Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective: Political and Economic Development since 2008 3031076001, 9783031076008

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
Part I: Diverging Development Paths
Chapter 2: North Korea: The Decline of the Kim Jong-il Era
2.1 The Problem of the “Line of Succession” and the Continuity of Political Power
2.2 A New Leader Enters the Arena
2.3 The Socioeconomic Situation: Attempts to “Turn Back the Clock”
Chapter 3: The Start of Kim Jong-Un’s Era in North Korea: Political Consolidation
3.1 A New Leader and Domestic Political Intrigues
3.2 Power Vertical Consolidation
Chapter 4: New Socioeconomic Trends of the Kim Jong-Un Era: Covert Transformations
4.1 Flirting with Reforms
4.2 Byungjin: A Strategy to Build Nuclear Potential and Develop the Economy Shoulder to Shoulder
4.3 Back to “Military Communism”?
Chapter 5: The Revenge of the Conservatives in South Korea
5.1 Lee Myung-bak’s Promises and Reality
5.2 Protests, Criticism and Government Reaction
5.3 The Variable Success of the “Global” Strategy
Chapter 6: The Fall of the “Father of the Nation’s” Daughter: South Korea Under Park Geun-Hye
6.1 Pre-election Hopes and First Steps
6.2 Criticism of Park Geun-hye’s Style of Governance
6.3 Foreign Policy
6.4 The Road Downwards: Scandals, Public Protests
6.5 Image Scandal and Impeachment
Chapter 7: The Comeback of the Liberals in South Korea
7.1 The Election Campaign and Its Implementation
7.2 Moon Jae-in’s Work Style
7.3 Liberal Foreign Policy
Chapter 8: Inter-Korean Relations: Ups and Downs
8.1 From the “Liberal Decade” to a New Cold War: Inter-Korean Aggravation Under Lee Myung-bak
8.2 A Crisis in Relations During Park Geun-hye’s Presidency
8.3 The Inter-Korean “Honeymoon”
8.4 A Period of Disappointment
Part II: The Nuclear Challenge
Chapter 9: North Koreas’s Nuclear Missile Policy: New Facts
9.1 A Retrospective Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Missile Efforts Before Kim Jong-un
9.2 The Nuclear Programme Reaches a New Level
Chapter 10: Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in Times of Growing Tensions Between Pyongyang and the Administrations of Barack Obama and Lee Myung-Bak
10.1 Termination of the Six-Party Diplomatic Process
10.2 A Return to Confrontations and Bilateral Talks
Chapter 11: A New Period of Confrontation (2012–2017)
11.1 From Diplomacy to Pressure
11.2 The 2016–2017 Escalation: The “Hydrogen Bomb” the “Intercontinental Missiles”
Chapter 12: Detente and Stagnation: What Lies Ahead?
12.1 A Sudden Breakthrough in North Korea’s Relations with South Korea and the United States
12.2 Diplomatic Stagnation and Roll-Back
12.3 Diplomacy Sidelined
Chapter 13: Advantages of the Six-Party Format as the Foundation of the Collective Security System in Northeast Asia
13.1 The Six-Party Negotiating Format as a Framework for Security Institutions
13.2 Equilibrium of Stability (“The Great North Pacific Project”)
Part III: Partnering with Russia
Chapter 14: Russia’s Political Focus on the Korean Settlement
14.1 Conceptual Approaches
14.2 Russia and the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue: The Inertia of the Second Half of the 2000s and the Metamorphosis of the Situation
14.3 A “Reactive” Approach to the Crises of the Early Kim Jong-un Era and New Initiatives
14.4 Russia and the Unexpected Thaw on the Korean Peninsula
14.5 Russia’s Reaction to the Suspension of the Dialogue
14.6 Russian Sanctions Against North Korea: Dilemmas and Resolutions
Chapter 15: A Difficult But Frank Dialogue with Kim Jong-il
15.1 The Cooling of Relations After 2008
15.2 Stabilization and Improvement of Relations Before the Change of Power in North Korea
Chapter 16: Russia’s Relations with North Korea Under Kim Jong-un: Ups and Downs
16.1 Initial Ambiguity
16.2 A Warming of Relations in 2014–2015
16.3 Another Crisis in 2016–2017
16.4 The Impact of the Unexpected Detente of 2018 on Relations with North Korea
Chapter 17: Breaking the Deadlock in Economic Co-operation with North Korea
17.1 Limited Co-operation on Projects up to 2014
17.2 Labour Migration
17.3 The Hasan-Rajin Project
17.4 Timeline of Attempts to Break the Economic Co-operation Deadlock
17.5 Stagnation of the Sanction Period
Chapter 18: On the Path Towards a “Strategic Partnership” with South Korea: Challenges of the Conservative Decade and New Hopes
18.1 High-Level Contacts and the Declaration of a Strategic Partnership
18.2 High-Level Dialogue in 2013–2017
18.3 Obstacles to Trilateral and Investment Co-operation
18.4 The Prospects of Russian–South Korean Contacts Under the Liberals
Chapter 19: Russia–South Korea Economic Relations Against the Background of Regional Economic Integration
19.1 The Potential for Economic Co-operation
19.2 Prospects for Economic Co-operation in the Context of Regional Integration
Epilogue
Bibliographic References
Literature
In Russian
Monographs
Periodicals
In English
Monographs
Periodicals
In Korean
Internet Resources (Official Websites)
In Russian
In English
In Korean
Index

Citation preview

Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective Political and Economic Development since 2008 Anatoly Torkunov · Georgy Toloraya Ilya Dyachkov

Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective

Anatoly Torkunov  • Georgy Toloraya Ilya Dyachkov

Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective Political and Economic Development since 2008

Anatoly Torkunov Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) Moscow, Russia

Georgy Toloraya Institute of Economics Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia

Ilya Dyachkov Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) Moscow, Russia

ISBN 978-3-031-07600-8    ISBN 978-3-031-07601-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Russia has been directly involved in Korean affairs since the nineteenth century and at times (like in the aftermath of World War II and during the Korean War) played a crucial role in the developments in the Peninsula. Although Russian attention to this neighbouring area has diminished after the breakup of the Soviet Union and especially in the wake of dramatic events in Europe in 2014–2022, Russia remains one of the four most influential players here. However, the views and assessments on current Korean affairs from within the country are not well known internationally, while the understanding of Russian policy and goals is often inadequate. This sometimes leads to misinterpretation and even policy mistakes, while Korean issue remains one of the few international problems where, despite current global confrontation, co-operation between Russia and the West is still possible and desirable. This book is an attempt by the experts intimately involved in Russian policy-making and research on Korea for the last several decades to systemize information and data (often available only in Russian) on Russia’s approach to Korean issue and its relations with both Koreas in the first decades of the twenty-first century. This book is aimed for the broader audience, including researchers and students of Korean history, so it is not a strictly academic study but contains a lot of personal assessments by the authors based on their unique experience. Moscow, Russia  

Anatoly Torkunov Georgy Toloraya Ilya Dyachkov v

Contents

1 Introduction  1 Part I Diverging Development Paths  13 2 North Korea: The Decline of the Kim Jong-il Era 15 3 The Start of Kim Jong-Un’s Era in North Korea: Political Consolidation 25 4 New Socioeconomic Trends of the Kim Jong-Un Era: Covert Transformations 39 5 The Revenge of the Conservatives in South Korea 53 6 The Fall of the “Father of the Nation’s” Daughter: South Korea Under Park Geun-Hye 67 7 The Comeback of the Liberals in South Korea 97 8 Inter-Korean Relations: Ups and Downs121

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Part II The Nuclear Challenge 155 9 North Koreas’s Nuclear Missile Policy: New Facts157 10 Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in Times of Growing Tensions Between Pyongyang and the Administrations of Barack Obama and Lee Myung-Bak173 11 A New Period of Confrontation (2012–2017)185 12 Detente and Stagnation: What Lies Ahead?199 13 Advantages of the Six-Party Format as the Foundation of the Collective Security System in Northeast Asia223 Part III Partnering with Russia 233 14 Russia’s Political Focus on the Korean Settlement235 15 A Difficult But Frank Dialogue with Kim Jong-il267 16 Russia’s Relations with North Korea Under Kim Jong-un: Ups and Downs275 17 Breaking the Deadlock in Economic Co-­operation with North Korea299 18 On the Path Towards a “Strategic Partnership” with South Korea: Challenges of the Conservative Decade and New Hopes315

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19 Russia–South Korea Economic Relations Against the Background of Regional Economic Integration339 Epilogue351 Bibliographic References353 Index367

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Over the past 75  years, the Korean Peninsula has remained one of the world’s most volatile regions, and leading politicians and researchers closely follow the events there. Tension outbreaks usually attract much attention, but in many cases, the analysis, often emanating from the countries hostile to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is biased and not reliable. In fact, Korea is unique in this regard: different observers evaluate the situation in radically different ways reflecting their political views. The Peninsula is in the midst of a long-term large-scale information war. For decades, Korea has remained one of the few points in Asia where the interests of the “big four”1 collide. Ongoing great international changes have intensified rather than suppressed the potential for conflict, as the old post-1991 world order seems to be collapsing. Today, the Korean issue additionally sours increasingly confrontational US–China relations and further complicates interactions within the tangled web of regional powers. Besides, it even managed to corrupt the very foundations of global strategic security, which is especially noticeable in the case of the non-proliferation regime. The emergence of new world order, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, has brought about many changes. Nationalism and militarism 1

 That is, Russia, the United States, China and Japan.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Torkunov et al., Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5_1

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are on the rise across the globe. International law remains crippled while world powers promote selfish interests. Alliances grow useless and the global governance system is collapsing. How does this affect the Korean Peninsula? South Korea retains its significant economic potential but has somewhat lost its former vigour. The country remains a “political dwarf”: Seoul’s attempts to escape external control have been fruitless. However, in general, South Korea’s future gives no reason for concern. Someday economic difficulties will pass, and the country will move on to a new knowledge-driven development model. At the same time, Seoul is unlikely to escape American custody, especially in the midst of the unfolding US– China conflict. Ironically, the changing global order can strengthen North Korea’s position. Even within the emerging global subordination system, the DPRK will still remain a hard nut to crack. Isolated from globalization for decades, the country has made self-reliance its existential basis and has acquired the means (i.e. weapons of mass destruction and rigid vertical power structure) to protect its lifestyle. New global societal trends are quite compatible with the North Korean vision of rigid autonomous nation-state structure, and North Koreans hardly see them as challenging. The way global and national authorities use the pandemic and its consequences to create a system of centralized control within borders and to fence themselves off is fully consistent with North Korean practice. In fact, it was the exact reason why democratic countries have criticized Pyongyang for so long. Today, the North Korean reality, unfortunately, may be closer to the “new normal.” Of course, new trends are unlikely to overcome the inertia of history. Basic parameters of the confrontation have remained constant over the past decades, despite the change in leadership in the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and elsewhere. The pendulum swings between crisis and detente, but the essence of the two Korean states and the basic formula of their relations remain unchanged. Admittedly, the current paradigm of international relations offers no solutions to regional security problems. The leading actors’ incompatible interests are a major factor. However, the military-strategic balance of the recent decades has ensured enviable “confrontational stability.” Hundreds of volumes cover this topic, including those published in Russia. One of the authors of this book is the editor and co-author of The Korean Peninsula: Metamorphoses of Post-War History (2008). It was

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the first comprehensive Russian monograph on Korean post-War history, which analysed the South Korean “economic miracle,” Pyongyang’s secret quest for nuclear weapons, the birth of “Korean-style democracy” from within South Korean autocracy, South Korea’s emergence as a developed country, and the complicated cultural and civilizational evolution of the nation’s two separated parts. This book develops these ideas: it covers events and processes we were witness to since 2008, when the previous work came out. To recap, the turn of century was a time of hope for the Korean Peninsula. The main factors were the “sunshine policy” and “peace and prosperity policy” pursued by the ROK president Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun, respectively, and aimed at the reconciliation with the North. Also, Pyongyang and Washington were actively trying to reach a deal. Even the conservative Republican George W. Bush administration had to engage diplomatically with North Korea after Pyongyang’s significant steps towards nuclearization. However, in the mid-2000s, it became obvious that this “warm spell” was just an illusion. “Paleoconservatives” who still saw North Korea as “enemy number one” came to power in the ROK.  The United States remained under the illusion that “the Pyongyang regime” was about to collapse. Thus, Washington’s unwillingness to make concessions couple with North Korea’s stubbornness prevented both sides from finding a compromise. Pyongyang elite was concerned about the leader’s deteriorating health and unsure who was going to succeed to the North Korean “throne.” They became disillusioned with economic and foreign policy experiments. Subtle market-oriented economic changes slightly improved life in the DPRK but gave rise to new social tensions. Increased external pressure and sanctions have exacerbated economic problems, and North Korea gladly returned to “manual control” and habitual “screw-­ tightening” practices. It seems that the same story is already repeating itself in the early 2020s as we are writing this book. The North and the South follow their diverging paths, and the stars that guide them are different; the two are far from bridging the growing gap. A lot depends on what role North Korea will play and what direction Pyongyang will choose. When the global socialist camp disintegrated and external support for North Korea ceased, the West and Seoul decided that it is only a matter of time before the DPRK collapsed like other communist regimes. Then the ripe fruit of reunification will fall right into Seoul’s lap, and the South will absorb the North. This would also automatically

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solve the nuclear problem, so even this issue required no concessions to the “doomed Kim regime.” This disastrous mistake happened because decision-makers did not understand the DPRK well and ignored reality. Notably, leading Russian experts have never agreed with such opinions. By the early 1990s, North Korea had become not a “classic” socialist state, but rather a clan-based “aristocratic theocracy,” something akin to Oriental despotism of old. It remains very isolated and maintains an exceptionally tough regime of administrative and police control. Therefore, there could be no hope that some “popular uprising” (even with outside help) would “depose the tyrant,” like in Romania. The North Korean elite is a complex web of family, blood and caste relations. Within it, some level of meritocracy is obvious, owing to Confucian and feudal traditions. The Korean upper class is very monolithic, characterized by a high level of asabiyyah,2 as no escape route is available should the worst happen. In other socialist countries, young members of the upper class hoped (in many cases, reasonably) that they will become successful capitalists and international oligarchs under the new market system. North Korean upper class realizes they would not be so lucky. No safe haven on the globe would take in former leaders of a “rogue state,” and if the South wins, their fate will be deplorable. Therefore, they all are in the same boat and ready to fight to the last drop of blood, rather than succumb to internal strife. In the case of North Korea, it would be extremely difficult for even the most cunning external agents to benefit from the inevitable factionalism and contradictions within the upper class. Not to mention that this upper class has to consider the country’s well-oiled repressive system. Despite Western hopes that marketization will undermine the political regime, the emerging North Korean “bourgeoisie” joins the nomenklatura in their opposing reunification. From the sociological point of view, as some researchers suggest, these “capitalists” are similar to the tsekhoviks of 1970s’ Soviet Central Asia and South Caucasus. They are one with the

2  “Asabiyyah” or “asabiyya” is a term dating back to the fourteenth-century Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun denoting solidarity and social cohesion, used when speaking of an upper class consisting of clans. (See Tausch, Arno & Heshmati, Almas. Asabiyya: Re-Interpreting Value Change in Globalized Societies. 2009. URL: https://ideas.repec.Org/p/iza/izadps/ dp4459.html).

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state apparatus and understand perfectly well that they will lose their privileged status upon reunification. This is precisely why the 2011 transition of power did not provoke, as many in the West and South Korea hoped, the governing class to split and the regime to collapse. When Kim Jong-un came to power, he repressed many “aristocrats” (mostly without harming ordinary people), but any hopes that the discontented upper class will orchestrate a coup d’état have proven to be false. However, Kim Jong-un, despite his initial urge to reform the economy and co-operate with the outside world, soon became a voluntary hostage of the system, and had to turn to the traditional pressure policy and initiate unprecedented military build-up. For decades now, socio-economic systems of the DPRK have been operating as if under martial law and remained isolated from the outside world. Even the boldest estimates suggest that North Korean foreign trade turnover does not exceed 15%–20% of its gross national product (GNP) even in “better” years, which is significantly less than in developed countries. This explains why this society is very stable and can survive even under forced isolation. New scientific and technological advances improve North Koreans’ lives, for example, information technologies, solar panels, more compact and less energy-intensive equipment, new materials that are not too difficult to manufacture and so on. However, changes, while hard to detect, still continue, and they have even gained momentum under Kim Jong-un. Back in the 1990s, the DPRK managed to avoid an economic collapse thanks to the unspoken permission to tolerate markets out of necessity. Marketization gained momentum at the end of Kim Jong-il’s reign, especially after the catastrophically ill-conceived attempt to turn back time with the 2009 monetary reform. North Korea successfully bypasses sanctions and sells traditional export goods (primarily to China). Having secured new funding options through legal and illegal cyber operations, Pyongyang purchases whatever it needs (even high-tech and luxury items) abroad via its shadow businesses. Even North Korea’s extreme “self-isolation” during the pandemic did not lead to economic disaster. The DPRK is slowly modernizing, and the country has great potential for peaceful evolution and development. Of course, no serious progress is possible unless technological level of the productive forces increases considerably. This requires, among other things, an open economy, which would provide connectivity, foreign investment and technologies. Currently it is quite difficult to expect this.

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The government fears that they will lose control over society and open it to external “harmful influence.” Another important factor is the tightening sanctions against Pyongyang, aimed at stopping its nuclear and missile programs. As a result, North Korea is all but cut off from the global financial system and legal international trade, bound to practice “self-reliance” and join global processes furtively, from the shadows. In comparison, socio-economic development of South Korea, who chose a different path, looks very impressive. Despite the blow it took in the 2008 crisis, the country continued its economic growth and technological progress to become a developed country. Scope and nature of current political processes suggest that South Korea has become a full-fledged, albeit still immature, democracy. The flip side, however, is the chaotic domestic politics, understructured political forces, growing populism and mounting social problems. Since the late 1980s, the Republic of Korea has been going through the difficult transit from authoritarianism to democracy. South Koreans remember the time when they had much less freedom, and most do not want to go back. The main means of improving the government and “purifying” the elites is public scrutiny aimed at rooting out abuse—along with politicians who have sullied their reputation. Therefore, people pay enormous attention to the politicians’ image, and the top leadership has to pass the strictest checks. In the end, the leaders usually fail this biased test. Most of the democratic era presidents went on trial and then to jail when their turn ended, although during elections the public thought them to be the embodiment of honesty and virtue. However, the political history of the Republic of Korea is surprisingly cyclical. Over time, the president turns out to have been involved in corrupt practices, nepotism and other forms of power abuse; they lose popularity and support and eventually freedom. In 2008, when our book begins, conservatives returned to power in the Republic of Korea, and the new Lee Myung-bak’s government dismantled many things the previous liberal administration worked hard to build. This process continued under Park Geun-hye; but did it help to solve the problems the country faced? In any case, Seoul failed to reach an economic breakthrough and the international situation deteriorated further. South Korea has become a hostage to the global confrontation, which keeps escalating regardless of Seoul’s desires. The dramatic transition of power back to liberals in 2017 also failed to solve internal issues, and, perhaps, aggravated problems in both politics

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and economy. President Moon Jae-in stubbornly experimented with transforming the economy into a socially oriented one. South Koreans do not understand this approach, and it is unlikely to solve accumulated systemic problems. Politically, liberals turned out to be not so liberal: like the conservatives, they are deaf to criticism and continue to suppress their opponents. The liberal government mostly kept to tried and true foreign policy patterns. Seoul remains highly dependent on Washington in the military and political sense. On the other hand, increasingly robust economic relations with China further limit South Korea’s independence. Under Moon Jae-in, historical disputes with Japan, that the conservatives started, remained unresolved and turned even bitterer. The liberal administration inspired great hopes regarding the emerging nuclear and inter-Korean settlement; however, by 2019, both these tracks reached a dead end. Park Geun-hye’s resignation in 2017 rocked the country, and many decided that the shocking impeachment marked a radical turning point: South Korea would no longer be the same. However, the politics quickly sot stuck in the old groove of factional struggle, intrigue and ruling by diktat. Such harmful “baggage” invariably limits Seoul’s ability to secure its national interests. The military and political situation on the Korean Peninsula can be described as a confrontational impasse. It is akin to mid-flight turbulence: while extremely unpleasant for passengers, it almost never causes the plane to crash. However, it is the “almost” part that remains a cause of concern. In fact—and technically—the Korean War, which began 70 years ago, is still not over. It was the first proxy conflict between superpowers who formerly were World War II allies. The war marked a new era in international relations, replacing the short-lived “concert of winning powers.” It helped to build the global bipolar confrontational system that would shape the international landscape for the next four decades. The poisonous seeds sown back then are sprouting today as the new world order burgeons on the ruins of the post-1991 global liberal system (perhaps later we will call the 2020s the Roaring Twenties too). Today, in North East Asia two geopolitical triangles, half-forgotten after the Cold War, come into clearer view once again. These triangles, the “continental” one (USSR—China—DPRK) and the “oceanic” one (US— Japan—Republic of Korea), emerged during of the Korean War and as a result of it.

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Of course, allied and quasi-allied relations do not presuppose unanimity and lack of contradictions within the two blocs. The US-led alliance was and is a rigid, vertical structure: both “junior partners,” Seoul and Tokyo, accept Washington’s leadership, remaining at odds (sometimes significant) with each other. In contrast, North Korea had been using the “tail wags the dog” tactic for most of the post-War period, at least since the late 1950s. Pyongyang manoeuvred between the USSR and China, trying to outsmart its senior allies and reap twice the benefit. After the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea wanted to use the same approach when dealing with Washington and Beijing, but failed, because neither could tolerate Pyongyang’s nuclear programme. However, North Korea is still very skilled at using all kinds of differences between the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the Republic of Korea to advance its agenda. North Korea believes that the main task of its foreign policy is to get Washington to recognize the country. This would lead to further international legitimization of the DPRK, allow Pyongyang to receive economic development aid, and finally become independent of China. At the same time, history has shown that it is Pyongyang that comes up with military and political initiatives, while the other involved countries have to react. Direct dialogue between the US and DPRK leaders, which began with the June 2018 Singapore summit, was an unprecedented milestone. Many thought that a brand new era had begun in solving the Korean issue. In fact, the negotiations between the United States and North Korea have been perfunctory for many years. Both sides never looked for compromise, but rather used a pro-diplomacy image to advance their hidden agenda and achieve long-term goals. Previously, US strategy at the talks had been tantamount to demanding surrender from Pyongyang, and Washington demonstrated no desire to negotiate an acceptable status for North Korea. The reason is simple: reconciliation on equal terms would technically mean recognizing the “rogue state” and giving the “dictatorship” security guarantees. US political elites cannot go this far due to several factors: old trauma of an unsuccessful war; intolerance to totalitarianism; desire to contain China; need to maintain a military presence in East Asia which would become unnecessary if North Korea ceases to be a “threat to peace” and so forth. Even during periods of détente, US policy proceeds from a fanciful idea that engaging with North Korea is merely the safest way to

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“soft-land” it, that is, cause it to collapse. North Korea is a bipartisan issue for US politicians. North Korea, for its part, was pretty aware of these calculations, but nevertheless pursued the opportunity for direct negotiations with “the only superpower” in order to explore possibilities to improve their position and raise international prestige. Pyongyang saw the Vietnamese model as particularly interesting. That country also fought against the United States, won and later became an important, yet still independent Washington’s partner in South East Asia. Admittedly, North Korea realizes that these goals are unrealistic or, at least, distant. In fact, Pyongyang has been using the talks to buy time to develop nuclear and missile deterrents and therefore strengthen their hand for later negotiations. The Korean conflict has been a dichotomy since its inception. Although it almost immediately turned international, deep inside it remained a civil war, a deadly fight for dominance between two national elites. For ordinary Koreans, despite all the ideological flair, the war was not so much about communism or capitalism, but rather about who would rule united Korea and which camp it would belong to. Both countries did not explicitly give up on the dream of ending the Korean War (which neither side won) and achieving the final victory (now codenamed “unification”). South Korea still believes (as stated in the country’s constitution) that the fall of the North Korean regime and the South absorbing the North is a question of time. Seoul thinks that the very logic of history will prove it right, although new generations of Koreans are waiting for this less and less eagerly. The core of North Korean state ideology (although this does not necessarily translate into practical measures) is complete nonacceptance of the “South Korean puppet regime.” Propaganda clings to the semi-religious dream of a “better world” where “Joseon” (the name North Koreans use for their country) will miraculously reunite under Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un cannot completely abandon this legacy of his predecessors, which represents his mandate to rule. The North Korean military at the same time might still be preparing for a future war with the South, and not necessarily a defensive one. As long as at least the North Korean rhetoric reflects this idea, South Korea will have suspicions about possible aggression. This creates the need for a deterrent, and one such option is to strengthen the military alliance with the United States, which, in turn, scares Pyongyang. Painful history, bitter memories of a technically unfinished war, overblown suspicions and misunderstandings, and the

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difference in the social systems remain insurmountable obstacles for the North and the South. Sometimes it seems that nationalism can help to bridge this gap. In 2018, during an unprecedented inter-Korean rapprochement and after new summits, the two parties signed documents that basically amount to peace agreements. However, it turned out that implementing them is impossible. South Korea is too dependent on the United States when it comes to relations with Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un was outraged by president Moon Jae-in’s apparent inability to fulfil his promises, even though the latter was genuinely committed to dialogue. North Korean leader considered it pointless to continue talks if South Koreans cannot make decisions themselves. Unfortunately, the hopes that the “Trump factor,” the “Kim Jong-un factor” and “Moon Jae-in factor” would line up perfectly for a breakthrough in 2018 did not materialize. It was “all talk and no action”: the American “deep state” and political establishment remain very far from making a strategic decision to coexist with North Korea. Yet, a new reality emerged after the 2017 “stress test.” North Korea endured the threats of “fire and fury,” and everyone saw that the United States cannot use their military force for a pre-emptive strike. The whole world, and Washington itself, finally recognized that the Korean problem has no military solution. Pyongyang took this as proof of actual “strategic parity” with the United States and shows no eagerness to make concessions. In the middle of the twenty-first century, stability and progress on the Korean peninsula and around it will remain linked to the interests of major power centres. Russia, a country bordering Korea and historically involved in Korean problems, cannot just ignore this. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has consistently advocated a political and diplomatic solution to numerous problems of the Korean Peninsula. This approach should revolve around equal dialogue and respect for sovereignty, and consider the participants’ legitimate interests. This point of view has not found much support in the West, which exacerbated the confrontation between the two “triangles.” However, Russia will always stand for pursuing multilateralism, for balancing and harmonizing the interests of all actors involved in order to create a sustainable system of regional security and co-operation. It seems that Russia still can influence the Korean situation in a positive way (of course, while tending to its national interests, which, however, do

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not contradict anyone’s legitimate interests). Moreover, growing Russian role in Korea-related multilateral diplomacy would add to our prestige in the region. Later, should the parties find a solution, this would become a great basis for promoting Russian economic and security interests in the dynamic East Asia. This book is a comprehensive analysis of all these interconnected issues, and the structure reflects the method. The authors proceed from firm belief that foreign policy is a function of domestic and external circumstances (i.e., diplomacy is “the art of the possible”). So, the book becomes a look through a zooming lens: (1) domestic situation in the North and the South; (2) Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s foreign policy options within the omnipresent regional nuclear dilemma; (3) what the DPRK and the Republic of Korea gain from dealing with Russia and what is Moscow’s current and potential role in multilateral and bilateral interactions. It would be impossible to advance the next stage of detailed analysis without going through the previous one. Such skips would create gaps in understanding and undermine explanations. This very preface is a sample of our research tactic and literary style, as well as an “executive summary” of the entire work. Few authors ever dare to take on the daunting task of painting the big picture. Most opt for a more easily manageable tighter focus, coming up with a creative theoretical framework to explain it. We firmly believe that showing the full scope is much more useful for the reader and challenging for a researcher than sticking to a reductionist methodology. This would be true even for a purely descriptive work, yet our book strives to be much more than that. Another noticeable point about our book is its timing. The Korean Peninsula now is in the midst of a new crisis cycle. To explain what and why is happening today, and what to do about it, one needs to look at the roots of the problem. Those lie precisely where the book starts, a little more than ten years ago, when a power shift occurred almost in sync in both Koreas and the United States, who all are major players in the regional dilemma. In terms of international situation, 2008 marks a point in time when the Six-Party Talks stopped, and, without this mechanism to tackle the nuclear issue, regional security started to deteriorate, leaving Seoul and Pyongyang to search for new leverage. So, the first section, “Diverging Development Paths,” analyses the socio-political and economic situation in North and South Korea. It cannot be done with a single descriptive snapshot, since history is a study of

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processes—hence the prolonged “contemporary” period from 2008 to 2020. Second, in “The Nuclear Challenge,” we assess Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s foreign policy options weighted against this rich historical background and evolving international situation—under the looming shadow of the nuclear issue. Finally, in the third section, “Partnering with Russia,” we focus specifically on the two Koreas’ relations with Moscow, giving a rare first-hand account in English of this part of Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s diplomatic undertakings. All in all, the logic of the narrative serves our ultimate goal of creating, essentially, a comprehensive and coherent Russian book on contemporary Korea. We hope that our book will not only provide insights on North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies, as well as the international struggle surrounding the nuclear issue, but also add to the analysis of South Korean domestic and diplomatic decision-making. We believe that our work can add to the discussion and introduce English-speaking readers to the Russian academic and official view on Korean issues to the global discourse.

PART I

Diverging Development Paths

CHAPTER 2

North Korea: The Decline of the Kim Jong-il Era

2.1   The Problem of the “Line of Succession” and the Continuity of Political Power The late 2000s in North Korea was a period of stagnation and the rejection of innovations. The regime was “hiding in a shell.” It was the North Korean nuclear escapade that played the main part in this situation, which resulted in the country becoming even more isolated. In addition, the “closing-off” of the country was a result of the vulnerability of the ruling elite due to the deteriorating health of the “state-forming” personality— Kim Jong-il. By this time, the situation inside and outside the country had improved somewhat. After several exhausting decades in pursuit of the “nuclear genie” in the interests of national security, and at great economic cost, North Korea has acquired virtual invulnerability against external aggression. Despite the initial doubts around the world about the success of the first test on October 9, 2006, specialists later confirmed that the country had crossed nuclear line.1

1  Renowned nuclear scientist and former head of the Los Alamos Laboratory Siegfried S. Hecker, who Pyongyang favours and demonstrates unique sites to, said after visiting the “scene”: “The DPRK counted on the [explosion] power of 4 kt, but it turned out only 1 kt. It’s not bad for the first time. We can say that the test did not give an ideal result, but we

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The second factor was the sharply deteriorating health of Kim Jong-il. He suffered a stroke in August 2008, after which, as far as is known, he fell into a coma. French neurosurgeons—brought in specially from Paris— managed to save him, but only barely. As a result, his left arm and leg were partially paralysed, and he lost a large amount of weight. Doctors predicted that he had just three to five years left. The Supreme Leader faced several frighteningly poignant questions: Who would succeed him? And how he could ensure stability to smooth the transfer of power? The problem of who Kim Jong-il’s successor would be was not an easy one to solve. According to the Confucian tradition (the significance of which in the North of Korea, as in the South, cannot be discounted), his eldest son Kim Jong-nam was supposed to be the next North Korean leader. In 1998, he was appointed to an important position in the Ministry of Public Security, and also served as the head of the Computer Technology Committee. In January 2001, he accompanied his father to Shanghai, where he held talks with Chinese IT officials. However, Kim Jong-nam was the son of Kim Jong-il’s out-of-favour mistress, actress Song Hye-rim. Kim Senior cut her off. She lived in Moscow from 1974 until her death in 2002, and was buried there. Ko Yong-hui, a dancer by profession and Kim Jong-il’s new beloved, appears to have held a grudge against her predecessor and her children. Not everyone liked it—Ko Yong-hui was a native of a hostile country (although she was an ethnic Korean repatriate, she was born into a family of a native South Koreans in Japan, her Japanese name was Hime Takada). Kim Il-sung did not consent to his son’s official marriage to her. Kim Jong-nam’s “frivolity” made him fall out of favour. The incident at Narita International Airport in Tokyo in May 2001 was the “last straw.” Kim Jong-nam and his relatives were detained while trying to illegally enter Japan with a fake Dominican passport to “see Tokyo Disneyland.” His father never forgave him for that transgression, and after that Kim Jong-nam was no longer considered his successor. He lived a life of leisure in Macau until his death in Malaysia in 2017 (see Chap. 3). It was no surprise that the line of succession was passed to Ko Yong-­ hui’s children. However, it was a hard decision for Kim Jong-il, as they were quite young and had not yet proven themselves as heirs or been consider it successful.” Quoted by Bruce Bechtol, Jr., Defiant Failed State (Washington: Potomac Books, 2010): 86.

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presented to the elite as such. Previously, Kim Jong-Il’s father, Kim Il-sung, spent many years introducing his son to power. Kim Jong-Il worked in the state apparatus starting in the mid-1960s. The press gave him the moniker of the “party centre” in the early 1970s, and his father continued to give him more and more functions. However, it was not until 1980, at the Sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), that Kim Jong-il was officially appointed to senior positions in the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee and other top authorities. Kim Jong-il feared that he would not be allowed to nurture an heir for such a long period. Ko Yong-hui’s eldest son, Kim Jong-chul (born in 1981, according to some sources, now a professional guitar player), did not seem a suitable candidate to his father—he believed that he was “girlish” (Western observers believe that mental health issues and his introverted character may have played a role). Ko Yong-hui’s youngest child, Kim Yo-jong, not immediately accepted by the upper class as the leader of the country for the simple reason that she was a woman. Confucian traditions stipulate that women should occupy a subordinate position. Kim Jong-un (born 1984) was seen by his father as the best suited for the job, although he did not really fit the traditional Korean succession canons—he was the youngest son, born to a common-law wife. However, objective preferences prevailed. According to many accounts, Kim Jong-un had been tough, quick-tempered and decisive since childhood. His father’s decision to transfer power to him was not taken lightly or on the spur of the moment: it is no accident that from the age of ten, Kim Jong-un was addressed as “General.” Thus, Kim Jong-il’s main task in his final years was to ensure stability in the country, abandon dangerous attempts at transformation and fight dissent to ensure a smooth transfer of power. This task became especially urgent in connection with the coming to power of South Korean conservatives, who were hostile to the North. They did not hide their hopes for the collapse of the Pyongyang regime, and when Kim Jong-il’s health started to deteriorate, the Seoul authorities became obsessed with the idea. Such hopes were shared in Washington. There, the Obama administration actually withdrew itself from the Korean problem, leaving it to South Koreans. Such sentiments were fuelled by the Arab Spring, which observers projected onto North Korea. Therefore, further centralization of power became the natural next step.

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Even if Kim Jong-il initially had a mindset for change, the logic of his behaviour in the following years was entirely dictated by his personal safety, not development.

2.2  A New Leader Enters the Arena According to what we know, Kim Jong-il was forced to choose his successor as early as January 8, 2009, when his youngest son turned 25. From that moment on, the official propaganda organs started to feverishly disseminate information about the “amazing wisdom and diverse talents” of Kim Jong-il’s youngest son. Taking the Songun (“military-first”) policy into account, a document for the military was released entitled “The Greatness of Comrade Kim Jong-un, a Respected Young General” that highlighted his military achievements. A “letter of loyalty” from the General Staff’s General Political Bureau followed, saying: “We accept the young general, Comrade Kim Jong-un, as our commander.” Notably, the military took a leading role in supporting the succession of Kim Jong-un, proclaiming “Let us give our lives for the centre of the party led by the young general, Comrade Kim Jong-un.” In addition, his image was promoted through works of art. Songs emerged praising the greatness of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, in particular, “We Will Be Loyal Down Through Generations” and “Footsteps” (the latter referred to the “coming of the marshal”). In the summer of 2009, Kim Jong-un was appointed head of his father’s security service, and became a member of the National Defence Commission. Such a choice was not welcomed by the leader’s entourage—as mentioned earlier, the eldest son, Kim Jong-nam, would have been a more legitimate heir. An influential relative—Jang Song-thaek, the husband of Kim Jong-il’s sister—supported him. In April 2009, Kim Jong-un became a member of North Korea National Defence Commission, which was updated at the session of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly and the expanded National Defence Commission (now with 13 people). The Constitution was also amended (previous amendments were made in 1992 and 1998)2 to include a section entitled “Chairman of the National Defence Commission,” in which Kim Jong-un was called the “Supreme Leader of North Korea,” responsible for directing the “affairs of the State.” In May 2009, Kim Jong-un was included on the ballot for the election to the Supreme People’s Assembly  The post of “eternal president” belongs to the founder of the dynasty, Kim Il-sung.

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of North Korea. However, in subsequent reports, his name did not appear in the list of legislators—apparently, the position of “one of the …” was considered unworthy of the future leader. On May 28, 2009, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il presented Kim Jong-un to the leadership as his successor (this was never officially confirmed). Year 2010 was a milestone in the preparations for the transfer of power. The main event there was the Third Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in September. This format was chosen for the first time since 1966, and the last party congress had been held in 1980. Even the meetings of the WPK Central Committee ceased in 1993, as the following difficult years gave little ground for rousing closing remarks. The conference was postponed several times, which added intrigue, although the official reason given was the typhoon that had struck in early September. Finally, Kim Jong-un was elected a member of the Central Committee and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Central Committee of the WPK at the conference on September 28, 2009. He was promoted to the rank of army general the day before, meaning that he had become one of the leaders of the two main branches of real power in North Korea. On the same day, a Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the WPK was held, at which the Presidium of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the WPK, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the WPK the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the WPK, and the Central Military Commission of the Party were elected. On September 30, 2010, Kim Jong-un’s photo was published for the first time on the front page of the Rodong Sinmun national paper, alongside the participants of the party conference and Kim Jong-il. Many new faces were elected to the leading party bodies, but there were no young leaders among them: most of the Politburo members drafted on this occasion were born in the 1920s and 1930s. Several relatives of Kim Jong-il were elected to the committee: Kim Kyong-hui’s sister, Jang Song-thaek, her husband, and Yang Hyong-sop, the husband of Kim Il-sung’s cousin.3 The established system of political balances was under the personal control of the leader, since the heir’s position was precarious. As a result of the permutations made, each of the potential applicants became a boss and at the same time a subordinate of the others in a different institution. 3  “Kim Jong-il’s Son Becomes Member of Central Committee of Ruling DPRK Party,” RIA News (September 29, 2010), http://ria.ru/world/20100929/280267913.html (accessed December 24, 2019).

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After that, the son appeared with his father almost everywhere. His appearance—a product of the image makers’ creativity (as they say, led by his sister)—was supposed to remind the people of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who remains popular in the country. Kim Jong-un was called “beloved and respected comrade general” in the press, and was greatly praised. Perhaps the events of the Arab Spring hastened the campaign to endear the heir to the population. The rather unexpected fall of authoritarian regimes could not but raise a certain kind of fear in Pyongyang. It did not occur to grassroots workers to doubt the legality of this order of things: the execution of orders from above was mandatory on pain of death, and there was nothing new in them. The fate of the doubters was unenviable.

2.3   The Socioeconomic Situation: Attempts to “Turn Back the Clock” The timid attempts of the “economic reforms” announced in 2002 had been replaced by a tendency towards curtailing reforms by the second half of the decade. However, the North Korean government was interested in what happened in Vietnam (the Doi Moi policy). Nevertheless, market relations were perceived as a kind of “deviation” in a difficult period, which would be forgotten as soon as the “local type of socialism” developed. Back in late 2007, during a meeting with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Jong-il criticized the attempts to impose the formulas of “reform and openness.” At the same time, the economic reality that has developed since the 1990s, when the planned economy was on the verge of collapse with little help from the outside, has become strikingly different from the distributional equalization of the last century. State-owned industry stood idle (with the possible exception of the defence sector). Workers earned their living by hook or by crook by trading in the market, shuttling, producing handicrafts and other more serious dealings. A fairly large class of merchants and the infrastructure they used (a system of purchasing goods abroad, semi-contraband exports and imports, retail market trade and the private sector) had emerged by the beginning of the new century. There was a merging of “new Koreans” with elite and middle-level law enforcement officers. The system of bribes enabled individuals to move around the country, create and maintain a business, rent space, and buy vehicles, equipment, and even real estate. It is fair to say that

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South Korea witnessed the same systemic corruption during a similar period of rapid economic growth—insofar as it did not interfere with business. At the same time, state property was gradually “privatized”—firstly on behalf of the organizations associated with the party authorities, central and local authorities, military bodies and special services. Various types of firms and offices engaged in real market business—from foreign trade to consumer services for the population—were created at all departments and organizations. The repressive control over the population started to glitch after the inter-Korean detente at the beginning of the 2000s. Despite all measures to deal with the problem, imported goods (showing North Koreans how economically backwards they were), liberal ideology and mass culture (including from South Korea—such as K-pop and television dramas which became popular in North Korea) began to penetrate the country. With a hostile group of conservatives coming to power in South Korea and the United States cutting off its dialogue with North Korea, they needed some kind of counter-reaction. Kim Jong-il found his country in a difficult position because of domestic problems and deteriorating relations with other countries, so he tried to “take a step back.” All kinds of liberal sentiments completely disappeared as the North Korean leader had to stabilize the situation to enable the transfer of power: the elite had to survive before they could thrive. Beginning in 2008, the leaders of North Korea wanted to “return to the roots” of the country’s communism and restore Kim Il-sung’s order. They attempted “tighten the screws” and fight against “private ownership instincts,” “bourgeois manifestations” and the “alien” (primarily South Korean) culture. New impetus was given to the military-first (Songun) policy, which provides for militarizing all aspects of life. The economy was supposed to bounce back thanks to the extensive use of the armed forces and their inherent methods of “ordered enthusiasm” on the “economic front” (which is, in fact, a kind of forced labour). Back in December 2006, the authorities banned able-bodied men from trading in the market, with an exception being made for those on welfare. The able-bodied were to work for state-owned enterprises, although they stood idle. Such decisions showed that the North Korean leaders had become disengaged from real life. Later, women under the age of 50 were forbidden from trading in the markets, despite the fact that women in

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North Korean families had become the main “breadwinners” after the collapse of the “socialist economy” in the 1990s. In October 2007 (at least as far as we know), the Central Committee issued a paper on the “problem of markets” stating that the markets were a source of turmoil and a breeding ground for speculative trading (“sellers raise prices and get excess profits”). The report was highly critical of the fact that it was women of working age who were mainly engaged in market trading. It also mentioned that South Korean-made goods smuggled into the country were widely sold in the markets, and that this helped spread dangerous “enemy fantasies.” Finally, the report said that markets located outside the designated areas provoked social unrest and harmed the city’s image. At the same time, scandals and other incidents on the markets were secretly filmed by the “enemies” to be used in their propaganda. This kind of outlook outraged the traditionally obedient people, who had grown used to harsh punitive measures (e.g., protests against these measures reportedly broke out in Chongjin in early March 2008). At the same time, there was a “crackdown” in the social sphere. Measures against illegal screenings of foreign (especially South Korean) films smuggled into the country were tightened, and control over the movement of people and goods inside the country was strengthened (law enforcement officers confiscated goods that were clearly intended for sale). As a result of stricter border controls, the number of North Korean migrants to China decreased from approximately 200,000–250,000  in 1998 to 30,000–40,000 in 2007. Soon, this escalated in a co-ordinated strike against “bourgeois tendencies.” The monetary reform in introduced in November 2009, whereby banknotes were replaced with a restriction on the exchange amount, produced a kind of “St. Bartholomew’s Night” effect. People were only allowed to exchange 100,000 won (roughly $30) at 100:1 par for a week (later, after much public discontent, the authorities raised the limit to 500,000). Panic spread through the country, leading to suicides and mass protests and people saw their savings evaporate. It was the “newly rich Koreans” (those who had earned money on the markets) who suffered most. An inflation spiral unfolded. The measures taken by the North Korean authorities were unanimously described by foreign analysts as “predatory” and aimed at eliminating the “middle class” (i.e. people who had learned how to earn money during the hungry 1990s outside of the paralyzed public sector). The reforms

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deprived mostly wealthy people of their savings and cut the foundations of the non-state sector in the economy. The results were predictably disastrous: having faced economic paralysis and massive rejection, the authorities retreated. The subsequent attempt to “turn back time” failed miserably. Blame fell squarely on the shoulders of Pak Nam-gi, director of the Planning and Finance Department and mastermind behind the reform: he was dismissed from office in January 2010, and later allegedly executed. In an attempt to whitewash themselves, the authorities backtracked and tried to deflect the hit from the authorities. In late 2009, many families were reportedly given 500 won each as a “gift from General Kim Jong-un.” Market activity gradually returned to normal. However, the concessions were made as if behind the scenes, and no one breathed a word about the reforms. The ageing North Korean ideologists and “economists” were not able to develop a sensible strategy of their own, even if they had wanted to. But they did not want to, as they were afraid to rock the political system. Some sticking-plaster solutions, however, had to be made. Economic propaganda began to emphasize the need to implement scientific and technical achievements (first and foremost, the original “Juche” metal and fertilizer production methods), computerize production processes, create a so-called knowledge economy (which was mentioned at the All-­ Republican Congress of Scientific and Technical Workers in March 2010) and intensify international co-operation, in particular with China. The introduction of measures to attract investment from abroad and improve state regulation in this area for the modernization and technical re-equipment of the economy were an important innovation. In January 2010, the city of Rason, which is the centre of the oldest Special Economic Zone in North Korea on the coast of the Sea of Japan, was declared a special city. The Taepung International Investment Group and the State Development Bank were established to attract and consolidate external investment resources in the same month. Another step in this direction was the creation of two economic zones on the islands of Hwangkumphyong and Wihwa near the border with China, issued by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly on June 6, 2011. In general, however, the innovations were of a targeted, experimental nature and could not solve the chronic economic problems.

CHAPTER 3

The Start of Kim Jong-Un’s Era in North Korea: Political Consolidation

3.1   A New Leader and Domestic Political Intrigues Kim Jong-il’s sudden death on December 17, 2011 (as a result of a heart attack on a train heading to the north of the country so he could provide “on-site guidance”), came as a shock to the country’s leadership. Both inside and outside the country, it was expected that the “great leader” would rule for at least a few more years and, at the very least, be around to celebrate Kim Il-sung’s 100th anniversary in April 2012. According to some estimates, it was then that the preparations for the hereditary transfer of power could be formalized. After Kim Jong-il’s death, the elite wasted no time in fulfilling his request to make his youngest son the new leader. They were guided both by the already established “monarchical” traditions and by their instinct for self-preservation. It was clear to everyone that a conflict at the highest level could easily “rock the boat.” The upper-class unanimously swore an oath to the new “monarch.” On December 19, 2011, the authorities called on the people to remain loyal to Kim Jong-un, who was declared “the great successor of his father’s work” and his heir. The central newspaper Rodong Sinmun named him Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces for the first time on December 24, 2011: “We vow with tears of blood to call Kim Jong-un our Supreme Commander, our leader,” the editorial read. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Torkunov et al., Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5_3

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Kim Jong-un was officially declared the Supreme Leader of the party, army, and people during the funeral ceremonies that ended on December 29, 2011. He was officially appointed Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee at the end of 2011. Kim Jong-un was also elected the First Secretary of the WPK on April 11, 2012, during the fourth conference of the WPK (this position was created specifically for him; Kim Jong-il symbolically remained the head of the party as the “Eternal General Secretary”). He also became a member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee and Chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission. Kim Jong-un was appointed “First Chairman” of the National Defence Commission at the session of the Supreme People’s Assembly and became the de facto head of state on April 13, 2012. The updated Constitution, adopted at that time, for the first time included a provision stating that North Korea “possesses nuclear weapons.” Kim Jong-un made his first public speech at a military parade marking the 100th anniversary of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung on April 15, 2012. He called for continuing efforts to build up the country’s military potential. Kim Jong-un was awarded the rank of Marshal of North Korea (the highest military rank) on July 18, 2012. During his first year in power, Kim managed to eliminate the disaffected and disloyal and, in general, a mechanism for making and executing decisions was developed. The new leader closed the borders to defectors and smugglers, repressed those who were not loyal to him (primarily the military), sent inspectors wherever he felt necessary—not only to assess the situation at hand, but also to “instil fear”—and called for escalating the fight against “alien influences.” All of this indicated an attempt to “tighten the screws” rather than make the country more liberal. A statement issued by the Ministry of Public Security on October 8, 2012, called for “escalating the fight against the penetrating hostile ideology and culture that poison the minds of people.” Kim Jong-un’s attack on the military elite was quite bold and unexpected for many. This elite, after all, occupied a privileged position under his father. Having been accepted as party leader, head of the State Defence Committee and chief of staff, he began to aggressively and actively push the military away from the main control levers. Finally, the most authoritative military officer, whose positions seemed unshakeable—the Chief of

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the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), Vice-Marshal Ri Yong-ho—was dismissed from all military, state and party posts on July 16, 2012. Later, Minister of Defence Hyon Yong-chol was also repressed: rumours spread that he had been shot with an anti-aircraft machine gun in early 2016. He is said to have been accused of falling asleep during Kim Jong-un’s speech. Interestingly, this happened shortly after his visit to Russia, suggesting that Kim Jong-un was not afraid to displease the Russian military by treating their recent guest in such a way. Other high-ranking military personnel were also affected. All this was strikingly different from the previous period, when Kim Jong-il pursued a “military first” policy. Back then, the military controlled exports of natural resources, seafood and other areas that allowed the generals to earn currency and, as a result, feel rich, powerful and invulnerable. Now it was the government and the party who gained control over them. Besides, attention was mostly focused on the nuclear missile component (조선인민군전 략로케트군—Strategic Missile Forces, whose status was upgraded in 2012), and the rest of the units were perceived mainly as free labour. The Army’s position on the political arena was severely limited. The key detail was that the paradigm of power changed. It was the party structures that began to rule the country, rather than the military “vertical” that ruled under Kim Jong-il. However, security issues were still given much attention. The conventional armed forces were not so important then, so Kim Jong-un relied on the nuclear missile component following the aggravation of the military-­ political situation on the peninsula in 2013. The byungjin strategy (병진, byungjin noseon—the parallel development of economy and the creation of nuclear forces) played a pivotal role at the March plenary session of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. The same strategy was adopted by Kim Il-sung in December 1962 because of the security concerns arising from a cooling in relations with the USSR (when Moscow refused to provide military assistance for free). This strategy was conceptualized without a nuclear component in the 1960s and found figurative expression in the slogan “a gun in one hand, and a hammer and sickle in the other!” South Korean experts have put forward a suggestion of their own regarding a new slogan for Kim Jong-un: “missiles and nuclear weapons in one hand, and light-water reactors and satellites in the other!” These decisions were motivated by the threat of invasion, as well as by the lessons of the Yugoslav Wars and the conflicts in the Middle East (Iraq and Libya). The emphasis was placed on the vital need to build up nuclear deterrence capabilities.

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This strategy included the following: • solving energy problems by developing an independent nuclear power industry and implementing projects for the development of light-water reactors; • launching numerous highly advanced satellites, including communications satellites, by accelerating space science; • legally confirming the country’s status as a nuclear power, as well as expanding and strengthening its nuclear forces, both in quantity and in quality, until the entire world becomes nuclear-free; • refining the strategy for nuclear combat readiness by developing tactics and strategies to strengthen the key role of nuclear weapons in all aspects of the country’s deterrence strategy and operations; and • preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ensuring peace and stability in Asia and all over the world, and conducting global denuclearization as a responsible nuclear state. Military programmes began to fit into the logic of economic development and lost the noticeable autonomy of the Songun policy (where the armed forces were prioritized), a symbol of the Kim Jong-il era. This approach made it possible to thoroughly shake out the elite and select people personally loyal to the leader. Kim Jong-un made it clear that he was deadly serious from the very beginning of his reign. His cartoonish appearance and young age prevented Western experts from immediately seeing his iron grip. When his first year ended, few of the seven senior leaders who helped him carry his father’s coffin in a snowstorm in Pyongyang in December were left. Laws were tightened both inside the country and at the border. The story of the rise and fall of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-il’s brother-­ in-­law (married to his sister Kim Kyong-hui) and one of most trusted associates, was particularly revealing. After his downfall, Kim Kyong-hui also disappeared, and it was even speculated that Kim Jong-un was willing to go as far as killing Kim Il-sung’s daughter in order to intimidate the elite; however, in January 2020, she reappeared next to her nephew, alive and well. Jang Song-thaek was known as a charismatic and masterful person who enjoyed great influence (which he did not hesitate to use to his advantage) during Kim Jong-il’s reign. At the same time, he was considering undertaking Chinese-style economic reform. In particular, he led the creation of

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free economic zones and was close to Chinese leaders. He suffered more than once for his free-thinking and bohemian habits (feasts and beautiful women), and the leader even sent him to a camp to be “re-educated” in 2004. However, he “redeemed himself” and returned when Kim Jong-il was seriously concerned with building a “pyramid of power” for his heir. Certain signs suggest that Kim Jong-il saw Jang Song-thaek as the “guarantor” of a stable power transfer and a “family adviser.” He was named Deputy Chairman of the State Defence Committee in 2010, effectively making him the second most powerful person in the country. Jang Song-thaek was elected to the Politburo in April 2012, at the Fourth WPK Conference, where Kim Jong-un was “crowned.” He held the key position of Chief of the Central Administrative Department of the WPK. At that time, many analysts predicted that he would be a “regent” under the young leader (according to Korean traditions), or at least his main mentor, while he was sizing himself up for the position. A triumvirate appeared. Its members believed it could rule under Kim Jong-un. This included Jang Song-thaek, his wife, and Choe Ryong-hae (a long-­ time Kim family confidant). The latter was the son of Kim Il-sung’s associate, Choi Hyeon. His son, in turn, married Kim Ye-jung, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister. Jang Song-thaek was accepted at the highest level in China (which later served him poorly) in 2012. Discontent with Jang Song-thaek was already starting to mount. It was no secret to Kim Jong-un that Jang Song-thaek would have preferred his half-brother Kim Jong-nam, who he liked and who would have been more manageable, to take the helm of the state. Gradually, Jang Song-thaek was moved into the background, and before long he stopped being invited to the meetings of the State Defence Committee starting in early 2013. Based on the experience of the current leader’s father, experts believed that he would be given a symbolic position, placed on the retired list, or possibly sent into exile. The reality turned out to be much more tragic. A decision was made to make a scapegoat out of Jang Song-thaek as a warning to others. The massacre was staged according to all the laws of theatrical art. He disappeared from sight, and two of his closest aides were arrested and shot in mid-2013. An extended meeting of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee was convened under the chairmanship of Kim Jong-un on December 8, 2013. In an unprecedented move, the meeting was made public and shown on television. The speakers described Jang Song-thaek’s misdeeds

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in no uncertain terms. These included: selling raw materials to China at low prices, “forming a faction” in the party that undermines its unity and attempting to usurp power, having “inappropriate relationships with women,” gambling and using drugs. The biggest “traitor of all time” was removed from all his posts, stripped of his military ranks, and expelled from the party. For dramatic effect, two soldiers dragged the “human scum, worse than a dog” out of the meeting room, twisting his hands behind his back. Three days later, on December 12, the “disgraceful political careerist and crook” was convicted and executed by a special military tribunal of the Ministry of State Security. The most ridiculous rumours immediately spread about his execution: many inexperienced in North Korean affairs even took the claim made by a Hong Kong blogger seriously that he was “fed to hungry dogs.” Regardless, the North Korean elite shuddered, learning the lesson well. The main reasons for removing Jang Song-thaek were his desire to become the sole and, it seems, rather loose interpreter and executor of the new leader’s instructions, as well as his attempts to switch some of the financial flows that were supposed to replenish the party treasury to the structures under his control. The final provisions of the verdict leave no doubt about this: “those who dare disobey the unitary leadership of Kim Jong-un, challenge his absolute authority and oppose the lineage of Paektu [a euphemism meaning “royal bloodline” in North Korea—author] in pursuit of their own interests … whoever they are an wherever they are hiding [perhaps the first public reference to Kim Jong-nam living in Macau—author] will be mercilessly punished in the name of the party, the revolution, the motherland and the nation.” No one thought that the young leader would have the spirit to take such harsh measures against his elders, which goes against traditional Confucian ethics. It became clear to the elite that no one was safe, not even through any fault of their own, but simply by becoming a victim of the leader’s bad mood. There were no more people willing to contradict him or even follow his instructions with insufficient enthusiasm.

3.2   Power Vertical Consolidation The Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea held on May 6–9, 2016, was a milestone that left no doubt about the inviolability of Kim Jong-un’s power. It was preceded by a “70-day battle” in the best traditions of the mobilization economy, a powerful propaganda campaign.

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Convened for the first time since 1980 (when the country’s leader, Kim Il-sung, officially named his son Kim Jong-il as his successor), the congress demonstrated Kim Jong-un’s desire to codify the party leadership, finally disposing of his father’s legacy, under which the military had played a significant political and managerial role, and to formalize his position. Observers noticed that Kim Jong-un, wearing a European suit, stood against the background of a photography of his grandfather who was wearing the same suit (clothing atypical for Korean leaders). They interpreted this as a desire to emphasize the civic nature of power, continuity and openness to international dialogue. The congress finally consolidated the new party governance structure and Kim Jong-un’s central role. He was appointed Chairman of the Workers’ Party1 (replacing the position of First Secretary of the WPK); this was also the name of the highest party position held by Kim Il-sung from 1949 to 1966. It was later transformed, following the Soviet model, into the post of General Secretary, which Kim Jong-il also inherited. The North Korean leaders tried to instil in the population the idea of the “unique role” of North Korea in the modern world, acting as a “leader of the cause of socialism and independence.” Making economic development the main topic of the congress, Kim Jong-un reiterated his promise that the North Koreans would not have to tighten their belts. However, at the same time, he criticized the “dirty winds about reform and openness in our neighbourhood,” clearly warning China against trying to impose its experience on North Korea. The state administration system was transformed through constitutional reform. The National Defence Commission was officially transformed into the State Affairs Committee at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly on June 29, 2016, while its powers were broadened. The new version of the Constitution stipulates (in Article 106) that the State Affairs Committee is the “supreme national body of state sovereignty.” Kim Jong-un took the highest positions in all three North Korean branches of power—the party, the army and the state—as Chairman of the State Affairs Committee, the Supreme Commander of the KPA and the Chairman of the WPK. It would seem that there is no threat to Kim’s power and he has no potential competitors left. However, foreign observers mentioned that Kim Jong-un has brothers and other relatives of the Paektu bloodline who 1

 Rodong Sinmun. 2016.07.05.

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could potentially become contenders. Specifically, they have singled out the aforementioned Kim Jong-nam. However, he is believed to have repeatedly said that he has no plans to lay claim to the throne. Kim Jong-nam lived in exile under the protection of China. According to analysts, he could be used by Beijing as a “puppet” to replace Kim Jong-un if the recalcitrant North Korean leader was to seriously disappoint Beijing. Of course, this kind of idle speculation was hardly taken seriously in Beijing. Whether the same can be said about Pyongyang and its leaders’ manic suspicions, however, remains an open question. Kim Jong-un hated his half-brother as a child. While he didn’t actually know him, he nevertheless considered him a competitor. According to South Korean intelligence, a “secret order” to “eliminate him if possible” had been in place since 2012 (possibly not given by Kim Jong-un himself, but by “employees in the relevant fields” who sought to please him). When Kim Jong-un came to power, Kim Jong-nam was not cautious at first and had no qualms about letting his feelings be known, often mocking about his half-brother’s leadership skills. However, as soon as he sensed that this would not end well, he took a step back and even wrote a letter to the North Korean leader begging him to leave him and his family alone and swearing not to claim any role in North Korea. According to South Korean press, Kim Jong-un ordered his brother to return home and help the country with money, but he refused, which infuriated the leader of North Korea. However, it is unclear whether he had any resources at his disposal. According to reports, although North Korea once favoured Kim Jong-nam, after Kim Jong-un came to power and executed Jang Song-­ thaek, the state stopped supporting him. It seems that the Chinese authorities also did not particularly care about his material wellbeing. There appears to be some plausibility to reports that Kim Jong-nam, in an attempt to secure financial support, established contact with the CIA and was used by its agents to gather information about internal Korean affairs. This kind of mistake cannot be forgiven in North Korea, even if made by top cadres. It is possible that eliminating Kim Jong-nam was not a top priority for Pyongyang, although it is believed that numerous assassination attempts were made. However, an opportunity presented itself in February 2017, when the North Korean leader’s half-brother found himself without any protection in Malaysia, where was reportedly set to meet with CIA agents and receive money ($120,000 dollars were found on him).

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Two call girls (Siti Aisyah from Indonesia and Doan Thi Huong from Vietnam) threw a cloth doused in an unknown substance over his face at Kuala Lumpur International Airport as a joke. As they demonstrated at the re-enactment of the crime, they believed that they were participating in a TV prank: the people who had hired them (possibly North Koreans) had got them to carry out similar “gags” in the hours before, claiming that thy were filming a prank show. In this case, however, it turned out that the substance they had doused Kim Jong-nam with was a VX-gas type agent. Within minutes, Kim Jong-­ nam had passed away. It later turned out that he had been expecting just such an attack, as he had several doses of an antidote for nerve agents on him, but for some reason did not use them. Law enforcement agencies found out that four North Korean nationals were at the airport at that time. They boarded the next flight and went back to Pyongyang, and by a roundabout route, not through China (naturally, the Chinese were most displeased about what had happened). Despite the diplomatic row, there was no direct evidence of North Korean involvement, and the hype gradually faded. Siti Aisyah was released after the charges against her were dropped in March 2019. The murder charge was also dropped against Doan Ti Huong in April 2019: she pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of “voluntarily causing harm with a dangerous weapon or means.” She was sentenced to three years and four months in prison, but her term was reduced by one-third, and she was released on May 3, 2019. Mahathir Mohamad, the newly-appointed Malaysian Prime Minister, took the matter philosophically, even noting that many countries, for example Israel, commit political assassinations abroad. It remains a mystery whether Kim Jong-un was really behind the assassination attempt, as it greatly affected his image. China did not hide its dissatisfaction, and the imminent first talks between the DPRK and the Trump administration in the United States (which were to take place a few days later) were cancelled. Relations with many countries have deteriorated—for example, with Malaysia, which was quite close to the DPRK— and the DPRK also suffered economic damage. Nevertheless, in the end, an enviable domestic political stability prevailed in the country. Kim Jong-un now feels confident enough to challenge the United States and the world with a series of nuclear and missile tests. The situation around the DPRK became extremely heated in 2017, but he already had enough political status and authority to act without consulting anyone.

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The Third Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee of the Seventh Convocation in April 2018 had a milestone significance. It was stated that “byonjin” goals were successfully achieved, and thus the country had started a transition to a new strategy: a line of dialogue and a “peaceful offensive.” Kim Jong-un said that “thanks to the victory of our party’s policy, our people’s struggle—who, tightening their belt, selflessly fought against difficulties for the possession of a powerful sword for protecting peace—is brilliantly over, and a strong guarantee is prepared for our descendants to enjoy the most worthy and happy life in the world”.

He called on “the whole party and the whole country to concentrate all their forces on building a socialist economy.” There is a downside to a system based on unquestioning obedience. It is the lack of alternative opinions. For example, no one dared to stop the leader from trying to “play all-in” with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and the then American President Donald Trump in 2018. Grandstanding and impressive agreements were eventually disavowed by the American “backstage.” His partners’ “cheating” was a lesson for Kim Jong-un. These events, obviously, did not add to the young leader’s authority among the wise old-school politicians, who have overcome many years of confrontation. It is possible that some of them secretly gloated. It was the diplomats who became “scapegoats”: the lower echelon was repressed, while the bosses were replaced by “hardliners.” Kim Jong-un, enraged by the collapse of expectations and sanctions, became completely disillusioned with the compromise strategy and made a U-turn instead. Kim Jong-un called the creation of nuclear missile weapons their main achievement and announced a new course at the Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee in December 2019. Such a “frontal breakthrough” course became necessary in conditions when the country no longer counted on improving the situation with foreign policy. He acknowledged that “the challenges we have faced over the past few months have been so brutal and very dangerous that others could not make it past a single day and had to retreat” and warned of new “obstacles and challenges.” The leader called for a return to the traditional model of “self-­ reliance” and said, “If we, while waiting for the sanctions to be lifted, do not intensify the struggle to grow our own forces, the reactionary

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offensive of our enemies will become more and more rampant, and they will swoop onto us to block our progress.” This is why the course was taken to centralize management, strengthen the system of responsibility of the Cabinet, and centralize the system overall. Numerous personnel changes were approved at the 3rd Session of the 14th Convocation of the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2020, indicating an ongoing purge of the elite. The subsequent combination of circumstances—the COVID pandemic in early 2020—proved favourable for the transition to a hard line. Kim Jong-un managed to improve his image, as his country was the first (since January 2020) to take what seemed to be excessive “totalitarian” measures to close the country and introduce quarantine. Taking the already-­ shrinking external contacts into account, the terrible virus did not spread widely in North Korea. However, the official statements that there were no COVID cases seem quite unlikely. It can be assumed that the virus threat was real, as it was discussed at the meetings of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee in April and July 2020. However, in general, if compared to the tragic events that could be seen all over the world, North Korea can be seen an example of good crisis management. This did not go unnoticed abroad. Everyone noted the effectiveness of the system and Kim Jong-un’s management skills. Special measures were taken to strengthen the “nepotism” in the government in 2020. According to rumours, this happened at Kim Jong-un’s initiative, possibly due to concerns about his health and performance. Foreign observers also noted his obesity, poor genetic background, and bad habits. This persisted until April 2020, when the world was stirred by rumours about Kim John-un having had cardiac surgery. It is these circumstances that foreign experts use to explain why the leader’s younger sister Kim Yo-jong (born in 1988) was introduced into the top echelon of power at the beginning of 2020. The world first saw her at her father’s funeral in December 2011. After this, her brother put her in charge of the North Korean National Defence Commission in early 2012. She started working in the Central Committee of the WPK in January 2014 before being appointed First Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the WPK Central Committee on November 28, 2014, though she obtained influence far beyond that position. She was elected as a candidate member of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee in 2017, and later became a member of the Politburo.

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Kim Yo-jong became the focus of global media attention in February 2018, when she served as Kim Jong-un’s unofficial envoy to South Korea at the opening of the Pyeongchang Olympics. She was perceived as a “dove of peace,” holding talks with South Korea and agreeing on further steps for detente. Her stock went up steadily after that. However, after the unsuccessful summit in Hanoi in February 2019, which she organized, Kim Yo-jong fell out of favour and was excluded from the list of candidates for the Politburo. This, however, would not last long. She regained her positions at the beginning of 2020 and quickly occupied a place in the state hierarchy directly under her brother, on whose behalf she spoke. Foreign journalists even speculated whether Kim Yo-jong was going to be Kim Jong-un’s successor in the event that something happened to him. However, this is idle speculation. Kim Yo-jong was the First Deputy Head of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a key link in the party apparatus, in mid-2020. Today, as always, the head of the department is considered the leader of the party and the state, so Russian diplomats considered her “an established high-level statesperson.” She began to play the role of the main confidante and guide of the leader’s decisions. Kim Yo-jong has been making statements on important international issues on behalf of North Korea since March 2020. She was given the task of taking a “hawkish” stance on South Korea in mid-2020, and she became the main herald of the break with the Moon Jae-in’s administration “on behalf of” her brother. She made unusually harsh statements blaming Moon Jae-in personally (with whom she had ostensibly had a good personal relationship), ordered the demolition of the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong and applied all kinds of pressure on South Korea. All this clearly indicated that Kim Jong-un had delegated some of his powers to her, while at the same time making sure that she, who had a stiffness of character not typically found in women, gained popularity in the security forces. However, Kim Jong-un played the role of “good cop” by delaying the implementation of “military measures” against South Korea in late June: the South Korean leadership, however, had to abandon any illusions that it would be “easier to negotiate” with a lady from the Kim family. Nevertheless, people speculated about her role (“based on intelligence”) even after that: for example, tongues started to wag in August 2020.

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New personnel changes were made in August 2020 and approved at the meeting of the Politburo and the Sixth Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee on August 19. Specifically, the prime minister was replaced by Kim Tok-hun. The highest party organs also saw some changes. Such “consequences” seemed to reflect Kim Jong-un’s dissatisfaction with the way things were going and showed that his style was becoming more voluntaristic.

CHAPTER 4

New Socioeconomic Trends of the Kim Jong-Un Era: Covert Transformations

4.1   Flirting with Reforms Kim Jong-un, without explicitly saying so, began to show a penchant for gradual economic transformations to steer the country out of crisis. The North Korean leader said that the people of his country would will “not have to tighten their belts anymore,” and declared the economy the focus of his attention at the first major event he took part in—the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the WPK in April 2012. This gave rise to hopes for reform and increased the leader’s authority among the people. The joint New Year’s Eve editorial released during his first year focused on developing consumer goods manufacturing, agriculture and improving the wellbeing of the population. As is traditional, emphasis was also made on overcoming the chronic energy deficit in North Korea. One of Kim’s first speeches to attract the attention of observers was the one he made at a meeting with party activists on Bringing About a Revolutionary Turn in Land Administration in Line With the Demands for Building a Thriving Socialist Country, which was published on May 21, 2012. There were clear hints of transformations. He set the task of upgrading and completing several facilities that had a symbolic meaning. It is clear that he put greater emphasis on memorial sites, as he had to show his loyalty to the ideological views of Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, which was © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Torkunov et al., Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5_4

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also emphasized in his article “Let Us Step Up the Building of a Thriving Country by Applying Kim Jong Il’s Patriotism,” published on August 26, 2012. However, the smokescreen of ideological chatter hid imperceptible transformations. As a leader, he wasted no time. Immediately after he gained full power, the limited the “economic measures” that had started to be discussed (the word “reform” is a taboo for “true Jucheists”). A special group was created under the Cabinet to study the opportunities for economic transformation. The “new economic management system,” called the “June 28 measures” after the date it was adopted, was launched just six months after Kim came to power. The main innovation was the introduction of the “family contract” in agriculture—the so-called field responsibility system (포전담당제, pojeondamdangje). The size of work teams was reduced from 10–25 people to 4–6 people. This is a very important innovation, as it enables the creation of a “labour collective” made up of one or two families, actually allowing family farms. The state buys 70% of the harvest from farmers at market prices, leaving 30% to the producers themselves, who can sell the product on the market. If a particular farm exceeds the target, the farmers can keep the surplus. It was later reported that farmers, depending on the region, would be allowed to keep and sell up to 50% of their crop. Admittedly, the authorities subsequently made many exceptions to these rules on the grounds of “extreme emergencies” and resorted to surplus appropriation. According to the testimony of defectors, instructions on the reform of the industrial management system were received from above on May 30, 2014. This gave momentum to the transition towards a “socialist corporate responsible management system” (사회주의 기업 책임 관리제, sahoejuui gieop chaegim gwallije). Everyone could witness the growing independence of individual economic entities and the degrading elements of voluntarism in the economy. Industrial managers were given unprecedented freedom of action, while the role of central planning significantly decreased. An order resembling the Soviet khozraschet (“self-financing”) of the 1960s was gradually introduced. This system provided for calculating production costs and the cost of products at market prices, whilst enterprises were involved in free trade with products materials and services (e.g. electricity supplies). Enterprises were allowed to invest the profits in

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themselves, but private individuals still could not create factories and plants. However, employees were allowed to invest in their enterprises. The so-called Taean Work System has been used in North Korean enterprises since 1961, according to which it was the party committee that managed the production process. However, the Enterprise Act was amended in November 2014. This chapter deals with the management system, although nothing is said about the Taean Work System. In the past, it was the Party Committee that played the most important part in this process, and it was the manager who carried out its decisions, but now the manager makes decisions on his own; the chief engineer would manage production and daily operations, assisted by deputy directors. It would seem that the Party Committee is no longer a production management body. Management was given broad autonomy in important areas such as foreign trade and investment. The degree of local autonomy was significantly increased: the right to create enterprises was granted to state and party bodies up to the local level. Even the people’s committees of the county (the lowest level of state administration) were given the right to create enterprises. The concept of planning has acquired a new, indicative, role. Under the previous system of central planning, the central authorities sent the indicators to the ministries, which, after breaking them down, handed them to the enterprises. The enterprise would subsequently create a production plan following these goals. Under the new system, businesses are required to draw up plans that are “in line with their circumstances,” in order to implement the “national economic plan” (Article 31). The degree of centralized control over its implementation was initially unclear, although the “unified leadership of the Cabinet,” as well as that of other central and local institutions, was mentioned (Article 51). The Law granted enterprises with “de facto management rights,” which include managing personnel, supply and product output (Articles 29–30). Broad rights were also granted to economic entities involved in foreign economic activities (Article 37). They gained the right to take part in foreign trade and establish joint ventures with foreign partners, which radically changes the North Korean economic policy. According to classical socialist practice, foreign trade was traditionally carried out centrally and controlled by the Ministry of External Economic Relations. However, since the late 1970s and early 1980s, foreign trade associations with the influential party, state and military bodies began to appear, receiving a cut of the inflow and outflow of foreign currency and goods. At least on paper,

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virtually all North Korean domestic enterprises have been allowed to engage in “foreign economic activity” and even attract foreign investment. The financial sector has attracted the most interest from observers. Of course, the North Korean authorities deny having private entrepreneurship and, consequently, private capital. In reality, however, many private companies are registered as pseudo-state enterprises. One cannot but notice the increasing role of private capital—the so-called masters of money (돈주, Donju). The authorities decided to use this investment resource. Enterprises were allowed to attract “the unused cash of residents” to finance their activities (Article 38). North Korea has been trying to attract people’s money for economic development since the early 2000s. For example, personal bank accounts (with debit cards such as Narae Card) in the form of savings accounts, were introduced. After the failure of the 2009 confiscatory currency reform, the government decided to act more prudently and allow citizens to directly invest in manufacturing plants. However, long-term investment in infrastructure on this basis is unlikely due to the lack of long money. A realistic system of multiple exchange rates was adopted in 2013. The “standard rate” was used for statistical purposes, while the conditional official rate was used for settlements with foreign economic entities, and most transactions were carried out with an account of the market exchange rate (dollars, yuan and euros are easily exchanged for won). It should be noted that the propaganda constantly emphasized that the measures taken are not “capitalist” and are not based on the experience of “other countries.” However, allowing the use of market mechanisms did not mean abandoning the methods of the mobilization economy or the centralized allocation of limited resources, and this is a characteristic feature of the North Korean reforms. Thus, the government set a course for major investments in the agricultural sector and forestry in September 2012. The new measures were introduced by the Law on Changes in the Structure of Agriculture adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 25, 2012. Regarding agriculture, Kim Jong-un highlighted the problems of poor land reclamation, which had grown significantly worse during the years of devastation, when no attention was paid to the appropriate facilities and no one fought deforestation (the lack of fuel and predatory deforestation were a real environmental scourge). He underlined the fact that forest protection and management had to be improved to “green the entire territory of the country.”

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“When I travel around the country,” Kim Jong-un said, “I see barren land. This is bad—it does not just look bad, as dust rises with the wind. Trees need to be planted on all land plots, except for arable land. Either that, or meadows need to be created, of flowers and grass planted, so that there would be no single piece of ‘free’ land overgrown with weeds.” In the absence of investment resources and a surplus of labour, Pyongyang has set a course for infrastructure reconstruction through non-­ economic coercion. Constructing numerous large projects is a key element of the “Kim Jong-un era.” Unlike in previous years, however, these were not so much military or infrastructure projects as they were social and cultural facilities—the Masikryong Ski Resort, the Wonsan-Kalma Resort Complex, hot spring health complexes, “model cities” (e.g. Samjiyon), water sports complexes, amusement parks, a dolphinarium, “model” residential areas in Pyongyang, shops, restaurants and a large hospital in the capital. The new leader also took some measures to improve living conditions (at least in Pyongyang), including those of scientists and teachers, to demonstrate that the state cared about and focused on science and education. It seems that this is how Kim Jong-un fulfilled his promises to improve living standards and the quality of life of the people. Of course, these projects are primarily aimed at the upper and middle classes, but it is these people who support the authorities. The “middle class” is particularly prominent in Pyongyang. Middle-­ class people are employed not only in the party and military bodies, as in the classic North Korean model, but also (and primarily) in business, science, medicine and other such fields. According to our calculations, their average monthly expenses are the equivalent of $200–$500. Keep in mind that the official salary in North Korea is calculated in terms of single digits, and not even in tens of US dollars, and construction sites are full of soldiers and “shock workers” who make the compliant labour and are paid almost nothing. The “middle class” enjoys housing, some types of home appliances and mobile phones, and can buy a wide range of food and industrial goods, clothing, shoes, etc., in the markets and at currency stores. There are even North Korean “hipsters,” but the authorities are fighting them. Even families of ordinary workers, especially in the cities, do not rely on official wages as their main source of income—according to observers, they receive at least 70%–80% of their income from trade on markets, of which there are thousands in North Korea. The authorities have tried to restrict

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their activities, but this is no longer possible. Of course, this kind of activity is not limited to classical open-air markets only: the real estate market, transport services, financial services and other forms of market activity have spread. Kim Jong-un was obviously aware of the growing social differentiation, as well as the growing gap between the standard of living for the “chosen few” in the capital and those in the regions, which could give rise to discontent and tension. He said: “together with Pyongyang, it is necessary to improve the provincial administrative centres and other local cities and villages, with due account of their unique features.” “Model” social and cultural sites were also built in small towns. The problem is that improvements made in the country were selective.

4.2   Byungjin: A Strategy to Build Nuclear Potential and Develop the Economy Shoulder to Shoulder The North Korean socioeconomic strategy has always been hostage to the military-political situation. The announcement of Byungjin (aimed at developing military nuclear capabilities and the economy at the same time) in March 2013. A serious turn not only in the military-political strategy but also in the economy proved to be a serious turn not only in the country’s military-political strategy, but also in the economy. Despite the fact that Byungjin was officially completed in 2018 (when it was stated that the goals had been achieved), the North Korean economy still features militarization: the military-industrial complex remains an absolute priority. Despite the negative comments that the focus on nuclear weapons means sacrificing the economy to military ambitions, not everything was so clear and simple. On the one hand, it seemed that focusing on the nuclear missile programme would constrain economic development, since resources would be allocated to the military. However, promoting economic goals to the same level of priority as military goals meant progress compared to the previous Songun course. In the 1990s–2000s, all resources were earmarked for military needs. In addition, nuclear missile weapons no longer required constant significant investments after the technologies had been developed and the basic facilities created. As in other countries, the military-industrial

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complex is a source of innovation and technology for other sectors of the economy. The emphasis on nuclear weapons could reduce unproductive military spending, and the army could be considered a source of free labour. Kim Jong-un outlined the building of a “strong and prosperous state” where “people can enjoy the wealth and splendour of socialism through strengthening defence capabilities and focusing on economic construction,” achieving “the prosperity of the nation through strengthening deterrence and accelerating economic construction” as the ultimate goal of the new Byungjin course. Hi-tech sectors such as nuclear energy, computer science and the space industry have also received a significant boost within the framework of the Byungjin policy. For example, the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted laws “Further Strengthening the Self-Defence Status of North Korea as a Nuclear Power,” on space exploration, and on establishing a National Space Development Agency. The IT sector is an important component of the modern defence industry (North Korea also uses it to obtain information and illegal income). Under Kim Jong-un, scientific and technological progress (and the people associated with it) became the subject of national adoration. The construction of a large Palace of Science and Technology in Pyongyang and technical centres that have proven to be popular among children, as well as the presentation awards and other honours to scientists (primarily related to the nuclear missile programme), have inspired young people to pursue careers in science and technology. In some ways, this is reminiscent of the early 1960s in the USSR after Yuri Gagarin’s flight to outer space, when admiration for technical sciences grew, but the arts were ignored. This course, however, did not, as many feared, affect market mechanisms. However, they were not institutionalized. It is still believed that there are no taxes in North Korea, although the state uses both economic and non-economic methods—“loyalty contributions,” “assistance to victims” or payments “for the construction of national facilities”—to withdraw a significant part of the income from businesses and people. At the same time, the scale of corruption increased sharply, which caused concern amongst the authorities. According to Russian scientists, “the sense of threat to the monolithic leadership played a key role, because if the new course involves certain legalization of the parallel economy, then the corruption associated with it should be eliminated as much as possible. Otherwise, those who perpetuate corrupt practices will bend the state to their will.”

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In the early years of Kim Jong-un’s economic strategy, China remained the main external source of investment for the ambitious economic programmes—its expansion was even called the “economic colonization” of North Korea. North Korean leaders, however, expected their country to get along with the international community and co-operate with South Korea, which had the potential to become the top investor in the North Korean economy and the country’s modernization. The Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (May 2016) played a particular role in declaring the socioeconomic strategy. This kind of declaration is characterized by a certain duality. It was publicly confirmed that North Korea would not follow the path of “reform and openness” (so as not to complicate relations with the main sponsor), which was previously heard only out of public view. This meant that North Korea would not follow the Chinese path. However, this statement itself was brought about by political reasons—namely, the deterioration of relations with the Chinese side, whom the North Koreans called “traitors of socialism,” and Kim wanted to distance himself from Beijing. Kim Jong-un’s report acknowledged the economic problems and presented the main lines of economic development for 2016–2020. It was announced that the “five-year economic strategy” had been adopted without specifying the main macroeconomic indicators. However, the state no longer had any resources or levers of influence on private entities for policy planning. As it turned out, Kim Jong-un was talking about a development “strategy” drawn up on the basis of previously tested annual strategies for the development of individual industries (energy, agriculture and forestry, innovation, etc.). This concerned key areas of the public sector and is based on reliable metrics. According to open sources, the declared course included three main areas. The first path concerned the expansion of the scope of the North Korean “method of managing the economy”: that is, the method in which market mechanisms are used as additional mechanisms within the framework of a planned economy. This relates to the aforementioned order of functioning of agricultural and industrial enterprises, along with cautious efforts in the implementation of the reforms undertaken by the country’s leadership since 2012. The second path implied the development of infrastructure and the energy sector. Significant efforts have been made in recent years to build

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new power plants and upgrade generator sets. Despite this, the problem of providing electricity, especially outside of Pyongyang, was not solved. In this regard, its decision was called a prerequisite for implementing the five-­ year strategy. Specific tasks were identified in this area: modernizing existing power generation capacities; improving the efficiency of equipment; restoring the power transmission network; reducing losses in the transmission of electricity; and using alternative energy sources (water, solar, tidal and wind energy). Solar panels have become especially popular in North Korea. The third path included the foreign economic component. Kim Jong-un emphasized the creation of special economic zones with the participation of foreign capital. He urged his country to continue making efforts to create favourable investment conditions, and to use the practice of joint ventures to increase the volume of foreign trade, which fell sharply in 2016 as a result of the sanctions imposed against North Korea and the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Park. The 157-page National Economic Development Strategy (2016–2020), along with “Cabinet Decision No. 2” dated January 21, 2017 (obtained by the Japanese press), are of special interest. Both documents give a negative assessment of the current state of the economy, indicating the low level of electricity and coal production and the inability to meet domestic demand for food and basic necessities. The documents name scientific and technological development, trade diversification and the “full implementation of a new method of economic management” (which we mentioned above) as measures for implementing the economic development strategy. The goal was to achieve an average annual economic growth rate of 8%, and a proposal was made to reduce dependence on China and expand foreign trade with other regions, including Russia and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The document states that China accounted for 71.6% of North Korea’s turnover in 2014, with Russia accounting for 4.2% and Germany for 0.8%. “China accounts for the vast majority of trade. We have not been able to overcome our dependence on China,” the document allegedly stated. The proposal was made to increase the volume of trade with Russia to $1 billion (as provided for by mutual agreements signed in 2014–2015). The document allegedly contained a provision on receiving capital investments from Russia for the construction of hydroelectric power plants, as well as details of plans to resume technical co-­ operation on the modernization of such facilities as the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex and the Musan iron ore mine. The intention was also

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expressed to attract Russian investment into international tourist zones in Wonsan and Mount Kumgang, as well as in the free economic zone in Chongjin. The location of these facilities—on the coast of the Sea of Japan closest to Russia—is perfect for “building a joint network for the production of medical products using raw materials, processing marine products, and developing natural energy sources.” Hopes were raised in connection with the announcement of the Byungjin plan, as well with the announcement of economic development as the main national priority at the following Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee in April 2018. Observers interpreted this as a long-­ term change in the orientation of the government.

4.3   Back to “Military Communism”? However, the implementation of such a strategy has faced serious objective difficulties, particularly due to the measures taken at the initiative of the United States to isolate North Korea economically. The sources of growth have narrowed significantly after the sanctions were strengthened and North Korea experienced unfavourable weather conditions. Both the public sector and the “independent” way of life in 2018–2020 turned into a “struggle for survival” and a paramilitary situation. The “five-year strategy” failed due to the comprehensive sanctions. This much was recognized in August 2020 (see further). There was a systematic strengthening of administrative control, and attempts were made to regulate the work of economic entities and extract more resources for national needs. The law on foreign trade was revised in 2018, the goal of which was clearly to centralize and tighten the control system. Trading companies started to receive greater leeway, and the bureaucratic procedures for signing contracts with foreign partners became more complicated. The programme aimed at creating free economic zones, even despite the participation of Chinese companies (not to mention other investors scared off by sanctions), failed. Despite the efforts made, only the Rason Special Economic Zone functioned, but with the introduction of comprehensive sanctions at the end of 2017, only some economic entities remained in it—in particular, the representative office of the Russian–Korean joint venture RasonConTrans, which was officially withdrawn from UN sanctions. In connection with the increase in sanctions and the shortage of resources, the trends towards strengthening centralized control and

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restricting the freedom of economic activity and the action of market forces became more pronounced. A notable role was played by the Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee on April 10, 2019, at which Kim Jong-un “in his report made a scientific analysis of the changing international landscape and the specific features of the present situation, which is becoming worse with each passing day.” Kim Jong-un stressed that they had “to advance socialist construction more vigorously through an independent national economy suited to the specific local conditions of our country based on our efforts, technology and resources under the lofty banner of self-reliance, so as to deal a telling blow to the hostile forces that roam about with bloodshot eyes erroneously believing that sanctions can bring North Korea to its knees.” He noted that “great progress had been made in the struggle to make the national economy independent, and the deterrent power of North Korea, as well as the huge potential of its independent economy, have been vividly demonstrated at home and abroad.” Kim said that “self-reliance and self-supporting national economy are the bedrock of the existence of our own style of socialism, the driving force of its progress and development and the eternal lifeline essential to the destiny of our revolution.” The constitutional amendments adopted at the first meeting of the National Assembly of the 14th Convocation in April 2019 confirmed the leading role of the Cabinet in the management of the country’s economy. Although there were provisions for “ensuring actual profits,” market reforms were definitely no longer in the foreground. Conservative trends became especially noticeable after the Fifth Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee held in late December 2019. The “frontal breakthrough” meant reusing economic mobilization methods. The explanation for this was that the country would be living under the pressure of sanctions for a very long time, if not forever. This implies, in turn, that the economy, politics, social sphere and defence sector needed to be prepped for the new period. At the same time, it was confirmed that the Cabinet would play the central role in the economic life of the country, with the explicit goal of strengthening the control of the government authorities over economic activities. Kim Jong-un said, The Cabinet should strengthen the state’s finances by making effective use of the existing economic foundations and undertake economic planning properly and scrupulously command the economic activities … For the

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­ resent, the Cabinet’s unified leadership and command should be ensured, p first of all, in the work of safeguarding the lifeline and integrity of the country’s economy.

The criticism of economic departments and figures voiced at the Plenary Session testified to a certain frustration the authorities were feeling with the way the “invisible hand of the market” functions during unfavourable economic conditions. Kim Jong-un pointed out the useless economic practice of declaring self-sufficient but failing to take reasonable and optimal measures in this most important and vital period, when we are faced with severe difficulties, and to direct efforts towards maintaining and reinforcing the self-supporting foundations of the national economy […] With no visible progress made in terms of implementing unified guidance over and strategic management of economic work and improving the management methods of enterprises, the role of the state as the organizer of economic work has not been enhanced, and serious problems have emerged.

The government has tightened accounting standards for state-owned companies dealing with foreign currency. As far as can be seen, the authorities began to demand “loyalty contributions” in foreign currency from “wealthy citizens.” There was a hike in electricity prices, with the Pyongyang authorities tightening control over electricity usage in order to raise more funds. Taxes on merchants in consumer goods markets in some parts of the country were increased in 2019 to a level 30 times higher than in 2005. Some provinces began levying fines (at least 30% of profits) on small businesses that were not properly registered in 2019. The pressure on military structures that carried out economic activities increased: each KPA division had logistics departments that managed livestock and agricultural land for military consumption. Corruption is very noticeable in the farms managed by the KPA, with military officials using agricultural products from the land cultivated by the soldiers at their own discretion. According to a directive issued in early 2020, these resources had to be controlled by the Cabinet and its bodies, which can be considered part of an attempt to end corruption related to agricultural land under the KNA management. The activities of the so-called groups to combat anti-socialist manifestations intensified at the beginning of 2020, which began to make life a nightmare for business more often, demanding compliance with the rules

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of registration and payment of various kinds of contributions, even confiscating property in case of violations. These groups focused on restaurants, shops and rich people, all in an apparent attempt to increase the flow of funds to the state. The central press criticized “those who forget about the country’s interests and needs and care only about their own business.” Foreign trade was also centralized in conditions when the borders were closed for quarantine reasons, and small traders (“shuttles”) could not continue working even for bribes to the border authorities. Through the decision of the Cabinet and the WPK Central Committee, a ban was imposed on the import of “non-essential” goods, which is easily implemented when borders are closed due to the “international crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.” The decision was also made to reduce the number of priority national construction projects from 15 to five. At the same time, even these facilities were not safe, as evidenced by the leader’s reprimand of the builders of a Pyongyang hospital in July. Official sources (an editorial in Rodong Sinmun) began to openly admit that the country was “facing difficult trials” and that it was “lagging behind others in some areas.” People rushed to purchase imported goods across the country. “Mistakes” in economic management became a constant topic. Rodong Sinmun said in May 2020 that “absurdities” had “accumulated in the economic sector,” and suggested using domestic resources as potential solutions. The press said, “the hostile forces are making insane efforts to strangle us economically. Their machinations aimed at stopping our march towards the driving force of socialism by deepening economic problems and provoking unrest will continue.” The only way out is to make the country more “independent,” economically autarkic. “Those who do not become economically independent will be forced to bow to others,” the newspaper wrote. “Economic subordination leads to political subordination.” In fact, the reforms were quietly revised: the state authorities could not resist the temptation to lay their hands on companies’ independent sources of income in the conditions of sanctions and quarantine. It was natural under these conditions to recognize the failure of the five-year strategy approved by the Seventh WPK Congress in August 2020 at the Sixth Plenary Session of the WPK Central Committee. Such disappointing results had not been made public previously, which shows the desire of the North Korean leader to solve the problems that had built up more effectively. The Plenary recognized that the economic situation had

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“not improved due to the ongoing internal and external circumstances and various unforeseen challenges.” Kim Jong-un declared that “the planned achievement of the national economic development goals was seriously delayed, and the people’s standard of living had not improved significantly.” It was decided to convene the Eighth WPK Congress, in order to develop a new strategy “to analyse and review the shortcomings and deviations in the work on the implementation of the decisions of the Seventh WPK Congress in a comprehensive and anatomical manner,” and “to discuss and decide on the strategic tasks of the party and the government at a new stage of the struggle in this critical period of our revolution.” The North Korean leader, as we can clearly see, once again decided to return to the “economic mobilization” model and strengthen control of market forces in the post-coronavirus world, where globalization has noticeably lost steam. The old North Korean strategies of the 1960s are once again in demand.

CHAPTER 5

The Revenge of the Conservatives in South Korea

5.1   Lee Myung-bak’s Promises and Reality Liberal forces were in power in South Korea from 1998 to 2008. Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) were representatives of the centre-left camp, the legalized opposition of the military rule era. Nevertheless, the “liberals” had begun to lose ground by the end of Roh Moo-hyun’s term, with the president’s rating in particular falling. The liberals lost the 2007 presidential election to the conservatives, largely due to the decline in Roh Moo-hyun’s popularity and the weakness of the presidential candidates from the ruling party. The top post in the country was taken by the former Seoul mayor, Lee Myung-bak, an experienced businessman who had headed up Hyundai for many years. The centre-left lost their majority in Parliament in 2008. One of Lee Myung-bak’s main rivals within the conservative Hannara Party was Park Geun-hye (who would later become president herself). Relations between the two were not great: the party authorities removed many of Park Geun-hye’s supporters who wanted to nominate her for the parliamentary elections, treating Lee Myung-bak’s associates much more favourably. However, Park’s followers formed a coalition united by personal loyalty to her (친박, chin-Pak) even before election. The group existed until the end of her career. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Torkunov et al., Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5_5

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Lee Myung-bak’s campaign platform was based on promises to strengthen the economy—property stratification and unemployment had increased in South Korea by the end of Roh Moo-hyun’s term. The future president named the programme after himself, “MBnomics,” and his main project received the catchy name of the “747 Plan.” These figures “codified” the country’s economic targets: 7% annual economic growth; GDP per capita equal to US$40,000; and the seventh largest economy in the world place in the world. Interestingly, ten years had been allocated for these tasks to be completed—twice the presidential term under South Korean constitution. The impracticability of this plan was immediately apparent, and it is no surprise that the targets had not been met by the end of Lee Myung-bak’s presidency, and they were still incomplete in 2020. To implement the plans, Lee Myung-bak proposed a set of measures. Taxes for businesses were reduced, as were the tariffs on some imported goods, in particular oil, in order to combat inflation. Strict control over consumer prices (primarily for petrol) was introduced. The state gave businesses access to its reserves of industrial raw materials. The government negotiated with large corporations to create new jobs. Moreover, the president pardoned several businessmen convicted of questionable practices in exchange for promises to invest and strengthen the economy. Political attitudes also changed. The president planned on helping the economy by noticeably reducing and optimizing the state apparatus (“small government with a large market”). Once again, the task was set to improve the investment climate. A new regional economic policy (the “5+2 strategy”) was announced, which implied an individual approach to regional problems and increased local independence. Lee Myung-bak also launched a number of “mega-campaigns,” which are “traditional” for many South Korean presidents, with dubious goals and results. For example, the project of the “great trans-Korean canal” between Seoul and Busan (more precisely, the canal system between the Han and Nakdong rivers) became a symbol of the beginning of Lee Myung-bak’s reign. The canal, however, was never completed. The “natural resources diplomacy” project, a state subsidy for connecting Korean businesses to initiatives that give the country access to the world’s raw material bases, was not realized either. Lee Myung-bak came to power at a time when South Korea was ready to convert its accumulated economic potential into political influence both in East Asia and globally. Not only was the country was ready to solve such a large-scale problem, but the new president also had serious ambitions in this regard.

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To do this, it was first necessary to update the image strategy of the state and be more active in global political mechanisms, and then to boost economic development to further support this new status. Lee Myung-­ bak’s foreign policy doctrine was presented during the election campaign and was essentially focused on the following ideas: pushing for the denuclearization and opening up of North Korea; strengthening the alliance with the United States on the basis of common values; promoting South Korea in the region and the world to ensure more favourable political and economic positions. Many practical steps were complex in nature, linking the external and internal agenda. Lee Myung-bak put forward the “green growth” concept, which combined stimulating the economy with improving the environmental situation and, as a result, the international image of South Korea, as well as increvasing the standard of living inside the country. The government pledged to support green businesses financially and through subsidies. The desire to reduce carbon emissions meant that the country needed to change the structure of its energy consumption. Although South Korea did not switch to renewable, “green” energy sources, the country’s nuclear industry benefited from the new policy. For example, South Korean companies signed an export contract for the first time—on the construction of a reactor in the United Arab Emirates—at the end of 2009. Lee Myung-bak’s strategy for improving the country’s international image is succinctly expressed in his slogan “mature global power” (성숙한 세계국가, seongsukhan segyegukka—often translated into English as the less direct “Global Korea”), which partly echoed the ideas of “globalization” (세계화, segyehwa) voiced by President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998). It was assumed that South Korea could and should show that it was a world leader, an active participant in international relations at the global, and not just the regional, level. The propaganda rationale was quasi-­ altruistic: Seoul seemed to be returning a debt to the international community that had supported it during the Korean War (it should be noted that it was not the whole world that supported the South in this conflict). The reality was simpler: according to Lee Myung-bak, the world is divided into leaders and followers, and South Korea should be a part of the first group. Lee Myung-bak’s foreign policy clearly assumed synergy with the economy: South Korean goods grew in terms of recognizability and their image improved. The latter point was important for the president, who

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was upset that foreigners often perceived Korean goods as cheap versions of more prestigious products, rather than something of intrinsic value themselves. To address this shortcoming, a State Branding Committee was established (which served from 2009 to 2013).1 The main pathway towards global recognition for South Korea was to improve relations with the United States. Lee Myung-bak represented the conservative camp and held a very low opinion of his predecessors, calling their period of service a “lost decade,” particularly as he did not share their foreign policy views. The new leader blamed Roh Moo-hyun for harming the ties with the United States and Japan during his years in office, and was less inclined to involve the North (relations with Pyongyang soon deteriorated significantly). The United States under Barack Obama began a “pivot to Asia,” so Seoul’s readiness to become regional support for Washington was accepted with confidence. The pro-American orientation determined the hierarchy of other foreign policy priorities. The US House of Representatives adopted an unprecedented resolution congratulating Lee Myung-bak on his election to the post of president, prepared by representatives of both the Democratic and Republican parties on February 6. A special place in the resolution was given to further strengthening the US–South Korea military-political alliance. Lee Myung-bak visited the headquarters of the joint forces of South Korea and the United States on January 14, where he had a meeting with the Commander of United States Forces Korea, General Burwell Bell. Lee Myung-bak called for strengthening the US–South Korea alliance by creating a new diplomatic framework for it in a meeting with Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye shortly after his inauguration on February 13, 2008. The call was heard. After a visit to the United States in April 2008, Lee Myung-bak went first to Tokyo and then to Beijing (although the Chinese diplomats hinted that they would prefer the opposite). Russia was fourth on the list. Inter-­ Korean relations were also sacrificed in solidarity with the United States. Seoul became Washington’s foreign policy fairway. The tough attitude towards North Korea was partly in line with Lee Myung-bak’s ideas, and partly a result of the South’s unqualified support for American ideas that pressure could make the Northerners give up the nuclear programme. The 1  State Branding Committee. [A copy of the official website of the organization on the website of the Presidential Archive of South Korea]. URL: http://17koreabrand.pa.go.kr/ gokr/kr/index.do (accessed June 1, 2020).

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President sought to integrate South Korea more closely into the US security and foreign policy system on both the regional and global levels. Seoul began to actively support its “senior” ally on the issues on Washington’s agenda: the global economic crisis; disarmament as Barack Obama saw it; and settlement in the hot spots created by the United States, such as Iraq. Of course, the new South Korean administration sought to find benefits, for example, by calling for the disarmament of North Korea. Although Lee Myung-bak’s top foreign policy priorities were global, he also managed to achieve impressive results in intraregional co-operation. For example, South Korea, China and Japan have held regular meetings of leaders since December 2008, and the secretariat of the trilateral co-­ operation project opened in Seoul in September 2011. This project was inspired by the interaction of Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo with the countries of Southeast Asia in the ASEAN+3 format, and South Korea sought to increase its regional and global status through participation in such a “club of the strong.” The political dialogue with Japan at the highest level was quite intense during Lee Myung-bak’s presidency, and the parties were ready to turn a blind eye to differences in the interests of co-operation. Nevertheless, various political and historical disputes which were to paralyze bilateral communication during the presidencies of Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in could not go unnoticed. For example, South Korea recalled its ambassador from the country in 2008 following the most recent recommendations from the Japanese side on the promotion of the “correct” point of view in schools about the island of Dokdo (known as Takeshima in Japan, and Liancourt Rocks everywhere else, is a disputed territory de facto controlled by Seoul) were adopted. At the same time, Japanese prime ministers were often replaced, and stable co-operation could not be established at the beginning of Lee Myung-bak’s term. Relations with China soured. Lee Myung-bak’s pro-American course irritated Beijing, which disapproved of a modern policy on the foundation of Cold War alliances and protested against the holding of US–South Korea military exercises. The increased economic competition between the two countries against the background of the growth of the Chinese economy also fuelled the flame. The fundamental differences with Beijing on Seoul’s newfound stance on North Korea did not help to improve mutual understanding. Lee Myung-bak’s calls to build a “strategic partnership” were received with little enthusiasm during his visit to Beijing in May 2008.

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Lee Myung-bak sought to strengthen the US–South Korea alliance at all costs, both in military-political and in economic terms. He began to actively promote the ratification of the free trade agreement with the United States (FTA; often referred to by the English abbreviation KORUS FTA), which was signed under Roh Moo-hyun. The South Korean president was ready to make concessions that were not supported by the majority of the country. For example, the South Korean leader, at the request of Washington, lifted the 2003 ban on the import of American beef after a meeting with President George W. Bush in 2008.

5.2   Protests, Criticism and Government Reaction Large-scale protests broke out immediately after the decision was made to allow the import of American meat. These were the largest manifestations of public unrest since the democratization of the 1980s. The formal reason was the persistent fears among the population that imported beef could be infected with mad cow disease, but in general, the people were expressing their discontent with the “pressure-based” style of Lee Myung-­ bak’s policy, as well as the unfavourable FTA. The inability to quickly fulfil inflated election promises also added to the reputational problems typical of South Korea and the protesters eventually began to demand the resignation of the head. It is noteworthy that people began to come out with lighted candles in 2008, which became part of the political culture of peaceful protest (it was the “candle” protests that would lead to the impeachment of the next conservative president, Park Geun-hye, almost ten years later). The president, who had carefully created the image of a “man of the people” in campaign materials, made millionaires his confidantes. Besides, many of the new leader’s advisers had been either his fellow countrymen, classmates, or parishioners of the same church, which is typical of South Korean society. South Koreans also disliked Lee Myung-bak’s excessive assertiveness, often coming across as irreconcilable stubbornness, which had long since earned him the nickname “Bulldozer.” The new president, being an ex-corporate manager, positioned himself as the “CEO” of South Korea, and this was the style he used in his work. Lee Myung-bak was not willing to compromise, even when his initiatives did not find support. For example, the fanciful idea of building a trans-Korean canal from Seoul to Busan was promoted by the government even though the Korean people did not support it (perhaps money was

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pumped into the project for corrupt reasons). Lee Myung-bak did not even receive the complete support of conservative politicians and voters, with many remaining supporters of Park Geun-hye, who, in their opinion, had been unfairly ousted by the president. The voters were disillusioned partly due to the difficulties in implementing election promises. Rising prices for oil and other raw materials affected the South Korean economy. The standard of living not only stagnated but even fell against the background of inflation. The impracticability of the “747 Plan” was becoming apparent. Under the circumstances, South Korea failed in its task of becoming the seventh-largest economy in terms of GDP.  The already solid economic growth rates could not be turned into ultra-high rates (the global crisis of the end of 2010s also played a part in this). There was no longer any talk of quickly doubling GDP per capita and achieving economic targets. The task of fighting inflation also became more complicated. Promoting the concept of “green growth” also proved to be difficult. The state had not developed a detailed plan to support businesses in this campaign. According to critics, Lee Myung-bak only cared about growth, and supporting “green” ideas was just a propaganda trick. The new president’s style of work and actions alienated representatives of civil society, business and many members of parliament. Economic and environmental reforms proved difficult to implement without the support and coordination of these forces. Interestingly, environmental projects—such as the FTA with the United States—were the initiative of Roh Moo-hyun, but Lee Myung-bak’s “unhealthy” zeal made them a bone of contention between the new administration and the intellectuals. The struggle against the growth in the number of bureaucrats took strange forms. Initially, Lee Myung-bak intended to reduce the number of ministries by eliminating the Ministry of Unification, which traditionally deals with Pyongyang, the Ministry of Fisheries, and the “social” ministries (the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family). The consolidated opposition in the parliament forced the president to reconsider his plans. The number of ministries was nevertheless reduced from 18 to 15, and in 2009, another ministry—the Ministry of Civil Servants and Security—was eliminated. What is more, the president’s powers became somewhat limited. Some state corporations were privatized or reorganized in 2008. The post of Deputy Prime Minister (central to the financial and economic bloc) was abolished, and many structures under the head of government’s control were made directly subordinate

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to the president (many of these changes were subsequently cancelled by President Park Geun-hye). The role of the presidential administration grew, as it was entrusted with the work on Lee Myung-bak’s main economic and ideological “campaigns.” The authorities suspected that it was supporters of then-retired Roh Moo-hyun who were behind the 2008 protests. A campaign against his supporters began, and soon corruption charges were brought against the former president himself. This was a serious blow to Roh Moo-hyun’s reputation, as he had created the image of a fighter against corruption. The country was shocked when a retired politician committed suicide in May 2009 by jumping off a cliff to protect his honour (although he once drove his political opponents to suicide himself). The population saw Roh Moo-hyun as a martyr, and soon the rating of Lee Myung-bak and the conservative party fell. Their popularity sunk even lower thanks to their efforts to push a reform of the press through parliament, which gave large businesses (including those connected with the government) greater control over the media. Even former president and Nobel laureate Kim Dae-jung criticized both the deterioration in inter-­ Korean relations and the country’s domestic policy. However, the Lee Myung-bak administration managed to improve the situation somewhat. For example, the president changed the tactics and tone of his speeches, moving away from the one-sided focus on supporting big business to rhetoric about paying attention to the common people. Despite the global financial crisis, South Korea’s economic performance was not bad, which also played a role. Of course, the “747 Plan” failed, but the economy shrank by only 1% in the crisis year of 2009, despite the initial gloomy forecasts. The balance of payments was positive, the won strengthened, foreign exchange reserves grew and unemployment remained low. The economy was revived against the background of a “tightening of the screws” in the sociopolitical sphere. According to critics, judges and law enforcement agencies expanded their powers almost to the level they had been at during authoritarian rule. The authorities tightened control over the media and dissidents (primarily anti-government protesters), and relying on the police, the prosecutor’s office, and the National Intelligence Service, which was headed by the president’s close ally Won Sei-hoon (later, under Park Geun-hye, he was sentenced to prison for his involvement in an online smear campaign against opposition candidates in the

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2012 presidential election). In addition to intelligence, the army’s cyber units were also involved in manipulating public opinion and fraudulent activities. The Broadcasting and Telecommunications Evaluation Commission was established as early as 2008. In addition to such harmless functions as assigning an age rating to TV shows, it also monitored and censored social networks, particularly during the protests. Freedom of speech was also affected by the fact that Lee Myung-bak insisted on appointing his cronies to senior positions in many media corporations. There was an incident with the sinking of South Korean corvette Cheonan in the spring of 2010, and later, an artillery exchange with the North Koreans in the area of Yeonpyeong Island in the autumn. These events seriously affected the relations with Pyongyang, which were already going through hard times after the incident in the Kumgang Mountains when a tourist from South Korea died, and following the North Korean nuclear test in 2009. Although the direct threat of an inter-Korean conflict usually improves the ratings of the conservatives, this time it fell. Voters decided that Seoul, which had abandoned its “solar policy,” was just as much to blame as Pyongyang for what was happening. People did not trust the official conclusions about the Cheonan tragedy, raising questions about the actions of the military and the selective character of the information they provided. As a result, the Hannara Party lost the local elections (having already lost the parliamentary bi-elections earlier). As a result of the incident with Cheonan and the events on the Yeonpyeong Island, the South Korean elite unanimously decided not to ramp up the transfer of wartime command to Seoul by joint US–South Korean forces (now, in the event of a war, the South’s troops will be commanded by an American general). According to the agreement reached under Roh Moo-hyun, this was supposed to happen in 2012, but the decision was taken in 2010 to postpone the matter until 2015 (the issue was shelved altogether under Park Geun-hye). Nevertheless, Lee Myung-bak’s economic policy bore fruit, and positive trends took hold. Not only did the country emerge from the global crisis, but it also demonstrated impressive economic growth (about 7%). The president, however, took on a new project: he was going to restore and develop the infrastructure of the “four rivers,” comparable in scale and ambition to the canal project. However, the same fate and results awaited him as with that project, with the public and experts alike

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criticizing the government for its voluntarism and haste. Despite the protests, a lot of money was spent on the project over the course of three years (most of it ended up in the pockets of businessmen with ties to the authorities), but the results remained dubious.

5.3  The Variable Success of the “Global” Strategy An event that symbolized the success of Lee Myung-bak’s efforts to promote South Korea to a leading position in the world took place in November 2010 m when Seoul hosted the G20 summit with great fanfare. The tactic of “stepping out of the shadow” through a major international event was not new to South Korea, as Seoul had hosted the Summer Olympics in 1988. The materials dedicated to the G20 summit always emphasized that South Korea was the first country outside the G7 to accept it (later, playing on this love of posturing, US President Trump began to attract South Korea to the G7). The agenda was designed to show the Lee Myung-bak administration and South Korea at their best—as a carrier of valuable economic experience and knowledge, a force that can teach the world how to overcome the crisis. Lee Myung-bak had already advised foreign partners on this issue in his articles in The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times a year earlier (the second was co-authored with the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd). The claim to the status of global economic power was also supported by the real achievements of the South in recent years. In December, shortly after the summit, Seoul continued to discuss the FTA with the new US administration. The negotiations did not progress despite the concessions. Congress delayed ratification as early as 2008, arguing for better conditions for the American automotive industry, and the opposition criticized Lee Myung-bak for “being willing to humiliate himself” and bringing no results. Seoul made faster progress (at least in foreign policy) in Europe. The FTA with the European Union was signed in 2010 and ratified in 2011 after several years of discussions. The success in Europe also pushed the American side into action, as Congress finally adopted the document in 2012. The creation of the FTA network, which began under Roh Moo-hyun, was intended to increase the economic and political “visibility” of South Korea at the global level on the one hand, and reduce the South’s

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increasing dependence on the growing Chinese economy on the other. What is more, the liberalization agreements were simply beneficial for the export-­oriented South Korean economy, which relied on the power of large corporations. However, the FTA with the EU did not significantly affect the structure of external economic links: almost a decade later, there is not a single no European state among Seoul’s top ten trading partners. South Korea has been increasing pressure on Japan over historical disputes since 2011. For example, the Constitutional Court of Korea adopted a ruling stating that the authorities did not actively protect the state interests on the issue of wianbu (Korean women who were forcibly recruited into Japanese field brothels during the colonial period), and such passivity is contrary to the constitution. The South Korean authorities failed to conclude an intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan in May 2012 due to popular discontent.2 Although Seoul had signed a similar document with more than 20 other countries, including Russia, most of the elites felt that such an agreement would tie Seoul too tightly to the anti-Chinese coalition (however, the real motive was the traditional anti-Japanese sentiment). Lee Myung-bak stopped the procedure a few months before the end of his term and even fired one of his advisers who was responsible for promoting the agreement. Relations with Japan were again strained when Lee Myung-bak visited Liancourt Rocks in August 2012. This step could have been “inspired” by Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative (which later became a tradition for Russian leaders) to visit the Kuril Islands, over which Russian sovereignty is also disputed by Japan. The initial diplomatic reaction from Tokyo was expected to be harsh, but Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, as the South Korean press emphasized, was the first to approach Lee Myung-bak in an attempt to mitigate the consequences of the diplomatic scandal at the APEC summit in Vladivostok on September 9, 2012. Nevertheless, the increasing international pressure and emotional tension had the opposite effect: irritation among the Japanese elite grew over the continuing demands of the Korean side. Shinzo Abe returned to power in 2012. He espouses nationalist views and does not believe that Japan should continue to publicly repent over events that took place more than 70 years ago.

2   The English abbreviation GSOMIA—General Security of Military Information Agreement—is often used in the press and literature.

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South Korea held another large-scale multilateral event designed to prove the validity of its claims to global status in March 2012—the Nuclear Security Summit. It was also important for Seoul that President Barack Obama, who put forward the idea of holding such summits, spoke in favour of holding the second summit in South Korea (the first was held in the United States). This allowed Seoul to demonstrate its leadership skills in the nuclear field (soon after the disaster at the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant in Japan), re-advertise the relevant branch of its industry and provide a platform for world diplomacy. * * * The 2012 parliamentary elections served as a kind of summing up of the results of Lee Myung-bak’s term, testing, as it did, the mood of voters in the run-up to the presidential elections later that year. The merits of the conservative administration in the economic sector were recognized by opponents, but both the president and his party remained unpopular, especially among the intellectuals. The falling rating of the “presidential” party—following the rating of the president himself—was a typical situation for the “liberal decade.” This is partly why the ruling Hannara Party rebranded itself as Saenuri (New Frontier) and tried to cash in on the popularity of its leader, Park Geun-hye, in 2012. She did manage to endear herself to voters, and her promises to expand social support helped win over some of the centre-left electors. In response to the Conservative Party’s recognition of a female politician, the Grand Unified Democratic New Party made Han Myeong-sook, who served as the Prime Minister of South Korea in 2006–2007, their new leader. After the results of the parliamentary elections were announced, Saenuri’s position weakened significantly (losing 24 seats), but the conservatives still managed to maintain a small majority in parliament: 152 seats out of 300. On the one hand, this advantage meant the opposition could not turn the current president into a “lame duck”; on the other hand, the slightest change in the balance of power in the event of by-elections threatened to create an extremely unfavourable situation for the Saenuri. The “balance” in parliament also meant that whoever was to win the next election would not be able to carry out their policies with the same ease and assertiveness as Lee Myung-bak at the beginning of his term. Despite the successful parliamentary elections and foreign policy accomplishments, the end of Lee Myung-bak’s presidency was not the

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best time for the country, or for him personally. Economic growth had slowed significantly, income inequality had grown rapidly and the promises of the “747 Plan” looked like a mockery against this background. The president’s close associates—and even his brother, Lee Sang-deuk—found themselves at the centre of a corruption scandal. South Korea greeted Lee Myung-bak with gleeful cheers in 2007, but by 2012, the people could not wait to get rid of him, hoping that things would be different with the next leader.

CHAPTER 6

The Fall of the “Father of the Nation’s” Daughter: South Korea Under Park Geun-Hye

6.1   Pre-election Hopes and First Steps The current political system of South Korea took shape in the 1980s during a hard-fought democratization process. Presidential powers being restricted to a five-year period became one of the guarantees against the country falling back into its authoritarian past. The historical experience of living in an authoritarian state and the unwillingness to return to such a system are the reasons for the higher requirements that South Korean presidents face.1 Almost all leaders in recent years have faced similar circumstances: a politician comes to power riding the waves of success as a “beacon of light,” but after a year or two, the people start to notice certain flaws. Corruption and other scandals, or the growing dissatisfaction of the people, limited the president’s influence and turned them into a “lame duck” by the end of their term. The majority of South Korea’s past leaders ended up behind bars after their terms.2

1  I.V.  Dyachkov, “South Korea Scandal: Good News Lies Buried, Bad News Flies,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/skandal-vyuzhnoy-koree (accessed August 7, 2020). 2  Ibid.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Torkunov et al., Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5_6

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The Conservative leader Park Geun-hye won the presidential election on December 19, 2012, despite the odds being stacked against her. Firstly, Lee Myung-bak, the previous conservative candidate, had become extremely unpopular by the end of his term. The election fever had been long forgotten, and at the end of his term, the people started to criticize him almost unanimously even for things they used to consider his merits (he did, however, manage to evade justice and a prison term for quite some time before the “curse of South Korean presidents” finally caught up with him under Moon Jae-in).3 Second, the voter turnout in 2012 was extremely high (about 76%)—the past experiences of the democratic era indicated that the conservatives would have ordinarily lost under such circumstances.4 The conservative party distanced itself from Lee Myung-bak. On the one hand, after his ascent to power, he himself made efforts to show that he was above parliamentary debates and that his decisions were not influenced by the opinions of members of parliament (this, in turn, served to annoy the party). On the other hand, the Hannara Party (later renamed Saenuri Party), especially the group headed by Park Geun-hye, scurried to distance themselves from their leader, whose popularity was in rapid decline, at the start of his term, then did not express support for him during the “beef” protests of 2008. One of the reasons for this was that many of Park Geun-hye’s supporters had been prohibited from taking part in the 2008 elections.5 Park Geun-hye herself and her inner circle were almost entirely in control of Saenuri Party by 2012, preventing any potential competition from entering the fray (similar events were taking place in the left-centrist camp).6 Park Geun-hye’s success at the election was attributed to several factors. First of all, over the course of many years, she had created a voter-friendly image and was considered the paragon of virtue. Second, she managed to structure her election campaign more effectively than her opponents.

3  I.V.  Dyachkov, “You can only lose face once,” MGIMO website https://mgimo.ru/ about/news/experts/257547 (accessed August 7, 2020). 4  R. Panda, “Elections in South Korea: Assessing Park’s Victory,” IPCS Issue Brief no. 201 (2013): 1. 5  Shin Soon-ok, “South Korea’s Elusive Middlepowermanship,: The Pacific Review. 29, no. 2 (2016): 203. 6  Lee Hyunji, “The Democratic Deficit in South Korea: The 2012 Presidential Election and its Aftermath,” Representation 51, no. 3 (2015): 316.

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In the eyes of the general public, Park Geun-hye was, above all, the “daughter of Korea”: one who had abandoned personal happiness and dreams of a family for the sake of her motherland. Her image was inextricably tied to the “father of the miracle on the Han River” figure, Park Chung-hee.7 Park Geun-hye entered big-time politics at an early age: after the death of her mother during a failed assassination attempt on her father in 1974, she had to perform the duties of the first lady until the murder of Park Chung-hee himself in 1979. In her political speeches, she claimed to be “married to the country” and ready to give the people her undivided motherly affection. In the 1990s, Park Geun-hye made a political comeback after the Asian crisis which, in her own words, made her remember her civil duty. By that time, the people’s opinion on Park Chung-hee had changed for the better: the older generation felt nostalgic about his time, which served to increase his daughter’s chances of success. In the 20 years that Park Geun-hye had spent away from the public eye, she had made efforts to restore and protect her father’s legacy, greatly improving his image.8 Adherence to such Confucian traditions is worthy of respect in Korea. Success followed Park Geun-hye from the onset of her political career: under her leadership, the conservatives achieved impressive results at the parliamentary elections, winning a majority in 2012 against all odds. Her past political career garnered her a reputation as a decent person with principles who was even prepared to go against her allies to reach the truth. The political harassment on the part of Lee Myung-bak and his supporters also garnered the people’s affection. These two motives served to increase each other’s potency: in 2009–2010, Park Geun-hye organized collective action in opposition to the president, as the latter was about to go back on one of his pre-election promises—the continuing transfer of all capital-based institutions to the city of Sejong.9 Park Geun-hye structured her pre-election campaign in such a manner as to win over hesitant voters, mainly those in the 40+ age group. The older generation consistently supported the conservatives, whilst the younger generation supported the left-centrists. Her promises were more 7  An authoritarian leader of South Korea in 1963–1979 considered by many to be the progenitor of the “economic wonder.” 8  R. Garikipati, “Challenges before South Korea’s New President,” Economic and Political Weekly, 48, no. 10 (2013): 25. 9  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 167.

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modest compared to her liberal opponents, but at the same time more realistic. Among her promises were the more traditional “to strengthen the economy,” and “to create jobs.” However, Park Geun-hye also proposed a number of socially oriented projects in her quest to win over the left-centrist electorate: support for the middle class, expanded social security, lower university tuition fees and more control over the appetites of financial and industrial groups (kor. 재벌, chaebol).10 The latter is especially intriguing: conservatives usually tend to protect the interests of businesses and Lee Myung-bak, himself a protégé of the business environment, was no exception. Park Geun-hye, according to polls, was ahead of her main opponent, Moom Jae-in, from the very start of the campaign. Her position took a blow when the programmer and entrepreneur Ahn Cheol-soo, who had been persistently and unsuccessfully trying to create a “third power” in South Korean politics for the past 15 years, announced his candidacy in the presidential race. However, he revoked his candidacy shortly before the election, having endorsed Moon Jae-in.11 Moon Jae-in, a former attorney and current human rights activist, had served a prison sentence when Park Chung-hee was leader. Thus, for Moon Jae-in’s supporters, Park Geun-hye’s rise to power meant a return to the dark times of authoritarianism. However, Moon Jae-in’s political image was tied to that of his close friend, the deceased Roo Moo-hyun, a polarizing populist figure in the eyes of the people. The country was divided into two camps.12 In the end, Park Geun-hye’s lead turned out to be minimal (51.6% of votes against Moon Jae-in’s 48%; for comparison, Lee Myung-bak received almost twice the number of votes as his opponent back in 2008). From the public’s point of view, the first female president of South Korea found herself in a vulnerable position. Seoul voted primarily for the opposition, and residents of the capital make up almost half of the country’s population, which meant they set the tone for public opinion.13 In the first days 10  Lee Hyunji, “The Democratic Deficit in South Korea: The 2012 Presidential Election and its Aftermath,” Representation, 51, no. 3 (2015): 317, 319. 11  R. Panda, “Elections in South Korea: Assessing Park’s Victory,” IPCS Issue Brief, no. 201 (2013): 1. 12  Lee Hyunji, “The Democratic Deficit in South Korea: The 2012 Presidential Election and its Aftermath,” Representation, 51, no. 3 (2015): 314, 318. 13  I.V.  Dyachkov, “South Korea Scandal: Good News Lies Buried, Bad News Flies,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/skandal-vyuzhnoy-koree (accessed August 7, 2020).

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of her presidency, the controversy with the aforementioned “fake” internet comments generated by intelligence services in favour of Park Geunhye came to light, which planted doubt as to the legitimacy of the election. In her inauguration speech, Park Geun-hye promised to create a “second miracle on the Han River” by building a “creative economy.”14 IT, innovations, increased R&D subsidies, support for small and medium-­ sized businesses (including crowdfunding opportunities) and new jobs were to become the means to achieving these goals. More vague promises were also made: for example, the need to stimulate creative thinking in a traditionally conservative society. The transformations were meant to increase people’s wealth. Funding for all of these goals was to come not only from government funds (during the election campaign, Park Geun-hye promised not to impose new taxes (as opposed to Moon Jae-in), but rather to optimize the collecting of the existing taxes15), but also from the funds of chaebol, including their subsidiary innovation centres. Redirecting the power of financial and industrial groups to the good of the state (a move in the style of Park Chung-hee) was meant to secure a competitive advantage over China.16 In this vein, Lee Myung-bak’s “eco” policy was resumed in a more moderate manner without too much emphasis put on it and without the “megaprojects.”17 In February 2014, Park Geun-hye proposed a “Three-Year Plan for Economic Innovation,” which was set to reach certain indicators: 4% annual economic growth; a 70% employment; and $40,000 income per capita by 2017. In other words, her strategy was suspiciously similar to Lee Myung-bak’s “747 Plan,” both in terms of its “code” structure and in terms of how ambitious the goals were, although the codename differed 14  제18대 대통령 취임식. 대통령기록관. (“The Inauguration Ceremony of the 18th President of the Republic of Korea”). Presidential archive, http://pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp (accessed July 1, 2020). 15  Lee Hyunji, “The Democratic Deficit in South Korea: The 2012 Presidential Election and its Aftermath,” Representation 51, no. 3 (2015): 317. 16  N.P Leshakova, “‘Creative Economy’ as a New Source of Growth for the Republic of Korea,” Security and Cooperation Infrastructure in East Asia: Reports at the IV International Conference for Young Orientalists at the RAS Far East Institute, Moscow, November 17–18, 2016 (Moscow. IFES RAS, 2017): 178–182. 17  A.F.  Sinyakova, “South Korea: ‘Ecology’ Translates to ‘Economy,’” Security and Cooperation Infrastructure in East Asia: Reports at the IV International Conference for Young Orientalists at the RAS Far East Institute, Moscow, November 17–18, 2016 (Moscow. IFES RAS, 2017): 172–173.

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somewhat (hers being the “474 Vision”). This warranted involuntary comparisons to Park Chung-hee’s government’s five-year plans,18 although the five-year plans of the past were far more substantive. Jumping ahead, it should be noted that Park Geun-hye managed for the most part to fulfil her economic promises during her term. Even though there was obviously no second economic wonder, economic growth rates remained stable at about 3% annually. Small and medium-­ sized businesses did in fact see easier operating conditions.19 Moreover, the people held the president responsible for unsolved structural economic problems, even though in reality there was little the president could do in such cases, considering the scope of their powers, the short presidential term, and the depth of the crisis. On the other hand, Park Geun-hye, having promised to make the people happier in her inauguration speech, quickly discarded the “left-wing” socioeconomic promises that helped her win the election under pressure from her conservative colleagues when faced with reality. Critics also note that the transition to a “creative economy” served to conceal, first and foremost, the liberalization of economic relations and the continuing privatization of state assets. “Social” obligations were forgotten. No meaningful steps to limit the influence of chaebol were taken. Moreover, there was no place in the Park Geun-hye administration and government for the moderate conservatives who had helped her to formulate her election campaign. In August 2013, the president reshuffled the government, appointing officials from her father’s era as advisors. In addition, many of her appointees were former public prosecutors. The opposition took this as a sign that the security agencies were being given greater power, and that control over the population was being tightened.20

18  J.  Doucette, and Koo Se-Woong, “Pursuing Post-Democratisation: The Resilience of Politics by Public Security in Contemporary South Korea, Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 2 (2016): 199, 216. 19  A.F.  Sinyakova, “South Korea: ‘Ecology’ Translates to ‘Economy,’” Security and Cooperation Infrastructure in East Asia: Reports at the IV International Conference for Young Orientalists at the RAS Far East Institute, Moscow, November 17–18, 2016 (Moscow. IFES RAS, 2017): 166–169. 20  J.  Doucette, and Koo Se-Woong, “Pursuing Post-Democratisation: The Resilience of Politics by Public Security in Contemporary South Korea, Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 2 (2016): 199, 212–213.

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Park Geun-hye also announced her desire to improve the efficiency of state governance (“Government 3.0”); however, no meaningful steps were taken in that direction. The optimization of the governance system came down to restoring ministries abolished by Lee Myung-bak (the ministries of science and mariculture) and the head of government administration, with the simultaneous expansion of the presidential administration’s powers.21

6.2  Criticism of Park Geun-hye’s Style of Governance Almost any South Korean politician, upon their initial ascent to power, enjoys a reputation as an exceptionally honest person, one who is not involved in bribery or nepotism. Ironically, the thing that causes politicians, especially high-ranking ones, to commit acts with which they would later be charged and probably imprisoned is the culture of communicating within the inner circle of elites. In Park Geun-hye’s case, the image of a selfless heroine was rather reasonable: she did not in fact engage in any corrupt practices before the election. The president’s integrity came to life in her policies. In 2015, an exceptionally harsh anti-corruption bill was passed—the so called “Kim Yong-ran Act,” after the member of parliament who proposed the bill—which limited “hospitality expenses” for communication with officials and their families to miniscule sums (only gifts of up to $40 or dinners of up to $30 dollars were allowed, etc.). This extremely strict act, which actually failed to be passed during Lee Myung-­ bak’s final year, completely transformed the traditional relationship between the Korean authorities and the people.22 However, Park Geun-hye herself was not oblivious to nepotism, which is also traditional for Korean political culture. During her term, the procedure for appointing people to public office was changed. The aim was to create an opportunity for the government to appoint honest people “from outside” to the necessary positions without taking the length of service into account. As a result, the new system started to be used for placing

21  Park Sauk-Hee, and M. Wilding, “The Politics of Government Reform in Korea: From Tripartite to Bipartite Politicization,” Administration & Society 48, no. 9 (2016): 1074. 22  K.V Asmolov, Korean Political Culture: Traditions and Transformation (Moscow: Izdatelstvo universitetat D. Pozharskogo, 2017), 178–180.

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unqualified “insider” candidates in profitable “hot positions,” e.g., in state-owned corporations.23 Park Geun-hye became the first democratically elected woman as a head of state in Northeast Asia. She made active use of the gender card in her election campaign. Feminists accused her of exploiting the topic for political points: during her years in parliament, Park Geun-hye did not fight for women’s rights, despite having the means to do so. Her administration saw even fewer women than Lee Myung-bak’s, in spite of all the promises.24 Moreover, by using the image of a caring mother and a loving daughter, she ended up embracing gender stereotypes instead of breaking them. Besides, as is the case with many women in politics (especially in Asia), the population chose her not as her own person, but rather as her father’s successor.25 The new president’s modesty and her awkward manner in public were not easily accepted. In addition, the opposition was ready to explain the president’s every misstep through her being the daughter of the authoritarian leader Park Chung-hee.26 The general public also disliked her being so distant from the people due to her being related to a former president; for example, during one of her election campaign market visits, she decided to smell a potato she had bought, which would not have occurred to anyone familiar with cooking.27 One of the first public initiatives of Park Geun-hye was the reinstatement of mini-skirt fines and fines for wearing other clothes that were deemed to be “too revealing,” which reminded Koreans of the bans of the 1970s and was met with spiteful comments (for

23  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Uk Heo, “The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye’s Leadership and South Korean Democracy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 5 (2018): 653–654. 24  Lee Hyunji, “The Democratic Deficit in South Korea: The 2012 Presidential Election and its Aftermath,” Representation 51, no. 3 (2015): 318, 320–321. 25  Lee Young-Im, “From First Daughter to First Lady to First Woman President: Park Geun-Hye’s Path to the South Korean Presidency,” Feminist Media Studies 17, no. 3 (2017): 377–382. 26  I.V. Dyachkov, “You can only lose face once,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/ about/news/experts/257547 (accessed August 7, 2020). 27  Lee Young-Im, “From First Daughter to First Lady to First Woman President: Park Geun-Hye’s Path to the South Korean Presidency,” Feminist Media Studies 17, no. 3 (2017): 384.

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the sake of fairness, South Korean police attempted to restore ethics control back in 1996).28 Park Geun-hye did not hold press-conferences during her first year in office and hardly addressed the nation directly during her entire term (despite her predecessors having done so regularly). The South Korean people were irritated by the lack of communication with the authorities, which they interpreted as a sign of arrogance and authoritarian governance methods.29 Left-centrists and their electorate justifiably feared the damage that might be caused to South Korean democracy by Park Geun-hye. For instance, she dismissed the teachers’ labour union and remained in conflict with the union of railway workers, who had gone on strike against the privatization of high-speed lines. The amount of pressure on the press also increased during her term. Similar to Lee Myung-bak’s administration, the authorities hid behind defamation and slander accusations in order to silence journalists and even social media accounts criticizing the government.30 This was not done without cause, as Park Geun-hye’s forced resignation was accelerated by mass protests organized through social media. Park Geun-hye’s decision to create a centralized history textbook approval system caused a major public outcry. Before this, each educational institution could select textbooks independently. The new standards caused public protests due to this decision being viewed as the government’s wish to feed conservative ideas to the young about their country’s history.31 The political elites and the population were all equally unsatisfied with Park Geun-hye’s style of governance. Lee Myung-bak, in advancing his policies, at least created the impression of a consensus or sought to reach one with force. Meanwhile, his successor was not inclined to consult anyone, keeping the decision-making process behind closed doors, hardly 28  I.V. Dyachkov, “You can only lose face once,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/ about/news/experts/257547 (accessed August 7, 2020). 29  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Uk Heo, “The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye’s Leadership and South Korean Democracy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 5 (2018): 651. 30  S. Haggard, and You Jong-Sung, “Freedom of Expression in South Korea,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 45, no. 1 (2015): 170–171. 31  J.  Doucette, and Koo Se-Woong, “Pursuing Post-Democratisation: The Resilience of Politics by Public Security in Contemporary South Korea,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 2 (2016): 214–215.

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taking anyone’s advice. Park Geun-hye did not delegate her powers—officials simply had to write down her orders (which is why the photos of the government’s work during the era look so North Korean). Due to little feedback, unpredictability and her being prepared to make unpopular choices, even conservatives sometimes found it hard to identify themselves with Park Geun-hye’s political course. Despite having common political and ideological beliefs, Park Geun-­ hye did not plan out specific political steps and strategies. As a result, her administration could not act independently, which slowed down the decision-­making process significantly if the president was for some reason unavailable.32 Communication with her was possible only through official channels: the president avoided non-formal communication with her subordinates.33 Park Geun-hye’s personal qualities served only to make the situation worse. She selected her inner circle based on loyalty, applying the “with us or against us” principle not only in relation to her political opponents, but also to those compatriots who dared to speak out against her policies. For example, when Yoo Seong-min, the floor leader for the Saenuri Party, expressed an opinion different from Park Geun-hye’s on amendments to the Parliament Act, she called upon the people to “condemn” him during the election. Generally speaking, integrity and adherence to one’s beliefs to the point of inflexibility are good qualities for an elected politician (this explains Park Geun-hye’s popularity during the parliament years), but are harmful when held by the highest authority who should remain more diplomatic and master the art of compromise.34 A defining phenomenon of her era became the division of public activists and arts and science workers into “black” and “white” lists based on their loyalty to the government. “Out-of-favour” figures were refused

32  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Uk Heo, “The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye’s Leadership and South Korean Democracy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 5 (2018): 654. 33  Kim Young Ho, “Bureaucratic Politics in South Korean Foreign Policy-Making,” Domestic Constraints on South Korean Foreign Policy (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018): 32. 34  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Uk Heo, “The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye’s Leadership and South Korean Democracy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 5 (2018): 650, 656.

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access to public events.35 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even extended this “censorship” to foreign researchers in South Korea. Despite all of the above, Park Geun-hye managed to maintain a rather high and stable approval rating almost throughout her entire term, as opposed to Lee Myung-bak. According to surveys, in April 2016, months before the scandal that led to her impeachment, she received an approval rating of 40%, even though at that time the public did not approve of certain political decisions the government was making. The reason for the famous personal stability of the president was the loyalty of the main electorate—the elderly who tended to romanticize the times of Park Chung-hee.36 Her stable rating notwithstanding, Park Geun-hye was forced to overcome significant adversity from a divided parliament throughout her presidency. First, at the 2012 election, the conservatives failed to acquire a decisive numerical advantage in the National Assembly. Second, this was also a time when reforms to the legislature were adopted, which provided more opportunities for the opposition and lesser parties to influence decisions.37 Park Geun-hye did not shy away from using “classic” foul-play tactics to shape the political field to her liking. For instance, the second half of 2013 saw the opening of a case against the Unified Progressive Party (UPP). This was sparked by an anonymous tip-off to the National Intelligence Service that members of this organization had acted in violation of the National Security Act of 1949. This act was adopted in the times of Rhee Syngman and was used as a tool this dictatorship could use to suppress opposition. The Act provides that any expressions of support for left-wing ideology and any criticism of the anti-communist view of the government are prohibited as acts in support of the enemy—North Korea.38

35  J.M. Dostal, “South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal: Transformative Change or Business as Usual?” The Political Quarterly 88, no. 3 (2017): 481. 36  Seo Soomin, “South Korea’s Watergate Moment: How a Media Coalition Brought Down the Park Geun-hye Government,” Journalism Practice (February 21, 2020), https:// doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2020.1730221, pp. 5–6 (accessed June 1, 2020). 37  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Uk Heo, “The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye’s Leadership and South Korean Democracy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 5 (2018): 650. 38  I.A. Tolstokulakov, “The evolution of the Republic of Korea’s national security legislation, Vestnik FEFU 5 (2007): 76–77.

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Despite the efforts of the left-centrists, the act was not repealed after democratization, and prison sentences were occasionally handed out on its basis. In 2004, this was exactly what president Roh Moo-hyun attempted to do, but the conservative opposition in parliament—led by Park Geun-­ hye, no less—vetoed the proposal.39 As a result, at the end of 2013, the UPP, which held seats in parliament at the time, was dissolved by court order, the mandates of its members were revoked, and one of its members—Lee Seok-ki—was sentenced to prison for violating national security laws and creating anti-governmental organizations. The conspiracy charges were later dropped later. However, he still had to serve a 12-year sentence.40 The motives behind the persecution of a relatively unpopular political force are, at first glance, unclear. It is likely that the government decided to take these measures in order to divert the public’s attention from the court case of the former head of intelligence, Won Seok-hyun, who was charged with organizing a defamatory internet campaign against the opposition candidates during the 2012 election. Moreover, Park Geun-hye may have harboured a personal dislike for the party, particularly as during the live debates one of the UPP candidates (Lee Jong-hee) called the future president a dictator and a pro-Japan collaborator.41 One cannot help but remember the fact that another former opponent of Park Geun-hye—Han Myeong-sook, the face of the left-­ centrists at the 2012 parliamentary elections—was also imprisoned in 2015 on charges of corruption.42

6.3   Foreign Policy The main foreign-policy project of Lee Myung-bak—the idea of a “global Korea”—was primarily designed for South Korea itself. President Park Geun-hye, in her thinking on foreign policy, looked beyond the borders of the peninsula and set truly ambitious goals. She planned and hoped to 39  S. Haggard, and You Jong-Sung, “Freedom of Expression in South Korea,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 45, no. 1 (2015): 176. 40  K.V Asmolov, Korean Political Culture: Traditions and Transformation (Moscow: Izdatelstvo universiteta D. Pozharskogo, 2017), 229–231. 41  J.  Doucette, and Koo Se-Woong, “Pursuing Post-Democratisation: The Resilience of Politics by Public Security in Contemporary South Korea, Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 2 (2016): 199–200, 207. 42  K.  V Asmolov, Korean Political Culture: Traditions and Transformation (Moscow: Izdatelstvo universiteta D. Pozharskogo, 2017), 229–231.

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solve the fundamental issues of international relations in Northeast Asia and unite Eurasia with the help of a single economy and mutual political understanding. The well-known American scholar Scott Snyder made a good point when he said that it is never hard to identify the key issues, but putting forward effective means to solve them is.43 Even before the election, Park Geun-hye published a “policy” article in The Wall Street Journal on the concept of the “Asian paradox”:44 despite close economic co-operation, active mutual trade and investments, security co-operation among China, Japan and South Korea (even between Seoul and Tokyo, two US allies) remains at an extremely low level. A major obstacle in terms of consolidating the region remains the intense competition among these three major powers, alongside their differences and the incompatibility of their ambitions and interests.45 In order to overcome the differences in economic, military and political relations, as well as to “pull South Korea back” to the continent from which it is cut off by the North, Park Geun-hye proposed a number of vague and widely advertised strategies during her first year of presidency. The whole world was to bear witness: Park Geun-hye presented her ideas in speeches at different international events (to the US Congress in May 2013;46 at the International Conference “Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia” in Seoul in October 2013,47 and several others). The phrase “Eurasian Initiative” was used as an umbrella term for this push. The president proposed turning Eurasia into a unified, “creative,” and peaceful continent. The first and second elements were connected: they were primarily about restoring overland transportation links between Seoul and the continental powers, as well as about exporting the ideas and experiences of South Korea’s “creative economy.” “Peace-making” turned 43  S.  Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 170. 44  Park Geun-hye, “A Plan for Peace in North Asia,” The Wall Street Journal (November 12, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323894704578114310 294100492(accessed June 1, 2020). 45  I.V Dyachkov, “A Lesson in Regional Cooperation for Northeast Asia,” Mezhdunaridnye prozessy 15, no. 3 (2017): 92. 46  The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. The Road to Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, Overcoming the “Asian Paradox (Seoul: South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014): 2. 47   A.L.  Lukin and C.  A. Korotich, “The Eurasian Initiative after Park Geun-hye: Development, Current State and the prospects of South Korean Integration Projects,” Izvestiya Vostochnogo Instituta 4, no. 32 (2016): 102.

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into a separate project altogether that had completely overshadowed and replaced the general “Eurasian” undertaking by 2015. It was dubbed “the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative” (commonly referred to as NAPCI).48 The main way to achieve these goals was through a “policy of trust”: the rejection of conflict as a go-to solution and an approach to dealing with mutual grievances.49 The “trust procedure” was to become a special case of this approach and the “general recipe” for inter-Korean relations. It was described as something between the extremely soft Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung and the extreme pressure of Lee Myung-bak. Even though the president had already expressed these notions in 2011 in her Foreign Affairs article,50 in the first years of her administration no one amongst South Korean experts and officials could explain what exactly was being planned. North Korea, however, did not care much for the good intentions of a dictator’s daughter, conducting a nuclear test in February, just two weeks before Park Geun-hye’s inauguration, before announcing its exit from the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement in light of the US–South military training programme. Spring 2013 saw the situation escalate, with North Korea having once again conducted rocket launches. The work of a joint industrial complex in Kaesong was temporarily halted.51 The escalation of the situation between the two Koreas became one of the reasons for the shift from economic topics to security issues in Park Geun-hye’s integration initiatives. Amidst the ongoing and escalating North–South conflict, words on reuniting with the continent became rather meaningless. The administration in Seoul failed to explain how they would solve this pressing issue, neither could they explain their approaches 48   The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. The Road to Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, Overcoming the “Asian Paradox (Seoul: South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014): 4. 49  Heajin Kim, “Northeast Asia, Trust and the NAPCI,” The Diplomat (December 18, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/northeast-asia-trust-and-the-napci/ (accessed June 1, 2020). 50  Park Geun-hye. A New Kind of Korea. Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang. Electronic resource: Foreign Affairs. 2011, Sept–Oct. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/northeastasia/2011-09-01/new-kind-korea (accessed June 1, 2020). 51  I.V.  Dyachkov, “Korea: Changes against the Soothing ‘Routine,’” MGIMO website (September 8, 2014), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/245808/ (accessed June 1, 2020); I.V. Dyachkov, Non-Peaceful Nuclear Energy in Northeast Asia: The Korean Knot: A Treatise (Moscow: MGIMO University, 2016), 193–194.

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to larger goals. Park Geun-hye’s actions in inter-Korean and regional politics painted her not as a visionary messiah, but as a direct and a harsher proponent of Lee Myung-bak’s conservative policies. In the end, the “Eurasian” ideas were forgotten. Instead, Seoul focused its attention exclusively on the NAPCI, although the vague promises still did not produce concrete action. As a result, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to present propaganda-like presidential strategies as main steps towards realizing the stated goals.52 This failure was due to both subjective and objective reasons. First and foremost, the deterioration of South Korea’s relations with some of its neighbours (e.g. Japan). Second, the realization by Seoul’s other partners of the propagandistic nature of the initiative. Third, even though the goal of ridding the region of conflicts and transitioning to a fundamentally different communication format seemed noble enough, it is quite obvious that many of the players in the region saw the controlled conflict as a blessing. It is far easier to pursue one’s national interests and strengthen one’s military and political blocs without taking the interests of other actors into account in circumstances of zero compromise. Moreover, Park Geun-hye expected all the regional players (including those she had antagonized, such as North Korea, Japan and China) to not only accept her rules of the game but also share her criteria and turn to Seoul in determining what constitutes denuclearization, trust, apologies or security tightening. South Korean diplomacy during those years was impervious both to the objections of its opponents and to the recommendations of its partners, despite not having the authority to force anyone to implement its policies. Macro-projects were not implemented, and Seoul’s insistence was beginning to irritate its neighbours. The NAPCI did not arouse interest even in the South’s closest ally— the United States. Seoul’s “patron” did not in fact have any incentive to follow its “younger” ally’s plans. The Barack Obama administration believed that law-making in the region should be conducted according to American rules. Besides, both Washington and other capitals understood

52  The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. The Road to Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, Overcoming the “Asian Paradox (Seoul: South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014): 20.

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that it was not productive to support a project that was unlikely to survive the change of administration in Seoul.53 As a result, in spite of the region’s reformation rhetoric, South Korea ended up with its “traditional” conservative security trump card—an alliance with the United States—and nothing more. In an ideal world, strengthening the alliance with Washington and securing the North’s trust would not be mutually exclusive tasks. However, it soon became clear that Seoul only truly wanted to proceed with the former (and, in reality, this is all it could do). Park Geun-hye had no intention of being as headstrong as her father, who, in the second half of his term, aimed to reduce American interference in Seoul’s politics. From the very beginning—back during her inauguration speech—she proclaimed the need to protect the country from the North Korean nuclear threat. The existential nature of this threat specifically to South Korea became more and more prominent in the years that followed and soon became the justification for putting pressure on Pyongyang, as well as for other questionable decisions made by the South. Moreover, from what is known of the North Korean nuclear doctrine, Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal is designed to combat and threaten the United States, not South Korea. This much was even confirmed by representatives from Pyongyang. However, it was through the aim of deflecting the alleged attacks from the North that South Korea justified its additional military and political convergence with Washington. The first overseas visit of Park Geun-hye in May 2013, naturally, was made to the United States. It was timed to coincide with the 60-year anniversary of the signing the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. However, the political limits of the convergence had been reached long before that time, and the alliance had been sufficiently “reinforced” by Lee Myung-bak, which is why the joint declaration of 2013 was almost identical to its 2009 equivalent. By the time of Park Geun-hye’s next visit to the United States, in 2015, Seoul had started to play a more active role in American overseas military campaigns. The two countries became closer due to their shared position on the need to exert increased pressure on North Korea. Moreover, Park Geun-­ hye not only supported Obama’s “tactical patience”—which in reality 53  S.  Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 179.

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simply meant refusing to conduct diplomatic communications and imposing new sanctions—but was ready to “stay ahead of schedule.” During this period, Seoul virtually “stole” the agenda of US–North-Korea relations, and, as a result, the nuclear issue saw “the tail wagging the dog.” With that in mind, the rigidity of Seoul’s position only became worse as the administration succumbed to the political crisis. The scale of joint military exercises with the United States grew larger and larger, and the sides did little to hide their anti-North-Korea slant— on the contrary, they emphasized this point. A typical scenario during exercises was the taking of Pyongyang and the “beheading” of the North Korean administration which, naturally, caused an adverse reaction from the North Korean side. Interestingly, during the American 2016 presidential race, South Korea, not unlike other US allies, expressed enthusiastic support for Hillary Clinton.54 Donald Trump hinted during his pre-election campaign that he would cut spending on the US armed forces’ overseas projects. South Korean elites began to seriously fear that he might withdraw troops from the peninsula entirely. Individual politicians, including members of the governing party, began suggesting that South Korea arm itself with its own nuclear arsenal in order to compensate for the loss of American support.55 Moreover, South Korean conservatives were worried about Trump’s repeated claims that the administration was prepared for diplomatic dialogue with the North Korean leadership—deviation from the policy of pressure would have ruined their plans. As a result, South Korean elites became so convinced of Clinton’s impending victory that they were rendered speechless after the results of the election were announced. However, the newly elected American president was not in a hurry to patch up relations with the North and to cut military expenses. By mid-2017, the tensions in the region reached their peak due to mutual provocations from North Korea on one end and from the US and South Korea on the other. South Korea’s relations with China improved during the first years of Park Geun-hye’s presidency. One of the factors of this rapprochement was 54  Paula Hancock, “Japan and South Korea Hit Back at Trump’s Nuclear Comments,” CNN (March 31, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/politics/trump-­ viewfrom- south-korea-japan/index.html (accessed June 1, 2020). 55  See O.V. Kiryanov, “South Korea Nuclear Armaments in Response to the North Korean Threat: Resumed Discussion and Potential Repercussions,” in North and South Korea—70 Years (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2018): 137–150.

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the good personal relationship between the South Korean president and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.56 Seoul and Beijing also developed closer ties thanks to their shared dislike for Japan—both in terms of historical legacy and in terms of current political and economic interests. For the first time in history, the Chinese leader visited Seoul before Pyongyang after his inauguration (he only made it to Pyongyang in 2019). Park Geun-hye, in turn, visited Beijing before Tokyo and was also present in 2015 during the Chinese events commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory in World War II. In the West, this decision was taken as an expression of support for Chinese authoritarianism. The South Korean media placed a great emphasis on the close friendship between Park Geun-­ hye and Xi Jinping, noting with satisfaction that the North Korean presence at the festivities was not as notable (China–North Korea relations at the time were rather strained). One of the factors contributing to the improvement of South Korea– China relations was Beijing’s growing irritation with North Korea, much to Seoul’s satisfaction. However, this did not mean that Beijing had “reoriented” itself towards the other Korea. China remained the North’s primary benefactor and its key economic partner. The sanctions helped remove China’s competitors from North Korea, and Beijing was in no hurry to end its partnership with Pyongyang in the relevant areas. The improved political climate had some practical effects as well, with South Korea and China signing a Free Trade Agreement in late 2015. This was a natural consequence of the boom in economic co-operation. China had always been one of the largest recipients of investments from Seoul and had been its leading trade partner since 2003. The advancement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership project by the Obama administration, in which the United States played a key role, and the emergence of “competing” Chinese integration projects (the Belt and Road initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), forced South Korea to decide who to follow. Seoul aimed to reduce the conflict potential of this choice and strove to work with both Washington and Beijing if possible. For instance, China and South Korea reached an agreement on coordinating and combining two integration initiatives—the Chinese Belt 56  Hereinafter see: A.V Torkunov, I.V. Dyachkov, and A.A. Kireeva [et al.], Transformation of International Relations in Northeast Asia and Russia’s National Interests, eds. A.  V. Torkunov, and D.V.  Streltsov (Moscow.: Aspect Press, 2019), 273.—ISBN 978-57567-1025-0.

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and Road and Park Geun-hye’s Eurasian projects—no matter how utopian they may have seemed. South Korea also joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank instituted by Beijing. However, soon after the North Korean nuclear tests and rocket launches in 2016, Seoul allowed American THAAD elements to be deployed on its soil. Before that, South Korea had remained reluctant and not given its unequivocal consent. In light of the THAAD on the peninsula, Xi Jinping stopped responding to Park Geun-hye’s calls, having wished to reach a consensus on the situation of North Korea. What is more, the “bonding” anti-Japan incentive also vanished: Seoul managed to reach an agreement with Tokyo on “comfort women.”57 Beijing’s response to the decision of the South Korean authorities on THAAD was quite tough. According to Washington, the THAAD system is being deployed in East Asia for protection against the North Korean threat. However, the scale of the project implies the goal of keeping China and Russia in check. This decision, while questionable from the perspective of protection specifically from the “Northern threat” (the North’s regular artillery can “reach” Seoul and THAAD will not provide protection from that), became a key factor in the deterioration of China–South Korea relations.58 Beijing imposed harsh sanctions against the South Korean economy and businesses. The Lotte Corporation was effectively chased out of the country (the THAAD system was to have been deployed on land purchased from it), whilst other South Korean companies also began experiencing various issues. China also boycotted pop culture products from South Korea and stopped tourist groups from travelling to the country (as a result of which many tourist spots in South Korea quickly became empty). The overall damage to the South Korean economy totalled tens of millions of dollars. Moreover, the strategic dialogue on security issues between Beijing and Seoul came to a stop.59

57  S.  Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 183–184. 58  I.V. Dyachkov, “The Korean Peninsula: A Turbulent Year,” MGIMO (September 20, 2017), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/koreyskiy-poluostrov-god-turbulentnosti (accessed June 1, 2020). 59  T. Stangarone, “Did South Korea’s Three Noes Matter? Not So Much,” The Diplomat (October 30, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/did-south-koreas-threenoesmatter-­not-so-much (accessed June 1, 2020).

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In conclusion, we can say that economic processes became the basis for rapprochement between China and South Korea during Park Geun-hye’s term in office, with the military and political polarization in the region becoming the disincentive. Despite constant and active co-operation between Japan and South Korea, Park Geun-hye had no intention of establishing a dialogue with Tokyo, citing, among other things, concerns about Shinzo Abe’s right-­ wing views and his administration’s questionable stance on the wianbu (“comfort women”) issue.60 The United States was forced to intervene. The consolidation of the regional pro-American forces would have been advantageous for Washington. However, it was the “comfort women” issue that more than once caused a breakdown of military and political agreements between its closest allies in Northeast Asia. By 2014, American diplomats had managed to convince Park Geun-­ hye and Abe to meet at the Hague Nuclear Security Summit.61 The meeting notwithstanding, Japan continued to manoeuvre around the wianbu issue. The South Korean people were so infuriated with the Japanese leader’s inconsistent claims concerning gaps in the story about the compulsion system and wianbu in the context of military tragedies throughout the entire history of the world that Koreans began to perceive it as attempts to justify crimes.62 The “comfort women” issue remained at the forefront of bilateral consultations, and the parties only managed to reach a mutually acceptable decision by the end of 2015. Tokyo offered additional apologies and Seoul undertook to remove the controversial monument from the vicinity of a Japanese diplomatic mission. At the same time, South Korea established a foundation for payments of monetary compensation to former wianbu, with the Japanese government donating 1 billion yen (approximately $10 million) to the foundation. The Japanese side made official statements on

60  Hereinafter see: I.V. Dyachkov, “Historical Legacy and Politics: The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue in Contemporary Japan–South Korea Relations,” Yaponskye Issledovaniya, no. 4 (2019): 72–87. 61  Ankit Panda, “Shinzo Abe, Park Geun-hye to Meet at Nuclear Security Summit,” The Diplomat (March 22, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/shinzo-abepark-geun-­ hye-to-meet-at-nuclear-security-summit/ (accessed June 1, 2020). 62   P.  Hein, “Unresolved Comfort Women Issue: How Pragmatism Precludes Reconciliation,” The Korean Journal of International Studies 14, No. 3 (2016): 454–455.

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multiple occasions that it considers the issue settled with the consensus having been reached.63 Regardless, the reality turned out to be different. The accommodating nature of the document paradoxically caused its failure. The agreement was not approved by the opposition in both countries: leaders were accused of betraying national interests. Unsurprisingly, the implementation of the agreement also came to a halt. In the summer of 2016, replicas of the Seoul monument appeared in multiple cities around the globe (e.g. in Sydney and in suburbs of Los Angeles) through the efforts of Korean activists. In early 2017, Tokyo recalled its ambassador from Seoul after another monument appeared in front of the Japanese consulate in Busan. In September 2017, yet another monument, slightly more “international” in nature, was erected in San Francisco depicting a Korean woman, a Chinese woman and a Philippine woman on a pedestal, holding hands, with the author of the first wianbu memoirs—Kim Hak-sun—standing before them deep in thought. Soon, the mayor of Osaka announced its was breaking off twin-city relations with the American city in protest.64 One cannot fail but notice that the actions of Japanese social activists are taken “in sync” with the government’s stance, while lulls in activity coincide with the government’s manoeuvres around the issue (a similar dynamic can be observed in the work of several groups responsible for sending agitational messages from the South to the North via air balloons). Perhaps the South Korean authorities delegate questionable activities to non-governmental activists, which the government may shun if the need arises. For instance, Park Yu-ha, the author of a 2013 book on wianbu in which they were painted as more than just martyrs, was fined by court order and her work censored. In April 2017, a professor was fired from Suncheon National University for suggesting that “comfort women” may have served voluntarily.65

63  “Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2015, 28 Dec. URL: http://www. mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html (accessed July 25, 2020). 64  Casey Quackenbush, “Osaka Severs Ties With San Francisco Over ‘Comfort Women’ Memorial,” Time. (October 5, 2018), https://time.com/5416425/japan-osaka-san-­ francisco-comfort-women-statue (accessed July 25, 2020). 65  Joseph Yi, Joe Phillips, and Lee Wondong, “Manufacturing Contempt: State-Linked Populism in South Korea,” Society 56 (2019): 498.

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The left-centrists who opposed Park Geun-hye’s administration and who gained the coalition majority in parliament in 2016 were extremely critical of the joint Japan–South Korea document.66 Despite public and parliamentary disapproval, in November 2016, Seoul finally managed to conclude the long-delayed agreement with Tokyo on intelligence sharing, which had been in the works since the times of Lee Myung-bak. Afterwards, Park Geun-hye’s early removal from power due to a large-­ scale political scandal and her eventual incarceration were followed by severe damage to her reputation, which also had an effect on some of her popular initiatives. At the 2017 presidential election, all of the five candidates announced their intentions to review the 2015 “comfort women” agreement.67

6.4  The Road Downwards: Scandals, Public Protests April 2014 saw the sinking of the Sewol ferry en route from Incheon to Jeju Island. More than 300 people died, the majority of whom were high-­ school students. The tragedy shook the country and led to major criticisms of the authorities on every level, primarily of the president’s actions. The Korean people were outraged by the government’s response, most of all the belated reaction of Park Geun-hye: she is claimed to have become available only seven hours after the disaster (it was later stated that she was at a beauty salon). With that said, in a normally functioning system of government, a reaction to such emergencies should hardly warrant the head of state’s approval. The population held both the president and the officials appointed by her responsible both for the tragedy itself and for the mistakes made during the rescue operation. This is a questionable argument at best, since the reason for the high number of casualties was likely the negligence and the recklessness shown by the lower ranking officials. The actions of both the crew and the operating company were under suspicion. However, Park Geun-hye claimed responsibility, firing many 66  B.  Lee, “South Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement: Where Do We Go From Here?” The Diplomat (September 6, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/south-­ koreajapan-­comfort-women-agreementwhere-do-we-go-from-here (accessed July 25, 2020). 67  J. James. Kim, John J. Lee, “A Primer on the 19th South Korean Presidential Election in 2017,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief 13 (2017): 5–16.

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officials and reshuffling the government.68 This did not, however, stop the press from acquiring documents that indicated that the government’s primary concern at the time was not helping the families of the deceased or salvaging the debris, but rather suppressing riots and identifying discontented citizens in order to put them on “blacklists.” South Koreans are generally quite prone to emotional reactions. During the 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak, 186 cases were registered and 38 people died.69 This relatively small-scale epidemic caused panic across the country. The people criticized the slow reaction of the authorities and the unsuccessful attempts at suppressing the outbreak: according to many Koreans, a more coordinated approach would have helped reduce the number of victims. Notably, the MERS experience helped South Korea successfully contain the new COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and also helped Moon Jae-in earn political points precisely where Park Geun-hye had lost them. Although the highest executive authority could not have been directly responsible either for the ferry disaster or for the outbreak of a new disease, these two events greatly damaged the administration’s image. Public criticism was not limited simply to the government’s actions; it also concerned the president’s awkward reaction and her emotional unresponsiveness. In other words, the crises served as an even clearer demonstration of Park Geun-hye’s inability to communicate with her people. The people, in turn, searched for someone to blame for the tragedies, and the familiar concept of the “Mandate of Heavens” seemed to imply that a good ruler would not allow disasters to occur. After the Sewol disaster, Prime Minister Chung Hong-won was unceremoniously dismissed from office, although a new head of government was appointed much later due to parliamentary opposition and reputational scandals. In the end, President Park Geun-hye was forced to reject the official’s resignation. On May 28, Ahn Dae-hee refused the nomination for the position of prime minister. The former Supreme Court member was accused of using his status for personal gain in his own private attorney practice. On June 68  I. V. Dyachkov, “You can only lose face once,” MGIMO website https://mgimo.ru/ about/news/experts/257547 (accessed August 7, 2020). 69  “MERS Outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 2015,” World Health Organization (2015), https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/2015-mers-outbreak (accessed June 2, 2020).

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24, without awaiting parliamentary debates on the subject, Moon Chang-­ geuk also refused to be confirmed as prime minister, becoming the second candidate proposed by Park Geun-hye to do so. The reason for this recusal was the wave of criticism following his 2011 and 2012 speeches in front of a congregation at a Seoul church in which the former journalist explained that the Japanese occupation of 1905–1945 and Korea’s division was “god’s will.” In those same speeches, Moon Chang-geuk called Japanese dominance “geopolitically advantageous” and claimed that laziness and dependence are written into the Korean nation’s DNA.70 In early 2015, Lee Wan-koo took office as prime minister, albeit not for long, handing in his resignation in February due to corruption allegations. These allegations unfolded like a detective novel, with Lee Wan-koo’s name being mentioned as a bribetaker in the suicide note of prominent businessman Sung Wan-jong (the bribe was claimed to be around $30,000—a rather small sum compared to corruption scandals in other countries).71 The prime minister “shuffle” was, on the one hand, a means for the opposition to combat Park Geun-hye. South Korean politics often features a strategy of demonizing a previously untouchable leader through their inner circle. On the other hand, the constant scandals around the candidates for head of government were a result of the president’s unpopularity and her inability to consolidate the elites. 2016 saw new parliamentary elections. Contrary to forecasts predicting victory for Saenuri Party, the conservatives suffered a major loss. The party not only lost its parliamentary majority, but also ceased to be the party with the greatest representation in parliament, winning just 122 seats, compared the Democratic Party’s 123. Paradoxically, the Democrats were helped by an unfortunate event that occurred just before the election when the supporters of Ahn Cheol-soo, a recent addition to their ranks, split off to form their own faction. Having lost the race to Moon Jae-in, Ahn Cheol-soo was forced to form an independent power once again— the People Party. The new party received 38 seats, with the centrist

70  I.V.  Dyachkov, “You can only lose face once,” MGIMO website https://mgimo.ru/ about/news/experts/257547 (accessed August 7, 2020). 71  I.V. Dyachkov, “Political decay: how South Korea combats corruption,” MGIMO (April 23, 2015), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/270614 (accessed June 2, 2020).

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“populists” having taken votes away not from the democrats, but from the conservatives.72 Despite their differences, the Democratic and the People parties were united by a common enemy—the Saenuri Party. Although the by-election that soon followed improved the conservatives’ standing somewhat, the opposition coalition retained its majority. The parliament’s fundamental aversion towards the executive branch’s initiatives, regardless of their content, essentially served to paralyse the government’s work until the end of Park Geun-hye’s term. Saenuri’s loss at the 2016 parliamentary election can be explained by the fact that many people simply voted against Park Geun-hye. Moreover, the president still had a lot of disagreements with those in “her” camp.73 For example, before the election, she urged people to vote not for the conservatives as a whole, but for individual politicians—in other words, for those loyal to her. Conservative voters did not take kindly to this.74 Soon after the loss, Saenuri Party held a conference where those who were not loyal to the president were removed and the leading position was given to one of her close comrades, Lee Jong-hyun.75 A number of observers concluded that the people voted against the president’s foreign policy, more specifically against the imposition of unilateral sanctions against the North and consenting to have the US THAAD deployed on Korean soil. Regardless, the average South Korean voter is not too interested in the aforementioned topics. The election results were impacted mainly by the people’s dissatisfaction with the domestic economic situation (many of the problems can be considered structural, but the voters wished to find someone to “pronounce” guilty).76

72  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 168–169. 73  I.V.  Dyachkov, “South Korea Scandal: Good News Lies Buried, Bad News Flies,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/skandal-vyuzhnoy-koree (accessed August 7, 2020). 74  I.V. Dyachkov, “The Korean Peninsula: A Turbulent Year,” MGIMO (September 20, 2017), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/koreyskiy-poluostrov-god-turbulentnosti (accessed June 1, 2020). 75  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 173. 76  I.V. Dyachkov, “The Korean Peninsula: A Turbulent Year,” MGIMO (September 20, 2017), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/koreyskiy-poluostrov-god-turbulentnosti (accessed June 1, 2020).

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Despite the loss of parliamentary support, the president attempted to continue to govern in a rather tough manner, making no efforts to settle the differences between her and the opposition. Thus, unlike her predecessors, including even Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye did not meet with the opposition leader in the National Assembly. She proceeded to clash with members of parliament on appointments it had approved and even declined its decision to remove one of the candidates she had proposed her by exercising her right of presidential veto—the first time this had been done since 1987.77

6.5  Image Scandal and Impeachment Starting in late July 2016, a major political scandal started to flare up around the president. Journalists came into possession of scandalous evidence in the files stored on a tablet computer found by accident “in a dumpster.” This information suggested that Choi Soon-sil—a long-time close friend of Park Geun-hye, who had not held any office in the government—had direct influence on the president’s actions and statements, as well as the on the country’s foreign and domestic policies. Moreover, suspicions arose that Choi Soon-sil extorted “donations” from the country’s major corporations through the presidential administration, placing money into controlled funds, and also enrolled her daughter into a prestigious university by taking advantage of her influence.78 South Korean civil society is very emotional and it takes the public image of its politicians very seriously, considering them to be practically “irreproachable.”79 The South Korean people were outraged that an outsider could interfere so directly in high-level politics. Journalists claim that the president’s friend not only edited Park Geun-hye’s speeches and had access to classified documents, but also pushed her to make such controversial decisions as allowing the American THAAD to be deployed on 77  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Uk Heo, “The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye’s Leadership and South Korean Democracy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 5 (2018): 652–653. 78  I.V.  Dyachkov, “South Korea Scandal: Good News Lies Buried, Bad News Flies,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/skandal-vyuzhnoy-koree (accessed August 7, 2020). 79  Hereinafter see: I. V. Dyachkov, “The Korean Peninsula: A Turbulent Year,” MGIMO (September 20, 2017), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/koreyskiy-poluostrov-­ god-turbulentnosti (accessed June 1, 2020).

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Korean territory, or taking a tougher stance on Pyongyang, because “the stars” said that the regime “was about to fall.” The latter, in particular, turned into the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex that had been in operation for many years. In the end, a lot of things backfired on the president. Another reason for allegations was the fact that Choi Soon-sil’s late father, the head of an alternative religious organization, had a strong personal influence on Park Geun-hye, claiming that he was in contact with the spirit of her late mother (as an American diplomat wrote of those times, he controlled her and the “saint” Choi Tae-min himself claimed that they were “a spiritual family”).80 This, however, is not too outlandish for East Asia, and for Korea specifically—even North Korea’s Chondoist Chongu Party, which represents a non-traditional syncretic religion, has seats in parliament. Rumours soon surfaced that fortune-telling and shamanic rituals had become a regular part of political planning for the president’s administration. For the outraged layman, allegations of political corruption shifted to the background in light of the emergence of a plethora of scandalous details.81 At first, the authorities denied the allegations, stating the president was allowed to have friends and that she was free to ask for their advice. But public pressure continued to escalate. Denials and evasive answers only angered the public. Park Geun-hye’s awkward efforts to explain herself damaged her approval rating even more. The country’s public prosecution office authorized investigations into Choi Soon-sil, and mass demonstrations would soon be held in Seoul and other cities. The protests lasted for a total of 20  weeks, occurring each Saturday, with hundreds of thousands of people taking part. A record number of protestors—reportedly one million people—took to the streets of Seoul on November 12.82 The protestors carried candles, just as they had done during the 2008 protests. The internet became a platform for expressing outrage and a means of coordinating actions.

80  [Interview] “Park Geun-hye believed in Choi Tae-min after he predicted her father’s death,” Hankyoreh (November 6, 2016), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_ national/768958.html (accessed July 14, 2020). 81  I.V. Dyachkov, “The Korean Peninsula: A Turbulent Year,” MGIMO (September 20, 2017), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/koreyskiy-poluostrov-god-turbulentnosti (accessed June 1, 2020). 82  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 153–154, 171.

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Park Geun-hye made two public apologies and, once again, made a “ritual sacrifice” in the form of dismissing her prime minister, proposing a candidate closer to the opposition.83 This, however, only served to anger her political opponents, who held a majority in parliamentary. The president’s apologies fell on deaf ears, as the protesters continued to call for her resignation, and discussions of impeachment emerged in political circles. Public opinion generally plays a big role in South Korean politics. At the same time, it is prone to change and distrustful of those in power. A leader at any level, especially the highest level, is expected to be “ritually clean” and to be practically “irreproachable.” At the same time, it is almost impossible to save one’s reputation once it has been damaged: the Confucian political view suggests that a leader must claim responsibility even for things they are not directly responsible for. At the same time, South Korean “shame culture” knows no compromise and the public is sometimes prepared to cling to a cause that would ordinarily elicit a smile in other countries. Thus, soon after Park Geun-hye’s election, bloggers seriously debated whether it was acceptable for a future president to appear in public holding a purse worth almost a thousand dollars. In a way, Park Geun-hye’s honesty became the cause of her downfall: South Korean presidents are usually accused of corruption, and sooner or later a connection to certain dubious transactions, either by them personally or their family, is found. However, Park Geun-hye, some of whose decisions could definitely be considered unfortunate, was likely a true woman of principle and above corruption. This is why the roots of the scandal were somewhat far-fetched, especially for South Korea, where clan systems, lobbyism and behind-closed-doors conversations are considered more or less “regular” parts of the political process. Even the fabled shamanic rituals remain an important element of their culture. At first, it seemed that Park Geun-hye was unlikely to resign. Even in 2004, as parliament impeached the former president Roh Moo-hyun (on charges of corruption and unacceptable public statements in support of one of the parties), the Constitutional Court repealed the decision. However, by late 2016, discontent among the population was only growing in light of the ever-developing scandal. Park Geun-hye, having long lost her appeal, came to be perceived as a villain-like figure and all her 83  Hereinafter see: I. V. Dyachkov, “South Korea Scandal: Good News Lies Buried, Bad News Flies,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/skandal-­ vyuzhnoy-­koree (accessed August 7, 2020).

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political allies scurried to distance themselves from her. Even before the scandal itself, the two main political powers had expressed their dissatisfaction with her. The disappointment in the president brought people with completely opposing political views together: one of the reasons for the scandal was the findings of a joint investigation conducted by journalists from the liberal paper The Hankyoreh and the conservative media corporation JTBC.84 The Saenuri Party had the most seats in parliament (129) and could have blocked the impeachment, but more than half of the faction members voted in favour. A number of conservatives with anti-Park Geun-hye views separated and formed their own party, the Bareun Party, only to return two years later. Saenuri Party was forced to rebrand itself and transformed into the Liberty Korea party. During the voting on December 9, 2016, a total of 234 of the 300 members of the National Assembly voted in favour of impeachment and suspended her powers. On March 10, 2017, in a unanimous ruling, the Constitutional Court of Korea confirmed this decision and relieved the president of her powers. Park Geun-hye only needed the support of three of the nine presiding judges for the impeachment to be thrown out, and she was clearly counting on the fact that the majority of the judges held conservative views—but this proved to be of little consequence. The president was soon relieved of her immunity and after a court hearing she was incarcerated.85 She was eventually sentenced to 15 years in prison. In order to maintain the efficiency of the state machine, which had regularly ground to a halt due to the president’s unpopularity, some experts proposed to reform the system of government, more specifically by expanding the prime minister’s powers. However, the political structure of South Korea is generally quite rigid—the government and the public are both equally fearful of destabilizing changes. Besides, such an option would have kept an old issue afloat: the public would have started to actively search for faults in another figure and would likely have found them if they looked hard enough.86 84  Seo Soomin, “South Korea’s Watergate Moment: How a Media Coalition Brought Down the Park Geun-hye Government,” Journalism Practice (February 21, 2020), https:// doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2020.1730221, pp. 5–6 (accessed June 1, 2020). 85  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 154–155, 174. 86  I.V.  Dyachkov, “South Korea Scandal: Good News Lies Buried, Bad News Flies,” MGIMO website, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/skandal-vyuzhnoy-koree (accessed August 7, 2020).

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It was later, in 2018, that—due to another scandal—details surfaced that the future president Moon Jae-in’s inner circle was manipulating public opinion in 2017, including through the use of social media bots, to further discredit conservatives and bolster the left-centrist candidate’s positions, as the latter became the main beneficiary of the “candlelight protests.”87 This involuntarily brings to mind the “beef” protests of 2008, which, according to the Lee Myung-bak administration, were also instigated by left-centrists. Regardless of who “staged” the protests, in terms of social standing, most of the protestors were indeed more left-centre-leaning, both historically and ideologically. The current South Korean democratic movement came out of the student protests of the 1980s. And the 2016 protestors were the same people who had taken to the streets back then, albeit now with children of their own.88 Park Geun-hye’s political career, with its ups and its downs, illustrated the leader–public relations of post-democratization South Korea. The question remains whether the elites managed to learn something from it.

87  K. V. Asmolov, “Where will the Druid King blogger scandal lead the Republic of Korea?” Russian International Affairs Council (February 27, 2019), https://russiancouncil.ru/ analytics-­a nd-comments/analytics/k-chemu-privedet-respubliku-koreya-skandal-sblogerom-druid-king (accessed June 1, 2020). 88  Seo Soomin, “South Korea’s Watergate Moment: How a Media Coalition Brought Down the Park Geun-hye Government,” Journalism Practice (February 21, 2020), https:// doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2020.1730221, pp. 7–10 (accessed June 1, 2020).

CHAPTER 7

The Comeback of the Liberals in South Korea

7.1   The Election Campaign and Its Implementation Early elections were held in South Korea following Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and dismissal in May 2017. The country faced a number of systemic challenges: a rapidly ageing population and the economic effects stemming from it; transforming corrupt practices into a culture of communication between business and government; high unemployment rates, especially among the youth; a combination of a highly competitive nature of education and climbing the career ladder and the colossal expenditures necessary for taking part in this never-ending race.1 According to the majority of South Koreans, not only did the ten-year conservative rule fail to solve these pressing issues, but it even aggravated them. After the scandal around Park Geun-hye, the public was more prepared to choose an alternative than ever before. In the end, the left-centrist candidate Moon Jae-in became the favourite at the election. He and his party managed to take advantage of the protests against Park Geun-hye, who had lost all trust by that point (and

1  “South Korea’s Presidential Transition and Strategic Challenges,” Strategic Comments 23, no. 5: 6.

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perhaps even orchestrated the scandal itself2). Moon Jae-in was born in 1953 to a family of refugees who has escaped the North to save themselves from the terrors of the Korean War. During his student years, which took place in the times of Park Chung-hee, he took part in protests, for which he was imprisoned and expelled from university, where he returned after serving in the military. Having graduated from university, he passed the qualifying examination but was not allowed to become a judge due to his “criminal” past, much to his disappointment. Soon after, he became close with Roh Moo-hyun, a “people’s” lawyer and the future president, and began a similar career as an attorney and civil rights activist. By the time the 2017 election rolled around, Moon Jae-in was hardly a novice in politics. During Roh Moo-hyun’s term, he served as head of the administration, and afterwards took part in parliamentary debates.3 Moon Jae-in had already attempted to run for president in 2012, losing out to Park Geun-hye. Moon Jae-in could have faced fierce competition from Ban Ki-moon, who had just returned to the country after finishing his term as UN Secretary-General. However, the latter quickly announced that he had no desire to become president.4 In the end, the democratic candidate received 41% of the votes, leaving his conservative opponent, Hong Joon-pyo, far behind with 24%.5 Ahn Cheol-soo took third place with 21%, despite a poll conducted in April indicating that he would finish second behind Moon Jae-in, albeit with a similar gap in votes to Hong Joon-pyo.6 During his campaign rallies, Moon Jae-in pointed out three main elements of his policy: first, a new approach to North–South relations; second, the fight against corruption, “a leftover evil” from the times of Park Geun-hye; and third, economic growth. 2  K.V. Asmolov, “Where will the Druid King blogger scandal lead the Republic of Korea?” Russian International Affairs Council (February 27, 2019), https://russiancouncil.ru/ analytics-­a nd-comments/analytics/k-chemu-privedet-respubliku-koreya-skandals-blogerom-druid-king (accessed June 1, 2020). 3  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Seo Uk, “President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2020): 4. 4  I.V.  Dyachkov, “The Korean Peninsula: A Turbulent Year,” MGIMO (September 20, 2017), https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/koreyskiy-poluostrov-god-turbulentnosti (accessed June 1, 2020). 5  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 174. 6  J. James. Kim, John J. Lee, “A Primer on the 19th South Korean Presidential Election in 2017,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief 13 (2017): 3.

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Unlike his predecessors, for whom the “Northern” issue was not the top priority, Moon Jae-in put this issue at the forefront of his political course. This was dubbed the “New Northern Policy,” and suggested a peaceful coexistence with the North. In this sense, it contained traces of both Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo-hyun’s “peace and prosperity” policy (the latter is often quoted in ideological pieces in order to demonstrate succession7). On the one hand, the desire to make peace with Pyongyang and to serve as an intermediary for the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue (KPNI) can be considered as nothing short of noble. On the other hand, Moon Jae-in put his political fate in the hands of an impulsive neighbour and a similarly impulsive patron. Jumping ahead, one may say that this turned out to be a mistake in terms of domestic policy. By 2020, Washington and Pyongyang had collectively sabotaged Seoul’s efforts on the “nuclear front,” returning to the 2015 status quo. Notably, both sides of the conflict criticized the intermediary who had done so much for de-escalation in the region. In terms of inter-Korean relations, South Korea chose not to cross the line towards actual practical co-operation due to pressure from the United States and the lack of political will. Without it, North Korea was not interested in continuing the political show to raise the approval rating of the South Korean president and in 2020 found a reason to demonstratively take personal offence at Moon Jae-in. The general optimism about the success of the New Northern Policy was quickly followed by disappointment. Conservatives criticized Moon Jae-in for his unwillingness to change his soft approach to the North after it had allegedly proved to be ineffective. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the government to divert the public’s attention towards foreign and inter-Korean successes and away from faults in domestic policy. All of the previous presidential administrations fought corruption (though they all turned out to be corrupt to one degree or another themselves), with varying degrees of success. In Moon Jae-in’s political establishment, bribery, nepotism and similar vices were proclaimed to be a “rooted evil” for which Park Geun-hye and the conservatives were to 7  See: 한반도정책 // 통일부 (“Politics on the Korean Peninsula”), Ministerstvo Obyedineniya, URL:https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/policy/koreapolicy/policyinfo/goal (accessed July 1, 2020).

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blame. In reality, however, the fight against these vices often took the form of personal vendettas and pursuits of personal political interests via alternative means. Thus, soon after Moon Jae-in’s ascent to power, proceedings against Lee Myung-bak were initiated. The former president was sentenced to a multi-million-dollar fine and 15 years of prison. Many saw this as exacting revenge on the former president for Roh Moo-hyun’s fate, while others saw it as a “ritual sacrifice”: perhaps the persecution of a leader disliked by Pyongyang could help improve relations with the North. All of the 2017 election candidates claimed to be prepared to reform the political system,8 and many believed that a constitutional reform was in the works, with a potential transition from the “sixth” to the “seventh” republic.9 However, this did not come to pass. In the spring of 2018, Moon Jae-in proposed a constitutional amendment bill under which the president could be elected for two terms with their powers somewhat limited, these being passed on to the prime minister and parliament.10 Parliament did not, however, pass the bill, which Moon Jae-in took as going against the will of the people.11 Park Geun-hye’s removal and political shifts were not enough to solve the key problems facing the country, primarily its economic woes. Moon Jae-in’s response to the economic challenges was to adopt a socially oriented and statist course which his opponents hurriedly dubbed as an experiment of an almost socialist nature. The primary economic concept for the new president was the idea of “growth based on income.” The rationale behind the concept was that increased salaries and the expansion of the public sector would stimulate domestic demand, which would, in turn, create new jobs, with the process as a whole set to restore the economy and secure its growth.12 Moreover, the proposed policy was in response to the demands of Moon Jae-in’s 8  J. M. Dostal, “South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal: Transformative Change or Business as Usual?” The Political Quarterly 88, no. 3 (2017): 488–489. 9  Kim Yong Woong, “Governance Trends in North and South Korea,” in North and South Korea—70 Years (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2018): 63. 10  O. Kiryanov, “South Korean President to be Allowed to Serve Two Terms,” Rossiyskaya gazeta (March 22, 2018), https://rg.ru/2018/03/22/prezidentu-iuzhnojkorei-razreshat-­ izbiratsia-na-vtoroj-srok.html (accessed July 1, 2020). 11  “Moon Expresses Regret over Failed Attempt to Amend Constitution,” Yonhap News (April 24, 2018), https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180424004952315 (accessed July 1, 2020). 12  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Seo Uk, “President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2020): 2.

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electorate, the “candle protesters” of 2016, many of whom were unemployed youth. A lot of people were disappointed with the growing wealth gap between the rich and the poor and believed that forced economic growth only benefited the upper crust of society, which is why the government needed to transition to a socially-oriented policy.13 The proposal offered 810,000 new government jobs (mainly by expanding the police, fire safety departments, etc.), a gradual increase of the minimum wage to 10,000 won/hour by 2020, a reduced working week 52  hours (this was also meant to help create jobs since Koreans worked a lot longer in reality), the transfer of employees to permanent contracts, the introduction of international labour standards, higher pensions, and expanded healthcare and childcare.14 Some of Moon Jae-in’s promises were rehashes of Park Geun-hye’s policies (which obviously remained unfulfilled): Moon Jae urged to take chaebol’s privileges away and to reduce tuition fees. In order to “tame” large businesses, he proposed a controversial measure—a tax increase, particularly for high-­earners and corporations.15 The new president was quick to start making good on his promises. The minimum wage had been raised from 6470 to 7530 won/hour by 2017,16 and to 8350 won/hour by 2018.17 Starting from July 2018, the 68-hour working week was reduced to 52 hours (40 hours standard and up to 12 hours overtime). Corporate taxes were increased (from 22% to 25%) along with personal income tax for persons with incomes higher than 500 million won per year (from 40% to 42%). These measures were met with protests from businesses unsatisfied with increased tax and “social” burden. The effects of the government’s actions were mixed. The authorities created jobs in the government sector, while construction and the 13  Inhye Heo, “The Revival of ‘Big Government’ Discourse in South Korea, 2017,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 54, no. 6 (2019): 920–921. 14  Kwon Soon-Mee, and Hong Ijin, “Is South Korea as Leftist as It Gets? Labour Market Policy Reforms under the Moon Presidency,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 85. 15  J. James. Kim, John J. Lee, “A Primer on the 19th South Korean Presidential Election in 2017,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief 13 (2017): 7–8. 16  Kwon Soon-Mee, and Hong Ijin, “Is South Korea as Leftist as It Gets? Labour Market Policy Reforms under the Moon Presidency,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 85. 17  S.S.  Suslina, “The South Korean Economy: Foreign and Domestic Challenges and Innovation Prospects,” in The Korean Peninsula in the Search for Peace and Prosperity, two volumes, vol. 1 (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2019): 191–201.

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industrial sector lost a total of 130,000 workers due to the wage increase requirement.18 Small and medium-sized businesses were the first to cut job numbers due to a lack of resources. Unemployment subsequently rates hit a 20-year high (more than 1.15 million people were without work). The attempt to decrease temporary employment rates had unforeseen consequences, with many people not being transferred to permanent employment contracts, being and made redundant instead. The temporary labour market went into the shadows and businesses began turning to illegal immigrants for services.19 In the end, Moon Jae-in’s strategy hurt those it was meant to protect. In addition to (mainly small and medium-sized) businesses, the reforms also caused discontent among the population. According to critics, the new policy led to discrimination: temporary employees received the same benefits as permanent employees, despite undergoing a less rigorous selection process.20 Increased tax and social burdens on the economy failed to solve complex issues facing South Korea, but actually made the situation worse. The issues included a rapidly ageing population, consumer debt, adverse external economic conditions, fluctuating energy prices, and the effects of the Chinese-American trade war on South Korean exports. Exports were particularly affected by Washington’s transition to protectionist policies.21 South Korea’s key sector—the automotive industry—took a serious blow. The country is still behind Japan on the global market, while China is quickly catching up. Not only did Moon Jae-in’s economic experiments fail to solve structural issues facing the South Korean economy, but they also failed to secure growth. Growth rates gradually went down from 3.2% in 2017 to 2.7% in 2018,22 and just 2% in 2019 (the first quarter even saw negative 18  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Seo Uk, “President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2020): 2. 19  A.F. Sinyakova, “The Economic State of South Korea in 2019,” in The Korean Peninsula in the Search for Peace and Prosperity, two volumes, vol. 1 (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2019): 209–210. 20  Kwon Soon-Mee, and Hong Ijin, “Is South Korea as Leftist as It Gets? Labour Market Policy Reforms under the Moon Presidency,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 86–87. 21  A.F. Sinyakova, “The Economic State of South Korea in 2019,” in The Korean Peninsula in the Search for Peace and Prosperity, two volumes, vol. 1 (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2019): 206 22  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Seo Uk, “President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2020): 2.

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growth rates of −0.4%). The indicators for 2020 were even more tragic on the back of the global COVID-19 pandemic. The lack of success in the economy and in foreign policy paradoxically failed to cause any damage to the president’s approval rating. In the first half of his term, he enjoyed the support of 40%–50% of the population. The numbers were similar at the end of 2019, before the authorities successfully contained the COVID-19 pandemic and after the slow-down of the New Northern Policy. These are exceptionally high numbers for South Korea. Park Geun-hye’s pre-scandal approval rating was 30%, which was considered quite high. Lee Myung-bak’s rating was 22%, and Roh Moo-­ hyun’s fluctuated at around 25%. Moreover, Moon Jae-in became the only leader of the democratic era to have an approval rating higher than their disapproval rating in the third year of their term.23 At the 2018 local elections, the left-centrists received more than 90% of seats in  local authorities, while also retaining the majority of governor seats and 11 out of 12 re-elected seats in the National Assembly.24 In the end, the number of seats held by the ruling Democratic Party increased from 119 to 130,25 which was still not enough to secure a majority, meaning the opposition could still block the government’s initiatives through collective efforts. The Democrats were aided by Moon Jae-in’s approval rating being at an all-time high after inter-Korean talks, as well as by the conservatives still being divided after the Park Geun-hye scandal.26 In early 2020, the novel COVID-19 infection began spreading around the world. At the early stages (in March 2020), South Korea was a centre of the global pandemic due to its proximity to China, where the virus was discovered, and because people actively travelled between the two countries. The city of Daegu became the epicentre of the infection due to the virus having spread among Shincheonji Church of Jesus followers there. However, the South Korean authorities managed to suppress the epidemic by April and reach extremely low infection rates. This can be attributed to  Ibid.  Kim Yong Woong, “Governance Trends in North and South Korea,” in North and South Korea—70 Years (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2018): 63 25  길 잃은 보수… 여당 사상최대 압승 // 동아일보 (“The Conservatives Have Lost Their Way … For the First Time in History the Ruling Party Secures an Impressive Victory.”) Ton’ya ilbo. (June 14, 2018) https://www.donga.com/ISSUE/Vote2018/News?m=view& gid=90569698&date=20180614 (accessed July 1, 2020). 26  Kwangho Jung, and Youngju Kang, “A Report of the 2018 Regional Election in South Korea,” Regional & Federal Studies 30, no. 3 (2020): 497–498. 23 24

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the high degree of discipline among citizens and the competent manner with which the authorities handled the problem. Mass testing was organized at special road checkpoints, with the movements of those infected being traced through cellular data. The government covered all the associated medical and established a centralized mask distribution system. Although it has been noted that the spread of the infection was prevented without resorting to “anti-democratic” measures such as complete city blockades, South Korean surveillance of the infected can hardly be called democratic.27 The successful containment of COVID-19 can definitely be attributed to Seoul having prior experience in dealing with similar outbreaks, specifically atypical pneumonia in 2013 and MERS in 2015. Moon Jae-in’s administration managed to act effectively thanks to the negative experiences accumulated by the Park Geun-hye administration. After criticism of the government’s response to the 2015 epidemic, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was given more power, and it made good use of it in 2020. Notably, despite South Korea having restricted travel to many countries, China did not make the list. The president was harshly criticized for such an obvious pro-Beijing stance, but in the end, the successful containment of the epidemic did wonders for the president’s approval rating. Seoul instantly began looking into ways to capitalize on external markets. Official commentaries and news outlets began expressing ideas of exporting South Korean sanitary know-how, and the situation itself became an additional cause for supplementing the overall “soft power” apparatus with medical achievements. The government’s success in suppressing the epidemic had a direct impact on the ruling party’s political standing. The left-centrists won the spring 2020 parliamentary elections handily, receiving 180 seats in parliament, compared to just 103 for the conservatives. The National Assembly had not been so dominated by a single political power since the 1980s.28

27  A.V. Vorontsov, “How South Korea Managed to Suppress the Coronavirus,” Russian International Affairs Council (April 10, 2020) https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-­ comments/analytics/kak-yuzhnayakoreya-obuzdala-koronavirus (accessed July 1, 2020). 28  O. Kiryanov, “South Korea’s Ruling Party Achieves Confident Victory at Parliamentary Election,” Rossiyskaya gazeta (April 16, 2020), https://rg.ru/2020/04/16/naparla mentskih-­vyborah-v-iuzhnoj-koree-uverenno-pobedila-praviashchaiapartiia.html (accessed July 1, 2020).

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Even though the population is not blind to the faults and mistakes of the new administration, the conservatives are unable to formulate a consolidated and appealing alternative. Firstly, a well-thought-out image policy and other foreign and domestic strides allow Moon Jae-in to maintain high approval ratings. Secondly, the right wing is still trying to pull itself back together after the scandals 2016–2017. The people still do not trust the conservatives, although a relatively outspoken support group for Park Geun-hye still exists. Politically speaking, her former followers and the conservatives who voted in favour of impeachment still find it hard to find common ground. The electorate is divided in an unprecedented manner. The election results have created fertile ground for future presidency—the current parliament will remain in power until 2024. At the election, the Democratic Party was aided on the one hand by lucky circumstances and on the other by changes in vote distribution mechanisms under the proportional representation system. The majority of the 300 seats in the South Korean parliament are distributed on a single-­seat basis, with the remaining 47 being selected via party tickets. Election reform was conducted in 2019 that modified the distribution principle of 30 of these seats. Beforehand, all of the 47 seats were distributed by means of parallel voting, whilst now separate tickets were introduced for 30 of those seats. This was originally done to ensure that minor parties are better represented in parliament. It was the minor parties that put the initiative forward,29 although conservatives speculated that the ruling party was in fact behind the reforms in its quest to establish its dominance.30 Moreover, the reform lowered the voting age from 19 to 18, which gave almost a million people the right to vote, with the youth tending to support left-centrists. Democrats had been calling for the reform as far back as the 2018 local election cycle (e.g. Moon Jae-in’s constitutional amendments contained the provision on lowering the voting age), but conservative forces advocated against it, 29  Yonhap, “Minor Parties Reach Deal Over Details of Electoral Reform Bill,” The Korea Herald (December 18, 2019), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20191218 000689 (accessed July 1, 2020). 30  이낙연 «黃, 코로나 대책 갈팡질팡»vs 황교안 «李, 비례당 왜 말 바꿨나»//조선일보 Lee Na-gyon: “Hwan Gyo-ahn’s Stance on COVID-19 Measures Remains Unclear” vs. Hwan Gyo-ahn: “Why has Lee Na-gyon Changed his Stance on Proportional Representation?” Choson ilbo (April 6, 2020), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2020/04/ 06/2020040603361.html (accessed July 1, 2020).

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justifying the sentiment by saying that the changes would damage their standing, especially in the regions (although this did not save them in the end).31 In the end both camps—first the conservatives and then left-centrists— created provisional satellite-parties (kor. 비례당, peerehdan, “proportional parties”) specifically for ticket voting. The Democratic Party received support from the Democratic Civil Party, while the United Future Party (as the former Liberty Korea was renamed) was “accompanied” by the Future Korea Party. Both provisional entities merged into their parent organizations soon after the election. As a result, 2020 saw fewer minor forces in the parliament than earlier, despite party lists reaching record lengths. Two deserters from the North ran for the National Assembly in the election—Ji Seong-ho and Thae Yong-ho (who changed his name to Tae Ku-min). The latter used to be an advisor-delegate for the North Korean embassy in London. After his flight to the South, he regularly criticized Pyongyang and even published memoirs about the North’s foreign policy “kitchen.” Thae Yong-ho managed to win over the upmarket Gangnam district of Seoul. Both “northern” members of parliament ran on behalf of the conservative party, which is known for its harsh approach to inter-­ Korean relations. Party leaders, and future presidents for that matter, usually ran for office from the central Seoul district of Jongno. Lee Nak-yon (Moon Jae-­ in’s prime minister who resigned in January 2020  in order to rally the Democratic Party for the election) and Hwan Gyo-ahn (Park Geun-hye’s last prime minister, acting president after her impeachment) played that role in 2020. Hwan Gyo-ahn resigned after the conservative’s defeat in the election—a typical reaction for Korean politicians that does not necessarily imply an end to their careers.

7.2  Moon Jae-in’s Work Style An important factor that allowed the new president to maintain a high approval rating was the way he communicated with the people. Unlike Park Geun-hye, Moon Jae-in regularly gives interviews and holds unscripted press conferences during which he freely answers the public’s questions. Moreover, the president regularly meets with the citizens under 31  Shin Soon-ok, “The Rise and Fall of Park Geun-hye: The Perils of South Korea’s Weak Party System,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (2020): 176–177.

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informal circumstances. Although sometimes even such “people visits” seem scripted, they are still infinitely better in terms of PR than the rare and awkward attempts of his predecessor at interacting with voters. Although on paper Moon Jae-in wished to increase the government’s transparency, in reality he turned out to be just as secretive as the conservative leaders that came before him, and he was also unwilling to listen to alternative opinions. For instance, the president ignored the objections of experts and the business community concerning economic policy, and as the faults of the new approach became evident, he evaded the discussion or manipulated statistics in order to conceal these faults. The new president’s forcefulness corresponds to his general outlook on increasing the government’s presence in politics and the economy (the “big government” concept, as opposed to Lee Myung-bak’s “small government”) that he declared in 2017. Interestingly, the usual bearers and advocates of statist ideologies in South Korea are conservatives rather than left-centrists.32 The opposition in parliament regularly criticizes Moon Jae-in for his “political shows.” Moreover, he too, just like his predecessor, does not take an active stance in debates with the parliamentary opposition. After the new president’s ascent to power, his party did not have a parliamentary majority (only 120 seats33), which is why Moon Jae-in preferred to work for the populace, securing support for his initiatives in circumvention of the National Assembly. The new leader rarely tried to work with the opposition, and in the few instances that he did, he did so in the form of mutual concessions: for example, he switched the labour minister for a candidate more acceptable to his opponents so that parliament would fund the creation of new jobs. Moon Jae-in has not yet met with opposition leaders, and even accused the opposition of “establishing a majority tyranny” when the National Assembly began stalling the 2019 budget bill.34 Trade unions became the sociopolitical foundation for Moon Jae-in in his “socialist” experiments. Strangely enough, beforehand, the government rarely relied on this quite active and numerous force. For Lee conservative administrations of Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, trade unions 32  Inhye Heo, “The Revival of ‘Big Government’ Discourse in South Korea, 2017,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 54, no. 6 (2019): 914. 33  “South Korea’s Presidential Transition and Strategic Challenges,” Strategic Comments 23, no. 5: 6. 34  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Seo Uk, “President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2020): 4–6.

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were the “natural” opponents, with left-centrists avoiding getting too close to these groups, perhaps in fear of allegations of radicalism.35 Moon Jae-in, for the first time in history, initiated direct contact with two main trade union coalitions—the technically “pro-government” Federation of Korean Trade Unions and the left-leaning Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. Moon Jae-in has taken advantage of this fact in order to boost his image, claiming that this was the first time that the new administration has listened to the workers directly. The government needs a link to public pressure to carry out its reforms. The new administration remains rather quiet on social demonstrations and protests. The government is not in a hurry to suppress them, sometimes using and directing the protesters’ energy for its own means (which is nothing new for South Korea).36 According to the conservatives, trade unions wreak havoc under the government’s directives or under its connivance, while Moon Jae-in punishes undesirable officials through the hands of workers. Contrary to Moon Jae-in’s promises to right the wrongs of South Korean system of government, personal loyalty remains his main criterion in selecting candidates for key offices, which was the case for almost every president before him. Similar to Park Geun-hye, the new leader provides his close friends with potentially lucrative appointments in state-owned corporations and funds irrespective of professional qualities. Notably, Moon Jae-in appoints his candidates without consulting parliament on an even more frequent basis than some of his notoriously obstinate predecessors, even his mentor Roh Moo-hyun. Political opponents call Moon Jae-in a hypocrite for making the same questionable staff decisions for which he actively criticized conservatives back when he was in opposition. Apart from “forced” appointments and distribution of “fodder” for loyal figures, the decisions also include creating “blacklists” (now for former Park Geun-hye supporters) and “juggling” a small number of associates who the president shuffles between key offices if the need arises. A good example would be the scandal surrounding Cho Kuk’s appointment to the position of Minister of Justice in the autumn of 2019. He was a follower of Moon Jae-in, who, at the start of his term, managed the 35  Kwon Soon-Mee, and Hong Ijin, “Is South Korea as Leftist as It Gets? Labour Market Policy Reforms under the Moon Presidency,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 81–83. 36  S.  Borowiec, “Green Light from the Blue House?” Index on Censorship 46, no. 4 (2017): 30–32.

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administration’s “people’s policy” department and would expose corrupt officials. By the time his candidacy was proposed, Cho Kuk himself was charged with abuse of authority in various schemes (including his daughter being admitted into a prestigious university). Despite the National Assembly’s opposition and the public outcry, Moon Jae-in still pushed through the candidates of his choice. However, in light of the scandal and prosecution against family members, the newly-appointed minister was soon forced to resign.37 Moon once again affirmed the policy of “not selling your friends out” in July 2020 as he reshuffled multiple security agency offices by appointing the former National Intelligence Service director Suh Hoon and National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong to important positions in the president’s administration. Both played key roles in Northern diplomacy, for which they were publicly shamed by the former US national security advisor John Bolton in his famous memoirs. Keeping them in their former posts thus became inconvenient. One of the best examples of Moon Jae-in being prepared to do things his own way was the outlandish election promise of going nuclear-free. References to the dangers posed by atomic energy—in particular the example of the relatively recent 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in Japan—were made as justification. Going by this logic, natural disasters like the 2016 Gyeongju earthquake may serve as a catalyst for similar catastrophes in South Korea, where a third of the energy consumed is nuclear-based. Evidently, it is impossible to give up such a large amount without issue, all the more so considering the short term that South Korean presidents serve (five years). The nuclear lobby and protests in cities with nuclear plants forced Moon Jae-in to review his policy. The government even failed to halt construction of the new nuclear plant in Kori, and the only thing to come out of the president’s new policy was his 2017 speech at the closing down of the “Kori-1” energy block, whose 13-year term of operation had expired. Thanks to the construction of new blocks, nuclear energy production rates in South Korea will not decline. Rather, they will continue to grow (according to the industry development strategy passed

37  Sung Deuk Hahm, and Seo Uk, “President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2020): 7.

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back during Park Geun-hye’s times in 2014).38 Based on documents ­published by the government in late 2017, “going nuclear-free” turned into a gradual transition to renewable energy sources. Interestingly, when it comes to defence, Moon Jae-in’s denuclearization sentiment is not as consistent as was previously the case with South Korean politicians. On the one hand, he did not advocate for the return of American tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula, similar to his conservative opponent in the elections Hong Joon-pyo, and was even less supportive of South Korea arming itself with nuclear weapons, unlike some scientists and politicians. On the other hand, Donald Trump’s ambiguity concerning the alliance with Seoul and regional tensions in 2017 prompted Moon Jae-in to construct nuclear submarines for the South Korean navy. The idea was supported by Washington, although in terms of information the idea got “lost” among news of successful inter-Korean talks and the negotiations between the United States and North Korea on the nuclear issue in 2018.39

7.3  Liberal Foreign Policy During his election campaign, Moon Jae-in called for rethinking the approach to North Korea. However, this did not imply any changes in relations with Washington. The future president shared and repeatedly affirmed the decades-old formula that the US alliance was the foundation of South Korea’s foreign policy.40 Naturally, Moon Jae-in’s first foreign visit in office was to the United States. However, one cannot help but notice that Seoul’s interests and those of its elder ally do not always align. This became especially evident in 2017, as President Trump, after an altercation with Kim Jung-un, was ramping up tensions in the region and gave off the impression that he might disregard the South’s wellbeing for the sake of his “bigger game.”41 38  Juyong Jong, and Eunju Rho, “Public Acceptance of Nuclear Energy Policies in South Korea,” in Ali Farazmand (ed.) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance (Basel: Springer, 2020): 4, 10. 39  Lim Eunjung, “South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 2, no. 1 (2019): 310–311. 40  “South Korea’s Presidential Transition and Strategic Challenges,” Strategic Comments 23, no. 5: 6. 41  A.Z. Zhebin, “The Korean Peninsula in the Changing Geopolitical Environment,” in The Korean Peninsula in the Search for Peace and Prosperity, two volumes, vol. 1 (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2019): 33.

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The differences between South Korea and the United States in relation to North Korea run unprecedentedly deep. Moon Jae-in was looking for a peaceful conciliation and the North’s “involvement,” the establishment of a new “peaceful regime,” and the initiation of co-operation. Seoul took the initiative in its own hands: starting from late 2017, South Korean diplomats made attempts to secure contacts with the North and then became a low-profile agent in the US–North Korea talks.42 For Seoul, it became an unpleasant surprise that the real nuclear settlement policy was substituted with Trump’s political show orchestrated for his own domestic goals and for the sake of his image. Moreover, the US conservative political establishment was not about to stop applying pressure and allowing their ally to deviate from this course.43 This stance of the American “deep state” and Seoul’s lack of decisiveness led to the literal failure of Moon Jae-in’s reconciliation efforts in 2020, on which he banked both in his domestic and foreign policies. The US transition to trade protectionism also posed a serious problem for Seoul. Trump would frequently criticize the Obama administration for its rather soft stance on the US–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and announced plans to revise the instrument. This posed a threat to the South Korean economy and to Moon Jae-in’s recovery plans. Export cuts, among other negative effects, would have reduced the number of jobs the government so sought to increase.44 However, Seoul, working without any leverage against the United States, failed to prevent the inevitable, and only managed to secure less unfavourable conditions in the reviewed document. In September 2018, the leaders of the two countries signed the revised FTA. South Korea lowered trade barriers for American agricultural and pharmaceutical goods and expanded US car imports quotas. Seoul also decreased its US steel export quota. South Korean diplomats managed to avoid the inclusion of

42  I.V.  Dyachkov, “Korean Reconciliation: A New Hope or a New Dead End?” in The Korean Peninsula in the Search for Peace and Prosperity, two volumes, vol. 1 (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2019), 70. 43  A. Levkowitz, “President Moon Jae-in’s Dilemma.” BESA Center Perspectives Paper 626 (2017): 2. 44  Inhye Heo, “The Revival of ‘Big Government’ Discourse in South Korea, 2017,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 54, no. 6 (2019): 919.

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such provisions in the instrument as currency rate control, on which the Trump administration insisted during the FTA revision process.45 Besides fears for the future of trade agreements after Trump’s inauguration, South Korean elites began harbouring fears about whether the United States intended on fulfilling its obligations and, if so, to what extent. The list of concerns also included suspicions about whether Washington would proceed to dissolve the Combined Forces Command and give command of South Korean forces over to South Korea in times of war.46 This is why Seoul sought to organize Trump’s 2017 Korea visit in such manner so as to allay any such fears. The president arrived not at a civilian airport but at an American military airbase, where he was met by Moon Jae-in. The message was clear: the United States would remain on the peninsula as a military force. South Korea grasped the opportunity and took advantage of Trump’s readiness to make his allies’ defence their own responsibility, as Seoul received permission from Washington to take its military to a new technological level.47 Broken Restrictions on the mass of re-entry vehicles’ were lifted, construction of atomic submarines for South Korean navy was approved, and other such policies were established. A hint of independence could also be found in the fact that, later, in 2018, the Panmunjom and Pyongyang declarations both contained Seoul’s readiness to work towards peace on the Korean Peninsula, proceed with the demilitarization of the 38th parallel, and further such decisions. The main issue in the military and political situation was the deployment on South Korean soil of the American THAAD, which the Moon Jae-in administration “inherited” from Park Geun-hye. Although the decisions were made with her still in office, the radar deployment itself happened in a “unilateral” manner at a very specific moment in

45  S.  Lester, I.  Manak, and Kim Kyonghwa, “Trump’s First Trade Deal: The Slightly Revised Korea-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement,” CATO Institute (June 13, 2019), https:// www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trumps-first-trade-deal-slightly-revisedkorea-us-free-trade (accessed July 1, 2020). 46  “South Korea’s Presidential Transition and Strategic Challenges,” Strategic Comments 23, no. 5: 7. 47  “President Donald J.  Trump’s Visit to the Republic of Korea,” The White House (November 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-­donald-­ j-trumps-visit-republic-korea/ (accessed July 1, 2020).

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time—after the impeachment and before the new elections.48 The United States likely wanted to avoid any opposition from the future president. On the one hand, Moon Jae-in’s stance on the THAAD issue prior to the election was evasive. During debates, he claimed that nothing was set in stone until an opportunity arose to hold negotiations with the United States and China. On the other hand, Park Geun-hye’s decision was extremely unpopular with the people, both because of her poor approval rating, and because of the negative reaction it received from China and Russia. After taking office, Moon Jae-in proceeded to stall the deployment of THAAD, making various cases against it—for example, that it would damage the environment—and then froze it altogether, having reached an agreement with Beijing. China, in turn, justifiably perceives the deployment of the American THAAD in Korea as a threat to its national security and an attempt to drive a wedge between China and Seoul.49 Taking the wide-scale negative political and economic consequences of such a decision for South Korea into account, Trump’s claims that the South was to pay a billion dollars for radar deployment, as they were supposed to increase security, sounded even more insulting.50 Trump conducted an openly confrontational policy towards China, and Seoul thus needed to make the hard choice between its key military and political ally and its vital economic partner.51 Therefore, having discarded the Trans-Pacific Partnership proposed by Obama, Trump has been advancing an openly anti-China “free” Indo-­ Pacific region policy. The justification was that an unnamed force—clearly meant to be Beijing—prevents freedom and transparency from taking root. The coalition is actively recruiting current and potential US allies. At the summit negotiations in November 2017, Trump called for South Korea to help put the American plans in motion, continually pressuring Seoul in inter-governmental communication. However, despite countries like Japan having expressed their enthusiasm concerning China’s 48  J.M. Dostal, “South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal: Transformative Change or Business as Usual?” The Political Quarterly 88, no. 3 (2017): 489. 49  Huizhi Zhang, “The Strategic Choice of ROK Facing Sino–US Competition,” East Asian Community Review 1 (2018): 134. 50  J. James. Kim, John J. Lee, “A Primer on the 19th South Korean Presidential Election in 2017,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief 13 (2017): 6. 51  Huizhi Zhang, “The Strategic Choice of ROK Facing the Sino-US Competition,” East Asian Community Review 1 (2018): 129–130.

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“containment,” South Korea was faced with an unpleasant dilemma in light of the American proposal. Moreover, other pressing issues came to light, such as the allocation of expenses for the maintenance of US forces (Trump proposed to increase Korea’s payments five-fold) and the prospect of giving the command of the combined forces over to the Koreans in times of war. Seoul cannot openly resist a number of its ally’s proposals, despite having no intention of provoking China, considering the trouble the countries went through to reach a settlement in the autumn of 2017.52 This became one of the priority tasks for the newly formed South Korean administration. It was necessary to have the Beijing sanctions lifted and secure China’s support in light of the 2018 diplomatic breakthrough. It is hard not to notice that the course towards convergence with China while at the same time maintaining the existing alliance with the United States had been previously taken by the president’s mentor, Roh Moo-hyun.53 Working consultations on rebuilding relations were over by the end of October,54 and in December Moon Jae-in had already made his state visit to China. The basis for the agreement became the so-called Three-Noes policy. Moon Jae-in guaranteed that South Korea would not accept anti-­ missile strike batteries, would not enter the American regional THAAD system, and would not become a part of the three-way military alliance with the United States and Japan. Beijing, in turn, lifted the year-old restrictions (although some events turned out to be irreversible—Lotte still failed to return to the Chinese market). The conservative opposition scurried to accuse the government of excessive compliance. However, it is not hard to notice that South Korea’s undertakings were not in fact too onerous. The deployment of THAAD was out of the question from the beginning, regional issues are hardly under Seoul’s control, and an alliance with Japan was not even in

52  R.N.  Lobov, “The Concept of the Indo-Pacific Region: South Korea’s Side of the Story,” in The Korean Peninsula in the Search for Peace and Prosperity, two volumes, vol. 1 (Moscow: IFES RAS, 2019): 172–174 53  Huizhi Zhang, “The Strategic Choice of ROK Facing Sino–US Competition,” East Asian Community Review 1 (2018): 133–134. 54  C. Kim, and B. Blanchard, “China, South Korea agree to mend ties after THAAD standoff,” Reuters (October 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usnorthkorea-­ missiles/china-south-korea-agree-to-mend-ties-after-thaadstandoff-idUSKBN1D003G (accessed July 1, 2020).

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consideration: for the past half a century, the United States failed to reconcile its two Asian allies.55 What is more, not only did relations between South Korean and Japan fail to improve during the first half of Moon Jae-in’s term, they also actually underwent a number of crises. Moon Jae-in’s initial stance on Tokyo was ambiguous. The new president could not express support for the 2015 wianbu agreement for a number of reasons: the “deal” being unpopular with the people; party solidarity; Park Geun-hye’s stained reputation; and her being the mastermind behind the agreement.56 That notwithstanding, during his election rallies, Moon Jae-in declared the need to develop relations with the country’s eastern neighbours and even called for an FTA with Japan.57 The new leader did not dare to openly denounce the agreement, wishing to avoid tensions with Tokyo, although the Korean party was in no hurry to put the agreement into effect. For instance, the work on establishing a foundation under the 2015 agreement did not go as planned. The South Korean government compensated payments it had made to citizens in order to avoid making use of Japanese funds and returning them instead. At the same time, public activists established their own “competing” organization with similar goals. In the end, Moon Jae-in declared the “inevitable deterioration” of the joint foundation,58 and in July 2019 the foundation was shut down, despite protests on Japan’s part.59 The erecting of “Seoul format” monuments has ceased during Moon Jae-in’s presidency, although in 2018 some countries (e.g. the Philippines and Taiwan) took up South Korea’s torch and erected their own distinct monuments in honour of their female comrades (the one in the Philippines 55  T. Stangarone, “Did South Korea’s Three Noes Matter? Not So Much,” The Diplomat (October 30, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/did-south-koreas-threenoesmatter-­not-so-much (accessed June 1, 2020). 56  Hereinafter see: I. V. Dyachkov, “Historical Memory and Politics: The Comfort Women Issue in Modern Japanese–South Korea Relations,” Yaponskiye issledovania, no 4 (2019): 72–87. 57  J. James. Kim, John J. Lee, “A Primer on the 19th South Korean Presidential Election in 2017,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief 13 (2017): 6. 58  Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Signals End to ‘Final’ Deal With Japan Over Wartime Sex Slaves,” The New  York Times (November 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes. com/2018/11/21/world/asia/south-korea-japan-sex-slaves.html?module=inline (accessed July 25, 2020). 59  “Japan-Funded ‘Comfort Women’ Foundation in S. Korea Formally Closed,” https:// mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190705/p2g/00m/0fp/053000c (accessed July 25, 2020).

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was soon destroyed). The wianbu monument in the Korean capital did not, however, disappear. With that said, the liberal South Korean government made active use of sensitive historical issues and related matters in its foreign policy. For example, during Trump’s 2017 Seoul visit, he was introduced to one of the “comfort women” at the dinner ceremony and the menu included shrimp from the seas around the disputed Tok Islets (Takeshima). The South Korean press, seemingly in celebration, shared pictures of Trump embracing the elderly woman and shared news of the subsequent protests on the part of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.60 The appeal to Washington had several implications. On the one hand, the United States is the “older” ally of both South Korea and Japan, and its opinion should be taken into account by both countries. On the other hand, it was the United States that would have been the primary benefactor of the failed reconciliation. During Moon Jae-in’s term, both the South Korean leadership and the general public increased pressure on Japan concerning another matter linked to the common history of the two countries. In the autumn of 2018 and then in the summer of 2019, the Supreme Court of South Korea ruled against a number of Japanese companies in relation to their use of mandatory and low-wage Korean labour during colonial times (1910–1945). Notably, this issue became a tool for South Korea’s foreign and domestic policies. Park Geun-hye’s administration was accused not only of inaction in this matter, but also of stalling the proceedings through corrupt means.61 The workers’ case quickly made a “practical” turn: the refusal of Japanese companies to fulfil demands for compensation, which was supported by Tokyo, was soon followed by their Korean assets being seized. Japan’s irritation concerning the failure of the “final” 2015 agreement was exacerbated with the emergence of a new contentious issue and took 60  日정부, ‘독도새우·위안부할머니’ 이틀 연속 항의»// 조선일보 (Two-Days’ Worth of the Japanese Government’s Protests against ‘Tok’ Shrimp and the “Wianbu Grandma’”), Cheoson Ilbo (November 9, 2017), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_ dir/2017/11/09/2017110900984.html (accessed July 25, 2020). 61  C. Arrington, “Japan Claims It’s Restricting Exports to South Korea because of ‘National Security.’ Here’s the real reason why,” The Washington Post (July 18, 2019), URL: https:// www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/18/japan-claims-its-restrictingexportssouth-­korea-because-national-security-heres-real-reason-why/?utm_term=.bb89eaff1eb8 (accessed July 25, 2020).

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on a shape similar to that of the ongoing US–China trade war. Alluding to a potential leak of sanctioned goods into North Korea, Tokyo suspended the preferential exports programme with South Korea concerning a number of chemical agents necessary for the production of semiconductors. Now each delivery was to be negotiated separately. In the end, the Japanese authorities approved them, but they made it clear to Seoul what the development of South Korean technological production and the economy as a whole depended on.62 Seoul soon declared that it had no intention of extending the intelligence-­sharing agreement prior to its expiration on November 22, 2019.63 However, this notion was discarded at the last moment under pressure from Washington. The Japanese–South Korean meeting at the ASEAN Summit in early November 2019 did not bring about any concrete results.64 Three quarters of a century after the end of the Japanese colonization, issues of historical legacy went from background conflicts to a powerful factor setting the agenda for Japan–South Korea relations. From a military and political point of view, Japan and South Korea both constitute elements of the American security system. The elites of both countries unanimously consider this choice correct and strategic. However, Seoul and Tokyo are also competitors in the fight for regional influence and markets. In this sense, historical matters became, on the one hand, a “valve” for conflict settlement, and on the other, a real tool of reputational—and even sanction-based—combat within allied borders. Moon Jae-in’s foreign policy also became quite unorthodox by South Korean standards. For example, in late 2017, the new president attended the ASEAN Summit in Bali and declared a “New Southern Policy.” This meant expanding ties with Southeast Asia and turning ASEAN into one of South Korea’s key partners. ASEAN turned out to be a success for South 62  김세형. 문재인-아베 싸움, 트럼프 누구손 들어줄까? // 매일경제 (“Kim Sho-hyun. Who Will Trump Favour in the Battle between Moon Jae-in and Abe?”) Maeil Kyon-je (July 9, 2019) https://www.mk.co.kr/premium/special-report/view/2019/07/26054 (accessed July 25, 2020). 63  H.  Scott, “Why South Korea Should Rethink GSOMIA Withdrawal,” The Diplomat (November 6, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/why-south-korea-shouldrethinkgsomia-­withdrawal (accessed November 10, 2019). 64  “Abe urges Moon to Adhere to Bilateral Pact over Wartime Compensation,” The Japan Times (November 4, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/04/national/ shinzo-abe-moon-jae-in-south-korea-japanasean (accessed November 10, 2019).

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Korean diplomacy, as it was relatively “problem-free” and combined jointly accumulated relations capital coupled with good prospects for developing it further. Moreover, during his July 2018 Singapore visit, Moon Jae-in declared that he hoped to receive ASEAN’s support in matters of inter-Korean convergence and nuclear settlement.65 Southeast Asia did in fact help in the matter: in the Summer of 2018, Singapore held the first North Korea– United States Summit organized through South Korean mediation, and in early 2019, Vietnam offered to host another meeting between Kim Jung-un and Donald Trump. South Korea’s relations with Southeast Asian countries are based first and foremost on economic considerations. Since 2014, ASEAN has been South Korea’s second-biggest trade partner and direct foreign investments recipient. A number of leading South Korean companies transferred production over to Southeast Asia due to cheap labour resources, and South Korea itself has seen an influx of labour migrants from the region. ASEAN countries are a popular holiday destination for South Korean tourists. It seems that one of Moon Jae-in’s primary hopes is to convert all of the economic potential into political assets by creating an alternative to the conflicting circle of the “great powers” surrounding South Korea—the United States, China, Russia and Japan.66 Unsurprisingly, the second target of the New Southern Policy turned out to be India, a relatively neutral large power that attracts partners from different camps. In July 2018, Moon Jae-in visited India.67 Soon afterwards, his spouse, Kim Jung-sook, did the same, having taken part in the opening ceremonies of a number of cultural events. Through official social media channels, the South Korean president stressed the close and friendly nature of relations with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. An historic symbol was discovered that proved how far back Indian–South

65  “South Korean President Moon Jae-in Seeks ASEAN’s Support for Korean Peninsula Peace Process,” The Straits Times (July 13, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-­ asia/south-korean-president-moonjae-in-seeks-aseans-support-of-korean-peninsula-peace (accessed July 1, 2020). 66  R.K. Dhawan, “Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’ Towards India: An Analysis,” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 24, no. 1 (2020): 57–58. 67  “South Korean President Moon Jae-in arrives in New Delhi,” DD News (July 9, 2018), http://ddnews.gov.in/national/south-korean-president-moon-jae-arrives-new-delhi (accessed July 1, 2020).

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Korean relations went: in the first century AD, king Kim Soo-roh, the founder of the Korean state of Kai, married an Indian princess. However, the development did not go further than ceremonial promises and the start of several economic projects (e.g. the opening of a mobile phone factory). Strangely enough, Seoul and New Delhi found it hard to reach an understanding on political matters. South Korea did not accept the anti-Chinese concept of the Indo-Pacific region endorsed by Indian diplomacy. What is more, entering the Indo-Pacific coalition implies additional convergence with the United States and Japan and a “return” to Northeast Asia, which Seoul was trying so hard to avoid through its New Southern Policy. Other unexpected problems arose: in an attempt to enter the Indian arms market, South Korea was met with opposition from the Russian military-industrial complex, which has close ties to New Delhi.68 In terms of the combination of pomp and political futility, India–South Korea ties are similar to the New Northern Policy. It should, however, be conceded that the ASEAN element of the New Southern Policy will bring real results, as it is based exclusively on intense economic co-operation and does not require material foreign-policy investments. By mid-2020, the government, in response to the criticisms of the economic situation, declared the Korean New Deal strategy, based on former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous New Deal designed to overcome the Great Depression. Frankly speaking, these goals are ambitious and are unlikely to be achieved easily. According to the new policy, Seoul will discard the “old” development algorithms based on using “traditional” technologies. The main areas of focus are 1. environmentally clean development with the widespread application of new and renewable energy sources (73.4 trillion won of investments); 2. the use of databases, artificial intelligence, informatization, and 5G networks in all spheres of life (58.2 trillion won); and 3. social initiatives; guaranteed jobs for everyone willing to work; nurturing new talents; the introduction of new labour algorithms, for example, remote work (28.4 trillion won).

68  R. K. Dhawan, “Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’ Towards India: An Analysis,” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 24, no. 1 (2020): 60–64.

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Funding for the New Deal is to come from the government (114.1 trillion won), local authorities (25.2 trillion won) and businesses (20.7 trillion won). The Deal will create 1.9 million new jobs.69 * * * Reviewing the results of the first half of Moon Jae-in’s term, one may say that—despite the promises—he failed to make any fundamental changes to South Korean political system. The new administration has no intention of reconciling the left and right wings and achieving political harmony. The conservative’s dictate was switched out for the left-centrists’ dictate, albeit a softer version. The South Korean public is tired of stubborn economic experiments which are unlikely to help South Korea mend its structural problems. A “revolution” in foreign policy is also nowhere to be seen, and the diplomatic breakthrough in inter-Korean and nuclear relations seems to have reached a dead end. Instead of a wondrous transformation for South Korea, which many hoped for after Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, all the country saw was the beginning of a new, albeit more optimistic, chapter in its history with a familiar storyline—a fight between two camps, with scheming and mutual accusations often serving as an obstacle to achieving strategic goals.

69  O.  Kiryanov, “South Korea invests 133 billion dollars in new development strategy,” Rossiyskaya gazeta (June 14, 2020), https://rg.ru/2020/07/14/iuzhnaiakoreia-­ investiruet-­133-mlrd-dollarov-v-novuiu-strategiiu-razvitiia.html (accessed July 17, 2020).

CHAPTER 8

Inter-Korean Relations: Ups and Downs

8.1   From the “Liberal Decade” to a New Cold War: Inter-Korean Aggravation Under Lee Myung-bak The seemingly permanent Korean crisis has two components. One of them, internationalized from the outset and hogging most of the attention worldwide, is rooted in the missile and nuclear programme promoted by North Korea. The other is that the Korean nation has been divided into two states for decades. These issues are interrelated, but their influence on each other is not reciprocal. If Pyongyang abandons its nuclear option, that will not, in itself, stop the North–South conflict. At the same time, inter-Korean normalization would be an indispensable precondition to resolving the nuclear problem, as the North Korean missile and nuclear programme is the direct product of prolonged antagonism between North Korea and South Korea, where the United States backs the South.1 The US military threat was the direct reason for which the nuclear deterrent was created. In addition, Pyongyang may imply that 1  G.A. Ivashentsov, “Kim-Moon Summit: What Will Happen to the North Korean Missile and Nuclear Programme?” Valdai International Discussion Club (April 24, 2018), http:// ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sammit-kim-mun/?sphrase_id=130025 (accessed June 20, 2020).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Torkunov et al., Understanding Contemporary Korea from a Russian Perspective, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07601-5_8

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this factor should prevent US intervention if it eventually decides to attack the South.2 According to Russian experts in Korean studies, inter-Korean relations could be compared to a volatile sea fluctuating between sunny and stormy conditions.3 After the “liberal decade” of dialogue and co-operation, when shoots of national reconciliation seemed to have taken deep root, a “glacial period” arrived to kill them. All that was needed for this to happen was a change of the administration in Seoul in early 2008. Shortly after that, relations between the two Korean states took a sharp turn for the worse. Under Lee Myung-bak, inter-Korean relations were actually rolled back to the pre-Kim Dae-jung era. Once sworn into office, the South Korean President stated that he would not tolerate the distribution of any gratuitous aid to Pyongyang, and that any co-operation with North Korea should only be based on a number of conditions to be met by the North, the most important of which were complete nuclear disarmament and observance of human rights. Even before that, he had threatened to dissolve the Ministry of Unification, the authority in charge of programmes for interaction with the North. “The new government will be complying with the South-North agreements subject to the reasonability of such activities, their financial burden and civil accord,” he said.4 Lee Myung-bak put forward the “3000 Plan for Denuclearization and Opening of North Korea” providing that if the North abandoned its nuclear weapons and “opened the doors,” South Korea would help it in order to bring its national income per capita to $3000  in ten years.5 Pyongyang called this approach derisive. North Korea said that this concept “replicates the anti-North course being pursued by the American conservatives who seek to strangle North Korea by forcing it to dismantle its nuclear program first.”6 2   K.V.  Asmolov, “Inter-Korean Summit: Deep Symbolism of the Protocol,” Valdai International Discussion Club (May 3, 2018), http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ mezhkoreyskiy-sammit-glubokiy-simvolizm-protokola/?sphrase_id=130025 (accessed June 20, 2020). 3  “A Public Interview with Aleksandr Matsegora, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to North Korea dated June 29, 2020,” TASS, http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=I8vaqPHKulI (accessed June 29, 2020). 4  Dong-a Ilbo (January 22, 2008). 5  L.V.  Zakharova, Inter-Korean Economic Relations: From Their Origin to Present Day (Moscow: Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014), 250 pp. 6  KCNA article dated April 16, 2008.

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During the Sunshine Policy era, the parties effectively banned any criticism towards each other, intervention in their respective internal affairs and the internationalization of their relations. Lee Myung-bak resumed the previous practice by criticizing North Korea in the Human Rights Commission, conducting joint US–South Korean military exercises in order to simulate offensive activities on North Korean soil, and joining anti-North Korea draft UN resolutions sponsored by the United States and Japan. South Korea actually scrapped the programmes approved at the second Inter-Korean Summit, also stopping the delivery of food (which had amounted to 400,000 tonnes annually between 2000 and 2007) and mineral fertilizers (300,000 tonnes annually between 1999 and 2007).7 A short time later, Lee Myung-bak added that economic aid would only continue to go to the North if Pyongyang started to repatriate the fishermen captured by the North and South Korean citizens who had been captured during the Korean War in 1950–1953 (more than 1000 people, as estimated by Seoul). At the March 2008 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the South Korean delegation criticized the human rights situation in North Korea for the first time since 2000.8 Pyongyang gave a sharply negative response to the South’s new policy. On March 27, 2008, the North Korean authorities expelled 11 South Korean officials from the Consultation Office for the North-South Economic Cooperation in Kaesong. On March 29, a North Korean representative at military talks declared the suspension of inter-Korean dialogue and a ban on crossing the border for all South Korean government officials. At the same time, importantly, no restrictions were imposed on those employed by joint projects. A regular criticism of Lee Myung-bak in the North Korean media started on April 1.9 In his speech before the National Assembly on July 11, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak adjusted his position with respect to the North by pointing to the need to resume a full-scale dialogue between the two Korean states and his willingness to co-operate with Pyongyang in good faith with respect to the fulfilment of all those agreements signed by

7  L.V.  Zakharova, “Inter-Korean Economic Relations under President Lee Myung-bak” Problems of the Far East, no. 2 (2010). 8  Ibid. 9  Ibid.

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his predecessors.10 Therefore, by fine-tuning its course, the government of South Korea declared that it planned to expand inter-Korean economic co-operation while making progress in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem at the same time, rather than after this issue had been resolved (which was the original intention). Nevertheless, it was still necessary to wait for Pyongyang’s response to the proposals from Seoul. In an ominous coincidence, on the same day (July 11, 2008), a North Korean female soldier shot and killed a South Korean tourist who had accidentally found herself in a prohibited area in the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region.11 Pyongyang refused to conduct a joint investigation into the incident, and tours to Mount Kumgang were suspended. Tour operators, led by Hyundai Asan, lost over $140 million in the first four months after tours were suspended.12 In late 2008, Pyongyang imposed stricter rules regarding the stay of South Korean nationals in the North and their crossing of the Military Demarcation Line. On November 28, North Korea suspended tours to Kaesong, as well as all railway communication with the South, and closed the office for economic co-operation.13 On December 1, Pyongyang further restricted land traffic via the Military Demarcation Line by cutting the number of permits for crossing it for the purpose of visiting the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) from 500 people and 200 vehicles to 250 people and 150 vehicles daily.14 In addition, the number of South Korean nationals allowed to stay at the KIC was reduced from 4200 to 880.15 However, the Lee Myung-bak administration chose not to scrap the previous arrangements and continued activities intended to secure the interests of South Korean businesses in North Korea. In 2008, the South Korean government proposed amendments to the law on inter-Korean exchanges and co-operation (the National Assembly approved them on 10  Speech by the President of the Republic of Korea dated July 11, 2008, www.president. go.kr/kr/president/speech/speech_list.php (accessed June on 20, 2020). 11  L.V. Zakharova, “Inter-Korean Economic Relations under President Lee Myung-bak” Problems of the Far East, no. 2 (2010). 12  The Korea Herald (November 19, 2008). 13   “PowerPoint_Presentation_on_the_North_Korea_Policy,” Ministry of Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr (accessed June 20, 2020). 14  L.V. Zakharova, “Inter-Korean Economic Relations under President Lee Myung-bak” Problems of the Far East, no. 2 (2010). 15  The Korea Herald (December 6, 2008).

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January 8, 2009), which were to simplify administrative procedures for North–South exchanges. According to the new procedure, South Korean citizens no longer had to report on their contacts with Northerners, and all that investors in small joint projects had to do was submit a report on such projects without having to wait for government approval.16 The 2009 Work Plan published by the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea on December 31, 2008, identified restarting the dialogue with North Korea and expanding “mutually beneficial inter-Korean cooperation” as key goals. Among its priorities, the Ministry mentioned projects in the fields of forestry and agriculture, fishing, mining, work to connect the Trans-Korean railroad to the Trans-Siberian and Trans-China railway, and the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea with North Korean participation. In addition, the South Korean government pledged to make every effort to have the restrictions imposed by the North with respect to the operation of South Korean companies in Kaesong relaxed and to address the delays experienced by such companies in terms of transportation, communications, and customs inspection.17 Given that the Kaesong Industrial Complex remained the only large-­ scale project of the two Korean states, the North Korean authorities decided to use it in order to put pressure on the South. Seoul was invited to hold official inter-Korean negotiations in the Kaesong Industrial Complex on April 21, 2009 (for the first time under Lee Myung-bak).18 In the course of that meeting, North Korea demanded that South Korean representatives pay higher wages to North Korean workers employed at the KIC and start paying land rent in 2010 rather than 2014, as had been decided in 2005.19 Continuing this line, on May 15, North Korea announced that it would deem all contracts relating to the KIC invalid. Introducing new rules regarding worker wages and land rent payments, Pyongyang underlined that companies that did not agree with this decision were free to leave the

16  “Inter-Korean Relations in 2008,” Ministry of Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr (accessed June 20, 2020). 17  “Ministry of Unification Work Plans 2009,” Ministry of Unification, http://www. unikorea.go.kr (accessed June 20, 2020). 18  L.V. Zakharova, “Inter-Korean Economic Relations under President Lee Myung-bak” Problems of the Far East, no. 2 (2010). 19  “Monthly Recap” (April 5, 2009), Kyungnam, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr (accessed June 20, 2020).

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complex.20 North Korea explained these new requirements by stating stated that beneficial terms and low production costs for South Korean companies had been based on the “historical Joint Declaration of North Korea and South Korea of June 15, 2000,” which had proclaimed goals of economic co-operation in order to achieve national unification. Given that, according to Pyongyang, Seoul had abandoned that agreement, it had to pay full price. In this regard, it seemed quite reasonable for the North to demand a four-fold wage increase for its workers, up to $300 monthly, and to insist that the South should pay $500 million for the lease of the land at the KIC.21 However, by August it was time to make concessions: a number of agreements were signed during the visit of the head of Hyundai Group to North Korea following his meeting with Kim Jong-il allowing the resumption and enhancement of inter-Korean economic relations.22 The signed document contained the following points: 1. The parties agreed to resume the suspended tours to Mount Kumgang as soon as possible and launch tours to Pirobong, the highest peak of the mountain system. 2. The parties agreed to reopen land traffic via the Military Demarcation Line for employees travelling from the South and to reinstate the maximum period of their stay in the North according to the spirit of the historical Declaration of October 4. 3. The parties agreed to resume tours to Kaesong and to expand operations at the KIC once land traffic via the Military Demarcation Line is reopened. 4. Hyundai Group decided to launch tours to Mount Paektu (a sacred location for all Koreans).

20  “Monthly Recap” (April 6, 2009), Kyungnam, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr (accessed June 20, 2020). 21  The Korea Herald (July 24, 2009). For more detail, see: L. V. Zakharova, Inter-Korean Economic Relations: From Their Origin to Present Day (Moscow: Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014), 250 pp. 22  L.V. Zakharova, “Inter-Korean Economic Relations under President Lee Myung-bak” Problems of the Far East, no. 2 (2010).

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5. The parties agreed to arrange meetings among separated relatives from the North and the South at Mount Kumgang on the day of Chuseok, a Korean national holiday (the harvest festival).23 On August 20, in order to demonstrate its willingness to develop economic co-operation with the South, the North cancelled the restrictive measures imposed on December 1, 2008. As a further “concession,” Pyongyang proposed to raise the wages of the North Korean workers employed in Kaesong not by four times, but by just 5%, from $55.12 to $57.88.24 * * * Relations took a dramatic turn for the worse in March 2010. At 9:22 pm (local time) on March 26, a powerful explosion shook the Cheonan corvette located in a maritime area in the Yellow Sea that is disputed between North and South Korea near Baengnyeong Island, breaking the ship apart and sinking it. Of the 104 sailors aboard, 46 died.25 South Korea and the United States set up a special commission that included foreign experts representing US allies. Of course, North Korea’s proposal to participate in the commission was denied. On April 16, 2010, the chairman of the commission said that “a probable cause of the sinking of the Cheonan is an external blast.” On April 22, Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Kim Tae-young suggested that the accident might have been caused by naval mines placed at some date between the war and the 1970s.26 On May 7, however, the commission stated that the corvette had been “destroyed by a German-made torpedo.” On May 20, the commission issued a report stating that the ship had been sunk by a North Korean 23  “Kim Jong Il Meets With Hyundai Chief,” Kyungnam, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/ eng/m05/s10/content.asp?nkbriefNO=303&GoP=1 (accessed June 24, 2020). 24  The Korea Herald (September 12, 2008). 25  See a summary and the various versions at https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D 0%B8%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C_%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B5% D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%92%D0%9C%D0%A1_%D0%A0%D0%9A_%C2%AB%D0%A7%D 1%85%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%C2%BB 26  O. Kiryanov, “Mysteries of a Perished Ship,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, Moscow Issue no. 65, 5144 (March 30, 2010). https://rg.ru/2010/03/30/korabl.html (accessed June 20, 2020).

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mini-submarine, as evidenced by some fragments of a torpedo “made in North Korea,” which had allegedly been found at sea. After that, NATO and the European Union condemned North Korea.27 Pyongyang officials vigorously denied any involvement in the sinking of the Cheonan. The key arguments were: the disputed territorial waters were closely monitored by South Korea and the United States using large naval forces, radio and acoustic location and satellite surveillance. In such conditions, it was virtually impossible for any submarines to make their way to Baengnyeong, hit the corvette, and return unnoticed. In addition, a North Korean source pointed to the fact that, initially, South Korean officials had all but unanimously rejected the version of North Korean involvement in the tragedy.28 On April 24, 2010, the North Korean website Naenara expressed its regret regarding the loss of the ship, since “the majority of the numerous missing and rescued people are members of our nation.” Later on, a representative of North Korea’s National Defence Commission proposed sending a team of experts to South Korea in order to carry out an on-site evaluation of any evidence related to the incident. Of course, the proposal was ignored. At the same time, some specialists in South Korea itself questioned the technical feasibility of an unnoticed torpedo attack in a continuously monitored area. At the time, two ships, as well as speedboats and aeroplanes, were present within the area, and satellite surveillance was in place. US Navy ships took part in the exercises (according to some marginal theories, the corvette may have sunk after a collision with a US submarine).29 Further doubts were caused by the excessive corrosion of the torpedo fragments allegedly “found on the scene” – they could not have been corroded to such an extent within just a month.30 27  “The Situation Surrounding the Demise of the Cheonan Corvette in the Yellow Sea on March 26,” ITAR TASS (May 20, − 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20100525185319/ http://www.itar-tass.com/level2.html?NewsID=15144423 (accessed June 20, 2020). 28  北,南대북조치에’남북관계단절’대응(3보) (“North Korea’s Response to the Sanctions against North Korea Caused by the ‘Breakdown of North–South Relations’”), Yonhap News (May 25, 2010), https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20100525235900014 29  귀신같은 북한군? 귀신잡는 시나리오 (“A Ghost Army of North Korea? A Ghost Chase Scenario”), The Hankyoreh (April 19, 2010), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_ general/416718.html (accessed June 20, 2020). 30  Jung Sung-ki, “Questions raised about smoking gun,” The Korea Times (May 20, 2010), http:// www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/205_66234.html (accessed June 20, 2020).

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Nevertheless, the political conclusions were predetermined. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak stated: “We will take firm, responsible measures against the North. On the basis of international cooperation, we will force the North to recognize what they did and to become a responsible member of the global community once again.”31 On May 24, 2010, Lee Myung-bak appeared on national TV stating that the country would ask the UN Security Council to punish North Korea for the attack on the Cheonan. In addition, South Korea also imposed sanctions against North Korea that effectively stopped any joint projects with the country (these sanctions are still in effect). On the same day, May 24, the North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland declared that North Korea would: • cut off all lines of communication with South Korea; • freeze the operations of the inter-Korean Cooperation Office in the joint industrial area of Kaesong and expel all South Korean representatives; • cease any contacts via the Red Cross societies in Panmunjom; • close its air and sea space to South Korean aircraft and maritime vessels; and • be ready to fight back against Seoul by all means in the psychological war resumed by Seoul after a six-year break.32 Relations deteriorated further on November 23, 2010, when the South Korean military decided, despite warnings from the North, to hold manoeuvres in a disputed maritime area in the Yellow Sea. North Korea believes that this area protrudes into the “rear” of its territory because the Northern Limit Line was drawn unilaterally. In response to the manoeuvres, the North Korean artillery fired 200 gunshots at Yeonpyeongdo Island. Two South Korean nationals died, and more than a dozen were wounded. South Korea retaliated by firing 80 volleys on artillery bases in North Korean territory. The exact damage is 31  “The History of Relations between North and South Korea. A Dossier,” TASS (January 9, 2018), https://tass.ru/info/4862015 (accessed June 20, 2020). 32  北,南대북조치에’남북관계단절’대응(3보) (“North Korea’s Response to the Sanctions against North Korea Caused by the ‘Breakdown of North–South Relations’”), Yonhap News (May 25, 2010), https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20100525235900014 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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unknown, but South Korean estimates that five to ten North Koreans were killed and as many as 30 were wounded.33 The situation became extremely tense. F-16 fighters were deployed on the island.34 Lee Myung-bak ordered an attack on North Korea’s missile bases adjacent to the artillery bases in the event of further escalation. The decision was made to strengthen the troops along the border and to alter the rules of responding to North Korean threats so that any fire would be returned on an expanded scale. South Korea increased its defence budget “in order to cope with asymmetric threats on the part of North Korea.” All inter-Korean projects except for the Kaesong Industrial Complex were stopped. The South found a pretext to sharply reduce its humanitarian aid for the North (as low as $480 million between 2008 and 2013, compared to $2 billion between 2003 and 2008, during the Sunshine Policy era). North–South relations entered a stage of deep animosity, and Lee Myung-­ bak himself became a symbol of evil and a target of derision in the North (where they earned the nickname “little rat”).35 The response of South Korean officials to the sudden death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the rise of Kim Jong-un to power was a mix of poorly concealed gloating and expectations of a rapid collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. The young leader did not forgive that and rejected any co-operation with Seoul. “We will be eternally taking revenge on Lee Myung-bak and his associates for the unforgivable sins committed in relation to the funeral of Kim Jong-il,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) declared.36 Kim Jong-un kept his promise during his first year in office.

33  “Satellite Photos Show North Korea’s Losses Inflicted by South Korean Artillery,” Lenta.ru (December 2, 2010), https://news.tut.by/world/206977.html (accessed June 24, 2020). 34  A.Z. Zhebin, “The Korean Peninsula: On a Dangerous Brink,” Problems of the Far East, no. 1 (2011). 35  “North Korean ‘Volkssturm’ Vows to Punish ‘Rat Myung-bak,’” One Korea (April 25, 2012), http://onekorea.ru/2012/04/25/severokorejskij-folksshturm-klyanetsya-nakazatkrysu-­myon-baka (accessed June 20, 2020). 36  “Pyongyang Does Not Want to Cooperate with the Seoul Authorities,” DW (December 30, 2011), https://www.dw.com/ru/пхеньян-не-желает-сотрудничать-с-властямив-­сеуле/a-15636420 (accessed June 20, 2020).

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8.2  A Crisis in Relations During Park Geun-hye’s Presidency Park Geun-hye (who had actually met Kim Jong-il previously when he was elected the President of South Korea in December 2012), seemed to be willing to improve relations with the North. During her electoral campaign, she stressed that North Korean nuclear programme should not be recognized, and that the loss of the Cheonan and the Yeonpyeongdo incident should not be forgotten, but that it was necessary not to focus on those facts and to search for ways to reduce tension and normalize relations between the two Koreas.37 Kim Jong-un also made a peaceful gesture and called for improving relations with the South in his New Year speech.38 Shortly after she had been sworn into office, in March 2013, Park Geun-hye presented her programme for the improvement of ties, dialogue and exchanges between North and South Korea, called the “Trust-­ Building Process on the Korean Peninsula.” The guidelines subsequently issued by the Ministry of Unification explained, alluding Confucius, that no relations could develop without trust, but if the North, instead of participating in dialogue, tried to violate peace, the South Korean government would force it to “pay.” Therefore, the “trust process” was supposed to become a sort of middle ground between the excessively hard-line policy of Lee Myung-bak and the excessively soft sunshine course of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, combining the best features of both approaches. The new policy was linked to Park Geun-hye’s initiatives in the field of regional security, so the interrelated objectives of the “trust process” included the development of inter-­ Korean relations, the building of peace on the peninsula, and preparations for unification.39 At her first presidential news conference, Park Geun-hye said that unification would be a “bonanza” (Kor. 대박, daebak) for the entire Korean 37  “Park Meets Kim DJ’s Wife on ‘Unity Tour,’” The Korea Herald (August 22, 2012), http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120822001169 (accessed June 24, 2020). 38  Lucy Williamson, “North Korea’s Kim Jong-un Makes Rare New Year Speech,” BBC (January 1, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20880301 (accessed June 24, 2020). 39   Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul: Ministry of Unification (2013): 5–11.

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people. The South Korean media praised the benefits of such a development and the opportunities that it would open to the country and its people. The significant costs of unification to be borne by Seoul were called an “investment” in a prosperous future.40 In practice, however, the views of a relatively small group of conservatives prevailed in Seoul. Secretly, they started to carry out practical preparations for the occupation of North Korea and put together plans in anticipation of the fall of Kim Jong-un’s regime. Relying on some intelligence, Park Geun-hye tried to convince her allies that it was highly likely that the regime would collapse soon. It transpired later, however, that this scenario had been invented by Choi Soon-sil, her “court shaman.” Nevertheless, US hawks announced that North Koreans would soon “meet South Korean soldiers with flowers.” The hotheads in Seoul did not realize that reality may not be so rosy. Unification through the merger of the North into the South could trigger extremely negative consequences  – not only for the Korean people, but for the whole region as well. It is quite possible that some supporters of juche nationalism would launch an armed struggle against “occupants and compradors.” Given that, according to our estimates, the “servants of the regime” include (together with their families) hundreds of thousands of people, even 5% of “active fighters” would be a dangerous force. They would have nothing to lose anyway: the South Korean public would hardly accept “activists of the bloody regime” and even their descendants being exempt from the responsibility for their past crimes. Probably, plans for a guerrilla war in North Korea have been prepared and appropriate bases in the mountains and underground have been already built and may even contain weapons of mass destruction (not necessarily nuclear bombs, but probably chemical and biological agents). The new authorities would not merely face Afghan-type sabotage, but civil war with the probable use of WMDs, and not only within the limits of the Korean Peninsula. Even if we imagine that no such dramatic events would unfold and the North Korean ruling class and military would humbly accept their expected fate, the Northern population, not being ready to become part of a capitalist economy and dissatisfied with their inevitable role as “second-grade people,” would be in permanent opposition to the central government. 40  “Unification a Bonanza for Korean Peninsula,” Korea Joongang Daily (May 26, 2014), https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2989714 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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North Korea has also developed its administrative/business “middle class,” which includes a certain segment of intellectuals as well. These people (and their number is high) have no interest in being thrown overboard and leading a lower-class life under the heel of South Koreans. Indeed, most Northern defectors find it impossible to adapt to life in South Korea. Also, low-skilled workers would need considerable time to cope with today’s industrial requirements (one cannot even rule out that South Korean businesspeople would initially be forced to bring external labour resources to the North of the unified country). North Koreans would not be allowed to go south, so the former North Korean territory would experience unemployment. That would create persistent instability on the peninsula.41 Of course, Pyongyang was aware of the prevailing attitudes in Seoul. Kim Jong-un immediately decided to develop ties with the daughter of former South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee so that it would be clear to everyone who was No. 1 on the Korean Peninsula and that it would be better not to attack him. An occasion soon presented itself—the start of the Foal Eagle joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States. Arguments for a response were solid indeed. The exercises involved US Navy ships carrying nuclear weapons.42 The Pentagon publicly announced that B-52 bombers from Andersen AFB had flown over South Korea, thus demonstrating the strength of the “nuclear umbrella.”43 On March 7, 2013, North Korea threatened to terminate the Armistice Agreement and declared that these exercises threatened its security.44

41  For more detail, see: G. D. Toloraya, “Status Quo for the Sake of Progress,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (2011). 42  “U.S. Nukes to Remain in South,” Korea JoongAng Daily (March 12, 2013), http:// ww38.koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2968431 (accessed June 24, 2020). 43  Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Threatens U.  S. Military Bases in the Pacific,” The New York Times (March 21, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/world/asia/ north-korea-threatens-us-military-bases-in-the-pacific.html (accessed June 24, 2020). 44  “Korean Armistice Agreement Will No Longer Exist,” Rodong Sinmun (March 7, 2013) KCNA, http://www. Kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201303/news07/20130307-07ee.html (accessed June 24, 2020).

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In connection with the approval of Resolution No. 2094 by the UN Security Council,45 North Korea announced on the following day that it had withdrawn from all non-aggression pacts with South Korea.46 In this situation, on March 11, the United States and South Korea launched their military exercises, which Pyongyang strongly condemned.47 On March 13, North Korea reiterated that the 1953 armistice was no longer in effect and announced that it had terminated the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.48 Then, on March 27, North Korea announced that it was shutting down communication lines with the South, saying that “in a situation where war may begin at any time, it is unnecessary to maintain a military liaison channel anymore.”49 On March 26, the United States again sent B-52 bombers from Guam to fly over South Korea as part of the exercises.50 On March 30, the North Korean government declared that it had returned to a “state of war” with South Korea. The declaration promised “stern physical actions” against “any act of provocation.” Kim Jong-un stated that North Korean missiles were ready to hit US bases in the Pacific Ocean in response to the passage of two B-52 bombers over the Korean Peninsula. The Pentagon said that “the U.S. is fully capable of defending

45  “North Korea Ends Peace Pacts with South,” BBC News (March 8, 2013), https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21709917 (accessed June 24, 2020). 46  “North Korea Ends Armistice with South Amid War Games on Both Sides of Border,” The Guardian (March 11, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/11/ north-korea-declares-end-armistice (accessed June 24, 2020). 47  Lucy Williamson, “US-South Korea Drills Begin Amid North Korea Tensions,” BBC News (March 11, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21737859 (accessed June 24, 2020). 48  Lim Chang-Won, “North Korea confirms end of war armistice,” AFP (accessed June 24, 2020). 49  “North Korea Cuts Off Contact with South,” The Australian (March 28, 2013), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/north-korean-fury-over-souths-warning/ story-e6frg6so-1226607959530?nk=19f49e6bfc54da8d9ad2589bf5174789-1591877963 (accessed June 24, 2020); Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Cuts Off the Remaining Military Hot Lines With South Korea,” The New  York Times (March 27, 2013), https://www. nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/north-korea-shuts-last-remaining-hotline-to-­ south.html?_r=0 (accessed June 24, 2020). 50  “US Reinforcing Pacific Defenses to Counter North Korean Threats,” Defense-Update. com (April 6, 2013), https://defense-update.com/20130406_us-reinforcing-pacific-­ defenses-to-counter-north-korean-threats.html (accessed June 24, 2020).

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itself and its allies against North Korean missile attacks. We are firmly committed to defending South Korea and Japan.”51 On April 3, North Korea closed access to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and its employees were permitted to leave the area (most of them voluntarily elected to stay and continue working52). On April 8, North Korea announced the withdrawal of all its workers (about 50,000)53 from Kaesong,54 with them not reporting for work the next morning.55 As The New York Times wrote, “the fate of Kaesong is seen as a crucial test of how far North Korea is willing to take its recent threats against the South. Its continued operation was often seen as a sign that Pyongyang’s verbal militancy was not necessarily matched by its actions.”56 Kaesong was previously closed on three occasions in 2009.57 Pyongyang stated that the threat of US aggression might result in a “preventive” nuclear strike and that war might begin “today or tomorrow.”58 On April 4, North Korea relocated its medium-range missiles to its east coast.59 On the following day, South Korea sent two Sejong the Great-class 51  “North Korea Enters ‘State of War’ with South,” BBC (March 30, 2013),: https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21979127 (accessed June 24, 2020). 52  Jethro Mullen, Barbara Starr, and Laura Smith-Spark, “Embassies Face Decisions as Tensions Rise in North Korea,” CNN (April 5, 2013), https://edition.cnn. com/2013/04/05/world/asia/koreas-tensions/index.html?hpt=ias_c1 (accessed June 24, 2020). 53  “North Korea Urges Foreigners to Flee From South Korea,” (newspaper) (April 10, 2013): 6. 54  Twitter. YonhapNews: (URGENT) “N.  Korea to withdraw,” Twitter.com (April 8, 2013), https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/321176683422035968 (accessed June 24, 2020). 55  Christine Kim, “North Korea Workers Don’t Report for Work at Joint Industrial Park: Report,” Reuters April 9, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-­ kaesong/north-korea-workers-dont-report-for-work-at-joint-industrial-park-report-idUSBRE93716C20130409 (accessed June 24, 2020). 56  “North Korea Threatens to Close Factories It Runs With South,” The New York Times (March 30, 2013), URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/world/asia/north-­ korean-­sites-are-down-in-possible-cyberattacks.html (accessed June 24, 2020). 57  “北, 2009, Three Times in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Passage Blocked,” NAVER (April 3, 2013), https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=shm &sid1=100&oid=001&aid=0006182728 (accessed June 24, 2020). 58  “North Korea Warns of Merciless Nuclear Strike,” Sky News, https://news.sky.com/ story/1073563/north-korea-warns-of-merciless-nuclear-strike (accessed June 24, 2020). 59  “North Korea Moves Missile to Its East Coast,” The Wall Street Journal (April 4, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323646604578402123491813936 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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destroyers to observe the possible deployment area of the North Korean missiles.60 Tension was growing. In response to the demonstrative fuelling of their missiles by North Korea, South Korea, the United States and Taiwan placed their troops in operational readiness. On April 11, one of the North Korean missiles was put in an upright position, which was understood as preparation for launch.61 Throughout the night, North Korean troops relocated the missiles several times in order to conceal them.62 The confrontation was growing along all lines: the South Korean side was throwing subversive leaflets over the Military Demarcation Line. North Korea stated that South Korea would “definitely face a disastrous situation.”63 Understandably, South Korea’s proposal to hold negotiations regarding the Kaesong Industrial Complex was, given the circumstances, rejected by the North, which called Seoul’s initiative “empty and meaningless.”64 North Korea then moved on to threats. According to the military commanders’ ultimatum published by KCNA, “a military demonstration of the might of North Korea’s revolutionary armed forces will result in a powerful blow that will, like a hammer, annihilate the hostile forces that threaten the honour and dignity of the country’s top leaders.”65 North Korea also deemed the actions of South Korean activists, when they burned a portrait and effigy of Kim Il-sung in Seoul, as well as portraits and effigies of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, on Kim Il-sung’s birthday (April 15) a “crime.” North Korea threatened to attack its enemies

60   “South Korean Destroyers Watch for Possible North Korean Missile Launch,” Navaltoday.com (April 5, 2013), https://www.navaltoday.com/2013/04/05/south-­ korean-­destroyers-watch-for-possible-north-korean-missile-launch (accessed June 24, 2020). 61  “N. Korea May be Able to Deliver Nuke, Pentagon Intel Says,” CNN (April 12, 2013), https://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/11/world/asia/koreas-tensions/index.html (accessed June 24, 2020). 62  Ibid. 63  “N. Korea Warns Against Seoul Activists Releasing Propaganda Leaflets,” Yonhap News, https://en.yna.co.kr “(accessed June 24, 2020). 64  Pyongyang Dismisses Seoul’s Negotiation Proposal,” Lenta (April 14, 2013), https:// lenta.ru/news/2013/04/14/dismiss (accessed June 24, 2020); Post to Facebook. “North Korea Rejects South Korea’s Calls for Talks,” USA Today (April 14, 2013), https://www. usatoday.com/stor y/news/world/2013/04/14/nor th-kor ea-south-kor eastalks/2081431 (accessed June 24, 2020). 65  North Korea: Threats for Provocations,” Interfax (April 16, 2013), http://www.interfax.ru/world/txt.asp?id=301789 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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without warning in the event of new offences on the part of the “South Korean puppets.” However, North Korea felt that overreacting would be no good and started to send hints that it was ready for peace. Pyongyang stated that if South Korea wanted to set up dialogue between the two countries, it had to apologize for its “offensive acts.”66 In this regard, the North indicated that it was ready to restore peaceful relations provided that its status as nuclear power would not be in dispute.67 The situation cooled somewhat in May. Jang Jong-nam was appointed new Minister of National Defence in North Korea, which South Korean experts understood as an attempt on the part of Kim Jong-un to relieve tension (specialists described the former minister, General Kim Kyok-sik, as a hardliner). However, short-range missile trial launches continued in a manner irritating Seoul. The South Korean military deployed Spike missiles on the islands of Paeknendo and Yongpyeongdo.68 North Korea placed its upgraded artillery on its border with South Korea.69 Nevertheless, the confrontation abated. In late May, UN Secretary-­ General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the reduced tension on the peninsula and noted that he expected Russia to facilitate dialogue with North Korea.70 On May 29, North Korea proposed signing a peace treaty to replace the existing Armistice Agreement. On June 8, North Korea accepted a South Korean proposal to hold negotiations in Panmunjom and reopened its hot line with South Korea at 2 p.m. local time. In August 2013, South Korea, in turn, proposed the joint creation with North Korea of a “Peace Park” within the demilitarized area dividing the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel. On August 14, following negotiations, representatives of the North and the South signed a five-point 66  “North Korea Issues Ultimatum to South Korea,” Lenta (April 16, 2013), URL: https://lenta.ru/news/2013/04/16/attack (accessed June 24, 2020). 67  “North Korea Ready to Develop Relations, Ensure Stability ‘as a Responsible Nuke State,’” RT News (April 5, 2013), https://rt.com/news/north-korea-nuke-state-844 (accessed June 24, 2020). 68  “South Korea Deployed Missiles to Protect Islands Near its Border with North,” RIA Novosti (May 19, 2013), https://ria.ru/20130519/938162360.html (accessed June 24, 2020). 69  “North Korea Deploys Ungraded Artillery at Border with South Korea,” RIA Novosti (June 30, 2013), https://ria.ru/20130630/946648843.html (accessed June 24, 2020). 70  “Ban Ki-moon on Reduced Tension and Enhancement of Dialogue with North Korea,” RIA Novosti (May 19, 2013), URL: https://ria.ru/20130519/938156326.html (accessed June 24, 2020).

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plan for resuming joint operation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex.71 In February 2014 and October 2015, separated families were reunited.72 Meanwhile, South Korea continued searching for a theoretical basis for the policy of its conservative administration with respect to the North. A detailed “trust-building process” road map was set forth in a special document issued by the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea and presented to the public by unification minister Ryoo Kihl-jae on August 21, 2013. The minister explained that the degree of inter-Korean distrust was currently very high and that relations between the parties were not great, so the policy of Park Geun-hye was one of the tools to establish, under the leadership of South Korea, a new trust-based order.73 Ryoo Kihl-jae described the essence of the new administration’s North Korean policy as follows: to develop North–South relations on the basis of stable security, thus shaping inter-Korean trust; to strengthen peace on the Korean Peninsula; and then to create the basis for unification.74 The document mentions three phases of implementing the trust process on the Korean Peninsula (or, more precisely, in inter-Korean relations, since it focuses on them): Phase 1 is the building of trust; Phase 2 is co-operation in the field of social and economic infrastructure; and Phase 3 is large-scale support for North Korea subject to its denuclearization. Kim Jong-un, having proven his stubborn and unyielding character in 2013, was also willing to proceed to the normalization of relations, including for the purpose of receiving economic benefits. In October 2014, he used the fact that South Korea was holding the Asian Games to send a high-ranking official delegation led by Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army Hwang Pyong-so to attend the Games’ closing ceremony in Incheon. At that time, Hwang Pyong-so was believed to be the “second man” in North Korea and had nothing to do 71  Rick Wallace, “Koreas Reach Deal to Reopen Kaesong,” The Australian (August 15, 2013), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/koreas-reach-deal-to-reopen-­­ kaesong/story-e6frg6so-1226697308362?net_sub_uid=44933799 (accessed June 24, 2020). 72  “The Results of Park Geun-hye’s Activities as President of South Korea. A dossier,” / TASS (March 10, 2017), https://tass.ru/info/4084225 (accessed June 24, 2020). 73  Kim Yeong-woong, “President Park Geun-hye’s ‘Trust Process’: Its Goals, Content and Prospects,” in Russia and Korea in a Changing World (Moscow, 2014). 74  Ryoo Kihl-jae. Nambuk kwangye bulsin nopha … Se jilso henson gih-ve (“Distrust in inter-Korean relations is high … A chance to create a new order”), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2013/08/21/0505000000AKR20130821133551043.HTML (accessed June 24, 2020).

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with sports. In Incheon, the North Korean visitors held negotiations with Minister of Ryoo Kihl-jae and National Security Advisor Kim Kwan-jin. Following the conversation, South Korean representatives announced plans to hold new high-level meetings with the North.75 In addition, Seoul began to express interest in participation in the Russia–North Korea Hasan-Rajin logistics project, in particular for the purpose of coal deliveries to South Korean ports.76 However, no real improvement of relations occurred until the end of Park Geun-hye’s rule (when she was impeached in March 2017). Park Geun-hye retained her belief that the regime would soon fall days and made no serious concessions. Sabre-rattling continued, and the annual Key Resolve and Toxuri joint military exercises held by the United States and South Korea did not alter their goals. They still took place in the immediate vicinity of the inter-Korean border and simulated the capture of a foothold on North Korean soil and a further advance toward the capital. Some scenarios even proposed the “decapitation” of North Korea, i.e. to physically annihilate its leaders.77 At the beginning of 2016, after North Korea had carried out its latest nuclear test (on January 6) and missile launches (on February 7), inter-­ Korean relations dramatically deteriorated. On February 10, 2016, the government of South Korea declared that it would close the joint industrial site in Kaesong and unilaterally withdraw from the Hasan-Rajin project. In addition to the UN sanctions adopted in connection with North Korea’s actions, South Korea imposed its own unilateral sanctions: financial restrictions with respect to individuals and entities suspected of involvement in the development of weapons of mass destruction; a ban on access to South Korean ports for any foreign flag vessels that had visited any North Korean port within the last 180 days; a ban on the import of North Korean products into South Korea via third countries; and a prohibition for South Korean nationals to use North Korean restaurants or

75  “South Korea announces restart of negotiations with the North,” DW, https://www. dw.com/r u/южная-корея-объявила-о-возобновлении-переговоров-скндр/a-17973486 (accessed June 24, 2020). 76  “The Results of Park Geun-hye’s Activities as President of South Korea. A dossier,” / TASS (March 10, 2017), https://tass.ru/info/4084225 (accessed June 24, 2020). 77  Kim Yeong-woong, “President Park Geun-hye’s ‘Trust Process’: Its Goals, Content and Prospects,” in Russia and Korea in a Changing World (Moscow, 2014).

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other commercial outlets outside North Korea. Any co-operation was completely curtailed.78 The infamous end of Park Geun-hye’s presidency apparently symbolized the unpromising nature of such a policy. The deadlock in inter-Korean relations was not the cause of her impeachment, but it contributed to the public opinion on the scandalous national leader.

8.3  The Inter-Korean “Honeymoon” The rise to power of liberal president Moon Jae-in following the early election of May 9, 2017, dramatically changed the situation. Moon Jae-in was an even more radical supporter of closer ties with North Korea that his patron, former President of the Republic of Korea Roh Moo-hyun. This is why conservatives labelled him “leftist” and “communist.” The principles declared in his inter-Korean policy looked very impressive. The website of the Ministry of Unification noted that the new government would pursue a “long-term and comprehensive policy […] to realize ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’ on the Korean Peninsula, as well as in Northeast Asia, together with North Korea, regional neighbours and the international community.” It was stated that Seoul would “peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, using a step-by-step, two-track approach of sanctions/pressure and dialogue […] Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and improvement of inter-Korean relations are not two separate matters, they should complement each other.” The new administration also promised to conclude a “New Inter-Korean Basic Agreement for establishing sustainable inter-Korean relations,” restore “national homogeneity,” and build “an inter-Korean community by expanding various inter-Korean exchanges.”79 It should be noted that these approaches gained a modicum of support in Pyongyang, subject to the fact that it did not accept any correlation between the nuclear problem (that the North Koreans were willing to discuss solely with the United States) and inter-Korean relations. Generally, however, the line proposed by realists in South Korean ruling circles, such 78  “The Results of Park Geun-hye’s Activities as President of South Korea. A dossier,” / TASS (March 10, 2017), https://tass.ru/info/4084225 (accessed June 24, 2020). 79   “Four Strategies,” Ministry of Unification, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_ unikorea/policylssues/koreanpeninsula/strategies (accessed June 24, 2020).

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as Chung Eui-yong (minister of foreign affairs), Moon Chung-in (presidential advisor) and Suh Hoon (director of the National Intelligence Service), was constructive and perceived with understanding both inside and outside the country, although there were a lot of ardent opponents as well. Such an approach generally conforms to Russia’s ideas regarding the desirable scenario of inter-Korean relations. It should be understood, however, that Moon Jae-in, while radically changing policy with respect to North Korea, had to appease the United States and South Korean conservatives, for whom the nuclear issue was the key argument for the isolation and weakening of North Korea. Nevertheless, despite the good intentions, 2017 became a period of acute tension on the Korean Peninsula, due to the concentration of troops and verbal duels between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. The situation prevented Moon Jae-in from going through with his plan to build closer relations with the North. His new administration was forced to manoeuvre between President Trump’s sabre-rattling and Kim Jong-un’s predicting inevitable nuclear war. South Korea found itself hostage to a “big game” of two leaders matching each other in extravagance and reluctant to listen to its exhortations. In late 2017, for instance, Seoul asked Washington to not conduct any joint exercises until after the Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in 2018. The drills had irritated the North immensely in previous years, and not without reason, as they regularly simulated operations against North Korea and its leaders. A golden opportunity for Moon Jae-in emerged at the beginning of 2018. South Korea found itself in the “driver’s seat” in the peace process, and Moon Jae-in’s personal role in this process was quite remarkable. Notably, the United States acted as spoiler throughout the previous period of détente, the decade of liberal leadership in South Korea (1998–2008). US President George W.  Bush opposed the “appeasement” of North Korea and, in fact, sought to contain the peaceful policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Now, however, due to the coinciding interests of Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump, the scale of change was all but tectonic. While eventually the dawn of a new era failed to appear, that was not the fault of Moon’s administration. The threat of disaster that had seemed quite real after the approval of a harsh UN Security Council Resolution against North Korea on December 22, 2017, in response to the launch of its Hwasong-15 missile (effectively an economic blockade of the republic) was eventually neutralized owing

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to a smart initiative by North Korea. In his 2018 New Year speech, Kim Jong-un wished the 2018 Winter Olympics in the South Korean county of Pyeongchang success and expressed the hope that North Korean athletes would take part in the event. “First of all, it is necessary to abate the acute military tension between the North and the South and to create a peaceful situation on the Korean Peninsula,” he emphasized. Moon Jae-in, in contrast to his predecessors—who had repeatedly dismissed such proposals from the North as propaganda—immediately seconded this idea. On January 4, representatives of the two countries representatives talked on the reopened hot line, and high-level negotiations were held in Panmunjom on January 9 (for the first time since December 2015). It was decided to “actively support” the Olympics as “a good time to demonstrate the great image of the nation.” The parties agreed that North Korea would send a representative “high-level delegation” to the South, including, in addition to high-­ ranking officials and athletes, a group of fans, a group of artists, a music band, a taekwondo demonstration team, and journalists, and South Korea would receive them according to their status.80 Undoubtedly, the very fact that conflict had become less likely and North and South Korean athletes competed (not for the first time, by the way) under a single flag was inspiring. More importantly, however, North Korea used the opportunity for political dialogue by sending an unprecedentedly large delegation. Formally, this delegation was led by Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the nominal head of North Korea who represented the state at all international events. But the participation of Kim Yo-jong, the leader’s sister, was far more significant, because negotiations in South Korean territory were for the first time attended by a representative of the “ruling family.”81 During her meetings with the top South Korean leaders, she expressed her brother’s position regarding further rapprochement and prospects of inter-Korean relations. They agreed to hold the first Inter-Korean Summit for 13 years (and the first one for Kim Jong-un). 80  K.  V. Asmolov, “North and South: An Olympic Exit from a Pre-Heat Attack State,” Valdai International Discussion Club, http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sever-i-yug-­ olimpiyskiy-vykhod/?sphrase_id=130025 (accessed June 24, 2020). 81  K.  V. Asmolov, “The Political Results of the 2018 Olympics,” Valdai International Discussion Club (January 15, 2018), http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/itogi-­ olimpiady/?sphrase_id=130025 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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Both parties acted without delay, which is not typical for the North Korean side, which usually spends a lot of time weighing all the pros and cons. National Intelligence Service director Suh Hoon played a significant role in arranging the summit and improving inter-Korean relations as a whole. He had already taken part in arranging two previous summits (in 2000 and 2007), which meant that he had met Kim Jong-il more times than any other South Korean official.82 In early March, he visited Pyongyang, established direct contact with the North Korean leaders, and resolved many fundamental issues, thus paving the way for the negotiations. On March 29, 2018, a new round of high-level negotiations was held as part of preparations for the summit between Minister of Unification of the Republic of Korea Сho Myoung-gyon and Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland Ri Son-gwon. Th two agreed that the summit would be held at the Inter-Korean Peace House in the southern part of Panmunjom in South Korea on April 27.83 In anticipation of his meeting with South Korean president Moon Jae-in, Kim Jong-un stated that, starting on April 21, North Korea would suspend its nuclear tests and intercontinental missile launches and close its nuclear testing ground in the northern part of the country. The Panmunjom Declaration was adopted as a result of the April 27 summit, which was important primarily from the symbolic and demonstrative point of view (it was the first time that such a meeting occurred in South Korean territory, and many beautiful photos were taken). It should be noted that the document was rather symbolic. Like all previous inter-­ Korean documents (whose history began in 1972), it contains many forward-­looking oaths, but few specific provisions. The text said that the “two sides affirmed the principle of national independence” and “agreed to hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields, including high-level talks at an early date.” It was agreed to “establish a joint liaison office” in Kaesong, which was an unprecedented step towards the wishes of South Korea. It was also agreed to “invigorate multi-faceted cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts of people from all levels of 82  “Seoul to Send Special Delegation to Pyongyang Next Week,” Dong-a Ilbo (March 3, 2018), https://www.donga.com/en/Home/article/all/20180303/1240505/1/Seoul-­ to-­send-special-delegation-to-Pyongyang-next-week (accessed June 24, 2020). 83   K.V.  Asmolov, “Inter-Korean Summit: Will the ‘Olympic Warming’ Grow into Something Bigger?” Valdai International Discussion Club (April 2, 2018), http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/mezhkoreyskiy-sammit-teplo/?sphrase_id=130025 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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society in order to give further momentum to the atmosphere of national reconciliation and unity.” The North and South decided to jointly participate “in international sports events such as the 2018 Asian Games,” and to “convene the Inter-Korean Red Cross Meeting to discuss and solve various issues including the reunion of separated families and relatives.” Referring to the declaration concluded by Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-­ hyun on October 4, 2007, it was agreed to “take practical measures to relink and modernize railways and roads on the eastern and western coasts on a priority basis for their active use.” A special section was devoted to measures to alleviate military tension. The parties promised to “completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, sea and air that are the root cause of military tension and conflicts,” and to “stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) from May 1, to dismantle their means, and further to transform the DMZ into a peace zone in a genuine sense.” Given the history of their conflicts, it is especially important that the parties agreed to “devise a practical scheme to turn the area of the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone to prevent accidental military clashes and ensure safe fishing activities there.” As regards the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, it was stated that “the two sides reaffirmed the non-aggression agreement that precludes the use of force in any form against each other,” and agreed to “carry out disarmament in a phased manner.” An innovative element was that the parties agreed to declare the end of war this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement and actively promote the holding of trilateral meetings involving the two sides and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two sides, the United states and China with a view to replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.

Although this provision reiterated ideas from previous summits, the abandonment of the six-party format had never been declared so openly at such a level. Moon Jae-in, who did not want to anger his US ally, considered it a personal success that Kim Jong-un agreed to include in the declaration the provision that “the two sides confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean

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Peninsula.” In addition, at the insistence of the North Korean side, the declaration emphasized that “the measures being initiated by the north side are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”84 It should be recognized that Moon Jae-in did everything he could to not irritate Pyongyang or disappoint Washington. Moreover, he managed to become an intermediary between North Korea and the United States in arranging the first US–North Korean summit. This is why the reference to denuclearization was so important for the South Korean side—they needed something to demonstrate to Trump. When the North Korea– United States Singapore Summit scheduled for June 2018 was called into question after a quarrel between the two sides, Moon Jae-in was the one to step in and save it. To this end, he arranged an urgent meeting with Kim Jong-un in the northern part of Panmunjom in late May and, after that, convinced Trump not to scrap the summit.85 Kim Jong-un was satisfied with the role Moon Jae-in had played in the unprecedented breakthrough in US–Korea relations and received him warmly in Pyongyang. The third Inter-Korean Summit of that year (September 18–20, 2018) was truly triumphant. In addition to the programme, Kim Jong-un even invited his guest to Mount Paektu, where the two leaders were photographed together with their families against the background of a lake on its top that is sacred for the Koreans. To mark their reconciliation, the leaders planted a tree. For the first time in history, a South Korean leader was allowed to speak publicly at a stadium in front of a North Korean audience, and a massive audience to boot—as many as 150,000 people, although the attendees were specially selected. The leaders signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, which contained many meaningful agreements in various areas, including some “sensitive” areas, including the military. Along with a commitment to “national autonomy,” the theme of inter-Korean solidarity was declared more clearly than ever. The document singled out the attainment of independence and self-determination of the Korean nation,

 Rodong Sinmun (April 28, 2018) (accessed June 24, 2020).  K.V.  Asmolov, “Inter-Korean Summit: Deep Symbolism of the Protocol,” Valdai International Discussion Club (May 3, 2018), http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ mezhkoreyskiy-sammit-glubokiy-simvolizm-protokola/?sphrase_id=130025 (accessed June 20, 2020). 84 85

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as well as the desire to resolve Korean issues without any external intervention, as priorities. The most important section of the declaration was the agreement “to expand the cessation of military hostility in regions of confrontation such as the DMZ into the substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean Peninsula and a fundamental resolution of the hostile relations.” To elaborate this provision, an unprecedented agreement in the military area was concluded (we will cover this in greater detail below). It was agreed to start construction activities “within this year” in order to connect and upgrade railroads and motorways on the east and west coasts, “normalize the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourism Project,” and discuss “a west coast joint special economic zone and an east coast joint special tourism zone.” It was also decided “to actively promote South–North environment cooperation so as to protect and restore the natural ecology, and as a first step to endeavor to achieve substantial results in the currently on-going forestry cooperation,” and “strengthen cooperation in the areas of prevention of epidemics, public health and medical care, including emergency measures to prevent the entry and spread of contagious diseases.” In addition, it was agreed that there would be cooperation in humanitarian matters, including opening “a permanent facility for family reunion meetings in the Mount Kumgang area,” resolving the issue of video meetings and exchange of video messages among the separated families […] through inter-Korean Red Cross talks, expanding cultural and artistic exchanges, sending a joint team to international sports events, including the 2020 Summer Olympic Games, and cooperating in bidding for the joint inter-Korean hosting of the 2032 Summer Olympic Games. The last point was very important, as it demonstrated that South Korea was not expecting the North Korean regime to collapse any time soon (unlike its previous position), and that the North and the South would exist separately for at least the next 15 years.86 Observers noted in particular the two countries committing to turn the Korean Peninsula “into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats” and to “cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The North Korean party also promised to “permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine 86  Chung-in Moon, Understanding the Korea Peace Initiative: The North Korean Nuclear Quagmire and the Quest for Peace.

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test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries.” In addition, North Korea expressed its intention (addressed primarily to the United States) to carry out “the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon, as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-North Korean Joint Statement.” Kim Jong-un’s consent to visit Seoul for the first time was the most striking news. In the past, such a visit was believed to be unsafe for him.87 Throughout the difficult history of inter-Korean relations, there had never been an agreement governing military activities and trust-building arrangements that was more far-reaching than the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration [the Agreement Resulting from the April 27 Inter-Korean Summit—author’s note] in the Military Domain” signed in Pyongyang on September 19.88 It is worth noting that Seoul did not give prior notice to the United States regarding the document to be signed in Pyongyang and, as a result, the commander of the US troops in South Korea learned about this development, with its vital important for the security of the Korean Peninsula, post factum. The agreement rarely hones in on specifics for inter-Korean documents. In fact, it is a non-aggression treaty. It was agreed that live-fire military drills and field training exercises would be ceased at the regiment level and above within 5 km of the Military Demarcation Line. The sides also agreed to reduce military forces and weapons in the demilitarized zone, literally to “install covers on the barrels” of their artillery. The establishment of a “peace zone” in a disputed maritime area in the Yellow (West) Sea was of particular importance. The parties created no-fly zones along the DMZ, up to 40 km wide on both sides, where drones, helicopters and other aircraft were prohibited. The two Korean states agreed to an initial phase of control over troops and weapons. This would not in itself ensure that a conflict would not break out, but it certainly lowered the likelihood of one happening by accident. 87  “The September Pyongyang Joint Declaration,” Uri minzok kiri. – 2018. – 19 Sep. – URL: http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?lang=rus&ptype=cfotpo&no=4 (accessed June 24, 2020). 88  O. Kiryanov, “Leaders from North and South Korea Sign Joint Declaration,” Rossiyskaya gazeta (September 19, 2018), https://rg.ru/2018/09/19/lidery-iuga-i-severa-korei-­­ podpisali-sovmestnoe-zaiavlenie.html (accessed June 24, 2020).

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Following the summit, Pyongyang also planned substantial measures to develop inter-Korean co-operation. These were intended to “develop the economy in a well-balanced manner.” Particular attention should be given to the proposal to form a special economic zone (SEZ) in the Yellow Sea, an area long disputed by North and South Korea, and such a measure would be a perfect solution (however, an agreement to this effect was reached back in 2007). It was agreed to set up a special tourist zone on the eastern side of the peninsula.89 The North Korean side seemed to place genuine hopes on the implementation of the agreements and at the working level said that, hopefully, the construction of the “western” railroad would soon begin along the coast of the Yellow Sea with a connection to China. North Korean experts expected regular traffic via this route to be opened within two years of the commencement of joint activities. Then, as projected, the construction of the “eastern” railroad going to Russia would begin. On a first-priority basis, efforts would be made to resume “Kumgang(san) mountain tourism” and the operation of the joint industrial area in Kaesong. Regarding plans to set up an SEZ along the west coast, as the North Koreans believed would happen, an understanding was reached and working-level consultations began, whereas a tourism SEZ on the east coast was only approved in principle.90 Further events showed that these expectations were exaggerated, although some steps to implement the agreements were taken. For example, the parties completed the disarmament of the joint security area in Panmunjom in October 2018, and North Korea destroyed ten guard posts on the border between the countries. As early as November 22, the militaries of the two countries had established a road connection. A month later, on December 26, a ceremony was held to celebrate the start of work to connect and upgrade railroads between the North and the South. Activities to clear mines and to search for soldier remains were carried out.

89   For more detail, see: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ i t o g i - p y a t o g o - m e z h k o r e y s k o g o - s a m m i t a - p o s h a g o v y y - a n a l i z - i t o g o v o g o -­ dokumenta/?sphrase_id=45701839 90  A.V.  Vorontsov, “The Diplomacy of Summits—A New Face of the Korean Peninsula Today,” Valdai International Discussion Club (October 12, 2018), https://ru.valdaiclub. com/a/highlights/diplomatiya-sammitov (accessed June 24, 2020).

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8.4  A Period of Disappointment The brief “honeymoon” did not result in a radical change in relations. Kim Jong-un seemed to hope that, given “America’s focus on its own interests” under Trump and his personal “flirtation” with the US president, Seoul would manage to escape strict US guardianship and follow its own line in inter-Korean relations. The North Korean side believed that the Northern Policy of Moon Jae-in was generally acceptable to them, except for the emphasis on the nuclear issue. Soon it was confirmed, however, that the South Korean leader was so firmly tied to the “American chariot” that most initiatives, although genuinely desirable for Moon Jae-in, were simply unfeasible. Oddly enough, this was an unpleasant discovery for Kim Jong-un, and he, to a certain extent, “lost face” in the eyes of domestic conservatives. The events of 2019–2020 demonstrated again that the North and the South inherently lacked the ability to resolve the issue of regional security regime through their joint efforts alone. The last straw was a summit with the United States in Hanoi where US president Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un failed to reach an agreement. After the failure, Kim took it out on the “dependent” South Koreans. The North Korean side was outraged by the fact that, after all the oaths and hugs, South Korea continued to coordinate its actions with the United States. Kim Jong-un was especially disappointed by the personal inconsistency of the South Korean leader in the country’s North Korean policy, which manifested itself, for example, in new military exercises (“a knife in my back”). He complained about that in his letters to Trump, as revealed by Bob Woodward’s journalistic investigation.91 This weakened the position of the Pyongyang leader vis-à-vis the internal “hawk” faction. After the abortive Hanoi Summit in February 2019, North Korea entered a period of self-isolation, and contacts with South Korea started to dwindle. Pyongyang stated that, if Moon Jae-in’s administration had in fact supported the North, “it would have stopped any military exercises between the United States and South Korea, as it had been asked, as well as the import of any invisible fighter jets capable of attacking North Korea without being detected.” 91  “Kim Jong Un: ‘Hypersensitive’ US Military Actions Contributed to Failed Talks,” NK News (September 11, 2020), https://www.nknews.org/2020/09/kim-jong-un-­ hypersensitive-us-military-actions-contributed-to-failedtalks/?t=1599884393778 (accessed September 12, 2020).

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In October 2019, Kim Jong-un visited the long-inactive “joint tourist zone” at Mount Kumgang and criticized the resort as “poorly maintained” and “backward,” demanding that the “ugly” buildings constructed by South Korea be demolished. Seoul’s proposal to hold a bilateral meeting in order to discuss this issue was ignored. In addition, the attempts of South Korea to revive this symbolic (in all aspects) project were blocked by the United States which, within the context of sanctions, prevented Seoul from reopening the tourist zone in order to prevent a new source of funds for the North Korean nuclear programme from appearing. In April 2020, Donald Trump said that “it is not the time” to grant economic benefits to North Korea. Nevertheless, Seoul continued its attempts to fulfil those items of the inter-Korean agreements in which it was interested.92 On April 27 2020, for instance, South Korea unilaterally conducted a ceremony at the ministerial level marking the official launch of the North–South railroad connection project.93 A downturn in relations occurred in mid-2020 triggered by the actions of two groups of defectors from the North: the Movement for Human Rights and Freedom in North Korea and the Kuen Saem Project, which launched balloons with “hundreds of thousands” of propaganda leaflets over the Military Demarcation Line on May 31—something that had been directly prohibited by the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018. Seoul’s attempts to reign in the anti-North Korean organizations “within the framework of democratic procedures” were condemned by Pyongyang as “insufficient.”94 The North Korean side reproached the Blue House, saying that Moon Jae-in could have acted in a much more decisive manner after the pro-presidential party had won parliamentary elections in April.

92   “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council Approves Railway Construction between Gangneung and Jejin on the Donghae Bukbu Line,” Ministry of Unification (April 23, 2020), https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/? boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54232&category=&pageIdx= (accessed June 24, 2020). 93  “S. Korea Holds Inter-Korean Railway Ceremony to Mark 2nd Anniversary of Moon-­ Kim Summit,” Yonhap News (April 27, 20,202), https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/ AEN20200427001452325 (accessed June 24, 2020). 94   “How Park Sang-hak and His Group all but Derailed Inter-Korean Dialogue,” ru.m.journal-neo.org (June 10, 2020), http://telegra.ph/Kak-Pak-San-Hak-i-ego-gruppa-­ chut-­ne-sorvali-mezhkorejskij-dialog-06-10 (accessed August 3, 2020).

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However, the response was far harsher and far-reaching than the event warranted, thus revealing the ripened decision of Pyongyang to return to pressure-based methods and the abandonment of dialogue. In the person of Kim Yo-jong, the leader’s sister (about whom there had been a rumour, shortly before this time, that she may be his possible successor), North Korea declared that it was ready to terminate the agreements reached at the summits and stated that its relations with the South had “become hostile.” It should be noted that it was she who acted as a “pigeon of peace” at the 2018 Olympic Games in South Korea and many facts indicated that Kim Jong-un then appointed her to supervise the country’s relations with the South. Therefore, the message to the South was unambiguous: “there is no way back.” The statement read as follows: “The authorities of South Korea, evading their serious responsibility under a vile pretext, as if there were no other way, have tacitly approved the hostile anti-Republic activities of the scoundrels and led inter-Korean relations toward a disastrous final point.” Stressing its “complete turnaround,” North Korea disabled all communication lines which had been used to maintain the North–South dialogue as of 12:00 pm on June 9, 2020. “The current measures represent an initial phase after the decision to completely block all spaces for liaison with South Korean elements and to liquidate any unnecessary ones,” emphasized KCNA. At the same time, Pyongyang informed Washington that it did not see the maintenance of ostensibly good relations with Seoul as a “substitute” for the fulfilment by the United States of its commitments under the direct agreements of the two leaders. With respect to the “disappointment” expressed by the United States regarding the deterioration of North–South relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated that “the United States has no right to comment on inter-Korean affairs […] It is disgusting to see the duplicity of the United States, which frantically hampers the development of inter-Korean relations when they give signs of progress and pretend to be bothered when they worsen.”95

95  “FM Official Releases Press Statement,” KCNA (June 14, 2020), URL: https:// kcnawatch.org/newstream/1592111071-527965908/fm-of ficial-releases-pressstatement/?t=1592202880782 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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Pyongyang warned Seoul that “from now, time will be, indeed, regretful and painful” for the South Korean authorities.96 And on June 12, Kim Yo-jong stated that North Korea would take the “next action” with respect to Seoul, elaborating by saying “it is high time to surely break with South Korean authorities […] Rubbish must be thrown into dustbin.”97 On the day of the 20th anniversary of the first Inter-Korean Summit, when it seemed appropriate to reflect on the future, the central North Korean media wrote as follows: We have already concluded that there is no need for us to sit face to face with the South Korean authorities and to discuss any matters with them. It remains for us to make them pay a high price for their ugly crimes. We have decided to take a series of retaliatory measures in order to punish the traitors and scoundrels. As already announced, the Inter-Korean Liaison Office will cease to exist and the right to take further measures against the enemy will be delegated to our army. Our invincible revolutionary military forces will act boldly in order to take revenge on our enemies.98

Earlier, North Korea announced that it would cease the activities of the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong, one of the key symbols of détente. On June 16, North Korea moved from words to actions, demolishing the recently erected building that housed the office within the direct line of sight of South Korean surveillance cameras. North Korean TV reported that “the enemy-fighting department has taken steps to completely destroy the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong.” KCNA announced that Pyongyang intended to redeploy its troops in some of the areas that had been demilitarized since 1953. Seoul and Pyongyang had never tried to revise the demilitarized status of that zone, and such a decision would have been a direct violation of the armistice regime that had been in place 96  “Kim Yo Jong Issues Statement,” KCNA (June 14, 2020), https://kcnawatch.org/ newstream/1592111071-831360346/kim-yo-jong-issues-statement/?t=1592202897419 (accessed June 24, 2020). 97  “First Deputy Department Head at the Central Committee of the WPK Kim Yo-jong Says North Korea Will Soon Take Steps of the Next Stage,” Korean Radio (June 14, 2020), https://koreanradio.info/the-1st-deputy-head-of-the-department-of-the-centralcommittee-­­of-the-cpc-kim-ye-jong-expressed-the-position-that-the-dprk-will-soon-take-­ steps-of-the-next-stage (accessed June 24, 2020). 98  Ho Yong Min, “We Will Continue to Take Retaliatory Actions to the End,” rodong.rep (June 15, 2020), http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&ne wsID=2020-06-15-0003 (accessed June 24, 2020).

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since 1953, as well as, more pertinently, the military agreements signed in the presence of the leaders of North and the South two years previously. The Headquarters promised to “turn the front line into a fortress and further strengthen vigilance against the South.” The Republic of Korea National Military was put on high alert, although the government abstained from any sharp response. Nevertheless, the peninsula again found itself in a critical condition.99 A few days later, however, Kim Jong-un disavowed his sister and proved himself to be a “peacemaker.” On June 23, he held a preliminary meeting of the Fifth Session of Central Military Commission (seventh term) of the Workers’ Party of Korea, at which the decision was made to suspend the plan of military operations against South Korea submitted by the Headquarters.100 After that, according to the Yonhap agency, North Korean web resources began to delete articles criticizing the South Korean government and the North Korean military dismantled the loudspeakers along the border that they had just started to install.101 These moves were criticized in South Korea as a tactical game, likely intended to “drive a wedge” between Seoul and Washington, and said that they were ready for new confrontations on the part of the North at any time. It is entirely possible, however, that the South promised something to the North via confidential channels. For North Korea, it was clearly a factor of political manipulation. Soon the leaders of the two Korean states started exchanging rather warm messages via secret channels. On September 22, 2020, North Korean border guards, in compliance with a strict order to allow nobody to enter the country to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, shot dead a potential defector from the South near the disputed limit line and burned down his “water craft.” In an unprecedented move, Kim Jong-un apologized to Moon Jae-in in connection with the matter, thus creating the basis for improving relations.

99  “North Korea Breaks Ties with the South,” Kommersant (June 16, 2020), https:// www.kommersant.ru/doc/4379530?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_ referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews (accessed June 24, 2020). 100  “Kim Jong-un Suspends Military Operation Plan against South Korea,” TASS (June 24, 2020), https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/8803829 (accessed June 28, 2020). 101  “Experts Explain why Pyongyang suspended military operations against Seoul,” RIA Novosti (June 25, 2020), URL: https://ria.ru/20200625/1573470956.html (accessed June 28, 2020).

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But there is a long-term aspect to this as well. Bitter historical experience, the lingering war trauma on both sides, the remaining suspicions and lack of understanding, the differing social systems and mentalities of the North and the South, and the limited independence of South Korea in terms of its policy towards the North still constitute insurmountable obstacles to reconciliation. Any reconciliation seems to be a task for future generations of politicians when both sides of the DMZ are led by someone who has not experienced the trauma of the Korean War personally. This means that we will need to wait another 10 or 15 years until a formula of peaceful coexistence is in place.

PART II

The Nuclear Challenge

CHAPTER 9

North Koreas’s Nuclear Missile Policy: New Facts

9.1   A Retrospective Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Missile Efforts Before Kim Jong-un North Korea’s nuclear missile policy has become its most identifiable characteristic on the international stage after the fall of socialism. In North Korea, it is justifiably considered the only guarantee of the country’s security and independence. “The nuclear card” has taken on an almost sacred meaning for Pyongyang politicians. Not only does it serve as a “deterrent,” but it is also a means of keeping North Korea’s partners (both those who are against the regime and those who support it, like China and Russia) interested in maintaining stability within a de facto nuclear state so as to avoid chaos. North Korea’s nuclear policy places it in the small group of independent international entities, which works to the advantage of North Korean leaders. It is not just the West that Pyongyang sees as a threat, as it is no secret that the North Korean leadership always keeps the possibility of Chinese intervention in mind.1 It would thus be entirely logical to conclude that North Korea will hold on to its nuclear weapons to the very end—at the very least until the highly improbable point where it is 100% sure that its enemies no longer 1  G.D. Toloraya, At Russia’s Eastern Borders. Outlines of Korean Politics in the Early twenty-­ first Century (Moscow: Izdatelsko-torgovaya corporatsiya Dashkov i Co., 2019), 410 pp.

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harbour any hostile intentions and may reasonably expect real developmental assistance. This is unlikely to occur in the near future.2 Although the nuclear issue had become a key factor in international relations by the late 1980s—early 1990s, the roots of this problem go way back some 60 years. Several factors influenced the decision to go nuclear, some of which are still in effect. First and foremost, it is the great trauma of the Korean War, which for all intents and purposes is still going on. The North Korean leadership, having been saved through Chinese intervention, realized that conventional means were no longer sufficient to secure its independence. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (which Kim Il-sung saw as Moscow’s betrayal of Cuba), the “Great Leader” became convinced that the country could no longer rely on the “Soviet nuclear umbrella.” The détente and disarmament between his other main ally (China) and his main enemy (the United States) during Nixon/Kissinger diplomacy only served to exacerbate his concerns about the unreliability of Chinese support. Kim Il-sung came to the conclusion that the North Korean leadership could sleep peacefully only with its own nuclear deterrent in tow. Pyongyang was also aware of the fact that the United States had deployed nuclear armaments in South Korea starting from 1958. This process reached its peak in 1967 when 950 nuclear charges were deployed in South Korea for eight different types of US tactical nuclear weapon.3 Moreover, South Korean President Park Chung-hee, also fearful of a US– China, began to develop his own secret nuclear programme. He planned to finish it by the late 1970s, but was assassinated before he could complete his plan. However, “competition” forced Kim Il-sung not to lag behind. Thus, all the conditions for a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula were already in place by the mid-1970s. In reality, however, North Korea’s security was maintained for another decade and a half through a balance between Soviet and US forces, which is why it was not in a hurry to develop its nuclear programme (its activity was primarily restricted to searching for available resources, training specialists, conducting experiments and developing the necessary

 Ibid.  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “A History of US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 6 (2017): 349–357. 2 3

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infrastructure).4 Moreover, thanks to active Soviet diplomatic efforts in December 1985, North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-­ proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The starting point for the North Korean nuclear programme is believed to be the establishment of the Atomic Energy Research Institute under the Academy of Sciences in 1952.5 The program was initially focused on research into available sources and materials, developing a deep understanding of the subject, training specialists and establishing scientific research centres. It seems that the North Korean sides had already chosen its weapon technology in the form of plutonium, as uranium enrichment was an expensive and resource-­ draining process. By the early 1960s, North Korea had, with the USSR’s assistance, begun construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which has become the heart of its nuclear programme. The equipment—including the research reactor supplied by the USSR, as well as a radiochemical laboratory (RCL)—was not designed for military purposes. However, back then North Korea avoided joining the non-proliferation regime. Thanks to the RCL, North Korean experts were presented with an opportunity to learn how to process spent fuel and extract plutonium from it. Having received IAEA-approved access to the blueprints and papers of English companies, the North Koreans began constructing a “Magnox”-type gas-­ graphite nuclear reactor in 1979, which would produce plutonium for military purposes after its construction. At the same time, a civilian nuclear power policy was also in the works—after a long period of persuasion, the USSR promised to supply two light water reactors in 1985. Pyongyang also made greater efforts to produce delivery systems, with a missile programme being in place since the 1970s. North Korea selected the Soviet P-17 liquid-propelled, single-stage ballistic missile as a sample model (the prototype was supplied by Egypt).6 4  “The Treaty of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed in Moscow in 1961,” The Soviet Union’s Relations with the People’s Korea, 1945–1980, Documents and Materials (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 196–198. 5  For More on the history of the North Korean nuclear programme and attempts to settle the issue up until 2015, see I. V. Dyachkov, Non-Peaceful Nuclear Energy in Northeast Asia: The Korean Knot: A Treatise (Moscow: MGIMO University, 2016), 239 pp. 6  Joseph S.  Bermudez Jr. “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper, no. 2 (November 1999): 6, URL: http://www.missilethreat.com/repository/doclib/19990000-CNS-dprk.pdf (accessed June 29, 2020).

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Nuclear-related research was further fuelled by the 1986 Moscow meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il-sung. The North Korean leader saw the “new thinking” and perestroika as a bad omen signifying radical changes in Moscow’s policy, which could spell the end for Soviet aid. The Korean People’s Army were in decline due to economic hardships and the halt of Soviet technology supply lines since the 1980s. The appeal of the nuclear solution was its radical nature, as well as its relative cheapness. After the collapse of the USSR, North Korea stepped up its production of nuclear materials (plutonium). At the same time, Pyongyang was forced to “diplomatically” conceal this activity. In its diplomatic manoeuvres, the North expressed its desire to work on its relations with Washington in regard to security issues.7 In January 1992, South Korean president Roh Tae-woo announced the complete withdrawal of the US tactical nuclear weapons from the country and the suspension of joint military training exercises. Soon Pyongyang and Seoul adopted the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea signed the safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (which entered into force in April 1992).8 It was Pyongyang’s refusal to co-operate with the IAEA and fully disclose potential plutonium production that had taken place before 1992 that led to the 1993–1994 nuclear crisis. This was resolved with the signing of the Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula by the United States and North Korea, under which the nuclear programme was to be suspended. In particular, the construction of additional reactors with an output of 50 and 200 MW was halted. The freeze did not last long, however, giving way to a protracted “tug-of-war” with the world community. As sure as the seasons change, periods of de-escalation and talks were followed by crises and tensions. After the failure of the Agreed Framework in the early 2000s, Pyongyang, having lost all hope at smoothing out relations with the United States, focused on producing and testing a nuclear charge. For example, in October 2002, as a response to American envoy James Kelly’s allegations, the North Korean side declared that a threat to their country’s 7  A. Panin, and V. Altov. North Korea. The End of the Kim Jong Il Era (Moscow: OLMA-­ PRESS Obrazovanie, 2004), 88. 8  Jon Chol Na, A Duel of Reason between Korea and US: Nuke, Missile and Artificial Satellite (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publications, 2000), 141.

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security entitles them to “not only produce enriched uranium weapons, but more powerful weapons as well.”9 Having exited the NPT in 2003, North Korea went on to declare that it was in possession of nuclear weapons in January 2005 and conducted its first nuclear tests on October 9, 2006. The resulting negotiations halted development but did nothing to stop the active development of nuclear delivery systems. Several missile launches were conducted over the next five years. The launch of a satellite-carrying missile into Earth’s orbit on April 5, 2009, caused a massive outcry. The West believed that Pyongyang had conducted a ballistic missile test. Regardless, the test turned out to be a failure, as the payload did not make it into orbit and the missile debris fell into the Pacific Ocean.10 In protest against the UN Security Council resolution on the matter, North Korea deported nuclear inspectors and informed the IAEA that it was resuming its nuclear weapons programme.11 Nuclear experts began processing used fuel rods (the first step in the production of plutonium12). The process utilized gas-graphite reactor-irradiated fuel produced before 2007.13 On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and carried out new missile launches, this time with short-range missiles. More missiles were launched in early July 2009, and the decision to start a uranium enrichment programme was announced. The latter allowed North Korea to use the country’s natural mineral deposits more efficiently. Rumours of the programme began to surface back in the early 2000s. However, there was no evidence to support the allegations made by the United States. On November 20, 2010, North Korea demonstrated its enrichment factory to the aforementioned American nuclear expert 9  Cit. A.V. Torkunov, The Korean Peninsula: Transformations in the Post-War Era (Moscow: OLMA Media Group, 2008), 429. 10  G.D.  Toloraya (ed.), Unruly Neighbours. The Problems on the Korean Peninsula and Challenges for Russia (Moscow: MGIMO University, 2015), 239. 11  Hereinafter: I.V. Dyachkov, Non-Peaceful Nuclear Energy in Northeast Asia: The Korean Knot: A Treatise/I.V.  Dyachkov (Moscow: MGIMO University, 2016), 178–186.— Source text. 12  G.D. Toloraya, “Another Cycle of the Korean Crisis (2008–2010). Russian Interests and Prospects of Resolving the Deadlock,” Far Eastern Issues, no. 5 (2010): 8. 13  Siegfried Hecker, H. Brown, and Robert Carlin, “North Korean Nuclear Reactors: The Past, the Present and the Future,” Nuclear Club, nos. 5–6 (2010): 27.

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Siegfried Hecker. According to Hecker, the site produced low-grade uranium, despite North Korea potentially having the means to produce high-­ grade uranium as well. According to the site’s chief engineering officer, the North Korean side had installed 2000 centrifuges with a total enrichment capacity of 8000 separation work units (six cascades, with 332 centrifuges per cascade). All this suggested that the programme had been started several years prior, clearly before 2009 and obviously during six-­ party denuclearization talks.14 Shortly before that, North Korea announced the construction of an experimental light-water reactor (LWR) on the site of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, with an output of 100 MWt (or est. 20–30 MWe).15 It was important for North Korea to announce construction of the site so that, should the global community react, they would be ready to respond with the claim that enriched uranium is purposed as fuel for the LWR. However, the danger posed by the site was not only of a military nature: it was doubtful whether North Korea could maintain proper safety measures onsite. In order for the reactor to function safely in a seismically active region, advanced construction and engineering technologies are required, not all of which were used when building the complex, according to a number of American experts.16 At the same time, the missile programme was also in active development. North Korea’s missile arsenal expanded significantly during this period. It now included ground mobile short-range (/ ko/index.php? strPageID=SF01_0 2_01&NewSID=2016-02-12-0017 (accessed: 13.02.2016). 고재 남. 러시아 외교정책의 이해. 서울 : 역사공간，2019 (“Ko Jae-nam. Understanding Russia’s Foreign Policy”). Seoul: Yeoksa gonggan, 2019, 388. 국가브랜드위원히 (“State Branding Committee.” [A copy of the official website of the organization on the website of the Presidential Archive of the South Korea]). Accessed June 1, 2020. http://17koreabrand.pa.go.kr/gokr/ kr/index.do. 귀신같은 북한군? 귀신잡는 시나리오 (“A Ghost Army of North Korea? A Ghost Chase Scenario”). The Hankyoreh. April 19, 2010. Accessed June 20, 2020. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/416718.html (accessed June 20, 2020).= The ghost army of North Korea? Scenarios of chasing ghosts. _ Text: electronic./ Hankyoreh _ 2010. _ Accessed April 19. 길 잃은 보수... 여 당 사상최대 압승 // 동아일보. (“The Conservatives Have Lost Their Way… For the First Time in History the Ruling Party Secures an Impressive Victory.”) Ton’ya ilbo. June 14, 2018. accessed July 1, 2020. 김세형. 문재인-아베 싸움, 트럼프 누구손 들어줄까? // 매일경제 (“Kim Se-hyeong. Who Will Trump Support in the Fight between Moon Jae-in and Abe?”) Meil Gyeongje. July 9, 2019. Accessed July 25, 2019. https://www. mk.co.kr/premiiam/ special-­report/view/2019/07/26054/. 김정은동지께서 지상대 지상중장거리 전략탄도탄《북극성-2》형 시험발사를 현지에서 지 도 (“Leader Kim Jung-un Personally Oversees Launch of Pukkuksong-2 Medium- and Long-Range Ground-to-Ground Missile”). KCNA.  Accessed August 20. 2017. http:/Acna.kpAcna.user.article.retrieveNewsWewInfoList.kcmsf;jsessionid=60334C672D4E10D4E0A20C3706 5A93DA#this. 박영환. 이명박, 가난·시련 떨친 ‘성공신화’ CEO형 리더십. 경향신문 (“Pak Yeong-hwan. Lee Myung-bak: Leadership in the Style of ‘a Legendarily Successful Company Executive Who Has Gone through Poverty and Difficulties”) Gyeongyang Sinmun. December 19, 2007. Accessed February 29, 2020. http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_ view.html?arti d=20071219230527l&code=910112. 방송통신심의위원히 (“Korea Communications Standards Commission, Seoul”). Accessed June 1, 2020 http://www.kocsc.or.kr/mainPage.do.

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23, 2014. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/ AKR20140922191500001 (accessed February 29, 2020). 北 미사일 광명성호, ‘은하 3호’와 사실상 같은 발사체 (“North Korean Kwangmyongsong and Unha-3 Missiles – Basically the Same Carrier”), Yonhap News. February 9, 2016. Accessed February 13, 2016. http://www.yonhapnews. co.kr/bulletin/2016/02/09/0200000000AKR20160209027400014.html. 北 최선희 „김정은, 생각달라지는 느낌...회담 계속할 필요 못느껴". 조선일보 (“Choi Sung-hui: ‘Kim Jung-un Seems to Have Changed His Mind […] There is no Need to Continue the Talks”). March 1, 2019. Accessed March 2, 2019. http:// news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/03/01/2019030102408.html. 北, 개인의 기업 투자 합법화…기업소법 개정 확인. Yonhap News. June 4, 2017.  https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20170602153700014. (accessed 12.07.2020). 대북조치에 ‘남북관계 단절1 대응(3보) (“North Korea’s Response to the Sanctions against North Korea Caused by the ‘Breakdown of North–South Relations’”). Yonhap News. May 25, 2010. Accessed June 24, 2020. https:// www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20100525235900014 (accessed June 24, 2020). 日정부, ‘독도새우·위안부할머니’ 이틀 연속 항의»// 조선일보 (“Two-Days’ Worth of the Japanese Government’s Protests against ‘Tok’ Shrimp and the “Wianbu Grandma’”). Cheoson Ilb. November 9, 2017. Accessed July 25, 2020. http:// news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/11/09/2017110900984.html ()

Internet Resources (Official Websites) In Russian Lenta.ru: URL: https://lenta.ru/ Gazeta.ru: URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/ Iz.ru: URL: https://iz.ru/ Interfax: URL: https://www.interfax.ru/ TASS: URL: https://tass.ru/ Channel One: URL: https://www.1tv.ru/ RBC: URL: https://www.rbc.ru/ RIA Novosti: URL: https://ria.ru/ Rossiyskaya Gazeta: URL: https://rg.ru/ Kommersant: URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: URL: https://www. mid.ru/. Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic: URL: http://government.ru/

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In English BBC (London): URL: https://www.bbc.com/ Bloomberg (New York): URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/ CNN (Atlanta): URL: https://edition.cnn.com/ Daily NK (Seoul): URL: https://www.dailynk.com/ Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia): URL: https://www.fpri.org/ Journal of Eurasian Studies (London): URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/ KCNA Watch (Wilmington): URL: https://kcnawatch.org/ — Text: electronic. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo): URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/ NK News (Wilmington): URL: https://kcnawatch.org/ North Korean Economy Watch: URL: https://www.nkeconwatch.com/ Reuters (London): URL: https://www.reuters.com/ The Diplomat (Tokyo): URL: https://thediplomat.com/ The Korea Times (Seoul): URL: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ The New York Times (New York): URL: https://www.nytimes.com/ The Washington Post (Washington): URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/

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Index1

A Agreed Framework, 160, 173, 174, 202 B Bush, George W., 3, 141 Byungjin, 27, 44–48 C Cheonan (ROKS Cheonan), 61, 127–129, 131, 182, 270, 320, 325 D Dokdo, 57 G Gorbachev, Mikhail, 160, 315

J Jang Song-thaek, 18, 19, 28–30, 32, 280 K Kim Il-sung, 16, 17, 19–21, 25–29, 31, 39, 136, 158, 160, 185–187, 186n5, 243, 281 Kim Jong-il, 5, 15–23, 25–29, 31, 39, 126, 130, 131, 136, 143, 144, 176, 181, 184, 243, 267–275, 303 Kim Jong-nam, 16, 18, 29, 30, 32, 33, 137 Kim Jong-un, 5, 9, 10, 17–20, 23, 25–37, 39–52, 130–134, 136–138, 141–145, 147, 149–151, 153, 157–163, 165, 171, 186, 187, 194, 200–205, 207, 208, 211–219, 230, 242–252, 263, 275–298, 306

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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INDEX

Kim Yo-jong, 17, 35, 36, 142, 151, 152, 200, 220, 221 Ko Yong-hui, 16, 17, 19, 28 KORUS FTA, 58 L Lavrov, Sergey, 192n23, 255, 257, 258, 268, 269, 271, 272, 281, 285, 288–290, 334 Lee Myung-bak, 6, 53–65, 68–71, 73–75, 77, 78, 80–82, 88, 92, 96, 100, 103, 107, 121–131, 173–184, 187, 188, 267, 268, 270, 303, 315–324, 334 M Matvienko, Valentina, 280, 291, 334 Medvedev, Dmitry, 63, 267, 273, 315–317, 319–323, 329 Moon Jae-in, 7, 10, 34, 36, 57, 68, 70, 71, 89, 90, 97–118, 98n3, 100n12, 102n18, 102n22, 120, 140–145, 149, 150, 153, 199, 201–203, 206, 213, 216, 220, 304, 332–335, 340, 345, 346 O Obama, Barack, 17, 56, 57, 64, 81, 82, 84, 111, 113, 173–184, 186, 188, 190, 276 P Park Geun-hye, 6, 7, 53, 57–61, 64, 67–98, 100, 101, 103–108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 120, 131–140, 188, 191n20, 192, 276, 318, 324, 326, 327, 329, 330, 332, 334, 347 Putin, Vladimir, 215, 237, 275, 276, 280, 281, 291–296, 298, 303, 316, 323, 325–327, 329, 330, 334, 336

R RasonConTrans, 48, 303–305, 310 S Six-party talks, 11, 173, 175–178, 175n8, 180–184, 187, 188, 213, 224–227, 227n1, 230, 237–240, 242–246, 267, 268, 271, 272, 274, 293, 294, 325, 327 T Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 159, 161, 188, 235, 238, 239, 243–245, 247 Trump, Donald, 10, 33, 34, 62, 82, 83, 83n54, 110–114, 116, 118, 141, 145, 149, 150, 168, 178, 193, 194, 200–206, 205n9, 208–219, 230, 284, 291–294, 296, 332 U United Nations Security Council, 29, 134, 141, 161, 164, 169, 171, 179–181, 187, 188, 193, 195, 215, 237–239, 242–249, 252, 255, 257, 259–261, 263–266, 268, 272, 276–278, 283, 285–287, 302, 304, 305, 312, 313, 327, 331 W Wianbu, 63, 86, 87, 115, 116 Y Yeonpyeong Island, 61 Yongbyon, 162, 163, 176, 242, 243 Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, 159