The use of the power of recognition as an instrument of diplomacy

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THE USE OF THE POWER OF RECOGNITION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School The University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

by Ross North Berkes June 1942

UMI Number: DP30233

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TABLE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION ................................. Purpose and scope

• • . • • • • •

..........

Treatment of the subject.......... . . . . . D e f i n i t i o n s ......................... . The power of recognition

.......... .

Methods of according recognition ............ ^Historical evolution of the theory of recogni­ tion ............................... . . . II.

BRITISH USE OP RECOGNITION AS AN INSTRUMENT OP HIGH POLICY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.

The Napoleonic states (1802) . . . . . . .

2.

The revolt of the Spanish American col­ onies (1821-1825)

...................

3.

The independence of Brazil (1821-1826)

..

4.

The July Revolution in Prance (1830) .

..

5.

The independence of Texas (1836-1842)

•.

6.

The French revolution of 1848

7.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908-1909)

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

8.

The Austrian Anschluss (1938).. ..........

9.

The Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1938)

10.

The Franco regime in Spain (1939)

. • ••

CHAPTER III.

PAGE

UNITED STATES1 USE OF RECOGNITION AS AN INSTRU­ MENT OF HIGH P O L I C Y ...................... ^1.

The independence of the Spanish American states (1811-1823)

2. ^ '3. 4. '5.

122

..

................

128

The Hawaiian revolution (1893) • • • • •

134

The independence of Panama (1903) . . . .

151

The non-recognition of Manehukuo (1932) .

159

The post-Machado regimes in Cuba (19331935) . . . . .

..................

200

Recognition of the Martinez government in El Salvador ( 1 9 3 4 ) ............... IV.

^

BRITISH USE OF RECOGNITION WITH REFERENCE TO THE CHARACTER OF A GOVERNMENT..............

236n

1.

The revolutionary regime in France (1792)

237

2.

The independence of Brazil (1825) . . . .

243

3.

The independence of Texas (1842) . . . .

246

4.

The regicide government of Serbia

5.

(1903-

............

1906)

251

The annexation of theCongo Free State to Belgium (1907-1913)

V.

223

.......

.....

256

UNITED STATES* USE OF RECOGNITION WITH REFER­ ENCE TO ‘‘"'SL.

THE CHARACTER OF A GOVERNMENT . . . .

267

The non-recognition of Haiti (1798-1862)

268

CHAPTER

PAGE Policies regarding the question of mon­ archy in Brazil (1822-1894) . . . . . .

^-3.

The Maximilian government in Mexico (18621 8 6 7 ) ............................... .

\4.

.........................

304

The Tinoco government in Costa Rica (19171919) . . . ...........

6.

290

The Huerta government in Mexico (19131914)

\~5.

281

324

The non-recognition of the Soviet govern- . ment in Russia (1918-1933)

. . . . . .

334

"7.. The civil war regimes in Honduras (19241925) - 8.

. . . . . . . . .

Revolutionary governments in Nicaragua (1926-1936)..........................

^-9.

364

The Orellana regime in Guatemala (19301931) .

"SLO.

354

...........

394

The Ohregon government in Mexico (19201923)

..........

404

^VT.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...................

424

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . .

453

......................

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The history of modern diplomacy reveals numerous practices whereby one state has attempted to regulate the conduct of another state without resorting to the extreme of war or even warlike acts.

Since the persuasiveness of

mere argument has seldom carried the day, statesmen from time Immemorial have resorted to the Realpolitik of diplo­ matic bargaining.

It is almost a truism to state that suc­

cess in diplomacy has been the reward of those most endowed with the resourcefulness of being able to give something in return for a favor asked.

In' diplomatic parlance, the

phrase quid pro quo has ever connoted the essence of nego­ tiations leading to success. It has often been the fate of smaller powers to be­ come subservient to strong states because of economic pres­ sure exerted by means of commercial treaties, loans or tariffs.

Economic pressure has on many occasions been so

identified with political objectives that the meaningful expression ,fdollar diplomacy” has been coined to cover the aspects of economic imperialism in a recent period of Amer­ ican foreign policy.

One of the main factors in the polit­

ical rise of Prussia during the nineteenth century was Its Zollverein, and it is no less significant that National

Socialist Germany has notoriously used its unique forms of trade agreements as a prelude to political hegemony. PURPOSE AND SCOPE No doubt, bargaining power based upon trade treaties ,loans and other economic weapons has played a major role in diplomatic history.

The purpose of this dissertation, how­

ever, is to examine the use of the power of recognition— a diplomatic weapon more political in nature— in order to ascertain the extent to which it has served objectives in foreign policy.

The challenge may be summarized in the

statement by one authority that To anyone interested in history it had been apparent that recognition was not merely a function that was automatic. It has held places of great importance in the formation of history and has been used many times as an adequate weapon of coercion.1 It is the expressed desire of the author to avoid treating the subject of recognition in its multifarious legal aspects*

Few subjects of international law have been

covered so exhaustively, or, incidentally, with such clearcut divergence of opinion.

There has been good cause for

this plethora of enlightenment, for to the tutored as well as to the untutored, the legal term “recognition11 conjures

1 Marcellus Donald A. R. von Redlich, The Law of Nations (New Yorks World League for Permanent Peace, 1937),

pT’27.'

3 a confused picture of verbal appendages, such as state, government, belligerency, insurgency, de jure, de facto, conditional, unconditional, and even premature.2

Most texts

on international law take up each of these aspects of recog­ nition, as well as the question of the location of the power to recognize, the methods of according recognition, and the judicial effects of recognition.

The accomplishment

of being able to distinguish between the various types of recognition is somewhat offset by the tendency of certain authorities to deny to nearly every aspect in turn either its existence or its validity in international law#3 Pursuing this delimitation of the subject, the author desires to emphasize with equal care his refusal to treat

2 por the legal aspects of recognition, see John G. Hervey, The Legal Effects of Recognition in International Law as Interpreted~~ancr Applied by the Co'uHs of the tJnited States (Philadelphia: University of PennsyIvanTa Press, 1928), 170 pp.; Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, in Particular of the Recognition of Foreign Powers TOsimBrldLge: Harvard~trniversity Press,^953), 278 pp.; Edwin D. Dickinson, ffRecent Recognition Gases,1* American Journal of International Law, 19:263-72, April, 1925, and his article ^The Unrecognized Government in English and Amer­ ican Law,M Michigan Law Review, 22:29-45, November, 1923; Edwin M. Borchard, llfHe Unrecognized Government in American Courts,11 American Journal of International Law, 26:261-71, April, 1932; Quincy Wright, "The British Courts and Ethio­ pian Recognition,w American Journal of International Law, 31:683-88, October, 1937; Hans Kelson, ^Recognition in International Law,11 American Journal of International Law, 35: 605-18, October, l94l. 3 Thomas Baty, 11Abuse of the Terms ’Recognition* and ’War,*11 American Journal of International Law, 30:377-99, July, 1936; Borchard, op. cit., p. 261-71.

the matter as a history.

While in times of academic des­

pair the line of least resistance has held an alluring appeal, it can he stated that chronological sequences will not be ends in themselves, but will subserve some other point.

Nor will ah attempt be made to present every--or

even the vast majority— of recognitions within any given period of time by any one state, for no purpose could be served in repetition beyond a certain point of conclusive­ ness. At the outset it may be observed that most recogni­ tions are more or less matters of routine, devoid of negotiatory propensities which make for diplomatic bargaining.

It

is only under certain conditions, to be explained in suc­ ceeding paragraphs,

that the power of recognition as con­

ceived in international law becomes endowed with the arbitrariness of being very highly political. If law had had Its way, there would hardly have been such a thing as an American policy of recognition or a British recognition policy, for international law vaguely tended to provide that given a certain set of facts, recog­ nition- -whether it be of statehood, of a government, or of belligerency— would automatically follow. to be

While there seems

no question of the automatic right of recognition on

the part of

the aspiring claimant provided It has satisfied

certain prerequisites, the corresponding duty to recognize

Is not so objectively defined.4

One authority has observed

that Since . . . the granting of recognition is a matter of policy, and not of law, nothing prevents an old state from making the recognition of a new state de­ pendent upon the latter fulfilling certain conditions.5 While the above statement has reference only to the recognition of states, it may be repeated even more pointed­ ly with reference to governments.

Perhaps the jurist1s dis­

taste for this degradation of international law into the realm of diplomacy is revealed by the complaint that It is only by lifting recognition from the realm of unrestricted policy and giving it a more definite legal significance that we can sever it from the principle of legitimacy and can assign it to its proper place in international jurisprudence.5

Charles G. Fenwick, in his text, International Law (New York? D. Jkppleton-Century Co., 19347 refers to the test of stability, then admits that It Is sometimes sub­ ordinated to the issue of political principles, etc., pro­ fessed by the new regime, (p. 117). L. Oppenheim, in his International Law, a Treatise (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 19127, states lhat ^Recognition will as a rule be given without any conditions whatever, provided the new state is safely and permanently established” (Vol. I, p. 118). Clearest is the statement of Ellery C. Stowell, in his Int ernational Law (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1931), that"Whenever acommunity is able permanently to maintain Its independence of any other control and when It has de­ monstrated its ability and intention to fulfill all the obligations of a member state of international society, it Is entitled to recognition and admission to the society of states” (p. 38-9). 5 Oppenheim, oj>.

cit., p. 118.

6 Julius Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States (New York; Columbia University Press, 1915), p. 68.

6 Tims, already, the political or diplomatic attributes of the concept of recognition appear in the shadow of its sterner legalisms.

For if the legal right of a foreign

state to choose between recognition and non-recognition only rarely presents itself except in theory, it is yet emphatically true that almost the same question is

resolved

in the right of a foreign state to time its recognition, especially in cases of abrupt or revolutionary changes of regime.

This leeway, within which diplomacy can run the

gamut, has been conceded in international law as being the only pragmatic solution, for in the words of Professor Fen­ wick,

international law admits that

It is the right of third states to refuse or delay recognition of the new government until such a time as it has shown that it is sufficiently well established to be able to speak with authority In the name of the state and to be answerable for its obligations. Inter­ national law thus leaves it to each state to determine for Itself the time at which it will regard the new government as backed by a responsible public opinion, and as therefore competent to pledge the future conduct of the state.^ While it has been revealed in the above paragraphs that states are entitled to apply certain tests, and, by the nature of international society, are equally entitled to judge the extent to which an aspiring candidate for recogni­ tion has satisfied

these requirements, there would be little

point in writing this dissertation should one stop there and

*7 Fenwick, op. cit., p. 114.

7 examine merely how entities claiming recognition either met or failed to meet the objective tests of stability and re­ sponsibility generally provided in international law.

The

problem is rather to go beyond this so-called de facto theory of recognition and into the realm of diplomacy which treats the power of recognition as a positive weapon to at­ tain certain goals in foreign policy which have little to do with the mere judgment, partial as it might be,

as to

whether a claimant for recognition has satisfied the requi­ sites of a generalized formula. TREATMENT OP THE SUBJECT A problem which immediately presents itself is the

type of recognition to be dealt with, for out of the con­ fusion already mentioned one reason would be little better than the next for choosing one type over another.

Consider­

ing the nature of the project, however, the problem resolves itself, for the research is concerned with the use of the power of recognition in diplomacy, and thus what matter if the occasion be a question,of the recognition of a state, government, belligerency, or the acquisition of title by this or that devious means.

If the decision on any par­

ticular question of recognition possesses the ingredients of a move with ulterior motives, its presentation has been considered justified, regardless of type.

8 Considering the structural basis of the thesis, the author has attempted to adhere as faithfully as possible to the single purpose stated— an investigation of the use of the power of recognition as a weapon of diplomacy.

The

difficulties encountered in the selection of material to be presented were surprisingly more real than they were appar­ ent.

Much research, for instance, has been made on recent

policies of non-recognition— a phenomenon which has created a great stir in international politics since the Sino-Japanese controversy beginning in 1932.

The question which

immediately arose in view of this recent development was with reference to its classification in the structural out­ line of this special research.

The question resolved it­

self, however, upon the fundamental issue of policy (or diplomacy) versus law.

The author takes full responsibility

for excluding a vast category of material, although it properly belongs to the generic subject of recognition, as being above and beyond the realm of diplomatic action by virtue of its legal aspects of collective, obligatory nonrecognition. In view of this delimitation, no consideration will be given to such instrumentalities in the service of the organized movement for peace, important as they no doubt are, as the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 11, 1932 (if not also the Note of the

9 Council of the League of Nations of February 16, 1932, to Japan),® Article Two of the Anti-War Treaty of NonAggression and Conciliation (signed at Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1933, by delegates of the American Republics),9 or Article Eleven of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (signed at Montevideo, December 26, 1933, by delegates of

the American Republics).-**9

Such instrumentalities in

practice tend to take the question of recognition in exactly the opposite path from that which forms the channel of the present research, since they imply an automatic decision which leaves no scope for diplomatic maneuvers.

In observing

® The Assembly Resolution declared that "it is incum­ bent upon the Members of the League of nations not to recog­ nize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.* For text, see League of Nations, Official Journal (1932), Special Supplement, j s o 101, p. 87-8.

.

9 In this article of the Anti-War Treaty the signa­ tories pledged flthat as between the high contracting parties territorial questions must not be settled by violence, and that they will not recognize any territorial arrangement which is not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories that may be brought about by force of arms.” For text, see tJnited States Treaty Series, No. 906. Article Eleven of the Convention states in part that "The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employ­ ment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure." For text, see United States Treaty Series, No. 881.

10 that such Instrumentalities have established international duties of non-recognition, one authority has stated in sup­ port of this contention that their effect . * . i s therefore to diminish the diplomatic and subjective control by legal standards. By making nonrecognition a duty, individual governments lose to a degree their traditional political or executive control of the act. It was the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Reoo gnitlon which gave the most trouble in the matter of classification, since this unique pronouncement embodied a peculiar ad­ mixture of political and legal aspects. x n

one respect,

It was an attempt to alter the principles of International law, especially with reference to the validity of treaties and acquisitions of title to territory by conquest, which for centuries had been regarded as perfectly valid In

H Roland H. Sharp, Duties of flon-Recognition in Practice, 1775-1934 (Geneva Special Studies, Vol. 4, No. TI Genevas Geneva Research Center, 1934), p. 17. The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition originated In an Identical note sent by the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, to China and Japan on January 7, 1932, as a protest against the military invasion of China by Japan, particularly in Manchuria. The section of the note which pertains to non-recognition reads that the United States ”does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.” For the full text of the note, see Quincy Wright, ”The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932,” American Journal of International Law, 26:342-44, April, 1$32.

11 themselves-13

since Secretary Stimson regarded the Kellogg

Pact as proscribing the conquest which Japan was engaged upon in China, he felt that the United States, being bound * by the Pact, could not officially approve situations re­ sulting from its violation.14 This attempt to make a legal case of a political attitude seems to have done little more than to confuse the issue, for most authorities agree with Professor Sharp*s statement that at best "the Pact imposes no express duties of non-recognition, and that its implications on the subject can be admitted only under a liberal interpretation of its

terms."3.5

Lauterpacht states that "Non-recognition

of changes brought about contrary to the Pact of Paris is of a moral rather than judicial nature."16

Thus in considera­

tion of the Stimson Doctrine itself, the general consensus seems to be that the Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, is • ♦ • largely only a declaration of intent not to recognize certain situations or treaties which violate

3-3 Herbert W. Briggs, "Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the Doctrine," Proceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law {Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 72. 3-4 Sharp,

0 £.

cit., .p. 10.

15

P* 11*

3-6 H. Lauterpacht, "The Principle of Non-Hecognition in International Law," Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict. Institute of Pacific Relations Inquiry Series (New York: International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 154.

12 certain prior treaties. It imposes no legal obligation on either the United States or the state to which it was addressed. Least of all is there any legal obliga­ tion therein to.renounce conquest. Analysis reveals that the Stimson declaration of January 7, 1932, is merely a statement of policy.

The uni­

lateral attempt to interpret or read into an existing treaty an unexpressed legal obligation of non-recognition hardly creates its own legal basis.

It is therefore the conclusion

of the author to highlight the non-recognition of Manchukuo as an example of the use of the power of recognition as an instrument of high policy on

the part of the United States,

and thereby to divorce it from the group of instrumental­ ities which have been created to substitute legal standards for political control of the power of recognition. In the process of investigating materials for presen­ tation in such a case study as this, the author has restricted his research to the policies of Great Britain and the United States from the time of the independence of the United States to the present.

The end of the eighteenth

century was chosen as a starting point partly to place Great Britain and the United States on a par, and partly because of the fact— to be enlarged upon below— that the theory and practice of recognition took on their modern character at that time.

17 Briggs, op. cit., p. 76.

13 Great Britainand the United States were the subjects of this

chosen as

investigation partly in an effort to

restrict the study for the sake of simplicity and continuity, and partly to offer possible comparisons and contrasts. However, it is not the purpose of the study to go beyond the presentation of cases in a conscious effort to bring out comparisons and contrasts between British and American practices.

The research will remain devoted to the single

purpose of investigating the use of the power of recognition as a weapon of diplomacy. Finally, it may be stated that in choosing the United States and Great Britain as the two states under in­ vestigation, the author was guided research material on

by the availabilityof

the practices of these two states as

contrasted with the relative sparsity of material on the practices of the other Great Powers over such a long period of time. DEFINITIONS A few words as to definitions are in order, for in spite of

the intention to choose any type of recognition

provided

It fulfills certain other requirements of the

theses, It would be unwise to rush into the subject without first making clear the terminology used. with accompanying enlargements, follows.

A brief resume,

14 Recognition of states*

According to Moore, recogni­

tion is the “assurance given to a new state to hold its place and rank in the character of an independent, political organism in the society of nations.fl^

Oppenheim states

that “recognition is the act through which it becomes apparent that an old state is ready to deal with a new state as an International Person and a member of the Family of Nations.11^ Recognition of governments. more recent definitions

One of the best and

is to be found

Resolutions adopted by the

inArticle Ten of the

Institute of International Law at

Brussels in April, 1936, which states that The recognition of the new government of a State which has already been recognized is the free act by which one or several states acknowledge that a person or a group of persons are capable of binding the State which they claim to represent, and witness their in­ tention to enter into relations with them.20 Most of the authorities, however, are content with the original definition

of recognition

ofstates, and then

distinguish recognition

of governments

bya statement with

^ John B. Moore, A Digest of International Law (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), Vol. I, p. 72. Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 117. 20 por the text of the Brussels Resolutions, see the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, Supplement, 1936, p. t e w :

regard to the latter such as, ^There is no issue of the legal rights possessed by the state as such, but merely the issue as to who is competent to speak in the name of the state."21 has

The generally accepted doctrine is that a state

a continuity of personality, once recognized, which is

not affected by governmental changes.22

This doctrine pro­

vided, incidentally, a very neat legal point with regard to. Soviet Russia, wherein for a decade and a half the United States persistently maintained that while it recognized Russia as a state, it refused to accord recognition to the Soviet government of that state. Recognition of belligerency.

Moore states that the

recognition of belligerency • • • does not confer on the community recognized all the rights of an independent state, but it grants to its government and subjects the rights and imposes upon them the obligations of an independent state in ali matters relating to war.^3 The above definition implies the necessary circum­ stances of revolt on the part of a community against the parent state, either to replace or to secede from the recog­ nized regime.

A concise summary of the rights, as well as

21 Fenwick, op. cit., p. 111. 22 Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United States since 1901 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19SS), p. 4. 2^ Moore, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 164.

16 the obligations,.gained by such recognition is found in Briggs, and includes the right of the admission of ships of the insurgents into ports of the recognizing state, the right to borrow money on the credit of the de facto state, and the right of visit and search at sea, confiscation of contraband goods, and the maintenance of a blockade.^ Recognition of insurgency.

In making an exception

to the rule laid down above, no attempt will be made in this research to take up cases of recognition of insurgency, because, of all the types of recognition, this is the least political in nature.

In the words of one authority,

The admission of insurgency is the admission of an easily discpvered material fact. The recognition of belligerency involves not only a recognition of fact but also questions of policy touching many other con- • siderations, Paraphrasing Briggs, one may say that the recognition of insurgency expresses the belief by the recognizing power that the insurgents should not be treated by the parent state as mere traitors or pirates, as well as a willingness on the part of the recognizant power to submit to measures taken by insurgents to prevent access of supplies to forces of the parent state, without, however, giving them the

^ Herbert W* Briggs, The Law of Nations (New York: P. S. Crofts and Co., 1938), p. 729. ^ George G. Wilson, Handbook of International Law, (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 19*27), p. 39.

17 right of visit and search at sea.^® Conditional Recognition,

According to von Redlich,

A conditional recognition does not imply that the recognition itself may be withdrawn in case of a breach, but it signifies that this grant has been made with certain express stipulations which the new state must comply with as set forth in the act of recognition, such as obligatory neutrality, commercial and religious liberty.27 Oppenheim observes that recognition will as a rule be given without any conditions whatever, provided the new state is safely and permanently established, but he adds that "noth­ ing prevents an old state from making the recognition of a new state dependent upon the latter fulfilling certain con­ ditions.112®

Goebel deplores the use of conditional recogni­

tion as perverting the true nature of the act, stating that it makes the power of recognition r,an instrument for

26 gpiggs, op. cit., pp. 759 et^ seq. The distinction between belligerency and insurgency has been classically defined in the case of The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897). 27 von Redlich, op. cit., p. .20. 2® Oppenheim, 0 £. cit., Vol. I, p. 118. The classic example of a conditional recognition is that given to Bul­ garia, Hontenegro, Serbia and Rumania by the Powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, on condition that these states did not impose any religious disabilities on any of their subjects (Briggs, op. cit., p. 78). Another authority states that this dicT not mean that non-performance could promote withdrawal of recognition (which, once given to a state, is irrevocable), but that the Powers thereby gained a legal right of intervention to guarantee fulfillment of the conditions (Oppenheim, o£. cit., Vol. I, p. 119).

18 enforcing the demands of the recognizant state.*'29

with

this type of recognition one passes quickly from mere legal formula Into the more highly political realm of diplomatic bargaining with the instrumentality of recognition.

Con­

sidering other terminology, to be taken up immediately below, one will find law almost completely subservient to policy. De facto and de jure recognition.

A great confusion

has resulted from the indiscriminate use of the terms de facto and de jure.

Basically, the problem is one of a

beispiel, for the terms de facto and de jure used in reference to governments as such connote one thing, and when used in connection with the recognition of governments they have an entirely different meaning of almost contradictory signifi­ cance.

The confusion can be avoided, however, by distin­

guishing first de facto and de jure governments, and then distinguishing de facto and de jure recognition.

Von

Redlich gives a clear distinction regarding governments by the statement that There may be de facto and de jure governments and to all purposes, reasons and aims they are similar, with the exception that the de jure government has received, and the de facto government In its highest form has not received, recognition.3^ Thus while a de facto government by definition is

^

Goebel, op. cit., p. 65.

30 von Redlich, op. cit., p. 15.

19 unrecognized, it admits of the possibility of a partial re­ cognition in the form of a de facto recognition 11some times extended for the purposes of trade and practical needs."31 This is often a step to complete de jure recognition. The Resolutions of the Institute of International Law adopted at Brussels in 1936 attempted to regularize the definitions of de jure and de facto recognition, both as applied to states and to governments.

Regarding states,

Article 3 reads: Recognition is either definite and com­ plete (de jure), or provisional or limited to certain juri­ dical relations (de facto ).tf Regarding governments, Article 15 reads: “Recognition de facto of a government does not necessarily imply the recognition of the competence of its judicial, administrative or other organs, or the attribu­ tion of territorial effects to their acts.”

Article 17

states that recognition de jure does imply acceptance of such competence.32 Graham describes de facto recognition as being . . . accorded to new states as evidence of willing­ ness to acknowledge their actual existing position, their capacity to contract limited types of obligations,

31 Stowell, op. cit., p. 47. 32 ipke text of the Brussels Resolutions may be found in the American Journal of International Law Supplement, 30:185, 1936. For a critical analysis of them, see Llewellyn Pfankuchen, A Documentary Textbook in International Law (Hew York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940T* pp. 96-7.

20 and their right to exercise most of the functions of international and external sovereignty, without thereby passing upon the viability of the new entities, imputing to them the character of permanency, or assuming enduring obligations toward them, 3o The essence of the distinction between de facto and d© jure governments seems to be one of legality,34

The

practice of states therefore has been to refrain from according de jure recognition to a de facto regime until by agreement of the parties in dispute the de facto government has legalized its own position (for international law does not deny the right of revolution), or until the issue has been settled beyond all reasonable hope for the de jure authorities.

In the meantime, however, the necessities of

international intercourse usually demand relations on the part of third states with the de facto authorities.

Thus

has arisen the phenomenon of de facto recognition, which, in its stricter sense, is not recognition at all, but merely the pragmatic acknowledgment of facts without censure or sanction.

3 3 Malbone W. Graham, In Quest of a Law of Recogni­ tion (Faculty Research Lectures. Berkeleys University of California Press, 1933), p. 11.

34 The point may yet be debatable, but at least one authority has claimed that a de facto government ”is one in unlawful control of the supreme or sovereign political power in the State. It is a Government by usurpation founded perhaps in crime, and in the violation of every principle of municipal law and the Law of Nations” (von Kedlich, 0 £. cit., pp. 20-1).

21 Premature recognition.

The essence of premature

recognition is, of course, time.

It involves either the

recognition of states, governments or belligerency.

As

Jaffe states, Recognition before assured independence or before it is clear that

the parent state is without reason­

able hope of success is an unfriendly act, even an act of war, toward the parent s t a t e . M o o r e asserts that wpremature recognition constitutes an act of intervention, committed in favor of insurgents or of a conqueror.”36

The

classic example of premature recognition is that given by France to the United States In 1778.3*? At times, however, even the most impartial of foreign policies will find itself on the horns of a dilemma In the realization that if, on the one hand, a precipitant recogni­ tion is likely to give offense, on the other hand 11an In­ excusable refusal of recognition or delay in according it justifies the injured state in employing coercive measures adequate to enforce recognition,1 1 It is not unreasonable to presume, therefore, that since one likely

sideorthe other

will

take offense regardless of the policyathird state

35 Jaffe, op. cit., p. 104. 36 j/ioore, ££. cit., Vol. 1, p.

73.

3*7 Cited, for example, In Moore, loc. cit. ^

Stowell, op. cit., p..40.

22 might pursue, then if sympathy--or animosity— fails to dictate the policy of the third state, its stand on recog­ nition may be auctioned for more material considerations. It is the national policies and practices arising from this dilemma which will form in great part the substance of this research. THE POWER OP RECOGNITION With regard to the government of the United States, the question has arisen from time to time as to the location of the power of recognition.

The Federal Constitution does

not specifically mention the matter, but by implication it is conceded that, except for the question of whether it is exclusive, the power of recognition resides in the executive b r a n c h .

^

Prompted by the problem of the Cuban Insurrection,

an Investigation of the entire question was made by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1897.

Its conclu­

sions were in the nature of a vindication of the right of

39 Sections 2 and 3 of Article II of the Federal Con­ stitution serve as the basis for this implication. Section .2, Clause 2, provides that the President ”shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present con­ cur, and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, ambassadors, other pub­ lic ministers and consuls.11 Section 3 further provides that the President nshall receive ambassadors and other public ministers.” Senate Document No. 232, 74th Congress, 2nd Ses­ sion, The Constitution of the United States of America (Wash­ ington: Governmen:FTrTnTrTng Office, 193$), pp. 381-402.

23 the executive to make its own decisions regarding recogni­ tion.^ The executive has not, however, been free from Con­ gressional pressure, exerted by means of resolutions, urging a particular policy on a question of recognition.41

Nor has

it been uncommon for the President to delegate to Congress the responsibility, if not the power, in regard to a par­ ticular question of recognition.

One authority has observed

that when the question weighed in the balance, such as did the recognition of the Spanish American colonies and Texas, the President has invoked the judgment and cooperation of Congress before acting; when the recognition would be clearly premature, the President has not acted at all but has turned the question over to

Congress.

42

This latter

course was the one chosen by McKinley with regard to Cuban

Senate Document No. 56, 54th Congress, 2nd Ses­ sion. The report concludecF’"’that" 11The recognition of the independence or belligerency of a foreign power, techni­ cally speaking, is distinctly a diplomatic matter. It is properly evidenced either by sending a public minister to the government thus recognized, or by receiving a public minister therefrom. The latter is the usual and proper course.11 For examples of Congressional pressure, in earlier days even indicating claims in Congress for joint control over the power of recognition, see C. A. Berdahl, ^The Power of Recognition,11 American journal of International Law, 14:519-39, 1920. 42 Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 270.

24 indep endenc e .43 Although Congress has shared In exercising the power of recognition, few today would claim its participation as one of constitutional right*

In a self-denying fashion,

even the Senatorial investigation of 1897 concluded that Congress • • . can exercise no influence over his step, except very indirectly, by withholding appropriations* . . . Foreign nations communicate only through their respec­ tive executive departments* Resolutions of their legis­ lative departments upon diplomatic matters have no status in international law, therefore, a Congressional recognition of belligerency or independence would be a nullity* Modern authorities are practically unanimous in re­ gard to the President’s power of recognition*

In the

opinion of one, The uniform practice • • • shows that recognition has been in the United States the act of the President, and there can be no question of the President’s constitu­ tional right, under his power to negotiate treaties and to receive and send diplomatic agents, to accord sudi recognition, the Senate sharing in this right when it is exercised by the despatch of accredited agents*45 Further conclusiveness is provided by the opinion of

43 X). Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, i78§-1902 (Hew York: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1$05), Vol. X, p. 67* ^ Senate Document No. 56, 54th Congress, 2nd Ses­ sion, p. 46. 43 Edwin S. Corwin, The President’s Control of Foreign Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

I31T),

p T T T . ---

25 another authority, who has observed that The weight of judicial opinion . . . as well as precedent and practice, shows that the power of recog­ nition belongs clearly to the President alone, or to the President in conjunction with the Senate. Although there have been frequent attempts to claim for Congress an independent and even a paramount right in regard to recognition, Congress itself has clearly conceded that the act is distinctly an executive function, its own powers being limited to proffers of advice and assist­ ance, and to consultation with regard to the exercise of the right when dangerous consequences might result.46 The power of recognition in a parliamentary system is not such a matter of controversy, either in theory or in practice.

In Great Britain the crown manages the foreign

relations of the country.4?

Since the crown is itself a

nebulous institution In Its political implications, a practical interpretation would conclude that the power of recognition resides in the cabinet.

Parliamentary control

of the general aspects of foreign policy is certainly claimed, for wthe generally accepted theory of the English Constitution assumes that foreign affairs are under the strict control of

P a r l i a m e n t .

”48

Reality, however, espe­

cially in England, has a habit of diverging sharply from theory.

More and more observers are coming to the conclusion

46

Berdahl, oj>. cit., pp. 538-9.

4^ Frederick A. Ogg, English government and (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 9(5.

Politics

4 8 Eugene B. Chase, 11Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 11 The American Political Science Review, 25:861-88, November, 13'51, p. 8^1.

26 that Parliamentary control over even general foreign policy is more of a fiction than a reality. Th© difficulties, which apparently have proven in­ surmountable for the theory of parliamentary control of foreign affairs, are aptly described in a letter to Disraeli, written by Sir Stafford Northcote in 1864., which in part states that It belongs to Parliament, no doubt, to lay down the broad, general outlines of the foreign policy of the country. It belongs also to Parliament to criticize the action of the ministry when fully informed of it. But the difficulty of criticizing, while our informa­ tion is imperfect, and the uselessness of criticizing after the event, detract seriously from the value of the Parliamentary check, in nine cases out of ten which arise.50 In the days of Palmerston the conduct of British foreign policy was distinctly autocratic.51

It was hardly

less so, however, in the days of the Salisbury, Rosebery, Asquith and Baldwin governments.

The British laborites

have made a great issue of the undemocratic conduct of

1*QC * eft > The opening paragraph states that **Parliament has today less supervision over foreign policy than over any other field of governmental activity.1* 5 0 Ibid., p. 864, quoting Andrew Lang, Life of Sir Stafford Northcote, Vol, 1, p. 214-15.

^ Palmerston, in a letter to Cobden in 1859, con­ ceded at least cabinet participation, stating that **♦ * . it is in the Cabinet alone that questions of foreign policy are settled. We never consult Parliament until after they are settled.” Ibid., p. 863, quoting John Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, Vol. II, p. 231.

27 foreign affairs, but about the only tangible result of their criticism was an investigation of parliamentary control of foreign policy in other European states, made at the request of the British government by its diplomatic agents in 1912* The results of the investigation, published as Command Papers, vindicated the British practice by concluding that parlia­ mentary control of foreign policy in Europe really existed only in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Norway.52 While the British Parliament, especially during periods of a strong Labor opposition, has evidenced occa­ sional distaste for the lack of consideration paid to it in questions of foreign policy, parliamentary reproach has only had an indirect effect at best.

Two already famous

cases of recognition in recent years illustrate the impotency of the British parliament, even should one conceive of a majority of the House of Commons reluctant to accept a decision of the cabinet.

Both the decision of the British

government to recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the decision to recognize the Franco government in Spain were made in and by the cabinet.

Both questions of recogni­

tion were bound up in exceedingly broad questions of general

^ British Foreign Office, "Report of His Majesty1s Representatives Abroad on the Methods Adopted in the Parli­ aments of Foreign Countries for Dealing with International Questions, 11 Parliamentary Papers by Command, Miscellaneous No. 1912,~Cmd. 6102, and Miscellaneous No. 19, 1924, Cmd. 2282.

28 policy, but in neither case did the matter come to the attention of the House of Commons until it was already settled. The Ethiopian decision reveals some of the intri­ cacies of foreign policy, for recognition formed only a part of a vast scheme to settle Mediterranean problems in general.

Even when parliament was given the opportunity to

ratify the Anglo-Italian Accord of April, 1938, the decision to recognize Italian control of Ethiopia remained contingent upon the British governments satisfaction as to other matters entirely removed from the question of recognition.53 Recognition was finally extended some seven months later, by action of the government without securing the sanction of Parliament beforehand.5^ The British recognition of the Franco government in Spain provided a noteworthy example of unilateral action by the cabinet with accompanying remonstrances from the House of Commons.

On February 27, 1939, Prime Minister Chamber-

lain announced the unconditional recognition of the Franco regime to the Commons.

Clement Attlee, the Labor leader,

made a bitter argument'out of the fact that the cabinet had decided upon recognition and had informed the French govern-

53 Hew York Times, May 3, 1938. 54

Ibid., November 17, 1938.

29 ment ‘before telling the House of Commons.55

Pressed by Mr.

Attlee for the exact date when the cabinet had reached its decision, the.Prime Minister evaded the issue by replying that he could not be cross-examined about the matter.56 On the next day, a Labor motion of censure as to the government *s action came before the House of Commons.

The

resentment of the opposition is seen in the context of the motion, which stated That, in the opinion of this House the decision of His Majesty*s Government to grant unconditional recog­ nition to the Spanish insurgent forces dependent upon foreign intervention constitutes a deliberate affront to the legitimate Government of a friendly Power, is a gross breach of international traditions, and marks a ftirther stage in a policy which is steadily destroying in all democratic countries confidence in the good faith of Great Britain.57 Mr. Attlee followed up the motion by likening Chamberlain to na dictator addressing a Fascist Grand Council,f because he had decided on recognition before getting the approval of Parliament. ^ 8 The fate of the motion was a foregone conclusion. Mr. Attlee and the Laborites had their day in court, how­ ever, dramatically giving evidence of the practice of the _____

e

55

344

House of Commons Debates,

Loc. cit. 5*7 Loc. cit. 58

Ibid., P*

1100.

5 s,

p. 1099.

30 British government of taking questions of recognition unto itself, subject only to such indirect sanctions as motions of censure and the airing of grievances after the act had been consummated.

A strong, disciplined majority in a

parliamentary system does not lend itself to parliamentary participation in the conduct of foreign affairs. METHODS OF ACCORDING RECOGNITION There is no particular manner in which recognition Is accorded by a state.

It may be given by formal declara­

tion in a separate and independent document, or by such a declaration included in a convention dealing with other matters as

w e l l .

59

^ common method of extending recogni­

tion to governments that have superseded those to which official representatives had been accredited has been that of issuing new letters of credence to the diplomatic agent already accredited to the old government.50

other methods,

outlined by Berdahl, have included the mere entering into relations with the recognized government without express declaration, the official reception of diplomatic agents, or

59 Cole, op. cit., p. 7. Stuart A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recogni­ tion toward Mexico (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, XS33), p. 1 8 “

31 even the grant of an exequatur to a consul.61 As the Senate investigation of 1897 revealed, the usual American practice has been to receive a public min­ ister from the government aspiring for recognition, thereby according the desired recognition.62

Yet the practice of

establishing de facto relations with a non-recognized government has led to innumerable fictions and circum­ ventions which on the surface have appeared somewhat ridiculous• Typical of British instructions to its envoys accredited to a sovereign just overthrown are those of Palmerston to Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador to France during the Revolution of 1848.

A despatch of

February 26, 1848, advised Normanby to stay at his post, report events closely, and added that Your Excellency’s Credentials having been addressed to King Louis Philippe who has now abdicated, your official functions are of course for a time suspended; but you will not on that account abstain from such unofficial communication as you may think useful . . .63 Luring the French Revolution of 1792, the French Ambassador to England, accredited from the unfortunate

Berdahl, op. cit., p. 520. 6% Senate Document No. 56, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, p . 1 T l 66 Herbert A. Smith, Great Britain and the Law of

Nations (London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1&32), Vol. I, ppT 1TT6-7.

32 Louis XVI, maintained his official position as best he could, but persisted in addressing himself to the British government as the plenipotentiary of the new and unrecog­ nized French Republic.

Lord Grenville was willing to treat

with him through the back door, but wary, of any act which might appear as establishing formal relations, the British Foreign Minister finally returned notes sent by the envoy as officially unreceived and unread, although of course they were carefully studied by the British Foreign Office. 6 4 A question which immediately arises from a discussion of unofficial relations with an unrecognized government, especially in consideration of the random methods of according recognition, is that of whether recognition might be accorded inadvertently. • The issue, simply put, is whether intent is a necessary element of recognition.

John

Bassett Moore has lent his esteemed opinion to the school claiming that recognition may occur regardless of intention.6 5 Such an opinion is today, however, anachronistic.

If the

issue were one of theory, Judge Moore and others might well

64

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 95.

Judge Moore has claimed that by allowing Russia's adhesion to the Kellogg Pact, the other signatories, includ­ ing the United States, automatically recognized the Soviet government (John Bassett Moore, Candor and Common Sense (New York; no publisher cited, 1930), p. 13T* For a clear but brief summary of the question of intent as argued by various authorities, see Briggs, op. cit., pp. 68-9.

argue as to modern perversions, but contemporary state practice leads only to the conclusion that without intent there is no recognition.6 6

Many are of the opinion that

modern practice in this regard is more enlightened than theory. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OP THE THEORY OF RECOGNITION Being an indigenous product of international law, recognition as a state phenomenon could hardly have become a practical concept either before the development of inter national law or the establishment of the modern state sys­ tem with its implication of national sovereignty.

All

three in fact developed simultaneously, and in their cor­ related development naturally affected one another to a large extent.

The Reformation, which introduced both

6 6 rpke reception of a new Italian ambassador to the United States, October 19, 1936, gave rise to a recent problem as to intent. While the United States was per­ fectly willing to receive Mr. Suvich, it was to be made perfectly clear that by so doing the United States did not recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. As early as July of that year the State Department prepared the way by informing the press that Hthere could be no diplomatic recognition without intent to recognize” (New lork Times, July 25, 1936). Upon the presentation of credentials, President Roosevelt*s reply carefully avoided reference to the Italian king in any capacity at all, let alone as Emperor of Ethiopia, but stated merely that ”1 am happy to receive from you the letter by which His Majesty the King, your Sovereign, accredits you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Government of the United States (New York Times, October 20, 1936).

34 modern international law and the national state system, marks as well the first step in the development of the concept of recognition.

As one eminent authority states,

before the Reformation, the will of the state lacked any sovereign character. It was regarded as inherently limited by the law of God and the law of nature; any enactment of the state contrarv to their principles was inherently void of effect.**' Without the essential element of state sovereignty, recognition as an aspect of modern international law was unknown and unknowable, for prior to the Reformation Western Europe was regarded as a single Christian brother­ hood.

Men, not states, were the essential units.

A law

to reconcile equal, coexisting, independent authorities was not felt to be needed under such conditions of European society at the t i m e . Bodin1s doctrine of sovereignty, announced in 1556, became the germ of a new system which was duly inaugurated by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

As one authority remarks, by the terms of the

Treaty of Westphalia ^Protestant states, were given equal standing with Catholic.

The dismemberment of the universal

hierarchy was complete.11 While tolerant enough to admit the theoretical

^ Harold J. Laski, Introduction to Politics (London: G.. Allen and Unwin Ltd., l$3l), p. ^5.

Jaffe, ojp• cit., p. 82. 69

Ibid., p. 84.

35 equality of Christian states, whether Protestant or Catholic, the new Family of Nations ^regarded itself as an exclusively constituted club, at first of sovereign persons . . .tf70 Thus the theory of recognition is seen first as a doctrine of a personal ruler, a

doctrine wwhich upheld the estab­

lished hereditary right of a single house against all other individual claimants. 1171

As the most thorough jbnerican

student of the history of recognition has stated, the doctrine later developed into the principle of legitimacy of monarchy itself, and eventually it passed into a concept of the legitimacy of an established government against any opposing o n e . ^ It was only when the idea of sovereignty was severed from personality that the necessity and practicability of recognition as a concept in international law was realized to a full extent.

For many years afterwards, however, the

family of nations continued to remain an exclusive, selfappointed, mutual-protective society of European monarchs which, under the doctrine of legitimism, wielded the power of recognition as a means of safeguarding the institution

70

Ibid., p.

86

.

Goebel, op. cit., p. 20. ^

Loc. cit.

36 of hereditary monarchy within the European system. If revolutionary regimes were ostracized through non-recognition within the European system, it was equally true that the family of nations remained exclusively Christian and European until quite recently.

Goebel states

that "Even until late in the nineteenth century the family of nations retained its ancient feature of restriction to the Christian nations of the earth. " 1? 4

The formal admis­

sion of Turkey in 1856 marked the first entry of a nonGhristian state into this society of nations.

Since that

time, however, both the national state system and inter­ national law— and consequently the doctrine of recognition— have become worldwide. Before this brief survey of the origin and develop­ ment of the doctrine of recognition can be terminated, the contribution of the United States toward its evolution must be recorded.

The concert of European monarchies

quite naturally anathematized revolution, at any place and for any cause, because of Its inherent incompatibility with the static theory of legitimism.

But since the independence

Goebel remarks that "the tendency of sovereigns to exclude from international law those governments ar states which had violated this system was not overcome either by the American or French revolution" (Ibid., p. 52). ---Loc. cit.

37 of the United States was the result of revolution and symbolized emancipation from the monarchial system, this nation,

11

as befitted its recent revolutionary origins,

set its face squarely against the doctrine of legitimacy.H In their eagerness to promote

the success of repub­

licanism against the system of legitimism, American states­ men utilized the power of recognition to counter the legitimist theory.

Rationalizing a new doctrine of

recognition called de factoism,

Jefferson based his

theory upon the belief that revolution was a necessary element of progress, and thus instead of being opposed by the legitimist policy of non-recognition, it should be acknowledged as a construetive element in the dynamics of politics. Jefferson1s theory led him to a vindication of the right of revolution and a justification of the recognition of a revolutionary regime.

Thus in separate instructions

to our representatives in France during the revolutionary era there, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, made two statements in 1792 which epitomized the new American divergence from the legitimist doctrine of recognition.

75

P*

The

m *

For this aspect of Jefferson’s political thought, see Paul L. Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904-05), Vol. IV, !pp. 36S and 467.

38 first, in a despatch of lovember 7, was the declaration that "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any govern­ ment to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially d e c l a r e d . T h e

second was contained

in a despatch of December 30 to Pinckney, the American representative to London, in which Jefferson wrote that We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under what forms it pleases and to change these forms at its own will; and externally to transact business with other nations through whatever organ it chooses whether that be a King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President or whatever it be. The only thing essential is the will of the nation . ? 8 The attitude adopted by Jefferson marks the begin­ ning of a de facto theory of recognition, proudly upheld as guiding American policy almost continuously up to the present time. It is significant that Great Britain found itself subscribing to de factoism almost immediately after Jefferson had enunciated the policy, and thus the two great Anglo-Saxon nations vied with one another throughout the decades In their devotion to a common theory.

Decla­

rations made by British statesmen as to the adherence of

77

Ibid., vol. VI, p. 131.

7® H. A. Washington (ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson (Philadelphia: J. B . Lippincott and Company, 1869-^1), vol. Ill, p. 500.

39 their government to a de facto theory of recognition are neither lacking in quantity nor quality.

It was George

Canning who inaugurated the British counterpart to the Jeffersonian theory, laying the foundation of British policy with regard to recognition on the occasion of the revolt of the Spanish American colonies.^9

Contrasting

the stubborn views of Spain, Canning presented the alternative that There was also a recognition de facto which was based on a practical appreciation ofwhether the new state had shown a sufficient degree of force and stability first to achieve its independence, and next to discharge internal and external acts of sovereignty. Provided it had, it mattered little whether the state was a monarchy or a republic. Stability was the first test of legitimacy. British recognition of a new state was not the recognition of a right but of a fact, *or rather of an opinion of a fact.*80 In support of this d£ facto policy, Palmerston ex­ plained to Russia his reasons for recognizing the new French regime in 1848 by writing that . . . it is an Established Principle of the British Government . . . to acknowledge the Right of every State to decide what shall be its own form of Government; and therefore the Government of Great Britain is in the habit of acknowledging any Govern­ ment established in a Foreign State when such Govern-

79

Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 77

Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foun­ dations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt to Salisbury (Cambridge: The University Press, 19 36), pp.~T6-7.

40 ment shall appear to be firmly and permanently estab­ lished. si As a sequel to the 1848 Palmerston declaration, Lord Malmesbury in 1852 informed the House of Lords of the gen­ eral principles governing the decision to recognize the new French Empire of Louis Napoleon by stating that It has been • • . our usual policy for a period-of twenty-two years— since the Revolution of 1830 in Paris— to acknowledge the constitutional doctrine that the people in every country have the right to choose their own sovereign without any foreign interference; and. that a sovereign having been freely chosen by them, that sovereign, or ruler, or whatever he may be called, being de facto the ruler of that country, should be recognized by the sovereign of this.82 To cite another example of British adherence to de factoism, Lord John Russell in a despatch of 1859 recalled the consistency of Britain*s policy of recognition with reference to Spanish American, Greek, and Belgian independ­ ence, and added that Britain . . . uniformly gave her countenance and, if neces­ sary, her aid, to consolidate the de facto Governments which arose in Europe or America. . . . We should pursue a .similar course in regard to the affair of Italy • . . by using our Influence to maintain and consolidate any regular and orderly governments which the Italians may form for t h e m s e l v e s .33 To bring the examples up to date, the House of

81 Ibid., p. 159 (quoting Foreign Office 65/343 Ho. 70, March 28, 1848). 82

123

House of Lords Debates, 3s, p. 971.

83 Temperley and Penson, op. cit., pp. 206-7 (quoting Foreign Office 27/1287 Ho. 498, November 15, 1859).

41 Commons debate over the recognition of Francofs government in Spain in February of 1939 evoked numerous reiterations of the traditional aspects of British policy, supporting the asserted application of a de facto policy to the• Franco

regime.®4

In conclusion, it is to be observed that the implica­ tions of pure de factoism would hardly have merited this research if the Jeffersonian theory had been as faithfully adhered to In practice as it has been In political speeches. As a diplomatic weapon, recognition was ostensibly emascu­ lated of all effectiveness, except for Its use in 'Undermining legitimism, by the theory of de factoism.

If stability,

permanence, and the will of the people substantially de­ clared were to become the sole criteria for the grant of recognition, other considerations which might be prompted by political opportunism were implicitly proscribed.

How­

ever, It Is the belief of the author— a belief which forms the hypothesis upon which this dissertation is based--that in the formulation of a given policy of recognition the statesmen In both the great Anglo-Saxon nations have been rather reluctant to yield the power of using recognition in practice as a diplomatic weapon, despite repeated pro­ fessions of faith to de factoism, which in theory proscribes its use as such.

84 544‘..-House of Commons Debates, 5s, pp. 1114-15.

CHAPTER XX

BRITISH USE OP RECOGNITION AS AN INSTRUMENT OP HIGH POLICY In this chapter it is the purpose of the author to examine recognition in its relationship to political opportunism*

The motives guiding a particular policy

of recognition in this aspect have no necessary correla­ tion to specific economic gains, or to some of the more consistent principles guiding general policy*

In short,

the alternatives presented in the particular situation are resolved mainly in accordance with their bearing upon world politics.

Consideration will be given, in other chapters,

to the use of the power of recognition to promote more particularized goals*

Its use herein, however, is in

obtaining ends which in reality have little to do with the simple relationship of recognizant vis-a-vis recognizee, but have decisive ramifications in the field of general policy. Even to the casual observer, it would be apparent that the complexities of foreign policy have necessitated the use of the power of recognition in the promotion of high policy in Great Britain a good deal more than in the United States, where historically and geographically the United States has been able to remain more insensitive to power politics.

American persistence in the wlegitimacy

43 of origin*1 doctrine, its stubborn hesitancy in recognizing the Soviet government, and its intransigent refusal to recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia indicate the idealized plane upon which the United States has based its foreign policy..

No state as close to Europe and with so

much depending upon foreign policy as Britain could afford to conduct itself with such puritanic zeal. Although it is not our purpose to emphasize a com­ parison of British and American policies, it may be asserted that

the examples of British use of recognition

In the realm of higher stakes of diplomacy are much more numerous than those of the American.

The following survey

of British practice in this chapter and of American prac­ tice in the subsequent chapter will incidentally supply evidence to support this assertion. 1.

THE NAPOLEONIC STATES (1802)

Th© war which had been going on between France and England since 1793 came to a temporary halt in 1801 with peace negotiations at Amiens.

If the British had enter­

tained any sincere hopes that they could come to terms with Napoleon, the consultations at Amiens certainly Indicated the contrary.

Although a pact of peace was

concluded and signed on March 27, 1802, It failed to touch upon many of the most vital points at issue between

44 the contending parties•1 Among the subjects for negotiation at Amiens was a series of recognition questions having to do with the acknowledgment by Great Britain of three puppet states set up by Napoleon during his European campaigns. 2

While the

British apparently found no objection to the three new states per se— mainly because they could do nothing to prevent their erection^— it was yet considered inadvisable to recognize them without certain other quid pro quo then thought necessary. To the British, the value of being on friendly terms with their defeated ally, the King of Sardinia, proscribed their acknowledgment of a puppet state carved from Sardinian soil.

The ramifications of the situation are revealed in

the instructions sent by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, to Lord Cornwallis, who at the time was negotiating with Napoleon at Amiens.

The instructions,

sent on January 27, 1802, read as follows:

1 J. Holland Rose, wThe Struggle with Revolutionary France, 11 The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. I, 1783-1816 (Mew Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 307. and

2 These were the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, the Kingdom of Etruria.

3 R # w. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe: 1789-1914 (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 3U3TJ, p . IU.

45 • . • however this Government might wish to oblige the First Consul, there is so strong a Feeling in this Country respecting the unfortunate King of Sardinia, that we could not be warranted in acknowledging by Treaty the Cisalpine Republic, which is composed of a part of his Dominions, unless a suitable territorial provision was made for that Monarch--The acknowledgment of the Ligurian Republic, without acknowledging the Cisalpine, would appear invidious to the latter. . . . I think the King might be induced to do this [ acknowledge the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics and the King of Etruria] if a proper provision was made for His Sar­ dinian Majesty. • • .4 Napoleon refused the British bargain, however, and the latter thereupon refused to recognize the puppet states. A few months later during the armistice provided by Amiens the British again approached Bonaparte, offering recogni­ tion of the Italian states for the rather high price of the retention of Malta, the Immunity of Turkey, and the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland by

France.

5

As might

have been expected, Napoleon flatly refused the British offer. The two powers drifted into war again in 1805.

De­

spite British failures, however, the Peace of Amiens did provide an opportunity for the British to use the power of recognition in an attempt to gain other ends in diplo­ macy.

Vis-a-vis Napoleon, the British failed, but even in

failure their use of the instrumentality of recognition

^ Foreign Office, 27/59 "Private.*1 5 Seton-Watson, op. cit♦, p. 19.

46 indirectly proved a boon toward strengthening British bonds with its potential friends. 2.

THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN COLONIES (1821-1825) It is doubtful whether any other question of recogni­

tion has ever produced such fertile field for international politics in the history of the modern state system as that pertaining to the independence of the Spanish American colonies. 6

The motives behind the various policies of the

Interested powers were often so complex that one almost despairs of presenting any or all of them without also discoursing at length on the history of the times.

While

it is a simple matter to find an economic basis for British policy as it eventually evolved into that of full recogni­ tion of these states, the determination of the issue involved some of the most delicate points of political consideration. In these political aspects, British policy regarding the Spanish American colonies was intimately connected with the British reaction to the Holy Alliance and the "System

6 As one authority states, it is significant that "the policy to be pursued in recognizing new states first became acute in modern history in connection with the revolt of Spain* s Spanish American colonies1* (Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, in parti­ cular of the Recognition of Foreign Powers, Cambridge: Harvard-’University Press,“T 9 3 3 , p p . 103-4).

47 of 1815.tt Britain*s main concern in the peace conferences which followed the Napoleonic Wars was to prevent the out­ break of further revolutions against the Bourbons in France. To that end, the British were willing to sacrifice a cer­ tain degree of independent action in foreign policy by assuming obligations in the treaties of Vienna and Paris to intervene, in conjunction with the other signatories, in any attempt to overthrow the order of things in France by revolution. To Metternich and to Tsar Alexander I, the commit­ ments made by the Allies at Vienna and Paris heralded the beginning of a

congressional system whereby intervention

in the internal affairs of any state was to become the right of the European concert.®

British policy, however,

was evolving in the opposite direction towards isolation, and while the more

liberal British government was willing

to merge with the absolutisms of Europe to stamp out the scourge of Napoleon, there was little desire to continue the association once its cause had been removed.9

Sensing

** C. K. Webster, l,The Pacification of Europe, 1813- . 1815,n The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. I,’T 7783-lSl5, p. 519. 8 For an enlightening survey of the development of the flSystem of 1815“ see W. P. Cresson, The Holy Alliance; The European Background of the Monroe Doctrine (New fork: Oxford University Press,~X922), 147 pp.

^ Ibid., p. 45.

48 British suspicion, the members of the Holy Alliance were deliberately vague in their mutual pledges, ^

eventually

gaining the adhesion of the British, however, if not their enthusiastic support .H As the intentions of the Holy Alliance became clearer with the succeeding congresses, the disaffection of Great Britain became more apparent.

The issue was joined upon

the appeal of the much harassed King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, for the intervention of the Alliance to help restore his autocratic power in Spain as well as in his colonies. The British cabinet declared itself unalterably opposed to any action even tending toward armed intervention.

At

Laibach in 1821, Ferdinand listened gleefully to the plans of the Holy Alliance to restore his power in Spain, while British policy slowly crystallized into one diametrically opposed to that of the more absolute autocracies. As a means of regaining their lost prestige, the French Bourbons eagerly fell into line with the schemes

1 0 An authoritative text of the Holy Alliance, signed primarily by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, September 14, 1815, is to be found in the British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. Ill, 1815, pp. 211-Y2. Even the most studied reading of the document produces little else than suspicion that the mutual pledge of the sovereigns as to "Christian . behavior” is something more than a well-meaning platitude.

Cresson, oj>. clt., pp. 42 et. seq. 12 Ibid.,'p. 64.

49 of Alexander by offering to assist Ferdinand by means of armed intervention. ^*3

The French thereupon invaded Spain,

despite British pleas for non-intervention. It was contrary to the interests of the continental powers to countenance rebellion against monarchical govern­ ment in Europe, and it was proving equally disturbing to them that rebellion was breaking out in the Spanish col­ onies.

British policy, meanwhile, had been mainly concerned

with an attempt to force Spain to accept the exclusive mediation of Great Britain in its quarrel with the colonies.14 Castlereagh and Canning both desired peace, mainly for commercial reasons, but also to dissipate the possibility of giving the Holy Alliance another chance to act as the supreme arbiter of Europe. It was in this contest between the Holy Alliance and England that the British found the power of recognition to be a handy weapon.

Neither Castlereagh nor Canning had

any particular quarrel with monarchy , ^ 3 and as a result

13

Ibid., p. 113#

^ For a scholarly research on British mediation efforts with Spain, see John T. Banning, 11Great Britain and Spanish Recognition of the Hispanic American States, 11 The Hispanic American Historical Review, 10:429-56, November, 1930. ’ 1 5 Harold Temperley, lfThe Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820-27,” The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. II, 1BT5-1866, pp. 6 & et seq♦

50 the British could look impartially upon the alternatives of peace based upon the reassertion of control by the Spanish monarchy, or a peace based upon the independence of the colonies*

The important thing was the creation of

a settled condition whereby commerce could thrive and the Holy Alliance degenerate through complacency.

That to

which Britain was unalterably opposed was the restoration of a Spanish authority relying upon the armed forces of prance*

Thus, as one authority remarks, nEvery success

of the policy pursued by prance in Spain caused Canning to seek a counterpoise which might add to the influence of Great Britain in the affairs of the Spanish American colonies. tfl® The English were faced with.a delicate situation. The possibility that Spain would reassert its control over the American colonies made it inadvisable for the British to give offense to Spain by recognizing the independence of the rebellious colonies, for to do so would close the door on any hopes the British might have that they would receive favorable treatment commercially from Spain.17

16 Cresson, op. cit♦, p. 115. 17 ^ Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Spain had already been won by the British in 1814, whereby the parties had expressed an agreement to frame a treaty of com­ merce, and, in the event of the opening of Hispanic American trade, to admit Britain as the most favored nation. See Foreign Office, Spain, 94/268, 28 August, 1814.

51 On the other hand, the alternative of recognition seemed the most reasonable counterpoise to the threat of French intervention in the Spanish colonies.18 For a time the British took a compromise stand, pressing Spain to recognize the independence of the colonies, but making it quite apparent that British recognition would soon take place if Spanish intransigence continued• In a note of June 28, 1882, Castlereagh informed Spain that it should well know that in the unselfish British offers of mediation, Britain "has refused every exclusive Commercial advantage, 11 and that since Spain’s final refusal, Britain • . . has seriously respected the Rights of his Catholic Majesty and has patiently awaited the results of those efforts which Spain declared it to be Her determination to employ for the pacification of that important portion of Her Dominions. Noting with pleasure the renewed efforts of Spain to reach its own settlement, Castlereagh continued by promising that Britain would "abstain as far as possible,

18 Upon the success of the French invasion of Spain in 1823, Chateaubriand soon began laying plans for extending French intervention in Spain to the Spanish colonies. To Ferdinand VII he suggested a compromise whereby the colonies were to become a league of separate principalities, with a prince of the House of Bourbon (from either the French, Spanish, or Italian branches) at the head of each. As if to make the scheme even more unpalatable to the British, the arrangements were to be guaranteed by the Holy Alliance (Cresson, op. cit., p. 116).

52 from any step which might prejudice His Catholic Majesty*s endeavors for the termination of His difficulties with the said Provinces.n

But, the note concluded, Britain was

obliged to warn against delay, for His Catholic Majesty must be aware that so large a Portion of the World cannot without fundamentally dis­ turbing the intercourse of Civilized Society, long con­ tinue without some recognized and established rela­ tions, - That the State which can neither by its Councils nor by its Arms, effectually assert its own Rights over its Dependencies, so as to enforce obedience, and thus to make itself responsible for maintaining their rela­ tions with other Powers, must sooner or later be pre­ pared to see those relations established themselves. Between 1822 and 1824, much had occurred to cause the British to be more determined than ever to acknowledge the independence of the Spanish colonies, but at the latter date the British still manifested an almost surprising patience with the Stubbornness of Spain .& 0

jn

corres­

pondence of that year,21 the Spanish Secretary of State,

19

Foreign Office, 120/53.

20 Trie commercial motives behind. British recognition cannot be overdrawn to the exclusion of other considerations, for in the words of one authority, r,Despite serious and increasing injury to British commercial interests due to long continuance of the struggle, the Foreign Office was slow to take even the first steps toward recognition11 (Herbert A. Smith, Great Britain and the haw of Nations, London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1§3&, VoY. I, pY ISO). 21 As late as 1824, Canning informed Spain that Britain did not wish to anticipate Spain, but he insisted 11that His Catholic Majesty should have the grace and ad­ vantage of leading the way in that recognition among the powers of Europe11 (Foreign Office, Spain, 72/284, 30 January, 1824).

53 Senor Ofalia, expressed his appreciation for Britain’s delay in recognizing the independence of the colonies, and offered to make certain concessions in the hope of getting the British to yield the threat of recognition altogether* 2 2 While admitting that Britain was the logical mediator, Ofalia insisted that its mediation with recognition as a sine qua non was not acceptable to Spain.2^ It was not, however, In the course of mere negotia­ tions with Spain that British policy toward the revolted colonies crystallized into recognition.

The spectre of a

reinvigorated France was even more conclusive, not to men­ tion the important fact that the United States had already ingratiated itself with the rebel governments by its recog­ nitions in 1822.

The latter factor had already worked to

the disadvantage of the British in the fact that Spanish America was turning to

the United States and was showing

its gratitude by heaping commercial favors upon the Ameri­ cans which the British themselves had hoped to

r e c e i v e .

24

22 ofalia1s concessions were that Spain had no inten­ tion of soliciting or using foreign arms or of establishing a commercial interdiction (Lanning, op. cit., p., 433) . 23 Loc. cit. 24 one authority states, wFear that the United States, whose recognition of certain Insurgent Republics dated from 1822, might consolidate its influence in Latin America drove Canning to urge recognition11 (Algernon Cecil, British Foreign Secretaries, 1807-1916, London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1927, p"* 74).

54 Canningfs preoccupation with the schemes of Prance, however, was perhaps of the most decisive importance in his use of the weapon of recognition with regard to the Spanish American colonies.

In the words of one commentator, Canning

flwas determined to prevent any of the colonies from falling into French hands, and set his face against any idea of establishing petty Bourbon thrones in South America. Even more conclusively, it is to be observed that ^Canning held that French occupation of Spain constituted the prima­ ry reason for British action” in finally recognizing the independence of the Spanish American colonies.^ Canning*s diplomacy during 1823 and 1824, directed mainly at countering France and the Holy Alliance, gave rise to some of the most remarkable negotiations in the annals of British diplomatic history.

The British Foreign

Secretary*s famous proposal to the United States of a joint policy vis-a-vis Spanish America came.as a direct result of the schemes of Chateaubriand to create puppet Bourbon states out of the colonies.^*7

History records that out of the

25 Seton-Watson, o£. cit., p. 84. 25 Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning (Londons Gr. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925), p. 151.

^ For an authoritative account of the Canning pro­ posals, the memoirs of the Ann rican Minister to England at the time are excellent (Richard Rush, A Residence at the Court of London, Philadelphia? J. B. LTppIncott ancT’Company, II, 1872")".

55 Canning proposal was born the Monroe Doctrine.

On August

22, 1823, Canning promulgated an uncompromising declaration of the British position, leaving for both France and the United States either to adjust their policies accordingly or prepare for the consequences.

The memorandum, a brief

enumeration of the points of British policy, was summarized by the American Minister to England in the following words: 1 . She conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless. 2. That the question of their recognition as in­ dependent states was one of time and circumstance. 3. That England was not disposed, however, to throw any Impediment in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and mother country by amicable negotiation. 4. That she aimed at the possession of noportion of the colonies for herself. 5. That she could not see the transfer ofany por­ tion of them to any other Power with indifference.^

France yielded to the British in the famous Polignac Memorandum, which embodied a series of disclaimers on the part of France In regard to intervention in the Spanish colonies *29 The continued uncompromising stand of Spain, the disclaimers of France, and the previous recognitions by the United States served to create the "time and circum­ stance” for the beginning of formal British recognitions in South America, the first being that of the United

28

vol.

ii, p. n.

29 Cresson, op. cit., pp. 118-19.

.56 Provinces of the Rio de la Plata on February 2, 1825*30 If British recognition had been predicated upon the mere fact of independence, the delay would have been of much shorter duration.33-

jf

it had been predi cated upon the mere

opportunity for commercial advantages, there should have been even less delay, for the British would not have allowed President Monroe, after such ample warning, to best them in being the first to welcome the new states.^

To the British,

however, the occasion was a threat to their ability to con­ duct a successful foreign policy independent of the Holy Alliance, the members of which were not only attempting to make foreign policy a joint concern of the European powers, but were also inaugurating policies inimical to the inter­ ests of Great Britain.

Although the issue of Spanish

America eventually caused the British to withdraw completely from the congressional system of the Holy Alliance, it was apparent that for Britain1s own interest the break would not alienate the continent so forcefully as to create a

Smith, op. cit., p. 151. As to the question of when Spanish America became in fact independent, it is generally conceded that MBy 1818 the colonies were almost entirely successful, and Spanish rule was non-existent” (Jaffe, op. cit., p. 104). The London merchants were sufficiently provoked with British hesitancy in recognizing the Spanish American republics to present at least two petitions to Parliament, one in 1825 and another in 1824, urging recognition of the de facto governments (banning, 0 £. cit., pp. 430-32).

57 unity of opposition toward the British on the part of the European powers.33 .a s long as Britain could threaten recognition of the Spanish colonies, she necessarily had influence in the court of Spain.

The threat of recognition

also was used as a deterrent to France, heing finally carried out in a definite spirit of blocking French schemes in Spanish America. Thus it is seen that in the determination of British policy regarding the recognition of the Spanish American republics, Canning used the power of recognition in diplo­ matic negotiations involving far more than the mere issue of British relationships vis-a-vis Spain and the Spanish colonies.

Th® success of the British in this case is to

be noted.

They definitely saw the realization of their

hopes that the question of the Spanish colonies should be decided neither by a legitimist conference of the Holy Alliance nor by the intervention of France, but that the*

33 After Verona, another attempt was made by Fer­ dinand and the Holy Alliance to settle the Spanish quarrel with the colonies by conference. This time Canning flatly refused British participation, stating that lfEngland oo uld not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Span­ ish America upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question, and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it11 (Augustus G. Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Creep, III, 1831, Vol. II, p. 29). It was this action on the part of Canning that definitely alienated Great Britain from the Holy Alliance (Cresson, o£. cit., p. 118).

58 disputants should find a solution by themselves without the enforced patronage of Europe.

Sponsorship of the settle­

ment by the concert of Europe, whether the solution be in­ dependence from or reconciliation with the Spanish throne, would not have been to the interests of Great Britain. 3.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BRAZIL (1821-1826)

British policy regarding the Brazilian movement for independence offers an interesting sequel to its Spanish American policy, especially with reference to the question of recognition.

While the two movements were contempora­

neous, British policy with regard to the one was at times diametrically opposed to that regarding the other.

The

divergence was most apparent In the use of the power of recognition, for when in 1825 the British decided to acknowledge the independence of some of the Spanish American colonies, they refused to concede the same favor to Brazil, despite the fact that Brazilian independence was certainly as well established by that date as was that of any of the de facto Spanish American governments.3 4

3 4 Testifying as to the de facto independence of Brazil, one authority observes lEat when Dom Pedro de­ clared Brazil independent on September 7, 1822, the declara­ tion ”was virtually equivalent to de facto independence, for the increasing anarchy in Portugal rendered almost futile any attempt to put down the revolt” (Lawrence P. Hill, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, Durham:Duke university Press, 1 9 3 3 , p. 26).

59 Th© explanation for this use of the power of recog­ nition one way with Spanish America and the other way with Brazil is found in the uniqueness of British relationships with Portugal.

The famous Methuen Treaty of 1703 had

established a continuing alliance, rare in the annals of British balance-of-power diplomacy, f,which

hr

de the pro­

tection of the territorial integrity of Portugal both a legitimate interest and a primary duty of Britain. w 3 3 Portugal*s historic role as the protege of Great Britain made it somewhat embarrassing for the British to remain completely neutral when a quarrel among the princes of the House of Braganza was apparently resulting in a split empire--one prince ruling in Portugal and claiming Brazil­ ian allegiance, another ruling in Brazil and claiming Portuguese allegiance.3 3 The British dilemma was created by a question as to

35

Smith,

0 ]D.

cit., p. 181.

3 6 The invasion of Napoleon in 1807 forced the Por­ tuguese Prince Regent, John, to Brazil, which he ruled directly for thirteen years while the British carried on in Portugal. During a Portuguese revolt in 1820, John re­ turned to Lisbon, appointing his eldest son, Dorn Pedro, as Regent of Brazil. The latter immediately fell in with a Brazilian liberal movement. Alienating himself from the more autocratic government in Lisbon, Dom Pedro declared Brazil independent and had himself crowned Emperor in 1822. por an authoritative account of the Brazilian secession, see Percy A. Martin, "Brazil, 11 Studies in H|.spanio American Affairs, III, 1934 (Washington, George Washington University Press, 1935), pp. 147-278*

60 whether stipulations in the Anglo.-Portuguese treaties ob­ ligating Great Britain to defend Portuguese territory ex­ tended also to the colonial possessions of Portugal.

Can­

ning apparently thought not, for his instructions to the British Minister in Lisbon, October 18, 1821, included the advice that . . • with the political effects of this separation of the Colonial Empire of the House of Braganza from Its European Dominions, Great Britain has no concern; nor are you to express any opinion of your Government upon it.37 Since an overt act of recognition of the de facto independence of Brazil would give offense to its loyal ally, Portugal, the British government made an even greater effort to mediate the quarrel than it did with respect to Spain*s difficulties with its American colonies.

During 1822-25,

Canning pressed both sides with a view to promoting a settle­ ment which would concede to Brazil the substance of recog­ nized independence, while preserving a bond in the nature of a personal union.38

gy the nature of events, the

British could not long deny to Brazil the acknowledgment of its de facto independence without seriously impairing good and profitable relations with that country; yet to recognize Brazil in advance of a Portuguese acknowledgment would give

37 poreign Office, 179/82. 38 Smith, oj3 . cit., p. 185.

Ho.

8

.

61 the color of had faith to a traditional ally of Britain. Much to the distress of the British government, Por­ tugal in 1823-24 proved as hopelessly intransigent as did Spain.

Neither of the two mother countries manifested any

intention of acquiescing in the de facto independence of its American possessions despite an obvious inability to force a reunion by war or by any other method.

As Canningfs

Htime and circumstance11 for recognition of the Spanish American regimes drew near, however, the question of Brazil assumed an even greater importance, for the acknowledgment of Brazilian independence simultaneously with the Spanish American recognitions would endanger British relations with Portugal as well as with Spain.

While it seemed impossible

to delay much longer the recognition of the Spanish American governments, an attempt to save British prestige in the Peninsula by denying to Brazil a like acknowledgment would be an obvious cause for resentment on the part of the Brazilian government. Despite the awkward ramifications, however, it was the above alternative that the British eventually deter­ mined upon— hoping that their relatively greater influence in Lisbon than in Madrid would be more successful in get­ ting the mother country to recognize the independence of its colony before Great Britain was itself forced to do so.

Although Canning resigned himself to risk the loss

62 of Brazilian friendship by this move, he made a magnificent attempt to justify to Brazil his action in recognizing Span­ ish American states without a corresponding recognition of Brazil by a famous State Paper of January 12, 1825.

1/9hi3e

the Paper is unfortunately far too long to be inserted as a whole, some excerpts and paraphrasing deserve recording. Canning began his State Paper by asserting that • • • our footing with the Spanish American States, after the Commercial Treaties shall have been signed, will be in truth very little further advanced than that on which we have stood for two years with the Government of Brazil. Stating that Britain was not in a situation as media­ tor between Spain and Spanish America, since Spain had continuously refused even though Spanish America had con­ sented, Canning justified his Spanish American decision by adding that **when our decision was to be taken, it could be hardly otherwise than favorable to the accepting party . 11 Between Portugal and Brazil, he hastened to add, the Brit­ ish were in the position of mediators, since both had accepted the British offer.

Canning mentioned further that

while Britain did have treaties with Portugal binding it ”to take Care of Her Dominions,” Spain had no such treaty with Great Britain.

As a concluding argument, Canning

made an ingenious comparison of British responsibilities toward Spain and toward Portugal should the internecine struggles continue and in case Britain had recognized the

63 independence of the colonial possessions of both.

Stating

that the recognition of Spanish America would not involve Great Britain in war shomld Spain and Spanish America con­ tinue to fight, Canning added that if Brazil were recog­ nized, and then should make war on Portugal, the British would be bound by treaty with Portugal to come to the latter1s aid, since Great Britain was obligated to defend Portugal against any foreign power.

Canning then concluded

his Paper with the following statement: I place these considerations before the Brazilian Government . . . because the general resemblance of the two cases of Spanish and Portuguese America is cal­ culated to lead the Brazilian Government into fatal mistakes; if care be not taken to mark at the same time their distinguishing p e c u l i a r i t i e s . 3 9 Fortunately for the British, Canning had guessed correctly, for while Spain stubbornly refused to concede the independence of its American colonies for yet another decade and over, British mediation succeeded in reconciling Portugal with the loss of Brazil within the

y e a r . 4 0

Formal

British recognition of Brazil followed close upon the Portuguese action; a treaty embodying the British acknow­ ledgment was signed with Brazil on January 12, 1826.41

^

Foreign Office, 128/2, Ho. 1.

40 in the treaty between Portugal.and Brazil, signed August 29, 1825, Portugal recognized Brazil as an independ­ ent Empire (Smith, op. cit., p. 196). 41 Loe. cit.

64 It is believed by the author that the related cases of British recognition policy toward the Portuguese and Spanish colonies deserve to be characterized as classic examples of the effect of extraneous considerations upon the use of the power of recognition*

In these two situa­

tions the British found that any policy of recognition had ramifications and potentialities both for good and bad, and that affairs of transcending importance were so inti­ mately bound up with the question of recognition that an objective consistency as between the two cases was mani­ festly impossible#

It was due to considerations of higher

diplomatic significance that the British used the power of recognition one way vis-a-vis the Spanish colonies and, temporarily, the other way vis-a-vis Brazil* 4.

THE JULY REVOLUTION IN PRANCE (1830)

A swift series of events in Prance during the summer of 1830 culminated in a three-day revolution forcing the abdication of the reactionary Bourbon king, Charles X, and establishing a relatively liberal constitutional monarchy under Louis Philippe, the Duke of Orleans.

A tempered

revolution, wherein monarchy— even the same family--was maintained, its success was none the less ominous as a threat to the legitimist, reactionary concert of autoc­ racies that had been dictating the affairs of Europe since

65 1815.42

The British government, previously seen to have

deserted the Holy Alliance, formally recognized the new regime in Prance on September 1, 1830, only thirty-one days after the date of the abdication of Charles X .4 3 Behind the rapid evolution of British policy toward the July Revolution lies a background of clever strategy on the part of Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, who in this instance made brilliant use of the power of recognition to further British interests.

The British did

not regret the fall of Charles X, for in so far as it pur­ ported to express the triumph of constitutionalism over despotic government, it commanded a large measure of sym­ pathy in Or eat Britain.4 4 The question of acknowledging the July Revolution was not, however, so easily decided.

In the eyes of the reaction

ary statesmen of Europe, this new French revolution seemed to challenge the settlement of 1815, which had made the maintenance of the French monarchy and the suppression of revolutionary activities a matter of international concern .4 3

4 2 Charles Cuignebert, A short History of the French People (Hew York: The Macmillan Company, 1930T7 Vol. II,

p.~§7‘ 6. 43

Smith, op. cit., p. 101. Loc * c:*-t.

43

Cecil, op. cit., p. 108.

66 The British Tories, as well, were constrained to consider the July Revolution as falling within the scope of the treaties of Vienna and Paris, wherein the joint inter­ vention of the Allies of 1815 was provided for, should the French radicals once again rise to threaten the peace of a legitimist

E

u

r

o

p

e

.

puke of Wellington, at that time

the British Prime Minister, was among those who were con­ vinced— for a while at least— that Great Britain not only should intervene but was also obligated to do so in order to guarantee f,the settlement."4^ Once the British cabinet had determined to jilt the Alliance powers by this sudden and unilateral gesture of acknowledgment to Louis Philippe, Aberdeen prepared a cir­ cular for the guidance of British representatives at the various courts of Europe who were likely to bear the brunt of protestations and demands for explanation on the part of the European reactionaries.

The circular, despatched on

4 6 Although none of the reactionary governments of Europe looked with favor upon the July Revolution, apparent­ ly only Russia felt itself in a position to urge interven­ tion with any great vigor (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 147).

4^ Wellington finally yielded to the arguments of Aberdeen, writing to the latter that ,fThere are some bitter pills to swallow, the cockade, the alterations of the Char­ ter, the act of placing it under the sauvegarde of the National Guard, the tone assumed by La Fayette. However, the best chance of peace is to swallow them all** (Loc. ci t ., quoting Wellington to Aberdeen, August 12, 1830, Welling­ t o n ^ Despatches, III, p. 157).

67

August 27, 1830, warrants close attention, for it is one of the most notable of British state documents* Beginning with the statement that non-interference in the internal affairs of France was the course best cal­ culated to preserve the peace of Europe, Aberdeen added that

11the

sound doctrine is laid down that recognition, if

it is likely to promote general peace and stability, should not be refused because we disapprove of the means whereby a government has obtained power.1* The Foreign Secretary reviewed British obligations under the Treaty of Paris, 1815, especially with reference to the obligation to act in concert if the same revolutionary principles of the last usurpation should again convulse France, then stated his opinion of the 1830 revolt to the effect that * * • the object aimed at, was the confirmation of the order of things in France, founded on the mainte­ nance of the Royal Authority, and of the Constitutional Charter. The danger intended to be guarded against O y the Treaty of Paris] was the overthrow of this order of things by revolutionary principles under some form or other. With a bold frankness, Aberdeen admitted that the 1830 revolution might possibly endanger the principles and provisions of the treaties of Vienna and Paris, but de­ cided nonetheless "that we should studiously abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of France* 11 With equal frankness, Aberdeen admitted the obligation, moral at least, to act in union with other signatories of the

68 Treaty of Paris regarding prance, but in apologizing for the unilateral action of recognizing Louis Philippe, the Foreign secretary remarked that ftThe peculiar situation of Great Britain and even the interests of the Alliance itself, must in the present conjuncture, in some degree influence His Majesty1s decision.w Aberdeen recalled the willingness of Prussia and Austria to join Britain in maintaining a neutral attitude, neatly clinching a point with the comment that It is difficult to imagine that the Governments who are prepared scrupulously to abstain from all inter­ ference with the affairs of Prance, should hesitate to acknowledge the Sovereign who has been placed upon the French Throne. This recognition appears to be the natural, and even the necessary consequence of the policy which has been adopted. In an enlargement upon the reasoning behiid Aberdeen* s decision to recognize Louis Philippe with such promptness and despatch, the circular concluded with the following justifies tions: Our hopes of peace are mainly founded on the prudence and moderation of character of the Duke of Orleans, pro­ vided he shall possess sufficient power to maintain him­ self in his perilous elevation. . . . His wishes and endeavours to preserve peace cannot be doubtful; but the countenance and protection of the Great Powers appear to be almost essential to his stability; certainly to his tranquil possession of the Throne. We may all lament that the legitimate claims of the Duke de Bordeaux have been set aside; and we might rea­ sonably have preferred to see the Duke of Orleans as Regent . . . during the minority of this Prince - But it must be admitted that . . . it is to the Duke of Orleans alone . . . that we can look with any degree of confid-

69 ence for the preservation of order and tranquility in Prance* Without at present inquiring into the nature of his title or his claims, it is not to be doubted that the danger of all the revolutionary evils against ifihich it is the object of the Allied Powers to protect Europe would be greatly increased, if any hostile feeling should be exhibited towards the new King; or even if any doubt or hesitation should be apparent in recogni­ zing his authority* Under these circumstances, and influenced by these considerations, His Majesty has determined to acknow­ ledge the Duke of Orleans as King of the French. His Majesty has felt also, that in coming to this determina­ tion, and to enhance its value, the recognition should be made promptly, frankly and cordially. * . ♦ 9 Despite the considerable rationalization found in Aberdeen*s circular, the point to be emphasized is that the July Revolution offered a chance of cooperation with France, and Aberdeen “desired to exploit it for all it was worth.“50 The timely invocation of an ostensibly de facto policy of recognition in this case proved an efficient instrumentality for the promotion of British foreign relations.

As one

authority has remarked in commenting upon Aberdeen1s clear­ sightedness, “Quickness of decision had given him, at no cost, the credit of a friendly gesture; and he led the great Chancelleries of Europe in the recognition of Louis Philippe.1*5!

49

Fore3-gn Office» 65/184.

50 Cecil, 51

033.

cit., p. 109.

Ibid., pp. 109-10.

70 5.

THE INDEPENDENCE OP TEXAS (1836-1842)

Pew questions of recognition have been so replete with a complexity of motives as has that of the British in relation to Texas*

Although other factcr s besides those

of primary diplomatic importance played a decisive part in the formulation of British policy regarding Texas, it is the intention of the author to give a brief account of the considerations of high diplomacy which made for the deter­ mination of British relations with the Texan Republic, while reserving for a subsequent chapter the study of some of the other factors* The British have had a habit of adopting particular traditional policies, many of which have considerably embarrassed England in some of its attempts to pursue an impartial, de facto theory of recognition.

Among these

traditional policies has been one of close alliance with, and protection of, Portugal— a policy which, as has al­ ready been seen, obviously complicated the question of Brazilian recognition.

A second example, especially

dominant in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was that of being an unofficial— if often uninvited-guarantor of the territorial integrity of Turkey, despite the rather glaring inconsistency of British intervention on behalf of Greek Independence in the second decade of the nineteenth century.

A third, which grew out of the

71 Independence of the Spanish American colonies, was one of being the loyal champion and privileged advisor of the new Latin American states, particularly Mexico* The special consideration for Mexico on the part of the British originated in the fertile mind of George Can­ ning. 52

Perhaps the first indication of Canning*s Mexican

policy is’found in an early memorandum urging British re­ cognition of the Spanish American states, wherein the Foreign Secretary stated: I believe we now have the opportunity (but it may not last long) of opposing a powerful barrier to the influence of the U.S. by an amicable connection with Mexico, which from its position must be either sub­ servient to or jealous of the U.S. In point of popu­ lation and resources, it is at least equal to all the rest of the Spanish colonies; and may naturally ex­ pect to take the lead in its connections with the powers of Europe. 53 In a burst of enthusiasm immediately after Great Britain had decided upon recognizing the Spanish American states, Canning further revealed the motives behind his Mexican policy in a letter stating that The thing is done. . . . The Yankees will shout in triumph; but it is they who lose most by our decision. The great danger of the time - a danger which the policy of the European System would have fostered, was a

52 por a good account of this development of British policy, see Harold Temperley, !lThe Later American Policy of George Canning,’* American Historical Review, 11:779-97, 1906. 53

Ibid., pp. 781-82.

72 division of the World into European and American, Repub­ lican and Monarchical; a league of worn-out Govts,, on the one hand, and of youthful and stirring Rations, with the United States at their head, on the other. We slip in between; and plant ourselves in Mexico. The United States have gotten the start of us in vain; and we link once more America to Europe, Six months more and the mischief would have been d o n e . 54 It is with this background of a policy of supporting Mexico as a barrier against the United States that the British were confronted with the Texas movement for, and de facto establishment of, independence from Mexico.55 Apprehensions as to the ultimate designs of the United States with reference to Texas naturally followed in Great Britain, and were even manifested in the House of Commons, where one of the members on August 5, 1836, em.phasized the dangers to Britain involved in the annexation of Texas by the United States and urged the government even to come to the aid of Mexico.56

The British government,

however, showed a marked tendency to be even less a friend

54 £ 2£* 55 The Texas revolution occurred during 1835-36. On March 2, 1836, the Texans promulgated a declaration of in­ dependence, and on April 21, 1836, effective Mexican resis­ tance to the Texan secession collapsed with the defeat and capture of Santa Anna at the Battle of San Jacinto (A. Curtis Wilgus, The Development of Hispanic America, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941, p. 706}. 56 a good account of the House of Commons debate over Texas on August 5, 1836, is to be found in isphriam D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1&I6), pp. 16-17.

73 of Mexico on this occasion than it had been of Portugal or Spain in the previous decade*

It could more easily afford

to antagonize Mexico, for while Portugal and Spain had the Hdly Alliance to turn to to offset the British, Mexico*s only practical alternative was the United States, which at the time was hardly an alternative at all since Ameri­ can sympathies were quite boldly on the side of the Texans. Thus despite the traditional aspects of Britain*s Mexican policy, the causes which evoked it, detailed in the Canning memoranda cited above, did not proscribe the alternative of turning against Mexico and of supporting Texas as long as the possibility of Mexico*s turning to the United States was so slim.

This was especially true

when the British in 1838 came to the decision that the Mexicans would in all probability never be able to re­ conquer Texas.

It was this assumption that played a most

important part in the determination of British policy toward the Texan Republic.57

^phe evolution of British

57 In a despatch which became the pivot for the reversal of British policy, the British char g 6 to Mexico declared himself in favor of the recognition of Texas on the grounds that Mexico could not possibly reconquer Texas, that Texas, if recognized, might perhaps do some­ thing for English creditors (in contrast to the Irrespon­ sible Mexican regimes), and that as long as any hope existed in Mexico of Texan recovery, there would be disorders and disturbances within Mexico itself (Ibid., p. 24, quoting Foreign Office, Mexico, 114, AshburnSam to Palmerston, June 24, 1838).

policy is admirably summarized in the following quotation: Thus, although at first the government of Great Britain appeared to be desirous of seeing Mexico re­ conquer Texas, by the close of 1838 it decided that reconquest would be extremely difficult, if not im­ possible. Thereafter it held that further continu­ ation of hostilities between Texas and Mexico would result in injury to British interests, which had now come to be important to both countries. Accordingly, the Foreign Office undertook to mediate between the combatants and to persuade Mexico to recognize her revolting province, although England herself delayed recognition until 1842. . . .58 Although the British themselves abstained from an acknowledgment of Texas for nearly four years after that date to support the futile claims of Mexico as to

Texas.

50

Palmerston, however, was ready to checkmate any expansion­ ist schemes of the United States by a deliberate recogni­ tion of Texan independence as early as 1837, regardless of the consequences to Anglo-Mexican relations which might thereby result .5 1

Palmerston*s policy was in a way identi

j # Fred Rippy, Historical Evolution of Hispanic America (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1940), pi 3891 59 por reasons behind this delay, see Chapter IV. 65 It has been observed that under Palmerston Brit ain favored an independent Texas openly and at some risk to Anglo-Mexican relations, but that Aberdeen was slow, anxious to be just, and desirous of avoiding any rupture with Mexico (Adams, op. cit., p. 79). Palmerston, however, became increasingly— if mistakenly— confident that American annexation plans were unlikely to meet success, and thus delayed recognition of the Texas Republic (Ibid., p. 19).

75 cal to that of Canning in its emphasis upon a strong buffer state as a barrier against the southward expansion of the United States.

The difference was simply that while Can­

ning saw in Mexico the buffer state, Palmerston by necessity was forced to substitute the possibility of Texas becoming that buffer state.

Palmerston was willing to go to great

lengths to help create a powerful, independent state in Texas, often making appeals to Mexico to recognize Texas on the ground that otherwise the Texans ,fmight throw themselves upon the United States for assistance, and their final incorporation with the Union might be the consequence of temporary cooperation."^ British recognition of Texas finally materialized on June 28, 1842, upon the ratification of three Texas treaties containing certain quid pro quo.

In the four year period

which had elapsed since the British had forsaken the Mexi­ can case, the question of acknowledging the independence of Texas had amassed a series of extraneous considerations for the British. It is to be recalled that before 1838 the British were prepared to recognize Texas only in the case of the emergency of having to forestall a movement for *annexation by the United States.

After 1838, the British had lulled

62 Quoted in Adams, op. cit., p. 29.

76 themselves into the eomplacent assurance that Texas would not lose its independence to the United States, even that it had no desire to do so.63

a consequence of this

assurance, the British indulged in the luxury of slowmoving negotiations with Texan agents to exact perhaps another pound of flesh in return for the desired acknowledg­ Meanwhile, Britain pressed an excessively stubborn

m e n t . ^

Mexico to recognize Texas as a means of stabilizing the situation and indirectly to help foster the Palmerston policy of making Texas a strong buffer state. British policy underwent another modification, how­ ever, with the accession of the Peel-Aberdeen Ministry in 1841, which inaugurated the policy of improving the rapidly disintegrating relations with the United States.

The cul­

mination of this new attitude was, of course, the famous Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.

While the question of

Texas or Mexico did not even provide a point for discussion between the parties, the lengthy negotiations leading up to the treaty had a definite, if indirect, effect upon British policy toward Texas. Inasmuch as the new British government had a sincere desire to cleanse the air for the Anglo-American negoti-

63 Rippy, oj>. cit., p. 390. 64

See Chapter IV.

77 ations, a deliberate policy of checkmating American policy toward Texas was out of harmony with the spirit of the occasion and would hardly have served to further the chances of settling larger issues.

The very optimism of the British

that an accord settling all issues with the United States could be reached led Aberdeen to the concL usion that to antagonize the United States by pursuing Palmerston’s policy of aiding in the creation of a powerful, independent state in Texas would handicap Britain in its negotiations with the United States.^

Aberdeen’s disappointment over the

results of the negotiations as embodied in the websterAshburton Treaty provoked him to revert to Palmerston’s policy of an independent Texas as a necessary barrier to American expansion.^ 6

was subsequent to this decision

that the formal recognition of the Texan Republic by Great Britain took place. History records that the British schemes regarding Texas failed upon the annexation of Texas to the United States in 1845, but even in failure the British manifested once again their ingenuity in making use of the power of recognition as a means of gaining their ends.

While the

functional division of this research proscribes a continu-

Adams, op. cit., p. 95. 66

Ibid., p. 96.

78 ous, unified account of the manifold ends that the British attempted to serve in employing the power of recognition In the case of Texas, it is submitted that few cases offer such a variety of goals and policies being served by the mere use of the power of recognition*

The considerations of higher

diplomacy such as the ramifications of the British Latin American policy and their effect upon the recognition policy shielded a complexity of other considerations often as vital in the determination of the question of Texan recognition. 6

.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1848

The overthrow of the July Monarchy in February, 1848, and the establishment of a provisional government under Lamartine, a bourgeois republican, was not in itself a sufficiently upsetting event to call for much more than the traditional tests of de factoism in according recognition by the British government.

Surrounding circumstances*

however, provoked Palmerston into a hasty recognition in May which violated the very conditions he had prescribed a few months earlier.

Since Palmerston*s inconsistent

decision was mainly motivated by a desire to lend a stabi­ lizing influence to France as a means of safeguarding peace in Europe as a whole, a brief survey of the case Is merited. In the words of one authority, flThe February Revolu­ tion of 1848 had the effect of a spark in a powder magazine

79 • . . revolution was in the air almost everywhere.”6 ?

Almost

immediately after the events in Prance, revolutionary out­ breaks occurred all over Germany, Italy and Central Europe. In truth it may be said that The republican infection seemed about to sweep every­ thing before it, and the conservative courts found it less possible than ever to draw the necessary distinc­ tion between the theories of red revolution and those of constitutional liberalism.6 S While the germs of revolution were spreading all over Europe, the new provisional government in prance was just barely a going concern.

The more radical, socialist pro­

letariat under the leadership of Louis Blanc had temporarily merged with the Lamartine republicans, but the coalition was extremely artificial and unstable.

Pending the election and

activities of the Constituent Assembly, the destiny of Prance was held in the balance. It is to be noted that interim of uncertainty, in­ stability and even civil war lasted from February to Decem­ ber, 1848, when the presidential elections under the new constitution were held, and when the life of the much harassed provisional government came to an end.

Although

Palmerston received the credentials of a Lamartine agent as early as March, full British recognition did not occur

Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 257. Loc. cit.

80 until an exchange of credentials in May . 6 9

Even granted

that the British delayed their recognition from February to May, conditions in France during the latter month were yet in such a deplorable state of chaos that british re­ cognition seemed a gratuity quite undeserved. The policy followed by Palmerston during the first month of the Lamartine provisional government was in the main quite traditional, except for a declared disposition in favor of Lamartine. ^ 9

In a note of March 1, Palmerston

circularized Europe with a plea for neutrality regarding France, concluding with a frank avowal of support for Lamartine in the statement that . . . it appears at present the unanimous Opinion of everything that is respectable in France • . • that the only Hope for the maintenance of internal Tranquility, and for the permanent Restoration of Order in France, lies in the Continuance, for the present at least, of M. Lamartine and his Colleagues in power, and His Majesty*s Government are persuaded that the Government of __________ fully considering the gravity of the various Interests involved in the decision which it may take, will be disposed to ab­ stain from any Course which would tend to aggravate the present condition of Things in France, and which . by exciting irritation or alarm in that country,

Smith, op. cit., p. 111. The British Jimbassador in Paris, acting unoffici­ ally, of course, hinted to Lamartine that Britain would likely recognize his government in a short time, optimistic­ ally referring to the British rule Mto recognize any form of Government which seemed to promise permanency, which maintained security within and gave no wanton cause of offence to its neighbors11 (Foreign Office, 146/341).

81 might leacl to Events by which the Peace of Europe would be broken Although Palmerston* s action in receiving the cre­ dentials o f the French agent of the Lamartine government on March 13, 1848, ordinarily would imply full recognition, Palmerston still refused to issue new credentials to Lord Normanby, the British plenipotentiary in France, explaining to Normanby in a despatch of March 15 that the Queen could not address letters to any government . . . that is not, ostensibly at least, established as a Permanent Government, and although the National Assembly has determined that the general form of Govern­ ment in France shall be a Republic, yet it has not hitherto decided what specific kind of Republican Institutions France is to have, nor what Officer or Officers shall, as invested with the Executive Author­ ity of the State, be the permanent Organ through which the Diplomatic and International intercourse of France with other countries shall be carried on. ^ The tenor of the above despatches hardly harmonizes with the actual recognition of the French government some two months later.

Nothing had occurred in France in the

meantime to justify a recognition based upon the conditions of an established regime set forth in the despatch of March 15.

If anything, the future of France was even less pre­

dictable; a constitution was hot framed until after the riots of June 24-26.

Throughout May and June France was in

^

Foreign Office, 146/328.

72

Foreign Office, 146/331.

82 chaos, with no sign or stability and permanence in sight. “But,” as one authority remarks, Mthe disorders in Paris did not deflect Palmerston from his policy of according early recognition. **^3 It is evident from the above despatches that British recognition of the Lamartine government was a gratuitous gesture of support which the British government had antici­ pated for months, but which it had hoped to give without vio­ lating the traditional prerequisites.

Since the Lamartine

regime, however, proved itself quite unable to meet the tests of recognition, Palmerston made an exception to them in the hope that by extending recognition anyhow the Lamartine government would gain the necessary stability for survival. It was the alternative to control by the Lamartine faction which goaded Palmerston into action.

A more radical

regime would not only have endangered Anglo-French relations, but would have gravely threatened the peace of Europe by inspiring the restless revolutionaries all over the con­ tinent.

Herein, at least, was a case of recognition so

deeply devoted to the ends of quieting a restless contin­ ent of revolutionaries that Palmerston was even willing to abandon his own standards in order to wield the power of recognition for a greater cause.

Smith, op. cit., p. 111.

Again the British

proved that at times the ends of recognition were of greater concern than the standards* 7.

THE ANNEXATION OP BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1908-1909) While this and the following case, that of the Aus­

trian Anschluss in 1938, are not linked as one study, cer­ tain interesting analogies between the two cases enhance the value of reviewing them together*

Besides the fact of

a certain geographical analogy, both incidents are signifi­ cant as stepping stones in a path which led to general European war; both possessed the attributes of semi­ conquest; both involved the violation of treaty stipula­ tions, which lent color to charges of illegality— thereby seeming to imply a moral, if not legal, obligation of nonrecognition*

The great distinction between the two cases,

on the other hand, is that while the British government was able to make its acknowledgment conditional in the former case, thus asserting an influence in the affairs of Europe, it found itself obliged in the latter to go no further than a futile protest*

The.distinction is a commentary not only

upon the relatively greater cleverness of Nazi Germany, but also upon the relatively less Influence of the more recent British governments* The Interest of the British government in the Bos­ nian crisis of 1908-09 was greatly implemented by the

84 London Protocol of 1871, which provided that • . . it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable a r r a n g e m e n t .*74 Since the London Protocol definitely had in mind the engagements of the powers as embodied in the Treaty of Paris of 1856,75 a precedent for barring any changes made by uni­ lateral action was conveniently provided for by the insis­ tence of Austria-Hungary that the Treaty of San Stefano, imposed upon Turkey by the victorious Russians in 1878, was invalid because it modified the Treaty of Paris without the assent of the other signatories.76

The Dual Monarchy was

ably seconded on this point by Disraeli, and thus

to the

great humiliation of the Tsar, the powers proceeded to

74 British and Foreign State Papers, LXI, 1870-1871, p. 1198. ibid., pp. 1193 et. seq. The signatories to the London Protocol were Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey. one authority writes that on February 3, 1878, ,fAustria, indignant at the disposal of Bosnia and Herze­ govina in a manner contrary to what was believed to be the promise of the Czar in the previous July, notified Russia that she would consider null any agreement between the belligerents which should modify existing treaties and which should affect the interests of Kurope, and especially those of Austria-Hungary, unless it were submitted to a con­ ference of all the powers” (Stephen P. H. Duggan, The Eastern Question, a Study in Diplomacy, Studies in History, Economics and public Law, Columbia University, Vol. XIV, Ho. 3. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1902, pp. 139-40.

85 denude Russia of1 its spoils of war at the Congress of Berlin.*^ Despite this colorful precedent, which Austria it­ self had been so instrumental in establishing, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Aerenthal, announced to an unexpect­ ant world on October 3, 1908, the annexation of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Austro-Hungarian E m p i r e . T h e fact of the matter is, however, that the Austrian announcement did not greatly change the status quo, for in 1878 the Congress of Berlin had given to Austria the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina; to all intents and purposes, the two provinces had been in the possession of Austria ever since that t i m e . ^ While the Austrian action was quite obviously ir­ regular and violative of international commitments, the probability of any serious objection was much less than

77 Ibid., pp. 143-44. 7® One authority remarks that this announcement, and the simultaneous announcement by Prince Ferdinand of the independence of Bulgaria, ncame like a thunder-clap. They were unknown to, and apparently unsuspected by, England or France. They took Izvolsky by surprise In some sense, they aroused a profound emotion in Serbia*1 (A. J* Grant and Har­ old Temperley, Europe in the nineteenth and Twentieth Cen­ turies (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), pi 4. *79 Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878, by Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey, empowered Austria-Hungary to 11occupy and administer11 Bosnia and Herzegovina (British and Foreign State Papers, LIX> 1877-1878, p. 758).

appeared on the surface, for as one authority has effectively summarized it; By various agreements Austria-Hungary1s right to annex the provinces at her own discretion had already been recognized. She had secured Russia1s consent in 1876 and again in 1881, Germany*s approval in 1881, and Italy*s promise (1887 and 1905) that their annexa­ tion would not be considered a change in the Balkan status quo in the meaning of the terms of the Triple Alllance.BO While the commitments of these powers to Austria still did not guarantee their silence or disinterested­ ness, 81 a further fact had a tendency to quiet any fears Aerenthal might have had as to the ramifications of annexa­ tion.

Unilateral violations of the Treaty of Berlin had

been so frequently committed by practically every signatory-Great Britain included--that by 1908 the London Protocol

BO p. j^ee Benns, European History Since 1870 (New York: P. S. Crofts and Co., 1941), p. 340. Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, protested quite loudly over the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not because he objected to the annexation per se, for he himself had suggested it to Aerenthal in a memorandum on June 19, 1908, and at the famous meeting of the two diplomats at Buchlau, September 15, 1908, a mutualaid arrangement was made whereby each agreed to support the other*s respective objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Straits. Aerenthal, however, acted before Izvolsky was prepared, and the fait accompli threatened to deprive Russia of further support from Austria for its policy regarding the Straits. Thus, since Russia*s chances of gaining its objec­ tive was materially lessened, Izvolsky was determined that Aerenthal should not realize his. For an excellent account of this aspect of the Bosnia crisis, see G. P. Gooch, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,*1 The Cambridge History of Brit­ ish Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, 1866-1919, pp. 402'-12.

87 appeared so debilitated by infractions that such a slight change in the Berlin Treaty as that of making de jure such a long-standing de facto control over Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed hardly sufficient cause to bestir the conscience of Europe. It is this background of dilatory unconcern on the part of the powers, especially of Great Britain, that makes significant the sudden British defense of the London Proto­ col upon the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The

unanticipated refusal of the British Foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to acknowledge the annexation without fuss seems to have belied a deeper cause than mere respect for the integrity of two European treaties which in the past had already been brushed aside with such impunity.

On the

other hand, the reluctance of Grey was not provoked by any special distaste for seeing Austria entrenched in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for in Grey’s own words, flTo us the terri­ torial changes were indifferent; it mattered not to us that Austria should annex instead of merely occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . .1,83

8^ Too numerous to be recorded herein, the infrac­ tions of the Treaty of Berlin include those committed by Bulgaria, Russia, Turkey, France, Great Britain and Austria. Comment on these infractions may be found in William H. Dawson, ^Forward Policy and Reaction,” The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, 1866-1919, pp. 143-44. 83 Viscount Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), Vol. I, p. 169.

88 On October 5, 1908, however, Grey sent a despatch to the British Plenipotentiary in Vienna, instructing him to protest the Austrian annexation on the grounds of a breach of international obligations.

The text of the despatch,

which includes the British condition of recognition of the annexation, is as follows: ♦ . . H i s Excellency [Aerenthal] should be reminded that Austria-Hungary is a party to the Treaty of London, and consequently to the Protocol of January 17, 1871, which is attached to it. In this it Is stipulated that the engagements into which any power has entered can only be broken or modified with the full assent of the Contracting Parties, and after a friendly agreement has been arrived at. a deliberate violation or alteration of the Berlin Treaty, undertaken without previous con­ sultation with the other Powers, of which in this case Turkey is the most affected, could never be approved or recognized by His Majesty*s Government. This should be represented to the Austrian Government, and you should impress upon them how necessary it is that their decision to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina should be reconsidered.^4 Even many of the British themselves, generally quite complacently satisfied with explanations based upon the moral plane of the integrity of international commitments, evidenced a degree of mystification at the Foreign Secre­ tary* s stand on the two treaties.

In Parliament, July 2 2,

1909, Sir Charles Dilke felt prompted to suggest that the title of Great Britain and Russia to remonstrate was singularly weak, that the Treaty of Berlin had been violated over and over again, by Turkey no less than by the powers,

84 Ibid., pp. 169-70.

89 and that nobody imagined that Austria was entrusted with a purely temporary occupation of the provinces— which she had actually taken over on the proposal of Great Britain in the first place.

Dilke concluded with the warning that Britain

was not sufficiently interested to make it wise for her to play a leading part, or to allow Russia to force her too

‘

far in the direction of an Interference certain to encounter resistance and doomed to failure.®® The key to the explanation of British policy, however, was to be found in Turkey.

In July, 1908, the revolt of the

Young Turks ushered in a regime dedicated to reform.

The

passing of the decadent, corrupt and even vicious system which had been the despair of Christian Europe was a welcome relief to most states, and perhaps even more so to Great Britain than any of the others.

Sir Edward Grey indicated

these sentiments on Turkey in a speech on October 7, 1908, in which he stated that Our relations with the Government of Turkey have changed from friction and remonstrance to a very deep sympathy. . . . Hatred, strife and oppression have been swept away, and have been replaced by fair-play, peace and goodwill. Never in history has there been, I think, a change more sudden and beneficient.®® It was this sympathy and hope that Grey had for the new Turkey that inspired his refusal to allow such a blow

®® The debate is summarized in Gooch, op* cit., p. 411. ®6 Ibid., p. 404.

90 to Turkish prestige as the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina to fall without affording the Young Turks an opportunity to save face.

Referring to the Young Turk Revolution and

the relationship of the Bosnian crisis to it, Grey wrote in his memoirs; I sympathized with the enthusiasm fin Turkey], and was keen that the new order should have every chance. • • • I was still in the stage of hope and sympathy with young Turks, when, in the autumn of 1908, Austria announced that she had changed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into annexation. Turkey was indeed to be given the Sanjak as compensation, but Austria* s act and decision were quite arbitrary. Tur­ key had not been consulted, or asked to consent, and the change was therefore a blow to Turkish prestige. A cruel blow it seemed to the budding hopes of better things in Turkey. S'? Thus it is seen that the action of the British govern­ ment in withholding its acknowledgment of the annexation was basically motivated not by the mere inclination to rescue the integrity of a treaty, nor by an opposition to the annexation per se, but by a desire to give the Turkish re­ volution every chance of success.

As one authority remarks;

It was above.all from this angle that Grey con­ demned Austria-Hungary*s annexation of Bosnia . . . as likely to compromise the reforming party in Turkey, bring other claimants into the field against her, and so precipitate partition and perhaps a general war.88 The British withheld recognition of the annexation as a means of gaining compensation for Turkey; holding out

^

Grey, op. cit., pp. 168-69.

^

Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 615.

91 on the basis that any change in the Treaty or Berlin re­ quired the assent of all its signatories.

The natural

antagonism of Russia and Serbia, as well as Turkey, to the unilateral annexation was enough to neutralize the arbitrari­ ness of Austria, and an agreement of all the powers on the annexation was far less damaging a blow to Turkish prestige. The British achieved their objective, for in the end Turkey received compensation in money and recognized Austrian control over Bosnia and Herzegovina.®9

Britain,

however, held out until the last of the interested powers had acquiesced.

On the eventual recognition by Serbia,

March 31, 1909, the British themselves surrendered their opposition by an acknowledgment of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary.90 8.

THE AUSTRIAN ANSCHLUSS (1938)

While British tactics in the Bosnian crisis were re­ plete with success and evidenced a subtle use of the power of recognition, they only served to contrast the comparative bankruptcy of British diplomacy in the crisis occasioned by the annexation of Austria to the German Reich in March, 1938.

Although some variation as to the facts cannot be

®9 Grey, oj£. cit., p. 171. 90 Gooch, o p , cit., pp. 410-11.

92 denied, the two cases are as uniquely similar as British policy with regard to them was dissimilar. The immediate background of the German annexation of Austria commences, no doubt, with the meeting of the • Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, with Hitler, the German dictator, at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938. Apparently under duress, Schuschnigg was obliged as a re­ sult of the meeting to appoint three Nazis to the Austrian cabinet and to legalize Nazi activities in Austria.91

In

the words of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, The results of the meeting at Berchtesgaden was stated by the German Chancellor to be an extension of the framework of the July 1936 Agreement . . . (which Agreement] provided, inter alia, for the recognition of the independence o t Austria by Germany and the re­ cognition by Austria of the fact that she was a German state.92 The resultant infiltration of Nazi influence into the Austrian government was an ill omen for Schuschnigg. The Austrian Chancellor made a desperate move to counter the Nazis by suddenly announcing a plebiscite on March 9, hoping to evoke an anti-Nazi vote and thereby defeat any German claims as to Austria*s desire for Nazi rule.

Threats

91 For the Berchtesgaden agreement and the subse­ quent downfall of the Schuschnigg regime, see M. W. Fodor, "Finis Austriae,11 Foreign Affairs, 16:587-600, July, 1938. 92 viscount Halifax, Speeches on Foreign Policy, 1934-1939 (Londons Oxford University Press", 1940), p . 118.

93 and ultimatums from the Nazi cabinet members, Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, precipitated a crisis and forced Schuschnigg to back down. unwilling to turn back.

By then, however, the Nazis were Further demands were made, and on

the apparent threat of German occupation Schuschnigg re­ signed. ^3

By radio on the night of March 11, Schuschnigg

bowed out of the scene with the statement that . . . he wished the world to know that the President and he had yielded to force, and that Austrian troops had been instructed to oppose no resistance to German troops if and when the latter had crossed the frontier.94 On the day of Schuschnigg^ resignation, the British Ambassador to Berlin registered a protest in strong terms with the German government against such use of coercion backed by force against an Independent state in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independ­ ence.^

The reply of the German Foreign Minister, Baron

von Neurath, denied German coercion and acrimoniously suggested that *

The British Government is not within its rights In claiming the role of a protector of the Independence

93 pew doubt the actuality of direct German threats. Citing the forced resignation of Schuschnigg on March 11 upon the threats of German troop movements, the British Foreign Secretary stated that flThis fact seems to show that Germany was behind the ultimatum11 (Ibid., p. 119) 94 Ibid., p. 120. 95 Loo. cit.

94 of* Austria . . . the relations between the Reich and Austria can only be regarded as an internal affair of the German people which is no concern of third P o w e r s , 9 6 The significance of this exchange lies in the ques­ tion of Britain’s responsibility for the independence and integrity of Austria.

Despite the German denial, there is

hardly room for doubt that the status of Austria, like that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was legally unalterable except by the consent of the signatories to certain treaties, Great Britain among them. prove this contention.97

A rapid research suffices to Even that is unnecessary in view

of the fact that the British government itself staunchly denied the right of Germany and Austria to alter the status of the latter state even by the most amicable of bilateral agreements.

In evidence of this stand, the speech of Lord

Halifax to the House of Lords on March 14, 1938, included the following statements:

. cit., pp. 121-22. 97 The most important treaty in this regard was the First Geneva Protocol, signed on October 4, 1922, by Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Austria,.pro­ viding for a loan under the auspices of the League of Nations in return for which Austria “undertakes, in accord­ ance with the terms of Article 88 of the Treaty of SaintGermain, not to alienate its independence; it will abstain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagements calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence.” The full text of this Protocol may be found in Walter C. Langsam, Documents and Readings in the History of Europe since 1918 (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co".','" I9'39T, pp. 151-52.

95 I am bound at once to refute bis [von Neurath*sJ statement to the effect that His Majesty*s Government were not within their rights in interesting themselves in the independence of Austria. . . . Britain and Austria are both Members of the League, and both were signatories, as was also the German Government, of treaties which provided that the independence of . Austria was inalienable except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.93 British protests, however, were of no avail; German troops occupied Austria on March 12, and in the absence of any resistance the Anschluss between Germany and Austria was realized on the same

d a y

.99

On April 2, 1938, even before the meaningless and perfunctory "plebiscite” within the new "Greater German Reich” took place in confirmation of the Anschluss,190 Great Britain formally gave its acknowledgment of the annexation by notifying Berlin that since "Austria has ceased to exist as a sovereign and independent state," the British legation in Vienna was being converted into a Consulate-General•101 The British action was not accompanied, however, by the best of grace, for as Lord Halifax stated in his speech

98 Halifax, op. cit., pp. 122-23. ^

New York Times, March 13, 1938.

100 (piie plebiscite occurred on April 10, 1938, with the anticipated overwhelming vote favoring the Nazis. For an account of the vote, see New York Times, April 11, 1938. 101 jjew York Times, April 3, 1938.

96 to the House of Lords on March 14, 1938: In the judgment of His Majesty’s Government the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation, . . , His Majesty’s Government emphatically disapprove, as they have always dis­ approved, actions such as those of which Austria has been made the scene,102 As in the later case of Britain’s recognition of Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia, Lord Halifax was obliged to defend his government’s decision in the face of a moral obligation to refuse such an acknowledgment of the violation of international commitments to which Great Britain itself was a party.

This the Foreign Secretary did in a speech

to the House of Lords, March 16, 1938, which is quoted and paraphrased below, Halifax began by stating that Britain had never been interested In the maintenance of the status quo for Austria forever, and that his country was willing to recognize the special interests of Germany,

But, he added, ’’Britain has

been concerned to see that no changes should be made in Europe by violence, or by something approaching violence,11 Regardless of the merits or demerits of the issue from the German point of view, Many such action involving violent solution was bound to administer a most rude shock to European confidence.w The Foreign Secretary went on to state that the

102 Halifax, op. cit., p. 123.

97 framers of the peace treaties foresaw possible union between Germany and Austria, but that they also realized that such a union would cause a serious shifting of the balance of power in that part of Europe; therefore, they accordingly stipu­ lated that changes, if desired, should only be brought about after the Council of the League had carefully con­ sidered the difficulties and dangers involved.

Referring to

the immediate situation, Halifax continued: The juridical position of Austria as she existed up to a few days ago was that of an independent state which was bound by treaty not to alienate that independence without the consent of the Council of the League. That independence, in complete disregard of treaty provisions, has disappeared over night, and the world, therefore, has been presented with a fait accompli. Immediately following this review, the Foreign Sec­ retary prepared the ground for Britain1s decision with the following pessimistic statement: Nothing that the League can do can undo what has been done, and I confess that I can see no good to be gained at this juncture for the League . . . by bringing this matter before the League tribunal. Nothing short of war can put back the clock, and States Members of the League are not prepared to go to war on this issue. Thus, in the conclusion of his speech, Lord Halifax announced the policy of Great Britain by stating that His Majesty*s Government are therefore bound to re­ cognize that the Austrian state has been abolished as an international entity and is in process of being entirely absorbed into the German Reich.103

103 ibid., pp. 125-27.

98 In reviewing the two cases or Bosnia-Herzegovina and Austria, one may observe that both afforded the British the same opportunity, if not also the same moral obligation, to refuse recognition of a change brought about in violation of international treaties*

In the former crisis Great

Britain exploited the power of recognition to the utmost, using it as a weapon to safeguard the prestige and strength of the new Turkish government, as well as to check the irresponsible disregard of Austria for the obligations of international conduct. In the latter crisis, the British made an equally important use of the power of recognition by their decision to grant an acknowledgment unconditionally, despite the implication of acquiescing in an illegal action, for the purpose of keeping peace in Europe.

If in the Bosnian

crisis British policy was a sign of strength, the attitude of Britain in the Austrian crisis was more certainly a sign of weakness and the inability of the British to cope diplomati­ cally with the uncompromising determination of Nazi Germany. In both cases, however, the use of the power of recognition played a vital part in the diplomacy of Great Britain. 9.

THE ITALIAN CONQUEST OP ETHIOPIA (1938) cause celebre of all recognitions in the annals

of British diplomacy is perhaps that of the Italian conquest

99 of Ethiopia, which occurred some two years after the inva­ sion of Ethiopia by Italy.

Its significance is made out­

standing not because of the mere acknowledgment of the fruits of

aggression,

1°4 but because of the dramatic back­

ground of a positive, collective non-recognition, in which the British themselves played so active a role. It is not the purpose of the author to take up the story of non-recognition as it was employed by the League of Nations in the Ethiopian dispute; reference to certain aspects of it as they touched upon British policy In 1938 towards Italy and the conquest of Ethiopia, however, Is essential to the presentation of motives leading the Brit­ ish to retrace their dramatic steps by recognizing a situ­ ation that, two or even one year before, was so preeminently “unrecognizable. 11

104 A common misconception of the historical scope of the power— or at least of the use— of recognition has pertained to territories acquired through annexation, either by means of conquest or otherwise. Historically, the ex­ pansion of a state has not been the subject of recognition by other powers. As one authority remarks, “Nobody 1recog­ nized1 the annexations effected by the United States in 1846 and 1899 . . . nor, it is believed, was any nation asked to frecognize* the annexation of the Boer Republic in 1901. The idea that annexation requires express recognition of the expansion is an essential part of the post-war formulae designed to hold down the status quo" (Edwin M. Borchard, “The Boctrine of Hon-Recognltion, Legal Problems in the Par Eastern Conflict. Institute of Pacific Relations Inquiry Series. Hew York: International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, p. 161.

100

In the eyes of the British and undoubtedly the vast majority of the nations of the world, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia was a criminal act.

Since both states were

members of the League of Nations, they were bound by Article XII not to resort to war until three months after any one of three peaceful methods of solution had yielded a deci­ sion. 105

jn October, 1935, both the Council and the Assembly

of the League indicted Italy for its action taken in viola­ tion of Article XII, and in the same month adopted five proposals for the purpose of restraining and punishing Italy.106 However serious was the effect of the League sanc­ tions upon Italy, it was not enough to prevent the eventual conquest of Ethiopia.107

The failure of sanctions has been

the subject of unending controversy ever since, but it is generally conceded that the reluctance of certain League members to aggravate Italy further by adding an embargo of more vital materials such as oil to the list of sanctions

105 por a text of the Covenant, see John E. Harley, Documentary Textbook on International Relations (Los Angeles: Suttonhouse, 1934), pp. 61-73. 106 An excellent account of the League sanctions against Italy is found in Arnold J. Toynbee, Abyssinia and Italy. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1935 (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), Vol. II. 107 The annexation of Ethiopia to Italy was pro­ claimed on May 5, 1936 (New York Times, May 6, 1936).

101

contributed to their failure,108

It is at this point, how­

ever, that the germ of Italian appeasement, if not forgive^ ness, was born--born out of the necessity of opposing an even greater threat to the peace of the world, the spectre of a reawakened and rearmed Germany. The French fear of the new Hitler Germany had from the very beginning of the Ethiopian invasion provoked an embarrassing reluctance on the part of the French statesmen to alienate Italy over the more remote question of Ethiopia, and thereby drive Italy into the arms of Hitler.100

Ger­

m a n y ^ remilitarization of the Rhineland, announced on March 7, 1936, put a definite end to the half-hearted attempts of the French to participate in schemes of the League of Nations to increase the punishment meted out to

108 For a critical account of the failure of sanc­ tions see M. J. Bonn, ”How Sanctions Failed,” Foreign Af­ fairs^ 15:350-61, January, 1937. 100 Enumerating various reasons for the French objec­ tions to sanctions, one authority concluded that "Finally, and always bearing Immediate security In mind, the French who fear the possibility of this or that German initiative that might imperil the peace of Europe, view with displea­ sure the moral and material weakening which might result for Italy from a too strict application of sanctions” (Regis de Vibraye, ”France, Germany and Abyssinia,” Contemporary Review, 149:264, March, 1936). Another authority records that "Unless (Britain) gave a pledge to follow in Europe the course it wanted France to adopt in Africa, Premier Laval was reluctant to jettison Italy, which he regarded as a valuable ally against Germany” (Vera Micheles Bean, ”The League and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis,” Foreign Policy Reports, 11:214-24, November 6, 1935).

102

Italy,^'0 much to the disgust of the British, who yet con­ sidered that the Italian threat to their Mediterranean and Near Eastern interests was too great to be disregarded in face of the possibility of later threats to the status quo emanating from Germany. The French fears, however, soon materialized, for prodded by world censure, Mussolini responded to the timely gestures of friendship from Germany.

In the summer of 1936

the outstanding issues in dispute between Italy and Germany were settled, the wRome-Berlin Axis11 was created, and Ger­ many joined with Italy in supporting the rebels in the Span­ ish civil war which had just broken out.ttl It is this background of the rise of Hitler, the effect of sanctions in driving Italy into the German camp, and the collaboration of the two fascist powers in Spain that finally drove the British to sell their acknowledgment of the Ethiopian conquest for a price, in the hope that the

H O One authority writes that wEden, in the first week of March, 1936, announced that his government was pre­ pared to impose an oil embargo if other League members would join. . . . But all prospect of French support was now out of the question, since Hitler had availed himself of the God-given moment to denounce Locarno and reoccupy thee Rhineland. That France would now risk hostilities with Italy was obviously Impossible. Flandin . . . tempered and post­ poned, still hoping to placate Mussolini” (William Orton, Twenty Years1 Armistice, 1918-1938, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, inc*7 PP* 181-2).

Ill jjew York Times, October 26, 1936.

103 resultant understanding would not only settle the particular causes of Anglo-Italian friction, but would also open the door again for a more positive friendship, thereby minimiz­ ing the danger of a Europe uncompromisingly split into re­ visionist and anti-revisionist camps. The complete realization of Italian aims in Ethiopia meanwhile promoted a new quandary within the League as to whether sanctions should be abandoned as having failed in their announced purpose, or be continued indefinitely as a means of forcing Italy to disgorge--or at least to serve as a painful reminder to Italy of her crime.

Prompted by a

more realistic attitude on the part of Great Britain, the Assembly on July 4, 1936, decided to abandon collective action* While the effect of the Assembly decision was to release member states from whatever obligations they had incurred In the attempt to impose sanctions upon Italy, opinion and practice differed as to the further implication

112 ipk© recommendation, passed by the Assembly on July 4, 1936, was that MThe Assembly, Taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on the subject of the situation arising out of the ItaloEthiopian dispute; Recalling the previous findings and decisions in connection with this dispute: Recommends that the Coordination committee should make all necessary pro­ posals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them In execution of Article 16 of the Covenant” (League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 151, p. 66).

104 that member states were also free to acknowledge the conquest on their own initiative*113

It is difficult to know which

claim the British would have made had they been free to choose, hut the insistence of the Italians that the League itself renounce the obligation, even though it might only be implied, of continued collective non-recognition seems to have formed a prerequisite to an Italian understanding with Great Britain. It is at this juncture that the Anglo-Italian negoti­ ations began, leading up to the comprehensive agreement of A£>rll 16, 1938, for the settlement of all matters at issue between Great Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean, North­ eastern Africa and the Middle East.H^

It is evident from

the text of the pact that Italy coveted recognition, for in commitments the Italians paid dearly enough.US

113 For a discussion of this point, see H. Lauterpacht, r,The Principle of Mon-Recognition In International LQgal Problems in the Par Eastern Conflict, p. 137* The text of the Anglo-Italian Accord may be found In the Mew York Times, April 17, 1938. 115 An American editorial cites the Italian agreement to respect the integrity of the Arab kingdom of Yemen and to acknowledge a British protectorate along the Arabian coast, and surmises that f,It begins to look as if the Brit­ ish get more out of it than Mussolini; If they can induce the Roman empire-builder to enter a Mediterranean partner­ ship, they will strengthen their own position in this area while protecting themselves against the upstart Power most likely to dispute their claims” (Mew York Times, April 15, 1938).

105 When the agreements finally reached the question of recognition, two phases of the issue were determined upon: first, the question of what the League of Nations might do, and second, the question of British recognition itself. Fortunately for the negotiations, the British and Italian views harmonized as to the relationship of these two phases, for the British conscience was quite unable to yield a simple recognition without previously preparing the road at Geneva.

116 British took great care, however, to empha­ size that their action in consulting the League was not an admission of any obligation to do so. In a parliamentary debate on the &nglo-Italian Pact, May 2, 1938, Chamberlain reasserted the principle that "The act of recognition re­ mains within the sovereign rights of each individual state. In other words, so far as this country is concerned, the time and circumstances of recognition remain within our own discretion" (New York Times, May 3, 1938). Explaining the British attitude of consulting the League before making a decision regarding recognition, Lord Halifax in a speech before the Council of the League, May 12, 1938, stated that "His Majesty1s Government were influ­ enced by the consideration that, while no express obligation had been assumed by Members of the League, yet, in view of the common action which Members of the League had agreed to take in the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia, the final recognition of Italy’s position in the latter country by one Member of the League was a matter of concern to other Mem­ bers.” Carefully avoiding any untoward implications of such a statement, Halifax added that "His Majesty’s Government do not think that the various steps which the League has taken in the course of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute can be held to constitute any binding obligations upon Member States to withhold recognition until a unanimous decision has been taken." The British view, Halifax concluded, was that Hthe situation is one in which Members of the League may, without, disloyalty, take such action at such time as may seem to them appropriate" (Halifax, op. cit., p. 152).

106 The speech made by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, to the Council of the League on May 12, 1938, well deserves attention because of the exceedingly delicate nature of the British arguments for recognition before the very body that had been the instrumentality for world-wide censure of the Italian action.

It is difficult to imagine

a task more replete with the dangers of hypocrisy.

The

tenor of the speech, however, merits its place as the polished work of a deserving statesman, as may be seen in the following excerpts: Halifax immediately stated that by recognition, Great Britain did not mean to condone Italian action.

f,0n this

issue, u he declared, "we have declared our judgment in plain terms and we cannot go back upon it.fl The Foreign Secretary then recalled that Italy's conquest of Ethiopia was by then an established fact, stating that The conclusion follows that the only means by which the Italian position could be challenged by League Members would be by concerted military action— in other words, by going to war. Such action is unthinkable . . . It was, indeed, by implication deliberately excluded by the Assembly resolution of July 4, 1936. With no little courage, Halifax continued by taking up the question of principle involved in any action designed to facilitate recognition of the Italian conquest.

Stating

that he could well understand the reluctance of many to im­ pinge upon the principle of non-recognition of 11any situa­ tion, treaty or agreement which was brought about by means

107 contrary to the Covenant,11

Halifax nonetheless could not

share their view, for . . • when, as here, two ideals are in conflict— on the one hand the ideal of devotion, unflinching but un­ practical, to some high purpose; on the other, the ideal of a practical victory for peace--I cannot doubt that the stronger claim is that of peace• Halifax then rose to the climax of his speech with the rhetorical passage to the effect that In an imperfect world the indefinite maintenance of a principle evolved to safeguard international order, without regard to the circumstances in which it has to be applied, may have the effect merely of increasing international discord and friction and of contributing to those very evils which it was designed to prevent. This is the position which His Majesty* s Government feel bound to adopt in the case of Ethiopia* Toward the end of his speech, Lord Halifax stated that it was the opinion of His Majesty’s Government that ♦ . . for practical purposes Italian control over virtually the whole of Ethiopia has become an estab­ lished fact, and that sooner or later, unless we are prepared by force to alter it we are forever to live in an unreal world, that fact, whatever be our judg­ ment on it, will have to be acknowledged. If this is so . . . it is plain that the issue between those who would be disposed to take action by way of recognition of facts earlier than those who would take the same action later is one of political judgment and not part of the eternal and immutable moralities. Tbe speech concluded with the oft-quoted statement that

This wording, as well as the principle itself, originated in the 1932 League resolution concerning Manchu kuo, and by implication carried over to the Ethiopian con­ quest. For a discussion of the 1932 League resolution, see Chapter III.

108 His Majesty*s Government do not ask for decisions on questions of principle, nor do they suggest that the Council should impose on any Member of the League a particular course of action. They hope, however, that Members of the Council will share their opinion that the question of the recognition of Italy*s position in Ethiopia is one for each Member of the League to decide for itself in the light of its own situation and its. own obligations. While it

is not the purpose of this chapter to dis­

cuss the action

of the League of Nations, it is of interest

to observe that

in one of the most unique and subtle of

procedures, the

League gave its assent to the British posi­

tion on the day after the Halifax speech. The Halifax speech made it quite clear that the Brit­ ish were bartering recognition— even of an outstandingly illegal conquest in terms of the newer international law-for the dubious causes of peace and the re-establishment of a less dangerous balance of power.

It evidenced an attempt

to insure a new status quo based upon the acceptance of a change in the old.

The question, however, as to whether

the British move was inspired by more exclusive national interests or by a transcending desire for a generalized peace will, of course, remain imponderable, at least for

Halifax,

0 £.

cit., pp. 152-7.

119 without even a vote, the president of the Council simply announced that the Members of the League seemed to be in accord with the policy of the British government as stated by Lord Halifax at the meeting of the Council on May 12 (New York Times, May 14, 1938).

109 some years to come.120 If the Italians were obligated to pay for this inter­ vention of Britain with the League of Nations on behalf of their new empire, they still found that the question of British recognition per se had other conditions attached, and these had reference to the entirely extraneous matter of the Spanish civil war. Briefly tracing the background for the British con­ ditions of recognition, one should recall that new inter­ national developments centering in the Spanish civil war had become of primary concern to the British for some months.

The clear-cut ideological division between the

Spanish factions found the fascist powers, especially Italy, committed to the insurgent cause so deeply that a general European war threatened on the horizon.

Again the

danger of international war prompted the British to join prance and others In setting aside the more traditional rules of international law, this time by an offer to bar­ gain non-support of the loyalist regime--clearly an un­ warranted sacrifice of loyalist rights— for a corresponding non-support of the Franco insurgents on the part of the

120 The Geneva correspondent of the New York Times seems to have been inclined towards the former conclusion by commenting that it was "clear that national interests and the obligations of the Anglo-Italian Accord came before League resolutions and the Covenant11 (New York Times, May 14, 1938).

110

fascist powers.*^1 The non-intervention agreement proved highly unsatis­ factory to all concerned, but was continued in the absence of any better plan.

On October 2, 1937, however, a Franco-

British note to Italy revealed the dominant source of fric­ tion by appealing for the withdrawal of foreign nationals from the Spanish armies.122

Italy managed to postpone

meeting the issue, thereby gaining time for Franco to win a decisive victory still supported by Italian troops,125 by demanding a reciprocal recognition of Franco’s belligerency. The entire negotiations soon bogged down In a jungle of procedural and preliminary detail, however, much to the satisfaction of the fascist powers, who no doubt had planned it that way in the first place.12^

121 por an enlightening discussion of this unusual arrangement, see Vernon O ’Rourke, ’’Recognition of Belliger­ ency and the Spanish War,11 American Journal of International Law, 31:398-413, July, 1937. See also Norman J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife (New York: THe Macmillan Company, 1939), pp. 53-120. 122 New York Times, October 3, 1937. 125 In October, 1937, an official Italian agency admitted that 40,000 Italians were aiding Franco (New York Times, October 14, 1937). Later reports variously estimated that from 16,000 to 100,000 Italians served Franco (New York Times, February 18, 1939). 124 on October 20, 1937, Italy and Germany agreed to postpone an acknowledgment of belligerent rights to Franco until after the token withdrawal of foreign troops on both sides (New York Times, October 21, 1937).

Ill The inability of the British to maneuver Italy out of Spain, even at the cost of sacrificing loyalist rights (for which the British were highly criticized), was a con­ stant irritant in Anglo-Italian relations, and quite nat­ urally led to the Inclusion of the question on the agenda for the settlement consummated on April 16, 1938.

Thus,

in the sometimes circuitous methods of diplomacy, the Brit­ ish agreed to recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, but only after a wsettlement” of the Spanish question had been reached.3-25

Although it was not explicitly stated,

the settlement quite obviously implied, In the words of a New York Times editorial, that Withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain is a condi­ tion of the imminent agreement, but from the British conservative point of view, the important ’quid pro quo* for recognition of the Ethiopian conquest is to get the Italians out of Spain and its islands when the war Is over. It was inevitable, however, that the vagueness of the British condition of recognition would provide an em­ barrassing point of attack for critics of the agreement. The debate in the House of Commons on May 2, 1938, which preceded ratification of the Anglo-Italian Accord by a vote of 316 to 108, offered fair opportunity for embittered

125 'Tke Royal Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin of international News, 15:11-13, April 23, 1938. 126 jjew York Times, April 13, 1938

112 opponents of the Governments Italian or Spanish policy--or both, as was usually the case— to harass Mr* Chamberlain with demands for a definition of the word ’’settlement•11 While the prime Minister was too far-sighted to restrict the scope of future British action by so obvious a trap, it must have been somewhat embarrassing to have been unable to define the meaning of the key word of the government 1a en­ tire Italian policy as it referred to both Ethiopia and Spain.127 The Prime Minister’s defense of the Accord brought

out, however, the link between Ethiopia and Spain which had motivated the imposition of a prerequisite to British re­ cognition of Italy’s conquest, for in Mr. Chamberlains concluding remarks were the following statements; I have always maintained that the only circumstances in which recognition could be morally justified were if it were shown to be an essential feature of a general appeasement• We could not feel that we had taken an essential step toward a general appeasement unless at the same time we could say that a Spanish settlement was within reach. That is the reason that we had made this Spanish settlement a prerequisite of the entering into force of this instrument and a prerequisite therefore of the re­ cognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia.128

127 confronted squarely with a demand from the floor of the House of Commons to define the word 11settlement,11 the Prime Minister bluntly refused to do so (New York Times, May 3, 1938). 128 Xioc. cit

113 Some seven months after the Anglo-Italian Accord had been signed, the British formally recognized King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy as “Emperor of Ethiopia.M129

Appar­

ently, but with an air of noncommittal deliberation, the British government regarded the Spanish question as suffici­ ently settled by November as to warrant performance of their end of the bargain. Thus, after three years of high tension over the question of acquiescence In and acknowledgment of the Ital­ ian conquest, the British finally yielded, but not before they had exploited the power of recognition to a degree al­ most unprecedented in the history of modern diplomacy.

Re­

gardless of whether they were motivated by selfish interests, altruistic desires, or by the more probable mixture of both, the ends that the British hoped to promote by means of the power of recognition were as profound as they were clear. In the eyes of the League powers, Italy deserved punishment for committing a wrong.

In meting out this

punishment, however, they had turned Italy into an aggrieved rebel, willing to upset the delicate balance of Europe by combining with a new, revengeful Germany, and willing to risk war by aiding a potential ally in Spain1s civil war. To the British, the continuance of an idle fiction was too

^•29 uew York Times, November 17, 1938.

114 high a price to pay Tor upholding a mere principle, when the consequences threatened the entire structure built at Ver sallies. In an effort to forestall these more serious con­ sequences, Great Britain employed the power of recognition, using it for all it was worth in order to gain the ends of policy both in Spain and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Per­

haps In the ultimate analysis, the British failed to gain these ends, but it is the opinion of the writer that this signal occasion of the use of recognition In high diplomatic bargaining was, on the contrary, amazingly replete with success, for the fact of the matter is that Italy felt it­ self obliged to accept the British conditions. The ends of British policy were to force Italy to pay a certain price for recognition. promised to pay.

Italy paid, or at least

That Italy subsequently refused to perform

In accordance with the contract is hardly a reflection upon the use of recognition in exacting the terms.

By its very

nature, recognition, once given, loses its character as a diplomatic weapon.

Since it can only be used to exact con­

ditions, not enforce them, its success must be measured in terms of the former purpose.

Enforcement is a problem of

an extraneous character, and thus need only be considered as a sequel, not as an inherent part of the effectiveness of recognition in diplomatic bargaining.

115 10,

THE FRANCO REGIME IN SPAIN (1939)

The hopes for a loyalist victory in the Spanish civil war were dashed by the end of 1938*

Although the war con­

tinued with the intermittent haphazardness of dying blows, the insurgents had established their supremacy and were mainly consolidating their power.

On February 27, 1939,

the British Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons the unconditional recognition of the Franco

r e g i m e , 130

ostensibly the mere result of the natural course of events, but actually the expression of a complicated policy of re­ conciling British interests with the new order in Spain. It was the dominating importance of the question of how to promote a free Spain— a Spain friendly to the British and thus ipso facto independent of the foreign fascist in­ fluences which had so materially.aided in Franco 1s victory— that motivated the British recognition of Franco, and not the mere tests of de factoism.

filhile the latter Is often

claimed as the basis of the British as well as the American recognition policy, the claim is so ofte.n at variance with the facts, as evidenced by this entire thesis, that one may reject it as an idle platitude. As it has already been seen in the previous case of the British recognition of the Ethiopian conquest, the ag-

130

344

H0use of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 873.

116 gressive alignment of fascist powers hostile to British interests on the side of the Franco insurgents had provoked a corresponding alignment of democratic and more leftist sympathizers on the side of the loyalists.

The natural

tendency of the British was to join with the latter, but the very real danger of an international conflict arising from the clash of foreign influences in Spain influenced Great Britain to support a policy of mutual hands-off, a policy which indirectly aided the Franco victory.-31

While

the British policy did succeed in keeping the Spanish war localized, which seems to have constituted Britain*s worst fear, it was unfortunately at the price of realizing Brit­ ain1s second worst fear— the participation of foreign, fascist influence in the victory of Franco.-32 At this stage of development the British government found itself obliged either to revert to a more natural antagonism to the Franco regime, and thereby drive Spain even more securely into the arms of Italy and Germany, or make a quick gesture of friendship and forgiveness, trust-

13! Anthony Eden, for instance, stated in the House of Commons on February 28, 1939, that the non-intervention agreement was an attempt to circumscribe the area of con­ flict (344 House of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 1143). 132 The debate in the House of Commons, February 28, 1939, gives an enlightening reviey/ of the implications of Britain*s Spanish policy (Ibid., 344:1143-48 elb. seq. ).

117 ing that a relief from British opposition would strengthen the traditional Spanish tendency to guard jealously their independence and run their own affairs.

It was in the face

of severe criticism and accusations of ”selling out” to the dictator states— characteristic attack of the entire Chamberlain appeasement policy— that the British government chose the latter course with a sudden but deliberate deci­ sion to recognize the Franco regime in Spain.133 The announcement of the grant of recognition and the subsequent debate in the House of Commons on February 27-28 brought out most forcibly the reasons behind the govern­ ment *s decision.

Apparently, Chamberlain had hoped to make

recognition a more positive instrumentality than the above analysis of the British alternative implied; for while it was hoped that recognition would lead indirectly to an in­ dependent Spain, British diplomacy had attempted to exact guarantees to that effect in return for recognition. Justifying the recognition before the House of Commons on February 27, Chamberlain hinted at certain reciprocating 11assurances11 from General Franco, but as one observer re­ marked, ,fApparentiy they were so vague that he did not

133 Chamberlain justified the recognition by stating that lfTo withhold recognition from General Franco could not help the Republican Government or the people of Madrid. What it would do would be to embitter our relations with the new Government in Spain and to destroy any influence which we may hope to have with that Government1* (Ibid., 344:1117).

118 think it worth-wh.ile to disclose them. ”134

The only comment

that the Prime Minister would make on this score w a s ■a rather disconcerting hint of defeat in the statement that His Majesty1s Government have noted with satisfaction the public statements of General Franco concerning the determination of himself and his government to secure the traditional independence of Spain « . .135 Apparently, the British felt that .they could do nothing at the moment hut trust the assurances, vague as they probably were, that were given by Franco— basing their policy on the assumption that the wisest course for Britain to follow was to strengthen Franco’s power and influence in Spain.

As one commentator has remarked, "Britain finally

decided to take a gambler’s chance that the new Spanish Government will not allow Germany or Italy to keep a domina­ ting position on the Iberian Peninsula."136 Feeling obliged to defend the Franco recognition by a more complete vindication of it to Parliament in the de­ bates of the next day, Chamberlain revealed a telegram from Franco, and from it read to the House of Commons a declara­ tion by Franco that "Spain Is not disposed to accept any foreign intervention which may impair her dignity or in-

134 jjew York Times, February 28, 1939. 135

344

House of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 873.

136 flew York Times, February 28, 1939.

119 fringe her sovereignty.”137 The assurances, vague or otherwise, as to Franco’s determination to rule Spain free from foreign interference., did not, however, appease left-wing critics of the British action.

The Prime Minister was thus obliged to resort to

the more involnerable argument that, however British inter­ ests may have suffered as the result of the government's Spanish policy during the duration of the civil war, they would have been even more seriously endangered if recogni­ tion had been delayed a day longer.138

The testimony of

Anthony Eden— by that time out of the cabinet and leading the conservative rebels, who were the most telling critics of the Chamberlain appeasement policy— gave a surprising confirmation of the Prime Minister's defense of the Franco recognition by stating that to continue withholding re­ cognition would not help in achieving the independence of Spain.139 Before any conclusion can be reached regarding the British recognition of Franco, mention should be made of the persistent charge of "selling out" in the interests of

137

544

H0use of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 1118.

138 pew York Times, March 1, 1939. 139

344

piouse

of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 1147.

120 British capitalists.

Of* course, a great deal of British

money had gone into Spain, and the presence of. an unfriendly government could materially endanger the financial interests of the British investors.

The most celebrated of British

interests were the copper mines of the Rio Tinto, and critics of the British appeasement of Franco saw an underlying cor­ relation between the softening of British antagonism toward Franco and his simultaneous consolidation of power in the Rio Tinto district.140 It is manifestly impossible at this early date either to prove or to disprove the above charges.

It is the opin­

ion of the writer, however, that the British recognition of Franco hardly required further motivation than that ex­ plained by the Prime Minister himself.

In terms of Chamber-

l a i n ^ entire foreign policy during the hectic years of his cabinet leadership, the Franco decision was quite consist­ ent.

If the British capitalists gained by the gesture of a

timely recognition, all the better; but Chamberlain was hardly looking out for the interests of a special group of

140 clement Attlee, the leader of the British Labor Party, and the most outspoken of the parliamentary critics of Chamberlain1s Spanish policy, took the occasion of the House of Commons debate on the recognition of Franco to launch one of his bitterest attacks. Attlee accused the government of "thinking all the time of the interests of British capitalists,11 and added "What does it mean to the government if Gibraltar is in danger if we get the Rio Tinto dividends?" (Ibid., 344:1099 et seq.).

121 British capitalists; the stakes of his diplomacy were of much greater significance.

In the light of Chamberlain1s

whole character and attitude, one can well believe the sincerity of the Prime Minister1s remarks in the House of Commons on February 28, 1939, when he explained that to withhold recognition from Franco could not help the loyalist regime, but would only destroy any influence Britain might hope to have with the new government. ^ 1 ‘ ihus it is asserted that in using the power of re­ cognition in the case of the Franco regime in Spain, the British government was not concerned with either the mere de facto supremacy of the Franco insurgents or the interests of British investors in Spain.

Instead, recogni­

tion was used as an instrumentality to restrict the influ­ ence of the Rome-Berlin axis, by affording even an anti­ democratic government the opportunity to strengthen its posi­ tion and thereby rely less upon the support of the axis powers.

British diplomacy gambled upon a traditional

Spanish tendency to run its own affairs, and by the use of recognition enhanced Spain’s chances of reverting to type, despite the significant fact that British sympathies were in general opposed to Franco’s regime.

141 Ibid.,

344:1099.

CHAPTER III UNITED STATES’ USE OP RECOGNITION AS AN INSTRUMENT OP HIGH DIPLOMACY A consideration of the policy of the United States with reference to the use of recognition in high diplomacy reflects quite a different history from that of the British, The cause for this variation no doubt lies in the fact that except for certain isolated cases, the use of the power of recognition by the United States up through the nineteenth century was characterized by two closely correlated mani­ festations: first, an emphasis upon the criterion of de facto control as a rationalization of American propagation abroad of its own form of government;^ and second, a con-

1 The origin of this criterion is found in the in­ structions of Jefferson, as Secretary of State, to Gouverneur Morris, American Minister to prance, regarding American policy toward the French Revolution, Jefferson’s instruc­ tions of March 2, 1795, contain the following classic defi­ nition of policy? MWe surely can not deny to any nation that right whereon our own Government is founded--that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded” (Paul L. Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1&04-10), Vol. Vl, p* 199. An account of this use of the power of recognition for the extension of republicanism Is given in Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United States Since 1901 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1920), pp. 19-26.

123 sequent reduction in tlie scope of the power of recognition as a weapon in more immediate questions of diplomatic nego­ tiations,

The writer is of the opinion that it has been the

relative absence of more serious consequences arising from the conduct of foreign affairs that has permitted the United States to dispense with the necessity of using recognition as a weapon in higher diplomacy for the sake of securing the advantages of a de facto policy of recognition,2 In so far as it has been the tendency of American policy to accord recognition on the luxurious basis of a set formula, manipulation has generally been possible only as to the question of the fulfillment of prerequisites already formulated.

It is to be observed, therefore, that

the constant reiteration of this de facto theory of recogni­ tion by American statesmen has rather effectively proscribed the withholding of recognition pending the fulfillment of

2 It is also suggested that the refusal of the United States to use the power of recognition for more diverse pur­ poses throughout the nineteenth century was as much the re­ sult of our being a young, weak nation whose policies were of relatively little concern to the family of nations. Since, under this hypothesis, a foreign regime could gen­ erally afford to reject conditions of recognition imposed by the United States, American statesmen found solace and more amicable foreign relations in liberality and tolerance. Evidence to support this contention is supplied by the fact that upon emerging as a world power in the twentieth cen­ tury, the United States began to pursue a bolder, more in­ definite and more flexible recognition policy. See Stuart A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition toward Mexico (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p . 24.

124 other conditions.3

A review of responsible declarations of

American policy ranging over a period of more than a cen­ tury tends to bear out this statement. The first occasion of such a pronouncement was in 1792, when Secretary of State Jefferson instructed the American Minister in Paris as to the policy of the United States towards the French Revolution in a letter of November 7.

The Secretary asserted that It accords with our principles to acknowledge any

3 A host of monographs--with varying conclusions— have been primarily concerned with tracing the history of the American recognition policy in terms of its prerequi­ sites and their interpretation by various administrations. These prerequisites, as generally agreed upon, have com­ prised: (1) the present and future stability of the govern­ ment to be recognized, (2) the willingness and ability of the government to fulfill its international obligations. One authority states that American reliance upon these cri­ teria nhas resulted in giving to the United States a recog­ nition policy which has been fundamentally continuous from earliest times to the present” (Cole, op. cit., p. 20). The interpretation and emphasis given to these cri­ teria, however, have not always been consistent. As an example, the former criterion is in itself meaningless and dependent upon its own pragmatic criteria for implementa­ tion. Tests to determine the stability of a government as' employed by the United States have ranged from that of the absence of actual civil strife to that of the positive act of formal approval of the new regime by popular vote. More over, the criterion involving the fulfillment of interna­ tional obligations was only implicit--if it existed at all— for many decades. Cole acknowledges its early existence, but states that although it was present, it was not empha­ sized while American foreign policy was in Its formative stages. He adds that It received increasing attention, with a few variations, along with the extension of American interests in foreign states (loc. cit.)•

125 Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared.4 In 1836, President Jackson in referring to Texas stated that The uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and to recognize the prevailing party eventually without reference to our own particular interests and views or merits of the original controversy.5 Upon the recognition of the provisional government of Prance in 1848, Secretary of State Buchanan took quite a definite stand with his pronouncement that In its intercourse with foreign nations the Govern­ ment of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized de facto governments. We recognize the right of alT"“nations to create and reform their politi­ cal institutions according to their own will and plea­ sure. We do not go behind the existing Government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself; and then its recogni­ tion on our part inevitably follows.6 In a statement regarding the recognition of the Diaz government in Mexico, 1877, President Hayes reiterated American policy by observing that . . . the custom of the United States, when such revolutionary changes of government have heretofore occurred in Mexico, Cis3 to recognize and enter into official relations with the *de facto* government as

4 Ford, op. cit*, Vol. Ill, p. 489. 6 Cited in Cole, op. cit., pp. 23-4. 6 John B. Moore, A Digest of International Law (Wash ington: Government Printing Office, 1966), Vol. I, p. 124.

126 soon as It should appear to have the approval of the Mexican people and should manifest a disposal to adhere to the obligations of treaties and international friendship.” Finally, a statement by Acting Secretary of State Hill, made on September 8, 1900, in a despatch to the American Minister to Bogota may be cited to complete this survey of examples of American adherence to a de facto policy of recognition.

In the words of Mr. Hill,

The policy of the United States, announced and prac­ ticed upon occasion for more than a century, has been and is to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the de jure control of the executive power of a for­ eign staUe, but to base the recognition of a foreign government solely upon its de facto ability to hold the reigns of administrative powerl WEen, by reason of revolution or other internal change not wrought by regu­ lar constitutional methods, a conflict of authority exists in another country whereby the titular government to which our representatives are accredited is reduced from power and authority, the rule of the United States is to defer recognition of another executive In its place until it shall appear that it is in possession of the machinery of state, administering government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial resistance to its authority and that it is in a position to fulfill all the International obligations and respon­ sibilities incumbent upon a sovereign state under treaties and international law.® The above citations mainly serve as evidence of the consistent application of a set formula to questions of re­ cognition by the United States.

While the purpose of the

formula was originally Intended to protect the right of

7

9 P* 3-48*

8 Ibid., p. 139.

127 revolution by countering the reactionary, old-world theory or legitimism, and thereby encourage stifled republicanism wherever it flamed into revolt, yet another consequence was the circumscription of the use of recognition as a device for the pursuit of other goals in foreign policy,9 Since choice coincided with necessity and even advantage In the reliance upon a de facto recognition policy during most of the first century and more of American independence, it is perhaps not surprising that only scant use of the power of recognition was made in the pursuit of higher diplomacy. Although a survey of American use of recognition since the end of the eighteenth century does not yield many examples of recognition being employed as a device In higher diplomacy— certainly less than in the case of the British-there are certain cases in which American policy has been substantially guided by factors of world diplomacy.

The

writer believes that the cases considered below, although neither exhaustive nor unrelated to other considerations in policy formulation, are yet representative both in number and character of the use of recognition in high diplomacy

^ Th© best account of the development of American policy in opposition to the de jure principle in Europe is found In Julius Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States (New York; Columbia University Press, 1915), Chapter IV.

128 by the United States. 1. THE INDEPENDENCE OP THE SPANISH AMERICAN STATES (1811-1823) It is perhaps somewhat of a commentary on the use of platitudes in the realm of national and International poli­ tics that both Great Britain and the United States exploited the Spanish American independence movements with a strong reliance upon the de facto theory of recognition.10

A

realistic view might question the sincerity of their allegi­ ance to de factoism, for in both cases a selfish motivation made such a choice by far the most advantageous. The fact of the

matter is that while British policy,

as seen above, was distinctly complicated by questions which had little to do with a de facto criterion, American recognition of the Spanish American republics was also con­ ditioned by factors hardly consistent with the rules of de factolsm as pronounced by the very men responsible for

10 For American claims of de factoism, see the speech by Henry Clay of March 24,“T 8 18, advocating recogni­ tion of the Spanish American republics In Daniel Mallory,Life and Speeches of Henry Clay (New York; A. S. Barnes and Co., 1857), Vo1. I, p. 391. see also the reply of Secre­ tary of State Adams to the protest of the Spanish Minister against the American decision to accord recognition, quoted in Goebel, op. cit., p. 137. For the British claim of de factoism regarding Span­ ish America, see the reply of Canning to the Spanish Minis­ ter of March 25, 1825 (British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XII, 1824-1825, pp. 90§-15T7“

129 American poliey* The first formal request for American recognition came from Venezuela as early as 1811, immediately after that country’s abortive declaration of independence.H Obviously, the Venezuelan request was premature, but even at that time the attitude of the United States was distinct­ ly receptive, hinting at recognition at an early date,

The

reconquest of Venezuela and the War of 1812, however, de­ ferred American interest in the promotion of independent republics in South America until 1817, when the United Pro­ vinces of the Rio de la Plata formally demanded recognition on December 16, after almost a year and a half of a declared independent existence*12 Despite the constant affirmation of a de facto policy and of the desire on the part of the United States to grant an early recognition to the revolted Spanish colonies, the interesting fact is not that the United States was the first of the powers to extend recognition, but that it delayed recognition for some six years after the more aggressive of the revolted colonies had successfully established their independence* As early as 1817, President Monroe was duly impressed

Frederic L. Paxson, Independence of South American Republics (Philadelphia: Ferris and Leach, TU03), p. 37* 12 Goebel, op* cit•, p. 121*

130

with the success of the Spanish American movements for in­ dependence, and in that year appointed a commission of in­ quiry to report on developments to the south.13

While it

is generally taken that the purpose of such a commission was to prepare the way for an early recognition, its great­ est contribution seems to have been to afford a refuge be­ hind which the Department of State could hide from the in­ creasingly persistent demands for recognition by hopeful and oft-times encouraged agents of the revolted colonies. When finally in December, 1818, the reports of the commis­ sioners were submitted to Congress by the President, it was found that they were sufficiently contradictory to make a definite stand based upon them manifestly impossible. Evidence well supports the contention that until the middle of the year 1818, the question of recognizing the independence of the Spanish American colonies had reference only to the degree of stability attained by them.

Since,

however, stability had been generally achieved in some of the revolted provinces by that time, the further hesitation of the United States in extending recognition necessitates explanation upon other grounds.

It is at this point that

-*-3 ibid., p. 119. ^ As this authority states, f,these commissions, as a rule, were usually used as a device to postpone as long as possible a recognition which the political situation rendered for the moment inadvisable” (Ibid., p. 120).

131

factors involving special questions of diplomacy entered into the picture to affect the American policy of recog­ nition towards Spanish America#

These factors, it is sub­

mitted at the outset, were related to developments in the relations of Spain to the United States. The incautious action of General Jackson in invading Spanish Florida in the spring of 1818 provoked a natural resentment on the part of Spain which, combined wi'ch the complicity of American private aid to Spanish American rebels, made for an atmosphere of increasing tension be­ tween Spain and the United States#

In spite of these actions,

however, the United States was desirous of being on the best possible terms with Spain pending overtures and negotiations with the latter over the question of Florida.15 Further aggravation by a grant of recognition to the re­ volted colonies was not politic, for in the words of one authority, rtAny ill-timed move on the part of the United States might result in the complete rupture of negotia­ tions. ”15 Pending the completion of negotiations over the ces­ sion of Florida to the United States, recognition of the

15 An account of the negotiations for the purchase of Florida is found in Hubert B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Co#, 1906}. 15 Goebel, op. cit#, p. 126#

132 revolted colonies in Spanish. America was p o s t p o n e d * T h e negotiations were rapidly approaching an amicable settle­ ment in January, 1819, when Secretary of State Adams, pre­ tending a decision based upon a de facto test, optimisti­ cally informed the agent from Buenos Aires that since the latterfs republic had by then demonstrated its stability, the time was ripe for recognition*19

The encouragement

given in the Secretaryfs promise was specious, for while nothing occurred subsequently to compromise the de facto independence of Buenos Aires, the United States persisted in withholding recognition.

What did occur, however, was

that upon the completion of negotiations over Florida, the Spanish king refused to ratify the treaty, hoping to exact a further price— including non-recognition of the revolted provinces— In return for his signature.19 While the United States did not yield to the new de­

17 While the deferment of American recognition was no doubt disappointing to the new republics, Monroe did not abandon his project of early recognition. In view of the possible penalties attached to unilateral action, he merely altered his tactics by circularizing Europe with an appeal for joint recognition. The appeal failed, for at the time not even Creat Britain was anxious to go so far in endanger­ ing its relations with Spain. A brief account of the ap­ peal, taken from the contemporaneous diplomatic correspond­ ence, is found in MacGorkle, ojd. cit., p. 32. 1® Charles Francis Adams, editor, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1874-77), Vol. IV, p. 203., 19 Fuller, op. cit., p. 210.

mands of Spain, neither did Buenos Aires secure its recogni­ tion until after Spain had finally ratified the Florida treaty some two years later.

Even then, the long-awaited

and long-heralded recognition did not take place for another two years.^0 An inescapable conclusion to be made from this brief survey of the policy of the United States towards the Span­ ish American republics is that the attempt to promote a de facto policy of recognition at least partially failed due to extraneous considerations.

Thus, even at the outset of

the history of American foreign policy, the advisability of laying down immutable principles to be followed by rigorous adherence to a set formula was put to test and found want­ ing.

Had the tests of de factoism been the sole criteria

of recognition, the United

States would have anticipated

its own action by three or four years.

It was, however, the

question of how to appease Spain during negotiations leading up to the cession of Florida that led to a departure from the announced policy and a refusal to perform accordingly. The withholding of recognition of the independence of the South American republics was a device employed in the pur-

^ The Florida treaty was finally ratified on Febru­ ary 22, 1821. The first grant of recognition by the United States to a Spanish American republic was that given to Colombia on June 19, 1822. Buenos Aires was not recognized until January 27, 1823 (Paxson, op. cit., pp. 218-19).

134

suit of an entirely extraneous question of diplomacy, and was of special significance in view of the sincere attempt on the part of the United States to maintain a strictly de facto policy. 2.

THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION (1893)

Pew cases in the history of the recognition policy of the United

States have been so blatantly Irregular and

so motivated by ulterior objectives in the realm of high diplomacy as was that of the recognition of the provisional government in ‘Hawaii on January 17, 1893, by the United States Minister, John L. Stevens.

It has been convenient

for the historians who take pride in the consistency of American policy to dismiss such recognitions as those of the Hawaiian government and the state of Panama as being incidental to the greater factor of actual intervention, and therefore excusable as to certain jarring aspects be­ cause of the minor role which, it is asserted, the act of recognition played.

If anything, however, it would seem

that of all the steps taken— legally and otherwise--by the United States In the course of the.Hawaiian revolution In 1893, the most Important, ultimately, was not intervention, but the recognition of the singularly weak provisional government established under the presidency of Sanford B. Dole.

When the reactionary Cleveland administration re­

135 placed tiie more imperialistic government of Harrison, it was intervention and not recognition which could be, and was, withdrawn. The peculiar relationship of Hawaii to the United States, which had existed since the middle of the nineteenth century, explains the motivation of higher policy which prompted the recognition by

Stevens of the coup d 1etat

against the Hawaiian monarchy.

As a naval base, Hawaii

loomed in importance soon after Perry's expedition to Japan. At various intervals the Sandwich Islands had voluntarily acceded to propositions of annexation to the United States, only to have the negotiations collapse over comparatively minor issues.^

A reciprocity treaty concluded in 1875

’’virtually made Hawaii an economic colony of the United States,11^2 if not quite a political dependency, for while stipulating free trade as between the two signatories, the treaty also pledged Hawaii not to alienate any port or territory to any other power— a stipulation which emphasized

Most nearly culminated was a treaty of annexation signed in 1854, but most colorful was a sealed document pur­ porting to be the cession of Hawaii to the United States which the Hawaiian king presented to the United States in 1851 with the stipulation that it be revealed should a con­ temporary quarrel with France get out of hand. For a dis­ cussion of these treaties, see Foster R. Dulles, America in the Pacific (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938), pp. 155-607 22 Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 34.

136 the strategic interest of Hawaii to the United States. The reciprocity treaty provided a great stimulation to Hawaiian industries, especially to sugar, and by 1890 the value of Hawaiian foreign trade had quadrupled as of 1877. As one authority points out, the phenomenal prosperity in Hawaii ^largely depended upon the continuance of the favored status enjoyed by Hawaiian sugar in the American market. u24 A calamity befell Hawaii in 1890, however, which made the American merchant-planter residents of the islands increasingly intent upon annexation to the United States. The McKinley Tariff Act of that year dealt a heavy blow to the Hawaiian sugar industry by forcing it to compete not only with other foreign sugar, but also with American-grown sugar enjoying a bounty of two cents a pound. 25— Sugar prices allegedly fell in Hawaii from flOO to $60 a ton, and annexation appeared to be the only solution in this crisis of Hawaiian economy.

The pro-American party, which composed

the majority of the white minority, had long been restive under the more backward aboriginal government, but by its predominant influence in Hawaiian economy had already

25 W. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers (Washington: Government Printing Office,' IUTO-23), VoTTT, pp. 915-17. 24 Pratt, 0 £. cit., p. 35.

25 Ibid., p. 45.

137

arrived at a challenged position of ascendancy in Hawaiian governmental affairs. The discontent of the white minority with the status quo did not stem exclusively from the economic crisis, for it

included also a political quarrel fostered by a growing

determination of the native element to free Hawaiian poli­ tics from the domination of the white minority and to re­ turn to the now quite anomalous aboriginal institutions.26 Beginning with 1891, Queen Liliuokalani1s attempts to re­ vive the power of native rule and to break away from foreign influence was singularly ill-timed and ill-advised, for in the words of one authority, The merchants building up Pacific trade, and the sugar planters, were all prepared to resist any reac­ tionary turn in Hawaiian affairs. And seeing little hope for the preservation of their liberties or for Hawaiian progress under the decadent native dynasty, they turned to annexation to the United States as the only possible solution to their p r o b l e m s . 27 The Annexationists were not without moral support emanating from Washington.

President Earrisonfs adminis-

26 •pue corruption, backwardness and decadence of the Hawaiian monarchy and government had already led to American military intervention in 1874 upon the occasion of riots at­ tendant to the accession of King Kalakaua* Constitutional reforms forced upon the Hawaiian government had promoted the domination of the Hawaiian legislature by the white minority. Native reaction set in, however, and the movement of *Hawaii for the Hawaiians” became threatening upon the accession of the stubbornly reactionary Queen Liliuokalani in 1891* See Dulles, op. cit., pp. 164-69. 27 Ibid., p. 169.

138 tration, especially Secretary of State James G. Blaine, showed evidence of frank sympathy for the ambitions of the Hawaiian-Americans.

Most outspoken, however, was John L.

Stevens, the American Minister to Hawaii, whose predilec­ tions cut a deep bias across the long, alarmist despatches from Honolulu to Washington.

Intently depicting the grow­

ing confusion In Hawaiian affairs, Stevens attempted to con­ vince Washington of the necessity for intervention and annex* ation by warning of the Imminence of British action along similar lines.

Typical of the Stevens despatches is the

following excerpt from one of them written prior to the out­ break of the revolution In January, 1893, wherein Stevens asserted that Annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and oppor­ tunity to get a hold in the islands, which will cause future embarrassment to the UnitedS t a t e s . 28 In another despatch dated February 8, 1892, Stevens wrote that The present political situation is feverish and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain.29 Words and ambitions were suddenly translated into action and realization as the result of an Ill-advised

28 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations.of the UnitedStates tWashington: Government Printing Office, 1862 ff.),1894, Appendix 2, p. 354 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations)• 29 Ifria., PP* 353-54.

139 attempt by the Queen to proclaim by royal edict on January 14, 1893, a new constitution restoring the prerogatives of* the Grown and emasculating the foreign-dominated legisla­ ture.

The boldness of the coup was too much for the Queen*s

more timid Ministers, who, being less insensitive to the intense protests of the American party, refused to counter­ sign the unconstitutional decree.

Lacking ministerial sup­

port, the Queen postponed promulgating the new basic law-an action which both angered the aroused Hawaiian natives and failed to appease the increasingly distrustful American party. Thoroughly aroused, the Annexationists were convinced that in order to protect their interests they had to act at once.

A Committee of Public Safety was immediately ap­

pointed, and plans were made to appeal to the United States for protection and for the establishment of a provisional government.

The weight of authority supports the assertion

that while the Queen*s false step furnished an occasion for the measures of revolution which they had rather vaguely con­ templated for possible use in the future, there is no evi­ dence that the Annexationists had formulated plans for revo­ lution at this time.30

On the succeeding day, Sunday, Janu­

ary 15, however, the Committee attempted to legitimize the

30 Pratt, op. cit., p. 82.

140 proposed revolution by giving it a foothold, in the existing cabinet, but the two most sympathetic cabinet members re­ fused to cooperate.31 Monday afternoon, January 16, a mass meeting of some 1300 foreign residents of Honolulu was held.

A state of

emergency was proclaimed, and' in ratifying the actions already taken the foreigners empowered the Committee . . . to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to se­ cure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty and property in Hawaii.32 There was no turning back now, for the revolution had begun.

On the same evening the Committee of Public Safety

asked the American Minister for the protection of American troops, which in a stroke of mere good fortune happened to be available on an American naval vessel stopping over at the islands.

The rebels immediately capitalized upon the

availability of the marines, and whether or not they antici­ pated using them in actual combat should the occasion arise, it is certain that they counted upon the presence of United States troops to give at least moral support to the projected provisional government.

A request to Stevens for the protec­

tion of American troops was enthusiastically complied with by the partial Minister, and when the Committee attempted to

31

Ibid., p. 89.

32 ibid . t pp. 86-7

141 withdraw its request pending the establishment of a provi­ sional government, Stevens wouldn't hear of it.33

.^he

American troops were perforce landed that same evening. It is hardly surprising.that Stevens received a strong protest from the Queen's Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the audacity of landing American troops without request or even permission from the legitimate government, but the Minister merely replied that In whatever the United States diplomatic and naval representatives have done or may do at this critical hour of Hawaiian affairs we will be guided by the kindliest views and feelings for all the parties con­ cerned and by the warmest sentiments for the Hawaiian people and the persons of all nationalities.34 On Tuesday, January 17, the Committee of Public Safety, without a single native Hawaiian to be counted among its members, carried out its bloodless revolution. From the steps of the Government Building a proclamation was read abrogating the Hawaiian monarchy and establishing a provisional government Mto exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and

33 Although no definitive explanation has ever been given for the Committee's decision to defer the request for troops, the most plausible explanation seems to be that if the troops were landed before the provisional government was established, the Queen might have embarrassingly re­ quested Stevens to have the troops support her against those seeking to overturn her government (Pratt, op. cit., p. 88 ). 34 Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix 2, pp. 1057-59

142 agreed upon.1135 The provisional government, an executive council of four Americans appointed by the Committee of Public Safety, immediately asked for United States recognition as a de facto-government, while at the time supported by an impro­ vised militia of about 200 men.

The Queen had 496 armed

men, but despite the superiority of force on the Queen*s side, Stevens promptly gave the desired recognition, and on the same afternoon (January 17) informed the Queen*s Ministers that he had done so . ^ 6 Some hours before the provisional government was in undisputed control of the city, Queen Liliuokalani sur­ rendered her power, announcing that she yielded . . . to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused the United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional G o v e r n m e n t . 37 Even the most casual review of events leading up to the fall of the Hawaiian monarchy will reveal the sharp inconsistency between the traditional policy of the United States toward the recognition of governments and the action of Minister Stevens.

35 ibid.,

p .

If the United States prided itself in

2 1 1 .

36 ibid., p. 228. 37 ibid., p. 218.

143 applying a de facto theory of recognition, it liad been be­ cause of the asserted establishment of objective tests, wherein the aspiring claimant had merely to give evidence of stability and its willingness and ability to. perform international obligations.

It had become traditional for

the United States to justify all recognitions by special reference to the fulfillment of the prerequisite of stabili­ ty, under which definition the provisional government of Hawaii had not a leg to stand on when it applied to Stevens for recognition.

In complete violation of the principles

for which the United States had stood for a solid century, within an hour after the reading of the proclamation abro­ gating the Hawaiian monarchy, and . . . while the Queen and her government were still in authority, and in possession of the palace, the barracks, and the police station, the United States Minister accorded the Provisional Uovernment his re­ cognition.3® As one authority has pointed out, It Is evident that the considerations which deter­ mined the Queen’s decision were the knowledge that Stevens had recognized the new government and the presence of the United States troops. The barest conceivable minimum in the fulfillment of any qualification of stability is that the claimant be exercising de facto authority at the time; yet the evi-

38 ibid., p. 388. 39 pratt, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

144 dence is conclusive that the action of Stevens in granting recognition was exceedingly premature, as may be seen in the letter from Provisional President Dole to Minister Stevens acknowledging Stevens! recognition and at the same time admitting that We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the im­ mediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces so that they may act together for the protection of the c i t y . 40 One authority recalls that the Committee of Public Safety had called for help because of its inability to pre­ serve order, but that within thirty hours after the original request had been made it had been recognized by Stevens as the provisional government, thereby implying that it had won complete control of Hawaii.

This authority then succinctly

suggests that If a situation existed on Monday so dangerous to American interests as to demand the landing of marines, it was surprising, to say the least, that the de facto Government deserved recognition .on T u e s d a y . 41 Even at that, the irregularity of the situation lays claim to further honors, for as this same authority remarks, Moreover, there was the question of whether the Amer­ ican minister’s prompt extension of recognition, with complete disregard for the Government to which he was

Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix 2, p. 565. 41 Dulles, op. cit.,

p. 174.

145 officially accredited, did not even precede the Provi­ sional Government's seizure of those administrative build­ ings which symbolized governmental control,42 In a report submitted to President Cleveland and relayed to Congress by James H. Blount, Cleveland's special commissioner sent over to investigate the Hawaiian revolu­ tion, the complicity of Stevens in the plot of the rebels is sufficiently established to lend credence to any charges of recognition granted almost regardless of the progress of the revolution.

The Blount report states that Stevens had

agreed to support the revolution before it was begun, and that he had promised to recognize the provisional govern­ ment the moment it occupied the government buildings in H o n o l u l u . B y the testimony of one witness, Stevens had not only promised recognition and support to the proposed provisional government as soon as it should be in posses­ sion of the Government Building, but had even offered re­ cognition when the revolutionists might be in control of any building in the city.44

Denials were of course made,

but for the record the most useful was that presented to Secretary of State Foster by the five Hawaiian commission­ ers immediately despatched by the provisional government to

^

k°° * cit.

43 The Blount Report has been reproduced in Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix 2, pp. 467-1151. 44 ibid., p. 561.

146 conclude a treaty of annexation with, the United States.

Ac­

cording to the commissioners, No public recognition was accorded the Provisional Government by the American minister until they were In possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, supported by several hundred armed men, and after the abdication by the Queen and the sur­ render to the Provisional Government of her forces.^ It isshardly worth the effort to question the valid­ ity of this bit of circumvention indulged in by the commis­ sioners, for indeed if the recognition had no official status while only the American Minister, the rebels, the legitimate government and probably the entire diplomatic corps were In on the secret, Its extension was hardly made more legitimate by a mere announcement to the public. The complicity of Stevens in such a violation of American principles and precedents could have been resented and repudiated by the State Department as being a sponsion, but of all the actions taken by the American Minister pur­ suant to the Hawaiian revolution, only Stevens’ presumptu­ ousness in raising the American flag above the Government Building in Honolulu was subsequently disavowed, ard that rather tardily.

In a telegram dated January 28, Secretary

poster even ventured an official approval of Stevens’ re­ cognition of the provisional government.46

45

P- 237.

46

Ibid., p. 399.

147 •The subsequent history of the annexation movement, although now destined for ultimate realization, did not run any more smoothly despite the boost and support of the Harrison administration, for one of President Cleveland*s first acts upon returning to power in March, 1893, was to withdraw the Hawaiian annexation treaty from the official cognizance of a lethargic but amenable Senate*

In the

words of one authority, The President*s liberal susceptibilities had been deeply offended by the rapidity with which the Provi­ sional Hawaiian Government had been recognized, and the equally hasty conclusion of the annexation t r e a t y . 4 7 As mentioned previously, President Cleveland des­

patched a special agent to Honolulu for the purpose of in­ vestigating the entire revolution as a means of resolving the dilemma created by the actions of the Harrison adminis­ tration*

The report of the commissioner, James H* Blount,

completely vindicated Cleveland’s disapproving attitude, but despite the commencement of negotiations with Liliuokalani to restore the Hawaiian monarchy, the prospects of a second intervention to undo the work of the first neither appealed to the President nor to Congress, to which body Cleveland gladly shifted the responsibility for determining the Issue.

investigations made in 1894 in both the House

of Representatives and the Senate resulted in rather scathing

^

Dulles, oj3. cit *, p. 178.

148 denunciations of the actions of Stevens and the Harrison administration, but neither body was inclined on the one hand to recommend further American interference in support of the acknowledged claims of the Hawaiian queen, or to advocate annexation or the establishment of a protectorate on the other,4®

It was not until the succeeding McKinley

administration had plunged the country into the war with Spain that the annexation was finally culminated by Joint Resolution of Congress, August 12, 1898. In summarizing and reviewing the Hawaiian revolution of 1893 with special reference to the action of Minister Stevens in recognizing the provisional government of the Annexationists, one is apt to overlook the significance and the ramifications of the recognition while dwelling more upon the dramatic aspects of actual military intervention, or else treat the recognition merely as an incident in the longer-ranged movement for annexation.

Certain aspects of

the recognition itself, however, deserve emphasis in support of the contention of the writer that in this realm of high policy the imperialistic administration in Washington— and the Annexationists in Honolulu as well— found in the power of recognition the essential instrumentality which eventu­ ally. secured the desired goal.

4® For the 1894 Senate Investigation report, see United States Congress, 52:2, Senate Ex. Doc., 76.

149 Granted the rather wholesale violation of the codes of international conduct, let alone the principles and practices of American foreign policy, the American inter­ vention on behalf of the Annexationists had as -its ultimate objective not the maintenance of order or the protection of American lives and property, but rather the establishment of the provisional government.^

Obviously, the ultimate

goal of the Annexationists was not merely to supplant the legitimate Hawaiian government, but to promote the annexa­ tion of Hawaii to the United States.

Recognition was used

as a decisive instrumentality not only in the immediate aim of supplanting the Hawaiian monarchy,50 hut also as the one key available to open the gates of annexation in Washington. The Harrison administration could never have promoted a treaty of annexation by negotiating with private citizens.

49 in his report, Blount cited the weighty opinion of Admiral Skerrett, U.S.N., who arrived on the scene as the rebels were in the process of their revolt. Skerrett was of the opinion that the marines landed were improperly stationed in so far as the protection of American interests was con­ cerned, but very well located if their objective was support of the Provisional Government (Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix 2, p. 799).

50 As reported by one authority, the Queen maintained that it was American recognition of her enemies rather than their own power, which forced her capitulation. This same authority is of the opinion that the testimony found in Com­ missioner Blount1s report lends support to the Queen*s position (Dulles, op. cit., p. 180). Another authority states with even more conviction that Stevens* recognition was a major if not the determining factor in the Queen*s decision to surrender (Pratt, o]D. cit., p. 107).

150 The recognition of the provisional government was the sole alternative to outright conquest of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States, which, if certainly not inconceivable in the annals of American diplomacy, just as certainly did not merit serious consideration at the time--partly because it would have been impolitic domestically, and partly because of the welcome alternative which was being provided in Hawaii itself. As a final word, it Is significant that the reaction which set in with the Inauguration of President Cleveland cannot be taken as nullifying the significance of Stevens* adroit recognition of the provisional government, for the fact of the matter is that despite the vigorous but tempo­ rary check made upon the progress of the movement for annexa­ tion, the recognition of the rebel regime as the legitimate government of Hawaii by the Harrison administration seems to have been a decisive factor in preventing the Cleveland regime from attempting to restore the status quo

a n t e .51

The dilemma facing Cleveland is revealed in a let­ ter of Richard Olney, Attorney-General, to Secretary of State Gresham, in which Olney stated that "Since the Pro­ visional Government had been placed In power through the aid of the minister and the armed forces of the U.S., and since the preceding administration had approved the action of its representatives, the U.S. had incurred obligations to the revolutionists who had enjoyed its support, and was respon­ sible for their safety. 11 (Quoted in Pratt, op. cit., p. 139). Dulles feels that once the provisional government was re­ cognized, the United States had no right to intervene yet a second time (Dulles, op. cit., p. 184).

151 There are few cases in the history of American for­ eign relations that can rival that of the Hawaiian revolu­ tion of 1893 in demonstrating the use of the power of recognition by the United States in the pursuit of high policy, especially -with such a blatant disregard for the customary amenities of international conduct.

The illustri­

ousness of this case is not measured in these terms alone, for it must be recalled that the American action violated a traditional self-denial of such a use of the power of recog­ nition which had been repeatedly acclaimed as an American contribution to international ethics for exactly a century. If it may be claimed that in general the United States has consistently followed a de facto theory in the application of the power of recognition, certainly this case ranks as an outstanding exception. 3.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF PANAMA (1903)

If any case of the use of recognition by the United States has suffered from sharp criticism, it has been that of the recognition of Panamanian independence in November 1903.

A background of assertive imperialism with its

slogan of "manifest destiny 11 served to Indict our action in Panama for a rather gross breach of the rules of inter­ national conduct— a charge which has been difficult for the United States to live down in its relations with Latin

152 .America.52

Since ^manifest destiny” inspired American conduct in the Panamanian revolt, a rapid survey of the factors which led to the adoption of such an imperialistic policy is in order.

Prom the time of the annexation of California

in 1848, the westward.expansion of the United States in­ corporated an interest in an isthmian ship canal, and thus an interest in Central America.

Unfortunately, the United

States had unwittingly renounced its interest in construct­ ing an isthmian canal with any exclusive privileges by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain in 1850.53

Under

the increasing strain of a conscious imperialism, the United States finally gained its release from the bonds of the 1850 agreement by the terms of the famous Hay-Pauncefote

52 in regard to the Hawaiian revolution, some question has been raised as to the advisability of includ­ ing the case of the Panamanian secession in a consideration of the use of recognition. The negative argument is that the decisive element was not recognition, but rather actual intervention. One authority dedicates six pages to the Panamanian affair in his survey of American recognition policy and then apologizes for having discussed an act of intervention (Goebel, op. cit., pp. 212-17). The writer grants the importance oT the case as an example of inter­ vention, but is puzzled by the logic which denies the sig­ nificant part played by recognition. Recognition was a device used to follow up actual intervention; its part was as essential to the realization of American objectives as was that of the intervention itself. It is the writer*s purpose to justify this contention in the following pages. 53 p0p a text of the treaty, see Malloy, Vol. II, pp. 1349-57.

ojd .

cit.,

153 Treaty of 1901.54

As one authority describes the effect of

the latter treaty, flThe way was now clear for the diplomatic arrangements with the Central American state through which the canal must

run*

”55

Two routes were possible, one through Nicaragua and the. other through Panama.

Surveys revealed that the former

was the better choice, but pressure was exerted to purchase the concession of the bankrupt French Canal Company, which had abandoned its project of a canal across Panama after digging about one third of the way.56

£ S a result the famous

Hay-Herran Treaty was negotiated with Colombia and signed on January 22, 1903, granting a cash settlement and an an­ nuity to Colombia in exchange for full control by the United States of a strip of territory across the Isthmus of Panama. Unfortunately, the Colombian Congress refused to ratify the treaty on the exasperating pretext of holding out for more money•

54 por a text of the treaty, see Malloy, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 782-4. 55 Samuel F* Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1936), p. 5TX. 55 The unbecoming pressure exerted by panicky stock­ holders of the defunct French canal Company seems to have been a decisive influence in the final choice of the Panama route. The story behind the Panama lobby is revealed in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Hareourt, Brace and Co., 1931). See also J. Fred Rippy, The Capital­ ists and Colombia (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1931), Chapter V.

154 President Roosevelt was thoroughly provoked at the Colombian action, and was at first undecided whether to turn to the Nicaraguan alternative or win some shape or way to interfere when it becomes necessary so as to secure the ' Panama route without further dealing with the foolish and homicidal corruptionists at B o g o t a * W h a t e v e r may be said, it is at least certain that the stubbornness of the Colombian Congress was the direct cause of the revolution in Panama .5*3 Many Colombians, especially those in Panama, re­ sented the action of the Colombian Congress.

Two foremost

Panamanians immediately began plans for organizing a revolu­ tion.

Meanwhile Mr. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, ex-chief

engineer of the French Canal company, prepared the was for the revolution by playing upon the sympathies of more ag­ gressive imperialists in New York and Washington.

As

Goebel remarks, #lDefinite information of the probability of such an outbreak appears to have been given our administra­ tion long before the event actually took place.**59 While the complicity of the United States government or of any of its officials has never been proven, at least

5? Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (New Y 0 rk: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1920), Vol. I, p. 278. Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 230 eh. seq. 59 Goebel, op. cit., p. 213.

155 nothing was done to discourage a movement which presented itself for their convenience.6 0

Orders from the Acting

Secretary of the Navy on November 2, 1903, to American war­ ships previously despatched to Panama were to Mprevent land­ ing of any armed force, either Government or insurgent, with hostile intent.”6^- As one commentator has observed, !l0n the day before the revolution was scheduled to take place, the United States Navy was fully instructed to prevent the Col­ ombian Government forces from landing on the isthmus. t,62 The success of the revolution was assured when the United States Navy persuaded the Colombian troops stationed at Colon to return home and prevented a Colombian troopship from landing. Meanwhile, however, Beaupre, the United States Minis­ ter at Bogota, was undergoing a difficult and embarrassing time.

On November

6

he notified the State Department that

the Colombian Government wished to know whether the United States was prepared to preserve her sovereignty in the isthmus, and relayed a practical guarantee of ratification of the Hay-Herran Treaty if the United States would allow

60

Bemis, op. cit., p. 213.

61

Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 218.

Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy; ~ Study in American Imperialism (New York: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925), p. 79. 62

156 Colombian troops to land on the isthmus.63

It is at pre­

cisely this point that the power of recognition was em­ ployed to offset the Colombian offer now that the objectives of the United States had progressed to a new stage.

The

Colombian offer, made only three days after the outbreak of the revolution, was too late, for on the same day the United States recognized the de facto government of

Panama.

64

In reply to the Colombian offer, Secretary of State Hay wired Beaupre that The people of Panama having, by an apparently unani­ mous movement, dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their inde­ pendence, having adopted a government of their own, republican in form, with which the Government of the United States of America has entered into relations, the President of the United States, in accordance with the ties of friendship which have so long and so happily existed between the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the Governments of Colombia and Panama the peaceable and equitable settlement of all questions at issue between them. Apparently, Beaupre did not fully appreciate the meaning of the instructions of the Secretary of State, for he again wired to ask whether General Reyes would be free to conduct operations in Panama.

Hay rather curtly replied,

63 General Reyes informed Beaupre that he was pre­ pared to declare martial law and ratify the treaty by decree, or call another session of Congress— whichever the United States desired--In return for permission to land troops in Panama (Ibid., p. 80). 64 Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 233. 65 Ibid., pp. 224-6

157 *fI telegraphed you on November

6

that we had entered into

relations with the provisional government. Although it was now too late to undo what had already been done, General Reyes submitted an able protest to the United States on December 23, 1903, in which he rightfully blamed United States intervention for the failure of Colom­ bia to suppress the rebellion, and pointed out that the course of the United States in recognizing previous governments had in no way justified the action toward Panama, and that by recognizing and guaranteeing Panamanian independence the United States had deliberately violated its express obliga­ tions towards Colombia . 61 The reply of Secretary Hay to the Colombian protest deserves special attention, if only to see how the Secre­ tary met the embarrassing charge of prejudicial inconsist­ ency with our traditional practice of recognition by an acknowledgment .so obviously given without imposing a test of stability.

In attempting to excuse the haste in recog­

nition, Hay explained that . . . if in the present instance the powers of the world gave their recognition with unwonted promptitude, it is only because they entertained the common convic­ tion that interests of vast importance to the whole civilized world were at stake, which would, by any

66

Loc. cit.

67

Ibid., p. 284.

158 other course, be put in peril . 6 8 Soon after the independence of Panama had been estab­ lished, the United States realized its primary objective by a treaty with the new republic which conferred upon the United States the right to build the canal, fortify it, and to possess a ten mile zone across the length of the isthmus nas if it were sovereign. r,69 In review, it is to be observed that the United States went so far as even to violate its own tenets in recognizing the independence of Panama.

By means of this acknowledgment,

the United States gave to Panama the final assurance of suc­ cess and prevented any overtures of compromise emanating from the Colombian authorities.

The objective of the United

States had been primarily to secure a canal concession, and when a temporary but annoying hindrance was occasioned by the stubbornness of Colombia, the United States took advan­ tage of an isthmian revolt to guarantee its success. ^ 0

68

Deal­

Ibid,, p. 294;

69 Bemis, op. cit., p. 515.

A month before the revolt, Roosevelt admitted a desire to see Panama independent. Writing to Dr. Albert Shaw, October 10, 1903, he remarked, MI cast aside the pro­ position at this time to foment the secession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do, the United States cannot go into the securing, by such underhand means, the cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at this moment (Quoted by Nearing and Freeman', op. cit., p. 82, from the Literary Digest, 29:551-2, October 29, 1904.

159 ing with a grateful and weaker republic was eminently pre­ ferable to dealing with Colombia; thus the United States extended a quick recognition as a means of securing the advantage already gained by intervention.

The recognition

of Panama was an important and even vital step in securing for the United States its coveted goal of an isthmian canal. 4.

THE NON-RECOGNITION OP MANCHUKUO (1932)

Much of the confusing complexity which surrounds and precedes the declaration of American policy toward the SinoJapanese dispute over Manchuria must be sacrificed in the interest of emphasizing the single aspect of non-recognition, as applied to Manchukuo by Secretary of State Stimson in his identic note of January 7, 1932.

The legal relationship

of the powers--especially those of the United States, Japan and China--demand brief treatment, however, in order to ex­ plain the evolution and significance of the Stimson policy of non-recognition. Manchuria, a loosely-held province of China, had been the object of Japanese penetration for decades prior to the military occupation in 1931.

By treaties negotiated mainly

with China but partly also with Russia--Japanfs imperial­ istic rival in Manchuria— the Japanese had secured a ,fspe­ cial position” there, although not without arousing the ap­ prehension of the United States and the other great powers.

160 As one authority has pointed out, Japan had vainly endeavored to persuade the rest of the world that there was an absolute distinction between Manchuria and the rest of China, in order to exempt Man­ churia from the obligations of the Open Door* The United States had notified Japan quite bluntly that *so far as the United States is concerned, Manchuria is es­ sentially Chinese soilJ^l Until about the turn of the last century, the inter­ est of the United States in par Eastern politics was of little consequence, but after 1905 ,!the principal opposi­ tion to Japan in her Asian ventures came from the United States . 11*72

By means of the concession of the South Man­

churian Railway Company--the principal agency through which Japan has acted to develop her sphere of interest--Japan has entrenched herself so thoroughly within Manchuria that by 1916 an American authority was able to state that * . . the Japanese authority has become practically absolute, not alone in the Leased Territory and along the Railway Z o n e , but, indirectly, throughout all of Southeastern Manchuria; for, while the Chinese adminis­ tration still functions, the Chinese officials submit to the exercise of a veto power by the Japanese which renders Japan for practical purposes the final authority in determining issues of importance•73 The anxiety of the great powers to restrain Japanese

^ Claude A. Buss, War and Diplomacy in Sastern Asia (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1941), p”. TU3. 72 Harold M. Vinacke, A History cf the Far Bast in Modern Times (New Yorks F. S* 0rof ts and "Co., 193771 P • 427. *73 Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politic s in the Far East (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1916), p. 262.

161

imperialism in China increased as the result of Japan* s en­ croachments during the World War, and an opportunity to commit the Japanese to uphold the territorial integrity of China was presented at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, held in 1921-22.

While Japan suc­

cessfully forestalled a consideration of the status of existing commitments in China, thereby gaining an implicit recognition of the status quo in Manchuria, it joined the United States and seven other powers in signing the NinePower Treaty, concluded on February

6

, 1922.

By the terms

of this treaty, Japan and the other signatories were ob­ ligated (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) To provide the fullest and most unembar­ rassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To re­ frain from taking advantage of conditions in Cbina in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.*^ It was singularly unfortunate that political con­ siderations forbade the consideration at the Washington Conference of the 1915 treaties imposed upon China by Japan with reference to Manchurian concessions, for while signing

*74 United States Treaty Series, No. 723.

162

tiie self-denying Nine-Power Pact, Japan remained more in­ sistent than ever upon the validity of these treaties, which extended the concessions as well as the period of the lease of the Kwantung territory*

China *s refusal to regard the

1915 treaties as valid, due to the duress which occasioned their signature, greatly increased the potential friction between the two Eastern Asiatic powers despite the commit­ ments of Japan in the Nine-Power Treaty. Besides the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan was similarly committed by Article 10 of the covenant of the League of Nations ”to respect and preserve as against external ag­ gression the territorial integrity and existing political independence11 of China, both parties being members of the League.

Since the United States was not a party to the

Covenant, the only other important legal commitment which the United States as an interested party felt entitled to invoke in case of further violent changes in the Far East was the Pact of Paris, signed August 27, 1928.

This agree­

ment, to which both Japan and the United States were parties, pledged the signatories to renounce war as an instrument of na­ tional policy and settle all disputes by pacific means only .175

*75 tpke text of the Pact of Paris and a brief, enlight­ ening discussion of its debatable meaning and interpreta­ tions may be found in John H. Latane and David W* Wainhouse, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: The Odyssey Press, 194UJ*, PP* 752-62*

163

The growth of Chinese nationalism increased the ten­ sion between China and Japan, a tension which soon came to a climax in Manchuria.

A series of incidents culminating in

an explosion which damaged the Japanese-controlled South 'Manchurian Railroad on the night of September 18, 1931, led rapidly to the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. Despite the apparent violation of Japan*s treaty commitments in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Pact and the Treaty of Paris, the Japanese con­ tinued to consolidate their gains in Manchuria in the very face of rising protests from the world at large, and par­ ticularly from the United states and the League of Nations. By January 3, 1932, the Japanese were in complete control of Manchuria, and were in the midst of erecting a puppet state out of the Chinese province which they had begun to establish almost immediately after the first a t t a c k . T h e independence movement in Manchuria, ninspired, fostered, and controlled by Japanese officials culminated in a declara­ tion of independence on February 18, 1932.,,r^ This legal and historical approach serves as a neces­ sary preface to the reaction of the United states to the establishment of the state of Manchukuo by Japanese arms.

ibid.., p. 780. 77

Ibid.., pp. 780-1.

164 It has been detailed with particular care, for it forms an important background to the adoption of a novel policy of non-recognition by the United States.

While Japan continu­

ally insisted that ”the whole Manchurian affair was occa­ sioned solely by a violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese Army on the railway zone,”78 the rapidity and precision of the movement was interpreted by the State Department as evidence of an elaborately preconceived plan. 79 Pour days after the initial outbreak the State Department presented a memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador in Wash­ ington stating that events in Manchuria were of ’'concern, morally, legally and politically to a considerable number of nations,” adding that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria ”brings into question at once the meaning of certain provi­ sions of agreements, sudi as the Nine-Power Treaty of Febru­ ary

6

, 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.”80

The memorandum

directly laid down the challenge to Japan by stating that . . . the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situ­ ation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exer-

^ Senate Document No. 55, Conditions in Manchuria, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 24. ^ Henry L. Stimson, The Par Eastern Crisis (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936), p. 36. ^ &enafre Document No. 515, Conditions in Manchuria, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 4-5.

165 cl sing de facto control in sontli Manchuria. 81 On October 20, 1931, a Washington note to China and Japan called the attention of both disputants to the obliga­ tions they had assumed under the Pact of Paris with the statement that A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of pro­ found concern to the whole world and for this reason the American Government, like other governments, was constrained to call to the attention of both disput­ ants the serious dangers involved in the present situ­ ation.

This Government now desires, as do other signatories of the treaty for the renunciation of war, particularly to call to the attention of the Japanese and the Chin­ ese Governments the obligations which they voluntarily assumed when they became parties to the treaty, especi­ ally the obligations of Article II, which reads: fThe high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. Meanwhile, China had appealed to the League of Na­ tions, which, before the adjournment of the Council on September 30, 1931, had succeeded in exacting pledges of peace from both the Chinese and Japanese representatives.

81 82

P* 4 * Ibid., p . 5.

83 Japan had also given assurances to the United States that her military forces in Manchuria would refrain from any further acts of hostility and would "avoid any action that is calculated to prejudice an amicable settle­ ment of the differences between Japan and China 11 (Ibid., p. 1 1 ).

166

Eight days later, however, Japan apparently broke its pledge by an aerial bombardment of the unfortified city of Chinchow, some fifty miles from the railway zone.

The United

States presented a strong protest to Japan over the Chinchow incident, brusquely rejecting the explanations of the Japan­ ese military authorities as being quite inadequate, adding that the attack ”would appear quite at variance with the commitments undertaken by the Japanese Government in respect to the resolution of September 30 of the Council of the League of Nations.”®^ The intense interest of-the world in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria provided the United States with an opportunity to work in close collaboration with the League of Nations in the hope that by joint effort Japan could be restrained.

The ineffectiveness of the League, despite its

courageous and pioneering efforts, and the resurgence of an anti-League spirit in the United States, drove Stimson, how­ ever, from a policy of f,direct participation” in the League to one of llindependent cooperation” by November 1931 ^ 5 Hope for a peaceful settlement by means of League intervention was still held with the decision of the Council on December 10 to establish a Commission of Inquiry to in­

84

i b l d •»

p*

17 •

Latane and Wainliou.se, op. cit., p. 774.

167

vestigate the entire dispute on the spot.

After some show

of reluctance, Japan not only consented to the investigation by the League Commission but also agreed, pending the re­ port of the Commission, flnot to aggravate further the situ­ ation by moving to eliminate the Chinese authority from Chinchow, which alone remained outside the field of Japan­ ese control # ” 8 6 Being so near to complete control of Manchuria, the Japanese forsook their pledge of December 10, and on Janu­ ary 3, 1932, occupied Ghinchow.

At t he same time the Japan­

ese government issued a long statement defending the occupa­ tion of Chinchow nas a measure of self-defense, which was expressly reserved by its representative at Geneva on Dec­ ember

10

#”8*7

Paced with the military conquest of Manchuria, which had progressed to its culmination despite the activities of the League of Nations, Secretary Stimson abandoned his pol­ icy of actively supporting the League in favor of taking the initiative against Japan.

On January 7, 1932, Stimson sent

his famous identic note to the governments of China and Japan which embodies what has since become known as the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition.

The full text of the

Yinacke, op . cit., p. 459. Tatsujl Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (>Doub 1 edayy Doran and Company, Inc., 1935 5, p. 370.

168 note follows: With, the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently autho­ rized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obliga­ tions therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it can not admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agree­ ment entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy rela­ tive to China commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties . 8 8 The reply of the Japanese government, January 16, 1932, left the issue to be resolved upon a question of fact, for in the words of the Japanese rejoinder, They [the Japanese government] take note of the statement of the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matter which . . . might be brought about by means contrary to the treaty of August 27th, 1928. It might be the subject of academic doubt, whether in a given case the im.propriety of means necessarily and always avoids the

8 8 Senate Document No. 55, Conditions in Manchuria, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 53-4.

ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise. Admitting the binding character of the stipulations of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, the Japanese reply goes on to state that the present unsettled and dis­ tracted state of China was not contemplated by the parties at the Washington Conference in 1921-22, and thus ,fit £the state of ChinaJ may in material respects modify their ap­ plication, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist. ”89

In the

words of one eminent Japanese authority, Japan has never disputed the doctrine of non-recognition itself, but l,what Japan has disputed is the accusation that it has used any means contrary to the Pact of Paris or the Covenant of the League of Nations , ” 9 0

Japan, therefore, only disputes the

relevance of the Stimson Doctrine to the Manchurian Inci­ dent . The significance of the Stimson note and the impli­ cations of the doctrine have created continued interest and discussion ever since its initial announcement.

It has

been suggested, however, that except for the reference to the Pact of Paris and the implied reference to the Nine-

8°

Ibid., p. 56.

Kisaburo Yokota, ”The Recent Development of the Stimson Doctrine,” Pacific Affairs, 8:133-43, June, 1935, p. 142. 90

170

Power Treaty, the Stimson Doctrine is not a new policy in the annals of American diplomacy.

The doctrine— even much

of its phraseology--dates back to an identic note sent by Secretary of State Bryan to China and Japan on May 11, 1915, in connection with the Twenty-One Demands which Japan at the time was presenting to China in the form of an ultima­ tum.^^-

Other American precedents for the Stimson Doctrine

have been suggested, including a declaration made at the First International Conference of the American States, held in Washington in 1889-90, and a note to Japan from Secre­ tary Hughes in 1920 with regard to Japanese operations in Russian Siberia.92 Despite the precedents mentioned above, however, the Hoover administration took considerable pride in the belief that the Stimson Doctrine of Hon-Recognition was a new con-

91 The most significant excerpt from the Bryan note, which Stimson merely rephrased in his note of January 7, 1932, states that the United States '’cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered Into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China known as the open door policy *1 (Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 146). ^ The precedents suggested were brought up and dis­ cussed by members of the American Society of International Law at their 34th annual meeting in Washington, D*C*, in May of 1940. The discussion has been reported in the Froceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Ameri­ can Society of International Law (Washington, D.C., 19407, pp. §4-$7.

171

tribution to the methods of checking aggression.

William

R. Castle, at the time Under-Secretary of State, referred to the doctrine as a flnew dictum in international law," and as

11the

strongest moral sanction the world has ever

k n o w n . P r e s i d e n t Hoover, in a speech accepting the Republican nomination on August 12, 1932, proclaimed that I have projected a new doctrine into international affairs, the doctrine that we do not and never will recognize title to possession of territory gained in violation of the peace pact.94 As one authority suggests, a close examination of the Stimson note of January 7, 1932, reveals not one but two distinct policies of non-recognition.95

^He first,

referring to the non-recognition of any treaty or agreement which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the integrity of China and the open door policy, is almost identical with the policy of non-recognition declared by the United States on May 11, 1915, with regard to the TwentyOne Demands.96

The second, referring to the non-recognition-

93 Department of State press Releases, No. 136, May 7, 1932, pp. 418 and 436. 94 Hew York Times, August 13, 1932. 93 chesney Hill, "Recent Policies of Non-Recognition," International Conciliation, No. 293, October, 1933, p. 13. L o c . cit.

172 of "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris , 11 is in itself an innovation.

The author­

ity referred to surmises from this second aspect of the Stim­ son Doctrine that non-recognition could extend to a treaty or agreement even though it does not impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China.97 It is the reference to the Pact of Paris that gives to the Stimson Doctrine its main character, as well as its originality, for by implication Stimson regarded the Pact of Paris as proscribing the conquest which Japan was en­ gaged upon in China.98

As this authority suggests, Japan,

as a party to the Kellogg pact, however, obviously never subscribed to that interpretation, nor did Paraguay, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, or the U.S.S.R., who were all parties to the Pact of Paris, and who were all recently engaged in conquest.^ While Secretary Stimson valiantly tried to indict Japan for having violated the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, he was still resting his policy on rather arbitrary

^

koc. cit.

98 Herbert W. Briggs, "Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the Doctrine," Proceedings~of the Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American SocTety of International Law, p. 76. ~ 99 Loc. cit.

173 and vague grounds.

Even beyond the question of whether

Japan had violated the Pact of Paris, there yet remained the issue of whether its violation obligated the other signatories not to recognize a situation, treaty, or agree­ ment brought about by means contrary to the pact.

The

primary question of violation, however, is not so easily resolved as the State Department seems to have decided. Although the Pact of Paris appears clear, the document was almost emasculated from the outset by reservations, inter­ pretations, explanations and exceptions made by the various signatories. 1 0 0

one authority suggests the dilemma created

by the various limitations in the query, Does the text of the Pact embody the full intention of the negotiators, or is it to be read in the light of the ‘reservations1 which the signatories made but did not formally incorporate in the agreement? 1 0 1 Prominent among the powers attaching reservations to the pact was the United States, which did not ratify the treaty until after Secretary Kellogg had included in the

100 rpke main text of the Pact of Paris is as follows: ‘‘Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international contro­ versies, and renounce it as an instrument of national pol­ icy in their relations with one another. Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solu­ tion of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among theip, shall never be sought except by pacific means” (United •States Treaty Series, No. 796). 101 Latane and Wainhouse, oj>. cit., p. 752.

174

diplomatic record of the negotiations an interpretative note of June 23, 1928, in which he clarified the hearing of the agreement on the right of self-defense by stating that That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether the circumstances necessi­ tate recourse to war in self-defense. 1 0 2 Secretary Kellogg*s interpretative note, especially in its granting to each state the right to decide whether a war of self-defense is in order, rather materially weak­ ened the pact in the estimation of many of its critics. In ratifying the treaty, the United States Senate in adopt­ ing the report on the treaty by its Committee on Foreign Relations, January 15, 1929, further limited its scope by the statement that "the United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its national security and selfdefense."

Although the Committee*s report carefully empha­

sized its purpose as being that of recording "the true interpretation of the treaty," and not in any sense as attempting to effectuate a reservation to the treaty (a rather dubious distinction), it further added the signifi­ cant statement that

102 Department of State, The General Pact for the Renunciation of War (Washington, D.C.s Government printing Office,

175 The committee further understands that the treaty does not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty or any nations adhering to the treaty violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the part of any other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive measures as against the nation violating the t r e a t y . 103 It is to be emphasized, therefore, that the United States had fully interpreted the Pact of Paris before it became a part of the law of the land, and that in ratifying the agreement, the United States understood it to allow wars made in self-defense, include the Monroe Doctrine with­ in the meaning of American self-defense, to permit each signatory to determine when a war of self-defense becomes justified, and to obligate no signatory to engage in punitive or coercive measures as against a state violating the pact.104 In view of these restrictive interpretations, it is diffi­ cult to substantiate Secretary Stimson*s claim that Japan

103 iphQ full text of the report may be found in United States Senate, 70th Congress, 2nd Session, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 104 ^ome question has arisen as to whether the inter­ pretative notes are as binding and as much within the mean­ ing of the agreement a s .if they were written into the text^ itself. An interesting discussion of this point may be found in David Hunter Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris; a Study of the Briand-Kellogg Trea t y (New York: 0. P. Put­ nam Ts Sons, 1928), pp. 118-19. As one authority points out, however, ‘‘Whatever the right legal answer may be, the considerations by which a nation violating the treaty will be judged lie more in the field of politics and public opinion than they do in that of law” (Latane and Wainhouse, op. cit., p. 754).

176

had even violated the Pact of Paris, let alone that it was incumbent upon the United States, as a signatory to the pact, to refuse recognition of the effects of the asserted violation, ^ 5 Reservations and interpretations by other signa­ tories were also made, the most far-reaching having been the reservation of the British, who accepted the treaty only on the far-reaching condition that it would not pre■judice their freedom of action in ^certain regions of the world (unspecifiedQ

the welfare and integrity of which

constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety•

less significant was the interpretative

note sent by the Japanese government on May 26, 1928, which endorsed the American interpretation on the vital issue of the right of self-defense with the statement that wThe proposal .of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right

£ most pessimistic view of the pact is registered by Professor Borehard, who argues that since both the negoti­ ations and the text made it clear that ratifying states had not renounced, wars in self-defense, and that each signatory had the right to interpret the pact for itself, the pact had no definite or positive practical meaning as to what wars were renounced, but rather had the practical effect of legal­ izing all wars (Edwin M. Borehard, ”The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War,” American Journal of Inter­ national Law, 23:116-20, January, 1§29, p. 116). 106 ipke text of the British reservation may be found in Department of State, The General Pact for the Renuncia­ tion of War, pp. 26-9.

177 of self-defense. . . Contending, therefore, that her use of force in Man churia was justified on grounds of self-defense, Japan seemed to have the legal side of the issue pretty well in hand in terms of the 1928-29 American interpretation of the Pact of Paris.

In fact, the claim of self-defense was

never as far-fetched as many were led to helieve.

If the

measures taken by Japan in the name of self-defense were not justified, at least there was evidence to support the con­ tention of the Japanese that some positive measures of selfdefense were imperative under the circumstances and at the time.-^®

Japanese statements are replete with the claim,

but an interesting substantiation of the Japanese position comes from an American authority on the Far East who, in justifying the Japanese action in Manchuria, complained that Every foreign government . • • knew what was trans­ piring in Manchuria . . . that the Young Marshal with an army of 400,000 veterans supported by the largest

107 rpftg text of the Japanese note of May 26, 1928, may be found in Takeuchi, oj>. cit., pp. 262-3. It cannot be overlooked, however, that in the re­ port of the neutral commission (Lytton Commission) sent by the League of Nations to investigate the Manchurian affair the Japanese claim that her actions were in self-defense was investigated and found untenable. The report states that r,the military operations of the Japanese troops during the night (September 18, 1932) . . . cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defenseff (League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of tTTe Commission o f Enquiry, p."Vl).

178 arsenal in Asia, had announced his determination to drive the 11,000 Japanese railway guards out of Man­ churia. They were fully aware as to the nature and the progress of the "boycotts, the seizure of Japanese goods, the violence of anti-Japanese movements, the virulence of anti-Japanese propaganda and the meaning of incident after incident in Manchuria. They knew that it was only a question of time when under protec­ tion of the law, the huge Japanese investments in Manchuria would be ruined, that all that Japan had fought so hard to obtain would be wrested from her.109 The Japanese wedge of self-defense in the American argument drove stimson to revise the 1928-29 interpretation of the pact of Paris.

In a strong speech on August

8

, 1932,

the Secretary maintained that countless precedents had clearly established the limits of self-defense, and added that "a nation which sought to mask imperialistic policy under the guise of the defense of its nationals would soon be

unmasked.

”110

A few weeks later, Stimson went even

further with the bold statement that there was nothing in the pact warranting the destructive interpretation that ,feach signatory was to be the sole judge of its own be­ havior. ” 1 1 1 Enough has been said about the question of Japan’s

100 Qeorge Bronson Rea, ’’Documents of American His­ tory: The Stimson Doctrine; where Will It Lead Us ? 11 Far Eastern Review, 31:444-9, December, 1935, p. 447. Henry L* Stimson, uTbe Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development , 11 Department of State Publications No. 357, 1932, p. 4. H I Department of State Press Releases, October 25, 1932.

179 violation of the peace pact to indicate that at best the claim of Secretary Stimson is legally debatable.

Passing

to the second prop of the Stimson doctrine of non-recogni­ tion— the asserted obligation of non-recognition.of the effects of a violation of the pact— one is struck even more by the difficulties involved in constructing a legal case for the claim.

It is submitted at the outset that, in his

note of January 7, Stimson did not make the express claim that an obligation of non-recognition existed.

In that

document the words were framed to read merely that the United States ’’does not Intend to recognize . • .,! Like­ wise, in Stimson*s letter to Senator Borah of February 24, 1932, the Secretary, employing stronger words, still made no expressed claim of an obligation to refuse recognition of the changes wrought by Japan.H2 The implication is clear in the Stimson correspon­ dence, however, that such an obligation of non-recognition existed; it marks a fundamental attitude in the Secretary1s written commentaries on the Manchurian affair.113

As one

1 1 2 jt is to be noted that while in the note of January 7, Stimson used the words ’’does not intend to re­ cognize, 11 in his letter to Borah the Secretary wrote ’’would not recognize . 11 For the text of the letter to Borah, see New York Times, February 25, 1932.

113 gee, for instance, Stimson 1 s ’’The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development, 11 Department of State Publication No. 357, and his later work, The Far Eastern Crisis’ (New ^ork: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936).

180 authority remarks, Stimson believed he was acting in support of the provisions of the Pact of Paris, even acting under their mandate, in refusing recognition, and he felt that states bound by the pact could not officially approve situ­ ations resulting from its violation.114 ■ Following out this reasoning, Stimson seems to have felt that Extension of de facto or de jure recognition to a state or government' established on territory acknow­ ledged to belong to a part^ by other parties through the use of war in its legal or military definition would constitute affixing such a seal of approval. The fact that Stimson was prone to accept non-recognition as an obligation, and yet was reluctant to make an express claim to that effect in his diplomatic corres­ pondence, suggests the possibility that the Secretary pre­ ferred not to meet the question.

Apparently, it was much

simpler to offer non-recognition as a sanction against Japan without risking the chance that the question or its existence as an obligation would, if not universally ac-

Roland H. Sharp, "Duties of IMon-Recognition in Practice: 1775-1934," Geneva Special Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Geneva: Geneva Research center, 1934), p. To. hoc. cit. It is to be observed, however, that not all authorities are in agreement with the contention that the extension of recognition signifies approbation. Many follow the lead of Professor Borehard in approving his stand that "Recognition is merely designed to indicate that you are dealing with the new accomplished fact. You neither approve nor disapprove" (proceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American Society of Internationa1 haw, p. 9T).

181

cepted by the other signatories to the pact, imperil the foundation of Stimson^ policy.

In fact, one of Stimson1s

first steps after the announcement of the non-recognition policy was to entreat the other nations of the world to back up his stand by adopting a similar .attitude.

This

Stimson did by the circuitous but well-considered device of his open letter to Senator Borah, in which the Secretary suggested that if the non-recognition doctrine were general­ ly adopted, . . . a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought; to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived. Although no formal meeting of the other signatories of the Fact of Paris occurred in an effort to express an identity of interpretation of the pact, the Stimson request did take effect within the League of Nations; the results of the deliberations of the Assembly of that body being concurred to by important non-member states, parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

A draft resolution of the Assembly,

unanimously voted on March 11, 1932, reaffirmed the policy of non-recognition already stated by the Council of the League, and added that

116 Hew York Times, February 25, 1932

182 The Assembly . . . pending the steps which it may ulti­ mately take for the settlement of the dispute, which has been referred to it, Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is insr cumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris Moreover, the definite report on the Sino-Japanese dispute, finally adopted by the Assembly of the League on February 24, 1933, on the basis of the report of the Lytton Commission as it emerged from the Committee of Nineteen, incorporated the terms of the Assembly Eesolution of March 11, 1932.11

In a note to the League, the United States

endorsed the action of the Assembly and declared that . . . the findings of fact arrived at by the League and the understanding of the facts derived by the American government from reports made to it by its own representatives are in substantial a c c o r d . 1 1 9 Thus it is submitted that while there is some doubt as to whether Japan had actually violated the Pact of Paris, and while there is even more doubt as to whether non-recog­ nition of the effects of an asserted violation was an obligation incumbent upon the other signatories, Secretary

heague of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement N o . 101, 1932, pp. 87-8. League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement N o . 112, 1933, pp. 22 and 75-6. 119 New York Times, February 26, 1933.

183

Stimson nonetheless successfully joined his policy of nonrecognition with the Pact of Paris, and was gratified in observing that the members of the League of Nations adopted a similar view* Secretary Stimson did not, however, rest his policy on the basis of the Pact of Paris alone, for hardly less prominent were his claims of Japan1s violation of the NinePower Pact*

The invocation of the Nine-Power pact was

particularly emphasized by Stimson after Japan had invaded Shanghai on January 28, 1932, for the Secretary hoped to capitalize on this attack upon the nerve center of Britain*s Par Eastern interests by providing a solid basis for a joint appeal*

Since the Secretary had no occasion to dis­

tinguish between the obligations of signatories to the Pact of Paris and those of signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty, a discussion of the possible obligation of non-recognition of a situation violative of the Nine-Power Treaty does not become necessary, for it is implicit in all that has been stated regarding the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

A few words re­

main to be said, however, concerning the primary charge of violation of the Nine-Power agreement. It has already been seen that as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan was committed, among other things, t!to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the

184

territorial and administrative integrity of China.,f120

It

is difficult— and from the American point of view, impossible--to reconcile Japan1s invasion and occupation of Man­ churia with the obligations she assumed under the Nine-Power Pact, but Japan nonetheless made a significant attempt at It* In the reply to Stimson1s note of January 7, 1932, Japan assured Washington that she contemplated no territorial aims or ambitions in Manchuria, but Intimated that a new state would be set up in Manchuria by the Chinese people there who were f,not destitute of the powerfor self-determination.**121 The prospect of a Manchurian independence movement put an entirely new light upon the problem, and directly affected the relationship of the powers both with respect to the Nine-Power Treaty and to the Pact of Paris.

A bona

fide movement for independence, if actually present at the time, would have partially emasculated the basis for the American policy of non-recognition, for the United States has traditionally been leery of being exposed to the charge of intervening against the inherent right of rebellion by a foreign community from its parent state . 1 2 2

j-t was one

Supra, p. 161. ^21 genate Document No. 55, Conditions in Manchuria, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 56. 122 policy, originating in Jefferson* s instruc­ tions to Crouverneur Morris In 1792-3, is emphasized and en­ larged upon in Chapter III, supra.

185 tiling to oppose any move by Japan in “taking advantage of the conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges* • .«3.23

might have been another thing to

refuse recognition to a bona fide secession state such as Manchukuo soon claimed itself to b e *3-24

The Japanese For­

eign Minister, Count Uchida, made capital of this defense in an address before the Japanese Diet on August 25, 1932, in which he announced the imminent de jure recognition of the new state of Manchukuo by Japan and asserted that the Nine-Power Treaty did not guarantee Ghina against “seces­ sion movements. “3-25 It is possible, although highly improbable, that such a genuine independence movement did take place at the time in Manchuria.3.26

The Lytton Commission investigated

3*23 wording quoted from text of the Nine-Power Pact. 3.24 One pro-Japanese publicist (American) even criti­ cized Stimson1s interpretation of the Pact of Paris as pro­ scribing the legitimate right of revolution, stating that “This new concept of the Peace Pact throws upon the liberty loving American people the obligation to come to the support of the oppressors whenever revolution or force is resorted to on the part of the oppressed or their friends to right their wrongs. It denies recognition to any new state brought into being as the result of force whether from within or without, that is to say, the same methods whereby every nation from the beginning of time has come into existence and been recog­ nized as one of .the Family 11 (Rea, 0 £. cit., p. 445). 125 Quoted in Takeuchi, ojd. c i t ., pp. 389-90. 3-26 Qenuine or otherwise, the independence movement in Manchuria culminated in a declaration of independence on February 18, 1932. On March 9, the ex-Emperor of China, Henry Pu-yi, was inaugurated as Regent of Manchukuo— Manchu­ kuo being the name given to the new state created to supplant the former Chinese provinces comprising Manchuria.

186

ther claim on the spot, and reported its conclusion that the new Manchukuoan regime wcannot he considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement♦“127

The denial by the Lytton Com­

mission of the claim of a genuine independence movement has been almost universally accepted.

It is interesting to

note, however, that one American authority has recently maintained that much that has come to light since 1932 tends to modify this judgment of the Lytton Commission. In the words of this authority, That there was a strong movement in Manchuria for an autonomous administration, freed from all responsibility to Nanking and relieved from the burdens of costly ad­ ventures in China, seems probable. That the advocates of “Manchuria for the Manchurians11 could not risk a rebellion against the armed forces of Chang Hsueh-liang is even more likely. But when the Japanese army scat­ tered the divisions of the Young Marshal all the separa­ tist elements dared raise their heads. That the work of the Japanese army made possible an independent Man­ chukuo is unquestioned; but that the Japanese had to create a separatist movement is very doubtful.128 It may be assumed that regardless of certain claims to the contrary, Japan did violate the Nine-Power Treaty. The logic of the situation led to the consequent claim that parties to the treaty could not consistently recognize as

League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Govern ment, Report o f t h e Commission of Enquiry (Lytton Report), pi 97.--------------------------128 payson J. Treat, The Far East, A Political and Diplomatic History (New York: Harper and Brothers Publish­ ers, 19OTT, P- 501.

187

valid a change in the sovereignty, independence, or terri­ torial and administrative integrity of China.-**29

The policy

pursued by Secretary Stimson supported this stand by soon making it evident that The United states stood definitely committed before the world, as a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, and as a signatory of the Pact of Paris, not to recognize any separate government in Manchuria. 130 Before concluding this survey of the Manchurian case, the writer desires to emphasize the more revolutionary aspects of the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition.

It is

true, as Professor Briggs maintains, that juridically the Stimson declaration of January 7, 1932, is merely a state­ ment of policy like the Monroe Doctrine, and thus imposes no legal obligation upon either the United States or the state to which it was addressed.131

The significance of

the doctrine lies, however, in the claim by Secretary Stim­ son that the United States was legally obligated to adopt such a policy.

The unique feature of the policy, there­

fore, is the effort made to utilize a claimed obligatory non-recognition as well as a voluntary non-recognition as a sanction in the service of an organized movement for peace.

One authority has suggested the implications of

129

3 harp,

op. cit., p. 10.

130 Bemis, Oja. cit., pp. 790-1. 131 Briggs, op. cit., p. 76.

188 the doctrine in his observation that The recognition process ♦ . . has undergone a most fundamental mutation through the emergence of a system of international government which, if it has arrogated to itself the funded power to withhold recognition as in the case of Manchukuo, has also . • . demonstrated the possession of a far more tangible, formal authority than existed before, to confer investiture upon new candidates for statehood.132 It is not disputed that, as Professor Lauterpacht states, the Stimson note of January 7, 1932, implied the transformation of non-recognition ^into a long-range deter­ mination not to validate the fruits of Illegal acts.*1! ^ That which is more open to dispute Is the claim that, as a purely national policy, the Stimson Doctrine has transcended the realm of actions determinable by national policy.

Pro­

fessor Padelford has dispelled the assumption that the Stimson Doctrine has made of non-recognition a legal question by stating that recognition has always been accepted as a matter determined or determinable by national policy, and thus anon-recognition would be essentially a matter determinable in the first instance by national policy.M134

it is acknow-

132 Malbone W. Graham, In Quest of a haw of Recogni­ tion (Faculty Research Lectures. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933), p. 22 I s 3 H. Lauterpacht, nThe Principle of Ion-Recognition in International Law , n Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Con­ flict. Institute of Pacific Relations, Inquiry Series (Hew York: International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 136. 134 Proceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, p. 94.

189

ledged that in certain cases states have yielded by treaty their right to grant recognition under certain conditions similar to those prevailing in the case of Manchuria, for as Padelford states, In the case of treaties or other on the Rights and War Treaty, there been taken out of placed within the

those states which have accepted commitments, as under the Convention Duties of States, the Argentine Antithe matter of non-recognition has the sphere of political policy and ambit of legal relationships.135

The fact of the matter Is, however, that as the Stimson Doctrine was merely an Interpretation, politically made, of certain treaties wherein the obligation of non­ recognition resided only in the interpretation, the policy of the United States towards Japan1s activities In Man­ churia was essentially the employment of non-recognition as a political weapon. The collective aspect of the non-recognition of Manchukuo, provided by the League of Nations decision men­ tioned above, Intensified the sanctionist character of the policy, but failed to make of It an effective weapon against Japan.

With the slower-moving thoroughness that character­

ized Its actions, the League appointed an Advisory Commit­ tee to determine the precise effects of withholding re­ cognition of Manchukuo.

The fact appears to be that in the

case of the League, as no doubt also in the case of the

-*■35 JjO C . c i t .

190 United States, the decision to resort to non-recognition as a sanction was taken before any attempt was made to deter­ mine practical effects.136

Although it is not an essential

concern of this thesis to investigate the actions of the League of Nations in the Manchurian case, it is of interest to note briefly the pioneering efforts of that body in ex­ ploring the potentially sanctionist implications of non­ recognition.

It is significant, however, that in its

efforts to apply non-recognition to Manchukuo, the League was limited to making recommendations to Its members re­ garding steps they might and might not take within the observance of their obligations.137 The report of the Advisory Committee was completed In June of 1933, and a set of recommendations issued by the committee was forwarded to all members and to some non-member states on June 7, 1933.

The seven recommenda­

tions made to the various governments, paraphrased for the sake of brevity, include the followings (1 ) a recommendation that all steps be taken to prevent the accession of Manchukuo to international, conventions; (2 ) a reminder that the Chinese government had declared all postal services in Man-

136 Frederick A* Middlebush, wThe Effects of the Non-Recognition of Manchukuo,w American Political Science Review, 28:677-83, No. 4, 1934, p. 677. 137 jgharp. o|>. cit., p. 13.

191 churia suspended, and that stamps of the Manchukuoan regime would not he honored abroad; (3) a recommendation that of­ ficial quotations of Manchukuoan currency be prevented, but that the currency might be bought and sold in the interna­ tional market; (4) a recommendation that the question of ad­ vising nationals against accepting concessions in Manchukuo be left to the discretion of each government; (5 ) a recom­ mendation that passports issued by Manchukuo not be visaed, but that foreign consuls might issue identity documents or a l& 3»s;5 QZ~Pa sser to residents of Manchukuo wishing to visit those countries; (6 ) a recommendation that the replacement of consuls should not be ruled to imply recognition; (7) a recommendation that applications for the export of opium to Manchukuo should not be granted unless the applicant produced an import certificate in accordance with the Geneva Opium Convention of 1925.3*3® The mildness of these measures to implement non-recog­ nition is self-evident.

While many were discouraged by the

practical ineffectiveness of the policy, there has been a growing realization that justification for the doctrine was not to be sought in its sanctionist aspects, but rather in

138 9

a current editorial in the New York

Times advised that ”Ambassador Welles, with fine skill and needful guile, maneuvered Machado out of office.

. . .*f160

Thomson writes that since American diplomatic activities constituted one of the major factors in the overthrow of Machado, it is true to say that in that sense nthe revolu­ tion was produced as the consequence of the activities of a foreign diplomat •ff161 Although the break was presumably clean, the legal fiction of the constitutionality of the Cespedes government

Charles E. Chapman, Republican Hispanic America (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 158. . 160. n ew York Times, August 17, 1933. 161 Thomson, ojd. cit., p. 258.

205 was conveniently maintained by the United States.

Adopting

the attitude that the question of recognition did not arise— since the new government had come into office by \

constitutional methods--President Roosevelt issued a state­ ment on August 13 stressing the regime fs semblaice of con­ stitutionality, adding significantly that The change of government now taking place in Cuba is in entire accord with the recognized constitution and laws of that country and no possible question of inter­ vention or of the slightest interference with the in­ ternal affairs of Cuba has arisen or is intended by this precautionary step [the sending of three destroyers to Havana]} to protect, if necessary, the lives of Ameri­ can citizens, pending the restoration of normal condi­ tions of law and order by the Cuban authorities.3-62 The claim of constitutionality conveniently allowed the Washington authorities to evade the application of even de facto tests to the Cespedes regime.

It became increas­

ingly apparent, however, that Cespedes headed an extremely precarious government, and many Cubans felt that Cespedes would not continue if the United States withdrew its support.^63

& g Thomson records, disorder in Cuba was rife,

a general strike was proclaimed, and a riding popular sentiment was calling for a thorough political reorganiza­ tion to rid the government of all vestiges of the hated Machado regime.

The government was practically bankrupt,

163 ibid., p. 259. 163 New York Times, August 25 and September 5, 1933.

206 and its ability to continue service on the foreign debt was open to serious question.

Thomson concludes that

The new government was seriously handicapped by its origin in securing popular confidence. In the first place, it had come into office largely as the result of the mediation and was accused by many groups of bearing a 1Made-in-the-U. S.-Embassy1 label. In the second place, its status was based on the 1928 con­ stitution, containing amendments particularly hateful to the Opposition because they had assured to Machado his second term.164 Washington’s a

support of the

support contrived by the refusal of

unstable Cespedes regime-the

United Statesto

apply any tests of recognition— was impotent to stop the political disintegration.

Many Cubans were charging that

the Cespedes government was a United states invention to block social and economic reforms desired by the masses.165 In a desperate attempt to stave off the opposition, the Cespedes regime declared itself frankly and openly revolu­ tionary and de facto only a fortnight after its inception.166 Even though Cespedes ftabandoned the constitutional course which Mr. Welles had attempted to chart for it,” the move markedly failed to satisfy the newer revolutionary elements.167 On September 4-5, a

164 Thomson, 165 popper,

bloodless coup of

ojd.

0 £.

the

cit ., p. 259.

cit., p. 273.

$[ew York Times, August 25, 1953. 167 Thomson, op. cit., p. 260.

rank and fileofthe

207 Cuban army replaced Cespedes by a Committee of Five, which soon elected Grau San Martin as provisional president. The attitude that the United states would take to­ ward the new regime immediately became an issue o f great importance, not only to Cuba, but to the hemisphere gener­ ally and to the success o f the Good Neighbor policy so recently embarked.

As Fitzgibbon states,nThe coup o f

September 5 represented an entire departure from the fic­ tion of constitutional succession which Welles had striven so hard to maintain. ”168

new government was frankly

radical and revolutionary; it criticized its predecessor for not breaking completely with the past and asserting Cuba’s full independence from alleged domination by Ameri­ can governmental and capitalist i n t e r e s t s . I t was quite obvious that Grau San Martin represented a regime unfriendly to the United States, and therefore hardly a government to negotiate with for the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. The situation became even more complicated by the fact that hostility or intervention from Washington in coping with the turn of events in Cuba would seriously handicap any attempt to put across the Good Neighbor Policy at the com­ ing Montevideo Conference of American Republics, which was

168 pitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 198. 169 popper, op. cit., p. 273.

208 to be held in December. While it was sincerely hoped in Washington that intervention would not become necessary, warships were immediately ordered to Cuban waters, and Secretary of Navy Swanson ominously sailed for Havana.

Secretary of State

Hull informed the Cuban ambassador that marines would be landed only if American lives were endangered, but antiAmerican violence continued and the seizure of six American sugar mills was reported in the press. 1*70

The obviously

revolutionary character of the regime made it impossible for Washington to utilize the means of evading the recog­ nition issue employed in the case of Cespedes; the character of the new regime, however, made it quite undesirable to accommodate Grau San Martin by such an attitude even if it had been possible.

Furthermore, it was apparent from the

beginning that during its first few weeks in office, at least, the government of Grau was too unstable to pass even objective tests of recognition.1^ Unfortunately, if the question of recognition could not be answered in the affirmative, non-recognition of Grau would undoubtedly take the color £>f intervention and

'l-'VO ;^ew York Times, September 9, 1933. 1 7 1 As one authority states, the government of Grau San Martin ffwas patently not favored by a majority of the populace, and disorder continued rife” (Fitzgibbon, o p . cit., p. 198).

209 reprisal, as well as the resort to a familiar device to control the political destiny of a neighboring Latin Ameri­ can republic.

This was especially probable in view of the

evasive way that Washington had coddled the more compatible Cespedes regime.

The contrast of non-recognition as ap­

plied to Grau San Martin, plus the threat, at least, of military intervention, omened a distinct embarrassment for the United States in its fervor to breathe life into the highly promising Good Neighbor Policy. In an inspired move to allay suspicion in Latin America, President Roosevelt deferred action in regard to the question of Grau*s recognition until after he had ex­ plained his position to Latin America and had informed the rest of the hemisphere that the United States had no desi re to intervene in Cuba.

This the President did by his immedi­

ate invitation to the ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico to a conference at the White House on September

6

, at which time he f,expre. cit., p. 147. 2^0 hoc. cit.; Thomson herein refers to an article appearing in the London Times of September 28, 1932.

233 on January 25, of the present regime there by the Re­ publics of Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala, Costa Rica having previously denounced the treaty and ex­ tended recognition to El Salvador, the American Charge d»Affaires ad interim in San Salvador has today 'been instructed, under authorization of the President, to extend recognition to the Government of El Salvador, on behalf of the United states.221 With regard to the reactions engendered by the re­ cognition of Martfnez, the consensus was highly laudatory. Professor Chapman, however, commented that it was quite a serious matter, "as it ruined the Central American treaties of 1907, and 1923. ff222

Woolsey, in observing that the three

remaining signatories to the 1923 Treaty decided to recog­ nize Martfnez on the grounds of expediency, was of the opin ion that In view of all the circumstances, the United States also came to the conclud on that it was not feasible to follow a treaty policy outside the circle of treaty members.223 More representative of the general opinion is Pop­ per fs statement that Recognition In this case not only removed a serious inconsistency In our recognition policy but constituted renunciation of any special interest which the United States may have had in the internal political affairs of the Central American Republics. As such, it was

221 Department of State Press Release, January 27, 1934. 222 chapman, op. cit., pp. 157-8. 223 d . H. Woolsey, "The Recognition of the Govern­ ment of El Salvador," American Journal of International haw, 28:325-29, No. 2, April, 1934, p . 328.

234 another illustration of the non-intervention policy of the Roosevelt Administration. It stood in contrast to our attitude in the Cuban situation.224 The action of the United States was generally con­ sidered in the light of Roosevelt1s Good Neighbor Policy. While the New York Times regarded it as an extension of the Good Neighbor Policy,225 another authority stated that the action served a double purpose; 11it peira itted recogni­ tion which in turn served to strengthen the policy of the good

n e i g h b o r .

”226

£ S still one other authority has ob­

served, In the opinion of the Department of State nothing could have been done earlier because of the implied obligations under the Five-Power Treaty; but in acting as soon as circumstances permitted, the United States government showed its desire to avoid interference in the domestic affairs of the Central American republics and removed another impediment to the development of better relations with its southern neighbors *227 As a final sample in this review of opinion concern­ ing the recognition of Martfnez, it is of interest to re­ cord the opinion of a well-known journalist-commentator, whose undocumented statement implied that the United States changed its policy toward Martfnez due to its fear of in-

224 popper, o p . cit., p. 278. 225 |jew York Times, January 26, 1934. 226 katan^ and Wainhouse, ojd. cit., p. 850. 227 Shepardson and Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs, 1954-5, p. 130.

235 creasing Japanese influence in El Salvador at its own ex­ pense,

This authority writes that

By coffee purchases Japan bought Salvador’s retire­ ment from the League of Nations and her recognition of the Manchukuo government. Washington, which for two years had refused to recognize the Martinez government, seated by an unsavory and bloody coup, veered quickly about, brought pressure and secured tariff legislation similar to that in Cuba.228 While it is exceedingly doubtful if the change of policy was prompted by a desire to forestall Japan, it is reasonable to assume that the recognition of Martfnez was a gesture of high policy to appease Latin America in General and Central America in particular.

By repudiating the non­

recognition of Martfnez, Washington provided conclusive evidence of its desire to uphold the doctrines of non-inter­ vention and the equality of states.

The much-resented Wil­

sonian principle, having been generally abrogated in 1930, bowed out entirely before the new era of the Good Neighbor. Thus by a simple act of recognition, the United States was able to go a long ways toward convincing Latin America of the sincerity of its new policy.

228 carleton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938}, pp. 30-31•

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH USE OP RECOGNITION WITH REFERENCE TO THE CHARACTER OP A GOVERNMENT It is the purpose of this chapter to cite examples in the practice of British diplomacy wherein the power of recognition has been used as a device of censure, as a means of discouraging the existence of a government which has been considered inimical to the interests of the state consider­ ing the grant of recognition.

A distinction must be marked

immediately, however, between this use of recognition, which is essentially political in nature, and that which Is pseudolegal.

In the latter category a refusal of recognition be­

comes an obligation arising from treaty commitments, and while this phenomenon is of vast significance in the evolu­ tion of international society, it will be excluded from treatment In this research.

The delimitation is more than

arbitrary, for it marks the distinction between policy and the newer outposts of an expanding international law wherein the state begins to lose control over the power of recogni­ tion— a willful forfeiture to collective action in the promotion of a more civilized society of nations. In the previous pages the prerequisites ordinarily established by a recognizing state were set forth.

One of

these was stability; the other was ability and willingness to

237 fulfill international obligations*1

The latter prerequisite

has been concerned generally with the honoring of contractu­ al obligations, but on occasion has also served to deny re­ cognition on the grounds of a generalized conduct considered dangerous, or perhaps only below a minimum standard of inter­ national behavior*

The relationship of recognition to the

performance of contractual obligations on the part of .the state seeking recognition is a sufficiently particularized question to merit individual treatment in another

c h a p t e r *2

The subject under examination herein, however, is the use of the power of recognition with reference to the more general conduct of a government, in which moral but not legal stand­ ards are established as the basis of consideration for the grant of recognition. 1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN PRANCE (1792)

Of all the European powers, Great Britain was perhaps the most optimistic as to the general tenor of the French revolution which broke out in 1789*

During the first two or

three years the dominance of a middle class group with pre­ dilections toward a limited monarchy not only failed to alarm the British, but even omened the development of their

1 See Chapter I. ^ see Chapter VI.

238 own political thought in French soil.3

Complicated by a

foi^eign war, however, the French revolution got out or con­ trol.^

Even before the September Massacres, in which thou­

sands of royalists were slaughtered, the capture and impri­ sonment of Louis XVI by the French radicals awakened the British to the dangers of the situation.

On August 17, 1792,

the British government recalled its ambassador to France as a protest against the 111 treatment of the imprisoned French king.5 On September 21, 1792, the radical National Conven­ tion proclaimed the establishment of the French Republic. From that date until February 1, 1793, when finally war was declared between Great Britain and France, the British were

3 a s late as February 17, 1792, Pitt felt inspired to state that ^unquestionably there never was a time in the his­ tory of this country when from the situation in Europe we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace, than we may at the present moment11 (R. W. Se ton-Wat son, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937, p. 12). 4 One authority records that after the events of Aug­ ust 10, 1792, MFrom a nation about to be crushed by a super­ ior military force, France became at a bound a great revolu­ tionary power, pushing its doctrines and its armies beyond Its own frontiers. French victories in Italy, on the Rhine, and in Belgium forced England to recognize that she must give herself for war in defense of Holland11 (Ephraim L. Adams, The Influence of Grenville on Pitt* s Foreign Policy, 1789-1798, Washington, D«C«: Carnegie Institute of Washing­ ton, 1'904, p. 21). 5 Herbert A. Smith, Great Britain and the Law of Na­ tions (London: P. $• King and Son, Ltd., 1932), Vol. TJ p. 81.

239 faced with the question of recognizing the French Republic. Their persistent refusal to do so was almost exclusively due to the character of the radical republic.6

The ruthless

brutality of the September Massacres and the gross scandal of the kingfs trial and execution created a state of public opinion in England which would not have tolerated any form of recognition.^

On November 19, 1792, however, a decree

promulgated by the French National Convention revealed to Europe the dangerous aggressiveness of radical France, and served as the main cause for the refusal of most of the European states, including Great Britain, to recognize the republic.

The text of the onerous decree was as follows:

La convention nationale declare qu*elle accordera secours ^ tous les peuples qui voudront recouvrir leur libert&, et elle charge le pouvoir ex^cutif de donner des ordres aux gfeeraux des armies franyaises pour secourir les citoyens qui auraient 4 t 6 9 ou qui seraient vex^s, pour la cause de la libert^.B

6 The qualification is made in deference to British reaction to the opening of the Scheldt River and the French invasion of the Lowlands. The latter was the direct cause of war between Britain and France, and did not occur until the British had already persistently refused recognition on other grounds. As to the former, it was only incidentally the subject of negotiations for recognition between Britain and France. The context of the exchanges indicates that the British were far more concerned with assurances as to two other questions. It is highly doubtful if Britain would have denied recognition once these assurances were satis­ factory, no matter what might have been the outcome of the Scheldt question (see Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 97). ^ Loc. cit. 6

Quoted

in

Smith,

ojd.

c i t .,

Vol. I,

p.

84

240 This announcement of the crusading character of French republicanism was especially alarming to the reaction­ ary regimes on the continent, but was only slightly less frightening to the British Tories, who were now convinced that the French Republic should not live.

The French Ambas­

sador to London, M. Chauvelin, did his best to meet the Brit­ ish objections in a constant effort to obtain recognition. In a note to Grenville, the British Foreign Minister, on December 27, 1792, the ambassador tried to conciliate the British with an explanation of the decree of November 19, stating that Britain* s alarm was due to a misunderstanding of the decree, and offering the explanation that The National Convention never meant that the French republic should favor insurrections, should espouse the quarrels of a few seditious persons, or, in a word, should endeavor to excite disturbances in any neutral or friendly country whatever. . . . This decree, then, is applicable only to those people, who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, may have demanded the fraternity, the assistance of the republic, by the solemn and unequivocal expression of the general will.9 In the same note, Chauvelin added a promise of the territorial integrity of Holland, stating that as long as the Netherlands confined itself within the bounds of a strict neutrality, France would never attack that country.10 The reply of Grenville, dated December 31, evidenced

9 10

Vol. I, pp. 85-87 Loc. cit.

241 a stubborn intransigence, for it dismissed Chauvelin* s ex­ planations as wholly unsatisfactory and reprimanded the ambassador for attempting to represent himself in the capa­ city of minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic, since he had been accredited as representing the King of France.H

In the same note, Grenville advised Chauvelin

that If France really desires peace and friendship she must show herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggrandizement, and confine herself with­ in her own territory, without insulting other govern­ ments, without disturbing their tranquility, and violat­ ing their rights.d^ The execution of Louis XVI on January 21, 1793, put a m end to British hopes for the restoration of the French monarchy under a liberal constitution, and the consequent complete ascendancy of the French republicans drove Great Britain to sever diplomatic relations completely.

Chauvelin

was given his passports on January 24 and ordered out of England with a curt notification by Grenville that upon the death of the king, the French ambassador was divested of any public character.1 ^ With the gauntlet thrown down, the British deter-

11 Ibld*> Vol. I, pp. 87-88. 12 j # n. Rose, The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era,

1789-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), p7T6"

Smith, op. cit*, Vol. I, p. 98.

242 mined upon using more forceful means of crushing the aggres­ sive and dangerous radicalism of the French republic.

Until

the time of the execution of Louis XVI, however, the British had resorted to a policy of appeasement, wherein they were willing to offer their recognition of the new republic if the French radicals would confine their influence and activities to France.

As one authority has remarked, however, ffThe

elaborate explanations offered by Chauvelin failed to con­ vince the British Cabinet that the decree of the 19th of November was anything but a general invitation to revolution.11^ The conclusion of this authority adequately sums up the cause for Britain’s refusal to recognize the French republic, for in it he states that The essential reason which moved Pitt’s administra­ tion to refuse recognition to the French Republic lies in the policy adopted by the republican government it­ self. Its international policy challenged both the general order of Europe and the particular interests of Great Britain.-**5 It is evident from the above statements that British recognition of the French republic was primarily refused on the grounds of the dangerous character of the radical regime In France, especially as It was manifested by the threats to foreign states expressed in the decree of November 19, 1792.

The declared intention of the French government; to

14 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 97. ibid., Vol. I, pp. 95-96

245 support revolution in other countries was considered inimi­ cal to the interests or Great Britain, and led directly to the British refusal to recognize the French republic.

While

history records that the British failed in their attempt to modify the radicalism of the French revolution by refusing to recognize the revolutionary government in lieu of ade­ quate guarantees of its international respectability, the fact remains that the device of recognition played an im­ portant part in the prosecution of British policy vis-a-vis the revolutionary government of France prior to the out­ break of war in 1795. 2.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BRAZIB (1825)

One aspect of the question of British recognition of the independence of Brazil has already been surveyed in a previous chapter.16

While It is with reference to that as­

pect of high policy that the British decision ultimately rested, it is submitted that the solution of the PortugueseBrazilian difficulties only put an end to the basic con­ sideration prompting British deferment of recognition, but did not, ipso facto, lead to an unconditional grant of re­ cognition to the new Brazilian Empire.

On the contrary,

the British stubbornly refused to revert to a de facto

16 See Chapter II

244 policy of recognition.

Even after a solution had been

reached between Portugal and Brazil, a solution having been a primary requisite to British recognition of an independent Brazil, the British withheld their recognition pending Brazil’s acceptance of a condition pertaining to the slave trade. As early as February of 1823, the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, conceded the likelihood of Brit­ ish recognition to a Brazilian agent if Brazil would abol­ ish the slave trade.

In a despatch to the British Consul-

General in Rio de Janeiro of February 15, 1823, Canning, in a lengthy explanation of British policy, emphasized the importance his government attached to this condition.

The

despatch merits reproduction despite its length, for it is one of the clearest expositions of this reformatory— if not altogether altruistic— quirk in British foreign policy.

On

more than one occasion the abolition of slave trading made its appearance as a condition of the grant of recognition to some state or government by Great Britain.

With only

minor abridgments made by the writer, the Canning despatch declared that . . . Recognition by Great Britain of the new Brazil­ ian Government would be principally a question of time; if it were not for our Consideration which was early stated to General Brant [the Brazilian agent], as a governing consideration in British policy. The Brazilian Government cannot be unaware how deeply the Faith and Honor of this Country is engaged in the

245 complete and final abolition of the Slave Trade, The Crown of Portugal is the only European Crown which has withheld its Consent from the Principle of that Measure, and it has done this expressly on the plea of providing for the cultivation of Brazil, The altered relations of Brazil and Portugal alto­ gether invalidate that plea; for it is preposterous to suppose, that Portugal can at once declare Brazil to be in Rebellion, and pretend to a Right to keep up a Trade, admitted to be otherwise indefensible, for the benefit of Brazil. But if Brazil should take that abominable trade into its own hands; and if Great Britain should at the moment when that new trade begins, hasten to re­ cognize the Power which undertakes it; I leave to M. de Andrada to judge what would be the sentiment excited in Europe. . . . Let the Brazilian Government announce to us this re­ nunciation; and, M. de Andrada may depend upon it, that single and sole condition will decide the disposition of this Country. . . . You are authorized, therefore, to state confidentially to M. Andrada, that, if the recognition of the new Empire by Great Britain be an object of interest to his Sover­ eign, You are persuaded that he may best find his Way to it/ through an offer on the part of Brazil, to consent to a renunciation of the Slave Trade.3-7 The Brazilian government soon rallied to the British condition, and upon yielding the right to engage in the slave trade, it received its desired recognition from the British government on January 12, 1826.3-8

On November 23,

1826, some ten months later, an Anglo-Brazilian treaty for the abolition of the slave trade was signed.-1-®

3-7 Quoted by Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 186-87, from Foreign Office, 128/1. 3-8 Smith, o£. cit., Vol. I, p. 196. 3-9 Loc. cit.

246

In summarizing the case of the recognition of Brazil, it may be stated that a moral principle was asserted and maintained by the British government as a condition to be met before recognition was granted.

As it will be illust­

rated In the following case to be considered, Great Brit­ ain* suse of the power of recognition contributed greatly to the achievement of a higher standard of human!tarianism in the realm of international conduct. 3.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF TEXAS (1842)

As suggested in a previous chapter, Great Britain*s relations with the Texan Republic involved considerations of vastly different n a t ure.^

One of these considerations,

which persisted to the very end after a halting

start, was

the question of slavery and the slave trade.21

During the

first three years of the attempt on the part of Texas to secure British recognition, the British refused to entertain the Texan appeals with any great seriousness.

20

See Chapter

It was not

II.

An outstanding authority remarks that during the early 1840*s the belief was prevalent that Britain was di­ rectly interfering in the affairs of Mexico and Texas for the purpose not only of preventing the annexation of Texas to the United States, but also Hof securing abolition within the state of Texas itself, and of thereby exercising an In­ fluence tending to the abolition of slavery within the United States** (Ephriam D* Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846, Ba11Imore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1910, p~ 13).

247 that the British were disinterested, for in truth Texas was threatening the success of Britain’s entire Latin American policy*

Other factors of consideration, however, made it

advisable for the British to delay for three years any negotiations with Texas over the question of recognition. It was not until 1840 that the British Foreign Sec­ retary, Lord Palmerston, had arrived at the stage of recep­ tiveness and was willing to begin negotiations with the Texan agent regarding recognition.

On October 14, 1840,

Mr. Hamilton, the rather over-zealous agent of the Texas Republic, submitted a famous letter to Palmerston in which he outlined the arguments with which he hoped to win British recognition.22

jn reply, the British Foreign Secretary

wrote Hamilton on October 18 that Great Britain was ready to negotiate a treaty of commerce and navigation with Texas (and thereby accord recognition, either tacit or express) if Texas would at the same time sign a slave-trade treaty giving to Great Britain the right of search*

Palmerston

added significantly that the slave trade treaty would be a tfsine qua non Condition of any other Treaty between Great Britain and Texas.,f23

22 The full text of the letter, which is rather, un­ usual and exceedingly interesting to a student of recogni­ tion, may be found in Adams, op. cit *, pp* 53-54. 23 Ibid., p. 54. The authority quotes herein from Foreign Office, Texas, I.

248 Hamilton seized upon the British offer as an oppor­ tunity not to "be missed, and undertook to negotiate three treaties with Great Britain, all of which were duly signed by the plenipotentiaries in November of 1840.

The last

of the three treaties signed was the agreement for the sup­ pression of African slave-trade, the agreement providing for the right of search on the part of the British.

In a pro­

tocol to these agreements, however, the British government stipulated that the treaties were to be ratified within six months, and that upon such ratification British recognition of the Independence of Texas would be

a s s u r e d . ^ 4

While the Texas agent possessed sufficient authority to negotiate the first two treaties— one on commerce and navigation and the other on the public debt of Texas— he was not empowered to treat with the British on the subject matter included in the third treaty.25

Threatened with

failure after having come so near to his goal in the nego­ tiations with the British, Hamilton took the risk implied in committing a sponsion by negotiating and signing the slave-trade treaty anyhow.

The agent then forwarded the

latter treaty to Texas separately, after having consciously delayed its departure for some time after the first two had

24

Ibld•» P- 59.

25 Ibid., p. 67.

249 been sent.

Hamilton apparently feared the reaction of his

government to a slave-trade treaty, and hoped that by the prompt ratification of the first two treaties either Texas would forgive him and accept the third, with British re­ cognition so close at hand, or else he could extort further concessions from the British for the sake of the third treaty in case the Texan government

b a l k e d .

26

As Hamilton had feared, his home government did balk on the slave-trade treaty.

Moreover, the new Peel-Aberdeen

ministry which came into power in Great Britain in 1841 was not inclined to be any more lenient with the Texas agent. On October 4, 1841, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, flatly rejected the proposals of Hamilton to find a way out of the dilemma by stating that the three treaties already signed were all that Great Britain would negotiate for the present.^

Although Hamilton*s plans were unsuccess-

26 When the British stubbornly refused to recognize Texas until the slave-trade convention had been ratified as well as the other two treaties, Hamilton tried to hold out for extra compensation in return for ratification of the slave treaty, apparently hoping that his government would be more amenable if he could show some added quid pro quo. At one stage he offered immediate ratification in return for a British guarantee of Texan bonds. Hamilton may have laid his schemes this way from the beginning, for as one authority states, he possibly delayed transmitting the slavetrade treaty in order to use it in securing the adoption of a new convention for British financial support (Loc. cit.). 27

Ibid., p. 71.

250 ful, the Texan government nonetheless ratified the slavetrade treaty on June 28, 1842.

According to the previous

agreement of the parties, the Texan ratification of the slave-trade treaty opened the door for Great Britain1s re­ cognition of the independence of Texas.

While it is doubt­

ful whether the Texan ratification would have legally ob­ liged the British to extend the promised recognition, the British found no further conditions to be satisfied by Texas and immediately thereafter extended the desired acknowledg­ ment .28 The two cases of the recognition of Brazilian and Texan independence serve as perhaps the best examples of this use of the power of recognition by the British govern­ ment in the promotion of humanitarian aims.

It is not of

concern to the subject of this research that the moralistic tone of British policy may have been Inspired by less lofty considerations.

For one reason or another, the abolition

of the slave trade was for some decades a constant objective In British foreign policy.2^

One of the most effective

28 ibid., pp. 87-88. 29 it has been stated that Palmerston was especially insistent upon the slave-trade treaty as a sine qua non of British recognition of Texas because he hoped thereby to bring pressure upon the United States to secure at least a limited right of search. His annoyance with the United States^wasjnot"lessened by the fact that the abuse of the American flag by slave traders had been on the increase (Ibid., p. 59).

251 weapons In the pursuit of this cause by Great Britain was to be found in the use of the power of recognition as a means of bargaining for the abolition of the slave trade, 4.

THE REGICIDE GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA (1903-1906) A problem of recognition concerning the government

of Serbia- was presented to the British in 1903 by the brutal assassination of the Serbian monarch, King Alexander Obrenovitch, and his queen by a group of Serbian military of­ ficers on June 11 of that year.

As one authority records,

the assassination wwas carried out with an atrocious bar­ barity which caused an immediate shock of horror throughout the civilized

30

w o r l d . 11

a convenient lack of heirs allowed

the Serbian parliament to offer the throne to Prince Peter Karageorgevitch, a member of the rival house of royal descent, which eventuality appeared to be the ultimate aim of the group of assassins from the very beginning. The immediate reaction of the British government to the Serbian affair was one of extreme disapproval.

The

instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, to the British minister at Belgrade in a despatch of June 15 indicated a reluctance on the part of the British govern­ ment to do anything which might be construed as approving

30 Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 229.

252 a regime created out of such repulsive and atrocious circum­ stances.

The contents of this despatch follow:

His Majesty*s Government have considered whether, in order to mark their reprobation of the atrocious occur­ rences which have lately disgraced the Servian Capital, His Majesty’s Representative should not be withdrawn from Belgrade. They have however come to the conclusion that you should for the present, remain at your post in order to watch and report events ana for the protection of Brit­ ish subjects and interests. Your intercourse with the authorities will be strictly limited to what is neces­ sary for these purposes. You will be careful to do nothing which could be con­ strued as an official recognition of the provisional Government, whose freedom from complicity in the acts of Friday night has not as yet been established, or as pledging His Majesty’s Government to recognize the authority which may be set up in succession to the late Dynasty. . . .31 The anomalous position of the British Minister to Belgrade, sir George Bonham, was increasingly difficult to sustain, and upon the inauguration of the new king relations with Servia were broken, since it was deemed politic to avoid participation in any official ceremony of welcome.

^ Foreign Office, Servia 157, Ho. 4, as reproduced in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the World War, 1898-1914 (London: His Majes­ ty's Stationery Office, 1928) , Vol. V, p. 128, Nov. 95. 3 2 In a despatch of June 19, 1903, Lord Lansdown

instructed Bonham that flHis Majesty’s Government consider it desirable that you should leave Belgrade before the arrival of the new Sovereign, and the ceremonies which will no doubt take place on that occasion. • . .” (Foreign Office, Servia 157, No. 6 , as reproduced in Gooch and Temperley, ojd. cit., Vol. V, p. 133, No. 107.

253 prom that time on, the British government held steadfast to the position that it would not renew regular diplomatic re­ lations with Serbia so long as the officers guilty of com­ plicity in the murder remained in the public service.

Al­

most three years after the assassinations Sir Edward Grey, the new British Foreign Secretary, informed the House of Commons on April 11, 1906, that The question of the renewal of diplomatic relations between England and Servia cannot be discussed between the two Governments so long as the regicide officers hold official positions and influence the Servian Government. In the event of these officers being with­ drawn from their positions and of the King agreeing to send a representative to Belgrade, it would of course be understood that the officers in question would not be reinstated.33 The stubborn recalcitrance of King Peter was not e v e r l a s t i n g .

^

34 On further pressure from Great Britain he

Souse of Commons Debates, 155:1302.*

34 »piie immediate recognition of King Peter by Austria and Russia deserves comment. Despite a reluctance to sanc­ tion such an outrageous crime, neither state was Inclined to sacrifice its influence in Serbia by condemning the regicide regime. The intense rivalry between Austria and Russia in Serbia made It politically Inexpedient for.Austria to refuse recognition to King Peter after the Russia recognition (Smith, o£. cit., pp. 230-32). Austria continued underhandedly to assert its influ­ ence in Serbia to keep the guilty officers in power, thereby taking advantage of the moralistic British policy In order to exclude British influence from Belgrade. According to British diplomats, it was Austrian influence which kept Peter from acceding to the British demands for so long a time (see Foreign Office 371/130, No. 21, as reproduced in Gooch and Temper ley, o p c i t . , Vol. V, p. 140, No. 118).

254 finally accepted the resignation of the officers, later giving the British satisfactory assurances that the con­ spirators would not again be employed in any capacity in the Serbian state service. It is of interest that while the Serbian government eventually gave in to the British demands, the negotiations over the disposal of the six Serbian officers regarded by the British (and acknowledged by Serbia) as primarily re­ sponsible for the Obrenovitch assassinations provided an exacting terminological duel.

The British demanded that

the officers not only be dismissed from government service, but requested assurances that they "will never again be employed under the Government•"35

Serbia at first tried

to get by with an assurance to the British that the officers had resigned and would not again be allowed to "serve in the Army.1133 Unsatisfactory to the British negotiator, Sir E. Goschen, the Serbian assurance was replaced by one guar­ anteeing that Serbia would never again employ the conspira­ tors in the service of the state.

The text of the latter

riote, which proved satisfactory to the British, states that . . . Sur le d^sir du Gouvernement Royal Britannique exprime dans la susdite lettre de Votre Excellence, le

33 gee Foreign Office 371/130, No. 63 (Reproduced in Gooch and Temperley, 0 ]d. cit., Vol. V, pp. 145-6, No. 127). 33 hoc. cit.

255 Gouvernement Royal d© Serbie declare, que les officiers de l ’a m l e serbe: MM, les Colonels Alexandre Machine et Damyan Popovitch, les lieutenants-cdoneIs Pierre Michitch et Loukas Lazarevitch et le mjor Ljoubomir Kost­ itch ayant pris part a la conspiration de l fann£e 1903 et mis en retraite par I ’Oukase Royal en date du 16 (29) mai, ann^e courante, ainsi que le General Jovan Atanatzkovitch (anterieurement mis en retraite) no seront ja­ mais repris au service de l fEtat. (Be telle mani&re que, par leurs positions, ils ne soient jamais mis en relations avec les repr^sentants royals jTsicJ britanniques en serbie.). • • .37 The Serbian assurances were duly received by the British Foreign Office on June 5, 1906, and normal diplo­ matic relations were immediately resumed with Serbia by an exchange of ministers.38

information was not particu­

larly welcome, however, from one of Sir Edward Grey»s questioners in the House of Commons on June 28, 1906, that several of the Serbian regicides had just been pensioned, with an increase in pay, for very special services rendered to the state, and that others were still occupying import­ ant posts at the Serbian court.

Asked whether he was aware

of these facts at the time of resuming diplomatic relations with Serbia, the Foreign Secretary stated that. His Majestyfs Government made the resumption of dip­ lomatic relations conditional upon the retirement of the principal regicides from posts held by them under the Servian Government, so that their future positions would not bring them into relations with British repre­ sentatives in Servia. This condition has been complied

^

£°c * cit

.

38 smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 233.

256 with, and His Majesty 1 s Government are not concerned with other matters. . . .39 Here again a high moral plane was assumed by the British government in its use of the power of recognition. Upon this occasion, at least, there is little doubt that the British stand was courageously altruistic.

In sacri­

ficing her influence for three years in such a vital Balkan country, Great Britain was laying herself open to risks potentially quite dangerous to her own interests.

In the

long view, however, it is probable that British prestige was enhanced by this dedication of the power of recognition to the principles of morality In international society, even though the actual results stemming from the British demands hardly merited in themselves the protracted strain upon Great Britain’s Balkan diplomacy. 5.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE CONGO

FREE STATE TO BELGIUM (1907-1913) Missionary societies and other humanitarian organi­ zations have habitually rallied great strength in England, and at times have exercised a powerful influence upon Brit­ ish public opinion, and, in consequence, upon the British government itself.

One of these more Influential societies

was the Congo Reform Association, which for years had been

39

159

House of Commons Debates, 4s, p. 1133.

257 demanding reform of the wretched system of native exploita­ tion in King Leopold’s Congo Free State.4^ British opinion had long demanded the cession of the Congo to the Belgian government in order to take the terri­ tory out of the apparently irresponsible hands of the Bel­ gian king.

When finally a draft treaty of November 18, 1907,

was published announcing the impending annexation of the Congo to Belgium, the British were still unsatisfied.

The

terms of the treaty provoked some doubt in England as to whether the Belgian government would be any more inclined toward reform than King Leopold had been . 4 1

Even the Brit-

It is regretted that, due to unavailability, dir­ ect use could not be made of authoritative British documents in this case study. A survey of the invaluable work by Har­ old Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914 (London: His Majesty1s Stationery Of­ fice, 1936), reveals that between 1907 and 1913, the years pertinent to the question of Britain’s policy toward the Congo annexation, no less than eleven British Blue Books were published on the subject. Identified chronologically according to their Blue Book numbers, they are as follows: 1740 (1907), 1776, a, b, c, d (1908), 1820a (1909), 1875 TT^Tl) , 1910 (1312)7 l^lOa (X913), and~ T § S g (1913). The one source relied upon in this case survey fortu­ nately provides an adequate basis for authenticity, since it relies almost exclusively upon the material found in the British Blue Books cited above. 4 1 While the treaty annulled the infamous Fondation de la Couronne, the Belgian government agreed to respect the conoessibns ineluded in the Fondation granted to companies in which the Congo State had large holdings. In effect, the treaty did not give any great assurances that the Belgian government would administer the Congo any better than the Belgian king had done (G. P. Gooch, "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1907-1914," The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, 1866-1919, p. 426.

258 ish king, in a speech at Westminster on January 29, 1908, felt moved to reiterate British hopes with the statement that My Government are fully aware of the great anxiety felt with regard to the treatment of natives* Their sole desire is to see the Government of that State humanely administered in accordance with the spirit of the Berlin Act and I trust that the negotiations be­ tween the Sovereign of the Congo State and the Belgian Government will secure that o b j e c t . 42 Mass meetings were held by the populace all over England to discuss the annexation.

One of them, presided

over by London’s Lord Mayor, passed a resolution to the effect that no annexation could be recognized which did not restore to the natives their rights in land and trade.43 Parliament was particularly mistrustful, one Member taking the occasion of a debate on the issue, February 24, 1908, to state that Belgium agree, under the proposed treaty to maintain the Crown Domain monopoly and all the other company monopolies that have been granted by King Leopold on the Congo, and the territory covered by these monopolies is where all these terrible horrors and this enforced labour has taken place. In other words, the funda­ mental nature of the Congo system is to be perpetuated under the treaty. . . .44 The alarmed parliamentarian went on to state that

cited in 184.House of Commons Debates, 4s, pp. 1275-76. 43 Gooch, o p . cit., p. 425. ^

184 House of Commons Debates, 4s, p. 1274.

259 he could not believe tliat ftthis is the Belgian solution for which we have been waiting for so many years* 1145. Prompted by persistent diatribes against the outrages committed in the Congo, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, optimistically pictured to the House of Commons on February 26, 1908, an amelioration of the situation once the Belgian government assumed control, stating that I cannot believe that the Belgian Parliament would agree to accept responsibility for the government of the Congo in the present state in which it is unless it was also to have a real and full control • • • Given real effective Parliamentary control, the other results that we desire must follow. . . m The attitude of the British public as well as the British government was most admirably expressed, however, in a statement made by Lord Lansdowne that • • ♦ the transfer must be a real and complete trans­ fer. It would not be a transfer which any of us could regard with acquiescence if there were any reservation of rights, any conditions made which might have the effect of impairing the full and complete control of the Belgian Government over the whole of the territor­ ies . . • now administered by the Government of the Congo State.47 On November 14, 1908, sovereignty over the Congo was transferred from the Belgian king to the Belgian state. Germany and France immediately recognized the transfer, but

45

p- 1275.

46

Ibid.. p. 1873.

47

Ibid., pp. 1301-2.

260 Great Britain, backed by the United States, held out for positive evidence of reform before acknowledging the annexa­ tion.

The British stand was heavily fortified by legal,

treaty rights--if not obligations as well— to guarantee an enlightened administration in the Belgian Congo.

The Gen­

eral Act of the Conference at Berlin of February 26, 1885, signed and ratified by Great Britain, Belgium and thirteen other pov/ers included among other lengthy and important provisions a Declaration concernant la Traite des Esclaves, in which the powers agreed that 'Conformement aux principes du droit des gens, tels qu*ils sont reconnus par les Puissances Signataires, la Traite des Esclaves £tant interdite, et les operations qui, sur terre ou sur mer, fournissent des esclaves la Traite devant ^tre egalement considerSes c o m e interdites, les Puissances qui exercent ou qui exerceront des droits de souverainet4 ou une influence dans les territoires formant le bassin conventionnel du Congo, declarent que ces territoires no pourront servir ni de march^ ni de voie de transit pour la Traite des Esclaves de quelque race que ce soit. Chacune de ces Puissances sfengage k employer tous les moyens en son pouvoir pour mettre fin a ce commerce et pour punir ceux qui s*en occupant.48 In another article of the Act of Berlin, under the title of Dispositions Generates, it was agreed that ✓

/

Les Puissances Signataires due present Acte General se reservent d fy introduire ult^rinurement et d fun commun accord les modifications ou ameliorations dont l futilite serait demontree par 1 1 experience.49

British and Foreign state Papers, 1884-1885, Vol. LXXVI, p. 11. 49

Ibid., p. 19.

261 The British case was further fortified by a bilateral exchange of declarations between Great Britain and the Inter­ national Association of the Congo on December 16, 1884 (gen­ erally referred to as the Anglo-Congolese Convention), in which the British received the promise flThat the Association and the said Free State will do all in their power to pre­ vent the Slave Trade, and to suppress slavery, rf50 Two weeks prior to the transfer, the British Foreign Secretary sent a note to the Belgian government reiterating the right of Great Britain to guarantee that the new admin­ istration should not repeat the fatal errors of the old, and demanding that grievances be remedied within a reasonable period of time. 51

Conciliatory assurances from the Belgian

government were freely given, but the British Foreign Sec­ retary retorted in a note of June 11, 1909, that while he was anxious to recognize the annexation, he must first be satis­ fied that the abuses of taxation and forced labor had ceased,52

The Grey note faithfully reflected the impatience

of the British Parliament, which had aired its opinions on the subject once again on May 27, 1909*

On that date, Mr,

E. N. Bennett recalled to the House of Commons the assur-

50 British and Foreign State Papers, 1883-1884, Vol. LXXV, p. 36. 51 Gooch, o|>. cit., p* 426. 52 ibid., p. 427.

262 ances given by Belgium, adding that The annexation took place on 20th August, Nine months have now elapsed. Nothing has been done. The abuses are perpetuated, and are becoming stereotyped. Once more our government has allowed itself . . . to be bluffed by the insolent and brutal slave drivers who control the Congo policy of the Belgian Government.53 As Gooch records, Grey reiterated to Parliament on June 22, 1909, that Great Britain could not recognize the annexation until the system of forced labor had ended.54 Thus the' issue was joined, and the British had committed themselves to withhold recognition until positive reforms had been made in the treatment of the Congolese natives. During 1910, the Belgian government began to give more satisfactory proof of the sincerity of its assurances. On March 22, a decree was issued abolishing forced labor and restoring the right of the natives of collecting and selling the produce of the soil in three designated areas soon to be opened.55

British consular reports, upon which

the government relied most heavily in making decisions of policy regarding the Congo, recorded improvement in their despatches of October, 1910; early in 1911, Sir Edward Grey announced that, where the old system was discarded, the improvement was so rapid that Britain would recognize

5

House of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 1387.

Gooch, op. cit., pp. 427-28, 55

Ibid., p. 428.

263 Belgium*s annexation as soon as the whole area was opened to trade*^

By the middle of 1913 the situation was so

much better that, as Gooch states, • . * the execrable system of King Leopold had van­ ished* The Concessionaire Companies had disappear ed or lost their privileges. The tax on rubber had been abol­ ished, and Free Trade prevailed over the greater part of the Congo, the fortunes of which were now in the hands of the Belgian nation* A final move which left no doubt as to the likelihood of an immediate recognition was the announcement by the Congo Reform Association that it would no longer oppose recognition of the annexation.

In the words of Gooch,

With such a certificate from the chief guardian of native interests, Sir Edward hesitated no longer, and, on May 29, he announced British recognition of the transfer of sovereignty effected five years earlier. On the date of the announcement of British recogni­ tion, and as a gesture to Parliament preceding the acknow­ ledgment, Grey recalled to the House of Commons his pledge that Britain would not officially complete recognition of the Belgian annexation until his government was prepared to say that the consular reports showed that the condition of things in the Congo was substantially in accord with the treaty obligations of the original Congo State, and "until

^

kQ

57

Ibid., p.429.

C 9

cit.

5® Loc. cit.

264 the House of Commons had had an opportunity of discussing those particular Reports.tf^

In explanation of the govern­

ment 's policy, Grey told the House of Commons that We are . . . of the opinion that the time has now come when we ought to recognize officially the annexation of the Congo Colony by the Government of Belgium, . . . The Reports show that the condition of affairs has complete­ ly changed from that which existed under the old re­ gime in the Congo before the responsible Government of Belgium took the Congo in hand, • • • The time has now come when it would be neither justifiable nor political­ ly expedient that we should refuse to give the Govern­ ment of Belgium that recognition of their annexation of the Congo Colony which has practically been given by all the other Powers.^ While no disparagement of the Belgian government is intended, it is yet evident that the reforms undertaken in the Congo were in a large measure inspired by the vociferous demands of humanitarian groups in England.

No less signifi­

cant, however, was the pressure exerted on Belgium by the British government, a pressure made particularly effective by the refusal of the British government to recognize the annexation until positive evidence of a thoroughgoing re­ form had been presented.

There is little doubt that the

British policy of-deferring an acknowledgment of the transr fer until the Belgian assurances were realized materially intensified,Belgium* s sincerity in reforming native treat­ ment in the Congo.

59 53 House of Commons Debates, 5s, p. 346. 60

Ibid., pp. 346-47.

265 In conclusion, it is to be observed that the British government did possess a legal right to Interfere in the Congo.

The terms of the Berlin Act gave all signatories an

interest in native treatment.*^

Moreover, the Anglo-Congo­

lese Convention further entrenched British rights in the Belgian C o n g o . S o m e of the British were even inclined to assert a moral right of Intervention quite irrespective of the treaty rights involved, for in the British Parliament

as Lord Lansdowie stated

in 1906, *

Quite irrespective of any right we enjoy under the letter of these Acts the Anglo-Congolese Convention of 1884 and the Berlin Act of 1885 we have a moral right to interfere, which comes to us in consequence of the false pretenses • • • under which the Congo State has ac­ quired its privileged position in that part of Africa.63 It Is possible that a liberal Interpretation of the Berlin Act would have imposed an obligation on the part of the British to refuse recognition to a transfer of sovereign­ ty over the Congo which did not include ample assurances of reform.

The fact of the matter is, however, that the sanc­

tion of non-recognition did not play any part in the plans envisaged by the signatories to the Berlin Act.

The British

stand adopted in 1907 was not an obligation pursuant to the Berlin Act, nor was It so taken by the British government or

Supra, p. 261. 62

Supra, p. 262. 159

House of Commons Debates, 4s, p. 1585.

266 public.

It is highly doubtful that an obligation of non­

recognition under such conditions was ever considered by any responsible government until Stimson successfully put forward his interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Fact in 1932,64

Basically, the British action was merely an ex­

pression of policy wherein political opportunism made available the power of recognition aa a device to effect reform.

^ An excellent study non-recognition is presented Duties of Non-Recognition in Special Studies, Vol. 4, No. Center, 1934).

of the history of obligatory in the work by Roland H. Sharp, Practice, 1775-1954 (Geneva 4. Geneva: Geneva Research

CHAPTER V UNITED STATES’ USE OP RECOGNITION WITH REFERENCE TO THE CHARACTER OP A GOVERNMENT The United States has been quite proud of originating and championing the de faoto theory of recognition; yet a survey of its use of the power of recognition provides Im­ pressive examples of violation of the de facto theory.

In

the majority of cases violative of the principle, a moral criteria has been the distinguishing feature. It has already been suggested in previous chapters that Great Britain has been more prone to employ recognition as a diplomatic device in the service of higher policy than the United States.

On the other hand, it Is clear that the

United States has surpassed Great Britain In resorting to the recognition device in the service of international morality.

It is probable that the best assignable reason

for this phenomenon lies in the fact that the United States has been historically freer from the pressure of realpolitik than Great Britain, and has consequently been better able to afford moral judgments.

The added fact that the. majority

of United- States cases covering this aspect have concerned Latin America supports this contention, for the almost un­ challenged hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere has greatly reduced the significance of the factor

268

of realpolitik*

In any case, it is hoped that the following

cases will adequately illustrate the reliance that the United States has placed upon the recognition device to secure foreign regimes more compatible to our own political ideals, and to penalize those whose character Is deemed inimical to the interests of the United States. 1.

THE NON^RECOGNITION OP HAITI (1798-1862)

One of the most unusual cases in the history of the recognition policy of the United States Is to be found in * the sixty-four year relationship between the United States and Haiti from 1798 to 1862.3-

The significance of the case

lies in the fact that it directly contradicted every es­ sential element of the de_ facto theory of recognition which the United States otherwise so zealously upheld during the

3- A confusing terminological muddle necessitates im­ mediate dissipation. The entire island has gone by the names of Espahola, Saint-Dominque, Santo Domingo and Haiti. Historically, however, the Island has been divided into two halves. Prance controlled the western half from 1697 until the end of the eighteenth century. Spain retained the east­ ern half until 1795 when Prance took ostensible control of the whole island for a decade. In 1806 Spain again regained sovereignty over the eastern half, but an independence move­ ment ousted the Spanish in 1821 (see A. Curtis Wilgus, The Development of Hispanic America. New York: Parrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941, chapters XLII and XLIII). Although at certain periods it may have been technically incorrect to call the western half of the is3_and Haiti and the eastern half Santo Domingo, for the sake of simplicity and clarity this de­ limitation of terminology will be adhered to as strictly as possible.

269

same period.

■'While most authorities admit the constant ap­

plication of* a de facto policy of recognition from the in­ ception of American independence until the Wilson adminis­ tration, Haiti remained a hushed exception to the general rule for well over half of the entire period of the new de factolsm.^ The question of recognizing an independent Haiti first arose as a result of the behavior of a native negro leader, Toussaint L TOuverture, who habitually asserted as much independence from France as he could get away with, and. never too much to drive himself into the arms of the British.

Considering the vital importance of Haiti in the

trade of the times, and the strategic value of the island during the Napoleonic wars which were being waged, the activities of the negro, Toussaint, were of no little con­ cern to both Great Britain and the United States, as well as to France.

^ The best and most exhaustive work on the history of the American recognition policy is probably the work by Juli­ us Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1915*77 While Goebelfs vol­ ume is considered the basic treatise on the subject, later authorities have observed that his survey strangely omits the Haitian case altogether. The omission is highly unfor­ tunate, since Goebel was able to show, ,ln the case's absence, an admirable consistency^ by the United States in the promo­ tion of a de facto policy (see Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776rl891, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1941, p. 76).

270 The interest of the United States first came to the surface in an interview with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, by the American Minister to London, Rufus King, on December 7, 1798.

Anticipating that Toussaint would

free Haiti from France, King informed Grenville of his fear of T?the example upon our slaves in the Southern states. Since both feared the possible transition of Haiti into another piratical nation like those in North Africa, and since both understood the danger to the institution of slavery of a free, black state, they were able to agree upon a policy of concerted action Magainst the danger that might result from the independence of a negro state founded upon a slave

r e v o l t . ' ’^

Both Great Britain and the United States

agreed to treat with Toussaint for a trade treaty, but to do so without recognizing his independence from France. With this beginning, the policy of the United States vis-a-vis Haiti became a perplexing anomaly.

Consciously

refraining from giving Toussaint any recognition, the United States nonetheless generously afforded Toussaint actual naval aid in his civil war with the French authorities on the island at the turn of the century.

As one authority

comments upon the motives behind the support of Toussaint by

3 Logan, o|>. cit., p. 70. 4

Ibid.,

p.

71.

271 the United States: • . • the naval aid which, the United States gave Tous­ saint in his war against Rigaud was designed in part to make it unnecessary for Toussaint to maintain a navy of his own. But the prospect of trade with the ports lib­ erated from the control of the Francophil Rigaud also contributed to the first armed intervention by the United States in a foreign civil w a r *5 The fact of the matter seems to be that in the course of the quasi-war with France, the United States helped to promote the virtual independence of Toussaint, but yet re­ fused to recognize his independence after it was established. Early in 1802, Hapoleon sent an expedition under Leclerc to reconquer Haiti,

Toussaint was captured, but his

successor, Dessalines, proved even more vigorous in his de­ sire for independence.

The tragic fate of the Leclerc ex­

pedition is a wel3„-known story, but a lesser known contribu­ ting factor to its fate was the sub rosa renewal of American support to the insurrectionists.

A decisive victory over

the French at Vertieres on Hovember 18, 1805, paved the way for Dessalines to proclaim the independence of Haiti on January 1, 1804,^ Ibe

facto independence of Haiti was heartily wel­

comed by American merchants, but was just as heartily dreaded by the southern slaveholding interests*

^ Ibid., p . 103. 6

Ibid., p. 150.

Dictated

272

partly by a desire to placate Prance, but even more by a sympathy with the attitude of the slaveh.old.ing states, Pre­ sident Jefferson, who ironically formulated the de facto theory of recognition, made no move to give an official wel­ come to Haiti as a new member in the family of nations. The inconsistency between the announced recognition policy and the attitude taken toward Haiti was perhaps most glaringly apparent when the United States recognized the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies in 1822-23. As Logan states, the recognition of the latter “makes all the more striking the continued refusal of the United States to acknowledge the independence of Haiti . u 8

If anything,

Haiti seems to have been far more qualified and deserving of recognition under the condition imposed hy American practice than any of the Spanish American colonies at the time.^

*7 Ibid., p. 179. 8

P. 188.

9 Logan convincingly compares the qualifications of the Spanish American republics recognized by the United States and those of Haiti at the time the United States ac­ knowledged the former. Taking Into consideration stability and the prospect of maintaining its independence, Haiti was at least^equally deserving of recognition— probably more so. The claim that Haiti at the time was a monarchy was hardly a bona £ide cause for non-recognition, for both the monar­ chies of Brazil and Mexico were recognized by the United States. Finally, regarding the criterion of the importance of commerce, the recognition of Haiti at the time would have been.of far greater benefit, since American trade with Haiti exceeded that of all South America put together (ibid., pp. 192-94).

273

A prevalent southern attitude regarding Haiti was ex­ pressed in Congress during the debates over the appointment of delegates to Bolivarfs conference at Panama in 1826. Wesley records that Hie southern- point-.of view, as expressed in the de­ bates on this question* was that disaster awaited the Southern states, if the United States should send dele­ gates to a congress in which Haitian representatives would sit, and v/hich would consider the separation of Cuba and Porto Rico from Spain and the cessation of slavery• Quoting from Gales and SeatonTs Register, 1825-26, Wesley recalls the opinion of Benton of Missouri on the question of Haiti, which is reflected in the latter*s state­ ment that We buy coffee from her, and pay for it; but we inter­ change no consuls or ministers. We receive no mulatto consuls or black ambassadors. And why? Because the peace of eleven states in this Union will not permit the fruits of a successful Negro insurrection to be exhibited among t h em .H From the same source one finds Hayne of South Carolina warning against an apparent sympathy between republican Span­ ish America and negro Haiti in his apprehension of the schemes of the Panama Conference.

It was Hayne1s opinion that

With nothing connected with slavery can we consent to treat with other nations, and least of all, ought we

Charles H. Wesley, nThe Struggle for the. Recogni­ tion of Haiti and Liberia as Independent Republics," The Journal of Negro History, 2:369-83, No. 4, October,.1917. 11 Loc.

cit.

274 to touch the question of the independence of Haiti, in conjunction with revolutionai^r governments. . . . You find men of color at the head of their armies, in their legislative halls, and in their executive departments. They are looking to Hayti, even now, .with feelings of the strongest fraternity and show, by the very docu­ ments before us, that they acknowledge her to be in­ dependent .- ^ The United States did find a legitimate complaint against the regime of the Haitian king, Ghristophe, in 1823, due to the latterfs policy of tariff discrimination against the United States.

While this served as a conveni­

ent argument to be used against recognition, it is yet true that the United States refused to follow through by re­ cognizing Haiti once the tariff discrimination had been removed.

Subsequently, however, France itself recognized

the independence of Haiti in 1825, but by exacting the heavy price of exclusive commercial advantages in return for the acknowledgment.

The United States complained bit­

terly at the economic vassalage of Haiti to France which resulted from the treaty, and again asserted an unwilling­ ness to recognize the Haitian government except under the conditions of most-favored-nation treatment.13

rpk© fact

of the matter- is, however, .that in 1830 Boyer, the Haitian president, abrogated the fifty per cent preference enjoyed by France, and in 1838 France recognized the unconditional

12

I£id., pp. 373-74.

13 Logan, ojo. cit., p. 229.

275 independence of Haiti in resigning herself to most-favorednation treatment.

Still the United States persisted in its

refusal to recognize the black regimes in Haiti. Beginning in the 1850rs, the question of recognition more openly revolved around the main issue of slavery.

As

Tansill remarks, After 1830 the development of the movement for the abolition of slavery led to an increased interest in the recognition of Haiti, and petitions to this effect began to pour in upon C o n g r e s s . l b The rising quarrel between slave and free states reached a critical point in 1838 and 1839 when the slavery question was partially silenced in Congress by the applica­ tion of a gag-rule.

In a maneuver to keep the issue of

slavery as alive as possible under the handicap of the gagrule, the Congressional abolitionists resorted to the ques­ tion of the recognition of Haiti.

They were inevitably

voted down on the Haiti question, for in the words of Logan, nthe growth of cotton capitalism and slavery made increasingiy impossible the recognition of a free Negro republic.”16 The decisiveness of the opposition of the slave in­ terests is reflected in the fact that Great Britain recog-'

14

Ibid., p. 232.

Ib Charles C. Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873 (Baltimore: The Johns Hookins Press, 1938) ,“ p. 123. Ib Logan, o|>. cit., p. 236.

276

nized Haiti in 1839.

By tliat date British, recognition of a

free negro republic was no longer a threat to the security of British colonial planters, since Great Britain had pro­ claimed the emancipation of all slaves in 1833.3-^ Of added significance was the interest manifested by the United States in the revolt of the eastern half of the island from Haitian control in 1844, and the subsequent establishment of the Dominican Republic under General Juan Pablo Duarte.

While the United States did not recognize

the Dominican Republic until 1866, which was four -years after the recognition of Haiti, the hesitation occurred rather in spite of an overt anxiety to give the new republic an early recognition, and was entirely due to considerations of a special nature.

The conditions seem to have been

alternately a lease on Saman^ Bay and a guarantee that the republic would not place itself under the protection of a European government.-*-® Soon after the Dominican revolt had

17

Ibid ., p. 231.

18 Regarding th.e Samana Bay condition, it is of interest that in the instructions, of Secretary of State Marcy to the United States Commissioner to the Dominican Republic, June 17, 1854, Marcv included the statement that ffThe strong­ est inducement for recognizing the Dominican Republic • • . is the acqiiirement of the advantages which the United States expect to derive from the possession and control of the tract of country on Samana Bay. . . .,! (’ William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935, Vol. VI, 1831-1860, p. 18).

277 occurred, the State Department began to send agents to in­ vestigate conditions in Santo Domingo prior to any possible recognition.

The reports of the agents, which emphasized

white supremacy in the new republic, were sufficiently favon able to evoke a recommendation of recognition by Secretary of State Buchanan in 1845.-9

Both President Polk and Tyler,

however, came out against the recognition, and the matter was deferred until 1866, pending further guarantees with respect to the conditions imposed by the United States. It is evident that had the Dominican Republic been more amenable to the conditions imposed by the United States, it would have won an early recognition, especially in view

of the enthusiasm that the slaveholding interests

in the United States had for the establishment of a govern­ ment characterized by white supremacy as a counterpoise on the same island as the free, black republic of Haiti. The eventual recognition of Haiti, coming fiftyeight years after the proclamation of Haitian independence, occurred on June 5, 1862, after President Lincoln in his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1861, had recom­ mended the recognition of both Haiti and Liberia.

By the

time Lincoln had pronounced his advocacy of recognition to

-9 ipj^e reports of the various agents sent to investi­ gate conditions in the Dominican Republic are compiled In the valuable work by Manning, op_. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 27-219.

278 Congress only four slaveholding states remained, with repre­ sentatives in the national legislature; consequently there was hardly any effective opposition to. Lincoln’s statement that If any good reason exists why we should persevere longer- in withholding our recognition of the independ­ ence and sovereignty of Haiti and Liberia, I am unable to discern it. Unwilling, however, to inaugurate a . novel policy in regard to them without the approbation of Congress, I submit to your consideration the expedi­ ency of an appropriation for maintaining a Charg^ d !Af­ faires near each of these states. It does not admit of doubt that important commercial advantages might be secured by favorable treaties with them . 2 0 It is almost superfluous to recall, that the secession of the southern, slaveholding states in 1861 gave the aboli­ tionists free reign, and that the recognition of Haiti was a rather direct consequence of the challenge that the South had thrown down.

Yet when Charles Sumner introduced a bill

in the Senate on February 4, 1862, authorizing the President to appoint diplomatic representatives to the republics of Haiti and Liberia, opposition arose from the Senators from Kentucky and Maryland.

Senatpr Saulsbury of Maryland was

particularly adamant, stating: How fine it will look, after emancipating the slaves in this District, to welcome here at the White House an African, full-blooded, all gilded and belaced, dressed In court style, with wig and sword and tights and shoebuckles and ribbons and spangles and many other adorn­ ments which African vanity will suggest. If this bill

20 J . d . Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902 (New York: Bureau bT’"National Literature and Art, 1905), Vol. IV, p. 47.

279

shmild pass the House of Congress and become a law, I predict that in twelve months, some Negro will walk upon the floor of the Senate and carry his family into that which is apart from foreign Ministers. If that is agree­ able to the tastes and feelings of the people of this country, it is not to mine. . . .2 1 While the removal of the obstacle of the slaveholding states was no doubt the controlling cause for Lincoln1s re­ cognition of Haiti, yet another factor which made a contempo~ raneous appearance may have served to impress Washington with the propriety of an immediate acknowledgment•

The weak

Dominican Republic was restored to Spanish suzerainty on March

18,

1861,

upon the proclamation of President

Santana.22

The United States was apparently too occupied in its own Civil War to do more than weakly protest this realization of a fear it had long had with regard to the Dominican Republic, but

the actual threat of Haiti also falling into the hands

of a reinvigorated Spain possibly contributed to the decision of a prompt recognition as a method of foresta3.1ing that eventuality.23 The unique history of the relations between the

21 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 2501-2. 22 Tansill, op. cit., p. 212. 23 While no official correspondence from Washington officials reveals this argument for the recognition of Haiti in so many words, it has been suggested that the re­ cognition might be construed as a gesture of moral support to Haiti, weak as the gesture no doubt was (Logan, op. cit*, p. 293).

280 United States and Haiti is one which, ranks along with tha.t of American-Soviet Russian relations as perhaps the great­ est exceptions to the traditional policy of recognition as practiced by the United States,

In the case of Haiti, the

United States for a long time resorted to the double role of safeguarding the independence of the black republic while steadfastly refusing to acknowledge its independence.

The

evidence is indisputably clear, as pointed out by the most thorough authority on Haitian relations with the United States > that the major consideration in the long refusal to recognize Haiti "was the fact that the independence of Haiti resulted from the revolt of Negro slaves and that the ruling class were

N e g r o e s .

There is little room for doubt that the character of the government in Haiti was distinctly inimical to the in­ terests of the United States as long as the institution of slavery existed in the latter country.

As soon as the issue

of slavery had split the nation, the abolitionist government In ?/ashington found no difficulty in extending the longsought recognition, since the existence of a free black re­ public held no fears for a nation without the institution of slavery.

In this regard, the United States followed in the

footsteps of Great Britain by refusing the acknowledgment

24 Ibid., p. 77.

281

of Haiti*s independence until slavery had been abolished within its own country.

For sixty years, therefore, the

United States used the power of recognition as a d evice to discourage the success of a government dominated by ex­ slaves, and thus to safeguard the institution of slavery at home.

On the other hand, Wesley correctly states that the

recognition of Haiti and Liberia as independent powers by the United States "forms one of the great landmarks in the Negro *s progress toward democracy and justice. ff25 2.- POLICIES REGARDING THE QUESTION OF MONARCHY IN BRAZIL (1822-1894) One of the first potential boomerangs of the de f aGto policy of recognition as it was formulated by the United States to inspire and protect the growth of republican institutions was with the respect to the establishment of a monarchy in Brazil, independent from Portugal, by Dom Pedro I in 1822.

Monarchy in itself was considered inimical

to the interests of the United States In the earlier days of Its national existence, and while the policy of recogni­ tion as formulated by Jefferson was frankly prescribed to promote republicanism abroad, its application had embarrass­ ing defects as an effective weapon in the field of inter-

25 Wesley, ojd. c i t ., p. 385

282

national politics.26

pn resorting to pure de factoism, the

United States was obliged to recognize any form of govern­ ment provided certain objective prerequisites had been satisfactorily met. The success of the Portuguese prince, Dom Pedro in severing all bonds with the Lisbon branch of the House of Braganza in 1822, and in setting himself up as Emperor of Brazil, was an immediate challenge to the United States.

As long as

Brazil had been content in its relations with the mother country, as unique as they may have been, the United States could not and would not make an issue of the extension of monarchy to the Western Hemisphere.

The establishment of an

independent monarchy headed by a European prince in the Western Hemisphere had its potential dangers, however, which could not be dissipated by a de facto policy of recognition. The question reached a critical stage upon the arrival in Washington of a Brazilian agent in April, 1824, whose com­ mission was frankly to secure recognition from the United States. 27

Monroe cabinet immediately quarreled regarding

26 in referring to the question of the recognition of Dom Pedro as Emperor of Brazil, one authority asserts that ”As a champion of republican government there was some prejudice in this country against an acknowledgment of in­ dependence which implied at the same time a sanction of principles antagonistic to those which the United States was supposed to represent” (Goebel, op. cit., p. 139). 27 Lawrence F. Hill, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 1932), p. 28.

283 the wisdom of giving official audience to the Brazilian agent, and thereby by implication recognizing the Rio de Janeiro government.

Some members demurred on the ground that an ex­

tension of recognition would encourage monarchy to gain a foothold on the continent.28

in the end, however, the

argument turned upon another consideration, for while it was feared that Dom Pedro was somewhat tainted by the Holy Alli­ ance, the feeling prevailed that Mif there was any hope of pre­ venting the European agency of reaction from making of the younger ruler its point d 1appui, it lay in recognizing his government.1129 In a more positive sense, President Monroe was able to rationalize a recognition of Dom Pedro *s Brazilian Empire by asserting that it would lessen the offensiveness to the Holy Alliance of the previous recognition of the Spanish American republics, and thereby indicate that the action of the United States regarding the Spanish American rebels had not been merely a piece of political propaganda.30

As a re­

sult, the recognition of Dom Pedro took place on May 26, 1924,

28 An excellent account of the cabinet discussions re­ garding the question of recognizing Brazil is to be found in Charles Francis Adams, editor, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1874-77}, Vol. VI, pp'. 280-85 ejb seq. 29 Hill}, ojo. cit., p. 30. 30 Stanislaus M. Hamilton, editor, The Writings of, James Monroe (New York: G. P. Putnam*s Sons, 1898-1903), Vol. VI, pp. 128-29.

284 upon assurances concerning tlie suppression of the slave trade.SI Although the United States upon this occasion was com­ pelled by other considerations to refrain from using the power of recognition as a means of discouraging the growth of monarchical institutions in the Western Hemisphere, the case of Dom Pedro I has merited review as a prelude to the attitude taken by the United States towards the political upheavals in Brazil during 1889-90 and 1893-94.

If the United States con­

descended to the establishment of a European monarchical sys­ tem In Brazil with some misgivings, the careers of Brazil1s two Dom Pedros did a good deal toward dispelling most of Washington1s fears.

The Empire of Brazil remained in rather

sharp contrast to the Spanish American republics not only in order and stability, but even in enlightened liberality. Republican agitation was not to be quashed, however, even by good administration in Brazil.

Upon a reorientation

of the Brazilian government pursuant to the transfer of authority from the ailing and aged Dom Pedro II to his daughter, Isabel, in 1889, the republicans instigated a bloodless coup d *etat.

On November 15, 1889, the Empire was declared sup­

planted by a federal republic,.and on the evening of the next day the venerated emperor and his family made a lonely departure

Hill, o p . c i t ., p. 30.

285

Tor Europe and exile. 32

Hie long, peaceful

reign*, of the

House of Braganza was at an end. Despite a traditional predilection for republicanism, the United States looked with mixed feelings upon' the change in Brazil.

As Rippy remarks, when news of the forced abdi­

cation of Dom Pedro reached the United States, . . . a good portion of the editors of the country seem to have been in doubt for a moment whether to con­ gratulate Brazil for having set up a republic or to con­ dole with the country on having deprived itself of the services and presence of so great a ruler and m a n . S3 The advocates of an e arly recognition of the Brazilian Republic were not slow in making themselves heard, however, for a resolution proposing immediate recognition of the re­ public was submitted in Congress and formed the subject of lively debate.34

On November 17, two days after the over­

throw of the imperial regime, the American Minister to Rio de Janeiro cabled to the State Department a recommendation of immediate recognition, later writing a letter to Secretary of State Blaine again advocating early recognition in stating that In my opinion, the republican form of government is securely established, even though the present ministry

32 Wilgus, o£. cit., p. 326. 33 j. Fred Rippy, f,The United States and the Estab­ lishment of the Republic of Brazil,” Southwestern Political Science Quarterly, 3:39-53, 1922-23, p. 41. " ^ GQ^gPQssloaal Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 114-16 et seq.

286

should fall. Our constitution and flag have been copied, and, looking to future relations, I desire our country to be first to acknowledge the R e p u b l i c . 3 5 When the revolution assumed the more questionable character of a military dictatorship, the American Minister changed his mind, and cautioned against a hasty recognition.36 For the time being, at least, Washington did nothing, for Unwilling to take the chance of strengthening a mili­ tary despotism, when its design was to advance the cause of popular government in the New World, the Harrison ad­ ministration deemed It wise not to hasten formal recog­ nition. 37 The delay was not appreciated by the more ardent antimonarchists in the United States Congress, who were arguing that an immediate recognition would strengthen the republi­ cans of Brazil and discourage any European designs for inter­ vention. 38

rpfoe criticism of these more .ardent republicans

did not fall upon deaf ears, for Secretary of State Blaine, an ardent Pan-American, threw caution to the winds in ex­ tending a formal recognition on January 29, 1890.39

That

Blaine!s step marked a reversal of the policy of watchful 33 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States~~(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862 f f .)7 1889, p. 60 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations). 36 Ibid., 1890, p. 74. 3*7 Hill, ojd . cit., p. 264. 38 Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 216, 323, 871 et_ seq. 39 Foreign Relations, 1890, p. 83.

287

waiting is attested by tlie Tact that recognition was given "while evidence of the disposition of the Brazilian people toward the revolutionary government must still have re­ mained far from explicit and conclusive."40

The fact of

the matter is that even months later the fate of the revolu­ tion was still far from certain.

Intermittent disorders

continued for more than four years following the overthrow of Dom Pedro 11.41 Perhaps the greatest significance of this recognition of the Brazilian republic by the United States lies in the fact that the Department of State found it advisable to stretch a few points, and even to reverse a decision to await the settling of conditions in Brazil, in order to en­ courage the republicans by a premature recognition.

Under

more normal circumstances, It is probable that the United States would have awaited political stability and some more tangible evidence of support of the regime by.the Brazilian population before extending recognition.

The opportunity

to encourage republicanism was not to be missed, however, even at the cost of a few modifications in the policy of recognition.

As Rippy has remarked,

This fear of European intervention and preference for republican institutions, even in a case where the

40 Rippy9 ojD. clt., p. 51. 41 L o g . cit.

288

choice was between a republic and one of the best of monarchies, tended to hasten recognition of the new order in Brazil.42 A sequel to the acknowledgment of the Brazilian re­ public occurred some three years later, as the result of the outbreak of a naval revolt on September

6

, 1893.

On October

24 of that year, Admiral Mello announced the establishment of a provisional government at Desterro.

Upon appealing to

the United States for recognition as a belligerent, the Mello faction was informed by the Cleveland administration in Washington that . . . recognition by the United States of the insur­ gents as belligerents would be an unfriendly act toward Brazil and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, the insurgents having not, up to date, established and maintained a political organization which would justify such recognition on the part of the United States. . . .43 As the weeks went by, the rebels became better estab­ lished and renewed their request for recognition on several occasions.

If there was any doubt, however, that Washington

favored the government, or Peixoto faction, the doubt was dispelled upon the issuance of an insurgent manifesto pro­ claiming a return to monarchy.44

j±s Hill states,

The insurgent manifesto proposing the reestablishment

42 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 4^ Foreign Relations, 1893, p. 63. 44 The monarchical manifesto, published on December 10, 1893, is reproduced in Foreign Relations, 1893, p. 84.

289 of the imperial form of government, even though the change was to be subject to ratification by the Brazilian people, absolutely precluded the possibility of recogni­ tion at Washington.45

The United States did not stop at mere non-recogni­ tion of the rebels, but in an over-zealous defense of its rights, refused to allow the rebels much of an opportunity to win a decisive victory around the vital commercial cen­ ters.

The action of United States gunboats in protecting

American merchant vessels and cargoes against rebel fire was plausible enough, but the protection seems to have served as a pretext to discourage the insurgents upon the slightest opportunity. The rebellion collapsed on March 13, 1894, but it had been a close call for the defenders of the newly-born repub­ lic of Brazil.

A debt of gratitude was at least due to the

United States, for as one commentator has observed, American policy during the revolution very definitely strengthened the cause of the Peixoto faction. If the insurgents had been permitted to shell the capital city and to prevent supplies from reaching their opponents, victory would have been theirs.46 It is apparent in a revie?/ of the Brazilian case that the United States, in favoring republicanism, employed the device of recognition to discourage monarchy in Brazil on two occasions.

45 46

Interestingly enough, recognition 7/as employed

.Hill, o£. cit., p. 275. Ibid., p. 280.

290

in a father opposite manner in the first case as contrasted to the second.

With, regard to the coup d !£tat of 1889, the

United States made a liberal bestowal of recognition to the republicans which in terms of its own standards would have been regarded as quite premature.

In relations to the 1893-

1894 rebellion, the United States steadfastly refused to grant the insurgent monarchists even a recognition of belligerency, notwithstanding the fact that they held out for more than six months.

With reference to the latter case, it has been ob­

served by Hill that “without doubt American opposition would have been less persistent had not the insurgents made the fatal mistake of declaring for monarchy.” -*7

Thus, with Ameri­

can help, the Brazilian republic was made secure by 1894. The power of recognition had served the cause of republicanism first by aiding the republicans in 1889-1890, and then by hindering the monarchists in 1893-1894. 3.

THE MAXIMILIAN GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO (1862-1867) One of the most delicate problems of diplomacy faced

by the United States in its relations with European powers was with regard to the establishment of the Austrian Arch­ duke, Maximilian,- as Emperor of Mexico by the grace of an invading French army in 1863.

^

Loc. cit.

While the attitude of the

291 United States was clear and easily determined, its enforce­ ment was

unfortunately

deemed inadvisable during the dura­

tion of the American Civil War. .Upon many occasions the dynamic Secretary of State, William H. Seward, was obliged to contemplate the discouraging alternatives of acquies­ cence in this gross violation of a basic principle in Ameri­ can foreign policy, or else French support to the Confeder­ ate States of America..

The dilemma drove the otherwise

vigorous Seward to resort to a policy subsequently character­ ized as ffmasterly inactivity. French intervention arose from a quarrel which the Juarez government in Mexico had precipitated by a decree in July of 1861 suspending for two years all payment on the foreign debts of Mexico.

As one authority states, the action

of Juarez marked the climax of continuous trouble since 1842, when Mexico agreed with Great Britain, France and Spain to set aside a percentage of customs duties at Vera Cruz and Tampico to pay the principal and interest of Mexico’s foreign

4 8 R i p p y remarks that "Between the danger of provok­ ing Hapoleon into supporting the Confederacy and declaring war on the United States under conditions that might have assured him of the backing of the French people, on the one hand, and that of maintaining a silence which might be inter­ preted as acquiescence, on the other, there lay only a very narrow? path; and this path became more and more difficult to follow with the passing of time 11 (J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico, iKew York: A..A. .Knopf, 1926), p. 260.

292 indebtedness.^9

A vigorous assertion of rights on the part

of the interested powers led Seward in September, 1861, to propose a novel solution of a treaty whereby the United States was to assume the interest on all foreign debts for five years, with public lands and mineral rights in Lov^er California, Chihuahua, Sonora and Sinaloa as security.50 Seward hoped by this scheme to avoid the threat of inter­ vention in Mexico from Europe. Perhaps in the long view, it was fortunate for the United States that Seward’s rash offer t o assume Mexico’s international responsibilities was vetoed not only by the United States Senate, but also by Prance and Great Britain. On October 3, 1861, however, Prance, Great Britain and Spain signed a convention at London providing for joint occupation of Mexico until their demands should be satis­ fied. 51

The agreement asserted that the povsrers were not

seeking an acquisition of territory or any special advan­ tage, and that they would not nprejudice the rights of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form

Stuart A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recogni­ tion toward Mexico (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933, p. 55. 50

PP* 55-6.

51 William Spence Robertson, !,The Tripartite Treaty of London,n Hispanic American Historical Review, 20:167-89, Ho..2, May, 1940.

293

of government.ff5^

The United States was invited to join

with the other signatories to the agreement, but declined on December 4, 1861. The forcible intervention of the three powers took place early in 1862.

On February 19 of that year the Mexi­

can government signed a convention with Great Britain and Spain agreeing to their demands, whereupon the forces of the latter two countries retired from Mexico.

Napoleon,

however, refused to sign the convention, and by his behavior began to reveal his imperialistic designs which had been masked by the declarations of the London convention. As the French expeditionary force continued alone in its occupation of Mexico, Secretary Seward became alarmed and circularized the legations of the United States with an elaborate statement of policy on March 3, 1862.

The signifi­

cant passages from the despatch, marking the outline of the subsequent attitude of non-recognition towards the Maximilian regime, are as follows: We observe indications of a growing impression in Europe that the demonstration made by the Spanish, French and British forces against Mexico is likely to provoke a revolution in that country which shall bring about the introduction of a monarchical government, and the assumption of the crown by a foreign prince. . . The President has relied upon the assurances given his government by the Allies that they were in pursuit

^ British and Foreign State Papers, 1860-1861, Vol. LI, p. 63..

294 of no political object, but simply the redress of their grievances. . . Nevertheless the President regards it as his duty to express to the Allies . . . that a monarchical government established in Mexico, in the presence of foreign fleets and armies, occupying the waters and the soil of Mexico, has no promise of security or permanence; in the second place, that the instability of such a monarchy would be enhanced if the throne were assigned to a person alien to Mexico, that in these circumstances the new govern­ ment would instantly fall unless sustained by. European alliances, which, under the influence of the first in­ vasion, would be practically the beginning of a perma­ nent policy of armed intervention by monarchical Europe, at once injurious and inimical to the system of govern­ ment generally adopted by the American continent.53 While the tenor of Seward's despatch evidenced a fundamental antagonism to the imperialistic designs of Na­ poleon in Mexico, the Secretary of State yet did nothing to impress Prance with the seriousness of the consequences. Even the American Consul-General in France became impatient at Seward's lack of forcefulness, but received the reply from Seward that t!We have compromised nothing, surrendered nothing, and I do not propose to surrender anything.

But

why should we gasconade about Mexico when we are in a struggle for our own life?"54 Either as the result of credulity or preoccupation,

53 Quotedu in James M. Callahan, Evolution of Seward 1 s' Mexican Policy (West Virginia University Studies in American History, Series I, No. 4-6. Morgantown, West Virginia: West Virginia University, 1909), pp. 31-32. 34 Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (New York: Harper and brothers, 1900j, Vol. II, p. 430.

295

Seward Tailed even to submit a formal protest to the French, government.

The Secretary of State should not have been

unduly siirprised, therefore, when in the spring of 1863 General Forey, the head of the French expeditionary force, handpicked a temporary government for Mexico on the eve of occupying Mexico City.

The new supreme junta thereupon

chose a Francophil Assembly from among the enemies of the legal president of Mexico, Benito Juarez.

On July 11, 1863,

the day after the French occupation of the capital, the puppet Assembly voted for an empire-monarchy, and decided to offer the crown to Maximilian and his descendents, "or, if he refused, any other Catholic prince whom Napoleon should indicate for the Mexican nation. ”55

Upon the comple­

tion of this act, the puppet government of Mexico set the stage for the greatest violation of the Monroe Doctrine that has yet appeared in the Western Hemisphere. It was some nine months before Maximilian formally accepted the Mexican crown, but in the meantime Seward busily reiterated his distaste for the arrangement through the usual diplomatic c h a n n e l s . I m m e d i a t e l y upon the organiza-

55 Callahan, op. cit., p. 40. 55 Maximilian was offered the Mexican crown in October of 1863 by a deputation of citizens, but at that time magnan­ imously refused unless his acceptance was confirmed by the wish of the whole nation. In April of the following year, however, Maximilian accepted the crown without the question yet having been submitted to the majority of the Mexican people (MacCorkle, op. cit., p. 59).

296

tion or the new provisional government in Mexico, Seward in­ structed the American Minister, Thomas Corwin, to shun it. Gorwin was then granted a leave of absence as a more definite indication of the policy of the- United States regarding the French intrigues in Mexico.57 The French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de IFHuys, mean­ while parried the constant demands of Mr. Dayton, the Ameri­ can Minister to Paris, to define the intentions of France by liberal disclaimers "of all intentions to hold permanently, or to colonize, any part of Mexico, or to interfere with the right of the people to choose or maintain their own form of government

•"5®

On August

21,

1863,

Dayton wrote Seward that

Mr. Drouyn de L THuys took occasion again to say that France had no purpose in Mexico other than heretofore stated.; that she did not mean to appropriate permanently part of that country, and that she should leave it as soon as her griefs were satisfied, and she could do so with honor. . . . I took the occasion to say she might leave a puppet behind her. He said no; the strings would be too long to work. . . .59 Subsequently, in the following month, Dayton denied to Drouyn de IFHuys— upon being questioned by the latter— that the United States had made a formal protest against the action of France in Mexico, but added that

57 1159-60.

Diplomatic Correspondence, Oo-llQ-han, op. cit.,

p.

1863,

Part II,

1863,

Part II, p.

pp.

43.

59 Diplomatic Correspondence,

689.

297

. . • relying on the constant assurances of Prance as to its purposes in Mexico, and its determination to leave the people free as to their form of government, and not to hold or colonize any portion of their terri­ tory, my government had indicated to me no purpose to interfere in the quarrel; at the same time we had not concealed . . • our earnest solicitude for the well-being of that country, and an especial sensitiveness as to any forcible interference in the form of its government.60 Seward, however, remained calm in his certainty that Napoleon’s Mexican project would not succeed regardless of whether the United States took the initiative in forcing out the French.

In a despatch to Switzerland on October

2, 1863, Seward reflected an optimism in some short-sighted disclaimers of his own, stating that the United States had • • . neither the right nor the disposition to inter­ fere by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish or maintain a republican (or even domestic) government there or to overthrow an imperial or foreign one if Mexico should choose to establish or accept it. A new step in the Franco-American controversy was reached at the turn of the year when the resourceful de L ’Huys put forward the recognition of the proposed empire as a con­ dition upon the American demand for the withdrawal of French troops from

M e x i c o .

62

Seward flatly rejected the proposition

of de L'Huys, stating that the'opposition of the United States to the establishment of a foreign and monarchical government

60 Ibid., p. 699. 61 Quoted in Callahan, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 62 MacCorkle, op. cit., p. 60.

298

In Mexico remained unchanged, and that, "besides, the de jure government of Mexico iiad not yet been quashed,

Seward argued

from there that the United States was therefore not at liberty to consider the question of recognizing a government which in the further chances of war might come into its place,

Seward

concluded his argument with the statement that Consistent with her principles, the United States could only leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own. people, and recognize their sovereignty and independence in whatever form they should choose to manifest It. 63 It was at this point that the impatience of the House of Representatives with Seward's frustrated policy provoked a legislative-executive quarrel over the control of the power of recognition.

On April 4, 1864, the alarmed Lower

House unanimously passed a resolution stating that . . . the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are Indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico, and that they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical Government in America under the auspices of any European P o w e r . 64 While the Senate failed to. take any action on the House resolution, and while Secretary Seward admitted that the resolution was a true expression of the prevailing

^ Senate Executive Document Ho. 11, o8 th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 475. 64 Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1408.

sentiment of the people, Seward maintained that such ques­ tions were only of concern to the President* 65

'ihe dispute

continued for some months, but in the meantime Seward was obliged to reiterate the American stand upon the occasion of Maximilian’s acceptance of the Mexican crown on April 10, 1864,

In a despatch to Dayton on April 30, Seward wrote,

I remain how firm, as heretofore, in the opinion that the destinies of the American continents are not to be permanently controlled by political arrangements that can be made in the political capitals of E u r o p e . 6 6 Once established as Emperor of Mexico, Maximilian made repeated efforts to obtain recognition from the United States.

Early in March of 1865, Se5Tor Luiz de Arroyo,

Maximilian’s Secretary of State, wrote United States Minister Cor?/in requesting his influence in obtaining an interview/ with Seward to solicit two points, one of which was the re­ cognition of Maximilian1s consular agents in the United States Seward’s reply, March 13, included the statement that it was the fixed habit of the government of the United States . . . to hold no official intercourse with agents of parties in any country which stand in an attitude of revolution, antagonistic to the sovereign authority in the same country with which the United States are on terms of friendly diplomatic intercourse• 6 8

65 G-oebel, op. cit., pp. 195-96. 86

Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part III, p. 759.

6*7 Ibid., p. 484. 68

■> PP- 484-85.

300 In an attempt to force recognition, the Maximilian government issued a decree requiring all invoices and other commercial paper to be certified by a commercial agent of a government which, held the ports to which the goods were destined.^9

The decree made the position of the Juarez

agents in the United States somewhat anomalous, since the forces of Maximilian had been increasingly successful in gaining control over the more Important Mexican ports. Moreover, the continued non-recognition of Maximilian was proving by the same token to be an Increasing hardship on merchants in the United States.

In July, however, Seward

wrote Bigelow in Paris yet another explanation of his re­ fusal to recognize the Mexican Empire, stating that They [the United States] still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico as disallov/able and impractical. For these reasons they could not now agree to compromise the posi­ tion they have heretofore assumed. They are not pre­ pared to recognize, or to pledge themselves hereafter to recognize, any political Institutions in Mexico which are in opposition to the republican government with which we have so long and constantly maintained relations of amity and friendship. . . . On November 29, 1865, M. Montholon, the French Minis­ ter to the United States, presented Seward with confidential instructions from de L*Huys stating, again, that if the

69

Ibid., p. 487.

70

Ibid., p. 489.

301

United States by opening diplomatic relations with, the Maxi­ milian government should furnish assurances that she had no intention of impeding the consolidation of the new order of things founded in Mexico, Prance f,would see no difficulty to enter in arrangement for the recall of (her) troops with­ in a reasonable period. • .T,r^l ber

6

Seward fs reply, dated Decem­

, was unusually frank and evidenced a tone of increas­

ing impatience at the procrastinating attitude of the French. Seward forgave the occupation of Mexico by the French army with the admission that all states have the right to make war, but went on to observe that The real cause of our national discontent is, that the. French army • • . i s invading a domestic republican government there which was established by her people, and with whom the United States sympathize most pro­ foundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical govern­ ment, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions. . . . . . We should think it wrong as well as unwise, on the part of the United States, to attempt to subvert by force monarchical governments in Europe for the purpose of replacing them with republican institutions. It seems to us equally objectionable that European states should forcibly intervene In states situated In this continent to overthrow republican institutions and re­ place them with monarchies or empires. . .*^2 Sev\rard!s antagonism to Napoleon 1 s Mexican venture had

71

Ibid., p. 449.

72

Ibid., pp. 450-1.

302 ■become progressively firmer as the Civil War drew to a close. On December 16, 1865, the Secretary of State went so far as to send a near ultimatum to france.^^

Soon, however, the

debates started anev/ as de-LTHuys, on January 9, 1866, per­ sisted in considering the question of recognition as intima­ tely bound with that of withdrawal of French troops.^ With Seward1s hand freed by the termination of the American Civil War, and with political fences badly in need of tending closer to home, Napoleon yielded to the principle of the American demand for the unconditional withdrawal of French troops supporting Maximilian, and in 1866 began nego­ tiating with the TJnited States over the more practical as­ pects of retirement from Mexico.

Just before the negotia­

tions commenced, however, the French made a parting bid for recognition of Maximilian by pointing out an asserted in­ consistency between the amicable relations of the United States with the Empire of Brazil and the antagonistic rela­ tions of the United States with the Empire of Mexico.

If

the French were unwilling to see any decisive distinction between Dom Pedro II and Maximilian, Seward found no diffi­ culty in pointing it out to them.

In a memorable note to

Montholon on February 12, 1866, the Secretary of State wrote

73 Ibid., p. 429. 74

Ibid., pp. 805-8.

305

the last of his more lengthy arguments to the French, includ­ ing in his remarks the statements that . . . whatever were the intentions, purposes and ob­ jects of France, the proceedings which were adopted by a class of Mexicans for subverting the republican form of government there, and for availing themselves of French intervention to establish on its ruins an imperi­ al monarchy, are regarded by the United States as having been taken without authority, and prosecuted against the will of the Mexican people. , . The people of the United States have not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico have spoken and have called into being or accepted the so-called empire. . . . the presence of European armies in Mexico, maintaining a European prince with imperial attributes, without her consent and against her will, is deemed a source of apprehension and danger. . . Seward went on to state that where the people of any country, like Brasil now, or Mexico in 1822, . . . have voluntarily established and acquiesced in monarchical institutions of their own choice, free from all foreign control of intervention, the United States does not refuse to maintain relations with such govern­ ments, or seek through propagandism, by force or in­ trigue, to overthrow those institutions. On the contrary, where a nation has established institutions, republican, and domestic, similar to our own, the United States as­ sert in their behalf that no foreign nation can right­ fully intervene by force to subvert republican institu­ tions and establish those of an antagonistic character.75 It was hardly the exclusive pressure of the United States that drove Napoleon to abandon Maximilian, but what­

ever the causes, the French expeditionary contingents were entirely out of Mexico by March 12, 1867— eight months before the completion of the removal had been scheduled.

75 Ibid., pp. 813-22.

True to

304

Seward’s predictions and expectations, the Maximilian empire was unable to survive.the loss of support by foreign troops, and thus collapsed some nine weeks after their final depar­ ture.^^

Although the Juarez government did not return to

Mexico City unchallenged by rival chieftains, Mexico was again free to work out its own destiny within the framework * of domestic republicanism. In conclusion, it is to be observed that with refer­ ence to the traditional American policy of recognition, the statements made in certain of Seward1s despatches were hardly consistent with a pure de factoism.

Although for some un­

explained reason Seward did not once refer to the Monroe Doctrine during the entire five years that France openly violated the doctrine, it is apparent that the refusal of the United States to recognize Maximilian was. directly traceable to this fundamental principle of American foreign polic3^.

In this Instance, therefore, the power of recogni­

tion was einployed In upholding the Monroe Doctrine. 4.

THE HUERTA GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO (1913-1914)

An unending controversy has seemingly been provoked over the question of whether President Wilson’s policy of recognition, especially as it was applied to the Huerta re-

76 Callahan, o p . c i t ., p. 85.

305

gime in Mexico, was a departure from the traditional policy of the United States.^

Without venturing an opinion on the

matter, it is yet to be observed that the Wilson policy was an aggressive assertion of the power of recognition to dis­ courage regicide and other revolutionary changes of govern­ ment that may have been brought 'about by extra-legal methods. Upon other occasions, the United States has been content to acknowledge revolutionary regimes— often regardless of the means by which the government assumed power--whenever it had

Goebel, writing just after the Huerta episode in Mexico, acknowledges the exceptional character of WilsonTs policy, but dismisses the question as one of intervention rather than of recognition. He admits, however, that the non-recognition of Huerta seems to have been based upon cri­ teria not in accord with the traditional— and, he feels, superior— policy of recognition ( o j d . eit., pp. 217-18). Cole asserts that Wilson* s Mexican policy "did not represent a fundamental break in the continuity of the American recogni­ tion policy” (Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United States since 1901. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Sta't'e University Press, 1928, p. 60). John Bassett Moore, in his Candor and Common Sense (New York: fn.n.,J 1930), p. 24, declares that it "constituted a radical and subversive de­ parture from our previous policy and practice. 11 Most vigorous in his denunciation of ^Wilson* s policy, and equally assertive as to its radical nature, is .former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in his The United States and the Other American Republics (Department of State, Latin American Series, No. 4. ^Washington, D. C . : Government' Printing Office, 1931), pp. 7-8. McMahon observes that it "marked a radical departure from the policy pursued for over a century," and then cites an editorial in the American Journal of International Lav/ (7:832-36, October, 1912) which holds that "precedents may be.found for his {Wilson*sj re­ fusal to recognize General Huerta" (John L. McMahon, Recent Changes in the Recognition Policy ...of .the United States. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1933, p p . 43-44)•

306

been generally approved by a plebiscite or other manifesta­ tion of popular support.

In this instance, hovsrever, a back­

ground of illegality made the Huerta government inherently persona non grata to President Wilson, and in the latterfs puritanic zeal for constitutionalism there was nothing that Huerta subsequently could have done which would have erased the barriers to his recognition by the United States.

As

G-oebel has warned, this vigorous adoption of a ^legality of origin” doctrine was significantly reminiscent of the old European theory of legitimacy which the United States, in formulating its de facto theory of recognition, had so vehe­ mently opposed for over a century.*78 Regarding the background of the Huerta regime, a libex°al revolution headed by the aristocratic Francisco Madero put an end to the long reign of Porfirio Diaz in the spring of1911 -.

Although the aged dictator had long

been

the friend of exploiting foreign capitalists and concession­ aires. he

had

lost so much favor in. the United Statesthat

there was

”no

question but that the sentiment in theUnited

States was strongly in favor of Madero, ana that the United States government took the earliest opportunity of recogni­ zing him. ”*79

Whether inspired by the belief that Madero was

Goebel, op. cit., p. 218. *79-’Scott Hearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy; a_ Study in American Imperialism (Hew York: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925) , pp . 89"-90.

more disposed towards American than British interests in the intense rivalry for the control of Mexican oil fields is yet conjecture, hut an arms embargo was imposed upon factions resisting the new government.

Moreover, the prompt

recognition of Madero, despite the fact that at no time did he command the full support of the Mexican people, evidenced the esteem with v/hich the Taft administration regarded the moderate-liberal head of the Mexican revolution. Greatly to the disappointment of those who had hoped that Madero would bring a new era in the troubled relations between the United States and. Mexico, a counter-revolution broke out in February; 1913.

Headed by Felix Diaz, the

nephew of the ex-president, and Victoriano Huerta, who was Madero*s commander-in-chief of the army, the counter-revolu­ tion assumed a reactionary character.

With the support of

the army, the rebels soon forced the resignation of Madero. At the first signs of Huerta's success, the Depart­ ment of* State seemed ?/illingly disposed towards considering the eventual recognition of the nev? government, based upon its fulfillment of general prerequisites.

In a despatch to

Henry Lane Wilson, the United States Ambassador to Mexico, Secretary Knox evidenced the absence of any fundamental antagonism toward the Huerta regime, but was inclined toward a policy of caution, as may bet'seen in the following excerpt . . . the Department is disposed to consider the new Provisional Government as being legally established and

308

to believe that it apparently intends to reestablish, peace and order throughout Mexico,, and to hope that it has the support of the majority of the Mexican people. • . . however . . . especially in view of the situation which has prevailed for the past two years or more, this Government must very carefully consider the question of their £those now in responsible control] ability and earnest disposition to comply with the rules of inter­ national law and comity, the obligations of treaties, and the general duties to foreigners and foreign govern­ ments incidental to international intercourse ., . .80 Even before the Taft administration had left office in March of 1913, the conduct of Pluerta and his.militant followers became sufficiently -unbecoming to evoke strong protests of disapproval from Washington.

As one authority

has remarked, the Huerta regime lost all hope of immeidate recognition when Madero and the former vice-president, PinoSuarez, were brutally assassinated on February 23, 1913.81 Although the Huerta regime disclaimed any responsibility for the assassinations, Secretary Knox advised Henry Lane Wilson that the American press considered the. explanations of Gen­ eral Huerta as quite inadequate.82 With the developments in United States-Mexican rela­ tions having reached this tense and complicated stage, the idealistic administration of Woodrow 'Wilson came into power in the United States.

While it is conceivable that the more

80 Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 728. 81 McMahon, ^

ojd

.

cit., p. 41.

Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 747.

309

realistic attitude of the Taft-Knox administration would have eventually led to a formula for tlie recognition of Huerta, President Wilson, on the other Hand, assumed an attitude of adamant Hostility toward Huerta from the very beginning.

In

an Historic statement on MarcH 11, 1913, the new President laid tHe groundwork for His refusal to recognize Huerta by proclaiming His reliance upon a ’’legality of origin” doctrine, explaining His stand in the following words: Cooperation is possible only wHen supported at every turn by tHe orderly processes of just government based upon lax®/, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We Hold . . . that just government rests always upon tHe consent of the governed, and there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public con­ science and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect and Helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves. We shall lend our Influence of every kind to the realiza­ tion of these principles In fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal Intrigue and defiance of consti­ tutional rights weaken and discredit government and in­ jure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to Have their common life and their common af­ fairs so tainted and disturbed. We have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal Interest or ambition. We are the friends of peace, but we know that there can be no lasting or stable peace in such circumstances. As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights, and respect the restraints of constitutional provision. Mutual respect seems to us the Indispensable foundation of friendship between states, as between individuals*So Henry Lane Wilson, still representing the United States In Mexico, Y/as not convinced of the practicability of the

83 Ibid., p. 7.

310

idealism of his new chief, and on the day following the Presidentfs famous pronouncement sent back an urgent plea for the recognition of Huerta.

Unable or unwilling to find

any distinction between the provisional government of De la Barra, which was recognized by the United States, and that of General Huerta, the ambassador advised that a refusal of recognition would expose the government to attacks from its enemies, and that flour attitude will take on a color of at least constructive sympathy with the elements conspiring against the reestablishment of order and peace in a neigh­ boring and friendly republic.**84 Although the President remained firm in his opposition to Huerta, the policy of other governments seems to have been more in harmony 'with the attitude of the United States ambas­ sador, for one of the contemporaneous critics of Wilson’s Mexican policy remarked that while all the leading govern­ ments of the world recognized Huerta, President Wilson e stablished a "moral empire" in America by refusing to recognize a provisional president who had come into power through revolution. 855 Henry Lane Wilson correctly predicted the difficulties that would beset the Huerta regime as a result of non-recog-

84 Ibid., p. 773. william Bayard Hale, "Our Moral Empire in America," World1s Work, 28:52-58, May, 1914, p. 57.

311 nition by the United States,

As one authority has observed,

President Wilson*s attitude convinced aspiring rivals that Huerta could not survive, and within three months the pro­ visional government was faced with

r e v o l t . 86

Recalling his

unsympathetic ambassador, the President sent John Lind to Mexico as a special agent In an attempt to reach a settlement of the chaotic conditions prevailing in the country.

Accord­

ing to his Instructions, Lind proposed a settlement based upon the following conditions: (a) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed. (b) Security given for an early and free election In which all will agree to take part. (c) The consent of Gen. Huerta to.bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election. (d ) The agreement of all parties to abide by the re­ sults of the election and cooperate In the most loyal way In organising and supporting the new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 8*7 When the Huerta government rejected the Lind proposals as being humiliating and an unnecessary Interference with Mexican affairs, Wilson retaliated by imposing an arms em­ bargo.

Huerta continued in his efforts to regularize the

86

Bearing

and Freeman, op. cit., p. 94.

87 The full text of the Lind instructions may be found In Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917 (Hew York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), pp7 191-19.

position of his government, however, and in the autumn of 1913 he dissolved the Assembly, imprisoned one hundred and ten deputies, and issued a call for new elections to he held in October.

It was quite evident to-Washington that Huertafs

strong-arm methods would hardly permit a free and fair elec­ tion, and the arbitrary imprisonment of the deputies evoked a sharp rebuke from Secretary of State Bryan.

Meanwhile,

the United States Charge d fAffaires was instructed to in­ form the Mexican. Foreign Office that the President regarded the dissolution of the Assembly an act of bad faith toward the United States, a violation of constitutional guarantees which made a free and fair election impossible and because of which the President would feel justified in refusing to accept the results of such an election or In recognizing a president so chosen .8 8 Despite the warnings from Washington, the elections nevertheless took place on October 26, 1913.

Huerta, not

surprisingly, was elected as interim constitutional presi­ dent.

Far from yielding an inch from its former position,

the Wilson administration took up the challenge Immediately and announced Its intention of destroying the Huerta regime. On November 7, Secretary of State Bryan cabled various American diplomatic officials that Wilson considered it to

Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 838.

313

be his immediate duty *9to require Huerta*s retirement from the Mexican Government, and that the Government of the United States must no?/ proceed to employ such means as may be neces­ sary to secure this result.11^

Wilson himself reaffirmed

the intransigence of his antagonism towards General Huerta in his address to Congress on December 2, 1913, wherein the President forcefully asserted that There can be no certain prospect of peace in America; until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped author­ ity in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, in­ deed, that such pretended governments will not be counte­ nanced or dealt with by the Government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional govern­ ment in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neigh­ bors • . . work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico has no Government . . . a mere military despotism has been set up which has hardly more than the semblance of national authority.90 As history records, the warning of the Wilson adminis­ tration was not an idle threat.

A financial blockade of

Mexico soon forced Huerta to suspend the payment of interest on all government bonds in January, 1914, and the timely re­ moval of the arms embargo just as the rebels under Carranza and Villa were winning military victories in the north gave the Constitutionalists a real opportunity to challenge the authority of Huerta all over Mexico.

A trivial incident at

Tampico on April 9, 1914, finally led to the occupation of

89

Ibid., p. 856.

98

Robinson and West, op. cit., p. 209.

314 Vera Cruz by tlie United States Marines.

A rather harsh, but

no doubt realistic view or these new developments in Wil­ son’s Mexican policy has been given by the wife of the American Charge d*Affaires, who was of the opinion that With the taking of Vera Cruz, through v/hose customs a full one-fourth of the total imports come, Huerta is out a,million pesos a month, more or less. We are cer­ tainly isolating and weakening him at a great rate. 11Might is right.fr We can begin to teach it in the schools.91 The situation was hardly any better when a conference met at Niagara Palls, Canada, on May 20, 1914, in which Argentina, Brazil, and Chile took upon themselves an attempt to mediate the quarrel between the United States and Mexico. Although the United States accepted the offer of mediation, President Wilson stubbornly refused to discuss any question but that of how to oust Huerta and to put in those ,fwho represented interests and aspirations of the people, whose forces are now in the

a s c e n d e n c y . n9 2

While the conference at Niagara Palls failed to achieve any permanent results, the Qarranzistas, or socalled Constitutionalists, were themselves clarifying the situation in taking advantage of the strategic intervention of the United States to push back the forces of General

91 Edith Louise 0 fShaughnessy, A Diplomat1s Wife in Mexico (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916), p. 290. ^

Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 505-6.

315 Huerta.

On July 15, 1914, Huerta fled from Mexico, and in

tlie succeeding month. Carranza entered Mexico City, took over the government, and had the pleasure of observing the withdrawal of the American troops from Mexican soil. The active interest of Wilson in Mexico was not terminated by the removal of Huerta, howeyer, for Carranza was immediately confronted by the outbreak of factional quarrels which rendered conditions in Mexico as chaotic as ever.

Perhaps as a choice among evils, Carranza had long

been Wilson’s choice as successor to the unacceptable Gen­ eral Huerta.

Wilson went even so far as to announce his

determination to select a man for Mexico himself, with Y/hom the United States could enter into peaceful relations. Although Carranza was not mentioned in this unusual state­ ment of June 2, 1915, it was soon evident that he was Wil­ son’s candidate,

The statement of President Wilson, a rare

document on interference in the domestic affairs of another country on idealistic grounds, well deserves reproduction and is embodied in the following quotation:. • • • Mexico is apparently no nearer a solution of her tragical troubles than she was when the revolution was first kindled. And she has been swept by civil war as if by fire. . . . There is no proper protection either for her own citizens or for the citizens of other nations resident and at work within her territory. Mexico is starving and without a government. • . . It is time, therefore, that the Government of the United States should frankly state the policy which in these extraordinary circumstances it becomes its duty to adopt. It must presently do what it has not hitherto

316 done or felt at liberty to do, lend its active moral support to some man or group of men, if such, may be found, who can ral iy the suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore,, if they cannot unite, the warring factions of the country, return to the constitution of the Republic so long in abeyance, and set up a government at Mexico Gity which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with, a gov­ ernment with whom the program of the revolution will be a business and not merely a platform.93 About a fortnight after the above statement was made, Secretary of State Lansing instructed Silliman, a special agent in Mexico for the United States, to . . . intimate cautiously that it is within the pos­ sibilities to this end preferring to Wilson*s announce­ ment of June 2j that the United States might recognize . General Carranza in view of the way in which things appear to be shaping themselves.94 As though the Carranzista campaign needed any further outside support, a Pan-American conference was called by Lansing on August 11, 1915, in a second attempt to solve the domestic problem of Mexico by the joint intervention of Western Hemisphere powers.

Carranza refused an invitation

to attend, as was his custom with regard to all attempts on the part of foreign officials and governments to intervene in affairs that he considered t o be of concern onl3^ to Mexicans, but the single-purposed Wilson administration backed him anyhow.

It was hardly surprising, therefore,

that upon the termination of the conference a statement

93 Ibid., 1915, pp. 694-95. 94 ibid., pp. 715-16.

317

was issued to the press, October 9, 1915, announcing that The conferees, after careful consideration of the facts, have found that the Carransista party is the only party possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto government of Mexico, and they have so reported to their respective Governments.95 The unusual sequence of events came to a close on October 19, 1915, when the United States formally accorded recognition to Carranza.

The fact remains, however, that

nearly three years had passed since Mexico had been under the authority of a government with which the United States was willing to establish normal relations. In reviewing the use of the power of recognition by the United States In its successful attempt to defeat the regime of General Huerta in Mexico, it would be an unwar­ ranted oversight not to bring out the relationship of cer­ tain private interests to the policy of the- United States in Mexico.

During the twilight years of the reign of Por-

firio Diaz vast quantities of oil were discovered in Mexico. Anglo-American rivalry over oil concessions, as represented by Lord Cowdray and Edward L. Doheny respectively, became an issue of such magnitude that Mexican politics developed into a matter of great international concern.

Since Doheny

had been the first to arrive, the shrev/d Mexican dictator pursued a policy of befriending the British interests until

95 Ibid, j p. 767.

518 tlie one foreign Interest balanced tlie other, effectively preventing any one group from exercising a dominating in­ fluence over Mexican affairs. 96 Hie policy of Diaz in aiding Cowdr&y to become a serious competitor of tlie United States interests was quite naturally resented by tlie American group, and the Madero revolution was looked upon by the latter as an opportunity not to be lost.

It has been proven by a Senatorial investi­

gation that American money heavily .backed Madero.97

One

can draw his own conclusions as to the motivation for the precipitate action of the Taft administration in extending such an early recognition to the Madero government in view of these Interesting circumstances.

At any event, if Madero

did show his gratitude to the Americans, the fact has not yet been satisfactorily revealed, for as Hearing and Freeman state, MJust how far Madero went in restricting British oil interests and In favoring those of the United States, is . . • open to some question. **98 If the Madero regime may be considered as having favored the United States oil interests, it was equally

98 Hearing and Freeman, op. cit., p. 87. ^ bnited States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ^Revolutions in Mexico,n Hearings, 62nd Congress, 2nd Ses­ sion, 1913, pp. 104-5. 98 Hearing and Freeman, op. cit., p. 90.

true that Huerta ?/as seized upon by the British interests in an effort to counter their American competitors.

Huerta

turned to the British after the rebuffs of President Wilson, and as one critic observed at the time, .That the Huerta forces have maintained the Diaz policy of antagonism to American oil interests and friendship to Lord Cowdray is apparent. On Lord Cowdray!s own statement, the firm subscribed to. of the loan floated by Huerta. . . . It is a rich prize for which these American and British capitalists are contending.99 As though it wer e not enough that Huerta was patroniz­ ing the Cowdray group, Washington was further confounded by the British recognition of Huerta, Y/hich occurred only three weeks after Great Britain had assured the United States that it would collaborate with the Wilson policy of non-recogniti o n . 1^0

jt became more and more evident that the British

ambassador In Mexico Y/as steadily backing the Huerta regime nwith the view of promoting the economic interests of Brit­ ish citizens, particularly those of the oil magnate, Lord C o w d r a y .

”101

Hendrick observes that

To Wilson and Bryan this could mean only one thing; The Lnglish government was permitting its foreign policy to be dictated by Big Business;, it was more Interested in money than in morals, more in love with-order than

James Middleton, "Mexico, the Land of Concessions,” World1s Work, 27:289-98, January, 1914, p. 294. 100 Cole, o p . c i t ., p. 58.

320 with democracy. Wilson’s decision in October, 1913, to destroy the Huerta regime by force if necessary, also prompted a willing­ ness to bargain with the British over the letter’s abandon­ ment of the Mexican leader.

In November, Sir William Tyr­

rell, private secretary to the British Foreign Minister, interviewed Wilson at the White House.103

The interview

eventually led to an agreement between Great Britain and the United States In which the British agreed to yield their support of Huerta in return for an adjustment of the Panama Canal tolls to the benefit of British shipping, although Great Britain would not go so far as to help the United States in ousting the Mexican leader.

This Immediate re­

versal of British policy in Mexico is evidenced by the following commentary: A few days after this White House Interview £the Wil­ son-Tyrrell talkj Sir Lionel Carden . . . led a proces­ sion of European diplomats to General Huerta, and for­ mally advised that warrior to yield to the American de­ mands and w ithdraw from the Presidency of Mexico. The

1^2 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Wal­ ter Hines Page (Garden City, New York; Doub1eday, Page and Company, 1925), Vol. I, p.203. IQS jt was on this occasion that Wilson, in reply to Tyrrell’s request that he explain his Mexican policy, made the famous statement: ”1 am going to teach the South Ameri­ can Republics to elect good men! ” When Tyrrell then asked how Wilson could distinguish between Huerta, Carranza and Villa, Wilson could reply only that Carranza was the best of the three, and that Villa was not so bad as he had been painted (Ibid., pp. 204-5).

321 delegation informed the grim dictator tliat their govern­ ments were supporting the American policy and Sir Lionel drought him the unwelcome news that he could not depend upon British support.104 If President Wilson had any further cause to "begrudge a rival British policy in Mexico, the outbreak of the World War dissipated the possibility, for the British became too absorbed in the European conflict to pursue an aggressive policy for or against any particular faction in the political quarrels of Mexico. The record of the Anglo-American rivalry in revolu­ tionary Mexico stands, however, as evidence of a less Idealized criterion in the decisions of both powers with regard to the question of recognition.

Charges that the

policy of both powers was being dictated by the interests of big business were freely made, and authoritative reports reveal the suspicion with which the one government regarded the policy of the other.

It appears to be more than mere

coincidence that while the Department of State over-readily acknowledged the Madero government, backed by American oil interests, it steadfastly refused to recognize the regime of G-eneral Huerta, which was backed by British oil interests.105

104 Ibid., p. 209. 105 An interesting sidelight was provided by an interview Secretary Bryan had with a British diplomat, in which Bryan accused the*" British of having only one interest In Mexico— oil. The Britisher replied: f,That1s just what the Standard Oil people told me in New York. The ideas that you hold are the ones which the Standard Oil is disseminating. You are pursuing the policy which they have decided on. With­ out knowing it, you are promoting the interests of the Stan­ dard Oil” (Ibid., p. 218).

322

The conclusion which, must inevitably be made, however, as to the motivation behind President Wilson*s policy toward General Huerta, does not accord with the muck-raking theory of economic imperialism.

The character of Wilson has been

sufficiently revealed to cast the first doubt upon a charge of insincerity in any of the idealistic pronouncements made by the President with regard to Mexico.

Wilson*s single

purpose was to insure the establishment of constitutional government in Mexico.

As McMahon has observed,

Through-out all of his declarations and official statements as well as- those of his secretaries concern­ ing the relations of the United States with Mexico is to be found the same identical demand— constitutional government • MacCorkle, in analyzing the causes for Wilson's re­ fusal to recognize Huerta, mentions the fate of Madero, the failure to hold a real election, and the fact that Huerta was not in control of the larger part of the country.

In

conc3.usion, he makes the statement that To have recognized Huerta would have meant the same as announcing to all ambitious military leaders that they need only ally themselves with a strong force, murder or drive the lawful rulers from the country, and establish a supreme military dictatorship in order to gain the support of the United States. This President Wilson refused to do.107 Some eighteen years later the then Secretary of State,

106 McMahon, o|). cit., p. 55. MacCorkle, op. cit., p. 91.

323 Henry■L. Stimson, wrote a vigorous criticism of Wilson*s recognition policy, particularly with, reference to Mexico, but with all of his objections the Secretary did not even refer to any charges of subservience to economic interests. Most representative of Stimson*s critical remarks was that. In his sympathy for the development of free constituj • __ _ n

• ... _ t_ • jl

t_ _* _

...

_ . _ _ __

* -i _

_ _

n _

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v

_ i • _

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tice of his predecessors in seeking actively to propa­ gate these Institutions in a foreign, country by the direct influence of this Government and to do this against the desire of the authorities and people of Mexico.108 In the last analysis It appears to have been the feel­ ing of Washington that Huerta was a self-constituted dicta­ tor whose authority rested upon military force rather than upon the consent of the majority of the people that prompted Wilson to refuse recognition to General Huerta.3-09

It is

submitted, therefore, that In this instance, perhaps more than in any other, the United States used the pov/er of re­ cognition as a device to promote orderly and constitutional government, and to discourage a regime whose origin was considered too shady to deserve the respect of civilized nations.

The moralistic tone of President Wilson’s Mexican

policy suggests that which the British and the United States took toward the regicide government of Serbia a decade earlier.

108 stimson, op. cit., p. 8. 109 Q03_e, ojd. cit., p. 60.

324 While it may be of great interest and significance, the question of the advisability, or ultimate effect, of Wilson’s Mexican policy is not of concern to the subject at hand.

For the purpose of this research, it is suffici­

ent to have brought out that it was the character of the Huerta government which was the decisive factor in Wilson’s decision to refuse recognition.

While a moral end may have

been implied in the attitude Secretary of State Sev/ard took toward the Maximilian government in Mexico, the character of the latter*s regime was considered as a danger to the United States, and inspired a policy of non-recognition based more upon self-preservation than upon the crusading altruism tha.t was reflected from President Wilson* s, policy toward G-eneral Huerta. 5.

THE TINOCO GOVERNMENT IN COSTA RICA (1917-1919) In confirmation of the practice of the Wilson admin­

istration in using the power of recognition as an instrument to promote constitutional government, the attitude of Presi­ dent Wilson toward the regime of Federico Tinoco in Costa Rica was almost an exact counterpart to that taken toward the Huerta government in Mexico.

If there was any signifi­

cant distinction to be made between the two cases, it was that Tinoco merited recognition on stronger grounds than Huerta, and that In Its refusal to recognize the former,

325 the Wilson administration even more emphatically gave evi­ dence of an intolerance of foreign regimes, particularly in Latin America, which were born of illegality. The political ascendancy of Tinoco began with the indecisive presidential election of 1913, when as Minister of War and Navy, Tinoco convinced the Costa Rican Congress and the two leading presidential candidates to disregard the procedure outlined by the constitution in cases of dead­ lock and to appoint as Bnirst Designate an obscure politician named Don Alfredo Gonzitlez Flores.HO

Decreed as president

by the Costa Rican Congress, Gonzalez reciprocated by re­ appointing Tinoco as Minister of War and Navy,

As head of

the armed forces, Tinoco was in a position to enforce the selection of Gonz&lez, but although somewhat amazed at this extraordinary series of events, the Costa Ricans supported the latter*s administration until it was ousted in January of 1917 by Tinoco himself, the very man who had been re­ sponsible for its success in the first place. The background of the Tinoco coup d* etat deserves special attention, for behind the clear-cut policy of the Wilson administration is to be found a significantly dis­ cordant element of economic imperialism.

American oil

Raymond L. Buell, 11The United States and Central American Stability,ff Foreign Policy Reports, 7:161-86, July 8 , 1931, p. 178.

326

interests found the Gonzalez administration annoyingly dif­ ficult to deal with., but despite the opposition of the pre­ sident, an agent named Valentine succeeded in convincing the Costa Rican Congress to override the veto of Gonzalez upon the contract for an oil concession by means o'f a number of well-placed bribes, not the least of which seems to have been a gratuity to Federico T i n o c o . E v i d e n c e that Tinoco was the tool of American business interests was further pro­ vided by the relationship of the Minister of War and Navy as business partner to Minor C. Keith, founder and president of the United Fruit Company, whose ’’banana empire11 was rapidly becoming powerful enough to dominate more than one of the petty Central American governments.112 Backed by American interests and in control of the armed forces of the state, TinocoTs bloodless revolution of January 27, 1917, was hardly surprising in its success.

That

which may have been surprising to the credulous believers in governmental duplicity in the pursuit of economic imperialism was the immediate and persistent antagonism of the Wilson ad­ ministration towards the Tinoco regime.

On February 9, 1917,

Secretary'of State Lansing cabled to the American minister in

111 Ibid.,- p. 179. 112 por oharggg that the United Pruit Company aided in the revolution, see Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 312 e_t seq.

327 Costa Rica the advice that ‘ The Government of the United States has viewed the recent overthrow of the established government in Costa Rica with the gravest concern and considers that illegal acts of this character-tend to disturb the peace of Cen­ tral America and to disrupt the unity of the American continent. • • • The desire which this Government has of seeing the will of the people prevail in governmental matters in Gosta Rica has forced it to the conclusion that no Government except such as may be elected legally and established according.to,the Constitution shall be considered entitled to recognition.113 This Lansing despatch, vigorous in its denunciation of unconstitutional regimes, rather conveniently overlooked the point of the questionable legality of the Gonzalez govern­ ment which the United States had not. hesitated to recognize in 1914.

In anticipation of the objections of the Depart­

ment of State, however, Tinoco tried to borrow the color of legality by a decree of January 30, 1917, which announced a constitutional election to Congress by popular vote to be held on April 1st.

The new Congress, it was declared, would

then assemble on May 1st in order to form a new constitution and to elect a president of the republic.

The Tinoco pro­

nouncement did not affect the attitude of Washington, however, for on. February 17, Secretary Lansing instructed the American minister f!by authorization of the President . . .

to Inform

Tinoco that even if he is elected he will not be given recog­ nition by the United States. T!114

113 Ibid., pp. 306-7. 11^ Ibid., p. 308.

328

A few days later, on February 22, 1917, Lansing re­ vealed the sanctionist character of the non-recognition of Tinoco by issuing a public statement that In order that the citizens of the United States may have definite information as to the position of this Government in regard to any financial aid which they may give to, or any business transactions which they may have with those persons w h o .overthrew the Constitu­ tional Government of Costa Rica by an act of armed re­ bellion, the Government of the United States desires to advise them that it will not consider any claims which may in the future arise from such dealings, worthy of its diplomatic support.115 Tinoco proceeded, nonetheless, to legalize his reign by staging the announced election and getting himself and his brother elected president and vice-president respective­ ly by the new Congress, which body also adopted a new con­ stitution for Costa Rica.

As Buell records, however, des­

pite his election and the new constitution (?/hich made Tin­ oco eligible for recognition under the terms of the 1907 Central American

t r e a t y ) , 3-^-6

and despite the original popu­

larity of the revolution with the majority of Costa Rican citizens, President Wilson continued his adamant refusal to recognize Tinoco. hoc, cit. 116 gy the terms of an added convention to the Treaty of Peace and Amity signed at Washington in 1907, the five Central American republics agreed not to tfrecognize any other government which may come into power In any of the five re­ publics as a consequence of a coup d *€tat or of a revolution against the recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not consti­ tutionally reorganized the country11 (for the text of the treaty see American Journal of International Law Supplement, 2:219. 1908. ll? Buell, Q£. c i t ., p. 181.

329 In an effort to influence the rest of Central America t to conform to the policy of the United States, the Department of State even w e n t so far as to instruct the heads of lega­ tions at the capitals of the other four Central American states that. The United States desires it clearly understood that she has not recognized Tinoco*s Government In Costa Rica and would not regard his recognition by the Government to which you are accredited as evidence of a friendly feeling toward the United States.118 Tinoco seemingly did everything possible to gain favor in Washington.

In an attempt to capitalise on the

Imminent participation of the United States in the World War, he offered to place Costa Rican waters and ports at the disposal of the Allies early in 1917.

In September of

the same year Costa Rica severed relations with Germany, and in May of 1918 declared w a r . H 9

Tinoco* s enthusiasm for

the Allied cause hardly did his own any good, for not only did the United States stubbornly refuse to alter its policy

H Q Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 343. It Is note­ worthy that only. Nicaragua conformed to the warning of the United States. The other three states, acting In accord­ ance with the terms of the 1907 convention, withheld recog­ nition only until Tinoco was duly elected president, justi­ fying their action by a statement that the recognition of the undisputable fact of the existence of a Government which, without opposition in Costa Rica, exercises, supreme author­ ity! and assumes international obligations is the sole re­ quirement of International law in such cases (Foreign Rela­ tions, 1917, pp. 346-47). 119 Buell,

0 £.

cit., p. 181.

330

toward Tinoco, but in the pariahship inspired by the atti­ tude of the United States the Tinoco government was not allowed t o 'participate in the Paris Peace Conference, sign the Treaty of Versailles, or even join the League of Na­ tions •^20 As an investigator for the Department of State re­ vealed in 1917, the deadlock v/hich resLilted from the efforts of Tinoco to stay in power despite the non-recognition of the United States ,fbegan a process of economic strangula­ tion. fi121

Enemies of Tinoco, encouraged by the Wilson pol­

icy, began plotting revolution.

Two unsuccessful revolts

broke out, with consequent restrictive measures in retalia­ tion from the increasingly unpopular Tinoco government-.

On

August 9, 1919, Tinoco went to Congress and asked permission to leave Costa Rica uto repair his health.*f An associate of Tinoco, General Juan B. Quiros, was aprjointed First Designate, and on August 12, Tinoco definitely resigned and summoned Quiros to serve as president of the

r e p u b l i c . 1 2 2

The Wilson administration, however, was no more favorably disposed toward Quiros than it was toward Tinoco,

120 McMahon, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 121 John Foster Dulles, ^Conceptions and Misconcep­ tions Regarding Intervention,fI Annals of the American Acadexny of Political and Social Sciences, 144:102-4, July, 1929, p. 103. 122 Buell, oj3* cit., p. 183.

331

Tor Secretary Lansing was determined that Costa Rica return as near as possible to the status quo ante Tinoco, and the nearest seemed to be the accession to the presidency of Francisco Aguilar Barquero, who had been elected Third Designate in the 1914 elections and under the 1871 constitu­ tion.

Accordingly, Lansing instructed the American consul

in San Jos€ that You may make it public that the Government of the United States will not recognize J. B. Quiros as present president. The governmental power should be deposited in the hands of Francisco Aguilar Barquero, successor to. the executive power, under the Alfredo Gonzalez regime. Barquero should hold free and open elections for presi­ dent at earliest possible date. Were this done, it would appear that the necessary legal formalities had been complied with to constitute a legitimate government worthy of recognition by the Government of the United States•123 Quiros thereupon resigned on September 2, 1919, in favor of Aguilar, after twenty days in office.

As insisted

upon by the Department of State, presidential elections were held in May of 1920.

Julio Acosta, an enemy of Tinoco who

had led an unsuccessful revolt against the Costa Rican usurp­ er in May of 1919, was elected president.

An Immediate recog

nition of Acosta was extended by the United States, signali­ zing the resumption of diplomatic relations with Costa Rica after nearly three and a half years of

n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n . 1 2 4

123 Quoted in McMahon, op. cit., p. 37. Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol.

I, p. 834.

332

If the two cases of Huerta and Tinoco aptly illustrate tiie insistence of the Wilson administration upon a more rigid adherence to democratic institutions in the Western Hemisphere, they illustrate also the use of the power of recognition to enforce that adherence*

In reviewing these

two cases, an outstanding authority in the field of inter­ national law was prompted to declare: 'The United States now appears to take the stand that normally a government which by force has won the ascend­ ency in opposition to the will of the people and with contempt for rights created under a local constitution, is internationally a menace because its very supremacy sows seeds of discord bound to ripen into a conflict which, however localized, may fairly be deemed hurtful to the maintenance of the general peace. It Is doubt­ less also believed that a government of such character will lack those moral qualifications which are found to be essential to enable the agencies of a state to per­ form scrupulously its obligations to the outside world.125 In the case of General Huerta In Mexico, the point was brought out--and subsequently denied of any validity— that American business interests may have been of decisive influence In the determination of the policy of recognition. The attitude taken by Wilson against the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica, however, was so obviously at cross-purposes with the Interests of big business as to bring out in sheer relief the crusading idealism which motivated the Wilson administration.

As McMahon has observed,

125 Charles Cheney Hyde, International haw: Bhiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States T b o s ton: Little, Brown, and Company, 1922), Vol. 1, p. 73.

333

It made no difference that Tinoco was in control of the administrative machinery of state, that his govern­ ment was acquiesced in by the people and that it showed a disposition to discharge international obligations. The one cardinal, principle or requisite of the Wilson policy, constitutional government, was l a c k i n g . 126 In his pursuit of constitutionalism, Wilson seems to have identified legality of'origin with the general requisites of the traditional policy of recognition cherished so long by the United States, for in the opinion of President Wilson, stability, permanence, and the willingness and ability of a government to perform Its international obligations were not likely to be found in illegally constituted regimes.

In

the refusal to acknowledge such governments, however, the United States assumed the rather smug responsibility of judging the character of a government by the use of criteria far beyond those customarily accepted as within the right of foreign states to employ.

Certainly in the case of Costa

Rica, and probably also in the case of Mexico, the penalties arising from three long years of non-recognition by a state as influential as the United States may possibly have done more harm than good.

John if. Dulles, the investigator sent

to Costa Rica by the Department of State, effectively pictured the disastrous results in Costa Rica of the policy of the United States when he wrote: We did not Intervene by our military force in Costa

126 McMahon, o p . cit., pp. 38-39.

334

Rica to oust the revolutionary government and replace its predecessor. We adopted a policy which, most oppo­ nents of intervention would recognize as being entirely correct and proper from the standpoint of international law. We merely refused to recognize the government. But the effect: was that we thereby began a process of economic strangulation of Costa Rica. . . . As a result, however, of our policy of non-recognition and of the economic and financial pressure inevitably incident thereto, the government, feeling itself under that pressure, began to expend more and more money on the army and for the purposes primarily de­ signed to maintain itself in pov/er. . . . The result of some years of that policy was the country was squeezed dry, the school system and the posts and telegraphs dis­ organized, and a decade of progress had been lost. The economic pressure finally grew so strong and the tax burden became so heavy that ultimately a new revolution broke out, Tinoco was assassinated, a new government came in, which we recognized. 2-27 6.

THE NON-RECOGNITION OP THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'IK RUSSIA (1918-1933)

The refusal of the United States to recognize the Bolshevik government in Russia lasted for the unusually long period of fifteen years, and was staunchly maintained ■by four administrations in Washington.

As in the case of

Haiti, the policy of the United States, covering such a length of time and upheld by such varying administrations, was ofttimes sufficiently complicated by a complexity of considerations that any assumption as to the predominant character of the American attitude must necessarily appear

127 U u H e s ,

o p . cit., p. 103.

335 somewhat arbitrary.

It is submitted, however, that in the

oonstance of* the .American refusal of recognition, considered in relationship to the inconstance of many of the criteria imposed by the United States, a residue remains which com­ prises the basic factor which kept alive the fundamental antagonism of the United States toward the Soviet regime for such a length of time.

Out of the maze of official

correspondence and unofficial commentary Is to be found this factor of the subversive character of the Soviet govern­ ment, for recent Investigations have revealed that while the United States took every opportunity to emphasize other disqualifications of the Soviet, their removal one by one had no appreciable effect upon the policy of the four suc­ ceeding administrations in Washington to maintain a refusal to recognize that government from 1918 to 1933,3-28 In contrast to the policy of the United States with regard to the Bolshevik revolution, the celerity with which the Wilson administration recognized its precursor, the Kerensky regime, was typical of the enthusiastic support that Wilson gave to the growth of potential democracies. Upon the outbreak of the March Revolution in 1917, the Ameri-

128 exhaustive and conclusive survey of the rea­ sons motivating the non-recognition of the Soviet from the date of that government’s inception unto the very eve of the grant of an acknowledgment by the Roosevelt administra­ tion in 1933 has been presented by McMahon, op. cit., pp. 56-115.

336

can Ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, cabled Secretary Lansing bis opinion that nThis revolution is the practical realization of that principle of' government which we have championed and advocated,, I mean government by consent of the governed. Despite the fact that Kerensky*s regime was only a government, and that it was constantly threatened by the Bolsheviks, the Wilson administration did not trouble its conscience over the liberties it seemed to take with the traditional policy of recognition, for if the encouragement of democracy was not enough to inspire recognition, the fact that the success of the Kerensky regime was practically the only assurance left that Russia would not capitulate in the war with.'Germany made the recognition of it an impera­ tive war measure as well. An important factor in the support that the United States gave to Kerensky, and one which loomed large in the subsequent controversy between the Soviet regime and the United States, was the liberal allowance of credit given to the Kerensky government by the United States to enable the Russians to buy war supplies.

The American credits placed

at the disposal of Russia amounted to some $350,000,000 be­ fore the Kerensky regime fell from power.

Of these credits

Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 5-6.

337

advanced, some $187,729,750

Ysrere

utilized by the Kerensky

government, and it is this latter amount which has consti­ tuted the Russia war debt to-the United States.130

During

the entire fifteen years in which the United States refused to recognize the Soviet, that government not only refused to pay the principal or the interest on the debts contracted by Kerensky, but even refused to acknowledge them, except under certain unfulfilled conditions. Yet another fundamental consideration in this brief survey of the background to American-Soviet relations is that of the Allied intervention in Bolshevik Russia, which lasted from 1918 to 1920.

The seeming inevitability of

Japanese and Allied intervention, combined with the dramatic appeal of 45,000 Czech soldiers trying to fight their way out of Russia after their ally had collapsed and had begun to turn on them, transformed into marrauding Bolshevik hordes, prompted the United States to adopt the ill-considered policy of Joining in the Russian intervention.

On August 3,

1918, an official statement proclaimed the purpose of the American intervention, which included the rendering of wsuch protection and help as is possible to the Czechoslovaks,n and the steadying of ”any efforts at self-government or selfdefense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to

1 30 McMahon,

ojd.

cit., p. 61.

358

accept assistance.11 The statement announced, further: Whether from Vladivoskt'ok or from Murmansk and Arch­ angel the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in . the organization of their own self-defense.131 With this review of certain essential factors in the relations of the United States to Russia, a consideration of the asserted causes behind the persistent refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet may be pursued with more -understanding.

The attitude of the Wilson administra­

tion seems to have been based mainly upon the unrepresentative character of the Soviet

g o v e r n m e n t

.132

other factors may

have also played a vital part in the determination of Wilson’s policy, such as Russia’s ?fnegation of every principle of honor and good faith11 and Russia’s refusal to “be bound by any of their most solemn pledges,"133 but the predominant objec­ tion as embodied in official statements emanating from the Wilson administration was an indictment of the undemocratic character of the Soviet regime*

Two statements by Secretary

131 nAllied Intervention in Russia,ft Current History, 8:465-72, September, 1918, p. 466. 132 McMahon, op. cit*, p. 80. In another paragraph McMahon asserts that"unquestionably, the fact that the Sov­ iet government did not represent the consent of the governed furnished at the very beginning one of the chief reasons for withholding recognitionT! (p. 77). 133 Ibid., p. 78.

339

or State Colby, made in 1920 and 1921 respectively, may serve to bear out the point.

In a note to the Italian

ambassador on August 10, 1920, Colby set forth the official policy of the United States toward tbe Soviet and justified non-recognition on tbe following grounds: That tbe present rulers of Russia do not rule by tbe will or tbe consent of any considerable proportion of tbe Russian people is an uncontestable fact. Although nearly two and a half years have passed . . . they have not yet permitted anything in tbe way of a popular election.134 In a statement to tbe press made in January of 1921, Colby was prompted to reassert that . . . Refusal to recognize tbe Soviet Government was due in tbe first place to tbe fact that it was itself tbe denial of self-determination of tbe Russian people being a rule by men who violently usurped power and destroyed tbe democratic character of tbe Russian people!s government•135 Tbe passage of time and tbe apparent consolidation of Soviet authority in Russia caused the succeeding adminis­ tration in Washington to alter tbe reasons for continued non-recognition, for as one authority has observed, ^Nonrecognition of tbe Soviet Government no longer rested upon considerations of its violent origin or its undemocratic character, but upon quite different grounds.”136

jn a letter

Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. Ill, p. 466. 3-35 iJew York Time s, January 30, 1921. 136 Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 275.

340

to Samuel G-ompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, Secretary of State Hughes gave evidence of this change.

Excerpts from the letter, dated July 19, 1923,

include the following -statements: ♦ . • while this government has laid stress upon the value of expressed popular approval in determining whether a new government should be_recognized, it has never insisted that the will of the people of a foreign state may not be manifested by long continued acquies­ cence in a regime actually functioning as a government. When there is a question as to the will of a nation it has generally been regarded as a wise precaution to give sufficient time to enable a new regime to prove its stability and the apparent a cquiescence of the people in the exercise of the authority it has assumed. The application of these familiar principles is not in de­ rogation of the democratic ideals cherished by our people and constitutes no justification of tyranny in any form, but proceeds upon a consideration of the im­ portance of international intercourse and upon the established American principle of non-intervention in the internal concerns of other peoples.137 In the interim from Wilson to Roosevelt, the succeed­ ing Republican administrations based their refusal to re­ cognize the Soviet government on the grounds of the latter*s refusal to accept its international obligations.

If this

were the real, rather than the ostensible, reason for con­ tinued non-recognition, a discussion of the Russian case would not be pi»esented in this chapter.;

Sufficient evidence

has been gathered, however, and the testimony of competent authorities has emphasized, that the Soviet-American contro­ versy over war debts contracted by the Kerensky government

Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol.

II, p . 762.

341

served mainly as a convenient excuse for the American atti­ tude.

That it was not the decisive consideration ?/ill he

seen in the following paragraphs. The total claims which the United States held against the Soviet immediately prior to the advent of the Roosevelt administration amounted to approximately §800,000,000— which figures included a public debt of §317,953,066•37,on Novem­ ber 15,

1931

.-38 Since the Soviet had repudiated all of its

forcing obligations by a decree of confiscation promulgated on January 21, 1 9 1 8 , a deadlock ensued as the result of the American demands.

In an address of May 18, 1922, Sec­

retary of State Hughes typified the attitude of the United States regarding the debts by stating that . . . no state is entitled to a place within the family of nations if it destroys the foundations of honorable intercourse by resorting to confiscation and repudiation and fails to maintain an adequate system of government through which valid rights and valid engagements are re­ cognized and enfoi’ced. 1*^0 In reviewing Russo-American relations in his message to Congress in December of 1923, President Coolidge also

3-38 McMahon, op. cit., p. 82. 139 text of the decree is found in Leo Pasvolsky and Harold G. Moulton, Russian Debts and Russian Reeonstruc tion (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1&24), pp. 197-98. 140 Charles E. Hughes, ^Some Aspects of the Work of the Department of State,tf American Journal of International Law, 16:355-64, June, 1922, p. 357.

342

emphasized this aspect of the refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet, stating that ”Our government does not propose, however, to enter into relations with another regime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of inter­ national obligations •tf141 Tflfh.ile the .American position as outlined in the above statements seemed quite in accord with the traditional pol­ icy of recognition, a consideration of the attitude taken by the Soviet government toward the debt controversy con­ clusively invalidates the sincerity of the American argu­ ments.

Although the confiscation decree remained unaltered,

the Soviet quite early manifested a willingness to acknow­ ledge the American debt, but subject to certain considera­ tions.

Ghicherin, the Russian People1s Commissar for For­

eign Affairs, gave evidence of this conciliatory attitude in a note of October 28, 1921, addressed to several govern­ ments, including the United States.

Ghicherin proclaimed

in the note that ,!no people is bound to pay the price of chains fastened upon it for centuries,” but added signifi­ cantly that ”the Russian Government is inclined to make several essential and highly important concessions in re­ gard to this question.”142

concessions mentioned were

Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol. I, p. VIII. 3-^2 McMahon, op. cit., p. 85.

343 presented by Chicherin at the Genoa Conference in 1922, and included: (1) the recognition of Russia’s debts if they were scaled down, and (2) the restoration to foreign nation­ als of confiscated property provided de jure recognition be accorded and that financial assistance be given in order to meet the obligations which Russia might deign to acknow­ ledge .3.43

in a note to the other powers represented at

Genoa, dated May 11, 1922, Ghicherin presented the Russian point, of view in the following words: . . . the Russian Delegation feels obliged to recall the principle that revolutions which constitute a vital break with the past give rise to new legal standards in the external and internal relations of states. Govern­ ments and administrations created by revolutions are not bound to respect the obligations of the Governments which have been overthrown. . . . . . . nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation . . • the Russian Delegation has expressed its readiness to agree to the payment of state debts, on condition that the losses caused to Russia by intervention and block­ ades are recognized.D44 Ghicherin then proceeded to deliver the coup de grace by presenting counterclaims against all other states for the colossal sum of §60,000,000,000— graciously offer­ ing to scale them down to $25,000,000 for the consideration of recognition and financial aid.

The stupendous character

of the Russian counterclaims could not detract, however,

*^4^ Doc. cit. 144 Foreign Relations, 1922, Vol. II, pp. 798-800.

344

from their essential validity in principle as recompense for the damages resulting from the Allied intervention in Russia. Referring to the intervention and to the consequent counter­ claims submitted by the Soviet, Schuman writes that It was an ill-considered act of policy, wholly without justification in law, the failure of which subjects the governments involved to full responsibility for compen­ sating the aggrieved party. • • • The Russian counter­ claims appear, in principle, to be quite proper. The United States, as well as the Allied Governments, would seem obliged to recognize their validity•145 Ghicherin had a ready answer, therefore, to the Ameri­ can indictment as it was presented in the Coolidge Message to Congress in December, 1923.

Immediately proposing a

settlement of the question, Chicherin included the follow­ ing abbreviated statement in his reply to Coolidge: As to question of claims mentioned your message, Soviet Government is fully prepared to negotiate with vie?/ Its satisfactory settlement on assumption that principle reciprocity [Russian counterclaims] recogni­ zed all round. • . .146 On the basis of this new development in the RussoAmerican controversy, Secretary of State Hughes framed an historic., answer revealing the complete disinclination of the United States to consider the recognition of the Soviet government despite the fact that the.asserted reason for continued non-recognition was rendered somewhat beside the

145 Schuman, ojo. cit., p. 309. 146 Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol. II, p. 787.

345 point toy tli© Russian offer.

The Hughes statement, December

18, 1923, formed the new basis of the American attitude which persisted until the accession of the Roosevelt adminis­ tration in 1933.147

The main text of the Hughes statement

is as follows: . . . There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiation. The American Government . . . Is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated pro­ perty of American citizens or make effective compensa­ tion they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russian obliga­ tions to this country and appropriately recognizing them, they can do so. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obliga­ tions. • . .148 Considering that the refusal to recognize the Soviet was admittedly no longer based upon the criteria of stabi­ lity as evidenced by the acquiescence of the people, and that the seemingly decisive objection that Russia refused to per­ form its international obligations was patently emasculated by the Chicherin proposals of 1922 and 1923, the continued intransigence of the American attitude— which persisted for almost a decade more— necessitated an explanation based upon other grounds.

McMahon has enumerated the main objec­

tions, grouping them under the title of manifestations of the subversive character of the Soviet government.149

147 McMahon,

ojd.

According

clt ., p. 86.

14 8 Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol. IX, p. V88. 149 McMahon, ojs. cit., p. 87.

346

to this authority, the Soviet manifested a subversive char­ acter: (1) hv propaganda designed to bring about the over­ throw of all legally constituted government not in harmony with the principles of communism, (2) by that principle of communism which must of necessity lead to T world revolution, (3) by the Third International, which is but the world as­ pect of sovietism and communism, (4) by its opposition to capitalism and the fundamental principle of private owner­ ship of property, and (5) by its opposition to all religions. Stating that these principles furnished a continuing threat against the American government and American institutions, McMahon holds that Hthey furnish ample justification for the severance of diplomatic relations and therefore a fortiori furnish an adequate and the actual reason for with­ holding recognition. tf150 Cognisance of the dangerous character of the Bolshevik regime was first taken upon the announcement of a decree, promulgated by the Bolsheviks on December 13, 1917, appro­ priating money to foment world-wide revolution.

The main

text of the decree, interestingly reminiscent of the decree promulgated by the radical French National Convention in 1792,151 was as follows:

Ibid., p. 88. Supra, p. 240.

347 » • • tii© Soviet of People*© Commissaries considers it necessary to come forth with all aid, including financial aid, to the assistance of the left, inter­ nationalist, wing of the workers movement of all coun­ tries, entirely regardless whether these countries are at war with Russia, or in alliance, or whether they re­ tain their neutrality. With these aims the Soviet of People’s Commissaries ordains: the assigning of two million rubles for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement, at the disposition of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs .±52 In his note to the Italian Ambassador of August 10, 1920, Secretary of State Colby gave evidence of an aware­ ness of this revolutionary aspect of Soviet policy, and stated the possible consequences of a recognition with the warning that • . . The Diplomatic Service of the Bolshevik Govern­ ment would become a channel for intrigues and the propa­ ganda of revolt against the Institutions or laws of countries with which it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened governments cannot subject themselves.153 The propaganda activities of the Soviet were suffici­ ently real and threatening by 1923 to provoke Coolidge in his December message to Congress to demand Its cessation as a condition precedent for the establishment of amicable r e l a t i o n s .

-^4

Secretary Hughes also emphasized this point

-52 Quoted In United States Senate, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Pursu­ ant to Senate Resolution 50, 68th Congress, 1st Session, p. 207. 153 Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. Ill, p. 467. 154 ibid., 1923, Vol. I, p. ix.

348

in iiis answer to Chicherinfs proposals or that year with the statement in his note of December

18,

1923,

that

• • • Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. The Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned.155 As McMahon has observed,,if there was any doubt that subversive propaganda activity was largely responsible for the continued non-recognition of the Soviet government, the declaration of policy made by Secretary of State Kellogg on April 14, 1928, quite adequately dispelled

I t . 156

Kel­

logg declaration included the forceful statement that The Government of the United States . . . does not pro pose to acquiesce in such interference by entering into relations with the Soviet Government. Nor can the Gov­ ernment of the United States overlook the significance of activities carried on in our midst under the direc­ tion of Moscow as evidenced by the continuance of the fundamental hostile purpose of the present rulers of Russia, which makes vain any hope of establishing re­ lations on a basis usual between friendly n a t i o n s . 1 5 7 The deadlock was eventually resolved by the decision of the Roosevelt administration— made public as a part of its pre-election platform— to recognize the Soviet at the earli­ est opportunity.15S

Upon the invitation of President Eoose-

155 Ibid., 1923, Vol. II, p. 788. 156 McMahon, ojo. clt., p. 90 ^ew Mork Times, April 15, 1928. 158 g-foe decision was prompted partly by the false hope that renewal of relations with Russia would aid in com­ batting the depression by opening the vast Russian market (See Vera M. Dean, rfThe Outlook for Soviet-American Trade,” Foreign Policy Reports, 10:134-43, No. 11, August 1, 1934).

349 velt, Maxim LItvinoff, Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, came to Flashington and negotiations were opened in November of 1933.

After an exchange of notes, the United States

officially recognized the Soviet regime on November 16, 1933.159- it is to be observed that assurances were given by the Soviet regarding propaganda activities.

In one of

the notes signed by Litvinoff and presented to Roosevelt on November 16, Russia made the following declaration: I have the honor to inform you that coincident with the.establishment of diplomatic relations between our two governments it will be the fixed policy of the Gov­ ernment of the Uhion of Soviet Socialist Republics: (1) To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life 'within its own jurisdiction in Its own way and to refrain from Interfering in any manner in t h e.Internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions. (2) To refrain, and to restrain all persons In gov­ ernment service and all organizations of the government or under its direct or Indirect control, Including or­ ganizations In receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way what­ soever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed inter­ vention, or any agitation or propaganda having as an aim, the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, Its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions. . . .ISO

159 Department of State Press Releases, November 17, 1933.

3-60 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Department of State, Eastern European Series, No. 1. 'Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 5-6.

350

In acknowledgment of the receipt of the above note, Pre­ sident Roosevelt wrote a reply of the. same date which carefully reproduced the Russian assurances■word for v/ord, adding that It will be the fixed policy of the Executive of the United States within the limits of the powers conferred' by the Constitution and the laws of the United States to adhere reciprocally to the engagements above expressed.161 It Is quite significant that in another note, carry­ ing the same date of November 16, Russia formally abandoned its claim for damages resulting from the intervention of the United States in Siberia during the years 1918-1921.

Con­

sidering the fact that this Russian argument played such a large part In the quarrel over American debts contracted by pre-Bolshevik Russia, the Russian renunciation was equally as generous as its guarantee of non-intervention in American affairs was thorough.

Ihe text of the Litvinoff renuncia­

tory note to Roosevelt is as follows: I have the honor to Inform you that, following our conversations and following my examination of certain documents of the yeai^s 1918 to 1921 relating to the attitude of the American Government toward the expedi­ tion into Siberia, the operations there of foreign military■forces and'the inviolability of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Govern­ ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that it will waive any and all claims of whatsoever character arising out of activities of military forces of the United States in Siberia, or assistance to mili­ tary forces in Siberia subsequent to January 1, 1918, and that such claims shall be regarded as' finally set­ tled and disposed of by this agreement.162

3hid., pp. 6-7. 162 ibid., p. 15.

351

It is apparent that in return for Russia*s promise of non-intervention and renunciation of claims arising from the -American intervention in Siberia, President Roosevelt not only granted to tiie Soviet Its long-sought recognition, but also abandoned the traditional stand on debt settlement as being a sine qua non condition of recognition.

In the

Litvinoff negotiations which led to recognition, no agree­ ment was reached regarding questions of indebtedness and claims other than that embodied In Litvinoff*s renunciatory note reproduced above.

A joint statement issued by Litvin­

off and Roosevelt on November 16 merely stated that In addition to the agreements which we have signed today, there has taken place an exchange of views with regard to methods of settling all outstanding questions of Indebtedness and claims that permits us to hope for a speedy and satisfactory solution of these questions which both our Governments desire to have out of the way as soon as possible.163 If the above joint statement gave the appearance of an untimely abandonment of a long-fought cause by means of yielding the one weapon which had been used on Its behalf— that of non-recognition— the fact still remains that no agreement was made for the extension of credits for Soviet purchases.

Obviously, credits were to remain as a decisive

argument in future negotiations leading to the settlement of debts owed by Russia to the United States and to its

163 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

352

citizens.

In a radio speecli of November 22, 1933, Assistant

Secretary of State Moore explained the agreements to the American public, rationalizing the failure to reach a debt settlement prior to the grant of recognition by stating that the agreements made • • • unmistakably show the President’s resolute pur­ pose to safeguard the integrity of our Government and the rights of our nationals no?/ or hereafter residing in Soviet territory. That was the primary purpose to which. any strictly material question such as the settle­ ment of debts was altogether ancillary.164 In essence, therefore, the recognition of the Soviet government In Russia was conditioned upon adequate assur­ ances that propagandistic activities ‘ would not be carried on In any attempt to subvert American institutions, and that It was not conditioned upon the settlement of debts and claims owed to the United States.

1/S/hether in self-protec­

tion or In the pursuit of a more altruistic goal, the United States seems to have taken the position once again wthat It Is entitled to inquire not only into the fact of the exist­ ence of another government, but into the moral qualifica­ tions of that government.!,3-65

In discussing this criterion

164 Walton Moore, Recognition of the Union of Sov­ iet Social!st Republics (Department of State, Eastern Europ­ ean Series, No. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 5. 165 Edward A. Harriman, ”The Recognition of New States and Governments: Soviet Russia,” Proceedings of the Eight­ eenth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1924, p. 93.

353

of tli© claaracter of a government with, reference to the Ameri­ can policy of recognition toward the Soviet, Harriman in 1924 ventured the following summarization: The first objection to recognition is that the Soviet Government is not the kind of government which is satis­ factory to.the moral ideals of the American people. The objection, of course presupposes the major premise that the recognition of the existence of a foreign government should depend upon whether that government is satisfac­ tory in its constitution and methods to the nation which is asked to recognize it. This major premise is not gen­ erally accepted by other nations, and if it is to be re­ garded as an American doctrine, it is a doctrine of very recent origin. Writing in 1928, Cole summarizes the motivation be­ hind the long-continued policy of non-recognition of the Soviet in his observation that By virtue of attendant circumstances, we are justi­ fied in assuming that the objections to the recognition on the part of the Department of State are based pri­ marily upon American objections to the principles upon which the Soviet Government is based and to the prin­ ciples it wishes to propagate. The United States is applying that very instrument, recognition, which has been used to help spread repub­ licanism to prevent another state from propagating a government founded upon principles repugnant to us.167 While the theory of de facto recognition no doubt bears out the contention of Professor Harriman that there is a certain inconsistency in examining the moral qualifi­ cations of a government aspiring for recognition, it is

Z^id., pp. 92-93. 2-6^ Cole, o]D. cit., p. 90.

354

worthy of emphasis that this entire chapter gives evidence of the fact that the moral character of a government has been a decisive factor in the determination of a policy of recognition upon many occasions in the annals of .American diplomacy, just as the preceding chapter gave evidence that the British have also inquired into moral qualifications in certain instances despite an equally fervent claim of faith­ fulness to a de facto policy of recognition* 7.

THE CIVIL WAR REGIMES IN HONDURAS (1924-1925)

In presenting this case of the recognition policy of the United States toward the abortive Honduran governments of 1924 and 1925, as well as in presenting the two subse­ quent cases of the United States a ttitude toward the Cha­ morro and Orellana governments in Nicaragua and Guatemala, respectively, the writer desires to point out that in all three cases— as in that of the Martfnez government in El Salvador— the point of departure is the 1923 Treaty of Peace and Amity signed at Washington, February 7, 1923, by repre­ sentatives of all five of the Central American republics. Brief consideration was given to the relationship- of the United States to the 1923 Treaty in the presentation of the Martfnez cases In El Salvador.^-6®

gee Chapter III

Since the Salvadorian case

555

was discussed from another approach, however, it is sufficient merely to recall that it also ranks along with this and the following two cases as the outstanding examples of the application of the 1923* Treaty to revolutionary governments in the signatory states. It was mentioned in Chapter III that while the United States sponsored the 1923 Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity, and even assisted in drafting it, the United States did not become a party to the agreement, and was thereby never legally bound by its provisions,169

Woolsey

is of the opinion, however, that although the United States did not sign the 1923 conventions, . , • nevertheless, it would seem that the United States from its participation in the conference was morally bound to support the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, which its representatives had assisted in drafting.^-^ Whether morally bound or otherwise, Secretary of State Hughes soon after the conventions had been signed took the attitude that the policy of the United States with regard to the recognition of new governments in Central America tfwill be consonant with provisions of the 1923 Treaty. ”1*71 As recorded in Chapter III, Secretary of State Stimson was

Supra, pp. 224-25. L. H. Woolsey, ”The Recognition of the Government of El Salvador,” American Journal of International Law, 28: 325-29, No. 2, April, 1934, pp. 327-28. ^ 0

Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol.

II, pp. 433-34

356

able to state eight years later that ever -since the Hughes announcement the United States had "consistently adhered to this policy in respect to those five Republics.”172 Specifically, the important aspect of the 1923 agree­ ment relative to the question of recognition was contained in Article II of the treaty, which supplanted a similar agreement contained in an Additional Convention to the older 1907 General Treaty of Peace and Amity which was also signed at Washington by the five Central American republics. In the earlier convention the Central American states had promised not to . . . recognize any other government which may come into power In any of the five republics as a consequence of a coup d*&tat or of a revolution against the recogni­ zed government, so long as the freely elected represen­ tatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the c o u n t r y . 3 The 1907 agreement was a modified form of the Tobar Doctrine, which had first been announced in a letter of March 15, 1907, by Carlos R. Tobar, former Ecuadorean Minister for Foreign Affairs, and which had proposed that the American republics should Intervene, at least in a mediatory and in­ direct manner, in the internal dissensions in the American

172 Henry L. Stimson, The United States and the Other American Republics (Department of State, Latin American Seriies, Ho. *4. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 9-10. 173 The text of the 1907 agreement may be found in the American Journal of International Law Supplement, 1908, pp. 229-31.

357

hemisphere, and that the intervention should take the form of non-recognition of de facto governments that had been established by revolution against the constitutional re­ gime .174

Because of Central America1s strategic importance

and commercial possibilities, the United States had long been of the opinion that peace and stability in the area was essential to the welfare and prosperity of the United States* Washington, therefore, looked with favor upon such instru­ ments as the Tobar Doctrine which would put a damper on revolutions without creating ill-will by exclusively taking the responsibility of maintaining order in Central America. Pound to be still too easily circumvented, the 1907 agreement was supplanted by the 1923 Treaty.

By Article II

of the latter convention the Tobar Doctrine was made con­ siderably stronger and more far-reaching.

Covering as many

eventualities as possible, Article II of the 1923 agreement stated on behalf of the signatories that: Desiring to make secure in the Republics of Central America the benefits which are derived from the mainte­ nance of free Institutions and to contribute at the same time toward strengthening their stability and the pres­ tige with which they should be surrounded, they declare that every act, disposition or measure which alters the constitutional organization in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the peace of said Republics, whether It proceed from any public power or from the private citizens.

1*74 Buell, o p . eft., p. 167

358

Consequently, tiie Governments or the Contracting Parties will not recognize any other Government which may come into power in any of the five Republics through a d T&tat or a revolution against a recognize Gov­ ernment so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorgan­ ised the country. And even in such a case they obligate themselves not to acknowledge the recognition if any of the persons elected as President, Vice-President or Chief of State Designate should fall under any of the following heads: 1) If he should be the leader or one of the leaders a coup d*&tat or revolution, or through blood rela­ tion or marriage, be an ascendant or descendant or bro­ ther of such leader or leaders. 2) If he should have been a Secretary of State or should have held some high military command during the accomplishment of the coup d 1dtat, the revolution, or while the election war being carried on, or if he should have held this office or command within the six months preceding the coup d Tetat, revolution, or the election. Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution of his country as eligible to election as President, Vice-President or Chief of State D e s i g n a t e . 175 In announcing that the United States would adhere to the provisions of this agreement, while not deigning to sign it, Secretary of State Hughes almost immediately was presented with a test case in Honduras, where a revolution threatened on the eve of presidential elections in October 1923.

Due

to a split in the Liberal Party ranks, three aspirants arose to contest the right to succeed President L6pez Gutierrez upon the expiration of his term of office on February 1, 1924.

175 Th.e text of the treaty may be found in the Ameriean Journal of International Law Supplement, 17:117-22, 1923.

559

As it was feared, wiien the elections occurred none of the three candidates received the necessary majority.

In the

fulfillment of a constitutional provision in such a case, the issue was taken to the Honduran Congress for a decision, but the Congress also failed to agree upon a choice between General Tiburcio Carias, the plurality winner, and his two rivals, Dr. Bonilla and Dr. Arias; nor would Carias accept a compromise Conservative, Dr. Paz Baraona, as provisional president.176 On February 1, 1924, the day Lopez Gutierrez1 term expired, the election crisis was still in deadlock and as a provisional measure Gutierrez established a dictatorship. Fearing the threatened intervention of the United States, . Gutierrez accepted the proposal of the United States that changes in the cabinet be made to make possible the holding of new elections which would be free and

f a i r . 177

Gutierrez,

however, failed to make satisfactory changes despite his promise to do so, and Carlas turned to revolution after re­ fusing to accept the American offers.

The failure of the

three political factions to reach an agreement for the restoration of constitutional government, in Honduras caused

176 Raymond Leslie Buell, nThe United States and Cen­ tral American Revolutions,11 Foreign Policy Reports, 7:187204, No. 10, July 22, 1931, p. 194. See also Foreign Rela­ tions, 1923, Vol. II, pp. 443-48. Foreign Relations, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 301-2.

360

tiie United States to sever diplomatic relations on February 13, 1924, when the American Minister, Morales, notified Gutierrez of the suspension of relations on the grounds that his continuance in office was illegal-. In the hope of forestalling intervention in Honduras by the United States, President Quin6nez of SI Salvador, In agreement with Guatemala and Nicaragua, invited the factions to meet at a peace conference at Amapala, with or without United States representation.

At first neither the rebels

nor the United States— which had already sent in Marines and established a neutral zone— were favorably disposed toward the plan of Quin6nes.

Upon the arrival of Sumner

Welles, a special representative from the Department of State, on April 18, an agreement was made between all the parties for a peace conference at Amapala, on board the U.S_.S. Denver. In the midst of the conference the rebels took the Honduran capital, ‘ Tegucigalpa, but only four hours later an agreement was signed which on May 3, 1924, was made into a definitive treaty signed by representatives of the four Central American republics, the United States, and the two Honduran factions.1*79 In essence, the latter agreement, known as the Pact of Amapala,

Doc* cit. See also Charles W. Hackett, tfMexico and Central America,11 Current History, 20:123-25, April, 1924, p. 125. Buell,

0 £.

cit., pp. 195-96.

361

declared Vicente Tosta as provisional president, forbade Tosta to run for the office of constitutional president for the next term, and obligated him to convoke elections for a National Constitutional Assembly within thirty days after assuming office. 3-^0 The interest of the United States in the Honduran political problems did not end with the Pact of Amapala, for on July 3, 1924, a note presented by the United States Minister, Morales, to the Honduran Minister of Foreign Af­ fairs notified General Tosta, the provisional president, that the United States v/ould base its future policy in the recognition of Central American governments upon the provi­ sions of Article II of the 1923 Treaty, and that for that reason the United States • • • would not recognize any Honduran Government headed by a leader of the recent revolutionary movement or by anyone who held a high post or command in the revolt. -^3Buell records that the note of July 3rd was directed against General Carias, in order to forestall any efforts to put the leader of the recent revolt Into office In the forthcoming elections•3-82

Criticism was directed against

Washington’s opposition to Carias, however, since It was

•P>oreig^- Relations, 1924, Vol. II, p. 316. 181 Ibid., p. 318. 182 Buell, op. oit., p. 196.

362

felt in many quarters that inasmuch as Carias had. revolted against not a recognized government, but against the Gutier­ rez dictatorship with which the United States had broken relations, that the discrimination against Carias had been unfair.183

attitude of the United States remained firm,

however, and Carias finally withdrew his candidacy in the forthcoming elections in favor of a fellow-Conservative, Dr. Paz Baraona.

As Buell states, the subsequent presidenti­

al elections in December, 1924, were an overwhelming victory i

for the Revolutionary Party, now represented by Paz Baraona, although the party1s greatest leader, Carias, had been pre­ vented by the attitude of the United States from becoming president•184 The election of Paz Baraona was confirmed by the Honduran Rational Assembly on January 20, 1925.

Two days

later a note signed by Secretary of State Hughes marked Washington1s approval of the new regime by the statement that The Government of the United States is gratified that it has been possible to reach a solution of the problem of establishing in Honduras a constitutional government with which the Government of the United States and those of the other Central American Repub­ lics can maintain cordial relations without inconsis­ tency with the provisions of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity signed at the Washington conference of

hoc• cit. !84 ibid., pp. 196-97.

363

1923. The Government of the United States contemplates with pleasure the resumption of formal relations with the Government of Honduras upon the inauguration on February 1st of the new constitutional authorities•183 Even with the rather awkward solution of allowing Paz Baraona to assume the presidency, Washington had yet. to dis­ charge a residue of responsibility for the outcome of the Honduran revolution.

General Ferrara, who had led another

faction stemming from the Gutierrez dictatorship had refused the Pact of Amapala, was once suppressed in his revolt against Tosta in August of 1924, but again took to the field in February, 1925, to contest the election and inauguration of Paz Baraona*

Being a recognized regime, the Baraona govern­

ment was able to buy adequate military supplies from the United States to suppress Ferrara once more, and was thus able to avoid more direct ^mediation” from Washington.3-86

Ferrara

broke loose again in 1931, but with an equal lack of success, partly dictated by the ominous presence of the U.S.S. Memphis in Honduran waters which was ^making provision for the safety of American lives ana property in the coast towns.”3-8*? In conclusion, this first test of Article II of the 1923 Central American treaty appears to.have proven its

185 Foreign Relations, 1925, Vol. II, pp. 316-17. Buell,

ojd .

cit., p. 197.

18*7 Department of State Press Releases, April 25, 1931.

364

efficacy, although it is to be doubted whether the solution which resulted from the application of the treaty served any specific interests but those of the treaty itself.

The

premium therein established upon constitutional succession may have merely confused the issue.

Certainly Honduras had

some cause for dislike of the treaty, a probability which was hardly lessened by the fact that Honduras did not approve the 1923 Treaty until after Paz Baraona had assumed office.188 The United States and the four other Central American re­ publics, however, had successfully asserted their right, legal or moral, to sanction revolutionary regimes in Central America; they had forced the rebel conservatives of Honduras to submit their case to the electorate rather than to the sword, and had punished the leaders of the revolt, as well as the leaders of the illegally continued dictatorship, by refusing to recognize their succession in office either by force, election, or by any other means. 8.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTS IN NICARAGUA (1926-1936) Hardly more than a year had passed since the applica­

tion of the 19 23 Central American Treaty to Honduras, and the labored settlement of the Honduran troubles in harmony with Article II of the treaty, when a coup d 1£tat in Nicara-

188

3 ee

op. c i t ., pp. 194 and 197.

365

gua against tiie duly constituted and recognized Solorzano government in Nicaragua evoked the second application of the treaty by the United States. Of all the Central American states, Nicaragua, due to its potentialities for an inter-oceanic canal, has been most closely affected by Washington diplomacy.

The choice

of the Chamorro regime to illustrate the use of the power of recognition in diplomacy certainly does not mean that it is the only available illustration.

It is something of a

coincidence, in fact, that not only was one of the first tests of the earlier 1907 Central American non-recognition agreement applied to Nicaragua, but also that the faction favored by the United States in this dispute was headed by the same leader whom the United States frowned upon in 1926. To review, briefly, the earlier case as a background for the application of the 1923 Treaty to Nicaragua in 1926, the former was occasioned by a deep-seated dislike by the United States for the sixteen-year dictatorship of Jos£ Santos Zelaya, who blithely disregarded the rights of for­ eigners and constantly stirred up revolution in other Cen­ tral American states to bring about his own supremacy.139 As though in need of anything more to deserve the enmity of Washington, Zelaya managed to create much suspicion by

Charles Edward Chapman, Republican Hispanic Ameri­ ca. .(New York: The Macmillan Company^ 39?37), p. 264.

366

alleged negotiations with, non-hemisphere powers over conces­ sions regarding a canal route.190

Zelaya*s hostility to

the United States was expressed not only by his opposition to attempts on the part of the United States to extend its control over Nicaragua by obtaining Fonseca Bay and a canal route, but also by his opposition to the attempts of Ameri-. can business interests to establish themselves in the republie.191

From the time that the agreements of 1907 to promote

Central American unity were signed until the downf all of Zelaya in 1909, the Zelaya government in Nicaragua proved a constant threat to the integrity of the agreements.

In the

latter year, in fact, President Taft felt constrained to state that ever since the 1907 conventions had been signed, . . . this Government has been almost continuously called upon by one or another, and in turn by all of the five Central American Republics, to exert itself for the maintenance of the conventions. Nearly every complaint has been against the Zelaya government of Nicaragua which has Central America in constant ten­ sion and turmoil. 192Despite the anti-revolutionist attitude of the United States as expressed in its adherence to the 1907 Central American agreements, the United States .looked with high

190 Raymond Leslie Buell, t!The United States and Cen­ tral American Stability,” Foreign Policy Reports, 8:161-86, No. 9, July 8, 1931, p. 169. 191 Nearing and Freeman, op . cit., p. 152. Foreign Relations, 1909, p. xvii.

367

favor upon tiie revolution headed by Emiliano Ciiamorro and Juan Estrada which broke out in 1909.

It is no less signifi­

cant that American business Interests are reputed to have contributed a million dollars to ensure the success of the revolution*193

Soon after the outbreak, the United States

landed four hundred Marines at Bluefields, thus preventing Zelaya1s forces from capturing Estrada.

On the pretext of

alleged violations of Costa Eican territory by Zelayan troops, Washington unsuccessfully attempted to interest the other Central American republics in a plan for joint Cen­ tral American intervention in Nicaragua.194 A climax occurred in November, 1909, when the Zelaya forces captured and executed two American adventurers, Cannon and Oroce, who had joined with the rebels and who had been caught In the act of laying mines to blow up two steamers carrying Zelaya troops.

Taking an attitude wholly

inconsistent with the acknowledged law and practice of the United States, Secretary of State Knox characterized the executions as an !loutrage,fl used the Incident as the pre­ text for severing relations with Zelaya, accused Zelaya of being an unprincipled dictator, and stated that the United

193 Harold N. Denny, Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua” (New York: The Dial Press, 1929), p.” 310. 194 Buell, op. cit., p. 169.

368

States was convinced that the Estrada revolution represented Hthe ideals and the will of a majority of the

N i c a r a g u a n s . 11195

Belaya resigned on December 16, 1909, hut in his message of resignation to the Nicaraguan Assembly the dictator bitterly charged the United States for his downfall, stating that it was • • . the hostile attitude of a powerful nation, which, against all right, has intervened in our political af­ fairs, and publicly furnished to the rebels the aid they have asked f o r . 196 As successor to Zelaya, the Zelayista National Assem­ bly chose Dr. Jos6 Madriz, a distinguished man with the mark­ ings of a good

president

.197

Despite the change, the United

States continued to support the Estrada revolt, and when Madriz protested to President Taft against American inter­ ference in the domestic affairs of the republic, the United States insisted that American ships carrying war materials to the rebels be allowed to pass through the blockade estab­ lished by the authorized government, and that customs duties• be paid to the revolutionists.198

1/hen American Marines

prevented the government forces from blockading or attacking the rebels while they strengthened their forces at Blue-

195 Foreign Relations, 1909, p. 455. 196 15id., p.. 459. 197 Buell, op. cit., pp. 170-71. Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 752.

369

fields, the revolution was assured of success.

On August 20,

1910, Madriz resigned, and one week later the victorious forces of Estrada and Emillano Chamorro entered

M a n a g u a * 199

By direct Intervention and the use of the power of recognition, the United States therefore succeeded in estab­ lishing a more amenable alternative to the Zelayista govern­ ment in Nicaragua.

A special agent from the Department of

State, Thomas Dawson, was sent to Managua soon after the Estrada victory to negotiate with the victors as to the terms of recognition.

Accordingly, the provisions of the

famous Dawson Agreements, signed on October 27, 1910, re­ corded EstradaTs promises, in return for United States re‘cognition, that: (1) a constituent assembly would be chosen at once which would elect Estrada president and Adolfo Dfaz vice-president for a two year term, with the added stipula­ tions that Estrada could not succeed himself and no Eelayista could enter the administration; (2) a mixed commission, satisfactory to the Department of State, would be appointed to settle claims, including the Gannon-Groce indemnity; (3) Nicaragua would solicit the good offices of the United States to secure a loan to be guaranteed by a certain percentage of the customs receipts collected in accordance with an agree­ ment satisfactory to both

g o v e r n m e n t s .200

199 Nearing and Freeman, op. cit., p. 154. ^QPQigu Relations, 1910, p. 763.

370

In May of 1911, the presidency was passed on to the Vice-President, Adolfo Diaz, whose term of office soon de­ pended entirely upon the support of the United States when the compromising terms of the iniquitous Dawson Agreements became known to the general public of Nicaragua..

The loan

conventions made pursuant to the Da¥/son Agreements were so derogatory of Nicaraguan sovereignty that the Liberals broke out in revolt in August of 1912.

Forced to rely upon Ameri­

can support for its existence, the Dfaz government was un­ able to resist signing a w a y to the United States an exclu­ sive right to construct a trans-isthmian canal, as well as the right to establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca. All Central American, including many factions in Nicaragua, vociferously protested the terms of the canal agreement, which, upon its ratification on February 18, 1916, became known as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, but the protests did no more than to discredit further the United States-supported Conservative government of Estrada-Diaz-Chamorro faction. Fear that the 2ielayista-dominated Liberals might be victorious in the forthcoming presidential elections late in 1916 led the Wilson administration to advocate openly the election of General Emiliano Chamorro, who had repre­ sented the Diaz government as Nicaraguan Minister to Wash­ ington during the negotiation of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. Chapman ably presents the dilemma which faced the Department

371

of* State on the eve of the 1916 Nicaraguan elections by recalling that If the Washington government kept hands off, the existing Conservative regime would steal the elections, and the Liberals would go out in revolution. . . In all probability, too, the Liberals could win the revolution, as they were believed to have a majority in the country. If the United States officials supervised an election, the Liberals would probably win and denounce the arrange­ ments already made under the intervention. . . . 201 While openly .advocating the election of Emiliano Chamorro, the Department of State went even further to se­ cure his election by announcing that there would be no re­ cognition of any followers of Zelaya who might be elected. 202 Since the Liberals had nominated a former Zelaya cabinet officer, Julian Irias, as their candidates for the presidency, Chamorro won the election unopposed. The Liberals were confident, however, that if the United States would not allow them to succeed by revolution, Washington would, If its conscience 'were pricked long enough, be forced to assume the responsibility of conduct­ ing fairer elections..

As Stuart records, in order to avoid

the accusation of supporting the administration in power, the Department of State in 1920 suggested to President Cham­ orro that the election laws be revised; but with the elections

201 Chapman, op. cit., p. 267. 202 Ibid., p . 268.

, 372

at hand the suggestion was not regarded as appropriate.203 Once more the Conservatives had put their candidate in office. The new president, Diego Chamorro, uncle of Emiliano Chamorro, remained in office until his death in 1923, and was -.succeeded by the vice-president, Bartolome Martinez. When it appeared that Martjfhez was laying plans to succeed himself in the coming elections of 1924, the State Depart­ ment again assumed a paternalistic role in Nicaraguan poli­ tics by reminding him that self-succession was unconstitu­ tional, and thereby expressly forbidden by the 1923 Central American Treaty.204

As the result of American pressure,

Martinez withdrew his candidacy.205 By 1924 the Liberals had resigned themselves to the faits accomplis of the American intervention, and since it was felt that American interests would no longer be greatly imperiled by a Liberal victory at the polls, the United States consented to assume the burden of conducting a fair election.

Chapman states that

The United States therefore persuaded--or virtually compelled--the Conservative regime to enact an election law, prepared by an American expert and designed to meet the electoral frauds within the previous experience

203 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938), p. 367. ffopeign Relations, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 506-7. 205 Ibid., p. 503.

373 of tlie country. 206

While the honesty of the 1924 elections proved at best a relative matter, despite all preparations, a mixed opposition won by a substantial majority.

The more en- .

trenched Conservatives found their candidate, ex-president Emiliano Chamorro, defeated by a Liberal-Conservative coali­ tion formed by the outgoing president, Bartolome Martinez, which elected the Conservative Carlos Solorzano president and the Liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa vice-president by a vote of 48,072 to 28,760.207 Upon the inauguration of President Solorzano on Janu­ ary

1

,1925, the political outlook in

moreclarified and

Nicaragua appeared

stabilized than it had been for years.

The United States had previously announced its intention of withdrawing the Marines, Y/ho had been decisively and continu­ ously asserting their presence in the country since 1912, on the very day of Solorzano!s inauguration.

Their depart­

ure was postponed until August 4, 1925, however, at the urgent request of President Solorzano.

Hardly a month had

passed after the Marines had finally left, however, when Chamorro started a revolution, this time of the Conservatives, with the avowed purpose of. driving the Liberals from the

206 Chapman,

ojd .

cit., p. 268.

207 Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New .York: Charles Scribner!s Sons, 1927), p. 21.

374

cabinet and restoring the Conservative party to the power it had enjoyed before the ’’fraudulent elections” which had brought in Solorzano as president.208 In an attempt to circumvent the proscriptions of the 1923 Treaty, Chamorro.and Adolfo Diaz maneuvered the revolution so as to give it the semblance of constitutionality.

By

forcibly changing the complexion of the Nicaraguan Congress from Liberal to Conservative, a preconceived plan was carried out whereby Congress banished Liberal Vice-President Sacasa and chose Chamorro In his place.

By forcing the

resignation of Solorzano, Chamorro thereby automatically succeeded to the presidency on January 17, 1926. The Department of State, however, was not taken in by the manipulations of Chamorro, nor was it inclined to. wink at the dubious methods of these Conservatives with whom it had so long allied.

Apparently, the continued friendship

of the more amenable Conservative faction was no longer worth being exposed to accusations of political favoritism, especially when It Involved compromising the ideals of the 1923 Treaty.

A clear, firm note from Secretary of State

Kellogg to the Nicaraguan Minister to Washington on January 22, 1926, bluntly Informed the minister that the United States could not recognize the Chamorro government.

After

208 L. H. Woolsey, ”The Non-Recognition of the Cha­ morro Government in Nicaragua,” American Journal of Inter­ national Law, 20:543-49, July, 1926, p. 543.

375

referring to the terms of the 1923 Treaty, the Kellogg note went on to state that The object of the Central American countries, with which the United States was heartily in accord, v/as to promote constitutional government and orderly procedure in Central America and those Governments agreed upon a joint course of action with regard to the non-recogni­ tion of governments coming into office through coup d !€tat or revolution. The United States has adopted the principles of that Treaty as its policy in the fu­ ture recognition of Central American Governments as it feels that by so. doing it can best show its friendly disposition towards and its desire to be helpful to the Republics of Central America.

■ -

It is therefore with regret that I have to inform you that the Government of the United States has not recognized and will not recognize as the Government of Nicaragua the regime now headed by General Chamorro, as the latter was duly advised on several occasions by the American Minister after General Chamorro had taken charge of the citadel at Managua on October 25th last. This action is, I am happy to learn, in accord with that taken by all the Governments that signed with Nicaragua the Treaty of 1923,209 Rippy records that the non-recognition of Chamorro by the United States

11gave

the exiled Sacasa and the Liber­

als what appeared to be a favorable opportunity to fight their way to power.”210

on May 2, 1926, therefore, the

Liberals began a revolution at Bluefields.

When the Sacasa

forces made the mistake of accepting aid from Mexico,, the United States felt constrained to intervene in order to safeguard both its interests and its prestige.

By having

209 Foreign Relations, 1926, Vol. II, p. 784. 210 j. Fred Rippy, Historical Evolution of Hispanic America (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1940), p. 305.

376

previously refused recognition to Chamorro, however, Washing­ ton felt unable to assert its intervention on his behalf.

in

a note dated August 27, 1926, Secretary Kellogg reaffirmed his refusal to recognize Chamorro, reminded him that two revolutionary movements had broken out in Nicaragua since he had assumed power, and warned that the only way for Nicaragua to avoid ruin was for Chamorro to withdraw.211 Unable to secure credits as a result of non-recogni­ tion, Chamorro finally resigned on October 30, 1926, turning the government over to a political follower who had been ap­ pointed Designate by the same Congress that had made Chamorro president

.212

Although the published diplomatic correspondence

does not reveal the express attitude of the United States towards Uriza, the new provisional president, it was asserted In a New York Times account that in refusing recognition to Uriza, the Department of State explained that

11there

was no

constitutional basis for his assumption of power. If215 While unrecognized, Uriza at least paved the way for a solution to the enigmatic issue of Washington1s relation­ ship to the Nicaraguan government by reinstating the eight-

Foreign Relations, 1926, Vol. II, pp. 788-89. 212

Ibid., p. 803.

213 New York Times, January 11, 1927. Stimson states that the ffUnited States refused to recognize Uriza as pre­ sident on the ground that he had been elected by the same il­ legal Congress which elected Chamorro” (ojo* cit., p. 25).

377

een congressmen expelled "by Ciiamorro in his manipulations to gain po?/er.

It was this Congress, restored to the status

quo ante Ciiamorro, that on November 14 elected Conservative, ex-president Adolfo Diaz to succeed Provisional President Uriza.

Since it was generally assumed that Washington had

sponsored the candidacy of Diaz, it was not overly surpris­ ing when three days after his inauguration Ddfaz was recog­ nized by the United States.

In the note of acknowledgment,

Secretary of State Kellogg expressed to Diaz his gratification . . . that a solution has been found for the Nicara­ guan political problems which is in accordance with the constitution of that country and in harmony with the Central American Treaty.^14 Washington’s action in recognizing Diaz was immedi­ ately open to severe criticism.

Even on the basis of de

facto tests, let alone the more demanding prerequisites of the 1923 Treaty, Dfaz did not merit such a ready acknowledg­ ment.

The favoritism extended to Diaz was so pronounced

that, as Cole states, it is highly doubtful that the State Department even seriously considered the question of the probable stability of the regime.215

Beyond the question

of prematurity, the recognition of Dfaz was even more sub­ ject to criticism on the basis of the 1923 Treaty— the very agreement in the interests of which the United States had

Foreign Relations, 1926, Vol. 215 Cole, op. cit., p. 93.

il, p. 807.

378

sacrificed tiie most pro-American faction in Nicaragua by refusing to recognize Ciiamorro.

Recognizing Diaz on the

grounds that the Congress which elected him was part of the government which the United States had previously acknow­ ledged hardly met the objection that Diaz had been connected with the Chamorro coup d 16 tat not only by his own actions but also by a blood relationship to one of the most active leaders of the Chamorro coup.Si6

Either count would have

ruled Diaz ineligible in the application of the 1923 Treaty, but as Rippy states, ”The United States was in desperate need of a government which it could back, and the friendship of Adolfo Diaz could be relied uponllr217

The rather gross

inconsistency in Washington1s refusal to apply the 1923 Treaty to the Dfaz government was perhaps best explained by President Goolidge’s statement that _”if the revolution con­ tinues American investments and business interests in Nica­ ragua will be seriously affected, if not destroyed. ,f218 The recognition of Diaz in no way improved the situ­ ation in Nicaragua, for a new struggle began between Diaz,

Buell, o|>. cit., p. 198. cit., p. 306.

See also Rippy, op.

217 Hippy, op_. cit., p. 306. ^ew ~york Times, January 11, 1927. Stimson attempts to justify Washington’s recognition of Diaz, but while his arguments are politically potent, they do not meet the legal objections. -See Stimson, op. cit., pp. 27-30.

379

backed by the United States, and Sacasa, who was backed by Mexico and who bad established a Liberal government at Puerto Cabezas with himself as president.^19

There can be

little doubt that one of the chief reasons prompting the United States to intervene in the newer Nicaraguan conflict was that its prestige was challenged by Mexico's recognition and very active support of Sacasa.

President Coolidge, in

his annual message to Congress on January 10, 1927, took the occasion to state that he had . . . the most conclusive evidence that arms and muni­ tions in large quantities have been on several occasions since August, 1926, shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua. . . with the full knowledge of and, in some cases, with the encouragement of Mexican officials. . . •

220

Hi/hen it became abundantly clear that the rebels were receiving aid from Mexico, the United States decided to lift its embargo on the export of war materials and to permit the Nicaraguan government to buy arms and munitions from the United States.

As Stimson asserts, if the United States had

not lifted the embargo, ,fwe should have been unfairly siding against and hampering the efforts of the very government we had recognized as legitimate defending itself against its assailants.ff2 2 1

219 Buell,

jn the exposition of his successful efforts

o jd

.

cit., p. 198.

220 Quoted in Stimson, op. cit., p. 34. 221

rbid-«* p. 35.

as mediator in the Nicaraguan conflict, Stimson rather open­ ly criticized Mexico1s support of Sacasa while defending Washington1s support of Diaz by stating that . . . it would be difficult for any friend of Mexico to say.that, as between our recognition of Diaz and her recognition of Sacasa, hers was not the more provocative action, or that it was not the more violative of the spirit of the convention of 1907, of which her govern­ ment with ours had been a sponsor and promoter . 2 2 2 As Wilgus reports, in the civil war that followed between the two factions, the United States attempted to mediate and at the same time to keep order by supporting the Dfaz government.

In an effort to make some adjustment

of the situation, the Department of State sent Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua as a mediator. According to Stinson’s own report of his task, he was quite struck by the friendliness of both factions to the United States, and was especially surprised to learn that the Liberals also earnestly sought the intervention of the United States.224

Noting the desire of both factions

that the United States should supervise the forthcoming presidential elections, and the willingness of both sides to negotiate for peace, Stimson secured liberal terms from President Diaz in the hope that the Liberals, under Sacasa

at Puerto Cabezas and General Moncada fighting In the hills, would lay down their arms.

The only point upon which the

Liberals hesitated was the Insistence of Stimson— not of the Conservatives in power— that Adolfo Diaz be allov/ed to com­ plete his term of office.

At Stimson’s famous meeting with

General Moncada at Tipitapa, May 4, 1927, Moncada emphasized the difficulty he would have in convincing his men to lay down their aims and accept as their president the man they had been fighting against all winter.

In the strange ways of

diplomacy, however, Moncada provided the solution to the deadlock by suggesting to Stimson that the latter write him a letter insisting on Diaz as a necessary condition to United States supervision of the elections.

Moncada felt

that he could then successfully persuade his army to lay down its arms by arguing that he would not fight the United States.225

stimson readily acquiesced to Moncada1s request,

and the way was cleared for the conclusion of peace terms. In May of 1927, the Tipitapa Agreement was signed whereby peace was restored to Nicaragua and the Liberals gave up their arms.

By the terms of the pact, Diaz continued in of­

fice until the completion of his term, in return for which the United States agreed to supervise the 1923 elections.226

225 ibid., pp. 77-79.

382

The result of the American-supervised elections of 1928 was the election of the Liberal leader, General Jose Maria Moncada,

Inaugurated on January 1, 1929, Moncada was

immediately recognized by the United States.

Buell writes

that Despite the fact that Moncada had been at the head of Sacasa* s armies, the State Department immediately recognized him on the ground that the new President - ?/ould not come into power as a result of revolution but of an election held by the Diaz g o v e r n m e n t . 227 It is doubtful that, despite his previous connections, Moncada could have been ruled ineligible under the terms of the 19 23 Treaty, yet on previous occasions the United States has Interpreted the agreement so as to bar candidates from office on similar grounds.

Beyond the fact that the United

States wanted peace and stability In Nicaragua above practi­ cally anything else, another factor leading to Washington’s ready acknowledgment of Moncada was the high esteem and re­ spect with which Stimson and the State Department regarded the cultured, brilliant, pro-American military hero of the Liberals.

In reading Stimson’s account of his mission,, one

is immediately struck by the American mediator’s "whole­ hearted admiration for Moncada.

Fortunately, Stimson’s

neutrality was safeguarded by an equally profound respect for Adolfo D^az, for in closing his survey of the mediation

227 Loo.

cit.

383

Stimson felt

inspired to state that

As we sailed away there remained with me as an earn­ est of the hopeful future of Nicaragua the memory of two patriotic men, one a Conservative and one a Liberal, each willing to sacrifice personal ambition and party interest to the liigher welfare of his country and each willing to trust in the honor and good-will of the United States— Adolfo Diaz and Josd Maria Moncada*228 Stimson, and no doubt also the Department of State, was particularly impressed by the fact that General Moncada had formerly put himself on record publicly in support of the right

of the United States to intervene in Nicaragua to

assist in

the establishment of order and liberty.229 xt was

now not only quite safe, but also highly hopeful for the future relations of the United States and Nicaragua that General Moncada, recent military leader of the revolt against the duly recognized Diaz government, be warmly received and immediately recognized by the United States as President of Nicaragua• Moncada served out his full term in comparative peace, and in the succeeding presidential, elections of 1932, also supervised by the United States, a Liberal again won the presidency, #,in the person of none other than the man whom the United States had been obliged to defeat in 1926: Sacasa.”230

228 stimson, op. cit♦, pp. 88-89. 229 Ibid., p. 56. 230 Chapman, op. cit., p. 270.

384

Again the Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua, only upon this occasion the earnest solicitation of the incoming pre­ sident, reminiscent of Solorzano1s more successful plea, that their departure he delayed until an adequate constabulary could be developed to take their j)lace, was not heeded by the American authorities.

One day after the inauguration of

Sacasa, the Marines were withdrawn.

Arrangements were made

previous to their departure, however, for a non-political National Guard to be established and headed by General Anastasio Somoza.^-*Before Sacasa1s term of office had expired, Nicaragua became the scene of yet another revolution.

Provoked by a

pre-election Liberal-Conservative agreement between President Sacasa and Emiliano Chamorro to nominate the same candidate, Dr. Leonardo Arguello, for the presidency, ex-president Moncada and General Somoza went out in revolt.

Condemning

the Conservative-Liberal agreement as nanti-democratic,n a statement issued by Somoza1s National Guard on May 30, 1936, announced that The people have risen up in acts of civic protest because of the conclusion of a bipartisan agreement that has put in the hands of President Juan B. Sacasa and General Emiliano Chamorro the nomination of a

231 por text of the United States-Nicaraguan agree­ ment regarding the creation of a non-political National Guard, see Juan B. Sacasa, C. cit., p. 200. ^ ew Yopk Times, January 11, 1931.

598

same date liad the Guatemalan Assembly decree his provisional presidency until L^zaro Chacon recovered from his illness.258 The State Department, meanwhile, withheld its decision on the question of recognizing Orellana pending the receipt of more information.

On December 22, Secretary of State Stim-

son announced that while the State Department was not yet in the possession of sufficient facts to determine its attitude towards Orellana, the United States would continue to adhere to its policy of supporting the 1925 Treaty by not recogniz­ ing governments which might come into power in Central Ameri­ ca by force.^59

On December 30, however, it was announced

that !!in view of its support of the 1925 Treaty,n the United States had formally notified Orellana, through its Minister, Sheldon Whitehouse, that he would not be recognized.260

in

a thoughtful effort to make the task of readjustment less difficult, however, the State Department was careful.to avoid publicizing the non-recognition of Orellana.261

On

the following day, December 51, General Orellana resigned, as did also the ailing Chacon.

As testimony to the influ­

ential role played by Washington*s policy of non-recognition

258 Buell, op. cit., p. 200. 259 pew York Times, December 25, 1950. 200 pew York Times, December 31, 1930. ^oc • cit.

399

it was asserted that WhitehouseTs notice that the United States could not recognize Orellana "apparently was suffi­ cient to cause him to resign."262 With regard to the Orellana coup the policy of the United States in applying the 1923 Treaty was not only eminently successful and immediately productive of results, hut it also secured a commendable solution.

On the day that

Orellana resigned, the Guatemalan Congress chose Jos6 Maria Reyna Andrade to succeed to the office of First Designate and Provisional President. ^€>3

Although a Liberal, Andrade

had not been associated with the Orellana coup, and his succession to the presidency was generally acclaimed to be an equitable solution to Guatemalafs political difficulties. United States recognition of Andrade, however, apparently awaited his announcement of presidential elections, for it was only after he had called for them to be held on February 6-8

that Washington, on January 7, 1931, announced its

recognition of the Andrade government.264

Similarly, the

other Central American states, which had also refused to recognize Orellana in adhering to the terms of the 19 23 Treaty, contemporaneously announced their respective in-

^ew Mork Times, January 1, 1931. 263 Loc. cit. 264 Department of State Press Releases, January 10, 1931.

400

tentions of recognizing the Andrade government•265One factor rather marred an otherwise satisfactory conclusion to the difficulties occasioned by the Orellana coup, and that was the resentment provoked in Conservative circles by Andrade’s announcement of almost immediate elections.

Charging that Andrade had purposely fixed the

elections early so as to prevent the organization of an effective opposition, the Conservatives refused to enter a candidate.266

The insistence of the United States that

elections be announced as a condition of recognition, however, may have been as decisive a factor in Andrade’s de­ termination to hold early elections as was his appreciation of the opportunity victory for his own Liberal party.

Since

no opposition candidate made an appearance, General Jorge Ubico, representing a Liberal-Progressive coalition, was elected president in the 1931 elections for a' regular six year term.267

It is of interest to note that Ubico had

been Chacon’s opponent in the 1926 elections.268 By one means or another, but particularly by suspend­ ing the Guatemalan constitution after conducting an over-

265 New York Times, January 266 Buell, o£. cit., p. 200. 267 Loc. cit. 268 Loc. cit.

8

, 1931.

401

whelming favorable plebiscite in 1935 on the question of his continuation in office, Ubico extended his presidency for another six year term.£69

gy succeeding himself in

violation of the Guatemalan constitution, regardless of the fact that it had been suspended, Ubico in 1936 boldly chal­ lenged the 1923 Central American Treaty, which expressly provided that . . . in no case shall recognition be accorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution of his country as eligible to election as President, Vice-President or Chief of State Desig­ nate. 270 When Washington under the new Roosevelt administra­ tion recognized the illegally established Salvadorian gov­ ernment of Martinez in 1934, however, the life of the 1923 Treaty had come to an unacknowledged end.

Not only did

Ubico challenge the agreement, but in the same year Somoza contemptuously violated the pact by maneuvering himself into the Nicaraguan presidency, as it has been pointed out in the preceding section.

A third violation occurred also

in 1936 when President Tiburcio Carias of Honduras promul­ gated a new constitution which incidentally extended his own regime for another six years. 271

269 Jones, op. cit., p. 98. STOPa, p. 360. 271 Wilgus, op_. cit., p. 544.

402 By 1936, however, the United States was no longer dis posed toward enforcing the 1923 Treaty, even though the agre ment ostensibly remained in force vis-a-vis the very three states which in that year were its sole offe n d e r s .272

Al­

though violated with impunity by the governments of Nicara­ gua, Guatemala and Honduras, the 1923 Treaty had not been expressly renounced by any of those three states— for the very good reason that the agreement worked both ways, and might still discourage the opposition from attempting a coup d 16 tat or revolution against the established and duly recognized government. The Orellana coup d 16 tat in Guatemala was therefore the last occasion, except for the Martinez revolution in El Salvador in 1931, upon which the United States applied the 1923 Treaty by refusing to recognize a Central American government established in violation of the terms of the Central American pact.

Since the application of the 1923.

Treaty to Martinez ended in failure and a reversal of policy which signified the abandonment of the treaty by the United States, It may be said that the Orellana case was the last successful attempt on the part of the United States to carry

272 An excellent summary of the dilemma presented to Washington in 1936 by the political maneuvers of Somoza, Ubico and Carias to gain or to continue In office in their respective states in violation of the 1923 Treaty may be found in the New York Times, November 22, 1931.

403

out the ideals of constitutionalism in Central America by agreeing to refuse recognition to a government established by coup d* £tat.or revolution. The success of the 1923 Treaty had not been outstand­ ing.

Toward the end of its effective existence the pact was

provoking increased criticism in Central America, a criticism which ramified into a derogation of the United States for its adherence to the agreement.

After examining contempo­

rary opinion in Central America regarding the 1923 Treaty, Buell in 1931 pointed out that many felt that its applica­ tion had resulted in injustice, since it attempted to de­ prive the Central American peoples of the right of revolu­ tion against

a

b

u

s

e

.

^73

Buell recorded that El Cronlsta of

Tegucigalpa recently had declared that ♦ . . if the United States wishes to apply effectively the 19 23 Treaty, it must see to it that the established governments of Central America faithfully live up to their constitutions and guarantee individual liberty, freedom of suffrage and reasonable taxation.274 Buell also brought forward the arguments of another Central American journalist who had just published four art­ icles in Nuestro Diario of Guatemala City attacking the 1923 Treaty and particularly Washington1s policy of adhering to the pact.

Arguing that by applying this recognition.

273 ]\few York Times, January 11, 1931. 274 Loc. cit.

404 principle the United States could fasten dictators upon coun­ tries against the popular will, this Central American journal­ ist reasoned that The recognition of governments under the guise of constitutionality has been the means used by the United States to maintain in power in Central America men en­ joying its confidence.175 Most certainly, the 1923 Treaty possessed many defects, and it seemingly did not suit at all the mores and customs of Central American politics.

Moreover, it was observed in

the Nicaraguan case that the United States had not always maintained a purely altruistic motive in applying the 1923 Treaty.

While -failing to justify itself in practice, the

Central American pact did embody a laudable ideal.

For the

purpose of this research, however, the adherence of the United States to the 1923 Treaty presented some excellent examples of the use of the power of recognition in an attempt to raise the moral standards of Central American politics. 10.

THE 0BREG0N GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO (19 20-1923)

The attitude of the United States toward the election of General Alvaro Obregon to the Mexican presidency in 1920 presents an aspect of the use of recognition quite different from that expressed in the above Honduran, Nicaraguan and

275 Loc. cit.

405 Guatemalan cases.

The writer believes, however, that the

case of the Obregon government falls into the same general category illustrating the use of recognition in the inter­ ests of international morality, although it must be ad­ mitted that Washington*s emphasis upon the protection of American investments in Mexico provoked a rather subjective and arbitrary definition of international morality. The point of departure in the question of recognizing the Obregon government, which was presented to the Harding administration immediately upon assuming office in 1921, was not the acts or even the declared intentions of the new Mexican government of General Obregon, but rather the effect of the Mexican Constitution of Queretaro which had been promulgated under the Carranza regime in 1917.

Most dis­

turbing to the United States investors in Mexico, and con­ sequently to both the Wilson and Harding administrations, were the provisions of the constitution concerning the owner­ ship of land and natural resources.

Article 27 of the con­

stitution had ominously stipulated that the ownership of all minerals, petroleum, etc., was vested directly in the state, was inalienable, and could not be lost by prescription. Furthermore, as to the legal capacity of foreigners to ac­ quire ownership of lands, it was provided that • • • only Mexicans by birth or naturalization, and Mexican companies, have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters* and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters, or mineral fuels

406 in the Republic of Mexico. The nation may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the department of foreign affairs to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property, and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their governments'in respect to the same. . . . Within a zone of 1 0 0 kilo­ meters from the frontiers and 50 kilometers from the sea-coast, no foreigner shall under any conditions ac­ quire direct ownership of lands and waters.276 The effects of the 1917 constitution were exhaustively examined by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and particularly by a.sub-committee headed by Senator Albert B.

F a l l . 277

After gathering voluminous testi­

mony from hearings lasting from August

8

, 1919, to May 28,

1920, the Fall Committee published its report.

Callahan

has efficiently summarized the recommendations embodied in the report of the Fall Committee by writing that The Fall committee in its recommendations . . . indi­ cated that Mexico under Carranza was not a safe place for an American citizen or American investments, stated that the American government should defer recognition ■until assured that the Mexican people had approved an adminis­ tration of stability to endure and a disposition to com­ ply with international obligations; that it should give clear notice of its intention to insist upon responsibi­ lity for American lives and property; that recognition should be made with a plain understanding or agreement that certain provisions of certain articles (130, 3, 27 and 33) of the new Constitution of 1917 would not apply

Affairs.

Senate Document No. 285, Investigation of Mexican th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. II, p. 3121.

66

277 The scope of the Fall committee was quite broad, for the Senate resolution establishing the body authorized it to investigate the matter of damages and outrages suffered by citizens of the United States in Mexico, the proper in­ demnities, and what measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such outrages.

407 to American citizens; that it should require the appoint­ ment of commissioners at- once to decide all claims and to settle disputes concerning the international boundary and waters of the Rio Grande and the Colorado; that, after recognition upon these conditions, it should ex­ tend to the new government moral support and aid in se­ curing financial support necessary for Mexican rehabili­ tation; and. that, if the conditions were refused and if disorder continued, it should issue a warning of its purpose in the name of humanity (and without warring upon the Mexican people) to terminate conditions which parties to the conflict were unable or unwilling to stop* 278 Immediately upon assuming office, the Harding adminis­ tration inherited this already explored and well-publicized problem in Mexican relations.

It was soon indicated that

Harding would at least delay recognition of Obregon, who had been inaugurated on December 1, 1920.

A few days before

his appointment as Secretary of the Interior, Senator Pall wrote Harding that So long as I have anything to do with the Mexican question, no government of Mexico will b e recognized, with my consent, which does not first enter into a written agreement promising to protect American citi­ zens and their property rights in M e x i c o . 279 Even before his inauguration Obregon made attempts to secure recognition from Washington by avowing his friend­ liness for the United States.

Stuart reports that in a pre-

278 James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 581. Callahan summarizes herein the recommendations of the Fall committee found in Senate Document No. 285, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 6 6 th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. II, pp. 3369-73. 279 Quoted in Callahan, o£. cit., p. 586.

408

inauguration speech, at Dallas, Texas, on October 17, 1920, Obregon gave assurances that Mexico would recognize all legal foreign debts and all legal rights of Mexicans and .foreigners alike*280

Despite a sincere eagerness to assure

the United States that his regime would not confiscate legally acquired property by interpreting Article 27 of the Constitution of Queretaro retroactively, Obregon was unable to breach the wall of opinion in Washington which adhered to Pall!s demand for written guarantees.

In pursuit of the

Pall policy, the Harding administration formulated a draft treaty of amity and commerce which, on May 27, 1921, was presented to Obregon for his signature by United States Charg6 d fAffaires Summerlin as embodying the American condi­ tion for recognition*

While it is neither pertinent nor

desirable to reproduce all of the eighteen detailed articles of the Harding draft treaty, emphasis must be placed upon Article I, for within it were embodied the guarantees of protection to American property owners in Mexico which the Harding government demanded from Obregon as a condition of recognition.

The important sections of the article were as

follows: . . Property rights of whatever nature, heretofore or hereafter acquired by citizens of either country with­ in the territories of the other, in accordance with the laws thereof, shall under no circumstances be subjected

280 Stuart, o p . cit., p. 161

409 to confiscation, under constitutional provisions, legis­ lation or executive decree or otherwise. The right of expropriation may he resorted to only on proper grounds of public purpose, and it shall not be exercised without due process of law, nor without the prompt payment of just compensation. . . . desiring clearly to define the property rights of American citizens in Mexico . . . the United Mexican States declare that neither the Mexican Constitution nor the Decree of January 6 , '1915, to which the said Consti­ tution refers, is retroactive in its operation; that neither the said Constitution nor the said decree, nor any [decree, order, lawJheretofore or hereafter issued or enacted has or shall have any effect to cancel, de­ stroy or impair any right, title or interest in any property . . . which, prior to the coming into effect of the said Constitution and the said Decree . . . was ovmed in accordance with the laws of Mexico as then existing or declared or interpreted. . . . and the United Mexican States undertakes: (a) to restore to American citizens, corporations [etc.J the property, rights or interests of which they may have been deprived in Mexico without just compensa­ tion since January 1, 1910; (b) to make compensation . . . for damages or injuries . . . as a result of such deprivation; (c) to make adequate compensation for any such proper­ ty, .rights or interests of which they may have been so deprived and which it is not possible to restore.281 After presenting to Obregon this exacting draft, Summerlin imported in a despatch to Secretary of State Hughes that I then stated -that the signing of the instrument would constitute recognition by the United States Gov­ ernment. In other words, I said, the act of recogni­ tion and signing of the dociiment ?/ould be concurrent. 282 From the Mexican point of view, the draft treaty vrns.

281 Foreign Relations, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 598-99. 282 Ibid., p. 405.

410

a singularly unwelcome document, not only because or the exacting demands contained in it, but also because it con­ stituted the price Mexico was to pay for a recognition that Obregon had expected to be gratis.

One week before he had'

even been presented with the draft treaty,

0 breg