power to an authoritarian political regime. Even today, there is no reason to take at face value the ethically admirable picture that spin-doctors provide of political leaders and their policies, by means of effective marketing methods. As a result of the fact that such politicians have so often in the past turned out to be corrupt and selfserving, trust in politicians, worldwide, is presently at a low point. To depict the charismatic political leader as sole agent of the ethic of responsibility is also unacceptably elitist, in that no other role-player in or outside the sphere of politics is granted such a role. Apart from the fact that such elitism flies in the face of contemporary convictions regarding democratic participation and individual responsibility, it has in the past often resulted in complete abdication of any personal moral responsibility for participating in, or not preventing, harm done to people by authoritarian governments. A  case in point is Adolf Eichmann, who was a lieutenant-colonel in the German army during World War II, and was tasked by SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich with facilitating and managing the logistics involved in the mass deportation of Jews to ghettos and extermination camps in German-occupied Eastern Europe. At his 1961 trial in Jerusalem, he excused himself by insisting that he was only diligently doing his duty as an officer. Weber conceptualised the ethic of responsibility in such a way that no other role-players, apart from the political leader, could be agents of this ethic. This means that, should we want to make provision in a contemporary ethic of re-

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sponsibility for more agents, in and outside politics, such an ethic of responsibility would have to be conceptualised differently. (b)  Weber over-emphasises the enclosed nature of differentiated social spheres and the contradictory nature of value-systems In present-day parlance, one could depict Weber as a precursor of the ‘valuepluralist movement’ that has emerged in modern political theory. Although this ‘movement’ owes a clear debt to Isaiah Berlin’s work, Peter Lassman, in his book Pluralism, stresses that the contribution of Weber should not be underestimated: “It would appear that a historical interpretation of the rationalization, secularization, and progressive disenchantment of western society, such as that advanced by Max Weber, supplies the often unacknowledged background to much of the discussion of modern politics in a world of value pluralism” (Lassman 2011: 15).

Weber could, more specifically, be classified as a representative of the ‘existentialist’ version of value pluralism (Lassman 2011: 18; 31). In the ‘existentialist’ version, value pluralism does not only refer to the empirical reality of cultural difference and diversity, nor only to the intractable epistemological difficulties human reason experiences in dealing with disagreements in moral and political affairs, but also, even first and foremost, to the ontological incommensurability of values (Lassman 2011: 4–5). The ‘existentialist’ version is allied, furthermore, with an awareness of the inevitably tragic dimension in political life, in that the incommensurability of values not only forces role-players in politics to choose between values, but also has as result that the choices made always brings about inevitable and often serious loss or cost. The inevitable choice between values thus does not so much entail a ‘trade-off’ as a ‘sacrifice’ (Lassman 2011: 17–18). One could interpret Weber’s proposal on the ethic of responsibility approach that the political leader should adopt as an attempt to overcome paralysing political uncertainty and endless competition regarding leading values in politics, while acknowledging the insoluble conflict between values. He probably saw it as the only acceptable way available in democratic states to cut the Gordian knot of incommensurable values, and to provide ethical direction and cohesion to the nation. How should we assess Weber’s ‘existentialist’ and tragic view of value-pluralism? In my opinion, we could only arrive at a satisfactory answer to this question if we distinguish more carefully between different types of values than Weber does, when he refers to the inevitable conflict between values as a result of disenchantment and differentiation. In particular, we should take the distinction between moral and social-order-specific non-moral values into account. If we take this distinction as point of departure, the question regarding the incommensurability of values could be broken down into three sub-questions: (i) To what extent are moral values incommensurable? (ii) To what extent are moral and order-specific



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non-moral values incommensurable? (iii) To what extent are the non-moral values of different social orders incommensurable? As only the first two sub-questions are relevant to the present investigation, I will only give attention to them. When it comes to the first question, one has to agree with Weber, that ethical value systems forming part of different life-views, or to use a term of Michael Walzer, ‘thick’ ethical value systems, are to a large extent incommensurable (Walzer 1994: xi). Such ethical value systems mostly proceed from different hierarchies of ethical values, often include different ethical values, or provide different interpretations of ethical values, even when they are seemingly identical. To a certain extent, the incommensurability also applies to individual moral values that form part of different ‘thick’ value systems, as they always carry distinctive connotations derived from distinctive views of life. We should, however, not exaggerate the incommensurability of individual moral values taken from different views of life. Were such individual moral values totally incommensurable, it would have been impossible for one religion to take over moral values from other religions, or for one view of life to take over moral values from other views of life. Yet history is full of examples of the adoption of individual moral values, even sets of moral values, from other religions or views of life. The Old Testament authors, for example, took over moral prescriptions from Babylonian religions, the New Testament from Judaism and Hellenist Greece, the theologians of the Middle Ages from Plato and Aristotle, and the Humanists from the Christian religion. It thus seems quite possible to strip individual moral values or sets of moral values of their ‘thick’ connotations and incorporate them into another religious or life-view related ethical system. Vincent Brümmer makes a distinction between ‘behaviour’ and ‘action’ that is relevant for our present discussion. Two people may be involved in behaviour that is identical, when perceived from the outside by onlookers. They may, for example, both be distributing food in a refugee camp. Yet when asked what they are doing, they may give two completely different answers. The one may answer: ‘I am supporting the revolutionary struggle of the refugees’. The other one may answer: ‘I am serving the Kingdom of God in obedience to God’. According to Brümmer, their perceivable behaviour is identical, but what they are doing, their actions, are not the same, given the fact that they have different intentions with, and attach different meanings to, their distribution of food (Brümmer 2008: 133–134). I believe that, by extension, one can make the same type of distinction with regard to moral action guidelines or norms that are shared by Christians and non-Christians, or by religious and non-religious people. They can be seen from two perspectives. Seen from the insider perspective, the norms and the actions prescribed are not identical, but different, even incommensurable, because of the different intentions and different meanings involved. However, when considered from the outside, the norms involved and the behaviour they prescribe are often identical and certainly not incommensurable.

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What we can conclude from this is that, the more moral norms are disarticulated from the belief systems that give them a distinctive meaning, the less incommensurable they become, and the more it becomes possible to reach consensus on them. As in most problem situations, the number of applicable behavioural options that could be prescribed is far more limited than the number of interpretations, motivations, and justifications provided by different views of life, consensus on ‘thin’ moral norms stripped of ‘thick’ connotations is not improbable. The more limited the social context, the number of people involved, and, particularly, the variety of life-views involved, the better the chances are for reaching such a consensus. This is why it is often possible in limited social contexts such as organisations and professions to reach considerable consensus on the ‘thin’ moral values that should guide the actions and attitudes of people involved. Ethical codes in the workplace and in professions provide clear proof that the claim of Weber and other value pluralists, that moral values are always incommensurable, is not justified as it does not hold for ‘thin’ moral values. This leaves us with the second sub-question: To what extent are moral and order-specific non-moral values incommensurable? Again, one has to concede that Weber is right in holding that ‘thick’ moral values derived from religious or secular life-views often clash with non-moral values of social orders. To orientate policies and actions in social orders in accordance with such ‘thick’ moral values could severely disrupt operations in these social orders, on account of both the inevitable conflict between role-players with different views of life, and the interference in the implementation of non-moral values. To recall an example I have already mentioned: introducing the religious moral value of pacifism into politics could, among other things, severely reduce the effectiveness of police services in providing security to citizens. Also, elevating sacrificial charity to poor people to a leading value in a company could completely undermine the goal of achieving profitability in the company. It is, however, not true that ‘thin’ moral values are also incommensurable with the non-moral values of social orders. When sufficient agreement among role-players is reached on the applicable ‘thin’ moral values that should form part of the ethical code of a company, a profession, or a civil service, no incommensurability with non-moral values needs to be at stake. The ‘thin’ moral values that form part of the normative framework within which the non-moral values typical of a particular social order are implemented, do to some extent limit, and sometimes guide, the manner in which this implementation takes place, but for the most part do not exclude, or obstruct it. Although they do not necessarily contribute to the effectiveness of operations in social orders, they do contribute to their legitimacy. This is something Weber did not take into account. The reason for this might be that he made the mistake of equating all moral values with ‘thick’ values, that is, values that are derived from particular religious or secular views of life, not



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considering the possibility that moral values might also be ‘thin’, stripped of the connotations of specific views of life. He also made the mistake of not recognising an important difference between moral and non-moral values, the fact, namely, that moral values play an orienting role in all spheres of life, although this does not mean that the moral values applicable in the different spheres are identical. Using the terminology of the sociologist Peter Beyer, one can attribute to moral values a special status by asserting that they are ‘all-encompassing’ in nature, in that they have validity not only in one particular social sphere, but rather in all social spheres, albeit in different formats (Beyer 2001: 266). (c)  Weber’s formal concept of ethics has unacceptable implications and deviates unnecessarily from the common understanding of ethics I do not believe, as someone like Peter Breiner does, that Weber’s ethic of responsibility is intrinsically linked to his nationalism (Breiner 1996: 199). One cannot say that his view on the ethic of responsibility depends on his personal nationalist convictions, in that one can only accept the ethic of responsibility on the basis of such convictions. In ‘Politics as a vocation’, he never appeals to such convictions to argue his case for the ethic of responsibility. His argument in favour of this ethic depends, rather, on a sociological analysis of the nature of modern politics and the role-players involved, a demonstration of the inappropriateness of the ethic of conviction approach, and the identification of the features of a more appropriate approach in modern politics. However, what one can say is that Weber, in the way he constructs the ethic of responsibility, creates room for the political leader acting in accordance with this ethic to elevate an internationally strong German nation to ultimate value. In fact, one may ask whether his purely formal understanding of ethics in terms of devotion to an ultimate value does not leave room for almost any cultural value to be elevated to ultimate value of the ethic of responsibility, including cultural values the pursuit of which could be very harmful to particular individuals or groups of people. This is a negative implication also faced by other attempts to provide a purely formal definition of ethics or morality. R. M. Hare’s influential and purely formal definition of morality provides an example. In The Language of Morals (1952), he indicates two formal features to which a moral judgement has to comply, namely prescriptivity and universalizability.5 Subsequently, in Freedom and Reason, published in 1963, he admitted that his analysis of ‘moral’ in his earlier book was inadequate and that universalizability and prescriptivity should be regarded as necessary, rather than sufficient conditions for calling a judgement or principle moral. Moral principles, according to Hare, also have the added formal character5 In Freedom and Reason Hare summarises his view on moral judgement in The language of morals as such: “[…] moral judgements are a kind of prescriptive judgements, and they are distinguished from other judgements of this class by being universalizable” (Hare 1963: 4).

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istic that a person accepts them, in the end, to guide his life by, and therefore they always, in the case of conflict with other principles, have priority for him or her (Hare 1963: 168–169). Already in the seventies, there was growing resistance in analytical moral philosophy against defining morality in a purely formal way. G. J. Warnock, in The Object of Morality (1971), expressed the opinion that a formal definition such as Hare’s does not exclude values that in vernacular would not be called moral, for example, the values by which a sadist guides his life. “What is it, then, that is distinctive of ‘moral discourse?’ How is it that we can tell […] when we have a specimen or stretch of moral discourse before us? The obvious answer to this question seems to me to be the right one: we go by what that specimen or stretch of discourse is about” (Warnock 1971: 131).6

What Warnock is saying is that in common parlance we do not recognise moral language by its formal features, but by its reference to a particular content, namely the wellbeing of people. According to him, we only call a guideline for action ‘moral’ if we think that following it would be, in one way or another, beneficial to human beings, while breaching it would somehow be disadvantageous (Warnock 1971: 55; 57). I am in agreement with Warnock that the definition we provide of morality should not be so wide and formal as to allow any value that has priority for an individual (Hare), or is elevated by her to ultimate value (Weber), to be called ‘moral’. I also agree with him that, in distinction from Weber, our definition of morality should display continuity with the understanding of morality in the history of the Western world and with the common use of language today. Despite the variety of religious and secular systems of moral values in the history of the Western world, what has remained consistent is that the term ‘moral’ is taken to relate to human wellbeing in one way or another. It is certainly true that in both the ethics of Greek philosophers and Christian ethics, which have indelibly stamped ethical thinking in the Western world, morality is associated with human wellbeing or flourishing. In Greek ethics and ethical traditions influenced by Greek philosophy eudaimonia (happiness, faring well) was widely recognised as ethical goal. According to Viroslav Volf, the good life in Christian tradition has three components: life being led well, life going well, and life feeling good (Volf 2015: 75). We would thus be justified in claiming that, at least in the Western world, wellbeing or flourishing should be regarded as a partial criterion for calling values ‘moral’.7 6  Cf. Bernard Williams’s remark in his 1972 book, Morality: An introduction to ethics: “I shall assume as given […] a conclusion which Mr Warnock reaches in his discussion and which must certainly be correct, namely that any significant delimitation of the moral must involve reference to the content of the judgements, policies, principles, or whatever, that are being described as ‘moral’ (Williams 1972: 73). 7  Volf goes further and claims that the emphasis on comprehensive flourishing is found in



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In discussions on morality in moral philosophy during the last few decades, a helpful distinction has been introduced between two concepts of morality that have been influential in the Western world, both relating to wellbeing: (i) A wider concept relating to ‘the good’, concerned primarily with the wellbeing of the agent within the context of a particular community or society, although the wellbeing of the agent is mostly closely linked to the wellbeing of the community and other persons, as well as with the fulfilment of obligations to contribute to the wellbeing of the community and other persons. (ii) A narrower concept relating to ‘the right’ or ‘the just’, primarily concerned with the wellbeing of other persons and the community, and the obligations of the agent to enhance their wellbeing, and to abstain from doing harm (cf. Bayertz 2004: 37–39; Putman 2002: 93–94). According to Kurt Bayertz, the wider use of the concept ‘morality’ refers to a complex of norms, virtues, and ideals that provides every individual with general guidelines to give shape to her life within a particular religious or cultural community. Such systems of orientation are found in all human societies, so that their existence can be regarded as an anthropological constant. For the most part, such systems of orientation find their legitimation in tradition and are specific to particular religious or cultural groups. In Greek philosophy, the project to base such a comprehensive morality purely on reason was undertaken for the first time. Morality in a more narrow sense is, in Bayertz’s opinion, already present in the Old Testament – more specifically the second table of the Ten Commandments – although there it still forms an integral part of a morality in the wider sense. In the course of Western history, morality in the narrower sense has increasingly been distinguished, and eventually even completely severed, from morality in the wider sense. Morality in the narrower sense – according to Bayertz, one may even say morality as such – is today regarded as a separate social institution, that has as its function the minimising of anthropogenic evil. It works against the spontaneous egoism of individuals and their limited sympathy for others, and protects the interests of other persons they deal with. The content of morality in a narrower sense correlates with its social function in modern societies. Its directives prohibit, especially, hurting, killing, stealing from, and cheating other people, and tell us to keep to agreements. As such, it consists of a generally recognised minimal morality, regarded as necessary for living together in modern societies. It is this minimal morality, in Bayertz’s opinion, that has the limited social function to ensure the survival of others, which is today referred to in Western societies – if not in most

all world religions: “World religions distinguish between the transcendent and mundane realms and give primacy to the former; they are concerned with the good that goes beyond ordinary flourishing and contend that attachment to the transcendent realm is in fact the key to ordinary flourishing” (Volf 2015: 44).

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contemporary societies – when the term ‘morality’ is used (Bayertz 2004: 34–42; cf. also Shapcott 2010: 47). In my opinion, Bayertz makes out a convincing case for the recognition of both a wider and a narrow concept of morality in the history of the Western world, and the correlation of both concepts with human wellbeing. What I find less convincing, is his view that the wider concept of morality, at least in the Western world, has historically been left behind and that morality, the narrow conception of it that prevails today, not only functions as a separate social institution, completely severed from morality in the wider sense, but is considered as morality as such. We have already come to the conclusion, in Chapter 5, that the prediction of Weber and other sociologists regarding the inevitable demise of Christian ethics and religious ethics in general has been proven false. There are still many religious people in the world, including the Western world, who conduct their lives primarily in terms of the comprehensive religious morality they adhere to. And what about the moral value systems of non-religious people based on secular views of life? Are they not also manifestations of the wider concept of morality? Added to that, the debate between liberals and communitarians has shown that it is not possible to completely dissociate ‘thin’ moral values (thus moral values in terms of the narrow concept of morality) from the cultural and religious context in which they originated.8 It may be asked whether we should not rather accept that the link with ‘thick’ moral values that existed at the origin of ‘thin’ moral values, has not completely vanished today. And could it not be to the benefit of both systems of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ values to deliberately retain the link and the interaction between them? To these questions I will give more attention in the next section. What I  also find insufficient in Bayertz‘s account, is his description of the nature of the new morality giving expression to the narrow concept of morality. First of all, he recognises only a negative function and content for this morality, relating to the prevention of harm. However, we have already noticed that the ethical codes adopted in organisations and professions do not only play a negative limiting role, but also a positive guiding, directing, or aspirational one. Secondly, Bayertz does not seem to recognise that the narrow concept of morality does not only find expression in a very specific moral code, more or less resembling the second table of the Ten Commandments, but can take on a variety of formats, depending on the social context in which it is adopted. It might also be that, in some of these social contexts, the moral codes on which agreement is reached are not as ‘thin’, and thus not to the same extent shorn of ‘thick’ life-view connotations, as those in other social contexts. And lastly, one may ask whether an expansion of the scope of ‘thin’ moralities has not in the meantime taken place. 8  Cf. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and cummunitarians (1992) for a thorough discussion on the debate between liberals and communitarians.



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The recognition that we also have the responsibility to optimally enhance the wellbeing of living creatures other than human beings, often finds expression in ‘thin’ ethical codes formulated today.

3.  A proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility In his book Postmodern ethics Zygmunt Bauman emphasises: “If anything does matter it is the redemption of moral capacity and, in the effect, remoralization of modern space. To the likely objection ‘This proposal is unrealistic’, the proper response is: ‘It had better be realistic’” (Bauman 1993: 240). In the previous section I have made out a case that there is a need, not only for salvaging and promoting ethical living in contemporary societies, but also for introducing a second-level ethic of responsibility approach, to facilitate efforts to achieve this. Such an approach, in my opinion, is not altogether new, as it has in some respects intuitively been implemented in efforts, over the last half a century or more, to reach agreement in different social contexts on moral values that could provide a basis for cooperation (human rights, ethical codes in companies and professions). Although one should be careful not to make exaggerated claims regarding the effectiveness of such initiatives in promoting ethical living in contemporary politics, business, professional life, and public life in general, one should acknowledge the degree of success that has been achieved. This success shows that the claim that a secondlevel normative ethical approach can contribute to the promotion of ethical living in contemporary societies is not an unrealistic one. What I  would like to do in this last section of the book is to draw on the valid insights of Max Weber (and others) regarding modernisation and the ethic of responsibility to present my own proposal on a contemporary ethic of responsibility. I  will not here provide a comprehensive exposition of, and extensive argumentation for, this proposal; that will have to wait for another occasion. Until then, the following brief outline of the shape of the contemporary ethic of responsibility I visualise, will have to suffice.

3.1.  Terminological clarification What do I more precisely mean by ‘a contemporary ethic of responsibility as a second-level normative ethical approach’? Let me initiate the exposition of my proposal by explaining each of the terms in this designation. (a)  ‘Ethic of responsibility’ The term ‘ethic(s) of responsibility’ has been used quite differently by philosophers and theologians over the past half a century. This divergence has un-

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doubtedly contributed to considerable confusion about what exactly ‘ethic(s) of responsibility’ refers to. The term has been used, for example, to refer to the body of thought dealing with the ‘concept or discourse of responsibility’ to which many publications have been devoted in the recent past, especially in Great Britain and the USA (cf. Schweiker 2001: 18–19). Among other things, these publications give attention to the relatively recent emergence of the concept, and the different types, of responsibility (e. g., moral, political, legal, personal, collective, and role responsibility) that can be distinguished. Special attention has been given to the meaning and feasibility of taking retrospective moral (or legal) responsibility for negative outcomes of past actions. In my opinion, it is preferable to use the customary term ‘theory on responsibility’ rather than the term ‘ethic(s) of responsibility’ to refer to the topic of such publications to avoid confusion. Another use of the term ‘ethic(s) of responsibility’ is to refer to normative ethical thinking recognising ‘responsibility as foundational moral principle’. The influential normative ethical theories of Emanuel Levinas and Hans Jonas provide examples of this usage of the term. Without trying to glibly dismiss Levinas’s and Jonas’s views on the ethics of responsibility, I would like to raise the question whether Kurt Bayertz is not right in asserting that responsibility should be regarded as a second-level principle always referring to a first-level normative notion in terms of which responsibility is allocated (Bayertz 1995: 65–66). If he is correct, responsibility could hardly serve as the first-level foundational principle of a normative ethical theory. I use the term ‘ethic of responsibility’, not to refer to a theory dealing with the concept or discourse of responsibility, nor to a normative ethical theory based on responsibility as first-level moral principle, but to ‘an ethic comprehensively qualified by responsibility’, or even better, ‘an ethic facilitating comprehensive responsibility’. It facilitates comprehensive responsibility by providing guidance on taking responsibility for the salvaging and promotion of ethical living and on how this could be done in a responsible or appropriate manner. The responsibility at stake here should be understood, in the first instance, as prospective responsibility, seeing to it that ethical living is promoted, and seeing to it that this is done responsibly or appropriately. This does not, however, exclude the possibility of the ethic of responsibility also providing guidelines for dealing with specific issues regarding retrospective responsibility: on when and how someone, or an organisation, could be held morally accountable for not supporting the effort of promoting ethical living, or doing so in an irresponsible or inappropriate manner, and on how to overcome difficulties experienced today when it comes to identifying the morally or legally accountable agent in certain situations, for example, when a serious accident occurs as a result of system failure in technological applications (cf. De Villiers 2002: 16–21). I need to add that the ‘ethical living’ that the ethic of responsibility promotes should be understood as living qualified by the aim of contributing to the optimal



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flourishing of human beings and other living creatures, as I have argued in the previous section. Any understanding of ‘ethical living’ based on narrow egotistic personal or group interests is thus disqualified. (b) ‘Contemporary’ The ethic of responsibility is characterised as ‘contemporary’, in that it responds to the problem of the undermining of ethical living in contemporary societies and the factors contributing to it. It is also ‘contemporary’ insofar as it strives to contribute to the salvaging and promotion of ethical living, by adequately acknowledging the relevant features of contemporary societies, as well as the underlying processes and other factors contributing to these features. Thus, it depends on social science analysis of relevant societal features and contributing factors. (c)  ‘Normative ethical approach’ The ethic of responsibility is ‘normative ethical’ in that it provides guidelines on the most effective and contextually appropriate manner of promoting ethical living in the different spheres of life. More specifically, one can say that it is ‘normative ethical’, in that it reflects on the ‘goals’ that need to be set and achieved, the ‘virtues’ that need to be cultivated and instilled, and the ‘norms’ that need to be followed to contribute to this promotion of ethical living. At this stage, I prefer to call the ethic of responsibility not a normative ethical ‘theory’, but a normative ethical ‘approach’. This is not only because the required systematic exposition and tight argumentation that would justify the designation, ‘theory’, are still lacking. It is also because it seems to me that the term, ‘approach’, is simply more accurate. The Oxford Dictionary provides the following definition of ‘approach’: “A way of dealing with a situation or problem”. My proposal on an ethic of responsibility could be described as a normative ethical proposal on how to effectively and appropriately deal with the undermining of ethical living in contemporary societies. (d) ‘Second-level’ The ethic of responsibility is a ‘second-level’ normative ethical approach, in that it does not, like the major normative ethical theories, strive to identify and rationally justify the first-level moral goals or ideals to aspire to, moral virtues to exhibit, or moral principles to guide one’s actions. It takes for granted, rather, that most people already have their own moral ideals, virtues, principles, and norms, and for the most part believe that they are vouchsafed justification by the reli­ gious or secular view of life, or the normative ethical theory, they adhere to. It is a ‘second-level’ normative ethical approach, in that it strives to find ‘second-level’

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guidelines to effectively enhance ethical living in all spheres of life, among other things, by appropriately dealing with the plurality of ethical and non-ethical values found in these spheres of life in contemporary societies, and by appropriately making decisions on the basis of applicable values. The contemporary ethic of responsibility I  have in mind could be defined as ‘the second-level normative ethical approach providing guidance on taking responsibility for the effective and appropriate enhancement of ethical living in all spheres of life in contemporary societies’. This definition should be understood in the light of the terminological clarification just offered.

3.2. Presuppositions In a certain sense, one can say that many of the conclusions drawn in Chapter 5, as well as the first part of this chapter – conclusions regarding the particular manner in which modernisation undermines ethical living in contemporary societies, the inability of first-level normative ethical approaches to adequately stem the tide of the undermining effect of modernisation, and the need for a second-level normative ethical approach marked by comprehensive responsibility and attuned to the contemporary social contexts in which we are living – count as presuppositions in my proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility. There are, however, a number of other pivotal presuppositions that need to be spelled out. (a)  Presupposed normative notions In my opinion, one has to agree with Kurt Bayertz that ‘responsibility’ should be regarded as a second-level principle that always refers to first-level normative notions in terms of which responsibility, whether retrospective or prospective, is allocated. This raises the question: which first-level normative notions are presupposed by the ‘responsibility’ involved in the ethic of responsibility? Without making any claim for completeness, I would like to list the following normative notions: (i)  Ethical living The enhancement of ethical living, normatively defined as ‘living qualified by the aim of contributing to the optimal flourishing of human beings and other living creatures’, is the main goal of the ethic of responsibility. The manner in which the ethic of responsibility strives to enhance ethical living, however, should be guided by the following principles, some of which are non-moral in nature, while others are moral:



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(ii) Effectiveness The actions, strategies and policies proposed to enhance ethical living should be as effective as possible. This implies that the foreseeable consequences of different options should be estimated as accurately as possible, in order to decide on the most effective means. The effective means employed should, however, be limited by the moral goals, virtues, and principles that spell out ethical living in the specific social context, and the other presupposed principles listed here. (iii)  Contextual appropriateness All guidelines provided should pass the test of being appropriate to the relevant macro- (global and national), meso- (organisational) and micro- (concrete decisional) contexts. (iv)  Peaceful coexistence and cooperation Guidelines provided should not contribute to divisiveness and strife, but rather to optimal peaceful coexistence and cooperation. (v)  Democratic participation The approach is anti-autocratic and strives to ensure the optimal democratic involvement of all role-players in a particular social context in selecting applicable values and in decision-making. (b)  The validity of both social-context-specific non-moral and moral values is recognised The ethic of responsibility is based on the recognition of the validity of distinctive sets of non-moral values, not only in different social orders, but also in different types of organisations and different professions. In the course of modernisation, with its processes of differentiation, division of labour, and specialisation, these distinctive sets of non-moral values have crystallised and gained recognition. As a result each of these sets of non-moral values has validity in a particular social order, organisation or profession and is regarded by relevant role-players as essential for its effective functioning. Social-context-specific non-moral values are, however, not the only values recognised within a particular social order, organisation, or profession. In Chapter 5, we saw that, in due course, sets of social-context-specific moral (and legal) values have been introduced that act as normative frameworks, both limiting and guiding activities undertaken in such social contexts. The ethic of responsibility is also based on the recognition of the validity of these social-context-specific moral values. It is, however, also based on the recognition of the pivotal importance of finding the right balance between the sets of social-context-specific moral

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and non-moral values.9 Should the scale tip too far in the direction of the sole recognition of moral considerations, to the detriment of the recognition of nonmoral considerations, the effective functioning of a particular social order, organisation, or profession could be at serious risk. Should the scale tip too far in the opposite direction, the risk for morally corrupt behaviour and life-threatening operations and products arises. (c)  Both ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moral values are recognised The ethic of responsibility does not only recognise that both ‘thick’ and ‘thin’, or maximal and minimal, moralities are realities of contemporary life with which it has to deal. It also recognises the need for both ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moralities. As Michael Walzer puts it: “Minimal morality is very important, both for the sake of criticism and for the sake of solidarity. But it can’t substitute for or replace the defense of thickly conceived values” (Walzer 1994: 16–17). The reason is: “The morality in which the moral minimum is embedded, and from which it can only temporarily be extracted, is the only full-bloodied morality we can ever have” (Walzer 1994: 11). This last remark points to two important facts regarding ‘thin’ moralities. The first is that one cannot say that ‘thin’ morality comes first, that there has always been a set of universally recognised ‘thin’ moral values that has also been integrated in the course of history in different life-views and cultures, and has been cladded with ‘thick’ meanings. Rather, it is the other way around. ‘Thin’ morality always has its origin in ‘thick’ morality, from which it is abstracted for specific purposes. The second is that it is not the case that there is only a onedirectional movement from ‘thick’ to ‘thin’ morality, that once the ‘thin’ morality is formulated, it is forever freed from any ‘thick’ connotations. Even when a code of ‘thin’ moral values is agreed upon in a particular profession or organisation, it is unavoidable that persons involved will to some extent interpret the ‘thin’ moral values in terms of their own life-views and find their own ‘thick’ justification or motivation for recognising it. One may thus conclude: “There is no moral principle or norm that does not have its origin in the context of specific religious or cultural communities, and the interpretation of which is not influenced by contextual frameworks of meaning” (De Villiers 2014: 170).

9 As I  have already indicated in Chapter 4, I  do not agree with Wolfgang Schluchter’s view that Weber introduced a ‘bridging principle of balance’ in his ethic of responsibility (cf. Schluchter 1996: 89). From the perspective of constructing a present-day ethic of responsibility one can, however, appreciate Schluchter’s recognition of the need to find a balance between different types of values involved in decision-making.



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(d)  Moral values do not have absolute validity In the past, religions, secular views of life, and normative ethical theories have often proclaimed their systems of moral values on the assumption that these moral values are absolutely valid. It cannot be denied that, in a certain respect, this assumption may be regarded as legitimate. It is constitutive of ethical convictions held by adherents of religions (and also secular life-views) that they are regarded by them as unconditionally binding for themselves in that they have to unreservedly conduct their lives in accordance with them. From this ‘existential absoluteness’ of religious ethical convictions we, however, have to distinguish other forms of ethical absolutism that are less legitimate. The first is the claim that one’s own moral values are absolutely valid, in the sense that they are universally valid for all people and should therefore be recognised by them. The second is that these moral values are absolutely valid in that they should be regarded as infallibly and timelessly true. The third is that these values are absolutely valid in that they have to be recognised and obeyed in all spheres of life. The fourth is that these moral values have absolute priority, and should therefore, in all instances, override considerations based on non-moral values (Weber’s ‘pan-moralism’). As a result, not only of the research findings of social sciences regarding the plurality of moral systems worldwide and, especially, the pluralising impact of modernisation, but also of criticism in philosophical circles, particularly by postmodern philosophers, it would be difficult today, if not impossible, to uphold this fourfold claim regarding the absolute validity of moral values. In this regard, I  identify with the philosophical approach of ‘postfoundationalism’, of which Wentzel van Huyssteen is a major protagonist (cf. Van Huyssteen 1997; 1998 and 1999). This philosophical approach echoes much of the criticism of postmodern philosophers against the claim that moral values could be justified by grounding them in an indubitable foundation within our grasp, whether this foundation is God’s revelation, Nature, or Reason. Yet, in my opinion, it manages to avoid the pitfalls of ethical relativism, to which postmodern philosophy often remains vulnerable. Postfoundationalism stresses that all ethical convictions are based on interpretations of particular ethical traditions, whether these traditions are religious, cultural, or philosophical in nature. No ethical conviction can therefore claim to be universally valid for all people, infallibly true, applicable in all spheres of life, and overriding all non-moral considerations. Moral values should rather be de-absolutised, in a fourfold sense, by regarding them as 1) binding only for those who share the same view of life; 2) in principle open for interpretation and even correction; 3) having social context specific applicability; and 4) having only relative priority over non-moral values, in that they mostly do not override, but only limit and steer, activities based on non-moral values.

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What sets the postfoundationalism of Van Huyssteen apart from deconstructive postmodernism is its denial of the incommensurability of rationalities operating in different life spheres and of beliefs held in these life spheres. Instead, it recognises transversality with regard to rationality operating in different life spheres, and thus a certain universal intent at work in all rationality. As a result, we are able to transcend our specific contexts and are able to reach out to more intersubjective levels of discussion and to achieve a certain wide reflective equilibrium (Van Huyssteen 1999: 136, 279–20; 2006: 23, 33; cf. De Villiers 2017: 265). When it comes to moral values it is thus possible to reach a certain level of agreement and consensus, even if one has to take into account that this consensus if often limited and incomplete. With that we have identified another important presupposition of my proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility.

3.3. Features (a)  An ‘in-between’ ethic Where exactly does the ethic of responsibility fit in? By characterising the ethic as a second-level ethical approach I have already indicated that it should not be regarded as another first-level normative ethics, competing with other versions of such a normative ethics and striving to replace them. Rather, it acknowledges and works with existing first-level normative ethical systems, whether they are part of religious and secular views of life, or more philosophical in nature. Nor should it be regarded as an enterprise trying to answer the fundamental question: ‘Why be moral?’ This is, of course, an important question to deal with in our time, as it is no longer so evident to everyone that we ought to be moral beings acting morally. The ethic of responsibility does not itself deal with this question, but rather presupposes that a satisfactory answer to it has already been provided, or could be provided. I would like to suggest that we could characterise the ethic as an ‘in-between’ ethic. It fits in-between the enterprise of providing a rationale for being moral and acting morally, and the enterprise of dealing with, and implementing, firstlevel normative ethical principles. It follows on the first by taking for granted that it makes sense to be moral, but precedes the second in that it provides guidelines which should be heeded in dealing with, and implementing, first-level normative ethical principles. It also should not be equated with applied ethics, as it does not itself offer solutions to those particular bio-ethical, economic ethical, political ethical, or technological ethical issues that applied ethics deals with. It does, however, have relevancy for the manner in which applied ethics is executed. One can use the simile of a ‘filter’ for camera lenses to explain the manner in which the ethic of responsibility operates. Just as a ‘filter’, when used in photography, does not replace the lens of the camera, but rather enhances the images



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projected by the lens, by filtering out undesirable elements and highlighting desirable ones, the ethic of responsibility enhances the operations of normative and applied ethics by providing guidelines on how out-dated and unacceptable ways of salvaging ethical living could be avoided, and how ethical living could be enhanced in an appropriate manner. A more dynamic simile would liken it to a GPS or SATNAV system, as an improvement upon the traditional form of navigation upon which motorists once had to rely when driving to a given destination, namely, a printed road map. Such a system does not negate road maps, but rather works with them, even as it augments them in various ways. It enables the driver to overcome navigational problems not readily solved by means of printed road maps, and significantly enhances navigation by adding new and dynamic navigation functions. In a similar manner, the ethic of responsibility helps to overcome the shortcomings of traditional normative ethical approaches in contemporary circumstances without negating them. It explores ways in which traditional normative approaches have to adapt to changed circumstances, and provides guidelines on how ethical living could be effectively and appropriately enhanced in social contexts where traditional normative ethical approaches are not recognised, or considered inappropriate. (b)  Focus areas The ethic of responsibility has to deal with any new issue related to the undermining of ethical living that emerges in contemporary societies. An example of a relatively new issue in this regard is the difficulty experienced in contemporary societies with retrospectively holding specific agents morally and legally responsible for war crimes, as in the case of the Holocaust, for serious human rights violations, such as those committed under the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and for serious accidents as a result of the failure of technological systems, such as the explosion of nuclear reactors at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. It would be unwise, therefore, to limit the number of focus areas beforehand. With this in mind, I am of the opinion that we could retain – albeit in an adapted form – the two focus areas of Weber’s ethic of responsibility: (i) dealing responsibly with values and (ii) dealing responsibly with ethical decision-making, as main focus areas of a contemporary ethic of responsibility, without denying that other focus areas could be added. (i)  Dealing responsibly with values When it comes to dealing responsibly with values there are certain distinctions that have to be taken into account: yy Dealing responsibly with the sets of values that are applicable in a particular sphere of life should be distinguished from responsibly selecting and applying particular values from such sets when making ethical decisions. This is a distinction not

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explicitly made by Weber. Today, as a result of the advanced differentiation of social orders, trickling down to organisations and professions, this distinction has become necessary. Not only have distinctive sets of social-context-specific values in social orders, organisations, and professions crystallised, but is there also a stronger awareness of the need to have clarity on the depository of applicable values recognised in a particular social context. yy Dealing responsibly with ‘thick’ moral values in personal and communal life should be distinguished from dealing responsibly with ‘thin’ moral values in social orders, organisations, professions, and public life in general. Leaving aside, for the moment, the responsible selection and application of values in decision-making, let us first give attention to responsibly dealing with sets of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ values respectively: 1.  Responsibly dealing with sets of ‘thin’ moral values in social orders, organisations, and professions. Among other things, the ethic of responsibility has to identify ways in which role-players in these social contexts could responsibly deal with sets of ‘thin’ moral values. It also has to provide guidelines on how this could be practically and appropriately implemented. In my opinion, a contemporary ethic of responsibility should provide guidance to, and encourage, role-players in these social contexts to: yy Find the right mix of social-context-specific moral and non-moral values. With regard to moral values it means providing guidance on the selection of ‘thin’ moral values that do justice to the distinctive nature of the particular social context. Those ‘thin’ moral values have to be selected that are relevant and applicable in the particular social context, while others that are not relevant, and may prove unnecessarily disruptive of operations, should be left out. This does not mean that sets of social-context-specific ‘thin’ moral values are static and cannot be revised. It could be that, as a result of negative outcomes of operations, the need arises to introduce new moral values. The fairly recent introduction, in many ethical codes, of norms regarding safety and the protection of the environment, attests to that. What is also needed is guidance on the correct procedure to follow in finding the right mix of non-moral and moral values resulting in ethical code formation. Especially, the sets of ‘thin’ moral values that form part of this mix should find agreement and ‘buy-in’ among relevant role-players. It should be taken into account that, in some organisations and professions, the applicable moral values need not be as ‘thin’, that is, to the same degree shorn of life-view related and cultural meanings, as in others. If, in a small family-owned business, the owners want to maintain a Christian ethos, or a professional body of pastoral psychologists decide to base their ethical code on broad-based Christian ethical values, this is not necessarily morally unacceptable. Should the right democratic procedure be followed,



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and those involved agree on the moral values to be upheld, the mere fact that these moral values are not as ‘thin’ as in the case of the codes of other businesses and professions cannot be considered inappropriate. But, of course, there is always the danger of undemocratically or even autocratically introducing moral values in social orders, organisations, and professions that are too ‘thick’, in that they are only recognised by a certain percentage of the role-players, and denounced by the rest. How this ever-present danger, against which Weber already warned, could be avoided is something the ethic of responsibility should also provide clear guidance on. yy Maintain the ‘buy-in’ and motivation of role-players to recognise the ethical code agreed upon. Often, the problem is that, after the acceptance of an ethical code, little or no attention is given to the need for regular revision, to the ‘buy-in’ of new employees or members, and to the continued motivation of all role-players to recognise, internalise, and apply the values of the code. The document with the ethical code is either posted on walls or shelved in a file, and practically forgotten. It is of the utmost importance that new role-players be introduced to the ethical code, that all role-players be motivated to identify with it, and actually base their action and policy decisions on it. The ethical code should also be revised regularly, to ensure that the values it contains are still applicable and acceptable to all role-players. yy Identify new moral values when a moral gap emerges. In contemporary societies we are, as a result of rapid technological development, faced with the emergence of an increasing number of new ethical issues for which we do not always have adequate and applicable moral values that might assist us in evaluating those issues and moral norms that can provide ethical guidance on how to proceed. There is often an ethical backlog when it comes to technological development. An ethics qualified by responsibility should, in my view, assist those who are involved in applied ethical reflection to overcome this ethical backlog, by also taking on the responsibility to encourage them to identify and formulate applicable new moral values, and to provide guidelines on how this could be done and on the sources that could be explored. yy Maintain the relative priority of moral values over against non-moral values. I have already affirmed that the ethic of responsibility should assume that moral values do not have an absolute, but only a relative, priority. To spell out what this means in practical terms is one of the tasks of the ethic of responsibility. In my opinion, it could be helpful to interpret the relative priority of moral values as an ‘accommodative’ priority. For the most part, moral values do not override non-moral values, but, rather, optimally accommodate them by providing a normative framework, a moral space, within which activities based on nonmoral values could be freely undertaken. Only those activities that are clearly contradicting moral norms, or are hampering the positive contribution of such activities to a moral goal or ideal, are ruled out. Even in such cases, the

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seeming contradiction of a particular non-moral value by a particular moral value, or set of moral values, could often be overcome by finding alternative and morally acceptable ways to realise the same non-moral value. In cases where there is genuine conflict between moral and non-moral values, acceptable compromises could be considered. Again, guidelines are needed, in this case to help distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable compromises. 2.  Responsibly dealing with ‘thick’ moral values in personal and community life has become a responsibility of immense importance today. This is a responsibility that rests on all individuals, communities, and organisations holding and proclaiming ‘thick’ moral convictions, whether they are religious or secular in nature. Without any doubt, however, religious communities and individual believers have a very special responsibility in this regard. The reason is that in all the major religions there has been the tendency, especially over the last few decades, to respond to the pluralising and fragilising effect of modernisation and its offspring, globalisation, by adapting fundamentalist attitudes and stances. This religious fundamentalism has contributed considerably to religious strife and violence in societies. It would be presumptuous to claim that the ethic of responsibility on its own could overcome religious fundamentalism and its disastrous consequences. However, it could make a modest contribution by identifying ways in which religious denominations and religious believers could responsibly deal with their own ‘thick’ ethical convictions, those of other religious and secular life-views, and the sets of ‘thin’ moral values they are confronted with in society. There is little doubt that right-minded religious leaders could make the most effective contribution in combatting religious fundamentalism. They are the ones that should be persuaded to adopt and implement the ethic of responsibility approach in their own religious denominations. In elaborating on some of the ways in which responsibly dealing with ‘thick’ moral values could be accomplished, and the ethic of responsibility could provide guidance, I will mainly discuss religious communities and individual believers, although these ways are also applicable to communities and individuals proclaiming secular views of life. In my opinion, the ethic of responsibility should provide guidance on and encourage adherents of ‘thick’ moral values to: yy Deabsolutise their ‘thick’ moral convictions. I  have already indicated that one of the presuppositions underpinning the ethic of responsibility is that ethical absolutism is unacceptable. This is not to deny that being a religious person goes hand in hand with having strong convictions. However, what the ethic of responsibility would suggest is that we should distinguish between convictional certainty, that is, having strong convictions, and epistemological certainty, that is, claiming that these convictions are infallible. Convictional certainty applies – legitimately so – in that religious beliefs, whether ethical or not, calls for a certain personal commitment that is existential and unconditional in nature.



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Having convictional certainty on a particular ethical belief does not, however, imply the epistemological infallibility of this belief. It is quite possible, therefore, to have convictional certainty on the belief, while at the same time acknowledging its epistemological fallibility, admitting that, in principle, it may be correctable. ‘Thick’ moral convictions could thus be adapted and corrected in the light of fundamentally changed circumstances or convincing criticism, without sacrificing convictional certainty. This is exactly the point Charles Taylor makes when he stresses that, although religious people, as a result of the impact of pluralisation and fragilisation today, often make lifetime changes in their religious convictions, this does not necessarily mean that the faith they end up with, becomes more fragile. “On the contrary, the faith arising in this contemporary predicament can be stronger, just because it has faced the alternative without distortion” (Taylor 2007: 833–834, n 19). It is true that certain core ethical convictions cannot be abandoned without seriously undermining the integrity of a religious ethics. However, even such core ethical convictions could be reinterpreted, something that has frequently happened in the course of history. yy Exhibit tolerance towards the ‘thick’ moral values of other people. As a result of the pluralising effect of modernisation, today we do not only find a plurality of religions with distinctive sets of ethical values, or even a plurality of religious schools and denominations within a particular religion, each with their own sets of ethical values, but also a plurality of views on ethical issues within a particular religious denomination, or local branch of such a denomination. Within the Christian religion, for example, the most diverse views, on such ethical issues as same-sex relationships, cohabitation, abortion, divorce, capital punishment, and climate change, can be found, today, from the level of ecumenical bodies down to the congregational level. On all these levels, a strong polarisation of stances on such ethical issues often occurs. The groups opposing one another tend to regard their own views as absolutely correct, and condemn those of opponents as absolutely false. Still higher levels of polarisation and absolutising of moral convictions are found in the confrontation between different schools in a particular religion, and between religions. Should we accept that no one, including religious believers, has infallible access to the truth, and therefore can only make truth claims provisionally, such intolerance is unacceptable. The leaders of religious denominations and individual believers ought to be much more tolerant towards fellow members of their denominations, or adherents of other religious or secular life-views, who hold convictions on ethical issues that differ from their own. This tolerance should not be misunderstood as indifference. It should be based, rather, on the acknowledgement that we are all truth-seekers, who only have limited access to the truth and who constantly need to test our own ethical views against the arguments of those who differ from us. Leaders of religious denominations

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and individual believers should therefore be willing to engage in constructive critical discussions with people who have views on ethical issues that differ from their own. Jeffrey Stout rightly points out that proponents of different ethical views based on views of life can have fruitful critical conversations, and even learn from one another. Yet this requires that they not use such conversations as opportunities to shout one another down, or revert to sloganeering, but, instead, engage in immanent criticism of the discussion partner’s views and attempt to persuade him or her by presenting cogent arguments (Stout 2004: 73; 85–91). yy Adapt their ‘thick’ moral values to fundamental changes in society. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any ‘thick’ religious or secular ethical value system that has not changed over time. These changes could, among other things, consist in the reinterpretation of particular moral values, the rearrangement of the hierarchical ordering of fundamental moral values, the elimination of certain traditional moral values, or the addition of new moral values in order to deal with new ethical problems. They could be the result of cross-cultural and cross-religious influences, or of what Weber calls ‘value-rational’ initiatives, to eliminate inconsistencies or dilemmas inherent in the ethical value systems. However, it cannot be denied that the changes are often due to fundamental changes in society that necessitate the better ‘fit’ of a particular ethical value system to the macro-context in which it is providing moral guidance to the adherents of a particular life-view. It may be asked whether in our time, in which so many fundamental societal changes are taking place as a result of modernisation, it would not be responsible to reflect, intentionally and systematically, on the changes needed to such systems of moral values, instead of relying on inadvertent changes in the ‘thick’ moral value system that a religious community or an individual believer adheres to. In this respect, the ethic of responsibility could also assist adherents of ‘thick’ systems of moral values in providing guidelines on how this could be done appropriately. yy Achieve optimal consensus on ‘thick’ moral values in their own communities and organisations. In the past, religious communities have often been strong forces in achieving good in this world, by being involved in extensive charity work and in mobilising protests against injustice in society (e. g., against slavery, and the apartheid regime in South Africa). Today, they still have the potential to contribute effectively to the achievement of good in national societies and the global society. The realisation of this potential is, however, often hampered by the plurality of views on ethical issues prevalent in many religious communities. The reason is that a certain moral consensus is needed within religious communities to undertake joint charity and justice projects. Thus, to optimise the positive contribution religious communities could make in undertaking projects such as these, concerted efforts should be made in these communities to achieve optimal consensus on moral values undergirding such



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projects. Guidance is needed on how optimal consensus could be achieved without reverting to authoritarian enforcement. yy Positively relate ‘thick’ moral values to sets of ‘thin’ moral values in public life. Unfortunately, religious communities sometimes assess the secular sets of ‘thin’ moral values their members are confronted with in public life, for example in politics (human rights), companies (ethical codes), and professions (professional codes), quite negatively. Religious communities thus inclined encourage their members to disregard and oppose such secular moral values as far as possible, and proclaim the Christianising, Islamising, etc. of all aspects of society, sometimes embracing repressive and violent means to achieve it. Religious communities, especially more moderate ones not in the grip of a fundamentalist mind-set, should be convinced of the urgent need in pluralised societies to introduce secular sets of ‘thin’ values in social orders, organisations, and professions. It should be demonstrated to them, preferably by some of their own members, that the only way to achieve, in a peaceful manner, some of the ethical ideals they proclaim (e. g., peace and justice) in the pluralised societies of our time is by acknowledging such secular sets of ‘thin’ moral values. Furthermore, they should be encouraged to motivate their members to acknowledge, support, and apply the secular sets of ‘thin’ moral values they are confronted with in society. The strong motivation that religions can provide is of the utmost importance for the effective implementation of such sets of ‘thin’ moral values, and for enhancing ethical living in all spheres of life. yy Positively contribute to the formation of sets of ‘thin’ moral values. Ethical living in particular sectors of society can only be effectively and peacefully enhanced when agreement is reached on an applicable set of ‘thin’ moral values. Yet in many sectors of society, there is only limited agreement on the ‘thin’ moral values that could and should be acknowledged by everyone involved in that sector. There are at least two ways in which religious communities could contribute to the required agreement. The first is to encourage their members involved in these sectors to actively support efforts to achieve agreement, to participate in code formation, and to motivate fellow role-players to acknowledge and apply the set of ‘thin’ moral values agreed upon. The second is to take on the responsibility to contribute to the creation of new ‘thin’ moral values to address existing ethical issues more effectively, or to speak to new ethical issues when they arise, especially as a result of the introduction of new technology. This is where adherents of religious ethics could possibly make an important contribution. It is conspicuous that the philosopher Jürgen Habermas was willing to admit that the liberal morality prevalent in Western societies is too poor or ‘thin’ to provide adequate ethical guidance on ethical issues involved in genetic engineering. He expressed the opinion that Christian ethics, which is rich and ‘thick’, could help to provide the normative

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notions that are needed. Christian ethics could do this by demonstrating, in a manner accessible to all role-players, how insights drawn from the Christian ethical tradition could enlighten ethical reflection on ethical issues involved in genetic engineering (Habermas 2002: 162; 2005: 115). (ii)  Responsibly dealing with ethical decision-making With regard to the other focus area of a contemporary ethics of responsibility, namely responsibly dealing with ethical decision-making, I want to point out that the German theologian Eduard Tödt has already done ground-breaking work in identifying and discussing the steps that are involved in such a process. Critically discussing and further developing his views could be an appropriate point of departure for a contemporary ethic of responsibility (Tödt 1977; 1979; 1988a; 1988b; cf. De Villiers 2011). Tödt explicitly relates his theory on the formation of moral judgements to the ethic of responsibility. In the publications in which he develops his theory, he often refers to thinkers who contributed to the development of an ethic of responsibility: Max Weber, Georg Picht, Hans Jonas, as well as Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He sets himself the task of incorporating insights gained from the ethic of responsibility into his own theory on the formation of moral judgements (see Tödt 1979: 53–56; 1988a: 43–46; 1988b: 51,79–81). He also shares the conviction of the responsibility ethicists that traditional approaches to ethics  – including approaches to ethical decision-making – have been overtaken by rapid and incisive changes in contemporary social reality. Traditional approaches, like the casuistry approach, were developed for a social environment that remained stable for a long period of time, and are therefore based on the conviction that all that is needed to reach a moral judgement on what ought to be done is to apply the traditional ethos or a general moral principle to a particular case. Given the complex problems we are faced with today, we will do well to heed Tödt’s view that, in the formation of moral judgements, it is advisable to start out from the stipulation of the problem that has to be solved, and to only then undertake an inquiry into the criteria for right action (Tödt 1988b: 50–51). In his theory on the formation of moral judgements, Tödt distinguishes six steps involved in responsible ethical decision-making: yy Perceiving, accepting and stipulating the moral problem Tödt is convinced that the “point of departure for the formation of moral judgements in the vein of an ethics of responsibility must be to tackle the problems that crop up from the context of life and history” (Tödt 1988b: 51, tr. from the German). The first step in the formation of moral judgements involves: Perceiving the moral problem, accepting it as a moral problem that concerns oneself, clearly defining the moral problem, being self-critical of selfish and ideological motives in identifying and prioritising moral problems,



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and making sure that all the role-players agree on the urgency of the moral problem at hand and understand it in the same way. yy Analysing the concrete situation The situation in which an ethical decision has to be made has to be analysed as thoroughly and with as little prejudice as possible, by consulting reliable sources of information and submitting one’s own analysis to the criticism of other role-players. “To not analyse a situation as thoroughly as possible is negligence” (Tödt 1988a: 32, tr. from the German). Part of this situation analysis is also to take the historical context of the problem into account. Situation analysis “only succeeds in understanding the situation concretely if it reveals which past events have given shape to the present constellation of the problem” (Tödt 1988b: 62, tr. from the German). It also involves taking cognisance of the characteristics of the social order, organisation, or profession in which the ethical decision has to be made, including the existing role responsibilities. yy Designing and evaluating options for action Tödt emphasises the need to design and evaluate different options for action in order to find the best solution for the moral problem at hand. He adds: “The person who designs options for action responsibly cannot ignore effects and side effects, because all moral actions play out in the field of inter-human relationships” (Tödt 1988b: 64, tr. from the German). Through prognosis and planning, an attempt should be made to predict and manage the future. And, by analysing trends in the present, the consequences of different options for action should be estimated as accurately as possible. Tödt agrees with Weber that the consideration of morally suspect or ambivalent means, in order to ensure the achievement of a morally good goal, is sometimes unavoidable. There are, however, moral limits to the means that may be utilised. The moral agent should never act against his/her own conscience and put his/her own moral identity at stake (Tödt 1988a: 34–35). yy Testing of norms, goods and perspectives A responsible choice of the combination of applicable values forming the normative basis of decision-making should be made. It should be taken into account that moral norms are not the only applicable norms. Recognised social norms, in many cases embedded in institutions and social roles, have to be considered. They are not necessarily moral in nature, but often non-moral and sometimes even immoral, as they undergird discriminatory practices in society. There are also ‘goods’ (material values) that are recognised in society as desirable. In the process of the formation of moral judgements all these social norms and ‘goods’ must be scrutinised for their applicability, but also tested for their moral quality. Tödt is adamant that we should not give in to the modern tendency to allow only functional considerations to play a role in deciding on the actions to be taken or policies to be implemented. In deciding on the applicable moral values, what he calls perspectives can and should play a decisive

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role. These are the wider belief systems in which particular beliefs about life, the world, and God are integrated. These perspectives – according to Tödt – can and should also serve as sources when the need arises to formulate completely new moral norms, to decide on the new and complex problems we are faced with today (Tödt 1988a: 37–39; 1988b: 65–74). yy Testing the morally-communicative obligatory character of the selected option for action Tödt finds it necessary to introduce this step because he agrees with Georg Picht that an understanding of the concept ‘norm’, as referring to a fixed principle that has validity for all people of all times, would contradict an ethical approach that takes ‘responsibility’ as its central notion. The reason for saying this is that history confronts each person with his/her own specific responsibility regarding the moral problems that have to be solved. On the other hand, an overly individualistic interpretation of the norm concept has to be avoided, at least when it comes to moral norms. Implicit in all moral judgements, based on moral norms, is the standard of the unity of humanity that has to be respected. For that reason processes of interaction and communication have to be implemented in order to find common norms and ‘goods’ and to ensure the acknowledgement of their validity by all stakeholders (Tödt 1988a: 39–41; l988b: 74–77). yy Making the judgement decision A deliberate decision is needed to act on the outcome of the process of forming a moral judgement. Tödt emphasises that a person, after going through the first five steps in the process of forming a moral judgement, does not automatically proceed to act accordingly. There is indeed the possibility that he/she can be paralysed by uncertainty or fear. He/she first has to take a deliberate decision that involves, not only cognitive insights gained in preceding steps, but also the will to do what is involved, and to take responsibility for the consequences of his/her actions (Tödt 1988a: 41–42; 1988b: 77–78). I do not want to present Tödt’s theory of the formation of moral judgements as the definitive ethic of responsibility model for responsibly dealing with moral decision-making today  – indeed, I  have some critical questions regarding his theory. For example, I  would ask whether his fifth step (testing the morallycommunicative obligatory character of the selected option for action) should be recognised as a separate one. Arguably, both the consideration of one’s own personal responsibility and the consideration of the acceptability by other roleplayers should be regarded, rather, as part and parcel of the other five steps. I also wonder whether he is not too one-sided in his discussion of the process of the formation of moral judgement in terms of individual responsibility, failing to take into account that in many instances of decision-making it is rather a case of co-responsibility. Many of the decisions that have to be made today on effective morally directed actions or policies that could solve the complex ethical issues we



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are faced with, involve international agencies, governments, and the management of companies and other organisations. One can also ask whether some of the proposals made by him do not apply to the formulation of sets of applicable values in a particular social context, rather than to the responsible selection of values applicable in decision-making on a particular action or policy. His suggestion that “processes of interaction and communication have to be implemented in order to find common norms and ‘goods’” applies less to the process of moral decisionmaking than to code formation. These critical questions do not, however, take away that Tödt has provided us with an instructive model of responsibly dealing with moral decision-making, which could serve as point of departure in our discussion of appropriate ways to enhance ethical living in moral decision-making. (c)  Levels of operation The ethic of responsibility does not operate only on one level, but on at least two levels: a primarily theoretical level on which academics, but also professional people are involved, and a primarily practical level on which managers, educators, parents, and individual persons are involved. Let us give some more attention to these two levels of operation: (i)  Theoretical level On a theoretical level, some of the main types of activities that could be mobilised to serve the ethic of responsibility ethics are: yy Empirical analysis by social scientists of existing macro-, meso-, and the microcontexts could be undertaken to serve more than one purpose. It could be utilised to gain insight into the impact that factors at work in these contexts have on ethical living today. Of special interest is the impact of rapid technological development and globalisation. It could also assist in the selection and formation of values, by revealing in which areas of social life shared moral values are lacking, and where moral gaps are created as a result of technological innovation. Lastly, it could be utilised by companies, government agencies, and NGOs to ensure the reliability of situation analysis, when they have to decide on ethically directed actions and policies to be implemented. yy Critical philosophical reflection could be employed for different purposes. Further fundamental reflection on the shape of a contemporary ethic of responsibility, its relation to other forms of normative ethical thinking and the challenges it faces is much needed at this initial phase of its development. The same is true of on-going reflection on more particular issues regarding the distinction and relation of moral and non-moral values, ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moral values, the priority of moral values, and when compromise is justified. yy Social and industrial psychological research could help to determine how boards, managers, and employees in organisations and communities, and individuals

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in their personal lives, could effectively be motivated to take responsibility for the enhancement of ethical living in their own spheres of influence. Educational research has an important role to play in identifying effective ways to instil the virtue of being willing and ready to take responsibility for enhancing ethical living in children, students, political leaders, company managers, and employees. (ii)  Practical level All the theoretical inputs are to no avail if the insights gained are not effectively implemented on a practical level, in the everyday lives and activities of individuals, communities, organisations, companies, and governments. In all of these spheres of life, there are two sub-levels of individual and/or co-responsibility: the level of responsibility for enhancing ethical living by personally setting an example of ethical living (a responsibility everyone bears), and the level of responsibility for enhancing ethical living by teaching, inspiring, and motivating other people, or introducing effective measures that would encourage other people to also contribute to ethical living (a responsibility not borne by everyone). The more difficult it becomes for contemporary individuals in certain spheres of life to act morally in the execution of their duties (due to institutional culture, or other reasons), the more urgent the need becomes to give special attention to and to strengthen the second sub-level of responsibility in our societies. (d) Agents From what has been said so far about the contemporary ethic of responsibility we need, it must be clear that, in distinction from Weber’s assignment of the charismatic political leader as sole agent of the ethic of responsibility, we have to stress that such an ethic has multiple agents operating on different levels and in different spheres. What we have to admit is that leadership, including political leadership, remains important when it comes to the implementation of the ethic of responsibility. Today, leaders in all spheres of life can still play an important role in advancing ethical living. When they do not only instigate and support programmes to root out corruption and strengthen ethical behaviour in their own spheres of influence, but personally set an example by their own incorruptibility and moral integrity, they can exert enormous influence for the good in society. In South Africa we have the example of two charismatic leaders, Nelson Mandela as political leader, and Desmond Tutu as religious leader, who played an important role in ensuring a peaceful transition to the new democratic society in the early nineties, by proclaiming the message of reconciliation and instigating programmes to bring about reconciliation in society, and who, through their personal reconciliatory attitudes and behaviour, set an inspiring example to the people of South Africa.



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What we also have to grant Weber is that, as a result of the division of labour and specialisation, the influence that people can exert in organisations is, to a large extent, limited by their role responsibility. Yet we are justified in disagreeing with his view that role responsibility, at levels of the organisational hierarchy other than the leadership level, is totally determined by non-moral functions. Role responsibility also includes the responsibility always to act in accordance with the ethical code of the organisation. This grants the employee fulfilling a particular role the right to query and even resist assignments of superiors that contravene the ethical code of the organisation. Despite Weber’s doubts about the ordinary individual’s freedom to exert significant moral influence in society, today we cannot emphasise enough the responsibility of individuals to contribute to the strengthening of the moral fibre of society. For one thing, parents still have the greatest influence when it comes to instilling moral virtues in children, and therefore have either the co-responsibility or the individual responsibility to educate their children to be morally responsible human beings, above all, by setting a personal example. Individual responsibility is also of the utmost importance when it comes to addressing contemporary problems such as environmental pollution, the consumption of non-renewable natural resources, water scarcity, and global warming. It is true, of course, that enough people have to behave in similar ways to have a significant collective impact in solving such urgent problems. This introduces a new type of responsibility that has become increasingly important in our time and falls mainly on NGOs, although it is also shared by organisations of communities sharing the same view of life: to present viable ways in which individuals can help solve current problems and to strongly motivate them to buy in and adapt their own behaviour accordingly. This points to the fact that individual responsibility and co-responsibility should not be played off against one another. The exercise of both individual and co-responsibility (including collective and organisational responsibility) is indispensable in our time. (e) Modes The emphasis on agreement and tolerance as part and parcel of a contemporary ethic of responsibility might create the impression that the only mode such an ethic operates in is an accommodative one. This is not the case. In situations where the ethic of responsibility has to address the proclamation of extreme views, or the instigation of extreme practices in society, it might be necessary to adopt an activist, confrontational stance, and to operate in what one might call a prophetic or social critical mode.10 In my opinion, this would especially be situations in which, 10  In his book, Interpretation and social criticism (1987), Michael Walzer links social criticism to prophetic witness. He believes that Old Testament prophecy is the “standard form of social

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on the one hand, the functionalist denial of any recognition of moral considerations in a particular social order or organisation is proclaimed or practiced, or, on the other hand, the fundamentalist absolutising of one particular set of ‘thick’ moral values is proclaimed or enforced in society. When the adherents of either extreme functionalism or fundamentalism refuse to become involved, in any way, in constructive discussions and negotiations, the most responsible thing to do to enhance ethical living could be strongly to denounce and resist such attitudes and the views on which they are based.

4. Conclusion In this study, Max Weber’s proposal on an ethic of responsibility has been revisited. The aim of the study has been to fathom the relevancy of this proposal for the time in which we are living. The conclusion drawn from our interpretation and assessment of Weber’s proposal is that its relevancy lies in its recognition of the need in late modernity to introduce a second-level normative ethical approach characterised by comprehensive responsibility. However, due to serious shortcomings in Weber’s proposal, a contemporary ethic of responsibility has to be conceptualised differently. In the last section of this chapter, I have ventured a brief proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility. The aim is to outline a cogent proposal to stimulate further discussion. No claim is made that the proposed ethic of responsibility is, in all respects, completely new. Quite a number of initiatives adopting similar approaches as the ethic of responsibility have already been undertaken during the last half a century. The ethic of responsibility I envision could provide a common denominator for such initiatives, integrate them, and stimulate new initiatives. And while I make no claim for the universal validity of the proposed ethic of responsibility, I would nevertheless argue that it could be supported and practiced by anyone in the world – and not only in the Western world – who accepts that ethics has to do with the flourishing of living beings and underwrites the presuppositions on which my proposal for a contemporary ethic of responsibility is based.

criticism” and that the prophets may even be regarded as “the inventors of the practice of social criticism” (Walzer 1987: 87, 71).

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Name index Adorno, Theodor 4 Alexander, Jeffrey 166, 170 Ammerman, Nancy T. 164 Apel, Karl-Otto 4 Aristotle 99, 201 Bain, Alexander 140 Bauman, Zygmunt 189, 191n, 207 Barker, James 177–178 Bismarck, Otto 105 Bradley, F. H. 140 Baumgarten, Hermann 104n Baumgarten, Ida 39, 41n Baumgarten, Otto 38n Bayertz, Kurt 127–128, 205–206, 210 Beck, Ulrich 173 Bentham, Jeremy 51, 145, 153, 194 Berger, Peter 158, 161–164 Berlin, Isaiah 200 Bernasconi, Robert 139–141 Beyer, Peter 203 Birnbaum, Immanuel 19 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 4, 222 Breiner, Peter 8, 56–60, 99, 100–102, 114, 124–127, 130, 203 Broad, C. D. 50 Brubaker, Roger 53, 65n Brümmer, Vincent 201 Brugger, Winfried 65n Bruun, H. H. 8, 32, 65–70, 130–134, 138 Burckhardt, Jacob 106 Casanova, J. 157 Castells, Manuel 174–175 Channing, William 41 Clegg, Stewart 174–177 Coady, C. A. J. 189n, 191n Constant, Benjamin 141 Crusius, Otto 15

Dahlmann, D. 44–45 De Villiers, D. Etienne 194, 212, 214, 222 Dewey, John 152–154 Diederichs, Eugen 44 Dilthey, Wilhelm 152–154 Donskis, Leonidas 189 Dostojewski, Fiodor 51 Dreijmanis, J. 40 Du Gay, Paul 178–180 Ebert, Friedrich 16 Eichmann, Adolf 199 Eisenstadt, Shmuel 158 Eisner, Kurt 17–19, 44, 110, 115 Factor, Regis 54 Feraud, Jean-Francois 140 Fitzi, Gregor 38, 81n Foerster, Friedrich Wilhelm 16, 21, 28, 32, 36, 157 Fouillée, Alfred 152 Frankena, William K. 50 Franz, Erich 143 Fuller, Lon 191 Gane, Nicholas 7, 45–46, 52–54, 122–124 Gladstone, William 24, 104 Goldman, Harvey 83, 94–96 Goodin, Robert 58 Goodman, Lenn E. 165 Green, Thomas Hill 152 Habermas, Jürgen 138, 164, 166, 170, 222 Hare, R. M. 203 Harris, Charles 183 Harris, M. 175, 177

238

Name index

Hayek, Friedrich 187 Hennis, Wilhelm 31–32, 35, 38, 104, 106 Hensel, Paul 50, 121 Heydrich, Reinhard 199 Hitler, Adolf 199 Höpfl, H. 175, 177 Honigsheim, P. 44n Hopkins, N. S. 16–19, 40 Huber, Wolfgang 5

Mommsen, Wolfgang 19n, 42–43, 44n, 52, 98–99, 104, 106–109, 111–112 Monsma, S. V. 160 Mullhall, Stephen 206n Müller, Hans-Peter 7, 30, 45–46, 52, 54–55, 80–81, 122–124 Münch, Richard 166, 170–171

Jaffé, Else 18 James, William 152–154 Jaspers, Karl 41, 49 Joas, Hans 157–159, 167, 170n Jonas, Hans 5, 222

Palonen, Kari 34–35 Parker, Theologe 41 Parsons, Talcott 166–167 Peters, Tom 174 Picht, Georg 140, 143n, 222 Plato 21, 201 Preyer, G. 84 Prince Max of Baden 16 Pritchard, Michael 183 Putman, Hilary 205

Kaesler, Dirk 6n, 38n, 39n, 40n, 41n, 42, 104, 107n, 114n, 116n, 158n, 159n Kant, Immanuel 8, 50–51, 70, 74–77, 134–137, 145, 153, 194 Kim, Sung Ho 52n Kloppenberg, James T. 152–154 Körtner, Ulrich 5 Korczynski, Marek 183 Krug, Wilhelm Traugott 140 Lassman, Peter 23n, 200 Legge, Karen 176, 180–182 Lenin, Vladimir 17 Levinas, Emmanuel 5 Levy-Bruhl, Lucien 140 Liebknecht, Karl 16–17 Livingstone, J. 189 Löwith, Karl 42, 52 Luhmann, Niklas 166–171, 184, 188 Luther, Martin 28 Luxemburg, Rosa 16–17 Macchiavelli, Niccolo 38, 51, 100 MacIntyre, Alisdair 174 Mandela, Nelson 226 Maturana, H. R. 167 McKeon, Richard 139–140 Michels, Robert 18, 42–43, 93, 106, 131 Mill, John Stuart 22, 51, 140, 145, 153, 194 Mirabeau, Honoré 141

Niebuhr, H. Richard 5 Nietzsche, Friedrich 1, 50, 88, 106

Rabins, Michael 183 Radkau, Joachim 39, 41–42 Rasch, William 168–169 Rawls, John 164–165, 181, 196 Reed, Michael 175–177 Rickert, Heinrich 50, 121 Ricoeur, Paul 4 Rossouw, Deon 181 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 38, 99 Roth, Guenther 4n, 33, 70n, 108–109, 111 Sandel, Michael 188 Scaff, L. A. 88, 91 Schluchter, Wolfgang 8, 14–16, 18, 19n, 37, 70–77, 84–85, 105, 108, 111, 134–138, 212n Schmidt, Helmut 4 Schulze-Gävernitz, Gerhard von 109 Schwab, Franz Xaver 14, 34 Schwartländer, Johannes 139 Schweiker, William 5, 208 Schwinn, T. 167, 169–171 Sennett, Richard 175–176, 182 Sewell, Graham 177–178 Sidgwick, Henry 152–154



Name index

Simmel, Georg 25 Somary, Felix 40, 44n Soper, J. V. 160 Speirs, R. 23n Starr, Bradley E. 65n Stierle, K. 141 Stout, Jeffrey 163–165, 220 Suzuki, Masahito 17, 45 Swammerdam, Jan 21 Swift, Adam 206n Taylor, Charles 157, 159–162, 164, 219 Tobler, Mina 98 Tocqueville, Alexis de 38 Tödt, Eduard 12, 222–225 Tönnies, Ferdinand 40 Toller, Ernst 42–44 Tolstoy, Leo 21, 51, 72, 93, 117 Tomlinson, John 172 Turner, Charles 95n Turner, Stephen 54 Tutu, Desmond 226

239

Van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel 194, 213–214 Varela, F. J. 167 Volf, Miroslav 204 Waas, Lothar 7, 49–52, 120–122, 138 Walzer, Michael 11n, 201, 212, 227n Warnock, G. J. 204 Weber, Alfred 14 Weber, Helene 38–39 Weber, Marianne 15, 38–39, 109–110, 138, 145 Weber, Max sr. 38–41 Wieland, Wolfgang 8, 60–64, 127–130 Wilhelm II 2, 93–94, 115, 122 Williams, Bernard 204n Wilson, Woodrow 17 Wolff, Ernst 4n Wolterstorff, Nicholas 164 Zijderveld, A. 161

Subject index absolute validity of moral values 213–214 aestheticism 3, 91–92 bureaucratisation 101–102, 173–175 –– impact on personal ethical freedom according to Weber 88–89, 173–174 –– appraisal of Weber’s views 178–180 –– bureaucratisation in contemporary organisations 174–183 –– post-bureaucratic organisations 175–176 –– neo-bureaucratic organisations 176–178 –– role and place of ethics in contemporary organisations 180–183 capitalism –– spirit of 1, 83 –– neoliberal capitalism 187–188 charisma –– charismatic (political) leadership 23–25, 112–116, 146–147, 198–199 –– charismatic domination or rule 23, 101–103 commodification of practices in public life 188 contextual appropriateness 211 democratic participation 211 disenchantment 20–23, 84–85, 94–95, 197–198 differentiation (thesis) 30, 85, 116–117, 144, 165–173 effectiveness 211 eroticism 3, 92 ethical and professional codes 190–191, 216–217

ethical approach –– need for a new second-level normative 189–197 ethical decision-making 150–151, 222–224 ethical ideals 1–2, 55, 72, 94–95, 109–111, 145, 191, 209, 221 ethical living 208–210 ethic of conviction 3–4, 27–29, 50–51, 53, 55–57, 66, 71, 147–148 ethic of responsibility 4–6, 148–152, 207–209 –– Weber’s view in ‘Politics as a vocation’ 27–29 –– interpretation problems 47–48 –– major interpretations 49–77 –– assessment of major interpretations 120–138 –– interpretation as ethic fundamentally qualified by responsibility 143–152 –– assessment of Weber’s view 186–207 –– proposal on a contemporary ethic of responsibility 207–228 ethics –– consequential or teleological 7–8, 48, 50, 58, 61–62, 65–70, 125, 133 –– deontological 7–8, 48, 50, 60, 65, 74–75, 145, 153, 194–195 –– Kantian 74–75, 84, 153, 194–195 –– non-technical use in book 1n –– professional 9, 36–37, 54, 122, 181, 195 –– Protestant (Reformed) 1, 28, 31, 85, 88, 95, 173 –– religious 10, 74, 81, 83–84, 160–165, 187, 189, 192, 198, 206, 219, 221–222 –– understanding in terms of flourishing 204

242

Subject index

–– utilitarian 6, 8, 45, 50–51, 58, 60–64, 194–195 –– Weber’s ethics of political action 26–29, 96–98 –– Weber’s formal understanding 116–117, 146 –– criticism of Weber’s formal understanding 203–207 –– Weber’s negative view of traditional ethics in politics 109–111 –– Weber’s professional virtue ethics 25, 94–96 failure of technical systems 215 globalisation and its consequences 171–173 historical circumstances in Germany and Munich January 1919 16–19 inappropriate responses to modern culture 90–94 –– objectivist 90–91 –– subjectivist 91–92 –– absolutist 92–93 –– adaptionist 93–94 inner-worldly asceticism 1, 83–84, 86, 92–93 ‘iron cage’ (thesis) 10, 88–89, 157, 173–183 legitimate domination: forms Weber distinguishes 101–103 –– traditional 101 –– rational-legal 101–102 –– charismatic 102–103 minimal morality 205–206 modernisation –– negative impact on ethics 3–4, 86–89, 187–189 –– appraisal of Weber’s view on its negative impact on ethics 156–185 moral blindness 189 moralism 189n morality 188, 189n, 192n, 203–207, 212 –– non-technical use in book 1n

–– Luhmann on 168–169 –– Weber’s negative view of traditional morality in politics 109–111 Munich Free Student Association 14–16 nationalism –– Weber’s 107–111 naturalism 3 normative ethical theories 145, 194–195 peaceful coexistence and cooperation 211 political leadership –– Weber’s criticism of leadership role of government officials 24 –– Weber on ‘power-politicians’ 25–26, 147 –– Weber on solution of leadership problems in German politics 111–116 –– criticism of Weber’s views 197–200 political liberalism –– Weber’s ambiguous stance 104–106 political realism 187 politics –– ‘Politics as a vocation’ 23–29 –– comparison with ‘Science as a vocation’ 29–31 –– academic categorisation 31–38 –– Weber’s sociological views on politics as social order 99–104 –– Weber’s personal political views 104–111 postfoundationalism 213–214 power and domination 100 prophetic witness or social criticism 227–228 rationalisation 20–21, 82–85 –– Weber’s distinction between value- and instrumental (purposive) 82–83 –– Weber’s view on the impact of rationalisation on (Christian) ethics 85–89 relevant biographical information on Weber –– personal relationships 38–40, 42–45 –– personal characteristics 40–42, 45 responsibility –– emergence of concept 139–143



Subject index

–– retrospective and prospective 132, 141–142, 148–149, 196–197, 208

state monopoly of legitimate use of physical violence 100

science –– ‘Science as a vocation’ 19–23 –– comparison with ‘Politics as a vocation’ 29–31, 37 –– science and ethics 20–23 second-level normative ethical approach –– Weber’s ethic of responsibility as 151–152 –– contemporary ethic of responsibility as 209–210 secularisation (thesis) 1–2, 157–165 –– Weber’s views on 157–158, 159n –– assessment of Weber’s views 158-165 –– fragilising effect 161-162 –– pluralising effect 160-161

technicism 188 ‘the good’ 205 ‘the just’ 205

243

values –– ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ moral values 11n, 206207, 212, 215-222 –– social-order-specific (or social-contextspecific) 211-212 –– ultimate values 2, 9, 11, 26, 46, 56-57, 88, 96-98, 100-101, 117-118, 121, 123, 125, 129, 133-134, 137, 144-152, 166, 179, 197-198 value pluralism 200-203 ‘via media’ 152-154