Confucianism and Enlightenment: Contemporary Chinese Thought from the Perspective of Philosophical Understanding and Mergence 9819954703, 9789819954704

Table of contents :
Introduction
Reviving the Thoughts on the Ancient-Modern and Chinese-Western Issues
Contents
Part I The Finality of Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Outlet for Contemporary Chinese Thought
1 Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Intellectual History of Thirty Years: Centering Around Li Zehou 李澤厚
2 Cultural Nationalism: Hedgehog-Like or Fox-Like?
3 How Do Modern Intellectuals “Take the World as One’s Own Duty”: Regarding the Approach of CAO Jinqing 曹錦清
3.1 Which Tradition Does Cao’s Approach Belong to?
3.2 How to Comprehend the Significance of Rural Investigation?
3.3 Elite Education as an Intermediary Between Social Construction and National Construction
Part II The Revival of Confucianism and Confucian Socialism
4 On Contemporary Confucian Political Arguments
5 The May 4th Movement, Confucianism, and Enlightenment: Reflections on the Issue of “Feudal Autocracy”
6 New Confucianism in Mainland China and Confucian Socialism: Taking Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 As an Example
6.1 The Emergence, Purpose, and Problems of Modern New Confucianism and Confucian Attitude Toward Socialist China
6.2 Liang Shuming and the New China
6.3 How to Inherit the Legacy of the First Generation of New Confucianism in Mainland China?
7 Philosophical Understanding-and-Mergence of Confucianism and Marxism
7.1 Feng Youlan’s Version of “Harmony Philosophy” and Its Problems
7.2 Would Confucianism Think “Conflict Will Necessarily Be Reconciled and Resolved”?
7.3 The Significance and Status of “Harmony” (He 和) in Dialectics
7.4 The Significance and Status of “Harmony” (He 和) in Confucianism
7.5 Guiding “Harmony” (He 和) Toward “the Mean” (Zhong 中)
Part III Philosophical Understanding-and-Mergence & the Ancient-Modern and Chinese-Western Issues
8 Political Comparison Between Philosophy and Theology: On Plato’s Symposium
8.1 Analysis on Different Voices in Community of Logos: Structure and Theme
8.2 The Reason of the Polis: Political Theology of Eros
8.3 Socrates’ “Honest Remarks” and the Eros of Political Philosophy
8.4 Monologue in Dialogue: Two Kinds of Immortality
8.5 The Purpose and Danger of “Honest Remarks”
8.6 The “Truth” Told by the Drunker: Why Does Socrates Conceal His Teaching?
8.7 The “Shepherd” Issue in the Gospel of John
9 Translating What One Knows is Impossible to Translate
10 A Discussion on Several Translated Terms of Die Grundprobleme Der Phanomenologie
10.1 Sein, Dasein, and the Relevant Terms
10.2 Wahrheit and the Relevant Terms
10.3 Sorge and the Relevant Terms
10.4 Zeitlichkeit and the Relevant Terms
10.5 Wahrnehmen, Wahrnehmung, and the Relevant Terms
10.6 Selbst、Ich、Ego
11 On Different Interpretations of Being: Philosophizing and Modernization of Chinese Thought from the Perspective of Debates on Translated Terms
11.1 The Debates on Translated Terms and Problems Derived
11.2 The Absence of the Ontology of Copula Verbs in Chinese Thought: A Defect or a Blessing?
11.3 Concluding Remarks
12 On Being and Change (Yi 易): Phenomenological Guide to the Way (Dao 道)
12.1 Investigation and Dismantlement of the Original: After Sein Und Zeit
12.2 The Limits of Philosophy and Plato’s Allegory of the Cave
12.3 The Deformation and Destruction of the Cave Allegory
12.4 Concealedness as the Manifestation: The Complete Reduction of the Original Phenomenon
12.4.1 Being, Change (Yi 易), and the Original Phenomenon as a Whole
12.4.2 The Issue Concerning the Guidance of Xing 形 and Xiang 象 in the Book of Changes: Centering Around Xi Ci Zhuan 系辭傳 (the Appended Remarks of the Book of Changes)
12.4.3 Conclusion: Ereignis and the Life-Giving Force
Postscript

Citation preview

Confucianism and Enlightenment

Yun Ding

Confucianism and Enlightenment Contemporary Chinese Thought from the Perspective of Philosophical Understanding and Mergence

Yun Ding School of Philosophy Fudan University Shanghai, China Translated by Yanyan Zhao New York, NY, USA

ISBN 978-981-99-5470-4 ISBN 978-981-99-5471-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1 Jointly published with SDX Joint Publishing The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: SDX Joint Publishing. The work was supported by “China Classics International”. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Introduction

Reviving the Thoughts on the Ancient-Modern and Chinese-Western Issues Both the ethos and characteristics of the academic thoughts in China have been changing dramatically over the last decade. During that time, the research tradition and the academic discipline were highlighted, which—in comparison with the last century—shall be considered as an extension as well as an enhancement of the academic atmosphere penetrating in the 1990s. However, when it comes to the whole vision concerning the issues in discussion, the past ten years responded to and furthered the spirits of 1980s instead. It is more than obvious that China has made considerable progress in modernization to the extent that certain inherent—and even fundamental—problems of modern society have sprung up in a more explicit way. The mainstream in the 1980s was characterized by longing for the modern society that indistinctly appeared, which therefore served to give an overview of modernity in a rough, yet generally integral, way. Such a longing for the modern society continued in the 1990s. However, due to the dramatic divergence of the society and academic disciplines which is a significant dimension of modernization, the 1990s lost the vantage point to survey the past and future as in the pivotal 1980s. But it’s another story concerning whether the 1980s, at the point of transition, has made observation comprehensively and calmly enough along the way. The mentor of the 1980s in China was Immanuel Kant, while both Max Weber and Martin Heidegger, who symbolize the polarization of Kant, led the trend in 1990s. Considering the fact that Chinese academic realm was dominated by social sciences in the 1990s, the influence of Heidegger shall be inferior to Weber at that time. In this sense, the thought in this period was primarily grounded on modernization, while the philosophical reflection on modernity was secondary. Although the so-called reflective perspective has already been included in Weber’s thought, the reflective standpoint implied in modern social sciences per se was still implicit in the 1990s. There’s another advancement in the 1990s, namely certain theoretical exploration v

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has been done on the political construction of modern society, with the purpose of compensating the practical stagnation in the 1980s. The process of modernization has been developing rapidly during the past 20 years, which facilitated the Chinese to get clearer understanding of the modern society. Meanwhile, the things we enjoyed and the price that have to pay have never been so concrete. It is life itself that leads us to reexamine modernization. Those scholars who haven’t lost their sharp minds, no matter what approach they take in our time, would inevitably reach the age-old question on the ancient-modern and Chinese-western issues. However, this seemingly sole big question raised in the 1980s actually dates far back, namely it’s also an age-old question that haunts the modern history of China ever since the very beginning. For the Chinese, the reason for the recurrence of the ancientmodern question was certainly not that similar debates had been carried out sometime in Europe. Rather, it was due to the whole life course we had been encountering since the modern times that we revived the ancient-modern question. The ancient-modern question necessarily entails the issue of relations between different civilizations, which has its origin within the modernity per se, while pointing to external possibility of transcending modernity. Whenever the society encounters dramatic change or gets to the fork, there will be a new round of debates on the ancient-modern and the Chinese-western issues taking place in the modern thought of China with no suspense. Counting from the late Qing Dynasty when the modern thoughts in China originated, the debate this time shall be considered as the fifth one. The first four debates of the same kind were launched, respectively, during the time around the Hundred Days’ Reform (1898), the New Culture Movement (1919), the debate over social history (1930s), and the initial stages for the reform and opening up (1980s). Among all of these, the first three debates turned out to be the herald of a more thorough revolution, while the fourth one the herald of reform which reactivated the motivations that had been oppressed by the themes of revolution entailed in the first three debates beneath the history. Of all the debates on the ancient-modern and Chinese-western issues, the opportunity for the debate this time is unique. If all previous debates took place before the anticipated arrival of the modern society, then this time we revive the debate in the development of both our experience and the experience of other countries gathered in the process of modernization. Possibly due to the reason above, the debate this time—when compared to the previous three ones—shows more reflection on modernity and more tender feelings toward our tradition. Such feelings based on understanding even propelled some Confucian scholars to transcend the New-Confucianism dated from May 4th Movement, directly inheriting the tradition of studying Confucian classics prosperous in the Qing Dynasty. In this sense, the debate this time bears more resemblance to the one happened in the late Qing Dynasty. Of course, the debate this time is still different from the late Qing Dynasty in the sense that the latter occurred in the process of breaking away from the tradition, stepping into the modern time, and tributary system falling apart, while the former takes place in the modern time. Therefore, the debate this time starts more with the

Introduction

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modern fate of humanity per se and the position of contemporary China in the world. The position is always the starting point—if not the basis—for reflection. Meanwhile, the debate this time is continuous with that in the 1980s on the one hand, while being distinctly different from the latter on the other hand. The similar case applies to the relation between the debate happened around the time of New Culture Movement in 1919 and that over social history in1930s. To sum up, the debate this time is directly inherited from the thoughts in the 1980s. The expectation of 1980s for modernization is summarized in the thoughts of enlightenment at that time, giving priority to the ancient-modern issues while being supplemented by the Chinese-western ones. Meanwhile, the reflection this time is indirectly inherited from the debate on Chinese tradition (which can be generalized as Confucianism) ever since the late Qing Dynasty, taking aim at the Chinese-western issues while taking the ancient-modern ones as arrows. This book titled Confucianism and Enlightenment actually aims at delving into both the ancient-modern issues and the Chinese-western ones, which are interlinked ever since the late Qing Dynasty. One might wonder whether such a momentous big question can be studied in such a little book or small articles. My answer is that if the key ideas couldn’t be made clear in such a little book, then a greater quantity of books wouldn’t help. Meanwhile, as long as the big question is evaluated properly, the book would serve to hit the target even in a small length. To illustrate this point, one need to look no further than the previous four debates which are usually carried out in the form of newspaper articles. One might still ask, considering that the social sciences in China since 1990s have developed rapidly, why not study such a big question through academic discipline? My answer is that academic knowledge and academic discipline are not necessarily one. The scholarship in the form of academic discipline has its own advantages and disadvantages, which becomes the mainstream nowadays. Those who are able to innovate and make contributions beyond the realm of academic discipline have become fewer and fewer. The difficulties faced by Chinese academia nowadays can mostly be attributed to the limits of “academic discipline”. To steer clear of the narrow-mindedness and disorganization which might lead to the termination of the study on Chinese thoughts, the key is to perk up and set up a brandnew atmosphere. My early academic life was benefited a lot from the academic masters of 1980s. Although my academic achievement is not as great as theirs, I never deny my spiritual identification with that decade. In this sense, please allow me to extend the spirit of 1980s and maintain the freedom to explore the truth through keeping a proper distance from the so-called academic discipline. Although this book is a selected volume of my articles written in the past ten years, it turns out, unexpectedly, to have a consistent system. In this sense, no individuals can detach themselves from the rhythm of contemporary thoughts even if they are unaware of it. The book is divided into three parts—Enlightenment, Confucianism, and Philosophy. The central concern is to explore the ancient-modern and Chinesewestern issues from different perspectives and levels. The part of enlightenment gives a general review on the main trend of thought evolvement in the past 30 years and discusses its possible outlet. In this way, the ancient-modern issue is incorporated into

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the Chinese-western one. The part of Confucianism is unfolded in the context of the new debate on the ancient-modern issues, aiming at remotivating new possibilities of Confucianism in times of post-enlightenment. The above two parts are mostly thought comments. The basis of the ancientmodern and Chinese-western issues is that of “the substance and its use” (tiyong 體 用), which is, in its own form, a philosophical issue, or at least a corresponding issue to philosophy. Such an issue in western philosophy essentially concerns noumenon, while in Chinese philosophy it is an issue of “the substance of the Way” (daoti 道 體) and “the nature of the heart/mind” (xinxing 心性). It is quite rare to consider the ancient-modern and Chinese-western issues from the perspective of “the substance and its use”, which requires great wisdom. And those who are able to elaborate on the issue of “the substance and its use” philosophically and in turn evaluate the spiritual histories of both the ancient-modern and the Chinese-western accordingly shall be masters. Due to the limits of my knowledge, though vaguely seeing the point, I am not able to unfold it specifically. Therefore, I list, in the part of Philosophy, the outline of thoughts that I came up with in the past ten years, especially my elaboration on methodology and the problem theory, while the integrity of the structure needs further exploration. Throughout our normal life, the period of ten years is not short at all. But such a period is far from being enough from the perspective of the thoughts on both the ancient-modern and the Chinese-western issues this time. China—and perhaps the humanity as a whole—has reached a critical moment again. Most of the platitudes about the human future pale compared with the critical moment this time which is full of complexity and difficulty. Contemporary Chinese thinkers who are able to activate the classical resources through reflecting on the contemporary have the traditional ability to solve big problems, which may help the humans find a new way out. Let’s hope so, endeavor to do so, and witness so. Summer 2011 Shanghai, China

Contents

Part I 1

The Finality of Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Outlet for Contemporary Chinese Thought

Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Intellectual History of Thirty Years: Centering Around Li Zehou 李澤厚 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2

Cultural Nationalism: Hedgehog-Like or Fox-Like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

3

How Do Modern Intellectuals “Take the World as One’s Own Duty”: Regarding the Approach of CAO Jinqing 曹錦清 . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Which Tradition Does Cao’s Approach Belong to? . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 How to Comprehend the Significance of Rural Investigation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Elite Education as an Intermediary Between Social Construction and National Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part II

25 27 28 30

The Revival of Confucianism and Confucian Socialism

4

On Contemporary Confucian Political Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

5

The May 4th Movement, Confucianism, and Enlightenment: Reflections on the Issue of “Feudal Autocracy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

6

New Confucianism in Mainland China and Confucian Socialism: Taking Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 As an Example . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Emergence, Purpose, and Problems of Modern New Confucianism and Confucian Attitude Toward Socialist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Liang Shuming and the New China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 How to Inherit the Legacy of the First Generation of New Confucianism in Mainland China? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

69 72 78

ix

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Contents

Philosophical Understanding-and-Mergence of Confucianism and Marxism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Feng Youlan’s Version of “Harmony Philosophy” and Its Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Would Confucianism Think “Conflict Will Necessarily Be Reconciled and Resolved”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The Significance and Status of “Harmony” (He 和) in Dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 The Significance and Status of “Harmony” (He 和) in Confucianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Guiding “Harmony” (He 和) Toward “the Mean” (Zhong 中) . . .

81 82 84 87 89 91

Part III Philosophical Understanding-and-Mergence & the Ancient-Modern and Chinese-Western Issues 8

9

Political Comparison Between Philosophy and Theology: On Plato’s Symposium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Analysis on Different Voices in Community of Logos: Structure and Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 The Reason of the Polis: Political Theology of Eros . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Socrates’ “Honest Remarks” and the Eros of Political Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Monologue in Dialogue: Two Kinds of Immortality . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 The Purpose and Danger of “Honest Remarks” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 The “Truth” Told by the Drunker: Why Does Socrates Conceal His Teaching? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 The “Shepherd” Issue in the Gospel of John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97 99 100 101 102 103 105 107

Translating What One Knows is Impossible to Translate . . . . . . . . . . 111

10 A Discussion on Several Translated Terms of Die Grundprobleme Der Phanomenologie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Sein, Dasein, and the Relevant Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Wahrheit and the Relevant Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 Sorge and the Relevant Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 Zeitlichkeit and the Relevant Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Wahrnehmen, Wahrnehmung, and the Relevant Terms . . . . . . . . . 10.6 Selbst、Ich、Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 On Different Interpretations of Being: Philosophizing and Modernization of Chinese Thought from the Perspective of Debates on Translated Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 The Debates on Translated Terms and Problems Derived . . . . . . . 11.2 The Absence of the Ontology of Copula Verbs in Chinese Thought: A Defect or a Blessing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

119 122 123 124 126 126 128

129 130 133 137

Contents

12 On Being and Change (Yi 易): Phenomenological Guide to the Way (Dao 道) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Investigation and Dismantlement of the Original: After Sein Und Zeit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 The Limits of Philosophy and Plato’s Allegory of the Cave . . . . . 12.3 The Deformation and Destruction of the Cave Allegory . . . . . . . . 12.4 Concealedness as the Manifestation: The Complete Reduction of the Original Phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.1 Being, Change (Yi 易), and the Original Phenomenon as a Whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.2 The Issue Concerning the Guidance of Xing 形 and Xiang 象 in the Book of Changes: Centering Around Xi Ci Zhuan 系辭傳 (the Appended Remarks of the Book of Changes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.3 Conclusion: Ereignis and the Life-Giving Force . . . . . . .

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139 141 147 152 163 167

172 177

Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Part I

The Finality of Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Outlet for Contemporary Chinese Thought

Chapter 1

Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Intellectual History of Thirty Years: Centering Around Li Zehou 李澤 厚

Abstract Aiming at providing a relatively concise clue to the complex historical process of the past 30 years after the event of reform and opening up, this chapter reflects on the trends of thoughts made up of the varying reactions to the works of Li Zehou 李澤厚 in China, evolved under the successive influence of the young Karl Marx, Immanuel Kant, Heidegger, and Leo Strauss. Generally speaking, there are four key concepts successively involved in this process, namely human beings (corresponding to targets), subjects (corresponding to objects), Dasein (corresponding to world-being), and political animals (corresponding to civilization-nation). Each concept, though doesn’t necessarily contain the previous concept completely within itself, is an advance in some aspect of the previous one, a product of escaping the ideological dilemma brought about by the previous concept.

In 2008, which is the 30th year of the event of reform and opening up, a series of natural disasters and human events dramatically influenced the commemorative activities among the intellectuals, which cannot be forgotten, for sure. The great reform in China per se is undoubtedly the subject of those commemorative activities. Besides continuously reviewing the great achievement of the past 30 years and insisting on the justifiability of the reform, other relevant commemorative activities seemed to carry out under the themes such as “humanities and social sciences in China in the past thirty years”. However, I’m afraid tautology shall not be a good form of argumentation. The best commemoration for the reform shall not be in the form of arguing for the literal meaning of the term “the reform and opening up”. Rather, it shall delve into the historical context and internal logic underneath that term. The main history of ideas is the self-consciousness of actual human history of life. Reflecting on the evolution of trends of thoughts throughout the past 30 years or so is a relatively concise clue to the complex and varied actual historical process. The ancients consider every 30 years as a time period, since issues of the mundane world can probably be summarized every 30 years. The reason for initiating the concept of “the intellectual history of thirty years” is to give a spiritual sum-up for the marvelous time. Such a sum-up is different from a summary, since the former looks forward into the future. Neither can we interpret the “intellectual history” as the “academic history” or the “history of social culture”. Rather, the “intellectual © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_1

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1 Enlightenment Subjectivity and the Intellectual History of Thirty Years …

history” is more general than the “academic history” and more specific than the “history of social culture”. Nowadays, with the formation of the college system, the “academy” and “social sciences” have overwhelming superiority over “thoughts”. However, the flourishing of “academy” and “social sciences” is certainly based on certain concrete factors and conditions, of which the notion part is one of the critical contents of the “intellectual history of thirty years” per se. Ever since the western learning spreading to the East, every momentous change in the history of Chinese intellectual culture has a lot to do with both the Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of and their attitude for the academic culture overseas. That is even so for the academic studies of “national cultural heritage” and thoughts such as that of “protecting the quintessence of Chinese culture”. To illustrate this point, one need to look no further than the rise and fall of thought trends since the 1970s. The reflection on this phase of history reveals that there are four western thinkers whose influences are widespread, that is, the young Marx,1 Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Leo Strauss. I shall call them the “four advisors of western learning” in the period of reform and opening up. If we are able to delve into issues such as why the four thinkers stated above matter that much at that time, how their thoughts and theories are explained by our era, what kinds of influences they have, respectively, and especially what internal relations their teachings are, we might in turn be able to gain an appropriate perspective to understand the general character and the development context of “the intellectual history of thirty years”. Reforms require far more than the adjustment of the basic state policy. Rather, it implies the self-refreshing spirit of our big era. The new era, when brewing, cannot avoid connecting to the orthodox ideology of the old era in a positive way, that is, to dig out new possibilities from old classics. Therefore, not surprisingly, in order to cancel out the nearly lifeless image of old Marx interpreted within the orthodox framework, scholars reveal a young Marx who is the author of Paris Manuscripts and his doctorate dissertation, a proponent of Feuerbach faction, a humanist, and a revolutionist with eighteenth-century characteristic—in a word, a typical enlightening intellectual. The most stimulation brought by young Marx to the 1970s in China is the concept of “Mensch”, which appears in Paris Manuscripts. Actually, it is a concept initiated by Feuerbach and was filled in with many ideas of Ceorg Lukacs at that time. The unity of Marxism and any form of humanism is doomed to be momentary. Except for a few scholars who stay with Paris Manuscripts and thus manage to step away from western Marxism, those worshipers of Lukacsian Marxism find an object who is more appropriate to be delved into, that is, the Li Zehou-ian Kant. Li Zehou 李澤厚 is not a Kantian expert. Neither can his interpretation of Kant be regarded as a must Book for Kantian study. However, when it comes to using Kantian ideas to grasp the lifeblood of era and even to promote the spirit of time, Li is incomparable—even the brilliant Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics written by Heidegger cannot parallel him in this aspect. Largely due to factors such as favorable timing and geographical conditions, Kant became astoundingly inspiring at some point in the twentieth century which should be considered as either the era 1

Translator’s note: The “young Marx” refers specifically to Karl Marx in his youth.

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of Nietzsche or that of Heidegger. But it was the interpretation of Kant initiated by Li that made a significant contribution to turning those factors into living actual force. No matter how the orthodox think, the spirit of time calls for the concept of Mensch as a starting point. It is not only the requirement of thought, but also that of social economy and culture. With the enlightenment of Li, the difference between young Marx and old Marx changes into that between Kant and Hegel, which opens an unlimited horizon. Through Kant, we can directly inherit the entire enlightenment tradition of the eighteenth century on the one hand, while on the other hand steering clear of the Hegel-Marx faction that is closely related to the orthodox ideology. In this way, we have a chance to take into account neo-Kantianism, which enables us to have access to both the “modern western capitalist learning” that used to be the “untouchable” and another possibility of modern society and modern thinking. By interpreting Kant, Li found a concept more meaningful than Mensch, that is, subjectivity (zhutixing 主體性). He tried to delve into the main questions of the reform era, namely how to argue for and construct a modern society? How to reevaluate traditional Chinese culture in the process of modernization? Meanwhile, the concept of subjectivity also touches on a question not so obvious at that time, that is, at that critical time of dramatical transition from the old to the new, how to define the meaning of individual life? The three questions above can respectively be reduced to the issues of “society”, “culture”, and “individual life”—or “modern”, “tradition”, and “settlement of life”, from another perspective. At least at the first half of the reform, those questions dominated the intellectual circle in China. Li’s interpretation of Kant basically provides us with a reference frame to draw a relatively clear picture of the intellectual history of the past 30 years. Starting from studying Kant, the ambitious scholars in the 1980s begin their new academic journey. Why did Gan Yang 甘陽 introduce the mediocre philosopher Ernst Cassirer? The reason doesn’t lie in Cassirer, but in the interpretation of Kant made by Li Zehou. The scholars afterward must break through the framework of Li Zehou as a Kantian interpreter. Some Chinese scholars chose to study Kant more deeply and carefully, while Gan Yang chose to study some other western scholars who also had aimed at breaking through Kant. Cassirer, as a neo-Kantian, paid special attention to the cultural issue or the ancient-modern issue. His statement that “man is a symbolic animal” served to shift the focus from “critique of reason” to “critique of culture”. As for the issue of “society” (or that of “modernity”), Marx Weber, due to his close affinity with neo-Kantians, began to draw a lot of attention. Many scholars of Weber, such as Su Guoxun 蘇囯勛 and Gan Yang 甘陽, participated in the reconstruction of sociological discipline. Meanwhile, the governmental reform of economic system also bred the flourishing of the research of modern western economics. Both sociology and economics together in turn revived the study of modern social sciences. However, with the growingly stronger study on economics, the deep thinking on modernity during the process of reconstructing sociology was simplified into the issue of “how to realize both the market economic system and to accommodate the modern society that such a system is pregnant with”. Unfortunately, the mainstream of modern Chinese social sciences—even that of sociology afterward—inherited the above inclination of modern economics. As for the focus appearing at the

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revival moment of sociology, besides its being maintained and deepened by the young scholars of Michel Foucault, it has mostly been concentratedly expressed by Martin Heidegger, who is the opposite side of Marx Weber and the real terminator of neo-Kantianism. In 1990s, with the research going further, the problem domain that used to maintain intact in the study done by Li Zehou gradually lost balance, disintegrated, and diverged into “disciplinary disputes”. That came the time when “modern social sciences” dominate. The so-called tradition, besides being attached either to overseas Sinology or to Neo-Confucianism and being glanced over by intellectuals, was mainly revived in the folk in a way far beyond the academical expectations. With the culture fever fading, different kinds of postmodern amusement—that is, different forms of anti-culture—arose instead. In such a commercial society where traditions evaporated and the modern society gradually shaped, the meaning of “individual life” was starkly displayed in front of the so-called humanistic intellectuals whose study area does not belong to social sciences. Both the poetic thinking of Liu Xiaofeng 劉曉楓 on Christian experiences and the reflection movements of humanistic spirits expressed the fundamental anxiety of our time, which cannot be focused on by the mainstream of social sciences. Even the so-called humanistic disciplines are no more than rich experience, while there’s no way to do any reflection systematically. Such fundamental anxiety about the meaning of individual life was illustrated in lines of thoughts as the focus on several “poetic philosophers”. But it was Heidegger whose work finally take into consideration the research enthusiasm of Chinese scholars on previous philosophers such as Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Arthur Schopenhauer. Ever since the Chinese version of Sein Und Zeit being published (it has been 21 years since its first publication), Heidegger’s thought has not only influenced many academical philosophical disciplines including that of Marxism, but also the theory of literature and art, art criticism, and even poetry creation. The circulation and the influence of Heidegger’s works have been so widespread to the extent that Marx Weber—even Kant—cannot compare. This phenomenon is hard to be understood for outsiders. And the main reason for such a phenomenon taking place certainly lies in the characteristic of this era: the great reform collapsed the fundamental yet out-ofdate community and eliminated the trite sense of belonging; meanwhile, humans were driven off into the all-encompassing system of market economy and bureaucracy. The perplexed feeling of how to settle down and get on with one’s pursuit, though might not be able to become a specific subject of social sciences, was a primary issue that tortured every sensitive mind at that time. The question raised by Heidegger about the meaning of being then became the most profound support for these minds. For this reason, “Heidegger” surpassed any special research area and became a principal symbol for the life meaning of individuals. Martin Heidegger, an odd philosopher, was the final destination for the Marxist exploration for humanism and the Kantian exploration for subjectivity. In this sense, the asymmetrical “fight” between humanistic discipline and social sciences might actually be a fight within Heidegger alone, that is, a fight between the post-enlightenment of ideological culture and the overall enlightenment of social reality. Ever since the later stage of 1990s, the relationship

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between the post-modernism in the ideological culture and the pan-realism in the socioeconomic system has moved from mutual struggle to mutual interdependence. Both the irrationalism in the subjective consciousness and the rationalism in the objective mind were developing to incorporate the other side into itself. The more expansive and pervasive the unfamiliar objective facts were, the more ignorant and being in a bind the subjective consciousness would be. The internal state of failing to distinguish between nihility and freedom was the very subjective segment of the objective reality that destroyed all boundaries and dominated every other party. The price for ignoring the teaching of Hegel while solely interpreting subjectivity alone was that the “subject” (zhuti 主體) failed in confronting “entity” (shiti 實體). The spirit of time shall be one part of philosophical thought. However, it is difficult for the simple “philosophy of subjectivity” to ponder over such an era that it called up. If philosophy doesn’t want to approach entity through the way of Hegel and Marx, then there’s only one way left, that is, to interpret the “subject” in a manner more thoroughly than Kant did. The enlightenment subjectivity symbolized by Li Zehou-ian Kantianism was, therefore, melted into the age of Heidegger. In the final analysis enlightenment can be considered as the positive attitude for reason—even though German idealism interpreted sensibility as an alien form of reason, and overly relying on reason would lead to religious criticism and even actual activities—such as social revolution—which are flooded with sensibility. However, in his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger elevated productive imagination (productive Einbildungskraft)—a concept that is equivalent to that of timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) in Heidegger’s own theoretical framework or to that of internal time consciousness (inneren Zeitbewußtseins) in phenomenology—to the original position that is higher than the positions of both reason and sensibility. What’s more, in exploring the real future metaphysics which credits human beings with the most conspicuous ontological position, Heidegger thoroughly described the being of “subject” as the vacant “Abgrund”. Meanwhile, he also announced, in a mysterious and acute way, that reason has gone too far away from thoughts. The descriptions made by Heidegger above disenchanted the glories of enlightenment, modernity, and even the whole western civilization. As we can see, the philosophical standpoint that “favoring Kant over Hegel” made by Li Zehou emphasizes “individual subjects” to the extent that prevails over “social existence”. Yet in a more thorough philosophical analysis, the existential stability (the subjectivity as subject terms) of the “individual” disappears. If there’s no solid “subject” that is as impenetrable as atoms, then it’s questionable whether we shall take seriously the enlightenment request for “social existence” which has been called up by the “individual subjects”. Different from the human comedies that tear up unworthy things in front of man, historical comedies realize unworthy things in front of man. The biggest ridicule made by history for philosophers of enlightenment is that when the modern society finally came, those philosophers suddenly found out that its legal birth certificate which was supposed to be ready beforehand had been lost. What the prophets called out has come, which yet can’t be argued for by philosophers. However, what’s the usage of philosophy for the growth of an era? Even in the early stage of 1990s, mysterious issues such as “philosophy of subjectivity” or “the

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meaning of life” were long ignored by the progressive market economy and modern society. The question of “how to construct a modern society” not only drew almost all the attention of heroes of our time, but also gave birth to another relatively entire problem domain in itself. The question of how to grind in the market and the government together became fundamental to the market economic system founded by the governmental economic policies. When taken forward, this question would involve the relation between society and country. The aggravation of social inequality reinforced the disputes among different social groups on the tendency of changes to the state system. With the maturity of modern society and the differentiation of social realms, the fragile consensus reached in 1980s broke down. Meanwhile, the “open” market economy unavoidably made the whole society caught into the global economic system and even the global political system. Both the market economy and social reform enormously increased the economy on one hand, yet brought in challenges for social distribution and national security on the other hand. The issue of modernity gradually got rid of the form of the simple “economic construction” and became more and more complicated. The arguments among intellectuals were tangled with multiple concerns for social equality, national security, and rejuvenation. The camps that participated in such arguments became more than purely “left” wing and “right” wing, with those who paid close attention to “national construction” and even “the revival of civilization”. The divergence and complexity of the issues brought obstacles for the systematic exploration among intellectuals. That is to say, unless the complicated intactness of the issues is treated as the primary object, any kind of discussion might be one-sided and even detrimental. One prominent example is that the mainstream of economic discipline only focuses on how to stimulate the increase of economics, but seldom (or fundamentally impossible, if strictly speaking) considers the problems that economic policies might bring to social justice, moral atmosphere, and especially national security. Fundamentally speaking, one-sidedness is one of the well-differentiated problems of the modern social sciences itself. The attempt to overcome one-sidedness is doomed to be rare in the era of modern social science. It is necessary to consciously focus on, to the full extent, those which are, in the first place, practical skills useful for ruling the country and those that are theoretically titled as modern philosophy, modern social theory, and classic political philosophy. For the intellectuals of the late stage of 1990s, what they were consciously eager for was never the realm of philosophy whose academical concern basically sticked with issues of 1980s—maybe Li Zehou is an exception. Theories of sociology were the earliest attempt that some sober brains resorted to for overcoming one-sidedness. However, the academic atmosphere among public intellectuals in 1990s were so superficial that even the thoughts of Max Weber cannot be studied thoroughly. The book Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik written by Weber and translated by Gan Yang 甘陽 is much more important than Ernst Cassirer’s An Essay On Man, yet the former wasn’t paid much attention. Yet after ten more years, the situation has pushed many people to reconsider the issues discussed in the book Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik. Compared to modern social theories,

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classic political philosophy achieved amazing impacts at the beginning of twentyfirst century. The historical status of Leo Strauss cannot be compared with Kant and Heidegger, of course. But this fact cannot prevent the interpreters of Strauss to start finishing the era of Heidegger in China. We cured diseases by medicines, yet medicines might in turn lead to diseases. The teaching of Strauss was originally used to restrain the disease of German philosophy. Heidegger holds a kind of phenomenological thoroughness and interprets the Kantian subjectivity emphasized by Li Zehou as the being of Dasein. Similar to the concept of self-consciousness emphasized by German idealism, there are dual ways of being of Dasein: One is the inauthentic way, that is, living and acting toward external things, other people, and the world; and the other is the authentic way, that is, being alone toward oneself and through doing so approaching the being per se. The former implies interacting with beings in different ways, while the latter implies suspending all the beings and the whole world (or the falling of everything in the Angst, if expressed in an existentialist way), through which the being per se illustrates its absolute difference (“ontological difference”) from the beings. In a word, as a quest for being, the price philosophy has to pay is to be indifferent to the whole world and to directly face the isolated self. Heidegger’s quest for being reaches the limit of philosophy and human life. His theory seems to value life more than any other philosophical system, while also thoroughly eliminates the foundation of life. As criticized by those contemporaries of Heidegger, ontological phenomenology is purely formalistic, no matter for the world or for Dasein. It describes the timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) structure in which Dasein makes decisions, but all the preexistent content on which decisions are made should be discarded. Heidegger revealed the purest dimension of philosophy without reservation, leaving his adherents with the following troubles—the phenomenalization of the world, the rootlessness of life, and the separation between the ontological truth and the truth of Dasein. In phenomenology, fundamental questions that have been awakened by our big era such as “Who am I? How should I live?” were simply be described as a basic phenomenon of Dasein and a quest for being. However, the answers to these questions have nothing to do with the fundamental ontology; the reason for such questions to be basic phenomena exactly lies in their having no answer. If these questions were endowed with any substantial answer, Dasein would at once fall into the inauthentic way of being. Yes, philosophy reflects on life and even sheers away from inquiring what good life is. In doing so, philosophy makes clear of how such kind of “goodness” originating from the inauthentic life of the preexisting world and how it obscures the truth of being. However, the main questions of all the eras belong to the inauthentic issue of “how to live well in this world”. By endowing human life with the victorious position of first philosophy, Heidegger’s theory resumes our concern for the world as a whole, through which the one-sidedness of modern life and modern knowledge system can be overcome. However, the integrity of the world in the sense of fundamental ontology is phenomenal, formalistic, and has to be suspended for the sake of authenticity. Therefore, Heidegger offers everything in form, while depriving of everything in content. In his theory, the negative meaning of philosophy for life has peaked to

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its ultimate. The challenge of Leo Strauss against the theory of Heidegger is not represented as any form of attack or destruction; rather, the former just wisely restricts the latter. Strauss never attacks the quest for being as the authentic way of living. Leaving out such a quest, what would be left for philosophy? Instead, he only focuses on the inauthentic way of living, the one about “to exist in the world”. His fundamental task is to surmount the barrier of formalism in phenomenology. The content of “world phenomenon” is nothing but Plato’s allegory of the cave. In other words, life world is, after all, political world, which is neither the fragments of the world nor one of the different “worlds”. It is not a regional being either. Rather, it is the world as a whole per se. As a basic phenomenon of Dasein, “to exist in the world” verifies the old proposition; that is, “Human beings are born political animals”. Even the “metaphysical nature” of humans cannot transcend the limits. In the jargon familiar to philosophers of enlightenment, the nature of “subject” warms us that “reason” cannot break through the limits of “authority” “mythology” “poetry instruction” (or “tradition”, in a word). The fundamental ontology looks down upon reason, and classical political philosophy places restriction on reason. In this way, the spirit of enlightenment characteristic of “being brave enough to use reason” is further frustrated. In short, through pushing on fundamental ontology and in turn endowing the political nature of living with the primary position in philosophy, Strauss provides help to reuniting the problem domain that was split in 1990s. He reminds intellectuals to face things themselves (an die Sachenselbstherankommenden) and historically know oneself, as well as to realize the objectified effect of philosophy, science, and knowledge impulse in the formation of modern society. Such statements imply that the deep investigation into the modern society cannot steer clear of the reflection on the enlightenment itself. The era of post-enlightenment then secretly transformed into the era of anti-enlightenment (or reflection on enlightenment). Contrary to romanticism or the critical theory, the trend of conservatist antienlightenment was edified by the peaceful temperament of classical political philosophy. The conservatist trend of thought quietly, yet irreversibly, renewed the issue as a whole: the issue of politics, or that of civilization-nation, became overarching, to which previous issues of modern society and traditional culture both attached, while the issue of individual life disappeared. In a different word, the appearance of post-Heideggerian conservatist political philosophy gives an answer to the question of individual life: Human beings are political animals; only the secular life in this ethical–political-historical world is the principal meaning of individual life being. Conservatism remains silent in metaphysics. And its attitude for all kinds of pure philosophy represented by Heidegger reminds us of the attitude for Buddhism and Daoism in the era of Confucian revival. Compared with conservatist political philosophy, the reason for Neo-Confucianism to take more trouble in doing metaphysics is nothing but warning that “to exist in the world” is the real authentic being; philosophical life is not meaningless, but the ethical–political life penetrated with the sagely self-cultivation endeavor is the highest level philosophical life. It is reasonable to anticipate that after Strauss’s conservatism accomplishing its historical mission, there will come a new revival of Confucianism and even Chinese political thoughts. The

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era of western great philosophers is going to end. Although the more intensive work of translating western masterpieces will never terminate, the situation of western learning tutoring Chinese intellectuals will be gone forever. The Chinese intellectual history of these 30 years will end up with the self-consciousness of Chinese thought, which will be a true destination. To sum up, leaving aside the names of “advisors”, the “intellectual history of thirty years” has four conceptual sections as follows: human beings (corresponding to targets), subjects (corresponding to objects), Dasein (corresponding to worldbeing), and political animals (corresponding to civilization-nation). These concepts are successively enriched and developed. Each concept doesn’t necessarily contain the previous concept completely within itself, but it is an advance in some aspect of the previous one, a product of escaping the ideological dilemma brought about by the previous concept. When reflecting on the theory of subjectivity initiated by Li Zehou, which can be considered as the real starting point of the intellectual history of the past 30 years, we may claim that the developing process of notions in these 30 years is the dialectics of subjectivity, while the dialectical unfolding of such subjectivity has transcended the content of enlightenment itself. Similar to the unfolding of the spirit of time, the thoughts of Li continuously enrich and demonstrate the concept of “subjectivity”. It will be interesting to make a comparison between the intellectual history of the past 30 years and the development of Li’s thinking. Actually, the real systematic contribution of Li doesn’t lie in his well-known Kantian discussion, but in his continuous exploration on and ongoing construction of “the philosophy of subjectivity” on the basis of his Kantian study. Resorting to his “anthropological ontology” (historical ontology, practical philosophy of subjectivity), we can see that Li accomplishes a lot in interpreting classical Chinese thoughts including Confucianism. Compared to Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 whose research approach is similar to Li, Li puts more emphasis on “the substance of the heart/mind” (xinti 心體)2 rather than on “the substance of human nature” (xingti 性體) and thinks highly of the complexity of “subjectivity”. In the year 1983, Li delineated the two dual connotations of “subjectivity” as follows: The first “dual connotations” (of subjectivity) denote that “subjectivity” has both the external structure of craft-society and the internal structure of culture-psychology. The second “dual connotations” (of subjectivity) denote that “subjectivity” has both the communitive nature (which can be divided as different societies, eras, nationalities, class, hierarchies, and cliques) and the personal nature of bodymind. These four connotations indivisibly intertwine, with each of them as a complex compound.3

Translator’s note: It’s worth pointing out that the meaning of ti 體 in the context of Chinese philosophy shall be devoid of the meaning of ousia implied in ontology which later has to do with the onto-theo-logos structure and that of Kantian noumenon in contrast to empirical phenomenon. Its meaning is closer to “essence” or “roots”. Since Li Zehou once clarified ti 體 as “substance”, I shall use the word “substance” to translate the term ti 體. 3 Shi Yong Li Xing Yu Le Gan Wen Hua 實用理性與樂感文化 (Pragmatic Reason& A Culture of Optimism), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2005, p. 218. 2

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By referring to the concept of “subjectivity”, the basic issues involved in the intellectual history of the past 30 years are all included in philosophy. Therefore, the unbalance of the whole problem domain is also demonstrated in the particular stress on certain connotations of the concept of “subjectivity”. Although Li Zehou clearly realizes the complexity of the concept of subjectivity, he also definitely points out his emphasis on the second perspective of each dual connotations, that is, the individual perspective and the internal perspective. With his delving into the classic Confucianism, Li elevates the elements of individual “psychology” and “emotions” to the original position. In his works published in this century, the concept of “subject” is basically replaced by that of “substance” (ben ti 本體), while maintaining the fundamental structure of “culture-psychology” with emotions as the fundamental or the substance. “Emotions as the substance” (Qing ben ti 情本體) can be considered as the footing stone of Li’s later theoretical framework. According to Li, the “ethical-religious” approach implied in the “emotions as the substance” can include the framework of Mou Zongsan. Furthermore, through interpreting the “ethical-religious” approach, Li initiates a new project, which takes “the interaction of Confucianism and Legalism” as the principal line, for the revival of Confucianism and even the reconstruction of Chinese political thoughts.4 It is necessary to distinguish between the “effect” of Li and the ideas of Li per se: Although the former dwells on the neo-enlightenment in 1980s, the latter—despite retaining the basic ideal of enlightenment—has responded to the whole “intellectual history of the thirty years” through continuously interpreting the concept of “subjectivity”. In fact, the initiation of “emotions as the substance” is an attempt to developing Kant by referring to Heidegger—Li thinks that Mou Zongsan did the same thing in a different approach. The idea of “the interaction of Confucianism and Legalism” is delicate and ingenious, which fits one of the core issues in post-Straussian political discussion, that is, what on Earth is the nature of the political system or state form in China? What’s more valuable is that Li tries to deduce his “ethical-religious” perspective from the idea of “emotions as the substance”. This is the unique endeavor in our days when the authority of “holistic resort” has been deprived by the so-called political philosophy. This is the beginning of a theoretical system and is the only real impulse in the area of Chinese philosophy after Mou Zongsan died. Admittedly, Li assertively announces the content of certain new concepts, which not only lacks a “phenomenological description” on the “emotions as the substance”, but also falls short of a “phenomenological construction” or “dialectical deduction” of the “ethical–political world”. However, for a real philosophical beginning, what’s left may just be the necessary matters of secondary importance. The post-Kantian exploration of Li—either from the perspective of “emotions as the substance” or from its “ethical–political” perspective implied in “the interaction of Confucianism and Legalism”—has not only transcended his plain belief in For more details, please see Shi Yong Li Xing Yu Le Gan Wen Hua 實用理性與樂感文化 (Pragmatic Reason& A Culture of Optimism), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2005, p. 97; Li Shi Ben Ti Lun Ji Mao Wu Shuo 歷史本體論·己卯五說 (Historical Ontology & Five Essays Written in 1999), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2006, p. 189.

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enlightenment, but also opened up a pondering approach that is meaningful to the intellectual history of the past 30 years. The biggest benefit gained from Li’s wisdom is that his theoretical exploration is still unfolded in the form of “philosophy” which used to be popular in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The persistent pursuit of Li shows that the entire problem domain of philosophy may be included into a more profound and more satisfactory system. How are we going to restart off and begin to think after 30 years? Will philosophy still be the starting point of the next 30 years after the enlightenment? Every later scholar who has been enlightened by Li’s work would reflect on these questions when confronting the old works of Li which are newly republished by SDX Joint Publishing Company. Written in August 2008, in Shanghai. (Originally published in the Dushu 讀書 Journal).

Chapter 2

Cultural Nationalism: Hedgehog-Like or Fox-Like?

Abstract This article is more than a book review on Gan Yang’s collected work Over Shoes Over Boots. Different from those common book reviews which mainly introduce the structure and content of each chapter of the book reviewed, this article begins with the tension between the Gan’s fox-like writing style and his hedgehoglike problem consciousness on Isaiah Berlin’s theories of both value pluralism and nationalism, which then leads to a reflection on different types of nationalism as well as their relation with value pluralism. On that basis, the article discusses further how would certain kind of nationalism lead to a Confucian vision of universal brotherhood.

This is a time when small articles flourish. Postmodernism is wise enough to claim that the age of “books” is over. In this sense, to compile articles into a book is nothing but a kind of camouflage. However, if the collected works happen to be an organic ensemble which echoes back and forth, then there’s only one possibility, namely the topics of these articles originally center around the same issue, either intentionally or unintentionally. The college libraries are the places where books should be, while newspaper columns are the places where small articles should be. Once small articles are compiled into real books, there comes the dislocation of expression. It has been a malposition for those who should have been writing masterpiece for intellectuals in colleges to convert to discussing trifles for the mass media through columns in newspapers. And it can at best be counted as over shoes over boots to compile those trivial articles into books for intellectuals to ponder on. The disposition of newspaper readers is totally different from that of book readers. The temperament of newspaper writers is also different from that of book writers. As the western saying goes: “A fox knows many things, but a hedgehog, one important thing”. Isaiah Berlin once popularized this distinction to portray two kinds of thinkers. Those who focus on one single permanent issue and thus tend to be monists might be considered hedgehogs, while those focusing on different issues and thus tend to be pluralists might be considered foxes. Judging from the metaphor above, those who concern nothing but finishing a giant book are naturally hedgehogs, while those who write tons of articles are undoubtedly foxes. All of the principal writings of Berlin himself are collected works. Although it’s a pity that he didn’t publish any giant book of his own, this fact—together with © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_2

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his continuous criticism against monism—seems to verify that Berlin is a fox-like scholar who matches his words with his action. The first Chinese scholar in mainland China who introduced Berlin is Gan Yang 甘陽 in the 1980s. From then on, more and more similarities between Gan Yang and Berlin can be seen. Although he became well known for his writings, he is most interested in giving public speaking and less interested in compiling books, with writing articles the least interest. In the middle of 1990s, due to various opportunities, Gan Yang suddenly began to write columns for newspapers in Hong Kong. At that time in Hong Kong, matins have long been replaced by morning daily newspapers. Since Gan Yang has studied abroad for a long time, he may have been skillful at the persuasion in such a context. However, the speaker is earnest while the hearers are contemptuous. After all, Gan Yang’s writings are inappropriate for prosperous places. Now that those articles are compiled into a collected work, the intellectuals in mainland China finally have a chance to read and reflect on them. The collected work Jiang Cuo Jiu Cuo 將錯就錯 (Over Shoes Over Boots) has eight parts, focusing on different subjects and buttering both sides of its bread. Such a writing style is typically fox-like. In this book, Gan Yang mentions Berlin every now and then. In the former parts of this collected work, he discusses Berlin’s theory of “value pluralism”. But in the last part named “Universal Brotherhood”, the keyword about Berlin is “nationalism”. Is leaving a place for “nationalism” the only purpose of “rementioning value pluralism”? Why does the part named “Universal Brotherhood” paradoxically begin with nationalism? What would this kind of “universal brotherhood” lead to? Before answering these questions, it would be beneficial to do a general survey on the structure and intention of the “Universal Brotherhood” part and on that basis backtrack the whole book. This part is composed of seventeen chapters. The first four chapters mainly elaborate on nationalism in the context of liberalism, which make the following two basic concerns stand out, namely individual freedom and the sense of ethnic belonging. What’s rare is that it doesn’t avoid discussing the tension between these two concerns. The next five chapters expound the actual crimes and theoretical troubles caused by the invasion of the western powers into national countries. The following four chapters reflect on the main lines of thoughts in the USA after the Cold War, i.e., the historical philosophy and theories of international relationship, represented by the viewpoints of “the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations”. Obviously, Gan Yang thinks that the viewpoint of “the clash of civilizations” fits the mainstream of power politics better—that’s why the last chapter of this part is titled “Troubled Times Is Around the Corner”. It is mostly worth noticing that Gan Yang acutely points out that the origin of both viewpoints—“the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations”—lies in the Christian political theology. Judging from that we’d not overlook why the part on the Chinese-western/American conflict (i.e., the last four chapters of the whole book) centers around the issue of “God and the mundane world”. Citing Nietzsche and Karl Lö with, Gan Yang bases the foundation of modernity on the thorough secularization. The so-called thorough means abandoning even the viewpoints of “the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations” that is founded on the simulation of eschatology. The real self-sufficient

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mundane history is the circulation of birth and death that gets rid of “the realization of absolute idea”. In this unique mundane world which has no place for God, idea, and ultimate ends, do human being still have any reason to live? Gan Yang predicts that this nihilist question that always tangles with modernity is certainly going to torture human beings further. However, at the end of discussion, his tone shifts and claims that for Chinese this question never stands, since in our culture God has never been alive, let alone discussing his death. Although the discussion of this insight stops abruptly right after its being brought up, we may still conjecture that the so-called Chinese-western conflict is, in effect, the conflict between this world and God, the conflict between the mother Earth and the ideas, and the conflict between circulation and ends, or in a word, the conflict between the “too modern” and the “modern”. The content of so-called Universal Brotherhood part is yet composed of many conflicts, which reveals that the only concern of Gan Yang is the biggest and age-old issue, namely the issue of “culture: China and the World”. The word “and” uncovers the conflicting facts and the ambition of realizing universal brotherhood, while the word “culture” implies the ultimate perspective of conflict or universal brotherhood. It is similar to the viewpoints of Berlin illustrated by Gan Yang. The only reason that this issue worth noticing even now is that it is still a question and maybe is the ultimate question. And the reason that this issue worth noticing for now is that we have been entitled with enough political sensitivity in the past twenty years. The issue of culture used to be one of the most momentous topics in the 1980s. The discussion at that time obviously centered around the following two issues, i.e., the Chinese-western issue and the ancient-modern issue. Generations of elder scholars in mainland China mostly tended to discuss the issue of culture on the basis of the Chinese-western issue. In contrast, younger generations definitely claimed to reduce the Chinese-western issue into the ancient-modern issue, to preserve the “subjectivity” of Chinese culture through “the modernization of culture”, and thus to solve the conflict between the Chinese and the western from a deeper perspective. As a representative of the new prominent, Gan Yang drew on the theory of timeliness in ontological hermeneutics to analyze the possibility of cultural subjects’ planning for the future. In doing so, he theoretically gave a cogent answer to the question of “whether modernization would lead to the vanishment of cultural identification”.1 At that time, he claimed that planning for modernity is to plan for the self, and the future reconstruction of cultural subjects is realized right through the modernization of culture. In this sense, we may equate what is “modern” with what is “Chinese”. As Gan Yang goes, “I awake after dreaming ten years in Xingzhou 星洲”.2 With the suspension of the ideological-cultural movement in 1980s, different kinds of disputes centering around the issue of culture also have gradually been settled. This is the inevitable result of modernization in China. The actual unfolding of modernity in China quickly ruined the cultural identification that already had nearly touched the bottom line. This kind of ruin is so severe that humans even don’t have any sense See Gan Yang’s article “Chuan Tong, Shi Jian Xing Yu Wei Lai” 傳統, 時間性與未來 (“Tradition, Timeliness, and the Future”). 2 See Jiang Cuo Jiu Cuo 將錯就錯 (Over Shoes Over Boots), p. 203. 1

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of crisis in cultural identification. The sense of crisis symbolizes the agreement of sticking to the final bottom line. The initiation of the issue of culture in 1980s originated exactly from this kind of final bottom line. The disappearance of the sense of crisis doesn’t mean that the issue of cultural identification has already been solved; rather, it just signifies that the issue of cultural identification has temporarily been suspended. Now the focus is the issue of modernity. The interpretation of and the disputes over the issue of culture in 1980s mainly depend on the resources of humanistic thoughts, while various frameworks that accept and handle the issue of modernity mainly originate from different social sciences. The complexity of modernization leads to the division of the modernity issue. Various popular theories in 1990s offered outlets for the problems of modernity in China. Although those theories respectively dominated for years, none of them—due to their “scientific” nature (i.e., their nature of “being one part of the knowledge system”)—managed to avoid applying the conclusions deduced from one part of research to the integral knowledge system. Thus, there were different “lines of thoughts”, or parts of the knowledge system that transcended their natural boundaries and thus become opinions, for example, liberalism that is mainly supported by the economic discipline, neo-Marxism and postmodernism that are mainly supported by sociology (including social theories, social history, anthropology, and even “cultural study”, etc.). Nearly meanwhile, these lines of thoughts fought for the speaking right in the fields of politics and law. Economic liberalism emphasizes “efficiency”, and political liberalism focuses on “freedom”, while the rivalry underlines “justice” and “equality”. The historical process, as the actual arbiter, prefers the former while endowed the latter with more honors. However, this cannot eliminate the complaint of or the disagreement of modernization. Undoubtedly, the focus of their disputes is modernity. For a long time, both sides don’t have enough consciousness for the gradually severe crisis of national identification in China. Judging from this, the so-called Chinese culture is indeed the prosperous old dream that belongs to 1980s. Can the issue of modernity really separate from that of national characteristics? If we take “modernity” as the origin of higher validity, then it is reasonable to admit that the centralized national country is the most effective political unit for realizing modernization. This has been clearly revealed by the history of western Europe since the Renaissance. That is to say, if modernity is the goal, then the firm national identification would be the inevitable approach. However, the case of China is the contrary. In the starting off of our modernization process, modernity itself is not the origin of validity, but is a pragmatic choice for getting guarantee of validity from another higher origin which is—in Gan Yang’s word—the “subjectivity” of Chinese culture. In fact, the validity of modernity is always derived either from certain kind of Christian political theology (the way of the west), or from the nature of certain cultural self-preservation and self-glory (the way of China). The subjectivity of culture doesn’t equal to national identification, while the former definitely imply the latter, even if such a nation may not be a modern national country in the strict sense. If the process of modernization erodes, the basic subjectivity of certain culture

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and thus effective national identification cannot be founded, then two judgements can be made accordingly. First, due to the necessity of national identification for modernization, the kind of modernization that erodes national identification cannot actually accomplish self-realization in the real sense. Second, since cultural subjectivity is the valid origin of modernization, the kind of modernization that destroys the basis of validity cannot justify itself in ideas. Unfortunately, from the perspective of both facts and ideas, the Chinese process of modernization has been threatened in different degrees. From the perspective of facts, due to the long-term demonization or dwarfism against our own cultural tradition, due to the naïve belief of certain liberalists in universalism, and due to the overall unfolding of the so-called globalization process, the national identification needed by modernization is now trapped within unprecedented severe crisis. From the perspective of ideas, those innocent liberalists surprisingly express naiveness and obtuseness toward the issue of validity, while the most profound opinions of the left-wing scholars deliver their question for modernity and their equivocal attitude toward national characteristics. Of course, such views would voice nothing but postmodernism or rather nihilism. In view of this, some far-sighted scholars have to make a fresh start and explore other possibilities. This denotes the flourishing of political nationalism. Based on the observation of the world history and the current situations of China, especially after being enlightened by the political practices of Federalists and the political theories of Max Weber, political nationalists try to reconcile the basic appeal for liberalism and nationalism. According to them, only real constitutional democracy is able to realize real national identification. “By taking individual citizens as the basis of political society, and by taking unified constitution as the guiding principle of national state, there comes the footing stone for American democracy by the federalists. I think it should also become the fundamental principle for Chinese democracy in the future”.3 “Mature nationalism is doomed to be founded on the basis of political identification…. There shall be a constitutional democracy that includes everyone into this political system, which makes them become citizens in the modern sense and forms a strong political identification…. in this sense…the overall will that represents national states is formed.”4 The prevailing political nationalists clearly illustrate national identification as political identification and distinguish it from “immature nationalism” (i.e., cultural nationalism). Undoubtedly, they identify the actual and ideal meanings of national identification for modernization, and in turn attribute national identification to political identification which is founded on constitutional democracy. This is a major advance for Chinese thoughts since 1990s, which symbolizes the preliminary consciousness of “political maturity” gradually developed among Chinese intellectuals. However, one question remains. Considering that none of the discussions in See Gan Yang, “Zou Xiang ‘Zheng Zhi Min Zu’” 走向 “政治民族” (“Towards ‘Political Nations’”). 4 See Wang Yan 王焱, Guan Yu Min Zu Zhu Yi De Fa Yan 關於民族主義的發言 (“A Speech on Nationalism”). 3

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China about political nationalism managed to exceed the level of Gan Yang’s articles “Zou Xiang ‘Zheng Zhi Min Zu’”《走向 “政治民族”》(“Towards ‘Political Nations’”) and “Gong Min Ge Ti Wei Ben, Tong Yi Xian Zheng Li Guo”《公民個體 為本, 統一憲政立國》(“To Take Individual Citizens As the Foremost; To Build a Country on Unified Constitutionalism”) published in the mid-1990s, Gan Yang can be considered as a secret advisor of political nationalism. However, Gan Yang not only avoids criticizing cultural nationalism, but also concerns the issue of culture in a gloomy yet all-encompassing way in his works for years. He even argues for a certain kind of cultural nationalism through interpreting Berlin-ian liberalism. Are all of these purely coincidences? Is it because Gan Yang’s failure to get rid of the innocent characteristics of 1980s, or because some political nationalists actually fail to be as mature as what they themselves have imagined? In between Gan Yang’s political theory and his cultural theory, there’s a crucial yet gloomy domain. He himself never definitely asserts the possible relationship between political nationalism and the cultural issue. In order to enter into this domain, we have to return to the foundation of all disputes and reexamine the issues that has been studied in a rushing haste even by political nationalists, namely the validity of modernity and the national identification. Undoubtedly, those pure political nationalists admit the constructing function of national identification for modernization, and this is what makes them more reasonable than those superficial universal liberalists. However, when they reduce national identification to political identification and thus consider themselves as managing to transcend the “immature nationalism” (or cultural nationalism), they lay bare their immaturity. The approach of purely depending on political identification to construct national identification actually originates from a certain kind of “constitutional patriotism”. In this sense, the sense of belonging owned by individuals toward certain community only depends on the natural rights—especially political rights—of those individuals guaranteed by this community through legislation. Admittedly, the approval to natural rights is indeed a crucial and even necessary condition for the sense of belonging. However, if we completely base the sense of belonging on natural rights, a vital aspect would be ignored, that is, the sense of belonging indicates uniqueness and individuals’ inevitable approval to certain community. It is one thing for individuals to pertain to certain community in the name of citizens or subjects of rights; but it is quite another thing for individuals to find the sense of belonging in certain community. The former means a transferrable political identity, while the latter originates from the cultural identity that naturally occurs. The sense of belonging is not only a matter of a law of nations, but also that of a law of citizens. It not only requires constitutionalism, but also requires intrinsic culture. Just like life, the cultural identity can be abandoned, but can never be transferred. Once political identification and cultural identification are completely separated, once the individuals have—besides natural rights—no cultural belongings as historical right or national reverence, there would be nothing either of fact or of idea that could prevent individuals from selecting a ready-made constitutional state. The original purpose of political nationalism was to reconstruct national identification through realizing natural rights. However, without the premise of “whose” national

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identification, all national identifications would become empty talk or even worse. Such a premise can only originate from cultural identification. The real origin of the error of political nationalism lies in a premise they secretly share with liberalism, i.e., the supreme position of modern natural rights. The foundation of natural rights is to elevate desires and to depreciate passions. However, politics distinguishes between enemies and friends, while the enemies and friends of nations can only be set through passions. Natural rights will make political nationalism go to the opposite: The desire-founded “political nationalism” will neither be “political” nor “national”. Both political discipline of desire and that of passion belong to political theology. The only difference lies in that the God of the former is eros, while the God of the latter is the Vico-ian nature-nation-life. If we believe Diotima in Plato’s work, eros is actually not a real God; rather, it is a spirit between Gods and humans. Therefore, it is only appropriate to praise eros privately in the scenes of drinking in comedy, while unqualified to require reverencing eros openly in public scenes of tragedy. The nature or nation is the only legitimate object of reverence. A universal God is a national one that imitates Caesar in the Kingdom of Heaven. Reverence means believing in and following mythology as well as admiring Gods. The national mythology is also traditional culture, and the national Gods are cultural traditions. The universal God is dead, while the fight among Gods continues. Only political nationalism knows that the fight still continues. Only cultural nationalism knows that nations have something to do with Gods, while only cultural nationalism that is politically mature knows that the final politics is nothing but the fight among Gods. That is what Gan Yang foresaw in his “little articles”. The review can thus come to an end. It seems that Gan Yang considers himself as a hedgehog-like scholar that masters the skills of fox-like scholars. But is someone who is continuously reverent a hedgehog-like scholar? According to Berlin, the real difference between a hedgehog-like scholar and a fox-like scholar is whether he tries to solve problems from the perspective of absolute monism or that of relativist pluralism. According to Gan Yang, those who continuously ponder on one certain issue is a hedgehog-like scholar. Therefore, maybe both Berlin and Gan yang are hedgehog-like in raising questions and fox-like in answering questions? As an interpreter of Berlin, the reverence of Gan Yang lies in his leaving place for the Gods of nations through relativist pluralism. However, can relativist pluralism really preserve national identification? Some scholars who are against Berlin once questioned the relativist liberalism in a manner of Socratic coldness. As stated by Leo Strauss, “the absolute appeal that favors the most minimal private domain cannot be completely satisfied, … since the opposite appeal has the equal rights. The liberalism understood by Berlin can neither fully have nor completely abandon certain absolute foundation”. As a “classical scholar” who makes Berlin feel bothered, Strauss also points out the difference between civilization and culture, which seems to specifically target at the statement made by Berlin about maintaining equal rights among different “cultures”. Both science and morality constitute the foundation of civilization, on both of which the cultivation of real human nature depends. Although science and morality are

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unique, it is accidental when it comes to the issue of which culture finally turned into civilization. Both Strauss and Berlin are Jews, while the former bravely confronts cultural universalism shunned by Berlin. As a philosopher, Strauss has no interest in the mythologies such as “cultural subjectivity”. But he doesn’t lose temperance to the extent of openly breaking this mythology into pieces. Although the kingdom of Judea perished long time ago, there always are some Jews who mistook some other country as the hometown of their own and considered themselves as better Greeks than those real Greeks. To illustrate this point, one need to look no further than the phenomenologist Husserl who tried hard to elucidate the ancient Greek spirit implicit in “our European civilization” after Nazi’s rising to power. Even for those scholars who focus on the duration of Jewish nation (e.g., Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Emmanuel Levinas), they would select several advanced elements from western thinking to form “the subjectivity of Jewish civilization”. However, no matter how hard they tried, they at best created a seemingly interesting “Other” from the perspective of western civilization. Berlin seems to be smarter than all those scholars above. In appearance, relativist pluralism may be able to steer clear of the pitfalls of “subjects” and “others”. Nevertheless, relativism itself is in fact a bigger pitfall. Since relativism doesn’t commit to anything universal, its own culture shall certainly not be universal as well. In this sense, if confronting a civilization that is so opinionated to regard itself as a representative of “universal spirit”, what relativists fight for would never extend the domain of an autonomous province. The conflict among different civilizations is the kind of fight among Gods who don’t belong to the same theogony. However, the God who doesn’t have any universal appeal is only a fake one. Those nationalists, who intend to preserve a sacrificial altar for their own Gods through relativism, have deviated from “reverence” in this way per se. To save a place for nationalism by the way of relativism—that is the heritage of “historicism” (although Berlin might be more willing to name it as “cultural pluralism”), especially that of Giovanni Battista Vico and Gottfried Herder. Although Herder showed interest in the historical mythologies of different nations, his only real purpose was to find the German nation that had been forgotten at that time. In other words, relativism is actually a strategy for approaching nationalism, while nationalism is not limited to relativism. As for Vico, he seemingly cared about the “natural laws” of different nations (See his work New Science), while was actually only interested in the kind of national natural law that can be treated as a universal law (See his work On Universal Rights), i.e., the Roman law of ancient Latin race. Neither “historicism” nor “cultural pluralism” serves to fully explain the purpose of Vico. Maybe in the eyes of proponents of Berlin, the intention of Vico was nothing more than arguing for the “culture” and “subjectivity” of his own nation. However, different from his smart followers, Vico didn’t elucidate much on “culture”. Similar to classical political philosophy, he only concerned about the commonality of nomos of different nations. By arguing for the common origin of “nature” and “nation” (i.e., life and giving-birth-to), Vico proposed the most powerful national political theology. What is national is actually what is natural and is also what is universal. But in this sense, the Berlin-ian nationalism is abandoned. The will that longs for

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universalization can only be realized under the premise of natural theology (in order to understand Vico’s work, we shall refer to Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia). The justification for the nomos of its own nation should be unfolded in the order as follows: natural theology—natural law—the law of peoples—civil law. The nationalists who don’t argue in the natural aspect are not real nationalists. Meanwhile, there’s no need for those nationalists who have been arguing in the natural aspect to continue setting themselves up as nationalists. That is to say, no matter what kind of nationalism it is, it shall only be a segment of the self-consciousness of global empire (de monarchia). Although the interpretation of natural theology as political hermeneutics is the highest level political action that nationalism can possibly take, it is through this kind of interpretation and action that nationalism sublates itself into the universal brotherhood of global empire. In this sense, it is no wonder that the chapter of universal brotherhood (da tong 大同) for Chinese ends up with the Analects and even the study of Confucian classics. Politics can only be the politics of nation, which implies that there would be no politics without reverence. Reverence refers to a positive view on holy things, and the national classics interpret holy things. Therefore, the most momentous connotation of reverence is the reverence toward classics. What’re classics? According to historians, classics are the earliest histories and are the not-so-reliable description of ancient life. Historians only concern about human issues and cultural relics, while historicists think that the more important thing is to enter into the whole life context of ancients. But deconstructionists claim that it is impossible to enter into that context, since everything is so uncertain, and the classics—similar to all other texts—are another beginning of some endless game. All of these statements above refuse to connect classics to any eternal principles or nomos. However, what’s holy must also be eternal. Rejecting classics is to reject holiness, which means the rejection of the justifiable origin of national life; therefore, rejecting this origin is equal to rejecting the nations per se. But now the question is: does that kind of eternity really exist? Chinese classics are written by sages. And sages know that the reason for what they write to be considered as classics is that they don’t just write to describe the life of that time (that is, the life of ancients that has been considered as the past in our eyes), but also the eternal principles alive in the life of ancients. Does life ever change from the Emperor Zhou to the Emperor Han? According to Su Zizhan 蘇子 瞻, “to view from what changes, even Heaven and Earth cannot last for a minute; while to view from what doesn’t change, both external things and me are endless”. In this sense, the issue about eternity is related to “to view” (guan 觀). The reason for sages to be sages is that they are able to think ahead. In bronze script, mu 目 is the very traditionally recognized radicals (bu shou 部首) to which the Chinese character dao 道 belong compared with the character xing 行.The appropriate approach to interpret classics is to learn to “view” in the way sages (i.e., the authors of classics) do. For sages, the life that would never be backward is the first and foremost, while those eternal things are secondary. In order to learn to view in the way sages do, we shall live our life and view our life in the way sage do. The reason for classics to be classics is that they fit in with

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everyone’s life. The life of sages is the life of everyone. The process of using our present life to enrich the content of classics is called “to experience” (ti hui 體會). To experience is not the learning of history. Neither is it historicist hermeneutics, let alone being deconstructionist anti-hermeneutics. Rather, “to experience” is the mutual enlightenment of classics and life, and is to build up or to discover “eternity” through the coupling of the past life experience and the present life experience. Such eternity is the real political archy. To sit and theorize is what san gong 三公 do5 ; while to walk upright and take actions is what shi da fu 士大夫 do.6 Both theorizing and taking actions are parts of the political entity as a whole. The political entity is “monarchy” (yi tong 一統), which can also be considered as the eternal ruling. Neither Berlin nor Gan Yang is wrong in claiming that the issue of culture and politics is decisively dependent on the relation between one and many. Gan Yang has even dimly seen the universal brotherhood which is the very “one” in the relation between one and many. As for the very “one”, I would love to modestly make the following supplementary specification for what Gan Yang said in interpreting the Analects: “We know quite a few about the idea of the Good (Agathon). And if we cannot comprehend the Good, it would be useless for us to acquire even tons of knowledge about other things” (Plato’s The Republic 505a). For Plato, it is due to our human body that what we’ve experienced as “many” has no “correctness”. Maybe the prisoner who returned to the cave, as depicted in Plato’s The Republic, shall be viewed as the first person of “over shoes over boots”. Draft completed in October 2002, in Shanghai. (Originally published in the Du Shu 读书 journal, 2003 (3)).

Translator’s note: The term san gong 三公 usually refers to the persons who took the three noblest official positions in ancient China, preceded only by the emperor. 6 Translator’s note: The term shi da fu 士大夫 usually refers to those who took the official positions below san gong 三公. 5

Chapter 3

How Do Modern Intellectuals “Take the World as One’s Own Duty”: Regarding the Approach of CAO Jinqing 曹錦清

Abstract Taking the Chinese sociologist Cao Jinqing as an example, this chapter discusses a better approach for modern intellectuals to “take the world as one’s own duty”, in comparison to the different approaches taken respectively by academic intellectuals and public intellectuals. By elaborating on Cao’s general method of investigation which can be regarded as an organic integration of Gu Yanwu, Fei Xiaotong, and Mao Zedong, this chapter further critically reviews Cao’s method of rural investigation, advocating modern intellectuals to comprehensively observe reality and deeply comprehend human life, with deep concern for the basic situation and development trend of Chinese society.

Ever since the beginning of 1990s, due to the change of both social environment and the atmosphere of cultural-educational units, the collective features of modern intellectuals in China at that time have varied dramatically. There emerged a division among the intellectual groups in 1980s that highly concerned about the cultural meaning and social transformation. Most of the intellectual groups at that time broke away from the public domain and turned to focus on different kinds of institutionalized duties within the gradually shaped academical organizational system. Among these people, some—due to the characteristic of their majors—managed to participate, through their own academic disciplines, in the significant discussion on the transformation of Chinese society. This phenomenon is most vividly reflected in scholars of economics, sociology, laws, and politics. One minor part of the intellectual groups still maintained relatively strong practical concern and continuously participated, through their unique ways, in the arguments about the social condition and social tendency in China. These public intellectuals sticked to their should-be. But the camps to which they belong are different, and their statements are diverse. Despite of these complexities, they approximately have the following similarities: First, all of them bravely make judgments of—and prescribe accordingly—the reality. Concerning for the reality is the principal duty of public intellectuals, while it is not required for academic intellectuals to do so since their original duty is to construct academic disciplines and to apply for academic projects. However, such a self-expectation of public intellectuals has to be restrained according to certain © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_3

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rules. Nowadays, the concern of public intellectuals for reality has overwhelmingly exceeded their knowledge of reality. The Chinese society is a tremendous whole that not only changes rapidly and profoundly, but also is in a complex and dynamic relation that is multilayered and deeply intertwined. Therefore, one has no right to make indiscreet remarks on realities solely by his partial observation, outdated feelings, and fragmentary impressions. Different from ancient local gentries who were the head of the four classes of people, modern intellectuals do not occupy a proper position in the main social strata (we should always remember that we are members of the working class, that is to say, our legal identity is not “intellectual” but working class). Mainly living in a college environment that is seriously divorced from the reality of society, modern intellectuals never investigate into reality yet monopolizing the right to speak. How can such country doctors prescribe reliable medicine? Second, all of them are passionate about applying theories. Admittedly, the public intellectuals still retain some genuine enthusiasm for theoretical expression, which makes them more noble than the academic intellectuals who pick up what they hear and make a living by learning academic knowledge. But the realization of this enthusiasm still basically depends on the digestion of academic intellectuals on western learning. Since the 1980s, China has introduced on a large scale, if not quite at the same time, various fashionable western ideas. Different from academic intellectuals who are dominated by various academic projects and immersed in quoting western learning, public intellectuals truly have their own problem consciousness. But problems are always formulated and solved in accordance with theories. The intellectuals can neither understand the concepts and methods they use historically and comprehensively in the context of the problems aroused within Western learning, nor critically examine the presuppositions and backgrounds behind various theories, let alone being able to adjust, reflect on, or even transform—when facing the reality in China—the theoretical presuppositions they hastily accept from academic learning. They try to cut the feet to fit the shoes when confronting the mismatch between reality and theories, by either simply ignoring reality or cutting reality to accommodate the authority of theory. It is the direct reason that modern public intellectuals are either speechless or talking nonsense in the face of reality. Yet, the fundamental reason lies in the lack of honesty, courage, and perseverance to build a reasonable social ideal through a comprehensive observation of reality. Third, all of them have strong emotions of moralization. Public intellectuals, instead of being just shriveled and anemic rational animals, must—of course—have genuine moral fervor. However, the deeper the emotion is, the more mature the reason would be, and the more knowledgeable he becomes. Those who allow emotion to prevail over reason would barely succeed. Unfortunately, modern public intellectuals are more emotional than rational. They are characteristic of an alternation of passionate idealism, apathetic cynicism, and cynical postmodernism, which in fact confuses theories, ideals, and even doctrines. Therefore, it turns out that they either curry favor with the world and become weathercocks, or carry resentment and become too rebellious to emotionally get along well with the current political system. Neither of these two manifests any mature and independent consciousness, since the former

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has the soul of a hanger-on of an aristocrat while the latter is a typical psychology of adolescents. In such a picture, Cao Jinqing is indeed a peculiar person. He observes and understands reality, but never hastily draws any conclusion; he reads the classics and learns history as well as delves into western learning, but is vigilant and never abuses his name. He is enthusiastic and clear-headed, unworldly and perceptive, being able to swim with flesh-eaters yet look far ahead, being loyal and patriotic yet lofty and detached, and being close to common people yet contemptuous of government officials. In a word, he is not very similar to the public intellectuals in our time. But he is not similar to academic intellectuals either, since he is not that narrow-minded and thus doesn’t seem to be that professional. Cao majors in sociology. However, he is not as inherited as other average scholars of this area; neither does he have as many disciplines or sectarian bias as the professional scholars do. All these above would bring difficulties to the estimation and evaluation of Cao’s approach. Only by putting this approach into an appropriate historical context can we properly understand and further promote its significance. The followings are just some outline ideas that need to be fleshed out.

3.1 Which Tradition Does Cao’s Approach Belong to? Comparing Cao’s approach with that of the former intellectuals who made local investigations for different purpose, we can find that he is close to Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 and Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 in spirit temperament and thus establishes a semiconscious relationship with the practical tradition of Confucianism and the practice of rural conventions. Cao is very familiar with Liang Shuming and once edited a selected works of the latter. Meanwhile, Cao himself also has a similar history of turning from philosophical research to social observation. Since the publication of Huanghe Bian De Zhongguo 黃河邊的中國 (China by the Yellow River), with the enrichment of his vision and the deepening of his experience, Cao has gradually realized that his primary concern is not the rural investigation in the narrow sense of sociology, but the ups and downs of the Chinese nation. This speech which starts from the Confucian orthodoxy would serve as a clear evidence. I venture to predict that Cao shall have a stronger and more conscious sense of the nature and significance of his work. At the same time, such self-consciousness will deepen our understanding of Confucian tradition and serve to break through the one-sided opinion that what Confucian scholars aim at is either interpreting the Confucian classics or sit quietly to preserve and cultivate human nature. Cao once said that noble spirit (hao ran zhi qi 浩然之氣) should not be cultivated in the way of sitting quietly, but should be cultivated in-between Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, through traveling from place to place in difficulty and distress. This insightful comprehension is come up with through his actual practice. Accordingly, Cao combines former intellectuals’ methods of investigation, such as those of Gu Yanwu, Mao Zedong 毛澤東, and Fei Xiaotong 費孝通. He focused quite

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a lot on the impact of economic policy adjustments on rural life. At the micro-level, he pays attention to the seemingly random and intimate personal verbal surveys. This seems to be close to Fei Xiaotong, but Cao does not do, as Fei does, any comprehensive survey of a particular village. Rather, compared to Fei, Cao’s vision is both narrower (without Fei’s focus on the structure of social organizations) and broader—and is thus largely ignored by professional sociologists. At the macrolevel, Cao not only pays attention to data relations, but also investigates into the situation of mountains and rivers in the world, the historical evolution of local areas, the smoothness and stagnancy of government orders, the rising and falling of social classes, and the sadness and happiness of people. As a result, his vision is gradually broadened and his mind is gradually enlarged. He travels thousands of miles between Heaven and Earth and shares one body with the myriad things. Being close to Heaven and Earth and mountains and rivers is known as wisdom, while being close to the myriad things is known as benevolence. The closer he is to the myriad things, the more he realizes the way (dao 道). Whenever Cao arrives at a place, he would first read the local Chronicles, in order to get to be acquainted with the situations of local mountains and rivers as well as the replacement of local customs. His actual survey, instead of focusing on narrating life details, usually centers on the main points of social life revealed in daily life. These characteristics above are inherited from the approaches of Gu Yanwu and Mao Zedong and are entirely different from the sociological surveys of academic intellectuals. If “intellectuals” are to take the world as their own duty, they must first experience the world themselves. As far as nature is concerned, the world is nothing but mountains, rivers, and people. Walk 10,000 miles, and then know the world; read 10,000 books and then is enlightened by the way of the world. This is the practical tradition of scholar-bureaucrats. If we are able to continue this tradition, the modern intellectuals may have a chance to save themselves.

3.2 How to Comprehend the Significance of Rural Investigation? As mentioned above, Cao Jinqing is semiconscious of the significance of his work. That is to say, although he pays increasing attention to the positive significance of the relation between rural investigation and world care, he has not yet come up with any clear and concrete plans. This draws a sharp difference between him and either Mao Zedong or Liang Shuming. Cao gradually developed a larger ambition and a broader picture in his mind after accumulating rich experience in rural areas through investigation. It seems that among contemporary experts on the issue of agriculture, rural areas, and farmers, only He Xuefeng 賀雪峰 takes the similar way, i.e., that of gradually being exposed to the larger overall issues of civilization, while the rest of experts in this area inevitably talk about the issue of rural areas within the limited context of rural areas. In contrast, Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming aim at dealing

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with the problem of the whole Chinese society from the very beginning, while the countryside is the starting point for them to solve this big problem. As stated by Liang Shuming: For me, the book XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (The Theory of Rural Construction) can also be called ZhongguoMinzu Zhi Qiantu 中國民族之前途 (The Future of Chinese Nation), since it is an answer, I think, to the perplexing problems about China.1 The problem of today’s China is that the existing structure of its social organizations which has been followed for thousands of years has collapsed, while the new one has not been established. The rural construction movement is actually a movement of our nation to rebuild a new organizational structure—this is the true significance of rural construction.2

In his work that was hastily written during the time of Cultural Revolution, Liang even further states that: The nearest object and the most distant object that Chinese people have a sense of is, respectively, themselves and the world, while the concept of nation is lacked in the mind of Chinese people…. The political life of most Chinese people in the past is negative, and it must now turn into being positive. Meanwhile, the political system of monarchy in the past must be changed into that of democracy nowadays. These are the undoubted facts. However, these need to be gradually cultivated in real life, rather than through any empty constitutional document. As an intellectual who grew up in a big city (Beijing) yet become devoted to rural construction, my original motive was to cultivate the ability of Chinese people to engage in democratic political life by starting from a small scope of local autonomous groups. The key for China turning into a democratic state lies in its move from disorganization to organization, as well as Chinese people learning to organize in groups to live…The collective life of Chinese people has long been devoid of the centripetal force, and must further resort to organizations for remedy…This still seems to be true even when we look back from today which has been 40 or 50 years afterwards.3

These words above clearly show that Liang’s general solution to China’s problems is to build a new basic social organization, which is different from either the family-based approach in previous China or the individual-based approach in modern western countries. It is a group living unit regulated by etiquette and custom. Rural construction solely is the starting point of constructing community life and society. Different from Liang’s approach of starting with construction, Cao starts from investigation. Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. Liang’s lack of a systematic investigation of Chinese society led to his making three basic misjudgments that in turn caused his failure in the rural construction movement. First of all, rural areas are just one part of Chinese society, and Chinese society is more than rural society and agricultural society. Industrialization and urban construction are the general trend of China’s modernization. Any observation about the fate of rural areas which fail to take into account this trend will certainly be abandoned by our time. See the Introduction chapter of Liang’s book XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (The Theory of Rural Construction). 2 See the forth section of the first chapter in Part I of Liang’s book XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建 設理論 (The Theory of Rural Construction). 3 See Chapter 24 of Liang’s book Zhongguo: Li Xing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Rational State). 1

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Furthermore, it is absolutely true that the solution to China’s social problems always lies in the construction of post-family groups. But in terms of the needs for modernization of Chinese society, such groups should not be any small ones of local autonomy, but a modern state. It is irrational to avoid national construction during the process of social construction. History has proved that Liang Shuming is wrong to make the pessimistic judgment about the difficulty of establishing a modern unified country in China. The construction of any social organization in China can only be realized under the general premise of modern national construction. Last but not least, a powerful revolutionary party is the basic group that can simultaneously solve the problems of social construction and national construction in China. The basic factor of building this party is organizational disciplines rather than village etiquettes and customs. The primary premise for this party’s governance is to change customs and to promote the dissolution of clans (this process of dissolution is not started by this party, yet is completed by it). This solved the most fatal trouble in Liang’s rural construction movement, namely who would bear the new customs and govern the new countryside after the disintegration of the gentry class? The practical heritage of Mao Zedong’s approach and the theoretical heritage of Liang Shuming’s approach are the two basic standards for criticizing Cao’s approach. Cao’s survey does not seem to take into account social organizations that are parts of the urban–rural interaction network and the state-social interaction network, while these interaction networks are one of the essential attributes of modern society. Cao is clearly aware of these two networks, and this is where he is superior to Liang Shuming. But he does not explicitly start with the overall construction of social organization (or just start with the economy-domesticity perspective of the rural areas), nor does he take into account the same problem in the city. This is where his investigation needs to be improved. What is “the world” (tian xia 天下)? From the perspective of social theory, “the world” is, first of all, the basic social organizations and their living customs. From the perspective of civilization theory, “the world” is the civilization tradition that is the dominant way of life. This is the non-material nature of “the world”, which lies in the level beyond the situation of mountains and rivers. This is also the first concern of Gu Yanwu and Liang Shuming. Only in this sense can Cao Jinqing’s practical work be combined with his conscious ambition.

3.3 Elite Education as an Intermediary Between Social Construction and National Construction The achievement of new China’s social construction and national construction, as a heritage of Mao Zedong, is the fundamental premise of any practice in the present era. Mao made several principal contributions to social organizations—that is where he is more successful than Liang Shuming. In rural areas, Mao established the people’s commune system. On the one hand, such a system made a successful exploration for

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the construction and planning of agricultural development as well as the collective life and governance of farmers. On the other hand, such a system also strongly supported the industrialization led by the state and realized the necessary primitive accumulation of China’s modernization. In urban areas, Mao established the unit system. On the one hand, this system gradually realized the basic accumulation and construction of the country through the economic plans of units. On the other hand, through centering around units, this system also satisfied the basic social security needs of citizens. This, in his own way, realized Liang Shuming’s ideal on a higher level—that the Chinese people managed to live the life of organizations. From the perspective of social construction, the reason for Mao’s success and Liang’s failure is closed related to Mao’s planned regulation through national decrees. Mao didn’t construct villages simply within the limit of rural areas. Instead, he mobilized villagers to carry out armed struggles and then to seize the state power. On that basis, he then promoted social constructions which include rural construction through national construction. As noticed by all political forces, old China is problematic of falling into pieces. But it is Mao Zedong who managed to solve this problem. The key is systematization. The construction of social groups needs to be promoted by a more organized group, namely the state, while the state needs to be constructed by another highly organized group, namely a Leninist party with a high degree of systematization and strict disciplines. This can be said to be a process of pushing down the intensity of systematization. In the final analysis, the problem of falling into pieces can only be solved by the centralized power from the top down. For a country like China which lacks the tradition of community life, it is impossible to solve the fundamental construction problems by social autonomy. That is to say, different from the western basic structure of family—civil society—the state, the three elements for the political practices in China during the era of Mao Zedong is: grassroots organizations (people’s communes and units)—the state (departments of power)—political parties. Only through introspection on the western theory of state-society opposition and through reflecting on the western theory of party-state can we explicitly explain the achievement of social construction and national construction in the era of Mao. Among the three kinds of collective construction (i.e., society, state, and political party), the most fundamental one is party construction. The members of Chinese political parties are not only members of political organizations, but also the basic integrative force of social organizations. After the dissolution of clans and the demise of gentry, the members of political parties—as alternative grassroots elites—shoulder the mission of social integration and political governance. With the development of the market economy and the end of the people’s commune system and the omnipotent unit system, Chinese society has changed from a collectivist group society to a nearly individual-oriented society that is unfamiliar to the traditions. Meanwhile, different from the western society that is maturely individual oriented, Chinese society still has collectivist residues and a remaining ideal of happy family; meanwhile, it is ruled by a political party full of highly organizational disciplines and rich experience of governance. All these above, together with the ancient classics and the remaining tradition of interpreting those classics, are extraordinary resources that can be used in solving the problems of our times.

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In such an era, it is necessary to continue to promote Cao Jinqing’s approach of investigating things and extending knowledge. The real duty of modern intellectuals shall be to comprehensively observe reality and to deeply comprehend human life, as well as pay close attention to the basic situation and development trend of Chinese society. Also, they shall solve various practical problems existing among individual, family, society, state, and the world based on various heritages of predecessors, even to the extent of solving the most fundamental problems originated in getting on with one’s pursuit on that basis. (Originally published in the book Jingxue, Zhengzhi Yu Xiandai Zhongguo 經學 、政治與現代中國 (The Study of Confucian Classics, Politics, and Modern China), Vol.3 of Sixiang Shi Yanjiu 思想史研究 (Study On the History of Thoughts), Shanghai People’s Publishing House, April 2007).

Part II

The Revival of Confucianism and Confucian Socialism

Chapter 4

On Contemporary Confucian Political Arguments

Abstract This chapter begins with an argument for the political dimension of the so-called new Confucianism of the third period and then turns to elaborate on two types of contemporary political Confucianism, respectively, represented by Jiang Qing 蔣慶 and Gan Yang 甘陽, both of which differ from the new Confucianism in the sense that neither of the former go through the self-negation of the Confucian tradition with the purpose of creating the “new external king”; instead, they both try to integrate the Confucian tradition with modern society, though each taking a different approach.

One of the biggest changes taking place in Chinese intellectual circle is that Confucianism is taken more seriously or more sincerely than almost all the mainstream schools in the history of modern Chinese thought. Like many other trends, this change is a sign that Chinese thought, long torn between ideological and academic lines, is learning to grow deeper and more mature. It can be anticipated that the change of the intellectual circle will have a slow and far-reaching impact on ideology and academic research itself. The essence of this change is the activation, derivation, application, and consideration of the Confucian tradition as a source of thought in the face of the complex and heavy problems confronted by Chinese society and Chinese civilization as well as human history. That is the key to differentiating the academic research and ideological adjudication. There may be two reasons for this change. First, judging from some mature intellectual quality (here, “mature” at least means experienced), the various new problems faced by humans in each new age are nothing more than the latest variations of those eternal problems. Once the intellectual circle realizes this, the trend of blindly seeking new and unusual things will often change into going back to the origin and resolving This article was once presented as the first part of my another paper titled “Gongheguo de Junzhu Jiaoyu: Shi Lun Xin Xing Ruxue de Zheng Zhi Xing” 共和國的君主教育——試論心性儒學的政 治性 (“Sovereign Education in the Republic of China: On the Political Nature of Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind”) at the symposium of Gong He Guo Liushi Zhounian: Huigu Yu Zhanwang 共和國六十周年: 回顧與展望 (“The 60th Anniversary of the Republic of China: Retrospect and Prospect”) in Fudan University in October 2007. Actually, this article is the introduction part of that paper. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_4

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the tradition. History is laden with facts of this kind. Second, considering the original meaning of the word “tradition”, every great tradition not only applies to the beginning of its establishment, but also addresses some aspect of the eternal problem through confronting present problems. This is the basis on which tradition can be revived from time to time in seemingly different historical circumstances. The two reasons above are clearly interrelated. As the eternal problem develops into different forms, so can and should the tradition develop into different forms. The opportunity for such development lies in the perception that “problems of times” derive from the “eternal problem”, or rather the “problem of tradition”. In other words, this requires us to be both “conservative” in our understanding of “times” and “open-minded” in our understanding of “tradition”. Review the old to know the new and examine the present to know the old, with both elements interact as both cause and effect. If we look at the “new” with “old” eyes and the “old” with “new” eyes, it then turns out that the new is not so new, and the old is not so old. All the secrets of life and death, of eternity and decay, lie between the “old” and the “new”. Appreciating the old and new opportunities shall be considered as the beginning of mental maturity. To understand the revival of contemporary Confucianism in such a context can not only clearly appreciate its significance and trend of development in the history of thought, but also find some deficiencies that are not commensurate with its historical mission, that is to say, to find its greater possibility, so as to give it appropriate defense and friendly reminder. The contemporary development of Confucianism, including its self-description, self-justification, interpretation, judgment, and suggestions, all revolves around a principal axis, that is, the politics. This is obviously different from the methodology of the “New Confucianism of the third period” (di san qi xinru jia 第三期新儒 家) 1 which interprets, justifies, and creatively reconstructs Confucianism from the perspective of culture. If this is an emphasis on the “eternal problems”, there is an equally clear difference between the two in the “problems of the times”: Contemporary Confucianism has a more or less sober attitude toward the ideal of “modernity”,2 1

Some people refer to contemporary Confucianism as “New Confucianism in mainland China”, in order to distinguish it from the “New Confucianism in Hong Kong and Taiwan”. This, however, conflates Xiong Shili 熊十力, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 and their followers with the contemporary Confucians in mainland China, and goes too far in separating them from their disciples in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In what follows, I shall collectively consider Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan 牟宗 三, Tang Junyi 唐君毅 and their disciples as “New Confucianism”, in order to make a distinction between these scholars and the Confucians who are mainly active in contemporary mainland China and whose thinking shall be called political Confucianism (zhengzhiruxue 政治儒學) or institutional Confucianism (zhi du ruxue 制度儒學). 2 In the expression of Jiang Qing 蔣慶, one of the representative figures of contemporary Confucianism, the “western democracy” is clearly reflected on, while a fair degree of tenderness for the glorious word “modern” is reserved. This reservation is rather intriguing, and will be discussed below in this chapter. Gan Yang 甘陽, by contrast, wisely defended the Confucianism of cultural conservativism (these Confucians are only cultural conservative) and its critique of modern culture (and only the critique of culture). However, such a defense is offered solely on the basis of treating Confucianism of cultural conservativism as a necessary part of modern society. For more details,

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while the New Confucianism of the third period mainly focuses on the modernization of Confucianism, or in other words, to win a glorious place for the Confucian tradition through its demonstration of the basic values of modern society. It is worth pointing out that we can’t simply conclude that there’s no political dimension in the concern of the “New Confucianism of the third period” solely on the basis that most of their statements mainly focus on the realm of culture. On the contrary, the new Confucians’ claims on culture imply some political premises, which can be reduced to the following judgments: First, Confucianism has a theory about “the nature of the heart/mind” (xinxing 心 性) and culture. Meanwhile, it has a theory about politics and political system. And these two lines of theories can be separated from each other. Second, the new Confucians—no matter Xiong Shili 熊十力, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, or their followers—have either assumed or were forced to accept that the traditional Confucian political discourse (i.e., the theory of “external king” (wai wang 外王)) was incompatible with the political values of modern society.3 Third, modern political values (either people’s democracy or liberal democracy) are desirable or necessary. Fourth, the theory of people’s democracy and that of liberal democracy must be separated from each other, too. Fifth, the foundation of political system is “the nature of the heart/mind”. The theory of “the nature of the heart/mind” is the essence of Chinese culture. In order to preserve the Confucian tradition in modern society, it is necessary to cut off the relationship between the theory of “internal sage” (nei sheng 内聖) and the theory of “external king” wai wang 外王. In other words, the primary task of the New Confucianism is to restate “the substance of the Way” (daoti 道體), while the secondary task is to develop the basic value of modern society through transforming “the substance of the Way”. please see Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學 (Political Confucianism), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2003: 359; Gan Yang, “Zhongguo Daolu: Sanshi Nian Yu Liushi Nian” 中 國道路: 三十年與六十年 (“The Chinese Approach: Thirty Years and Sixty Years”), Du Shu 讀書, 2007 (6). 3 The phrase of being “forced to accept” denotes being forced by historical reality rather than by power. Here I refer to Liang Shuming. Perhaps Qian Mu 錢穆 is an exception (he does not reject the basic values of modern politics, but believes that some elements of these value were included in the ancient Chinese political system to a certain extent). But Yu Yingshi 余英時, for some reason, has explicitly refused to include Qian Mu into the neo-Confucian camp. For more details, please see Yu’s work Qian Mu Yu Zhongguo Wenhua 錢穆與中國文化 (Qian Mu and Chinese Culture), Shanghai Far East Publishers 上海遠東出版社, 1996. Besides, scholars who proposed the politicalcultural theory can hardly be simply considered as modernists. Neither can they be fit into the camp of New Confucianism. If Yu Yingshi’s statement above is taken as the standard, then the academic thinkers before the generation of Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming, who have obvious sentiment for Confucianism, would be hard to be classified into any camp (it is probably a good thing, though, for the narrative of the history of thought). One of the sharp questions raised by Yu’s criteria of classification is why the generation of Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming spontaneously chose to combine Confucianism with people’s democracy in modern politics, while their next generation chose to combine Confucianism with liberal democracy in modern politics.

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The main focus of New Confucianism is the fifth judgment stated above, which is also the main target of the criticism raised by contemporary Confucians against New Confucianism.4 Contemporary Confucianism seems to have completely reversed the basic consciousness of New Confucianism implied in the fifth judgment above, with a suspended attitude of keeping a wide distance from the theory about “the nature of the heart/mind” and culture, and clearly regards it as their basic task to design a political system for the modern Chinese society and even the future of human beings according to the tradition of “the study of Confucian classics in clerical script” ( jin wen jingxue 今文經學), especially that of Gongyang 公羊 school. But as we have shown, the fifth judgment (which is mainly about culture) is difficult to hold without the support of the first four judgments (all of which are political or has something to do with politics). Likewise, without an attack on the first four judgments, the criticism of the fifth judgment is difficult to sustain. The subversion contemporary Confucianism has toward the second and third judgments above is implicit in their criticism toward the thinking direction of New Confucianism. This is the real premise of political Confucianism, which deserves special attention from scholars. Unlike New Confucianism, the representatives of political Confucianism rejected the desirability of “western democracy” (which in Jiang Qing’s case could be equated with “liberal democracy”) and ignored the inevitability of “people’s democracy”.5 Furthermore, political Confucianism completely denies the disconnection between modern times and the Confucian theory of “external king”). But if modern times consist only of people’s democracy and liberal democracy, then this denial seems untenable. Therefore, political Confucianism must have a dual attitude toward the second judgment mentioned above. If the political value of modern society is nothing more than “democracy”, then even Jiang Qing can agree with this judgment of New Confucianism. In this way, he would have to admit that the Confucian theory of “external king” was “outdated”. But if modern political values can have some other

4 For more details, please see the first two sections of Chapter I in Jiang Qing’s Zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學 (Political Confucianism) (SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2003). See also Gan Chunsong 乾春松, Zhidu Ruxue 制度儒學 (Institutional Confucianism), Shanghai People’s Publishing House 上海人民出版社, 2006. Jiang Qing relied mainly on the Confucian “ideals” expressed in Confucian classics. Gan Chunsong paid more attention to historiography, that is to say, the Confucian practice that gave full play to the actual institutional effect, while Chen Ming and others tended to give full play to this effect by taking current actions. All these are easy to be ignored in Jiang Qing’s simple expression of “political Confucianism”. 5 It is the realization of founding new China through practicing “people’s democracy” that forces Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili to face up to and even argue for socialist China. See especially Liang Shuming’s unfinished article (1950) titled “Zhongguo Jian Guo Zhi Lu (LunZhongguoGongchandang Bing Jiantao Wo Ziji)” 中國建國之路 (論中國共產黨並檢討我自己) “The Approach to Founding the People’s Republic of China: On the Communist Party of China & My Self-Criticism”), in: Liang Shuming Quan Ji 梁漱溟全集 (The Collected Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 3, Shandong People’s Publishing House 上海人民出版社; Xiong Shili 熊十力, Yuan Ru 原儒 (Tracing Confucianism), in: Xiong Shili Quan Ji 熊十力全集 (The Collected Works of Xiong Shili), Vol. 6, Hubei Education Publishing House 湖北教育出版社.

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possibilities besides “democracy”, then the contemporary argument for the Confucian theory of “external king” can be preserved. That is to say, in political Confucianism, the contemporary establishment of the Confucian theory of “external king” must be based on the design of another “modern political value”. Such a design is crucial to the modern vindication of Confucian theory of “external king”. It can only be a design, because the study of political Confucianism on the modern actual political system can only draw a conclusion that is not conducive to the traditional Confucian theory of “external king”. This is completely consistent with New Confucianism. Any existing form of Confucianism cannot directly defend the Confucian tradition comprehensively from the perspective of the modern actual political system. Neither can it do an effective demonstration of the modern actual political system from the perspective of Confucian tradition. There must seem to be an either-or between the Confucian political tradition and the modern political system. Note that although contemporary Confucian representatives still incorporate the word “modern” into their design tasks in some positive way, their specific discourse has in fact emptied out any actual content that history ascribes to “modern politics”. For example, according to Jiang Qing’s remarks, political Confucianism has some positive or negative relations with liberalism, conservatism, Marxism and even Christian political theology, but it is obvious that political Confucianism cannot be reduced to any of these positions.6 Jiang also claimed that political Confucianism, based on the reestablished tradition of “interpreting Confucian classics by political system”, advocates the creation of a “Chinese-style political system”, which can also be called the “kingship politics”. On the other hand, he also emphasized that the creation of “kingship politics” should be the character and direction of “Chinese modernization”.7 Any attentive reader will not give up asking what Jiang Qing really stands for here when it comes to the relation between the “kingship politics” and “modernization”. How does he understand and view “modernization”? There are only two possibilities: One is that he understood “modernization” as a formal expression representing the general trend of history and politics, and the other is that he sincerely believed that the essence of Chinese modernization was the kingship politics, and that the word “modern” here is just a pure tense language, which does not imply the position such as the “dispute between the ancient and the modern”. No matter considering “modernization” as a formal expression or a tense language, Jiang Qing’s understanding of “modernity” is very different from that of both his opponents and his sympathizers. He either completely denies modernity in the dispute between the ancient and the See Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學 (Political Confucianism), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2003: 118–125. Jiang made no secret of the fact that political Confucianism and Christian political theology are “very similar” in fundamental aspects, and that it is also closely associated with conservatism. And he also criticized liberalism in many ways under the premise of agreeing with its representing some basic consensus of modern society. However, he was remarkably silent on the specific relationship between political Confucianism and Marxism or socialism. And this is where Gan Yang bravely explores. 7 See Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學 (Political Confucianism), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2003: 359. 6

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modern (therefore only the empty form is retained), or further denies the dispute between the ancient and the modern per se. Either way, Jiang Qing’s position is what is commonly called an “ancient” one. However, we would like to add at once that this is the ideal position in the context of the ancient texts. The ancient reality has been suppressed by Jiang into the dark darkness under the spell of “politicized Confucianism”. This is in contrast to ancient times, when what’s beneath the political reality of ancient times was actually sublime words, while what’s beneath those sublime words was hardly visible. What must have appeared in ancient times in the almost invisible form of an “ideal” (it’s essential for political reality to have an ideal, even if it is an unrealized one) is openly emphasized by modern interpreters of Confucian classics. Jiang Qing tried to realize the ancient ideal through real political action and reasonable political design in the process of “modernization”. Political ideals arise out of the relatively noble eros. Ideals are characteristic of being in the state between the necessary and the unattainable. Once realized, the ideal is no longer an ideal. Jiang Qing’s attitude toward the ancient ideal has been completely different from the ancient times, but belongs to the modern trend of romanticizing conservatism. What forms a subtle contrast with Jiang Qing’s using ancient ideas for today’s reference is Gan Yang’s narrating today’s idea in alluding to the ancient.8 The modern state, which already existed or at any rate cannot be overtly redesigned, is the starting point of Gan’s Confucian discourse, which is subordinate to his interpretation of the republic. On the surface, Confucian discourse does not participate in the explanation of political system, but merely represents the description of the resources of the ethics (Sittlichkeit) of the republic. At most, it expresses a kind of “cultural conservatism” which originated from Max Weber and derived from Daniel Bell.9 Gan Yangnever made any overt attempt to design a political blueprint based on the Confucian classics. In his so-called compromise work, the so-called “the unification of three traditions” (tong san tong 通三統), what concerns the unification of political system is neither “Confucianism” nor “socialism”, but “liberal” constitutionalism. In the interpretation of “People’s Republic of China”, what strictly corresponds to the “republic” is constitutional unification, while the “people” corresponds to “socialism” and “China” corresponds to “Confucianism”. In response to this explanation, it is likely that the question arises as to how “China” in the Confucian tradition can possibly be a republic when it should be followed by “empire” and “dynasty”. In other words, does the combination of modern polity and ancient tradition in the ordinary sense has any real or intrinsic inevitability? 8

Nowadays, Gan Yang has been labeled by various academic groups as “a westernizer”, “a nationalist”, “a liberalist”, “a new Confucian”, “a conservatist”, and even “a leftist”. These derisive titles merely show the complexity that underlies his clear writing style. Few in the academic world have seriously confronted—or even recognized—the complexity behind Gan’s simple writing style, let alone consciously explored what really matters behind such simplicity. How to read Gan Yang may be a test to show how intelligent and patient our times would be, just as how to treat Jiang Qing may be a test to show the spirit and unyielding character of our nation. 9 In this sense, Jiang Qing’s comments on the contents of Gan Yang’s Confucian discourse are correct. But he does not take into account the intent of this discourse. See Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學 (Political Confucianism), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2003: 6.

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Both political Confucianism and its opposite would reject this inevitability. Political Confucianism wants to plan the polity from scratch. That is to say, similar to New Confucianism, they deny the coordination between Confucianism and the “republic”. Both the left wing and the right wing of liberalism also reject any positive association between Confucianism and either the “republic” (proposed by the right wing) or the “People’s Republic” (proposed by the left wing). History seems to be on their side. The process of building a modern state in China is also a process of “de-Confucianization” in culture and politics. This is an obvious fact, and it also means obvious truth. To preserve and adjust the modern regime, we must continue to preserve the historical achievement of “de-Confucianization”, which is a tacit agreement between the radical right wing of liberalism and the radical left wing of liberalism. On the other hand, to revive Confucianism, it is necessary to “demodernize”—or at least remove the usual meaning of “modernization”—the modern Chinese polity premised on “de-Confucianization”. In principle, both the liberalists and the conservatives should be critical of Gan Yang’s interpretation of the republic. In fact, the reaction of political Confucianism is more subdued, because Gan Yang’s work at least includes a defense of Confucianism. Although this defense is clearly different from political Confucianism, it somehow links politics with Confucianism and has left a place for Confucianism in modern society. What political Confucians complain about Gan Yang is that he seems to defend Confucianism in the context of modern regime, leaving only “culture” for Confucianism. In other words, Gan Yang’s defense is also restriction. The ultimate aim of Gan Yang’s discourse is to adjust the modern regime. His acceptance of Confucianism never exceeds the cultural position of New Confucianism and further cuts off the substantive connection between culture and regime.10 In fact, the real contribution of New Confucianism in the history of Confucianism is to take the lead in connecting culture with regime for modern times. Gan Yang’s statement—“individual citizens are the foundation, and the united constitutionalism builds the country”—clearly induces people to understand him as merely a wise defender of the modern regime. In this sense, defending the modern regime is indeed his aim. But the way Gan Yang defends it—rather than the content of it—suggests he is also a wise defender of ancient traditions. This defense is neither enlightening nor modern in terms of ethical ideals, but respects the direct consequence of enlightenment-like modernity in terms of political system, that is, the modern republic. Gan Yang does not reject the radical political conservatism held by political Confucianism on the basis of the straightforward standpoint of cultural conservatism, but—through his unique defense—transforms it into the kind of political conservatism that only plays the cultural role. As I’ve said, ideals are characteristic of being in the state between the necessary and the unattainable. An ideal would cease to be an ideal without the impulse to realize it. In order for political The main concern of my book review of Jiang Cuo Jiu Cuo 將錯就錯 (Over Shoes Over Boots) is the issue of whether it is possible to publicly sever the substantive ties between culture and politics as well as induce scholars to regard ethical resources as civic religion or noble lies. For more details, please see Chap. 2.

10

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conservatism to play the role of cultural conservatism, it is necessary to both respect and limit the kingship ideal of political Confucianism in terms of rhetoric content. However, it is one of the characteristics of the ancient political system that the ancient government should be positively expounded and properly restricted. On the contrary, the unflinching implementation of ancient ideals is the practice of modern romanticism. By limiting ancient ideals and respecting established regimes in his words, Gan Yang expresses in his actions exactly what is beyond modern times. It is really political conservative to criticize modern ideals in rhetoric and to respect established regimes in action, even if they are, from the standpoint of cultural conservatism, highly undesirable. Again, from the viewpoint of political Confucianism, Gan Yang’s defense still is, in the final analysis, based on regarding Confucianism as primarily concerning the nature of the heart/mind, which plays the role of cultural conservatism. This observation is correct in the respect that Gan Yang really wants Confucianism to work as cultural conservatism. But, unlike the old version of cultural conservatism, Gan Yang bypasses the substantive argument about “the self-negation of truly good knowledge” (liang zhi zi wo kanxian良知自我坎陷) in the context of Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind. Also, he steers clear of political Confucianism, and reversely, through the limited acknowledgment of political Confucianism, further pushes political Confucianism itself to undertake the mission of cultural conservatism they originally attacked against the Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind. As we know, political Confucianism is typically characteristic of going beyond that mission. Gan Yang’s way of argumentation, and even his whole statement of “the unification of three traditions”, is a typical strategy of “over shoes over boots”.11 Therefore, Gan Yang’s defense of Confucianism is neither carried out in the way of cultural conservatism nor through any substantive argumentation of Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind. It is precisely in the way of political conservatism that he defends cultural conservatism, precisely in the way of political philosophy that he defends political Confucianism. In other words, Gan Yang’s defense of Confucianism has nothing to do with the content of Confucianism itself. Let us explore Gan Yang’s Confucian position according to the hidden “selfjudgment table” of modern Confucianism mentioned above. At this time, this Confucian discourse with its “political philosophy–civil religion” character completely reveals its complex or cunning side. By not engaging in any substantive argument, Gan Yang’s position is silent on each of those self-judgment points. What cannot be obtained from words, can be explored from action, and silence itself is a kind of 11

Let’s use Gan Yang’s own language. The soul of true political conservatism is, in a word, “over shoes over boots. Conservatism entails the recognition of modernity in ancient ways, not the denial of modernity in modern ways. It is to affirm the revolution in a conservative way, not to deny it in a revolutionary way. On the contrary, any kind of retro, romantic, counter-revolutionary conservatism is “more and more wrong”. It is here that Gan Yang differs from the classicists with their noble passions, as well as from liberals with their naïve inferiority. True conservatives don’t talk their way out of revolutions; neither does a wise classicist always emphasize the conflict between the past and the present.

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action. Gan Yang does not make a clear distinction between the Confucian theory of “the nature of the heart/mind”—culture and that of politics—system, which shows that whether such a distinction is made is completely irrelevant. Whatever kind of traditional Confucianism it is, it can only function as an ethical resource rather than a political system of the modern republic. At the same time, more importantly, Gan Yang dissolves—in such a gentle way—the problem that has haunted Confucianism for more than 100 years, the one that has become the real nightmare for Confucians the Confucian tradition, namely whether Confucianism—no matter the so-called Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind or the so-called political Confucianism—can actually be compatible with the modern society’s political value. According to Gan Yang, even the kind of Confucianism which vehemently opposes modernity and holds stubbornly conservative positions, can be and must be accommodated for the health of modern society itself. A healthy modern society must in fact contain various strains, which must have an anti-modern pole in order to prevent modernity from going overboard.12 In this sense, it is better that Confucianism is not modernized or even antimodernized, since in this way it can better serve modern times. It is clear here that Gan Yang’s key step in breaking the modern dilemma of Confucianism is to remove the premise of the problem. He does not adjust Confucianism itself; rather, he does not pay attention to Confucianism itself at all, but to adjust the “political values of modern society”. To be more specific, Gan Yang manages to break through this dead end because his argument actually tends to abolish the common premise shared by both the traditionalists and modernists, namely the conflict between the ancient and the modern. Different from Jiang Qing’s approach, Gan Yang’s abolishment doesn’t aim at expunging substantial modern values through interpreting ancient traditions. Rather, it tries to seek a more mature and healthy “modern” society which contains the ancient traditional power. Like Jiang Qing, Gan Yang overthrows the second basic judgment of New Confucianism and no longer insists on the incompatibility between Confucianism and modern politics. At the same time, Gan Yang criticizes the simplicity of the third basic judgment of New Confucianism and goes beyond New Confucianism’s simple understanding of modern politics. The fundamental difference between him and Jiang Qing is that he starts from the modern polity itself, which is existing, changing, and even turbulent. Gan Yang reconstructs modernity rather than designs it. The fundamental meaning of “the unification of three traditions” is to improve a healthy and mature modern Chinese society which, due to its internal tension, has both stimulating and balancing mechanisms through the allocation of political system.13 If Jiang Qing’s design of the modern regime in the name of antiquity can be regarded as a reform of modernity depending on ancient political system (which is certainly 12

Although Gan Yang may only understand it as a cultural and ethical “going-overboard”, the kind of Confucianism that unlimitedly opposes to the modern regime is actually also politically going overboard. 13 That is also “Politeia” in the Platonic sense. Ethical resources are also elements of this political system.

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more radical than reform), then what Gan Yang does can be regarded as a reform depending on modern political system. The roots of modernity, it seems, lie precisely in the pre-modern classical political and religious spirit.14 The main idea of conservatism is to respect authority and rely on authority to reform. In view of the fact that modern authority is modernity itself, the reform depending on modern political system is more in line with the spirit of conservatism. The truly wise classicists do not rhetorically emphasize the rivalry between the past and the present, nor do they explicitly oppose radical romantic conservatism. Rather, they surpass conservatism precisely by embracing and supporting conservatism. To sum up, the two dominant contemporary Confucian discourses both try to restimulate the solemn power of Confucianism in contemporary life by showing the positive connection between the Confucian tradition itself and modern society, especially modern politics itself. Unlike New Confucianism which attempts to, through the self-negation of the substance of the way, “creatively interpret” the Confucian tradition to create the “new external king”, both Jiang Qing and Gan Yang show great respect to the Confucian tradition itself. Jiang Qing has no sympathy for the theory of new external king, while Gan Yang’s theory of new external king has to rely on the tradition to be active in the present. These explorations are undoubtedly the remarkable achievements of modern thought circle in China and can be regarded as the key elements that constitute the current progress of the history of thought. The most dynamic thing here is undoubtedly the integration of the Confucian tradition with modern society. Such integration can have two starting points. Jiang Qing goes from the Confucian tradition to the modern society, while Gan Yang goes from the modern society to the Confucian tradition. But what I want to underline here is that the two approaches above, though seemingly heading toward each other, may never achieve the mysterious end of such integration. Because Jiang Qing’s understanding of modern society is not the same as Gan Yang’s, or perhaps anyone else’s. Jiang Qing makes no substantive claim about modern society, just as Gan Yang has nothing substantive to say about the Confucian tradition. What Gan Yang wants is the pre-modern traditional authority of certain modern society. It makes no difference whether it is Confucianism or some other traditional religion, except that the dominant tradition of Chinese society happens to be Confucianism. If what he faces is the USA or Turkey, he will not hesitate to fill in the blank of ethical resources with Christianity or Islam. In fact, due to the absence of substantive evidence from the Confucian position, it is hard to truly distinguish Gan Yang’s conservative views from those of American conservatives.15 Has anything done more to reverse the 14

For more, please see Leo Strauss’s article titled “The Three Waves of Modernity”. In fact, the young Chinese conservatives who were raised by the Straussian school (and even some well-endowed Confucian scholars who do not know the depth of Western learning) enjoy almost every victory of the American conservatives in their domestic policy debates and admire almost every skill with which those American conservatives manage their political culture. Our young conservatives can be very promising, but it depends on how they further reinvent themselves. What is happening is that young Chinese disciples of the Straussian School want to learn to love and defend China in the same way that American conservatives love and defend America. They try their best to look for the loveliness of China as well as the parts of its religious and political

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conservatism of one nation than to learn, or even to borrow, the conservatism of another empire?16 All the arguments of American-style conservatism that are in favor of Confucianism, in terms of its rhetoric and in terms of its defense of ethical customs, are more favorable to Chinese Christianity. In other words, defending China solely by American-style conservatism would risk the disintegration of China as a state and would even lead to the end of Chinese civilization. Gan Yang’s whole vision shall be a picture of the clash of civilizations. The clash of civilizations is a natural fact, not a deduction of some relativist philosophy. However, to see only one natural fact and not the other leads to relativism and ultimately to the elimination of the former. It is also a natural fact that every true civilization contains an intention of universal legislation. Without such an intention, there will be no real civilizational conflict at all. In other words, the latter fact (i.e., the universal will to power) is the natural basis of the former fact (i.e., the clash of civilizations). After all, no natural fact can be changed; although perhaps it can be disguised, it can never be disguised to the extent of being against fact. Therefore, if civilization is to be civilization, it must ultimately, in its rhetoric, claim itself to be universal and absolute.17 Words go hand in hand with deeds. The “civilization” that only stays in form yet does not carry out substantive argumentation would have no essence of civilization in fact. Neither would it be qualified enough to enter into any natural fact. The selfassertion of civilization must be substantial. Gan Yang’s statement of unifying three traditions is not substantive (this does not mean to criticize Gan Yang himself, but aims at pointing out that the way he argues for “the unification of three traditions” is not substantive). The reason lies in the necessary abstraction of the statement of tradition that fit with Strauss’s teachings. Meanwhile, they ignore, scorn, and even hate everything about China that is different from the USA. However, the biggest difference between China and the USA lies in the fact that she is China, and that her whole nature and history are different from those of America. The mode of defense may be learned, but the premise of defense is unconditional love or love out of habit, which can never be learned intellectually. The mode of young Chinese Straussians resembles the followers of Soviet Union, who were more accustomed to Moscow than to Yan’an. The “Chinese” conservatives, who invariably refer to Greece and the USA, must undergo a thorough “rectification” and a reinvention before they can truly understand what they talk about all the time. Only when they learn how to break openly with the Straussian school and American conservatives can Chinese “young” conservatives be hopeful to be “mature” and become the true conservatives they have always claimed to be. 16 Perhaps for this reason, Gan Yang has recently begun to deliberately criticize specific views or policies of American conservatives in his public works. But it is also the kind of criticism that suggests Mr. Gan has a more sensible, American-style conservative stance. Smart American conservatism would no doubt support Confucianism in China. But given the substance of the claim, and the fact that a hyperactive Christianity is more resistant to radicalism than a still-resurrected Confucianism, it is surely a better way to address the specific claims of conservatives through supporting Christianity. Whether Confucianism itself can support conservatism unconditionally is another matter. Conservatism, like radicalism and even all doctrines, is a school of one-sidedness. In contrast, Confucianism is the school of keeping to the middle and changing in time, which is conservative when it should be conservative and radical when it should be radical. 17 For more, please see my article titled “Cultural Nationalism: Hedgehog-like or Fox-like?” (Chap. 2 of this book).

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unifying three traditions through both sociological theories and the theories of civilization, that is, any statement about society and civilization in a common sense would have to draw out the specific connotation of Chinese civilization. The real position of Gan Yang’s Confucian discourse is a wise or cunning political conservatism in the mask of cultural conservatism. Confucianism is clearly written on its mask of cultural conservatism, and political philosophy is written in the fine print of its political conservatism. That expressionless mask merely reveals itself as formal cultural conservatism demanded by substantive political conservatism. And our general criticism is that formal cultural conservatism ultimately fails to truly defend substantive political conservatism. We sympathize with Jiang Qing rather than Gan Yang on the following point: The true defense of Confucianism and even that of Chinese civilization must, of course, ultimately be manifested as a substantive explanation and justification of the basic contents of Chinese tradition. It would be a secondary question concerning whether Jiang Qing’s way of proving Confucian tradition is perfect and whether his conclusion is biased. Meanwhile, we sympathize with Gan Yang rather than Jiang Qing on the following point: The legitimate starting point of defending Confucianism, or at least one of the hidden starting points, must be the modern regime itself, as well as the substantive review and proper adjustment in the face of modern problems.18 The occurrence of modernity and the break or change of tradition are the established reality of any modern society. Any self-criticism in modern society cannot be the direct application of tradition. The real power of tradition is embodied in its “non-direct” application. Being interrupted or even speechless is a necessary part of the tradition’s identity. If ignoring the basic “hermeneutical situation” in which the tradition is interrupted by enlightenment, one cannot deeply understand the nature of “tradition” as the origin of the world. The primary task of Confucianism is not to demonstrate itself, but to demonstrate the legitimacy of China’s political modernity, that is, the founding of new China through revolution. Only through the Confucian way to prove the revolutionary founding can Confucianism simultaneously prove themselves. By adjusting the modern society in the Confucian way, Confucianism can be revived in the modern society. It would be a secondary question as for whether Gan Yang’s effort to adjust and balance the modern society (the unification of three traditions), which becomes the first concern of contemporary thinkers, is practically feasible. In short, our greatest agreement with the two Confucian arguments above is that the direct defense of the Confucian tradition (or the reform of the modern regime) 18

Therefore, we agree with Liang Shuming’s criticism of Xiong Shili in the 1970s, namely we should not take Confucianism as a given to demonstrate socialism, but should take socialism as a premise to demonstrate Confucianism. See Liang’s defense of Confucianism in his article Jin Tian Wo Men Ying Dang Ru He Ping Jia Kong Zi 今天我們應當如何評價孔子 (“How Should We Evaluate Confucius Today”), included in Liang Shuming Xian Sheng Lun Kong Meng 梁漱溟先 生論孔孟 (Mr. Liang Shuming On Confucius and Mencius), Guangxi normal university press 廣 西師範大學出版社, 2003: 173. In fact, taking Confucianism as a given starting point is likely to result in an over-interpretation and even distortion of Confucianism, while the contrary approach can give full play to the true spirit of Confucianism.

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lies in linking the modern Chinese political system with the Confucian tradition. However, we are not content with their contributions and shall set ourselves the task of substantively unifying the ancient and the modern; that is, we must substantively link the modern Chinese political system with the Confucian tradition. This substantive linkage between the past and the present requires that our discourse has a dual starting point: the modern republic and the Confucian tradition. We shall first start from the modern republic and give a general consideration of the active connection between the republic and the ancient political system. We shall generally investigate the changes of political system and its continuity along with the changes of social structure in ancient China. Special inspection would be done to the new form and necessary function of the ancient political residues, which concerns the function of the monarchy in the republic. At the same time, we shall also start from the other side of the issue, namely to investigate how the Confucian tradition is divided and functions politically. We will pay special attention to a great political tradition ignored by political Confucianism under the name of Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind, namely the tradition of educating emperors. Finally, we shall combine the above two aspects of investigation and compare the system design of political Confucianism, to defend the political effect of Confucianism concerning the nature of the heart/mind in the republic. Written in October 2007. (Originally published in the book Xila Yu Dongfang希臘與東方(Greece and The East),Vol. 6 of Sixiang Shi Yanjiu 思想史研究 (Study On the History of Thoughts)).

Chapter 5

The May 4th Movement, Confucianism, and Enlightenment: Reflections on the Issue of “Feudal Autocracy”

Abstract By reinterpreting how Chinese Enlightenment movement understands Confucian tradition, this chapter initiates a new explanation for the tension between salvation and enlightenment in the context of feng jian zhuan zhi 封建專制 (which is not quite equivalent to the English term “feudal autocracy”). Through distinguishing and reflecting upon the original meaning, the contextual meaning, and the historical effect of the concepts feng jian 封建 and zhuan zhi 專制 as well as their difference to the seemingly similar western terms such as “feudalism” and “autocracy”, this chapter clarifies the ambiguities underlying the concept feng jian zhuan zhi 封建專 制, and on that basis criticizes the misleading duality of feng jian zhuan zhi 封建專 制 and democracy, which serves as a response to the criticism of the May 4th New Culture Movement against Confucianism.

In the social and cultural history of mankind, there may be few ideological and cultural movements as the May 4th New Cultural Movement,1 which was full of passionate theoretical debates in its occurrence, subsequent interpretation, and final evaluation, and took the increasingly brutal political struggle between different social groups as the background. No social movement with cultural preoccupation has such direct political origins and far-reaching political consequences as the May 4th Movement.2 It’s an unpublished article written for the 90th anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and has been revised when being included in this book. 1

The New Culture Movement is broadly defined as the period from the year 1917 to 1921, not just the parade during the day of May 4 in 1919. See Zhou Cezong 周策縱, Wu Si Yun Dong 五四運動 (The May 4th Movement), Jiangsu People’s Publishing House 江蘇人民出版社, 2005: 1. 2 It is true that the Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought, the Movement of the Wise, and the Renaissance or the Enlightenment had perhaps a longer and richer clash of ideas than the May 4th Movement. But except in a few cases, the leaders and participants of the Contention of a Hundred schools of Thought were merely theoretical prophets and could not simultaneously be the main agents of social reform. However, the enlightenment and revolution in China were so close in time that the social mission forced Enlightenment prophets to try to play Rousseau, Robespierre and even Napoleon at the same time. In this regard, the May 4th Movement is obviously closer to the international workers’ movement, but the former involves a much wider range of fields than the latter. The May 4th Movement gave birth to professional revolutionaries, but it was driven by © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 49 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_5

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The May 4th Movement was the extinctive point of the old era and the explosive point of the new era. On the one hand, it represents the complete break of the proponents of the new culture from the old system and the old culture—which means that the modernity of China can only achieve its clear consciousness through the “rupture between the ancient and the modern”. At the same time, politically, it also means a complete rejection of the legitimacy of the Beiyang 北洋 republic government,3 which originated from the former Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, with the increasing radicalization of the social change process accompanied by the revolutionary founding of modern China, the cultural and political groups that once achieved the basic consensus in the May 4th New Cultural Movement generated significant differentiation. The radicalization of the Chinese Kuomintang and the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party itself belong to the political effects of the May 4th Movement.4 The union and split of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, their respective shifting and transformation, as well as the ebb and flow of their forces directly led to the different interpretations and orientation of the May

intellectuals. The May 4th generation of intellectuals was the last generation of classical scholarofficials and the first generation of modern intellectuals. To some extent, this characteristic means the modern transformation of Chinese scholar-official tradition. See Lin Yusheng 林毓生, “Wusi Shi Fan Chuantong Sixiang Yu Zhongguo Yishi De Weiji” 五四式反傳統思想與中國意識的危機 (“The May 4th Movement-style anti-traditional thought and the Crisis of Chinese Consciousness”), in his book titled Zhongguo Chuantong De Chuangzao Xing Zhuanhua 中國傳統的創造性轉化 (The Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 1996: 147. 3 In terms of legal theory, the legitimacy of the Republic of China was not directly derived from the Revolution of 1911, but from the abdication of the Qing Emperor and the constitutionalism of various factions. 4 From the perspective of world history in the twentieth century, it can also be said that the changes in the pattern of great powers brought about by the First World War, especially the Russian revolution that is one of the most important consequences of the First World War, are obviously the important reasons for the May 4th Movement, the radicalization of the Kuomintang, and the establishment of the Communist Party. It was the same Versailles arrangement that led to the Second World War, and its postwar international arrangement was one of the key factors in the rise and fall of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.

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4th Movement.5 The explanation and evaluation of the May 4th Movement depend on the self-demonstration and self-description of the modern Chinese state. The May 4th Movement is the strongest and clearest symbol of China’s modernity. However, the inherent complexity and tension of modernity will continue to erode the meaning of any symbol. If modernity itself—whether its desirability or feasibility—was in question,6 such a symbol would go from being something to refer to, to something to be debated. As shown by the interpretive history of the May 4th Movement, different attitudes toward modernity itself, different modernization roads, and different periods of modernization roads will inevitably lead to differences and even debates on the interpretation of the May 4th Movement.7 Modernity may not yet be complete, but the modern world is and will remain to be a given fact. The reason that we are still thinking about the May 4th Movement after generations of predecessors is to try to, through thinking about it, reflect on the world we live in now, to reflect on its premises, origins, and principles, and to reflect on what is still active, what has passed, or what is temporarily dormant. The New Culture Movement condensed many conflicting elements of modern Chinese thought. To think about the May 4th Movement is to reflect on China’s modernity. Although historians have different opinions on the tone of the May 4th New Culture Movement, the tone generally cannot be out of this range: The main feature of the May 4th New Culture Movement was the complete and most straightforward break from the Confucian tradition strengthened by patriotic passion. In other words, it is the self-identity of modernity achieved in the sharp and strong conflict between the ancient and the modern and achieved through the fierce negation of the traditional culture as a whole (including academics, ethics, character, customs, and especially family system, while not limited to the traditional political system). The greatest ideological effect of the May 4th New Culture Movement was to completely cut off the positive relationship between the Confucian tradition and modern society, and to discharm, reject, and even openly disdain Confucianism in the name of modernity. 5

It is a striking fact that for Chinese Kuomintang that is characteristic of the increasing nationalist and even traditionalist tendency, the evaluation of the May 4th Movement has undergone subtle fluctuations and overall decline. In contrast, the position of the May 4th Movement for the Chinese Communist Party is rising. See Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 569, footnote 2. The positioning of “anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism” of the May 4th Movement and the establishment of the new democratic theory are originally two sides of the same coin. It’s worth noticing that Mao Zedong commemorated the May 4th Movement in the following grandest way during the year 1939 when the New China is around the corner: He credited the May 4th Movement with “the very transiting moment of founding new China through revolution” in the transition from the old democratism to the new democratism. In view of the significance of new democratism in providing the most original and most accepted argumentation for the legitimacy of new China, it can be said that the legitimacy of new China and that of the May 4th Movement is inseparable. See Mao’s article titled “Qingnian Yundong De Fangxiang” 青年 運動的方向 (“The Orientation of youth movements”), in Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 561. 6 Isn’t it the clearest character of modernity that modernity itself continues to become a question? 7 See Zhou Cezong 周策縱, Wu Si Yun Dong 五四運動 (The May 4th Movement), Chapter 14, Jiangsu People’s Publishing House 江蘇人民出版社, 2005.

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After the May 4th Movement, any modernization program that explicitly appealed to the Confucian tradition, any high-key conservative effort, or even any intellectual attempt to reconcile tradition with modernity, was merciless ridiculed by the mainstream of the times. On the other hand, this sharp break with tradition stems precisely from concern and anxiety over the fate of the motherland. Ideological historians have paid full attention to the complexity of the May 4th New Culture Movement, which has always been dually named as “anti-imperialist and anti-feudal”, “anti-traditional nationalism”, or “the double variation of salvation and enlightenment”.8 National salvation, anti-imperialism, nationalism, or patriotism is roughly the same, while anti-feudalism, anti-tradition, and enlightenment are roughly corresponding. However, different theorists disputed over the relationship between antiimperialism and anti-feudalism. In the most eloquent and simple self-argument on the new China, imperialism and feudalism have an alliance relationship, so there is no logical conflict between anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. Of course, this judgment is mainly based on the social and political reality.9 However, almost all of other kinds of arguments acknowledge the implicit conflict between anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism.10

8 SeeLin Yusheng 林毓生, “Wusi Shi Fan Chuantong Sixiang Yu Zhongguo Yishi De Weiji” 五 四式反傳統思想與中國意識的危機 (“The May 4th Movement-style anti-traditional thought and the Crisis of Chinese Consciousness”), in his book titled ZhongguoChuantong De Chuangzao Xing Zhuanhua 中國傳統的創造性轉化 (The Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 1996: 147. See also Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Qimeng Yu Jiuwang De Shuangchong Bianzou” 啓蒙與救亡的雙重變奏 (“The double variation of salvation and enlightenment”), in his book Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shi Lun 中國現代思想史論 (On The History of Modern Chinese Thoughts), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2008: 11. See also Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 558. What Mao Zedong said partly clarifies the complexity of the May 4th Movement. Feudalism and imperialism are allied in his narration, obviously not from the perspective of ideology but from that of the political reality and social reality. This is the close relationship between the landlord class and the bureaucratic comprador class. What anti-feudalism discourse really appeals to is not so much about the criticism of traditional culture, but about agrarian revolution. 9 From the academic point of view, the question naturally arises as to whether the ideology of the comprador bourgeoisie, as the running dogs of imperialism, is feudal. The ideology of antiimperialist national bourgeoisie certainly has one side of fighting for democracy, but can it be said to be anti-feudal? Undoubtedly, in the political statements of Mao Zedong, the word “feudal” is verified by the arguments about the social history and is also supported by the actual social reality. I shall elaborate on this point in the following discussion. 10 Whether motivated by nationalist enthusiasm or not, it is obvious that anti-traditionalism easily leads to the opposite of nationalism, resulting in the decline of national self-esteem and the loss of the legitimacy of national self-rule. Since the 1930s, Kuomintang’s nationalism has moved toward reconciliation with tradition, which to some extent led to the decline of the status of the May 4th Movement. The Communist Party’s affirmation of the May 4th Movement was synchronized with the Kuomintang’s denial. See Zhou Cezong 周策縱, Wu Si Yun Dong 五四運動 (The May 4th Movement), Jiangsu People’s Publishing House 江蘇人民出版社, 2005: 348.

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In order to explain this nearly paradoxical conflict, scholars either attribute it to the traditional way of thinking itself,11 or believe that the two themes—enlightenment and salvation—have only external relationship in nature. According to the latter view, enlightenment used to be solely a historical tool of salvation, and since the self-serving purpose is higher than the tool for others, salvation eventually overcame enlightenment; therefore, the task of the Chinese ideological circle is to continue the undertaking of enlightenment.12 Both explanations have their own problems. The traditional concept of the former argument is too general. It is true that the May 4th New Culture Movement strongly opposed the Confucian tradition, but this rejection was accompanied by a positive evaluation of the rival schools of Confucianism in the traditional culture. For example, the emphasis on legalism and Mohism is not without a profound motivation to find traditional resources for modern society.13 “Anti-tradition” is not only a gesture or a “way of thinking”, but also has rich concrete content. The biggest problem with this argument is the claim of “nationalism”. The complex spectrum of the May 4th New Culture Movement obviously contains the world vision beyond the simple national consciousness.14 Even the patriotic passion embodied in the consciousness of national salvation must be distinguished from the movement of “expulsing the Manchus” initiated by the pre-1911 revolutionary party. Anti-imperialist patriotism must not be confused with the nationalist tendency against the Manchus. The former argument deliberately avoids the relationship between anti-tradition and enlightenment, but traces the motive of anti-tradition back to tradition itself to some extent. This is clearly a profound concern tinged with conservatism, but it does not fit the selfunderstanding of the leaders of the May 4th Movement. So far, among all the analysis of the May 4th New Culture Movement, “salvation and enlightenment”—though adjusted to some extent—remain the most widely accepted discourse. To be exact,

See Lin Yusheng 林毓生, “Wusi Shi Dai Jilie De Fan ChuantongSixiang Yu Zhongguo Ziyou Zhuyi De Qiantu” 五四時代激烈的反傳統思想與中國自由主義的前途 (“The radical anti-traditional thought during the time of May 4th Movement and the future of Chinese liberalism”), in his book titled Zhongguo Chuantong De Chuangzao Xing Zhuanhua 中國傳統的創造性轉化 (The Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 1996: 160. See also Liu Xiaofeng 劉曉楓, Rujia Geming Jingshen Yuanliu Kao 儒家革命精神源流考 (Study On the Origin of the revolutionary Spirit of Confucianism), Shanghai Joint Publishing Company 上海 三聯書店, 2000. 12 See Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Qimeng Yu Jiuwang De Shuangchong Bianzou” 啓蒙與救亡的雙重變 奏 (“The double variation of salvation and enlightenment”), in his book Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shi Lun 中國現代思想史論 (On The History of Modern Chinese Thoughts), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2008: 11. 13 The unique controversial position of legalism in the study of the history of Chinese thought in the twentieth century is quite intriguing. 14 See Cheng Nong 程農, “Chonggou Kongjian: 1919 Nian Qian Hou Zhongguo Jijin Sixiang Li de Shijie Gainian” 重構空間: 一九一九年前後中國激進思想裏的世界概念 (“Reconstructing Space: The Concept Of the World In the Radical Thoughts of China Around 1919”) “, in Xu Jilin 許紀霖 (ed.), ErshiShijiZhongguoSixiang Shi Lun 二十世紀中國思想史論 (On the History of Chinese Thought In the twentieth Century), Orient Publishing Centre 東方出版中心, 2000: 253. 11

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more and more theorists prefer to use “enlightenment” to provide an appropriate scale of analysis for the May 4th New Culture Movement.15 Since the historical purpose of national salvation is nothing more than the establishment of modern states, and the justification of modern states can only come from enlightenment,16 so it is impossible to exclude enlightenment from national salvation. In view of this complexity, more cautious scholars differentiate the European Enlightenment tradition and try to limit “salvation” to the historical effects of the French-style Enlightenment tradition.17 In any case, all the arguments that only resort to the “enlightenment” paradigm equally cannot erase the collision between “salvation” and “enlightenment”. The significance of the ideological history of the May 4th New Culture Movement lies in this paradoxical relationship. It must be seen that this kind of paradox is an inherent feature of Chinese modernity. That is to say, the ancient and the modern are bound to conflict; Confucianism and modernity cannot be two sides of one coin, and only by rejecting the Confucian tradition can we establish a modern society and a modern country, as well as fulfill the mission of national salvation. This fundamental belief that drives the establishment of the modern Chinese world is, of course, based on a specific understanding of Chinese tradition, modern society, and their relationships. On the other hand, the modern Chinese state and society established according to this belief do not fully conform to the imagination and expectation about modernity in the Enlightenment Movements. Such a state and society are both modern and ancient. How could that be? There is always a sufficient basis for what exists. It will be a very meaningful work to explore the actual basis of Chinese modernity and Zhou Cezong 周策縱 has doubts on that. See Zhou Cezong 周策縱, Wu Si Yun Dong 五四運 動 (The May 4th Movement), Jiangsu People’s Publishing House 江蘇人民出版社, 2005: 345. However, Shu Hengzhe 舒衡哲 insists on the enlightenment character of the May 4th Movement. See his Zhongguo Qimeng Yundong 中國啓蒙運動 (The Enlightenment Movements In China), New Star Press 新星出版社, 2007: 3f. See also Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Qimeng Yu Jiuwang De Shuangchong Bianzou” 啓蒙與救亡的雙重變奏 (“The double variation of salvation and enlightenment”), in his book Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shi Lun 中國現代思想史論 (On The History of Modern Chinese Thoughts), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2008; Wang Hui 汪暉, “Zhongguo Xiandai Lishi Zhong De Wusi Qimeng Yundong” 中國現代歷史中的五四啓蒙運動 (“The May 4th Enlightenment Movement In the Modern Chinese History”),in: Xu Jilin 許紀霖 (ed.), Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Sixiang Shi Lun 二十世紀中國思想史論 (On the History of Chinese Thought In the twentieth Century), Orient Publishing Centre 東方出版中心, 2000: 31. Besides implying that the Confucian tradition is full of the darkness of the Middle Ages, Hu Shi’s “Statement of Renaissance” is obviously not in line with the characteristic of the May 4th New Culture Movement, since the latter is not a request for ancient reform, but a clear pursuit of new changes. 16 The justification of new China comes directly from the overall victory of the Marxist view of history in the social history debate. The social history debate itself is the most profound defense of the basic issues of the May 4th Movement, while the materialist view of history is the Vicostyle inheritance of the European Enlightenment (converting natural law into destiny or historical necessity). In this sense, without the Chinese and Western Enlightenment, there can be no new democracy theory. 17 See Gao Like 高力克, “Xin Qingnian Yu Liangzhong Ziyou Zhuyi Chuantong”《新青年》 與兩 種自由主義傳統 (“New Youth and Two Kinds of Liberalism Tradition”), in: Xu Jilin 許紀霖 (ed.), Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Sixiang Shi Lun 二十世紀中國思想史論 (On the History of Chinese Thought In the twentieth Century), Orient Publishing Centre 東方出版中心, 2000: 135. 15

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to criticize the contradictory beliefs about the ancient and the modern held by the Enlightenment Movement in China. Due to the limitation of space, this article can only limit its task to reviewing the understanding of Chinese Enlightenment on tradition, especially Confucian tradition. We shall start with the May 4th Movement’s criticism of Confucianism. Only 2 years after the outbreak of the May 4th Movement, Hu Shi 胡適 promptly summed up the anti-Confucianist contributions of the two influential figures at that time: Mr. Wu and our friend Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 are two of the most powerful men to attack Confucianism in recent years. The two of them... have much in common spiritually... Mr. Wu has studied law and politics, so his methods are a little different from Chen Duxiu’s.18

Just as described by Hu Shi, the representative figures of the May 4th Movement against Confucianism were Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 and Wu Yu 吳虞. The anti-Confucian resources later generations got from the May 4th Movement are probably not beyond the discussion of these two figures. As far as their resolute rejection of the Confucian tradition is concerned, Chen Duxiu and Wu Yu are of no difference. However, their arguments and effects have difference that cannot be ignored. In general, Wu attacked Confucianism mainly in terms of autocracy, while Chen extended this view to a general critique of “feudal society”. As early as in his anti-Confucian article titled “Jiazu Zhidu Wei Zhuanzhi Zhuyi Zhi Genju Lun” 家族制度為專制主義之根據論 (“On The Family System as the Basis of Autocracy”) published in 1915, Wu Yu said: When the lord of Shang and Li Si 李斯 destroyed feudalism, our country had the chance to transform from patriarchal society into military society. As for the present day, Europe has long been free from patriarchal society, while our country is unable to move forward in a patriarchal society. And the real reason for this is the family system as its root.19

Since the late Qing Dynasty, the Chinese intellectual circle has fiercely criticized the traditional monarchy, which started after the defeat of Jia-Wu 甲午 war, and Tan Si-tong 譚嗣同, Yan Fu 嚴復, and Liang Qichao 梁啓超 were the representatives. According to the relevant researches, the description of the autocratic regime of China’s traditional imperial power system originated from Japan and the Montesquieu theory. Liang Qichao in 1899 was the first person in the Chinese intellectual circle to directly describe the traditional regime of China as “autocratic”.20 However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Liang fiercely criticized traditional politics with his powerful essays respectively titled “Zhongguo Zhuanzhi Zhengzhi Jinhua Lun” 中國專制政治進化論 (“On the Evolution of Autocratic Politics in China”) and “Lun Zhuanzhi Zhengti You Bai Hai Yu Junzhu Er Wu Yi Li” See the introduction section of Wuyu Wen Lu 吳虞文祿 (The Collected Works of Wu Yu), Huangshan Press 黃山書社, 2008: 2f. 19 See the introduction section of Wuyu Wen Lu 吳虞文祿 (The Collected Works of Wu Yu), Huangshan Press, 黃山書社 2008: 1. 20 See Hou Xudong 侯旭東, “Zhongguo Gudai Zhuanzhi Shuo De Zhishi Kaogu” 中國古代專制 說的知識考古 (“The Knowledge Archaeology Of Ancient Chinese Tyrannical Theory”), Research On Modern History 近代史研究 4, 2008. 18

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論專制政體有百害于君主而無一利 (“On How Autocratic Regimes Have Nothing But Harm to Monarchs”), as well as indirectly criticized Confucianism for respecting Confucius to the extent of preserving Confucianism as a national religion. Despite of that, he still held great respect for the teaching of Confucius and never directly traced the root of the so-called autocratic regimes to Confucianism and the family system.21 This is the contribution of Wu Yu, but also is one of the more radical features of the May 4th New Cultural Movement. In a word, Wu’s condemnation of Confucianism is based on such a basic conclusion: Confucianism that supports the clan system in social organization must support the absolute monarchy in politics. After the revolution of 1911, there may be room for debate between constitutional monarchies and enlightened autocracy, while pure autocracy has difficulty in gaining unanimous support even among royalists. After the Republican revolution, it was only a matter of time before Confucianism, which was closely associated with absolute monarchy, suffered a complete liquidation. Under the premise of political correctness of the republic system, Wu Yu’s criticism of Confucianism is difficult to refute,22 even a transformation of Confucianism depending on ancient political system wouldn’t help much in defending Confucianism, unless we restate Confucianism with a clear break from the traditional political system, which is the new Confucian path that emerged after the May 4th Movement. However, Wu’s argument also implies a series of judgments on social history as follows. First, the Chinese society before the Warring States was a society of the “feudal” political system and patriarchy. Second, the legalist reform destroyed feudalism, and the patriarchal society had the chance to turn into a “military society”. Third, modern European society is a kind of “militaristic society”. Fourth, it is the family system supported by Confucianism that makes China stuck in the “patriarchal society”; the only way to learn from the West and build a “military society” is to deny Confucianism and destroy the clan system. Wu Yu’s argumentative idea is not different from that of the general antiConfucian. But its three characteristics about the Eastern Zhou Dynasty, the Qin and Han Dynasties, the Qing Dynasty and modern society (he did not use the word “modern”) were not widely spread and gradually disappeared. Although his interpretation is based on the classification in Yan Fu’s translation of Shehui Tong Quan 社會通詮 (A History of Politics), the former is exactly the opposite of Yan Fu’s own judgment.23 Yan Fu saw that the “military” character of the system of prefectures and counties established by legalists in Qin and Han Dynasties was different from the “patriarchal” See Liang Qichao, Yin Bing Shi Wen Ji 飲冰室文集 (Ice-drinking Room Collected Works), Shanghai New Culture Press 上海新文化進步社, 1935, Vol. 3. 22 In the political struggle in the early years of the Republic of China, the restoration of the monarchy was often accompanied by respect for Confucian classics. This is the main background for the gradual radical criticism of Confucianism. 23 According to Yan Fu, the author of Shehui Tong Quan 社會通詮 (A History of Politics) is wrong in taking China as the example of patriarchal society, “although China was originally a patriarchal society, it gradually turned into a military society”. See Yan Fu Ji 嚴復集 (The Collected Works of Yan Fu), Chinese Publishing House 中華書局, 1986, Vol. 4: 923. 21

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character of feudalism. On the contrary, Wu Yu firmly held that the other side—and even the foundation—of the county dictatorship system is the clan system. Bringing the theory of Yan Fu and that of Wu Yu together, the ancient history of China is a “military” (prefectural, autocratic) state and a “patriarchal” (feudal) society. They each saw one side, and the combination of these two sides happened to be the socalled “feudal autocracy” ( feng jianzhuanzhi 封建專制) or “the convergence of Confucianism and legalism”. Wu Yu’s contribution is to see deeply the relationship between these two sides, pointing out that the “autocratic” state (the legalistic monarchy, in its appearance) has its roots in the family system of patriarchal society (Confucian society). The problem here is very complicated, which not only implies the deep meaning of the Confucian theories of “affaction for one’s kin” (qin qin 親 親) and “respect for the monarch” (zun zun 尊尊), but also implies the transformation of primitive Confucianism itself during the Zhou and Qin Dynasties. Moreover, it implies the key to solve the apparent contradiction between Confucianism and Legalism or that between feudal counties. But in the context of the May 4th Movement, Wu’s point of view soon led to the only way to bring about the destruction of Confucianism through social history. Wu’s political-cultural argument of “shaking off the fetter of Confucianism with one single hand” (zhi shou da daokong jia dian 只手打倒孔家店) has many proponents, but has not encountered any substantive challenge. But as far as the argument of social history that must be implied in such a political-cultural argument is concerned, it is Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀’s “feudal theory” that has been inherited by many followers. Compared to Wu Yu, Chen Duxiu has more self-awareness of modern consciousness. He explicitly declared that the “Way of Confucius” is incompatible with “modern life”.24 However, his view of modern life, mainly in terms of both economy and ethics, is more historical materialism: Economy is the lifeblood of modern life, and individual independence is the major principle of economic production, which influences ethics. Therefore, the independence of individual personality in modern ethics and the independence of individual property in economics prove each other to be unshakable. For this reason, both social ethos and material civilization progress greatly. The Confucians of China established their teachings by virtue of three main-stays and five constant virtues... This is not even the way of personal independence.25

In his criticism of Confucianism around the times of the May 4th Movement, Chen Duxiu—unlike Wu Yu—did not make a historical judgment with subjective will just from the unconditional opposition to absolutism, but evaluated Confucianism from a more comprehensive social history viewpoint with the background of historical materialism and evolution. That is to say, he acknowledged the historical significance of Confucianism to some extent, while declaiming that Confucianism is doomed to be 24

The primary reason to deny Confucianism is its failure to be compatible with modern society. See “Kong Jiao Yan Jiu” 孔教研究 (“Study on Confucianism”), in: Duxiu Wen Cun 獨秀文存 (Writings of Duxiu), Anhui People’s Publishing House 安徽人民出版社, 1996: 415. 25 “Kongzi Zhi Dao Yu Xiandai Shenghuo” 孔子之道與現代生活 (“Ways of Confucius and Modern Life”), in: Duxiu Wen Cun 獨秀文存 (Writings of Duxiu), Anhui People’s Publishing House 安徽人民出版社, 1996: 82f.

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infeasible in modern times on the basis of judging from the perspective of “historical inevitability” (not just “political desirability”): Considering that Confucius had been grown up in feudal times, his advocation of morality, ethics, and politics is characteristic of feudal times, which is limited within the rights and reputation of a few monarchs and nobles, while making no contribution to the happiness of the majority of common people.26

It must be noted that Chen Duxiu’s use of the concept of feudalism is quite different from Wu Yu’s. The former no longer holds to the old meaning of Chinese institutional history, but explicitly uses the term “feudal” in the sense consistent with Marxist social history. According to some scholars, before Chen Duxiu the use of the concept of feudalism was still in the stage of mutual equivalent translation among Chinese, Western, and Japanese languages. Chen’s argument during the May 4th Movement played a key pioneering role in attributing this concept to the sense of materialist historical view. Originally, feudalism is a concept of social history in reference to certain characterstic of medieval European society, but it was Chen who first used it to refer to the character of the so-called patriarchal society entitled by old scholars like Wu Yu, together with the general historiography of social development behind it.27 Compared with Wu Yu, Chen Duxiu was not necessarily more fierce in his criticism of Confucianism. The unique advantage of Chen lies in the establishment rather than the abolishment. During the New Culture Movement, Chen defended his antiConfucianism argument by claiming that his rejection of Confucianism and opposition to Confucius was only for the sake of establishing the position of democracy and science. For him, in order to support democracy and science, we must oppose the Confucian tradition, the old system, the old culture, and all the quintessence of Chinese culture. To be a defender of Confucianism, one must first overthrow

“Kongzi Zhi Dao Yu Xiandai Shenghuo” 孔子之道與現代生活 (“Ways of Confucius and Modern Life”), in: Duxiu Wen Cun 獨秀文存 (Writings of Duxiu), Anhui People’s Publishing House 安徽人民出版社, 1996: 85. 27 See Feng Tianyu 馮天瑜, Fengjian Kao Lun 封建考論 (Study On Feudalism), Chapter 9, Wuhan University Press 武漢大學出版社, 2006. According to Feng Tianyu’s research, during the May 4th New Culture Movement only Chen Duxiu actually used the concept of feudalism in the later mainstream sense. The premise of its reference is to criticize the Japanese ideological circle of shogunate gate politics. Chen’s concept of feudalism was rooted in the social history controversy in the early 1930s, which obviously provided the background for Mao Zedong’s acute summary of the May 4th Movement in the late 1930s. In such a context, compared with “the controversy of science and metaphysics” and “the controversy of Chinese and Western culture”, the controversy of social history is the main substantive development of the May 4th Movement. Once the general view of history is settled, the outcome of the two controversies above is evident. Feng Qi 馮契 brilliantly pointed out that the problem of historical view is the primary problem of modern thoughts. The dispute on the Chinese-Western and ancient-modern issues revolves around the problem of historical view. For more, please see Section II of the introduction part of his work titled Zhongguo Jindai Zhexue De Geming Jincheng 中國近代哲學的革命進程 (The Revolutionary Course of Modern Philosophy In China), Shanghai People’s Publishing House 上海人民出版社, 1999. 26

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democracy and science.28 However, democracy and science are the consequences rather than the causes, and its foundation is fundamentally not science or democracy, but historical materialism. According to the application of historical materialism in Chinese society, the role of democracy and science is no more than sweeping away feudal culture and feudal autocratic politics.29 As the historians of philosophy have pointed out, the central issue of all explorations of the May 4th New Culture Movement and even modern thoughts is nothing more than establishing historical views to guide the revolution.30 What is the enlightenment significance of the May 4th New Culture Movement? The key to solving this problem may not lie in strictly following the specific contents of the European Enlightenment,31 but in the specific context of Chinese society at that time. The main target of China’s Enlightenment Movement is the Confucian tradition, which is judged to be the spiritual pillar of “feudal autocracy” ( feng jianzhuanzhi 封建專制).32,33 The two anti-Confucian masters of the May 4th New Culture Movement criticized Confucianism from different perspectives, respectively,

“XiN Qingnian Zui An Zhi Dabian Shu”《新青年》 罪案之答辯書 (“A Defense against oppositions to The New Youth”), in: Duxiu Wen Cun 獨秀文存 (Writings of Duxiu), Anhui People’s Publishing House 安徽人民出版社, 1996: 242f. 29 Please see Chen Duxiu’s redefense of the May 4th Movement in 1938. Quoted from Zhou Cezong 周策縱, Wu Si Yun Dong 五四運動 (The May 4th Movement), Jiangsu People’s Publishing House 江 蘇人民出版社, 2005: 350f. Besides, almost at the same time of Mao Zedong initiating his criticism of Chen Duxiu, Mao still sticked to his ideal of the new democratism culture characteristic of democracy and science. Science is anti-feudal, and democracy is mass based. See Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 567, 707f. 30 See Feng Qi 馮契, Zhongguo Jindai Zhexue De Geming Jincheng 中國近代哲學的革命進程 (The Revolutionary Course of Modern Philosophy In China), Shanghai People’s Publishing House 上海人民出版社, 1999. 31 Wang Hui 汪暉, “ZhongguoXiandaiLishi Zhong De Wusi Qimeng Yundong” 中國現代歷史 中的五四啓蒙運動 (“The May 4th Enlightenment Movement In the Modern Chinese History”), in: Xu Jilin 許紀霖 (ed.), ErshiShijiZhongguoSixiang Shi Lun 二十世紀中國思想史論 (On the History of Chinese Thought In the twentieth century), Orient Publishing Centre 東方出版中心, 2000. Hengzhe 舒衡哲, ZhongguoQimengYundong 中國啓蒙運動 (The Enlightenment Movements In China), New Star Press 新星出版社, 2007. 32 Translator’s note: As noted by the author in his following discussions, the connotations of feng jian 封建 and zhuanzhi 專制 are different from that of the western terms of feudalism and autocracy. For the convenience of narration, I shall use “feudalism” (sometimes “feudal”) and “autocracy” to, respectively, translate the Chinese terms of feng jian 封建 and zhuanzhi 專制, while using quotation marks to remind readers of the difference between the Chinese terms and the corresponding western terms. 33 See Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Qimeng Yu Jiuwang De Shuangchong Bianzou” 啓蒙與救亡的雙重變 奏 (“The double variation of salvation and enlightenment”), in his book Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shi Lun 中國現代思想史論 (On The History of Modern Chinese Thoughts), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2008. Unlike other works on the history of thoughts, Li’s article does not define “enlightenment”, but only shows his position through what enlightenment opposes. This is clever because, as Cassirer sees it, it’s hard to come up with a unified definition of the enlightenment. See Li Zehou, Qi Meng Zhexue 啓蒙哲學 (Philosophy of Enlightenment), Shandong People’s Publishing House 山東人民出版社, 1988. 28

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and the combination of which pointed exactly to the “feudal autocracy” characteristic of Confucianism. After the debate of social history, the new democratism—as the orthodox successor of the May 4th New Culture Movement—then combined “feudalism” and “autocracy” to describe the Chinese society from the Qin and Han Dynasties to the Manchu Dynasty.34 Therefore, the theory of “feudal autocracy”— as a part of the new China’s self-argument—thus constituted a stereotype of the modern Chinese national self-understanding. As an Enlightenment Movement, the significance of the May 4th New Culture Movement for the so-called salvation lies in providing the necessary stereotype above. The reason why Confucianism has been repeatedly criticized in modern society and why it is difficult to defend Chinese traditional politics35 is ultimately due to this stereotype. In the final analysis, reflecting on the May 4th movement is to reflect on this stereotype. The inherent structure of the theory of “feudal autocracy” is generally as follows: feudal society and autocratic country. The nature of society determines the nature of the regime, and the feudal land and clan system determines the autocratic monarchy form of the regime. Feudal autocracy is a pre-modern and undeveloped social and political form. The democratic ideal of the New Culture Movement is to oppose autocracy; and its scientific ideal is to oppose certain aspect of feudal culture (e.g., “feudal superstition”). We should distinguish the original meaning, contextual meaning, and the historical effect of a concept. The theory of “feudal autocracy” has its specific meaning in the complicated social and political reality since the Republic of China. The word feng jian 封建 refers first to the separation of warlords, then to the system of private land ownership, and finally to the patriarchal system.36 Among them, the meaning of “separation” (geju 割據) is basically equal to the ancient meaning of feng jian 封 建. The patriarchal system is closely related to the ancient meaning of feng jianzhi 封建, but the former should not be confused with the latter. The feudal relationship in the system of private possession of the land system basically means “feudalism” in the West sense, which is not the same concept as the Chinese term feng jianzhi 封 建制 which primarily refers to a political relationship. However, since feng jian 封 建 had a meaning in the society at that time, it was a functional concept. Even if its original meaning was deflected, there was nothing to be done. “Autocracy” refers to “On the Theory of New Democratism”, in: Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 664. According to Mao Zedong, Before Qin Dynasty China was a separatist feudal state, while after Qin Dynasty China was a centralized absolutist feudal state, in: Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 624. The revolution of 1911 overthrew the tyrannical regime of the emperor and the nobility. See Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 2: 631. 35 See Gan Huaizhen 甘懷真’s discussion on the so-called Qin Mu 錢穆’s Complex. See Gan’s article titled “Huangdi Zhidu Shi Fou Wei Zhuanzhi” 皇帝制度是否為專制 (“Is the Emperor System Autocratic”), in: Gan Huaizhen 甘懷真, Huangquan, Liyi Yu Jingdian Quanshi 皇權, 禮儀 與經典詮釋 (Imperial Power, Rituals, and Classical Interpretation), East China Normal University Press 華東師範大學出版社, 2008: 381. 36 See Feng Tianyu 馮天瑜, Fengjian Kao Lun 封建考論 (Study On Feudalism), Chapter 9, Wuhan University Press 武漢大學出版社, 2006: 212. 34

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the paternalistic and commander-in-chief rule of emperors and warlords, as well as the unconstitutionally independent rule of republican leaders. Our concern does not just lie in the context of the concept, but in its historical effect. In order to investigate the historical effect of the concept, it is necessary to review its original intention and its deflecting mechanism. Reflecting on the history of China and the West, the Confucian theory of “feudal autocracy” and its premodern undeveloped argument does face some problems. This chapter only tries to put forward these problems and the general ideas of solving them. Both concepts of feng jian 封建 (feudalism) and zhuanzhi 專制 (autocracy) have many ambiguities, which originate from ancient meaning, western meaning, translation meaning, and practical concerns. They are intertwined, which makes it difficult for us to properly understand the societies and regimes of ancient and modern China. However, if criticism of the Confucian tradition is to be taken seriously, these ambiguities must be clarified. Let’s start with the concept of feng jian 封建. The original meaning of the concept of fengjianzhi 封建制 (feudal system) in ancient Chinese history should refer to the political structure of rendering officials to be feudal lords. However, this political structure corresponds to the social structure of the patriarchal system. The core content of fengjianzhi 封建制 is as follows: Politics has the similar structure as society; state has the similar structure as family; and the structure of monarchy corresponds to that of patriarchy. Therefore, since Yin and Zhou Dynasties, although there were also direct governance modes of prefectures and counties, fengjianzhi 封建制 was the dominant ruling mode in terms of the world. Fengjianzhi 封建制 and zong fa zhi 宗法制 (patriarchy) formed each other. Fengjianzhi 封建制 is the political extension of patriarchal system, which is the social basis of zong fa zhi 宗法制. The change of the political system during Yin and Zhou Dynasties was characteristic of the integration of monarchy and patriarchy; therefore, its political structure was ruled by rites and feudalism. However, in this kind of political system, the feudal monarch is the king of the land, not an autocratic one. The reasons are twofold. First, restricted by the rites (mainly the relationship between clans), the minor clans were subject to the major ones, and the dukes were subject to the monarch. How can this kind of system be considered as autocratic? Second, feudal patriarchy restricts the ruling of major clans over the minor clans. Feudalism was naturally incompatible with autocracy, and the decentralized factor in feudalism gradually overpowered the centralized factor. This is the reason why the rites of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty collapsed and why the ministers administer state affairs. The Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period witness the process that the feudal decentralized factors and the autocratic centralized factors compete with each other. The feudal system of Zhou could not stop the process of power transfer. The suppression of this power-transferring tendency was achieved by the reform of laws initiated by the legalists, as well as by their respecting the monarch and suppressing the hereditary officials. During both the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, the form of the state had undergone fundamental changes, that is, changing from a state dominated by the aristocracy characteristic of the Spring and Autumn period to a state dominated by

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the monarch characteristic of the Warring States period.37 The Qin Dynasty merely extended this powerful monarchical factor to the whole world. At the time of Zhou and Qin Dynasties, the system changed greatly. But of course, the political aspect of this change belongs to legalists rather than Confucians. After the Warring States period, due to the legalist reform, the monarch gradually took over the power and the autocratic factor gradually overrode the feudal factor. The Qin and Han systems were then established. This system is called zhuanzhi 專制 (autocracy), with a certain background of “orientalism” discourse,38 and is not the final conclusion of history. The system of government determines the naming. The system of Qin and Han Dynasties is not a ready-made system in the regime table, but should be extrapolated from the regime classification. If only judging from the negation of the aristocracy, the system of Qin and Han Dynasties can either be said to be absolute monarchy, or be called the civilian regime. Qian Mu 錢穆, for example, called the Qin and Han regimes “civilian governments” and even attributed the fall of Qin to the inability to lead a “civilian government” with the last aristocratic state.39 However, it must be noted that during the Zhou and Qin Dynasties, the patriarchal system was not completely destroyed, but the political principles were separated from the social principles, and the form of state was separated from the form of family. The form of state during the Warring States period was once considered as the so-called state of Confucianism and legalism.40 The Han Dynasty inherited the Qin system, which was considered as a mixture of ruling by justice and ruling by force, and some other scholars also called it the mutual use of Confucianism and legalism.41 Fundamentally speaking, it is nothing more than a Confucian society and a legalist state. However, since the patriarchal system has not been fundamentally shaken, the kinship hereditary principle still has an impact on the ruling foundation. Since the Han Dynasty, although the feudal aristocracy was constantly degraded through the process of strengthening the cadres and weakening the branches, as well as cutting off vassals and promoting favors, the rise of the big family name of powerful emperors could not be prevented until the imperial examinations of Sui 隋 and Tang 唐 Dynasties or the transformation of Tang 唐 and Song 宋 Dynasties.

37

Mencius’ argument that the hereditary officials could dethrone the king would be made against the power of the monarch in the Warring States period. It is hard to imagine Confucianism in the Spring and Autumn period having such opinions. 38 About the analysis of “autocracy”, please see Hou Xudong 侯旭東, “Zhongguo Gudai Zhuanzhi Shuo De Zhishi Kaogu” 中國古代專制說的知識考古 (“The Knowledge Archaeology Of Ancient Chinese Tyrannical Theory”), Research On Modern History 近代史研究 4, 2008. 39 See Qian Mu 錢穆, Guo Shi Da Gang 國史大綱 (Outline Of Chinese History), Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1996, Vol. 1: 127. 40 See Zhao Dingxin 趙鼎新, Dongzhou Zhanzheng Yu Ru Fa Guojia De Dansheng 東周戰爭 與儒法國家的誕生 (The Wars During the Eastern Zhou Dynasty and the Birth of the State of Confucianism and Legalism), East China Normal University Press 華東師範大學出版社, 2006. 41 See Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Shuo Ru Fa Hu Yong” 說儒法互用 (“On the Mutual Use of Confucianism and Legalism”), in: Li Shi Ben TiLun Ji Mao Wu Shuo 歷史本體論·己卯五說 (Historical Ontology & Five Essays Written in 1999),SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2006, p. 189.

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Our question is, the pre-Qin Confucian’s worshiping Zhou can be said to represent feudal factors42 but the so-called autocratic factors obviously came from the legalists who respected the sovereign,43 so why can we generally characterize Zhou and Qin Dynasties as being “feudal autocratic”? If the concept feng jian 封建 refers to the “feudal society” ( feng jian she hui 封建社會) instead of “feudal system” ( feng jianzhi 封建制), then feng jianzhuanzhi 封建專制 (“feudal autocracy”) refers to nothing more than the Qin system. But is the Qin system the ideal of “the Way of Confucius”? The key lies in how the Confucian tradition was adjusted during the Qin and Han Dynasties and how it absorbed legalist factors to adapt to the autocratic unification after the collapse of the feudal rites of Zhou. Moreover, it’s also important to know how later Confucians, especially the Neo-Confucianism tradition, criticized the Qin and Han systems according to the spirit of the pre-Qin Classics and the ideals of the three generations. On the other hand, there should be a profound social reason why Confucianism did not break off during the great changes in Zhou and Qin Dynasties and even gained a far higher supremacy in the Qin and Han systems than in the earlier Qin Dynasty. In this sense, the concept of feng jian 封建 is not entirely inconsistent with feudalism. The concept of feng jian 封建, regardless of its origin, can be divided into three aspects, that is, the land system in economic relation, the patriarchal system in social relation, and the feudal system in narrow sense in political relation. Since land has the dual meaning of “territory” and “property”, the land system is bound to have economic and political changes. At the time of Zhou and Qin Dynasties, changes in the land system inevitably led to changes in the political system. The lords with judicial, administrative, and taxation powers were transformed into landlords who only owned property and enjoyed land rent rather than taxes44 (The reform of the Shang emperor even granted land to the common people with military exploit; therefore, the new landlord class could also come from the common people, rather than the lords in the traditional sense). Since land was state owned, the political system would inevitably lead to the disappearance of feudal lords at all levels. The monarch then acquired/occupied the lands in real and not only nominal (i.e., through judicial, administrative, and tax relations), which is called the conversion of feng jian 封建 into counties. However, under the background of great changes in land system and political system, the patriarchal clan system had not been substantially 42

Even in the Warring States Period, Mencius still tried to limit the autocracy of the monarchy with the relatives of the monarch. 43 The society of the Spring and Autumn Period was in chaos and disorder, even to the extent that accompany ministers administer state affairs. Both Confucianism and legalism advocate respect for the king, but their ways of respect are different. With the spirit of the rites of Zhou (both the inherent and flexibility), Confucianism respected the king under the hierarchy system, while the tendency of legalists is to esteem the monarch as the primary. Confucianism represents a balanced spirit of monarchy with aristocracy, while legalism represents the dominant spirit of monarchy. Here, of course, the main opposite of legalist autocracy is aristocracy rather than democracy. These can be accommodated into different forms of modern state governments. 44 See the analysis of social history by Hou Wailu 侯外廬, in: Zhongguo Sixiang Tong Shi 中國 思想通史 (The Comprehensive History of Chinese Thoughts), Chapter 1 of Volume 2; Volume 4, p. 3–34, People’s Publishing House 人民出版社, 1992.

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overturned, and the basic spirit of the patriarchal clan system—i.e., filial piety— after some transformation was still urgently needed by the county system. This is the main reason why Confucianism continued to become the dominant school under the Qin and Han systems, even after the so-called transformation of the Tang and Song Dynasties. In this context, what we want to ask about China’s Enlightenment Movement is whether the Qin and Han systems were backward in pre-modern times? If you want to reasonably refer to the Qin and Han systems as feng jianzhuanzhi 封建專 制 (feudal autocracy), the feng jian 封建 here should refer to the land system and patriarchal system. The real state-owned system of land is not the land system of the Middle Ages in Europe (it is meaningless to name it only as the Asian system), but the compatibility between the county system and the patriarchal system actually means the mutual cooperation and balances between the local autonomy and the state power.45 So, what is modern? What is tyranny? Is the modern state diametrically opposed to autocracy? To solve this problem, we should examine the word zhuanzhi 專制 (autocracy) after analyzing the word feng jian 封建 (feudalism). We shall first examine the concept of autocracy in the context of European Enlightenment in order to understand the relationship between the modern state and autocracy. In contrast to the Chinese Enlightenment, which took Confucianism as the main object of criticism, the European Enlightenment took Confucian tradition as one of the important resources for enlightenment for quite a long period of time.46 The Confucian tradition and the Chinese system gave European Enlightenment philosophers two great stimuli, one religious and the other political. In the aspect of religious theology, there is no place for the personal God in the Neo-Confucianism system, and the theory of Heaven is very close to the philosophical theory of li 理.47 In the political aspect, the way and experience of China’s (and mainly the Manchu Dynasty’s) success in ruling a vast empire, as relayed by Jesuits, offered some lessons for the absolutist states that are in latent crisis. It is worth noting that both the proponents of China (Voltaire and Quesnay, for example) and its critics (Montesquieu, for example) used the term “autocracy” to indicate the nature of the Chinese Empire’s polity.48 The debate about China is actually an argument about “autocracy” and about the future See Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, Zhongguo Shi Shen 中國士紳 (Gentries in China), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2009. 46 See Zhu Qianzhi 朱謙之, Zhongguo Zhexue Dui Ouzhou De Yingxiang 中國哲學對歐洲的影響 (The Influence of Chinese Philosophy to the Europe), Shanghai Century Publishing (Group) Co., Ltd. 上海世紀出版集團, 2006. See also Zhang Guogang 張國剛, Qimeng Shidai Ouzhou De Zhongguo Guan 啓蒙時代歐洲的中國觀 (The European View of China in the times of Enlightenment), Shanghai Classics Publishing House 上海古籍出版社, 2006. 47 Even if Neo-Confucian theory of Heaven is different from a theological God, it is certainly closer to a natural God than a personal one. See Pang Jingren 龐景仁, Ma Le Bu Lang Shi De “Shen” Guannian Yu Zhuxi De “Li” Guannian 馬勒布朗士的 “神”觀念與朱熹的 “理”觀念 (Malebrache’s Concept of “God” and Zhuxi’s Concept of Li), Commercial Press 商務印書館, 2005. See also Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, Chinese version published by Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1991, Vol. 2: 266. 48 See Voltaire’s criticism of Montesquieu in his Essai sur les mœurs, Chinese version published by Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1997, Vol. 2: 478. 45

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of absolutist countries in Europe. This is an argument between two different forms of modern state, i.e., enlightened monarchy and constitutionalism, but it has never been an argument between the ancient and the modern, the backward and the progressive. The reason for Quesnay to write about the despotic system in Imperial China, to a large extent, is to take China as an example to countercriticize Montesquieu’s criticism of autocracy.49 In this debate, the former actually represents the monarchical elements of the kingdom of France, while the latter actually represents the interests of the local aristocracy of France, that is, the feudal lords in the absolutist states.50 No matter “feudal” or “autocratic”, it is not naturally pre-modern. Modern states still have a certain degree of conflict and balance between feudalism and autocracy, such as the struggle between the tradition of local autonomy and the centralization of power, or as the struggle between sector-group interests and national interests. In the context of European history, autocracy represents a typical “modern” factor when compared to feudalism. The absolutist state of absolute monarchy is the early form of the modern state. Absolute monarchy deprived the Pope of the secular-ruling power, on the one hand, and weakened the authority of feudal lords on the other hand, which realized the unity of national legislation, government order, finance, and justice. The changes of Western Europe in the Middle Ages and modern times and the changes of Zhou and Qin Dynasties also show that “autocracy” is the real “anti-feudalism” factor.51 The changes of Zhou and Qin Dynasties and the modern Middle Ages in Western Europe also show that the unity of autocracy is the real “modern” factor. The history of European political thought reminds us that we should not rush to consider feudal autocracy with the standards of progress/backwardness and modern/ pre-modern. Even if these criteria are suitable, they are not the first. For the state system, the first thing should be analyzing both the elements and the forms of the polity (i.e., the different elements of power). Bodin, the first to justify the modern European state, did so,52 as did Liang Qichao 梁啓超, who’s the first to use the Chinese concept of zhuanzhi 專制 to account for the political system of ancient China.53 Any complete analysis of polity is a three-way relationship analysis of “monarch”, “aristocrat”, and “people”. From this perspective, the binary opposition between “feudal autocracy” and “democracy” is seriously misleading. This basic presupposition of the May 4th New Culture Movement makes it impossible for us Quesnay, Despotism in China, Chinese version published by Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1992: 93f. 50 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, Chinese version published by Shanghai People’s Publishing House 上海人民出版社, 2001: 105. 51 The “democracy” embodied in local and national autonomy may be the manifestation of “feudalism”. 52 Bodin’s book Six Books of the Commonwealth describes three forms of polities, i.e., monarchy, tyranny, and tyrant politics. The so-called reign of kings is equivalent to Quesnay’s statement of legal despotism that is characteristic of China. 53 Liang Qichao introduced several different theories of polities in detail. See his books Zhongguo Zhuanzhi Zhengzhi Jinhua Shi Lun 中國專制政治進化史論 (“Evolution History of Chinese Autocratic Politics”), and his article Kaiming Zhuanzhi Lun 開明專制論 (“On Enlightened Autocracy”), and so on. 49

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to properly understand the ancient Chinese history and the natural legitimacy (rather than the legitimacy of social history) of the modern Chinese state founded under the inspiration of the May 4th Movement. Although most historians believe that the political system from the Qin 秦 and Han 漢 Dynasties to the Manchu 滿清 Dynasty basically followed the Qin system,54 more and more scholars of ancient history have emphasized the so-called transformation of Tang 唐 and Song 宋 Dynasties.55 Of course, there is still much room for debate on whether the actual opportunity of transformation is between Tang and Song Dynasties,56 what is the premise of its ideological history, and how to understand the relationship between nation-state and empire.57 But generally speaking, scholars have tacit understanding on the following points. First, the so-called transformation, according to Naito Konan 内藤湖南 et al., actually means that the factors of aristocracy are weakened and the factors of absolute monarchy are strengthened.58 Second, the origin of the modern Chinese state should be traced back to this transition; this is to say, then, thirdly, that absolute monarchy is a necessary factor in the rise of the modern state. The viewpoints above can be cross-referenced with the history of the rise of modern sovereign states in Europe. But we should add the following points. First, the factors of autocratic monarchy after the transformation had already appeared at the time of Zhou 周 and Qin 秦 Dynasties, and the transformation only strengthened them rather than created them from scratch. Second, clan politics is not aristocracy in the pre-Qin and European sense. It is closely related to the inheritance of Confucian scholarship and patriarchal system. In the era when foreign nationalities destroyed the state power of the Han 漢 nationality, the clan preserved the social structure from being shaken with the collapse of the state power. Thirdly, the strengthening of the autocratic monarchy directly weakened the aristocratic factors, which benefited the common people in this respect. It is not so much that “democracy” is opposed to “autocracy” as that “autocracy” is directly opposed to “aristocracy”. Fourthly, the strengthening of the factors of autocratic monarchy has objectively benefited the common people, but the modern polity is still not completely free of the factors of mixture and balances. Nevertheless, it is not in line with the reality of China’s Hou Wailu 侯外廬, in: Zhongguo Sixiang Tong Shi 中國思想通史 (The Comprehensive History of Chinese Thoughts), Vol. 2: 2. 55 Naito Konan 内藤湖南, Zhongguo Shi Tong Lun 中國史通論 (On the Comprehensive History of China), Social Sciences Academic Press 社會科學文獻出版社, 2003. 56 The problem consciousness of the book Tangdai Zhengzhi Shi Shu Lungao 唐代政治史述論稿 (Treatise on the Political History of Tang Dynasty) by Chen Yinque 陳寅恪 is actually in accordance with the theory on the transformation of Tang Dynasty. But Chen traced it back to the rise of the imperial examination in the Tang Dynasty and the decline of the Guanlong 関隴 group. 57 Wang Hui 汪暉, Xiandai Zhongguo Sixiang De Xingqi 現代中國思想的興起 (The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought), Vol. 1, SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 2004. 58 “This kind of aristocracy declined in the transition from the end of Tang Dynasty to the five dynasties. It was replaced by the polity of autocratic monarchy. As a result of the decline of aristocracy, the distance between the monarch and the people became closer and closer”. Naito Konan 内藤湖南, Zhongguo Shi Tong Lun 中國史通論 (On the Comprehensive History of China), Vol. 1, Social Sciences Academic Press 社會科學文獻出版社, 2003: 324. 54

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political system to criticize the Ming and Qing polities as “all people are equal before the monarch because they have nothing” by holding the position of mixed polity like Hegel. Last but not least, it is necessary to properly understand the political and social functions of the Confucian tradition under such a unified polity of “feudal autocracy”. On the one hand, the Confucian tradition maintained the autonomy of the lower society through the patriarchal system to balance the imperial power. On the other hand, the Confucian tradition was also integrated into the unified bureaucratic state in the political structure.59 As long as patriarchal societies existed, the disintegration of feudal states was not enough to interrupt the Confucian tradition. The basic judgment of Confucianism on the system of Qin 秦 Dynasty can be proved by the historical theory of Wang Chuanshan 王船山: The emperor of Qin 秦, with the purpose of “taking the world as a private one” (si tian xia 私天下), abrogated feudal lords and implemented the system of prefectures and counties. However, Heaven took advantage of Qin’s private purpose to carry out the plan of “justice” (gong 公). What an unexpected mystery!60

The greatest historical significance of the May 4th New Culture Movement’s attack on Confucianism is nothing more than the destruction of feudal land relations and clan system, but it has not destroyed and cannot destroy centralization and land ownership—those are the respective missions of enlightenment and salvation. In other words, the realization of the national salvation mission just released the legalist tradition which had been integrated by Confucianism. After some transformation, the legalist factor of autocracy/equality is the constitutive element of China’s modern state and society. Now the question is, in the modern society where the clan system has basically collapsed, how should the Confucian tradition, which has been in harmony with the legalists for more than 2000 years and maintained the legitimacy of Chinese governance, reprove itself? How will the modern republic of China, without Confucianism, continue to maintain its legitimacy without losing its basic cultural and historical identity? Written in October 2008.

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See Max Weber, Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Wang Fuzhi, Du Tong Jian Lun 讀通鑒論 (A Comprehensive Analysis of Chinese History), Vol.

Chapter 6

New Confucianism in Mainland China and Confucian Socialism: Taking Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 As an Example

Abstract This chapter takes Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, one of the representative figure of New Confucianism, as an example to illustrate how new Confucianists in Mainland China found a balance between socialism and Confucianism. By pondering on Liang’s exploration on rural construction and communal life beyond family, this chapter provides reference for the further development of New Confucianism in mainland China centering around the following question, i.e., What was the relation among family, community, and state? And what should it be?

6.1 The Emergence, Purpose, and Problems of Modern New Confucianism and Confucian Attitude Toward Socialist China Confucianism is a school of thought with profound political purport and complex historical features. It is more closely related to traditional Chinese political history, social history, and Chinese culture as a whole than any other school of thought. At the historical juncture of the transformation from traditional China to modern China, Confucianism naturally occupied the focus of controversy. No matter from the political, social, or ideological and cultural aspects, this period of change is a revolutionary history. In politics, revolution means the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. Confucianism and monarchy are hard to separate. The remarks and actions of the representatives of modern Confucianism to preserve the monarchy can only make Confucianism and the monarchy sink into the abyss of history. Socially speaking, revolution meant the dismantling of the Confucian-guided clan system, which is a source of justification for monarchy, while a modern republic—of course—could not match the traditional clan society. When its social and political foundation had been lost, Confucianism could not sustain itself in ideology and culture anymore. Ever since Daoxian 道咸 period of Qing Dynasty, people with insight have clearly seen this great change, whether it is emotionally accepted or not. It’s naturally of no exception for Confucians. Even martyrdom for monarchs would be a decisive move after knowing that there was no way out. Those Confucian’s self-examination was © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_6

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as deep as the reflection of Confucians in the late Ming Dynasty on WangYang-ming 王陽明’s theory of mind. In the face of the modern transition of self-transformation, although Confucianism is no longer the academic mainstream anymore, it has its own inheritor, which is the so-called “New Confucianism” (xiandaixinru jia 現代新 儒家). Due to the different embodiments of China’s modernization road, newConfucianism also has complicated differentiation in different historical periods. At the end of the Qing 清 Dynasty, there were great scholars in the old system among the conservatives, reformists, and even revolutionaries. Many of them were influential figures in the political circle at that time. Although they could not stop criticizing each other, they were all able to lead different political opinions based on the play of Confucianism. This chapter will not hackle these opinions. The so-called new-Confucianism in this chapter denotes the school of thoughts that appeared before and after the May 4th Movement when the statuses of both Confucian tradition and modern civilization have been reversed, and Confucianism has lost the authoritative position of being the leading political thought. New-Confucians are not the kind of Confucians who hold an innate position due to traditional education, but the ones who return to the Six Classics after understanding new learning as well as comparing the West and the East with a balanced mind. In their time, the central political issue was no longer the survival of the Manchu regime and the monarchy, but the political crisis of the Republic of China itself: partisanship, the division of warlords, Sino-Japanese relations, and the dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Although new-Confucians did not have to wrestle with the troublesome issues of monarchism and nationalism as the Confucians in the late Qing Dynasty did, the new-Confucians had to face the biggest political debate of their time: What kind of republic should China aim at building? In other words, how to judge between constitutionalism and the Party-state, as well as between the Three People’s Principles and new democratic socialism? At the revolution time, most elites of new-Confucianism chose to leave mainland China, so the new-Confucianism was generally confused with the new-Confucianism in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other foreign countries. At the end of the twentieth century, Confucian thoughts in the People’s Republic of China revived, establishing itself as mainland new-Confucianism, in order to distinguish it from newConfucianism abroad. Perhaps both trends above ignored that the new-Confucianism of the Republic of China had a great master living in mainland China, who kept writing and thinking after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. This paper intends to sort out the pedigree of new-Confucianism as follows: after its emergence around the May 4th Movement, new-Confucianism as a whole divided into two groups before and after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. One is the new-Confucianism overseas, represented by MouZongsan 牟宗三 and Tang Junyi 唐君毅, who are basically the disciples of Xiong Shili 熊十力, as well as other scholars of older generation such as Qian Mu 錢穆 and Fang Dongmei 方東 美. The other is the new-Confucianism in mainland China, with the first generation represented by Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 and Xiong Shili 熊十力, and the second generation represented by the rising Confucian figures in the last decade. Although

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there is no clear relationship between generations of the new-Confucians in mainland China, it is undeniable that Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 and XiongShili 熊十力 are the first generation of Confucians in mainland China. However, being the teachers of most representatives of new-Confucianism abroad, their thinking after the founding of the People’s Republic of China deserves more attention from the intellectual circle. The second generation of mainland new-Confucians is confronting the same socialist republic of China as they did, so it is especially unreasonable to talk about the so-called Confucian socialism while bypassing the thoughts of Liang Shumingand XiongShili. The fundamental problem of the new-Confucian study of external king is the relationship between Chinese cultural tradition and modern China. If leaving aside the 60-year history of the People’s Republic of China, where shall modern China begin? From a Confucian standpoint, there can generally be three attitudes toward the People’s Republic of China: The first attitude was to deny its political tradition as well as its Confucian orthodoxy, that is, a complete denial both politically and culturally. The mainstream of new-Confucianism overseas generally had this attitude, so did the second generation of new-Confucianism in mainland China. The second attitude was to accept its political tradition as a given historical reality but not to recognize its independent orthodoxy. Instead, it favors following the Confucian attitude toward the legitimate dynasty to press the monarch with the Way. The mainstream thoughts of the second generation of new-Confucianists in mainland China, such as the so-called political Confucianism scheme, belong to this category. Even the current argument of “Confucian socialism” was born out of combining Confucianism and socialism, taking both of which as external things. The third attitude is to face up to the new China’s own orthodoxy, trying to understand it, and regard the connection between the old and the new China in both the political tradition and orthodoxy as the most fundamental problem. Such efforts can only be found in the first generation of new-Confucians in mainland China. Because of the direct conflict between Confucianism and the revolutionary party in China’s modern history, it is very difficult for Confucianism to seriously admit the legitimacy of the country founded by the revolution, let alone face up to its later orthodoxy. Such an admission requires not only a historical process to sufficiently develop the political and ideological trend of modern China but also the unvulgar spirit of true man to face the reality. More importantly, it also requires a calm and comprehensive observation as well as objective profound thinking. However, there are not many people who meet all these conditions at the same time. Taking Liang Shuming 梁漱 溟—the representative figure of new Confucianism—as an example, we will briefly investigate the third attitude of Confucianism toward socialism and modern China, so as to provide reference for the further development of New Confucianism in the mainland China.

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6.2 Liang Shuming and the New China Different from some pure academic thinkers who tried to “get in touch with reality” according to the suggestion of the Communist Party of China after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Liang Shuming’s lifelong practice and thinking started from “the problem of China”. During the period of the Republic of China, he made two contributions to this big problem, namely, “understanding old China and building new China”. His knowledge of old China can be found in his works Zhongguo Wenhua Yao Yi 中國文化要義 (Essentials of Chinese Culture) and Dong Xi Wenhua Ji Qi Zhexue 東西文化及其哲學 (Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies). The practice of building New China was mainly the rural construction movement and the mediation activities as the leader of the Democratic League (min meng 民盟) during the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. And it was reflected in his book titled XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (Theory of Rural Construction). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Liang Shuming participated in the construction of new China by taking part in politics and making suggestions, but the political twists and turns made him observe the new China more from a detached perspective. This old man, who had lived in the new China for nearly four decades (slightly longer than his life during the Republic of China), has thus been given a chance to “see the new China”. His experience was embodied in his works Zhongguo: Lixing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Nation of Reason), which was written during the “cultural revolution”, and Zhongguo Jianguo Zhi Lu 中國建 國之路 (The Road to the Founding of China), which was written at the beginning of founding the People’s Republic of China. Liang Shuming’s thinking and action are connected. The fundamental purpose of his political life stems from his understanding of old China. His attitude toward the new China—even a “new China” different from his own ideals—depends on his own experience and practice in old China. More importantly, as a thinker who has systematically studied and summarized traditional Chinese culture and society, he has made a profound investigation into the cultural roots of new China’s politics. Liang Shuming is a man of great confidence and backbone. His understanding of new China is not the crafty work of a greedy man but reflects a deep meditation in the face of a huge historical existence that cannot be bypassed. All his defense, introspection, criticism, and praise flow straightly from his heart of equanimity and uprightness. This vividly illustrates that only those with perfect virtue can love and hate people. Zhongguo Jianguo Zhi Lu 中國建國之路 (The Road to the Founding of China) is a work of understanding the political system of new China, while Zhongguo: Lixing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Nation of Reason)is a work of demonstrating the doctrine of New China and positively associating it with the doctrine of old China. These two works are also natural extensions of his pre-1949 concerns. Liang Shuming worked hard for decades to build a new China during the time of the Republic of China. The collapse of old China must be examined for this reason.

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Old China is a so-called ethical-centered society, in which different occupations are separated. Traditional culture is rational precocious. Compared with western culture, the status of individual and community in traditional Chinese culture is weaker than that of the West, while the status of family and the world is stronger. Since the precocious rationality is mainly applied to the ethics of life, there is no tradition of science and technology nor tradition of religious organization in China. The characteristics of ethical centeredness and occupational separation exclude the existence of social class. The old China had its own way of governing itself, so it ran smoothly with all these characteristics. However, through the comprehensive contact with the western culture, these merits also become weaknesses. One of the biggest results is the inability to create a real state which grows out of community life and must be based on class society: If referring specifically to its [author’s remarks: old China’s] failure, there is only two points: one is the lack of science and technology; the other is the lack of communal organization (tuan ti zu zhi 團體組織). Nothing else. In modern times, the western world is good at science, technology and communal organization, and nothing else. In my book 東西文化 及其哲學 (Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies), I pointed out that there are three advantages of modern western countries. First, the spirit of democracy in society and politics... Now... Since I have come to realize that the spirit of democracy is a kind of progress in communal life (tuan ti sheng huo 團體生活), it is not advisable to mention only this kind of progress and ignore its fundamental communal life...1

The community (tuan ti 團體) here refers to the community organizations beyond the family, which includes religious organization, class, and state. First of all, despite the inaccuracy of expression in his works, Liang Shuming did go beyond the fundamental view of the May 4th New Culture Movement. Compared to this, the disciples of new Confucianists Xiong Shili 熊十力 and MouZongsan 牟宗 三 are still entangled in the idea of new external king, i.e., giving birth to science and democracy through the self-negation of the substance of the Way. Even to this day, many scholars who study the West haven’t realized that the “community” beyond the family (whether it be a city-state, church, class, or state) is far more fundamental to the West than the so-called democracy. In fact, the community is also the other side of the “individual”: these two cannot be separated. Secondly, Liang Shuming’s view of the state and class generally conforms to Marxism. But his judgment of Chinese society is the exact opposite of that of the Chinese Communist Party. Liang believed that traditional Chinese society was not a class society at all, and thus, Russian-style revolution (no matter bourgeois or proletarian revolution) would not work in China.2 Finally, since the difference between Chinese and Western societies mainly lies in the communal organization, which is the foundation of the state, the primary task See Liang’s 鄉村建設理論 (Theory of Rural Construction), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 2: 192. 2 See Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, “Wo Men Zheng Zhi Shang Di Er Ge Bu Tong De Lu: E Guo Gong Chan Dang Fa Ming De Lu” 我們政治上第二個不通的路: 俄國共產黨發明的路 (“Our second politically impassable road: The road invented by the Russian Communists”), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 5: 261. 1

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of founding a nation is to create such a new communal organization. In addition, since Chinese society has no class but the declining family, the establishment of such an organization should start in the countryside where the old family dominates and forge a new community with new customs. This is the fundamental concern of Liang Shuming’s rural construction movement—to solve China’s problems through rural construction. It can be seen that the starting point and goal of Liang and those revolutionaries in old China had something in common, namely the establishment of a new community, and then the establishment of a new country. There is also a further difference between Liang and those revolutionaries, that is, he denies the existence of class in ancient Chinese society and then denies the necessity of establishing revolutionary political parties as the vanguard of class. In 1938, Liang had a hot debate with Mao Zedong 毛 澤東 in the Yan’an Cave (延安窯洞), which vividly illustrated the points above. Mao criticized Liang for ignoring the general trait of human society, i.e., class conflict, while Liang refuted Mao’s argument by pointing out that the latter had failed to notice the particularities of Chinese society, for example, being ethical-centered and occupationally separated, and so on. History is the arbiter of this unyielding debate. In addition to the Kuomintang, Liang Shuming was probably the most unconvinced about the victory of the Communist Party of China and the founding of the new China. However, it was he who thought and summarized it most carefully. On the occasion of 1950 and 1951, Liang summarized the three major contributions of the Communist Party of China, i.e., the reunification of the state and the establishment of national rights, the introduction of communal life, and the demonstration of the heart of the people (that is, the spirit of selflessness). The first contribution is obvious. The second contribution is the main justification for the creation of a sovereign state. However, Liang’s rural construction and even the Kuomintang’s party building were also the efforts of collective life. Why only the CPC succeeded? This is what caused Liang the most pain: Not only did he fail to build the new China, but even he may have been wrong about the old China. The failure to build a new China is due to the fundamental mistake of recognizing the old China. In his debate with Mao Zedong, Liang seems to suffer a big defeat. But Liang still held to his fundamental view of old China and the difference between China and the West. In Jian Guo Zhi Lu 建國之路 (The Road to the Founding of China), he argues that the Communist Party of China created quasiclasses in Chinese society (that is to say, there used to be no classes in China) and then, in an almost early Christian way, established communal life in the fierce struggle, since struggle is the greatest cohesion of communal strength. By contrast, the Kuomintang—which tried to represent the whole people and thus lost its class base—failed, as did the rural construction which tried to establish communal life through rites and music rather than struggle. History shows that Chinese communal life can only be successfully established through class struggle, which Liang Shuming, a Confucian, knew well while refused to do.

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The community causes the struggle, and the struggle facilitates the group. Community is associated with struggle and incoherence with peace.3 For thousands of years, we Chinese people have been lacking communal life. Today, the success of the Communist Party of China in its communal organization almost can be said to be unprecedented.4 I tried hard to introduce communal life, but failed, because I don’t want to go down this road [Author’s note: “This road” here denotes the road of struggle]. When seeing the Communist Party succeed, I have mixed feelings.5

Liang Shuming does not go on to ponder this fundamental question of political philosophy, which is of great importance to Confucianism: Whether political communities must be derived from struggle, and how the internal ethical ethos of political communities and the need for external struggle complement each other. He ascribes directly the fundamental ethical spirit required for communal life (the human heart) to the third unintentional contribution of the Communist Party of China: Today, my road did not go through, but the Communist Party’s campaign to save the country and build a nation has been effective. In particular, the Communist Party saw the new way of understanding and popularity of the human heart and the new way of interconnectedness of human life, both of which can roughly answer the question I had earlier... The Communist Party of China has ignored this problem from the beginning, but it is unconsciously on the right track... The Communist Party of China has only inadvertently done two things: It looks like a great religion, filling the gap in China’s lack of religion... and introducing a new life of community to replace the old ethical organizations.6

The upward and selfless spirit needed for communal life reveals the nature of the human heart. The problem of human heart and human life originates from Liang Shuming’s exclusive thought and is also the connection center of his two fundamental problems, i.e., “the problem of China” and “the problem of life”. Liang Shuming has always criticized the legal basis of capitalist society (which has nothing to do with the influence of the Communist Party of China), that is, “right” means a self-interested, possessive, downward spirit, which shows the dirty and degenerate side of human heart. So the path of the so-called constitutional democracy is not only unworkable, but also undesirable. This was the main background for Liang Shuming to accept the communist ideal in his later years. From this, we can generally see Liang Shuming’s basic opinions on the political system of the People’s Republic of China and the orthodoxy of the Communist Party of China in the early years of the founding of the People’s Republic of China: Since the People’s Republic of China ended the division to establish the right of state, the Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (Theory of Rural Construction), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 2: 333. 4 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (Theory of Rural Construction), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 2: 339. 5 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (Theory of Rural Construction), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 2: 351. 6 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, XiangcunJiansheLilun 鄉村建設理論 (Theory of Rural Construction), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 2: 384. 3

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legitimacy of its regime is not suspicious. The foundation of its founding was also the introduction of communal life. There are two sides to communal life: One is the external struggle, the other is the positive heart within. The Communist Party of China is most conscious of external struggle (class struggle, national struggle), which— though is against the Confucian orthodoxy and rejected by Liang—is the choice of history. The positive heart is a fundamental problem of Confucian orthodoxy, but it is also an inadvertently acquired outcome of the Communist Party’s endeavor to build communities. In short, while the political system of the People’s Republic of China is not in doubt, the new orthodoxy of the Communist Party is not in conformity with the old Confucian orthodoxy, and if the former did promote the latter, it unconsciously did so. The ideology of the Communist Party of China will never divide the struggle and the human heart as Liang Shuming does. Nor will the former admit that it is merely unwittingly promoting selflessness. In terms of the Communist Party, class struggle, class consciousness, and the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat are inherently an indivisible whole. After continuing to live in the People’s Republic of China for more than twenty years, at the peak of the era of Mao Zedong, Liang Shuming gained a fabulous chance to give an overall observation of how all these three elements above were connected. Liang Shuming continued his understanding of new China in Zhongguo: Lixing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Nation of Reason). Contrary to what any superficial reading may tell us, this book is a clumsy attempt to justify socialism on the basis of Confucian orthodoxy, but it also sticks more stubbornly to Liang Shuming’s conventional view on the orthodoxy of old China than, for example, Zhongguo Jianguo Zhi Lu 中國建國之路 (The Road to the Founding of China). This is a peculiar work that blends ancient and modern Chinese traditions. Liang believes that the main source of the great success of the socialist revolution in China lies in China’s traditional culture, and as the center of the world revolution, China can take the lead in the human society to enter communism in the future, whose opportunity still lies in carrying forward and improving the traditional spirit. To this end, he made a large adjustment to the views before and after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. On the surface, he no longer obsessed about the gain and loss of the views on “communal path” respectively held by the Communist Party and him. However, those that had been ascribed to the unique advantages of the communal path of the Communist Party in the early years of founding new China were now almost all reabsorbed into the Chinese tradition in his works. Although admitting that ancient Chinese society was indeed a class society (that is the main focus of his debate with Mao Zedong in the 1930s), he still emphasized that ethical centeredness is the fundamental feature of this rather weak class society. In the era of old China, the ethical-based culture not only enabled the Han nationality to expand immensely but also enabled the Communist Party of China to unite relevant social forces and carry out revolution and construction with the spirit of collectivism beyond the individuals. Liang Shuming cleverly used the example of the Communist Party of China successfully launching the proletarian revolution in

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the society where the working class was weak. By invoking Lenin’s theory to distinguish the existence of the proletariats from the consciousness of the proletariats, he attributed the success of Chinese revolution and social construction to the “proletarian spirit” and thus included into his own so-called human heart aspect. That is to say, with the understanding of the revolution and construction of the Communist Party of China, Liang Shuming gave up the view that “the Communist Party of China unconsciously established the upward spirit”. But at the same time, he immediately distinguished this upward spirit from the Christian spirit of struggle and unity. While still only symbolically invoking the doctrine of “class struggle”, Liang Shuming positively linked the essence of the spirit of the Communist Party of China with the ethical-based traditional culture in an unprecedented way. We have to say that the socialist construction of new China provides new evidence for him. [Author’s note: The questions of socialist construction are as follows] First, in large and small collectives, how to cooperate with each other and live together well? Second, how to improve people’s conduct and style and build good social discipline, placing labor discipline and social order directly on people’s conscious selfdiscipline?… The traditional ethical centeredness of Chinese society would undoubtedly be the most suitable contribution to the former question, while the rites and music that the ancient Chinese loved to speak of are just in line with answering the latter question.7 Liang revised his criticism of traditional Chinese civilization to distinguish ethical centeredness and family centeredness. It holds that although ethical centeredness did not turn old China into a country in the modern sense, it enabled the Han nationality to expand immensely in the history of human civilization and provided the basic historical conditions for China’s socialist revolution. What is more, ethical centeredness both overcomes individualism and surpasses collectivism, since collectivism is only amplified individualism. Ethical centeredness means that the age of the heart will replace the age of the body (i.e., the age of individualism and capitalism). In this sense, China’s socialism is only the forerunner of this “age of the heart” of mankind. It was through his “mind learning” in his later years that Liang Shuming closely linked the selfless “proletarian spirit”(even if it was separated from the existence of the proletarianism) with ethical centeredness, thus completing his highest affirmation of ethical centeredness—that is, Chinese civilization—in the new era. He uses this as the essence of Chinese civilization to connect China’s past, present and future, to connect Confucianism and socialism—communism, and to summarize the pros and cons of Sino-Western civilization and politics. The reason why traditional Confucianism can overcome the narrow class position is that it puts others (including the governed) in their shoes in ethical centeredness. The reason why China takes the road of socialism instead of capitalism is that ethical centeredness attaches importance to duties rather than rights. The reason why China can take the lead in entering communism in the future is that ethical centeredness includes the upward factor of human heart. Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, Zhongguo: Lixing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Nation of Reason), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 4: 459.

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6 New Confucianism in Mainland China and Confucian Socialism … The proletarian spirit is both superior to our traditional customs and not far from our inherent spirit, thus can easily be learned by the Chinese.8 China takes the lead in building socialism in the world because of its own cultural background of thousands of years. For the same reason, it can be pointed out that it is much easier for us than it is for Westerners to realize the issue of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need” by “going beyond the narrow vision of bourgeois legal rights”.9

6.3 How to Inherit the Legacy of the First Generation of New Confucianism in Mainland China? On the surface, the historical situation of the first generation of new Confucianists in mainland China has passed away, but the heavy legacy they left is unavoidable. Liang Shuming’s profound thinking leaves the following problems to later generations. First, how to rethink the basic problem of political philosophy under the historical background of the crisis and revival of Chinese civilization: the group spirit of external struggle and internal unity. More importantly, how to give a new clue to solve this problem in the ethically based Chinese community? Secondly, how to summarize the basic lifestyle and social structure of Chinese civilization? This issue is debated even within New Confucianism, not to mention other schools of thought. Xiong Shili 熊十力 once criticized Liang Shuming’s theory of ethical centeredness: “The Chinese family is indeed the origin of the nation’s decline and collapse. He’s putting too much gloss on the ethical centeredness. In fact, the long imperial system and the failure to pull out feudal ideology were all due to the poison of the family.”10 This is not a temporary word of anger. Xiong Shili wrote Yuan Ru 原儒 (Tracing Confucianism), which was exactly targeted at Confucianist theories such as “ethical centeredness”. Xiong Shili is a Confucian master, but he still regarded the traditional family system of China as a venomous thorn and a verbosity. Isn’t it thought-provoking? Thirdly, how to understand socialist China? The greatest change in the historical situation of the first generation of New Confucianism in mainland China is the development and change of socialist China. The change of socialist China itself and its invariance is the historical premise for us to think about the changing way of Confucian tradition. To sum up, to inherit the legacy of the first generation of Confucianism, the primary thing is to enter the complete problem vision composed of the following three aspects, that is, the ebb and flow of Chinese and western civilization, the reunderstanding of Confucian tradition and Chinese civilization tradition, and the fate of modern socialist China. All three aspects above are indispensable. In particular, to Liang Shuming 梁漱溟,Zhongguo: Lixing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Nation of Reason), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 4: 309. 9 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, Zhongguo: Lixing Zhi Guo 中國——理性之國 (China: A Nation of Reason), in: 梁漱溟全集 (The Complete Works of Liang Shuming), Vol. 4: 477. 10 The Complete Works of Xiong Shili 熊十力全集, Vol. 8: 646f. 8

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elaborate the Confucian tradition, we should not separate ourselves from the modern state and the relationship between China and foreign countries. The best clue to enter into this problem vision is to reinitiate the core themes of the debates among Mao Zedong 毛澤東, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, and Xiong Shili 熊十力: What was the relation among family, community, and state? And what should it be? In the process of such thinking, the fate of Confucianism and the fate of socialism will be unpredictably entangled. March 2010, draft completed in Shanghai. (Originally published in Wenhua Zongheng 文化縱橫 (Cultural Review), 2010 (4)).

Chapter 7

Philosophical Understanding-and-Mergence of Confucianism and Marxism

Abstract This chapter shows a possible philosophical connection between Confucianism and Marxism in the context of the “harmony” (he xie 和諧) concept. Beginning with a critical investigation of Feng Youlan 馮友蘭’s version of “harmony philosophy”, this chapter initiates the integration of “struggle” and “harmony” by arguing for guiding “harmony” (he 和) toward “the Mean” (zhong 中), which can also be regarded as a useful resource for the sinicization of Marxism.

In recent years, the idea of harmony (he xie guan 和諧觀) has gradually become more and more popular in China. It condenses more and more social consensus and increasingly becomes the main guiding principle for the government to carry out economic and social construction as well as to deal with the domestic and international political problems. Theoretically speaking, the idea of harmony clearly abandons the ideology that emphasized political struggle before the 1980s. As the consciousness and summary of the spirit of reform, the idea of harmony can be said to be the ultimate summary of the second stage of the Sinicization of Marxism. However, as the cornerstone of the new theoretical form, the idea of harmony obviously has more content in economic development and social politics than in philosophy. Although it overcomes the politically class-struggle discourse of “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat”, it lacks the systematic expression of philosophy to restrain the so-called struggle philosophy as the basis of this discourse. In other words, the idea of harmony hasn’t yet become the philosophy of harmony to the extent of becoming the successor to Mao Zedong’s/Maoist philosophy in the sense of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. The Maoist thought is a complete system that contains the worldview, epistemology, a picture of social history, and the political-economic theories. There is no philosophy of struggle without the politics of struggle. It is impossible to correct its political discourse without changing its philosophy. The abridged version was published in Wenhua Zongheng 文化縱橫 (Cultural Review), 2011 (4), with the title Dou Zheng, He Xie, Yu Zhong Dao: LunZhongguo Hua Ma Ke Si Zhu Yi De Zhe Xue Ji Chu 鬥爭、和諧與中道——論中國化馬克思主義的哲學基礎 (Struggle, Harmony, and the Way of the Mean: On the philosophical foundation of the Sinicization Of Marxism). It was slightly revised when being included in this book. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_7

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The troubles that Maoist thought brought to the theorists of the harmony era are more than that. It is the same Maoist thoughts that guide the revolution and the construction. If we completely abandon the struggle politics, it means that the legitimacy of Chinese revolution and the founding of new China through revolution is written off. If the theory of harmony treats the doctrine of struggle with the attitude of struggle and revolution with the attitude of revolution, it is still no more than the extreme transformation of the doctrine of struggle and revolutionary practice. It is the characteristic of the philosophy of struggle to emphasize opposition, but the trap of the harmony theory is that it can neither emphasize its opposition to the former nor erase its difference from the former. In a word, the deficiency of the harmony theory is that it lacks a philosophical approach to deal with the relation between harmony and struggle—it rarely even seriously reflects on this pair of concepts. The relation between the different stages of the Sinicization of Marxism in philosophy is ultimately the relation between the idea of “struggle” and that of “harmony”. The relation between “revolution” and “reform” is the social and political application of this philosophical relation. To think positively about this relation is indeed the first and most important task necessary for the self-deepening of the Sinicization of Marxism in China. In fact, in the early stage of the reform, a prophetic figure once seriously reviewed the “philosophy of struggle” in the “worldview” and replaced it with the “philosophy of harmony”. He was the philosopher Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990). At the end of his ZhongguoZhexue Shi Xin Bian 中國哲學史新編 (A New History of Chinese Philosophy), Feng credited himself as the inheritor of “ancient Chinese philosophy”, profoundly criticizing Marxism and Maoism in his understanding, as well as giving a deep response to the reform exploration in China at that time. This response is especially noteworthy because it comes from the most authoritative heir and interpreter of the Chinese intellectual tradition. Up to now, all the structures of “harmony philosophy” produced by the intellectual circle are merely applying or rewriting Feng’s thoughts in his later years in various ways. It can even be said that the real source of the vulgar “harmony philosophy” is the final chapter of 中國哲學史新 編 (A New History of Chinese Philosophy). After a critical investigation of Feng’s version of “harmony philosophy”, this chapter will give philosophical suggestions for the academical exploration of Marxism in the way of integrating “struggle” and “harmony”.

7.1 Feng Youlan’s Version of “Harmony Philosophy” and Its Problems According to Feng Youlan, both Marxism–Leninism and Maoism are fundamentally different from the philosophical standpoint of “ancient Chinese philosophy”:

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There is only one objective dialectics, but people’s understanding of objective dialectics can vary with different conditions. According to Marxist dialectic thought, contradiction and struggle is absolute and unconditional, while “unification” is relative and conditional. This is to put contradiction and struggle in the first place. In contrast, ancient Chinese philosophy did not say so, but put unification first. This theoretical difference has great significance in practice.1

Feng Youlan quoted four sentences of Zhang Zai 張載, a scholar of the Song Dynasty, which more clearly summed up the difference between the two different understandings of dialectics in their positions. “As there are forms, there are their opposites. These opposites necessarily stand in opposition to what they do. Opposition leads to conflict, which will necessarily be reconciled and resolved”. Marxist dialectics would agree with the first three of these four sentences, but Marxism wouldn’t say that about the fourth… By my reckoning, Marxism might say, “conflict will necessarily be avenged to the end”.

According to Feng’s interpretation, “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” “is to maintain the unity of the two opposites”. The so-called conflict will necessarily be avenged to the end means “to destroy the unity in which the two opposites stand”. Feng even questioned Mao Zedong by saying that “Mao’s thought certainly approve that ‘conflict will necessarily be avenged to the end’. But the question is what is ‘to the end’ and where is the ‘end’?” Feng Youlan pointed out that the destruction of unity leads to the entrance of the next unity, which also has opposites and contradictions, but the contradictory struggle at this time should maintain this new unity of coexistence, which is called “harmony” (he 和). “Harmony” (He 和) is the key concept of Zhang Zai’s philosophy, not arbitrarily given. It is not only the category of unity of opposites for dialectic but also expresses the “normal state” of the objective world. Therefore, “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” has both cosmological and sociopolitical implications. In Zhang Zai’s view, “great harmony” (tai he 太和) as the normal state of the universe is consistent with “harmony” (he 和) as the normal state of society. Zhang Zai’ “harmony” (he 和) should maintain the “unity of feudal society”. The “harnomy” (he 和) advocated by Feng Youlan is to maintain the ruling relationship of the new society as the purpose of the revolution and seek peace in the world after the revolution ends (that is, be avenged to the end) and the social unity as the object of the revolution is destroyed. The social and historical meaning of “harmony” is post-revolutionary rule and permanent peace after war. Based on Zhang Zai’s interpretation of “harmony” (he 和), Feng Youlan not only reflected Marxism on behalf of the Confucian tradition but also grasped the trend of the times through philosophical speculation, summarizing the difference between Chinese and Western ideals as well as the key to the change of the ancient and modern world with a concise language. However, Feng’s statement, upon close inspection, is not doubtless. Feng Youlan, ZhongguoXiandaiZhexue Shi 中國現代哲學史 (The History of Modern Chinese Philosophy), Chap. 11.

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The first question is: can Feng’s understanding of “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” represent “ancient Chinese philosophy” and even Confucianism? If not, how on Earth does Confucianism view this proposition? The second question is: Feng once clearly stated that “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” represents objective dialectics.2 Can objective dialectics really be expressed as unity before struggle? Does the difference between Marxist dialectics and Confucianism really lie in “conflict will necessarily be avenged to the end” and being “reconciled and resolved”, that is, one approves struggle and one approves unity? The third question is: Feng’s so-called “harmony” (he 和) has the dual purpose, one is theoretical and the other practical. In dialectics, “harmony” (he 和) means “unity”, while in practice “harmony” (he 和) means post-revolutionary rule, international peace, and so on. If, theoretically speaking, unity comes first, then it means harmony comes first in practice. What would Confucianism and Marxism think of this interpretation of harmony? In what follows, we shall study along these questions, hoping to clarify the relationship between “harmony” and “struggle” from the level of so-called objective dialectics on the premise of understanding ancient Chinese thought and Marxist dialectics.

7.2 Would Confucianism Think “Conflict Will Necessarily Be Reconciled and Resolved”? Feng Youlan elaborated on Zhang Zai’s claim that “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved”, taking it as the representative of “ancient Chinese philosophy”, to act as a counterweight to Marxism–Leninism and Maoism. However, the authoritative position of Feng actually concealed such a fact, i.e., this claim of Zhang Zai is actually disputable in the Confucian orthodoxy, no matter from the perspective of universe or from that of ethics-politics. Let’s explore it respectively both from viewpoint of Neo-Confucianism and that of Confucian classics study. The four sentences of Zhang Zai quoted by Feng come from “Tai He”《太和》 (“Great Harmony”), the first chapter of Zheng Meng 正蒙 (Correcting Youthful Ignorance), which provided a general summary of the process of vaporizing the myriad things. The “Tai He” 太和 chapter sets up a clear empty as the basis. The invisible “Great Vacuity” (tai xu 太虛) is the so-called substance of “material force” (qi 氣). The gathering and dispersing of material force is the change of the myriad things. The myriad things dissipate and return to emptiness. That is, as Zhang Zi said, “the Great Vacuity of necessity consists of material force. Material force of necessity integrates to become the myriad things. Things of necessity disintegrate and turn to the Great Vacuity”. One material force has no opposites. When it disperses into the myriad Feng Youlan, ZhongguoXiandaiZhexue Shi 中國現代哲學史 (The History of Modern Chinese Philosophy), p. 253.

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things, there comes the conflict—and even the mutual fight—of hardness and softness, cold and warmness, life and death. The myriad things of mutual conflict would finally die out; their forms vanish and their material force disperses, returning to the Great Vacuity while no longer turning into their opposites. According to the annotation of Wang Chuanshan 王船山, the so-called conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved is nothing but “disintegrating and returning to the Great Vacuity”. The clear empty being set up has neither opposites nor avengement; therefore, it is not the unity of opposites but is the Great Vacuity that has no opposites. Judging from the orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism, the statement of Zhang Zaihas flaws. Yang Shi 楊時 once questioned Zhang Zai’s theory that “people are my brothers and all things are my kinds” (min bao wuyu 民胞物與) to have the disposition of Mohist universal love which dissolves the differentiation of “benevolence” (ren 仁). Cheng Yi 程頤 pointed out that the fundamental fault lies in Zhang Zai’s theory of material force (See Cheng Shu Fen Lei 程書分類 (The Classification and Recomposition of the Works of the Cheng Brothers), Vol. 13). Judging from the perspective of “the substance of the Way” (daoti 道體), Zhu Xi 朱熹 even questioned the one that has neither conflicts nor opposites: At first, Qu 渠3 initiated the concept of “a clear empty”. But Cheng Yichuan 程伊川 doubted this concept by claiming that “clearness is implied in turbidity; emptiness in implied in concreteness; the one is implied in the two; and the big is implied in the small. Originally, Zhang Zai aimed at initiating something metaphysical, but it turned out to be something physical…Therefore, clearness shall be viewed in combination with turbidity, emptiness with concreteness, the one with the two, the big with the small. In this way, the metaphysical can be seen functioning among those physical things”.4

ZhuXi made it clear that the material force that has no opposites nor conflicts was nothing but physical, and the metaphysical Way should be the unity of opposites that combines the one with the two. In the word favored by Feng Youlan, the thing that has neither opposites nor conflicts was not originally the unity of opposites but was in abstract unification. Obviously, this cannot be the statement of any dialectics. Feng Youlan could not fail to understand this truth, so he emphasized Zhang Zai’s saying that “if the two are not set up, the one would not be visible, and if the one is not visible, the use of the two will cease”, in order to show that Zhang Zai did notice the unity of opposites and thus his theory had dialectics. However, from Zhu Xi’s remarks cited above, we can know that the “opposites” in Zhang Zai’s theory were a remedy for the criticism he faced later. It was the “words coming out of following sages’ thinking”, not from real experience. This is why we can still find in the same book Zheng Meng 正蒙 (Correcting Youthful Ignorance), the words such as “even if there doesn’t exist the two, there still is the one”, which still advocate putting the abstract unity beyond and above opposition. It must be understood that words such as “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” advocated by Feng Youlan belong to this kind. What it advocates is the “clear empty” coming out of the dissolution of opposition, that is, the abstract unity without two or opposition. 3 4

Translator’s note: Here, Qu 渠 denotes Zhang Zai, who’s known as Mr. Heng Qu 橫渠. Zhu Zi Yu Lei 朱子語類 (Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), chapter 99.

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However, this not only doesn’t belong to the so-called dialectics but also cannot be included in the orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism as one part of “ancient Chinese philosophy”. Compared with “harmony” (he 和), “avengement” (chou 仇) is a special term of Zhang Zai and has no high status in the neo-Confucian tradition. However, both “harmony” (he 和) and “avengement” (chou 仇) can be found in the Confucian classics. Therefore, according to the meaning of Confucian classics, will Confucianism agree that “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved”? Quite the opposite. Judging from the orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism, this statement is not quite reasonable. Yet, if judging from the Confucian classics study, it is a heinous treason. In all Chinese classics, whenever avengement is initiated, settling a score is the only solution, and no reconciliation is admitted. According to the Qu Li 曲禮 chapter of Li Ji 禮記 (The Book of Rites), “The chou 仇 of killing or insulting one’s parents is deadly feud. The chou 仇 of killing or insulting one’s brothers results in one’s arming with weapons”. The statements recorded in Tan Gong 檀弓 chapter of Li Ji 禮記 and that in the Tiao Ren 調人 chapter of Zhou Li 周禮 were slightly different from this, but the major principle of avengement was the same. Avengement was the maintenance of the ethical order dominated by the relationship between king and minister. It is not a small matter, but where the great justice resides. Chun Qiu Gong Yang Zhuan 春秋公羊傳 emphasized this point. It believed that the reason that the Chun Qiu 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals), as the national history of the State of Lu 魯, highly affirmed the action of Duke Xiang 襄 of Qi 齊 who destroyed the State of Ji 紀 for avenging the ninth generation of the distant ancestor(we should know that Duke Xiang of Qi had patricide and the shame of adultery against Prince Lu 魯) was to commend the great righteousness of avengement. Even the meanness of Duke Xiang of Qi could not cover up the nobility of his avengement. “The Spring and Autumn Annals… How noble Duke Xiang was! Avengement. Is it appropriate to avenge the ninth generation of the distant ancestor? It is applicable even after a hundred years!”.5 To honor avengement is equal to deeply detesting the failure to avenging one’s monarch or one’s parents. Failing to avenge oneself denotes the failure to follow the way a minister or a son should be and is thus not qualified enough to stand between Heaven and Earth: “If any minister does not crusade against the enemy who killed one’s monarch, the former would not be qualified to be a minister; if one’s son does not avenge one’s parents, the former would not be qualified to be a son”.6 Under the influence of Confucian tradition, although the mainstream of Chinese laws in successive dynasties set some restrictions on private avengement, the great

See Chun Qiu: Zhuang-Gong Si Nian 春秋·莊公四年 (Spring and Autumn Annals, The Fourth Year of Duke Zhuang). 6 See Chun Qiu: Yin-Gong Shi-Yi Nian 春秋·隱公十一年 (Spring and Autumn Annals, The Eleventh Year of Duke Yin). 5

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righteousness of avengement is still advocated, and the action of “private reconciliation on relatives’ being killed” was even considered as a crime.7 That is to say, avengement is not forbidden but ought to be carried out according to law; it is a sin to “reconcile” without avengement. In this sense, contrary to Zhang Zai’s claim, Confucian classics thought highly of avengement. The mainstream of Confucianism in the Song 宋 Dynasty was short in understanding the allusive meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals. Therefore, the Northern Song Dynasty was silent in “fighting against the barbarians”, and the Southern Song Dynasty was silent in “avengement”. Zhang Zai, as one of the five representatives of the Northern Song Dynasty, even openly claimed that “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved”, which gave a philosophy defense in advance for the dishonorable behaviors of serving enemies carried out by the politicos such as Zhao Gou 趙構 and Qin Hui 秦檜. To sum up, no matter in the study of Confucian classics or Neo-Confucianism, no matter reflecting from the perspective of cosmology or from that of social politics, the theory of “conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved” is not justified by Confucianism. The philosophical thoughts of Zhang Zai blindly emphasized abstract unity, depreciating and even eliminating opposition, which in practice opened a convenient door to erase the necessary ethical boundaries within the family, the country, and the world. That is specious and is returning good for evil. It is the way of hypocrites. Ethical hypocriticalism corresponds to political capitulationism in disguise of pacifism. Fundamentally speaking, Zhang Zai endeavored to be a gentleman. The shortcomings of his claim were not his original intention. But Feng Youlan’s contemporary interpretation, I’m afraid, exactly confirmed what Cheng Yichuan 程伊川 commented about Zhang Zai and Shao Yong 邵雍: “Although Zi Hou 子厚8 and Yao fu 堯夫9 have firm ambitions and high integrity, the inheritors of their theories undoubtedly have drawbacks”.

7.3 The Significance and Status of “Harmony” (He 和) in Dialectics Borrowing Zhang Zai’s theory, Feng Youlan used the concept of “harmony” (he 和) to illustrate the unity principle of contradiction. As indicated above, Zhang Zai’s theory of “great harmony” (tai he 太和) does not accord with Feng’s intention. Now let’s put aside this point and briefly discuss the theoretical and practical status of “harmony” (he 和) in Feng’s theory from the perspective of dialectics. Feng Youlan explained “harmony” (he 和) and “avengement” (chou 仇) as the unity and conflict of contradiction. His dialectics is the reversal of Marxist See Vol. 17 of Tang-Lv Shu Yi Jian Jie 唐律疏議箋解 (Commentary On Tang Law). Translator’s note: Zi Hou is the style name of Zhang Zai. 9 Translator’s note: Yao Fu is the style name of Shao Yong. 7 8

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dialectics, that is, endowing the unity of contradiction—rather than the conflict of contradictions—with the first and absolute status in philosophy. Obviously, Feng Youlan agreed with Marxist analysis of contradiction of things as well as its conflict and unity. He simply adjusted the status of both on this basis. Such an adjustment shall be aiming at the fifth part of Mao Zedong’s work Mao Dun Lun 矛盾論 (On Contradiction), namely “The Unity and Conflicts of Aspects of Contradiction”. In that part, Mao elaborated on Lenin’s following statement: “The unity (agreement, equality, and balance) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transient, and relative; while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as the development and movement are absolute” (Lenin, “Dialectics Issues to Talk About”). For this, Mao gave the following elaboration: “The permanence of all processes is relative, but the mutability of one process into another is absolute”.10 It is clear that the contending nature of contradiction is absolute and primary, while the unity of contradiction is relative and secondary, which merely explains the view that change precedes existence in a more concrete way: That is, motion and process are absolute and primary, while stillness and substance are relative and secondary. This view was by no means invented by Marxism. It ran through the history of classical dialectics from Heraclite to Hegel and was echoed in modern process philosophy represented by Whitehead, for example. It is also the basic spirit of Zhou Yi 周易 (The Book of Changes), the first of the Six Classics. The characteristic of Marxism lies in explaining and grasping the principles and laws of change by dealing with the complicated contradictions of concrete things. But Marxism has never rejected temporary existence in the name of absolute movement. That is to say, the absoluteness of the contentiousness of contradiction never excludes the unity of contradiction. “In (objective) dialectics, the difference between relativeness and absoluteness is also relative” (Lenin, “Dialectics Issues to Talk About”). Feng Youlan himself also admitted that the mechanism of change lies in the struggle between contradictions, and the mechanism of existence lies in the balance or unity of both sides of contradiction. Marxist dialectics does not avoid the unity between contradictions. Therefore, while asserting that the struggle between contradictions comes first, it is still suggested that “dialectics should be briefly defined as a doctrine of the unity of opposites” (Lenin, “Elements of Dialectics”). This is because it never separates motion from stillness, process from reality. The principle of motion is “avengement” (chou 仇), and the principle of temporary existence is “harmony” (he 和). What is advocated by Marxist dialectics is the unity of “avengement” (chou 仇) and “harmony” (he 和). In a sense, it also advocates that conflict will necessarily be reconciled and resolved. But in the new unity there were still struggles of contradictions. Therefore, where there is reconciliation, there must be new opposites and conflicts; otherwise, it is a denial of the absoluteness of motion and implies that the universe has an end and that it will never flow. Any separation or antagonism of “avengement” (chou 仇) and “harmony” (he 和) would lead to the separation or antagonism of existence and change. As long as we insist that change comes first, there would be no chance that the unity of contradictions comes first. 10

Mao Zedong Xuan Ji 毛澤東選集 (The Collective Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 1: 332.

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Because changes can include temporary existence, not vice versa. Even the temporary existence is permeated with the competition and transformation of the two sides of contradiction; otherwise, the principle of the change of the temporary existence would not be internal. Therefore, “for objective dialectics, the absoluteness is implied in relativeness. In contrast, for subjectivism and casuistry, relativeness is only relative and excludes the absoluteness” (Lenin, “Dialectics Issues to Talk About”). In this light, the assertion that the unity of contradiction precedes the conflict is actually the assertion that there can be a permanent being beyond the process of change, which as an absolute precedes change. On the contrary, those who advocate struggles first do the opposite. The vulgar version of the “philosophy of harmony” simply turns the “philosophy of struggle” on its head. The statements of struggle first appeared in the fragments of Heracletes’ works, with the purpose of explaining the temporary existence and change of things. It is, above all, a theoretical concept, not intended to stir up contradictions and struggles in practice, but to explain the objective law of changes in things. The same applies to the interaction between yin 陰 and yang 陽 in Chinese philosophy, which is used to explain the way things change, rather than to advocate sexual pleasure. On the other hand, only by facing up to the unity of change and temporary existence in theory can we not only face squarely struggles and reforms but also maintain soberness in practice. We shall do nothing but maintain the mean in between changes. How can we be stuck on one end! However, time changes and the way of knowing the mean has already equated to regarding the change as the only constant way. Is it necessary to acknowledge permanence and reduce the status of change in theory simply because we are tired of struggle and afraid of revolution in practice? Isn’t such consideration theological and eschatological all over again? Can such consideration which makes the status of change invisible still be considered as dialectics?

7.4 The Significance and Status of “Harmony” (He 和) in Confucianism Feng Youlan thinks that the reversal of Marxist dialectics comes out of inheriting the theory of “harmony” (he 和) in Chinese classical thought. Now, putting aside the meaning of Feng Youlan’s so-called dialectics, let’s focus on studying “harmony” (he 和) in the context of Confucian thought. The most famous treatise of Confucianism on “harmony” (he 和) comes from the Xue Er 學而 chapter of the Analects: You Zi 有子 said, “Among the functions of “propriety” (li 禮) the most valuable is that it establishes “harmony” (he 和). The excellence of the ways of ancient kings consists of this. It is the guiding principle of all things great and small. If things go amiss, and you, understanding “harmony” (he 和), try to achieve it without regulating it by the rules of “propriety” (li 禮), they will still go amiss.”

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This chapter not only talks about the remedy of “harmony” (he 和) to “propriety” (li 禮) but also talks about the control of “propriety” (li 禮) to “harmony” (he 和). It is by no means a pure advocation of “harmony” (he 和) but reveals the integrate harmony and prudence of Confucianism on this issue. In his work Lun Yu Ji Zhu 論語 集注 (Collected Annotations on the Analects), Zhu Xi 朱熹 quoted the annotations of previous scholars to show that the content of this chapter grasps the root of “propriety and music” (li yue 禮樂). Therefore, the so-called “harmony” (he 和) in this chapter actually refers to the function of “music” (yue 樂). Confucianism always attaches equal importance to “propriety” (li 禮) and “music” (yue 樂), since “propriety” (li 禮) emphasizes separation while “music” (yue 樂) emphasizes reconciliation, neither of which can be neglected. According to the Yue Ji 樂記 chapter of Li Ji 禮記 (The Book of Rites), “The spirit of “music” (yue 樂) lies in similarity, while that of “propriety” (li 禮) lies in difference. Those of similarity love each other, while those of difference respect each other. If the elements of “music” (yue 樂) dominate, things “get flowing” (liu 流) without rules; if that of “propriety” (li 禮) dominates, things “get departed” (li 離) without intimacy”. Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 annotated the Chinese word li 離 as “living separately without harmony” (xi jubuhe 析居不和). “Propriety” (Li 禮) emphasizes differentiation, which—when going excessive—would lead to estrangement without harmony. When such situation turns out, the remedy of music (yue 樂) would be needed. The true meaning of the sentence “among the functions of propriety the most valuable is that propriety establishes harmony” (li zhiyong he weigui 禮之用和為貴) is to overcome the tendency of separation and estrangement implied in “propriety” (li 禮). On the contrary, overtly emphasizing “harmony” (he 和) would lead to the result of “get flowing (liu 流) without rules”, with the Chinese word liu 流 denoting “going side by side without respect”, which refers to the disorder of the upper and lower, or the erasing of the limit. When such situation turns out, “propriety” (li 禮) would be needed to restrain the “harmony” (he 和) that has crossed the border. However, which one is more fundamental, “propriety” (li 禮) or “music” (yue 樂)? The answer is “propriety” (li 禮). As noted by Zhu Xi, “If one has propriety without harmony, one still preserves the substance of the foundation; if one only focuses on harmony, one forgets everything, including the foundation”.11 In this sense, “harmony” (he 和) is only a supplement to “propriety” (li 禮), and its status is inferior to that of “propriety” (li 禮). The most comprehensive interpretation of “harmony” (he 和) in practice can be found in the Yue Ji 樂記 chapter of Li Ji 禮記 (The Book of Rites). The primary meaning of “harmony” (he 和) in the Confucian classics is the function of “music” (yue 樂). The elaboration of “harmony” (he 和) of music in the Yue Ji 樂記 chapter runs from the origin of nature and humanity to the significance of ethics and politics. But even in this authoritative document that gives “harmony” (he 和) the highest status, “music” (yue 樂) is always attached to “propriety” (li 禮.) “Harmony (He 和) is the harmony of Heaven and Earth. Propriety is the order (xu 序) of Heaven and Earth. Due to the harmony, all things dissolve into one; due to the order, all 11

Zhu Zi Yu Lei 朱子語類 (Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), chapter 22.

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things differentiate”. Li Ji: Yue Ji 禮記·樂記 (The Book of Rites: The Records of Music). In this chapter, “propriety” (li 禮) and “music” (yue 樂) are simultaneously mentioned whenever the term “harmony” (he 和) appears. In fact, “harmony” (he 和) is only one of the natural virtues. Considering the existence of all virtues of Heaven and Earth, it is not accurate to praise highly of just one virtue. “Propriety (Li 禮) helps restrain the heart/mind of people, and music (yue 樂) helps harmonize the voice of people. Politics (Zheng 政) aims at acting, and punishment ( fa 罰) aims at prevention. When the four— propriety (li 禮), music (yue 樂), politics (zheng 政), punishment ( fa 罰)—are realized without contradictions, the Way of Kings is fulfilled”. Li Ji: Yue Ji 禮記·樂記 (The Book of Rites: The Records of Music). Obviously, the Way of Kings cannot be summed up by he 和 alone. The Way of Kings is not unprincipled goodwill but also includes appropriate punishment and even war: “Music (Yue 樂) is used by the ancient king to decorate his joy, and axeshaped weapons, to decorated his anger. So the ancient king shared his joy and anger. When he’s joyful, his people lived in harmony; when he’s angry, the rioters feared his wrath”. Li Ji: Yue Ji 禮記·樂記 (The Book of Rites: The Records of Music). That is to say, both struggle and harmony are parts of the Way of Kings, but both are its function rather than the fundamental. The fundamental lies in applying the principle of appropriateness and the timely judgment on whether to apply struggle or harmony, that is, “the time-dependent Mean” (shizhong 時中).

7.5 Guiding “Harmony” (He 和) Toward “the Mean” (Zhong 中) In Confucianism, the most profound expression on the significance and status of “harmony” (he 和) comes from the Zhong Yong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean) chapter of The Book of Rites 禮記. This chapter doesn’t choose “harmony” (he 和) as its key concept. Instead, it focuses on “the Mean” (zhong 中): Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are aroused it is called “the Mean” (zhong 中). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called “harmony” (he 和). “The Mean” (Zhong 中) is the great foundation of the world, and “harmony” (he 和) its universal path (see The Book of Rites: The Doctrine of the Mean).

The connotation of “harmony” (he 和) in The Doctrine of the Mean is extended compared to that in The Records of Music. The concept of “anger” (nu 怒), which contrasts with the harmony of music in The Records of Music, is included in the concept of “harmony” (he 和) in The Doctrine of the Mean. However, there is still a connection between the two, which is to guide and standardize “harmony” (he 和) with “regularity” ( jie 節). Externally speaking, “regularity” ( jie 節) comes out of ritual. Its essence is “the Mean” (zhong 中), that is to say, being neither excessive nor deficient. “Originally speaking, “the Mean” (zhong 中) in the term zhongyong 中庸 denotes the kind of the Mean that is neither excessive nor deficient. Its key lies in “the time-dependent Mean” (shizhong 時中). It is a combination of two states: One is that

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each feeling attains due measure and degree in its arousal, and the other is that such arousal is neither excessive nor deficient”.12 In other words, “the time-dependent Mean” (shizhong 時中) is the foundation of “harmony” (he 和), and “harmony” (he 和) is the function of “the time-dependent Mean” (shizhong 時中). “Harmony” (He 和) means each feeling attains due measure and degree, or being neither excessive nor deficient. Therefore, “harmony” (he 和) is nothing more than a form of “the Mean” (zhong 中). In this sense, Zhou Lianxi 周濂溪 even includes “harmony” (he 和) into “the Mean” (zhong 中): “Only the Mean (zhong 中) brings harmony (he 和). The Mean is the principle of regularity, the universally recognized law of morality”.13 When reviewing Yue Ji 樂記, it can be found that the anger that attains due measure and degree yet is reflected as war in the Way of Kings can be completely treated as “harmony” (he 和) of “the time-dependent Mean” in The Doctrine of the Mean 中 庸. Through the discussion above, it can be found that although “harmony” (he 和) is of great importance in the Confucian tradition, it is only used to stand for function, rather than for substance. In its narrow sense, “harmony” (he 和) is only remedial, and just as other remedial things it has one-sidedness. And in the broad sense of its functioning as “the time-dependent Mean” for all things, “harmony” (he 和) includes struggle. In any sense, “harmony” (he 和) is not a fundamental, comprehensive, and decent concept, and thus is inappropriate to be used to summarize the spirits of Chinese classical thoughts or that of Chinese civilization, let alone being used to represent ancient Chinese philosophy with the purpose of rejecting Maoism. If we properly grasp the essence of Confucianism, we will not take that reckless attitude toward the relationship between Marxist–Leninist dialectics and Chinese classical thought, and we can better grasp the relationship between “harmony” and “struggle”. As mentioned above, the concept of “the Mean” (zhong 中) in Confucian philosophy is more fundamental than “harmony” (he 和). “The Mean” (Zhong 中) has two basic dimensions. On the one hand, it is connected with “change” (bian yi 變易) through “the time-dependent Mean” (shizhong 時中), and on the other hand, it is connected with “permanent residence” (chang zhu 常住) through “the doctrine of the Mean”. In other words, “the Mean“ (zhong 中) reflects the unity and interaction between “change” and “permanent residence”. Two important classics of Confucianism—Zhou Yi 周易 (The Book of Changes) and Zhong Yong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean)—mainly focus on the relation between change and permanence. “The Mean” (Zhong 中) embodies the Confucian answer to this problem from both the theoretical and practical perspectives. “The way of the Mean” (Zhong dao中道) not only contains the scale of change at any time but also reflects the theorem of permanence. It also refers to grasping the appropriate sense of proportion in action and realizing permanence through changes. According to the Confucian tradition, “the Mean” (zhong 中) is the fundamental, and “harmony” (he 和) is the incidental. Judging from the tradition of the Sinicization 12 13

Zhu Zi Yu Lei 朱子語類 (Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), Vol. 62. Tong Shu: Shi Di Qi 通書·師第七 (Penetrating the Book of Changes, Ch. 7. Teachers).

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of Marxism, the concept of “the way of the Mean” (zhong Dao 中道) is to unify struggle and harmony as two links in itself. That is to say, the most appropriate foundation for the third stage of the Sinicization of Marxism is “the way of the Mean” (zhong Dao 中道). Theoretically speaking, harmony and struggle have been included in the unification of contentiousness through “the Mean” (zhong 中), while in practice both harmony and struggle in the narrow sense are the function of the time-dependent Mean. As we know, the basic issue of Marxist dialectics is the relation between change and permanence. The so-called contentiousness and unity of contradiction are used for reflecting on the relation between change and permanence. Marxist dialectics holds that change is absolute and permanence is relative, while the absolute and the relative are unified, and the relative also contains the absolute. The contradiction theory of Marxist–Leninist dialectics fully considers the principles of change and permanence but does not provide a single concept for this important unity between them to the extent that extra supplementary explanation is often needed. On this issue, ancient Chinese philosophy can make substantial progress on Marxist dialectics— certainly not in the way of Feng Youlan. The core of dialectics is neither the absolute view of change nor the relative view of permanent residence, but the unity of both. In the words of Sinicized Buddhism, the view of change is the “true meaning” (the principle of philosophy), and the view of permanence is the “secular truth” (the principle of secular life), while the view of time-dependent Mean as the unity of change and permanence is the “first noble truth of the way of the Mean” (the highest truth of harmony). Separated and simple “struggle”, “change”, “harmony”, and “permanent residence” are all one-sided views that should be sublated. Philosophically, the “struggle” view of the first phase of Sinicized Marxism lays more emphasis on change, while the “harmony” view of the second phase lays more emphasis on permanent residence. Therefore, the philosophical foundation of the third period must be the concept of “the way of the Mean” (zhongdao 中道), which is a higher concept unified at both ends of struggle and harmony. This is the highest meaning of China (zhongguo 中國) as a state of “the Mean” (zhong 中). The philosophy of “the way of the Mean” (zhongdao 中道) not only contains the unity of change and permanence but also guarantees the practical communication between change and permanence. In practice, “the Mean” (zhong 中) is reflected in the broad sense of “harmony” (he 和), from which theories of politics and ethics can be unfolded. The dual implication of “the Mean” (zhong 中) in theory and practice not only represents the essence of Confucianism but also promotes dialectics and practical philosophy on the road of Sinicization of Marxism. On the basis of liberating Confucianism from misreading, it is possible to connect and complement ancient Chinese thoughts with Marxism–Leninism, and it is also possible to think and defend the idea of harmony more deeply. The original meaning of harmony is not the stability of a backwater in opposition to struggle (in other words, movement and change). As old Hegel had long pointed out, harmony is the absolute change.14 14

See Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1.

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The true foundation of the so-called harmonious civilization can only be the idea of “the harmonious Mean” (he-xiezhong-dao 和谐中道) that is not separated from change and struggle. (Originally published in Wenhua Zongheng 文化縱橫 (Cultural Review), 2011 (4)).

Part III

Philosophical Understanding-and-Mergence & the Ancient-Modern and Chinese-Western Issues

Chapter 8

Political Comparison Between Philosophy and Theology: On Plato’s Symposium

“What last sin do I have left?… Pity! My pity for the superior man!”. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (Also Sprach Zarathustra).

Abstract This chapter gives a detailed analysis on Plato’s Symposium. After investigating into its structure, theme, and the philosophical meaning implied, especially Socrates’ “honest remarks” and Diotima’s monologue, the chapter moves on to discuss Socrates’ alertness against oligarchy and democracy as well as the “shepherd” issue, with the purpose of shedding light on the political connotations implied in the philosophical and theological reflections of Symposium.

Of all Plato’s dialogues, the Symposium holds a unique place. This status appears at first glance to be derived from form rather than theme. Form sometimes teaches more than content. In a conversation in which Socrates participates rather than dominates, the importance of what others say is emphasized by the style of writing. The nous/ intention of Plato depends not only on the content and implication of his words but also the formal relations of these different conversations. This is especially the case in the Symposium, since a significant number of the speakers do not constitute a direct dialogue with Socrates (who is believed to be a mask of Plato himself). Their intention was to glorify eros in turn, rather than fall into a “dialectic of question and answer” with Socrates. Although there definitely are connections between these eulogies and the small conversations that have been thrown into them by chance (such as commentaries on previous speeches, allusions to those present, and so on), the arrangements in form tell us something more, even deeper. Any interpretation should have a “point of entry”, which is to “hit the heart of the problem”, and then “with the blade of no thickness cutting into the slit joints, there still is plenty of room The original version of this chapter was presented in a small symposium in the summer time of 2001. The form of this article is not strict at all. But it has not been revised since then. Considering that there have been more than one outstanding interpretations of Plato’s Symposium, I shall not revise this paper any more. Rather, I leave it intact as a historical witness. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_8

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for the play of the cleaver”.1 The point of entry for the Symposium, first of all, should be looked for in the structure of the whole dialogue. The so-called symposium means “drinking together” and meanwhile “talking together” about a theme, that is, celebrating eros. Two “togetherness” or communities emerged: the community of wine and the community that legoes(the verb form of logos) eros. Wine is something that breaks boundaries (even Kant admitted that it can break down barriers between humans. See Practical Anthropology. In the Symposium, it can be seen how Alcibiades at last, under the Dionysian power, rushes into the feast from which he had been excluded). But wine does not remove boundaries. All communities have boundaries. It starts with the boundaries of drinking. Socrates appears and talks to the narrator about the reason for the demarcation of the “wine community”. As usual, Homer is quoted first and then criticized. “At the feast of the good (agathon), the good (agathon) come uninvited” (note the literal connection between the name of Agathon, the host of the feast, and “the agathon”); but in Homer, there are still people of less agathon who attended the party of the agathon. This remark is not a generalization (there is no such thing as an unintentional “generalization” in Plato’s work). Notice that it’s the first thing Socrates says in this dialogue (the last thing he says is about another line, the line between comedy and tragedy). It comes at the beginning, and the real context is at the end of the conversation. Alcibiades will then break this barrier and “come uninvited”. Is Alcibiades, the only politician at the feast, a man of agathon or a man of less agathon? There is a slight transition before Socrates makes his formal entrance. He fell behind the other person (the narrator of the whole conversation, whom Socrates had forcibly brought to the dinner) and could not stop “musing” for some time, until the host sent for an invitation. What does Socrates’ “late arrival” and Alcibiades’ uninvited arrival mean to this community? The wine community changes its character as soon as it is formed. Some people say that they can’t drink (because they drank too much the day before and are a little hungover) and suggest talking instead of drinking. Everyone agrees. And again a boundary (the boundary of speech, that is, of logos) is drawn, and the piper is dismissed (but her voice is heard again when Alcibiades enters, which implies that Alcibiades also breaks the boundaries of dialogue, even on topic). Phaedrus starts the topic. So in terms of topic, the dialogue of the Symposium has something to do with the Phaedrus. And later, when Socrates finishes his “eulogy or whatever”, he speaks to Phaedrus. The latter is the “father” of the subject of eros. In this way, the wine community formed by the performance of a tragic poet’s work turns into the logos community that legoes eros. In the latter, the themes of tragedy and Dionysus do not disappear but shift into a subtle confrontation with logos and eros. It lasts until Alcibiades appears in the image of Dionysus to praise Translator’s note: It is quoted from the Inner Chapter 内篇 of Zhuang Zi 莊子: Yang Sheng Zhu 養生主, in which pao Ding 庖丁 (Cook Ding) uses this sentence to describe his fabulous skill of carving an ox. It is often used by later works (including this chapter) to describe the status of finding one’s groove. 1

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Socrates, regarding the latter as the image of eros or the flesh. Not surprisingly, it can be found in Nietzsche’s book Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie) many allusions to the scene and atmosphere of the Symposium. Nietzsche is said to have “reversed Platonism” or at least the Birth of Tragedy reversed the Symposium. As proposed, the participants decide to take turns eulogizing eros. The definitive agreement on this topic is given by Socrates. The last words before the eulogy belong to Socrates. His speech divides the participants into several voices. In addition to Phaedrus and Eryximachus, there are “I” (the narrator), “Agathon and Pausanias” (the tragic poet and the wise), Aristophanes (the comic poet), and others. This arrangement suggests that the tragic poet and the wise speak in the same voice; Socrates agrees because he “only knows erotica”. Aristophanes would not have objected all the more, for he spends his entire life with “Dionysus and Aphrodite”. In other words, Socrates implies that he knows nothing about Dionysus. (Socrates, on his deathbed, heard his “inspiration” tell him, “Socrates, take up music”, and thus sang a hymn to Aphrodite. Nietzsche once elaborated on it). What about the tragedy that comes from being a Dionysian sacrificial rite? The style of alternated eulogy in Plato’s writings is peculiar. Unlike the “dialectics of question and answer”, there is no direct conversational relationship in the alternative eulogy. This is a familiar pre-Socratic style. The eulogy is about “God”. Questions and answers about God are indecent. Eulogy belongs to the logos of political theology, while the question and answer belongs to the logos of political philosophy. It is not difficult to realize this. The question is, why does Plato himself give these many kinds of logos (theological, pre-Socratic natural philosophical, Socratic) here? Why are the words of Socrates drowned out or hidden in others’ eulogies? Why does Plato give those non-Socratic statements in such a long, almost comprehensive way (besides Socrates, there are many eulogists in turn—the wise man, the physician, the comic poet, the tragic poet, and the would-be statesman)? How did he arrange their eulogies? What does this arrangement reveal? How to understand the Socratic statement embedded in this arrangement? That is, how to understand its location, style, and content? After Socrates’ seemingly summative “erosology”,2 why arrange Alcibiades’ “uninvited” eulogy? These questions are the entry points for the unique structure of the Symposium.

8.1 Analysis on Different Voices in Community of Logos: Structure and Theme After the characters in this dialogue decide to give their own opinions on logos of eros,3 a series of eulogies are arranged. The speakers, in actual order, are: Phaedra, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades. One thing to note about this sequence is that Eryximachus is temporarily switched 2 3

It is a coinage denoting the logos for eros. For the term “logos of eros”, please see Phaedrus.

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with Aristophanes. Alcibiades’ visit is uninvited and unexpected. Before and after Agathon’s eulogy, there are interwoven dialogues between Socrates and Agathon (the first time is about whether to deceive the masses and a few wise men; the other time is about whether eros is divine at all). Socrates’ eulogy is still really a dialogue, through which an absent speaker Diotima is brought in. Alcibiades’ presence restores the Dionysian community. The whole dialogue ends in the narrator’s drunk eyes. He vaguely remembers that Socrates was still debating with the tragic poet and the comic poet on whether anyone could be good at both poetic arts, the tragic and the comic. There are many voices in this dialogue. “Many” is no stranger to Plato. He is well versed in Pythagorean mathematics. If the number is properly arranged, the “many” can become the “one” of the ordered cosmos. This is the secret of the cosmic logos, and the secret of “logos”. The number of voices that appear in the community of logos in the Symposium is: first, Phaedra; second, Pausanias and Agathon; third, Eryximachus; fourth, Aristophanes; fifth, Socrates; sixth, the absent speaker Diotima; and seventh, Alcibiades. Pythagorean numbers are mystical. In other words, it is a form with content implications. In the connotation of number, structure and theme are connected. According to Pythagorean number theory, the fifth level of life is the spirit among Gods and men; the seventh is Athena, and the eighth is friendship or love, and so on.

8.2 The Reason of the Polis: Political Theology of Eros The pre-Socratic eulogies generally talk about eros in terms of physis, nomos, and the polis. Judging from Socrates’ speech (before quoting Diotima, he has only twice engaged in the specific dialectic of question and answer, both with Agathon), his eulogy has particular significance for Agathon (a tragic poet) and Pausanias (a sophist). There are two hints in the text to suggest that Agathon and Pausanias belong to the same voice. Perhaps more important is the fact that they represent more mainstream Athenian opinion than anyone else; or rather, they are expressing the reason of the polis. The two men, one is a tragic poet and the other a sophist, both shape public opinion in the theater. (See Socrates’ question about whether to deceive “the multitude” and “some wise men” as well as Agathon’s interrupted question and answer. Being interrupted means, we might find the text somewhere else. See also the discussion of “theatocracy” in The Laws.) They are exponents of Athenian democracy (Aristophanes, among the other participants, was a satirist of democracy; Alcibiades is an oligarch who speculates in it). Although they lay particular stress on different aspects, the difference between them is insubstantial, except that the former says more about the nomos of eros and the polis (which is good for “civic solidarity”), while the latter says more from the perspectives of physis and from the theological point of view. Taken together the eulogies of these two, eros is the theological basis for the politics of friendship in Athens. This nexus of the politics of friendship is the civic education in democracy, as the sophists understand it. “Noble friendship cannot be produced by money and political status (note that money and political status are

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positive values in an oligarchy)” (184B). This unique style of education has only one way, and that is about virtue. “According to the Athenian nomos, there is only one way left for one to receive his lover with honor… and that is for virtue” (184C). For some secret reason, Socrates never offended nomos (as can be clearly seen from his death), though his lifetime activity is to shake and even remove the theological foundation of nomos. Perhaps it is because he is both a citizen and a philosopher?

8.3 Socrates’ “Honest Remarks” and the Eros of Political Philosophy Socrates’ speech is directed against Agathon’s theology. This time there is no “disbelieving in the Gods” (the charge against Socrates). Socrates only says that Agathon is not really praising a God, but a “spirit”. The structure of Agathon’s eulogy is to speak first of the qualities of eros and then of its benefits. Socrates follows the structure of this theme in general. But he still adheres to his “dialectics of question and answer” as usual. The style of writing, it seems, is no trivial matter to the philosopher. It’s about the essential difference from theology, from the sophists. Socrates is even willing to withdraw from the community to coerce others into accepting his unique form of speech, that is, conversation, even with an absent person: It’s a fine way to give eulogy, but I didn’t know it was going to be done in this way when I agreed to glorify eros along with you. So it was just my verbal consent, not my heartfelt consent. Please allow me to go, since I cannot give such a eulogy. I simply cannot. But if I’m allowed to give honest remarks in my own way… I’d rather have a try.

Before giving “honest remarks”, Socrates has a brief confrontation with Agathon and removes the divinity of eros. “Considering that eros falls short of beautiful things, and that good things are also beautiful, eros must also lack good things”. And, very unusually, Socrates describes himself as the representative of “truth” (it is worth noticing that Socrates does not even answer “what is knowledge” with certainty. See Theaetetus). “Dear Agathon, it is the truth you cannot disprove, not Socrates. Disproving Socrates is easy”. The truth is about what eros is not. As for what eros is (that is, its qualities, in Agathon’s word), what is left is only honest remarks, in Socrates’ own way, of course. The honest remark focuses on the history, nature, and function of eros. Its history and nature are discussed in terms of physis, while its “function” (Agathon calls it “benefits”) is discussed in terms of nomos or polis. Socrates, in the guise of Diotima’s teaching, speaks of the nature of philosophers and their significance to the polis. The nature of eros is both rich and lacking, somewhere in between understanding and ignorance. “Since wisdom is the most beautiful of all things, and eros makes beauty the object of his love, eros must be a philosopher who loves wisdom, and, as such, is in between being wise and being ignorant”. The philosopher only loves wisdom; he lacks it. He is poor and weak. He is neither the sun nor Zarathustra who only gives and never takes. He is not the prophet who

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saw the fire on Mount Sinai and wrote down the nomos after hearing the sound of that fire; nor is he the light that descends upon the cave after being embodied. Neither is he an apostle who has been moved by the Holy Spirit, who has stood in the light and seen the vision. There is darkness in his nature. Darkness is still surrounding him. He has never been anywhere but the cave of the polis. In this cave, he talks to those who were curious or disgusted with him and frightens them with a clear world outside the cave, which is full of eidos. Has Socrates really witnessed such a world ever? So does the desire for “wisdom” seem to be the whole nature of eros? Socrates thinks he has understood the question, so he quickly moves on to the next question, which concerns the usefulness of philosophers: “If the nature of eros is what you say, what usage does it have for mankind?” This question, indeed, is asked on behalf of the polis: What is the use of philosophers who have no wisdom when we already have sophists? Diotima, who takes up this question, does not end her teaching about the physis of eros. Some function to the polis is the physis of Socrates’ eros. The nature of eros is originally political.

8.4 Monologue in Dialogue: Two Kinds of Immortality In further instruction under the name of “function”, Diotima gradually leads Socrates to realize that “the purpose of eros is not beauty”, but rather “the pursuit of immortality” by “being conceived in beauty”. What follows is a sudden change in Plato’s style of writing. The dialogue is drowned in Diotima’s long monologue, “in the style of a sophist”. Such embedded prose is rare in Plato’s other dialogues but always appears meaningfully at key points (see the mythological narrative of the “reincarnation of the soul” at the end of the Republic). Could this be Socrates’ giving honest remarks “in his own way”? Monologues are no longer inquiries and questioning. Monologue political philosophy has a positive character; in other words, it has become a theological political philosophy. Why does Plato reject the eulogistic monologue of others and hide his monologue of teaching style in dialogue? Is it because eulogy has something to do with the old Gods of the tragic poets (Dionysus and Aphrodite) while teachings have more to do with the new Gods of the prophets? What kind of God is that? What is certain, at least, is that it is a God of which no one knows “what it is”, and whether it exists at all is hinted only by style of writing and by a few obscure points unnoticed. The thread of this long teaching is immortality. Diotima actually demonstrates two kinds of immortality: political (educational polis) and “theological” (intellectual, mystical) immortality. The former is the teaching about eros, which Socrates could grasp; as for the latter, Socrates has no right to interject and could only “listen attentively”. Is he blessed to get it? It’s hard to say. On the surface, there seems to be no connection between these two immortalities other than their difference in depth. But one can find the profound meaning Plato implies in his example of the former kind of immortality. He is concerned with the

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works of legislators and poets. These works are said to be the “education of the lover”, that is, the product of reproduction. The poetic example has come up once before, where Diotima denotes eros and poesis in broad terms. In fact, “reproduction” is “creation”. The immortal intention of politics (education) is legislation. The immortality of the latter is to give a “theological” basis to the former. The validity (validity precedes legitimacy) of the creator’s legislative ability (his reproductive power) comes from wisdom, that is, the observation of the “noumenon of beauty”. In order to base the virtue of legislation on the virtue of knowledge (the “true virtue”), Plato must preach the immortality of the latter kind. Whatever that God is, he is present and responsive. “Only those who bear true virtue could win the love of the God (theophilei). If a mortal could be immortal, only someone like this could be immortal”. (212A) To the political philosophy of affirmation, the teaching of response is not insignificant, even if it is “explicit”. This is also the reason for emphasizing eros (the legislation and its “theological” foundation). Because response concerns the issue of eros or philei. Without response, there would be no philosophy: “He who does not receive answer with love from wisdom does not love wisdom”. (Lysis, 212D.) For the distinction between the admiring character of “love” in Plato’s “love of wisdom” and the harmonizing character of Pre-Socrates’ “love of wisdom”, see Heidegger’s “What Is That—Philosophy?”) Is political philosophy another kind of political theology, as long as it is concerned with legislative issues? Does Socrates’ God have to claim in an explicit way?

8.5 The Purpose and Danger of “Honest Remarks” In a style of almost brilliant eloquence, Socrates’ honest remarks end the whole game of the community of logos. If the whole dialogue ends with that, that would be in accordance with Plato’s convention. Judging from the atmosphere, reason, plot and structure, Socrates’ “eulogy” should have been terminal. Compared to several Platonic dialogues that have few positive conclusions, Socrates’ eulogy should do a good job of satisfying the desire for a positive answer. Socrates in this dialogue seems to expect the same: These are the words Diotima taught me. I am convinced of it myself, and I am trying to convince others of it.

Does the dialectic of question and answer really end in this monologue intended to be convincing? And does Socrates really drop his mask of chattering lover, and refrain from admiring, seducing, exhorting, as well as praising hypocritically? Does he no longer allegorically mention his only true lover, the polis of Athens (the superior man!)? Has he finally revealed the truth about the loveless lover (See Phaedrus), the lover who is more sacred than the spouse (See this chapter)? Is he really a strange prophet legislating from a humble position? Is there hidden in the meekness peculiar to the lover (“The humble in this world is the greatest in Heaven”) the same “cunning of the will to power” as in the Galilean on the cross? Does he merely substitute one

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political theology for another? Is this just a triumph of flirting different in style from that of sophists? However, the attendees show no particular sign of being completely convinced besides the usual praise. Aristophanes even tries to raise questions (aiming at drawing Socrates from the peak of oratory experience back to the dialectic of question and answer). As in other contexts, only the comic poet Aristophanes understands Socrates. He correctly sees Socrates rise again high in the clouds through the glorious monologue (though this time Socrates learns to pretend to be someone who is not present). Socrates even talks a lot about the invisible world of “the noumenon of beauty” at the feast of tragic poet. The mask of lover is Socrates’ shield to protect himself in the polis. A mask is originally a prop for the play. Once the question and answer are replaced by other forms of writing, the flirting is over. What he loves is actually “the noumenon of beauty”! He is not lamenting, but legislating! Would the Athenians, spoiled by legions of admirers, tolerate a man posing as a lover to legislate for them? What waits for this lover who shows false display of affection will be the wrath of the old Gods in the polis (see Aristophanes’ comedy TheCloud). Athenian democracy is built on the humble adoration of politicians (lovers) for the people (spouse) (persuading people to choose themselves with more “love” than others by claiming “We love the people!”). The people are satisfied with being courted and loved (they certainly feel themselves powerful, active and even “sovereign”, or at least potentially virtuous. And “a woman has no talent”. So the political gender of the people is not female. This is why the eros symbol of Greek democracy must be manhood), and the Greek people also feel that they, for the sake of increasing their arete, accept politicians who have been trained by the sophists to be very flirtatious (to be honest and to assert their virtues). Since virtue can be taught universally (universal education is the basis of democratic government, see Rousseau’s Emile), everyone is an aristocrat. A true democratic system (demokrtie) is also a true virtual system (aristokratie). Eros has always been political (physis). The eros initiated by PausaniasAgathon is the theological foundation of the democratic political system. Anyone who wants to preach a “God unwelcomed by the polis” beyond the democratic eros must hide this intention under the mask of Aristophanian banter. Anyone who swims away from the mainstream to produce dangerous charm (this charm is the paradoxical result of the Greek manhood—the charm of a loveless lover; that is to say, the appeal of the anti-liberal logos is the paradoxical result of liberal democratic politics—the appeal of the divine voice in the multivoice of liberal democracy) and spouts eloquent speeches from above would inevitably be under attack of the old Gods.

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8.6 The “Truth” Told by the Drunker: Why Does Socrates Conceal His Teaching? The logos community about eros is coming to an end. It is a “battle of the worldviews” with no consensus but eros, and in the last part, there doesn’t even seem to exist a usual God. The “uninvited” Alcibiades puts an end to such an unsustainably awkward situation. His imitation of Dionysus makes him look like a Dionysian priest. He does, in fact, restore the wine community with Dionysian powers: “Friends, I see you are all sober. No, you have to drink, you know, that’s what we agreed. Now I choose myself to be the chairman until you’ve had enough”. In contrast to what Nietzsche reveals, it seems that Alcibiades is a Dionysian priest as a comic figure. He is reminded that this is still a logos community. The condition for joining this logos community is that someone must be celebrated. Alcibiades, the truth-teller (“Wine tells the truth”), insists on eulogizing Socrates, for the great power of Socrates’ logos over the individual (different from the way sophists or leaders treat the masses), for the peculiar charm of Socrates as a loveless lover, and for the amazing restraint with which Socrates hides his teachings. Alcibiades’ trap is as follows: I hope that I can use my kindness in exchange for his teachings and that he can teach me all he knows.

But Socrates escapes. He does not “teach” “everything he knows”. As for the reason, naive Alcibiades thinks it is due to sophrosyne, a kind of pre-Socratic traditional virtue. He does not seem to understand Socrates’ words, though he has copied them in the “truth”: However, my dear friend, you may be mistaken, and I may be worthless. When the eyes begin to be dim moonlight, the heart will start to be sharp, but you are far from that moment.

Socrates is indeed sophrosyne-ing. But the object of his sophrosyne is not lust; rather, it is the overall urge to “tell the truth”. It must be noted that in the Symposium, Alcibiades is the only person whose profession is politics. And he does find that Socrates “has a power to change him into a better man” and is therefore considered “not so stupid after all” by Socrates. So why doesn’t Socrates give any definitive teachings? To answer this question, one must appeal to Alcibiades’ natural hierarchy. In terms of social hierarchy, Alcibiades is excellent. He is of good birth (he is the adopted son of Pericles), intelligent, and has set a notable military exploit. What is especially rare is his heartfelt worship of Socrates. Isn’t it the “utility” of Socrates’ dialogue about eros in terms of getting such excellent oligarchs in a democratic system? Doesn’t he wish, by means of education, to impregnate the good mind and achieve the first kind of immortality stated above? As told by Socrates to Alcibiades who undoubtedly has a great political future: Your plan is very good and you have taken advantage of me, because what you are offering is beauty in appearance, and what you are willing to get in exchange is beauty in reality. It is really called “exchanging copper for gold”.

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Copper and gold are Plato’s famous metaphor for the hierarchy of nature (see Plato’s Republic, Book III). But, isn’t Alcibiades a “superior man”? Why does he just belong to the natural scale of copper? He is under the seductive control of Socrates, “a slave has never been more at the mercy of his master than I am”. Poor Alcibiades is only a slave in the natural order. At the end of his eulogy of Socrates, Alcibiades also mentions that Charmides and so on have similar experiences. Who was Charmides? He is Plato’s maternal uncle, who is both a famous oligarch and a politician of the Thirty Tyrants period. Alcibiades’ those true words speak of Socrates’ attitude toward oligarchs. They are also critics of democracy. They are “uninvited” to Socrates and to the existing Athenian democracy. They do resent the existing Gods of the polis, but what is underneath is an even older God, Dionysus. In the tragic attitude to life related to them, they belong to the pre-Euripides tradition, which is different from Agathon’s democratic tragic art (Nietzsche severely criticizes Euripides in Birth of Tragedy. This is consistent with his critique of democratic system.) The Democrats are resentful of Socrates (they are the ones who tried and executed him). Most of the people who try to be close to Socrates are old aristocrats like Alcibiades and Charmides (who in the democratic system are oligarchs). In fact, the important objects of Socrates’ teaching are them. The teaching that “virtue is knowledge” is spoken chiefly to those who think they are born virtuous (note the literal connection between “virtue” and “aristocracy”). Socrates has no choice but to hide the secret of philosophy from those who “come uninvited” and try to rely on their noble family to “exchange copper for gold”. What’s the secret Socrates tries to hide? A philosophical attitude is not a political attitude; it is not a choice between political system, doctrines, and theology. Both the democratic political theology of eros and the older oligarchic Dionysian political theology are things Socrates tries to avoid. Perhaps there is a lesson here to be taught for Nietzsche’s modern-conservatist misinterpretation. During the brief period of the restoration of oligarchy (the restoration of the Dionysian community), the Tyrants killed a lot of people in order to suppress the Democrats. Socrates says to the oligarchs who used to be close to him in their youth yet forbid him to teach after their reign, that he is amazed that a shepherd doesn’t admit himself to be a bad shepherd at all when his flock becomes fewer and fewer (see Xenophon’s Recollecting Socrates). Now, what should a good shepherd be like? Maybe it’s not a philosophical issue? Is it an issue of ideal polis?

In any case, what we see in the Symposium is a real polis. There are very few other works of Plato which directly use this stylistic arrangement to describe the polis. Socrates’ performance in this community of logos is a microcosm of how he fits in (or should fit in) in the real Athenian democracy. However, if the naive Alcibiades still had been alive (he died in Persia during the period of Thirty Tyrants because of his political capriciousness. Throughout his life

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he “pushes boundaries”, the furthest of which is the boundaries of the polis. He once surrendered to Sparta and Persia), he would have pulled Socrates along and asked: What on Earth should a good shepherd be like?

8.7 The “Shepherd” Issue in the Gospel of John The shepherding analogy is reminiscent of biblical tradition. At the end of his work Athens and Jerusalem, Strauss compares Socratic’ word above with the same metaphor in the Old Testament: Samuel, which also mentions an example of a bad shepherd. With the same interest as Strauss, we may note the following passage in the New Testament: Gospel of John4 : Jesus saith to Simon Peter, “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest (agapas) thou me more than these?”Peter saith unto him, “Yea, Lord; thou knowest that I love (philo) thee.”Jesus saith unto him, “Feed my lambs.” Jesus saith to Peter again the second time, “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest (agapas) thou me?”Peter saith unto him, “Yea, Lord; thou knowest that I love (philo) thee.”Jesus saith unto him, “Feed my sheep.” Jesus saith unto Peter the third time, “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest(phileis) thou me?” Peter was grieved because Jesus said unto him the third time “Lovest(phileis) thou me?” And he said unto Jesus, “Lord, thou knowest all things; thou knowest that I love (philo) thee.” Jesus saith unto him, “Feed my sheep.”5

This dialogue is cited fromGospel of John 21: 15–17.Why does the writer of the Forth Gospel write this way? Let’s take a look at the context. There are only three main parts to this very short Gospel of John 21: first, “Jesus shewed himself again to the disciples”; second, “Jesus and Peter” (as cited above); third, “Jesus and his beloved disciples”. This disciple (John) is said to have written this Gospel. In the third part of the text, Peter asks about John’s fate, and Jesus answers, “If I wish he remain until I come, what does it matter to you?”.6 Judging from this text, what the Fourth Gospel implies is that Peter and John are the two most important disciples. And there is a difference between what the two disciples understand about Jesus and what Jesus has planned for them. John is also known as the author of this Gospel, so the above dialogue between Jesus and Peter seems to be the criticism against Peter initiated by the John’s group. In 4

The translation of Gospel of John quoted in this chapter is based on the KJV Bible and the Jerusalem Bible of the Chinese-Catholic-Church version. Some places are annotated based on the Greek original in Zhong Xi Ying Zhu Zi Dui-Zhao Ban Sheng Jing 中希英逐字對照版聖經 (The Word-By-Word Version of the Chinese-Greek-English Bible). 5 Translator’s note: For the convenience of understanding, the translation is slightly revised compared to the KJV Bible. 6 Gospel of John 21: 23. Translator’s note: The translation is revised according to the version offered by Ding Yun, the author of this book. The original sentence in KJV Bible is: “If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?”.

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history, Peter was the head of the so-called Jewish Christians and the shepherd of the popular Christians (who can be considered as the sheep). The Fourth Gospel begins by saying that the law (nomos) comes from Moses; Grace and Truth (aletheia) come from Jesus. In fact, Jewish Christians considered themselves a small faction of Judaism (Jacob, another leader of the faction, is even a common saint of both Judaism and Christianity), and they took Jesus’ teaching of fulfilling the law to heart and strictly abided by the Jewish law (Peter even rejected uncircumcised men, and Paul enlightened him about it). For John and Paul, it’s not the law that fulfills the law; rather, it’s the aletheia that fulfills the law. Aletheia is open only to the spiritual (peneuma) (In the Fourth Gospel Jesus talks about the coming of another parakletos, the Holy Spirit. How can the Holy Spirit sermon on the Mount and satisfy them with five loaves and two fishes? The masses witness the miracle of the Son of God, but how many people are blessed to see the Holy Spirit?) It seems that Peter could only grasp the nomos, not the aletheia. In his questions, Jesususes the word agape, while Peter answers with the word philei. Why does Jesus speak Greek to his fellow Jews? How could Peter, a Hebrew fisherman, understand the subtleties of Greek (even Paul, a cultured Jew, surprised the Roman soldiers by speaking Greek. See Acts 21:37)? These details are deliberately arranged by the writer of the Fourth Gospel to show that Peter simply does not understand or simply rejects the aletheia of agape. In contrast, John’s connection with agape is highlighted everywhere. None of this is hard to understand. The question is, if Peter is so stupidly obstinate in the sense of failing to answer Jesus’ questions, why does Jesus assign him to feed the sheep? Jesus asks about agape, but Peter answers with philei. It’s harder than answering without thinking. Insisting on answering with philei is because Peter understands that agape is the very logos. Agape is the so-called theophileiin the Symposium above. With agape, shepherding gains the theological foundation. But to be a good shepherd, philei is enough. As for the issues such as the truth of agape and the fate of those who know agape, when they are initiated by a shepherd, Jesus’ response is, “what does it matter to you?”. Alcibiades is a statesman, that is, a shepherd (see Socrates’ criticism of oligarchy cited above). A politician who tries to extract from Socrates “everything he knows” is stepping out of his natural order. Socrates’ answer is, “what does it matter to you?”. Does Socrates have a God? Can he neither legislate nor feed his sheep without his God? Is political theology a gesture of political philosophy? “When the eyes begin to be dim moonlight, the heart will start to be sharp”. Is this “the moment” to answer this question? For Jesus and Socrates, both the polis and the world are caves. Socrates is a man or a spirit who tries to get out of the darkness and see the light. Jesus is the light coming into the cave. But how could Peter, who has seen him, fail to grasp theological truth but only political nuance? If John knows the true meaning of light and logos, why doesn’t Jesus let him feed the sheep but only entrust him with his mother? It seems that theophilei is the light which shines on the law. But light is not what is shone upon. Seeing the light is not politics per se. But legislation requires witnessing the illuminated archetype. This difference between philosophy and politics is, as we know it, an “ontological difference”.

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(Originally published in Si-Xiang Yu She-Hui 思想與社會 (Thinking and Society), Vol. 4.)

Chapter 9

Translating What One Knows is Impossible to Translate

Abstract Through critically reflecting on Ni Liangkang 倪梁康’s first Chinese translated version of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, this chapter initiates several hermeneutic problems involved in the translation of western works, to remind scholars of the boundary of translation.

As a Chinese unfortunately immersed in Western scholarship, I always have a relatively lucid understanding of my so-called research career: It is nothing but a process of reproduction from one translated version to another. In this sentence, the former “translated version” refers to the old and new “Chinese translated version of western classics” that introduce scholars like me to the conscious “quasi-Western way of thinking”; the latter “translated version” refers to the “monograph” I can produce. When I say that my future “monograph” is a translated version, I do not mean to make fun of the sacred discipline, but to say that it seems to be identical—in thought, practice and even language—to the translated versions listed in the “bibliographies”, or rather “being exactly the same”. If there is a difference, it is one that exists between fakes and originals. The reason why I call this realization lucid is that it is not primarily a judgment about myself. Rather, it is my estimation of the basic shape of the mainstream of “Chinese learning” now and in the foreseeable future. That is to say, in a long period of time, the mainstream of academic circle in China will still be a “scholarship of translation”. Of course, this does not mean that Chinese academic thought will lose its “locality” in problem consciousness and research purported purpose. On the contrary, it is the local and contemporary growth of consciousness and purported purpose that has led to some progress in Chinese scholarship since the 1990s. “Scholarship of translation” is a harsh and potentially dangerous term. People love to use the term “modern academic” not only to avoid a lot of trouble but also This chapter, written in 2000, involves a partial criticism of the first Chinese translated version of Logische Untersuchungen. The translator, Mr. Ni Liangkang 倪梁康, published a revised Chinese version in 2006. So the criticism here is no longer valid. What is still worth noting is only the hermeneutic problem in the translation of western works discussed in this chapter and more than one article in Part III of this book. This problem has not attracted enough attention in the philosophical circle up to now. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_9

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to introduce the issue into the familiar field of “the theory of modernity”. I mention this simply to remind you of a simple fact that few would deny: the establishment of modern Chinese scholarship has largely depended on the translation and introduction of western classics. The translation and dissemination of Indian Buddhism contributed to shaping the academic thought of ancient China, to the extent that a large number of Chinese translation of Indian Buddhist glossary have already penetrated into the blood of Chinese thought. If we admit that, then the translation of western learning into Chinese, which mainly started in the late nineteenth century, not only accompanied and influenced the establishment of modern Chinese itself but also contributed to the comprehensive transformation of Chinese academic thought from the form to the purport. In a sense, we are still living in an era of translation which is the effective history of Chinese translation of western learning. In other words, “the history of translation” is one of the many aspects of “current history”. To interpret the phenomenon of translation is to understand our era. With the help of a text that I happen to be familiar with, I would like to make a little observation on the issues of translation in our era. In the spring semester of 2000, I gave a seminar on Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen to several graduate students. At that time, Mr. Ni Liangkang 倪梁康’s translation was just published completely, so I used it as a teaching material. I accidentally found some inadequateness in his translation. It must be said that these minor flaws doesn’t suffice to change my opinion on the work of Mr. Ni Liang Kang, whose series of translations are among the finest of our time. In fact, only such translations can expose the problems of this era and even reveal the limits of translation itself. In the Chinese translated version of Logische Untersuchungen, the problems I personally found can be divided into three categories. First, the omission and mistranslation that can be avoided by careful collation.; second, some negotiable translation of names or sentences, and the third, I’m afraid, is the misunderstanding of the text. Here are some representative examples to illustrate my points above. Among the problems caused by poor proofreading, the relatively common cases are the misinterpretation or omission of certain keyword or prefix, which causes the reverse of the meaning of the whole sentence. For example, on page 28 of Book II (A25/ B25), Husserl discusses the concept of “Anzeihen” and concludes: “Some objects or states of affairs (whose existence is actually known) indicate to people the existence of other objects or states of affairs in such a sense”. Ni’s translation goes as follows: “The existence of some objects or states of affairs is not realistically known”.1 It would surely bring some troubles to the readers. There are some other obvious problems caused by carelessness, such as mistaking “indirect knowledge” for “direct knowledge”, “infinity” for “finiteness” and so on, to name just a few. The second kind of problem involves disputable sentences and terminology. Compared with terminology, the problems of sentences are easier to make clear. For example, in the seventh line from the bottom of page 34 (A32/ B32) in Book II, 1

Translator’s note: I translate Ni’s Chinese translated version into English. For readers’ reference, I shall quote Ni’s translated version. The following is the same. Here Ni’s version goes like this: “ 某些物件或事態的存在不為人現實地知曉”.

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the original goes as follows: “An ihnenliegt es auch, dasswir die Begriffe ‘Ausdruck’ und ‘Anzeichen’trennen”. The meaning is clear and fits perfectly with the main idea of this section. However, Ni translates it as: “In the expression, we can also distinguish between ‘concept’ and ‘sign’”.2 This is quite inappropriate. As for the discussion on the translation of terminology, it is difficult to make any final conclusion. Considering that phenomenology has its own terminology system, it is impossible to discuss further here about the translation of phenomenological terminology. Let’s just take a few terms that are not unique to phenomenology as examples. Almost all of these examples have to do with logic. For example, on page 155 of Book I (A178/110, B178), there is a statement that “The universal concept is the range of the lowest kind (spezifische Differenzen)”, which is translated by Ni as “ the range of the lowest special difference”.3 The translation of this terminology appears many times. Since Aristotle, “differentiamspecificam” has been the basic concept of formal logic, and it is often translated in the Chinese works of philosophy and logics as zhong cha 種差. Ni’s strange term “special difference” is confusing. In addition, Ni’s translation of “Satz” as “laws” is also puzzling (since in this sense we would have “false laws” and “contradictory laws”). In his recent book Hu-SaiEr Xian-Xiang-Xue Gai-nian Tong Shi 胡塞爾現象學概念通釋 (An Explanation of Husserl’s Phenomenological Concepts), Mr. Ni has retranslated it as determinate sentences as the dual implications of theorems and sentences. In any case, as far as the problem domain involved in LogischeUntersuchungen is concerned, “Satz” may be more appropriate than the newly coined term “determinate sentence”. Undoubtedly, “Satz” is also more popular in the Chinese literature of logic and linguistic analytic philosophy. In LogischeUntersuchungen, Husserl discusses the negative influence of “Aequivokation” on logic and believes that logic has better ensured that one word strictly corresponds with one meaning. It is understandable that Mr. Ni deliberately adopted a polysemous translation of the phenomenological term since the role of logic is downplayed in phenomenology. However, for some specific logical terms with definite meanings, “flexible” translation does not seem to be desirable. For example, with the simple logical term “regressus in infinitum”, Mr. Ni hesitates about whether to translate it as “infinite cycle” or as “infinite regression”. Even the concept of ambiguity itself has several different translations (double meaning, ambiguity, etc.). The third defect of Ni’s translation, from my perspective, lies a deviation in understanding, and the problem of which is still more in related disciplines rather than in phenomenology. The most striking example here is Husserl’s reference to a pure mathematical theorem (Book II, page 116, A111/ B111): “Alle analytischenFunktionensinddifferenzierbar” (All analytic functions are differentiable). This is an important theorem in the theory of functions of complex variables, and a corollary of Cauchy’s integral formula (a more complete formulation is “all analytic functions are infinitely differentiable”). Husserl used to be the assistant of Weierstrass who is Translator’s note: Ni’s Chinese translation here is—“在表述那裡, 我們也可以區分 ‘概念’和 ‘ 信號’”. 3 Translator’s note: Ni’s Chinese translation here is—“最低的特殊的差異的範圍”. 2

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one of the great masters of the theory of functions of complex variables. However, Mr. Ni translates it as “all analytical uses are divisible”.4 It is the legacy of Chun Qiu 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals) to blame the sage. We criticize Mr. Ni’s translation so harshly, but only out of the following purpose, that is, through the problems that appeared in Ni’s translation, to have a glimpse of our translation era that is far from the end. Generally speaking, the problems in Ni’s translation are more or less common problems in translation of all times. In our time, these problems are actually quite serious, and Mr. Ni’s translation can still be considered as relatively excellent. But we’d better look at the great times of translating Buddhist texts and see how the sages at that time solved such problems. The long career of translating Buddhist texts into Chinese reached its peak in the hands of Xuan Zang 玄奘 and his assistants. Xuan Zang had what may be the most lavish translation team in human history, that is, the “translation field” (yi chang 譯 場). There are ten kinds of staff in the “translation field”: first, the chief translator who is in charge of the whole process of translation (yi zhu 譯主); second, the staff in charge of verifying the translated version to avoid any discrepancy between the translation and the original (zheng yi 正義); third, the staff in charge of proofreading the Sanskrit read out by the chief translator according to the original text, to prevent the chief translator from misreading it (zheng wen 証文); fourth, the staff in charge of writing down the transliteration (shu xie 書寫); fifth, the staff in charge of translating Sanskrit into Chinese (bi shou 筆受); sixth, the staff in charge of arranging the Chinese translation according to Chinese grammar (zhui wen 綴文); seventh, the staff in charge of translating the Chinese translation back to the original text, to compare the former with the latter (can yi 參譯); eighth, the staff in charge of deleting and editing the translation to make it concise (kan ding 刊定); ninth, the staff in charge of embellishing the text and polishing the translation (run wen 潤文); tenth, the staff in charge of chanting the original text and revising the rhyme ( fan bai梵唄). Summarizing these works, we can know that translation in the eyes of the ancients is a project involving the following aspects: first, the collation of the original text itself (there may be errors existing in the process of circulating the original text, typographical errors and even the author’s errors); second, it revises the original text in the eyes of the translator, because the translator may misread the original text; thirdly, the accurate translation of meaning; fourth, expressing in Chinese the meaning of the original text accurately and without textual misunderstanding; finally, the processing of rhetoric and phonology. This is not to mention the problem of proofreading after they have been printed or circulated. The criterion of these sections, summarized in the words of Yan Jidao 嚴幾道, is “accuracy” (xin 信, including the accuracy in

4

Translator’s note: Ni’s Chinese translation here is—“所有的分析功能都是可劃分的”.According to Ding Yun, Ni seems to misunderstand the meaning of the word “Funktionen”(function) in this sentence. “Funktionen”(function) has two meanings: (a) hanshu 函數 which is a mathematical term, and (b) zuoyong 作用, which refers to the uses of things. Ni mistakes (a) for (b).

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reading which can be corrected by collation and the accuracy in understanding), “preciseness” (da 達 , which denotes the preciseness of the translation), and “elegance” (ya 雅, the elegance of the expression). From this point of view, most of the above problems in the Chinese translation of LogischeUntersuchungen are caused by a lack of accuracy in reading or understanding (that is, a misunderstanding or a deviation in understanding) and a lack of preciseness in Chinese expression. It would have been difficult for one single person to avoid these problems. So don’t blame our era for that. It is only to be admitted that our ability to grasp and control our mother tongue has been greatly degraded. However, judging from the perspective of understanding argumentation and determining the translated terms, there is still an insurmountable distance between us and those great translation times. Take the Chinese translation of LogischeUntersuchungenas an example. The translator’s understanding of phenomenological principles should be impeccable, but there are obvious problems in the understanding of important knowledge such as logic and mathematics. Now let’s look at the scope of Xuan Zang’s study in India. During his 14 or 15 years of study tour in India, in addition to the Yogacara, he also studied deeply the opposed yet important school of Theravada Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism, as well as the Hetuvidya research which is closely related to the construction and spread of Buddhism. Due to that reason, the translation of Xuan Zang is huge in quantity, extensive in scope, appropriate in choice, and beautiful in quality. His defense and elucidation of his school of thought, not only rationalize the subtle but also blend the various schools of thought. Good sages must first go deep underwater and then can stand on the top of the mountain. The common defects of comprehension among translators of our time are consciously avoided in the era of Chinese translation of Buddhist texts. Understanding is nothing more than a “fusion of horizons”. The highest level of translation should be not to let the translator’s personal learning defects hinder the fusion of horizons among different cultures. The personal learning of the translator should not only bring him as close as possible (which is a cultural hermeneutic possibility in the first place) to the text of the alien culture he is confronted with but also should not prevent his native culture from expressing through his translation. In fact, the deeper the translator’s roots are in the soil of his own culture, the higher the crown of his understanding will reach in the sky of the alien culture. Only with a thorough understanding of the local culture can the translator understand the meaning and limits of his mother tongue, as well as know how far the mother tongue can stretch without collapsing under the strain of translation. The distance between mother tongue and foreign language is first reflected in grammar and basic Buddhist glossary. The problem of grammar is complicated (for details, see my article “Zou Chu FanYi Shi-Dai” 走出翻譯時代 (“Out of the Age of Translation”), in: Ci-hai Xin-zhi 辭海新知, No.7), and in this respect, modern Chinese language is much less under pressure than ancient Chinese language, so there is no need for more discussion here. In contrast, the translation of Buddhist glossary is still a common problem we share with the ancients. In the face of this common problem, there is a difference in situation and attitude between us and our ancestors. It is this difference or gap that

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hinders the fusion of the super-personal horizons between modern Chinese culture and alien culture. Let’s first look at the difference between us and the ancient translators in the hermeneutic situation of translation. In the era of Chinese translation of Buddhist texts, after analysis and interpretation by scholars of “the study of ancient classics” ( jing xue 經學) and scholars of “dark learning/Chinese metaphysics” (xuan xue 玄學), the glossary of ancient Chinese has generally possessed the comprehensive, clear, profound, and careful traits. Those traits are the main resources for Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures. In a sense, it can be said that the translation of Buddhist terms is a hermeneutic variation of the terms and phases of “the study of ancient classics” ( jingxue 經學) and “dark learning/Chinese metaphyscis” (xuanxue 玄學). This kind of variation with rich technique reflects the true fusion of horizons. This is very different from the Latinization of Greek philosophical concepts, for example, because Latin had no philosophical tradition before, and the Chinese translators of Buddhist classics were deeply immersed in Chinese thought, so that they were even qualified as scholars of “the study of ancient classics” ( jingxue 經學) and “dark learning/Chinese metaphysics” (xuanxue 玄學). After thousands of years, these translated terms have already infiltrated the veins of Chinese thought. Chinese translators of Western learning may forget that the glossaries of “mother tongue” they used to understand, identify, and translate the western concepts are mostly translated terms. That is to say, the ancients used the real glossary of mother tongue to translate Buddhist scriptures, but people nowadays are translating new concepts with old translated terms. There is a sort of archeological distance here. This gap of historical situation requires translators of modern Chinese to have enough clear hermeneutic consciousness. We should have a minimum understanding of the origin of the “mother tongue” glossary that we use for translation. This understanding will be reflected as an attitude of being both respectful and critical. We can find this attitude in Xuan Zang 玄奘’s solemn proposal of the principle of “five kinds of not translating” and in Yan Fu 嚴復’s “ambulate and contemplate for several days” (xunri chi chu 旬日踟躕) when determining the translated terms. But it is a pity that among native speakers of modern Chinese, we hardly see any deep reflection on the issue of translation. It just shows that we may not know our mother tongue as well as we think we do. No great translation would occur in a language that is not truly understood by its speakers, let alone great thoughts. For thoughts, like writing, can only be a miracle of language. Time creates wonders, too. One century is enough to transform the translated name into the original name we use to think and express ourselves. In the Chinese translation of Western classics, modern Chinese are filled with basic translations from Japan. People who speak modern Chinese as their mother tongue act in the range delimited by these translated terms. As a result, there appears the wield phenomenon that Western texts cover Buddhist texts and Buddhist glossaries cover Western learning concepts. For example, when saying that Buddhism is “idealism” (weixinzhuyi 唯心主義), we are entering a strange circle of topology. First of all, “being idealistic/originating from mind” (weixin 唯心) is a term that the Yogacara school of Indian Buddhism

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use to identify themselves—sanjieweixin 三界唯心 (All three realms originate from mind). However, as a translated term, “idealism” (weixinzhuyi 唯心主義) actually refers to idealism. The term idealism advocates the “form” in ancient western philosophy and the eidos in modern Western philosophy, which basically has no meaning of “all three realms originate from mind” (sanjieweixin 三界唯心). Therefore, in the view of modern Chinese, the Yogacara school is both true “idealism” (weixinzhuyi 唯 心主義) and not the kind of “idealism” as identified by philosophy. The reason for this confusion is that the users of modern Chinese are misunderstood by the translators. As a result, they not only don’t know what “being idealistic/originating from mind” (weixin 唯心) is, but also interpret from Chinese texts without real understanding and make assumptions about idealism. Finally, the fallacy spreads and becomes the “philosophical common sense” of modern Chinese. In the basic philosophical concepts of modern Chinese, such problems are commonly seen. Perhaps, the main reason is that the determiners of the terms of modern Chinese thought (whether they are Chinese or Japanese) do not have as deep understanding as the ancients, of the heritage and tension of the terms of ancient Chinese thought they use to convey foreign ideas. Since this is the case, the successors, who mainly live in the circumstance of modern Chinese, of course can only hold on to these terms that they have used to think and experience without any reflection. The problem is that the Chinese translation of Western classics is still in progress. When we finally come across the concepts that are at the core of Western thought and are also the most difficult to be translated and interpreted, the original concepts that came mainly from Japanese translation are not enough to use. The establishment of ancient Greek philosophy, modern rationalism, and especially German idealism depends on those very scholars with excellent knowledge of Chinese and Western studies. In the works of translation since the 1980s (perhaps the most difficult of which is the Chinese translation of the concept of phenomenological pedigrees), we have had to rely on those who have mastered the spirit of their mother tongue mainly through the Chinese and political textbooks of the new China. It is conceivable that the Chinese language will be torn apart by these newcomers because the Chinese language we have learned is not very firm and tough, and because we (including my generation) have long forgotten how to respect our Chinese language. People who know how to respect their mother tongue can also respect foreign languages and translation. In his peerless career, the greatest translator saw the limits of translation itself, and humbly guarded the untranslatable: (1) Secrets thus untranslatable, such as Dharani; (2) multiple implications thus untranslatable, such as the Bhagavad which has six implications; (3) unseen in China thus untranslatable; (4) following the ancient tradition thus untranslatable; (5) the good benefiting from Buddhism thus untranslatable, such as Prajna. The above is called “the five untranslatable”. Nowadays, we can certainly question the specifics of these principles. But there is no doubt that the philosophical translators with modern Chinese as their mother tongue have paid little attention to the boundary of translation. The neglect of boundary originates from the naive view of the fusion of horizons, which actually means the absence of hermeneutic consciousness and the absent consciousness

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of untranslated Chinese thought. We have no right here to lay down the rules of philosophical translation, but perhaps we can point out the effect of such rules on thought itself. For example, if philosophical translators notice the rule called “unseen in China thus untranslatable”, then all kinds of arguments in the reluctant translation of Sein/to be may be put to an end, because there is no such word in Chinese that has both the meaning of “being” and “having” and supports all sentences. Any reluctant translation of Sein/to be would obscure a significant fact, namely foundationally speaking, there is an irreducible difference between Chinese thought and Western philosophy. It is the root of all spiritual fakes and ideological translations that attempt to force the ontology of studying Sein/ to be into Chinese and form “philosophy” in Chinese with it as the center. Translation affects a language in this way. A language that is translated into another kind of language does not therefore become what it is not, but it can become what it has not yet been. The era of translation we are living in is far from over, and the real modern Chinese that can protect our thoughts has not yet arrived. All we can do now, perhaps, is to look forward further in our translation. Written in August 2000, in Fudan University. (Originally published in the Du Shu 读书 journal, 2001 (9)).

Chapter 10

A Discussion on Several Translated Terms of Die Grundprobleme Der Phanomenologie

Abstract This chapter discusses the Chinese translation of key terms in both Heidegger’s Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie and phenomenology in general, such as Sein/Dasein, Wahrheit, Sorge, Zeitlichkeit, Wahrnehmen/ Wahrnehmung, Selbst/Ich/Ego and their derivatives. Such a discussion exemplifies the translation principles of “accuracy”, “preciseness”, and “fluency”.

Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie was originally part of the whole project of Sein Und Zeit. This book was revised and compiled on the basis of the Marburger Vorlesung of the summer semester in 1925. All the revised synthesis was completed under the guidance of Heidegger himself. In fact, this is the first volume of Heidegger’s complete works, published in 1975 as Volume 24th. Martin Heidegger died the following year. This particular publication moment has already made evident the significance of this book. According to the authoritative summary of Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, the editor of the complete work, this book examines in detail the central question of the third part of Part I of Sein Und Zeit, that is, to answer the fundamental ontological inquiry into the meaning of Sein in general which guides the analytic theory of Dasein, by putting forward “time” as the realm of comprehension for all beings. Some important clues in Sein Und Zeit are developed in this book. It also contains some of the outstanding work hidden in the previous book, such as Aristotle’s theory of time, the explanation of Kant’s proposition of sein, and so on. This book is the first must-read for a more complete and profound understanding of Heidegger’s thoughts in Sein Und Zeit. It is actually a deeper part of the original Sein Und Zeit and to some extent an outer chapter of the current Sein Und Zeit. It has been 80 years since the first edition of Sein Und Zeit and exactly 20 years since the first Chinese edition (published at SDX Joint Publishing Company in December 1987). It can even be said that the real lively philosophical exploration in China was ruled by Heidegger for almost twenty years after the brief period of Kant and early Marx. Only recently have individual Chinese thinkers made See the Chinese version of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (Shanghai Yiwen Chu-ban-she 上海譯文出版社 (Shanghai Translation Publishing House), 2008) translated by me. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_10

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prudent attempts to criticize Heidegger. Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie was published during the same period, and it is not clear whether such arrangement is the destiny in the unseen world. I happened to enter universities to study philosophy twenty years ago. At this moment, I realized that my entire philosophical career before was precisely overlapped with the era of Heidegger in the Chinese intellectual circle. These 20 years are also the growth era of my generation. To be seized by Heidegger—rather than by Marx, Kant, or Strauss—wandering, hesitating, or being furious through his work is the mark of my generation. The reason we instinctively feel close to Gadamer or Strauss, perhaps, is that their generation had exactly the same mark as we do. Reading must first deal with the translated terms. Almost all of the important translated terms in Heidegger’s works represent good issues for philosophical debate. Here, I set aside my own experiences as a reader and a learner—though perhaps more important—and talk about some of my own experiences as a translator. The basic translated terms of Heidegger’s works have been generally determined by Xiong Wei 熊偉, Chen Jiaying 陳嘉映, Wang Qingjie 王慶節, and Sun Zhouxing 孫周興. Although some of them have led to disputes and repeated translations, on the whole, it should be said that they have been basically acknowledged by peers and widely circulated among generations of readers. Some translated terms even gradually become the keywords in contemporary Chinese philosophical thinking. As far as the book Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie is concerned, since it was originally a part of the project of Sein Und Zeit, its important translated terms should be as consistent as possible with the Chinese translations of Heidegger’s earlier works, especially the existing Chinese versions of Sein Und Zeit. Generally speaking, the existing translations of Heidegger’s works are superior among the Chinese translations of Western philosophical classics. When translating Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, I should consciously respect this translation context as a principle. I have always been conservative in translation and have always advocated respecting conventions. Things accepted by generations of people have now accepted as an acceptable part of our tradition. There is an acceptable reason for carrying them down. This conservative principle in translation might be called “fluency/obedience” (shun 順): It refers not only to the fluency of the text, which means not to be unusual and to obey the reading habits of the reader but also to obey the translation tradition we reside in. My second principle as a translator is to respect the literal meaning. This means, above all, trying to distinguish between translation and interpretation. Any translation is, of course, an interpretation, but this interpretation as a translation has one limitation: It must be as close to the literal meaning of the original word as possible. Another meaning of the principle of respect for literalism is that the same word in the original text, under the condition that the original author does not intentionally use in ambiguity, shall also be translated in the same term. Subtle synonyms used intentionally in the original text are also translated into Chinese synonyms. The group of words that have a relationship with each other should also be translated in the way that shows such relationship. If there are real difficulties, they will be made up additionally in the form of translator’s note or supplementing the original

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text. The principle of “respect for literal meaning” is almost similar to the so-called “accuracy” (xin 信) emphasized by Yan Jidao 嚴几道. However, we should point out that although the Chinese character xin 信certainly refers to accuracy, the scope of accuracy should not only include the meaning but also include the rhetorical color of words, the style of sentences and even the rhythm of intonation, etc. (e.g., in the translation of literary works, especially poetry works, the style rhythm, that is, the rhetorical accuracy, is far more testing than the meaning of accuracy). To translate plain or even rustic lines into elegant words is to sacrifice accuracy for elegance (that is to say, it is hard to do both unless the original text is beautiful). For example, when translating Dasein as yuanzai 緣在, we may not only face the problem that the literal meaning of Dasein is far from that, but also would encounter the tough issue that Da is a common term while the Chinese term yuan 緣 is relatively rare, and thus is not an accurate translation. My third principle as a translator is to avoid misunderstandings as much as possible—this is to reduce the principle of preciseness to its bottom line. It is difficult to convey exactly what the author intended. But sometimes, the bigger trouble is caused by the smart translator. A typical practice is: In order to improve the understanding of readers, the translator might polish the translated terms from several perspectives, taking advantage of the reader’s interpretation without real understanding to produce some wrong association and simple comparison. From another point of view, the words we use to translate the basic terms of Western philosophy certainly have their context in the Chinese classical literature. The comparison or connection between the foreign philosophical tradition to which the original word belongs and the Chinese classical tradition is of course very exciting. But it is more of a serious matter and should not be expected to be accomplished by cheap verbal tricks. In translation, we should first emphasize the inherent context of the original text, stressing the difficulty for the translated terms to express the ideas of the original text and stressing the essential difference between the Chinese context of the translated terms and the inherent context of the original text. As for how to carry out the research, that is another matter. If perfect translation is difficult to achieve, then we should at least try to avoid the misunderstanding caused by intentional insinuation. Although this principle is the so-called bottom line, it is actually the hardest to stick to. Translator, including myself, sometimes finds it difficult to refrain from shoving into the translated terms some potentially valuable experiences. The reason why I put forward this principle is more to remind readers to guard against the premature semi-conscious “fusion of horizons” by translators. These three modified principles of translation—“accuracy” (xin 信, respecting the original text in terms of logic, rhetoric and even context), “preciseness” (da 達, to avoid misunderstandings as much as possible), and “fluency/ obedience” (shun 順, conforming to reading habits and translation traditions as much as possible)— are what I try to maintain in the process of translation. But practicing principles is far more difficult than proposing principles. In translation, we often encounter the situation that we cannot get all of the three, so we have to balance. If we have to delete one of them, I would choose to delete “fluency/obedience” (shun 順). If having to delete two, I would choose to delete “preciseness” (da 達) and “fluency/obedience”

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(shun 順). I hope readers and peers would be able to appreciate my consideration. The following is a brief discussion of some important translated terms identified in this book, in order to seek advice from experts. This chapter mainly deals with the translation of both certain special terms in Heidegger’s works and several concepts that are common in phenomenology and German philosophy in general.

10.1 Sein, Dasein, and the Relevant Terms Sein is one of the most controversial terms in translating Heidegger’s works. This concept is certainly not unique to Heidegger, but the study and translation of Heidegger have again intensified the relevant debate. At present, the translated term of Sein has basically been determined as cun zai 存在. The translated terms of some related concepts (such as Seiendes, Dasein, Ontologie, etc.) are also determined accordingly. The main criticism against this translated term is that the term cun zai 存在 fails to convey the connotation of “to be” (shi 是) as a connective verb implied in Sein. This criticism has merits. On the other hand, if Sein is uniformly translated as shi 是, the meaning of “to exist” (cun you 存有) is also sacrificed. Meanwhile, there is a significant gap in the ontological origin between Sein and the “is” understood as a simple copula verb,1 which makes it more difficult for us to agree to translate Sein as shi 是 altogether. In Chinese, it is impossible to find a word that clearly has both the meaning of shi 是 and you 有. In such circumstances, I generally still translate Sein as cun zai 存在. If in a special context (e.g., Sein is combined with some adjectives or adverbs to form a combinative word) which is more appropriate to understand it as shi 是 I’d translate it directly as shi 是 or add another explanation. In all these cases, the translator tries to make the reader understand by attaching the original text or other ways that the original term of both cunzai 存在 and shi 是 is Sein. It is worth noting that the controversy caused by the term Dasein not only lies in Sein but also in the “da” Dasein contains. Although the word can elucidate a lot of things, but in any case, interpretation and explanation cannot replace translation. From the principle of respect for literal meaning, to translate Dasein as ci zai 此在 is generally acceptable. Perhaps the main reason for translating Dasein as qin zai 親在 and other criticisms against translating Dasein as ci zai 此在 is that ci 此 is always relative to bi 彼 while the “da” in the term “Dasein” is not in such a relationship. In fact, everything that can be located in relation to each other depends entirely on its relative distance from the “da” in Dasein. The closer it is to “da”, the more it belongs to ci 此. Thus, Dasein is the original ci 此 that makes possible all kinds of ci 此 and is the beginning of the world. Dasein and da are fairly common in German. “Exist in da” is roughly equivalent to the English phrase “there is”. Albert Hofstadter often translated “da ist” as “there is”. In view of the difficulties, he did not translate Dasein 1 For those who insist on translating Sein as shi 是, please see Chap. 4 of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, which makes a special review of the tradition of the copula verbs.

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in his English version but copied it directly from the German original. The Chinese version cannot follow this way of translation. In all possible translations, ci zai 此 在 is most appropriate. There are two groups of terms related to cun zai 存在, one is “ontisch” and “ontologisch”, and the other is “existenzial”, “Existenzialität”, and “existenziell”. In the current Chinese version of Sein Und Zeit, the former group is respectively translated as cun-zai-zhe Zhuang-tai shang de 存在者狀態上的 (in the state of beings)2 and cun-zailunshang de 存在論上的 (ontological), while the latter group shengcunlunshang de 生存論上的 (existentialist), sheng-cun-lunzhuang-tai 生存論狀態 (in the state of existentialism), and sheng-cunzhuang-tai de 生存狀態的 (in the state of existence). This Chinese version prefers to use the term zhuang-tai 狀態 (in the state of). Similarly, the term “Temporalität” is translated as shi-jianzhuang-tai 時間狀態.3 These two sets of translations are perfectly accurate in distinguishing between cunzaizhe de 存在者的 (beings’) and cunzailun de 存在論的 (ontological) and between shengcun de 生存的 (existent) and sheng cunlun de 生存論的 (existentialist), except that the Chinese word zhuang tai 狀態 (state/condition) is too ambiguous to be added either as a pure Chinese translation or as a translation of the western term. My translation conciliates the relevant translations (ontisch and existenziell) into cun-zai-zhe de存在者的 (or cun-zai-zheshi de存在者式的) and sheng-cunshang de生存上的. The translations of “ontologisch” and “existenzial” (respectively cun-zailunshang de 存在論上的 and sheng-cunlunshang de 生存論上 的) are still appropriate and don’t need to be changed. The abstract suffix of “Existenzialität” should have been translated, but it was so awkward that it had to be translated as sheng-cun-lunzhuang-tai 生存論狀態.

10.2 Wahrheit and the Relevant Terms It is commonplace to translate Wahrheit/truth as zhen li 真理. This translated term has been reflected upon in translating analytic philosophical literature into Chinese. But there seems to be little debate in the translation circles about this key concept in Heidegger’s work. This may be because the use of the word zhen li 真理 has acquired a certain authority. In any case, the word Wahrheit does not have any Platonic implication of “idea”. However, if we translate Wahrheitas zhen 真 as suggested by the translators in the field of analytical philosophy, it is not easy to highlight its abstractness and nominality (although the word zhen 真 in Chinese can also be regarded as a noun, it is also easy to be regarded as an adjective or even an adverb). Perhaps a better translation is zhen xing 真性. In deference to the conventional 2

The glossary (Appendix III) of the Chinese translated version (1987) of Sein Und Zeit translates “ontisch” as “cun-zaizhuang-tai shang de 存在狀態上的 (in the state of being)”, which should be a typographical error. For details, please see page 541 of this version. 3 Please see Appendix I of the Chinese translated version (1987) of Sein Und Zeit on page 523. This term is not included in the glossary (Appendix III).

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translation, I still translates Wahrheit as zhen li 真理 in most cases, and in other cases involving other combined nouns or phrases formed with the adjective wahr, I shall accordingly translate them differently. For Heidegger, to illustrate Wahrheit, there are three important concepts (entdecken, erschliessen, enthüllen) and some variations (Entdecktheit and Erschlossenheit). The first three words (entdecken, erschliessen, enthullen) are usually translated respectively as jieshi 揭示 (to unveil/reveal), zhan kai 展開 (to unfold/open up), and zhanlu 綻露 (to disclose)4 or jieshi 揭示,5 with the last two words (Entdecktheit, Erschlossenheit), respectively, as beijieshi de zhuang-tai 被揭 示的狀態 (the state of being revealed) and beizhan kai de zhuang-tai 被展開的狀態 (the state of being unfolded). There is nothing wrong with this translation, but it is not very appropriate. First, Heidegger refers to entdecken and erschliessen as two ways of enthüllen, so entdecken and enthüllen should not be both translated as jieshi 揭 示. Only in the unwrapping sense can entdecken be interpreted as jieshi 揭示, while actually entdeckenis a common word denoting “to discover”, with no ambiguity. And the primary meaning of enthüllen is indeed to unveil/reveal. Entdecktheit, as a variant of entdecken, is used by Heidegger to refer to the true natures having to do with the “Wahrheit” of Vorhandensein. This is also the meaning of the so-called find so-and-so, without such a strong implication that “must be uncovered”. Therefore, I translate entdecken as fa xian 發現 (to discover), while in fact the Chinese word fa 發 has already implies “to reveal”. But as a whole, fa xian 發現 does not contain as strong an implication of debunking false appearance as jieshi 揭示. This implication should not be compatible with the “Wahrheit” of Vorhandensein, since the Wahrheit of Vorhandensein is the existential expression of, for example, intuitive truth, which implied more the intuitiveness or directness instead of false appearance. In contrast, the literal meaning of erschliessen has more to do with something indirect, such as to show and to infer, I translate erschliessen as zhanxian 展現 instead of zhan kai 展開. This is partly because zhanxian 展現 matches better with fa xian 發現 and has the meaning of “to manifest” (shi 示); more importantly, the word zhan kai 展開 would easily remind people of relevant concepts in Hegel’s philosophy. Equally with the purpose of emphasizing the meaning of shi 示 or xian 現, I follow the Chinese translated version of VomWesen der Wahrheit to translate enthüllen as jieshi 揭示, though translating it as zhanlu 綻露 might be more accurate.

10.3 Sorge and the Relevant Terms Besides Sein, Sorge and its derivatives are perhaps the terms that have caused the most controversy in the translation of Heidegger’s work. The word has some history. In section 42 of Sein Und Zeit, Heidegger quotes the fable of the goddess Cura (Latin See the Chinese translated version of Sein Und Zeit, by Chen Jiaying 陳嘉映 and Wang Qingjie 王慶節. 5 See the Chinese translated version of VomWesen der Wahrheit, by Sun Zhouxing 孫周興. 4

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for Sorge) (which itself comes from the German literary tradition) and indicates the word’s arc in the history of Western thought, which he traces back to the Stoics and the New Testament. However, in its Latin form, it has older and more important roots in ancient philosophy. The most famous ancient use of Cura sui is cura sui, a translation of “epimeleia he autou” from Alcibiades I, which is attributed to Plato. As Foucault shows, this “care for oneself” (which can also be translated as concern, care, warning for oneself) is of extreme importance to the genealogy of the “subject and truth” issue in the history of Western philosophy.6 In this sense, it is accurate to highlight Sorge’s connotation of care and concern, but we should also pay attention to the complexity of this concept. Translating it as fan 煩 (annoyance) does imply too much emotion. However, as other translators have pointed out, there are problems with translating it as cao xin 操心 (worry). While translating it as guan huai 關懷 (concern)would imply a relatively strong directivity. We shall keep in mind that the biggest difference between the verb Sorgen and the word epimeleia in Alcibiades I is that the former has less specific directivity. Although sorgen does have its directivity, such directivity has something to do with “realm” ( jing yu 境域) and is not as specific as besorgen and fürsorgen. I take the advice of Mr. Ye Xiushan 葉秀山 given many years ago and translate it as ying huai 縈懷, which may avoid the problems of translation mentioned above.7 However, translating besorgen as gua huai 挂懷 and fürsorgen as guan huai 關懷, is the complements I make by myself. The reasons for these two translations are too obvious to be repeated. Besides, the translated terms of Zuhandensein and Vorhandensein are also of strong Heideggerian sense, both of which reflect the appropriateness of the conventional translation. However, translating Vorhandensein as xian-chengzai-shou cunzai 現成在手存在 might lead to misunderstanding for Chinese readers as if this “way of being” (“cun zai fang shi” 存在方式) is “always in the hand” (“yi-zhizai shou-li wo-zhe” 一直在手裏握著). In fact, the Chinese translation of Vorhandensein denotes “being at hand” (zai shou bian 在手邊). So I amended the translation to “shou-qianxian-chengcun-zai” 手前現成存在 (“existing at hand”). Zusammenhang is actually a basic concept in Hermeneutics, denoting “situation” and “context”, but its literal meaning is “correlation”. The Chinese version of Sein Und Zeit translates it simply as guan lian 關聯 (correlation), without highlighting its hermeneutical meaning. To highlight its rich meaning, the English version of Sein Und Zeit by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson uses a number of words to translate Zusammenhang: connection, interconnection, context, and so on. Perhaps in order to avoid using different translated terms to translate the same word in the original text, Albert Hofstadter directly translates it as “contexture” in the English version of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, thus integrating the meanings 6

See Alcibiades I, 119a, 124b, 127e-134d. See alsoM. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, She Biping 佘碧平 (trans.),Shanghai Ren-min Chu-ban-she 上海人民出版社 (Shanghai People’s Publishing House), 2005, p.4 ff.。. 7 See Ye Xiushan, Si, Shi, Shi: Xian-Xiang Xue Yu Cun-ZaiZhe-Xue Yan-Jiu 思, 史, 詩——現象 學與存在哲學研究 (Thinking, History, Poetry: A Study On Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Existentialism), Ren-min Chu-ban-she 人民出版社 (People’s Publishing House), Beijing 北京, 1988: 165.

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of both “interweaving” and “context” into the same word. I translate it as guanlian mai-luo 關聯脈絡, in order to highlight its literal and hermeneutical meaning. Finally, there is artikulieren and its noun form Artikulation, which means “articulation” (each syllable is pronounced clearly). The Chinese version of Sein Und Zeit translate it asgoulian 勾連 (hook) or gou shu 勾述, which is really unclear. I translate it as fen shuo 分說, indicating that Sein is expressed in unity by different elements (essential and existential).

10.4 Zeitlichkeit and the Relevant Terms The translation of Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitat depends on our use of the Chinese word relevant to shi時 (time). However, I avoid the temptation to directly use the word shi 時, shi ji 時機 (timing) or dao shi 到時 (by that time) too randomly. If you translate Zeit as shi jian 時間, there would be no reason not to translate Zeitlichkeit as shijianxing 時間性 (timeliness) or to translate Zeitigung as shi jian hua 時間化 (temporization). Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität are basically the same in German, except for the etymology. There is even no etymological difference between the relevant words in English. In the English version of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, Zeitlichkeit is translated as temporality and Temporalität as temporality. According to Heidegger’s statement in section 20 of this book, “Zeitlichkeit is the possible condition of Sein’s comprehending the ordinary; The understanding and conceptual grasp of Sein start from time. If Zeitlichkeit functions as such a condition, we call it Temporalität”. Judging from here, there is no fundamental difference between the two words. When Zeitlichkeit is treated as the realm of Sein’s comprehension, it is called Temporalität. But in the Chinese version of Sein Und Zeit, translating Zeitlichkeit as shi jian zhuang tai 時間狀態 (state of time) can lead to some misunderstandings. I reluctantly change the translated term to shi tai xing 時 態性, though not satisfied. The reader should carefully understand the meaning of the relevant text in the specific context, in order to be able to understand it.

10.5 Wahrnehmen, Wahrnehmung, and the Relevant Terms In translating Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, I deal with a special phenomenon of translating German literature of philosophy and social science into Chinese, that is, the distinction between verbs and related nouns. For example, zhi jue 知覺 can be used as both a noun (perception) and a verb (perceive) in Chinese. Confusion is caused when the text emphasizes the distinction between the two. Therefore, in translating this book, when verbs are emphasized in the original text, I use the verb xing 行 (to act) to represent the active voice of the verb and the verb bei 被 (by)to represent the passive voice of the verb. In this way, Wahrnehmen is translated as xing zhi jue 行知覺 and Wahrnehmung is still as zhi jue 知覺. But Verhaltung

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itself means xing wei 行為 (action), and xing xing wei 行行爲 (to act action) is incomprehensible. Thus, to distinguish from the relevant terms, let’s translate the verb verhalten as shi wei 施為 (to do something). In addition, in translating Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, I also deal with the specific translation of some phenomenological terms, some of which do not occur frequently, but are still worth discussing. For example, Auffassung is a rather troublesome word. In phenomenological literature, it is translated either as tong wo 統握 (uniformly grasping) or as li yi 立義 (concepts setting). I sometimes translate it as shu yu 術語 (terminology), and other times as some common words. Besides, Noesis-Noema is a pair of basic concepts in Husserl’s phenomenology, which in the book Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie only appear in the adjective form noetisch-noematische.8 This pair of concepts is usually considered to be special to Husserl’s phenomenology, so the intentionality variant is translated as “yi xiang zuo yong& yi xiang dui xiang 意向作用-意向對象” (“intentionality function—intentionality object”),9 or “yi xiang huo dong& yi xiang xiang guan xiang 意向活動-意向相關項” (“intentionality activity—intentionality related items”).10 These translations may be influenced by the Japanese translation (は心が一定の 方向に向かってはたらくこと).11 However, the pair of concept Noesis-Noema is a Latinized transliteration of the Greek word, which derives from the Greek verb noeou [Greek: thinking], which in turn derives from the noun nous [Greek: mind, mentality, mental consciousness]. Translators may not know that this pair of concept has some history, which is not unique to Husserl. The terms Noesis, Noema and their corresponding relation originated from Aristotle’s De Anima (On the Soul).12 Thinking is the result of the heart’s functioning. According to the relevant Chinese translation of De Anima, Noesis is sizhiguocheng 思之過程 (the process of thinking) and Noema is suo si 所思 (the object of thinking).13 Therefore, the book translates noetisch-noematische as xing si& suo si 行思-所思 (the process-object of thinking). This pair of concepts is actually the Greek equivalent of the Latin terms cogitatio [Latin: the process of thinking] and cogitatum [Latin: the object of thinking], which Husserl used elsewhere.14 In a more and 8

See Section 5 of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, p. 29 in the German version. Li Youzheng 李幼蒸 translate it in this way. See his Chinese translated version of Allgemeine Einführung in die reinePhänomenologic, Vol. 1, The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1992: 585. 10 Ni Liangkang 倪梁康 translate it in this way. See his work Hu-Sai-Er Xian-Xiang-Xue GaiNian Tong-Shi 胡塞爾現象學概念通釋 (A Thorough Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenological Concepts), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 1999:313–314. 11 Ibid. 12 See De Anima, Vol. I, Chap. 3, 407a 5-10. 13 See the Chinese translated version of De Animaby Wu Shoupeng 吳壽彭, The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1992: 62, 426. 14 See Husserl, Die Krisis der EuropäischenWissenschaften und die TranszendentalePhänomenologie, Section 20. In Section 17 of this book, Husserlmakes a statement of “ego cogitocogitata qua cogitate”, which illustrates the intrinsic intentional relationship between noesis and noema. 9

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more conscious effort to restore the root—which, in Husserl’s case, is undoubtedly ancient Greek philosophy—Husserl more than once rewrote some German words of Latin etymology into words of Greek origin. For example, Form/Stoff in the LogischeUntersuchungenis was rewritten as Morphe/Hyle in the Ideen zuEiner Reiner Phänomenologie und PhanomenlogischenPhilosphie, with the latter derived directly from Aristotle’s works.

10.6 Selbst、 、Ich、 、Ego The concept of zi wo 自我 (self) is one we often encounter in Chinese translations of German philosophical works. However, corresponding to the Chinese word zi wo 自 我, there are actually three German terms—Selbst, Ich, and Ego which come directly from Latin. These three terms have their own differences and should not be confused. I respect the Chinese translation tradition of classical German philosophy, especially that of Fichte’s work, and leave the word zi wo 自我 to Ich. Selbstbewusstsein is translated as zi shen yi shi 自身意識 (self-consciousness). In Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, Heidegger deliberately distinguishes between selbt and Selbst, which cannot be distinguished in Chinese. The only distinction I can make is to translate selbst as zi shen 自身 (oneself) and Selbst as wu shen 吾身 (myself) where possible. In German philosophical literature, especially in Husserl’s phenomenological works, Ich and Ego are not only etymologically different. Husserl made a clear distinction between these two terms in the Fourth Meditation of MéditationsCartésiennes, taking Ich as the pole of consciousness and the foundation of habit, while treating Ego as the embodiment, that is, the “I” that is relative to the world and the other.15 For Heidegger, this is certainly not insignificant. (It is originally the appendix to the Chinese translated. version of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, Shanghai Yiwen Chu-ban-she 上海譯文出版社 (Shanghai Translation Publishing House), 2008).

15

See MéditationsCartésiennes, Section 33. The translator of the Chinese version translates both Ich and Ego as zi wo 自我, which would cause trouble in reading. Instead, Ni Liangkang 倪梁 康 translates Ich as zi wo 自我, and Ego as ben wo 本我, which is more appropriate. See Zhang Tingguo 張廷國 (trans.), MéditationsCartésiennes, China City Publishing House 中國城市出版 社, 2002. See alsoNi Liangkang 倪梁康,Hu-Sai-Er Xian-Xiang-Xue Gai-Nian Tong-Shi 胡塞爾現 象學概念通釋 (A Thorough Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenological Concepts), SDX Joint Publishing Company 三聯書店, 1999:108.

Chapter 11

On Different Interpretations of Being: Philosophizing and Modernization of Chinese Thought from the Perspective of Debates on Translated Terms

Abstract This chapter begins with an elaboration on different translations of Being—one emphasizes its origin as a copula while the other emphasizes its connotation of “to exist”—and the problems derived from such translations. Then it moves on to analyze the phenomenon of lacking the ontology of copula verbs in the Chinese language and its implication for the philosophizing and modernization of Chinese thought (which underlies the opportunity for realizing the theory of “es gibt”).

It is undeniable that the translation and study of Western philosophy have had a comprehensive and far-reaching influence on the modernization of Chinese thought. Even when ontologies are discussed in Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy, people always trace back the meaning, problems, and history of the term ontology in western philosophy in order to find the roots. In fact, the influence of Western philosophy on the discussion of ontology is even more profound than we realize. The formulation of the first philosophy, the position of ontology in the first philosophy, and even the standard meaning of the word ontology are all defined and explained from Western philosophy. Through this interpretation, the issues of ben 本 and ti 體 concerned by Chinese thought are naturally absorbed into ontology. However, from the perspective of the western philosophical research circle, the oldest, most extensive, and most profound debate on ontology, a big problem involving philosophy itself, lies in the discussion of the specific problem of translation. The translation of “Being”1 and other morphologically related words has led to a lengthy debate involving several generations of leading figures in Western philosophical research. So far, the debate has generated a lot of thought-provoking

This is a keynote speech given by the author at the Conference “German Philosophy and Modern China” organized by the Institute of German Philosophy and Culture of Tongji University and the Department of Philosophy and Sociology of Tongji University (Shanghai, June 2004). The author’s current position has been revised. This draft is only a witness reserved for the path of thought. 1

In this article, the word Being is used to refer to what we are talking about, except in some places where the same concept is used in German, Greek and Latin. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_11

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commentary from different backgrounds, but it is far from unanimous.2 If the translation of the word “Being” remains to be discussed, then the understanding of ontology derived from “Being” will be worth discussing. In fact, any discussion of ontology should first clarify the meaning of Being. This clarification is the basic content of the so-called debates on translated terms.

11.1 The Debates on Translated Terms and Problems Derived As for the translation of the word Being, there have always been several kinds of translations, such as cun zai 存在, zai 在, you 有 and shi 是. These translated terms can be basically divided into two categories. One is to emphasize the origin of Being as a copula and advocate to translate it as shi 是 in Chinese. The other focuses on Being’s connotation of cun you 存有 (“es gibt” in German; “to exist” in English). There is naturally a distinction between the Chinese words you 有 and cunzai 存在/ zai 在, but this distinction is not fundamental for either school of thought.3 It is worth noting that the school of copulative understanding, starting from Chen Kang 陳康, has been advocating the translation of shi 是, and from time to time with a series of arguments launched a useful debate. However, the other school of thought that treats Being as denoting “to exist” seldom takes the initiative to state their opinions positively, and the translated terms they advocate are changing. As far as the current situation is concerned, the translation of cun zai 存在 is popular in mainland China, while those in Hong Kong and Taiwan advocate the translation of you 有. This is obviously related to the following background: the classical status of the ideological circle in mainland China is occupied by Marxist literature,4 while the mainstream of the academic circle in Hong Kong and Taiwan still retains the respect for traditional Chinese classics. See Song Jijie 宋繼傑 (ed.),Being Yu Xi-Fang Zhe-Xue Chuan-TongBeing 與西方哲學傳 統 (Being and the Tradition of Western Philosophy), Shi Jia Zhuang 石家莊: Hebei Daxue Chu-Ban-She 河北大學出版社 (Hebei University Press), 2002. 3 Even translators like He Lin 賀麟 fail to point out any appreciable difference between the two when they change the word you 有 to cunzai 存在. See his “xin ban xu yan 新版序言” (“New Preface”) to the 1980 edition of the Chinese translated version of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik (Little Logic), Beijing 北京: The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1994, p. pxvli. The most superficial difference between you 有 and cunzai 存在/zai 在 immediately suggests the vein of traditional Chinese thought. More in-depth differences, with the following analysis of the meaning of you 有, will gradually become clear. 4 The historical-materialist proposition of “she hui cunzai 社會存在 (social existence) determines social consciousness” has since evolved (leaving aside the issue whether this evolution conforms to Marxist principles or not) into the dialectical-materialist proposition of “Cunzai 存在 (Existence/ Matter) is primary while consciousness is secondary” (i.e., Marxist proposition of physics and metaphysics). Few people notice that the two cunzai存在 here are not synonymous, with the former is Wesen while the latter Sein. In keeping with the innocuous translation of she hui cunzai社會存 在, Sein is also translated as zai在 to help accurately understand Marxism. 2

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Why is the translation of Being always elusive and difficult to unify? To be brief, there are two basic reasons: first, there is too much ambiguity in the word “Being”; second, there is no other common Chinese word like Being that has all its basic ambiguity at the same time. Aristotle listed several ambiguities between “to on” and “ousia”(substance) in Chaps. 7 and 8 of Book V of Metaphysics. The former mainly includes: predicate or attribute, truth-judgment (affirmation-negation) and potentiality-reality. Generally speaking, it can be divided into the nature of being and the attribute of being. The latter basically has two meanings: ultimate substratum (which is no longer predicated of anything else) and separation (“this”).5 According to the study of philology, as early as Parmenides’ time, the Greek word einai mainly had three kinds of ambiguities: being a copula verb, “to exist” (cun you 存有), and “making truth-judgment” (duan zhen 斷真).6 This statement, though must be supplemented,7 is generally valid. It can also be confirmed by philosophers and historians of philosophy to a large extent. To sum up, the most important ambiguities in the word Being are of three categories: to exist, being a copula verb, and making truth-judgment. Other ambiguities can more or less be traced back to these three (the meaning of “the postulation of identification” can be included into the meaning of being a copula verb). Among these three categories, the function of truth-judgment can be formally merged into the structures of the copula verb and the predicate, and is directly related to the meaning of to exist in real sense. Therefore, in order to simplify the discussion, the basic ambiguity of Being can be defined as to exist and being a copula verb. People with rich experience of using Chinese and People with certain knowledge of Chinese are both very clear that there is not a single Chinese word with the connotations of both to exist and being a copula verb.8 Work in the history of language 5

See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1017a7-b8; See also 1003a34-1003 b19; 1017b10-25. See Ch. H. Kahn, The Verb “Be” in Ancient Creek, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973: 33, 400. 7 See Wang Lu 王路’s comments on Kahn’s work. At least Tugenhardt’s criticism can add the meaning of “the postulation of identification”. See Wang Lu, “Dui Xi-La-Yu Dong-Ci einai de Li-Jie 對希臘語動詞 einai 的理解”(“The Understanding of the Greek verb einai”), Zhongguo Xue Shu 中國學術 (Chinese Academics), 2001 (1). The rationale for Tugenhardt’s criticism is Sophist. It is Aristotle who explicitly mentions the use of truth-judgment and existence. In addition, in ancient times, the connotation of existence less reflected by Kahn—in addition to referring to Heidegger’s so-called existing at hand (i.e., the meaning of “existence” under the background of modern metaphysics)—actually has rich meaning of appearance and manifestation. Therefore, the “existence” here is best understood as what we call cun you 存有, which includes you 有 and the narrow sense of existence; See: Heidegger, die Grundprobleme derPhaenomenologie, GA, Band 24, p.42f, and the Chinese translated version of Einführung in die Metaphysik, Beijing 北京: The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1996, p. 71f., 91f. 8 Mr. Wang Lu 王路 once used the sentence “Guo le xiao he shi xiao shan 過了小河是小山” (After the river is a hill) to show that shi 是 also has the meaning of “to exist”. Whether or not the word shi是 in this sentence means “to exist” is disputable: “Guo le xiao he you yizuo xiao shan 過了小 河有一座小山” (There is a hill beyond the river) means “to exist”. The Phrase “shi xiao shan 是小 山 ”functions to emphasize the fact that there isa road rather than something else. The shi 是 here should be a weak sense of truth-judgment. It is obvious that its negative form, “Guo le xiao he bushi xiao shan 過了小河不是小山 ”(There isn’t a hill after the river), does not mean “non-existence”. Even if it is so, it is similar to the English sentence of “There is…”. In Chinese, wo shi 我是 is 6

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has shown that the copula verb in ancient Chinese appeared rather late,9 at least being later than the peak of Chinese thought in the pre-Qin period. Even in the period of WeiJinand Southern-and-Northern Dynasties when copula verbs had already appeared or were close to appearing, such verbs had no influence on the initiation of the issue of metaphysical Buddhism. In fact, there is no positive connection at all between the copula verbs and the fundamental problems of Chinese thought. However, the late appearance of the copula verbs and its dispensability in daily communication suggest the characteristics of Chinese thought in a certain way. That is to say, translating Being as shi 是 may lead to the sacrifice of the meaning of “to exist” (cun you 存 有). However, only the meaning of “to exist” (cun you 存有) rather than the copula verbs can prompt the highest inherent problem of Chinese thought, as well as elicit the original meaning of Being. We should be more cautious about interpreting Being as cun zai 存在, zai 在, you 有 (let’s just call it in general the school of “to exist”—understanding). First, that kind of translation must have lost the direct connection with the copulative meaning inherent in the original word of Being. But does the loss of such connection mean that such translation is not desirable at all? It depends on the context. For example, for Aristotle who studied ousi through subject-predicate syntactic structure, shi是 is more appropriate than cun zai 存在. But for Heidegger who has sought to free Sein from the copulative understood, shi 是 is no more appropriate than cun zai 存 在 (though this does not mean that cun zai 存在 is the most appropriate translation). More importantly, for those who think in Chinese, this school of translation opens and blots out the highest issues of Chinese thought. On the one hand, it suggests a way to think about the issue of substance beyond shi 是 (In this sense, it “opens” the Chinese thought). On the other hand, it basically does not pay attention to the difference between cun zai 存在 and you 有 and has a tendency to replace you 有with

never understood as a complete sentence in the way that “I am” is understood in English. What’s more, grasping the problem of Being in Chinese does not relate to the issue of copula verb at all. We must respect this characteristic of thought which shows the style of thought. 9 Mr. Wang Li 王力 maintains that “when the indicative language (the author’s note: that is, predicate) is adjective, there’s no need to use the copula verb; when the indicative language is a noun, there is no affirmative copula before the Six Dynasties”. (Wang Li Yu Yan Xue Lun Wen Ji王力語言 學論文集 (The Collection of Essays on Wang Li’s Linguistic Study), Beijing 北京: The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 2000: 429). However, Mr. Guo Xiliang 郭錫良 believed that the copula verb was produced in the Western Han Dynasty or the late Warring States period. See Guo Xiliang 郭錫 良, Han Yu Shi Lun Ji 漢語史論集 (Treatise on Chinese History), Beijing 北京: The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1997:121.

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cun zai 存在 as the highest issue of thought10 (In this sense, it “blots out” the Chinese thought). In Chinese, there is a subtle but significant difference between cun zai 存在 and you 有. The connotation of you 有 is broader, which not only contains the meaning of cun zai 存在, but also expresses the meaning cun zai 存在 doesn’t have, such as “to manifest” (xian xian 顯現), “to appear” (chu chang 出場) or “to be present” (zai chang 在場), “holding” (chi you 持有) or “having” ( ju you 具有). For example, in modern Chinese, we can say “jin wan mei you yue liang 今晚沒有月亮” (there is no moon tonight), but probably no one will say “jin wan yue liang bucunzai今晚 月亮不存在” (tonight the moon doesn’t exist). But the sentence “yue liang buzai 月 亮不在” (there is no moon) also makes sense. This situation of modern Chinese has actually preserved the original meaning of you有 in ancient times. The connotations of “to manifest” and “to appear” are original, both in etymology and thinking, for the term you 有. All this reveals the fact that we must face: It is impossible to be satisfactory to both sides—the school of copulative understanding and the school of “to exist”— understanding. One of the feats of the translation debate has been to reveal this fact, namely it is fundamentally impossible for Chinese to provide a proper translation of the word Being. Our task is to interpret this fact as the fundamental situation of Chinese thought. Not everyone sees this simple truth. Most scholars who are caught up in the translation dispute insist on finding a proper translation for the word “Being” and keep arguing about it. This, of course, shows that they do not acknowledge the fact. There are a few sober scholars who see this. But there are also intriguing differences in how they view and interpret this fact. This chapter attempts to make a preliminary discussion on this problem.

11.2 The Absence of the Ontology of Copula Verbs in Chinese Thought: A Defect or a Blessing? The Chinese cannot provide a proper translation of the word Being. Scholars in mainland China have different opinions on this fact. Some scholars rightly call for reflection on this fact, but treat it as a defect. However, some scholars believe that it is “perhaps a blessing” that there is no word in Chinese which has both the connotation of the relation and existence. This is said mainly from the viewpoint of analytical As for zai 在, it can either be interpreted as cun zai 存在, shi cun 實存, or as zai chang 在場 according to the ancient meaning. For example, zai在has the meaning of being actually present in the 3:12 of Analects: “Ji ruzai, ji shenrushenzai 祭如在, 祭神如神在” (When Confucius offered sacrifice to his ancestors, he felt as if his ancestral spirits were actually present. When he offered sacrifice to other spiritual beings, he felt as if they were actually present). This layer of meaning can be merged into that of you 有. The simple word zai在does not pose a problem for Chinese thought. In the pre-Qin literature, cun 存and zai在can be mutually commenting. “…zai,cun ye 在, 存也”, “zai, cun… cha ye 在、存, 察也” (Erya ZhuShu: Shi Gu Xia 爾雅注疏· 釋詁下). Again, “cun cun… zai ye 存存, 在也” (Erya Zhu Shu: Shi Xun Di San 爾雅注疏· 釋訓第三).

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philosophy of logic. In symbolic logic, the copula verb disappears into the structure of the predicate function, while shi cun 實存 is represented as the quantifier, and the shi cun zhe 實存者 is the so-called value of the constraint item. That is to say, the Chinese language is in line with the ideal, and it is exactly the expression of “the spirit of logos” to express the copula verb and the existence with different characters. We generally agree that this feature of the Chinese language “may be a blessing”. But the detailed foundation for such statement doesn’t have to be the same. This chapter tries to put forward a reason from the perspective of basic problems in metaphysics. This aspect of the argument has also been put forward by scholars.11 My argument here is based on the fundamental difference between shi 是 and you 有. We do not believe that this feature of Chinese indicates “the incomparability of Chinese and Western learning”.12 The judgment of “perhaps a blessing” is based on some kind of “comparison”. But this “comparison” is not an anatomical or even mechanical search for “the same”, the “similarities”, or the “differences”, but an appeal to the grasp of the fundamental question and its timing. That is to say, the special triumph of Chinese thought is achieved from the aspect of the basic and the highest issues and is in the context of the “modern”. If the fundamental and supreme problems of Chinese thought have nothing to do with Western philosophy or philosophy itself, then any “comparison” is impossible. But isn’t the supreme problem of philosophy ontology? Isn’t ontology the study of the issue to on hei on (Being qua Being), that is, the first ousia (Substance)? As Aristotle put it: “Kai de kai to palaite kai nun kai aeizetoumenon kai aeiaporoumenon, ti to on, toutoesti tis he ousia”.13 Since the root of ousia lies in shi 是 and the way of truth that “only being possible without being impossible”, is there any doubt in asserting that Chinese thought, whose basic issue is never guided by shi 是, is not philosophy? Isn’t there a typical gap between the Chinese thought and the Western thought? This issue raised by Aristotle is the supreme one only in Aristotelian metaphysics. If philosophy is equal to “metaphysics”, then the “comparison between the Chinese thought and the Western thought” in essence can only be nonsense. But the history of Western philosophy offers other possibilities. Before Aristotle, Plato identified the supreme knowledge of the philosopher king as the knowledge of the good and the eidos, “einai and ousia originate from the good” and the good is “superior to ousia in status and power”. I will not discuss here Plato’s insight above and the hidden clues it leaves to the history of philosophy. Let’s take a look at an “approachable” who also kept his basic vision “before Aristotle”, namely Heidegger. We pay attention to him for the following three reasons. First of all, among all the masters who have thought about the highest issues of Western philosophy, only he is basically of our contemporary generation. Secondly, he has something to do with the hidden clue left by Plato. Last but not least, Heidegger is the most powerful force in the Western learning of the Chinese ideological circle in the past two decades. Now even the Please see the relevant discussions initiated by Ye Xiushan 葉秀山, Zhao Dunhua 趙敦華, Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀, and Fang Zhaohui 方朝暉. 12 Ibid. 13 See Aristotle, Metaphysics: Zeta, 1028b2ff. 11

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interpretation of Marx is beginning to fall under his shadow. The reason that people have so much interest in rediscussing the issue of translated terms proposed by Mr. Chen Kang 陳康 in his translation of Plato’s works mainly lies in the stimulation of Heidegger’s works. It’s true that Heidegger took up the issue raised by Aristotle and even explicitly invoked Aristotle to illustrate himself. However, it is precisely through his “phenomenological interpretation”14 of the latter that he suspended and even deconstructed the pre-understanding of the meaning of Being caused by the copious words. In Heidegger’s language, that is to say, the connotation of Sein as a copula word corresponds to a ready-made comprehension of existence.15 In other words, the subject in a proposition is a participation of the copula word and in this sense is a “being” (cun you zhe 存有者, “das Seiende” in German). The subject is specified in the structure of sentence, which is supported by nothing more than the copula verb. The meaning of “das Seiende”, as a propositional subject, can only be grasped from the copula verb and not from “to exist”. “Metaphysics” probes into the foundation of “das Seiende”. No matter such foundation is “entity” or “subject”, it will be understood as the ready-made ousia, which is permanent and eternal in the flow and thus hides behind the phenomenon as well as is opposed to the phenomenon. This ousia is not shaken by the flow of predicates but only gets the simple stipulation from the copula verb, and thus is the pure Seiende. The essence of ousia is the subject. The essence of the subject is “only being possible without being impossible”. The pure subject, the real subject or ousia, can only be derived from shi 是 and not from other stipulations. The essence of the subject lies in the shi 是, that is, the copula verb. The “metaphysics”, in essence, lies in the oblivion of Sein, which is accomplished by interpreting Sein as shi是. What, then, is the true meaning of Sein, obscured by shi 是? Why does shi 是 obscure this meaning? Is this obscuration entirely “wrong”? How to break through this obscuration and reveal the true meaning of Sein? To sum up, Heidegger’s thinking accomplished the following tasks. First, in Sein Und Zeit, he connected Sein to the original meaning of Phänomen such as appearance and manifestation with the assertion that ontology is only possible as being phenomenology. In die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie, he specifically criticized the whole tradition of the theory of copula verb.16 These two things are one and the same. The so-called phenomenological ontology must criticize the understanding of Sein as a copula verb. For it is this understanding that is at the root of the opposition between Phänomen and Wesen, between Sein and Schein. To understand Being as a copula verb means to understand “Sein” only in the sense of the basic subjectpredicate structure of “S is P”. The subject term (individual) or species (form) and contingency are logically asymmetric in terms of shi 是.17 This logical asymmetry is 14

Heidegger, die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie, GA, Band 24, p.288. Ibid. 16 As for the tradition of the theory of copula verb, see Heidegger, die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie, GA, Band 24, Sect. 16–18. 17 For example, Socrates is young (compared to the old), but not young (compared to the young). Then “being young” cannot be a being (das Seiende) because it may not be what Socrates is. Only 15

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understood “metaphysically” as the contrast between “Being” (shi 是) and “Becoming” (bian 变). Phänomen are opinions, are “being while not being” (shi you bu shi 是又不是). Phänomen is the “Becoming”, and “Being while un-Becoming” (shi er bu bian 是而不变) in the process of Becoming is the opposite of the Phänomen, the Wesen behind the Phänomen. The greatest contribution of phenomenology is to restore the original status of Phänomen and changes, and to suspend the Being behind them, and even constitute the Being from the Phänomen. It could be said that it was phenomenology that began to dissolve the tradition of understanding Sein in terms of the copula verbs. From this point of view, translating Sein as shi 是 without regard to context is the result of the domination of the old “metaphysical” ideas of pre-phenomenology. The Sein of phenomenological comprehension is you 有. For various reasons, late Heidegger no longer ascribed his work to phenomenology. But his emphasis on Sein’s connotation of manifesting and being present has not changed, but has been validated and played out. He began to relate the exploration of Sein’s meaning to the history of philosophy and ultimately to the history of language. Not only the Sein of German philosophy is understood in this way, but also the Greek philosophy of to on, ousia, parousia, etc. For example, he thinks that the best translation of parousia is “Anwesenheit” in German (the presence, not the being who is present). According to Heidegger, the biggest problem of Western philosophy, or the fate of Western philosophy, is to forget the existentialist difference between “beings” and “Being”. It is the discussion of “beings” (i.e., metaphysics) that obscures the thought of “Being”. Late Heidegger had been thinking: How did this obscuration happen? What does it mean for the fate of thought? The history of languages shows that18 Indo-European languages, such as Greek, have clear divisions between verbs, infinitives, and nouns, and this has a substantial effect on the comprehension of Being. At first, Being functions as a verb. Later, its function as infinitives and nouns evolved. To focus on the “beings” of Being is to mistake Being for the “beings” existing in the Being. From a linguistic point of view, this is the result of replacing the meaning of the original verb with an infinitive or even a noun. The lexical distinctions of Western languages are untouchable, and the thinking of Being in such languages can only be initiated by “manipulating” the word “Sein” which is highly inclined to be a noun. This situation led late Heidegger to think not even in terms of Sein, but in terms of the more primitive Lichtung or Ereignis, what had previously been thought under the issue of Sein. This fundamentally cuts off the basic vein of understanding the issue of Being from the perspective of the copula shi 是. “Socrates” and “man” can be the “beings”. For they must always be accompanied by shi 是 and are impossible to be not shi 是. When Aristotle focused on whether man (the form) or Socrates (the individual) was the first Sein, he had lost the vision to understand to on hei on from outside the view of the copula verbs. Of course, in the same syntax of subject-predicate, and in the same sentence above, Plato would immediately exclude the individual (both is and is not) and consider being young itself as the real Sein (being young is different from the youth, since being young itself is always young). 18 See the Chinese translated version of Heidegger’s Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, Beijing 北京: The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 1996: 54ff.

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If Heidegger, before the change of his research focus, mainly started with the ontological difference between Anwesenden and Anwesenheit, then he went further back to Anwesen and inquired of Anwesen-lassen, which had already gone beyond the logic-metaphysical scope marked by Sein and entered into the thinking of “es gibt” (“to exist”). Heidegger is very clear that this direction of thinking has departed from the Western tradition. According to him, Sein has been pondered on since the beginning of Western thought, but “Es gibt als solches” hasn’t.19 We may boldly claim that the Western language is not suitable for the thought of “es gibt” that late Heidegger expected (although he regards such unsuitableness as the destiny of “es gibt”), but in a language that distinguishes shi 是 from you 有 without having a stubborn noun form, can the theory of “es gibt” be truly realized? This is the greatest opportunity left by Western philosophy for Chinese thought. The highest problem of Chinese thought cannot be derived from Being, so it cannot belong to the copulative ontology which is based on the logical analysis of copula verbs (that is, the kind of ontology mainly understood from the aspect of shi 是, which can be called the “ontology of shi 是”). In this respect, the triumph of translation is likely to lead to the defeat of thought. Perhaps, we can find the very issue most relevant to Being in Chinese thought through the seemingly “appropriate” translation. However, the process of translation always erases—rather than reveals—differences. In this sense, once we do that kind of translation, we may logically regard that very issue in Chinese thought as the issue of Being (that is, the ontology of shi 是). Its supreme status and standard method would be just like that of “The first philosophy” of the West. In this way, we would basically misunderstand the fundamental problem in Chinese thought. The price of this misunderstanding is the real extinction of Chinese thought. To say that the supreme problem of Chinese thought does not stem from Being does not mean that there is no connection between Chinese philosophy and the rich original meaning of Being. The highest task of Chinese translation and understanding of Western learning is precisely to reveal and explain this connection as it is. As Heidegger rightly said, the meaning of Being is related to the destiny of Western thought, so this task is also tied to the fate of Chinese thought.

11.3 Concluding Remarks The most significance of the debate on translated terms is that it pushes people directly into the discussion of the various meaning of Being and pushes us to look back and dive deeper into our own traditions. Such a shock of thought cannot be brought about by unimpeded translation. The greatest danger, as illustrated by the debate on translated terms, is that researchers mostly believe in finding a suitable translated term and interpret this relatively suitable term as the supreme problem of Chinese thought itself. The difficulty and reluctance of translation force people to 19

Heidegger, ZurSache Des Denkens, Tuebingen, Tuebingen, 1976, S8.

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face the abstruse difference of the Chinese and Western language. The foundation of the debate on translated terms is the differences between Chinese and Western ideas. This indelible difference presented in the issue of translation is the greatest contribution of the debate on translated terms to the history of Chinese thought. (Originally published in The Journal of Tongji University, 2005 (1): 71–76).

Chapter 12

On Being and Change (Yi 易): Phenomenological Guide to the Way (Dao 道)

Abstract This chapter focuses on investigating into Heidegger’s own critical reflection on Sein Und Zeit, which not only symbolizes his complete rejection of transcendental subjectivity, but also uncovers the possible connection of the thoughts of late Heidegger with traditional Chinese thoughts, especially those in the Book of Changes (Zhou Yi 周易) and its supplementary classics. On that basis, this chapter further discusses the difference between thoughts of late Heidegger and the way of change in Chinese thoughts, to denote the possible development of the Heideggerian thinking.

It’s been 80 years since the publication of Sein Und Zeit. It was first published in Chinese exactly 20 years ago. At this historic moment, the reconsideration of the Chinese academic community on this great work which is still almost decisive for the current philosophical thinking is the best remembrance and response to that spiritual event eighty years ago. Sein Und Zeit is almost universally regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works of the twentieth century. But this does not prevent us from carefully following, questioning, and even investigating into it. Questioning and investigation into a work might be the most faithful followership. Although Sein Und Zeit is Heidegger’s most famous work, it is not his ending work. He has made a series of explorations since the book was published. Their consistency in the “turning”/ change of Heidegger’s research-focus does not obscure the fact that the topologically rotating facets around this book as the principal axis are complex. The “road signs” after Sein Und Zeit do not mark the only route forward and backward, nor do To commemorate the 80th anniversary of the publishment of Sein Und Zeit. The first half of this paper was read at the Conference “Interpretive Phenomenology and its Metamorphosis: The 80th Anniversary of the Publication of Heidegger’s Sein Und Zeit” held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in May 2007. The full text was read at the academic exchange during the spring semester of 2007 at the Center for the History of Thoughts of Fudan University. The author owes thanks to some teachers and friends, especially the guest reviewers of CUHK (the Chinese University of Hong Kong), who put forward some pertinent comments, based on which the author made some revisions. But some of the opinions, which are too large to be dealt with in this chapter, have to be left for the other time. © SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1_12

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they simply point to the same center of a circle from different directions. Rather, it shows paths diverging, echoing, winding, and converging—though not without the characteristic of polyphonic counterpoint. In any case, even though the roads make up a maze-like picture, the entrance to the maze is certain. As the only intersection of Heidegger’s early thoughts, it is the different motives contained in Sein Und Zeit that developed the complex road network pattern in his later works. In Sein Und Zeit, the motives that seem to be temporarily settled in the systematic way break through the interrelation given to them by the structure of “fundamental ontology” and move from an architecturallike “mechanical relation” to a musical-like “musical-movement relation”, which is the transformation of thought style from Heidegger’s early period to his late period. As far as his correlated motivation is concerned, there is hardly a single measure of these complex changes. It would be most fitting, perhaps, to take one of the recurring motives in Heidegger’s later works, which can be found in the “musical movements” of BeitrgenZur Philosophie,1 and follow the development of this motive to its end. In such a following process, a motive will naturally show corresponding and entangling relationship with other motives. Whether we start from any of the motives—truth, metaphysics, language, art, time, Dasein, freedom, or a concept in the history of philosophy—we will eventually arrive at a realm or situation in which all of these motives can be organized. Where Sein/Seyn or Ereignis rushes-presents to us is the place to which all Heidegger’s writings and speeches lead, and to which he tries to teach us to appreciate and admire. But how do we determine that guiding motive? Is this choice arbitrary? The key to the answer lies in the fate of Sein Und Zeit. More precisely, how does Heidegger— after publishing Sein Und Zeit—review this work? And how has he dismantled in different ways this “palace” which is admittedly unfinished and converted those fragments into intertwining themes and motives which belong to another integrity? The answers to these questions are guidelines to our exploration of Heidegger. Twenty years ago, the mission was to enter and investigate into Sein Und Zeit. Twenty years later, the task is to see how to dismantle Sein Und Zeit? Dismantlement is not equal to destruction, and watching people do the dismantlement is not to “watch the building fall down”. He who can build it can also dismantle it. In any case, Sein Und Zeit has “passed away”. Perhaps, this is the true meaning of the word “memorial” ( ji nian 紀念). In view of this, this paper attempts to start from Heidegger’s own reflection on Sein Und Zeit, and to push Heidegger’s thoughts into an original—phenomenon situation by comparing intertextuality to restore the context of the basic problems. This chapter hopes that the basic situation presented by restoring the original phenomenon as a whole can be used to outline the initial direction of efforts to measure the contribution of Heidegger’s thought in the context of certain original situation of traditional Chinese thoughts, and to further develop this original situation in such a process of measuring.

1

Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophie-Vom Ereignis, GA65, Vittrio Klostermann, FaM, 1989.

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12.1 Investigation and Dismantlement of the Original: After Sein Und Zeit Heidegger made it clear once in a correspondence in 1935: A cover was added, incidentally, under the title Critique of Being and Time. I slowly understood the book, and now I grasped its problems more clearly; I see that the book is full of great carelessness... Only now is it possible to raise the same questions again, in a much more fundamental way, and much more freely from all contemporaries, scholars, and students.2

In 1942 he was even more blunt, claiming that Sein Und Zeit is a failure.3 If the quotation above is a more honest expression of Heidegger’s ideas, the “failure” he thinks is, of course, in terms of the project of Sein Und Zeit itself, not in terms of the book’s failure to accomplish such a project.4 It may be slightly exaggerated to say that all thinking activities after Sein Und Zeit are “criticisms” of this book. The essence of this criticism lies in the so-called raising the same questions again in a much more fundamental way. Since this “much more fundamental” activity implies at the same time being “much more free from all contemporaries”, and so on, the further elaboration of raising the question takes on a distinct historical dimension. Providing a definitive footnote to the contents of this private correspondence, and certainly to our explanation above, is the short and thoughtful essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”.5 The foreword of this essay is an almost precise response to the claims made in the above correspondence: Since 1930, I have repeatedly tried to make the theme of Being and Time more authentic, and this has meant an internal critique of the starting point of Being and Time. So, the title of the mission Being and Time will also change. We may ask: First, how does philosophy come to its doom in the present age? Second, what kind of task does philosophy leave for thought at the time of its doom?6

2 It is in Heidegger’s correspondence to Elisabeth Blochmann. Also quoted in Guenter Figal, Martin Heidegger zur Einfuehrung, Hamburg, 1992, S48. Translator’s note: For the convenience of readers, I purposefully translate the quotation into English, instead of maintaining its German original text. For the fluency of translation, the book title Sein Und Zeit is purposefully translated as Being and Time in the quotation, similarly hereinafter. 3 Ibid, S48. 4 At least Figal’s argument is misleading, as if the failure Heidegger thinks merely denotes that Sein Und Zeit was not finished as planned. 5 This essay is included in: Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, Tuebingen, 1976. The page number refers to that in its Chinese translated version Mian-Xiang Si de Shi-Qing 面嚮思的事情 (hereinafter “SD”), Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. Similarly hereinafter. Translator’s note: How to translate into English the word “Ende” in this title is perplexing. I translate it as “position” to denote the meaning similar to Ort in German. As stated by Heidegger himself, “Ende” here doesn’t have the meaning of ending, though the German word “Ende” itself does. For more discussion about this, please see footnote 8 of this chapter. 6 SD, S58.

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That is to say, to raise the question about Sein Und Zeit “more fundamentally” means nothing more than a return to the “Ende” of philosophy,7 and to all possibilities gathered at the origin of philosophy especially the “most extreme possibilities”, which shows that the task has to break through the “Ende of philosophy” and leave to “thinking” the reason of destiny. The explanation of the history of philosophy, or more precisely the deconstruction of the history of ontology—that is, the possibility of showing, investigating into, and breaking through philosophy itself—is internal to the self-composition of “des Denkens”.8 The investigation into the “Ende” of philosophy seems to be the usual exercise in the history of philosophy, which, in its true meaning, provides a springboard for the leap (Sprung, in the metaphysical sense) of thinking. At the beginning of the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, Heidegger lays out the primary task of philosophy: Philosophy is metaphysics, which focuses on Being and the unity of beings in Being to think of beings in integrity, that is, the world, man and God. Metaphysics thinks of “das SeiendealsSeiende” in a way based on acting the phenomenon (Die Metaphysikdenkt das SeiendealsSeiende in der Weise des begruendendenVorstellens)…Being, as the foundation, brings beings into its present presence. The foundation manifests itself as the presence (Anwesenheit). The here-and-now (Gegenwart) of Anwesenheit lies in that Gegenwart brings up—in Anwesenheit— beings of presence, each in its own way. According to the texture (Gepräge) of Anwesenheit, the foundation thus is characteristic of Gruenden according to the basis (den Charakter des Gruendens)…The trait of metaphysical thought which aims at looking for foundation for beings (das dem Seienden den Grundergruendet) is that, it starts from beings of presence to represent the beings of presence in their Anwesenheit, and thus from its ground to express it as the beings of presence established on the foundation.9

These texts are precise and thorough and contain Heidegger’s basic program10 of deconstructing the history of ontology—this is the potential use or mechanism to investigate into the ground and root. Heidegger deliberately uses several grund-rooted words in succession here to emphasize this mechanism. Thinking about “das SeiendealsSeiende” is originally the first task of the “tradition of metaphysics” originated from Aristotle’s “first philosophy”.11 The fundamental characteristic of metaphysics is not to propose the task for itself, but to solve it by the mechanism of seeking the It is inappropriate to translate the word Ende as zhongjie 終結 (ending). The word has many meanings, but it is explained in Heidegger’s text that Ende means the same thing as Ort, and the sentence “from this Ende to that Ende” means “from one position to another”. For example, both the starting point and the ending point of a line are Ende. This word is similar to “Peras” that Aristotle discusses. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, book V, chapter 17. The German translated version of Metaphysics translates “Peras” as “Grenze”. See Aristoteles’ Metaphysik, Neubearbeitung der Uebersetzung von Hermann Boniz, Hamburg, 1989, S79. 8 In view of the balance of Heidegger’s later thinking, the only way to “des Denkens” in Sein Und Zeit is to deconstruct the history of ontology. See SD, S10; Sein Und Zeit, S6. 9 SD, S58f. 10 We omit from the quotation Heidegger’s respective comments on the history of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche. But even without the historical details, he can’t bypass Aristotle and Plato in this summary. 11 See Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book IV, S1, 1003a24. 7

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root. Even a post-metaphysical style of thinking also starts from the basic “truthimage” of “Being makes beings present”. The key lies in understanding Being as the basis (Grund), and further on this Grund to establish (Gruenden) the whole of beings. However, authentically reflecting on Being requires the evasion of Being as the Grund of beings.12 For a long time, Heidegger’s work is nothing more than to explore, with different schemes, how to break this mechanism of grasping Being as the basis of beings. The two main essays—“The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” and “Time and Being”—in the book of Zur Sache des Denkens show two intertwined and echoing paths of “breaking and establishing”. The root-seeking mechanism was developed in the ancient Greek philosophy since Plato. But from Heidegger’s conception of metaphysics, and from his repeated consideration of Platonic philosophy, the principal character of this mechanism should be more fully demonstrated in Aristotle—although the above quoted statements such as “according to the texture (Gepräge) of Anwesenheit” allude to Platonic theory of form/idea (eidos).13 After Aristotle raised the supreme question of “to on hei on /das SeiendealsSeiende/Being qua Being” at the beginning of Book IV of Metaphysics,14 it is turned into the issue of what is “ousia/Wesen/substance”15 in Chap. 1 of Volume VII. It was not until the end of this chapter that it was decided to think of the question of “Being qua Being” raised in Book IV “in der Weise des begruendendenVorstellens”. That is to say, the entire first chapter of Book VII decisively establishes the potential of pursuing the root in the most authoritative way—the rationale behind the repeated consideration and pursuit of ousia in Metaphysics and throughout the metaphysical history. Let’s look at Aristotle’s own statement: None of them [“to walk”, “to be healthy”, or “to sit”] is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks, sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e., the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate…Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the other also is. Therefore that which is primarily, i.e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance.16 12

See the essay “Time and Being” in SD, S6. See Martin Heidegger, die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, S149. 14 The order of the volumes of Metaphysics is certainly determined by the editor, but the chronological order of these two volumes is definite. See also an alternative edition different from the traditional one, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Edited and Trans by John Warrington, London/New York, 1956. 15 Therefore, from ancient times to modern times, the theme people usually question has been “what is substance”. See Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1028b. 16 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028a 10-32.The subject-underlying principle runs through Aristotle’s theory of substance. “Separateness” and “individuality” are the limitations on this basis, without which pure matter will become the substance. As Aristotle puts it, the matter without “separateness” and “individuality” is the substratum. It is the substratum rather than the subject-underlying principle itself that is being questioned. It is also according to this principle that Categorias determines the perceptible thing as the first substance. Perhaps the best demonstration of the root-seeking mechanism at work is Aristotle’s On Coming-to-Be and Perishing. From the perspective of the history 13

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Clearly, there is a “force” that drives Aristotle (and, in his view, the pre-Socratic philosophers) to establish a self-entity that resides beneath or behind the stream of life (this “beneath” and “behind” are also established simultaneously). When this force is applied to explore the whole universe of beings, Being is resolved to the highest substance, i.e., the deity. Eastern thinking might call this force “obsessionstagnation” (zhi-zhuo 執-着), and to grasp it as the continuing “beings of stagnation” (zhuozhe 着者).17 “Stagnation” (Zhuo 着) is an original state of time, that is, the momentary flow of life and death suddenly stagnate into “temporarily existing” and “simultaneity”. “Stagnation” (Zhuo 着) is the origin of all Temporalität. With “stagnation” (zhuo 着), there are three phases of the (vulgar) time composed of “past”, “future”, and “present”. That is to say, with the constant stagnation of moment, there is the longitudinal time stretching long formed by the points of moments. The stagnation is the cause for stretching long, while stretching long precedes the moments. It is not the moments that stretch long, because without the continuity-stretch will there be the absence of all moments. If we look from the nature of the flow of life, that is to say, if there is no simultaneity, “Being” (shi 是) can not “be being” (shi zhe 是着); and without “be being”, all “being” will be equal to “non-being” unconditionally. This makes it impossible to talk about the so-called to on hei on/das SeiendealsSeiende. To establish this supreme task, Aristotle had to exorcise the “being-yet-non-being” ghost of Heracletes. His way of exorcism is to establish (or, stagnate) simultaneity. The first thing that really needs no proof is this simultaneity, this point of moment (the “stagnation”) and nothing else. It was in Volume IV that initiated this supreme task that he hastened to introduce the metaphysical principle which is often mistaken for the law of logic: The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.18

It is called a principle, because it cannot be proved, but is the premise of all proof; the reason why this is metaphysical is that what it says is simply that simultaneity is the premise of Being. This principle, which appears in Book IV, seems to support the premise of the root-exploring mechanism in Book VII. “Be being” is the premise of “beings” and seems to be the premise of “the first being” (substance). However, the before-after here is just stated in a conventional way. The mechanism of exploring the root is actually the mechanism of stagnation. The latter, as a potential, must be applied to the flow of phenomenon. When it is used in this way, it becomes a mechanism for exploring the root. Let’s now take a review of Heidegger’s statement quoted above: of philosophy, this paper shows the overwhelming victory of Sein/Being over Werden/Becoming, or “noumenon” over “phenomenon”. Or, in Buddhist terms, it demonstrates the establishment of “self-nature” or changjian 常見 (duanjian 斷見 is made possible by changjian 常見). 17 See the third section of this chapter for the eastern thinking on the praise and criticism of the self-entity. It’s only worth noticing that the establishment of the self-entity is the decisive dividing line between the eastern and western thinking. 18 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1005b22.

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Being, as the foundation, brings beings into its present presence. The foundation manifests itself as the presence (Anwesenheit). The here-and-now (Gegenwart) of Anwesenheit lies in that Gegenwart brings up—in Anwesenheit— beings of presence, each in its own way.

The overlapping of the foundation and the presence is what we call the overlapping of the root-exploring mechanism and the stagnation mechanism. This means that it is also possible to discredit the ground by dismantling the present. This is how Heidegger’s whole discourse of time—and here in particular his lecture notes of “Time and Being”—echoes the discourse of being. Here, we need to take a closer look at the potential of root-exploring/stagnation.19 From “being and non-being” to “be-being and beings”, what kind of function is this? To break this mechanism, what “method” should be based on, and what kind of situation will this “method” present? In view of these ways and situations, how to estimate, continue, and finish Heidegger’s philosophical exploration comprehensively? This chapter will give a more detailed explanation in the second especially the third part. For now, let’s give a hint to the application and resolution of this potential from the perspective of the origin of ancient Greek philosophy in the western thought tradition. It is this “perspective” that dominates Heidegger himself. From the consciousness of the ancient Greek philosophers, this potential of rootexploring/stagnation is entangled with the power of language. The philosopher who advocates flow of change is also the one who is conscious of language.20 From the perspective of grammar, the root-seeking potential matured in Aristotelian philosophy may just indicate both the primacy of subject to predicate and that of noun to verb. In Heidegger’s word, it is the predominance of Was over Wie. Whatever Aristotle considered in his search for substance (form, matter, synthetical concrete as a sensible thing, final end, first motive force, perfect realization, etc.), they were subjects or subjects in disguise,21 and thus at the same time were indicated by nouns. What these candidates have in common was already lurking in the Greek language when the question about “to on hei on” was posed through Aristotle. He answered the highest task of “research of being” with “the research of substance”, which is nothing more than to exert to the end the potentiality of “subject-noun” presented in gerund. Gerund is the intermediate form between the present tense and the noun. Through this mediation, there is a corresponding between present tense-gerund and subject-noun, and between resident-stagnation potential and root-exploring mechanism. It is these that determine what is called the overlapping relationship between the present and the foundation. 19

The above is only referring to “force” in a metaphorical sense. If it is an original power, what power is it? Is it strong will? The discussion of the strong will should start from the analysis of the theory of potentiality in the ninth volume of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, while the original work of Heidegger reviewed in this chapter is not a particularly suitable text. 20 It might be due to this reason that Kratylos, a dialogue written by Plato, is named after the inheritor of this philosopher. 21 There may be other explanations for what one thinks about potential/reality, just as there are other explanations for Plato’s theory of eidos. It was Aristotle himself who swallowed up the other possibilities implied in the theory of potential/Reality with the theory of form/matter. This implication should be unfolded in elsewhere.

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The issue of time and that of Being are also two sides of one coin in language. Raising the question of “reality/being” in the form of “present tense–gerund” and responding to it in the form of “gerund–noun” itself illustrates the dominance of that force embodied in grammar over the Greek doctrine of being.22 In the Western tradition, there is no way to bypass language in order to break through stagnation. But on the other hand, we can’t equate this kind of potential with what is determined by language and ascribe the study of philosophical thought to that of etymology. Metaphysics and linguistics have a corresponding relationship of mutual invention, but one cannot replace the other. For this reason, Heidegger reminds us that grammar should not determine philosophy, and that “which one comes first, verb or noun” should not be regarded as a final question.23 And for the same reason, he also constantly meditates on the roots of language, using the terms such as Sagen and Wort to denote the Es gibe/Ereignis that cannot remain stagnated in the noun and (even formal) subject. Taking into account the occasions in which Sagen/Wort spoke, of course, breaking the rules of the language means breaking the rule of the subject-noun. The theory with its recurrent formal synonym (Ereignisereignet, Zeit zeignet, Wesenwestet, etc.) seems to be an attempt to make the subject-noun visible in the form of a verb. This is not the identity law of A = A, but the removal of subject-noun precedence or associative-verb precedence on which the law of identity depends. The metaphysical premise of logic is the primacy of beings. Before logics is developed comes the real use of the phenomenology. Mr. He Lin 賀麟, a senior Chinese philosopher, observed that “the method of phenomenology is that we spy upon the substance in its use”.24 Although he did not explicitly mention Husserl’s phenomenological tradition, he did not depart from it. Heidegger thought that what he used was called “possible phenomenology”25 which was different from Husserl himself in thinking of being. We can also understand it as a theory of phenomenological character. In Heidegger’s more formal exploration of “methodology”, it is the “formal guidance” that obscure Was and give prominence to Wie that played a guiding role either implicitly or explicitly. This statement does not mention the name of language, but

22

As illustrated by researches on Plato’s Kratylos, the connotation of “noun” is the beings one chases after. See the Chinese translated version of Plato’s Cratylos, translated by Peng Wenlin 彭 文林, Taibei 臺北: Linking Publishing Co. LTD. 聯經, 2002: xxxvii. 23 See Heidegger’s Einführung in die Metaphysik. In Indo-European languages, verbs and nouns occur separately and simultaneously, and there is no question of which comes first. It is only in the morphologically undifferentiated words that such inquiries can be answered. The question is not whether verbs or nouns come first in the sense of mature grammar, but simply how we break through this “mature”—or too “mature”, that is, “logical”—“grammar” to grasp the original word, term, or form-image. This is probably the most valuable lesson Heidegger’s learning has given to the century of so-called language-pragmatics turning. At the same time, it was the hammer that broke the “philosophy of language” as the last philosophical icon. Naturally, few people are brave enough to accept the lesson of this hammer. 24 He Lin 賀麟, “Wang Chuan-shan de Li-Shi Zhe-Xue” 王船山的歷史哲學 “The Historical Philosophy of Wang Chuanshan”, in Wen-Hua Yu Ren-Sheng 文化與人生 (Culture And Life), Shanghai People’s Publishing House 上海人民出版社, 2011: 256. 25 SD, S85.

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actually contains the connotation of demonstrating the original “verb” and refuting nouns.26

12.2 The Limits of Philosophy and Plato’s Allegory of the Cave As the beginning of the task of thinking, the effort to break down the basic and return to the emptiness begins with the breakthrough of philosophy. Things to think about are not simply to throw philosophical things aside, but to explore their greatest possibilities at the limits of philosophy, and it is here that “hides what remains to be thought that can no longer be philosophical things”.27 That is to say, the “terminal” of philosophy coincides with the “beginning” of thought. This terminal-beginning is the Being of beings or the Being to beings—Anwesenlassen. The seminar centering around the essay of “Time and Being” makes it clear that Anwesenlassen can be interpreted in two ways. One concerns Anwesenden, which has to do with beings. We may understand it as “to allow…to be present” (lassen... Anwesen, suo rang 所讓). The second focuses on what makes the beings to be present, which can be reluctantly interpreted as “to be able to allow beings to be present” (neng rang 能讓).28 The way of thinking in the essay of “Time and Being” is to regard “to be able to allow being present” (neng rang 能讓) as the formal subject (xing shi zhu yu 形式主語) of “Es/Ereignis” through reflecting on “Es gibt…”. There is a big trouble here. Although this expression avoids mentioning any subject as much as possible and emphasizes the contemplation of “es gibt”, the power of German and all Western grammar forces the speakers to consider this Ereignis as a subject. Even if not credited with a concept, it is logically interpreted as a “giver”, and in this sense the force to search for a root-—which should be overcome—, is still in play. The formal subject, after all, still has the appearance of the subject. But any true subject term shall refer to a given being that is present. Therefore, the one who causes beings to be present shall not be such a given being that is present. However, if only interpreted in this way, it would be no more than a logical argument against infinite regression. Nevertheless, what is discussed here predates logic and requires no argument. What Heidegger wants to do here is not to give arguments, but to point, to show, and to guide. The other approach to Lichtung did not begin directly with Es gibt, but its use was more widespread—it could be said that all the thought of “truth” in Heidegger’s path belonged to this approach. This more clearly demonstrates the power of “formal guidance” or “metaphysical guidance”. The entrance to this path is still “Anwesenlassen”, but it is to place it at the beginning of metaphysics—that is, in the context of the fundamental problem that 26

Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologi des religioesen Lebens, GA 60, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, SS57-65. 27 SD, S67. 28 For the difference between these two connotations of Anwesenlassen, Please see SD S38.

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gathers the greatest possibilities. This problem situation is what illustrated by Plato’s allegory of the cave. Heidegger has repeatedly elaborated on this famous allegory in The Republic.29 This is not without reason. The reason stated earlier is: Philosophy has not made any progress on its central questions since Plato.30 It is not accidental that Plato touches upon the outer limits of philosophical inquiry, that is to say, upon the beginning and the end of philosophy. The content of the metaphor, in particular, is not accidental. At the beginning of Book VII of The Republic, Plato explains the allegory of the cave.31

And then: “Why is this explanation of Plato’s allegory of the cave historically fundamental? For here it is also clear in an elicited meditation how aletheia at the same time bears the burden of the Greek inquiry of on, and how aletheia is finally brought down by this inquiry (by the setting of eidos)”.32 There are some similarities between the previous and later discussions, that is to say, inquiry into the Greek issue of Being from the explanation of the truth theory in this allegory. There is also a substantial shift from his earlier interpretation to his later one, which is the transfer to Parmenides-Heracletes of the status given to Plato in the earlier interpretation. But even if the later thought takes deconstruction of ontological history as one of its main tasks, Plato’s allegory of the cave still assumes the cornerstone role of “touching the beginning and end of philosophy”. As stated in the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, it is Plato, and no one else, that is initiated as the decisive figure in philosophy-metaphysics, and it is by no means a mere parroting of Nietzsche. The basis here is that Plato’s allegories, with both that of the cave and that of the sun as the main body, most clearly shows the characteristics of metaphysics,33 and thus more clearly indicates the opportunity to break through metaphysics than other approaches, such as the one that leads directly to Es gibt/Ereignis in the essay of “Time and Being”. In Heidegger’s earlier and later interpretations of Plato’s theory of truth, although Plato’s position has changed substantially, Heidegger’s thought on truth—which causes the change of Plato’s position—has not changed fundamentally. In other words, the interpretation of Plato has changed, but the result of the interpretation remains the same. The difference is only that in the earlier period he considered 29 Its original book title in Greek is Politeia, which has the connotation of the political system of polis and souls. 30 Martin Heidegger, die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, S399. 31 Martin Heidegger, die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, S402. 32 Martin Heidegger, Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, S359f. 33 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978. See also the statement such as “Since we attempt to go beyond Being into the ‘light’ from which Being derives and get comprehended, we are, of course, directly engaged in one of Plato’s fundamental problems” (die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 24, S402).

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Plato to be, to a certain extent, the expounding of truth, while in the later period he considered it more appropriate to ascribe that position to Parmenides. To better understand the approach, adopted by late Heidegger, to breaking down the basic and returning to emptiness which leads to Lichtung, we shall first look at the early Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the cave. As we all know, the three allegories from the end of Book VI to Book VII of The Republic—the so-called linear allegory, the sun allegory, and the cave allegory— most intensively embody Plato’s core ideas in this major dialogue. Among them, the cave allegory is the most complex and comprehensive, which actually encapsulates the first two in itself.34 As Heidegger astutely observes, the cave allegory, unlike the first two allegories, consists of a dynamic plot. The point of the allegory, and indeed the core of the whole Republic, is hidden in this plot.35 In Heidegger’s words, the plot is about “the [two] turns from cave to daylight and from daylight to cave”. The “transition of the soul”36 from the cave to the daylight is, of course, the process of Peideia/Bildung, the ascent of the soul from city-state etiquette to natural truth, as emphasized by Socrates. This process, which involves groping out of the dim light of the cave and learning to observe real things and even light and the sun, fits in with the first two allegories. The question is, what does the second turn of the cave allegory, the one from daylight back to cave, mean? Generally speaking, only interpreting The Republic from the perspectives of “pure philosophy”, “first philosophy” and “metaphysics” can well explain the first two allegories, but it is difficult to fully explain the cave allegory in this way. In The Republic, this second turn clearly refers, on the one hand, to the real (but not the book’s) conversations that Socrates had in Athens that got him killed; on the other hand, the allegorical context can also be inferred and alludes to the process in which the philosopher (perhaps Socrates, who regained his virtual life in Plato’s pen) subjugates himself as a king and learn to rise and fall in the world in order to realize justice.37 Whatever the motives and consequences, the descent to the cave refers to the process in which the philosophical dweller ends his natural retreat and returns to participate in the political life of the polis. It seems that only non-metaphysical interpretations or the political-philosophical interpretations of this plot can be tolerated.38 However, in this context that clearly has to do with justice-politics Heidegger maintains that this process is about the occurrence of truth, just as he maintains that it is also about the occurrence of truth in another context which clearly has to do 34

Seth Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing, Chicago/London, 1989, p.176. The English translated version by Bloom used the phrase “went down to” to describe the plot. 36 Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, miteinem Brief ueber den Humanismus, Bern/ Muechen, 1975; Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 248. 37 The essence of justice in the Republic is that the philosopher refrains from philosophical love and gives up happiness, which means that the philosopher is the king. Without this, no other form of justice is possible. The logos part of the soul looks upward into the world of eidos, which is the theoretical life of the philosopher. The soul goes downward to control the non-logos parts with the purpose of illuminating the practical life of the wise. The essence of justice is to force this part to rule downward. 38 See the various Straussian explanations represented by Seth Benardete. 35

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with beauty-art. This certainly does not mean that Heidegger complies with the traditional metaphysical interpretation of eidos-theory. Rather, it means that Heidegger also broke down the practical philosophy or political philosophy framed by the first philosophy after he had broken down the metaphysics defined by the fundamental potential of resorting to substance. Only after this kind of work can we more fundamentally explore the essence of truth, including the essence of politics and art. As can be seen below, on the road of essence of truth, which is embodied in Heidegger’s constant interpretation, transformation, application and disintegration of Plato’s allegory of the cave, politics and art-religion, or perhaps even philosophy, are entangled in the same complete situation. In Heidegger’s view, Plato had reached the truth in the sense of aletheia (“the truth of beings”) by proposing eidos (Aussehen).39 Eidos indicates the flashing and self-manifestation of the thing itself. Without this, everything remains shrouded. For Plato, eidos may even be called the most aletheia, “because it first appeared among all who were revealed, and made them accessible”.40 Eidos has the upward potential, which is the self-manifestation of the beings in Was-sein. From this point on, aletheia in the sense of “the truth of Being” can be obtained by further observation of the conditions of “forming eidos”.41 But Plato’s theory of truth shows more of the opposite potential—that is, let the eidos control aletheia, thus placing aletheia under the eidos.42 From the aletheia of beings, the truth of beings is then solidified in eidos and falls into the association with seeing and even with eyes, so that the theory of propositional truth in the sense of conformity occupies a prominent position in the later generations.43 In short, Platonic theory of truth contains the “two meanings of necessity”44 —being upward to aletheia and being downward into the “correctness” in the sense of conformity, with the latter being dominant. This Platonic conclusion can generally lead to the even adverse—yet more unambiguous on the surface—evaluation of Plato in later Heidegger’s work. However, what is more striking here is Heidegger’s explanation of the second turn. This explanation shakes the conclusion above to a certain extent, thus making ambiguous the position of Plato’s allegory of the cave in Heidegger’s work. Heidegger was keen to note that it was through the return and descending (Rueckstieg) to the extent of returning to the cave and struggling with the other prisoners that the whole allegory (or even the three allegories) is completed. 39

Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 54ff. About aletheia, See Sein Und Zeit S44 B&C;Wegmarken: 217, which breaks through the propositional truth, and enters into the thinking of aletheia in the sense of “truth of beings”. The upward tendency towards “the truth of Being” is originally implied in the “truth of beings”. In 1931/1932, Heidegger starts directly from the aletheia in the sense of the “truth of beings”, and tries to interpret how Plato lost track of the upward tendency of the truth of beings and degraded it into the propositional truth. 40 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978:255. 41 How to go upward in this way is the starting point of Part II of the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”. 42 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 265. 43 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 258f. 44 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 266.

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Although the word aletheia is not mentioned here, this return-to-struggle plot symbolizes the most important meaning of aletheia, that is, to overcome the state of being concealed.45 Only through emphasizing and explain the second turn can the Greek experience of the original truth be reached46 : “… The essence of truth is the state of unconcealedness (Unverborgenheit) associated with the beings being concealed…”.47 Aletheia in itself contains, depends on, and illuminates the concealedness. Aletheia illuminates the struggle and dependency between unconcealedness and concealedness, so that concealedness almost acts as the core of unconcealedness. This is Heidegger’s mature conclusion on “the truth of Being”, and it is also something that must be told in the meditation on and interpretation of Lichtung. Although Heidegger later refused to use the term “truth”—even “the truth of Being”—to describe aletheia, in order to firmly distinguish aletheia from correctness; although Plato is interpreted here as referring only to aletheia in the sense of “the truth of beings”, the allegory of the cave provides a rich experiential description of Lichtung. More than anywhere else, this description, as well as the experiential description of the artwork, shows the constitutive role of the internal “struggle” to aletheia. It is the plot of returning to the cave that refers to the “struggle” of aletheia against the concealed—and Heidegger’s later works, the glory of aletheia is explicitly ascribed to Parmenides (where Plato is interpreted as merely speaking of “appearance” and “correctness”), and the “struggle” is unquestionably the contribution of Heracletes.48 The most profound part of Plato’s allegory of the cave, then, seems to be the Heracletian doctrine of truth. The matter is pressing. It must not be forgotten that this struggle between unconcealedness and concealedness is the basic context in which truth takes place and is what Heidegger has always emphasized repeatedly. The status of Plato may be allowed to be lowered, but the status of struggle never is. More important than the explanation is what the explanation expresses. Aletheia and struggle—not Plato’s status—is what Heidegger is trying to reveal by explaining Plato’s allegory of the cave. But even so, we can point out two joints that Heidegger skipped. It’s not about textual research on Plato or Heidegger, but about making things clear. In the setting and plot of the cave allegory, there are two puzzling points that Heidegger did not cover in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. The first was the “fire” in the higher part of the cave, and the free men carrying objects between the fire and the prisoners.49 In this article, Heidegger also mentioned that “fire is the descendants of the sun”,50 but he didn’t mention what fire, objects, or pedestrians refer to. Second, in Plato’s original text, eidos—at least the eidos of all things—is not the highest and final goal of observation. In the process of learning to stare at the real or aletheia 45

Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 257. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 257. 47 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 258. 48 See GA65, S360. 49 The Republic, 514a-515b. 50 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 263. 46

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(which is what Plato called learning philosophy51 ), one must look beyond eidos to the light, and finally to the source of light, which is the sun as the primary cause of all things growing and being seen, as well as the “cause” of aletheia.52 Although Plato’s allegory of the sun still aims at the eidos of the Good, that is to say, it is still about the eidos, the sun’s shining is of course not the same thing as the flashing of all things; The viewing of the appearance of common things is also different from the viewing of light and even that of the source of light; these three viewings are three stages of “meta/beyond”. This is also in line with the hierarchy of appearance, light and sun. This is the fundamental reason why Plato used the sun as a metaphor for the Good or the One. If the meaning of this is not understood, the whole allegory of the sun is useless, and the person who climbs out of the hole has gained nothing after all.53 However, Heidegger was also basically ambiguous about this point here. Both of these points are about the key of the problem, not about the dispensable details. One relates to ritual, law and religion, the other to natural beings, and the fundamental problems of philosophy (metaphysical-political philosophy) have been included. Heidegger’s omission of those points here should be intentional. In fact, the crucial advance he makes later in the expression of aletheia has a lot to do with these two points, which is to say, the whole allegory of the cave.

12.3 The Deformation and Destruction of the Cave Allegory Let’s now return to the way of breaking down the basic and returning to the emptiness in Heidegger’s essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”. The key point of this essay is to follow the experience of looking at eidos, light and sun in the cave allegory. Compared with Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, this essay explains Plato in a closer manner, and the whole framework is more distant from that of Plato. It is clear here that overcoming metaphysics does not mean ignoring Platonism, but rather sticking to it and keep asking. The basic circumstances of the philosophical problem are contained in Plato’s cave allegory, and the basic possibilities for overcoming philosophy are gathered here, only to be laid bare. I am afraid this is the meaning of the so-called limits of philosophy. This position on metaphysics is the result of some adaptation. In the essay of “Time and Being”, the task of “reflecting on Being while ignoring the beings”54 simultaneously denotes ignoring metaphysics. This essay makes a complete summary of the way, namely to skip the process of pointing out Entbergen in the context of Anwesenlassen and to focus on “Geben”, “Es gibt”, and even “Ereignis”. Although this essay briefly points out that Entbergen denotes entering into “das Offene”, many doubts

51

The Republic, 475e. The Republic, 509b. 53 Platonism, especially the Neo-Platonism, discussed much about these three hierarchies. 54 It is the central clue of this whole essay. 52

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arise concerning where “das Offene” comes from and how is it possible.55 Therefore, the relation between the essay of “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” and that of “Time and Being” can be determined, namely the former can be embedded in the path of the latter, which focuses specifically on interpreting how to make “das Offene” possible. As for the “Being” itself, Heidegger only asked the question at the end of the article, leading the clue back to the essay of “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”. But it is just such a footnote-style “embedding” that makes the radical position of “ignoring the metaphysics” adapt to “overcoming metaphysics”. As the thought falls back onto the springboard of the limits of philosophy, Plato’s allegory of the cave then reappears as the basic problem situation. The philosophical thing, as the being of Anwesenlassen, is the Scheinen of eidos (in the sense of appearance), which is dependent on something else instead of being self-sufficient. As Plato saw it, Scheinen must occur in some light. Only when there is light can Scheinen appear as such—that is, there is appearance (eidos). The light, too, is dependent rather than self-sufficient. This is the last step that Plato and Heidegger took together—but what is the light dependent on? Plato replied that it was the source of light—the sun, that is, the Good—the One. Plato’s answer is the beginning of all the substance-theology of Western philosophy. In contrast, Heidegger said in a way that is completely strange and out of line to the Western philosophical tradition, namely the light depends not on the light from which it comes, but on “das Offene” it reaches in: “einMoeglichesScheinenlassen und Zeigen” is credited as “Lichtung”.56 It is not light that creates Lichtung. Light—and darkness—is premised on Lichtung, which is “das Offene” between those present and those not present.57 “Das Offene” is strange to the Western philosophical tradition, but it has something in common with Laozi 老子’s thought and experience of “turning non-being into utility” (yi wu wei yong 以無為用).58 But Heidegger here thinks deeper than the simple worship of non-being. In his view, the Parmenides philosophical poem of aletheia is a reflection on Lichtung (rather than the “truth” interpreted by the later generations). Why, then, has this meaning been obscured since Plato? To reach such a depth of thought, any theory of external occasionalism is childish and ridiculous. What makes aletheia be concealed and hide (Sichentziehen) is not something external to aletheia, but can only be aletheia itself. “Concealedness” in this sense, as shown by the form a-letheia, forms the core of aletheia: “Lichtung des sichverbergendenBergens”.59 55

SD, S38. SD, S67. Literally speaking, the word “Lichtung” is the verbalization of the verb “lichten”. Besides the meaning of “to light up”, Lichtung also means “to make the dense trees sparse”. According to Vico, the origin of civilization is to expose the earth by fire in the forest, that is, to open a clearing in the forest. See Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, translated by T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 1970, pp.208f. Therefore, the precise Chinese translation of Lichtung shall be pi辟 (and the word Offenheit which has a close meaning to it shall be accordingly translated as kai开). 57 SD, S68. 58 Dao De Jing道德經, Chap. 11. 59 SD, S74. 56

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In this sense, the metaphysics that focus on beings while ignoring Being is, by itself, the result of aletheia’s self-concealment. We see again the emergence of symbiosis between aletheia and the concealedness emphasized in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. But here the meaning of mutual externality implied in the word “struggle” is lost—Heracletian’s name or doctrine does not appear at all—and is replaced by a deep retreat of aletheia. The light which illuminates the beings is the vanishing of the Being itself. He that makes the beings present must not be present; it makes the present to be present through its non-presence. Further, when the present is transcended upward to promise to make the “Anwesenlassen” “Lichtung”, then “Lichtung” opens itself. As the result of “reflecting on Being while ignoring the beings”, when aletheia appears, the beings will retreat. The concealedness no longer appears in the kind of concealedness that forgets aletheia (that is, the truth of the state of beings is concealed), but appears in aletheia as the very thing that conceals the unconcealedness. Unconcealedness (aletheia), in itself, contains the concealedness (Being retreats from the beings). Concealedness, in itself, contains the unconcealedness (The beings “Sein”, “Anwesen”, and “Lichtung”). If concealedness is concealed, aletheia gets “Entbergen”. If aletheia gets “Entbergen”, concealedness is concealed. All these above, is the integrated harmony of aletheia.

This complex form of gibberish, which Heidegger predicted would be accused of “irrationality”, may be likened to a “topological” structure that returns to the positive by going backward. But to the Chinese tradition, this awkwardness, with its modern mathematical analogy, may not be so outlandish. If we understand aletheia as yang 陽 and concealedness as yin陰, then what the above four sentences describe is just the Yin-Yang fish of the “Two Forms” (liang yi 兩儀). The fourth sentence above describes the closed and obvious circle formed by the Two Forms—that is, the so-called “Taiji Diagram” (tai ji tu 太極圖).60 Do we have any Abgrund for loosely interpreting aletheia in terms of yin-yang 陰-陽, tai ji 太極 and the like? We really had no “Abgrund”, but we were not careless. If Heidegger didn’t abandon any kind of Abgrund, and didn’t withdraw from any Grund, he will not be able to jump upward into Lichtung. All this is supported not by evidence, but by the experience of the cave allegory. It’s just that his experience is different from that of the liberated prisoner in The Republic. It is in this ultimately different place (that is, the self-concealed aletheia) that Heidegger text offers no more experience. We have to notice that this position (the interdependence of aletheia and concealedness) ends in Plato’s experience with a return to the cave. And in this text, there doesn’t seem to be any sign of a return to the cave since Heidegger started 60

Although Taiji diagram is made popular by the Song Confucianism, the statements such as “Taiji gives birth to the Two Forms” and so on come from Xi Ci Zhuan 系辭傳 (Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes).

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talking about the premise of light. Is the premise of light, Socrates in The Republic might have asked, only to open up into Lichtung? If the experiencer in Heidegger’s sense has always been outside the cave, where is the sun? If caves can provide the experience of concealedness, then where does concealedness as the core of aletheia come from? If Heidegger’s experience is not enough, what experience do we have to support the continuous circling of yin 陰 and yang 陽? Indeed, the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” loses its rigorous empirical style when it talks about aletheia and replaces it with a game of words. This is not, however, the usual game talk, for the relevant experience is already given in another, more famous text, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. Based on the context of this article, we will take another look at this easily misunderstood masterpiece. This work has nothing to do with the so-called philosophy of art or aesthetics. In order to avoid the vulgar misunderstanding of this text—in fact, of art itself and “beauty” itself—Heidegger clearly pointed out that “art is the truth that sets itself into the work”,61 “Beauty is the way in which the truth of unconcealedness emerges”.62 Similar to Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, the theme of Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes is Wahrheit. Similar to his essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes the abstruse Wahrheit is illustrated in the interaction between concealedness and unconcealedness. As demonstrated above, these two works are both from the investigation into Plato’s cave allegory. As suggested by Heidegger, all the experience of Wahrheit is a kind of inheritance or tension correspondence with Plato’s allegory of the cave. The experience of overcoming the metaphysical truth to reach the state of aletheia also begins by picking open the possibility of being obscured by the cave allegory. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes is (more of, compared to the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”) a calm and patient account of experiencing aletheia. But does this experience also form some kind of correspondence with the Platonic allegory—as in the more concise essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”? Here, the experience of Wahrheit begins with the work of art— in this case, the Gods’ temple—does Plato’s cave allegory also include “aesthetic” experience? The answer is yes: Plato’s cave allegory includes the experience of “works of art”. Moreover, this “inclusion” is by no means insignificant to the cave allegory. Heidegger’s explanation of Plato’s cave allegory firstly takes the degree of “authenticity” as the basic clue. In his interpretation of the cave allegory, the eidos, which is more “unconcealed” than “shadow”, plays a central role. But even before the cave allegory, Plato himself had given a hierarchy of “authenticity” in the linesegment allegory.63 In the line segment composed of soul-cognitive states with different degrees of authenticity, the “representational image” such as projection, 61

Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, 1980. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, 1980, pp. 42f. 63 The Republic, 509b–514a. 62

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poetic description and modeling imitation belongs to the initial line with the lowest authenticity, and the corresponding imagination is lower than the perception of the perceptive thing. That is to say, the work of art and the eidos as the most unconcealed are at exactly the opposite extremes of authenticity. To regard works of art as “true happenings” is obviously a reversal of Plato’s Nietzschean style. Plato had his reasons for putting art on a par with, say, reflections as the most unreal apparitions. This reason is inseparable from the theme of The Republic. In Plato, works of art are imitative. This art includes poetry—or, rather, refers primarily to poetry. In The Republic, the position of poetry—art in the hierarchy of truth is consistent with that of tyranny in the hierarchy of justice, and with that of epithymia— imagination in the hierarchy of the soul: All of these three above are the lowest. The experience of works of art, as Plato describes it, is at the heart of The Republic. If the cave does refer to the city-state, then living according to what is supposed to be the “one true” image at the bottom of the cave is the foundation of the citystate. It was Socrates’ fate to antagonize such a city-state. This is called the “debate between poetry and philosophy”—and it is this debate that Heidegger interprets, in Heracletian fashion, as what is contained within the higher sense of aletheia. But in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, it is as if the polis that kills Socrates were being defended. This reversal reminds us of the position repeated in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy: philosophy is the fall of the Greek spirit, while poetry and art are the only true ones! Heidegger, for whatever reason—perhaps not wanting to be involved only superficially in the Platonic/Nietzschean debate over Wahrheit—deliberately steered clear of the imitators (and thus of the Greek poetics), citing a particular example: the Gods’ temples of ancient Greece. This work of art is so special. In the case of the Greeks, temples were not meant to be aesthetic works of art. Not to mention the fact that the Greeks had all kinds of art, but not the art in the modern sense. Even if art could explain the Greek experience, the temple in the life of polis was more of religion than of art. From the perspective of a modern discipline such as art history, the temple is not only a work of art itself, but the source and center of all other works of art as offerings. Through laws, the temple organized all objects and language into the religious life of the polis centered on itself. It gives meaning to everything else. In fact, the life of polis was based and centered on the Gods’ temple. We need not go far enough to illustrate the close relationship between ancient polis and ancient religions. The problem to be solved now is that since Wahrheit is a “philosophical concept” later than religion-art, what does this temple, which belongs more to religion and art, have to do with Wahrheit and the like? Religion-art has nothing to do with philosophy and Wahrheit. Without the latter, religion-art can still hold its own and its own world. But as soon as “philosophy” appeared, religion and art—or rather “art” concerning God—were inescapably implicated in the same situation by Wahrheit. How did philosophy emerge? This question, on the religion-art side, is as much a matter of chance as the question of why the free

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prisoner in Plato’s cave allegory suddenly became unbound.64 The question is, how do you settle into a situation in which Wahrheit and myth are all involved? How to settle the Wahrheit, and how to settle the myth after the Wahrheit? This is the basic situation of philosophy. The primary problem of philosophy is, of course, how to deal with the relationship between people shaped by Wahrheit and people not educated by Wahrheit; that is to say, how to settle the myth, settle or transform the traditional polis based on the myth. This situation is what Plato’s cave allegory is ultimately about. In that dramatic way, The Republic also overhauled the question: What has religion-art to do with Wahrheit and the like? Art has to be ascribed to the issue of religion, religion to the issue of Wahrheit, and Wahrheit to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and myth, and this problem has to be ascribed to the problem of politics-philosophy. Only by putting Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes and The Republic in the same context of problems can we understand the deep meaning of Heidegger’s discourse of Wahrheit. Like his other two treatises on Wahrheit-aletheia, and like all treatises on Wahrheit, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes is still based on the cave allegory. Now let’s go back to the text and look at the specificity of the temple example. For the cave allegory, Lichtung and the like in the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” is not explicitly mentioned, but can be traced from the same eye—light phenomenon. So to speak, the cave allegory implies Lichtung, and philosophy implies the possibility of ending its own thought. In the same way, the cave allegory in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes is also self-revolutionary. First, the temple as the central meaning of polis is, of course, present in Plato’s comprehensive description of the polis in the cave allegory—the location of the temple is that of the fire in the cave. That is why it is not an expressive, imitative work of art,65 but a source and center that illuminates all such works of art. If Heidegger always intentionally or unintentionally omitted the fire in the cave in his other interpretations of Plato’s cave allegory, then the omission of the sun and the whole world outside the cave, as well as the description and meditation on the temple in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, is even more thought-provoking. In the interpretation set in the cave allegory, Socrates refers to “fire” as the “sun” in the visible world.66 This seemingly authoritative account fails to account for the other scenes associated with the fire in the cave: the pedestrians between the flames 64

However, from the perspective of philosophy and Wahrheit, the chance will be understood in the so-called unity of history and logic. See also the work of Hegel’s phenomenology of mind. 65 Due to the ambiguity of the phrase “work of art” and the duality of Plato’s cave allegory itself, the modern so-called work of art appears in two ways in Plato’s cave allegory. The first is in the broad sense, the things that are made, that is, the artistic products that civilized life inevitably contains. The mannequins, horses, and utensils that move on the low wall in front of the fire. Examples are the horses and chariots involved in military operations, and the beds made of carpenters. (The sensible horse is an imitation of the appearance of a horse, hence the fake beast in the cave allegory All others imitate this); the other is the narrow sense of what is imitated, what is now called an artwork. In the cave allegory, it refers to the shadow on the bottom wall of a cave. Examples of other metaphors are horses and chariots in poems and beds in paintings. See The Republic, Vol. X, as well as the whole text of Ion. 66 The Republic, 517b.

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and the prisoners, with their daily implements, the mannequins; in particular, what the prisoners thought was most real—the shadow of the flame on the bottom wall of the cave. In fact, the cave allegory has a kind of duality. The cave is both a metaphor for the sun—the visible world, which Socrates explicitly states, and the polis-laws, which he does not explicitly state.67 That is to say, the cave refers to the polis—the natural world, the place outside the cave refers to the natural world—the intellectual world. Plato himself meant that the (Gods-established)68 fire of laws (through the words of the poet) lit up the world of polis and produced the images of the liturgical and legislative poems (the images of the cave walls); the sun illuminates the visible world and produces everything in nature. What is certain is that if the cave refers to the polis, then the place of the fire is exactly the temple. In Socrates’ blueprint for the so-called best city in The Republic, the issue of the location of the temple is discussed last, and it corresponds to the position of the fire in the cave.69 The separation of nature from the polis and the separation of Gods from natural forces, such as the sun, are the inevitable consequence of philosophy. In other words, the duality of cave allegory is the end of natural philosophical interpretation. In Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Heidegger, according to the tradition of pre-philosophy, breaks down the separation of nature and polis, and puts the metaphorical duality of caves (topologically?) tangled together—here he is saying that it is the temple (not the “sun”) that illuminates nature, that the temple ultimately illuminates nature, and that through this illumination the temple finally reveals the nature that is different from the general problem of natural philosophy. What Heidegger explicitly criticizes in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit but here he remains silent about is the intellectual world above the natural world. First, Heidegger, like his predecessors, did not deny the direct meaning of the temple. The presence of Gods in the temple depicts a realm, which opens up “dieWelt dieses geschichtlichenVolkes”,70 and the destiny of the peoples is carried out in this world. The so-called national world here actually contains the meaning of the ancient polis.71 After briefly mention the national world, Heidegger puts it down and began to describe nature. It was not as if he had moved on to another matter. Without the integrity of nature, the national world and the historical world would be out of the question and could not rise. It is in the whole nature illuminated by the temple that the national world takes its place. This “place” is not a definite coordinate in physical space, but a place where the human world occurs in the whole original phenomenon. 67

Seth Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing, Chicago/London, 1989, p.177. See the beginning of Plato’s Laws. 69 The Republic, 427b. Significantly, Socrates respected the traditional authority of the Apollonian priests when it came to the location of the temple. This suggests that fire still exists in the best polis, and that it is respected as a tradition by the sage Kings. 70 Holzwege, p. 27. 71 In reference to the ancient time, the German word “Volk” has the meaning of Polis. See Hegel’s critique of the modern theory of natural right represented by Fichte from a classical standpoint. G.W.F. Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit, Hamburg, 2002, especially S84f. In this case, the concept of “world” in Heidegger’s sense also has the meaning of historical living world. 68

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Contrary to the assumption of natural philosophy, man does not find his place in opposition to nature—whether it is above, below, or following nature—but rather, only when nature reveals itself in its entirety can the world take its place as a world. Temple does not express, indicate, or symbolize nature as the so-called works of art usually do, but opens and stretches nature to gather and show the nature itself including the human world. Strictly speaking, man did not build the temple, but the temple opened up the world to which man belonged and upon which he constructed himself—just as a fire illumines the cave of prisoners. In this sense, the temple transcends the natural/artificial or even natural/ordained opposition of the ancient Greeks. These oppositions are only possible within the whole sphere of the temple. There is no doubt that Heidegger’s description of the temple—nature itself means the negation of the premise of the polis/nature opposition contained in Plato’s cave allegory. Heidegger’s use of the temple’s “lichtet” (note the literal implication of the word Lichtung) was not confined to the narrow meaning of the so-called aletheia. In other words, aletheia does not only refer to the sky, sea, rocks, birds, and beasts that emerge from the natural things. If that were the case, Heidegger’s temple would be of no difference from the sun outside Plato’s cave. What the temple illuminates is not only the nature (physis) which is unconcealed by itself, but also the Earth which is concealed by itself. The Earth is also opened up in Werksein. On the one hand, its existence contains the contextuality of meaning it belongs to, which is one part of the unity of the national life world and the natural world. Unlike other works of art, the temple does not connect the whole world in a piecemeal (um-zu) way, but directly demonstrates the unity of the universe-polis over generations and regions. On the other hand, all works are material. But whereas works consume material only for a particular purpose, temples alone allow materials to be revealed for themselves: It is in the temple, a so-called artifact, that the gold, wood, Earth, stone, and the like reveal themselves as elements of nature themselves—that is, not as materials of a product, exactly, but as themselves. In this way, the artificial work of the temple unfolds another kind of “natural being”, namely the Earth containing all the goods.72 The world opened by the work contains the Earth to which the material belongs. That is to say, the original world of Wahrheit-aletheia, illuminated by the work, shows the existence of matter. It even “makes” the matter and its sum (i.e., the Earth). This means that the original Wahrheit as a phenomenon of the world, the illustration of which is the sole purpose of Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke, is precisely not the eidos in Plato’s intelligible world. As is well known, this eidos is the form in the Aristotelian sense, which is separated from the matter. The contamination of form with matter (soul with body) is the cause of the visible world (the human world). As Heidegger had already examined, eidos was the most unconcealed thing in Plato. It may be inferred, then, that what makes the shadow (the most unreal thing, the hidden thing) being concealed and dark is the For the discussion of the Wu Xing 五行 (the Five Elements), please see Shang Shu 尚書: Hong Fan 洪範.

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matter. There is no doubt that the Earth, as the mother of all matter, covers itself. The Earth, it seems, is the opposite of Wahrheit in its immediate unconcealed sense. When Heidegger explained Plato’s allegory of the cave, the shadow was interpreted as being concealed, and the cave was all the concealedness itself. It is clear that the position of the Earth in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke is equivalent to that of the cave in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. This is not surprising, as Heidegger emphasized in his interpretation of Plato’s cave allegory that caves are “surrounded by the Earth”.73 This means that the somewhat abrupt exposition of the interdependence between the concealedness and unconcealedness in the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” is premised on the Earth-world experience described in the Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke. It is the works of art such as the temple that show the original image and illustrate how Heaven (tian 天) and Earth (di 地) being in their position. In this sense, building a world and fabricating the Earth are the two basic characteristics of Werksein.74 The Earth is the concealed, while the Heaven is the unconcealed. No image is greater than Heaven and Earth. The original image is that things in the universe take their proper places, rather than only the unconcealed Heaven. In Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Heidegger explained the interdependence and symbiosis between concealedness and aletheia with the philosopher’s journey back to the cave. In the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, he alludes to the symbiosis above in a rather blunt play on words; while in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke he uses rich phenomenological experience descriptions to make clear that the Wahrheit or the aletheia in the original sense developed by “works of art” are the Heaven and Earth blessed by Gods for the nation,75 which we call the whole of the original phenomenon (the original experience of the world) or the original image. Whatever the explanation, there is an opportunity for symbiosis and mutual inclusion of aletheia and concealedness.76 The greatest contribution of Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke is to elucidate the debate between aletheia and concealedness. This interpretation provides an effective phenomenological support for the metaphysical understanding of aletheia. As has been pointed out above, without such support, such understanding is not only inevitable to be considered as irrational babble, but also is not a practical action: concealedness is the core of exposing aletheia. The existence of works of art shows the original image; the principle of the whole formation of the original phenomenon is that of interaction between aletheia and concealedness. The temple gathers all through its sacrificial rituals. Just as in Plato’s cave allegory, eidos can lead the eye to the sunshine and the sun beyond beings, so 73

Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, 1978: 258. Holzwege, p. 34. Hereinafter, the phrase “world-earth” will be replaced by “Heaven and Earth”. 75 There is no mention of the relationship between Heaven and Earth, Gods and man. The “Gods” are those of the nation. Man lives in the meantime into a position that takes Heaven and Earth as references. However, although Doctrine of the Mean praises the virtues of ghosts and Gods, it does not put ghosts and Gods into the original phenomenon. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke takes temples, Heaven and Earth as references, so there is no need to list out Gods and man alone, considering that the temple contains both Gods and man. 76 Holzwege, p. 35. 74

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the whole of the beings gathered can show Lichtung beyond the whole of beings. But unlike that typical Platonic tradition, Lichtung is not separated from everything, but is present in the whole of the beings and “West”. Since Lichtung is what makes the beings present, Lichtung seems to be more existential than the beings judging from the tradition of beings (seienderals das Seiende). Lichtung contains the whole of beings, just like “non-being” (wu無) contains all the beings—here, Heidegger’s sudden mention (no doubt only once) of “non-being” certainly reminds us of the traditional image of Laozi 老子. However, as illustrated by the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, Heidegger is not one of those simple proponents of non-being who are devoted to the directness of non-being. The mystery of aletheia is that aletheia is self-concealed. This self-concealed aletheia is the Wahrheit of Being itself. In Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Heidegger emphasizes the debate between aletheia and concealedness. In the essay “The Position (Ende) of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, he emphasized the self-concealedness of aletheia. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke shows that the debate between aletheia and concealedness is the self-concealedness of aletheia itself. Wahnheit is not just Lichtung or aletheia in the sense of Lichtung; rather, Wahnheit occurs as the original dispute between Lichtung and concealedness. In the being of the Gods’ temple, “Heaven and Earth being in their position” is the original phenomenon of Wahnheit. Heaven has the virtue of clear and bright, and Earth that of vast and long-standing. That is to say, the world is unconcealed at ease. The original chaos divides into two elements. Heaven is high and the Earth is low.77 It is due to the bearing of the Earth that the virtues of clear, bright, vast, and long-standing last. With the birth of Two Forms (liang yi 兩儀), there appears Horizont. The world is called the Horizont. Without the Earth and the Horizont, the Heaven cannot reveal itself. No concealedness means aletheia cannot be shown. With the world born, the undivided Heaven became the Heaven that has opposites,78 which means to show the images of Heaven and Earth being in their position. That is what called the self-concealedness of aletheia, which is also the debate between aletheia and concealedness. That is to say, the Heaven and Earth being in their position leads to the vital energy of Heaven condensing into the Earth. As a result, aletheia conceals itself and presents itself as the world blindly founding on the Earth.79 That is as far as the unconcealed Heaven is concerned. Accordingly, the other end of the primary Wahrheit, that is, as the concealedness of the Earth, has double metaphysical connotations accordingly. In the original image of Heaven and Earth, the Earth appears to be compliant and tranquilizing, showing the image of concealedness and seclusion. Being concealed and secluded means “to stay closed” (xi 翕), See Shuo Wen Jie Zi 説文解字 (The Origin of Chinese Characters), according to which shang 上 (the above) and xia 下 (the below) are the self-explanatory characters, emerging relatively from the image of the high Heaven and the low Earth. 78 The Heaven has two connotations, one is being divided into opposites, and the other is being undivided without opposites. For more, please see Li Ji: Li Yun禮記·禮運 (The Book of Rites: Li Yun). 79 Holzwege, p. 42. 77

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while being compliant to the Heaven means “to open up” (pi 辟). The original text of concealedness denotes nothing more than the connotation of “to stay closed” (xi 翕), and showing Lichtung means “to open up” (pi 辟), both of which are the virtues of kun 坤.80 In Heidegger’s case, the origin image of the Earth is concealedness. The Earth closes and is secluded, which is a free concealedness. According to Heidegger, it has the connotation of Versagen.81 But in the original image, the Earth is revealed as the Earth. If the Earth was not revealed, then Heaven and Earth would not be in their position, Heaven and Horizont would not be visible. That “Heaven is high and the Earth is low” means that the Earth reveals and enters into aletheia, which means the Earth is unconcealed as the concealedness. The Earth is unconcealed means the Horizont exposes. That means to use the vastness of the low to illustrate the brightness of the high. Therefore, the concealedness transcends itself to manifest the Heaven and Earth. In this sense, concealedness no longer means itself, but means something else, which is the second meaning of Heidegger’s so-called concealedness, i.e., Verstellen.82 The Gods’ temple opens up Heaven and Earth and gives the world its Horizont. Heaven and Earth take their position. Since Two Forms is born, the Heaven and Earth open up; the Heaven is high while the Earth is low. The Earth exposes, and there comes the land under Heaven. Concealedness leads to the open-up, which means the manifestation of the Heaven with the Earth. Concealedness leads to Lichtung, which means the manifestation of the land under Heaven with the Earth. These are the two connotations of Verstellen. The revealing of the Earth is no more than one end of the original Wahrheit. Both Chinese and Western civilizations are based on the revealing of the Earth. However, China and the West have different experiences on such revealing, which means that the original Wahrheit of China and that of the West take place in different ways. In the West, it is fire that “lichten” and reveals a clearing in the forest surrounded by the dark and dense forests and thus comes the fire of civilization. The inner and outer boundaries of the forests are clear and thus established the original political space and the world of polis. In the case of China, on the other hand, the road guides out of the floods which sink back into the sea, through which the Earth reveals. Burning the barren land is just to keep the wild animals away.83 Therefore, in the primitive civilized experience of China, the world has a long history, which is due to the opening-up of the Earth and the “way” of water and soil, rather than just “lichten” with fire. Xi 翕 and pi 辟 is not equivalent to yin 陰 and yang 陽. The succession of yin 陰 and yang 陽 cannot be completely interpreted as the succession of xi 翕 and pi 辟. Although the claim of Xiong Shili 熊十力 has its own basis (as noted in the Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes, “Kun 坤 means closing and qian 乾 means opening. The succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation”), it is not consistent with the original text of Yi Jing 易經 (The Book of Changes). 81 Holzwege, p. 40. 82 Holzwege, p. 40. 83 See Shang Shu: Yu Gong 尚書·禹貢; Mencius 5A. 80

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To sum up, in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke, Heidegger used the debate between aletheia and concealedness to highlight the undivided, yet self-concealed, aletheia. At this point, aletheia cannot directly be understood as “das Offene”. To avoid the literal misinterpretation of Offene and Lichtung, Heidegger suggests that the Wahrheit of aletheia is not a stage on which the curtain always keeps opened.84 This may suggest that aletheia is illustrated in the succession of opening and closing. Therefore, the struggle between aletheia and concealedness has gone beyond both the debate between philosophers and citizens and the debate between philosophy and poetry in Plato’s cave allegory and is manifested as the Way of the opening and closing of Heaven and Earth. In the Chinese description of the original phenomenon as a whole, the opening and closing of Heaven and Earth are the way of yin 陰 and yang 陽 of the universe. When Heidegger elucidates the meaning of Heaven and Earth through the phenomenological description of artworks, our explanation of yin-yang above has received some degree of empirical support. The metaphor of the curtain’s opening and closing has more affinity to the principle of the movement of qian 乾 and kun 坤. It seems that Heidegger’s thinking is more and more similar to traditional Chinese thought. However, sages hate those as like as chalk and cheese in case that the unorthodox takes the place of the orthodox. Academical discussion is a pious and subtle thing, and the more similar things are, the more vigilance shall be aroused. Otherwise, the spark of thought is easily extinguished in something as dull and ready-made as comparative philosophy. In order to promote Heidegger’s thinking path, we must weigh western philosophy in the original integrity of thought experience. The task is too big to be accomplished in one article. In the final section of this chapter, I shall only make a few points from the perspective of methodology according to the conclusion drawn above, while the complete and systematic discussion is still to be raised in the future.

12.4 Concealedness as the Manifestation: The Complete Reduction of the Original Phenomenon As Heidegger asserts in Nietzschean terms, philosophy—or Western philosophy— is Platonism. However, the basic experience of western philosophy and its basic expression are based on the problem situation presented by Plato’s cave allegory. As is shown in this chapter, Heidegger’s overcoming and transcendence of the Western philosophical tradition is reflected in his explanation, application and transcendence of that basic problem situation. This is strictly an interpretive phenomenological approach. In this part of this paper, I try to use this method further to review his own thought experience and expression. The reason why this paper does not—as the general studies of Heidegger do—directly start from the discussion of his terms (Sein, 84

Holzwege, p. 40.

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Lichtung, Ereignis, etc.) or even directly use these expressions without discussion, is precisely that it follows Heidegger’s method. The balancing of different thought-forms, if limited to the comparison of equivalent translations between conceptual expressions, is only superficial. Whatever the comparison, it is the result of a legitimate misunderstanding. Concept expression belongs to certain experience and problem situation, the habit of expression itself is also a special experience. This basic vision of the whole of experience is what hermeneutics tries to show with “Horizont”. The proper balance between thoughtforms presupposes ease of movement between the basic realms. Being able to go in and out naturally means being able to reflect-describe some basic realm to a certain extent. The hermeneutic expression “introspection-description of the realm” corresponds to the phenomenological proposition of “describing the world phenomenon”. The highest task of hermeneutics is not to describe the specific experience within a realm, but to describe the realm itself; just as the work of phenomenology in the strict sense begins with the description of the world phenomenon-world consciousness. As for the hermeneutic debate of “whether to reflect-beyond one’s own realm”, it should have been settled by the interactive understanding and interpretation work at various levels. One’s own realm is not a potential one, and the mutual integration of realms is possible only because a larger common potential realm emerges under each of its own realm. Only when the original realm is revealed (which belongs to the phenomenological method of deconstruction-reduction) so that the relatively largest common realm is invented (which belongs to the hermeneutic method of interactive understanding), the balancing of discussion and the like is possible. The prerequisite for Heidegger to overcome Platonism is precisely to go deeper than to get rid of the basic problem situation of Plato. In other words, without a more fundamental understanding of what Plato suggests, there is no qualification to overcome Platonism. For us, this means that Heidegger and Plato share, in different ways, the fundamental phenomenological totality of the experience concerning both (the Way of) Heaven and mn. The term “the experience concerning the Way of Heaven” (tian daojingyan 天 道經驗), which we coined according to the terms of theories of the Way in preQin Dynasty, roughly corresponds to the experience concerning nature in western philosophy.85 However, in Chinese classical thought, the experience concerning the Way of Heaven is one of the approaches to experiencing the substance of the Way. The experience concerning the way of man may also be an alternative approach. The two approaches are not incompatible, but neither are they isolated.

As for theories of the Way in pre-Qin Dynasty, please see ZhangShunhui 張舜徽, Zhou Qin Dao-Lun Fa-Wei 周秦道論發微 (Elaboration On theories of the Way in Dynasties of Zhou and Qin), Wuhan 武漢: Hua Zhong Shi-Fan Da-Xue Chu Ban She 華中師範大學出版社, 2005. This book discusses relatively less about the Way of Heaven and rarely mentions the studies of the Book of Changes. For a comprehensive discussion on the Way of Heaven, please see Zhang Xianglong 張 祥龍, Hai-De-Ge-Er Si-Xiang Yu Zhong-Guo Tian-Dao 海德格爾思想與中國天道 (The Thoughts of Heidegger and the Chinese Way of Heaven), Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996. This book mainly discusses the Way of Heaven within the realm of Daoism.

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The “nature” in the so-called experience concerning nature here strictly indicates the concept of physis/natur, which is not understood from the inherent context of Chinese. Discussion related is concerned with the following issues: First, how the Western philosophical tradition, which is based on the works of Plato, extracts fragments from the whole experience concerning the Way of Heaven to form the physis/ natur which is against nomos86 ; second, how Heidegger introspected, reversed and even overcame it; and third, what else is needed to balance and promote Heidegger’s work. These extra points needed belong to the so-called phenomenology of the Way in this chapter. The mission of this chapter will be accomplished by making a preliminary outline of the nature, task, method and sequence of the phenomenology of the Way through several textual commentaries. Due to the particularity of “phenomenological” context, this section will especially focus on the “methodological” explanation of the experience concerning the substance of the Way which reveals the original phenomenon as a whole. Perhaps it can be explained in advance that this is related to the interpretation and comparison of the experience of the substance of the Way. This section is not intended to distinguish between the substance of the heart/mind and that of human nature, but to emphasize the substance and application of the Way, as well as to include the nature of heart/mind. Accordingly, although Heidegger takes rethinking nature as an important approach, he still relies on the pre-Socratic philosophers and goes back to the tradition beyond the Aristotelian distinguishment between “natural philosophy” (cosmology), “humanistic philosophy” (ethics), and “metaphysics” (ontology) in a narrow sense. In this sense, it is in accordance with the tradition of interaction between the Way of Heaven and that of Humans in the Chinese classical thought represented by the Book of Changes and The Doctrine of the Mean. Heidegger was not unaware of the distinction between “nature” and “realm” in German philosophy before him (especially neo-Kantianism). In phenomenological terms, this at best involves the issue of “regional ontology”. On the other hand, Heidegger regards humans as an exceptional kind of being, and uses the analysis of human beings as the basis for the so-called fundamental ontology to inquire into the meaning of existence from the perspective of the things that human beings suffer in the world and their own way of existence. This responds, in a deeper way than that of neo-Kantianism, to Kant himself whose theory is based on the question of “What is man”. The deliberate distinction between cosmology and ethics stems from Aristotle’s classification of beings (eternally necessary, variably probable, etc.), which is based on some understanding of the meaning of Being. However, it is precisely the understanding of Being and the classification of beings which originated from Plato and developed by Aristotle that Heidegger wanted to inquire and transcend by interpreting pre-Socratic philosophers. Therefore, to accuse Heidegger of lacking “natural philosophy” or “ethics” is not hitting the target. On the other hand, Aristotle himself, after distinguishing the realm of nature and humans, combined the two with his theory 86

The other side of this process certainly is: how to form nomos which is against the physis/natur from the whole experience concerning humanity. The integrity of the experience concerning both the Way of Heaven and humanity lies in the fact that they belong to the same phenomenon whole.

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of potential/realization, so that the basis of ethics has its natural root, or even has a common root with nature. This is a great work done by a great philosopher. If not, ethics and nature, the Way of Heaven and man will break into two parts, and the basis of the Way of man is not in nature, but in agreement, will, freedom, reason, spirit, and so on. Thus, it has become an inexhaustible source of modern philosophy. Based on this and to reflect on the tradition of Book of Changes and The Doctrine of the Mean, we know that it has its profound meaning to continue the succession of the Way of Heaven and man as well as the substance of heart/mind and human nature. The system of The Doctrine of the Mean establishes the substance of heart/mind with that of human nature (What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called education), and reconnects the heart/mind with the substance of human nature (the mandate of Heaven is beautiful and unceasing, and the purity of King Wen likewise is unceasing). Therefore, the Way of Heaven and man is circulating, unified in the substance of “sincerity/reality” (cheng 誠). If we are to criticize, based on the concept of “sincerity/reality” (cheng 誠), the claim of regarding the concept of value as the substance of universe, then it can be observed that Platonic system takes the eidos of “Good” (Agathon) as the source of all natural things and human affairs and even that of all other eidos. Even if Aristotle did not use the eidos of Good to establish his philosophy, the framework of this teleology of the universe is still true, that is, the neo-Kantian distinction between “values” and “facts” is not enough to understand the ancients’ profound meaning. Limited to the topic, this section will set aside The Doctrine of the Mean, and take Yi Zhuan 易傳 (Commentaries of the Book of Changes) as the foundation to delve into the substance of the Way. Commentaries of the Book of Changes didn’t take the approach of The Doctrine of the Mean to prove the substance of human nature through the substance of heart/mind. Despite of this, the virtue of two primary sources—qian 乾 and kun 坤—and even that of the 64 Hexagrams are enough to accommodate both the gentleman ( jun zi 君子) and Heaven and Earth. One can also see this through studying shiyi 十翼 (Ten Wings) carefully. In this way, it is sufficient to prove that the two primary sources—qian 乾 and kun 坤—are actually illustration of the substance of the Way. The development and application of the substance of the Way relies on Heaven and man. By connecting Heaven and man with the substance of the Way, there will no long be the criticism against distinguishing “nature” and “humanity”. In this sense, Book of Changes and The Doctrine of the Mean are actually consistent, both of which are the foundation of the theories of Zhou Lianxi 周濂溪. Without these two books, the neo-Confucianism would no longer exist, neither would the so-called Chinese thoughts.

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12.4.1 Being, Change (Yi 易), and the Original Phenomenon as a Whole For Plato, philosophy certainly contains dimensions that are open to experience of physis/natur. According to the orthodox philosophical statements, these dimensions are the premise of philosophy. The complexity of Platonic philosophy lies in dealing with the relationship between philosophical experience of physis/natur and mythological experience-political expression. According to Plato, the experience of physis/ natur is possible only when the experience of nomos is denied (going out of the cave). Outside the cave, the free philosopher observed in turn the following phenomena: At first, he would see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. From these, it would be easier for him to go on to look at things in the sky and the sky itself at night, gazing at the light of the stars and the moon, than during the day, gazing at the sun and the light of the sun.87

Then, compelled by some external circumstance—compelled, according to The Republic, by those who love justice—the philosopher returned to the cave, and in this way he acquired the experience of man’s way under the dim light of myths-nomos. If this man went back down into the cave and sat down in his same seat …his eyes be filled with darkness, coming suddenly out of the sun like that…Now if he had to compete once again with the perceptual prisoners in recognizing the shadows, while his sight was still dim and before his eyes had recovered, and if the time required for readjustment was not short, wouldn’t he provoke ridicule…And as for anyone who tried to free the prisoners and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn’t they kill him?88

Plato’s description here, though alluding to the fate of Socrates, is poetically metaphorical. We may as well imitate the way of the Chan Sect, to investigate into the text through keen words. The reason for the one who climbs out of the cave find it impressive and cling to it is that there is daylight outside, in other words, because it is daylight outside the cave. But it was a matter of chance that there should be a clear day outside the cave at this moment—was he not equally likely to encounter night, storm, thunder, and other dark moments? We may say that just at that moment the Platonic observer of nature sees the sunlight outside the cave and feels that the experience of man is not worthy, and thus such feeling keeps him stay outside of the cave. This moment is indeed the beginning of the history of metaphysics, which we may call “the moment of Being”, which shows the image of the sun at the center.89 The basic concepts that constitute the history of metaphysics—Being, substance, to be, truth, and so on—are all derived from this bright moment of sun in which Plato solemnly described. If, in equal probability, this free prisoner were to fall into a deep night once going out of 87

The Republic, 516a-c. The Republic, 516e-517b. 89 Similar description can be found in the second chapter of Shuo Wen Jie Zi 説文解字 (The Origin of Chinese Characters). The copula verb in Chinese is born lately, and it has profound meaning to translate Sein as shi 是, which is consistent with the theory of Aληθεια ´ (aletheia) in Platonic sense. 88

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the cave, he would have ended up believing that the way of man (the cave) is more unconcealed and thus returning to the cave without going out again, having no time for the ludicrous Socratic dizziness. He would credit nomos with the position that Plato gave to the sun, therefore, anyone who considers nomos to be self-consistent without the foundation of Heaven or natural law may be the descendant of that man. Such a person has no opportunity to go upward, but can only fall down and stick to nomos, thus stay in a low place. Such civilization is that of politics and religion inferior to philosophy. Even if, as Socrates says, this man had been exposed to the sun, how could he, having spent a long time outside the cave, learning to see, and having experience of day and night, of Heaven and Earth, and of the four seasons, still think that it was this sun that ruled over all things in the visible world? As has already been shown, Heidegger eliminated this dominant position of the sun through all his discussions on the issue of Wahrheit. He regards the Lichtung between Heaven and Earth as the original phenomenon of aletheia which has a boundary compared with “the land under Heaven” (tian xia 天下). The meaning of Ereignis is indicated by further questioning of es gibt. Heidegger also had to explain the presentation of light and form. He grasped the space between Heaven and Earth in natural experience (with the limitation of caves, which have boundaries90 ) and omitted the sun and moon. But it also means that he and Plato saw the same situation in different ways and understood nature in different ways. According to the virtue of the sun, Plato established the goodness that transcends, produces, and reveals all eidos. The sun is also visible, and though it is self-revealed, it is still a thing. Therefore, the Good is transcendent, but also an eidos and a being. Phenomenology suspends the beings, and then the appearance of the beings becomes visible. Heidegger does not stay in things; rather, he uses the method of showing non-being, to open up the presence of the existant with the self-concealedness and unconcealedness of Lichtung. He then asked why Lichtung is possible. The latter is no longer one of the myriad beings, so the formal subject of beings, “es”, is actually the end of no end, the beginning of no beginning, and the being of non-being. The last teaching of Heidegger is thus es gibt, or Ereignis. Heidegger’s words have their own meaning. However, although the selfconcealedness and self-unconcealedness of Lichtung is slightly concurring with the meaning of qian 乾 and kun 坤, the former is still confined to the form and stagnated in the potential. The principle of qian 乾 and kun 坤 is the Way of yin 陰 and yang 陽, which has the connotation of life-giving force and continuous generation. If solely through the static confrontation between Heaven and Earth yet depart from the experience while being forced by German grammar to ask why es gibt is possible, we cannot understand the meaning of life-giving force. Since Heidegger sees only one side of the whole phenomenon, he omits the cultivation of the myriad things. 90

Considering that caves are bounded and that the land under heaven are boundless, it is not appropriate for us to solely use the cave to indicate the whole visible world. On the other hand, Heidegger explains the visible world which overlaps with the world of nomos as a polis that is stretched out by the Gods’ temple yet restricted by the dense forest representing barbarism. In this way, Plato’s description of the whole cave is interpreted in a consummate way.

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In view of the original phenomenon as a whole, Plato and Heidegger are biased. The former only sees the sun and moon, the latter only see Heaven and Earth. What Plato doesn’t know is that the Way of Heaven has yang 陽 yet yin 陰 is also included, and that the Way of man has yin 陰 yet yang 陽 is also included. The shortcoming of Plato lies in dividing Heaven and man. The so-called political philosophers only look at the Heaven and forget the Earth, and when they return to the Earth, they dare not to speak of Heaven. Heidegger does have slight understanding of “Heaven and Earth being in their proper place”, but he is not acquainted with the idea about the cultivation of the myriad things, let alone grasping the principles of self-fulfillment from the functioning of sun, moon, and four seasons. The original phenomenon as a whole is neither the momentary stagnation of the sun at the center, nor the confrontation between Heaven and Earth, but the sun and the moon, the rotation of day and night, the four seasons taking turns, and the cultivation of Heaven and Earth. The basic experience of Western philosophy on the Way of Heaven has been marked by the stagnation of the sun—the “Being” (shi 是) of the sun at the center, while the basic expression of Chinese thought on this can be expressed by the “Change” (yi 易) of the sun and the moon. The literal meaning of “Change” (yi 易) is the functioning of the sun and the moon,91 through which we can gain access to the principle of “Change” (yi 易), which is the supreme Way of Heaven and man. It is said that “The system of Change is tantamount to Heaven and Earth, and therefore can always handle and adjust the Way of Heaven and Earth”92 ; “The Book of Changes is comprehensive: the Way of Heaven, the Way of Earth, and the way of man—all are included”.93 In the Confucian classics, there are various expressions about the original phenomenon as a whole and the experience of the substance of the Way, among which those in The Book of Changes: Appended Remarks are the richest and the most systematic, for example, “The Way that the day links up with the night is that of wisdom”. Different from Western philosophy which cuts the momentary stagnation of the sun’s movement into the “being” of the sun at the center, the principle of “change” (yi 易) regards the functioning of the sun and the moon as the beginning of the experience of the substance of the Way. After observing the image of the sun and the moon, the Way of the day and night is illuminated; after the Way of the day and night is illuminated, the four seasons running their course are linked up; after the link-up of four seasons, the Way of the cultivation of Heaven and Earth is manifested. Knowing the Way of Heaven, then the principle of ruling the lands under Heaven is grasped. The political and religious way of the sages is nothing but following the Heaven. Confucius said, “Great indeed was Yao as a sovereign. How majestic was he! It is only Heaven that is grand, and only Yao corresponded to it! How vast was

See Yao Peizhong 姚配中, Zhou-Yi Yao Shi Xue: Xu 周易姚氏學·序 (Yao’s Study on The Book Of Changes: Introduction). 92 Zhou Yi: Xi Ci Zhuan Shang 周易·系辭傳上 (The Book of Changes: Appended Remarks(I)). 93 Zhou Yi: Xi Ci Zhuan Shang 周易·系辭傳下 (The Book of Changes: Appended Remarks(II)). 91

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his virtue! The people could find no name for it”.94 “May not Shun be instanced as having governed efficiently without exertion? What did he do? He did nothing but gravely and reverently occupy his royal seat”.95 Again he said, “Does Heaven say anything? The four seasons run their course and all things are produced. Does Heaven say anything?”.96 Both the four seasons running their course and the production of all things are functions of the virtue of Heaven, while both saying nothing and doing nothing are substance of the virtue of Heaven. Therefore, the Tuan Zhuan 彖傳 of the guan 觀 hexagram said, “Observing the holy Way of Heaven, then the four seasons take turns. The sages set the principles according to the holy Way, and all people follow them”.97 The guan 觀 hexagram elaborates on the way of setting holy principles, while the lin 臨 hexagram next to it elucidates the way of governance: “Gentlemen…can protect common people boundlessly”.98 Its divinatory phraseology goes as follows: “The first line… shows its subject advancing in company (with the subject of the second line). Through his firm correctness there will be good fortune. The second line… shows…there will be good fortune; (advancing) will be in every way advantageous…The fifth line… “shows the advance of wisdom” (zhilin 知臨), such as “befits of the great ruler” (da junzhiyi 大君之宜). There will be good fortune”.99 According to the commentary of Lai Zhide 來知德, “the so-called befits represent the whole state of the ruler”.100 Jiao Xun 焦循 comments zhilin 知臨 as “practicing the loft ideal of wisdom step by step”.101 According to the annotation of Li Daoping 李道平, “As The Doctrine of the Mean said, Shun was indeed a man of great wisdom, who took hold of the two extremes, took the mean between them, and applied it in his dealing with the people. It is the righteousness”.102 According to Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Righteousness is the befits of things”.103 Befits of the great ruler is nothing more than the righteousness of politics, including the justice (dikaiosynee) of the polis community as one of the themes of The Republic. When the philosopher king wishes to do justice to his people, he must first observe the sun and returns to his cave to show wisdom. Since this “knowledge” (sophia) has no sense of the image, it will be rejected by the people in the cave. Therefore, the image of observing and showing must be inherent in any governance. The special triumph of the principle of Change lies in the image that the great ruler shows wisdom to people which is inherited byobserving the image of Heaven and life. Through observing life 94

The Analects 8.19. The Analects 15.5. 96 The Analects 17.19. 97 Zhou Yi: Guan Gua, Tuan Zhuan 周易 觀卦 彖傳 (The Book of Changes: Appendix of Guan). 98 Zhou Yi: Lin Gua, Xiang Zhuan 周易·臨卦·象傳 (The Book of Changes: Appendix of Lin). 99 Zhou Yi: Lin Gua 周易·臨卦 (The Book of Changes: Lin Hexagram). 100 Lai Zhide 來知德, Zhou Yi Ji Zhu 周易集注 (The Variorum of the Book of Changes), Vol. 5. 101 Jiao Xun 焦循, Yi Zhang Ju 易章句 (Compilation of the Book of Changes). 102 Li Daoping 李道平, Zhou Yi Ji Jie Zuan Shu 周易集解纂疏, Vol. 3. 103 Zhu Xi, Lun Yu Ji Zhu 論語集注 (Collected Annotations On the Analects), Vol. 1. 95

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can one feel the direction of the heart/mind, which is thus easy to be known and to be followed. Through observing Heaven can the Mean be illustrated. In this sense, the governance of the world can be realized. In general, the ways of observing differ from one another. The Doctrine of the Mean cited The Book of Odes and said, “The hawk flies up to Heaven; the fishes leap in the deep”,104 which means that the Way is clearly seen above and below. In this sense, the “original phenomenon as a whole” has no obstacle and runs smoothly. The view of the philosopher king is separated into two parts, since Plato cut off Heaven and man, and saw only the sun shining at the center without seeing the four seasons as well as day and night. The view of Western philosophy has been summarized as “Being” as stated above. “Being” is one of the times of Change, during which the sun shining at the center. Naming it as “Being” originates from its ancient meaning, but it is mostly due to the role it played in modern Chinese and modern philosophy. Judging from the symbolism of Change, the meaning of “Being” shall belong to the “great havings” (da you 大有) hexagram, as its Appendix of Xiang Zhuan 象傳goes, “The gentleman tries to suppress evil and promote good, and abdicates his life according to Heaven”.105 As shown in the image of this hexagram, fire being in Heaven is one aspect of the functioning of Heaven. The “linear symbol” (yao 爻) of yin 陰 takes the honorable position of yang 陽. Through the induction of what’s above and what’s below, people act in accordance with the will of Heaven and the Time. This hexagram is next to that of tong ren 同人 and is followed by those of qian 謙, yu 豫, gu 蠱, lin 臨, guan 觀, all of which together can be considered as explaining the Way of the holy king comprehensively. Those who would like to compare it with the theory of the philosopher king’s four cardinal virtues in The Republic shall come up with their own opinion concerning this point. To sum up, “Change” (yi 易) represents the functioning of the sun and the moon, which is derived into the way of day and night, the four seasons taking turns, and the position of Heaven and Earth. “Being” (Shi 是) is one of those time positions of “Change” (yi 易). “Being” (Shi 是) is included in “Change” (yi 易); the way of “Change” (yi 易) contains philosophy and the former exercises control over the latter. The civilization of rites and music based on the three ways of “Change” (yi 易)—the Way of Heaven, the way of Earth, and the way of man—is the civilization of politics and religion higher than philosophy.

104

See Chapter 12 of The Doctrine of the Mean. Zhou Yi: Da You Gua, Xiang Zhuan 周易·大有卦·象傳 (The Book of Changes: Appendix of Da You)

105

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12.4.2 The Issue Concerning the Guidance of Xing 形 and Xiang 象 in the Book of Changes: Centering Around Xi Ci Zhuan 系辭傳 (the Appended Remarks of the Book of Changes) The functioning of the sun and the moon is the beginning of the experience of the substance of the Way, though the former is not yet a real experience of the substance of the Way in a strict sense. The Commentaries included in Bo Shu Zhou Yi 帛書 周易 (The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated) has a chapter titled Yao 要, which records the following words of Confucius: Since The Book of Changes shows the Way of Heaven, it cannot be represented completely by the sun, the moon, and the stars. In this sense, we credit to it yin 陰 and yang 陽.106

Different from it, The Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes 系辭傳 solely mentions the Way: The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way (zhi wei dao 之谓道). What issues from the Way is good, and that which realizes it is the individual nature.107

The above remarks in the Appendix Remarks of The Book of Chnages are comprehensive in containing three ways, that of Heaven, that of Earth, and that of man. The way of man has never been outside the Way of Heaven, so the first sentence of The Doctrine of the Mean can derive the way of man from the mandate of Heaven which is subordinate to the Way of Heaven. Therefore, that “the successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way” should be the true expression of the complete experience of the substance of the Way. But what kind of expression is that? To figure it out, we need to contrast it with another famous remark frequently quoted in this book that has caused several historical misunderstandings: What exists before physical form is called the Way (weizhidao 謂之道). What exists after physical form is called a concrete thing. That which transforms things and controls them is called change. That which extends their operation is called penetration. To take them and apply them to the people of the world is called the business of life.108

Different from general viewpoints, we don’t think that “what exists before physical form is called the Way” expresses the substance of the Way. On the contrary, “the successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way” does so. As pointed out by Dai Dongyuan 戴東原: In ancient Chinese, zhi wei之 謂 (constitute) differs from wei zhi 謂之 (is/be called). Whenever the term zhi wei 之謂 (constitute) appears, the content before it is used to explain the content after it… Therefore, the sentence “yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一陰一陽之謂道” is expressing the Way of Heaven, thus is equivalent to the statement that the Way is the successive movement of yin and yang. In contrast, whenever the term wei zhi 謂之 (is/be called) 106

The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated: Yao, S4. Zhou Yi: Xi Ci Zhuan Shang 周易·系辭傳上 (The Book of Changes: Appended Remarks(I)). 108 Zhou Yi: Xi Ci Zhuan Shang 周易·系辭傳上 (The Book of Changes: Appended Remarks(I)). 107

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appears, the content after it is used to clarify the content before it…Therefore, the statement that “what exists before physical form is called the Way, while what exists after physical form is called a concrete thing” (xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao, xing er xia zhe wei zhi qi 形而上者謂之道, 形而下者謂之器) does not aim at repectively expressing the Way and the concrete things. Rather, it aims at distinguishing “what exists before physical form” (xing er shang 形而上) from “what exists after physical form” (xing er xia 形而下) through identifying them respectively as the Way and the concrete things.109

The statement of Dai Dongyuan above is clear. The statement that “what exists before physical form is called the Way, while what exists after physical form is called a concrete thing” (xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao, xing er xia zhe wei zhi qi 形而上者 謂之道, 形而下者謂之器) is certainly not used to respectively express the Way and the concrete things. Neither does it aim at distinguishing the Way from the concrete things and making them contrast with each other. Otherwise, how to explain the terms following this statement, such as bian 變 (becoming), tong 通 (penetration), and shi ye 事業 (the business of life)? The reason for those inappropriate explanations of this statement lies in their interpreting the word xing 形 as “the body of forms” (xing ti 形體) or “the quality of forms” (xingzhi 形質), and thus explaining xing er shang 形而上 as formless (wu xing 無形), and xing er xia 形而下 as form(s) (you xing 有 形).110 However, such explanation doesn’t fit well with ancient texts. We may preliminarily determine the meaning of the word xing形 through internal evidences and comprehension by analogy. Xiang 象 appears in the Heaven and xing 形 occurs on Earth. In them change and transformation can be seen. Therefore, kun 坤 means closing and qian 乾 means opening. The succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation. The alternate going and coming is called penetration. What is manifested is called xiang 象. What has taken xing 形 is called a concrete things. To control and use things is called method. And used to advantage, either in this or that way, so all people utilize them, that is called spirit.

Note the usage here. Xing 形 and xiang 象 are in parallel with each other (except that in the last example xing 形 is a verb). In connection with statements like “Looking up, we observe the pattern of the Heavens; looking down, we examine the order of the Earth (di li 地理)” and “Qian 乾 means the completion of xiang 象, kun 坤 means to model after them (xiao fa 效法)”, we may deduce from these that the word xing 形 here is equivalent to “model” ( fa 法) and “order” (li 理).111 When appearing in pair with xiang 象, xing 形 denotes the image on Earth; when appearing independently, xing 形denotes the shapes of hexagrams or linear symbols in a broad Dai Zhen 戴震, Meng Zi Zi Yi Shu Zheng 孟子字義疏証 (Commentary On the Meaning and Words of Mencius). Leaving aside Dai’s viewpoint on the substance of the Way, he is reliable on the distinction between seemingly similar terms. 110 Even if following this explanation, there are three key words, namely, dao 道, qi 器, and xing 形. Since qi 器is subordinate to xing 形, how can these two terms confuse with each other? And what’s the exact meaning of xing 形 that is different from dao 道and qi 器?. 111 The word xing 形 in Bo Shu Zhou Yi 帛書周易 (The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated) is written as xing 刑, which has a closer relationship with fa 法. 109

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sense. Such interpretation fits well with the nature of the Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes, since the latter is a commentary on the hexagrams and linear symbols, which are created based on certain opinions and functions of the xing 形of hexagrams and the xiang 象of linear symbols. Some commentaries on the hexagrams and linear symbols are to express the Way of Heaven and Earth, such as those of qian 乾and kun 坤,112 while some others are to express the concrete things for use, such as ding 鼎. The same image of hexagram may express the Way of Heaven and man, demonstrating a concrete thing, or manifesting good or ill luck. Another example involves the hexagram of yi 益. In the second part of Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes, this hexagram represents concrete things, but it also expresses “that which extends their operation is called penetration; to take them and apply them to the people of the world is called the business of life”. However, in Bo Shu Zhou Yi 帛 書周易 (The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated), the same hexagram turns into expressing the ways of Heaven, Earth, and the emperor: “The way of sun 損 and yi 益 is sufficient for observing the change of Heaven and Earth as well as the business of the emperor”.113 Therefore, when judging directly, the statements such as “what exists before physical form is called the Way” (“xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao 形而上者謂之道”) is an reinterpretation (of the author of Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes) of the interpretation (of the author of hexagrams and linear symbols) on the xing 形 of hexagrams and the xiang 象 of linear symbols; when judging indirectly, it expresses different ways of observation and employment (by the author of hexagrams and linear symbols) on the xiang 象 of Change. As for the function of the virtue of Change, Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes also gives hints in other places: How perfect is its eminent virtue and great achievement! Its achievement is great because it possesses everything, and its virtue is abundant because it renovates things every day. The system of Change is that by which the sage reaches the utmost of things and examines their subtle emergence. Only through depth can the will of all men be penetrated; only through subtle activation can all undertakings in the world be brought to completion; and only through spirit is there speed without hurry and the destination reached without travel. Therefore, kun 坤 means closing and qian 乾 means opening. The succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation. The alternate going and coming is called penetration. What is manifested is called xiang 象. What has taken xing 形 is called a concrete things. To control and use things is called method. And used to advantage, either in this or that way, so all people utilize them, that is called spirit.

Combining the relevant descriptions in these paragraphs, it can be found that Change has the following virtues: forming concrete things (to know objects, to imitate the natural image, and to form it into concrete things), making judgments (to make changes, to transform, and to make decisions in the world), penetrating into the aim of the world (to extend the operation is called penetration), determining the business of the world (to take and apply them to the people of the world), and making divination. Qian 乾 means jian 健, and kun 坤 means shun 順, which respectively represent the virtue of Heaven and that of Earth. 113 The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated: Yao, S4. 112

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With this in mind, let’s resort to the paragraph beginning with “what exists before physical form is called the Way” (xing er shangzheweizhidao 形而上者謂之道). The statement above can be summarized into three segments: forming concrete things, implementing to make judgments,114 and seeing the Way. The same xing 形 corresponds to different uses of virtues, which can be form (for forming concrete things), situation (for making decisions), and image (for linking up with Gods and seeing the Way). The so-called “what exists before physical form is called the Way” (xing er shangzheweizhidao 形而上者謂之道) means to observe xing 形 as the image of the Way, rather than as the form of forming concrete things or certain practical situation. That is to say, the statement of “what exists before physical form is called the Way” (xing er shangzheweizhidao 形而上者謂之道) is not to describe the Way, but to describe how to observe the Way or how the Way manifests itself. Therefore, what on Earth does the image of the Way mean? And how does the Way observe the law? To answer these, we shall delve more into the purpose of the paragraph beginning with the statement of “what exists before physical form is called the Way” (xing er shangzheweizhidao 形而上者謂之道). By putting it into the context, we may find it that this paragraph is written to illustrate the hexagram images of qian 乾 and kun 坤: The system of Change is indeed intermingled with the operation of qian 乾 and kun 坤. As qian 乾and kun 坤take their respective positions, the system of Change is established in their midst. If qian 乾and kun 坤are obliterated, there would be no means of seeing the system of Change. If the system of Change cannot be seen, then qian 乾 and kun 坤 would almost cease to operate. Therefore what exists before physical form is called the Way….To take them and apply them to the people of the world is called the business of life…Therefore (Shi gu 是故), xiang 象 comes out of the process that sages imitate the obscureness of things in the world…When the obscureness of things are exhausted, the hexagrams (gua 卦) are formed.

The word shi gu 是故 indicates that this paragraph is used to show the presence of xiang 象 to Change, that is, the ceaseless presence and functioning is qian kun 乾坤. The ways of Change are multiple, with the observance of the substance of the Way being one of them. Besides, the words gua 卦 and xiang 象 in the paragraph quoted above are worth pondering. In fact, xiang 象 is not visible, though can be illustrated by gua 卦. Therefore, in the commentary on gua 卦, linear symbols are interpreted by xiang 象. To say that xiang 象is recorded in gua 卦 doesn’t mean that xiang 象is equivalent to gua 卦. Although xiang 象is not equivalent to gua 卦, it is unobservable without gua 卦. Since that “Heaven is high, the Earth is low”, the statement of “what exists before physical form is called the Way” (xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao 形而上者謂 之道) means to make manifest the Way of Heaven through the xiang 象 of Heaven. What is the meaning of xiang 象 which can be borrowed to make manifest the Way of Heaven? As stated in Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes, the xing

As recorded in The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated, wei er shizhi 為而施之 (to act and to implement) is called Change.

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形 of the sun and the moon most clearly show the xiang 象 of Heaven.115 Recall the teachings of Confucius in Bo Shu Zhou Yi 帛書周易 (The Book of Changes copied on silk excavated): Since The Book of Changes shows the Way of Heaven, it cannot be represented completely by the sun, the moon, and the stars. In this sense, we credit to it yin 陰 and yang 陽.

Therefore, it can be determined that the xiang 象 of the Way of Heaven, the xiang 象observed by making hexagrams and the xiang 象 that exists before physical form are yin陰 and yang陽. Yin 陰and yang陽clearly belong to Two Forms (liang yi 兩儀). Why then does Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes say “there are four xiang 象 in The Book of Changes”? Four xiang 象, like four seasons, which is nothing more than the flow of yin 陰 and yang 陽. The flow is infinite and ceaseless, which cannot be expressed as yin 陰 and yang 陽 separately, but as the succession of yin 陰 and yang 陽. The manifestation of the Way of Heaven is the succession of yin 陰 and yang 陽. However, qian 乾 and kun 坤are shapes of hexagrams, how to manifest Change? It is through their hexagrams that the xiang 象 of yin 陰 and yang 陽is expressed. When qian 乾 and kun 坤are treated as what exists before physical form, they no longer refer to the myriad things, but to the opening and closing of yin 陰 and yang 陽. “Therefore, kun 坤 means closing and qian 乾 means opening. The succession of closing and opening constitutes transformation”. The succession of yin 陰 and yang 陽 denotes endless changes. Only now can we agree with Dai Dongyuan’s conclusion that the statement of “the successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way” (yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一陰一陽之謂道” is expressing the substance of Heaven. I also agree with Zhu Xi that it is acceptable to say that “yi yin yi yang zhiweidao 一陰一陽之謂道”, while it is not acceptable to say that the succession of yin 陰 and yang 陽 are the Way per se.116 Different from the former scholars, I do not equate the Way with yin 陰 and yang 陽 (As stated in Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes, “that which is unfathomable in the operation of yin 陰 and yang 陽 is called spirit”, which indicates that yin 陰 and yang 陽differ from the way of changes). Neither do I interpret yin 陰 nor yang 陽as the “concrete things existing after physical form” as the neoConfucians do (Concrete things can be made, but how can yin 陰 and yang 陽 be made?). Instead, I take the succession of yin 陰 and yang 陽 as the xiang 象of the Way to guide the ceaseless way of Change. We call this method of observing the Way as xingxiangzhi yin 形象指引 (image guidance), which manifest the substance of the Way through the opening and closing of yin 陰 and yang 陽.

115 In the six classics, ri 日 (the sun) and yue 月 (the moon) are examples of pictographic characters. See Shuo Wen Jie Zi 説文解字·敘 (The Origin of Chinese Characters: Xu). 116 See Li Guangdi 李光地, Zhou Yi Zhe Zhong 周易折中 (A Moderate view on The Book of Changes), Vol. 14.

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12.4.3 Conclusion: Ereignis and the Life-Giving Force As Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 once commented, the statement that “the successive movement of yin and yang contitutes the Way” (yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一陰一陽之謂 道) aims at “guiding” rather than “defining”. My meaning here is similar to his.117 The further work required here is a phenomenological reflection, that is, a review of the method to which this “guiding” belongs. Judging from the tradition of western philosophy, we must inquire whether it is a conceptualized grasp, a symbol, a representation, a display, a signifier and so on. All of these ways point to Anwesenden through nominalization. Heidegger tried to show the Anwesenheit of Anwesenden by bracketing out Anwesenden in the form of formaleAnzeige (formal indication). In the words of this chapter, it interrupts the nominalization and shows the original verb. His efforts are reflected in the question: “Woheraber und wiegibt es die Lichtung? Was sprichtim Es gibt?” According to Heidegger’s elucidations, in “es gibtetwas”, the “es” that transcends the Anwesenden, even Anwesenheit of Anwesenden, even to the extent of Lichtung, in the process of giving—endowing to so-and-so, has been “Entzug”. “Es gibt” (alethia) has its own non-being (represented by the Chinese characters 沒 (submerged), 莫 (do not), and 默 (silent)). This is called self-concealedness. The only way to manifest this “es” that is silent, submerged, and invisible, together with its giving-endowment, is to think disregarding of Dasein (the beings that es gibt). This simple es gibt, which cuts off etwas so that it does not have to avoid Entzug, is called Ereignis, which means (spontaneous) occurring. Ereignisereignet is actually of no difference from esgibtetwas; the only difference lies in its being concealed or unconcealed. When etwas is concealed from Ereignisereignet, es gibt is shown. When Ereignisereignet is concealed from es gibtetwas(=Es gibt “es-gibt”)—what Heidegger called the selfconcealedness of “es”–etwas becomes manifest. Roughly speaking, the latter is called forgetting Being. Heidegger’s method is a thorough “formaleAnzeige”, though he never mentions this term again. Relevant to the interest of the study of Heidegger in the academic circle abroad, the Chinese academic community often compares Heideggerian theory of Ereignis with both Buddhist and Daoism ideas.118 Since there are multiple schools of Daoism, and that all of which focus on discussing the methods of political governance, I shall not discuss them further in this chapter. The theory of dependent origination and the emptiness of nature can indeed compare with that of Ereignis. However, it is important to note that the subject-predicate structure underlying Ereignis is not completely inactivated by Heidegger’s emphasis on the formality of the subject Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Zhou Yi Zhe Xue Jiang Yan Lu 周易哲學講演錄 (Lectures On the Philosophy of The Book of Changes), Shanghai 上海: East China Normal University Press 華東師範大 學出版社, 2004. 118 See Graham Parkes, Heidegger and Asian Thought, University of Hawaii Press, 1987. This book mainly compares Heidegger’s thought with Chinese thoughts, especially that of Laozi 老子, Zhuangzi 莊子, and the Chan sect. See also Zhang Xianglong 張祥龍, Hai-De-Ge-Er Si-Xiang Yu Zhong-Guo Tian-Dao 海德格爾思想與中國天道 (The Thoughts of Heidegger and the Chinese Way of Heaven), Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996. 117

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of “es”. The question such as “Woheraber und wiegibt es die Lichtung?” is the result of thinking in the subject-predicate structure. Only in the sense that beings are concealed to show “es gibt” is Heidegger’s study close to the approach of breaking from dependent origination and directly make manifest the emptiness of nature. However, emptiness is emptiness per se. Buddhism will not accept the structure that “(even empty) self-nature gives birth to all secular existence”. Neither the “being that gives birth to” nor the action of “giving birth to” would be recognized by Buddhism. On the other hand, the secular existence is svabhava-sunyata. At least Mahayana Buddhism would not fully accept the concealed-unconcealed approach of “ignoring beings to reflect on Being”. Buddhism is exactly gazing at the so-called beings and finding that the beings and even Being are completely untenable. Buddhism denigrates beings (the so-called self-nature), while Heidegger keep pondering on how beings are possible. There’s a big gap between these two. This point is briefly explained in this chapter. Limited by space, I shall not elaborate on it any further. According to the analysis of this paper, it is more appropriate to interpret and weigh Heidegger’s theory with the Way of Change in a series of important joints such as Heaven and Earth, concealedness and unconcealedness, opening and closing, and in the presentation way of the original phenomenon as a whole. The ultimate question of Heidegger is how is Lichtung possible. As has been explained above, Lichtung actually refers to aletheia of self-concealedness. So this problem is equivalent to the problem of observing the Way in studying The Book of Changes, namely how does the image of yin 陰 and yang 陽 manifest the substance of the Way? Of course, none of the Commentaries or the Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes asks this question. This is so clear to the ancients. There is no need to query in the situation unfolded at present, and only the things far away are needed to be grasped by questioning. The ancients were different from the Greek philosophers— or the study of classics was different from philosophy—what shock brought was not inquiry in surprise, but simple description, admiration and even regret. As stated by Appended Remarks of The Book of Changes in the tone as follows: The successive movement of yin 陰 and yang 陽 constitutes the Way. What issues from the Way is good, and that which realizes it is the individual nature. The man of humanity sees it and calls it humanity. The man of wisdom sees it and calls it wisdom. And the common people act according to it daily without knowing it. In this way the Way of the superior man is fully realized. It is manifested in humanity but is concealed in its functioning. It promotes all things without sharing the anxiety of the sage. How perfect is its eminent virtue and great achievement! Its achievement is great because it possesses everything, and its virtue is abundant because it renovates things every day. Changes mean life-giving in production and reproduction. Qian 乾 means the completion of forms, and kun 坤 means to model after them. Divination means to go to the utmost of the natural course of events in order to know the future. Affairs mean to adapt and accommodate accordingly. And that which is unfathomable in the operation of yin 陰 and yang 陽 is called spirit.

The basic task of the phenomenology of the Way is to follow the authors of Yue Ji 樂記, Zhong Yong 中庸, and Tong Shu 通書, and lead their thoughts to the clear realm of this paragraph. The outline of the theory of the Way is to explain this paragraph. Limited to the subject of this chapter, I shall base my comments on the fragments of

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this paragraph, starting from the key questions raised above in relation to Heidegger’s thought and, in the final analysis, to Western philosophy as a whole. First of all, the statement that “the successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way” (yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一陰一陽之謂道) denotes the approach to breaking the substance and returning to the Way, which is that of image guidance (roughly equivalent to the idea initiated by Xiong Shili 熊十力 and Mou Zongsan 牟 宗三, which denotes the manifestation of the substance in recognizing the function). This substance is that of the Way, rather than the subject or the foundation. The Way is manifested only in the opening-closing and the operation of yin 陰 and yang 陽. Dao 道 is not the subject of “the successive movement of yin and yang” (yi yin yi yang 一陰一陽). Therefore, it cannot be said that dao 道 is both Being and acting. Being is only the function of the Way. To summarize, only that “Change means life-giving force” can interpret the statement that “the successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way” (yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一陰一陽之謂道), since the Way is constantly in change. The substance of the Way is changing, and being and non-being are the functions of the substance of the Way. There is no being that makes the life-giving force possible, as stated by “the spirit has no definite approach, and changes has no substance”. That is the first difference between the theory of Heidegger and the way of Change. Secondly, there are processes of occurring and becoming in the flow of life-giving force and the successive movement of yin 陰 and yang 陽. The virtue of qian 乾 is “to give life” (sheng 生), as “qian 乾 is the originator, and the successive is the good”.119 The virtue of kun 坤 is “to become” (cheng 成 ). Occurring and becoming are two things yet inseparable from each other. This is called “with the changing of the way of qian 乾, everything gets into its appropriate position”.120 In Heiddeger’s theory of Ereignis, Ereignis and etwas are separated from each other. Therefore, it only admits the principle of “to give life” (sheng 生) while ignoring that of “to become” (cheng 成), and it only admits the principle of “becoming into” while ignoring that of ceaselessness. Generally speaking, Heidegger saw only that Heaven and Earth taking their proper places, while ignoring the cultivation of the myriad things. That is the second difference between the theory of Heidegger and the way of Change. Lastly, the Way of Heaven is self-fulfilled in “sincerity/reality” (Cheng 誠), while the way of man is to think how to be sincere in imitating the Way of Heaven. Rites and music are thus born. Both Yue Ji 樂記 and Zhong Yong 中庸 are the result of the functioning of the Change principle. Heidegger only said that forming concrete things (art), politics and religion, sacrifice and even the thinking are different ways of Wahrheit. However, he did not elaborate on how these ways were related to each As noted by Zhu Xi 朱熹, the Way is endowed in yin 陰and takes action in yang 陽. The successive denotes its functioning. Different from that, for Li Dingzuo 李鼎祚, the successive denotes tong 統 (to unify), indicating that qian 乾 can unify the myriad things given birth by Heaven, while kun 坤cultivates the myriad things and make them become themselves. See Li Daoping 李道 平, Zhou Yi Ji Jie Zuan Shu 周易集解纂疏, Vol.8. Sheng 生 shall not confuse with cheng 成, since the former denotes the changing of the Way of qian 乾, while the latter denotes the uprightness of the nature of the myriad things. 120 Zhou Yi: Qian Gua, Tuan Zhuan 周易·乾卦·彖傳 (The Book of Changes: Appendix of Qian). 119

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other or whether they led to the same destination. For him, the relationship between Heaven and man inevitably ends with either man’s taking Heaven in or Heaven taking man in. The Sorge and Angst of Dasein is not the same as the worry and concern of the sages. The great business comes out of decision. But where does the height of virtue originate from? All these problems arise from the boundary of Heidegger’s theory, which, though there are Gods of Heaven and Earth, fails to get the state of participating into the transformation and nourishment of Heaven and Earth. That is the third difference between the theory of Heidegger and the way of Change.

Postscript

The book is a general compilation of some of my published articles, slightly forming in a systematic way. It is simply a starting point—in the sense of setting the basis and directions—for the unfinished thinking, especially for certain systematic work. I’m thankful to Gan Yang甘陽, Liu Xiaofeng劉小楓, Shu Wei舒煒, Feng Jinhong 馮金紅, Li Xuejun李學軍, Shi Hongjun施宏俊 and other of my teachers and friends, who contributed to the publication of this book and the writing of the articles in this book. I’m also thankful to SDX Joint Publishing Company (hereafter “SDX”). To me, SDX always reminds me of 1980s. Every time I re-open the old books published by SDX and the Du Shu讀書 Journal, I feel like returning to my spiritual hometown. It is SDX that has been, for many years, guiding the foolhardy young people like me with her wisdom and patience, as well as instructing some of us to grow up from readers to writers. As for those friends who study together with me day and night, you have been one part of my life. And no more special thanks would be addressed here. Ding Yun July 2011

© SDX Joint Publishing 2023 Y. Ding, Confucianism and Enlightenment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5471-1

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