Mobilizing Romani Ethnicity: Romani Political Activism in Argentina, Colombia and Spain 9789633864500

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction. Personal equation: Where did it all start?
Chapter 1 Defining Ethnic Mobilization—A Synergic Approach
Chapter 2 Political Opportunities—Understanding the Broader Context
Chapter 3 Romani Ethnic Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective. Looking into the Case-Study Countries
Chapter 4 Who Is Doing the Mobilizing? Anatomy of Romani Ethnic Mobilization Through the Prism of the Actors
Chapter 5 Mobilizing Frames? Identity and Interests Intertwined
Chapter 6 Mobilizing Romani Ethnicity for Collective Action
Conclusions Mobilizing for Change? Limits and Potential of Romani Ethnic Mobilization
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Mobilizing Romani Ethnicity

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Critical ROMANI Studies Book Series S e r i e s E di t or s Angéla Kóczé

Central European University

Márton Rövid

Central European University

E di t or i a l B oa r d Colin Clark

University of the West of Scotland

Margareta Matache Harvard University

Jan Selling

Södertörn University

Annabel Tremlett

University of Portsmouth

This book series aims to bring together emerging new interdisciplinary scholarship by Romani and non-Romani critical scholars within and outside of Romani Studies. The series galvanizes cross-dialogues between various regions, disciplines, ideas, approaches, and methodologies to expand the spatial-temporal and conceptual realm of critical Romani Studies. The book series critically examines the intersectional racialization of Roma as well as different forms of deep-rooted patterns of structural racial/classed/gendered exclusions, oppressions, and inequalities.

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Mobilizing Romani Ethnicity Romani Political Activism in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka

With a Foreword by Ethel Brooks

Central European University Press Budapest–Vienna–New York

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© 2022 Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka Published in 2022 by Central European University Press Nádor utca 9, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.ceupress.com Cover and book design by Sebastian Stachowski Cover illustration: Simple Story, 2016, by Małgorzata Mirga-Tas All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher.

isbn 978-963-386-449-4 (hardback) isbn 978-963-386-450-0 (ebook) issn 2786-2925 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Mirga-Kruszelnicka, Anna, author. Title: Mobilizing Romani ethnicity : Romani political activism in Argentina, Colombia and Spain / Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka. Other titles: Romani political activism in Argentina, Colombia and Spain Description: Budapest ; New York : Central European University Press, 2022. | Series: Critical Romani studies book series, 2786-2925 ; vol. 3. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022030715 (print) | LCCN 2022030716 (ebook) | ISBN 9789633864494 (hardcover) | ISBN 9789633864500 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Romanies--Political activity--Argentina. | Political participation--Argentina. | Romanies--Argentina.--Ethnic identity. | Romanies--Political activity--Chile. | Political participation--Chile. | Romanies--Chile--Ethnic identity. | Romanies--Political activity--Spain. | Political participation--Spain. | Romanies--Spain--Ethnic identity. | BISAC: SOCIAL SCIENCE / Anthropology / Cultural & Social | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Political Advocacy Classification: LCC DX301 .M57 2022 (print) | LCC DX301 (ebook) | DDC 305.8914/9708--dc23/eng/20220720 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022030715 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022030716

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For my family 

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Contents

Foreword by Ethel Brooks  Acknowledgments  List of Abbreviations 

xi xv xix

Introduction

Personal equation: Where did it all start?  The dilemma  The guiding questions and objectives of the book  Romani voices in academia and the emergence of Romani positionality  Notes on fieldwork and methodology  Europe vs. Latin America  Structure of the book 

1 4 6 9 12 14 15

Chapter 1

Defining Ethnic Mobilization—A Synergic Approach  Ethnic mobilization—a conceptual puzzle  Definitions and approaches  Ethnicity and mobilization  Theoretical approaches  The need for a synergic approach  Defining ethnic mobilization  Ingredients of ethnic mobilization  Ethnic mobilization as interplay  Political opportunities  Mobilizing structures  Mobilizing frames—identity and interests  Ethnic mobilization as process—towards a multi-directional perspective  Internal mobilization  External upward mobilization  External lateral mobilization  Understanding Romani ethnic mobilization  Framing Romani activism—literature overview  Delineating Romani ethnic mobilization—actors and processes  Defining Romani mobilizing structures  Pro-Roma actors and Romani ethnic mobilization 

19 20 20 22 22 28 30 30 32 33 36 39 42 44 45 47 48 48 57 57 60

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Contents Chapter 2

Political Opportunities—Understanding the Broader Context  Setting the scene: Ethnic mobilization in Europe and Latin America  Ethnic mobilization in Europe: a short overview of minority struggles  Ethnic mobilization in Latin America  Roma as political subjects  Evolution of the “Roma issue” in Europe  Historical considerations: Roma in Europe  Towards Romani political subjectivity  Roma as a target group  Romani voices  Roma in Latin America: invisibility and indifference  Roma in Latin America—a short history  Emergence of Romani voices in Latin America  Roma in Europe and Latin America: Comparable cases?  Visibility, size, and political relevance  Discrimination and antigypsyism  Master-frames for dealing with the “Roma issue”  “Panorama of Romani affairs”: resources and incentives 



63

                

64 65 68 73 73 73 76 77 80 82 83 88 94 94 96 97 99



101

                 

104 104 108 111 113 113 119 124 126 128 128 130 132 134 134 137 139 142

Chapter 3

Romani Ethnic Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective. Looking into the Case-Study Countries  Argentina, Colombia, and Spain: majority contexts, minority struggles  “Argentineans descended from ships”  Colombia’s multi-ethnic panorama  Spain: “Peoples and Nationalities”  Reconstructing the genealogy of Romani presence  Roma in Argentina—diversity and invisibility  Roma in Colombia—a minority among minorities  Roma in Spain—600 years of history  Demographics  In search of windows of political opportunity  Argentina: Kirchnerismo and interculturality  Colombia: Aftermath of La Violencia and opportunities created by the Peace Process  Spain: Democratic transition and emergence of the “Roma issues”  Anno Domini 2017—Status of Roma  Argentina—stagnation in the face of struggle  Colombia—political successes of a tiny minority  Spain—achievements or setbacks?  In conclusion 

viii

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Contents Chapter 4

Who Is Doing the Mobilizing? Anatomy of Romani Ethnic Mobilization Through the Prism of the Actors 



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146 147 148 150 154 155 156 156 161 163 165 169 172 177 178



181

Identity and interests—and potential of collective agency   Romani identity frames   Exogenous frames—defining Roma as a target group in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain   Homogeneity and stability of exogenous frames of Romani identity   Endogenous frames—collective identity narratives as “the public expression of self”   Between inclusive citizenship and ethnic difference   Narratives of shared identity   Identity as a prerequisite and as a product?   Frames of collective Romani interest   Mobilizing frames? Frame alignment and frame correspondence vis-à-vis Romani constituency  

181 183 186 191 193 193 196 202 203 207

Anatomy of a movement—birth and growth of Romani actors  Argentina  Colombia  Spain  Political opportunities and movement expansion  Panorama of Romani mobilizing structures: an overview  Typology and topography of Romani actors  NGOs as main drivers  Formal politics and Romani actors  Traditional leadership structures—the exceptional case of Colombia  Evangelical Church—an emerging actor?  Leadership and composition patterns  Multiple voices: Between fragmentation and consolidation  Rationale for ethnic mobilization  Being and doing: representation as a premise  Chapter 5

Mobilizing Frames? Identity and Interests Intertwined 

Chapter 6

Mobilizing Romani Ethnicity for Collective Action  Targets of mobilization—why is this important?  Targeting structures of power—external upward mobilization  Interacting with the opponent and the “invited spaces”  Strategies of containment and the illusion of power  Ambiguous relationships  International stakeholders as targets  Building support and seeking allies—external lateral mobilization  Bystanders as allies? Searching for public support  Internal mobilization—community as a resource?  Frame alignment and internal mobilization  Interacting with the constituency  Building trust—representativeness and legitimacy 



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210 212 213 215 217 220 223 228 229 230 233 237

ix

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Contents Conclusions

Mobilizing for Change? Limits and Potential of Romani Ethnic Mobilization  Romani issue as a global issue—importance of the trans-continental perspective  Looking back to Europe—lessons for Latin America  Why Europe needs to look beyond  Contributions to Romani Studies  Importance of a global outlook  Perspective of the minority scholar and the emergence of Critical Romani Scholarship  Romani agency in world politics—possibilities and opportunities  Romani ethnic mobilization and the potential for collective agency  Roma in world politics 

Epilogue  Bibliography  Index 



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243 244 245 247 247 249 254 254 256

  

259 265 295

x

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Foreword

Beyond Europe: Romani Identities, Self-Representation, and the Possibilities of a New Politics Ethel Brooks

Up until now, Romani people and Romani communities were seen through the prism of Europe. Represented by European scholarship and as a European minority, through a Eurocentric worldview inherently and often explicitly marked by racism, anti-Gypsyism, and exclusion. This book marks a fundamental shift away from Romani Studies based in Europe, maintained by European non-Roma intellectuals, and sustained by the absence of a Romani subject. It challenges these dominant understandings of Romani identity, belonging, politics, and activism. It asks us to dismantle that Eurocentrism that has been intrinsic to Romani Studies, and it shows us the complexity of Romani history and everyday life within and beyond the borders of Europe. Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka provides us with a new map of Roma in the world, precisely by placing us—Romani people—in the world, beyond Europe, across the Americas, into contexts and places where we so often remain invisible. MirgaKruszelnicka provides a new lens for understanding, offering new knowledge about Roma as not just a transnational, but a transcontinental, global minority. In this work, she presents an understanding of Romani mobilizations and Romani ethnicity that takes seriously Romani lives, the complexity of Romani histories and migrations, and the context of the nations and continents that serve as the frames through which political mobilization takes place. Growing up as a Romani-American, I was never able to see myself, or my community, in local or national politics, in archives or history books, or in school curricula. As a child, my parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, were heroes to me, and my family was everything, but I did not see my community represented anywhere in the larger world. I knew that my mother and xiii

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Foreword

her siblings had not been allowed to go to their local school after a certain age because of who they were; I knew that we were invisible as subjects, except in songs and movies about fortune-tellers and free spirits. By necessity, we also hid our existence—our language and our culture—keeping our identities, our connections to one another, secret from the gadje, in order to protect our community, our family, and to ensure our continued survival. At the same time, in my local community, our neighbors knew who we were; they knew us for our horses, for the work we did in the town, for close-knit family ties. This local knowledge is something that varies from town to town, from state to state, from region to region, across the United States and the million or more Roma who live here. In the US context, Romani identity has been localized, even hyper-localized. Identity is geographically grounded, based on the sheer size and heterogeneity of the United States, where Romani people are made visible or invisible in regional formations, dependent on labor markets, on seasonal migrations, on local cultural practices and political openings. One the other hand, Romani identity in the US is hyper-localized in that we, Romani-Americans, also take our language, culture, food, clothing practices, approaches to belonging and community participation, and connections to one another, as well as our ideas of political participation and activism, from our own traditions in our subcommunities, from our histories and patterns of migration. Which means that, as with Romani people globally, we Romani-Americans have a feeling of “being” Romani as part of a larger Romani Diaspora that stretches across centuries and across continents. At the same time, we carry our smaller group identities within that larger Diaspora as Roma, Sinti, Ludvar, Kale, Manouche, Machwaya, and Romanichal, for example. These hyper-localized identity formations and senses of belonging make large-scale mobilization a challenge for Roma in the US—and it is something that we see across the Americas, in Europe, and in Australia, Africa, Asia, and everywhere where Roma have lived, settled, and made home. In this book, Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka carefully documents and analyzes the complexities of Romani identity and ethnic mobilization, holding both the sense of unity in being Romani and the challenges of maintaining identity for Romani people in multiple state and national contexts. The both-and analysis is at the heart of this book. The brilliance of Mirga-Kruszelnicka’s analysis is that she never reduces the complexity of mobilization and activism to one variable; she also constantly keeps at the forefront the importance for our community—for our survival, for our flourishing, yes, but also for the larger xiv

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Beyond Europe

world, Roma and non-Roma alike—of claiming our rights, maintaining our culture, and nurturing our transnational, transatlantic, global ties even in the face of violence, of erasure, and, as we know from recent and longer histories, of genocide. This book performs a vital task, and adds to our overall understanding of history, of politics, of colonialism, of migration, of the world, and of Roma. Because Romani history is world history. We Roma have served as an internal vector of the global colonial project. Mirga-Kruszelnicka documents the anti-Roma laws that were enacted across Europe from the sixteenth century onward, the waves of genocide and expulsion to which Romani people were subjected, the 500-year history of slavery within the borders of Europe, socalled “Gypsy Hunts,” transportation, forced labor and forced assimilation. These histories are also part of larger racist, colonial, nation-building, violent histories of settler colonialism, extraction, enclosure, and appropriation. We, Romani people, have been continually framed as the constitutive outside of Europe, of politics, of history, and of the nation. In fact, Roma have been central to the project of Europe, as one of its first racialized Others, upon whom politics and policies of nationalism are enacted, whose belonging is alwaysalready suspect. Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka reframes these questions of belonging by focusing her attention—and our attention—on the making of politics among Roma, not just in Europe, but in the Americas and transnationally, globally, across borders and across nations. She shows us how context matters, policies matter, and, not to be forgotten, politics matters. Mirga-Kruszelnicka’s careful treatment of the historical and political contexts of Argentina, Colombia, and Spain show the possibilities of rights-claiming, of mobilization, and of building a politics of Romani identity that at once builds from local, regional, and national context and transcends those contexts to build a pan-Romani politics that reflects the reality of Romani communities, migrations, and survival across the centuries. Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka is a powerful voice in Critical Romani Studies. Mirga-Kruszelnicka is at the forefront of a growing movement of Romani intellectuals who are breaking new ground in knowledge production through a conscious practice and politics of self-representation. For Romani scholars, self-representation means, first and foremost, centering Romani subjectivity, Romani knowledge, Romani existence, Romani activism, Romani people and Romani communities in our scholarship and activism. For too long, nonRoma have spoken for us, analyzed us, and taken our existence as a foil for coloxv

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Foreword

nial, racist projects of nation-building. Mirga-Kruszelnicka, by examining the political contexts, histories, activism, survival practices, and everyday lives of Romani people, opens up new possibilities for understanding Romani political mobilization, ethnic solidarity, and collective action. In so doing, she shows the work that we Roma do, every day and often in the face of great challenges and adversities, to make the world a better place for ourselves and our families, for our communities, for everyone. This is powerful, pivotal work: through her scholarship, and with this book, Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka is documenting and building greater possibilities for local, regional, and transnational mobilization. She is faithfully mapping our multiple diasporas, our multiple connections, and the work that we as Roma, in the Americas, in Europe, in the world, do to foster change and make a new politics.

xvi

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Acknowledgments

The book you are holding in your hands came into existence thanks to the generous support, inspiration, and encouragement of many people. This book would have never happened if it was not for the opportunity to travel to Latin America and conduct research among Romani communities there. I am very grateful to the Open Society Foundations Roma Initiatives Office for giving me a chance to become their Fellow; an endeavor which had me travel across two continents, conduct research in six countries, and meet countless people, among them numerous outstanding Romani personalities. Their financial support during this time allowed me to dive deeply into the field. I would like to personally thank RIO’s director Zeljko Jovanovic and RIO staff members for their support, as well as their inspiring and thoughtprovoking discussions. I am hugely in debt to all those who have helped me during my period of residence and fieldwork in Spain, Colombia, and Argentina. In Spain, I would like to thank my Romani friends and collaborators for accepting me and making me feel at home in Barcelona. An especially big thank you to Alba Fernández, Noemí Fernandéz, María Rubia, all the girls from Voces Gitanas (especially, Paquí Perona, the late Juana Fernández, and Amalia Cortés), Israel Ramírez, and Vicente Rodríguez. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Federation of Roma Associations in Cataluña (FAGIC), and especially the previous Executive Board members, in particular the late Tía Emilia Clavería, for giving me a chance to work and get to know the Romani associative movement from within; to all the staff of FAGIC who over the years became my close friends, including Anabel Carballo and Mónica Aragonés; and finally, to the outstanding intellectuals and personalities of the Romani associative movement in Spain, especially Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, Ismael Cortés Gómez, Miguel Ángel Vargas Rubio, José Heredia Moreno, Pedro Aguilera, Demetrio Gómez, and Sandra Heredia, for their trust, friendship, and for sharing their knowledge with me. xvii

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Acknowledgments

In Colombia, I would like to express my gratitude to my Romani informants, especially Romani women, who accepted me into their homes, and for their help, kindness, and hospitality, including Dalila Gómez Baos, Sandra Demetrio, and the late Yesenia Gómez. I would also like to thank Esteban Acuña for sharing with me his knowledge and contacts, for keeping me updated on developments after I left, and for our stimulating academic exchanges. In Argentina, I would like to thank the members of AICRA, and especially Jorge Bernal, its president, and his wife Carmen Jiménez, for their generous support and for guiding me through the long history of the Roma in Argentina. This book is largely based on my PhD Dissertation (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016), defended at the Autonomous University in Barcelona in 2016. I was very fortunate to have as my PhD supervisors two brilliant scholars, Silvia Carrasco Pons and Bálint Ábel Bereményi, who guided me with their rigorous, strict, and detailed feedback and guidance, critical outlook, and high academic standards. I am also grateful for the comments from Liliana Feierstein in the process of preparation for this book. The academic contributions made in this book are built on the legacy of decades of scholarship in Romani Studies. In particular, I was inspired by the revealing contributions made by some Romani scholars, including Nicolae Gheorghe, Ian Hancock, Ethel Brooks, Iulius Rostas, Angéla Kóczé, and Margareta Matache. I am especially grateful for the mentorship and support of Ethel Brooks and Iulius Rostas throughout my academic career. This book has also benefited from extensive and enlightening conversations with Roma and non-Roma public intellectuals, scholars, and activists, in particular Thomas Acton, Peter Vermeersch, Adrian Marsh, Mensur Haliti, Jan Selling, Jonathan Mack, Jean-Pierre Liegeois, Ioanida Costache, Gabriela Hrabanova, Violeta Naydenova, Hamze Bytyci, Emran Elmazi, Akif Karima, and the late Valery Novoselsky, among many others. I owe many thanks to the community built around the Alliance which brought about the establishment of the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture (ERIAC): Timea Junghaus, Nicoleta Bitu, Dijana Pavlovic, Katalin Bársony, Mihaela Zatreanu, Ciprian Necula, Sead Kazanxhiu, Nadir Redzepi, Saimir Mile, and William Bila, along with Zeljko Jovanovic, Ethel Brooks, and Iulius Rostas. My many years of work and collaboration with the Romani youth movement, especially with the ternYpe International Roma Youth Network, and cooperation with the Romani women’s movement provided a constant source of insight. I would also like to thank the CEU Press, especially Linda Kunos, for their interest and patience. xviii

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Acknowledgments

I dedicate this book to my family, who has been an endless source of inspiration and pride, and whose words of encouragement and support strengthened my sense of confidence to complete this book. Special mention goes out to my parents—Halina and Andrzej—whose faith and capacity to wisely feed my ambitions was an essential ingredient in my personal and professional path of development. My father Andrzej was the one who brought me closer to the path of Romani activism and shared his knowledge with me along the way. His high intellectual standards became a guideline in my own academic work. For all this, I owe him a very special thank you! And finally, I would like to thank my husband Kuba, the companion of my adventures and travels, for his patience, incessant support, and for sharing with me all the ups and downs of this long journey.

xix

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List of Abbreviations

AICRA CEE CEPG CEU COE CPRSI CSO EC EU EP ERIAC FAGIC FSG HCNM ILO INADI IRU LGBT MEP MP NGO ODIHR OSCE OSF POS PRORROM SKOKRA SMO UN UR URC

Asociación Identidad Cultural Romani de Argentina Central Eastern Europe Consejo Estatal del Pueblo Gitano Central European University Council of Europe Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues Civil Society Organization European Commission European Union European Parliament European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture Federación de Asociaciones Gitanas de Cataluña Fundación Secretariado Gitano High Commissioner on National Minorities International Labour Organization Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia y el Racismo International Romani Union Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Member of European Parliament Member of Parliament Non-governmental Organization Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Open Society Foundations Political Opportunities Structure Proceso Organizativo del Pueblo Rrom (Gitano) de Colombia Saveto Katar le Organizatsi ay Kumpeniyi Rromane anda´l Americhi Social Movement Organization United Nations Unión Romani Unión Romani de Colombia xxi

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Introduction

Personal equation: Where did it all start?

In my private and professional life, I have witnessed at close hand the diverse manifestations of Romani ethnic mobilization, first in my home-country of Poland and, as I have grown older, in different European and eventually Latin American countries. My direct involvement in socio-political activism advocating for the rights of the Romani population in Europe dates back to the first year of my bachelor’s degree. In 2004, I cofounded the first Romani youth organization in Poland— the Roma Educational Association “Harangos”— and through this activity, I engaged in research and grassroots activism, with a particular focus on Romani youth. Since then, I have been employed by, collaborated with, have founded, and have been a member of several Romani associations, in Spain and in Poland, and internationally. My active engagement as part of the so-called Romani movement has allowed me to establish a broad network of contacts and collaborators across Europe and beyond, by working together on common projects, strategizing, participating in common events, or engaging in lobbying activities. In the framework of the Erasmus program during my M.A., my path led me to live in Barcelona for six years, during which I studied, worked with, and researched Romani ethnic mobilization in Spain. My involvement in Romani activism, through voluntary work but also professionally as an employee, has given me a unique chance to experience at close range the modus operandi of Romani organizations and to observe the overall continuum of Romani ethnic mobilization, with its achievements and pitfalls. The experiences and observations I accumulated over many years fed my curiosity to understand what I saw more systematically and comprehensively, not as isolated instances of activism, but as a complex, multi-dimensional, inter-related, and dynamic social phenomenon. Naturally, my activist and professional engagement has made a strong imprint on my academic interest and, eventually, on my academic career. As 1

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Introduction

an activist in the international “Roma civil rights movement” (or what some refer to as “the Roma movement”) as well as nationally, I was a witness and, on occasions, an active participant of numerous milestones and/or turning points of Romani political history. Over fifteen years of personal involvement in Romani activism has allowed me to view current developments with a certain perspective in time, being able to trace shifts and changes in Roma-related politics and policies as well as in structures of Romani activism. It has enabled me to gain a deeper understanding of national and international policy processes and to observe the work of Romani actors involved. Throughout this period, I have seen internal discussions among Romani activists transform into public narratives, problems become articulated demands, and collective action bring achievements; I have also seen new Romani actors emerge and some Romani structures decline. Being a board member and a staff member of Romani organizations at different points in time has given me a privileged look into the intimacy of Romani entities, their daily struggles and challenges, their internal dynamics, and their interactions with diverse types of other actors. Furthermore, my involvement in Romani activism has also opened my eyes to the heterogeneous universe of Romani populations across the world: the diverse sub-groups and dialects, traditions and histories, lifestyles and lifetrajectories. It has shaped my understanding of Romani ethnicity as an “archipelago”, a mosaic shaped by diverse inter-related elements; I agree with Nicolae Gheorghe, a renowned Romani sociologist and activist, that “multiculturality might be an appropriate concept to describe the basic reality” of the Roma people (Gheorghe and Acton 2001:55). My many travels and experiences of Romani activism rooted in different contexts and environments, along with my academic training (B.A. and M.A. in Comparative Studies of Civilizations at the Jagiellonian University) led me to inquire comparatively, searching for global, more comprehensive answers and gaining insight into how diverse environments determine differences (or similarities) in the manifestations of Romani ethnic mobilization that I observed. My comparative approach pushed me to look as far as possible, to find comparable cases in seemingly distant and largely unknown places. My curiosity, thus, pushed me to travel across the ocean and investigate Romani ethnic mobilization beyond Europe. In autumn 2012, I approached the Open Society Foundations (OSF) Roma Initiatives Office with the idea of conducting a research project aimed at understanding better the phenomenon of Romani ethnic mobilization and its underlying processes. The concept proposed to look closely into the strat2

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Personal equation: Where did it all start?

egies of ethnic mobilization among Romani communities in diverse cultural and socio-economic contexts to identify favorable “ingredients” which contribute to the emergence and greater success of ethnic-based social movements. I wanted to study more in-depth the dynamics of mobilization and demobilization among Romani under different conditions and in vastly different environments—to understand how groups of individuals become collectives and what stimulates the activation of agency among communities. Latin American countries seemed like a fascinating location—although I was aware of the historical presence of Romani communities in some of these countries, their situation and the stage of development of their own political movements to me remained a mystery. More importantly, the (hi)stories of Romani across the Atlantic remained under-researched, creating an almost virgin field of study. Furthermore, in my eyes the limited networking between the Romani leaders and communities of both continents put into question the robust discourse on the “Roma transnational identity” and impeded an exchange of experiences and practices on a global scale. This research project was envisioned as a first step towards bringing the Romani communities from both continents under the same analytical framework, to grasp the nature of “Romani movements” in Europe and in Latin America. Eventually, in February 2013, I became an Open Society Fellow entrusted with the task of comparatively researching the Romani organizations in six strikingly different countries on two continents: in Europe, I selected Spain, Slovakia, and Northern Macedonia; in Latin America—Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina. Over the course of the next two years, split roughly in half between Latin America and Europe, I travelled extensively, conducting fieldwork in various countries and engaging with Romani communities, individuals, activists, and organizations. Throughout this time, I conducted around 300 in-depth interviews with Romani and non-Romani leaders, public intellectuals, activists, politicians, scholars, public officials, journalists, artists, donors, legislators and representatives of public administration, and pastors, as well as with non-associated, politically unengaged individuals and their families. This journey, incredibly enriching on intellectual, political, and personal levels, granted me a unique insight into the public, political, and private lives of Romani communities across thousands of kilometers. Part of the knowledge I gained during this time became the basis for my PhD dissertation, defended at the Autonomous University in Barcelona (UAB) in 2016. The thesis “The Associations are all we have”. Comparative study of the Romani Associationism and Ethnic Mobilization in Spain and Colombia 3

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Introduction

allowed me to scientifically digest the experiences during my years of travel yet was limited to only two of the case-study countries. Much of the data gathered remained unpublished, becoming the main drive to write this book.

The dilemma It was 2010, and I was in the midst of my M.A. studies and at a high point of my professional (Federation of Roma Associations in Catalonia, FAGIC) and activist (Romani youth movement) involvement in the Romani movement. In Europe, it was another oppressive year for the Romani who became the subject of an intense political discussion: it was then that Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, had begun a nation-wide anti-Roma campaign, deporting over 9,000 Romanian and Bulgarian Roma—significantly, EU-citizens—and violently bulldozed their humble camps constructed on the outskirts of major French cities. The move sparked international criticism and eventually led to a firm movement on behalf of the European Commission.1 The subject of Roma integration became a political priority, eventually leading to the adoption of the so-called “EU Roma Framework” in 2011, which obliged the European Union (EU) member states to create their own National Roma Integration Strategies. As these developments were unraveling, Spain held the EU Presidency in 2010 and set on organizing the Second EU Roma Summit in Cordoba, held in the framework of the International Roma Day (8 April). I travelled to Cordoba that spring to attend the European Roma Youth Summit, organized by the ternYpe International Roma Youth Network. Romani youth activists were not invited to attend the summit, so in protest we—over sixty Romani youth activists from across Europe brought together by ternYpe—staged a flash mob right outside the main entrance to the building where the summit was taking place. With placards bearing slogans clearly protesting against the exclusion of youth representatives from the event (for example, “I see you, can you see me?”), we sought acknowledgment of Romani youth activists as stakeholders and partners in dialogue (successfully). Romani activists, and especially Spanish Romani activists, joined the young protesters for the grand finale of 1 EU policy communication COM(2010)133, The social and economic integration of the Roma in Europe. The European Commission’s Roma Task Force was created on 7 September 2010 to streamline, assess, and benchmark the use (including the effectiveness) of EU funds by all Member States for Roma integration and to identify underpinning deficiencies in the use of funds.

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our project at the Plaza de la Corredera in the center of Cordoba, providing us with an opportunity to brainstorm together about the importance of Romani activism and the then-current state of affairs. 2010 was an important year for the Roma in Spain. Besides hosting the EU Roma Summit in Cordoba, the Spanish government also approved its “Action Plan for the Development of the Roma Population 2010–2012.”2 That same year, in November, UNESCO recognized flamenco as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, although mentioning the role of Romani only marginally.3 In fact, even the Spanish Institute of Romani Culture (Instituto de Cultura Gitana) issued a statement reminding of the Romani contribution and ownership of flamenco, arguing, among other things, that “Denying or underestimating the Romani contribution to flamenco is as unfair as denying the contributions of black communities to jazz” (Instituto de Cultura 2011). The numerous international-level developments related to Roma in Spain led the international community to hail the Spanish government as the champion of Roma rights, declaring that Spain is “A model of Roma inclusion”; a large article even made it into the prestigious Time Magazine declaring Spain a model for Europe (Cala 2010). But I was troubled and conflicted by these declarations: knowing the situation of the communities and intimate with Romani ethnic mobilization, I knew that the Romani population in Spain was largely disenfranchised and powerless. Despite being a community of around a million people, at the time they had not a single Romani representative in the national parliament. Despite the unquestionable interconnection between Roma and non-Roma communities in the south of Spain–Andalusia and the fact that most Spanish Roma lived in this region, there has never been a Romani political representative in its regional government. Romani culture lacked political and official recognition as a minority, and Romani political representation was limited to consultative bodies which remained without budgets and decisionmaking competencies. In my eyes, the “Spanish model of success” remained elusive and overstated. Romani communities in Spain faced very similar issues as in all the other countries I knew: inequality, discrimination, and social and political marginalization were an everyday component of the vast majority of Roma lives (Maya and Mirga 2014). That same year, in 2010, through the Roma Virtual Network, I received information about a spectacular political success of Romani activists in a 2 https://www.msssi.gob.es/ssi/familiasInfancia/PoblacionGitana/docs/INGLES_ACCESIBLE.pdf. 3 https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/flamenco-00363.

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country across the ocean which I did not even realize had a Romani community of its own: Colombia. In August 2010, by the power of Presidential Decree (2957), Colombia adopted a legal framework recognizing its Romani population and granting them with numerous targeted laws and privileges. The scope and depth of Decree 2957 was much more extensive than most of the institutional gains made by the decades-long Romani activism in Spain. In 2010, another bit of information from across the ocean reached me, placing Latin American Romani communities on my mind-map. It was my Uruguayan co-worker at the time who informed of the death of Sandro El Gitano—the famous Argentinean musician, singer, and actor, an iconic personality often referred to as the “Latin Elvis” who proudly celebrated and emphasized his Romani background. I had never heard of Sandro before; neither did I know that the Romani diaspora in Argentina is the second largest in Latin America and among the most diverse. As I read on about the community, I was surprised to learn that there is and always has been only one Romani organization, working out of Buenos Aires. I grew more intrigued and curious. As I inquired deeper through available sources online, an intellectual—and academic—dilemma started crystalizing before my eyes: Why is it that the small Romani community in Colombia, with no more than 150 years of documented history and a community of less than 10,000 members, can be more politically effective than the almost one million Roma in Spain, whose presence dates back over 600 years? Why is it that for the over 300,000 Roma in Argentina—a community much bigger than in many European countries, including my own—Roma political movements stalled and remained in an early stage of development, even if in other countries of the region (including Colombia and neighbouring Brazil) Roma were engaged, and quite successfully so, in processes of ethnic mobilization?

The guiding questions and objectives of the book The dilemma became a piece of an intellectual puzzle that needed solving. It became a guiding point for my subsequent academic engagement, including my successive research plan and fieldwork, my PhD dissertation, and this very book. The dilemma translated into my driving questions: 6

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Personal equation: Where did it all start?

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

How is Romani ethnicity mobilized for political action? Under what conditions does Romani identity become activated for collective action, and mobilized for the purpose of concrete political goals? What type of actors are doing the mobilizing? And who are the people and structures behind Romani political activism? How is Romani identity framed, performed, and articulated in the process of ethnic mobilization? What discourses, narratives, and symbols are used to communicate with Romani communities and majority societies? How does the broader socio-political, historical, cultural, and legal environment—the overall surrounding context—condition and influence the process of ethnic mobilization among Roma? What factors account for the different outcomes and stages of development of Romani political activism in the different countries I travelled to? And finally: can I distil and systematize patterns that account for these diverse outcomes?

In other words, the objective of this book is to explore the nature of ethnic mobilization as a phenomenon of political and social collective activism, including its underlying dynamics and the characteristic elements that compose it, and to assess how the political environment influences the birth and development of ethnic movements, determining and affecting the strategies and discourses adapted, based on case studies of Romani ethnic mobilization. In embarking on the task of trying to solve the dilemma described above, there were some initial reflections that, based on my initial academic knowledge and informed by my personal experiences and observations, were evident and eventually became points of reference in my analysis. Firstly, political activism does not occur in a vacuum but rather in response and relation to a broader socio-political context. In this sense, diverse manifestations of ethnic mobilization cannot be treated as independent events but should be assessed in relation to the political, historical, and spatial contexts at a specific point in time. The analysis of patterns of ethnic mobilization cannot be understood exclusively through the prism of national-level politics; to an extent, international developments, global trends, or major geopolitical changes also affect domestic affairs. Importantly, however, the external environment which conditions ethnic mobilization is not immune to ethnic mobilization itself—after all, successful mobilization may lead to an altering of the broader political environment, for example, through policy-change. Thus, the underlying hypothesis is that political opportunities and ethnic mobilization 7

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Introduction

are in constant interplay with each other and that shifts in ethnic mobilization can be understood as a dynamic process of adaptation to, alignment with, and transformation of the ever-changing political and social environments. The ability of actors to skillfully and strategically adapt to a fluctuating environment is a determinant for a movement’s success. Secondly, I was convinced that ethnic mobilization cannot be analyzed through the lens of single developments or actors. Rather, I understood ethnic mobilization as a field of interaction between diverse sets of actors on an axis of time. Ethnic mobilization was an intricate web of relationships and networks in a dynamic of mutual interplay, inter-dependency, and influence. I also understood ethnic mobilization as a field of interaction which produces and re-produces meanings, in this case, for both the Roma and non-Roma alike. Finally, I was set on trying to reconstruct the genealogy of Romani ethnic mobilization from the perspective of the actors themselves, through the prism of their narratives, discourses, and actions. The books and analyses I read until then, with few exceptions, typically concentrated on policy developments—whether on national or international levels—and the impact (or lack thereof) on Romani communities, in statistical terms. Romani activism was often taken for granted and easily criticized for its limited results and political power, and for its deficiencies and problems. Somehow, I felt that the Roma are described as a rather passive population, politically insensitive or ignorant, and left at the margins of history and politics. The Romani collective agency was largely absent or peripheral to the core developments which affected them directly. Nonetheless, my direct involvement in the lives of Romani organizations provided me with a rather different perspective—that of attempted political strategy, unlimited dedication towards a noble mission, and an incessant struggle of the powerless against the powerholders. I was aware of the pitfalls, limitations, and deficiencies of Romani ethnic mobilization but saw its root causes not so much in the Romani people themselves but rather in the broader dynamics of systemic social inequality, the marginalization of whole sectors of the population (Roma being one among many), and the limitations of civil society structures in the face of formal politics. Historic and contemporary antigypsyism, and especially its structural and institutional legacies, provide an additional and essential layer of analysis. I felt it is important to write about ethnic mobilization dynamics from within Romani subjectivity.

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Romani voices in academia and the emergence of Romani positionality My travels and experiences—as a Romani activist, employee of Romani organizations, and especially as an investigator—have led me to understand the complicated and frequently ambiguous status of a researcher, who constantly must negotiate different roles while in the field. This was especially relevant for me as a person with a Romani background who researches topics related in one way or another to the Romani population. Throughout these experiences, both in Europe and Latin America, I learned that my status as an investigator was ambiguous, even more so than for a researcher coming from outside of the Romani community—as a foreigner, a stranger, and an investigator, I was an outsider. However, as a Roma, declared and recognized by my interlocutors (often initially with a dose of disbelief), I was an insider, facilitating my entrance to the field, gaining trust, and accessing the intimacy of Romani families and communities. My professional experience and personal involvement in Romani activism added an additional layer to my status as a researcher. Over the years, and thanks to my previous fieldwork experiences, I have tried to maintain a balance between these different roles, learning how to negotiate and separate different roles depending on the context, field, and objectives of research. As I was familiarizing myself with the scholarship of other minority academics—from the seminal works of Gayatri Spivak, to Black Feminist scholars such as the influential Patricia Hill Collins, and to indigenous scholars such as Linda Tuhiwai Smith or Lester-Irabinna Rigney—I began to realize that the challenges I was navigating were not unique. On the contrary: one could argue that these discussions, which surfaced among other “subaltern” or colonized minorities decades ago, have come late in the case of the Roma. In fact, over the last few years heated debates have emerged about the status of Romani scholars, or more broadly, the relationship between ethnicity and academic performance (Bogdán et al. 2015; Ryder 2015; Kóczé 2015; Brooks 2015; Matache 2016b; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015). At times, these discussions have intensified, becoming increasingly more polarized, politicized, and violent. Historically, the field of Romani Studies was a near-exclusive monopoly of non-Roma scholars. However, throughout the last decade the increasing numbers of Romani university students and Romani scholars pursuing academic careers have provoked a deeper reflection regarding Romani Studies, challenging the existing relationship between the researcher and the researched with relation to Roma. As Roma ascend to the ranks of academic relevance, they also increasingly engage critically with the legacy of Romani Studies and the 9

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Introduction

body of knowledge created about Roma by non-Roma. This process is not free of tensions and confrontations along the divisive lines of ethnic identity. Matache points out, for example, that “for a long time, we have embraced most anybody as ‘expert’ or ‘objective’ interpreters of Romani realities, except for Romani researchers, who have often been perceived by their non-Roma fellows as political and overly tied to NGOs, emotional, or subjective” (Matache 2017). Ken Lee notes that “the members of the Gypsy Lore Society and [the Journal] GLS claimed a privileged epistemological position, asserting that they were the only internationally recognised source of scholarly information about ‘The Gypsies’” (Lee, 2000:133). Angéla Kóczé (2015) further writes that “Concerning the validation of Roma-related studies, there is a tacit consensus that non-Roma are in a better position to provide a more reliable and objective account of the situation of Roma. This assumption is based on the premise of ‘objectivity’ (…)” (Kóczé, 2015:84). She further explains “how epistemic authority has been claimed and manifested as an exclusive power of nonRoma scholars, to maintain hegemony over Roma-related knowledge production” (ibid.). Much of these discussions reflects the deep fissure between notions of scientism, that is, of “objective” and “neutral” scholarship, and critical research (Ryder 2015; Bogdán et al. 2015; Ryder 2017). But undoubtedly, it is also a premise of a power-struggle over knowledge production and ultimately for control and ownership over definitions. In these polarized debates about the status of Romani scholars, too often ethnic background has been juxtaposed with academic merit, as if these, too, were mutually exclusive. Rather, I argue that these should be treated as complementary qualities, which are relevant to the researcher but not necessarily to the quality of the academic performance. In this regard, ethnicity should be regarded as an added value in research, but should not overshadow the quality of academic production (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015). My previous academic experience, and most notably my participation in different research projects, allowed me to navigate these different roles and to rely on my academic training in order to differentiate my role as a scholar from other involvements. Based on my own experience, I argue that the added value of Romani scholars resides in their status as “outsiders within” (Collins 1986; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018b; 2015). The combination of lived experience, academic training, and commitment to scientific rigor and quality that many Romani scholars possess offers the much-needed plurality of perspectives and voices which were missing from Romani Studies until relatively recently. The ascendance of authoritative Romani voices in scientific debates helps to unravel 10

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Personal equation: Where did it all start?

internal tensions, gaps, and incongruences within Romani Studies by contrasting the body of knowledge on Roma with the lived experiences of communitymembers. In this sense, Romani scholars approximate first-hand knowledge which can otherwise be inaccessible or difficult to attain by non-Roma scholars. How otherwise would it be possible to provide insight into the “authenticity tests” which a Romani scholar goes through when entering the field of research among a Romani group different than their own? Or how can a non-Roma researcher explain the intricate and complex relationship of belonging and distinctiveness when building relationships with Roma from another country or sub-group? Or in what way can a non-Roma scholar describe why and how Romani identity is performed, described, and felt differently, depending on the context; or understand the processes of “passing” and “invisibility”, as something that is contextual, temporary, and fluid? These questions can be answered best from within Romani subjectivity, bearing in mind internal codes of conduct and performances of daily rituals, which require a level of intimacy, proximity, and insiders’ knowledge (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018b; Costache 2018). The ethnicity of a scholar bears relevance but should not signify superiority or exclusivity. A heterogeneity of voices in scholarship should instead result in a dialogue based on equality and complementarity of knowledge, approaches, and methodologies. In this sense, Romani scholars cannot claim greater legitimacy over the knowledge and research they produce on Roma, but neither can their non-Roma colleagues make these claims. It is also significant that despite its added value, the emergence of Romani scholarship does not automatically mean that researchers of Romani background are inherently immune to methodological shortcomings, theoretical pitfalls, and, indeed, even internalized racism. Neither does it mean that Romani scholars will by default produce plural narratives or challenge homogenizing and essentializing scholarship. Nonetheless, over the last few years an increasing number of Romani scholars have relied on critical scholarship; it becomes clear that their engagement in knowledge-production is essential for promoting diversified, balanced, and context-sensitive discourse. In the current debates about the status of Romani scholars, often ethnic background has been juxtaposed with academic merit, causing heated discussions and alienating self-declared Romani scholars. At the same time, however, the introduction of standpoint theory is still rare and perspectives dealing with positionality are almost absent in scholarship on Roma. Researchers themselves—both Roma and non-Roma—are yet to understand the relevance of positionality and its scholarly value for Romani studies. While Roma schol11

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Introduction

ars call for recognition of authority and legitimacy of their own scholarly voice (Matache, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Mirga-Kruszelnicka, 2015, 2018c), they also struggle with articulating in what ways their own Romani positionality informs their processes of knowledge production. In fact, elaborating a “Romani standpoint theory” or “Romani school of thought” has not yet come into existence although arguably its foundations have been laid down already. In this sense, embracing reflexivity and positionality should also become a common practice among Romani researchers themselves. Romani scholars are yet to give convincing answers to such questions as: What is the Romani standpoint? How is their research produced on Roma different from their non-Roma colleagues? What are the common features of Romani positionality? And given the vast diversity of Romani communities, can we speak of a single Romani standpoint theory at all? The first steps to answer these questions must start with looking at oneself. This book, and the research on which it is based, is an attempt to translate my own subjective experiences into academic discourse and apply a conscious Romani standpoint reading of my findings. Therefore, this book should be placed within this context and aims to be another contribution to this broad discussion, becoming yet another example of knowledge produced from “the outsider within” and from a declared positionality of a Romani scholar. Notes on fieldwork and methodology

This book is guided by two methodological and theoretical methods of inquiry: namely, comparative and inter-disciplinary approaches. Comparison is a major tool of academic inquiry (Collier 1993; Lijphart 1971). In Romani Studies, comparative analysis has also been used frequently in research on Romani political activism (for example: Barany 2002b; McGarry 2010; Vermeersch 2006). However, a comparative perspective which includes data-sets from countries outside of Europe has been scarce. In fact, to my knowledge, research on Romani ethnic mobilization which is based on non-European case-studies, and specifically on countries of Latin America, has never been produced before4. Through inter-continental comparison I aim to contribute to the debate on the ethnic mobilization of Roma 4 A notable contribution in this context is “Roma Rights and Civil Rights. A Transatlantic Comparison” by Felix B. Chang and Sunnie T. Rucker-Chang (Cambridge University Press, 2020). While not focusing exclusively on Roma, this book brings a unique interethnic perspective by looking at the similarities of Roma and African-American struggles for rights and historical justice.

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specifically and, from a broader perspective, to the global debate about this social phenomenon. Furthermore, in my analysis, I will draw on diverse branches of social sciences and different theoretical approaches to produce a more nuanced and contrasted analysis. The proposed book covers a wide area in social sciences, making it an inter-disciplinary contribution. More specifically, although the topic of ethnic and social movements has been lively discussed among sociologists and political scientists, this issue has not been adequately addressed from a standpoint of anthropology. I intend to draw on inter-disciplinary literature and put it into conversation with each other, allowing me to develop a new perspective on a complex socio-political phenomenon. The reflections contained in this book are based on case studies (Yin 2009) and draw from a multi-sited ethnography approach (Marcus 1995). The data collection process relied principally on methods typically regarded as qualitative, incorporating elements of ethnography. However, rather than acquiring the typical role of an ethnographer submerged in a studied community which observes the rituals of daily life, my approach was an ethnography of leadership and representation, at the intersection of public and private spheres. Finally, following Yin’s approach, I combined a variety of different primary and secondary sources of knowledge and evidence (Yin 2009) through different qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection, such as documents (selfproduced by organizations, reports, policy-related, minutes of meetings, press, etc.), archival records, in-depth and informal interviews, field visits, focus groups, questionnaires, ethnography, and participant and non-participant observation (as an active member of organizations, as an observer during general assemblies, working sessions, formal and informal meetings), in order to contrast the data collected during the study. I have also relied on existing academic literature, studies and reports, non-academic texts (press, blogs, interviews, reportages), as well as photos, videos and audio recordings. The use of social networks, most notably Facebook, proved to be important for contacting relevant informants and maintaining contacts with them over longer periods of time, as well as a way to search for relevant information and analyse the reactions and behaviour of my informants and contacts with regards to significant developments.

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Introduction

Europe vs. Latin America A few final remarks I believe are deemed necessary. Throughout this book the dichotomy of “Europe” and “Latina America” is used, becoming a simplifying and generalizing practice which may be considered problematic. Similarly as the “West”–“East” dichotomy or “North”–“South” dichotomy are largely artificial constructs which reify borders and reinforce certain stereotypes (Shulman 2002; Rucker-Chang 2018), the “Europe”–“Latin America” divide can be overstated. It is for this reason that I treat this simplifying binary in strictly geographical terms, even though a certain set of values, or an imagined socio-political and economic reality may be associated with these regions. The very term “Europe” is problematic, given the immense diversity and divergent historical paths across the countries of the region, the most recent of which would be the legacy of the “democratic” and “communist” divide in Europe until the fall of the Soviet Union. Likewise, in “Latin America” the diverse social, historical, cultural, and political realities across the “Latin American” region—which encompasses a part of North America, Central America, and South America—makes generalizations largely problematic. I am acutely aware of the complexities of the divergent national realities and how they feed into regional or continental dynamics, and vice versa. The diverse pathways of Romani ethnic mobilization in the two Latin American countries covered by this very book are yet further proof of why regional generalizations, beyond their geographical markers, can lead to false assumptions if not investigated on a case-by-case basis. What brings the three countries—Argentina, Colombia, and Spain— closer together is their belonging to a Spanish-speaking “South” (although this description would also not fit the commonly used “North–South” binary). These countries are bound by a common socio-historical and cultural legacy even if this legacy also echoes the problematic relationship between “the colonizer” (Spain) and “the colonized” (Argentina and Colombia). What is important for the reader to bear in mind is that the reflections made in this book draw from case studies of specific countries, which are by no means representative of the geographical regions to which they belong or other countries in that region. There are, of course, regional and/or continental dynamics that play a paramount role in how domestic politics and policies develop, nonetheless, the reader should understand that these reflections are based predominantly on realities investigated in these specific countries. 14

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Personal equation: Where did it all start?

Structure of the book The book is a critical exploration of ethnic mobilization based on the case study of Roma, tracing the genealogy of Romani political activism in Spain, Colombia, and Argentina. By providing original empirical data on Roma in Latin American countries, the book opens a new avenue of inquiry in Romani Studies, pointing to its global character, an aspect largely overlooked and under-researched. In its analysis and argumentation, this book adapts an interdisciplinary approach and covers a wide area in social sciences—from anthropology, ethnic and racial studies, political science, social movement and policy studies, and, of course, Romani Studies. By drawing from different theoretical paradigms and approaches, this book arrives at a new synergetic conceptualization of ethnic mobilization (understood as the interplay between political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and identity framings), and defines its multi-directional character. By outlining parallel lineages of Romani ethnic mobilization comparatively in three countries and on two continents, the book arrives at broad conclusions regarding the nature of ethnic mobilization, while at the same time providing a unique description of political activism of a heterogeneous trans-national Romani global diaspora, narrated from the intimate perspective of the actors themselves. The arguments made in this book are developed across 6 chapters. Chapter one lays out the theoretical apparatus employed throughout and outlines the synergic conceptual and analytical framework of the study of ethnic mobilization. In this section, the reader will find the definition of the concepts employed in this analysis and will be introduced to the phenomenon of Romani ethnic mobilization. Chapter two sets the stage to understand the broader context which shapes ethnic mobilization. I start by providing some insights into the phenomenon of ethnic struggles in Europe and Latin America more broadly. I then introduce the Roma as a political subject, delineating the history of Roma as a specific target group as well as describing the process of development of Romani political subjectivity, on both continents. This chapter concludes with a reflection on the comparability of both cases, identifying key factors which the reader needs to keep in mind to understand the considerations laid out subsequently. In Chapter three I introduce the case-study countries: Argentina, Colombia, and Spain. I provide a short contextualization to the national majority 15

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Introduction

societies vis-à-vis their minority struggles. I then reconstruct the genealogy of Romani presence in all three countries and identify significant shifts in the political spectrum which produced the so-called windows of opportunity, relevant for Romani ethnic mobilization. Chapter four digs deeper into the Romani mobilization by focusing on the actors “doing the mobilizing”. In this section, I provide the anatomy of the Romani movement in each country and give an overview of the panorama of Romani actors, their typology and topography. Here, I focus on presenting the different types of institutional vehicles of collective action, and discuss questions related to leadership and composition patterns, issues of fragmentation and consolidation, or the question of representativeness. In Chapter five I look specifically at the mobilizing frames employed by Romani actors in the process of ethnic mobilization. The frames are analyzed through the optic of Romani public discourses and through the voices of Romani leaders. Here, the reader will find a discussion of Romani identity frames and understand in what way Romani identity and interest frames are intertwined. Finally, Chapter five analyses the overall Romani ethnic mobilization from the perspective of the targets of collective action. It is here that the discussion of external and internal mobilization is clearly described. The vast network of interactions and relationships within the field of Romani political activism is examined to provide depth and an ultimate evaluation of the Romani ethnic mobilization in each country. The country-specific analysis allows one to draw broader conclusions regarding ethnic mobilization among Roma, and more generally. The book concludes with a discussion of Romani politics vis-à-vis global developments. I also provide additional thoughts regarding Romani Studies as a discipline and the relevance of Romani positionality. The final part of this section includes a short epilogue which reflects on the most recent events and considers their impact on Romani ethnic mobilization. Lastly, a short clarification on the terminology used throughout this book is necessary. I use the term “Roma” as a plural noun, to refer to the broad and beautifully diverse diaspora of Romani people, which encompasses a landscape of multiple self—subgroup adscriptions, including Roma, Sinti, Calo, Manouch, Lovari, Kalderash, Kale, and many others, as well as persons who identify themselves as Gypsies. 16

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The word “Roma” is an endonym originating from the Romani language used by diverse Romani groups to describe themselves. Literally the term “Rom” means a man or a husband, and “Roma” is its plural form. The term “Roma” has been established as an all-encompassing term, referring to the diverse panorama of Romani communities throughout the world during the First International Romani Congress in London in 1971 and is now recognized and used by most international organizations such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (even if the more specific definition of the term “Roma” as well as the explicit inclusion of sub-groups varies considerably between these institutions). By using an all-encompassing term “Roma” by no means am I erasing or downplaying the existing diversity among different communities belonging to the vast Romani diaspora. I believe that this multiplicity—a direct result of the complicated history(ies) of Romani presence and mobility in Europe and the world—is a rich part of Romani heritage and an undeniable source of pride. In my understanding, unity and in-group solidarity does not imply sameness. Consequently, throughout this book the term “Roma” is used as a generic noun when referring to both the particular cases of Romani communities in different countries as well as when making more general statements about the Romani people. To provide more nuanced context in each country, in the corresponding chapters I provide a detailed description of the multiple communities, along with their self-adscriptions and particular ethnic markers. When it is relevant to the developments covered by this book, I refer to the self-adscriptions and internal sub-divisions. The word “Romani” is used as an adjective, in accordance with the most recent standards in Romani Studies. “Romani” is also used to refer to the language spoken by Romani communities (“Romani ćhib”), commonly also referred to as “Romanes”. When specifically referring to the majority population that is not Roma, I simply use the term “non-Roma”. Finally, in quotes and citations, I maintain the original spelling and terminology used.

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Chapter 1

Defining Ethnic Mobilization —A Synergic Approach

This chapter has two objectives. The first objective is to allow the reader to understand the terminological apparatus employed throughout the book and provide an insight into the theoretical perspective which underscores this research. Thus, this chapter will provide a theoretical and conceptual framework, define key concepts, and introduce the analytical model employed throughout. It also provides a perspective into ongoing debates regarding the phenomenon of ethnic mobilization. It aims to answer the questions: What is ethnic mobilization? What are the “prerequisites” and ingredients of mobilization? In doing so, it provides an overview of existing literature on ethnic mobilization, paying special attention to definitions and theoretical approaches. It illustrates conceptual gaps in defining ethnic mobilization and existing theoretical divisions, arguing that a synergic approach is needed to produce a more comprehensive and complex understanding of this phenomenon. The chapter then proposes a harmonizing and dynamic theoretical-analytical model of ethnic mobilization and lays out its practical operationalization. The second objective of this chapter is to shed light on the particular case of Romani ethnic mobilization. In doing so, I will engage critically with the existing scholarship on Romani activism, presenting the diverse approaches, definitions, and theoretical paradigms employed to explain this phenomenon, unraveling gaps, incongruences, and deficits. I will subsequently provide my own definition and conceptual delineation of Romani ethnic mobilization, pointing to actors and processes which underscore Romani activism. To provide depth and context, I will describe Romani actors vis-à-vis other stakeholders involved. I will then introduce the term “Romani associative movement,” conceptually located at the intersection of social movement theories and literature on civil society; the Romani associative movement is treated as the unit of analysis for the research which is presented in this book. 19

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Chapter 1

Ethnic mobilization—a conceptual puzzle Definitions and approaches

When as an M.A. student at the Jagiellonian University I first began to inquire into and research ethnic mobilization, what was striking was the general conceptual confusion around the term and the very nature of this socio-political phenomenon itself. With regards to the case of Roma, I felt that rather than defining it as a full-blown social movement, ethnic mobilization might be a better concept illustrating the specificity of Romani activism. But as I got deeper into research, I became convinced that although abundant and rich in empirical data, the scholarship on ethnic mobilization faces numerous conceptual and theoretical shortcomings. Susan Olzak, one of the leading scholars researching ethnic mobilization, arrived at a similar conclusion, arguing that richness of data “has not generated much in the ways of generalizable and testable propositions” (Olzak 2006:xiii). First, there is the problem of what the term “ethnic mobilization” actually refers to. In fact, drawing a clear-cut definition of what ethnic mobilization is inevitably causes difficulties. There are different aspects of ethnic mobilization which the academic literature deals with: collective ethnic behavior, ethnic separatist party voting, ethnic autonomous movements, ethnic conflicts, and ethnic nationalism. Consequently, the term “ethnic mobilization” becomes a very broad concept, encompassing very diverse socio-political events; the term has been used to label most socio-political developments that in one way or another evoke ethnicity in political processes, ranging from autonomous movements, such as in Catalonia or the Basque Country, cases of ethnic violence and armed conflict, mobilization of separatist ethnic voting, ethnic nationalism, or civil society activism among non-EU immigrants (Veredas 2004). The breadth of the concept in itself is not negative; it is rather the lack of clarity of what specific type of political action or event can be regarded as a manifestation of ethnic mobilization that causes confusion. Secondly, in scholarship it is evident that researchers deal with diverse dimensions of ethnic mobilization. Some scholars, like Olzak (2006), link the phenomenon of ethnic mobilization predominantly to ethnic conflict and instances of violence. She argues that while there have been instances of peaceful ethnic mobilization, “comparative research indicates that ethnic movements have contributed to the majority of violent conflicts among and within nationstates since World War II” (Olzak 2006:1). Nonetheless, numerous examples 20

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of ethnic mobilization are not set in violent-conflict contexts, but within stable democracies, like the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia or the recent case of pro-independence mobilization in Catalonia which resurfaced after 2010, and most visibly in 2017. Despite this, a vast part of the literature on ethnic mobilization tends to theorize based on case-studies marked by violence and armed conflicts. For others, indeed, ethnic mobilization is related entirely to political processes—typically of formal and electoral politics—and is associated closely with theories of political mobilization. The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science defines political mobilization as: “the activity of rousing masses of people both to express themselves politically and also to undertake political action” (Bealey 1999:214). Under this approach, ethnic mobilization is concerned principally with formal politics and the ability to influence existing institutions of power through collective action via formally established channels (for example, by mobilizing voters during elections). With regards to Roma, Vermeersch (2006, 2011) also embraces this perspective, although his understanding of what is in fact political is very broad, including in his analysis activities which take place outside of formal politics as well. Others perceive ethnic mobilization as a type of social movement, in which ethnicity and collective ethnic identity become key ingredients. Under such an approach, the term refers rather to collective actions with “some degree and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority” (Kriesi et al. 2007:11); in these cases, theories of social movements are employed to explain ethnic mobilization. Consequently, ethnic mobilization is often used interchangeably with a number of different terms such as: “ethnic movement” (Olzak 2001), “political mobilization of ethnicity,” “ethno-nationalism” (Gorenburg 2003), or “ethno-political mobilization” (Cartrite 2003; Alptekin 2014), leading to further terminological confusion. Consequently, by concentrating on different dimensions of ethnic mobilization, scholars employ diverse concepts and establish discrepant variables, leading to multiple theoretical frameworks adopted to explain a seemingly similar socio-political phenomenon. While this strategy serves the purpose of explaining specific cases of ethnic mobilization, it does not prove helpful to establish a more comprehensive, broad, and universal definition of ethnic mobilization. In response to this conceptual disarray, Olzak1 in her 2006 seminal work The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization provides a compre1 An overview of leading theoretical perspectives and a typology of ethnic/racial/nationalist movements can be found in her earlier works (Olzak 2001).

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hensive overview of the dimensions of ethnic mobilization and introduces a typology of ethnic and nationalist movements, distinguishing between: 1) regional movements; 2) civil rights movements; 3) antagonistic movements directed against specific ethnic targets; 4) and state-strengthening nationalism (42). She also proposes a distinction in forms of ethnic mobilization along the axis of aggression-protest and by contrasting violent from non­ violent events. Ethnicity and mobilization Disregarding the diverse forms which ethnic mobilization can take, there are two obvious sine qua non elements which guide researchers in their query to unravel the dynamics underlying this phenomenon: namely, ethnicity and mobilization. Ethnicity is a defining element of ethnic mobilization—it is the existence of a distinct identity which differentiates the group from others, enabling ethnic mobilization. “A key identifying feature of ethnic mobilization (as compared to mobilization along class, regional, occupational, or some other lines) is that claims are made based upon particular identity or boundary, defined by the presence of racial or ethnic markers” (Olzak 2006:37). Significantly, modern scholarship on ethnicity increasingly tends to challenge essentialism and move away from seeing ethnic identity as something given, fixed, and static (R. Jenkins 2000; Brubaker 2009; Wimmer 2008). Rather, ethnic identities, as all identities, are understood as dynamic, multi-faceted, ever-changing, and complex constructs which cannot be described through tangible and stable properties, but which have to be defined in a relational and processual manner. The seminal work of Fredrik Barth Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969) was fundamental in shaping the contemporary theoretical approaches to ethnicity, challenging the notion of static objectivism by famously rejecting the focus on “the cultural stuff”, that is, on shared, observable, and tangible culture. Instead, Barth argued that it is the ethnic boundary that defines the group, shifting towards a more dynamic and processual understanding of ethnicity. However, Brubaker rightfully notes that “Barth equates the drawing of ascriptive distinctions, and the channeling of certain actions in line with such distinctions, with the existence of bounded ethnic groups and thereby contributes, against his own intentions, to the reifications of groups” (Brubaker 2009: 29). Brubaker reminds us that: ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery 22

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of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring “groups” encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms (Brubaker 2002:167).

He proposes to critically “rethink ethnicity” beyond reification of boundaries or essentializing, and inevitably homogenizing, perspectives on ethnicity. He challenges the concept, which he refers to as “groupism,” which leads to the perception of ethnic groups as internally homogeneous and externally bounded. He rather shifts the perspective towards “groupness,” paying attention to identifications (rather than identities), categorizations (rather than “shared culture”), and the process of making and re-making groups, concluding that ethnicities (like races and nations) are not “things in the world” but ways of seeing, interpreting, and representing the social world (Brubaker 2002; 2004). Such an approach allows one to take into account the political, social, cultural, and psychological contexts as well as various types of agencies which affect this process. Moreover, scholarship has been seemingly responsive to the increasingly more complex social realities and has welcomed the salience of multivalent, hybrid, and ever-changing identity constructions. Stuart Hall’s announcement of “new ethnicities” and his definition of identity as “a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’” (Hall 1990:225), concepts of “hybridity” and “inbetweenness” popularized by Homi Bhabha (H. K. Bhabha 1994), or more recent notions of “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2014; 2007), among many others, have been very influential in shifting the academic focus from essence to process of identity formation. The most recent concepts in academic debates on ethnicity, such as the idea of trans-ethnicity (Brubaker 2016a, 2016b; Tuvel 2017) and post-ethnicity (Hollinger 2006), may lead to diluting ethnicity altogether, losing sight of collective identities by focusing on over-relativized individual identities. In the face of these contributions and the increasing elusiveness of ethnicity, quite understandably scholarship tends to focus more on the processes of boundary-forming and shifts within these boundaries, rather than on tangible properties of ethnic identities. These discussions are important in understanding how a relational, processual, and dynamic ethnic identity— both individual and collective—can be triggered in a process of ethnic mobilization by acquiring a political dimension and becoming activated as a resource for collective mobilization (Veredas 2004). Of the two elements, the concept of “mobilization” is less problematic. Significantly, according to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the primary 23

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meaning of “mobilization” is related to armed conflict and warfare2. In scholarship, Charles Tilly was among the first and, arguably, most influential theorists of mobilization in the context of social movements and collective action. According to him, “Mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action. Those resources may be labor power, goods, weapons, votes and any number of other things, just so long as they are usable in acting on shared interests” (Tilly 1978:9). Olzak, visibly inspired by Tilly’s contributions, defined it as “the capacity to harness resources (including solidarity, organizations and material resources) in an effort to reach some collective goals” (Olzak 2007:668). Canel defines mobilization as “the process by which a group assembles resources (material and/or non-material) and places them under collective control for the explicit purpose of pursuing the group’s interests through collective action” (Canel 1997:207). On the other hand, drawing from the literature on new social movements, della Porta and Diani argue that “the capacity for mobilization depends either on material resources (work, money, concrete benefits, services) or on the nonmaterial resources (authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship) available to the group” (della Porta and Diani, 2009:8). In scholarship on mobilization, different dimensions or types of mobilization can be detailed. For example, in writing about the case of Islamist political mobilization, Mecham conceptualizes political mobilization “as a category with several distinct manifestations” and distinguishes between different spheres of mobilization: electoral mobilization, street demonstrations, and political violence (Mecham 2017:14). The relationship that these two elements—ethnicity and mobilization— hold with each other allows for a greater understanding of the nature of ethnic mobilization; and the difference in how this interplay and mutually reinforcing relationship is understood leads to salience of diverse theoretical approaches which explain ethnic mobilization. For example, among the primary on-going academic debates is the discussion of whether the existence of collective ethnic identity is a prerequisite for mobilization or vice versa (Barany 2002a; Koubek 2017; Nagel 1997). Recent scholarship suggests that group identity can be analyzed “as both an important precursor and as a consequence of mobilization” (Olzak 2006:38) or that identity may well be used not only as a strategy for empowerment but also as a goal (Bernstein 2008).

2 “The action of a country or its government preparing and organizing troops for active service.” https:// en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mobilization.

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Theoretical approaches In order to explain the phenomenon of ethnic mobilization, scholars have typically drawn from social movements theories. Vermeersch (2006, 2011), Olzak (1983, 2006), Mecham (2017), among many other scholars,3 have tried to delineate the main theoretical strands regarding the literature of ethnic mobilization/ ethnic social movements, defining major theoretical currents or main “schools” of thought. I follow Vermeersch’s typology (2006, 2011) to briefly review these approaches, namely: 1) the culturalist perspective; 2) the reactive ethnicity perspective; 3) the ethnic competition/ resource mobilization perspective; 4) and the political process perspective. Each of these perspectives focuses on a different set of decisive factors which shape and condition the patterns of ethnic mobilization. The so-called “culturalist perspective” (1) is considered close to primordialism as it emphasizes the significance of strong subjective bonding and values within ethnic groups for shaping the lines of ethnic mobilization. Under this approach, ethnic mobilization is perceived as a natural reflection of cultural structure and ultimately it is the cultural content that is considered determinant for a group’s pattern of mobilization (Harrison and Huntington 2000), and that ethnic groups are inherently and naturally political (Fearon 2008). Critics of this approach argue that culture or cultural essence is too diffuse to be used as a variable (Glazer 2000:223). Others point to the fact that this approach is tautological. Most importantly, this perspective is often rejected because of its inability to perceive culture and identity as dynamic and fluid, rather than stable properties. Moreover, this approach fails to account for the role of agency and organizational structures, as well as the political environment in which ethnic mobilization emerges and develops. The “reactive ethnicity perspective” (2) relies principally on economic factors to argue that the primary cause of ethnic mobilization lies in the coincidence

3 For example, Esteve (Esteve 2010) and Dietz (Dietz 1999), among others, opted for another way of explaining the diverse theoretical strands in the study of social movements—including ethnic ones, defining two major and most influential schools, namely: 1) The so-called “American school”—represented by scholars such as Tilly, Tarrow, McAdam, McCarty, and Olson (Theoretical approaches of resources mobilization theory and political opportunities structure); 2) and the so-called “European school”—represented by scholars such as Offe, Touraine, Melucci (Theoretical approaches of the so-called “new social movements”). On the other hand, Gibb distinguishes four main “schools” or “traditions” in the field of social movements: collective behavior perspective, resource mobilization theory, new social movements, and the political process model (Gibb 2001). Furthermore, others pointed out to the big differences between perspectives adopted by social sciences in studying social movements in Latin America in comparison to those adopted in Europe or North America (Goirand 2009).

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of ethnic bonding and relative deprivation. The rise of ethnic mobilization is seen as a process prompted by unequal division of resources along ethnic lines. Ethnic antagonism is generated by competition (Drury 1994) and in reaction to economic inequality. According to Vermeersch, critics of this approach argue that economic disadvantage is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of ethnic mobilization—the level of mobilization does not seem to be dependent of the level of disadvantage. After all, ethnic mobilization also emerges among economically well-off social groups (Piven and Cloward 1995; Cougghlan and Samarasinghe 1991, in Vermeersch 2011); a recent example of resurgence of proindependence mobilization in Catalonia is a good illustration of this. The “resource mobilization perspective”, which Vermeersch and others, denominates the “ethnic competition perspective” (3) resembles the “reactive ethnicity perspective” in that it also makes reference to economic arguments. However, under this approach, it is not the economic inequality but the distribution and availability of diverse resources (economic, human, political, etc.) that mobilize political action (Crowley 2001; Cunningham 2012; Owens et al. 2015; Nagel 1997). This approach focuses predominantly on the role of leaders making rational calculations about their identity and invoking ethnicity in their struggle for resources and power. The ethnic competition perspective builds on Barth and his focus on socially-constructed ethnic boundaries (1969); the mobilization of ethnic groups in collective action is effected by leaders who pursue a political enterprise (Barth 1994). Usually, this approach regards ethnic group identity not so much as a pre-existing fact but as a phenomenon which arises or gives new meaning to collective identity through the process of mobilization. Self-proclaimed group leaders invoke an ethnic group identity or apply new meaning and interest-based connotations to existing ethnic terms—identity and interests are mutually reinforced (Bell 1975). It is an instrumentalist perspective—ethnicity is seen as a calculation of social, economic, and political profits carried out by political elites (Nagel 1997; Cunningham 2012); ethnic activists or ethnopolitical entrepreneurs “produce” ethnic groups. This approach has been criticized for not accounting for the role of external factors (political elites and the state) and ignoring the structural context of contentious politics. Furthermore, and more importantly, the “ethnic competition” approach questions the pre-existence of ethnic groups, denying the role of ancestry and traditions in the process of collective ethnic identity formation. Arguably, the most complex and most commonly referenced theory of ethnic mobilization is the so-called “political process perspective” (4). It seeks to 26

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synthesize elements from the ethnic competition perspective, which accounts for the role of resources and the agency of leaders and organizational structures, while at the same time emphasizing the role of macro-politics, especially the external context, and in particular, the institutional environment. This approach is inspired by literature on social movements which emphasizes the articulation of identity and awareness of the influence of power relations in the creation/transformation of identity (Cohen and Arato 1995). Under this approach, ethnic mobilization is seen as a two-way relationship between political action and interests which are shaped by the institutional environment. Ethnic identity is utilized and activated as a basis for mobilization in search of access to political power, material resources, and control of representation (McAdam et al. 1996). Two elements are the backbone of the political process perspective: the political opportunities structure and the framing process. The political opportunities structure (POS) relates to the formal and informal conditions, the stable properties of the institutional environment, such as: state propensity to repression, the openness of institutionalized systems (official recognition of ethnic groups, existence of special channels for ethnic representation), and the existence of elite allies or shifts in political alliances (McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1994; Kriesi 2007; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly 1978; Giugni 2009). According to March and Olsen, under the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006) strategies and preferences of the actors are determined by institutions, or as argued by Rothestein: “Institutions create or socially construct the actors’ identities, belongings, definitions of reality and shared meanings” (Rothestein 1998:147). The POS emphasizes the emergence of opportunities which become incentives associated with changes in the broader political context. Nonetheless, the political environment and changes within it are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of emergence and evolution of ethnic mobilization; the institutional political context is overemphasized (Jenson 1998). Furthermore, according to some critics, formal and informal internal organizational processes of ethnic mobilization, as well as the question of strategic choices, leadership, and representativeness are ignored (Bousetta 2001, in Vermeersch 2011). To deal with this criticism, the political process perspective introduced a variable which refers to interpretation of dynamics shifts with political environment, and which can account for changes within patterns of ethnic mobilization. That variable is typically referred to as “framing.” The term “framing” draws from the writings of Erving Goffman, who understands “framing” as a scheme of interpretation (Goffman 1974). In the study of social movements, importance is given to deliberative processes 27

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of framing (McAdam et al. 1996; Benford and Snow 2000; Koubek 2017). Frames and meanings are constructed by leaders “to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and demobilize antagonists” (Benford and Snow 2000:198). Moreover, framing is always negotiated and, to a degree, is influenced by the complex, multi-organizational, and multiinstitutional arenas (ibid.). The process of meaning-making is relevant for the movement itself—the “constituencies” of the movement “do not exist” until they are articulated and defined through an identity frame (Jenson 1998). Despite its popularity, the political process theory has also had its critics (Giugni 2009; 2011; della Porta and Diani 2009). Escobar, for example, has emphasized that there is a widespread view among theorists that “social movements cannot be understood independently of culture” (Escobar 1992:405), arguing that the analysis of social movements has to account not only for political aspects but should pay equal attention to cultural elements. Goodwin and Jasper also underline the fact that movements which do not target the state as their main opponent are poorly served by the political process model (J. Goodwin and Jasper 1999); authors also point out that some movements seem to respond more to threats than to opportunities (J. Goodwin and Jasper 2014). The need for a synergic approach

The multiplicity of theoretical approaches employed to explain ethnic mobilization leads to fragmentary accounts and analysis; indeed, according to some scholars “each of these [theoretical] approaches showed but one side of the coin” (Klandermans 1991:17). It is difficult to juxtapose theoretical perspectives in order to evaluate their performance and feasibility, as they tend to differ in units of analysis, scope, and choice of variables. Furthermore, ethnic mobilization as a topic of inquiry has been dealt with from a variety of academic disciplines—among others, sociology, political science, international relations, and economics—but there has not been enough overlapping and cross-fertilization across the disciplinary boundaries. It is increasingly clear that a feasible theoretical approach, capable of explaining the complexity of ethnic mobilization as a phenomenon, requires a holistic and harmonizing approach which incorporates multiple variables. A growing consensus among scholars can be evidenced regarding the need for greater synergies, rather than divisions, in scientific perspectives on ethnic social movements; according to Olzak, “despite this fragmentation of approaches, an emerging tradition in political science and sociology suggests that it might be useful to begin to 28

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analyze different forms of ethnic mobilization using a singular framework” (Olzak 2006:71). In the past, scholars have searched for a solution to this theoretical fragmentation. In an attempt to harmonize the diverse theoretical perspectives, McAdam et al. (1996) in their seminal book Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, propose an analytical model for comparative studies of social movements. By analyzing different theoretical approaches, the authors define three variables which make such a comparative perspective possible, namely: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings. This model synthesizes the competing leading theoretical paradigms of social movements—arguing that all three factors have been defined as key in the majority of different paradigms. This model can be applied as well to the study of ethnic mobilization. A more recent trend which tries to overcome the theoretical and pragmatic divisions in the study of social movements and other forms of collective action is the introduction of the study of contentious politics. Contentious politics is defined as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interest, in which governments are approached either as targets, initiators of claims or third parties” (Tilly 2008:5) and consists of the “public, collective making of consequential claims by connected clusters of persons on other clusters of persons or on major political actors when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims” (McAdam et al. 2009:2). The definition of contentious politics refers to diverse types of collective political struggles; it includes social movements but also “less sustained forms of contention—like riots and strike waves—and more extensive ones— like civil wars, revolutions, and episodes of democratization—and it intersects with routine political processes—like elections and interest group politics” (Tarrow 2013). Thus, such diverse phenomena as revolutions, religious and ethnic conflicts, social movements, transnational movements, or civil rights struggles can all be analyzed using a single theoretical framework. The introduction of contentious politics aims to synthesize different theoretical traditions of studying social movements and other forms of collective political action (including ethnic mobilization). Under this approach, these authors define three main components of contentious politics: interactions, claims, and government. The three main properties of contentious politics are (although consensus is still to be reached): political opportunity structure, collective actors, and performances and repertoires. 29

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The above-mentioned contributions have brought the scholarship on collective action and, specifically, ethnic mobilization closer to the objective of building a common theoretical-analytical framework. Nonetheless, and despite these advances, consensus has not yet been reached, and scholars continue to develop new theoretical approaches.

Defining ethnic mobilization Ingredients of ethnic mobilization

In an attempt to overcome the existing theoretical divisions and to simplify and operationalize the concept of ethnic mobilization for analytical purposes, I propose a slightly different approach, while drawing on previously mentioned findings with regards to the nature of ethnic mobilization and its underlying macro-variables. The proposed model incorporates the main common features present in the majority of theories on social movements and ethnic mobilization, and at the same time allows for a detailed analysis of the different components or what are regarded as the ingredients of ethnic mobilization relevant for this study. The point of departure for this model is the popular definition of Susan Olzak (1983) on ethnic mobilization according to which “ethnic mobilization is a process in which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends.” To develop the model, I suggest dissecting the above-quoted definition, breaking it down into constitutive elements or ingredients. In order to do so, I propose to paraphrase Olzak’s definition, transforming it into a set of questions: Who (leadership, formal structures such as organizations) mobilizes whom (identity frame), with what aim/why (collective interests and goals) and how (strategy, through what actions)? When does this process emerge and when (under what conditions) does it change?

An element absent in Olzak’s definition is the question of time and place—an indispensable case-specific understanding based on the self-evident fact that ethnic mobilization emerges and evolves in very concrete conditions. It is for this reason that manifestations of ethnic mobilization cannot be analyzed in a 30

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vacuum but in a contextualized, concretely defined place and time. Likewise, instances of ethnic mobilization cannot be understood as isolated events, but rather need to be examined as a continuum, allowing to establish a logical dynamic of causality. Below is a schematic table which summarizes each ingredient, its defining features and associated theories and concepts: Table 1. Ingredients of ethnic mobilization COMPONENT AND UNDERLYING QUESTION

DEFINING FEATURES

RELATED CONCEPTS

WHO Ȇ What actors and vehicles are mobilizing?

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Formal and informal structures Individuals NGOs Political parties Networks Churches

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Mobilizing structures Agency Micro-mobilization Social movement organizations

WHOM Ȇ Who is being mobilized?

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Constituencies Adherents Supporters Allies Opponents

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Identity frame Collective identity formation Political dimension of ethnicity Boundary framing Adversarial framing Narratives

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Collective interest frames Diagnostic frames Prognostic frames Injustice frames Frame alignment process Motivational framing

FOR WHAT AND WHY Ȇ Objectives and goals Ȇ What are the aims of mobilization? Ȇ Reasons for mobilizing Ȇ What are we mobilizing for? Ȇ Claims and demands Ȇ Problems and solutions Ȇ Discourses HOW Ȇ What strategies are employed to pursue these goals?

Ȇ Strategies Ȇ Collective actions such as protests, lobbying and advocacy, press statements, etc.

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Collective action Performances Repertoires of contention Tactical repertoires Bi-directional repertoires (external and internal)

WHEN Ȇ When does ethnic mobilization occur and how does it evolve?

Ȇ “Windows of opportunity” Ȇ Political environment Ȇ Stable and unstable properties of political system Ȇ National cleavages Ȇ Shifts in political alliances

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Political opportunities structure Political process theory Dynamic perspective Mechanisms of strategic change

Breaking down the concept of ethnic mobilization into these separate elements, which I refer to as ingredients, enables a detailed, transparent analysis, while allowing an insight into the mutually dependent and dynamic relation31

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ships which these components establish between each other. These ingredients can be treated as variables which permit a careful inquiry into different aspects of ethnic mobilization. Ethnic mobilization as interplay

Defining the ingredients of ethnic mobilization facilitates a more detailed inquiry into specific aspects which compose and condition the patterns of ethnic mobilization. For example, by isolating the “Who” ingredient, associated with actors driving the process of ethnic mobilization (formal and informal structures, networks, etc.), it is possible to develop a detailed overview of the landscape in which actors interact with various types of stakeholders and with each other. Profile and typology of actors involved, patterns of leadership and membership, among others, can be described in detail. This strategy is useful in that it provides an in-depth immersion into concrete aspects of ethnic mobilization, whether inquiring into the strategies employed by concrete stakeholders, which lead to specific policy outcomes, or whether analyzing changes within the narrative of collective identity over a certain period of time. Nonetheless, isolating these ingredients and analyzing them separately also has a down-side—it produces a detailed description of a fragmentary aspect of ethnic mobilization, without explaining its overall dynamic. Ethnic mobilization, as a phenomenon, is never static—while a snapshot of a specific development in a concrete space and time can be produced, the overall, complex, relational, reactive, and multi-layer dynamics remain insufficiently unraveled. For this reason, similar to the scholarship on comparative social movements (McAdam et al. 1996) or contentious politics (Tarrow 2013; McAdam et al. 2009) discussed earlier, I distinguish three constitutive elements of ethnic mobilization which interact with each other and are mutually interdependent. More specifically, I assess ethnic mobilization by taking into consideration the interplay between: 1) political opportunities; 2) mobilizing structures; and 3) mobilizing frames. I argue that these three constitutive elements—which can be considered as macro-variables in the study of ethnic mobilization—are in a dynamic and mutually-dependent relationship. The interplay between these elements and, in particular, the capacity of mobilizing structures and frames to invoke conscious, strategic, and adaptive responses to their volatile political environment, are determinant for the success of ethnic mobilization. Ultimately, the diverse patterns of ethnic mobilization as well as their outcomes, produced in a spe32

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cific context, can be explained through the analysis of the interplay between political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and mobilizing frames. Political opportunities According to scholars who subscribe to the Political Opportunities Structure (POS) model, the single most influential factor which explains the emergence of ethnic mobilization, conditions its evolution, and influences its rate of success (in terms of achieving articulated political goals) is the broadly understood political and institutional environment in which mobilization takes place (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Kriesi 2004, 2007; McAdam et al. 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam et al. 2009; Tilly 1978, 2008; Tarrow 1994). Stable and unstable properties of the political system, as well as shifts in political alliances and the political environment, among others, may all produce “windows of opportunity” which affect the dynamic process of transformation and adaptation in ethnic mobilization. Translating POS into specific and stable properties is not a self-evident process. In fact, some scholars have argued that due to its enormous popularity, it has become an overly-used term which is applied without scientific rigor (Giugni 2009, 2011; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Berclaz and Giugni 2005). Goodwin and Jasper point to the structural bias of political process theory (J. Goodwin and Jasper 1999), while others argue that “the lack of consensus on the relevant dimensions of the concept of political opportunities has resulted in their exponential growth” (della Porta and Diani 2009:17). Meyer and Minkoff, on the other hand, argue that “this diversity of approaches may provide credible answers to particular problems, but it also produces a situation in which the same terms are used to describe completely different factors” and that “scholars use different terms for the same phenomena and offer different understandings of which phenomena are relevant altogether” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004:1460). Giugni also points to the divergent paths of development in scholarship on POS in Europe and the US: while American scholars concentrate predominantly on the volatile aspects of POS, European scholars focus more on the stable features of political opportunities (Giugni 2009). It is generally considered that the political opportunities structure refers to formal and informal political conditions, such as stable properties of the institutional environment (for example, state propensity to repression or the openness of the institutional system) or more volatile factors such as the existence of elite allies or shifts in political alliances. Tarrow defines political opportu33

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nities as “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure” (Tarrow 1994:85). Numerous analytical models have been developed over time by scholars in order to crystallize which elements of the political environment are determinant for social or ethnic movements. Kriesi et al. (1995), for example, point to the importance of existing national cleavages, the character of formal institutional structures (such as parliament, public administration, the existence of democratic procedures), the structure of alliances, and the prevailing informal strategies of the state in dealing with social movements. McAdam, in an effort to synthesize the diverse conceptions regarding the dimensions of political opportunities (based on the work of such prominent scholars as Tarrow, Kriesi, and Brockett) developed a consensual list of the features of political opportunity: 1. The relative openness or closure of the institutional political system 2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity 3. The presence or absence of elite allies 4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996:27).4 What is relevant is not so much the existence and durability of these features, but rather the changes and shifts within them.5 Regime change, shifts in political alignments, and the introduction of new legislation, may all produce political opportunities. But for these changes to translate into collective action, these shifts need to be perceived and framed as opportunities in the first place. After all, the availability of political opportunities does not automatically translate into increased protest (Koopmans 2007:24). Changes in political environment in some instances may produce opportunities for collective action, and in others may constrain them (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Indeed, “movements may largely be born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions” (McAdam et al. 1996:15). The ability of leaders to seize 4 Although significant steps have been undertaken (Kriesi et al. 2007; della Porta and Diani, 2009) with the aim of synthesizing, delineating, and specifying the dimensions of political opportunities and the relationship and co-relation between mobilization and political environments, scholarly consensus has still not been reached. 5 Or as stated by McAdam et al., political opportunities are defined “by both enduring and volatile features of a given political system” (McAdam et al. 1996:13).

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opportunities, frame them, and act on them determines the potential for success of ethnic mobilization struggles, by capitalizing on shifting contexts and translating them into collective action. It is also relevant to underline that although initially POS was generally linked to state-level developments, current scholarship suggests the importance of global/international political opportunities. Processes of globalization and growing interdependence between state-bound politics and international developments have led to the increasing impact and role of international politics on domestic affairs (Maiba 2004; Sadurski 2004; Schöpflin 2000; Oberschall 1996; J. Smith 2007; Olzak 2006). Olzak has developed one of the most holistic models which explains the dynamics between global-, countryand group-level developments, showing how “embeddedness in the world system of international organizations, inequality, poverty, and restrictions on minority civil rights all play roles in the generation of ethnic mobilization” (Olzak 2006:26). The relevance of transnational POS shapes this research as well—the realization that major targets of mobilization may, in fact, be located beyond the constrained limits of states, is a necessary point of analysis, especially in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization. Throughout my research, the variable associated with POS is treated as a transversal, dynamic, and over-arching one which is determinant for patterns of ethnic mobilization, in particular the mobilizing structures and mobilizing frames (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016). On the one hand, POSs are not static, but undergo shifts and changes over time; different factors condition the emergence and/or closure of political opportunities for different interest groups. In analyzing ethnic mobilization, it is impossible to do so convincingly without taking into consideration the unstable dimension of POS; in fact, it needs to be understood contextually, both in time and space. On the other hand, constantly shifting conditions of the broad political environment (as well as international developments) influence the shape, nature, strategies, discourses, and the very objectives of collective action pursued by mobilizing structures at a given moment of time. I coincide with McAdam who argues that “movement form would appear to be yet another variable that owes, in part, to differences in the nature of the opportunities that set movements in motion” (McAdam 1996:29). Most importantly, however, it is not only the POS that influences ethnic mobilization—the relationship between collective action and the broadlyunderstood political environment is mutual. The structure of political opportunities is not independent of social movements, rather “the structure of polit35

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ical opportunities is now more a product of the interactions of the movement with its environment than a simple reflection of changes occurring elsewhere” (McAdam et al. 1996:13)6. Gamson and Meyer further argue that “opportunities open the way for political action, but movements also make opportunities” (Gamson and Meyer 1996:35). Ethnic mobilization emerges within certain favorable conditions that facilitate the process; successful and effective mobilization leads to further concessions, widening the scope of available opportunities. Having been transformed, the structure of political opportunities acts back on the interest groups, which reformulate their objectives to accommodate further claims and demands. This process of interplay between POSs and ethnic mobilization ultimately challenges and transforms them both. Mobilizing structures Ethnic mobilization requires some degree of leadership and organization, since groups who engage in collective action must do so through a number of formal and informal vehicles (McAdam et al. 1996; Kriesi 1996; Minkoff and Clemens 2007; Hensmans 2003; Ganesh and Stohl 2014; Fuchs 2006; della Porta and Diani 2009). Activist networks, non-governmental organizations, political parties, as well as churches, businesses, private clubs, and unions, among many others, can become such vehicles. All of them can be considered as actors which “do the mobilizing,” providing platforms for collective action while guaranteeing some degree of continuity. They are organizational expressions of collective agency that engage in direct interactions with constituencies, targeted authorities, and allies; they may become the representatives of collective claims in the public sphere; and they help to articulate identified problems or grievances and set the agenda for collective goals to be pursued. These actors or vehicles are often referred to in academic literature as mobilizing structures (McAdam et al. 1996). Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, formal and informal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (ibid.: 3). Mobilizing structures are not restricted only to “social movement organizational forms”; a whole range of so-called micro-mobilizations with potential for generating mobilization, like family units, friendship networks, and voluntary associations, can also be considered as mobilizing structures (McCarthy 1996). These micro-mobilizations are especially relevant for recruiting new followers of a movement, and are often activated spontaneously. 6 McAdam further notes that a characteristic element of POS is the “typically fluid, reciprocal, unpredictable, and crucially important relationship of social movements to structures of political opportunity” (McAdam 1996:37).

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The selection of specific mobilizing structures which would best drive the cause pursued is not accidental. Leaders and activists must consciously choose mobilizing structures and successfully frame them as usable and appropriate to the social change required in their interaction with their constituencies, as well as the state and other stakeholders (Kriesi 1996). March and Olsen also argue, in what they refer to as “the logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006), that the institutional environment influences not only the choice of strategies and interests, but also the very type of mobilizing structures. “Social movement organizations (SMOs) are crucial building blocks of the mobilizing structures of a social movement” (Kriesi 1996:152)—they are the formal side and a formal, organizational expression of a movement. Kriesi (1996:153) defines 4 types of formal organizations of a social movement, which are spread across two axes depending on the relationship with constituencies (direct vs. indirect participation of constituencies) and the target of mobilization (constituent/client orientation vs. authorities’ orientation): Ȇ SMOs: mobilize constituencies for collective action and do so with a political goal; Ȇ Supportive organizations: service organizations, such as friendly media, churches, restaurants, educational institutions; they contribute to the movement indirectly; Ȇ Movement associations: self-help organizations, voluntary associations, clubs; they are created by the movement itself in order to cater to some of the daily needs of its members; Ȇ Parties and interest groups: pursue political goals but normally do not depend on direct participation of their constituencies for attaining these goals; they are specialized in political representation and normally do not have resources for mobilization of their constituencies; they are typically carried out by the elites. It should be underlined, however, that Kriesi’s seminal typology has also been criticized by some scholars. For example, the concept of “social movement organizations” has been challenged by Burstein (1998), arguing that it is difficult to distinguish SMOs from “interest groups,” proposing instead the use of “interest organizations” as a broader term to refer to these types of structures. The disagreements with regards to terminology reveal the lack of consensus on the nature and conceptualization of social movements as such (Diani 2012). More importantly, Kriesi’s clear-cut typology has been ques37

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tioned for its neatness and stability. Firstly, because individual mobilizing structures are not stable entities but dynamic ones, which evolve and transform over time, as a result of mutual influence and interaction with other structures or shifting conditions of the environment in which they operate (Willems and Jegers 2012; Hensmans 2003). Secondly, the clear-cut delineation of the type of mobilizing structure becomes problematic as a growing number of organizations combine mixed and fluid attributes. Indeed, there is an increase in scholarship on the so-called “hybrid organizations” (S. R. Smith 2014; Heaney and Rojas 2014; Minkoff 2002) or “multi-purpose organization” (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005; Evans 1997) which refer to organizations which combine service-provision with mobilizing activities, self-help, and political advocacy. Minkoff (2002) notes that the proliferation of hybrid organizations reflects a shifting relationship between social movements and the state, moving from contention and confrontation to accommodation through deliberation and co-ordination of partnership. Furthermore, it is not uniquely the type of mobilizing structure that conditions the outcome of mobilization—the human factor is paramount as well. Different theoretical frameworks on ethnic mobilization and social movements point to the important role of leaders in shaping group identity and interests as well as determining the strategies and resources used in collective action; the type and quality of leadership are determinant for the potential success of mobilization (Ganz 2010; Vermeersch 2006; McAdam et al. 2009). Groups striving for social change need credible leaders who represent the collective claims of their people and often act as indispensable intermediaries between their community and those in positions of power (Anna Mirga 2015). Some research also suggest that organizations with more skilled and committed leaders have higher levels of political presence (Han et al. 2011). Finally, in assessing mobilizing structures it should be noted that a movement is not constituted and driven by one mobilizing structure but rather is formed by a multiplicity of diverse actors, operating on different levels and through a variety of means and strategies. Thus, it is paramount to analyze mobilizing structures not as isolated entities but in their relationship to each other and in interaction with their environment. Given the plurality, heterogeneity, and dynamic character of mobilizing structures, it is necessary to analyze ethnic mobilization not through the prism of individual actors but by looking at the interconnected field of interaction.

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Mobilizing frames—identity and interests The core of a successful process of ethnic mobilization lies in the capacity to mobilize constituencies for collective action. To do so effectively, leaders and activists need to define who is targeted for mobilization. In this process it is necessary to delineate who “we” are as a group in order to construct a common understanding of collective identity shared by constituencies of ethnic mobilization or, as put by Flesher Fominaya, “Collective identity involves the ability to distinguish the (collective) self from the ‘other,’ and to be recognized by those ‘others’” (Flesher Fominaya 2010:395). This definition of collectivity is not selfevident—after all not all groups with distinct identity mobilize. Identity can be a tremendously powerful mobilizing tool, but needs to be activated deliberately, through narratives which accommodate commonly shared properties, interests, and goals. This process is referred to in academic literature as identity framing (Benford and Snow 2000; McAdam et al. 1996; Bernstein 2008). Powerful identity frames are constructed and articulated through discourses, narratives, symbols, and performances which delineate “who we are as a group,” and may produce new meanings regarding the collective interpretation of “us”. These frames often activate or underline the existence of a boundary which separates “us” from “them”; defining “who we are” inevitably determines “who we are not” through “boundary framing” (Hunt et al. 1994; Silver 1997) and “adversarial framing” (Gamson 1995; Benford and Snow 2000). In case of ethnic mobilization, this is relevant as it assumes the pre-existence of distinct groups which self-perceive as such. Nonetheless, the articulated content of this identity—the elements and symbols assembled for the purpose of mobilization—can emphasize some cultural attributes over others. Choosing an appropriate frame of identity may help to increase the mobilization potential—a concept which refers to “that part of the population which, because of its situation, has attitudes favorable to a movement or a certain issue” (Melucci 1988:339). These frames of “who we are” are a “public expression of self” (McDonald 2002) and need to be skillfully crafted by leaders in order to encompass multiple individual identities, which intersect with diverse identity markers existing alongside ethnic ones. These narratives of collective identity commonly become not only a “public expression of self” but also a “political expression of self,” in which the group transforms into a politically relevant subject or acquires political subjectivity. Researchers studying diverse types of collective action and social movements have long stressed the significant role of collective identity as a sine qua non element (Melucci 1996; Flesher Fominaya 2010; Snow 2001; McDonald 39

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2002; Hund and Benford 2004; della Porta and Diani 2009; Bernstein 2008; Bernstein and Olsen 2009). Nonetheless, scholars are still to agree whether collective identity in social movements is a pre-requisite or indeed a product of mobilization (Flesher Fominaya 2010; Bernstein 2008). Throughout this book, I will try to provide a contribution to this debate, based on findings from the case-study countries. In analysing the role of identity framing in ethnic mobilization it is important to examine through what discourses collective identity frames are articulated and deployed, how they are shaped and by whom. In doing so, two things need to be considered. Firstly, identity framing is a dynamic process—frames of identity shift over time, become more or less exclusive, have more or less rigid boundries.7 The process of re-framing of identities oftentimes responds to shifting contexts, emerging opportunities, or new circumstances, always at the service of specific political goals. Furthermore, different identity narratives can be deployed at the same time, depending on the audience, the venue, the context, or the goal pursued (Bernstein and Olsen 2009). Secondly, the collective identity variable is complex and multi-level; the construction of narratives articulating collective identity are influenced by exogenous discourses (who “they” are as a group) as well as self-crafted endogenous discourses (MirgaKruszelnicka 2016). This will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. Alongside the identity frame, which enables the identification of “who we are mobilizing”, another key element is the framing of “what we are mobilizing for”. It is not enough to define a collective identity of the group—a frame of collective interests is also necessary. Frames of collective interests can be understood as a way of interpreting or constructing the meaning of reality, by identifying problems and solutions which are experienced collectively by the group. Benford and Snow (2000) differentiate between “diagnostic framing”—which identifies problems—and “prognostic framing”—in which perspectives are given as to how to remedy the defined problems. These frames, like in the case of collective identity frames, are consciously constructed and set the agenda for ethnic mobilization by providing possible reasonable and feasible solutions. Through this process, specific goals are defined which should be pursued collectively. Moreover, the choice of these frames needs to 7

McAdam et al. argue that “Participants frequently shift their collective definitions of who ‘we’ and ‘they’ are. They do so especially through two processes. First, they create new connections among individuals, networks, and previously constituted actors in the form of named coalitions, fronts, and organizations. Second, they activate, deactivate, and redraw boundaries separating one actor from another, creating collective stories about the two sides” (McAdam et al. 2009:5).

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be strategically made to increase their resonance; the collective interest frames need to reflect the interests and grievances of the members of the group mobilized and represented. Framing processes “are deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: Frames are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose—to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth. Strategic efforts by social movement organizations to link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers were initially conceptualized as “frame alignment processes” (Benford and Snow, 2000:624). Frames of collective identity and interests resemble each other in that they need to be constructed, articulated and convey meaning—a certain interpretation of the social reality of the group, shaping a collective sense of belonging and presence and a collectively shared historical past. They also transmit beliefs about a foreseeable and better future, if the goals set by ethnic mobilization are to be met. More importantly, collective identity and interest frames are closely intertwined, and at times, completely inseparable: a specific interpretation of reality laid out through a collective interest frame may become part of a group’s collective identity. In fact, Melucci defines collective identity “as a process in which the actors produce common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess the environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of the action” (Melucci 1988: 343), making identity and interests frames inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Although conceptually, collective identity and collective interest frames are typically treated as isolated variables and are discussed separately, in practice they are often indivisible. Assessing both frames in relationship to each other provides more depth and context to the specific narratives, their “resonance,” “alignment,” and “correspondence” (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and McAdam 2000). Finally, it is paramount to acknowledge that “the relationship between ethnicity and collective action is undoubtedly mutually reinforcing” (Olzak 2006: 35). The dynamic character of the identity framing process is influenced by the development of ethnic mobilization itself—frames of collective interests, evolution of mobilizing structures, narratives crafted by leaders, and the very context of the external environment in which these take place, affect the way in which collective identity is framed and articulated (Diani 1996). In fact, some scholars argue that identity, interests, and structures intersect and are in a constant interdependent relationship with each other (Bernstein 2008). Likewise, Oliver argues that: “Mobilization happens through social networks and social networks are changed in the process of mobilization; identities shape mobili41

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zation and mobilization changes identities; political and organizational structures constrain mobilization and mobilization changes political and organizational structures” (Oliver 2013:235). Ethnic mobilization as process—towards a multi-directional perspective

Ethnic mobilization is ultimately about mobilizing resources—material and non-material resources, human capital, solidarity, support, and money—in a variety of ways for collective use in pursuit of some goal though collective action. Significantly, the process of mobilization is complex and multi-leveled and can be deployed in different ways, in multiple directions, and towards various audiences. Therefore, it is not only relevant to understand what type of resources are mobilized for collective action but also to assess who is the target of mobilization. Collective action, in most cases, targets the state as the main opponent with the objective of accomplishing collectively shared goals (McCarthy 1996; Van Dyke et al. 2004); after all, collective action is done “for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority” (Kriesi et al. 2007:11, italics in original). However, as much as mobilization can be directed upwards—towards an opponent associated with the state—it can also be directed elsewhere, focusing on other targets. In fact, although social movements have traditionally identified the state and its institutions as targets and opponents, most recent scholarship suggests that movements increasingly tend to target societies at large (Earl and Kimport 2008; Salehyan and Stewart 2017). Van Dyke et al., for example, argue that social movements use public protest to “shape public opinion, identities, and cultural practices and to pressure authorities in institutional arenas not directly linked to the state” (Van Dyke et al. 2004:27). Furthermore, if ethnic mobilization is ultimately about the capacity to mobilize support and harness resources, it is also important to analyze in what ways mobilization tactics are employed internally. The capacity to adapt effective repertories internally, towards potential constituencies and supporters of the movement is essential as “a movement’s ability to mobilize will, of course, influence its ability to achieve its goals” (Bernstein 2008:293). The capability to effectively mobilize constituencies—taking advantage of the potential agency of communities themselves—may, in fact, improve the overall ability of collective action. Thus, different techniques might be deployed by actors, depending on who is the target of mobilization and what is the aim sought to be accomplished. The success of ethnic mobilization, in terms of accomplishing articulated objectives, depends on the capacity to mobilize in different directions simultaneously, 42

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adjusting the tools and discourses to the targeted audiences; and these different levels of interaction overlap and are interrelated. The fulfillment of a specific goal which has as its ultimate target the institutions of power (the state) is, to an extent, dependent on the capacity to initially harness mass mobilization among constituencies, galvanizing public support among powerful allies or the general society. Effective mobilization of strategic allies, through coordinating collective struggles across movements and interests, ultimately increases the political leverage of these struggles. It may also target bystanders, associated with uninvolved mainstream society, with the objective of producing broader social change or generating sympathy and public support towards the cause. Thus, I propose to acknowledge the multi-directional and multi-layered dimensions of ethnic mobilization. The multi-directional process of ethnic mobilization is a taken-for-granted aspect, which remains under-conceptualized in existing scholarship and lacks serious theoretical discussion. To understand better these dynamics, it is important to recognize how the actors who are driving the process of ethnic mobilization relate to and interact with the external world which surrounds them. We can differentiate between three sets of actors with which the mobilizing structures interact: 1. Broadly understood structures of power and their institutions, which tend to be treated as the main targets of ethnic mobilization and towards which mobilizing structures direct their claims and demands. Often these structures are regarded as opponents (McCarthy 1996) and are associated with formal structures of power such as the state administration, public authorities, intergovernmental organizations, etc. 2. The constituency which the mobilizing structures seek to represent, on behalf of whom they act, and with whom they engage. These constituents are the potential adherents of the ethnic movement. In this book, they are associated with the Romani community. 3. Those who are external to mobilization. On the one hand, mobilization may target allies who are external to the ethnic mobilization itself but who may share common objectives and collective interests and may support the ethnic mobilization in a variety of ways; in this context, allies refer to specific structures, organizations, and institutions which act or have the potential to act as stakeholders. On the other hand, mobilization may target what I refer to as bystanders—members of the majority society, the uninterested and disengaged masses—with the objective of building public support for the cause or shaping public opinions. 43

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Schematically, this model of interaction can be illustrated in the figure below: STRUCTURES OF POWER

BYSTANDERS

MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

ALLIES

CONSTITUENCIES Figure 1. Schematic figure of ethnic mobilization as a multi-directional process

Understood and conceptualized in this way, I distinguish three directions and/or sub-types of ethnic mobilization: 1) internal mobilization (downwards); 2) external upward mobilization and; 3) external lateral mobilization. Below, I discuss these three directions of ethnic mobilization in detail. Internal mobilization I define mobilization downwards (or internal mobilization) as the overall sum of efforts directed at mobilizing constituencies; in the case of this research, the Romani population. It refers to the ability to empower members of the group, activate their potential, and promote their direct involvement; fostering the ownership of the constituency and its leaders in the ethnic mobilization efforts. The capacity to adapt effective repertoires internally, towards the potential constituencies and supporters of the movement, is an essential factor which contributes to the potential success of collective action (Bernstein 2008). Della Porta and Diani further underline that whichever tactic is employed to pursue collective interests, they should not only be “directed to external targets, but they also have an internal movement-building dimension” (della Porta and Diani 2009). The importance of internal mobilization lies in the fact that the community possesses resources and agency which can be activated for collective use in the process of ethnic mobilization. By not engaging in internal mobilization, actors are denied access to a range of resources of the population and/ or individual adherents or constituents. Resources which are potentially available but remain largely under-appreciated and unused include moral (such as legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity), cultural, 44

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socio-organizational, human (labor, experience, skills, expertise), and material resources (McCarthy and Edwards 2007:125). Furthermore, the capacity to mobilize mass support—for example, by convoking mass protests—raises the leverage of the movement in political negotiations towards the concession of specific demands. Accessing collective, community resources also reinforces the level of independency of actors; after all, literature suggests that externally derived resources come with a cost, namely that of losing a significant degree of autonomy, and the risk of co-optation and control (Cress and Snow 1996). Internal mobilization requires the adjustment of strategies employed by mobilizing structures, both in what concerns their narratives directed towards the constituencies and in what concerns their overall modus operandi. With regards to narratives, internal mobilization should rely on what Benford and Snow call “motivational framing,” understood as the “final core framing task, [which] provides a ‘call for arms’ or a rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action” (Benford and Snow, 2000:617). The mobilizing frames of collective identity and interest should be aligned with and respond to those of the constituents. The narratives should also be directed at activating the agency which community members themselves possess (Ganz 2010; Han et al. 2011)—in that process, members should not be seen as passive and disinterested beneficiaries and claimants but as rational partners capable of contributing. In this sense, the constituents should not be transformed into clientele of the actors driving the movement, in a patron-client relationship, but should be treated as partners and co-contributors. To strengthen internal mobilization, it is important that stakeholders maintain dialogue, foster participation, and establish durable relationships with their constituencies, rooted in transparency, accountability, and shared ownership with the objective of building collective power. Klandermans, among others, provides a good model which enables the analysis of the process of recruitment and maintenance of sympathizers and recruits in the process of internal mobilization (Klandermans 2007). External upward mobilization Ultimately the identification of the target of mobilization is defined by the objective which the movement itself seeks—it is the objective that determines a feasible strategy, based on the identified stakeholder who has the competencies or power to bring a response to demands voiced by the mobilizing structures. Even if the aim of collective action does not fall explicitly within the mandate of states/governments—for example, when what is aimed for is a 45

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change in attitudes among fellow citizens—the state will become one of the key stakeholders targeted by mobilization. More importantly, the attributes associated with the political opportunities structure and the opening and closing of those “windows of opportunities,” depend to a great extent on the activity of governments. It is for this reason that upward mobilization plays a significant role in ethnic mobilization. I define external upward mobilization as those efforts which are directed at external targets, typically associated with power-holders and the state. Often these targeted structures are regarded as opponents (McCarthy 1996) and are associated with formal structures of power such as state administration, public authorities, intergovernmental organizations, etc. It refers to the ability to advocate for a desired change, assuming the responsibility and power of the mobilization target to provide responses to collective interests of a group. The state and its institutions have typically been regarded in scholarship as the main target of mobilization (Tilly 1978; McAdam et al. 2009). The very foundation of the scholarship on “contentious politics” is the premise that the state is “a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims” (McAdam et al. 2009:5). Van Dyke et al. (2004), in a study on the waves of protest in the US between 1968 and 1975, found that over half of these events had the state/government as the target of mobilization—leading to inquiry into the remaining targets of mobilization, other than the government. Indeed, while more recent literature sustains that there are also other targets for social movements than the state powers (Earl and Kimport 2008; Salehyan and Stewart 2017; Van Dyke et al. 2004), public authorities continue to be a significant point of reference and a major stakeholder with whom mobilizing structures need to interact in one way or another. In the relevant literature, mobilizing structures establish a relationship with the opponent which are characterized by contention, confrontation, or conflict (Tarrow 1994, 2013; McAdam et al. 2009). Nonetheless, more recent scholarship points to the fact that increasingly these relationships shift to be based more on collaboration and bargaining (della Porta 2001). This shift reflects a broader trend of accommodating and including interests groups in the context of “the deliberative turn” and the emergence of new frameworks of governance (Goodin 2008). Structures of power (such as state institutions) establish mechanisms through which collective claims can be accommodated and contained by creating channels of involvement, participation, consultation, and co-ordination. Financial support given to mobilizing structures, their formal involvement in policy-making, and oftentimes joint responsibility over implementa46

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tion alter the relationship between the opponents (the state) and the interest groups, shifting from confrontation to partnership. External lateral mobilization I define external lateral mobilization as the activity directed at mobilizing external support by establishing alliances, generating public support, and/ or joining forces with other actors for accomplishing similar, specific goals. Generally, this process is based on building strategic alliances and aligning specific collective interests with other social demands and/or movements. Lateral mobilization is important as it provides greater political leverage in advocating for collective demands. After all, as Dieter Rucht observes, “a set of actors with similar goals strengthen their position when coordinating their activities or even joining forces” (Rucht 2007:202). He further notes that “social movements as a whole or parts of them, may also form alliances with external groups, such as other movements, interest groups, political parties, elites, intellectuals, and media” (ibid. 202–203). Lateral mobilization can take a variety of forms; among them, it can rely on common interests (interest-based initiatives) and shared grievances and problems (for example through interethnic initiatives seeking non-discrimination or granting of minority rights), or it can exploit the dimension of identity, shared across movements (as in the case of minority women’s struggles or the LGBTIQ movements). Alliances tend to be limited in their objectives and are time-bound; oftentimes they are temporary and goal-oriented. They are also formed by actors who want to retain their autonomy and distinctiveness (Rucht 2007), and rather than merging into one they prefer cooperation and strategic collaboration in the overlapping areas of collective interests or (similar) identities. They resemble temporary coalitions which, nonetheless, can translate into longer-term and durable relationships. To effectively engage in lateral mobilization it is important to identify potential allies in the first place. Curtis and Zurcher (1973) but also others (Evans 1997; Klandermans 2013) acknowledge the existence of “multi-organizational fields” which are defined as “the total possible number of organizations with which the focal organization might establish linkages” (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973:53). The supportive sector of the multi-organizational field refers to the “movement organization’s alliance system, consisting of groups and organizations that support it” (Klandermans 2013). Identifying and effectively acknowledging the existence of a potential supportive sector—those actors which can potentially become mobilized laterally—and targeting it may enable the building of alliances, 47

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which can result in additional resources or help to create political opportunities. Furthermore, strategic discourses which enable alliance-building through processes of frame alignment and frame extension (Snow et al. 1986) need to deploy narratives which re-connect group-specific interests with interests of other potential allies. Additionally, identifying and engaging with powerful allies can be key for accomplishing the movement’s goals. Another dimension, more difficult to measure and evaluate, is the question of mobilizing support among so-called bystanders—the uninvolved, passive members of the broader society who are external to the movement and seemingly do not benefit directly from the potential accomplishment of the goals of ethnic mobilization. Arguably, the sympathy and solidarity of bystanders can become a powerful resource, capable of shifting the tides in favor of the movement. After all, as Tarrow argues, “power in movement grows when ordinary people join forces in contentious confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents” (Tarrow 1994:ii). At the same time, however, generating sympathy and support might not only be a strategy of gaining stronger political grounds, but can also be considered an objective in itself. Many of the modern social movements sought not only a specific policy change but additionally, and often more importantly, a broader social change in public attitudes and/ or values; the LGBTIQ movement and support for gay marriages, for example, illustrate this process well.

Understanding Romani ethnic mobilization Framing Romani activism—literature overview

The history of Romani ethnic mobilization dates back several decades, although the first signs of what can be regarded as Romani activism— through dynamics of political representation and self-organization—can be traced back to the 1920s or possibly even earlier (Klímová-Alexander 2007b; Marushiakova and Popov 2005; Hancock 2002).8 Since then, Romani ethno-politics has progressed, passing through various stages of development (Gheorghe and Liégeois 1995) and has proliferated across the world. 8 Klímová-Alexander argues that “some crafters of Romani nationalist history argue that the roots of Roman activism date from the end of nineteenth century (….). These early international congresses are, however, nationalist myths based on dubious sources and creative interpretation” (Klímová-Alexander 2005:15).

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But what exactly is Romani ethnic mobilization or the so-called Romani movement? I consider the case of Romani ethnic mobilization unique and substantially different from other ethnic movements described in relevant literature on the subject. On the one hand, Romani activism does not seek an autonomous state—it is well-known that the Romani leaders self-define the Romani transnational diaspora as a non-territorial nation (famously declared by the IRU during the 5th World Roma Congress in 20009), although there have been isolated cases of territorial utopias of a “Romanistan” (Poulton 2000; Barany 2002b; Acton 1974; Hancock 1991; Ficowski 2013; Rövid 2009; Marushiakova and Popov 2005). Therefore, the case of Romani ethnic mobilization does not deal with ethnic separatist party voting or ethnic autonomous movements, unlike a vast portion of literature dedicated to ethnic mobilization. On the other hand, the Roma case is also only marginally related to cases of ethnic violence and armed conflict, which the literature so predominantly deals with (Olzak 2006). Romani ethnic mobilization is non-violent and by no means seeks armed confrontation with any other entity, be it other communities or states; there have also been no instances of violent confrontation provoked or inflicted by Roma on the non-Roma majority. On the contrary, the Roma have been among the primary victims of violence, both during armed conflicts—in recent history most painfully during the Second World War and the Balkan Wars—as well as the result of racially motivated violence and hate crimes (J. Bhabha, Mirga, and Matache 2017). The case of Romani ethno-political mobilization is also unique because of the very character of its population. Dispersed across the world, with multiple languages and dialects, belonging to most of the major world religions, with a myriad of diverse traditions and lifestyles, the Roma are defined by their internal heterogeneity (Gheorghe and Acton 2001). It is difficult to speak of the Romani identity, as if it was a contained, homogeneous, naturally existing and single form; rather, Roma themselves tend to embrace and take pride in their internal diversity, and not uncommonly speak of Romani identities and cultures (in plural) (for example: Brooks, in Friedman and Friedman 2015; Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Gheorghe and Acton 2001). This heterogeneous status of Romani identity should not be understood as a weakness or 9 According to Rövid, “the concept of the Roma as ‘a nation without a state’ was suggested and developed in many articles by a non-Roma individual, Paolo Pietrosanti from Italy, an influential member of the Transradical party, was co-opted into the International Romani Union leadership (even though it was not very clear how this happened) as early as the mid-1990s” (Rövid 2009:11).

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a proof of non-existence of Roma as a distinct community. On the contrary, it is the concept of identity which requires revision, moving away from essentialist and closed definitions to more fluid, context-sensitive, and relational identity framings. Elsewhere, by reviewing scholarship of Brubaker (2002, 2004), Hall (1996) and Vertovec (2007), I discuss the potential of definitions in deconstructing homogenized and essentialized discourses on Roma, in knowledge production and beyond (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018). Moreover, this unity in diversity of the transnational Romani diaspora, both symbolically and in practice, can be a source of strength and political leverage in Romani ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, Romani activists operate on different levels—from local to transnational—employ multiple and divergent types of mobilizing structures, and deploy numerous, and at times contradictory, discourses of what specific objectives and strategies are sought in representation of the global and heterogeneous Romani diaspora. For this reason, when speaking of the plethora of different expressions of Romani activism—from NGOs to political parties, from public protests to lobbying and advocacy, and from community initiatives to involvement in transnational networks—a legitimate scholarly question arises: under which theoretical paradigm should this socio-political Romani phenomenon be interpreted? In literature regarding Roma, different theoretical approaches have been used in order to explain the phenomenon of Romani ethnic activism: ranging from identity politics, ethnic mobilization, social movement, civil society, political activism, ethno-nationalism, and politics of recognition (Vermeersch 2006; van Baar 2011c; McGarry 2010; Kóczé and Rövid 2012; Kóczé 2012a; Rövid 2011; Barany 2002a; Acton and Ryder 2013; Guy 2013; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Hancock 1991). When it comes to the phenomenon of Romani activism, one can find a number of excellent academic literature dedicated to this topic (see for example Vermeersch 2006; McGarry 2010; van Baar 2011c; Barany 2002b; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Guy 2013).10 In analyzing this phenomenon, scholars draw from different disciplines and theoretical paradigms, and often focus on different aspects or expressions of Romani activism, ranging from transnational Romani activism to electoral politics or minority self-governments. There seems to be a disagreement, however, on what is the nature of Romani activism and, 10 Some scholars, like Vermeersch, however, argue that “there is a dearth of research on the political mobilization and political participation of Roma communities” (Vermeersch 2017:200). He further rightfully notes that “most literature about Roma discuss the scale of the Roma’s socioeconomic marginalization in contemporary Europe and the problems of hate speech and anti-Roma discrimination” (Vermeersch 2017:201).

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consequently, which term is most adequate to describe it. In a vast portion of literature on Romani activism, the term “movement” is associated with it, for example, “the Roma movement” (Marushiakova and Popov 2005; Vermeersch 2006; Georgieva-Stankova 2015). However, there are voices which question whether Romani activism can in fact be considered a type of social movement in the first place (Barany 2002a; Trehan and Sigona 2010). Scholars who have written about Romani activism or the so-called “Roma movement” have generally tended to view it in a rather negative light and concentrate on its weaknesses and shortcomings. Marushiakova and Popov were among the first scholars who described the emergence of a so-called “Gypsy industry” and associated it with the actors and activities of Romani organizations (Marushiakova and Popov 2005). Their interpretation of the activities of diverse actors (notably, Roma and non-Roma) revolving around the socalled “Roma issues” was quite unfavorable while referring to a “caste” of Roma involved. They argue that the emergence of the “Gypsy industry” lead[s] also to the emergence of quite a few ‘professional Roma’ (on national and international level), whose solely [sic] educational and professional qualification is the Romani origin (often contested by other Roma) and proficiency in English, which appeared to be enough to earn their living as ‘experts’ in NGO sector and in the European institutions (Marushiakova and Popov 2005:87).

This assessment and terminology quickly spread among other scholars and is now used commonly with regards to the Roma movement. Other terms, similar in tone, have also been deployed in the scholarship, such as “ethno-business,” “Roma industry,” “human rights industry,” or the “NGOization of the Roma issue” (Trehan 2001; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Barany 2002a; van Baar 2013). It is quite striking that the Romani intellectuals themselves associate the “Gypsy industry” with a relatively different, although related, phenomenon. In All Change! Roma Studies through Romani Eyes the authors argue that the discussion around “the Gypsy industry” revolved around two issues: One was concerned with how non-Romani institutions claim collaboration with the Romani community by including the participation of a token Gypsy. The other regarded how non-Romani people construct a false Romani identity to gain a foothold in the Gypsy industry (Acton and Le Bas 2010:82). 51

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Kóczé, in her analysis of the “Gypsy industry,” also points to the fact that Roma have fallen victim to a development industry (Kóczé and Trehan 2011; Kóczé 2012a). Other scholars concentrate on the alleged failures of the Romani political project. Gay y Blasco, for example, argues that Romani politics is characterized by the “weakness or even absence of any overarching Gypsy imagined community” (Gay y Blasco 2002:173). Barany famously claimed the failure and impossibility of Romani ethnic mobilization, pointing to the weakness of Romani identity, divided leadership and incompetent organizations, incoherent and unrealistic objectives, and unstable financial support (Barany 2002a, 2002b). Undoubtedly, the most common deficiency of the so-called Romani movement in scholarly assessment, which delegitimizes the Romani political project altogether, is its supposed detachment from Romani communities, or the criticism that Romani mobilization is elite-driven (Barany 2002b; Trehan 2001; Cohen and Arato 1995; Kovats 2003; Guy 2001). Most critical scholarly voices relate to the so-called Romani nationalism as a project. Some non-Roma scholars have been especially vocal and grave in their assessment. Kovats (2003) famously claimed that “as a statement of fact, the nationalist claim is the most amazing nonsense [emphasis added]” and that “Roma nationalism represents the politicisation of the Romantic racial myth of the Gypsy people” (Kovats 2003). Cohn, in a dramatic response to an essay by Ian Hancock (“The East European Roots of Romani Nationalism”) refutes the real existence of Romani nationalism, arguing that it is limited to “a few individuals who have no meaningful contact with actual gypsies” (Cohn 1993). Others have been more moderate; for example, McGarry described it as “an ambiguous nationalism,” arguing that while it undoubtedly exists symbolically, it is generally unknown outside of the Romani elites (McGarry 2009). Yet others, although acknowledging existing shortcomings and challenges, see a potential in the project of Romani political transnational activism in the representation of rights of a non-territorial nation. Rövid, for example, notes that the Roma have a potential of being “an exceptional, avant-garde nation” (Rövid 2009:14). Nicolae Gheorghe and Thomas Acton note that “The unfolding agenda of Gypsy activism may be nothing less than the abolition of the nation-state” (Gheorghe and Acton 2001:69). In contrast, some scholars of Romani background have been defending the Romani nationalist project, despite being aware of its limits and challenges. Hancock, one of its primary advocates, argues that it is rooted in the symbolical quest for a “Romanistan” and that it results in the political project of Jekhipé: 52

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the Romanes word for ‘oneness’ (Hancock 1991:226). For Nicolae Gheorghe, on the other hand, the Romani nationalist project is defined as a process in which a social group, previously occupying a despised and inferior position, [is] moving from this position to some kind of respectability with a sort of equality with other social groups in the hierarchy of social stratification on the basis of a revised perception of their identity (Gheorghe 1997:158).

Nonetheless, the scholarly criticism of the decades-long history of Romani activism, both on the national level and in the international arena, and the focus on its limitations, shortcomings, and deficits, generally fails to appreciate the accomplishments and progress of Romani ethnic mobilization. Indeed, since the publication of an influential and well-known policy paper “The Roma in the Twenty-First Century,” written by two Romani intellectuals Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorghe and published 20 years ago (Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997), which represented a unique illustration of the status quo of Romani politics at the turn of the century, numerous evidence point to the fact that the Romani movement continues to face some of the same challenges and problems as it did back in the late 1990s. Romani ethno-politics continues to be driven predominantly by NGO-type structures (Vermeersch 2006; Rostas 2012; Trehan and Sigona 2010; McGarry 2010; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016) and is internally fragmented (McGarry 2010; Vermeersch 2006). Romani representatives have been unable to conquer spaces of formal politics and Roma interest groups continue to be largely powerless (Rostas 2012). Challenges such as a lack of unity and internal competition; questionable legitimacy of leadership and representation; limited transparency and accountability; donor dependency, competition, co-optation, politicization and self-interests; or sometimes difficult relations with its own constituencies or grassroots communities have not yet been effectively overcome (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016; Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Guy 2013; Rostas 2012; McGarry 2010; Kóczé 2012a; Kóczé and Rövid 2012; Rostas 2009; Ivasiuc 2018; van Baar and Kóczé 2020; Rostas 2019). These shortcomings have been an object of discussion among Romani activists themselves and have already started to produce adjustments in the strategies of Romani activism, moving towards building greater accountability, developing stronger relationships with the grassroots and direct participation, and building broader coalitions of multiple Romani actors. But a more balanced analysis of the Romani movement should require a comprehensive contextualization. On the one hand, some scholars right53

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fully argue that there are significant factors which explain the shortcomings of Romani activism. For example, Vermeersch argues that “poverty, illiteracy, the relative youth of the Roma constituency, competition, and limited access to resources have all been identified as factors” (Vermeersch 2006:120). Prevalent racism and antigypsyism, socio-economic marginalization of a significant part of the European Romani population, lack of stable and independent funding, among other factors, are also obstacles which effectively impede a dynamic and sustainable development of the Romani movement. On the other hand, it is important to note that the problems that the Romani activists and leaders are dealing with are by no means unique and “typical” of Roma, but rather represent challenges which plague other social movements and/or civil society in general. Problems related to the NGOization of social struggles has been largely discussed in the scholarship, pointing to some of its underlying causes, such as the salience of deliberative democracy or the neoliberal order (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2016; Steffek 2014). Likewise, the struggle of social movement actors to maintain financial and de facto independence in the face of cooption or donor dependency is a well-known challenge (Banks et al. 2015; Vincent 2006). Issues related to internal fragmentation or legitimacy and accountability are also problems of contemporary civil society (Brown and Kalegaonkar 1999; Reich 2006). Furthermore, the frequently repeated argument about the detachment of Romani actors from the grassroots and the evidence of how the movement is predominantly driven by Romani elites requires contextualization. First, because the scholarship shows the paramount role of elites in nationbuilding processes (Bendix 2017; Deutsch and Foltz 2010; Whitmeyer 2002) and in social movements (J. C. Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Brown-Nagin 2005; McAdam et al. 1996), so the Romani movement being “an elite-driven project” is neither unusual nor undesirable. Secondly, because it wrongfully assumes that the Romani intellectuals and/or leaders considered as the elite are somehow losing ties with their own families and communities due to their socioeconomic ascendance; an argument which in itself can be considered biased.11 Van Baar is among the few scholars who have pointed out this false dichotomy between “Romani elites” and “Romani grassroots,” along with other dichotomies:12 11 Sometimes it seems that scholars themselves fall into the trap of essentializing and stereotypical discourses by searching for a “true Gypsy” (Acton 1998; Tremlett 2009; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018c). In such an interpretation, a Roma leader who ascends socially and economically is somehow “detached” from the community and thus becomes an illegitimate representative. 12 I have contested the language of binary opposition with regards to the Roma movement elsewhere (Anna Mirga 2015).

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I call into question the binary oppositions between the representatives and the represented, elites and grassroots, or formal and informal sides of the movement. Such a binary approach to the Romani movement and to the possibilities of NGO development more generally embodies several ontological and epistemological problems. These binary constructions and the way in which they oppose expert to local knowledge privilege a problematic view of ‘local needs’ and ‘grassroots communities’. The Romani grassroots communities and local Romani NGOs are set against a non-Romani and Romani elite, including the professionalized international NGOs with whom they are affiliated (van Baar 2013:195).

Finally, despite the limitations of Romani politics and the unresolved problems of the past, the Romani ethno-politics has also accomplished some milestones over the last few decades. The development of Roma-targeted policies and the ascendance of the so-called “Roma issue” to the highest levels of the political agenda, both internationally and nationally, and the shifting of the political discourse from a general human rights and minority protection framework to a specific, Roma-targeted, sui generis category in the policy-making of the current National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS) among the EU member states can also be seen as achievements of Romani ethnic mobilization (MirgaKruszelnicka 2017b). The most recent shift in Romani policymaking, from a socio-economic inclusion approach to justice defined by the fight against antigypsyism, also responds to the advocacy efforts of well-organized Romani actors. Moreover, Romani leaders also managed to raise awareness around key issues such as the question of Roma Holocaust recognition (van Baar 2011a; MirgaKruszelnicka et al. 2015; Kapralski 2012), the centrality of antigypsyism (Alliance against Antigypsyism 2016; Nicolae 2006), and cultural inclusion, leading to important responses on behalf of national and international political stakeholders. With regards to the evolution of Romani ethnic mobilization, Vermeersch argues that “a growing number of Roma are involved in various forms of political and social activism, often in self-organized civil society groups” and that despite a growing number of “well educated and outspoken activists seeking to engage fellow-citizens—non-Roma and Roma—as voters and activists, the archetype persists that Roma are politically more passive than other groups of citizens” (Vermeersch 2017:201). Nonetheless, in scholarship such reflections tend to fall outside the scope of scholarly analysis of Romani activism. While abundant in criticism, fewer scholars have dealt with the phenomenon of Romani activism in a more scrupulous way; and only a handful of 55

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academics have tried to come up with something resembling a definition of the Romani movement. Vermeersch, for example, wrote that according to him Romani activism in Central Europe is a multiform phenomenon. It encompasses a variety of activities, strategies, and organizations. Some of the actors in this field claim they represent the Roma, others only aim to speak for the Roma. Sometimes their strategy is limited to filing complaints against those who discriminate against Roma, while at other times activists actively involve themselves in policy- and legislation-making debates and seek to become the “voice” of the Roma in politics. In all cases, however, the central focus of this activism is on minority rights (Vermeersch 2005:464).

Elsewhere, he argues that the Romani movement “is complex and diffuse. It consists of both officially recognized and informal groupings, and it encloses organized as well as less organized associations.… the Romani movement is not monolithic but rather fragmented, and it is in constant flux” (Vermeersch 2006:9). Van Barr, on the other hand argues that like other social and civil movements, the Romani movement is heterogeneous, complex, diffuse, not clearly bound, fragmented, in permanent flux, and made up of various formal and informal organizations and networks. I have argued (van Baar 2011; 2012c) that we need to understand and analyze the Romani movement beyond what Vermeersch (2006:9) calls ‘the formal side of the movement’ (van Baar 2013:201).

To avoid confusion, throughout this book I adopt the term ethnic mobilization with regards to Romani activism (which elsewhere may be referred to as the Romani movement, Romani activism, Romani political mobilization, Romani ethno-politics, etc.) in order to accommodate its different forms. For me, therefore, the overall continuum of Romani activism observed throughout the world in its diverse manifestations, ranging from community actions, cultural activities, political mobilization, protest, lobbying and advocacy, self-organizing, service-provision, among others, is considered an expression of ethnic mobilization among Roma. Significantly, in my understanding, Romani ethnic mobilization—associated with what I refer to as “Roma politics” (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017b)—is principally a Romani-driven endeavor in pursuit of Romani rights. 56

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Delineating Romani ethnic mobilization—actors and processes

Defining Romani mobilizing structures Ethnic mobilization can take on a variety of forms and expressions and can be linked to virtually all spheres of human social interaction, ranging from entities as small as family units or friendship networks to structures as large as nation-wide ethnic political parties. In literature concerning Romani ethnic mobilization or the so-called Romani movement, reference is often made to Romani civil society (in fact, both terms tend to be used interchangeably). In the relevant literature we can find a plethora of definitions of civil society. For example, according to Kubik (2007:34), civil society as a term refers to three main ideas: 1) civil society as a normative concept, referring to “an ideal self-organization of society outside of the state’s control”; 2) civil society “as a public space institutionally protected from the state’s arbitrary encroachment” or the sphere which mediates between society and the state; and 3) civil society as “a set of organized groups/ associations, whose members deliberate or act collectively to accomplish common goals.”13 Generally, the term refers to “the arena outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individuals and collective actions, organizations and institutions to advance shared interests” (CIVICUS 2013:10). Civil society can take on various forms of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, community groups, faith-based organizations, trade unions, and informal civic groups, as well as cooperatives, charities, thinktanks, cultural foundations, social enterprises, or the academia. In the past few decades, the civil society sector has expanded considerably across the world. Various developments have contributed to this growth— among them the process of democratization in different regions across the world, including Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, disenchantment with economic, political, and social models, social yearning for togetherness, as well as embracement of the “deliberative democracy” discourse (Edwards 2009; Goodin 2008; Steffek 2014; Carrasco 2007). Despite the ideal that civil society contributes to “good governance” and is, in fact, a pillar of healthy democracy, numerous scholars problematize the reality of civil society functioning, point13 Kóczé (2012a), following Tabbush (2005), also provides a comprehensive overview of theoretical approaches to civil society, distinguishing between two main frameworks, namely: 1) the Neo-liberal pluralistic paradigm, represented by scholars such as Gellner (1994), Putnam et al. (1993), Fukuyama (1995), and ­Habermas (1992); and 2) the Neo-Gramscian ideological perspective, represented by scholars such as ­Cohen and Arato (1994), Lewis (2001), Haberson et al. (1994), and Tabbush (2005).

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ing to internal paradoxes, un-democratic or un-civic mechanisms, and unexpected consequences of participatory discourse (Kóczé 2012a; Edwards 2009; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Kóczé (2012a) and Trehan and Sigona (2010) have been among those scholars who have demonstrated some of these dynamics in relation to Romani ethnic mobilization. Definitions of mobilizing structures and civil society overlap but are not identical and should not be used interchangeably. For this reason, using the term civil society in relation to Romani ethnic mobilization is somewhat misleading as it might exclude from the analysis units which fall within the realm of formal politics (political parties) and business, or which relate to a whole range of informal, unstructured micro-mobilizations. Instead, I refer to the multiplicity of Romani actors which operate in the context of Romani ethnic mobilization as mobilizing structures. In the case of Roma, we can identify a whole range of formal and informal mobilizing structures: NGOs or other associative, voluntary, non-profit organizations; political parties or political representatives; public intellectuals; formal and informal networks; community groups; religious institutions; traditional structures of leadership; artistic collectives; and academic groups or think-tanks. With regards to the typology of mobilizing structures, most commonly the main divide is drawn between structures belonging to civil society (outside of the realm of formal politics) and political representatives (formal politics, political parties, elected politicians, etc.). It should be noted, however, that in the case of Roma, the division between civic and political is rather fluid (Anna Mirga 2015; Project on Ethnic Relations 2001; Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997). Indeed, evidence shows that in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization, the organizations of civil society, especially the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have become the principal formal structures through which Romani collective interests and claims are represented (Vermeersch 2006; Rostas 2012; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Marushiakova and Popov 2005; Kóczé 2012a). This fact should not be surprising as it coincides with and reflects patterns traceable in other collective struggles. The non-governmental organization is among the most popular type of formal structure which serves as a vehicle for social movement and ethnic mobilization alike. After all, social movements can be understood as “a form of collective action outside of institutional channels” (Kriesi et al. 2007:6), which explains why the use of non-governmental organizations have been so prominent in social movements across the world. Social movement organizations (SMOs) “have prolif58

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erated at an incredibly rapid pace during the last three or four decades” and the most common forms are those of “small, local, mostly volunteer, SMOs” (McCarthy and Edwards 2007:136). They have quickly become “one of the chief vehicles for mobilization in claim making” (McAdam et al. 2009:21). In numerous studies of social movements, organizations play a central role not only instrumentally—as a resource or a vehicle enabling mobilization— but also as “arenas of interaction,” which “sustain distinctive cultures of interaction and shape trajectories of mobilization” (Minkoff and Clemens, 2007:157). Furthermore, the past few decades have witnessed a rapid expansion of non-governmental organizations, not necessarily in the framework of social movements but as a trend of shaping more democratic societies, as part of the expansion of the civil society sector. This trend has often been referred to as the “NGO boom” (Dietz 1999) or the “global solidarity boom” (Salamon 1994). In the context of Roma, NGOs of diverse types, sizes, scopes, and profiles are the most commonly encountered structure of mobilization. It should be noted that these types of mobilizing structures are very heterogeneous—after all, the broad concept of “NGOs” encompasses a number of different entities: from service-providing organizations, to cultural and sports clubs, to public advocacy bodies, experts’ networks or think tanks and artists’ networks, among many others. In contrast to these civic structures, there are political mobilizing structures operating in the context of formal politics—ranging from Romani ethnic political parties, to Romani politicians involved in mainstream political parties, to Roma occupying positions in public administration and self-government structures (as in Hungary, for example). These types of structures, operating within the realm of formal politics, are less prevalent in the context of Romani ethnic mobilization than NGOs. In fact, some scholars argue that the proliferation of NGOs can also be seen as a failure of political integration of Romani representatives in formal political structures, such as political parties (McGarry 2010; Rostas 2012). Pursuing collective goals through electoral politics is a strategy which is feasible under certain conditions and represents many challenges. First, because forming ethnic-based political parties is a realistic and effective strategy only in those countries which can count on large Romani populations and/or where the Roma represent a relatively high percentage of the population; in countries with a small number of Roma (such as Poland, the Baltic States, and Slovenia) forming ethnic Romani parties is not viable. Second, over the last decades and increasingly today, mainstream political parties have made considerable political gains on anti-Roma 59

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mandates. This trend is currently not restricted to radical parties but is present throughout the whole spectrum of the political scene, from left to right.14 Existing antigypsyism and unfavorable social attitudes towards the Roma mount obstacles to their incorporation into mainstream political parties. Despite the common divide of Romani mobilizing structures into civic ones—mainly NGOs—and political ones, there is a whole variety of other, less visible actors which are part of the vast panorama of Romani ethnic mobilization. On the one hand, the traditional structures of leadership and community—through self-proclaimed “kings,” community leaders often referred to as Šero Rom or Baro Šero, or in some countries through the so-called Romani Kriss (Andrea et al. 2008; Bustamante Cardona 2012)—have increasingly begun to participate in policy-processes, demanding their recognition as legitimate representatives of the Romani community. In fact, some claim that there is a resurgence of traditional structures of power which are emerging alongside, and in competition with, Romani civic and political leaders (Guy 2013; Anna Mirga 2015). On the other hand, the rise of Romani religious leadership has also introduced another stakeholder in the context of Romani ethnic mobilization. Increasingly, Romani Evangelical leaders, in particular, are becoming active politically and are engaging in activities which go beyond the scope of spiritual guidance (Carrizo-Reimann 2011; Cantón Delgado and Gil Tébar 2011; Cantón Delgado 2013). Pro-Roma actors and Romani ethnic mobilization We cannot consider the development of Romani ethnic mobilization— understood as Roma-driven politics—without considering the broader picture of what I refer to as “the arena of Roma affairs”15 (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017b, 2018a). Especially in Europe, simultaneously with the proliferation of Roma civil society, other actors have become increasingly involved in Romani 14 Background report “The situation of Roma and Travellers in the context of rising extremism, xenophobia and the refugee crisis in Europe,” Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe (2016), available at: https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&In stranetImage=2947279&SecMode=1&DocId=2385346&Usage=2 15 I use the term “Romani affairs” to describe the field or landscape which engages with the broadly-understood Roma-related issues. This field encompasses both Roma activism (Roma-driven, by Roma actors themselves) as well as Roma-targeted activism, including pro-Roma actors (non-Roma entities with a clear mission on working with Roma communities, for example the ERRC or the Fundación Secretariado Gitano), non-Roma entities (for example, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and development agencies which happen to implement projects on Roma, taking advantage of funding opportunities (for example the Red Cross and the UNDP). “Romani affairs” also engages states, intergovernmental organizations and donors.

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issues as well: pro-Roma/non-Roma organizations, charitable organizations, and development agencies have emerged as stakeholders in Romani policies as project implementers, service-providers or, in many cases, as voices representing Romani interests.16 Such non-Roma actors, most notably the Catholic Church, have frequently been involved in Romani issues at least since the late 1950s; and in some countries, such as Spain, they preceded Romani selforganization (Méndez López 2005). Over the last two decades, however, a “pro-Roma microcosm” (Kóczé and Rövid 2012) has emerged, marked by the salience of global pro-Roma civil society. Various factors contributed to this. Kóczé and Rövid argue that “pro-Roma civil society developed over the past 20 years in response to this extraordinary deterioration of the social situation of Roma” (Kóczé and Rövid 2012:111). The gradual emergence of Romatargeted policies, together with increasing financial resources made available for their implementation, generated heightened interests in Romani issues among a variety of non-state actors. Moreover, the rising demand for expertise and knowledge on Roma-related issues, especially among intergovernmental organizations, governmental agencies, and policymakers, heightened the influence of “experts on Roma” and, especially, those associated with academia. Engagement of non-profit organizations, even those without relevant expertise in the field of Roma inclusion, has seemingly become a wide-spread phenomenon from East to West.17 While the increasing involvement of pro-Roma civil society is not in itself negative, it does have profound implications for Roma-lead politics (D’Agostino 2014; Rövid 2013). On the one hand, Romani affairs are dominated by a specialized pro-Roma civil society, often more professional and better equipped, “while Romani associations remain weak and fragmented” (Kóczé and Rövid 2012). Furthermore, with the expansion and diversification of actors involved, the arena of Roma affairs has gradually become an over-populated field, and consequently, it has increasingly become a site of tensions between Roma and non-Roma stakeholders over participation, influence, and, of course, funding. 16 Some scholars, for example, Kóczé and Rövid (2012), include among the panorama of “pro-Roma microcosm” the donors who have funded Roma-targeted projects and initiatives, such as the Open Society Foundations. 17 For example, a study conducted by the UNDP on the use of the European Social Fund in Slovakia found that an increasing number of organizations, with no previous experience in working with Roma, specialize in writing projects and often become implementing entities (Hurrle et al. 2012:83). The same study argues that such “commercial contractors (…) consume considerable sums” for their services and their involvement is ”often accompanied by a suspicion that the mediating site, frequently associated with powerful non-Roma mediating institutions, are benefiting from the projects more than the local Roma” (Hurrle et al. 2012:72).

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Some scholars, notably of Romani background, have pointed out the potentially detrimental development of the field, in which non-Roma allies transform into competitors instead of partners who jointly defend and represent the rights and claims of Roma. A general critique of this dynamic draws from “Third World” literature on developmental policies, arguing that “development experts are misusing the concept of ‘human development,’ and instead of increasing choices and creating opportunities and more freedoms for the socially excluded groups, they are increasing their control over financial resources and misusing their powerful positions” (Kóczé 2012a:17). Rövid argues that the case of pro-Roma involvement of non-Roma experts reveals power-relations, in which “solidarity can easily turn into hegemony” (Rövid 2011a:385). These authors have been raising important questions of legitimacy and motivation of those who enter into the field of interventions for the Roma, often seeking funding opportunities rather than being committed to resolving the Romani plight (Rostas 2012; Matras et al. 2015). It is in this context that McGarry, among numerous others, raises the question of “Who Speaks for the Roma?” (McGarry 2010). The dominance of pro-Roma actors over expertise, funding, and influence in policy-making leads to increasing tensions between Roma and pro-Roma organizations (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017b, 2018a). Furthermore, the increasing number of powerful non-Roma actors and their salience as key stakeholders in Roma-related affairs challenges the premises of Roma-led change. Kóczé and Rövid rightfully argue that pro-Roma actors should support Roma claims but “replacing or outweighing Romani activists is counterproductive; it can only result in the further marginalization and demobilization of Roma” (Kóczé and Rövid 2012:120).

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Political Opportunities—Understanding the Broader Context

This book aims to describe how Roma ethnic identity is mobilized for collective political action, based on case-studies in selected Latin-American and European countries. However, prior to engaging in detailed descriptions and subsequent analysis of empirical data from specific countries, I believe it is necessary to first “set the stage” for the reader, that is, to provide an overview of both regions of the world—Europe and Latin America—with regards to the history of ethnic mobilization and the overall status quo of minority struggles, as well as specifically, with the case of Roma. In other words, this chapter will enable the reader to situate the specific cases of Romani ethnic mobilization in a broader, regional context vis-à-vis other minority groups and the majority societies. Thus, this section of the book will provide an illustration of the broader socio-political, historical, cultural, and legal context in which Romani ethnic mobilization emerges and develops. The first part of the chapter provides a brief overview of past experiences of ethnic mobilization as well as practices of dealing with collective minority struggles in both parts of the world—Europe and Latin America. In broad strokes, the chapter will depict the European socio-cultural and political make-up and assess how ethnic diversity is dealt with throughout the region. In contrast to Europe, this chapter will demonstrate how the colonial past and presence of indigenous and afro-descendant people in Latin America results in a different understanding and practice of dealing with cultural diversity. The second part of this chapter will present how the specific issue of Roma is framed and dealt with in Europe and Latin America and compare the status of Roma as political subjects in both parts of the world, pointing out considerable differences. More specifically, the chapter will argue that the “Roma issue” is conceived as a European issue and that the political and policy approaches to Roma in Europe have undergone considerable shifts throughout the last 63

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decades. In contrast, in Latin America the Roma are not considered a community of any political relevance—resulting in a different treatment. I will then asses to what extent comparing Romani ethnic mobilization in an inter-continental perspective is feasible, pointing to opportunities and limitations of such scope of analysis.

Setting the scene: Ethnic mobilization in Europe and Latin America The central argument in this book is that the external environment as well as changes within it—commonly associated with emerging and shifting political opportunities—affects the patterns of ethnic mobilization. Significantly, the factors which can influence patterns of ethnic mobilization are not only restricted to the realm of formal politics. On the one hand, broader socio-economic and cultural developments— both domestic and regional—are deeply political and play a role in shifting the scope of political opportunities. Socio-ethnic composition of states and regions, history of conflict or tensions along ethnic cleavages, economic turmoil or social unrest, among many other factors, provide the background to political action and need to be assessed historically and contextually. On the other hand, the panorama of codified norms and existing legislation also significantly influence ethnic mobilization. With regards to minorities, the legal framework and the scope of existing public policies play an enormous role in how minority identities can be mobilized politically, influencing the scope of collective action repertoires and available strategies. Indeed, it should be acknowledged that public policies shape the social reality in which we live by creating and re-defining actors, transforming discourses and ideologies, and establishing the dynamics of governance of citizens and the channels of interaction. Scholarship on “anthropology of policy” (Shore and Durão 2010; Shore and Wright 1997) also unravels how public policies actively “create new categories of individuals to be governed” (Wedel et al. 2005:30). Furthermore, no public policies are born in a vacuum but rather respond to general tendencies and ideologies through an incessant interplay between domestic affairs, international developments, and broader sociopolitical trends. Moreover, literature on social movements demonstrates that the processes of globalization have affected the way in which social movements work (Maiba 2004; Oberschall 1996; J. Smith 2007; Kriesi 2007) and how public policies are developed. 64

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In an attempt to embed the phenomenon of Romani ethnic mobilization in the three specific countries which are dealt with in this book, in this section I will provide a description of the broader social, political, historical, cultural, legislative, and economic contexts in which Romani ethnic mobilization emerges and evolves. The reader should bear in mind, nonetheless, that rather than providing a comprehensive and detailed description, I will point out major tendencies and trends visible in both parts of the world— Europe and Latin America. I am also aware of the need to “unpack” the very concepts of both “Europe” and “Latin America,” a task which remains outside of the scope of this book. However, the legacy of centuries of common history, geopolitical relationships, physical and metaphorical closeness across the countries of both regions, and, especially, the existence of supra-national bodies and/or legal frameworks, allows one to draw some wide-ranging reflections. While some generalizations will be made, the reader should consider the diversity of national and even regional histories, which consequently account for differences across domestic developments—the casestudy countries are by no means “representative” of the situation on both continents. The detailed and context-sensitive description of the case-study countries, provided in the subsequent chapter, will present a more detailed and accurate description. Ethnic mobilization in Europe: a short overview of minority struggles

Historically, Europe has always been diverse. Multiple ethno-linguistic groups—Slavic, Latin, Germanic, Hellenic, and Celtic groups, among dozens of others—interacted, exchanged, inter-mixed, and fought over millennia. The existence of different religious traditions (especially Jewish, Christian, and Muslim) as well as the historic immigration of some of the present-day nations (notably, the Bulgarians and Hungarians) and contemporary minorities (Roma, Tatars, Jews) complete this picture of diverse and multi-cultural Europe. Despite wars, conflicts, rivalries, and animosities across borders and peoples, which are an inseparable part of the European historical legacy, multiculturalism remained a natural fact of life in many corners of the continent. Much of this changed in the nineteenth century with the process of nationbuilding, which transformed the way in which states—as entities—were understood (and how peoples—as nations—began to think of themselves). Unity, uniformity, and homogeneity were fundamental to the new ideology of nationalism, and consequently, difference was suppressed. 65

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Arguably, conflicts between national groups have been at the root of conflicts and wars throughout the last few centuries of European history. Indeed, the processes of state-formation and nation-building in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought about the historical emergence of ethnic minorities and their corresponding political movements. Although national identity can be based on an ethnic identity—in which ethnic and national identity constructs overlap—it can also be grounded in cultural or political identity, or their combination (Kymlicka 1999). The lack of alignment between national and ethnic minorities on a territorial level (lack of overlap between national identity and its physical borders) led to much of the violent struggles in modern European history. Indeed, the political mobilization of ethnic minorities around specific claims and collective demands has been one of the most important ingredients which explains emergence of armed conflicts in Europe during the twentieth century. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the fate of minority/ethnic struggles was different in the West and East of the continent. In the countries of the West, as of the 1970s some scholars pointed to the revival of ethnic cleavages or what Smith regarded as the “third wave” of ethnic mobilization (Smith 1991); others declared the emergence of a “new regionalism” in Western Europe (Keating 1998). This ethnic revival was exemplified by political ambitions and greater visibility of minority movements in Spain and France (Basques and Catalans), Belgium (Flemish), Italy (Sardinians), and the United Kingdom (Northern Irish, Scottish, Welsh). While some scholars question whether the famous 1970s “ethnic awakening” ever really happened (Strijbis 2012), the regional development and targeted regional policies promoted within the EU have undoubtedly affected this phenomenon of “regionalism” (Buettner 2013) on an identitarian level as well. According to Oliver Strijbis (2012), “the last 90 years have witnessed a shift from native ethnic minorities to immigrant ethnic minorities,” a result of the historical processes associated with globalization. By observing the number of ethnic parties in Western European countries between 1918 and 2008, Strijbis concludes that “most ethnic minorities witnessed splits, dissolutions and/or (re-)foundations of ethnic parties during their democratic periods, presenting them with a more or less fragmented ethnic party bloc. This resulted in 43 ethnic parties representing 17 ethnic minorities in seven West European countries in the period since WWI” (Strijbis 2012:92). He adds that ethnic protest and mass-mobilization have also declined during this period. What did change, however, is the presence and political activism of immigrant communities in 66

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Western European countries. The growing immigrant foreign-born populations and immigrant-background citizenry in post-colonial countries, such as the Netherlands and France, as well as those which sought foreign “guestworkers,” such as Germany and Switzerland, gradually emerged as an electoral group and potential political force. While this did not translate into electoral politics, it did result in the gradual growth of immigrant protest. Strijbis convincingly argues that immigrant mobilization, rather than that of (native) ethnic minorities, has become the dominant form of minority struggle, asking in conclusion whether this announces “the end of ethnonationalism?” (139). The situation in Western European countries differed from that of other regions during this time. In the Soviet bloc of Central and Eastern Europe, the omnipresent communist ideology and its executive state apparatus aimed at suppressing difference by inventing a new man—Homo Sovieticus —as sarcastically coined by writer Aleksandr Zinovyev. Though the situation in the region varied at different points in time and between countries, it was not until the dissolution of the Soviet Union that ethnic difference—and animosity—resurfaced (Drobizheva et al. 2015). In fact, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, interethnic conflicts, pogroms, and separatist movements proliferated in ex-communist countries, newly-created post-communist states, and the Russian Federation itself (Stepanov 2000). The dissolution of the USSR led to the redefinition of geographical and political borders on an unprecedented scale. Powerless minorities, among them Roma, fell victim to numerous pogroms and acts of ethnically driven violence. Simultaneously, the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe between the years 1989 and 1991 resulted in a drastic expansion of nationalism, fueling in-state conflicts, especially in ethnically heterogeneous states (Vojtech 2010). The gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia which began thereafter in the early 1990s, led to the deadliest conflict on European soil since the Second World War. The conflict spread along ethnic divides leading to numerous acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Currently, as a consequence of numerous economic and political crises, as well as the so-called “refugee crisis,” a wave of nationalism and far-right ideology is spreading across Europe, from East to West, from North to South. The resurgence of nationalist movements for many is a reaction to the processes of globalization, the growth of immigrant populations, and the limits of multiculturalism as a political project. Some even go so far as to compare the current situation to the political ambient prior to the eruption of the First World War. Ivan Krastev, for example, pushes his readers to contemplate 67

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the current moment of insecurity and imagine the continent “After Europe” (Krastev 2017). With nationalism on the rise and the evident weakening of the European Union (Brexit, illiberal democracies in Hungary and Poland, rise of far-right parties in European countries), Europeans seem to forget not only their multicultural legacy but, more gravely, the consequences of nationalistic ambitions. Ethnic mobilization in Latin America

In contrast to Europe, quite unsurprisingly, Latin American countries can be generally defined by their pluricultural, multiethnic, and heterogeneous character. The region is profoundly multicultural, multiracial and multiethnic— a direct result of its colonial past—and consequently, a multitude of different peoples of diverse origins cohabit this part of the world. Firstly, according to a 2010 World Bank report, there are over 42 million indigenous people in Latin America, accounting for around 8% of the entire population (Costa et al. 2015:22). These native inhabitants of American lands belong to a plethora of different groups and sub-groups, with the greatest diversity in the area around the Amazon (316 different groups) (Costa et al. 2015:24). The existence of numerous indigenous languages across the region is also evidence of the rich diversity of indigenous people: for example, in Mexico alone there are as many as 364 language variations belonging to 68 language groups (agrupaciones lingüísticas) (Embriz Osorio and Zamora Alarcón 2012); in Brazil there are 186 recognized indigenous languages (Costa et al. 2015:26). Secondly, the majority of Latin American countries count the presence of afro-descendant peoples, who were generally forcefully brought to the continent as slaves; it is estimated that between 1500–1867 over 12.5 million African slaves were brought to Latin America (CEPAL 2017:13). Today, there are over 111 million afro-descendant people in Latin America, amounting to as much as 20% of the entire population (CEPAL 2017:52). Finally, the region is a unique place in which diverse nationalities, religions, ethnicities, and races coexist, interact, and mix—a legacy of those who came to populate “the New Continent,” originating from different parts of the world, and who arrived in multiple and diverse waves of migration ever since the discovery of the Americas by the Europeans. Nonetheless, and despite this undeniably existing diversity, recognition of the multiethnic and multicultural character of Latin American nations was a gradual process which took time to crystallize. After all, for centuries, the existence of diverse cultures and people was denied, marginal68

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ized, and invisibilized. Arguably, this process is still ongoing, often marked by revolts, protests, and even armed conflict (as was the case, for example, in Mexico during the Zapatista Uprising in 1994). The process of colonization of Latin America and the subsequent construction of post-independence governments envisioned the creation of monoethnic nations (Vogt 2012:7). The diverse cultures, ethnicities, and races were assumed to melt into a unique, all-encompassing “mestizo race,” creating a new national identity for the diverse Latin American countries (Arocha Rodríguez 1989, 2005; Bonilla 2003; Vogt 2012). According to Vogt, under this approach “civilized nation-states could only be built if the racially inferior non-white components were dissolved into this new cosmic race” (Vogt 2012:7). While the mestizo race emerged over time, facilitated through diverse historical, legislative, and even educational processes, Latin American countries continue to be marked by strong social divisions along the lines of ethnicity and race, in which the white race continues to be perceived as superior and in reality possesses the majority of socio-economic and political power, while indigenous and afro-descendant people are largely excluded, discriminated against, and marginalized in all spheres of public and economic life (CEPAL 2009, 2012, 2017; Costa et al. 2015). The correspondence of poverty and levels of social exclusion with racial and ethnic origin leads to the emergence of a system of ethno-class or “social races” in the context of Latin American nation-states. The process of gradual recognition of indigenous rights came with the emergence of indigenismo as a political ideology in several countries of Latin America, which emphasizes the relationship between nation-states and indigenous people and/or communities (Engle 2010). In 1940, the First Indigenous Inter-American Congress took place in Mexico, positioning indigenismo as the main official ideology of Latin-American states (Sánchez 1999). Nonetheless, the establishment of indigenous policies under the indigenismo paradigm was not without numerous flaws (Sánchez 1999): among others, policies designed to target indigenous people proposed integration through educational policies or administrative practices, for example, by rejecting the indigenous forms of self-government and imposing municipal structures. Scholars, and most notably anthropologists, such as Guillermo Bonfil, have opposed the indigenismo approach since the early 1970s, and proposed diverse alternatives to the dominant political ideology of indigenismo (see for example: Bonfil Batalla, 1987). Nonetheless, since the 1960s, indigenous groups, and subsequently afrodescendant people, have begun to organize civically and politically, claiming equal rights and treatment, political and cultural recognition, and often 69

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the right to self-determination. The political objectives of this mobilization have generally aimed at creating or modifying legal frameworks (both constitutional and through establishing specific policies) which would guarantee respect for minority rights. This process has taken on speed across the region over the last few decades. Vogt argues that “While ethnicity was long of little importance, the last decades have seen an increasing ethnicization of the region’s politics: the political mobilization of indigenous and Afro-Latino groups both in the realms of civil society and of party politics” (Vogt 2012:2). In their collective struggle, both in the realms of national politics and internationally, the indigenous and afro-descendant mobilization has used diverse strategies to obtain recognition of their rights. One of the important objectives of the indigenous struggles was the attribution of the status of a people, and its recognition and inclusion semantically in the legislative texts and general political discourse.1 International organizations, and most notably the United Nations (UN), have played an important role in advocating and mounting pressure on the international community and national governments to grant recognition of minority rights. In 1989, the International Labor Organization (ILO) of the UN established specific regulatory legislation, which has become an important legal basis for the collective struggles of indigenous, afro-descendant, and eventually Roma peoples: the ILO Convention 169, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. Furthermore, the issue of the rights of indigenous and afrodescendant peoples have also begun to be included in the most notable international events hosted by international organizations, such as the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, Cairo, 1994), the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (CMR, Durban, 2001), and follow-up processes to these summits as well as the Millennium Declaration (New York, 2000). Eventually, these developments led to the establishment of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted on 13 September 2007 by the United Nations 1 Dr. Consuelo Sánchez briefly explained this process of a semantic shift and its importance: “Now, they are called indigenous peoples because it refers to demands of indigenous peoples. In Mexico and Latin America in general the trend was to denominate them as ‘a population.’ The states did not even want to recognize them as ethnic minorities. Partly as a discussion of a trend within anthropology and linked to leftist orientation, it was suggested that the people were ‘a people’ due to the knowledge of their collective character, as collective entities. And recognizing them as ‘a people’ had a political consequence, because [based on] the definition ‘a people’ have the right to self-determination. It was an [indigenous] claim to be recognized as ‘a people’. So, this has finally been accepted that communities are requiring rights and there is a discussion. Now, ‘communities,’ is a way of saying ‘the people’ and ‘a people’ consists of several communities.” [interview with Dr. Consuelo Sánchez, conducted on 28 November 2012 in Mexico City, Mexico.]

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General Assembly (CEPAL 2009). This declaration is a major milestone for indigenous movements. According to Coates: “[it] should be seen as the culmination of generations-long efforts by Indigenous organizations to get international attention, to secure recognition for their aspirations, and to generate support for their political agendas” (Coates 2013). Mounting international pressure and recognition of indigenous rights, as well as proliferating indigenous and afro-descendant movements in Latin American countries have also advanced the process of greater acknowledgement and inclusion of their rights in national legal frameworks. According to the 2009 CEPAL report: “Both indigenous and African descent and other ethnic groups have a growing political leadership which claims the exercise of their rights and are undergoing a process of revitalization of their identities and strengthen their organizations. This has resulted in a higher legal and constitutional recognition in many countries, such as multi-ethnic and multicultural societies” (CEPAL 2009:52). This progress can also be traced, for example, by the inclusion of minority-identities in national censuses in Latin American countries. According to the same report: “In the round of censuses 2000, there was a breakthrough in this regard, since 17 of 19 countries incorporated questions for identifying the indigenous population and/or of African descent in the census questionnaire” (CEPAL 2009:5). In conclusion, the emergence and consolidation of indigenous and afrodescendant movements as political actors and civic agents constitutes one of the most remarkable phenomena of Latin American democracies. The intensification of ethnic mobilization processes can be witnessed also through the ethnicization of civil society and electoral politics, and the increasing importance of ethnic claims in national and international political agendas (Vogt 2012). The process of consolidation also allowed for the emergence of ethnic/ minority groups as important political cleavages,2 which continue to reshape the political scene in most Latin American countries. Scholars point out that “these processes of ethno-genesis have become common in the region, and go hand in hand with the recognition and greater visibility of indigenous peoples’ rights and voices” (Costa et al. 2015:19). Self-organization and ethnic mobilization of minority populations contributes to greater visibility of their issues in domestic and regional politics and has produced significant policy advances. This is why the development of indigenous and afro-descendant 2 By political cleavage I mean the division of voters into voting blocks. Political cleavages are national, religious, ethnic, or linguistic divisions affecting electoral politics and the formation of political alliances.

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ethnic movements and the gradual acknowledgement of their rights, both in the international arena as well as in the context of Latin American nationstates, was relevant for the emergence of Romani ethnic mobilization in some of these countries. The indigenous movements paved the way for other minority identities to emerge in the context of the politics of identity across the region, including the Roma. It provided an important reference point as well as the know-how as to what strategies and discourses may most effectively lead to recognition of other minorities’ rights, using the recognition of indigenous people as a precedence which opened up similar possibilities to other ethnic groups. The emergence of processes of ethnic mobilization among diverse minority groups in Latin America—most notably of indigenous and afro-descendant peoples—as well as their gradual accommodation in the context of national legislative frameworks (in some cases safeguarded by constitutional provisions), the recognition of their rights, and the granting of special status produced a favorable conjuncture for other emerging minority struggles to be included under the same paradigm of politics of cultural diversity. In some cases, such as in Colombia, this shifting political context contributed to the process of ethnic revival among minorities, or a type of “re-indigenization” (Borda 2009) as a result of the expansion of minority rights, and arguably, may be a result of increasing self-awareness among members of ethnic minorities, and a sign of “re-ethnicization”. Some announced the emergence of an “ethno-boom” (Arocha Rodríguez 2005). Arguably, however, this trend is visible throughout the continent. A 2015 World Bank report points out the salience of ethnic identities and the increasing importance of the politics of recognition in political and policy debates across the region. The definition of who is and who is not indigenous has become increasingly relevant and controversial in recent decades, not only because of the reemergence of groups thought to be extinct, but also because in the wake of a new set of legal frameworks, covenants, and international agreements safeguarding indigenous rights, indigenous peoples often rely on their official recognition to be protected from or included in aspects of decision making that could affect their lives, assets, and cultures. As a result, the resurgence of indigenous forms of belonging and indigenous peoples’ increasing visibility in the regional arena have brought about old and new debates on the definition of indigeneity, and thus on the rights that derive from their recognition as indigenous. (Costa et al. 2015:18)

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Roma as political subjects Evolution of the “Roma issue” in Europe

Historical considerations: Roma in Europe Discussing the history of Roma in Europe is beyond the scope of this book. Some historical considerations, however, are necessary. Today, there is a consensus among scholars that Roma originated from India. Based on linguistic studies of the Romani ćhib (the language of Roma, based in Sanskrit), and the linguistic influences from other languages, it is possible to reconstruct to some extent the route of migration of the Romani people throughout Europe. It is believed that they arrived in Europe at the beginning of the fourteenth century3 and by the early fifteenth century, reached the vast majority of European countries, including Britain and Scandinavia.4 Arguably, and due to this migration, Roma are inherently a European people. Indeed, the ancestors of diverse groups of people whom today we denominate under the generic term “Roma,” embarked on the journey Westward centuries ago, starting somewhere in the northern part of India. But it was not until they reached the European continent, in interaction with the majority societies, that they became a separate and unique ethnic minority, different from their historical ancestors and clearly distinct from the host population which inhabited the European lands. Upon their arrival, they were received with curiosity and hospitality— the strange people, traveling in small groups and speaking a peculiar language fascinated the locals. Shortly thereafter, however, the initial friendliness transformed into hostility. The dark-skinned people, often attributed with the knowledge of magic or sorcery, were perceived as vagabonds, possible delinquents, and evil doers. The growing distrust among the majority population and their rulers facilitated the enforcement of increasingly 3 The chronicle of Symon Semeonis, a Franciscan friar, from 1323, describes his encounter with Roma on the island of Crete. Throughout the fourteenth century, similar statements referring to Roma can be found on the island of Corfu, in the Peloponnese, and the harbour of Modon (Bartosz 2004:27). Although some investigators argue that the Roma presence in Europe might date back as far as the eleventh century. In “The Life of Saint George of Athos” (1009–1065), written by his disciple George Hucesmonazoni around the year 1068, the term Adisincani appears for the first time. Adisincani is a Byzantine word used to refer to a heretic sect, commonly associated with the Roma minority. Adisincani is the source of a number of contemporary words used in reference to Roma—the Turkish Çigene, Italian Zingari, French Tsiganes, and German Zigeuner. Whether this document is in fact mentioning Roma is still a matter of discussion among scholars. (Mirga and Mróz 1994:33). 4 Bartosz 2004:27.

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strict and discriminatory laws. The beginning of the sixteenth century marks the first anti-Roma laws5 which soon became very popular throughout. From this moment on what follows without exception across Europe, although to varying degrees, is centuries of persecution, violence, and social and legal rejection, including mass imprisonment, deportations, expulsions, forced labor, forced assimilation, Gypsy-hunts, around 500 years of slavery, and (historical and modern) genocides. The legacy of this history is not only traceable in the current socio-economic standing of Romani communities but is also at the root of contemporary approaches towards and perceptions of Romani people. It was then, in the early sixteenth century, that the imagery of “Gypsies” as “Others” was shaped. In the context of the European and Judeo-Christian civilizing project—both within Europe as well as throughout the world since the “era of colonization”—the Roma represented the archetype of pagan, barbaric, backward peoples: they were considered native savages. They were also visible and distinctively different—their dark skin-tones, clothing, and attributes made the Roma easily distinguishable from the rest of the population. This imagery associated with the Roma as eternally and irreconcilably different from the non-Roma majority explains the emergence of the so-called “reasonable antigypsyism” (van Baar 2014a). Antigypsyism is a deeply-rooted, historically stable, and multi-dimensional specific type of racism towards Roma, Sinti, Travellers, and those who are labelled as “gypsies” (Alliance against Antigypsyism 2016:3). It is transmitted and stabilized through policies, and academic and cultural narratives. Despite some discussion, it is generally agreed that it is a form of “racism or ideology based on hatred and fear, originating in stereotypes of and prejudices towards Roma” (Carrera, Rostas, and Vosyliūtė 2017:71). According to Iulius Rostas, “The intellectual roots of antigypsyism […] can be found in religion, in the organization of economic relations, in the political organizations of communities and medieval states, and in the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment. […] As a consequence, the majority society and institutions portrayed Roma as different and developed rules and institutions to interact with Roma and to oppress them” (Iulius Rostas 2019:16). Importantly, antigypsyism does not

5 Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor (1459–1519), issued a decree ordering all Roma to leave the territory of the Empire by Easter 1501. After that deadline, they were considered outlaws and could be caught and killed by any citizen. “Factsheets on Roma,” Education of Roma Children in Europe, Council of Europe, http://romafacts.uni-graz.at/index.php.

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only incorporate elements of biological racism but is also considered a type of so-called “differentialist” racism, which centres around “cultural” and allegedly irreconcilable differences between “us” and “them” (Nicolae 2006; Carrera, Rostas, and Vosyliūtė 2017; van Baar 2014a; McGarry 2017). As a complex phenomenon, antigypsyism is not only an ideology but also a form of social practice—individual, collective, structural, and institutional; it is ultimately about power and power relations, which maintain different dynamics of oppression (Rostas 2019). Arguably, the historic processes which shaped contemporary antigypsyism were not only targeted at the Romani population, but in parallel served to shape the contemporary identity of the non-Roma majority. Roma became the anti-thesis of white Europeanness and served as a discursive and de facto point of reference for the consolidation of the “Gadjo” (non-Roma) identity. Ioanida Costache in her recent article argues that “The ‘constitutive outside’ of European whiteness is Romani identity. Following Said, Roma are the internal ‘Other’ against which European identity crystallized” (Costache 2018:41). Indeed, Europe thrives on its whiteness and its self-perceived superiority. Despite millennia of wars and internal conflict between great empires and, subsequently, the European nation states, there is a common historical narrative and a shared heritage of the “Old World,” of Europe as the cradle of civilization and democracy. This narrative places so-called Western values, i.e. White values, as superior to those of other worlds, civilizations, and races. Throughout the history of the “Old Continent,” European nations have come together to defend their European sanctuary—whether against the Huns, the Mongols, the Tatars, or the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Roma—an autochthon people, part of the European cultural panorama, yet an invariably foreign population—became the biggest and most visible community of “strangers,” resulting in their status as “the enemy within” (Dietz 2003). From this optic, the Romani communities can be seen as internal colonies, sustained on practices and ideology of control, superiority, and economic exploitation of the powerfully dominant non-Roma majority. The presence of Roma helped to uphold European confidence and proved the dominance of the white, European race. This superiority of race and color was also exported overseas, with ideas of Christianity and colonialism/imperialism. Likewise, antigypsyism, present throughout the world, has also spread globally with European colonization. These considerations are of the utmost importance to understand both the current socio-economic and political standing of Roma in Europe as well as 75

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the way in which the Roma are portrayed and perceived by the majority in the realms of public and political discourse, academia, media, culture, and policies. Antigypsyism in its diverse manifestations, ranging from the forthright to the subtle, transcends the every-day Roma experience and conditions the relationship of the non-Roma majority towards Roma. Towards Romani political subjectivity

Centuries of discrimination, persecution, and anti-Roma legislation reached its culmination during the Second World War when the Roma were targeted by the Nazis and their collaborators. During the Roma Holocaust it is estimated that around 500,000 European Roma were murdered; in many countries, such as Germany, Austria, and Poland, the majority of Roma were annihilated. In the years after the war, little attention was paid to the fate of Roma under the Nazi rule by scholars or governments alike. For decades, the tragic fate of the Roma during the Second World War was referred to as “the forgotten Holocaust”. Indeed, for decades it was. In fact, the fight for recognition of the Roma Holocaust has been a driving force for Romani activism ever since postwar times. It has guided efforts to ensure historic justice and has led action to introduce Roma into the dominant narrative of the Holocaust, making it part of the official and institutionalized memory of the Second World War.6 As a result of mounting pressure and visibility, in 1982 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt7 finally acknowledged that Roma as a people were targeted for complete extermination by the Nazis. Roma had to wait until 2012 for the first Roma Holocaust Memorial to be erected in Berlin. Such late acknowledgment of German responsibility for the genocide of Roma had its repercussions. Unlike European Jews who suffered unimaginable losses during the war, Roma were not entitled to compensation or at least moral compassion as victims. The consequences of the war for Roma were farreaching—it was not only the loss of lives and the magnitude of the trauma suffered by the entire community but also the dramatic socio-economic and 6 Since the 1960s, Roma and Sinti organizations have begun to fight for official recognition of the Roma Genocide and, over time, this fight has become an essential aim of Romani ethnic mobilization across Europe. The role of German Sinti and Roma organizations was key in mobilizing public attention through actions such as demonstrations in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in 1979 and the famous hunger strike in 1980 at Dachau. 7 “The Nazi dictatorship inflicted a grave injustice on the Sinti and Roma. They were persecuted for reasons of race. These crimes constituted an act of genocide.” Helmut Schmidt, Federal Chancellor of Germany (17 March 1982).

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cultural aftermath (including loss of previously accumulated wealth, social status, and breakage of family lineages). This added to the legacy of previous centuries of discrimination, leaving the remaining Roma a largely powerless, marginalized, impoverished, and voiceless community. The increasingly deplorable situation of some Romani communities required governmental action. Roma themselves began to self-organize, seeking historical justice and equality. Over time, and more clearly since the 1980s, the “Roma” gradually emerged as a specific target group on international and national political agendas and at the same time Roma themselves increasingly became recognized as active stakeholders. Roma as a target group There are different views as regards to what prompted the interest in Roma that has resulted in policy programs targeting this population in Europe. Some see it as an outcome of Roma migration: after the end of the Second World War some Roma migrated westward, raising concerns among the majority and politicians and prompting policy responses (for example: Matras 2013). Others argue that the numerous human rights violations against the Roma led intergovernmental organizations responsible for human rights standards to scrutinize the Roma’s situation more closely (for example: Vermeersch 2006). While in the first situation, governments were mobilized to find a response to Roma migrations, in the latter, Romani activists worked to raise interest in the Roma among national governments and international organizations. This can be clearly traced to the actions of Sinti and Roma Holocaust survivors in the new Germany in the 1960s and early 1970s (seeking recognition of the Roma genocide and its racist nature), to the efforts of English Gypsies and Travellers in the late 1960s (ensuring caravan site rights), and the actions of Romani leaders and organizations in former communist countries (in some instances perceived as subversive and countered by communist regimes). Intergovernmental organizations have been a natural focal point, within which various concerns regarding this population have been raised. The Council of Europe (CoE), the United Nations (UN),8 the European Union (EU), and 8 The Roma situation has been scrutinized for example by the UN Human Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) for their respective international covenants. Within the UN, General Recommendation 27 of the CERD on Discrimination against Roma has set out a number of measures to be followed by member states. The UNHCR has been strongly involved in Roma IDPs and refugee issues as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars.

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the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, starting with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which led eventually to the establishment of the OSCE) have addressed the Roma through sets of recommendations directed to their member countries’ governments as early as the late 1960s. Specific mandates of these organizations enabled them to play significant roles during various periods, especially after the 1989 transition. In accordance with the scope of their respective competencies, they have developed their own programs and activities targeting the Roma and have produced a large body of recommendations and commitments to Roma equality and nondiscrimination and the promotion of their social and economic integration. They have encouraged, facilitated, and supported the design and adoption of national governmental programs for Roma integration. By analyzing the development of the Romani issue in major intergovernmental organizations, such as the OSCE, the CoE, and, most notably, the EU, one may trace the evolution of Roma-related policies in Europe: from a general, non-discrimination, minority and human rights protection approach towards the centralist, ethnicbased, and targeted approach of the first so-called EU Roma Framework (“An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020”), focused mainly on socio-economic inclusion9 (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016; Rostas 2019) to the recently approved “EU Strategic Framework for Roma Equality, Inclusion and Participation for 2020–2030,” which recognizes the centrality of antigypsyism and shifts towards a more balanced approach between social inclusion, historical justice and human rights, and empowerment objectives. With the fall of the Berlin Wall on the one hand, and with the radicalization of the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia on the other, different international bodies became increasingly aware of the importance of minority rights protection as a prerequisite for maintenance of peace and stability in the region. The OSCE was first in creating political instruments for the protection and monitoring of the treatment of minorities among its member states, including the Roma, through the creation of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in 1992. Initially, the first big report on Roma in the OSCE area was produced by the HCNM in 1993. By 1994, the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (CPRSI) was established under the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), changing the institutional placement of Romani issues within the OSCE from the national minorities approach towards the 9 For a detailed overview: Marcia Rooker 2002. The International Supervision of Protection of Romani People in Europe. Nijmegen: Nijmegen University Press.

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human rights dimension. This development was significant—it can be deduced that the Romani issue did not fit under the competencies of the HCNM mandate, as Roma are not a national minority (or at least not recognized as such in many member states) nor can their ill-treatment result in cross-border or interstate conflicts, and as such, their case needs to be treated under the competencies of a general human-rights approach. This approach gave way to the creation of the “Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area,” ratified by OSCE member states in 2003, and which became the first international and intergovernmental comprehensive action plan aimed at improving the situation of Roma through coordinated efforts, marking a trend for future Roma-related policies in Europe. A similar shift in policy approach can be observed in the Council of Europe (CoE). The explicit interest of the CoE in minority rights and protection also took a determinant turn in the mid-1990s, leading to the adoption of the European Charter for Protection of Minority Languages in 1992 and the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities in 1995. Although, the 1995 Framework does not specifically name the Roma among protected communities, the 1992 Language Charter explicitly does list the Romani language among those which fall under the competencies of the Charter. Therefore, although the CoE initially placed the Romani issue within the same framework as other minority groups, there were simultaneous impulses from within the CoE to devote special attention to the Roma. In 1993 the Parliamentary Assembly passed Recommendation 1203 on Gypsies in Europe, which laid the bases for future Roma-specific targeting at the Council of Europe. Eventually, in 1994, the CoE established a mandate for a Coordinator of Activities on Roma/Gypsies, and in 1995 created the Specialist Group on Roma/Gypsies (MG-S-Rom), which was “the only expert body in the Council of Europe dealing with the situation of a separate ethnic group” (Vermeersch 2006:194). However, undoubtedly the biggest influence in shaping the international approach towards Roma, and with the most immediate impact on domestic policies on Roma, has been the European Union and its policies in the post-communist era. With the prospects of EU enlargement, the EU began to pressure candidate countries to meet certain standards of democratic governance and human rights through the so-called “Copenhagen criteria,” which also included clauses on minority rights protection, including the Roma. Simultaneously, the European Commission (EC) became gradually more interested in the topic of Roma. Since the EU 2004 enlargement, European institutions have increasingly 79

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turned their attention towards this minority, searching for policy responses which would go beyond national approaches. With the completion of the fifth enlargement wave of the EU (2007) and the accession of Romania and Bulgaria with their large Romani populations, the Roma shifted from being an item of external relations towards a key priority of internal EU policies (Sobotka and Vermeersch 2012; Vermeersch 2012). A consequence of this was the establishment of a specific Roma-targeted policy framework in 2011: The EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020—COM(2011)173—which required members states to establish or revise national Roma-targeted policies, aiming at improving the situation of Roma EU citizens. Romani voices

Although the first signs of Romani activism can be traced back over a century, it was not until relatively recently that this phenomenon became widespread. Throughout the past few decades, and especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Romani groups across Europe increasingly started to carve out spaces of socio-political participation and representation, searching for a political voice(s). In recent decades, the number of Romani organizations has increased significantly, from West to East. In Spain, for example, the number of Romani organizations has grown considerably since the 1990s, leading to an “associative boom”—it is estimated that the number of Romani associations between 1997–2004 grew from 200 to around 400 (Méndez López 2005). The proliferation of this form of civic participation has become common not only among the Romani population but among Spanish non-Roma citizens in general (Pérez Díaz and López Novo 2003), a phenomenon referred to as the “global solidarity boom” (Salamon 1994).10 On the other hand, following the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, civil society has also bloomed among Roma, a process which some scholars refer to as the “NGO boom” (Marushiakova and Popov 2005) or the “Roma awakening” (McGarry 2010; Ivasiuc 2018). The transition to democracy, the increased interest of international agencies such as the UN, OSCE, CoE, and EU in issues related to minority rights, as well as the appearance of “participation discourse” in European governance (Steffek 2014; Goodin 2008) have created opportunities for direct involvement 10 A similar process can be seen in Spain among the general population where a considerable growth in the number of associations can be traced—in 1990, 113,065 associations were registered, and 5 years later that number doubled to reach 206,363 (Fundación Encuentro, 1996).

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by Romani groups in political affairs which affect them. Roma themselves have responded to this shifting context by searching for ways of representing the collective claims and interests of this community both nationally, as well as in the international arena—hence the proliferation of different expressions of Romani activism. Moreover, the availability of funding (especially private funding—from the Open Society Foundations, for example—and involvement of foreign agencies, humanitarian aid and intergovernmental organizations) has supported this growth, convinced of the necessity of building-up of a Romani civil society sector capable of securing a Romani voice as stakeholders (Kóczé 2012a; Trehan and Sigona 2010; van Baar 2011c; Beck and Ivasiuc 2018). In this process of transition from a passive collection of individuals to the emergence of Romani agency as active protagonists in social and political affairs, the Roma have applied different strategies and used a variety of vehicles to communicate their interests and claims. “Awareness of the ethno-political dimension of Romani identity has translated into a variety of diverse mobilizing structures—hundreds of Romani organizations and NGOs, Romani political parties, and media and civic initiatives can be found virtually everywhere Roma live” (Mirga 2015:31); however, civil society organizations (especially NGOs) became the principal organizational structures which represent collective interests and claims (Vermeersch 2006; Rostas 2012; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Marushiakova and Popov 2005). During this time, Romani activism has been undergoing substantial changes, evolving into a more diversified, creative, modern, and competitive movement, despite facing enduring challenges, including those related to internal fragmentation, legitimacy of leadership and representation, transparency and accountability, tokenism, donor dependency, competition and co-optation, politicization, as well as difficult relations with their own constituencies and the grassroots (Anna Mirga 2015, 2016; Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Guy 2013; Rostas 2012; McGarry 2010; Kóczé 2012a; Beck and Ivasiuc 2018). Consolidation and strategic alignment among Romani organizations continues to be a challenge—lack of coordination is a sign of further fragmentation rather than sustainable growth of the so-called Romani movement. Yet, despite the shortcomings of Romani politics and the unresolved problems of the past mentioned above, Romani ethno-politics has also accomplished achievements over the last few decades which should not be underestimated. The development of Roma-targeted policies—strategies and action plans (such as those of the OSCE or the EU) and the continuously growing body of recom81

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mendations and resolutions—is also in part due to the efforts of Romani leaders and organizations. The ascendance of the so-called “Romani issue” to the highest levels of the political agenda, both internationally and nationally, and the shifting of the political discourse from a general human rights and minority protection framework to a specific, Roma-targeted, sui generis category in the policy-making of the National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS) among the EU member states can also be seen in part as achievements of Romani ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, the direct involvement of Roma in the policy design and policy-making targeting their communities has been consecrated as a principle11 and is part of a common practice throughout Europe, even if such involvement translates into non-binding consultations or “rituals of participation” (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017b). Finally, the establishment of new institutions guided by the principles of Romani leadership, such as the creation of the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture (ERIAC) in 2017, should be seen as a success of the Romani movement (Ivasiuc 2018). Romani issues gained political relevance under favorable geopolitical circumstances and in part as a result of decades of Romani activism, which strove to bring to the attention of governments and majority societies the deplorable situation of Romani communities, building a sense of urgency and mobilizing authorities to react. In parallel, Romani leaders aimed at building a common identity—as a people and as a political entity—increasingly understanding that the leverage of Romani politics might rest not only with the powerholders but, more importantly, within their own communities. Today, Roma have emerged as a political subject claiming recognition, with political ambitions and consistently improving tactics. They increasingly seek a permanent place at the policy table and a role in the process of implementation. Roma have gradually shifted from the rhetoric of participation towards one of leadership. Roma in Latin America: invisibility and indifference

The Latin American context represents a wholly different case. The political, public, scholarly, and media debates on the situation of the Romani populations have largely been limited to Europe, framing the “Romani issue” as “a European problem.” The exclusive focus on Europe misses out on the bigger picture—that of a global and diverse Romani diaspora, dispersed across the 11 See for example the general principle “For Roma, with Roma” of the OSCE’s Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area and of the European Union’s 10 Common Basic Principles for Roma Inclusion.

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world. After all, historically, the Romani community has populated different places of the world, settling in North America, South America, North Africa, the Middle East, and Australia. Roma in Latin America—a short history The history of the presence of Roma in the Americas dates back several centuries. According to some scholars, the first Roma arrived as crew-members with the third voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1478; these were: Anthony of Egypt, Catherine of Egypt, Macías of Egypt, and Mary of Egypt, who had come from the Iberian Peninsula (Gómez Alfaro 1982). Bernal argues that “the presence of Romani groups, brought to the Americas with the first days of colonization, is undeniable” (Maronese and Tchileva, 2005:98). From then on, and in multiple waves of migration and in different historical periods, Roma began arriving from various European countries to the American territories, often escaping persecutions (Gamboa Martínez et al. 2002; Bernal 2002; Muskus 2012; Peeters Grietens 2004). Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconstruct the exact moments and routes of migration of Roma from Europe to Latin America over the centuries; indeed, historical research on the presence12 of Roma in various Latin American regions is still under-developed (Baroco Galvéz, n.d.; 2014; Sabino Salazar 2014; Muskus 2012; Armendáriz García and Kwick 2009; Pacheco 2009; Garay 1987). According to Ian Hancock, the early Roma arrivals rather than being voluntary were coerced by European Monarchs as a measure of forced deportation, punishment, or enslavement: During the colonial period, western European nations dealt with their ‘Gypsy problem’ by transporting them in large numbers overseas; the Spanish shipped Roma to their American colonies (including Spanish Louisiana) as part of their solución americana; the French sent numbers to the Antilles, and the Scots, English, and Dutch to North America and the Caribbean. Cromwell shipped Romanichal (i.e. Roma from Britain) as slaves to the southern plantations; there is documentation of Roma being owned by freed black slaves in Jamaica, and in both Cuba and Louisiana today there are Afro-Romani populations resulting from intermarriage between freed African and Roma enslaved people (Hancock 2022). 12 Despite the fact that it is only in the past two decades that researchers in Latin America have increasingly turned their gaze towards the Roma communities, there are also investigations which are much older. Ferrari and Fotta, for example, argue that the beginnings of Brazilian Romani Studies can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century (Ferrari and Fotta 2014).

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In contrast, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a time of predominantly voluntary migration rather than state-sponsored exile, although the “push” factors were undeniably strong. Many Roma arrived in the American territories escaping persecution: a large wave of Roma migration dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, after slavery was abolished in 1864 in Wallachia; another large wave of migration is associated with the fall of the AustroHungarian Empire in 1918 (Hancock 2010; Bernal 2003; Torbágyi 2003; Sabino Salazar 2014; Armendáriz García 2003). Diverse accounts demonstrate that large numbers of Roma from Central and Eastern Europe (especially Poland and Hungary) arrived after the 1920s; migration of Roma from Russia intensified a bit earlier as a result of the Russian Revolution (Armendáriz García 2003). The migration of Roma from Hungary was significant and numerous; some argue that it is for this reason that Roma are commonly known and colloquially referred to in some countries of Latin America (especially in Mexico and Central America) as húngaros—Hungarians (Armendáriz García 2003). During the first decades of the twentieth century in some places the wave of Roma migration was so large that in the 1930s some Latin American countries forbade the entry of Roma migrants, for example in Mexico (1931–1933) and El Salvador (1931–1944) (Muskus 2012). The lack of historical accounts of Roma migration and presence in the Latin territories is due to several reasons. Among the primary reasons is the issue of invisibility. In the context of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which comprised parts of the North American continent (present-day Mexico and the southern US), the Caribbean, and Central America, there were parallel mechanisms of invisibilization. On the one hand, there was the state-sponsored invisibility executed by the Spanish Crown: between 1499 and 1812, the Spanish Crown passed 459 laws (las Pragmáticas) which forbade Roma the use of the language, attire, and maintenance of their distinct culture and traditions (Baroco Galvéz and Lagunas 2014). One of the laws, imposed by Philip IV in 1633, forbade the use of the word gitano, leading to the disappearance of any direct reference to Roma from historical accounts (Baroco Galvéz 2014). On the other hand, Roma escaping persecution and pogroms in Europe, upon arrival adapted a tactic of self-invisibility as a means of protection (Baroco Galvéz 2014; Lagunas 2010a). The Romani migrants also used different strategies to enter the Latin American territories unseen (illegally) or unrecognizable (for example, under false names). Furthermore, the existing archives which recorded the entry of new migrants to Latin American territories typically contained annotations about the nationality of the newcomers, but not 84

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about their ethnicity. Jorge Bernal, in an interview, also explains that “In most of the American countries, due to having received migratory flows from several continents, it made our group go unnoticed, or that, as in Argentina, we were taken as another population coming from Europe, as another European ethnic group” (Unión Romaní 2015). There are two interrelated consequences of this history of arrival of diverse Romani groups at different historical moments over the centuries: the scattered presence of Roma across the Americas, and internal fragmentation and diversity. On the one hand, today, the Roma are dispersed across almost all the countries of the Americas (although with a limited presence in Central America). Yet, there is no reliable data available on the actual number of Roma in the Americas. Most of the Latin American countries do not include “Roma” as a variable in their national census (Torbágyi 2003), although with some exceptions (in Colombia, Brazil, and Canada). For this reason, we mostly rely on estimates, sometimes with great disparities. According to different scholars and the available (public) data, the largest populations of Roma can be found in Brazil—approximately one million (SEPPIR 2013), Argentina—300,00013 (Bernal 2002a, 2003) and the United States—one million (Hancock 2010). Data on Canada varies between the official census information—5255 Roma in 2011 and 4630 in 2016—and the unofficial estimates, which indicate a Romani population of over 110,000 Roma (Izsák 2015). There are reportedly around 15,000–20,000 Roma in Chile, around 5000 in Ecuador, 5000 in Uruguay and 8000 in Colombia (Bernal 2003). There are also Romani communities in other countries of Latin and South America, but there is no reliable data regarding their number. The size of the Romani population in Mexico remains a mystery; nonetheless, Romani activists and scholars argue that Mexico might be host to one of the largest Romani populations in the whole region (Bernal 2003; Armendáriz García 2003). Some researchers estimate that the overall Romani population in both Americas may exceed 4 million (Bernal 2003). These estimates, however, vary depending on the source. In a recently published report by the UN, it is argued that: “Despite the lack of official census data, a 1991 study by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization estimated the Romani population in the region to be approximately 1,500,000. Recent government data indicates a population of over half a million Roma in Brazil.” (Izsák 2015:4) 13 The same estimate is provided by the Argentinian public authorities. See: The Response of the Government of Argentina to the Questionnaire issued by the Special Rapporteur on Minorities, 2015. http://www. ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IEMinorities/ProtectionRoma/Argentina.pdf.

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On the other hand, Roma arrived at different historical moments proceeding from different European countries, and thus belonged to diverse Romani communities and groups, resulting in immense diversity in the contemporary Romani population in Latin America. According to Bernal, the different groups which arrived in Latin American countries since the nineteenth century were: the Kalderasha (from Russia, Sweden, France, Serbia and Moldavia), the Machwaya (from Serbia), the Lovaria (from Hungary, Germany, Russia), the Rom Xoraxane (mainly from Serbia, becoming Christians once in the New World upon arriving in the 1900s), the Boyash (from Rumania, Serbia), the Sinti, and once again, but this time voluntarily, the Spanish and Portuguese Kalé who had never stopped arriving. In recent times, during the 1990s, escaping from communism but especially, the poverty and the racism of the new regimes of Eastern Europe and wars, have arrived many Rumanian, Serbian, Bulgarian Rom and so on. (Bernal, 2003:4)

What is even more relevant is the immense diversity of Romani groups present in the context of specific Latin American nations. In European countries, the presence of specific Roma sub-groups is also related to specific European territories, regions, or even countries (although this dynamic is changing due to the intra-European migration of recent years), and the history of Romani populations is inseparable and intertwined with history of specific nation-states. In many European countries, Roma are also recognized as national minorities and are part of the cultural panorama and collective historical-cultural heritage of nations. Conversely, the contemporary diversity of Romani groups in Europe is a direct consequence of the different treatment Romani people endured in specific territories throughout history. In Latin America, on the contrary, in the context of specific countries, various Roma sub-groups, of diverse national backgrounds and which came in different historical periods (and thus display diverse levels of integration with local majority populations), reside in the same territory. Beyond the intra-group heterogeneity, there is a great plurality regarding lifestyle, occupation, educational achievement, socioeconomic status, level of conservatism regarding Romani traditions, knowledge and use of the Romani language, etc. Furthermore, it should be noted that there are still diverse itinerant and nomadic Romani groups in some countries, such as Mexico and Brazil (Armendáriz García 2001; Armendáriz García and Kwick 2009; Maronese and Tchileva 2005), and semi-itinerant groups, 86

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which travel extensively as part of their economic activity, as in the case of Colombia (Gómez Baos 2011). This vast diversity of Romani communities in specific countries understandably affects the level of internal cohesion and consolidation of Romani groups. Factors such as country of origin, practiced religion, Roma sub-group affiliation, and moment of arrival, among others, became determinant for the level of integration within the host Latin American society, on the one hand, and for the level of consolidation and solidarity with other Romani groups populating the corresponding country, on the other. Furthermore, the question of self-perceived common history across all these groups is a relevant factor. While in the case of Europe, the common history of the Roma Holocaust during the Second World War became a unifying element of collective Romani identity, a shared history and collective trauma, the Roma in Latin America lack such symbolism of collective history, beyond maybe their common European origin. All of this contributes to a significant degree of internal fragmentation of Romani groups within a specific geo-political territory; Roma tend to build diverse hierarchies and relationships (through kinship but also economic collaboration) between each other across different Romani groups, depending on the context of each country. Romani-speaking groups tend to maintain stronger ties of mutual acknowledgement and solidarity; they also inter marry, work together, and maintain closer contacts. According to Bernal: It is also important to note that most of the groups existing in the Americas are related among themselves by kindred or origin, and also due the permanent contact they have nowadays, which is also extended to other similar groups, e.g.: between Kalderasha and Machwaya, Lovaria and Kalderasha, Kalderasha and Xoraxane, Kalderasha and Boyasha, and so on. (Bernal 2003:4).

However, the non-Romani speaking groups such as the Ludar, and especially the Calo Roma of Spanish or Portuguese origin, tend to maintain contacts within the limits of these groups; they rarely collaborate or intermarry with members of the Romani-speaking groups. In fact, there is a visible level of distance between Romani groups and the Calo Roma, which rarely recognize each other as belonging to the same ethnic minority. Despite the centuries-long and numerous presence of Roma in different parts of the Americas, this issue has not aroused much interest among schol87

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ars on the one hand, and the public administration on the other. Faced with this state of affairs, many researchers have proclaimed the invisibility of the Roma (Baroco Galvéz 2014; Lagunas 2010a; Gamboa Martínez et al. 2002) or have described them as “hidden Americans” (Hancock 2010; Sutherland 1975). The invisible status of Roma in the Americas has been documented in several countries. With regards to Mexico, for example, David Lagunas writes: “invisibility has been a strategy employed by communities to this inauspicious national context and is explained as an adaptive logic for maintaining a separate identity and culture” (Lagunas 2010a:4). With regards to other Romani communities in Latin American countries, other scholars also claim that Romani invisibility occurs both through a process of institutional and social invisibilization, as well as a self-imposed invisibility, which is seen as a mechanism of protection and ethnic resistance (Gamboa Martínez et al. 2000; Paternina Espinosa et al. 2010; Baroco Galvéz and Lagunas 2014; Gamboa Martínez et al. 2002; Muskus 2012; Palacio Sanchez 2007; Hancock 2007). The same dynamic applies to the other countries of the American continent, including the United States. With regards to American Romani communities, Gropper and Miller argue that: “The rule against sharing information about themselves with outsiders persists. Fear of mistreatment and a scapegoat mentality underlie the people’s reluctance to admit they are Gypsy” (Gropper and Miller, 2001:104). Emergence of Romani voices in Latin America Despite the proclaimed invisibility of Roma in Latin America (or the Americas in general), since the late 1990s, and most notably in the decade of the 2000s, the Roma in some countries have increasingly entered public spaces and sought visibility, pursuing official, institutional recognition of their existence and claiming rights in the context of the nation-states in which they live. It is in recent years, and with the increasing proliferation of processes of self-visibilization of the Roma themselves, which I regard as an expression of ethnic mobilization, that this topic has managed to raise a certain academic interest as well—since the 2000s, an increasing number of academic papers, monographs, and studies can be found dedicated to addressing “the Roma issue”. It wasn’t until the 1980s that Romani ethnic mobilization started to emerge (Bernal 2003). In 1987 the first Romani organization was established in Brazil (Centro de Estudios Ciganos); the initiative was subsequently taken to Argentina where a group of Roma gradually began to organize, first informally (as Narodo Romano in 1989) and later through establishing a formal 88

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organization (Bernal 2003). In the early 2000s the same leaders decided to reestablish a Romani NGO, this time under the name of the Roma Cultural Identity Association in Argentina (Asociación Identidad Cultural Romani en Argentina, AICRA), which was officially registered in CIOBA in September 2000. In the late 1990s, Roma in Colombia began to organize, establishing the first Romani organization in 1999 and another one in 2000. In 2000, a Romani association in Ecuador—National Association of the Roma (Gypsy) People of Ecuador (Asociación Nacional del Pueblo Rom del Ecuador, ASOROM)— was also established (Bernal 2003). Currently, there is still only but a handful of Romani organizations in Latin American countries. The leaders of these first Romani organizations began to communicate and collaborate across the countries, leading to the creation of a pan-American Romani initiative—Saveto Katar le Organizatsi ay Kumpeniyi Rromane anda’l Americhi (SKOKRA). Prior to the World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa in 2001, which was attended by a number of prominent Romani leaders from around the world, a number of Romani organizations in the Americas decided to create an informal network/platform to coordinate their common collective struggles. They met in 2001 in Quito, Ecuador, drafted the so-called Quito Declaration entitled The Other Son of Pacha Mama (Mother Earth): Declaration of the Romani People of the Americas, and founded SKOKRA, the Council of Roma Organizations and Kumpanyi in the Americas (Organisations and Kumpania 2001). The declaration was signed by representatives of Romani organizations from Colombia, Argentina, Canada, the United States, Chile, and Ecuador and can be considered a first step in gaining visibility for the Romani people in the Americas and presenting coherently their collective claims. Additionally, the authors of the declaration demanded the right to self-determination, autonomy, and self-government of the Roma, and rejected the term “ethnic minority,” opting for the denomination as “Romani people”. Furthermore, despite the evident fragmentation and lack of consolidation of diverse Romani groups, even in the context of the same country, the Quito Declaration also proclaims Romani unity “beyond the group cohesion between the distinct Romani Kumpanias in the Americas” (Tchileva 2004). The overall objectives of Romani ethnic mobilization in Latin America are based on the conviction that their presence and existence remain invisible and marginalized. According to Tchileva: “When the cultural and ethnic diversity of the American continent is discussed, however, the existence of Roma as an ethnic group is systematically ignored” (Tchileva 2004). Therefore, the 89

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main efforts concentrate on the process of increasing visibility. According to Armendáriz: In America the issue of visibility is understood as a struggle for the kumpeniyi Roma to be taken into account by the State in which they live, so that its members are recognized as citizens with full rights, while belonging to a distinct people. The Roma in America are working to be recognized in public policies for their contribution to the history, culture, art and economy of the societies in which they are established. They are described as ethnic minorities or ‘local communities’ while their specific fight is for recognition to participate, as a people, in discussing issues that concern them (funding, education policy, health, housing, construction of democracy, etc.) (Armendáriz García 2009).

Armendáriz further argues that Romani ethnic mobilization in Latin America draws from the indigenous movements. He argues that indigenous and Romani organizations share common approaches by seeking recognition of their customs and cultural traditions but are demanding a very deep and very old cultural heritage not related to the territory, and therefore more difficult to reference or equate with the approaches of indigenous peoples in America. At the same time, while they [Roma] are struggling for the right for control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property, they demand respect for their internal diversity. They are not interested in an approach that requires them to homogenize in order to be recognized (Armendáriz García 2009).

Despite the emergence of SKOKRA, which in itself should be considered a major achievement, the effective functioning of this structure is hindered by the lack of resources, which would support sustainable cooperation on the continental level. Consequently, SKOKRA remains a virtual network rather than a well-functioning organization; it relies on a handful of Roma activists who meet sporadically and maintain limited, although continuous communication with each other. SKOKRA did not manage to become a recognizable and powerful actor which would represent a capacity of political leverage or advocacy for international-level objectives regarding Roma in Latin America. This also weakens their potential for building solid bridges of communication and collaboration, as well as strategic collective action, between European and Latin American/ 90

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American Romani activist movements. Beyond the pan-American activism of Roma, restricted to a handful of organizations and Romani leaders, the potential for building a unified pan-American solidarity has yet to be constructed. It should be noted that Roma from Latin America remain largely detached from the developments and achievements of the Romani associative movement in Europe.14 Despite some attempts at bringing together a world-wide Romani activism in the years after the Second World War, most notably in the 1960s, they remained largely fruitless. Klímová-Alexander documents the attempts of the World Gypsy Community (WGC) at bringing together Romani communities from across the world; an attempt at what she refers to as “Romani Political Zionism,” which was a failure (Klímová-Alexander 2007a). There were also other attempts, pursued by Romani organizations, most notably the International Romani Union (IRU), at re-joining Romani communities from across the world, at least discursively, through a “Declaration of Nation,” which was passed during the Fifth Romani Congress in Prague in 2000 (ibid.). A breakthrough in establishing a joint dialogue between Roma across continents, and which contributed significantly to the increased visibility of Latin American Roma, was the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban. The conference was attended by 50 Romani leaders and activists from across the world, including a delegation of Latin-American Roma. The conference was a major milestone for the Roma cause—through the organization of a thematic session on the Roma as well as the inclusion of specific recommendations (part 1, article 68 and part 2 articles 39–44 of the Declaration) dedicated to the Romani communities across the globe, it galvanized the visibility of the struggle for Romani rights recognition. For the Romani delegation, the objectives were not restricted to gaining recognition and mobilizing solidarity with 14 Quite significantly, beyond the global links among Roma through activism, there is another channel of communication, collaboration, and coordination across Romani communities, not only in the pan-American perspective but also globally. This is the role played by Romani Evangelical Churches in Latin America and in Europe (Cantón Delgado and Gil Tébar 2011; Cantón Delgado 2010, 2013, 2014; CarrizoReimann 2011; Margaret Greenfields 2013; Méndez 2005; Muskus 2012; Podolinská and Hrustič 2011; Ripka 2007). Romani Evangelical Churches function through extensive networks of collaboration across countries, regions, and continents, often organizing visits and exchanges between pastors. Romani churches often exchange pastors or organize field visits of pastors to other countries. They also periodically organize large-scale events of Evangelical Congregations, which can expect thousands of participants. Despite the evident potential which religious structures possess, so far, with limited exceptions, there has been little engagement in activism or service provision on the part of such religious leaders. Interviews with some Romani pastors reveal their reluctance to join political struggles—the vast majority of them prefer to limit themselves to their role as spiritual leaders.

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the Romani cause; it also aimed at building dialogue among Romani communities on a global scale. Goodwin argues that, “Other objectives of the delegation included meeting and befriending Romani groups from other parts of the world—as well as representatives of other oppressed groups from around the world—with the aim of initiating future cooperation within the Romani movement to further the Romani cause” (M. Goodwin 2001). In a joint statement issued by the Spanish organization Unión Romaní, the Romani activists claimed unity and emphasized that they belonged to one Romani nation, whose members are scattered across the globe. The statement explicitly denounced the use of different names when speaking of diverse Romani communities: When someone speaks of us he would allude to [different terms such as] the gypsy15 people, romà, romanies, gitano, sinti or nomads as if they were different people linked by common problems (…). The gypsies from all over the world are making a great effort so that the society contemplates and accepts us as a single town, integrated for more than twelve million people who live fundamentally in Europe (10 millions) and in America (2 millions and a half). We are bearers of a common history in their origins and of an identical culture in the fundamental thing. (…) Finally, we want to make notice how the gypsy NGOs, present in this World Conference against the Racism, use all the same terminology to be identified. “European ROMA Rights Center”, of Hungary; “Union ROMANI”, of Spain; “Proceso Organizativo del Pueblo ROM”, of Colombia; “Pueblo ROM”, of Ecuador; “ROM Star Organization”, “ROMA Students Association” and “ROMA Center for Public Policies Aven amentza”, last three of Rumania; and “Romano Lil, ROMA Community and Advocacy Center”, as well as “Western Canadian ROMANI Alliance”, both of Canada (Unión Romaní 2001).

In fact, the Durban conference was among the few exceptional events during which the issue of Roma was framed and perceived as a global issue, not restricted exclusively to the limits of the European continent. As argued by Klímová-Alexander: 15 Term as used in the English original. The term “Gitano” used in the Spanish original was translated literally to “Gypsy”. It should be highlighted that the term “Gitano” is the word that Roma in Spain generally use to refer to themselves. “Gitano” carries much less pejorative connotation than in other languages and is widely used in policymaking, scholarship, and as a self-denomination of the Spanish Roma population.

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With the exception of the Declaration of Nation, which is the only global Romani political manifesto and claims made by Latin American Romani activists (mostly within the WCAR framework), all Romani claims have a strong European focus—either on the European Union (EU) or the Council of Europe, which is not that surprising given that the majority of the world’s Romani population lives in Europe (KlímováAlexander 2007b: 403). Indeed, the United Nations (UN) has been the only intergovernmental institution which treats issues of Roma as a global one. In the 2015 “Comprehensive Study of the Human Rights Situation of Roma Worldwide, with a Particular Focus on the Phenomenon of Antigypsyism,” produced by the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Rita Izsák, a global lens with regards to Romani issues is applied and one of the recommendations of the report was that more attention should be paid to the specific challenges faced by Roma living outside Europe (Izsák 2015). The UN is also among the only institutions which finance collaboration among Roma regionally: in 2015 (Brasilia) and 2017 (Buenos Aires) the Special Rapporteur hosted workshops for Romani leaders and organizations in the American continents. The workshop was guided by the conviction “that the invisibility of Roma outside Europe remains a challenge, and that more should be done to highlight their situation and raise their profile with policymakers, while also helping to empower the communities” (Izsák 2016:3) and that “This invisibility contributes to a vicious circle of marginalization and exclusion, and leads to neglect by the authorities and policymakers” (Izsák 2016:5). In recent years, SKOKRA meetings have been taking place predominantly online, facilitated and promoted through social media channels. Gradually, the Romani organizations and activists have emerged as political subjects who, in some Latin American countries, have been acknowledged by public authorities as stakeholders and legitimate representative voices of local Romani populations. Although some progress can be evidenced, the Roma in Latin America today continue to be a “minority among minorities,” existing at the margin of public, political, and social consciousness. This, in turn, results in lack of available funds which would support the development of Romani organizations and the Romani communities. In fact, the Romani issue in Latin America remains outside the scope of vision of public institutions and private funders, especially in what concerns regional, or even transcontinental collaboration. 93

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Roma in Europe and Latin America: Comparable cases? According to McAdam et al. (1996), the development of a theoretical approach to studies on social movements is innately comparative—the scholarship has been developed based on a constant dialogue between national scholars, based on national case-studies. It is, in fact, this comparative approach which allows broader conclusions to be drawn about the dynamics, and their underlying factors, of social movements and ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, scholarship on the political opportunities structure (POS) provides a perspective which allows us to account for the diverse external factors which condition collective action, both with regards to national developments as well as the international contexts which inevitably influence domestic environments. Undoubtedly, the Latin American and European contexts with regard to Roma, and Romani ethnic mobilization specifically, represent very different cases, which provide for distinct socio-political environments in which Romani ethnic mobilization in the case-study countries (Spain, Argentina, and Colombia) takes place. To what extent can they be treated as comparable cases? There are relevant factors which set the Latin American and European environments greatly apart, among them the size of the Romani population, their socio-cultural visibility and political relevance, and especially the socio-ethnic and composition of majority societies among which they live—a consequence of the colonial past (of the “Colonizer” and the “Colonized”). There are, however, some relevant similarities or kin experiences which Roma on both sides of the Atlantic share, such as the question of experienced discrimination. Visibility, size, and political relevance

In the context of Europe, Roma constitute the largest ethnic minority; a minority which in recent years has received considerable attention, becoming an important item on political agendas, both nationally and internationally. The socio-economic marginalization and exclusion, historical and contemporary manifestations of antigypsyism, including the discrimination, persecution, and hatred which Romani communities in Europe experience, have contributed to the building up of a sense of urgency, mobilizing governments and the international community to search for coordinated and comprehensive responses. Additionally, the context of the EU enlargement and the subsequent intraEuropean mobility of Roma from East to West have further contributed to this process. Roma, as the largest ethnic minority, in part due to its generally deplor94

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able socio-economic standing, are also the most visible minority group, seemingly perceived by majority societies as different, foreign, and “other” (Kligman 2001; Surdu 2016). Even though Roma have been part of the European cultural panorama for centuries, they continue to be rejected and marginalized as a group. The status of Roma as an alien group, as eternal “others,” is the foundation of historically shaped and sustained antigypsyism (End 2015; Rostas 2019). The Romani identity has been problematized and stigmatized (van Baar 2011c). The very existence of special policies on Roma (such as the National Roma Integration Strategies) leads to the othering of Roma, emphasizing the perceived ethnic and citizen-status difference between Roma and non-Roma. The Romani ethnic identity acquired a political dimension, but a stigmatizing one—associating ethnicity with marginalization, poverty, and discrimination. In consequence, the Roma are treated and often inexplicitly defined as a socio-economically deprived group, identified by its vulnerability, social exclusion, and marginalization, rather than as a viable and complex ethnic minority (Bereményi and Mirga 2012; Anna Mirga 2015a). Increasingly, especially in the current context of rising populism and extremism in Europe, the discourses on Roma lead to the “securitization” of the Romani issue, framing the Roma as “abnormal citizens” or as a “societal threat” (van Baar 2014b; 2011b; Carrera 2014; Bărbulescu 2012). In fact, the very misconceptions regarding Romani identity and the root causes of their contemporary problems lie at the root of the failures of Roma-targeted policies (Rostas 2019). The Latin-American context, on the other hand, is different. In the cultural and ethnic panorama of cultural diversity across Latin America, the Roma are only a marginal group, one among many, a minority among minorities. The size of the Romani population in the respective countries tends to be very small, except for Brazil and the US, which have the largest Romani populations in Latin America. The relatively small size of the Romani population, as well as the processes of invisibility (both imposed as well as self-imposed) result in Roma not being considered a relevant item on national political agendas, or their absence in major public and social debates. Furthermore, although Roma in Latin American countries reportedly often face difficult socio-economic conditions as well (Izsák 2015, 2016), unlike in Europe, they are not the most impoverished, marginalized, and excluded community. The challenges which indigenous and afro-descendant people in Latin America face are far worse than those of Roma. The presence of Romani communities in corresponding nation-states also does not pose a threat of ethnic conflict as Roma are not considered potentially destabilizing for the societies, democracies, or even communities among 95

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which they live. In the case of Latin America, other minority groups, most notably indigenous and afro-descendant people, represent major ethnic cleavages, which must be also accommodated and attended to politically. There is another essential element which should be considered. LatinAmerican countries, similar to Europe, tend to be socially stratified based on the color of skin and ethno-racial ascriptions. Roma, in this context, are often seen as “white” citizens of European background (Bereményi 2007: 64), making them less susceptible to racial discrimination. Their physical appearance, resembling more European traits, as well as the self-invisibilization process allows them to effectively hide their ethnic origin and blend into the societies among which they live. According to Bereményi: “we can say, therefore, that, contrary to the European countries, the Roma have not been presented as a ‘major social problem,’ but rather have remained unknown or simply [have been considered] as ‘strange’ neighbors, surrounded by an air of estrangement” (Bereményi 2007:64). In contrast, Roma in Europe, with their generally darker skin-tones, often stand out visibly from the white European majority, making them an easily recognizable group which is more vulnerable to racially motivated attacks. In this sense, visibility is a double-edged sword whereby being visible and raising awareness is crucial for any movement, but for Roma it can lead to further stigma and persecution. Discrimination and antigypsyism

Despite clear differences, Roma on both sides of the Atlantic face similar challenges—prevalent discrimination and the stigma of “Gypsyiness,” which is the root-cause of the socio-economic challenges of Romani communities. The evidence of striking, on-going and regretfully, still socially acceptable antigypsyism in Europe abounds (McGarry 2017; van Baar 2011b; Carrera et al. 2017; Alliance against Antigypsyism 2016; End 2015); The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) of the EU, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank and organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regularly report on the alarming situation and growing hostility towards Roma. While, quite shamefully but undeniably, discrimination of Roma in Europe is not a surprising fact, the Latin American case displays similar trends, although, for the reasons exposed above, with lower intensity. Jorge Bernal accurately argues that “in general terms, in the Americas, including North America, the Roma have found good host-countries. (…) 96

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This does not mean that European immigrants have not brought their prejudices against our people to the Americas; stereotypes and prejudices remain, although to a lesser degree” (Unión Romaní 2015). Indeed, although Roma in Latin America may often be perceived as migrants of European origin, in popular perceptions and social imagery Roma are associated with a number of deviant traits and negative stereotypes, resembling closely the features of antigypsyism in Europe. According to Izsák’s report: Although antigypsyism is originally a European term, the discrimination it embodies manifests itself in a variety of ways across regions. In Latin America, discrimination against Roma was imported with European migration, and negative stereotypes remain present today, with reports that many Roma do not speak Romani in public for fear of discrimination or reprisal. (Izsák 2015:5)

Reportedly, Roma have been experiencing discrimination also in Latin America (Izsák 2015; Maronese and Tchileva 2005; Bernal 2003; Gómez Baos 2011; Mouratian 2014; Izsák 2016). For example, in Argentina data shows that Roma are the community which is most rejected by Argentinean society (Adaszko and Kornblit 2007)—almost 70% of Argentinean youth reject Roma (only 17% report a favorable attitude towards Roma). According to a recently published report by the Argentinean National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism (INADI), Roma are the community with the highest level of social rejection, oscillating between 53-81% of respondents (Mouratian 2014:50). In Brazil, there were concerns “about the widespread occurrence of offences of discrimination against Roma in Brazil, including racist crimes” (Izsák 2015:5). Despite this, Carrizo-Reimann argues that: “Like the indigenous communities and other immigrants, from the beginning the Gitanos were considered unwanted guests, but despite this they found that the situation in America was better and safer than the organized persecution and discrimination in Europe”. (Carrizo-Reimann 2011:167) Master-frames for dealing with the “Roma issue”

The situations of the Romani communities in both regions of the world— Europe and Latin America—present distinct features, which determine different collective objectives and the use of diverse strategies to pursue them. Consequently, the treatment of the “Roma issue,” its social and political rele97

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vance, nationally and regionally, represents different approaches. The development of the “Roma issue” in both regions, especially in terms of policy framing and public discourses, displays distinct characteristics. In Europe, the “Roma issue” has been principally framed in the context of their deplorable socio-economic situation. Although the policy framing is generally considered to follow a human rights- and/or minority rightsbased approach (Sobotka and Vermeersch 2012; Vermeersch 2006; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Uzunova 2010), the way in which Romani issues translate into policies and policy interventions rather points to treating Roma principally in terms of a socio-economic dimension (M. Goodwin and Buijs 2013; van Baar 2011c; Medda-Windischer 2011; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017a). Consequently, socio-economic problems become ethnicized and the Romani identity becomes problematized; rather than treating Roma as a viable and valuable ethnic group, they are associated with a marginalized status in which poverty becomes another attribute of “Roma culture”. In recent years, there has been renewed energy among Romani activists and organizations to reclaim Romani culture and shift the discussion around Romani people from socio-economic problems to the value and shared heritage of Romani culture (Magazzini 2016; Ivasiuc 2018); this crystallized most visibly with the establishment of the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture (ERIAC) in 2017 in Berlin. The over-emphasis on socio-economic problems without addressing issues related to historical justice has been challenged consistently by Romani scholars and activists alike. The adoption in 2020 of the new EU Roma Framework, which recognizes the role of historical and contemporary antigypsyism in sustaining an inferior status of Roma in European societies, marks a new stage in Romani policies in Europe. In Latin America, on the contrary—Romani issues, if treated at all through policy approaches, are perceived rather strictly in terms of a broad framework of cultural diversity. The context of the indigenous rights struggle, although also having a socio-economic dimension, has a strong component of claims of self-determination and cultural heritage preservation. As will be argued further in this book, following the example of the indigenous communities and other ethnic groups in the country, Roma undertook a process of visibilization with the objective of becoming an officially recognized minority group enjoying similar benefits to other ethnic communities. An analysis of the discourse of Romani organizations and leaders in Colombia, for example, reveals a resemblance to the approach taken by the indigenous communities. Many elements of this discourse revolve around cultural or folk aspects—unlike in 98

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Europe, the Roma in Colombia speak about Romani cosmology, legends and myths, traditional knowledge and relationship with Nature, magic as a form of resistance, ritual impurity, etc. Also, elements such as the concept of neonomadism or “nomadism as a state of mind” are being introduced into the political discourse of the Roma. In this sense we can observe the folklorification of Romani discourses, through a process resembling “strategic essentialism” (Spivak 1996), as well as of the policies themselves. The importance of being visibly different is thus made evident through aesthetics (traditional clothing predominantly, especially for public or political events), by speaking publicly in the Romani language, by evoking stereotypical elements of identity like nomadism, fortune-telling, and “Roma principles” such as “be a permanent tool of peace,” “have the lucidity of knowing how to wait,” and “have as a motto ‘be happy’.” Such elements dominate the discourse and impose ethnicization on the movement itself. This approach contrasts strongly with the Romani discourses in Europe, which are based mostly on equality, citizenship, and human rights issues. “Panorama of Romani affairs”: resources and incentives

Finally, a relevant element, which differentiates the continents—Europe and Latin America—and which proves to be determinant for the emergence and evolution of Romani ethnic mobilization, is the question of available resources and existing opportunities. In Europe, there is a vast panorama of diverse stakeholders involved in the arena of Romani issues, as was explained previously. The visibility of the Romani issue and the emergence of Roma-targeted policies create opportunities for Romani organizations, as well as other actors involved in Romani issues—opportunities for funding and opportunities for participation. Romani actors thus become relevant stakeholders, interlocutors, and executors of diverse efforts aiming at the improvement of the situation of Roma in Europe. The availability of resources also becomes an incentive for action and involvement; consequently, the growth and expansion of Romani associative structures throughout Europe is still ongoing. In contrast, the situation of Roma in Latin America regarding such incentives and opportunities for action is quite different. Contrary to the European context, there are no earmarked funds dedicated to Roma inclusion in the context of Latin America, except for those countries where policies on Roma have been created, such as in Colombia and Brazil. In those countries, in fact, a growth in Romani ethnic mobilization has been recorded. In other places, 99

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however, Romani organizations may apply for funding from various public administration sources available to civil society organizations. Nonetheless, the fact that Roma remain a low priority makes it more difficult for them to apply on a competitive basis. Furthermore, there are no supra-national structures in the context of the Americas that provide funding for Romani organizations. Likewise, and contrary to Europe, there are no private donors who might invest and support the growth of Romani ethnic mobilization. Funding provided by both types of donors has been recorded but remains isolated and sporadic. For Romani activists and organizations in Latin America, the challenge lies in positioning the Roma as a relevant and visible community and advocating for funds directed at supporting Romani ethnic mobilization. It is also a question of having an entrepreneurial attitude on the part of those Romani actors, which requires them to fundraise extensively, attracting potential donors and supporters.

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Romani Ethnic Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective. Looking into the Case-Study Countries

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Europe and Latin America represent very different geo-political and historical contexts with regards to Roma—their history, presence, visibility, and treatment. In such diverse environments, in different corners of the world, can comparing Roma ethnic mobilization be feasible? Comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis which sharpens our powers of description and plays a central role in formulating concepts by focusing on suggestive similarities and contrasts between cases (Collier 1993). Lijphart, a key scholar who has shaped our understanding of comparative politics, defined the comparative method as the analysis of a small number of cases, including at least two different case studies, to discover empirical relationships between variables (Lijphart 1971). He further argues that “a clear distinction should be made between method and technique. The comparative method is a broadgauge, general method, not a narrow, specialized technique. (…) The comparative method may also be thought of as a basic research strategy, in contrast with a mere tactical aid to research” (Lijphart 1971:683). Even though Lijphart’s teachings are over five decades old, they continue to mould our understanding of comparative studies and have also informed my own research. On the other hand, according to McAdam et al. (1996), the development of a theoretical approach to research on social movements can be characterized as innately comparative, as it has been developed based on a constant dialogue between scholars, based on national case studies. The development of the discipline has led to the establishment, according to these authors, of three key elements—pillars of knowledge—about the phenomenon of social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. These three elements, which broadly speaking, can be found in most theo101

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ries on social movements, establish solid variables for developing a comparative analysis. These same concepts guide the analysis of the dynamics of ethnic mobilization. Additional elements come to affect the character of such mobilization—as these processes are not born in a vacuum, but rather are determined by external factors including the political environment, historical moment, condition of democratic institutions, legal framework, and degree of proliferation of structures of civil society, among others. To investigate comparatively how Romani identity is mobilized for political action in Latin America and Europe, I selected case-study countries representing diverse historical, political, legal, and socio-cultural contexts, but which share relevant common features, enabling a feasible comparison. Namely, I sought countries which: 1. are characterized by multicultural and multi-ethnic social composition, creating a basis for the existence of different frames of politics of recognition (Taylor 1994); 2. count with the historical presence of Romani communities, whose representatives have come to develop their own mobilizing processes in pursuit of collective political goals (the presence of dynamics of ethnic mobilization) (Olzak 1983); 3. have had a certain historical momentum that allowed for the emergence of a “political opportunity” (McAdam et al. 1996), relevant for the Roma. The three case-study countries selected—Argentina, Colombia, and Spain— fulfil the criteria listed above. Firstly, all three countries are multicultural and multi-ethnic states, although representing diverse socio-ethnic compositions and histories. Argentina is often defined as a country of immigrants; at the same time, however, the size of ethnically diverse communities—especially native indigenous populations and afro-descendant communities—is significantly lower than in the neighboring countries. Colombia is a multi-ethnic and multi-racial country too—according to the Department of National Statistics, yet with a considerably higher presence of autochthonous/indigenous communities; approximately 15% of the Colombian population belong to some ethnic group. Historically, Spain has been multicultural, due in part to its colonial history and its unique territorial localization, resulting in the presence of peoples of diverse cultures, ethnicities, and religions, and impacting the evolution of Spanish culture and mentality. Furthermore, since the 2000s, Spain has experienced a remarkable growth in 102

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immigrant population, originating both from the EU, as well as Latin America and Africa. This multicultural and multi-ethnic reality in all three countries requires a response from the state to accommodate diversity in the context of a single nation-state. Such diversity, naturally, has implications transcending all areas of life, including the process of building a national identity and tailoring forms of political representation of diversity. The diverse historical trajectories of each country and various approaches to multi-culturality result in very divergent socio-political arrangements with regards to national identity framing, on the one hand, and minority treatment, on the other. Secondly, all three countries have a history of presence of Romani communities. More importantly, in all three cases, some expression of Romani ethnic mobilization can be evidenced, although developed and proliferated to varying degrees. According to some sources, Argentina hosts one of the largest Romani populations in Latin America and second largest in South America after Brazil (Bernal 2003). Regardless of the size, the process of political involvement and Argentinean Romani activism has been relatively new and is limited to a handful of actors. In Colombia, despite the minuscule size of the Romani community and relatively recent ethnic mobilization—the first Romani organizations were born early in the new millennium (Lozano Uribe 2005; Paternina Espinosa 2014; Acuña Cabanzo 2011)—Romani actors have already achieved some level of institutional recognition and a considerable degree of success. In Spain, Romani ethnic mobilization dates back several decades and includes hundreds of diverse actors—mainly associations— which have proliferated across the country. The emergence of a dynamic and vocal Romani movement in Spain has led to heightened interest among scholars too—several academic contributions on this subject have been produced in recent years (Aguilera Cortés 2000; Dietz 2003; Méndez López 2005; San Román 1994a, 1999; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016; Sordé Martí 2006). Finally, following the theoretical approach of McAdam et al., in the three case-study countries a certain historical momentum enabled the emergence of “political opportunity”. In Argentina, the Constitutional Reform of 1994 provided relevant, though symbolic, provisions with regards to minorities and rights. Arguably, however, more relevant political opportunities emerged during the period of socio-political renewal following the deep economic crisis of 1998–2002. The political changes are generally associated with the somewhat controversial Kirchnerismo, which had a strong focus on human rights and historical justice, and generated opportunities for minority groups to re-negotiate their relationship with the state. In Colombia, however, the historical momen103

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tum is more recent. In an atmosphere of political crisis in the late 1980s and thanks to a student social initiative (called “the movement of the seventh ballot”) a convening of the National Constituent Assembly was accomplished, leading to the development of a new Colombian Constitution, eventually adopted in 1991 (Restrepo 2002; Archila and Pardo 2001). The new Constitution recognized the pluri-cultural and multi-ethnic character of the nation, resulting in a series of legal provisions such as the official recognition of ethnic languages (Article 10), the obligation to recognize and protect national diversity (Article 7), non-discrimination (Article 13), and the recognition of traditional authorities (Article 246). According to Bonilla: “this legal and political recognition has become a tool which has facilitated the process of the assertion of cultures which have been undervalued up to now, as well as the defense of their collective differentiated rights and the protection of individual rights that compose it” (Bonilla, 1999:10). This political event opened up a political opportunity space that conditioned the emergence of ethnic mobilization of Colombian Roma and other ethnic peoples in Colombia. In Spain, this historical momentum is associated with regime change and the process of transformation from a dictatorial state into a modern democracy. With the death of General Franco in 1975 and the formulation of the democratic Constitution (1978), the social status of Roma changed considerably, at least in legal terms—the Constitution recognized the principle of equality of all citizens (Article 14) and penalized discrimination (Penal Code, Article 510). In addition, the right of association (Article 22.1 of the Constitution) created a regulatory framework that allowed Roma to establish entities of social and political representation. This chapter will discuss the case-study countries in more detail, providing the necessary context and deeper understanding of the socio-economic and political background against which Romani ethnic mobilization in each country emerged and developed.

Argentina, Colombia, and Spain: majority contexts, minority struggles “Argentineans descended from ships”

In Argentina, it is often said that “Argentineans descended from ships” (los argentinos descienden de los barcos). Argentina, like Uruguay, Canada, and the United States, is a country of immigrants (Solberg 2014). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Argentina was a country with the second largest migration wave 104

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in the world, with new settlers arriving from European countries.1 A genetics study conducted in 2010 demonstrates that the genetic map of Argentina is composed of 79% Europeans (mainly Spanish and Italian ethnicity), 18% indigenous, and 4.3% African ethnicities (Corach et al. 2010). Socially, Argentina is considered a model melting pot (Lucio 2013) and Argentinean national identity emphasizes and feeds off its European roots. Argentina takes pride in its European heritage and commonly underlines its status as “the most European of Latin nations.” The legacy of immigration is ever-present—the national background identification of Argentineans is conserved over generations (even 3 or 4 generations back) and is celebrated and supported institutionally, especially through public fairs and festivities. Cultural diversity in the country is treated through the optic of immigration and the national background of ancestors—even religious diversity is connected to nation-states of countries of origin. Indeed, some scholars demonstrate how the question of race has been marginalized in public discourses while simultaneously the concepts of “whiteness” and “Europeanness” have dominated the image that Argentineans have about themselves (Alberto and Eduardo 2016). Argentina, therefore, is a multi-cultural state but one which is based on recognition of diverse national backgrounds of its citizens—as national minorities who cherish the memory of their countries of origin—while existent ethnic diversity, mostly the autochthonous native indigenous populations and the connected colonial history which led to their decimation—remains marginalized and under-represented. In fact, the issue of ethnic and racial diversity often remains invisible in public policies, and unlike other countries in the region where ethnic minorities, especially the indigenous people, are a relevant political agenda item, in Argentina they have been treated marginally. Due to the history of colonialization, expulsions, and extermination of indigenous communities, their presence in Argentina today is very small—according to 2010 data, less than 3% of the population declare to belong to some indigenous group.2 Similarly, the presence of afro-descendant groups is minor (0.4% of the population). Ethnicity is treated marginally, both in terms of national identity-building processes (Alberto and Eduardo 2016), as well as in terms of public policies:3 “The crisol de razas 1 In fact, the Constitution of Argentina today still states that foreigners enjoy the same rights in Argentinean territory as citizens (art. 20) and that the Federal Government shall foster European immigration (art. 25). 2 It is important to note, however, that genetic studies confirm that a vast portion of Argentineans have at least one indigenous ancestor. A study conducted in 2005 demonstrates that 56% of Argentineans have at least one indigenous ancestor (Heguy 2005). A more recent study from 2011 shows that 30% of the population have an indigenous ancestor, and 5% of the population have ancestors of African descent (Navarra 2011). 3 It is not without significance that we often find in legal texts the terms “indigenous societies,” “groups,” or “collectivities” (colectividades), rather than “people” (pueblos).

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(‘the melting pot’), a concept imported from the US, was seen at that time by the Argentinean elites as the best strategy for the country’s development: educated, white West Europeans should settle down in Argentina so as to improve the young, Argentinian, mestizo society. Creoles and indigenous communities should remain excluded from the national project” (Weissmann 1998:152–3 in Carrizo-Reimann 2011). The approach towards indigenous and afro-descendant populations aimed at the annihilation or invisibilization of these groups, is considered barbaric and uncivilized (Lucio 2013). In common interpretation, not free from racist undertones, Argentina was “unpopulated” when the first settlers arrived to the territory; an interpretation of Argentinean history which is naturally false (Bartolomé 2003). The process of nation-building as a “country of immigrants” which proudly emphasizes its European roots, left no place for minority identities, especially indigenous people.4 In fact, Daniel Feierstein argues that the Argentine Nation-State that, as we have said, has built and continues building in this way their identity based on denial of identities, of “identity by exclusion,” has operated through both classic faces of the NationState. On the one hand, Argentina has implemented its genocidal face, through material annihilation (just think about the fate of many of the native peoples or think about the policies towards afro-descendants). Also, Argentina has operated with its assimilationist face, denying the identity of diverse cultural groups (think about this in the policy implemented towards European migrants: the State accepts them as long as they stop being what they are, both accepting a new identity and abandoning their culture, their language, their customs) (Feierstein 2005:28).”

It is only in the last decades that indigenous activism5 and academic research6 have worked to correct such historical interpretations. Nonetheless, the dynamics installed by colonial rule have left a strong trace on Argentinean 4 “The construction of the Argentine nation-state of the late nineteenth century (1880–1910) involved a selective and racist stance on the form in which the society is formed, both culturally and on a population level. The shaping of the national identity was not far from the Eurocentric paradigm at the time, and would appeal more to biology and to think of these divisions in terms of ‘races.’” (Lucio, 2013:23) 5 The indigenous movement began to organize actively in the period of the 1960s. In 1968, a group of indigenous intellectuals created the Indigenous Centre in Buenos Aires (CIBA) considered the first indigenous ethno-political organization (Bartolomé 2003). 6 Bartolomé points out that when studying anthropology back in the 1960s, the academic world also omitted the indigenous presence, arguing that only a few “mestizo” individuals existed and that indigenous cultures were extinct in Argentina (Bartolomé 2003).

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indigenous people, not only in terms of their socio-economic condition and marginalization but also in the discrimination which indigenous communities (both autochthonous and immigrants from neighboring countries) continuously face. The challenges faced by the native Argentineans (which to an extent apply equally to afro-descendant communities) is multiplied by an institutional approach towards indigenous people which some scholars refer to as “institutional ethnocide” (Bartolomé 2003). Following the return of democratic rule in 1983, after the last military junta was installed in 1976,7 the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) was created in 1985. The INAI’s activity focuses on service-provision and social assistance but its work has been often questioned by scholars and indigenous leaders alike. A breakthrough, at least symbolically, was the recognition of the preexistence of indigenous peoples in Argentinean territory (Chapter IV, art. 17) and other measures regarding linguistic rights, territory, and education in the Constitutional Reform of 1994. The ethno-genesis or ethnic revival of various indigenous groups in Argentina resulted in an increasing number of collective demands towards the state, with the objective of institutional recognition of the historical presence of indigenous people. As a response to these salient claims, several legal measures were passed in order to improve the situation of indigenous communities: in 1985 the Law of Indigenous Affairs (Law 23.302) was approved; in 1989 the ILO Convention 169 was ratified; and in 2006 the law regulating indigenous legal property (Law 26.160) was approved. In recent years, similar dynamics of ethnic revival can be observed among afro-descendant communities as well (Monkevicius 2013). Ethno-political mobilization of afro-descendant communities has also accomplished a number of legislative milestones, some of which remain rather symbolic: for example, in 2010 the national census finally included an afro-descendant variable; and in 2013, Law 26.852 established November 8 as the “National Day of Afro-Argentineans and Afro-Culture.” Despite a gradual political shift towards a more inclusive and multi-cultural society, as well as a process of re-shaping Argentinean national identity and exposing historical narratives of subaltern groups in the country, Argentina today still remains a society marked by racism and classism, with 87% of the 7 The history of Argentina is marked by numerous authoritarian and military dictatorships knows as “juntas.” The last military dictatorship, referred to by its leaders as the National Reorganization Process (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional), was installed following the coup d’état in March 1976. This period— marked by state terrorism, thousands of forced disappearances, and violence—is often referred to as the Dirty War. Following growing social unrest, mass protests, and political instability, constitutional rule was reinstalled through presidential elections held in October 1983.

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population believing there is a lot or quite a lot of discrimination in Argentina (Mouratian 2014:36).8 Regardless of some considerable improvements, indigenous and afro-descendant communities, as well as other groups, still face rampant discrimination. It is important to note, however, that discrimination in Argentina is based not only on ethnicity or race, but most importantly on socio-economic status. Studies confirm that Argentinean citizens discriminate most strongly against poor and disadvantaged communities (Mouratian 2014). Unsurprisingly, however, in Argentina the variables of race, ethnicity, and social class commonly coincide. Colombia’s multi-ethnic panorama

Historically, Colombia has always been a multi-ethnic state: autochthonous indigenous people, various groups of African descent, immigrants of European background as well as Roma have been present in the territory of today’s Colombia for centuries. However, it was not until the 1990s that this diversity became recognized institutionally and legally. In the past, the Colombian national identity and culture have been generally projected by making reference to white and mestizo cultures, while disregarding the existing diversity and plurality. In 1989, Arocha Rodriguez argued that “so far, the law has required that people give up their identity and speak Spanish; that they are Christian, believe in the same epic of the Conquest, Colony, Independence and affirm themselves to be of the same ‘race’” (Arocha Rodriguez 1989:15). The recognition of Colombia as a multi-ethnic country in the Constitution of 1991 (art. 7),9 created frameworks for minority protection and the promotion of diversity, such as indigenous jurisdiction (art. 246), political and territorial autonomy (arts. 286, 287, 288, 290, 321, 329, 330), special electoral constituencies for the Senate (art. 171) and Chamber of Representatives (art. 176), linguistic rights (art. 10), and educational rights (art. 68). Consequently, in the matter of minority and ethnic rights, Colombia is argued to have the most progressive legal and constitutional frameworks in all of Latin America, and is often posed as an example for other countries of the region (Bonilla 2003). The ratification in 1991 of Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (“Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention”) and its incorporation into national legal frameworks further advanced the legal rights of minorities. 8 Sixty-five percent of the population also reported they had experienced discrimination in the past. 9 Article 7 of the Colombian Constitution literally states: “The State recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian nation”.

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What was before referred to as alleged “cultural backwardness,” now became “cultural diversity,” worthy of protection and promotion as part of the country’s richness and heritage (Borda 2009). Without a doubt, the reformulation of the Colombian Constitution in terms of minority rights and cultural diversity was the result of the ethnic activism and political engagement of indigenous leaders: “if policies towards ethnic groups of the Colombian state have changed, it is due to the organization, struggle and resistance of indigenous people” (Gamboa Martínez 1993:44). The successful and explicit incorporation of indigenous rights in the 1991 Constitution gave an impulse to other ethnic minorities in the country to demand similar treatment. Consequently, throughout Colombia, one can witness a type of ethnic revival among minorities, or a type of “re-indigenization” (Borda 2009) as a result of the expansion of minority rights frameworks. Curiously, the 2005 Census found that the population of ethnic groups had increased significantly since the previous census in 1993 (Hudson 2010). This increase may be due to the refined methodology employed for the 2005 Census but may also be a result of increasing self-awareness among members of ethnic minorities and a sign of “re-ethnicization” in Colombia, or what Arocha refers to as the “ethno-boom” (Arocha Rodríguez 2005). Nonetheless, the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the new Colombian Constitution was not entirely inclusive; other ethnic minorities were excluded and consequently did not enjoy the same benefits as the indigenous people (Arocha Rodríguez 1989, 1992). In fact, Arocha argues elsewhere that: “Since 1985, social movements in favor of multiculturalism were extended, encompassing people of African descent, gender minorities and those of religion. In such a way, they contributed significantly to the constitutional reform of 1991” (Arocha Rodríguez 2005). The inclusion of minority-rights provisions, as well as the explicit mention of indigenous peoples and indigenous rights, motivated coordinated responses by other groups, who were significantly less organized politically than the indigenous: Afro-descendant groups, Raizales (a Protestant Afro-Caribbean community), Palenqueros (descendants of escaped slaves), as well as Roma, engaged in their own processes of ethnic mobilization with the objective of gaining visibility and, consequently, institutional recognition under the same legal framework as the indigenous people. Indeed, the processes of self-organization and representation of collective claims through a process of ethnic mobilization is especially evident when looking into the case of Colombia. The indigenous peoples have been organized under a common ethnic move109

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ment for many decades—and it is thanks to these struggles that their claims were incorporated into the 1991 Constitution. The case of Afro-descendants, on the other hand, presents an interesting asymmetry—the Afro-descendant people in Colombia are much more numerous than the indigenous communities. However, due to the lack or weakness of internal organization and maturity of the socio-political mobilization, their demands were not incorporated into the Constitution (the Afro-descendant people are only mentioned briefly in Provisional Article 55 of the Constitution of 1991). Despite the fact that scholars, activists, and politicians remain reticent in their evaluation of the translation of constitutional provisions into specific policies, caused, among other factors, by tensions between cultural diversity and cultural unity (Bonilla 2003), or by difficulties of determining who can in fact be considered as a member of an ethnic group (Borda 2009),10 the Colombian approach towards minority treatment—based on the recognition of diversity, differential approach (enfoque diferencial), and affirmative action—is still considered today as among the most advanced in the continent. The policy developments regarding ethnic minorities should be understood in the broader context of the Colombian peace process (Fisas 2010; Agencia de Noticias UN 2013; Chará 2011). Within its framework, the Colombian government aims at strengthening democratic institutions and practices, participatory governance, and social cohesion. As part of these efforts, the government promotes not only ethnic groups separately, but also an interethnic dialogue and collaboration between them. In recent years, a great number of interethnic initiatives have been established by the government (events, festivals, conferences, networks, projects) and it also provides spaces for interethnic collaboration (like the establishment of interethnic roundtables at municipal and regional levels). Embracing Colombian multiculturalism also means that interethnic collaboration is seen as a way of generating greater social cohesion, and consequently supporting the sustainability of the peace process. Furthermore, the Constitution has helped to advance the process of decentralization as well as to create the Regalías11 system, whose royalties are then re-invested in human development projects (among others), creating an additional and abundant source of public funding. This situation has created a favorable climate for human development projects, contributing to the rapid growth of the civil society sector, especially 10 See also: Torres 2013; Bocajero 2011. 11 Regalías is a system of royalties coming from non-renewable natural resources and industry production. Royalties are assigned to territorial public entities and are an important source of municipal funding (Bonet and Urrego 2014) .

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NGOs. All of these developments are important to the process of Romani ethnic mobilization and are factors which allow us to contextualize the environment under which this mobilization is taking place. Spain: “Peoples and Nationalities”

Historically, Spain has been a culturally diverse country, due in part to its unique geopolitical localization—the Iberian Peninsula represents a natural bridge connecting Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Consequently, Spain has been inhabited by diverse peoples, including the centuries-long presence of Moors, Jews, and Roma; its colonial history as well as numerous emigration waves of Spanish citizens also resulted in greater circulation and presence of racially varied communities. Furthermore, over the last decades, and most dynamically since the end of the 1990s, Spain has become a country with one of the highest immigration rates in the world. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), between 2002 and 2014 Spain became the second-largest recipient of immigrants in absolute terms among OECD countries, following the United States. In 2000, according to the INE (National Institute of Statistics), Spain had a total foreign population of approximately 2% of; in 2011, the foreign population was almost 12% (Martí Romero and Breugel 2015). Currently, based on 2020 data, there are more than 5 million foreigners living in the country (INE 2021). The centuries-long multicultural reality has not resulted, however, in the creation of an explicit policy framework that would unequivocally acknowledge the existence of this diversity. This is especially noticeable when taking a closer look at the narrative of national identity and the constitutional development of concepts of citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity in Spain. The current legal and political arrangements in this regard are a direct consequence of modern Spanish history, especially the suppression of regional identities under the Franco regime and the emergence of numerous independence struggles (most notably in the Basque Region and more recently in Catalonia). The Spanish Constitution (1978) defines the Spanish people as citizens of the Kingdom of Spain, disregarding national, religious, linguistic, or ethnic identification. The Constitution recognizes the existence of “peoples of Spain” (Preamble) and of “nationalities” (Preliminary Title, section 2) which comprise the society of the Spanish democratic state. Yet, the term “nation” in relation to these various co-existing regional cultures, is intentionally avoided, cautious of nationalistic or even separatist movements in the country. The de facto his111

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toric, linguistic, and cultural diversity has been constitutionally linked to concrete territories by granting a certain degree of autonomy to regions, and a considerable degree of freedom with regards to identity and culture (in particular through regional competencies in areas of education, culture, language, or heritage). More precisely, Section 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Constitution articulates the compatibility of the principle of unity of the Spanish nation with the rights to autonomy of regions and nationalities. While it “recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all,” it is unconstitutional for a nationality or a region to declare itself a “nation.” In a similar spirit, the Spanish constitution defines Spaniards in terms of their citizen status, disregarding their ethnicity and nationality; at the same time, however, it acknowledges this diversity by ensuring the protection of the “peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions” (Preamble). As a result of such legal architecture, Spain effectively denies the existence of national minorities in the country; consequently, the collection of ethnic data is unconstitutional. The category of national, ethnic or cultural minority has been made irrelevant in the Spanish legal system. The lack of specific minority provisions in the Spanish legal system is surprising, especially considering the factual linguistic, national, cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity of Spanish society (Ruiz Vieytez 2014). Nonetheless and somewhat paradoxically, in 199512 Spain ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, facing the challenge of accommodating international provisions in the context of the Spanish legal system with regards to minorities. As argued by scholars, the transposition of the Framework Convention in Spain has been limited and restrictive—Spain has explicitly negated the existence of national minorities in Spain (Ruiz Vieytez 2008).13 In practice, however, Spain has only adapted dispositions from the Convention to the Roma (Ruiz Vieytez 2014:65), although simultaneously arguing that “the Spanish authorities have provided clarification on their official position in this regard, stating that the Spanish Roma community does not constitute a national minority.”14 These contradictions along with the 12 https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1998-1369. 13 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_1st_Com_Spain_en.pdf. All reports regarding the application of provisions of the FCNM by Spain is available here: https://www.coe.int/ en/web/minorities/spain. The expert opinions issued by the CoE consistently point to limited awareness, understanding and application of FCNM in Spain. 14 Council of Europe: Secretariat of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Opin-

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ambiguous status and the apparent difficulty of transposing the Framework Convention in Spain has been underlined by scholars (Ruiz Vieytez 2008; 2014; Lago Ávila 2000; González Vega 2014) and intergovernmental organizations, including the Council of Europe. The existing cultural, ethnic, and racial diversity, beyond that of Spanish autonomous regions which are linked to specific Spanish territories, is dealt with through the prism of immigration, especially in the case of non-citizens residing in Spain. However, for those Spanish citizens who belong to ethnic, racial, national, linguistic, or religious minorities, the legal and policy frameworks existing for promotion of minority identities remain limited. Lack of legal recognition of minorities limits the institutional tools available although, discursively and symbolically, via festivities, fairs, and occasional (non-binding) acts of institutional recognition, numerous minority groups have been acknowledged as belonging to the cultural panorama of the country. In this context, the Romani citizens in Spain enjoy special treatment. Roma, acknowledged institutionally as a separate population, are not officially recognized as an ethnic, national, or cultural minority. There have been, however, numerous acts of institutional recognition passed on regional and national levels, enabling the introduction of specific Roma-targeted policy frameworks and additional dispositions, which compensate for the lack of formal legal status of a national minority. The most recent acts of institutional recognition took place on the occasion of the International Roma Day in 2018, when the Spanish Government, following the request from the Parliament, officially recognized the Romani flag, Romani anthem and April 8 as the official Roma Day.

Reconstructing the genealogy of Romani presence Roma in Argentina—diversity and invisibility

As in the case of other countries in Latin America, it is very difficult to re-create the exact history of Romani presence in Argentina. It is unknown when the first Romani families arrived in what is today Argentinian territory as no registries accounted for ethnicity.15 What is certain, however, is that Roma arrived in ion on Spain, 27 November 2003, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)004, available at: http://www.refworld.org/ docid/4edf515c2.html. 15 “Like the indigenous communities and other immigrants, from the beginning the Gitanos were considered unwanted guests, but despite this they found that the situation in America was better and safer

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numerous waves of migration, proceeding from different European countries; the two main migration waves took place between 1880 and the 1920s and during the 1950-1960s (especially in the case of Calo Roma proceeding from Spain). Oral testimonies and some historical accounts date back to the mid-nineteenth century; according to some Romani leaders, there is no Romani family clan that traces their arrival to Argentina prior to the 1880s.16 Nonetheless, some speculations regarding the routes of Roma migration to and around Argentina have been elaborated by Argentinean historian Esteban Garay (1987), who claims there are documents from the period of rule of the eighteenth-century Spanish governor of Buenos Aires Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo that give an account of the existence of Roma who sold merchandise in the streets and practiced fortune-telling. According to Garay it was then, in 1774, that the first repressive measures against the Romani people were enforced, including imprisonment and deportations to Spain (Garay 1987; Maronese and Tchileva 2005). Others find even earlier accounts of Romani presence in Argentina. Jorge Nedich, an Argentinean Romani writer, argues that: In 1536, the first Roma arrived in the port of Buenos Aires, as part of the crew of Pedro de Mendoza; the landings continued until 1581 when, at request of the citizenship, the Attorney General Don Felix Santiago del Pozo expelled ‘filthy men who used to swamp old horses until they were almost colts and as such they sold them deceiving people, others stole chickens and pigs’. They were also reading the future [fortune-telling], scaring the neighbors. To comply with the request, the prosecutor found the law that made effective the first official expulsion, dated in 1580, referred to as ‘law of Philip II’, which ordered the Roma to be imprisoned in the citadel of Montevideo, with the intention to protect the citizens, while a ship was expected to deposit them again in Spain (the fate of that group is unknown). In this way, Buenos Aires was clean of Roma until the end of the 18th century, when groups of Russian, Greek, Moldovan, Serbian and Romanian Roma, always fleeing from slavery, death and ill treatment, arrived at the port of Buenos Aires. (Nedich 2005; no references were quoted) than the organised persecution and discrimination in Europe (Carrizo-Reimann and Pacheco 2009). Notwithstanding the shared trajectories, the Gitanos should be differentiated from other immigrants such as the Italians or Spaniards, since they neither assimilated nor were recognised officially as a differentiated community. Thus the Gitanos in Argentina, unlike the European Roma/Gypsies, were and are in the minority” (Carrizo-Reimann 2011). 16 However, some scholars point to Romani presence already in the eighteenth century (Pacheco 2009:70).

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The Romani population in Argentina is highly heterogeneous and fragmented into smaller communities. Due to different waves of migration and different places of origin, we can find various Romani groups: Ȇ Calo Roma: Proceeding from Spain (and Portugal to a lesser extent), the first families arrived in the late-nineteenth century; consecutive migrations took place in the early-twentieth century (Maronese and Tchileva 2005:61), after the First and Second World Wars, and later on during the period of dictatorship of General Franco in Spain. Numerous Calo families arrived between the 1950s and 1970s (Pacheco 2009). The Calo Roma self-divide into Argentinian Calo (for their historical presence in Argentina) and Spanish Calo (who arrived from Spain in the second half of the twentieth century) (Villalpando 2005). Ȇ Argentinian Calo work mainly in the construction business (often as owners, employing non-Roma) and in wholesaling. They speak Spanish (with an Argentinian accent) and the Calo language is conserved better than in Spain. Ȇ Spanish Calo work generally in commerce (especially textiles) and the cultural field, particularly as flamenco artists. They often refer to themselves as “Gitanos flamencos” (Carrizo-Reimann 2011), highlighting their distinctiveness from other Romani groups. Ȇ Both groups can be considered conservative with regards to traditions and present a strong tendency towards endogamy. Curiously, it is argued that both Calo groups maintain a weak relationship with each other (Maronese and Tchileva 2005:105). Ȇ Kalderash Roma: Proceeding from different countries: Greece (arrived around the 1890s) and Serbia; Moldova (arrived around the 1900s and 1920s); Russia (arrived in the late-nineteenth century and in a second wave around the 1920s). Most of these groups are Romani-speaking and subdivide according to place of origin (Greek Kalderash, Russian Kalderash, etc.). Among Romani-speaking groups, there are also some Xoraxane Roma (mainly from Serbia; unlike their European relatives, they are not Muslim but Catholic (Bernal 2005:23)) and Lovara Roma (proceeding mainly from Hungary, Germany, and Russia). Also, the presence of a few Sinti Romani families has been reported (Bernal 2005). Moldavian Kalderash Roma are the most numerous diaspora (CarrizoReimann 2011). Kalderash Roma tend to maintain traditional lifestyles, upholding numerous rituals (connected to marriage, birth, etc.), and con115

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serving Romani language and traditional clothing among women. They are generally well-off economically, with some considerably affluent families. Many households dedicate themselves to work in commerce (especially used cars, metals, copper-smithery, and hydraulics; as independent traders or providing external services). In the automotive sector, Kalderash Roma have established an extensive network of businesses and work closely together across the country. Kalderash Roma conserve the traditional institution of imparting justice and conflict mediation—the Kris Romani. Ȇ Boyash/Ludar Roma: Proceeding from Romania and Serbia, they arrived in Argentina in the late-nineteenth century. They do not speak Romani, but archaic Romanian (although over time Spanish language became more prevalent). Compared to Kalderash Roma they are considered less traditional and strict towards Romani traditions (marrying more frequently outside of their ethnicity). They are not as well-situated economically as Kalderash Roma and are typically not involved in traditional trades. Ȇ As of the 1990s, a number of Romanian Roma families began to arrive in Argentina, together with other Romanian citizens. Little is known regarding this wave of migration, nonetheless, it seems that with the Argentinean economic crisis, most of them left the country. During their presence, they stood out as a community and their presence was acknowledged; many families came to beg in the affluent streets of major Argentinian cities.17 Furthermore, there is a high level of cross-country mobility of Roma from other countries of Latin America (especially Chile and Brazil) to Argentina. This subdivision of diverse Romani groups, and especially the ability to speak Romani language, is highly relevant. Romani-speaking groups tend to maintain strong relationships between each other, disregarding their country of origin. The Romani-speaking groups maintain some weaker relationship with Boyash Roma (some inter-group marriages have been reported); however, contacts and collaboration are sporadic. The Calo Roma, arguably a very numerous group, are not considered part of the same diaspora and maintain no relationship of any kind with Roma or Boyash groups.

17 For example: http://www.ipsnoticias.net/2000/02/argentina-rumanos-turistas-permanentes-temidos-yrechazados/.

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There is no official data or academically rigorous research regarding the exact number of Roma in Argentina, their sub-division along sub-ethnic/clan fragmentation, or their distribution throughout the country (Radovich 2011). Most sources point to the same estimates—between 70,000 and 300,000,18 nonetheless exact and official data is lacking.19 Census data has been disaggregated according to ethnically-relevant variables since 2001, but thus far only according to specific categories of indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants; there is no census data on Roma in Argentina (Izsák 2016:6). Roma are dispersed throughout the country, living mostly in or around big cities. The biggest concentration of Roma can be found in Buenos Aires (approx. 70,000 Roma (Carrizo-Reimann 2011); AICRA refers to a population of 20,000 Roma), Mar del Plata, Neuquén, Comodoro Rivadavia, Rosario, Santa Fe, Córdoba and San Miguel de Tucumán (Maronese and Tchileva 2005). The Roma from different groups tend to live apart from each other, in separate neighborhoods, marking their distance from each other also territorially; nonetheless, Romanispeaking groups do not tend to maintain such physical distance between each other. According to some data, no more than 5% of Roma lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle; in the 1950s President Juan Perón enforced a law that required Roma in Argentina to abandon the nomadic lifestyle and lead a more sedentary life (Izsák 2016). In fact, nomadism in Argentina was already banned by Peron in the 1940s and Roma were forced to settle (Maronese and Tchileva 2005:104). It is argued that numerous Roma still live in traditional tents and caravans (Nedich 2007). Due to the overall lack of data, and also little interest both by the academia and on the part of state authorities regarding Roma, there is a general lack of information regarding the socio-economic (education, housing, health, employment, etc.) situation of Roma in Argentina. Regarding the educational situation, it is argued that Romani children attend only the first years of primary education, if at all; schools are often perceived as hostile for Roma (Bel 2011; Bernal 2003). As a solution, in numerous communities Biblical Schools have been established in Evangelical Churches. This tendency is slowly declining, as more Roma youth continue their education to high school, and in limited cases, to university. 18 A press article gives more specific estimates regarding numbers of Roma: 170,000 Kalderash Roma, 80,000 Calo, and 150,000 Boyash Roma. It is unclear, however, what these estimates are based on (Fabrykant 2005). 19 The estimate of 70,000–300,000 was developed by a small group of Roma associated with the first Roma association in Argentina (AICRA) during the 1990s by surveying Roma families and clans. It is significant that these estimates are also quoted by public authorities yet no other serious research, whether academic or governmental, has been conducted thus far.

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Generally, Roma in Argentina remain an unknown community.20 Until recently, little attention had been dedicated to Roma in academia, press, or policy arenas. Furthermore, as a tool of ethnic resistance and self-protection Roma also employ similar strategies of self-imposed invisibilization like in other Latin-American countries; Roma also display a strong tendency towards endogamy and live in closed communities. In a country of immigrants, such as Argentina, it is relatively easy to blend into a multi-national society, hiding ethnicity under a national origin. As a result, Roma continue to remain socially invisible, a trend which has also increased with the expansion of the Evangelical Church—it was reported that Romani women used to be much more visible in the public by engaging in fortune-telling, but since this profession is forbidden by the Evangelical Church, these street-level interactions between Roma and non-Roma remain sporadic. Despite this social invisibility or maybe in part because of it, there still is a traceable level of discrimination against Roma. Generally, Roma rarely have reported acts of direct discrimination although it is known that in the past Roma tents were burned down and demolished, causing some fatalities (Nedich 2006). More recent reports note ethnic profiling and denounce acts of discrimination and the prevalence of different expressions of antigypsyism (Izsák 2015). Data also shows that Roma are a community which is most rejected by Argentinean society (Adaszko and Kornblit 2007)—almost 70% of Argentinean youth reject the Roma (only 17% are reported to have a favorable attitude towards Roma). Already in 2005, INADI noted the hostility towards Roma among the majority and included Roma in the 2005 Report “Towards a National Plan against Discrimination” (Villalpando 2005) According to a more recent report published by INADI (Mouratian 2014:50), the Roma are the community with the highest level of social rejection (oscillating between 53-81% of respondents). Other statistical data, however, is unavailable—INADI does not account for discrimination against Roma and was unable to present any data in this regard. Nonetheless, Roma activists claim that Roma are subject to ethnic discrimination and institutional discrimination (Villalpando 2005); similarly, according to UN 20 It should be noted, however, that the existence of Romani communities in Argentina might have been brought to the consciousness of the general public not only by “street encounters” with Roma fortune-tellers, but also through the realm of the arts. Sandro, known as Sandro of the Americas (Robert Sanchez-­ Ocampo, 1945–2010), was a famous Argentinean singer and actor of Romani origin who proudly asserted his ethnicity (in fact, his stage name was “El Gitano”). Sandro is one of the biggest names in the Argentinean musical hall of fame, often regarded as the Argentinean Elvis.

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reports, antigypsyism in Argentina is deeply-seated among the majority society (Izsák 2016). Roma in Colombia—a minority among minorities

Until relatively recently, Romani people have not been a subject of academic inquiry or a target of public policies; the Roma themselves also preferred to remain socially invisible (Gamboa Martínez et al. 2002; Lagunas 2010a; Baroco Galvéz and Lagunas 2014; Acuña Cabanzo 2020). This is why it is difficult to say exactly when the first Romani people arrived in what is today Colombia. It is also difficult to reconstruct the history of Roma migration and mobility throughout the continent. Historically, it is argued by historians that the first Roma arrived in Latin America on the third trip of Christopher Columbus (Paternina Espinoza 2014; Muskus 2012; Sabino Salazar 2014; Lagunas 2010a; Gamboa Martínez et al. 2002). From then on—in different waves of migration and proceeding from various European countries (and consequently belonging to different Romani groups)—the Romani people began to mark their presence in different countries of Latin America. A number of academic and nonacademic texts chart the different waves of migration in an effort to re-construct their historical journeys (Gamboa Martínez 1993; Gómez Baos 2011; Acuña Cabanzo 2011; Lozano Uribe 2005; Gamboa Martínez et al. 2000; Paternina Espinoza 2014). Bereményi (2007:61) rightfully points out the fact that the need to recuperate the history of Roma in Colombia was not only guided by academic curiosity or the need to reconstruct historical memory, but also had a clear political agenda—to demonstrate the historical presence of Romani people as “autochthonous” to Colombia (that is, present before the consolidation of Colombia as an independent state). In the process of reconstruction of Romani history in Colombia, scholars have mainly used oral histories due to the lack of historical materials which document the presence of Romani people in Colombia. It is argued that the current population of Roma in Colombia dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, and originates from Russia, Germany, and/or Greece (Bereményi 2007) as well as Serbia, Spain, and France (Peeters Grietens 2004; Acuña Cabanzo 2011, 2020). Roma in Colombia constitute a very small community. The first national census which included Romani ethnicity as a variable dates to 2005, according to which there were 4,857 Roma (0.012% of the population) (Gómez Baos 2011). Nonetheless, the representativeness of this data was often questioned. On the one hand, Roma point to the high mobility rate among Roma, which 119

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causes fluctuations in the number of Roma citizens in Colombia (mostly due to cross-country mobility). The question of the incorrect results of the 2005 DANE census surfaced numerous times during my fieldtrip, during interviews with high-level officials, other minority representatives, and some Roma. Seemingly, the incorrect statistical data gathered during the census is not limited to Roma only but has also been noted for other ethnic minorities. The representatives of public administration declared themselves during the interviews to be conscious of this problem. Arguably, the discrepancies between estimates and the census data are not free from political influences and bias, and is part of a “numbers game,” in which estimates and official data are used to pursue political agendas. On the other hand, Roma themselves make clear that the real number of Roma is in fact much lower—according to the 2005 census, the highest number of Roma can be found in the department of Atlántico, where in fact there are very few Romani families. The interviews revealed that many people who are not Roma, declared themselves in the census as belonging to this minority. Some argued that this is due to a lack of knowledge of who Roma are—the stereotypes associated with Roma, such as nomadism and a specific life-style and mentality, caused some individuals to identify with imagined “Romani culture,” ignorant of the fact that Roma are an ethnic minority, which one has to be born into (Paternina Espinosa 2014:173). The example of the Atlantic Coast is illustrative. According to DANE 2005, there were 4,857 Roma in Colombia, the majority of them living in Atlántico (40.7%). The interviews, however, reveal something different. A Romani leader argued that the numbers were not correct—according to her the number in reality was much lower (between 2000 and 3000). Nonetheless, the local leaders do not intend to “correct” the DANE census because it benefits them to present higher population numbers. Later on, this was confirmed by other interlocutors. These challenges in correctly assessing the size of the Colombian Romani population were eventually addressed during the 2018 census, which corrected its methodology of data collection among Roma. As a result, the size of the Romani community in the country went down significantly, to only 2,649 people (0.006% of the population) (DANE 2019). The population of Roma in Colombia can be considered relatively homogeneous in terms of belonging to specific Romani macro-groups. Unlike other Latin American countries, where different Romani groups live alongside each other, in Colombia the majority of Roma are of Kalderash descent (Gómez Baos 2011:22), although some scholars argue that there are also some 120

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Ludar/Boyash families (Paternina Espinosa et al. 2010).21 The Romani language is preserved (Deman 2002; Caballero Rodríguez 2010) and is considered as one of the most important pillars of Romani identity, a type of identity marker. According to Rodríguez: “At present and in all cases there are no monolinguals among the Colombian Roma, all are bilingual in Romanes and Castilian [Spanish]; and some—of the oldest [members of the community] — are competent in one or several European languages, a proof of their mobility” (Caballero Rodríguez 2010). Nonetheless, during fieldwork it was revealed that in fact not all Roma are bilingual; and the language is used to a lesser extent among the younger generation. In fact, according to DANE 2005, 76.9% of Roma in Colombia declared that they use the Romani language (Gómez Baos 2011:28). Romani communities are organized into so-called “vitzas”22 (patrilineal clans) and “kumpeñy”or “kumpañy”23—local family networks (plural); “kumpania” (singular). There are several different vitzas in Colombia (the names of which correspond to the names of male ancestors). However, through the years Roma have abandoned their original surnames and adopted more Spanishsounding ones, such as Mendoza, Cristo, Gómez, Méndez, and Romero, although some families also maintain original last names such as Bolochock. Romani communities are hierarchically organized around the variables of age and gender. Historically, in this region Roma have lived a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle (Gamboa Martínez et al. 2002). In the past few decades, however, the majority of Roma have settled down (Paternina Espinosa and Gamboa Martínez 1999:167). Paternina and Gamboa further clarify that the relatively rapid process of sedentarization of Roma in Colombia during the 1970s was a consequence of rapid changes within Colombian society. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the level of mobility remains high (Acuña Cabanzo 2019, 2020). The armed conflict and rise of violence has had a significant impact on the lives of Roma, pushing them to seek refuge and abandon their previous life21 However, during my travels I have not met any person who would declare themselves Boyash and their presence in the country, if any, has been generally ignored. 22 From Kalderaš Romani vica, meaning 1. tribe, clan 2. lineage 3. generation. http://romani.uni-graz.at/romlex/lex.cgi?st=vic&rev=n&cl1=rmyk&cl2=en&fi=&pm=in&ic=y&im=y&wc=. 23 “The kumpeñy (kumpania in singular) are generally called by the cities where they are located or, if not located in the city, by the name of the most important nearby city where they are located. The kumpania, simply, could be defined as the set of patri-families belonging either to the same vitza (or lineage), or different vitsi (plural of vitza) that have established alliances with each other primarily through intermarriage, and whose interaction and endogenous relationships generate, in fact, a space on which the Sere Romengue establish their jurisdiction” (Gómez Baos, 2011:35).

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style (Gómez Baos 2011; Bimbay 2011). Currently, the vast majority of Romani families have settled down, living in rented houses or on their own property; there is only one kumpania the majority of whose members still live in traditional tents—Kumpania Pasto (Peeters Grietens 2004). Nevertheless, numerous Roma still practice geographical mobility as part of their economic activity (travelling throughout the country and between Colombia and neighboring countries) or because of “family reasons”—according to data, 64.7% of Roma declared this reason as the main cause for changing their place of residence (Gómez Baos 2011). On the other hand, maintaining family bonds across geographical borders constitutes a highly relevant element of Romani culture. In fact, Romani leaders reify their nomadism, arguing that: “The Roma people are par excellence a nomadic people and have configured their identity consciousness based on structural itinerancy” (Gómez Baos 2011:91). The Roma in Colombia live mainly in and around big cities and tend to settle in close proximity to each other, within the same districts or in neighboring districts. Currently, there are 10 kumpeñy, distributed in different departments in Colombia. The majority of Roma are self-employed or members of family businesses— their main occupation is commerce (peddler selling, often working with leather and shoes) and working with metal (as crafts and industrially); occupations which are considered as traditional among Roma men. Nonetheless, there are those who also take up temporary employment not considered as traditional: for example, there are some individuals employed by public administration and others who work in non-Roma-owned businesses as employees (Bereményi 2007). Women typically work as fortune-tellers (drabarel)—the only occupation that is traditionally allowed among Romani women (Bereményi 2007:334), and they also accompany their husbands in their trade activities. With regards to the fortune-telling, however, it should be noted that the Evangelical Church is against these practices and advocates that Romani women cease this form of traditional occupation. Despite the rootedness of the Evangelical movement and its impact on the Romani community in Colombia, fortune-telling is still widely practiced by Romani women. Generally, members of the Roma in Colombia commonly describe themselves as a traditional community, underlying the fact that they keep to a Roma system of values and a lifestyle they consider as traditional. The elements underlined as traditional are the following:

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Ȇ Traditional forms of social organization—through vitzas (patrilineal clans) and kumpeñy (local family networks); strong family ties; Ȇ Social stratification according to age and gender; Ȇ Use of Romanes (Romani language); Ȇ Existence of traditional forms of leadership, such as Sere Romengue and Romani Kriss; Ȇ Strong ethno-centrism, tendency towards endogamy regarding interethnic marriages;24 Ȇ Maintenance of traditional codes of conduct, referred to by Colombian Roma as Zakono or Rromanipen (also the presence of rules regarding marime); Ȇ Historical and self-declared nomadism (physical and metaphorical); Ȇ Practice of traditional crafts and occupations; Ȇ Conservation of Roma rituals, especially those regarding marriage (to a lesser extent those related to the rituals of mourning). This self-perceived traditionalism of Roma in Colombia has some negative consequences. The traditional rigid social organization in terms of age and gender creates unequal opportunities for Romani women, especially when it comes to economic independence (employment beyond the traditional occupation). Interviews with Romani women revealed that they generally accept the role attributed to them culturally, as they say, as “guardians of the tradition”: they are expected to cultivate the Romani lifestyle, conserve the language and teach it to children, maintain the traditional dress-code (in numerous communities, women are expected to wear long skirts), and behave “as respected Roma women do”. However, in numerous conversations, many of my interlocutors were critical of their status and the excessive control enforced over women, especially in terms of independence, education, or economic activity. The participation of Romani women with regards to the Romani ethnic mobilization in Colombia will be discussed later on in this chapter. According to studies and collected testimonies, Romani communities often face socio-economic difficulties. For example, research carried out among the Romani community living in Bogota argues that: “The vast majority of the Romani population living in Bogota, D.C., show high levels of poverty and unmet basic needs, presenting living standards that are far below national aver24 Roma declare that they are against marriages outside of their ethnic group. In reality, marriages between Roma men and non-Roma women are quite popular. However, marriages between Romani women and nonRoma men are strongly opposed and socially rejected (although individual cases have also been identified).

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ages. In this context we must alleviate this situation of growing pauperization which is having a negative impact on the cultural identity of the Romani people” (Alianza Entrepueblos 2004:15). Roma in Spain—600 years of history

The history of Roma in Spain dates back almost 600 years. Some scholars argue that the Roma first appeared in Spain around 1415, although the first historic document which indisputably makes reference to the Roma dates back to 1425 (Leblon 1987; San Román 1994b; Gómez Alfaro 2009; Sánchez Ortega and Caro Baroja 1977; Sánchez Ortega 1994). Upon their arrival the Roma were initially welcomed and received letters of safe conduct granting their passage. This situation, however, did not last very long—the turn of the century marked a radical change in approach towards Roma. In 1499 the first decree (pragmática) was passed by the Catholic Monarchs, ordering all Roma to abandon the nomadic lifestyle, settle down, acquire a profession, and serve a local lord (San Román 1994b). This decree follows the general politics initiated by the Catholic Monarchs during the last decade of the fifteenth century which aimed at religious and cultural unification. It is then that the forced conversions to Catholicism were imposed on all Jews (1492), Moors (1592), and other non-Catholic communities under the threat of forced expulsions from the Spanish territories. These laws formed part of the Spanish Inquisition, formally introduced in the Kingdom of Castile in 1478 and later spread through the entire Spanish territory, marking the beginning of the era of witch-hunts and persecutions. Gómez Alfaro argues that between 1499 and 1783, more than 250 decrees and orders targeting Roma were issued, and “the account of such documents demonstrates a radical demonizing rejection, resulting in the best case in a policy committed to the dissolution of Roma as a distinct group” (Gómez Alfaro 2009:13). As argued by Dietz, since their arrival until present times, the Roma were often perceived by the Spanish nation-state as an “enemy within” (Dietz 2005). Throughout the centuries, the Roma were persecuted, imprisoned (for example, the Great Gypsy Round-up of 1749), and expulsed. Furthermore, the use of their language, traditional clothing, or trade was officially forbidden to Roma; as a consequence, the Spanish Roma community lost numerous ethnic markers, and the use of the Romani language, especially, was almost entirely forgotten. The last pragmática of the Catholic Monarchs in 1783 granted the Roma citizenship25 but forbade 25 Also, the 1812 Spanish Constitution confirmed the citizen-status of Roma but upheld the prohibition of

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them to maintain their distinct culture and traditions (continuing with clearly assimilationist efforts); in fact, among other measures, using the term “Roma” (Gitano) was forbidden in any context (Gómez Alfaro 2009). This legislation remained in force throughout the nineteenth century. During the industrial era Roma remained suspicious in the eyes of the state—for example, in 1844 the Guardia Civil established its first office responsible for the surveillance of Roma communities (Gomez Alfaro 2009)—but it was a period relatively more peaceful. Nonetheless, the gradual industrialization of the country made Roma services and traditional occupations obsolete, pushing Roma further to the margins of society. The fate of Roma during the Spanish Civil War and the post-war period remains largely unknown—only in the past few years have scholars (Martín Sánchez 2000, 2006; Martínez Martínez 2020, 2021; Fernández Fernández et al. 2009; Rodríguez Padilla and Fernández Fernández 2010), and Romani intellectuals and organizations themselves begun to recuperate this chapter of Romani history. During General Franco’s dictatorship Roma remained invisibilized in policy-making—Buezas calls it the ethnic indifference phase, yet the repressive politics towards the Roma continued (Calvo Buezas 1985). Among other measures, the use of Calo was strictly forbidden (since 1941 all non-Castilian languages were forbidden) and was considered a “jargon of criminals.” Furthermore, the Guardia Civil after 1943 was given strict orders to guard, control, and survey Romani communities. Nonetheless, specific data on repressive measures against Roma and the number of victims are still largely unknown. Once Spain entered the period of democratic transition, centuries of persecution, repressions, marginalization, and forced assimilation had borne its toll on Romani communities. As the biggest minority in Spain, Roma were in a significant disadvantage in comparison with the majority society in basically all key areas of life. The dramatic socio-economic situation, relocation of Roma from shantytowns to low-quality housing estates throughout the country, and their social marginalization and evident exclusion became a major policy challenge, which required coordinated responses. The deeply rooted antigypsyism against Roma perpetuated the situation of general exclusion of Roma society in Spain (Cortés 2021). Following the transition to democracy, the welfare of Romani citizens was recognized to be a governmental responsibility. In 1979, a special Inter-Ministerial Commission was created to study problems affecting Roma. In 1985, the National Plan for Roma Development was manifesting Roma identity (through language, clothing, and other visible features).

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approved; in 1986, for the first time a special line of credit was included in the state budget to finance Roma-targeted measures. In 1989, the Plan, with a separate budget, was enforced; subsequent regional, municipal, and national plans and strategies have been approved and implemented since then. In this regard, it should be underlined that Spain has been a pioneer in Europe in creating targeted, sectorial and comprehensive political and policy measures for Roma. Demographics As the collection of ethnic data is considered unconstitutional in Spain, there are no official data concerning the size of the Romani population in Spain other than the estimates provided by the government, NGOs, and/or scholars. Consequently, there are no reliable data regarding the size of the Romani population in Spain. Various sources provide estimates, which range between 700,000 and 1,000,000 Roma; according to the Spanish National Roma Integration Strategy 2012–2020, there are around 725,000–750,000 Roma in Spain although “estimates may range from 500,000 up to 1,000,000 people” (Ministerio de Sanidad 2012). The most “realistic” estimate, according to Laparra, is between 800,000–970,000 (Laparra Navarro 2011), amounting to between 1.72%–2.10% of the entire population. Nonetheless, it should be noted that Romani leaders have questioned these statistics, claiming that the estimates have remained the same over the period of the last few decades, which seems unrealistic if we consider the rate of population growth among Roma and the demographic decline of the Spanish non-Roma population. However, in relative terms, Spain is considered the country with the second largest population of Roma in the EU after Romania. Furthermore, to these estimates of the national Romani population it is necessary to add the ever-growing number of non-citizen Romani immigrants, especially those coming from Central and Eastern Europe. As confirmed by scholars, there are no reliable data regarding the number of Romani immigrants in Spain (Sordé Martí 2010; Tarnovschi 2012). The vast majority of these immigrants come from Romania and Bulgaria. The National Roma Integration Strategy estimates the size of the immigrant Romani population to be approximately 50,000 (Ministerio de Sanidad 2014). On the other hand, already in 2003, before the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen Area, Dietz argued that there were approximately 40,000 migrant Roma in Spain (Dietz 2003) while Laparra and Macias estimated that there were around 75,000 Romanian Roma in Spain (Laparra Navarro and Macias 2009). It is very likely that the size of the Romani immigrant population is in fact 126

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much higher than these estimates, especially considering the fact that between 2008 and 2015 Romanians constituted the largest immigrant community in Spain, amounting to 15.7% of all immigrants (INE 2017:10); it is possible that among these immigrants a significant part belongs to the Romani minority although they were not accounted for in the existing estimates. Today, arguably, the socio-economic situation of Roma in Spain is relatively better than in other countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe or the Balkans. For this reason, Spain has often been lauded as the alleged “model of Roma inclusion,” a discourse which has been questioned by some scholars (Daley and Minder 2010; Maya and Mirga 2014; Bereményi and Mirga 2012, 2013). Fresno defines 5 key aspects which were determinant for the progress in socio-economic standing of Romani communities in Spain made since the transition to democracy: 1) democratization after Franco; 2) EU accession; 3) improved welfare programs; 4) targeted measures at the local and regional level; 5) civil society on the side of Roma (Fresno 2010). Other factors, such as demographic changes or the economic boom between the late 1990s and 2006 have also contributed to these improvements (Bereményi and Mirga 2012b; Maya and Mirga 2014; Maya et al. 2012). Indeed, due to these factors the economically relieved and socially integrated class of Roma was steadily growing, even though there were noticeable differences and gaps between “middle class Roma” vis-à-vis their non-Roma neighbors, and the levels of social exclusion remained significantly high. In fact, as a consequence of the economic crisis (2008–2014), many Romani families’ status ascendance faltered (Fundación Secretariado Gitano 2013); as recent data suggests, Roma are disproportionately affected by the economic crisis (European Commission 2016:60). As a result of the crisis, two thirds of the Romani population in Spain dropped below the poverty line (Fundación Secretariado 2013). A 2018 study shows further impoverishment of the Spanish Romani population (Fundación Secretariado 2019). Despite some advances, however, Roma in Spain continue to be well behind the non-Roma population in all of the key areas (housing, education, health, political participation, employment). And Roma continue to be the most discriminated and despised community in Spain (Laparra Navarro et al. 2013). Antigypsyism manifests itself both individually and institutionally (Cortés 2021). Racial profiling also targets the Romani population—in Spain people belonging to this ethnic minority are up to ten times more likely to be stopped by police for identification than those of a Caucasian appearance whilst people with a Maghreb aspect have up to seven times more chances (García Añón et al. 2013). 127

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In search of windows of political opportunity Argentina: Kirchnerismo and interculturality

Argentina differs from other Latin-American countries. The third-largest economy in the region and a member of the G-15 and G-20 major economies, Argentina emerged as one of the richest countries in Latin America in the twentieth century and still today enjoys a “very high” rating on the Human Development index. Historically, Argentina has been torn by numerous coups d’etat, military regimes, and a volatile (often violent) political environment, returning to democratic constitutional rule in 1983. The process of democratization has paved the way towards some legal and political improvements with regards to minorities in the country. For example, at the national level, between 1984 and 1993, a series of “comprehensive” laws were enacted that have indigenous people as recipients.26 The Constitutional Reform of 1994, which introduced significant amendments to the 1853 Constitution, has also provided relevant, though symbolic, provisions with regards to minorities and rights. The constitutional reform process was driven by politics, namely the interests of the ruling party to introduce provisions allowing presidential re-elections (Widner 2005). However, the Constitutional reform included a number of other provisions, for example the elevation of international treaties ratified by Argentina to the status of supreme law and the creation of an independent office of Ombudsman. Arguably, however, more relevant political opportunities emerged during the period of socio-political renewal following the deep economic crisis of 1998–2002 which pushed the country again into political instability and social unrest, with the proliferation of protests and sometimes violent demonstrations (known as cacerolazos). The social turmoil caused by the crisis, with unemployment reaching historical highs of 27% in 2003 and millions of citizens pushed into poverty (poverty climbed to 53% of the population), affected not only the working class but also the middle class (Maletta 2009:6). According to some scholars, “possibly more than other twentieth-century ‘shocks to the 26 The most important of which was the national law 23.302 sanctioned in 1985 and regulated in 1989. A number of provincial regulations were also passed during this time, including the law No. 426 / 84 of Formosa, No. 6,373 / 86 of Salta reformed in 2000, No. 3,258 / 87 of Chaco, No. 2,727 / 89 of Misiones, No. 2,287 / 88 of Río Negro, No. 3,657 / 91 of Chubut and No. 11,078 / 93 of Santa Fe. For current overview of the existing legal framework which regulates indigenous rights in Argentina, see: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/derechoshumanos/inai/normativa.

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system,’ the Argentinazo constituted a crisis of culture and confidence about national identity: wither then nation and who, or what, constituted the country” (Levey et al. 2014:xv).The process of economic recovery included a set of social measures, shifting the paradigm of social policies with the government of Nestor Kirchner elected in 2003, succeeded by his wife Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, elected in 2007 (a period known as Kirchnerismo). A social dialogue process was initiated with all sectors of society, including the Catholic Church, the civil society sector, and international organizations in order to establish long-term goals that aimed not only to recuperate the Argentinean economy but also to provide a more socially just and participative society (Maletta 2009). Kirchnerismo “has established a political-ideological line based on the guarantee of human rights embodied in the recognition and visibility of defense organizations. (…) In short, one of its bases has been the deepening of democracy based on the expansion of rights, social inclusion and the demand for equality as respect for diversity” (Melella 2014). Some of the measures introduced by Kirchnerismo include the improvement and universal coverage of the social security system; increased spending on education; politics of human rights (especially in relation to crimes committed during the dictatorship of the previous decades); and measures regarding children’s rights and the retired population (de Altube 2012). The new political ideology represented by Kirchnerismo also laid the ground for policies regarding national identity: “a revitalization of the concept of the national, the collective, the identification of public and state, of goods and collective rights, and of course of common history […]” (de Altube 2012:23). According to governmental officials “the process of rebuilding the State started in 2003 involved a paradigm shift that meant the recognition, promotion and protection of human rights as a cornerstone in the design and layout of the public policies implemented by the national government, committed to building and empowerment in this regard to citizenship” (Lucio 2013:9). Melella further argues that “interculturality has also been approached as one of the central axes (together with democratization, equality and diversity, among others) for the realization of socio-political projects that sustain the concretion of inclusive societies where social justice governs” (Melella 2014). These ideological principles had direct consequences—in policies, finances, and public discourses and debates—and are relevant for understanding the Argentinean context of minority rights treatment and human rights approaches. Nonetheless, the period of Kirchnerismo has not been without controversies. With regards to minorities, especially the indigenous, afro-descendants, and Roma, interculturality remained an empty slogan which has not brought 129

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significant changes or policy progress; ethnic leaders as well as some organizations, including Amnesty International, have underlined the declarative character of the Kircheners’ promises. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities continue to struggle with socio-economic problems, social marginalization, and prevalent and deeply rooted discrimination. It should be noted, however, that while indigenous and afro-descendant communities are still awaiting substantial legislative changes, the Argentinean government has been a pioneer of innovative legislation regarding LGBT rights (“Gay Marriage” 2010; Corrales 2012; Encarnación 2014). In 2010 Argentina legalized gay marriage (Law 26.218 and Decree 1054/10), becoming the first Latin American country to do so. In 2012 the Law of Gender Identity (26.743) further advanced LGBT rights, by allowing different gender choice on personal identity cards, along with other provisions regarding transgender and transsexual individuals. As Argentina successfully positioned itself as a champion of LGBTIQ and trans-gender rights, much less progress had been made for other—cultural and ethnic—minorities. Colombia: Aftermath of La Violencia and opportunities created by the Peace Process

Colombia—the third most populous country in Latin America (after Brazil and Mexico)—is a country defined by paradoxes. On the one hand, Colombia is described as a country of relative political stability, with some arguing that it has one of the longest-functioning democracies in Latin America (Hudson 2010): unlike its neighboring countries, it has not been repeatedly torn by coups d’état,27 violent dictatorships, or authoritarian regimes. Ever since its creation as an independent republic in 1886, Colombia has enjoyed relatively regular and fair elections and has promoted respect for political and civil rights (Hudson 2010). Nonetheless, the argument about the “relative stability” of Colombian democracy should not overshadow the history of existing armed struggles (Tirado Mejía et al. 1998). After a time of relative peace, Colombia was torn by internal violence. Between 1948 and 1958, Colombia was torn apart during the period of the so-called “La Violencia”—a violent civil war fought mainly in the countryside between the Colombian Conservative Party and the Colombian Liberal Party. In the aftermath of this period, armed polit27 Coups d’état have taken place in Colombia only three times over the period of its history—in 1830, 1854, and in 1953.

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ical groups began to appear, first with the emergence of the Marxist guerrilla group known as the National Liberation Army in 1964, and then with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in 1966. Many other guerrilla and paramilitary groups have emerged since then, which have effectively destabilized the country politically, terrorized the population, and extended the period of armed conflict. Continuous insurgency, paramilitarism, terrorism, and narco-terrorism, along with criminality, political scandals, and political violence have brought Colombia to the verge of collapse. Colombia is also a highly fragmented country, with strong social, economic, and political polarization, marked economic inequalities, and considerable regional disparities. The social inequalities, violence, corruption, and narco-terrorism of the 1980s resulted in increasing social unrest and a crisis of governability. The assassination of three presidential candidates in 1989 spurred popular demand for political reforms, giving way to constitutional reform (Cárdenas, Junguito, & Mónica Pachón, 2006:10). Eventually, the Seventh Ballot movement (movimiento de la séptima papeleta) succeeded in pushing for constitutional reforms through the establishment of a National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente) (Cárdenas et al. 2006). The new constitution was meant to become a tool to overcome institutional, social, and political divisions within a country ripped apart by violence. It envisioned the establishment of modern, democratic institutions based on the principles of greater democratic participation and the rule of law, as well as mechanisms for human rights protection. The National Constituent Assembly aimed to be inclusive, representative, and participatory. Through nation-wide elections, seventy delegates were chosen in order to represent diverse social groups and interests, including politicians of different political strands, ex-guerrillas, indigenous leaders, representatives of business and civil society, peasants, academics, and clerics. As a result, a new Constitution was signed on July 6, 199128 and included a number of important innovations and reforms, such as the creation of the Constitutional Court and the Attorney General, principles of decentralization, and a complete ban on presidential reelection.29 The most important changes, however, were made regarding civil, economic, and social rights. The Constitution of 1991 introduced a catalogue of Fundamental Rights, set up the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office and a mechanism of tutelage which allows citizens to request action for the protec28 https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/Constitucion-Politica-Colombia-1991.pdf. 29 This has changed under the government of Álvaro Uribe, who successfully sought a Congressional amendment in 2004 of the Colombian Constitution which allowed for presidential re-election.

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tion of their fundamental rights. Furthermore, it enshrined the principles of gender equality and freedom of religion, and recognized the plurality and ethnic diversity of Colombian society. The period of great violence and the subsequent peace processes also placed the question of minorities’ protection and rights, especially that of the indigenous peoples, at the heart of the discussions regarding the new constitutional provisions of the Colombian state. In fact, the indigenous and afro-descendant people were among the principal civilian victims of the armed conflict, targeted by all the armed groups. This is what also contributed to visibilizing the dramatic situation of the indigenous people in the context of Colombia’s armed conflict and demanded a response from the authorities to protect them. Ultimately, in the new Constitution, the question of minority rights protection became institutionalized, giving way to important legal changes concerning minorities. In fact, with regards to minority rights protection, the Colombian constitution is considered to be among the most advanced in the region. Spain: Democratic transition and emergence of the “Roma issues”

Without a doubt, the turning point in the modern history of Spain was the end of the almost 40-year long dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. The bloody Spanish Civil War, fought between 1936–1939 between the left-wing Republicans and the right-wing Nationalists, was won by the Nationalist troops led by General Franco. Their victory marked the beginning of a fascist regime which continued until 1975. The Franco dictatorship was built on authoritarianism, Catholic nationalism, and militarism and left no room for political or civic opposition; social control, police presence, repressions, and numerous human rights violations terrorized the population. Furthermore, Franco imposed a nationalistic discourse which sought homogeneity and uniformity of the Spanish identity and consequently repressed all cultural diversity. Through language policies, for example, Franco enforced the nation-wide and exclusive use of Castilian Spanish while the use of regional languages, such as Catalan, Galician, or Basque, was forbidden; this also included the Calo language used by Roma in Spain. Likewise, regional traditions and festivities were censored or made illegal. As a result, for almost four decades the existence of cultural diversity—whether religious, ethnic, or linguistic—was delegalized and made invisible. Although Franco installed a military dictatorship, in 1970 he named Prince Juan Carlos as his successor, thereby re-establishing the monarchy. When 132

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Franco died in 1975, Juan Carlos became king of Spain and the slow process of rebuilding democracy in Spain began. The transition to democracy had a significant impact on Roma. First, after the death of General Franco and with the gradual democratization of the country, Roma faced the unprecedented opportunity of becoming active political subjects, discovering the potential of ethno-politics (Dietz 2003:75) and formal politics. In 1977, during the first democratic elections, Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, a 35-year-old Romani lawyer and journalist from Andalusia, became the first Roma in Spain ever elected to the Spanish Parliament, running on the list of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). Ramírez Heredia participated in the deep institutional reforms of the process of building a democratic Spain, including the drafting of the new Constitution, ratified in 1978, which also bears his signature. Democracy gave the Roma equal legal status as Spanish citizens, enshrined in the 1978 Constitution, and created a political opportunity to vocalize their interests through “the right of association” (article 22.1). It is also in part to the presence of Juan de Dios that many of the then-still-enforced discriminatory laws against Roma were removed. For example, during his famously passionate speech on June 7, 1978, he addressed the Parliament requesting the removal of three repressive and discriminatory articles of the Regulation of the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil); Juan de Dios received a standing ovation and the law was passed (“Apoteosis gitana” 1978). Second, since the transition towards democracy, the welfare of Romani citizens has been recognized to be the government’s responsibility. The universal welfare system was also inclusive of the Romani population; nonetheless, early on the administration recognized the need to multiculturalize and particularize universal policies in order to better attend to the specific needs of Roma. Thus, the administration, both regional and national, aware of the alarming situation of the vast majority of Romani citizens, began to draft programs for their inclusion. In 1978, an Inter-Ministerial Commission was created to study the problems affecting the Romani community, significantly under the Ministry of Culture. The gradual interest of governmental institutions in the fate of their Romani citizens gradually led to the creation of the first national plan for Roma development, approved by the Spanish Parliament in 198530 simultaneously with the creation of the Office for the Romani issues; in 1986, for the first time, a special line of credit was included in the state budget to finance Romani measures. In 1989, the Plan, with a separate budget, was 30 Approved by the Spanish Parliament on October 3, 1985.

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put into force. Regional governments were also encouraged to set up their own strategies and create local consultative bodies to ensure dialogue with Roma; the first such initiatives were set up in Andalusia where most Roma reside: the Municipal Council for Roma in Seville was created in 1984 and the first Andalusian Plan for the Roma Community was approved in 1987. Thus, Spain became a pioneer of Roma-targeted policies, which sought an overall improvement in the socio-economic standing of its Romani citizens. The Spanish legal arrangement of autonomous regions, with their separate budgets and broad competencies in key fields, has also had an important impact in the way the Romani ethnic mobilization has developed and consolidated.

Anno Domini 2017—Status of Roma While the three case-study countries share some significant characteristic traits—as multi-cultural states which have a history of Romani presence and which have experienced drastic shifts in political landscapes, thus creating windows of political opportunity—at the time when this research was concluded, the legal and political status of Romani communities in these places could not be more disparate. It should be noted, furthermore, that all three countries have become places of a civil and political awakening of Roma, who are demanding a place at the policy table and recognition of their ethnic identity. Argentina—stagnation in the face of struggle

Despite the fact that Argentina is the country with the second-largest Romani population in Latin America, the level of public and institutional recognition is scarce. In public and media discourses, Roma continue to be portrayed mainly through the prism of stereotypes. The media31 tends to cover Roma-related news in a sensationalist way, contributing to sustaining a negative perception about the community (Radovich 2011). On television, numerous programs and reportages abound, which talk about the “mysterious Romani culture,” resembling closely the stereotypical portrayal of Roma in European TV shows such 31 Popular culture in Argentina has also contributed to stabilizing biases towards Roma. For example, in 1935 the first edition of the popular comic strip “Patoruzú” appeared in the newspaper El Mundo in which the Gypsy Juaniyo is the main villain. Since then other cartoons and comics commonly reproduce the stereotypical image of the “Gypsy thief ” (Dominguez 2015).

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as My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding.32 The press often covers criminal cases which sporadically involve Romani individuals, thus affirming the alleged link between Romani culture and unlawful activity. One example, which shocked Argentinian society, was the case of a Romani couple from Mar del Plata who allegedly bought a Romani teenager to marry her to their son and held her captive in their house (“Trata de personas” 2018). Similar cases have been reported earlier in which families which practiced the traditional dowry for the bride (“dote”) was considered as cases of human trafficking (“Dos gitanos” 2017). Such media coverage—being the dominant type of Roma presence in public discourse—sustains deeply engrained stereotypes and strengthens prejudice towards Roma. Complaints of ethnic discrimination by members of the Romani community to the corresponding agencies have been futile. For example, the “Comprehensive Study of the Human Rights Situation of Roma worldwide, with a Particular Focus on the Phenomenon of Anti-Gypsyism” recounts: For example, in Argentina, a now discontinued television series, Soy Gitano, focused on so-called “Gypsy crime”. Although the Roma community in Argentina denounced the soap opera to the National Institute to Combat Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism, the complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the series was fictional. (Izsák 2015)

In fact, as underlined by the handful of Romani activists in the country, the Roma continue to face discrimination and are the least-favorably perceived community in the country (Izsák 2016).33 As argued by one of their leaders, especially in the capital city of Buenos Aires, the stigmatization is fierce, and Roma seek invisibility rather than recognition. In numerous interviews, Jorge Bernal has argued, for example, that Romani women increasingly abandon traditional clothing when going out, in fear of discrimination and social rejection (Melgarejo 2017). For Gitanos—Roma of Spanish origin—the stigma associated with the Roma/Gitano identity results in separation between both groups. Gitanos can easily pass as Spanish citizens thus underlining their clear 32 For example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvGtSZy0kOg. In fact My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding is also broadcast on Argentinean TV. 33 In fact, a 2015 report states that [Roma] “mentioned incidents of police harassment and violence experienced by Roma communities, and that they believe that they are the victims of racial profiling. So-called preventative raids have been carried out on Roma houses by law-enforcement authorities without any legal basis, purely because of presumptions made about criminality based on the ethnicity of the occupants. Participants also noted the heightened discrimination experienced by Roma women, who are often easily identifiable due to their traditional dress” (Izsák 2016:7–8).

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European background and discursively distancing themselves from the hypervisible Romani groups; many Gitanos self-describe as “flamencos” or simply “andaluces,” avoiding the association with Romani culture. The only exception is in the field of the arts—especially flamenco—where being an authentic Gitano becomes an added value. By exploiting the positive stereotype associating flamenco with an artform and alluding to “El Duende,” numerous flamenco performers, schools, and so-called “tablaos” arguably become more successful. For example, the Avenida de Mayo in Buenos Aires is a well-known bastion of Spanish and Gitano culture and is a famous tourist hotspot. There, Gitanos are the carriers of Spanish culture. In general, Romani ethnic mobilization in Argentina is still in its early stages: there is only one Romani organization, limited leaders and public figures, a lack of awareness of the relevance and role of Roma formal organizations among the community, and internal fragmentation among groups and leaders. A greater level of self-organization among Romani communities, increased collaboration across groups and regions, and enhanced public visibility campaigns could all contribute to the repositioning of Romani issues in Argentina. Arguably, greater interest in Roma communities in academic circles and the press, as well as the establishment of strategic alliances with other sectors of the population and civil society, could also contribute in providing greater leverage to Romani affairs. Until then, however, it is easy for Argentinean state administration to dismiss Romani claims made on behalf of only one, relatively small organization. Consequently, Roma-related issues and their recognition remain in a state of stagnation. There are to-date no programs or policies which target Roma explicitly or even mention Roma, despite the fact that the government is aware and acknowledges deficits among the Romani population in the fields of education. National and regional governmental institutions are reluctant to work with Roma communities—Romani actors have not yet generated sufficient political leverage to exert pressure on politicians and the Romani issue remains too peripheral and invisible to build a sense of urgency to act. In fact, Romani leaders denounce the “lack of systematic and frank dialogue” with public governmental agencies (Izsák 2016). Consequently, Romani entities and leaders remain under-funded and lack opportunities to expand their scope of activities. Limited, rather symbolic, gestures have been noted on the part of the government, such as statements released on the occasion of International Roma Day (April 8).34 Sporadic funding has also been given to support Roma projects: for 34 For example, in 2017 the National Department for Human Rights and Cultural Plurality (Secre-

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example, in 2015 INADI sponsored the publication of a book on Romani history, legends, and traditions and the documentary film Roma—Gelem, Gelem. Romani leaders also denounce that while “they are often the subject of anthropological studies by outsiders… [they are not given] opportunities to design and author such studies themselves” (Izsák 2016). The issue of Roma in Argentina has been given more visibility from abroad. In the framework of activities of the UN Human Rights Council, Rita Izsák, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues and personally of Romani background, organized two regional workshops on the situation of Roma in the Americas. On 25 September 2015, she convened a workshop in Brasilia, during which Roma from different Latin American countries, including Argentina, were represented. A follow-up workshop was organized in Buenos Aires by the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Dr Fernand de Varennes, which took place on September 20–21, 2017. The 2017 workshop was attended by representatives of INADI who affirmed the existing discrimination against Roma and encouraged Roma to denounce these instances to corresponding institutions.35 It is yet to be evaluated whether the international visibility given to this issue in Argentina, and arguably pressure, will result in greater interest on the part of institutions to work with Roma or whether these statements will remain merely declaratory. Colombia—political successes of a tiny minority

The first Romani organization advocating for the recognition of Romani identity in the political spectrum was established in 1998 (Paternina Espinoza 2014; Paternina Espinoza et al. 2010; Gómez Baos 2010). Since then, over 30 institutional agreements have been approved, among them a number of Romaspecific decrees and public policy documents. Below is a summary of the most important legal documents targeting Roma, including but not limited to: Ȇ Document no. 0864 of February 20, 1998 issued by the Ministry of Interior, which recognizes that a) Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization also applies to Roma as they are an ethnic minority “with a clear traditional tribal social organization”; b) Roma pretaría de Derechos Humanos y Pluralismo Cultural de la Nación) released a short video on the occasion with an interview with the most active Romani leader, Jorge Bernal. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=xpB0mAEHRmU 35 http://www.inadi.gob.ar/2017/09/21/el-inadi-expone-sobre-la-discriminacion-y-el-pueblo-romani/.

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Ȇ

Ȇ

Ȇ

Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Ȇ Ȇ

existed in Colombia prior to the establishment of the Colombian republic and the same legislation applies to Roma as to other ethnic groups; and c) it is necessary that States undertake necessary actions to bring the Roma out of invisibility and guarantee special treatment of their collective rights; Circular 1629 of October 2, 2003 issued by the Ministry of Interior and Justice to the mayors and Governors: “Request for the Implementation of Measures and Special Actions for the Protection of the Population Belonging to Roma (Gypsy)”; Decree 200 of 2003, Article 1 which states: “Objectives: The Ministry of Interior and Justice will have the following objectives: (...) Numeral 9: Support policy design and implementation in their competence in relation to the issues and rights of ethnic groups.” As set out in paragraph 9 of Article 16 it is a function of the Office of Ethnicities to monitor Romani people’s organizations; Agreement 0273 of 2004, issued by the National Board of Health and Social Security in which Roma are included under the subsidized health insurance as an ethnic group, based on the census list endorsed by PRORROM and traditional authorities; Roma have also been explicitly mentioned in four National Development Plans (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1998–2002, 2002–2006, 2006–2010, 2010–2014); Incorporation of Roma into the national census (2005 and 2018); Decree 2957 of August 6, 2010 “For the Comprehensive Protection of the Romani Ethnic Group in Colombia.” This is the most important regulatory framework for Roma, which entails comprehensive protection of the rights of Romani citizens nationally. The decree includes a definition of who is Roma; recognizes and registers kumpeñy (which acquire legal personality as representative bodies); recognizes the existence of a Romani system of justice (Romani Kriss); gives Roma freedom of movement around the country due to its nomadic traditions; recognizes Roma as a national ethnic minority and appreciates its contributions; and establishes the National Dialogue Table (Mesa Nacional de Diálogo); Law 1381 of 2010, “Law for the Protection of Languages,” which explicitly mentions Romani languages (Romani ćhib); Presidential Directive 01 of 2010 “Guarantee of the Fundamental Right to Prior Consultations with Ethnic National Groups,” which mentions Roma explicitly;

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Ȇ Decree 582 of 2011, “by which the District Public Policy is adopted for the ethnic group Rom or Gypsy in the Capital District and other provisions are dictated”; Ȇ Decree 4634 of 2011 “by which measures of assistance, attention, integral reparation and restitution of lands are dictated to the victims belonging to the Rom or Gypsy people”. Beyond the Roma-specific legislation, it is important to highlight that all legislation targeting ethnic minorities in Colombia is by extension also applicable to the Romani community members. Romani stakeholders are operating within an institutional framework that guarantees their regular consultations and participation in processes of deliberation and policy discussions, most notably through so-called “invited spaces” (Cornwall 2004). The 2010 decree institutionalized a Roma consultative body (Mesa Nacional de Diálogo), which is attended by representatives of the Ministry of Interior and Justice, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, and the Ministry of Culture, as well as legal representatives of Romani organizations. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior established a separate Director of the Department for Roma, Indigenous and Minorities’ Affairs at the Ministry of Interior (Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, Rom y Minorías). Consequently, Roma are mentioned in a significant number of legislation which targets minorities, as well as in broader policy frameworks and strategic plans. For example, in 2015, the government of Colombia initiated consultations with Romani organizations in the process of drafting the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) 2014–2018 (Departamento Nacional 2015a); as a result, the document mentions Roma 170 times (Departamento Nacional 2015b). Logically, this translates into available funding for Romani activities and projects and state-sponsored spaces of visibility. Spain–achievements or setbacks?

The history of Romani ethnic mobilization in Spain dates back to the late 1960s. Since then, the Romani associative movement has expanded and developed. With regards to Roma-related policymaking, Spain is often taken as a positive example—Spanish officials tend to speak about Spain’s pioneering work on Roma; in the international arena, some have already branded the socalled “Spanish model of Roma inclusion” (Daley and Minder 2010) as a way towards assumed progress. Indeed, in some respects the Spanish government 139

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was a pioneer: Spain was one of the first countries to design explicit Romarelated policies with a specifically assigned budget; municipal, regional, and national-level Romani consultative bodies were a Spanish innovation; and the first Romani MEP also came from Spain. The Spanish Romani associative movement, on the other hand, was also exemplary and is, in some respects, avant-garde. The pace of growth and proliferation of Romani organizations was exceptional in comparison to Europe, and the Romani women’s movement—with its organizations and subsequent federation—was equally a novelty of at that time (Mirga-Kruszelnicka and Kóczé 2016; Mirga-Kruszelnicka, 2018). The dynamic development of the Romani associative movement, combined with the relative openness of Spanish political elites, resulted in numerous institutional achievements. Since the creation of the Municipal Council for Roma in Seville in 1984, numerous similar bodies have been created at different levels of public administration (Catalonia, Extremadura, Madrid, Basque Country, Castilla-La Mancha). Regional autonomous communities have also devised regional Roma integration plans—the first was the Andalusian Plan for the Roma Community, approved in 1987; since then, autonomous regions have set up or begun the preparations for their own regional Roma development plans (Catalonia, Navarra, Basque Country, Galicia, La Rioja, Extremadura). The State Council for Roma in Spain—the highest-level Roma consultative body in Spain—was constituted in 2005 (based on Order TAS/3795/2005 of November 21, 2005). In 2007, the Institute of Romani Culture (El Instituto de Cultura Gitana) was created in Madrid (Order CUL/1842/2007), established as a public foundation of the state public sector promoted by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, “whose objectives are the development and promotion of the history, culture, and language of Roma, and the dissemination of their knowledge and recognition through various cultural activities, research, and publications” (Instituto de Culturo Gitana n.d.). Romani organizations have succeeded in securing institutional and symbolic acts of recognition, although formally, Roma have not been recognized as a minority. Already in 1996, the Andalusian Parliament established November 22 as the “Day of Andalusian Roma” and other regions followed: in 2004, November 16 was established as the “Day of Roma People in the Basque Country”; in 2007, the Government of Navarre established April 27 as the “Day of Roma People of Navarre”; and in 2016, the General Assembly of the Autonomous Community of Madrid declared May 24 as the “Day of Roma People in Madrid”. In 2001, the Catalan Parliament passed a resolution recog140

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nizing Romani identity and its value; and in 2006 article 42.7, which urges the government to safeguard the culture of the Romani people, was added to the Statute of Catalonia. On the national level, in 2005, the Congress approved a proposition stating that the government has to promote Romani culture, history, identity, and language resulting in creation of the Institute of Romani Culture. International Roma Day, commemorated in Spain for the first time in 2002, is increasingly celebrated by public institutions. In April 2018, another historic recognition was approved. Following the unanimous approval by the Health and Social Services Commission of the Spanish Congress on March 9, 2017 of a no-law proposition recognizing the Romani people’s day and symbols (Fundación Secretariado Gitano. 2017), the Council of Ministers passed a motion recognizing April 8 as International Roma Day and recognized the Romani flag and Romani anthem as official.36 This decision allows these symbols to be used formally at institutional events, acts, and commemorations related to the Romani People. Since that year numerous political leaders, including Mariano Rajoy, Pedro Sánchez, and Albert Rivera, have mentioned Roma Day on their social media pages and in official speeches. All these acts of institutional recognition—though of historical importance—are rather symbolic and aim at remedying and mitigating the negative consequences of the lack of formal recognition of Roma as an ethnic minority. Despite the above-mentioned advances, however, there are numerous shortcomings. The Spanish Romani population continues to lag behind the non-Roma majority and is at a disadvantage in all key areas of life. In 2018, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) published a damning report on Spain which leaves no doubt—the report highlights the Roma as one of the most disadvantaged groups in Spain, pointing to “disproportionate inequalities,” “persistent discrimination,” and “school segregation” (CESCR 2018). Despite the undeniable growth of the Roma civic sector, their increased participation in associations has not translated into greater power, presence, and leadership in political structures per se. While Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia championed the political arena as early as the 1970s, until 2017 only one other person of Romani background was successfully elected to Spain’s highest legislative body. In 2011, Silvia Heredia Martín entered the Congress of Deputies on the People’s Party list (Partido Popular, PP) and was re-elected in 2016. Only two other Romani candidates have been elected to regional congresses: Manuel 36 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/Paginas/enlaces/060418-enlacegitano.aspx.

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Bustamante in Valencia (in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2013; PP) and Francisco Saavedra in Extremadura (in 2003 and 2007; Socialist Party, PSOE). Currently, only Heredia Martín remains in office—in 2017 there were no other Roma in regional or national parliaments. On the municipal level the situation has relatively improved but the inclusion of Roma in public administration structures— either as elected officials or public servants—remains drastically low. Surprisingly, even in municipalities where Roma represent an important electoral power, the number of elected Roma municipal councillors, for example, is marginal. Finally, representatives of the Romani associative movement often point to the existing atomization and fragmentation among actors, their enormous dependency on public funding and parallel frail watchdog capacity. More importantly, Romani actors remain with limited influence and resources visà-vis more powerful actors. In Spain, the Fundación Secretariado Gitano (FSG), the biggest and most influential pro-Roma organization in the country, receives more funding annually from the State than any other Romani organization or federation; the FSG is also the main consumer of European Social Funds (ESF) for Roma. For example, the 2017 division of income tax contributions (IRPF) for the Roma cause assigned over 2.5 million euros to the FSG; in comparison, the second-highest subsidized Romani organization— the national umbrella organization Unión Romani—received 260,000 euros. Numerous Romani entities have complained that the state is favouring the FSG by providing it with greater public funding and criticized the FSG for its focus on service-provisions rather than empowerment, its inability to employ Roma in higher ranks of management, and its weakness in criticizing the state. Thus, while there are numerous achievements in Spain, there are also shortcomings and a certain level of frustration. It is somewhat felt that the secondlargest Romani population in the EU, with over a four-decade history of mobilization, should have achieved greater gains, especially in terms of political power, level of influence, and access to resources. And, indeed, decades of targeted Romani inclusion work should have brought more tangible results in the everyday lives of Spanish Romani citizens. In conclusion

To some extent the contrasting situation of Roma in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain is counterintuitive. What are, therefore, the factors that determine the relatively more successful levels of recognition and institutional standing of Roma in these countries? 142

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Is it a matter of the size of the Romani diaspora in each country? Is it the particular history of presence of Roma and their relationship with the majority? Does it have to do with the existence and/or emergence of ethnic cleavages? Does it depend on the level of development, extensiveness, and proliferation of Romani ethnic mobilization itself? Or rather, is it the efficiency and skillfulness of Romani leaders and/or actors which determine the “rate of success”? What does the political leverage of Romani leaders depend on? Or maybe it is a question of the broader political context, the volatile conditions of the socio-political panorama that allow for the emergence of opportunities? Or is it a matter of timing and the capacity to adapt to salient windows of opportunity? The following chapters will attempt to shed light on these questions— and explore possible interpretations—by focusing on an analysis of the actors (mobilizing structures), the type of discourses deployed internally and externally (frames), and the existence and use of political opportunities.

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Who Is Doing the Mobilizing? Anatomy of Romani Ethnic Mobilization Through the Prism of the Actors

Ethnic mobilization requires some degree of organization and institutionalization; after all, groups engage in collective struggles not based on individual claims but through a number of formal and informal vehicles or “mobilizing structures” (McAdam et al. 1996; Kriesi 1996; McAdam et al. 2009; Kriesi et al. 2007). These structures become recognized actors who engage in direct interaction with constituencies, targeted authorities, and potential allies; they become the “spokespersons” who articulate and represent collective grievances and aims on behalf of the community, and set the agenda for pursuing these collective goals. According to the relevant literature, mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, formal and informal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996:3); activist networks, NGOs, political parties, but also religious institutions, private clubs, businesses or trade unions can become such vehicles of collective action. In the case of Roma, who is driving the process of ethnic mobilization? What actors and structures are conducive to collective political action? Are there specific types of mobilizing structures adopted as vehicles of collective action among Roma? Are there traceable differences and similarities, and if so, what are they caused by? How can we assess the diversity (or lack thereof) of Romani vehicles of collective action? What are the patterns of leadership within Romani structures of mobilization, and especially with regards to gender and age? Analyzing the landscape of Romani actors, what is their relationship with each other? Is the emerging plurality of structures an asset or a challenge? How is the emergence of multiple “Romani voices” dealt with by Romani leaders themselves? These are some of the questions dealt with in Chapter 4. 145

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The first part of this chapter will proceed with an analysis of the “anatomy” of the movement to understand when and how mobilizing structures emerge; the birth of new actors as well as the process of growth and expansion of mobilizing structures will be assessed comparatively in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain. Then, a detailed overview of the panorama of Romani mobilizing structures will be described. From a comparative perspective, a typology will be developed, taking into consideration the type of actors which engage in activism. Finally, the overview of Romani actors will include an illustration of the individuals behind those structures: leadership profiles and patterns—both individual and collective—will be discussed, pointing to old and new leadership trends, along with an analysis of the composition patterns of actors and their membership. In discussing the panorama of Romani mobilizing structures, I will critically examine what factors have determined the choice of vehicles of collective action in each country. The second part of this chapter will discuss Romani ethnic mobilization as a web—a field of interactions and networks—and, thus, will look into the relationships which diverse mobilizing structures establish with each other. I will argue that the growth and diversification of actors involved translates at times into a multiplicity of competing voices; evident internal fragmentation and atomization requires more dynamic consolidation attempts. The last part of this chapter, through voices and statements of the actors themselves, will discuss the underlying logic behind setting up structures of Romani ethnic mobilization. What is the rationale for conceiving mobilizing structures in the first place? I will argue that the main premise of ethnic mobilization is that of representation and “having a voice.” Consequently, the very reason for the existence of Romani structures—representation—also becomes their modus operandi; representation simultaneously becomes an objective and a strategy.

Anatomy of a movement—birth and growth of Romani actors When and how did the first genuinely Romani mobilizing structures emerge? What factors contributed to the growth and proliferation of Romani actors? The examples below show some patterns but also important differences. As this section will demonstrate, in the case of Spain and Colombia, the involvement of non-Roma actors—whether through individual engagement or institutional support—had an essential role in galvanizing and supporting the birth of the first Romani organizations. Furthermore, the opening of political 146

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opportunities for civil society structures, and specifically for Roma, provided incentives to Romani community members to engage in socio-political activism. Consequently, Romani ethnic mobilization began to grow into a number of actors and spread across both countries. Argentina, on the other hand, presents a strikingly different case. Argentina

The first signs of ethnic activism can be traced back to the mid-1980s, and no signs of activism can be found prior to that time. The emergence of Romani activism in Argentina was influenced by a similar process of self-organization which took place around the same period of time in other neighboring countries. As revealed during interviews, Romani leaders from Spain (notably, the Spanish Romani Unión), international Roma organizations (initially, the International Romani Union, and subsequently the European Roma and Traveller Forum), and most importantly, Romani activists from Brazil provided most inspiration. In 1987, the first association for Roma1 in Brazil was set up: of the Center for Gypsy Studies (Centro de Estudos Ciganos, CEC), presided over by Romani violinist Mio Vasite (Maronese and Tchileva 2005). In 1989, representatives from the CEC came to Buenos Aires to perform at the Centro Cultural San Martín. This meeting sparked similar ambitions among some Argentinean Roma and marked the beginning of setting up the first cultural association in Argentina. As a result, a small group of Roma, among them Jorge Bernal—a key person in the Argentinean Romani associative movement—created an informal organization called Narodo Romano that same year. Although the organization was never formally registered, it was active for some years; among other things, it “advised local TV while it produced three consecutive programs about our culture” (Bernal 2003). After this initial period of activity, Narodo Romano ceased to exist for the following 8 years. Finally, in the early 2000s the same leaders decided to re-establish a Roma NGO, this time under the name of the Roma Cultural Identity Association in Argentina (Asociacion Identidad Cultural Romani en Argentina, AICRA), which was officially registered in September 2000.

1 The CEC was established by a group of scholars and writers; Mio Vasite was invited to serve as the honorary president and leader of the association. Due to divergent opinions, Mio Vasite left CEC in 1990 and established the União Cigana do Brasil; in 1991 CEC was dissolved. http://uniaociganadobrasil.blogspot. com/2016/11/e-assim-comecou-o-movimento-cigano-no.html.

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The re-emergence of ethnic activism on the part of Argentinean Roma is linked to the period of awakened activity among Roma in other countries of the region during this time: namely PRORROM in Colombia, established in 1999, ASOROM in Ecuador (in 2001), Union Romani de Colombia (in 2000), and heightened activity in Chile. To my knowledge, AICRA currently remains the only Romani NGO officially established in Argentina. On social media (Facebook) another Romani organization, by the name of Unión Gitana Universal (Universal Romani Union) and funded by Jorge Felipoff, is promoted as established in Buenos Aires but it remains inactive and has not been formally constituted.2 Colombia

Before the 1990s little had been known about Roma in Colombia: both the media and academia rarely took Roma as their subject of inquiry. Roma themselves preferred their invisible status and remained on the margins of social and political debates in the country. Roma did not represent a serious political or social issue, which explains why Roma have not been recognized as an ethnic minority nor have they been a target of policies until relatively recently. It was not until the process of Roma visibilization began, accompanied by various claims for recognition and special rights, that the public administration, as well as scholars and the broader majority society, began to turn their attention to the Colombian Roma. Eventually, the small size of the community and especially the initial lack of territorial claims on behalf of Roma facilitated the process of recognition of Roma as an ethnic minority. Prior to the 1990s there are no signs of Romani ethnic mobilization—no events aiming at “visibilization of Roma,” no political involvement, and no collective claims on behalf of this ethnic group. With the constitutional reforms of 1991, and the legal changes in the treatment of ethnic minorities, Roma found themselves facing a new political panorama—one which promoted cultural diversity and created a number of minority-specific opportunities and benefits. The beginning of ethnic mobilization among Roma can be traced back to the 1990s and was initiated by two non-Roma historians—Juan Carlos Gamboa and Hugo Paternina (Paternina Espinosa 2014). According to numer2 According to information I have gathered, this organization is promoted by the Yanchoni family, which originally came from Russia. Rumor has it that they were first established in France, then in Argentina, and have now settled in Spain. Despite the declared existence of this new Roma entity in Argentina, they have never engaged in any type of activity; the organization is also not formally registered.

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ous sources and confirmed in my interviews, these two scholars with previous experience in indigenous ethnic mobilization approached the Romani community in 1997 explaining that the new constitution created a framework of political opportunities for ethnic minorities which could be highly beneficial for Roma in Colombia (Lozano Uribe 2005; Paternina Espinoza et al. 2010; Paternina Espinoza 2014). This marks the beginning of the process of gradual socio-political involvement and ethnic activism among Roma (Acuña Cabanzo 2008). The first association, PRORROM (Proceso Organizativo del Pueblo Rom [Gitano] de Colombia), was initiated in 1998 by a group of young Roma together with non-Roma advisors: Juan Carlos Gamboa, Hugo Paternina, and Jairo Grisales Vallejo, the husband of a Romani woman from the kumpania in Bogota, who later became, for a brief period of time, the vice-coordinator of PRORROM. The non-Roma advisors were the driving force of the process; the association was created out of their initiative. Paternina’s dissertation narrates this process in extensive detail, describing the steps which led to the creation of PRORROM, its internal crises and changes in composition and leadership over the years (2014). According to the interviews with those who later became the leaders and spokespersons of PRORROM, prior to the involvement of Gamboa and Paternina, the Romani community had no ambitions or even consciousness of bringing the Romani issue to the public and policy spheres. With the help of Gamboa and Paternina, a handful of future Romani leaders gradually understood the historic opportunity which the Romani community was facing. Paternina and Gamboa brought the lessons learned from their prior involvement in the indigenous movements and encouraged the Roma to follow suit. They recruited two leaders—Venecer Gómez and later on his cousin Dalila— who were meant to lead the struggle and be the “faces” of the organization; Venecer Gómez became the coordinator of PRORROM. The main objective of PRORROM was to increase the visibility of Roma throughout the country as an ethnic minority which should be protected and promoted by the state, and which should enjoy the same treatment as other minorities in the country (Paternina Espinoza 2014). The non-Roma advisors helped to produce a number of texts (academic and otherwise) which helped the Roma validate their request. Until then, Roma had remained largely invisible in academic scholarship as well; thus, generating new, authoritative knowledge, as a justification of the Roma’s historical existence in the country, became a tactical step. Their efforts in raising awareness about Romani history and cul149

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ture quickly bore fruit: by 1999, resolution 0223 was passed by the Ministry of Interior, Ethnic Directorate Division, which recognized PRORROM as “an association of traditional authorities of the Roma people” and granted the extension of constitutional rights to Roma in symmetry with those enjoyed by other minorities in the country. During the 2000s, new structures and actors emerged, resulting in a plurality of voices. There are two Romani organizations which dominate the landscape: the already mentioned PRORROM, and the Unión Romani de Colombia (URC), established in 2000 and inscribed in the Ministry of Interior Registry # 087 (Paternina Espinosa 2014:185). The two organizations were created one after another; significantly, the second one was created somewhat in opposition to the first (Camilo and Cardona, 2010:106). These entities for some time have been the only formal entities representing Roma interests, giving them exclusive access to policy-making processes and a shared monopoly on the representation of Roma. The two organizations represent different Roma kumpeñy in Bogota city and are generally divided along family/clan lines (vitza). Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is a considerable overlap of kinship ties across families and organizations. For almost a decade these two organizations were the only operative and recognized Romani stakeholders which interacted with public administration and negotiated the granting of new concessions and affirmative action measures on behalf of the Romani community. However, towards the end of the decade, an additional type of actor obtained recognition, thanks to the lobbying of Roma themselves but granted by the power of a legal decree. In 2010, traditional territorial units of organization among Roma in Colombia—the kumpeñy— became recognized institutionally as legal representatives and stakeholders, enforced by the power of a decree of the Ministry of Interior (Decree 2957). As a result, 10 new actors become validated and acknowledged as mobilizing structures of the Roma associative movement in Colombia. A more detailed discussion of this unique institutional arrangement will be provided further on in this chapter. Spain

For Spanish Roma, the turning point for ethnic awakening and political mobilization was the period of the transition to democracy. With the death of Franco and the gradual democratization of the country, Roma faced the 3 Resolución 022, del 2 de setiembre de 1999.

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unprecedented opportunity of becoming active political subjects, discovering the potential of ethno-politics (Dietz 2003:75). Democracy gave Roma equal legal status as Spanish citizens, consecrated in the 1978 Constitution, and created a political opportunity to vocalize their interests through the right of association (article 22.1). Even though freedom of association had already been granted in the period during the dictatorship (“Law of Associations” 191/1964),4 for political reasons the associative movement began to flourish in years following the democratic transition. The birth of the Romani associative movement in Spain is directly related to the philanthropic work of the Catholic Church and the establishment of the Evangelical Church (Méndez 2005; San Román 1999). It is significant that the pro-Roma Church-sponsored associative movement preceded the Romani associative movement. The charitable involvement of the Catholic Church began in 1958 when Pope Pius XII established statutes for “moral and social assistance for the nomads” (García 1999; Méndez 2005). After that, the Church began working with Romani communities, especially in Spain, which eventually led to the creation of Church-related organizations, the so-called “Diocesan Secretariats for the Roma” (Secretariados Diocesanos Gitanos) (the first one created in Barcelona in 1966) and the National Secretariat of Roma Apostolate (Secretariado Nacional de Apostolado Gitano in 1968).”5 The latter with time evolved into the Fundación Secretariado Gitano (FSG, first as an association Asociación Secretariado General Gitano, created in 1982 and transforming into a foundation in 2001)—the biggest, most influential, and most powerful pro-Roma actor in Spain. The first genuinely Roma and independent (not Church-related) associations can be traced back to the 1970s. In Madrid, the first laic Romani organizations were founded already by the end of 1960s (Asociación de Desarrollo Gitano and Unión de Jóvenes Gitanos). According to Méndez, these organizations were connected to the anti-Franco movement and were clearly anticlerical (Méndez 2005:56). As of the 1970s, in the context of a general social awakening related to the weakening of the Franco regime, several Romani organizations appeared including a number of organizations with a national scope of activity: most notably, La Asociación de Desarrollo Gitano and La Asociación Nacional Presencia Gitana, both established in 1972 (and formally registered in 1979). From that moment on, a steady increase in the number of Romani 4 Ley 191/1964, de 24 de diciembre, de Asociaciones. See: https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOEA-1964-21491. 5 https://www.romarchive.eu/en/roma-civil-rights-movement/history-roma-associative-movement-spain/.

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associations can be observed throughout the country. With the gradual development of Roma-related policies with their corresponding public funds and the increased consciousness of the benefits of associative activism by the Romani leaders, the Romani NGOs experienced a rapid expansion in number. During this time, the role of Romani intellectuals, artists, and politicians was paramount in raising awareness around the situation of Roma and mobilizing institutional responses. A good example is “Camelamos Naquerar”—a theatre performance written by José Heredia Maya, the first Romani university professor and a poet, with choreography by Mario Maya, a famous Romani flamenco dancer—which premiered in Granada in 1976. “Camelamos Naquerar” denounced centuries of persecution of Roma and past and present injustices (in 1976, many of the repressive policies towards Roma were still in force). That same year, El Lebrijano (Juan Peña Fernández) published “Persecución”—a musical masterpiece with words by poet Felix Grande, which narrates the history of Spanish Roma. The proliferation of associations as a form of civic participation since the period of democratic transition has become common, not only among the Romani population but among Spanish citizens in general (Pérez Díaz and López Novo 2003), a phenomenon referred to as the “global solidarity boom” (Salamon 1994). In fact, civil society in Spain began to appear even prior to the death of General Franco—the weakening of the regime and especially the context of the 1973 global petrol crisis, which resulted in high unemployment and social strife, contributed to the gradual emergence of the so-called associations of neighbors (asociaciones de vecinos) of the movement of neighbors (movimiento vecinal) (Quintana and León 2008). In fact, many such local entities offered help and supported the birth of local Romani entities (Anna Mirga 2011a:47). During this time Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, the first Romani member of the Spanish Parliament elected in 1977, became an important figure of Romani politics and the Romani associative movement. As a participant of the 1971 World Roma Congress, and a founding member of the International Romani Union (IRU), Juan de Dios encouraged others to set up local Romani organizations. In 1986, he created the Unión Romaní Española (UR), the first national umbrella organization, and began publishing the only Roma bi-weekly newspaper, Nevipens Romani, which still exists today. As of the 1990s, Romani organizations began to grow considerably in number, leading to an “associative boom.” It is estimated that there were 141 Romani organizations registered already in 1987 (Ibarra 2007). Other sources indicate that between 1997 and 2004 the number of Romani associations grew from 200 to 152

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around 400 (Méndez, 2005). A similar trend can be witnessed in Spain among the general population where a considerable growth in the number of associations can be traced—in 1990, 113,065 associations were registered, and five years later that number had doubled to reach 206,363 (Fundación Encuentro 1996).6 According to some studies, there were as many as 362,654 non-profit entities registered in Spain by 2002 (Marbán Gallego and Rodríguez Cabrero 2008). Indeed, the conjuncture was favorable for the third sector to grow and flourish. Today, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of Romani organizations in Spain, as there is no reliable data; but undoubtedly, the Romani associative movement has grown exceptionally throughout the past decades. A search through the Register of Associations of the Ministry of Interior points to 1,198 Romani associations registered throughout the country.7 This number, however, may be inexact: Ȇ The number of registered Romani NGOs can in fact be greater as many organizations adopt various names without specifically referring to keywords used in the search (using, for example, words in Romani or Calo, such as Yag Bari). Ȇ Not all those registered may be founded and led by Roma. Often proRoma organizations adopt similar names to those used by Romani NGOs (for example, Fundación Secretariado Gitano or Asociación Enseñantes con Gitanos). Ȇ The registries do not have information about whether these entities still exist and operate in the field—given the high mortality rate of such entities it is possible that a percentage of organizations listed have ceased to exist. Another way of quantifying the number of Romani organizations in Spain is through the structures of federations. Currently, there are 14 regional federations in Spain and two national confederations (Unión Romaní and Platform Khetane). 6 Data shows, however, that Spain is a country with moderate levels of citizen participation in associations—varying between 31.5% (average for years between 1977–2002; membership of adults in associations ­[Fernandes 2012]) and 49% (1999–2002; “any type of involvement” in NGOs [Montero, Font, and Torcal 2006]). 7 The search engine of the Ministry of Interior: https://sede.mir.gob.es/nfrontal/webasocia.html. The keywords used in the search: “gitano” – 236; “gitana” – 803; “kalo” – 30; “kali” – 17; “gitanes” – 34; “gitans” – 3; “romani” – 75. All lists have been carefully reviewed to avoid duplication of the count and to exclude those results which did not correspond to the search. Nonetheless, it should be noted that such a search is orientative and may be inexact.

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Political opportunities and movement expansion

There is a general consensus among scholars that ethnic mobilization does not take place in a vacuum but rather is influenced by a number of external and contextual factors and circumstances. Thus, ethnic mobilization—the processes of its emergence and evolution over time—should not be treated as an independent and isolated event but rather should be analyzed in the context of broader political, historical, and legislative developments. The cases of Spain and Colombia suggest that Romani ethnic mobilization emerged in response to the environment which created opportunities and incentives for minority representation and participation. Nonetheless, there are traceable differences between both cases with regard to the emergence of Romani ethnic mobilization. In Spain, the emergence of Romani ethnic mobilization was preceded by the emergence of the so-called “Romani issue” in state policies and the parallel involvement of pro-Roma actors, whose activity aimed at attending to the needs and problems of the Romani community. Over time, and with the transition to democracy, Roma themselves began to forge a collective movement on their own by setting up Romani associations, gradually becoming recognized stakeholders. The expansion of the civil society sector in Spain as well as the gradual crystallization of state policies for Roma (including funding and participation opportunities which accompanied this process) contributed to the growth and proliferation of Roma civil society across the country. In contrast, the Colombian Romani ethnic mobilization emerged because of the shifting political and legislative context with regard to ethnic minorities’ recognition and treatment, paving the way for providing “symmetrical rights” to Colombian Roma. Contrary to the Spanish case, however, it was not until the process of the gradual visibilization of Romani communities in Colombian began, that the “Roma issue” became acknowledged in the spectrum of national state policies. It seems that for both of these cases, radical changes in political systems provided “political opportunities” for Roma to engage politically through ethnic mobilization. The transition to democracy in Spain and the creation of a new legal system by adopting a new Constitution in 1991 in Colombia opened “windows of opportunities” for Roma, creating favorable conditions for ethnic mobilization to emerge through formal structures. These findings point to the feasibility of political process perspective theory with regard to ethnic mobilization, leaving competing approaches such as the culturalist perspective, reactive ethnicity perspective, and resource mobilization perspective behind. 154

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Conversely, Argentina represents a completely different panorama. First, because Romani ethnic mobilization emerged not due to an apparent window of opportunity—while some legislative and discursive changes in the political environment can be identified—these shifts were not significant enough to produce a unique and unequivocal opportunity for Romani political representation. Rather, Roma in Argentina began the process of self-organization inspired by salient Romani organizations in other countries, in Latin America and Europe. Driven by examples from abroad, they sought support and recognition from the Argentinean government which was largely unsuccessful. Consequently, lack of recognition resulted in lack of visibility and resources—both private and public—that would support the growth of Romani ethnic mobilization. Finally, what is also significant is the limited involvement of non-Roma actors; in contrast to the case of Spain and Colombia, in Argentina ethnic mobilization was not preceded by Roma-focused activism of other agents, whether scholarly or philanthropic/humanitarian. Despite the size of the population, Roma continue to remain outside of the spectrum of mainstream public, political, academic, and civic discussions. The absence of incentives—for Romani community members themselves but also for pro-Roma actors and/or allies—led to a stagnation of the process; a situation that has already lasted for some years. In this sense, the case of Argentina should not be treated as an anti-thesis to the viability of political opportunities theory in explaining processes of ethnic mobilization. On the contrary—the lack of sufficiently strong shifts (i.e. opportunities) in Argentina, resulting in a lack of political achievement, the continued invisibility and marginality of the Roma, and insufficient resources, explains the stagnation of Romani ethnic mobilization in this country.

Panorama of Romani mobilizing structures: an overview Ethnic mobilization requires some degree of organization and institutionalization; after all, groups engage in collective struggles, not as individuals seeking individual benefits, but through a number of formal and informal vehicles or “mobilizing structures” which represent collective interests of the group (McAdam et al 1996; Kriesi 1996; McAdam et al. 2009; Kriesi et al. 2007). Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, formal and informal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996:3); activist networks, NGOs, political parties, but also religious institutions, private clubs, businesses or trade unions can become such vehicles of 155

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collective action. The choice of mobilizing structures is not accidental: leaders and activists must effectively choose mobilizing structures and successfully frame them as usable and appropriate to the social change which is desired. These framings are both internal—directed towards adherents and activists of the movement itself—and external—including bystanders, opponents, and authorities (McCarthy 1996). The type of mobilizing structures is also not independent from the context and the broader socio-political environment in each country. The constellation of structures and mechanisms through which citizen groups interact with the state becomes a blueprint for the Roma sector of the population to engage in collective struggles: the shape and form of civil society structures in each country, the formal and informal channels of participation and dialogue with the state, as well as legal and political practice are relevant factors which have influenced the Roma in the process of formation of ethnic mobilization structures. As the discussion below will demonstrate, the diversity of types of existing actors responds to a great extent to what March and Olsen refer to as the “logic of appropriateness”—the dynamic dependency of the institutional environment on the very type of actors which “do the mobilizing.” Below I will discuss the typology and topography of Romani actors in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain comparatively, demonstrating the similarities and striking differences between them. It is important to underline that in this chapter I will only focus on Romani actors—those mobilizing structures which are founded, led, and driven predominantly (although not exclusively) by Romani community members themselves. In this analysis, what is relevant for me is the Roma-led change and the principle of Romani leadership. The reader should bear in mind, however, that the landscape of Romani affairs in each country is to varying degrees occupied by other actors—pro-Roma organizations, charitable organizations, developmental agencies, or research centers. In some countries, and especially in Spain, the Romani actors are overpowered financially and politically by pro-Roma actors. Thus, the impact of the “pro-Roma microcosm” on Romani mobilizing structures needs to be considered. Typology and topography of Romani actors

NGOs as main drivers In the case of Romani ethnic mobilization in all three countries, NGOs are the dominant type of actors, legally registered and formally constituted as associations which operate on different levels and pursue a whole range of objectives and aims. 156

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The choice of NGOs as the main drivers of Romani ethnic mobilization is due to a number of reasons. First, there is a quite straightforward explanation: associations are among the most common and most accessible legally-constituted types of mobilizing structure in modern democracies. The very process of setting up associations requires little investment of time or money, and can generally be set up by a handful of individuals. Second, the state creates numerous incentives for Romani associative movements in both Spain and Colombia. The governmental administration searches for Romani interlocutors and/or “intermediaries” which would be a bridge between the grassroots communities and the public administration; it also provides spaces for dialogue and opportunities for direct involvement in policy-making processes through numerous fora of consultations and discussions. By acknowledging the existence of the diverse mobilizing structures of Romani representation, the state legitimizes them as the recognized and representative actors without having to interact directly with the communities. The inclusion of Romani representation also legitimizes policy processes and serves the purpose of outsourcing part of governmental responsibility to the Romani NGO sector. Third, and especially in Spain, the implementation of policies and Romaspecific measures is increasingly transferred from the level of national/ regional governments to the level of local administration, and most importantly, to non-state actors—non-governmental organizations and charitable entities. Despite the fact that the management and control over Roma policies must remain under the control of the public administration, “there are huge possibilities of sub-contracting and out-sourcing a broad range of activities included in the integrated activities” (Dietz 2003:63), making these nonstate actors not only relevant lobbying groups but also important intermediaries for the government on both national and regional levels. Consequently, since the early 1990s, a vast proportion of measures covered by regional and national plans for Roma are in fact sub-contracted, and thus implemented, by non-state actors. In other words, the state transfers part of its own responsibility to non-governmental actors, as for example in the case of social services. This dynamic can be traceable to a lesser extent in Colombia and Argentina, but spaces for dialogue, public consultation, and participation occupied by non-governmental stakeholders is also a visible pattern. Most importantly, this dynamic enables access to public funds, providing NGOs with resources for their operations. 157

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Finally, the expansion of NGOs as vehicles of social movements and/or ethnic mobilization is not unique to Roma. For the past few decades, the civil society sector has expanded considerably across the world. Different developments have contributed to this growth—among them the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and democratization in different regions across the world, disenchantment with economic, political, and social models, social yearning for togetherness, as well as embracement of the “deliberative democracy” discourse (Edwards 2009). Despite the idea that civil society contributes to “good governance” and is in fact a pillar of healthy democracy, numerous scholars problematize the reality of civil society functioning, pointing to internal paradoxes, un-democratic or un-civic mechanisms, and unexpected consequences of the participatory discourse (Kóczé 2012a; Edwards 2009; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Kóczé (2012a) but also Trehan and Sigona (2010) have been among those scholars who have demonstrated some of these dynamics with regards to Roma ethnic mobilization. How does this look in particular countries? In Spain, the previous experience of “associations of neighbors” and the gradual expansion of civil society (which some refer to as the “global solidarity boom” [Salamon 1994]) since the democratic transition, served as important reference points for Romani groups and as a blueprint for the purpose of Romani collective struggles. In the absence of other mechanisms of minority representation (such as ethnic political parties or minority self-governments, etc.) the Romani associations became the only viable structures which would serve the purpose of representing the collective interests of the Romani population in Spain. Romani organizations are well-rooted in the community: data from a study conducted in Barcelona in 2000 suggests that between 38.01–39% of Roma declare themselves as belonging to some type of NGO (for Badalona 21% declared participation); over 50% of Roma do not participate in any type of association (Garriga 2000, 2003). Data from 2006 also confirms these findings—in the Catalonia region, 51.57% of Roma do not participate in any Romani NGOs (Fundació Pere Tarrés 2006). In Galicia, a study revealed higher levels of non-participation, around 79% in 2002 (Méndez 2005:66). The available data also shows that Roma who participate in civil society would rather do so in Romani NGOs than any other type of structure—across regions, based on available data, the level of Romani participation in non-Roma NGOs does not exceed 5% (Méndez 2005). Nonetheless, the majority of Roma do not participate in any organization at all (Unió Romani 1994; Fundació Pere Tarrés 158

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2006). It should also be noted that the level of civic engagement increases proportionally among those considered to be part of the “middle class Roma,” that is, those considered “integrated” and with higher levels of education (Méndez 2005:64). Finally, it is argued that “the rate of citizen participation is lower amongst Gitanos than in the population as a whole” (Laparra and Macías 2009:233). Many Romani organizations tend to fulfill various roles at the same time: as representative organizations, as service-providing entities, and as self-help groups (or service-providing organizations with direct outreach and participation of the constituency). This is significantly more present in the case of Spain, where Romani mobilizing structures have proliferated and multiplied, becoming important service-providing stakeholders and fulfilling the criteria of socalled “hybrid organizations” (Minkoff 2002; Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005; S. R. Smith 2014). Since the early 2000s we can notice an increase in scholarship on the so-called “hybrid organizations” or “hybrid multi-purpose organizations,” which are characterized by four interrelated attributes: a. they set out as their mission to uphold and promote cultural values that are typically at variant with dominant and institutionalized values; b. they offer services to members and the public that express their distinct values, using the services as a model and catalyst for social change; c. in addition to their instrumental goals, they aim to meet the expressive and social identity needs of their members by promoting a collective identity; and d. they evolve into hybrid organizations by having multiple purposes— combining to various degrees goals of value change, service provision and mutual-aid (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2006:97). The emergence of such hybrid structures also reflects the shifting relationship between social movements and the state, moving from contention towards accommodating such actors in the context of deliberation, co-ordination, and partnership with the state (Minkoff 2002). This is not so much the case in Colombia as the two existing Romani associations rarely act as service-providers or implement projects that in any way mimic the responsibilities of the state administration. Rather, activities in Colombia are limited more to showcasing Romani arts and culture, promoting visibility of the Roma in public spaces, and, especially, participating in decision-making processes on behalf of the Romani population. Nonetheless, and 159

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despite these similarities, the two organizations present slightly different profiles. PRORROM is more focused on political advocacy, and has established more links with Romani organizations abroad, while URC acts more on the local level and emphasizes cultural activities and projects rather than politics. According to Paternina: “The trajectory of both organizations and leaderships has allowed them to have different experiences and developments, especially because, while the Romani Union has focused its action only in the Bogota kumpania, PRORROM has a national vocation and a strong presence in the international and dialogue spaces with the pan-Roma world movement.” (Paternina Espinosa 2014:799). Furthermore, significantly both organizations, now with considerable histories of operations, were founded and are active in the capital city. Thus, their interaction with public administration is restricted to either central government structures or municipal public administration. The capital city provides more opportunities to become engaged through formal channels of participation—mainly through input provided to public administration with regards to Roma. In Argentina, in the absence of any established channels of participation available to Roma or institutional structures of representation, creating an NGO seemed like the only viable choice of mobilizing structures. AICRA— the only existing Romani organization—is a small organization: since 2009 they do not have an office and consequently have little community outreach. Due to limited staff and network of local collaborators, AICRA struggles with finding sustainability and continuity of their activities and actions. The lack of a corresponding infrastructure, as well as governmental support (or that of other non-governmental donors) causes inconsistency and the lack of a sustainable long-term vision and strategy. Consequently, AICRA has had periods of dynamic activity and visibility, often corresponding to a favorable governmental conjuncture, and other periods of inactivity. What is significant in this context is that a limited number of Roma from other groups than the Kalderash are involved in its work. Individual collaborators from the Calo group or the Boyash have been involved at different points in time; this, however, has not translated into a more structured and collective cross-community dialogue. There is also limited direct community involvement due, in part, to lack of awareness of political representation through NGOs. Jorge Bernal argues that Roma see NGOs and political involvement as “something strange”; Romani organizations are often criticized, especially by the elders (like the Romani Kriss) or by the Evangelical Church authorities (Bernal 2003:35). 160

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Formal politics and Romani actors In a way, the proliferation of structures of civil society, mainly through NGO-type organizations, should also be seen as evidence of the inability of Romani interest groups to influence political processes through formal politics, for example through Romani political parties or Romani politicians in mainstream political parties. Consequently, structures outside of the realm of formal politics—the NGOs—have become the only viable vehicles which can feed into policy-making processes through secured mechanisms of consultation and the involvement of civil society actors. Some scholars argue that this is a process characteristic of new social movements and, more broadly, of the emergence of a new type of governance, especially in Europe (della Porta 2001). Evidence shows that the weakening of political parties and the salience of more complex forms of governance have made way for a practice in which social movements and/or interest groups are given space for participation and resources by the state, moving away from contention towards co-option and co-operation (ibid.). The expansion of the practice of “deliberative democracy,” especially in Europe but also in some countries of Latin America, provides additional background to further understand these developments. In Spain, ethnic political parties are not a viable strategy to represent political interests of minority groups—the national electoral law8 is based on territorial division into 52 provinces, and the system of allocating seats uses the so-called D’Hondt method (a highest-averages method for allocating seats in party-proportional representation). Ultimately, the law benefits large political parties but for smaller actors it is very difficult to pass the 3% electoral threshold. Under current legislation, the possibility of an electoral success of a Romani political party is virtually impossible. Despite this, there are past experiences of Roma forming ethnic political parties. Partido Nacionalista Caló (Roma Nationalistic Party, PNCA) was formed in 1999 as a political party of national scope. Funded by Maríano Fernández, along with other 18 founding members in Barcelona, it declared itself as a party representing political rights of all Roma in Spain. As declared by its founder, the creation of the party was greatly influenced by the Evangelical Church. The PNCA participated in the national general elections in 2000 and in 2004, with marginal results (in 2000 PNCA received 1331 8 Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General, see: http://noticias.juridicas.com/ base_datos/Admin/lo5-1985.html

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votes; in 2004 only 757).9 PNCA also presented some candidates in municipal elections in 2007 and 2011, without success. In 2004, another Roma political party was formed by Agustín Vega in Badajoz, Partido Alianza Romani (Party Roma Alliance, ARO), which was also set up as a national political party. The main aim of this political formation was to represent Romani communities in the political arena, and to push for recognition of the Romani people in the Spanish Constitution, as well as to adopt a Law on Ethnic Minorities or a Statute of the Romani People (Estatuto del Pueblo Gitano)—legislation which would explicitly recognize Roma as a historical ethnic minority in Spain and grant them special rights (Vega Cortés 2004). ARO planned to present their candidates during the municipal and regional elections of 2007, but without success. Both parties remained marginal to the mainstream political currents and, in fact, to Romani ethnic mobilization in Spain; today these parties have ceased to function although they are still formally inscribed into the registries of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to Aguilera, 95% of Romani politicians have some link with Romani associations or Romani platforms (Aguilera Cortés 2000). A different strategy of political representation of Romani interests is through mainstream political parties, or more specifically, through politicians of Romani background who join these formations. However, the participation of Roma in mainstream political parties has also been rather scarce. According to some data, it is estimated that between 1978–2003 a total of 40 Romani representatives were candidates in political elections throughout Spain, out of which two were candidates in regional elections, one in national elections, and the remaining candidates in municipal elections (Fundació Pere Tarrés 2006:272); however, only a handful were successfully elected. A limited number of Romani politicians have managed to successfully integrate into political party structures, and a limited number of candidates have been successful during elections, even in municipalities or regions with a significant Romani population. This demonstrates that Roma are yet to dominate the game of formal politics and convince mainstream political parties of the political leverage—and electoral potential—dormant within the confines of the Romani community. In Colombia, due to the small size of the population, Roma are marginal in terms of a distinctive electorate and therefore it is unlikely that their civic 9 http://es.partidos-politicos.wikia.com/wiki/Partido_Nacionalista_Cal%C3%B3.

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participation will transform into formal political structures of representation such as political parties. The only possibility of entering formal politics is on behalf of a mainstream political party. To date, this has occurred only once,10 when Dalila Gómez became a candidate for the Senate in the 2006 National Elections (on behalf of the Polo Democrático Alternativo political party). Due to the limited electoral power of Roma, and a low place on the list (29th position), Dalila was not elected to the Senate. Dalila herself revealed that she had no illusions about her success in the elections—rather, this was an important exercise in political and social visibility of Roma in Colombia, and a tactical step in providing more strength and visibility to Romani claims. In Argentina, there are no such experiences. There has been not one Romani candidate standing for elections in mainstream political parties; there have also been no attempts at creating ethnic parties in Argentina. Since the 1990s, among the multiple political parties, coalitions, and alliances there is a strong tendency towards decentralization creating a possibility towards locallevel political engagement. Nonetheless, there are no successful ethnic political parties in Argentina. For Roma, despite the considerable size of the Romani population and its regional centralization, due to the lack of visibility of Roma and scarce structures of self-organization, the electoral potential of Roma is marginal and underdeveloped. Traditional leadership structures—the exceptional case of Colombia Historically, the Roma have developed their own structures of social organization, representation, and leadership which include diverse mechanisms of decision-making and conflict resolution (A. Fraser 1995; Andrzej Mirga and Mróz 1994; Anna Mirga 2015; Guy 2013; Ficowski 2013). In many contemporary Romani communities, especially those which can be considered as more traditional, these structures have prevailed and continue to function. Whether through the figure of Baro Sero or Sero Rom (as among Polish Romani communities), the Romani Kriss (existing not only among some Eastern European Roma but also among many countries of Latin America, including Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil), quasi-like “monarchies,” Bulibasha or Vajda leaders, or the Council of Elders, these structures of traditional authority and leadership continue to influence the lives of Romani families. They tend to contrast with or are juxtaposed against the non-Roma structures of leadership and 10 When this manuscript was being finalized, in September 2021 Dalila Gómez again stood for elections to the Senate in Colombia, this time with the party Fuerza Ciudadana.

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representation which have been adopted by Roma from the majority societies (Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997). Sometimes, these two types of structures—“traditional” and “civic”—are positioned in opposition to each other, establishing a somewhat arbitrary dichotomy (Anna Mirga 2015; Project on Ethnic Relations 2001). There are, however, instances where these two types of structures overlap and are acknowledged as legitimate stakeholders and representatives by the public administration. Roma in Colombia are organized territorially through kumpeñy. This is a traditional social structure ascribed to a specific territory, created by a network of two or more vitzas (clans), and based on the principle of family ties (patrilineal and with a strong tendency towards patri-locality). These traditional social structures have become formally and institutionally recognized by the Colombian Ministry of Interior—Decree 2957 (2010)—and have been formally registered: they acquire a fiscal number, similar to an NGO or an association, which allows the kumpeñy to apply for public funding. The same decree created a formal definition11 and included a list of ten legally recognized kumpeñy throughout the country. The decree delineates the procedure for elections of official legal representatives and the registration of each kumpania under national law. This remarkable institutional arrangement—arguably unique throughout the world—is a reflection of the exceptional legal recognition of ethnic minority organizational structures. Thus, the fact that traditional structures of social organization and leadership have become officially registered and acquired formally recognized status is not limited to the case of Roma. This follows a trend in Colombia, in which the law recognizes the traditional social structures of leadership of ethnic minorities. The legal framework, and especially the recognition of ethnic groups and the corresponding transposition into laws and policies of provisions granted by the Colombian Constitution, provided a different set of opportunities for emerging Romani ethnic mobilization to those in Spain. The recognition of traditional structures of leadership of ethnic groups and the principle of self-determination allowed for the formal recognition and de facto institutionalization of kumpeñy as legally constituted entities representing local Romani communities throughout the coun11 “Kumpania (plural kumpañy): The set of family groups, patrilineally configured (patri-groups) that, based on alliances of various kinds, choose to share spaces to live near or to itinerate together. In Colombia, they are generally located at specific sites in urban centers or major and intermediate cities of the country”—art. 4.2.a of Decree 2957 (2010).

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try, which exist and operate alongside the Romani organizations (PRORROM and URC). The type of “mobilizing structures” of Romani ethnic mobilization resembles those of other ethnic groups—for example, indigenous people in Colombia organize around NGOs and associations (the largest such organization is the Organización Nacional Indigena de Colombia, ONIC) as well as through numerous formally recognized traditional structures of leadership and representation (cabildos). The merging of “traditional” with civic structures of representation and leadership is unprecedented. In Spain, I am aware of only one somewhat similar example which, nonetheless, is an isolated case. In Catalonia, the traditional Council of Elders (a Romani Kriss of Gitano communities) has been institutionalised as a local NGO, performing a traditional role as mediators and judges of internal conflicts while also participating in consultation meetings and other policy-related processes. El Consell D’Ancians (Consejo de Ancianos/Council of Elders) is federated under Federació d’Asociacions Gitanes de Catalunya (Federation of Roma Associations in Catalonia, FAGIC) as the Associació per a la Convivència i Civisme del Poble Gitano (the Association for the Coexistence and Citizenship of Roma People) and is also a separate sub-body of FAGIC. In instances of conflict, the council can be convoked to mediate and search for a solution. Nonetheless, more often than not, calling on the Council of Elders typically takes place outside of these formalities and operates independently from the association. In Argentina, among Kalderash Roma the Romani Kriss, which operates in a similar manner as the above-described Council of Elders, is a traditional structure which continues to function and whose authority is recognized. Even so, it is not formally constituted but rather convoked ad hoc when mediation and/or conflicts need to be resolved. It does not have an official status and is not recognized as a legitimate stakeholder or representative entity on behalf of the community in its interactions with the state. Evangelical Church—an emerging actor? Across the world, the Evangelical movement has conquered the hearts and minds of numerous Romani communities,12 altering traditional patterns of Roma social organization and leadership (Marushiakova and Veselin 1999; Méndez López 2005; Podolinská and Hrustič 2011). Not only in the case 12 Most notably in Iglesias Evangélicas de Filadelfia (the Philadelphia Evangelical Churches), but also the Jehovah’s Witnesses and others.

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of the Evangelical movement, but also among a variety of religious constellations ranging from Muslim to diverse Christian denominations, Romani individuals are ascending to positions of religious power. Often Roma religious leaders reach beyond their spiritual competencies to engage in social action, community initiatives, and self-help programs, combining their roles of religious and community/civic leaders. But the Evangelical Church has been by far the most rapidly ascending force within Romani communities across the world. In the context of Spain, it is impossible to analyze the process of birth of the Romani associative movement without acknowledging the important role of the Evangelical Church (the so-called “culto,” the cult, the worship). As argued by Teresa San Román, “in the context of the 60’s, the Pentecostal movement and the Roma associations movement, arise almost simultaneously” (San Román 1999). Indeed, the Evangelical movement spread rapidly among Roma. The first Roma Evangelical Church was created in 1968 in Balaguer (Cantón Delgado 2014) and over time the Evangelical faith expanded rapidly throughout the country. According to available data, in 1978, 91% of the Romani population declared themselves to be Catholic; in 1980 the number had fallen to 81%. Over the next twenty years, the Evangelical movement developed dynamically as more Roma converted: in 2000, 55.7% of Roma declared themselves as belonging to the Evangelical Church; in 2003 already 72.3% of the Romani population declared themselves Evangelical. The number of Roma Evangelical Churches also rose from 50 in 1973 to 800 in 1999 (Méndez, 2005:122). Today there are over 1,300 Roma Evangelical Churches and over 6,500 Roma pastors throughout the country (Cantón Delgado 2014). Likewise, the dynamic expansion of the Evangelical Church in Latin America is a general trend across the continent and has been an object of academic inquiry, including the case of Argentinean Roma (Carrizo-Reimann 2011). The Evangelical movement was initiated by the Moldovan Kalderash Rom Ricardo Papadopolus,13 who converted in the 1970s and established the first church in 1982 (Iglesia Evangélica Misionera Bíblica Rom). In the early 1990s the Roma Kalderash community in Buenos Aires bought a piece of land and constructed their temple. To date, there are 6 Roma Evangelical temples in Buenos Aires and 18 throughout Argentina (Carrizo-Reimann 2011). They work as independent entities but are connected with other Churches interna13 By other accounts, it was Juan Kalmykoff of the Yanchoni clan who initiated the Evangelical movement in Argentina—or both of them together.

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tionally—the Argentinian temples are organized in a committee which represents the Argentinian diaspora in international congregations. Similar to Kalderash Roma, Calo Roma in Argentina are also part of the Evangelical Church, however, they are organized around Iglesias de Filadelfia—a different branch of the Evangelical diaspora, which, nonetheless, traces the same origin to the French pastor Le Cossec who converted the first Roma during the 1960s. The Evangelical pastors (there are currently around 20 Roma pastors dispersed throughout the country) emerged as important community leaders, not only in what concerns spiritual affairs, but also outside of their religious competencies. Nevertheless, they do not exhibit any political or civic ambitions. The Churches and AICRA rarely collaborate, as they consider that “their political and religious tasks [are] not compatible” (CarrizoReimann 2011). The pastors see no benefit in socio-political activism like the kind represented by AICRA—there are no urgent problems which they cannot resolve independently from the authorities; they are economically well off and are typically distrustful of authorities and governmental procedures. There are no foreseeable specific benefits of such activism—and often they even see it as potentially conflicting. In Colombia, too, the vast majority of Roma have converted to the Evangelical Church (some also joined the Jehovah’s Witnesses)—a number of Roma pastors are currently being trained; there is also one recognized Romani woman pastor in Envigado (Antioquia). It should be noted that there are a number of different Evangelical Churches attended by Colombian Roma. At least in Bogota, there is a strong distinction between those who attend “nonRoma churches” (meaning those led and attended by non-Roma), in which religious services are conducted in Spanish, and those who attend “Roma Churches,” in which religious services are conducted by Roma and in Romani. These latter, Romani, churches maintain strong contacts of collaboration with other Romani Churches across the continent. The Roma Evangelical Churches also construct extensive networks of collaboration across cities, regions, countries, and even continents, making them the largest formal structures among Roma. Although the Church tends to be concerned exclusively with its spiritual duties, it is also an important platform for exchange and cooperation across countries. In Colombia, the religious leaders are not interested in socio-political struggles and thus remain marginal for ethnic mobilization at the moment. However, it should be considered that in some other countries, the Church has also become an active mobilizing force, and occasionally has become involved in socio-political issues. The presence 167

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and impact of the Church among Roma and its potential relevance for ethnic mobilization should not be overlooked. In Latin America, the Roma Evangelical Churches tend to operate independently from Romani associative movements and maintain themselves at the margin of political processes; they see their role as spiritual leaders and organizers of the community but not as political stakeholders or representatives. In Spain, however, the situation is slightly different. Initially, the Roma Evangelical Churches operated independently from the Romani associative movement, serving solely the purpose of spiritual community leadership and service. With time, however, some Romani churches began to establish religious associations, formally registered, which allowed them to access public funding. Nonetheless, since 2001 in Andalusia, and later on in Catalonia, the Romani evangelical associative movement has begun to crystallize through the Federation of Cultural Christian Associations in Andalusia (FACCA), and in Catalonia through the Federación de Asociaciones Culturales Cristianas de Cataluña (FACCAT, later called Agape) defined as the “social arm” of the Evangelical Church (Cantón Delgado 2014). FACCA is a federation of ethno-political and religious character which gathers all Churches which have decided to create parallel associations, in order to foster spaces of socio-political engagement and to obtain public funding destined indirectly to the Roma Evangelical Churches; FACCA gathers together over “170 congregations (…) which have formed their corresponding associations and registered them formally” (Cantón Delgado 2013). Over time, FACCA became an important stakeholder in Roma affairs—in 2010 they managed a budget of over 2,000,000 euros (Cantón Delgado and Gil Tébar 2011); FACCA is also a member of the State Council for the Roma. Undoubtedly, the Evangelical Churches have emerged as rising stakeholders with increasing influence not only over Romani communities but also over Roma policymaking. In some respect, they have been able to escape many of the pitfalls facing existing Romani organizations: they are generally better organized, are self-financed, and are independent of the state; they are also more presented, have greater impact in the every-day lives of Roma, and have a much greater mobilization capacity than any other Romani NGO. More importantly, they maintain strong networks of collaboration, exchange, and mutual support, not only within the limits of the countries where they operate, but regionally and increasingly globally. Large-scale congregations of Romani evangelical churches, some gathering various thousands of attendees, have been taking place across the world, and especially among the Spanish-speaking 168

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communities. The power and influence of the Evangelical Churches is a potentially valuable and precious resource for the Romani political movement. Yet, civic and political leaders are yet to find a way of bringing together these actors around the same specific—and political—goals. The important role of religious institutions for social movement building should not be underestimated. Already in the mid-1980s Aldon Morris powerfully explained the role of the so-called “Black Churches” which provided an institutional center to the black civil rights movement in the United States.

Leadership and composition patterns The role of leaders is paramount in shaping group identity and interests, as well as determining the strategies and resources used in collective action; the type and quality of leadership are determinant for the potential success of mobilization (Ganz 2010; Vermeersch 2006; Doug McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2009). Groups striving for social change need credible leaders who represent the collective claims of their people and who often act as indispensable intermediaries between their community and those in positions of power, and some research suggests that organizations with more skilled and committed leaders have higher levels of political presence (Han et al. 2011). In the case of Roma, what are the evident patterns of leadership and composition of Romani actors? Some similarities can be identified. The concept of community “is based on the idea of members complying with a particular, sometimes quite rigid, set of norms” (Belton, 2009:7) which determines the context in which individuals act. The Romani community, like many other European societies, is based on hierarchical relations organized, among other factors, around age and gender, in which the elder men are traditionally power holders and the highest authority (A. Fraser 1995). In fact, the interviews revealed that when asked to define the key elements of Romani identity, the respondents always mentioned the principle of respect towards the elders (known as “Phuriphen” among Romani speaking communities) as essential (Anna Mirga 2014). Scholars also argue that traditionally, in the majority of Romani communities the elders hold power (Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Andrzej Mirga and Mróz 1994; Project on Ethnic Relations 2001) and the social structure of communities is typically based on extended family ties. It should be noted, however, that research drawing on ethnography increasingly challenges the archaic or 169

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simplistic view of Romani social organizations, especially in urban contexts (Lagunas 2002, 2010b). Nonetheless, when analyzing the patterns of leadership in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain, the dominant position of men, especially of and above a certain age, within Romani organizations becomes evident. In this sense, Romani ethnic mobilization is men-driven. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the leadership is “traditional” or reflects “a traditional social organization” among Roma. Rather, evidence shows that Romani leadership is much more complex, pluralistic, fluid, and intertwined; and consequently, drawing a clear-cut typology is challenging. In Colombia, although the legal representatives of the kumpeñy are assumed to represent traditional structures of organization (and thus reflect traditional leadership), the evidence gathered during fieldwork clearly shows that the reality within the communities is different; often the individuals assuming the role of legal representatives are not those who enjoy the greatest respect and authority within each kumpania. In Spain, on the other hand, we see different types of leadership in which informal community power or authority does not necessarily overlap with leadership (presidency) over local associations. The salience of religious leadership within Spanish Romani communities adds an additional layer to the analysis of leadership and authority among Roma. Secondly, over time Romani leadership has diversified greatly and new patterns of community leadership have emerged outside of the political and NGO spectrums and beyond the so-called traditional leadership. Consequently, the patterns of leadership have become much more complex and may include a combination of different social roles and positions, with various degrees of overlapping between them (social, political, “traditional,” religious). Furthermore, increasingly a diversification of leadership profiles in Romani ethnic mobilization can be observed, most notably with the salience of women’s and youth organizations. Romani women’s and, more recently, Romani youth organizations have emerged as distinct branches of Romani ethnic mobilization, which articulate a separate identity as organizations representing specific sectors of the Romani population and their distinct collective interests. In Colombia, while the kumpeñy are run and dominated by men, the two Bogota-based NGOs are run and led by women. In fact, Romani women have played active roles as agents and civic leaders; they have occupied the key positions and have been the most visible Romani representatives, participating in meetings and political consultations. 170

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In Spain, the first Romani women’s association was created in 1989— Asociación de Mujeres Gitanas Romi (Association of Romani Women Romi), established in Granada—with Maria Dolores Fernández Fernández as its president. Soon after its creation, Romi began to organize annual Romani Women’s Seminars in Granada (the first in 1991), which gathered large numbers of Romani men and women to discuss collectively working towards the empowerment of Romani women. These meetings resulted in the creation of other Romani women’s organizations in different localities across Spain. The emergence of Romani women’s organizations and their dynamic development was a novelty at the time. The first Spanish Romani women’s organizations were also pioneers at the European level; Kamira, the first national federation of Romani women’s organizations in Spain (founded in 1999), was one of the first such organizations in Europe. The salience of Romani women’s and youth organizations inevitably challenges the dominant role and leadership of Romani men, contributing to further pluralizing patterns of Romani ethnic mobilization leadership and authority. With regards to the composition of Romani actors, the vast majority of Romani organizations are run and established by a small circle of likeminded individuals with common goals and shared ideas. They are constituted by a small circle of activists who regularly engage in activities. There are a limited number of people who maintain dialogue with public administration entities, regularly attend meetings, and participate in consultations. Beyond that, there is a broader circle of participating individuals who do not necessarily engage actively in policy-making processes and consultations, but who participate in organized activities, for example during festivals or intercultural events. Over time, some of these activities have grown in size and number. Finally, it is important to highlight that there is a general lack of membership-based organizations, which further hinders accountability and the ownership of local communities towards their leaders and organizations which claim to represent them. Although most Roma actors have a legal personality of associations, implying the possibility of membership, genuine membership structures, which include grassroots local communities, remain a rarity. Arguably, the lack of membership-based organizations is among the factors which contribute to weak structures built around Romani entities. These findings further demonstrate the limited capacity of Romani mobilizing structures to act as social movement organizations (SMOs). Rather than focusing on mobilizing communities, they act as representatives of Romani collective interests. 171

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Multiple voices: Between fragmentation and consolidation Ethnic mobilization should not be understood as a process driven by single actors operating independently of each other. Rather, ethnic mobilization is the totality of actions of and by Romani actors across a wide spectrum of objectives, claims, activities, actions, and strategies. I understand ethnic mobilization as a web—an intricate field of interactions among and across existing actors. These relationships are essential for understanding the outcomes and limitations of individual mobilizing structures but also of the collective ethnic mobilization within each country. Given the diversity of actors it is important to analyze these actors within a broader frame of ethnic mobilization (Willems and Jegers 2012); after all, it is the ethnic mobilization that should be considered the unit of analysis and not the individual actors which compose it. Thus, when speaking about the Romani associative movement in each country, it is important to look into the relationship which these organizations have with each other. A proliferation of Romani NGOs does not necessarily point to the maturity of a Romani associative movement, but may often be a sign of internal fragmentation (Vermeersch 2006). As the number of mobilizing structures in the movement grows, a process of consolidation may be necessary in order to avoid internal atomization and diffusion of interests and claims voiced by different actors. The level of maturity of an ethnic movement can therefore be “measured,” not only by its proliferation, but more importantly, by the degree of internal cohesion and the existence of common goals or actions, which consolidate the diverse actors of the Romani ethnic movement. Ganesh and Stohl (2014), relying on previous research (Shumate, Fulk, & Monge 2005), argue that there are two dimensions to the relationship between organizations acting in the same field: symbiosis and commensalism. The main variable in this model is the level of competition for resources between the actors. Thus, symbiosis describes cooperative relationships between organizations that do not compete for the same resources while commensalism is a relationship in which organizations can potentially compete with each other for the same funding. They further argue that the scholarship is still weak in conceptualizing the relationship and instances of conflict and contention within organizations of social movements or between them (Ganesh and Stohl 2014). In the case of Romani ethnic mobilization, the entities composing the movement are inevitably in a commensal relationship to each other—acting within the same field and in competition with each other for limited, mostly 172

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state-provided resources. This competition at times leads to rivalry and internal tensions, not only between the Roma and non-Roma/pro-Romani actors, but also among the Romani actors themselves (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018a). The existence of these tensions is yet another argument for the need for consolidation in order to overcome instances of conflicts, but also to avoid duplication and overlap in areas of activity and action. Moreover, the shrinking field for Romani actors vis-à-vis the growing “pro-Roma microcosm,” especially in Europe, results in the struggle for grants and affects the relationship which Romani organizations establish with each other. As the space becomes increasingly more competitive and resources are limited, the Romani organizations necessarily enter into competition also with each other—this often results in tensions, even rivalry, among Romani organizations, hinders the potential for consolidation and strategic alignment of Romani actors, and ultimately weakens the potential leverage of Romani civil society as a whole. On the other hand, it should be highlighted that the existence of diverse voices and divergent goals, strategies, and approaches is only natural. A plurality of voices and actors should not be evaluated negatively per se, but rather what should be analyzed is the capacity to form broader coalitions and engage in coordinated alliances among diverse actors to advance with the broader collective aims of the movement. In Argentina, the underdevelopment of Romani ethnic mobilization makes the problem of internal consolidation still anticipatory. It is not the case, however, for Colombia and Spain. My research in both countries shows that consolidation is a challenging process. There is a traceable level of internal fragmentation; Romani actors are often in competition with each other over funding, dominant voice, leadership, or territory. The fact that the state legitimizes some leaders over others or engages in favoritism fosters dissent and internal rivalry. The inner conflicts and tension between some Romani stakeholders is acknowledged by representatives of public administration that have been interviewed during fieldwork. They have often raised this issue, pointing to various consequences which such in-fighting has for the process of consultation and implementation. Fragmentation of the Romani associative movement, and most notably the occasional rivalries, damage the reputation of Romani actors as reliable and legitimate partners, not only in the eyes of the state but also in their relationship with their own constituencies. Furthermore, fragmentation leads to a diffusion of collective interests and the existence of divergent, even competing, claims, undermining their collective capacity for joint action. The multi173

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ple Romani actors in each territory14 often lack strategic alignment in terms of defining specific goals, crafting collective messages, and engaging in common action, especially on a national scale. I would differentiate between two types of spaces where consolidation does take place—one is the organic and self-generated space, led and established by Roma independently of the structures of public administration. The other is the “invited space” generated and hosted by public administration, through national-level consultative bodies or networks. On the one hand, Romani actors come together independently. In Spain, the process of consolidation took on a regional rather than national shape. The choice of forming regional rather than national federations has its logic—Spain is a highly decentralized country, in which 17 Autonomous Communities enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. In practice, competence in key areas such as education, culture, civil and administrative law, social welfare, and others is granted exclusively to autonomous governments. Consequently, Romani organizations interact to a much greater degree with regional governments than with the central government, and their potential for political leverage lies in their ability to successfully lobby the corresponding regional structures of power. Furthermore, many autonomous communities (such as Catalonia, Andalusia, and the Basque Country) have established their regional interdepartmental plans targeting Roma (Bereményi and Mirga 2012), which directly affects the situation of communities within that region. Sometimes, as Romani organizations grew in number and state policies for the Roma expanded, the public administration increasingly sought partners who would assist the governments in their implementation. Thus, the Romani organizations, encouraged by the administration, began to form federations, claiming greater representativeness and monopolizing the channels of partnership with the public administration bodies. While the process of consolidation of Romani actors on a regional level became widespread and remains a common practice, the same cannot be said about consolidation on a national scale. For over two decades, there was only one Roma national umbrella organization in Spain—Unión Romaní (UR), founded in 1986. There were other Romani organizations which claimed to operate on a national scale, however, only Unión Romaní was a federation, which brought together mem14 The scale of this growth in Spain is remarkable. Romani actors have multiplied in the context of specific territorial units such as a municipality or a region. For example, in Reus (Catalonia) there are reportedly 1,289 Roma (Fundació Pere Tarrés 2006:48), however, there are at least 5 Romani organizations registered in the city; in Tortosa (Catalonia) there are reportedly 494 Roma (Fundació Pere Tarrés 2006:48), and at least 3 Roma associations; Badalona (Catalonia) has over 3,000 Roma and 10 registered associations.

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ber organizations (Llopis 2003). UR, as a national federation, claims 94 federated associations “and over 18,800 members” (Unión Romaní 2014) and is the largest Romani organization in the country in terms of revenue as well ( in 2014, its budget was over 2,000,000 euros). Another national umbrella organization— bringing together numerous regional federations under a unique body—was created in September 2012 under the name Plataforma Khetane. Founded by regional federations and associations (currently Khetane has 23 member organizations), it claims to represent hundreds of Romani associations (through its federated structures) from all over the country. In Colombia, the question of internal consolidation among all existing actors has been more delayed. On the one hand, one of the Romani NGOs— PRORROM—has the ambition to act as a type of “umbrella organization,” claiming representativeness as a type of “national organization” due to its important role in the institutionalization of kumpeñy. Nonetheless, currently their self-proclaimed status as an “umbrella organization” has been contested. The lack of consolidation among Roma is made evident especially considering the fact that currently no platform exists which would bring together all of these actors in order to resolve internal disputes, develop a common agenda and collective goals, and establish a shared vision and a singular narrative. On the other hand, Romani actors are often brought together by public administration which seeks dialogue with multiple stakeholders instead of engaging with them separately and bilaterally. Authorities create so-called “invited spaces” (Cornwall 2004) through consultative bodies or platforms. Permanent and durable but also ad hoc and temporary consultative bodies, committees, and meetings have been created in both countries, through which the Roma can engage in dialogue regarding the issues affecting them, and through which negotiations can take place. In Spain, consultative bodies for Roma have been created on different levels of administration—ranging from municipal to national. The first such body was the Municipal Council for Roma in Seville, established in 1984; since then, multiple similar structures have been convened by local town halls across Spain. On the national level, the State Council for the Roma (Consejo Estatal del Pueblo Gitano, CEPG) was created in 2005, following Royal Decree 891/2005, and brought together Roma and pro-Roma organizations and representatives of state administration, providing an institutional framework for collaboration and dialogue between the state and the civil society working for Romani communities. Although the very creation of this consultative body was undeniably a step forward and also provided a framework for collaboration and dialogue 175

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between Romani actors themselves, it is strongly dependent on the state and, in fact, remains under the leadership of the state with respect to agenda-setting and decision-making. This was the only platform which brought Roma (and pro-Roma) actors together on a regular basis and fostered communication and collaboration between these actors on a national scale. For a long time, there was no other framework within which the Roma organizations could strategize together prior to the meetings of the State Council for the Roma and coordinate their actions (although as stated by the members of the Council, they usually meet a day before the formal meeting in order to coordinate). There are additional limitations to this structure: CEPG has no real decision-making power and is narrowly limited to providing assistance and recommendations to policymakers. Additionally, participation is very much limited to the formal participation of appointed (and self-appointed) Romani leaders of local NGOs, without providing access to other Romani actors. Thus, specific sectors of the population remain underrepresented and nonformal participation is not considered eligible under these institutional dynamics of participation (Laparra Navarro et al. 2013). Likewise, in Colombia, as part of the principles of participatory democracy and decentralization, the government created a number of different sectorial, territorial, demographic, and thematic consultative bodies and spaces. Decree 2957 of August 6, 2010 “For the Comprehensive Protection of the Romani Ethnic Group in Colombia,” established the National Dialogue Table (Mesa Nacional de Diálogo) as the permanent space for discussion and collaboration between Romani actors and the public administration. It is a consultative inter-departmental body for Roma attended by representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development and the Ministry of Culture. Convened by the Ministry of Interior, all Romani stakeholders take part, including the two existing NGOs and the legal representatives of each kumpania, who are invited to provide their input in policy-related processes and have the capacity to represent local needs and interests in the capital city. In fact, the meetings of the Mesa Nacional de Diálogo are the only times when all the actors meet. But these occasions are not frequent and leave little space for discussing internal matters of Romani ethnic mobilization. Due to the participation of various officials and representatives of the public administration, there is no space for strategizing for common political objectives and joint lobbying. While these venues are typically state-sponsored and become useful channels which secure dialogue and some degree of direct involvement in deci176

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sion-making processes, they can also be seen as a strategy through which the public administration exercises control and influence over participation (Bereményi and Mirga 2012). The establishment of such channels of participation and direct involvement often serves to legitimize policies rather than to provide real opportunities for Romani influence. Indeed, with regard to Romani ethnic mobilization in Europe, Vermeersch argues that, “The status of these advisory and expert bodies is often not clear. Sometimes they seem more to function as representative deliberation bodies than as advisory bodies. Since both states and international organizations have emphasized that Romani representation is needed in policy deliberation, the illusion is sometimes created that experts can play the role of representatives” (Vermeersch 2001:15). Nonetheless, this dynamic is often reversed: discourses on Romani emancipation suggest that Romani representatives can play the role of experts and fulfill that role better than non-Roma (but often considered as more professional) experts. Finally, consolidation increasingly takes place not only on the territorial plane, but also around specific objectives and areas of action. This is especially evident in Spain where Romani women’s organizations and gradually youthled initiatives as well, are coming together through formal and informal networks, or through legally established federations, to provide greater collective leverage and impact than they are able to generate individually. What is important to highlight is that internal fragmentation and tensions are not unique to Romani ethnic mobilization but are characteristic of all social movements; in this sense it is “natural” and happens among all groups engaged in collective action. In fact, according to Jo Freeman, conflicts within social movements can be productive. She argues that “Conflict is necessary and valuable, as it is the means by which we debate our ideas, resolve our differences, test our theories, and come to conclusions” (Freeman 1978). Nonetheless, more scholars on social movements and ethnic mobilization tend to agree that internal conflicts weaken a movement’s potential and its eventual outcomes (Kriesi et al. 2007; McAdam et al. 2009).

Rationale for ethnic mobilization Why do Romani actors emerge in the first place? What is the motivation of the very people behind these organizations that drives them to invest their time and resources into the processes of collective struggle for Romani rights? 177

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Being and doing: representation as a premise

My interviews in all three countries—Argentina, Colombia, and Spain— revealed that the very raison d’être of associations has been that of representation, based on the conviction that the Romani population remains underrepresented in virtually all spheres of public and social life. Romani actors—whether as associations or otherwise—are regarded as necessary organizational vehicles which are capable of representing the collective interests and claims of Roma and which fulfill the role of valid intermediaries between the grassroots and the state powers. The fundamental premise is that of participation or “having a voice”; it is assumed that self-representation is a first step in building effective responses to the collective problems suffered by the Romani community. Nancy Fraser refers to this as “parity of participation,” which is seen as a requisite of social justice (N. Fraser 1996). These discourses, which justify the need to mobilize in the first place, also work to build up narratives which justify the existence of Romani associations as vehicles of collective action. After all, leaders and activists must effectively choose mobilizing structures and successfully frame them as usable and appropriate (McCarthy 1996). Thus, broadly interpreted and diversely practiced representation becomes the underlying rationale for ethnic mobilization, which justifies ethnic mobilization and at the same time (self-)legitimizes associations and their leaders as rightful representatives. Thus, the rationale of action for Romani associations lies in the self-perpetuating objective of political representation and participation. The associations become the embodiment of the “public expression of self” of Romani communities; they project the collective public image of their constituencies. The scope of action of Roma “mobilizing structures” is based on the underlying principle of their role as representatives of the broad Romani community and/or their collective interests. Thus, the objective and function/scope of activity of Romani mobilizing structures merge; hence the two-fold role of representation as “being and doing.” Furthermore, the representative function of Romani associations is deployed in all directions of ethnic mobilization—these “mobilizing structures” act as representative agents simultaneously towards different sets of actors or targets. The role of Romani associations as legitimate and representative is based on the self-promoted discourses of those actors who claim representation; but they are also legitimized by other actors, most notably the institutions of the state, who recognize them as partners and stakeholders. Nonetheless, it should be noted that representation and the level of de facto representative178

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ness are problematic, not only in the case of Roma but also generally. Gaventa, for example, underlines the importance of whose voices are really heard, problematizing the question of who speaks for whom and on what basis (Gaventa 2004). These discussions on the different dimensions of participation and representation (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004; Cornwall 2004) apply equally to the case of Romani ethnic mobilization. In fact, scholarship on Roma has numerous times dealt with the question of representativeness, or lack thereof, in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization (Barany 2002a; Vermeersch 2006; van Baar 2011c; Tremlett 2009; Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Barany 2002b; McGarry 2010; Kovats 2003; Rostas 2009, 2012; Trehan 2001; Trehan and Sigona 2010). All of these scholars have underlined the lack of a democratic mandate and the limited real constituency of Romani associations. McGarry (2010) has given an important dimension to the analysis of Roma representativeness. In his analysis of the question of who can legitimately represent and articulate the interests of Roma, a distinction is made between representation of a group of people and representation of a collection of interests respectively. He rightfully argues that Romani organizations articulate the socio-economic and political interests of Roma but they do not and cannot represent Roma, “that it is more appropriate to conceive of representation as being of interests, rather than persons” (McGarry 2010:74). He further concludes that “individuals cannot represent the will of others but can represent the common purposes or goals” (ibid.) or the broad interests of a group or a society. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Mirga and Gheorghe (1997), due to the lack of democratically elected bodies or officials, the term “Roma representative” is implicitly given a broad meaning and assumed legitimacy. The scholarship on Romani ethnic mobilization and the critique of the representativeness of Romani mobilizing structures principally refers to the case of Romani ethno-politics in Europe. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these findings also find application in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization in Colombia. Romani associations in Colombia deal with similar problems to those in Europe with regard to the lack of a democratic mandate or real constituency. The question of the kumpeñy, on the other hand, is a bit more complex. Kumpeñy were formally recognized as stakeholders, based on the conviction that they reflect the traditional social organization of Romani communities and provide traditional Romani leadership a voice in public and political affairs. From this perspective, it could be assumed that kumpeñy and the figures of legal representatives do reflect a traditional scheme of representation and authority and are rooted in constituencies; it would thus seem that these 179

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formally recognized entities enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. Nonetheless, the evidence gathered during fieldwork clearly shows that the reality within the communities is different; often the individuals assuming the role of legal representatives are not those who enjoy the greatest respect and authority within each kumpania. There were also examples of silenced voices, for example, those of Romani women. These findings show that the question of representativeness and legitimacy is problematic for the various types of mobilizing structures. Mechanisms of ownership and accountability to the community are important ingredients which strengthen the degree of legitimacy; conversely, if such dynamics are not in place, the perceived degree of representativeness and legitimacy of actors by their constituency is significantly lower. In Argentina, a single Romani organization formed by a handful of Romani activists and their non-Roma allies can hardly count as legitimate, constituentbased representation. These words of criticism, nonetheless, need to be put into context. Representation and representativeness is tricky, and all social movements struggle to some extent with this problem. While pointing out the limitations of Romani representation can be useful with the objective of providing constructive criticism directed towards building stronger political leverage and greater outreach towards the community itself, it is essential not to stigmatize the case of Romani ethnic mobilization as limited or underdeveloped. Questions of legitimacy and representativeness are salient among other minority struggles various social movements, and even in the context of electoral politics (political parties). In the case of the Romani associative movement, associations—and more broadly, the different mobilizing structures—are important and useful as vehicles of collective struggle. Yet, drawing conclusions from their limitations can enable making steps towards next stages of development in the Romani movement possible.

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Mobilizing Frames? Identity and Interests Intertwined

Identity and interests—and potential of collective agency Ethnic mobilization is ultimately about the capacity to mobilize constituencies for collective action. In this process, the role of framing is essential—it allows to delineate and distinguish the “self” from “others,” building a sense of a collective identity (Flesher Fominaya 2010; Benford and Snow 2000; Hund and Benford 2004; McDonald 2002; Olzak 2006; Vermeersch 2011; Snow 2001; Melucci 1996). Ethnicity can be a powerful mobilizing tool but needs to be activated by crafting compelling narratives of collectively shared identity. Such frames, constructed for the use of ethnic mobilization, are referred to by Mary Bernstein as “identity for empowerment” (Bernstein 1997, 2008). These descriptions of “who we are” are a “public expression of self” (McDonald 2002) and need to be skillfully shaped by leaders in order to encompass multiple individual identities, which intersect with diverse identity markers existing alongside ethnic ones. These frames of collective identity commonly become not only a “public expression of self” but also a political one, in which the group transforms into a politically relevant subject or acquires political subjectivity. The frame of collective identity is of key importance for the potential success of ethnic mobilization—both in terms of capacity to mobilize constituencies for action as well as for reaching collective goals. After all, not all of those whom the mobilization claims to represent feel identified with the identity frame or are mobilized to participate in the struggle directly. Edelman, for example, argues that: “almost always it is a small minority that participates in the movement who claims to represent their interests, and maybe even more importantly, it is a small minority that feels identified with the movement” (Edelman 2003:1). Furthermore, considering the enormous diversity of all groups which fall under the over-arching term “Roma,” it is important to ana181

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lyze how the Romani identity frame is constructed, paying attention to divergent or competing frames in different settings and the evolution of the Romani identity frame(s) over time. It is also important to underline that numerous narratives can be deployed simultaneously by different actors. Finally, scholars have pointed out the importance of emotions and affective ties in collective identity formation (J. Goodwin and Jasper 2014; Hund and Benford 2004). Others have stressed the importance of maintaining bonds of solidarity “through shared leadership, organization, ideologies and rituals” (Flesher Fominaya 2010). “Symbolic resources as signifiers of collective identity” (Helman and Rapoport 1997, in Flesher Fominaya 2010) also become relevant. Thus, frames of identity are performed, articulated, and transmitted by using diverse strategies and tools, including symbols, rituals, cultural products, and artifacts which convey the meaning of collectiveness and a shared identity of an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991). Alongside the identity frames, there are the frames of collective interests which are also an inseparable ingredient of narratives and discourses articulated by actors in the process of ethnic mobilization. Frames of collective interests should be understood as frames of “what is the objective of mobilization” or “what are we fighting for”—they are a way of interpreting or constructing the meaning of reality by identifying problems and solutions and convincingly articulating them. They provide an overview of the list of existing grievances, which become driving forces and the leading collective claims for mobilization. They are the underlying motivations which are at the heart of ethnic mobilization. Collective interest frames, just like collective identity frames, are not given—they need to be consciously identified and articulated in order to become effectively usable. The choice of frames is relevant and needs to be made strategically. To increase its resonance, the collective interests frames need to reflect the interests and grievances of the groups’ members. Framing processes “are deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: frames are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose—to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth” (Benford Snow 2000:624). The identity frames and collective interests frame are closely intertwined. They resemble each other in that they need to be articulated, performed, communicated, and deployed in a way that is meaningful and understandable. These frames—as a specific interpretation of the surrounding reality of the group and their positionality in it—shape and reinforce a sense of a shared belonging. While analytically the frames of interest and identity tend to be 182

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separated in research, in practice they are intricately connected and at times completely inseparable: the specific interpretation of reality laid out through the collective interests frame may become part of the group’s collective identity; the definition of “who we are” often incorporates a certain interpretation of reality that implicitly and explicitly communicates the issues, grievances, or claims of the group. In fact, Melucci defines collective identity as “a process in which the actors produce the common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess the environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of the action” (Melucci 1988:343), making identity and interests frames inseparable and mutually reinforcing. The more effectively leaders can adjust their framing discourses to the feelings and interpretations of reality of their potential constituents—or those whom the actors seek to represent and whom they seek to activate for action— the greater the possibility of triggering collective agency. This is why to understand ethnic mobilization it is paramount to look into narratives, discourses, and symbols which communicate the frames articulated by individual actors and/or different sets of actors. In the case of Romani ethnic mobilization, what discourses or narratives convey such collective frames? How is Romani identity framed, articulated, and performed to serve the purpose of political mobilization? How are political goals incorporated into these frames? Towards whom and with what objectives are these narratives crafted? How are these frames of “public expression of self” shaped and by whom? How are the collective identity and collective interest frames influenced by external factors, such as legal frameworks or policy-approaches? Are these frames static or dynamic and why? How are identity and interest frames intertwined?

Romani identity frames Identity frames are typically crafted purposefully by the actors themselves with the objective of communicating “a public expression of self” (McDonald 2002) on behalf of the group, which at the same time may serve the purpose of activating ethnicity for collective action through mobilizing new adherents and reinforcing the group’s level of identification with the actors who seek to represent them. These self-crafted narratives of “self,” however, are not the only existing frames which define the group, making it distinguishable and externally identifiable. In fact, in the context of Roma it is important to recognize 183

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that the existing narratives which convey identity frames are not shaped exclusively by Roma but by a number of other actors as well, among them the proRoma organizations, scholars, and policymakers. Indeed, historically and still today Roma have had limited control over the discourses and images created about them by others. On the one hand, in knowledge-production and scholarly discourse the Romani people have been an object of academic inquiry for centuries. The first scholars who applied scientific methods to studying Roma can be traced back to the eighteenth century (Ryder 2015); the Gypsy Lore Society was founded in 1888 and has operated continuously until today. As an object of academic inquiry, Roma have seldom taken an active role in shaping academic knowledge about themselves. The academia, as increasing evidence suggests, had its role in sustaining and stabilizing essentialist, stereotypical, and at times antigypsyist worldviews (Acton 2015; Matache 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015, 2018c; Selling 2018). It is only recently, with the emergence of Romani scholars and the establishment of Critical Romani Studies, that Roma themselves have participated actively in knowledge production and have engaged critically with the legacy of Romani Studies which, until recently, remained largely unchallenged. In this regard, the establishment of academic hubs of critical research and journals (like Critical Romani Studies) play an essential role in institutionalizing academic counter-discourses in Romani Studies. On the other hand, in political, public, and media discourses, Roma continue to be portrayed as “abnormal citizens,” unable to fit into the mainstream society, prone to crime and misconduct, and with a tendency to disobey social and legal norms. This is often illustrated by problematizing and racializing such social phenomenon as migration (van Baar 2017), begging, vagrancy, early or forced marriages, or unemployment, which are commonly treated as traditional and inherent to Romani culture. Such a framing of the discourse on Roma disregards historical, institutional, and socio-economic factors, including deeply-rooted prejudice as manifested by prevalent antigypsyism (End et al. 2015; Alliance against Anti-gypsyism 2016; Cortés Gomez and End 2019; McGarry 2017; J. Bhabha et al. 2017; Carrera et al. 2017). Existing frames which position Roma as a threat to public order lead to and justify the “securitization of the Roma issue” in state policies, evidence of which can be traced in different European countries, for example, in Italy, France, Hungary, and Slovakia (Bărbulescu 2012; Carrera 2014; van Baar 2014b). Portraying Roma as a potential social threat to public order, which is seemingly becoming an 184

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increasing trend especially in the media and political discourses, results in the emergence of what Huub van Baar calls “reasonable antigypsyism.” According to him: “The argument goes that you are rightfully entitled to act against them and treat them differently, because they cause inconvenience, indulge in criminal activity and can generally be expected to cause trouble” (van Baar 2014a). As a consequence, antigypsyism becomes a legitimized, justifiable, and socially accepted attitude, instead of recognizing that antigypsyism is, in fact, a form of racism. Historically, antigypsyism has been the dominant ideology which conditioned the approach towards Roma by the non-Roma majority. Yet still today, this framing of Romani has been gaining traction across Europe over the past few years, with the strengthening of nationalism, xenophobic attitudes, and the growth of the right. This is not surprising—as indicated by a Pew Research Centre survey “there is a strong relationship between ideology and attitudes toward Roma. People who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum tend to offer more negative opinions, although these views are not uncommon among those on the left” (Pew Research 2014). As world politics increasingly shift towards the right and more nationalistic approaches, the negative anti-Roma sentiments proliferate further. These diverse discourses on Roma shaped through scholarly discourse, the media, and in public and political narratives affect the identity of Roma by assigning them a socio-cultural and ethnic label which influences the perceptions of Roma by the majority society (Matras 2015; Surdu 2014, 2016; Mcgarry 2010, 2014). Significantly, these ascribed labels also affect the way in which Romani people see themselves and, by extension, the way Romani actors themselves formulate their identity frames. Iulius Rostas rightfully notes that “exploring Roma identity automatically necessitates a review of power relationships between Roma and non-Roma, of the ways Roma engage with social and political institutions, and of the manner and degree to which they have affected Roma identity” (Rostas 2019:3). Moreover, and relevant for the topic of my inquiry is the reflection that “ethnic identity may become a form of oppression that pressures one to avoid disclosing their identity and avoid engaging in collective activities with other members of their ethnic group” (Rostas 2019:1). This is why it is necessary to look into these diverse narratives formulated by a plethora of different stakeholders, paying attention to the way in which they influence the self-articulated discourses shaped by Romani actors themselves. For this reason, I distinguish different analytical levels contained in the “Romani identity frames”: 185

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1. Exogenous frames: narratives of “who are the Roma,” crafted by various (mainly) non-Romani actors, especially through scholarship as well as by governments through targeted policies, and in social and public discourse. This layer resonates with Snow’s definition of “social identities” (2001). 2. Endogenous frames: self-crafted narratives of “who we are” as a group, articulated by leaders, associations, and other Romani actors. It is influenced by the frame “who are the Roma” but at the same time aims at influencing this frame in order to provide a counter-narrative. This frame is commonly used in public discourse and targets external agents, as well as the majority society. Rather than “who we aim at mobilizing” this frame refers to “who we are representing.” Exogenous frames—defining Roma as a target group in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain

In my understanding, the narratives and discourses established and imposed on Roma by other agents are referred to as “exogenous frames.” A critical and exhaustive examination of all existing exogenous frames deployed by different agents and/or institutions is beyond the scope of this book. I will concentrate, however, on the way in which the image of Roma has been developed by public and state institutions, and explicitly and implicitly through policies targeting Roma. Therefore, in my analysis the exogenous frames will refer to the way in which Roma have been framed/defined as a target group by institutions. Evidently, the framing contained in policies is not free of influence from other sources, especially academia, but also media and even popular culture. Adrian Marsh rightfully points to the influence of scholarly discourse on generating distorted representations of Roma and how these, in turn, have an impact on policymaking targeting Roma: Representation through research is the primary means by which international and national policy-makers, advocates and activists perceive the peoples we describe as Gypsies, as if they were in fact real, and not the interpretation of the researchers who depict them in the pages of reports, in many cases debating over the representations as if they were, in and of themselves, a totality. These representations take the place of the actual people and come to stand for them as symbols or sometimes ciphers for a series of notions, related to the overall trope and emplotment being used by the researchers— the frameworks by which the research has been formulated (Marsh 2007). 186

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Furthermore, in this context it is also important to assess the degree to which these framings have also been influenced by the target group themselves, in this case Roma, and vice versa—the degree to which these targeted discourses have influenced the self-crafted narratives of Roma actors. There are some evident differences in this regard between the countries covered by this book, both in terms of how exogenous frames came to be and what elements remain at the core of these frames. In the case of Spain, in the last decades the exogenous frame unequivocally refers to the process through which Roma are attributed a social and a politically relevant collective identity, defined not through a process of self-articulation, but by being treated as a separate and distinct policy target. Significantly, the positioning of Roma as a policy target group preceded the processes of Romani ethnic mobilization. Due to the specific legal constellation regarding the treatment of minorities in Spain, rather than being acknowledged as an ethnic minority by the power of legislation, Roma are treated as a minority group through policies which target them as a distinct sector of the population. In the history of modern democratic Spain, since the first institutional engagement of the state with the Romani community, the latter were viewed, and treated, as a vulnerable and marginalized community; the public administration acknowledged the existing problems suffered by the Romani community without recognizing Romani identity and culture (this can be well traced in the very names of these interventions—such as the 1978 “Interministerial Commission for the Study of Problems Affecting the Roma Community”). Since then, the general approach of governmental engagement with the Romani has been based on a consensus that Roma are an excluded and marginalized community, and their special needs require special attention and partly separate services—principally approaching the Romani community problematic from the perspective of normalization. This institutional approach is important as it provides an interpretation of the Romani community, inexplicitly defined as a vulnerable and marginalized group rather than as a viable ethnic and cultural minority, whose socio-economic situation is a consequence of complex historical and institutional circumstances marked by centuries of stigmatization and oppression rather than an attribute of a “culture.” This also has important policy consequences, for example, in education (Abajo and Carrasco 2004; Calvo Buezas 1990; García Pastor 2009). The report on the situation of Roma in Spain by the Open Society Institute in 2002 also offered the same conclusions arguing that Romani issues are placed “exclusively within the social sphere, and it reinforces the public perception 187

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of Roma/gitanos as a socially marginalised group” (Open Society Institute 2002:354). In fact, Romani leaders have consistently criticized existing plans (including the national policy towards Roma), viewing them “as a scheme for delivering social assistance rather than a strategic plan to protect and promote their rights and identity” (ibid.). A 2014 published study on Roma housing in Spain (López López et al. 2014) also demonstrates how policy interventions targeting Roma, seconded by “diagnostic studies,” have inexplicitly framed the Romani population as deficient, gregarious subjects in need of protection. The language used in policy and academic inquiries results in a stereotypical portrayal of Roma; and “although the use of ethnonym is avoided, and a careful use is made of these expression that could be considered ‘racist’ or ‘discriminating’, the diagnose of the housing condition of the gitano in the selected territories is based on the understanding of poverty as a specific ‘culture’.”(López López et al. 2014) The authors rightfully conclude that “the definition of a ‘problem’ is part of the problem” (WE Project 2014) The abovementioned study is an excellent example which illustrates the ambiguities of the definition of Roma as a target group, and the interplay between socio-economic and cultural dimensions attributed to this definition. In fact, similar conclusions, although with different implications, have been drawn with regards to the European policy approaches towards Roma by some Romani scholars (Surdu 2016; Rostas 2019). In Colombia, contrary to Spain, it was not until Roma began to articulate their collective claims that they started to be recognized as a distinct group and, eventually, as a target for public policies. For many years, Roma in Colombia had not been officially considered an ethnic minority and remained largely invisible. In fact, as explained earlier, although Roma in Colombia historically existed as a distinct community, their presence was not acknowledged institutionally and/or officially. With the new approach towards ethnic and cultural diversity and the gradual recognition of ethnic minorities by the Colombian state, a favorable conjuncture emerged which provided an opportunity for Roma to acquire the status of a formally recognized ethnic minority. The emergence of Romani ethnic mobilization in Colombia is directly connected to their demands for formal recognition as an ethnic group. Romani leaders, accompanied by non-Roma scholars, had to provide evidence that Roma are indeed an ethnic group, thus shaping the definition of a Romani collective identity relying on existing legal definitions, and subsequently articulate and present it as such to the outside world. Gamboa argues that in 1998, when the process of seeking institutional recognition of Roma began, the 188

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state institutions had no knowledge about them, their history and culture.1 So, while in Spain the exogenous narratives emerged prior to Roma self-narratives, in Colombia, the Romani actors themselves offered a definition of who the Roma are in the first place. The Colombian state followed its own logic of what constituted an ethnic minority—on the one hand, national legislation, as well as international conventions ratified in Colombia, provided clear guidelines as to how to distinguish a group as an ethnic minority; on the other hand, already existing ethnic minorities, who enjoyed legal recognition and a variety of minority-specific rights, represented a blueprint for Roma in seeking their own institutional acknowledgment. The architects of Romani ethnic mobilization in Colombia knew how to fit into these narratives skillfully and pragmatically, to justify their claims for granting Roma “a symmetry of rights.” In Argentina, similarly to the case of Roma in Colombia, the topic of Romani issues received little attention from the authorities. It was not until Roma themselves sought self-visibilization that some initial attempts at institutional “framing of Roma” began to crystallize. Even in the context of academic research, and despite the large size of the population and their historical presence, Roma generated little interest among scholars. The earliest work is that of Esteban Garay (Garay 1987), while some isolated scholarly articles about Roma in Argentina can also be found in the 1990s (Arana 1992, 1998). Many more publications, although still relatively few, began to appear after the 2000s, that is, subsequent to the emergence of the first Romani organization: AICRA. Since the year 2000, and with the attempts of AICRA to seek institutional recognition of the Romani presence in Argentina, this entity became the main source of information for most public governmental as well as academic institutions. In fact, even today, the estimates of the number of Roma residing in Argentina are based on the information provided by AICRA which has never been contrasted with data collected by governmental agencies (or commissioned by governmental bodies). Reviewing the types of events, seminars, and publications on Roma that have been produced and published by the administration, typically in collaboration with AICRA, one generally finds basic ethnographic information about Roma, with a significant focus on origins, history, traditions, and language. Despite the attempts at influencing the governmental discourse by Romani community members themselves, the image and representation of Roma still remains full of biased and romanti1 Gamboa argues: “As expected, the answers provided by government institutions showed that there was a total ignorance in the Colombian State regarding the Roma people of Colombia, since among other things, these public institutions expressed that they did not have any information.” (Gamboa Martínez 2004:2)

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cized stereotypes. For example, the note describing Roma on the website of the Buenos Aires City administration states: To know “Romaní” people or “Roma”, it is necessary to put aside the notions of territory, religion and nationality and start thinking about other concepts such as nomadism and diaspora. Indeed, for hundreds of years, the Roma have been moving to different parts of the world because of the constant persecution they have suffered, without giving up their identity. In the absence of a religion or a sovereign territory, what unites them as a people is the Roma culture, with its ancestral traditions and with the constant desire for freedom and love of life as its main values.2

Today, the Roma in Argentina still remain on the margins of public discourse and policy and they are not considered a specific target group. As argued by Jorge Bernal, president of AICRA: “we, Roma, are not seen as a cultural collectivity in Argentina” [personal interview on 16.08.2013, Buenos Aires]. What is paramount to highlight as a clearly distinguishable feature between both parts of the world—Europe (in the case of Spain) and Latin America (Argentina and Colombia)—is the degree to which socio-economic status plays a role in defining Roma as a group. In Spain, and similarly across Europe (M. Goodwin and Buijs 2013; van Baar 2011b; Medda-Windischer 2011; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017a), poverty and social and economic marginalization are the characteristics which dominate the exogenous frames on Roma, in policy-making as well as scholarship (Surdu 2016). Socio-economic status becomes “ethnicized” and linked to “a Roma culture,” inevitably leading to a stigmatizing understating of who the Roma are (Bereményi and Mirga 2012; Rostas 2019). In fact, the recognition of Romani cultural heritage and the importance of cultural inclusion alongside of social inclusion is a salient claim among Romani activists in recent years (Magazzini 2016; Beck and Ivasiuc 2018). This contrasts very much with the exclusive focus on cultural distinctiveness which can be evidenced both in Colombia and Argentina. Clearly, the definition of Roma, in contrast to the dominant focus on “Roma inclusion” witnessed in Europe, disregards the socio-economic status of Roma; these dimensions are by no means seen as characteristic defining features of Roma in Latin America. 2   Subsecretaria de Derechos Humanos y Pluralismo Cultural del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: https://baxcolectividades.buenosaires.gob.ar/historia/Gitana.

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I believe there are two main reasons for this paradigmatically different approach towards understanding Romani identity. Firstly, Roma as an ethnic minority in Europe are among the most visible and historically disenfranchised groups; their dramatic socio-economic status vis-à-vis the majority population is a fact. This deplorable situation is a direct consequence of their centurieslong history of persecution and discrimination and is yet another manifestation of past and ongoing antigypsyism. In the countries of Latin America, in contrast, Roma do not stand out visibly—they are, after all, of European background giving them a priori a higher social status than other races and ethnicities; they also often engage in dynamics of self-invisibilization. Objectively, there are other population groups which are in a much more difficult socioeconomic situation and which have been the subject of institutional rejection and stigmatization throughout history. This status quo needs to be understood through the prism of centuries of colonialism in Latin America. Secondly, these divergent exogenous master-frames of Romani ethnicity also have to do with the legal, cultural, and historical arrangements developed by public institutions towards diversity and multiculturalism. The presence of indigenous and afro-descendant communities across the region places the topic of racial and ethnic difference at the core of socio-political debates and social dynamics. In many countries the topic of cultural recognition of this racial and ethnic difference has translated into specific legislation. Europe, on the other hand, the predominantly white population of Judeo-Christian tradition has dealt with racial and ethnic difference to a much lesser extent. Homogeneity and stability of exogenous frames of Romani identity In all of these above-mentioned cases, what is important to explore is the way in which Romani identity is framed institutionally in terms of plurality/heterogeneity of the group and in terms of stability of their cultural characteristics. With regards to homogeneity, institutional discourses tend to have a hard time with making sense of the internal diversity of Roma in all three countries. In this regard exogenous frames are full of paradoxes and contradictions. In Argentina, three main macro-groups can be distinguished: Kalderash Roma, Boyash/Ludar, and Calo. These main groups sub-divide internally based on their country of origin and/or period of migration, subdividing the community even further; they differ in lifestyle, language, economic activity, level of conservatism towards Romani traditions, as well as in socio-economic status. Generally, these three main Roma macro-groups maintain very weak ties among each other and there are limited efforts which aim at creating a space 191

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of mutual dialogue and collaboration. The scarce materials produced or published by institutions initially provide this information, underlying the existence of this diversity. Yet, the documents seldom clearly define the difference between these groups nor clarify their relationship to each other. More importantly, since the only source of knowledge on Roma originates from AICRA, a Kalderash Roma-dominated organization, the description of the “Roma people” tends to reflect the Kalderash Roma but is extended automatically to other Romani communities. More importantly, Roma tend to be depicted in a stereotypical way, by focusing on concepts of “nomadism,” “orality,” and “freedom.” Consequently, despite affirming the existence of diverse groups, subsequent descriptions often provide an inaccurate representation of the social and cultural reality of all Romani groups or existing Romani lifestyles. In Colombia, the small community is indeed composed predominantly of Roma from one group—the Kalderash—yet, as in any community, a considerable level of internal heterogeneity and stratification exists. Despite this, institutional narratives and policy texts provide a homogenizing image of who the Romani people are, disregarding the existing internal diversity of Romani individuals, families, and communities. These narratives leave no room for a plurality of diverse expressions of Romani identities and lifestyles. While they may work effectively in the context of political activism, it may also potentially have negative effects on the life of Roma within the kumpeñy. These discourses, crafted predominantly for the external public and the authorities, also have an impact within the community itself. The institutionalization of defining features and cultural elements, as in the case of Decree 2957 (2010), imposes and reifies norms and cultural traits. Rather than reflecting the existing plurality and diversity of Romani lifestyles and identities, certain norms are institutionalized as defining elements. In Spain, the engagement of public administration with Romani issues through policies, strategies, and plans, as well as in public discourse, also leads to homogenizing representations of Roma. This can also be traced through an analysis of policy documents on Roma (Bereményi and Mirga 2012; López López et al. 2014). The Catalan Plans, for example, refer to “the Gitano people” in general, which is “equivalent to the term Roma in the European area” (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009:266). What is important to highlight is the fact that all of these terms are applied to the whole Romani population, treated as a unique and homogeneous entity. The use of such homogenizing terms disregards the different segments and sectors, and the internal diversity of the Gitano communities in Spain. In all three cases, the intersecting variables of class, gender, generation, sexual orientation, and level of education, among many others, are disregarded. 192

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Finally, in all three cases the Romani identity is described through a number of rather stable, fixed, and often stereotypical features. In policy texts, institutional documents, and scholarship, there is a clear lack of a dynamic and pluralist perspective of who the Roma are; instead, essentializing frames are applied to describe Roma (Costache 2018; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017a; Kóczé 2009; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018c; Brooks 2015; Jovanović et al. 2015). This trend is also traceable in scholarship and policymaking on Roma; the cases of Argentina, Colombia, and Spain seem to align with this trend. Endogenous frames—collective identity narratives as “the public expression of self”

The second layer of the analysis of Romani identity frames refers to the way in which Roma themselves construct the discourses of “public expression of self” in a process of acquiring political subjectivity. Arguably, the type of framing of these narrative frames is closely developed in response to and under the influence of the specific socio-political, legal, and historical environment in each country, which conditions the opportunities and determines the feasibility of some approaches compared to others. Between inclusive citizenship and ethnic difference First, there are evident discrepancies in the way Roma self-articulate narratives of collective belonging vis-à-vis the majority population, especially when assessing what elements of identity are underlined and emphasized. The identified differences are related to the way in which exogenous frames are constructed in Spain, Argentina, and Colombia. In Spain, the influence of the exogenous narrative of “being Roma,” both those crafted by scholarship as well as by public policies targeting Roma, has been significant for shaping public opinion on Roma as a predominantly problematic population; simultaneously it has also influenced the development of Roma self-narratives.3 Hence, discourses of Romani leaders often make ref3 Some Roma have been critical of these exogenous frames and have underlined the importance of Roma having a dominant voice in shaping the narrative of who they are. For example, with regards to academic scholarship on Roma, already in 1994, assertive voices had appeared, advocating for Roma to take control over the crafted definitions: “Already between us there are Roma men and women with appropriate education to give opinions with scientific knowledge about our reality. The very concepts of ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ of culture, which until now were reserved for ‘gadjo’ researchers of cultural anthropology, are terms which some Roma men and women handle with ease in their writings. And it is necessary that these Roma men and women give authorized responses to the questions of how to adequately describe the culture in its totality,

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erence to the socio-economic inequality suffered by Romani communities, echoing the narratives of policy documents, legal texts, and scholarship as well as public discourse. This narrative is commonly regarded as a “victim discourse” in which Roma emphasize their status as victims of historical injustice—a long history of discrimination and persecutions. This victimization has often been denounced as counter-productive and stigmatizing, especially by younger Romani leaders (SOS Racismo 2000; Fundación Secretariado 2008). Significantly, the leaders rightfully interpret the disadvantaged situation of Roma as a result of their differential treatment on the basis of their ethnic identity. For this reason, the discourse about Romani people crafted by Romani leaders themselves is much more rooted in cultural and historical elements, seeking cultural recognition while simultaneously acknowledging it as an integral part of Spanish heritage and history. In this sense, stressing over 600 years of common history of Roma in Spain works towards reinforcing the discourse of belonging and contribution of Roma to the construction of Spanish national identity. Consequently, in Spain emphasis is being put on questions of citizenship and social justice, demanding “equal opportunities” and full access and respect for Roma rights as Spanish citizens. Parallel efforts are pursued through Romani ethnic mobilization to challenge the stigmatized identity frame and to acknowledge and eventually recognize the distinct and culturally valuable Romani ethnic identity, thus moving away from a socio-economic logic of “inclusion” towards a logic of cultural recognition. Moreover, the use of cultural and historical features in these narratives also serves to uphold the frame based on distinctiveness. In this process, Roma discourses re-incorporate ideas of cultural difference and ethnic affirmation and, according to some, work to reinforce the binary opposition between “us” (the Roma) and “them” (the non-Roma majority society).4 The choice of employing predominantly “injustice frames” by Roma in Spain should also be understood in the frame of broader discussions regarding diverse approaches towards minority treatment, ranging from assimilation to integration and making the necessary distinction between mental and behavioral elements of its components” (Unió Romani 1994:11). 4 García criticizes the approach emphasizing cultural distinctiveness by considering it as cultural isolation and argues that “this attitude not only impedes the intended equality with any other Spanish citizen, but frequently generates the strengthening of the traditional stereotypes about the Roma” (García González 1999). He further states that “the progressive ‘ethnicization’ that has been given in the Roma associations in the last 15 or 20 years, has not promoted the social inclusion of Roma as much as it could have done since reaffirming differences too often ignores what unites us, [and] runs the risk of falling into segregationist postures of a new type” (García González, 2003:107).

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multiculturalism and/or interculturalism (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995). Arguably in Spain, over the years, and following policy approaches introduced by institutions of the European Union, the language of social integration has become the dominant terminology embraced in policy discourses (Carrasco 2007); others have brought arguments of “splintered multiculturalism” to Spain (Bonal and Rambla 2003). In contrast, both in Colombia and in Argentina, the “injustice frames,” although present, are much less pronounced than in the case of Spain. While in Spain Roma Leaders underline historical injustice and persecution as the root causes of their community’s current predicaments, Argentinean and Colombian leaders emphasize historic invisibility instead, although to different degrees. Consequently, their discourses seek differential treatment as ethnic minorities rather than equal treatment vis-à-vis majority societies. In Colombia, there is a tendency to construct discourses which emphasize cultural distinctiveness and differential treatment. Ethnic minorities are formally recognized and are guaranteed special rights through a variety of affirmative measures. The emphasis on cultural difference, distinct identity, and culture is tactical and serves to underline the institutional need to protect the Romani ethnic group and provide it with similar differential rights and benefits symmetrical to those attributed to other ethnic groups in the country. More specifically, the framing of the Romani identity has been strategic and pragmatic, adjusted to maximize the potential of political gains. The transposition of existing legislation to the Romani based on the principle of “positive symmetry” required reliable information based on which such institutional provisions could be drafted. In this process, detailed information about the origin of Roma, their historical presence in the American continent, and in Colombia specifically, their cultural values and codes of conduct, language, justice system (Romani Kriss), and other ethnic markers have been emphasized and framed as distinct traits of Romani ethnicity. Since the late 1990s PRORROM has become the main source of information used to create narratives with regards to “who the Roma are.” With the support of non-Roma advisors, PRORROM has produced an immense quantity of reports, articles, position papers, and other documents, which have subsequently served as the basis for drawing up institutional proposals and legislation5. Other ethnic movements in the country provided the Romani leaders with guidelines as to which 5 This process was especially intense in 1998–2002 when Paternina, Gamboa, Dalila Gómez, and Venecer Gómez—then the core group constituting PRORROM—were the principle authors.

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elements needed to be emphasized in order to achieve status equivalent to that of other ethnic minorities. In Argentina, evident influence in crafting identity frames came from other Romani leaders in the region. Thus, as in the case of Brazil and Colombia, emphasis has been placed on questions related to the history of the Romani presence and the existence of a distinct identity, language, traditions, and rituals. The efforts advanced by SKOKRA during the first half of 2000s have also provided a coherent discourse of Romani identity and cultural distinctiveness, encapsulated in the so-called Quito Declaration (Organisations and Kumpania 2001). Nonetheless, it needs to be underlined that the process of visibilizing Romani issues in Argentina and the very ethnic mobilization itself are still in their early stages of development. Neither the strategy nor the necessary socio-political leverage has been produced that would allow for possible legal concessions from the state administration. While Argentinean Romani leaders opt for discourses of ethnic difference, the legal framework does not provide sufficient openings to ethnic minorities for this approach to be successful. Narratives of shared identity In all three countries the self-crafted Roma narratives have one common characteristic—that of a collectively shared ethnic identity. In this sense, in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain there are several common elements of overarching pan-Romani identity which are articulated through discourses of ethnic mobilization, irrespective of the country. These elements are: Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ Ȇ

Common Indian origin and routes of migration; Roma as a transnational and dispersed diaspora; The Romani language—whether still in-use or largely forgotten; Romani family and kinship structures; Romani culture and intangible cultural heritage (although defined differently depending on the context); Ȇ Romani traditions (values, respect towards elders, pride, solidarity, honor, among others); Ȇ International Romani symbols such as the flag, the anthem, and International Roma Day.

There are, of course, local variations with regards to elements that are being emphasized. Firstly, the history of Roma in each of these countries is promoted and celebrated. In Spain, the Roma recount their 600 years of history in Spanish 196

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territory, and especially underline the abundant anti-Roma legislation. The fate of Roma, with a focus on specific events and/or historically relevant sites, is increasingly being promoted and commemorated. Furthermore, days important in the history of European Roma, most notably August 2 (Remembrance Day of the Roma Holocaust) and May 16 (Day of Roma Resistance) are also being commemorated, reinforcing the pan-European Romani identity and strengthening the connections between Roma in Spain and other parts of Europe. In Latin America, however, the common fate of the Roma Holocaust is not a unifying element, as the vast majority of Roma residing there were not affected directly by the Holocaust (the vast majority came in migration waves prior to the Second World War). In Colombia, the arrival of Roma and their existence in pre-republican times are emphasized (Gómez Baos 2002). In Argentina, while the history of Roma is relatively more recent, information regarding the different waves of migration is commonly promoted. Language remains among the primary identity markers among the Romani-speaking communities in both Argentina and Colombia. The existence of Romani is one of the principle elements of cultural distinctiveness and is emphasized in Romani discourses (Gómez Baos 2011; Gamboa Martínez et al. 2000; Bernal 2005). In the case of Spain, the historical persecution of Roma led to the gradual loss of the Romani language, which survived in a transformed form as a dialect referred to as Calo6 (Gamella et al. 2011; Jiménez González 2009; Ramírez-Heredia 2001). Interestingly, however, Romani is increasingly being recovered—for example, through classes organized in some larger cities across Spain or online. The growing importance of the Romani language can also be traced in the emerging trend of using Romani-originated words as names of newly-founded Roma organizations and projects (Abajo and Carrasco 2004:64). The importance of language, its transmission and/or loss, is also among the main areas of interest (goals) and action (activities, projects) of Roma organizations, something which can be traced by analyzing the types of demands and types of activities or projects developed by them (for example, publications of bi-lingual traditional Romani tales). This is quite unsurprising—after all, the existence of common language becomes one of the main elements of unifying trans-national Romani identity and is among the main demands in the trans-national Romani movement (Matras 2013a). 6 Calo should be considered as a dialect of Romanes or a so-called para-Romanes. As a consequence of the centuries-long persecution of Roma throughout Spain, the Spanish population of Roma has forgotten the original Romanes but has maintained a variation of the language which uses Spanish grammar and includes lexical terms originating from Romanes.

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The tangible and intangible facts of the Romani cultural heritage—traditions, festivities, traditional crafts, and occupations—are also among the elements commonly underlined, and which exhibit their own local/national variations. This is especially visible in discourses promoting Romani ethnic pride and contributions to majority cultures. In Spain, Roma often highlight the contributions of Romani culture and traditions to Spanish and regional cultures, especially in the fields of music and dance (most importantly flamenco and rumba catalana), emphasizing how Roma have contributed to the building of the common national (Spanish) cultural heritage. However, these cultural elements are often intertwined with demands for inclusive citizenship, underlining that the need to cultivate, promote, and protect Romani culture is an essential right of Roma as citizens.7 In Argentina, similar contributions can be claimed among the Calo population, yet since this population remains detached from the dynamics of ethnic mobilization, the role of flamenco is not clearly visible or used in public/political discourses. Rather, in Argentina and Colombia, Romani organizations emphasize traditional trade, Romani craftsmanship, and occupations (and their evolution) (Bernal 2014; Gómez Baos 2009; Maronese and Tchileva 2005; Cifuentes 2010). In all three cases, the links between different Romani communities dispersed across the world is acknowledged—the argument of diverse communities belonging to the same global diaspora is an essential premise of the contemporary Romani endogenous frames. The narrative of an international Roma non-state nation and a shared global transnational Romani identity can be traced in all three countries. Spanish Romani organizations and their leaders tend to subscribe to the trans-national discourse of Romani identity, echoing the achievements of the World Romani Congresses and following the narrative crafted by the International Romani Union. This is of no surprise and should be attributed, at least in part, to the figure of Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia. Ramírez Heredia is a founder, and was the vice-president, of the International Romani Union, which was formally constituted during the Second World Romani Congress in 1978. As a member of the Spanish Congress from 1977 to 1986 and then a Member of the European Parliament 7 Fonaments del pensament gitano avui [The Foundations of Romani Thought Today], published by Unión Romaní in 1994, is a good example of this narrative: “To be Roma is to feel Roma, to be part of a system of values that permeates the whole body and that conditions external perception based on an ancient culture. The struggle of the Roma community to enjoy fully their rights as citizens has multiple aspects, which range from the demand that we are respected and accepted as we are, carriers of this ancient culture and owners of our own collective destiny, to the most urgent claims, which refer to the conquest of the indispensable means to live with dignity” (Unión Romani 1994:13).

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from 1986 to 1999, he became an influential spokesperson on behalf of Roma, both towards the majority non-Roma society as well as towards his own community members. Ramírez Heredia became a speaker and an “ambassador” of Romani issues, loyal to the achievements of the International Romani Union, and enthusiastic about re-connecting Spanish Roma with its European counterparts. Furthermore, it should be also noted that in the 1970s Romani ethnic mobilization was almost completely non-existent in Spain. This is also why international developments led by Romani activists, most notably since the World Romani Congresses, have had a significant impact on the development of Romani discourses in Spain, thus echoing their macro-narrative of common Romani identity. Especially since the creation of the Spanish branch of the IRU, the Unión Romaní Española, in 1986, this pan-European narrative of Roma ethno-genesis has been promoted in Spain more powerfully. International Romani actors played, and continue to play, an important role in shaping the transnational discourse of the global Romani diaspora. KlímováAlexander documents the attempts of the World Gypsy Community (WGC) at bringing together Romani communities from across the world; an attempt at what she refers to as “Romani Political Zionism,” which was a failure (KlímováAlexander 2007a). There were also other attempts, pursued by Romani organizations, most notably the IRU, at rejoining Romani communities from across the world, at least discursively, through a “Declaration of Nation,” which was passed during the Fifth Romani Congress in Prague in 2000 (ibid.). In fact, a breakthrough in establishing a joint dialogue between Roma across continents, and which contributed significantly to the increased visibility of Latin American Roma, came shortly thereafter, in the framework of the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban. The conference was attended by 50 Romani leaders and activists from across the world, including a delegation of Latin-American Roma. The conference was a major milestone for the Roma cause—through the organization of a thematic session on the Roma as well as the inclusion of specific recommendations (part 1, article 68 and part 2, articles 39–44 of the Declaration) dedicated to the Romani communities across the globe, it galvanized the visibility of the struggle for Romani rights recognition. For the Roma delegation, the objectives were not restricted to gaining recognition and mobilizing solidarity with the Romani cause; it also aimed at building a truly global network of collaboration and collective agency. Participating Romani activists claimed unity and that they belonged to one Romani nation, whose members can be found across the world. Here again an important role 199

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was played by the Spanish Unión Romaní, which issued a statement promoting the recognition of the global Romani diaspora. Consequently, there are shared discursive elements of endogenous Romani identity frames present throughout the countries in both continents. The Romani flag, Romani anthem, and especially the celebration of International Roma Day are equally rooted. What is also relevant is the use of the terminology of a nation when speaking about Roma, something that is much more pronounced in the Spanish language. In Argentina, Colombia, and Spain alike, Roma self-regard as “a people” (un pueblo) underlines the desired status of recognition as a global stateless nation. In fact, the Quito Declaration of 2001 explicitly states that “we do not accept the label of ‘ethnic minority’ given to us in some international instruments, because it does not reflect our reality as a people who are facing a situation of domination” (Organisations and Kumpania 2001). Despite similarities with regards to transnational Romani identity framings, there is, however, one striking difference between Spain, on the one hand, and Argentina and Colombia, on the other. The difference has to do predominantly with the strategy of seeking recognition and the pragmatic use of existing policy and legal frameworks in both regions of the world. In 1989, the International Labour Organization (ILO) of the UN established specific regulatory legislation, which has become an important legal basis for collective struggles of indigenous, afro-descendant, and, eventually, Roma peoples—the ILO Convention 169, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. The Convention has served as the main point of reference for Roma seeking institutional recognition and symmetry of rights in Colombia. In fact, one of the first documents issued in Colombia on Roma recognizes that “(I) the 1989 Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, ILO, ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries’ applies to the Roma people of Colombia, as they are a people with a distinct traditional tribal social organization” (Oficio DGAI No. 0864 del 20 de febrero de 1998). For members of SKOKRA, the ILO Convention became the main referential document as well (Bernal 2015), and the application of the Convention became incorporated as one of the demands of the Quito Declaration.8 Article 1.1 (a) of the Convention states that the Convention is applicable to “tribal 8 “12. [We request] those [States and Governments of the Americas] who have not yet ratified Convention 169 of 1989 of the International Labour Organisation on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, to do so. And to those who have ratified the Convention to apply it in totality in their legal dispositions, keeping in mind that they also apply to our people” (Organisations and Kumpania 2001:168).

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peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations.” Therefore, one of the aims was to demonstrate the distinct social, cultural, and economic features of the Romani people in Colombia in order to emphasize their unique character as a “tribal people”—hence, references to the tribal character of Roma, their worldview (cosmovisión), common descent, traditional authorities, and justice system. The fact that Roma sought recognition as an ethnic minority in symmetry with other already institutionally-recognized ethnic minorities, and that reference was made to the ILO Convention 169 as the main international legal framework, determined the emphasis on mainly cultural elements, even if at times it bordered on exoticization. As argued by some scholars with regards to the legislative identity framing of indigenous groups (Vera Lugo 2006) and afro-descendant people in Colombia (Rossbach de Olmos 2011), these categories are founded on “radical ‘othership’, exoticism and cultural essentialism” (Vera Lugo 2006:206). Arguably, legislative framing of Roma in the Colombian context also reflects these tendencies and is based on an essentializing conceptualization of Roma. Nonetheless, it seems that rather than being imposed (as arguably is the case for the indigenous and Afro-Colombians) this tendency towards essentialism is self-enforced and articulated by Roma themselves. These narratives, I would argue, reflect the application of “strategic essentialism”: “a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest” (Spivak 1996:214). Notably, a similar strategy is pursued in Argentina; after all, AICRA was one of the founders of SKOKRA who contributed to shaping the Quito Declaration. This contrasts strongly with the Spanish context where there are no references to the “tribal character” of Roma and no elements of radical exoticization. It is relevant to underline that Spain has also ratified the ILO Convention 169 (along with Denmark, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Norway), although this policy tool has never been acknowledged as potentially useful by Spanish Romani organizations. Identity as a prerequisite and as a product?

It has already been mentioned that scholars are still to agree whether collective identity in social movements is a prerequisite or indeed a product of mobilization (or can they be both? See, for example, Flesher Fominaya 2010). Some schol201

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ars, such as Barany (2002), argue that collectively shared identity is a condition sine qua non of ethnic mobilization while others argue that collective identity is rather a product of mobilization and that ethnic groups are “made” through the process of framing by activists and leaders (Nagel 1997). Others, such as Saunders (2008), question the existence of collective identity altogether, arguing that “collective identity (in the singular) at the movement level does not exist, but that collective identities do” (Saunders 2008:232). The scholarship suggests that group identity can be analyzed “as both an important precursor and as a consequence of mobilization” (Olzak 2006:38) and that identity may well be used not only as a strategy for empowerment but also as a goal (Bernstein 2008). I argue that, based on my research in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain, while ethnic identity is a precursor of mobilization (in that its existence precedes mobilization), the political collective ethnic identity is simultaneously a goal and a consequence of mobilization, supporting the more recent scholarship on the character of collective identity for ethnic mobilization (Bernstein 2008; Olzak 2006). The existence of Roma as an ethnic group, with a self-consciousness of their cultural and identitarian distinctiveness, is undeniable. Nonetheless, collective identity is not something given; although it may have strong overlaps with other levels of identity (social and individual), it needs to be formulated and expressed for the use of ethnic mobilization (Snow 2001; Snow and McAdam 2000). In this process, Romani activists and leaders construct narratives which articulate these collective identity frames. Through these framings crafted in the process of ethnic mobilization, ethnic identity becomes activated as a resource for mobilization by acquiring a political dimension (Veredas 2004) and, to an extent, influences the content of individual, personal identities. In other words, the content of individual identity frames and collective identity frames overlap to a significant degree; nonetheless, there are also new elements which are articulated by narratives of shared belonging, and which shape the content of personal identities. Consequently, there is a constant interplay between the personal and the political, between individual identities and the collective identity frames—while “identity for empowerment” draws from elements of personal identities, it also shapes personal identities by introducing new meanings which reinforce not only the collective identity, but also the personal one by constructing new perceptions of ethnicity (Roma as a transnational identity) and symbols (for example, the Roma flag). Moreover, ethnic identities are not stable and static, but evolve and shift over time. Likewise, the process of identity framing for the use of ethnic mobilization is a dynamic process—the content and markers of identity evolve over time, frames of iden202

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tity shift, becoming more or less exclusive, and boundaries separating “us” from “others” are redrawn and may become more or less rigid (McAdam et al. 2009; Oliver 2013). When scholars discuss collective identity as a prerequisite of mobilization (Barany), they treat ethnicity framing as if it was static and fixed, without recognizing its dynamic and contextual character. The dynamic character of the identity framing process is influenced by the development of the ethnic mobilization itself—frames of collective interests, the evolution of mobilizing structures, narratives crafted by leaders, and the very context of the external environment in which these take place, affect the way in which collective identity is framed and articulated. In fact, some scholars argue that identity, interests, and structures intersect and are in a constant interdependent relationship with each other (Bernstein 2008). Similarly, Oliver argues that: “Mobilization happens through social networks, and social networks are changed in the process of mobilization; identities shape mobilization, and mobilization changes identities; political and organizational structures constrain mobilization, and mobilization changes political and organizational structures” (Oliver 2013:235). Through this process, collective and individual identities acquire new meanings and interpretations while incessantly informing and influencing ethnic mobilization itself.

Frames of collective Romani interest Along with collective identity frames, collective interest frames are equally important ingredients of ethnic mobilization. They represent the underlying motivations which are at the heart of ethnic mobilization—they respond to the questions “why” and “what,” representing two sides of the same coin. Collective interest frames can be separated into two analytical levels, as suggested by Benford and Snow (2000), into “diagnostic frames” and “prognostic frames.” In this case, therefore, the “diagnostic frame” is the “why”—the identification of a problem, the underlying reasons which justify activism; and the “prognostic frame” is the “what (for)”—which provides ideas for what is required, or claims which, if fulfilled, will enable an improvement of the situation. Both levels are more easily delineated in theory than in practice; often both “what” and “why” are intertwined and mixed together. In the case of Romani ethnic mobilization, what types of collective interest frames are deployed? Why do Roma need to mobilize in the first place, and what type of objectives do they pursue? What are the similarities and dif203

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ferences and what are they caused by? Can we differentiate between different types of “diagnostic frames” and “prognostic frames”? What is the relationship between the frames of collective interests and collective identity? The underlying element of the “why” variable responds to the question of “why are we mobilizing in the first place” or “why is the mobilization necessary.” In all three case studies, the fundamental premise is that of participation or that of “having a voice”; it is assumed that self-representation is a first step in building effective responses to the collective problems suffered by Roma. Nancy Fraser refers to this as “parity of participation,” seen as a requisite for social justice (N. Fraser 1996). These discourses, which justify the need to mobilize in the first place, also work to build up narratives which justify the existence of Romani associations as vehicles of collective action, which represent collective interests and claims of Roma. At the same time, these entities fulfill the role of valid intermediaries between the grassroots and the state. Not only do the associations become useful structures through which the administration can channel services to the community and assist the state in implementing policies for Roma—they, more importantly, become structures which legitimize and channel the collective claims of Roma in the first place. Broadly interpreted and diversely practiced representation becomes the underlying rationale for ethnic mobilization, which justifies ethnic mobilization and at the same time (self-) legitimizes the associations and their leaders as the rightful representatives. The concrete frames of collective interests are not constructed in a vacuum, but understandably respond to specific contexts by both interpreting the reality of the collective group in terms of problems, and at the same time by establishing possible solutions, in accordance with what is deemed feasible and effective for pursuing these specific goals under concrete socio-economic, political, and legal conditions. As such they are both “reactive” and “proactive”; Fuchs argues that “each social movement is reactive in the sense that it reacts to strains and protests against the existence of certain social structures, but each is also proactive in the sense that it wants to transform society and holds certain values and goals that shall guide these transformation processes” (Fuchs 2006:113–114). It is, thus, not surprising that the types of frames of collective interests— or the goals pursued—differ slightly in each country. There are some noticeable differences between Spain—as a European country—and Argentina and Colombia, in Latin America. In Argentina and Colombia alike, in an attempt to overcome their sociopolitical invisibility, Romani activists seek 1) institutional and/or legal recog204

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nition; and 2) cultural preservation and protection. Collective interest frames are built with the objective of increasing the social and political visibility of Roma in order to obtain symmetrical and differential rights as a means to meet specific cultural demands (such as cultural preservation, and promoting and protecting Romani culture as a heritage), as in Colombia; or to seek any type of recognition in the first place, as a point of departure for further political activism, as in Argentina. Thus, institutional and official recognition and a gradual transposition of this recognition into Roma-specific rights and claims is the cornerstone of collective interests. The question of discrimination is also an item on the agenda but to a much lesser degree than in the case of European Romani mobilization. The use of so-called “injustice frames” (Benford and Snow 2000) is much more limited—instead, cultural preservation associated with the politics of recognition (Taylor 1994) is the main center-piece of these collective interest frames. In Spain, on the other hand, rather than culture, Roma claim equal citizenship and justice. Under the specific legal framework in Spain, Roma cannot claim differential rights, which would be deemed as unconstitutional; the lack of formal recognition of Roma as an ethnic minority also excludes them from the frameworks of minority rights protection established, for example, by the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the fact that Roma are a marginalized, excluded, and disadvantaged community, and experience discrimination in virtually all areas of life and social practice, gives priority to those frames of collective interests which respond to these problems which are perceived as the most urgent and prevalent. Thus, in the case of Roma ethnic mobilization in Spain, rather than embracing cultural narratives, more emphasis is placed on socio-economic inclusion and equal citizenship discourses. Consequently, in Spain, the use of “injustice frames” predominates. Nonetheless, by concentrating on marginalization and exclusion (indeed the most urgent problems), this implicitly links Roma to problems, and problematizes Romani ethnic identity. Indeed, Benford and Snow argue that the way in which movements identify “victims” of a given injustice “amplifies their victimization” (Benford and Snow 2000). Such diagnostic framings, which stem from an “injustice” approach, direct attention to the identification and attribution of blame and responsibility for the injustices experienced by the group. From the optic of Roma themselves, the antigypsyist treatment of Roma by the majority societies and the discriminatory treatment by the state are to blame for the historical and contemporary Romani grievances. But there are also counter-discourses built on the purely antigypsyist argument that the Romani culture is partially to blame 205

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for their social and economic disadvantage or for the discrimination they experience. Issues such as poverty, criminality, or low school attainment are ethnicized, instead of viewing them in a broader scope of social phenomena, such as structural inequalities, social injustice, or legacies of oppression or discrimination (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018a; van Baar 2011b, 2014b). Furthermore, in Spain, collective Romani interest frames are influenced by the development of public policies—in fact, we can link the type of collective interests articulated by Roma to the priorities established by the state administration through specific strategies and policies. Thus, while the demands may be articulated as a response to urgent problems, emergency situations, acts of discrimination, or rights violations, they are often shaped as feasible and realistic by already existing policy approaches and the opportunities associated with them (often related to funding opportunities and priorities established by grants or donors, rather than by emerging political opportunities). Nonetheless, it should be noted that parallel to “injustice frames,” Romani activists and leaders also increasingly articulate collective interest frames related to cultural preservation, protection, and promotion. While the premises of the first Romani organizations were based more on claims for equality and social inclusion, over time these became complemented by the increasing salience of cultural claims. In this process, Roma increasingly reaffirm their cultural values and their own cultural distinctiveness not only as a tool of self-empowerment but also as a strategy for countering negative stereotypes and existing prejudice. It should be also underlined that reclaiming and visibilizing cultural heritage also helps to strengthen ethnic pride and boost self-esteem. The focus on Romani culture often becomes a conscious strategic choice. While the question of socio-economic problems and discrimination has been widely acknowledged by the Spanish state and has been addressed through policies and interventions, the questions of recognition, participation, and cultural promotion have not received similar attention. In fact, the efforts of public authorities with regard to Roma are oriented much more towards “the politics of redistribution” rather than “the politics of recognition” (N. Fraser 1995, 2000, 2003). The efforts of Roma to shift this institutional approach towards questions of “the politics of recognition” moves the paradigm of Romani ethnic mobilization towards a framework in which the politics of recognition and redistribution mutually complement and reinforce each other. This resonates well with the work of Nancy Fraser who argues that “justice today requires both redistribution and recognition, as neither alone is sufficient” (N. Fraser 1996:5).

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Mobilizing frames? Frame alignment and frame correspondence vis-à-vis Romani constituency According to Snow, “embedded within the shared sense of ‘we’ is a corresponding sense of ‘collective agency.’ This latter sense, which is the action component of collective identity, not only suggests the possibility of collective action in pursuit of common interests, but even invites such action” (Snow 2001:3). Snow argues that “the shared perceptions and feelings of a common cause, threat, or fate that constitute the shared ‘sense of we’ motivate people to act together in the name of, or for the sake of, the interests of the collectivity, thus generating the previously mentioned sense of collective agency” (ibid. 4). Under this logic, an appropriate combination of frames of collective identity and interests should not only serve the purpose of projecting “a public expression of self” and constructing a deeper understanding of the social positionality of the group—and their related diagnostic and prognostic projections which ultimately provide the function of public and political representation of the group—but should also activate collective agency, by mobilizing constituencies and adherents. But to do so effectively, the narrative of “us” and the sense of shared fate and collective agency need to align well with the perceptions and subjective feelings of the constituent group. In the case of Romani ethnic mobilization in the three countries covered by this book, frames of collective identity face several shortcomings which can weaken their mobilizing capacity. Most significantly, projected public identity frames do not always respond to the plurality and heterogeneity of Romani lifestyles and realities. In fact, case studies suggest that in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization, the discourses constructed 1) evoke common elements of Romani identity and culture, but in doing so they 2) employ rather homogenizing frames. Consequently, discourses of the “public expression of self” tend not to respond to the de facto internal heterogeneity of Romani communities, weakening the “identity correspondence” (Snow and McAdam 2000). The weakness of “identity correspondence”—the linkage or alignment of collective and personal identities—may hinder the resonance of collective frames used for the needs of ethnic mobilization and undermine their potential for empowerment. Furthermore, the imposition of collective identity frames, which assume homogeneity and internal cohesion, tends to reify identity, implying a dominant discourse of authenticity about what “being a Roma” means. Fraser rightfully notes that by “stressing the need to elaborate and display an authentic, self-affirming and self-generated collective identity, it puts moral pressure on 207

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individual members to conform to a given group culture” (N. Fraser 2000). These dominant public discourses may consequently discourage critical or dissident counter-narratives. Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that in Spain, for example, other voices are increasingly emerging which challenge the static view of the collective frame of “who are the Roma” by introducing more plural representations of collective Romani identity(s). Most notably, Romani LGBT, Romani feminists, and some young Romani activists are introducing more diversified narratives into the public discourse, adding new dimensions to the collective identity frames articulated by activists and leaders. The salience and gradual proliferation of these diversified and more plural discourses may eventually produce shifts in dominant collective identity frames in Spain, by evoking different elements of the multiple identities of the Romani constituencies. In Argentina and Colombia, despite the existing diversity within Romani communities, in public life there are scarce dissident voices which would challenge dominant identity frames. Finally, it is important to underscore that the question of the resonance of collective interest frames is not only about their content or articulation but often about the process through which these are communicated to the constituency. Narratives considered as “motivational framing” are not enough in themselves to be a “call to arms” for collective action. The process of communicating these frames may at times be more relevant than the frames themselves. In all three countries, the frame alignment and correspondence is weak, not only due to discursive shortcomings but also due to how these narratives are performed and communicated to the constituent group.

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Mobilizing Romani Ethnicity for Collective Action

I treat ethnic mobilization as a complex socio-political phenomenon, which should be understood as a field of interaction between diverse sets of actors: 1) those involved in mobilization as agents who drive the process of mobilization (both formally and informally, recognizing collective, institutional forms as well as individual agency); 2) those treated as opponents or targets of mobilization, commonly associated with the state and/or powerholders; 3) allies (potential and existing); and 4) bystanders. Furthermore, those actors who conduce the process of ethnic mobilization also interact with their constituencies, in the name of whom they act and who they aim to represent; this is the underlying logic of “internal mobilization.” Nonetheless, in a broader perspective, other sets of actors also interrelate with constituencies of the movement in a variety of ways, leading to an intricate web of interactions and networks. These relationships are multilayered and multidirectional and are developed through a constant interplay between different types of actors who influence each other mutually. It is for this reason that they are also inherently dynamic and change over time. By treating ethnic mobilization as a field of interaction, I echo Minkoff and Clemens’ argument that these relationships also “shape trajectories of mobilization” (Minkoff and Clemens 2007:157). Furthermore, I treat ethnic mobilization as a field which produces and reproduces meaning through specific frames which provide an interpretation of the socio-political realities in which ethnic mobilization emerges and evolves. These frames often differ depending on the type of actors which produce them, the audience these discourses are directed towards, and their shifts over time as a consequence of ethnic mobilization. Moreover, these narratives become powerful tools which infuse collective action with meaning, providing a certain understanding of the social reality and shaping and reshaping identities (both collective and individual). They can also alter public opinion 209

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and socio-cultural practices, and lead to producing social and cultural change, which is as significant as political and policy change (Van Dyke et al. 2004). Such an understanding enables an analysis of the phenomenon of ethnic mobilization through the prism of actors and through discourses and narratives which encapsulate frames and meanings. It is for this reason that I treat the Romani associative movement as a unit of analysis. This approach facilitates a dynamic and relational interpretation of the process of ethnic mobilization and sheds light on how changes within ethnic mobilization are produced and why. To understand these processes, it is important to look at the modus operandi of the actors who drive the process of ethnic mobilization. In this sense, acknowledging ethnic mobilization as a multidirectional and multilayered phenomenon allows us to look deeper into how the actors of ethnic mobilization operate, and analyze the motivations behind their choices. In this chapter, I will discuss the overall mobilizing efforts by assessing the targets of mobilization in interaction with Romani actors. Therefore, this chapter will aim at understanding the workings of ethnic mobilization in the case of Roma, by looking at actors and identity frames in the context of collective action.

Targets of mobilization—why is this important? If ethnic mobilization is ultimately about mobilizing—material and nonmaterial resources, human capital, support, finances, solidarity—in a variety of ways, it is necessary to assess who is at the receiving end of the mobilization efforts. The answer may not always be straightforward—mobilization is a complex process which takes place in multiple directions. In this context, it is relevant to understand not only what resources are mobilized, but more importantly, who is the target of mobilization. To do so, we need to analyze towards whom (or what) are the overall collective efforts of mobilization directed. Reviewing the work of Romani organizations, understanding where they invest their energy, toward whom they direct their communication, and who is their ultimate reference point will provide a better understanding of the strategies, repertoires, and discourses deployed by Romani actors purposefully to achieve collective goals. Furthermore, there can be multiple targets and audiences of ethnic mobilization that are being addressed simultaneously. Different messages can be crafted and distinct strategies can be deployed depending on the target; a skillful adaptation 210

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and alignment of tailored messages to the audiences of mobilization may increase their potential of success. Arguably, the choice of the target is determined by the question of power and real and/or perceived leverage in this relationship of (im)balance of power. Actors may choose to target those stakeholders whom they see as possessing the power, authority, competency, or mandate to influence the change which is demanded in the process of ethnic mobilization. In other words, the identification of the target of mobilization is defined by the objective which the movement itself seeks—it is the objective that determines a feasible strategy based on the identified stakeholder who has the competencies or power to bring a response to demands voiced by the mobilizing structures. In the situation of an evident imbalance of power (if not powerlessness) that the Romani communities find themselves in, the actors need to consciously identify potential leverage points, assessing the possible trade-offs and wins to negotiate concessions with the powerholders. Collective action typically targets the opponent, such as the state or specific authorities, with the objective of accomplishing shared collective interests. However, as much as these actions are directed towards the opponent they are also directed downwards and internally—towards the constituencies. If ethnic mobilization is ultimately about the capacity to mobilize support and harness resources, it is also important to analyze in what ways the mobilization tactics are employed internally. Furthermore, effective mobilization of strategic allies, through the coordination of collective struggles across movements and interests, ultimately increases the political leverage of these struggles. It may also target uninvolved bystanders associated with mainstream society, with the objective of producing broad social change or generating public support. In fact, although traditionally social movements identified the state and its institutions as targets/opponents, most recent scholarship suggests that movements increasingly tend to target societies. Van Dyke et al., for example, argue that social movements use public protest to “shape public opinion, identities, and cultural practices and to pressure authorities in institutional arenas not directly linked to the state” (Van Dyke et al. 2004:27). Bearing this in mind, leaders must effectively choose mobilizing structures, objectives, and strategies and frame them as usable and appropriate; these framings are internal—directed towards adherents and activists of the movement itself—but also external—including bystanders, opponents, and authorities (McCarthy 1996). In this chapter, I will discuss the choice of targets of Romani ethnic mobilization in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain. 211

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Targeting structures of power—external upward mobilization I characterize external mobilization directed upwards (or upward mobilization) as those efforts which are directed at external targets, typically associated with powerholders and the formal institutions of the state and which are regarded as opponents. Indeed, the scholarship suggests that the state structures are the most common targets of social movements (Tilly 1978; McAdam et al. 2009). The governmental structures are, of course, not the only targets of mobilization (Van Dyke et al. 2004; Earl and Kimport 2008; Salehyan and Stewart 2017) yet they remain the main ones. The shifts within “windows of opportunities,” depend to a great extent on the activity of governments and consequently influence the choice of strategies employed by actors engaged in mobilization. In this sense, upward mobilization refers to the ability to advocate for a desired change, assuming it is the responsibility and power of the state to provide responses to the collective interests of a group. My research confirms that in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization the main target of collective action is indeed the state and its institutions. After all, collective action is done “for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority” (Kriesi et al. 2007:11). In Argentina, Colombia, and Spain, most of the energy of Romani collective action is invested in raising a sense of urgency and motivating state institutions to react. The collective goals pursued, the way in which the demands and claims are articulated, and the strategies of pursuing these goals all point to the state as the main target. In all three cases, Romani organizations seek participation and their direct involvement as the interlocutors which represent the interests of Roma. This is the overall rationale of Roma ethnic mobilization, as argued earlier in this book. Representation predominantly refers to political, institutional, and policy-making processes, which rest directly within the competencies of the state. However, different specific demands can be identified in every country. In Argentina, Romani activists articulate demands in three main areas: 1) recognition (in an attempt to overcome their socio-political invisibility); 2) cultural preservation and protection; and 3) non-discrimination (especially when seeking institutional responses in cases of reported discrimination). in Colombia, similarly to the case of Argentina: 1) Roma struggle for visibility and institutional recognition (in order to mitigate the historical processes of invisibilization); 2) Roma seek the means for cultural preservation and protection; and 3) Roma demand the granting of special rights (in symmetry to those attributed to other ethnic groups). While the initial declaration of the applicability of the 212

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principle of symmetry of rights to the case of Roma has been made, its transposition into specific affirmative action measures requires certain political efforts. In Spain, I have identified four broad elements which coincide in most of the demands articulated by Romani organizations, namely: 1) Representation and participation; 2) Equality and social justice; 3) Non-Discrimination; and 4) Cultural recognition and promotion. In all three cases, the power and authority to meet these demands rests predominantly, although not exclusively, with the public authorities and the state. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Romani organizations in these countries tend to focus predominantly on governmental structures. The rationale for such an approach is based on the conviction that in order to bring change to Roma, it is necessary for states and other relevant actors (mainly through pressure which intergovernmental organizations may impose on states) to respond. This strategic choice of target also translates into repertoires of action adopted by Romani organizations and leaders. There are diverse strategies employed by Roma to exercise political pressure over public authorities through bottom-up lobbying in order to influence and negotiate the priorities established by state bodies and institutions, and, consequently, influence funding opportunities. The repertoires of Roma actors range from engaging in dialogue with public administration (on diverse levels of power, from local to international), advocating and lobbying around specific goals and demands, and providing data and evidence on the legitimacy of these claims (through reports, analysis, public statements, etc.), among others. Most energy and efforts are directed at broadly-interpreted political interaction, with the objective of seeking fulfillment of collective demands and claims by public institutions. Beyond advocacy and lobbying, which have been identified in all three cases, Romani organizations establish relationships with diverse policy-actors which serve not only as channels of communication but also, and more importantly, as sites of collaboration and partnership between them. Interacting with the opponent and the “invited spaces”

In what ways specifically do the Romani actors interact directly with their targets—the powerholders? Are there durable channels available through which this interaction is sustained? Romani organizations become vehicles through which Roma exercise their right to political participation and which are recognized as “valid intermediaries between the grassroots and the administration” (Méndez López 213

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2005). Angéla Kóczé argues that “civil society organizations offer a space for a broadly defined political activism” and that “civil society is an extension of the collective politics that influence and transform formal political participation” (Kóczé 2012). Political participation can be understood as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly, by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (Burns et al. 2009:21). Indeed, Romani organizations become those vehicles through which Romani participation can be secured (through formal, established channels of participation) or conduced. The primary channel of interaction through participation between Romani agents and the public administration is done through so-called “invited spaces.” According to Cornwall: ‘invited spaces’, a label that serves to convey the origin of many intermediary institutions as government-provided, whether in response to popular demand, donor pressure or shifts in policy (Brock et al. 2001). Some are more transient in character: policy moments where public space is opened up for deliberation or communication, before being closed again as authorities return to business as usual. Other ‘invited spaces’ are more durable, often taking the shape of regularised institutions modelled on enduring templates such as the welter of co-management committees and user groups that have proliferated in the wake of sector reforms ­(Cornwall 2004:1–2).

In Colombia, the legislative framework creates a number of formal channels through which Roma, and other minorities, can voice their claims and seek fulfillment of their demands. As part of the principles of participatory democracy and decentralization, the government created a number of different sectorial, territorial, demographic, and thematic consultative bodies and spaces. All of these can be considered as “invited spaces.” Likewise in Spain, “invited spaces” emerged through a series of interrelated factors such as the “deliberative turn” in European democracies (Goodin 2008; Steffek 2014) and the emergence and consolidation of Roma-targeted policies, among others (Bereményi and Mirga 2012; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018a). But rather than transient, temporary spaces they became durable platforms which secure Romani voices and participation in political affairs. In both countries, there are also specific governmental bodies (departments) or staff members who are responsible for deal214

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ing with the Romani issues. In Argentina, on the other hand, no such durable spaces of interaction have yet been established, leaving Romani activists with lobbying efforts to meet and dialogue with diverse public representatives in the hope of securing an opening and a more durable space for dialogue. In fact, there are also numerous consultative bodies or working groups organized around different institutions which create a space for interaction between civil society organizations and state authorities. However, so far no such participation has been granted to AICRA, the only Romani organization in the country, despite its repeated requests. Secondly, it should be further noted that while the state provides opportunities for interest groups to be included, consulted, and informed through these “invited spaces,” it also affects the evolution of Romani ethnic mobilization internally. By involving some actors and excluding others, the state legitimizes a chosen number of interlocutors by giving them a monopoly over participation. This can result in internal conflicts and disputes over claimed legitimacy, influence, and control over representation. Furthermore, the establishment of close relationships between a limited number of Romani actors and public administration actors is a double-edged sword—on the one hand, it becomes a channel for continuous dialogue and collaboration, but on the other hand it becomes a site of favoritism, dependence, and more importantly cooptation and contention of dissident or critical voices, which effectively hinders the independence of those actors (Rostas 2012; Laparra Navarro 2007; Bereményi and Mirga 2012). Strategies of containment and the illusion of power

The structures of participation and dialogue created and established by public administration, such as the consultative committees listed above, are useful channels which secure dialogue and direct involvement in decision-making processes. These types of structures, however, can also be tools through which public administration takes control over participation: Local, regional or central administrations search for efficiency, control of expenses, and long-term sustainability of projects, as well as legitimacy of their policies. In order to attain this, public administrations seek the support of different segments of the society, especially of those that usually do not have access to public or formal spaces of participation.[…] administration often instrumentalises participation in search 215

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of interlocutors and to assure social and political control of participation (Bereményi and Mirga 2012:32).

As San Román rightfully observed already in 1999 in relation to the Spanish Romani movement: [...] a golden opportunity for the administration [is] to have a convenient interlocutor, creating the impression of representativeness and democratic dialogue, and allowing [the administration] not to speak with anybody else and avoid social and political responsibilities related to Roma. If Romani NGOs and not the administration are the entities responsible for distributing resources within the Romani community (houses, grants, social welfare, etc.), then not only that [but] all the failures, conflicts and protests are also the responsibility of Roma. (San Román 1999:40)

On the other hand, the establishment of such channels of participation and direct involvement often serves to legitimize policies rather than to provide real opportunities for their influence. It has been emphasized numerous times both by existing scholarship and during my interviews that such consultative committees provide an illusion of influence—typically, these consultative bodies are limited to their counseling status; the recommendations issued by such bodies are non-binding, and members of these committees have neither real decision-making power nor a budget capable of implementing specific actions. In this way, participation becomes a governmental strategy of containing potential conflict with non-governmental claimants—in this case the Romani actors. It is also a way of exercising a certain degree of control over the ethnic mobilization. It was already mentioned that the processes of internal consolidation of different Romani actors in Colombia, and until recently in Spain, were taking place in the context of state-sponsored spaces of Romani consultative bodies rather than through independent, Roma-led initiatives. Finally, it is necessary to critically assess to what extent this ambivalent relationship between Romani actors and state institutions contributes to providing a real sense of power, ownership, and control to Romani mobilizing structures. While building channels and mechanisms through which the involvement and direct participation of Romani actors in policy affairs is secured can be seen as an advance and the achievement of demands for securing “a Romani voice” and participation, it also has to be problematized. Using the classical model of the ladder of citizen participation developed by Arnstein 216

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(1969) can be helpful in understanding the degree of de facto influence and power of Romani actors in matters concerning them. The ladder model is composed of 8 rungs grouped into three levels of involvement: nonparticipation, tokenism, and citizen power. The citizen control level is the highest one, in which power is redistributed among citizens and powerholders through various types of institutional arrangements of joint control and responsibility. Nonetheless, as suggested also by Rostas “In most cases Roma are involved through non-participatory methods or, at best, through consultation and placation.1 No genuine form of participation of Roma, as described by Arnstein, can be observed in Europe” (Rostas 2012:4). Indeed, his assertion also reflects well my own findings from Spain and Colombia: while there are mechanisms of consultation and participation for some Romani actors, these dynamics are insufficient to adequately provide Romani actors with power and control. Often their inclusion and participation serve the purpose of legitimization, and instead of challenging the status quo it might equally contribute to its maintenance. Simultaneously, the involvement of Roma as partners and accomplices of the state works to shift the degree of responsibility away from the state and towards the Romani actors themselves. Ambiguous relationships

Relevant literature suggests that the relationship which mobilizing structures establish with the opponent can be characterized by contention, confrontation, and conflict. Nonetheless, more recent scholarship points to the fact that increasingly these relationships are shifting to be based more on collaboration and bargaining (della Porta 2001). This shift reflects a broad trend of accommodating and including interest groups in the context of the “deliberative turn” and the emergence of new frameworks of governance (Goodin 2008). Structures of power (such as state institutions) establish mechanisms through which collective claims (or broadly interpreted contention) can be accommodated and contained by creating channels of involvement, participation, consultation, and co-ordination (like the “invited spaces” described above). Financial support given to mobilizing structures, their formal involvement in 1 “Consultation gives an opportunity to citizens to express their opinions without any guarantee that they will be taken into account. Placation occurs when a few selected citizens are placed on various boards and committees, usually forming a minority in these structures, without being accountable to the community. The level of citizen placation varies depending on their capacity to define priorities and the level of community organisation” (Rostas 2012).

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policymaking and often joint responsibility over implementation alter the relationship between the opponents (the state) and the interest groups, shifting from confrontation to partnership. This dynamic has been traced in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization— in the case of Europe it is well documented in literature on Romani activism (Kóczé and Rövid 2012; Kóczé 2012; McGarry 2010; Rostas 2009, 2012; Sobotka and Vermeersch 2012; Trehan and Sigona 2010; Vermeersch 2006). In Spain, most Romani organizations depend on public funds; the percentage of funding from public sources is much higher than in many other countries, especially in CEE countries, where the existence of EU grants, international private donors (Open Society Foundations, National Democratic Institute etc.), charities (Red Cross), and international organizations (World Bank, OSCE) is much greater, allowing for a diversification of funding sources. Furthermore, limited know-how and technical capacity, as well as lack of employed staff or even office premises, present barriers for a vast portion of small Romani organizations in terms of being competitive in the struggle for subsidies available through open calls—both those launched by the public administration as well as those by private donors. Financial dependency quite understandably affects the capacity of Romani actors to become watchdogs—interviews reveal that Romani leaders are aware of potential repercussions which may arise from a critical and confrontational attitude towards the public administration. This dynamic of donor-dependency creates a problematic relationship between organizations and the state, and constitutes a channel through which the administration can exercise power and control over organizations (Laparra Navarro 2011; Dietz 2003). Furthermore, it is considered to be an institutionalized form of an assistentialist attitude and approach towards working with Roma. Laparra argues that public administration to a certain extent establishes instrumental relationships with Romani associations, and especially establishes a patron-client relationship with its leaders (relaciones clientelistas): “legitimation of associations and their leaders was based on their ability to raise funds from the public administration resulting in deepening of its political dependence, thus restricting their ability to channel the demands of the group and to build a strategy and a discourse independent of political power” (Laparra 2007:208). In Colombia this dynamic is much less visible but also present. There are virtually no external sources of funding for Romani organizations other than the economic support provided by the government. The state maintains directed relationships with a handful of Romani activists, especially those 218

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based in the capital city of Bogota, and with representatives of both existing NGOs. The limited circle of regular interlocutors creates a monopoly over participation, leaving space for favouritism and dependency. On the other hand, however, the direct relationships between Romani activists and some public officials make the dynamic of negotiation and lobbying much easier. Arguably, the small size of the Romani community in Colombia also means that making concessions to their claims does not translate into a heavy administrative and financial burden. The trade-off is beneficial not only for Roma—in return Colombia can maintain its image as a progressive country which has championed the rights of its Romani citizens. In Argentina, the handful of persistent Romani activists still struggle to position the issue of Roma as a topic of any relevance. Some relationships have been established with individual public officials in the Buenos Aires Municipality and with the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI). Periods of greater political engagement and dialogue have been associated with electoral campaigns but efforts to maintain a durable and long-term dialogue have been elusive and limited. Consequently, the relationship between Romani mobilizing structures and the opponents is an ambiguous and ambivalent one. As much as the structures of power, such as the state, are treated as adversariesy and targets for action, they are also perceived as partners and benefactors; as much as they are considered as opponents they are also seen as accomplices of joint action. This ambivalent relationship has been critically assessed in the scholarship on Romani ethnic mobilization, which has pointed out its negative effects such as co-optation, clientelism, dependency-trap, tokenism, and manipulation. Without a doubt, as states contain social struggles through diverse dynamics of co-optation, participation, and funding, they exert a significant amount of control and influence over the evolution of ethnic struggles. Undeniably, the capacity for Romani mobilizing structures to be challengers and watchdogs is visibly diminished; after all, their very survival depends on the good will of the state administration to continuously support them financially. What is important to highlight in the context is that fact that these ambiguities are by no means unique or limited to the case of Romani ethnic mobilization but are rather representative of the challenges which contemporary civil society, development industries, and social movements are facing. Numerous NGOs and other social movement actors struggle to escape the dependency trap (Reich 2006; Brown and Kalegaonkar 1999; Alymkulova and Seipulnik 2005); the challenge of maintaining a healthy relationship between social 219

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movement actors, the state, and communities themselves remains one of the biggest issues for the civil society sector throughout the world (Howard 2003; Vincent 2006; Banks et al. 2015). Therefore, the case of Roma is symptomatic rather than exceptional. International stakeholders as targets

In the case of upward mobilization, actors can also choose to target supranational structures. This strategy has its logic—international law has supremacy over national legislation. Furthermore, numerous intergovernmental organizations—for example the UN and the EU—have their own competencies and legislation in matters that concern Roma directly, such as minority conventions, human rights standards, protection of minority languages, etc. At the European level, the mutual dependencies and interplay between European developments and national politics are especially evident. The principle of the supremacy of EU law over national legislation has become an important tool which exerts pressure on member states, and the political impact of international governmental organizations (IGOs) can be easily traced. Consequently, in the case of Spain, a number of different institutional and legal tools exist, which originate from international law or are part of agreements and strategies promoted by intergovernmental organizations. Spain, as a member of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), and, especially, the European Union (EU) is bound by numerous international conventions, directives, and rules of international law. The extent to which the conventions and treaties are binding and mandatory varies depending on the IGO. EU directives, in this sense, have the highest political power, even though the EU lacks effective mechanisms and sanctions for enforcing its laws in case of violations. Nonetheless, they provide an incredibly important point of reference for domestic legal arrangements with regards to Roma. In the context of the international Romani movement, intergovernmental organizations have been a natural focal point within which various concerns regarding this population have been raised. For the Spanish Romani activists, the EU especially has been a natural point of reference and a major target of mobilization efforts. It is worth highlighting here that the first Member of the European Parliament (MEP) of Roma background came from Spain (Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, 1986– 1999) and played a significant role in positioning the issue of Roma on the European agenda, and consequently in Spain. 220

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Outside of Europe, the only existing intergovernmental organization which deals with minority-related issues and provides similar possibilities of exercising some degree of external pressure on its member states is the UN. In Latin America, specifically, the UN has played an important role in advocating and increasing pressure on the international community and national governments to grant recognition of minority rights. The 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Declaration on the Rights of Minorities) provides an important point of reference for minority recognition. In 1989, the International Labour Organization (ILO) of the UN established specific regulatory legislation, which has become an important legal basis for the collective struggles of indigenous, afro-descendant, and, eventually, Roma peoples—the ILO Convention 169, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. Furthermore, the issue of the rights of indigenous and afro-descendant peoples has also begun to be included in the most notable international events hosted by international organizations, such as the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, Cairo, 1994), the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (CMR, Durban, 2001), and follow-up processes to these summits as well as in the Millennium Declaration (New York, 2000). Eventually, these developments led to the establishment of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted on September 13, 2007 by the United Nations General Assembly (CEPAL 2009). The declaration was a major milestone for indigenous movements. According to Coates: “[it] should be seen as the culmination of generations-long efforts by Indigenous organizations to get international attention, to secure recognition for their aspirations, and to generate support for their political agendas” (Coates 2013). In the context of Roma specifically, the UN was actually the first international organization that expressed interest in the plight of the Romani people, and over the years various UN bodies have dealt with Romani issues (Klimova-Alexander 2005, 2007a; M. Goodwin 2006). The Roma situation has been scrutinized, for example, by the UN Human Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) for its International Convention (ICERD), and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) for its International Covenant (ICESCR). Within the UN, the 2000 General Recommendation XXVII of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on 221

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Discrimination against Roma2 set out a number of measures to be followed by states. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been strongly involved in Roma, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugee issues as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars. UNESCO expressed interest in Roma as early as 1958 (in an article published in the UNESCO Courier) (Klimova-Alexander 2005). Quite significantly, the UN still remains the only global intergovernmental player that deals with Romani issues. In Colombia and Argentina, the UN has remained an important point of reference for Roma seeking recognition in domestic contexts. Especially in Colombia, as described earlier, the ILO Convention 169 has become a major source of inspiration for Roma, ultimately leading to the granting of symmetrical rights in line with other ethnic minorities. In Argentina, the ILO Convention 169 has been useful for symbolic recognition of Roma as “a people” but the domestic legal constellation with regards to minorities has not resulted in similar gains as in Colombia. In the context of the aforementioned Quito Declaration Convention 169 is mentioned explicitly. What is important to highlight, however, is that the very presence of UN agencies in Buenos Aires, in the context of the 2017 workshop on the situation of Roma in the Americas organized by the UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, brought immediate reaction and visibility to Romani issues in Argentina, even if only temporarily. In contrast to the American continents, in the European context the UN remains a distant target of mobilization, predominantly because other, more immediate targets have greater impact on national policies and practices. Finally, with the rise of populist nationalism and the remaking of the geopolitical global order, arguably we are witnessing the declining power and influence of international organizations, affecting their ability to leverage domestic policy developments or to enforce respect for common rules developed under international treaties. This is particularly visible in the EU (most notably, in the context of BREXIT or the disputes with Hungary and Poland over rule of law, judicial reforms or policies regarding women or LGBTIQ rights, among others); however, some scholars have also pointed to weakening roles of other international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE or the UN (Nanopoulus and Vergis, 2019; Krastev 2017; ElistrupSangiovanni 2020; Dunay 2006; Council of Europe 2021). Concomitant with this, human rights and other international conventions cease to be treated as 2 http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139d4f4.pdf.

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the “gold standard” in international relations, leading some commentators to declare a “post-human rights” world (Stranglo 2017).Consequently, non-state actors, and increasingly Roma activists, are turning back to national-level politics. These broader changes in global politics need to be considered to understand shifts in strategies of Romani actors, on the one hand, and the outcomes of ethnic mobilization, on the other.

Building support and seeking allies—external lateral mobilization Lateral mobilization refers to actions directed at mobilizing external support among actors who are neither part of the group embraced by the collective identity frame (they are not part of the “we” group) nor are they opponents of ethnic mobilization. It refers to efforts at establishing alliances, generating support, and joining forces with other actors (external to Romani mobilization) for the same collective goal. Typically, it is based on building strategic alliances and aligning specific collective interests with other social demands and movements. According to Rucht, lateral mobilization is important as it provides greater political leverage in advocating for collective demands (Rucht 2007). He further notes that “social movements as a whole, or parts of them, may also form alliances with external groups, such as other movements, interest groups, political parties, elites, intellectuals, and media” to maximize the potential of success (ibid.:202–203). More specifically, building alliances can rely on common interests or common values, or shared grievances or goals, which may benefit more than one specific sector of the population. This process can rely on “frame bridging,” “frame alignment,” and “frame amplification” processes (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000) to connect with values, beliefs, and interests of broader circles of people and, specifically, other interest groups. This allows separate movements to engage together for a shared cause or collective goals. In this process, ethnic divides can be overcome and more universal beliefs can be triggered in order to expand the base of a social movement and facilitate the processes of alliance-building, creating bridges across collective interests and different social struggles. Despite being a potentially beneficial tactic for building greater leverage and political support, findings from Argentina, Colombia, and Spain show that building mobilization laterally—across movements through alliances— remains a rarely pursued strategy. Nonetheless, there are notable examples of different types of such initiatives. 223

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In Colombia, interethnic collaboration is important for advancing collective claims and extending bridges across ethnic movements and peoples. The state, on different levels of administration, promotes such interethnic collaboration and creates numerous spaces in which different ethnic minorities can interact and collaborate. Interethnic collaboration is framed to be part of the peace-building process in the country, necessary for social wellbeing and overall social cohesion. Furthermore, in the context of the capital city and the ongoing armed conflict, a lot of refugees from conflict areas came to Bogota, most of them belonging to some ethnic group. In response to the challenges and consequences of the armed conflict, the state created various institutions, mechanisms, and networks in order to also build cohesion through interethnic collaboration and partnership. Interethnic meetings (mesas interétnicas) are created and organized (some as ad hoc consultative groups, others as more consolidated and formal groups which meet periodically) by different levels of administration, but especially on the local level. They provide a space for interethnic exchange and collaboration and, most importantly, represent a space of dialogue between powerholders and ethnic groups. Indeed, while the government provides a lot of spaces for interethnic exchange, the efforts concentrate more on showcasing the ethnic diversity of each of the groups separately although in one venue, instead of funding sustainable and long-term collaboration. There are, however, some positive examples. For some time, in 2000, there was a temporary organization or alliance called the Temporary Union of the Peoples (Unión Temporal Entre Pueblos) which was formed by the Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC, representing the indigenous communities), Consultiva de Comunidades Negras (representing the peoples of African descent), and PRORROM (on behalf of Roma). The objective of the collaboration was to produce a TV series aimed at giving more visibility to cultural diversity in Colombia. Despite the fact that the alliance existed only during the period of producing the TV series, the collaboration was important for Roma and provided hands-on knowledge about the ethnic mobilization processes of other ethnic groups in Colombia. The Roma, especially PRORROM but also the Unión Romaní de Colombia, were inspired by the tone of the discourse, the legal framework used, and the narrative of cultural preservation (or “etnocidio”), traces of which can be found subsequently in the Romani claims. There were other occasions when strategic alliances between Roma and other minorities, most notably with indigenous organizations, were established (Gamboa Martínez 2004). Such interaction has been highly beneficial especially for Roma themselves—it gave them the possibility to participate in meetings and 224

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congresses, but most importantly, it served as hands-on training regarding strategies towards recognition of collective rights. Arguably, such interethnic collective efforts can become a powerful advocacy tool, one that embraces collective claims shared by different people and strengthens mutual support and collaboration as allies in the same common struggle. Unfortunately, Romani collaboration in this regard has been rather sporadic; nonetheless, it should also be considered an effective strategy of ethnic mobilization. In Spain, on the other hand, although interethnic alliances have not been created, there have been numerous experiences of interest or issue-based alliances (most notably around the common issues of peddler-sellers) and alliances built through frame alignment by broadening the struggle to encompass a broader sector of the population, namely in the cases of Romani women’s and Romani LGBT movements. Spanish Romani women have been especially effective in reaching out to other sectors of society by connecting their claims with those of others (Sordé et al. 2014; Sordé Martí et al. 2012; Sordé Martí 2006; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018, 2016; Méndez López 2005). The amplification of identity and interest frames enabled some of them to build strategic partnerships not only with both majority and minority women’s movements. Romani women’s organizations are also more skillful in searching for allies and supporters beyond the Romani community, and especially at connecting the struggle of Romani women with other social movements and agendas. This is especially evident in the context of the fight against domestic violence towards women, in which numerous Romani women’s organizations have been actively participating. Romani organizations have not only subscribed to broader initiatives established by others (such as anti-racist movements) but have also been pioneers in initiating campaigns beneficial to broader sectors of the population, and not exclusively Roma. An excellent example of such an effort is the Federation of Romani Women Associations KAMIRA, which initiated a public campaign to encourage the creation of a nation-wide free legal service for victims of discrimination and hate crimes.3 The increasing use of intersectional approaches (Collins 2017; Jovanović et al. 2015) among Roma actors can be noted—not 3 The rationale behind this campaign, as described by KAMIRA, is the following: “The reason that has prompted the Federation to carry out this initiative is none other than to combat effectively the continuing and disturbing increase in discriminatory and racist demonstrations and acts that the Roma people suffer as much as many other minorities or groups, which in the face of majority society of rule of law, such as Spain, are left without proper legal response.” https://federacionkamira.com/kamira-pide-la-creacion-deun-turno-de-oficio-para-victimas-de-delitos-de-odio-y-discriminacion/.

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only in the case of the Romani women’s movement but also in that of Romani LGBTIQ initiatives. Although these actions still remain somewhat marginal to the mainstream Romani associative movement, they have begun to be increasingly noticeable and relevant. One such organization which activates Romani LGBT individuals and fosters interethnic alliances of LGBT from diverse communities is the association Ververipen, Rroms por la Diversidad (Roma for Diversity). On the other hand, there have been some examples of successful interestbased alliances among Roma and other groups. The example of Coordinadora Marxants de Catalunya (CMC, Platform of Peddler Sellers of Catalonia) is a good case of how goal-oriented, timely, and strategic action can have a positive impact. Coordinadora was a joint platform founded in Catalonia in 2010, which brought together Roma and non-Roma merchants (peddler sellers; vendedores ambulantes) and organizations with the collective aim of defending the rights of merchants in Spain, and more specifically in Catalonia, where it was established. Coordinadora was created to fight against the transposition of the so-called Bolkestein Directive (Services in the Internal Market Directive 2006/123/EC) which directly affects the rights and obligations of merchants/peddler sellers (considered among the typical occupations for Roma in Spain). The organization was led by a Romani pastor and its secretariat was managed by the Federation of Roma Associations in Catalonia (FAGIC). The platform made important gains during the period of its existence. It is an exceptional example of an effective and temporary interest-based initiative, which goes beyond Roma-specific claims and brings together individuals and organizations under a common aim, independently of their ethnicity. Furthermore, in Spain, like in Colombia, a gradual shift towards cooperation across social movements has been triggered and facilitated by state institutions. Several consultative bodies involving social affairs have been created by different levels of public administration, which bring together civil society actors representing diverse sectors, groups, and interests, including Romani representatives. Such is the example of the State Council of Social Action NGOs4 (Consejo Estatal de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Acción Social) which brings together a variety of civil society actors ranging from Roma to LGBT, Church-related institutions like Caritas, and others or the Council for the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination

4 https://www.sanidad.gob.es/ca/ssi/familiasInfancia/ongVoluntariado/docs/Triptico-Consejo-Estatal.pdf.

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of Persons for Reasons of Racial or Ethnic Origin5 (Consejo para la promoción de la igualdad de trato y no discriminación de las personas por el origen racial o étnico) which also includes Romani representation. Similar consultative bodies and councils have been created by different bodies of public administration and at different levels of power (municipal, regional, and national). These state-sponsored spaces facilitate regular collaboration and dialogue between Romani actors6 and other civil society organizations. Beyond the venues provided by the administration, there are also independent networks and federations which bring together social action groups found in civil society. These facilitate exchanges and collaboration between Romani organizations and other entities, thus forging a common front for lobbying and advocacy focused on collective shared goals. Organizations such as Plataforma de ONGs de Acción Social (Platform of Social Action NGOs), SOS Racismo, and anti-racist coalitions such as Unitat Contra el Feixisme i el Racisme (Unity against Fascism and Racism) create spaces for long-term collaboration and dialogue, which increasingly result in a conscious and strategic “frame alignment” process among diverse social actors, including Roma (Benford and Snow 2000). Numerous other initiatives, such as Movimiento contra la Intolerancia (Movement Against Intolerance) and Consejo de Víctimas de delitos de Odio y Discriminación (Council for Victims of Hate Crimes and Discrimination, COVIDOD), promote collaboration across movements and social struggles, while at the same time also generating public support for Roma-specific claims. In Argentina, not many examples of such alliance-building can be identified. Arguably, Romani ethnic mobilization is still in its early stages of development, and a lack of visibility and political success makes it marginal vis-avis other social struggles. Evangelical churches have also been linked to spaces within which such alliances may be produced. While the churches have not expressed a willingness to join in political struggles, they play a very important role within Romani communities, as they operate through extensive networks and commonly engage with Roma, and in some cases non-Roma, followers from across different macro-groups.

5 https://igualdadynodiscriminacion.igualdad.gob.es/elConsejo/portada/home.htm. 6 It should be noted that in both committees mentioned the only Romani member is the Unión Romaní, although the FSG also participates as a pro-Roma organization. Both organizations, due to their institutional recognition, size, scope, and expertise have monopolized spaces for Romani participation in the context of national consultative bodies. It should also be noted, however, that at the municipal and regional levels, other Romani organizations have also begun to participate in similar consultative bodies and platforms.

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Bystanders as allies? Searching for public support

Apart from targeting other specific interest groups or social movements, actors may also choose to broaden their scope drastically by targeting societies at large in an attempt to establish alliances and bridges across concrete sectors of society. In this sense, social movement actors may choose so-called bystanders as targets of mobilization. Bystanders are the uninvolved, passive members of broader society who are external to the movement and seemingly do not benefit directly from the potential accomplishment of the goals of ethnic mobilization. Arguably, the sympathy and solidarity of bystanders can become a powerful resource, capable of shifting the tides in favor of the movement (Tarrow 1994; Vráblíková 2013; Rohrschneider 1990). Favorable public opinion towards the goals sought by the movement can play a decisive role in generating desired and long-term changes. In fact, there is a constant interplay between public opinion and political decisions—after all, “public opinion shapes, and is shaped by, the overall political environment” (Kitz 2016). Focusing on generating mass public support through campaigns and carefully tailored messages which speak to broader values and connect with society at large can be a highly successful strategy. For example, the struggle for gay-marriages and LGBT rights has progressed, in large part, thanks to widening public support for same-sex relationships (Chomsky and Barclay 2010; Brewer 2008; Lewis and Gossett 2008). For Roma, the strategy of capturing the attention of and generating sympathy from the masses around the issue of Roma has remained a major challenge. Roma, especially in Europe, over the last years have been a topic of heated political and public discussion and have received a lot of attention in the mainstream media. Unfortunately, mass media tend to portray the Roma in a rather negative light, contributing to sustaining biased and stereotypical opinions regarding Roma (Friedman and Friedman 2015; End 2015; Bogdan 2017; Messing and Bernáth 2017; Tremlett et al. 2017; Richardson 2014; Oleaque 2014). In public and political discourse Roma have also been an object of racist portrayals (Balch et al. 2013; Cortés 2016). Numerous studies also point to the prevalence of racist and stereotypical portrayals of Roma, as well as the presence of hate speech towards Roma, even among the political elites.7 Consequently, the historical, deeply-rooted antigypsyism against Roma is sustained and reinforced (Carrera 7 https://rm.coe.int/1680718bfd; https://hatecrime.osce.org/anti-roma-hate-crime ; https://www.osce.org/ odihr/roma-sinti-monitoring-infographic.

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et al. 2017; Alliance against Antigypsyism 2016; Selling et al. 2015), leading to the social acceptance of “Romaphobia” among the majority society (van Baar 2014a; McGarry 2017). A similar dynamic, although with lesser intensity, can also be evidenced in Latin America, and in Colombia and Argentina specifically (Izsák 2015; Radovich 2011; Adaszko and Kornblit 2007). In such a context, generating public support and mass sympathy towards the Romani cause remains a major challenge. Awareness-raising campaigns, educating majority societies about Roma as well as generating balanced, positive counter-narratives about the Romani people, need to be emplaced and supported in order to gradually overcome the persistent hate and prejudice towards Roma worldwide.

Internal mobilization—community as a resource? It is impossible to understand the dynamic of ethnic mobilization without taking into account the issue of power, of both the actors and the opponent(s). But for a largely powerless community, such as Roma, what is the source of power and leverage? Arguably, power lies predominantly within it, through its own constituents, adherents, and supporters. Indeed, according to Tarrow, “power in movement grows when ordinary people join forces in contentious confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents. Mounting, coordinating and sustaining this interaction is the peculiar contribution of the social movement” (Tarrow 1994:1). This is why I believe internal mobilization is so relevant for movements to grow and harness enough leverage to generate social change. I define mobilization downwards (or internal mobilization) as the overall sum of efforts directed at mobilizing constituencies—in the case of this research, the Romani population. It refers to the ability to empower members of the group, activate their potential, and promote their direct involvement, thus fostering ownership of the constituency and its leaders in ethnic mobilization efforts. The importance of internal mobilization lies in the fact that the community possesses resources and agency which can be activated for collective use in the process of ethnic mobilization. These resources—moral (such as legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity), cultural, socioorganizational, human (labor, experience, skills, expertise), and material resources (McCarthy and Edwards, 2007:125)—are invaluable to any move229

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ment. Furthermore, the capacity to mobilize mass support—for example, by convoking mass protests—raises the leverage of the movement in political negotiations aimed at concessions to specific demands. Ultimately, politics is a game of numbers—the capacity to convoke and mobilize a large collective of people, either through solidarity and public presence, or as a disciplined electoral bloc, may increase a movement’s bargaining power considerably. In the case of Roma, specifically, who lack vital economic and material resources or links to powerful elites, activating the very presence of constituencies may prove essential, especially in those countries or regions where Roma constitute a relatively numerous population. Frame alignment and internal mobilization

In order to tap into the resources of the community it is vital to adjust and deploy messages and strategies which aim at activating them for the purpose of collective action. Activating the agency resting in the community and/or its individual members may be done through crafting narratives which include so-called “motivational framing” (Snow and McAdam 2000). This framing should reinforce the sense of collective belonging and common purpose and provide a prognosis of the usability of the collective struggle in the first place. Indeed, according to Tarrow: the most common denominator of social movements is thus interest; but interest is no more than an objective category imposed by the observer. It is participants’ recognition of their common interests that translates the potential for movement into collective action. By mobilizing consensus, movement entrepreneurs play an important role in stimulating such consensus. But leaders can only create a social movement when they tap more deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. This is almost certainly why nationalism and ethnicity—based on real or “imagined” ties—or religion—based on common devotion—have been more reliable bases of movement organization in the past than social class (Tarrow 1994:6).

Carefully adjusted collective identity and interests frames, tailored to the perceptions and interpretations of the community and deployed internally, can produce collective action frames which are defined as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns 230

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of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). Weakness in the “correspondence” of frames deployed by organizations with the perceptions and feelings of the community (Snow and McAdam 2000) may hinder the resonance of collective frames used for the needs of ethnic mobilization and undermine their potential for empowerment. In Colombia, all relevant actors (leaders, organizations) are concerned with the representation of their local Romani communities and are oriented towards the external world outside of these communities, such as public institutions, academia, the media, and the general public of the mainstream society. Romani leaders and activists create frames which focus primarily on cultural elements that distinguish Roma from other social groups in Colombia.8 However, little attention has been focused inwards—on working towards the community or aiming at the mobilization of members of the community towards greater participation. Lozano Uribe argues that: it is important to note that while PRORROM has been concerned with advocacy and community awareness regarding certain advantages that the contact with the different state institutions and with the majority society can generate, as an organization it has focused most of its management efforts on work towards the outside, that is, to make the Roma visible before various government agencies whose activity somehow relates to the Romani people. Such an approach led the organization to at times work too autonomously from the community, a fact that has led to misunderstandings and tensions (Lozano Uribe 2005:50). In Spain, while Romani actors craft narratives for the public, targeting institutions, policymakers and the majority-society, they rarely construct narratives which target the community itself. Commonly, Romani leaders engage with the public outside of the Romani community, preoccupied about the need to justify the increasing commitment with Romani affairs or to challenge prevailing stereotypes or prejudices. But there are few spaces and occasions where the Romani leaders engage with the community itself directly, beyond those members who are already part of the associative movement through projects, asso8 The use of “strategic essentialism” tends to provide a cultural and folkloristic image of Roma, in which Romani cultural elements are reified and oftentimes exaggerated. This dynamic corresponds with the process of “re-ethnicization” or “re-indigenization” (Borda 2009), which is a result of the expansion of minority rights and, arguably, may also be the result of increasing self-awareness among members of ethnic minorities.

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ciations, or initiatives. Romani leaders assume the existence of a collectively shared identity—after all, the Romani ethnicity is a lived every-day reality and Roma know they are part of the same ethnic group. Nonetheless, the leaders do not construct frames of what Mary Bernstein calls “identity for empowerment” (Bernstein 2008). She writes: “content of identity for empowerment is critically important for social movements because it affects who is mobilized and what issues are deemed valid and pursued” (ibid. 293). In the case of the Romani associative movement in Spain, however, the importance of addressing the community itself through powerful discourses and narratives, with an objective of mobilizing greater support and participation, is left unattended. This approach is somewhat taken for granted, as the Romani leaders often assume that the strength of collective identity and ethnic solidarity is enough to activate collective agency. Evidence shows, however, that this is not enough. Moreno, for example, argues that “the Romani associative movement does not include an efficient discourse capable of mobilizing its representative basis— the Roma” and he calls for a critical reflection and renewal of the discourses of Romani associations and their leaders in order to re-connect with the reality they claim to represent. According to him, there is a need for a “spectrum of discourses”: These discourses can be elaborated from very diverse instances, but they will not work without efficient mechanisms of debate and consensus in the center of which are the non-associated Roma. Otherwise, we will continue to suffer from self-referential discourses detached from the reality to which they pretend to correspond and useful uniquely for the spurious interests of an impotent oligarchy (Heredia Moreno 2010:13).

My findings from both countries highlight issues of questionable identification and lack of accountability towards the constituent basis, which hinders the level of frame correspondence. I can conclude that there is a detectable level of detachment of Romani mobilizing structures from their constituencies. Grassroots communities do not possess ownership of the process of ethnic mobilization; often unassociated Romani individuals feel that the Romani actors represent their own self-interests rather than those of the community. The case of Argentina is rather different. Due to the immense internal diversity of Romani groups and communities, and the relatively weak ties these groups maintain with each other, it is very difficult for the handful of Argentinean Romani leaders to craft narratives broad enough to be able to 232

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embrace all existing Romani communities and their distinct sub-group identities. There is a general lack of cross-group mutual identification and recognition. The processes witnessed in Europe which essentially bring all communities considered as “Roma” under a unique pan-Roma identity have not influenced Romani groups in Argentina. In fact, AICRA maintains weak links with other Romani groups in Argentina—namely, Calo Roma and Boyash Roma, although their relationships are limited to a small group of individuals rather than entire communities. Through a network of personal contacts and friendships, they maintain regular dialogue with various Romani Kalderash groups, mainly in the Buenos Aires area. There is, however, little participation of Roma community-members in the work of AICRA. Crafting inclusive narratives and, most importantly, searching for bridges of mutual collaboration and support across different groups have yet to be undertaken. Arguably, the question of discrimination could potentially serve as a collective frame for action. The question of cultural preservation and promotion could also be of interest to all of the groups. However, in this context it is also important to question whether the spokesperson—in this case, the only Romani organization—is perceived as valid and legitimate by other Romani groups. Taking into consideration the existing distance between Romani groups, it is difficult for AICRA to be accepted as a representative vehicle for all-Romani claims and interests. Interacting with the constituency

My findings reveal that the question of the resonance of the narratives created by Romani actors is not only about their content or articulation but often about the process through which these are communicated to the communities. Narratives considered as “motivational framing” are not enough in themselves to be a “call to arms” for collective action. The process of communicating these frames may at times be more relevant than the frames themselves. It is equally important to maintain and foster relationships—through direct interaction— between the actors and communities they seek to represent. How do Roma actors in Argentina, Colombia, and Spain interact with their own communities? Despite its relevance, my research in all three countries suggests that the importance of internal mobilization tends to be overlooked or underestimated by Romani leaders and activists. Little attention and limited efforts are put into working directly with the constituencies with the objective of generating 233

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further support or activating the collective (or individual) agency of the community members. In Argentina, the scope of activities of AICRA is very limited. The organization remains under-funded and struggles with securing sustainability and durability for the few projects that the authorities have agreed to support. Some of the events and activities they have organized have been self-funded by AICRA members. However, given the early stage of development of ethnic mobilization in Argentina, most of the activities are directed towards visibility and recognition as a logical choice in an attempt to secure a greater social, political, and institutional presence and consequent expansion. AICRA occasionally participates in cultural fairs and festivals—at these events AICRA sets up a Romani kiosk which offers information and publications (books and music) as well as Romani tea and sweets.9 As stated by AICRA’s president, Jorge Bernal, these events are organized more for the public than the community, and are used as a tool for building increased visibility. In fact, it was explained that during such occasions very few Romani community members participate. Consequently, AICRA as an entity interacts to a limited extent with members of different Romani communities. Unlike the case with AICRA, the Roma communities in Argentina are much more organized around the local Roma Evangelical Churches. As previously mentioned, the Churches and AICRA rarely collaborate—so far, no overlapping interests have been articulated between socio-political activism and the religious mission of the Roma Churches. For AICRA, the strategic challenge lies in how to develop closely-knit collaboration between the organization and the Evangelical Churches. The Church has tremendous mobilizatory potential and great influence in the community. However, up to now, the Church has never become involved in activities organized by AICRA and is rather reluctant, even distrustful, to join forces with it. In Colombia, the majority of the effort of Romani activism is oriented externally—targeting principally government institutions, but also, to a lesser extent, the media, academia, and the general non-Roma public. Emphasis is put on presenting Romani culture, as mentioned earlier, especially through public events sponsored by state—music festivals, dance performances, and concerts, which take place regularly, especially in the capital city. A lot of grants have also been given to Romani organizations for such culture-related activi9 A video of one such cultural fair organized in 2005 can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3bfj5FASGcA.

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ties as producing CDs with Romani music and publishing books. Curiously, very few projects have been implemented beyond these cultural issues. Most energy is dedicated to those projects and activities which serve to showcase Romani culture and identity, rather than to working towards the community. The grants attributed to such activities are generally small, corresponding to the managing capacity of the organization leaders and often reflecting the interests of the organizations themselves rather than those of the community. The lack of direct community engagement in the work of the kumpeñy and organizations, beyond those individuals and often small family circles which compose these formal structures, demonstrates the general rationale of their approach—speaking in the name of the community and community representation. Romani ethnic mobilization in Colombia is aimed at taking advantage of existing opportunities, with an assumed collective benefit for Romani community members, but not so much at community engagement or empowerment. The articulated objectives are imposed by Romani representatives and are not built through a bottom-up process. Naturally, the representatives are part of the Romani communities or kumpeñy in which they live, nonetheless, their perception of what is needed may not necessarily represent the demands of all members of the communities or its diverse sectors (such as women, youth, etc.). Evidently, the Romani actors in Colombia engage in a process of mobilizing externally but not of mobilizing within. In Spain, Romani organizations tend to interact with their constituencies through the provision of services. This has a lot to do with the development of the Spanish model of governance. During the process of consolidation of the Spanish welfare system, the implementation of policies and Romaspecific measures was increasingly transferred from the levels of national/ regional governments to the level of local administration, and most importantly, towards non-state actors—non-governmental organizations and charity entities. Consequently, a vast part of the measures covered by regional and national plans for Roma are in fact sub-contracted, and thus implemented, by non-state actors. This phenomenon of shared implementation of social measures between public administration structures and civil society is not unique for the case of Roma but rather exposes a more general trend in Spain. It also echoes Minkoff’s argument about the shifting relationship between social movements and the state, moving from contention towards accommodating such actors in the context of deliberation, co-ordination, and partnership with the state (Minkoff 2002). Thus, the service provision represents a fundamental and largest source of funding for Romani organizations. The services 235

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provided by Romani organizations can be differentiated between the target groups they serve and the direct beneficiaries of the services provided. In the vast majority of cases the declared direct target and beneficiaries of services are the Romani communities which the organizations serve. Beyond providing services directly to the Romani community members, Romani organizations provide services to non-Roma stakeholders, such as social services, public administration agencies, and institutions (such as schools, hospitals, public transport companies). These services are mainly restricted to mediation and conflict resolution, and to the provision of relevant information and feedback on localized actions implemented by specific state institutions (for example, social services). Interacting with the community mainly through services is not in itself negative. After all, the scholarship on hybrid organizations, which combine service-provision with advocacy efforts, as in the case of Spanish Romani organizations, shows that they can indeed be an effective tool for social change (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005; Minkoff 2002). Nonetheless, it also has important consequences for the relationship that is built between organizations and constituents. Arguably, it reproduces the assistentialist approach to the state-civil society relationship, resulting in the establishment of patron-client relationships between Romani organizations and their communities. Consequently, the community often views Romani associations as another type of public institution, which is expected to provide services and benefits but which is not “owned” collectively by it. Instead of establishing horizontal and reciprocal relationships, which facilitate joint action and partnership, the Romani organizations tend to create vertical relationships, undermining the community’s ownership. In Colombia, on the other hand, the mobilizing structures tend to interact directly even less than in Spain. The general negligence of Romani actors to dedicate efforts to interact with their own community, beyond the limited scope of service-provision or the occasional cultural celebrations, proves that Romani leaders are unaware or underestimate the potential of collective agency dormant within the confines of their own local communities. Romani leaders and activists tend not to see the potential of community agency; the community is not viewed as a resource which can be useful for the overall ethnic mobilization struggle. Leaders tend to hold pessimistic views regarding the possibility of involving the constituency. Rather, the community is perceived as passive and/or uninterested. Since the Romani mobilizing structures in both countries do not establish dynamics of community participation and dialogue, lack mechanisms of accountability, 236

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and often work in a nontransparent and nondemocratic manner, the community has limited input and no ownership over the process of ethnic mobilization. This results in a detectable level of distrust and distance between communities and their mobilizing structures, further hindering the potential for internal mobilization. Instead of mobilization, we can trace dynamics of demobilization among uninvolved community members, which further distances Romani communities from their representatives. Building trust—representativeness and legitimacy

In all cases, Romani mobilizing structures are concerned with their role as representatives of the community but not as organizational forms which are built on the community’s mandate. Romani mobilizing structures become predominantly a site of representation instead of a space for participation. This clearly shows that rather than mobilizing constituencies (internal mobilization, aimed within) associations focus on their representative role, mobilizing externally. In Argentina, there is only one Romani organization and, consequently, the dynamics of ethnic mobilization are not rooted in or proliferated among Romani communities. In general, those outside of AICRA’s activity have little interest to engage in socio-political representation and activism. There is little awareness about the tangible benefits which such public presence could bring to the Romani communities as a whole. Different sectors, such as representatives of the Evangelical Churches, have expressed their reluctance to such an idea and are generally unwelcoming of this type of political activism. Furthermore, Romani communities generally tend to be self-sustaining (self-employed, oftentimes self-taught, etc.) and resolve any arising community problems or tensions themselves, within the community itself. Lack of previous experiences of state-sponsored support and limited knowledge about successful Roma-led campaigns for the recognition and establishment of Roma-specific provisions in other countries makes the question of ethnic mobilization quite unfamiliar to Romani groups. Any type of involvement with state authorities is generally seen with distrust, so this type of activism is often rejected. Political involvement is also perceived as something potentially dangerous—during the time of military regimes in Argentina, those involved in contentious political activism frequently became victims of political persecution. During that period, Roma remained relatively safe and unharmed by the oppressive military regimes as they were completely uninvolved in politics. Jorge Bernal argues that Roma see NGOs and political involvement as “some237

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thing strange”; Romani organizations are often rejected by the population, especially by the elders (like the Romani Kriss) or by the Evangelical Church authorities (Bernal 2003:35). In Colombia, the lack of attention towards the local community through specific activities, the provision of specific services, or merely communication on a regular basis occasionally generates distrust towards the leaders, who are perceived as “doing business” instead of attending to more concrete local needs. Community members, especially those individuals who rarely participate in activism, have very little knowledge about current developments regarding Roma-related policies and events or existing opportunities (as was mentioned in previous sections). The leaders of the kumpeñy and other organizations have not established any dynamics of communication aimed at shaping greater awareness regarding the socio-political situation of their community—any communication is done informally; rarely are there meetings aimed at communicating information to the entire kumpeñy. In fact, Gamboa recognizes this limitation and already wrote in 2004 that: It is noteworthy that since its creation, PRORROM has sought to work out processes of sensitization and awareness within the different kumpeniyi and Romani family groups, while making efforts to bolster the “Roma question” in public institutions and in the so-called civil society in the country. In that sense it has always wanted to work simultaneously with both scenarios, that is, inside and outside, but sometimes it has not been possible so it was necessary to favour one over the other, depending on the circumstances encountered. The distance between the work demonstrated in these two scenarios—internal and external—is due to the times and methods of work that were not synchronized and articulated. It is clear that decision-making and the search for consensus within family groups and Romani kumpeniyi, and dialogue and negotiation with the Colombian State correspond to different dynamics. That is why the challenge PRORROM has in the immediate future is to achieve harmonization of these two dynamics of organizational work, which necessarily involves adequate attendance to real and concrete expectations that the Roma people are building, while continuing the dynamics of dialogue and negotiation with the Colombian State. (Gamboa Martínez 2004:80) In Spain, the inability to mobilize Roma beyond providing them with services has been outlined numerous times as a major weakness of the Romani associa238

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tive movement (Méndez 2005). There are occasions when distrust of Romani NGOs and distance from their local communities are traceable. Interviews with non-associated Roma on some occasions demonstrate this lack of trust towards Romani associations (Fundació Pere Tarrés 2006; Anna Mirga 2011a). Often, those Roma who remain outside of the circle of Romani associations and who do not participate whatsoever, do not feel represented by their local leaders. This is especially made evident by the limited capacity for mobilization on the part of Romani associations as well as the lack of accountability, transparency, and direct involvement of the Romani constituency in their local entities (Anna Mirga 2011a, 2014). Although most Romani associations claim to be grassroots, they often rely on a limited circle of collaborators rather than on community support. While in general terms Romani associations are seen as necessary and useful, the words of criticism are the result of the inability of Romani entities to establish strong ties of permanent dialogue and community involvement. Writing about Romani ethnic mobilization, Rostas rightfully notes that rather than mobilizing constituencies, they tend to target the authorities, and indeed, Roma organizations are more accountable to the donors than to their local communities (Rostas 2009:166). As explained previously, this undermines the degree of representativeness and legitimacy of these structures. The modus operandi of Romani mobilizing structures shows their weakness in becoming “social movement organizations” (SMOs) which are principally concerned with mobilizing constituencies for collective action (Kriesi 1996). SMOs are crucial building blocks of mobilizing structures and of social movements as such. But in the case of Roma, the ethnic mobilization process is not driven downwards (internally) towards and by the constituencies themselves; rather, activism is driven by leaders and activists who remain unaccountable to the communities. Consequently, the Romani community is often implicitly perceived by its leaders as a passive mass of disengaged individuals who are unable to engage themselves, and who are more concerned with their individual everyday struggles rather than with the greater collective good of the Romani people. The Romani leaders need to speak for the Romani communities and represent their interests because the communities themselves are unable to do so. Consequently, the community is not viewed as a potential source of change and power which needs to be activated. This contributes to the perpetual disengagement of a part of the Romani community, which feels ignored and unmotivated. This also has consequences for the real and/or perceived level of representativeness of Romani actors, an aspect which has been raised numerous times 239

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by scholars with regards to the European Romani movement (Barany 2002a; Trehan and Sigona 2010; van Baar 2011b; McGarry 2010). Representation is a tricky thing, especially when we evaluate the “representativeness” of those who claim the role of representatives (Pitkin 1967). John Gaventa brought attention to the need to analyze whose voices are heard (Gaventa 2004) and, consequently, whose voices are being silenced or ignored. Scholarship on Roma has dealt numerous times with the question of representativeness, or the lack thereof, in the case of Romani ethnic mobilization (Vermeersch 2006; McGarry 2010; van Baar 2011c; Tremlett 2009; Andrzej Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Barany 2002b; 2002a; Kovats 2003). Furthermore, the status of associations as representatives is legitimized by their interlocutors—the decisionmakers and public authorities. Those in power determine which of the actors are treated as legitimate interlocutors and are acknowledged as representative of the community. This process is often problematized both by scholars and activists, who recognize the phenomena of tokenism, instrumentalization, and donor dependency, among others. These problems are noticeable as much in Spain as across Europe, and are not limited exclusively to the case of Roma (Aparicio 2011; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Laparra 2007; Rostas 2009, 2012; Trehan and Sigona, 2010). However, as explained earlier, while examining questions of representativeness with regards to Roma and otherwise, it is important to provide nuances and to problematize the very concept of representativeness and/or representation. McGarry (2010), among others, provides a detailed discussion of Romani representativeness. In broader terms, the very concept of representativeness presents challenges, even in its very own recognition; so much so that even the EU recently published a paper discussing the use and meaning of this concept across the member states, finding that “Representativeness has various meanings across the 28 member states and Norway. In practice, few national systems correspond to an unalloyed form of either mutual recognition or legal conformity” (Eurofound 2017:1). In fact, the questions of legitimacy and representation are also brought up when discussing the very dynamic of democratic processes and electoral systems (Parkinson 2006; Przeworski et al. 1999). Major debates about the state of deliberative democracies and representation are taking place both in scholarly circles as well as public and political discussions. Recent contributions to these debates argue that “while representation claims are important, no one kind of representative has perfectly legitimate authority” (Parkinson 2006). NGOs, development organizations (Lister 2003; Atack 1999), governments, 240

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and intergovernmental organizations (Ossewaarde et al. 2008) all struggle with the questions of legitimacy and representativeness. Thus, if we cannot claim representativeness and unquestionable legitimacy even in the most developed democracies across the world, it seems strange to demand such levels of unchallenged representativeness from Romani leaders and organizations, as many scholars writing about Romani politics do. Ultimately, the lack of effort directed towards internal mobilization weakens the overall ethnic mobilization effort by challenging the legitimacy of Romani representative structures, undermining the capacity for mass support, and decreasing political leverage. As a result, Romani actors cannot tap into the broad range of resources of the community and/or individual adherents or constituents, including moral (such as legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity), cultural, socio-organizational, human (labor, experience, skills, expertise) and material resources. We should also not forget about the power of protest and public assembly in social movements; in this sense the capacity to mobilize people for public displays of collective power may be the greatest resource of all. This leads to the question of the type of resources that Romani ethnic mobilization relies on—whether indigenous, generated internally, or externally derived resources—and to what extent their source determines and constrains the scope of activity, tactics, and goals. The literature suggests that externally derived resources come with a cost, namely that of losing a significant degree of autonomy, along with the risk of co-optation and control (Cress and Snow 1996). In the case of the Romani ethnic mobilization analyzed in these countries, Romani actors depend to a significant degree on government funding, and to a lesser extent on private donors; the use of internally derived resources is marginal or absent altogether. This fact leads to numerous problems with regard to the autonomy and self-determination of Romani mobilizing structures.

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Mobilizing for Change? Limits and Potential of Romani Ethnic Mobilization

Romani issue as a global issue—importance of the trans-continental perspective The Romani issue is perceived and treated predominantly as a European issue. Indeed, the Roma are a European minority—their presence outside of Europe is a result of immigration; consequently, in many parts of the world the Roma are perceived as “European” and “white” migrants, a status which they often comfortably assume. It is also in Europe where the vast majority of the global Romani diaspora reside—and it is here that their presence is most visibly pronounced. Significantly, the stereotypes associated with Roma—the problematized, stigmatized status of the “Gypsy” along with historical antigypsyism—are also of European origin. Migrating to other parts of the world, often escaping persecutions and immediate threats to their own security and wellbeing, did not allow Roma to avoid hostility and hate. The centuries of stigma and anti-Roma rhetoric shaped in Europe throughout history travelled across the world and infected the imagery associated with Roma worldwide. It is for this reason that many contemporary non-European Romani communities often engage in dynamics of self-invisibilization as a strategy of cultural resistance and survival. But this perception of Roma being strictly a European issue (or “problem” as many assume) is flawed and, quite simply, erroneous. At least a quarter of the global Romani diaspora resides in other parts of the world, and mainly on the American continents. Looking at the Roma exclusively through a European optic misses the fuller picture of the vast diversity and richness of the Romani people, and the variety of social realities of the everyday experiences of contemporary Romani individuals and entire communities. Looking beyond the restrictive continent-bound focus is enriching, inspiring, and necessary. 243

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Reconnecting the Romani issue globally—across Romani communities and political struggles, as well as across governments—represents an important learning experience and an added value for mutual benefit. Looking back to Europe—lessons for Latin America

Looking back to Europe is especially relevant for the Romani communities themselves. The salient socio-political struggles of many Romani organizations and leaders in Latin America provide a direct source of inspiration— a type of a blue-print of an activist guidebook, which includes not only some successful measures, but also, and maybe more importantly, a lot of failed experiences and bad practices. Learning from failure is an enriching experience and a path to reach success sooner (Edmondson 2011). Despite the limitations of Romani politics in Europe and the number of unresolved problems, Romani ethno-politics has also accomplished some achievements over the last few decades. The development of Roma-targeted policies—strategies and action plans (such as those of the OSCE and the EU), and the continuously growing body of recommendations and resolutions— is also in part due to the efforts of Romani leaders and organizations. The ascendance of the so-called “Romani issue” to the highest levels of the political agenda, both internationally and nationally, and the shifting of the political discourse from a general human rights and minority protection framework to a specific, Roma-targeted, sui generis category in the policymaking of the current National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS) among the EU member states can also be seen as achievements of Romani ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, the direct involvement of Roma in the policy design and policymaking targeting their communities has been consecrated as a principle and is part of a common practice throughout Europe, even if such involvement translates into non-binding consultations or “rituals of participation.” Although, as numerous evidence confirms (Acton et al. 2014; Rostas 2009, 2012; Acton and Ryder 2013), the implementation of the “participation principle” is often superficial and Roma continue to lack real political power, the very existence of such channels of participation is an asset. Thanks to their existence, Romani leaders and organizations have managed to raise awareness around key issues such as the question of Romani Holocaust recognition (van Baar 2011a; MirgaKruszelnicka et al. 2015; Kapralski 2012) and antigypsyism (Alliance against Antigypsyism 2016; Nicolae 2006; Selling et al. 2015; Carrera et al. 2017), leading to important responses on behalf of national and international political 244

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stakeholders. Furthermore, the salience of Romani women and Romani youth agendas, and their explicit mention in policy documents, is also due to the selfmobilization among different Romani interest groups (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017b). Moreover, the decades of Romani political struggle have also resulted in higher political and civic awareness even for the disengaged members of the community; such civic education, if tapped into effectively, may result in greater and better coordinated socio-political engagement. Looking into these experiences in Europe might provide a necessary reference point for Romani activists in Latin America. Even more relevant is the reconnecting and strengthening of ties between Romani leaders across both continents for mutual collaboration and support. The robust kinship ties of individual Romani families—which in many cases remain incredibly strong, especially in the context of more-recent migrations (for example of European Roma to Canada, the United States, Mexico, and Argentina)—can prove useful in building political alliances among Roma. On the other hand, the structures of the Romani Evangelical Churches, which operate through extensive networks of collaboration across the oceans and frequently are much more effective, deeply rooted, and better organized than Romani civic organizations, may eventually also reinforce partnerships in the Romani political struggle. The internet and especially the popularity of social media networks among Roma provide easily accessible channels through which relationships can be built and maintained across groups, countries, and continents. Why Europe needs to look beyond

But for Europeans, gazing towards the American continents is equally important, although for different reasons. Europe is rather focused on itself, and centered on looking inwards, as it has always been. This historical and contemporary Eurocentrism is both a social and political mentality as well as a practice in politics, academia, and research. This outlook also has values associated with it—Europe likes to think of itself as the “First World,” as a space of excellency and prestige, the reference point for democracy and development, and the birthplace for so many other nations as well as institutions. In this imagined self-image that Europe has of itself, there is little room for self-criticism and self-reflection, and limited practice of searching for inspirations elsewhere, outside of the confines of European geography. 245

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My travels through many countries of Latin America are at the root of this realization. Despite the artificial binaries of “developed” and “developing” worlds, of the dichotomy between “North” and the “South,” I found Latin America a vibrant and inspiring place from which Europe can also learn. In spite of its many social, political, and economic challenges, or maybe exactly because of them, Latin American nations are often sites of social experimentation, creative thinking, and testing of new solutions. In urban areas and among rural communities, among mestizo, indigenous, and afro-descendant peoples I discovered a spirit of resistance and social innovation, of surprising entrepreneurship and social organization, oftentimes rooted in tradition and adapted to contemporary realities. The hardship, insecurity, and at times violent conflicts require solidarity and mutual support; the complex ethnic and racial composition of many Latin American communities demands new ways of social negotiation and bargaining, and different narratives on the meaning of social and historical justice. Many of these experiences came as a discovery which I found enlightening in understanding the social realities back home in Europe. In what concerns the Roma, specifically, there are numerous reflections which challenged common assumptions. Firstly, I discovered the European identity as a white society, analyzing it in racial terms. I believe Europeans are yet to discover their white identity and understand the meaning of “white privilege”—a concept largely absent in European discourses but increasingly visible in the Americas. The realization of European whiteness and its uncritically assumed superiority puts in perspective the inferiority and racialization of Roma—as a perceived non-white community. It also made me realize that race is contextual—while European Roma were racialized as “non-whites” in Europe, Latin American Roma were treated as a “European race,” and they assumed their whiteness proudly vis-à-vis other racialized peoples—mainly, the indigenous and afro-descendants. Secondly, it puts into perspective the very assumption of “integration” as the master-frame of the European approach towards Roma. The paradigm of “social inclusion” and “Roma integration” posed by Roma-targeted policies assumes a set of norms which are always imposed by the majority. In this sense, it is Roma who needs to change, implicitly sending a message of “abandoning their ways” in order to enjoy access to full rights as citizens and Europeans. Despite centuries of Roma presence in Europe, their numerous contributions to national cultures and histories, their heritage is excluded from the mainstream narratives, and is under-appreciated and marginalized. The Roma cul246

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ture is not treated as a value and as an enriching element to Europe’s vast cultural and social panorama. Latin American Roma, especially in Colombia, made a contrasting case and adopted a different strategy. Rather than highlight their equal citizenship, they highlighted cultural and ethnic difference in order to underline the importance of the cultural preservation of Romani identity as a national, and universal, treasure. They used the concept of “ethnocide” to denounce assimilationist practices associated with imposed “integration” standards of the majority. They proudly and ostentatiously manifested Romani ethnic markers, especially in public—through speaking Romani or wearing traditional clothing—in order to highlight their vivid cultural legacy and to underline the importance and responsibility of the state to safeguard this Romani patrimony as a national and human treasure. Beyond the very contextuality of these strategies, there is something universal about this approach, namely, that culture should not be suppressed under the hegemony of a “citizenship” defined only by the majority; that cultural rights are human rights; and that social inclusion will never succeed without cultural inclusion. As Europe struggles with generating impact with the efforts of “Roma integration” maybe it is also the time for a critical reflection and realization that the current approach is inherently flawed. The Romani experiences outside of Europe can become an inspiring food-for-thought and point of reference.

Contributions to Romani Studies Importance of a global outlook

In Europe in recent years the “Romani issue” has become a subject of heightened political interest (nationally and internationally) as a result of different social and political processes (such as the enlargement of the EU and the Schengen area). Evidence of the alarming situation of the “largest ethnic minority in the Old Continent”—poverty, discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion from mainstream society—together with the growing visibility of different sectors of civil society have contributed to a repositioning of this issue towards an affair of growing importance in political agendas. However, the political and media debates about the Romani population have largely been limited to Europe. This trend of limiting the perspective on Romani issues to the European context can also be detected in the world of academic research. It should be 247

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noted that the development of so-called Romani Studies has been limited to a European scope for many decades (for example, the Gypsy Lore Society, considered the most important institution that promotes the development of the discipline, was founded in 1888 in Great Britain). Although in many Latin American countries there is an increasing interest among researchers in examining Romani communities, their research often remains outside of the mainstream currents of Romani Studies, which traditionally focuses on Europe. Furthermore, there are very few academic papers that focus on addressing the Romani issue from a comparative perspective that goes beyond the Old Continent (Bereményi 2007; Klímová-Alexander 2007b; Mirga-Kruszelnicka and Kóczé 2016; Rucker-Chang 2018; Chang and Rucker-Chang 2020). Given this dynamic, the development of Romani Studies has been limited by its restricted focus on local, national, and European realities, without the potential of addressing research on Romani communities in all of their breadth of diverse geopolitical, historical, and social contexts, including those reaching beyond the European. As a result of this Eurocentric perspective, Romani Studies is somewhat limited—geographically, methodologically, and paradigmatically—and lacks the necessary plurality of approaches, which are so enriching for the development of scientific disciplines (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015; Acuña Cabanzo 2019; van Baar and Kóczé 2020). This gap in the academic body of knowledge might be a potential new field of research that is still undeveloped. Indeed, gradually Romani scholarship is emerging outside of Europe, not uncommonly prompted by the salience of processes of self-visibilization among Romani communities in Australia, Latin America (most notably in Brazil and Colombia), and in North America (distinctly, with important nuclei of Romani knowledge production in the USA at the University of Texas and, more recently, at Harvard University; relevant initiatives have also emerged at Rutgers University, Columbia University, and New York University, mostly due to the presence of Romani scholars). There are also limitations with regards to scholarship on Romani ethnic mobilization. In recent years, there have been many excellent books and dissertations published which provide an analysis of the process of ethnic mobilization of Roma, some examined from the comparative perspective (Barany 2002b; McGarry 2010; Rövid 2011; van Baar 2011c; Vermeersch 2006). However, most of the existing scholarship on this subject has been geographically limited to Europe, with a few notable exceptions (Klimova-Alexander 2005; Chang and Rucker-Chang 2020). An analysis of the existing literature leads us to understand that the phenomenon of ethnic mobilization has been 248

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framed in purely European dynamics. Nonetheless, in countries of North America (most notably in Canada) and in South America in recent years, Romani communities have been building their own organizational processes (mostly through civil society structures) to make themselves visible and to be recognized as integral parts of the national, cultural, and ethnic panorama (especially in Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and Chile). These processes of ethnic mobilization are relatively younger1 and less mature than in the European case, however, in several countries Romani actors have achieved some institutional milestones. Furthermore, Romani leaders have promoted an initiative of Pan-American collaboration through SKOKRA (Council of Roma Organizations and Kumpanyi of the Americas). The context of the political changes over the last decades, on the one hand, and the struggle of indigenous people, on the other, have had a major impact on the process of emergence of ethnic mobilization among Romani communities in the Americas. Despite this, these processes have still not been sufficiently analyzed by researchers even now, and there are very few academic papers or reports describing these events in Latin America (Acuña Cabanzo 2011, 2008; Lozano Uribe 2005; Paternina Espinoza 2014; Bernal 2003). Comparative analysis of the transcontinental character of Romani ethnic mobilization has yet to become a noticeable trend in Romani Studies. Perspective of the minority scholar and the emergence of Critical Romani Scholarship

Today, with the increasing number of Romani scholars, there is a growing challenge to accommodate them within the existing panorama of Romani Studies (Matache 2016b, 2017; Beck and Ivasiuc 2018; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015; Costache 2018), leading to tensions along the divide of ethnic belonging. Inevitably, the relationship between the researcher and the researched, and the positionality of the scholar writing from a minority perspective become salient issues which require addressing. While this discussion within Romani Studies emerges rather late, looking into contributions made by other scholars writing from a minority position offers a deeper reading into the current situation. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere: “debates regarding the importance that ethnic background bears 1 Nonetheless, it should be noted that some claim that the first Roma organization set up in the Americas was the E Tsoxa e Lolí (Red Skirt) cooperative, founded in 1920 in the United States (Bernal 2003:34).

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on researchers have been taking place for some time among other minority or ‘subaltern’ groups across the world (for example, in the US, Canada, Australia, and numerous countries of Latin America). The ascendance of Indigenous, Aboriginal, and Afro-American individuals, to name a few, to ranks of academic distinction has provoked reflections regarding the relationship between the researcher and the researched, and the importance of the voice ‘from within.’ Post-colonialist and feminist paradigms, and the analytical frameworks offered by critical race theory and intersectionality, among others, provide an adequate theoretical background for these reflections” (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015:43). In fact, the very development of these academic strands is a consequence of the academic salience of minority voices and their direct involvement in knowledge production. Looking into the experiences of other minority groups may prove instructive for understanding the emerging Romani scholarship within Romani Studies and its importance for the discipline, namely, through the dynamic development of Critical Romani Studies. Indigenous scholarship is a good case at point. Some indigenous scholars aregue that indigenous scholarship emerged “as an alternative mode of engagement with knowledge to the dominant mode of Western research” (Coghlan and Brydon-Miller 2014:430) to tell “the history of Western research through the eyes of the colonized” (Tuhiwai Smith 1999:2). The development of an Indigenous academic agenda is aimed at challenging and critically reflecting on the knowledge produced about their own communities by Western researchers or under Western scientific influence. Moreover, it aimed at reflecting indigenous, rather than Western, ontologies and epistemologies (Coghlan and Brydon-Miller 2014:430). Similar agendas are being or have been developed by academics belonging to other minority or “colonized” groups. Rigney rightfully notes that “the continuation of Indigenous scholars’ engagement with the intellectual traditions of their cultures draws upon the emergence of a broader global intellectual movement through which the ‘colonised’ and the ‘marginal’ speak back to the ‘centre’” (Rigney 2001:7). The development of “subaltern” scholarship is not only a process in which the “the marginal speak back to the centre” but also in which scholars increasingly turn inwards, exploring their own ways of knowing. In fact, Battiste (2005) argued that the very emergence of Indigenous scholarship rooted in Indigenous epistemology should be perceived as “acts of intellectual self-determination” through which Indigenous scholars develop “new analyses and methodologies to decolonize themselves, their communities and their institutions” (Battiste 2005:1). Such “intellectual decolonization” can 250

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be witnesses among other “subaltern” groups and is increasingly also becoming part of Romani scholars’ agendas. In fact, with the growing number of Romani scholars, new narratives of identity and subjectivity are central in Romani knowledge production. For example, Ioanida Costache convincingly writes that Roma identity both serves as an oppressive social category while at the same time empowering people for whom a shared ethnic group provides a sense of solidarity and community. In re-conceptualizing, reimagining and re-claiming Romani-ness, we can make movements towards outlining a new Romani subjectivity—a subjectivity that is firmly rooted in counterhistories of Roma, with porous boundaries that both celebrate our diversity and foster solidarity” (Costache 2018).

Native, Indigenous, First Nations, and Afro-American Studies have experienced similar transformations as those which are now lived in Romani Studies and were able, at least to some extent, to overcome tensions and challenges of writing from the standpoint of the minority scholar. Relevant institutional accomplishments can be noted, as, for example in the case of scholarship regarding First Nations in Canada and the US: First Nations Studies have become a well established branch of science, as reflected by the numerous departments located within universities. Likewise, First Nations scholars have ascended to the ranks of academic importance as professors and faculty members. A similar path of development is possible in the case of Romani Studies as a consequence of the increasing number of scholars of Romani background and their gradual inclusion in academic mainstream currents. I have argued elsewhere that the emergence of such scholarship, promoted by scholars who have typically been treated as objects of study, does not necessarily have to be confrontational. Rather, dialogue between exogenous and endogenous voices helps to refine methodologies, establish synergies of approaches, and contribute to the development of academic discipline by establishing a body of knowledge based on complementarity and a plurality of voices. That may be the case for Romani Studies as well with the progressive development of Romani scholars, the inclusion of their voices in the mainstream currents of scientific debates, and their critical engagement with the legacy of Romani Studies as it has developed over the years. The opening up 251

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of Romani Studies to new, alternative discourses may help to establish approaches for Romani intellectuals to write and speak about each other, combining their outsider and insider status with a foundation on principles of academic rigor and quality” (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2015: 44-45).

All of these provide a path to the establishment of the so-called Critical Romani Studies. Notably, non-Roma scholars have also played a significant role in the emergence of Critical Romani Studies as a distinct scientific branch. The rise of Romani scholarship and the ongoing calls for inclusive, participatory, and balanced research on Roma has also provoked a reflection among some nonRoma scholars. In fact, over the last few years, an increasing number of contributions have been published by non-Roma scholars which deal with reflexivity and positionality (for example: Dunajeva 2018; Fremlova 2018; McGarry 2010; Ryder 2015; Silverman 2018; Tremlett 2009, 2014; Vajda 2015). Inspired by critical theories such as intersectionality, feminist theories, queer theories, critical race theory, and critical whiteness theory, they provide much-needed insight into how knowledge on Roma is produced and the implications of positionality in influencing research agendas. In 2015, Violeta Vajda made a powerful call for employing critical whiteness theory in Romani Studies (Vajda 2015). She raises essential questions about the structural positionality of white non-Roma scholars in a monoculture and monological vacuum, calling out the “invisibility of white positionality.” She argues that “the project of Romani emancipation will have difficulty moving forward until the concept of critical whiteness is incorporated into it, both theoretically and practically” (Vajda 2015:48). Carol Silverman, a non-Roma scholar, activist, and performer with over three decades of dedicated work with Roma, in a response to current discussions about who produces the knowledge on Roma and with what agendas, turns the focus of inquiry on herself, assessing the various shifting, overlapping, and at times contradictory roles she has occupied throughout her years of research (Silverman 2018). In her convincing and personal account of her own positionality vis-à-vis Romani subjects, and inspired by critical whiteness theory, she makes a call for a “reflexive turn” in Romani Studies, arguing that “while self-examination of knowledge production is useful for all researchers, for non-Roma it is mandatory because historically non-Roma have held more authority” (Silverman 2018:77). She further stresses the importance of accountability of scholars for their words and actions. 252

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In a similar spirit, Lucie Fremlova examines positionality and reflexivity of a non-Romani scholar by critically examining non-Roma researcher identity and its accompanying privilege (Fremlova 2018). In an insightful account, Fremlova constructs a convincing argument about the methodological and theoretical implications of a non-Roma researcher’s status. By “queer(y)ing” ethics and methodologies of enquiry, and through queer theorizing, Fremlova makes a valuable contribution to the discussion on reflexivity in Romani Studies at the intersection of multiple identities and positions. She argues that “there is an urgent need for non-Romani scholars engaging in what is sometimes referred to as ‘outsider research’ to consider and incorporate the topics of researcher positionality and reflexivity on a much larger scale” (Fremlova 2018:104). Fremlova concludes with a listing of suggested questions which each and every non-Roma researcher should ask themselves in order to reflect on their own positionality and privilege. Likewise, Jekatyerina Dunajeva examines critically her own research experiences while conducting fieldwork in a Romani settlement (Dunajeva 2018). She reflects on interactions and the power dynamics between the researcher and the informants during research, concluding that all researchers “must still be sensitive to asymmetries of power in the context of interactions” (Dunajeva 2018:139) and how this informs and influences the outcomes of research and, consequently, the academic knowledge produced. The above-mentioned examples are essential contributions to contemporary polarized discussions in Romani Studies. Not only do they represent a developing ethical practice committed to the quality of academic knowledge as well as the respectful and dignified treatment of Roma, they also open up new fields of inquiry in Romani Studies and undeniably push the discipline towards development. At the same time, the emerging reflexivity of nonRomani scholars and the inclusion of positionality perspectives paves the way to academic reconciliation across the Roma vs. non-Roma divide. Ultimately, the emergence of Romani scholarship and the unraveling practice of reflexivity in Romani Studies are an opportunity for the development of Romani Studies, and in particular, for its critical branch. The ascendance of authoritative Romani voices within scientific debates helps to unravel internal tensions, gaps, and incongruences within Romani Studies. It also opens up Romani Studies to new approaches, different inquiries, and innovative avenues of research, in accordance with ethical guidelines necessary for inclusive and respectful research with Romani communities. With the growing popularity of the “Roma issue” in the academic world, it is increasingly 253

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necessary to develop such ethical guidelines and adequate research protocols. Furthermore, as Romani scholars, but also increasingly their non-Romani colleagues, confront the legacy of Romani Studies developed over the decades, we observe a gradual revision of the body of knowledge developed on Roma, exposing its limitations, incongruences, and, occasionally, scientific racism (Acton 2015). This emerging momentum is reflected institutionally as well—the establishment of the Romani Studies Program at Central European University (CEU), the recent establishment of the Department of (Critical) Romani Studies at Södertörn University (SH), the development of the Roma Program at Harvard University, and the visible expansion of the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture (ERIAC), with its connect knowledge-production thematic section—enables Romani scholarship to be rooted in mainstream academic settings. More importantly, the commitment to critical theories and their growing visibility—thanks, among others, to the Critical Romani Studies Journal (CRSJ) and the annual Critical Romani Studies conferences—contribute to the gradual decolonization of curriculums and methodologies.

Romani agency in world politics—possibilities and opportunities Romani ethnic mobilization and the potential for collective agency

Romani ethnic mobilization—as the overall continuum of Romani activism observed throughout the world in its diverse manifestations—has several decades of history. In this process, Roma have accumulated collective experiences. The expertise, political networks and connections, created structures and institutions, and especially the knowledge gained over these years constitute invaluable capital which should be put to the collective use of Romani ethnic mobilization. There have been some political gains and important achievements, and many failures along the way. Nonetheless, Romani leaders and entire communities should treat this decades-long history of Romani civil rights struggle as a source of pride and inspiration. At the same time, however, a process of critical self-reflection is needed, which should include a sober dose of self-criticism but also self-praise. Evaluating the Romani ethnic mobilization strategies, their milestones and pitfalls should serve as a resource for a re-assessment of future approaches in the fight for the rights of Roma throughout the world. Especially in Europe, the limited impact in the everyday lives of Romani communities, despite investment and efforts, is 254

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a cause for concern. More importantly, it is urgent to consider the development of Romani politics in relation to the current global socio-political context and the declining importance of “Romani issues” in the face of new challenges and political priorities in Europe. The increasingly hostile environment for Roma (as well as other minority and migrant groups)—traceable by the emergence of the securitization discourse on Roma (van Baar 2014b; Bărbulescu 2012; van Baar et al. 2018) and the rise in hate crimes2—will continue to raise obstacles for the success of Roma-led political endeavors. The impact of these rapid political changes on the Romani politics and the situation of Romani communities has yet to be understood and critically analyzed in full. One thing progressively becomes clear: as the global political context becomes increasingly more hostile and as the past decade of financial investment in Romani plans and strategies brings little substantial improvement, more voices coming from Romani leaders and thinkers themselves arise, calling for the need for a renewal of the Romani movement. In offices of Romani organizations, in corridors of public institutions, in conferences and during coffee breaks, in blogs and Facebook posts, seemingly the process of self-reflection and self-criticism has already begun, sparked by the realization of the need to reinvigorate Romani politics. It seems also clear that if the so-called Romani movement is to be ready to face the challenges of the near future and to adapt to the quickly changing socio-political environment, there are a number of issues which will have to be attended. Traces of these changes are already visible. My findings from Argentina, Colombia, and Spain, as well as existing scholarship, seem to be pointing to the essential role of engaging directly with community members. I believe that Romani stakeholders need to increasingly engage with their own communities through what I regard as internal mobilization (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2016). I define internal (or downward) mobilization as the overall sum of efforts directed at mobilizing the resources, human capital, and support of the Romani constituencies. In the case of Romani politics, however, efforts are predominantly directed externally—at targeting authorities and institutions of power. Likewise, Romani mobilizing structures are concerned with their role as representatives of the community but not as organizational forms which are built on the community’s mandate. Much less energy is invested to engage communities in a meaningful way, through horizontal and reciprocal relationships. Furthermore, Romani stakeholders remain more 2 Council of Europe. 2016. “The situation of Roma and Travellers in the context of rising extremism, xenophobia and the refugee crisis in Europe.” Council of Local and Regional Authorities, Resolution 403(2016). Available at: https://rm.coe.int/1680718bfd.

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accountable to their donors than to their own constituencies (Rostas 2009). Indeed, Romani representatives seldom view their communities as a resource, appreciating their human capital and acknowledging the potential collective agency that the communities themselves possess. Mobilizing internally may also contribute to attending the long overdue problem of questionable legitimacy through greater community ownership, transparency, and accountability. Such an approach towards community members—viewing them as building blocks of the so-called Romani movement—may result in a critical mass of supporters, allies, and adherents and, consequently, enhance the political leverage of Romani stakeholders; after all, politics is a game of numbers. Internal mobilization is also key for transforming political activism through civil society structures into political leadership in formal politics. In order to challenge the evident lack of power in relationship with the state, Roma need to increasingly integrate into structures of politics; this is necessary to secure the decision-making power and control over implementation. Access to resources, especially political and financial capital, can be best advanced through direct involvement in the structures of power. Internal mobilization can also provide greater electoral power and, consequently, greater bargaining power, at least in countries and regions with a significantly-sized Romani population. Roma in world politics

What is the future of Roma in the context of geopolitical developments and global politics? What are the chances of Roma becoming a global issue of political relevance? There are numerous essential uncontrollable factors which remain unpredictable, and which will shape the future of Romani politics. As we witness the social and political landscape change rapidly, in which the very values on which Europe is founded are endangered, Romani actors will need to skillfully adapt to these new political conditions in order to secure the wellbeing of Romani communities in the future. However, some foreseeable trends are relevant. Firstly, especially in Europe, Roma are a demographic force—in some CEE countries Roma constitute a significant percentage of national populations; there are also numerous regions and municipalities where Roma constitute a relevant size of the population. These demographics will necessarily provide a context to unraveling Romani politics. Likewise, Roma constitute a sizable potential workforce, which to a 256

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great extent remains unproductive. As European societies get older and Europe faces the challenges of a limited workforce, the relatively young age of Roma society may see Roma emerge as a resource which will need to be activated for the benefit of the mainstream society. Understanding this as a long-term strategy, both by Roma themselves but also by the political leaders, will hopefully push away the tactics of short-term gains towards a longer-term vision. Secondly, as European societies become increasingly more hybrid, complex, and multi-cultural, Europe needs to craft new master-frames of national identity, citizenship, and, ultimately, belonging. Contrary to the current trends, with growing nationalism and the expansion of the far-right, Europe will eventually need to come to terms with the growing diversity of modern societies. The increasing closing of European societies is indeed a reflection of the state of European democracy. Back in 1993, in the midst of the process of European reunification, Václav Havel said that the treatment of Roma is a litmus test for European democracies (Kamm 1993). Indeed, the way we treat Roma is a reflection of the condition of our democracies. It speaks less of Roma and more of who we are as societies; it is rather symptomatic and revealing—giving testimony of deeper problems affecting European democracies. In this sense, the “Romani problem” is in reality a problem of the majority society. So, the poverty and marginalization Roma face is not “inherent” to Roma culture but is a proof of historically unjust and unequal societies. The intensification of antigypsyism is yet another evidence of our societies growing more intolerant, radical, and closed. Social cohesion and sustainability, and indeed peaceful development, depend on the capacity of European societies to see diversity and plurality as an advantage and an added value—and not a threat. In this sense, looking beyond Europe—to multi-cultural countries of Latin America—may provide ideas for alternative conceptualization of national identities and citizenship. Finally, if the Romani issue is to become a global issue, I believe that the leverage for this recognition should come from Europe. It is necessary to expand and consequently put into practice the discourses of transnational Romani identity, promoting narratives of ethnic solidarity and unity, and seeing the existing diversity of Romani identities not as an obstacle but as a source of cultural wealth. Growing recognition of the status of Roma as a global diaspora will also come with the increasing visibility and presence of Roma from other parts of the world. Until relatively recently, many non-European Romani communities used the strategy of self-invisibilization as a means of cultural survival and a mode of ethnic resistance. The Roma communities I met through257

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out my travels in Latin America were very closely connected with Romani traditions—by European measure, we would tend to consider them as much more “conservative” and attached to traditional lifestyles than Romani communities residing in Europe. On the outside, however, in relations with the non-Roma majority and in public spaces, Roma would rather hide their ethnicity behind their national background. An ethnic “coming out” in many cases would not be seen as beneficial—on the contrary, the distrust towards public institutions and the collective memory of discrimination and persecutions makes the process of exposing Romani ethnicity somewhat risky. Dynamics of ethnic mobilization in Latin America emerged most successfully in those countries where incentives and tangible benefits could be identified. It is therefore a challenge in crafting messages of ethnic solidarity and pride, which would equally point to foreseeable collective benefits of recognition. While difficult, I believe that this process is feasible and necessary. Roma are a global diaspora whose very existence and cultural survival, in spite of centuries of discrimination, persecution, and assimilation, represents a unique case of cultural resilience.

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The research which inspired this book has been developed at a strikingly different time than today. In 2010, and during the decade that followed, the world was still struggling with the aftermath of the global financial crisis (2007– 2008), but there seemed to be a broader political and social consensus built around the democratic process and universal democratic values, at least in much of the northern hemisphere. Particularly in Europe, the political climate was favorable and had important consequences for Roma—in 2011, the EU Roma Framework was just launched and the Decade for Roma Inclusion was to continue until 2015. States generously supported civil society and encouraged deliberative processes in policymaking. Since then, so much has changed. Multiple political crises—national, regional, and global—have produced rapid tectonic shifts in the makeup of democracies around the globe. The spread of illiberal democracies in Europe, radicalization and polarization of societies, increasing nationalism, and the rise of far-right extremist groups across Europe and beyond have visibly affected the everyday lives of millions of people. Furthermore, the shifting balances of power in global politics, growing instability and armed conflicts, the increased movements of peoples (migrants and refugees), as well as the climate crisis have all resulted in shifting political priorities. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020 has only increased the pace of democratic decline and pushed the world towards even greater insecurity and instability. All these developments have critically affected the situation of Romani communities and the potential of success of their political struggle, in Europe and globally. Undoubtedly, the current socio-political landscape has changed and continues to shift, in many respects for worse, making the work of Romani actors—and their potential political leverage—more difficult than a decade ago. As political support for Romani rights declines, Romani leaders need to reassess their current priorities, strategies, and tactics and carefully re-articu259

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late their demands to ensure that Romani issues remain relevant for the major developments and priorities in world politics too. While the outlook is grim, there are also some notable developments which are positive. On the one hand, the changing political landscape produces, as was argued in this book, political opportunities. In Spain, for example, the global financial crisis led to a profound political crisis leading to questioning of the decades-long bi-partisan monopoly over the Spanish political scene. As a result, new political parties emerged, many rooted in local assemblies, and with direct links to communities and grassroots movements rather than to established political elites. While many new political formations emerged on the left side of the spectrum, on the other side of the spectrum a radical right-wing party VOX became a significant new player as well. The shifting political scene also created openings for Romani politicians who joined new parties and managed to achieve significant political gains. The 2019 parliamentary elections produced an unprecedented result for Roma in Spain as four Romani parliamentarians, from four distinct political formations, entered the Spanish Congress: namely, Sara Giménez (Ciudadanos), Beatriz Carrillo (PSOE), Ismael Cortés (En Comú Podem), and Juan José Cortés (Partido Popular). With the growing number of Romani voices in political debates, Romani demands were also articulated with more force, leading to some advances: for example, in 2021 the Congress unanimously approved the creation of a parliamentarian sub-commission tasked with developing the “National Pact against Antigypsyism.”1 In Andalusia, partly as a result of consistent lobbying by Romani advocates, among them the Grupo de Investigación Bernó Strategies, for the regulation of the status of flamenco and its recognition as a Romani heritage,2 legislation for a regional law on flamenco was concluded in 2021. After many years of advocacy, Romani history and culture will also be included as part of the formal school curricula, with relevant educational materials developed with significant input from Romani authors and published in 2021.3 On the other hand, the current crises required a reorientation on the part of Romani activists and a shift towards a different modus operandi. In the last years, grassroots community groups, oftentimes without formal legal personalities but with a structured movement-building dynamic and clear leadership, 1 https://www.europapress.es/epsocial/igualdad/noticia-congreso-aprueba-unanimiddad-subcomisionlograr-pacto-estado-contra-antigitanismo-20210520181435.html. 2 https://www.canalsur.es/noticias/cultura/el-parlamento-reivindica-al-pueblo-gitano-como-creador-delflamenco/1559386.html. 3 https://sede.educacion.gob.es/publiventa/d/25684/19/0.

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have emerged as powerful new stakeholders in many countries across Europe: ARESEL in Romania, AVAJA in North Macedonia, Opre Roma in Serbia, Roma Standing Conference in Bulgaria, to name a few, appear as professionally-built networks which focus on harvesting community power in service of well-defined and strategically deployed collective political goals. Some of these grassroots movements projected strength towards their own communities too, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, which disproportionally affected Roma (Jovanovic and Korunovska 2020); as the state of emergency among Roma became more acute, community-driven responses were more visible visà-vis the absence of state support. Worthy of mention are the new Romani-led institutions which strive for durability and aim for exercising relevant influence in their corresponding fields, including the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture (ERIAC), the Roma Entrepreneurship Development Initiative (REDI), the Roma Education Fund (REF), and the Romani Studies Program at Central European University (RSP CEU). The shift from fragmented and localized organizations to powerful sectorial institutions may help to provide leverage vis-à-vis majority stakeholders in each of these particular fields, at national and international levels; it may also be an indication of entering a stage of greater maturity in Romani ethnic mobilization. All the above-mentioned structures diversify the landscape of Romani mobilizing structures. Beyond Europe, Romani ethnic mobilization continues. In Colombia, in 2016, the government finally signed a peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla group, ending an armed conflict which lasted for the past five decades. The difficult Peace Process also contemplates reparations to victims belonging to ethnic groups, which were particularly affected by the conflict. In this context and in the frame of the 2011 Decree 4634, in recent years activities and publications have been released by the government to facilitate the process of individual and collective reparations of Romani victims.4 While the panorama of Romani ethnic mobilization remains unchanged, Romani activists continue to seek visibility and presence in public and political affairs. The latest of these steps of strategic visibility, and with potential impact, is the candidature of Ana Dalila Gómez Baos, who is running for the Senate in the upcoming legislative elections in 2022 as a candidate of the leftist Fuerza Ciudadana.5 In Argentina as well, consistent lobbying activities, even if driven only by a limited number of actors, have borne fruit. In 2018, a space of dialogue 4 https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/asuntos-%C3%A9tnicos/orientaciones-generales-para-lasv%C3%ADctimas-rrom-o-gitanas/14181. 5 https://anadalilagomezbaos.wixsite.com/my-site.

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between Roma, the Argentinean authorities, and other stakeholders was finally established (Mesa Nacional de Diálogo Romani), with the objective “to continue carrying out concrete actions of inclusion and promotion of rights.”6 In 2019, a legislative initiative proposed to establish April 8 as the National Day of Romani People and Romani Culture.7 In 2021, the Chamber of Deputies of the province of Salta unanimously approved the project that proclaims the Provincial Day of the Romani People and the Day of Romani Culture, the first province in Argentina to do so.8 In 2018 Salta was the province chosen to carry out a pilot survey on the social situation of the Roma People, possibly laying the foundations for more comprehensive mapping of Romani people in Argentina. While the landscape of Romani ethnic activism in Argentina has not changed dramatically and continues to be led by a single formal Romani organization, these achievements may also become incentives for awakening Romani political consciousness among more community members and non-Roma allies. On the regional plane, Romani organizations continue to maintain connections around the SKOKRA coalition, albeit without funds. Nonetheless, despite the remote character of current working dynamics, the growing digital interconnectedness among Romani individuals and groups online, facilitated by social media, helps them to stay in touch. Some links of dialogue extend to the non-Spanish speaking communities too, galvanized by the growing interest in American Romani histories among scholars on both sides of the Atlantic.9 Ultimately, the success of Romani ethnic mobilization in meeting its collective demands is not only important to Romani people themselves but is in the interest of the non-Romani majority too. There are moral, social, and economic arguments which reveal the multiple ways in which societies at large can benefit from a thriving Romani community of fellow-citizens in their corresponding countries. On the one hand, Roma are a young and demographically growing community which is a potential workforce for the many countries facing demographic decline and aging societies. On the other hand, Romani heritage—tangible and intangible—as well as the notable values and qualities of many Romani societies (such as community strength and resilience, adapt6 7 8 9

https://www.argentina.gob.ar/derechoshumanos/promocion/pluralismo/comunidad-romani. https://www.hcdn.gob.ar/proyectos/proyecto.jsp?exp=3727-D-2019. https://www.pagina12.com.ar/349780-el-pueblo-gitano-busca-celebrar-su-dia-y-su-cultura-en-salta. See for example the 2019 conference “Neglected Roma Voices: the Global Roma Diaspora.” For more information: https://romanistudies.ceu.edu/article/2019-04-03/neglected-voices-global-roma-diaspora.

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ability and flexibility, multiculturalism and “in-betweenness,” and conflictresolution through mediation and dialogue) are the still untapped riches that majority societies can embrace and seek inspiration from. Finally, the capacity to accommodate difference (real or perceived) in increasingly more diverse, hybrid, multicultural, dynamically changing societies is essential for the years ahead. Social cohesion and sustainability, and indeed peaceful development, depend on the capacity of majority societies to see diversity and plurality as an advantage and an added value—and not a threat.

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Index

antigypsyism, 8, 54–55 , 60, 74–76, 78, 93–98, 118–119, 125, 127, 184–185, 191, 228–229, 243–244, 257, 260 Argentina, xv, xvii–xviii, xxi, 3, 6, 14–15, 85, 88–89, 94, 97, 102–108, 113–119, 128–130, 134–137, 142, 146–148, 155–157, 160, 163, 165–167, 170, 173, 178, 180, 186, 189–191, 193, 195–198, 200–202, 205, 208, 211–212, 215, 219, 222–223, 227, 229, 232–234, 237, 245, 249, 255, 261–262 Bernal, Jorge xviii, 83–89, 96–97, 103, 115, 117, 135, 137, 147, 160, 190, 197–198, 201, 234, 237–238, 249 Brubaker, Rogers, 22–23, 50 civil society, 8, 19–20, 50, 54–58, 61, 70–71, 80–81, 100, 102, 110, 127, 129, 131, 136, 147, 152, 154, 156, 158, 161, 173, 175, 214–215, 219–220, 226–227, 235–236, 238, 247, 249, 256, 259 collective action, xvi, 2, 7, 16, 21, 26, 29–31, 34–39, 41–42, 44–45, 57–58, 64, 90, 94, 145–146, 155–156, 169, 177–178, 181, 183, 204, 207–212, 230, 233, 239 Colombia, xv, xvii–xviii, xxi, 3, 6, 14–15, 72, 85, 87, 89, 92, 94, 98–99, 102–104, 108– 110, 119–123, 130–132, 137–13–9, 142, 146, 148–150, 154–157, 159, 162–165, 167, 170, 173, 175–176, 178–179, 186, 188–190, 192–193, 195–198, 200–202, 205, 208, 211–212, 214, 216–219, 222–224, 226, 229, 231, 233–236, 238, 247–249, 255, 261 contentious politics, 26, 29, 32, 46 ethnic identity, 10, 21–24, 26–27, 30, 63, 66, 95, 134, 185, 194, 196, 202, 206 ethnicity, xiii, 2, 7, 9–11, 20–26, 31, 41, 69–70, 85, 95, 105, 108, 111–113, 116,

118–119, 135, 154, 181, 183, 191, 195, 203, 209, 226, 230, 232, 257–258 external mobilization, 212 framing, 15, 27–29, 31, 39–41, 45, 48, 50, 82, 95, 98, 101, 103, 156, 181–187, 189, 193, 195, 200–203, 206, 208, 211, 230, 233 FSG, xxi, 142, 151, 227 Gheorghe, Nicolae, xviii, 2, 48–49, 52–53, 58, 81, 164, 169, 179, 240 Gomez, Ana Dalila, 149, 163, 195, 261 Hall, Stuart, 23, 50 Hancock, Ian, xviii, 48–50, 52–53, 83–85, 88 Holocaust, 55, 76–77, 87, 197, 244 internal mobilization, 16, 44–45, 209, 229– 230, 233, 237, 241, 255–256 invisibilization, 84, 88, 96, 106, 118, 191, 212, 243, 257 Kriesi, Hanspeter, 21, 27, 33–34, 36–37, 42, 58, 64, 145, 155, 177, 212, 239 Kumpeñy, 121–123, 138, 150, 164, 170, 175, 179, 192, 235, 238 Leadership, 13, 16, 27, 30, 32, 36, 38, 49, 52–53, 58, 60, 71, 81–82, 123, 141, 145– 146, 149, 156, 163–165, 168–171, 173, 182, 256, 260 McAdam, Doug, 25, 27–30, 32–36, 38–41, 46, 54, 59, 94, 101–103, 145, 155, 169, 177, 202–203, 208, 212, 230–231 McGarry, Aiden, 12, 50, 52–53, 59, 62, 75, 80–81, 96, 179, 184–185, 218, 229, 240, 248, 252 mobilizing structures, 15, 29, 31–33, 35–38, 41, 43, 45–46, 50, 57–59, 60, 81, 101, 143, 145–146, 150, 155–157, 159–160, 165, 171–172, 178–180, 203, 211, 216–217, 219, 232, 236–237, 239, 241, 255, 261

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Olzak, Susan, 20–22, 24–25, 28–30, 35, 41, 49, 102, 181, 202 participation, xiv, 10, 37, 45–46, 50–51, 53, 62, 78, 80, 82, 99, 123, 127, 131, 139, 141, 152–154, 156–163, 176–179, 204, 207, 212–217, 219, 227, 231–233, 236–237, 244 political mobilization, xiii, xvi, 21, 24, 49–50, 56, 66, 70, 107, 110, 150 ,183, political opportunities structure, 25, 27, 31, 33, 46 positionality, 25, 27, 31, 33, 46, 94, PRORROM, xxi, 138, 148–150, 160, 165, 175, 195, 224, 231 Ramirez Heredia, Juan de Dios, xvii, 133, 141, 152, 197–199, 220 representation/representativeness, xiii, xv, 5, 13, 16, 27, 37, 48, 50, 52–53, 80–81, 103–104, 109, 119, 146, 150, 154–155, 157–158, 160–165, 174–175, 177–180, 186, 189, 192, 204, 207, 213, 215–216, 227, 231, 235, 237, 239–241 Romani ethnic mobilization, 1–2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14–16, 19, 35, 48–50, 52–53, 55–60, 63–65, 72, 76, 82, 88–90, 94, 99–101, 103–104, 111, 123, 134, 136, 139, 143, 145–148, 154–157, 162, 164–165, 170–173, 176–177, 179–180, 183, 187–189, 194,

199, 204, 207, 211–212, 215, 218–219, 227, 235, 239–241, 243–244, 248–249, 254, 261–262 Romani ethnic movement, 172 Romani Studies, xiii, xv, xviii, 9–12, 15–17, 83, 184, 247–254 SKOKRA, xxi, 89–90, 93, 196, 201, 249, 262 social movement, xxi, 15, 19–21, 31, 36–37, 41, 50–51, 54, 58, 169, 171, 205, 219, 223, 228–231, 239 Spain, xv, xvii, 1, 3–6, 14–15, 61, 66, 80, 84, 92, 94, 102–104, 111–115, 119, 124–127, 132–134, 139–142, 146–148, 150–162, 164–166, 168, 170–171, 173–175, 177–178, 186–190, 192–200, 202, 205–206, 208, 212–214, 216–217, 218, 220, 223, 225–226, 231–233, 235–236, 238, 240, 255, 260 Tarrow, Sidney, 25, 27, 29, 32–34, 46, 48, 169, 228–230 Tilly, Charles, 24–25, 27, 29, 33, 46, 169, 212 Van Baar, Huub, 50–51, 53–56, 74–75, 81, 95–96, 98, 179, 184–185, 190, 206, 229, 240, 244, 248, 254 Vermeersch, Peter, xviii, 12, 21, 25–27, 38, 5051, 53–56, 58, 77, 79–81, 98, 169, 172, 177, 179, 181, 218, 240, 248

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