Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle's "Rhetoric": Anonymous and Stephanus, ›In Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria‹ 3110626756, 9783110626759

Table of contents :
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric
3. Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24
4. Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric
5. Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric
6. The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III
7. Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Melpomeni Vogiatzi Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina

Quellen und Studien Edited by Dieter Harlfinger, Christof Rapp, Marwan Rashed, Diether R. Reinsch

Volume 8

Melpomeni Vogiatzi

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric Anonymous and Stephanus, In Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria

ISBN 978-3-11-062675-9 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-063069-5 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-062863-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019940105 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Contents

1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.3

Introduction | 1 Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 1 Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 4 Introduction to the commentaries: intentions, interests, style | 4 The commentaries and their philosophical and rhetorical background | 9 Dating the commentaries | 12 Authorship | 18 Anna’s circle | 31 Methodology | 33

2 2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2

Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric | 35 Introduction | 35 Enthymeme | 36 Anonymous’ Commentary | 43 Stephanus’ commentary | 54 Rhetorical Topoi | 63 Anonymous’ commentary | 70 Stephanus’ commentary | 77

3

Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24 | 80 Fallacy depending on the expression | 80 Anonymous’ Commentary | 82 Stephanus’ commentary | 89 Fallacy due to homonymy | 92 Fallacy due to combination and division | 97 Fallacy due to exaggeration | 112 Fallacy due to sign | 114 Anonymous’ commentary | 118 Stephanus’ commentary | 120 Fallacy from the consequence | 124 Anonymous’ commentary | 126 Stephanus’ commentary | 127 Fallacy from accident | 130 Anonymous’ commentary | 132 Stephanus’ commentary | 134 Non Causa pro Causa | 135 Fallacy from the Omission of When and How | 138

1 1.1 1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2

3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.6 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.8 3.9

VI | Contents 3.10 3.10.1

Secundum Quid et Simpliciter | 139 Anonymous’ commentary | 140

4 4.1 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.5 4.5.1 4.6

Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric | 143 Introduction | 143 Happiness | 145 Anonymous’ commentary | 147 Stephanus’ commentary | 149 The Good | 151 Anonymous’ commentary | 153 Stephanus’ commentary | 158 Virtue | 160 Anonymous’ commentary | 163 Stephanus’ commentary | 167 Pleasure | 168 Anonymous’ commentary | 171 Conclusions | 172

5 5.1 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.4

Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric | 175 Introduction | 175 Stephanus on Emotions | 176 Introduction to the second book — Summary of the first book | 176 Second Chapter: anger — other pathe | 179 Conclusions | 185 Anonymous on Emotions | 185 Judgement | 186 Appearance | 201 πάθος – ἦθος | 209 Conclusions | 215

6 6.1 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2

The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III | 217 Introduction to lexis | 217 Anonymous’ commentary | 222 Stephanus’ commentary | 235 Introduction to the account of metaphor | 239 Anonymous’ commentary | 243 Stephanus’ commentary | 252

7 7.1 7.2

Conclusions | 255 Summary | 255 Main features of the commentaries: similarities and divergences | 257

Contents | VI

Bibliography | 259 Index | 267

1 Introduction In order to understand the context in which the two Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric were written, and their interpretation of the main issues raised in the Aristotelian treatise, we need to examine two sorts of sources. First, we need to present briefly (1) the circumstances under which Aristotle’s Rhetoric itself was composed, namely, its relation to the previous rhetorical theories, (2) the main topics discussed in the treatise, and (3) the Rhetoric’s relation to other Aristotelian treatises. Second, we need to view the circumstances of the composition of the two commentaries, namely the commentators’ background, sources, and interests as well as to examine the identity of the two commentators.

1.1 Aristotle’s Rhetoric The construction of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is immediately connected to the rivalry between rhetoric and philosophy, which was represented in the 4th century BC mainly by Plato and Isocrates. The Rhetoric is in fact usually thought to be the philosopher’s response to the Platonic criticism of sophistic rhetoric, which one can grasp by reading the dialogues Gorgias and Phaedrus. In the Gorgias, Plato’s Socrates argues that rhetoric unlike philosophy is not an art, but a mere skill based on experience, since it possesses no true knowledge of the thing in question and aims at the pleasant rather than at the good. Socrates also criticises rhetoric’s disconnection from morality, and argues that only in connection with philosophy can rhetoric be used for the good. Rhetoric is therefore presented as mere flattery used for one’s own advantage. A less strict criticism of rhetoric is expressed in the Phaedrus, where Plato focuses on a rather philosophical type of rhetoric, and hence presents properly-practiced rhetoric as being identical with philosophy. However, rhetoric as usually practiced in his time is still criticised for lacking both knowledge of the nature of the soul and an understanding of what is good for the soul. This popular conception and practice of rhetoric is therefore distinguished from philosophy in both dialogues, mainly due to the different goals the two disciplines pursue: while philosophy aims at the knowledge of what is best, rhetoric aims, according to Plato, at providing pleasure through flattery and at persuading at all costs (even at the price of untruthfulness). Moreover, rhetoric is also criticised because of the method it uses to reach this goal, namely, the sophistic method. Given that the addressees of this criticism are mainly the sophists, it is clear that Plato rejects the sophistic rhetorical practice (especially of Gorgias) due to its lack of any systematic procedure and its use of mere commonplaces aimed at arousing emotions. In response to this criticism, Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric addresses each of the above-mentioned points: on the one hand, his presentation of rhetoric makes

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-001

2 | Introduction

use of concepts that turn rhetoric into a systematic tool, that is, into an art with its own principles and method, while, on the other hand, it provides the orator with a description of ethical and psychological notions necessary for understanding the components that contribute to persuasion. These issues ought to be examined in detail, since the study of Aristotle’s views on the relation between the rhetorical art and philosophy (or other arts and sciences) is connected with and can contribute to our understanding of the position of the Rhetoric within the Aristotelian corpus, which in turn will be relevant to our discussion of the commentators’ understanding of the Rhetoric. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains that the art of rhetoric consists of two branches, one which is closely related to dialectics, whereas the other is an offshoot of ethical science, particularly of politics (1356a25-27). Rhetoric’s connection to each of them becomes clearer in the first two chapters of the treatise (I.1-2). On the one hand, rhetoric shares with political or ethical science its interest in characters and emotions. The orator, says Aristotle, must have a grasp of characters, virtues and emotions, namely, what each one of them is and in what way each comes about, so that the orator will be able to persuade the audience. However, after stating this similarity between ethics and rhetoric, Aristotle immediately makes clear that, although rhetoric resembles politics, it differs from it insofar as it does not provide any knowledge of its subject (1356a27-30). The same idea seems to underline the initial discussion of the Nicomachean Ethics I, where Aristotle introduces the topic of the treatise and states that rhetoric, among other arts, is a branch of politics (1094b1-3). Similar to the discussion in the Rhetoric, it is also implied here that the two disciplines differ with respect to their goals and precision: if the goal of ethical science is the ultimate goal of human life, that is, happiness, which is achieved through a long procedure of habituation in virtuous actions, it becomes evident that the achievement of this goal or the education of the audience with respect to this goal cannot be the task of the orator, who, as explicitly stated in the Rhetoric, aims at finding available means of persuasion (and not at educating the audience). Moreover, although a study of politics and ethics cannot be as precise as other disciplines since they concern things that are not always true, the ethical philosopher will be as precise as his subject matter allows and will try to approach the principles of his science as exactly as possible. Conversely, the rhetorician does not deal with any specific subject matter, is not looking toward the principles of any science, and can also argue indiscriminately for what is true and not true. This last feature of rhetoric, which separates it from ethical science, is what makes it more similar to dialectic. The exact relation between the two is not clear, rhetoric is said to be either counterpart (ἀντίστροφος) or a part (μόριον) of dialectics, but their common features are discussed in length. Besides their use of syllogismoi and topoi, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 below, the two disciplines are similar in respect of their lack of specific subject matter as well as in respect of their ability to formulate arguments in favour of any side of opposite

Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 3

views. As Aristotle states, neither of the two provides knowledge of the contents of any subject, but both are capacities for supplying arguments. Hence, it is fair to assume that rhetoric resembles dialectic not only with respect to its precision, but also with respect to its means of achieving its goals. Given that both aim at finding suitable arguments for reaching a certain conclusion, their difference lies in the fact that rhetoric deals only with matters of the political sphere that require deliberation, whereas dialectic has a more general application. Another difference might lie in the addressee of each discipline: rhetoric addresses a diverse audience, which would not necessarily consist of educated people, whereas dialectical discourse requires that both participants are well acquainted with the principles of argumentation. For this reason, the two additional means of persuasion discussed in the rhetoric, namely arousal of emotions and the character of the speaker, are more useful and effective in rhetorical rather than dialectical discourse. What has been said so far is sufficient for understanding Aristotle’s views on the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. The most telling difference between the two would be the fact that rhetoric neither requires nor aims at the acquisition of knowledge, whereas any philosophical inquiry aims precisely at the acquisition of knowledge of the subject matter in question. In fact, philosophy consists in this search for truth simply, whereas rhetorical discourse can even intentionally aim at persuading for what is not true. Moreover, philosophy deals with many different topics, so that rhetoric’s restricted interest and application bring it even further from the philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s rhetorical and philosophical projects are not completely disconnected. Aristotle’s art of rhetoric comes a step closer to his philosophy by touching upon subject matters that are relevant to both, but mainly by making use of similar means through an emphasis on the importance of argumentation: rhetoric is more effective when the hearer believes that something has been proven. Hence, the concept of syllogismos becomes central in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, and persuasion is identified with proof. As we will see in the following chapters, Aristotle’s main thesis in the Rhetoric of the centrality of argumentation will be examined in detail insofar as it is taken up by the two commentators. Moreover, the relation between the Rhetoric and the other Aristotelian treatises will be also examined, since it is related to the status of rhetoric and its relation towards philosophical inquiry, which in turn is relevant to the discussion of the commentators’ references and analysis of the passages from the Rhetoric in view of the other Aristotelian treatises from the Organon and Ethics. Hence, the relation between the rhetorical syllogismos and the syllogism as presented in other treatises of the corpus, as well as the relation of particular discussions of the Rhetoric with parallel accounts of the other Aristotelian treatises, will be discussed in the introductions of the relevant chapters.

4 | Introduction

1.2 Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.2.1 Introduction to the commentaries: intentions, interests, style In this section, I will focus on the two Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric themselves and I will try to answer some introductory questions concerning the commentators and their commentaries, namely how did these commentaries come about, to which tradition do they belong, who are the commentators and their addressees, etc. My primary goal is to understand the context in which the commentaries were written, that is, the reasons that led the commentators to writing their treatises and their intentions in doing so. Were the commentators typical Byzantine scholars, namely scholars with broad interests in both rhetoric and philosophy, who aimed at understanding the Aristotelian text, or were they Byzantine rhetoricians in search of abandoned rhetorical theories that might have practical use in Byzantine society? Or, in other words, are the commentaries products of rhetoricians aiming at applying the material of Aristotle’s Rhetoric to the rhetorical practices of their time or are they products of a scholarly interest in preserving Aristotle’s rare texts? These texts have never been studied in depth, although contemporary scholars of Byzantine rhetoric refer to them among other Byzantine rhetorical texts in order to integrate them into some group of treatises. Therefore, I would first like to give an overview of these references and of the views hitherto espoused concerning the context of the two extant commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Thomas Conley, in his account of the commentaries presented in his paper “Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Byzantium” (1990, 38 ff.)1, argues that the two commentaries are not thorough (p. 33-34), but rather concentrated on what the commentators themselves found worthy of comment, such as the discussion of epideictic speeches in Rhet. I.9, the account of non-technical means of persuasion of chapter I.15 and the account of style from Rhetoric’s book 3. This focus is in line, in his view, with the previous reception of the Aristotelian treatise (during late antiquity and the early Byzantine period) and in general with the main points of interest of the Byzantine scholars regarding the study of rhetoric. More specifically, he argues that the rhetorical treatises that precede the commentaries made only indirect use of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, since this treatise was either unnecessary (given that the Hermogenic rhetoric and its commentaries were the canonical reading in this period’s rhetorical studies), or difficult to read (due to Aristotle’s obscure way of writing) or unavailable, since up to the 12th century manuscripts containing Aristotle’s Rhetoric were very sparse. Moreover, material from Aristotle’s Rhetoric that was interesting and relevant for the rhetoricians of late antiquity and early Byzantium could be found in other texts: for instance, the definition of the art of rhetoric, often quoted in the

|| 1 Cf. also Conley (1994), 237-240.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 5

Prolegomena, could have been taken not from Aristotle’s Rhetoric directly, but from later Peripatetic or Neoplatonic commentaries that referred to this definition, just as the definition of the enthymeme is, according to Conley, “undoubtedly taken from the old commentaries on Posterior Analytics and Topics”. In this sense, Conley argues, the two commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, both of which he attributes to scholars of the circle of Anna Komnene, are typical products of their time. They are both more interested in topics that have been central in the preceding rhetorical treatises, such as the definition of the art of rhetoric2, and in topics that are more relevant to their contemporary rhetorical practice, such as epideictic or legal oratory, which is also mirrored in their use of contemporary terminology. He concludes, therefore, that “their interests (or their readers’ interests) were not particularly intellectual, but practical” (p. 39). Many aspects of Conley’s account are accurate, as for instance his note on the commentators’ use of vocabulary borrowed by earlier and contemporary rhetoric, as well as his observation that the commentators focus disproportionally on some issues rather than on others. However, the use of contemporary terminology need not to surprise us, since the use of terminology, with which both the author and the reader are familiar, aimed probably at making the commentary more comprehensible. Therefore, the use of such vocabulary is not necessarily enough in itself for one to draw conclusions regarding the content and aim of the commentary. Second, Conley’s identification of the topics that hold the commentators’ interest and merit their comments, is mainly based on quantitative facts, namely on the length of the discussion dedicated to each chapter. This criterion, helpful as it may be, does not take into account elements of the interpretation itself, such as the abundant direct and indirect references to Aristotle’s logical treatises. Elsewhere3, Conley observes that the commentators often interpret Aristotle ex Aristotele, but he still seems not to recognise the centrality of Aristotle’s logical theory in the interpretation of basic passages of the treatise. Such interpretation, it seems to me, disproves Conley’s claim that the purpose of the commentaries is practical rather than intellectual. How can an analysis of enthymemes in formal terms (i.e. as proper syllogism, missing one premise) or an analysis of the sign arguments into the figure syllogistic (with explicit reference to Aristotle’s Analytics) be of any practical use for the reader of the commentaries? Instead, given the fact that the commentators refer, whenever it is possible, to notions known from Aristotelian logic, it seems more probable that the commentators themselves were familiar with Aristotle’s philoso-

|| 2 This observation is problematic and I do not know on what it is based, since the beginning of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle gives the definition of the art, is either not commented upon by both commentators or, most probably, it is commented upon but this part of the commentary has not survived. Both of our commentaries start with the second chapter of the first book of the treatise. 3 Conley (1994), 238.

6 | Introduction

phy and that the addressees of the commentaries were also familiar (at least) with Aristotle’s logic. In fact, it would not be surprising if the commentators had argued in the missing Prolegomena that the Rhetoric is part of the Organon. I will come back to this issue when discussing particular passages from the commentaries that show a clear focus on the logical aspects of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory. In particular, this focus is evident in the discussions on enthymemes (chapter 2), fallacies (chapter 3) and, especially in Stephanus, in the discussion of emotions (chapter 5) and style (chapter 6). But it is not only these passages that speak against the view that the commentators did not have intellectual interests. The constant references to Aristotelian works (even besides those on the logical treatises) indicate that the addressees of the commentaries were quite familiar with Aristotle’s works, and could easily spot the similarities between the account of the Rhetoric and an account in the Ethics, Politics, etc. This familiarity is to be expected if the addressees are students of philosophy, but not if they are orators who plan on using these commentaries as material when delivering a speech. Hence, I take it that the commentators have rather an intellectual interest in understanding better the Aristotelian treatise and its positions within the Aristotelian corpus, and that the commentaries can be of practical use only insofar as they are used as teaching material. Moreover, one must pay more attention to the differences between the two commentaries. As will become clearer in the main part of this book, although the commentators often share views of the meaning of some passages of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, this is not necessarily the rule. First, although the Anonymous commentary focuses more or less on certain topics, the author comments on the treatise as a whole, whereas Stephanus’ commentary covers only select issues. It is therefore only in the case of Stephanus that one can more properly speak of “choosing” what is worthy of comment4. In addition to this fact, it is not always the case that the commentators agree on the meaning of a passage. In fact, there is often an explicit disagreement, where (usually) Stephanus refers to older commentaries on the Rhetoric and criticises their understanding of the text. George Kennedy, who also refers to the two Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric in his book Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors (1983, 318-320), notices correctly that the two commentaries “seem largely independent from each other”, whereas he also points out that the commentators seem to consider the Rhetoric as part of the Organon. Kennedy’s account focuses on the commentators’ use of the previous rhetorical material and points out passages in which the commentators show an interest in reconciling Aristotle’s Rhetoric with Hermogenes5’

|| 4 I do not think that Stephanus’ commentary is fragmentary in the sense that we miss parts of it, since all the references in it to other parts of the commentary are to be found in the comments we possess. S. Chiron (2018), 1. 5 On Hermogenes, the 4th century AD rhetorician, s. Kennedy (2005).

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 7

rhetorical theory (p. 319). A confirmation of Kennedy’s observation are the abundant passages wherein both commentaries refer directly and indirectly to the preceding rhetorical theories they take to be in line with Aristotle’s thought. A more detailed analysis of some of these passages will be given in the following chapters. For now, the following list, which entails some explicit references to preceding orators and rhetoricians, will be a sufficient illustration of this use of previous rhetorical material: Tab. 1: References to orators and rhetoricians in the Byzantine commentaries

Anonymous’ Commentary

Stephanus’ Commentary

Demosthenes

3, 7; 10, 31; 14, 16; 38, 23; 309,15; 319, 9 140, 26; 147, 8; 151, 30-31; 160, 31; 178, 25; 232, 13; 260, 3 ff.

Aeschines

37, 19-23; 38, 64; 147, 9; 232, 289, 4; 299, 37; 309, 15 14; 261-262

Aristeides

229, 17

Hermogenes

35, 27; 158, 4; 164, 18; 191, 19

Minucian

35, 27

Aphthonius

57, 3

Basilius the Great

47, 8; 182, 16; 184, 4; 193, 3; 197, 27; 223, 21

Libanius

122, 4

298, 22 ff.; 308, 14 ff.; 312, 15-30; 313, 35; 315, 32; 318, 34; 322, 1 282, 10-14; 299, 38

312, 10

Julian

312, 10

Dion Chrysostomos

309, 15

As one can see, the commentators seem to have knowledge of the entire history of rhetoric, starting from ancient oratory and continuing through the rhetoricians of late antiquity, including the Christian Fathers. The Anonymous author refers more often to the classical orators and seems to have a preference for Demosthenes. In fact, his references to Demosthenes are always with an admiration he expresses for no other author. Further, Hermogenes and Minucian are mentioned together in one passage (35, 27) as two of the best rhetoricians. In general, the Anonymous commentator seems to be happy to point out his knowledge of other authors, and to make indirect references to other texts. Stephanus’ references to other treatises also show

8 | Introduction

a broad knowledge of rhetoric as well as of other fields6, but without indicating a particular interest in one author. His most detailed discussions of other authors are those about Hermogenes’ treatises, which are said to correspond thematically to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (308, 14 ff.). Moreover, Kennedy refers to the style of the commentaries, and argues that Stephanus’ commentary has a more personal tone, unlike the Anonymous’ commentary, which might have originally been annotations in the margins of manuscripts that contained the Rhetoric. What speaks against this suggestion is the fact that Anonymous’ commentary consists largely in a paraphrase of the treatise and in fact a very detailed one (since it comments on the treatise as a whole), which is usually not the case in the marginal scholia found in the manuscripts that entail Aristotle’s treatises. However, it is true that Anonymous’ commentary seems to be a more descriptive analysis of the Aristotelian treatise, since it is only rarely that the commentator explicitly argues for or against a particular reading of a passage. Instead, his commentary often consists in quoting different views either that he has found in preceding marginal scholia or that he has heard by a teacher, but without making clear which reading he finds more preferable7. And on important issues, he often reveals his stance to the reader only implicitly. Unlike the Anonymous, Stephanus’ commentary has indeed a more personal tone, since the commentator often takes a clear stand on what he believes to be the correct meaning of the Aristotelian text. He often attacks previous attempts to interpret a passage and makes an effort to prove that his interpretation is the only correct one. He is also meticulously careful when it comes to textual issues, in which cases he explicitly chooses the writing of one manuscript over another. This brings us again to the question about the addressee of the commentaries. Given the above description of the different style of the two commentators, I think it is clear that Stephanus’ commentary was intended for use within a class studying Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In fact, Stephanus often writes in the second person as a teacher addressing his students. Given that Stephanus very often references other treatises of Aristotle’s Organon, the students should already have had a basic knowledge of the Aristotelian logic. It is possible that this is also the case for the Anonymous. He sometimes uses the second person, and, as highlighted above, he often offers a variety of interpretations of certain passages, which might have been useful if the commentary was intended for classroom use. However, the paraphrastic style of the commentary renders it less appropriate as a student handbook. It is still an open || 6 He also refers for instance to Thucydides, Pausanias, Aratus, Plutarch, Philostratus and the Stoics. 7 Such references to marginal scholia or to a teacher/philosopher, whose interpretation he is quoting, are found in the following passages: 3, 2-4; 17, 22-23; 26, 3; 40, 16-17; 41, 17 ff.; 53, 5; 53, 30-31; 98, 1-2; 147, 23; 147, 32; 150, 25; 203, 27; 206, 16; 206, 28; 207, 22; 221, 22; 230, 6; 232, 21; 241, 31; 250, 5; 250, 25; 254, 14; 259, 3.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 9

possibility that the commentary was written with an eye to the preservation of a text that was otherwise hard to find, namely of a text that might soon be lost, regardless of any additional, immediately practical use. In the following, I will first present in more detail the literary background of the commentators, in particular their understanding of the position of the Rhetoric within the preceding philosophical and rhetorical tradition. Second, I will deal with the environment in which the commentaries were written, and with issues of dating the commentaries, which will lead to a discussion about the relationship between them. Finally, I will deal with the authorship of the commentaries, namely with a possible identification of their authors.

1.2.2 The commentaries and their philosophical and rhetorical background In the previous section, I have already hinted at some of the topics that will be relevant for this section, whereas some of these topics will be also discussed in detail in the following chapters. My aim is to give the commentators’ background when writing their commentaries, namely to present the philosophical and rhetorical theories embodied in their interpretations. In explaining their background, I will focus on three groups of sources: (1) their use of the other treatises of the Aristotelian corpus, (2) the philosophical theories that postdate Aristotle, mainly Hellenistic and late antique philosophy, and (3) the rhetorical theories expressed mainly during late antiquity. Starting with the first point, I have referred above to the prominent role of the Aristotelian Organon in the commentators’ interpretation of many aspects of the Rhetoric. In particular, and as we will see in detail in the following chapters, both commentaries often make use of theories expressed by Aristotle in his logical treatises, and try to show the agreement between views expressed in the Rhetoric and the treatises of the Organon. First, the presentation of the features of enthymemes, which will be discussed in the second chapter below, takes into account in both commentaries the relevant treatments from the Organon – both commentators make use of the treatment of sign arguments in the Prior Analytics, and hence, analyse the enthymemes in terms of the figure-syllogistic. Similarly, the commentators’ accounts of fallacious arguments (s. below, chapter 3) make extensive use of the Organon. The Anonymous focuses again on the Prior Analytics and Aristotle’s account of the modality of premises, whereas Stephanus takes the rhetorical list of fallacies as corresponding to the treatment of fallacious arguments in the Sophistical Refutations. Hence, it already becomes clear that the two commentators have themselves interest in and address an audience that is familiar with such accounts. However, such interpretation of the logical aspects of the Rhetoric does not surprise us, if the scholars we deal with aim to show the consistency of Aristotle’s thought throughout his treatises. In other words, the interpretation of the aspects of

10 | Introduction

the treatise that are related to argumentation in connection to the other accounts of arguments is not in itself enough for drawing conclusions regarding the general focus and aim of the commentators. However, such conclusions can easily be reached in the case of Stephanus, when looking at his interpretation of the nonlogical aspects of the Rhetoric8. In particular, as we will see in the fifth and sixth chapters below, Stephanus also interprets Aristotle’s accounts of emotions and style as contributing to argumentation and as offering additional topoi for arguments. Stephanus does not at all recognise the role of the account of emotions as assistance towards the arousal of the emotions of the audience, but considers the account as an additional list of topoi that describe the emotional state of a person when committing certain actions. Interestingly, his comments exhibit extensive use of logical terminology. In addition to this interpretation that aims at proving topoi as the focus of the whole treatise, Stephanus leaves many parts of the treatise without a comment, particularly those that seem to be irrelevant to this general strategy. It is, therefore, justified to conclude that, in his view, the Rhetoric consists mainly of the analysis of rhetorical arguments and topoi, and therefore, is a part of the Organon. In the case of the Anonymous commentary, it is not equally clear that the commentator wishes to ascribe a specific position to the treatise within the Organon. The commentator interprets, as we have said above, all the logical aspects of the treatise in connection with the relevant treatises of the Organon, but the non-logical aspects of the Rhetoric are interpreted independently of these treatises. In particular, it seems that also Anonymous is interested in and familiar with Aristotelian logic, but unlike Stephanus, he does not reject the treatment of the non-logical aspects neither does he try to bring them in line with the Organon, but he interprets them as being in line with other more related Aristotelian treatises. Hence, the rhetorical account of ethical definitions (s. chapter 4) is explicitly said to be a shorter version of the account of the Ethics, whereas also his interpretation of the emotion-related chapters (chapter 5) seems to take into account the treatment of continence and incontinence from Nicomachean Ethics VII. Moreover, the commentator’s interest in showing the consistency of the Rhetoric with the Ethics is evident in his focus on the role of the orator, who is, in the commentator’s view, morally good and has true knowledge of the ethical questions. Therefore, unlike Stephanus exclusive focus on logic, the Anonymous commentator seems to have broader interests. Like Stephanus, he also takes the most important aspect of the treatise to be the presentation of the rhetorical arguments, but, when dealing with accounts unrelated to this aspect,

|| 8 Surprisingly, Rambourg (2018), 25 takes Stephanus’ commentary to be less focused on showing the relation between the Rhetoric and the Organon than the Anonymous’ commentary. However, my analysis of the two commentaries shows the exactly opposite, namely that Stephanus has a deeper knowledge of the Organon and in fact focuses only on these aspects of the Rhetoric that can be interpreted in such a way as to show the logical background of the treatise.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 11

he seems contented to turn towards other Aristotelian theories. So, he seems to aim at showing the consistency between the Rhetoric and the other Aristotelian treatises, rather than the position of the Rhetoric within the Organon. I can here already refer to the commentators’ use of the Poetics, since, besides the relation between the Rhetoric and the Organon or the Rhetoric and the Ethics, the relation between Aristotle’s rhetorical and poetical accounts has often been examined by contemporary scholars. As we will see in the last chapter on the rhetorical theory of style and metaphor, the two commentators refer to the Poetics, but their references seem to be limited in repeating Aristotle’s own references to this treatise. In addition, both commentators seem to be unable to quote from the Poetics, and, when discussing the division of metaphors, turn to divisions known from late antique texts, instead of using the Aristotelian one from the Poetics. Hence, it seems that the treatise was not available to them. Turning now to the post-Aristotelian tradition, a philosophical school that seems to have influenced the commentators is Stoicism. The Anonymous commentator does not refer explicitly to Stoics, but his interpretation of the account of emotions is very much reminiscent of the Stoic view of emotions as obstacles to reason, whereas the vocabulary used is also very reminiscent of the Stoic descriptions of the nature of emotions. Stephanus refers to Stoicism three times, and takes the opportunity on one of these occasions to attack their views of probability at length. More obvious in the case of Stephanus is his Neoplatonic background. The most telling examples of this background come from his account of sign arguments, in which he makes extensive use of the division between matter and form of the argument. This division, although it was introduced by Aristotle himself in Metaphysics Δ, has been developed mainly by the late antique Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s logical treatises9. Moreover, Neoplatonic views on intellect and the division of intellects (external-internal intellects, creative, theoretical, practical intellect) are mentioned by Stephanus, when he discusses which intellectual capacities are responsible for deciding what is good or bad. Finally, a characteristic of Stephanus’ commentary that is relevant both for his influence from the late antique and Byzantine tradition and for his focus on the logical aspects of the treatise, is his use of syllogistic diagrams. In particular, Stephanus’ commentary entails a diagrammatic depiction of the examples of syllogisms used in the commentary, which is very typical especially for the Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Analytics. On the one hand, this integrates Stephanus into the late antique and Byzantine tradition in which he belongs, but on the other hand, it once again indicates his view of the Rhetoric as being part of the Organon.

|| 9 For a more detailed analysis of Stephanus’ use of the division between matter and form of the argument s. section 3.5 below on Stephanus’ interpretation of fallacious sign arguments.

12 | Introduction

The Anonymous commentary does not exhibit such an extensive use of late antique logical concepts, but rather makes use of material from the previous rhetorical tradition. Besides the explicit references to rhetoricians and rhetorical texts (s. Table 1), his thorough knowledge of concepts that have been developed mainly by the late antique rhetoricians is obvious in his interpretation of particular passages of the Rhetoric. For instance, his interpretation of the account of topoi can illustrate well his rhetorical background. As we will see in detail below (chapter 2, section 3 on topoi), the commentator creates a hierarchy of generality of topoi, in which he makes use of terminology and concepts known mainly from the Prolegomena to the late antique rhetorical treatises. Hence, he introduces the term “epicheireme” as being equivalent to “enthymeme” for explaining the role of idia, and similarly he refers to the koina of chapter II.19 as universal/final headings (κεφάλαια). Moreover, in his interpretation of the account of style, he brings in the concept of ἐνάργεια, known again from the late antique rhetorical treatises. However, we need to note that this vocabulary seems to be transferred from its rhetorical origin into the new philosophical context not in order to show the connection with the contemporary rhetorical theories, but rather in order to give to the concepts familiar names already known to the readers. Regarding Stephanus, it can be noted that he also has knowledge of his preceding rhetorical tradition, as shown for instance by his references to Hermogenes and Aphthonius (s. Table 1), but this knowledge seems to be rather superfluous. In particular, although he explicitly says that the Aristotelian account of style corresponds to the Hermogenic treatment of the same subject matter, his references to the particular Hermogenic treatises are mistaken. It seems, therefore, that he is not at all interested in precision when it comes to the non-logical aspects of the Rhetoric, but he just refers the reader to other theories, though inaccurately.

1.2.3 Dating the commentaries In order to determine when a text was written, we usually start by trying to find direct references of the author to himself, in which he might reveal his identity. In addition, when he is an author who is known from other sources, we can date the text with certainty. If the text is not signed, as with the Anonymous commentary, or if it is signed, but by an otherwise unknown author, as in Stephanus’ case, we have to focus either on internal material of the commentary, namely references to events that might posit a terminus ante quem or a terminus post quem, or on language features, which might give us some indication of the period in which the author wrote his text. Regarding Stephanus’ commentary, Brandis has already hinted to such internal references as well as language features (Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin, 1831, p. 77-78, in footnote), stating:

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 13

Das späte Zeitalter des Stephanus verräth sich in allem, namentlich der Sprache, wie sehr er sich auch bemüht rein zu schreiben. Er redet (zu I 13, 1 [p. 285, 1]) von den Gerichtsbedrückungen, denen Fremde, wie Ägyptier und Korinthier, in Konstantinopel ausgesetzt, von den selbst gegen die Venetianer gerichteten Seeräubereien der Sicilianer [p. 285, 12]. Wahrscheinlich lebte er in Konstantinopel.

Indeed, Brandis’ inference (quoted also by Rabe in his edition of the commentaries) that Stephanus probably lived in Constantinople must be accepted, firstly, due to the passage that Brandis quotes (285, 1-10), in which Stephanus refers to foreigners coming from Egypt or Corinth, and states that they often suffer injustices when getting involved in trials in Constantinople, but also due to a similar passage found in 270, 16-19, where Stephanus makes a distinction between indigenous (αὐτόχθονας) people and foreigners, namely those who come from other countries as immigrants or settlers, and states that some of the latter group might stay so long in the new country that they are almost like the natives, “just like those who are close to Constantinople”. Both statements are not surprising if Stephanus himself was either one of the natives or one of those who have lived in Constantinople for so long that they can be considered as natives. Furthermore, although Brandis did not notice it, the passage that he quoted offers some evidence of the context in which Stephanus wrote his commentary. Specifically, this is shown in Stephanus’ reference to the Egyptians as settling and going through trials in Constantinople. Stephanus refers to Egypt in two other passages (in 270, 27 and 271, 1), in the former of which he points out that insecure possessions are those that are far away from one’s own city, like those in Persia or Egypt, whereas in the latter he names two common products of Egypt, that is, myrtles and laurel leaves. These statements seem to suggest that in Stephanus’ time there was a certain relationship between Egypt and Constantinople that included trade of goods as well as settlements. Of course, such a relationship between the two places must have been a common phenomenon up to the 7th century AD, namely up to the time when Egypt fell to the Persians (in 619) and to the Arabs (in 641)10. However, since Stephanus explicitly refers to and makes use of the Suda encyclopaedia (285, 18-25), which was written in the 10th century, we need to use the 10th century as the terminus post quem, and search for a later occasion when the trade between Egypt and Constantinople flourished11. This occasion ought to be identified with the 12th century “Byzantine Renaissance”, when the Byzantine economy flourished under the reign of John II and Manuel I Komnenos. During this time, we learn, the trade with Egypt as well as with the Italian cities increased and the size and prosperity of the urban settlements

|| 10 S. Ostrogorski (1963), vol. 1, 155-192. 11 This reference to Suda is also the reason why we cannot accept Christ-Schmid’s (1912, 770) suggestion that the author of the commentary is Stephanus of Alexandria, who lived in the 7th century.

14 | Introduction

grew. Other cities of the Byzantine Empire also thrived during this period, for instance Thessaloniki and Corinth12. This picture is immediately reminiscent of Stephanus’ description, in which traders from Egypt and Corinth live in the city and typical products from Egypt arrive in Constantinople. Given that the economic prosperity of the state decreased after the death of Manuel I Komnenos (1180) and the Fourth Crusade (1202-1204), Stephanus’ references to political, economic and social phenomena connected with Constantinople lead us to the conclusion that he composed his commentary in the 12th century and, more precisely, during the reign of John II (1118-1143) or Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180). Another point suggesting the 12th century is the fact that Stephanus explicitly distinguishes in 270, 27 Egypt from Persia and refers to them as two different states (ἐν Περσίᾳ ἢ Αἰγύπτῳ). This is an understandable distinction only if we accept that the commentary was written after the Turk invasions of the Middle East at the end of the 11th century and the First Crusade (1095-1099), as a result of which the Fatimid state lost many territories and consisted only of Egypt until its complete decay in 117113. In order to delimit these conclusions even more, we must take a close look at two passages of the text, which seem to make more explicit references to particular events. The first passage is the one mentioned by Brandis, as quoted above, where Stephanus refers to a certain conflict between Romans and Venetians (in 285, 11-14), which led to the enslavement of Venetians. Sicily was also involved in this event, since it is said that “if the Romans had not enslaved the Venetians, the Sicilian (ὁ Σικελός) would have plundered them when arriving there.” The second passage that can help us specify the date of the commentary is that in which Stephanus explains that one needs to protect the places that are particularly helpful or useful, “such as the privately called narrow passes (κλεισούρας), as in the main acropolis of Corfu, so that the enemy will not cause you countless damage by seizing them and then attack from [his] fenced resort” (269, 1-6). Wolska-Conus14 has also used these two passages and argued that they must refer to the events of 1122-1123, when, after John II Komnenos denounced the treaty that his father Alexios I Komnenos had signed with the Venetians in 1082, Venice attacked Corfu among other islands (in 1122) and hence forced John to re-evaluate the agreement. As for the conflict between Romans (i.e. Byzantines) and Venetians, to which Stephanus refers in the first passage cited above, Wolska-Conus takes it to refer to the Norman practice of plundering the cities of Italy in the 11th-12th century without declaring a war against them. If these are the events to which Stephanus refers, then he must have written his commentary shortly after 1122.

|| 12 S. Ostrogorski (1963), vol. 3, 41-62; Sanders (2008), 151 ff. 13 S. Sanders (2008), 151 ff.; Al Sayyid Marsot (1987), 1-30. 14 W.W. Conus (1971), 599-600.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 15

The conclusion that the commentary was written in the 12th century is in line, as we will see, with information that we can gather regarding Stephanus’ language. As Brandis stated above, Stephanus’ language is characterised by an effort to write in a clear Attic style. A detailed study of the basic features of Stephanus’ linguistic style has already been published by Wolfram Hörandner (2007, 257-267). I will summarise his paper with a focus on the issues that are relevant to our current discussion. Of the information given by Hörandner in his paper, that which speaks in favour of dating the commentary to the 12th century is mainly the use of some terms that are known (at least in the sense used in our text) only from other treatises written around the same time. Such terms are: κλεισούρα (269, 3) from the passage cited above referring to the narrow passes of Corfu’s acropolis, ξυλοχάρτιον κοντάκιον (277, 27, meaning treatise or essay), παραμοναὶ (278, 1-2), οὐσουκαπίων (287, 12), παρεκβόλαιον (290, 2-3), ἀεροβάμων and αἰθεροβάμων (312, 24), ἀσάλπιγκτον (317, 4), and ἑνοείδεια (318, 27). Hörandner also presents some biblical and patristic references found in the commentary, which, although they do not point to a particular time frame for the writing of the commentary, fit into our conclusion that the text was written in the 12th century. Although it will turn out that the Anonymous precedes Stephanus, I deal with him second, since some of our evidence for his earlier dating comes also from Stephanus. As in the case of the latter, we are looking for internal references as well as linguistic features of Anonymous’ commentary that might lead us to a safe conclusion regarding the date when the commentary was written. In his edition of the text, Rabe sets the Anonymous treatise also in the 12th century (p. ix) and quotes A. von Gutschmid for his reasons: Die mehrfachen Anspielungen auf Kämpfe zwischen Romäern und Ismaëliten weisen uns auf die späteste Zeit hin. Untrüglich aber ist, dass II fol. 33a13 [pag. 99,14] der Perser Τανισμάνης als typisches Beispiel für einen Feind der Romäer angeführt wird; unter diesem Namen kennt auch Kinnamos den Turkmanen Kamschteghin ben el Danischmend, König von Malatia, der 1126 verheerend in das Romäerreich einfiel und in der Geschichte dieser Zeit eine grosse Rolle spielt. Andererseits glaube ich nicht, dass der Scholiast viel später geschrieben hat: als grösste That der neuern Geschichte wird zur Exemplifizierung I fol. 18b33 [pag. 52, 20] der Fall des Bulgarenreiches (durch Basilios II.1019) verwendet, der in den Hintergrund getreten sein würde, wenn der Scholiast auf das ganze Komnenenzeitalter hätte zurückblicken können.

Von Gutschmid refers indeed to the most important historical information that we can gather from the commentary. A terminus post quem cannot be set later than 1019, which is when Basilios II conquered the Bulgarian Kingdom, an event to which the commentator refers in 52, 20 (κατάπτωσις τῶν Βουλγάρων). This is, however, not enough for our purposes. One can find many other passages similar to the one that von Gutschmid quotes, for instance the references to conflicts between Romans, namely Byzantines, and Ishmaelites (24, 16; 37, 25). These passages are of no help since, as we have also said above, the wars between Byzantium and the

16 | Introduction

Arabs lasted for many centuries and, hence, the Anonymous might refer to any of these instances. Elsewhere (124, 35-125, 1) he also refers to the conquest of Egypt, but again not as a recent event. However, other passages that have not been taken into account by previous scholars, can be of more help for dating the commentary more precisely, such as the Anonymous’ references to Constantinople. In particular, in a passage parallel to the Stephanus passage discussed above, the Anonymous commentator refers to the difficulties that foreigners come across when they have to undergo a trial in Constantinople. As the commentator states (73, 2-10), it is a common phenomenon that the most injustices are suffered by foreigners, and so they usually avoid even going to trials. Therefore, just like Stephanus, the Anonymous wrote his commentary in a time when foreigners were common in the city of Constantinople. Given that Constantinople was the capital, we expect that there were always some foreigners visiting the city or settling there. However, unlike Stephanus’ description of his city as being rather multicultural due to trade practices, the Anonymous elsewhere implies that it was not so common to see Persians or Scythians in Constantinople (164, 6). In particular, he says that “whenever we see a foreigner coming into our own city, like a Persian or a Scythian, and if a Scythian has never been in the city before, and if we have never seen one elsewhere, we are immediately surprised by the spectacle and we gather in order to look at the Scythian”. Could this passage be an indication that the time in which the commentator wrote his commentary was not yet the time in which the trade with the south had flourished, and in which it was not yet common to meet so many foreigners from different countries in Constantinople? If so, then the commentary must have been written in the beginning of the reign of John II Komnenos. Additional evidence in favour of this conclusion is offered by one more passage, in which the commentator apparently refers to the conflict between John II Komnenos and his sister Anna about the possession of the king-title, after the death of their father Alexios I Komnenos in 1118. [T.1] φιλοῦμεν καὶ οἷς συμπράττομεν καὶ συναγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὸ κτήσασθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, οἷον εἰ συναγωνίζομαί τινι εἰς τὸ κτήσασθαι τὴν βασιλείαν, εἰ μή που μέλλομεν μείζω παθεῖν κακὰ ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν, ὅτε βασιλεύσουσι, ἢ παρ' ἄλλων, εἴ γε νοηθῶμεν, ὡς συμπράττομεν τῷ τυραννῆσαι μελετῶντι· (CAG XXI.2 98, 23-27)

As the Anonymous states in this passage, we love those with whom we work together in order to achieve some good, for instance those who have fought with us for procuring the kingship. Elsewhere, he says that when the government is kingship, one must show that he is in agreement with the king and praise the monarchy, even if one does not agree (44, 25-29; 45, 3-35). If these passages are indeed autobiographical, the commentator not only has written his commentary at the beginning of the reign of John II Komnenos, but he is also clearly taking side with Anna Komnene. More on this point will be said in the next section.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 17

Our only difficulty is to explain the reference to Tanisman, who, as Alfred von Gutschmid argued while relying on Cinnamos’ account, is the man who became the king of Malatia and in 1126 attacked the Byzantine Empire. This information led von Gutschmid to suggest that the Anonymous wrote his commentary shortly after 112615. However, Cinnamus, who recorded the Byzantine history from 1118 till 1176, is not the earliest author mentioning Tanisman. In fact, there are two passages in Anna’s Komnene Alexiad in which she mentions the name Tanisman. In the first of these passages (11, 3, 5) a sultan with the name Tanisman is said to have joined the Hebrew fights, which took place in 1097. The second passage (12, 7, 3) referred to a Tanismanis, who offered his help to Gregorios Taronites in 1105/616. Apparently, Tanishman (or Danishmed) is a family name, and members of this family were known to the Byzantine rulers at least since the reign of Alexios I Komnenos. Hence, given that in the Anonymous’ commentary the name appears as a famous enemy, it could be the case that the Anonymous refers (in 99, 14) either to the second of the Tanisman that Anna mentioned, or even to the whole family. Therefore, if our previous conclusions are right, the Anonymous must have written his commentary shortly after the beginning of the reign of John II in 1118, and therefore shortly before Stephanus wrote his commentary, which is in fact in line with the references found in Stephanus to earlier commentaries, which can be identified with the Anonymous. More specifically, most criticisms that Stephanus addresses to earlier commentators on the Rhetoric, who have neither understood nor correctly interpreted passages of the treatise17, seem to be directed at the Anonymous (or at least to a source of the Anonymous), since we can easily see the Anonymous himself expressing the views that are criticised by Stephanus. Given now that the production of commentaries on the Rhetoric does not seem to be so vast even in the 12th century flourish of Aristotelian studies, I take it as more plausible that Stephanus has read the Anonymous commentary itself and that it is this particular commentary that he criticises, possibly among other commentaries. Regarding now some linguistic elements of the Anonymous’ commentary, as also said in Stephanus’ case, the Anonymous’ effort to use very clear language indicates the text’s late date. I would like to mention only a couple of passages, which will confirm the suggested date for the writing of the commentary. First of all, the commentator uses some vocabulary that is not used, as far as we know, before the 10th century. For instance, the term κονταράτοι (103, 21) is used, besides the commentary, only after the 9th-10th century, in Georgios Monachos and in John Skylitzes.

|| 15 This suggestion is accepted by Rabe (1896), and more recently by Rambourg (2018), 16. 16 S. Reinsch/ Kambylis (2001), 72. 17 Such criticisms that are identified with passages in the Anonymous commentary are to be found in Stephanus, CAG XXI.2 265, 12-16; 273, 14; 274, 11; 290, 20; cf. also 270, 28; 272, 5-62; 282, 16; 283, 16; 304, 30; 305, 30; 311, 32; 320, 26.

18 | Introduction

The same with the term θηρολέκτης (160, 32), which is only to be found in the commentary and in one passage of Constantinos Porphyrogennetos (10th century). It is also interesting that there are many ἅπαξ λεγόμενα in the commentary, such as the terms κύτζια (66, 12), σκυλία (73, 35), γρανάτα (74, 10), καπτρίον (74, 12), τζιμπίσαι (107, 5), the meaning of which, however, is easy to understand from the context. In summary, based on references found in the commentaries themselves, we have concluded that Stephanus wrote his commentary shortly after 1122, and the Anonymous around 1118 (-1122)18, namely the first years after John II Komnenos became king.

1.2.4 Authorship In this section, I will focus on the identity of the commentators and I will argue for or against the identification of the commentators with particular well-known authors of the 12th century AD, taking also into account the conclusions from the previous section. Starting with Stephanus, whose identity has already been subject of a study by Wanda Wolska-Conus19, I will argue that Wolska-Conus has convincingly identified him with Stephanus Skylitzes. As she argues, based on information that the commentator himself reveals in the commentary on the Rhetoric, it has become clear that we are dealing with a teacher of philosophy and rhetoric, who lived in Constantinople and wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s works20. Stephanus, whose fuller name is transmitted in the manuscripts as Stephanus Cyrus (ἕτερα σχόλια Κυροῦ21 Στεφάνου) explicitly refers to his own comments on Aristotle’s Ethics, and he also seems to be very well acquainted with the Aristotelian logical treatises (he explicitly refers to the Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Categories and De Interpretatione). As we will see in the next section, this can be an indication of his affiliation with the scholarly group of Anna Komnene.

|| 18 I set 1122 as the latest date in which the commentary was written because of Stephanus’ references to the Anonymous. 19 W.W. Conus (1971), 599-600. 20 Conus argues that Stephanus must have also been the author of commentaries on Hermogenes and Aphthonius, but I do not think that there is evidence on that. In fact, given that his references to Hermogenes’ treatises are inaccurate, I believe that he was not fully acquainted with the late antique rhetorical tradition. In contrast, he shows expertise in the Aristotelian philosophy. 21 The term κύρος or κυρός (used instead of κύριος in byzantine Greek and meaning “ruling” or “having authority”) was used in Stephanus’ time as title. The byzantine dictionaries [s. for instance Sophocles (1914)] offer many examples of such use of the word: Chal. 988d, 993a, 1568b; Eustrat. 2361a; Joan. Mosch. 3037d, 3040c, 3084a; Leont. Cypr. 1713d; Const. III 1020a; Nic. II 895b etc., cf. also Trapp (2001), 902.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 19

Regarding Stephanus Skylitzes, our main source for his life is a monody written by his friend and student Theodoros Prodromos (1100-1158)22 entitled “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ μονωδία εἰς τὸν ἱερότατον μητροπολίτην Τραπεζοῦντος κυρὸν Στέφανον τὸν Σκυλίτζην”. In Theodoros’ description of his teacher, we learn that Theodoros met Stephanus Skylitzes, when the latter undertook a position at the school of Saint Paul23, in the beginning as ὕφεδρος and soon afterwards as πρόεδρος. However, his career at this school ended early, since Stephanus became the archbishop of Trebizond in 1126 at the age of 30 (Mon. 74-95). In fact, Theodoros praises Stephanus’ extraordinarily fast development into a successful professor at Saint-Paul school (Mon. 74-80), although he does not explicitly refer to his exact activities in the school, for instance to his activity as an Aristotelian commentator. Besides the information that Theodoros gives about Stephanus’ life, and which Conus reports, I could add the information that Theodoros’ account of his teacher gives us regarding Stephanus’ style, which also confirms Conus’ conclusion. Theodoros praises Stephanus’ eloquence as being such that no one else in the whole Byzantine Empire possessed, as well as his knowledge of the art of grammar, through which he guided and purified the Greeks and foreigners (Mon. 36-43). This knowledge of grammar is illustrated in his teaching practices: we learn that Stephanus made extensive use of classical authors (Simonides and Plutarch) as examples of the right use of language (Mon. 130-141). His own style is characterised, according to Theodoros (Mon. 49-61), by a combination of rich speech (εὐλεξία) and intelligent thought (εὐνοία), which he passed to his students by teaching the way in which one can avoid a linguistic style that is either too soft and befitting a woman or too rhythmical, in order to achieve strong enthymemes (τὸ στιβαρὸν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων). Theodoros himself admits that he has learned from Stephanus how to find the essence of things and leave aside what is obvious and superficial. He uses an analogy in which one’s soul corresponds to the thought (νόημα τοῦ γεννήσαντος νοῦ), and one’s facial features correspond to the verbal expression (λέξις). It is already clear that Stephanus’ most distinctive features concern, according to Theodoros, his rhetorical style. Evidently, Theodoros’ description of Stephanus, namely his profession as a teacher, his education and interests as well as the time (until 1126) and place of his action (Constantinople), seem to fit our expectations regarding the author of the commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Additionally, as Wolska-Conus has argued, Theodoros’ description of Stephanus as a teacher who made an early and brilliant carrier and who showed an expertise in rhetorical arguments, and our knowledge of our commentator’s production of various commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises as

|| 22 Petit (1902). PG 133, 1253-1258. 23 Anna Komnene also refers to the grammar school of Saint Paul in Alex. 15, 7.

20 | Introduction

well as his focus on the logical aspects of the Rhetoric, that is, on the enthymematic arguments, indicate the identification of Stephanus with Stephanus Skylitzes. Therefore, as a summary of Stephanus’ life, we can say that he was born in 1096, lived in Constantinople, studied philosophy and rhetoric and started at a very young age to teach and comment on the Aristotelian treatises as well as on the rhetorical treatises of late antiquity, which he did until 1126, when he became metropolitan in Trebizond. Regarding the identity of the Anonymous author, it has been suggested that we can identify him with Michael of Ephesus24. The reason for this identification is, I believe, the fact that Michael of Ephesus lived in the period that we are studying (he must have lived in the first half of the 12th century), belonged to the circle of Anna Komnene25 and, allegedly wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric26. Moreover, it has been argued27 that the use of medical and zoological examples can confirm this suggestion on the basis of indicating the knowledge of Aristotle’s biological works, on which Michael has written commentaries. However, these reasons are not sufficient for identifying him as the author of this commentary on the Rhetoric. I will argue that this identification must be rejected mainly due to linguistic features of the Anonymous’ commentary, which differ greatly from Michael’s style and language in his commentaries on other Aristotelian treatises. First, regarding the content of the commentaries, we should note that it cannot give us any secure information in favour of or against the identification of the two authors. In passages that deal with similar topics, as for example the discussions of some fallacies dealt with by both the Anonymous in his comments on ch. II.24 and by Michael of Ephesus in his commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, we can find some similarities, which might, however, indicate a common source. The fact that an Anonymous author of a paraphrase of the Sophistical Refutations interprets the same passages in a similar way, shows that the most probable explanation is the existence of a common source for all three authors28. The same argument can be used regarding the medical and zoological examples brought in the Anonymous commentary. Given that the use of such examples is not unique in or distinctive of the Anonymous commentary, it cannot be a secure indication for the identity of the author. More will be said below, where I will refer to particular commentaries that

|| 24 Conley (1990), 38; (1998), 61-64; Rambourg (2018). 25 To which, as we will see, also the Anonymous also belonged. 26 He refers to this commentary in the commentary on the Sophistical Refutations CAG II.3 98, 12: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀτέχνου ταύτης πειραστικῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὴν Ῥητορικὴν πονηθεῖσι διειλήφειμεν. S. also the reference to a commentary on the Rhetoric written by Michael of Ephesus in the list of Michael’s works in Hieros. Patr. 106, f. 7v. 27 Rambourg (2018), 25 ff. 28 On a more detailed presentation of these similar accounts s. my chapter 3 on the fallacy of combination and division.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 21

also make use of such examples. Hence, our arguments must rely mainly on the linguistic style and the format of the commentaries. Regarding the style of the Anonymous’ commentary, one can immediately see some basic differences from the commentaries written by Michael. All known commentaries by Michael consist of lemmata followed by their detailed analysis. Unlike this structure, the Anonymous’ commentary is a continuous text, which largely paraphrases29 the Aristotelian treatise and adds some additional information (quotations from other authors or texts, or some historical or mythological details) when necessary, in order to illustrate some difficult passages. It then follows that, since he comments on quoted lemmata from the Aristotelian text, Michael’s interpretation focuses necessarily on some central passages and leaves others aside, whereas the Anonymous’ commentary remarks on and expands almost every thought stated in the Aristotelian text30. Moreover, by comparing the language of the two authors, one can find great differences. Very helpful in this direction is the work of C. Luna31, who, in her work on Michael’s commentary on the Metaphysics, collected all the basic features of his linguistic style. As she argues, there are particular expressions that appear frequently in Michael’s commentaries and that are characteristic for his style of writing. Of a list of 26 such typical expressions, only seven are found in the Anonymous commentary, which are not even strongly indicative cases: (1) expressions such as ὅ λέγει τοιοῦτον or (2) λέγων appear in both Anonymous and Michael, but not in them alone. Specifically, the use of the participle λέγων is equally common in the Anonymous as well as in Stephanus. Moreover, the phrase ὅ λέγει τοιοῦτον, although appearing in the Anonymous, is relatively rare in relation to its frequency in Michael’s commentaries. (3) τὸ + adjective/adverb + τῆς λέξεως, which is common in Michael, appears in two versions in the Anonymous, namely τὸ ανθηρὸ τῆς λέξεως and τὸ ὀγκηρὸν τῆς λέξεως, but both appear only in the related discussions of the Rhetoric about lexis, namely the discussion about the virtue(s) and the ὄγκος of lexis. (4) Similarly, the phrase ἀσάφειαν ποιεῖν and (5) the term σαφήνεια are used by the Anonymous only in the context of talking about the σαφήνειαν and ἀσάφειαν of the verbal expression, about which Aristotle speaks in book III of the Rhetoric. (6)

|| 29 It is, however, not a paraphrase, since, unlike other paraphrases of the Aristotelian treatises (for instance, Themistius), the Anonymous quotes Aristotle’s text and uses these quotations within his analysis. 30 Rambourg (2018), 38 argues that the continuous form of the Anonymous’ commentary agrees with Michael’s method, since it indicates the interest in the precision to every word and the attention to the formulation. However, this is misleading: on the one hand, the precise commentary on every word is not a feature of Michael’s method, who focuses on some of the phrases of the Aristotelian text. On the other hand, the attention to formulation cannot be said to be a distinctive feature of only one commentator, since this is exactly the aim of every commentator. 31 Luna (2001), 197-213.

22 | Introduction

Vocabulary such as ταὐτον, and (7) ἀπαγγέλλω, are the only cases which are common to both authors, but they can be found (less frequently) also in other commentaries, such as Stephanus. Similarly, typical expressions used frequently by the Anonymous’ author are not to be found in Michael’s commentaries. I will only mention here the use of the explicatory word ἤτοι or ἤγουν, which seems to be a very characteristic feature of the Anonymous’ commentator. In fact, ἤτοι is used as often as 1100 times within the commentary on the Rhetoric. In comparison, Stephanus uses the same word 25 times in his commentary, whereas Michael uses it 269 times in his whole corpus of commentaries (those that are known and edited). Similarly, ἤγουν is used 90 times by the Anonymous, 50 by Stephanus and 78 by Michael (again in his entire corpus). Naturally, given that we deal with commentaries, which are texts with a rather educational character, the use of such vocabulary intended to explain a phrase, sentence or passage more extensively, is to be expected. However, the frequent use of such wording is an interesting case for understanding the special writing style of a commentator. In the case of the Anonymous especially, we obviously have an extraordinarily frequent use of ἤτοι, sometimes more than once into the same sentence. For instance: [T.2] δεῖ γὰρ μὴ διηγεῖσθαι μακρῶς ἤτοι ταχέως, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ μακρῶς προοιμιάζεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεις ἤτοι τὰς ἀποδείξεις λέγειν μακράς· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εὖ ἤτοι τὸ μέσον θεωρεῖται ἢ ἐν τῷ ταχὺ καὶ μακρῶς διηγεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ συντόμως, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μήτε μακρῶς καὶ ταχέως διηγεῖσθαι μήτε συντόμως· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ μετρίως ἤτοι τὸ μέσως. (CAG XXI.2 243, 11-16)

Therefore, due to both stylistic and linguistic reasons, as well as due to the lack of significant philosophical similarities between Michael of Ephesus’ commentaries and the commentary on the Rhetoric, the identification of the Anonymous author of the commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric with Michael of Ephesus must be rejected. Interestingly, this last feature of our commentary can give us some hint for the identification of our author, since the commentary on the Rhetoric is not the only one that exhibits such frequent use of the explicatory ἤτοι. Yet another anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VII makes use of the term 638 times, which is the only use of ἤτοι analogous to the Anonymous in the Rhetoric. Since the analogous use of the term is not the only similarity between the two commentaries, but also since the format and style of commentary on the NE is very similar to the one on the Rhetoric, the relation between the two commentaries must be further examined. First, before discussing issues of style and format, some shared features between the two commentaries can be studied with the help of existing studies on the Anonymous commentary on the NE VII, the importance and usefulness of which (in comparison to the other Byzantine commentaries) has been largely rejected by

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 23

scholars of the Byzantine reception of Aristotle’s ethics. Some basic features of this commentary have been presented by Elisabeth A. Fisher32 as follows: (1) Simultaneous use of regular and less regular grammatical forms: he uses both the Attic form of neutral plural subject with singular verb and the less regular combination of neutral plural subject with plural verb33. (2) His vocabulary indicates the educational use of the commentary, such as explicatory words like ἤτοι or ἤγουν. (3) He uses rare medical vocabulary, which has led scholars to (wrongly, as Fisher states) believe that he is a physician. (4) He has good knowledge of literature; by this, she refers to the commentator’s proclivity toward providing additional information about the mythological and historical background of Aristotelian references. As Fisher says, the commentator is “enthusiastic about incorporating into his commentary allusions to literary sources and identifications of persons and places drawn from literature”. Fisher refers also to an example illustrating this feature, in which the commentator explicates Aristotle’s statement about “monsters, like the female, who they say ripped open pregnant women and ate their children” (NE VII.4 1148b20-22), by saying that Aristotle here refers to Lamia and by then providing us with some information about Lamia34. Similarly, in other passages he often refers to mythological incidents, like Philoctetes’ deception by Neoptolemus (414, 18; 442, 2), or Priamus’ praise of Hector in Homer (408, 32). (5) He makes use of Latin terminology. Interestingly, all four features discussed by Fisher are also typical of the Anonymous commentary on the Rhetoric: (1) The first couple pages of the CAG edition are enough for illustrating that the Anonymous commentary on the Rhetoric is also indifferent in the use of Attic verbal forms and hence uses both verbal forms in combination with neutral plural subjects. Of the first four instances of neutral plural nouns as subjects, two are combined with a singular verb, and the other two with plural verb: [T.3.a] ἀεὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει, κἄν μὴ βουλευσώμεθα, τὰ ἀναγκαία. (1, 12) [T.3.b] ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ἀδύνατα, ὡς τὰ ἀναγκαία ἀεὶ ὄντα. (2, 12)

|| 32 Fisher (2009), 145 ff. discusses some of the basic features of the commentary in order to summarise and reject the criticisms of other scholars against the commentator. Interestingly, Fisher discusses in her paper the possibility that the Anonymous on NE VII is Stephanus Skylitzes and rejects it. For the criticism of the Anonymous commentary on the NE VII s. Mercken (1991), Schleiermacher (1838). 33 This feature, she argues, can be found also in other writers of the middle Byzantine period. So, it is not, as other scholars have argued, lack of knowledge of Greek grammar, but rather “indifference to this matter” (p. 148). 34 S. Fisher (2009), 147.

24 | Introduction [T.3.c] […] ἔσται καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα τινὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία, τινὰ δὲ ἐοικότα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα. (3, 16) [T.3.d] […] τὰ δὲ ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων εἰσὶ […] (3, 25)

As Fisher stated for the commentary in NE VII, this feature is not characteristic only of this commentator, but can be found in other authors as well. It is therefore not sufficient for drawing conclusions about the particular commentary, but interesting insofar as it can help us integrate the author into the Byzantine scholarly tradition. (2) We have already shown that ἤτοι (and ἤγουν) are used extraordinarily frequently only in the two commentaries in question, which indicates not only the educational character of the commentaries, but also the unique writing preferences of the author(s). (3) Medical parallels and examples are also to be found in the Anonymous commentary, in passages where their use is not expected. I will quote only a few such passages, which indicate a good knowledge of medicine: [T.4.a] οἷον εἰ τῆς κεφαλῆς πληρωθείσης αἵματος, ὃ βάρος τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐνεποίει καὶ τύφλωσιν, καταπεσὼν ἢ προσράξας τις νέος τὴν κεφαλὴν ἢ τὴν ῥῖνα ἐκένωσε τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ὀπτικὸς ἐφάνη καὶ ἀνάλγητος τὴν κεφαλήν, εὐτυχὴς ἂν ὁ παῖς ἐκεῖνος· τούτου δὲ τέχνη ἡ ἰατρική. πάλιν τις πυρέττων κατὰ τύχην ὕδωρ πιὼν ἢ οἶνον ἀνθοσμίαν ἔπαυσε τὸν πυρετόν. (20, 1-6) [T.4.b] ἀγαθὸν δὲ κἀκεῖνο, οὗ χάριν ἄλλο βουλόμεθα, οἷον ἡ νίκη, ἧς χάριν εἱλόμεθα τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι, ἢ ἡ ὑγεία, ἧς χάριν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ φάρμακα ὑποιστὰ καὶ οὐ λυπηρὰ νομίζονται καὶ οἱ καυτῆρες ἡδεῖς δοκοῦσιν […] (20, 34-21, 2) [T.4.c] καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀγαθά, ὡς τὸ τὰ ψιλὰ τῶν γραμμάτων μὴ ἀναγινώσκειν κωλυτικὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ὀφθαλμοπονεῖν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ψυχροποτεῖν † κωλυτικὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπληστεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ προσφέρεσθαι τὰ δύσπεπτα. κωλυτικὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἡ κένωσις καὶ ἡ μάθησις τῆς ἀγνοίας, καὶ τῶν νόσων κωλυτικαὶ αἱ τοιαίδε φλεβοτομίαι. (21, 19-24)

Regarding this feature, although it is evident that both commentaries make abundant use of medical examples, one can still object that this is a distinctive feature of the two Anonymous commentaries by arguing that medical examples are frequently used in many other commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises. For instance, Alexander’s and Philoponus’commentaries on De anima, Philoponus’ commentary on De generatione et corruptione and Physics, as well as Michael of Ephesus’ commentaries on Aristotle’s biological treatises entail many such examples drawn from medical theories and exhibit a great knowledge of medicine35. Nevertheless, in many of these

|| 35 S. Todd (1976) and (1984); Ierodiakonou (1995); Westerink (1964). It is generally accepted that Galen is often the primary source for such references.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 25

cases, the use of medical examples can be justified by their context: it does not surprise us to find medical references within the discussions about nutrition or the sensory organs, or in passages dealing with the physiological functions of animals. This is not the case for most medical examples used in the commentaries on the Rhetoric and Ethics, which often seem to be unconnected from the context or at least unnecessary. In the first of the passages cited above, when commenting on Aristotle’s statement that art can be the cause of some things, the Anonymous on the Rhetoric says that medicine is the cause of good luck (εὐτυχία) in cases in which one finds again his sight that he had lost due to a brain haematoma, as when one accidentally hits his head and causes the nose to bleed. This medical example cannot be justified by the context, and hence seems to be out of place. Similarly, in the last of the cited passages, the medical example seems to be unnecessary: the commentator tries to give examples of things that are good by hindering something bad, and he mentions among other things bloodletting as preventing diseases36. The medical examples provided by the Anonymous on the NE VII are also of this type, that is to say unnecessary for comprehending the text. For instance, the commentator refers in 423, 26 to the Aristotelian division of things that bring about pleasure into necessary (such as those related to food and sex) and elected (such as honour and wealth) (NE 1147b23-27), and adds that sexual pleasures are necessary for those who suffer kidney diseases. However, the use of medical vocabulary in a non-physical context is not unique in these two commentaries. Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on the NE X makes abundant use of medical examples37, and some of the examples used in the Anonymous are also to be found in Stephanus’ commentary. Therefore, although this feature is common between the two commentaries and indicates the author’s familiarity with medical vocabulary and practice, it is not sufficient for establishing the authorship, but can only be used as an indication of the common tradition to which the two commentaries belonged. (4) As for the commentator’s proclivity in providing information from literature, we already discussed at the beginning of the section on the Byzantine commentaries on the Rhetoric, where I mainly focused on the rhetorical tradition that he

|| 36 Both theories can be found in Galen’s corpus, namely both bloodletting from veins as a legitimate therapy and nose bleeding as healing brain hematomas. 37 For instance, bloodletting is also mentioned in Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on the NE as an example of things that are not desired for themselves, but for the sake of healing (534, 29-34: οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ τὸν ἡδόμενον, διὰ τί ἥδεται, ὥσπερ τὸν λουόμενον ἢ φλέβα τεμεῖν ἡ φάρμακον πιεῖν βουλόμενον, διὰ τί τούτων ἕκαστον αἱρεῖται. τοῦτον γὰρ εἴ τις ἔροιτο, διὰ τί ἐπὶ τὴν φαρμακοποσίαν ἵεται, τάχ' ἂν εἴποι ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, ἐκεῖνο δὲ εἴ τις ἔροιτο διὰ τί τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκει, εἴποιεν ἂν δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι). However, although the thought is the same, the language used is different from the Anonymous commentary and, hence, can only indicate that this used to be a well-known method for healing some diseases. S. Ierodiakonou (2009), 187 ff.

26 | Introduction

knows and makes use of. Aside from the classical orators and the rhetoricians of late antiquity, whom he always tries to integrate into the discussion, he also often strengthens his commentary with references to other authors or events. As we will also see later (chapter 2, section 3 on topoi), especially when dealing with his commentary on Rhetoric II.23, the commentator provides us with abundant material regarding the historical and mythological background of some Aristotelian references. For now, it will be sufficient to mention some passages from II.23 where the commentator expands on an Aristotelian statement in the same way as in the passages from the commentary on NE discussed above. [T.5.a] Ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσηνιακῷ. οἱ Μεσηνιᾶται ἄποικοί εἰσι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων· καὶ διότι συνεμάχησαν καὶ προσετέθησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὡρμήθησαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καταδουλῶσαι αὐτούς. συμβουλεύει γοῦν ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καταδουλῶσαι τοὺς ἐν Μεσήνῃ ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου38. (133, 13-17) [T.5.b] τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήσαντος ἡ Μακεδονία διῃρέθη εἰς ἀρχὰς πολλάς. καὶ ὁ Νικάνωρ Μακεδὼν ἦν· λαβὼν καὶ αὐτὸς μέρος τῆς Μακεδονίας καὶ ἄρχων ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσπευδε καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα· τέως γοῦν ἀνῃρέθη παρὰ τῶν συγγενῶν. ὁ γοῦν ῥήτωρ δικάζεται εἰς πρόσωπον τοῦ Νικάνορος μετὰ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων τὸν Νικάνορα39. (134, 31- 135, 5)

In both passages, we see the commentator’s method of commenting on Aristotle’s references to some historical or mythological persons and events. The commentator expands upon these references and offers some additional information. More specifically, in the first passage we learn the history of the Messinian settlements and their relationship with the Lacedemonian and Athenians, while the second passage aims at offering historical information, which, however, postdate Aristotle. Similar passages with mythological information are abundant in the commentary. (5) Fisher recognises as a further feature of the Anonymous the use of Latin words “when native Greek words exist”, such as κάρβωνας instead of ἄνθρακας. This feature is shared by the Anonymous on the Rhetoric, but is again also shared by other 12th century writers, for instance Anna Komnene or Stephanus. Therefore, it is important for our purpose only insofar as it puts both commentaries into the same scholarly framework. I take the features of the commentary on the NE discussed above and their appearance in the commentary on the Rhetoric to give us a good ground (although not yet sufficient) for suggesting the identification of the authors. This suggestion can be supported, as I have already stated, by the analysis of the style and format of the two commentaries. First, regarding the format of the Anonymous commentary on

|| 38 Cf. Rhet. 1397a11-12: ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ· “εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι”. 39 Cf. Rhet. 1397b7-8: καὶ ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικάνορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἐκρίθησαν ἀποκτεῖναι, δικαίως ἔδοξεν ἀποθανεῖν.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 27

the NE, it also consists of a continuous presentation and analysis of the Aristotelian text, without headings of lemmata. This feature, shared only by these two commentaries in question, brings the commentary on NE very close to the one on the Rhetoric and distinguishes it from the other Byzantine commentaries on the NE and other Aristotelian treatises, which usually consist of interpretations of particular lemmata. Second, the writing style of the two commentaries is very similar. Besides the exceptionally frequent use of the explicatory word ἤτοι, of which I have already discussed, the commentaries seem to make use of similar wording and expressions. Moreover, interpretations of particular passages of both treatises provided in the two commentaries can strengthen our suggestion that the two texts are written by the same author. In the commentary on the Rhetoric, we do find many references to the NE that indicate an exceptional knowledge of the text. In the first lines of the commentary, where the commentator gives an account of things of which there is deliberation, he refers directly to the parallel discussion in the NE and even borrows some of the criteria presented by Aristotle in the latter treatise: [T.6] ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί τε τοιούτων, περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν τέχνας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς εἶπε, περὶ τίνων ἐστὶν ἡ βούλευσις, ὅτι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, εἰ κινηθῇ ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἀνατελεῖ, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, εἰ σύμμετρος ἡ διάμετρος, οὔτε περὶ ὧν ἐστι τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οἷον εἰ τοῦ τριγώνου αἱ τρεῖς γωνίαι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι εἰσίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει, κἂν μὴ βουλευσώμεθα, τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· καὶ τοῦ τριγώνου αἱ τρεῖς γωνίαι οὐκ ἀπὸ βουλῆς ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμῃ διδάσκονται. τοίνυν βουλευόμεθα περὶ τούτων, ὧν οὐκ ἔχομεν τέχνας. (CAG XXI.2 1, 6-14)

Elsewhere, he refers to the Ethics in order to point out that Aristotle had made a similar statement (s. 35, 17; 49, 7) or to point the reader to a detailed presentation of a subject matter (in 59, 34 and 87, 32 he points to the Ethics for a detailed account of virtues). Moreover, stronger points of contact between the two commentaries can be found in passages that are interpreted in a way that presupposes knowledge of both Rhetoric and NE VII. First, some such passages are found in the discussions of ethical definitions that will be examined in detail later in the relevant chapter (chapter 4 below). Specifically, the commentator’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the good and virtue in the Rhetoric (I.6-7, 9) often brings into the discussion the case of continence and incontinence, which is the subject matter of NE book VII. In three passages, the Anonymous on the Rhetoric refers to the relation between continence and temperance and states that continence is the mean or starting point towards temperance and temperance is the extremity of continence (23, 19-32; 30, 37; 31, 19). Elsewhere, he distinguishes between virtues whose outcomes have only a personal impact, such as temperance and mildness, and virtues whose outcome can be useful and advantageous to the whole city, such as justice and courage (48, 20), or he explains why it is better for an incontinent action to be due to a particular occasion and not due to an incontinent ἕξιν. These unexpected references to continence and

28 | Introduction

incontinence can already give the ground for inferring that the author of the commentary on the Rhetoric had knowledge of NE VII such that he wanted to highlight any possible convergences between the two theories. Let us look closely at some additional passages: [T.7] συμβήσεται δὲ λέγοντας ἡμᾶς τόπους καὶ πίστεις, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἐπαινῶν καὶ ψέγων ἐπιχειρῶν φανεῖται, παραδοῦναι κἀκεῖνα, ἐξ ὧν ποιός τις φανήσεται ὁ ἐπαινῶν ἢ ψέγων· πόρισμα γὰρ οἷον κάλλιστον ἀκολουθήσει τὸ καὶ ποιὸν γενέσθαι τὸν πανηγυρίζοντα ἐκ τῶν πίστεων, ἐξ ὧν ἐγκωμιάζων ἐπιχειρήσει τόδε μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τόδε δὲ ψέγειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαίρω τοῦδε τὰ κατορθώματα καὶ δεικνύω τυχὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ σώφρονα ἐκ [τῶν]40 τοιῶνδε λόγων καὶ πίστεων καὶ δίκαιον ἀπὸ λόγων ἀκριβῶν καὶ τεκμηρίων, ἃ χαρακτηρίζουσι τὸν δίκαιον, ἀνάγκη κἀμὲ δίκαιον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι καὶ σώφρονα, ὅτι μηδ' ἔστιν εἰκὸς ἐκθειάζειν με πάνυ τεχνικῶς τάδε τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, μὴ εἰδέναι δέ, τίνα εἰσὶ τὰ ἐπαινούμενα καὶ ἐξαιρόμενα· ἐπεὶ οὔτε τὸ μέλι θαυμάσει τις, εἰ μὴ τῆς γλυκύτητος ἀπογεύσαιτο, οὔτε τὸ πῦρ ὡς θερμὸν καὶ ζῳογόνον ἐγκωμιάσει μὴ εἰδὼς ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἀρετῆς ἐπαινέτης ἔσται μὴ ζηλωτὴς ὢν αὐτῆς καὶ θερμὸς ἐραστής, οὔτε σωφροσύνης ἔργα καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐξᾶραι θελήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τὴν πεῖραν ἐξ ἔργων ἔχει, ποῖαι δή τινες καθεστήκασιν. εἰκότως δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι δευτέραν λέγει πίστιν41 (Anon., In Art. Rhet. 46, 23-38) [T.8] οὐ γάρ φασιν οἷόν τε εἶναι καὶ δυνατὸν τὸν ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος παρασφαλῆναί ποτε. δεινὸν γὰρ ᾤετο ὁ Σωκράτης τὸ ἔνθα πάρεστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἐκεῖ ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ ἕλκειν τὸν λόγον ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιστήμην ἔχει τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅτι κακόν ἐστι, πῶς ἡττᾶται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ περιέλκεται, ὡς ἀνδράποδον; (Anon., In NE VII 411, 29-34) [T.9] ἡ μέν, ἤτοι ἡ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ λέγουσα, ὅτι οὐδενὸς γλυκέος ἀπογεύεσθαι δεῖ, κελεύει φεύγειν τόδε τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ μὴ ἀπογεύεσθαι τούτου, ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία ἄγει καὶ παρακινεῖ σε καὶ ἄκοντα ἀπογεύσασθαι τοῦδε τοῦ γλυκέος. (Anon., In NE VII 421, 19-22)

In the first passage, the Anonymous argues that when the orator praises one’s virtues he has himself these character traits, since one cannot admire and praise something without having a personal experience of it. Hence, the orator knows what good is, and praises it. In an earlier passage, the commentator stated that it is the orator who, by knowing the good, uses the topoi of controversial goods in the best way, namely, in a moral way. To understand the commentator’s reading one needs to look to the Socratic doctrine against incontinence and to Aristotle’s criticism of it in the NE, which is repeated by the Anonymous on the NE VII in the second passage [T.8]: it is impossible for one to be mistaken, if one has knowledge of something. Further, in the first passage, in order to illustrate the case of virtues, the Anonymous refers to one more case in which knowledge and personal experience of a thing are necessary for its appraisal: one does not praise honey, if one has never tasted anything sweet. This example is used by Aristotle, in his discussion of the || 40 The manuscript V (Vat. 1340) does not have τῶν in this line. 41 This passage is analysed later in chapter 4 (s. passage [T.10])

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 29

conflict between knowledge of universals and desire of particulars that leads to incontinence (NE VII.5), and is repeated and analysed in detail by the Anonymous commentator on NE VII. Interestingly, the vocabulary used by the commentator on the Rhetoric is not similar to the example in Aristotle’s text, but identical to its interpretation by the commentator on NE VII. It is also interesting that the expression “γλυκέος/γλυκύτητος ἀπογεύεσθαι” is not a typical expression and is only to be found in these two commentaries and in some ecclesiastical treatises42. Similarly, there are some traces of the commentary on the NE VII in the commentator’s discussion of emotions in Rhet. II.2-11. As we will see in chapter 5, emotions are criticised by the Anonymous as being deviations from correct judgement and even hindering reasoning. Although the commentary on these passages seems to be influenced also by the Stoic views of emotions, the origin of this reading can be traced in the Aristotelian theory of incontinence. In the commentary on the NE VII, the Anonymous often refers to incontinence or to desire as πάθος, and highlights the contrast to reason: the incontinent is beaten by the emotion (ἡττᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους) and cannot follow reason. Interestingly, the vocabulary used by the commentator is strikingly identical to that of the commentary on the Rhetoric. [T.10] οὔτε οἱ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οἱ γὰρ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸν φόβον οὐκ ἐλεοῦσι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει ἤτοι διὰ τὸ ὅλοι τοῦ πάθους γενέσθαι· (Anon., In Art. Rhet. 111, 911) [T.11] τὰ δὲ πάθη, καθ’ ἃ μεταβάλλοντες καὶ ἀλλοιούμενοι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ οἱ κριταὶ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις διαφέρουσιν ἤτοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνονται, ταῦτά εἰσιν, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή. (Anon., In Art. Rhet. 88, 33-89, 1) [T.12] καὶ τοῖς ἐξεστηκόσι τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑβρίσασιν ἡμᾶς πραεῖς φαινόμεθα ἢ ἧττον ὀργιζόμεθα· οὐ γὰρ ὡς καταφρονῶν ἔπραξεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τι, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ὀργῆς παρακινηθείς. (Anon., In Art. Rhet. 94, 11-13)43 [T.13] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς γινώσκων, ὅτι φαῦλόν ἐστι τὸ μοιχεύειν, πράττει αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἤτοι ἡττηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, […] ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς γινώσκων ὅτι φαῦλαί εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐδ' ὅλως πράττει αὐτὰς […] διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἤτοι τοῦ λόγου προστάσσοντος. (Anon., In NE VII 411, 5-9) [T.14] ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ὅλος τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὶν ἡττηθῇ ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσχρᾶς ἐπιθυμίας, οὐκ οἴεται, ἤτοι οὐ δοξάζει, καλὸν εἶναι τὴν αἰσχρὰν ἡδονήν, φανερόν ἐστι τοῦτο. (Anon., In NE VII 412, 7-10) [T.15] ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἤτοι οἱ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις κατεχόμενοι ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ, οὕτω διατίθενται ὡς οἱ μεθύοντες καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι […] οἱ θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν ἀφροδισίων οὐ μόνον τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλοιοῦσι καὶ οἱονεὶ μεθύειν αὐτὴν παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ

|| 42 S. Rom. Melodus, Cant. 34, 23; Theod. Studites, Epist. 513, 21; Johan. Chrysost. In Il. 59, 528. 43 All three passages are translated and analysed in chapter 5.3.1.

30 | Introduction φανερῶς τὸ σῶμα μεθιστῶσιν, ἤτοι ἀλλοιοῦσιν. εἰ γάρ τις θυμῷ κατέχεται, ἴδοις ἂν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐρυθρούς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἐρᾷ, ἴδοις ἂν τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ὠχρόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπερβολικοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς μανίαν ἐτράπησαν καὶ ἐξεστηκότες ἐγένοντο. (Anon., In NE VII 420, 5-10)

The verbal similarity between the two commentaries is obvious in these and in many other similar passages. I argue that, in order to show the compatibility between the account of incontinence in NE VII and the account of emotions in Rhet. II, the commentator has interpreted Aristotle’s discussion of emotions by applying the incontinent’s conflict between reason and desire to all emotions. Therefore, both commentaries exhibit the same view of emotions: emotions are contrary to reason, consist in alterations, while reason can become wholly subject to emotions. In addition to these passages, in which emotions are examined in general, there are some similarities between the two commentaries in the discussions of particular emotions. Anger is a characteristic example: [T.16] Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις τιμωρίας φαινομένης ἤτοι φανερᾶς μετὰ λύπης· λυπηθεὶς γὰρ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ὥρμησεν εἰς τὸ τιμωρῆσαι τὸν λυπήσαντα, ἐλυπήθη δὲ διὰ τὸ ὀλιγωρηθῆναι καὶ καταφρονηθῆναι μὴ προσηκόντως ἢ αὐτὸς ἤ τις τῶν αὑτοῦ οἷον συγγενὴς ἢ φίλος. […] τὸ γοῦν φαντάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, πῶς δεσμεῖ τὸν λυπήσαντα καὶ μαστιγοῖ, ἡδονὴν ποιεῖ· (Anon., In Art. Rhet. 89, 8-24) [T.17] ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία, ἤτοι ἡ διάνοια αὐτοῦ, ἐδήλωσε τῷ θυμῷ, ὅτι τὸ πραχθὲν ὕβρις, ἤτοι μοιχεία ἦν, ἢ ὀλιγωρία, ἤτοι καταφρόνησις, οὗτος δὲ μὴ ἐμμείνας ἀκοῦσαι, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τιμωρῆσαι αὐτὸν τὸν μοιχεύσαντα […] ἢ τὸν καταφρονήσαντα εὐθὺς χαλεπαίνει καὶ ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τιμωρίαν. (Anon., In NE VII 430, 19-25) [T.18] οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος, ἤτοι ὅτι εἰ γινώσκει τις τόδε, ὅτι κακόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο δράσῃ, μάχεται τοῖς φαινομένοις, ἤτοι τοῖς φανεροῖς πράγμασιν. (Anon., In NE VII 412, 2-3)

These passages, as the previous ones, exhibit a striking similarity to one another both with respect to their interpretation of anger and contempt, and to the language used. It is more likely to infer here that the commentary on the NE VII relies on the more extensive discussion of anger in the Rhetoric. Hence, the Anonymous on the NE calls contempt (ὀλιγωρία) as despise (καταφρόνησις), which is the way that Aristotle refers to contempt in the Rhetoric. Moreover, the two commentaries express in the same way the angry person’s urge towards revenge, “ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τιμωρίαν”. Finally, regarding the last passage quoted, it is very interesting that the term φαινόμενος is interpreted as φανερός in both commentaries, even if this is in different contexts. The reason why this is important will become evident when we examine the meaning of the term φαντασία in the commentary on the Rhetoric (chapter 5), but for now it is enough it point out to the fact that the commentator explicitly considers “clear” or “obvious” as an adequate meaning for “apparent”. Although this might sound trivial to an English speaker (since “apparent” encompasses both meanings, namely “seeming” and “evident”), this should not be taken for granted.

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric | 31

In fact, there are several passages in Aristotle and late antique commentators that explicitly distinguish between the two terms. Hence, the commentator’s interpretation of φαινόμενος as φανερός shows, on the one hand, that a slight change might have occurred in the 12th century, such that φαινόμενος might also mean φανερός in some context, and on the other hand, that it is the commentator’s conscious decision to interpret the two terms as equivalent, and, hence, to adopt the view that anger requires an “evident” insult. It has become clear, I hope, that the two commentaries must have been written by the same author. Unfortunately, both commentaries have come down to us without the name of their author. According to Fischer (2009, 157), Sten Ebbesen noticed some similarities between the commentary on NE VII and a scholiast of Aristotle’s logical treatises, Leo Magentinos. First, Leo makes exceptionally frequent use of the explicatory term ἤγουν. Second, Leo is also indifferent regarding the use of Greek koine, namely he uses verbs in both singular and plural with neutral nouns as their subject. Further, just as the Anonymous on the NE VII, Leo’s scholia are said to be of “mediocre content and inelegant style”, while his comments often derive from earlier commentators. However, I do not think that these features can be used as proof for the identification of Leo Magentinos as the author of the commentaries on the Rhetoric and NE VII. First, although Leo frequently uses explicatory terms, he prefers the use of ἥγουν over ἤτοι. In fact, ἤτοι is hardly ever used. Second, we already stated above that the simultaneous use of both regular and less regular grammatical forms is typical for 12th century writers, and hence, it is not shared only by Leo and the Anonymous commentator. Finally, it has been argued that Leo heavily relied on previous commentators, and he explicitly refers often to his sources, for example to Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on the Sophistical Refutations. Unlike Leo, the Anonymous on the NE VII never refers explicitly to other commentaries, while the commentary on the Rhetoric refers only vaguely to scholia without identifying their author. Moreover, although it is not clear when Michael of Ephesus wrote his commentaries, it is generally agreed that he belonged to the circle of Anna Komnene and lived in the 12th century. Therefore, if our conclusions above are correct, Michael was at best contemporary of the Anonymous, whereas we would expect that Leo wrote his commentary shortly afterwards. In fact, Sten Ebbesen has dated his activity as a scholiast at the late 12th/ early 13th century. Therefore, the identity of the author of the two commentaries remains still unclear.

1.2.5 Anna’s circle In the previous two sections, I referred to Anna Komnene and her circle of scholars as being connected to the work both of the Anonymous and of Stephanus. Given that this connection will put the two commentaries into a more concrete context of action, it is worth being examined further. First, a few words can be said about An-

32 | Introduction

na’s activities as a patron of Aristotelian scholarship. Anna Komnene (1083-1153) is mostly known for her work Alexiad, in which she describes the reign of her father Alexios I Komnenos. She is also known for her attempt to overthrow her brother John II Komnenos in order to take over the reign of Byzantine Empire after her father’s death in 1118. However, what attracts the interest of the scholars of Aristotle’s reception in Byzantium is mostly her life after this failed attempt, an account of which has come down to us through Georgios’ Tornikes funeral oration to Anna44. He reports that, after her failure to usurp her brother, Anna secluded herself in a monastery and devoted her time in studying philosophy, especially Aristotle. Moreover, and more importantly, she created a group of scholars whose tasks included the commenting on the Aristotelian treatises, especially those that had not been commented on previously. The only commentaries that we have, for instance, on Aristotle’s biological writings and on Politics come from this period and from this initiative. Michael of Ephesus and Eustratios of Nicaea are known to have belonged to this group of scholars, and Georgios Tornikes also counts himself as a member of it. It therefore comes as no surprise to argue that both of our commentators, the Anonymous and Stephanus, who lived in the same place and at the same time as Anna Komnene, wrote their commentaries on the Rhetoric under her patronage. This suggestion becomes more plausible considering that Aristotle’s Rhetoric was one of the philosopher’s treatises largely rejected in late antiquity, and hence would fit into Anna’s plan of commenting on the least known and studied texts. This suggestion is also supported by internal material from the commentaries. Starting with the Anonymous, I have already presented above a passage that seems to be a direct reference to his support of Anna and his affiliation with her activities. In particular, in CAG XXI.2 98, 23-27, the Anonymous refers to a certain conflict with regard to undertaking the reign of the Empire, and to taking sides with the losing part. If this is indeed an autobiographical reference, as apparently it is, then we can infer that he refers exactly to the conflict between Anna and her brother, and to himself as taking sides with Anna. Therefore, if our previous conclusions that Anonymous wrote his commentary shortly after the beginning of John II’s reign in 1118 are correct, then this coincides with the time when Anna Komnene, whom the Anonymous seems to have supported, created a group of scholars in order to study Aristotle’s treatises, a group to which the Anonymous belonged. Aside from this historical reference, the Anonymous’ profile as a commentator also fits well with the scholars surrounding Anna in the 12th century. In particular, the Anonymous commentator, as I have already presented above, was a scholar with thorough knowledge of the late antique philosophical and rhetorical tradition, and especially of the Aristotelian corpus, the treatises of which he uses abundantly when interpreting particular passages from the Rhetoric. Especially if our previous || 44 S. Browning (1962) on Anna’s patronage of Byzantine scholarship.

Methodology | 33

conclusions regarding his identity are correct, the fact that he is the author of more than one commentary on Aristotle’s treatises enhances the suspicion that his production of commentaries was part of an organised initiative, specifically that of Anna Komnene. The same also holds true for Stephanus. As already discussed, he is even more exclusively interested in the philosophical aspects of the treatise. In particular, he shows throughout his commentary good knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy, especially logic, and refers explicitly to his own commentary on the Ethics. Therefore, as in the case of the Anonymous, the fact that Stephanus wrote many commentaries on the Aristotelian treatises, in addition to his knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy, indicates that he might also have been a member of the group of scholars who were patronised by Anna Komnene and focused on the production of commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises45. On a concluding note, if the two commentators indeed belonged to the same philosophical community, it becomes even more interesting to study the two commentaries comparatively. In particular, the fact that Stephanus often expresses his criticism of earlier interpreters of the treatise, a criticism that seems to be directed to the Anonymous’ commentary, helps us imagine the way scholarship was developed within the group patronized by Anna. We are namely dealing with an active and flourishing community, within which scholars express conflicting views and create a dialogue regarding the interpretation of particular passages of the Aristotelian treatises.

1.3 Methodology The following five chapters deal with the most important and central aspects of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and their interpretation by the two Byzantine commentators. The second chapter is dedicated to the valid rhetorical arguments and the topoi, the third chapter deals with the topoi of fallacious rhetorical arguments, the fourth focuses on the ethical definitions, the fifth on the account of emotions, and finally, the sixth chapter is devoted to the account of style. Each chapter is structured in the following way: first, I present the issue in question as dealt with by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and the questions that arise from Aristotle’s account; second, I give an overview of the contemporary interpretations of these issues and the contemporary answers to these questions; finally, the main part of each chapter deals with the Byzantine interpretations of these questions. My general strategy is to focus on the issues that are relevant to a modern discussion about Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and to see the commentators’ answers to the

|| 45 Frankopan (2009), 48.

34 | Introduction

problems recognised also by modern interpreters. The reason for this focus is that I aim to create a dialogue between the Byzantine and the modern understanding of the treatise, and, in this way, to highlight the importance of studying the two commentaries that have been largely rejected by modern scholarship. As I hope to make clear in the following chapters, I believe that this strategy has led to interesting conclusions, since the commentators seem to notice many of the problematic issues that trouble the modern interpreters of the Rhetoric, and to give solutions that can be useful for a better understanding of the treatise. This comparative way of presenting the commentators’ interpretations is also useful in the cases of divergence between the Byzantine and the modern commentaries, which are due mainly to the particular interests or goals that each commentator tries to accomplish. In particular, it seems that the Byzantine commentators have written their commentaries aiming mainly to preserve a rare text from extinction, but also to offer a systematic treatment of the treatises of the Aristotelian corpus so that it could defend itself against criticism coming from non-philosophical circles. The Byzantine commentators are namely interested not only in interpreting the Rhetoric, but in interpreting it in such a way as to integrate it into Aristotle’s philosophy. This element is missing from modern interpretations of the treatise, which often point to inconsistences found among the various treatises of the corpus and point out differences in Aristotle’s treatment of the same subject matter within different treatises. Moreover, and connected to the previous point, the two Byzantine commentators, in order to integrate the Rhetoric into Aristotle’s philosophy, seem to make a conscious choice as to the main focus of the treatise. Hence, the Rhetoric is mainly interpreted with respect to its logical aspects, whereas the other parts of the treatise are either completely rejected (by Stephanus) or interpreted in connection with other treatises only when it is not possible to highlight their connection to the Organon (by the Anonymous). Again, this focus is missing from the modern commentators, who, even when aiming to show the consistency between the different accounts, do not seem to suggest that the Rhetoric is supposed to complete Aristotle’s theory of arguments. These differences in goals often lead to competing attitudes towards particular passages, which are considered more interesting from a modern point of view, but less interesting from a Byzantine point of view, or vice versa. Therefore, in the following chapters the reader can expect to find a more detailed presentation of such convergences and divergences between modern and Byzantine interpretations of the same passages, which will form the starting point for closely reading the Byzantine commentaries and for better understanding the aims and goals of their interpretation.

2 Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric 2.1 Introduction Aristotle’s art-based rhetoric differs from the non-art-based rhetorical theories of his predecessors insofar as it focuses on argument and makes use of technical means of persuasion (I.1 1354a12-18). As Aristotle himself states at the beginning of the treatise and shows throughout, a rhetorical speech tends to be more persuasive when the hearers believe that the orator has proved his case, namely when they have been convinced through a series of arguments (Rhet. I.1 1355a3-14). Hence, the orator, in order to persuade the audience, ought to prove why something is or is not the case, rather than merely guide the audience by arousing their emotions or through appealing to external factors. It seems, therefore, that, according to Aristotle's initial remarks at the beginning of the treatise, it will be exactly this focus on argumentation that will form the core of his rhetorical theory. Indeed, the first two books of the treatise fulfil this task, since the three means of persuasion are analysed with reference to the importance of logical argumentation. The analysis of the first mean of persuasion makes use of enthymemes, the core or body of the rhetorical argument (σῶμα τῆς πίστεως). Subsequently, the arousal of emotions and the appeal to the character of the speaker can play an important role in Aristotle's rhetoric as well, as long as they are brought about by the central part of the speech, namely through the argumentative process1. Therefore, in order to understand the Aristotelian theory of rhetorical argumentation better and, consequently, the commentators' interpretations of it, it would be useful, first, to sketch out the meaning of the relevant terms used by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. In particular, I will examine syllogism and enthymeme both in their use within this treatise as well as in their use in the Aristotelian corpus in general. Later on, I will focus on the meaning and function of topos and on the commentators' interpretation of its rhetorical use.

|| 1 Rhet. I.2 1356a4 ff.: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα [...] δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα·[...] διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν [...] περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δηλωθήσεται καθ' ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν λέγωμεν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν. The bold in the Greek text is always mine. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-002

36 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

2.2 Enthymeme The syllogism is a deduction defined by Aristotle as “the logos, in which, when certain things have been laid down, something other than these things follows from them with necessity” 2. In particular, syllogismos is a generic term and includes several sub-types, i.e. demonstration, dialectical and rhetorical syllogism, which are distinguished from one another regarding their differences in scope or affinity with the truth. Each of these syllogisms is dealt with separately by Aristotle: demonstration is the subject matter of the Posterior Analytics, whereas the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations deal with the dialectical and sophistical arguments respectively. In the Rhetoric, there is extensive discussion of rhetorical syllogisms, namely enthymemes. Before dealing with each of these types of syllogisms one should first make a distinction between syllogismos in its non-technical sense and the syllogism within the Aristotelian syllogistic, as it is presented mainly in the Prior Analytics. In short, by Aristotelian syllogistic we refer to the theory of deductions in the three figures3. The presentation of this theory is systematic, since Aristotle, after laying down and defining some of the terms that will be important for the rest of the inquiry (I. 1), describes first each of the three figures with reference to the type of premises used (universal or particular, affirmative or negative) and the reduction of the two figures to the first one (I. 2-7), and then moves on to analyse the different modes of syllogisms, namely assertoric, apodeictic or problematic syllogisms (I. 8-22). The questions that are relevant to my current purposes are whether this syllogistic is meant by Aristotle to be applicable to all types of syllogism and whether it is actually to be found in the treatises dealing with the dialectical and rhetorical syllogism, namely the Topics and the Rhetoric. To answer this question and to introduce the commentators' answer to it, I will give a short overview of Aristotle's division of the types of syllogisms. First, demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) is defined in the Analytics as the syllogism which makes use of premises that are “true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to and causative of the conclusion4”, and is described as the only syllogism that is productive of scientific knowledge. In fact, the Posterior Analytics deal exactly with this type of syllogism, the features of its premises and the conditions under which knowledge is brought about through demonstrations. Scholars are not || 2 Pr. An. I.1 24b19-24; Top. I.1 100a25-27. For a full discussion about this definition and its appearance both in the Topics and in the Prior Analytics s. Primavesi (1996), 62 ff. 3 I do not want to discuss here at length the theory of Aristotelian syllogistic, the relation between the two Analytics or the features of demonstration. I only refer to these terms in order to give a very short overview of the Aristotelian logical theory in its different stages, so that I can identify the rhetorical references to syllogism with one of these stages. 4 Post. An. I.2 71b20 ff.; cf. Top. I.1 100a27-30.

Enthymeme | 37

in agreement as to the relation between the two Analytics, but the Posterior Analytics has been dated both earlier5 and later6 than the Prior Analytics. In any case, there seems to be a continuity between the two treatises, since both contain references to the other, and the use of the term syllogism in its technical sense seems to be common to both, namely, both make use of a theory of syllogism dated more or less to the same period. As for the dialectical syllogisms, their logical structure and their relation to demonstration, there is disagreement among scholars, which is also related to the discussion about the applicability of the syllogistic theory to the dialectical arguments. On the one hand, Aristotle states in the Prior Analytics (II.23 68b8-14) that his syllogistic theory is meant to cover all instances of syllogisms, namely also dialectical or rhetorical syllogisms. If this is so, then the logical structure of the dialectical syllogisms is the same as the structure of demonstrations, and the only difference between the two lies in the quality of the premises used: unlike demonstration, the premises of a dialectical syllogism are not primary and true but only reputable (ἔνδοξα), namely they contain opinions that are accepted by all or most people or by the wise7. On the other hand, given that in the Topics there are no traces of this syllogistic theory, it has been fairly argued that it is a later development in Aristotle’s thought, namely after he wrote the treatises on dialectics8. Hence, even though his syllogistic, when written, was meant to be applicable to all types of syllogisms, the Topics seems to entail an early concept of “deduction” that is not related to the three-figure syllogistic. However, even for those scholars who detached the syllogistic theory from dialectics, there is a tendency to find a link between the two theories. Hence, they contend that although the term syllogismos in the Topics does not refer to the syllogistic theory of the Analytics, the deductions as described in the Topics are taken as presupposed for all deductive reasoning. According to this view, the deductions provide the principles of demonstrative sciences, and, further, the Topics entails the doctrine of the four predicables, which is a presupposition of the deductive reasoning of the Analytics (i.e. one needs to know first how to distinguish an accident from the genus, before one can formulate premises)9. As for the rhetorical arguments, Aristotle notes in the Rhetoric the important role of enthymemes, which are the rhetorical version of syllogisms, by stating that they are the body of persuasion. Given that the Rhetoric explicitly connects the art of rhetoric with dialectics, and given that there are some references to a treatise on

|| 5 S. Solmsen (1929). 6 S. Ross (1949). 7 Top. I.1 100b22-24. Cf. Soph. el. 2 165b1-4; Pr. An. I.1 24a22-25. 8 S. Raphael (1974), 155-156; Barnes (1981); Smith (1993), 336-337; Primavesi (1996), 59-60; Grimaldi (1972), 84 argues that the Topics use only the technical sense of syllogism. 9 S. Raphael (1974), 155-156; Irwin (1988).

38 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

Analytics or “analytical science”10, the questions that arise are, first, what is the relation of the rhetorical use of syllogism to the dialectical syllogism and, second, whether there is any trace of the syllogistic theory in the Rhetoric. If one affirms both statements and hence recognises the close relation between rhetoric and dialectic, on the one hand, and rhetoric and analytical science, on the other, then one might be led to the same conclusions as Solmsen11, who argued that there are two layers in the Rhetoric, the second of which contains any passages with reference to syllogismos used in its technical sense. Starting from the latter question, the above-mentioned references to the “analytical science” as well as the fact that the Rhetoric entails a discussion of signs that is parallel to the discussion of signs in the Prior Analytics II.27, have led some scholars to argue that the Rhetoric must be composed later than the Topics and that the former treatise makes use of the syllogistic theory rather than the less systematic theory of deductions of the Topics12. However, as I hope to show later in this chapter, the presentation of sign arguments in the Rhetoric is not entirely similar to the treatment of this topic in the Prior Analytics. The difference between the two rests on the fact that the Rhetoric presents the different types of sign arguments with absolutely no reference to the three syllogistic figures. Instead, the types of sign argument are differentiated from one another with reference to the particular-universal relation of the terms of the propositional terms to the sign. As for the references to the Analytics, one should note that they all seem to be side-references (namely not necessarily connected to the text), and thus they might be later additions to the text, either by Aristotle himself or by a later scholar, in order to indicate the treatment of the same subject matter in another treatise. Regarding the first question, the relation between rhetoric and dialectic, though explicit in the beginning of the treatise on Rhetoric, has been a subject to controversial interpretations. The difficulty seems to rest upon the fact that the relation between the two disciplines is described by Aristotle in the very first line of the treatise as being equivalent, with rhetoric being a “counterpart” to dialectic, whereas in the second chapter the relation seems to be described as dependent, since rhetoric is here rather characterised as an offshoot of dialectic. Hence, it has been argued that, although the two arts were described as similar to13 one another, this view was

|| 10 Rhet. I.2 1356b10, 1357a30, 1357b25. 11 Solmsen (1929). 12 Raphael (1974), 157-159; Leszl (2004), 89-90; Grimaldi (1972), 84. 13 Since here I only give a very short overview of the issues in question, I do not want to enter the huge discussion about the meaning of antistrophos in this passage. The Aristotelian commentators, including the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentators of late antiquity, the Roman rhetoricians and philosophers from Cicero till the Renaissance as well as the contemporary scholars, have been troubled in explaining what this term means and what is the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic as presented in this passage.

Enthymeme | 39

abandoned in the second chapter, where Aristotle undertook the task of presenting a rhetorical theory that does not focus on its relation to dialectics but instead a theory which consists in three means of persuasion14. However, independently of how one chooses to describe their relation, the Aristotelian rhetorical theory shares much with dialectics, as will become evident in the rest of the chapter: (1) both lack a specific subject matter, (2) both can be used for arguing for opposing views, (3) both make use of deductions from acceptable premises, and finally, (4) both make use of topoi. But in describing their relation, the most important feature is their common use of arguments: since Aristotelian rhetoric is based on deductions, which come about in the form of enthymemes, the dialectician, by being an expert in syllogisms, becomes the person who is most able to formulate enthymemes15. This having been said, I will proceed to a closer analysis of the features of enthymemes in the Rhetoric and to a presentation of the interpretation of the relevant passages by the two Byzantine commentators. As stated above, an enthymeme is the rhetorical syllogism, which resembles the dialectical syllogism insofar as its premises are acceptable (ἔνδοξα) and not, like the premises of demonstrations, primary and true, and insofar as it makes use of topoi. The enthymemes play a prominent role in the Rhetoric, since it is said that through them the orator can prove or disprove his case, and thus succeed in persuading the audience more efficiently. In fact, Rhetoric I.2 is largely dedicated to delineating the usage and features of enthymemes, namely the type of premises and propositions they make use of as well as the audience they address. The rest of the treatise (books I-II) deals with the specific and common topoi, which help the orator in formulating the enthymemes. Rhetoric I.2 emphasises the fact that the enthymeme is a syllogism16. This statement is of great importance for distinguishing, on the one hand, Aristotelian rhetorical theory from previous rhetorical theories on the grounds of the fact that Aristotle’s art-based method relies on logical argumentation, and, on the other hand, for explaining the relation between dialectic and rhetoric that was announced at the beginning of the treatise. It is also necessary for understanding Aristotle's methodology and the structure of the inquiry into the method of the art of rhetoric: since the enthymeme is a syllogism, it is important to investigate its similarities and differences from the other types of syllogisms and to focus on the type of propositions this syllogism will use. In fact, as we will now see in detail, this is what the rest of the chapter does by stating, first, that the premises of enthymemes are only rarely necessary but usually are contingent, since enthymemes deal with contingent matters, and, second, by stating that the propositions of enthymemes are signs or probabili-

|| 14 For a full discussion of this issue s. Rapp (2016a), 162-168. 15 Rapp (2016a), 169-181. 16 1356a22; 1356b2-6; 1356b18; 1357a16; 1357a23. Cf. 1394a24; 1395b23-25; 1400b27; 1402a29.

40 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

ties. Moreover, another distinctive feature of the enthymemes is the fact that they tend to be as clear and short as possible since the audience they address cannot follow a long train of argumentation, such that one must avoid repetition or a detailed presentation of the thought (Cf. Rhet. II.22 1395b25 ff.). Hence, from the second chapter of the treatise it becomes clear that rhetorical syllogisms are characterised as those syllogisms that (1) address a certain type of audience, i.e. the uneducated audience of a public speech, and, due to this fact, they use endoxical premises, i.e. premises that the audience would easily accept and that will not require a long argumentation process. Moreover, (2) since the matters with which enthymemes deal are almost never necessary, but deal with courses of actions, the type of premises that the enthymemes make use of is contingent. Finally, (3) the contingency of the matter is expressed through the main use of signs or probabilities. At this stage, it is important to keep in mind the traditional interpretations of these features to which Rhet. I.2 refers, in particular, the brevity of the enthymemes and the use of propositions from signs and probabilities. First, the interpretation of the brevity of the enthymeme has been a subject of controversy among scholars. On the one hand, it has been argued that the brevity is accomplished by the suppression of one of the premises, namely by one of the premises being unexpressed. This view, which has been supported by many rhetoricians during late antiquity, seems to follow from the connection of the enthymeme to the syllogistic theory: if the enthymeme is a syllogismos and every syllogismos follows the formal rules presented in the syllogistic theory of the Prior Analytics, then what Aristotle means when he says that the enthymeme should be brief is that it should not express both premises, but only one17. On the other hand, however, if one were to disconnect the syllogistic theory from the enthymeme, then what the text seems to suggest is that the orator should avoid using long trains of thought or repeating himself and proving things that are already known by everyone (I.2 1357a14-21). This latter interpretation namely does not refer to the number of the premises used by the orator or to any formal features of the enthymemes but to the general method that should be used. In fact, this second interpretation seems to be a more natural way of understanding Aristotle’s statement that enthymeme needs to be kept short, since the suppression of one of the two premises could actually create more confusion and can render the argument harder to follow. Second, as stated above, the discussion of sign arguments of the second book of the treatise is connected, on the one hand, to the discussion of the same topic in the Prior Analytics, but also to the presentation of the fallacy from sign in the second book of the Rhetoric (II.24). Signs as well as probabilities are said in both treatises to

|| 17 Madden (1952), 373 and Grimaldi (1972), 87-88 who argues that the rhetorical syllogism is a proper syllogism with two premises. For criticism of this view s. Rapp (2016a), 187.

Enthymeme | 41

be that in which the propositions of the enthymemes consist. However, the two treatments differ insofar as the Prior Analytics makes use of the syllogistic theory discussed previously in the treatise, whereas the Rhetoric introduces the topic of sign arguments by referring to the universal-particular relation of the terms of the premises. Regarding the propositions from signs, Aristotle distinguishes between three types of sign arguments, of which only one is valid, when true, whereas the other two are said not to yield a syllogism (ἀσυλλόγιστον): [T.1]. Of the signs, one is related as the particular to the universal, for example, if someone said that since Socrates was wise and just, it is a sign that the wise are just. This is indeed a sign, but it is refutable, even if true in this case; for it is non-syllogistic; whereas if someone said that there is a sign that someone is sick, for he has a fever, or that a woman has given birth, for she has milk, that is a necessary sign. Among signs, this is the only token; for only it, if true, is irrefutable. Another type [of signs] that is related as the universal to the particular is, for example, if someone said that it is a sign of fever that someone breathes rapidly. This, too, is refutable, even if true [in some cases]; for it is possible to breathe rapidly and not be feverish. Thus, what probability and what sign and token are and how they differ has now been explained. In the Analytics, they are defined more clearly, and the cause said why some are not syllogistic and others are.18

As we see in this passage from the Rhetoric, the distinction between the different types of sign arguments is here made with reference to the universal-particular relation among the terms of the argument. This relation, absent in the treatment of the same matter in the Prior Analytics, is substituted in the latter treatise by the presentation of sign arguments with reference to the syllogistic figures. This difference is often left aside by recent commentators on the Rhetoric, who have argued that, since Aristotle deals with the same subject matter in both treatises, this treatise must presuppose the treatment of sign arguments of the Analytics and, hence, it should make use of the syllogistic theory. The commentators will also follow this line of argument, as we will soon see. Turning back to the rhetorical treatment of the signs, the first type of sign arguments, which is called a token (τεκμήριον) and is said to be, when true, the only

|| 18 Rhet. I.2 1357b1-25: ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖον, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ εἰρημένον (ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ), τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν, ὅτι γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, ἄλυτόν ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι πυρέττει σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα πνευστιᾶν. τί μὲν οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν, μᾶλλον δὲ φανερῶς καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν. The translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric are by Kennedy (1991), often slightly modified, unless stated otherwise.

42 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

non-refutable kind, is described as the argument in which the sign has a relation towards the thing, of which it is a sign that corresponds to the relation of the particular to the universal. This same sign argument is described differently in the Prior Analytics: it is a syllogism of the first figure, whose middle term is a sign. Similar examples of this type of argument are given in both treatises: Tab. 1: Non-refutable sign arguments- 1st syllogistic figure

Rhetoric I.2 1357b 14-16

Prior Analytics 70a 13-15

One has fever. Therefore, he is sick.

Pregnant women have milk. This woman has milk. Therefore, this woman is pregnant19.

This woman has milk. Therefore, she has given birth.

Similarly, the other two types of sign arguments, which are refutable, are analysed in the Analytics in syllogistic terms by referring to the second and third syllogistic figure, whereas in the Rhetoric they are only described with respect to the relation of their terms, namely as expressing a relation of universal to particular or particular to universal, respectively. I will deal with these types of sign arguments in the next chapter. Finally, regarding the propositions that consist of probabilities, they are also discussed in both treatises. In the Rhetoric, probabilities (εἰκότα) are those cases that happen for the most part (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) and have towards the thing, in regard to which they are probable, the relation of the universal towards the particular. In the Prior Analytics, however, we lack any reference to the universal-particular relation of the terms, but the probable is defined as a generally accepted premise, namely one that is generally known to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be. However, not all scholars agree on this presentation of the relation between these treatments, but it has been argued that this section of the Rhetoric presupposes the discussion of sign arguments of Prior Analytics II.23, and hence, the former treatise must be either as a whole or at least partly written after the composition of the latter and the development of its syllogistic theory20. In other words, the rhetorical treatment is said to presuppose the treatment of sign arguments in the Prior Analytics and, therefore, to make use of the syllogistic theory. I take such an approach to aim mainly at reconciling Aristotle's logical theory as found in the different treatises of the corpus, and at presenting a unified logical theory that underlies || 19 The example is almost the same in the two treatises: in the Rhetoric, it is said that women who have given birth have milk, whereas in the Prior Analytics it is said that pregnant women have milk. 20 S. Raphael (1974), 161.

Enthymeme | 43

all the so-called logical treatises, including the Rhetoric. As will become soon evident, this is also what the Byzantine commentators of the Rhetoric tried to show by pursuing exactly this line of thought, namely by connecting the two treatments of sign arguments.

2.2.1 Anonymous’ Commentary In his commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, the Anonymous author offers some interesting interpretation of some aspects of the Aristotelian theory on the features of enthymemes when he deals with the second chapter of the treatise (Rhet. I.2). Unfortunately, his commentary starts only in the middle of the second chapter of the treatise, and hence, we do not have any comments on the relation between rhetoric and dialectics, which was dealt with by Aristotle in the first chapter, or on the introduction to the three means of persuasion, which is treated in the beginning of the second chapter. However, some indications of his views on these matters can be found in the rest of the commentary. For example, in his surviving interpretation of the second chapter, the commentator does refer to some similarities between dialectics and rhetoric, such as the fact that they both make use of accepted opinions, and more specifically, of views that are accepted by certain types of people but not by anyone in particular. The commentary starts instead with the discussion of the subject matter of the rhetorical arguments, namely with the discussion of what sort of things a rhetorical speech concerns. After this discussion, the commentator moves on to the discussion of the relevant audience of the rhetorical speeches. As Aristotle stated, the audience of a speech consists in simple-minded people, and hence, the orator should, first, use premises which the audience would easily accept and, second, avoid long trains of arguments21. Regarding the length of the rhetorical arguments, the commentary presents two ideas: generally speaking, rhetorical arguments should be kept as short as possible in order not to tire the audience; and more specifically, assuming the theory of syllogisms of the Prior Analytics, enthymemes have only one premise, in order to achieve brevity. These ideas are introduced and presented by the commentator in the following passages:

|| 21 Rhet. I.2 1357a7-17: ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μέν, δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδ' ἐνδόξων, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περί τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός.

44 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric [T.2.a] Therefore, we deliberate about those things, for which there is no art, and towards such an audience that has not anticipated [the argument]; for this is what he means by saying “they (i.e. the audience) cannot comprehend what has been said through many [arguments]”, namely because they haven't anticipated; for whenever one has not anticipated the argument, one follows the arguments of the speaker step by step and concludes calmly, paying attention to anything that is being said, and going, so to say, “with a calm foot” through the road that leads to the knowledge of what has been said, but without formulating a long syllogism as if he had foreseen what is said. “And towards an audience”. This means either as I just explained or it can be interpreted in that way: “neither towards skilful dialecticians, nor towards [skilful] at syllogisms, nor towards sophists”; for the speech is in prose and by way of conversation. So, when many things have been laid down by the orators, the audience cannot comprehend them and understand what has been concluded through the many [premises]; nor can [the hearer] form a long syllogism and say that this orator may, due to this homonymy or due to the argument that has been laid down, use probable arguments and lie, especially when the orator inserts many additional premises in between.22 [T.2.b] As we said, nobody deliberates on those things that cannot be otherwise; for they are always impossible, just as the necessary things are always so. One then can form syllogisms and proofs, on the one hand, by using premises that have already been proven, as for instance “I want to sum up23 the accusations: I proved that Philipp did not report anything true”, etc.; on the other hand, [one can form syllogisms and proofs] by using premises that have not syllogistically been proven before, and require syllogism [themselves], since they are not generally accepted. […] But of these arguments some necessarily are not easy to follow, because they are many and the hearer has not anticipated [what will be said], whereas some are not convincing because they are neither self-evident nor accepted. Therefore, it is necessary that there are enthymemes and paradigms, so that the speech will be persuasive, contentious24 and necessary through the premises of the enthymeme and of the induction, and so that it will be short and condensed and easy to follow. So, one should express and construct the argument through few

|| 22 Anon., In Rhet. 1, 13-2, 6: τοίνυν βουλευόμεθα περὶ τούτων, ὧν οὐκ ἔχομεν τέχνας καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς, οἳ οὔκ εἰσι προειλημμένοι· τοῦτο γὰρ βούλεται λέγειν ἐκ τοῦ εἰπεῖν οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ προειλῆφθαι· ἡνίκα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι προειλημμένος, ἀκολουθεῖ ταῖς πίστεσι τοῦ λέγοντος κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ συμπεραίνει ἠρέμα προσέχων ἑκάστῳ τῶν λεγομένων καὶ διανύων ‘ἡσύχῳ ποδὶ’ τὸ τοῦ λόγου τὴν εἰς γνῶσιν τῶν λεγομένων ἄγουσαν ὁδόν, οὐ μέντοι πόρρωθεν συλλογιζόμενος ὡς προειδὼς τὸ λεγόμενον. καὶ ἐν ἀκροαταῖς. ἤ, ὡς ἔφθην ὑφηγησάμενος, ἢ οὕτως ‘οὐ δεινοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐδὲ συλλογιζομένοις καὶ σοφισταῖς’· πεζὸς γὰρ καὶ καταλογάδην ὁ λόγος· οἱ δ' ἀκροαταὶ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν τεθέντων παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι συνορᾶν καὶ θεωρεῖν τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν συναγόμενον, οὐδὲ συλλογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν δύναται καὶ λέγειν, ὅτι ὅδε ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας ταύτης ἢ τούτου τοῦ νῦν τεθέντος λόγου μέλλει πιθανολογεῖν τε καὶ ψεύδεσθαι, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ παρεμπλέκει μεταξύ. 23 The editor prints συλλογίσασθαι, but συλλογίζεσθαι fits better and it is also supported by the oldest manuscript that entails the commentaries (Vat. 1340). 24 In this context, the term seems to refer to the style of argumentation, which is debating and fitting for contest. The term is also used in this sense by Aristotle (1413b9).

Enthymeme | 45

premises, and often through less premises than those that the syllogism uses. For the enthymeme has one premise, whereas the syllogism has two. He says then “conclude the argument through one premise for the sake of conciseness and brevity; for the rest is understood by the hearer; for if it is known, it does not need to be added.”25

As we read in the first passage [T.2.a], the commentator takes the statement that “the audience cannot follow a long train of thought” to mean that the recipients of the rhetorical speech are an audience as contrasted to dialecticians, sophists or experts in syllogisms. In other words, the ἀκροαταὶ of the rhetorical speech are taken here as being the proper audience of this type of arguments in contrast with the proper audience of dialectical arguments, i.e. dialecticians or generally experts in the formulation of syllogisms. According to the commentator, this audience lacks the capacity to anticipate the conclusion, but can only proceed slowly from one point to the next one and “go through the road that leads to the knowledge of what has been said”. What the commentator seems to expect from the orators is namely that they express themselves in arguments that only mention the main points, without arriving at the conclusion, but also without adding any irrelevant information that would make it hard for the audience to keep track of the premises that lead to the conclusion. In addition to the fact that such a slow and careful unfolding of the argument will be easily understood by the audience, the commentator refers to one more effect of the arguments that proceed slowly: the audience will be able to detect the fallacies. For example, states the commentator, through a long series of arguments it cannot be understood when the orator has made use of homonymy or a fallacious argument. It is not clear why the commentator refers here to the detection of fallacies and whether he implies that the audience is supposed to be able to detect fallacies, but it seems that he tries to give various reasons as to why long arguments need to be avoided. More importantly, the incapacity of the audience to follow long trains of arguments is also used by the commentator in order to explain the necessity of the use of

|| 25 Anon., In Rhet. 2, 10-30: περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδεὶς ὡς εἴπομεν βουλεύεται· ἀεὶ γάρ εἰσιν ἀδύνατα, ὡς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀεὶ ὄντα. ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ ἀποδεικνύειν τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένων πρότερον, οἷον ‘συλλογίζεσθαι βούλομαι τὰ κατηγορημένα· ἀπέδειξα τὸν Φίλιππον μηδὲν ἀπηγγελκότα ἀληθές’ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μὲν δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα, [...]. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐπαρακολούθητα διὰ τὸ εἶναι πολλά, τὸν δὲ ἀκροατὴν μὴ προειλημμένον, τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτόπιστα μηδὲ ὁμολογούμενα. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐντεῦθεν εἶναι τό τε ἐνθύμημα καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἵνα καὶ πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος ᾖ καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸς καὶ ἀναγκαστικὸς ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ ἵνα εὐσύνοπτος ᾖ καὶ συντετμημένος καὶ εὐεπακολούθητος. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων λέγειν καὶ κατασκευάζειν τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός· τοῦ γὰρ συλλογισμοῦ ὄντος ἐκ δύο προτάσεων τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἔχει μίαν. ὃ γοῦν λέγει, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὅτι ‘συντομίας φροντίζων καὶ βραχυλογίας ἐκ μιᾶς προτάσεως συμπέραινε τὸ λεγόμενον· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλο συνεννοεῖται τῷ ἀκροατῇ· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ γνώριμον, οὐδὲν δεῖ προστιθέναι’

46 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

enthymemes and paradigms. As we read in the second passage [T.2.b], since the audience cannot anticipate a long argument and since the arguments should be based on accepted views, it is evident, he says, that the enthymemes and the paradigms are necessary (1) for the speech to be persuasive and (2) for the argument to be short and, hence, easier to follow. It seems therefore that the commentator refers here to the reason why the enthymeme is the proper type of syllogism for the rhetorical speech. On the one hand, if the speech wants to be persuasive, it needs to make use of syllogisms. On the other hand, if these syllogisms are to be understood by the audience, then they need to use endoxa and to be short. The enthymemes fulfil these requisites, and therefore, they are what rhetorical arguments should utilise. Here, a note should be made on the way in which the commentator thinks an enthymeme succeeds in being short. In the section in which he discusses this matter, what is important is the fact that he states that unlike the other syllogisms, the enthymeme has one and not two premises. According to this interpretation, in order to be brief and short, the enthymeme reaches its conclusion by stating one of the premises, whereas the other premise remains unexpressed26, in a way of “agreement” between the speaker and the audience: whatever is obvious or known is not spelled out. This passage, together with the commentator's interpretation of the fallacious arguments from verbal expression, with which I deal in the next chapter, gives some insight to the commentator's views on what a good enthymeme comprises. Since, according to the commentator's view, the enthymeme is a syllogism, in which one premise is unexpressed, its legitimacy can be shown only when one takes the missing premise into consideration. As we will see in detail in the next chapter on fallacies (chapter 3 below), in his commentary of Rhet. II.24, the commentator states that the fallacy based on a verbal expression comes about when the major premise of the enthymeme, which had been unexpressed, is in opposition to the expressed premise. By contrast, as we read here in [T.2.b], when the audience agrees (συνεννοεῖται) that the missing premise is true, then the argument is accepted. Therefore, it becomes clear that, in this reading, a good enthymeme comes about when the audience accepts that the inference follows from acceptable premises and, if so, that these premises do not need to be supplemented27. However, one might wonder how the uneducated audience will be able to have such complex thoughts and decide what the missing premise is that would complete the syllogism. It seems to me that it is on the grounds of this concern that the commentator seems to suggest that it is not only the content, but also the inference in || 26 This view is not new: in fact, many of the rhetorical treatises written during late antiquity have described or defined the enthymeme exactly as the syllogism that lacks one premise. This interpretation will later be adopted also by the medieval commentators on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, s. Green (1994), 320 ff. 27 Cf. the commentator's repetition of this view in his interpretation of ch. II.22. see also Minucian 9 605, 8 ff. where he expresses a similar thought.

Enthymeme | 47

the enthymemes that is endoxical. In particular, if the acceptance of the enthymeme is based, as the commentator seems to suggest, upon the fact that the audience agrees that the missing major premise is known and does not need to be supplemented and expressed, then the inference does not follow from the premises due to settled rules, but it is true because the audience believes that it is true. In other words, it is not only the content of the premises that must be accepted by the audience, but it seems that it is up to the hearers to accept that what is missing is known and, hence, that the inference follows without difficulty. It is also up to them, according to the II.24 passage, to recognise the difficulty in the inference and detect a possible fallacy. In this way, the enthymeme is a looser syllogism and its validity is based on what the audience generally accepts. This is not an absurd thought especially given the fact that the audience of an actual rhetorical speech does not usually examine every single argument that is expressed, but examines whether the overall argumentation has been convincing. In his commentary on the sentence concerning the brevity of the enthymeme (καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός), however, the commentator offers a second (though not necessarily alternative) reading, which he cites and attributes to a certain “philosopher”, probably meaning a teacher or one of his sources. This second reading interprets the meaning of brevity not in formal terms but rather in respect of enthymemes' need to be as short as possible, in order to fit the needs of the audience: [T.3] This is how the philosopher interpreted the statement saying that “[the enthymeme is] from few premises and often from less than the premises of the first syllogism”: For he said that, first, one should prove the matter through long arguments and then summarise it into shorter arguments; just as Demosthenes did: “I want to sum up the accusations: I proved that Philipp did not report anything true”, etc. So, at a later stage one should form syllogisms from few and often less premises [than the first syllogism], rather than arguing from so many premises and saying so many things as those of which the first syllogism was made, namely the long narration of the matter. This meaning of the statement is the best and it fits his knowledge and greatness of intellect.28

In this passage, the Anonymous commentator transmits the interpretation of the text by a philosopher, who must have been an earlier interpreter of the Aristotelian Rhetoric and a source of the commentator. It interprets Aristotle's reference to first || 28 Anon., In Rhet. 3, 2-13: ὁ μέντοι φιλόσοφος οὕτως ἐξηγήσατο τὸ ῥητὸν τὸ λέγον, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἔφη γάρ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἀποδεῖξαι δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα διὰ λόγων μακροτέρων, εἶτα συλλογίσασθαι ἐκεῖνο διὰ λόγων ἐλαττόνων· ὡς καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης ‘συλλογίζεσθαι βούλομαι τὰ κατηγορηθέντα· ἀπέδειξα τὸν Φίλιππον μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπηγγελκότα’ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. δεῖ γοῦν ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ὕστερον συλλογίζεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοσούτων καὶ τοσαῦτα λέγειν, ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμὸς ἤγουν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος διὰ μακροῦ ἀφήγησις. κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ νόημα καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου συνέσεως καὶ μεγαλονοίας ἄξιον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡμᾶς οἴκοθεν προσεπεξευρίσκειν τινά.

48 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

syllogism by focusing on the meaning of “first” and on the structure of an enthymematic argument as contrasted to the first syllogism. The interpreter seems to take the meaning of “first” as being strictly temporal and as indicating a long train of arguments that precedes the short enthymematic formulation. In this reading, the process of argumentation seems to be the following: the speaker initially formulates the argumentation in full, and only later cuts down on unnecessary information, in order to put this argumentation into a form that fits the rhetorical needs. Superficial as this reading may seem, it has unique aspects: on the one hand, the brevity of the enthymeme is not connected with the number of the premises used; instead, what it means for a premise to be brief is for it to entail no unnecessary information. On the other hand, and more importantly, the enthymematic argumentation is described in this reading as a shorter version of a series of syllogisms. In this sense, the enthymeme is no less of a syllogism than any other type of syllogism, since it comes as a result of the same procedure, its only difference being that it is a summary of fuller argumentation. In fact, this reading seems to make better sense of Aristotle’s solution to the fact that an uneducated audience cannot follow a long argumentation. In other words, it is easier to understand how an uneducated audience can follow better an argument that does not entail unnecessary information, rather than an argument with premises that need to be supplemented in order to confirm whether the inference can be accepted. Moreover, this interpretation can explain Aristotle's statement that the skill to formulate both syllogisms and enthymemes is one and the same. This view of enthymemes as making use of the conclusions of a series of arguments together with the view that the enthymeme consists in a suppressed premise is also mentioned later in the commentary, in the commentator's interpretation of the chapter II.22, which summarises some of the points of chapter I.2: [T.4] And [we need to examine] how the enthymeme is a syllogism namely an incomplete syllogism, and how does it differ from the dialectical syllogisms, namely insofar as the dialectical is complete, whereas the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, or insofar as the dialectical syllogism is about every exposition, whereas the enthymeme is a syllogism that inquires only about the political matters29. For the syllogisms should not come about from too far, namely when we insert in the enthymemes both the premises of the syllogism and the premises of the pre-syllogisms of the premises, nor should we take all, i.e. every premise, that is, both the major and the minor, and deduce the conclusion; for it is enough to express the minor premise

|| 29 This note makes it evident that the Anonymous commentator follows the rhetorical tradition of late antiquity and especially the treatises, such as the Prolegomena, in which the rhetoricians discussed at length the similarities and differences between rhetoric and dialectic. Rabe (1931).

Enthymeme | 49

and leave the major aside as being known. For the former, namely to take arguments from too far, i.e. to use the premises of the pre-syllogisms, creates an unclarity due to the length, whereas the latter, namely to take all premises, i.e. also the premises of the pre-syllogisms, is garrulity.30

In this passage, what has been said of chapter I.2 is repeated, with the addition of some new thoughts. The commentator, who here refers to the relation between rhetorical and dialectical syllogisms, locates one difference between the two in expression of their premises: the dialectical syllogisms are complete, whereas the enthymemes are incomplete, since their major premise remains unexpressed31. This feature of enthymemes, namely their formulation through only one premise, is here considered as necessary, given the negative impression that a long argument creates to the audience. In particular, the commentator states that the use of a long series of syllogisms makes the argument unclear, while the use of all related syllogisms and pre-syllogisms creates the impression of garrulity. Hence, the enthymematic arguments should not express all premises, nor all premises of the presyllogisms, namely of the [first] syllogism that preceded the formulation into enthymemes. Rather, the orator should suppress them as much as possible by leaving aside the information already known. After this discussion about the form of the enthymeme and the relevant audience of the rhetorical speeches, the commentator moves on to discuss the propositions of enthymemes. As Aristotle states, the propositions of enthymemes are only rarely necessary, but are mostly contingent, since the subject matter of the rhetorical speeches is mostly contingent32. Hence, Aristotle concludes, the enthymemes

|| 30 Anon., In Rhet. 130, 18-31: καὶ πῶς ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἤτοι ἀτελής, καὶ τί διαφέρει τῶν διαλεκτικῶν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς τέλειός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς ἀτελής, ἢ ὅτι ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμὸς περὶ παντὸς προτεθέντος γίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστι περὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνα θεωρούμενος. οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν γίνονται συλλογισμοί, ὅταν λάβωμεν τὰς προτάσεις τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ τὰς προτάσεις τῶν προσυλλογισμῶν τῶν προτάσεων ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, οὔτε δεῖ πάντα ἤτοι πάσας τὰς προτάσεις λαμβάνειν, καὶ τὴν μείζονα καὶ τὴν ἐλάττονα, καὶ συνάγειν τὸ συμπέρασμα· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τὴν ἐλάττονα, τὴν δὲ μείζονα ὡς γνώριμον παρεῶσι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι τὸ λαμβάνειν πόρρωθεν ἤτοι καὶ τὰς προτάσεις τῶν προσυλλογισμῶν ἀσάφειαν ποιεῖ διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἤτοι τὸ λαμβάνειν πάντα ἤτοι καὶ τὰς προτάσεις ἀδολεσχία ἐστίν. 31 That this is what he means by complete-incomplete syllogism is clear from the rest of the passage, where he refers to the lack of one premise of the rhetorical syllogisms. Moreover, another difference mentioned in the text between rhetorical and dialectical syllogisms is the difference in the subject matter: the dialectical syllogisms are concerned with every subject matter, whereas rhetorical syllogisms deal mainly with political issues. Later in the same chapter, the commentator calls enthymeme as “political syllogism”. 32 Rhet. I.2 1357a22-33: ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοί εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων, τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων

50 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

consist in propositions from signs and probabilities, of which the signs correspond to the necessary propositions and the probabilities to the contingent. This account is repeated by the commentator, who, after describing the correspondence of tokens (τεκμήρια) with the necessary propositions, and those of probabilities and the anonymous signs with the contingent propositions, moves on to a detailed presentation of sign arguments and arguments from probabilities. [T.5] So, it is necessary that each one of these is the same as each one of them, namely the probable is the same as the contingent matters and of the signs the token is the same as the necessary matters. Subsequently, he explains what the sign is and what the probable is and in what way the one type of sign is necessary and token, whereas the other, which is anonymous, is homonymous with the sign with regard to their genus, but is contingent. The probable is that which happens for the most part, for instance those who adorn themselves are for the most part catamites and those who wander at night are for the most part thieves, but not all; and those who breathe rapidly are sick, neither simply nor for the most part, but even less probably. For this is a feature of nature, namely to err sometimes; for it is probable that the one who has a full armor will become a tyrant and the one who digs will find a treasure, and the one who goes to the bathing-room will come upon a friend or a useful book or anything else that is very needful. The relation of the probable towards that for which it is probable is like the relation of the universal towards the particular, when it is proven and established; for instance, “this person wanders at night. Therefore, he is a thief”. I did not mention the “everyone who wanders and night is a thief” and so I established the argument through the minor and particular premise. Here the minor premise is particular, whereas the major premise, which is not mentioned, is false, namely that “everyone who wanders at night is a thief”, and, hence, the conclusion is also false. But if one uses [as major premise] “some of those who wander at night are thieves”, then the two particular premises are invented. So, the probable is of this type. And the relation of the more probable or less probable towards that which is probable for the most part, is as the relation of the universal towards the particular; for how can that which includes both what is less probable and what is probable for the most part, not be more probable and more universal than that probable, which is probable only for the most part?33

|| ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαίων· δῆλον δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι. 33 Anon., In Rhet. 3, 28-4, 18: ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων ἑκάτερον ταὐτὸ εἶναι ἐκείνοις, τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις πράγμασι, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον τὸ τεκμηριῶδες τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις. λέγει τοίνυν ἐφεξῆς, τί τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τί τὸ εἰκός, καὶ πῶς τοῦ σημείου τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ ἀνώνυμον ὁμωνυμοῦν τῷ σημείῳ τῷ γένει, ἐνδεχόμενον δέ. εἰκὸς οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οἷον ὁ καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πόρνος καὶ ὁ νύκτωρ πλανώμενος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ κλέπτης, οὐ πᾶς δέ, καὶ ὁ πυκνὸν ἀναπνέων πυρέττει, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον· τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς φύσεως τὸ ποτὲ διαμαρτάνειν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχοντα πανοπλίας τυραννῆσαι καὶ τὸν ὀρύττοντα θησαυρῷ ἐντυχεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ βαλανεῖον πορευόμενον φίλῳ ἐντυχεῖν ἀνδρὶ ἢ βιβλίῳ χρησίμῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ χρειωδεστάτῳ. οὕτω δὲ ἔχει τὸ εἰκὸς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ εἰκός, ὡς τὸ καθ' ὅλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ἀποδεικνύμενον καὶ κατασκευαζόμενον· οἷον ‘ὁ δεῖνα νύκτωρ πλανᾶται·

Enthymeme | 51

In this passage, the Anonymous commentator presents the arguments from probabilities and interprets Aristotle's statement in the Rhetoric that the probable (εἰκός) is that which happens for the most part in the case of those things that can be otherwise, and that which has towards the thing, with respect to which it is probable, a relation as the one of the universal towards the particular34. In the two treatises that deal with the probable, Aristotle neither gives further information nor offers any example outside of this description of probability arguments and the statement in the Analytics that the probable is a generally accepted premise. However, this description can be better understood in comparison with the treatment of sign arguments, since in the following lines of the treatise, as highlighted above, sign arguments are also presented with reference to the universal-particular relation of the signs towards the things of which they are signs. More specifically, the probability propositions, which were said by Aristotle to express contingent matters in rhetorical arguments, are described as being more universal than the things with respect to which they are probable, and hence, they resemble one type of sign arguments, namely sign arguments of the second figure. As we read in the above passage, the commentator develops the Aristotelian treatment of probability arguments, and offers some examples in order to illustrate them. By this development, I refer specifically to his interpretation of the universality in the arguments, which he seems to attribute both to the modality of the premises as well as to the content of the terms. On the one hand, the probability-arguments are, as in Aristotle, said to be those in which the probable has with the thing, with respect to which they are probable, a relation of the universal to the particular. However, this relation is here described in rather formal terms: it is the major premise that is universal, unlike the minor premise which is particular. That the commentator intends to apply the universal-particular relation to the premises of the argument becomes even clearer by his note that it is only when one proves or establishes the probability that the relation between the probable and the thing of which it is probable becomes evident. Hence, in his view, it is the universal statement of the major premise and its relation towards the particular statement of the minor premise that Aristotle has in mind when stating that the probable has towards the

|| κλέπτης ἄρα.’ παρέλειψα τὸ ‘πᾶς νύκτωρ πλανώμενος κλέπτης’ καὶ κατεσκεύασα διὰ τῆς ἐλάττονος καὶ μερικῆς προτάσεως τὸ λεγόμενον. ἐνταῦθα οὖν ἡ μὲν ἐλάττων μερική, ἡ δὲ μείζων, ἣν παραλιμπάνει, ψευδής, τὸ ‘πᾶς ὁ νύκτωρ πλανώμενος κλέπτης’, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' εἴπῃ ‘τὶς νύκτωρ πλανώμενος κλέπτης’, αἱ δύο μερικαὶ προτάσεις εὑρίσκονται. τοιοῦτον μὲν τὸ εἰκός. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς τὸ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὃ εἰκὸς μὲν ἐπὶ πολὺ δέ, ὡς τὸ καθ' ὅλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· ὃ γὰρ περιέχει καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, πῶς οὐκ ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ καθολικώτερον τοῦ εἰκότος ἐκείνου, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μόνον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ; 34 Rhet. I.2 1357a35-b1: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος·

52 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

thing of which it is probable a relation as that of the universal towards the particular. In addition, in this same passage, we also find references related to the validity of the argument, which depends on whether the major premise is accepted as true or false, in which case it will render the argument as true or false accordingly. In the example given by the commentator, the argument is said to have been constructed only with the minor premise and the conclusion (“this man wanders at night; hence, he is a thief”), whereas the major premise is not mentioned in favour of brevity35 (“every man who wanders at night is a thief”). This major premise, however, is supplemented by the commentator in order to indicate the universal-particular relation between the probable and that thing for which it is probable. As we will see in detail in the next chapter, this interpretation of probability arguments is strikingly similar to the commentator's interpretation of sign arguments, and especially of the sign arguments of the second figure. In fact, the example that the commentator uses comes from Aristotle's treatment of fallacies in the second book of the treatise and is also mentioned by the commentator in his treatment of sign arguments36. A question one might raise is whether there would be any difference between a fallacious probability argument and a fallacious sign argument of the second figure. This question is implied also in the commentary, when the Anonymous commentator distinguishes between two types of signs, of which one is necessary and called token, while the other is unnecessary and is either anonymous or probable. It seems therefore that of the two refutable sign arguments, one is identified with the arguments from probabilities. On the other hand, the universal-particular relation is attributed by the commentator not only to the modality of the terms, but also to the things themselves, of which some might be more probable, and therefore, more universal, than others. In particular, he seems to make a distinction between three types of probabilities: less probable, probable for the most part and more probable, of which the latter should be more universal. Regarding the sign arguments, Aristotle distinguishes, as we saw, between three types of signs, of which one is said to be irrefutable, whereas the other two are not necessary and do not yield a syllogism. Since a fuller analysis of the two refutable sign arguments will be given in the next chapter in which I address the fallacy from signs, here I will deal mainly with the first type, namely the necessary sign arguments, which are said to be irrefutable, when true. This is the way in which the || 35 As said previously, the commentator takes the major premise as corrupted, in order for the enthymeme to be brief and, therefore, successful in persuading the uneducated audience of a rhetorical speech. 36 In Aristotle's Rhetoric, the example illustrates the fallacy from consequence, which, however, bears many similarities to the second figure sign arguments. For a more detailed discussion of this matter s. my chapter 3 on fallacious arguments.

Enthymeme | 53

Anonymous commentator interprets the above cited passage from the Rhetoric [T.1] and connects it with the treatment of sign arguments in the Prior Analytics: [T.6] One type of signs is the token, which is necessary, whereas the other type, which is homonymous with the sign with respect to their genus but has itself no name, is refutable and not necessary, but also non-syllogistic. [...] We should give some examples of tokens, in the following way: “this woman has milk; therefore, she has given birth”, “this person has fever; therefore, she is sick”. These signs are necessary and irrefutable; for they are tokens. [...] He says that one type of the signs is this, as the particular is towards the universal (he will give examples of this as well as of the following cases), whereas the other type is as the universal is towards the particular. Of these, the former we called token, whereas the latter is probable and has no name. Necessary are those, from which a syllogism is formed in the first figure. This is the reason why this type of sign is a token, namely necessary. For when the statement cannot be refuted, then people believe that one has brought a token that the argument has been concluded and proven and accomplished by accurate and true premises. [...] He has now explained shortly what is the probable and what is a sign and a token, but more broadly in the Analytics.37

In this passage, the Anonymous commentator deals with those sign arguments, which Aristotle calls tokens and which are said in the Rhetoric to be the only irrefutable sign arguments, whereas the others are non-syllogistic and, therefore, refutable. Interesting in this passage is the connection between the treatment of signs in the Rhetoric and in the Prior Analytics. As I have mentioned above, the commentator cites, both here and in his treatment of the fallacious sign arguments in the chapter II.24, the account of the latter treatise as expressing the same thought as the account of the Rhetoric. More specifically, the commentator refers to the exact relation between the two accounts: the rhetorical one is a shorter version of the more detailed presentation of sign arguments in the Analytics. If this is so, then the two accounts do not differ with respect to the thought that they express, but only with respect to the way in which this thought is presented. Therefore, the absence of reference to the syllogistic figures in the Rhetoric is, according to this interpretation, due to the fact that Aristotle here gives only an overview of the theory that he presents in the Analytics. Hence, while trying to fill this gap, the necessity in the token arguments is explained by the commentator with reference to the first-figure syllo|| 37 Anon., In Rhet. 4, 18-5, 20: τοῦ δὲ σημείου τὸ μὲν τεκμήριον, ὃ καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὁμώνυμον τῷ σημείῳ τῷ γένει, αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον ὄν, ὃ καὶ λυτὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστον. [...] ῥητέον δὲ καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα τοῦ τεκμηρίου οὕτως· ‘ἥδε ἡ γυνὴ γάλα ἔχει· τέτοκεν ἄρα.’ ‘ὅδε πυρέττει· νοσεῖ ἄρα.’ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα σημεῖα καὶ ἄλυτα· τεκμήρια γάρ. [...] τῶν σημείων φησὶ τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθ' ὅλου (θήσει δὲ τούτου καὶ τῶν ἑξῆς παραδείγματα), τὸ δέ, ὡς τῶν καθ' ὅλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτου δ' ἐλέγομεν τὸ μὲν τεκμήριον, τὸ δ' ἀνώνυμον καὶ εἰκός. ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμὸς ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι. διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτο τῶν σημείων ἐστὶν ἤτοι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν. ὅταν γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε ἐνδέχεσθαι λυθῆναι τὸ λεχθέν, τότε φέρειν οἴονταί τινες τεκμήριον ὡς πεπερασμένον καὶ δεδειγμένον καὶ τετελειωμένον διὰ προτάσεων ἀκριβῶν καὶ ἀληθῶν. [...] τί μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, ἐστενωμένως εἴρηκε νῦν, πλατύτερον δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς.

54 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

gistic: the sign arguments of this type are called tokens, i.e. necessary, because they form a syllogism in the first figure38.

2.2.2 Stephanus’ commentary As will soon become evident, Stephanus' commentary bears many similarities to the Anonymous commentary regarding its interpretation of particular aspects of the Aristotelian theory of enthymemes. In particular, Stephanus is also interested in the rather logical aspects of the treatise, and often dedicates great effort to arguing for the relation between the Rhetoric and the various treatises of the Organon. Hence, the Analytics' account of sign arguments also plays an important role here, and the examples of signs in the Rhetoric are interpreted with reference to the syllogistic figures. However, Stephanus' interpretation differs from the Anonymous insofar as it focuses on certain points of the text, without dealing with the whole of it, and as it often offers a more original and diligent interpretation of these points. The commentary, just as the Anonymous one, contains no comment on the first chapter of the treatise or on the beginning of the second chapter. However, Stephanus’ commentary, unlike the Anonymous commentary, entails some direct references to the first chapter, namely to views expressed there by Aristotle, or even quotations of some passages39. However, although he must have read and commented on the first chapter as well as on the beginning of the second, the first comments that we have interpret the last part of the second chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric, and in particular, the discussion of the propositions of enthymemes: [T.7] “Since there are a few necessary things”. After having said once that the means of rhetoric resemble in philosophy (for in philosophy there are syllogisms, but also in rhetoric there are enthymemes; and in philosophy there are inductions, but also in rhetoric there are paradigms), now he inquires again into yet another communion between philosophy and rhetoric, and says “as the sources of the philosophical syllogism is either the necessary propositions40, through which apodeictical syllogisms come about, or the contingent propositions, through

|| 38 Discussions of tekmeriodic syllogism are found also in earlier commentaries on the Prior and Posterior Analytics. However, these discussions often focus on the role of the tekmeriodic syllogisms or proofs in acquiring knowledge, a thought that is absent from the commentary on the Rhetoric. S. Morrison (1998). 39 See for instance the first lines of Stephanus' interpretation of the second book of the treatise as well as the beginning of his comments on the third book. 40 I translate here and elsewhere πρότασις as “proposition” and not as “premise”, when I take the commentators to refer more generally to propositions independently of their use as premises of an argument.

Enthymeme | 55

which dialectical syllogisms come about, so you will find that also in the rhetoric there are propositions corresponding to the contingent ones, i.e. the probabilities, and premises that correspond to the necessary ones, i.e. the necessary signs”. For the sign is said in three ways.41

In this passage, the commentator refers to the propositions of enthymemes, which are said by Aristotle to be rarely necessary, but mostly contingent. Stephanus explains that this extensive use of contingent propositions is due to the fact that (1) the matters with which rhetorical speeches deal are contingent (i.e. those things for which we deliberate), and (2) the enthymemes consist in probabilities and signs, of which only one type is necessary, but he also adds an interesting note, stating that this discussion on propositions aims at indicating another similarity or analogy between rhetoric and philosophy. As he states, after Aristotle showed that rhetoric is analogical to philosophy by making use of enthymemes and paradigms, which correspond to the philosophical syllogism or induction, he now points out that the conception or formulation of syllogisms through necessary and contingent propositions also finds an analogy in rhetoric, whose propositions from signs and probabilities correspond to the necessary and contingent propositions of philosophy. There are some interesting points in this passage. On the one hand, the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy, which is not to be found in the Aristotelian Rhetoric, where Aristotle focuses on the relation between rhetoric and dialectic, indicates the commentator's views about the status of the treatise. In particular, the commentator refers in this passage to the discussion about the relation between rhetoric and dialectic and, more specifically, to Aristotle's statement that both make use of syllogisms, since enthymemes are also types of syllogisms. However, he refers to this discussion as presenting an analogy between philosophy and rhetoric or between philosophical and rhetorical syllogisms. Dialectic is, in this reading, one part of philosophy, since dialectical syllogisms are said to be the type of philosophical syllogisms that makes use of contingent propositions. On the other hand, rhetoric is only analogous to philosophy, without being a part of it as dialectics. In other words, if the focus of the passage is no longer on the relation between rhetoric and dialectic, but between rhetoric and philosophy, then I take it as indicating the commentator's decision that rhetoric is not a part of philosophy, unlike dialectic, which clearly is. This being so, it becomes easier to explain the commentator's focus on some parts of the treatise and his decision to leave some other parts without com-

|| 41 Steph., In Rhet. 263, 2-10: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὀλίγα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. ἅπαξ εἰπὼν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν παρεοικέναι τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ (συλλογισμός τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐνθύμημα· ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῇ ῥητορικῇ παράδειγμα) νῦν πάλιν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ φιλοσοφίας κοινωνίαν καὶ ῥητορικῆς πολυπραγμονεῖ καὶ λέγει ‘ὥσπερ παρὰ τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ συλλογισμοῖς ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ ἐξ ἀναγκαίων καὶ γίνεται ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἢ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίνεται ὁ διαλεκτικός, οὕτως εὑρήσεις λοιπὸν καὶ παρὰ τῇ ῥητορικῇ προτάσεις οἷον ἐνδεχομένας τὰ εἰκότα, οἷον δὲ ἀναγκαίας τὰ τεκμηριώδη σημεῖα’· τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον.

56 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

mentary: he seems to focus on the more logical aspects of the rhetorical speech, which are the ones that resemble philosophy, whereas he deals, as we will see in the next chapters, with the other two pisteis (arousal of emotions and presentation of the character of the speaker) only insofar as they are related to these logical aspects. The commentator further explains the relation between philosophical and rhetorical propositions: [T.8.a] “[Contingent syllogisms are] necessarily formulated from such” and “different [propositions]”. He correctly added the “different”; for the necessary syllogism, for example the one about the soul being immortal, proceeds always from the same premises and not now from these and then from others and again from others (for it would not be necessary, if it is different in different occasions). On the contrary, the contingent syllogism, for instance the one about whether pleasure is good or bad, can be deduced variously from different premises and often from others and of different kind.42 [T.8.b] “So necessarily each one of these corresponds to each one of those”, namely the probable will be the same as the contingent propositions and the signs will be the same as the necessary propositions, though not every sign absolutely and indefinitely, but only the irrefutable sign, which is called a token. So, the enthymeme from probabilities is analogous to the contingent syllogism and the enthymeme from signs is analogous to the necessary syllogisms.43

In these passages, Stephanus deals with the relation between the premises of philosophical syllogisms, namely necessary and contingent propositions, and the premises of enthymemes, which consist of signs and probabilities, as well as with the meaning of necessity in the relevant syllogisms. In the first passage [T.8.a], which interprets Aristotle's statement that contingent conclusions come about only through contingent premises and necessary conclusions only through necessary premises (Rhet. I.2 1357a22 ff.), Stephanus explains the differences between necessary and contingent syllogisms. In his reading, contingent syllogisms can take various forms, since the arguments may be constituted by different premises and reach opposite conclusions, as opposed to the necessary syllogisms, which reach their conclusion by being deduced only and always through the same premises. For instance, he says, the argument about the immortality of the soul is necessary because it can only be formulated in a certain way and through certain premises. On the

|| 42 Steph., In Rhet. 263, 11-17: Ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη καὶ ἑτέρων. καλῶς προσέθηκε τὸ ἑτέρων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖος συλλογισμὸς ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ φέρε εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ προτάσεων γίνεται καὶ οὐχὶ ἐξ ἑτέρων νῦν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑτέρων καὶ αὖθις ἐξ ἑτέρων (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀναγκαῖος, ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως ἔχων), ὁ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενος συλλογισμὸς ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἐξ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων καὶ ἑτεροίων πολλάκις πολυειδῶς συλλογισθήσεται. 43 Steph., In Rhet. 263, 18-22: Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τούτων ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ, ἤγουν τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἔσται ταὐτὸν τὸ μὲν ταῖς ἐνδεχομέναις προτάσεσι, τὸ δὲ ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπολύτως καὶ ἀορίστως πᾶν, μόνον δὲ τὸ ἄλυτον, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον λέγεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξ εἰκότων ἐνθύμημα ἀναλογεῖ τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ συλλογισμῷ, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημείων τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ.

Enthymeme | 57

contrary, an argument about the goodness or badness of pleasure can be variously deduced. This is a strange thought, since it takes “necessary” to refer to the particular premises that construct a particular conclusion, and not to the quality of the premises used. However, its meaning can become clearer in connection to what has been said in the previous passage, where the commentator connected necessary propositions with proofs and contingent propositions with dialectical syllogisms44. The contingent propositions, meaning those that can be used for arguing in favour of any side of the argument (τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε, τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐνδεχόμενον), are perfectly suited for dialectics, unlike the necessary propositions, which cannot be otherwise, and are therefore, suitable for scientific syllogisms. This correspondence of dialectics to contingent propositions and of philosophy to necessary propositions does not exclude the possibility that necessary propositions might occur in a dialectical argument (if they are accepted by the audience), but it seems that Stephanus refers here to what kind of propositions can be allowed in each case: dialectical arguments might allow also for contingent propositions, and they often consist of such, whereas scientific arguments allow only for necessary propositions. This is parallel to what we read about rhetorical arguments, which consist of the most part in contingent propositions (signs and probabilities), but might also make use of necessary ones (tokens), as we read in [T.8.b]. As we will see in detail below, this correspondence of signs and probabilities with the propositions of philosophical syllogisms is further analysed with reference to the three syllogistic figures of the Analytics. Hence, the tokens will be the necessary signs, because only these propositions form a syllogism in the first figure. After these remarks, the commentator turns to the detailed discussion of signs and probabilities. First, he deals with Aristotle's treatment of the probable, and this discussion gives him an occasion for delineating the meaning of necessity as opposed to contingency. [T.9.a] “But not generally, as some argue”. The Stoics, and as you will also find in the De Interpretatione, if you read carefully, identified that which happens for the most part with what is necessary. For by declaring everything as necessary, they annul the contingent, namely that which is as it chanced, i.e. the equally possible. So here it is said that that which happens for the most part is contingent (for it is sometimes interrupted), and does not happen generally, namely always and necessarily, as the Stoics probably thought. So, he divides the statement

|| 44 This section of the commentary is used by Grimaldi (1972), 92 in order to argue that the fact that Aristotle introduces the rhetorical inference from necessary facts, brings Aristotle's rhetoric “within the orbit of what is more properly philosophic discourse”. This, he believes, is the view implied in this passage by Stephanus, who seems to consider this as an instance of communion between philosophy and rhetoric. I do not think that this is what Stephanus means here, but it seems that, in Stephanus’ view, the whole argumentative aspect of rhetorical discourse is what brings it closer to philosophy.

58 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric and says “I call probable that what happens for the most part, namely that which is equally possible, and not the necessary, as some have argued”.45 [T.9.b] “The probable has such a relation towards that for which it is probable, as the universal towards the particular”. The probable is called probable in relation to something, for instance it is said that it is probable that Alcibiades, who wanders at night, is a thief; this is an enthymematic syllogism from probability. So, see here what the probable is and in relation to what it is called probable; for example, based on a probability, I judge that this person is a thief; Which probability? The probability of wandering at night. For it is probable that one wanders at night. “In relation to something”, namely it is probable in relation to being a thief. So, the probable is more universal than the thing in relation to which it is probable. For not everyone who wanders at night is a thief, but one might also wander at night, if one is mad or a foreigner who ignores the right way. So, since the “wandering at night” is said perhaps for three occasions, namely for the mad, for the ignorant foreigner and for the thief, and since you, the orator, took into account only the case of the thief, so the probable is more universal than the thief, since the three are more universal than the one; for not everyone who wanders at night is a thief.46

In the Aristotelian text that the commentator interprets here, Aristotle deals with the arguments from probabilities, and states that the probable is (1) that which happens for the most part in the case of those things that could be otherwise, and (2) that which is towards the thing, in relation to which it is probable, as the universal is towards the particular. In the passage cited above, Stephanus focuses on these two statements, and interprets them by referring to the discussion of necessity from the De Interpretatione, but, as we will see, instead of using this discussion for excluding the connection of probability with luck, he uses it to attack the Stoic view and the connection of probability with necessity.

|| 45 Steph., In Rhet. 263, 23-264, 6: Οὐχ ἁπλῶς δέ, καθάπερ ὁρίζονται τινές. Οἱ Στωικοί, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, εἰ σὺν προσοχῇ ἀναγινώσκεις, εὑρήσεις, τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐταύτιζον τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ· πάντα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον γινόμενα δογματίζοντες ἀνῄρουν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἤγουν τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε, τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐνδεχόμενον. λέγεται οὖν ὧδε, ὅτι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστι (διακόπτεται γὰρ ποτέ), οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἤγουν ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαίως γινόμενον, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ ἴσως ὡρίζοντο. διαιρεῖ οὖν τὸν λόγον καὶ λέγει τοιοῦτον ‘λέγω ἐπὶ πολύ τὸ εἰκὸς οἷον ἄρα τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐνδεχόμενον, οὐ μὴν δὲ ὡς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς τινὲς ἔλεγον’. 46 Steph., In Rhet. 264, 7-19: Οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ εἰκός, ὡς τὸ καθ' ὅλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τὸ εἰκὸς πρός τι λέγεται εἰκός, οἷον εἰκὸς λέγεται τὸ τὸν νύκτωρ πλανώμενον κλέπτην εἶναι Ἀλκιβιάδην· ἐξ εἰκότος ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐνθυμηματικὸς συλλογισμός. ἴδε οὖν ὧδε, τί τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πρὸς τί λέγεται εἰκός· οἷον ἐξ εἰκότος τινὸς κρίνω τὸν δεῖνα κλέπτην εἶναι· ποίου εἰκότος; τοῦ νύκτωρ πλανᾶσθαι· εἰκὸς οὖν τὸ νύκτωρ πλανᾶσθαι. πρὸς ὃ δὲ ἤτοι πρὸς τὸ κλέπτην εἶναι τὸν δεῖνα. Καθολικώτερον ἄρα τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ πρὸς ὅ· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ νύκτωρ πλανώμενος κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ ἢ μεμηνὼς ἢ ξένος καὶ ἀγνοῶν τὴν εὐθεῖαν λεωφόρον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ νύκτωρ πλανᾶσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τριῶν ἴσως, τοῦ μεμηνότος, τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος ξένου, τοῦ κλέπτου, σὺ δὲ κατὰ μόνου ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ κλέπτου τοῦτο ἐξελάβου, καθολικώτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ κλέπτου, ὡς τὰ τρία τοῦ ἑνός εἰσι πλείω· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ νύκτωρ πλανώμενος κλέπτης.

Enthymeme | 59

Regarding the first statement, in his definition of the probable, Aristotle refers to previous definitions47 that identified the probable with that which happens for the most part without qualification. As he says, what is probable is not just that which happens usually or for the most part, but rather what is characterised as that which happens for the most part in the cases which could be otherwise. Stephanus' comment [T.9.a] on this definition focuses on this qualified sense of the phrase “for the most part”, and tries to deal with cases of things that happened “for the most part” on the basis mainly of explaining the phrase with respect to its affinity to necessity and contingency. In particular, the probable is that which is as equally possible as its opposite, namely that which may or may not happen, whereas that which happens for the most part is both probable and contingent, since, although it usually happens, it might still not happen. The grounds for his interpretation are given, as he himself states, by Aristotle's discussion of necessity in the De Interpretatione. Indeed, in this treatise we read that Aristotle distinguishes between the things that happen from necessity from two other cases: first, from those that happen by luck, in which case both their affirmation and their negation are equally possible, and second, from those things that happen for the most part, which, although either their affirmation or their negation happens as a rule, the other might happen as well48. Hence, one could conclude that Aristotle's statement in the Rhetoric that the probable is that which happens for the most part not simply, but for those things that can be otherwise, refers to this discussion of the De Interpretatione. Further, this statement aims to clarify that the probable is not that which usually happens by luck and whose negation is equally probable, but instead is that which happens as a rule, although its negation is still possible. However, the commentator excludes the identification of the probable with the necessary, which, as he states, is implied by the Stoics. In particular, according to Stephanus, the Stoics delimit contingency by identifying the things that happen for the most part with those that happen necessarily. However, he states, the probable is that which happens in the most part and whose opposite could equally happen. As for the second passage [T.9.b], it refers to Aristotle's description of the probable as that which has towards that in respect to which it is probable, a relation as the universal has towards the particular. The meaning of this is that B is probable with respect to A (namely if something is A, it is probable that it is B) and B applies to more things than A. This description, which resembles the way the sign arguments are described in the next paragraph of the Aristotelian text (passage [T.1]), is

|| 47 Rhet. I.2 1357a35: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν [...]. 48 De Inter. 19a18-22: φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθής, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μὲν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ θάτερον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.

60 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

not in itself very helpful for understanding the probabilities, since, as already stated, it does not explain the difference between probability arguments and the anonymous sign arguments. This problem was implicitly observed by the Anonymous commentator, and is also present in Stephanus' commentary, who offers a similar interpretation and the same example as the Anonymous. More specifically, the commentator explains the reason that the probable is more universal than the thing in relation to which it is probable and gives the same example as the Anonymous commentator for illustrating this case: Alcibiades is a thief, because he wandered at night. However, as he explains, being a thief is only one reason why someone wanders at night and, therefore, wandering at night (the probable) is more universal than thievery (that for which it is probable). As I have mentioned in my discussion of the Anonymous' commentary, since this example is used by Aristotle as illustrating a fallacious sign argument, the commentators probably also had a difficulty explaining the difference between probability arguments and sign arguments of the second figure49. After the treatment of probability arguments, Stephanus turns to sign arguments. Since I will deal with the fallacious sign arguments in the next chapter, I will quickly present here only Stephanus' interpretation of the necessary sign arguments (tokens). [T.10] He also forms another enthymematic syllogism which has the nature of a token and is necessary, and which is deduced in the first figure and entails a sign that is such, as the particular is towards the universal, e.g. “she has given birth; for she has milk; to have milk is a sign of having given birth”. This is irrefutable; for the syllogism is true and correct both in matter and in form. [...] and again “he is ill; for he has fever; fever is a sign of illness”. This is a token and is irrefutable, just as [the example] with having milk; for this syllogism is also correct both in form and in matter. [...] Think of this in the following way: how do these two signs, which are tokens and irrefutable, have a relation [towards that of which they are signs] as the relation of the particular towards the universal, e.g. to have a fever, which is a sign more particular than being ill? How? It is because everyone who has a fever is ill, but not everyone who is ill has a fever; for there are other illnesses besides fever. And again: to have milk is a sign of the signified thing, namely of having given birth, and is more particular than having given birth; for everyone who has milk has given birth, but not everyone who has given birth has milk. So, this is correctly interpreted by me with the help of God, whereas the others wandered fully from the truth.50

|| 49 We should note that the fact that both commentators make use of this example might be an indication of influence of the one from the other or of a common source. 50 Steph. In Rhet. 264, 29-265, 12: τίθησι δὲ καὶ ἕτερον ἐνθυμηματικὸν συλλογισμὸν τεκμηριώδη καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι συναγόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸ σημεῖον ὡς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθ' ὅλου ‘αὕτη τέτοκε· γάλα γὰρ ἔχει· τὸ γάλα ἔχειν σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ τετοκέναι’. Ἄλυτόν ἐστι τοῦτο· ἀληθής τε γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς καὶ καλῶς ἔχων κατά τε ὕλην κατά τε εἶδος· [...] καὶ αὖθις οὗτος νοσεῖ· πυρέττει γάρ· σημεῖον ὁ πυρετὸς τῆς νόσου. τεκμήριον

Enthymeme | 61

There are some interesting points in this passage, in which Stephanus deals with the necessary sign arguments or tokens. First, as by the Anonymous commentator, the sign arguments are here also interpreted in connection to the account of signs of the Analytics, and hence, the necessity of the tokens is also explained due to the fact that it forms a first-figure syllogism. Second, this is the first time in this commentary that we find a reference to the matter and form of the argument, namely to the correctness of the argument both in its matter, i.e. the premises used, and in its form, i.e. the conclusion deduced through the premises. Since the meaning of these expressions becomes clearer in the passages where Stephanus presents the fallacious sign arguments, I will deal with it in the next chapter. Finally, another issue that we will also see in the next chapter is the depiction of sign arguments in a diagrammatic form. In particular, in his commentary Stephanus adds diagrams that describe the argument. An instance of such diagrams can be seen here, in his treatment of necessary signs and later in his treatment of the fallacy from sign. Moreover, Stephanus deals more elaborately with the relation between the sign and the signified thing and explains, as he did in the case of probabilities, how the relation between universal and particular is applied here. As he says, the necessary signs are particular in relation to the signified things, which are more universal. In the examples used by Aristotle, the fever, which is a sign of being ill, is more particular, since everybody who has a fever is sick, but not everybody who is sick has a fever. However, in a later part of the commentary Stephanus tries to explain the relation between the sign and the signified thing in a different way and, in particular, with reference to the temporal relation between them. More specifically, he argues that the tokens in their most proper sense are those signs that exist simultaneously with the things of which they are signs. [T.11] It should be also checked, in what way the signs in some cases precede the things of which they are signs, for instance the rainbow precedes the rain, which is often deceitful (for the rainbow appears, but no rain comes); or in what way that thing of which there is a sign, precedes the sign, as for instance the fire precedes the ashes; or in what instances the sign and the signified things are simultaneous, which is a token in the proper sense, as for instance the

|| τοῦτο καὶ ἄλυτον, ὡς δὴ καὶ τὸ γάλα ἔχειν· καλῶς γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἔχει καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· [...] νόησον οὖν ὧδε· πῶς ταῦτα τὰ δύο σημεῖα, ἃ καὶ τεκμήρια καὶ ἄλυτα, ὡς μερικά εἰσι πρὸς καθ' ὅλου τὸ πυρέττειν, ὃ σημεῖον μερικώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ νοσεῖν; πῶς; ὅτι πᾶς μὲν πυρέττων νοσεῖ, οὐ μὴν δὲ πᾶς νοσῶν πυρέττει· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἕτεραι νόσοι παρὰ τὸν πυρετόν. Καὶ αὖθις· τὸ γάλα ἔχειν σημεῖον ὂν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ἤτοι τοῦ τετοκέναι μερικώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ τετοκέναι· πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ γάλα ἔχουσα καὶ τέτοκεν, οὐ μὴν δὲ πᾶσα τετοκυῖα καὶ γάλα ἔχει. Καλῶς ἄρα τοῦτο ἐξήγηταί μοι σὺν θεῷ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀποπλανηθέντων ὅλῳ πήχει τῆς ἀληθείας.

62 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric fire and the smoke are simultaneous; so, if you say that the ashes are a sign that there is a fire here, this is wrong; for there are ashes in one place and the fire was not lit here, but it was possible that the ashes have been transferred here from elsewhere.51

Here the commentator suggests another feature that describes the relation between the signs and the things of which they are signs. Neither in the Rhetoric nor in the Prior Analytics did Aristotle deal with this aspect of sign arguments, namely with signs that are preceded or followed by the signified things52. Signs are instead treated by Aristotle only as existing simultaneously with the things of which they are signs, and all the examples brought in the relative passages of both treatises make use only of simultaneous signs. Stephanus seems to have noticed this problem and tries in this passage to deal with it by referring to other non-simultaneous signs. Hence, he says, there are cases in which the sign comes before and cases in which the sign comes after the signified thing. These cases are not necessary, since they are often proven wrong. For instance, he says, there are times when a rainbow, which is a preceding sign of rain, makes its appearance before the rain and sometimes even without being followed by the rain. Or in the case of ashes, which as a sign of fire follow the signified thing, it might happen that they are found somewhere without indicating that a fire had actually occurred in this place. Therefore, he concludes, these are not necessary signs and can be refuted, unlike the signs which exist simultaneously with the things of which they are signs. An example of this case is the smoke that exists simultaneously with the fire, and hence, whenever smoke exists, fire exists as well. These signs are tokens in the most proper sense. Therefore, this addition is provided by the commentator as a further criterion for the classification of signs. It follows then that a sign argument might be necessary if it fulfils all the criteria mentioned by Aristotle (i.e. its terms are related as the particular towards the universal or it forms a syllogism in the first figure), but, in addition to that, for it to be irrefutable and a token, the terms must exist simultaneously.

|| 51 Steph., In Rhet. 266, 20-26: Ἰστέον καὶ ἐπὶ τινῶν πῂ μὲν τὰ σημεῖα προηγοῦνται ὧν εἰσι σημεῖα, οἷον ἡ ἶρις τοῦ ὑετοῦ, ὃ καὶ πολλάκις καὶ διαψεύδεται (φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ ἶρις, ὑετὸς δὲ οὐ γίνεται), πῂ δὲ τὸ οὗ σημεῖον προηγεῖται, ὡς τὸ πῦρ τῆς τέφρας, πῂ δὲ ἅμα τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ σημειωτόν, ὃ καὶ κυρίως τεκμήριον, οἷον ἅμα πῦρ καὶ καπνός· ἐὰν οὖν εἴπῃς, ὅτι σημεῖον τοῦ εἶναι ἐνταῦθα πῦρ τὸ εἶναι ἐνταῦθα τέφραν, ψεῦδος· ἔστι γὰρ τέφρα ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐνταῦθα πῦρ, ἀλλ' εἰκὸς ἦν μετενηνέχθαι ἀλλαχόθεν ἐνταῦθα τὴν τέφραν. 52 The Rhetoric to Alexander, ch. 12, does, however, refer to such signs and can therefore be Stephanus’ source at this point. For a detailed discussion regarding the various accounts of inference from signs in antiquity s. Allen (2008).

Rhetorical Topoi | 63

2.3 Rhetorical Topoi The use of topoi is another common feature between dialectical and rhetorical arguments. In fact, both treatises on dialectic and rhetoric, namely the Topics and the Rhetoric, consist mainly in the exposition of topoi, but, although two large treatises are devoted on this issue, it is still not clear what a topos is, neither for Aristotle nor for the tradition after Aristotle. The term topos, meaning literally “location” or “place”, is used in this context in order to indicate a set of argumentative rules, in accordance with which one can find the pertinent premises for a given conclusion53. A topos is therefore an element “under which many enthymemes fall” (Rhet. II.26, 1403b17-18) as Rhetoric defines it, namely it is “a means for classifying many arguments together”54. In his commentary on the Topics55, Alexander of Aphrodisias makes use of this definition from the Rhetoric in order to describe what a topos is, and this description is attributed to Theophrastus: a topos is a starting point or element (ἀρχή τις ἢ στοιχεῖον), “by means of which we obtain starting points for particular cases”. Even though this definition seems to apply both to the topoi dealt with in the Rhetoric and to their dialectical counterpart, what seems to be relevant primarily to their rhetorical usage (and not to the topoi that are presented in the Topics) is the distinction that Aristotle himself makes at the beginning of the treatise between common topoi and ἴδια. [T.12] I am saying that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those in which we state topoi; these are common in arguments about justice and physics and politics and many different species [of knowledge], as for example, the topos of the more and the less; for one cannot form syllogisms or speak enthymemes from this [topos] more about justice than about physics or anything else; and still these subjects differ in species. The “specifics” are those that come from the propositions of each species and genus [of knowledge]; for example, in physics there are propositions from which there is neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism applicable to ethics and in the latter [there are] others not applicable in physics. [...] Most enthymemes are derived from these species that are particular and specific, fewer from the common [topics]. Just as in the Topics, so also here, a distinction should be made between the species of enthymemes and the topoi from which they are to be taken. By “species” I mean the propositions specific to each genus [of knowledge], and by the topoi those common to all. But let us take up first the genera of rhetoric so that having defined how many there are, we may separately take up their elements and propositions.56

|| 53 s. Rapp (2016a), 177 ff.; Smith (1997), xxiv-xxviii; Raphael (1974), 153, 161-162. 54 Smith (1997), xxiv. 55 In Top., CAG II.2 5, 21-26; 126, 14-20; 135, 2-11. 56 Rhet. I. 2 1358a10-35: λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ κοινοὶ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τούτου

64 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

The meaning of this distinction is controversial, since it is not clear whether the term ἴδια is meant to be contrasted with the topoi, in which case these specifics will be not topoi but might have a certain relation to the topoi57, or whether the passage presents a distinction between common and specific topoi, namely between topoi that are common to all types of arguments and topoi that are relevant only to one science or only to one type of speech and, therefore, cannot be used for the construction of another type of argument58. In favour of the former interpretation is the fact that in the initial presentation of topoi in Rhetoric II.2, Aristotle's words or expressions that refer to the “specifics” are either εἴδη or ἴδια or ἴδιαι προτάσεις, each of which is contrasted with the word τόπος59. Moreover, since it is only the so called common topoi that resemble the topoi of the Topics60, this interpretation can make more sense of the connection between the two treatises, since it attributes a common meaning of the term topos in both. However, if this is the case, then one needs to explain what would then be the relation between these specific propositions and the topoi, and why the presentation of both in the next chapters is similar, namely what accounts for the similarities in the presentation of the ἴδια and of the topoi. For instance, some idia presented in chapters I.6-7 seem to be rather argumentative schemata and not fixed premises, and hence, they come closer to our description of topoi. According to the latter reading, there are, on the one hand, the topoi that can be used for formulating arguments independently of the subject matter. These common topoi, which are of the same character as the ones we find in the Topics, are presented in the second book of the Rhetoric, where we find a list of topoi for formulating enthymemes (II.19-23) as well as a list of topoi for apparent enthymemes (II.24). On the other hand, there are topoi that are proper to one discipline and cannot form

|| συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων ἢ περὶ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν· καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει διαφέρει. ἴδια δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεών ἐστιν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμὸς ἔστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν·[...] ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα, τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ὁμοίως πάντων. πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστίν, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς λαμβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις. 57 s. Rubinelli (2009), 61. Cf. Solmsen (1929), 208-210. 58 S. Cope (1877), 173 ff.; McBurney (1936); Rapp (2002), 282 ff. 59 One exception is a passage from chapter I.15, where Aristotle refers to the idia discussed in the previous chapters as topoi (I.15 1376a29-32). 60 What I mean here is that, since we have no such distinction in the Topics, and since the topoi of the Topics are said to be applicable on any subject matter, the description of topoi in this passage of the Rhetoric fits the list of topoi in the Topics. Rubinelli (2009) in fact argues that in this distinction between idia and topoi, the topoi refer to the dialectical topoi of the Topics.

Rhetorical Topoi | 65

arguments of a different subject matter, for example the ethical topoi that cannot be used for arguing about physics. The topoi presented in the first book of the treatise (I.4-14) are of this type: they contain arguments of ethical matters and are specific to the three kinds of rhetorical speech, in addition to the topoi about emotions presented in the chapters II.2-12. This interpretation of the distinction between common topoi and idia is supported by the fact that what follows in the course of the treatise fits into this schema: first, some topoi are presented that can be used for arguing about specific matters, before Aristotle turns to the treatment of the common topoi. Moreover, Aristotle characterises in chapter I.6 (1362a20-21) the idia on good and advantageous as elements (στοιχεῖα), which, as he says later in the treatise is the same as topos (II.26 1403a17-18). However, what must be explained in this case is, first, the meaning of the passage from Rhetoric I.2 and, second, the distinction between common and specific topoi as applied to the topoi presented in the Topics. In particular, there is no such distinction between common and specific topoi in the Topics, and it has been argued that only the common topoi correspond to the ones presented in the latter treatise, whereas the specific topoi are rather related to the rhetorical tradition before Aristotle61. Before dealing with other passages of the treatise related to this issue, some notes should be made regarding, on the one hand, what has been said about the absence of the distinction in the Topics, and on the other hand, the implications that each of the interpretations of this distinction has in the structure of the arguments. Regarding the Topics, although it is a fact that such a distinction between common or specific topoi is not to be found in this treatise, one should note that even Aristotle admits of degrees of generality of the topoi, namely of topoi that are more or less general than others62. On the other hand, it is important to point out that the difference between the two interpretations is not a trivial one, but it has implications for the way the structuring of arguments is conceived. More specifically, if the idia are specific topoi, then their difference from the common topoi is only a matter of generality, i.e. they have they same function, but the idia are more specific in their application. However, if by idia Aristotle means the προτάσεις of the arguments, namely the premises, then their function within the argument is much different than the function of the common topoi. In particular, while the topoi are argumentative schemata, through which various arguments can be formulated, the idia will be fixed premises.

|| 61 Rapp (2016a), 179-181. For a fuller discussion in the literature of the distinction between the two types of topoi or, as it is usually presented, of the distinction between topoi-enthymemes and premise-enthymemes, of which the former would correspond to the commonplaces presented in II.23-24 and the latter to the treatment of arguments proper to each of the three rhetorical speeches (I.4-14), s. Rapp (2002), 263 ff. 62 Top. III.5 119a12 ff.

66 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

One would expect that chapter II.18 would solve this problem, since here Aristotle recapitulates what has been said so far in the treatise. However, Aristotle again does not specify what is the status of the idia, but states that the previous chapters dealt exactly with the presentation of what is specific to each type of rhetorical speech, whereas the treatment will be fulfilled after the presentation of what is common in all: [T.13] Since there was a different end for each genus of speech, and opinions and premises have been collected for all of them, from which [speakers] derive pisteis when speaking in deliberation and in demonstrations and contention, and from which, moreover, it is possible to make speeches appropriate to character, and since definitions have been given on these matters, it remains to describe the koina; for it is necessary for all, in their speeches, to make use of [propositions] concerning the possible and impossible and for some to try to show that something will be the case and others that something has taken place. Further, a common feature of all speeches is the matter of magnitude; for all use diminution and amplification when deliberating and when praising or blaming and when prosecuting or defending themselves. Once these have been defined, let us try to speak about enthymemes in general terms, so far as we can, and about paradigms, in order that having added what remains, we may complete the program originally outlined.63

Based on the original plan of Rhetoric I.2, what should follow the presentation of the idia is a presentation of those topoi that are common to arguments about any subject matter. Now in the resume of the plan in II.18, what Aristotle states is that, after having dealt with the specific propositions for each branch of rhetoric and after presenting the ethical propositions, what will follow is (A) a description of the κοινά, (B) a presentation of the features of enthymemes and (C) of paradigms. Should we then assume that the koina of this passage refers to the common topoi of I.2, or is there a difference between the two? Over the course of the treatise, two chapters are dedicated to the presentation of the paradigms (II.20) and enthymemes (II.22), while the chapter immediately following this discussion (ΙΙ.19) deals with the koina that were mentioned in the cited passage. In particular, there Aristotle presents propositions for arguing about what is possible or impossible, about what has or has not happened, about what will or will

|| 63 Rhet. II.18 1391b22-1392a7: ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἕτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἁπάντων δ' αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιδεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἠθικοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισται, λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν. πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι. ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι. τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων κοινῇ πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

Rhetorical Topoi | 67

not happen and about amplifying or weakening a claim. In short, this presentation has the following form: If something of sort x were possible, then y would also be possible; or if x has happened, then y must have happened as well; or if x happens, then y will also happen. These formulas are usually followed by examples that clarify the claim, twice by quotation from Agathon and Isocrates that presents the same thought. So, the proposition “If it is possible for something to occur and to occur nicely, it is also possible for it to occur simply” is followed by the example of a house: “if it is possible to build a nice house, then it is also possible to build a house simply”. What are then these koina? As shown by the formulas, these propositions are argumentative schemata, in accordance with which various arguments can be formed. Moreover, all propositions of this chapter are “common”, since they can be used by all three types of rhetorical speeches and for any subject matter whatsoever. So far, there is no reason not to identify the propositions of this chapter with the common topoi announced in chapter I.2. However, after this series of chapters, which deal with the stated plan of the treatise, a difficulty arises when he introduces a chapter (II.23) that contains a list of topoi of enthymemes. This treatment is announced only at the beginning of the previous chapter (Rhet. II.22 1395b21 ff.), where Aristotle states that he will first deal with the construction of enthymemes and then will present the topoi. Here a question arises as to the character of these topoi64, specifically in what way they are different from the list of chapter 19, and, as far as I can tell, there are four ways in which these differences might be explained. (1) Could it be the case, as has been argued, that the two lists differ insofar as the list of II.19 entails not topoi, but common propositions (as the previous chapters of the treatise entailed a list of specific propositions), whereas II.23 entails argument schemes, namely topoi65? The problem with this view is that, as I said above, the formulas used in II.19 suggest that we are discussing argument schemes and not just protaseis that can be used as premises of an argument. (2) A different proposal for explaining the differences between the two lists can be based on the different sense of “common”. It could namely be that both lists entail topoi, but the topoi of II.23 are common in the sense that they apply either (a) to all three kinds of rhetorical speech or (b) to any subject matter, whereas the topoi of II.19 are even more general and are common in every way. A closer look to chapter 23 might be of some help. In this chapter (Rhet. II.23), Aristotle enumerates 29 topoi, which are usually presented in the following way: || 64 Grimaldi (1988), II, 297-298 identifies these topoi with the common topoi that were announced in chapter I.2. Cope (1877), 221 explains the content of the chapter as follows: “general heads of enthymemes, arguments for inferences; a classification of cases to which orators may refer for appropriate arguments in any particular case they have to argue”. S. also Rapp (2002), 286, who argues that Aristotle does not distinguish between τὰ κοινά and κοινοὶ τόποι. 65 Rubinelli (2009), 67-68.

68 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

First, Aristotle introduces the topos by saying “Another topos is ...” and then names it by stating the starting point of such an argument, i.e. “from opposites” or “from the more and the less” or “from definition”. This primary description requires explanation, which is given by Aristotle by way of examples often accompanied by quotations from poets or orators66. Already one can see the difference in style between the two chapters (II.19-II.23): both the presentation of the topoi and the way of explanation differ. As for the character of this list of topoi from II.23, one expects to find here topoi that are common to all three species of rhetorical speech, as was announced in the previous chapter (II.22), and that can be used to argue on any subject matter. Indeed, some of the topoi presented in the chapter have a universal character; about half of these are found in the Topics, while others seem to be commonly applied to all species and subjects of rhetorical speeches. In particular, the topoi from opposites (Rhet. II.23 1397a7-19; Top. II.8 113b27-114a6), from the inflections of words (Rhet. II.23 1397a20-23 Top. II.9 114a26-b5), from correlatives (Rhet. II.23 1397a23-b11; Top. II.8 114a13-25), from the greater and the lesser degree (Rhet. II.23 1397b12-17; Top. II.10 114b37-115a14), from existing in a similar degree (Rhet. II.23 1397b18-27; Top. II.10 115a15-24), from definition (Rhet. II.23 1398a15-28; Top. II.2 109b30-110a9), from division (Rhet. II.23 1398a29-32; Top. II.4 111a33-b11) and from the parts (Rhet. 1399a6-9; Top. II. 4 111a33-b11), from contradictions (Rhet. II.23 1400a14-22; Top. II.7 113a20-23), from the name (Rhet. II.23 1400b16-25; Top. II.6 112a32-36), are all to be found in both treatises, and can be identified as common topoi insofar as they can be applied in formulating arguments on any subject matter. So far it seems that both (a) and (b) are possible explanations of the differences between the two lists, since many of the topoi from II.23 that I have mentioned seem to be common either in respect to their application to the three kinds of rhetorical speeches or to various subject matters. However, when examining the complete list of topoi from II.23, (a) must be rejected, since many of the remaining topoi are not applicable to all three species, but only to one or two of them. For example, the topos “from turning what has been said against you against the person who said it” can function only within a judicial context and could not be used in a deliberative or epideictic speech. Similarly, another topos is explicitly said to be relevant only to deliberative and judicial rhetorical speeches (Rhet. II.23 1399b32-1400a4.). Hence, it seems that the list of II.23 is at odds with Aristotle's explicit statement in II.22 that || 66 This use of examples in chapter 23 is taken by Rapp (2002), 287 ff. as a further indication for the chapter’s mixed character. He argues that, although the first part of the chapter contains topoi that are mostly found in the Topics and, hence, corresponds to the idea that this chapter presents the “common topoi”, in the second part of it the style of presentation changes, and the examples are in many cases necessary for an understanding of the topos. Moreover, these last topoi seem to be drawn from more sources than the previous chapters. In fact, Rapp distinguishes three types of topoi that are found in this chapter: (1) “Topik-affine Topen”, (2) “Argumentative, Prämissenkonstruierende Topen”, (3) “Nicht-argumentative Topen”.

Rhetorical Topoi | 69

what follows is a list of topoi which can be used in all three types of rhetorical speech, unlike the preceding lists of topoi which were meant to be used only for one type of speech (Rhet. II.22 1396b28 ff.), since many of the topoi of chapter 23 are not common in the sense that they can be used by all branches of rhetoric. Moreover, (b) also needs to be rejected, since some of the topoi also do not seem to be common regarding the subject matter to which are applicable, but many are closely related to subject matters that have to do with social or public affairs and could not be used in a different context. For instance, the topos mentioned above for turning against someone that for which you are blamed, has a rather interpersonal character. Similarly, the topoi from praising different things openly and secretly (Rhet. II.23 1399a28-32), from not always choosing the same thing before and after, but the reverse (Rhet. II.23 1399b13-19), from looking at what promotes or what dissuades (Rhet. II.23 1400a5-14), from seeing whether something could or can be better (Rhet. II.23 1400a35-b4) etc., can be understood only within a rhetorical context and, more specifically, are often related to specific subject matters, namely to social interactions. For that reason, Rapp (2002, 284) refers to this type of topoi as material, indicating that they are not used as argumentative schemata but as fixed arguments that one can use verbatim. Hence, both (a) and (b) suggestions fail due to the problematic form of chapter II.23. (3) An additional note that could help us distinguish between the usage of each list would be the note from the end of chapter II.22, where Aristotle refers to a further distinction of topoi, namely the one between probative and refutative (Rhet. II.22 1397a1-6.). According to this distinction, some of the common topoi can be used for proving a case and some for refuting it. The topoi of chapter II.23 can therefore be said to be a list of common topoi that are used for either one of these purposes. However, this interpretation encounters some difficulties. First, only twice during the chapter does Aristotle refer explicitly to the probative/refutative function of the topoi, whereas in the rest of the chapter the focus does not seem to be on the use of the topoi for either constructing or refuting arguments. Second, this function does not seem to distinguish these topoi from the topoi of chapter II.19, since the latter can be also used for both constructive and destructive purposes. Another suggestion would be that one of the two lists is a later addition to the project of the Rhetoric. Given that, according to the plan announced in I.2 and II.18, the list of II.19 fits well in the presentation of common topoi that precedes the presentation of the features of enthymemes and paradigms, and given the strange character of the chapter II.23, it would seem more probable that the latter list, including the references to it in chapter II.22, might be a later addition to the text. In summary, given the composite character of II.23, the role of this chapter in the treatise is not clear, specifically whether this is the chapter that deals with the common topoi announced in the I.2, and what its relation is to the topoi of II.19. These difficulties could be partly solved under the assumption made above, namely, that the composite character of the chapter and its apparent incommensurability

70 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

with the general project of the treatise are due to the fact that it was a later addition to the text, either by Aristotle himself or by a successor67. This issue, as well as the question about the role of idia and their relation to the common topoi, also seems to trouble the Anonymous commentator, who nonetheless offers an interesting solution.

2.3.1 Anonymous’ commentary In this section, I will focus on the Anonymous commentator's interpretation of these passages of the Rhetoric that deal with the rhetorical topoi. I am mainly interested (1) in the Aristotelian distinction of the first book (I.2) between κοινοὶ τόποι and ἴδια/εἴδη, (2) of the role of chapter II.19, namely of the κοινά, whether this refers to the common topoi announced in the I.2, or whether there is a difference between the κοινὰ and the κοινοὶ τόποι, and (3) the role of the topoi of chapter II.23 and the commentator's general strategy in his interpretation of this chapter. We can try to reveal the commentator's views based on his interpretation of the second chapter: [T.14] “A very big difference in the case of enthymemes”. What he wants to say is either (1) that there are some common topoi that apply to all [arguments], like the one from the more and the less, from possible and impossible, from the great and the small, whereas there are other enthymemes applying only partly to them– he will first teach about the specific in each case and then about the common topoi – or (2) what he says is such, namely that it escapes the notice of many that the enthymemes are many and of various subjects, because some enthymemes are ethical, some physical, some might be geometrical and some maybe arithmetical; for as the dialectician sometimes forms a syllogism by using a physical theorem such that a physical syllogism would come about, and sometimes he forms a syllogism by using an ethical theorem such that an ethical syllogism would come about, sometimes he concludes geometrically, when he makes a false diagram and there a geometrical syllogism would come about, so also the rhetorician will be discovered making enthymemes from various methods and subjects. [...] for some of the enthymemes are rhetorical, namely proper to rhetoric, as the “this person wanders at night; therefore, he is a thief”, just as in dialectics68 there are syllogisms proper to dialectic.69

|| 67 Rubinelli (2009) also supports this view. 68 Rabe prints διαλεκτικοί, but Vat. 1340 (V) has διαλεκτικῆς. The same formulation is also repeated in 8, 29. 69 Anon., In Rhet. 6, 26-7, 27: τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορά. ἢ βούλεται εἰπεῖν, ὅτι εἰσὶ τόποι τινὲς κοινοὶ ἐφαρμόζοντες πᾶσιν, ὡς ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὁ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, εἰσὶ δὲ ἄλλα ἐνθυμημάτων τισὶ μονομερῶς ἐφαρμόζοντα – παραδώσει οὖν πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἑκάστοις, εἶτα καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν τόπων – ἢ ὃ λέγει, καὶ τοιοῦτον, ὅτι λανθάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα πολλὰ ὄντα καὶ διαφόρων πραγματειῶν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἠθικά εἰσιν ἐνθυμήματα, τὰ δὲ φυσικά, τὰ δὲ γεωμετρικὰ τυχόν, τὰ δὲ ἴσως ἀριθμητικά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ποτὲ μὲν συλλογίζεται φυσικόν τι θεώρημα λαβὼν καὶ εἴη ἂν τότε ὁ συλλογισμὸς

Rhetorical Topoi | 71

This passage comments on the introduction to the discussion of the topoi, where Aristotle refers to an important difference that escapes the notice of most listeners of the speeches and is also found in dialectics, namely the difference between enthymemes that are formed in accordance with rhetoric, and those that are formed in accordance with other arts. After this statement, Aristotle points to another common feature of rhetoric and dialectics, namely their use of topoi, some of which are common, such as the topos of the more and the less, while some are “specifics”, that is, from the propositions of each individual branch of knowledge (1358a1 ff.). The Anonymous commentator also deals with this “difference”, and offers two possible interpretations of what this “difference” might refer to. Either (a) this refers to the difference between purely rhetorical enthymemes, namely enthymemes proper to rhetoric, and those that are proper to other arts or sciences, like ethics or physics, or (b) it refers to the difference within the field of rhetoric between the topoi that can be applied to all arguments and the enthymemes that apply to some cases. In the following pages of the commentary, he offers a detailed analysis of both readings. According to (a), what escapes the notice of many is the fact that some enthymemes, just as some dialectical syllogisms, do not belong to the field of rhetoric and dialectics respectively, but extend into the field of specific arts and sciences. Hence, there are ethical, physical, geometrical and arithmetical enthymemes. For instance, the commentator says (7, 4) that an example of a physical enthymeme is “to cause injustice is in accordance with nature (φύσει)70; therefore, causing injustice is good, since everything that is in accordance with nature is good”. Similarly, an example of an ethical enthymeme is “this person is worthy of honour, for he is prudent and courageous and just”. A geometrical enthymeme would be used in a deliberative speech in order to convince the army to be arranged in a way that will make it look smaller to the enemies, for example “be arranged in a circle, for the circle is very spacious, and to be conducted in a circle seems from afar as small and closed up”. Purely rhetorical enthymemes are those that are proper to rhetoric. The commentator probably takes such arguments to be those that both apply to a rhetorical case and draw from no other science unlike the previous ones, e.g. “this person wanders around at night; therefore, he is a thief”. In this case, the enthymeme is purely rhetorical, since it draws only from matters that have to do with the rhetorical speech in question. || φυσικός, ποτὲ δὲ ἠθικόν τι θεώρημα συλλογίζεται καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἠθικός, ποτὲ δὲ γεωμετρικῶς συμπεραίνει, ἡνίκα ποιεῖ τὰ ψευδογραφήματα, καὶ εἴη ἂν τότε γεωμετρικὸν τὸ συλλογιζόμενον, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκ διαφόρων μεθόδων καὶ πραγματειῶν ἐνθυμήματα ποιῶν εὑρεθήσεται· [...] τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἰσὶ ῥητορικὰ ἤτοι οἰκεῖα τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὡς τὸ ‘ὅδε πλανᾶται νύκτωρ· κλέπτης ἄρα’, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ εἰσι διαλεκτικῆς οἰκεῖοι συλλογισμοί. 70 This premise is further explained: the animals, he says, cause injustice by seizing the food of other animals or by eating the smaller animals, and this type of injustice is in their nature.

72 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

The (b) reading is more interesting for our current purposes. According to this interpretation, the pertinent difference in the case of rhetoric, one also shared by dialectics, is the difference between common topoi and specifics. The passage does not make completely clear what the term “specific” refers to, but it seems that it is connected to the term “enthymemes”. Hence, we have on the one hand the common topoi, and on the other, the specific enthymemes. I will discuss this connection of the term idia with the term enthymeme below, but for now I will focus on the commentator’s description of what the difference between these specifics and the common topoi consists of, which seems to be stated rather explicitly in the commentary: the common topoi apply to all cases/arguments, whereas the specifics apply to particular subject matters. What needs to be noticed is that, in the sentence that states this description (πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἑκάστοις, εἶτα καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν τόπων), idia seem to be taken as also being topoi, or at least to have a certain similarity with topoi. In any case, in this passage, idia are definitely not considered to be fixed premises, but, since they are said to apply to some subject matters, they are taken to be argumentative schemata of limited application in comparison to the common topoi. This will be also confirmed by the next passage. Moreover, this passage is also useful for answering the second of our initial questions (2), since the commentator refers to the topoi of the possible and impossible in chapter II.19 as examples of the common topoi that are announced in I.2. A more detailed presentation of these views is offered later in the commentary: [T.15] What is said about the enthymemes will be clear when further elaborated. For what I say is not only that in dialectic and rhetoric there is one syllogism that is geometrical and another physical, and one enthymeme ethical and another physical, but additionally I say that there are common topoi that are suitable for all arguments by71 being one and the same topos for the physical and ethical and rhetorical and dialectical and political treatise72 and for many different kinds, as is for instance the topos from the more and the less, which is suitable also for the physics; for the lighter thing is moved upwards in a higher degree, whereas the less light thing is also moved upwards, but in a lesser degree. And in medicine, lettuce is more cooling than this herb. And in ethics magnificence is a greater good than generosity, although both are virtues; as also in the vices, licentiousness is a greater vice than insensibility. And in dialectics, the wise believe that health and virtue are a greater good than wealth. And in rhetoric, sacrilege is a greater evil, whereas thievery is smaller, and murder is greater, whereas hitting someone is smaller, and to kill a tyrant is greater than to convince him to hold off from the tyranny. And in geometry, the circle is more spacious, whereas the triangle is less. And so on with the rest. So, this is how the topos from the more and the less is the most common. There are also common topoi for the orators, from which the epideictic and the deliberative and the forensic orator establishes that it is possible for something to happen; and the topos that

|| 71 Rabe reads here καί, although Vat. 1340 (V) transmits ὡς. 72 I correct the edited text ποητικῆς, based on the meaning of the passage and due to to parallel passage in 8, 31: καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ ῥητορικὰ καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ πολιτικά. This correction has been pointed out to me by Prof. Diether Reinsch.

Rhetorical Topoi | 73

something is great or small is also common to all three. And there are other such topoi, as for instance those about the just, which are proper to rhetoric, or about physics or any subject, about ethics or about the dialectical treatise. And of course the rhetorical enthymemes differ in kind from the ethical and political, but the common topoi apply to these equally, as is evident from the topos of the more and the less; for from this topos one can equally well form a syllogism dialectically or express an enthymeme about the just rhetorically or about physics or any other subject. And these, as we said many times, differ in kind. From these, it is evident that we have common topoi that apply to all. Specific epicheiremes73 and pisteis are those that are from the propositions that are proper to each species and subject, i.e. there are propositions about physics, from which there cannot be any rhetorical enthymeme or any syllogism about ethics. For what would be common between physical and ethical thoughts? And about these, namely the ethical and rhetorical, there are enthymemes and proper topoi, from which there can be no syllogism proper to physics. [...] Hence, just as in the Topics we have both some common topoi and others that are specific and suitable and useful for the establishment or refutation of the genus, and others proper for showing that something is a species or not, so also here one should distinguish the species of enthymemes that are proper for each, from which the just or the unjust (for the judicial speech), the useful or the harmful (for the deliberative speech), and the good and the bad (for the epideictic speeches) will be established. Hence, he will give other pisteis and topoi, from which something will be shown to be great, something to be small, and from which something will be shown to be possible and something impossible. These specifics to each should be distinguished, which he calls species, as well as the topoi that are common to all, namely that apply to all. First, let us talk about the species, I mean the proper means and enthymemes and topoi of each. 74

|| 73 I do not translate ἐπιχείρημα, because I want to keep its rhetorical connotations, since the term had a technical usage during late antiquity. It is interesting that in the rhetorical tradition after Aristotle, the term ἐπιχείρημα has substituted the use of the term enthymeme for referring to the rhetorical deductive arguments and that the commentator uses this term here in order to refer to the arguments that are specific to one subject matter. Moreover, I take epicheiremes and pisteis to be synonyms in this passage and to refer to arguments. 74 Anon., In Rhet. 8, 5-9, 32: σαφὲς δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον περὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων διὰ πλειόνων ἐπεξεργασθέν. λέγω γὰρ οὐ μόνον εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἄλλον μὲν συλλογισμὸν γεωμετρικὸν καὶ ἕτερον φυσικόν, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἐνθύμημα ἠθικὸν καὶ ἑτεροῖον φυσικόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις λέγω καὶ κοινοὺς εἶναι τόπους πᾶσιν ἁρμόττοντας ὡς εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα τόπον φυσικῆς πραγματείας καὶ ἠθικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ διαλεκτικῆς καὶ πολιτικῆς καὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἁρμόττει· τὸ μᾶλλον γὰρ κοῦφον ἄνω φέρεται μᾶλλον, τὸ δ' ἧττον φέρεται μὲν ἄνω, ἧττον δέ, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον βαρὺ μᾶλλον κάτω φέρεται. ἐπὶ δὲ ἰατρικῆς μᾶλλον ἡ θριδακίνη ψύχει, ἧττον δὲ ἥδε ἡ πόα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν μᾶλλον μὲν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἧττον δὲ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης ἀγαθόν· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος, ἀρεταὶ δὲ ἄμφω· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακιῶν μᾶλλον μὲν κακὸν ἡ ἀκολασία, ἧττον δὲ ἡ ἀναισθησία. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς μᾶλλον μὲν δοκεῖ τοῖς σοφοῖς τὴν ὑγείαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἧττον δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς μᾶλλον μὲν κακὸν ἡ ἱεροσυλία, ἧττον δὲ κακὸν ἡ κλοπή, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ὁ φόνος, ἧττον δὲ κακὸν τὸ αἰκίσαι, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀγαθὸν τὸ τύραννον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἧττον δὲ τὸ πεῖσαι ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς τυραννίδος. ἐπὶ δὲ γεωμετρίας μᾶλλον ὁ κύκλος πολυχωρητότερον, ἧττον δὲ τὸ τρίγωνον· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. οὕτως ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος κοινότατος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσι κοινοὶ τόποι, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ὁ πανηγυρίζων ὅτι δυνατὸν

74 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

In this lengthy passage, the commentator analyses the difference between common and specific topoi, and offers examples of both, whereas he also speaks of the different ways in which topoi can be common. First, the distinction between common topoi and idia is described as consisting, on the one hand, in the topoi that can be applied to the formulation of any argument on any subject matter whatsoever, and on the other hand, in the topoi that are proper to particular topics, e.g. ethics or physics (οἰκείοι τόποι). As for the common ones, they are said at the beginning of the passage to “fit” (ἁρμόττοντας) to all arguments independently of whether the matter is rather ethical, rhetorical, physical or dialectical. As an example of such topoi the commentator refers to the topos of the more and the less, which is presented by Aristotle in chapter II.23. Turning now to the ἴδια, they are interestingly named as “the epicheiremes and pisteis that come from the propositions that are proper to each species and subject matter”. On the one hand, this statement brings to mind the description of idia in the previously cited passage [T.14], where idia were named as enthymemes. On the other hand, both statements make clear that the commentator carefully tries to make sense of the use of the word ἴδια: the form of the term (plural neutral) refers to the epicheiremes and enthymemes75. But what does it mean that the idia are epichei-

|| γενέσθαι τόδε κατασκευάζει καὶ ὁ συμβουλεύων καὶ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν· καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ μέγα τόδε ἢ μικρὸν κοινὸς τοῖς τρισίν. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι τόποι τοιοῦτοι περὶ δικαίων ἤτοι ῥητορικῆς οἰκεῖοι ἢ περὶ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν, ἠθικῆς ἢ διαλεκτικῆς πραγματείας. καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ ῥητορικὰ καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ πολιτικά, ἀλλ' ὅμως κοινοί τινες τόποι τούτοις ἐφαρμόττουσιν, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τούτου τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπου· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τούτου συλλογίσασθαι διαλεκτικῶς ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων ῥητορικῶς ἢ περὶ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν ἑτέρου. ταῦτα δέ, ὡς εἴπομεν πολλάκις, τῷ εἴδει διαφέρει. ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον, ὡς ἔχομεν κοινοὺς τόπους πᾶσιν ἐφαρμόζοντας. ἴδια δὲ ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ πίστεις, ὅσα εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἑκάστῳ εἴδει καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ προτάσεων, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις, ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα ἔσται ῥητορικὸν οὔτε συλλογισμός ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν· τί γὰρ κοινὸν νοήμασι φυσικοῖς καὶ ἠθικοῖς; καὶ περὶ τούτων αὖ, τῶν ἠθικῶν φημι καὶ ῥητορικῶν, εἰσὶν ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τόποι οἰκεῖοι, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς φυσικοῖς οἰκεῖος [...]. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ἄλλους μὲν ἔχομεν τόπους κοινούς, ἑτέρους δὲ ἰδίους καὶ καταλλήλους καὶ προσφόρους τῇ κατασκευῇ τοῦ γένους ἢ τῇ ἀνασκευῇ, ἑτέρους δὲ οἰκείους τῇ δείξει τοῦ εἶναι τόδε εἶδος ἢ μή, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη τὰ οἰκεῖα ἑκάστῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὸ δίκαιον (τοῦ δικανικοῦ) ἢ τὸ ἄδικον, καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὸ συμφέρον (τοῦ συμβουλευτικοῦ) ἢ τὸ βλαβερόν, καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν (τοῦ πανηγυρικοῦ)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρας πίστεις καὶ τόπους παραδώσει, ἐξ ὧν τόδε μέγα, τόδε δὲ μικρόν, καὶ ἐξ ὧν τόδε δυνατόν, τόδε δὲ ἀδύνατον. ταῦτά τε οὖν διαιρετέον τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστῳ, ἅπερ εἴδη λέγει, καὶ τοὺς κοινοὺς τόπους ἁπάντων ὡς πᾶσιν ἐφαρμόζοντας. πρῶτον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, τῶν οἰκείων ἑκάστῳ λέγω πίστεων καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τόπων. 75 It is very interesting for the history of rhetoric that, in this interpretation, the terms enthymeme and epicheireme are used interchangeably. The term epicheireme, which was already used by Aristotle (s. Top. VIII.6 162a16) for denoting the dialectical arguments, became in late antiquity the technical term for referring to the rhetorical arguments and replaced the use of the term enthymeme.

Rhetorical Topoi | 75

remes? I have already argued above that the commentator seems to consider idia to be argumentative schemata with a rather restricted application. This view is confirmed in this passage, in which the idia are explicitly called enthymemes and proper topoi (οἰκείοι τόποι), namely proper to each subject matter. There are, the commentator states, enthymemes and proper topoi of ethics, from which one cannot form a syllogism that is proper to physics76. Finally, that the idia are schemes, under which many arguments fall, and not fixed premises is also confirmed by the fact that they are said to be formulated by premises (προτάσεις) proper to each subject matter. Hence, the picture that we see so far is that, according to the commentator, there are common topoi that have a more general application, idia epicheiremata with more limited application, and fixed propositions that can be used in the formulation of the idia. This hierarchy of generality will be expanded later with the addition of the koina of chapter II.19. However, before I turn to this matter, I would like to focus on another interesting feature of this passage and, in particular, the application of the distinction between common and specific topoi in the Topics. It is generally agreed that this distinction is absent from the system of the Topics, and that the topoi presented in this treatise have a rather common character insofar as they are argumentative schemata that can be used for constructing deductions on any subject matter. Only the third book is partly restricted in its application, since the topoi about what is worthy of choice and preferable are more proper to ethical arguments. However, at the end of his interpretation of the second chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric, the Anonymous commentator deals with the topoi of the Topics, and explains the way in which the distinction between common and specific topoi is applicable in this treatise. As in the Rhetoric, there are topoi that are common to all arguments i.e. that can be used in any case independent of the topic, so in dialectics, there are some topoi that can be used for the formulation of any deduction whatsoever, independent of the predicable it uses. In other words, in dialectics those topoi that can be used for establishing a genus, a species, a definition or an accident are common. In this sense, all the topoi of the Topics that are said to be proper for the construction of deductions with a genus, species, accident or definition, and, therefore, a topos constructive of genus, cannot be used in a deduction about an accident. This comment is interesting not only because it refers to the commentator’s views of the topoi of the Topics, but also because the application of the distinction between common topoi and specifics to the Topics confirms that the specifics are considered by the commentator as topoi (since the whole list of topoi of the Topics consist of specifics).

|| 76 Later, in his interpretation of chapter II.19, the commentator will name the idia again as topoi, when he will refer back to the treatment of these specifics in the first book of the treatise (CAG XXI.2 124, 14-17).

76 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

Turning now to the commentary on chapter II.19, the commentator employs a similar strategy as he did previously in his interpretation of ch. I.2, and tries to make sense of the term κοινά. Hence, as he argued that the term ἴδια refers to the arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα), he similarly argues that the word κοινὰ refers to the final or supreme heads or topics of the arguments: [T.16] Now we should talk about the commons. As common he names the final headings, namely the possible and impossible, and that which proves that something will be, namely that it is possible to happen and that it has happened. Also common is to increase or decrease the matter.77

Although in this passage the commentator neither refers to the discussion of common topoi in the first book (I.2), nor uses the term topoi, nor refers to the chapter as presenting something common to all three types of rhetorical speeches or to the treatment of any subject matter, the description that he offers fits our concept of common topoi. The reason for this lack of explicit reference to the term topoi seems to be the different form of the term “common” (κοινὰ instead of κοινοὶ [τόποι]), which the commentator tries to explain by providing the noun to which the term “common” refers. Hence, we read that these “commons” are in fact the final headings or final topics of the rhetorical arguments. Given that in the contemporary literature, namely in the rhetorical and philosophical texts of late antiquity and early Byzantium, the term κεφάλαιον refers to the ultimate questions or topics to be discussed, the use of it in reference to the κοινὰ implies that for the commentator these topoi are the most general of all78. If in fact the koina are the most generic topoi, then one can assume that they can be used for the formulation of arguments both on any subject matter and in any kind of rhetorical speech. The propositions of chapter II.19 are namely the generic topics of arguments, under which particular arguments fall. In this sense, the koina are inserted in the hierarchy of generality that they commentator had introduced in his interpretation of I.2 as the most universal topoi. Regarding the interpretation of chapter 23, it is not clear enough to discern the commentator's views on the role of this chapter and of the status of the topoi presented here. Instead, the commentator offers a detailed analysis of the examples given by Aristotle for illustrating each of the topoi, with a focus on providing some historical or mythological details for the examples or the quotations. The texts quoted by Aristotle are explained and attributed to their authors and are sometimes

|| 77 Anon., In Rhet. 122, 34-37: ῥητέον δὲ νῦν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν. κοινὰ λέγει τὰ τελικὰ κεφάλαια, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἄλλους μὲν λόγους δεικνύειν, ὡς ἔσται, ἤτοι ὅτι δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, ὅτι ἐγένετο. Ἔτι δέ ἐστι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ μεγεθύνειν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μειοῦν. 78 As the term epicheirema, as well as the term kefalaion, seem to be borrowed in this context from late antique rhetorical vocabulary. This is interesting for sketching the Anonymous’ sources and background.

Rhetorical Topoi | 77

accompanied by their context, and additional examples are sometimes provided. For instance, when presenting the topos from relatives (πρὸς ἅλληλα), Aristotle refers to Nicanor, who was, according to the commentary, one of the Macedonians, who tried to enslave Greece after the death of Alexander the Great. Similarly, the quotations used as illustrations of the first topos of the chapter, namely the one from opposites, are attributed, in the first case to Alcidamas' Messenian speech, and in the second to Euripides with the addendum that it comes from Thyestes' speech towards his brother Atreus (134, 31-135, 3). The chapter is full of such information, and it seems that the commentator's interest here not in a presentation of the topoi as such, but rather in the secondary sources of the Aristotelian chapter.

2.3.2 Stephanus’ commentary For Stephanus' interpretation both of the role of topoi within Aristotle's rhetorical theory and of the types of topoi discussed in the treatise, we can rely only on his comments on the first book of the Rhetoric. His commentary on the second book is very short, with the exception of his comments on chapter 24 and the fallacious arguments. Of the chapters relevant to the topoi discussion, chapter 18 is absent altogether, and on chapters 19 and 22 Stephanus writes only one comment on a couple of quoted passages. By contrast, his interpretation of chapter 23 focuses, as in the Anonymous' commentary, on the presentation of the historical and/or mythological background of some quotations given by Aristotle as illustration of some topoi. Such an interpretation of the 23rd chapter from both commentators can be said to support the view that II.23, or at least a part of it, is not regarded as particularly relevant for Aristotle's theory of topoi, but instead is useful only insofar as it provides examples or even fixed arguments. The commentary of the second chapter of the first book is, however, enough in order for us to glean some insight into Stephanus' views of (1) the meaning of “common” topoi, and (2) the distinction between common topoi and ἴδια. [T.17.a] “The biggest difference of the enthymemes”. Just as in dialectics there are dialectical syllogisms, but there are also physical and ethical lectures in it, but those are called [properly speaking] dialectical which are proven from the common topoi, even if they are physical or even if they are ethical and not only those that are dialectical, i.e. from the topos of the more and the less, from the equal, from possible and impossible, from endoxical or adoxical, whereas those of the specifics and the specific arts, namely physics, medicine, ethics, that are proven from propositions that are specific and proper to them and only them, are not called dialectical but rather either ethical or physical or medical (for the propositions of medicine do not apply in the ethics and those of ethics do not apply to physics); so also in the rhetoric there are enthy-

78 | Rhetorical Arguments in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric mematic syllogisms and sometimes the problems79 are called rhetorical, when they are proven from common rhetorical topoi, for example from the possible, the more etc., and sometimes they are not called rhetorical but are either deliberative, or judicial or epideictical or about peace or about war or about supplies or about protection of the country or about the law or constitutions. So, if you search after the three branches of rhetoric, either in a deliberative or in a judicial or in an epideictic speech, and intend to argue in all three of them from the topos of the more, or from the less or from the possible, then call these problems rhetorical; for you have started from the common topoi of the rhetoric. But if you deal now only with the deliberative and of this the species about supplies and you use the arguments and the problems on supplies that are proper to it and only to it, then you can call this rhetorical, but make it more particular by calling it deliberative or about supplies or somehow particular and specific.80 [T.17.b] By “species of enthymemes, I mean”, he says, “the specific propositions to each genus”. By genus he meant either the subject or the species; for a species of rhetoric is the deliberative, a species of rhetoric is also the judicial. So, learn the proper and specific topoi to deliberative speech, from which you would never prove the judicial problems and learn specifically the particular topoi that are proper to judicial speeches, from which you would never establish the deliberative arguments. By common topoi he means those from which you would argue commonly, but not specifically about this or that subject in a proper and specific and a sufficient way.81

|| 79 Here the term again has Peripatetic connotations. The commentator uses “problemata” in the same way that Aristotle does, for instance, in the Topics. 80 Steph., In Rhet. 267, 1-23: Τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορά. Ὥσπερ εἰσὶ διαλεκτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ παρὰ τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ φυσικῶν παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ ἠθικῶν διαλέξεις, ἀλλὰ ὅσα μὲν ἀπὸ κοινῶν τόπων δείκνυνται, κἂν φυσικὰ εἶεν, κἂν ἠθικά, οὐ μὴν μόνον διαλεκτικά, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἧττον, ἀπὸ ἴσου, ἀπὸ δυνατοῦ, ἀδυνάτου, ἐνδόξου, ἀδόξου, ταῦτα λέγονται διαλεκτικά, ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἰδίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τεχνῶν, ἤγουν φυσικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, ἠθικῆς, δείκνυνται ἀπὸ ἰδίων καὶ οἰκείων αὐταῖς καὶ μόναις προτάσεων, ταῦτα λέγονται οὐ διαλεκτικὰ ἀλλ' ἢ ἠθικὰ ἢ φυσικὰ ἢ ἰατρικά (αἱ γὰρ προτάσεις τῆς ἰατρικῆς οὐκ ἐφαρμόσουσι τῇ ἠθικῇ οὐδ' αἱ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἐφαρμόσουσι τῇ φυσικῇ), οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ εἰσιν ἐνθυμηματικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν λέγονται τὰ προβλήματα ῥητορικά, ὅταν ἀπὸ κοινῶν τινων ῥητορικῶν τόπων δεικνύωνται, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ λέγονται ῥητορικὰ ἀλλὰ ἢ συμβουλευτικὰ ἢ δικανικὰ ἢ ἐπιδεικτικὰ ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ περὶ πολέμου ἢ περὶ πόρων ἢ περὶ φυλακῆς χώρας ἢ νομικά, εἰ περὶ πολιτειῶν εἶεν καὶ νόμων. εἰ οὖν τὰ τρία τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη μετιὼν καὶ συμβουλευόμενος ἢ καὶ δικανευόμενος ἢ καὶ πανηγυρίζων ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς τρισὶν ἐπιχειρήσεις ἢ τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, ῥητορικὰ ταῦτα εἰπὲ τὰ προβλήματα· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς τόπων ὥρμησας. εἰ δὲ τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν μόνον νῦν μεταχειρισάμενος καὶ τούτου τὸ περὶ πόρων εἶδος μόνον ἐπιχειρήμασιν οἰκείοις αὐτῷ καὶ μόνῳ τῷ περὶ πόρων προβλήματι χρᾷ, τὸ τοιοῦτον ῥητορικὸν εἴπῃς, ἀλλὰ ἢ συμβουλευτικὸν μερικεύσας ἐκεῖνο ἢ περὶ πόρων ἢ οὕτω πως μερικῶς καὶ εἰδικῶς. 81 Steph., In Rhet. 267, 34- 268, 6: Τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη, λέγω δέ, φησί, τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις. γένος ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶπε ἢ τὸ εἶδος· εἶδος γὰρ τῆς ῥητορικῆς τὸ συμβουλευτικόν, εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς τὸ δικανικόν. γίνωσκε οὖν τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ ἰδίους τῇ συμβουλῇ τόπους, ἀφ' ὧν οὐδέποτε δείξαις τὰ δικανικὰ προβλήματα, γίνωσκε εἰδικῶς τοὺς οἰκείους τῷ δικανικῷ μερικοὺς τόπους, ἀφ' ὧν οὐδέποτε τὰ συμβουλευτικὰ κατασκευάσαις. τόπους δὲ λέγει

Rhetorical Topoi | 79

In the first of these passages [T.17.a], Stephanus, following Aristotle's note that this difference is common between rhetoric and dialectics, elaborates, and states that Aristotle refers to the fact that both rhetorical and dialectical syllogisms can be either “purely” rhetorical or dialectical, when the arguments make use of the common topoi, or they can be specific in the sense that the arguments are proper to a particular art or science such that they could not be used by a different one. As examples of such common topoi, he mentions the topos from the more and the less, which was used as an example by Aristotle, as well as the equal, the possible, the impossible, the endoxical and the adoxical. As in the Anonymous' commentary, Stephanus also considers the topoi from chapter II.19 as being common to all species of rhetorical speech, since he refers to the topos from possible and impossible. It is strange is that what is or is not a matter of opinion (ἔνδοξον, ἄδοξον) is also considered one of the common topoi. This might refer, for instance, to an argument that states whether a view is or is not acceptable by the many or the wise, since such an argument could be used when discussing any subject matter whatsoever. Just as in dialectics, it is also said that in the rhetoric there are topoi that can be commonly used for arguments of all species of rhetorical speech and on any subject matter. Besides these topoi, there are also other “propositions” that are proper to each speech and to each subject matter, as stated in the second passage [T.17.b]. These propositions are explicitly said to be topoi that are proper for arguing for each of the branches of rhetoric. The fact that the protaseis are identified with topoi without any additional classificatory remarks, though it might seem strange to a contemporary scholar, does not seem to trouble Stephanus, who makes no distinction here between protaseis, which can be simply premises or propositions, and topoi, namely argumentative schemata, to which the various propositions can apply. In any case, according to this passage, the plan of the treatise includes the presentation of specific topoi, that are proper for deliberative, judicial and epideictic speeches, and a presentation of the common topoi, for example of possible/impossible and of the more and the less.

|| τοὺς κοινούς, ἀφ' ὧν κοινῶς μέν, οὐ μὴν ἐπιχειρήσεις ἰδίως περὶ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε οἰκείως καὶ εἰδικῶς καὶ αὐτάρκως.

3 Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24 In this chapter I will examine the exposition of the topoi of fallacious arguments in the commentaries on Rhetoric II.24. I will focus on the commentators’ interpretation of the Aristotelian text with an emphasis on the connections drawn between the Rhetoric and the other Aristotelian treatises. As will be shown, the interpretation offered by the two commentators is often based on an alleged correspondence between the Rhetoric and the treatises of the Organon that dealt with the fallacious arguments, namely the Prior Analytics and mainly the Sophistical Refutations. The study of this connection can provide evidence of the role that the commentators ascribe to the treatise, namely whether they take it to be related to the logical or dialectical theory of Aristotle. I will proceed by presenting the topoi of apparent enthymemes as appearing in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, followed by a presentation of each commentator’s interpretation.

3.1 Fallacy depending on the expression [T.1] There are topoi of apparent enthymemes, of which one rests on the verbal expression; and one part of this occurs, just as in dialectical arguments when the final sentence, without having been deduced, is stated in a conclusion-like way — “Therefore such and such is not the case”, “Therefore such and such is necessarily the case” — and so too for the enthymemes, when one is put in a compact and antithetical way, it appears to be an enthymeme; for such a verbal expression is the realm of the enthymeme; and such a case seems to rest on the form of verbal expression. In order to state something in a deduction-like way, it is also useful to state the heads of many deductions, for example that he saved these, but he punished the others and he set the Greeks free; for each one of these was proven through other deductions, but when combined it seems that something comes about from these.1

This is the first topos of apparent enthymemes presented in Rhetoric II.24. As stated in the text, this fallacy due to the form of verbal expression, which is the first of the || 1 Rhet. II.24 1400a1-13: τόποι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἷς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, “οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό”, ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα (ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος) · καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ' ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δ' Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι. The translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric are in this chapter by Rapp (2013a). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-003

Fallacy depending on the expression | 81

two fallacies depending on verbal expression (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν) has to do with errors that originate from the verbal form of the propositions (παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως), which gives the impression that a conclusion has been reached, although nothing has been deduced. As in dialectic one can present one’s last sentence as if it were the conclusion of a syllogism, when really it is not, only by using words like “hence”, “therefore”, “then necessarily”, so in a rhetorical context it might seem that an enthymeme is formulated just by making a compact and antithetical statement, even without using a proper enthymeme. What demands explanation in this passage is, (1) the characterisation of the fallacy as a linguistic one, more specifically, one that rests on the form of the expression, (2) the features ascribed to the enthymemes, namely their characteristic of being compact and antithetical, and (3) the relation mentioned between dialectic and rhetoric. With respect to the linguistic character of the fallacy, this passage is traditionally interpreted in comparison with the passage of Sophistical Refutations dealing with the 'fallacy from the form of verbal expression' (παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως)2. This fallacy, though sharing the same name with the one in the Rhetoric, seems to have a totally different content. As presented in the Sophistical Refutations, the fallacy contains those cases of errors, which originate from the syntactical position of the words or their morphology, when these two factors are considered to mirror the ontological status of the thing stated by the word. In other words, it comes about because of a confusion of the relation between language and the things signified by the language and, for this reason, it is counted among the linguistic fallacies (Soph. el. 4 166b10 ff.). For example, the similar grammatical form of two verbs, e.g. ὑγιαίνειν (being healthy) and τέμνειν (cutting), might be fallaciously presented as indicating a similar meaning, although the latter means acting and the former means being in a certain disposition. In the Rhetoric, on the other hand, the fallacy arises because of the style of the expression, namely because of its syllogistic or enthymematic appearance3. More specifically, the fallacy as presented in the Rhetoric comes about both in a dialectical and rhetorical context, when the addressees (the opponent dialectician or the audience of a public speech respectively) conclude that something is proven when

|| 2 Cope (1877), 303-304; Grimaldi (1988), 338; Rapp (2013a), 139-140; (2002), 777 ff. 3 Although the fallacy is named here as “due to expression” (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν), it is not meant to be in the Rhetoric a linguistic fallacy in the terms of the Sophistical Refutations. Rather it seems that the word “expression” (λέξις) is used here in a looser way than in the latter treatise and is not related to the distinction between fallacies in dictione – extra dictionem. If this distinction, which is crucial for the dialectical fallacies, does not have exact application to the rhetorical use of fallacies, then the fallacy from “expression” or “form of expression” would not rest on the problematic use of the language, and it would not occur due to the deficiency of the language, which is the case for the dialectical fallacy from “form of expression”, but it would rely merely on the formulation of the speech.

82 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

they detect in the speech the presence of an inferential connective or an enthymematic formulation respectively, although nothing has been proven. It seems, therefore, that the fallacy that is here presented as applicable to both rhetoric and dialectic is different from the fallacy that is treated by Aristotle in the treatise on dialectical fallacies. As for this enthymematic formulation, it is noteworthy that in this passage the brief and antithetical construction of the arguments is termed the realm (χώρα) of the enthymeme. The brevity of the enthymemes is, as stated previously in the chapter on the Rhetorical Arguments (chapter 2 above), mentioned again in the treatise (Rhet., I.2 1357a1 ff.) as suitable for the rhetorical speeches in order for the rhetorician to adjust the argument to the character of his audience that is usually simpleminded (ἁπλοῦς) and not able to follow a long chain of inferences (οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν). However, the antithetical formulation, common in the traditional rhetoric before Aristotle, is almost entirely absent from Aristotle's own account of the enthymeme in the Rhetoric4. In fact, the only other reference in the first two books of the treatise (Rhet. I-II) to the use of antithesis within argumentation comes from the list of topoi in the second book of the treatise (II.23 1397a7-19) and, more particularly, from the presentation of the first topos, where Aristotle states that an argument can be construed through an antithetical pair (ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων), namely when one argues that temperance is good by showing that its opposite, that is, intemperance, is harmful. However, given that this topos is only one of the twenty-eight topoi provided in this chapter, it becomes clear that Aristotle did not mean to present here antithesis as the main feature of enthymemes, as he states in the passage cited above. Another reference to the importance of antithesis is found in the third book of the treatise (Rhet. III.9, 1410a20-23), where Aristotle states that the antithetical formulation is pleasant, because it provides easy knowledge and because antithesis resembles syllogism, since refutation consists in bringing together the contraries in brief form (cf. Rhet. II.23 1400b26 ff.).

3.1.1 Anonymous’ Commentary Our two Byzantine commentators, who are also concerned with the abovementioned points, seem to have an approach different from the contemporary one, at least on certain aspects of the text. Firstly, the Anonymous author provides two different interpretations of the linguistic character of the fallacy:

|| 4 s. Rapp (2013a), 125 n. 7; Cope (1877), 303.

Fallacy depending on the expression | 83

[T.2.a] And, on the one hand, the teacher interpreted the present passage in the following way: [namely by saying] that he named this kind of fallacy “depending on the expression” as being the same as “depending on the form of the expression”; for by taking indefinite propositions like “man is animal, animal is substance, therefore man is substance” it seems, based on the form of the words, that there was a syllogism, namely as far as one took the terms and combined them, although one did not actually deduce from them, but only concluded without expressing the premises; for the indefinite propositions are equivalent to the particular ones; this error has its origin in a slight distinction, namely because it is thought not to differ at all to say “man is animal” and “every man is animal”.5 [T.2.b] On the other hand, I found a scholium, which interprets the passage as follows: [it states] that this enthymeme is called “depending on the expression”, because the syllogism is defective; for we expressed the conclusion without stating the premises in advance, which is an imperfect syllogism having a defective premise.6

The first interpretation [T.2.a] cited by the commentator focuses on Aristotle's statement that this fallacy seems to rest on the form of the expression and takes the phrases “depending on the expression” (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν) and “depending on the form of the expression” (παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως) to be equivalent in this context. In this reading, the fallacy “depending on the form of the expression” is namely not considered as the first sub-case of the linguistic fallacies, but rather the latter phrase is taken just as an explication of the former. Hence, in this interpretation, there is no such group or genus of fallacies called “linguistic”, which would include both the fallacy depending on the form of verbal expression and the fallacy due to homonymy, but the Aristotelian list of fallacies starts with one topos that depends on the verbal expression, followed by the second topos, namely that from homonymy. More specifically, I take the fact that the Anonymous commentator identifies the expressions “παρὰ τὴν λέξιν” and “παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως” to be an indication that he might consider the distinction between fallacies depending on language and fallacies independent from language as non-applicable to the rhetorical fallacies. In this case, the first two fallacies of the Rhetoric would not fall under the heading of “language-dependent” fallacies in the sense used in the Sophistical Refutations, but would be said to be related to “expression” or “speech”. In fact, the fallacy due to

|| 5 Anon., In Rhet. 147, 22-31: καὶ ὁ μὲν διδάσκαλος οὕτως τὸ παρὸν ῥητὸν ἡρμήνευσεν, ὅτι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάλεσεν ὡς ταὐτὸν ὂν παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λαβὼν προτάσεις ἀπροσδιορίστους, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, τὸ ζῷον οὐσία, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα οὐσία, φαίνεται μέν, ὅτι συνελογίσατο, ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ σχήματος τῶν λέξεων, ἤτοι καθ' ὃ ὅρους ἔλαβε καὶ συνέπλεξεν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐ συνελογίσατο, ἀλλὰ συνεπέρανε μόνον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰπεῖν προτάσεις· αἱ γὰρ ἀπροσδιόριστοι προτάσεις ἰσοδυναμοῦσι ταῖς μερικαῖς· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἤτοι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν εἰπεῖν ‘ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστι’ καὶ ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν’. 6 Anon., In Rhet. 147, 32-35: εὗρον δὲ σχόλιον οὕτως αὐτὸ ἑρμηνεῦον, ὅτι λέγεται τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τὸ ἐνθύμημα, διότι ἐλλιπής ἐστιν ὁ συλλογισμός· συμπέρασμα γὰρ εἴπομεν ἄνευ τοῦ προλαβεῖν ἐνθύμημά ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἀτελὴς ἐλλιποῦς οὔσης μιᾶς προτάσεως.

84 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

homonymy, which is more clearly based on a linguistic factor, will be interpreted by the commentator as including some types of fallacies that depend on speech as well, namely on the articulation of the speech and not on the language as such. Similarly, the fallacy from expression is also interpreted by the commentator as not depending on the language as such, but as a “formal fallacy”, namely one that comes about due to the form of the argument. Let us explain this further by looking more closely the commentator’s interpretation of this fallacy. Starting from the application of this fallacy in the dialectical context (since the fallacy should be, according to the text, applied both to rhetoric and to dialectics), the fallacy is “formal” insofar as it violates the rules of a valid syllogism. By using a logical interpretation of “form” (σχῆμα), the commentator refers to the quantity of the premises of a syllogism, namely whether they are universal, particular or indefinite. In this case, the fallacy that depends on the quantity of the premises would come about when indefinite propositions, which are here said to be equivalent to the particular and not to the universal ones, are used as premises for a universal conclusion. In order to shed light on this interpretation, and to understand why such a syllogism is taken by the commentator as fallacious, one must look to the account of the fallacies given in the Prior Analytics. The impact of Prior Analytics In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle makes a distinction between universal, particular and indefinite propositions7. Indefinite propositions are defined as those that have no quantifying attribute such as “every” or “some”, and can, therefore, be true either universally or particularly. However, Aristotle takes indefinite propositions to be equivalent to particular ones8, and often points out that particular and indefinite propositions have the same function within a syllogism9. By contrast, universal propositions should be stated clearly with their universal quantifier10; otherwise, one can be misled by taking an indefinite statement as a universal. This confusion can come about because of the “similarity in expression”, or, more

|| 7 Pr. An., I.1 24a16-23: Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατά τινος· οὗτος δὲ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος. [...] ἀδιόριστον δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ τὸ τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. 8 Pr. An., I.4 26a29-30: ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἀδιορίστου τε καὶ ἐν μέρει ληφθέντος. 29a2729: δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀδιόριστον ἀντὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ τοῦ ἐν μέρει τιθέμενον τὸν αὐτὸν ποιήσει συλλογισμὸν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς σχήμασιν. S. Barth (1974) for the use of indefinite propositions as equivalent to particular ones in Aristotle and his followers. For cases in which Aristotle does not follow this rule and uses indefinite propositions instead of universal ones s. Bäck (1987), 136. 9 S. Pr. An. I.4 26a29; 26a34; 26a40; 26b24; I.5 27b36; I.6 28b28; I.16 35b15. 10 Pr. An. I.27 43b13-15: διὰ γὰρ τῶν καθόλου προτάσεων ὁ συλλογισμός. ἀδιορίστου μὲν οὖν ὄντος ἄδηλον εἰ καθόλου ἡ πρότασις, διωρισμένου δὲ φανερόν.

Fallacy depending on the expression | 85

precisely, because of “the slight distinction”11 between an indefinite statement such as “A applies to B” and a universal statement such as “A applies to all of B”12. Given that for Aristotle the validity of a syllogism requires at least one universal premise13, it becomes evident why a syllogism formed by indefinite premises would be fallacious: it would appear to be valid by having a universal premise, although it would in fact contain an indefinite premise. In the 33rd chapter of the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle gives two examples in order to illustrate this type of fallacy. In both examples, one of the premises, though indefinite, seems to be taken universally, and consequently, leads to a false conclusion14. Hence, although an indefinite proposition can in some cases be true universally, it should always be treated as particular within a syllogism in order to avoid such fallacious conclusions. The verbal affinity between the commentary on the Rhetoric and the relevant passage of the Prior Analytics (I.33) is evident, since the Anonymous commentator interprets the rhetorical fallacy from the verbal expression on the grounds of the logical theory of the latter treatise: It is the premises of the arguments, which, by being similar in form to a valid deduction or an enthymeme, give the impression that the argument is valid, although it is in fact fallacious. Therefore, as the fallacy is interpreted here, it would occur in the dialectical arguments when the final sentence is presented as a conclusion of a syllogism15, although it is not one, since the argument does not fulfil the presuppositions of syllogisms. More specifically, the example given by the commentator, namely “man is animal; animal is substance; therefore, man is substance”, belongs to the above|| 11 A similar thought seems also to be present in the Sophistical Refutations, when Aristotle refers to the fallacies “depending on the omission” (παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν) or “being said in a specific respect and simply” (παρὰ τὸ πῂ καὶ ἁπλῶς). Both fallacies are said to come about because of a slight distinction between two statements that remains unnoticed. Soph. el. 7 169b9-17. 12 Pr. An. I.33 47b38-40: Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρόν· ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρον εἰπεῖν τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχειν ἢ τόδε τῷδε παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, συγχωροῦμεν. 13 Pr. An. I.24 41b6-9: Ἔτι τε ἐν ἅπαντι δεῖ κατηγορικόν τινα τῶν ὅρων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ὑπάρχειν· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον, ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτήσεται. 14 Pr. An. I.33 47b15 ff.: Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐνίοτε δὲ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τῶν ὅρων θέσεως· ὅπερ οὐ χρὴ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς. οἷον εἰ τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Β λέγεται καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ τοῦ Γ· δόξειε γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων εἶναι συλλογισμός, οὐ γίνεται δ' οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲν οὔτε συλλογισμός. For the interpretation of this passage s. Ross (1949), 401-2; Striker (2009), 216-219. 15 It is interesting to notice that the inferential connectives (“therefore”, “then necessarily”) by which Aristotle says that one can create the appearance of a conclusion, are absent from this interpretation. In 147, 22 the commentator refers to this statement but only in order to say that the fallacy occurs when a conclusion is brought about without having been deduced. However, one could say that the sentences “therefore such and such is not the case”, “therefore such and such is necessarily the case” can fall under the same type of fallacy, if the distinction between assertoric and apodeictic premises is latent.

86 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

mentioned fallacies that come about due to an arrangement of words that simulates a valid syllogism. However, though it gives the impression of a valid deduction, it cannot be a valid deduction, since neither of the premises is universal, but both are indefinite. Therefore, according to this interpretation, the fallacy is brought about due to vagueness in the expression of the premises or, more precisely, due to the misleading use of indefinite propositions instead of universal ones16. Turning now to the application of the fallacy to the rhetorical context, the fallacy can come about in rhetorical arguments, but in this case when there is a contradiction. In particular, and as highlighted above, the “formal” character of the fallacy refers, in the rhetorical case, to the feature of antithesis: [T.3] It appears to be an enthymeme, when we express in a compact way, namely in short and briefly, the contraries in the enthymemes, which are not contraries in the proper sense, but seemingly17; for example, if to be manly is good, then to be licentious is not good; for the licentiousness and manliness seem to be contraries, but they are not.18

The “slight distinction” between valid enthymemes expressed in a compact and antithetical way, and arguments that appear to be antithetical but are not, is, according to this passage, the source of the fallacy in the enthymemes. In this view, the brief and antithetical expression, which is said by Aristotle to be typical of the enthymemes, can be in some cases fake, when the antithesis, usually expressed by contraries, is not a proper one, but is expressed by a pair of terms that are not actual contraries though they appear as such. It is interesting that the antithetical charac|| 16 A similar claim is made about the source of delusion in the fallacies due to form of expression in Michael of Ephesus' commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, as well as in the paraphrase of the treatise by an Anonymous author (CAG II.3 67, 13-69, 3. Cf. 151, 3-8; CAG XXIII.4, 21, 10-27). They also recognise that in this case the fallacy occurs due to the form of the terms used in the argument, and they argue that the fallacy in fact rests on the similar form of the universal and particular terms. More specifically, when a term that can be used either universally or particularly (e.g “man” can be both the universal “man” and the particular ‘man’, like Socrates) is predicated of a particular subject, this predicate term can be the source of the fallacy when it is taken to be particular just because it has the same form as the particular subject of the sentence, i.e. because they are both singular. The confusion, says Michael, might arise by the predication of a term in the singular to a particular person, which can lead one to think that every predicate is particular and one and the same as the subject. This interpretation contradicts Aristotle's view as presented in the Categories, namely that it is only the first substances that are individual, whereas the second substances, predicated of the first, are not particular, but rather universal. 17 I use both “apparent” and “seeming” in these passages as translation of φαινόμενος, but I take all instances of φαινόμενος to refer to what seems to be or appears to be, without being evident. So, apparent is not used here meaning “being evident”. 18 Anon., In Rhet. 147, 35-148, 3: φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν συνεστραμμένως, ἤτοι βραχέως, συντόμως, τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, ἃ οὐδὲ ἀντικείμενα ἂν εἴη κυρίως ἀλλὰ φαινομένως, οἷον εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀνδρία, τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγαθόν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία ἐναντία, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ.

Fallacy depending on the expression | 87

ter of the enthymemes is accepted here as Aristotelian, and interpreted as such by the commentator in order to explain the fallacy in the rhetorical context. However, the question that arises from this interpretation concerns the alleged relation between rhetoric and dialectic. In particular, what is the relation between the fallacy as applied in dialectics and as applied in the rhetorical context? Is there a similarity between the two? From what we have seen so far, it seems that it is this slight distinction between two statements that brings about the fallacy in each context: as the fallacy in dialectics rests on the slight and latent difference between an indefinite and a universal statement, so in the case of the enthymemes the fallacy rests on a misuse of contraries that remains unnoticed. In other words, both in dialectic and in rhetoric, the fallacy rests on the “form” of the argument, due to which a difference between two statements remains unnoticed: in dialectic, the latent difference is between indefinite and universal premises, whereas in rhetoric it is between actual and fake contraries. The second [T.2.b] interpretation offered by the Anonymous commentator also takes the Analytics as its background, since the apparent character of the enthymeme is explained on the grounds of its having only one premise19. Both the dialectical and the rhetorical argument mentioned in the text are thought to be apparent when they do not have a perfect syllogistic form, but one of the premises is missing. In the case of enthymemes, the premise that is omitted renders the enthymeme apparent by being antithetical to the other premise. [T.4] [The enthymeme is apparent when expressed], on the one hand, in a compact way, namely briefly, because one of the premises, the major one, is omitted; and on the other hand, in an antithetical way, because the major omitted premise, being false, is contrary to the minor one, which is particular and true. For this expression, namely to express one premise, but leave the other, is the realm of the enthymeme, namely it appears to be an enthymeme, but is not; and this is the apparent enthymeme due to the form of the expression, namely to express briefly the contraries, that is, in so far as it appears to be an enthymeme from the expression, namely by taking the one premise.20

In this second interpretation, although the formal conditions of valid syllogisms of Aristotle's logical theory are met, namely the conditions as presented in the Analytics and as were used in the first interpretation of the commentator (namely one || 19 Pr. An. I.1 24b22-26: τέλειον μὲν οὖν καλῶ συλλογισμὸν τὸν μηδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεόμενον παρὰ τὰ εἰλημμένα πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀτελῆ δὲ τὸν προσδεόμενον ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀναγκαῖα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὅρων, οὐ μὴν εἴληπται διὰ προτάσεων. 20 Anon., In Rhet. 148, 3-11: συνεστραμμένως μὲν ἤτοι συντόμως διὰ τὸ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν τὴν μείζω λείπειν, ἀντικειμένως δέ, διότι ἡ μείζων ἡ λείπουσα πρότασις ψευδὴς οὖσα ἀντίκειται τῇ ἐλάττονι τῇ μερικῇ ἀληθεῖ οὔσῃ. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις, ἤτοι τὸ εἰπεῖν πρότασιν μίαν, τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν ἐᾶσαι, χώρα μέν ἐστιν ἐνθυμήματος ἤτοι ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐνθύμημα, οὐκ ἔστι δέ, καὶ τοῦτο φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα ἤτοι τὸ συνεστραμμένως λέγειν τὰ ἀντικείμενα παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, ἤτοι ὅσον ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα, ἤτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν μίαν πρότασιν.

88 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

premise is universal and the other particular), the enthymeme is still not valid because of the falseness of one of the premises which is hidden due to the omission of that premise. The features ascribed to the enthymemes, in particular, brevity and antithesis, are considered here as the cause of the fallacy, but only brevity is taken as being typical of the enthymemes21. In order to be brief, the enthymeme is bereft of one premise, which turns out to be contrary to the other premise. Interesting is that in this interpretation the characteristic of the antithesis is not taken to be attributed by Aristotle to the enthymemes, but is interpreted as being the source of the fallacy. How this reading applies to the Aristotelian text becomes more evident through the analysis of the commentator's interpretation of its last sentence (1401a8-12). More specifically, as an illustration of this fallacy, Aristotle provides an example in which the conclusions of several syllogisms are put together in order to give the impression that something aside from these comes about. This example is meant to show the way in which a compact and antithetical formulation can appear to be an enthymeme: “He saved these, but he punished the others and he set the Greeks free”. On the one hand, in this example, the brevity occurs in respect of many conclusions together without any reference to the premises from which they came. In the commentator's interpretation as well, combining propositions that were proven through other syllogisms is useful in giving the impression that an enthymeme is formulated, although no enthymeme can come about through unconnected premises. According to the commentator, this lack of connection seems to result from the view that an enthymeme is compact due to the defect of one of its premises. Therefore, if these separate statements are put together, a new enthymeme seems to occur. On the other hand, the example seems to also illustrate the antithetical character of the enthymemes mentioned by Aristotle. The antithetical pair μέν-δὲ, found in each proposition in the example, gives the impression that the premises come from a unified thought and aim at a unified conclusion. What needs to be noted is that this interpretation does not make sense of the application of the fallacy in dialectics. However, as I will try to show later in my reading of Stephanus’ commentary, there is a possible solution. In summary, the two interpretations given by the Anonymous commentator focus on different aspects of the fallacy, but both draw a connection between the Rhetoric and the Prior Analytics. The fallacious character of the enthymeme is thought to be, on the one hand, due to its form, namely due to the latent mode of the premises and terms used. On the other hand, the fallacy comes about due to the expression itself, namely due to the omission of one premise that contains a hidden antithesis.

|| 21 According to the interpretation, the brevity of enthymemes is the realm, namely the place, where apparent enthymemes are to be found.

Fallacy depending on the expression | 89

3.1.2 Stephanus’ commentary Stephanus' interpretation of the passage (CAG XXI.2 303, 13 ff.), though close to the second interpretation of the Anonymous commentator, is in some respects different. Unlike the Anonymous commentary, Stephanus' interpretation is based upon a connection of the text with the Sophistical Refutations, where Aristotle distinguishes between linguistic and non-linguistic fallacies and gives a list of six fallacies of the former type and seven fallacies of the latter type (Soph. el. I.4-5.). Stephanus takes the expression “fallacy of the verbal expression” to indicate the linguistic fallacies in general, and considers the defect of an antithetical premise to be the first kind (ἕν μέρος) of that type of rhetorical fallacy. However, Stephanus' interpretation is reminiscent of the second interpretation of the Anonymous commentator. In both commentaries, the fallacy occurs when an enthymeme lacks a premise that turns out to state the contrary of what is said in the given premise. On the one hand, the antithetical meaning of the major premise as compared to the minor premise creates the fallacy. On the other hand, the compact and dense way of expressing the enthymemes gives rise to such fallacies. In this respect, the interpretation of the passage found in Stephanus' commentary is consistent with Anonymous'. [T.5] The sophisms depending on the verbal expression can happen in six ways. He takes one part of these to be the case, when the final sentence, without having been deduced, is stated in a conclusion-like way; just as Parmenides [had said], “what is besides being, is not being; the non-being is nothing; therefore, the being is one”. And he said “final” and not “conclusion”, because we have a conclusion in the proper sense, when we also have premises. An apparent enthymeme is to have a major and omitted premise, which, as he says, is antithetical to the true premise, in an antithetical way, namely falsely; for, while the premise “everyone who wanders at night is a thief” is false, the major premise was omitted, which is antithetical and true, namely the one [that stated] “not everyone”. And the phrase “so too for the enthymemes, when one is put in a compact way”. He calls compact the major premise, because, on the one hand, it is omitted and, on the other hand, it twists up the judges and promotes them to invent it. For this reason, in the treatise On Demonstration he said, “the rhetorical speeches persuade22”. For together with that universal, omitted premise, the judges either neglect or are persuaded after having in a way completed the whole syllogism. And this is why he called that major and omitted premise “realm of the enthymeme” and not “enthymeme”, because it completes the topos of the enthymeme. And the statement “such a case seems to rest on the form of verbal expression” means the following: with respect to the verbal expression, the enthymeme is formed similarly to a true enthymeme, but it is not truly so; as if one says, “the feminine is neutral; the masculine is neutral; therefore, the feminine is masculine”.23

|| 22 Post. An, I.1 71a5-9. 23 Anon., In Rhet. 303, 13-34: Τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα ἑξαχῶς συμβαίνει. αὐτὸς δὲ ἓν μέρος τούτων τίθησι τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς εἰπεῖν τὸ τελευταῖον· ὡς ὁ Παρμενίδης ‘τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ὄν, τὸ οὐκ ὂν οὐδέν, ἓν ἄρα τὸ ὄν’. τελευταῖον δὲ εἶπε καὶ οὐ συμπέρασμα, ὅτι κυρίως

90 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

In his interpretation of the fallacy from verbal expression, Stephanus focuses on the formal features of enthymemes, and argues that the fallacy comes about due to the antithetical character of the major premise that has been omitted in order for the enthymeme to be brief. However, besides the compact character of the enthymeme, which is mentioned in Aristotle and is repeated by Stephanus, the commentator also provides an alternative explanation of the text based on the different meanings of the word συνεστραμμένως. In particular, the word συστρέφω can either mean 'gather, collect', from which the translation of συνεστραμμένως as 'compact' arises, or it can mean 'turn, twist'. Based on this second meaning, the commentator says that the absence of the major premise encourages the judges to consider it in order to invent it, or twists them up and makes them find the missing premise. We can think of this interpretation as Stephanus' effort to bring the notion of invention into this passage. The so-called inventive function of the topoi is their auxiliary role in finding the appropriate premises that can be used in order to get the desired conclusion. According to Stephanus' interpretation of the passage, the major premise of the enthymeme has a twofold function as συνεστραμμένον: On the one hand, based on the first meaning of the word, the major premise is omitted, and by its omission it renders the enthymeme brief and compact. On the other hand, the premise itself is συνεστραμμένον because it twists up the judges, and motivates them to invent the appropriate premise, which leads to the given conclusion. In that case, the enthymeme would be fallacious, when the premise that was invented is antithetical to the given one. According to Stephanus, this interpretation is supported by a passage at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics24, where Aristotle says that rhetorical speeches are convincing because they consist of examples, which are like induction, and enthymemes, which are syllogisms. Therefore, the judges of a rhetorical speech

|| συμπέρασμα τότε ἐστίν, ὅτε καὶ προτάσεις. Φαινομένως δὲ ἐνθύμημά ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν καὶ παραλελειμμένην, ἣν καὶ ἀντικεῖσθαί φησι τῇ ἀληθεῖ, ἀντικειμένως, τουτέστι ψευδῶς, εἰπεῖν· ψευδοῦς γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ὅτι ‘πᾶς ὁ νύκτωρ πλανώμενος κλέπτης’ ἡ πρότασις καὶ μείζων καὶ παρελείφθη ἡ ἀντικειμένη ἀληθὴς ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’. Καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι συνεστραμμένως. συνεστραμμένον τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν λέγει ὡς παραλειφθεῖσαν μέν, συστρέφουσαν δὲ καὶ ἐνάγουσαν τοὺς δικαστὰς πρὸς εὕρεσιν ἑαυτῆς. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀποδεικτικῇ εἶπε ‘συμπείθουσι’· σὺν τῇ καθ' ὅλου γὰρ τῇ παραλελειμμένῃ ἐκείνῃ ὅλον τὸν συλλογισμὸν οἷον ἀπαρτίσαντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱ δικασταὶ ἢ παρεῶσιν ἢ πείθονται. διὸ καὶ εἶπε πάλιν, ὅτι ἡ μείζων αὕτη καὶ παραλειφθεῖσα ψευδὴς οὖσα χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος, οὐ μὴν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλὰ τόπον οἷον ἐνθυμήματος ἀποπληροῖ. Τὸ δὲ ‘καὶ ἔοικε δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα εἶναι τῆς λέξεως’ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐσχημάτισται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ὁμοίως τῷ ἀληθεῖ, οὐ μὴν ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει· ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴπῃ ‘τὸ θῆλυ οὐδέτερον, τὸ ἄρρεν οὐδέτερον, τὸ ἄρρεν ἄρα θῆλυ’. 24 Post. An., I.1 71a5-9: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὡς δ' αὔτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν.

Fallacy depending on the expression | 91

can be persuaded only when they are able to see the syllogism as a whole by inventing the major premise, which is said to 'complete' or 'fulfill' the enthymeme. Moreover, at this point we can see a similarity between the two commentators, namely that both seem to have trouble in explaining Aristotle’s statement that the fallacy applies both in rhetoric and in dialectic. As we saw before, the Anonymous commentator (in his second interpretation) had explained the rhetorical fallacy as resting upon the imperfection of the syllogism, but no mention was made in the scholium, from which he draws, of the dialectical counterpart of this fallacy. Stephanus’ interpretation of the passage is also not clear in this matter, but it does hint at the commentator’s views on the matter, which might also apply to the Anonymous’ commentary. In particular, in Stephanus’ view, only rhetorical arguments may be fallacious due to the omission of a premise, specifically one that is antithetical to the given premise. By contrast, dialectical arguments are fallacious when the final statement is presented as if it were a conclusion, when in fact it is not, since it does not come about through the premises. Although this interpretation evidently rests on Stephanus’ desire to bridge the theory of syllogism and Aristotle’s remarks about inferential connectives in his treatment of this fallacy, it does not state clearly the way in which one should understand the correspondence between rhetoric and dialectics mentioned by Aristotle. However, it seems possible that for Stephanus the fallacy would rest in both cases on the unsoundness of the premises. On the one hand, a dialectical argument would be fallacious when the proposition presented as a conclusion does not result from the premises, whereas on the other hand, the fallacy is brought about in rhetorical arguments due to the antithetical character of the omitted premise. This correspondence can be also describted in this way: in both dialectical and rhetorical arguments, the fallacy comes about due to the “form”, namely either due to the form of the conclusion (in dialectic), or due to the form of the antithesis (in rhetoric). This suggestion could also be accepted by the Anonymous commentator, since it makes use of notions that he himself has accepted as relevant. As for Aristotle's reference to the “form of verbal expression” (παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως), Stephanus interprets it as corresponding to the description of this fallacy in the Sophistical Refutations. As stated above, the use of the phrase “σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως” has a different content in the two Aristotelian treatises, since in the Rhetoric it does not refer, as it does in the Sophistical Refutations, to the syntactical position of the words or to their endings, but to the form of the enthymeme as a whole, namely the position of the premises and the consistency of their content. However, reproducing the description of this fallacy from the Sophistical Refutations, Stephanus maintains that in the Rhetoric the fallacy is called 'depending on the form of expression', because the propositions used have a form similar to the true or correct ones, and hence, give the impression that they form an enthymeme, although they truly do not. In order to support the connection between the two Aristotelian treatises, he uses the same example used in the Sophistical Refutations as a fallacy due to

92 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

the form of verbal expression: “the feminine is neutral; the masculine is neutral; therefore, the feminine is masculine”25.

3.2 Fallacy due to homonymy [T.6] Another part rests on homonymy; e.g. saying (1) that the mouse is noble, since the most honorable consecration derives from it, for the mysteries is the most honorable of all. Or (2) if someone praising a dog incorporates the dog in the heaven or Pan, since Pindar said: “You blessed one, whom the Olympians call multifarious dog of the great goddess”. Or to say that it is dishonorable for there not to be a dog, so that clearly the dog is honorable. And to say (3) that Hermes of all gods is the most sociable; for he alone is called “Hermes, the comrade”. And to say (4) that the logos is the most honorable thing, since excellent men are said to be worthy not of money, but of logos; for the phrase “being worthy of logos” is not said in a simple way.26

In the Categories27, Aristotle gives the definition of homonyms: the words named as homonymous are those that share the same name but have a different definition of their essence. In fact, there are many instances in the Aristotelian corpus of such cases in which Aristotle distinguishes between the different uses or meanings of one word28. Generally speaking, the use of a homonymous word within an argument can lead to a fallacious inference, when the conclusion reached is true only for one of the meanings, although it is presented as being true for the other meaning(s) as well. I will focus on the presentation of the examples given by Aristotle and their interpretation mainly by the Anonymous commentator, since Stephanus offers only a short remark on this fallacy. (1st example) In the first example, the fallacy rests on the apparent etymological connection between the words μῦς (= mouse) and μυστήρια (= mysteries). Since they || 25 Soph. el. 4 166b10-12: Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως συμβαίνουσιν ὅταν τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸ ὡσαύτως ἑρμηνεύηται, οἷον τὸ ἄρρεν θῆλυ ἢ τὸ θῆλυ ἄρρεν ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ θάτερον τούτων. This example, though not very clear in the original text, is interpreted by the two commentators of the Sophistical Refutations exactly as mentioned in this passage by Stephanus. 26 Rhet., II.24 1401a13-25: ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, τὸ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφ' οὗ γ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή. Ἢ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν ὦ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι, ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύν' ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. Καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. Καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται. 27 Cat. 1a1-5: Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον· τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. 28 S. Met. Δ, which is dedicated to such terms that can be used homonymously: being, one, essence etc.

Fallacy due to homonymy | 93

have, according to the Anonymous commentator, the same root, and since we know for sure that the mysteries are the noblest consecration of all, one might falsely infer that mouse is also noble. In other words, because of the similarity in the names, one would ascribe the same definition to the two words (Rhet. II.24 1401b15-16). The Anonymous commentator says: [T.7] Another [topos] is due to homonymy, for example when one says that the mouse is noble and good; that it is noble is evident by the fact that the noblest consecration of all, namely the mysteries, is derived etymologically by it; but it is not truly named by the 'mouse', but by 'μῶ', which means 'to learn'.29

The meaning of the example is clear: the same attribute, that is nobility, is ascribed to two words that seem to be etymologically related because of the similarity in their form. The interesting part of the interpretation is the commentator’s endeavour to provide the real etymology of the word 'mysteries', in order to give the solution of the fallacy30. The verb μῶ, references of which we find in the medieval dictionaries (Photius 9th, Eustathios 12th), seems to have the same meaning as the verb ζητῶ, namely 'seek for', 'seek after', 'desire', 'search for'. The commentator evidently wants to connect the mysteries with research and knowledge. (2nd example) The second example contains a case of different uses of the same word. The noun κύων (= dog), is also used as a name of a constellation, as a nickname of Pan derived from a poem by Pindar, but also in order to signify the Cynic philosophers. Therefore, it is a typical case of homonyms, since the same word has several meanings. This is how Stephanus interprets the passage, also indicating that the last sentence refers to the Cynic philosophers: [T.8] '[Or to say that it is dishonourable] for there not to be a dog'. This passage indicates either the inclination of the philosophers towards a cynical, rough character, preservative of the right

|| 29 Anon., In Rhet. 148, 23-27: ἕτερον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπῃ, ὅτι ὁ μῦς σπουδαῖός ἐστι καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστι, δῆλον ἀπὸ τοῦ παρονομασθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ μῦς τὴν τελετὴν τὴν τιμιωτέραν πασῶν τῶν τελετῶν μυστήρια· οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ μῦς δὲ ἐπωνομάσθη, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶ, τὸ μανθάνω. 30 Cf. Soph. el. 19 177a10-: Τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐλέγχων οἱ μὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων τι πλείω σημαῖνον, οἱ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον [...] ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ ὄνομα καὶ λόγον οὕτως ἀποκριτέον, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ὥσπερ τῷ “σιγῶντα λέγειν” ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἅ, ἔστι δ' ἃ οὔ. Here Aristotle indicates in what way one may give the solution to this fallacy, namely by pointing out the double meaning of the word and its logos. This is exactly what the commentator does, since he distinguishes between the two meanings and explains the source of the fallacy. Cf. Top. VIII.12.

94 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24 doctrines, or the tendency of the animal to be affectionate. For κύω means to love and the dog loves the relatives, but barks at the foreigners.31

However, the Anonymous commentator chooses a different interpretation of the text. According to his interpretation, the fallacy relies on the use of different words that sound the same: [T.9] Or if someone also includes Pan in the praising of a dog. “You blessed one,” we call Pan blessed, “whom the Olympians call common”, instead of saying commonly, “multifarious from the great goddess” […]. Some of the books have 'κύνα'. But it is like a homophony of κοινά and κύνα. Or that if it is dishonorable not to have anything in common, namely if there is no communion to someone, it is evident that the common, namely to laugh together with others, is noble; for it is beast-like not to be able to laugh together with others.32

According to this interpretation, the fallacy does not rest on the various meanings of the word κοινός (common), but on its similarity in sound to the word κύνα (dog). This similarity between the two words is explained by the same pronunciation of the diphthong [oi] and the vowel [u]. In the 6th century BC [u] started being pronounced in some Greek dialects as [y], a phoneme similar to the German /ü/ and the French /u/. The same happened also to the diphthong [oi], which was already in the 3rd century BC Boeotia pronounced as [y]. Therefore, already from the 3rd century BC and especially after the 3rd century AD, when this accent of [oi] as [y] was extended also to the Attic dialect, the two vowels were pronounced the same and were confused with one another. Later, [oi] and [u] had the same evolution, and in the 9th/10th century AD both started to be pronounced as [i], an accent that they maintain through today33. The interpretation of the text by the word 'common' is an interesting one, and reminiscent, first, of the Aristotelian view that human beings are naturally disposed to live not alone but in a community, since lonely life is a feature of beasts (Pol. I.2.). Second, it is reminiscent of the view that the ability to laugh is the proper feature of

|| 31 Steph., In Rhet. 304, 13-16: Ἢ τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνα. ἢ τὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων κυνικὸν καὶ αὐστηρὸν καὶ φυλακτικὸν τῶν ὀρθῶν δογμάτων δηλοῖ ἢ τοῦ ζῴου φιλητικόν· κύω γὰρ τὸ φιλῶ λέγεται· φιλεῖ γὰρ τοὺς οἰκείους, καθυλακτεῖ δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. 32 Anon., In Rhet. 148, 27-149, 4: ἢ συμπεριλάβῃ καὶ τὸν Πᾶνα, ἐν τῷ τοῦ κυνὸς ἐγκωμίῳ. ‘ὦ μάκαρ’, τὸν Πᾶνα λέγομεν μάκαρα, ‘ὃν κοινά’, ἀντὶ τοῦ κοινῶς, ‘καλοῦσιν οἱ Ὀλύμπιοι παντοδαπὸν ἀπὸ τῆς μεγάλης θεοῦ’ ἤτοι τῆς Ῥέας. παντοδαπὸν δὲ τοῦτον λέγουσι, διότι πάντες συνεδοιάσθησαν τῇ Ῥέᾳ καὶ ἀπεσπέρμηναν, ἐξ οὗ συνέβη ἀπ' αὐτῆς γεννηθῆναι τὸν Πᾶνα. τινὰ δὲ τῶν βιβλίων ἔχουσι καὶ κύνα, τὸ κυ ψιλόν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὡς παρήχησις κυνα κοινά. ἢ ὅτι εἰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κοινὰ ἤτοι εἰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κοινωνίαν πρός τινα ἀτιμότατόν ἐστι (θηριῶδες γὰρ τὸ μὴ συναγελαστικόν), τὸ κοινὰ δηλονότι ἤτοι τὸ συναγελαστικὸν δηλονότι καὶ κοινωνικὸν τίμιόν ἐστι. 33 Allen (1968), 59 ff.

Fallacy due to homonymy | 95

human beings34. The commentator probably sees this example as an opportunity to connect the Rhetoric with other Aristotelian treatises and to show their consistency. By interpreting the example as containing many instances of common actions among humans, he refers to the political theory that is in any case relevant to the rhetorical theory35, but also to the feature that all men have in common by nature, namely laughter. According to this reading of the example, besides extending to the fallacies in etymology as we saw in the previous example, the homonymy fallacy can extend to cases of homophony, namely when two words sound the same or similarly. (3rd-4th example) The homonymy in the last two of Aristotle’s examples rests on the different meanings that the words 'κοινός' and 'λόγος' can have. The former can mean either common or sociable, while the latter can mean either speech or esteem. Therefore, both examples seem to be typical cases of what is called homonymy. The Anonymous commentator again offers a different interpretation. He says: [T.10] And that Hermes is more sociable than the other gods; for logos is named as Hermes; for we communicate with the others by the logos. And again, the fact that logos is noble, is evident, because we don't call the excellent men worthy of money, but of logos.36

On the one hand, the commentator interprets Aristotle’s third example as a fallacy brought about by the metonymical use of a word. The god Hermes, being the god of communication, stands as a symbol for logos, through which the communication is succeeded. On the other hand, the last example is the only one that the commentator interprets as showing the different meanings of one word. In summary, the Anonymous commentator sees four different types of the fallacy of homonymy in the four examples of this passage of the Rhetoric. The first example is interpreted as an etymological fallacy, namely one that occurs due to the apparent etymological relation of two words. In the second example, homonymy is related to homophony, and the fallacy comes about due to the same pronunciation of two words. The third is an example of metonymy, where one name stands instead of the notion that it represents. Only the fourth example refers to the case in which two different meanings belong to the same word. Hence, in his view, the four examples correspond to four different types of homonymy.

|| 34 De Part. An. III.10 673a8: Τοῦ δὲ γαργαλίζεσθαι μόνον ἄνθρωπον αἴτιον ἥ τε λεπτότης τοῦ δέρματος καὶ τὸ μόνον γελᾶν τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον; a28: οὐδὲν γὰρ γελᾷ τῶν ἄλλων. 35 Rhet. I.2 1356a25-27: ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. 36 Anon., In Rhet. 149, 5-10: καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν ὁ Ἑρμῆς κοινωνικός ἐστιν· Ἑρμῆς γὰρ λέγεται ὁ λόγος· κοινωνοῦμεν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις διὰ τοῦ λόγου. Καὶ πάλιν ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ λέγεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἀξίους χρημάτων ἀλλ' ἀξίους λόγου.

96 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

One might wonder whether this interpretation could also be true of the use of this fallacy in dialectical arguments, namely whether the fallacy due to homonymy as interpreted by the commentators on the Rhetoric can also be used in dialectics. In his commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, Michael of Ephesus offers a similar interpretation of the fallacy of homonymy. Based on Aristotle's own statement in the Sophistical Refutations that there are three ways in which the fallacies of homonymy and amphiboly can be said (Soph. el. 4 166a14-18), Michael adds another, and concludes that the two fallacies occur in four ways: (1) when the name or phrase has more than one meaning, (2) when we usually use a non-literal meaning of a word, (3) when the words of a phrase have one meaning when separated, but more when they are combined into a phrase, and (4) when the combination of the words has only one meaning, whereas the words that constitute the phrase have more than one37. The four examples presented by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations are accordingly interpreted by Michael in the above-mentioned ways (CAG II.3 23, 30-25, 37). Although the fourfold division of homonymous words in dialectics is not the same as the one presented by the Anonymous commentator of the Rhetoric regarding the use of the fallacy in rhetoric, and although no mention of the one treatise is made in the other, one could consider that the authors of the two commentaries wanted the rhetorical fallacy to correspond to its dialectical counterpart in its range of use: Both in dialectics and in rhetoric, homonymy (and amphiboly in dialectics) is used in four ways that are suitable for each occasion. In dialectics, these are the four ways in which one word or phrase can be said to have a double meaning. In a rhetorical context, however, double meaning is not enough, given that the arguments are presented in a public speech and in front of a simple-minded audience. Hence, it is no surprise that three out of the four ways that the commentator says homonymy is used in the Rhetoric ought to be understood mainly in a rhetorical context. First, etymological mistakes and mistakes due to homophony could be more easily used for the delusion of an uneducated audience. Moreover, metonymy, which simulates metaphor, seems to be particularly suitable for a rhetorical speech, since Aristotle states that a metaphorical use of a word is particularly useful for prose, and that the rhetorician could make use of them in order to achieve both originality (since the speech is has an unusual feature) and clarity (since the audience is accustomed to such expressions) (Rhet. III.2 1404b31- 1405a2).

|| 37 CAG II.3 137, 20-30. The Anonymous' paraphrasis of the treatise initially follows Aristotle's statement, and discusses only the three first ways in which homonymy can be said (CAG XXIII.4 7, 112), whereas later (CAG XXIII.4 47, 25 ff.), he expresses the same thought as Michael of Ephesus.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 97

3.3 Fallacy due to combination and division [T.11] Another topos is to state the divided as something combined or the combined as something divided; for since it often seems to be the same while not being the same, one has to choose whatever is more useful. This is Euthydemus' mode of argument, e.g. the argument that (1) one knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, since he knows both of them. And that (2) one knows the word, because he knows the particular letters and the word is the same as the letters. And the argument that, (3) if the double portion is unwholesome, neither the simple portion can be said to be wholesome; for it would be strange, if two good things constitute one bad thing. Used in this way, it [the statement] is refuting, while it is probative in the following way: one good thing is not two bad things. However, the entire topos is fallacious. Again, the saying of Polycrates with regard to Thrasybulus, (4) that he defeated thirty tyrants; for he combined them. Or the saying in the Orestes of Theodectes; for it is from division: (5) it is just, for the woman who killed her husband, to die, and, for the son, to avenge his father; therefore, these things have been well done; for when combined they are perhaps no longer just. It might also rest on omission; since one omits by whom it was done.38

The fallacy of combination and division is the third topos of apparent enthymemes presented in the Rhetoric. As described in the passage, the fallacy comes about either when things that should be taken apart are combined, or when things that should be combined are divided, as if it would make no difference to their meaning. Another way to describe it, based mainly on the modern use of this fallacy, is connected to the whole-part relation, according to which the combination would be the predication to the whole of what is attributed to the parts, and the division would be the opposite39. Combination and division are also presented in the Sophistical Refutations under the heading of linguistic fallacies, but there they are treated as two distinct fallacies40. However, both rest on the combined or divided sense in which two words || 38 Rhet. II.24 1401a25-b3: ἄλλος τὸ τὸ διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὂν ταὐτὸ πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐμ Πειραεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὧδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά· ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσε· συντίθησι γάρ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου·ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν· δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν, ἀποθνῄσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν, οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γὰρ ἴσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος. 39 S. Grimaldi (1988), 341; Schreiber (2003), 55. For modern discussion of this fallacy s. Rowe (1962); Bar Hillel (1964); Broyles (1975); Woods/Walton (1989). What should be mentioned is that in the part-whole interpretation, the fallacy does not have the linguistic character that it has in the Sophistici elenchi, but it relies upon mistakes of predication (i.e. what is predicated of the parts, is falsely predicated of the whole). Cf. Copi (1953), 79 ff. 40 Soph. el. 4 166a23-38: παρὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν καὶ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει ἂν διελών τις εἴπῃ καὶ συνθεὶς ὡς δυνατὸν τὸ

98 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

are used. This becomes clearer through the examples used in the treatise to illustrate the combination fallacy: the same statement, for instance “being able to walk while sitting” or “being able to write while not writing”, has a different meaning when the words are combined or when they are treated separately. On the one hand, due to combination of the words, the statements mean that one has the ability for walking while sitting and the ability for writing while not-writing. On the other hand, if the words are taken separately, the statement would mean that a person has the capacity for writing, when she is not writing, and the capacity for walking, when she is not walking. In other words, in these examples the fallacy is brought about when the words are treated as combined, and is dissolved, when they are taken as separate41. Respectively, the fallacy of division occurs when the words of a statement are falsely divided, as in “I made you a slave being free” and “The divine Achilles left the hundred fifty men”. Different interpretations of the examples have been suggested, but in any case, in both the fallacy should rest on the division of the words that should have been treated as combined. In the first example, a false division of the words (maybe the separation of the “slave-being” or of the “being-free”) would bring about the fallacy, while, in the second example, the division of the words “hundred-fifty” could give the impression that the statement is that “Achilles left the hundred men fifty” or “Achilles left the fifty men hundred”, instead of “Achilles left the hundred-fifty men”42. The solution of the division fallacy would come about respectively through the right combination of the words. It is evident, therefore, that the fallacies of combination and division, as presented in the Sophistical Refutations, are fallacies that depend on language, since their source is the ambiguous meaning of a pair of words when they are taken combined or separated. Contemporary interpretations of the relation between the two treatises that deal with the same fallacy, and especially of whether the fallacy is a linguistic one in both treatises, differ significantly. Grimaldi, for instance, who cites a list of corresponding passages between the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, considers the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations as generally applicable to the Rhetoric, and therefore, he counts the

|| “καθήμενον βαδίζειν” […] Παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν [...] ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος διῃρημένος καὶ συγκείμενος οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὸ σημαίνειν ἂν δόξειεν, οἷον “ἐγώ σ' ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον” καὶ τὸ “πεντήκοντ' ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς”. I.20 177a33-b34. On the discussion about whether they are actually two separate fallacies s. Schiaparelli (2003); Schreiber (2003). 41 Cf. Soph. el. 20 177a33-35: Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν πῶς λυτέον· ἂν γὰρ διαιρούμενος καὶ συντιθέμενος ὁ λόγος ἕτερον σημαίνῃ, συμπεραινομένου τοὐναντίον λεκτέον. 42 This is Forster's (1955) reading of the passage. For a different analysis of the examples s. Schiaparelli (2003), 125-128 who tries to analyse the examples of the fallacy of combination and division in the Soph. el. with the use of an operator with wide and narrow scope respectively. Hasper (2009), 119-121 explains the examples through grammatical trees of composition. S. also Schreiber (2003), 60 ff.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 99

combination and division fallacy in the Rhetoric as a linguistic one as well43. However, Rapp points out differences in the common examples used in the two treatises, and argues that the fallacy in the Rhetoric is not dependent on the language, but, as the examples provided by Aristotle show, the rhetorical fallacy comes about when what is divided is treated as combined and vice versa. In particular, “the source of delusion rests on the fact that these things often seem to be the same without actually being the same”44. The two commentators of the Rhetoric offer their own interpretations of the passage by focusing on the examples given by Aristotle. I would like to focus on their views, explicit or implicit, (1) of the relation between the two treatises that deal with the same fallacy, and more specifically, of whether the fallacy in the Rhetoric is language-dependent, and (2) whether we are dealing with two distinct fallacies or one single one. In this section, I will discuss each of the examples from the Aristotelian text and the interpretation offered first by the Anonymous commentator and subsequently by Stephanus. (1st example) The Anonymous commentator interprets the first two examples, after he adds and addresses the Achilles example from the Sophistical Refutations: [T.12] For since it is considered as being the same to take the phrase “the divine Achilles left [of the] hundred fifty men45” either in a divided or in a combined way, but these are actually not the same, you should treat them as it is useful for you; if you are accusing someone, then divide the hundred and say that “it is unintelligible to say that one left, from the fifty men, a hundred”, but if you are speaking in defense, then say that “he says that he left fifty out of hundred men”. And again to state due to combination that: “So do you know the ships in Piraeus?” “No”. This was the initial question. “So what? Do you know what a trireme is?” “Yes” “Do you know Piraeus?” “Yes”. And then one adds these together: “Therefore, you know the triremes in Piraeus”. The solution: it is not necessary, if I know each of these separately, to add them together and know them. And again, “So do you know this verse 'the anger (μῆνιν) sing, goddess'?” “No.” “So what? Don't you know the elements, like m, e, n, i, out of which this verse is composed?” “Yes.” “Therefore, you know the verse 'the anger sing, goddess'”. But it is not necessary, if I know the elements (namely the twenty-four letters) of which the whole phrase and the whole verse is composed, to know every verse and every book; for the verse is not the same as the elements, like you said, even though it is composed of them.46

|| 43 Grimaldi (1988), 338: “A distinction is also made between fallacies which, while not stated in the Rhetoric, is also valid there […] In the Rhetoric the following would fall among the verbal fallacies: […] II, 01a24-01b3 (composition, division)”. 44 Rapp (2013a), 142-143. 45 The commentator cites the hexameter in a reversed way, namely instead of “πεντήκοντ' ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς”, he wrote “ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν πεντήκοντα λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς”, which cannot be a right hexamenter. 46 Anon., In Rhet. 149, 10-26: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ τό, εἴτε διῃρημένως λάβῃς τὸ ’ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν πεντήκοντα λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς’ εἴτε συνημμένως, καὶ ταῦτα μὴ ὂν ταὐτόν, ὁποτέρως σοι χρησιμεύει

100 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

First, I would like to focus on the citation of the Achilles example. It is interesting that the commentator uses this example, given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as indicating the fallacy from division, as an illustration of the fallacy called in the Rhetoric “combination and division”. On the one hand, this shows that he might consider it as an example of both combination and division47. On the other hand, the fact that he uses an example of the Sophistici Elenchi in order to shed light on the function of the fallacy in the rhetorical context might offer some indication about his view of the relation between the two treatises. However, the example is itself not clear, and has troubled contemporary scholars who have worked on the Soph. el. It is, therefore, difficult to see in what way the commentator wants us to understand the fallacy and the remaining examples of the Rhetoric by using this example. The statement “Achilles left a hundred fifty men” can be read in three different ways: first, through a combination of “hundred” and “fifty”, the phrase could mean that “Achilles left 150 men”. Second, due to a division of the “hundred” from the “fifty” the phrase could be either “Achilles left fifty men out of hundred” or “Achilles left a hundred men out of fifty”. In this example, it is interesting that, besides the first reading in which the phrase is clearly combined, the other two readings could be read as cases of both combination and division, since in each of them one of the two words (“hundred”, “fifty”) is combined with or divided from “men” in order to give each reading. If this is the case, then it is not clear which of the two fallacies the example is meant to explicate. Therefore, if one wants to distinguish the fallacies of combination and division from one another, and to read the Achilles example of the Sophistical Refutations as an example that aims at illustrating only the fallacy of division, then the right interpretation of the phrase would be that each of the two divided versions is fallacious, and that the solution of the fallacy would come about through the combination “Achilles left 150 men”. In other words, the fallacy in this example would rest on the ambiguity caused by the division of the phrase, which should have been combined48.

|| τοῦτο, οὕτως ληπτέον· εἰ μὲν κατηγορεῖς τινος, διαίρει τὸ ἑκατόν καὶ λέγε ὅτι ‘ἀδιανόητα λέγεις τὸ καταλειφθῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν πεντήκοντα ἑκατόν’, εἰ δὲ ἀπολογῇ, λέγε ‘ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔφησε καταλειφθῆναι πεντήκοντα’. καὶ πάλιν παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦτο ‘ἆρ' οἶδας τὰς ἐν Πειραιεῖ νῆας;’ ‘οὔ.’ τοῦτο τὸ πρόβλημα. ‘τί δέ; οἶδας, τί ἐστι τριήρης;’ ‘ναί.’ ‘οἶδας δὲ τὸν Πειραιᾶ;’ ’ναί.’ εἶτα συντίθησιν· ‘οἶδας ἄρα τὰς ἐν Πειραιεῖ νῆας.’ ἡ λύσις· οὐ γάρ, εἰ ἕκαστον οἶδα διῃρημένως, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ὁμοῦ συντιθέναι καὶ γινώσκειν ταῦτα. καὶ πάλιν ‘ἆρ' οἶδας τόδε τὸ ἔπος τὸ “μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά”;’ ‘οὔ.’ ‘τί δέ; οὐ γινώσκεις τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷον τὸ μ, τὸ η, τὸ ν, τὸ ι, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται τόδε τὸ ἔπος;’ ‘ναί.’ ‘οἶδας ἄρα τὸ ἔπος τὸ “μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά”.’ οὐ γάρ, εἰ τὰ στοιχεῖα (τὰ κδʹ δηλονότι γράμματα) γινώσκω, ἐξ ὧν πᾶς λόγος καὶ πᾶν ἔπος σύγκειται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πάντα τὰ ἔπη καὶ πάντα τὰ βιβλία γινώσκειν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἔπος ταὐτόν ἐστι τοῖς στοιχείοις, ὡς σὺ φῄς, κἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν σύγκειται. 47 Which agrees with Schiaparelli's (2003), 126 reading of the example. 48 For the problems of this reading s. Schiaparelli (2003), 126 n. 32.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 101

However, this is not the way the commentator uses the example, but instead, he reads only the two divided versions of the phrase, and recommends using each of them in whatever way is more advantageous for one’s purposes. First, I should note again that both versions can be read, as said before, as examples of both combination and division. This reading can partly justify the commentator’s use of the example in the rhetorical context, where the fallacy is meant to work both ways. Second, one of the versions of the phrase is evidently senseless, namely to say that “Achilles left a hundred of the fifty men”. This version, according to the commentator, comes about when one divides the “hundred” from the rest of the phrase (“Achilles left fifty men”), and can be used in a court when one wants to accuse the opponent of saying something incomprehensible. The other version, namely the combination of the “hundred men” and the division of the “fifty” (“Achilles left the hundred men fifty”), is the solution to the first one and can be used as a defense against the before-mentioned accusation. Therefore, whether the example is here brought as an illustration of both division and combination fallacies, or whether it is an example of division that is solved through the correct combination, the commentator in any case seems to believe that the fallacy rests on the false connection of the words of a phrase that leads subsequently to an ambiguous meaning, and therefore is language-dependent. As we shall see, this is not the case in his interpretation of the examples provided by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. The commentator interprets the first two examples used in the Rhetoric through a series of questions and answers. The first example, which is said to have Euthydemus as its origin49, is interpreted by many contemporary scholars as illustrating a linguistic fallacy and in reference to the account of the Sophistical Refutations. In particular, Cope and Grimaldi50 read the passage as reconstructed by Schrader, whose reading is the following: “You are now in Piraeus. You know that there are triremes. Therefore, you know that there are triremes in Piraeus”. Such a reconstruction, I think, aims at reconciling the example of the Rhetoric with the fallacy of the Sophistical Refutations, by presenting the fallacy in the example as resting on the ambiguous position of the phrase “in Piraeus”, which can be combined either with “you know in Piraeus” (namely you know while being in Piraeus) or with “the triremes in Piraeus” (namely you know the triremes which are in Piraeus). In this case, the fallacy rests on the possibility of various groupings of the words in the phrase, and is, therefore, a linguistic fallacy51. In order to support this interpretation of the || 49 There is no such argument in Plato's Euthydemus. 50 Cope (1877), 307; Grimaldi (1988), 342. 51 S. Cope (1877), 308 about Victorius' effort to combine what is said in the Rhetoric with the example of the Soph. el., and about the difficulties of such combination. Hasper (2009), 123-124 finds in the example of the Rhetoric the confirmation for his interpretation of the example's function in the Soph. el. s. also Rapp (2013a), 143 about the differences in the treatment of this example in the two treatises.

102 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

example, scholars usually turn towards the use of a similar example in the Sophistical Refutations: “Being in Sicily do you know now that there are triremes in Piraeus?52”. In this example, the fallacy of combination seems to come about by the conjunction of the phrases “existence/knowledge in Piraeus” and “knowledge of triremes in Sicily”. Michael of Ephesus offers an interpretation of it in his commentary on Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations: [T.13] This question asked Euthydemus, who happened to be in Piraeus, when the Athenian triremes came to Sicily. This is the construction of the sophism: “So are you now in Piraeus?” “Yes.” “So, do you know that there are triremes in Sicily?” “Yes.” “So, do you know now being in Sicily that there are triremes in Piraeus?”. The sophism is due to combination; for it is not necessary, if I am now in Piraeus and if I know that there are triremes in Sicily, to be now in Sicily, while being in Piraeus, and for the triremes in Sicily to be in Piraeus. For Euthydemus conjoint these, namely he, who is in Piraeus, to be now himself in Sicily, and the triremes, which are in Sicily, to be now themselves in Piraeus. (CAG II.3 145, 35-146, 8)

Michael’s interpretation of the example is based upon the ambiguity in the position, on the one hand, of the adverb “now”, and on the other hand, of the prepositional phrases of place “in Piraeus” and “in Sicily”. The statement, which is literally rendered, “so do you know now in Piraeus there are triremes being in Sicily?”, given that the adverb “now” is not combined with the “you know”, but with the participles “ὤν” and “οὔσας”, could fallaciously be taken to mean that someone is simultaneously (νῦν) in Piraeus and in Sicily (if both of the prepositional phrases are combined with σύ νῦν ... ὤν), or that the triremes are simultaneously in both places (if the prepositional phrases are thought as combined with νῦν οὔσας ... τριήρεις). The example, therefore, is interpreted by Michael as illustrating the fallacy of combination in a more complex way than the other examples, since there are two points that cause the fallacy: both the combination of the temporal adverb with the participles, and the combination of the participles with the local prepositional phrases. It is evident, then, that in this example we come across a linguistic fallacy (and it is interpreted as such by Michael of Ephesus). However, the Anonymous commentator of the Rhetoric offers a different interpretation of the rhetorical example, and states explicitly that the fallacy rests on the combination of two distinct things, namely Piraeus and triremes, which are known separately but are said to be known together, namely “the triremes in Piraeus”53. In other words, the fallacy comes about when the knowledge of two separate things is presented as being knowledge of their combination54: “You know what a trireme is;

|| 52 Soph. el. 20 177b12-13: καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος “ἆρ' οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὔσας ἐν Πειραιεῖ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὤν;” 53 Cf. De Inter. 20b35-37: ἀλλ' οὐχί, εἰ σκυτεὺς καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ σκυτεὺς ἀγαθός. εἰ γάρ, ὅτι ἑκάτερον, καὶ τὸ συνάμφω, πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ἔσται. 54 This is also Rapp's (2013a), 142-143 reading of the example.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 103

you know what Piraeus is; hence, you know there are triremes in Piraeus”. The difference of this interpretation is that the fallacy of combination can be counted as a non-linguistic one, since it does not rest on different combination of the words within a phrase55. However, the verbal affinity in their interpretation of the example in the two commentaries immediately draws one’s attention. In both texts, the function of the example is presented through a series of questions and answers, with the interrogator asking whether the elements that constitute the statement are known by the respondent, and then combining them into one statement and assuming that the combined statement is also known. Furthermore, the solution of the fallacy offered in both texts is identical: “it is not necessary, if two things are known apart, to know also their combination”. Though this is the only fallacy of the Rhetoric thus interpreted by the Anonymous commentator, this kind of examination is often used in Michael's commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, as well as in the paraphrase of the latter treatise, which is generally thought to be influenced by Michael56. It remains yet unclear why none of the commentaries makes use of the similar example in the other treatise. Why does the Anonymous commentator of the Rhetoric not cite the example used in the Sophistical Refutations, since he has already made use of the latter by citing the Achilles example? The answer might be that they are considered to be examples of different kind, namely examples that aim to illustrate something different. A comparison of the interpretations of the two examples in both commentaries shows that this difference could in fact be the linguistic factor, which was also mentioned before: In the commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, the fallacies of combination and division, whether they are one or two, are definitely linguistic, whereas this linguistic feature is absent from the fallacy of the Rhetoric, which is not at all concerned with various groupings of words, but instead has to do with elements that are known separately but presented as being known in combination. Unlike in the Anonymous commentator, Stephanus, who so far57 seems to aim to point out the connection between the two treatises, makes clear in his commentary

|| 55 And is, therefore, in line with the view that the list of fallacies of the Sophistical Refutations and the distinction between in dictione – extra dictionem is not applicable to the rhetorical fallacies. 56 Given our conclusions in the introduction, we can assume that the interpretation of the fallacy in this way was a common topos for the commentators, either because our Anonymous as well as the Anonymous on the Soph. el. read and made use of Michael’s commentary or because all three had a common source. The suggestion that it is Michael who wrote both the commentary on the Soph. el. and the commentary on the Rhetoric must be rejected for the reasons discussed in the introduction, and because, as we see in this example, the Anonymous on the Soph. el. also interprets the fallacy in the same way. 57 Also in his interpretation of the fallacies of the form of verbal expression and homonymy.

104 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

that he considers the list of language-dependent fallacies of the Sophistical Refutations as applicable in the Rhetoric. [T.14] [Another topos is from] the divided. And this topos is one of the sophisms that depend on the verbal expression. For what he taught in the Sophistical Refutations are these, namely what is homonymy, amphiboly, combination, division, accent, form of verbal expression.58

He does not, however, offer an extended interpretation of all examples, but deals with them selectively. On the first example presented by Aristotle, Stephanus notes only that it illustrates a case of combination and then moves to the discussion of the third example, which I will discuss below. (2nd example) Regarding the second example of the Rhetoric, it seems to have the same function as the first, since the fallacy in both cases rests on the elements that, known separately, appear to be known as combined. In this example, knowledge of a word (or verse, according to the Anonymous commentator) is shown through the knowledge of the elements, namely the letters of which it is composed. As in the previous example, the Anonymous commentator presents his interpretation through a series of questions and answers, and gives the solution of the fallacy by stating that the knowledge of the letters does not necessarily entail the knowledge of all the verses or books, which are constituted by these letters. Stephanus does not deal with this example at all, but one could assume that he would take it to illustrate a fallacy due to combination as well. (3rd example) The third example is the one that seems to have troubled both the modern and ancient commentators the most, since it is not clear whether it is meant to represent a case of combination or division. The statement, “if the double portion is unwholesome, neither can the simple portion be said to be wholesome”, is said to be fallacious, whether it is used as a refuting one, with the form “for it is strange if the two bad constitute one good”, or as a probative one, with the form “for the two bad things are not one good”59. Is this statement fallacious due to combination or due to division? At first glance, it seems to be an example of division, since the fallacy seems to rest on the division of the whole (double dose) and the predication to its parts (each of the single doses) of what is predicated to the whole60. If this is right, then this example would represent the opposite of the previous examples, in which the attributes of the parts (knowledge of each of the elements) was attributed

|| 58 Steph., In Rhet. 304, 18-21: Ἄλλος τὸ διῃρημένον. καὶ οὗτος ὁ τόπος τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐστὶ σοφισμάτων· ἃ γὰρ ἐδίδαξεν ἐν τοῖς Σοφιστικοῖς ἐλέγχοις, ταῦτα, ἅ ἐστιν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως. 59 The statement “ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν” is refuting because it is contradicting the initial statement, while the statement “οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά” has a demonstrative form. 60 S. Rapp (2002), 782.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 105

to the whole (knowledge of the triremes in Piraeus/ of the word). However, the fact that the last example is clearly said to be an example of the division fallacy might be an indication that Aristotle meant to use this example (and the other three) as an illustration of combined things that should be separated. If this is the case, then the fallacy in the statement would rest on the explanation given: “for it would be strange, if two good things constitute one bad thing […] for the two bad things are not one good”, where what is said of the thing’s parts is also said of their combination61. The Αnonymous commentator does not clarify whether this is an example of combination or division. However, he solves the fallacy by providing an additional example, in which a single portion of money is bad, while the double is good (by being fair). [T.15] And again, since the double portion is unwholesome, namely since the two measures of pith are unwholesome, it remains that neither measure of pith is wholesome; for it would be strange to say that the one is bad, if the two are good. But this is a fallacy; for it might happen that the one is bad […], and that these two portions are good; for if it is good to take two coins, when my book is sold (when it is worthy of two coins), then if I take one coin, it is bad. Used in this way, the statement is refuting, namely to say that, if the two portions are good, the one portion will be good as well; for it is strange to say that the one portion is bad, if the two are good. But used in the following way it is probative: if one says that, if the two portions are good, it remains that the one is not bad62.63

The Anonymous commentator paraphrases the Aristotelian text, and adds examples in order to illustrate the fallacy, but without explaining in detail the difference between the refutative and the probative function of the argument. In particular, he gives two examples, each of which presents a case when a single amount and its double have opposite attributes: (1) a double portion of a medicine (pith) is bad, but a single portion might be good; (2) a double portion of money is good (when it is fair), but a single is bad (when it is unfair).

|| 61 S. Cope (1877), 309; Rapp (2013a), 144. 62 In Aristotle's text the probative form of the statement is “for the two bad [things] do not constitute one good” and is meant to demonstrate the original statement “for since two portions of one thing is unwholesome, neither is the one wholesome”. The commentator, however, does not take the former into account. S. also Stephanus' commentary that has the same text. 63 Anon., In Rhet. 149, 26-150, 7: καὶ πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, ἤτοι ἐπεὶ νοσώδη εἰσὶ τὰ δύο ἑξάγια ἡ ἐντεριόνη, λοιπὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἑξάγιον ἡ ἐντεριόνη ἐστὶν ὑγιεινόν· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰπεῖν τὸ ἓν εἶναι κακόν, εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθά. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος· συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ ἓν εἶναι κακόν, […] καὶ ταῦτα τῶν δύο ὄντων ἀγαθῶν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ βιβλίον μου πωλούμενον, εἰ λάβω δύο νομίσματα, ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄξιόν ἐστι δύο νομισμάτων, εἰ δὲ λάβω ἓν νόμισμα, ἐστὶ κακόν. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ λέγειν ὅτι, εἰ τὰ δύο ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, καὶ τὸ ἕν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν· ἄτοπον γάρ ἐστι τὸ λέγειν τὸ ἓν εἶναι κακόν, εἰ τὰ δύο εἰσὶν ἀγαθά· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι ἀγαθόν. οὕτως δέ ἐστιν ἀποδεικτικόν, εἴ τις λέγει ὅτι, εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθά εἰσι, λοιπὸν τὸ ἓν κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν.

106 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

Since Anonymous' interpretation bears many similarities with Stephanus', I will present their common views after discussing Stephanus' comments. In his interpretation of this example, Stephanus is clearer. He says: [T.16] “And since the double portion is unwholesome”. The previous examples were sophisms due to composition, while the current is due to division; for if twenty carats of pith is a harmful medicine for those who take it, then neither the half of these, namely the ten, is harmless and wholesome. For how would it be, since the twenty were taken as harmful? For if the ten of these carats were something wholesome, it remains that the twenty carats cannot be taken as something harmful. But they were; for if the two coins are something good, then necessarily the one of them is also such.64

First, one ought to notice a similarity between the two commentaries: on the one hand, both commentators introduce the pith (ἐντεριώνη65), namely the inmost part of a plant, as an example of medicine. On the other hand, they both make use of the coin example, although the Anonymous presents in a more detailed way. These similarities could be a sign of a common source of the two commentaries or of a possible influence of one over the other66. Second, when focusing on Stephanus’ interpretation, we see that he states his view of the function of this example explicitly. It is one that illustrates a case of division, namely, where the attribute of the whole (i.e. harmfulness) is predicated of its parts. Stephanus comments further: [T.17] “For it is strange, if two good things constitute one bad”. This statement troubled a lot our teachers and interpreters; but now I will make it, I believe, clear. But first, it is worth it to establish in advance the thought of the previous sophism, i.e. of the “And since the double portion is unwholesome, neither single portion can be said to be wholesome”. For the latter can be conversed [to the former]: there an argument was given that the half of the two unwholesome portions is necessarily also such, while here an argument is given that the half of two good things is necessarily also such, namely good; for if the two portions are good, then each one of them is good as well; for [if the one was something bad] it remains that the two have not been taken as good. But they have. One then must combine [the statements] in the following way: “for it is strange and ought not to be guessed and held by any that the one portion is bad, if the || 64 Steph., In Rhet. 304, 22-28: Καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες. τὰ μὲν εἰρημένα παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἦσαν σοφίσματα, τὸ παρὸν δὲ παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ εἴκοσι κεράτια τῆς ἐντεριόνης βλαβερὸν φάρμακον τῷ προσιεμένῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥμισυ τούτων ἤγουν τὰ δέκα ἀβλαβὲς καὶ ὑγιεινόν· πῶς γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὰ εἴκοσιν ἐδόθησαν βλαβερά; εἰ γὰρ τὰ δέκα τούτων ὑγιεινόν, λοιπὸν οὐχὶ τὰ εἴκοσιν ἐδόθησαν βλαβερόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐδόθησαν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ δύο νομίσματα καλόν τι, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ ἓν τούτων τοιοῦτον. 65 Moreover, in both texts the word is misspelled (ἐντεριόνη instead of ἐντεριώνη). This might be an indication of common source (maybe use of the same manuscript) or of the one taking into account/imitating the other. 66 See the first chapter above (Introduction) on the relation between the two commentaries, where I have argued that Stephanus’ commentary should be dated later than Anonymous’, and that Stephanus must have read the Anonymous one.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 107

two are good”. He had actually a slight stop in the word “two”, another in the “good”, another in the “one” and another in the “bad”67, which is the last to be combined with the “for it is strange”. In fact, he, the marvellous, imitated, as it seems, this sophism that is due to division with these many disjunctive formulations that are called slight stops.68

In this passage, Stephanus focuses on the meaning of the statement “ἄτοπον γάρ, εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν”. According to his interpretation, this statement can be analysed as a case of division in two ways. First, semantically speaking, it is described in connection to the previous statement (they are said to be conversed or correlated) as both being subject to the fallacy of division by having the same attribute (unwholesomeness and goodness respectively) predicated to the parts that constituted the whole, of which the attribute was originally predicated. Second, there is an underlying case of division in the words of the statement, which should be read as separate from one another as indicated by the use of a mark (ὑποδιαστολή), which aims at dividing the words from one another69. Therefore, the fallacy of division is brought about in this statement not only in its meaning but also in its formulation. The reason why the commentator mentions the second type of division, i.e. the verbal division, is unclear. It could be, however, that he tries to find points in the example that can prove the fallacy to be a linguistic one, namely one that depends on the verbal expression. We learn more about his views on the fallacy from his discussion of its solution, which again is closely related to the Sophistical Refutations (Soph. el. 20): [T.18] The statement “triremes in Piraeus” is a sophism due to combination, and its solution is due to division. The same also holds true for the statement “one who knows the elements, knows the word”. The statement “since the double portion is unwholesome” and the rest are

|| 67 I.e. in the phrase: “if two good constitute one bad”. 68 Steph., In Rhet. 304, 29-305, 13: Ἄτοπον γάρ, εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστι. τοῦτο πολλὰ πράγματα παρέσχε τοῖς διδασκάλοις ἡμῶν καὶ ἐξηγηταῖς· ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς ἔνι τὸ παρόν, ὡς οἶμαι, σαφηνίζω. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον ἄξιον προκαταστῆσαι τὸ νόημα τοῦ προτέρου σοφίσματος τοῦ καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι. ἀντίστροφόν ἐστι τόδε· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δύο ἐδόθη ὁ λόγος βλαβερῶν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος τοιούτου, ὧδε δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ δύο ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος τούτων τοιούτου ἤγουν ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ γὰρ τὰ δύο ἀγαθά, καὶ τὸ ἓν τούτων ἀγαθόν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ δύο λοιπὸν ἀγαθὰ δέδονται· ἀλλὰ μὴν δέδονται. συντακτέον οὖν οὕτως ‘ἄτοπον γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀτόπαστον καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑποληπτὸν τὸ ἓν κακόν, εἰ τὰ δύο εἰσὶν ἀγαθά’. ὑποδιαστολὴν οὖν τίθει εἰς τὸ δύο καὶ ἑτέραν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθά καὶ ἑτέραν εἰς τὸ ἕν καὶ ἑτέραν εἰς τὸ κακόν, τοῦ ἐσχάτου δηλαδὴ τοῦ ἔστι τῷ ‘ἄτοπον γάρ’ συνταττομένου. ἐμιμήσατο οὖν ὡς ἔοικεν ὁ δαιμόνιος τὸ παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦτο σόφισμα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς τούτοις διαιρετικοῖς σχήμασι ταῖς λεγομέναις ὑποδιαστολαῖς. 69 For the use of ὑποδιαστολή s. the work of various contemporary with the commentator grammarians: Commentaria In Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, Scholia Marciana, 297, 7-8: Διαφέρει κατὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὑποδιαστολὴ διαιρεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡνῶσθαι, ἡ δὲ ὑφὲν συνάπτει τὰ δοκοῦντα διῃρῆσθαι. Ps. Zonaras, Lexicon, 1674, 4: διαφέρει δὲ στιγμὴ τῆς ὑποδιαστολῆς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν στιγμὴ μόνην τὴν φωνὴν διΐστησιν, ἡ δὲ ὑποδιαστολὴ ἅμα τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

108 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24 sophisms due to division, so it remains that the solution is due to combination; for if the twenty carats of a medicine are sickness-causing, the half of these, namely the ten carats, are wholesome; but the twenty were taken as sickness-causing; therefore, the ten are not wholesome. You see how the person who says these, creates the sophism by dividing the twenty into ten and ten, and takes the first ten of the twenty to be wholesome and the other harmful; which is strange, as he says; for the twenty carats were taken as unhealthy. But one should not divide, as he did, the twenty, but the twenty should remain as one undivided part, and then one should take another ten carats of wholesome, so that together the harmful and the wholesome carats will be counted as thirty; and you make everything twenty, but you should not do this. So, let the combination of twenty carats remain whole and undivided, and let the half of these be another ten and not the ten that are part of the twenty. For the twenty should remain whole, as said. This is how it should be proved.70

Just as the combination fallacy is resolved through division, the fallacy of division is resolved through a combination of the divided terms. In this example, the fallacy rests, according to Stephanus' interpretation, on the ambiguity of the statement, which refers to the half of one particular quantity either as being part of one and the same thing or as being simply a measure of something else. In other words, if twenty doses of a medicine are harmful, then half of these, that is, ten doses, of this particular medicine will also be harmful. But another ten doses, of a different medicine, can be healthy. The fallacy comes about due to the assumption that both the statement about the whole and the statement about the part refer to one and the same thing, while they actually refer to equal quantities of two distinct medicines that have an opposite effect. However, if one combines the two halves, which constitute the two parts of the original medicine, then one will immediately see that they have the same quality, unlike the portion of the second medicine which is of the opposite quality. Again, it is interesting that Stephanus interprets the text in such a way that the fallacy rests on the ambiguous meaning of a phrase. It is not the thing itself that causes the confusion, but the language. The thing itself, either as a whole or all the parts of it separately, has indeed one and the same quality. It is the language that

|| 70 Steph., In Rhet. 305, 14-29: Τὸ δὲ ‘τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεῖ’ σόφισμα παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσίν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ λύσις τούτου παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν γίνεται. ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ‘τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν ὁ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα.’ τὸ δὲ ‘ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες’ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν μὲν ὡς σόφισμα, ἡ δὲ λύσις τούτου λοιπὸν παρὰ σύνθεσιν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ εἴκοσι κεράτια τὸ φάρμακον νοσοποιόν, τὸ ἥμισυ τούτων ἤγουν τὰ δέκα ὑγιεινόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ εἴκοσιν ἐδόθησαν νοσοποιόν· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ δέκα ὑγιεινόν. ὁρᾷς, πῶς ὁ ταῦτα λέγων σοφίζεται διαιρῶν τὰ εἴκοσιν εἰς δέκα καὶ δέκα καὶ τὴν μὲν μίαν δεκάδα τῆς εἰκοσάδος ἀγαθὸν τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν βλαβερὸν θέμενος· ὃ ἄτοπον, ὥς φησι· τὰ γὰρ εἴκοσι νοσερὸν ἐδόθησαν. ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ διαιρεῖν, ὦ οὗτος, τὰ εἴκοσιν, ἀλλὰ μενέτωσαν τὰ εἴκοσιν ἀδιαίρετα ὡς μέρος ἕν, εἶτα τίθει ἕτερα δέκα κεράτια ὑγιεινόν, ὡς ὁμοῦ τά τε βλαβερὰ τά τε ὑγιεινὰ τριάκοντα ἀριθμεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ εἴκοσι τὰ πάντα ποιεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο. ἔστω οὖν ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν εἴκοσι σώα καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, τεθείσθω δὲ καὶ ἥμισυ τούτων ἕτερα δέκα καὶ μὴ ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς δεκάς· ἡ γὰρ εἰκοσὰς σώα τηρείσθω, ὡς εἶπον· ὧδε δὲ δεικτέον.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 109

creates the ambiguity by referring to two distinct things with one word. However, Stephanus’ reading invites us to be aware that this fallacy should not be confused with the fallacies of homonymy or amphiboly, since in our present case the fallacy is brought about due to the combination of the statement “one is bad” with what preceded it, namely the statement “two are good”. The same thought is repeated when Stephanus interprets lines 1401a32-33 of the Rhetoric, in which he reads the same text as the Anonymous commentator: “for the two good [things] do not constitute one bad”, and not the text that has come down to us “for the one good thing is not two bad things”. [T.19] This statement troubled the interpreters as well; but I believe that this will also be correctly interpreted in this way: “the two good things”, he says, “do not constitute one bad”; this sophism is, as we said, due to division. And if it had the hypothetical conjunction “if” in order to be “the one is not bad, if the two are good”, then the statement would not cause any disturbance. For if the double is good, the half of it, namely the one of the two, is not bad either; for the two are taken as good; and we solved this above. This was the sophism from combination that remained sophism due to division. But now, since it does not have the conjunction, the statement has a difficulty; for the two good things are not bad. What I mean is that the two good things, when divided into one and one, are not at any rate one bad thing […]; for one should not divide the two goods into one good and one bad, which, though not mentioned, is clear to the one who pays attention.71

Unlike the Anonymous commentator, Stephanus tries to understand the difference between the two similar statements that Aristotle says are the refuting and the demonstrating forms of the same thought. His trouble (or the confusion of his predecessors) stems from the absence of the hypothetical conjunction in the statement. This absence changes, in his view, the meaning of the statement: In the phrase “if the two are good, then neither one is bad”, the discussion focuses on the attribution of the opposite properties “good” and “bad” to one thing as a whole and to its parts. On the other hand, the absence of the conjunction turns the focus of the statement to the “good” and the “bad” themselves and not as attributes of something else. As he says, he already dealt with the first case, interpreted it and provided its solution. However, the second case can be solved in the same way: the two parts of the good

|| 71 Steph., In Rhet., 305, 30- 306, 15: καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ῥητὸν ταραχὴν πεποίηκε τοῖς ἐξηγηταῖς· ἀλλ' οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο ὡς οἶμαι κατορθωθήσεται. ‘τὰ δύο’, φησίν, ‘ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν κακόν’· καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ σόφισμα. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν εἶχε τὸν εἴ συναπτικὸν σύνδεσμον, οὐκ εἶχεν ὄχλησιν τὸ ῥητόν, ἵνα ᾖ οὕτω ‘οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν κακόν, εἰ δύο ἀγαθά’· εἰ γὰρ τὸ διπλάσιον ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἄρα κακὸν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἥμισυ ἤγουν τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο· τὰ γὰρ δύο δέδοται ἀγαθά· καὶ ἐπελυσάμεθα ἀνώτερον. ἰδοὺ τὸ σόφισμα διὰ τῆς συνθέσεως σόφισμα μένον ἀπὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως. νῦν δέ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχει τὸν σύνδεσμον, δυσκολίαν φέρει τὸ ῥητόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κακὸν δύο ἀγαθά. φημὶ οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ διαιρούμενα πάντως εἰς ἓν καὶ ἓν ἓν κακόν [...]· οὐ δεῖ γὰρ τὴν δυάδα τὸ ἀγαθὸν διαιρῆσαι εἰς ἓν κακὸν καὶ εἰς ἓν ἀγαθόν, ὅ, εἰ καὶ σεσιώπηται, ἀλλ' οὖν τῷ προσέχοντι εἴρηται.

110 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

are both good, while any other option (i.e. to say that one of them or both are bad) is false. (4th example) The fourth example given by Aristotle is traditionally interpreted as being an example of combination72. Thrasybulus is said by Polycrates to have overthrown the thirty tyrants, namely the tyranny that is composed by thirty individual tyrants. If this is indeed a case of combination, then the example is meant to show in what way the thirty individual tyrants are treated as constituting one tyranny combined 73. However, the Anonymous commentator takes this example as a case, not only of the division fallacy, but also of the fallacy of omission, which Aristotle later treats in detail (1401b35 ff.), but which is also mentioned as an alternative interpretation of the final example (1401b2-3). In his view as presented in passage [T.20.a], the statement is fallacious, because Thrasybulus, although he did overthrow thirty tyrants, did not do so at once, but on different occasions. Therefore, one should not merely combine them and state that Thrasybulus overthrew thirty tyrants, but one should also state when and how he did so. [T.20.a] Polycrates, who was a rhetor, wrote a praise for Thrasybulus, in which he presented Thrasybulus as overthrowing thirty tyrants, by saying that at a particular time he overthrew one tyrant and at another time he overthrew another and then another one; and then he combined these and concluded “so it remains that he overthrew thirty tyrants”. But this is a fallacy; for it is not right to say, if he overthrew thirty tyrants separately, that he overthrew them all together.74 [T.20.b] Additionally, I found another scholium75 regarding the statement “he overthrew thirty tyrants”, such as: he overthrew a tyrant, both a tyrant and a woman; and then he combines and says three: a tyrant and a woman and a daughter; a tyrant and a woman and a daughter and a son.76

|| 72 Cope (1877), 309-310; Grimaldi (1988), 342-343. 73 Rapp (2013a), 144 sees the fallacy as resting mainly on the omission of the definite article that would make clear whether the statement is about the one tyranny or the thirty individual tyrants. However, as he points out, this is not a clear example of combination, but could also be interpreted as one of division. Cf. Quint., Inst. Or. III.6, 26. 74 Anon., In Rhet. 150, 7-13: ὁ Πολυκράτης ῥήτωρ ὢν ἔπαινον ἐποίησεν εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ἐν ᾧ ἐδείκνυεν αὐτὸν τριάκοντα ἀποκτεῖναι τυράννους ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν δεῖνα καιρὸν ἀπέκτεινε τύραννον καὶ κατὰ τὸν δεῖνα ἀπέκτεινεν ἕτερον τύραννον καὶ κατὰ τὸν δεῖνα ἕτερον· εἶτα συντιθεὶς συνεπέρανε ‘καὶ λοιπὸν ἄρα τριάκοντα τυράννους ἀπέκτεινε’. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος· οὐ γάρ, ἐὰν ἰδίᾳ τριάκοντα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἤδη ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁμοῦ τούτους ἀπέκτεινε. 75 Cf. the Anonymous' interpretation of the fallacy due to form of verbal expression in the first section of the current chapter. 76 Anon., In Rhet. 150, 24-28: εὗρον δὲ σχόλιον εἰς τὸ κατέλυσε τριάκοντα τυράννους τοιοῦτον· κατέλυσε τύραννον, καὶ τύραννον καὶ γυναῖκα· συντίθησι γοῦν καὶ ποιεῖ τρία· εἶτα τύραννον καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ θυγατέρα, εἶτα τύραννον καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ θυγατέρα καὶ υἱόν.

Fallacy due to combination and division | 111

In the second passage, the commentator cites another interpretation of the example, according to which, as I understand it, the fallacy rests on the combination of the statements “he overthrew tyrants” and “he overthrew thirty [persons]”. In this interpretation, the example seems very similar to the first two examples of the Aristotelian text, which were interpreted as illustrating the combination of two different statements that should be treated separately. Again, in none of the above-cited passages do we find any indication that the Anonymous commentator considers the fallacy as language-dependent. Stephanus' interpretation is similar to the Anonymous', but it seems to be once again related to the treatment of the fallacy in the Sophistical Refutations: [T.21] Again, [the statement] of Polycrates to Thrasybulus, that he overthrew thirty tyrants, is the same as if one says that the shoulder lifted up a hundred medimnus; but it did not do so simultaneously, but divided in four or three.77

According to this interpretation, Polycrates ascribed to Thrasybulus the ousting of thirty tyrants, but in fact he did not overthrow them at once, but only separately. The shoulder example that is brought by Stephanus is similar to one used by Aristotle in the Sophistici elenchi: “τὸ ἓν μόνον δυνάμενον φέρειν πολλὰ δύνασθαι φέρειν” (166a31-32), a fallacious statement that rests on the ambiguous position of “μόνον” which can either mean “only being able to carry one thing is to be able to carry many things”, or “being able to carry one thing alone is to be able to carry one thing”78. Stephanus' use of the example seems to be closer to the second reading, since what he says is that one shoulder can carry the medimni in groups of three or four, and eventually it can carry also a hundred. (5th example) The fifth and last example is said to be a fallacy from division (ἐκ διαιρέσεως). However, at first glance it is easier to read it as an example of the combination fallacy, where what is predicated of the parts is also predicated of the whole. In the example, two separate statements are said to be just: it is just for a woman who killed her husband to die and for a son to avenge his father. However, when these statements are combined they may no longer be just: in fact, it is not just for Orestes, in order to avenge Agamemnon, to kill Clytemnestra who killed her husband, because it is not just for a son to kill his mother. Therefore, the fallacy in this example seems to rest on the combination of two statements that should be treated separately. In this reading, this example also seems similar to the first two Aristotelian examples, since here again the attribute of the elements of a statement

|| 77 Steph., In Rhet. 306, 37-307, 2: Πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσεν, ὅμοιον εἴ τις εἴπῃ, ὅτι ὁ ὦμος ἑκατὸν μεδίμνους ἐβάστασεν· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα, ἀλλὰ διῃρημένως ἀνὰ τέσσαρας ἢ ἀνὰ τρεῖς. 78 For the analysis of this example s. Schiaparelli (2003); Schreiber (2003), 67; Hasper (2009).

112 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

(justice) is falsely predicated to the whole statement79. Furthermore, the example is also said to be interpreted due to omission, since the fallacy is brought about because of the omission of the relevant details. The Anonymous commentator also interprets the passage in this way, namely by referring to it as a fallacy due to division, but also by pointing out that the fallacy comes about due to the combination of two statements that should be treated separately: [T.22] And again, from division “it is just, if one woman killed her husband, to die”, namely Clytemnestra, and again, “it is just for the son, like Orestes, to avenge and help the father”. And these were done; for both Clytemnestra killed her husband and Orestes killed her, helping his father. For when each of these is said separately, it is just; it is namely just for the one who killed her husband to die, and again it is just for the son to help his father. But it is not just to combine these and say that it just to kill the woman who killed her husband, and for her son to avenge his father. For it is not just for the mother to be killed by the son. This fallacy would also be due to omission; for what is not just is, by whom the mother is assumed to be killed.80

According to the commentator, the example is fallacious because the two statements appear just when they are divided, but they are no longer just, when one considers them combined: it is just for a woman to die, if she has killed her husband, and for a son to avenge his father. But as combined, they are no longer just, namely for a mother to be killed by her son.

3.4 Fallacy due to exaggeration [T.23] Another topos is either to establish or to demolish a statement through exaggeration; this happens when, without having proven that something is done , one amplifies the claim; for when the defendant amplifies it, he produces the appearance that something has not been done, or, when the prosecutor does it, he produces the appearance, that it has

|| 79 In this reading, the example illustrates combination and not division. For a reading of this example as a fallacy depending on division s. Rapp (2013a), 144-145: “In this example, combination means that two independent rules apply to one and the same case. This constellation may cause a fallacy if we treat the combined case (Orestes' assassinating his mother) as if it were divided (just for a woman to die, just for a son to take revenge)”. Cf. Cope (1877), 310. 80 Anon., In Rhet. 150, 14-24: καὶ πάλιν ἐκ διαιρέσεως ‘δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴ τις γυνὴ ἀπέκτεινε τὸν πόσιν, ἀποκτείνειν αὐτήν’ ἤγουν τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν, καὶ πάλιν δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν υἱόν, ὡς τὸν Ὀρέστην, τιμωρεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν τῷ πατρί. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπράχθησαν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ Κλυταιμνήστρα τὸν ἄνδρα αὑτῆς ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ὁ Ὀρέστης βοηθῶν τῷ πατρὶ τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀπέκτεινεν. ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἰδίᾳ λεγόμενόν ἐστι δίκαιον· δίκαιον μὲν γάρ ἐστι θνῄσκειν καὶ τὴν ἀποκτείνουσαν τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα, καὶ πάλιν δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν υἱὸν βοηθεῖν τῷ πατρί· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ δίκαιον συντιθέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι κτεῖναι τὴν ἀποκτείνουσαν τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τιμωρεῖν τῷ πατρί· οὐ γὰρ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὴν μητέρα κτείνεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, παρὰ τίνος κεῖται κτείνεσθαι τὴν μητέρα.

Fallacy due to exaggeration | 113

been done. Therefore, it is not an enthymeme; for the hearer forms the fallacious inference that something has been done or not been done, while actually nothing was proven.81

The fourth topos of apparent enthymemes is that of the exaggeration or amplification of a claim (δείνωσις82), and is mostly suitable for rhetorical use (more specifically, in the forensic speeches), as implied by the application of the topos to one's defense or accusation83. Therefore, no equivalent fallacy is found in the treatment of the fallacies in the dialectical treatises. The fallacy, as presented in the Rhetoric, relies on the false assumption that something has been proven, which is based upon the exaggeration or amplification used by the speaker84. Stephanus does not deal with this passage at all. Given that he has so far tried to draw a connection between the Rhetoric and the treatment of fallacies in dialectics, it seems legitimate to think that the reason for this is that this fallacy has no application in dialectics and logic. The Anonymous commentator interprets it through an example: [T.24] Another topos is to establish a statement through exaggeration; to establish through exaggeration is this: when the prosecutor, without proving that one committed the murder, namely before he proved that one assassinated, he amplified the thing as if it was great 'it is terrible what he did'; for it seems that he would not proceed to the amplification of the thing, if he had not proven by common consent that one assassinated. But when the thing is amplified by the one who is charged, namely the accused and defendant, by stating that either the prosecution or the assassination are dishonest and terrible, then it seems that it has been proven in advance that he did not commit the murder. The same happens also if the prosecutor is irritated and amplifies the thing, by stating that the assassination is terrible, it seems again that he has proven it in advance that the charged has committed the murder, and this without having actually proven the case. For the hearer infers fallaciously and is deceived and believes that the prosecutor has proven that the charged has committed the murder by hearing him proceeding to the amplification of the thing; but the amplifications come after demonstrations.85

|| 81 Rhet. II.24 1401b3-9: ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν μηδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ. οὔκουν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ δεδειγμένου. 82 Cf. Rhet. II.21 1395a8-10: καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἁρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ἀποδείξαντα. 83 S. Cope (1877), 311 about the use of this topos in all three types of rhetorical speech. 84 S. Rapp (2013a), 146 on the relation between the fourth and the first topos. “Up to a point, then, this topos displays a certain family resemblance with topos #1 – however, while topos #1 misled the hearer in thinking that the delivered propositions form a conclusion, topos #4 suggests that another conclusion has previously taken place”. 85 Anon., In Rhet. 150, 28-151, 8: ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ ἐν δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν· τὸ δὲ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν μὴ δείξας, ὅτι ἐποίησεν ὅδε τὸν φόνον, ἤτοι ὅταν πρὸ τοῦ δεῖξαι, ὅτι ὅδε ἐφόνευσεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡς μέγα, ‘δεινὸν τὸ παρὰ τοῦδε πραχθέν’· δοκεῖ γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως πρὸς αὔξησιν ἐχώρησε τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ μὴ ἔδειξεν ὁμολογουμένως τόνδε

114 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

In this passage, the Anonymous commentator interprets the fallacy from exaggeration by bringing an example of assassination, and by also taking into account what is said about the amplification later in the Rhetoric, namely that it should be used only in the conclusion of the speech, after the demonstration86. Hence, the fallacy is brought about in this case, according to the commentator, when one amplifies a statement without having proven it in advance. If this is done, then the audience infers fallaciously that the statement has been proven.

3.5 Fallacy due to sign A complete exposition of Aristotle's theory of inference from signs is not found expressed in any treatise of the corpus, but only exists dispersed in various passages. On the one hand, he repeatedly makes use of sign arguments in his treatment of any subject matter87, while, on the other hand, he expresses aspects of this theory in the Rhetoric as well as in the Prior Analytics. In both treatises, the sign is presented as one of the two elements of enthymemes (together with probabilities, εἰκότα88), and is defined as a “demonstrative, necessary or generally acceptable premise, which assures the existence of something else by its own existence”89. In the lines that follow this definition in the Prior Analytics, Aristotle describes the use of signs in each of the three syllogistic figures, and provides examples of each. More specifically, the sign, which is identified with the middle term of the syllogisms, can be said in three ways, namely in as many ways as the middle term is said in the three figures. Only the sign arguments of the first figure are valid and irrefutable when true, whereas the arguments of the other two figures are said to be refutable. || φονεύσαντα· ὅταν γὰρ ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων ἤτοι ὁ κατηγορούμενος καὶ ἀπολογούμενος αὔξῃ, ὡς δεινὸν ἢ ἡ συκοφαντία ἢ ὁ φόνος, δοκεῖ προαποδεῖξαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησε φόνον. ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν καὶ ὁ κατηγορῶν, ἐὰν ὀργίζηται καὶ αὔξῃ, ὡς δεινὸν ὁ φόνος, δοκεῖ προαποδεῖξαι, ὅτι πεποίηκεν ὁ φεύγων τὸν φόνον, καὶ ταῦτα μὴ δείξας τοῦτο αὐτό· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροατὴς παραλογίζεται καὶ ἀπατᾶται καὶ οἴεται τὸν κατηγοροῦντα ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἐποίησεν ὁ φεύγων τὸν φόνον, ἐν τῷ ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ χωροῦντος πρὸς αὔξην τοῦ πράγματος· μετὰ γὰρ τὰς ἀποδείξεις αἱ αὐξήσεις. 86 Cf. Rhet. III.19 1419b10-13: Ὁ δ' ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἔκ τε τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστῆσαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. 87 The formula “σημεῖόν δε ...” or “τεκμήριόν δε” is often used in order to introduce the sign arguments that contribute to achieving the desiring conclusion. For their use in the various treatises s. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, vol. 5. 88 Cf. the last fallacy presented in the Rhetoric, namely the fallacy from what is taken simply or in a specific respect. 89 Pr. An. II.27 70a2-10: Ἐνθύμημα δὲ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων, εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ σημεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, [...] σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἢ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος· οὗ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὗ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι.

Fallacy due to sign | 115

In the first book of the Rhetoric we find a similar account of sign arguments90, in which the same distinction is made, albeit without reference to the syllogistic figures, between refutable and non-refutable sign arguments, or in the terminology of the Analytics, valid and non-valid sign arguments. In this account, sign arguments are said to be of two kinds: (a) some of them have with the thing, of which they are signs, a relation that corresponds to the relation of the particular to the universal, while (b) others have with the things, of which they are signs, the reversed relation, namely the one that corresponds to the relation of universal to particulars. Only a sub-group of the first type of sign arguments are said to be non-refutable, namely those which are necessary, and these are named tokens (τεκμήριον). This type of sign arguments was analysed in the previous chapter. The other types of sign arguments are refutable, even if they are true91. These refutable signs are the ones that are relevant to the present chapter. The first type of non-valid sign arguments is illustrated in both treatises by a similar example, which is said to be refutable, even if it is true: Tab. 1: Refutable sign arguments – 3rd syllogistic figure

Prior Analytics 70a16-18

Rhetoric 1357b11-13

Pittacus is good (σπουδαῖος). Pittacus is wise. Therefore, the good are wise.

Socrates is wise and just. Therefore, the wise are just.

In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle explains the reason this argument is refutable. First, one must notice that this example falls under the third syllogistic figure, where the middle term is the subject of the premises. The argument, states Aristotle, cannot be valid, since the syllogism is not universal, but also because it is not relevant to the thing in question. In other words, it does not fulfil the required universal premise of valid syllogisms, since here both premises are particular and, in addition, irrelevant to the conclusion, since the universal statement of the conclusion is not proven by the particular statements of the premises: as Aristotle says, it is not because Pittacus is good that other people are wise92. This view is echoed in the passage of the Rhetoric, in which Aristotle states that the argument is refutable even if it is true, because

|| 90 See passage [T.1] in chapter 2 above. 91 Rhet. I.2 1357b1-25; II.25 1403a1 ff. 92 Pr. An. II.27 70a30-34: ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἐσχάτου λύσιμος, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ συμπέρασμα, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι καθόλου μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸν συλλογισμόν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ Πιττακὸς σπουδαῖος, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκη σοφούς.

116 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

it is non-syllogistic (ἀσυλλόγιστον), namely it does not yield a deduction93. In this kind of sign arguments, the sign is related to that of which it is a sign as particulars are related to universals. In other words, the sign “Socrates is wise and just” is particular compared to the universal statement “all wise are just”. Similarly, the sign arguments of the second figure are also invalid and refutable: Tab. 2: Refutable sign arguments – 2nd syllogistic figure

Prior Analytics 70a20-24

Rhetoric 1357b17-21

Pregnant women are pale. This woman is pale. Therefore, this woman is pregnant.

The feverish breathe rapidly. He breathes rapidly. Therefore, he has a fever.

In this case, both examples are invalid for two reasons: first, due to the major premise that expresses the universality in the wrong term, and second, because two affirmative premises cannot yield an affirmative conclusion. Hence, in order for the syllogism to be valid, we would need to either (1) convert the major premise and state that “All pale women are pale”, in which case we would have a syllogism in the first figure, or (2) make one of the two premises negative, in which case we would have a particular negative conclusion. Therefore, Aristotle concludes in the Prior Analytics that when the terms of the syllogism are as such, no valid syllogism results94. What he means by the “terms being such” becomes more evident through the relevant passage of the Rhetoric, where he states that in this type of sign arguments, the signs are related to that of which they are signs, as the universal is related to the particular. In the examples cited above, the sign (“paleness” and “rapid breath”) is more universal than the thing of which it is a sign, namely pregnancy and fever respectively, since not all pale women are pregnant and not all rapidly breathing people are feverish. This type of sign argument is said to be refutable always and at all events (ἀεὶ καὶ πάντως λύσιμος). Although in this passage of the Rhetoric (I.2) there is no reference to fallacies and the two types of refutable signs are not named as fallacious arguments or seeming enthymemes, the similarities with the treatment of the refutable signs in the chapter dedicated to the apparent enthymemes (II.24) are evident.

|| 93 Allen (2008), 28 ff. argues that non-syllogistic arguments, like the sign arguments (except for the tokens), can still be counted as enthymemes. Cf. Burnyeat (1994), 19-20; Woerner (1990), 352. For criticism of this view s. Rapp (2013a), 147. 94 Pr. An. II.27 70a34-37: ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ μέσου σχήματος ἀεὶ καὶ πάντως λύσιμος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἡ κύουσα ὠχρά, ὠχρὰ δὲ καὶ ἥδε, κύειν ἀνάγκη ταύτην.

Fallacy due to sign | 117

[T.25] Another topos is from the sign; however, this is also non-syllogistic (ἀσυλλόγιστον); for example, if someone says that (1) the lovers benefit the cities; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton demolished the tyrant Hipparchus. Or if someone says that (2) Dionysius is a thief, since he is vicious; but this is actually non-syllogistic, for not every vicious man is a thief, but every thief is a vicious man.95

In this chapter, Aristotle gives two new examples of refutable sign arguments. However, both examples fall under the types described above96. The first example, like the Socrates/Pittacus example cited above, seems to be a case in which the sign is particular compared to the universal claim of the conclusion: Harmodius and Aristogeiton were lovers and benefited the city; therefore, lovers benefit the city. In the Analytics' terms, this third-figure argument is invalid, because, on the one hand, its premises are irrelevant to the conclusion, namely the conclusion does not follow from the premises, and, on the other, both of its premises are particular, whereas the conclusion is universal. The second example has the same form as the sign argument of the second syllogistic figure. In this case, the argument is invalid because the sign (viciousness) is universal in relation to that of which it is a sign (thievery): All thieves are vicious, but not all vicious men are thieves. In order for the form of this syllogism to be valid the major premise would need to be conversed, namely “all vicious men are thieves”. Both examples of sign arguments here are said to be non-syllogistic. Therefore, fallacious sign arguments come about either due to universal conclusions resulting from particular premises (sign in a third-figure syllogism), or due to the false assumption that a predicate and its subject are absolutely convertible (sign in a second-figure syllogism)97. What can be noted here, but will be analysed in the following sections, is that in this latter sense fallacies due to signs come closer to fallacies due to consequence, which is a fallacy Aristotle will deal with later in Rhetoric II.24. The similarity between the two can be explained as follows: the fallacy in this sign argument is based upon the assumption that, since someone has what follows from a certain quality, she should also have this quality itself. For instance, in the example used before, in order to prove that Dionysius is a thief, one uses the consequence of thievery, namely viciousness, and argues that Dionysius is a thief, because he is vicious. This proximity between the fallacies from sign and consequence is mentioned in the Sophisti|| 95 Rhet. II.24 1401b9-14: ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο· οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι “ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον Ἵππαρχον”, ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός. 96 S. Rapp (2013a), 147-148 for an elaborate analysis of the arguments and their relation to the examples of ch. I.2. 97 S. Pr. An. I.3 25a27 ff. about the convertibility of the terms in a syllogism.

118 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

cal Refutations, where, although the fallacies from signs are not enumerated among the seven non-linguistic fallacies, the sign arguments of rhetoric are said to be based on consequences98. Cope notes that the difference between the two is that rhetorical signs can sometimes be necessary, namely they can in some cases state a necessary relation between the sign and the signified, whereas there is no necessary consequence, “no general rule of connection can be established between them (i.e. between the two related terms), from which we might infer (without fallacy) that the one would always, or for the most part, follow the other”99. As will be shown in the next section, the two commentators seem to be puzzled about the relation of these fallacies to each other (as well as the fallacy from accident), and to make no clear distinction between them. As for their interpretation of the examples from sign arguments, the two commentators on the Rhetoric, both in their treatment of the signs in ch. I.2 and in their interpretation of the fallacy due to signs in ch. II.24, take into account both of the treatises in which Aristotle dealt with sign arguments. In their discussion of the former chapter, the interpretation is more elaborate and contains an analysis of ch. II.27 of the Prior Analytics in both commentaries, similar to the one I provided above.

3.5.1 Anonymous’ commentary On the one hand, in his interpretation of the relevant passage from the first book of the Rhetoric (I.2), the Anonymous commentator regards the sign arguments of the first type (i.e. of the third figure) as fallacious on account of the invalid form of the premises (particular premises yield a universal conclusion), but also because of the falsity of the conclusion. The same holds true also for the refutable sign arguments of the second figure, which are said to be fallacious due to the falsity of their major premise, but also due to their invalid form (two affirmative premises, affirmative conclusion100). He argues: [T.26] Of the signs, one is as the particular towards the universal, in the following way: This is an example of the first division of signs and the relation of the particular towards the universal, namely that “The wise are just; for Socrates is wise and just”. This argument is non-syllogistic

|| 98 Soph. el. 5 167 b8-12: ἔν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων εἰσίν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος. πολλοῖς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει. 99 Cope (1877), 311-312. 100 Pr. An. I.5 27a3-28a9. As I stated above, the middle term needs to be affirmative in one premise and negative in the other, i.e. to belong to one and not to belong to the other. When both premises are affirmative or both negative, says Aristotle, we have no syllogism (27b10-12).

Fallacy due to sign | 119

in the third figure, brought about through two particular premises, as he said in the Analytics. But the conclusion is also false; for not every wise man is just. […] The other type of signs is as the universal towards the particular, namely as if one says “The conclusion is that he is feverish; Why? Because he breathes rapidly”, which is the middle term. The major premise is “everyone who breathes rapidly, is ill”; but it is false. The argument “she has given birth; for she is pale; and every pale woman has given birth” is non-syllogistic in the second figure, through two affirmative premises. But this is fallacious.101

In this passage, the Anonymous author of the commentary on the Rhetoric interprets the Aristotelian text on sign arguments by explicitly taking into account the treatment of sign arguments in the Analytics. In particular, the examples of the Rhetoric are interpreted by the commentator with reference to the syllogistic figures of the Prior Analytics, whereas the examples of fallacious sign arguments brought in the latter treatise by Aristotle are cited here by the commentator. Hence, the first type of the fallacious sign arguments (i.e. the ones in which the sign is so related to that of which it is a sign, as the particular is related to the universal) are said to be non-syllogistic in the third figure, namely they do not yield a deduction due to the fact that no universal conclusion follows from two particular premises. In the second type of fallacious sign arguments (in which the sign is more universal in relation to that of which it is a sign), the source of fallacy rests in the major premise, which is wrongly affirmative. As an illustration of this latter case, the commentator cites the example of paleness from the Prior Analytics. Similarly, the commentator also interprets the examples of the chapter dedicated to the topoi of apparent enthymemes (II.24), only in a more compact way. The example of the two lovers who benefited the city is corrupted, probably because of its obvious relation to the Socrates example of Rhet. I.2, while the Dionysius example is explained in the same way as the arguments of the second figure were explained in the above-cited passage. The Anonymous commentator says:

|| 101 Anon., In Rhet. 5, 4-18: ἔστι δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μέν, ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθ' ὅλου, ὧδε. τοῦτο παράδειγμα τῆς πρώτης τομῆς τοῦ σημείου καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθ' ὅλου, ὡς τὸ ‘οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι· Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ὢν δίκαιός ἐστιν’. ἀσυλλόγιστον δέ ἐστιν ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι, ὡς εἶπε καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς, ἐκ δύο μερικῶν συναγόμενον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς σοφὸς δίκαιος. […] τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθ' ὅλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπῃ ‘ὅδε πυρέττει τὸ συμπέρασμα· διὰ τί; ‘διότι πυκνὸν ἀναπνεῖ’ ὁ μέσος ὅρος. ‘πᾶς δὲ ὁ πυκνὸν ἀναπνέων νοσεῖ’ ἡ μείζων πρότασις· ψευδὴς γάρ. εὑρίσκεται δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι ἀσυλλόγιστον ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν καὶ τὸ ‘ἥδε τέτοκεν· ὠχρὰ γάρ· πᾶσα δὲ ὠχρὰ τίκτει’· τοῦτο γὰρ ψεῦδος.

120 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24 [T.27] The enthymeme from sign is also non-syllogistic, because it is deduced in the second figure through two affirmative premises, or in the third figure: Harmodius and Aristogeiton loved each other. The deduction of Dionysius is non-syllogistic because the major premise is false; for not every vicious man is a thief.102

In this passage, the Anonymous commentator remarks briefly on the examples brought by Aristotle as an illustration of the fallacy from sign. His comment is, however, reminiscent of his treatment of signs in the first book of the treatise and his reference to the account of signs in the Analytics. In particular, the fallacious sign arguments are here again said to be of two types, one of which does not yield a conclusion in the second syllogistic figure due to the fact that it has two affirmative premises, whereas the other type is non-syllogistic in the third figure due to the falseness of the major premise. Of the examples, only the one of the third figure is analysed, namely the example of Dionysius, whereas the example of the second figure is mentioned only briefly.

3.5.2 Stephanus’ commentary Aristotle's discussion of the sign arguments in the Prior Analytics is also taken into account by Stephanus. In his commentary on the first book of the Rhetoric, he makes use of the examples given by Aristotle in the former treatise and offers an explanation based on the syllogistic theory as presented there. Interesting in Stephanus' reading is the use of the distinction between the form and matter of the argument103. In this reading, the fallacy in an argument rests either on the matter, that is the content of the premises, or on the form, namely the logical form. This point merits further explanation. First, the distinction between the form and matter of a syllogism seems to take as a starting point Aristotle's argument in the Metaphysics Δ104, where the philosopher states that the premises are the cause of the conclusion in a material sense, namely in a similar way to that in which the matter is the cause of artifacts or the single letters are the cause of syllables. This idea is further developed by later commentators on Aristotle's logical treatises, who seem to take it for granted that syllo|| 102 Anon., In Rhet. 151, 8-13: ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐκ σημείου ἐνθύμημα, διότι ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι ἀπὸ δύο καταφατικῶν συλλογίζεται ἢ ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι. ὁ Ἁρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ἀλλήλων ἤρων. ἀσυλλόγιστον λέγει τὸν συλλογισμὸν τὸν τοῦ Διονυσίου διὰ τὸ ψευδῆ εἶναι τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης. 103 For an extensive discussion of this matter s. Barnes (2012), 43 ff.; Flannery (1995), 109 ff. 104 Cf. Met. Δ.2 1013b17-28: τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῶν σκευαστῶν καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου καὶ αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὡς τὸ ἐξ οὗ αἴτιά ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὰ μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, τό τε ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος.

Fallacy due to sign | 121

gisms contain a logical form as well as logical matter, of which the former refers to the syllogistic figures whereas the latter to the different material that can provide the sources for the premises of the argument. For example, in his commentary on Prior Analytics105, Alexander of Aphrodisias states that the three syllogistic figures are the forms of the syllogism, to which the different sorts of matter can fit, namely the different sorts of terms. Therefore, it could be the case that the same matter might fit into the different forms, i.e. figures, and so different conclusions might come about, being either valid (in the first figure) or invalid (in the second or third figure)106. Therefore, according to this reading of the Aristotelian text, the fallacies come about in the sign arguments either due to the invalid form of the premises, namely two particular premises yielding a universal conclusion or two affirmative premises that do not yield the stated conclusion, or due to the falsity (i.e. false content/matter) of the syllogism. [T.28.a] Of the signs, one is such as the particulars are related to the universal, namely when the universal is shown through the particulars; for example, “every wise person is good, since Pittacus was wise and good”; for Pittacus, being something particular, is a sign that the wise are good. However, this sign is refutable; for this apparent syllogism is non-syllogistic, because it was brought about through two particular premises and, because of that, it is not a syllogism. But the conclusion is also false both in matter and in form; for particular conclusions are brought about in the third figure.107 [T.28.b] The other is such as the universals are related to the particular; namely, when the sign is found to be taken more universally than the signified; for example, if one says “this person is feverish, since she breathes rapidly”. And all the other commentators deduced this in the first figure; but I have deduced this in the second figure, following Aristotle who said at the end of the second book of the Prior Analytics, that only the non-refutable tokens are deduced in the first figure, whereas the other signs of the second and third figure are refutable either as false and mistaken in form or in one of these two ways. Which? It is namely the one that is mistaken only in form, even if it is right in matter.108

|| 105 In Pr. An. 6, 16-21; 52, 19-25; cf. In Top. 2, 9-15. 106 Alex., In Top. 2, 9-14. 107 Steph., In Rhet. 264, 20-28: Τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά τι πρὸς τὸ καθ' ὅλου, ὅτε δηλαδὴ τὸ καθ' ὅλου δεικνύεται ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν· οἷον τὸ ‘πᾶς σοφὸς σπουδαῖος, διότι ὁ Πιττακὸς σοφὸς ὢν ἦν καὶ σπουδαῖος’· τοῦ γὰρ ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ σπουδαῖοι σημεῖόν ἐστιν ὁ Πιττακὸς μερικόν τι ὤν. τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον λυτόν ἐστιν· ἀσυλλόγιστος γὰρ ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὗτος ὁ φαινόμενος, ὅτι ἀπὸ δύο μερικῶν συνήχθη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδὲς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· ἐν γὰρ τῷ τρίτῳ σχήματι μερικὰ συνάγεις. 108 Steph., In Rhet. 265, 13-24: Τὸ δ' ὡς τῶν καθ' ὅλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· ὅταν δηλαδὴ τὸ σημεῖον εὑρίσκηται τὸ τάχα λαμβανόμενον καθολικώτερον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ· οἷον εἴ τις εἴπῃ ‘ὁ παρὼν πυρέττει, πνευστιᾷ γάρ’. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι οὕτως αὐτὸ συνελογίσαντο πάντες ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι πυρέττει πνευστιᾷ οὗτος ἄρα ἐγὼ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι τοῦτο συνελογισάμην ἀκολουθῶν

122 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

In Stephanus' interpretation, the two refutable sign arguments are also explained with reference to the two syllogistic figures of the Prior Analytics. What is added is a further explanation of the fallacy: a syllogism might be fallacious both in matter and in form, or only in one of these two ways. For example, a sign argument of the third figure might have two invalid premises, since they are particular yielding a universal conclusion, and a false conclusion that is irrelevant to the premises. Of these two components of the argument, it seems that the falsity in the form of the syllogism refers to the fact that the premises are particular and hence cannot bring about a universal conclusion, whereas the falsity of the matter of the syllogism is due to the fact that the conclusion is irrelevant to the content of the premises. It is therefore both the form and the content of the argument that bring about the fallacy. On the other hand, a sign argument might be fallacious due only to the form of the argument, even when the matter is true, namely even when the premises are true. In the example used in the Aristotelian text, even if it is true that someone both breathes rapidly and has a fever, the conclusion that everyone who breathes hard is feverish is false, since it is brought about in the second figure by two affirmative premises. Therefore, even when the matter is right, the argument cannot be valid when it is deduced in the second or third syllogistic figure. Such an argument will not be, according to Stephanus, a syllogism at all109. This point seems to have been made earlier also by Alexander, who states that such an argument is non-syllogistic and offers a similar example110. Although it is not clearly stated in the text, one can infer that arguments can also be fallacious due only to the matter of the syllogism, when the form is valid. For example, it could be the case that a syllogism of the first figure, which is nonrefutable, will contain a false premise. In other commentaries, such a case is mentioned. For example, Alexander's commentary on the Topics refers explicitly to such

|| Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τῷ τέλει τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν λέγοντι μόνα τὰ ἄλυτα τεκμήρια ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα σημεῖα ἃ μὲν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, ἃ δὲ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ, ἃ καὶ λύσιμα ἢ ὡς ψευδῆ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἡμαρτημένα ἢ καθ' ἕν τι τούτων. ποῖον; τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἡμαρτῆσθαι δηλαδή, κἂν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἀληθῶς ἔχῃ. 109 Stephanus' point here is similar to Rapp's (2013a), 147 argument, in criticism of those who argued that sign arguments are enthymemes: non-valid sign-arguments are not enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms at all. In fact, the sign arguments of the second and third figure are here called apparent, which justifies their later treatment in chapter II.24. 110 Alex., In Top. 21, 13-19: ἔστι δέ τις ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμὸς καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἡμαρτημένος· οὗτος δὲ οὐκέτι οὐδὲ συλλογισμὸς ἁπλῶς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός. τοιοῦτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ ἐν ἀσυλλογίστῳ συζυγίᾳ ἐρωτώμενοι λόγοι. οἷον εἰ συνάγοι τις ἤτοι τὸ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππος ἐστὶ διὰ τοῦ λαβεῖν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον εἶναι καὶ πάντα ἵππον ζῷον· ἀσυλλόγιστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη συμπλοκὴ καίτοι ἐξ ἀληθῶν οὖσα προτάσεων τῷ εἶναι δύο καταφάσεις ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι.

Fallacy due to sign | 123

a fallacious argument111, which, though deduced in the first syllogistic figure, is fallacious on account of its major premise. It should be also noted that, as we have said in the previous chapter, the presentation of the argument in Stephanus' commentary involves its depiction in a triangle shape (with the angles representing the terms of the syllogism). Specifically, the examples of the Aristotelian text dealing with sign arguments are represented in diagrams, which form the following syllogisms112: (1)

a

b

c

Whoever has milk, has given birth. She has milk. Therefore, she has given birth. Whoever has fever, is sick. He has fever. Therefore, he is sick. Whoever breathes rapidly, has fever. He breathes rapidly. Therefore, he has fever.

Such diagrams are also found later in the commentary on chapter II.24, where Stephanus, without commenting further on the types of fallacies from sign, reduces the examples again to the syllogistic form depicted by the triangle, a formulation in which he includes not only the examples of sign fallacies, but also fallacies due to accident and consequence. In doing so, he evidently again pursues a connection between the treatment of the fallacies in the Rhetoric and the Sophistical Refutations, where, as highlighted above, sign arguments were presented as a sub-group of the fallacy from consequence. The depiction of these examples will be examined in the following sections where I examine the fallacies from consequent and accident and their relation to the fallacy from sign. In any case, it is striking to see that Stephanus not only uses the diagrammatic depiction of syllogisms in both treatments of sign arguments in the Rhetoric (I.2 and II.24), but also that it seems to be a common practice of commentators on Aristotle's logical treatises, and mainly of the scholiasts, namely those who wrote scholia on the margins of manuscripts of the Aristotelian treatises and of the commentaries on them. In a recent paper on this topic, Camille Rambourg113 argues that the presence of such diagrams in Stephanus' commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric indicates the || 111 Alex., In Top. 21, 8-13: ‘πᾶς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνδρείαν ἔχει· ἔστι δὲ ὁ χιτὼν ἀνδρεῖος· ὁ χιτὼν ἄρα ἀνδρείαν ἔχει’· οὗτος γὰρ ἐριστικὸς ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὐ παρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ παρὰ τὸ ληφθῆναι ὡς ἔνδοξον τὸ πάντα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ἀνδρείαν ἔχειν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν συζυγίᾳ συλλογιστικῇ ἐν πρώτῳ οὔσῃ σχήματι ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους τῆς δὲ καθόλου, τῆς μείζονος. 112 Cf. Steph., In Rhet. 264-265. 113 Rambourg (2012), 283 ff.

124 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

commentator's intention to attribute a rather syllogistic character to the treatise, namely to make the account of enthymemes here compatible with the account of syllogisms of the Analytics. More specifically, the diagrammatic representation of the enthymemes seems to be adapted to the use of diagrams of syllogisms and, in particular, of diagrams used for the representation of the theory of syllogistic figures of the Prior Analytics. In fact, this is in line with the interpretation given so far of Stephanus' comments on Aristotle's treatise, and in particular, of the logical aspects of the treatise, where, as already said, Stephanus aims at a reconciliation of the views expressed in the Rhetoric with the views expressed by Aristotle in his logical treatises.

3.6 Fallacy from the consequence The fallacies that occur when one affirms the consequent were already mentioned in the discussion of the sign arguments, since the two fallacies are, according to Aristotle, closely related. In fact, in his treatment of the fallacy from consequence in the Sophistical Refutations, the rhetorical sign arguments are said to be a sub-group of the fallacies from consequence (Soph. el. 5 167b9-11). The latter fallacy occurs when one assumes that since someone has what follows from a certain quality, then they should also have this quality itself, i.e. the features that follow from something are taken as indicating the thing itself. In this sense, it is clear why the fallacy from consequence is related to the sign arguments of the second figure: in both cases one quality is wrongly taken as a sign of another. As we will see below when analysing the examlples from the Rhetoric, the arguments from consequence, like the ones from second-figure sign arguments, are fallacious due to the major premise that is falsely converted. In addition to the statement regarding the close relation of the fallacy from consequence to the fallacy from sign, Aristotle also refers in the Sophistical Refutations to the close relation between consequence and accident. Since I will deal with the fallacy from accident in the next section, I will only refer here to what is relevant for our understanding of the commentators’ interpretation of the fallacy from consequence. According to Aristotle’s description of their relation, both fallacies rest on the application of an accidental feature to something, the difference being that the fallacy from consequence occurs when qualities that happen to belong to one thing are taken as always following each other, whereas the fallacy from accident occurs when a particular accidental feature of a thing is identified with the thing itself. We should note that in this description of the fallacy from consequence that rests on the arbitrary connection of two things that happen to exist in one and the same thing, the argument can be analysed as a third-figure syllogism. In other words, the Sophistical Refutations seem to make a distintion between two types of fallacy from consequence, one of the second and one of the third syllogistic figure.

Fallacy from the consequence | 125

Coming now to the treatment of the fallacy in the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents this fallacy through examples, as he did for most of the fallacies discussed in II.24: [T.29] Another topos is the one from the consequence, as (1) it is said in the Alexander that he was high-souled; for disdaining the company of the many, he spent his time on Mount Ida by himself; and since high-souled people are like this, he might seem to be high-souled as well. And (2) when someone adorns himself and wanders around at night, he is an adulterer, for adulterers behave thus. Similarly, (3) [it is argued] that beggars sing and dance in the temples and that it is possible for exiles to live wherever they want; and since these things accrue to those who seem to be happy, whoever has these might seem to be happy as well. However, the way in which someone has these makes a difference; therefore, this fallacy falls within the case of omission.114

In this passage, Aristotle offers three examples that illustrate the fallacy from consequence, while he also connects the latter with the fallacy of omission (cf. 1401b35 ff.). The examples offered are the following: (2)

a

b

c

High-souled people spend their time by themselves. Alexander spent his time by himself. Therefore, Alexander is high-souled. Happy people sing and dance. Beggars sing and dance. Therefore, beggars are happy. Adulterers adorn themselves and wander around at night. He wanders around at night. Therefore, he is an adulterer.

These arguments are all fallacious or, in Aristotelian terms, non-syllogistic. In particular, the fallacy is brought about due to the fact that one affirms the consequence of a proposition concerning, say, adultery, in order to conclude that one is an adulterer. The problem seems to rest on the major premise, which should have been true when converted in order for the terms to form a valid syllogism, namely it should have been true that everyone who adorns himself or wanders at night is an adulterer, and not only that all adulterers behave thusly. The middle term of the argument (adorning oneself and wandering at night) is, therefore, more universal than the subject of the major premise (adultery). However, as we saw in the previous section,

|| 114 Rhet. II.24 1401b20-29: ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχος· ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ διέτριβεν καθ' αὑτόν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν. Καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει.

126 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

the same could also be said for the second-figure sign arguments, which can be read as illustrating the fallacy from consequence: in the examples used above for these second-figure sign arguments, the feature that follows from thieves, namely that they are vicious, is taken as an indication that Dionysius is a thief, because he is vicious. Similarly, the feature that follows as a consequence of fever, that is, rapid breathing, is taken as indicating fever itself. Reversely, the examples used as illustrating the fallacy from consequence could be easily read as second-figure sign arguments: the fact that Alexander spent his time alone in Mount Ida is used as a sign that he is high-souled. So, it looks like this second type of fallacious sign argument does not differ from the fallacy from consequence. Given what we have examined so far, the questions on which both ancient and contemporary commentators focused, are (a) in what way these examples are connected to each other, (b) what the relation is between this passage from the Rhetoric and the treatment of the same fallacy in the Sophistical Refutations and, finally, (c) what the relation is between the fallacies that are said to be related to one other.

3.6.1 Anonymous’ commentary Regarding the above questions, the Anonymous commentator seems to be also puzzled and to recognise that the fallacies from sign from consequence are closely related, but without making clear whether, in his view, they are actually one and the same fallacy or one falls within the other in such a way that they are not easily distinguishable. The reason for this obscurity rests on the fact that in his discussion of the examples of fallacies from consequent (and accident), the commentator offers only a brief interpretation, without introducing the new topoi, as he did for previous fallacies. Instead, after his discussion of the fallacious sign arguments, he turns to the examples of the fallacies from accident and consequent without stating or implying any difference between these and the examples of the fallacy from sign. Instead, the examples Aristotle provides to illustrate the fallacy from consequence (and of accident, as we will see in the next section) are interpreted in such a way that it is not easy to tell whether they are actually fallacies from sign or consequence115, namely whether he takes the arguments that entail a sign or those that affirm the consequent (or those which entail an accident) to be three different types of fallacies, or actually different aspects of one and the same fallacy. If it is the former, then it is important to examine whether the commentator takes these three

|| 115 Cf. Rapp (2013a), 150-151 for a similar interpretation of the passage.

Fallacy from the consequence | 127

fallacies of the Rhetoric to be closely related to each other in the way described in the Sophistical Refutations116. This is the way the Anonymous commentator reads Aristotle's account of the fallacy from consequence in the Rhetoric II.24: [T.30] For even if the high-souled disdain [the company of others], it is not true that everyone who disdains is high-souled; for often some people avoid the company of others out of sorrow or anger or madness. Nor is it true that everyone who sings and dances is a beggar, even if beggars sing and dance in the feasts; for the rich and the chorus leaders sing and dance as well. Nor is it true, even if the happy are able to live wherever they want, that all those who possess this ability, namely to live wherever they want, are happy; for exiles possess this ability as well. But it makes a difference, because the exiles live wherever they want because they are hindered by their country, namely involuntarily, whereas the happy live wherever they want voluntarily.117

The Anonymous commentator takes all the examples of the passage to be cases of false conversion, namely he interprets them with reference to the non-convertibility of the major premise. As he states, it is true that high-souled people avoid the company of others, but it is not true that everyone who avoids the company of others is high-souled. Similarly, it is true that beggars sing and dance at night, but not that everyone who sings and dances is a beggar. In all of the examples, the arguments fall within the second figure, and are interpreted by the commentator in the same way as the Dionysius example that illustrated the second figure sign arguments. This is something that we need to keep in mind when reading his interpretation of the fallacy from accident, namely that he seems to identify the fallacy from consequence with the second figure sign arguments.

3.6.2 Stephanus’ commentary Stephanus, who does not offer any extended interpretation of the passage, but only a diagram of the examples, could be said to share this perplexity regarding the rela-

|| 116 Namely the fallacy from consequence is a type of the fallacy from the accident, whereas the fallacious sign arguments are a sub-group of the fallacy from consequence. s. discussion on the fallacy from accident below. 117 Anon., In Rhet. 151, 18-28: οὐ γὰρ ἐὰν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι ὑπερορῶσιν, ἤδη καὶ πᾶς ὑπερορῶν εἴη ἂν μεγαλόψυχος· πολλάκις γάρ τινες διὰ λύπην ἢ ὀργὴν ἢ μανίαν φεύγουσι τὴν μετ' ἀνθρώπων διατριβήν. οὐδὲ εἰ οἱ πτωχοὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς, ἤδη καὶ πάντες οἱ ᾄδοντες ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ὀρχούμενοι πτωχοί εἰσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ χορηγοὶ τῆς ἑορτῆς ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται· οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ τοῖς εὐδαίμοσιν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ἤτοι τὸ οἰκεῖν, ἔνθα ἂν ἐθέλωσιν, ἤδη καὶ οἷς ἂν ὑπάρχῃ ταῦτα ἤτοι τὸ οἰκεῖν, ἔνθα θέλουσιν, εἰσὶν εὐδαίμονες· ἔχουσι γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ οἱ φυγάδες. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν φυγάδες οἰκοῦσιν, ἔνθα βούλονται, διὰ τὸ κωλύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἤτοι ἄκοντες, οἱ δὲ εὐδαίμονες οἰκοῦσιν ἑκόντες, ἔνθα βούλονται.

128 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

tion between the fallacy from sign and the one from consequence, since all the examples of the fallacy from consequence are put next to those from sign, represented in exactly the same way, as if they have exactly the same function. However, as will soon become evident, Stephanus interprets the examples in a different way than the Anonymous, namely in connection to the third-figure sign arguments, and not in connection to the second-figure, as the Anonymous. Stephanus' diagram (CAG XXI.2 307-308), which includes eleven examples, respresents the two examples from sign (1), (3), one of the examples from accident (4), five from consequent (2), (5)-(8) (two of which are slightly different from the original ones), and another three, which, in Aristotle's text, are used for the illustration of the secundum quid fallacy. In the following table, one can see the terms depicted in the diagrams: Example Middle Term (1)

Ἁρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρει

ἐρῶντες

(2)

ὁ Πάρις

μεγαλόψυχος

μονότροπος

(3)

Διονύσιος

κλέπτης

πονηρός

(4)

Ἀχιλλεύς

ἐμήνισεν

ὑβρίσθη μὴ κληθείς

(5)

ὅδε

μοιχός

καλλωπιστής

(6)

ὅδε

κλέπτης

νύκτωρ πλανᾶται

(7)

ὅδε

πτωχός

ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ᾄδει

(8)

ὅδε

φυγάς

ᾗ βούλεται οἰκεῖ

Focusing here on the examples from sign and consequence (I will deal with the one on accident in the next section), one immediately sees that Stephanus must have taken them to have a similar function. In particular, a closer examination of his diagram shows that, in each of these examples, Stephanus takes the fallacy to rest on the generalisation of particular cases, that is, drawing universal conclusions from particular premises. Of the examples of sign arguments, the one on Harmodius and Aristogeiton has already been examined above in the section on sign arguments as a clear case of third-figure sign argument, and seems also to be understood by Stephanus in this way. This is not the case for the second example of sign arguments (3), namely the one of Dionysius. In particular, Aristotle’s presentation of the example, and Anonymous’ reading of it, rest upon the thought that an attribute was ascribed to Dionysius (thievery) on the grounds of him having a feature that precedes this attribute (viciousness). In this way, the argument can be read as a second-figure sign argument. However, in Stephanus’ reading, the argument states that thieves are vicious on the grounds that Dionysius is both a thief and vicious, which is a third-figure argument, with Dionysius as a middle term.

Fallacy from the consequence | 129

The examples from the fallacy of consequence are presented in Stephanus’s diagram in a similar way. The examples (4) and (5), which are similar to each other and often used as examples throughout the commentaries by the two commentators, are slightly different from the original example of the Aristotelian text. In the “adulterer” example (5), Aristotle stated that the fallacy from consequence is committed when one concludes that a person is an adulterer by the fact that he adorns himself or wanders around at night. As in the Dionysius example, the fallacy comes about in Aristotle’s text (and in Anonymous’ interpretation of it) due to the false affirmation of what follows as a consequence from a certain statement, namely due to the fact that the two terms of the major premise are not convertible: it is only true that adulterers behave so, but not that everyone who behaves so is an adulterer. Again, Stephanus paraphrases the original examples and states that whoever adorns himself is an adulterer and whoever wanders at night is a thief, since one particular person does both, thus formulating again third-figure syllogisms instead of the second-figure arguments found in Aristotle’s text and in the Anonymous’ commentary. The same holds true for the last two examples of the diagram, which, according to Aristotle, are meant to show that whoever possesses the features that follow from the condition of being happy, that is, the ability to sing, dance and live wherever one wants, is also happy. In other words, the consequence of happiness is taken as showing that one is happy. However, Stephanus, who formulates two separate diagrammatic depictions of the Aristotelian example, prefers a different reading of the example that brings it closer to the previous ones: (3)

a

b

He sings in the temples. He is a beggar. Hence, whoever sings in the temples is a beggar. He lives wherever he wants. He is an exile. Hence, whoever lives wherever he wants is an exile.

Read thus, the examples have exactly the same function as the previous ones. The conclusion comes about because two things that are incidentally the same in one subject are taken as being always the same. Hence, in his reading, the argument, again a third-figure syllogism, states a universal conclusion on the basis of two particular premises. Therefore, in Stephanus’ reading of the examples that illustrate the fallacy from sign and consequence, we see that always two attributes predicated of a particular subject are said to be predicated of each other. In order to formulate third-figure arguments, Stephanus often changed the original text and paraphrased the examples. This makes it even clearer that his interpretation of fallacious arguments from consequence as being arguments of the third syllogistic figure was intentional. One

130 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

wonders what Stephanus’ intention was in reading the examples in this way. Interestingly, this interpretation of the examples seems to be influenced by the treatment of the fallacy from consequence and the description of its relation to the fallacy from accident in the Sophistical Refutations118, where, as I shortly presented above, Aristotle argued that the fallacy from consequence occurs (in one sense) when two things that are the same as one third thing are taken to be the same as one another. This corresponds exactly to Stephanus' representation of the examples of the fallacy from consequence, in which the fallacy rests on the fact that two things that are attributed to one and the same thing are taken as being attributed to one another. This connection of the account of the fallacy in the Rhetoric with the treatment of the fallacy from consequence in the Sophistical Refutations is in line with what we have seen so far regarding Stephanus’ effort to show the Rhetoric is compatible with the accounts of the other treatises of the Organon.

3.7 Fallacy from accident [T.31] Another topos is due to an accident; for example, (1) what Polycrates said regarding the mice, namely that they helped by gnawing through the bow-strings; or (2) if one says that an invitation to dinner is most honorable; for Achilles was angry with the Acheans at Tenedos because he was not invited; but actually, he became angry because he was dishonored, and it was only accidental that this dishonor occurred by not being invited.119

This topos of apparent enthymemes, which is said to rest on an accident, is again illustrated in the Rhetoric by two examples, in both of which the fallacy occurs due to the use of an accidental instead of the real cause, or due to the use of an accidental feature. In the first example, mice are said by Polycrates to be honourable, because they offered a service in the field by gnawing through the bow-strings; however, their service was not intentional, but only accidental, since the real cause of their action was appetite120. In the second example, the accidental reason of Achilles' wrath, namely the lack of an invitation to the dinner, is presented121 as a sign of

|| 118 Soph. el. 6 168b27-33: οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τὸ γὰρ ἑπόμενον συμβέβηκε. Διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς μόνου λαβεῖν, οἷον ταὐτὸ εἶναι ξανθὸν καὶ μέλι, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ κύκνον, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀξιούμεν εἶναι ταὐτὰ. s. The next section for a more detailed presentation of his views on the fallacy from accident. 119 Rhet. II.24 1401b14-19: ἄλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς· ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δ' ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι. 120 Cope (1877), 313. 121 By Sophocles, Sundeipnoi (Pearson, 199)

Fallacy from accident | 131

the honour attributed to dinner invitations. Since in both examples what is called accidental is the cause, Cope, followed by Grimaldi, considered this treatment to be incompatible with the Sophistical Refutations' presentation of the fallacy of accident122, where Aristotle states that the fallacy comes about due to a confusion of the accident with the subject and, more specifically, due to the false predication of the same attribute both to the subject and to its accidental feature123. However, according to Rapp, the two texts can be conciliated, if the first example is meant to attribute both to mice themselves and to their accidental feature of gnawing through the bow-strings the accidental feature of the latter, namely the contribution to the rescue. Similarly, in the second example, the same attribute, i.e. dishonour, is applied both to the insult and to the accidental cause of the insult, namely the lack of invitation124. As I mentioned above, Aristotle states in his treatment of it in the Sophistici Elenchi that the fallacy from accident is closely related to the fallacy from consequence, since the latter also rests on an accident in the sense that the consequent is accidental to the subject. As presented in the Sophistical Refutations, the only difference between the two fallacies is that the accident refers to one thing, namely it occurs when one thing is identified with its accidental property, while the consequent refers to many things, that is to say, when one takes the properties that are the same in one thing to be the same with each other. Hence, if indeed the treatment of the fallacy from accident in the two treatises is compatible (as Rapp suggested), then the rhetorical fallacy of accident will correspond to the dialectical one. Therefore, it must also be the case that the rhetorical fallacy from accident is closely related to the fallacy from consequence and maybe also to the fallacy from sign, since Aristotle considers, as we have seen, sign arguments a sub-group of the fallacies from consequent. Could it be true then, that fallacious sign arguments are one type of fallacy due to accident, or perhaps that some of the fallacies from accident are sign arguments? If this is so, then an accidental feature, which is attributed both to a subject and to a predicate of the subject, would be used as a sign for the predication of this feature to all related occasions. As we will soon see, this is one way to interpret the examples provided by Aristotle, namely as fallacious sign arguments in which the sign is an accident.

|| 122 Cope (1877), 312-313 ; Grimaldi (1988), 345. 123 Soph. el. 5 166b28-36. For problems arising from the compatibility of this fallacy with Aristotle's theory of predication (Cat. 1b10-15, Pr. An. I.4 25b31-35) and for a possible solution through Philoponus' interpretation s. Bäck (1987), 139 ff.; cf. also Bäck (2009) for an elaborate discussion of the fallacy from accident and its relation to the practical syllogism. 124 Rapp (2013a), 149.

132 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

3.7.1 Anonymous’ commentary It is in such a way that the Anonymous commentator seems to read this passage from the Rhetoric. As we will see, both examples of the rhetorical fallacy from accident can also be read as presenting the fallacy from signs and, in fact, were interpreted by the Anonymous commentator in the same way as the third-figure sign arguments. This is how the Anonymous interprets the Aristotelian text: [T.32] “Gnawing through the bow-strings”. Polemon relates the story of those who live in Troada, who, in accordance with some oracles, honour the local mice for gnawing through the bow-strings of the enemies, as well as the holders of the shields, namely the thongs. Achilles was angry for not being invited by Agamemnon who invited the noblest.125

Of the examples cited by the commentator, the first one means to illustrate that “mice are worth praising”, since, as Aristotle states, it comes from Polycrates' praise of mice. As distinct from the fallacy from signs (and as Aristotle presents it), Polycrates' argument is fallacious since it makes use of the accidental feature upon which the praise is based. The fallacious deduction that Aristotle seems to have in mind is: (4)

a b

The mice gnawed through the bow-strings. The gnawing through of the bow-strings helped. Hence, the mice are helpful. The mice are helpful. Helping is worth praising. Hence, mice are worth praising.

In this invalid syllogism, the major premise (a) is the one that renders the argument as deceitful due to the fallacy from accident, since the predicate used is accidental: mice did not help as such, but only ate through the bow-strings, which accidentally was serviceable to the Trojans. Moreover, the second premise (b) is also problematic, since it does not specify that only intentional help is worth praising, not any accidental service. In fact, as Aristotle stated in the first book of the treatise, only actions made by conscious choice are worth praising and especially those which were repeatedly chosen (Rhet. I.9 1367b22-26). This example therefore could be interpreted as exposing the fallacy from omission as well. In any case, the help offered by the mice to the Trojans should not be praised, and consequently mice are not worth praising in general.

|| 125 Anon., In Rhet. 151, 13-17: διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς. Πολέμων ἱστορεῖ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Τρωάδα κατοικοῦντας ἀπὸ χρησμῶν τινων τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους μῦς σέβεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὰς νευρὰς τῶν τόξων τῶν πολεμίων φαγεῖν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὀχεῖς τῶν ἀσπίδων ἤτοι τοὺς λώρους. ἐμήνισεν ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος τοὺς ἀρίστους καλέσαντος.

Fallacy from accident | 133

On the other hand, the truth of the statement that mice are worth praising can be based upon the fact that people of Troada actually praise them for helping by eating the bow-strings. Read in this way, the argument would rely on a sign: (5) People of Troada praise the mice. Hence, (all) mice are worth praising.

Read thus, the argument seems to be invalid due to the generalisation of the particular premise and, therefore, to fall under the third-figure sign arguments. Given that the sign used entails an accident that is the accidental cause of the appraisal of mice, this example could be a “fallacious sign argument from accident”. It is not completely clear whether this is the reading that the Anonymous commentator preferred, but it seems possible, given that his very brief interpretation of the example focuses on Polemon's126 citation of the story about the citizens of Troada and their decision to show respect towards the local mice, which is the premise of the sign argument as reconstructed above. Moreover, his interpretation of the example comes right after his explanation of the fallacious sign arguments as falling under the two syllogistic figures, which is also the case for the reconstructed argument that can be taken as a sign argument of the third figure. In the second example, the case of Achilles is supposed to illustrate that “to be invited to dinner is most honourable”. The deduction, as presented by the Anonymous, could be as follows: (6) Achilles was angry because he was not invited. Achilles was angry because he was dishonoured. Hence, not being invited is a dishonour = Being invited is an honour.

Read thus, the argument seems also to be similar to the fallacious or non-syllogistic sign-arguments of the third figure described above. If so, then it is invalid, since no universal conclusion can come about through particular premises. In addition to that, the first premise entails an accidental cause. Therefore, in this case the fallacy occurs when one makes a general statement through signs, and especially when the signs are problematic by entailing an accidental term. To sum up, it seems that the Anonymous commentator has spotted the problem regarding the relation between the three fallacies and interpreted the examples in a way that makes this relation clear. In his view, there are two types of sign arguments, one that can be analysed in the second syllogistic figure, and to which the argument from consequence is related, and one that can be analysed in the third

|| 126 Cf. Clem. Alex. Protr. 2, 39, 7.

134 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

syllogistic figure, under which the arguments from accident also fall. Moreover, his interpretation of the examples that brings the fallacy from accident closer to the fallacy from sign can also be useful for our understanding of the use of the fallacy of accident in the rhetorical context and its difference from the dialectical fallacy. In particular, whereas in both rhetoric and dialectics the fallacy rests on the accidental predication of one and the same feature to the subject and its attribute127, the difference between them relies on the form of the argument that entails the accidental predication. In dialectics, which makes use of deductions, the arguments that entail an accidental attribute128 will not be valid, when the conclusion does not follow with necessity from the premises. In rhetoric, which uses signs and probabilities, the fallacy of accident rests on the accidental predication of a property to a sign used for a universal conclusion.

3.7.2 Stephanus’ commentary Stephanus does not comment on the first example, but his diagram-representation of the second example (s. table in 3.6.2 above) suggests a reading similar to his reading of the examples of the fallacy from sign and consequence. Hence, he takes the syllogism as invalid on the same grounds mentioned above, namely because no universal conclusion can come about from particular premises (CAG XXI.2 307): (7)

Achilles was not invited. Achilles was angry. Hence, everybody not invited is angry.

In his triangle diagram, Stephanus represents the example of the fallacy from accident again in the third syllogistic figure: the two particular premises, having their subject as the middle term, bring about a universal conclusion. In this case, the feature of not being invited and of being angry are attributed to Achilles, in order to conclude that everybody not invited is angry. Hence, in Stephanus’ view, both the fallacy from consequence and the fallacy from accident are closely related to or fall under the third-figure sign arguments.

|| 127 As shown by Rapp's (2013a), 149 reconstruction of the examples. 128 Namely, one that is confused with an essential property or one that is not convertible with the subject. Hamblin (1970), 26-27, 85-86; Bäck (2009), 101-104.

Non Causa pro Causa | 135

3.8 Non Causa pro Causa In the Sophistical Refutations (Soph. el. 5 167b21-36), Aristotle addresses the fallacy of presenting non-causes as causes, and explains that this fallacy comes about when something irrelevant to the argument is added to it and presented as the cause. A version of the dialectical fallacy from using non-causes as causes is the rhetorical fallacy of the same name, which, however, applies only to those cases in which a temporal sequence is taken as indicating the cause. This fallacy is widely known as post hoc ergo propter hoc, and is still to be found in modern textbooks on fallacious reasoning129. As described in the Rhetoric, the fallacy comes about when one thing, which occurred before another, is considered to be its cause: [T.33] Another topos is from using the non-cause as cause, for example because it happened at the same time or after it; for, given that one thing happened after something, it is taken as if it happened because of it; especially in the politics, for example Demades considered the policy of Demosthenes as the cause of all evils; for the war occurred after it.130

As Cope puts it, this fallacy relies on the confusion between the chronological and causal relation of two events131, or, in other words, on the confusion of the relation between antecedent and consequent with the relation between cause and effect. The Anonymous commentator, who throughout his commentary refers with admiration to Demosthenes132, did not offer any detailed interetation of the fallacy, but took here the chance to interpret Aristotle's reference to the rhetor by criticising Demades' statement: [T.34] For instance, when someone gives the cause as to why something happened later, and [explains the cause] of these [by stating] that this was the reason. As, for instance, Dimades called the constitution of Demosthenes as the cause of all evils. And surely, if they had listened to Demosthenes and looked at his policy, then no evil would have happened to the city, but rather everything good.133

Although the Anonymous’ comment on this fallacy is very brief, a comment that he made earlier on the same chapter (II.24) seems to be relevant here. In particular,

|| 129 Hamblin (1970). 130 Rhet. II.24 1401b29-34: ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν· μετ' ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος. 131 Cope (1877), 316. 132 cf. CAG XXI.2 10, 30-32; 14, 16-19; 38, 23-28; 140, 25-29; 147, 6-10. 133 Anon., In Rhet. 151, 31-152, 2: οἷον εἴ τις αἰτιᾶται τὸ διότι ἀπέβη ὕστερον, καὶ ταῦτα ὄντος ἐκείνου τοῦ αἰτίου· οἷον ὁ Δημάδης ἔλεγε τὴν τοῦ Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν αἰτίαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν· καὶ μήν, εἰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἤκουον καὶ ἀφώρων πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ἐκείνου, οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν συνέβη τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ πᾶν εἴ τι ἀγαθόν.

136 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

after he dealt with the fallacy from verbal expression and before he introduced the fallacy from homonymy, the commentator added a fallacy “from the cause”, which he seems to intend as an addition to the Aristotelian list of fallacies. Interestingly, this new fallacy has the same name as a topos of valid enthymemes mentioned by Aristotle in the previous chapter (II.23). Since an extant comment on the topos “from the cause” is rightly placed in the discussion and interpretation of the 23rd chapter of the second book of the Rhetoric, I take this comment (on the fallacy “from the cause”) not to be a false placement134, but an addition by the commentator. His treatment of the topos in II.23 can actually be quite useful in understanding way in which this topos can introduce a fallacious argument. But let us first take a look at the additional remark of the 24th chapter: [T.35] Another topos is from the cause, if it exists, that it is; for example, if one loves his country, he would undertake a danger for the sake of the country, whereas if he does not love his country, he would not undertake the danger.135

At first glance, the argument, which has the form “A follows from B; B exists; hence, A exists”, seems to be a valid argument and the counterpart of the fallacy from consequence: the consequent is granted by the affirmation of the antecedent. However, the example given by the commentator is problematic. According to the example, if the cause is given, namely a person who loves his country, the result is also given, that is, the acts of defense of this country. But this cannot be true, since there are cases of people who love their country, but have not been given the chance to defend it. It should be noted here that a similar thought is expressed by Aristotle himself, namely the thought that such an argument from the cause can be fallacious. In particular, in his discussion of virtue in Rhet. I.9, Aristotle referred to the fact that an orator can praise someone by presenting their vices as virtues: for instance, the audacious person can be presented as courageous and hence praised with the argument that, if she is endangered when it is not necessary, then she will even more be willing to act in this need. Such an argument, adds Aristotle, is fallacious due to the cause (Rhet. I.9 1367a24-b4: παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας). What the commentator seems to have in mind, becomes more evident by his presentation of the related topos in the chapter on common topoi (II.23): [T.36] Another topos is to argue from the cause; for if the cause exists, the effect exists as well, and if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist as well. For he says that the efficient cause exists simultaneously with the effect. And yet there may be a builder, but no building

|| 134 Which seems to be what the editor thinks, given that he has added the reference number 1400a29 before the comment. 135 Anon., In Rhet. 148, 21-23: ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἄν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστιν, οἷον εἰ φιλόπατρίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἕληται κίνδυνον, εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι φιλόπατρις, οὐδὲ τὸν κίνδυνον ἕληται.

Non Causa pro Causa | 137

built by him; and we say that if there is a builder in actuality, there is necessarily that, which is being built simultaneously, and if the builder is in potentiality, then that, which is being built, is also in potentiality. Hence, he said that the cause is simultaneous inasmuch as both are either in potentiality or in actuality.136

According to this interpretation, the topos of enthymemes “from the cause” rests on the affirmation of the causal relation between two things, of which, when the cause exists, the effect exists as well. What the commentator adds is the distinction of causes in actuality and in potentiality. In order to shed light on this interpretation, one can take a look at Aristotle's doctrine found in the Physics, as well as the Metaphysics137, where he refers to the simultaneous existence of the actual cause and its effect: when the cause exists in actuality, at the same time so does its effect. For example, an actual builder exists simultaneously with the building that he builds, and an actual doctor exists simultaneously with the healing. This is not the case, however, for the potential causes, which do not always exist simultaneously with their effects. This doctrine is echoed by the commentator, who, by almost citing the Aristotelian text, gives us a hint of the way in which a fallacious reasoning may follow from this doctrine: although the relation of an actual cause with its actual effect can be used as the basis for a valid reasoning, the confusion between actual and potential causes can lead to a fallacy. In particular, a fallacy can be brought about, when one argues that an effect follows the cause by necessity or exists simultaneously with the cause without specifying whether the cause exists in actuality. This can be said to be the case for the example given by the commentator in his additional remark on the chapter on fallacies: The causal relation between the person who loves his country and the act of defending the country is a potential one, and hence, it is fallacious to argue that if the cause exists, the effect exists as well. Hence, I take this addition to be an interesting case, since it clearly shows the Anonymous’ own activity as a commentator. In particular, this was one of the few cases where he makes such a clear addition or improvement to the text, which he otherwise usually paraphrases, on the basis of Aristotelian doctrines from the corpus.

|| 136 Anon., In Rhet., 144, 4-11: ἄλλος τόπος ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου. ἂν γὰρ ὑπάρχῃ τὸ αἴτιον, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν, κἂν οὐχ ὑπάρχῃ τὸ αἴτιον, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αἰτιατόν· τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ ποιητικόν φησιν ἅμα εἶναι τῷ αἰτιατῷ. καίτοι ἐνδέχεται οἰκοδόμον μὲν εἶναί τινα, οἰκίαν δὲ μὴ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ· καί φαμεν ὅτι, εἰ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν οἰκοδόμος, ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἅμα καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομούμενον, καὶ εἰ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὁ οἰκοδόμος, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομούμενόν ἐστι δυνάμει· ὥστε ἅμα αὐτὴν εἶπε, καθ' ὃ ἢ ἄμφω εἰσὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἄμφω ἐνεργείᾳ. 137 Metaph. Δ.2 1014a16-25. Phys. II.3 195b16-21: διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἅμα ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ὧν αἴτια, οἷον ὅδ᾽ὁ ἰατρεύων τῷδε τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ καὶ ὅδε ὁ οἰκοδομῶν τῷδε τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐκ ἀεί. Φθείρεται γὰρ οὐχ ἅμα ἡ οἰκία καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος.

138 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

3.9 Fallacy from the Omission of When and How Aristotle already mentioned this fallacy twice in his presentation of the rhetorical fallacies in Rhetoric II.24. In both references, it was said that the arguments in question could be explained as being fallacious due to the omission of the manner, in which they are stated. In the first argument, brought as an example of combination, Orestes was stated to have killed his mother justly, since it is just for the son to revenge his father and for a woman who slayed her husband to die. However, clarifying the circumstances under which the two statements are combined, it is evident that it is not just for Orestes to kill his mother. In the second argument, used as an example of the fallacy from consequence, Aristotle notes that by affirming the consequent of happiness, namely the ability to live wherever one desires, and by considering everyone, who possesses those abilities as happy, one disregards cases such as exile. However, the two cases differ inasmuch as the manner, in which one has come to possess this privilege is omitted, namely, whether one possesses it voluntarily or involuntarily. In the passage that is itself dedicated to the fallacy from omission, another two examples are brought in, both of which illustrate the omission of when: [T.37] Another topos is from the omission of when and how, for example the argument (1) that Alexander took Helen justly; for the choice was given to her by her father; however, it was perhaps not meant to be forever, but only for the first time; for the father was responsible only until then. Or (2) if someone says that it is an outrage to hit free men; however, it is not so in any case, but only when one starts the unjust gestures.138

The Anonymous commentator interprets this passage in connection to the next fallacy, which is a wider version of the fallacy from omission. Both examples, he says, are not taken simply, but in a specific respect. In the case of Helen, the omission of “when” makes the argument fallacious by obfuscating that only in a particular time did Helen have the right to choose, whereas in the second example, it is again the “when” one is not justified to commit an outrage that is omitted. Additionally, the Anonymous commentator takes the chance here for a theological comment, the origin of which is to be found in the work of a theologian, whose name he does not give139. He argues that some theologians have committed the fal-

|| 138 Rhet. II.24 1401b34-1401 a2: ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων. 139 Since elsewhere in the commentary (CAG XXI.2 24, 8) he refers to Gregory of Nazianzus with admiration (he calls him “the great Gregory”), it seems plausible here that the reference is to Gregory's doctrine against Arianism. In short, the supporters of the latter doctrine argued that the Father

Secundum Quid et Simpliciter | 139

lacy from omission when they have considered that what is greater as a cause is greater by nature, since the cause is by nature. In other words, they have taken what is said in a certain respect to be true in general. Hence, they concluded that, since the Father is greater than the Son with respect to being a cause, He is greater than the Son also by nature. This fallacy, which is said to be common amongst those who articulate such theories, is either committed unconsciously, and therefore the theologians themselves are mistaken, or it is meant to deceive those, to whom the argument is addressed. As we said in the previous section, where the commentator added a new topos on the list of fallacies, here his addition of this theological comment is another interesting example of passages in which the commentator shows his own background and interests through his interpretation.

3.10 Secundum Quid et Simpliciter [T.38] Moreover, just as in the eristics the apparent syllogism occurs due to what is taken simply and not simply, but in a specific respect, for example in dialectics that (1) the not-being exists, since not-being is not-being, and that (2) the unknown is known, since it is known that the unknown is unknown; in the same way in the rhetoric, the apparent enthymeme occurs due to what is not simply-probable, but probable in a specific respect. But this is not true in general, (3) as Agathon says: “Probably one could say that this is itself probable: that many improbable things happen to mortal men”. For things, which are past probable, do happen, so the past probable is probable. If this is so, then the non-probable will be probable. However, it will not be simply [probable], but just as in the eristics, the sophism occurs when the respect, the relation or the manner is not added; and here the “past probable” is not taken simply but as probable in a specific respect. (4) The art of Corax consists of this topos; either if one is not subject to a charge, for example when a weak person is accused of assault; for it is not probable; or if one is subject to charge, for example if it is a strong man; for it is not probable, since it was going to appear probable. Similarly, also with the rest; for necessarily one either is or is not subject to a charge; and both of these cases seem to be probable, however one is probable, whereas the other is not simply [probable] but as we said. (5) And this is to make the weaker claim the stronger. And, hence, people were justified at being displeased by Protagoras' announcement; for it is false and not true, but only apparently probable, and it is of no art besides rhetoric and eristics.140

|| is prior to the Son, the cause of his existence, and hence, He is prior by nature. According to the commentator, this doctrine entails the fallacy of omission of the manner. 140 Rhet. II.24 1402a3-28: ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν [ὄν], ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει τάχ' ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι, βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα. γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ

140 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

This topos of apparent enthymemes is the rhetorical counterpart of the dialectical fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter (παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἢ πῇ λέγεσθαι). In dialectics or, as it is here named, eristics, this fallacy rests on the use of a premise in its simple sense, although it is actually said in a particular respect141. In modern informal theories, this fallacy is thought as being the converse of the fallacy from accident, since the latter applies to those cases in which what is said (simply) about a subject is also said about its accidental predicate (i.e. about a certain respect of the subject), whereas the former fallacy entails those cases in which what is said in a certain respect, is inferred about the simple or general case (and this is why it is also called a hasty generalization)142. Two examples of the dialectical fallacy are used in the Rhetoric, before the introduction of its rhetorical variation, namely (1) when one argues that non-being exists, since it is non-being, and (2) when one states that the unknown is known. A slightly different version of the first example is used in the Sophistical Refutations, where non-being is said to exist, since it is an object of opinion. In this case, it is evident why the fallacy rests on the confusion between what is said simply and what is said in a certain respect, since the non-being is taken as being, although this is actually true only in one respect, namely as being an object of opinion. Both commentators use this version in their interpretation of the example, evidently having in mind the treatment of the fallacy in the Sophistical Refutations. Moreover, they both include the same premise in their argument, namely one that entails the example of a goat-stag. On the one hand, Stephanus uses the diagrammatic form in order to represent the syllogism, whereas the Anonymous commentator interprets the argument in detail:

3.10.1 Anonymous’ commentary [T.39] We use sophisms also in dialectics, for example when one concludes that the non-being is being and concludes in fact thus: “The goat-stag is an object of opinion. The goat-stag does not exist (is not). Hence, non-being is being”. For the “object of opinion” is omitted. Hence,

|| πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστι δ' ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· “ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός), κἂν ἔνοχος ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν)”. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται· καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστιν. Καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ. 141 Soph. el. 5 166b37- 167 a1: Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς τόδε ἢ πῇ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ κυρίως, ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰρημένον ληφθῇ, οἷον, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστι δοξαστόν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν. 142 S. Hamblin (1970), 28; Bueno (1988), 5.

Secundum Quid et Simpliciter | 141

non-being is being in a particular respect, namely it is an object of opinion, not that it exists, but that it is non-being, namely that it does not exist. Therefore, non-being is being in a particular respect, namely as an object of opinion.143

First, it is interesting to notice that the Sophistical Refutations are again present in the interpretation of the rhetorical fallacy. As argued above, Stephanus is evidently trying to draw a clear connection between the two treatises, but also the Anonymous commentator often uses the treatment of the fallacies in the Sophistici elenchi. Second, it is also worth noticing that the two commentators make use of the same example, namely the example of goat-stag, which is their own addition to the passage from the Rhetoric144. In the second example of the dialectical fallacy, the known is identified with the unknown on the basis of the use of a term as simple instead of non-simple. As Aristotle presents the example, the two opposites are identified, since it is known that the unknown is unknown or, in other words, the unknown is known as unknown and not known simply. The Anonymous commentator offers a detailed interpretation of the rest of the passage, which refers to the rhetorical counterpart of the dialectical fallacy145. In this detailed interpretation, the commentator seems to aim at showing the source of delusion in each one of the cases presented by Aristotle. Given that Aristotle considered the probabilities to be, together with signs, the sources of rhetorical arguments, the reason the commentator dedicates a more extant discussion of this fallacy becomes clearer. In particular, the application of the dialectical fallacy in the rhetoric, which is no longer about terms that are used simply or in a specific respect, but about what is used as simply probable or probable in a particular respect, is presented through the citation of a verse by Agathon, who identified the probable with the improbable by saying that it is probable that improbable things happen to humans. The fallacy occurs, according to Aristotle, due to the omission of the respect in which improbable things happen. Also based on this fallacy is the art of Corax,

|| 143 Anon., In Rhet. 152, 14-20: χρώμεθα γὰρ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαλέξεσι σοφίσμασιν, οἷον συνάγουσι συμπέρασμα, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ὄν ἐστι, καὶ συνάγουσι τοῦτο οὕτως ‘ὁ τραγέλαφος δοξαστόν ἐστιν, ὁ τραγέλαφος μὴ ὄν, τὸ μὴ ὂν ἄρα ὄν ἐστιν’· καταλιμπάνεται γὰρ τὸ δοξαστόν· ὥστε τὸ μὴ ὂν πῂ ὄν ἐστιν ἤτοι δοξαστόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ ὄν ἐστιν ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστιν· ὥστε τὸ μὴ ὂν πῂ ὄν ἐστιν ἤτοι ὡς δοξαστόν. καὶ πάλιν συνάγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ἄγνωστον ἐπιστητόν ἐστιν· τὸ γοῦν ἄγνωστόν ἐστιν ἐπιστητὸν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῄ· ἐπιστητὸν γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ὡς γνωστὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἄγνωστον. 144 As I have argued in the frst chapter above (Introduction), this similarity can mean either that the one commentator takes into account the commentary of the other, or that both use a common source. 145 Stephanus, who is mainly interested in the relation between that rhetorical and the dialectical fallacies, does not refer to the examples of the rhetorical fallacy from presenting the probable in a certain respect as simply probable. The last note on this chapter is the diagrammatic representation of the previous example.

142 | Topoi of Fallacious Arguments in the Commentaries on Rhetoric II.24

the famous author of the first treatise on the art of rhetoric and teacher of Tisias, with whom he took part in a trial in which both made use of the power of rhetoric. As the commentator notes, this teacher-student couple is the source of a famous saying of his time: “a bad egg comes from a bad crow” (= κόραξ). Corax seems to have argued that, on the one hand, a weak man should be considered not guilty of assault on the basis of his lack of strength, whereas, on the other hand, a strong man should again be considered as not guilty, since he could have not committed the assault, of which he would so probably seem guilty. Moreover, the announcement of Protagoras, that he can make the weaker claim the stronger, falls within this type of fallacy, since it is only apparently true and probable, these two features being the subject matter of the art of eristics and rhetoric.

4 Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric 4.1 Introduction In the first book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle gives an extensive account of ethical notions, in particular those of happiness, good, virtue, and pleasure. First, given that the deliberative orator tries through the speech to exhort or dissuade the audience in respect to a certain action, and also, given that this exhortation or dissuasion aims at or is directed toward the happiness of the audience, Aristotle gives an account of happiness (I.5) that contains topoi from which the orator can argue in each case for the contribution of his advice towards the happiness of the audience. Similarly, since the advice of the deliberative orator aims at exhorting the audience to what is advantageous and good in each case, the Rhetoric entails an account about what is good (I.6-7). Third, in the case of epideictic speeches, in which the orator praises or blames someone for what she has done, arguments about virtues will be particularly useful. These latter topoi are also useful, according to Aristotle, in order for the orator to present himself as virtuous, which would contribute to the second rhetorical pistis, namely the persuasion through the character of the speaker1. Finally, Aristotle addresses pleasure and its constitutive parts, since they are also considered as an end of human action, and such considerations are necessary for the judicial speeches. Regarding the character of the propositions presented in these chapters of the Rhetoric, a question arises about what kind of propositions they are or in which cases they can be applied. This question is related to the distinction that Aristotle himself made in the second chapter between common topoi and idia (Rhet. I.2 1358a10-20). According to this distinction, there are topoi that can be used for formulating arguments independently of the subject matter, namely the topoi presented in the second book of the treatise, in particular, in II.23-24. Furthermore, there are idia, i.e. specific topoi that are proper to one kind of rhetorical speech or to some subject matters2. Of this type seem to be the topoi presented in the first book of the treatise (I.4-14), which contain arguments that concern ethical matters and are specific to the three kinds of rhetorical speech. In particular, chapters I.4-8 offer topoi mainly (but not exclusively) for deliberative speech, the next chapter (I.9) topoi || 1 Cf. Rhet. I.9 1366a25-28; Rhet. II.1 1378a15-18. 2 For a more detailed discussion on the literature of the distinction between common topoi and idia or, as it is usually presented, of the distinction between topoi-enthymemes and premiseenthymemes, of which the former would correspond to the commonplaces presented in II.23-24 whereas the latter to the treatment of arguments proper to each of the three rhetorical speeches (I.414), s. the section on topoi in chapter 2 above. Cf. also Rapp (2003), 263 ff. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-004

144 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

mainly relevant to epideictic speech, whereas the topoi presented in the chapters I.10-14 are proper mostly to judicial speeches. Hence, through the topoi presented in these chapters, orators can build arguments for evaluating the quality of an event or action as good or virtuous, or its contribution to happiness and pleasure. Moreover, since these chapters give an account of happiness, goodness, virtue and pleasure, a question arises as to the way in which this account is related to the treatment of these notions in Aristotle's ethical treatises, which present his developed views on ethics. In other words: what is the status of the account of ethical terms in the Rhetoric? What is the contribution of this account to Aristotle's philosophical thought? Does it depict Aristotle's own views or only the common, popular views about morality? If the former, then one needs to explain the differences found between the treatment of the subject matter in the Rhetoric and the ethical treatises. If the latter, one should explain the gap between the common views that the orator knows and uses in his arguments, and the views from which an ethical investigation starts3. Scholars represent both of the two possible answers to this question in the literature. On the one hand, it has been argued that the moral views presented in the Rhetoric are in fact Aristotle's own early views, namely views he supported before he developed the moral theory of the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics4. The account of the Rhetoric is hence not an enumeration of common moral views with which Aristotle himself disagrees, but rather is representative of an account that is generally consistent with that found in his Ethics, the latter being a more detailed, elaborated or well-considered presentation of the same views found in the Rhetoric. This consistency between the two accounts is supported by the fact that both are said to take as a starting point the views of popular morality (endoxa). The fact that the orator knows these endoxa so well, from which ethics and politics initiate their reasoning—, indicates the close relation between these views and the truth of these matters. In this consistency-theory, the orator should possess real knowledge both of valid reasoning and of the endoxa that form the premises of enthymemes. By using these endoxa in accordance with Aristotle's teaching in the Rhetoric, the orator aims at reaching the truth in ethical and political matters. Therefore, the orator should, in this view, be morally good and possess a genuine knowledge of the matters with which he deals, so that he uses the strategies suggested by Aristotle only in light of his aim of finding the truth5. On the other hand, according to the scholars who support the view that the Rhetoric presents a rather amoral theory, Aristotle is not at all concerned in this treatise about teaching the orator to look after the truth, nor is he interested in ex-

|| 3 s. Cooper (1994); Irwin (1996), 147. 4 Kennedy (1991), 56. 5 s. Wörner (1990); Engberg-Pedersen (1996); Cooper (1994).

Happiness | 145

pousing a rhetorical theory that is consistent with his ethical theory, because the two projects are simply different. It is therefore not the subject of the Aristotelian Rhetoric to give a full account of ethical matters, and the moral considerations presented in this treatise are relevant to its subject only insofar as these are the views which the audience shares and which the orator should carefully consider when trying to persuade the audience. Thus, the account presented in the Rhetoric is one of popular moral views, and the similarities to the Aristotelian ethical theory as known from the ethical treatises can be easily explained, since “Aristotle's moral philosophy is to a certain extent a clarification and systematic development of popular moral convictions”6. The difference between the two projects would therefore be that, whereas both Rhetoric and Ethics take as a starting point these common beliefs (endoxa), ethics, which additionally focuses on less common but more thorough views, aim at redirecting these beliefs7. In the rest of this chapter, I will present the rhetorical account of these ethical terms, namely happiness, the good, virtue and pleasure, especially its relation to the account offered in Aristotle's ethical treatises, focusing on the interpretation of this relation by the two Byzantine commentators on Aristotle's Rhetoric.

4.2 Happiness The account of ethical definitions in the Rhetoric starts with the treatment of happiness (I.5). In this chapter Aristotle presents topoi for happiness, gives its definition as the end of human action, and provides a description of the factors that contribute to it. The deliberative orator can make the most use of these topoi in order to indicate the contribution of his suggestions to the happiness of her audience, although the account seems to be useful for the epideictic and judicial speeches as well. [T.1] Both to an individual privately and to all people generally there is one goal at which they aim in what they choose to do and in what they avoid. Summarily stated, this is happiness and its parts. Let us, then, for the sake of giving an example grasp what happiness is, simply stated, and the sources of its parts; for all forms of exhortation and dissuasion are concerned with this and with the things that contribute, or are opposed, to it; for one should do things that provide happiness or one of its parts or that make it greater rather than less, and not do things that destroy it or impede it or effect its opposites. Let happiness be [defined as] success combined with

|| 6 Sprute (1994); s. also Irwin (1996). 7 Irwin (1996), 148.

146 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric virtue, or as self-sufficiency in life, or as the pleasantest life accompanied with security, or as abundance of possessions and bodies, with the ability to defend and use these things; for all people agree that happiness is pretty much one or more or these.8

In this chapter, he gives several accounts of happiness, namely as “success combined with virtue, or as self-sufficiency in life, or as the pleasantest life accompanied with security, or as abundance of possessions and slaves, with the ability to defend and use these things”. As a rhetorical definition, it starts with the typical stipulation “let happiness be ...”, which indicates the provisional character of the definition, namely its non-scientific nature, which Aristotle also notes many times in the rest of the passage. More specifically, the account of happiness is said to be given “summarily” and “for the sake of giving an example”, whereas for the more detailed and precise treatment of the moral considerations Aristotle refers to another discipline that is more profound and true9. The non-scientific nature of these definitions is further indicated by the very fact that a variety of them is given without any sign of preference of the one over the other. In particular, the four different definitions are suggested, and are said to be, either altogether or in part, supported by “the many”. Of these four accounts, all but the latter (that is, the definition of happiness as abundance of external goods) are mentioned in the Nicomachean Ethics, but there it becomes immediately clear that the definition of eudaimonia as “activity in accordance with virtue” is preferred over those of self-sufficiency or pleasure, which are inadequate10. However, as stated

|| 8 Rhet. I.5 1360b4-18: Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός τις ἔστιν οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἥ τ' εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς· ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἵ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαί εἰσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ἢ μεῖζον ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν. ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθενία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἓν ἢ πλείω τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἅπαντες. All translations of the Rhetoric are in the following chapters by Kennedy (1991). 9 Rhet. I.4 1359b2-18: καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι δ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ τε πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων [...]. ὅμως δὲ ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴπωμεν καὶ νῦν. 10 NE 1098a16-18: τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. 1102a5-6: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν [...]. 1098b9-31: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα

Happiness | 147

above, in the Rhetoric there is no such discussion about which is the most adequate or correct definition of happiness, and virtue does not seem to have a higher place over the other goods with respect to its contribution to happiness. Self-sufficiency, on the other hand, could be said to be preferred as a more important part of happiness, if one takes as a sign of this preference the fact that after the presentation of his list of the parts of happiness Aristotle concludes that the possession of all these external or internal goods makes someone the most self-sufficient11. Finally, another important feature of this account is Aristotle’s use of rather instrumental language for referring to the definitions and parts of happiness, namely he presents eudaimonia through a list of the things and goods that contribute to it (Rhet. I.5 1360b19-30). In this list of contributions, besides the fact that virtue is presented as one part of happiness among others, we also do not find a distinction between constitutive parts and necessary conditions of happiness12. This lack is again an indication of the non-scientific character of the account and of Aristotle's lack of concern both for a full development and analysis of the matters in question and for consistency between the account of the Rhetoric and that of the ethical treatises. In their interpretation of the chapters of the Rhetoric concerning the ethical definitions, the two Byzantine commentators give their own explanation of the role of this account within the general project of the treatise and of the relation between the treatment of these moral considerations in the Rhetoric and the ethical treatises.

4.2.1 Anonymous’ commentary The Anonymous commentator interprets the text thus:

|| κατορθοῦν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. 11 Rhet. I.5 1360b19-30: εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν· ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς (οἷον ὑγίειαν, κάλλος, ἰσχύν, μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν), δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν [ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς φρόνησιν, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην] · οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατός τις εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή, ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην· οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος. Λάβωμεν τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον τί ἐστιν. 12 Virtues as parts of happiness. Cf. Eudemian Ethics VIII where Aristotle makes the distinction between parts and necessary conditions. It seems however that Aristotle does not want to take up this dispute in the Rhetoric, and for that reason he does not distinguish between means-ends and parts or necessary conditions.

148 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric [T.2] The aim of life for the living, which they long for, is roughly speaking happiness; so, one should argue and give advice based on arguments that lead to it. Another aim for the living are also the virtues and the parts of happiness itself, namely practical wisdom, courage, noble birth, honour, reputation. [...] So let us say what happiness is and what aim or end the deliberative orator has and let us also say what is the definition of its parts, with reference to which the orator proves enthymematically. He reports the definitions of happiness clearly, and he also clearly goes through its parts. Having said in an articulated and clear way that the parts of happiness are the external goods (wealth, good children, noble birth, good aging, many friends, noble friends) and the bodily virtues (beauty, strength, power for contests) and the virtues of the soul (courage, practical wisdom, temperance, justice, good nature, readiness of mind, memory, wisdom, sympathy), he defines what each one of them is.13

In his interpretation of the definition of happiness, the Anonymous commentator refers to the role of the account of eudaimonia and its parts within the treatise: it offers topoi from which the orator can argue using enthymemes. In particular, the deliberative orator will argue or give his advice through the arguments or accounts (λόγοι) that present happiness as their outcome. Since happiness is the end of every human action, the orator will try to show that his advice and the arguments used within the speech may contribute to this happiness. I believe that the commentator emphasises this function of the speech (i.e. contributing to happiness), first of all, by stating clearly that the orator should argue from logoi that lead towards happiness (ἐκ τῶν φερόντων πρὸς ταύτην λόγων ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν), and, second, by arguing that the definition of happiness and its parts are those with reference to which or in view of which the orator formulates the arguments enthymematically (πρὸς ἃ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐνθυμηματικῶς ποιεῖται). Hence, by knowing the definition of happiness and its parts, the orator establishes the end of the speech and of the argumentative process. However, a question arises as to whether the commentator takes this definition to be an Aristotelian definition, in the sense of being consistent with Aristotle's wellconsidered ethical theory, or to be in contrast with this theory. Although the commentator does refer to a plurality of definitions (τοὺς ὅρους τῆς εὐδαιμονίας), this reference does not necessarily suggest that he takes this plurality as indicating that the definitions presented are not in line with Aristotle's own views. On the contrary,

|| 13 Anon., In Rhet. 16, 19-33: Σχεδὸν σκοπὸς τοῖς ζῶσιν ἐν βίῳ, οὗ ἐφίενται, ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐστί· δεῖ οὖν ἐκ τῶν φερόντων πρὸς ταύτην λόγων ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τούτοις καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἤτοι φρόνησις, ἀνδρία, εὐγένεια, τιμή, δόξα. [...] λάβωμεν δέ, τί ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία καὶ τί ἔχει σκοπὸν καὶ τέλος ὁ συμβουλεύων, λάβωμεν δὲ καί, τίς ὁ ὁρισμὸς τῶν μερῶν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ἃ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐνθυμηματικῶς ποιεῖται. σαφῶς δὲ ἀπαγγέλλει τοὺς ὅρους τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαφῶς δὲ διηγεῖται καὶ τὰ μέρη ταύτης. εἰπὼν δὲ διηρθρωμένως καὶ καθαρῶς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ (πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, εὐγένειαν, εὐγηρίαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν) καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῦ σώματος (κάλλος, ἰσχύν, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικὴν [...]), τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς (ἀνδρίαν, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, εὐφυίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, μνήμην, σοφίαν, συμπάθειαν), ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁρίζεται, τί ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.

Happiness | 149

the reference to virtue at the beginning of the passage leads to the opposite conclusion. More specifically, in the Aristotelian text virtues are mentioned as one part of happiness, unlike the view presented in the Ethics, where happiness is defined primarily through virtues. In the commentator’s analysis, however, virtues seem to have a more profound role than the one Aristotle ascribes to them in the rhetorical account of happiness: virtues themselves are said to be ends of human actions, while they are separated from the other parts of happiness. A possible counterargument regarding the status of virtues as independent ends can be that everything named as a part of happiness is an end in itself, exactly insofar as each is a part of happiness. However, it seems to me that the interesting aspect of the commentator’s interpretation rests on the fact that he separates virtues from the other parts of happiness. This separation takes place at the beginning of the cited passage, where the commentator states that happiness is the end or aim of human beings, and goes further by saying that virtues are ends as well as parts of happiness, i.e. phronesis, courage, nobility, etc. This suggests, I believe, that the commentator, by explicitly referring to and emphasising only this part of happiness, wants to ascribe to virtue a more prominent place for its contribution towards happiness. If this is indeed so, and the Anonymous does try to read the Aristotelian ethical theory between the lines of the Rhetoric, we can also intelligibly account for the emphatic reference to clarity. In particular, the commentator states that Aristotle gives clearly (σαφῶς) both the definitions of happiness and the descriptions of its parts. This may suggest, and other passages in the commentary confirm this suggestion14, that the Anonymous commentator takes the account of ethical terms in the Rhetoric to be a short but clear way of expressing the same views that are presented in the Ethics. Stephanus will also argue for this same conclusion.

4.2.2 Stephanus’ commentary Stephanus' interpretation both of the definition of happiness and of its status, that is, the role of the account of happiness in relation to the other Aristotelian treatises, is even clearer. [T.3] The “simply stated” indicates either that which is said briefly or roughly and not precisely15. Happiness is destructed by vice [...]. In the first book of the Ethics he has defined practical happiness, in the tenth book theoretical happiness, whereas here he defines political happi-

|| 14 Cf. CAG XXI.2 13, 1, 6-14; 4-14, 7. 15 Cf. NE I.3 1094b19-22: ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

150 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric ness; for that reason, he speaks about noble birth and good children in the cities and nations. So, here he explains hastily what is thought about happiness by all wise people.16

First, in his interpretation of the definition of eudaimonia, Stephanus immediately and clearly makes a remark on the precision of the account of the Rhetoric: it is not precise but rough and brief. This remark is already an indication, as I have also argued in case of the Anonymous commentator, of the view that the account of the Rhetoric does not contradict Aristotle’s ethical theory, but is a brisk and less precise presentation of the same theory. Support for such a view aims at a unification of Aristotelian moral theory as presented throughout the corpus. As will become soon evident, this unification is pursued, in Stephanus' case, through notation of and emphasis on the common points between the two treatments (i.e., of the Rhetoric and the Ethics) and through explanation of the differences by reference to the different projects that each treatise wants to accomplish. The difference between the projects of the two treatises is clearly presented in more detail by Stephanus, who tries to adjust the account of happiness of the Rhetoric to the account of the Ethics. We find, according to his interpretation, three types and treatments of happiness: In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle deals with practical happiness, that is, happiness defined as activity accompanied by virtue; in the tenth book he deals with theoretical happiness, that is, happiness achieved by contemplation. Last, the account of the Rhetoric differs from those of the Ethics inasmuch as it concerns political happiness, that is, happiness within the city, as a result of which it touches upon matters that are irrelevant to the accounts of the Ethics, like good generation and good birth within cities. According to this view, the two treatises seem to complete each other in their treatments of eudaimonia. It could be argued that Stephanus’s distinction is inaccurate, since the Nicomachean Ethics also deals with happiness within the polis, and hence, it cannot be the rhetorical account of happiness alone that describes political happiness. However, Stephanus seems to refer to the main and central focus of each account, without excluding the possibility that there are common topics discussed among the treatises. By offering such a unified theory of the treatment of happiness in the different Aristotelian treatises, Stephanus manages to explain the differences between the two accounts. On the one hand, this interpretation explains why the definition of happiness in the Rhetoric is different from the one in the Nicomachean Ethics: it deals with a different type of happiness. On the other hand, it also explains the absence of detailed treatment of good birth or nobility or acquiring of good children in the Ethics: they contribute neither to prac|| 16 Steph., In Rhet. 269, 33-270, 8: Τὸ δὲ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἢ τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ συντετμημένως ἢ τὸ παχυλῶς καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν [...] Φθείρει τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ κακία [...]. ἐν μὲν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς ὡρίσατο ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ τὴν πρακτικὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ Κ τὴν θεωρητικήν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὴν πολιτικήν· διὸ καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας καὶ εὐτεκνίας λέγει πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν. λέγει οὖν ἐνταῦθα τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας πᾶσι πολλῇ σπουδῇ σοφοῖς.

The Good | 151

tical happiness and to possession of virtue, nor to acting in accordance with it, nor to happiness reached through contemplation; rather, they are necessary parts of happiness within the city. What is missing from Stephanus’ account is a reference to Politics. It would be interesting namely to see whether he tries to link here the project of the Rhetoric to the Politics rather than to the Nicomachean Ethics. Unfortunately, as there is no explicit or implicit reference to the Politics in the commentary, we cannot draw any such conclusions with certainty.

4.3 The Good The account of happiness is followed by a treatment of the notion of the good (I.6-7). As Aristotle states, the account of happiness offered topoi about those things at which the orator aims when exhorting or dissuading. However, since the orator sets as his end the advantageous, and since no one deliberates about the end but about the practicable means towards this end, the treatment of the good necessarily follows (Rhet. I.6 1362a15 ff.). In the first half of the sixth chapter, Aristotle presents, as in the chapter on happiness, a variety of definitions of the good and a list of things that are considered as good, based on the definitions just given17. The rest of the chapter entails a presentation of topoi from which the orator can argue for the goodness of things that are not good in the full sense18, but due to a certain feature. Similarly, the next chapter offers topoi for comparing goods, through which the orator can argue about which good is better and preferable19. The definition of the good in the Rhetoric runs thus: [T.4] Let a good be [defined as] whatever is chosen for itself and that for the sake of which we choose something else and what everything having perception or intelligence aims at or what everything would [aim at] if it could acquire intelligence. Both what intelligence would give to

|| 17 Rhet. I.6 1362b10-28: ὡς δὲ καθ' ἓν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. Εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτῆς τἆλλα αἱρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς. καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν. πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολλῶν. φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν. τιμή, δόξα· καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐταῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ' οἷς τιμῶνται. δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν· ποιητικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. Ἔτι εὐφυΐα, μνήμη, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι. καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν. Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν. 18 Rhet. I.6 1362b29-30: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλλογισμοί. 19 Rhet. I.7 1363b5-7: Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦντες ἄμφω συμφέρειν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος.

152 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric each and what intelligence does give to each in individual cases is the good for each; and whatever by its presence causes one to be well-off and independent; and independence itself; and what is productive or preservative of such things; and what such things follow upon; and what is preventative and destructive of the opposite.20

As in the case of happiness, the provisional definition of good in the Rhetoric begins with the formula “let good be defined”, and then continues with “whatever is chosen for itself and that for the sake of which we choose something else and what everything having perception or intelligence aims at and whatever by its presence causes one to be well-off and self-sufficient”. These definitions are followed by a list of things that everyone agrees to be good, the goodness of which Aristotle explains with back reference to these definitions. For example, happiness is good due to the first definition, namely because it is chosen for itself and because we choose other things for the sake of it, as well as due to the definition of good as that which by its presence causes self-sufficiency. Similarly, virtues of the soul21 and virtues of the body are good by producing good things, whereas pleasant things are good because they are chosen in themselves and are productive of pleasure, which is good because living beings long for it by nature22. This account of the good bears many similarities with the account in the ethical treatises. First, the very fact that each member of the list of goods is said to be good only by reference to the definitions, is reminiscent of a more scientific treatment that was not found in the previous chapter on happiness. Moreover, in the first definition of good as that which is chosen in itself and for the sake of which other things are chosen, we find a reference to the means-end relation of goods, which is an important aspect of the Aristotelian ethical theory as presented in the Ethics. However, these facts do not in themselves ensure Aristotle's concern here for a philosophical treatment of the matter in question. Instead, whereas the focus of the ethical treatises is on finding the highest good in order to pursue it23, the Rhetoric is not || 20 Rhet. I.6 1362a21-29: ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ· τοῦτό γάρ ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά. 21 In this passage virtues are named as dispositions (hexeis), whereas later Aristotle will define them as powers (dunameis). Aristotle is not interested in being consistent throughout the treatise in the definitions of the ethical terms. 22 Rhet. I.6 1362b5-9: καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν. 23 For the focus in the Ethics on the practical character of the treatment of the good s. NE I.2 1094a18-22: Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα [...], δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

The Good | 153

concerned with knowledge of the highest good or with its pursuit. Rather, in the latter treatise goods are listed or compared to each other in view of their expediency for the purpose set by the orator. As for the controversial goods, namely the things that are not accepted by all to be goods, Aristotle offers topoi for arguing for their goodness based on rather accidental attributes. For example, something might be considered good if its opposite is expedient for our enemies, although it might also be the case that the same thing is considered good even by two opponent parties24. Hence, in this second part of chapter I.6, Aristotle discusses cases in which the orator can argue in different ways for the goodness of different things. These will be the tricky passages for the commentators, who, as we have seen above, want to argue for a continuity between the ethical account of the Rhetoric and of the Ethics.

4.3.1 Anonymous’ commentary The Anonymous commentator, who often paraphrases passages of the treatise without entering into detailed interpretation, does not explain in any detail the first part of the sixth chapter (I.6), the discussion of the definitions of good and the description of the things that are considered as good. His discussion of this part of the chapter is mostly a paraphrase of the Aristotelian text with emphasis on the justification of the goods as good, namely by reduction to the definitions of good. [T.5] Since, he says, the aim of the deliberative orators is what is advantageous, and advantageous is that which is necessary to be promoted by the person towards whom the deliberative speech is addressed, and since the advantageous is the end and it is good, one should take the topoi of the good and the advantageous. [...] We should give, he says, the elements and topoi for proving that something is advantageous and in what way it is advantageous. So, let ‘good’ be that which is chosen for its own sake, e.g. to live, health, happiness. Also good is that for the sake of which we desire something else, e.g. victory, for the sake of which we choose to fight or go to war, or health, for the sake of which exercises and medicine are thought to be tolerable and the cauterisations are considered as pleasant. Also good is that which everyone wants, e.g. to be and pleasure. By “those who want” he means everyone who has perception, with respect to which pleasure is said (for it is pleasure, what they want); or good is that which everyone who has intellect wants, e.g. practical wisdom, health and honour and not to suffer something bad. Also, these things are good, which intellect will render as good, e.g. ease in learning, readiness of mind, memory, variance and precision of art. [...] and that is good, in the presence of which one is well-disposed, as [one is in the presence of] practical wisdom and health; for in

|| 24 Rhet. I.6 1362b30-37: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλλογισμοί. ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν. καὶ οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει· οἷον εἰ τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνδρεία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις. Καὶ ὅλως ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ χαίρουσι, τοὐναντίον τούτου ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται [...] ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις·

154 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric the presence of these we are in a good condition. And the self-sufficient is good, e.g. happiness and that which has no need of the necessary; and that which produces goods, e.g. exercises produce health and virtues produce goods.25

In this passage, as in the rest of the Anonymous' interpretation of the first part of chapter I.6, it is evident that he notices and emphasises Aristotle's method in the treatment of that subject matter: rather than being presented at the beginning of the chapter to be followed by a list of goods and their justification as in the Aristotelian text, the various definitions are accompanied by examples of goods that are said to be good due to the presented definitions. In other words, the commentator, in order to emphasise Aristotle's method in this chapter, rearranged the text and presented each one of the definitions of good together with its proper examples. In the second part of the chapter, however, the Anonymous commentator offers an interpretation that, when compared to his interpretation of the rest of the chapter and the following chapters, offers hints to his own views on the role of the ethical account within the treatise on Rhetoric and the text’s moral status. [T.6] These are, roughly speaking, the agreed upon goods. He spoke of agreed upon goods and goods in the proper sense. Thereupon he will deliver topoi and arguments about how one can establish in a persuading way that something is good. And since we say, “in a persuading way”, the same thing will be good in this topos, but bad in another topos or non-good but neutral. After these, he wants again to give topoi, through which one will prove that one thing is preferable and more advantageous than another, but in the opposite topoi the former is worse and more harmful than the latter. “In the disputable goods”. Before, he spoke of the agreed upon goods, whereas here he speaks of the persuasive and disputed goods, which are however useful for the orator. Which these topoi that establish that something is good are, equally those that really are and those that are disputed, he will say by providing common and persuading topoi.26

|| 25 Anon., In Rhet. 20, 23-21, 25: Ἐπειδή, φησί, τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, συμφέρον δὲ λέγεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον προαχθῆναι ἐκείνῳ, πρὸς ὃν ἡ συμβουλὴ γίνεται, διά τι τέλος, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον τόπους ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος. [...] ὀφείλομεν οὖν δοῦναι, φησί, στοιχεῖα καὶ τόπους εἰς τὸ ἀποδεικνύειν, ὅτι τόδε συμφέρον καὶ πῶς ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο συμφέρον. ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθόν, ὃ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα αἱρετόν, οἷον τὸ ζῆν, ἡ ὑγεία, ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἀγαθὸν δὲ κἀκεῖνο, οὗ χάριν ἄλλο βουλόμεθα, οἷον ἡ νίκη, ἧς χάριν εἱλόμεθα τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι, ἢ ἡ ὑγεία, ἧς χάριν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ φάρμακα ὑποιστὰ καὶ οὐ λυπηρὰ νομίζονται καὶ οἱ καυτῆρες ἡδεῖς δοκοῦσιν. ἀγαθὸν δὲ καί, οὗ πάντα ἐφίενται, οἷον τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. τὰ δὲ ἐφιέμενα ἢ πάντα λέγει τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἡδονὴ λεχθήσεται (ταύτης γὰρ ἐφίεται), ἢ ἀγαθόν, οὗ ἐφίεται τὰ νοῦν ἔχοντα, φρονήσεως, ὑγείας καὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν κακὸν παθεῖν. κἀκεῖνα ἀγαθά, ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἀποδώσει, εὐμάθειαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, μνήμην, τέχνης ποικιλίαν καὶ ἀκρίβειαν· [...] καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθόν, οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκειταί τις, ὡς ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ὑγεία· τούτων γὰρ οὐσῶν εὖ ἔχομεν. καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἀνενδεὲς ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς τὰ γυμνάσια ὑγείας καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ ποιητικὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. 26 Anon., In Rhet. 22, 21-32: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά. εἶπε περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων καὶ κυρίως ἀγαθῶν· ἐφεξῆς δὲ μέλλει παραδοῦναι τόπους καὶ πίστεις, πῶς ἂν

The Good | 155

As stated above, Aristotle presents in the sixth chapters topoi from which the orator can argue for the goodness of things that are good not in themselves but occasionally or due to some accidental features. Hence, the occasion might arise in which one and the same thing can be argued as good due to one topos and bad due to another topos. It is therefore clear that these topoi can be used by the orator for arguing both for the goodness and the badness of one action. For example, a particular action either may be said to be bad and harmful for a city itself, or the same action might be considered as good and advantageous, because it will be harmful for the enemy. Thus, these topoi can be used in accordance with the orator's wish and aim. These considerations about the crucial role of the orator in the use of these topoi of controversial goods seem to follow directly from the thought that, since these goods are not considered as good in themselves, as a result of which one cannot form always and in any occasion arguments for their goodness, it is the orator who should decide how to use them. These considerations are not explicitly mentioned in the Aristotelian text, but they are emphasised by the Anonymous commentator. The latter clearly refers to the use of these topoi, which, although they are not about the proper and agreed upon goods, are useful for the orator's attempt at persuading the audience. Since the aim is to persuade, the orator needs to be able to form arguments in favour of the goodness, badness or neutrality of one and the same thing. As we will see in the next section27, I argue that the Anonymous commentator will in fact ascribe a crucial role to the orator: since these topoi do not themselves ensure the goodness of a thing, or, in other words, since one cannot show the goodness of a thing through only one particular topos, it is the orator who should possess full knowledge of the ethical notions, in order to be able to efficiently persuade the audience. That being said, we can understand in this way also the Anonymous’ interpretation of this second part of the chapter. Given that these topoi are not about things that are good in themselves, but only about controversial goods, and also given that, by being about such goods, the topoi do not ensure in themselves that the argument will be about what is truly good, but require the orator to use them in the “right way”, it comes as no surprise that the Anonymous does not relate this section

|| κατασκευάσῃ τις πιθανῶς, ὅτι τόδε ἀγαθόν. καὶ ἐπεὶ πιθανῶς εἴπομεν, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τόνδε μὲν τὸν τόπον ἀγαθόν, διὰ δὲ ἕτερον φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μέσον. βούλεται δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν εἰπεῖν τόπους, οἷς ἀποδείξει τις τόδε μεῖζον αἱρετὸν καὶ συμφέρον μᾶλλον τοῦδε καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φαῦλον καὶ βλαβερὸν μᾶλλον τόδε τοῦδε. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις. ἄνω εἶπε περὶ ὁμολογουμένων ἀγαθῶν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ λέγει πιθανὰ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμα, χρειώδη μέντοι τῷ ῥήτορι. τίνα δὲ ταῦτα τὰ κατασκευάζοντα τόδε εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὁμοῦ δ' ὄντα καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμα, ἐπιφέρει αὐτὸς κοινοὺς καὶ πιθανοὺς παρατιθέμενος τόπους. 27 Given that the language used in the relevant passage from I.9 is similar to the passage cited above, it seems legitimate to infer for the latter passage what is said by the commentator about the orator in the chapter on virtues. For a detailed analysis of this interpretation s. next section on virtue.

156 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

with views expressed by Aristotle in his Ethics, where the philosopher dealt with what is truly good. That the absence of any reference to the Ethics here was intentional, can become clearer from passages where the commentator shows good knowledge of the ethics, as for instance the following passage, which presupposes the theory of virtues as means: [T.7] And those things in which there is no excess are good, e.g. temperance is good (for there is no excess of it), but continence is not good (for there is an excess of it, namely temperance). That which is more than it should be, is bad; for to be bright is good, but the excessive gleam of light might often blind the eye, just as it happens whenever the sun shines clearly when there is snow, or whenever one looks towards the sun when it rises. So, this is what the philosopher said. But there is no single topos which says, on the one hand, that what has no excess, namely what escapes excess and is a mean, is praised, and, on the other hand, that which is greater than is should be, namely whatever coincides with excess and escaped the mean, is bad; for it is good to be warm up to a certain degree, but not excessively, and to take medicine up to a certain degree, but not excessively and to be in a middle pain is better and greater than being in an excessive pain.28

In this passage, the Anonymous commentator comments on one topos of the controversial goods, according to which things in which there is no excess are good29. First, it is interesting that in his interpretation of this passage, the commentator does not take this Aristotelian topos to be single, but rather argues that in fact this passage entails two distinct topoi. On the one hand, one topos is to argue that what has no excess is good. On the other hand, according to the second topos, one can argue that everything that is more than it should be is bad. Second, it seems that in the original text we have a direct reference to the Aristotelian theory of virtues as means between two extremes, a reference that seems to provide a good opportunity for connecting the account of the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics. However, the commentator does not associate the text with the treatment of the good in the ethical treatises, but instead interprets this passage mainly through non-ethical examples. Given that he is aware of this theory, since in other passages he does refer to the Ethics and even to the theory of virtues as means

|| 28 Anon., In Rhet. 23, 19-32: καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἡ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἀγαθόν (οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ὑπερβολή), ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια οὐδαμοῦ (ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ὑπερβολή, ἡ σωφροσύνη). ὃ δ' ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ, κακόν. τὸ γὰρ φωτίζεσθαι ἀγαθόν· ἀλλ' ἡ ὑπερβάλλουσα τοῦ φωτὸς αἴγλη τυφλοῖ πολλάκις τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ὥσπερ ἡνίκα χιόνος οὔσης καθαρῶς ὁ ἥλιος λάμψει, ἢ ἡνίκα ἀνατέλλει, εἰ ἀντωπήσῃ τις. οὕτω μὲν ὁ φιλόσοφος. μή ποτε δὲ εἷς ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ λέγων, ὡς, ὃ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει ὑπερβολήν, ἤτοι ὅπερ ἐκφεύγει τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἔστι δὲ μέσον, ἐπαινεῖται, ὃ δέ ἐστι μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ, ἤτοι ὅπερ συντρέχει τῇ ὑπερβολῇ, τῆς μεσότητος ἀπελαθέν, κακόν· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μέχρι τινὸς ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ὑπερβαλλόντως, καὶ τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι μέχρι τινός, οὐ μὴν ὑπερβαλλόντως, καὶ τὸ πονεῖν μέσως τοῦ ὑπερβαλλόντως κρεῖττον καὶ μεῖζον. 29 Rhet. I.6 1363a2-3: καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ' ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ, κακόν.

The Good | 157

(CAG XXI.2 46, 23-38)30, I believe that his failure to associate the two was intentional. In particular, since the aim of the passage is to show in what way the orator can use the different topoi in order to reach opposite conclusions for the goodness of one and the same thing, it is clear for what reason the commentator does not want to relate it with the Ethics, in which Aristotle deals with the highest good, which is good in the most proper sense. Consequently, the Anonymous commentator brings his own examples in order to explain in what sense the extremes might not be good, i.e. the excessive exposition to light, he says, might harm the eyes, whereas also the heating, ingestion of medicine or pain are better when they are not excessive. His initial example of temperance and continence is more obscure than the rest, since he states that temperance is a good, because there is no excess of it, unlike continence, whose excess is temperance, and which therefore is not a good. First, here it seems that by “good” the commentator means “virtue”, and hence, what he might want to say is that temperance is a virtue, unlike continence31. The justification of this distinction is that there is no excess of temperance, whereas there is an excess in continence. The commentator seems to mean that, in the case of temperance, one cannot be too temperate, namely have the virtue to an excessive degree. On the contrary, as the commentator says, the highest degree of continence would be identified with temperance. For example, if the continent person is habituated into doing continent actions, then she might become a virtuous, temperate person when she actually starts wanting to do or desiring this action32. In all these examples, therefore, the “extreme” (ὑπερβολή) is not taken as indicating the extremity in respect to virtue, but is understood by the commentator to mean that something might be “too much”. This interpretation does not solve completely the difficulty, since it is still hard to see how exactly temperance would be “too much”. On the other hand, a more plausible interpretation is that the reference to extremity might mean that temperance is not good because there is an extremity, i.e. there is something that is beyond it or even better than it, namely continence. In this case, ὑπερβολή does not have a negative sense, but rather indicates that which is beyond. In this sense, continence, being itself a virtue, does not have anything beyond it, but is in itself good. In summary, it seems that the Anonymous commentator followed one line of interpretation in his discussion of the chapter on happiness and on the first part of the || 30 If our conclusions in the introduction are right, he does not only know well the Aristotelian ethical theory but he is also the author of a commentary, at least on NE VII. 31 Cf. NE VII.2 1146a10 ff. e.a. This passage is interesting for the identification of the Anonymous commentator to the Rhetoric with the Anoynmous commentator to NE VII. It is in fact a strange passage, since the reference to temperance and continence is unexpected and unjustified. It can be explained, however, if we accept that the commentator was familiar with Aristotle’s account of continence in NE VII. 32 This is stated also in 30, 37: καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια πρὸς τὴν σωφροσύνη ὁδός.

158 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

chapter on good, and took this account to be a brief treatment of the same views as those presented in the ethical treatises, whereas he seems in a way to dissociate the two accounts in the case of the second part of the sixth chapter, where Aristotle discusses the controversial goods.

4.3.2 Stephanus’ commentary Stephanus focuses on different aspects of this account of the good: [T.8.a] For [the deliberative orator] does not talk only about these five when giving advice to the city, but also about many other issues, e.g. about noble birth, about having good children, many friends, good friends, about having competitive power for wrestling, boxing, discus throwing and the rest about which he spoke. So now he says that the things that the deliberative orator should consider are these five and the rest, namely happiness and its parts; for the city is impelled to guard its young people in a way, so that it will have good children, to do well, which is honoured, to have friends, so that the person that is loved by them [...] acquires, so to say, every wonderful deed that she wished and desired.33 [T.8.b] “So, let good be”. As he defined happiness above so now he gives some accounts of good, which, when you learn, you will be able to prove easily that this or that is good.34 [T.8.c] “And whatever intellect permits for each case”, either the productive intellect or the intellect in us, the theoretical or practical. And one should not say “So, if your theoretical intellect permits something bad, this is good?”; for I say: it is that intellect that might permit something bad, which sinks into desire or appetite, whereas the one that rather checks the irrational part of soul is both chief and permitting correctly.35

First, the accounts of good and other ethical terms in the Rhetoric are said by Stephanus to fall within the general project of Rhetoric, namely they aim at persuading for political matters. The orator needs to be able to prove that something will be advan|| 33 Steph., In Rhet. 272, 28-273, 3: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῶν πέντε μόνων ἐκείνων ἐρεῖ ὁ συμβουλευόμενος ἐν πόλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷον περὶ εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, πολυφιλίας, χρηστοφιλίας, ἀγωνιστικῆς δυνάμεως, πάλης, πυγμῆς, δίσκου βολῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ εἴρηκε· νῦν οὖν φησιν ὅτι, ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τὸν συμβουλευόμενον, ταῦτά εἰσι τά τε πέντε καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἤγουν ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς· προτρέπεται γὰρ τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα φυλάττῃ τοὺς νέους αὐτῆς τοιῶσδε, ὡς ἂν ᾖ παρ' αὐτῇ εὐτεκνία, εὐεργετεῖν, ὃ μάλα τιμᾶται, φίλους ἔχειν, ἵνα δι' ἐκείνων ὁ φιλούμενος [...], ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, κτᾶται πάντα καὶ θαυμάσια, ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὀρέγεται. 34 Steph., In Rhet. 273, 4-7: Ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ ἀνώτερον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διωρίσατο, οὕτω καὶ νῦν λέγει διορισμούς τινας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα τούτους μαθὼν εὐχερῶς ἔχῃς δεικνύειν τόδε ἢ τόδε ἀγαθὸν. 35 Steph., In Rhet. 273, 8-13: Καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, ἢ ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς ἢ ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν θεωρητικὸς ἢ πρακτικός. καὶ μή τις εἴποι ὅτι ‘εἰ δὲ ὁ νοῦς σοι ὁ θεωρητικὸς ἀποδώῃ κακόν τι, ἆρα ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθόν;’ φημὶ οὖν· ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ἀποδοίη ἄν τι φαῦλον ὁ βυθισθεὶς θυμῷ ἢ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον λογίσας τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς τέ ἐστι καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδούς.

The Good | 159

tageous to the city in order not only to make a certain decision about security or war and peace (Rhet. I.4), but also, according to the first passage [T.8.a] about the promotion of a certain conduct of the citizens (i.e. to educate them towards offering services, having friends etc.). Therefore, the ethical account of the Rhetoric seems to have a prominent role: by knowing the topoi for happiness and good, the orator will in fact exhort the citizens towards educating the children in a way that promotes their desire to benefit the city and to create friendships. Through the speech, the citizens will hence learn the importance of friendship or that it is honourable to benefit the city. The topoi are namely used not only in order to show the advantage that might follow from a certain decision concerning the external politics of the city or its food supplies. Rather, when the orator knows that friendship is considered as a good, she will also use such arguments in order to support a certain type of education that steers young people towards creation of friendships. This interpretation brings Stephanus closer to the treatment of good in the Ethics, where the importance of its knowledge is connected with the importance of the pursuit of the good, which is the end of human action. Therefore, it becomes evident that deciding what is good and arguing for its pursuit are important tasks for the orator, who, by learning the definitions of the good, will be ready to argue for the goodness of particular things [T.8.b]: one can argue for the goodness of each thing by reference to the definitions initially given in the chapter. In fact, Stephanus also refers back to the definitions of the good, when presenting the goodness of virtues, pleasure and happiness, just as the Anonymous commentator had done36. However, Stephanus seems to focus more on one of the Aristotelian definitions, according to which good is what the intellect demands in each case, such that it will be according to intellect that one will argue for what is good or bad. Stephanus emphasises this point by distinguishing the intellectual capacities and by arguing for which one is responsible in deciding what is good in each case [T.8.c]. In particular, Stephanus tries in this passage to answer to a possible objection: if, as Aristotle said, it is the intellect that decides what is good, then what if there is a discrepancy between what a thing really is and what the nous thinks of it? Stephanus answers to this objection by arguing that it is not nous as such that is mistaken, but only the perverted intellect, namely the one that is perverted due to desires. More specifically, Stephanus distinguishes between the (external) productive or creative intellect, and internal intellects, namely the intellects in us, practical || 36 Anon., In Rhet. 274, 4-10: Καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. εἰπὼν ἄνω τόπους στοιχειώδεις τοῦ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τόδε ἐστὶν ἢ τόδε νῦν πάλιν οἷον δι' ὑποδειγμάτων ἐκεῖνα μεταχειρίζεται. αἱ ἀρεταί, φησίν, ἀγαθόν εἰσιν. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ποίου τόπου ὁρμᾶται τὸ ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἀγαθόν; ἀπὸ τοῦ πέμπτου δηλαδὴ καὶ τοῦ ἕκτου. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι> πόθεν δείξεις; ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίτου τόπου. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπὸ ποίου τόπου; ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, δευτέρου καὶ ἕκτου. καὶ οὕτως ἐφίστανε περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

160 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

and theoretical. Of these intellects, the external cannot be mistaken (this is not argued for but seems to be evident), but the theoretical is also always right. It seems that the practical intellect remains, which, as Stephanus says, is the one that can fall under the sway of desires. At this point I think it is important to note that what Stephanus seems to say is not that the practical intellect is always mistaken, but rather that it is mistaken when it is affected by desires, as a result of which it is somehow distorted. When, however, it is the leader, namely when it rules over the irrational part of the soul, then this intellect is not mistaken, but decides correctly for what is good. Therefore the role ascribed to each intellect is the following: the practical intellect is responsible for the desires/wishes and might be mistaken or give an order about something bad, when it is driven due by these desires, whereas whenever it is a ruler, it orders correctly. The theoretical intellect, on the other hand, as well as the external creative intellect, cannot be mistaken37. As for the creative intellect, there is no further description, but it is interesting to note that Stephanus follows here the peripatetic tradition initiated by Alexander of Aphrodisias in distinguishing between the external intellect and the intellects in us, namely the theoretical and practical38. However, the language that he uses in referring to the external intellect as “creative” seems to come mainly from the Neoplatonic philosophers, who name as creative the divine and external intellect39.

4.4 Virtue The account of virtues in the Rhetoric (I.9) is useful mainly in epideictic speeches. Through the topoi presented in this chapter, the epideictic orator will be able to praise one as virtuous. However, these topoi have a second function as well: they are useful as a way for the speaker to present himself as virtuous. The double function of this account is mentioned by Aristotle at the beginning of this chapter40, and is also repeated later in his discussion of the second means of persuasion, namely the presentation of the qualities of the speaker's character (II.1)41.

|| 37 Cf. DA III.6 430b26-29: ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ κατά τινος. 38 Alexander,In DA 80,16 ff.; Simplicius, In DA 222, 18; Philoponus, In DA 515, 9 ff. 39 Proclus, In Parm. 762, 22; In Tim. 150, 17; Theol. Plat. 117, 26 ; Damascius, De princ. 249, 2 ; Simplicius, In De Caelo 609, 2; In phys. 461, 14; Philoponus, De aet. Mundi 575, 21 ; 577, 20 : ἐνεργῶν δὲ οὕτως καὶ πάντα ἅμα νοῶν τὰ ὄντα οὐδὲν ταύτῃ διοίσει τοῦ θείου τε καὶ δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ. 40 Rhet. I.9 1366a25-28: συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν. 41 Rhet. II.1 1378a15-18: ὅθεν μὲν οὖν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διῃρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον.

Virtue | 161

The treatment of virtues in the Rhetoric is similar to the treatment of the other ethical notions, since Aristotle also offers here a definition of virtue that differs from the definition found in his Ethics, followed by a list of the commonly accepted virtues. This list of the Rhetoric does not include the nameless virtues that are presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle argues explicitly for their addition to the list of the commonly accepted42 virtues. Moreover, here Aristotle argues for a hierarchy of virtues based on their feature of benefiting others, which is absent from his treatment of virtues in the Ethics: [T.9] After these, let us speak about virtue and vice and honourable and shameful; for these are the points of reference for one who wants to praise or blame. Moreover, as we speak of these, we shall incidentally also make clear those things, from which we shall be able to make both ourselves and any other person worthy of credence regarding virtue. [...] Now virtue is an ability, as it seems, that is productive and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing good in many and great ways, actually in all ways in all things. The parts of virtue are justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. Since virtue is defined as an ability for doing good, the greatest virtues are necessarily those most useful to others. [...] Justice is a virtue by which everyone, individually, has what is due to them and as the law requires; whereas injustice is a vice by which they have what belongs to others and not as the law requires. Manly courage is a virtue by which people perform fine actions in times of danger and as the law orders and obedient to the law, and cowardice is the opposite. Self-control is the virtue through which people behave as the law orders regarding the pleasures of the body, whereas lack of control is the opposite. Liberality is the disposition43 to do good with money, illiberality is the opposite. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits, magnificence is a virtue in expenditures, productive of something great, while little-mindedness and stinginess are the opposites. Prudence is a virtue of intelligence, whereby people are able to plan well for happiness in regard to the good and bad things that have been mentioned earlier.44

|| 42 S. Irwin (1996), 159. 43 Here the translation is misleading. Kennedy is transferring here the view of the Ethics: Aristotle has just defined virtue as power and not as disposition. 44 Rhet. I.9 1366a23-b22: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέγοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν [...] ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις ὡς δοκεῖ ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα· μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, σοφία. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική [...]. ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ δι' ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος. ἀνδρεία δὲ δι' ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον. σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιητική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων [μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον],

162 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

What immediately draws one's attention in this Aristotelian account of virtue is its definition as capacity/power (δύναμις), which Aristotle rejects in the Nicomachean Ethics II.5 in favour of the definition of virtue as state or disposition (ἕξις)45. This difference between the two accounts has been explained through a developmental approach, according to which the Nicomachean Ethics II.5-6 account represents a view Aristotle developed later, namely after the composition of the Rhetoric46. However, given that elsewhere in the Rhetoric Aristotle says that virtue is a state, it is more likely that the difference between the two treatments is not one that can be explained through reference to Aristotle's own development, but rather it should be explained through the difference between the two projects. It seems therefore that Aristotle is not at all concerned with consistency between the two treatises or even within the same treatise, but, as Irwin puts it, virtue defined as a capacity fits his strategy in this treatise better, namely the strategy of keeping it simple, since his theory of virtue as a disposition needs a further clarification with reference to the theory of means, practical wisdom, etc47. Moreover, missing from the account of virtues in the Rhetoric is the theory of virtues as means, which Aristotle develops in his ethical treatises. In particular, the virtues are here presented with their corresponding vices with no reference to the schema of virtue as the mean between two extremes. Hence, courage is opposed to cowardice, temperance to intemperance, magnanimity to little-mindedness, etc. Another issue related to this discussion of virtue is the second function of this account, namely the presentation of the character of the orator as virtuous. Through the description of virtue, the orator can also present himself as virtuous and therefore trustworthy. In fact, this is what Aristotle calls as the second means of persuasion. However, the question that arises, which is also related to the legitimacy of rhetoric, is the following: does Aristotle expect the orator to appear as virtuous or to be virtuous? In other words, does Aristotle presuppose that these ethical topoi will be used by an orator who has fully grasped the nature of happiness and the good and is himself virtuous, or is the Rhetoric not concerned with these moral considerations and hence presents an amoral theory? The answer to the question about the role of the orator is therefore closely connected to the role one ascribes to the treatise and its aims. As I have presented above, although some scholars support the view that Aristotle's philosophical concerns in the Rhetoric are not so distinct from his aims in the ethical treatises and, hence, that the orator should have a full || μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικροπρέπεια τἀναντία. φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν. 45 NE II.6 1106b36-1107a2: Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. 46 Kennedy (1991); Grimaldi (1988) v.I, 194; Allard-Nelson (2001). 47 Irwin (1996), 160 ff.

Virtue | 163

knowledge of the ethical matters in order to persuade, there are some passages of the Aristotelian Rhetoric that contradict this view. For example, we find passages in which Aristotle states that the orator can choose the topos that is more advantageous for the particular case, without setting any moral limit to the way in which the orator should make use of these topoi48.

4.4.1 Anonymous’ commentary The Anonymous commentator deals with the latter aspect of this account, namely the moral role of the orator, and, as I mentioned in the previous section on controversial goods, seems to highlight the moral considerations of the rhetorical account of virtue, not through a direct association of it with the ethical treatises, but by arguing that true knowledge of the matters in question is a presupposition for the orator. Regarding my parallel reading of the passages on virtue and the good, although there is no explicit discussion about the moral role of the orator in the chapter on the good (I.6), I see a similarity in the context and language with this passage on virtue, since both passages refer to arguments on controversial cases: in both passages the orator is said to be able to present the same thing as good or bad through the topoi of controversial goods, or the same person as being either virtuous or vicious through the topoi of virtues. The latter will be implied by the commentator’s statement in the next passage [T.10], specifically that the orator can present the same qualities of one's character as being virtues or can turn the virtues into vices. Hence, I will conclude that the orator, by knowing what is truly virtuous, will also know what is truly good and use the topoi accordingly. More specifically, I argue, the commentator seems to want to show that the Rhetoric deals with ethical issues in a way that ensures the moral use of these topoi. In the case of virtue, where Aristotle refers to the possibility that the orator will make use of these topoi for arguing for controversial cases (i.e. in order to present a virtue as a vice or the opposite), the commentator brings into the discussion the crucial role of the orator, who in order to be able to persuade should appear to be virtuous himself and should have true knowledge of the matters:

|| 48 Rhet. I.9 1367a34-b4: ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ τὸν ἠλίθιον χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον, καὶ ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν, καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα παραλογιστικὸν [ἐκ] τῆς αἰτίας.

164 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric [T.10] It will happen that, while we give topoi and arguments from which the person who praises or blames will appear to argue, we also give those from which the person who praises or blames will appear to have a certain quality himself; for the consequence will be the best gain, namely the person who gives the encomium will become of certain quality through the arguments, from which the epideictic orator will try to praise one thing or blame another; for if I magnify the success of one person and show him to be courageous and temperate through these49 accounts and arguments or to be just through precise accounts and evidence that characterise the just person, then necessarily I should also be thought to be just and temperate, since it is not likely that I praise these goods, i.e. courage and practical wisdom, in such a skillful way without knowing what these praised and magnified things are. Since neither will one admire honey, if one has not tasted the sweetness, nor will one praise fire as hot and vitalising without knowing what it is, in the same way one will neither be a praiser of virtue, if he is not a zealous and fervent admirer of it, nor one will want to magnify the acts of justice and temperance, if one has not experienced from their own acts of what kind of qualities they consist. So, he reasonably takes appearing moral and of certain qualities as the second pistis.50

The meaning of this passage seems to be the following: according to the commentator, the orator, in order to persuade the audience of the moral quality of an action, needs himself to know what is really virtuous, that is, just or temperate etc. If one does not know what is just, one will not be able to use arguments about justice effectively. Moreover, if one does not know what is just and has not experienced it through his own acts of justice, one will not even want to praise justice (οὔτε σωφροσύνης ἔργα καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐξᾶραι θελήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τὴν πεῖραν ἐξ ἔργων ἔχει). Similarly, in a non-ethical context, one cannot know how to describe honey if one has not tasted the sweetness of honey51. In both his ethical and non-ethical examples, therefore, the commentator highlights the importance of first-hand knowledge by the orator of the virtues. Moreover, since the orator should know what is virtuous and since he should know it by his own experience, it follows that the orator will himself be also virtu|| 49 The manuscript V (Vat. 1340) does not have τῶν in this line. 50 Anon., In Rhet. 46, 23-38: συμβήσεται δὲ λέγοντας ἡμᾶς τόπους καὶ πίστεις, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἐπαινῶν καὶ ψέγων ἐπιχειρῶν φανεῖται, παραδοῦναι κἀκεῖνα, ἐξ ὧν ποιός τις φανήσεται ὁ ἐπαινῶν ἢ ψέγων· πόρισμα γὰρ οἷον κάλλιστον ἀκολουθήσει τὸ καὶ ποιὸν γενέσθαι τὸν πανηγυρίζοντα ἐκ τῶν πίστεων, ἐξ ὧν ἐγκωμιάζων ἐπιχειρήσει τόδε μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τόδε δὲ ψέγειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαίρω τοῦδε τὰ κατορθώματα καὶ δεικνύω τυχὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ σώφρονα ἐκ [τῶν] τοιῶνδε λόγων καὶ πίστεων καὶ δίκαιον ἀπὸ λόγων ἀκριβῶν καὶ τεκμηρίων, ἃ χαρακτηρίζουσι τὸν δίκαιον, ἀνάγκη κἀμὲ δίκαιον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι καὶ σώφρονα, ὅτι μηδ' ἔστιν εἰκὸς ἐκθειάζειν με πάνυ τεχνικῶς τάδε τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, μὴ εἰδέναι δέ, τίνα εἰσὶ τὰ ἐπαινούμενα καὶ ἐξαιρόμενα· ἐπεὶ οὔτε τὸ μέλι θαυμάσει τις, εἰ μὴ τῆς γλυκύτητος ἀπογεύσαιτο, οὔτε τὸ πῦρ ὡς θερμὸν καὶ ζῳογόνον ἐγκωμιάσει μὴ εἰδὼς ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἀρετῆς ἐπαινέτης ἔσται μὴ ζηλωτὴς ὢν αὐτῆς καὶ θερμὸς ἐραστής, οὔτε σωφροσύνης ἔργα καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐξᾶραι θελήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τὴν πεῖραν ἐξ ἔργων ἔχει, ποῖαι δή τινες καθεστήκασιν. εἰκότως δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι δευτέραν λέγει πίστιν. 51 See the first chapter above (1. Introduction) on the authorship on the Anonymous commentary, where I examine the implications of this passage regarding its relation to the Anonymous commentary on the NE VII.

Virtue | 165

ous. This thought, which is reminiscent of the Socratic doctrines, seems to be fallacious, since knowledge of the good is immediately identified with action in accordance with this good, and it seems that what the commentator implies is that it is not possible that one person could know what is good without acting in accordance with it. In other words, this argument takes no account of the possibility that the orator might try to manipulate the audience by praising what the audience thinks well of without truly believing in it. But according to this argument, the orator, in order to present and praise someone as virtuous and in order to magnify actions that were done in accordance with virtue, should have a full grasp of what virtue and good genuinely are and be himself virtuous. How does the orator reach this knowledge? The commentator answers this question in his interpretation of chapter II.1 of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle deals with the second pistis, namely the presentation of the character of the speaker: [T.11] From the divisions related to virtues that we made either here or in the Ethics. For starting from the same topoi one will show both themselves and another person to be good.52

According to this passage, the two accounts of virtue, namely the one in the ethical treatises and the one in the Rhetoric, seem to be in a way equally useful in order for someone to learn what is virtuous. It could be argued, therefore, that the Rhetoric presents here, as we said in the case of the happiness, briefly the same views as presented in the ethical treatises. The next question that arises is in what way the orator should make use of these topoi, and especially of those that are more controversial. As already said, Aristotle does refer to cases in which the orator might use the topoi as it is more advantageous for him, without stating whether any use of them is legitimate, for example to use the topoi in an immoral way. The commentator refers to that use as well: [T.12] We talked, he says, about the means of virtues and about their acts and signs and about some topoi; now we want to teach you how to find something useful for praise also in the excess or deficiency of virtues, just as from the means you will find some very useful paradox for the deduction of something. Means are good and the extremes are close to them, i.e. silliness is close to temperance and audacity is next to courage and villainy is next to practical wisdom; so, when praising the silly person, you should call him temperate or good, and when blaming the cautious or courageous, you should call him coward and treacherous (you see how a paradoxical topos for blaming has been given to you from the mean) and the insensible you can call mild. And everything you can argue from these things that follow always, namely you

|| 52 Anon., In Rhet. 88, 31-33: ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διῃρημένων ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τόπων ὁρμώμενός τις καὶ ἑαυτὸν δείξει ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερον.

166 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric can praise the badness of the extreme in a way that is useful for the best case of the mean. For instance, you should call the angry and mad person as simple-minded or53 as not willing to ponder deeply [...].54

In this passage, the commentator exhorts the orator, as Aristotle does, to use, for the sake of the argument, things that are related to or are close to the main issue in question. As Aristotle says, one can use qualities that are close to those actually present, for example the orator can present the cautious person as cold or the arrogant as high-minded. The Anonymous commentator, while interpreting this passage, refers to the theory of virtues as means, and takes the “qualities that are close to the qualities one actually has” (τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν) of the Aristotelian text to mean the extremes (vices) that are close to the mean (virtue). Hence, the orator might need, in order to persuade, to present one's vices as virtues by saying that the silly person is temperate, the audacious is courageous or that the villain is a practically wise person. So, as we saw in the case of controversial goods, the orator can present the same thing as being either good or bad through different topoi, and use the topoi from the virtues as means for giving a paradoxical argument. How is this connected with the view expressed in the previous passage that the orator knows the real nature of the good and the virtues? Does the orator handle the simple-minded audience in such a way, in order to teach them or to persuade them for what is really good? If this is the case, then by using amoral or morally-neutral means (i.e. the topoi) the orator will be able to lead the audience to a morally good decision, in order to teach what is morally good. In other words, (1) given that the Anonymous recognises that some of the topoi presented in the Rhetoric can be used by the orator to argue for both the goodness and badness or virtue and vice of the same thing or action, and (2) also given that he states that the orator, who makes use of these arguments, should necessarily be good and virtuous himself and have a knowledge of what good and happiness consist in, these two factors indicate that the Anonymous commentator thinks that the orator should make use of these topoi in the best possible way in order to persuade for the good and to bring about virtue in the audience. In these controversial cases, therefore, it is not the topoi themselves

|| 53 The manuscript V (Vat. 1340) does not have καὶ in this line. 54 Anon., In Rhet. 53, 5-20: εἴπομεν, φησί, περὶ ἀρετῶν μεσοτήτων καὶ ἔργων αὐτῶν καὶ σημείων καί τινων τόπων· νῦν δὲ βουλόμεθά σε διδάξαι, πῶς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ταῖς ἐλλείψεσιν εὑρήσεις τι πρὸς ἔπαινον χρησιμώτατον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν μεσοτήτων εὑρήσεις τι πρὸς καταφοράν τινος ἐπιτηδειότατον τὸ παράδοξον. ὑπάρχουσι μὲν ἀγαθὰ αἱ μεσότητες, σύνεγγυς δὲ αὐταῖς τὰ ἄκρα εἰσίν, οἷον τῇ σωφροσύνῃ ἡ ἠλιθιότης καὶ τῇ ἀνδρίᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ τῇ φρονήσει ἡ πανουργία· ἐγκωμιάζων οὖν εἰπὲ τὸν ἠλίθιον σώφρονα καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ τὸν εὐλαβῆ καὶ εὔψυχον δειλὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον (ὁρᾷς, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς μεσότητος τόπος σοι πρὸς ψόγον παραδοξότατος δέδοται) καὶ τὸν ἀνάλγητον κάλει πρᾶον. καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἤτοι ἐπαίνει τὸ τῆς ἀκρότητος φαῦλον προσφόρως κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τῆς μεσότητος. οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν εἰπὲ [καὶ] ὡς οὐ βουλόμενον βυσσοδομεύειν ἐντός [...].

Virtue | 167

that ensure the pursuit of a good result, but it is the orator who uses them in an appropriate way who ensures that pursuit.

4.4.2 Stephanus’ commentary Stephanus interprets this account of virtue in light of its treatment in the ethical treatises as well, but not in the same way as the Anonymous did. Stephanus does not refer to the legitimacy of rhetoric nor to the moral character of the orator, but instead he changes the rhetorical terminology in order to make it consistent with the terminology used by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. [T.13.a] “So, praise is”. Since he systematises here the epideictic speech, and epideictic is divided into encomium and blame, now he teaches, making it perfect, what the difference is between encomium, praise and blessing, just as the orator taught us the difference between encomium, hymn and praise. So here Aristotle says, as he also said in the end of the first book of Ethics, that praise is a speech that shows greatness of a perfect habit, e.g. of courage or justice; [...] whereas we have an encomium, when you magnify with the speech also the actions and the results of actions. [...] So actions are the most essential cause of encomium, whereas the rest are arguments for the actions.55 [T.13.b] The deeds are signs of habit. This is how one should write it and not “of actions”, as it is delivered in some copies of the text.56

In these passages, in order to bring the account of the Rhetoric closer to the one of the ethical treatises, Stephanus refers, first of all, to the virtues as states and not as capacities, which is the way virtues were defined in the Rhetoric. In fact, virtues are called the best dispositions (ἕξεως ἀρίστης) with reference to the end of the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Therefore, by changing the Aristotelian text and by assuming the technical terminology from the ethical treatises, Stephanus wishes to conciliate the rhetorical account of virtue with the one of Aristotle's ethical treatises.

|| 55 Steph., In Rhet. 281, 27-282, 15: Ἔστι δὲ ἔπαινος. ἐπεὶ περὶ πανηγυρικοῦ λόγου ἐνταῦθα τεχνολογεῖ, ὁ δὲ πανηγυρικὸς διαιρεῖται εἰς ἐγκώμιον καὶ ψόγον, νῦν τέλειόν τι ποιῶν διδάσκει, τί διαφέρει ἐγκώμιον, ἔπαινος, μακαρισμός, ὡς δὴ καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ55 ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν ἐγκωμίου, ὕμνου, ἐπαίνου. Ἐνταῦθα οὖν λέγει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ τέλει τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Ἠθικῶν εἶπεν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἔπαινός ἐστι λόγος μέγεθος δεικνύων ἕξεώς τινος ἀρίστης, οἷον ἀνδρίας, δικαιοσύνης· [...] τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον, ὅταν καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἀποτελέσματα τῶν πράξεων ἤγουν τὰ ἔργα ἐξαίρῃς τῷ λόγῳ. [...] αἱ μὲν οὖν πράξεις εἰσὶ τὸ συνεκτικώτατον αἴτιον τοῦ ἐγκωμίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πίστεις τῶν πράξεων. 56 Steph., In Rhet. 282, 16-17: Τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς εἰσιν. οὕτω γραπτέον καὶ μὴ πράξεως, ὡς παρ' ἐνίοις τῶν ἀντιγράφων φέρεται.

168 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

4.5 Pleasure In the eleventh chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses the notion of pleasure, and offers topoi that can be used mainly within forensic speeches, in order for the orator to argue for the intentions of a person who committed a certain action, since pleasure is said by Aristotle to be an end for human actions. In particular, in the previous chapter of the treatise (I.10), where Aristotle presented the motivations of human actions, he refers to pleasure as the end of the actions that are committed due to habit as well as due to desire, since one desires what is or seems to be pleasant57. Pleasure is hence dealt with by Aristotle, who, in a way similar to his treatment of the other ethical notions, here defines pleasure provisionally as a sort of movement of the soul towards the natural state, after which he offers a list of pleasant things. [T.14] Let us assume that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul58 and a collective organisation of sensual perception reaching into fundamental nature and that pain is the opposite. If pleasure is something of this sort, it is clear that, what is productive of the condition mentioned, is also pleasurable and that what is destructive [of it] or is productive of the opposite organisation is painful. Movement into a natural state is thus necessarily pleasurable for the most part, and especially whenever a natural process has recovered its own natural state. And habits [are pleasurable]; for the habitual has already become, as it were, natural; for habit is something like nature. (What happens often is close to what happens always, and nature is a matter of “always,” habit of “often.”) What is not compulsory also [is pleasurable]; for compulsion is contrary to nature. Thus, constraints are painful.59

|| 57 Rhet. I.10 1369b15-18: δι' ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται ὅσα φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν συνεθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν. 58 Kennedy (1991), 87 translates ψυχῆς as “mind” and argues that “The word traditionally translated “soul” literally means “breath.” Aristotle, as always, uses it for the vital principle of life found in all living things. In the case of human beings, it can often be best translated “mind.” To him the word had a scientific, not a religious, connotation. As in some earlier chapters, Aristotle here provides basic knowledge and understanding of human psychology that he regards as needed by a speaker, in this case a speaker in a court of law, but without attempting to show how the topics might be applied in a speech”. However, I do not see the reason for here translating ψυχή in such a specific sense. 59 Rhet. I.11 1369b33-1370a10: Ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις), καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν.

Pleasure | 169

In this passage, coming from the beginning of the chapter on pleasure, Aristotle defines pleasure and the pleasant with reference to one's natural state, towards which the soul is moved. This definition is followed by a list of pleasant things, which includes things that are considered to be natural, namely those that belong to one's nature, and those things close to natural, namely the habitual ones. Consequently, anything that is not by force is also pleasant. Moreover, also characterised as pleasant are those things for which there is a desire, either rational (the desire that is brought about through persuasion) or irrational (bodily desires). Finally, given that pleasure is related to perception, also called pleasant are those things that are related to perception and to the soul's faculty related to perception, namely imagination. Hence, Aristotle refers to the pleasure of things that are perceived (i.e. of things being seen) as well as to pleasure of things that one remembers from their past or expects and hopes to have in the future. However, the treatment of pleasure in the Rhetoric I.11, though consistent with views of pleasure known from non-Aristotelian sources, is not in line with Aristotle's views as developed in his ethical treatises. In particular, the definition of pleasure as movement of the soul seems to be of Academic origin, and is often ascribed to Speusippus60, or, as Aristotle states in the tenth book on the Nicomachean Ethics, to the opponents of Eudoxus, a supporter of a hedonistic theory (NE X.2 1172b35 ff.). In the latter treatise, Aristotle extensively discusses and criticises this view of pleasure as movement of the soul, as well as the view of pleasure as a sort of generation, in order to show that not all pleasures are bad and that hence, some pleasure might be identified with the highest good. More specifically, as Aristotle says in the NE, these opponents of hedonism support the view that pleasure cannot be the highest good with the argument that the Good is something complete and perfect, whereas pleasure, which is either movement or generation, is incomplete, since it is a movement (X.3 1173a29-31). However, Aristotle disagrees with this argument, and clearly states that pleasure cannot be a movement, since it is not the case that pleasure can have a speed either in itself or in relation to something else, whereas all movements are characterised by being faster or slower (X.3 1173a31-b4). Moreover, if pleasure was a movement, then it would be completed in a certain moment or it would become perfect by lasting for a longer time. However, this is not what happens with pleasure, but, as Aristotle states, pleasure is a whole that cannot be completed by extending its duration, but it is perfect in any time (X.4 1174a13 ff.). In the NE, Aristotle also criticises the view that pleasure is a replenishment or a reinstatement to the natural state. According to him, this view cannot be correct, since pleasure does not seem to belong to the body, and this replenishment necessarily refers to the bodily natural state. Moreover, pleasure seems to be felt not during the procedure of coming back to the natural state, but instead it is felt at the || 60 S. Fortenbaugh (1970); Guthrie (1978), V. 5, 468-469.

170 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

moment of the completion of such a procedure. This becomes more evident in the pleasures related to knowledge or to the senses, for instance the pleasure from seeing or smelling something. In these cases, and unlike the bodily pleasures related to food, there is no such replenishment taking place, since there is no pain preceding the feeling of pleasure. Instead, one feels pleasure by watching a performance or by hearing a song without beforehand feeling the lack of this pleasure and the presence of a pain due to the absence of pleasure (X.3 1173b9-20). Therefore, given that in his ethical writings Aristotle expresses such a severe criticism of the view of pleasure as a sort of movement of the soul towards the natural state, the fact that in the Rhetoric he defines pleasure exactly in this way requires clarification. One interpretational strategy is to explain such differences through a reference to the different time he wrote the two treatises. It has been therefore suggested that this part of the treatise is one of the earliest, namely before Aristotle developed his views known from his ethical treatises. Hence, the views of pleasure as movement of the soul are justified, if they were expressed in a time when Aristotle was still a member of the Academy, and therefore influenced by Platonic teachings61. However, although the Rhetoric is indeed an early treatise, I think that such differences can be also explained by the difference between the two projects, namely by Aristotle's lack of concern for a systematic analysis of ethical matters in the Rhetoric. The interpretation of this chapter on pleasure also seems to have caused some difficulties in the case of the two Byzantine commentators of the Rhetoric. Stephanus does not comment at all on this chapter. Given that he does not comment on certain other passages of the treatise as well or he only offers some scarce comments on other parts, it seems that this absence of comments is intentional, and indicates either his lack of interest in some aspects of the rhetorical theory or his difficulty in dealing with such differences between the Aristotelian treatises. In fact, throughout his commentary he often makes clear that he is interested in highlighting the connection of the Rhetoric with the other treatises of the corpus and in noting the role of the Rhetoric as a treatise that focuses on logical argumentation. Hence, it is possible that Stephanus does not comment on the rhetorical treatment of pleasure precisely because neither does it present an opportunity to show the focus of the treatise nor is it possible to bring it in line with Aristotle's ethical theory of the Nicomachean Ethics.

|| 61 S. Kennedy (1991), 87; Rist (1989), 84.

Pleasure | 171

4.5.1 Anonymous’ commentary The Anonymous commentator comments briefly on this chapter, and his interpretation is for the most part a paraphrase of the Aristotelian text. However, one finds traces of an effort to reconcile the rhetorical definition of pleasure as movement of the soul and Aristotle's criticism of this definition in the Nicomachean Ethics. In particular, Aristotle suggests in the latter treatise that such a definition of pleasure seems to take as a starting point these types of pleasure that are related to food. In these cases, pleasure seems to be a replenishment and a return to a natural state which was distorted due to the feeling of a pain. For instance, hunger is a pain that becomes pleasure after one eats, when one is brought to the natural state in which one does not feel any lack of food. This discussion is absent in the Rhetoric, but the commentator makes use of it, maybe in order to justify Aristotle's definition in this treatise: [T.15] Pleasure is a movement of the soul and a collective and sudden restoration that is perceived, towards the existing nature, namely towards the natural state; for when one is hungry and then eats and replenishes the stomach with food, one is pleased collectively as being moved towards their natural state and towards being satisfied, and one is then moved not without being perceived, but one feels the replenishment. But for the movement of growth, we do not feel pleasure, because we are moved towards growth unperceived. Pain, on the other hand, is the movement against the natural state; against nature is one moved when the paunch becomes empty of food and the animal feels pain.62

In his interpretation of the definition of pleasure, the Anonymous commentator explains the procedure of feeling pleasure through the example of eating. Pleasure is the movement that is perceived as a restoration of the natural state after a pain has been felt due to the lack of food. On the one hand, the fact that the commentator uses this particular way of explaining the definition of pleasure as movement could be an indication that the account of the ethical treatises is what he here has in mind. As Aristotle stated in those treatises, the view that pleasure is a movement seems to take as a starting point what happens in the case of food, where indeed a replenishment and restoration is taking place. It might therefore be the case that the commentator wants to show that pleasure is a movement only in those cases in which the natural state is restored after the feeling of certain pain. More specifically, this emphasis on the examples of food might indicate that the commentator, who

|| 62 Anon., In Rhet. 63, 35-64, 6: Ἡδονή ἐστι κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀθρόα καὶ αἰφνίδιος κατάστασις αἰσθητὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν ἤτοι εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· ὅταν γὰρ πεινᾷ τις, εἶτα ἐσθίῃ καὶ ἀναπληροῖ τὴν γαστέρα βρωμάτων, ἀθρόως ἥδεται ὡς κινούμενος εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀνελλιπές, οὐχὶ ἀνεπαισθήτως δὲ κινεῖται, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεται τῆς ἀναπληρώσεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αὐξητικῆς κινήσεως οὐχ ἡδόμεθα, διότι ἀνεπαισθήτως κινούμεθα εἰς αὔξησιν. λύπη δέ ἐστιν ἡ εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ κινεῖται, ὅταν ἡ γαστὴρ βρωμάτων ἐνδεὴς γένηται καὶ λυπῆται τὸ ζῷον.

172 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

probably was familiar with the ethical account of pleasure, tries to reconcile the two accounts by suggesting that pleasure is indeed a movement towards a natural state but only when this movement is perceived. Any other movement towards the natural state would hence not bring about pleasure, for example the movement of growing. Therefore, on this reading, it is the different types of movement or rather the accompaniment of these movements with perception that indicates when pleasure is felt. Similarly, pain is here defined as the movement that is against nature, namely when one feels or perceives a lack of food that needs to be restored. The definition of pleasure is repeated in another passage of the commentary where the commentator again makes clear that in order for pleasure to take place there needs to be a restoration of the natural state that was disrupted because of a preceding pain. In this passage perception is not mentioned, but the commentator focuses on the fact that pleasure follows from a pain, which is again reminiscent of what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics about this view of pleasure as a movement. In particular, Aristotle there observes that this is the only type of pleasure that seems to be a movement, namely the one that follows from the replenishment of a pain, i.e. fullness is the pleasure that follows from restoring hunger. Similarly, the commentator says: [T.16] But change is also pleasant and to change from one place to another or to change the way of living; for as long as something changes, one thinks that a change and an extension is taking place in them towards nature, namely towards the natural state, since pleasure is a collective movement of what is against natural state towards the natural state.63

This passage comments on Aristotle's statement that change is also pleasant because it brings one to their natural state64. According to the commentator, change both in space and in the way one lives is pleasant because it creates the impression of stretching out towards one's nature. The reference to change gives to the commentator the opportunity to repeat the definition of pleasure and to emphasise the fact that pleasure is a movement towards the natural condition that follows from a disruption of this condition.

4.6 Conclusions In general, the Anonymous commentator seems to take the Rhetoric as containing an enumeration of commonplaces for arguments, which, though in line with || 63 Anon., In Rhet. 66, 30-35: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ μεταβολὴ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἀπὸ ἑτέρου τόπου εἰς ἕτερον ἢ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὴν δίαιταν· καθ' ὅσον γὰρ μεταβάλλει, οἴεται γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ μεταβολὴν καὶ ἔκτασιν εἰς φύσιν ἤτοι εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀθρόα κίνησίς ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. 64 Rhet. I.11 1371a25-26: καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ μεταβάλλειν.

Conclusions | 173

Aristotle's views as expressed in the ethical treatises, are in this treatise presented concisely and in a manner useful for the orator and the speech towards the relevant audience. There is no contradiction between the two accounts, but the only difference seems to be that the Rhetoric is used for a different audience, and therefore uses different means to persuade, although the views expressed are ones that Aristotle himself would have accepted. In sum, the two accounts support the same views, except that the rhetorical accounts expresses them more briefly, but the views are truly Aristotelian in the sense that they correspond to Aristotle's ethical theory. This consistency is easily shown in the case of happiness or in the case of commonly accepted goods and virtues, where the commentator refers to the prominent role of virtue in eudaimonia or emphasises on the well-considered and careful method of Aristotle's treatment of the good in the Rhetoric. However, in the case of controversial goods, as well as in the discussion of the use of the various topoi both for the sake of the argument and in favour of the orator's case, the consistency between the two accounts is achieved through reference to the role of the orator, that is, by arguing that the orator should be morally good and have a full knowledge of the matters in question. The case of pleasure is unique, since the differences between the account of the Rhetoric and the one of the ethical treatises seem not to be easily reconcilable. However, here too the commentator tries to adjust the definition of pleasure in the Rhetoric to the Aristotelian criticism of this definition in the ethical treatises. Therefore, there seems to be two separate lines of interpretation of the ethical notions of the Rhetoric: on the one hand, when dealing with happiness, accepted goods, virtue and pleasure, the commentator associates the text with the account of the ethical treatises, and seems to think that the rhetorical account is a brief presentation of the same Aristotelian views. On the other hand, in the discussion of controversial goods and virtue, the Anonymous commentator refers to the prominent role of the orator, who, by being morally good himself and by knowing what good is, will persuade the audience accordingly. For Stephanus, the Rhetoric offers neither a parallel nor a contradictory account to the one of the ethical treatises, but rather the two accounts are taken either as consistent or as completing each other. In the case of happiness, the Rhetoric undertakes a study of that aspect of happiness that is not studied by the ethical treatises, namely political happiness. In his interpretation of the account of the good, Stephanus achieves the compatibility between the Aristotelian treatises by focusing on the role of intellect in the decision of what is good: he therefore takes the account of the Rhetoric as providing topoi for arguing about what is good or bad, as indicated by the intellect. Thus, he brings the Aristotelian theory of intellects as presented in the peripatetic tradition into the account. It is, he says, our practical intellect that concerns desires and appetites, and hence, this intellect is the one that in each case decides what is or is not good and that might be mistaken. Finally, the account of virtue of the Rhetoric is conciliated with the one of the Nicomachean Ethics through the adjustment of the ethical terminology to the rhetorical definition

174 | Ethical Definitions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

of virtue. Therefore, also according to Stephanus the account of the Rhetoric is an imprecise account, which, however, does not contradict Aristotle's views as presented elsewhere, but is in line with and presupposes them.

5 Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric 5.1 Introduction In the first half of the second book of the Rhetoric, specifically chapters II.2-11, we find the most extensive discussion of emotions within the Aristotelian corpus. This discussion follows the tripartite division of technical means of persuasion: argumentation, presentation of the character of the speaker and arousal of emotions. After having dealt in the first book with the specific topoi for enthymemes, namely the topoi relevant to each of the three types of rhetorical speech and to specific subject matters, and before the discussion of the common topoi (chapters II.18 ff.), Aristotle devotes the first chapter of the second book to the presentation of the speaker’s character and its contribution both to the persuasion of the audience and to the introduction to the third art-based means of persuasion, that is, the arousal of emotions. The next ten chapters are devoted to the presentation of particular emotions that can be aroused through rhetorical speech (anger, mildness, friendliness, hatred, fear, confidence, shame, gratefulness, pity, indignation, envy, emulation). This presentation follows in most cases a certain pattern: definition of the emotion in question, description of the state of mind of those who feel the emotion, enumeration of the reasons leading to the particular feeling and description of the object towards which the emotions is felt. However, given that this account of emotions is part of a treatise that, in general, does not depict Aristotle's own well-considered views of many topics (i.e. nature of virtues, eudaimonia or pleasure1), and also given that it is not completely clear for what reason Aristotle deals with this topic at length in the Rhetoric, whereas he did not elsewhere offer a fully developed theory of emotions (as far as we know), the account of emotions in the Rhetoric has become a controversial topic that has been interpreted in various ways by contemporary commentators. In particular, while investigating the nature of emotions in Aristotle and their position in Aristotle's theory of moral psychology, many contemporary commentaries have focused mainly on the relation of emotions to other psychic functions, like perception, imagination and reason, as well as on the role of the account of emotions within the Rhetoric. The questions that arise about the treatment of the emotions in the Rhetoric mainly concern the status of the account of emotions, namely whether one can talk about an “Aristotelian theory”, but also with the content of this account and its compatibility with the rest of the treatise, specifically whether it is legitimate for the speaker to arouse emotions in the audience, and, if so, under what conditions it is || 1 For a more detailed discussion about the status of the definitions of eudaimonia and pleasure in the Rhetoric s. my previous chapter 4 on ethical definitions. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-005

176 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

legitimate. This latter question is connected to the fact that in the first book of the treatise Aristotle already criticised his predecessors for focusing only on the means of persuasion that are external to the speech itself such as the arousal of emotions, before he introduced his own three technical means of persuasion, one of which is the arousal of emotions (Rhet. I.1 1354a11-18). The two Byzantine commentators of the Rhetoric have also dealt with these questions. This chapter will present their views of the role of the account of emotions in the Rhetoric, the legitimacy of emotion-arousal through rhetorical speech and their interpretation of some basic points of Aristotle's presentation of particular emotions. Since their interpretation is totally independent from each other and seems to focus on different aspects of the account, I will present them separately, dealing first with Stephanus' commentary.

5.2 Stephanus on Emotions Although Stephanus offers an elaborate interpretation of many parts of the Rhetoric (mainly the ones that are related to the logical argumentation and the real and apparent enthymemes), he only briefly comments on the chapters on emotions. In fact, his comments on the eleven chapters of the Aristotelian text (II.1-11) cover only three pages of the CAG edition of his commentary. The brevity as well as the content of his interpretation show, as will soon become evident, that the nature of emotions or the legitimacy of the arousal of emotions in the rhetorical speech are not among his main interests. Instead, in the few comments on the chapters on emotions, he interprets the account of emotions in a way fitting to the logical framework of the treatise. In particular, after a brief introduction to the second book of the treatise and a sketchy interpretation of some points of the first two chapters, Stephanus moves on to chapter I.19 and the discussion of common topoi.

5.2.1 Introduction to the second book — Summary of the first book Before commenting on the first chapter of the second book of the Rhetoric, Stephanus summarises what has been said so far in the first book of the treatise in order to introduce the topic of the following chapters. This summary includes quotations of passages of the first book, some of which are closely related to the discussion of character and emotions. In particular, the summary of the first book starts with a quotation from the very first chapter of the treatise, where Aristotle introduced the topic and aim of the treatise and discussed the three means of persuasion, namely arguments, presentation of character and arousal of emotions, the latter of which was, according to Aristotle, the main focus of the earlier rhetoricians, although the

Stephanus on Emotions | 177

arousal of emotions does not belong to the subject matter itself, but is external to the speech. As Stephanus says: [T.1.a] The philosopher said in the first book that “the pisteis are the only part of the rhetoric, whereas the rest are supplementary”, namely the introductions and the discussions in the introductions; and that “the enthymemes are the body of pistis; for slander and pity and anger and such affections of the soul are not related to the subject2” etc. 3 [T.1.b] And again, in the first book he said that “pisteis are the way in which one may become enthymematic4”; and that “of the pisteis that are provided through the speech (for there are other non-artistic pisteis as well) there are three kinds: for some are in the character of the speaker, some in a certain disposition of the audience and others in the speech itself5”. 6 [T.1.c] So, if in the first book he did not treat so much the introduction to the enthymematic pisteis, since he dealt with the powerful part of proofs, in the present book the philosopher is concerned with this part as well, namely with how to render the judge and audience of a certain kind. 7

This passage, although it mainly consists of citations of Aristotle's text, is particularly helpful for understanding Stephanus' disposition towards the account of emotions, but also towards the treatise and its role within the Aristotelian corpus. The

|| 2 Cf. I.1 1354a11-18: νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον (αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν εἰσι μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι), οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν. 3 Steph., In Rhet. 297, 2-6: Εἶπεν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὅτι ‘αἱ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόριον ῥητορικῆς μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι’ ἤγουν τὰ προοίμια καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ ὅτι ‘τὰ ἐνθυμήματα σῶμα τῆς πίστεως· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι’ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. 4 Cf. I.1 1354b21-22: εἰ δὲ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τἆλλα διορίζουσιν, οἷον τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὅθεν ἄν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός. 5 Cf. I.2 1356b1-4: τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. 6 Steph., In Rhet. 297, 13-17: εἶπε δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, ὅτι ‘ἔντεχνοι πίστεις εἰσίν, ὅπως γένοιτό τις ἐνθυμηματικός’, καὶ ὅτι ‘τῶν διὰ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων (εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλαι πίστεις, αἱ ἄτεχνοι) τρία εἴδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ’. 7 Steph., In Rhet. 298, 1-5: εἰ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ οὐ τοσοῦτον ἐφρόντισε τῶν προοιμίων ταῖς ἐνθυμηματικαῖς πίστεσι τὸ ἐνδύναμον κυρώσας τῶν ἀποδείξεων, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βιβλίῳ μέλει τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους, ὅπως ποιόν τινα θήσεις τὸν κριτὴν καὶ τὸν ἀκροατήν.

178 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric first two passages, quoted from the very first chapter of the Rhetoric8, can be taken to imply the commentator's general views about the arousal of emotions through rhetorical speech. Stephanus cites only Aristotle's criticism against his predecessors, who focused on the use of a means of persuasion external to the subject, that is, arousal of the audience's emotions, while leaving aside the most proper part of the rhetoric, that is, argumentation. This decision might be an indication of Stephanus' view of the illegitimacy of emotion-arousal within a rhetorical speech. However, given that Aristotle himself also dealt with the emotions and the character of the speaker, Stephanus mentions that the two means contribute to persuasion, when provided through the speech. As we will see in detail below, Stephanus, in the rest of his comments on the chapters on emotions, does not discuss this function of rhetorical speech at all, namely the arousal of certain emotions but focuses instead on the contribution of the emotion-related chapters to argumentation. This focus on the logical aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric is evident also in his introduction to the second book and, in particular, in the third passage cited above [T.1.c], which presents Stephanus' views of the structure of the first two books of the treatise. As Stephanus stated, the first book of the treatise dealt with the “powerful part of proofs” (τὸ ἐνδύναμον τῶν ἀποδείξεων), that is, the enthymemes and the topoi specific to each of the three rhetorical species, whereas the second book will deal with those parts that were not treated in the first book and that belong to the introduction of the enthymematic proofs (τῶν προοιμίων ταῖς ἐνθυμηματικαῖς πίστεσι), namely the character of the speaker and the emotions. Regarding the position of the emotion-related topoi in the introduction, which is stated in passage [T.1.c] and repeated elsewhere in the commentary9, one explanation could be based on the first two passages that Stephanus quotes, in which Aristotle stated, on the one hand, that emotion-arousal is external to the subject and, on the other hand, that the earlier rhetoricians dealt only with facts external to the subject, e.g. what should be said in the introduction and narration. Hence, Stephanus might have concluded that issues related to emotions need to be placed in the introduction. Or perhaps Aristotle's views on the parts of the speech, as presented in the third book of the treatise (III.13-14), are here taken into account: for Aristotle, the introduction is necessary in epideictic and forensic speeches for the orator to make clear the end of the speech (Rhet. III.14 1415a22-25). Hence, maybe Stephanus takes the account of emotions to be useful for this reason: the orator could be shown to be || 8 These quotations, together with a comment on the beginning of the third book (CAG XXI.2 309, 29), are actually the only evidence that Stephanus has read and most probably wrote a commentary of the first chapter of the treatise, although this part of his commentary is lost. 9 Steph., In Rhet. 309, 3-8: τρία γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγει, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα ῥήτορα ἤγουν σπουδαῖον, εὐλαβῆ, εὔνουν τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αὐτοὺς τοὺς δικαστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ποιοὺς εἶναι ἤγουν ἢ πρὸς ἔλεον παρακεκινημένους ὑπὸ τῶν προοιμίων ἢ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ τὰ τοιάδε πάθη, καὶ τρίτον τὸ καλῶς ἀποδεικνύειν τὰ περὶ ὧν λέγει πράγματα καὶ πιθανῶς.

Stephanus on Emotions | 179

credible and the audience could be prepared for the main part of the speech, namely the proofs. However, it seems more probable to me that the positing of the account of emotions in the introduction has a different purpose. It should be noted that Stephanus does not say that the emotion-related part belongs to the beginning of the rhetorical speech, but rather he says that this part belongs to the introduction of the enthymematic persuasion. The difference between these two statements is not trivial. If the account of emotions belongs to a part of the speech that is related to enthymemes, then this statement might anticipate what Stephanus will argue later, namely that the account can be used within the enthymemes, as additional commonplaces, from which one can argue for one’s case. If this is so, then the picture that we have so far of Stephanus' views on the account of emotions is that it has a subsidiary role, accompanying the more central and powerful part of the rhetorical speech, namely arguments, although both are related to enthymemes. This view, together with the interpretation of the account of emotions that will be presented in the next section, will have an interesting result: the account of emotions of the Rhetoric will be part of the logical project of the treatise and will contribute to the theory of argumentation featured in the Rhetoric as much as other parts of the treatise.

5.2.2 Second Chapter: anger — other pathe Stephanus’ interpretation of the treatment of particular emotions takes as a starting point the last sentence of the chapter on anger10. His interpretation does not focus on anger alone, but instead takes into account the Aristotelian treatment of enmity, friendship and emulation, and seems to be applicable to the other emotions as well. In particular, his comment, starting from a typical11 discussion from the end of the chapter on anger about the use by the orator of the topoi of anger, seems to aim at showing in what way the account of emotions in general is supposed to be used within the rhetorical speech or, in other words, what is the role of this account within the treatise. The fact that this is Stephanus' aim is evident originally from the first sentence of his comment (passage [T.2.a]), where he states that the end of the chapter on anger can show the way in which a speech can establish in what state of mind the culprits of an action are, but this aim becomes even clearer from what follows.

|| 10 Rhet. II.2 1380a2-4: δῆλον δ’ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις ὀργίζονται. 11 Typical insofar as it is to be found in the end of almost all of the chapters on emotions in the Rhetoric. More specifically, almost every chapter entails a discussion of the use by the orator of the topoi presented in the preceding discussion of each emotion.

180 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric [T.2.a] It would be clear then, how it would be needful to establish by the speech that they (i.e. the culprits) are in that state of mind, at the end of the chapter on anger. [T.2.b] For one will prove that a hidden enemy is an enemy by the topoi of enmity that were handed down, and immediately one will prove that someone, who was not considered as a friend, is a friend to the city or to a certain person or to the judge; starting from these topoi, you will show Alcibiades to be an enemy, although he is not; “What, then? Did he talk against Pericles not due to enmity but rather due to anger, seeking for revenge, because he (i.e. Pericles) had caused him pain in the past?”, or again you will make someone appear as a friend of another, though he is not his friend, through one of the given topoi; “But how, could you, Pericles, think that Alcibiades is your enemy, who is always fond of all popular leaders and of those who were in favor of the city?”. [T.2.c] And again, if he says that “I am an enemy of Pericles”, you will refute the statement by saying that “You should not be trusted; for how could you, who felt always zeal and admiration for the counsellors and the leaders of the city?”. And again, from the opposite [topos], if he says that he is a friend of Pericles, you will refute in this way: “No. For how [would you be his friend], if Pericles' enemies are your friends? Hence you are an enemy.” [T.2.d] From this topos you will convert, if you want, the [actions] of enmity into anger and the [actions] of anger into enmity, captivating the audience, due to the seeming similarity of the two emotions “for one who was distressed due to anger can be pardoned, whereas the one due to idle enmity cannot”. [T.2.e] For when there are different topoi about one and the same case, you will refute the same statement through one and you will establish through the other, as in the case of pleasure12; for you will show it to be good and non-good, the one through the “at which everything aims”, and the other through the “it is and is said to be a motion”.13

|| 12 The majority of the manuscripts and the editor of the commentaries have here “ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ ἔγνως”. This text however cannot be understood within the context of the sentence. Stephanus obviously speaks about pleasure and gives two topoi from the definition of pleasure. Our oldest manuscript V is the only one that transmits the correct text, whereas other manuscripts transmit the grammatically wrong “ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδὸν ἔγνως”, obviously by misreading the word ἡδονῆς and then adding the word ἔγνως in an effort to make sense of the text. From this wrong reading comes probably the text that our editor prints based on the manuscripts that corrected the ὁδὸν into ὁδοῦ. 13 Steph., In Rhet. 298, 27-299, 13: Δῆλον δ’ ἄν, ὡς δέοι κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐν τῷ τέλει περὶ τῆς ὀργῆς· ἀποδείξει γάρ τις ἐχθρὸν τὸν κεκρυμμένον ἐχθρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν παραδοθέντων περὶ ἐχθροῦ τόπων καὶ αὖθις ἀποδείξει φίλον τῇ πόλει ἢ τῷδέ τινι ἢ τῷ δικαστῇ τὸν μὴ ὑπολαμβανόμενον φίλον· ἀφ’ ὧν τόπων ὁρμώμενος ποιήσεις τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην μὴ ὄντα ἐχθρὸν ἐχθρόν· ‘τί γάρ, ὅτι δι’ ὀργήν, οὐ μὴν δι’ ἔχθραν ἔλεγε κατὰ τοῦ Περικλέους σπεύδων ἀντιλυπῆσαι αὐτὸν προλυπήσαντα;’ ἢ πάλιν τὸν μὴ ὄντα φίλον τοῦδε ποιήσεις φίλον αὐτοῦ διά τινος τῶν ἀποδοθέντων τόπων· ‘πῶς γὰρ σοῦ, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἐχθρὸς ἂν νομισθείη Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ πάντας ἀεὶ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀγαπῶν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως;’ καὶ αὖ φάσκοντος ὅτι ‘ἐχθρός εἰμι τοῦ Περικλέους’ διαλύσεις λέγων ὅτι ‘οὐ πιστευτέος σύ· πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἀεὶ τοὺς βουλευτὰς καὶ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς καὶ ζηλῶν καὶ θαυμάζων τῆς πόλεως;’ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πάλιν, εἰ λέγει φίλος εἶναι τοῦ Περικλέους, διαλύσεις ὡς ‘οὐχί· πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἔχων τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τοῦ Περικλέους φίλους; ἐχθρὸς

Stephanus on Emotions | 181

These are the only comments Stephanus makes on the chapters on emotions. Already in the first passage of his comment, he explicitly states his views on the role of the account of emotions in the Rhetoric: it helps the orator establish the state of mind of the opposite parties of a trial. As Cope notes14, there are two uses of the word κατασκευάζειν: in one sense, the verb means 'to establish', or to produce the feelings in the minds of the audience; in another, it means 'to produce in the minds of the judges by the speech an impression of the state of feeling of the adverse party, to establish, i.e. to represent in the speech'. In other words, one meaning of the verb refers to the arousal of emotions in the audience, whereas the second meaning refers to the use of the topoi presented in the chapters on emotions as premises for arguing for the intentions of the two parties. Aristotle also referred to this second function of emotions, namely the function of indicating the motives of an action, and argued that emotions can sometimes explain the action one chooses to undertake, as for instance a cowardly behaviour could be explained as due to the culprit's relevant flaw15. In fact, anger and appetite (ἐπιθυμία) are counted among the motivations of actions and particularly among the non-rational desires (ὄρεξις)16.

|| ἄρα σύ.’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου καὶ μεταβαλεῖς, εἰ βούλει, τὰ τῆς ἔχθρας εἰς ὀργὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς εἰς ἔχθραν συναρπάζων τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀπὸ τῆς οἷον ὁμοιότητος ‘ὁ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ὀργὴν λυπούμενος συγγνωστός, ὁ δὲ δι’ ἔχθραν ματαίαν οὐχί’· ὅταν γὰρ ὦσι περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς διάφοροι τόποι, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνασκευάσεις δι’ ἄλλου καὶ κατασκευάσεις δι’ ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς· δείξεις γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ‘οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται’, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ‘κίνησιν ταύτην εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι.’ 14 Cope (1877), vol. 2, 2; Cf. Dorothea Frede (1996), 264-270, who also takes one use of emotions within the rhetorical speech to be the presentation of the motivations of an action. She argues that this use is mainly relevant to forensic speeches, where a criminal action is analysed from its emotive reaction and motivation. She claims that Aristotle borrows this use of emotions in the rhetorical speech from Plato. Frede finds the trace of this use in the first book of the treatise, whereas she takes the account of the second book to be dedicated only to the analysis of the emotions of the audience (270); See also Striker (1996), 288 ff.; Rapp (2002), 578. 15 Rhet. I.10 1368b14-23: ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσιν μοχθηρίαν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ τοῦτο ὃ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν· οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρήματα, ὁ δ’ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλιμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φόβον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμήν, ὁ δ’ ὀξύθυμος δι’ ὀργήν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ’ ἄφρων διὰ τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ δ’ ἀναίσχυντος δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης. 16 Rhet. I.10 1368b32-a7: πάντες δὴ πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτούς. [...] ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὄρεξιν, τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλογον· [...] ἄλογοι δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία· ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι’ αἰτίας ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν. Rhet. I.10 1369b11-16: διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα πληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἔσται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν παθῶν. δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται ὅσα φαίνεται ἡδέα.

182 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

Leaving aside the function of the emotions as aroused in the audience, which is in fact what Aristotle seems to have in mind in the treatment of the emotions in the second book, I argue that Stephanus focuses only on the second use mentioned above, namely the use of emotions for pointing out the motives of actions, and, therefore, takes the account of emotions of the Rhetoric to be useful insofar as it provides additional topoi for argumentation. In short, an analysis of the structure of Stephanus’ comment can confirm this thesis. First, in the first paragraph, Stephanus clearly chooses the terminological use of κατασκευάζειν, which is mainly known from the dialectical context17 and which refers to the establishment of the facts and motives related to actions. After describing the establishment of a statement through a question-answer examination and through the use of the topoi of emotions (passage [T.2.b]), Stephanus presents the use of the same emotions for the refutation of a statement. Hence, in the second part of his comment, he chooses again to use technical dialectical vocabulary in order to show the bilateral use of the topoi, namely for establishing and refuting a statement. The use of logical terminology does not stop here, but, aside from the use of “establishing” through the argument and his discussion of refutation, the passage [T.2.a]-[T.2.e] makes full use of technical vocabulary, known from Aristotle's logical treatises as well as from the later tradition. More particularly, if one considers the expressions indicated in bold above, Stephanus speaks clearly not only about proving, establishing and refuting, but also about arguing from topoi. Moreover, a close examination of the examples that he raises will further confirm the thesis that the account of emotions is taken to provide additional topoi from which one can argue, and not to aim at arousing the emotions in the audience. Examining the text more closely, the second paragraph of the passage and its accompanying examples refer to the process of proving something, whereas the next paragraph to the process of refuting. In these two paragraphs (passages [T.2.bT.2.c]) the commentator explains the way in which one will prove or refute that one is an enemy or a friend. This process of proving or refuting the emotional state of the culprits takes into account, in Stephanus’ interpretation, the topoi of emotions as presented in the Rhetoric. In fact, the examples the commentator brings in order to show in what way the orator can argue for his thesis, draw directly from the topoi from anger, friendliness and enmity. In the first example18, which is intended to show how the orator can prove someone to be a hidden enemy, the commentator makes use of the definition of

|| 17 Cf. Top. II.1 109a1-10; II.2 109b25-26; 110a15-16; II.3 110b28-32 etc. 18 Steph., In Rhet. 298, 32-33: 'τί γάρ, ὅτι δι’ ὀργήν, οὐ μὴν δι’ ἔχθραν ἔλεγε κατὰ τοῦ Περικλέους σπεύδων ἀντιλυπῆσαι αὐτὸν προλυπήσαντα;'

Stephanus on Emotions | 183

anger as desire for retaliation for a past action that was considered as a slight19. Anger and enmity seem to be considered as so similar (in respect of the actions provoked through these emotions) that if one of them can be excluded, then the other is the case20: if an action was not committed due to anger, it must have been committed due to hatred. Hence, by providing a topos that is proper only to anger (namely, the topos from the definition of anger), it becomes evident, for example, that enmity is the real cause of Alcibiades' action: if Alcibiades wronged Pericles not out of anger (since Pericles had not wronged him before, and consequently Alcibiades was not looking for revenge), it must be the case that he wronged him out of hatred. Similarly, in the second example21 Stephanus takes into account a topos from the chapter on enmity22. As Aristotle states, one difference between anger and enmity is that the former is addressed towards particulars, whereas the latter towards groups of people or universals. The thief or the sycophant are groups that people usually hate, whereas anger is aroused against Callias or Socrates. In Stephanus example, Alcibiades always loves the demagogues, namely the universal group, so that he could not have hated Pericles, who was a demagogue. Hence, it must be out of anger that he wronged him. Coming to the paragraph on refutation, Stephanus shows how the topoi from the account of emotions can be used in order to refute a statement by the opposite party. The third example23, which draws from the chapter on emulation (II.11), shows in a way similar to the previous example that Alcibiades cannot be Pericles' enemy, since the former felt zeal and admiration for the counsellors of the city. Emulation is for Aristotle a positive emotion felt by good people towards those who possess certain honourable goods, i.e. bravery, wisdom, or public positions, like generals or orators, because they have the power to benefit people24. This descrip-

|| 19 Rhet. II.2 1378a30-32: Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ τι τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. 20 Based on Aristotle's discussion of the relation between anger and enmity in Rhet. II.4, Stephanus seems to think that an action can be proven to have either of these two emotions as a cause, due to their similarity. Since they are so similar, in an action that has their common characteristics, the two emotions can equally account for it: the action will be either due to anger or due to enmity. In the paragraphs [T.2.d- T.2.e] it will be clearer in what way he thinks the topoi of the two emotions can be used in order to prove the one through the exclusion of the other. 21 Steph., In Rhet., 298, 35-299,1: 'πῶς γὰρ σοῦ, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἐχθρὸς ἂν νομισθείη Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ πάντας ἀεὶ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀγαπῶν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως;' 22 Rhet. II.4 1382a5-7: καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας. 23 Steph., In Rhet. 299, 2-4: 'καὶ αὖ φάσκοντος ὅτι ‘ἐχθρός εἰμι τοῦ Περικλέους’ διαλύσεις λέγων ὅτι οὐ πιστευτέος σύ· πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἀεὶ τοὺς βουλευτὰς καὶ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς καὶ ζηλῶν καὶ θαυμάζων τῆς πόλεως;' 24 Rhet. II.11 1388a32 ff.: εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ ἔστιν

184 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

tion is certainly not compatible with enmity, which is felt against some characteristics that are without honour, like thievery. Therefore, if one feels emulation and admiration towards one group of people, one cannot feel also hatred. Finally, the last example of refutation25 refers to Aristotle's statement that friends share the same friends and enemies with each other (Rhet. II.4 1381a7-8). Hence, if Alcibiades argues that he was a friend of Pericles, he can be refuted through the fact that Pericles' enemies are Alcibiades' friends. The rest of Stephanus' interpretation seems to be a general description of the way his account is supposed to work. The thought of the last two paragraphs must be the following: after having said how to prove or refute one statement by making use of the account of emotions (particularly of anger and enmity), the commentator explains that through this way, one can convert anger into enmity or enmity into anger and persuade the audience due to the similarity of the two26. As in the examples offered about Alcibiades and Pericles, the orator can prove anger to be the state of mind by disproving enmity or the contrary. Hence, one proves that an action was due to anger by refuting that it was due to enmity, just as Stephanus previously showed in his examples by arguing from different topoi for one and the same case (περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς διάφοροι τόποι). The last sentence of the comment, which refers to two opposite topoi from which one can argue about a single case, seems to be connected to this thought of arguing from different topoi. In particular, both topoi mentioned in this paragraph, come from the definition of pleasure: Pleasure is defined in the Rhetoric both as good, since it is the end of some actions, and as motion27, though with no reference of it being non-good because of its being a motion.

|| (διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν [...]ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ὡς γὰρ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι, οἷα προσήκει τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἔχουσι, ζηλοῦσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. [...] εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ζηλωτὰ τὰ ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐεργετικά (τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς), καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον ἔστιν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτημένοι ζηλωτοί· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρεία σοφία ἀρχή (οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν), στρατηγοί, ῥήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι. 25 Steph., In Rhet. 299, 4-6: καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πάλιν, εἰ λέγει φίλος εἶναι τοῦ Περικλέους, διαλύσεις ὡς 'οὐχί· πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἔχων τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τοῦ Περικλέους φίλους; ἐχθρὸς ἄρα σύ.' 26 Cf. Rhet. II. 4 1382a16-19: φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ δι’ ὀργὴν ἢ δι’ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ’ ὁποτέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν. 27 Rhet. I.11 1370b33-35: Ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον. 1362b5-9: καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν.

Anonymous on Emotions | 185

5.2.3 Conclusions In summary, there is no reference to the arousal of emotions in the audience in Stephanus’ comment. As has become evident, he does not take the account of emotions of the Rhetoric to aim at arousing emotions, but rather as providing topoi for argumentation. One hint of the former use of the account of emotions is found, as I already showed, in his summary of the first book. There is another obscure reference to the alteration of the emotional state of those addressed by the speech, which can be found in the beginning of the comment in which Stephanus states that the topoi can be used in order to prove that one is a friend to the city or to a certain person or to the judge. This last point might imply the alteration of the judge's ruling and emotional state through the topoi of friendliness. Besides these uncertain references, Stephanus' interpretation seems to focus mainly on the use of the topoi as premises used by the orator to reveal the intentions of the two parties. His focus on this use of the account of emotions is amplified by the use of technical language, coming mainly from Aristotle's Topics, namely the reference to the establishment and refutation of a statement as well as the use of topoi for arguing. His examples, brought in order to show precisely the way in which the topoi can be used, have the form of a dialectical examination through which the orator can establish or refute a statement about the motivations of an action. Stephanus' quotation of Aristotle's note about the three means of persuasion, as well as his claim that the discussion of emotions and character belongs to the introduction of the enthymematic proofs, is, I believe, in agreement with the reading of Stephanus I have presented in this chapter. It might be the case that the commentator takes arguments about intentions not to be the most powerful arguments, but only helpful to the orator for making his point clearer, or that he takes such topoi that are placed in the introduction as proper for giving a brief sketch of the position of the two parties and hence for giving the background of the argument.

5.3 Anonymous on Emotions The Anonymous author of the commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric has talked more extensively about the account of emotions. His commentary entails a discussion of the whole of the eleven chapters on emotions and character (II. 1-11). However, this discussion often does not differ from the Aristotelian text, and, when it does, the limits between the paraphrase and the deliberate interpretation are not clear. The more interesting parts of the Anonymous' account come, from his presentation of the first chapter of the second book of the Rhetoric, which is dedicated to the discussion about the character of the speaker and about how it contributes to the persuasion of the audience. Moreover, Aristotle here introduces the topic of the next ten chapters, namely emotions, by giving the definition of emotions and by laying out

186 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

his plan for discussing the three factors that are related to emotions: formal object of emotions, state of mind of the person who feels the emotions, causes of arousal of emotions. In this section I will first offer a sketch of chapter II.1, and discuss some topics that Aristotle introduces in this chapter and that will later be relevant for the commentator’s interpretation: how do emotions result from or affect the judgement; how does the character of the speaker assist in persuasion; and how is the character of the speaker related to emotion-arousal. Later, I will present the commentator's views on some of the most basic points of the Aristotelian account. During this presentation, I hope to show the commentator's main views on the use of emotions in the rhetorical speech, on the legitimacy of emotion-arousal as well as on the role of the account within the treatise.

5.3.1 Judgement 5.3.1.1 Definition of emotions in Rhet. II.1 – Aristotle on the alteration of judgement Since, according to Aristotle, every rhetorical speech is connected to or aims at a judgement28, that is, the final judgement of the audience or judges to whom the speech was addressed, it is important to determine in what way emotions contribute to or affect this judgement. In the Rhetoric, emotions are defined with reference to this judgement, and in every chapter on emotions Aristotle refers to the impact of the arousal of emotions on the final judgement of the audience29. [T.3] So, emotions are those things through which, by undergoing change, people differ in respect to their judgements and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites. 30

Before taking up the discussion of the connection of emotions to judgement in this passage, one could first reflect upon the Aristotelian definition of emotions and, in particular, on the question of whether this is a real and adequate definition, or whether emotions in the Rhetoric are only provisionally defined. This question is related to the analysis of particular emotions that follows in the next chapters (or in other treatises of the corpus) and, in particular, to the aspects of emotions that Aris-

|| 28 Rhet. II.1 1377b2024; II.18 1391b7-21. 29 S. Rhet. II.2 1379a9-10, 1379b27-28, II.3 1380a5-7, II.5 1382b27-29, 1383a14-15, II.6 1383b12-13, II.7 1385a16-17, II.8 1385b11-12, 1386a3-4, 1386a16-17, II.9 1387a5-8, II.10 1387b21-24, 1388a23-24, II.11 1388a29-30, 1388b24-27. 30 Rhet. II.1 1378b19-21: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία.

Anonymous on Emotions | 187

totle seems to find essential or to the aspects that are today considered constitutive parts of emotions. Given that emotions are currently mainly explained by reference to (a) an input or stimulus that provides the ground for the emotion to be felt, to (b) a responsive expression or reaction to this stimulus, and to (c) the evaluative judgement that accompanies this procedure, Aristotle's definition of emotions in the Rhetoric seems to lack a counterpart for the first component, namely the stimuli, although the description of some particular emotions entail also references to these inputs, for instance anger. Instead, Aristotle recognises mainly two conditions for an emotional response, that is, (1) pleasure and pain and (2) an emotion's effect on judgement, but even the former condition is not always met in Aristotle's account of particular emotions, for instance in cases where some emotions are not connected with pleasure or pain at all (i.e. friendliness and enmity), as opposed to others, which are said to be accompanied by both (i.e. anger). Regarding the focus on the second condition, namely emotions' effect on judgement, it is closely related to the content and scope of the treatise that aims at persuasion, and has led scholars to consider the reference to it in the above cited definition [T.3], and consequently the whole definition as “tailored to the context” and not as representative of Aristotle's own views of the nature of emotions31. However, it has also been argued that this definition, even if it is contextdependent, can still depict Aristotle’s own views of emotions, if the orator needs to have a knowledge of their true nature. As David Konstan32 argues, the definition of emotions in the Rhetoric corresponds to other accounts from the corpus which focus on their “purpose in the sense of what they are used for”. More specifically, he uses a rather teleological explanation of Aristotle's definition, and argues that the rhetorical account of emotions focuses on the role of judgement due to Aristotle's primary interest in this treatise, persuasion, and in particular, because Aristotle is concerned “with the ends to which the knowledge of them (i.e. emotions) can be put; accordingly, he is interested chiefly in their use in persuasion”. In this context, the knowledge of emotions is necessary for the orator to be able to arouse them in the audience as a supplementary means of persuasion. This knowledge involves “the understanding of behaviours that arouse them” as well as the knowledge of the beliefs that are accompanied by pleasure or pain. This being said, we can focus on the content of this definition and particularly on the connection of emotions with judgement in Aristotle, since this will be useful for our discussion about the commentator’s interpretation. In the cited passage [T.3], emotions are immediately connected with judgement, which is said to be altered due to the changes of which emotions consist. In order to understand how

|| 31 Konstan (2006), 33-34; Fortenbaugh (2002), 114. 32 Konstan (2006), 34; (2009), 32 ff.

188 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

judgement is altered, one should first explain the reference to these changes from which the alteration of judgement follows. Based on views that Aristotle has supported in other passages of the Rhetoric33 as well as in other treatises dealing with emotions, the reference to alteration (δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες) seems to indicate the physiological changes which one undergoes, while coming to an emotional state34 and which, as Aristotle states in his treatise On the Soul, are essential to emotions and should be part of the definition of each individual emotion (DA I.1 403a24 ff.). For example, anger is said to be connected to and defined as the heating of the blood around the heart, whereas, when undergoing the emotion of fear, one becomes cold35. Although the bodily changes accompanying the emotions are only implied in this passage of the Rhetoric, mentioned only scarcely throughout the account and not used in the definition of individual emotions, the judgement is still said to be altered in accordance with these changes. Hence, in the definition of emotions in the Rhetoric, it is the alteration of judgement which becomes essential to emotions. As Aristotle states, the emotions can alter the rigor of a judgement or even the judgement itself (Rhet. II.1 1377b20-1378a4). Regarding now the relation between judgement and emotions, it has been much studied by contemporary scholars, who have tried to give an explanation of the way in which judgement follows from emotions. As Stephen Leighton has argued, there are at least two possible ways of explaining how emotions and judgements are related36: (1) “Change of judgement as a consequent of emotion”, meaning that certain emotions are connected to a certain set of judgements, and thus, the alteration of judgement is caused by the alteration of the emotional state. In this case, one could say that any emotional change is followed necessarily by an alteration of judgement. This explanation also accounts for the exclusion of certain emotions when other emotions are felt. As Aristotle says, there are cases in which the judges cannot feel an emotion, for instance indignation, when they have been aroused to another emotion, for example pity37. In this case, the one emotion and its consequent || 33 Many references to the bodily changes in which emotions consist are to be found in the chapters II.12-14, where Aristotle discusses the different age groups and their disposition or tendency towards certain sets of emotions. For example, since young people are in general more hot-blooded, they are more akin in feeling anger, whereas old people, whose blood has become cooler due to age, have the tendency to feel fear more easily. Rhet. II.12 1389a18-19; 1389b31-32. 34 S. Rapp (2002), 550-552; (2008), 50; (2009), 67. 35 DA I.1 403a30-b1; Rhet. II.12 1389a18-19; 1389b31-32. 36 Leighton (1996), 206-217. The difference between the two branches is also presented in the following way: one (2) is “an example of emotion altering judgement”, whereas the other (1) is “actually a matter of emotion itself being an alteration of judgements”; Rapp (2002), 575 ff.; Konstan (2006), 20 ff.; s. also Nussbaum (1994), 86, who argues that even pain and distress, which are said to accompany emotions, are results of the judgement. 37 Rhet. II.9 1387b16-21: ὥστ’ ἐὰν τούς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους ὄντας τυγχάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν,

Anonymous on Emotions | 189

judgements are excluded due to the presence of another emotion and its judgements. (2) “Change of judgement as a consequence of emotion”, that is, the alteration of judgement comes as a result of an emotion. In this case, the judgement depends on the emotions, first, either because one consciously makes a decision in favour of or against one person in order to make up for a fact that produced the emotion towards that person; or, secondly, in ambiguous cases, because one is misled by an emotion, namely when one does not have a clear opinion, but the emotion leads him or her to judge favourably or harshly; or, thirdly, due to misperception; or, finally, a judgement can be altered through pleasure and pain, since their presence leads one to pursue or avoid respectively the pleasant or painful object, and hence, the person in an emotional state accompanied, for instance, by pain will be moved to act in a certain way, unlike the person who is not in such a state. However, if judgements are connected to emotions as their consequent, or if a judgement is the consequence of the person's being in an emotional state, Aristotle does not seem to imply in his account of the Rhetoric that the alteration of a judgement due to the alteration of an emotional state is a negative procedure, that is to say, an alteration from a (previously correct) judgement to a corrupted judgement. If, on the one hand, certain judgements are, according to Aristotle, the consequent of certain emotions, then the absence of evaluation of the alteration in judgement is more clear: each emotional state would involve a certain set of judgements and, for Aristotle, to feel an emotion [in the right way] is within the human nature; hence, it cannot be the case that a corruption of judgements is essentially connected with the alteration of the emotional state, when being in this emotional state is not regarded as unnatural or abnormal38. But even if, on the other hand, of the possible explanations of the connection between emotions and judgements mentioned above, the correct one is that for Aristotle the judges alter their judgements after undergoing a certain change in their emotional state due to a misunderstanding of the stimulus or miscalculation of the facts, this alteration is not presented in the Rhetoric as being a change from a right judgement towards a wrong one or as being a deviation from rational thought towards a non-rational judgement. Hence, no matter which explanation(s) of the relation between emotions and judgement is right, the impact of the emotions on the judgement is not here evaluated by Aristotle at all, and there is no reference that indicates that Aristotle considers emotions as having a negative influence on the judgement, namely as confusing or altering the judgement in a way opposing to reason. On the contrary, given that in || ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν. Cf. The Anonymous' comment, which emphasises the fact that the speech itself is what banished the pity, by proving that one does not deserve to be pitied. CAG XXI.2 114, 4-7: ὥστε ἂν ὁ λόγος παρασκευάσῃ τοὺς κριτὰς τοιούτους ἤτοι νεμεσητικοὺς καὶ δείξῃ μὴ ὄντας ἀξίους τυχεῖν ἐλέους τὸν ἀξιοῦντα ἐλεηθῆναι, ἀδύνατον τοὺς κριτὰς ἐλεεῖν τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας ἐλεηθῆναι· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐκβολὴν ἐλέους ἐποίησεν. 38 NE II.3 1104 b24; II.5 1105b21 ff.; 1106b21 ff.

190 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric the Rhetoric emotions are presented with reference to cognition, since emotions are said to be aroused due to the subject's cognition or apprehension of a formal object and of certain reasons that allow for the emotion to be felt, it has been argued that not only are emotions based on and aroused due to certain judgements, but also that the actions initiated from an emotion are also reasonable39. 5.3.1.2 Judgement evaluation in the Commentary Unlike Aristotle’s neutral position towards the relation between emotions and judgement, the Anonymous commentator of the Rhetoric clearly states that emotions do have a negative impact by altering or corrupting the judgement: [T.4.a] The emotions through which, by undergoing a change and altering, the audience and the judges come to differ in their judgements, namely they don't give their opinion correctly, are those, which are accompanied by pain and pleasure.40 [T.4. b] “And with what sort of things they become angry”. For if we have one of these three, or the two, but we do not have the other, we would not feel anger; similarly, in speaking of the other emotions, e.g pity and fear, there are three factors through which one is moved astray [from their judgement] towards fear or pity.41

These paragraphs come from the commentator's interpretation of the first chapter and, in particular, of the definition of emotions and the introduction to the treatment of emotions. Here we find a reference to the final judgement as altered and corrupted whenever the judges have undergone an alteration of their emotional state: when an emotion is felt, the person does not judge correctly, but instead his judgement, according to the commentator, is altered in correspondence with the produced emotion (καθ’ ἃ μεταβάλλοντες καὶ ἀλλοιούμενοι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ οἱ κριταὶ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις διαφέρουσιν ἤτοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνονται). Although it is not clearly stated in the commentary as to whether each emotion involves a certain set || 39 Fortenbaugh (2006), 29-32, argues, for example, that since certain cognition is the cause (efficient cause) of the emotion arousal, hence acting in accordance with the emotion felt does not mean acting according to an “automatic reflex”, but instead it is acting in accordance with judgement. However, although the Anonymous commentator agrees with the first part of the statement, namely that emotions are aroused due to certain judgements (as will be shown mainly in the next section), he does not agree with the characterisation of the outcome of an emotional state as reasonable. Instead, he will argue that the final judgement is corrupted by the emotions. Cf. Rapp (2002), 559 ff. about the role of cognition in emotion-arousal. 40 Anon., In Rhet. 88, 33-89, 1: τὰ δὲ πάθη, καθ’ ἃ μεταβάλλοντες καὶ ἀλλοιούμενοι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ οἱ κριταὶ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις διαφέρουσιν ἤτοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνονται, ταῦτά εἰσιν, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή. 41 Anon., In Rhet. 89, 1-5: καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις πράγμασιν ὀργίζονται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν ἔχοιμεν ἢ τὰ δύο, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔχοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀργισθῶμεν· ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἤτοι καὶ ἐλέους καὶ φόβου τρία εἰσί, καθ’ ἅ τις παρακινεῖται πρὸς φόβον ἢ ἔλεον.

Anonymous on Emotions | 191

of judgements or if the alteration of judgement follows the emotional change as a consequence, the commentator’s description of alteration makes it more plausible that the Anonymous considers the change of judgement as essentially connected to the emotion, and not as following from it. According to his description, the alteration happens in the following way: when the person feels an emotion, he is moved aside or deviated from hia [previously correct] judgement towards this emotion (καθ’ ἅ τις παρακινεῖται πρὸς φόβον ἢ ἔλεον). The picture we have so far of the commentator's views on the arousal of emotions is the following: when aroused by the speech, emotions take possession of the judges' reason, and cause it to deviate from its right judgement, or, in other words, deviation from right judgement is the consequent of the alteration of the emotional state. Hence, it seems that the alteration of judgement consists exactly in the physiological condition of a person when undergoing an emotional change. More will be said on this point below (s. section 5.3.1.3 below). That this is the commentator's view is evident from other passages of the commentary as well. In his comment on chapter II.8 of the treatise, where Aristotle deals with pity42, the commentator says: [T.5] For these, namely anger and confidence are thoughtless, namely they make the angry or confident person not to think that an evil might happen to them; for that reason, the courageous due to confidence and the angry do not feel pity. But also, these people [feel pity] who are not in a disposition to insolence, namely those who are not so disposed, and those who do not want to insult everybody, they do feel pity; for the insolent people do not think that they can suffer some evil and for that reason they do not feel pity. But those who are between these feel pity, namely who are neither absolutely angry nor absolutely confident, but those [feel pity] who are disposed to a mean; nor those who are in a state of extreme fear. For those who are scared out of their wits do not feel pity, because they are so taken up with their own suffering, that is, they have become wholly subject to the emotion.43

|| 42 In particular, the comment refers to the passage 1385b29-33: καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρείας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτε ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλ’ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, μήτ’ αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει. 43 Anon., In Rhet. 111, 1-11: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἤτοι ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὸ θάρρος ἀλόγιστά εἰσιν ἤτοι ποιοῦσι τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ἢ τὸν θαρροῦντα μὴ λογίζεσθαι, ὡς ἐπισυμβήσεται αὐτοῖς τι κακόν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς θαρροῦντες καὶ ὀργίλοι οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μὴ ὄντες ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει ἤτοι οἱ μὴ διακείμενοι καὶ μὴ θέλοντες πάντας ὑβρίζειν ἐλεοῦσι καὶ οὗτοι· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ οὗτοι οἱ ὑβρισταὶ λογίζονται παθεῖν τι κακὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν· ἀλλ’ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ μήτε πάντῃ ὀργίλοι ὄντες μήτε πάντῃ θαρροῦντες, ἀλλ’ οἱ μέσον πως ἔχοντες. οὔτε οἱ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οἱ γὰρ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸν φόβον οὐκ ἐλεοῦσι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει ἤτοι διὰ τὸ ὅλοι τοῦ πάθους γενέσθαι.

192 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric In the Aristotelian text, the emotions are called ἀλόγιστα of the future, namely most of the emotions do not take any account of the future, as opposed to pity, which is accompanied with some sort of thinking or reasoning about the future44. Hence, it is in the nature of particular emotions to entail or not to entail reflection on the future, or, in other words, most of the emotions (except pity) do not entail any reasoning about the future. On this reading, emotions and reasoning might or might not accompany each other, but are certainly not opposed to each other. However, in his interpretation of this passage, the commentator implies that the emotions not only are not accompanied by reasoning, but are in fact obstacles of reasoning: they make the person neglect reflection on the future and future destruction. Hence, by being something external to reason, they hinder any rational thought. Additionally, the commentator’s remarks in the last paragraph can be an indication of his view that one does not think correctly when undergoing emotions. Pity requires a sort of reasoning about the future, but those who are extremely afraid cannot feel pity, because they are completely possessed by the emotion (διὰ τὸ ὅλοι τοῦ πάθους γενέσθαι). In this case reasoning is excluded because the person is in a certain emotional state. Again, emotions, by being something external to reason, are presented as being able to dominate reason in a way that hinders any reasoning about the future. Therefore, in all of the above-cited passages, emotions, at least in their excessive form, are presented as obstacles or powers that drive one's mind away from right judgement. Since this view of emotions as opposed to judgement seems to misread what Aristotle says completely, it is desirable to identify the source of the Anonymous’ view. First, as I have stated in chapter 1 above45, this description of emotions is parallel to the description of πάθη in the Anonymous commentary on the NE VII. In fact, the commentator, whom we proved to be the same in both commentaries, seems to have used the same notion of πάθη in both treatises, and hence, to apply the features of incontinence (which is discussed by Aristotle in NE VII, and is named as pathos in the Anonymous commentary) to every emotion whatsoever. Hence, he concluded that, just as incontinence was said to be a deviation from correct judgement, in the same way every emotion consists in alteration and in opposition to right judgement.

|| 44 Other emotions entail considerations about the future as well: fear or confidence are directed to the future, since we feel them for what we consider as possibly happening in the future; anger can also be said to be directed to the future, i.e. to the pleasure that one will feel when taking revenge for an insult. However, these considerations do not entail thought in the same sense as pity. Aristotle says that the man who feels pity undergoes a certain mental procedure: he compares his own situation with the person who suffers the misfortune, and then concludes that the same misfortune can happen to himself. Unlike this type of reasoning underlying the feeling of pity, anger and fear make the person who feels them act thoughtlessly in view of a future pleasure or pain, without taking into account other factors that might be of relevance. 45 In the Introduction, under the discussion about the authorsip of the Anonymous commentator.

Anonymous on Emotions | 193

The vocabulary used in both commentaries in describing emotions seems to be also influenced by the Stoic doctrine on the matter, namely by the famous doctrine of emotions as false judgements. First, the Anonymous (in both commentaries) seems to take a clear stand on the negative impact of the emotions, while also the vocabulary used by the commentator is strongly reminiscent of the Stoic vocabulary for describing the impact of emotions: emotions are impulses against reason, whereas the person who feels an emotion is said to be moved by it against what her reason commands46. The source of this Stoic impact on the Anonymous’ views on emotions cannot be identified with certainty, which is to say that it is not clear whether the commentator took over the Stoic views directly from Stoic texts, or indirectly as transmitted by Neoplatonists, who tend to follow the Stoic attitudes on emotions. It should be noted that the Anonymous never refers explicitly to the Stoics, unlike Stephanus, who, as we have seen in chapter 2, attacks the Stoic view on the probable (s. 263, 24 ff.). 5.3.1.3 Corrupting the judgement. Alteration and physiological change Now that it is clear that, for the commentator, emotions are connected to judgements in so far as the latter are altered and corrupted by the former, it would be helpful to try to see in what way this corruption takes place and in what it consists. In order to understand how this corruption works, one should take into account the alteration that is supposed to initiate this deviation from right judgement. One should notice that, just as Aristotle did in his definition of emotions, the commentator makes also use of language that implies the physiological change in which the alteration of the emotional state consists. More specifically, as we saw in the above cited passages [T.4] and [T.5], the alteration of a person’s emotional state is said to involve a certain movement, that is, a deviation or moving aside from right judgement towards the emotion. Moreover, the person is said to be unable to judge correctly due to the fact that he has become totally possessed by an emotion: emotion seems to be described as a certain movement that take control of reason. The same language is used in most of the passages of the commentary that refer to alteration of judgement. For example, in chapter II.3, the commentator paraphrases the Aristotelian text (Rhet. II.3 1380a34-36) about the people towards whom one is mild, and says:

|| 46 For this view s. Seneca L.85; On Anger; Naturales Questiones 6, 29; Epictetus, Discourses 3.2; Arius Didymus 65a etc.

194 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric [T.6] And we appear mild or are less angry towards those who have put their reason out of its place and insulted us because of that; for they did not do that to us by despising us, but by being moved aside due to anger.47

In this passage48, as in the previous ones, the feeling of an emotion is said to be an obstacle to judgement. However, what this passage makes clearer is in what way this corruption of right judgement might take place: the reasoning is said to be put out of its place due to a particular emotion. Emotions are therefore related to or consist in a movement, that is, a movement that carries reason from its proper place and leaves it unable to judge correctly. Hence, it seems that in the commentator's reading of the account of emotions in the Rhetoric, emotions are obstacles to reasoning because of the extraordinary conditions into which the person's body and mind is due to these emotions. Based on the interpretation offered in the above-cited passages, emotions are said to be alterations in so far as they remove reason from its place, possess it and cause the person to deviate from his right judgement towards the emotion. The judgement of the person is therefore altered and corrupted when he undergoes an alteration of his emotional state, because of the nature of emotions: they are motions that are able to possess the whole of reason, move it from its place, and inhibit it from judging correctly. Accordingly, in [T.4 b] the person's reason is said to be moved aside by an emotion in this precise sense. 5.3.1.4 Consequences of this view. Aristotle and Anonymous on the status of the account of emotions The status of Aristotle's account of emotions in the Rhetoric has been discussed at length by contemporary scholars, who have focused on both the role of the account within the treatise and its relation to views expressed by Aristotle in other passages of the corpus. The questions raised by the study of the account of emotions are, first of all, whether the views expressed are views to which Aristotle commits himself, or common and generally accepted opinions about the emotions that Aristotle cites only as a helpful tool for rhetoricians; second, depending on the answer one gives to the first question, scholars have expressed different views of which aspects of the account of emotions in the Rhetoric are to be counted as Aristotelian and, hence, which of them one can make use of when studying Aristotle's views of related topics, like desires, pleasure/pain etc.; third, a further question arises about the role of || 47 Anon., In Rhet. 94, 11-13: καὶ τοῖς ἐξεστηκόσι τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑβρίσασιν ἡμᾶς πραεῖς φαινόμεθα ἢ ἧττον ὀργιζόμεθα· οὐ γὰρ ὡς καταφρονῶν ἔπραξεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τι, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ὀργῆς παρακινηθείς. 48 The terminology of this passage, as of the previous ones, shows, as I have said above, strong Stoic influence. It is, however, not clear whether the commentator tries to insert the Stoic views into the text intentionally or whether he does so reflexively by working on a tradition that is influenced by the Stoic views of emotions, e.g. Platonic tradition.

Anonymous on Emotions | 195

the account within the treatise, namely whether the account is meant to be a list of ways in which the speaker can arouse the emotions to the audience, and whether it is legitimate for the speaker to do so. This latter question is related to Aristotle's statement in the first chapter of book I that emotion-arousal is the only topic on which his predecessors focused and is external to the speech. Different answers have been given to these questions, and can be briefly summarised. On the one hand, some scholars argue that the account developed in the Rhetoric II is Aristotle's well-considered theory or at least what Aristotle would have accepted to a certain degree. Solmsen49 considered the account of individual emotions as precise and careful. Cooper50 argues that this account of emotions is not a full-fledged theory, but it is approximately what Aristotle thought to be true. According to Cooper, the Rhetoric contains dialectical descriptions, which come from the common opinions about emotions, but “the ethical theory starts from and is responsible to the very endoxa that dialectic and rhetoric are specially directed to acquire effective control over”. Frede states that the account of the Rhetoric reflects the real nature of emotions for Aristotle, a view that is shared also by Nussbaum and Striker51, according to the latter the definitions of emotions found in the treatise must be of Academic origin with some alteration by Aristotle. They argue that, since Aristotle thinks that the speaker will be successful in arousing the emotions of the audience by this account, these must be views that Aristotle accepts to some degree. A similar view is also expressed by W. Fortenbaugh52, who, while arguing for the importance of the account of emotions, stated that “the Rhetoric's treatment of emotions is important not only for the rhetorical theory, but also for ethical theory and philosophical psychology”. On the other hand, many scholars agree that the account of emotions in the Rhetoric, as well as the treatment of other topics in the treatise, does not reflect Aristotle's views as expressed in the ethical treatises, a difference which is explained mainly due to the different scope of the Rhetoric, which does not aim at giving an exact and precise account. Cope, followed by Hunt53, argues that the account of emotions is an inexact discussion that reflects the popular views of how the emotions “express themselves outwardly”. Similarly, Dufour contends that the definitions of individual emotions are imprecise, based on popular opinions and serving only oratorical aims. Rapp argues that the definitions of emotions in the Rhetoric, if even called proper definitions, are not scientific, but entail the emotional traits necessary for their use by the orator. This is the reason for the use of provisional lan|| 49 Solmsen (1954), xvi; (1938), 393-394. 50 Cooper (1996), 239-242. 51 Frede (1996), 259-260; Nussbaum (1994), 82-83; Striker (1996), 286; about the academic origin of definitions of the Rhetoric s. also Fortenbaugh (2006), 11-13. 52 Fortenbaugh (2006), 9. 53 Cope (1867), 13-14; (1877), vol. 2, 8; Hunt (1925), 57-58. Cf. L. Cooper (1932).

196 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

guage as well as for the absence, in the definitions of individual emotions, of any reference to the physiological changes involved in emotion-arousal, which are said in the De anima to be essential to emotions54. As I have shown in the previous sections, the Anonymous commentator of the Rhetoric stated that emotions alter the judgement of the audience in such a way that makes the judge deviate from right decisions. If we are right in our understanding of the commentator’s views, and, additionally if we assume that the Anonymous considers such an effect on the audience's emotional state as intentional, namely if the speaker aroused emotions in order to corrupt the judgement of the audience, then it is strange that the commentator remarks on the passages of the treatise that refer to emotion-arousal, without addressing whether this arousal is legitimate. One would instead expect that, since the commentator believes that emotions are opposed to and even hinder reason, he would have referred to this view when commenting on the passages in which Aristotle speaks of the application of his topoi of each emotion in rhetorical speech and the arousal of emotions by the speaker. Moreover, if this is what emotions do to judgement, then why does Aristotle offer an entire account on how to arouse emotions through speech? In other words, the commentator’s view of emotions as deviation from right judgement leads to two problems: on the one hand, how can we explain the absence of reference to the effect that each particular emotion will have on the judgement that the audience will form? On the other hand, if the commentator's interpretation was right, namely if this was also what Aristotle thought, then why does the philosopher offer a complete account of emotions in the Rhetoric, or how would the commentator account for the fact that Aristotle dedicates such a large part of the treatise to the discussion of emotions? I believe that the only way that the commentator can support his view of emotions as alterations and corruptions of judgement and still account for Aristotle's treatment of emotions in the Rhetoric, is to argue that the account of emotions given by Aristotle is in fact the philosopher's well-considered theory of the nature of emotions, which he presents and explains in the treatise, not in order to help the orator to mislead the audience's judgement, but in order to give a full account of the factors that contribute to the persuasion of the audience. In fact, this is the view that the commentator adopts, as implied by his interpretation of the first chapter of the second book and, in particular, of the presentation of the three factors that must be studied in the chapters on emotions, namely (1) the state of mind of those who feel an emotion, (2) features of those towards whom the emotions are felt, (3) reasons for arousal of emotions.

|| 54 Rapp (2009), 76-77; (2008), 48-49; (2002), 547-548, 552.

Anonymous on Emotions | 197

[T.7.a] There is need to divide the discussion of each into three headings. I mean, for example, in speaking of anger, what is their state of mind when people are angry and against whom are they usually angry and for what sort of reasons; for if we understood one or two of these but not all, it would be impossible to create anger [in someone]. And similarly, in speaking of the other emotions. 55 [T.7.b] And with what sort of things they become angry. For if we have one of these three, or the two, but we do not have the other, we would not feel anger; similarly, in speaking of the other emotions, e.g pity and fear, there are three factors, through which one deviates [from their judgement] towards fear or pity.56

Of these passages, the former [T.7.a] comes from the Aristotelian treatise, which the commentator paraphrases and interprets in the latter paragraph [T.7.b]. In Aristotle, knowledge of the three factors that are announced as the subject matter of the next chapters, namely the state of mind of those who feel an emotion, the person or object towards whom the emotion is felt and the causes of emotion-arousal, is needed in order for the orator to arouse the emotions in the audience. If the orators know one but not all of them, then they cannot bring about emotion in the audience, i.e. they do not have enough tools for putting the audience into the emotion that is more useful for their case. However, in the commentary the three factors are taken as being necessary in order for someone to feel the emotion. If one is not in the state of mind of the angry people, as described by Aristotle, and does not face those who can make him/her angry and if the causes of anger are absent, then one does not feel anger at all. Hence, in this passage there is a difference between the Aristotelian text and the commentary on it. The question that follows is how great this difference is and what implications follow. On the one hand, Aristotle explicitly speaks of these three factors as necessary knowledge for the orator in order to produce an emotion. However, this explicit statement may not exclude the possibility that these factors are also necessary conditions in order to feel the emotion. In other words, perhaps the commentator may be right in saying that an emotion cannot be produced if one of these factors is missing. In this case (namely, if it is not only the case that the orator should have these aspects in mind so that he can have many topoi from which he can bring the audience to a certain emotion, but if these aspects are actually the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emotion to be felt; or, if the orator can bring the audience

|| 55 Rhet. II.1 1378b20-25: δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία, λέγω δ’ οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἢ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 56 Anon., In Rhet. 89, 1-5: καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις πράγμασιν ὀργίζονται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν ἔχοιμεν ἢ τὰ δύο, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔχοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀργισθῶμεν· ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἤτοι καὶ ἐλέους καὶ φόβου τρία εἰσί, καθ’ ἅ τις παρακινεῖται πρὸς φόβον ἢ ἔλεον.

198 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

into a particular emotion through having a precise knowledge of the temper and traits of the people feeling that emotion, and if only people in this state can feel that emotion57) the account of the emotions of the Rhetoric not only presents advice for the arousal of emotions, but in fact also presents Aristotle's views on the nature of emotions. In this case, the difference between Aristotle and the commentator is a difference only in focus. The commentator, by saying that these three factors are necessary in order for one to feel the emotions, adjusts the focus of the account to the particular conditions under which the emotion is felt, instead of focusing on the arousal of emotions through speech, without however much distancing himself from what Aristotle must have had in mind. However, the only way to show that this case is tenable is to show that for Aristotle one feels an emotion only when all these three factors are present and not otherwise. If for Aristotle one can also feel an emotion when one of these factors is missing, then the threefold pattern that he uses in the Rhetoric will not be a description of the three factors that are necessary for feeling an emotion, but will be a presentation of basic aspects that need to be taken into account by orators when they want to arouse an emotion through their speech. Indeed, Aristotle elsewhere does talk about circumstances in which an emotion might be aroused although some or all of these aspects are missing. For example, Aristotle says in De anima that simply because the body alone is in a condition similar to that of the angry person, one feels anger, even if nothing has happened. Therefore, even when one is not in the state of mind of those who are angry, and if one does not face anyone who insults them, one is still able to feel that emotion, only because their body is in a similar condition (DA I.1 403a19-25). Similarly, an emotion might be felt only by remembering a past event or by hoping for something to come in the future, namely when no formal object is actually present, and when there is no actual cause for the arousal of emotions, a person might still be able feel an emotion, as one can feel pleasure or pain for past or future events (Rhet. I.11 1370a27-35). Moreover, even when an emotion is felt under the circumstances described in the Rhetoric, namely due to certain reasons or the presence of a formal object and due to the person being in a certain state of mind, it can sometimes happen that a person continues to feel the emotion and remains in the bodily condition caused by the emotion even after the cause of the emotion-arousal has disappeared58. These examples are an indication that the threefold division of factors that contribute in emotion-arousal are not

|| 57 This is in fact the argument often used by scholars who take the account of emotions in the Rhetoric to present Aristotle's theory of emotions: since Aristotle wants the orator to arouse the emotions of the audience, then the descriptions of individual emotions must be what Aristotle considered to be right. 58 S. Rapp (2008), 51; (2002), 561.

Anonymous on Emotions | 199

intended by Aristotle to introduce an analysis of the nature of individual emotions, but instead systematise the treatment of emotions as related to rhetorical speech. On the other hand, if the three factors mentioned in the Rhetoric indeed refer to or are applicable only within rhetorical speech and therefore were not meant by Aristotle to indicate that an emotion can be felt only under these conditions, then the commentator differs in taking this account to reflect the real nature of emotions, contrary to Aristotle's intentions. If this is the case, the difference between the two texts is not trivial. In Aristotle's text, the account of the emotions would be meant to show the way in which the orator can bring the audience to a certain emotional state, without, however, specifying whether this account corresponds to the real nature of the emotions or is only a general and non-precise presentation of the emotions and of what the orator needs to know about the emotions in order to produce them. Indeed, the Aristotelian presentation of the emotions as well as of many other topics discussed in the Rhetoric seems not to be a scientific one and, though Aristotle might have taken some aspects of this account to be right, the presentation seems to be a vague or merely useful account, which is meant for the orator but which can be also used by non-philosophers and by those who have no interest in knowing the real nature of emotions. In other words, the account of the Rhetoric seems to present very general observations of the emotions and of those who feel the emotions. Contrariwise, in the commentator's reading the account of the emotions of the Rhetoric is meant to indicate how the emotion is felt, that is, the nature of the emotions. The same thought also seems to be the background of the commentator's statement that these three factors are those on account of which which one deviates from right judgement towards the emotions. Given that the verb παρακινεῖται indicates that one comes to the particular emotion and is in a distorting state, which can also imply the bodily change involved in the production of an emotion, the three factors are here named as the causes of such a state, and, therefore, they are the necessary conditions in order for one to feel the emotions. In other words, since the three factors are the causes of being in an emotional state and not just three aspects that the orator should remember referring to in order to bring the audience in an emotional state, then the account offered by Aristotle in the ten chapters of book II are actually dealing with what it is to be in an emotional state, that is, what in fact emotions are. Additionally, in a later passage of the commentary, the Anonymous author says:

200 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric [T.8.a] It is clear that it might be needful in a speech to put [the audience] in the state of mind of those who are inclined to anger and to show one’s opponents as responsible for those things that are the causes of anger and that they are the sort of people against whom anger is directed.59 [T.8.b] It is clear that the speaker should put the audience in the state of mind of those who are angry, and to show the opponents, namely the adversary in the suit, to be of such a kind, namely guilty of those crimes, for which the audience becomes angry against the culprit.60

This passage expresses once again that the account of the emotions represents Aristotle's theory of the nature of the emotions. By comparing the two texts, the following difference is noticed: Aristotle, while summarising his discussion of anger and while speaking of the use of his account by the orator, says “in what frame of mind they are when they are inclined to feel anger” (οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν), whereas the commentator, while paraphrasing the same passage, says “in the state of mind of those who are angry”. Since this is a summary of what was said previously in the chapter, the Aristotelian text refers back to the discussion of how to bring someone into a state of mind in which one is prone to feel anger. On the other hand, according to the commentator's reading, the discussion, to which he refers, is that of how people actually are when they are angry. Hence, in this reading, the preceded discussion is again said to be about “how people are when they are angry” and not just “how people are brought into anger”. In summary, from the two possible implications of the difference between the Aristotelian text and the commentary, I believe that the latter better captures Aristotle's intentions of the treatise, namely the view that the two texts differ insofar as the commentator takes the account of emotions to reflect the real nature of these psychic phenomena in contrast to Aristotle's original intentions. I do not think that the account of emotions in the Rhetoric is meant to be a fully developed theory, nor can the three factors sufficiently describe the conditions, under which an emotion is felt. However, the commentator seems to consider the role and status of the account of emotions in the Rhetoric in this way, as shown by the passages examined above. If we put this interpretation into the perspective of the whole commentary, it would be justified to infer that the Anonymous commentator views the orator as a philosopher, since he is supposed, in his view, to have a true knowledge of all matters in question. As we have seen in the previews chapters, according to the commentator, the orator not only needs to know logic, but also to have a full grasp of the ethical

|| 59 Rhet. II.2 1380a2-5: δῆλον δ’ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις ὀργίζονται. 60 Anon., In Rhet. 93, 21-26: δῆλον δέ, ὡς δεῖ αὐτὸν τὸν λέγοντα κατασκευάζειν τοὺς ἀκροατὰς τοιούτους, οἷοί εἰσιν οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἤτοι τοὺς ἀντιδίκους ποιεῖν τοιούτους ἤτοι ἐνόχους τοιούτοις ἐγκλήμασιν, ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται οἱ ἀκροαταὶ κατὰ τῶν ποιησάντων.

Anonymous on Emotions | 201

notions that he refers to by being virtuous himself, and, as we learned in this chapter, to have a knowledge of the true nature of emotions.

5.3.2 Appearance As already shown, every speech is related to and directed to a final judgement, which is based, on the one hand, on the soundness of the arguments used, and on the other hand, on the opinion the audience has formed about the character of the speaker and on the emotions the judges have developed while hearing the speech. However, according to Aristotle, it is not necessary that the arguments really are sound, but that they appear sound61; and it is not necessary that the speaker should be virtuous, phronimos and well disposed, but he should appear to be such to the audience62. Similarly, the emotions aroused do not need to be justifiably aroused, but they can be aroused due to reasons and towards persons that simply appear to provide grounds for the emotions to be felt. For example, in order to arouse anger, it is not necessary that a real insult has taken place, but it is enough that one believes that they are insulted or that a person appears to have insulted them; or in order for the audience to feel pity, it is enough that they believe that someone has undergone an undeserved misfortune that could have befallen themselves as well. Therefore, the emotions are aroused due to certain beliefs independently of the truth of these beliefs, namely they come about due to the appearance of a situation being such, even if this appearance fails to reflect the real state of affairs. In fact, in many of the definitions of individual emotions Aristotle does refer to the appearance-aspect of emotion-arousal. For example, anger is defined as desire accompanied by pain for an apparent retaliation because of an apparent insult, whereas pity is defined as pain for an apparent destructive or distressing evil63. Different interpretations have been given for what it means to talk about an apparent or seeming insult (διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν) or an apparent retaliation (τιμωρία φαινομένη). On the one hand, it has been argued that, by alluding to the apparent cause (i.e. insult) or end (i.e. revenge) of anger, Aristotle makes use of

|| 61 Rhet I.2 1356a3-b4: τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι [...] διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν. [...] τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός. 62 Rhet. II.1 1377b26-27: τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν; I.8 1366a10-12. 63 Rhet. II.2 1378a30-32; II.8 1385b13-16.

202 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric phantasia in its technical usage, that is, perceptual phantasia. In this case, it has been argued that emotions should be explained in terms of the imagination or impression of things rather than in terms of beliefs about these things64. An emotion would then be aroused when the biological faculty of phantasia interprets some stimuli perceived by the senses in a certain way. When one feels anger, it is because one's faculty of phantasia has interpreted a situation as being an insult or, in other words, when a situation created the impression of an insult, even though one might actually believe that this was not really the case65. As Jessica Moss66 puts it, emotions “involve essentially motivating pleasurable or painful, evaluative representations through phantasia, derived from previous pleasurable or painful perceptions''. On the other hand, in a rather doxastic interpretation that makes no use of formal theories from other treatises, the reference to φαινομένη insult and retaliation might easily reflect the everyday usage of the word. In this case, and as I have described above, Aristotle’s Rhetoric does not make use of technical vocabulary, and all Aristotle is saying when using this term is that one needs only to think or assume67 themselves to be undeservedly insulted, and they become angry regardless of whether their assumption is based on real grounds. Emotions are therefore aroused based not on real knowledge of the state of affairs to which they relate, but based only on beliefs about them. In this case, the treatment of emotions in the Rhetoric does not take into account any sort of perceptual appearance as distinct from beliefs, but the reference to appearance indicates Aristotle's intention to connect emotional response with beliefs about each state of affairs that could be either true or appear to be true despite being false68. As already highlighted, this interpretation seems in fact to be in line with the use of the word φαινόμενος in other passages of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle refers to apparent syllogisms: syllogisms that people assume to be real but are in fact fallacious. Connected with this latter use of the word is also the interpretation that takes the φαινομένη to mean not just apparent but evident (φανερά). According to Cope69, the use of “apparent” within the discussion of anger refers to the evident nature of the insult or retaliation: in order to be angry, the person should encounter an evi-

|| 64 For the relation of the emotions with beliefs, that is, the role of cognition in emotional response, s. Rapp (2002), 559 ff. 65 Cooper (1996), 246-247; Striker (1996), 291. The view that the impression is essential to emotions rather than beliefs, is argued for by the latter with reference to the definitions of emotions in the Rhetoric, where appearance is used as the differentia specifica, whereas belief is not mentioned, because Aristotle wants to make a clear distinction between emotions and rational judgement. 66 Moss (2012), 69. 67 Cf. Top. VI.13 151a15-17: οἷον εἰ ἡ ὀργὴ λύπη μεθ’ ὑπολήψεως τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι. ὅτι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡ λύπη γίνεται, τοῦτο βούλεται δηλοῦν. 68 Cf. Fortenbaugh (2006), 23; (2002), 94-103; Nussbaum (1994), 85-86. 69 Cope (1877), vol. 2, 10. Cf. Fortenbaugh (2002), 97-99 for a fair criticism of Cope's interpretation.

Anonymous on Emotions | 203

dent insult, whereas, in order to take revenge, the action must also be manifest. The evident retaliation is indeed mentioned by Aristotle as the end of anger in his discussion of mildness (Rhet. II.3 1380b20-25). As he says there, anger, which is addressed towards individuals, aims at taking revenge for the particular case, and the angry person becomes milder only when he believes that the opponent has suffered by him as a response to the previous insult. Hence, the retaliation needs to be evident in its intentions and grounds. This interpretation agrees, according to Cope, with the similar meaning that the word has elsewhere in the text. More specifically, he refers to other passages of the treatise, where φαίνεσθαι has the same meaning as or is used interchangeably with φανερά εἶναι. However, against this general interpretation of φαίνεσθαι as φανερά εἶναι is that, when referring to the apparent insult, the case seems to be quite different than the explanation given of the apparent nature of the retaliation. In particular, though a retaliation is more effective when manifest, in the case of the insult one might become angry on the basis of a false assumption that they were insulted. Turning to the Anonymous commentary on the Rhetoric, we find an interpretation that takes into account both the meaning of φαινομένη as apparent and of the evident (φανερά) nature of the revenge70. According to the commentator, the definition of anger is the following: [T.9] Let anger be the desire for an apparent or71 evident retaliation accompanied with pain; for the angry person, after being pained, has rushed in retaliating against the one who caused the pain; and he was pained due to being undeservedly belittled and despised either himself or a relative of his or a friend. The “apparent” is placed72 because, if the one who caused the pain is retaliated against, he does not know that he was retaliated by the one who he pained at some time.73

In this reading of the text, anger has two possible ends: on the one hand, the angry person aims at an evident revenge, where the one who caused the pain is evidently punished and knows the reason for this punishment; on the other hand, it might be || 70 The fact that the Anonymous interprets Aristotle’s definition of anger as referring to an evident retaliation is also connected to our conclusions of the previous section: the formal object of an emotion needs to be obvious. 71 I translate here ἤτοι as “or” and not as “namely”, which is the more usual meaning of the word, because, as I will show below, the commentator distinguishes here and elsewhere the term “apparent” from the term “evident”, and hence, the “evident” cannot be just an explication of the “apparent”. 72 Or “is set before”, if the right script is πρόκειται. 73 Anon., In Rhet. 89, 9-13: Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις τιμωρίας φαινομένης ἤτοι φανερᾶς μετὰ λύπης· λυπηθεὶς γὰρ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ὥρμησεν εἰς τὸ τιμωρῆσαι τὸν λυπήσαντα, ἐλυπήθη δὲ διὰ τὸ ὀλιγωρηθῆναι καὶ καταφρονηθῆναι μὴ προσηκόντως ἢ αὐτὸς ἤ τις τῶν αὑτοῦ οἷον συγγενὴς ἢ φίλος. πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ φαινομένης, διότι εἰ τιμωρήσει τὸν λυπήσαντα, ἀγνοεῖ δὲ οὗτος, ὅτι παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐτιμωρήθη, ὅν ποτε ἐλύπησεν.

204 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

the case that the person is punished without knowing who punished her and why, namely without knowing that her pain is the result of the desire for retaliation of a person who suffered an undeserved pain in the past. In this case, the reasons for suffering are unknown as are the intentions of the person who caused the pain. In order to clarify the distinction between the use of “apparent” and “evident” in the definition of anger, it would be useful to look at other passages including the account of emotions in which the commentator explains the two terms. In particular, in two passages of the commentary, the meaning of φανερά as opposed to φαινομένη becomes clearer. On the one hand, the commentator characterises those cases that are straightforward (κατ᾽εὐθυωρίαν) or those things that are clearly perceived (ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς) as “evident”. One becomes angry, says Aristotle, when someone is a straightforward hindrance to one74, namely, in the interpretation of Anonymous, when one hinders someone directly and evidently or manifestly (φανερῶς)75. Moreover, for Aristotle, one is ashamed for those things that can be easily seen76, or, as the commentator puts it, one feels shame for those things that are visible and manifest (τὰ φανερά)77 . The term is used in general throughout the commentary, and refers to the evident, namely obvious and manifest, cases. On the other hand, “apparent” are those things that seem to have, but do not really have, some feature. This meaning seems to be common in the Aristotelian treatise, especially in the context of referring to the apparent enthymemes or syllogisms. Again, in these passages Aristotle refers to fallacious arguments, namely those that appear to be enthymemes without really being so. Similarly, the term is used with this meaning when referring to the features that the speaker should appear to have, regardless of whether she actually has them. In the chapters on emotions, the commentator often makes use of the verb “appear” with this exact meaning. For example, in his interpretation of the conclusion of the chapter on friendliness and enmity, he describes the topoi of the chapter as arguments, from which one can depict as an enemy one who is not a real enemy but appears to be

|| 74 Rhet. II.2 1379a11-13: ἐάν τε οὖν κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν ὁτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐάν τε μή, ὁμοίως ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν. 75 Anon., In Rhet. 91, 3-7: ἐάν τε οὖν τις ἀντικρούῃ τινὰ ἢ κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν ἤτοι φανερῶς καὶ ἀμέσως, ἢ γὰρ φανερῶς κωλύει τὸν διψῶντα πιεῖν, ἐάν τε μή, ὁμοίως, ἤτοι ἐάν τε μὴ φανερῶς κωλύῃ τὸν διψῶντα πιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ πλαγίου οὐ κωλύει μὲν τὸν διψῶντα, θολοῖ δὲ τὴν κρήνην, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. 76 Rhet. II.6 1384a34-b1: διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. 77 Anon., In Rhet. 105, 35-106, 5: αἰσχύνονται καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἤτοι τὰ φανερά, οἷόν τινες ἐπιτηδεύονται· τὰ μὲν μανίκια τῶν ὑποκαμίσων ποιοῦσι καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ψιλά (αἰσχύνονται γάρ, εἴ γε ταῦτα μὴ τοιαῦτά εἰσι, διὰ τὸ φανερὰ εἶναι), τὸ δὲ ὅλον κορμίον καὶ ῥυπαρὸν καὶ τραχὺ ποιοῦσιν. ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ εἶναι αἰδῶ καὶ ἐντροπὴν ἐν τοῖς κειμένοις ὀφθαλμοῖς ἤτοι εἰς τὸ φανερόν.

Anonymous on Emotions | 205

one78. Moreover, the verb φαίνεσθαι is often used throughout the commentary in order to indicate that a case is or has the appearance of something79. For example, the commentator says: [T.10] We appear mild towards those who have benefited [...]. We are mild towards those who we are ashamed and afraid of [...]. We appear mild towards those who have put their reason out of its place.80

In this passage, as in other similar ones, the verb is used as simply meaning “to appear” or “to have the appearance of”, that is, it is used in its everyday meaning, without any implication of any technical use of the term. Finally, this is also the meaning of the term “φαίνεσθαι” when it is used in connection with the verb that means “to seem” or “to think” (δοκεῖν). In two passages of the commentary, the two verbs are used as synonyms, and refer to actions or deeds that appear or are thought to be of certain nature without really being so. In particular, in the chapter on mildness, Aristotle presents the traits of those towards whom people are mild, namely those who either have not done anything that produces anger, or have done something involuntarily or appear to have acted thus81. The commentator, who emphasises the last point, makes clear that people are mild towards those who appear and seem or are thought to have acted involuntarily (φαινομένοις καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀκουσίως ποιῆσαι πρᾶοί εἰσι)82. In this passage, the appearance of an involuntary action is therefore interpreted as meaning that an action seems to be or is thought and assumed to be involuntary. Second, in the chapter on shame, Aristotle states that one can feel shame due to acting in a way that is evil and can lead to ill-repute (Rhet. II.6 1383b12-15). However, there are, according to the commentator, things that either are truly evil or only appear and seem or are thought to be so (εἰσὶ γάρ τινα μὴ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὄντα κακὰ ἀλλὰ φαινόμενα καὶ δοκοῦντά τισι κακά). This latter passage comments on Aristotle's statement that people are ashamed for different things in front of different people; towards their relatives they usually feel shame of things that are thought as truly bad, whereas towards non-relatives they are ashamed of the things that are thought to be bad

|| 78 Anon., In Rhet. 100, 2-5: ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων δείξει τις καὶ τὸν μὴ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενον ἐχθρόν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἐχθρός, καὶ τὸν φάσκοντα ἐχθρὸν εἶναι διαλύειν καὶ δεικνύειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐχθρός. 79 S. Anon., In Rhet. 98, 22; 101, 18; 106, 28 etc. 80 Anon., In Rhet. 94, 6-13: πραεῖς φαινόμεθα καὶ τοῖς κεχαρισμένοις [...] πραεῖς ἐσμεν καὶ τοῖς, οὓς φοβούμεθα ἢ αἰσχυνόμεθα [...] καὶ τοῖς ἐξεστηκόσι τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑβρίσασιν ἡμᾶς πραεῖς φαινόμεθα. 81 Rhet. II.3 1380a9-12: εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δ’ ἑκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκουσίως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις τοιούτοις πρᾶοί εἰσιν. 82 Anon., In Rhet. 93, 27-30: Ἔστω δὴ πράυνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις τῆς ὀργῆς. φανερὸν δέ, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσι τῶν παρακινούντων τινὰ εἰς ὀργὴν ἢ ποιήσασι μὲν ἀκουσίως δὲ ἢ φαινομένοις καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀκουσίως ποιῆσαι πρᾶοί εἰσι.

206 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

according to law83. However, the commentator interprets this distinction between truly and conventionally bad things as being a distinction between true and apparent evils, true evils being the vices, for example licentiousness or vanity, whereas apparent evils are those that people opine as being evils: [T.11] But people are ashamed of the true evils towards the familiar ones, namely if the latter think that they are slight in respect to the true evils, for instance that they are licentious or vain. But towards the foreigners they are ashamed because of the things in accordance to the law, namely if they are seen by them doing those things that are punished by the law, for instance if one is a traitor; for if one announces to the king that I am a traitor, I will be punished by him; for the law punishes the traitors. It is also written that towards the foreigners [one is ashamed] of those things [that are evils] only in opinion, namely that they will not think that they are slight in those things that are opined as being evils; for there are some things that are not true evils but appear and seem to some to be evils.84

Hence, the commentator seems to take the reference to appearance found in the definition of anger to mean that one might try to take revenge on those who caused pain in the past either in an evident way, namely manifestly, or in an apparent way, namely without the person knowing that her sufferings are the result of an act of retaliation. These two ways of retaliating were supported by passages of the commentary where the commentator makes clear what he takes “evident” or “apparent” to mean. On the one hand, he used the word “evident” as indicating the straightforward and direct actions, whereas, on the other hand, the “apparent” things were distinguished from the true and manifest ones by being only a matter of opinion. In any case, the commentator did not take the reference to τιμωρία φαινομένη to indicate Aristotle's terminological use of φαντασία, but the meaning of the word according to the commentator seems to be in line with the meaning the term has in other passages, namely the meaning of the word in its everyday usage. The same conclusion can also be reached by looking at the commentator's interpretation of the meaning of phantasia in the definitions of other individual emotions. Shame, for example, is another emotion that is defined by Aristotle with reference to phantasia, in particular, it is defined as phantasia about ill-reputation:

|| 83 Rhet. II.6 1384b22-26: ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὔθ’ ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεὶς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται), οὔτε ταὐτὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν δοκοῦντα τοὺς δ’ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. 84 Anon., In Rhet. 107, 9-18: ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν κακά, ἤτοι μή πως νομισθῶσιν, ὅτι εἰσὶ φαῦλοι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὖσι κακοῖς, οἷον ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι ἢ ἠλίθιοι. τοὺς δὲ ἄποθεν αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον, ἤτοι μήπως φωραθῶσι παρ’ αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες ἐκεῖνα, ἃ τῷ νόμῳ κολάζονται, οἷον εἰ προδότης ἐστίν· εἴ που γὰρ προσαγγείλῃ τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι προδότης εἰμί, κολασθήσομαι παρ’ αὐτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοὺς προδότας κολάζει. γράφεται καὶ τοὺς δὲ ἄποθεν τὰ πρὸς δόξαν μόνον, ἤτοι ἵνα μὴ νομισθῶσι παρ’ αὐτοῖς φαῦλοι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν οὖσι κακοῖς· εἰσὶ γάρ τινα μὴ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὄντα κακὰ ἀλλὰ φαινόμενα καὶ δοκοῦντά τισι κακά.

Anonymous on Emotions | 207

[T.12] Since shame is phantasia about ill-reputation and [in fact] for its own sake, not for its results, and since no one cares about reputation [itself] but only because of the people who hold the opinion of them, then necessarily a person feels shame towards those whose opinion matters to her. (Rhet. II.6 1384a21-25)

The commentator analyses this definition: [T.13] Since shame is phantasia about ill-reputation, namely to imagine that I will be dishonoured and disgraced, and for its own sake, namely to assume that I will be dishonoured for its own sake, namely for the sake of dishonour itself, but not to assume that I will dishonoured for the sake of its results, namely that I will be deprived of the own things or because of the expectation of being defeated if going to a fight; but since no one cares about reputation, but only because of the people who hold an opinion of them, it is necessary that one feels shame towards those whose opinion matters, namely for whom one cares.85

In this passage, the commentator interprets the meaning of Aristotle's claim that shame is produced because of the bad opinion others can form of us, and in fact because of this opinion as such and not on account of the results of such ill-repute. However, the entire comment seems to show the commentator's effort to explain what phantasia means in this context. In the Aristotelian text, phantasia enters into the definition of shame in order to make clear that one's view of oneself as receiving ill-repute is the cause of the arousal of shame. People feel shame because they believe that they will have a bad reputation in front of those they admire or for whom they care. However, in the commentator's reading, shame is connected to the imagination, that is, a better conception that other people could form of me. In particular, I might be ashamed if other people assume that I do not care about honour and reputation, and that my dishonour is due to such insouciance, and not to its results. For example, I feel shame because someone might believe or assume that I did a certain deed, e.g. did not pay my debts or I fled from a battle, because I do not care about being honoured and well reputed, independently of the result of such deed, which could be that I managed to save my property or to survive a battle. It becomes clear then that the commentator takes the reference to phantasia in this passage not to be related at all to the biological faculty of phantasia, since, in his view, it does not even refer to one's imagination, but instead it refers to the opinion, belief or assumption of other people about us. If we also make use of the conclusion reached above about the meaning of φαινομένη in the definition of anger, then the commen|| 85 Anon., In Rhet. 105, 14-21: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ φαντασία περὶ ἀδοξίας ἤτοι τὸ φαντάζεσθαι, ὅτι θέλω ἀτιμηθῆναι καὶ ἀδοξασθῆναι, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἤτοι καὶ φαντάζεσθαι ἀτιμηθῆναι χάριν ταύτης αὐτῆς ἤτοι χάριν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀτιμηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ φαντάζεσθαι ἀτιμηθῆναι ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἤτοι ἐκ τοῦ ἀφαιρεθῆναι τὰ οἰκεῖα χρήματα ἤτοι τοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἡττηθῆναι εἰ πολεμήσει, οὐδεὶς δὲ φροντίζει τῆς δόξης ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι τούτους, ὧν ἔχει λόγον ἤτοι ὧν φροντίζει. φροντίζει δὲ τῶν θαυμαζόντων αὐτόν, ἵνα μὴ παρ’ ἐκείνοις ἄδοξος νομισθῇ, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει.

208 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric tator seems to think that shame is produced due to people's wrong assumption that I have certain intentions of acting in a certain way, although my intentions were different. In other words, when my actions appear to indicate my dispositions (i.e. that I do not care about reputation) without really doing so, I feel ashamed. That the word is used in this way in these passages is further confirmed by the commentator’s emphasis, when the word is used in some other passages of the account of emotions, on the meaning as “imagining”, in the sense of creating the imagination of something in one’s mind. In particular, when the word is used in order to mean that one imagines or creates the image of a future event, then the commentator uses a certain phrasing in order to differentiate this use of phantasia from the previous one, namely by saying that he refers to “imagination in the mind” (φαντάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ)86. Again, this difference does not necessarily indicate a reference to the biological faculty of phantasia, but seems to indicate a difference in the meaning of the word: namely a difference between the meaning of “appearing or having the appearance or being apparent” that the word had in the previous passages when referring to created opinions or assumptions, and the meaning of “imagining” when the word is used with reference to future events. For example, when speaking of fear and giving its definition, the commentator states that fear is a pain produced by imagining and representing in thought a future destructive evil (ὁ φόβος λύπη ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ ἀνατυποῦν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ μέλλον γενέσθαι κακὸν ἢ φθαρτικόν)87. Similarly, when speaking of the pleasure involved in anger, the commentator notes that one is pleased when they imagine and expect to punish the person that caused the pain in the first place. This imagination is presented in this passage like “sketching” (ὑποτυπῶν) and “reckoning upon” (ἀναλογιζόμενος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ) the punishment. In summary, Aristotle's reference to phantasia in the definition and treatment of individual emotions seems to have troubled not only the contemporary commentators, but also the Anonymous commentator on the Rhetoric. As I have shown, most of the references to phantasia are interpreted as meaning “appear” or “seem”, namely in line with the everyday usage of the word and with Aristotle’s use in other passages in which he refers to the apparent, e.g. false enthymemes, etc. In passages in which the reference is to future events, the meaning of the word, as presented by the commentator, seems however to be different and to indicate imagination and representation in the mind. Whether this implies Aristotle's use of perceptual phantasia is not clear, but given that the commentator interprets any other reference to this term in the way described above, it is more probable that he wants to keep the everyday usage of the word in these passages as well and to differentiate the meaning of it only insofar as it can refer to future events.

|| 86 Anon., In Rhet. 89, 23; 100, 7-8; 102, 26-27. 87 Anon., In Rhet. 100, 7-8. Cf. Rhet. II.5 1282a21-22.

Anonymous on Emotions | 209

5.3.3 πάθος – ἦθος 5.3.3.1 Aristotle’s Rhetoric on the character of the speaker In addition to the judges’ final judgement of a rhetorical speech, there is another judgement involved in every speech, which, though it can contribute to the final judgement, affects it only indirectly. I refer to the opinion that the audience or judges form about the character of the speaker or about the credibility of the speech. As Aristotle states, it makes a serious difference to the persuasion of the audience, when the speaker appears to have a certain character and when the audience thinks that the speaker has a certain disposition towards them88. In other words, when the audience forms a certain judgement about the character and disposition of the speaker, their persuasion or final judgement is greatly affected. I believe it would be helpful to see in what way the speaker’s arousal of friendly feelings in the audience and the presentation of friendly feelings in the speaker towards the audience are presented in Aristotle's Rhetoric, since, as will become soon evident, the Anonymous commentator emphasises the interaction of these two means of persuasion, that is, emotion-arousal and presentation of character. For the character of the speaker, Aristotle gives two traits that play an important role with respect to her credibility: phronesis and virtue. When the speaker possesses or appears to possess practical wisdom and virtue and to give her advice accordingly, then she is credible. Moreover, regarding the speaker's disposition towards the judges, Aristotle highlights goodwill (εὔνοια): the speaker is credible only when the judges believe that he is favorable towards the city. At this point, it is important to point out the text’s emphasis on the fact that the speaker should present himself as having these qualities in order to convince the audience. Aristotle does not seem to demand that the speaker actually possess these qualities, but instead he makes clear that his purpose in the introduction of this pistis is to ensure that the speaker is presented as trustworthy and that the audience trusts in his advice. If this is so, the treatment of ethos in the Rhetoric should not be confused with the treatment of ethos in the ethical treatises, where Aristotle deals with the moral and intellectual qualities themselves, and is concerned with their acquisition. Instead, his rhetorical treatment of these qualities seems to “conform to normal usage, which illustrates that the Rhetoric may have been meant for a more general audience than his other works”89.

|| 88 Rhet. II.1 1377b24-28: πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν. 89 Wisse (1989), 31. Cf. Rapp (2002), 536-537. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Anonymous argued that the orator should truly possess these traits.

210 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

The three character traits mentioned in the text are the criteria for the audience's trust of the speaker, and, according to Aristotle, all three of them are necessary in order for the speaker to appear credible. If the audience does not trust the speaker, it will be either because the speaker is not phronimos and therefore does not have the right views, or because he has the right views, but does not express them out of viciousness, or, finally, because, though the speaker may be both phronimos and virtuous, he may not be in favour of the city (Rhet. II.1 1378a9-15). Hence, in order to be convinced, the judges should form a certain judgement about the character of the speaker, namely that he is virtuous and possesses practical wisdom, and about the speaker's disposition towards the judges, namely that he is well intentioned or well disposed. The latter, although not dealt with extensively in II.1, is connected to the discussion of friendliness in the fourth chapter of Book II. In general, the discussion of friendliness in II.4 seems to refer mainly to the friendly feelings of the audience towards the speaker, but it also offers some clue as to how the speakers can present themselves as having a friendly disposition towards the judges90. Aristotle considers the friendly or hostile disposition of the audience towards the speaker and, in general, their emotional state during the hearing of the speech to be the third factor that contributes to the persuasion of the judges, after the speaker's disposition towards the audience and the presentation of character (Rhet., II.1 1378a24-28). In fact, as stated above, chapter II.4 deals exactly with this topic, namely how the friendly feelings are produced. Based on the treatment of friendliness in this chapter, the friendly feelings of a person can be aroused when he considers that someone has a certain disposition towards him, when they treat him as important and admire him. Furthermore, the speaker seems to be able to present herself as well-minded towards the audience by following some of the topoi from friendliness as well. As Aristotle states, to be friends with someone means to desire what is good for them, not for the sake of oneself, but for the sake of the friend, and further to do everything possible for the attainment of such goods. This definition of friendliness relates to the speaker’s presentation of himself, since by showing that they want what is best for the audience, and not for the speakers’ own benefit but for the benefit of the listeners, the speakers can present themselves as having friendly feelings. This position also agrees with Aristotle's account of goodwill in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE VIII.2 1155b32-34), where he states that one is well-minded towards someone when one wants for them what is good for the latter's benefit and not for oneself's. Similarly, by sympathising with the audience's misfortunes or by showing that they share the same desires as the judges, the speakers can demonstrate their friendly feelings towards the audience. Moreover, showing that the speaker has in the past || 90 Rhet., II.1 1378a18-19: περὶ δ’ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον.

Anonymous on Emotions | 211

offered some benefit to the city or is willing to do so can also contribute to the presentation of their disposition towards the listeners91. 5.3.3.2 Anonymous’ commentary - Emotion arousal resulting from the speaker's character As I have already mentioned in the previous section, in addition to the discussion about the audience's judgement about the character of the speaker, the commentator of the Rhetoric seems to see a possible interaction between the two means of persuasion (character of the speaker and emotion-arousal). In particular, the audience, after regarding the speaker as well disposed towards them, develops friendly feelings towards him, whereas they become hostile and angry, if they believe that the speaker is not well intentioned. Their judgement regarding the speaker's disposition can therefore be the cause of the arousal of emotions towards the speaker, and these would in turn play a part in the final judgement of the audience. The commentator argues: [T.14] And what opinions or assumptions, namely by making what assumptions about the speaker are the judges moved to pity or anger or fear and persuaded by what is said about him. By “propositions” he means the enthymemes. For the enthymemes start from these, namely from the just, the good, the advantageous and are concerned with these, namely the just, good, advantageous.92

In the relevant passage from the Rhetoric93, there is a summary of the first book of the treatise, from which the commentator draws, in which Aristotle refers to the sources of enthymemes, namely the opinions (δόξαι) and propositions (προτάσεις), which are proper to each of the three types of rhetorical speech. These two terms, namely opinions and propositions, are not considered by Aristotle as referring to two separate things, but instead the propositions rely on or are formed by these opinions and provide the arguments. This is in fact what Aristotle says in the next sentence: the enthymemes are from these, namely προτάσεις, and about these, namely about the opinions94.

|| 91 For these topoi for friendliness s. Rhet. II.4. Cf. Anon., In Rhet. 95, 23 ff. 92 Anon., In Rhet. 87, 1 ff.: Καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι ἤτοι ὑπολήψεις, ἤτοι καὶ ποίαν ὑπόληψιν ἔχοντες περὶ τοῦ λέγοντος οἱ δικασταὶ ἢ πρὸς οἶκτον κινοῦνται ἢ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἢ πρὸς φόβον καὶ πιστεύουσι καὶ τῷ λέγοντι κατ’ αὐτοῦ. προτάσεις δὲ λέγει τὰ ἐνθυμήματα. τὰ γὰρ ἐνθυμήματα ὥρμηνται ἐκ τούτων ἤτοι τοῦ δικαίου, τοῦ καλοῦ, τοῦ συμφέροντος, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρέφονται, ἤτοι δίκαιον, καλόν, συμφέρον. 93 Rhet. II.1 1377b16-20: Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων. 94 S. Rapp (2002), 525-526.

212 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

However, the commentator takes the two terms to be distinct from one another and to refer to the three types of πίστεις. By προτάσεις, he understands the enthymemes and logical argumentation in general, whereas δόξαι seems to be taken as indicating the other two means of persuasion, specifically the presentation of the character of the speaker and the arousal of emotions95. The view that the opinions mentioned by Aristotle as contributing to the persuasion of the audience refer to both means of persuasion comes with an interesting consequence, namely that the opinions formed by the audience about the character of the speaker are said to be a cause of the arousal of emotions to the audience. In other words, the audience comes to an emotional state not only when the speech arouses such emotions, as Aristotle argues96, but also based on the opinion that they have formed about the speaker himself. This reading makes even clearer that the emotions are closely related to judgement, but not only to the final judgement, which, when the result of an emotion, can be altered and misled, as we saw in the previous section. Emotions are also produced due to the opinion that the judges have formed about the speaker, or in other words, certain judgements are the causes of the emotion-arousal. The commentator, who uses the same language97 as that in the passages I have cited in the previous section, states that such an opinion can move the judges towards pity, anger or fear (πρὸς οἶκτον κινοῦνται ἢ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἢ πρὸς φόβον). A similar thought is expressed by the commentator later on: [T.15] But one needs not only to have confidence in persuading, if the speech, either the forensic or the deliberative or the epideictic, is demonstrative and powerful, but one needs to establish and prove himself to be of certain quality, namely good and lover of truth and well disposed towards the city; [one needs] to render the judge of a certain quality, namely to move him towards anger against the adversary in the suit, or to feel pity towards you. For if the speech is powerful, but seems to the audience to be base, you will by no means prevail in persuading the judge or the audience to believe you as being enemy either to the city or to the adversary.98

|| 95 Cf. The interpretation of Stephanus who by δόξαι understands the preceding discussion about eudaimonia and the other topoi related to each of the rhetorical speeches. In this reading, the δόξαι, to which Aristotle refers, include all the discussion of the first book: opinions about happiness, virtues, justice. This reading seems to me to be closer to what Aristotle must have meant. 96 Rhet. I.2 1356a1-15: τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν. 97 I refer to the language that indicates that emotion-arousal corresponds to a movement from right judgement towards an emotion. 98 Anon., In Rhet. 87, 14-20: δεῖ μὴ μόνον θαρρεῖν εἰς τὸ πείθειν, εἰ ὁ λόγος ἤτοι ὁ δικανικὸς ἢ ὁ συμβουλευτικὸς ἢ ὁ πανηγυρικὸς ἀποδεικτικός ἐστι καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἀλλὰ κατασκευάζειν καὶ δεικνύειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ποιόν τινα ἤτοι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλαλήθη καὶ εὔνουν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸν κριτὴν ποιὸν ἤτοι εἰς ὀργὴν κινῆσαι κατὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου ἢ οἶκτόν σου λαβεῖν· εἰ γὰρ λόγος ἐστὶν ἰσχυρός, πονηρὸς δὲ δοκεῖ

Anonymous on Emotions | 213

In this passage, the three character traits that the speaker should reveal through the speech are mentioned with slight variation: good, lover of truth and well-disposed (in Aristotle, the speaker should appear as virtuous, phronimos and well disposed). In addition to the argumentation, the speakers should prove themselves to possess these features in order to persuade the judges, namely they should present themselves as having a certain quality. Moreover, the judges can be turned by the speaker to a certain emotion, for instance anger or pity. It is not completely clear from the text whether the commentator intends to argue again that these emotions will be aroused in the judges due to their opinion about the speakers, but the next sentence leads in that direction, since it is said that the emotions of anger or pity will be felt against or towards the speaker and her opponent respectively. The audience will be thus moved to anger or pity towards the speakers also based on or due to their judgement about their characters. Especially with pity, there seems to be a clear case of an emotion that can be aroused due to a certain opinion or judgement that the audience has formed about the speakers themselves, based namely on what the audience thinks that the speakers deserve. As Aristotle states in the chapter on pity (II.8), in order for these emotions to be felt, one has, on the one hand, to form the belief/to judge that the person who has undergone the misfortune did not deserve it, and, on the other hand, the belief that something similar might happen to oneself. This is why, Aristotle says, people who do not consider anyone to be good cannot feel pity, since pity is directed towards those who undergo an undeserved misfortune. Moreover, this is the reason why people who do not think that it is possible for them to suffer the same misfortune also do not feel pity. Hence, it becomes evident that if the speakers want to arouse the emotion of pity in the audience, they need to show that a misfortune would be undeserved for them, and that the situation they are in is similar to the one of the audience. In this case, the emotion would therefore be aroused due to a judgement that the audience has formed about the character of the speakers and about their state of affairs. In summary, in both previously-cited passages, the emotional state of the audience is said to be dependent on both the speech itself and on the audience members’ opinion about the disposition of the speaker towards them. Moreover, the judges will not be persuaded by the speech alone if they think that the speaker is base and evil. The presented process of persuasion therefore seems to be the following: the speaker makes himself credible through the speech, and only after that, the audience will be persuaded and moved to a particular judgement, namely that the speaker is an enemy or a friend. Then they will consequently develop angry or friendly feelings towards him. In that way, the emotions are aroused fundamentally through the speech and, in particular, due to a judgement that a situation (i.e. the

|| τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς, οὔπω ἰσχύσεις πεῖσαι τὸν κριτὴν πιστεῦσαί σοι ἢ τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ὡς ἐχθρῷ ἢ τῇ πόλει ἢ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ.

214 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

topic of the speech) or a person (i.e. the speaker) is of a particular nature, which allows for the audience to feel a certain emotion, e.g. anger. In this reading of the text, the three Aristotelian means of persuasion (argumentation, character of the speaker, and emotion-arousal) would be related to each other in a way that emphasises the role of argumentation, which would namely be the basic means of persuasion, followed by the presentation of the character of the speaker. The arousal of the emotions has a subsidiary role, since in this reading it depends on both of the other two means of persuasion, by being brought into the speech through the arguments or through the opinion the judges form about the character of the speaker. This hierarchical presentation of the means of persuasion seems to be quite common in the rhetoricians after Aristotle, but interestingly the Anonymous has a take on the topic distinct from other rhetoricians. For example, Quintilian argues for a different view than the one of the Anonymous commentator, in which the emotions play a more important role within the speech as a means to persuasion than the presentation of the character of the speaker99. It should, however, be noted that, although such a hierarchy is absent from the Aristotelian account, in the Rhetoric we still read that the different means have a different value within each of the three types of rhetorical speech. For instance, the character of the speaker is said to be of greater importance for the deliberative orator, whereas emotion-arousal is more useful within forensic speech. 5.3.3.3 Usefulness of the two means of persuasion Regarding now the use of the two means of persuasion (πάθος-ἦθος) within the rhetorical speeches, Aristotle makes a distinction about the usefulness of each in deliberative and forensic speeches. According to him, the presentation of the character of the speaker is particularly useful in deliberative speeches, whereas the arousal of the emotions of the audience can play a more important role in forensic speech. This distinction can be explained as such: on the one hand, in deliberative speech, where the topics discussed are more common, they concern namely the majority of the listeners, the audience is more focused on the proof of the matter in question and on the advice of the deliberative speaker; whereas in the case of forensic speech, the topic of the speech does not concern the judges personally, and, hence, they are more easily influenced by the speaker without really judging100.

|| 99 In. Orat. IV. 5, 6; VI. 2, 1 ff. 100 Rhet. I.1 1354b27-1355a1: ὅτι ἧττόν ἐστι πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ἧττόν ἐστι κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία δικολογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὥς φησιν ὁ συμβουλεύων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικανικοῖς οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροατήν· περὶ ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν σκοπούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασι τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κρίνουσιν.

Anonymous on Emotions | 215

However, missing from this division is any reference to the friendly or hostile disposition of the speaker towards the audience. The commentator of the Rhetoric undertakes to complete this task: [T.16] For it makes a big difference and it contributes regarding persuasion to show oneself or the judge as having certain qualities, mainly and initially in the deliberative speech, and then in the trials, namely in the forensic speech, when (a) the speaker appears to be of a certain quality, namely favourable or good or base, and when (b) the judges think that the speaker himself is in a certain disposition, namely in a friendly or hostile disposition towards the judges themselves. It also contributes to persuasion if (c) the audience itself happens to be in a certain disposition towards the speaker; for they either feel pity towards him or are angry with him and, for that reason, they could never trust in him. When the audience is disposed, namely angry against the speaker or afraid or friendly, it contributes to the forensic speech.101

According to this passage, both the presentation of the character of the speakers and the presentation of their disposition towards the audience are more characteristic of deliberative speech, although they are useful in forensic speech as well. On the other hand, the emotional state of the audience towards the speakers, namely their friendly or hostile disposition towards the speaker or even their fear of him, is more effective in forensic speech.

5.4 Conclusions In conclusion, the Anonymous commentator, unlike Stephanus, does not take the Aristotelian account of emotions to be only additional topoi used within the argumentation. He recognises that the speaker is supposed to arouse emotions in the audience and that such an emotion-arousal will have an effect on the final decision of the audience. However, he also focuses on the importance of the argumentation, and makes clear that emotions are aroused either through the speech or due to the opinion that the audience has formed about the speaker. Emotions, however, though aroused due to the judgement that the audience has formed about the credibility of the speech and the character of the speaker, are presented in the commentary as having a negative influence on the judgement and reasoning of the person

|| 101 Anon., In Rhet. 87, 21-88, 6: πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει καὶ συμβάλλεται εἰς πίστιν τὸ δεικνύειν ἑαυτὸν ποιόν τινα ἢ τὸν κριτήν, κυρίως μὲν καὶ πρώτως ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις ἤτοι τῷ δικανικῷ τό τε φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα ποιόν τινα ἤτοι εὔνουν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ τοὺς κριτὰς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν αὐτὸν τὸν λέγοντά πως ἤτοι διακεῖσθαι ἢ ἐχθρωδῶς ἢ φιλίως καὶ ἀγαθῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς κριτάς. πρὸς δὲ συμβάλλεται εἰς πίστιν, καὶ ἐὰν αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τυγχάνωσι διακείμενοί πως πρὸς αὐτόν· ἢ γὰρ οἰκτείρουσιν αὐτὸν ἢ ὀργίζονται κατ' αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτῷ πιστεύσωσι. τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἤτοι ἢ ὀργίλον κατὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ἢ περίφοβον ἢ φιλίως συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ δικανικόν.

216 | Emotions in the Commentaries to the Rhetoric

who feels them. The judgement is altered and the person's mind is stirred up when she is under the influence of an emotion. Since the effect of emotion-arousal is described in the commentary and is presented as negative, one would expect to find a discussion of the legitimacy (or, better, non-legitimacy) of emotion-arousal. However, such a discussion is absent from the commentary, which instead addresses passages of the treatise that refer to the orator’s use of the topoi of emotions and their effect on the final decision of the audience. I have argued that the Anonymous commentator seems to take the account of emotions as a presentation of an Aristotelian theory of emotions, which would hence solve the problem of the legitimacy of emotion-arousal, namely by supporting the view that Aristotle's aim was not to give advice for how to arouse the emotions, but to inquire into the basic features of a rhetorical speech. Therefore, Aristotle's account of the Rhetoric, and consequently the commentator's interpretation of it, is only descriptive of the means that play a role in the persuasion of an audience without raising the issue of whether it is legitimate to use these means.

6 The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III 6.1 Introduction to lexis Aristotle treats the theory of verbal expression (λέξις) and its contribution to the persuasion of an audience in the third book of the Rhetoric, just before he addresses taxis, namely the arrangement of speech. It is first announced at the end of the previous book, but it is dealt with in more detail in the first chapter of the third book, where it is also set within the context of the treatise. In this short introduction to the account of lexis I will focus on (A) the relation of the treatment of lexis to the rest of the treatise, (B) the relation of the rhetorical account of lexis to the one in the Poetics, and mainly (C) the virtues of lexis, and, in particular, the importance of clarity. Aristotle discusses the first issue (A) at the beginning of Book III, where he makes two divisions regarding the subject matter relevant to the treatment of rhetorical speeches, each of which explains the necessity of dealing with verbal expression. According to the first division, there are three things into which one must inquire when dealing with a speech: (1) the means by which persuasion is accomplished, (2) the lexis, i.e. verbal expression or style and (3) taxis, namely the arrangement of the parts of the speech. The second division, which immediately follows, refers again to lexis as being the second element in the treatment of rhetoric, but here it is said that it is followed by delivery (ὑπόκρισις), that is, acting, which did not receive much attention by previous rhetoricians, even though it plays a central role in rhetorical speech. Aristotle emphasises the fact that the treatment of lexis, just as the treatment of anything that is external to logical argumentation, is superfluous (περιέργον) and decisive only insofar as both the audience and the constitution are corrupt. However, in both divisions of the subjects relevant to rhetoric, the treatment of verbal expression is considered necessary on account of its contribution towards making the speech appear to have a certain quality (συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον), as well as due to its contribution to the clarity of the speech (διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν)1. Given that lexis contributes to the speech and that the treatment of lexis is an integral part of rhetoric, it is evident that there must be a method of learning its correct use. The fact that the correct use of lexis must be taught is even made explicit by Aristotle’s statement that lexis is the

|| 1 However, Halliwell (1993), 60 ff. argues that there is no radical distinction between sense and style in the Rhetoric, but that the style contributes in making the subject persuasive, although the features of style are also not independent of the sense. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-006

218 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

result of an art (περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον), and hence differs from ὑπόκρισις, which is rather due to natural instinct and cannot be taught. Since we have seen how the discussion of lexis comes about in the Rhetoric, it should next be said what lexis is and in what it consists. The exact meaning of the term is hard to capture, and it is variously translated into English as “(verbal) expression”, “style”, “diction”, “enunciation” or “linguistic form”2. In order to grasp the meaning of the term, scholars usually turn to the account of lexis in the Poetics (B). In the latter treatise, Aristotle deals with the poetical lexis, that is to say, with the verbal expression appropriate for the poetical context, and makes two attempts to define it either (a) as the composition of the metrical speech or (b) as the expression through the words3. The former definition (a) is mentioned at the beginning of the chapter on tragedy, where Aristotle distinguishes between the parts of tragic poetry, and obviously applies only to poetical lexis. However, in the latter case (b), which comes later in the same chapter (ch. 6), Aristotle provides a definition that can be applied to any use of lexis, in poetry or prose, and states explicitly that lexis has the same power in both contexts. When closely examining this definition, Aristotle makes use of two important logical terms: ὄνομα and ἑρμηνεία. Since ἑρμηνεία is the linguistic expression of a notion, lexis is defined as the linguistic expression through the ὀνόματα. ὄνομα is characterised by Aristotle both as what we would call a word, i.e. a single term that has a meaning (De Inter. 16a19-b20), and the noun, i.e. the single term that conveys meaning but that does not indicate time (Poetics 20 1457a10-12). In this latter sense, ὄνομα is differentiated from ῥῆμα (verb) in respect to the indication of time, whereas in the former sense ῥῆμα is a type of ὄνομα. Therefore, it seems that lexis, in both its rhetorical and poetical context, is the expression of thought, through which the rhetorical enthymemes and the poetical mythos are delivered. In a later part of the Poetics, the difference between poetical and rhetorical lexis is explained with reference to the different types of study relevant to each case. In particular, in Poetics ch. 19-20, the study of lexis with reference to its parts (μέρη τῆς λέξεως) is distinguished from the study that is about the forms of lexis (σχήματα τῆς λέξεως). Aristotle proceeds immediately to the former study by enumerating and describing each part of lexis: element, syllable, connective, noun, verb, conjunction, inflection, statement. The latter study, however, which deals with the forms of lexis, i.e. command, prayer, narrative, question and answer, is postponed for another

|| 2 For the meanings of lexis in prose s. Kennedy (1991), 216; Halliwell (1993), 53-54; Rapp (2002), 806-808. 3 Poet. 6, 1449b33-34: λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν. 1450b12-14: λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν, ὅ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν.

Introduction to lexis | 219

occasion, since it is said to be irrelevant to poetry4. It is clear that this is the study undertaken in the Rhetoric, where Aristotle deals with some of these matters explicitly (narrative, question, answer) in the second part of Book III (ch. 16 ff.), and where he even refers back to the treatment of lexis with regard to its parts as a subject that he already dealt with in the Poetics (Rhet. III.2 1404b26-28). However, we should mention here that the expression “σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως” is not used in Rhetoric III for referring to narrative or question and answer, as it was in the Poetics, but only in order to indicate the rhythm of the speech, namely whether its form is metrical5, or to the antithetical schema of the enthymemes6. In all these cases, the term lexis seems to refer to the style of speaking or to the way something is expressed. The meaning of the term “lexis” becomes clearer if we take a close look at Aristotle’s description of the virtues and vices of the lexis (C). Given that the aim of a rhetorical speech differs from the aim of a tragedy, the virtue of rhetorical lexis differs from the appropriate poetical lexis. Regarding the poetical lexis, in the Poetics Aristotle named as virtuous the lexis that is, on the one hand, clear (σαφής) and, on the other hand, neither flat nor banal (ταπεινή). The former feature is achieved through the use of standard or appropriate terms (κύρια), whereas the latter by the use of loan words (γλώτται) and metaphors. Therefore, the perfect poetical lexis consists in an appropriate amount of standard terms, loan words and metaphors, although the poet should be careful not to exaggerate, or otherwise the result will be either banality, barbarism or a riddle respectively (Poet. 22). As for the rhetorical lexis, as described in Rhetoric III.2, it should be (1) clear and (2) fitting (πρέπουσα), which will be achieved by being (2.a.) neither banal (2.b.) nor above the dignity of the subject. Of these four features of lexis7, clarity is the most important in order for the speech to reach its proper function8, and it is always

|| 4 Poet. 19, 1456b8-13: τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. 5 Rhet. III.8 1408b21-29: Τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον [...] περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμήματα. 6 Rhet. III.10 1410b28-29: κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται. 7 The discussion of how many and which the virtues of lexis are, traces back to the rhetoricians of Hellenistic period. cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7, 59, 1-9: Ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε, Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. Ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ· σαφήνεια δέ ἐστι λέξις γνωρίμως παριστᾶσα τὸ νοούμενον· συντομία δέ ἐστι λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δήλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος· πρέπον δέ ἐστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι· κατασκευὴ δὲ λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων Ἑλλήνων, σολοικισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος. cf. the list of four virtues of the roman tradition in Cic., De orat. 3,37. 8 S. Rapp (2013b), 290; Kennedy (1991), 221 on clarity as the superior virtue of lexis. S. Rapp (2002), 828-829 and (2013b), 291 on the ergon-argument.

220 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

achieved by the use of standard terms (κύρια), whereas appropriateness is achieved by avoiding banality and the ascription of gratuitous dignity. The mean between the two is achieved, according to Aristotle, through change, namely when an unusual or unfamiliar term is used and makes the speech appear more noble or sophisticated (σεμνοτέραν). In fact, this is where the difference from poetics lies: unfamiliarity can come about in prose only through metaphors, whereas all other types of names mentioned in the Poetics (ch. 21) should here also be avoided, because otherwise the rhetorical speech will seem artificial, and, hence, it will not manage to persuade (Rhet. III.2 1404b18-19). Besides clarity and appropriateness, in the following chapters of Rhetoric III Aristotle discusses other features of rhetorical lexis, of which I will here give only a short overview, since they will be relevant for the commentators’ interpretation, which I will present in the following section. Starting with the “cold” expression (τὰ ψυχρά), which is dealt with in Rhet. III.3, Aristotle states that this feature can result through the use of nouns that are inappropriate for rhetorical speeches—but would be more appropriate for poetry—like composite words, loan words or many and long adjectives, which, as Aristotle states, reveal the art of the rhetorician and make the speech ridiculous (γελοῖον). Equally cold is the speech that makes use of inappropriate metaphors, which I will address in the next section. After completing the analysis of the appropriateness of lexis in single terms, Aristotle moves on in III.5 to the discussion of both verbal expression within a composition of words and the harmonic connection of sentences. Hence, the features discussed in the next chapters are: correctness in grammar, dignified speech, appropriateness, rhythm, structure of sentences, wittiness. First, important is the correct use of language (ἑλληνίζειν). By this, Aristotle means, on the one hand, the correct use of grammar, i.e. of connectives and expressions, the right use of the three genera (masculine, feminine and things), the right use of singular and plural, and, on the other hand, the avoidance of unclear, ambiguous or periphrastic words. Moreover, the orator, in order to achieve clarity, should avoid digressions. The opposite of correctness in language is, according to Aristotle, σολοικισμός, namely grammatical or syntactical mistakes. As an example of such phenomena, Aristotle mentions cases in which a verb is attributed to two nouns, one of which does not fit with the verbal form. The next feature of a good lexis, discussed in III.6, is to be dignified or sublime, namely to have an appropriate ὄγκον. The term ὄγκος seems to refer here to the amplification of the lexis either in the sense of increasing the style by making it more dignified, or in the sense of having a certain length, or, by combining these two senses of ὄγκος, the lexis can be amplified by unnecessary additions, which create a more elevated style. In fact, in the Poetics (24 1459b35) the use of the term with reference to the metrical scheme is more closely related to the first meaning, namely the higher and more dignified style. By contrast, a similar passage from the Topics (VII.5 155b22-23) seems instead to refer to the length of the argument, and is

Introduction to lexis | 221

in fact interpreted in this way by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Top. 521, 33 ff.), since ὄγκος is said to refer to the unnecessary premises that are added to the argument in order to make it longer (εὐμήκης, εὐμεγέθης). In the Rhetoric, things that are said to contribute to the amplification of lexis are (1) the use of the definition instead of the name, (2) the use of metaphors and epithets, (3) to make the one many, namely to use plural instead of singular, (4) not to combine the words under one article, but to use an article for each, (5) to make use of connectives. It seems therefore that in the Rhetoric, ὄγκος can refer to the addition of unnecessary terms or premises in the argument (unnecessary in the sense that they are not needed in order for the argument to come about), which create the impression of dignified style. The appropriateness of the lexis (τὸ πρέπον) is dealt with in III.7. According to Aristotle, the appropriate lexis is one that expresses emotion, character and is analogous to the subject matter. The lexis that corresponds to the subject matter in question is characterised as analogous: one should not present base things in a dignifying way nor dignified things (εὔογκος) in a careless or base way. The lexis is παθητικὴ when it expresses the right emotion, namely the emotion that corresponds to the statement: an argument about an insult should be presented in a way that shows anger, or praiseworthy things should be presented in a way that shows admiration. Such expression is achieved through the use of adjectives or unfamiliar words, whereas the correspondence of emotional lexis to the argument is said to increase the persuasiveness of the argument. Finally, the ethical lexis refers to the correspondence or adequacy of expression to each class (age, sex, origin) or moral state (educated or not). As stated in the text (1408a30-31), the words used should correspond to the moral state of a person in order to show her character, namely whether she is an educated person. Aptness or appropriateness in rhythm is the feature of lexis discussed in III.8. As appropriate for prose is thought to be the lexis that is neither metrical nor without any rhythm, since the former is reminiscent of poetry and, hence, sounds artificial and cannot persuade, whereas the latter seems to be never-ending, since the audience—by not being able to count any intervals—cannot see where it ends. Of the available metrical schemata, paean is said to be the perfect rhythm for the rhetorical lexis, since it is the only non-metrical rhythm and for that reason is not easily detected by the audience. Regarding the structure of the sentence, in Rhetoric III.9 Aristotle makes a distinction between εἰρομένη and κατεστραμμένη lexis. The former type was common among the ancient speech-writers and Herodotus, and consists in simple sentences that are connected to each other through connectives and have no rhythm and that are completed only when their meaning is completed. This style is considered by Aristotle as inappropriate due to its lack of rhythm, which renders it infinite and unpleasant. As for the κατεστραμμένη lexis, it consists in cohesive sentences, whose parts are connected to each other and to the sentence as a whole. Unlike εἰρομένη lexis, the κατεστραμμένη lexis, which is further divided into the divisional and anti-

222 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

thetical, has a clear beginning and end and is pleasant and easy to learn due to its enumerable structure. Finally, Aristotle dedicates a chapter (III.10) to the discussion of how the lexis can become witty or lively (τὰ ἀστεῖα) and popular (τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα). Since to learn is pleasant, he says, the enthymemes are witty when they produce fast knowledge (ταχεῖαν μάθησιν), namely when they are not superficial, i.e. too obvious or too unintelligible. More specifically, knowledge is acquired by the audience when the enthymemes have certain features: either when the enthymemes entail an antithesis, in which case the wittiness lies on the form of the expression (κατὰ τὴν λέξιν τῷ σχήματι) or when they expose a metaphor, and in this case the wittiness depends on the terms used (τοῖς ονόμασιν). In summary, we so far dealt with the rhetorical account of lexis, i.e. verbal expression or style, and tried to give an answer to the following questions: (A) what is the relation of lexis to dianoia, (B) what is the relation between rhetorical and poetical style and, (C) how many and which are the virtues of lexis, or what is the importance of clarity. I would now like to turn to the two Byzantine commentators and their effort toward answering these questions.

6.1.1 Anonymous’ commentary The Anonymous commentator explains the treatment of lexis and its role within the project of the Rhetoric, and, in his interpretation of the third book of the treatise, refers to the Aristotelian division between the threefold subject matter of the treatise: (1) dianoia-lexis-taxis, (2) dianoia-lexis-hypokrisis. In fact, he points out that Aristotle makes use of two different lists, and then moves on to discuss the importance of delivery in poetry and rhetorical prose: [T.1] Although previously at the beginning of this third book he placed the method as third, here he places as third the delivery.9

Of the two accounts of the subjects of rhetorical study, the first entails, according to this passage, a treatment of the “method”, which follows the treatment of the first two topics, namely dianoia and lexis. The discussion about the arrangement of the speech as “method” is explained at the beginning of the commentary on Book III: [T.2] Second is the treatment of lexis, namely the words through which we want to express things. As third comes the way in which one should arrange the parts of speech, namely which of the enthymemes should be said first and which second, which is a feature of method. Her-

|| 9 Anon., In Rhet. 159, 8-10: εἰ καὶ ὄπισθεν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦδε τοῦ τρίτου βιβλίου τρίτην ἔταξε τὴν μέθοδον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐνταῦθα τρίτον ἔταξε τὸ ὑποκριτικόν.

Introduction to lexis | 223

mogenes says that this enthymeme should be placed first, which evokes the other; but when you want to confuse and stir up the hearer, then you should turn this arrangement up and say the second enthymeme as first.10

As we read in this passage, the third element of rhetorical study has to do with the arrangement of the parts of the speech. However, it seems that by “arrangement” the commentator does not refer to the different sections of the speech, for instance the introduction or the narration, but by “arrangement” he understands the placement of the enthymemes in a certain order, according to the one's dependency on the other. Hence, he states, that enthymeme on which the other enthymemes depend should come first. One may change this order, however, when the aim of the speaker is to confuse or to stir up the listeners; in this case, the dependent enthymemes can be expressed first. In this sense of “arrangement”, it is evident why this treatment is named as “method”, since it concerns the speaker's methodology of argumentation and intentions11. Also noted is the origin of this terminology, which is borrowed, according to the commentator, from the Hermogenic corpus12. In his treatise On Invention, Hermogenes distinguishes between two types of arrangement of arguments. On the one hand, the arguments can be arranged in a way that creates the impression of culmination, which is achieved by expressing first the more apodeictic of the arguments and then the rather epideictic ones. On the other hand, the arguments can be arranged with the argument which will evoke the next discussion being expressed last. In this case, the unity of the speech is achieved, since the first point of the new argument seems to depend on the last point of the previous argument (De Inv. 3, 13, 1-35).

|| 10 Anon., In Rhet. 158, 2-8: Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, ἤτοι διὰ ποίων λέξεων θέλομεν ἐξαγγέλλειν τὰ πράγματα. τρίτον πῶς δεῖ τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου τάττειν, ἤτοι ποῖον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων δεῖ πρῶτον λέγειν καὶ ποῖον δεύτερον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς μεθόδου ἴδιον. καὶ ὁ Ἑρμογένης τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἐκεῖνό φησι δεῖν πρῶτον τάττεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου προκλητικόν· ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃς συγχῦσαι καὶ ταράξαι τὸν ἀντίδικον καὶ τὸν ἀκροατήν, τότε δεῖ ἀνατρέπειν τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον λέγειν πρῶτον. 11 It has been pointed out to me that here method might refer to rhetoric itself and that the passage refers to what is proper to rhetoric, namely the enthymemes. However, given the reference to method in both passages [T.2-3] and given that in both the term is brought up when the commentator discusses the third part of the distinction, that is, arrangement, I take it that by method he refers exactly to the arrangement of the enthymemes within the speech. In addition, what is proper to rhetoric is the use of enthymemes and not the arrangement of enthymemes in a certain order, which is what the commentator here says is proper to the method. 12 The treatise of the hermogenic corpus Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος, which deals with matters of style, is considered as pseudo-hermogenic, but self-references (On Ideas 2.9) to the hermogenic and now lost treatise on Method show that it also dealt with matters of style. S. Kennedy (2005), 201-203. Hermogenes’ work On Invention corresponds to the discussion of arrangement in Aristotle. On this point s. also Stephanus’ interpretation later.

224 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

Regarding now the second division of subjects, the third element of study should be the delivery of the speech (ὑπόκρισις), which is the rhetorical version of the poetical delivery. The commentator offers an interpretation of this distinction as well: [T.3] The things themselves are first by nature, second is to arrange and express them through lexis, whereas the third of these is everything related to delivery, namely what belongs to delivery and narration; for during the reading aloud of the speeches, one should act and sometimes raise the voice for making it sharper, when we talk on behalf of a woman; and sometimes talk and read aloud in a lower voice, if the person in question is weak and cannot speak boldly; or sometimes one should read aloud with severe voice, if we speak of a hero; for everything that belongs to the delivery contributes greatly to the reading of the rhetorical speeches.13

As in the Aristotelian text, the commentator says that delivery is an important contribution to the speech, and is connected with the voice. However, the Anonymous explicates further: the voice of the speaker who reads the speech aloud should fit itself to the content of the speech. When imitating a woman, the voice should be sharper, unlike the voice of an ill person, which needs to be lower. Although this description of delivery seems at first glance to be more closely related to poetical delivery, since it refers to imitation of certain people, the commentator seems to think it is also applicable to a description of rhetorical delivery. His reason for thinking so becomes evident through the reference to ἀνάγνωσις, namely the reading aloud. In fact, the practice of reading aloud is mentioned many times in the commentary on this chapter (III.1), and is explicitly described by the commentator as analogous to poetical acting, while later in the commentary it is presented as one element that contributes to clarity14. Moreover, a further distinction is introduced that is analogous to the poetical distinction between poet and actor: [T.4] These actors, namely those who are able to present the characters in question well when reading aloud, receive the prizes and awards in the contests. Here “almost” is added, because they do not receive the prizes always; but if the listeners are wise, they do not admire those who present the characters in question when reading aloud, but rather the poets themselves, namely those who created and wrote them; for often other people write the poems, but since

|| 13 Anon., In Rhet. 158, 19-159, 4: τὰ πράγματα φύσει εἰσὶ πρῶτα, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ διαθέσθαι καὶ ἀπαγγέλλειν ταῦτα τῇ λέξει, τρίτον δὲ τούτων τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑποκριτικὴν ἤτοι τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν καὶ ἀπαγγελτικόν· δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσι τῶν λόγων ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπιτείνειν τὴν φωνὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξύ, εἰ περὶ γυναικός τινος λέγομεν, ποτὲ δὲ ὑφειμένα λέγειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν, εἰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀσθενές ἐστι καὶ οὐ δύναται λαβραγορεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ βαρείας φωνῆς ἀναγινώσκειν, εἴ γε περὶ ἥρωος λέγομεν· μεγάλα γὰρ συμβάλλεται ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσι τῶν ῥητορικῶν λόγων τὸ ὑποκριτικόν. 14 It is interesting that here the commentator offers some information on the practices of his time. It is known that in classical antiquity, the orators would not read the speeches aloud, but had to learn them by heart before delivering them. Apparently, this is not the case for the 12th century orators, who could read their speeches in public.

Introduction to lexis | 225

they are not good and skilful in reading them aloud due to their bad voice, they propose others for reading them. But if the listeners are not wise, then they admire those who read and act rather than the poets, namely the writers. And as there, that is, in the tragedies, the actors, namely those who act well, are stronger in the contests and are more praised than the poets, that is, the writers, so also in the case of political contests, the readers of the rhetorical speeches in a council and those who deliver the speeches well in the rhetorical contests, are stronger and more praised than the orators who wrote the speeches, due to the badness of the constitutions, namely due to the corruption of the constitution. This, namely to praise those who deliver the speech more than the orators who wrote it, happens due to the fact that not all listeners of a state are wise; for by the corruption of the constitution, the audience became also corrupted.15

In this passage, the commentator introduces a double distinction between the poet and the actor and between the writer of the speech and the speaker. In both cases, the delivery (ὑπόκρισις) is related to the person who merely reads the poetical or rhetorical speech, and is distinguished from the art of the poet or orator. This view has two implications. On the one hand, and related to what has been said before, delivery becomes the third in a row of topics, since it has a great contribution to the speech. In fact, besides the arguments, which are produced by the orator, and the lexis, which has to do with the style of the expression (e.g. the words or schemata of expression used) and is dependent on the written speech, delivery is the only part of the speech that depends upon the person who reads aloud, and hence, it is strictly speaking distinct from the art of the rhetorician. On the other hand, since delivery has to do with the representation of the speech, it is delivery that has the most immediate impact on the audience, which, when it is so corrupted that it does not pay much attention to the arguments, focuses on and judges based on the delivery alone. In particular, the audience, being corrupted through the corruption of the constitution, consists in a majority of unwise listeners, who focus on the way a text is read rather than on its context, or, to || 15 Anon., In Rhet. 159, 35-160, 18: οὗτοι μὲν οἱ ὑποκριτικοὶ ἤτοι οἱ δυνάμενοι καλῶς ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὰ πρόσωπα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἆθλα καὶ τὰ βραβεῖα ἐν τῷ ἀγωνίζεσθαι. προσέθηκε δὲ τὸ σχεδόν, ἵνα ὅτι οὐκ ἀεὶ οὗτοι λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἆθλα· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οἱ ἀκροαταί εἰσι σοφοί, οὐ θαυμάζουσι τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους τὰ πρόσωπα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς ποιητὰς ἤτοι τοὺς ποιήσαντας καὶ συγγραψαμένους αὐτά· πολλάκις γὰρ ἄλλοι μὲν συγγράφονται τὰ ποιήματα, μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ εὐφυῶς καὶ ἐπιτηδείως εἰς τὸ ἀναγινώσκειν αὐτὰ διὰ τὸ κακόφωνον προβάλλονται ἄλλους εἰς τὸ ἀναγινώσκειν αὐτά. εἰ δὲ μή εἰσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ σοφοί, τότε θαυμάζουσι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ ὑποκρινομένους παρὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἤτοι τοὺς συγγραψαμένους. καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ ἤτοι ἐπὶ τῶν τραγικῶν οἱ ὑποκριταὶ ἤτοι οἱ καλῶς ὑποκρινόμενοι μεῖζον δύνανται ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται μᾶλλον τῶν ποιητῶν ἤτοι τῶν συγγραψάντων, οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν ἤτοι διὰ τὸ φθαρῆναι τὰς πολιτείας ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἀγῶσι μᾶλλον δύνανται καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ ἀναγινώσκοντες τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς ἐπὶ συνεδρίου καὶ καλῶς ὑποκρινόμενοι παρὰ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ῥήτορας τοὺς συγγράψαντας. Τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους μᾶλλον αὐτῶν τῶν ῥητόρων τῶν συγγραψάντων διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὅλους τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις σοφούς· ἐν τῷ διαφθαρῆναι γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας διεφθάρησαν καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταί.

226 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

put it in other words, they seem to enjoy the show without paying any attention to the content of the speech. Hence, the orator, after writing the speech, must decide whether his voice is strong enough and appropriate for expressing the characters/classes of the people represented and, if not, he needs to resign from delivering the speech himself and grant this position to someone else. Relevant to the view about the corruption of the audience expressed above is a view expressed in the next chapter of the commentary, where the commentator states that the audience of rhetorical speeches differs from the audience of poetical speeches insofar as the former consists of a vulgar crowd, unlike the wise listeners of a poetical speech: [T.5] For the things with which poetry deals, and the persons with whom, namely with which, the poetical speech deals, differ greatly from the persons and things with which rhetoric and the orator deal; for there, in the case of poetry, the hearers of poetical speeches are wise, whereas here, in the case of rhetorical speeches, the hearers are many and vulgar, and for that reason the orators should use usual vocabulary; moreover, in the case of rhetoric, the things with which it deals are political, whereas in the case of poetical speech, the things are historical and created; therefore, it has changed significantly, namely it differs. So, in the prose, namely in the rhetorical speeches, we make use of much lesser things; for the political things are of a lesser value than the historical; for histories narrate great things. For the subject of which the orator makes use is of lesser value; for the political subject is lesser than the historical.16

According to this passage, rhetorical and poetical speeches differ greatly in respect of (1) the people they address and (2) the things they treat. In particular, rhetoric is here distinguished from poetry not only in respect of the different audience, which, as said above, is in one case wise and in the other case vulgar (χυδαῖος), but also in respect of the subjects with which they deal. Hence, rhetorical speeches draw their subjects from current political situations, which often include minor issues. To the contrary, poetry deals with historical cases and is, therefore, of higher value, since history presents “great things”. The commentator’s reference to the subject matter of poetical speeches as historical and created ought to be noted here. On the one hand, it is not clear from the text whether he distinguishes the created or fictional

|| 16 Anon., In Rhet. 164, 24-36: τὰ γὰρ πράγματα, περὶ ἃ ἡ ποίησις καταγίνεται, καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα, περὶ οὓς ἤτοι περὶ ἃ ὁ ποιητικὸς λόγος καταγίνεται, κατὰ πολὺ διαφέρουσι τῶν προσώπων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, περὶ ἃ ἡ ῥητορικὴ καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ καταγίνεται· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ποιήσεως οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν λόγων σοφοί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥητορικῶν λόγων οἱ ἀκροαταὶ πολλοὶ ἤτοι χυδαῖοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς ῥήτορας χρᾶσθαι λέξεσι συνήθεσι· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ῥητορικῆς τὰ πράγματα πολιτικά, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ποιητικῶν λόγων τὰ πράγματά εἰσιν ἱστορικὰ καὶ πεπλασμένα· ὥστε κατὰ πολὺ ἐξέστηκεν ἤτοι διαφέρει. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις ἤτοι τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς χρώμεθα κατὰ πολὺ ἐλάττοσι πράγμασιν· τὰ γὰρ πολιτικὰ ἐλάττω εἰσὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν· αἱ γὰρ ἱστορίαι πράγματα μεγάλα ἀφηγοῦνται. ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις, ᾗ χρᾶται ὁ ῥήτωρ, ἐλάττων ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ πολιτικὴ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων ἐστὶ τῆς ἱστορικῆς·

Introduction to lexis | 227

events from purely historical, or whether here he uses the term “history” in a loose sense, meaning “stories”. If the latter is the case, then what the commentator is saying in this passage is that the stories presented in the poetical texts are greater than the political issues discussed in the rhetorical speeches, probably because the poet would just choose great events to narrate, whereas the orator deals with everyday issues that may at times be trivial. If, however, he intends to make a distinction between two different subject matters of poetics, namely, historical and fictional, then what he says is in contrast with Aristotle’s clear statement in the Poetics (9 1451b1 ff.) on the relationship between poetry and history. In particular, there Aristotle explicitly places poetry above history (φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν), since the former has a universal subject matter, unlike the latter, which deals with particulars. On the contrary, the commentator here considers historical events as a proper subject for poetry, and even argues that history is above politics, because it deals with greater things. This deviation from the Aristotelian text is interesting, because it indicates that the commentator’s exact knowledge of the Poetics, at least of aspects of the treatise not also mentioned by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, was lacking17. Moreover, it indicates a shift of interest towards historical, which is one of the most important aspects of Byzantine literature. As for the meaning of lexis and its role within a study of rhetoric, the commentator is explicit: [T.6] There has not been composed, namely articulated and created, any art of things related to the delivery; that is, nobody instructed these things into an art nor wrote about them, since also everything about lexis, namely to use embellishing and blooming words that tickle the hearers' ears, came and was invented at a late point; for the old orators did not take any care of lexis, of sonorous expressions and of beautiful language, but they rather took care only of the things themselves, i.e. how they would present the things themselves; whereas, when the new orators came, they were interested in the beauty of the expression rather than in the presentation of things. And this is considered as base, namely to aim at the lexis and the beauty of the speech instead of the presentation of the things, and is rightly so considered [...]. But since the whole treatise on rhetoric aims at renown (for the orators aim at becoming famous through aiming at renown18) one must pay attention to lexis and beauty, not because it is right to take care of the lexis, but because it is now necessary to take care of beauty and lexis; for that reason

|| 17 In fact, the commentator refers to the Poetics only where Aristotle himself does, and does not seem to have any additional knowledge of this treatise. This is interesting regarding the fate of the Poetics in Byzantium. 18 The meaning of this sentence must be that the orators aim at gaining glory themselves through making the speech glorious, and, hence, were indifferent towards the things themselves and paid more attention to ornamenting the speech and making it more beautiful. That this is the meaning of δόξα here is evident by a later part of the commentary on the same chapter, where the commentator states that the poets ἐδοξάσθησαν by making use of unusual words (162, 25-27).

228 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III one must pay attention to lexis; because justly speaking it shouldn't be necessary to inquire into anything else about the speech, but only into that, namely how not to distress the listeners in taking tropical and metaphorical words [...] and how not to please them and tickle the audience's ears with a blooming speech.19

As we read in this passage, the treatment of lexis in the Rhetoric is taken to be necessary due to the base condition of the audience. It is the listeners' habits that make such a study of lexis indispensable, whereas, were the audience not base, it would be sufficient —and in fact just—that the orator tries only to avoid causing distress or pleasure through the speech. Lexis and delivery are presented by the commentator as being the result of a later development in the study of rhetoric, brought about by the “later rhetoricians”, who became interested in its rather ornamental features. Lexis is explicitly described as “the use of ornaments and blooming words that tickle the audience's hearing”, and is therefore contrasted with the “things”, namely the strictly objective presentation of things. Such a presentation of things is typical, according to this passage, of the “older rhetoricians”, who did not care about making the speech beautiful, but instead focused on the objective representation of the facts. We can note here that this distinction between old and new oratory can also reflect the status of oratory in Byzantium. In particular, as I also mentioned above, Anonymous’ comments on these passages show a shift of interest towards a rather historical approach, which is typical of his time, in which oratory was not as effective in political matters anymore. In summary, this passage introduces the following distinctions: (1) the distinction between things and lexis and (2) the distinction between old and new oratory, according to which old oratory deals only with the things, whereas new oratory replaces the focus on the things themselves with the focus on the merely ornamental features of the speech. The indifference of the new oratory towards representation of things themselves and towards the thought (διάνοια) of the arguments is || 19 Anon., In Rhet. 160, 18- 161, 6: οὔπω δὲ σύγκειται ἤτοι ἐξετέθη καὶ ἐγένετο τέχνη τις περὶ αὐτῶν ἤτοι τῶν ὑποκρίσεων, ἤτοι οὐκ ἐτέχνωσε δέ τις ταύτας καὶ συνεγράψατο περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἤτοι τὸ κομμωτικαῖς χρᾶσθαι λέξεσι καὶ ἀνθηραῖς καὶ ὑπογαργαλιζούσαις τὰς τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀκοὰς ὀψέ ποτε ἦλθε καὶ εὑρέθη· οἱ γὰρ παλαιοὶ τῶν ῥητόρων οὐ τῆς λέξεως ἐφρόντιζον καὶ τῆς φράσεως τῆς ἀποκρότου καὶ τῆς καλλιεπείας ἀλλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, πῶς ἂν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα παραστήσωσιν, οἱ δὲ νέοι ῥήτορες ἐλθόντες τοῦ κάλλους τῆς λέξεως ἐφρόντισαν μᾶλλον τοῦ παριστᾶν τὰ πράγματα. καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο φορτικὸν ἤτοι τὸ ἀφορᾶν πρὸς λέξιν καὶ πρὸς κάλλος λόγου παρ' ὃ πρὸς παράστασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον [...]. ἀλλ' ὅλης οὔσης τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀφορώσης πρὸς δόξαν (οἱ γὰρ ῥήτορες ἀφώρων πρὸς τὸ δοξάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀφορᾶν πρὸς δόξαν) ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῆς λέξεως καὶ τοῦ κάλλους οὐ διὰ τὸ ἔχειν ὀρθῶς τοῦτο τὸ φροντίζειν τῆς λέξεως, ἀλλὰ διότι ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον νῦν τὸ φροντίζειν τοῦ κάλλους καὶ τῆς λέξεως, διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιμελητέον τῆς λέξεως, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔδει ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τοῦτο ἤτοι τὸ μήτε λυπεῖν τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἐν τῷ λαμβάνειν λέξεις τροπικὰς καὶ μεταφορικὰς [...] μήτε εὐφραίνειν καὶ γαργαλίζειν τὰς τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀκοὰς τῷ ἀνθηρῷ τῆς λέξεως.

Introduction to lexis | 229

repeated many times in this chapter20 and, hence, makes the correspondence between the two distinctions inevitable. As for the various features of lexis, the Anonymous commentator is also explicit when he presents the virtue and further characteristics of a good lexis: [T.7.a] The virtue of lexis is for it to be clear; for the speech is a sign, and it signifies things; therefore, if the speech is unclear, it neither indicates nor signifies anything, and so it does not perform its function, namely to signify. Moreover, the lexis ought not to be banal, but appropriate and suitable for the thing in question. Banal lexis is the one that is common and used by anyone; extraordinary is the lexis that is unsuitable for the thing.21 [T.7.b] “And the speech clarifies”, namely it might be clear; for clarity is the virtue of the rhetorical speech.22

According to the commentator, clarity is the one and only virtue of lexis, since it is the only one that actualises the function of lexis. More specifically, every speech is a sign and signifies a certain thing, which is a function that can work only when the speech is clear, whereas if the speech is not clear, it cannot perform this function. That clarity is the virtue of lexis is repeated in the second passage, unlike the other features of lexis described by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, which are nowhere in the commentary named as virtues. Instead, non-banality and appropriateness are analysed by the commentator as further features that a good lexis should have, but are mainly interpreted with reference to the delivery of a rhetorical speech, namely their contribution to and effect within the performance. Hence, banality is not an intrinsic feature of lexis in the way that clarity is, but is described as a certain style of expression, typical of a certain group of people (τυχόντες). Similarly, appropriateness is dependent on the subject of the speech, and should correspond to the type of people described by the speech. The same holds in the case of noble speech (σεμνὴν λέξιν):

|| 20 S. also the explicit statement of 162, 12-13: οἱ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ προσέχουσιν οὐ τῷ νῷ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλὰ τῷ κάλλει καὶ τῷ ἀνθηρῷ τῆς λέξεως. 21 Anon., In Rhet. 163, 23-30: ἀρετὴ δὲ λέξεώς ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ταύτην σαφῆ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος σημεῖόν τί ἐστιν ἤτοι σημαντικόν ἐστι πράγματος· ὥστε ἂν ὁ λόγος ἀσαφὴς ὢν οὐ δηλοῖ καὶ οὐ σημαίνει τι, λοιπὸν οὐ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον αὑτοῦ ἤτοι τὸ σημαίνειν. καὶ οὔτε ταπεινὴ ὀφείλει εἶναι ἡ λέξις ἀλλὰ πρέπουσα καὶ κατάλληλος τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ πράγματι. ταπεινή ἐστι λέξις ἡ κοινὴ καὶ ᾗ χρῶνται οἱ τυχόντες· ὑπὲρ δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀκατάλληλος τῷ πράγματι· 22 Anon., In Rhet. 166, 31-32: καὶ σαφηνιεῖ ἤτοι ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον σαφῆ· τοῦ γὰρ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἡ σαφήνεια ἀρετή.

230 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III [T.8] For to substitute, namely the change of nouns and verbs, makes the lexis appear noble; for instance, when I express appropriate words in the prosaic rhetorical speech, I will change and use in between a poetical word, since the poetical word, fallen in between in the prosaic speech, appears noble.23

Noble style comes about through the use of unfamiliar words that are not appropriate for rhetorical prose, or simply, through the use of poetical words. The use of such language is described in the passage above as a procedure of the change or exchange of the nouns or verbs of the rhetorical speech with words that are more appropriate for a poetical text. Still, to be noble is not considered by the commentator as a further virtue of the lexis, but is said to contribute to drawing the attention of the audience by making the listeners wonder about the use of unfamiliar poetical vocabulary. In general, it seems that the commentator interprets Aristotle's reference to unfamiliar language by identifying it with poetical language. Although this was not Aristotle's own intention, since he explicitly stated that the use of poetical expressions is forbidden for the rhetorical speeches and that unfamiliarity is achieved only through the use of metaphors, the commentator explains why the poetical language may be used in a rhetorical context: [T.9] So, if the speech-writer uses rhetorical words, they escape the notice of the hearers by being usual; but if he uses in between a poetical word, the hearers are immediately astonished by it being foreign and strange and they feel wonder. For that reason, speech-writers should make the language foreign, namely strange by using poetical words; for people always wonder at those words that they are not used to hearing always or for the most part; and because of that, whenever poetical words pop up, they immediately cause wonder by being unusual. For that reason, Hermogenes exhorts the use of heroic verse in the middle of the speech, by pointing out however that [the verse] should be corrupted, so that it will not be metrical in every part, but it will end in prosaic form.24

As in the previous passage, the commentator refers to Aristotle's statement that the orator needs to make use of foreign or unfamiliar language, in order to draw the

|| 23 Anon., In Rhet. 163, 35- 164, 3: τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ἤτοι ἡ ἐναλλαγὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι τὴν λέξιν σεμνήν· οἷον ἐν οἷς λέγω τῷ ῥητορικῷ λόγῳ τῷ πεζῷ λέξεις πρεπούσας, ἐναλλάξω καὶ χρήσομαι ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ καὶ ποιητικῇ λέξει, ἡ ποιητικὴ λέξις παρεμπεσοῦσα μεταξὺ ἐπὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ λόγου φαίνεται σεμνή. 24 Anon., In Rhet. 164, 9-20: εἰ μὲν ὁ λογογραφῶν χρᾶται λέξεσι ῥητορικαῖς, οἱ ἀκροαταὶ παρατρέχουσιν αὐτὰς ὡς συνήθεις, εἰ δὲ μεταξὺ χρήσεται καὶ λέξει ποιητικῇ, εὐθὺς οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ταύτην ξενίζονται ὡς ξενικὴν καὶ παράξενον καὶ θαυμάζουσι. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς λογογραφοῦντας ποιεῖν τὴν διάλεκτον ξένην ἤτοι παράξενον διὰ τοῦ χρᾶσθαι ποιητικαῖς λέξεσιν· οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ἀεὶ εἰώθασι θαυμάζειν τὰ ἀπόντα, ἤτοι ἃ οὐκ εἰώθασιν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ βλέπειν, καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ θαυμάζουσιν ἐκείνας τῶν λέξεων, ἃς οὐκ εἰώθασιν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀκούειν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἡνίκα παρεμπέσῃ τις λέξις ποιητική, εὐθὺς θαυμάζεται παρ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἀσυνήθης. διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμογένης παρακελεύεται χρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τοῦ λόγου στίχῳ ἡρωικῷ, πλὴν καὶ παραφθείρειν αὐτόν, ἵνα μὴ ᾖ πάντῃ ἔμμετρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελευτᾶν εἰς πεζόν.

Introduction to lexis | 231

audience's attention. This type of language is explicitly identified with poetical vocabulary, which causes wonder by being unusual. As the commentator explains, people wonder at those things that are unusual or absent from their everyday life. Hence, the poetical language, when used in a rhetorical context, causes wonder, since it is unusual. A similar strategy is attributed also to Hermogenes, who, according to the passage, supports the usage of “heroic verse”. Indeed, in the treatise Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος, we find a section dedicated to the use of verse within rhetorical speeches (30, 1-19). As stated there, there are two ways in which a verse can be part of a speech, namely either by making the quotation form a union with the prose (κόλλησις), in which case the whole quotation should be syntactically united with the speech, or by parody (παρῳδία), when the verse is partly quoted and the rest is presented in prose. This latter case is what the commentator apparently refers to when he argues that the verse can be used within the speech, but the orator should not quote it as a whole, since this would make the speech metrical; instead the verse should be corrupted and end in prose. As for the other features of lexis presented by Aristotle in the rest of Book III, the commentator does not consider them as further virtues of lexis either, but interprets them instead with reference to their contribution to clarity. First, the discussion about grammatical correctness (III.5) is explicitly said by the commentator to aim at making the speech clear. Accordingly, this chapter is taken as showing the way in which the various grammatical issues discussed here aim at producing clarity. There are five ways in which a speech can become clear: [T.10] “From here on about clarity”. For the principle of clear lexis is to speak correct Greek, namely to say clear, Greek words, not barbaric. This, namely to speak correct Greek, is observed in five things; first, clarity is brought about, if one expresses the connectives as they are naturally expressed, that is, the first as first and the posterior as posterior; for instance, the men is naturally expressed as first and, when posited as first, it requires that de is also expressed, i.e. “the one made that thing, the other made the other thing”. [...] So, this was the first way in which the good lexis is brought about, namely the good and clear lexis are observed in one way in the connectives, namely in expressing the sequence of the connectives shortly. A second way to bring about clarity is to name each particular and standard name specifically and not through the names that include them, namely the universal, i.e. Socrates; you will produce clarity if you say Socrates instead of man or animal. The third way that brings about clarity is not to use ambiguous, namely homonymous, names; one should be very careful with these, namely with the use of specific and not universal names as well as with the use of non-homonymous expressions, which produce unclarity, unless the orator decides for the opposites, namely for unclarity and appearance of shrewdness; for if this is what he chooses, both the use of universals and the use of homonyms will be useful for the

232 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III unclarity. […] The fourth way towards clarity is to divide the gender of nouns, namely masculine, feminine and things, i.e. neutral, as Protagoras said; [...] The fifth way of clarity is to name the many, namely to say the many in plural and to express them in the plural.25

In his interpretation of this chapter, the commentator spells out each of the features of ἑλληνίζειν with reference to their contribution to clarity. More specifically, in order to make the speech clear, which is the principal virtue of speeches, the orator needs to pay attention to certain linguistic aspects. First, with respect to the connectives, they should be used by following the grammatical rules pursuing their natural position. Both Aristotle and the commentator refer to pairs of connectives such as μὲν and δέ, which are used in a standard order. In such cases, they should not only appear in the speech in this order, namely the μὲν before the δὲ, but the latter should also follow shortly after the appearance of the former, so that the listeners will understand immediately that the one is the antecedent and the other the consequent sentence. Second, what also contributes to clarity is the use of particular names rather than their genus. For instance, when referring to Socrates, one should use the name Socrates and not “animal” or “man”. The third issue discussed is homonyms, the use of which makes the speech unclear and should be therefore avoided. Fourth, genders, that is, masculine, feminine or neutral, should be used correctly, whereas the pronouns should correspond to the genders of the nouns to which they refer. Finally, the speech is clear when the orator pays attention to the number of the nouns, that is, singular or plural. Besides the internal features of language that make a speech clear, namely the grammatical and syntactical issues discussed above, the correct delivery of the speech also contributes to clarity. In particular, the way a speech is read aloud plays, according to the commentator, an important role: || 25 Anon., In Rhet. 180, 9-182, 36: Περὶ σαφηνείας ἐντεῦθεν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς λέξεως τῆς σαφοῦς τὸ ἑλληνίζειν ἤτοι Ἑλληνικὰς λέξεις λέγειν καὶ σαφεῖς, μὴ βαρβαρικάς. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἑλληνίζειν ἐν πέντε θεωρεῖται· πρῶτον μὲν γίνεται σαφήνεια, ἐὰν [δὲ] ἀποδιδῷ τις τοὺς συνδέσμους, ὡς πεφύκασιν ἀποδίδοσθαι, τὸν πρῶτον πρῶτον καὶ τὸν ὕστερον ὕστερον· οἷον ὁ μέν πέφυκε πρῶτος ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τεθεὶς πρῶτος ἀπαιτεῖ ἀποδοθῆναι τὸν δέ, οἷον ‘ὁ μὲν ἐποίησε τόδε, ὁ δὲ τόδε’· [...] ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἤτοι καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ εὖ ἢ τὸ σαφὲς θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἤτοι ἐν τῷ συντόμως ποιεῖν τὴν τῶν συνδέσμων ἀπόδοσιν. δεύτερος δὲ τρόπος ποιῶν σαφήνειαν τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν ἕκαστον ὀνομάζειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν ἤτοι τοῖς καθ' ὅλου, οἷον τὸν Σωκράτην· σαφήνειαν ἂν ποιήσῃς, εἰ Σωκράτην εἴπῃς παρ' ὃ εἰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον. καὶ τρίτος τρόπος ποιῶν σαφήνειαν τὸ μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις ὀνόμασι χρᾶσθαι ἤτοι ὁμωνύμοις. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ παραφυλάττειν, ἤτοι τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι χρᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ τοῖς καθ' ὅλου, τὸ μὴ ὁμωνύμοις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἀσάφειαν, ἐὰν μὴ προαιρῆται ὁ ῥήτωρ τἀναντία ἤτοι τὴν ἀσάφειαν καὶ ἔμφασιν ποιῆσαι δεινότητος· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο αἱρεῖται, χρησιμεύσῃ ἂν εἰς ἀσάφειαν καὶ τὸ τοῖς καθ' ὅλου χρᾶσθαι καὶ ὁμωνύμοις· [...] τέταρτος τρόπος σαφηνείας τὸ τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διαιρεῖν ἤτοι τὰ ἀρσενικά, τὰ θηλυκὰ καὶ τὰ σκεύη ἤτοι τὰ οὐδέτερα, ὡς ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι ταῦτα τὰ γένη ὀρθῶς· [...] πέμπτος τρόπος σαφηνείας τὸ ὀνομάζειν τὰ πολλὰ ἤτοι τὸ τὰ πολλὰ πληθυντικῶς λέγειν καὶ ἀποδιδόναι πληθυντικῶς, [...].

Introduction to lexis | 233

[T.11] In general, the written speech should be easy to read and it should not be harsh or create a difficulty in pronunciation; such are those speeches that entail no collision of consonants, as the “Atreus strikes the sceptre”. Moreover, the statement should be easy to express, namely such are those that the reader can easily pronounce and those which the reader has no difficulty in expressing, like that which has collision of consonants; namely it should be easy to read. So, the speech is that, i.e. clear, if it is easy to read.26

As becomes clear from that passage, the facility of pronunciation or the delivery contribute to clarity. This is achieved through choice of words that are not hard to pronounce, namely words that do not have many consonants one after the other. When the speech is easy to pronounce, it is also easy to read, and, according to the commentator, a clear utterance of the speech contributes to making it clear to the audience27. What this emphasis on clarity shows is that, according to the commentator, every aspect of the speech aims at actualising the principal virtue of lexis, namely clarity. After having shown the Anonymous’ views about the central role of clarity and its relation to the other features of lexis, I now turn to another relevant distinction under which the discussion of clarity might fall. In III.2, Aristotle quotes the teaching of Lycimnius, a rhetorician of the 5th century, who was a student of Gorgias and who, according to Plato's Phaedrus (267c), composed a catalogue of beautiful names. According to Lycimnius, there are three aspects that contribute to making a name beautiful: (1) its sound, (2) its meaning, (3) its univocity or unambiguity, namely when it is not equivocal. Although the reference to Licymnius is introduced in Aristotle in order to explicate in what way metaphors should be brought about through beautiful expressions, in the commentary this reference introduces a section under the title “On the beauty of lexis”: [T.12] On the beauty of lexis. Lycimnius says that the beauty of words is observed in sounds, namely in the filling words and those that produce a rattling noise, or in the meaning, namely to signify something is the beauty of lexis and nouns. And in the same way, ugliness of lexis and of nouns is to produce no

|| 26 Anon., In Rhet. 183, 5-12: ὅλως δὲ δεῖ τὸ γεγραμμένον εἶναι εὐανάγνωστον καὶ μὴ τραχὺ καὶ δυσχέρειαν ποιοῦν περὶ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν· τοιαῦτα δ' εἰσὶ τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα συγκρούσεις συμφώνων, ὡς τὸ ‘Ἀτρεὺς σκῆπτρον κρούει’. καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δεῖ εἶναι εὔφραστον, ἤτοι ἃ δύναται ῥᾳδίως ἐκφωνεῖν ὁ ἀναγινώσκων καὶ μὴ ἔχειν δυσχέρειαν περὶ τὴν φράσιν αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀναγινώσκων ὡς συγκρούσεις ἔχον συμφώνων, ἤτοι δεῖ εἶναι εὐανάγνωστον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἤτοι σαφὴς ὁ λόγος, εἰ εὐανάγνωστός ἐστιν. 27 The same thought is expressed in another passage of the commentary as well. Anon., In Rhet. 169, 21-24: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἤτοι ταῖς λέξεσιν ἁμαρτάνειν, εἰ οὔκ εἰσιν αἱ συλλαβαὶ σημεῖα φωνῆς ἡδείας, εἴ γε συγκρούσεις συμφώνων ἔχουσι· τραχύνουσι γὰρ τὴν γλῶτταν ὡς μὴ δυναμένην ῥᾳδίως ἐκφωνεῖν αὐτάς.

234 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III rattling noise and to be not so filling or not signify anything. Moreover, a third element of the beauty of nouns is for the noun not to be homonymous, through which (namely not being homonymous) we solve the sophisms about homonymy.28

The first question one ought to ask is exactly which part of the discussion falls under this title. More specifically, it is not clear whether the title “on the beauty of lexis” covers the discussion that follows in the rest of chapter (III.2), or whether it refers to the whole discussion up to the end of III.8. If the former is the case, then it is the discussion about metaphors, taking place in the second half of chapter 2 that contributes to the beauty of the speech. What supports this case is that the interpretation of the rest of the chapter often refers to aspects of the speech that render it beautiful: not only are metaphors explained through their ability to make the speech beautiful, but syntactical issues are also said to contribute to this beauty. In particular, the commentator speaks about the procedure of deciding between the use of two different cases (“straight” or accusative), and argues in favour of the former in respect of its beauty. On the other hand, the introduction of III.9 under a different title (Περὶ λέξεως) might support the suggestion that the whole part from chapter 2 until the end of chapter 8 is taken by the commentator as a discussion of how to make the speech beautiful. If so, then lexis will be beautiful (1) by being warm, (2) by entailing metaphors and similes, (3) by having a certain rhythm, (4) by being clear with respect to grammar and syntax, (5) by having a certain length or dignity (ὄγκος). Hence, the structure of the third book would be formed on the basis of the question about the beauty of lexis, where every topic dealt with in this book would be an element of lexis that contributes to its beauty. Even clarity, the virtue of lexis, would be interpreted in view of its contribution to making the speech beautiful. Based on the structure of the chapters, both options seem possible. However, before deciding in favour of one, we should consider some implications. If the title “on the beauty of lexis” is meant to include the whole discussion up to III.8, then it is beauty that is the most important and distinctive feature of style, and everything else falls under it. If, however, it is only the account of III.2 that refers to the beauty of lexis, then our previous conclusions for the centrality of clarity in the commentator’s account remain intact. More about the beauty of the speech will be said in the section on metaphors, where it will be also clear that it is the latter of the two op-

|| 28 Anon., In Rhet. 171, 17-24: Περὶ κάλλους λέξεως. Ὁ μὲν Λικύμνιος λέγει τὸ κάλλος τῶν λέξεων ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις θεωρεῖσθαι ἤτοι ταῖς στομφαστικαῖς λέξεσι καὶ κρότον ἐχούσαις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, ἤτοι κάλλος δὲ λέξεως καὶ ὀνομάτων τὸ σημαίνειν τι. καὶ αἶσχος τῶν λέξεων καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κρότον καὶ τὸ στομφαστικὸν ἢ τὸ σημαίνειν. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον κάλλος τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὁμώνυμον τὸ ὄνομα, καθ' ὃ (τὸ μὴ εἶναι δηλονότι ὁμώνυμον) λύομεν τὰ περὶ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν σοφίσματα.

Introduction to lexis | 235

tions that needs be preferred due to the fact that clarity plays an important role in the treatment of metaphor and of their feature of “bringing before the eyes”.

6.1.2 Stephanus’ commentary Unlike the Anonymous' commentary, Stephanus' commentary on Rhetoric III is very short, since it does not deal with many chapters at all and contains only a few comments about others. More specifically, there is no comment on the second half of the book that deals with the arrangement of the parts of the speech (III.13-19), whereas from the first half (III.1-12), chapters 10-12 receive no comment, and Stephanus' comments on chapters 3-9 are sparse. However, the rest of the commentary offers enough material for understanding the writer's thoughts about the role of the third book within the treatise and about its main issues. The topic and the role of the third book, namely its connection with the previous two books of the treatise, are presented by the commentator at the end of Book II and the beginning of his commentary on Book III: [T.13.a] Because there are three [headings]. One heading we have been taught, the one about opinions, enthymemes, paradigms and generally speaking about those notions that we learned in the Ideas of Hermogenes' rhetoric; these notions Aristotle has here called “on thought”; we will be taught the other two, which are on lexis, in the third book. This is the second heading, whereas the third is about the arrangement, which is similar to Hermogenes' method.29 [T.13.b] And from how many [means does the orator persuade], namely from three; that is, the things, about which he spoke at the beginning of the second book; for he also says there that there are three means, namely (1) the speaker should appear to have a certain quality, namely to be good, pious and favourable to the city, but also (2) the jurors and hearers should have a certain quality, namely either by being moved to pity by the introductions, or to anger and the similar emotions and, (3) the speaker should prove well and convincingly the things about which she talks; on these issues he (i.e. Aristotle) makes some notes in the present third book.30

|| 29 Steph., In Rhet. 308, 12-17: ‘Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστίν. ἓν μὲν ἐδιδάχθημεν κεφάλαιον τὸ περὶ γνωμῶν, ἐνθυμημάτων, παραδειγμάτων καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, περὶ ὧν ἐμάθομεν ἐν ταῖς ἰδέαις τῆς Ἑρμογένους ῥητορικῆς ἐννοιῶν· ἃς ἐννοίας ὧδε ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κέκληκε· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ δύο ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ βιβλίῳ διδαχθησόμεθα, ἅ ἐστι περὶ λέξεως. τοῦτο δεύτερον κεφάλαιον, καὶ τρίτον τὸ περὶ τάξεως, ὃ ἔοικε τῇ παρὰ Ἑρμογένει μεθόδῳ. 30 Steph., In Rhet. 309, 2-9: Καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν, περὶ ὧν εἴρηκε καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου· τρία γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγει, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα ῥήτορα ἤγουν σπουδαῖον, εὐλαβῆ, εὔνουν τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αὐτοὺς τοὺς δικαστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ποιοὺς εἶναι ἤγουν ἢ πρὸς ἔλεον παρακεκινημένους ὑπὸ τῶν προοιμίων ἢ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ τὰ τοιάδε πάθη, καὶ τρίτον τὸ καλῶς ἀποδεικνύειν τὰ περὶ ὧν λέγει πράγματα καὶ πιθανῶς· ἃ καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι παρασημειοῦται τρίτῳ βιβλίῳ.

236 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

According to the Aristotelian distinction, also presented in the first passage cited above, the first two books of the treatise dealt with opinions, enthymemes and paradigms, all of which are summarised under the title “thought” (διάνοια), whereas the third book will deal, on the one hand, with lexis and, on the other hand, with arrangement. What should be noted here is, first, that the references both to the topic of the first two books and to the discussion of the arrangement in [T.13.a] are accompanied by a reference to Hermogenes’ treatment of the same issues. In particular, Stephanus states that the subject matter of the first two books, that is, enthymemes, paradigms and opinions (presumably by that he refers to the specific topoi), is said here to be also the topic of the Hermogenic treatise On Ideas. This is not correct: since On Ideas deals with matters of style, it should then correspond to the second heading31 mentioned by Stephanus. This is an interesting fact, since it shows that Stephanus’ interests were not primarily on the rhetorical practice or on the rhetorical tradition, but rather philosophical. This is in line with what we have seen regarding Stephanus’ focus on certain aspects of the treatise on Rhetoric. Moreover, as we also saw in the Anonymous commentary, the third element of the division, namely arrangement, is compared with what Hermogenes called method. We know now that Hermogenes’ discussion of arrangement is to be found in his treatise On Invention. As will become more evident later, Stephanus' interpretation of the third book often refers to Hermogenes' treatises and makes use of some aspects of his teaching. Hence, although Stephanus refers to Hermogenes, it seems that he has no deep knowledge of the rhetorical tradition or he is not interested here in being precise, but only points the reader of his commentary to a more elaborate discussion of matters of style. Instead, when it comes to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, he focuses on the more philosophical aspects, such as logic. This last point is relevant also to Stephanus’ introduction to the third book, which we read in passage [T.13.b]. In particular, it is interesting that Stephanus thinks that the third book deals partly with the same topic as the first two and, more specifically, with the question of how to argue well and convincingly (καλῶς ἀποδεικνύειν). In this case, namely insofar as it contributes to the argumentation, lexis is a necessary element of the art-based rhetorical speech because of its importance in the persuasion process. This view fits well with what I have argued regarding Stephanus' approach to the treatise. If the treatment of lexis is connected to argumentation, and if rhetoric's function is persuasion, then it is evident why Stephanus deals with this part of the third book, and ignores the rest32. In fact, in his

|| 31 In the chapter 2 of this book, I discussed the use of this term by the Anonymous. Stephanus here uses also this terminology, which he also borrows from the philosophical and rhetorical treatises of late antiquity. 32 We have already seen that he had a similar approach to the account of emotions and ethical definitions.

Introduction to lexis | 237

interpretation of the first nine chapters, he highlights any passage relevant to argumentation, and even interprets some views expressed by Aristotle with respect to syllogistic figures, as he had done in the previous two books33. Additional support for this interpretation of Stephanus’ stance on Rhet. III may be found in the fact that the second Aristotelian division of topics relevant to the treatment of rhetoric—specifically dianoia, lexis and the delivery of the speech—is absent from Stephanus' commentary altogether. In other words, although Stephanus deals with hypocrisis, and refers to its great importance both for poetry and prose, he does not mention Aristotle's distinction between (1) dianoia, (2) lexis, (3) hypocrisis. Instead, in his comment on delivery, the importance of it is shown only through an example of a famous speech, namely the one by Demosthenes On the crown. As the commentator says, Demosthenes lost the fight with Aeschines due to his incapacity with respect to delivery, whereas the latter, who was good in the delivery of the speech, won and was crowned (309, 12-26). The necessity of the study of lexis is explained in a similar way, namely through the citation of Socrates' speech: [T.14.a] That the observation of the words is not necessary and that such a dishonour destroyed the speech in a late time [in the history of oratory] and that the skilful orator is the one who says the truth rather than the one who deceives through the words, Socrates makes clear in his apology towards the Athenians, when saying about those who accused him: “Of their many lies, I admired mainly one, namely that you should be careful if I deceive you, because I am a skilful orator; for the fact that they did not feel shame, because they will immediately be refuted in practice, since I do not seem in any way to be a skilful orator, this seemed to me to be their most shameful lie, unless they call a skilful orator the one who says the truth. If this is what they say, then I would admit being an orator, but not in the way in which they conceive of rhetoric; for they have said nothing true, whereas you will hear from me the whole truth, but not, oh Zeus, any fined speech with fine verbs and names, as the ones they say, nor any adorned speech, but you will hear things said without plan in ordinary language; for I believe that what I say is just.”34

|| 33 S. Steph., In Rhet. 312, 3; 321, in the margin. 34 Steph., In Rhet. 310, 5-19: Ὅτι δὲ ἡ τῶν λέξεων ἐπιτήρησις οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ὅτι ὕστερον οἷά τις λώβη τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεισεφθάρη καὶ ὅτι δεινὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ τὰ ἀληθῆ λέγων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον παρ' ὃ ὁ διὰ λέξεων ἐξαπατῶν, ὁ Σωκράτης δηλοῖ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἀπολογίᾳ περὶ τῶν κατηγορησάντων αὐτοῦ λέγων “μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν, ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον, ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ δεινὸν λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ· οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω”. Cf. Apol. 17a-b.

238 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III [T.14.b] So, when such poetical lexis comes, it has the same capacity in the prosaic speech as the delivery; for both are successful under base hearers. Or thus; the art-based delivery, when we learn and instruct it in an art, has the same effect as the non-artistic.35

Unlike Aristotle, Stephanus does not consider the treatment of lexis, at least of an aspect of it, to be necessary, but lexis is contrasted in this passage to truth. As Socrates argued in his apology, a good orator is the one that says the truth and, therefore, ornaments and refinement of speech are not necessary. Even more, in the apology, this ornament of speech is connected to lying, and consequently a double distinction is made between telling the truth with no ornaments and lying by speaking with fine words. This type of lexis, namely the one accompanied with ornaments, is called in passage [T.14.b] poetical and is, according to the commentator, the one that is addressed to a base audience. This is hence the type of lexis that is not necessary and has been developed due to the base character of the audience or due to the base constitutions. On the other hand, the aspects of lexis that contribute to argument, to which Stephanus referred in the previously cited passage, are worth studying. Such aspects would be, I suppose, everything that contributes to the clarity of the arguments. As for the use of the poetical lexis within rhetorical speech, the commentator says the following: [T.15] Gorgias was either a poet or the orator himself; for also then the basest of hearers worshiped the Gorgian words. But one should not bring poetical words into prosaic speech; for they are unfamiliar to it. What I say shows this fact; for if the poets themselves noticed the related customs (for they left aside their older way, namely the tetrameters, and now they practice the iambic as more prose-like and clear and used in the talks at hand), then we, the speech-writers, should do so even more and leave aside the poetical talk, since it is not related to us who write prose.36

As in the previous passage, the commentator criticises the use of the poetical lexis within rhetorical and, in general, prose. In supporting this view, the commentator refers to the custom of poets, who adjusted their poetry to ordinary language. Hence, he concludes, if even the poets make use of language that is more prose-like,

|| 35 Steph., In Rhet. 310, 25-29: Ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ, ἡ τοιάδε λέξις καὶ ποιητική, ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ταὐτὸν δύναται τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ· ἀμφότερα γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς μοχθηροῖς ἀκροαταῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. ἢ οὕτως· ἡ ἔντεχνος ὑποκριτική, ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῶν καὶ τεχνωθῇ, ταὐτὸν ποιήσει τῇ ἀτέχνῳ. 36 Steph., In Rhet. 311, 5-13: Γοργίας ἢ καὶ ποιητὴς ἦν ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ· καὶ τότε γὰρ οἱ μοχθηρότεροι τῶν ἀκροατῶν τὰς Γοργιακὰς λέξεις ἐθείαζον. ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ τὰς ποιητικὰς λέξεις συνάπτειν τῷ πεζῷ λόγῳ· ἀνοίκειοι γὰρ αὗται τούτῳ. δηλοῖ δὲ ὃ λέγω τὸ συμβάν· εἰ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔθη παρεῖδον (εἴασαν γὰρ τὸν ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν τρόπον τὰ τετράμετρα καὶ νῦν ἐπετηδεύσαντο τὰ ἰαμβικὰ ὡς λογοειδέστερα καὶ σαφέστερα καὶ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ταῖς ἀνὰ χεῖρα συνήθη), πολλῷ μᾶλλον δεῖ ἡμᾶς τοὺς λογογράφους ἐᾶν τὸ ποιητικεύεσθαι ὡς οὐδὲ οἰκεῖον ἡμῖν τοῖς πεζοῖς.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 239

then the prose writers should completely avoid the use of poetical schemata in their speeches. Under this discussion of the use of poetical language falls, in the commentary, the discussion of the virtues of lexis: [T.16] One would say that “since one should not put a banal lexis into prosaic speech, and since the poetic lexis is not banal, why do you banish it?”. So, he solves the objection by saying that the prosaic lexis should have so many and such features: clarity, non-banality, nonextraordinariness and appropriateness for prose.37

In this passage, the commentator deals with the features of lexis discussed by Aristotle in the second chapter (III.2). Clarity is not considered here as principal virtue, but is enumerated as one among the features that the prosaic lexis should have. In fact, these four characteristics are named as virtues neither here nor in any part of Stephanus’ commentary on Rhet. III, and they are brought into the discussion only in orer to explain the banishment of poetical lexis from prosaic speech.

6.2 Introduction to the account of metaphor Rhet. III contains an extensive discussion about metaphors, which Aristotle considers rhetoric’s only means of making the speech non-banal. In this section, I will focus on the following issues, which will be relevant to the commentators’ interpretations: (a) the appropriateness of the use of metaphors in poetry and in rhetorical speeches, (b) the relation of metaphor to philosophy, (c) the distinction between active and non-active metaphors. In his rhetorical account of style, Aristotle emphasised the importance of metaphors and of presenting things in an active way (ἐνέργεια), namely in a way that brings the thing before one's eyes (πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν), for persuading the audience and for making the enthymemes to appear livelier. First, to present something as active seems to be a feature of some metaphors, contrasted with those metaphors whose meaning indicates a state rather than an action. For example, Aristotle says that to call the good man a square is a metaphor indicating that both are perfect, but the metaphor is not an active one, unlike the metaphors that are often used by Homer, which usually aim at the personification of non-living things (1411b26 ff.). This vivid type of metaphor is presented by Aristotle as preferable, and, in fact, it has been argued that to “bring something before the eyes” was for Aristotle the primary virtue of metaphors38, which contributes to “activate cognitive mechanisms || 37 Steph., In Rhet 311, 27-31: Εἶπεν ἄν τις ὡς ‘ἐπεὶ οὐ ταπεινὴν δεῖ λέξιν ἐντίθεσθαι τῷ πεζῷ, οὐ ταπεινὴ δὲ ἡ ποιητική, πῶς αὐτὴν διώκεις;’ λύων οὖν τὴν ἔνστασίν φησιν, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀφείλει ἔχειν ἡ πεζὴ λέξις καὶ τοσαῦτα· τὸ σαφές, τὸ οὐ ταπεινόν, τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ πρέπον· ὥστε λοιπὸν ἡ ποιητικὴ οὐ πρέπουσά ἐστι τῷ πεζῷ. 38 Moran (1996), 392.

240 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

on the part of the listeners”39. If this is so, and since metaphors are the means to produce knowledge, which was what Aristotle took the proper function of metaphors to be, then vivid and lively metaphors are the most successful in bringing about this function. This should become clearer after a more detailed presentation of the main features of metaphor. Aristotle gives a definition of metaphor in the Poetics, but it also seems to cover the rhetorical use of metaphors: [T.17] Metaphor is an application of a name that belongs to another thing, either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy.40

The main elements of this definition are analysed by Paul Ricoeur41 in the following way: (1) metaphor is connected to a noun or word and not to a discourse, (2) metaphor is defined in terms of movement, (3) metaphor entails the transposition of an alien meaning, (4) there are four sources or types of metaphor, namely this meaning-transfer can happen in four ways: from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species or by analogy. Metaphor is therefore the application of one term that normally belongs in one context to another context and, hence, the establishment of a certain comparison between these two domains. The four types of metaphor are presented in more detail by Aristotle in the Poetics, where examples of each type are also given: a metaphor from genus to species would be when one uses a more generic name instead of a more specific (“my ship stands here, for mooring is a type of standing”), whereas a metaphor from genus to species will be the opposite (“ten thousand noble deeds did Odysseus accomplish, for ten thousand is many”); similarly, a metaphor from species to species uses a specific name that belongs to the same genus (“drawing off the life with bronze, where drawing off is used instead of cutting, for both are kinds of removing”), whereas, finally, metaphor by analogy is the one in which b is said to be to a as d is to c (“the wine bowl is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares”). As for the rhetorical description of metaphors, metaphors are said to be the only type of nouns that can be used in a rhetorical speech for altering the style, namely for making the expression unfamiliar and, hence, pleasant. The other types of nouns, which were listed in the Poetics (ch. 21), are excluded from the rhetorical speeches due to their extremely poetical impression. Instead, Aristotle suggests a proportionate mixture of standard terms and metaphor, so that the speech will be both clear and non-banal. Metaphors, which are said to combine all these features,

|| 39 Newmann (2002), 3. In fact, Newmann (2002) argues that “to bring before one's eyes” is “not explicitly cognitive, but instead perceptive capacity”. 40 Poet. 21 1457b6-9: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. 41 Ricoeur (1996), 329-336. S. also Kirby (1997), 532-533.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 241

namely clarity (τὸ σαφές), pleasure (τὸ ἡδύ) and unfamiliarity (τὸ ξενικόν), become a crucial element of rhetorical speeches. Of these features, the association of metaphors with clarity is problematic, since previously (and in the Poetics) it was said that clarity is achieved only through the standard terms and that the constant use of metaphors might turn the speech into a riddle. The only additional information that Aristotle offers regarding the clarity of metaphors is that unclarity comes about in metaphors when they are too distant (πόρρωθεν). As for the feature of pleasure, Aristotle later explains it with reference to the metaphors' importance for acquiring knowledge. In particular, metaphors are said to produce knowledge in the following way: when the metaphor is expressed, it provokes the audience to find and discern the similarities between the compared things, and the audience feels pleasure when it grasps this connection. This procedure can be described as defamiliarisation, in which the hearer is stimulated due to the wonder for the unknown that leads one to make an effort to comprehend it42. On this last point, a note should be added, since for Aristotle this cognitive value of metaphors is what makes them analogous to philosophy. More specifically, it seems that what Aristotle proposes here is a theory of learning through assimilation, in which the analogy between two things brings about some new information. In this procedure, to “bring before the eyes” plays a supportive role by contributing towards capturing the hearer's attention and, hence, in activating the learning process, which is fulfilled when the listener comprehends the similarity between the contrasted things. One can add that this is not the only occasion that Aristotle expresses such a theory for learning. In the Poetics (4 1448b5-9), he states that learning starts from mimesis, which is described as a feature innate in human nature and which also consists in creating resemblance, since mimesis is a representation of reality. Mimesis can hence be achieved through metaphors, which are here considered as “a sign of a genius”, since to produce a good metaphor presupposes an inquiry into resemblances43 (22 1459a5-8). In general, the treatment of metaphors in the Rhetoric presupposes the Poetics, not only due to the fact that a definition is given only in the latter treatise, but also due to the fact that the distinction between four types of metaphors is taken in the Rhetoric to be already known (III.2 1405a2-6). Therefore, Aristotle refers to metaphors by analogy, for which he states that they are the most successful (III.10

|| 42 S. Rapp (2002), 832. 43 Cf. Top. I.18 108b7-14 for the importance of inquiring into the similarities. Interestingly, these Aristotelian theories are not significantly different from contemporary theories of learning, which propose that learning proceeds either through assimilation or through interaction. S. Kirby (1997), 519.

242 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

1411a1-2), or from genus to species and gives examples of them, but does not care to give a complete list of all types of metaphors. However, he deals in more details with the description of appropriate and inappropriate metaphors. Hence, in Rhetoric III we learn that a metaphor should be a noun taken from the same genus and specifically one that is neither too distant nor too obvious (III.11 1412a11-12). This also applies to the case of metaphors used for naming something that does not have its own name: the metaphorical word used should be related to or cognate with the new meaning that it acquires44, just as in any other type of metaphor. Moreover, the noun chosen should be the one that fits our goal better, namely our aim of increasing or decreasing something. For instance, both “begging” and “wishing” for something are types of “asking”, but one should use the term that best depicts their line of argument (III.2 1405a10 ff.). Regarding inappropriate metaphors, Aristotle mentions as a defective metaphor one that is formed on the sounds of the words when the result is not pleasant. A metaphor, says Aristotle, should be pleasant both in its sound as well as in its meaning. Equally inappropriate are the metaphors that are either laughable (γελοῖον) or too imposing or grandiose (σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν). Such metaphors would fit in a comedy or tragedy, but are unclear when they are used in a rhetorical speech. Finally, it should be noted that, although Aristotle has emphasised the importance of metaphors in rhetorical and poetical contexts, he has excluded their use in philosophy and science. In fact, in the Metaphysics (991a20-22, 1079b25-26) he criticises Plato for making use of metaphorical language when he explains participation, and states that such language is empty talk (κενολογεῖν), whereas Empedocles is criticized in the Meteorologica (357a24-28) for the lack of clarity due to the use of metaphors. Moreover, in the Topics he explicitly denounces the use of metaphors in the construction of definitions, and claims that every metaphorical statement is unclear (139b35: πᾶν ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον)45. To sum up, we saw that the Aristotelian account of metaphors in the Rhetoric raised some important issues, concerning (1) the appropriateness of use of metaphors in poetry and prose, (2) the claimed relation between metaphor and philosophy, (3) the cognitive effects of metaphors and the contribution of “bringing before the eyes” to these effects. I will now focus on the commentators’ interpretations of these issues.

|| 44 For the relation between the “old” and “new” references of the term, (i.e. whether the one substitutes the other or the words maintain their proper meaning) s. Schwiggers (1984), 42-43; Laks (1994). 45 For an analysis of Aristotle's criticism of metaphors s. Lloyd (1989), 183 ff.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 243

6.2.1 Anonymous’ commentary The discussion about metaphors, which, as highlighted above, the commentator considered to be an important factor for rendering the speech beautiful (s. [T.12]), is introduced in the commentary on III.2 and is interestingly interpreted. First, the commentator refers to the features attributed by Aristotle to metaphors, that is, clarity and unfamiliarity, and explains, in virtue of these features, in what way a good metaphor can be constructed: [T.18] Metaphor entails clarity; for it is not unclear in every case; it also includes the unfamiliar, namely the strange, as it is transferred from something else. And one cannot take it from someone else, namely there is no need of some interpreter. This, namely to express appropriate metaphors, will happen, if one keeps the best analogy, e.g. one seed of fire is called in analogy to the seed of men; for as the men's seed, though small, creates suddenly something greater, so the beginning of fire is called seed, because, though small in the beginning, it kindles suddenly a big flame after seizing the wood.46

According to this passage, good metaphors have the following features: (1) clarity, (2) unfamiliarity, (3) appropriate analogy. What must first be noted is that metaphors are not said to be pleasant, as they were called in the Aristotelian Rhetoric, but in this passage the focus lies instead on the appropriateness of the analogy made through use of a metaphorical word. This appropriateness is closely connected with clarity, since, as will become more evident in the next passage, clarity is produced when the metaphorical word is chosen from a context insufficiently distinct from its context of application. In other words, the metaphor is good and clear, when the analogy between the old and new context of the term is clear (namely between the context, to which the term originally belonged, and the context, to which the term is transferred), although this is achieved when the contexts are somehow related. In the passage just cited, the connection of clarity with analogy is not yet fully explained, and the commentator states only that a metaphor entails clarity by avoiding unclarity in every aspect. This sentence shows the commentator's struggle to deal with Aristotle’s controversial statements about the metaphor's clarity, which I discussed above. The solution he seems to have found is that, though metaphors are

|| 46 Anon., In Rhet. 167, 12-21: ἔχει δὲ ἡ μεταφορικὴ λέξις καὶ τὸ σαφές· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσαφὴς πάντῃ· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἤτοι τὸ παράξενον ὡς ἐξ ἄλλου μετακομισθεῖσα. καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου ἤτοι οὐ δέεταί τινος τοῦ ἑρμηνεύοντος. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἤτοι τὸ ἁρμοττούσας λέγειν τὰς μεταφοράς, εἴ τις τηρήσει τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἀρίστην, οἷον σπέρμα λέγεται πυρὸς κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ὡς γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρχή ἐστι τοῦ βρέφους, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πυρὸς λέγεται σπέρμα· καὶ ὡς τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μικρὸν ὂν μεῖζόν τι ἐξαίφνης δημιουργεῖ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πυρὸς σπέρμα λέγεται, διότι μικρὰ οὖσα κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐξαίφνης πυρκαϊὰν μεγάλην ἐξανάπτει ὕλης δραξάμενον.

244 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

unclear—since they substitute the standard name of things with an unfamiliar one— they are not unclear in every aspect or in every case, since they can be clear when the analogy from which they are brought about, is easy to grasp. This view is more explicitly stated in the following passages: [T.19.a] Moreover, one should not make the metaphors from far-fetched things, but from what is related and those of the same kind, in naming something that does not have a proper name of its own, namely when, in the things that have no name, a suitable name is found from another thing, which (namely this suitable, found name) will, when expressed, immediately make clear that it is related, namely that it has been taken from a related thing and of the same species.47 [T.19.b] The metaphors become unclear if they are transferred from far-fetched things and from things that do not belong to the same species.48

A good metaphor should be “transferred” (since metaphor is about transferring a word that applies in one context when talking about another context) from things that are not too distant from the thing that is named through the metaphor. The metaphorical word should therefore be chosen from things that have something in common (ὁμοειδῶν) with the new context of the term. The effect of such metaphors is to be clear, unlike the metaphors that are transferred from “afar” (πόρρωθεν), which are, according to passage [T.19.b], unclear and inappropriate. This is, therefore, how metaphors are clear, namely by being brought about from a related context, and hence by establishing a relation that the audience can easily grasp. Unlike these metaphors, the ones that come from an unrelated and distinct context are unclear and therefore hard to understand. Later I will focus on the commentator's interpretation of the metaphor's cognitive effect on the audience, where this procedure of “understanding the metaphor” or grasping the relation between the compared things, which are treated analogically, will be explained in detail. Related to this point and the previous discussion of the beauty of lexis, is the discussion about the sources of metaphors, namely the sources from which a good metaphor can be drawn. Taking as a starting point the Aristotelian statement in the second chapter (III.2 1405b17) that a good metaphor should be taken from words that are beautiful in sound, power, sight or any other sense, the commentator elaborates:

|| 47 Anon., In Rhet. 170, 1-6: ἔτι δὲ οὐ δεῖ ποιεῖν τὰς μεταφορὰς πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ ὁμοειδῶν τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως, ἤτοι ὅταν, ἐφ' οἷς οὐ κεῖται ὄνομα, εὑρεθῇ κατάλληλον ὄνομα ἀπὸ ἑτέρου πράγματος, ὅπερ (τοῦτο τὸ εὑρεθὲν ὄνομα κατάλληλον) ῥηθὲν εὐθὺς δηλώσει, ὅτι συγγενές ἐστιν, ἤτοι ὅτι ἀπὸ συγγενοῦς καὶ ὁμοειδοῦς ἐλήφθη. 48 Anon., In Rhet. 177, 11-12: ἀσαφεῖς δὲ γίνονται αἱ μεταφοραί, εἰ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοειδῶν μετακομίζονται.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 245

[T.20] We should bring the metaphors from beautiful expressions either in sound or in power or in appearance. Beautiful in respect of power, namely in respect of the analogy as well as to the nature of the thing, is like when we call the king “shepherd of the folk” because he has the same power as the shepherd of sheep; for as the shepherd is the master of the sheep, so is the king the master of the folk. Or beautiful in sight, as for instance, rose is more beautiful and pleasant than red; and for that reason, if we transfer metaphorically the name from rose for the dawn, it will be more beautiful than if we do it from red, i.e. “rosy-fingered dawn”. Pleasant in sound, namely in utterance, when it is not harsh due to the collision of consonants and does not cause pain in the speaker due to his inability to utter it easily, as for instance [the words] “misgageia” and “atarpos”49. Hence, one should transport and transfer the metaphors from beautiful names either in sound or in appearance or in power, namely in meaning and analogy.50

The commentator says that metaphors are beautiful with respect to three things: sight, sound and power. Striking in the commentator's interpretation of this view is his explanation of that in which this power or ability consists. According to him, beautiful expressions with respect to δύναμις, namely those that bring about good metaphors, are those that respect both the “nature of the thing” that we try to name and its analogy with the old context of the word. In other words, beautiful expressions are not only the ones that sound nice or refer to beautiful things, but also those that have the capacity to create a nice analogy between two domains, which corresponds to the essential features of these domains. A metaphor would then be beautiful if the metaphorical name corresponds to the nature of the thing by being somehow analogical to it: in the example given by the commentator, when naming the king as the shepherd of the people, we use a metaphor that brings about the nature of kingship, since we make clear that a king, just as the shepherd, is the master. So far, I have presented the commentator's interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of metaphors as described in the Rhetoric and, more particularly, of the description of the features of a good metaphor and its relation to clarity. Regarding the account of metaphor in the Poetics, it is hard to tell whether the commentator knows

|| 49 Both words appear in Homer. Μισγάγκεια (Il. 4, 453) is the meeting of glens, whereas ἀταρπός (Il., 17, 743; Od. 14, 1) is the path. 50 Anon., In Rhet. 173, 21- 34: τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ὀφείλομεν κομίζειν ἀπὸ καλῶν λέξεων ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει. καλὸν μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει ἤτοι τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος, ὥσπερ λέγομεν ’ποιμένα λαῶν’ τὸν βασιλέα διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν πρὸς τὸν ποιμένα τῶν προβάτων· ὡς γὰρ ὁ βοσκὸς ἡγεῖται τῶν προβάτων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῦ λαοῦ ἡγεῖται. ἢ καλὸν τῇ ὄψει, ὥσπερ τὸ ῥόδον κάλλιόν ἐστι καὶ ἡδὺ τῇ ὄψει παρ' ὃ τὸ φοινικοῦν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ μετακομίσομεν μεταφορικῶς τῇ ἠοῖ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥόδου, κάλλιόν ἐστι παρ' ὃ ἀπὸ τοῦ φοινικοῦ, οἷον “ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠώς”. ἡδὺ δὲ τῇ φωνῇ ἤτοι τῇ ἐκφωνήσει, ὅταν οὐ τραχεῖά ἐστι διὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν τῶν συμφώνων καὶ λυποῦσα τὸν λέγοντα αὐτὴν ὡς μὴ δυνάμενον ῥᾳδίως ἐκφωνῆσαι, ὡς τὸ μισγάγκεια καὶ ἀταρπός· ὥστε δεῖ τὰς μεταφορὰς μεταφέρειν καὶ μετακομίζειν ἀπὸ ὀνομάτων καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἤτοι τῇ σημασίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ.

246 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

it. On the one hand, he often refers to the latter treatise when paraphrasing the Aristotelian text and, in particular, Aristotle's references to his treatment of metaphor and lexis in the Poetics. However, in the only case in which he could have made use of the poetical account of metaphors and have added more information to the commentary, he chose to interpret the text of the Rhetoric completely independently from the treatment of metaphor in the Poetics. I refer to the discussion of the four types of metaphors, where Aristotle's Rhetoric itself does not give the whole list but hints at the poetical treatment of the same subject51. The Anonymous commentator interprets Aristotle's reference to the fourfold distinction of types of metaphor in this way: [T.21] Metaphor is said in four ways; either from living to living things as the “shepherd of folks”, or from non-living to non-living as the “saving the seed of fire”, or from living to nonliving things as the “spear fell on the ground, desiring to take fill of the body”, or from nonliving to living as the “flowing speeches”.52

Although the metaphors from analogy are discussed by Aristotle at length in the third book of the Rhetoric, and are hence also dealt with by the commentator, in this passage, where the distinction between the four types of metaphor is made, the Anonymous commentator does not refer at all to metaphors by analogy or to metaphors made from genus to species or from species to genus or from species to species, but instead introduces another distinction. Hence, as we read in the passage above, a metaphor can be (1) from living things to living things, (2) from non-living to non-living things, (3) from living to non-living things, (4) from non-living to living things. In all these cases and in the examples offered in illustration, it is described in what way a metaphor comes about and its effect on the new context in which it is applied. We can note here that this distinction, which is implied by Aristotle himself (Rhet. III.11 1411b33), is found in many late antique rhetorical and grammatical textbooks53. We can infer, therefore, that these texts have been the Anonymous’ source, and not Aristotle’s own division from the Poetics. This conclusion fits well with what we have seen so far both regarding the Anonymous’ background, i.e. his interests in the rhetorical tradition, and regarding the fate of the Poetics in Byzantium. The fact that the Anonymous does not seem to know well Aristotle’s account of lexis and

|| 51 Rhet. III.2 1405a3-6: τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἴδη μεταφορᾶς, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. 52 Anon., In Rhet. 171, 12-16: τετραχῇ ἡ μεταφορὰ λέγεται· ἢ ἀπὸ ἐμψύχου εἰς ἔμψυχα ὡς τὸ ‘ποιμένα λαῶν’, ἢ ἀπὸ ἀψύχου εἰς ἄψυχα ὡς τὸ ‘σπέρμα σῴζων πυρός’, ἢ ἀπὸ ἐμψύχου εἰς ἄψυχον ὡς τὸ ‘αἰχμὴν † δὲ ἐν γαίῃ πέσε λιλαιομένη χροὸς ἆσαι’, ἢ ἀπὸ ἀψύχων εἰς ἔμψυχα ὡς τὸ ‘ῥέει λόγους’. 53 For instance in the Comm. In Dionysii Thracis, Artem Grammat., in Demetrius’ De Eloq., in Hermogenes’ De Inv., etc.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 247

metaphor in the Poetics might be an indication that the Poetics were not very wellknown in his time. The reason the commentator introduces such a distinction can be explained if we take another close look at the Aristotelian account of activity (ἐνέργεια) in the metaphors, which I briefly presented above. More specifically, the distinction made by the commentator seems to try to capture the Aristotelian distinction between active metaphors and the ones that indicate a state. In particular, the above-cited types of metaphors can cover cases like the ones indicated by Aristotle: to make a metaphor which attributes a living feature to something non-living, would be an example of making something active. In the division introduced by the commentator, the metaphors that attribute to something non-living a feature that usually belongs to a living thing, are more active than the metaphors that transfer a name that belongs to non-living things to those living or, to transport a name from a group of non-living things to the other, which are rather static. In the third type of metaphor, which seems to be the one that can cover the instances of active metaphors, the attribute of living things (i.e. desire) is connected to a non-living thing (i.e. spear). However, this does not exclude the possibility that an active metaphor can be brought about in the other types of metaphor. One could expect that the transfer of a name within a genus of living things can bring about an active metaphor. Similarly, in the fourth type of metaphor, where the reversed procedure takes place, namely an attribute of a non-living thing is attributed to a living thing, an active metaphor can also result, as in the example used, where flowing (non-living) is attributed to the man who speaks (living). The connection between this distinction of types of metaphor and the feature of activity is made more explicit by the commentator in his interpretation of the treatment of metaphors later on in the treatise (III.10-11), where he refers to the examples used in the passage cited above and offers some further examples illustrating these types. [T.22.a] In calling, that is, in rendering the non-living as living through metaphor (that is, to use metaphors that signify activity) is what also Homer uses; in all cases, to exhibit this activity makes the metaphors thrive. [...] [T.22.b] And to say “the arrow has eagerly fallen”; for to desire something eagerly, namely to be eager, is said of the living and not of the arrow, namely of the non-living. And “on the ground the spears were standing, desiring, namely being eager to grasp and satiate the body”. To desire is said of the living. [...] [T.22.c] For all such things are activities and are taken from the living things.

248 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III [T.22.d] And to call the waves “patched with white”, namely white, is a metaphor from living to non-living; for to become white is said of old people.54 [T.22.e] The father of Havrias greatly benefitted the city of Athenians; so, Athenians rewarded him by setting up a golden image for him and freed him from taxes; when he died, he left this right [of not paying taxes] to his son Havrias. But when there was lack of money in the city, Leptines advised that they remove the right from those who had it; from this Havrias was in danger to lose the right and said, “feel shame of the father's suppliant golden image”, namely the image that supplicates you in favour of the son. In this speech, to call the image “suppliant” is a metaphor; for it is appropriate for the case of the image of Havrias' father to call it metaphorically “suppliant” (for to supplicate is said about living humans), because his father benefitted the city greatly. But one should not call every image metaphorically “suppliant”; in this matter, it was however appropriate to call the image “suppliant”; for the image supplicates because this Havrias was in danger; the metaphor is from living to non-living things, since the image is a reminder of the benefits that the father made towards the city.55

In the passages cited here, the commentator raises further examples of metaphors that attribute a name belonging to something living to something that is non-living, which is the third type of metaphor and the one that is more typical for representing activity. In the last example, the metaphor is also said to proceed from living to nonliving things, namely by attributing a feature of living things, i.e. supplication, to non-living things, that is, the image of Havrias' father. One of the examples, in particular the one in passage [T.22.b] is a repetition of the example given in the previous passage, where the commentator introduced the division of types of metaphors. As he explains in both passages, to attribute a capacity of the living, e.g. desire or

|| 54 Anon., In Rhet. 209, 12- 210, 20: ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἤτοι ποιεῖν τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς, ᾧτινι (τῷ χρᾶσθαι μεταφοραῖς ἐνέργειαν σημαινούσαις) χρᾶται καὶ Ὅμηρος· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ποιεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ παρεμφαίνειν ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν. [...] καὶ τὸ λέγειν ‘ὀιστὸς ἐπιπτάσθαι μενεαίνων’· τὸ μενεαίνειν ἤτοι τὸ προθυμεῖν ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων λέγεται, οὐχὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀιστοῦ ἤτοι τοῦ ἀψύχου. καὶ ‘ἐν γαίῃ ἵσταντο τὰ δόρατα λιλαιόμενα ἤτοι προθυμούμενα ἆσαι καὶ κορέσαι χροός’· τὸ λιλαίεσθαι ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων λέγεται. [...] ἐνέργειαι γάρ εἰσι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων λαμβανόμενα. [...] καὶ τὸ φαληριόωντα εἰπεῖν τὰ κύματα ἤτοι λευκὰ ἐστὶ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων εἰς ἄψυχα· τὸ γὰρ λευκαίνεσθαι ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγεται γερόντων. 55 Anon., In Rhet. 207, 25- 208, 7: τοῦ Χαβρίου ὁ πατὴρ εὐηργέτησε πολλὰ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων· ὃν ἀμειβόμενοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔστησαν αὐτῷ εἰκόνα χρυσῆν καὶ ἐποίησαν καὶ αὐτὸν ἀτελῆ· τελευτῶν δὲ ἀφῆκε τῷ υἱῷ αὑτοῦ τῷ Χαβρίᾳ τὴν ἀτέλειαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνις χρημάτων τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, συμβουλεύει ἵνα ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἀτέλειαν ὁ Λεπτίνης ἀφαιρήσωσιν αὐτήν· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Χαβρίας ἐκινδύνευεν ἀπολέσαι τὴν ἀτέλειαν καί φησιν ‘αἰσχύνθητε τὴν χρυσῆν εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ἱκετηρίαν οὖσαν’ ἤτοι ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύουσαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ υἱοῦ. ἐν τῷ παρόντι λόγῳ τὸ λέγειν τὴν εἰκόνα ἱκετηρίαν ἐστὶ μεταφορά· ἁρμόζει γάρ, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ πατρὸς Χαβρίου, τὸ εἰπεῖν αὐτὴν ἱκετεύουσαν μεταφορικῶς (τὸ γὰρ ἱκετεύειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων λέγεται ἀνθρώπων), διότι ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τὴν πόλιν ὠφέλησεν. οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ πᾶσαν εἰκόνα δεῖ λέγειν μεταφορικῶς ἱκετεύουσαν· ἐπὶ τῆς παρούσης γοῦν ὑποθέσεως ἁρμόζει λέγειν τὴν εἰκόνα ἱκετηρίαν· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χαβρίου ἱκετεύει ἡ εἰκών· ἡ μεταφορὰ ἐξ ἐμψύχου εἰς ἄψυχον, ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν ὑπόμνημά ἐστι τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν, ἃς ἐποίησεν ὁ πατὴρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 249

eagerness, to something non-living, e.g. to a spear or an arrow, is one kind of metaphor. Similarly, in the example of passage [T.22.d], the metaphor consists in transferring to a non-living thing, e.g. waves, a name that is usually attribute to men. The difference between the treatment of metaphors in this chapter (III.11) and in the chapter discussed earlier (III.2) is that here the commentator makes more explicit that one of these types of metaphor covers the cases in which a metaphor is active as opposed to static. In particular, in the passages [T.22.a] and [T.22.c], the procedure of transferring a name in the way described as the third type of metaphor, is identified with what Aristotle called activity. As the commentator states, to present something as living, though being non-living, is what it means for the metaphors to be active. As for the commentator's interpretation of the meaning of “bringing before the eyes”, it is presented in the commentary on the tenth chapter (III.10) under the discussion of successful metaphors and their characteristics. More specifically, it is said that successful (εὐδοκιμοῦσαι) metaphors are those that bring about learning, which happens when the metaphors (1) are short and, hence, pleasant, (2) entail names that provoke thinking, (3) bring things before the eyes. Starting from the meaning of “bringing before the eyes”, which is explained in terms of clarity, the commentator says: [T.23.a] Moreover, the metaphor is praised, if the metaphorical name brings the said thing before the eyes, namely makes them evident, as also if it makes one think that they see the thing. For one should rather see what is done and one does not foresee what will be done; for these are not evident. Some of the manuscripts have “activity” and this is understood in connection to “the metaphor should bring the thing before the yes; for one sees those things that are in activity”; but if it is “clearness”, then it is understood in connection to “the metaphor should bring the thing before the eyes, so that it is thought to be clear and evident”. Clearness, namely manifestation, as also to represent the thing clearly.56 [T.23.b] For the “they emptied out” is a metaphor and before the eyes, namely a metaphor that makes the thing evident and clear.57 [T.23.c] And that the metaphor brings the things before the eyes, namely represents things as clear and evident.58

|| 56 Anon., In Rhet. 203, 35- 204, 6: ἔτι ἐπαινεῖται ἡ μεταφορά, εἰ ποιεῖ τὸ μεταφορικὸν ὄνομα τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ λεγόμενον πρὸ ὀμμάτων ἤτοι φανερόν, ὡς καὶ δοκεῖν ὁρᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα. δεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν τὰ πραττόμενα, οὐχὶ τὰ μέλλοντα πράττεσθαι ὁρᾷ τις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀφανῆ εἰσι. τινὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων ἔχουσιν ἐνεργείας, καὶ νοεῖται τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ‘ὁρᾶν δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ὁρᾷ τις τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντα’· εἰ δὲ κεῖται ἐναργείας, νοεῖται πρὸς τὸ ‘πρὸ ὀμμάτων δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιεῖν τὴν μεταφοράν, ὡς δοκεῖν εἶναι ἐναργὲς καὶ δῆλον’. ἐναργείας ἤτοι φανερώσεως, ὡς καὶ ἐναργῶς παριστᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα. 57 Anon., In Rhet. 206, 18-19: τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐξεκένωσαν μεταφορά ἐστι καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ἤτοι δῆλον καὶ ἐναργὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιοῦσα.

250 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

In all passages cited above, the Anonymous commentator refers to the meaning of “bringing before the eyes”. The expression is not interpreted in connection to Aristotle's reference to activity, but it explained in a more literal way. More specifically, “to bring before the eyes” of the audience does not mean, according to the commentator, “to make things active”, but rather means “to make things clear”, apparent and evident. In passage [T.23.a], this interpretation is further explained: to bring before the eyes means to create the impression that something is seen by someone, whereas things that are seen are obvious and clear. What can be noted is that this interpretation is based on a suggestion by the commentator for a different reading. Although he reads, as he explicitly states, that the text, as appearing in the manuscripts, has “energeia” (activity), he suggests that this should be changed to “enargeia59” (clearness, vividness), which better expresses, in his view, the meaning of the phrase “to bring before the eyes”. Given that his treatment of this feature of metaphors falls under the discussion of which metaphors can bring about knowledge, it becomes more evident why “to bring before the eyes” is interpreted as an element of metaphor related to clarity. More specifically, if “to bring before the eyes” is, as the commentator seems to suggest, one of the features of metaphors that contribute greatly towards making them successful in bringing about knowledge, then the commentator's intention in interpreting this feature as referring to the presence of clarity in the metaphors becomes evident. Moreover, this interpretation is in line with our conclusions from the previous section, where we showed the centrality of clarity in the Anonymous’ commentary. The other features that contribute to the success of metaphors and to the metaphors' cognitive effect, are, as said above, (1) the short length of metaphors and (2) use of thought-provoking vocabulary. Starting with the first, this is what the commentator says: [T.24] The simile differs from the metaphor in respect of the preposition; for the simile has “as” or “just as”, whereas the metaphor has neither “as” nor “just as” nor anything else like that; the simile is considered to be bad because it is long; for it has “as”, for instance, “as when one sees a lion”. For that reason, if the metaphor is expressed in a long way, and becomes long through “as”, it is not pleasant; for if it is expressed verbosely60, it does not represent the thing as being easy to learn, but creates unclarity. Moreover, the metaphor does not say “as this, namely as something is in this case, so it is in another case”; for to say “as something is in this case, so it is in another case” is a simile. Or it can also be thus understood: the simile, i.e. the comparison, neither says that nor represents the thing as that. For in metaphors, the soul of the

|| 58 Anon., In Rhet. 208, 27-28: καὶ ἐν τῷ τὴν μεταφορὰν ποιεῖν τὰ πράγματα πρὸ ὀμμάτων ἤτοι ἐναργῆ καὶ φανερὰ παριστᾶν τὰ πράγματα. 59 Enargeia is a term with technical usage in the late antique rhetorical theories of style. 60 Literally: if it has the expression through a long [speech/utterance].

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 251

hearer does not look for the assimilation, namely “as it is in this case, so in the other case”, but [understands] immediately, namely simultaneously with its utterance, the hearer learns quickly what is said through the metaphor because its expression is short.61

As in the case of “bringing before the eyes”, the commentator explains the shortness of metaphors, in contrast with the length of similes, with respect to clarity and learning. Metaphors, which unlike similes neither explicitly express a comparison nor make use of any comparative preposition, should be short in order to be clear and, hence, pleasant and easy to learn (εὔγνωστον). In the case of metaphors, learning is accomplished, as we read, simultaneously with their articulation, to which the shortness of their form also contributes, whereas in similes the hearer must look for the comparison between the two things and, hence, must make an effort to understand their assimilation. So far, we have seen that the commentator interprets two of the three elements of successful metaphors as bringing about knowledge of the thing by making the metaphor clear. As for the last element, it is presented in greater detail: [T.25.a] To learn something easily is considered pleasant; names are signifying things; therefore, those of the names that produce some learning and knowledge in us are considered the most pleasant. The names produce learning in us, if we transfer names that stand for some things into other things, as for instance if someone calls women “maenander” (i.e. mad after men). The foreign words, namely the dialects, are obscure to us, namely unknown, whereas we know the standard names; the successful metaphor (this is when we transport the names from one thing to the other) produces this, namely it provides us with knowledge simultaneously with its utterance, [namely knowledge of] the thing for which the name was transferred from another thing.62

|| 61 Anon., In Rhet. 202, 31- 203, 9: ἡ εἰκὼν διαφέρει τῆς μεταφορᾶς τῇ προθέσει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ εἰκὼν ἔχει τὸ ὥς ἢ τὸ καθώς, ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ οὔτε τὸ ὥς ἔχει οὔτε τὸ καθώς οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον· ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν ὡς μακροαπόδοτος κακίζεται· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ ὥς, οἷόν ἐστιν ‘ὡς δ' ὅταν τις λέοντα ἰδών’. διὸ ἡ μεταφορὰ εἰ μακροτέρως ἀποδοθῇ καὶ μακροαπόδοτος διὰ τὸ ὥς γένηται, οὐδαμῶς ἔχει τὸ ἡδύ· εἰ γὰρ διὰ μακροῦ ἔχει τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, οὐκ εὔγνωστον ἡμῖν παριστᾷ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλ' ἀσάφειαν ἐμποιεῖ. καὶ οὐ λέγει ἡ μεταφορὰ ‘ὡς τοῦτο ἤτοι ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει’· τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ‘ὡς τοῦτο ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ ἐκεῖνο’ τῆς εἰκόνος ἐστίν. ἢ καὶ οὕτως νοεῖται· καὶ οὐ λέγει ἐκεῖνο ἤτοι ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ παριστᾷ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡς τοῦτο ἤτοι ἡ παραβολή. οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς μεταφορᾶς ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἤτοι τὴν ὁμοίωσιν, ἤτοι ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ ῥηθῆναι συνίησι ταχέως καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τῆς μεταφορᾶς διὰ τὸ καὶ σύντομον εἶναι τὴν ταύτης ἀπόδοσιν· 62 Anon., In Rhet. 202, 8-22: τὸ γοῦν μανθάνειν τι ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ μὲν δοκεῖ· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα πραγμάτων σημαντικά εἰσιν· ὥστε τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσα ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσίν τινα, ἥδιστα δοκοῦσι. ποιοῦσι δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἐὰν τὰ ἐν ἄλλοις κείμενα ὀνόματα εἰς ἄλλα μεταφέρωμεν, ὡς τὴν γυναῖκα εἴπῃ τις μαίνανδρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἤτοι αἱ διάλεκτοί εἰσιν ἀγνῶτες ἡμῖν καὶ ἄγνωστοι, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν ὀνόματα· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ἡ εὐδοκιμοῦσα (ἔστι δέ, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἰς ἄλληλα μετασκευάζωμεν τὰ ὀνόματα) τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἤτοι τὸ γνῶσιν ἡμῖν παρέχειν ἅμα τῷ ῥηθῆναι, εἰς ὃ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ ἄλλου μετεκομίσατο τὸ ὄνομα.

252 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III [T.25.b] Success is also in the names, when the names have a metaphor neither foreign and outside the matter and unclear, nor superficial and clear; for if the metaphor is clear, it does not make the intellect suffer and struggle to understand; but this metaphor is praised, which entangles the intellect.63

Unlike the other elements that contribute to the success of a metaphor and which were interpreted in terms of making the metaphor clear, in these passages the commentator refers to the nouns used in the metaphor, which, as stated, should be neither unclear nor clear. If the aim of metaphors is the production of knowledge, then the metaphors should not be too clear and self-evident, but challenging, so that they will provoke the hearer to struggle for acquiring this knowledge, namely to struggle for understanding what is what. In summary, in his treatment of metaphors, as well as in the treatment of lexis in general, the Anonymous commentator explains his views on the account of style in the Rhetoric: an account of style is indispensable, since good style contributes greatly to the clarity of the speech. Hence, by focusing on the principal virtue of lexis, namely clarity, he interprets all the related issues in view of their contribution to clarity: all features of lexis, discussed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric III, such as correctness in grammar and syntax or appropriateness, are interpreted with reference to clarity. Metaphors, which are said by Aristotle to require clarity, are also explained thus by the commentator, who, when distinguishing the elements that contribute to the success of metaphor and to the knowledge through metaphors, focuses on the way in which these elements render the metaphor clear and hence, produce learning. In his effort to stress the importance of clarity and to interpret Aristotle’s concept of “active metaphors” as distinct from “static metaphors”, the Anonymous offers an interesting fourfold division of the types of metaphor, based on the options of transferring a name to and from living or non-living things.

6.2.2 Stephanus’ commentary Of the main issues presented by Aristotle in Rhet. III, Stephanus refers to metaphors, although not extensively, since he does not comment at all on the chapters dealing with this topic, III.10-11. [T.26.a] One cannot take the metaphor from something else, but from the same thing or from the species or from the genus; for one should start from a living thing to a living rather than to a non-living; for he said “the irritated king roared like a lion”. For both the beast lion and the

|| 63 Anon., In Rhet. 203, 31-35: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασίν ἐστιν εὐδοκίμησις, ἐὰν ἔχωσι τὰ ὀνόματα μεταφορὰν μήτε ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἀσαφῆ μήτε ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ σαφῆ· εἰ γάρ ἐστι σαφὴς ἡ μεταφορά, οὐ ποιεῖ τὸν νοῦν πάσχειν, οὐ κοπιᾶν περὶ τὴν νόησιν· ἐκείνη δὲ ἐπαινεῖται ἡ μεταφορὰ ἡ τὸν νοῦν βλάπτουσα.

Introduction to the account of metaphor | 253

king are living, and the lion is the king of beast as the king is the king of people. Also, Hermogenes said in the book on tropes “common is what can be both in the subject and in the thing that appears from outside. This is called metaphor. The metaphor from analogy should be dispensed and not seen in inappropriateness.64 [T.26.b] “It is also in the syllables”. As Hermogenes says that to use a bad style can happen in many ways, either by being base or worthless or inconsistent and the rest, namely in so many ways as the refutation happens in the progymnasma, so also here Aristotle, while teaching about good and bad metaphor, says that its badness is due not only to the names and verbs, but also to harsh, hard and unpleasant syllables.65

These comments offer some information about the commentator's views of metaphors. In the first passage cited, Stephanus refers to the distinction of the types of metaphor, and gives an example in order to illustrate one of these types. Metaphors, he states, can be taken either from the same genus or from the same species or, as he says later on, from analogy. This distinction, introduced by Aristotle in the Poetics and ignored by the Anonymous commentator, is present in Stephanus’ work, but we cannot say with certainty whether the commentator has read it in the Poetics, or whether his knowledge of it is based completely on what Aristotle has stated in the Rhetoric. In fact, his vocabulary is not very reminiscent of that used in the Poetics, since, for instance, Stephanus does not refer to the transfer of a term as taking place, for example “from genus to the species”. Instead, this first division is expanded with the addition of a second division of metaphors, between those that attribute a feature of living things to non-living and those that attribute a feature of living things to living things, of which the latter is preferred. This second distinction is similar with the one introduced by the Anonymous commentator, but here it is presented as a part of the first. In particular, if metaphors should be taken from the same species or genus, then one can only transfer a name from something living to something living, which would belong to the same genus or species. In the example used, both divisions are explained: on the one hand, both a king and a lion are liv-

|| 64 Steph., In Rhet. 312, 25- 313, 2: Τὴν μεταφορὰν οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν παρ' ἄλλου, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ τοῦ γένους· ἀπὸ ἐμψύχου γὰρ εἰς ἔμψυχον ὁρμητέον μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς ἄψυχον· εἰπὲ γὰρ ‘ὡς ὁ λέων ἐβρυχήσατο καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὀργισθείς’· ὅ τε γὰρ λέων τὸ θηρίον ἔμψυχον καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὁ λέων βασιλεὺς θηρίων καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς βασιλεὺς ἀνθρώπων. οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἑρμογένης ἐν τῷ περὶ τροπῆς εἶπε “κοινὸν εἶναι δυνάμενον καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τοῦ ἔξωθεν ἐμφαινομένου, ὃ καλεῖται καὶ μεταφορά”. δεῖ γοῦν τὴν μεταφορὰν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον οἰκονομεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰς ἀπρέπειαν ὁρᾶν. 65 Steph., In Rhet. 313, 25- 314, 4: Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς. ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑρμογένης κατὰ πολλοὺς τοὺς τρόπους τὸ κακόζηλον λέγει γίνεσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἢ διὰ τὸ εὐτελὲς ἢ τὸ ἀνακόλουθον καὶ τὰ λοιπά, καθ' ὅσα τὸ προγύμνασμα ἡ ἀνασκευὴ γίνεται, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὧδε περὶ μεταφορᾶς διδάσκων καλῆς τε καὶ φαύλης λέγει, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐν ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι γίνεται φαυλότης ταύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς τραχείας καὶ σκληρᾶς καὶ ἀνηδύντου.

254 | The Account of Style in the Commentaries on Rhetoric III

ing, whereas, on the other hand, they both belong to the same genus by being kings of certain groups of living beings. As for the second passage of the commentary [T.26.b] in which metaphors are mentioned, Stephanus again quotes a parallel passage from Hermogenes, and interprets the Aristotelian text accordingly. Hence, the Aristotelian statement that metaphors can be bad due to their meaning or sound, is interpreted in view of Hermogenes’ distinction of grounds for bad or affected style (κακόζηλον). In fact, in De Inventione66, Hermogenes dedicates a chapter to this issue, where he argues that the style is bad either due to impossibility or due to inconsistency or due to ugliness or due to impiety or by being hostile to nature. All of these cases do not manage to persuade (ἄπιστα), and they can, as he says and as Stephanus repeats, be refuted. In summary of Stephanus’ interpretation of Rhet. III, his comments on the third book of Rhetoric are enough to sketch his views about the role of lexis and the legitimacy of its study. As we expected, Stephanus stresses the contribution of lexis to persuasion, and focuses only on the part of lexis that is related to argumentation. Besides being consistent with Stephanus’ interpretation of the first two books that dealt exclusively with arguments, such an interpretation of lexis makes the commentator’s views on the treatise on rhetoric’s role within the Aristotelian corpus even clearer: since Rhetoric is, according to Stephanus, part of the Organon, every issue discussed in the treatise must contribute to its principal goal, which is to teach about arguments. Hence, everything that concerns ornamenting the speech, namely the rather poetical aspects of lexis, are not considered to be necessary and, therefore, are banished from the commentary. In addition to this attitude towards the issues discussed in Rhet. III, Stephanus makes an effort to stress the relation between Aristotelian theory and the rhetorical theories of subsequent rhetoricians, whom he mentions and often quotes, i.e. Hermogenes, Libanius, Chrysostomos, Julian. It looks therefore that Stephanus focuses only to the aspects of Rhetoric that are relevant to philosophy, and for the rest he advices the reader to look to other rhetorical handbooks.

|| 66 Herm. Inv. 4, 12: Τὸ δὲ κακόζηλον γίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνακόλουθον, ὃ καὶ ἐναντίωμά ἐστιν, ἢ κατὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀσεβὲς ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἄδικον ἢ κατὰ τὸ τῇ φύσει πολέμιον, καθ' οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀνασκευάζομεν μάλιστα τὰ διηγήματα ἐκβάλλοντες ὡς ἄπιστα. Διά τοι τοῦτό φαμεν καὶ τὰς διασκευὰς μέχρι τοῦ εἰκότος προχωρεῖν, ὡς, εἰ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εὑρεθείη τι, πάντως καὶ κακόζηλον ἐσόμενον καὶ ἐμπεσούμενον τῇ ἀνασκευῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ λέγομεν ‘οὐκ εἰκὸς τόδε πραχθῆναι’, ἢ ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. γίνεται δὲ τὸ κακόζηλον ὅμως καὶ τροπικῇ λέξει μιᾷ χρησαμένων, εἶτα τὸ πλῆρες τῆς τροπῆς ἀποδοῦναι μὴ δυναμένων; cf. Dem. Eloq., 186; Long., 3, 4.

7 Conclusions 7.1 Summary In the six chapters of this book, I have presented the interpretations offered by the authors of the two Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric on some of the most central issues raised in this treatise. In chapter 1, I presented the context of the production of the two commentaries, that is, the date of production as well as their authorship. Moreover, I argued that the two commentators belonged to the group of scholars patronised by Anna Komnene, and I discussed some central features of the commentaries. In chapter 2, I presented the commentators’ views of valid rhetorical arguments as well as of the rhetorical topoi. As we have seen in detail, both commentaries showed a strong interest in explaining the relation of rhetorical syllogisms to dialectical and apodeictical syllogisms by focusing mainly on the structure of the arguments and on the number of premises that are used. The relation between the Rhetoric and Aristotle’s logical theory was, therefore, established, and Aristotle’s syllogistic logic has been taken as the background, e.g. of the account of sign arguments. In addition, Stephanus’ commentary, which made even stronger claims regarding the logical structure of the rhetorical account of arguments, exhibited traces of Neoplatonic logic especially in his distinction between form and matter of the argument. Similarly, traces of the rhetorical theories of late antiquity were found in the Anonymous’ interpretation of the rhetorical topoi, where the commentator introduced technical vocabulary known from this context for explaining the relation between common and specific topoi. In chapter 3, I presented the commentators’ account of fallacious arguments. Both commentators agreed in stressing, whenever possible, the similarity of the rhetorical account with the treatment of fallacious arguments in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Prior Analytics. Stephanus took all of Aristotle’s accounts of fallacies to be completely consistent, and often pointed out the similarities. Anonymous’ interpretation, on the other hand, seemed to have a broader scope, since, although the other logical treatises were mentioned and used in order to show the similarities between the different accounts, there are aspects of his commentary that showed independent thought: the Aristotelian division between linguistic and nonlinguistic fallacies presented in the Sophistical Refutatons is taken as non-applicable to the rhetorical list of fallacies, the close relation between three fallacies (from sign, consequence and accident) is pointed out, and a new fallacy “from the cause” is added in the list. Chapter 4 continued the examination of issues of argumentation and dealt with the specific topoi presented by Aristotle in Rhet. I.5-14, in which ethical notions useful for oratory were defined and analysed. The main focus of this examination

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-007

256 | Conclusions

was the commentators’ views of the status of this account, namely of the relation between the ethical account of the Rhetoric and the one of the Ethics. Therefore, we have seen the way in which the Anonymous commentator argued in favour of the consistency of the two accounts, and the way in which he justified Aristotle’s list of topoi that can be used for arguing for both sides of a controversy by highlighting the crucial role of the orator. It was namely the moral character of the orator that secures, according to the Anonymous, the moral use of controversial topoi, and hence, render the ethical account of the Rhetoric as compatible with Aristotle’s views expressed in other treatises of the corpus. Aiming at rejecting any critisism against Aristotle’s list of ethical topoi, Stephanus also argued in favour of the consistency in Aristotle’s thought, whereas any difference was justified with reference to the different goal of each Aristotelian treatise: Ethics aimed at practical and theoretical happiness, whereas Rhetoric’s end is political happiness. Similarly, the decision between two controversial topoi was said to be undertaken by the orator’s intellect, the reference which gave to Stephanus the opportunity to draw once again distinctions known from Neoplatonic commentaries of the late antiquity. In chapter 5, which presented the rhetorical account of emotions, the two commentators diverged completely from each other. Stephanus, who so far aimed at showing that arguments is the main topic of the treatise, interpreted the chapters on emotions accordingly. In his view, Rhet. II.2-11 offers nothing but topoi for establishing the emotions under which an action was committed. In a comment that abounds with technical logical vocabulary, Stephanus makes use of many definitions of emotions within examples of arguments and, hence, rejects the possibility that these topoi can be used for arousing the emotions of the audience. By contrast, the Anonymous commentator tries to explain the different aspects of emotional response: the role of judgement and of “phantasia”. Emotions were criticised as being deviations from correct judgement, in comments that exhibited Stoic influence, and reveal Aristotle’s theory of incontinence (NE VII) as their origin. However, although emotions were criticised, Rhetoric’s account of them was taken as being Aristotelian, namely as depicting Aristotle’s well-considered views on the matter. Hence, in the commentator’s view, although emotions can blur the hearers’ mind, they do play an important role in persuasion and should be, therefore, studied and have their real nature revealed. Finally, in chapter 6, I examined the commentators’ views of the account of style. According to the Anonymous commentator, the treatment of style was necessary due to its effect on the clarity of the speech. Hence, all issues discussed by Aristotle were interpreted in respect to their contribution to clarity: features of lexis, metaphors, and features of metaphors. On the other hand, Stephanus’ short account of style is characterised, just as his interpretation of any other subject of the treatise, by his focus on the centrality of argumentation, and hence, issues related to style were commented on only in respect to their contribution to argumentation.

Main features of the commentaries: similarities and divergences | 257

7.2 Main features of the commentaries: similarities and divergences Having summarised the previous chapters and the conclusions that we have reached in our dealing with each of the main issues that have been raised in the commentaries to the Rhetoric, I would like to emphasise here some general conclusions that can be reached regarding the main features of each commentator as well as their interrelation. Starting with Stephanus, his focus on the logical aspects of the treatise is evident in every part of his commentary. Every similarity to the logical treatises is pointed out or invented, whereas anything irrelevant to it is left aside without comment. Therefore, we can infer that Stephanus has a clear interest in proving the Rhetoric to be a treatise on argumentation, and hence a part of the Organon. Besides the treatises of the Organon, Stephanus as a scholar has a good knowledge of the other Aristotelian treatises, and often uses them as sources for his interpretation. A secondary goal of his commentary seems to be the establishment of the position of the Rhetoric within the history of rhetoric. This is achieved by pointing out the similarities with the rhetorical treatises especially of late antiquity, and hence, by showing a continuity in the treatment of various subject matters. Based on these, it is safe to conclude that Stephanus was a scholar completely aware of his goals and with clear views of what the Rhetoric deals with, to which tradition it belongs, and what it aims at. Some of these features also belong to the Anonymous commentator, who also had good knowledge of Aristotle’s philosophical views as well as of the history of rhetoric. However, unlike Stephanus, who picked the topics he wanted to comment on, the Anonymous aimed rather at providing a complete and continuous text that interpreted every issue discussed by Aristotle. Although his interpretation also makes an effort to show that the Rhetoric is a logical treatise that belongs to the Organon, his primary concern is to show the consistency among Aristotle’s treatises by interpreting Aristotelem ex Aristotele. Hence, when the topic seems to be irrelevant to Aristotle’s logic, he gladly refers e.g. to his Ethics. This stance on commentation provides us with a complete commentary, which deals with every aspect of the Aristotelian text, but which does not always express the commentator’s views in as clear a way as Stephanus’ commentary. These features of the commentaries are what makes their study interesting and important, especially for a historian of Aristotelian philosophy. It is namely interesting to see how a treatise that was largely rejected during late antiquity gained some value during the 12th century flourish of Aristotelian studies. In this context, the two commentators managed not only to interpret Aristotle’s Rhetoric in a clear way by addressing all problematic issues, but they also made its place within the system of Aristotelian philosophy clear, and contributed in this way to the survival of the treatise.

Bibliography Al Sayyid Marsot, A. 1987. A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allard-Nelson, S.K. 2001. “Virtue in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Metaphysical and Ethical Capacity”, Philosophy and Rhetoric 34, 3: 245-259. Allen, J. 2008. Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the nature of Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Allen, W.S. 1968. Vox Graeca: The Pronunciation of Classical Greek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Argyropoulos, R. and Caras, J. 1980. Inventaire des Manuscripts Grecs d’ Aristote et ses Commentateurs: Contribution à l’ histoire du texte d’ Aristote. Supplement. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Bäck, A. 2009. “Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident”, Phronesis 54, 2: 101-135. Barber, C. and Jenkins, D. (eds.) 2009. Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden: Brill. Bar-Hillel, Y. 1964. “More on the Fallacy of Composition”, Mind 73, 289: 125-126. Barnes, J. 1981. “Proof and the Syllogism”, in: E. Berti (ed.), Aristotle on science. The “Posterior Analytics”. Padova: Antenore, 17-59. Barnes, J. 2012. Logical Matters: essays in Ancient Philosophy II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barth, E.M. 1974. The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy: A Contribution to the Study of Conceptual Structure. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Bolton, R. 2012. “The Aristotelian Elenchus”, in: J. Fink (ed.), The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 270-295. Bonitz, H. 1870. Index Aristotelicus. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Brandes, P. 1995. “Printing of Aristotle’s Rhetoric during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries”, Communication Monographs 52: 368-476. Brandes, P. 1996. “The Composition and Preservation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, Speech Monographs 36, 4: 482-491. Brandes, P. 1989. A History of Aristotle’s Rhetoric: with a Bibliography of early Printings. Metuchen/London: Scarecrow Press. Brandis, C. 1849. “Über Aristoteles’ Rhetorik und die griechischen Ausleger derselben”, Philologus 4: 1-47. Browning, R. 1962. “An Unpublished Funeral Oration to Anna Comnena”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 8: 1-12. Broyles, J. E. 1975. “The Fallacies of Combination and Division”, Philosophy & Rhetoric 8, 2: 108-113. Brunschwig, J. (ed.) 1967. Aristote Topiques I-IV. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Bueno, A.A. 1988. “Aristotle, the Fallacy of Accident, and the Nature of Predication: A Historical Inquiry”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 26, 1: 5-24. Busse, A. (ed.) 1902. Olympiodorus Prolegomena et In Categorias. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 12, 1. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Busse, A. (ed.) 1904. Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 18, 2. Berlin: Georg Reimer.. Byden, B. and Ierodiakonou, K. (eds.) 2012. The many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy. Athens: The Norwegian Institute at Athens.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-008

260 | Bibliography Byrneaut, M. 1994. “Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion”, in: D.J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5-55. Castelli, L. 2015. “Alexander of Aphrodisias: methodological issues and argumentative strategies between the Ethical Problems and the Commentary on the Topics”, in: M. Bonelli (ed.), Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia (Questioni Etiche e Mantissa): Metodo e Oggetto dell’ Etica Peripatetica. Bergamo: Bibliopolis, 19-42. Castelli, L. 2015b. “Φθόνος: πάθος, ἦθος, Perception of Desert and the Place of Envy in Rhet. II”, in: B. Centrone (ed.), La Retorica di Aristotele e la dottrina delle passioni. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 221-248. Cereteli, G. (ed.) 1926. Joannis Itali Opuscula selecta, Vol. 2, Tbilisi: Typis at impensis universitatis Tphilisiensis. Chiron, P. 2018. “Les commentaires grecs tardo-antiques et byzantins à la Rhétorique: hypothèsessur une quasi-absence”, in: F. Woerther (ed.), Commenting on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, from Antiquity to the Present. Leiden: Brill, 1-13. Christ, W. and Schmid W. 1912. Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. München: Beck. Conley, Th. 1990. “Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Byzantium”, Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 8, 1: 29-44. Conley, Th. 1994. “Notes on the Byzantine Reception of the Peripatetic Tradition in Rhetoric”, in: W.W. Fortenbaugh and D.C. Mirhady (eds.), Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 217-242. Cooper, J. 1990. “Ethico-political Theory in Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in: D.J Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 193210. Cooper, J. 1996. “An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 238-257. Cooper, L. 1932. The Rhetoric of Aristotle: An expanded Transaction with supplementary examples for students of composition and public speaking. New York: Appleton. Cope, E.M. 1867. An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. New York: Macmillan. Cope, E.M. and Sandys, J.E. 1897. Aristotle: Rhetoric, v. 1-3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Copi, I.M. 1953. Introduction to Logic. New York: Macmillan. Dilts, M.R. and Kennedy, G.A. 1997. Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman Empire: Introduction, Text and Translation of the Art of Rhetoric Attributed to Anonymous Seguerianus and to Apsines of Gadara. Leiden: Brill. Dow, J. 2015. Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dufour, M. (ed.) 1932, Rhétorique, vol. 1-3. Paris : Les Belles Lettres. Ebbesen, S. 1981. Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, vols. I-III. Leiden: Brill. Engberg-Pedersen, T. 1996. “Is there an Ethical Dimension to Aristotle’s Rhetoric?”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 116-141. Erickson, K.V. (ed.) 1974. Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press. Erickson, K.V. 1975. Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Philological Research. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press. Evans, J.D.G. 1977. Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fisher, E.A. 2009. “The Anonymous Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VII: Language, Style and Implications”, in: C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds.), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Leiden: Brill, 145-162. Flannery, K. 1995. Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Leiden: Philosophia Antiqua 62. Fortenbaugh, W.W. 1990. Aristotle on Emotion. London: Duckworth.

Bibliography | 261

Frankopan, P. 2009. “The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for the Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics”, in: C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds.), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Leiden: Brill, 45-62. Frede, D. 1996. “Mixed Feelings in Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 258-285. Garver, E. 1994. Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Green, L. 1994. “The Reception of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the Renaissance”, in: W.W. Fortenbaugh and D.C. Mirhady (eds.), Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 320-348. Grimaldi, W.M.A. 1972. Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Wiesbaden: Steiner. Grimaldi, W.M.A. 1988. Aristotle Rhetoric: A Commentary, vol. I-II. New York: Fordham University Press. Halliwell, St. 1993. “Style and Sense in Aristotle Rhetoric Book 3”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 47: 50-69. Halliwell, St. 1996. “The Challenge of Rhetoric to Political and Ethical Theory in Aristotle”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 175-190. Hamblin, C.L. 1970. Fallacies. Metuchen: Methuen. Hamlyn, D.W. 1990. “Aristotle on Dialectic”, Philosophy 65, 254: 465-476. Harlfinger, D. 1971. Die Textgeschichte der Pseudo-Aristotelischen Schrift Peri atomon grammon: ein kodikologisch-kulturgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Klärung der Überlieferungsverhältnisse im Corpus Aristotelicum. Amsterdam: Hakkert. Haskins, C.H. 1924. The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century. Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Hasper, P.S. 2013. “The ingredients of Aristotle’s Theory of Fallacy”, Argumentation 27: 31-47. Hasper, P.S. 2009. “Logic and Linguistics: Aristotle’s Account of the Fallacies of Combination and Division in the Sophistical Refutations”, Apeiron 42: 105-152. Heath, M. 2003. “Porphyry’s Rhetoric”, The classical Quarterly 53, 1: 141-166. Heylbut, G. (ed.) 1892. Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in ethica Nicomachea commentaria. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 20. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Hunt, E.L. 1925. “Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians”, in: A.M. Drummond (ed.), Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans. New York: Literary Licensing, 3-60. Ierodiakonou, K. 1995. “Alexander of Aphrodisias on Medicine as a Stochastic Art”, in: Ph. J. van der Eijk (ed.), Ancient Medicine in its Socio-Cultural Context, vol. 2. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 473-486. Ierodiakonou, K. 2009. “Some Observations on Michael of Ephesus’ Comments on Nicomachean Ethics X”, in: C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds.), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Leiden: Brill, 185-202. Irwin, T. 1988. Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks. Irwin, T. 1996. “Ethics in the Rhetoric and in the Ethics”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 141-174. Jeffreys, E. (ed.) 2003, Rhetoric in Byzantium: Papers from the Thirty-fifth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies. London/New York: Routledge. Kassel, R. 1971. Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik. Berlin: de Gruyter. Kassel, R. 1974. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Berlin: de Gruyter. Kennedy, G.A. 1963. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kennedy, G.A. 1972. The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kennedy, G.A. 1980. Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times. London: Croom Helm.

262 | Bibliography Kennedy, G.A. 1983. Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kennedy, G.A. 1991. Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kennedy, G.A. 1996. “The Composition and Influence of Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 416-422. Kennedy, G.A. 2005. Invention and Method: Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Hermogenic Corpus. Leiden: Brill. Kirby, J.T. 1997. “Aristotle on Metaphor”, American Journal of Philology 118, 4: 517-554. Konstan, D. 2006. The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Konstan, D. 2009. “Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte?”, in: M. Harbsmeier and S. Möckel (eds.), Pathos, Affekt, Emotion: Transformationen der Antike. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 27-46. Kotzabassi, S. 1999. Byzantinische Kommentatoren der Aristotelischen Topik: Johannes Italos und Leon Magentinos. Thessaloniki: Hetaireia Byzantinon Ereunon. Kustas, G.L. 1973. Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric. Thessaloniki: Patriarchikon Hidryma Paterikon Meleton. Laks, A. 1994. “Substitution et connaissance : une interprétation unitaire (ou presque) de la théorie aristotélicienne de la métaphore”, in: D.J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 283-305. Leighton, St. 1996. “Aristotle and the Emotions”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 206-237. Leszl, W. 2004. “Aristotle’s Logical Works and His Conception of Logic”, Topoi 23: 71-100. Lieberg, G. 1958. “Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles”, Zetemata 19. München: Beck. Lloyd, G.E.R. 1989. The Revolutions of Wisdom. Berkeley: University of California Press. Luna, C. 2001. Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d’ Aristote. Leiden: Brill. Madden, E.H. 1952. “The Enthymeme: Crossroads of Logic, Rhetoric and Metaphysics”, The Philosophical Review 61, 3: 368-376. Margoliouth, D.C. 1897. “On the Arabic Version of Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in: G.A. Kohut (ed.), Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut. Berlin: S. Calvari & Co, 376-387. McBurney, J.H. 1936. (reprinted in Erickson. 1974) “The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory”, Speech Monographs 3: 49–74. Mercken, H.P.F. 1973-1991. The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (d. 1253), v. 1-3. Leiden: Brill. Mercken, H.P.F. 1990. “The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics”, in: R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence. London: Duckworth. Moran, R. 1996. “Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the Rhetoric”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 385-398. Moraux, P. 1976. Aristoteles Graecus. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. Morrison, D. 1998. "Philoponus and Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proof", in: E. Kessler (ed.), Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature. The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, London/New York: Routledge, 1-22. Moss, J. 2012. Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Newmann, S. 2002. “Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Bringing before the Eyes’: Its Contribution to Aristotelian and Contemporary Conceptualizations of Metaphor, Style, and Audience”, Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 20, 1: 1-23.

Bibliography | 263

Nussbaum, M. 1994. The Therapy of Desire. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nussbaum, M. 1996. “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 303-323. Ostrogorski, G. 1963. History of the Byzantine State. New Brunswick: Rudgers University Press. Papaioannou, S. 2013. Michael Psellos: Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Petit, L. (ed.) 1902. “Monodie de Théodore Prodrome sur Etienne Skylitzès, métropolitain de Trébizond”, IRAIK 8 : 1-14. Primavesi, O. 1996. Die Aristotelische Topik: Ein Interpretationsmodell und seine Erprobung am Beispiel von Topik B. Zetemata 94. Munich: Beck. Rabe, H. (ed.) 1896. Anonymi et Stephani in Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 21, 2. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Rabe, H. (ed.) 1931. Prolegomenon Sylloge. Rhetores Graeci 13. Leipzig: Teubner. Rambourg, C. 2012. “Les Diagrammes Syllogistiques des Scholies de Stephanos à la Rhétorique d’Aristote (CAG 21.2) ”, Classica et Medievalia 63: 279-315. Rambourg, C. 2018. “Qu’est-ce que le commentaire anonyme des CAG XXI 2?”, in: F. Woerther (ed.), Commenting on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, from Antiquity to the Present. Leiden: Brill, 14-40. Raphael, S. 1974. “Dialectic and Syllogistic Argument: Aristotle’s Position in Rhetoric I-II”, Phronesis 19, 2: 153-167. Rapp, Ch. 1999. “Rhetorik und Philosophie in Aristoteles’ Rhetorik”. In: P.L. Oesterreich (ed.), Rhetorik und Philosophie. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 94-113. Rapp, Ch. 2000. ‘Topos und Syllogismos bei Aristoteles’. In: Th. Schirren and G. Ueding (eds.), Topik und Rhetorik: Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 15-35. Rapp, Ch. 2002. Aristoteles‘ Rhetorik: Übersetzt und erläutert von Christof Rapp. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Rapp, Ch. 2003. “Dialektik und Rhetorik. Über Dialektische und Topische Elemente in Aristoteles’ Rhetorik”, Méthexis 16: 65-81. Rapp, Ch. 2005. “Zur Konsistenz der Aristotelischen Rhetorik”, in: J. Knape and Th. Schirren (eds.), Aristotelische Rhetoriktradition. Stuttgart: Steiner, 51-71. Rapp, Ch. 2008. “Aristoteles: Bausteine für eine Theorie der Emotionen”, in: H. Landweer and U. Renz (eds.), Handbuch Klassische Emotionstheorien. Berlin: de Gruyter, 45-68. Rapp, Ch. 2009. “The Nature and Goals of Rhetoric”, in: G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle. Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 579-595. Rapp, Ch. 2012. “The Moral Psychology of Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in: Ch. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 589-611. Rapp, Ch. 2013a. “Fallacious Arguments in Aristotle’s Rhetoric II.24”, in: Ch. Rapp and S.P. Hasper (eds.), Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, vol. 15. Münster: Mentis, 122-158. Rapp, Ch. 2013b. “Sprachliche Gestaltung und Philosophische Klarheit bei Aristoteles”, in: M. Erler (ed.), Argument und literarische Form in antiker Philosophie. Berlin: de Gruyter. Rapp, Ch. 2013c. “The Emotional Dimension of Friendship. Notes on Aristotle’s account of philia in Rhetoric II.4”, Anuario Filosófico 46: 23-47. Rapp, Ch. 2016a. “Dialectic and Logic from a Rhetorical Point of View”, in: J.-B. Gourinat and J. Lemaire (eds.), Logique et Dialectique dans l’ Antiquité. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 161-191. Rapp, Ch. 2016b. “John Rainolds über ethische Aspekte der Aristotelischen Rhetorik“, in: Ch. Strosetzki (ed.), Ethik und Politik des Aristoteles in der Frühen Neuzeit, (= special issue no. 12 of Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 177-194.

264 | Bibliography Rapp, Ch. and Krajczynski, J. 2009. “Emotionen in der antiken Philosophie: Definitionen und Kataloge”, in: M. Harbsmeier and S. Möckel (eds.), Pathos, Affekt, Emotion: Transformationen der Antike. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 47-78. Rapp, Ch. and Wagner, T. 2013. “On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory”, Argumentation 27: 7-30. Reinsch, D. 1981. “Über einige Aristoteles-Zitate bei Eustathios von Thessaloniki”, in: F. Paschke (ed.), Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Reinsch, D. and Kambylis, A. (eds.) 2001. Anna Comnena: Alexias. Köln: DuMont. Ricoeur, P. 1977. The Rule of Metaphor. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ricoeur, P. 1996. “Between Rhetoric and Poetics”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 324-384. Rist, M. 1989. The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ross, W.D. (ed.) 1949. Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics: Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ross, W.D. (ed.) 1959. Aristoteles, Ars Rhetorica. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rowe, W.L. 1962. “The Fallacy of Composition”, Mind 71: 87-92. Rubinelli, S. 2009. Ars Topica: The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero. Lugano: Springer. Sanders, P. 1998. “The Fatimid state: 969-1171, in: M.W. Daly (ed.), The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schiaparelli, A. 2010. “Aristotle on the fallacies of combination and division in Sophistici Elenchi 4”, History and Philosophy of Logic 24, 2: 111-129. Schleiermacher, F. 1838. “Über die griechischen Scholien zur nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles”, Sämtliche Werke Abt. 3: 309-326. Schreiber, S.G. 2003. Aristotle on False Reasoning: Language and the World in the Sophistical Refutations. Albany: State University of New York Press. Shute, R. 1888. On the History of the Process by Which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at their Present Form. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Smith, R. 1993. “Aristotle on the Uses of Dialectic”, Synthese 96, 3: 335-358. Smith, R. 1997. Aristotle Topics: Books I and VIII with excerpts from related texts. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Solmsen, F. 1929. Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik. Berlin: Weidmann. Solmsen, F. 1954. The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle. New York: Random House. Sophocles, E.A. 1914. Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sprute, J. 1994. “Aristotle and the Legitimacy of Rhetoric”, in: D.J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 117-128. Striker, G. 1996. “Emotions in Context: Aristotle’s Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral Psychology”, in: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press, 286-302. Striker, G. 2009. Aristotle Prior Analytics Book I. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Todd, R.B. 1976. “Galenic Medical Ideas in the Greek Aristotelian Commentators”, SOsl 52: 117-134. Todd, R.B. 1984. “Philosophy and Medicine in John Philoponus’ on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 38: 103-110. Wallies, M. (ed.) 1884. Anonymi in sophisticos elenchos paraphrasis.Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 23, 4. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Wallies, M. (ed.) 1891. Alexander Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2, 2. Berlin: Georg Reimer.

Bibliography | 265

Wallies, M. (ed.) 1898. Alexander, quod fertur Michael Ephesus, in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos commentarium. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2, 3. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Wartelle, A. 1963. Inventaire des Manuscripts Grecs d’ Aristote et ses Commentateurs. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Wartelle, A. 1982. Lexique de la „Rhétorique“ d’ Aristote. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Westerink, L.G. 1964. “Philosophy and Medicine in Late Antiquity”, Janus 51: 169-177 (= [1980] Text and Studies in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Literature. Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 83-99). Wisse, J. 1989. Ethos and Pathos: From Aristotle to Cicero. Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert. Wolska-Conus, W. 1976. “À Propos des Scholies de Stéphanos à la Rhétorique d’ Aristote: L’ Auteur, l’ oevre, le Milieu”, in: M. Berza (ed.), Actes du XIVe Congrès International des Etudes Byzantines, Bucarest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 599-606. Woods, J. and Walton, D.N. (eds.) 1989. Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Wörner, M. 1990. Das Ethische in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles, Freiburg/Munich: Alber.

Index Aeschines 7 Alexander of Aphrodisias 63, 121f., 160, 221 Alexios I Komnenos 14, 16f., 32 Anna Komnene 5, 16, 18, 20, 26, 31ff. Anonymous on NE VII 22ff., 27, 30, 192 Anonymous on the Sophistical Refutations 86, 96, 103 antithesis 80ff., 86ff., 219, 222 Aphthonius 7, 12, 18 Aristeides 7 Aristotle – Categories 18, 86, 92 – On the soul 188, 196, 198 – On Interpretation 18, 57ff., 218 – Metaphysics 11, 21, 120, 137, 242 – Nicomachean Ethics 2f., 6, 10f., 18, 22f., 25ff., 144, 146, 149ff., 156, 161f., 167, 169ff., 210 – Organon 3, 6, 8ff., 34, 54, 80, 130, 254 – Physics 137 – Poetics 11, 217ff., 227, 240f., 245ff., 253 – Politics 6 – Posterior Analytics 5, 36f., 90 – Prior Analytics 5, 9, 11, 36ff., 40ff., 53, 62, 80, 84f., 88, 114ff., 118ff., 124 – Sophistical Refutations 9, 18, 20, 36, 80f., 83, 85f., 89, 91f., 96ff., 107, 111, 118, 123f., 126f., 130f., 135, 140f. – Topics 5, 18, 36ff., 63ff., 68, 73, 75, 78, 220, 242 Arius Didymus 193 Basilius the Great 7 brevity 40, 43, 47f., 52, 82, 86, 88, 90, 150 character of the speaker 35, 56, 143, 165, 176, 178, 185, 209, 211 Cicero 38, 219 clarity 217, 219f., 222, 224, 229, 231ff., 238f., 241ff., 245, 249ff. Constantinos Porphyrogennetos 18 Damascius 160 deliberation 3, 27 delivery 217, 222, 224f., 227ff., 232f., 237f. Demosthenes 7, 47, 135, 237

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110630695-009

dialectic 2, 37, 39, 55, 57, 70ff., 75, 77, 79, 85, 182, 185 Dion Chrysostomos 7, 254 emotion 1ff., 6, 10f., 29f., 33, 35, 56, 65 enargeia 12, 250 enthymeme 5f., 9, 19, 35ff., 39ff., 43, 46ff., 52, 54ff., 65ff., 69, 71ff., 77f., 179, 185, 222f. epicheireme 12, 73ff. Epictetus 193 Eustratios of Nicaea 32 fallacy 6, 9, 11, 20, 33, 45ff., 52, 61, 202 – from accident 126, 130 – from combination and division 97 – from consequence 134 – from exaggeration 112 – from homonymy 81, 83f., 92, 103, 109, 136 – from sign 40, 52, 60f., 114, 128f., 134 – from the cause 136 – from the consequence 124 – from the omission 125, 138 – from verbal expression 46, 80, 103 – non causa pro causa 135 – secundum quid et simpliciter 139 Galen 24f. Georgios Monachos 17 Georgios Tornikes 32 good, the 1, 11, 25, 27f., 143, 151, 173 Gregory of Nazianzus 138 happiness 2, 143, 145, 173, 175 Hermogenes 4, 6f., 12, 18, 223, 230f., 235f., 246, 253f. idia 12, 63ff., 70ff., 143, 175 incontinence 10, 27ff., 157, 192 intellect 11, 159, 173 Isocrates 1 John II Komnenos 14, 16 John Skylitzes 17 judgement 186ff., 191, 209, 212 Julian 7, 254

268 | Index

koina 12, 66f., 70, 75f. Leo Magentinos 31 lexis 4, 6, 10ff., 21, 33, 81, 217, 244, 246, 252 Libanius 7, 254 Manuel I Komnenos 13 matter and form 11, 61, 120, 122 medicine 20, 23ff., 157 metaphor 11, 219, 221, 233, 239 Michael of Ephesus 20, 22, 24f., 31f., 86, 96, 102f. Minucian 7 paradigm 44, 46, 54f., 66, 69 phantasia 169, 175, 202, 206ff. Philoponus 24, 160 Plato 1, 233 pleasure 1, 57, 143, 168, 173, 175, 184, 187, 189, 222, 228, 241 predicables 37 probable 11, 40ff., 44, 50ff., 55ff., 69, 114 Proclus 160 Quintilian 110, 214 rhetoric – and analytical science 38 – and dialectic 2, 37ff., 43, 48f., 55, 63, 71f., 75, 81, 87, 91, 134, 140

– and ethical science 2, 144f., 152, 156, 163, 165, 169, 195 – and philosophy 3, 55ff., 242 rhythm 219ff., 234 scholia 8, 83, 91, 110 Seneca 193 sign 5, 9, 11, 38ff., 50ff., 59ff., 124, 132f. Simplicius 160 soul 1, 19, 169 Stoics 8, 11, 29, 58, 193f. Suda 13 syllogism 2f., 5, 35ff., 41f., 44, 46f., 49, 52ff., 61ff., 70, 72f., 75, 84 – demonstration 36f. – dialectical syllogism 36f., 45, 48f., 55, 57, 71, 77, 79 – first syllogism 47ff. syllogistic diagrams 11, 61, 123, 127, 134, 140 Tanisman 17 taxis 217, 222 Themistius 21 Theodoros Prodromos 19 Theophrastus 63 token 41, 50, 52ff., 56f., 60ff., 115 topoi 2, 10, 12, 26, 28, 33, 39, 63ff., 82, 90, 143, 175, 179, 182, 185, 197 virtue 2, 27f., 143, 149, 155f., 160, 163, 173, 175, 209f., 213