Different Shades of the Past: History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts 3111000257, 9783111000251

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
Between Wikipedia and a Museum: Historical Narrative “Tools”
Memory Politics and the Study of Crises in International Relations: Insights from Ukraine and Lithuania
Local Memory, International Conflicts: Case Study of the Katyn Memorial in Jersey City, USA
Sources of International Conflicts in Contemporary and Historical Context as a Threat to the Global Democratic and Liberal Order: Causes of Occurrence and Ways of Eradication
The Role of Historical Museums in Overcoming the Traumatic Past
Wiki-History of Crimea: Ukrainian and Russian Versions
The Problem of Preserving Monumental Objects of Art during Contemporary International Conflicts (on the Example of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict)
From Different Perspectives: History as an Instrument of Politics
Historically Charged Conflict: Nagorno-Karabakh between War and Diplomatic Failure
History as an Instrument of Continuing Indo-Pakistan Rivalry from 1947 till 2021
National History as Tools of Installing National Borders in Central Asia Countries
Belgium – Its Neighbours and the Process from a Centralised to a Federalist State
History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts: The Case of the Sudanese States
The Comparison of Russian Propaganda: From the Years 1917–1921 to Nowadays
List of Contributors

Citation preview

Different Shades of the Past

Different Shades of the Past History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts Edited by Mateusz Kamionka and Przemysław Łukasik

ISBN 978-3-11-100025-1 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-100059-6 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-100067-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022917810 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Map of Caucasus, in: Andrees Neuer Allgemeiner und ÖsterreichischUngarischer Handatlas, Moritz Perles, Vienna 1912. Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Contents Mateusz Kamionka and Przemysław Łukasik Introduction 1

Between Wikipedia and a Museum: Historical Narrative “Tools” Dovilė Budrytė Memory Politics and the Study of Crises in International Relations: Insights from Ukraine and Lithuania 11 Krzysztof Wasilewski Local Memory, International Conflicts: Case Study of the Katyn Memorial in Jersey City, USA 41 Feliks Baranovskyi Sources of International Conflicts in Contemporary and Historical Context as a Threat to the Global Democratic and Liberal Order: Causes of Occurrence and Ways of Eradication 59 Nataliіa Bulanova The Role of Historical Museums in Overcoming the Traumatic Past Maxim Potapenko and Mateusz Kamionka Wiki-History of Crimea: Ukrainian and Russian Versions

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Elena Makarova The Problem of Preserving Monumental Objects of Art during Contemporary International Conflicts (on the Example of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict) 105

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Contents

From Different Perspectives: History as an Instrument of Politics Arpine Maniero Historically Charged Conflict: Nagorno-Karabakh between War and Diplomatic Failure 119 Rajendra Singh Thakur History as an Instrument of Continuing Indo-Pakistan Rivalry from 1947 till 2021 139 Sharipov Shokhruz National History as Tools of Installing National Borders in Central Asia Countries 157 Ragnar Leunig Belgium – Its Neighbours and the Process from a Centralised to a Federalist State 165 Joanna Bar History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts: The Case of the Sudanese States 179 Anhelina Bulanova The Comparison of Russian Propaganda: From the Years 1917–1921 to Nowadays 193 List of Contributors

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Introduction Disputes between states and conflicts regarding the past are among the key sources of serious international rows. Such controversies may be defined as a situation of political and social stress connected with active, serious disparities of judgments referring to the common past of the disputing sides, including such disputes as those regarding borders, past armed conflicts, occupation, annexation, war crimes and crimes against humanity, oppression, discrimination, responsibility for international crises and humanitarian disasters, disputes on cultural legacy and achievements. On November 2, 2021 the Pedagogical University of Krakow in cooperation with the Research Center Global Dynamics (ReCentGlobe) of the University of Leipzig and the Institute of the European Network of Remembrance and Solidarity in Warsaw organized the second International Scientific Conference: History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts. The first edition of the conference took place in October 2018, also at the Institute of Political Science, Pedagogical University in Krakow. The event aroused great interest in the academic society. Both conferences were attended by researchers from 16 countries, including Armenia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and the United States. The results of the conference project will be presented within a multivolume edition including volumes on disputes and conflicts between states and nations regarding history in particular parts of the world, as well as in a volume on the outcomes of the comparative analyses of discussed conflicts including recommendations referring to conflict prevention and conflict solution in the presented context. ✶✶✶ “The past never dies. In fact, it’s not even the past,” as William Faulkner puts it. The words of the American writer very well reflect the dynamic nature of the process of shaping historical memory and awareness. In order to explain the process of constructing the past as a means of building an intergenerational community bond between its members, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-001

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introduced the concepts of an imagined community and an imagined tradition.1,2 It can therefore be said that contemporary generations look at themselves in the past like in a mirror, building their own images. In his book 21 Lessons for the 21st Century the historian Yuval Noah Harrari wrote that man had the possibility to conquer the world precisely because he could create fictional stories and believe in them. People created more and more complex stories about themselves that served and continue to serve, according to the professor of the University of Jerusalem, building unity, social harmony and gaining power.3 It is no different in the case of one of the bloodiest periods in the history of mankind, i.e. the twentieth century. According to Tony Judt, this epoch has become a “moralistic palace of memory” of nations, in which triumphalism is mixed with nostalgia, and singing out loud victories and famous people complete the suffering selectively. Contemporary historical memory has been compared by the British-American historian to a mosaic, fragments of separate stories “marked by their own (. . .) strongly emphasized feelings of injustice” that separate us from our common past.4 Victimisation, or the cult of national victims, is a common phenomenon in modern historical memory. A turning point in European memory and historical debate in this regard was the year 1991. After the end of the Cold War, the consensus regarding the events after 1945 was unfrozen, which allowed those nations and groups that had not yet been heard to speak. As a result, the Dutch could tell about the victims of the hunger winter of 1944–1945, and the inhabitants of the Baltic states could speak out about the Soviet aggression and the expulsion and deportation after the Second World War (about 10 per cent of the entire adult Baltic population was deported or sent to labor camps). Nowadays, the struggle for national unity with the threatening postmodern relativism, as Dan Stone emphasises, has acquired the character of a war of memory.5 As the British historian noted, the memory of the twentieth century can be used for the purpose of reconciliation or conflict.

 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, New York: Verso, 2006).  Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of tradition (Cambridge University Press, 2014).  Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2018), 390–406.  Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (London: Penguin Press, 2008), 28–31.  The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History, ed. Dan Stone (Oxford University Press, 2012), 729.

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A new look at the past, as shown for example by Bjørn Thomassen and Rosario Forlenza who wrote about national consensus building in post-war Italy, is not necessarily a bad thing itself.6 A revision of the look at the past, which opens up new spaces for discussion about the complicated past, can and should be regarded as an important contribution to building European open and balanced memory. On the other hand, revisionism, which is a negation of documented horrors of the past, should be unequivocally rejected.7 A narrative about past, in which memory fragmentation and victimisation play a large role, may be a temptation to instrumentalise the past. This is especially true in relation to the events of the twentieth century, when a series of bloody war conflicts occurred.8 As shown in the following post-conference volume, today the wars of the past (World War I and II, Indian-Pakistani war) and current conflicts (Russo-Ukrainian war, war in Sudan or Nagorno-Karabakh) are also a catalyst for the process of instrumentalisation. This process can be analysed both at the level of the evolution of the language of conflict, including the erosion of the values of democratic dialogue, and the use of specific means of commemorating the past (monuments, museums, the Internet). The conference, the papers of which are presented in the publication, as mentioned earlier, took place in November 2021. The Russian-Ukrainian war broke out three months later, during the editorial work on the post-conference volume. As a result, the papers on Ukraine and Russian-Ukrainian relations do

 After 1945, in the name of a national consensus built between the left and the right, Italian historiography, referring to World War II events, created an image of bad Germans and good Italians. Therefore, the blame for the crimes of fascism was mainly placed on the shoulders of Hitler and Mussolini. In this narrative, the Italians were to support the Duce without enthusiasm and not to use violence against the civilian population of the countries they occupied. At the end of the twentieth century, Italian historians such as Renzo de Felice deconstructed this image, describing, inter alia, use of war gases by Italian troops in Abyssinia in 1935–1936. Bjørn Thomassen and Rosario Forlenza, “The Pasts of the Present: WW II Memories and the Construction of political legitimacy in Post-Cold War Italy,” in The Use and Abuse of Memory. Interpreting World War II in Contemporary European Politics, ed. Christian Karner and Bram Mertens (New Brunswick and London, 2013), 137–52.  Bjørn Thomassen and Rosario Forlenza, “The Pasts of the Present: WW II Memories and the Construction of political legitimacy in Post-Cold War Italy,” in The Use and Abuse of Memory. Interpreting World War II in Contemporary European Politics, ed. Christian Karner and Bram Mertens (New Brunswick and London, 2013), 152.  The use and abuse of Memory. Interpreting world war II in Contemporary European Politics, ed. Christian Karner and Bram Mertens (New Brunswick and London, 2013); The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, ed. TG. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper (London, New York 2015); The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History, ed. Dan Stone (Oxford University Press, 2012).

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not take into account this important turning point. The texts on Ukraine contained in the manuscript are a clear and impressive indication of the depth of the conflict and the upcoming war, in which the historical and political manipulation of Russia’s denial of the autonomy of the Ukrainian nation and the state plays an important role. ✶✶✶ The conference volume consists of 12 articles and can be divided into two groups. The first group of articles deals with methodology and theory. The authors refer to the formulating and evolution of some theories and historical narratives (conflicts in international relations, the theory of democratic peace), but they also describe selected historical conflicts, by referring to the role of “tools” of historical narration, such as museums, monuments or new media. The second group of texts concerns cases of instrumentalisation of the past of a more general nature. The first group of articles includes the text of Dovilė Budrytė, Georgia Gwinnett College, USA. In the paper “Conflicts over Memory and Political Crises: Insights from Lithuania and Ukraine” she examines how research into memory politics in Eastern Europe can address more serious problems regarding international relations (IR). Budryte argues that research on historical memory (politics) that is common in area studies could help to rethink the study of crises in IR by demonstrating how crises change discourses and yield opportunities for memories to be challenged and defended ‒ not only by the “strong,” but also by the “weak” (or “peripheral”) actors. To illustrate this argument, the paper presents a comparative study of memory politics in Ukraine and Lithuania, tracing major discursive changes, their domestic and international impact and offering a depiction of how hegemonic historical accounts were created before and during the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine and how they were contested in the aftermath of the crisis. Krzysztof Wasilewski from the Koszalin University of Technology, Poland, is the author of the paper “Local Memory, International Conflicts. Case Study of the Katyń Memorial in Jersey City.” This article focuses on presenting the theoretical and empirical aspects of international politics of urban memory and its conflicting nature. The author analyses how local governments make use of international activity to promote their own narration on past events. He also refers to the example of the decision of the Jersey City authorities to relocate the Katyń Memorial in 2018, which resulted in a conflict with the Polish state. The challenges that contemporary conflicts bring to the global democratic and liberal order are discussed by Feliks Baranovskyi, Department of Political Science, Law and Philosophy at the Faculty of History and Law of the Nizhyn Mykola Gogol State University, Ukraine, in his text “Sources of International

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Conflicts in Contemporary and Historical Context as a Threat to the Global Democratic and Liberal Order: Causes of Occurrence and Ways of Eradication.” By examining the sources of international conflicts, the author considered it necessary to analyse them in a contemporary and a historical context. In the contemporary context the article stresses the existence of a crisis of trust at the global level. On the basis of the analysis the author concludes that the crisis of trust is based on a conflict of values. The article emphasises that democratisation (promotion of democracy on a global scale) and increasing the number of states with a democratic political regime can be seen as effective ways to eradicate sources of conflict. The author argues that the probability of armed conflict at the global level is inversely proportional to the number of democracies. He also expresses in his conclusions that in “the interests of democracy as a whole, democratic transit and individual young democracies cannot be neglected in favor of current temporary economic benefits, false alliances with authoritarian countries, even if they are superpowers, because these alliances are worthless. Otherwise everything could be lost.” The aim of the article by Natalia Bulanova, Director of the Museum of History of Kamianske, Ukraine, entitled “The Role of Historical Museums in Overcoming the Traumatic Past,” is to draw attention to the potential of historical museums in overcoming the conflict of historical memory of traumatic events in the history of the contemporary Ukrainian society. The author refers to the narrative of the museum exhibition (“simple language, awakens empathy, turns trauma into a state of security”), but also to the role of the museum as a platform for dialogue of community members who represent different views, historical ideas, cultural preferences and are the carriers of various versions of historical memory. Maxim Potapenko, Nizhyn Gogol State University, Nizhyn, Ukraine, and Mateusz Kamionka, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Poland, are the authors of the article “Wiki-History of Crimea: In Ukrainian and Russian Versions.” In the article, the authors try to examine the influence of new media on the historical discourse on the example of articles about the history of Crimea – a region that plays a key role in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. For both sides of the conflict the past is the main source of legitimising their rights to Crimea. As the authors emphasise: “Both versions of the Wiki history of Crimea exist in posttruth circumstances – they are not only a way and product of knowledge, but conscious or unconscious manipulation is also involved in its creation.” The last text belonging to this group was prepared by Elena Makarova, Tyumen State University, Russia, “The Problem of Preserving Monumental Art Objects during Modern International Conflicts (on the Example of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict).” Using the example of the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the author takes up the issue of monuments. The creation of new or removal of old

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monuments is a tool, as the author emphasises, of immortalisation of history in stone. The emotions accompanying this process, as well as the symbolism of monuments, e.g. exposing national hostility, may become an obstacle in understanding between nations for many decades. The first of the texts in the second group is an article by Armenian historian Arpine Maniero, Collegium Carolinum – Research Institute for the History of the Czech Lands and Slovakia, Germany, “Historically Charged Conflict: Nagorno-Karabakh between War and Diplomatic Failure.” The author analyses the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is one of the oldest in modern history. Nagorno-Karabakh has been a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the beginning of the twentieth century. Both sides consider this region the cradle of their national cultures, so any territorial claims made by the opposing side are seen as an attack on their own cultural heritage and national identity. Maniero emphasised how the experience of violence influenced the negotiations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Rajendra Singh Thakur, University of Jammu, India, prepared the text “History as an Instrument of Continuing Indo-Pakistan Rivalry from 1947 till 2021.” In his paper Thakur tries to establish the typology of this conflict in comparison with other conflicts. The dispute between India and Pakistan which started in 1947 has continued to degenerate with time. For the last seven decades both nations have fought three full scale wars and a limited war against each other. Thakur’s study is on how this conflict compares with similar conflict situations in other regions and what factors were at play in the resolved conflicts which can facilitate solving the Indo-Pakistan conflict. In his paper “National History as Tools of Installing National Borders in Central Asian Countries” Sharipov Shohruz from the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan discusses the role of the Soviet period, especially the years 1924–1925, when many borders of Central Asian countries were established by the leader of USSR Joseph Stalin. As a result, virtually identical ethnic groups and natural resources of the same territories were divided between different republics. Also, parts of the territories with a different ethnic population were included into one or another republic in order, according to Shohruz, to create a more multi-ethnic structure of the population, and make the republics more convenient for administration. Past decisions had a profound impact on the history of countries in the 1990s which were the times of the formation of independent countries in Central Asia. Ragnar Leunig, Centre International de Formation Européenne (CIFE), Nice, France, is the author of the article “Belgium – Its Neighbours and the Process from a Centralized to a Federalist State.” The author presents how Belgium, to some extent an artificial state created to maintain the balance of power in

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Europe, has become the heart of united Europe. Thanks to European integration and progressive federal state, this country of different ethnicities and culture (French and Flemish and German) remained a political unity. Belgium, according to the author, can be seen as a model of how different ethnicities live in one country, solving their problems in the compromise-based process: “Belgium is thus a laboratory where different ethnic groups co-exist and can serve as a model for solving parallel ethnic problems in other countries.” Joanna Bar, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Poland, wrote the article “History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts the Case of the Sudanese States.” The author analyses the historical conditions of the conflict between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan – its genesis and the prospects for ending and future peaceful coexistence of both countries. Despite the separation of the two countries, the conflict has not ended to this day. Both countries are continuing negotiations on the route of the common border and are defining the rules of cooperation in the field of oil transit. The author refers to the colonial past, religious and economic differences, but primarily explains the instrumentalisation of history in the process of Sudan’s break-up into two separate states. The last article in the second group is written by Angelina Bulianova, Ukraine, Institute of Archaeography and Source Studies at the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, “The Comparison of Russian Propaganda: From the Years 1917–1921 to Nowadays.” Bulianova’s article refers to the information warfare present in the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In the study, the author analyses the main features of Russian propaganda spread in Ukraine during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921 and today. According to the author, the clichés that Russian agitators copied from the Bolsheviks are aimed to misinform not only Ukrainians but the entire world community. ✶✶✶ The publishers would like to express their gratitude to the Institute of Political Science and Administration of the Pedagogical University in Kraków, which was the host for the 2021 History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts, and to the Polish Ministry of Education and Science, which financed it within “The Excellent Science” program. We would also like to thank our partner organisations which have supported us on every level, making an intellectual, organisational as well as a financial contribution to the success of both of these endeavours: Research Centre Global Dynamics (ReCentGlobe) at the University of Leipzig, Institute of European Network Remembrance and the Solidarity (Warsaw). Furthermore, we are grateful to Łukasz Stach, Przemysław Furgacz, Joanna Bar and Grzegorz Nycz for their assistance in moderating the conference.

Between Wikipedia and a Museum: Historical Narrative “Tools”

Dovilė Budrytė

Memory Politics and the Study of Crises in International Relations: Insights from Ukraine and Lithuania Abstract: How could research on memory politics in Eastern Europe speak to the wider concerns of International Relations (IR)? This article argues that research on historical memory (politics) that is common in area studies could help to rethink the study of crises in IR by demonstrating how crises change discourses and yield opportunities for memories to be challenged and defended ‒ not only by the “strong,” but also by the “weak” (or “peripheral”) actors. It further shows how conflicts over memory can become new crises. To illustrate this argument, the paper presents a comparative study of memory politics in Ukraine and Lithuania, tracing major discursive changes, their domestic and international impact, and offering a depiction of how hegemonic historical accounts were created before and during the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine and how they were contested in the aftermath of the crisis. By linking the study of international crises to memory politics of “weak” actors, this paper attempts to develop a “provincializing” platform for global IR. Keywords: crisis, discursive changes, identity, Lithuania, memory politics, Ukraine Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, have been described as “a game changer for policy makers and military planners” not only in the region, but globally.1 It has inspired scholars to explore the vocabulary of IR, including even conventional concepts such as “sovereignty” and “spheres of influence.”2 Others

 Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, eds., Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine (London: Routledge, 2017).  Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, eds., Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine (London: Routledge, 2017). Acknowledgments: Research for this essay was supported by a SEED grant from Georgia Gwinnett College (2016/2017). Note: Reprinted by permission from The Springer Nature Journal of International Relations and Development, “Memory Politics and the Study of Crises in International Relations: Insights from Ukraine and Lithuania” (Dovilė Budrytė, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-002

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were a bit more reserved in their evaluations of the transformative effects of the recent crisis in Ukraine. Without negating the emotional power of the events associated with the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine, Resende argued that these events can be conceptualised as historical events, close to what Deleuze has described as “scars” (with somewhat limited impact), while the disintegration of the Soviet Union can be described as a “wound” (a true, transformative “Event” that cannot be overcome or “fixed”).3 As the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine unfolded,4 the events associated with this crisis communicated with the “event” and transformed social relations.5 Thus, crisis can be conceptualised as an empowering mechanism, making new ideologies and new issues “visible” in both domestic and international politics.6 Drawing on this line of reasoning, this article argues that the Central and Eastern European crises (with a focus on the recent 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine) can be analysed as “engines of discourses,”7 yielding opportunities for historical memories to be

 Erica Resende, “Crisis and Change in Global Politics: A Dialogue with Deleuze and Badiou’s Event to Understand the Crisis in Ukraine,” in Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics: Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective, ed. Erica Resende, Dovilė Budrytė and Didem Buhar Gulmez (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 30.  President Yanukovych’s decision in November 2013 to walk away from Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) triggered a series of events described as the “Ukraine crisis” or “Ukrainian crisis” by mass media and foreign policy analysts in the United States and Europe. After this decision, thousands of protesters demonstrated in the streets of Kyiv, but this rebellion was cruelly suppressed by Yanukovych’s riot police and snipers. However, the protesters did not give up, and Yanukovych fled Ukraine. In early 2014, pro-Russian politicians in Crimea organised an unconstitutional referendum on secession from Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea by Russia followed. These events inspired armed groups in Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine to stage a rebellion. In April 2014, the government of Ukraine staged an “antiterrorist campaign” to fight the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. Russia has provided arms and support for the insurgents, while the US and the EU imposed sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. In 2014 and 2015 France and Germany brokered Minsk agreements that mandated ceasefire, local elections and special political status for territories in Eastern Ukraine, and the Ukrainian control of its border with Russia; however, these agreements were not respected by Russia which seemed to be interested in keeping Ukraine destabilised. As of 2020, approximately 14,000 people were the casualties of this armed conflict. Russia has continued to distribute its passports in Eastern Ukraine, and announced that its goal is to protect its compatriots. Many analysts continue to refer to these developments as a “prolonged” crisis. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europeand-russia (last accessed on August 31, 2020).  Erica Resende, “Crisis and Change in Global Politics,” 30.  Erica Resende, “Crisis and Change in Global Politics,” 37.  Dirk Nabers, A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

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(re)created, challenged and defended. Crises challenge dominant biographical narratives of the states8 and dislocate state identities,9 thus creating openings for the creation of new discourses and new meanings. At the same time, they introduce anxiety, thus increasing temptation to fixate on familiar historical narratives and “defend” familiar historical narratives. “Our” history, “our” narrative are seen as completely misunderstood and even threatened by “others”; thus, memory “must be defended.”10 These attempts to “defend memory” are resisted by various actors, both domestic and international, creating potential for conflict and raising pressing questions about the ways in which mnemonic conflicts emerge and develop. Serious conflict over memory can be conceptualised as a crisis as well because it “destabilises both state identity and its relations with other states.”11 Critical situations are related to increased anxiety which can disrupt order and predictability associated with routinised relations with the other states and redefine previously stable state identities.12 Although all states can experience ontological insecurity, “peripheral” states (which can be described as “weak” states),13 such as states in CEE, are especially prone to ontological anxiety.14 Conceptualisation of crises as “engines of discourses” means that it is essential to pay attention not only to the “strong” actors (as it has been done traditionally in IR), but also to the “weak” (or “peripheral”) actors, their discourses, transformation of their identities and even potential empowerment by crises.

 Filip Ejdus, “Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics,” Journal of International Relations and Development 21 (2018): 883‒908.  Erica Resende, “Crisis and Change in Global Politics,” 38.  Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 3 (2015): 221‒37.  Jelena Subotić, Yellow Star, Red Star: Holocaust Remembrance after Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 28.  Karl Gustafsson, “Routinized Recognition and Anxiety: Understanding the Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Review of International Studies 42, no. 4: 619.  There is no common definition or agreement in IR literature regarding how to define “weak” or “small” states. Although “brute quantifications of resources” are commonly seen as an inadequate measure to refer to small states, scholars studying peripheral actors point out that small states are likely to depend on “external options, whether a special relationship with a great power or other small states” (Tom Long, “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power,” International Studies Review 19 (2017): 187.) Peripheral actors, or “small powers,” are likely to exercise only “peripheral control over its own fate” (Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), 25) and are still likely to be treated as objects, not subjects, of IR (Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?,” in Small States in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen et al. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 15).  Subotić, Yellow Star, Red Star, 28.

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To gain insight into these questions, this paper draws on insights from memory studies in Central and Eastern Europe, tracing the development of “fighting and suffering” memory regimes15 focusing on discourses of resistance and collective trauma that consolidated in the aftermath of crises in Ukraine and Lithuania. In addition, the case studies explore how these memory regimes became the source of conflict, thus creating new “critical situations,” some of which extended beyond the actors themselves. Following Laffey and Weldes16 and drawing on these two case studies from CEE, the goal here is to make an attempt to further “decolonise” the study of crises in IR by focusing on the “weak” actors and their constitutive relationship with the “strong” actors as memories are (re) created and contested. By enabling East European voices, these case studies demonstrate that their accounts of the 2013/2014 crisis were linked to repressive policies of the Soviet Union and a long history of aggression. However, legitimation of resistance to aggression included privileging certain historical narratives over others, which resulted in new mnemonic conflicts.

Rethinking the Study of Crises in International Relations: Challenging the Traditional Accounts In the discipline of IR, a classic definition of “crisis” was developed by Charles F. Hermann who described crisis as a situation that puts the important goals of a decision-making unit in danger, limits the amount of time available for appropriate decision-making and is surprising to the decision-makers.17 Furthermore, in

 In the case of Ukraine, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Holodomor or “death by hunger” gradually became recognised as a major national trauma. In the case of Lithuania, the political repression and mass deportations under Stalin have become recognised as a major national trauma, and this is referred to as “genocide” (although recently the use of this term has been contested). In addition to collective traumas, the Ukrainian and Lithuanian memory regimes have focused on fighting and resistance. In both cases, the most contested and problematic resistance memories are associated with anti-Soviet fighters, some of whom participated in the Holocaust. In the case of Ukraine, the resistance discourse refers not only to the anti-Soviet fighters, but also the heroic struggle of the Red Army against Nazi Germany (Lina Klymenko, “Forging Ukrainian National Identity through Remembrance of World War II,” National Identities 22, no. 2: 138).  Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 555‒77.  Charles F. Hermann, “International Crisis as a Situational Variable,” in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), 414.

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mainstream IR, the study of crises has focused on the actions of the powerful states. Even the studies of the crisis in Ukraine (2013/2014) have tended to focus on the actions of Russia and their international implications.18 The persistent focus on the actions of the powerful states in IR produces an inaccurate view of global politics by erasing the ways in which the weak actors engage in acts of resistance.19 The marginal status of weak actors is often reproduced in IR scholarship. Both practices of powerful states and academic practices reproduce hierarchical international order in which weak actors are “not a significant locus of knowledge.”20 Conceptualising crises as empowering mechanisms and as “engines of discourses” implies that it is essential to pay attention not only to the powerful, but also to the “weak” (or “peripheral”) actors and their discourses. In the words of Barkawi and Laffey, for a full understanding of international politics, it is necessary to “wake up to the significance of the Melians and their kin,”21 starting to pay attention to the ways in which they resist the strong and the ways in which they articulate the legitimacy of their resistance. This implies paying attention to the use of memory politics by “weak” (or “peripheral”) actors, such as Ukraine or Lithuania, as legitimation of resistance usually involves the use of historical memory. However, literature on memory studies suggests that the use of historical memory in politics is closely linked to conflict. For example, invocation of memories related to past wars can create new political realities,22 increase the existing political tensions, and make the existing conflicts worse.23 Actions by

 E.g., Alexander Astrov, “‘There Are More Important Things Than Where the Border Runs’: The Other Side of George Kennan’s Containment Theory,” in Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine, ed. Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk (London: Routledge, 2017), 6‒18; Iain Andrew Ferguson, “The Crisis of Spheres of Influence in the EURussia Relationship,” in Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine, ed. Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, 19‒34; Stephen G.F. Hall, “Reconsidering Western Concepts of the Ukrainian Conflict: The Rise to Prominence of Russia’s ‘Soft Force’ Policy,” in Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine, ed. Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, 70‒89; and others.  Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 32 (2006): 329‒52.  Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 556.  Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” 352.  Maja Zehfuss, Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Stuart J. Kaufman, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18 (2009): 400‒34; Julie Fedor et al., eds., War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

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“memory entrepreneurs”24 or “mnemonic warriors”25 who view memory as non-negotiable and are devoted to the fight over only one “true” version of the past can lead to ongoing memory wars, both domestically and even internationally. Sometimes “mnemonic warriors” are basing their discourses on the traumatic past that they themselves experienced,26 and this can make their story about the past especially compelling to others, thus increasing their appeal and intensifying mnemonic conflicts. A similar insight (that memory can be a source of conflict and even crises) has been put forward by ontological security perspectives in global politics. Mälksoo introduced the concept of “mnemonical security,” arguing that the securitisation of memory takes place when certain memories are made secure, and others delegitimised or even outlawed.27 However, full security of memory can never be achieved, and attempts at securitisation reproduce the sense of insecurity, even in relations with other states. Such situations increase the sense of anxiety, which is related to a sense of disrupted order and predictability. In turn, increased anxiety leads the states to redefine their identities.28 Exploring the ways in which CEE states struggle with the Holocaust memory, Subotić demonstrated how conflicts over memory produced more ontological insecurity, affected state identities and even international relations.29 In sum, the ontological security literature has shown that conflicts over memory are essential for IR because memories help states to create biographical narratives that are essential for routinised relations with other states.30 Disruptions, changes or challenges to these narratives can affect states’ sense of security and can endanger their relations with other states. Dirk Nabers’ investigation of crises helps to conceptualise the dynamics of changes in narratives (“discourses”) and their relationship to “critical

 Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).  Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, eds., Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  Dovilė Budrytė, “Points of Memory in the Narrative of a ‘Mnemonic Warrior’: Gender, Displacement, and the anti-Soviet War of Resistance in Lithuania,” Journal of Baltic Studies 47, no. 4 (2016): 473‒96.  Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’.”  Karl Gustafsson, “Routinized Recognition and Anxiety: Understanding the Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Review of International Studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 619.  Subotić, Yellow Star, Red Star.  Felix Berenskoetter, “Parameters of National Biography,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 1 (2014): 262‒88.

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situations.”31 He argued that the articulation of a particular political crisis must “in some way be connected to sedimented practices to be credible.”32 After the crisis is articulated, there is “a competition between different political forces to hegemonize the political field, resulting in the acceptance of a certain interpretative framework of identification (actual hegemony) and its eventual routinisation and political institutionalisation. This final act of institutionalisation causes feedback effects on the discursive articulation of the crisis, new interpretative frames start to compete, and politics continues.”33 Following this framework, crisis can be conceptualised as an “engine” of discourses, and politics can be conceptualised as fundamentally linked to identity struggles. The two structured case studies below draw on Nabers’ insights, focusing on the creation of hegemonic memories associated with the “fighting and suffering regimes” in Ukraine and Lithuania and their evolution before, during and after the crisis in Ukraine in 2013/2014. In addition to outlining the emergence of the “fighting and suffering” hegemonic memories, I document their routinisation, political institutionalisation and contestation (both domestic and international) as well as the ways in which conflicts over these hegemonic memories travelled beyond the actors who constructed them and affected relations with the other states. To better understand the contestation of hegemonic memories in the aftermath of the crisis, I will outline relevant mnemonic conflicts with competing discourses and public debates about memorialisation and explore whether or not they can be analysed as “critical situations.” Ukraine and Lithuania have different historical experiences of collective trauma, and they experienced the crises, including the 2013/2014 crisis, differently. However, Ukraine and Lithuania created similar memory regimes rallied around a major historic trauma, referred to as “genocide,” and anti-Soviet resistance. Both states engaged in attempts to “defend memory” by privileging certain traumatic historical narratives and accounts of resistance and were engaged in mnemonic conflicts with the neighbours, including Russia. Unlike Ukraine, as a member of the EU, Lithuania had an opportunity to extend its memory regime and related remembrance practices transnationally, through the EU institutions. My hope is that a comparison of these two narratives of “fighting and suffering” and their intersections with crises will help to gain insight into the questions about the ways in which crises act as “engines of discourses” (articulated by “peripheral” actors) as well as the ways in which consequent mnemonic conflicts become new “critical  Dirk Nabers, A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  Dirk Nabers, A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics, 146‒47.  Dirk Nabers, A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics, 147.

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situations” (involving both “peripheral” and “non-peripheral” actors). To trace these processes, I draw on area studies research on memory politics in Ukraine and Lithuania.

Ukraine: From an “Uncertain” Genocide and Divided Memories to a “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm The Development of the “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm before the 2013/2014 Crisis As argued by Resende, the breakup of the Soviet Union can be conceptualised as an “event” with huge transformative power and a powerful potential for social change.34 In the context of the Soviet Union, it can be described as a crisis of history, when the established discourses about the Great Patriotic War and the “achievements” of the Soviet Union were challenged and new historical discourses and new historical interpretations emerged. In Ukraine, glasnost unleashed a wave of popular interest in the crimes of the Soviet regime, the Holodomor (or the “Great Famine” of 1932‒1933 which killed millions of Ukrainians) and the anti-Soviet resistance. The latter focused on the OUN (the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the UPA (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). The OUN was a nationalist organisation created prior to World War II with the goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state. Similarly, the goal of the UPA was also to establish an independent Ukrainian state. The members of the OUN and UPA collaborated with Nazi Germany and were responsible for killing many civilians, including Poles and Jews.35 Perestroika was the time when the term “genocide” started to be used in debates related to Soviet crimes (in the case of Ukraine, Holodomor), but “without special emphasis.”36 This means that the Holodomor did not yet have the status of a major national trauma, and cultural work still had to be completed to turn it into one. In addition, as noted by Yuliya Yurchuk, during that time Narodnyi Rukh, the Ukrainian nationalist movement, embraced the theme of

 Erica Resende, “Crisis and Change in Global Politics.”  David R. Marples, “Anti-Soviet Partisans and Ukrainian Memory,” East European Politics and Societies 24, no. 1 (2010): 26‒43.  Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “‘Capital of Despair’: Holodomor Memory and Political Conflicts in Kharkiv after the Orange Revolution,” East European Politics and Societies 25, no. 3 (2011): 597‒639.

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the OUN and UPA as one of the major ways to discredit the Soviet regime.37 Since then, memorialisation of the OUN and UPA has been “above all, a profoundly anti-Soviet and anti-imperial act.”38 Despite the rise of new identities and the emergence of new discourses, the breakup of the Soviet Union did not lead to the emergence of a coherent hegemonic memory discourse in Ukraine. Regional divisions prevailed in Ukraine’s memory culture, with the anti-Soviet fighters being commemorated in Western Ukraine, and the Great Patriotic War being commemorated in Eastern and central Ukraine. A crisis in 2004, when Russia forcefully intervened in Ukraine’s domestic politics by supporting Viktor Yanukovych, and the Orange Revolution that followed this intervention, came with a major change in Ukraine’s memory politics. Viktor Yushchenko (who came to power as a result of the Orange Revolution) became the first Ukrainian president who “delegitimized the Soviet past at the national level by considering the Soviet rule as a period of occupation starting in 1918.”39 The memory politics pursued by Yushchenko laid the foundation for the “fighting and suffering” memory regime in Ukraine with the establishment of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) in 2006. Under his presidency the Holodomor became “the core of a new identity politics.”40 Ukraine was presented as the ultimate victim of Soviet terror, and the experience of the Holodomor was essentially equated with the Holocaust.41 Furthermore, in 2007, Yushchenko gave the Hero of Ukraine title to Roman Shukhevych, a UPA commander, and in 2010 he gave the same title to Stepan Bandera, the controversial hero of Ukraine who was a Nazi sympathiser,42 and

 Yuliya Yurchuk, “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991‒2016),” in War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, ed. Julie Fedor et al. (Cham, Switzerland: Springer (Palgrave Macmillan), 2017), 108‒9.  Andreas Umland and Yuliya Yurchuk, “Introduction: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Post-Soviet Ukrainian Memory Politics, Public Debates, and Foreign Affairs,” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 3, vol. 2 (2017): 117.  Oksana Myshlovska, “Delegitimizing the Communist Past and Building a New Sense of Community: The Politics of Transitional Justice and Memory in Ukraine,” International Journal of History, Culture and Modernity 7 (2019): 389.  Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “‘Capital of Despair’,” 597.  Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “‘Capital of Despair’,” 603.  Stepan Bandera (1909‒1959) was a nationalist leader who fought for independent Ukraine during World War II and after it. He embraced a vision of ethnically clear Ukraine led by one political party, and collaborated with the Nazis whom he saw as the only power who could defeat two enemies of Ukraine ‒ USSR and Poland. His political faction (the Banderites) were complicit in the Holocaust and other massacres of civilians, including ethnic Poles. However, he is also remembered for resisting USSR for a long time, even after World War II. Bandera was assassinated by KGB in Germany in 1959. Bandera is a hero for many in Western Ukraine

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called on local governments to name schools, streets and squares after the leaders of anti-Soviet nationalist fighters. These actions triggered a negative reaction from Israel, revealing the uneasy relationship between the “fighting and suffering” paradigm and the memory of the Holocaust. There were protests from the Polish government as well ‒ albeit for different reasons. President Kaczynski pointed out that the OUN and UPA were involved in mass killings of Polish civilians during the interwar period and therefore do not deserve glorification.43 The attempts of Yushchenko’s government to achieve the international recognition of Holodomor as an act of genocide were adamantly resisted by Russia, and they became the focus of the Russian-Ukrainian memory wars in 2007‒2009. Yushchenko’s Ukraine associated the Soviet rule with tragedy and genocide (the Holodomor); however, for Putin’s Russia the collapse of the USSR was “the largest geopolitical tragedy.”44 These memory wars were fought in the international organisations as well, with Ukraine fighting for the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, and Russia (by and large successfully) blocking these attempts.45 Furthermore, Russia ardently challenged the “fighting” dimension of Yushchenko’s memory regime. In 2000s, Russia created its own memory regime focused on the cult of the Great Patriotic War, and memory politics was “the main instrument that Putin’s government has used to divide Ukraine and render it politically dependent on Moscow.”46 In Russia’s memory regime, the “Great Victory” over the Nazi Germany was essential, and thus the OUN and UPA had to be treated as Nazi collaborators and “backstabbing champions of Nazism.”47 The Russian Foreign Ministry was especially active in this memory war by issuing a whole series of complaints against Ukraine. In 2008, the

due to the “legacy of sacrifice.” https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2010/02/24/a-fascist-hero-indemocratic-kiev/ (last accessed on September 4, 2020). His virulent nationalist views were an inspiration for Ukraine’s right-wing protestors in Maidan.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/world/polish-president-condemns-hero-titleaward-for-ban-58755.html?cn-reloaded=1 (last accessed on September 4, 2020).  Georgy Kasyanov and Svetlana Osipchuk, “Historical Politics in Ukraine in the Context of Conflict with Russia, 1990–2017,” in Non-Objective Conflicts: Political Practices of Sharing the Common Past Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Transnistria, ed. Sergey Rumyantsev (Berlin: Center for Independent Social Research, 2017), 60.  Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 185.  Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 178.  Georgy Kasyanov and Svetlana Osipchuk, “Historical Politics in Ukraine in the Context of Conflict with Russia, 1990–2017,” 70.

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Russian Foreign Ministry successfully sponsored a UN resolution versus “glorification of the Nazi collaborators” which was adopted in 2015.48 President Yushchenko’s memory politics was met with intense resistance from local actors in central and Eastern Ukraine.49 At least partially, this politics contributed to his defeat in 2010 when Viktor Yanukovych came to power and suppressed the “fighting and suffering” memory paradigm by abandoning the attempts to get international recognition for Holodomor as genocide and moving away from commemorating the anti-Soviet fighters. Until 2013/2014, the official discourse in Ukraine embraced the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War, similarly to Russia.

The 2013/2014 Crisis as an Engine of Discourses and the Transformation of Identities Historical myths related to the “fighting and suffering” paradigm re-emerged during the Euromaidan protests, the first stage of the crisis in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014. According to Volodymyr Vyatrovych, who served as the Director of the UINR from 2014 until 2019,50 commemoration of the Holodomor played an important role in organising the initial Euromaidan protests. The fourth Saturday in November is celebrated as Holodomor Memorial Day. On November 23, 2013, he served as an organiser of this day in Ukraine. Thousands of people showed up for this commemoration event in Kyiv, and it became associated with a protest against the regime of Yanukovych, who was “dragging us back into a union with Russia,” a country associated with the death of millions of people.51 The “fighting” component of the memory regime was equally important during the Euromaidan protests. The red and black flags of the Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) were present during the protests, and symbols associated with the anti-Soviet Ukrainian fighters were also widely used, including portraits of Stepan Bandera.  Georgy Kasyanov and Svetlana Osipchuk, “Historical Politics in Ukraine in the Context of Conflict with Russia, 1990–2017,” 72.  Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “‘Capital of Despair’,” 597.  Volodymyr Vyatrovych was “known for a nationalistic bent” when he led the UINR. Under his leadership, the institute started the process of decommunisation which involved renaming streets and squares and promoted a positive image of the OUN and UPA. https://www.rferl. org/a/politics-of-memory-a-struggle-for-an-institute-and-what-it-means-for-ukrainian-iden tity/30226363.html (last accessed on September 4, 2020).  Tetiana Kovtunovich and Tetiana Privalko, eds., Maidan vid pershoi osobi: 45 istorii Revoliutsii gidnosti (Kyiv: K.I.C., 2015), 79.

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The protesters sang the songs of the nationalist fighters. The Euromaidan protesters adopted the greeting used by nationalist fighters, “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” As the crisis continued and the fighting in eastern Ukraine started, this slogan became associated with the Ukrainian soldiers who lost their lives.52 The second stage of the 2013/2014 crisis ‒ the annexation of Crimea ‒ introduced a new dimension to the “fighting and suffering” memory regime. Just one month after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, in April 2014, the parliament of Ukraine passed legislation restoring rights to “people deported on ethnic grounds.”53 Several other actions related to memory politics followed in 2015, including the denunciation of the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin as an act of genocide and the adoption of the National Day of Remembrance and Mourning of Victims of the Genocide (May 18). In Russia, the annexation of Crimea marked a rapid shift in the public opinion in support of Putin’s regime54 and related discourses, including Russia’s fight against “fascism.”

The Routinisation and Institutionalisation of the “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm At least initially, “the protest energy”55 associated with the Euromaidan translated into major changes in memory politics. The “fighting and suffering” paradigm was strengthened, routinised and institutionalised. Memory practices associated with this paradigm became customary. These processes started with the reestablishment of the UINR, which had been demoted to a research institute by President Yanukovych in 2010, as part of “the executive power”56 of the Ukrainian government in 2014. In 2014‒2018, the restored Institute contributed to the creation of an official memory by focusing on the lionisation of the OUN-UPA. Perhaps most importantly, in 2015 the Institute helped to draft Ukraine’s decommunisation laws which have once again attempted to rehabilitate Ukraine’s wartime  Yuliya Yurchuk, “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991‒2016),” 126.  Milana Nikolko, “Collective Trauma, Memories and Victimization Strategies in Modern Strategies of Ethnic Consolidation: The Crimean Tatar Case,” in Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics: Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective, ed. Erica Resende et al. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 86.  Kirill Rogov, “‘Crimean Syndrome’: Mechanisms of Authoritarian Mobilization,” Russian Politics and Law 54, no. 1 (2016): 28‒54.  Interview Tetiana Kovtunovich, Kyiv, July 26, 2016.  Interview Volodymyr Tylishchak, Kyiv, July 26, 2016.

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nationalist leaders, including Bandera. These laws include a condemnation of the communist and nationalist socialist regimes and a prohibition against the public display of their symbols, and the replacement of the Soviet term “the Great Patriotic War” with the Second World War. They were acts of “anticolonial nationalist politics of memory” because they represented an attempt to get rid of the Soviet past which was seen as a threat to the present and to the future of Ukraine.57 In addition, they were “mnemonic security measures,” adopted in response to Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and Donbass.58 “The recognition of fighters for Ukrainian independence in the twentieth century” (a new status awarded to OUN-UPA fighters) attracted the most controversy. The “public display of disrespectful attitudes” toward these organisations and “public denial of the legitimacy of the struggle for Ukraine’s independence in the twentieth century” were banned without public or parliamentary debate.59 There were several other initiatives that strengthened the “fighting” dimension of the leading memory regime. In October 2014, President Poroshenko signed a decree establishing October 14 as Defender of Ukraine Day, proclaiming that this move is associated with “seeking to commemorate the defenders of Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.”60 This move was supported by the parliament of Ukraine, and it cancelled the celebration of February 23, a relic from the Soviet Union, when the Day of the Armed Forces was celebrated. Apparently, the UINR recommended the establishment of this public holiday.61 It was linked to an old Ukrainian tradition going back to the times of the Cossacks; however, this was also the day when the UPA was established.62 This move helped to strengthen the link between the “cult” of the nationalist fighters and the ongoing war waged in Eastern Ukraine.63 Furthermore, it made the commemoration of the OUN-UPA part of the Ukrainian national military tradition.

 Barbara Törnquist-Plewa and Yuliya Yurchuk, “Memory Politics in Contemporary Ukraine: Reflections from the Postcolonial Perspective,” Memory Studies 12, no. 6 (2019): 699‒720.  Ilya Nuzov, “The Dynamics of Collective Memory in the Ukraine Crisis: A Transitional Justice Perspective,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, no. 1 (2017): 147.  Oxana Shevel, “The Battle for Historical Memory in Postrevolutionary Ukraine,” Current History 115, no. 783 (2016): 261.  https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/228452.html (last accessed on October 30, 2019).  https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80001 (last accessed on November 1, 2019).  https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80001 (last accessed on November 1, 2019).  As argued earlier in this essay, legitimation of the tradition of radical Ukrainian nationalism associated with the OUN and UPA can be traced to Euromaidan, when armed resistance against the hated regime of Yanukovych took place. The OUN and UPA were associated with devotion to fight for Ukraine, without remembering the vision of an ethno-nationalist state

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The routinisation and institutionalisation of the “fighting and suffering” paradigm was related to intense fears about the survival of the state triggered by the annexation of Crimea. Ukraine was faced with a “critical situation”64 ‒ torn with questions about its continued existence and “finitude,” experiencing transformation of relations with the other states (first and foremost, Russia) and dealing with major changes in its autobiographical narrative. The decommunisation laws were an expression of Ukraine’s desire to defend its memory and address its fundamental ontological insecurities. Memory was securitised by privileging the narratives about the collective trauma (Holodomor) and antiSoviet fighters and by outlawing the narrative about the Great Patriotic War (embraced by Russia). As pointed out by Mälksoo, such securitisation of memory was likely “to reproduce the sense of insecurity among the contesters of the ‘memory’ in question.”65 In this case, the contestation of the decommunisation laws and related narratives triggered new memory wars.

The Aftermath of the Crisis: The Contestation of the Hegemonic Narrative Resistance to decommunisation came from different quarters, including liberal intellectuals based in the West and in Ukraine as well as conservative forces in Ukraine and Russia that were “interested in keeping Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence.”66 The “New Left” in Ukraine and part of the liberal intelligentsia argued against the glorification of the OUN-UPA; however, they could do little to change the “fighting and suffering” narrative.67 Amending the memory laws turned out to be next to impossible because Ukraine’s defence efforts in Eastern Ukraine were linked to the OUN-UPA. Furthermore, the constant criticism of the OUN-UPA emanating from Russia and conservative forces within

promoted by these organisations. The continued fight against the Russian aggression made these aspects of the OUN-UPA legacy more appealing to the Ukrainian society. Yuliya Yurchuk, “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991‒2016),” 125‒6.  Filip Ejdus, “Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics.”  Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’,” 221.  Oxana Shevel, “The Battle for Historical Memory in Postrevolutionary Ukraine,” 263.  Georgyi Kasianov, “Tolkovaniye OUN i UPA v publichnom diskurse Ukrainy 1990kh2000kh gg.: ot ‘reabilitatsii’ k apologii,” Forum Noveyshey vostochnoevropeyskoy istorii i kultury 1‒2 (2018): 277.

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Ukraine made amending the laws impossible because this could be seen as “bowing to pressure from Russia.”68 Responding to Ukraine’s decommunisation laws, Russia accused Ukraine of violating individual rights, including the right of expression and violating its international commitments.69 Furthermore, in May 2014, Russia adopted its own memory law (Yarovaya Act) “criminalising any criticism of Soviet politics during World War II” and strengthening its Great Patriotic War narrative.70 The Ukrainian armed forces were depicted as “death squads” and “Banderites.”71 These actions were accompanied by massive propaganda campaigns equating the Ukrainian nationalism with fascism72 and material support for separatists fighting against Ukraine. Thus, memory wars (including Russia’s opposition to Ukraine’s decommunisation laws) became an integral part of an ongoing armed conflict in Donbass. On the other hand, the continued glorification of the OUN-UPA (intensified by memory wars with Russia) endangered Ukraine’s relations with its allies, including Poland and the United States.73 In July 2016, reacting to Kyiv’s commitment to its “fighting and suffering” paradigm, the Polish parliament made June 11 a day of memory for the Polish victims of the “genocide perpetuated by the OUN-UPA.” In response, during the same year, the Ukrainian legislature passed a resolution criticising Poland for its “incorrect interpretation of Polish-Ukrainian history.”74 Although the Polish use of the term “genocide” had a lot to do with domestic politics, including the rise of Polish nationalism,75 memory wars surrounding Volyn

 Oxana Shevel, “The Battle for Historical Memory in Postrevolutionary Ukraine,” 263.  https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/ua/-/asset_publisher/ktn0ZLTvbbS3/content/id/ 1157723 (last accessed on November 27, 2019).  Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 309.  Georgy Kasyanov and Svetlana Osipchuk, “Historical Politics in Ukraine in the Context of Conflict with Russia, 1990–2017,” 86.  As explained by Klymenko, the tendency to equate the Ukrainian nationalism with fascism goes back to the Soviet times when the OUN and UPA were depicted as movements created by the Nazis to pursue the occupation of Ukraine. The disagreements between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis were ignored (Lina Klymenko, “Forging Ukrainian National Identity through Remembrance of World War II,” 144). During the crisis in Ukraine, the tendency to equate the Ukrainian protesters with fascists strengthened. Difficulties experienced by Ukraine and Lithuania in addressing the problematic aspects of their World War II pasts have only empowered Russia’s “fascism” discourse.  Furthermore, the changes in memory culture related to World War II were contested by the EU (Lina Klymenko, “Forging Ukrainian National Identity through Remembrance of World War II,” 141).  Oxana Shevel, “The Battle for Historical Memory in Postrevolutionary Ukraine,” 262‒3.  Yuliya Yurchuk, “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991‒2016),” 129.

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(where Ukrainian nationalist fighters killed many Polish civilians) have remained a major issue in Polish-Ukrainian relations since 2015. In Ukraine, the Polish position was equated with “Polish historical imperialism” and the desire to deny Ukraine “the right to choose its own heroes” (the OUN and UPA).76 In Poland, there was a lot of dissatisfaction with the unwillingness of Ukraine to acknowledge the gravity of the Volynian massacre and the inability of the Ukrainians to see themselves not only as victims, but also as perpetrators.77 The discourses defending the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine have played a negative role in Ukraine’s relations with the United States. The appeal of 56 US congressmen to the US State Department expressing concern that Ukraine is engaging in “government supported” distortion of facts and even Holocaust denial in 2018 is a case in point. This action triggered a defensive reaction from Vyatrovych, who accused the congressmen of “poor knowledge” about the history of the OUN-UPA, arguing that the UPA fought not only against the Soviet Union, but also against Nazism.78 Another challenge to the “fighting and suffering” narrative came from Volodymyr Zelensky, who won the presidential elections in 2019 and who has promoted more inclusive policies in various fields and reducing tensions with Ukraine’s neighbours, including Poland.79 In an interview in April 2019, President Zelensky declared that he understood why many Ukrainians continue to lionise Bandera. At the same time, he suggested turning to those heroes, such as artists, writers, and football stars, who “unite Ukraine today”: “Stepan Bandera is a hero for a certain percentage of Ukrainians, and this is a normal and cool thing. He was one of those who defended the freedom of Ukraine. But I think that when we call so many streets and bridges by the same name, this is not quite right.”80 Shortly after this interview, the government of Ukraine dismissed Vyatrovych. This prompted a public discussion about the future of the Institute and Ukraine’s memory politics in general,81 suggesting that conflicts over memory after the 2013/2014 crisis resembled another “critical situation,” forcing Ukraine to rethink its autobiographical narrative about “fighting and suffering.”

 Łukasz Adamski, “Kyiv’s ‘Volhynian Negationism’: Reflections on the 2016 Polish-Ukrainian Memory Conflict,” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 3, no. 2 (2017): 275.  Łukasz Adamski, “Kyiv’s ‘Volhynian Negationism’.”  https://www.unian.info/politics/10096322-vyatrovych-comments-on-u-s-congressmen-s-let ter-on-anti-semitism-in-ukraine.html (last accessed on September 4, 2020).  https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/18/volodymyr-zelenskiy-s-second-act-pub-78934 (last accessed on October 30, 2019).  https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/vladimir-zelenskiy-nam-vygodno-raspustit-1555546435.html (last accessed on November 4, 2019).  https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80001 (last accessed on November 1, 2019).

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Lithuania: Holding on to the “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm The Development of the “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm before the 2013/2014 Crisis In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Lithuania developed a relatively strong “fighting and suffering” memory regime. Initially, traumas associated with the mass deportations and political repression under Stalin, not armed resistance, were the backbone of this regime. During this time, there was an avalanche of memoirs written by former deportees, and the public tended to focus on mass suffering associated with the trauma of deportation. Some memoirs by former partisans were published; however, they were fewer in number and much less influential when compared to the memoirs of former deportees.82 A decade later, in the late 1990s, the Lithuanian state started to institutionalise the memory of anti-Soviet resistance fighters. In 1997, a new memory day entered Lithuania’s national calendar: the Day of the Partisans (the fourth Sunday in May). In 1999, the Lithuanian parliament voted to make a declaration to defend the sovereignty of Lithuania that was signed by anti-Soviet resistance fighters in 1949 as a “legal document,” thus emphasising the importance of the antiSoviet resistance for post-Soviet Lithuanian identity. In 2009, the Lithuanian parliament declared that year the year of Lithuania’s freedom fighters, and described the 1949 declaration as “essential to Lithuanian statehood.” The parliament announced that Jonas Žemaitis, an anti-Soviet partisan leader, was “the fourth President of Lithuania” (the first three were in independent Lithuania, 1918‒1940). These actions in Lithuania’s domestic memory politics were related to an international development – the invasion of Georgia by Russia.83 This development contributed to anxiety in Lithuania, triggering fears about potential Russian aggression. In response, memories about anti-Soviet resistance were mobilised, and certain aspects of anti-Soviet resistance, such as devotion to

 Violeta Davoliūtė, “Heroes, Villains and Matters of State: The Partisan and Popular Memory in Lithuania, Cultures of History Forum, November 17, 2017, available at http://www.cul tures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/lithuania/heroesvillains-and-matters-of-state-the-partisanand-popular-memory-in-lithuania/ (last accessed on November 1, 2019).  Violeta Davoliūtė, “Heroes, Villains and Matters of State: The Partisan and Popular Memory in Lithuania”, Cultures of History Forum, November 17, 2017, available at http://www.cul tures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/lithuania/heroesvillains-and-matters-of-state-the-partisanand-popular-memory-in-lithuania/ (last accessed on November 1, 2019).

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the Lithuanian cause and fighting against a stronger and more powerful enemy, became especially important to anxious Lithuanian society. It is perhaps not surprising that during the same time (2008‒2009) there were heated confrontations between Russia and Lithuania regarding memory politics.84 These confrontations were intensified by the 2008 Prague Declaration which attempted to get recognition of communist crimes and make sure that they deserve the same condemnation as the Nazi crimes. Lithuania was an enthusiastic supporter of the 2008 Prague Declaration, thus extending its “fighting and suffering” paradigm to the international institutions. Similar ideas were articulated by the European Parliament’s 2009 resolution “On European Conscience and Totalitarianism” and 2009 OSCE “Vilnius Declaration.”85 This discourse led to the radicalisation of memory politics in Russia that included new nationalistic memory law proposals, a propaganda campaign and an international conference on Stalinism86 that focused on glorifying the Great Patriotic War and could not accept the responsibility for the Soviet crimes.

The Impact of the 2013/2014 Crisis in Ukraine The 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine has had a deep emotional impact on Lithuania. People were faced with a feeling of “anxiety of the eventual war,”87 a “sovereign uncertainty.”88 There was an outpouring of support for Ukraine ‒ not only from the government, but also from the public. During the time of the crisis there were

 Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 190.  The three documents implied that the two regimes ‒ Nazism and Stalinism ‒ were equally condemnable. The Prague declaration argued that the victims of Communism deserved “recognition for their sufferings in the same way as the victims of Nazism” (https://www.praguedeclara tion.eu/, last accessed on September 4, 2020). The European parliament resolution argued for “a common view” of European history and recognised “Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and communist regimes as a common legacy” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pu bRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0213+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, last accessed on September 4, 2020). Although it mentioned the “uniqueness of the Holocaust,” the Vilnius declaration referred to “totalitarian legacy” and warned about glorifying the Nazi or Stalinist past (https:// www.oscepa.org/documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilnius-decla ration-eng/file, last accessed on September 4, 2020).  Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 259‒60.  Neringa Klumbytė, “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier,” Slavic Review 78, no. 2 (2019): 336.  Neringa Klumbytė, “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier,” Slavic Review 78, no. 2 (2019): 337.

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many publications in the mass media comparing the 1940 Soviet occupation of Lithuania and the 2014 annexation of Crimea.89 Arguments were made that Russia has “not changed” since 1940, and fears about a potential occupation of Lithuania by Russia were also expressed.90 Remembering the Soviet occupation triggered memories about deportations and armed resistance. Comparisons between the armed Ukrainian anti-Soviet resistance and the Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance were made.91 Arguments were made that the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation “has not yet ended,” and the occupation of Crimea was framed as a major threat to Lithuania’s survival. “The West” was portrayed as indecisive, unreliabl and not willing to help Ukraine ‒ just like it was not willing to help Lithuania after World War II.92 This “sovereign uncertainty”93 was linked to several other developments and changes in identities, including feelings of victimisation felt by the majority of Lithuanians and intense insecurity felt by minorities, including Lithuania’s ethnic Russian minority. After the crisis in Ukraine, the Lithuanian government started monitoring Russian NGOs, trying to make sure that they did not start “politically dubious collaboration with Russia.”94 Ethnic Russians felt that their “loyalty” to the Lithuanian state was questioned, and that there were suspicions that they had connections with government institutions in Russia.95 These insecurities coincided with changes in commemorative practices. Instead of celebrating May 9 as the end of the Great Patriotic War, Lithuania’s Russians started commemorating

 Andrius Marcinkevičius, “Istorinio teisingumo diskursų formavimas LIetuvos spaudoje lietuvių ir rusų kalba” in Socialinis ir istorinis teisingumas diaugiaetninėje Lietuvos visuomenėje: sampratos, patirtys ir kontekstai by Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė et al. (Vilnius: LSTC, 2018), 58.  Andrius Marcinkevičius, “Istorinio teisingumo diskursų formavimas LIetuvos spaudoje lietuvių ir rusų kalba” in Socialinis ir istorinis teisingumas diaugiaetninėje Lietuvos visuomenėje: sampratos, patirtys ir kontekstai by Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė et al. (Vilnius: LSTC, 2018), 58‒59.  http://www.iskauskas.lt/2017/12/05/kas-bendra-tarp-ukrainos-ir-lietuvos-rezistenciniu-ju dejimu-i/ (last accessed on October 30, 2019).  http://www.iskauskas.lt/2017/12/06/ceslovas-iskauskas-parama-ukrainai-letaliniu-ginkluji-vis-dar-laukia-ii/ (last accessed on October 30, 2019).  Neringa Klumbytė, “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier,” 337.  Neringa Klumbytė, “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier,” 344.  Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė, “Socialinio teisingumo aspektai ir rusų savanoriškos organizacijos,” in Socialinis ir istorinis teisingumas diaugiaetninėje Lietuvos visuomenėje: sampratos, patirtys ir kontekstai by Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė et al. (Vilnius: LSTC, 2018), 206.

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this event on May 8 (which coincides with the celebrations of the end of World War II in Europe).96 Predictably, the strengthening of the “fighting and suffering” narrative and international support for it triggered memory wars with Russia. A short film about the “forest brothers” (anti-Soviet partisans) in the Baltic states created by NATO in 2017 and distributed via social media is a case in point. This film highlighted the link between the past (partisan warfare) and the “present” (preparation for irregular warfare by special forces in the Baltic states). It received an angry reaction from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose spokeswoman referred to the Baltic anti-Soviet partisans as “unfinished fascists.” Thousands of internet users from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine immediately started “defending memory”97 by opposing the remarks of the spokeswoman. This incident demonstrated the lasting popularity of the heroic narrative about the anti-Soviet resistance. Furthermore, the reaction of Russia revealed the continued intent to portray “all manifestations of resistance to the Soviet occupation as the work of fascists,”98 which merely strengthened the “fighting and suffering” narrative in Lithuania. In sum, the crisis in Ukraine gave a “new life” to the already existing memory about the anti-Soviet partisans in Lithuania. It did not invent it, but it definitely reinvigorated this memory and made it appealing to many, especially the young.99 On the other hand, it strengthened the Great Patriotic War narrative in Russia and its opposition to “fascists” in “near abroad.”

The Continued Routinisation and Institutionalisation of the “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm after the 2013/2014 Crisis By 2013/2014, the anti-Soviet partisan war and its official memorialisation were fully accepted by government institutions and all political parties. Since the 1990s, the memorialisation of the anti-Soviet fighters has been pursued by Lithuania’s Genocide and Resistance Research Centre, a government institution

 Neringa Klumbytė, “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier,” 344‒45.  Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’.”  Violeta Davoliūtė, “Heroes, Villains and Matters of State.”  Interview Arvydas Anušauskas, Vilnius, July 22, 2019.

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that includes a museum and a research institute. This institution has devoted significant energy to researching the partisan war and building memorials at the sites of partisan battles. Furthermore, the Lithuanian government made several other steps, such as resolutions and special exhibitions, memorialising the anti-Soviet partisans, thus strengthening the imagined link between the anti-Soviet partisan war and Lithuanian statehood and making the anti-Soviet partisans the essential part of the “fighting and suffering” memory regime. As the “fighting and suffering” paradigm was strengthened by responses to the crisis in Ukraine, it became less socially, politically and even legally acceptable to publicly criticise the legacy of the partisans or to question the trauma of the deportations. Lithuania’s “memory law” prohibiting the “public approval” of the crimes committed by the USSR or Nazi Germany dates back to 2010. Lithuania was one of the states which banned not only denial of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but also the denial or justification of “Soviet crimes.”100 This law has been described as an “extreme example of the tendency to use memory laws to promote national narratives,”101 and it could be interpreted as prohibiting any questioning of the crimes committed by the antiSoviet partisans and their helpers, many of whom were deported to the Gulag. Lithuania has not only prohibited the denial of Soviet crimes, it has also attempted to prosecute those who committed “genocide” (understood primarily not as the Holocaust, but as the mass deportations and political repression under Stalin). In 2019, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg agreed with the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Lithuania that the “systematic annihilation of the Lithuanian partisans and their helpers could be seen as genocide.”102 This ruling was widely publicised in Lithuania, and it has definitely strengthened the “fighting and suffering” paradigm. Similarly to Ukraine, routinisation and institutionalisation of the “fighting and suffering” narrative was related to fundamental ontological insecurities felt by Lithuania after disintegration of the USSR as it was trying to find its way into the “West.” Unlike Ukraine, the institutionalisation took place earlier, before the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine, but this event has definitely increased fears about the existence and introduced major changes in Lithuania’s biography by

 Eva-Clarita Pettai, “Protecting Memory or Criminalizing Dissent? Memory Laws in Lithuania and Latvia,” in Memory Laws and Historical Justice, ed. Ariella Lang and Elazar Barkan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, forthcoming).  Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars, 174.  https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/1096370/istorine-byla-strasburo-teismas-patvir tino-sprendima-del-sovietu-genocido-lietuvoje (last accessed on October 31, 2019).

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highlighting the importance of anti-Soviet resistance. Memory continued to be securitised, and this was the cause of domestic and international memory wars.

The Contestation of the “Fighting and Suffering” Paradigm after the 2013/2014 Crisis in Ukraine The “fighting and suffering” paradigm has coexisted with the commemoration of Holocaust victims in Lithuania; however, the fact that some anti-Soviet Lithuanian partisans participated in the Holocaust has been an extremely painful topic, especially in the aftermath of the crisis in Ukraine. This topic has been securitised by Russia which, drawing on its Great Patriotic War narrative, continued to link the post-World War II anti-Soviet resistance to “fascism.” In addition, dealing with this painful memory has triggered several local mnemonic conflicts with international implications, including one that began after the publication of Mūsiškiai (Ours), a book by the Lithuanian theatre specialist Rūta Vanagaitė in 2016. This book included a “confession” about one of Vanagaitė’s relatives who was regarded as a brave anti-Soviet partisan, but in fact participated in the Holocaust. By writing a popular book about Lithuanian Holocaust perpetrators, calling them “our own people,” Vanagaitė challenged ethnic Lithuanians to face up to the fact of widespread complicity in the Holocaust.103 A year later, in October 2017, Vanagaitė made several inflammatory statements about Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas (no relation), a prominent leader of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisans who was recognised as a head of state by the Lithuanian parliament. She suggested that he cooperated with the NKVD, the secret police, and may have participated in the Holocaust.104 Although the statements were immediately criticised and condemned by leading historians and opinion leaders, Vanagaitė’s publisher decided to withdraw all of her books from the bookstores. Her apology did not change their decision. This move triggered a series of international protests.105 A closer analysis of the mnemonic conflicts where the “fighting and suffering” paradigm and Holocaust memory intersect suggests that the desire of Lithuanian state actors to be more deeply integrated in the transatlantic community,

 Violeta Davoliūtė, “Two-Speed Memory and Ownership of the Past,” Transitions Online, September 1, 2016, http://www.tol.org/client/article/26264-two-speed-memory-and-owner ship-of-the-past.html (last accessed on November 2, 2019).  https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/r-vanagaite-pries-istorikus-kuri-pusenemato-partizano-vanago-veiksmu-visumos-56-872594 (last accessed on November 6, 2019).  Subotić, Yellow Star, Red Star, 196.

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especially after the crisis in Ukraine, has played a role in local memory politics. An ongoing mnemonic conflict about Jonas Noreika, also known as Generolas Vėtra, is a case in point. Generolas Vėtra was an active participant in the struggle to restore Lithuanian independence both under the Soviet and Nazi occupations; however, he also participated in the creation of ghettos during the Nazi occupation. In the 1990s, as the memory of anti-Soviet partisans was institutionalised by the Lithuanian state, this fact of his biography was obscured, and he was even awarded state honours posthumously. In 2015, a plaque to this partisan commander was placed on the wall of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, which is where he worked from 1945 to 1946. This plaque, however, soon became the subject of public controversy. The controversy was triggered by the publication of an essay by the Lithuanian journalist Rimvydas Valatka titled “Ką pagerbė Lietuva – partizanų vadą Generolą Vėtrą ar žydų žudiką” (Who Did Lithuania Honour: The Partisan Commander General Vėtra or a Jew Killer?).106 Valatka argued that by blindly embracing “heroes” with a questionable past, Lithuania is endangering its “Europeanness.” Shortly after the publication of this essay, a group of prominent intellectuals demanded that the plaque honouring Vėtra be removed. Linas Linkevičius, who served as Lithuania’s foreign minister in 2012‒2020, was the first prominent government official to ask for the removal of the plaque. He argued that keeping the plaque only helps Russia and other interested actors to “perpetuate propaganda” about Lithuania and this weakens Lithuania’s security.107 After intense public debate and an attempt to destroy the plaque by an unsuccessful candidate to the European parliament, Stanislovas Tomas, Vilnius’ mayor Remigijus Šimašius decided in July 2019 to remove the plaque, arguing that this was his way of addressing the “legacy of totalitarianism”108 and helping Lithuania to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy. Predictably, this decision triggered mixed reactions, with conservative politicians criticising the mayor for not treating the other “remnants of totalitarianism” the same way. Supporters of the “fighting and suffering” paradigm held passionate rallies in front of the Academy of Sciences. Some of them even waived the flags of Ukraine to make a point about the possibility of Russian aggression and the need to “defend” their version of history (they viewed Noreika as a brave nationalist fighter). Finally,

 http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/r-valatka-ka-pagerbe-lietuva-partizanu-vada-gener ola-vetra-ar-zydu-zudika.d?id=68576988 (last accessed on November 1, 2019).  https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/linkevicius-ragina-nedelsti-nukelti-jono-norei kos-generolo-vetros-atminimo-lenta.d?id=79106991 (last accessed on October 31, 2019).  https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/1082673/po-simasiaus-sprendimo-nukabinti-gen erolo-vetros-atminimo-lenta-pirmosios-reakcijos (last accessed on October 31, 2019).

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in September, several NGOs who were “defending memory”109 placed a new plaque for Noreika where the old plaque had been. Linkevičius immediately condemned this act, arguing that it hurt Lithuania’s interests and is likely to spoil its relations with the United States and Israel.110 The intensity of this mnemonic conflict reveals powerful challenges to the “fighting and suffering” paradigm after the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine. As pointed out by Davoliūtė, for decades Lithuanians tended to identify with the experiences of heroes and victims, but not the experiences of perpetrators and collaborators.111 The mnemonic conflicts surrounding Noreika suggest that this may be changing. However, this may be a long and complicated process as the “fighting and suffering” paradigm is deeply embedded in Lithuania’s mnemonic landscape. Although the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine initially increased the appeal of this memory regime, it also revealed its inherent tensions and revealed actors who are willing to challenge it. The crisis revealed the international dimensions of mnemonic conflicts in Lithuania as memory wars over Noreika have involved various actors, including the United States, Israel and Russia who challenged Lithuania’s “fighting and suffering narrative.”

Conclusion This article has attempted to develop a “provincializing” platform for global IR by linking the study of crises to memory politics of “peripheral” states. Instead of conceptualising the crises as problematic events that have to be “managed” by rational decision-makers, usually the elites in “strong” states, this article demonstrates the complexity of “critical situations” ‒ situations that fundamentally affect the ability of actors in IR to continue pursuing their routines and fundamentally affect their “discursive consciousness.”112 Instead of presenting a simplified picture of an “unexpected” situation that needs to be “addressed,” linking the study of crises to identities and discourses of “weak”

 Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’.”  https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/1082673/po-simasiaus-sprendimo-nukabinti-gen erolo-vetros-atminimo-lenta-pirmosios-reakcijos (last accessed on October 31, 2019).  Violeta Davoliūtė, “Between the Public and the Personal: A New Stage of the Holocaust Memory in Lithuania,” Cultures of History Forum, December 19, 2018, available at http://www. cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/lithuania/between-the-public-and-the-personal-anew-stage-of-holocaust-memory-in-lithuania/ (last accessed on November 1, 2019).  Filip Ejdus, “Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics,” 883.

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states allows us to highlight the importance of local actors who tend to be ignored in mainstream accounts of “international crisis management.” These local actors play a major role in “defending” memory (which is a way to legitimitise resistance against the “strong” actors). By engaging in these practices, they construct new mnemonic conflicts. By highlighting the agency of “weak” states in the construction of crises and production of related discourses, this article aims to contribute to the global IR research agenda. One of the main principles of this agenda is to acknowledge that agency can be exercised on the local level, and such “acts of agency” (including acts by those who are considered to be “weak” actors) are important in the construction of global order.113 This article demonstrates the importance of various dimensions of agency, such as historical memory and normative power, not just material power, as they relate to international crises. By doing so, it furthers global IR scholarship that encourages the exploration of “multiple forms of agency.”114 Conceptualising crises as “engines of discourses,”115 this article compared the various trajectories of “defending memory”116 discourses related to antiSoviet fighters and national traumas that have been described as genocides in Lithuania and Ukraine. It suggests that in both cases the disintegration of the Soviet Union can be equated with a “crisis of history” when discourses about the glorious “Great Patriotic War” were fundamentally challenged. In a sense, the two case studies suggest that this crisis was indeed a “wound” with a transformative impact,117 followed by other crises, including the 2013/2014 crisis in Ukraine, which also significantly affected memory politics in both cases. Even though the 2013/2014 crisis took place in Ukraine, it was internalised in Lithuania. It is possible to suggest that in both cases this crisis elicited feelings of “sovereign uncertainty”118 and raised questions about the existence of the

 Amitav Acharaya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014): 647‒59; Amitav Acharaya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions,” International Studies Review 18 (2016): 4‒15.  Amitav Acharaya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions,” 649.  Dirk Nabers, A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics.  Maria Mälksoo, “‘Memory Must Be Defended’.”  Erica Resende, “Crisis and Change in Global Politics.”  Neringa Klumbytė, “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier.”

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state, relations with the other polities and underscored the need to search for “biographical continuity.”119 As hypothesised in the introduction of this article, in both cases the 2013/ 2014 crisis, at least initially, gave new life to discourses that extolled the virtues of anti-Soviet fighters and focused on traumas that were described as “genocides” (which is referred to as the “fighting and suffering” memory paradigms in this article). These discourses attracted new followers who were interested in “defending memory” and, through institutionalisation and routinisation, were elevated to a hegemonic status. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the crisis, as hypothesised by Nabers, hegemonic discourses were challenged, and “new interpretative frames” of history started to emerge.120 In Ukraine, the challengers included both international actors (Poland, the United States, the EU and of course Russia) and domestic actors (liberal intelligentsia and conservative pro-Russian groups) who issued resolutions and public statements attempting to change the “fighting and suffering” discourse. In both cases, instead of focusing merely on victims and heroes, there has been an increased interest in collaboration and perpetrators, especially in relation to the memory of the Holocaust. In sum, this comparative analysis of memory politics in the two cases challenges the traditional rationalist accounts of crises in IR by demonstrating how crises yield opportunities for memories to be challenged and defended. Crises are accompanied by discursive changes related to memory politics and the emergence of actors who are determined to defend these discourses. Thus, memory becomes inseparable from the feelings of security. The understanding of this dynamic is essential for IR.

References Primary Sources Websites carnegie.ru carnegieendowment.org en.interfax.com.ua

 Filip Ejdus, “Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics.”  Dirk Nabers, A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics.

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www.15min.lt www.cfr.org www.delfi.lt www.europarl.europa.eu www.iskauskas.lt www.kyivpost.com www.lrt.lt www.mid.ru www.nybooks.com www.oscepa.org www.praguedeclaration.eu www.rferl.org www.rbc.ua www.unian.info

Interviews Interview Arvydas Anušauskas, Vilnius, July 22, 2019 Interview Tetiana Kovtunovich, Kyiv, July 26, 2016 Interview Volodymyr Tylishchak, Kyiv, July 26, 2016

Secondary Sources Acharaya, Amitav. “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions.” International Studies Review 18 (2016): 4‒15. Acharaya, Amitav. “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014): 647‒59. Adamski, Łukasz. “Kyiv’s ‘Volhynian Negationism’: Reflections on the 2016 Polish-Ukrainian Memory Conflict.” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 3, no. 2 (2017): 253‒89. Astrov, Alexander. “‘There Are More Important Things Than Where the Border Runs’: The Other Side of George Kennan’s Containment Theory.” In Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine, edited by Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, 6‒18. London: Routledge, 2017. Barkawi, Tarak, and Mark Laffey. “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.” Review of International Studies 32 (2006): 329‒52. Berenskoetter, Felix. “Parameters of National Biography.” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 1 (2014): 262‒88. Bernhard, Michael, and Jan Kubik, eds. Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Budrytė, Dovilė. “Points of Memory in the Narrative of a ‘Mnemonic Warrior’: Gender, Displacement, and the anti-Soviet War of Resistance in Lithuania.” Journal of Baltic Studies 47, no. 4 (2016): 473‒96.

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Davoliūtė, Violeta. “Between the Public and the Personal: A New Stage of the Holocaust Memory in Lithuania.” Cultures of History Forum, December 19, 2018. Available at http://www.cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/lithuania/between-the-public-andthe-personal-a-new-stage-of-holocaust-memory-in-lithuania/(last accessed on November 1, 2019). Davoliūtė, Violeta. “Heroes, Villains and Matters of State: The Partisan and Popular Memory in Lithuania.” Cultures of History Forum, November 17, 2017. Available at http://www.cul tures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/lithuania/heroes-villains-and-matters-of-state-thepartisan-and-popular-memory-in-lithuania/ (last accessed on November 1, 2019). Davoliūtė, Violeta. “Two-Speed Memory and Ownership of the Past.” Transitions Online, September 1, 2016. Available at http://www.tol.org/client/article/26264-two-speedmemory-and-ownership-of-the-past.html (last accessed on November 2, 2019). Ejdus, Filip. “Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics.” Journal of International Relations and Development 21 (2018): 883‒908. Fedor, Julie, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila and Tatiana Zhurzhenko, eds. War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Ferguson, Iain Andrew. “The Crisis of Spheres of Influence in the EU-Russia Relationship.” In Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine, edited by Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, 19‒34. London: Routledge, 2017. Frėjutė-Rakauskienė, Monika. “Socialinio teisingumo aspektai ir rusų savanoriškos organizacijos.” In Socialinis ir istorinis teisingumas diaugiaetninėje Lietuvos visuomenėje: sampratos, patirtys ir kontekstai by Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė et al., 189‒233. Vilnius: LSTC, 2018. Gustafsson, Karl. “Routinized Recognition and Anxiety: Understanding the Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations.” Review of International Studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 613‒33. Hall, Stephen G.F. “Reconsidering Western Concepts of the Ukrainian Conflict: The Rise to Prominence of Russia’s ‘Soft Force’ Policy.” In Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine, edited by Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, 70‒89. London: Routledge, 2017. Hermann, Charles F. “International Crisis as a Situational Variable.” In International Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by James N. Rosenau, 409‒21. New York: Free Press, 1969. Jelin, Elizabeth. State Repression and the Labors of Memory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Kasianov, Georgyi. “Tolkovaniye OUN i UPA v publichnom diskurse Ukrainy 1990kh-2000kh gg.: ot ‘reabilitatsii’ k apologii.” Forum Noveyshey vostochnoevropeyskoy istorii i kultury 1‒2 (2018): 257‒79. Kasyanov, Georgy, and Svetlana Osipchuk. “Historical Politics in Ukraine in the Context of Conflict with Russia, 1990–2017.” In Non-Objective Conflicts: Political Practices of Sharing the Common Past Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Transnistria, edited by Sergey Rumyantsev, 53‒90. Berlin: Center for Independent Social Research, 2017. Kaufman, Stuart J. “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case.” Security Studies 18 (2009): 400‒34. Klumbytė, Neringa. “Sovereign Uncertainty and the Dangers to Liberalism at the Baltic Frontier.” Slavic Review 78, no. 2 (2019): 336‒47. Klymenko, Lina. “Forging Ukrainian National Identity through Remembrance of World War II.” National Identities 22, no. 2 (2020): 133‒50.

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Koposov, Nikolay. Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Kovtunovich, Tetiana, and Tetiana Privalko, eds. Maidan vid pershoi osobi: 45 istorii Revoliutsii gidnosti. Kyiv: K.I.C., 2015. Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes. “Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis.” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 555‒77. Long, Tom. “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power.” International Studies Review 19 (2017): 185‒205. Makarychev, Andrey, and Alexandra Yatsyk, eds. Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine. London: Routledge, 2017. Mälksoo, Maria. “‘Memory Must Be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security.” Security Dialogue 46, no. 3 (2015): 221‒37. Marcinkevičius, Andrius. “Istorinio teisingumo diskursų formavimas LIetuvos spaudoje lietuvių ir rusų kalba.” In Socialinis ir istorinis teisingumas diaugiaetninėje Lietuvos visuomenėje: sampratos, patirtys ir kontekstai by Monika Frėjutė-Rakauskienė et al., 45‒98. Vilnius: LSTC, 2018. Marples, David R. “Anti-Soviet Partisans and Ukrainian Memory.” East European Politics and Societies 24, no. 1 (2010): 26‒43. Myshlovska, Oksana. “Delegitimizing the Communist Past and Building a New Sense of Community: The Politics of Transitional Justice and Memory in Ukraine.” International Journal of History, Culture and Modernity 7 (2019): 372‒405. Nabers, Dirk. A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics. Houndmills,Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Neumann, Iver, and Sieglinde Gstöhl. “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?” In Small States in International Relations, edited by Christine Ingebritsen et al., 3‒36. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006. Nikolko, Milana. “Collective Trauma, Memories and Victimization Strategies in Modern Strategies of Ethnic Consolidation: The Crimean Tatar Case.” In Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics: Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective, edited by Erica Resende, Dovilė Budrytė and Didem Buhari-Gulmez, 69‒93. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Nuzov, Ilya. “The Dynamics of Collective Memory in the Ukraine Crisis: A Transitional Justice Perspective.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, no. 1 (2017): 132‒53. Pettai, Eva-Clarita. “Protecting memory or criminalizing dissent? Memory laws in Lithuania and Latvia.” In Memory Laws and Historical Justice, edited by Ariella Lang and Elazar Barkan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022: 167–93. Resende, Erica. “Crisis and Change in Global Politics: A Dialogue with Deleuze and Badiou’s Event to Understand the Crisis in Ukraine.” In Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics: Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective, edited by Erica Resende, Dovilė Budrytė and Didem Buhari-Gulmez, 23‒41. Houndmills,Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Rogov, Kirill. “‘Crimean Syndrome’: Mechanisms of Authoritarian Mobilization.” Russian Politics and Law 54, no. 1 (2016): 28‒54. Rothstein, Robert L. Alliances and Small Powers, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968. Shevel, Oxana. “The Battle for Historical Memory in Postrevolutionary Ukraine.” Current History 115, no. 783 (2016): 258‒63.

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Subotić, Jelena. Yellow Star, Red Star: Holocaust Remembrance after Communism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara, and Yuliya Yurchuk. “Memory Politics in Contemporary Ukraine: Reflections from the Postcolonial Perspective.” Memory Studies 12, no. 6 (2019): 699‒720. Umland, Andreas, and Yuliya Yurchuk. “Introduction: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Post-Soviet Ukrainian Memory Politics, Public Debates, and Foreign Affairs.” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 3, no. 2 (2017): 115‒28. Valatka, Rimvydas. “Ką pagerbė Lietuva – partizanų vadą Generolą Vėtrą ar žydų žudiką?” Delfi, July 26, 2015. Available at http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/r-valatka-kapagerbe-lietuva-partizanu-vada-generola-vetra-ar-zydu-zudika.d?id=68576988 (last accessed on January 28, 2018). Vanagaitė, Rūta. Mūsiškiai. Vilnius: Alma littera, 2016. Yurchuk, Yuliya. “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991‒2016).” In War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, edited by Julie Fedor et al., 107‒37. Cham, Switzerland: Springer (Palgrave Macmillan), 2017. Zehfuss, Maja. Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “‘Capital of Despair’: Holodomor Memory and Political Conflicts in Kharkiv after the Orange Revolution.” East European Politics and Societies 25, no. 3 (2011): 597‒639.

Post Scriptum In 2022, attempts to “defend memory” have been made against the backdrop of Russia’s genocidal war in Ukraine. It is probably not a coincidence that right before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s Duma introduced legislation imposing prison sentences for the violation of the law adopted in 2021 which forbade any comparisons or equations involving Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany. Russia has consistently used terms such as “denazification” and “fighting fascism” in its aggressive rhetoric against Ukraine as it is waging war. On the other hand, traumatic memories associated with the Soviet past have been revived in Ukraine (the Holodomor and the current invasion became seen as an extension of past injustices). Given similar memory regimes, Lithuania has fully identified with the war in Ukraine. Traumatic memories associated with the deportations under Stalin have been revived in Lithuania, linking the past to the present brutalities in Ukraine. Given the developments in 2022 and the creation of new traumatic memories, the cycle of “defending memory” is unlikely to stop any time soon.

Krzysztof Wasilewski

Local Memory, International Conflicts: Case Study of the Katyn Memorial in Jersey City, USA Abstract: Non-state actors are gaining in importance in international politics. Regions, and even cities, often initiate global activities in the field of human rights, climate change or healthcare service. The paper presents the theoretical and empirical aspects of international memory diplomacy of cities and its conflicting character. The first part of the paper indicates theoretical assumptions considering the foreign policy of non-state actors and their memory diplomacy, analysed from the perspective of the constructivist paradigm. The second part focuses on an empirical case study, namely the case of city of Jersey City and the Katyn Memorial located there. Keywords: constructivism, international relations, Katyn, local government, politics of memory

Introduction Non-state entities are gaining more and more importance in international relations. Regions and even cities often launch global initiatives on human rights, climate change or universal access to healthcare. In the context of politics of memory – the politics of history – local governments are also beginning to gain an equal position in relations with states. At the same time, decisions made by self-governments – including those relating to the interpretation of the past – involve states and may lead to international conflicts. This article focuses on presenting the theoretical and empirical aspects of international politics of urban memory and its conflictogenic nature. The first part of the paper introduces reflections on the role of local governments in international relations and the foreign aspect of historical policy. They fell under the constructivist theory. In the second part, the above theoretical assumptions were confronted with a case study. To illustrate how local politics of memory may cause international conflicts, the paper analyses the decision of the authorities of Jersey City to relocate the Katyn Memorial in 2018. As a result, the autonomous action of the American local government initiated a conflict with the Polish state. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-003

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Cities as a Subject of International Relations The growing role of local governments in domestic politics is reflected by their growing importance in the international arena.1 This trend has been noticeable at least since the beginning of the 1980s, which was manifested, among others, by the adoption of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities by the Council of Europe. Under its provisions, signatory states have undertaken to “facilitate and support cross-border cooperation of territorial communities and authorities under its jurisdiction with communities and territorial authorities under the jurisdiction of another Contracting Party.”2 While initially reference was made to the international activity of the regions – especially those in the western federal states – a shift towards municipal self-governments has been clearly visible since the end of the twentieth century.3 It is enough to think about the global metropolises, such as New York, London, Berlin or Paris to realise their contemporary position in international relations. Moreover, it is urban centres that become the instigators of global initiatives, especially in the sphere of human rights or climate change. While the largest cities often gain an equal position to states, with the popularity of their presidents and mayors rivaling the popularity of heads of states and heads of governments, smaller local governments also try to actively shape relations with their foreign partners.4 This applies especially to borderland cities, although international initiatives on tourism and culture are within the interest and capabilities of most municipal governments. The political subjectivity of local governments in international relations is manifested by an increase in paradiplomacy. This term, interest from a growing number of political scientists, can be equated with terms such as micro-diplomacy, regional diplomacy or local government diplomacy.5 Despite many – often mutually exclusive – definitions in the literature on the subject, paradiplomacy can be defined as:

 David Held and Anthony McGrew, “The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (2001): 219‒43.  European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities Madrid, 21.V.1980.  Wojciech T. Modzelewski, “Dyplomacja bez dyplomatów. Polsko-chorwackie partnerstwa regionalne,” Studia Regionalne i Lokalne, nr. 4 (2020): 97.  Noé Cornago, “On the normalization of sub-state diplomacy,” in Regional sub-state diplomacy today, ed. David Criekemans (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 13.  Alexander Kuznetsov, Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy. Subnational Governments in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2015), 26.

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Involvement of the authorities (governments) of sub-state entities in international relations by building formal and informal contacts, both permanent and temporary, with foreign public or private entities in order to pursue socio-economic, cultural and political interests, as well as any other international dimension of their constitutional competences.6

Paradiplomacy may be implemented through political representation abroad, signing international treaties and other agreements, creating own support and assistance programs for foreign entities, participating in international organisations and other formal and informal methods of international cooperation, or – last but not least – conducting public diplomacy.7 The very goals and methods of paradiplomacy are determined by various factors, including legal framework, politicians’ skills and, most of all, the potential of local governments.8 Moreover, the division of powers between the local authority and the state authority is crucial. Despite the growing role of local governments, also in international relations, it is the nation states that set the directions and priorities of foreign policy. According to Adam Grydehøj,9 paradiplomacy may be implemented by local governments only if it is consistent with the overall policy of the nation state. Otherwise, a conflict of competences arises, which is usually resolved in favor of central authorities. As a consequence, more and more often states take legal steps to protect their own interests against international activities of local governments. Paradiplomacy serves local governments to achieve specific goals. The chief one is to create a positive image of the city or region in the international arena. Promotion of values, with which a given entity identifies itself, serves as the basis for achieving further political or economic goals. Such soft power is “more than just persuasion or the ability to influence people through arguments, although it is an essential part of it. It is also a power of attraction, and attraction often leads to silent complicity.”10 With this soft power, cities can achieve other goals – primarily those relating to economics, such as attracting new investments and increasing tourism. Building a positive international

 Maciej Raś, “Aktywność międzynarodowa regionów (paradyplomacja) w ujęciu teoretycznym,” Stosunki Międzynarodowe, nr. 3 (2016): 196.  Miguel S. Neves, “Paradiplomacy, Knowledge Regions and the Consolidation of “Soft Power”,” Janus.net. E-journal of International Relations 1, no. 1 (2010): 10‒28.  Helena S. Curto, Luis Moita, Brigida R. Brito, Célia Quintas and Maria S. Galito, “Cities and Regions. Paradiplomacy in Portugal,” Janus.net – e-journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (2015): 108‒15.  Adam Grydehøj, “Goals, capabilities, and instruments of paradiplomacy by subnational jurisdictions,” in Paradiplomacy, ed. Adam Grydehøj, Linda Fabiani, Jordi S. Ferrando, Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi and Maria Ackrén (Belgium: Centre Maurits Coppieters, 2014), 16.  Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

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image also helps to strengthen the internal position of the city and increase its political potential.11

International Dimension of Politics of Memory The rising position of local governments in international politics is reflected in the growing role of memory politics in relations with external partners. The politics of memory is based on the concept of collective memory – first defined by the French philosopher Maurice Halbwachs in the 1920s and developed by the next generations of sociologists, political scientists and cultural scientists. Polish literature tends to rely on the definition of Barbara Szacka, according to which collective memory is “a system of ideas about the past of a given community, constructed by its members, with content of various character and genesis, in the course of a process involving complex sequences of social interactions (acts of communication, participation in public activities, discussions about collective heritage, exchange of experiences, negotiating meanings) in accordance with socially and culturally established rules.”12 Thus, the concept of collective memory assumes its fluid character, as it is prone to constant changes exposed to various external factors, such as, for example, the dominant ideology, system of values, current political interests.13 It is therefore not unusual for the definitions of the politics of memory (often replaced by the term “historical politics”) to have this aspect emphasised. As Katarzyna Kącka notes, “politics of memory is not about establishing historical truth, but about using it for specific purposes (. . .). It is also the ability to shape a communal perception of the past to make it easier to influence the present.”14 Politics of memory is most often the domain of the domestic policies of central and local governments. History, or rather its current interpretation, is used to create desired social attitudes, values or integrated communities.15 However, the foreign aspect of politics of memory is also gaining in importance. The subjects

 David Criekmans, “Introduction,” in Regional Sub-State Diplomacy Today, ed. David Criekmans (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2010), 45‒46.  Barbara Szacka, Czas przeszły, pamięć, mit (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar, 2006), 29.  Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 113‒14.  Katarzyna Kącka, “Polityka historyczna: kreatorzy, narzędzia, mechanizmy działania – przykład Polski,” in Narracje pamięci. Między polityką a historią, ed. Katarzyna Kącka, Joanna Piechowiak-Lamparska and Anna Ratke-Majewska (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, 2015), 59‒80.  Rafał Chwedoruk, Polityka historyczna (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN: Warszawa, 2018).

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of international relations use various tools to shape collective memory in order to achieve specific effects in relations with external partners.16 The politics of memory can therefore be approached through the lens of soft power. Thus, to paraphrase Joseph Nye’s definition of soft power, it should be recognised that foreign politics of memory is something “more than just persuasion or the ability to influence people through arguments.”17 There are numerous examples of the use of history in international relations. It is used by powers, such as the United States and Russia, which, by emphasising their contribution to the defeat of the Third Reich in World War Two, are trying to strengthen their current international image as countries that defend democracy and peace.18 In the case of smaller states there is also an evident recourse to the past in pursuit of current political objectives. As researchers point out, politics of memory in international relations is used to achieve various benefits – economic or political.

Memory as a Source of International Conflicts – Constructivist Perspective In view of the proponents for the realist school of IR, aggression and conflicts lie at the heart of international relations. Since human nature is imperfect, so is the behaviour of states in relations with other participants of diplomacy. As a consequence, a state of anarchy is created where there is a struggle for hegemony. As Hans J. Morgenthau argued, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Regardless of the ultimate goals of international politics, its immediate goal is always power.”19 As a result, the international environment is a space of constant conflict, whereas periods of peace and stability are exceptions. Constructivists perceive international relations and the role of conflicts in a completely different way. In their opinion, international relations do not take place in an arena of anarchy where individual interests clash, but rather within a space for ideas, discussions and interpretations – the effects of which only determine stabilization

 Lech M. Nijakowski, Polska polityka pamięci. Esej socjologiczny (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne: Warszawa, 2008).  Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.  Nina Hachigan, “Cities Will Determine the Future of Diplomacy.” Foreign Policy, April 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/16/cities-will-determine-the-future-of-diplomacy/.  Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations (New York: Knopf, 1978), 29.

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or conflict.20 In one of their works, international relations theorists Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen make the following assumption: [Constructivists] argue that the most important aspect of international relations is social, not material. Furthermore, they argue that this social reality is not objective, or external, to the observer of international affairs. The social and political world, including the world of international relations, is not a physical entity or material object that is outside human consciousness. Consequently, the study of international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them.21

Therefore, when considering the significance of history (and memory) – which inevitably refers to the sphere of discourse – as a source of conflicts in international relations, its analysis should be performed within the constructivist perspective. Engaging the past or collective memory of one group in relationships with other groups is an example of communicating ideas and views, on which the constructivist perception of international relations is based. In connection with the above, it is worth recalling the basic assumptions of this school by again quoting Jackson and Sørensen: For constructivists, conflict does not mean a collision of various forces or entities (e.g. states perceived as individuals), but rather a dispute, controversy, misunderstanding, lack of communication, or some other intellectual incompatibility or dissonance between self-aware actors. Conflict is always a dispute of the minds and will of the parties involved. In order to understand it correctly, one has to penetrate the discourses related to a given event. It will allow one to discover the sources and advancement of the dispute, intellectual obstacles and the possibilities to overcome them – in other words, those sentiments, beliefs and ideas that organize and express this conflict.22

As a consequence, researchers analysing the role of memory in international relations more often refer to its conflicting nature than to its potential for building a dialogue. In his concept of the cross-border politics of memory, Hans Henning Hahn points to the possibility of building an agreement in the field of a common interpretation of the past, at the same time emphasising the scale of the difficulties related to it:

 Dale C. Copeland, “The constructivist challenge to structural realism: a review essay,” in Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics (1st ed.), ed. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (Routledge: New York, 2015), 1‒20.  Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 162.  Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 167.

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If we understand the cross-border politics of memory as a discursive event, then it is an accident in which someone tries to participate in the identity discourse of another society. (. . .) An additional problem, which seriously complicates the matter, is the fact that neither internal nor cross-border discourses are conducted by equal means. Participation in the discourse is not only the pure competition of ideas transferred by traditional and modern media (mass media). The resources are allocated very unequally, so disputes taking place through them do not follow the rules of fair play.23

Polish historian Bartosz Korzeniewski (2008) speaks in a similar tone, when he says that politics of memory may cause “memory conflicts” both internally and internationally. The feeling of past trauma that appears more and more often in the official policy of the state or other entity leads to increased tensions in foreign relations, and creates the need to come up with neutralisation strategies. One of these strategies is exemplified by Korzeniewski’s “communitarisation” of the celebrations of the outbreak and end of World War II, which serve to build a sense of unity rather than division: Between 1985 and 2005, most of the anniversary celebrations related to the history of World War II in Europe were taken to the common space of pan-European celebrations, in which both sides of the conflict participated on an equal footing. The changes and consequences that this process brings are especially visible in relation to states and nations blamed for unleashing this conflict.24

However, neutralisation strategies do not always achieve the expected goal. Despite the successive common celebrations of World War II anniversaries in Europe, the sense of injustice still affects interstate relations, an example of which is the postulates of war reparations from Germany raised from time to time by Polish or Greek politicians. It is significant that Henryk Woźniakowski has already written about three levels of memory conflicts in 2012. The first, internal, one concerns the differences in interpreting the past by particular groups (ethnic, cultural, etc.) forming one society. The other two levels relate to international relations: The second level of the conflict results from a certain asymmetry of memory in the socalled old and new Europe, that is, between the old and new member states of the European Union. On the third level, there are relationships between individual nations, most often neighbors, the past of which is littered with conflict and the elites of which have not yet made the gesture of reconciliation resembling the Adenauer and de Gaulle settlement

 Hans H. Hahn, “Pamięć zbiorowa – przedmiot polityki historycznej?” in Narodowe i europejskie aspekty polityki historycznej, ed. Bartosz Korzeniewski (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Zachodniego, 2008), 40‒41.  Bartosz Korzeniewski, “Przeszłość jako podłoże konfliktów czy most ku pojednaniu?,” Kultura Współczesna, nr. 2 (2008): 41.

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in Reims Cathedral in 1962 or the Polish bishops release of the 1965 letter ‘We forgive and ask for forgiveness’.25

In his deliberations on the conflicting potential of memory, Woźniakowski draws attention to the disproportions in disputes about the past, which Hahn mentioned earlier. Thus, he once again refers – perhaps quite indirectly – to discourse as a space in which international politics of memory is carried out. Thus, discourse analysis seems to be the most appropriate method to examine it. Therefore, while in other aspects of international politics this method is used as well – with a view to identifying, for example, the framework and ideological background behind specific actions and decisions – in the case of the so-called diplomacy of memory, it should be treated as a primary method. Discourse analysis allows not only to answer the question of how a given entity interprets the past, but also examines neutralisation strategies used to reduce potential conflicts caused by politics of memory.

Katyn Memorial in Jersey City – Case Study The above theoretical considerations, relating to the growing role of local governments in international relations, as well as to the increasing use of memory in diplomacy, will be used to analyse a selected case study. The case in question is the Katyn Memorial in Jersey City, the 2018 relocation of which, planned by the city authorities, led to the involvement of the Polish state authorities, including the president. This case study illustrates the growing importance of cities in the international arena, and above all, it shows how local memory – city memory – can become the source of an international dispute. Moreover, it presents neutralisation strategies applied to resolve the conflict. The case study method implies the use of multiple research techniques and approaches, addressing not only various sources, but also contexts.26 Given the nature of the politics of memory, discourse analysis served as the primary research technique in this article.27 The history of the Katyn Memorial in Jersey City dates back to the late 1980s. It was then that the local Polish community established the “Katyń – 1940”

 Henryk Woźniakowski, “Ludzka pamięć a historia. Źródła konfliktów,” Znak, nr. 9 (2012): 6.  Robert E. Stake, “Jakościowe studium przypadku,” in Metody badań jakościowych, vol. I, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2009), 623.  Barbara Jabłońska, “Krytyczna analiza dyskursu. Refleksje teoretyczno-metodologiczne,” Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej 2, no. 1 (2006); Philipp Mayring, Qualitative content analysis. Theoretical foundations, Basic procedures and software solutions (Klagenfurt: Gesis, 2014).

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Monument Building Committee, which included, among others, Second World War veterans Stanisław Paszul, Lucjan Rutkowski and Marian Morawski.28 They hoped that the monument would be the first initiative of this kind in the United States to commemorate the Soviet-led execution of nearly 22,000 Polish officers in April 1940. During the six years in which the committee was in operation, the sum of around $100,000 was collected for the construction of the monument. However, almost a third of this sum was donated alone by Zofia Rutkowska, a distinguished Polish-American activist. Although initially Montgomery Street was selected as the site for the monument, eventually a much more prestigious location was chosen – the Exchange Place, along the Hudson River Waterfront Walkway. The site was proposed and handed over to the committee free of charge by the then mayor of New Jersey, Anthony Cucci.29 Apart from the monument’s installation site, its appearance also changed over time. According to the original plans, the monument was to be in the form of a black granite cross, next to which there were to be two smaller installations, called “Katyn” and “Siberia.” However, this project was replaced by a more direct and expressive project by the Polish artist Andrzej Pityński. The monument, unveiled in 1990, takes the form of the figure of a Polish soldier being pierced from behind with a bayonet. The ceremony of its official unveiling, preceded by a holy mass, was attended by several thousand people, mainly members of the local Polish community and municipal authorities. From the very beginning, the monument itself evoked strong emotions. Some people considered it a “symbol of truth”; others, however, including some representatives of the Polish-American community, criticised its direct expression, which they believed to be inciting to hatred against Russians. One Polish journalist described the origins and construction of the monument, as well as the controversy related to it: The erection of the ‘Siberia 1939 – Katyn 1940ʹ monument – because that was the name that was finally adopted – carved by Andrzej Pityński, an outstanding Polish sculptor, not only took six years, through a staged unveiling (pedestal, Katyn, Siberia), but it became a kind of a test for understanding history by the Polish diaspora, and thus defines one more line of its division30

 Jan Maksymowicz, “Trudny pomnik,” Nowy Świat, November 13, 1992.  Jan Maksymowicz, “Trudny pomnik,” Nowy Świat, November 13, 1992.  Jan Maksymowicz, “Trudny pomnik,” Nowy Świat, November 13, 1992.

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From the moment of its official unveiling, the monument has become a medium of the collective memory of the local Polonia.31 Through its form, it also had a wider impact on the entire Polish community in the United States, as evidenced by numerous meetings and events organized around the monument. At the same time, the Katyn Memorial became something more than just a form of commemorating the mass-murder of Polish officers in April 1940. One can venture the thesis that the monument symbolised Poland’s entire wartime history, starting with the partitions and deportations to Siberia, through the hardships of the Second World War, and communist enslavement during the period 1944‒1989. As indicated by the representatives of the Polish community abroad, the monument represented ties to the homeland. However, for the same reason, the Katyn Monument did not manage to go beyond an ethnic framework. It has not been promoted to the rank of a symbol of the whole New Jersey community, which varies ethnically and culturally.32 An exception occurred in September 2001, when New Jersey residents gathered at the memorial in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to express their solidarity with the victims. Moreover, the date September 11, 2001 was also engraved on the plaque mounted on the monument’s pedestal. However, with the construction of memorial sites exclusively dedicated to the 9/11 attacks, the Katyn Memorial once again reverted to being a Polish symbol. In April 2018, Jersey City Mayor Steven Fulop announced a plan to relocate the monument. The Exchange Place was to be revitalised and transformed into a community space for recreation, where children could play. Although local authorities appreciated the “high artistic quality” of the monument, due to its “direct and brutal” form, unsuitable for children, they highlighted the need to change its location.33 Representatives of the local Polish community joined the discussion on the future of the monument. In May 2018, a mutual agreement was reached that the monument would be moved one block away to York Street. The Jersey City Mayor pledged to donate the site to the memorial committee for 99 years. In addition to this, the transport of the monument and its renovation in a new location were to be financed from the city budget, the cost of which was estimated at some $250,000. According to the chairman of the committee, Krzysztof Nowak, the consent to relocate the monument was the only chance for it to

 Andrzej Jasiński, “Kronika New Jersey. Uroczystości katyńskie w New Jersey,” Nowy Dziennik, September 21, 2009, http://dziennik.com/polonia/kronika-new-jersey-uroczystosci-ka tynskie-w-jersey-city/.  Colin Tyler, “The Implications of Parekh’s Cultural Pluralism,” Politics 16, no. 3 (1996): 152.  Terrence McDonald, “Critics slam plan to move N.J. statue commemorating Polish massacre,” NJ.com, April 30, 2018, https://www.nj.com/hudson/2018/04/critics_slam_plan_to_ move_statue_dedicated_to_vict.html.

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remain in the Jersey City urban space at that time. However, the committee’s consent to the change of location raised an opposition against it among part of the local Polish community. Despite protests and criticism of the Polonia media, on June 13, 2018, the city council officially decided to relocate the monument. However, efforts in this regard were soon abandoned, and the monument itself remained in its current place.34 Before the Jersey City authorities withdrew – at least temporarily – from their plans to relocate the monument, their original decision had sparked an international conflict. The announcement of the dismantling of the monument quickly received an official response from the Polish authorities. The first to voice protest was the Polish ambassador to the US, Piotr Wilczek. Using social media, the ambassador published a statement in English criticizing the idea of moving the monument. Pointing to the role it had played in the life of the Polish community, the ambassador called for a change of decision: I am concerned by the sudden announcement made by Jersey City Mayor Steven Fulop regarding the Katyn Memorial at Exchange Place, and by the lack of dialogue with the Polish-American community surrounding this issue. The Katyn Memorial was unveiled in 1990 after a decade long effort by the Polish-American community of Jersey City to erect such a memorial, an effort that was spearheaded by many American & Polish War Veterans. I encourage all involved parties to engage in a productive dialogue so that a solution can be arrived at which does not involve a permanent relocation of the memorial.35

Among other Polish officials who responded to Mayor Fulop’s decision was the Speaker of the Polish Senate, Stanisław Karczewski, who called the whole situation “scandalous.” Soon after that, he wrote an open letter to the Polish community in America, in which he called for a strong defense of the monument. The Polish Diaspora Consultative Council at the Speaker of the Senate was also convened. National institutions responsible for shaping Polish politics of memory in the international arena, including the Institute of National Remembrance and the Museum of the Second World War, referred to the matter as well. The authorities of the latter used social media to publish a statement, criticizing the plans to relocate the monument and the failure of Jersey City authorities to empathize with the Polish community:

 Rick Rojas, “City Argues Over a Statue, and Politicians in Poland Weigh In,” The New York Times, May 12, 2018, 19.  “Władze Jersey City chcą usunąć Pomnik Katyński. Reaguje Ambasador RP,” Wprost, May 1, 2018, https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10121573/wladze-jersey-city-chca-usunac-pomnik-ka tynski-reaguje-ambasador-rp.html.

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We consider the decision of Mayor Fulop to remove the Katyn Memorial from the land that many generations of Poles considered their Homeland to be deeply disturbing, unfair and painful. At the same time, we hope that it is only a misunderstanding that may result from Mr. Fulop’s misinterpretation of the emotional burden and tragic experiences that the Monument devotes to millions of Poles in the USA and around the world.36

The idea of moving the monument was also criticized by the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland and the Jewish Community of Warsaw.37 Official responses from Polish authorities, especially the actions of the Speaker of the Senate, were met with a response from the mayor of Jersey City. In an emotional post on Twitter, Fulop bluntly accused Karczewski of racism and nationalism: “Here is truth to power outside of a monument. All I can say is this guy is a joke. The fact is that a known anti-Semite, white nationalist + holocaust denier like him has zero credibility. The only unpleasant thing is Senator Stanislaw. Period. I’ve always wanted to tell him that.”38 In a response to the above post, Ambassador Wilczek sent an official letter to Mayor Fulop, in which, on behalf of the Polish state, he demanded an official apology. The content of the letter was then published by Polish and American media, which could be read as additional pressure on the Jersey City authorities: “Given the severity of the useless accusation you made, I ask on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Poland that you apologize to the Speaker of the Senate. Your sudden announcement regarding the Katyn Memorial and the lack of details provided by your office has upset many people, however, we cannot allow emotions to guide us. Let us clear the air and refocus our attention to the task at hand, constructive dialogue to find a solution that does not involve the permanent relocation of the Katyn Memorial.”39 In the face of the ambassador’s letter and the criticism that had fallen on the mayor after his tweet, he published another post, this time of a conciliatory nature: “I find it unfortunate that misunderstandings over my plans for the Katyn

 Maciej Chilczuk, “Pomnik Katyński w Jersey City. Prawda historyczna kontra polityczna poprawność,” Polska Zbrojna, May 2, 2018, http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/25340? t=Pomnik-katynski-w-Jersey-City-Prawda-historyczna-kontra-polityczna-poprawnosc#.  Norbert Nowotnik, “Polscy Żydzi: nie zgadzamy się z planami likwidacji Pomnika Katyńskiego w Jersey City,” Dzieje.pl. Portal Historyczny, May 5, 2018, https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/ polscy-zydzi-nie-zgadzamy-sie-z-planami-likwidacji-pomnika-katynskiego-w-jersey-city.  PAP, “Karczewski: Słowa Fulopa obrażliwe dla mnie i Polski; to nieprawdziwe zarzuty,” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, May 5, 2018, https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/ 1121554,karczewski-slowa-fulopa-obrazliwe-dla-mnie-i-polski-to-nieprawdziwe-zarzuty.html.  Marcin Wrona, “‘Bezpodstawne oskarżenia’. Ambasador apeluje o przeprosiny,” TVN24, May 5, 2018, https://tvn24.pl/swiat/spor-o-pomnik-katynski-w-jersey-city-ambasador-apelujedo-burmistrza-ra834611-2322904.

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Memorial have led to a build-up of injuries on both sides. But these plans were based on good intentions. (. . .) If my statements on Twitter gave the impression that I did not respect Senator Karczewski, I deeply regret it.”40 The culminating point of interest in the issue of the monument was the visit to Jersey City and the laying of flowers at the monument by the Polish President Andrzej Duda and his wife on May 16, 2018. The ceremony was attended by the city authorities, including Mayor Fulop. However, the president’s associates emphasised that the mayor acted only as a “host” and not as a partner in talks with the head of state. During the meeting with journalists, the head of the president’s office, Krzysztof Szczerski, explained that the visit was to emphasise the importance of the memorial for all Poles. According to Szczerski, Andrzej Duda was to say “quite categorically and clearly that he expects the fulfillment of the obligation, which is to respect the Katyn Monument in Jersey City. The president cannot imagine that the monument would be dismantled, that it would end up in the warehouse at any time. The president said that if it was the will of everyone, including the local Polish community, that this monument should change its place, it would simply have to be moved in its entirety, immediately, in a manner that would make everyone aware that the monument was respected and remembered, a wish, he hopes to be respected.”41 With these words, the Polish President presented the Mayor of Jersey City with publications on the Katyn events. The decision to relocate the Katyn Monument and the international dispute that followed is an empirical illustration of the theoretical assumptions of this article. First, it is a case study of the collective memory of a local community – Jersey City residents of Polish origin. This reservation is important because the Katyn memorial, which symbolized this memory, has not become a site of memory for the remaining part of the urban community. Its exceptionally direct form and reference to the Polish historical experience alone prevented it from being receptive to a more widespread audience. What is more, opposition has been raised by those who considered the monument offensive and brutal. Hence, plans to dismantle the monument and change its location met with hostility primarily from the members of the Polish community. Other minorities present in the local color of the Jersey City community were detached from the situation as a whole. It is true that in the last phase of the discussion on the future of the

 PAP, “Burmistrz Jersey City żałuje słów pod adresem Karczewskiego,” PAP.pl, May 14, 2018, https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1410992%2Cburmistrz-jersey-city-zaluje-slowpod-adresem-karczewskiego-.html.  Marzena Kozłowska, “Burmistrz Jersey City ‘wysłuchał twardych słów polskiego prezydenta,’” Interia Wydarzenia, May 17, 2018, https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/zagranica/news-bur mistrz-jersey-city-wysluchal-twardych-slow-polskiego-prez,nId,2582368.

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monument, the residents of Polish origin could count on the support from other groups, but there is no doubt that the monument was considered solely in terms of Polish collective memory – one ethnic group only. Second, international repercussions of the decisions made by the local government have exposed the growing role of cities in contemporary diplomacy. It is doubtful that the mayor of Jersey City planned to use the controversy surrounding the relocation of the monument to emphasise the position of his city in the global arena. However, he deliberately prolonged the conflict, along with the internationalisation of the problem. It is worth noting that despite the disproportion between Jersey City and the Polish state, the city gained an equal position in the dispute over the Katyn Memorial. By skillfully using the international interest in the case, as well as the persistent negative image of Poland at that time, intensified by the controversial amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – IPN), local authorities positioned themselves as an equal participant in the debate about the past. Third, the international conflict around memory has primarily taken place in the area of discourse. In line with the theoretical assumptions, especially with Hahn’s concept of the transnational politics of memory, the discussion on the interpretation of history by subjects of international relations impacted not as much themselves as the societies they represented: the residents of Jersey City and the Polish community. Public statements and letters as well as social media activity offered general access to everyone interested. Furthermore, media, eager to report on this topic – especially on the Polish side – made it a national issue. The neutralisation strategy relied on directly aiming it at societies, and not official structures. At the same time, the conflict in the discursive scope reduced the disproportions between the local government and the state. Moreover, the Jersey City self-government seemed to operate more efficiently in the conflict, controlling the discourse framework and its main themes. On the other hand, representatives of the Polish state were not able to go beyond the well-established patterns of operation, which they initiated in earlier confrontations with other countries, and which, in the event of a dispute with another political entity, i.e. the local government, often turned out to be ineffective. Fourth, the conflict triggered by the decision to relocate the Katyn Memorial has demonstrated the importance of memory in contemporary international relations. The aforementioned dispute was not of an economic or geopolitical nature, but almost exclusively featured a narrative about the past and its significance in the life of a certain social group. Therefore, its analysis may be approached from the perspective of soft power – Jersey City, presenting itself internationally as a multicultural and tolerant city actively fighting against

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nationalisms; and Poland – a country that tries to get international opinion interested in its tragic history and explain its current foreign policy actions.

Conclusion This paper presents theoretical assumptions that draw from the constructivist theory of international relations. The assumptions are related to the international dimension of politics of memory and its conflicting nature, and were illustrated with a case study relating to the decision of Jersey City authorities to relocate the Katyn Memorial. This example demonstrates the growing role of local governments in the international arena, especially in the context of soft power. While nation states continue to play a leading role in shaping economic and military relations, local governments may be gaining an equal position in other aspects of diplomacy. In the case of politics of memory, the existing power determinants of the international relations actors lose their importance. On the other hand, they learn to make the presentation of their own ideas and views appealing, given that politics of memory is based on discursive activities.

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Feliks Baranovskyi

Sources of International Conflicts in Contemporary and Historical Context as a Threat to the Global Democratic and Liberal Order: Causes of Occurrence and Ways of Eradication Abstract: The global democratic and liberal order, which was laid after the Second World War, is now in great danger. This order is a cornerstone in the interaction of consolidated democracies, which use liberal values and human rights, as well as follow the principles of international law. However, the growing number of conflicts, the increasing level of antagonism between superpowers and the danger of its escalation into a global conflict are factors that destroy the above principles. Examining the sources of international conflicts, the author considered it necessary to analyse them in a contemporary and a historical context. In the contemporary context, the article emphasises the existence of a crisis of trust at the global level. On the basis of the analysis the author concludes that the crisis of trust is based on a conflict of values. As a key point that differentiates norms and values, the concept of respect is defined and explored, which is strongly linked to the concept of tolerance. This is critical for further identifying the ways to eradicate conflict sources. In the historical context, the author considers an attempt by the authoritarian superpowers to impose on the rest of the world an alternative vision of the principles of the international order through external aggression aimed at restoring the lost influence and internal position of authoritarian leaders. Thus, there is actually a recurrence of aggressive revisionism in the 1930s. The article emphasises that democratisation (promotion of democracy on a global scale), increasing the number of states with a democratic political regime, can be seen as effective ways to eradicate sources of conflict. The author argues that the probability of armed conflict at the global level is inversely proportional to the number of democracies. Keywords: authoritarian revanchist revisionism, crisis of trust, democratization, global democratic and liberal order, international conflicts

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-004

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Feliks Baranovskyi

For the part of the world community representing liberal and open societies, that is, consisting of states of sustainable democracy, as well as states that are on the way to its consolidation, the moment of truth comes. The issue is a fundamental problem that is progressing rapidly and the essence of which is the threat of reformatting the key elements of the existing democratic liberal world order. The current stage of the world civilisational development is characterised by dangerous tendencies associated not only with authoritarian, undemocratic backslidings of a number of modern states, including some superpowers, but, above all, with the active attack of the latter on the established principles and values of global democratic and liberal order. Fortunately, it can be stated that recently the scientific community has begun to pay more attention to this problem.1 However, not all aspects are considered from different angles. The democratic liberal order is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence of states, cooperation of all subjects of international relations and international law, in other words, a conflict-free paradigm of human interaction. This means that all controversies or misunderstandings can be resolved in a peaceful, civilised way. In this aspect, international conflicts of any etiology are the absolute and complete antithesis of the global democratic liberal order. And we are talking about conflicts of different size, volume, degree of intensity and essential components. Most of these conflicts cannot be considered outside the global antagonism of superpowers when they try to set up destabilisation centres in third world countries, inspiring local conflicts. In doing so, they are trying to expand their sphere of influence, while harming the interests of the opponent and thus obscuring and sublimating the global conflict. Namely, the problems posed by the above circumstances, together with the challenge of resolving or at least minimising conflicts at the international level, determine the purpose of this article. It involves researching and revealing the sources and, on that basis, determining the causes and identifying ways to eradicate international conflicts.

 Olga Oliker, “Putinism, Populism and the Defence of Liberal Democracy.” Survival 59, no. 1 (2017): 7‒24; Anna Luhrmann, Sandra Grahn, Richard Morgan, Shreeya Pillai and Staffan I. Lindberg, “State of the world 2018: democracy facing global challenges.” Democratization 26, no. 6 (2019): 895‒915; W. Merkel and A. Luhrmann, “Resilience of democracies: responses to illiberal and authoritarian challenges,” Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 869‒84.

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This study features an analysis of the above sources in the contemporary and the historical context. Relevant means and approaches in achieving the goal are, in particular, historical analogy, political psychology and democratic studies. The combination of the above contexts in research is important and original, as it gives an opportunity to comprehensively consider the current essential preconditions and historical background of international conflicts as threats to the world democratic and liberal order. The principles of democracy and liberalism underlie the modern world order that was established after the Second World War. In order to understand the importance of their further preservation as a source of a conflict-free world, as well as to achieve the desired results of this research, it is necessary to have a theoretical and conceptual overview of modern democracy and a historical excursus of liberalism in the international context. Only in the twentieth century as a result of World War II has the civilized part of humanity realized that the world needs a system of international relations that could limit national sovereignty by an international framework and block the path of totalitarianism and abuse of power by individual countries internally and externally. The decision came in the form of transferring the rules of democracy, the principles of separation of powers and mechanisms of checks and balances, inherent in the rule of law at the interstate level. Democracy is an important tool for the development of individual states and world civilization in general, as well as a political mechanism that allows viable principles for preventing and resolving conflicts on the basis of equal rights and equal opportunities to be found. It is a key factor in the concept of sustainable development, which fits into the task of solving global problems of humankind. The successful implementation of the goals of sustainable development requires the efforts of both individual countries, especially represented by governments, and the entire world community, in particular intergovernmental associations. In this aspect, modern democracy, namely the principles of a democratic, liberal world order, play an important role in terms of creating a global development strategy that will define long-term vision and core values as well as specify policy tools and processes important for change. It means building and continuing the safe functioning of the global information society with the nation-states remaining an integral part of it. Democracy and the values it implies as well as the critical mass of states with a democratic political system contribute to functioning of rules and institutions promoting the resource-saving consumption and protecting the important societal values such as knowledge, health and the environment on which the

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sustainable and progressive development of society is based. All this presupposes the existence of civil society, liberal values and transparency of governance principles. The challenges of the twenty-first century must strengthen democratic cooperation for sustainable development not only at the national and local levels, but also at the international level. The international community must take responsibility for promoting scientific and technological progress, protecting the environment and human health. At the state level, a democratic political regime is a guarantee of national, civic and religious tolerance. In the absence of a democratic order, national and religious cleavages inevitably increase, the standard of living decreases, consequently launching a new factor in the disintegration of the state and the degradation of society. Violations of human rights lead to conflicts at the national and international levels. Democracy not only promotes the development of society and effective public administration, but also protects the individual interests of each individual: “. . . democracy is . . . the best form of government for protecting human rights and improving human well-being.”2 In this aspect, the security challenges and threats are connected with ignoring and neglecting democratic principles and values, and the imminent danger of global anti-democratic revenge can lead to a situation when individual states fail to survive as nations. Therefore, when we say that the development of democracy is the basis for peace and security of the state, we mean that peace in general is a prerequisite for economic prosperity. Speaking about the development of the concept and principles of liberalism in the twentieth century, it is important to see that in the international context it was in line with the struggle against the realistic concept, because the real manifestations of these paradigms are, respectively, peace and war. Realism is based on human selfishness and thirst for power. Individuals form the basis of the state which pursues its own national interest determined by the conditions of force. Force is seen primarily as the accessibility of the necessary material resources to physically harm or compel other states to submit. It is assumed that states, or those acting on behalf of the state, must be rational actors. Rational decision-making leads to the progress of national interest. The main factor in the states’ operation involves an anarchic international system, characterised by the absence of an authoritative hierarchy. One of the classic

 Larry Diamond, “Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (2020): 48.

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examples of a realistic theory of international relations is the “war of all against all” by Thomas Hobbes.3 Liberalism believes that human nature is mostly good and material conditions can be improved not by harming others, but by social success. Bad or evil behaviour is the product of inadequate social institutions and misunderstandings among leaders. War is a product of society. It is not a natural state but arises as a result of defects in society that can be overcome. According to Immanuel Kant, international anarchy can be overcome through some kind of collective action – a federation of states in which sovereignty would remain intact. Hence the need to create interdependence between states which would raise the cost of war. In the framework of such interdependence the free trade should become the dominant over national economic self-sufficiency.4 The first attempts to establish the foundations of a new world order based on liberalism have been attributed to the period between the First and Second World Wars. This is the so-called Wilson idealism, named after Woodrow Wilson, who stood at the origins of the League of Nations. War can be prevented. More than half of the provisions of the League agreement focused on war prevention. The agreement also included a provision legitimising the notion of collective security, in which the aggression of one state would be opposed by collective action embodied in the League of Nations.5 At that time, the creation of the League of Nations was an unconditional progressive step forward. Despite the League’s lack of political weight to exercise its powers, the collapse of the then world economy, it was, in fact, the first attempt to curb the anarchy of the international system, to create reasonable and adequate international rules of the game and principles of international law. However, the global economic and social crisis and the aggressive revisionism of Japan, Italy and Germany prevented the strengthening of liberal tendencies. In other words, democracies were weakened, and dictatorial regimes, on the contrary, were aroused. Belief in democracy and a free market economy was lost, while widespread pacifism, isolationism and a strong desire to avoid mistakes in 1914 left Western leaders without the will or means to resist reactionary forces. Unfortunately, all this is a direct analogy of the situation on the world stage, which we are witnessing today.

 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2009), 72.  Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 93‒131.  “January 8, 1918: Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”: transcript.” Millercenter: Presidential Speeches, accessed July 19, 2021, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-81918-wilsons-fourteen-points.

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Thus, we can draw a historical parallel between the interwar period around the 1920s to 1930s and the current international situation. This parallel, in our opinion, can be divided into three points, and the results prove to be very disappointing. The first point is the analogy of the then League of Nations with the modern United Nations. There is a reason to speak of an almost identical situation in regard to the complete inability of international institutions to stand in the way and stop the aggressive actions of individual states. As for the failures of the League of Nations, it did not have any real power to implement international law. The League of Nations failed to stop Japan from attacking China or Italy from doing the same to Ethiopia. The end of the League of Nations came when Italy attacked Ethiopia, which was also a member of the League, not to mention World War II. When the League did nothing to stop the aggression, it became powerless. The same can be said about the modern UN, when Russia, as a member of the UN Security Council, annexed part of Ukraine – a member of the UN. When authoritarian countries, including the aggressor country, have the status of a member of the UN Security Council, the paralysis of this organization is obvious. The second point is the attempt of the non-free, authoritarian and revanchist states, namely superpowers such as Russia and China, to impose on the rest of the world an alternative vision of the rules of international order, which in reality entails the division of spheres and areas of influence in the manner of criminal groups. It is a matter of strengthening the principle of “rising from one’s knees,” which was to compensate for the former humiliation after the collapse of the world communist system, technological and socio-economic backwardness of advanced democracies, and overcoming the so-called phantom pain of losing imperial greatness and territory that gave certain geopolitical advantages. Thus, in fact, we hear an echo of the above-mentioned aggressive revisionism of Germany, as well as Japan and Italy in the 1930s. In a Cincinnati town hall, US President Joe Biden said in response to questions from members of the public that Chinese and Russian leaders Xi Jinping and Putin were in fact betting on autocracies and really believed that the twenty-first century would be defined by oligarchs because democracies, in their opinion, cannot function in the twenty-first century. Their argument is that things are moving so fast that democracies are unable to make quick decisions, and that only autocracies can do so.6

 “Joe Biden town hall in Cincinnati: Here’s the full CNN transcript,” The Enquirer, July 21, 2021, http: // www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/21/joe-biden-cnn-town-halltranscript/8051311002/.

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Of course, authoritarian leaders are cunning, trying to mislead and hide the real reasons for their actions. In fact, this is due to the banal desire to consolidate the principles of authoritarianism and the monopoly of the ruling elites on the power within these states, to preserve their own personal lifelong power, while pushing the universality of democratic and liberal values, which should be the basis not only for international relations but, first of all, for building the political system and political regime of individual states. For the most part, all this nonsense pouring out of their mouths is for domestic consumption and is part of authoritarian propaganda. There is a purpose behind such categories as liberalism and democracy acquiring a derogatory colour in the social and political discourses of these countries. But they do not neglect to throw this informational garbage into the international discourse, involving democratic leaders in unnecessary discussions. However, autocracy should not be discussed with autocrats, but decisive action should be taken to protect democracy and its values. As Biden rightly remarked, “democracy has to stand up and demonstrate that it can get something done. It’s not just important that we are – no, I really mean it.”7 Unfortunately, these are still just words. The particular danger of the above tendencies associated with the authoritarian attack is that, in achieving their goals, these authoritarian superpowers seek to wreak havoc on relations between democracies, exacerbate social crises, weaken the effectiveness of democratic institutions and thus gradually return some states to anti-liberal and anti-democratic principles. This will make it possible to form a certain protective zone around the states of the authoritarian core. In addition to direct military threats, aggressive behaviour and, ultimately, the annexation of the territory of other states, the danger of anti-democratic impact of authoritarian states is as follows: – political and economic pressure based on intimidation or promises to reduce it in exchange for concessions, in other words bribery and blackmail; – hybrid changes in the domestic political climate of modern democracies, based on propaganda, cyberattacks and the spread of fake news; – betting on the populist left and right movements in democracies in order to destabilise the political system; – threats to the cohesion of democratic blocs in the form of democratic backsliding;

 “Joe Biden town hall in Cincinnati: Here’s the full CNN transcript,” The Enquirer, July 21, 2021, http: // www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/21/joe-biden-cnn-town-halltranscript/8051311002/.

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these challenges not only threaten the security and integrity of Western democracies, but also pose a challenge to the entrenchment of democratic and liberal values in countries seeking to join a cohort of civilised developed nations.

Unfortunately, with regard to these challenges, the politicians of developed democracies themselves add fuel to the fire of populist tendencies and spread the principles fundamental in the post-truth era, which greatly contributes to the negative impact of the authoritarian offensive. Even a country like the United States, which has a strong tradition of democracy, has not escaped these negative phenomena, in particular the era of President Donald Trump, who stood out with aggressive populism and spreading fake news. As noted by the American researcher G. Tsipursky,8 Donald Trump became the first (American) posttruth president. And he may well become the first of many. In other words, if in the late 1980s, during the 1990s and even in the early 2000s there were processes of democratic transit and many researchers were interested in analysing its procedural mechanisms, then now we are observing that an authoritarian, anti-liberal, anti-democratic and counteroffensive danger of its probable success is connected with the crisis phenomena and problems faced by contemporary democracies, with the general problems of the development of Western civilization as a whole and its interaction with the rest of the world. So the current situation is reminiscent of all previous ones, as the first alarm bells rang during the famous Munich speech of the Russian leader in 2007, where he unequivocally outlined the reconfiguration of the new world order.9 Moreover, after that, Russia has already become an aggressor in the post-Soviet territory and there is a serious and unfounded danger of further expansion of aggressive actions. However, neither after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, nor after the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and even after the intervention in the conflict in Syria, did the so-called Western establishment draw any useful conclusions. Thus, the third point, which takes into account the current situation in regard to international security and the principles of global coexistence, is the fact that the civilised world is constantly losing vigilance, not noticing in time

 Gleb Tsipursky, “Toward a Post-Lies Future: Fighting “Alternative Facts” and “Post-Truth” Politics,” The Humanist, March, April, 2017, 12.  “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” The Washington Post: Courtesy Munich Conference on Security Policy Monday, February 12, 2007, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.

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the dangerous changes in the world. Unfortunately, the history of the world testifies to the fact that humanity shall be faced with irreversible consequences and imminent war, where no other way to solve the problem remains as a result of untimely awareness of dangers and threats, slow reaction to events, belated and often erroneous actions. It was only after Russia’s attempts at hybrid interference in the internal affairs and internal politics of Western democracies that the perception of the danger that hovers over the entire civilized world finally emerged; this was at least first announced at the Security Conference in Munich in 2017.10 Thus, it took more than 10 years to recognise the indisputable fact of the creeping aggression of world authoritarianism led by Russia against the states of sustainable democracy and the principles of the up-to-date world order. Instead, it should be noted that in addition to the recognition, there must be a resolute counteraction to these threats, and new management tools are needed to prevent the inevitable consequences. In fact, it poses a number of problems. Now the liberal-democratic world is faced with the dilemma of cooperation and containment or competition with authoritarian states. Even among the democratic establishment, there is little desire to find effective means and to take resolute steps to protect their own endangered values. The reflection of the aforementioned is also found in public opinion. As data collected for the Munich Security Index shows, the citizens in some European countries – most notably in Italy, but also in France – have a more positive view of Russia than people in the UK or Germany have. Strikingly, in a potential conflict between the US and Russia, many people in France (43 per cent), Germany (46 per cent) or Italy (44 per cent) would like to stay neutral.11 What conclusions does this suggest? Unfortunately, many members of the elite representing the countries of the so-called civilized world seem to feel like outside observers, almost resigned to accept the state of affairs. They lack the will and vision to take certain steps and suggest effective ways. It seems that the modern alliance of free nations consists of those who want but cannot, and those who can but do not want.

 Munich Security Conference, “Munich security report 2017: Post-truth, Post-west, Post-order?”, 2017, https://www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/munich-securityreport-2017/post-truth-post-west-post-order/introduction/.  Munich Security Conference, “Munich Security Report 2021: Between States of Matter – Competition and Cooperation,” 2021, http://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_ Publikationen/MunichSecurityReport2021.pdf.

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Thus, in historical retrospect, it becomes clear that the conflict between open and closed, free and non-free, democratic and undemocratic states is based on the inability to find a point of contact that should minimise the negative consequences. Why does this happen in the contemporary world? It is possible to assume that the crisis of trust at the global level is to blame for everything, the background of which is the country aggravating contradictions in the political, psychological, moral, ethical and other spheres. Thus, in our opinion, in the framework of achieving the stated objectives of the study and to further identify ways to effectively counteract the current challenges and threats to the modern global order, there is a need to analyse the concept of trust as a psychological and sociological category based on the socalled universal values as well as the phenomenon of a crisis of trust at various levels. Trust is generally considered to be something good: the word trust has a positive connotation to it and the importance of trust has been stressed by researchers from many different disciplines.12 Trust is a state when one subject believes that the activities of another subject do not harm the first one, and the first one expects only positive things from these bilateral relations. This relationship is possible only if the opponents agree to be more pliable and compliant. By being open, partners demonstrate their flexibility and ability to compromise, resulting in complex issues. Based on this, trust can be considered in at least two dimensions. First, as a belief in honesty, sincerity, decency and friendliness of another subject. Second, as the subjects’ belief in belonging to the same association, which depends on the existence within the community of norms and values shared by all its members, as well as on the willingness of the latter to submit to common interests. In other words, trust is the result of the existence of common norms and values. Under conditions of trust, social actors, acting separately, become an institutionalised association, because trust is a certain type of social capital that can be acquired and used only by the community as a whole. In this case, the beneficiaries are both the group as a whole and its individual subjects, i.e. there is a synergistic effect. In particular, as Kevin Vallier notes, economists, sociologists, psychologists, and many others have argued that social trust is critical for maintaining well-functioning political and economic institutions. If members of a society do not trust one another, then they have little reason to

 Daniel Hult, “Creating trust by means of legislation – a conceptual analysis and critical discussion,” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 6, no. 1 (2018): 1.

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take the risks required to create, build and sustain good institutional structures. As such, social trust will generate many great goods.13 If there is a situation of distrust – a concept that is the opposite of trust – then social actors exist autonomously, trying to individually realize their own private interests and goals, often at the expense of each other. This can lead to an imbalance of the whole social organism, within which the individual results of any subjects are much poorer than potentially possible. From a psychological point of view, this is explained by the fact that the concept of trust refers to the expectations of events being hoped for and the concept of distrust – the expectations of things being feared of. That is, in the first case, the psychological state of the counterparties is positive and their joint energy and efforts are doubled; in the second, respectively, the psychological state is negative and the energy of each is aimed at neutralising the efforts of the opposite counterparty, which ultimately harms the sustainable development of entire community. Of course, the state of distrust is also evolutionarily determined by the entire history of humankind and even genetically embedded in the human psyche, but the paradox is that distrust is a hidden desire for trust. Therefore, these two concepts are constantly trying to reach a balance with each other and the famous saying “trust, but check” is just a confirmation of this. In fact, the ratio of trust versus distrust relations in a society may indicate the level of its civilisation development. Political trust, according to some scholars, has the same theoretical relationship to political capital as social trust has to social capital. In particular, Kenneth Newton believes that in many ways the idea of political trust and political capital is a modern social science version of the classical concept of fraternity – which along with liberty and equality is a necessary condition for democracy.14 Political trust can change over time, reflecting the short-term outcomes, evaluations of particular leaders and institutions, and the public’s expectations toward their governments and institutions.15

 Kevin Vallier, “Social and Political Trust: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences,” Niskanen Center Research Paper, April 2019, https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/old_ uploads/2019/05/Vallier-Social-and-Political-Trust-Niskanen.pdf.  Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy,” International Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (2001): 205.  S. Kumagai and F. Iorio, “Building Trust in Government through Citizen Engagement,” Governance Global Practice, World Bank, 2020, http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit stream/handle/10986/33346/Building-Trust-in-Government-through-Citizen-Engagement.pdf? sequence=5.

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Proceeding from the two-dimensional nature of trust, it is clear that a crisis of trust is a failure of each of its conceptual components, or a combination of them, as they are mutually connected. Different scientists measure trust from different points of view. However, the opinion of one of the most famous researchers of the problem of trust, Eric Uslaner, is of great interest for our study. He argues that trust is the result of moral values that must be stable over time and not dependent upon day-to-day experiences.16 The above inferences are particularly relevant and congruent in the analysis of crisis phenomena in the modern world, in which it is possible to discern a characteristic feature occurring at various levels, namely the conflict of values. This conflict has a civilisational basis. Different civilizations produce different norms and values, the fact of which does not correspond to the second component of trust. The so-called clash of civilizations occurs not only at the global but also at the regional and even local levels. The cornerstone that differentiates between norms and values is the attitude towards the concept of respect, which is strongly linked to the concept of tolerance. The problem is that in some cultures, traditions that are different are respected, while in others they are not. Such an imbalance leads to a violation of another crucial concept – justice. Feelings of injustice are a key sign of problems with the first component of trust. A crisis of trust is a socially aggressive environment that erodes relations within society itself as well as the relationship between society and government. At first, society is under a layer of political apathy, where social aggression accumulates, and then it bursts in the form of a social explosion. What then are the necessary means to make two dimensions or components of trust work at all levels? The principles and values that form the basis of the first dimension, the so-called universal values, must become the principles and values of any community that are shared by all its members. This aspect implies the existence of a common and meaningful goal for the subjects of interaction. The common goal is to ensure a safe living space that is equally important to every member of the community. This, in turn, will lead to trust on a global level in a global community as this community will include all communities sharing the aforementioned norms and values.

 Eric Uslaner, “The Moral Foundations of Trust,” SSRN Electronic Journal (2002), https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/228191342_The_Moral_Foundation_of_Trust.

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In the contemporary world, these norms and values embody such standards as freedom, tolerance, human rights, the ability to compromise and consent, mutual respect and the primacy of civil society over the state. They can only be guaranteed and implemented under a democratic political regime, with genuine pluralism, observance and respect for the law, elements increasing the level of legitimacy and trust. It is a question of rational political and legal legitimacy, which arises only as a result of people’s recognition of the rational and democratic procedures on the basis of which the political system operates. As for authoritarian or totalitarian political regimes, they seek to use the administrative resources of state power and controlled media to form their own legitimacy by substituting political and legal legitimacy based on trust for juridical legality, institutionalising their rule at the legislative level, and through manipulation of mass consciousness, forcing citizens to reproduce positive assessments of the regime’s activities. These regimes, merely pretending to be pluralistic, maintain a strong grip on power. Their leaders use a surprisingly democratic style of language to sustain this facade of pluralism.17 At the same time, methods of agitation and propaganda emphasise the legitimacy of the charismatic type, which is based on replacing genuine trust in authority with blind faith in the infallibility and outstanding qualities of the leader, thereby rendering the possibility of critical and objective perception of style, methods and results completely invalid. Indeed, such blind faith can hardly be called true legitimacy, because citizens do not have reliable information about the current processes and the genuine situation in all areas of social and state life, and thus cannot form their own opinions, take a stance on events and properly assess the actions of the authorities. When authoritarian regimes need to justify their right to rule, they reduce discourse to a certain level. It increasingly mentions nationalist or religious themes and much less universal values such as economic efficiency, prosperity and justice, while standards such as pluralism and human rights may not be mentioned at all.18 Very often, the so-called approval of the actions of authoritarian leaders is based on consent under the threat of violence. People support the government, fearing its threats, as well as expecting certain social benefits from it. All this is accompanied by political apathy combined with indifference to the generally  Seraphine Maerz, “Simulating pluralism: the language of democracy in hegemonic authoritarianism,” Political Research Exchange 1, no. 1 (2019): 1‒23.  Johannes Gerschewski, “Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?”, Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 652‒65.

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accepted format of government. In other words, it is a classic example of parochial political culture. The fake nature of such pseudo-trust is confirmed by the fall of autocratic regimes, when, with the collapse of the zombie propaganda, the same majority in the vanguard of support suddenly retain their senses and advances to the forefront of oppressors and accusers of the former regime. This pseudo-trust is transferred by these states from the internal framework to the international level, where there is an illusion of trust between authoritarian countries, whose relations can be destroyed at any time. This is confirmed by the indisputable fact that all armed conflicts that exist in the contemporary world firstly take place within authoritarian and totalitarian states, which, in some cases, can lead to their disintegration, secondly, between authoritarian and/ or totalitarian states themselves, and thirdly, between authoritarian and/ or totalitarian states on the one side and democracies on the other. In contrast, contemporary states with democratic political regimes always resolve their own disputes in a civilized way, never entering into armed conflicts. That is, in other words, modern democracies never fight each other. The more democracy we’ve got, the less conflict we incite. The probability of an armed conflict at the global level is inversely proportional to the number of democracies. The presence of a high degree of trust at all levels, described above, demonstrates open and friendly relations between states. Today, the most striking example of this is the European Union. Its principles could serve as a model of global coexistence of modern states. The EU is the most successful international project for uniting developed democracies, and the collective identity of the European Union in its institutional sense corresponds to the definition of a community of European states of liberal democracy. Such a collective identity is reflected in the rules governing the EU membership. Liberal democracy points to the EU’s ideological orientation, the fundamental political values on which the legitimacy of power in the member states is based: human rights and freedoms and the social pluralism based on them, the rule of law, democracy, private property and a market economy. Today, Europe is a springboard for the implementation of the contemporary global democratic paradigm, which is associated with the further expansion of the democratic political system, democratic institutions, values, attitudes and norms. Thus, the multidimensionality and diversity of the concept of trust in this scientific research makes it possible to understand that the existing problems need to be solved because they have a significant impact on the level of trust. Proceeding from the proposed study, it is important to draw certain conclusions, namely to answer the question: how to maintain a global democratic

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liberal order, which, on the one hand, is threatened by numerous international conflicts, and on the other, is the source and foundation of a conflict-free world? In fact, speaking about the causes of sources and ways to eradicate international conflicts, it is fair to say that they are identical to the dangers, challenges and threats to the world democratic and liberal order, as well as ways and means to minimize them. In my opinion, the universal way to eradicate international conflicts, in terms of their causes in both historical and contemporary contexts, is democratisation (the implementation and promotion of democracy on a global scale), increasing the number of states with democratic political regimes. On a global scale, the simplest solution at first glance seems to be to bring the number of democracies to one hundred per cent, which will put a definite end to the armed settlement of disputes. However, regrettably, things are not as simple as they seem. Difficulties in fostering the spread of democratic values are challenges that can only be addressed by building the capacity of key institutions that will be able to take the lead in responding to the challenges that arise. All levels of contemporary democratic institutions must show their superiority in efficiency and flexibility in overcoming existing problems and threats. There is a link between distrust of national governments and institutions, i.e. at the local level, and distrust at the regional and global levels. This is due to the crises and problems modern democracies face, including the destructive anti-democratic influence of authoritarian states described earlier in the article, overall problems in the development of Western civilisation in general and its interaction with the rest of the world. Differences in liberal democracies and the action within democratic alliances, which is not always concerted, have allowed authoritarian states to shape international norms and agendas and influence Western competitors. Resolving the political and economic problems underlying these differences is the most effective way to defend against authoritarian opponents. It can therefore be implied that contemporary democracies need to realise the potential of trust at their disposal and extrapolate it to the global level. As the famous researcher of democracy Larry Diamond19 argues: “the advanced democracies, above all the United States, must shake themselves loose from their current political malaise and return to first principles.” In his opinion,

 Larry Diamond, “Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (2020): 47‒48.

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“if authoritarian backsliding and impunity are to be slowed and ended, the Western democracies must recover their voice. And they must use it to defend embattled democrats, free elections, and civic space”.20 What can be done to this end and what means are necessary in the process? First, democracies need to increase their internal resilience. The fundamental element of democracy ‒ electoral competition ‒ must be protected. In other words, a consensus regarding dangers faced and a discussion on the deterrent measures must follow. Second, democracies must ensure to protect their principles. In response to the actions of authoritarian countries spreading fake news and promoting populism among democracies, the latter need to focus on civic education, more active efforts to counter misinformation and even greater promotion of free and impartial media. There must be a reliable and free flow of information between experts, governments and the public. Populism rises due to the perception of citizens that traditional politics is not aimed at solving their everyday problems. Therefore, the efforts of the democratic establishment should be aimed at a more adequate perception of politics and democracy in general by citizens. This is crucial to ensuring public confidence in democratic politics. Third, democracies must fight authoritarian, anti-democratic and antiliberal alienations within the democratic alliances and individually, as they threaten the strength of the entire world democratic community. Perhaps, one of the most illustratory examples is the EU dealing with the “Hungarian” problem, where one of the effective levers of influence proves to be the deprivation of many significant privileges enjoyed by countries of the democratic alliance. However, this applies not only to the so-called new democracies, but also to states of sustainable democracy. Fourth, democracies must fight for compliance with international law and strengthen the influence of international institutions. In the first case, democracies must provide an alternative to the presence of authoritarian competitors, reaffirming their commitment to a global presence and increasing the costs of supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law abroad, as the threat to the liberal order is targeted not only at specific countries but at specific regions and specific institutions. In the second case, it is necessary to repel authoritarian efforts for violating human rights and to cooperate in the formation and observance of international law.

 Larry Diamond, “Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (2020): 48.

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Fifth, it is necessary to provide all possible assistance from democracies in consolidating the democracy of transition or border countries, and to actively assist them in joining the alliance of sustainable democracies. In this respect, the interests of democracy as a whole, democratic transit and individual young democracies cannot be neglected in favor of current temporary economic benefits, false alliances with authoritarian countries, even if they are superpowers, because these alliances are worthless. Otherwise everything could be lost.

References Diamond, Larry. “Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump.” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (2020): 36‒50. Gerschewski, Johannes. “Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 652‒65. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2009. Hult, Daniel. “Creating trust by means of legislation – a conceptual analysis and critical discussion.” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 6, no. 1 (2018): 1‒23. “January 8, 1918: Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”: transcript.” Millercenter: Presidential Speeches. Accessed July 19, 2021. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches /january-8-1918-wilsons-fourteen-points. “Joe Biden town hall in Cincinnati: Here’s the full CNN transcript.” The Enquirer, July 21, 2021. http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/21/joe-biden-cnn-town-halltranscript/8051311002/. Kant, Immanuel. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In Kant’s Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, 93‒131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Kumagai, S., and F. Iorio. “Building Trust in Government through Citizen Engagement.” Governance Global Practice, World Bank, 2020. http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit stream/handle/10986/33346/Building-Trust-in-Government-through-CitizenEngagement.pdf?sequence=5. Luhrmann, Anna, Sandra Grahn, Richard Morgan, Shreeya Pillai and Staffan I. Lindberg. “State of the world 2018: democracy facing global challenges.” Democratization 26, no. 6 (2019): 895‒915. Maerz, Seraphine. “Simulating pluralism: the language of democracy in hegemonic authoritarianism.” Political Research Exchange 1, no. 1 (2019): 1‒23. Merkel W., and A. Luhrmann. “Resilience of democracies: responses to illiberal and authoritarian challenges.” Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 869‒84. Munich Security Conference. “Munich security report 2017: Post-truth, Post-west, Post-order?” 2017.https://www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/munichsecurity-report-2017/post-truth-post-west-post-order/introduction/. Munich Security Conference. “Munich Security Report 2021: Between States of Matter – Competition and Cooperation.” 2021. http://securityconference.org/assets/02_Doku mente/01_Publikationen/MunichSecurityReport2021.pdf.

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Newton, Kenneth. “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy.” International Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (2001): 201–14. Oliker, Olga. “Putinism, Populism and the Defence of Liberal Democracy.” Survival 59, no. 1 (2017): 7‒24. “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” The Washington Post: Courtesy Munich Conference on Security Policy Monday, February 12, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/ AR2007021200555.html. Tsipursky, Gleb. “Toward a Post-Lies Future: Fighting “Alternative Facts” and “Post-Truth” Politics.” The Humanist, March, April 2017, 12‒15. Uslaner, Eric. “The Moral Foundations of Trust.” SSRN Electronic Journal (2002). https://www. researchgate.net/publication/228191342_The_Moral_Foundation_of_Trust. Vallier, Kevin. “Social and Political Trust: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences.” Niskanen Center Research Paper, April 2019. https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/up loads/old_uploads/2019/05/Vallier-Social-and-Political-Trust-Niskanen.pdf.

Nataliіa Bulanova

The Role of Historical Museums in Overcoming the Traumatic Past Abstracts: The article considers issues related to the discourse of the traumatic past in the twentieth century history of Ukraine and features of its treatment in regional historical museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region. The historiographical review highlights the main developments of “trauma studies” and identifies the historiographical gap in investigating the problem of overcoming the tragic events experienced in Ukraine in the twentieth century with the help of historical museums. The history of the Holodomor of 1932–1933, the time of Brezhnev’s rule, and the current Russian-Ukrainian war is comprehensively revealed in the historical museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Museums have been found to follow the trend of dealing with the trauma of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 by creating exhibitions, expositions and communication with visitors about the complex past in order to reinterpret it and disengage from destructive impact. Nostalgia for the Soviet era can be traced in Ukrainian society as a reaction to trauma in the Post-Soviet period. This is specifically true of the L. I. Brezhnev rule, largely due to the impact that the aggressive propaganda of contemporary totalitarian advocates has had on ordinary citizens. Displaying of the exhibition project of the Kamianske Museum of History “Battle of memories: Myths and realities of the Soviet era” and the peculiarities of the visitor’s reactions have been subject to analysis. The work of museums in mastering the traumatic present of the current Russian-Ukrainian war is discussed. Conclusions are made about the important mission of museums in public reconciliation regarding the contradictory and vulnerable pages of historical memory (of the past), the formation of national identity. Keywords: collective memory, coping strategy, cultural trauma, Dnipropetrovsk region, Kamianske, museum, post-traumatic syndrome, reflection, Ukraine

Formulating the Problem For the post-totalitarian Ukrainian society, building an independent state, the problem of finding an adequate way of interpreting, presenting and perceiving its historical past has become especially acute. World War II, the Nazi regime that unleashed the tragedy of the Holocaust, the Soviet regime that destroyed https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-005

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Ukrainian lands with the Holodomor and political repression, are such an incomplete list of events, the memory of which continues to be controversial in modern Ukrainian society. Finally, the current Russian-Ukrainian war, which persists to this day in eastern Ukraine, has all the hallmarks of collective trauma. The totalitarian Soviet state has formed a strong tradition of displacing and even banning the memory of the many tragedies of the twentieth century, using the past to influence and subdue the masses. Therefore, the specifics of the memory of Ukrainians in the post-totalitarian period, as many researchers note, is traumatic in nature, affecting the perception of the world, identity, changes the structure of memory about the past and opportunities for development. Overcoming the consequences of tragic events in Ukraine requires not only understanding them as a cultural trauma, but also finding strategies for dealing with traumatic consequences, especially in the context of the ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. In this sense historical museums have ample opportunities to serve as a space for the accumulation, storage, presentation and interpretation of the past.

Historiography The contemporary socio-humanity studies feature an intensification of research related to collective memory, in the context of which follows the development of the “Trauma studies.” The concept of collective trauma has become widespread since the middle of the twentieth century regarding the basic principles of the social change theories in a new light. Thus, K. Erickson, in the work “Everything in its path” (1976), exploring the properties of trauma, which arise primarily in relation to communities, distinguished between collective and individual trauma for the first time at the conceptual level.1 Moving in the direction of K. Erickson’s innovative sociological model, A. Neal, in his work “National Trauma and Collective Memory” (1998), focused on the events that cause the trauma of collective identity.2

 K.T. Erickson, Everything in its path: destruction of community in the Buffalo Creek flood (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1976).  A.G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).

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Particularly notable is the concept of cultural trauma, in line with which follows the work of P. Sztompka,3 J. Alexander4 and R. Ayerman.5 Thus, the Polish sociologist P. Sztompka, who introduced the concept of cultural trauma into scientific circulation, believes that it follows a traumatic event and can last for many generations, destroying the prevalent norms of life to such an extent that they cannot be restored. Becoming the object of scientific studies, the topic of traumatic experience in relation to a much broader discourse of memory has received many interpretations. Thus, the German historian and cultural theorist Jörn Rüsen sees cultural trauma as a “catastrophic” crisis that creates and marks faults and gaps in the cultural body of society that cannot be restored. He stressed the need to find a language that can overcome the traumatic experience.6 J. Alexander, an American sociologist, believes that collective trauma occurs when members of a group feel that they have been affected by a horrific event that has left a deep imprint on their group consciousness, memory and changed their future identity in a fundamental and irreversible way.7 Agnieszka Matusiak, a Polish researcher of Slavic curriculum, emphasised that the Post-Soviet experience is traumatic to human consciousness, referring to the concepts of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. The researcher believes that to finally drop the trauma it should be properly reflected on.8 After all, it is not meaningfully understood, this experience is successfully revived in quasisoviet socio-cultural formations, which clearly demonstrates the example of the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions temporarily occupied by the pro-Russian militants.9 According to the scientific potential of “trauma studies,” theoretical and methodological aspects of this area have found supporters among modern Ukrainian researchers. One example is the book Transit Culture. Symptoms of

 P. Sztompka, “Social change as trauma,” Sociological research no. 1 (2001): 6–16.  Александер Д. Культурная травма и коллективная идентичность. Социологический журнал № 3 (2012): С. 5–40.  P. Айерман, Социальная теория и травма. Социологическое обозрение Т. 12, № 1 (2013): С. 121–138.  J. Rüsen, New ways of historical thinking / trans. with him (Lviv: Litopys, 2010), S. 2.  J. Alexander, “Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity,” in The Meanings of Social Life. A Cultural Sociology by J. Alexander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 85.  A. Matusyak, Break the silence. Decolonial competitions of Ukrainian culture and literature of the XXI century with post-totalitarian trauma (Lviv: LA Pyramid, 2020), 14.  A. Матусяк, Вийти з мовчання. Деколоніальні змагання української культури та літератури ХХІ століття з посттоталітарною травмою (Львів: ЛА Піраміда, 2020).

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postcolonial trauma (2013) by T. Gundorova,10 in which the researcher analysed the symptoms of trauma in modern Ukrainian literature. V. Ogienko focused on covering various aspects of the Holodomor trauma,11 O. Kis,12 V. Gorbunova, V. Klymchuk,13 L. Naidenova, I. Reva14 and other Ukrainian researchers. For example, Iryna Reva analysed the transformations that Ukrainian society experienced during the Stalin era, beginning in the 1930s. Among the museum studies, the monograph of S. Rudenko “Museum as technology” discusses the problem, one of the plots of which is devoted to the work of the museum with traumatic memory.15 Multiple studies advocate the need for national self-affirmation in overcoming the traumatic past. The historiographical review revealed a gap in the coverage of the peculiarities of the work of historical museums with a traumatic past, which led to the emergence of this study. This article aims to highlight the potential of historical museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region in overcoming the conflict of historical memory about the traumatic events of history in modern Ukrainian society, which hinders its integration and consolidation.

The Main Statement In historical museums, visitors come into contact with the past through displays and exhibitions that illustrate the history of specific territories. The historical course of events that took place in the twentieth century in the Dnipropetrovsk region, one of the most important regions of Ukraine, testifies that waves of military conflicts and crimes of different regimes swept here one after another.

 T. Gundorova, Transit culture. Symptoms of postcolonial trauma: articles and essays (Kyiv: Grani-T, 2013).  B. Огієнко, Посттравматичний стресовий синдром і колективна травма в особистих наративах свідків Голодомору. Україна модерна. 2018. 6 квіт, http://uamoderna.com/md/ ogienko-holodomor-trauma.  O. Кісь, Колективна пам’ять та історична травма: теоретичні рефлексії на тлі жіночих спогадів про Голодомор.  B. Горбунова and B. Климчук, Психологічні наслідки Голодомору в Україні. Історична правда. 2021.  I. Рева, По той бік себе. Культурні та психологічні наслідки Голодомору та сталінських репресій (Дніпропетровськ: АЛ Свідлер, 2013).  C. Руденко, Б. Музей як технологія: монографія (Київ: Вид. Ліра-К, 2021).

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The tragedies have been woven into the historical memory of Ukrainians with points of pain and despair, and much effort is needed today to “heal, honor, reason, or at least understand and explain the traumatic past. The unspeakable scars left on individuals and entire societies await revelation, testimony, and justice.”16 Historical museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region have accumulated considerable experience in dealing with the traumatic events of the twentieth century. For example, in recent years, the Museum of the Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Dnipro) launched an initiative aimed at creating the optics of seeing this tragedy of the twentieth century as an integral part of Ukrainian history. The museum’s exhibition called the “Civil feat of Dnipropetrovsk region in the events of the anti-terrorist operation” is dedicated to the events of the current Russian-Ukrainian war, etc. The vast majority of researchers believe that today the most unspoken trauma is the Holodomor of 1932–1933, which has long been silenced in Ukrainian society. The long experience of the Museum of the History of the City of Kamianske in this respect has demonstrated that any tragedy resulting in human suffering and death must not be reported in an unreliable manner. In this sense, the important mission of the museum is to reveal the traumatic past in such a way as to prevent history repeating itself, to make the visitors profoundly realise that they would never want to experience this and will try to prevent it in the future. It is important for the exhibitions not to be overloaded with evaluative statements when opening a dialogue with the visitor in the simple language of documents, with an emphasis on personal stories. An example of such an approach is the historical-documentary exhibition “Voices of the Unheard,” which was exhibited at the Museum of History of Kamianske in November 2020. The exhibition is based on the memories of people who survived the famine or kept the memories of their loved ones in their families. The structure of the exposition includes narratives of citizens of Kamianske and nearby villages, making it possible to tell about the tragedy in the language of eyewitnesses: “Who is guilty of crimes? No, not the harvest. This is all government” (Motrya Hychun, Karnaukhivka village); “And in the 33rd the famine began so terrible . . .” (Evdokia Yarko, Trituzne village); “There was a hunger strike in 1933” (Halyna Drozdenko, village of Blagoveshchenko); “In 1932–1933,

 David W. Blight, The Memory Boom: Why and Why Now? Memory in Mind and Culture, ed. Rascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 247.

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three of the six children of my grandfather, a staff worker, died of starvation in the city of Kamianske” (Bronislava Kvyatkovska, Kamianske). The narratives for the exhibition were selected without prejudice based on the age, life experience and socio-cultural context of each participant, but with a view to the place of residence in the local area, in the Kamiansky district of Dnipropetrovsk region. The feelings, emotions and impressions of various respondents (both eyewitnesses of the Holodomor and their descendants and witnesses) became divided into narratives, and formed into a holistic picture of human experience in 1932–1933. In the process of elaborating the traumatic history, the following opinion of the Ukrainian researcher, Vitaliy Ogienko, was an important insight: “only in the process of narration or testimony, the history of the trauma comes to life. To get rid of trauma means to give it meaning again, to learn to understand the world in the light of a traumatic event and to include traumatic information in one’s own story.”17 The exposition’s sole focus was not only the sufferings of eyewitnesses of the Holodomor of 1932–1933. After all, such a collective memory, which calls for solidarity based on common human suffering, is dangerous. As the German political theologian Joan Baptist Metz wrote, “the memory of suffering is a shroud for the nation.”18 In addition, the traumatic experience should not injure the visitor himself: museums should not leave with losses. In the context of the exhibition story, there were doses of themes about understandable things: for example, the devotion of a mother who sacrificed her last piece of bread for the sake of her child, episodes about people helping each other to survive even in hopeless moments. The specificity of the exhibition space lay in the fact that the appeal of the photo-documentary and narrative series was bolstered by the expressiveness of the pictorial and graphic art works devoted to this theme. Among them was a unique exhibit – the painting “Mavka,” created by a Ukrainian girl Pole Bychko from the village of Deriyivka in the Poltava region around May 1933, shortly before her own death, as a message to descendants. For visitors who got acquainted with this artifact during the tour, it became a symbol of hope and faith in the value attributed to singular human life, around which the main message of the exhibition was formed. Speaking about the absolute priority of

 V. Ogienko, Post-traumatic stress syndrome and collective trauma in personal narratives of Holodomor witnesses. Ukraine is modern, April 6, 2018, http://uamoderna.com/md/ogienkoholodomor-trauma.  J. B. Metz, The future in the memory of suffering. New questions on God (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), R. 9–25.

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the value of life, the museum responsibly approached the dignity of its visitors, as well as the dignity of the people whose memory became the purpose of the exhibition. This project of working with memory through the lens of a particular person’s fate was aimed at audiences of all ages, including children. By giving children access to traumatic information, museum workers took responsibility for the child’s timely receipt of information, the ability to understand this information, and its implications for personal development. Children under the age of seven who were not able to reflexively perceive tragic information at this age were excluded from the audience attending the exhibition, as the historical trauma could be excessively profound for them in emotional terms. Middle and primary school children were offered comforting conditions for the process of rethinking difficult experiences so that feelings and compassion did not cause psychological harm. At the same time, the four criteria of a friendly environment proposed by psychologist L. Petranovskaya for working with school classes were taken into account. The first is the child’s freedom to “know or not to know,” to let in traumatic material, or to fend it off, that is, the information should not be imposed on the visitors. The second is an opportunity for a child to receive moral support from adults during a difficult experience, creating a safe situation for the free expression of emotional reactions that are unconditionally accepted by adults. This important place belongs to dialogue, and clarification of different information. Third, the right of the child not to be a means to an end was also considered. In the light of this, there is an understanding that the educational process should not replace the guide’s value of the experience shared with the audience. The fourth factor of environmental friendliness is the existential courage of a guide or lecturer, who must have a profound awareness of the issue they are talking about to accompany the child in his experiences. Before presenting information about the tragedy to a young audience, the guide must find for himself “. . . answers to the question of how this could have happened in this world, how to live after what to look for support.”19 The photo exhibition “Voices from Overseas,” created by the National Museum of the Holodomor Genocide and the Union of Ukrainian Organisations of Australia, which was exhibited at the Dnipropetrovsk National Historical Museum named after Yavornytsky, was in tune with the exhibition of the Kamyansky Museum of History. The exposition includes large-scale black-and-white

 L. Petranovskaya, Does he talk to children about tragic, http://ludmilapsyholog.livejour nal.com/tag/war.

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portraits and envelopes with memories of the 1932–1933 Holodomor contributed by 26 Ukrainians from different regions of Ukraine who survived the genocide and then emigrated to Australia. It was there that the project’s curators, Australians of Ukrainian descent, Yanina Green and Halyna Kostyuk, searched for these older seniors and photographed and recorded their stories. These people remembered the events of the Holodomor from the stories of their parents. Respondents who took part in the project, in contrast to Holodomor witnesses living in Ukraine, recalled their experiences without warning or fear. For example, Semyon Kozlov described the river station in Kiev. When he was little, he saw the bodies of the dead being unloaded from ships. His grandmother explained to him “that there were people from the villages who tried to get to Kyiv to escape the famine and died on the way.”20 These examples show that the museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region try to deal with the trauma primarily by visualising and communicating the complex past to their visitors, to reinterpret it and eventually discard its destructive influence. The past should not be closed – in the sense of “closed” – instead it should be comprehensible as a part of life that has passed, that is different from the present life, but manifested in it. It is important not to try to erase the traces of the past in the present, but instead to learn to accept them integrating the pieces into one’s daily life, seeing them as normal consequences of an anomalous past, as a biographical work on traumatic experience.21 Descendants of Holodomor victims, as noted by Ukrainian researcher I. Reva, have signs of a Stockholm-like syndrome (psychological connection of a victim in captivity with a kidnapper) between the Ukrainian people and the aggressor, a complex of national inferiority and a constant fear of defeat (Reva 2013), therefore, the work to overcome this complex in the mass consciousness is an important task for historical museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region. In this sense, the concepts of expositions and exhibitions include plots of peasants’ resistance to grain procurement, which was ruthlessly suppressed by the Bolshevik authorities. The Museum of Holodomor Resistance, established on the Dnieper in 2020, has begun to work towards this goal. The presented materials included the Pavlograd peasant uprising and peasant “bagpipes” turned against collectivisation in the region during the 1930s. For a long time the events of 1932–1933 were forgotten in the Soviet society. The official history was silent and any dissidents faced persecution for  The exhibition “Voices from Overseas” was opened in Dnipro, https://www.radiosvoboda. org/a/news-voices-from-overseas-exhibition-opened-in-dnipro/30254692.html.  Gabriele Rosenthal, The Healing Effects of Storytelling: On the Conditions of Curative Storytelling in the Context of Research and Counseling. Qualitive Inquiry, Vol. 9. 2003, 927.

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disseminating information about the Holodomor and its consequences, which became one of the causes of the post-traumatic syndrome. Even in the postSoviet time, nostalgia for the past could be observed in Ukrainian society in response to this trauma from the Soviet era that might be perceived as insurmountable. This is especially true for the reign of LI Brezhnev, largely due to the way ordinary citizens were affected by aggressive propaganda of modern totalitarian advocates. This is evidenced by the heated discussion that erupted on social media around the exhibition project of the Kamyansky History Museum “Battle of memories: Myths and realities of the Soviet era,” implemented jointly with the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory with the support of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. The exhibition project was presented for the first time in Kyiv, the National Centre of Folk Culture “Ivan Honchar Museum.” Later, the exhibition was presented at the Lviv Museum of the History of Religion, the Museum of the History of Chervonohrad and the Museum of the History of the City of Kamianske. The aim of the exhibition was to restore the true historical memory of the Soviet past by showing the contrast between the values declared by the Soviet authorities and the everyday life of the Soviet people. The project was designed to convey the reality about the tragic existence of a “small” man in a totalitarian state, to refute nostalgic sentiments of the era that carry the danger of manipulating historical truth, in a manner which would be accessible and convincing to Ukrainians, especially the younger generation. Architectural and artistic design of the exhibition envisaged applying the principle of historical reconstruction by combining the themes of the Soviet period with historical documentary materials and extensive use of audiovisual and artistic collections. The concept of the exhibition, which reflects the main myths that have developed in Ukraine at the level of domestic consciousness about the Soviet period marked by LI Brezhnev’s rule, is based on the vision that in general it is assessed as a period of stagnation, marked by the term “stagnation.” In terms of exposition, the coverage of the ideological component of the stagnation involved the use of archival photographs, standard posters and documents in combination with audio-visual selections in order to reproduce the characteristic features and atmosphere of the era. The main space of the exposition was populated with a prominent part of Soviet people’s daily lives: the ceremonial world (ideology) and the real world (everyday life stripped off ornaments). This period was marked by a shortage of many goods and household items needed to meet the basic needs of the Soviet people, censorship and strict bans on education and culture. It was also a time of total Russification, aimed at forming a “single community – the Soviet people,” leveling

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differences between nations, a concept on which “the triune community of fraternal peoples – Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian” is based. The exhibition also recreates several hidden parallel realities, inaccessible to ordinary Soviet people at the time: the foreign world – the world of comfort and true democracy; and the Ukrainian space itself, which also existed in two dimensions – folklore and decorative (hopak at official concerts, mass publishing of censored works, comedians Tarapunka and Shtepsel on television) and the traditional system for Ukrainians, preserved in folk culture, faith and language. A separate topic is the protest against the system: the dissident movement, the underground, “samizdat,” political anecdotes and more. The Soviet people were isolated from European values, and could not move freely around the world. Hostile attitudes toward “aggressive imperialism” were instilled in society, and the mythical advantages of the socialist way of life were propagated. During the heated discussion around the project, happening live and on social networks, painful issues for ordinary residents were discussed: education, healthcare, social standards of the Soviet era and contemporary world were compared. Many of the discussants responded with nostalgia for paternalism – a political practice in which the state provides citizens with staples for basic needs, and they in turn allow the government to dictate models of their behaviour. This feature can be seen as one of the consequences of a traumatic experience when society continues to live in the past. Museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region do not stand aside from modern military and political conflicts, in particular, the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on since 2014. Over the years, considerable experience has been accumulated. Their expositions reproduce the main events of the war in eastern Ukraine in chronological order and honour Ukrainian soldiers. The museum is developing as a cultural and critical centre for assisting Ukrainian soldiers in overcoming the post-traumatic stress disorder along with the hospital at Mechnikov’s rehabilitation centre. The museum hosts exhibitions, presentations and commemorative events featuring former anti-terrorist operation fighters, who for the time of the event turn into guides, a form of rehabilitation for them. After all, the impact of military conflict is always ambiguous. On the one hand, the perception of the world in the categories of “one’s own – another’s own” is extremely acute. When the conflict intensifies, a new psychological process arises – the dehumanisation of the enemy. In our opinion, value-oriented communication should become a mechanism for overcoming the manifestations of separatism and radicalism, in view of the aggravation of the discourse on interregional differences and the importance of regions in a modern democracy.

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For example, in celebration of the Day of the Defender of Ukraine in 2020, the exhibition “New York – Ilovaisk: Choice” dedicated to the life of the American Ukrainian Markiyan Paslavsky opened in the museum of the “Civil feat of the Dnipropetrovsk region in the events of the anti-terrorist operation.” In 2014, a US Army reserve officer made a firm decision to protect the land of his ancestors. He fought in the east as part of the battalion “Donbass” and died in the battles for Ilovaisk. This exhibition was initiated by the Kyiv Museum of the Ukrainian Diaspora, to which relatives of the deceased soldier handed over Markiyan Paslavsky’s personal belongings. The concept and design of the exhibition was developed by the Museum of the Revolution. Among the exhibits you can see many photos and personal belongings of the volunteer. This exhibition opened in the Dnieper, because in 2014 the city became an outpost of Ukrainians. The traumatic nature of the information communicated to society is determined by the nature of the events themselves, in particular by Russian military aggression and the annexation of territories. Among the visitors to the “Civil feat of Dnipropetrovsk region in the events of the ATO” museum, one can encounter citizens of the Dnipropetrovsk region and other cities of Ukraine (school and student audiences, combatants, migrants, volunteers, ordinary residents, etc.). It can therefore be argued that the lines of potential conflict stretched between those who passed the crucible of war and those who watched it, looking from the screens; between migrants who have lost their homes and their usual routine and those who have missed it; between those who feel like citizens of their state and those who despair of it. As noted by P. Shtompko, the impact of the injury on the community depends on the relative level of the split with the previous order and with expectations for its preservation.22 At the stage of continued hostilities, tours of the stationary exposition of the “Civil feat of the Dnipropetrovsk region in the events of the anti-terrorist operation” museum and the numerous events that take place there have become not only a mechanism for trauma, but also a very effective means of uniting visitors around the idea of protecting Ukrainian land from Russian aggression and the formation of national identity.

 P. Shtompka, “Social change as trauma,” Sociological research № 1. (2001): 10.

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Conclusion Working with traumatic experiences in historical museums is extremely difficult due to the inevitable emotional perspective, the danger of turning from a researcher into a participant in contemporary political battles for memory in the name of the nation, religion, social justice, etc., pressure from the official memory policy. At the same time, the analysis of the history museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region showed that such measures as creation of narrative expositions and platforms for communication and dialogue with visitors bearing different versions of historical memory, different views, cultural preferences, etc. are widely used in trauma control. In this process, the museum acts as a kind of mediator, comprehending and interpreting phenomena and facts, constructing history from the past, which then acquires a powerful social and political significance today. Such a mission imposes on the institution a significant responsibility for the balance and impartiality of the position. Exhibition projects implemented in museums of the Dnipropetrovsk region help to find a way to overcome specific traumatic experience, achieve synergies with the past and visualise the values that museums as cultural hubs will offer Ukrainian society in a very difficult time of its development.

References Alexander, Jeoffrey. “Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity.” In The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology by Jeoffrey Alexander. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Alexander, Jeffrey. “Kultyrnaya travma i kollektivnaya identichnost.” Sotsiologicheckiy zhurnal, № 3(2012): P. 5–40. Blight, David W. “The Memory Boom: Why and Why Now?” In Memory in Mind and Culture, edited by Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Gоrbunova, Viktoriya, and Klumchyk Vitaliy. Psyhologichni naslidky Golodomoru v Ukrayini. Іstоrychna pravda, 2021. 24 ber. Gundоrova, Тamara. Тrаnzytna kultyra. Symptomy pоstkоlоnіаlnoyi travmu: stаttі tа еsеyi. Kuyiv: Grani-Т, 2013. Erickson, K. Т. Everything in its path: destruction of community in the Buffalo Creek flood. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. 284 p. Eyerman, Ron. “Sotsialnaya teoriya i travma.” Sotsiologichnoye obozreniye T. 12, № 1 ([2013]): 121–138. Кіs, Оksana. “Kоlеktyvnа pаm’yat tа іstоrychna travma: tеоrеtychnі rеflеksіyi nа tlі zhіnоchyh spоgаdіv pro Gоlоdоmорr.” In У pоshуkаh vlаsnogo gоlоsу: Usnа іstоriya jak tеоrіya, mеtоd tа dzhеrеlо: zb. nауk. st. / zа rеd, edited by G. G. Grіnchеnkо and N. Hаnenko-Frіzеn, 171–191. Hаrkіv: PP ТОRGSІN PLUS, 2010.

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Маtуcjak, Аgnеshkа. Vyitu z mоvchаnnia. Dеkоlоnіаlnі zmаgаnnia ukrayinskoyi kultury tа literatury XXI stolittia z pоsttotalitarnoyu travmoyu / per. Z polsk. A. Bondaria.Lviv: Pіrаmіdа, 2020. 308 s. Metz, J. B. The future in the memory of suffering. New questions on God. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. Nаidionova, Lyubov. “Gоlоdоmоr: strаzhdаnnia, sprychyneni polituchnoyu tehnologiyeyu.” In Prоblemy pоlіt. Psyhologiyi tа yiyi rol u stаnоvlеnnі grоmаdianynа ukrаyinskoyi dеrzhаvy: zb. nayk. pr. / Аsоts. psyhologiv Ukrаyiny, Іn-t sоts. tа pоlіt. psyhologiyi NАPN Ukrаyiny, Vyp. 9. S. 73–82. Kyiv: Міlеnium, 2009. Neal, A. G. National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. 224 р. Оgiyenko, Vitaliy. Pоsttravmatuchnyi stresovyi syndrom і kоlеktuyna travma v оsоbystyh nаratyvah svіdkіv Gоlоdоmоru. Ukrayina mоderna. 2018. 6 kvit. Pеtranovskaya, Lyudmyla. Gоvоryt li s dеtmi о tragicheskom. n.d. http://ludmilapsyholog.live journal.com/tag/война. Rosenthal, Gabriele. The Healing Effects of Storytelling: On the Conditions of Curative Storytelling in the Context of Research and Counseling. Qualitative Inquiry. Vol.9. 2003. P. 915–933. Reva, Iryna. Pо toy bіk sеbе. Kulturni ta psuhologichni nаslidky Gоlоdоmоru ta stalinskyh rеprеsіy. Dnіprоpеtrоvsk: АL Svіdler, 2013. Rudenko, Sergey.Mуzеi yak tehnologiya: mоnоgrаfіya. Кyiv: Vud. Lіrа-К, 2021. 436 s. Ryuzen, Yorn. Novi shliahy istorychnogo myslennia /per. z nim. Volodymyr Kamyanets. Lviv: Litopys, 2010. 358 s. Sztompka Piotr. “Sotsiologichnoye izmenenie kak travma.” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya № 1 (2001): S. 6–16. У Dnipri vіdkryly vystavku Gоlоsy z-za оkеаnu. n.d. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/newsvoices-from-overseas-exhibition-opened-in-dnipro/30254692.html.

Maxim Potapenko and Mateusz Kamionka

Wiki-History of Crimea: Ukrainian and Russian Versions Abstract: Wikipedia is a popular source of information. In Ukraine, it ranks as number four in the website popularity ranking, while it takes sixth place in Russia. Wikipedia is usually treated as an accessible and reliable source of information. As of 2013, over 70 per cent of Ukraine web users read the Russian-language sector of Wikipedia; however, this was not reflected in Russia where the Ukrainian-language part of Wikipedia enjoyed less than one per cent of popularity. The numbers are still standing and, therefore, the Russian-language Wikipedia continues to gravely impact Ukraine’s information environment. Wikipedia authors are reacting to Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine, having a significant effect on creating a profound gap in the semantics of their publications. This study aims to investigate the nature of the given situation. The range of articles on the history of Crimea, a region that plays a vital role in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, will serve as an example. Both sides of the conflict see the past as the primary source of legitimising their rights to Crimea. The earliest articles on the history of Crimea were submitted to the Ukrainian and Russian sections of Wikipedia in 2006. Initially, the Ukrainian section articles of Wikipedia were treated as a second variant. Many of them contained translated Russian texts and borrowings from the Russianlanguage Wikipedia. After 2014, articles on the history of Crimea presented in the Ukrainian section became more independent and original in terms of sources, structure and content. Articles contributed in Russian have a richer editing history and more views. As a result, they have a more significant impact on the information space. From 2006 to the present, the generalising article “History of Crimea” has had 692 edits made by 207 authors. It has been viewed more than 1.3 million times since 2015. The statistics for the Ukrainian version of the article look much bleaker in comparison: 134 edits, 64 authors, more than 0.15 million views. Despite the rule of neutrality of the articles, Wikipedia’s Ukrainian and Russian-language versions contain many opposing statements. These contradictory reviews are especially noticeable in the coverage of recent history: the transfer of Crimea to the USSR in 1954 (Ukr. – saving the Crimean economy, Rus. – increasing the share of Russians in the USSR), the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 (Ukr. – occupation, Rus. – accession). Certainly, this is not a new phenomenon and is widespread in the mass media appeal as well. According to Wikipedia’s cross-reference system, the https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-006

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Ukrainian section attributes Crimea to an ethnohistorical region of Europe, while the Russian version treats it as almost exclusively a region of Russia. The predominant practice is politicising any writing and editing articles on the history of Crimea in the Ukrainian and Russian- language sections of Wikipedia. As the political contradictions between Ukraine and the Russian Federation become more profound, they lead to the formation of two wiki versions of the history of Crimea. The authors shall also point to selected controversial differences existing in other languages sections. Keywords: Crimea, history, political semantics, the language version, Wikipedia

Introduction Wikipedia is currently one of the most popular internet sources, not only for obtaining “everyday” information but also – or above all – for shaping public opinion in a given country on political topics. The traditional media has been nearly in its entirety replaced by the Internet. The majority of magazines and e-books are accessed online, while Wikipedia has replaced the well-known, multi-volume encyclopedias. The speed of finding information is essential for the young generation, as well as its availability, since every kid has a multi-volume encyclopedia ready at hand in his or her cell phone. Although Wikipedia is also becoming more popular among older generations (quite naturally though), its most dedicated users are among those who follow Gen Z in becoming the second generation of “digital natives.” This website also serves another important purpose – it aids the process of learning at every level. Students in schools and universities use Wikipedia daily to find answers for their homework. As A. Head and M. Eisenberg suggest, students use Wikipedia just as most of us do – because it is a quick way to get started, and it has some, relative, credibility.1 Therefore, it is crucial that this source of information remains accessible and does not turn into a propaganda tool impacting young people. Jimmy Wales, the founder of the free encyclopedia in Wikimedia Foundation Inc. donation page wrote: “Wikipedia is a place to learn, not a place for advertising. The heart and soul of Wikipedia is a community of people working to bring you unlimited access to reliable, neutral information.”2 At the same time, Wikipedia includes several entries on contentious or highly  Alison J. Head and Michael B. Eisenberg, “How today’s College Students Use Wikipedia for Course-Related Research,” First Monday 15, no. 3 (2010), https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v15i3. 2830.  Jimmy Wales, https://donate.wikimedia.org/.

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politicised subjects that cause virtual conflicts, called “edit wars” in Wikipedia parlance. These conflicts exert a negative impact on the Wikipedia community, sharing a unique culture and having a strong sense of identity.3 Alongside the “edit wars,” there are also conflicts related to the content of the articles in a given language. One of the core issues of this type is discussed below. It is worth noting that researchers focus only on the deceptive “neutrality” of Wikipedia, which is increasingly becoming the target of external organisations, such as political or state bodies, and solicitation.4 D. Jemielniak claims that “the chances that an article [In Wikipedia] on a sensitive or controversial topic will be unbalanced at some point in time are very high.”5 In his book Common Knowledge? An Ethnography of Wikipedia D. Jemielniak mentions one of the first cases of edit warring which has polarised the followers of the “Gdańsk versus Danzig” site. One of the most extended crises among users (lasting approximately four years) was caused by opposing views on the Polish city Gdańsk’s designated name, the term introduced for use in the English (language) Wikipedia. The German version, Danzig, triggered an ambivalent response due to its dubious historical context. Issues like this could prove potentially problematic in the future, in terms of international relations. Things can be even worse if the edit warring parties are involved in the actual world conflicts and such warring becomes a part of the so-called “hybrid wars.” Hybrid wars usually target the military and the civilian population, including youth. The good news is that hybrid wars do not foster a drop in patriotism among the youngest citizens of the nation.6

Wikipedia in the Post-Soviet Area The largest dissonance of Wikipedia content is found in the “national” pages, where a given encyclopedic entry is described in different languages. The Russian-language part of Wikipedia is the seventh-largest section of the online encyclopedia, counting 1,743,988 pages. On the other hand, the Ukrainian section is positioned much lower, in seventeenth place and with around 1,107,630

 C. Pentzold, “Imagining the Wikipedia community: What do Wikipedia authors mean when they write about their “community”?”, New Media and Society 13, no. 5 (2011): 704–21.  Arwid Lund, Wikipedia, Work and Capitalism. A Realm of Freedom? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 326.  Dariusz Jemielniak, Common Knowledge? An Ethnography of Wikipedia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 5.  Mateusz Kamionka, “Patriotism of the Young Generation in Ukraine in the Era of Hybrid War,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 18, no. 1 (2020): 221–39, doi: 10.47459/lasr.2020.18.10.

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entries to be searched.7 The monthly rate of active users is also noticeably higher in the Russian-language edition: 10,755 versus 3,049 in the Ukrainianlanguage section. On average there are 14,017 editions of articles per day in the Russian-language wiki and only 6,613 in the Ukrainian section.8 Wikipedia, an immensely popular source of knowledge, is the world’s largest online encyclopedia. It stands among the top ten most commonly used Internet resources in Ukraine and Russia, along with Google, YouTube and Facebook. According to Alexa (a division of Amazon.com, collecting site visits statistics), in 2021, in Russia, Wikipedia took tenth place in the rankings9 and in Ukraine eighth place.10 According to the Tumblr account Maps on The Web, in Ukraine in 2020 Wikipedia was the most commonly visited site.11 Wikipedia cannot really be considered a reliable information resource, but it is undoubtedly very popular. The reasons behind this popularity is the source’s immense availability, which generally means it is the first source of information the user comes across. Due to that fact, it has a significant impact on the structure of knowledge on a particular topic. This fact is significant, because the use of Wikipedia in the educational process is constantly growing. In the Ukrainian or Russian higher education institutions it is common for students to write and edit Wikipedia articles, while learning certain subjects or presenting their research. This practice is coordinated by the Education program called “Wikipedia/Wikimedia.” More than 20 higher educational institutions cooperate with the program in Ukraine. In Russia alone over 400 articles for Wikipedia were written by students of the Psychology Department of M. Lomonosov Moscow State University between 2015 and 2019 as part of this programme.12 Wikipedia aptly reflects the language situation in Ukraine and Russia. In 2013, the Russian-language section of Wikipedia in Ukraine accounted for more than 70 per cent of readers’ requests. Accordingly, in Russia, the Ukrainian-language section of Wikipedia accounted for less than one per cent. Today, these indicators have not changed significantly – the Russian-language section of Wikipedia is dominated by the Ukrainian-language section of the site regarding the frequency of appeals from Ukrainian readers, although the latter’s audience has actually been growing from year to year. In July 2020, the residents of Ukraine visited the Russian-language Wikipedia 97 million times, while the

 https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Вікіпедія:Статистика (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://ru.wikiscan.org/ and https://uk.wikiscan.org/ (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/RU (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/UA (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/RU (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://ru.wikimedia.org/wiki/Образовательная_программа_в_МГУ (accessed July 10, 2022).

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Ukrainian-language section was only visited 32 million times.13 This situation has one important technical nuance. The priority of language when searching on Google is automatically determined by the language profile of the device from which the Internet is accessed. Moreover, many Ukrainian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have smartphones with a Russian-language interface. Therefore, the Russian section of Wikipedia retains a significant impact on the information space of Ukraine. As a result, the long-standing competition between the two language sections of Wikipedia has turned into a confrontation after Russia started the war. For example, there is a widespread opinion among Ukrainian Wikipedians about the need to avoid reading articles in the Russian-language section of the encyclopedia. If in 2014 Wikipedia was discussed to be an object of information warfare,14 then in 2020 we started talking about the “information war on Wikipedia.”15

Crimea as the “Apple of Discord” The “hot spot” of this confrontation is the history of Crimea (the Crimean Peninsula), which Russia annexed in early 2014. From a holistic viewpoint, the Crimean annexation exemplified an instance of revisionist behavior emanating from material motives – the aim was to enlarge its territory to the detriment of the country’s Western neighbour and to reinstate control over a strategically important region.16 The annexation was preceded by a hybrid war executed on three distinctive levels: integration, information warfare and military war. Integration was employed as a concentrated operation of all available military, political, economic, informational or other measures; integration of military means was centred on deployment of the so-called little green men or polite people (soldiers without their rank insignias or indication of army allegiance), naval infantry, airborne troops and special forces.17 This ideological and informational war

 Oksana Dumsʹka Informatsiyna viyna Ukrayiny ta Rosiyi u Vikipediyi: khto vyhraye?, n.d., https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/information-war-in-wiki/30792437.html (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2014/08/18_a_6179921.shtml (accessed July 10, 2022).  Ibid.  Jan Eichler, War, Peace and International Security From Sarajevo to Crimea (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 201.  Mark Galeotti, Mark. “‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’ – How it Works and How it Doesn’t?” In Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, ed. Richard Sakwa and Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska (London: eIR, 2015).

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which aimed to impact the peninsula started long before 2014.18 However, we are more interested in the battle on the information front, namely the one laid out on the Wikipedia pages. We aim to investigate and compare the nature of changes in the content of articles in the Ukrainian and Russian sections of Wikipedia regarding the history of Crimea and determine their semantic load. We are especially interested in the varying assessment of critical historical events and processes. The term “wiki history,” used in the article’s title, should be provided with a more profound explanation. We understand wiki history as a set of articles on the history of Crimea in one of the language sections of Wikipedia. A key feature of wiki history common to all sections is that it should be considered a complex self-organised, decentralised folksonomy (folk + taxonomy). Folksonomy is the spontaneous cooperation of a large and indefinite number of people on the classification of information by arbitrarily selecting keywords (tags), creating on their basic text pages (articles) that have cross-references (hypertext). The participants of this cooperation include people with different experiences, motivations and beliefs. Therefore, authors’ viewpoints can often be antagonistic, forcing a search for legitimate consensus and textual analysis. It is believed that the antagonism of views with the involvement of as many authors as possible contributes to the objectivity and stylistic consistency of Wikipedia articles.19 An excellent example of the relevance of this thesis is the comparison of the Ukrainian and Russian editions of one of the central articles in the context of the research focus of “Crimean Khanate.” The article in the Russian-language section of the site has a long history of editing and manifestations of antagonism. The result is the text in Russian has a more neutral point of view. The period preceding the abolishment of the Khanate (1735–1783) is set out in three subsections with the mostly neutral titles “The Russian-Turkish war of 1735–1739 and the destruction of Crimea,” “The Russian-Turkish war of 1768–1774 and the KuchukKainarji peace” and “The Last Khans and the Conquest of Crimea by the Russian Empire.”20 Meanwhile, the same period is described in the Ukrainian language

 Ibid.  E. Bryzgin, A. Vojskunskij and S. Kozlovskij, “Psihologičeskij analiz praktičeskogo opyta razrabotki onlajn-enciklopedii Vikipediâ,” Sibirskij psihologičeskij žurnal 73 (2019): 17–39.  https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA% D0%BE%D0%B5_%D1%85%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE (accessed July 10, 2022).

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edition in two subsections emotionally titled “The Destruction of Crimea” and “Death.”21 This tendency of “RU neutrality-UA emotionality” is repeatedly observed in the subheadings and content of these articles, notwithstanding the fact that close to half of both sets of articles was written and edited in 2019 by the same author, who had to consider the editorial policies’ differences introduced by the administrators of both language sections of Wikipedia. The primary task is to analyse the main articles on the researched issues – “History of Crimea” in the Russian-language section and “History of Crimea” in the Ukrainian-language edition of Wikipedia. They play a significant role in forming evaluative judgments about specific historical events, processes and figures. In addition, they specify the root system of cross-references. Both were created almost simultaneously in 2006, but the history of their writing is different. During the first year after the article has been released (March 29, 2006– March 28, 2007, last edited on December 29, 2006), the “History of Crimea” in the Ukrainian-language section has not undergone drastic changes compared to the original version. There were merely 11 edits from six editors during this period and its weight increased from 17.9 to 18.7 kilobytes. The article was written in a chaotic manner. It did not have a clear structure. In addition to the body of the article itself, only one section of the table of contents was singled out – the “chronicle,” which provided 14 dates. Half of the text was devoted to the era of antiquity, while the processes of modern history were hardly covered. The whole history of the twentieth century was limited to four lines of text.22 However, over its first year (August 15, 2006–August 14, 2007, last edited on July 18, 2007), the article “History of Crimea” in the Russian-language section of Wikipedia has undergone significant changes. Its structure was also amended during the first year. The criterion of nationality was covered in six chapters of the article. The body of the article increased from 2.5 to 23.9 kilobytes. Ten editors made 39 editions, and five of them introduced significant edits. The article borrowed heavily from the Ukrainian-language text, which is an important detail. In addition to antiquity, much attention was paid to when Crimea was a part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. Interestingly, these two distinct periods were combined in one chapter. The climactic event in this chapter, and the article in general, was the “transfer of Crimea” to the USSR in

 Ibid.  https://uk.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%D0%86%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1% 80%D1%96%D1%8F_%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D1%83&oldid=389531 (accessed July 10, 2022).

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1954. The next chapter, “As part of Ukraine since 1991,” included only two sentences about the failed attempt to proclaim the declaration of state sovereignty of Crimea.23 The following chronological section is the end of 2013, particularly the beginning of the Euromaidan events (November 21, 2013). At that time, the studied articles had undergone significant improvements. The main improvement of the Ukrainian-language article was the emergence of a structure based on the neutral allocation of mostly unnamed periods: “12–15th century,” “16–18th century” and so on. Along with the previous chronological structure, the Russianlanguage article gained two thematic sections – a list of statistical data on the population of Crimea in the eighteenth to early twenty-first century and a set of historical maps of the peninsula. At the same time, the ideas of these texts became increasingly opposite. The Ukrainian-language article focused on presenting the historical ties between Ukraine and Crimea, and the Russian-language article focused on presenting the past of the peninsula as a mosaic of colorful ethnicity. The nature of the edits of both articles during Russia’s military operation to seize Crimea is quite symbolic (February 20, 2013–March 21, 2014). The Ukrainian article was supplemented by a section “The 21st Century. Annexation by the Russian Federation.”24 However, the process of editing in the Russian article was more dynamic. In March 2014, an absolute record of article edits was set – 256 edits, i.e. 60% of edits during the year, or 16.5% from the time the article was first posted.25 Over one month, the article was protected from non-consensual edits five times. The “war of edits” was caused by unreliable sources of information, mostly news sites. Finally, two more chapters were added – the “Crimean Crisis” and “As part of Russia since 2014.” Furthermore, other sections of the article have been revised, and additional notes were posted.26

 https://ru.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1% 80%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%9A%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D0%B0&oldid=4924017 (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://uk.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%D0%86%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1% 80%D1%96%D1%8F_%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D1%83&oldid=14089819 (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://xtools.wmflabs.org/articleinfo/ru.wikipedia.org/%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0% BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%9A%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D0%B0?uselang=ru# month-counts (accessed July 10, 2022).  https://xtools.wmflabs.org/articleinfo/ru.wikipedia.org/%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0% BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%9A%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D0%B0?uselang=ru# month-counts (accessed July 10, 2022).

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By the time this text had been completed (as of September 1, 2021), the “History of Crimea” in both language sections of Wikipedia had about the same number of edits, but a different editing history. The article in the Ukrainian-language section is more unambiguous in terms of meaning, whereas the article in the Russian-language section shows signs of protracted “editing wars” between groups of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian authors. A comparative analysis of both articles indicates an advancing process of asymmetry in relation to terminology and meanings. For example, the Ukrainian-language article emphasises the military cooperation between the Crimean Khanate and the Hetmanate in the seventeenth century. In contrast, the Russian-language article devotes quite a lot of attention to the Russian-Turkish wars of the following century. The years between 1917 and 1921 are characterised as a revolution and a civil war in the Ukrainian-language article, whilst the same events in the Russian-language article are considered to only have been a part of a civil war. The events of 2014 are called the annexation of Crimea in the Ukrainian-language article. The Russian article described it as the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation. This terminological asymmetry is projected onto other articles on the history of Crimea in both language sections of Wikipedia. For example, the article in the Russian-language section named “The Accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation” is corresponding to the Ukrainian-language article called “The Annexation of Crimea (2014).” Another manifestation of the asymmetry of terminology are texts which have no counterparts in another language section. For example, an article from the Russian edition called “The problem of Crimean belonging” has no equivalent in the Ukrainian-language section of Wikipedia. The aforementioned terminological asymmetry is not only a reflection of the differences between Ukrainian and Russian historiography, hastily progressing in regard to the history of Crimea recently. It is a by-product of mixed political messages in both countries broadcast and reproduced by the mass media. The principle of language priority is also highlighted – each language section of Wikipedia prefers the “native” language sources. In general, the analysis of the chronology in the creation of Russian-language and Ukrainian-language articles on “The History of Crimea” on Wikipedia gives grounds to claim that, in terms of the editing process, the actions are considered to be largely politicised and determined by the dynamics of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation over Crimea. This inference is of primary relevance to other articles on the history of Crimea in both language sections of the site. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation has intensified the process of creating and editing other articles on the history of Crimea in both language sections of Wikipedia. The stimulus primarily came from organisations

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that administer the Ukrainian-language and Russian-language sections of Wikipedia. In 2009, Wikimedia RU organised the Crimean Week under the Thematic Week of the Russian-Speaking Regions of the World project. Since 2014, the Crimean Weeks have been held almost every year (2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). The main goal of the latter was to increase the number of articles about Crimea in the Russian-language version of Wikipedia by translating articles from other language versions of the site and writing independent articles based on the “Russian and Crimean sources.”27 In general, there is a tendency to reduce the functionality of these theme weeks. In 2015, 39 (64%) of the 61 planned articles were actually completed. In 2020, only eight (22%) of the 37 expected contributions were prepared. There is a consistent high rate of translation of articles from other language sections of Wikipedia. In 2015, eight articles were intended to be translations from other sections (five from German and three from English) out of 61 articles planned to be contributed. In 2020, seven texts (three articles from the Ukrainian section, two from the English section, one from the Tatar and one from German sections of the site) out of the expected 37 were to be translated. At the same time, the thematic priorities changed. In 2015, the content dedicated to Crimea during World War II (especially the German occupation authorities) was popular. In 2020, the most popular topic was the history of the Crimean Tatars (10 out of the 37 planned for writing). In the summer of 2015, Wikimedia Ukraine took up its most significant initiative to contribute articles on various Crimean topics, including history, which was the theme month called “The Sights of Ukraine: Crimea.” As a result, 346 articles about historical monuments and settlements of Crimea were prepared. Thus, the Ukrainian-language section of Wikipedia shows a much higher rate of growth in the number of articles on the history of Crimea. Their quality, however, remains poor. Since their 2015 inception, most articles have not been revised. The texts show a number of grave problems – incomplete structure, single primary source, incomplete or short text, a poor translation. Among the Wikimedia Ukraine initiatives some have state support. For example, the mentioned theme month was supported by the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine. Another example of such cooperation is the Month of Ukrainian

 https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82:% D0%A2%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA% D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8F_%D0%B5%D0% B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%85_%D1% 80%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2/%D0%9A%D1%80%D1% 8B%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0% BB%D1%8F (accessed July 10, 2022).

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Diplomacy held in May 2020, a joint project of Wikimedia Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Several articles related to the history of Crimea were also prepared during this event (for example, “International reaction to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation” and “Historical background of the pro-Russian riots of 2014 in Ukraine”). There is another vital feature of articles on the history of Crimea in the Ukrainian and Russian sections of Wikipedia which deserves special attention. It concerns the dialogic nature of some articles bearing the same title, manifested not only in translations of these articles but also in the “editing pendulum” – editing of an article in one language leads to the introduction of editing in another language section. Usually the translation is followed by an unremarkable but specific revision, which is not always supported by the sources. For example, the Russianlanguage article about the leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement in the early twentieth century, Noman Chelebidzikhan (published on October 25, 2006), is based on an article in the Ukrainian-language section of Wikipedia (published on December 30, 2005). However, the semantics of both texts are not corresponding to each other. Thus, in the Ukrainian article, Noman Chelebidzikhan advocates cooperation between Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian People’s Republic and victims of Bolshevik terror. The Russian article does not mention his sympathetic attitude towards the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and the cause of his tragic death in 1918 is called an anarcho-revolutionary terror. Another example of a revised translation and an “editing pendulum” is the Ukrainian and Russian articles “Transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR.” The piece in the Russian-language section of Wikipedia was created on February 20, 2010, and the Ukrainian-language section had its counterpart on April 10, 2014. In response to the fact that the Russian-language version of the article included a section called “The question of the legality of the transfer of Crimea to the UkrSSR,” the Ukrainian-language article introduced a rebuttal section with the title “Myths about the illegitimacy of the Crimea’s transfer.”28 Finally, it is important to compare how cross-references link articles on the history of Crimea in both language sections of Wikipedia. In the Ukrainian-language section of the site, Crimea is presented as an ethnohistorical region of Europe, while the Russian-language section claims it is the imperial and Soviet heritage of

 https://uk.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%D0%9F%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0% B4%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0_%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D1%81%D1%8C%D0% BA%D0%BE%D1%97_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%96_%D0% B7%D1%96_%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%83_%D0%A0%D0%A0% D0%A4%D0%A1%D0%A0_%D0%B4%D0%BE_%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0% B4%D1%83_%D0%A3%D0%A0%D0%A1%D0%A0&oldid=14173133 (accessed July 10, 2022).

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Russia. An eloquent illustration of this thesis consists of a list of related articles with its main title being “History of Crimea.” In the Ukrainian-language section of Wikipedia, the top three include the following articles: “Crimean Khanate,” “Noman Chelebidzikhan” and “Crimean Democratic Republic.” In the Russian-language section of the site, the first three related articles are different: “History of Sevastopol,” “Accession of Crimea to the Russian Empire” and “Ukrainians in Crimea.” As a result, we should note that articles on the history of Crimea in the Ukrainian and Russian sections of Wikipedia (we tentatively call their combination wiki history) are created and improved under the significant influence of the current political situation, and the dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The use of history as a tool for substantiating and legitimising the territorial claims has intensified. In turn, the instrumental use of history, and the predominance of evaluative judgments over facts undermines one of the basic principles which Wikipedia boasts to be ambassador to – the principle of neutrality. Both versions of the wiki history of Crimea exist in post-truth circumstances – they are not only a way and product of knowledge, but conscious or unconscious manipulation is also involved in its creation. On the other hand the regular internet users, for whom conflict on Wikipedia is said to be “as addictive as cocaine,” tend to participate in these conflicts.29 It is their actions that fuel conflict between nations and help to achieve propaganda goals.

References Bryzgin, E., A. Vojskunskij and S. Kozlovskij. “Psihologičeskij analiz praktičeskogo opyta razrabotki onlajn-enciklopedii Vikipediâ.” Sibirskij psihologičeskij žurnal 73 (2019): 17–39. Dumsʹka O. Informatsiyna viyna Ukrayiny ta Rosiyi u Vikipediyi: khto vyhraye? n.d. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/information-war-in-wiki/30792437.html. Eichler, Jan. War, Peace and International Security. From Sarajevo to Crimea. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Galeotti, Mark. “‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’ – How it Works and How it Doen’t?” In Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, 156–64. London: EIR Publishing, 2015. Edited by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska & Richard Sakwa. Head, Alison J., and Michael B. Eisenberg. “How today’s College Students Use Wikipedia for Course-Related Research.” First Monday 15, no. 3 (2010). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm. v15i3.2830.

 J.M. Reagle. ““Be nice”: Wikipedia norms for supportive communication.” New Review of Hypermedia and Multimedia 16, no. 1–2 (2010): 161–80.

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Jemielniak, Dariusz. Common Knowledge? An Ethnography of Wikipedia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. Kamionka. Mateusz. “Patriotism of the Young Generation in Ukraine in the Era of Hybrid War.” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 18, no. 1 (2020): 221–39. https://doi.org/10.47459/ lasr.2020.18.10. Lund. Arwid. Wikipedia, Work and Capitalism. A Realm of Freedom? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Pentzold, C. “Imagining the Wikipedia community: What do Wikipedia authors mean when they write about their “community”?” New Media and Society 13, no. 5 (2011): 704–21. Reagle, J. M. ““Be nice”: Wikipedia norms for supportive communication.” New Review of Hypermedia and Multimedia 16, no. 1–2 (2010): 161–80.

Elena Makarova

The Problem of Preserving Monumental Objects of Art during Contemporary International Conflicts (on the Example of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict) Abstract: The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine led to a change in the attitude of part of the population towards existing objects of monumental art in the country, the creation of new commemorative signs on the territory of either side and their consequent desecration. The study aims to identify the reasons contributing to the modern desecration and dismantling of objects located in the territory of Ukraine. The article is based on the analysis of scientific literature and open sources. The author systematises commemorative signs according to spatial localisation into conditional groups: dedicated to those killed in the Donbass or at the Donbass. When comparing the appearance of monumental art objects representing both groups, symbols were identified that ideologically unite and divide the population of the country. The latter may be the reason for the desecration and dismantling of the installed commemorative marks by representatives of another “camp.” In the future, it is proposed to enter a new stage of the memorialisation of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine, which consists of the creation of facilities acceptable to both sides. Keywords: monumental objects of art, memorialisation, desecration, dismantling, armed conflict in the east of Ukraine

Protection or Desecration and Dismantling of Commemorative Monuments that Existed before the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine In the literature, there is no unambiguous definition of the events that occurred during the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. In some sources, this period is called the “Russian-Ukrainian conflict,”1 while in others “The Russo-Ukrainian  Olga I. Brusylovska, “Russian-Ukrainian conflict. First stage: propaganda war,” Vіsnik Odes’kogo natsіonal’nogo unіversitetu. Serіya: Sotsіologіya і polіtichnі nauki, t. 20, no. 2 (2015): 59, 61; https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-007

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War”2 or “Armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.”3 The start of the conflict is marked on April 6, 2014.4 The combat unfolded on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine. Specific researchers opinionate this conflict as belonging to the category of violent.5 The literature reports in various ways as to the number of its victims. According to certain data, “As of early 2020, the conflict led to more than four thousand combat and non-combat deaths among the Ukrainian military and its affiliated units . . .”6 Considering other estimates, “the total number of casualties associated with the conflict in Ukraine (from April 14, 2014 to February 15, 2020) is 41–44 thousand: 13–12.3 thousand deaths (at least 3350 civilians, about 9,750 thousand combatants) and 29–31 thousand wounded (about 7–9 thousand civilians, 9.5–10.5 thousand Ukrainian military and about 22–24 thousand combatants).”7 The conflict split Ukraine as a state:8 part of its constitutional territory (Donbass) is occupied by the unrecognised republics of the DPR9 and LPR.10,11 At the same time, the objects of monumental art turned out to be visual markers of people’s attitude to the new reality, which manifested itself in the reassessment of the commemorative objects that existed before the start of the conflict.12 For example,

V’yacheslav І. Lyashenko and Roman V. Prokopenko and Sergіy V. Dzyuba, “Stsenarії rinkovoї orієntatsії zovnіshn’oekonomіchnoї dіyal’nostі Pridnіprovs’kogo ekonomіchnogo rayonu v suchasnikh umovakh,” Ekonomіchniy vіsnik Donbasu (2017): 75–76, 83, 86, 89; Viktor I. Mironenko, “Tret’ya ukrainskaya respublika. Razmyshleniya o periodizatsii istorii Ukrainy,” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, no. 6 (2018): 114.  Amos C. Fox and Andrew J. Rossow, “Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo–Ukrainian War,” The Land Warfare Papers, no. 112 (2017): 1, 4–5, 7, 10–11.  Viktor I. Mironenko, “Tret’ya ukrainskaya respublika. Razmyshleniya o periodizatsii istorii Ukrainy,” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, no. 6 (2018): 115.  Yana V. Komar, “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh,” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 341.  Anna Glew, “Path dependent: positioning Ukrainian war memorials in a post-Soviet landscape,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 63, no. 1–2 (2021): 233.  Anna Glew, “Path dependent: positioning Ukrainian war memorials in a post-Soviet landscape,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 63, no. 1–2 (2021): 237.  Yana V. Komar, “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh,” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 341.  Oksana B. Pen’kova, “Mesta pamyati” Donbassa: novye smysly i novye pamyatniki,” Donetskie chteniya 2018: obrazovanie, nauka, innovatsii, kul’tura i vyzovy sovremennosti (2018): 140.  Donetsk People’s Republic.  Luhansk People’s Republic.  Yana V. Komar, “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh,” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 341.  Oksana B. Pen’kova, ““Mesta pamyati” Donbassa: novye smysly i novye pamyatniki,” Donetskie chteniya 2018: obrazovanie, nauka, innovatsii, kul’tura i vyzovy sovremennosti (2018): 140–41.

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an attempt to dismantle the monument of V.I. Lenin in 2016 in Donetsk caused a sharp public outcry among the townspeople.13 In turn, the monuments “Artem” and “Glory to the miners’ labor” are now “perceived as a symbol of the unconquered spirit of Donbass.”14 The monument “Victims of Fascism,” the memorial “Your Liberators, Donbass,” a monument to General Vatutin and others have acquired “colossal potential as a means of manifesting their identity” for the residents of the unrecognised republics.15 The process of rethinking the significance of already existing objects of monumental art in Ukraine was also expressed in their desecration and attempts to dismantle them. Notably, a statue of G.K. Zhukov was destroyed in June 2019 and a bas-relief dedicated to the Marshal in Odessa on February 4, 2020.16 On February 10, 2020, in Kyiv, the monument to N. Vatutin was once again covered with bright green; two years earlier there had been an attempt to dismantle this commemorative symbol.17 In April 2020, a monument to a Soviet soldier was beheaded in the Ternopil region.18 Based on the above examples, the acts of aggression were aimed at objects of monumental art dedicated to the Soviet period of Ukrainian life. The most important reason for these actions may be the memory policy of the state. Consequently, E.I. Krasilnikova, by the term “Memory politics,” means “the totality of all kinds of actions of politicians and officials, having formal legitimation, the purpose of which is to maintain, supplant or redefine certain elements of collective memory.”19 At the same time, the researcher emphasises that “aggressive ideologization of the past and attempts to influence consciousness by methods of monumental propaganda often lead society into a state of tension, confrontation, and sometimes lead to outbursts of physical aggression.”20

 Oksana B. Pen’kova, ““Mesta pamyati” Donbassa: novye smysly i novye pamyatniki,” Donetskie chteniya 2018: obrazovanie, nauka, innovatsii, kul’tura i vyzovy sovremennosti (2018): 140.  Ibid.  Ibid.  Vandalizm vo vremya chumy: ukrainskie natsionalisty rushat sovetskie pamyatniki, n.d., https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/02042020-vandalizm-vo-vremyachumy-ukrainskie-natsionalisty-rushat-sovetskie-pamyatniki/ (accessed March 25, 2021).  Ibid.  Ibid.  Ekaterina I. Krasil’nikova, “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri,” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotyki 17, no. 3 (2018): 60.  Ekaterina I. Krasil’nikova, “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri,” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotyki 17, no. 3 (2018): 60.

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Certain objects of monumental art located on the territory of the post-Soviet space and countries of the former socialist camp are subjected to desecration and dismantling. Hence, the researcher M. Szajda points out the problem associated with counting the number of memorial plaques installed in the cultural landscape of Jelenia Góra since 1945. This problem is associated with the dismantling of commemorative objects or acts of vandalism in relation to some of them in the course of the change of political system in the country and in the subsequent period.21 At the same time, they dismantled “the most glaring objects associated with communism.” It was in the first years after the change of the country’s political course.22 Other reasons may include a sense of support for the official ideology23 and the current law in Ukraine “On the Condemnation of the Communist and Nazi Regimes”24 under which, however, war heroes do not fall.25 However, objects of monumental art that have nothing to do with the Soviet past of Ukraine were also subjected to acts of aggression during this period. These include a commemorative sign dedicated to an earlier period – the reunification of Russia and Ukraine in 1564. On March 24, 2021 (one day after its installation) in the village of Russian Lozova (Kharkov region), the Stone of Friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples was destroyed. The commemorative mark was also destroyed in 2017.26 In this case, the aggression was aimed at Ukraine’s friendship with Russia. Perhaps the most common reason for acts of vandalism in relation to the aforementioned monumental art objects is the following: “As a result of their

 Marek Szajda, “Pamięć wyryta w kamieniu. Wybrane aspekty pamięci społecznej na przykładzie tablic pamiątkowych w Jeleniej Górze w latach 1945–2012,” Letnia szkoła historii najnowszej 2012. Referaty / Pod redakcją K. Dworaczka i Ł. Kamińskiego (Warszawa, 2013), t. 6, 170.  Marek Szajda, “Pamięć wyryta w kamieniu. Wybrane aspekty pamięci społecznej na przykładzie tablic pamiątkowych w Jeleniej Górze w latach 1945–2012,” Letnia szkoła historii najnowszej 2012. Referaty / Pod redakcją K. Dworaczka i Ł. Kamińskiego (Warszawa, 2013), t. 6, 171.  Vandalizm vo vremya chumy: ukrainskie natsionalisty rushat sovetskie pamyatniki, n.d., https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/02042020-vandalizm-vo-vremyachumy-ukrainskie-natsionalisty-rushat-sovetskie-pamyatniki/ (accessed March 25, 2021).  Ofitsiyniy portal Verkhovnoї Radi Ukraiїni, n.d., https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/web proc4_1?pf3511=54670 (accessed August 22, 2021).  Vandalizm vo vremya chumy: ukraińskie natsionalisty rushat sovetskie pamyatniki, n.d., https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/02042020-vandalizm-vo-vremyachumy-ukrainskie-natsionalisty-rushat-sovetskie-pamyatniki/ (accessed March 25, 2021).  Dmitriy Rastorguev, Pod Khar’kovom radikaly unichtozhili pamyatnik druzhbe ukrainskogo i russkogo narodov (video), n.d., https://sharij.net/pod-harkovom-radikaly-unichtoz hili-pamyatnik-druzhbe-ukrainskogo-i-russkogo-narodov 49363 (accessed March 25, 2021).

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removal from public space, they were also removed from memory.”27 As a result, after dismantling, the object in the future remains invisible to both a passer-by and a researcher.28 Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that in the case of any act of hooliganism or intentional damage to a commemorative symbol, the source of such behaviour is the individual’s desire to perpetuate their own memory. Therefore, researcher T.V. Shmeleva claims that “in principle, any person can act as a subject of perpetuation, having inscribed ‘Vasya was here’ on the surface of virtually anything.”29

The Emergence of the Objects of Memorial Art Dedicated to the Armed Conflict in the East of Ukraine and the Events Timed to Coincide with their Opening Another tendency, resulting from the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, was demonstrated by the need for the population to perpetuate the memory of the victims. Examples of memorial art objects placed in the territory of Ukraine, both inside and outside the Donbass chapels, have been presented below. Commemorative objects were placed in locations of varying population density, from sparsely populated areas to larger cities. For objectivity of comparison, the article provides the same number of objects installed in the Donbass area and beyond. Commemorative signs were installed from 2014 to 2020, and their unveiling was often timed to coincide with a specific event. These objects of monumental art are a part of institutional memorialisation according to the classification of Ya. V. Komar,30 and are represented as memorial complexes, memorials, sculptural compositions,

 Marek Szajda, “Pamięć wyryta w kamieniu. Wybrane aspekty pamięci społecznej na przykładzie tablic pamiątkowych w Jeleniej Górze w latach 1945–2012,” Letnia szkoła historii najnowszej 2012. Referaty / Pod redakcją K. Dworaczka i Ł. Kamińskiego, t. 6, 170 (Warszawa, 2013).  Ibid, 176.  Tat’yana V. Shmeleva, “Memorializatsiya kak kul’turnaya praktika i onomastikon Velikogo Novgoroda,” Novgorodika-2015: ot Pravdy russkoy k rossiyskomu konstitutsionalizmu. Materialy V Mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii (Velikiy Novgorod, 2016), 123.  Yana V. Komar, “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh,” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 342.

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monuments and memorial plaques. All of the following commemorative symbols are dedicated to the ones who died a tragic death. One of the first commemorative signs dedicated to the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine is the memorial “To the Soldiers of the Patriots of Ukraine,” installed on October 9, 2014 in Kyiv. The following inscription is placed on the object: “Тим, хто виконав обов’язок, зберігши честь і гідність”. The unveiling of the memorial was accompanied by a prayer of gratitude and a minute of silence.31 Another monument dedicated to the soldiers and heroes killed in armed conflict in the east of Ukraine was erected in the city of Krivoy Rog on March 19, 2016. The sculpture of a soldier is placed between the symbolic wings of the plane that was shot down near Luhansk in June 2014.32 Another memorial, erected in the memory of those killed in the Donbass region, consists of a Hall of Memory and a Stella with a bell. The facility was unveiled on October 14, 2018,33 in Kyiv. As intended by its authors, the number of bell strikes symbolises the number of victims on a given day.34 In turn, a monument dedicated to the heroes killed in the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine was unveiled on October 14, 2020 in the urban-type settlement Pershotravensk (Zhytomyr region). During the event flowers were laid, and the memory of the victims was marked with a minute of silence.35 The sculpture of the object (like the commemorative monuments located in the cities of Krivoy Rog and Kiev) is a soldier in a uniform decorated by an Ukraine emblem. A soldier holds a weapon in his hand. The flower compositions brought to the monument represent the colors of the Ukrainian flag. Objects of monumental art dedicated to the soldiers who died in the Donbass region have common features. Their inscriptions “tell of the heroism of the Ukrainian soldiers and their sacrifice in the name of the nation.”36 In addition, images of swords and mentions of the Cossacks that are often found in the visual series “link the present-day conflict to Ukraine’s historical

 V Obolons’komu rayonі vіdkrili pam’yatniy znak voїnam-patrіotam Ukraїni, n.d., https:// obolon.kyivcity.gov.ua/news/2171.html (accessed October 3, 2021).  V Krivom Roge otkryli pamyatnik boytsam ATO, n.d., https://sharij.net/49363 (accessed October 3, 2021).  Date October 14 since 2014 in the country is a public holiday, Day of Defenders of Ukraine.  V Kieve otkryli Zal pamyati zashchitnikov Ukrainy s kolokolom, kotoryy budet zvonit’ po pogibshim voennym, n.d., https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/v-kyeve-otkryly-zal-pamiaty-zashchytny kov-ukrayny-s-kolokolom-kotoryi-budet-zvonyt-po-pohybshym-voennym (accessed October 11, 2021).  V Pershotravenske otkryt pamyatnyy znak pogibshim boytsam ATO/OOS, n.d., https:// beg.dp.ua/otkryt-pamjatnyj-znak/ (accessed September 9, 2021).  Anna Glew, “Path dependent: positioning Ukrainian war memorials in a post-Soviet landscape,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 63, no. 1–2 (2021): 237.

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struggles for independence, while also presenting Ukrainian soldiers as brave and noble warriors.”37 In only one Poltava region, corresponding commemorative objects were installed in the cities of Poltava, Gadyach, Horishnye Plavni, Karlovka, Kobelyaki and Mirgorod.38 It’s useful to note the objects of monumental art located in the territory of Donbass are mainly dedicated to civilians of the DPR and LPR. Donetsk has a memorial complex called the “Alley of Angels,” including the following: a memorial plaque, a sculptural composition and a forged arch dedicated to the children who died in Donbass. These objects were installed from May 3, 2015 to July 2, 2017. The sculptural composition shows a boy looking at the sky and shielding his little sister. The unveiling of the memorial art object was accompanied by a prayer for peace in Donbass.39 The composition of the wrought-iron arch includes metal roses – the symbol of Donetsk – and doves as a representation of the world. On May 7, 2016, the “Sorrow and Sadness” monument, dedicated to the civilians who died in the city, was erected in the territory of Gorlovka. The structure of the memorial represents two semi-arches, symbolising the hands of parents, protecting children from the horrors of war.40 The composition also includes a black bell, traditionally associated with grief. On May 12, 2016,41 the sculptural arrangement “They defended the Motherland” was unveiled in Lugansk to commemorate the soldiers-defenders of the LPR. Flowers were laid at the foot of the memorial, and dozens of balloons symbolising peace were released into the sky.42 In a less populated area of the “Metallist” (Slavyanoserbsk district of the LPR) village, a memorial dedicated to fallen civilians, soldiers and militiamen was erected in 2017 during the unveiling of which flowers were laid.43 In total, from 2014 to 2020, more than 100 memorial objects in the form of memorial plaques, memorial signs, monuments and memorial complexes were installed in

 Ibid.  Ibid.  V Donetske otkryli pamyatnik detyam Donbassa, n.d., https://regnum.ru/news/polit/ 2283376.html (accessed October 4, 2021).  Yana V. Komar, “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh,” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 350.  Day of the Luhansk People’s Republic.  Inna Tkacheva, Oni otstoyali Rodinu: v Luganske sostoyalos’ otkrytie pamyatnika zashchitnikam Luganshchiny, n.d., https://miaistok.su/61163 (accessed September 28, 2021).  Zhiteli Metallista otkryli pamyatnyy znak pogibshim zemlyakam i zashchitnikam poselka (FOTO), n.d., https://antimaydan.info/2017/09/zhiteli_metallista_otkryli_pamyatnyj_znak_po gibshim_zemlyakam_i_zashitnikam.html (accessed September 21, 2021).

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the territory of Donbass.44 Please note that the “Commemoration of the RussiaUkraine conflict in Ukraine is still in its early stages”;45 therefore, some monuments are scheduled to be erected at a later time under their planning process.

Desecration of Commemorative Signs Dedicated to the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine At the same time, there is no guarantee that the objects installed by both sides will not be subject to desecration or dismantling by another “camp” in the future. In January 2017, in the city of Kryvyi Rih, unknown persons burned the Ukrainian flag at the Stele of Heroes.46 The commemoration facilities found in the territory of Donbass are also subject to acts of aggression and vandalism. For example, the monument “They defended the Motherland,” located in the city of Luhansk, was blown up in 2016 and 2017.47

The Concept of a Common Monumental Art Object Dedicated to the Armed Conflict in the East of Ukraine How can the process of destruction and desecration of monumental art objects dedicated to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine be interrupted? Researchers studying the topic of the Civil War memorialisation in Russia conclude that it is necessary to install an object dedicated to the event which caused the desecration or destruction of certain commemorative signs. According to the researchers, this object, by its appearance, concept, general design and location, should

 Yana V. Komar, “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh,” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 342.  Anna Glew, “Path dependent: positioning Ukrainian war memorials in a post-Soviet landscape,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 63, no. 1–2 (2021): 241.  Pamyatnik boytsam ATO i geroyam Nebesnoy sotni oskvernili v Odesskoy oblasti, n.d., https://lenta.ru/news/2017/09/13/odessa_remembers (accessed September 23, 2021).  Andrey Belen’kiy, V Luganske snova vzorvali pamyatnik opolchentsam, n.d., https://daily storm.ru/news/v-luganske-snova-popytalis-vzorvat-pamyatnik-opolchencam (accessed September 23, 2021).

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reconcile, and not ideologically divide fellow citizens.48 E.I. Krasilnikova endorses this view and calls for new forms of commemoration to be sought, “which do not heroize the complicated past, but express the humanistic meaning of recognizing the tragedy, which should not be repeated.”49 The new symbols associated with the drama of Russia’s civil war must at the same time be of an “evaluatively neutral” nature.50 By way of an example, the researcher proposes an ice-hole as a symbol “expressing the significance of extreme cruelty manifested by both warring parties, as well as a violent policy of oblivion.”51

Conclusion The armed conflict in the east of Ukraine caused a change in the character of some of the Ukrainian commemorative signs from cultural to political. This process entailed the following course of action (including further perspective) in this regard: 1. Protection or desecration or dismantling, i.e. dooming objects of monumental art created before the outbreak of the conflict to a state of enforced oblivion. These commemorative signs are often associated with the memorialisation of the names of heroes related to the Soviet past of the country. The reasons for their desecration may be the state policy of memory, pursued by the authorities during the installation of these objects, the desire of the initiators of the dismantling “to wipe them off the face of the earth” and thereby erase them from collective memory. 2. Formation of a new memory “set in stone,” in line with a different understanding of history and different priorities by each of the “camps.” The objects, however, are represented by symbols that ideologically divide the population of the country, and may be a possible reason for their desecration

 Aleksey V. Sushko and Dmitriy I. Petin, “Bitvy za pamyat’: k voprosu o memorializatsii imeni admirala A. V. Kolchaka v Omske,” Omskiy nauchnyy vestnik. Ser. Obshchestvo. Istoriya. Sovremennost’ 4, no. 4 (2019): 12.  Ekaterina I. Krasil’nikova, “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri,” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotyki 17, no. 3 (2018): 57.  Ekaterina I. Krasil’nikova, “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri,” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotyki 17, no. 3 (2018): 57.  Ekaterina I. Krasil’nikova, “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri,” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotyki 17, no. 3 (2018): 73.

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or dismantling. These include sculptures of the military – the lead actors playing in the confrontational theatre, the glorification of whom is accompanied by an emphasis. It is commemorative signs of this type that are monuments reminiscent of the division into “us” and “others.”52 In turn, according to L.M. Nijakowski: “The attack on the monument is an attack aimed at people, against the social circles surrounding the monument, against various memory communities.”53 At the same time, these objects of monumental art dedicated to the conflict have also been represented by symbols common to the two “camps,” for instance a bell expressing deep pain for human losses, etc. Moreover, the unveiling of commemorative objects, regardless of their location, was accompanied by acts characteristic of any bereaved person: praying and offering flowers. In turn, in open sources, the author did not find cases of desecration of objects dedicated to civilians featuring attempts to refer to collective symbols. Bearing in mind the aforementioned reality, creating collective art monuments dedicated to the events of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, albeit of a neutral nature and serving as a “vaccine against fratricide,” is a fair proposal for the future.54

References Belen’kiy, Andrey. V Luganske snova vzorvali pamyatnik opolchentsam. https://dailystorm. ru/news/v-luganske-snova-popytalis-vzorvat-pamyatnik-opolchencam. Brusylovska, Olga I. “Russian-Ukrainian conflict. First stage: propaganda war.” Vіsnik Odes’kogo natsіonal’nogo unіversitetu. Serіya: Sotsіologіya і polіtichnі nauki 20, no. 2 (2015): 59–64. Fox, Amos C., and Andrew J. Rossow. “Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo–Ukrainian War.” The Land Warfare Papers, no. 112 (2017): 1–18. Glew, Anna. “Path dependent: positioning Ukrainian war memorials in a post-Soviet landscape.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 63, no. 1–2 (2021): 229–47.

 Lech M. Nijakowski, “Domeny symboliczne. O znaczeniu pomników w przestrzeni dominacji symbolicznej na przykładzie Śląska,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo, red. A. Kłoskowska t. 14, nr. 3–4 (Warszawa, 2001), 85.  Lech M. Nijakowski, “Domeny symboliczne. O znaczeniu pomników w przestrzeni dominacji symbolicznej na przykładzie Śląska,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo, red. A. Kłoskowska t. 14, nr. 3–4 (Warszawa, 2001), 85.  Ekaterina I. Krasil’nikova, “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri,” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotiki, 2018, no. 3 (17), 74.

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Komar, Yana V. “Memorializatsiya voennogo konflikta na Donbasse v pamyatnikakh.” Vestnik antropologii, no. 2 (2021): 340–54. Krasil’nikova, Ekaterina I. “Kommemoratsiya protivostoyaniya: konstruirovanie lokusov pamyati o grazhdanskoy voyne v gorodakh Sibiri.” Praksema. Problemy vizual’noy semiotiki, no. 3 (2018): 57–75. Lyashenko, V’yacheslav І., Roman V. Prokopenko and Sergiy V. Dzyuba. “Stsenarії rinkovoї orієntatsії zovnіshn’oekonomіchnoї dіyal’nostі Pridnіprovs’kogo ekonomіchnogo rayonu v suchasnikh umovakh.” Ekonomіchniy vіsnik Donbasu, no. 2 (48) (2017): 75–89. Mironenko, Viktor I. “Tret’ya ukrainskaya respublika. Razmyshleniya o periodizatsii istorii Ukrainy.” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, no. 6 (2018): 114–23. Nijakowski, Lech M. “Domeny symboliczne. O znaczeniu pomników w przestrzeni dominacji symbolicznej na przykładzie Śląska.” In Kultura i Społeczeństwo 14, no. 3–4, edited by A. Kłoskowska, 81–104. Warszawa, 2001. Ofitsiyniy portal Verkhovnoї Radi Ukraiїni. n.d. https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/web proc4_1?pf3511=54670. Pamyatnik boytsam ATO i geroyam Nebesnoy sotni oskvernili v Odesskoy oblasti. n.d. https://lenta.ru/news/2017/09/13/odessa_remembers. Pen’kova, Oksana B. “Mesta pamyati” Donbassa: novye smysly i novye pamyatniki.” In Donetskie chteniya 2018: obrazovanie, nauka, innovatsii, kul’tura i vyzovy sovremennosti, edited by S.V. Bespalova, 139–42. Donetsk: DonNU Publishing House, 2018. Rastorguev, Dmitriy. Pod Khar’kovom radikaly unichtozhili pamyatnik druzhbe ukrainskogo i russkogo narodov (video). n.d. https://sharij.net/pod-harkovom-radikaly-unichtozhilipamyatnik-druzhbe-ukrainskogo-i-russkogo-narodov. Shmeleva, Tat’yana V. “Memorializatsiya kak kul’turnaya praktika i onomastikon Velikogo Novgoroda.” In Novgorodika-2015: ot Pravdy russkoy k rossiyskomu konstitutsionalizmu. Materialy V Mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii, edited by E. V. Toropova et al., 123–130. Velikiy Novgorod: Novgorod University Press, 2016. Sushko, Aleksey V., and Dmitriy I. Petin. “Bitvy za pamyat’: k voprosu o memorializatsii imeni admirala A. V. Kolchaka v Omske.” Omskiy nauchnyy vestnik. Ser. Obshchestvo. Istoriya. Sovremennost’ 4, no. 4 (2019): 9–17. Szajda, Marek. “Pamięć wyryta w kamieniu. Wybrane aspekty pamięci społecznej na przykładzie tablic pamiątkowych w Jeleniej Górze w latach 1945–2012.” In Letnia szkoła historii najnowszej 2012. Referaty 6, edited by Kamila Dworaczka and Łukasz Kamiński, 168–76. Warszawa, 2013. Tkacheva, Inna. Oni otstoyali Rodinu: v Luganske sostoyalos’ otkrytie pamyatnika zashchitnikam Luganshchiny.n.d. https://miaistok.su/61163. V Donetske otkryli pamyatnik detyam Donbassa. n.d. https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2283376. html. V Kieve otkryli Zal pamyati zashchitnikov Ukrainy s kolokolom, kotoryy budet zvonit’ po pogibshim voennym. n.d. https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/v-kyeve-otkryly-zal-pamiatyzashchytnykov-ukrayny-s-kolokolom-kotoryi-budet-zvonyt-po-pohybshym-voennym. V Krivom Roge otkryli pamyatnik boytsam ATO. n.d. https://sharij.net/49363. V Obolons’komu rayonі vіdkrili pam’yatniy znak voїnam-patrіotam Ukraїni. n.d. https://obolon.kyivcity.gov.ua/news/2171.html. V Pershotravenske otkryt pamyatnyy znak pogibshim boytsam ATO/OOS. n.d. https://beg.dp. ua/otkryt-pamjatnyj-znak/.

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Vandalizm vo vremya chumy: ukrainskie natsionalisty rushat sovetskie pamyatniki. n.d. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/02042020-vandalizm-vo-vremyachumy-ukrainskie-natsionalisty-rushat-sovetskie-pamyatniki/. Zhiteli Metallista otkryli pamyatnyy znak pogibshim zemlyakam i zashchitnikam poselka (FOTO). n.d. https://antimaydan.info/2017/09/zhiteli_metallista_otkryli_pamyatnyj_ znak_pogibshim_zemlyakam_i_zashitnikam.html.

From Different Perspectives: History as an Instrument of Politics

Arpine Maniero

Historically Charged Conflict: Nagorno-Karabakh between War and Diplomatic Failure Abstract: On September 27, 2020, nearly 30 years after the outbreak of the armed Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the late 1980s, Azerbaijan provoked another war against the unrecognised Republic of Artsakh.1 This new escalation demonstrated quite explicitly that so-called “frozen conflicts” are never fully frozen and can escalate at any time. Indeed, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never resolved, not even during the seemingly calm Soviet period, and there are good reasons to assume that peace may be unlikely in the medium term. It remains questionable, therefore, whether the agreement that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia signed on November 9, 2020 will contribute to stability in the region. In this context, it is very important to address the question of when and why territorial conflicts escalate. Keywords: Armenia-Azerbaijan, historical memory, “Historikerstreit”, “history war”, Nagorno-Karabakh, territorial conflicts The image of the “historical enemy” that shaped the mutual perception of Armenians and Azerbaijanis for decades has not lost its significance to this day and leads to repeated violence in the border regions of the two countries. Under certain circumstances, when these images are instrumentalised politically, they have the power to mobilise people and even trigger bloody conflicts.2 This indicates a complex problem present in most territorial conflicts: history is related less to the past than to current political imperatives, rendering it an effective political tool.3 And yet the problems that exist in connection with disputed territories are not alone sufficient impetuses for bloody conflicts. Only when “hateful mythologies” that dominate the historical memory are manipulated by the state to serve internal and external political ambitions can “cultural differences often

 Artsakh is the historical Armenian designation for Nagorno-Karabakh.  Petra Bock and Edgar Wolfrum, “Einleitung,” in Umkämpfte Vergangenheit. Geschichtsbilder, Erinnerung und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich, ed. Petra Bock et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 7–14, 7.  Bock and Wolfrum, “Einleitung,” 7; see also Christian Gudehus et al., eds., Gedächtnis und Erinnerung. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart: Springer Verlag, 2010), 8. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-008

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degenerate” into violence.4 Ethnic hostility is then justified by historical memories and narratives, with politics further promoting and reinforcing mistrust and hatred. Historically based arguments have not only political but also social significance, which makes them a crucial factor in territorial conflicts. Monika Duffy Toft has argued that the loss of territory itself is of far less concern for the state than the establishment of a precedent that may encourage other groups to seek self-determination.5 It could be further argued that, not only at the national level but also internationally, the recognition of a seceded territory would set a virulent precedent, threatening the entire post-World War II world order. For this reason, while history cannot be completely separated from negotiation processes, it is rarely taken into account at the international level. Toft then identifies two conditions that, when fulfilled, lead to the bloody escalation of territorial conflicts: 1) the ethnic minority demands sovereignty over the territory it occupies; and 2) the state sees this territory as indivisible from the rest of the state’s territory.6 Both factors are present in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and have remained unresolved by negotiations over the past 30 years – until militant aggression ultimately regained dominance. The most recent war, which followed Azerbaijan’s armament policy of recent decades, dramatically changed the geopolitical situation in the region. What have changed little, however, are the aforementioned enemy images that continue to dominate the ongoing negotiations. Against the backdrop of the border demarcation negotiations and the opening of transport routes, the atmosphere remains extremely heated. Daily shootings, with several (both military and civilian) dead and wounded, dominate everyday life in the border regions and in Artsakh itself. Even the threat of an Azerbaijani attack on Syunik, Armenia’s southern territories, became a reality in November 2021. As a result, several Armenians and Azerbaijanis were killed, and new Armenian prisoners of war were added to those still held in Azerbaijan. This paper focuses on the historical and political dimensions of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The theoretical approach is based on the concept of the homeland, which is of great importance to the formation of national identity and crucial to understanding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in explaining why this particular territory became a catalyst for national aspirations.

 Shalala Mammadova, “Creating the ‘Enemy Nation’: The Difficult Historical Legacies of Armenian–Azerbaijani Relations,” Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 84 (June 2016): 8–13, 13.  Monika Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), 18–19.  Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence, 27.

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Theoretical Framework To define modern nations and explore the impact of their historical antecedents, the principal theorists of nationalism have emphasised the importance of the past in the process of nation-building. In Anthony D. Smith’s concept, the past plays a crucial role in creating the present. Smith based his definition of national identity on, among other things, shared memories associated with a historical territory – a homeland. A fundamental element of his concept is thus the “territorialization of memory,” that is, the connection of shared memories to particular territories from which delimited homelands emerge over time: The ancestral land is the place where, in the shared memories of its inhabitants, the great events that formed the nation took place; the place where the heroes, saints and sages of the community from which the nation later developed lived and worked, and the place where the forefathers and mothers are buried. This last element is particularly important. It ties each family to the homeland through memories of the last resting-place of their ancestors [. . .]7

Remembering the past is thus the key to creating the nation, which nationalists see as the only way to build a collective identity: “In fact, one might almost say: no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation.”8 Memorial rituals and remembrance ceremonies, especially for those who have sacrificed their lives for society, also serve the same identity-building purpose, tying memories to a specific place, the homeland.9 Ronald Suny has made a similar argument, saying that people belonging to a particular ethnic group and sharing traits such as language, religion, historical experience, or a belief in a “common destiny” may derive from this the right to self-determination or control over the defined homeland.10 The stories that people tell about themselves then engender discussion about “boundaries, who is in or out of the group, where the ‘homeland’ begins and ends, what the ‘true’ history of the nation is, what is ‘authentic’ about being national and what is to be rejected.”11 Consequently, the homeland gradually becomes an object of defense along an increasingly radical dividing line between what is perceived as

 Anthony D. Smith, The Antiquity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 75.  Smith, The Antiquity of Nations, 75.  Smith, The Antiquity of Nations, 76.  Ronald G. Suny, “Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations,” The Journal of Modern History 73, no. 4 (December 2001): 862–96, 866; see also Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence, 19.  Ronald G. Suny, “Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999–2000): 139–78, 141.

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one’s own and what is foreign. Particularly by the end of the nineteenth century, the homeland was increasingly thought of as a sanctuary that was static and had to be kept free of any “contamination” by that which was foreign.12 A homeland can be further understood as an “identity-forming habitat,” the loss of which is equated with the loss of national identity. This concept, described by Monika Duffy Toft as an “indivisible homeland,”13 is vital in understanding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. From the Armenian perspective, Artsakh has been an Armenian territory since “ancient times” and was given even greater prominence, as the Armenian principalities, the so-called Khamssa-Meliks, represented a certain form of statehood.14 As a result, this place became not only a centre of the Armenian liberation movement during the eighteenth century but also a symbol of the continual development of the Armenian national identity, reinforced by many historical and religious monuments. For today’s Azerbaijanis, conversely, Nagorno-Karabakh is the place in which their national self-consciousness emerged under the rule of the Muslim khans. The region is considered a part of Caucasian Albania, the territory of which essentially coincides with that of present-day Azerbaijan.15 Both parties consider this place to be the cradle of their national culture and history, and any claims made by the opposing side are seen as attacks on their cultural heritage and national identity. Considering the significance of this historical context, the resolution of the conflict in Armenia and Azerbaijan is comparable to the restoration of historical justice – however this may be interpreted in either society. The conflicting positions appear to be irreconcilable: for Baku, it is a question of territorial integrity, while from the Armenian point of view, the conflict is an intra-Azerbaijani affair concerning the right of the Armenian minority to self-determination. Both parties refer to historical arguments to legitimise their respective points of view, making it difficult to exclude the concept of “historical justice” from conflict resolution strategies. The demand for justice, of course, has no

 Gunther Gebhard, Oliver Geisler and Steffen Schröter, “Heimatdenken: Konjunkturen und Konturen. Statt einer Einleitung,” in Heimat. Konturen und Konjunkturen eines umstrittenen Konzepts, ed. Gunther Gebhard et al. (Bielefeld: transcript, 2007), 9–56, 22.  Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence, 2.  The principalities were established in the sixteenth century and retained their hereditary power and a certain degree of independence until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Robert H. Hewsen, “The Kingdom of Arc’ax,” in Medieval Armenian Culture: Proceedings of the Third Dr. H. Markarian Conference on Armenian Culture, November 7–10, ed. Thomas J. Samuelian et al. (Pennsylvania: Scholars Press, 1984), 42–68; Andranik Aslanyan, Energie- und geopolitische Akteure im Südkaukasus. Der Bergkarabach-Konflikt im Spannungsfeld von Interessen (1991–2015) (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019), 32–33.  Ceylan Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the NagornoKarabakh Conflict (1991–2009),” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 7 (2011): 1223–252, 1234.

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relevance in terms of international law, but it increases the emotionally charged nature of the conflict and complicates the resolution process.16 In this regard, it is hardly surprising that the term Historikerstreit17 or “history war”18 has found its way into historiography on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Historians, writers and journalists on both sides are examining the history in great depth to answer the fundamental question of to which side the disputed territory, which the conflicting parties both see as a crucial historical site for their respective national identities, belongs. In the process, the claims of one side are legitimised, while the opposing party is denied the same rights. Since this historical dimension is essential for understanding the NagornoKarabakh conflict, it is necessary to briefly outline its history.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: The Historical Background One of the key issues in the Historikerstreit over Nagorno-Karabakh is the question of which nation can be considered autochthonous and which immigrant. This implies that while the historical rights of one side to the disputed territory remain unchallenged, the presence of the other side is denied, i.e., an alleged homogeneity is asserted. The methodological challenge here, of course, lies in the fact that the Caucasus region has never been a homogeneous entity; throughout history it has been conquered by various powers, often accompanied by violent migrations and refugee movements. One particularly significant historical moment for the Armenians was the conquest of the Persian ruler Shah Abbas (1571–1629), who initially occupied the South Caucasus but was forced to withdraw under pressure from the Turkish army. During his retreat in 1604, vast numbers of Armenians – various sources

 Aser Babajew, Xenija Grusha and Vera Rogova, “‘Gerechtigkeit’ als Sackgasse oder Ausweg: Konfliktlösungsstrategien für Bergkarabach,” Osteuropa 64, no. 7 (July 2014): 105–20, 108.  Michael Kohrs, “Geschichte als politisches Argument: Der ‘Historikerstreit’ um BergKarabach,” in Osmanismus, Nationalismus und der Kaukasus. Muslime und Christen, Türken und Armenier im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Fikret Adanir et al. (Wiesbaden: C. H. Beck, 2005), 43–63.  Uwe Halbach and Franziska Smolnik, Der Streit um Berg-Karabach. Spezifische Merkmale und die Konfliktparteien (Berlin: SWP-Studie, 2013), 8–9, https://www.swp-berlin.org/filead min/contents/products/studien/2013_S02_hlb_smk.pdf.

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claim the numbers to be tens of thousands of people19 – were resettled in the inner provinces of the Persian Empire, altering the demography of the Yerevan and Nakhijevan Khanates in favour of the Muslim population. The expulsion of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, however, did not erase the Armenian settlements and cultural history in this region, primarily owing to the presence of the Armenian Khamssa-Meliks mentioned above. After Russia’s victory over Persia and the signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchai on February 22, 1828, the Russian Empire incorporated the South Caucasian regions into its territory. Under the terms of the treaty, Armenians were allowed to resettle in the Caucasus. This historical episode is important because it sheds light on the respective national narratives prevalent in today’s politics. According to Azerbaijani historians, Armenians were not settled in the South Caucasus until the nineteenth century, an approach entirely ignoring the great expulsion of the seventeenth century.20 For the Armenians, conversely, the tsarist settlement policy did not mean immigration, rather a return to their historical homeland. The Russian Empire’s conquest of the South Caucasus in the early nineteenth century resulted in it becoming a major player in the emerging conflict. The next decades saw the area integrated into the tsarist administrative system, which, on the one hand, facilitated more efficient administration of the region and provided economic advantages, leading to a relatively long period of political stability and economic integration, while on the other leading to a surge of ethnic mixing (Figure 1). In the course of the nineteenth century, the processes of nationbuilding and modernisation took root, first among the Armenians and Georgians and at the turn of the century also among Tatars21 as well, leading to growing political participation and demands for civil rights as well as for social justice and equality.22 The educated elite returning from Russian and European universities accelerated these developments by contributing to the foundation of new schools, a number of charitable organisations, political parties and the native language

 Sebouh Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Edmund Herzig, The Deportation of the Armenians in 1604–05 and Europe’s Myth of Shah Abbas I (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1990); Jasmine Dum-Tragut, Armenien. 3000 Jahre Kultur zwischen Ost und West (Berlin: Trescher Verlag, 2019).  Tokluoglu, Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite, 1224.  In the nineteenth century, the Caucasian Muslims, including today’s Azerbaijanis, were called Tatars.  Eva-Maria Auch, “Nationalitätenprobleme in Transkaukasien. Der Konflikt zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidshan,” Sicherheit und Frieden / Security and Peace 8, no. 3 (1990): 143–47, 111.

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Figure 1: The incorporation of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire. Source: https://www.edmaps.com.

press.23 However, these nation-building processes took place against a backdrop of acute social problems. The plight of peasants and workers before the First Russian Revolution led to a wave of mass protests that soon erupted into bloody clashes. Inter-ethnic conflicts between Armenians and Tatars first surfaced in Baku in 1904 and by the following year the violence had resulted in mutual massacres that swept across the whole region. It was not until a year later that the tsarist security apparatus regained control of the situation. As many as 10,000 people had been killed in the clashes by that time.24 Various explanations for these attacks have been offered in the historiography, including the ethnic and religious rivalry between the Christian Armenians  Arpine Maniero, Umkämpfter Weg zur Bildung. Armenische Studierende in Deutschland und der Schweiz von der Mitte des 19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), 14–15.  Eva-Maria Auch, “Zur Rolle armenisch-tatarischer Konflikte bei der Herausbildung einer aserbaidschanischen Wir-Gruppen-Identität und gesellschaftlicher Organisation zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Osmanismus, Nationalismus und der Kauaksus, ed. by F. Adanir et al. (Wiesbaden: C. H. Beck, 2005), 99–132, 104.

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and the Muslim Tatars, the violence caused by the difficult social situation in the Russian Empire, as well as the competition between the Armenian and Tatar bourgeoisie in the oil-rich metropolis of Baku.25 Irrespective of the causes, 1905 has manifested itself in the collective memory of Armenians and Azerbaijanis as an important historical reference point. These violent clashes marked the beginning of the national-territorial claims that were to act as a significant mobilising force for the national movements of both sides in the following decades.

The Soviet and Post-Soviet Era The collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 left unresolved territorial issues that led to military confrontations throughout the Caucasus. The territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhijevan were claimed by both of the newly proclaimed republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, leading to bloodshed on both sides. The most brutal pogroms were carried out in Baku in 1918, originally initiated by the Bolsheviks to suppress the Azerbaijani uprising against the so-called “Baku Commune.”26 After the city’s capture by the Ottoman army, attacks against the Armenians and other Christians followed, with up to 20,000 people falling victim to both massacres.27 On August 22, 1919, the Azerbaijani government eventually convinced the 7th Congress of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to accept Azerbaijani jurisdiction and promised the Armenians administrative and cultural autonomy.28 However, as early as 1920, devastating pogroms against Armenians were carried out in the city of Shushi, resulting in as many as 30,000 fatalities,29 leaving very few Armenian residents in the city for the following decades. On December 2, 1920, the Armenian Bolsheviks rose to power and proclaimed the Armenian Soviet Republic. Two days later an article in Pravda was published announcing that Stalin welcomed the Sovietisation of Armenia and declared, inter alia, Azerbaijan’s relinquishment of sovereignty claims to Nakhijevan, Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Stalin, the long-standing dispute between Armenia and the “Muslims surrounding the country” was  Auch, “Zur Rolle armenisch-tatarischer Konflikte”, 104.  Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: NYU Press, 2003), 100.  De Waal, Black Garden, 100.  Richard G. Hovhannisian, The Republic of Armenia, Volume 1: 1918–1919 (Berkeley: Near Eastern Center, UCLA, 1971), 184–89.  De Waal, Black Garden, 104.

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resolved in a single stroke by establishing fraternal solidarity between the workers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.30 Yet, the Armenian government was unable to take advantage of this opportunity and establish sovereignty over the disputed territories. The situation changed the following year, when the newly formed Soviet Union, in its desire to settle relations with Turkey, agreed to compromise.31 The Russian-Turkish peace treaty of March 16, 1921 established the autonomous status of Nakhijevan under Azerbaijani suzerainty, while the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh was sealed – illegitimately from the Armenian perspective – on July 5, 1921, at the plenary meeting of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia (Figure 2). On July 7, 1923, Nagorno-Karabakh was incorporated into the Azerbaijani SSR as an autonomous region. While this decision was declared a sign of national peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was never accepted by the Armenian side, which repeatedly denounced the linguistic and cultural restrictions in Nagorno-Karabakh throughout the Soviet period. The neglect of the region’s economic needs and the arrangement of Azerbaijani settlements were seen by Armenians as Baku’s deliberate efforts to expel them. Against the backdrop of de-Armenisation and the destruction of Armenian historical and cultural heritage in Nakhijevan, repeated calls for unification with Armenia were made.32 In the 1930s, the conflict entered a latent phase that lasted until the 1980s, despite nationalist sentiments in Armenia flaring up time and again. Indeed, the notion of “friendship among peoples,” which had been imposed and cultivated during the 70 years of Soviet rule, had to a certain extent proven its worth. That is to say, the negative mutual perceptions of Armenians and Azerbaijanis had become less intense and had even been reduced to near insignificance, at least superficially.33 It would, however, be incorrect to assume that the “image of the enemy” no longer played a role in everyday life in the Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet republics. The first cracks in the concept of a unified “Soviet people” had already surfaced in the years following de-Stalinisation, when national divisions

 Obrazovanie SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov 1917–1924 (The Emergence of the USSR. Document Collection) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1949), 159.  Auch, Nationalitätenprobleme in Transkaukasien, 144.  Franziska Smolnik and Uwe Halbach, “Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach im Lichte der Krise um die Ukraine,” in Nicht eingefroren! Die ungelösten Konflikte um Transnistrien, Abchasien, Südossetien und Berg-Karabach im Lichte der Krise um die Ukraine, ed. Sabine Fischer (Berlin: SWP-Studie, 2016), 67–88, 67.  Gayane Novikova, “The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict through the Prism of the Image of the Enemy,” Transit Stud Rev 18 (2012): 550–69, 553.

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Figure 2: Administrative division in the Soviet Caucasus, 1921. Source: Tsutsiev, Atlas etnopoliticheskoy istorii Kavkaza, 61.

became more visible. The 1960s, in particular, witnessed an unprecedented renaissance of national consciousness in Soviet Armenia, culminating in a mass demonstration on April 24, 1965, the year that marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. In a state system that barely tolerated public commemorations, an assembly of approximately 100,000 people came together to commemorate the victims of the genocide.34 The few posters displayed demanded a fair solution to the “Armenian question” and, for the first time, there was also a call for the return of lost territories.35 At this point, the recognition of the genocide was no longer separate from the solution to the Karabakh question.36 In

 Harutyun Marutyan, Hay inknutian patkeragrutiune. Tseghaspanutian hishoghutiune yev Gharabaghian sharzhume (Iconography of Armenian National Identity. The Memory of Genocide and the Karabakh Movement) (Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House, 2009), 71.  Marutyan, Hay inknutian patkeragrutiune, 71.  Arsène Saparov, “Ethnic Conflict in Nagornyi Karabakh – A Historical Perspective,” Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 84 (June 2016): 2–8, 6.

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other words, the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia became a part of the so-called Armenian Question, having been present since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost in the 1980s gave the Soviet republics the space to formulate political demands. This liberalisation implied that there were no longer any taboos in Soviet history and a certain freedom in reporting on the political, social and economic aspects of Soviet society ensued. Not originally envisaged, however, was the role of this process in escalating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Growing discontent over social issues soon developed into a political storm that was to shake the entire Soviet Union to its foundations. Empowered by glasnost, demands for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Soviet Armenia gained new momentum, rapidly mobilising people in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia under the slogan “Miacum” (unification). Initially, Armenians hoped for Moscow’s understanding and took to the street with mass demonstrations under the banner of “Lenin! Party! Gorbachev!” to express loyalty and highlight the Armenians’ trust in glasnost. However, the Karabakh Committee and the Krunk (“Crane”) group, which was formed in Nagorno-Karabakh in March 1988, were soon considering more radical paths, including secession from the Soviet Union.37 From February 1988, mass demonstrations took place in Armenia, and labour strikes that caused work to cease throughout the republic became the symbol of the protests (Figure 3). The immense force of the protests in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh initially took Azerbaijanis by surprise but quickly provoked a defensive reaction that developed into a broader national movement.38 On February 26, protests erupted in the Azerbaijani industrial city of Sumgait, attended by several hundred participants. By February 28, an angry mob was rampaging through the city in search of Armenians. Apartments were vandalised, cars were set alight, people were thrown out of windows and women were raped and burned alive.39 Over three days, the city was devastated – leaving not only the Armenian inhabitants terrified. Only on February 29 did the Soviet military set off from Baku toward Sumgait; martial law was declared and a curfew was proclaimed. However, the incensed crowd could only be brought under control by the use of force.40 In the aftermath of the pogroms, all Armenians remaining in Sumgait fled to Russia, but the events had a far broader impact: they left the wider Armenian community    

De Waal, Black Garden, 100. De Waal, Black Garden, 30. De Waal, Black Garden, 40. De Waal, Black Garden, 40.

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Figure 3: “Self-determination is not extremism!” Mass demonstrations in Armenia. Source: National Archives of Armenia.

in Azerbaijan in a state of shock, with a significant number fleeing to Armenia or Russia. Further pogroms against Armenians were carried out in November 1988 in the city of Kirovabad and in January 1990 in Baku. The modus operandi in the Azerbaijani capital was similar to that in Sumgait: the perpetrators obtained the addresses of Armenians living in Baku, who were then exposed to all kinds of violence for seven days from January 13. On January 19, Moscow deployed the army after a considerable delay, but the inhabitants of the city only learned about the imposition of a state of emergency and curfew from the radio the following morning. By then, the Soviet troops had used excessive force against the angry crowds: around 130 people lost their lives, and several hundred more were wounded. According to Thomas De Waal, the pogroms against the Armenians and the intervention of the military were the two components of “Black January” in Azerbaijan.41

 De Waal, Black Garden, 94.

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Although many Azerbaijanis condemned the pogroms, and numerous Armenians managed to escape with the help of their Azerbaijani neighbors, the effect of the violence was profound. Before the war in the 1990s, both sides were already aware that peaceful coexistence was no longer possible. In early 1992, the violence between the two newly declared republics escalated into a full-scale war. The ensuing military successes of the Armenians shook Azerbaijani internal politics to the core and caused President Ayaz Mutallibov to resign. The war lasted until 1994, when the Armenians gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding six Azerbaijani districts.

Negotiations in Light of a Troubled Past Between the ceasefire on May 12, 1994 and the recent escalation in September 2020, the so-called OSCE Minsk Group, created by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and chaired by Russia, France and the United States, attempted to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means. During this period, various approaches to conflict resolution, such as the proposals made after the 1996 OSCE Lisbon Summit,42 the so-called Madrid Principles43 and the Kazan agreement,44 were on the table. The negotiations, however, took place against the backdrop of an extremely tense social mood and irreconcilable political positions, with every step toward dialogue being socially demonised. The papers proposed by the mediating sides found little, if any, support in the two societies. This was in part reflected in the fact that discussions at the highest political levels tended to focus on the territories and their status rather than on the people living in those territories, their historical memories and the extent to which the memory of violence shaped the conflict. Moreover, both states and their major actors – politicians, journalists, historians – were more preoccupied with creating the image of the “historical enemy” than with preparing their respective societies for necessary and inevitable compromises.

 “Lisbon Document 1996” (Lisbon: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1996), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/39539.pdf.  “Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries,” https://www.osce.org/mg/ 51152.  The summit in Kazan took place on June 24–25, 2011, mediated by Russia. The core principles, which were ultimately not implemented, included the return of the territories around NagornoKarabakh to Baku, the right of return for displaced persons, an interim status for NagornoKarabakh with security guarantees and an agreement that a decision on its final legal status would be made at a later date.

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Political negotiations were accompanied by academic studies on the historical background of the conflict, which provided the basis for the states’ current policies. To support the claims of each side to the disputed territory, academic works provided historical, political, and, at times, international legal bases to justify the respective unquestioned national consensus on the ownership of this territory and the legitimacy of the states’ actions.45 These works, however, did not constitute a constructive reappraisal of history and tended to focus on predominantly negative – and at times traumatising – episodes of history. The focus has usually been on allegations of ethnic cleansing and other acts of violence, which have also been instrumentalised at various governmental and nongovernmental levels. Countless articles, books and high-profile expert interviews about the atrocities blamed on the other side reinforced the sense of loss and consequently the negative perception of “the enemy,” as Armenians and Azerbaijanis mutually refer to each other. The image of Armenians as the “main enemy” has been exacerbated in Azerbaijan after the military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh and the perception of Azerbaijanis as victims of Armenians has been reinforced. From schools, the media and universities to the highest political levels – including the president, defense minister and members of the Milli Mejlis (parliament) – an aggressive anti-Armenian propaganda has been pursued. The anti-Armenian rhetoric has varied depending on the target audience, with statements by high-ranking Azerbaijani politicians adopting an increasingly aggressive tone both in international forums and during negotiations. Outside the political arena, anti-Armenian sentiment has been fueled by mass media outlets, films, documentaries, round tables and conferences. In domestic politics, images of the enemy have been used to justify political repression and to gain complete control over the country’s mass media. On the Armenian side, anti-Azerbaijani propaganda has been far less intense over the past 30 years. Seeing themselves as “winners,” the Armenian society has significantly reduced its negative perception of Azerbaijanis in general, although not of the Azerbaijani state. For Armenia and the Armenian people, NagornoKarabakh was a historic victory and a symbol of liberation, so the militaristic

 See for example Aschot L. Manutscharjan, Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven (Bonn: ZEI, 1998); Johannes Rau, Berg-Karabach in der Geschichte Aserbaidschans und die Aggression Armeniens gegen Aserbaidschan. Geschichtliche Studien und Betrachtungen (Berlin: Köster, 2009); Esmira Jafarova, Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus. Challenges to International Efforts (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015); Michael Reinhard Heß, Karabakh from the 13th Century to 1920. Unfolding Azerbaijan’s History (Berlin: Gulandot, 2020).

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rhetoric in Armenian mass media was primarily a reaction to aggressive Azerbaijani statements. Nevertheless, the memory of violence – such as the Armenian genocide or the pogroms in Azerbaijan in the late 1980s – and public memorial ceremonies served a specific goal: to demonstrate to the outside world that the Armenian population under Azerbaijani control was at best threatened with expulsion and, at worst, with physical annihilation.

Conclusion Returning to the concept of “history war” or Historikerstreit mentioned above, it can be said that one of the most steadfast principles on both sides has been the claim to continuity, which has manifested itself on two different levels. The first and most important level concerns the continuous existence of the respective people in the disputed territory, which historically legitimises and substantiates territorial claims. The second level concerns the continuity of violence, with the two narratives being two sides of the same coin. Continuity, of course, also means that the impasse between the two sides and, most importantly, the expectation of new – i.e., continuing – violence have not yet been overcome. With the latest escalation, negotiations to resolve the conflict proved to be a failure, with both parties insisting on their respective positions and showing little willingness to compromise. The torpedoing of negotiations was accompanied by both sides strategically “playing for time” while simultaneously engaging in an arms race. According to the latest figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Azerbaijan’s military expenditure amounted to almost $24 billion between 2009 and 2018, while Armenia spent just over $4 billion over the same period.46 This armament was accompanied on Azerbaijan’s part by militant rhetoric, which was not taken sufficiently seriously in Armenia. The belief that Russia would not allow an escalation of the conflict in this region or would actively provide military support to Armenia as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization proved to be false. The current situation continues to remain highly dangerous as the militant rhetoric in Azerbaijan has not ceased even after the end of the recent war. In a speech at a congress of the New Azerbaijan Party on February 9, 2021, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared Yerevan the historical territory of Azerbaijan. He further referred to the Syunik region in the far south of Armenia and the  SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

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region around Lake Sevan in eastern Armenia as “our historical land.”47 As evidence, Aliyev cited not only mass culture exhibitions and films about the history of “our ancestral land” but also scholarly research. The subsequent statement by a spokesman for Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry provides a remarkable example of how historical narratives can be used to serve contemporary political goals, including the justification of aggressive rhetoric. Hikmet Hajiyev declared, upon request, that the Azerbaijani president’s words should not be understood as territorial claims but rather as a call to restore historical justice: “Azerbaijanis have the right to return to their historical lands, to claim their properties and visit the graveyards of their great-grandfathers.”48 Azerbaijan’s territorial claims, particularly to the territory of Syunik, seem to have gained new ground with the November 9 agreement. As part of the reorganisation of the country’s regional economic zones, a new zone – with the provocative name of East Zangezur – was established on the far western edge of Azerbaijan, suggesting that there is also a West Zangezur. Speaking at the opening of a new housing complex for the families of soldiers killed in the previous year’s war, President Aliyev made this stance explicit by arguing that the territory historically belonged to Azerbaijan and that Azerbaijanis had every right to “return” there: The Soviet government tore Zangazur apart from Azerbaijan and handed it over to Armenia. It is relatively recent history – 101 years ago. [. . .] It is the land of our ancestors: the whole of Zangazur – East and West Zangazur. [. . .] I said that we have to return there. We will and we are already returning there. No one can stop us.49

Far from mere rhetoric, these kinds of belligerent threats – made at the highest political level – are primarily responsible for the persistence of those “enemy” images that ultimately could not be overcome by peaceful negotiations and have made friendly coexistence unrealistic, at least at this moment in time. Even if no military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is expected in the intermediate term, any prospect of reconciliation between the two nations appears to be remote at best. This is particularly the case since the question of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved, with people on both sides of the border feeling that historical justice, however it may be understood, has not yet

 Joshua Kucera, “Azerbaijan President Calls for Return to ‘Historic Lands’ in Armenia,” in Eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-president-calls-for-return-to-historic-lands-inarmenia.  Kucera, “Azerbaijan President Calls for Return to ‘Historic Lands’ in Armenia.”  Joshua Kucera, “What’s the future of Azerbaijan’s ‘ancestral lands’ in Armenia?” in Eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/whats-the-future-of-azerbaijans-ancestral-lands-in-armenia.

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been established. While the Armenians continue to insist on the right of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination, Baku – in a radical change of policy – is now rejecting any form of autonomy for Armenians, causing great uncertainty on the Armenian side. Then again, mutual perceptions of Armenians and Azerbaijanis continue to be dominated by images of “winners” and “losers.” The situation is made even worse by seeing the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in the territories now under Azerbaijani control, as well as the fact that Azerbaijan, in violation of the agreement of November 9, is still holding Armenian prisoners of war and organising sham trials. Considering current developments, what paths could lead to a lasting solution to the conflict? History, so far, has been used rather to serve current political purposes. This is not a new phenomenon, of course, yet few effective methodological tools exist to counter an aggressive, biased and distorted instrumentalisation of history.50 Historical reappraisals of issues that are highly charged in light of contemporary politics are particularly marked by manipulation and propaganda, so that dealing with the past remains a challenge for the future. Yet, there are certainly examples of positive ways of dealing with the past. One of the reasons that political negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan were doomed to fail is that no continuous institutional contact exists between the two states. A common platform, meanwhile, could be helpful to replace backward-looking, retributive justice – featuring dogmatic political language, the use of enemy images and the instrumentalisation of history for public mobilisation – with forwardlooking, compensatory justice in the spirit of dialogue, tolerance, social recognition and inclusion.51 A professional board in the vein of many historical commissions, for example, could gradually resolve the explosive political situation through basic historical research.52 The constructive reappraisal of history is important because it would provide reliable protection for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh – and Armenian cultural heritage – under international scrutiny. In the current situation,  Bodo von Borries, “Zurück zu den Quellen? Plädoyer für die Narrationsprüfung – Essay,” Geschichte als Instrument (Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 42–43, 2013), https://www.bpb.de/ apuz/170162/zurueck-zu-den-quellen-plaedoyer-fuer-die-narrationspruefung.  For the terms, see Helmut Fehr, Vergeltende Gerechtigkeit – Populismus und Vergangenheitspolitik nach 1989 (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2016).  The idea of the historical commissions is basically to promote knowledge or awareness of each side’s views and experiences with historical conflicts. German-Czech and German-Slovak Historical Commission, for example, can be seen as an instance of a positive way of dealing with the past. See Christoph Cornelißen and Paolo Pezzino, eds., Historikerkommissionen und historische Konfliktbewältigung (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2018). See also Novikova, The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict, 552.

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statements about security guarantees for Armenians in the case that NagornoKarabakh is de jure incorporated into the Republic of Azerbaijan are perceived in Armenia as insincere or, even worse, as euphemisms directed exclusively at the international community. The presence of Russian peacekeepers has so far been unable to stop the recurring violence; for that, more sustainable methods are needed.

References Primary Sources Archives National Archives of Armenia, Fond 1159, List 6, Folder 12, Document number 14; Fond 1159, List 6, Folder 14, Document number 133.

Secondary Sources Aslanian, Sebouh. From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa. Berkerley: University of California Press, 2011. Aslanyan, Andranik. Energie- und geopolitische Akteure im Südkaukasus. Der BergkarabachKonflikt im Spannungsfeld von Interessen (1991–2015). Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019. Auch, Eva-Maria. “Nationalitätenprobleme in Transkaukasien. Der Konflikt zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidshan.” Sicherheit und Frieden / Security and Peace 8, no. 3 (1990): 143–47. Auch, Eva-Maria. “Zur Rolle armenisch-tatarischer Konflikte bei der Herausbildung einer aserbaidschanischen Wir-Gruppen-Identität und gesellschaftlicher Organisation zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts.” Osmanismus, Nationalismus und der Kaukasus. Muslime und Christen, Türken und Armenier im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Fikret Adanir et al. Wiesbaden: C. H. Beck, 2005: 99–132. Babajew, Aser, Xenija Grusha and Vera Rogova. “‘Gerechtigkeit’ als Sackgasse oder Ausweg: Konfliktlösungsstrategien für Bergkarabach.” Osteuropa 64, no. 7 (July 2014): 105–20. Bock, Petra, and Edgar Wolfrum. “Einleitung.” In Umkämpfte Vergangenheit. Geschichtsbilder, Erinnerung und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich, edited by Petra Bock et al. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999: 7–14. Borries, Bodo von. “Zurück zu den Quellen? Plädoyer für die Narrationsprüfung – Essay.” Geschichte als Instrument (Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 42–43, 2013). https://www. bpb.de/apuz/170162/zurueck-zu-den-quellen-plaedoyer-fuer-die-narrationspruefung. Cornelißen, Christoph, and Paolo Pezzino, eds. Historikerkommissionen und historische Konfliktbewältigung. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2018. De Waal, Thomas. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: NYU Press, 2003.

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Dum-Tragut, Jasmine. Armenien. 3000 Jahre Kultur zwischen Ost und West. Berlin: Trescher Verlag, 2019. Fehr, Helmut. Vergeltende Gerechtigkeit – Populismus und Vergangenheitspolitik nach 1989. Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2016. Galichian, Rouben. Clash of Histories in the South Caucasus: Redrawing the Map of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran. London: Bennett & Bloom, 2012. Gebhard, Gunther, Oliver Geisler and Steffen Schröter. “Heimatdenken: Konjunkturen und Konturen. Statt einer Einleitung.” Heimat. Konturen und Konjunkturen eines umstrittenen Konzepts, edited by Gunther Gebhard et al. Bielefeld: transcript, 2007: 9–56. Gedächtnis und Erinnerung. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch, edited by Christian Gudehus et al. Stuttgart: Springer Verlag, 2010. Halbach, Uwe, and Franziska Smolnik. Der Streit um Berg-Karabach. Spezifische Merkmale und die Konfliktparteien. Berlin: SWP-Studie, 2013. https://www.swp-berlin.org/filead min/contents/products/studien/2013_S02_hlb_smk.pdf. Herzig, Edmund. The Deportation of the Armenians in 1604–05 and Europe’s myth of Shah Abbas I. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1990. Heß, Michael Reinhard. Karabakh from the 13th Century to 1920. Unfolding Azerbaijan’s History. Berlin: Gulandot, 2020. Hewsen, Robert H. “The Kingdom of Arc’ax.” Medieval Armenian Culture: Proceedings of the Third Dr. H. Markarian Conference on Armenian Culture, November 7-1, edited by Thomas J. Samuelian et al. Pennsylvania: Scholars Press, 1984: 42–68. Hovhannisian, Richard G. The Republic of Armenia. Volume 1: 1918–1919. Berkeley: Near Eastern Center, UCLA, 1971. Jafarova, Esmira. Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus. Challenges to International Efforts. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015. Kohrs, Michael. “Geschichte als politisches Argument: Der ‘Historikerstreit’ um BergKarabach.” In Osmanismus, Nationalismus und der Kaukasus. Muslime und Christen, Türken und Armenier im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Fikret Adanir et al. Wiesbaden: C. H. Beck, 2005: 43–63. Kucera, Joshua. “Azerbaijan President Calls for Return to ‘Historic Lands’ in Armenia.” Eurasianet. n.d. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-president-calls-for-return-to-historiclands-in-armenia. Kucera, Joshua. “What’s the future of Azerbaijan’s ‘ancestral lands’ in Armenia?” Eurasianet. n.d. https://eurasianet.org/whats-the-future-of-azerbaijans-ancestral-lands-in-armenia. “Lisbon Document 1996.” Lisbon: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1996. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/39539.pdf. Mammadova, Shalala. “Creating the ‘Enemy Nation’: The Difficult Historical Legacies of Armenian–Azerbaijani Relations.” Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 84 (June 2016): 8–13. Maniero, Arpine. Umkämpfter Weg zur Bildung. Armenische Studierende in Deutschland und der Schweiz von der Mitte des 19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020. Manutscharjan, Aschot L. Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven. Bonn: ZEI, 1998. Marutyan, Harutyun. Hay inknutian patkeragrutiune. Tseghaspanutian hishoghutiune yev Gharabaghian sharzhume (Iconography of Armenian National Identity. The Memory of Genocide and the Karabakh Movement). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House, 2009.

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Novikova, Gayane. “The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict through the Prism of the Image of the Enemy.” Transit Stud Rev 18 (2012): 550–569. Obrazovanie SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov 1917–1924 (The Emergence of the USSR. Document Collection). Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1949. Rau, Johannes. Berg-Karabach in der Geschichte Aserbaidschans und die Aggression Armeniens gegen Aserbaidschan. Geschichtliche Studien und Betrachtungen. Berlin: Köster, 2009. Saparov, Arsène. “Ethnic Conflict in Nagornyi Karabakh – A Historical Perspective.” Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 84 (June 2016), 2–8. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. n.d. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Smith, Anthony D. The Antiquity of Nations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. Smolnik, Franziska, and Uwe Halbach. “Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach im Lichte der Krise um die Ukraine.” In Nicht eingefroren! Die ungelösten Konflikte um Transnistrien, Abchasien, Südossetien und Berg-Karabach im Lichte der Krise um die Ukraine, edited by Sabine Fischer. Berlin: SWP-Studie, 2016: 67–88. “Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries.” n.d. https://www.osce.org/mg/ 51152. Suni, Ronald G. “Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999–2000): 139–78. Suni, Ronald G. “Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations.” The Journal of Modern History 73, no. 4 (December 2001): 862–96. Tokluoglu, Ceylan. “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991–2009).” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 7 (2011): 1223–252. Toft, Monika Duffy. The Geography of Ethnic Violence. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003. Tsutsiev, Artur. Atlas etnopoliticheskoi istorii Kavkaza. (1774–2004). Moscow: “Evropa”, 2006.

Rajendra Singh Thakur

History as an Instrument of Continuing Indo-Pakistan Rivalry from 1947 till 2021 Abstract: The influence of varying interpretations of history has been a predominant factor in the continuation of the conflict between India and Pakistan, which started on October 22, 1947 and remains unresolved till date. For the last seven and a half decades, both nations have fought three full scale wars and one limited conflict against each other. However, none of these wars has succeeded in resolving the basic issue between them and to date both neighbours continue to spend a considerable portion of their national effort on managing this hostility. There is, therefore, a need to study the role of history and the divergent historical views which continue to dominate the agenda and prevent India and Pakistan from moving forward on a strategic course of mutual cooperation and prosperity. Keywords: Hindus and Muslims, Indo-Pakistan War, Jammu and Kashmir, partition, UNCIP, UNMOGIP

Introduction The genesis of this conflict goes back to May 10, 1857, when the Indian rebellion commenced in Meerut against the British Empire. The rebellion happened at a time when the British were the most powerful authority and had the largest empire in the World. It took them by complete surprise and almost brought their rule in India to an abrupt end. The rebellion lasted till June 1858, during which as per one estimate between two and five million Indians died, which was about 600 times more than the British casualties.1 The rebellion left a deep fear in the minds of the British, which lasted till the end of their rule.2 Britain governed the Indian subcontinent for two centuries till 1947 in furtherance of their imperial interests to expand her land frontiers. It was quite natural that the same consideration was applied by them while quitting the Indian sub-continent. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British were convinced that a free, undivided India would become too powerful to cooperate with them on military and strategic

 Giri Rajeev Ranjan, 1857, Virasat Se Jirah (New Delhi: Samayik Books, 2009), 75–76.  Kim A. Wagner, The Great Fear of 1857 (Oxford: Peter Lang Ltd, 2010), 241. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-009

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matters. As part of the grand strategy, to retain some influence over the subcontinent after their departure, the idea of the country’ partition and the establishment of an independent nation for Muslims was conceived. British strategic interests in the subcontinent convinced them that Pakistan as a separate nation would ensure the defense of Britain’s vital interests in the region. The year 1947 was an important milestone in the history of the Indian subcontinent, as it saw the creation of two independent nations, India and Pakistan, which marked the end of 190 years of British rule. The socio-political, historical and religious context, under which the two countries emerged, ensured that there was sufficient animosity and mistrust between their people which made any mutual cooperation in the future a very difficult preposition. On August 14 and 15, 1947, Pakistan and India emerged as two independent nations. The partition of British India based on “two nation theory” into India and Pakistan led to displacement of about 15 million Hindus and Muslims from their centuries old homes to other places which in turn resulted in a great human tragedy, in which about half a million people died. In addition to the loss of human lives, there was widespread looting, rape and brutalities against women and communal riots. This was followed by the commencement of the first Indo-Pakistani conflict on October 22, 1947 over the Kashmir issue,3 which is central to the ongoing conflict between the two nations. The cause pertaining to varying interpretations of history over Kashmir has arisen repeatedly and resulted in two full scale wars, one limited conflict and a proxy war between the two countries. The historical perceptions of India, Pakistan and the United Nations differ greatly over the genesis of the Kashmir issue and how it needs to be resolved. India interprets that the Kashmir issue has been settled with the integration of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947.4 Pakistan on the other hand has a different historical view and believes that a plebiscite needs to be held to resolve the same. The people of Kashmir have yet another viewpoint, which derives itself from the peculiar geography, history and culture of that region.

British Rule in India The Britishers ruled India for nearly 190 years from 1757 to 1947,5 during which they had established an exploitative system of governance and followed the

 Ira Pande, The Great Divide; India and Pakistan (Noida: Harper Collins, 2009), 23–24.  Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999), 37–38.  Christopher Hibbert, The Great Mutiny India, 1857 (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1980), 390.

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policy of divide and rule. Throughout their rule, they exploited India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. They ruthlessly suppressed the Indian Revolt of 1857 and persecuted the Muslims for their active role in the revolt. Eight decades later, when the Indian National Congress and many Hindu leaders were pressurising the British to quit India, they favoured the Muslims.6 They found religion as a convenient tool to stem the tide. Finally, when they could no longer rule due to mass opposition, and also found themselves considerably weakened in the wake of the Second World War, the British decided to quit India. The rift between Hindus and Muslims was promoted through various steps that were taken in the first half of the twentieth century. The first partition of Bengal was carried out in 1905 to separate the Muslim predominant eastern areas from the Hindu-dominated western part, which led to creation of communal divide between the two religions. In 1909, through Morley-Minto Reforms, separate electorates were introduced on the basis of religion for the first time, to widen the divide further. In 1858, USSR and Britain were two powerful nations that were in the process of extending their territories in Asia. On one hand USSR had begun its conquest of Central Asia which stopped at the borders of Afghanistan. Britain on the other hand was ruling the Indian subcontinent whose territories also ended at the borders of Afghanistan. There was a strong rivalry between these two nations to maintain and extend influence in Asia, called the “Great Game.” The British thought it necessary to use Pakistan and the State of Jammu and Kashmir as bases to restrict the ambitions of the USSR towards the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. They had as such used the north western region of undivided India for the same purpose for more than 100 years prior to 1947. Britain never wanted to lose control over the Indian subcontinent which they had used as its military base to dominate the Indian Ocean and the countries around the Persian Gulf for more than 50 years. Moreover, India was providing a large component of the military element of the British Empire for employment in other continents.7 In the run up to the Second World War, Britishers were convinced that a free, united India was unlikely to toe the British line in future. They had already got the taste of Indian nationalism during the Indian Revolt of 1857 and the “Quit India” movement of 1942. The British strategic interests in the Indian subcontinent dictated the continuance of their influence even after 1947. For this, they turned to Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League which had been

 B.M. Kaul, Confrontation With Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), 3–4.  J.F.C. Fuller, Imperial Defence: 1588–1914 (London: Sifton Praed & Co. Ltd., 1926), 49.

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providing full cooperation during the Second World War and in the preceding years. Jinnah was also propagating a “two nation” theory: two separate nations for Hindus and Muslims. Thus the idea of partition of the country and the establishment of an independent nation for Muslims was conceived. A state led by the Muslim League would be a permanent ally for the British. The plan to divide India one way or the other took its concrete shape in 1947. This in effect meant partial acceptance of the “two nation theory” of Mohammed Ali Jinnah by the British. Instead of removing communal ill-will, a decision was taken that would perpetuate communal differences forever.

Partition The term “partition” refers to the division of British India, an area ruled directly by the colonial government. British India and Princely India occupied twothirds and one-third of the total territory respectively. Partition, as planned in February 1947, was to be carried out by June 1948. However, Jinnah was terminally ill in 1947 (he ultimately died on September 11, 1948) and therefore Mountbatten advanced the date of partition by nine months to August 1947, to prevent the possibility of any last minute hurdle to the British plan for creation of a separate nation for Muslims. The partition involved division of the Bengal and Punjab provinces based on the Muslim majority districts and non-Muslim majority districts as per the 1941 census. The partition was accepted by major political parties in India, however no serious thought was given towards attendant problems such as the interest and rights of minority communities, division of various assets and the implication of lapse of paramountcy. The execution of partition in such haste without understanding various implications resulted in death and displacement on a massive scale,8 including rape and abduction of women, separation of families, looting of properties, murders etc. About half a million people died and another 15 million were displaced. As regards the princely states, these were ruled by the British through their respective rulers and not directly. Of the 565 states, 140 were fairly large in size, while another 200 odd states comprised just a village or two and were very small in size. As per section 7 of the Indian Independent Act, 1947 passed by the British parliament on June 17, 1947, the British returned all the rights to the states. This meant that all the princely states were free from all obligations to the Crown

 Verinder Grover, The Story of Kashmir; Yesterday and Today (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), 437.

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on August 15, 1947 and were free either to accede to India or to Pakistan or remain independent.9 This provision to become independent was seen by the Indian leaders as a part of British design to achieve dismemberment of India. During June to August 1947, a large number of states acceded to India. The states which gave maximum resistance against accession to India were the States of Travancore, Indore, Bhopal, Rampur, Jodhpur and Baroda. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan became an Independent nation, though truncated in size and not as large as initially envisaged by Jinnah. It did not have the whole of Punjab and Bengal as earlier envisaged by Jinnah. Both these provinces were divided while forming the boundaries of Pakistan. Pakistan comprised about 65 million Muslims whereas 35 million Muslims stayed behind in India. The next day, on August 15, 1947, India became independent. Incidentally, Mountbatten chose August 15 because the British had defeated the Japanese on the same day in 1945.10 By August 15, 1947, all the 565 princely states had acceded to India or Pakistan except the states of Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. The states of Hyderabad and Junagarh also acceded to India on September 21 and November 9, 1947 respectively.

Kashmir Issue The last state which did not accede to either India or Pakistan was Jammu and Kashmir. It was the third largest state. The state encompassed a totally mountainous terrain except a strip of plains in Jammu region. Its mountains and valleys comprised some of the grandest sceneries in the world. The area of the state was 84,258 square miles. In the south lay the plains of Punjab, from where the state extended north-wards to the Karakoram mountains. The north western region of the State called Gilgil and Baltistan shared common borders with Afghanistan, the USSR and China. The State had wide cultural and geographical contrasts. The Kashmir Valley, a fertile and green region, was enclosed by three great mountain ranges, the Karakoram ranges to the north separating it from Central Asia. The other two ranges were the Pir Panjal ranges to the West and South of the Kashmir Valley and the main Himalayan range to the East. The Valley was, and continues to be, a predominantly Muslim majority region. Due to its natural beauty and climate, Kashmir Valley was being extensively used as a place for rest and recuperation by the Britishers as well as Americans. South of the Kashmir Valley was the region of Jammu, a predominantly Hindu region. It included

 B.N. Mullik, My Years With Nehru (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), 4–5.  Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009), 466.

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the city of Jammu, situated on the north Indian plains and close to Shivalik Hills. The third main region of Ladakh was predominantly Buddhist-dominated. The region was characterised by high passes and had the impressive snow covered peaks of Nun Kun, the highest peaks in the Himalayas. The Jammu and Kashmir State had geographical contiguity with both India and Pakistan. In August 1947, Jinnah felt that Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim majority state should come to Pakistan. He along with the Muslim League firmly believed that with the help of British the state would ultimately accede to Pakistan. On the other hand, while Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was determined to keep Jammu and Kashmir State with India, leaders like Sardar Patel had already reconciled to its acceding to Pakistan. Keeping in view their strategic interest, the British were inclined that the Jammu and Kashmir State should accede to Pakistan, with the consent of India. Accordingly, Lord Mountbatten tried to influence Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan, who refused to join Pakistan and sought from both the dominions a standstill agreement.11 An agreement was reached with Pakistan in August 1947 with regard to the state’s communications, supplies and post/ telegraphic arrangements. The government of India, however, wanted the Maharaja or his minister to personally visit Delhi to negotiate the standstill agreement. Thus, the agreement with India could not be signed. Meanwhile, Jinnah and the Muslim League were working on a well thought plan to secure Jammu and Kashmir State for themselves. They unsuccessfully tried to convince the Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir Valley to accede to Pakistan. Subsequently, Jinnah considered capturing Jammu and Kashmir State in a swift military action to resolve the impasse. Unlike Jinnah, Indian State’s Ministry did not put any pressure on Hari Singh to accede to them, either between July 5 and August 15, 1947 or in-between August 15 and October 27, 1947. Pakistan imposed an economic blockade on Kashmir Valley by stopping the supply of essential commodities, such as food grain, petrol, kerosene etc. This was followed by agitations by Muslim Conference in September 1947 demanding immediate accession of Kashmir to Pakistan and invasion of the Kashmir Valley by the Pakistan Army regulars and tribals on October 22, 1947. Maharaja Hari Singh, alarmed by the early successes of the invaders and the devastation caused by them, appealed on his own for military help to India on October 24, 1947. On October 26, 1947, the Jammu and Kashmir ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, signed the Instrument of Accession and it was duly accepted by the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, although personally he was inclined

 Turkkaya Ataov, Kashmir and Neighbours; Tale, Terror, Truce (Sydney: Ashgate, 2001), 208.

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otherwise. The Instrument of Accession and the document, while indicating its acceptance, nowhere mentioned that the accession was temporary. Nor did they indicate that it was subject to approval by the people of the State. Jammu and Kashmir, thus, irrevocably and legally acceded to India. It was Lord Mountbatten who wrote in his reply to Maharaja Hari Singh’s letter, asking for a plebiscite to be held subsequently, thereby proving beyond doubt that British never wanted Jammu and Kashmir to become an integral part of India.

Indo-Pakistan War (1947–48) When all other means by Jinnah and Muslim League to secure Jammu and Kashmir for Pakistan failed, Jinnah and the Muslim League resorted to the last option, the use of force.12 On October 22, 1947, about 4,000 tribesmen, including Masoods, Afridis and Hazzaras from the frontier areas, infiltrated into the Kashmir valley, with the support of the Pakistan establishment.13 This marked the beginning of the first Indo-Pakistan conflict. During the course of 1948, intense fighting in the state of Jammu and Kashmir took place between the Indian Army and Pakistani forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during which the Indian Army recaptured territories which included Kargil and Poonch. In the final days of 1948, both countries agreed to a ceasefire which took effect on January 1, 1949, with the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established to supervise the ceasefire line. On July 27, 1949, India and Pakistan representatives met under the auspices of the Truce Sub-committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and signed the Karachi Agreement which defined a ceasefire line marking the boundaries of both the countries.

Handling of the Kashmir Issue by the UN January 1, 1948 was an important day for India. On this day, India submitted a formal complaint to the UN against aggression carried out by Pakistani nationals as well as tribesmen in Jammu and Kashmir State. It was a decision which in the

 Christopher Snneden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (London; C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2015), 176.  Dewan Ram Parkash, Fight for Kashmir (New Delhi: Tagore Memorial Publications, 1948), 17.

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years to come was to result in the avoidable internationalisation of the Jammu and Kashmir issue. It was a decision which resulted in India’s sovereignty to be violated by allowing a purely internal matter to be thrown open to foreign interference and which ultimately went against the Indian national interest. India had hoped that the UN would act in a fair manner, declare Pakistan an aggressor and ensure that the raiders would soon vacate the occupied-territories of Jammu and Kashmir. However, as the events started unfolding one after the other, India was greatly disappointed by the manner in which the UN overlooked the fundamentals of the UN Charter to accommodate power politics. It was indeed unfortunate for India that the UN overlooked the Indian complaint of aggression and turned it into a dispute. Right from the beginning, the British made efforts to convince other members of the Security Council to favour Pakistan and succeeded to a great extent in achieving this. The matter was made worse by the inept handling of the issue by the Indian delegation at the UN. In the initial years of their involvement, the main thrust of UN was to take away control of Jammu and Kashmir from India and bring it under its own aegis. Its emphasis was on holding plebiscite without taking into account the legitimate complaint of India against aggression by Pakistan. The UNCIP, in spite of its best efforts, couldn’t achieve any worthwhile success in this regard during its 18 months of existence.14 In December 1949, the UNCIP was finally wound up. The stage was now set for a scaling down of UN involvement from a multi-member commission to single member mediation as recommended by the UNCIP in its final recommendation. Meanwhile, Pakistan had entered into a military and political alliance with the majority of the permanent members of the UN. By now Pakistan had become the cornerstone in the Western defence strategy in West and South East Asia. It was banking on their support and influences to get a favourable outcome for Pakistan. By 1957, India had realised that the UN and the Western countries would not accept the Indian stand on Jammu and Kashmir. India, therefore, withdrew from its original offer of plebiscite in the State. It is interesting to note that in 1956 a draft UN resolution was being circulated amongst the 11 members of the UN. The draft resolution had been sponsored by the US, the UK, Australia, Colombia and Cuba. Things couldn’t have been better for Pakistan with as many as six out of 11 members being its military allies through the SEATO and the Baghdad pact. The draft resolution reminded both India and Pakistan that the final disposition of the State would be decided by a UN sponsored plebiscite. On February 14, 1957, another draft

 Surendra Chopra, UN Mediation in Kashmir (Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1971), 59–65.

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resolution was introduced by the US, the UK, Australia and Cuba. The two key points of the draft resolution were the re-introduction of the UN mediator and the preference for the induction of a UN force. At this juncture, the USSR voted against the resolution. As the negative vote was of a permanent member of the UN, the resolution was turned down by the Security Council. In 1966, the UN realised the fruitlessness of its involvement in the State. It gradually scaled down its role from a UN commission in 1948–1949 to single member mediations (Naughton, Graham, Dixon and Gunnar Jarring) in 1950–1953 and later years. The Security Council also lost interest and the Jammu and Kashmir issue was being discussed less and less as time passed. This was, however, after the US and the UK had tried their best to bring about a plebiscite or position a UN force in the state, which would have been predominantly American/British. During the two and half decades after 1948, the UN mostly acted as per the perceptions and interests of the USA and UK, which mostly favoured Pakistani interest. During this period, the issue pertaining to the portion of Jammu and Kashmir with India became more and more internationalised. In 1971, after decisively defeating Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war, India denied the UN any further role in the Kashmir dispute. As per the Simla Agreement of 1972, India maintained that the UN had lost its mandate, since the Karachi Agreement of 1949 relating to the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir had ceased to be functional anymore. The UN presence in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir, coupled with Pakistan propaganda and supported by anti-India lobbies in the UK and the USA,15 helped in keeping the separatist feelings alive over the past five decades.

Indo-Pakistan War (1965) The year 1965 was a year of reckoning for India. It was a year in which India faced the most serious threat to its national security and the sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. In 1965, India appeared vulnerable to its neighbours. Just three years earlier, the Indian Army had suffered a defeat at the hands of China. Moreover, the Indian political leadership had just changed six months previously, as Jawaharlal Nehru had passed away in 1964. India was thus considered to be in a weak position. The international environment too was greatly in favour of Pakistan during 1965. Pakistan’s diplomacy was at its best. It had maintained good relations with the US and the UK and had also established  B.L. Sharma, The Kashmir Story (Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1967), 89–95.

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cordial relations with China. Pakistan was reasonably certain that none of the big powers would take sides with India in any future Indo-Pak conflict. In addition, Pakistan began to realise that India could not be pressurised by the UN any further on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. As such, by the late 1950s India had withdrawn the plebiscite offer made to the UN in 1948. It was under such circumstances that Ayub decided that the situation was ripe for an attack on Jammu and Kashmir, which would ultimately force India to surrender its rights over the state. Pakistan planned to exploit this perceived weakness and launched guerilla operations into Kashmir valley, called Operation “Gibralter,” with the hope that the Kashmiris would rise in revolt against India. The grand strategy for the liberation of Kashmir was executed on August 5, 1965, when about 7,000 Pakistan trained and well-armed guerillas crossed the ceasefire line and moved into Jammu and Kashmir. The infiltrations took place at Kupwara, Gulmarg, Keran and Uri in Kashmir and at Poonch, Mendhar, Naoshera and Akhnur in Jammu. These infiltrators were to mingle freely with the local populace in various religious celebrations and protest demonstrations were planned for August 8 and 9, 1965. They were to subsequently proclaim a revolutionary government of Jammu and Kashmir. That would be the time for the Pakistani Army to move in and take over Jammu and Kashmir in a surprise move. However, by August 9, 1965, the Pakistani assessment had proved wrong and the whole scheme collapsed sooner than Pakistan expected. Instead of a rebellion, the local people of Jammu and Kashmir rose against the Pakistan Army and gave continuous and detailed information about the movement of infiltrators to the Indian Army. The events of Jammu and Kashmir clearly indicated that there had been an overreliance by Pakistan on its raiders. India responded by crossing the ceasefire line and launching military offensives in the Jammu and Kargil sectors. India also responded by launching a major attack on September 6, 1965 towards Lahore, taking the conflict beyond the line of control, across the international border. The war came to an end on September 23, 1965 without any decisive military victory for either nation. The ceasefire gradually came into being by December 1965 and the ceasefire agreement was signed subsequently on January 10, 1966 between the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan in Tashkent. The 22-day war of 1965 shattered the grand design that Pakistan had hoped to achieve. Pakistan had failed to annex Jammu and Kashmir by force. The result was a big military and a political set-back for Pakistan, the effect of which it was to realize fully in 1971. Having failed to revive the settled issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and also to achieve an addition of even an inch-territory of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan was face to face

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with a debacle by December 1965. The propaganda that Pakistan could come and “liberate” Jammu and Kashmir by force of arms had lost its efficacy. The outcome of 1965 war also shattered the myth that Pakistan’s military alliance with the US would be powerful enough to defeat the then discredited Indian military after the 1962 debacle of the Chinese attack. It was a big loss of face to the US too, so much so that it did not take the initiative for a truce, like it had done in 1947–1948.

Indo-Pakistan War (1971) The third Indo-Pakistani war happened for a reason other than the Kashmir issue. In the first general election to the 300-seat National Assembly held on December 7, 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s led Awami League was elected with an absolute majority. All its 160 seats were in East Pakistan. However, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was prevented from forming a government, which resulted in civil unrest in East Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, Gen Yahya Khan along with Bhutto launched “Operation Searchlight” to crush the civilian opposition in East Pakistan by the use of force. Between April to October 1971, while thousands of Bengalis were massacred, about eight million people from East Pakistan had migrated to India. This refugee situation was taken as a form of indirect aggression against India, impacting India’s security, and provided the basis for Indian Army elements to commence operations on the border regions of East Pakistan in November 1971. The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 is however considered to have begun on December 3, when the Indian Army launched offensives to capture Dhaka. It may be mentioned here that in October 1971 the UN moved resolutions suggesting a mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani military forces from their respective borders and the posting of a team of UN observers on each side of the border. The UN had first raised this idea in the summer of 1971, and pressed it more seriously in September and October, when both India and Pakistan commenced a full-scale mobilisation of their military forces. In a letter dated October 20, 1971 to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, U Thant offered “his good offices” in mediating the dispute and called for a mutual withdrawal of forces from the border by both sides. Yahya Khan responded favourably. However, India denied the UN any interference at that time. These resolutions were moved at the behest of the US. However, these were vetoed by the Soviet Union, while the UK and France abstained from voting. Ultimately, the UN resolutions did not make any progress. At this stage,

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India decided that it did not wish to be a part of the UN sponsored mediation over Jammu and Kashmir once again. It was in this context that India agreed to settle all disputes with Pakistan through bilateral negotiations without any outside mediation by the UN or any other power.

Continuing Insurgency/ Proxy War The withdrawal of the USSR forces from Afghanistan in 1988 had an unfortunate impact on the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir. A perception was propagated that if the Mujahedeen, the Afghanistan mercenaries, could defeat the mighty Army of the erstwhile USSR, then they could repeat the same feat in Jammu and Kashmir as well. Some sections of Kashmir Valley also got lured by this assumption. This resulted in Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir State which was most violent from 1993 to 2006. During the period, all of Jammu and Kashmir witnessed widespread terrorist activities, bomb blasts and retaliatory actions by the security forces, wherein both India and Pakistan were drawn into yet another round of bitterness, rivalry and accusations/ counter accusations. Pakistan used its territory and security forces to train Afghanistan mercenaries as well as disgruntled locals of Jammu and Kashmir to carry out militant activities with a view to subvert peace, disrupt law and order and carry out attacks on the security forces/ civilians. At the same time, multiple demonstrations were held in front of field stations, at Jammu, Rajouri, Poonch and the headquarters of the UNMOGIP at Srinagar. Numerous memorandums were submitted by political leaders of the Kashmir Valley to the UNMOGIP highlighting their grievances against the security forces and hardships caused by the military. For their part, the UNMOGIP headquarters continued to report the details of the insurgency situation to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations headquarters in New York. However, the matter remained limited to the United Nations headquarters itself and has not been raised/ discussed formally in the Security Council for a very long time. At a personal level, the military observers were mostly aware of the fact that the UNMOGIP was seen by Pakistan as an instrument to be exploited to continue to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

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Limited Conflict in Kargil (1999) The Kargil war commenced during March–May 1999, when Pakistan troops and terrorists infiltrated into Indian territory in the Kargil sector, Jammu and Kashmir State and occupied key mountain features, which gave them a strategic advantage. The operation was orchestrated by the then Pakistan Army Chief, General Parvez Musharraf. These positions were usually vacated by both sides during winters, to be re-occupied in the summers. However, in the spring of 1999, the Pakistan Army reoccupied the Indian positions before the onset of summer. The Pakistan Army had captured a total Indian territory of 15 kilometres by 10 kilometres. India responded by mobilising two divisions and recaptured the strategic heights by July 1999 after bitter fighting between the troops. The war led to the defeat and embarrassment to Pakistan’s third military adventure.

Indian Interpretation of History The essence of Indian interpretation about the history of the Indo-Pakistan conflict is detailed in the succeeding paragraphs. Firstly, as per the Indian view, the partition of India was orchestrated by the British to facilitate their strategic interests as mentioned in the beginning of the paper. Secondly, India interprets that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, that was signed by the ruler of the state and accepted by the Governor General of India, is irrevocable. This is because the Instrument of Accession and the document indicating its acceptance did not mention anywhere that the accession was temporary. Nor did these documents indicate that the Accession was subject to approval by the state. Lastly, there was no provision in the Indian Independence Act of 1947 to hold a plebiscite. The commitment made by the Indian Government to hold a plebiscite was contained in the covering letter accompanying the accepted Instrument of Accession. Hence, India is bound by the commitment, but this does not negate or dilute the validity of the Instrument of Accession. Indians are critical of India’s decision to refer the Kashmir issue to the UN, when the same could have been resolved by re-capturing all of Jammu and Kashmir in 1948. The involvement of the UN in Jammu and Kashmir over the five decades has not resulted in any fruitful outcome because their efforts were partial. The Kashmir issue was with the Security Council for more than half a century, during which numerous resolutions have been passed. In many deliberations held at the UN, a numbers of options to resolve the issue have been

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considered. However no solution has been found because of power politics between the two superpowers. The stance of the US, UK, and USSR in the Security Council was guided more by their national interests than the facts of the case. Such an approach by the US and USSR stifled the ability of the Security Council to act as an independent body to come up with a fair solution to the satisfaction of both nations. India also believes that the US was supporting Pakistan during 1950s and 1960s, because her opinion was influenced by the British attitude to India. The US was also concerned that any decision taken against Pakistan was likely to annoy the Muslim countries of the Middle East. India did not believe in the two nation theory because the Hindus and Muslims were living together in various towns and villages, although one of the two communities was in the majority in a given area. Implementing two nation theory would have meant creating a conflict situation in every village/ town. India is also critical of the role played by Mountbatten in influencing Nehru and Jinnah to refer the Kashmir issue to the UN. The reference of the issue to the UN also helped the British in one more way. British who were being accused by the US of delaying the transfer of power had a good reason now to support their action. They now propagated the view that the two new nations, i.e. India and Pakistan, were not yet mature enough to govern themselves and for performing their international duties in a peaceful manner.

Pakistani Interpretation of History Pakistan, since its creation, firmly believes in the two nation theory, based on which the partition of India was carried out in 1947. Pakistan claims Kashmir based on the logic of the two nation theory to divide the territory into Muslim and non-Muslim portions, Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim majority area. Moreover, Kashmir being contiguous to Pakistan is considered essential to it for defence. Pakistan views Kashmir as vital to its national security, because it considers the possibility of an Indian attack from the mountains of Kashmir a serious threat to its borders. Pakistan also claimed that the economy of Kashmir was closely linked with that of Pakistan, because the only all-weather road (the Rawalpindi Srinagar road) to it ran through Pakistan. At that time, there was no rail or road connection between Kashmir and India. Notwithstanding the above, more quantities of various goods were traded by Kashmir with India and not Pakistan.

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Interpretation of History by the Western World Some British writings have suggested that the root cause of the Kashmir dispute lies in what happened over the hundred years preceding 1947. The two main deductions they generally draw from their analysis are that the Muslims who comprised the majority were victims of the Hindu Dogra rulers’ tyranny and the transfer of power to the people living in the two dominions was incomplete because the Muslim majority area of Kashmir continued to be part of India. The implication is that the independence of the sub-continent was synonymous with the division of the country according to the Muslim League’s two nation theory. There is a subtle suggestion that India had no right over Kashmir because India is a Hindu nation according to the spirit of the Indian Independence Act, and since the Muslims of Kashmir had been oppressed by the Dogra rulers16 their real freedom necessitated the integration of Kashmir with the dominion formed by carving out Muslim-majority areas from India. Many scholars and writers have opined in their writings that the UN has played a significant role in bringing peace in the region. Pauline Dawson, in her book The Peace-keepers of Kashmir, has written about the role of the UN in Kashmir by claiming that the UN played a major role in the maintenance of peace since 1948.

Interpretation of History by the Kashmiris The interpretation of history by the Kashmiri people is guided by their selfpreservation, unique cultural heritage and long history of exploitation by outsiders. Kashmiris are greatly aware about various historical facts pertaining to the accession of the state to India. Kashmiri view themselves as the victims of confrontation between India and Pakistan. They know very well about the aggressive designs of Pakistan. Some of the Kashmiris also feel aggrieved due to the excesses committed by the Indian security forces. There is also a significant population of the Buddhists living in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir who have their own perception of history about the conflict. The Buddhist view the history in the same manner as the Indians.

 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1993), 84–85.

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Current Status of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict In the recent past, India has taken some major steps towards resolution of the Kashmir issue. Firstly, on August 5, 2019 India has abrogated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, thereby cancelling the special status granted to Jammu and Kashmir State. This was accompanied by the additional deployment of security forces, cutting of communication lines and arrest of several political leaders in the state. This step has led to greater integration of the state with India through a constitutional framework and will enable growth of trade between the state and the rest of India. However, it has led to greater alienation of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In the recent past, an unfortunate development has taken place towards history writing in India. It appears that attempts are being made to write or propagate history with a view to accentuate the divide between Hindus and Muslims. This is being done on social media as well as in the writing of history books. It appears as if history is repeating itself, wherein efforts are being made to divide the two major religions for trivial gains.

Recommendations for Conflict Resolution through Use of History There exists an urgent need to understand our history as a means to move towards the path of mutual growth and positivity rather than to divide the people. Both India and Pakistan have adequate problems/challenges to be dealt with, in the domains of health, economy, climate and others. The people of both nations had a common culture and traditions for several centuries before 1947. In 1857, both Hindus and Muslims fought together for more than a year against the well-structured forces of the British East India Company and almost brought the British rule to a sudden end. There is a need to learn from Japan, which has left behind its past anger against the US, responsible for using atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and causing 140,000 deaths. Today Japan and the US are two powerful allies. Like in any conflict, there are varied views on the Kashmir issue, but many of us follow a particular viewpoint based on our perception that is already fed into our minds and we try to justify the same. It is important to develop the aptitude and capacity to see all aspects of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and analyse these viewpoints in a holistic manner.

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Conclusion The conflict between India and Pakistan that commenced on October 22, 1947 remains unresolved even after a passage of seven and a half decades. Due to the nature of their birth, the mutual suspicions and insecurities, the differences between both nations have persisted. The conflict has been accentuated further due to varied interpretations of history over different related aspects such as the basis of partition, legality of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India and the role played by the UN. The wars fought by India and Pakistan in 1947–48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 have added fresh perspectives/ reasons for continuance of the conflict. The situation has been compounded further by the use of the situation in Kashmir as a convenient tool for political gains. The two nations and the people of Jammu and Kashmir have spent a considerable amount of time and energy in an attempt to resolve the conflict. In the larger interest of bringing peace to South Asia and the well-being of the local population of Jammu and Kashmir, it is imperative that urgent steps are taken by various stakeholders to bring the conflict to an end at the earliest opportunity.

References Primary Sources Archives UN Security Council Official Records available at National Archives, New Delhi. UN CIP Reports. Government of India Publications, New Delhi.

Others Government of Jammu and Kashmir Publications. Government of Pakistan Publications.

Secondary Sources Alastair, Lamb. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy. Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1993. Ataov, Turkkaya. Kashmir and Neighbours; Tale, Terror, Truce. Sydney; Ashgate, 2001.

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Chopra, Surendra. UN Mediation in Kashmir. Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1971. Fuller, J. F. C. Imperial Defence: 1588–1914. London: Sifton Praed & Co. Ltd., 1926. Ganguly, Sumit. The Origins of War in South Asia. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999. Giri, Rajeev Ranjan. 1857, Virasat Se Jirah. New Delhi: Samayik Books, 2009. Grover, Verinder. The Story of Kashmir; Yesterday and Today. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995. Hibbert, Christopher. The Great Mutiny India, 1857. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1980. Kaul, B.M. Confrontation With Pakistan. Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971. Mullik, B.N. My Years With Nehru. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971. Pande, Ira. The Great Divide; India and Pakistan. Noida: Harper Collins, 2009. Parkash, Dewan Ram. Fight for Kashmir. New Delhi: Tagore Memorial Publications, 1948. Sharma, B.L. The Kashmir Story. Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1967. Singh, Jaswant. Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence. New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009. Snneden. Christopher. Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015. Wagner, Kim A. The Great Fear of 1857. Oxford: Peter Lang Ltd., 2010.

Sharipov Shokhruz

National History as Tools of Installing National Borders in Central Asia Countries Abstract: In recent times, the border conflicts of Central Asia have been a serious challege for the Central Asian governments’ bodies. Certainly there are border signs established between the states, however, many of them are hard to be delineated due to extreme geographical obstacles, such as mountains, rivers and the like. All Central Asian countries have faced this problem since their independence in 1990s. Moreover, many countries in this area cannot entirely solve this problem, due to several reasons, such as residents’ pressure. For instance, there was a border problem between Kyrgiz and Tajik states in May 2021 and many citizens of these states attacked one another. Therefore, the purpose of my speech at this conference is to present that the solution to this problem is directly related to the period of the Soviet regime, especially 1924–1925, when many of the borders of Central Asian countries were divided by Stalin the head of the USSR. This had an adverse effect on the independence movements of Central Asian countries in the 1990s. Keywords: Afghanistan, border line, Central Asian countries, enclaves, Great Britain, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Russian Turkestan, Sokh, USSR, Uzbekistan, Vorukh

Introduction Madeleine Reeves who is expert on the issue of Central Asian borders wrote: “Everyday activities such as visiting relatives, burying the dead, transporting apricots, and irrigating domestic plots are often significantly harder to accomplish.”1 Currently there are eight enclaves in Central Asia: Uzbek Shakhimardan, Dzhanyail, Sokh and Chong-Kra in Kyrgyzstan; Tajik Vorukh and Kairagach in Kyrgyzstan; Kyrgyz populated Barak and Tajik populated Savak in Uzbekistan. Six of them are located in Kyrgyzstan, four in Uzbekistan and two in Tajikistan. Kyrgyz Prime Minister’s advisor Tokon Mamytov announced that Bishkek considered 58 disputed border spots with Uzbekistan left for negotiation. He also explained that

 Madeleine Reeves, “Conclusion,” in Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia (Cornell University Press, 2014), 241–250 (www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh25v.12). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-010

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the last time the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border had been seriously scrutinised and discussed was during the period between 1954 and 1961. Kyrgyz-Tajik border is one of the most complex borders in the region due to its highly mountainous terrain. Out of 978 km of the overall border, only 580 km were delimited. From time to time armed incidents occur in the area, involving both border guards and the local population. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan keep having frequent border disputes for different reasons, starting from access to roads, through migration rules and regulations, to fair water distribution and smuggling. Tajikistan insists upon delineating the borders in accordance with 1924–1927 maps, where the Tajik enclave Vorukh was a part of Tajikistan.2 An enclave is a territory or part of the territory of one state that is completely surrounded by the land territory of another state or several states. An enclave (Lat. Inclavatus – “closed, locked,” lat. Clavis – “key”) is a part of the territory of a state completely surrounded by the territory of other states. Parts of a state surrounded by another (one) country are called complete enclaves. The concept of territory includes both land and territorial waters.

The History of Border Issue At the end of the eighteenth century, the Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva khanates were founded in the region. The boundaries of these states were not clear-cut and often moved in line with the balance of power between them. In 1876, Russian Turkestan was created within the former Kokand Khanate, which was part of the Russian Empire. Its southern borders in the Pamirs were established by the Anglo-Russian commission in 1885. As a result, historical and geographical regions, such as Roshan and Wakhan, were transferred to the Bukhara Khanate in exchange for parts of the Darvaz region (on the left bank of the Pyanj River), which were given to Afghanistan. The aftermath was the undeniable collision of geopolitical interests between Russia and Great Britain during the imperialist time. These contradictions were resolved by the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907, which delimited the spheres of influence in the region. Russia refused to encroach on Afghanistan, recognising it as a sphere of British influence. After the revolution of 1917, the Soviet power dominated in the region and the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm republics were formed. But the process was described in the Soviet regime as wilful: “Central Asian Republics were independently joined  Zhulduz Baizakova, “Border issues In Central Asia: Current Conflicts, Controversies and Compromises,” Revista UNISCI, núm. 45 (October 2017): 221–234.

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to the Soviet Union.” For instance, according to F. Muhammadyarov, “Agriculture and handicrafts were the main branches of the economy and the victory of the “Great” October Revolution paved the way for the revival of the peoples of Central Asia and created conditions for their development as a socialist nation. The scattered parts of each nation were able to unite and form their own Soviet socialist states.”3 The above opinion has been then falsified. Today, everyone knows that Central Asian Republics were compelled to join the Soviet Union. In the early years of the Soviet rule, the People’s Committee for National Affairs performed a great deal of work on this issue in Turkestan. Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen branches have been established in the Turkestan MIC. On March 21, 1918, in order to ensure that the indigenous population of the Turkestan ASSR became more actively involved in the establishment of Soviet power on the ground, the ICC decided that all documents in volosts, villages and auls were kept in local records. In 1921, the Caspian region of the Turkestan ASSR was renamed the old Turkmenistan region. Turkmen and Kyrgyz national branches were established in the MICs of Bukhara and Khorezm SSR. On May 28, 1924, the forming of the MIC of Eastern Bukhara followed. In October 1923, at the 4th All-Khorezm Congress of Soviets, the Turkmen region with Dashhovuz as its centre and the Kyrgyz-Karakalpak region with Khojaly as its centre were established as parts of the USSR. The Uzbek-dominated region was transferred to the New Urgench region, the centre of which was New Urgench. In the Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm, and in the state apparatus of the TASSR, seats were allocated for representatives of all nationalities. Certain groups of Uzbeks lived in some districts of the Shymkent and Turkestan districts of the Syrdarya region. For eхample, they lived in Boysun, Bukhara, Guzar, Karshi, Karmana, Nurata, Shakhrisabz, Sherabad and Sariosiya regions (provinces) of the Republic of Bukhara, and in the Khorezm Republic, in the New Urgench region and in the city of Khiva. The Turkmens lived in the Turkestan region of the Turkestan ASSR, in the south of the Republic of Bukhara (Chorjoi region) and in the southern and south-western parts of the Khorezm Republic (in the Turkmen-Dashovuz region). Certain groups of Karakalpaks lived in different districts of the Fergana region. Kazakhs were the predominant ethnicity living in the northern part of the Turkestan ASSR: in the Almaty, Jarkent, Taldykorgan districts of the Yettisuv region, and in the Okmachit, Avliyota, Kazalinsk, Turkestan and Shymkent districts of the Syrdarya region. Kazakhs also resided in various districts of Tashkent and Mirzachul districts. The fact that Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks, indigenous

 Мухаммедяров Ш. Ф. К истории проведение национально-государственного размежевания Средней Азии в 1924 г. Советское Востоковедение.1955 №1. Б. 44.

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peoples, were scattered throughout the cities and villages of the region in 1924 was not sufficiently taken into account in the national-territorial delimitation of Central Asia. No territorial divisions were authorised. As a result, the nationalterritorial delimitation was not based on the mentality and will of the local people, but on the orders and instructions of the Central Authorities. As a result, the issue became so complex and controversial that a new wave of geopolitical demographic problems emerged, resulting in turn in negative consequences. The actual situation in Central Asia after the formation of the USSR is characterised by K. Atabaev, a member of the Central Executive Committee, before the nationalterritorial delimitation, a significant part of which was part of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The USSR Committee, at the second session of the second convocation of 1924, stated: “The activity of the Soviet government in Turkestan was subject to constant friction and hindered most of the useful work. In the environment of one nation, economic activity was aimed at harming another, exacerbating the conflict, associated with very complex national combinations put forward by one group in opposition to another . . .” He noted the atmosphere of an interethnic protest in the region, which in early 1924 raised the issue of defining the national-territorial boundaries of Central Asia at party meetings, non-party conferences, plenums of the Party Central Committee, Soviet congresses and others.4

The Formation of National States and Their Borders The issue of delimitation of Central Asian republics was widely discussed on March 10, 1924 at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, Central Asia. Bureau and party officials set up a special committee to study the issue of delimitation in Turkestan in detail. On March 27, 1924, the committee reported to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party that the development needs of the nations in the region were very timely in raising the issue of dividing Turkestan into national republics and provinces. The Plenum decided on the expediency of the national-territorial delimitation of the Turkestan ASSR. The border line was drawn from the area

 Sh.A. Khudoyberdieva, “Enclaves in Central Asia: History and contemporary concerns,” Scientific Progress Journal 2, no. 6 (2021) ISSN: 2181-1601.

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where the population of the same ethnic group was the largest and of the largest percentage, however the lifestyle of the nomadic and semi-nomadic population was not taken into account. As the clashes and conflicts escalated, measures were taken to redistribute the territory of one province or district among the Republics, and to officially register the enclaves. Conflicts have arisen as a result of redistribution processes, such as the transfer of Surkhandarya to Tajikistan and the transfer of Khojand to Uzbekistan. Proponents of “Greater Uzbekistan” and “Little Tajikistan” have emerged, and debates have begun over whether Turkmenistan’s Charjou (now Lebap) Dashoguz region and South-West Kazakhstan should be part of the “Greater Uzbekistan.” There were also proposals and demands for the annexation of Southern Uzbekistan, Bukhara and Samarkand regions to the Tajik SSR. There have been disputes between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the Chorjoi region. Turkmenistan has objected to Tajikistan, while Kyrgyzstan has objected to Uzbekistan on territorial and border issues. Relations between the Central Asian republics, which had been a border conflict during the Soviet era, were not resolved. As a result, an attempt was made to resolve the issue of the territories in the enclaves by organising districts in such places. For example, the Sukh district was established in 1955 as part of the Fergana region. The district is located in the Batken region of the Kyrgyz Republic and covers an area of 325 km2. The current population of the locality is 52,000, and more than 90 per cent of the population is Tajik. The highway leading to the district is controlled by Kyrgyzstan from the west. The majority of the population of the Sokh district in Uzbekistan is composed of the Tajik people. The Kyrgyz-Tajik border (990 km long) ran through the mountains, and in 1958 a specially appointed committeewas unable to resolve the border issue between the states. Speaking at a meeting on March 10, 1924, the chairman of the Central Asian Economic Council, M.A. Paskutsky, proposed unifying the three Central Asian republics, rather than demarcating the national-state borders, given the necessity and expediency of “political and economic unity.” Khodjanov, a member of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party (Bolsheviks), argued that Turkestan could not be divided into separate republics. On October 27, 1924, the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a final decision on the demarcation of the national-state borders of the peoples of Central Asia. In the territory of the Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara and Khorezm socialist Soviet republics the following territories emerged: the Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics (October 27, 1924) as well as the Tajik ASSR (October 14, 1924) as part of the Uzbek SSR, the Karakalpak Autonomous Region of the Kazakh SSR (May 11, 1925) and the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region

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of the RSFSR (October 14, 1924).5 The principles of demarcation were based on proposals prepared by the Party Bureau of the Uzbek SSR. The attitude to the delimitation of borders among the staff of the Central Bureau of the Central Committee (RCP (b) Central Committee, STO) represents the interests of not only the centre but also the nations and peoples of the region, and should not be treated as a process that determines the future of nations in order to facilitate the course of administrative-territorial zoning of a single country. The idea of internationalism has been adopted by all higher authorities at this stage of delimitation, despite the fact that the principles of demarcation were put forward by the Bureau of Uzbekistan, which cannot in any way be regarded as an indisputable fact. Although in an abbreviated form, the representatives of the nation which aspired to their statehood had to reckon with them. Drawing the border line, it is necessary to avoid activities that could harm the ethnic group of the overpopulated population. A simple analysis of the developed border patterns and the national structure of the population of the border areas while pursuing the delimitation of national-territorial boundaries shows that the authors failed to follow the principles (except for those related to water management systems). As a result of the committee’s work, the March 17, 1925 plenum laid down the boundary line between Central Asia states, according to which several enclaves were formed on the border of Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana Valley. This division was the main reason for the emergence of enclaves in the latter valley. However, in 1924 the national territorial demarcation did not end, since in May 1929 the Tajik Autonomous SSR was transformed into the Tajik SSR, in 1926 the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region into the Kyrgyz ASSR. In 1936, the Kazakh ASSR and the Kyrgyz ASSR were transformed into Soviet socialist republics and directly entered the USSR. With the national-territorial delimitation of the republics and the creation of new state formations in the region, there was a number of mistakes made that affected the subsequent development of each of the republics. Virtually identical ethnic groups and natural resources of the same territories were divided between different republics. Part of the territories with a different ethnic population was included into one or another republic in order to create a more multi-ethnic structure of the population, and make the republics more convenient for administration. By creating such borders, the authorities wanted to thwart separatist movements in the region. As

 Kh. Tursunov, The formatting The Republic of Uzbek Soviet Socialistic (Tashkent: Science, 1958).

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part of the Soviet Union, the border territories of neighbouring republics were often transferred among one another. For example, in 1956 the Sariagash, Kirov, Makhtaaral and Zhetisu districts of the South Kazakh region of Kazakhstan were transferred to Uzbekistan. Then they were returned to Kazakhstan, but incomplete. On February 13, 1956, part of the Hungry Steppe, the cradle of the Kazakh culture, was transferred from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, as well as the Bostandik district, which was subsequently leased until 1991, but has not yet been returned. At the present stage of development these are the territories that cause certain claims of Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan and vice versa.

Conclusion The study demonstrated that the root of the border issue in Central Asia is very problematic. Research shows that any form of the border problems that are taking place today is the aftermath of the policy of the Socialist Revolution, which has been carefully thought out and prepared over the years. These problems were not present in the days of the Soviet Union, because at that time the Central Asian republics had a common economy, water and energy system, so the preconditions and conditions for the problem to arise simply did not exist. After 1991, when the states in the region gained their independence and their main goal changed to the concept of building a state within each of the countries bringing the border issues back on the agenda. Therefore, the only way to solve this problem is to resolve the border problems of the Central Asian states on the basis of solidarity and mutual respect.

References Akchurina, Viktoria. The State as Social Practice: Sources, Resources and Forces in Central Asia. PhD Thesis. University of Trento, 2015. Baizakova, Zhulduz. “Border issues In Central Asia: Current Conflicts, Controversies and Compromises.” Revista UNISCI, núm. 45 (October 2017): 221–234. Bitabarova, Assel. “Contested Views of Contested Territories: How Tajik Society Views the Tajik-Chinese Border Settlement.” Eurasia Border Review 6, no. 1 (2015): 63–81. DOI: 10.14943/ebr.6.1.63. Khudoyberdieva, Sh.A. “Enclaves in Central Asia: History and contemporary concerns.” Scientific Progress Journal 2, no. 6 (2021): 17. ISSN: 2181-1601.

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Reeves, Madeleine. “Conclusion.” In Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia. Cornell University Press, 2014. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh25v.12. Tursunov, Kh. The formatting The Republic of Uzbek Soviet Socialistic. Tashkent: Science, 1958. Мухаммедяров Ш. Ф. К истории проведение национально-государственного размежевания Средней Азии в 1924 г. Советское Востоковедение. 1955.

Ragnar Leunig

Belgium – Its Neighbours and the Process from a Centralised to a Federalist State Abstract: The foreign domination of the Belgian region ended in 1830, when the South of the Netherlands became independent. With a liberal constitution and a strong economy based on coal and steel the new state played an important role in international economic affairs. Belgium was for British policy in the nineteenth century a buffer against all ambitions of France. But it was attacked twice in the twentieth century by Germany before becoming a leading factor in European integration – especially with its capital Brussels – first with Benelux and then with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Dominated for a long period by the French speaking Wallonie, the formerly mostly agrarian Flemish speaking Flanders became a decisive factor economically and demographically in the last 100 years. The Belgian constitution had to be changed from a centralised to a federalist state, many competences going from the central state to the three language communities (Flemish, French and German) and the three regions in the state. Keywords: buffer against France, European Union (EU), foreign domination of the Belgian region, independence, integration Belgium Benelux, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), two occupations by Germany

Introduction With its capital in Brussels, Belgium is one of the centres of the European Union (EU) including 27 member states and a population of 450 million people. It is the home to the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) including 30 European and North American member states. Last, but not least, since 1944 it has been the seat of the Benelux Union between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg and the centre of a number of banks and companies. What is not very well known, however, is that in recent decades Belgium has undergone a radical constitutional change from a centralist to a federal state. The Roman Emperor Julius Caesar, conquering the Gaul territories after 58 BC, called them “Belgae” and wrote “De Bello Gallico,” the bravest of the Gallic peoples. In this region, between the rivers Seine and Rhine, lived Celtic and German tribes, speaking Celtic and early German languages. Their name https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-011

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disappeared, but was reintroduced in the sixteenth century as “Belgica,” meaning the territory of the whole Netherland and became the name for the southern parts of the Netherlands after its independence in 1830.1 The Carolingian empire was divided among the three surviving grandsons of Charlemagne in the treaty of Verdun in 843. The Emperor Lothar I received the middle part of the empire between Friesland in the North and Italy in the South, to which the region of the latter Belgium belonged. The languages spoken in the area were French and Flemish.2 The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as well as the kingdom of France tried to acquire this territory located between them. What later became Belgium lay just at the rim of the two empires and in further centuries became a ball bouncing back and forth between the neighbouring powers.3 Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, the large urban centre in Flanders, such as Bruges and Gent – and further on Antwerp, when Bruges lost its direct access to the sea – were on the crossroads of the northern and southern European trade routes, their opulence mainly stemming from trading wool and textiles. Gent was the biggest town north of the Alps, only surpassed in size by Paris. In a battle at Kortrijk in West Flanders in 1302, the citizens of these towns defeated the equestrian army of the French king and regained their independence from France. At the same time, the citizens and the workmen in these towns gained the power over the patricians, a unique development in Europe at that time.4 At the end of the fifteenth century, three dukes of Burgundy formed an empire that included the French speaking Wallona and the Flemish speaking Flanders of what later became Belgium, which were inherited by the Hapsburg family which reigned in this region for more than 300 years.5 But the Habsburg heir Charles V, born in Gent, was not only an emperor in the German Reich. He also ruled in Spain, thus the Habsburg family became the most powerful dynasty in Europe. When Charles V abdicated in 1556, the whole of the Netherlands was passed onto his eldest son Philipp II, king of Spain. An uprising started out of religious and social reasons, to which Philipp responded  Christoph Driessen, Geschichte Belgiens. Die gespaltene Nation. 2. edition (Regensburg, 2020), 11–12.  Theodor Schieder, “Das karolingische Großreich,” in Handbuch der Europäischen Geschichte. Volume 1, Europa im Wandel von der Antike zum Mittelalter, ed. Theodor Schieder (Stuttgart, 1979), 594–95.  Driessen, 13.  Driessen, 17–31; Schieder, volume 2, Europa im Spät-und Hochmittelalter; Ahasver von Brandt, In cooperation with Arnold, Udo (Stuttgart: Die Hanse, 1987), 491, 499, 502.  Driessen, 34–52; Schieder, volume 2; Robert Folz, “Frankreich von der Mitte des 11. bis zum Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts,” 756–62.

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with military power and oppression. Starting in 1579 and ending in 1648, it brought a division to the whole of the Netherlands. The North, mainly Calvinist, became independent, while the South, re-catholicized, remained under Spanish rule until 1714. Flanders was booming in the centuries before, and the seventeenth century became the golden age of the Netherlands in regard to international trade, military power and art.6 In 1714, the southern Netherlands, still remaining under Spanish rule, was again passed to the Austrian Habsburgs. Under Empress Maria Theresa, relations were calm and her successor Joseph II wanted to reorganise the country. The resistance was ended when French troops took over the territory in 1792. It became a part of France, likewise the northern Netherlands later on, and the Code Napoleon was introduced among many other reforms. Numerous young men had to follow Napoleon to fight in his Russian campaign. After Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in the southern Netherlands, at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 the monarchs decided to unite the northern and southern Netherlands under the Dutch King William I. The idea behind it was to form a strong counterweight against all French aspiration to take over the southern7 Netherlands again. England was particularly interested in forming a barrier against French attacks to the north.

Belgium – The Independence The underlying circumstances for the new state of the north and south Netherlands could bring positive developments. The evolution, however, took different directions in both the north and south of the state. The north was not in the golden age any more. It was a time of economic stagnation. The south, on the contrary, became highly industrialised and had more inhabitants than the other part of the new state. During the French rule the French language was prevalent in the administration. King William on the other hand tried to strengthen the Dutch language in all sectors of the south and at the same time industrialisation also brought unemployment to many people. It was the opera by the French

 Driessen, 53–81; Schieder, volume 3, Die Entstehung des neuzeitlichen Europa; Jan Julian Wolter, Der niederländische Bürgerkrieg und die Gründung der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande (1555–1648) (Stuttgart, 1985), 663–88; Michael Erbe, Belgien-Luxemburg (München, 2009), 14 (later: Erbe).  Driessen, 81–91; Schieder, volume 5, Europa von der französischen Revolution zu den nationalstaatlichen Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts; Franz Petri, “Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg von der Französischen Zeit bis zum Beginn der Deutschen Einigung 1794–1865” (Stuttgart, 1981), 930–40.

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composer Auber in Brussels, staged in August 1830, presenting a Naples uprising against the Spanish, that started the fire with the spark. The people ran out declaiming “Aux armes!” (“To the weapons!”), with the call quickly picked up by the citizens and workmen on the streets: “Away with the Dutch!” This ended in the independence of the South as “Belgium.” It has often been commented that Belgium was an artificial entity, however, the French speaking Wallonians and Flemish speakers in Flanders have been living together for centuries and have had a certain common identity.8 The liberal constitution remained a model system in Europe for many years. The guarantor powers of 1815 did not interfere with this change as they were preoccupied with their own problems: in England a conservative government was replaced by a liberal one, favouring a liberal state, Belgium. Russia and Austria had to deal with uprisings in Poland and Italy. Finally Prussia feared a military conflict with France. They all ultimately accepted the independence of Belgium. A king was found and practically selected by the Belgian people in the person of Leopold of the house of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. Luxemburg had not been included in the state of 1815, but was reigned over until 1890 in the personal union entered into by Dutch kings and remained a Grand Duchy in the German Federation.9 In no other European state, except England, was the change from the agrarian and bourgeois society to a modern industrial society so fast as in Belgium and especially in Wallonia, where the resources of coal and iron ore were the basis of the economic progress. Last, but not least, the exploitation of the Belgian colony Congo gave strength to the Belgian export. For the second time in history Belgium earned a strong position in the world economy. This economic growth was restricted to Wallonia, with Liege and Brussels included. The capital, situated in the Flemish region, grew to a mostly French speaking city housing the monarchy, government, administration, politics and finance. The Flemish part of the country stayed more and more behind especially after the introduction of spinning mills, which deprived the countryside and the Flemish farmers of their traditional linen and textile production and resulted in large poverty in Flanders.10 Low wages and long work days as well as the women and child labour also added to the strong economic situation of the country, following the theory of supply and demand. But the resistance rose and ended in a series of wild strikes close to a revolutionary situation. To integrate the low social classes into the

 Driessen, 93–105; Schieder, volume 5; Petri, 940–48, 957.  Driessen, 105–07.  Schieder, volume 5; Petri 955–57; Driessen 108–14.

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political system the election system was reformed several times supported by the actions of the atholic party – in power from 1884 to the First World War – the majority voting system was changed – for the first time in the world – into a proportional representation, and education was eventually made compulsory.11 In Flanders, the disadvantage of speaking Flemish in the united Belgium has been increasingly under discussion since 1840. Teaching Flemish was only covered in primary schools in Flanders. The French speakers operating in politics, economy, finance and the army refused any change. For them, Belgium was to remain a French speaking state. The booming economy brought more wealth to Flanders. It was important for the Catholic Church to see their main hub of believers in Flanders. The Flemish movement also developed in Flanders. Finally, in 1898, a law was introduced and approved by the parliament that both French and Flemish texts of laws had the same validity. This regulation became the cornerstone of the Flemish movement. The idea was to build a Flemish speaking intellectual elite and make the university of Gent a Flemish university. The administrative separation of Flanders and Wallonia was demanded even before World War I.12 Emperor Napoleon III (1852–1870) was known for his ambitions to win parts of Belgium for France. But Belgium had received the guarantee for its neutrality status after its independence from the powers (1831). Belgium kept this international stability during the Luxemburg crisis, the Prussian-French War between the years 1870 and 1871 and in the course of the French-German tensions in 1875. It was common knowledge that during any future wars the neutrality of Belgium would be respected. Only in the first years of the twentieth century was a military reform introduced, along with a limited compulsory military service (1909) in Belgium.13 In the time of expansive imperialism King Leopold II (1865–1909) succeeded in maintaining neutrality and winning the freedom of trade for his enormous (more or less personal) Congo colony at the Berlin Conference (1884/85), thus preventing the English from carrying out their plans of uniting the British colonies in Africa. Brutal exploitation of the region’s immense resources, including rubber, copper, gold and diamonds, resulted in enormous profits for the king. When the scandalous situation in Congo with all its cruelties became

 Driessen, 109–15; Schieder, volume 6, Europas im Zeitalter der Nationalstaaten und Europäischer Weltpolitik bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg; Franz Petri, “Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg von der Krise 1867 bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs (1867–1918),” 476–80.  Driessen, 115–20; Schieder, volume 6, Europa im Zeitalter der Nationalstaaten und europäische Weltpolitik bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1973); Petri, 480–81.  Schieder, volume 6; Petri 466–72.

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public to the world, Belgium took over the colony (1908), improving the life of the people in Congo, but went on exploiting the resources and did nothing to form an elite in the country. When in 1960 Congo became independent, chaos arose and the first prime minister Lumumba was killed. The rich province of Katanga separated itself from the state and Congo fell under the dictatorship of President Mobutu (1965–1997).14

Belgium from the First World War to the End of World War II In 1914 German political and military leaders decided to disregard the superpower guarantees of Belgium’s neutrality and attack France as the fortifications on the French border made it difficult to attack from the German side and easier through Belgium. The British Empire immediately entered the war against Germany. Germans had assumed that they could easily conquer Belgium and then continue the war against France. However, they encountered bitter resistance under King Albert I (1909–1934) which lasted until the German army took control of Belgium. The occupants tried to separate Flanders from Wallonia, thinking like the German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg to have the northern part as a quid pro quo in future peace talks or as a future possibility for annexation. But the Flemish anti-German elite interpreted this separation of the administration – where the mostly French speaking Brussels was given to Flanders – as the basis for the impending Flemish linguistic, cultural and political power.15 After the defeat of the German Reich in 1918, the Belgian politicians hoped to obtain parts of Germany, but the only region annexed to Belgium was Eupen Malmedy, presently including a population of 78,000 inhabitants. A customs union with Luxemburg was concluded. A secret Belgian-French military alliance was signed in 1929, but Great Britain denied an inclusion of their country into this agreement. In the mid-1930s Belgian politics was working for a new independence and neutrality policy which in 1937 resulted in an new independence doc-

 Driessen, 123–45; Schieder, volume 6; Theodor Schieder, Europa im Zeitalter der Nationalstaaten und europäische Weltpolitik bis zum 1. Weltkrieg (1870–1918) (Stuttgart, 1973), 72, 90, 102.  Driessen, 146–69; Erbe, 18; Schieder, volume 6; Petri, 476–81, 487–91.

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ument, which was also guaranteed by France, Great Britain and National Socialist Germany.16 The Flemish movement grew. An anti-militarist Flemish party became stronger and the role of the catholic political support was diminished. The university of Gent now offered classes in Flemish (1930). Flemish was the official language in Flanders while French remained one, with a special regulation for the capital, Brussels. The language used in schools was either of the two languages, depending on the region, and the language used in administration, court of law and the army was restricted. Belgium established itself as more federalist as authoritarian tendencies expanded. The economy increased after the heavy losses of the war, but the country was hit hard by the Great Depression.17 Contrary to 1914, it was obvious to most of the Belgians that in a new war Germany would repudiate the guarantee of neutrality for the country. The invasion was not as detrimental as in World War I, because the thrust went further south in the direction of Paris, but the Belgian army had to capitulate after 18 days. The Belgian exile government first went to France and then to England, while King Leopold III (934–44, 1950–1951) remained in Belgium as prisoner of the Germans in the futile hope of negotiating an arrangement with Adolf Hitler.18 After the occupation there was a never-ending dispute between the German commander in chief and the military administration on the one hand and the growing number of Schutzstaffel (SS) and National Socialist Party positions that had been installed in Belgium. The military administration tried to keep the future open for Belgium and resisted any ideas to germanise the country as preparation for future annexation. Eupen and Malmedy returned to Germany. Thousands of Belgians were forced to work in the German armament industry, where many of them died. Because of the resistance, especially in Brussels and Wallonia, a higher percentage of Jews in Belgium was rescued from the transportations to the extermination camps in the East than in the Netherlands, not to forget the 1943 attack, the only one in Europe, on one of those deportation trains in Belgium that saved the lives of Jews. In a last futile attempt to change the fate planned by Hitler’s orders, there were thousands of fatalities on both sides in a massive battle in the Belgian Ardennes in December 1944/January 1945. During this important military investment in the West, Soviet soldiers advanced in the direction of Berlin.19

 Schieder, volume 7; Franz Petri, “Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg vom Ende des I. Weltkrieges bis zur Politik der europäischen Integration 1918–1970,” 699–702; https://www.-nzz.ch>in ternational:die stolzen-belgier.  Schieder, volume 7; Petri, 705–08.  Schieder, volume 7; Petri, 712.  Schieder, volume 7, 712–16; Driessen, 171–85; Erbe, 18–19.

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In 1944, before the end of the war in their countries, the exile governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands decided, driven by the idea of supranational integration, to form the BENELUX union, starting with a customs union. The prevailing idea of a greater, integrated European union has led these countries to join the United Nations, NATO (1949) and the European Coal and Steel Community as a precursor to the European Union (EU).20

Belgium after the Second World War: Changes in Economy and Society and Constitutional Implications A long-lasting dispute over a collaboration of King Leopold III ended in 1951 with his abdication. His son Baudoin I (1951–1993) became his successor.21 The main problem for Belgium has always been connected to the linguistic issues, as Flemish is spoken in the north in Flanders, while French in Wallonia, in the south. The decision finally came about in the 1960s for the language border to become permanent. Every village is linked to one of the two or three languages, including German in the East. The remaining question is Brussels. There are two languages, with the domination of French and Flemish, in 19 municipalities. As Brussels is in the Flemish region and its significance is clear, French often moved outside to Flemish villages. The Flemish people feared that their language territory would disappear. So in some villages bordering Brussels, Flemish remains the official language, with the use of French allowed for contact with the administration. The traditional university of Leuven offers classes in Flemish, while in the French speaking territory a new university, Louvain-la Neuve, has been founded offering French education. Thus, Belgium has now three communities: the Flemish, French and German speaking communities. Each community has competences in the fields of education, language, culture and health. The Flemish community decided that the language used in all companies in Flanders had to be Flemish.22

 Schieder, volume 7, 719–20; Erbe, 20.  Driessen, 186–91; Schieder, volume 7, 21.  Driessen, 212–15; Schieder, volume 7; Petri, 721–24; Erbe, 28–36; Bernd Müllender, Belgien. Ein Länderporträt (Berlin, 2017), 117–21; Alexander-Berge Grasse and Frank Berge, “Föderalismus in Belgien. Vom Bundesstaat zum Staatenbund,” Auslandsinfo 6 (2004): 67–103, here 81–84 (later: Grasse).

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There are several factors behind the Flemish pressure to have an equal position in the state. The birth rate in Flanders is higher than in Wallonia. Out of the 11 million Belgians, about 60 per cent have a Flemish background, while only 32 per cent are Walloon, with Brussels not included. Until the 1950s, Wallonia held a dominant position in terms of its economy. However, as a result of the coal and steel crisis in the 1960s, the South, haunted by high unemployment, had fallen behind, while in the formerly agrarian and relatively poor Flanders modern industry flourished, with the important port of Antwerp, the second most influential in Europe. Today, the gross domestic product of Flanders and Brussels surpasses that in the Wallonia region. Flanders brings more than 50 per cent of the national GDP, Wallonia only a quarter and Brussel about 20 per cent.23 In 1980, apart from the three cultural communities, there were three regions formed: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. Each of them are represented by their own parliaments and governments. Flanders has the same community and region and only one parliament and government exists, which is located in Brussels. In the case of Wallonia it is different, because the German speaking Belgians belong to the region of Wallonia, but at the same time they have their own cultural community. Brussels is also different: the French speaking people of Brussels belong to the French language community, and at the same time have their own region. The regions hold the following competences: environment, development planning, agriculture, traffic, economy and foreign trade. Each of the regions has the right to conclude international treaties. For example, in addition to Belgian embassies, Flanders representatives are operating in The Hague, Paris, Berlin and London. The importance of Belgian regions was demonstrated in 2016 when the Walloon parliament temporarily blocked the EU-Canada free trade agreement. Communities and regions comprise of provinces and finally municipalities. Today, the first article of the constitution reads: “Belgium is a federal state, consisting of communities and regions.”24 The remaining competences of the central state, the federal government and the parliament with the chamber of deputies and the Senate include: justice, finance, security and defence, foreign policy (except for the competence of the regions) and social security. The significance of soccer as a component of

 Driessen, 214–15; Schieder, volume 7; Petri, 722–23; Erbe, 36–37; Grasse, 93.  Driessen, 215–16; Ministry of Flanders, Administration of foreign Affairs. Flanders a state of federal Belgium (Brussel, n.d.); Grasse, 81–107; https://www.belgium.be/de/ueber/belgien/ landesgeschichte/belgien/ab-_1830/bildung_des_foederalen_staats; https://www.belgium.be/ de/ueberbelgien/staat/federale_staat; https://www.belgium.be/de/ueber_belgien/staat/feder ale_staat/aufbau.

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Belgian identity should not be overlooked as it enjoyed success at the 2018 World Cup in Russia. Kings Albert II (1993–2013) and Philip I (since 2013) hold representative positions but stand above the political infighting of the parties, although Philip has sought to introduce moderating measures during the difficult period of government formation.25 One reason for tremendous difficulties in Belgian politics is not only the division into communities and regions, but also the political party system in the country. The parties include Flemish and Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialist and Green parties, which often feel more responsible for their region than for Belgium as a whole. A tendency towards separatism can also be detected in Flanders, although the Flemish have been granted much greater authority in recent decades. “Vlaams Belang,” formerly “Vlaams Blok,” is an extreme party. A more moderate option is the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), which is not only the most powerful party in Flanders, but also in the Belgian parliament (2019). Building of a common government has been a challenge for a long time as there are many parties divided along language lines. The last government formation took 21 months, and to its disadvantage two great Flemish parties N.-VA (16 per cent in the last election) and “Vlaams Belang” (12 per cent) are not included in the new government. The right wing parties have a strong impact in Flanders. In Wallonia the socialist factions predominate in the lead. Another issue is that in Flanders there is traditionally a long-standing Flemish-speaking minority that primarily uses French in a family context, the so-called Fransquillons. In principle, one can say that a large percentage of Flemish citizens can speak French, whereas in Wallonia the percentage of Flemish speakers is very low.26 A particular form of political representation is found among the German community in eastern Belgium, as well as in Brussels. Citizens in various democracies have for many years demonstrated their dissatisfaction with voter participation in representative democracies. Many of them demand various forms of directive referendums. However, past referendums, such as on the European constitution in France in 2005 or on Britain’s membership of the European Union in

 Driessen, 214; Tagesspiegel, January 2, 2020, 28; Rheinische Post, July 3–4, 2021, E 4; Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 18, 2020, 6 (later SZ).  Driessen, 216–117; Erbe, 44, 70–183; Winfried Dolderer, “Nachbarn im Zerrspiegel. Das deutsche Flandernbild seit 1830,” in Nachbarsprache Niederländisch. Brochure 2 (1995), 135–54; Belgien das Ende des föderalen Systems?, https://www.treffpunkteuropa.de/belgiendas-ende-des foederalen-systems?/lang=fr; Grasse, 81–107; SZ, August 20, 2019, 7; Bocholter Borkener Volksblatt (later: BBV), November 8, 2019, A6; BBV, January 18, 2020, A6; SZ, February 18, 2020, 6; SZ, July 30, 2020, 6; SZ, October 1, 2020, 7; SZ, March 5, 2021, 6; Le Monde, January 26, 1968, 10.

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2015, show that complex issues cannot be decided solely by a citizens’ referendum. Another form of extending the participation of citizens is an attempt of the deliberative democracy or citizen assembly already practised in the province of Vorarlberg in Austria, in the Republic of Ireland, the province of Ontario in Canada, Germany and in the European Union.27 An assembly of 24 citizens operates for an 18-month term in the German community in Belgium. The questions to be discussed are settled by 50 citizens chosen by lot – as in ancient Athens – who are representative of the area in terms of gender, age, profession. They are provided with expertise to build up their understanding. A group discusses a topic, such as assistance for the elderly, and then presents the results of their discussion together with the citizens’ assembly to the municipal parliament as a recommendation for action. The parliament then has to discuss the recommendations. Finally, the parliament, government and responsible ministers have to react to these propositions of the citizen assembly. After some time the representative assembly is replaced by other citizens. With the passage of time, a large percentage of the population will be involved in this process. The members are thoroughly informed and understand how complex the policymaking is in case of different interests. Representative democracy can be improved by various means without introducing a deficient direct democracy imperative.28 All Belgium’s neighbours dominated its territory from time to time. French rulers were attracted to the country because the language of the south, Wallonia, was French and the country’s industry was a profitable prey. In the north,

 Daniel Oppold, Effekte deliberativer Demokratie am Beispiel der Bürgerräte in Vorarlberg (M.A. paper); Konstanz, 2016; Richard Youngs, Can Citizen Participation really revive European democracy?, https://www.iep-berlin.d/forschung/debatte-zur-zukunft-der-ero paeischen-union/eu-idea/;EU; IDEA – Integration and Differentiation for Effectiveness and Accountability, http://iep-de/forschung/Debatte-zur-zukunft-der-europaeischen-unin/eu/ idea/; A new way to vote in Ontario, http:///www.citizen assembly.govn.ca/; Lukas Kübler, Claus Leggewie and Patrizia Nanz, “Demokratische Innovation durch Bürgerräte,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Zustand der Demokratie, Jahrgang 26–27 (2021): 47–53 (later: APuZ); B14/97, 28. März, 1997; Karheinz Niclauss, Vier Wege zur unmittelbaren Bürgebeteiligung, 3–12; SZ, September 26, 2020, 7; SZ, November 23, 2020; Das Parlamemt, nr. 3–4, January 18, 2021; SZ, January 14, 2021, 4, 7; SZ, June 25, 2021, 6; SZ, July 6, 2021, 5; SZ, July 21, 2021, 15; BBV, September 23, 2021, C 8.  Alexandra Rojko, “Wenn zufällig ausgeloste Bürger plötzlich mit bestimmen,” https://www. spiegel.de/ausland/experiment-in-belgien-wenn-zufaellig-ausgeloste-buerger-ploetzlich-mitbes timmen-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000174211453 ; https://www.ipg-journal.deinterviews/arti kel/deliberative-demokratie-macht-buerger-gluecklich-3510/ ; Thomas Kirchner, Volksherrschaft wie im alten Athen, SZ, October 19, 2019, 9, http://www.g1000.org/en/method_futurephp.

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on the other hand, the Netherlands felt close to its southern neighbours as Flemish is closely related to Dutch, which is now taught in Flemish schools as High Dutch. Only in the golden times of Bruges and Gent, and later Antwerp, were parts of the Southern Netherlands self-governed. And yet these respective territorial dominions came to an end in Belgium. In 1815, not far from Brussels, Napoleon I lost his last decisive battle at Waterloo. Dutch domination ended with the events at the Brussels Opera House in 1830. In January 1945, Germans lost the conclusive battle after the offensive in the Belgian Ardennes. Is the federalisation of Belgium, that has taken decades, a real success? You can understand the complexity of the Belgian problem when driving from the German town of Aachen to Brussels. The first region welcoming visitors in Belgium is the German speaking area. A board informing about the next major town reads: Luettich. Next, entering the Flemish-speaking territory, this town is called “Luik” and finally you reach the French-speaking area, where the sign says “Liège.” All these names are the names of the same city. Arriving in Brussels, visitors see the bilingual street signs “Grand Place – Groote Markt.” Roman Catholicism is the dominating religion in Belgium, thus those of this religion have one major set of beliefs, but are split into two strong ethnicities: the Flemish and the Walloons speaking two different languages. The small group of the German speaking population is profiting from the introduction of the federalisation processes. We have seen a complete change in society, industry and wealth. The dominating Walloons have entirely lost their power in the aforementioned areas beginning with the 1950s. The formerly poor agricultural area of Flanders is now economically dominant and Flanders represents the majority in Belgium. Why can we recognise a strong but not dominating separatist movement in Flanders? One reason may be the past persecution of the Flemish in the past. This undemocratic behaviour still has a certain impact on the Flemish people. Another reason is that the government’s financial aid goes south, which the Flemish deplore. Parallel opinions can be observed in Italy about the relations between the north and south, and in Germany regarding relations between the south and the north and east. The Walloons are not in the least as capable to speak Flemish as the Flemish are to speak French. But neither the Flemish in the North nor the Walloons in the south are considering to come closer to the Netherlands or France due to language similarities with these countries. Some Flemish politicians deliberate replacing the federal state by a confederation of Wallonia and Flanders within the European Union. However, an unsolvable problem remains, presently the mainly French speaking capital city of Brussels located in the Flemish territory, and French speakers moving from the flourishing capital to Flemish villages. Brussels has

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been chosen by the EU as a central ground because it was situated in a smaller EU country and was easy to reach. Many observers of the political scene in Belgium think that one day Belgium will be separated due to the ongoing troubles after the introduction of federalisation, such as prolonged problems in forming a government. But Walloons and Flemish have been living together for centuries. Only the people of Brussels and the citizens of the German faction will call themselves Belgians, although some form of identity exists. In the administration the regions sometimes seem to know more about the regions in the neighbouring countries, the Netherlands, Germany and France, than about the regions in their own country belonging to the other language group. The migrants coming from other countries are not that much interested in the ethnic complexities of the country. Nevertheless the Belgians have since long developed a strong sense of compromise. Even if it takes a long time to find a solution to a problem, the solution to these difficulties is eventually found and a result is achieved – albeit under the sign of disputes and complications – and without the use of violence: see the division of the University of Leuven. Belgium is thus a laboratory where different ethnic groups co-exist and can serve as a model for solving parallel ethnic problems in other countries.29

References Alexander-Berge, Frank. “Föderalismus in Belgien. Vom Bundestaat zum Staatenbund.” Auslandsinfo 6 (2004): 67–103. Brandt, Ahasver von. In coperation with Arnold, Udo. Stuttgart: Die Hanse, 1987. Dolderer, Winfried. “Nachbarn im Zerrspiegel. Das deutsche Flandernbild seit 1830.” In Nachbarsprache Niederländisch, brochure2. 1995. Driessen, Christoph. Geschichte Belgiens. Die gespaltene Nation. 2. edition. Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg, 2020. Erbe, Michael. Belgien-Luxemburg. C.H.Beck Verlag, München, 2009. Folz, Robert. “Frankreich von der Mitte des 11. bis zum Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts.” In Handbuch der Europäischen Geschichte. Europa im Spät-und Hochmittelalter, volume 2, edited by Theodor Schieder. Stuttgart, 1987. Kirchner, Thomas. “Volksherrschaft wie im alten Athen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 18, 2019. Kübler, Lukas, Claus Leggewie and Patrizia Nanz. “Demokratische Innovation durch Bürgerräte.” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Zustand der Demokratie, Jahrgang 26–27 (2021): 47–53.

 Driessen, 216–21; Erbe 160–63; Grasse, 81–107.

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Ministry of Flanders. Administration of Foreign Affairs. Flanders a state of federal Belgium. Brussels, n.d. Müllender, Bernd. Belgien. Ein Länderporträt. Ch.Links Verlag, Berlin, 2017. Oppold, Daniel. Effekte deliberativer Demokratie am Beispiel der Bürgerräte in Vorarlberg. M.A. paper, Konstanz, 2016. Petri, Fanz. “Belgien, Niederlamde Luxemburg von der französichen Zeit bis zum Beginn der deutschen Einigung.” In Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte. Volume 5.Europa von der französischen Revolution zu den nationalstaatlichen Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts, edited by Theodor Schieder, 930–967. Klett.Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart, 1981. Petri, Franz. “Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg von der Krise 1867 bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges(1867–1918).” In Handbuch der Europischen Gesxchichte, volume 6, Europa im Zeitalter der Nationalstaaten bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, edited by Theodor Schieder, 465–493 (first unchanged reprint). Union Verlag Stuttgart, Stuttgart, 1968. Petri, Franz. “Belgien, Niederlande, Luxemburg vom Ende des 1.Weltkrieges bis zur Politik der europäischen Integration. 1918–1970.” In Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte, volume 7, Europa im Zeitalter der Weltmächte, edited by Theodor Schieder 699–728. Clett.Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart, 1979. Rojko, Alexandra. Wenn zufällig ausgelöste Bürger plötzlich mitbestimmen. 2021. https:// www.spiegel.de/ausland/experiment-in-belgien-wenn-zufaellig-ausgeloste-buerger-ploet zlich-mitbestimmen-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000174211453 Schieffer, Theodor. “Das karolingische Großreich.” In Handbuch der europäischen Geschichjte, volume 1 Europa im Wandel von der Antike zum Mittelalter, edited by Theodor Schieder, 544–596. Klett.Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart 1979. Youngs, Richard. Can citizen participation really revive European democracy? 2019. https:// carnegieeurope.eu/2019/07/30/can-citizen-participation-really-revive-european-democ racy-pub-79588. Wolter, Jan Julian. “Der niederländische Bürgerkrieg und die Gründung der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande(1555–1648).” In Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte. Die Entseehung des neuzeitlichen Europa, volume 3, edited by Theodor Schieder, 664–680. Klett.Cotta Verlag. Stuttgart 1985.

Joanna Bar

History as an Instrument of Contemporary International Conflicts: The Case of the Sudanese States Abstract: The aim of the paper is to analyse the historical conditions of the conflict between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan – the origins of the discord and prospects for ending this and the future peaceful coexistence of the two states. The main emphasis will be put on highlighting the most important moments of the history of both Sudanese states – until 2011 common – in order to show in the historical factors the premises of the conflict, which, despite the separation of the two states, has not been ended until today. This conflict already existed in the pre-colonial period, when Arab Muslims from the North organised raids on Christian and animist shepherds from the Dinka and Nuer tribes living in the South to sell them to slave traders. During the colonial period, when Sudan as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium was ruled by the British, the latter, in order to protect minority rights and prevent the Islamisation of the South, perpetuated religious-ethnic divisions, to the detriment of both parts of Sudan, including differences in the pace of economic development. These policies bear at least partial responsibility for the successive phases of the long civil war that erupted after independence (1956), in protest against the unequal treatment of the two parts of the country, followed by attempts to impose Islamic law throughout the state (1983). Today, the two countries should conclude negotiations on the course of the common border and define the principles of cooperation in the field of oil transit. However, the future of the two states will take a separate course, contrary to historical experience, but in accordance with the sense of cultural and civilisational belonging. The Republic of Sudan will permanently enter the Arab world, while the Republic of South Sudan will bind its future to its southern neighbours. Keywords: East Africa, international conflicts, Republic of South Sudan, Republic of Sudan In the introduction, it is worth emphasising that Sudan is a geographical, historical and political concept at the same time. Geographically, the area of Sudan is the plains stretching between the Sahara desert and equatorial forests,

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-012

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from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. It is a zone of savannas, a dry tropical climate and one rainy season. Geographers also distinguish between eastern and western Sudan, with the border between them being Lake Chad. Politically, the concept of Sudan contemporarily refers to two states; the Republic of Sudan (with its capital in Khartoum) and the Republic of South Sudan (with its capital in Juba). From reaching its independence in 1956 until the separation that took place in 2011, Sudan was one country, the largest in Africa, accounting for over eight per cent of the continent’s land area.1 Geopolitically and historically Sudan belongs to the so-called Horn of Africa, along with Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Although the very concept of the Horn of Africa comes from the decolonisation period (starting with the 1970s), the region has attracted the interest of great powers for centuries due to its high strategic significance.2 In the first centuries of the modern era, Sudan was first influenced by Christianity, and then by Islam, the conquests of which severed its contacts with Christian civilisation and permanently tied its northern part with the Arab world. In 1821, Sudan was conquered by Egypt. Practically speaking, only the northern part yielded to the occupant, because the swamps in Arabic known as the sudd, marking the border of the world known to geographers from the times of antiquity, for several decades remained an effective barrier to the conquest of the South and were only crossed by infrequent expeditions of slaves, ivory and gold traders. In 1882, due to the insolvency of the Egyptian government, the actual rule over Sudan was taken over by Great Britain. In the same decade, the Mahdi uprising broke out, remembered by Europeans mainly because of the fall of Khartoum in 1885 and the death of General Charles Gordon during his service defending the city. For the North Sudanese, this uprising, known as Mahdia (1881–1898), was an important stage in national integration. In the years 1899–1955 Sudan was formally an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The north and the south received two separate educational and administrative systems. In the north, the official language used was Arabic, while in the south it was English, introduced by the British, with consideration given (at the level of primary education) to the languages of the ethnic minorities.

 “Sudan,” https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan (accessed September 10, 2021).  Róg Afryki, ed. Joanna Mantel-Niećko and Maciej Ząbek (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 1999), 27–40.

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In order to protect the rights of minorities and prevent the Islamisation of the South, the British strengthened the divisions, also in terms of differences in economic development. These policies, to the extent of underplaying the fragmentation and diversity of ethnic groups, were at least partly responsible for the long civil war that erupted after independence (1956) and for Sudan’s current disintegration. Sudan gained independence in 1956 and became the largest country in Africa, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, divided into the Arab-Muslim North and the Christian and Animist South. The capital (Khartoum), in line with tradition and the preferences of the British, was established in the northern part. In the pre-colonial period, the Arab influence stopped at the swamp line, the sudd. The north of Sudan, which is more ethnically and religiously homogeneous, was culturally part of the Arab world, the so-called White Africa, while the south was part of sub-Saharan Africa, the so-called Black Africa. South Sudan is made up of historical provinces: Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal and the Greater Upper Nile. Nilotic peoples have been living there for centuries, including the Shilluk tribes living on the border of both zones, as well as the Dinka, Nuer and Luo. All of them shared racial, linguistic and cultural characteristics; they were traditionally shepherds, leaving agriculture in the hands of women. However, there never developed a bond between them to allow for the commencement of state-building processes, or at least for a peaceful continuation thereof. The most bitter fighting was between the Dinka (1.5 million) and Nuer (700,000) factions. Traditions of their own statehood, at the early statebuilding stage, were only cultivated by the Shilluk, the least numerous of the groups (200,000). Conflicts between the north and south of the country existed as far back as the pre-colonial period, when Arab Muslims from the north organised raids on Christian and animist herdsmen from the southern Dinka and Nuer tribes to sell them to slave traders. At the same time, inter-tribal skirmishes erupted among the inhabitants of the south. The Nuer, though half as numerous, were better organised and the bane of the surrounding tribes; they attacked Dinka, stole their cattle and kidnapped people whom they forced to join their own communities or who were sold to slave traders. The harsh historical background has thus not only affected the contemporary hostility between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, but have also had a negative impact on internal relations in the Republic of South Sudan. The regaining of independence did not bring Sudan the peace that had been forcibly maintained by the English. In Sudan, we observed processes

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typical for Africa in the post-colonial period, where the newly established states, united under the banner of national liberation during the struggle for independence, after its end, as a rule, were unable to implement the democratic principles they had proclaimed earlier – coups d’état prevailed, after which power was taken over by the military.3 The patterns promoted by the colonisers and ineptly implemented by the local elite, most of whom were educated at universities in the metropolis (or – more often – did not have one at all), did not pass the test either. World powers vied for political influence and profits from natural resources. These factors, along with many others, related to the local socio-political realities, meant that during the decolonisation period, African states developed specific features, the more or less visible remnants of which are observed to this day; among other things, the imperative of loyalty to one’s own tribal group, along with the primacy of ethnic identity, was associated with a deficit of loyalty to the state.4 These patterns also occurred in Sudan. After regaining independence, unity was replaced by a struggle for power, and subsequent coups were accelerated by economic problems resulting from the poor decisions of the authorities. The first Sudanese military coup (General Ibrahim Abboud) took place in 1958, only two years after regaining independence. Overall, Sudan has experienced four coups, separated by two brief periods of parliamentary rule. In 1989, a military coup was carried out by Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (the president of Sudan until April 2019), effective with the support of Islamic fundamentalists. Al-Bashir both seized and lost power in the coup. The so-called problem of the south persisted throughout the decades of independence, stalling the country’s economic development. The conflict began in 1955 with the so-called Incident in Torit (in South Sudan’s Equatoria), which was a protest against plans to move the garrison north and replace it with a Muslim detachment, and escalated as a result of a failed promise to create a federal state. The conflict that started in 1955 is referred to as the longest war in Africa, and one of the largest in the world, with over two million deaths and over four million refugees. Compared to most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sudanese conflict was based more on religious animosities than tribal issues. But while religion

 Paweł Frankowski and Irma Słomczyńska, Unia Europejska – Afryka Subsaharyjska. Uwarunkowania, mechanizmy, efektywność współpracy (Lublin: UMCS – Uniwersytet Marii CurieSkłodowskiej, 2011).  Państwo w teorii i praktyce stosunków międzynarodowych, ed. Mirosław Sułek and Janusz Symonides (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009), 373–92.

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was dominant in the struggles between the north and the south, both religious and tribal factors played out in parallel. The first phase of the conflict ended with an agreement concluded in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa (1972), the result of which was the formation of an autonomous southern region government. However, when in 1978 rich oil deposits were discovered in the south, the region was stripped of the profits. What is more, the refinery and headquarters of the investor – the American company Chevron – were located in the north. This did not bode well for a lasting agreement. The second phase of the conflict (1983–2005) broke out as the Islamic government in Khartoum tried to impose Islamic law across the country. This decision sparked a revolt of the garrisons from the South, resulting in the command being taken over by John Garang and creating the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) along its army branch, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Back then, the main goal of the politicians of the South was the struggle for autonomy, not independence. The war, however, conclusively interrupted hopes for the quick development of the country. In 1984, Chevron ceased operations in the area after partisans from the south murdered four of its employees. When it came to its policy towards the south, the central government sought to exploit ethnic animosities. As a result, hostilities between the Dinka, who were the backbone of the SPLM, and the Nuer began. The rarely authorised humanitarian aid was most often looted by the soldiers; crops were destroyed and cattle were killed, aggravating the famine. Ceasefire discussions have been held since 2002 and spanned over three years. A peace agreement was the culmination of peace negotiations finally reached in January 2005. The accord was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, listing the following provisions: fair distribution of oil profits, the distribution of seats in the central administration, the abolition of Muslim law in the South, the foundation of the new national army and a Government of National Unity. The key provision, however, read that after a six-year transition period, a referendum on the separation or autonomy of South Sudan would be held.5 By then, the alternatives were already anticipated: the emergence of a united and strong Sudan or the break-up of the state, as a result of which struggles for power between the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk would begin in the South.

 “The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” https://www.britannica.com/place/SouthSudan/The-2005-Comprehensive-Peace-Agreement (accessed September 10, 2021).

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The referendum was held in January 2011 in South Sudan. Almost 99 per cent of South Sudan’s population opted for the separation. The Republic of South Sudan was officially recognised by the international community on July 14, 2011.6 As early as 2011, great challenges emerged to both of the emerging countries. The government of the Republic of Sudan lost 80 per cent of Sudanese oil and most of its agricultural land to the South. The government of the Republic of South Sudan needed to manage on its own, securing the economic development of the country, one of the poorest in the world. The two countries had to negotiate the terms of their separate operation. The priority issues included an agreement for the use of the North Sudan oil pipeline, refineries and port for the export of South Sudan crude oil and the course of the common border in the disputed Abyei Area. Pessimistic forecasts on the conflict outbreak began to come true almost immediately, both on the international and domestic scale. The nature of these struggles deserves attention, as the disagreements emerged simultaneously: an international conflict regarding the border in the disputed Abyei Area and a domestic conflict in South Sudan for the seizure of power, where battles were waged exploiting historically based ethnic animosities. In the case of military operations between the north and the south, historical events were relegated to the background of the conflict, and its real causes were political and economic interests. While the memory of the troubled past and the attempt to forcibly impose Islam prevailed in the pre-2011 north-south fighting period, it has now given way to competition to seize the profits from the sale of South Sudan oil and control of the oil-rich Abyei Area. The domestic conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, on the other hand, experienced a much stronger historical influence on its course, and is now being used instrumentally to achieve political goals. Dinka, who had dominated the entire leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army guerrilla warfare during the period of the struggle with the north, began to see the less numerous Nuer as second-class citizens after the state gained its independence. Hence, it is not surprising that after 2011 the Nuer began to realise that they had to endure the same dictatorship in the new state as they had endured during the Arab dictatorship of Khartoum. The conflict, which broke out in August 2011, escalated in mid-December 2013. The pretext for the outbreak of new fighting was the alleged coup attempt by Riek Machar, a former vice president who was dismissed in July of that year.

 “Moving toward southern independence,” https://www.britannica.com/place/SouthSudan/The-2005-Comprehensive-Peace-Agreement (accessed September 10, 2021).

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In the spring of 2013, the Nuer representative in the central government, VicePresident Machar, began to publicly criticise President Kiir, accusing him of dictatorial tendencies, mismanagement and ignorance and of approval of passing the power in the state to Dinka, and announced that he was going to run for the presidency in upcoming elections. In July 2013, President Salva Kiir dismissed him along with the entire government.7 With the escalation of fighting, the state began to collapse three years after its creation. In an attempt to identify the exact cause of this process, the first step to take is identifying the exact causes of the conflict, a conflict over power that was shared by President Kiir’s troops and the rebel army of the dismissed Vice-President Machar. The conflict in South Sudan thus began with a political dispute between two leaders, but quickly turned into an ethnic war. The fact that it was not the ethnic divide that was decisive in the conflict between politicians, but that the politicians involved in the conflict used ethnic tensions for their purposes, should be borne in mind. Ethnic conflicts are very often conducted under the slogan of defending the interests of an ethnic group, but this slogan is equally often used instrumentally as one of the arguments in a dispute, as well as a convenient way of mobilising support from a large population; this catchphrase is not always an end, but more often a means to a fight, regardless of the accompanying phraseology. This tendency, often observed in the last half-century in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, was also observed after 2011 in the Republic of South Sudan. In January 2014, it could already be said that although the acute phase of the civil war in South Sudan lasted only a month, its consequences were catastrophic. According to the International Crisis Group, about 10,000 people died in four weeks of fighting.8 In August 2014, after eight months of the conflict, the number of people who were forced to leave their homes amounted to 1.5 million. Oil production stopped. In practice, the war resulted in the collapse of the state, the governing apparatus of which was completely paralysed. When analysing the prospects for stabilisation of the Republic of South Sudan at that time, the emphasis was put on ending the conflicts between the two armed forces; the external conflict was to be ended through a compromise on delineating the border line through the disputed territory of the Abyei

 “South Sudan’s Salva Kiir sacks cabinet,” BBC News, July 24, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-23428557 (accessed September 10, 2021).  “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name,” International Crisis Group, REPORT 217/ AFRICA, April 10, 2014, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/southsudan-civil-war-any-other-name (accessed September 10, 2021).

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district, and internal conflict by assigning an equal share of power and granting equal rights to members of all ethnic groups. While the demarcation of the exact border between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not been fully implemented, in 2012 the international mediation, with the support of the African Union and the United Nations, assisted in signing the agreement between the two Sudanese states on the creation of a demilitarised buffer zone for the purpose of deescalating the border skirmishes around the Abyei Area and on the terms for the sale of South Sudan oil through the North Sudan oil pipeline, refinery and port.9 On the other hand, the acute phase of the internal conflict in the Republic of South Sudan ended unexpectedly, with the accession process to the East African Community (EAC) playing a significant role. The EAC is one of the fastest growing regional economic blocs in the world, expanding and strengthening the co-operation among the partner states in political, economic and social spheres. The regional integration process is reflected by the progress of the East African Customs Union, the establishment of the Common Market in 2010 and the implementation of the East African Monetary Union Protocol.10 The Republic of South Sudan’s efforts to join this regional “club of the rich” were related to the extent of pre-colonial historical and cultural influence. While the abovementioned border defined by the sudd swamps naturally hindered the contacts of the Sudanese from the South with Arabs from the northern part of Sudan, the lack of a natural southern border has for centuries favoured contacts with their neighbours from the south, even if the southern borders of Sudan were peripheral for them. The history and tradition of these contacts helped the highly unrealistic, as it seemed at the time, plans to integrate South Sudan into membership in the economically successful East African Community, although it was fully realised that if the integration process were to be successful, all interested parties would benefit: the existing members of the EAC due to favourable prices for South Sudan oil, and South Sudan due to partner terms of its transit and many other benefits resulting from the membership. South Sudan’s first attempt to engage with the EAC was in June 2011, before it actually gained independence.11 Proper negotiations continued from September 2011.

 “Continued problems with Sudan,” https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Sudan/Contin ued-problems-with-Sudan (accessed September 10, 2021).  “Overview of EAC,” https://www.eac.int/conferenceonwomen/downloads/doc_download/ 47-overview-of-policies-and-legal-framework-for-promoting-women-in-socioeconomic-develop ment.html (accessed September 10, 2021).  Donnas Ojok, Bernard Mukhone and Mathijas Kamp, “The EAC Regional Integration and Prospects for Peace Building in South Sudan,” Country Report Uganda, May 2016, Konrad-

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South Sudan’s accession application was not rejected, but it was referred for further examination by a panel of experts. At the same time, the rejection of a similar application from Khartoum was confirmed on the basis of a geographical criterion related to the absence of shared borders. Although no direct reasons were provided for the postponement of the approval of South Sudan’s accession application, commentators pointed to the unfinished conflict with North Sudan, political instability, institutional weakness of the young state and the poor condition of the economy. Negotiations were further pursued, however, and in November 2012 South Sudan was admitted to the accession process regarding the terms of the Treaty, Article 3 (Membership of the Community) to be exact, referring to the criteria for the possible admission of new members.12 These criteria include provisions concerning, inter alia, adherence to generally accepted principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and social justice, as well as the principles of a market economy. The accession process was halted once again at the end of 2013 as concerns were raised about the low ratings of the South Sudan governance system, its institutional structures, the legal system and the condition of the market. The escalation of the civil war and no realistic prospect of its ending were also important. Accession negotiations were restarted as the peace process progressed. After several unsuccessful attempts, the agreement concluded between President Machar and former vice-president Kiir in August 2015 proved to be stable. Signed under pressure from the international community, it called for a permanent ceasefire and the formation of a provisional government, and laid down the terms of a powersharing agreement. The agreement turned out to be stable, though attacks on civilians continued, and the actual peace process dragged on until the end of 2016. On November 2, 2015, South Sudan, at the November EAC summit of heads of state and government, once again called for admission to the East African Community. Representatives of the South Sudanese government admitted at the time that not all eligibility criteria had been met, and that much remained to be done in the areas of governance, democracy, security and human rights. The country’s foreign minister, Barnabas Marial Benjamin, however, argued that Rwanda and Burundi, admitted to the EAC in June 2007, had similar

Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_45328-1522-2-30.pdf?160527114548 (accessed July 14, 2016).  “The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community,” EAC Publication (Arusha: EAC, 2002).

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problems, and that South Sudan “. . . has a better chance of solving its problems faster and more efficiently as a member of the EAC.”13 Ultimately, the accession treaty was signed on April 15, 2016. The signatories included the President of the Republic of South Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit and John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, President of Tanzania and at the same time President of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the East African Community. The accession ceremony was held in Dar es Salaam.14 The efforts to become a member of the East African Community seemed to be an almost impossible challenge, because even at the time of accession, South Sudan was only meeting the geographical criterion of sharing borders with the member states. The pursuit to “anchor” itself to a stable sub-regional organisation associating southern neighbours was fully understandable, both in terms of shared historical, ethnic and religious ties, and in view of the potential tangible integration and economic successes of the community. In the existing geopolitical system, it was also difficult to find a different choice of alliances, in view of the hostile relations with the northern neighbour and the internal problems of the countries bordering the Republic of South Sudan to the west. On the other hand, greater doubts were raised by the community decision to admit a new member so quickly, while this new member failed to comply with any of the systemic standards laid down in the treaty for the establishment of the East African community. It was feared that the introduction of such a politically unstable state into the community would adversely affect the pace of the integration processes that had been successfully carried out so far. Nonetheless, the existing members of the EAC do not always adhere to Western standards of good governance and democracy, and membership of the community did not prevent the attempted coup in Burundi in 2015. It seems that it was neither historical traditions nor political issues that ultimately prevailed on South Sudan being admitted to the East African Community, but potential economic gains; among other things, easier access to South Sudan’s oil fields and water resources, and the fact that South Sudan is expected to be the largest export market for the countries of the community, albeit temporarily constrained by the bottleneck of poor infrastructure. However,

 Fred Oluoch, “East Africa: South Sudan’s Push to Join EAC Gains Momentum,” The East African, November 2, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201511090602.html (accessed September 10, 2021).  “Signing Ceremony of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of South Sudan in to the East African Community,” http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press-releases/20160412/signingceremony-treaty-accession-republic-south-sudan-east-african-community (accessed September 10, 2021).

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successful economic cooperation has the potential to reduce poverty and develop South Sudan, both economically and socio-politically. This, in turn, has a chance to translate into good governance, the development of civil society and a new national identity. The latter, in the case of South Sudan, as in many other African countries, still remains at the level of the official rhetoric of the authorities rather than the actual awareness of citizens, who often still prefer tribal, clan or family identity over national identity, disrupting the nationbuilding processes. Regardless of the expected economic benefits of accession to the East African Community, building a civil society and a sense of national identity is essential for the peaceful existence and further development of South Sudan. Meanwhile, as in many other Sub-Saharan African countries, the building of civil society in South Sudan is a new phenomenon and still remains at the level of the official rhetoric of the authorities rather than the actual activity of citizens, who often still prioritise tribal, clan or family identity over national identity and its interests. In Sudan, as in many African states, this identity translates into electoral behaviour that ensures majority support for Dinka representatives. Seeking the South Sudanese unity among the historical and religious traditions is detrimental in the formation of a strong standing independent state. Contrary to the almost exclusively Arab North, in the South this process had never been institutionally encouraged before 2011. In the pre-colonial and colonial period, proper state structures did not exist at all, and after Sudan regained independence in 1956 a fierce campaign of Arabisation and Islamisation began in the south, with recurring persecution of Christians and expulsion of foreign missionaries from the country. It was only after 2011 that the significance and real commitment of the Christian communities/Churches in building the idea of unity was noticed. In January 2014, in response to the political crisis and pervasive violence, the South Sudan Council of Churches issued a joint statement entitled “Let my people live in peace and harmony,” which included a call by the leaders of Christian communities to a ceasefire and to help those affected.15 Meanwhile, while searching for a national symbol of unity, the figure of John Garang, called the father of the nation, was brought to attention in 2011, and at the same time the history of these lands, which goes back many centuries, was sought for inspiration. The new national anthem includes the words “country of Kush, land of great warriors,” “source of world civilisation,” as well as a reference to the Book

 “South Sudan: Let My People Live in Peace and Harmony – Statement From the South Sudanese Church,” allAfrica, January 11, 2014, https://allafrica.com/stories/201401151854.html (accessed September 10, 2021).

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of Isaiah and the curse on the land of Kush.16 The term Kush was even considered as the name of the new state, in rejection of Sudan as an Arabic term referring to the time after the Muslim conquest of the northern part of the country. Although this initiative turned out to be ineffective, it symbolically shows attempts to build a new identity of South Sudan, the youngest African state.

References Cisło, Waldemar, Jarosław Różański and Maciej Ząbek, eds. Bilad as-Sudan – kultura i polityka. Pelplin: Bernardinum, 2016. “Continued problems with Sudan.” n.d. https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Sudan/Con tinued-problems-with-Sudan. Frankowski, Paweł, and Irma Słomczyńska. Unia Europejska – Afryka Subsaharyjska. Uwarunkowania, mechanizmy, efektywność współpracy. Lublin: UMCS – Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2011. Kabzińska-Stawarz, Iwona, and Sławoj Szynkiewicz. Konflikty etniczne. Źródła – typy – sposoby rozstrzygania. Materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez Zakład Etnologii Instytutu Archeologii i Etnologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Warszawie, 5–7 grudnia 1994. Warszawa: Biblioteka Etnografii Polskiej, 1996. Komorowski, Zygmunt. Kultury Czarnej Afryki. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1994. Mantel-Niećko, Joanna, and Maciej Ząbek. Róg Afryki. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 1999. Moving toward southern independence.” n.d. https://www.britannica.com/place/SouthSudan/The-2005-Comprehensive-Peace-Agreement. Ojok, Donnas, Bernard Mukhone and Mathijas Kamp. “The EAC Regional Integration and Prospects for Peace Building in South Sudan.” Country Report Uganda, May 2016, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_45328-1522-2-30.pdf? 160527114548. Oluoch, Fred. “East Africa: South Sudan’s Push to Join EAC Gains Momentum.” The East African, November 2, 2015. http://allafrica.com/stories/201511090602.html. “Overview of EAC.” n.d. https://www.eac.int/conferenceonwomen/downloads/doc_down load/47-overview-of-policies-and-legal-framework-for-promoting-women-insocioeconomic-development.html. “Signing Ceremony of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of South Sudan in to the East African Community.” n.d. http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press-releases/20160412/ signing-ceremony-treaty-accession-republic-south-sudan-east-african-community. “South Sudan.” n.d. https://nationalanthems.info/ss.htm. “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.” International Crisis Group, REPORT 217/AFRICA, April 10, 2014. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudancivil-war-any-other-name.

 “South Sudan,” https://nationalanthems.info/ss.htm (accessed September 10, 2021).

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“South Sudan: Let My People Live in Peace and Harmony – Statement From the South Sudanese Church.” allAfrica, January 11, 2014. https://allafrica.com/stories/ 201401151854.html. “South Sudan’s Salva Kiir sacks cabinet.” BBC News, July 24, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-23428557. “Sudan.” n.d. https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan. Sulek, Mirosław, and Janusz Symonides. Państwo w teorii i praktyce stosunków międzynarodowych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009. “The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” n.d. https://www.britannica.com/place/SouthSudan/The-2005-Comprehensive-Peace-Agreement. “The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.” EAC Publication. Arusha: EAC, 2002.

Anhelina Bulanova

The Comparison of Russian Propaganda: From the Years 1917–1921 to Nowadays Abstract: In the study, the author analyses the main features of Russian propaganda spread in Ukraine during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921 and today. It is acknowledged that modern Russian propaganda is directed against Ukrainian statehood. The Bolsheviks` propaganda of 1917–1921 was also directed against the independence of Ukraine. The main common features of propaganda of both periods are: manipulation of public opinion, dissemination of false news in order to discredit the Ukrainian government, misrepresentation of historical facts, control over the media and more. The Bolsheviks used propaganda as a way to wage war against the Ukrainian government. Modern Russian propaganda is an integral part of the information war against Ukraine. The clichés that Russian agitators copied from the Bolsheviks are aimed to misinform not only Ukrainians, but the entire world community. Keywords: Bolshevik agitation, conflict, misinformation, Russian propaganda, Ukrainian revolution

Formulating the Problem To this day, informational wars remain an integral part of international conflicts of various scales. At first glance, they do not directly lead to bloodshed, destruction, human casualties, and the result is a certain carelessness when thinking about them. However, the destruction they inflict on social psychology, and the psychology of the individual, is quite commensurate in scale and significance, and sometimes exceeds the consequences of armed wars. It was evident on the Ukrainian lands during 1917–1921. The informational war, coupled with aggression from neighbouring Russia, led to the loss of Ukrainian independence. Today in Ukraine

Author’s note, July 2022: On February 24, 2022, Russia started a terrible bloody war against Ukraine. The article was written before the start of a full-scale war. In the paper, the author analysed similar features in Russian propaganda in the early years of the existence of the USSR in 1917–1921 and in the first period of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014–2021. The author did not investigate the methods of information warfare in Russia from February 24, 2022, but believes that this will become the topic of her future research. The author hopes for the understanding of her colleagues. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111000596-013

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the situation of centuries ago repeats itself, in the 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and occupation of eastern Ukraine by the troops of the Russian Federation. The hostilities were accompanied by an aggressive propaganda campaign launched long before the events. We believe that in 2014 the Russian Federation launched a hybrid war against Ukraine. A hybrid war is a conflict that “combines forms of military-political, economic, informational, cultural, educational, and armed attack on a country chosen for aggression.”1 Considering the fact that the main tool driving hybrid warfare is informational confrontation, including spreading propaganda, the purpose of this paper is to make a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the spread of the Russian Federation propagandistic content on the territory of Ukraine during the liberation struggle of 1917–1921, as well as during military operations on the east of Ukraine, which started in 2014 and continue until today.

Historiography It must be noted that scientific research of the problems regarding the current informational war, especially in the light of the origins of the modern Russian propaganda in the propaganda methods of the Bolsheviks, is largely insufficient and unsystematic: it mainly discusses some aspects of modern informational war waged by Russia against Ukraine without comparing its features with the informational war run by the Bolsheviks in 1917–1921. The historiographical gap in the coverage of an important problem led to the writing of this article. We understand the term “Russian propaganda” as the deliberate dissemination of false information aimed to destabilise the situation in Ukraine and discredit its international prestige, both in 1917–1921 and today. The only works that attempt to present a chronologically holistic image of Russian propaganda about Ukraine are the monographs “War for Consciousness. Russian myths about Ukraine and its past”2 and “Brother`s invasion. Wars of Russia against Ukraine in 12th to 21st centuries.”3 But the nature of the tasks

 Viktor Zhadko, Olena Kharitonenko and Yulia Poltavets, Hybrid War and Journalism. Problems of information security: a textbook (Kyiv: NPU named after MP Drahomanov, 2018).  Victor Brekhunenko, et al., “Brothers” invaded. Wars of Russia Against Ukraine of the XIIXXI centuries (Kyiv, 2016).  Viktor Brekhunenko, War for Consciousness. Russian myths about Ukraine and its past (Kyiv, 2017).

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addressed in these books, despite the valuable observations of the authors, did not contribute to a comprehensive clarification of the problem. Another article important for the development of the topic is “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: the main directions of imperial expansion that pose a threat to the world,” authored by M.I. Shaptalenko, O. I. Grinenko and O. P. Kutov, specialists of the Center for Military Strategic Studies Ivan Chernyakhovsky National University of Defense of Ukraine.4 The authors analyse the changes in the strategy of military security of the Russian Federation in the period from 1993 to 2014, i.e. the changes in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2010 after the Georgian-Russian war, as well as amendments to the doctrine made in 2014. After the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the abovementioned alterations make it possible to legitimise Russian military aggression against other countries. Among European researchers, it is worthwhile to become familiar with the work of the Berlin historian J. Baberowski, Red Terror. History of Stalinism.5 The author gives convincing evidence of Stalin’s repressions in 1930s, that are nothing but a natural continuation of the Bolsheviks’ Revolution Terror of the 1917–1921s: “frenzy of persecution and spy madness, that in the period of Stalin were brought to perfection came from civil war. This was the experience of the Bolsheviks, who surrounded themselves with enemies and isolated themselves from others in order to constantly fuel the fury of persecution”.6 The report of the staff and invited specialists of the American non-governmental organization “Atlantic Council” is a valuable source of information.7 The report provided incontrovertible evidence of Russian military presence in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The Russian side has been for a long time denying its presence in Ukraine. Using the method of digital forensics, known as “geolocation,” i.e. the collection and analysis of photo and video evidence through satellite observation, the authors of the report provide evidence of Russia’s military presence in eastern Ukraine since 2014.8 In particular, the report provides photographic evidence of the movement of Russian heavy equipment across the border, the  M. Shaptalenko, O. Grinenko and O. Kutovy, “Military doctrine of the Russian Federation: the main directions of imperial expansion that pose a threat to the world,” Proceedings of the Center for Military Strategic Studies of the Ivan Chernyakhovsky National University of Defense of Ukraine 3 (2016): 70–74, http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Znpcvsd_2016_3_14.  Jörg Baberowski, Red Terror. History of Stalinism, trans. Oleg Mayevsky (Kyiv: KIS, 2007).  Jörg Baberowski, Red Terror. History of Stalinism, trans. Oleg Mayevsky (Kyiv: KIS, 2007), 35.  “The American Atlantic Council is recognized as an undesirable organization in Russia,” Interfax Russia, July 25, 2019, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/670463.  Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2015), 1, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191186/Hiding-in-Plain_Sight_0529.pdf, 12.

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presence of landfills near the border with Ukraine and personal photos of the Russian military, collected from social networks.9 Georgy Pocheptsov names two directions of modern warfare: kinetic – direct physical actions; and non-kinetic or informational attacks.10 The kinetic direction used by the Russian Federation against Ukraine is to take physical action to destroy Ukrainian military and civilians, destroy settlements, conduct shelling, capture pro-Ukrainian activists and the like. The non-kinetic direction in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is to wage an informational war in the form of propaganda and disinformation aimed to destabilise Ukraine’s internal situation and destroy the country’s authority on the international arena. Recently, the non-kinetic direction of warfare has become increasingly common: “Hybrid warfare is part of a general trend of shifting away from kinetic warfare towards non-kinetic warfare”.11 So, “the increasing role of information in human civilisation has the potential for delivering new tools to provide the desired results without the use of kinetic weapons.”12 Both directions of conflict, characteristic of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war, were used by Bolshevik leaders during 1917–1921 revolution to seize power in Ukrainian lands. The kinetic method of warfare directly affects the nonkinetic method: before or during an armed conflict, the number of propaganda discourses in the public space increases in order to control the target audience. Thus, the aggressor tries to emotionally prepare the audience to change their patterns of behaviour, and to explore their reaction to certain actions of the aggressor country. In the absence of information pretexts by which the Kremlin’s narrative is being reinforced in the words of the propaganda disseminators, they create their own, spreading false fake news.

 Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2015), 1, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191186/Hiding-in-Plain_Sight_0529.pdf, 15–18.  George Pocheptsov, “Russian analytical contexts of hybrid warfare,” Psyfactor.org, 2015, https://psyfactor.org/psyops/hybridwar2.htm.  George Pocheptsov, “Russian analytical contexts of hybrid warfare,” Psyfactor.org, 2015, https://psyfactor.org/psyops/hybridwar2.htm.  George Pocheptsov, “Russian analytical contexts of hybrid warfare,” Psyfactor.org, 2015, https://psyfactor.org/psyops/hybridwar2.htm.

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The Main Statement Modern Russian propaganda is directed not only against Ukrainian territorial integrity, but also against the existence of an independent Ukrainian state in general. This has much in common with the 1917–1921 Bolshevik propaganda: manipulating public opinion, promoting political, economic, cultural and social destabilisation in Ukraine in order to discredit the Ukrainian government. Propaganda as one of the ways of waging war was especially popular among the Bolsheviks and contributed to the final establishment of Soviet government in Ukraine. The course of mythologising that modern Russian agitators follow after the Bolsheviks’ example is virtually indistinguishable in their rhetoric and is aimed at misinforming not only Ukrainians, but the entire world. In March 2014, the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed a law extending the confidentiality of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (commonly known as Cheka), People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (abbreviated NKVD) and Committee for State Security (CSS) records issued from 1919 to 1991. Accordingly, we assume that the same techniques of manipulating public opinion that were used by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, NKVD and Committee for State Security (KGB) during the times of the USSR are used by the current leaders of the Russian Federation in relation to the population of Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. The following statements are part in the most common mythologies created by Russia about Ukraine both 100 years ago and today: 1. The modern East and South of Ukraine is an organic part of Russia (Novorossiya); 2. The majority of Ukrainians supported the Bolsheviks in 1917; 3. All Ukrainian insurgents of 1917–1921 were bandits; 4. The Ukrainian People’s Republic was established by the German General Staff. There are two stages in the formation of communist propaganda: “prohibitive,” as a result of which the Soviet media gained a monopoly on coverage of events; and “offensive,” the spread of agitation among all parts of the population. Immediately after coming to power, on October 27, 1917, Lenin issued a “Decree on the Press,” which laid the foundations of party propaganda. The decree expressed harsh criticism towards the press of the revolution leader’s

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political opponents, whose articles were marked by liberalism, objectivity and independence of views.13 Disseminating propaganda in the USSR was approved at the state level, which established a special unit and individual public authorities, not only centrally oriented, but also at locations ranging from the Politburo to the countryside’s political informators. The Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), branches of which were found in each party or organisation of the Republic, had great impact in this respect. Historical research on the “Socialist Revolution” indicates that the first legislative acts on the creating of propaganda de facto emerged before the end of the revolution. Thus, even at the time of the insurgent peasant anti-Bolshevik movement, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, under the leadership of G. Petrovsky, issued a resolution establishing the so-called “Eastpart” – a commission to collect and study materials on the history of the October Revolution in Ukraine.14 The new institution was responsible for publishing of magazines, collections and other printed materials, the authors of which were not, by definition, impartial in covering the events. Moreover, all archival and museum materials related to the revolutionary process were to be transferred to the Eastport for further processing and censorship. From now on, a representative of the historical section worked in each museum or archival institution, supervising the storage and access to documents.15 In our opinion, it was the way selected by the authorities to strongly impact the formation of historical memory about the revolutionary events in the minds of the people. Alexander Zinoviev, a Russian social philosopher and well-known critic of the Soviet system, believed that the main purpose of Soviet propaganda was to install confidence in the inevitable victory of communism in the world into the minds of their audience.16 The following phrases were the main tags of Soviet propaganda in 1917: “Peace, land, bread,” “All power to the folk,” “All the land to the folk,”

 Decree of the SNC “On the Press,” October 27 (November 9), 1917, http://www.hist.msu.ru/ ER/Etext/DEKRET/press.htm.  “Resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee On the Commission under the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee for the History of the Ukrainian Revolution and the Communist Party of April 6, 1921,” ZZ USSR 168, no. 5 (1921).  “Resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee On the Commission under the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee for the History of the Ukrainian Revolution and the Communist Party of April 6, 1921,” ZZ USSR 168, no. 5 (1921).  Alexander Zinoviev, Crisis and the collapse of Soviet ideology (Moscow: Algorithm, 2003).

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“All power to the councils of workers` and peasants’ deputies.”17 A. Rabinovich claims that the popularity of these slogans helped the Bolsheviks win the civil war, because they represented all segments of society in government.18 Any criticism of the Soviet system, such as the dissemination of information about the Red Terror during the revolution, was automatically identified with “anti-Soviet propaganda,” and protest or opposition to the actions of the authorities was brutally suppressed. Propaganda was mainly disseminated in the media such as magazines, newspapers, propaganda posters and leaflets. The print media were in shortage, as only 18 per cent of Ukrainians were literate at the beginning of the twentieth century.19 To battle this problem, in 1921 a campaign was launched on the territory of Ukraine to eliminate illiteracy, pursuant to the resolution of the CPC (Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union), USSR “On Combating Illiteracy” of May 21, 1921, reproducing the decree of the Russian SFSR (Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) CPC of December 26, 1919 “On the fight against illiteracy,” and thus gave it effect in the Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic).20 The official data claims that this campaign was aimed to raise the literacy rate of the residents of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, a necessary manoeuvre to infuse a larger population with the text of the propaganda printed materials. Other methods of spreading propaganda included public speeches, rallies and demonstrations, as well as making of propaganda films. In 1922, Lenin uttered his one famous phrase, “Of all kinds of art, the most important for us is cinema,”21 which emphasises the importance of the Soviet film industry for spreading propaganda among the illiterate population. Soviet cinema featured a high level of censorship, idealisation of the Soviet system, the spread of communist ideas and the like. A separate type of propaganda was “monumental propaganda” – the propaganda disseminated via artistic means of the positive achievements of the Soviets. Its program was documented in the decree of the

 Alexander Rabinovich, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd (Moscow: Progress, 1989).  Ibid.  O. Movchan, Elimination of illiteracy (liknep), liknep campaigns in the USSR, Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine, volume 6, ed. V. Smoliy et al. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2009), 212, https://ztu.edu.ua/ua/science/files/7_Chicago-style-Notes-and-Bibliography.pdf.  Ibid.  Vladimir Lenin, Complete Works, Volume 44, ed. I. Gladkov (Moscow: Publishing House of Political Literature, 1970), 579, http://uaio.ru/vil/44.htm.

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Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union on April 14, 1918 “On the removal of monuments created in honor of tsars and their servants and the development of projects for monuments to the Russian Socialist Revolution.”22 According to this document, monuments created in the period of the Russian Empire were demolished throughout the territory controlled by the Soviet authorities, and new monuments dedicated to communist leaders were erected instead. The new sculptures often lacked in artistic quality as the materials and qualified staff were scarce. In consequence, the program of the Soviet propaganda of 1917–1921 was documented by a series of Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union decrees and aimed to install confidence in the power of the Soviet state and faith in the victory of communism across the globe. In this time propaganda diverged in the specificity of catchphrases, channels and means of dissemination. In this sense, the modern Russian propaganda continues the Soviet traditions of 1917–1921, although, over time, state propaganda in Russia has undergone significant transformations. Following into the footsteps of Soviet propaganda, it features branding of opposition forces and Western states, a high level of censorship, state monopolisation of the media, total control over journalists and repressive measures against dissidents. An example of that may be amendments to the law “On non-profit organizations” adopted by the State Duma of the Russian Federation on July 13, 2012.23 This law deemed all the media subsidised by entities from beyond the Russian borders to be “foreign agents.” Pursuant to the law, the status of “foreign agent”24 was given to 17 media outlets as of 2021. These include Voice of America, Radio Liberty (Radio Svoboda), Rain (Dojd`) and Present Time, as well as internet editorials such as Bellingcat, Meduza and more. The international community has perceived the granting of “foreign agent” status as the violation of democratic principles. In particular, the British magazine “The Economist” claims that the use of the term “foreign agent” is an attempt to control the civic activity of Russian residents: “It’s new law [that] defines any civil or public activity as political

 Decree of the SNC “On the Removal of Monuments Created in Honor of Tsars and Their Servants and the Development of Projects of Monuments of the Russian Socialist Revolution” of April 14, 1918, no. 416 (1918), http://istmat.info/node/29187.  Federal Law, On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning the Regulation of the Activities of Non-Profit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent, No. 121-FZ, (2012), https://rg.ru/2012/07/23/nko-dok.html.  N. Kupina, “Ideologema inostrannyy agent: three days in July, 2012,” politicheskaya lynhvystyka, no. 3 (2012): 43–48, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ideologema-inostrannyy-agenttri-dnya-v-iyule-2012-goda/viewer.

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and demands that any independent NGO receiving foreign money be stigmatized as a “foreign agent”, a phrase that has clear connotations of treachery.”25 Among other features of modern Russian propaganda we can discern: manipulation of public consciousness and the use of political technology, mythologising the past, falsification of history,26 popularisation of the theme of militarism and heroisation of the army in public space through the creation of relevant content on Russian television. Timothy Snyder said quite aptly: “The purpose of Russian propaganda is to show that the truth, in fact, does not exist.”27 The main lines of contemporary Russian propaganda on Ukraine are based on the idea of a plurality of truths and ambiguity of facts, so these slogans often contradict themselves: the Ukrainian state allegedly does not exist, however it is engaged in repression. There is no Ukrainian nation, but all Ukrainians are nationalists. There is no Ukrainian language, but the citizens of Donbass were all forced to speak Ukrainian.28 If in 1917–1921, the Bolshevik agitators used similar means to create conflicts between the kulaks (rich) and poor peasants, between the intelligentsia and the workers, between supporters of the regime and “enemies of the people,” between the Red Army and “bandits and Petliurists,” then modern Russian agitators are actively promoting the conflict between the pro-Russian population of Ukraine, i.e. “our people,” and patriotic residents, i.e. “fascists,” “Banderites,” “chasteners,” etc.29 Through this parallel it becomes evident that the agitation strategy and scenarios of information warfare have been borrowed from the Bolshevik agitators of 1917–1921 by modern Russian propagandists, now applied after some contemporary improvements. Therefore, the central Bolshevik myths regarding the events on the territory of Ukraine in 1917–1921 should be considered in more detail, and in relation to their connection with the contemporary state propaganda in Russia.

 “Putin’s Russia: Repression ahead,” The Economist, January 1, 2013, https://www.econo mist.com/europe/2013/06/01/repression-ahead.  Vladimir Putin, “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” kremlin.ru, July 12, 2021, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.  Iryna Lysenko, “Timothy Snyder: Russian propaganda works not only against Ukraine – it also works against the world,” Platfor.ma, February 11, 2015, https://platfor.ma/magazine/ text-sq/opinion/timoti-snaider/.  T. Bevz, “Ukrainians and Russians under the sights of Russian propaganda,” Scientific notes of the Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies. And. F. Kuras NAS of Ukraine. Vip. 1 (2015): 160, http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Nzipiend_2015_1_17.  Larisa Masenko, “Banderophobia in Russian propaganda: history and modernity,” Radiosvoboda.org, December 31, 2016, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28206392.html.

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The events from November 1917 to the outset of 1918, which preceded the beginning of the armed confrontation between the Bolshevik forces and the army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, were similar to those that took place just before the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014. In mid-November 1917, the Bolshevik government, the Council of People’s Commissars, officially recognised the right of the peoples of the former Russian Empire to self-determination. However, the Bolsheviks aimed to maintain control over the territory of Ukraine, and ideologically over other areas, implementing the utopian idea of a world proletarian revolution. Pursuant to the “Decree of Peace” issued on October 26, 1917, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The truth however was different, Moscow created revolutionary-military committees in Ukrainian settlements. The real purpose of these committees was to seize power on the ground by local workers in order to facilitate a full-scale military invasion. A similar tactic can be seen in the actions of pro-Russian forces in the spring of 2014, when representatives of pro-Russian organisations began to turn up throughout the eastern part of Ukraine, to the large extent representing anti-social behaviour. According to an Atlantic Council report: “In March 2014, a few weeks after the annexation of Crimea, Kremlin-controlled military, intelligence agents and public relations consultants organized a so-called ‘separatist movement’ to oppose the new Ukrainian government by force.”30 Despite the efforts made, the first attempts to seize power by the Bolsheviks were unsuccessful: in December 1917, armed demonstrations in Kyiv and Odessa were defeated. Around this moment, the Bolsheviks realised that they would not be able to seize power in the territory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic without a military invasion. During the Soviet era, it was widely believed that the majority of Ukrainians supported the Bolsheviks in 1917. However, this opinion was a fabrication disseminated by Soviet-Russian agitators. The only way for the Bolsheviks to seize power was to use the Russian armed forces ̶ the Red Army and Russified workers. The Kremlin made every effort to keep the use of the Russian army out of view. In 1917–1918, the Bolsheviks officially declared they were not engaged in the events in the territory of Ukraine, blaming everything on the civil war between the locals. Russia began to use similar tactics in 2014, and continues to do so today: “Russian propaganda presents the crisis in Ukraine as a civil war. In fact, the conflict in eastern Ukraine is a war artificially created by the

 Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine.

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Kremlin – it is carried out with the help of Russian-made weapons, with the participation of Russian soldiers and with the support of Mr. Putin.”31 Following the onset of Russian aggression, the head of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, declared to the whole world that there were no Russian troops in Donbas, and that the armed conflict between local police and government troops continued: “There are no Russian troops in Ukraine,” Putin said in 2015.32 However, the relevant facts and a number of circumstances point to the presence of Russian armed forces, without which the escalation of the conflict would be unlikely: “. . . without Kremlin forces there would be no conflict, no war, no occupation of the territory of eastern Ukraine.”33 In the context of the Congress of the Soviets of the Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih Basins in Kharkov and its declaration as the capital of the Soviet Republic in December 1917, the myth “Kharkiv is the first capital of Ukraine” became widespread, although the historical capital of Ukraine since Kyivan Rus was Kyiv. In 1917, the latter became the capital of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (abbreviated UPR) – a separate territorial unit focused on the autonomy of Ukraine. But the Bolsheviks deliberately manipulated public opinion in order to “prove” that before 1917 Ukraine did not have its own statehood, and therefore did not have its own capital.34 Kharkiv was chosen as the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic because it was closer to Moscow. Workers residing there were much more Russified, in contrast to Kyiv, where pro-Ukrainian and proindependence views prevailed among the local population. Another myth is the belief that the south-eastern part of Ukraine is part of Russia – the so-called “New Russia.” Here is how the head of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, put it in 2014: “Let me remind you that this is Novorossiya. Here it is – Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolaev, Odessa were not a part of Ukraine in tsarist times. These are all territories handed over to the Soviet government in the 1920s. Why they did it – God knows.”35 In fact, these lands belonged to the territory of the Zaporizhzhya Lowland and Slobozhanshchyna armies. In the mid-eighteenth century the lands were colonised by Ukrainian Cossacks. The spread of this myth fostered the Russian military invasion

 Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine, 7.  “Putin: There are no Russian troops in Ukraine,” Tass.ru, April 16, 2015, https://tass.ru/po litika/1908398.  Maksymilian Czuperski, et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine, 5.  Viktor Brekhunenko, War for Consciousness. Russian myths about Ukraine and its past (Kyiv, 2017).  Viktor Brekhunenko, War for Consciousness. Russian myths about Ukraine and its past (Kyiv, 2017), 21.

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of Ukraine in 1917 and 2014. It was one of the ways for the Kremlin to justify military aggression and make claims to Ukraine. In 1918, the Bolsheviks created the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic, and in 2014 the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics with puppet governments, controlled by Russia. Remarkably, in 1918 the Bolsheviks planned to put the question of the administrative affiliation of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih region to a referendum. In 2014, representatives of the DPR (Donetsk People Republic) also held a “self-rule” referendum in the Donetsk region. The Ukrainian leadership, OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the international community did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the referendum. During 1918–1921, an insurgent-peasant movement spread in the territory of Ukraine. It was spontaneous, there was no leading insurgent body or single leader, and its members fought against everyone. The Soviet leadership identified all members of the insurgent movement with criminal bandits and “Petliurist gangs,” regardless of their political views: In fact, there was no Soviet government in either the city or the counties of the Ekaterinoslav province. In the villages, the ‘fathers’ (bat`ki) and ‘atamans’ still reigned and quarreled, creating their own judgment and massacre of the defenseless civilian population, exploiting it by all means available to the leaders of the highway; complete anarchy reigned in the cities, and criminal banditry developed such a wide range of crimes that people in Ekaterinoslav, for example, were stripped naked and robbed in broad daylight.36

Insulting clichés predominated in the Soviet rhetoric regarding the Ukrainians: any Ukrainian self-awareness manifestation was granted a negative status of “Petliurism”; insurgent peasant detachments were identified as “criminal bandits,”37 an atmosphere of “total conspiracy” against the Soviet government was created and foreign agents and counterrevolutionaries were said to be in hiding. By means of information warfare, Bolshevik agitators helped to create a negative image of the prominent Ukrainian revolutionary figure Symon Petliura. The revolutionist began to be unreasonably associated in the USSR with anti-Semitism and banditry. “Petliurivshchyna,” in the understanding of Soviet propaganda workers, is a petty-bourgeois and chauvinist movement led by Western countries (Poland, the Entente), and at the same time it has the meaning of death. Many workers – natives of local villages and settlements with

 Victor Chentsov, Report of the Ekaterinoslav Provincial Emergency Commission from January 1, 1920 to November 1, 1921 (Dnepropetrovsk, 1994), 18.  Victor Chentsov, Report of the Ekaterinoslav Provincial Emergency Commission from January 1, 1920 to November 1, 1921 (Dnepropetrovsk, 1994).

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instructions from Petliura – came from abroad to Ukraine and in particular to the Yekaterinoslav region.38 Petliurists were often accused of Jewish pogroms, spreading the myth of S. Petliura as a fierce anti-Semite. Modern historians argue that he was neither an anti-Semite nor a bandit. However, Russian propaganda continues to actively repeat the myths about Petliura’s anti-Semitic activities. In 2017, Vladimir Putin made a statement after the unveiling of a monument to S. Petliura in Vinnytsia: “Now a monument to Petliura has been erected – a man of Nazi views, an antiSemite who exterminated Jews during the war.”39 Apparently, the President of the Russian Federation made a mistake, as S. Petliura was assassinated in 1926, the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933 and World War II began in 1939 – but for Russian propaganda, historical facts are not a relevant issue. Yet another myth, actively disseminated by contemporary pro-Russian media, is the claim that Ukraine is dependent on the United States. Along this reasoning, the Ukrainian government is incapable of making independent decisions without Washington’s consent, and Ukrainian troops are funded by Western countries.40 Incidentally, the United States has been called the main enemy of the Russians in the official Kremlin discourse since the Cold War. In this case, the tactic of “the friend of my enemy is my enemy” works, and reports of US aid to Ukraine automatically set the target public hostile to Ukrainians.41 The Bolsheviks endorsed a similar tactic. However, they emphasised the UPR’s dependence not on the United States, but on the German General Staff, in line with the geopolitical situation at the time.42 The Bolsheviks actively spread the myth that the UPR was invented by the Germans in order to split Russia. There was no truth behind this statement: the Ukrainian Central Rada emerged as an independent political organisation and throughout 1917 declared its support for the Entente forces. Only the war with the Bolsheviks and the threat of defeat forced the representatives of the UPR to change their stance.

 Victor Chentsov, Report of the Ekaterinoslav Provincial Emergency Commission from January 1, 1920 to November 1, 1921 (Dnepropetrovsk, 1994), 70.  “Putin called Petliura a Nazi who exterminated Jews during the war,” Istpravda.com.ua, October 20, 2017, https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/59ea2a09d5a5c/.  “Ukraine has announced guarantees of US support in the conflict with Russia,” RIA Novosti, April 2, 2021, https://ria.ru/20210401/garantiya–1603880069.html.  Elena Golub, “What is currently promoting Russian propaganda,” imi.org.ua, April 12, 2021, https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/shho-narazi-prosuvaye-rosijska-propaganda-i38578.  “Ten Myths About the Ukrainian Revolution. According to the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory,” Bbc.com, Ukrainian, March 13, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/fea tures-39216782.

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Conclusion The study proved that the Russian Federation is in a state of not only physical but also informational war with Ukraine. Russian propagandists are deliberately spreading false information aimed at destabilising the situation in Ukraine and discrediting its international prestige. All of these activities are part of the nonkinetic methods of warfare. The arguments of the study state that the contemporary Kremlin discourse uses a propaganda strategy similar to the techniques of Bolshevik agitators. They include distorting the facts in their favour, establishing subjective views and lies, as well as one-sided coverage of events, bias, denying the obvious, ignoring evidence and many others. For example, the Bolsheviks in 1917–1918 officially declared they were not involved in the events on the territory of Ukraine, while the Red Army troops actively fought against the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Along the same lines, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in 2014 that there were no Russian troops on the territory of Donbass, blaming the armed conflict and occupation of the area on a civil war between local residents. Moreover, some contemporary Russian agitators have been digging up the clichés and manipulative assertions created by the Bolsheviks and using them as such: the only change being the adaptation to the reality of the contemporary world. For example, the Bolshevik thesis about the support and financing of the UPR by Germany is very similar to the contemporary Russian thesis about the financing of Ukraine by the US government. Other common features of Soviet and modern Russian propaganda include criticism of Western powers, a high level of censorship, constant control over the media and repressive measures against dissidents. Due to the active dissemination of Russian propaganda in the international media space, sources of information should be carefully checked. The Institute of Mass Media in Ukraine and the independent media organisation “Stopfake” have developed tools to help counter the influx of Russian fake news.43 Among the main recommendations it suggests to learn to identify manipulation, detach emotions from events and facts, double-check facts, be critical of expert statements and unknown online releases, study the political and media context and be involved in the public clarification of propaganda narratives. Thereby, providing the public with details of the risks associated with the impact of Russian propaganda, informing friends of the facts and initiating public discussions on the operations and motives of Russian propagandists are invaluable actions.

 Elena Golub. “What is currently promoting Russian propaganda.” imi.org.ua, April 12, 2021. https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/shho-narazi-prosuvaye-rosijska-propaganda-i38578.

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List of Contributors Prof. Joanna Bar, PhD, is political scientist, historian and ethnologist, as well as associate professor at the Institute of Political Science and Administration of the Pedagogical University of Krakow. Her research field centres around the social and political change in east African countries, with a particular focus on contemporary social and political changes in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. She is a member of the Jagiellonian Centre for African Studies. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3256-8074 Feliks Baranovskyi is professor of political science and international relations, head of the department of Political Science, Law and Philosophy at the faculty of History and Law of the Nizhyn Mykola Gogol State University (Ukraine). His research areas are: the making of a democratic political system; European integration; international relations; and dangers, threats and challenges to the contemporary liberal and democratic global order. He is a member of the editorial board of the political science and international relations professional scientific periodical “Problems of International Relations,” published by Kyiv International University (Ukraine). e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4496-8761 Dovilė Budrytė (PhD, Old Dominion University) is professor of political science at Georgia Gwinnett College, USA. She was the recipient of research fellowships at Europa University Viadrina (Germany) and Carnegie Council on Ethnics and International Affairs. In 2019, 2018 and 2015 she was a visiting professor at Kaunas Vytautas Magnus University and Vilnius University in Lithuania. Her articles on minorities, women and historical trauma in Lithuania have appeared in The Journal of Baltic Studies, Gender and History and Journal of International Relations and Development. Her most recent book is Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics: Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective, co-edited with Erica Resende and Didem Buhari-Gulmez (Palgrave, 2018). Her other publications include books and articles on minority rights and historical memory in Eastern Europe. She is president of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS). e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0406-9553 In 2014, Anhelina Bulanova (Dnipro city, Ukraine), entered Dnipro National University. In 2020, she received a master’s degree in history and archaeology. She studied the resistance of Ukrainian peasants to the Soviet occupation in 1918–1921 in the south of Ukraine. In 2020, she began postgraduate studies at the Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Kyiv. She is currently working on a dissertation as part of her Doctor of Philosophy degree. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID ID: 0000-0002-8359-0661

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List of Contributors

Natalia Bulanova is candidate of historical sciences and director of the Museum of History of Kamianske. She is the author of numerous publications in professional periodicals and scientific collections. Her main specialisations are history of religion and regional history. Natalia is founder and curator of the All-Ukrainian Оrganiser of the annual scientific-practical conference “Ukrainian Cossacks in the ethnocultural space of the Dnieper region.” She is a member of the International Association of Humanities and the International Museum Organization ICOM, as well as member of the expert council of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9817-3668 Mateusz Kamionka, PhD, is assistant professor in the Institute of Political Science and Administrative at the Pedagogical University of Cracow. His main specialisation is the postsoviet area (mostly Ukraine) and youth in this region. He has been a visiting professor at universities in Durrës (Albania), Tbilisi (Georgia), Schwäbisch Gmünd (Germany), Prešov (Slovakia) and Poltava (Ukraine) and also completed a one-year academic internship in the eastern Ukrainian city of Sumy as a European Union volunteer. He has published widely in journals in Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and Lithuania. In his free time, he is an international election observer for multi-organizations such as OSCE/ODIHR and he is vice head of local NGO in Olkusz, Poland. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7316-145X Ragnar Leunig, is independent researcher. After state examination Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, USA, Certificat des Hautes Etudes Européennes, College of Europe, Bruges Belgium, Assistant and lecturer University of Giessen, department of Modern history, Germany, director Europa-Institut Bocholt, Germany,visiting lecturer at the Centre International de Formation Européenne, Nice , France and Adam Mickiewicz University Poznan, Institut Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa, Poznan, Poland. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2819-1393 Przemysław Łukasik, graduate of history and international relations at the Jagiellonian University, assistant professor at the Department of International Relations and Area Studies at the Pedagogical University of Krakow. Research interests include: transatlantic relations, German-American relations, Historical remembrance and politics of memory. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2358-9770 Elena Makarova is an independent researcher, Master of Cultural Studies (2005, Jagiellonian University in Krakow) and Master of History (2021, Tyumen State University). Her main specialisation is historical memory. She was a member of the scientific conferences: X, XI “Steller Readings” (2019, 2021, Tyumen), “Key Words” (2021, Tyumen), “Miller Readings – 2022” (St. Petersburg). She is the author of scientific articles on the topic of memorialisation of cultural heritage sites of the city of Tyumen. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-4482-1447

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Arpine Maniero, Dr. phil., is a research assistant at Collegium Carolinum, Research Institute for the History of the Czech Lands and Slovakia in Munich. In this position, she coordinates the area of digitisation and electronic publishing. Her research interests are focused on the history of Armenia in the broader context of political, social and cultural developments in the Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union. She was a scholarship holder of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Her latest book examines the foreign studies of young Armenians in Germany and Switzerland from the perspective of academic migration, transnational relations and the transfer of culture and knowledge. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8718-150X Maxim Potapenko, PhD, is associate professor of the Institute of History and Law of Nizhyn Mykola Gogol State University. His main specialisation is the history of the Polish community in Ukraine and Ukrainian-Polish relations in the early twentieth century. He was a member of the Ukrainian-Polish Commission for the Study of Relations from 1917 to 1921. He has publications in scientific journals in Ukraine and Poland. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0000-8892 Sharipov Shokhruz is researcher at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan. His research field centres around history as a tool of national conflict in the region of Central Asia. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1460-2902 Since his retirement from the Indian Army in January 2021, Major General (Dr.) Rajendra Singh Thakur has rekindled his interest in history. He did his PhD from Jammu University in 2010 on “Role of United Nations in Jammu and Kashmir: 1948 to 1990.” He has written the articles “The Indian Revolt of 1857: Global Response” and “Rani Lakshmi Bai and Maj General Hugh Rose: A Comparative Analysis” which were published by CLAWS and USI in December 2020 and August 2021 respectively. He is currently pursuing postdoctoral studies on the “German Response to the Indian Revolt of 1857” in Goethe University, Frankfurt. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD:0000-0001-5197-4460 Krzysztof Wasilewski is an associate professor of political science and media studies at the Koszalin University of Technology, and vice-rector for education; his academic interests include international politics of memory, intercultural communication and heritage studies. He has been awarded national and foreign grants and scholarships: Central European University (Budapest, Hungary), the Roosevelt Institute for American Studies (Middelburg, Holland), the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies (Berlin, Germany), Cambridge University, University of Michigan – Ann Arbor and the Polish National Science Centre. e-mail: [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5378-2822