Some Latin American attitudes in the United Nations: 1946-1949

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SOME LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1946— 1949

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

■fry

Miriam Llewelyn May 1950

UMI Number: EP59631

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T his thesis, w ritte n by ......... ICCRIAU.ILEVnYN.................. under the guidance of h.§¥.... F a c u lty C om m ittee, and app ro ved by a l l its members, has been presented to and accepted by the C ouncil on G raduate Study and Research in p a r t ia l f u l f i l l ­ ment of the requirements f o r the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS ...........................H ,... J A... DEUELj.«Ir.n. D ean D a te _______ M

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F a c u lty Com m ittee

M

_________

Preface A study of Latin Americafs attitudes and policies in the United Nations Organization activities is the theme of this thesis*

It covers important problems from January, 1946

through June, 1949, with which Latin America was concerned and endeavors to show that Latin America is participating actively in the world organization and is contributing to solution of world problems. In writing the paper, the steps which Latin American nations took in becoming full members of the United Nations Organization are first traced.

Many of the early acts and

problems of the Latin American nations had a definite begin­ ning then. As the official records of the United Nations are not complete, the material for study of the later phases of these problems is gathered mainly from newspaper reports. Records of the plenary sessions are complete through 1948, but those of the committees associated with the General Assembly are not yet available.

The First Committee’s record

for 1947 is also missing. As most of the material is from primary sources, these sources are used mainly for direct quotations.

The best

periodical source is the United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. Because men are the backbone of any organization a chapter on Latin Americans important in the United Nations Organization has been included. ML

Table of Contents Preface Chapter I SPADE WORK FOR THE UNITED NATIONS........... Declaration of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Conference Relief and Rehabilitation Administration XLO Conference Bretton Woods Conference International Civil Aviation Conference Chapultepec Conference Argentine Problem Regionalism Attack on Dumbarton Oaks Agreement San Francisco Conference

Page 5 5 5 6 7 8 10 11

16

II THE SPANISH FIASCO..................................21 Spanish Question atChapultepec Spanish Question atSan Francisco The Panama Resolution in the General Assembly Spain in the Security Council Dropping of the Question by the Security Council Action in 194.6 * Action in 1947 Action in 1949

21 22 23 25 41 41 63 67

III INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA............................71 The Problem Action in 1946 Action in 1947 Action in 1949

71 72 85 90

IV WORK OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL............. 93 Forming the Council Health Conference Fiscal Commission Population Commission Economic Commission for Latin America

93 94 96 98 101

V LATIN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS........................ 107 Food Mission to Latin America Contributions Positions Gained Ideas of Important Men Colombia’s Policy

107 109 112 113 117

4 VI IATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED NATIONS............... 121 Pedro leao Velloso Oswaldo Aranha Jose Arce Guillermo Belt Luis Padillo Nervo Francisco Castello Najera Jaime Torres Bodet Jose Gustavo Guerrero

121 126 131 134 137 138 140 142

Bibliography........................... .......... •... 144 Appendic es •••• ........................................150

Chapter I SPADE WORK FOB THE UNITED NATIONS The United Nations began with the signing of the Atlantic Charter in August, 1941, by Britain and the United States.

By

December of the same year the United States had been forced into the second World War through the bombing of Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands by the Japanese.

On January 1, 1942, when

twenty-six nations signed the Declaration of the United Nations, the historic phrase, tfUnited Nations,*’ was used for the first time.

Nine Latin American countries signed the agreement.^

Later, between June, 1942, and February, 1945, other Latin Amer­ ican countries also signed, except for Argentina. Not waiting for the end of the war, the United Nations be­ gan to hold conferences on questions of immediate and long range importance.

According to Franklin Roosevelt these meet­

ings were preliminary sessions that were to prepare the United Nations for a future major conference.

Russia, the United King­

dom, and the United States met and outlined a plan, known later as the Dumbarton Oaks Plan, that was to be presented to the United Nations for a new world government.

Many of these con­

ferences were converted into permanent subsidiary organizations of the United Nations Organization. The first of these meetings was the conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 15, 1943, with an at­ tendance of forty-four nations.^

All Latin American nations

* These first adherents were Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. 2 Forty-five nations met at Hot Springs according to the Bul­ letin of the Pan American Union, LXXVII (August, 1943), p. 430.

attended except Argentina and Bolivia.

The motto, f,Freedom

from Want,” used as the basis for this conference meant an ade­ quate and suitable food supply for every one.

The two problems

dealt with were: 1 Immediate relief for the victims of wartime hunger. 2 Restoration of the ruined farms of the world.1 The delegates made plans for increased production of food after the war, and also appointed a commission to prepare a consti­ tution for a permanent organization.

When the constitution

was finished a year later, thirty nations had already joined the organization.2

By July, 1947, all Latin American countries

had joined except Argentina, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.

The

organization’s main purposes were to make agricultural, forestry, and fishery production more efficient and to raise the standard of nutrition of the people. Not long after the Hot Springs gathering came another meeting of forty-four United and Associated Nations at the White House in Washington, November 9, 1943.

Here the repre­

sentatives signed an agreement v/hich formed the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

In this the countries

promised to give immediate aid to the suffering countries.2 1 ^Feeding a Hungry World, ** Scholastic. XLII (May 10, 1943). p. 6. 2 Of the first eighteen nations to join there were six La­ tin American countries: Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua. 2 UNRRA’S Council at Atlantic City limited the organiza­ tion’s task mainly to relief and Immediately-needed rehabilita­ tion. It did not consider long-term reconstruction at all. On December 31, 1946, UNRRA officially,closed shop but many shipments continued through March, 1947.

All Latin American countries signed this agreement except Ar­ gentina, Late in 1944, Dr, Eduardo Santos, ex-president of Colom­ bia, and Laurence Duggan, formerly of the State Department of the United States, made a tour of the Latin American republics to explain the relief and rehabilitation work confronting the United Nations,

By mid-November Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and

Peru had promised $33,165,000,-*- Brazil promised cotton tex­ tiles, shoes, chick-peas, marine products, and fibers. The International labor Organization was the only going segment left of the League of Nations when the United Nations began to function.^

During the war Montreal became ILO head­

quarters, with annual meetings held there until travel became too dangerous.

Between 1941 and 1944 no meetings were held.

In April, 1944, forty-one delegates and four observers met in Philadelphia,

As the delegates wanted to have a place

in the new world organization they desired to write a world labor charter.

This caused four great debates, centered upon

these proposals: 1 That labor policies and economic policies should be coalesced, with the emphasis on the welfare of the ^ "Latin America and UNRRA," Inter-American, III (Decem­ ber, 1944), p, 43, 2 The IID is the only tripartite international organiza­ tion, Delegates are from"three categories, representing la­ bor, employers, and government. One delegate each comes from labor and employers and two from the government. Because of the type of representation debates break out according to the views of labor, employers, or government and there is little voting by nations.

people and not on profits• 2 That United Nations funds would not be used for ex­ ploitation of labor. 3 That a policy for handling dependent and colonial people should be formed. 4 That the rebuilding of Germany’s unions should be considered.^ The stand of the Argentine delegation caused difficulties. Mexico’s labor leader, Vincente Lombardo Toledano, arrived with most of the Latin-American labor votes in his pocket.

He de­

manded the removal of Argentina from the meeting, by declaring it fascist and not fit to sit with free governments. caused consternation.

This

The United States representatives took

every opportunity to talk with the Latin American delegates. Finally, they turned the problem over to a small closed com­ mittee.

At last, Lombardo Toledano withdrew his objections

and Argentina’s Luis Girola attended the final meeting.

But

Lombardo Toledano won in another way, for from the workers’ full committee he obtained a denunciation of Argentine policies. Three Latin American countries not present at this con­ ference were Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, while Nicara­ gua and Paraguay attended only as observers.

This conference

stated the aims, purposes, and principles of the IDO and ob­ tained views of the United States on matters relating to post war social and economic measures. In July, 1944, at Bret ton Woods, New Hampshire, a confer­ ence was called to consider the need for stabilized currencies and long-term credit for permanent reconstruction.

Again forty-

Sigrid Arne, United Nations Primer. (New York. 1948). pp. 58-61.

four nations assembled.

The agreement drawn up provided for an

International Monetary Fund,-** and a Band for Reconstruction.^ Again all Latin American countries except Argentina -signed this agreement.

By July, 1947, all Latin American countries that had

signed, except Haiti, had joined either the Bank or the Fund or both. In setting up the monetary funds Mexico and Bolivia, sup­ ported by Peru, Ecuador, and other Latin Americans were unsuc­ cessful in establishing the outright inclusion of silver in the fund.

To soothe the feelings of the Latin Americans a recom­

mendation to study the silver question in the near future was made.3 Th6 Latin Americans gained a victory when they obtained two permanent seats on the eleven-man Executive Board of the Fund. At first Latin America showed little interest in the Bank and only offered token subscriptions.

They feared that most

of the money would be used in war-devastated areas and that La­ tin America would be overlooked.

This point was dealt with at

the Bretton Woods Conference by assigning a certain percentage of the loans for developmental purposes and giving each nation ^This would provide members with.funds to correct deficits in their foreign balance payments. Sigrid Arne, United Nations Primer, (New York, 1948), pp. 70-82. ~ This made capital available for specific projects that required long-term investment. 3 Finance Minister Eduardo Suarez of Mexico was pleased, for he considered this a great step forward.

10 250 basic v o t e s . I n this way Latin America obtained one seat on the Bank Executive Bo&rd.

Now Latin America supported the

Bank up to seventy percent of* its Fund quota.^

A spokesman for

Latin America, Luis Machado of Cuba explained that "they yielded in order to demonstrate solidarity with the United O

States on post war matters." An International Civil Aviation Conference of fifty-four nations met in Chicago during November, 1944.

This Conference

attempted to agree on rules to govern aviation in order to fore­ stall nationalistic air policies, frictions, and as Franklin Roosevelt said, to prevent "...great blocks of closed air, thereby tracing in the skies the conditions of possible future wars.,f^

At this Conference Latin America showed that it was

mainly interested in the commerce which air transport would bring. An International Civil^Aviation Organization with a coun­ cil of twenty-one members was created to harmonize the differ­ ences.

By July, 1947, twelve Latin American countries had

joined this organization.5 January 8, 1945, was a bad day for Argentina.

The Pan-

I "Latin America at Bretton Woods," Inter-American. Ill (September, 1944), p. 40. Britain wanted to give each nation a hundred basic votes. Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Mrs. Harrison Thomas, We the Peoples, (New York, October, 1945), p. 26. 5 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. (Year Book of the United Nations. 1946-7. New York, 1947).

11 American Union refused unanimously an Argentine suggestion of* a conference of all Pan-American foreign ministers.

At the

same time the Pan-American Union decided to have a meeting at Mexico City in February without Argentine representation, using the idea of a conference of American nations united in the war as its basis. There were many charges made against Argentina to cause her exclusion. 1 2 3 4

These are four of the claims made against Argentina:

Argentina had established a totalitarian state. Argentina was pro-nazi. Argentina had re-armed frantically. Argentina had put pressure to bear on Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay,-and Chile, versus BrazijLand the United States.

It had also been proven beyond a doubt that Argentina had col­ laborated with Japan and Germany.

On January 15, 1945, Foreign

Minister General Orlando Peluffo of Argentina resigned because of "Differences on internal policy."2

He said Peron’s attitude

was frightening Argentina’s neighbors and had contributed to the Pan-American rebuff. Hoping for a break in the stand of the American nations at Mexico City, Argentina attempted to make itself appear as demo­ cratic as possible.

The Argentine newspaper Libre was allowed

to resume publication; political parties began functioning again; interventors were appointed for three German owned firms; and an election date was set, to take place in sixteen months. * 1944). 2 1945),

"Argentina, Bad neighbor." Scholastic. XLV (October 2. p. 11. ’ "Argentina the Uninvited," Inter-American. IV (February, p. 5.

12 The Chapultepec Conference began February 21, 1945, with Mexico’s Ezequiel Padilla as president*

The official agenda in­

cluded these points as subjects for discussion: t

1 Further co-operative measures for the prosecution of the war* 2 Consideration of problems of international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. 3 Consideration of the economic and social problems of the Americas* 4 Consideration of the Argentine request for permission to participate in the Pan-American Union meeting again*1 Although the Argentine problem was the last thing on the agenda, some Latin Americans tried to settle it first. did not mean they were lining up with Argentina.

This

They were

worried about Argentina1s armament program: they wished to show a united American front to the world; some of them were apt to be in the same position later; and others feared too close a scrutiny of their own governments*

Galo Plaza, later to be

president of Ecuador, did all he could to reach a solution* Colombia^ Dario Echandia insisted Argentina should have been invited*

President Grau San Martin of Cuba regretted that the

conference could not be called Pan-American, and President Manuel Avila Camacho of Mexico stated that Argentina had fla cordial place in our affections.1,2 Others feared the collapse of the Pan-American Union without Argentina. After all other items on the agenda had been completed, the Argentine question was attacked fairly directly.

The Amer-

1 Olive Holmes, "Mexico City Conference," Foreign Policy Report* XXI (May 1, 1945), p. 43. ^ "Empty Chair," Inter-American* TV (March, 1945), p. 5.

13 lean nations finally accepted Argentina back on condition that Argentina would abide by the decisions of the conference.

These

conditions consisted of a declaration of war on the Axis, abo­ lition of axis activities in Argentina, signing of the Atlantic Charter, and acceptance of all other Chapultepec decisions.

No

demand was made that Argentina end its current regime; this last delighted Argentina. The most controversial resolution of the whole Chapultepec Conference, Colombia’s Alberto Lleras Camargo introduced, backed by Uruguay and Brazil.

This committed all American nations to

guarantee by armed force, if necessary, the frontiers and poli­ tical independence of Western Hemisphere countries.

This would

go far, these Latin Americans thought, in solving danger from -possible Argentine aggression.

The United States added an

amendment; providing that this provision would apply during the war but afterwards ’’treaties will be negotiated converting the engagements of the Act of Chapultepec into formal diplomatic obligations.”^

This was done because only the Senate of the

United States according to the Constitution could vote to send armed forces out to fight.

These later treaties could be made

to harmonize with the results of the San Francisco Conference, soon to be held. The Dumbarton Oaks agreement, made by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to set up a new world government, was also a topic, of concern at the Chapultepec Conference. 1 "Latin America,” Atlantic. CLXXV (April, 1945), p. 18.

14 Several of the American Republics were resentful of their ex­ clusion from the preliminary meetings at Dumbarton Oaks.

The

fight against the agreement was led by Chile, Mexico, and Bra­ zil.

Mexico held that membership in the world security organ­

ization should be "universal and o b l i g a t o r y . M e x i c o also suggested twenty-eight changes in the Dumbarton Oaks Plan. Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela objected to the name of the or­ ganization and suggested the Union of the United Nations.

Vene­

zuela and Mexico also considered that the term -peace-loving would become vague and indefinite after the war. Latin America believed the defect of the Dumbarton Oaks Plan was the ignoring of the Assembly.

The Latin Americans

wanted the powers of the Council matched with increased author­ ity in the Assembly.

The Chilean delegation desired fifteen

members on the Security Council and that these four additional o posts be assigned to Latin America. Brazil desired a perman­ ent seat added, with itself as the member,^

Venezuela, Ecua­

dor, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic wanted the Assembly to assign a fixed quota of three non-permanent seats in the Security Council to Latin America.4

Some coun­

tries in the world claimed that Latin America was already re­ presented on the Security Council in the membership of the 1 New York Times. February 11, 1945. This would include the current enemy powers, with rights restricted. ^ 11Family Reunion of Americas.11 Scholastic. LXVI (March, 19, 1945), p. 4. 3 Ibid. 4 Olive Holmes, "Mexico City Conference," Foreign Policy Report. XXI (May 1, 1945), p. 45. ~

15 Ufcited States, but Latin America claimed that the United States could not speak for Latin America because of the difference in national characteristics* Finally, the Latin Americans gave their approval of the Dumbarton Oaks Plan and pointed out that three sections were worth praising: 1 Inclusion of effective machinery for keeping the peace. 2 Abandonment of the rule of unanimity. 3 Innovation of the Economic and Social Council. They also suggested that the American republics be permitted to solve their own hemisphere disputes by their own methods and procedures.

The Latin Americans had shown that they desired

and would fight at San Francisco for regional co-operation, subordinate to a larger world program. The United States proposed a key resolution which was adopted with only minor changes.

This act maintained the value

of the existing Pan-American Union.

It provided for mandatory

meetings of the Union every four years, with the foreign minis­ ters meeting more often.

This act set up the Pan-American

Union as a regional League of Nations with a broader base of operations.

The United States gave up the chairmanship of the

Governing Board, making it elective.

Ambassadors were no

longer required on the Governing Board. The pact made at Chapultepec had some omissions. thing it lacked enforcement machinery.

For one

The resolution on the

free exchange cf news without censorship was theoretically ex3- New York Times. February 11, 1945.

16 cellent, but there was nothing in the resolution that pre­ vented a dictator from issuing news that had been censored. Nor was there anything in this resolution to prevent dictators from jailing their opponents by claiming them as dangerous ’fifth columnists*.'*' Some outstanding achievements in hemisphere affairs were made at the Chapultepec Conference inspite of the absence of Argentina until the last session: 1. The whole mechanism of collaboration was strength­ ened between the Americas. 2 A constructive beginning was made in the study of post war economic problems in the Western Hemisphere. 3 The prospects of a concerted stand at San Francisco were improved. 4 Political and military facilities for dealing with poss?lble aggressors were strengthened.2 On the whole, the Conference did only the easiest part of the job of unification.

It had shelved the question of

Franco’s aid to anti-democratic forces in Latin America, and it had ignored American colonial problems and dictatorships. The Conference at Chapultepec actually took few definite ac­ tions.

Its decisions were provisional, permissive, or worded

so that further action was necessary to carry them out.^ After Chapultepec the Latin Americans met next in San Francisco to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks' agreement with others of the United Nations.

Much has been written about the minor

points upon which the Latin Americans insisted, but little has 1 ’’Latin America,” Atlantic* CLXXV (April, 1945), p. 18. 2 Ibid. 3 Arthur P. Whitaker, ’’Latin America and the Post War Or­ ganization,” Annals of the American Academy. CCXL (July, 1945), p. 110.

17 been said about what they gave up.

They did everything they

could not to jeopardize the American system of protection, the Pan-American Union.

When the giants wouldn’t give up their

veto, Latin America refused to abandon this only guarantee of security.

It soon became apparent that the struggle at San

Francisco was between the establishment of highly centralized authority or the maintenance of regional organizations. The Latin Americans argued that the regional defense ar­ rangements were very sacred and exempt from approval of the Security Council or its veto.

This position was illogical

according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, made public before Chapultepec, which stated that "no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.11^

The Act

of Chapultepec had left a right of way for the proposed inter­ national organization.;£ One part provided that these arrangements "shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the o general international organization when established."^ Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru presented a joint draft amendment to Chapter Eight of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, declaring that the Pan-American system should continue to func­ tion independently.

Australia backed Latin America but consid­

ered the system should operate directly under the Security Coun­ cil and not independently of it. 1 Alzada Comstock, "Danger Pan-American Bloc," Current History. IX (July, 1945), p. 3. Ibid.. p. 4.

18 Alberto Lleras Camargo of* Colombia, Chairman of the Com­ mittee on Regionalism, pointed out that there were three pos­ sible solutions. 1 Intervention by the Security Council in all regional settlements. 2 Limited intervention by the Security Council in regional settlements. 3 No intervention by the Security Council in any regional settlement.^A compromise worked out from sixteen proposals was reached.

It

reconciled the viewpoint of Australia, Latin America, and the countries having mutual assistant pacts, by providing for inter­ vention only when the regional organization could not reach a decision. Another problem that faced the Latin Americans at San Fran­ cisco was the status of Argentina.

The United States did not

approve of the fascist complexion of its American neighbor, Ar­ gentina.

But the United States had been maneuvered at the Cha­

pultepec Conference into a place where it was forced to sponsor this country for membership in the United Nations.

Russia was

strenuously against the admission of Argentina, and Molotov objected to it in the Executive and Steering Committees. Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia pleaded for Argentina’s admission on the grounds of its contributions to international law and amity, its war effort, and declaration of war on Ger­ many. ^

Mexico’s Ezeauiel Padilla pleaded Argentina’s case on

the ground that it had adhered to the Atlantic Charter and had X g # Rowe, ’’Regional Arrangements and the United Na­ tions," Bulletin of the Pan-American Union. LXXIX (August, 1945), p. 430. 2 "Conference Debate," Life. XVIII (May 14, 1945), p. 94.

declared war on Germany.^*

Guillermo Belt of Cuba supported

Argentina because he believed that Latin America's future seo curity depended on union and solidarity, Latin America had to live with Argentina.

Coercing Argentina then, he insisted,

would arouse Argentina's national pride and defeat this aim. Russia requested more time to effect a diplomatic compro­ mise and settlement on Argentina.

Spaak of Belgium supported

Russia's plea while Edward Stettinius of the United States asked for an immediate vote. Francisco.

It was the first vote taken at San

The vote admitted Argentina by a 31 to 4 count.

3

Latin America and the United States were solidly behind the vote. Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece were the only nations to vote against it.

All other great powers abstained.

At this point Molotov made a dramatic exit from the meeting. Many countries began to comment on Latin America's soli­ darity.

Latin America's action in this case could not be taken

as a fair axample of hemisphere solidarity, however, because with the arrival of normal times they would be anxious to as­ sert their individual claims as sovereign states.4

This vote

showed that the power of the Latin American bloc was out of proportion to its population and economic power; Latin Amer­ ica had only five percent of the world's population.

This

overriding power in voting by an unimportant section of the 1 '.'Conference Debate," Life.. XVTII (May 14, 1945), p. 94. York Times. May 12, 1945. 3 Alzado Comstock, "Danger Pan-American Bloc," Current Wistory, IX (July, 1945), p. 2. ^ F reda Kirchwey. "Conference Notes." Nation. CLX (Mav 12. 1945), p. 532.

20 world was a danger that all were just beginning to see. But Latin America did not always back the United States* The United States and the United Kingdom did not want Spain to be kept out of the United Nations Organization indefinitely by a definite statement in the Charter*

Mexico refused to back

this point of view. At the end of the conference Chile caused a vigerous last minute debate when it Insisted on strengthening the preamble wording in respect to treaties. motion.

Peru also made an extraordinary

It moved a special resolution in appreciation of the

work of Dr. Evatt of Australia, a great champion of the smaller powers at the conference.

Every head delegate stood and ac­

claimed the motion. The main concern of the Latin Americans at San Francisco was to maintain unity among the great powers and to avoid issues that would cause friction among them.

They gained many of the

points they discussed at Chapultepec.

They obtained more

powers for the Assembly, a clearer definition of the princi­ ples and objectives of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, larger jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice, and a more active Social and Economic Council.

Chapter II THE SPANISH FIASCO The Spanish problem has been one which has been important in international meetings since the Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City in 1945.

Spain during the war had been considered

a fascist country and an active partner of the Nazi in the war, for Spaniards had fought Russia on the Eastern front in a unit known as the Blue D5-vision.

The United Nations claimed that

Spain had permitted the Nazi to use her as a base for subma­ rine refueling, for a testing ground for her planes and men, as a base for espionage warfare, and after the war as a refuge for Germans.

For these reasons the Latin Americans and others

of the United Nations doubted whether Spain should be permit­ ted to become a member of the United Nations Organization. This problem concerning Spain was discussed at San Francisco and it became an important factor at the first meeting of the United Nations Organization in London. A letter, signed by the Federation of Welfare for European Refugees, in the Mexican "Official Paper” charged the Franco regime in Spain with atrocities.^

It asked the Chapultepec

Conference to sever relations with Spain. such an action.

Colombia had favored

Uruguay through Jacobo Varela wanted a com­

mittee to decide the question on the basis as to what was best for the war effort.

If it would not help the war effort, he

could see no purpose in such an action. against it.

Peru and Cuba were

Peru declared it was a violation of the principle

of non-intervention in internal affairs of other nations and -I New York Times. February 24, 1945.

22 not in this conference's jurisdiction, Mexico's Ambassador Antonio Espinosa do los Monteros, on his way to the San Francisco Conference, called on Secretary of State Byrnes to explain that since Mexico had recognized the Republican "Government of Spain in Exile" it would not be able to follow American-British leadership on the Franco issue neither of the latter powers desired Spain to be kept out of the United Rations indefinitely by specific wording in the Charter. Near the end of the San Francisco Conference Mexico made a proposal for the exclusion from the United Nations any na­ tion whose government had been aided by the Axis.

Espinosa's

speech attacked Franco by name and made definite charges.

At

the end of his speech he read the following: It is the understanding of the delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III cannot be applied to the states whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the countries which have waged war against the United Nations, as long as those regimes are in power.2 The French government spoke -in support of the Mexican pro­ posal, though it hoped Spain would soon change its views and be able to join the United Nations.

Australia also approved,

if for no other reason than that Spain had sent a force against 2 Spain had been a republic until Franco with the aid of Italy and Germany had overthrown the government through Civil War. The Republican Government fled and established its gov­ ernment of Spain under the protection of Mexico. 2 "The United Nations Conference of International Organiza­ tion," The United Nations Information Organization, Documents. VI (1945), p. 127.

23 Russia.'*'

Belgium felt this wasn’t the time to decide who was

or who wasn’t to join the United Nations, hut that something should he done to prevent the intrusion of undesirable states. Belgium then suhscrihed to the general principle of the Mexican proposal.

Both Byelorussia and the Ukraine heartily approved

of Mexico’s actions.

At this time the United States through

James Dunn reversed its stand hut by association

only.

2

The

change occurred when the demand for exclusion became too gen­ eral.

Uruguay and Guatemala were in perfect agreement with the

interpretive declaration presented by Mexico, which was finally approved by acclamation and placed in the minutes of the com­ mission’s records. At the first United Nations meeting Roberto Jimenez of Panama introduced a proposal on Spain composed by Panama.

This

resolution provided that Spain should not oply be barred from admission into the United Nations but that the nations should also be advised to break relations with Spain.^

it pointed out

’’that the United Nations Members take into account their spirit and their letter in conducting their future relations with Spain.”4 It was brought to the plenary meetings of the United Nations in London on the recommendation of the General Commit" 1 ’’The United Nations Conference of International Organiza tion,” The United Nations Information Organization, Documents. VI (1945), p. 131. 2 I M d . , p. 135. 3 Appendix A. 4 ’’Panama’s Resolution on Spain,” Nation, CLXII (February 16, 1946), p. 183.

24 tee,

Jimenez declared that this resolution was nothing more

than a logical sequence of statements made at San Francisco and had been approved both unanimously and by acclamation.

He

mentioned that Chapter" II Article 4, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter did not apply to states whose regimes were started by armed forces that fought the United Nations.-*-

All •'

Panama wanted was a simple declaration that would serve as. a guide for future conduct of the United Nations with Spain, George Bidault of France supported the resolution even though he regretted Spain*s absence.

Ivo Duchacek associated

Czechoslovakia with the resolution and asked for severance of relations.

Roberto Cordova of Mexico felt some action should

be taken in the Spanish case.

Mexico felt honor bound to the

cause of the Spanish Republican Government in Exile as it had been allowed a haven there*

But Cordova deliberately did not

take the initiative on the question because he "wanted to avoid the possibility that a generous attitude could be branded as a selfish, interested, diplomatic move.**

Mexico considered

it a great day when they learned of the Panama resolution, and gave it enthusiastic approval.

Mexico had no intention of in-

terferring in the affairs of Spain.

All it desired was the non­

recognition of the Franco government for that was the sense of "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." 2 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, First Part of the First Session," United Nations Official Records. (February 9, 1946), p. 358. Hereinafter quoted as "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, (1946).

25 the resolution made at San Francisco.

Mexico considered it

time for the United Nations to put that resolution into prac­ tice.

The fight to oust fascism had to be continued, for

many places still were under this menace to democracy. Uruguay through Roberto MacEachen strongly supported the Panama resolution. wholeheartedly.

MacEachen held that it should be carried

He also favored a Norway resolution which

amended the Panama resolution; Norway had proposed to replace the words "taken into account" with the words "act in accor­ dance with."^ Remembering the Spanish Blue Division that had fought on the Eastern front, Kuzma Kiselev of Byelorussia thought that the declarations made at San Francisco should be confirmed.

Further

more, he charged that a new plot was being formed by Spain against world security, and that it was the Assembly's task to take all the necessary steps to combat this form of fascism. At this time a vote was taken on the Norway amendment by a show of hands. abstention.2

It was adopted by a vote of 35 to 3, with 1

Then the Panama resolution as amended was voted

on by roll call.

This was carried by a vote of 46 to 2, with

1 abstention.^ About two months later the Spanish question pushed its way again into discussions of the Security Council.

The

Council's attention was drawn to the situation by Oscar Lange ^ "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, (1946), p. 358. ' 2 Ibid.. p . 361. 2 Ibid. All Latin America voted for it except El Salvador and Nicaragua. Honduras was absent. It is of some interest to note that the two votes against the motion were cast by Latin American nations.

26 of Poland,

He declared that the Franco regime was a creation

of the United Nations1 enemies and a lone surviver of the Axis, for it had taken guns, ammunition, and soldiers to make Spain give up her freedom* Lange further recalled that Franco wrote to Hitler his plans for entering the war with the Axis*

After the French

fell Franco seized Tangiers, an international zone* was an unofficial but active partner in the war.

Franco

The Nazi

used Spain for the repair of weapons, for air bases, a.nd for the training of men. Lange also emphasized that the problems of Spain were still the same and were the concern of all because: 1 The Franco regime had been put into power by fascist and nazis against the will of the Spanish people. 2 The Franco regime had been an active partner in the war. 3 Franco had caused international friction forcing France to close its border. 4 Spain had become a refuge for Germans.1 To remedy this situation Lange offered a resolution asking for the severance of diplomatic relations.^

He appealed to the

Council for the acceptance of this resolution because he be­ lieved Spain was a danger to world peace.

Because of this

danger he believed enemy powers could use Spain as a breeding ground for subversive activity and then as a stepping stone 3 toward the conquering of Poland and the world. ”The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Security Council* (1946), p. 548. (The title of this work was later to be changed to the United Nations Official Records of the Secur­ ity Council). “ Appendix B. d ”The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Security Council, (1946), p. 547. He believed as the late President Roosevelt did, that ”Today the whole world is one big neighbor­ hood.”

27 . Henri Bonnet of France declared that the situation in Spain was a danger to international peace and security.

He

then cited the objections some had to the present request: 1 The continuation of the situation in Spain was not a threat to international security. 2 The Spanish problem was purely an internal matter. 3 Any collective action, by arousing national feeling, would strengthen the dictatorship.1 Bonnet insisted, however, that the real danger lay not in these points but in denying the Polish appeal, for moral condemnation was not enough. Francisco Hajera of Mexico declared emphatically that Mexico had never had any relations with Franco because the sit­ uation in Spain endangered international peace.

Najera stated

that the Potsdam Conference of August 2, 1945, had charged the Franco regime with "having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers," and with having maintained "close associa­ tion with the aggressor States."^

On March 4, 1946, the Uni­

ted States, the United Kingdom, and France had expressed in­ terest in establishing a provisional or caretaker government to replace Franco’s.

They also had expressed willingness to

break relations with Spain.

Therefore, the question did not

concern whether the continuation of the Spanish situation was likely to endanger peace and security; this was already estab­ lished.

The basis for the action of the United Nations should

be that Spain could not be a peace-loving state and so was a potential menace to peace.

He continued that the fears of in-

^ "The United Nations, First Year," Journal of the Security Council, (1946), pp. 549-51. ^ Ibid., p. 553.

28

tervening in Spain’s domestic affairs were groundless.

Only

Franco had raised the fact that such acts were against Article 2 paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter.^*

But Najera in­

sisted that Germany and Italy were the only nations guilty of interfering in Spain’s internal affairs.

All that the United

Nations were going to do was to redress these wrongs by giving back to the Spanish people the ground work of democracy for self government. The five governments, representing the permanent Council members, had adopted hostile attitudes against Franco.

Two

had never recognized his government while France had closed its borders to him. ment.

Two had wished to establish a caretaker govern­

Of the six non-permanent members of the Council only two

had relations with Spain.

The Spanish Republican government

had been recognized by some governments.

Bolivia, Guatemala,

Panama, Venezuela, and others had broken relations with Spain. Najera announced that he was in favor of the motion made by Poland.

He also emphasized that the decision should be made

entirely on the merits of the case. B. N. Van Kleffens of the Netherlands stated that this question had aroused many passions but it should be judged coolly and dispassionately.

He declared he had no sympathy

for the regime for he remembered clearly the men of his coun" 1 ’’Nothing contained in the present Charter shall author­ ize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen­ tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter: but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

29 try who had crossed its borders only to be imprisoned.

Still

he insisted that the shifting sands of emotion should be avoided in settling the issue and that the principles of justice and .international law should prevail. The Netherlands, said Van Kleffens, had no quarrel with the Spanish people but grave objections to the Franco regime.

His

government had never entertained the idea of breaking relations with Spain because this type of intervention would rally many Spaniards around Franco who never would support him otherwise. The Polish case was not strong enough to justify saying that the Franco regime endangered peace and security. was not enough.

The evidence

Franco had no armed forces and to say that

through these armed forces the Nazi doctrine could be reborn was an insult to the United Nations.

There was too little

ground for the Council to take action and it would establish a most regrettable precedent. The United States had friendly feelings toward the Spanish people, declared Edward Stettinius, but would take no action in economic or any other fields to show its friendship.

His

government had the following objectives in regard to Spains 1 The Franco regime and affiliated organizations should be removed from power by the Spanish people. , 2 The change should be accomplished by peaceful means. Stettinius wanted this question studied carefully and the ac­ tions decided on to be in conformity with the Charter. Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom claimed that Po^ f,The United Nations, First Year,!t Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 551.

30 land based its case mainly on the attitude and acts of Franco in the early war years.■*• This placed a lurid light on Spain*s attitudes.

Cadogan did not agree with Poland*s figures, on the

number of Spain’s troops.

p

He believed that there were be-

tween ten to twelve thousand Germans in Spain.

q

These were being

repatriated but the work was slow due to the lack of transpor­ tation.

Cadogan also stated that most of the German assets in

Spain had been handed over to the United Nations. The only operative part of the Polish resolution, accord­ ing to Cadogan, was the part that required members of the Uni­ ted Nations to sever relations.

According to the United Na­

tions Charter this could only be done if there was a threat to peace or an act of aggression.

Cadogan considered this step

unwise, as it would give the Germans left in Spain a free rein. Because of this the United Kingdom could not vote for the Po­ lish resolution. Andrei Gromyko of Russia asserted that fear, that the Po­ lish resolution constituted intervention in Spain, was ground­ less and a distortion of facts.

He stated that the Charter

permitted and provided for the necessity of applying certain measures against states whose internal conditions constituted a threat to international peace and security. ~ * 11The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 567. ^ Poland placed the figure at six to seven hundred thou­ sand men. Hodgson of Australia pointed out that these figures were based on those given by the Spanish Republican Government in Exile. 3 "The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 568. fbid., p. 569.

4

31 Gromyko noted that these three points needed examination with regard to the Polish resolution: 1 The nature of the Franco regime. 2 The question of Franco’s foreign policy during the war* 3 That the continuation of Franco’s regime consti­ tuted a danger to peace and security.1 In defending these three points, Gromyko stated that the Franco regime had not sprung from internal forces, and that Franco had been a faithful ally of Hitler.

This had been proven by docu­

ments on the table of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg. Gromyko insisted that the eighty thousand Germans in Spain could cause great danger there by making it a fascist breeding ground which could lead to violation of peace.^ Brazil’s Pedro Velloso stated that he would vote against any action that violated the principle of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, for Brazil had recommended the insertion of this principle.^

He doubted that this case fell

within the competence of the Council. tional affair of Spain.

He considered it a na­

He further pointed out that ’’the dele­

gate from Poland.•.denounced the existence in Spain of nazi elements which were engaged in work connected with new instru­ ments of war.”^

These new weapons would be just the type the

United Nations would want to control.

This the United Nations

could not do if relations were broken off.

For these reasons

^ ’’The United Nations. First Year.” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 571. ~ ~f~jbid.. p. 674. ? Supra p. 28. ^ ’’The United Nations. First Year,” Journal of the Security Council. (1946), p. 578.

32 Brazil could not agree with the Polish proposal. The Polish delegate had first brought up his case under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter stated W. R. Hodgson of Australia.

Then he had jumped to Chapter VII Articles 39

and 40 of this Charter.

He thus went from a chapter that re­

quired an investigation -before action could be taken to one that could only operate against a proven aggressor, Hodgson held. Australia accepted neither of these schools of thought.

p

Australia wanted an investigation, evidence, and proven facts before a decision was made.

Australia then put forward her re­

solution to which the United States agreed: The attention of the Security Council having been drawn to the situation in Spain by a Member of the United Nations acting in accordance with Article 35 of the Charter, and the Security Council having been asked to declare that this situation has led to international friction and endangers international peace and security, the Security Council hereby re­ solves, in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, to make further inquiries in order to determine whether such a situation does 'exist. To this end the Security Council appoints a committee of 5 of its Members and 1 "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or-act-of aggres­ sion and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main­ tain or restore international peace and security." (Article 39). "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or de­ ciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the^parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures." (Article 40). 2 The two schools were: a) Imposition of certain sanctions without investigation. b) Acceptance of the problem as a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

33 instructs this committee to examine the statements made before the Security Council concerning Spain, to call for further written statements and documentary evidence from Members of the United Nations and from the Franco regime, and to make such other inquiries as it may deem fit in order that the committee may report to the Secur­ ity Council not later than 17 May 1946, on the following questions: (1) Is the Spanish situation one essentially within the jurisdiction of Spain? (2) Is the situation in Spain one which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute? (3) If the answer to question (2) is "yes”, is the continuance of the situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security?1 Gromyko of Russia again defended the Polish resolution. He stressed that the basic motive of objection to the Polish proposal was the lack of data to convince the Security Council that Spain was a danger to international peace.

He objected

to Van Kleffens* statement that the severance of relations would strengthen Spain. might be good.^

Gromyko even thought that a civil war

Neither Gromyko nor Van Kleffens could see a

need for a commission.

Gromyko said that if a commission were

needed every time a charge was brought against a state the Uni­ ted Nations might become a tool of international ill feeling. Inquiries weren’t necessary but they might be useful, and de­ lay would not.be dangerous.

He desired to have the time limit

struck out of the Polish resolution for it was a new notion and not supported by the Charter. Before, Velloso had doubted that Spain’s question came 1 ’’The' United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur ity Council, (1946), op. 580-1. V Ibid., p. 608.

34 under the Council’s notice but now the Council had the duty of* clearing up points in question according to Article 1, para­ graph 1 of* the Charter.-*- As Australia*s proposal seemed to meet the requirements, he supported it, Henri Bonnet of France criticized Australia*s resolution, claiming paragraph two contained the ideas in the questions at the end.^

He wondered if the questions were necessary for they

would have a negative and restrictive effect on the work of the committee.

He asked Australia if it would accept an amendment

to the resolution.

Bonnet wanted the three questions dropped

and these words added: "and on practical measures which the United Nations might take in this matter," after "on the re­ sults of such studies, Although Bafael, de la Colina of Mexico supported the Aus­ tralian resolution as amended by France, he still insisted that Franco stood condemned on his own record.

Colina agreed that

unanimity was fundamental if it didn’t weaken the statements already made. Hodgson of Australia, replying to Van Kleffens of Belgium, stated that he used

a date only to show that the Council was

^ "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the pre­ vention and removal of threats tothe peace, and for the sup­ pression of acts of aggression of other breaches of the peace, and to bring about peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;" Supra p. 32, 3 "The United Nations, First Year," Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 612,

not trying to delay.

He agreed to drop the three questions

at the end of the resolution, but he did not agree to the added wording because if implied that the subcommittee would be mak­ ing the decision instead of the Security Council.

The United

Kingdom backed Australia completely. At this time Lange of Poland suggested a subcommittee to study the matter in order to reach a basis for unanimity.^-

He

also stated that he would not withdraw his resolution. After more discussion the Polish proposal for the forma­ tion of a subcommittee was misunderstood.

accepted.

^

At first it had been

The Council did not realize that the proposal

was made to bring the French, Australian, and Polish ideas to an unanimous agreement so that definite action could be taken. After the meeting was adjourned France, Poland, and Australia met to combine their proposals. was read.

The next day the new proposal

It asked the Council to keep in mind the moral con­

demnations made in the past against Spain and declare that the situation had led to international friction endangering peace and security.

It asked for a subcommittee o'!* five members to

study statements and documents pertaining to the case and to make inquiries.

If the subcommittee's findings showed that

world peace and security had been endangered, a solution should be

suggested.^

Raphael de la Colina of Mexico asked for ad-

1 He wanted a subcommittee of five to study the problem and find a basis for an unanimous decision that the Council could reach. 2 IMd. 3 Appendix C.

36 journment to have time to thoroughly study it* On the following Monday Poland agreed to support the new Australian resolution if the date were changed and if paragraph two would say 'in1 instead of 'by1.^- For as it stood it might have lead to a misunderstanding.

Russia was still against it.

Raphael de la Colina was prepared to vote for it.

His govern­

ment thought it was vital to avoid any division on this issue, for it believed that the Franco regime was a menace to peace and security. The Australian resolution was voted on and carried by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention.^

The president then ap­

pointed a committee made up of Australia, Brazil, China, France, and Poland to study the Spanish situation. Hodgson of Australia, as the Chairman of the subcommittee made the report.

He stated that there were two documents.

first reviewed the work of the subcommittee.

The

It analyzed the

problems and made conclusions and recommendations.

The second

document contained a summary of the information gathered.

The

subcommittee concluded that 11the activities of the Franco re­ gime do not at present constitute an existing threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter and, therefore, the Security Council had no jurisdiction to direct or to authorize enforcement measures under Article 40 or 42.”3 The subcommittee recommended the endorsement of the prin"AppendixC. 2 **The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council, (1946), p. 628. 3 Ibid.. p. 777.

37 ciples contained in the declaration made on March 4 by the United Kingdom, the United States, and France: 1 As long as the Francd regime continues in Spain, the Spanish people can not anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world. 2 The Council has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. 3 A change of government in Spain should include po­ litical amnesty, return of exiles, freedom of as­ sembly and political association, and free elections. 4 An interim government should be appointed dedicated to these ends.1 As there hadn’t been enough time for the governments to form an opinion on the subcommittee’s report, Najera, the Se­ curity Council chairman, asked if there were any general obser­ vations on points of legal character.

An argument then ensued

over Articles 39 and 34 of the Charter.^

If Article 39 was used

then the Council could do nothing as this article was to be used only when there was a virtual threat to peace.

Article 34 gave

the Council the right to investigate any dispute that might lead to international friction, which had also been the subcommit­ tee’s view. By the next meeting some changes had been made.

Egypt men­

tioned that Article 2 of the Charter was being ignored.*^ Gromyko accused the subcommittee of not daring to draw the right conclusion, of taking a restricted view of Article 39, and of denying the Council jurisdiction in making decisions regarding 1 ’’The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 726. 2 Supra p. 32. ’’The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine wheth­ er the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to en­ danger the maintenance of international peace and security.” (Article 34). 3 Supra p. 28.

38 the severance of* diplomatic relations.

Nor did he like the fact

that it recommended that the General Assembly should make the final decision. Next Cadogan of the United Kingdom submitted an amendment to the subcommittee’s resolution. and Mexico.

It was unacceptable to France

When this amendment was put to a vote it was de­

feated by a count of 6 to 2, with 3 abstentions.^At this point Najera left the chair and addressed the Coun­ cil as the delegate of Mexico.

He mentioned that the subcom­

mittee had been appointed with serious objections from Members of the Council and had been accepted to avoid a division on the issue.

Mexico’s delegate had thought that an investigation was

unnecessary but voted for the final draft of the Australian re­ solution hoping the subcommittee would find evidence that would convince the members that they should act at once.

He said

that this was an unparalleled case and was justified in having special treatment; because of this the Council should not be too inhibited by the fear of establishing precedents that might be applied indiscriminately*

p

The severance of relations would be the only effective pro­ cedure at the Council’s disposal, and it would be the right course to take in view pf the subcommittee’s findings.

Najera

was surprised at the subcommittee’s conclusion and considered it incorrect and perilous.

But as the motion to refer the ques­

-** ’’The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council. (1946), p. 794. 2 Ibid.. p. 775.

39 tion to the General Assembly appeared to have gained a majority in the Council, and as it was considered a step forward though less effective, Najera was willing to accept the subcommittee’s resolution with the recommendations contained in the report. The subcommittee’s recommendation then was put to a vote after rejection of the United Kingdom*s amendment.^"

The Coun­

cil voted on it paragraph by paragraph and all sections re­ ceived a two-thirds majority.

When the recommendations were

voted on as a whole they too received a two-thirds majority, but as one of the permanent members (Russia) voted against it, it was not carried.^ At this time Poland again put forth its proposal.

Lange

stated he had changed it by dropping this sentence in paragraph two of the originals

”In accordance with the authority vested

in it under Articles 39 and 41 of the C h a r t e r . He did this because the Council was divided in its opinion concerning the use of Articles 39 and 41.

This proposal was also rejected,

for only Mexico, Poland, Russia, and Prance voted for it. With the rejection of his proposal Lange of Poland ad­ vanced still another ones The Security Council takes notice of the report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish question appointed on 29 April 1946. The investigation of the Sub- .. Committee confirms fully the facts which have led to the condemnation of the Franco regime by the conferences in San Francisco and Potsdam, by the General Assembly in London, and by the Security \ Supra, pT~38. ^ ’’The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Securit£ Council, (1946), p. 795. The results were 9 to 1 with 1 abstention. 3 Ibid.

Council in its resolution of 29 April 1946. The investigation also establishes beyond any doubt that Franco*s fascist regime is a serious danger to the maintenance of international peace and s ecurity. The Security Council, therefore, decides to keep the situation in Spain under continuous observa­ tion and keep the question on the list of matters of which it is seized in order to be able to take such measures as may be necessary in the interest of peace and security* The Security Council will take up the matter again not later than 1 September 1946, in order to deter­ mine what appropriate practical measures provided by the Charter should be taken. Any member of the Security Council has a right to bring the matter up before the Security Council at any time before the mentioned date.1 A drafting committee consisting of Australia, Poland, and also the United Kingdom, because Cadogan had proposed an amendment, was appointed to study the -new proposal.

As a result, changes

were made to which Poland dissented. The differences proposed by the drafting committee were minor but the essence of the proposal was the same in that it kept the problem before the Council.

The first paragraph of

the Polish resolution was broken up into three paragraphs by the committee and reworded.

The second and third paragraphs

of Poland*s resolution became the committee’s fourth paragraph. The date was omitted from the committee’s resolution.

The com­

mittee added these words to the fourth paragraph, “without pre­ judice to the rights of the General Assembly under the Charter. These words were added because the committee feared that if 1 ’’The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Security C ouncil, (1946), pp. 803-4. g Ibid.. p. 823.

41 they were omitted the Assembly would be unable to consider the Spanish problem in the future.

After much discussion the draft­

ing committee’s resolution was voted on in parts.^ two paragraphs were accepted. by Russia’s veto.

The first

The third paragraph was rejected

The fourth paragraph was finally accepted

when the wording ’’without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly under the Charter,” had been deleted.

This

ended the'Council*s active consideration of the Spanish question. On November 4, 1946, Poland proposed the deletion of the Spanish problem from the Council’s agenda.

This was to enable

the Assembly to act on resolutions before it.

Pedro Velloso of

Brazil stated that he was anxious for the Assembly to fully and freely exercise its rights to discuss this matter.

The chairman

as a matter of form asked Lange to add this sentence to his pro­ posal: ’’The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to notify the General Assembly of this decision.” glad to do.

This Poland was

By a vote of hands the resolution was passed.

At the request of Belgium, Czechoslovakia^ Denmark, Norway, and Venezuela the Spanish problem was placed on the Assembly’s agenda and referred to the First Committee.

In the First Com­

mittee Lange, the first speaker, brought to the attention of the members a complete resume of the Council’s work on this question.

He reviewed the relations of the United Nations

1 Appendix D. “ Appendix E. 3 ’’Security Council, First Year,” United Nations Official Records. (1946), p. 498.

42 with Spain and was firm on the matter of non-membership.

He

could see no room for fascist Spain in an organization based oh human rights and freedoms.

Moral condemnation was not enough.

If the Assembly would not act on this case, it would not act on others*

Lange concluded that "a resolution be passed by the

General Assembly recommending that diplomatic relations with the Fronco regime be terminated forthwith by each Member of the Uni­ ted Nations* France favored this resolution because it believed that no security system could guarantee peace if Spain remained in her strategic position geographically outside the United Nations. Franco would not be a war danger but would be a symbol of resis­ tance to the United Nations and a rallying point of fascist Ger-

p

many and Italy.*

Pedro Zuloaga of Venezuela held that the lack

of enthusiasm of the people toward the United Nations was due to its inability to take concrete measures and help democratic forces in Spain.

Two main arguments had been put forward to

paralyze action against Spain, he claimed.

These were:

1 That the Spanish question was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of Spain. 2 That any measures taken against Franco would strengthen him. ZulOaga mentioned that the position of Venezuela was wellknown as it did not entertain diplomatic relations with Franco ^ “General Assembly, First Committee, Second Part of the First Session,n United Nations Official Records. (November 2Becember 13, 1946), p. 228. Hereinafter quoted as "General Assembly, First Committee," (1946). Ibid., p. 249. 3 Ibid., p. 229*

43 Spain but did recognize the Spanish Republican Government in Exile.

Zuloaga did not favor hypocritical declarations but

effective measures. Hector Castro from El Salvador stated that the La,tin Amer­ icans had firm ties with Spain and that they should remember that the peoples were related through language, religion, and blood.

He claimed that the Spanish government was not a result

of the war.

When the German and Italian troops withdrew the

Spanish could have overthrown Franco if the majority had desired.^ He charged that the Polish resolution called for interference in the internal affairs of Spain which was prohibited by Article 2 paragraph 7.3 Castro pointed out that Carlton Hayes1 book, My Wartime Mission, favored Franco.3

It showed that seventeen thousand

French soldiers had been aided to return to France and that military materials had been sold to the United States instead of Germany.^

Spain had remained neutral despite its debt to

Germany and had refused to let troops cross its territory. The Franco government, said Castro, had not been given an opportunity to be heard.

The judgment passed on the disagree­

ment between Spain and Russia had already prejudiced the Spanish case.

The Spanish government had retained normal relations with

^ "General Assembly, ,First Committee,** (1946), p. 229. o Supra p. 28. 3 Zuloaga of Venezuela declared that from Castro*s speech on this book, the inference could be drawn that F. D. Roosevelt approved of Franco*s government while Roosevelt actually op­ posed it. Granada of Guatemala pointed out that this book on page seventy showed that Franco had aided the Axis. 4 “General Assembly, First Committee,** (1946), p. 230.

44 many governments*

Breaking of relations with Spain could pro­

duce a desperate situation which could lead to revolt and civil war*

Castro asked the United Nations to seek a peaceful atmos­

phere instead of cultivating differences*

He warned them to re­

member that the member nations of the United Nations had all kinds of governments.

He considered it illogical to want Franco

overthrown while keeping Hirohito in Japan. El Salvador also opposed intervention of one state in an­ other (Castro had defended the principle of non-intervention at the inter-American Conferences).

Asking Members to break

off diplomatic relations with Spain was a clear case of collec­ tive intervention.

El Salvador desired to let the Spanish

people solve their own case.

Jose Arce of Argentina also sup­

ported this policy, but Kiselev of Byelorussia declared that it was incredible that El Salvador had defended Franco for the reasons already mentioned. Ricardo Fournier of Costa Rica explained the background of freedoms and laws of his country so the Assembly would know that Costa Rica's attitude on the Spanish question could not be attribute to any one group.

Part of Costa Rica wanted Spain

to adopt a government similar to its own but still could not forget the traditional policy of non-intervention.

Fournier

believed that a stable government that had taken no aggressive action against others should not be acted against.

The Council

had declared Spain only a potential enemy and had taken no ac­ tion against it.

Measures taken against Spain because of the

origin and nature of its government would imply interven-

45 tion which was forbidden by Article 2 paragraph 7.^ be wrong, legally and historically, to intervene*

It would

His govern­

ment would not hesitate to recognize another stable government in Spain but considered that a “weak resolution would bring re­ action and dislocation in Spain. Saenz of Guatemala declared that he understood the Spanish case, as he had been in Spain during the Spanish Civil War.

Be­

cause it had been a war of nazi and fascist intervention, he supported Poland’s statement that fascist Spain would be strength­ ened if the United Nations did not take any action.

The fear

of intervention reminded him that appeasement had been the down­ fall of the League.

If could be the same with the United Nations.

He stated that the breaking of relations was a passive measure and not intervention, as Franco was a product of fascism.

q

Kiselev of Byelorussia agreed with Guatemala that Franco pur­ sued the same policy toward the United Nations as Hitler and Mussolini had toward the League. Jose Mora of Uruguay favored breaking relations with Spain. At San Francisco Uruguay had supported the Mexican notion that prohibited governments installed by foreign military aid from becoming members of the United Nations, and at London Uruguay had supported the San Francisco declaration and the Potsdam agreement.

Mora stated that the subcommittee of the Council

had called attention to the fact that the Franco regime con~

\ Sunra p. 28. 2 “General Assembly, First Committee," (1946), p. 232. 3 By intervention Mora meant use of military force.

46 tinued “to use persecution methods against political adversaries and police control of* the people.11'*' He pointed out that Article 2 paragraph 6 of the Charter applied to people who were being persecuted in countries not members of* the United Nations, such p as Spain. The Charter also guaranteed them human rights and freedoms. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa of Nicaragua stated that he would support a resolution barring Spain from the United Nations but was firmly against any measure that disregarded the principle of non-intervention.

The United Nations should respect self-

determination and non-intervention.

Nicaragua would accept

the United States resolution that had been introduced*, which recommended that Spain be debarred from membership in inter­ national agencies set up by the United Nations and from any Q

activities arranged by these agencies or the United Nations. It desired Franco to surrender his power of government to a provisional government that broadly represented the Spanish people; the prompt holding of an election free from force, intimidation and regardless of party, so that the Spanish people could express their will.

Mariana Cueno of the Phil­

ippines believed that the United States resolution should be the basis for discussion.

Sir Hartly Shawcross favored this

resolution as the one most likely to get rid of Franco.

To

1 "General Assembly, First Committee,11 (1946), p. 233. ^ “The Organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so f«r as may be necessary for the main­ tenance of international peace and security.11 3 Appendix F.

47 it Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia desired to add an amendment, re­ commending that all nations sever relations with Franco.

Co­

lombia then through Alfonso Lopez, submitted a resolution with the same principles as the one of the United States, but with a different approach.

It desired the Spanish people to find,

as quickly as possible, and in accordance with the United Na­ tions Charter, a method to change their social and political conditions.

It recommended that the Latin American Republics

offer their services to assist Spain in this task.

It also

recommended that the discussion and adoption of the resolution proposed by the delegation of Poland and the one proposed by Byelorussia be deferred until the next General Assembly.^ Cesar Acosta of Paraguay stated that the Polish prop'osal was not satisfying, for breaking diplomatic relations to modify a regime was an act of intervention.

This severance of rela­

tions could be justified only when an act of aggression or menace to peace has been made.

Spain had attempted no aggres­

sions therefore it had not menaced the peace.

Acosta was in

agreement with the American proposal even though it contained contradictions because he thought it rested on the principle of non-intervention.

Acosta really considered the Colombia

proposal best as it kept more within the principles of the Charter.

He believed that a policy of non-intervention would

result in supporting Franco. Gertruda Sekaninova of Czechoslovakia stated that she supported the Polish resolution because the Spanish people I Appendix G.

48 were proud and freedom loving and would not resent collective action.

But Madame Vijaya Pandit of India did not think the

breaking of relations would solve the problem.

Breaking of

relations instead would shut off the source of information on the inside actions of Spain.

She would support only a measure

that would effectively get rid of Franco. There had been enough resolutions, and action was needed, insisted Ter.je Wold of Norway. to take?

The question was, what action

In looking at the Charter of the United Nations Arti­

cle 39 denied the Assembly the right to make recommendations, but Articles 10 and 14 gave it this right.^

He then stated that

f,any action taken by the United Nations-was to be considered as an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Spain under Article 2 paragraph 7."^

He believed that "severance of diplo­

matic relations with Spain would lead to nothing," but if might result in re-inforcing the democratic force in Spain.

He would

support the severance of re'lations but was worried about the im­ plementation of such a resolution because recommendations of the Assembly would not be binding legally.

He then read an amendment

^ "Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General As­ sembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, includ­ ing situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" (Article 14)# "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided fqr in the present Charter, and, except as pro­ vided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters" (Article 10). "General Assembly, First Committee," (1946), p. 238. 3 Ibid.

49 giving fuller implementation to the Polish resolution. The United States believed that the breaking of economic and diplomatic relations would make the situation worse by leading to chaos and civil strife.

Tom Connally believed that

Spain was not a direct threat to peace, and if it should become one, then the United Nations would act.

He suggested a commit­

tee to examine the United States resolution, as it had two main objectives: 1 To confirm that the Franco regime be barred from mem­ bership in the United Nations and established agencies. 2 To favor a change of regime without civil strife by requiring Franco to surrender power to a provisional government until a democratic government was elected. p He then reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention. From a legal point of view Ricardo Alfaro of Panama looked at the Spanish problem.

He declared that the barring of Spain

from membership did more than break relations, so why should the United Nations hesitate over an action likely to produce the desired change?

He went on to explain that the word ,finter-

vention*1 was misused and misinterpreted.

The only act that

could be called intervention would be the entering of a country by military occupation.

Article 2 paragraph 7 did not prevent

collective action, for nto deny the United Nations the right to act collectively would be tantamont to destroying the very purpose on which it was based,11 while Articles 39, 41, £ nGeneral Assembly, First Committee,19 (1946), p. 238. 2 Juan de Lavalle of Peru wondered, from Connallyfs re­ marks in the subcommittee against the break of relations with Spain, if it indicated that the United Nations would not abide by the majority rule.

50 42, and Article 2 paragraph 6 reaffirmed collective action*^ Severance of relations with Spain would not he intervention, he held, for it had become a well-known principle of international law, that the independence of a state did not depend on recogni­ tion by others, Cuba*s Carlos Blanco approved of both the Colombia and Uni­ ted States resolutions as they were in accordance with the stand that Cuba had taken in the past year of a plebiscite for the Spanish people.

Cuba had not broken relations with Spain but

was interested in helping Spain become a democratic State.

He

did not believe that the collective action of the United Nations was intervention in the former sense of the word.

But he did

believe that if no resolution was passed it would strengthen Franco.

He proposed a subcommittee of eleven members to study

the -proposals. _ Later Guillermo Belt of Cuba declared that if the United Nations did not interfere Spain would solve her own problems and Article 2 paragraph 7 would not be violated. Juan de Lavalle of Peru adhered to the principle of non-in­ tervention and he believed coercive action should be taken only when the existence of a threat to peace has been determined by the Council.

As the Council proved Spain only a potential

threat, action by the Assembly could not be taken under Arti­ cles 41 and 42 because the situation was internal.

He held

that keeping diplomatic relations with Spain did not mean ap­ proval. "General Assembly, First Committee,” (1946), p. 240.

51 Canada’s L. D. Wilgress would not support outside inter­ vention,

He favored the second part of the United States re­

solution calling upon Franco to surrender powers but no the first part.'*'

Zuloaga of Venezuela favored the first part but

not.the second as it could be construed as an instigation to civil war.

2

M. W. Loridan of Belgium considered the Colombian resolu­ tion inadequate and so proposed an amendment.

It was made with

the hope Of rallying a majority to positive concrete action. It demanded the recall of ambassadors from Madrid as a warning to Spain to do something about her internal affairs. Alfonso Lopez of Colombia came forward to defend his coun­ try’s resolution.

He stated he did not favor intervention nor

the stirring up of civil strife, which the United States’ re­ solution would bring about.^

Colombia’s proposal tried to re­

concile the ideas of all the nations by placing emphasis on co-operation between Spain and its government to bring about a change in the social and political system.4

He thought that

this would bring results from Spain but distrust from the Uni­ ted Hations.

Some would declare that this resolution didn’t go

far enough, but Lopez doubted if the situation in Spain quickly.

stricter measure would change If this resolution did not work

in a few months then the Polish proposal could be considered. The United Kingdom criticized the second paragraph of the 1 Appendix F. g ’’General Assembly, First Committee,” (1946), p. 246. Ibid., p. 249. 4 Ibid.. p. 250.

52 Colombian resolution because the United Kingdom did not think it was advisable for Latin America to offer its services to Spain in this matter,1

This, Lopez pointed out, was optional.

It had been suggested because Latin America felt the Spanish government would accept the good offices of some country from this area more quickly than that of another nation.

He stated

that Colombia would be willing to leave out this paragraph.

He

requested that his proposal and that of the United States be put to a vote paragraph by paragraph.

If the Colombian reso­

lution should be rejected, Lopez said he would vote for the United States proposal, except for the paragraph that sounded like intervention. Chile had broken diplomatic relations with Spain after the San Francisco and London declarations, explained Hugo Miranda, and in July, 1945, a spokesman stated that Chile hoped the United Nations would intervene and help the Spanish people* Chile would now vote for a break with Spain on the basis of the Charter and these facts: the origin of the government had been fascist; Spain had given aid to the Axis: Spain's war capacity was out of proportion to its size; and Spain had sup­ ported Fhalangist propaganda in Latin America.

He considered

that the ”best way to defend the principle of non-intervention was to eliminate this regime.” According to Padilla Nervo of Mexico Spain was a persis­ tent problem in connection with which the United Nations had 1 Appendix G. ^ "General Assembly, First Committee,” (1946), p. 253.

53 once made a decision to help Spain rid itself of Franco. had been no objections at San Francisco and London.

There

Mexico had

always defended the principle of non-intervention but disagreed with the interpretation of El Salvador on intervention.

He

pointed out that there should be no fear of establishing prin~ ciples for future use as all cases would be different.

He in­

sisted that the severance of relations was the right course and logical sequence. Jorge Granados of Guatemala summarized the ideas that had been expressed.

He stated that there were three.

was El Salvador’s friendly attitude.

The first

This was wrong, because

Franco was guilty of taking part in the war.

From a second

view point, some recognized the fascist character of Spain but resisted action because of a desire for non-intervention.

The

third view maintained the existence of a fascist regime and proposed to remove it.

Mexico, Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama,

and Chile proposed an amendment to the United States resolution.^This new amendment replaced the last two paragraphs of the Uni­ ted States resolution and gave it some power by incorporating Wold’s amendment.

It recommended that members of the United

Nations break diplomatic relations with Spain and report at the next Assembly the action they have taken regarding this r ec ommendat ion. Castro spoke again because Mexico had cast some doubt on El Salvador’s policy of non-intervention which it had always * Appendix H. ^ "General Assembly, First Committee," (1946), p. 270.

54 upheld.

It considered that in international law the recognition

of* the existence of a state was an act of sovereignty which need not be explained.

He regretted the remark of Guatemala’s repre­

sentative about El Salvador’s attitude.

He said he didn’t want

to submit Spain to civil war and had referred to Carlton Hayes* book as an impartial study to use in studying Franco,^

He be­

lieved that if an election were held the winning side would declare it unfair and the Assembly would have to take action. He considered recognition of the Spanish Republican Government in Exile as an imposition, for the Spanish people had had no voice in choosing it. The debate was then closed, and with a vote of 38 in favor with 2 abstentions the proposal for creation of a subcommittee to find common ground among the resolutions and amendments was o approved. The subcommittee was composed of all the authors of resolutions and amendments and the permanent members of the Security Council.4 After a meeting of the subcommittee the First Committee met and a new draft resolution was read covering the following points: 1 It condemned Franco’s regime 2 It recommended that the United Nations should act in accordance with the declarations of San Fran­ cisco and Potsdam* 3 It gave assurance to the Spanish people of endur­ ing sympathy. ^ Supra p. 43. f ’’General Assembly, First Committee," (1946), p. 270. ~ Ibid. These consisted of Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.

55 4 It recalled the findings of the Security Council. 5 It pointed out that the Franco regime was fascist in origin, nature, and structure. 6 It mentioned that Franco gave aid to Hitler and Mussolini. 7 It insisted that Franco was a guilty party with Hitler and Mussolini. 8 It pointed out that the government did not repre­ sent the Spanish people. 9 It recommended that Spain he harred from membership in international agencies. 10 It desired to secure all peace-loving nations in the community of nations. 11 It recommended the breaking of relations with Spain. 12 It recommended members of the United Nations to re­ port to the Secretary-General action taken by thern.^At this time Colombia withdrew the third paragraph of its re­ solution and placed the remaining part of its resolution as an amendment to this draft resolution.

As the Colombian resolu­

tion was the furthest from the draft resolution it was voted upon first.

Before voting on it three Latin Americans spoke,

each emphasizing one of the three ways to settle the

question.2

The First Committee rejected the Colombian resolution.

Colom­

bia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador were in favor of it.

The rest of Latin America either voted against it or ab­

stained. The chairman remarked that the draft resolution would be discussed by paragraph.

If there were no objections to the

draft resolution it would be considered adopted.

As there were

no serious objections to the first eight paragraphs and para­ graph ten they were adopted.

Because Peru considered the ninth

paragraph objectionable a vote was taken.

It was adopted 32

to 5, with 8 abstentions.^ 1 Appendix J. 2 Supra p. 53. 3 ^General Assembly, First C o m m i t t e e , (1946), p. 298.

56 Tom Connally introduced as an amendment to the last two paragraphs of the draft resolution the last two paragraphs of the'United States resolution as amended by the Netherlands1 resolution.

Through these two paragraphs Spain was asked to

give proof that it was governed by the consent of the people; that Franco surrender his power of government to a provisional government representing the Spanish people; and that an elec­ tion be held quickly.

It also invited the Spanish people to

establish their country’s eligibility for admission to the United Nations. "The chairman agreed that it would be practicable to vote first on the subcommittee text.

If the United States proposal

was voted on first, all those who favored a stronger move would vote against it, thus destroying the value of the United States amendment as a compromise proposal."^

However, the Committee

under the insistence of the United States voted on the United States proposal as amended by the Netherlands amendment, and Q

was rejected by a vote of 22 to 22, with 6 abstentions. Wold of Norway then called attention to the Norwegian amendment which asked the United Nations to report to the Sec­ retary-General by midnight, January 15, 1947, if they were going to break relations with Spain.

If two-thirds were agreed

to do this, it would go into effect, February 1, 1947, but if less than two-thirds were agreed these nations could act as 1 Appendix F. | "General Assembly, First Committee," (1946), p. 300. Ibid. A majority of the members voting is needed to pass a resolution in the United Nations.

57 they desired.

It was rejected.

This defeat of both proposals

showed that the Committee had followed the wrong parliamentary order. Bebler of Yugoslavia suggested that the Belgium amendment might be the logical compromise.

It recommended that if, with­

in a reasonable time the political conditions in Spain have not been realized the Security Council should take measures to rem­ edy the situation.

It also recommended the recall of ambassa­

dors from Apain.l

Both paragraphs of the Belgium resolution as

amended became the penultimate paragraph of the subcommittee resolution.

The last paragraph was adopted without comment.

The Committee adopted the whole resolution by roll call 23 to 4, with 20 abstentions.

Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mex­

ico, Panama, and Venezuela voted for it while Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador voted against it. the rest abstained. The First Committee's resolution as adopted was read before the General Assembly, and debate on the resolution began.

Felix

Nieto del Rio of Chile, speaking for the resolution, thought Spain would welcome this document.

The United Nations was not

intervening but just helping the Spanish people to resotre their freedoms and rights that intervening Germans and Italians had abolished.

For this reason the United Nations should sever re­

lations with Spann.

He insisted that the United Nations were

not defending a particular party or faction, for it did not 1 Appendix K. "General Assembly, First Committee," (1946), p. 304.

58 recommended a government to take its place.

Many have tried to

divide the United Nations into interventionists and non-inter­ ventionists, he said, and this had offended Spain.

Some said

that those who wished to sever diplomatic relations were in­ terventionists, and when Franco said this it was understandable. Felix Nieto del Hio stated that it was a "pity that the Franquist argument should be identical with that of pseudo-adversaries of a break with Spain in our Assembly.**^ Colombia in following its view had not defended the Franco government nor encouraged it, Lopez, the Colombian spokesman held.

All it tried to do was to help the Assembly to decide

what steps the United Nations could take in accordance with the Charter.

Colombia was inclined to think that Franco would help

in the task of rebuilding Spain.

Lopez desired to leave his

proposal on the table of the Secretariat but did not suggest that it should be considered as an amendment to the First Com­ mittee’s resolution. At the convening of the next session of the Assembly the president found twenty-one speakers listed.

As many had al­

ready spoken several times, he decided that two speakers would speak for and two against the resolution. their views in three minute speeches.

The rest could give

After much argument they

accepted the president’s suggestion. Carlos Stolk of Venezuela spoke for the resolution.

Stolk

1 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Part of the First Session,11 United Nations Official Records. (October 23December 16, 1946), p. 1169. Hereinafter quoted as -’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (October, 1946).

59 had defended and always would defend the principle of non-inter­ vention.

But he considered that the only logical moral conse­

quence of unanimous condemnation was the severance of diploma­ tic relations.-*-

He stated that Venezuela favored the idea of

indicating to the Spanish people the steps they should take to ♦

recover their freedom. Stolk also pointed out that the Belgium proposal did not go as far as the joint Latin American proposal but it did con­ stitute a step toward final and complete severance of relations o with Spain. It was a middle way between those who wanted nothing more than a declaration of principles and those who maintained the necessity of putting action into the moral con­ demnation felt by all.

He was surprised when he heard some say

their governments would ignore the Assembly*s recommendations. Francisco de Paula Gutierrez of Costa Rica was against the resolution.

He disagreed with the form and substance of the

proposal and with the idea that intervention could be either open or disguised. problem.

He insisted that government was a domestic

He considered that thg Spanish government was not a

direct threat to peace, and if it should become one, it would then be the Council’s problem to determine the move. ted that government was a domestic problem.

He insis­

He considered

that the Spanish government was not a direct threat to peace, and if it should become one, it would then be the Council’s problem to determine the move.

He insisted that the San Fran­

1 ’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,,f (October, 1946), p. 1180, 2 Ibid.

60 cisco, Potsdam and London agreements did not compel the Assem­ bly to act. Hector Castro of El Salvador, who had been the strongest opponent to intervention, then had his turn to speak.

He still

believed that the resolution would put the Spanish people in a position to isolation that could produce violent reaction.

He

pointed out that his conclusions were based on precise Charter stipulations and not on heated political atmosphere.1

He

stressed the vote in the Committee of 23 to 4, with 20 absten­ tions.

Certainly a resolution couldn’t be any more unpopular.

Castro listed five reasons for oppositions 1 Isolation would not especially effect the govern­ ment. 2 The result would be to bring the Spanish people to desperation and cause a civil war. 3 As there was no foreign intervention at present in Spain it had had the greatest opportunity to change the government. 4 Collective pressure by the United Nations to change the government would be intervention in a matter that belonged to Spain alone. 5 If coercive measures were taken against Spain by the Assembly it would be invading the powers of the Council.2 Czechoslovakia gave up its right to speak to France, whose representative listed five reasons for adopting the resolution: 1 Spanish government had been formed by foreign bayonets• 2 Spain needed moral help. 3 Broadcasts from Madrid were similar to Hitler’s. 4 Danger of war loomed in such a state of affairs. 5 Revival of the underground in Germany had its eyes on Madrid.3 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (October, 1946), p. 1186. Ibid., pp. 1189-90. 2 Ibid.. p. 1196.

61 Francis Illescas of* Ecuador pointed out that democracy in America was not the same as democracy in other countries and ”if at present the world Press really has reasons to distrust the democratic regime prevailing in some of* the states••.can it he said that the democratic system is securely established in the world.”**' For this reason the United Nations had found it complicated and hard to form an appropriate resolution, Illescas said that the democratic way of government could not be imposed from the outside but would have to rise as a free choice of the people.

Because Ecuador believed that non-in­

tervention and self determination were fundamental and could not be altered by outside pressure and despotism, it would vote against the resolution, Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa of Nicaragua stated he would accept the majority decision but was against the Polish pro­ posal because he believed the rupture of relations was a pas­ sive measure.

He considered that Connally’s proposal spoke in

strong terms against Franco and he was impressed when Connally said, ’’that non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was a basic principle of his country’s foreign policy."2 Mexico, Norway, Belgium, Uruguay, and Panama defended the principle of non-intervention but were still for the severance of relations.

Paraguay made it clear that voting for this pro-

^ ’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (October, 1946), p. 1196, 2 Ibid., p. 1201,

62 posal did not mean that intervention v/as favored. for the resolution too.

Russia was

Peru believed that the principle of

non-intervention should be zealously guarded but without pre­ judice to cases of collective action.

Costa du Reis of Bolivia

favored the United States resolution but would accept the Bel­ gium one if the United States resolution was rejected. Jose Arce of Argentina said that the Spanish question did not exist in such a form as to give this Organization the right to interfere.-*-

He noted that people said communism was a dan­

ger to peace but no-body suggested intervening in the political regime prevailing in communist-run countries. perialist capitalism endangered peace.

Others said im­

Many have said that

there was no democratic regime in Spain but could they maintain that the rest of the countries were governed in a democratic way?

Argentina was prepared to vote against any measure that

signified intervention in internal affairs.

Arce even went so

far as to declare that the Spanish people would have solved their problem by the next Assembly.^

Alfaro of Panama said

this debate, if it weren*t so serious and loaded with tragedy, would provoke laughter.^ intervention.

Everyone was declaring abhorrence of

This, Alfaro held, had nothing to do with the

collective action set up at San Francisco as it was foreseen, authorized and agreed upon in the Charter. reduced to hurling the word intervention.

Argument was simply He concluded that

”Genera 1 As semb ly, Plenary Meetings,” (October, 1946), p • 1206• Ibid., p. 1207* 3 I M d .. p. 1219.

63 situations of actual or potential danger to peace were not mat­ ters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any special state, but were essentially under international jurisdiction and in the powers of the United Nations.^ By roll call it then voted on the First Committee!s resolution and adopted it by a vote of 34 to 6, with 13 abstentions.

p

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela voted for it, while Colombia, Cuba, and Honduras abstained. voting were few.

The changes in the

Argentina and Peru, who had abstained before,

now voted against it, while Nicaragua and Paraguay voted for it. Colombia who had been against it, abstained.

This result came

at the end of a heated debate in the United Nations.

The most

important feature shown was that defeat of the Big Powers was possible. Shortly before the second session of the United Nations Assembly, convened in September, 1947, Argentina had stated that it would sponser Spain for membership in the United Nations. Argentina canvassed the Latin American countries and found Bolivia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua ready to give support.^ The plan had originated in Buenos Aires. tina’s crowning success if it worked.

It would be Argen­

Argentina had attempted

to obtain Spain’s acceptance into the International Telecommun­ "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,ff (October, 1946), p. 1220. o . p. 1222. 3 Bolivia and Nicaragua had voted for breaking relations the previous year.

64 ications Conference in Atlantic City.

The proposal for member­

ship in the Conference was rejected by a vote of 35 to 21.^ This move was not expected to succeed but the purpose behind it was to open diplomatic relations with Spain. The Spanish problem was placed on the agenda and referred to the First Committee.

After much discussion the Committee

recommended a new resolution to the General Assembly asking for the reaffirmation of the resolution adopted December 12, 1946, and expressing its confidence that the Security Council will take action against Spain when necessary.

The Committee

adopted it by a vote of 36 to 5, with 12 abstentions on Novem3 ber 17, 1947. The resolution was then read before the As­ sembly and discussion followed. During the discussion a joint resolution submitted by Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay asked for the re­ affirming of the resolution adopted the previous year, which concerned the breaking of diplomatic relations.

Manini y Rios

of Uruguay presented it. Carlos Romulo of the Philippines stated he was against the paragraph in the First Committee’s resolution that concerned the breaking of diplomatic relations and had voted against this paragraph.

He emphasized that he would abide by the majority

1 "Argentina Promotes Spain as United Nations Member,11 United Nations World. I (September, 1947), p. 52. 2T Appendix L. ■3 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session," United Nations Official Records. (1947), p. 1080. Hereinafter quoted as "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings," (1947).

65 rule as he was not willing to sacrifice the solidarity of the United Nations*

Czechoslovakia and Byelorussia were still for

the severing of diplomatic relations. Castro of El Salvador who had been against severance of relations with Spain but whose country had complied with the resolution of December 12, 1946, considered paragraphs One and Three of no special importance* preamble*

Paragraph One was just a

Paragraph Three had some substance but was absolutely

useless, for it asked the Council to do something about peace and security that according to the Charter it had to do anyway. El Salvador voted against them in the First Committee.

But

paragraph Two reaffirmed the resolution of last year and deserved careful attention.

Castro restated the idea that the

United Nations had no right to make decisions for the Spanish people.

According to Article 2 paragraph 7 the Assembly could

not decide the affairs of Spain.

Some members of the United

Nations said that this Article referred only to individual and not collective intervention, but according to Castrofs inter­ pretation there was no difference between individual and col­ lective intervention implied.

The only exception to this was

when the Council took over. Czechoslovakia had made the statement that Spain had gone to the left.

Castro pointed out that the resolution of the

previous year could have been a movement to make Spain swing to the left.^ ^ "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,1* (1947), p. 1092.

Castro also declared that Article 1 paragraph 2 stated the purpose of the United Nations was "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people.”1

This had direct bearing on

the Spanish problem, Castro asserted, for the Spanish people had the right to determine for themselves without coercion.

If

the General Assembly should vote against it, it would show that the resolution was a violation of the principles of the Charter. Clemente Duran-Ballen of Ecuador asked for a roll call vote by paragraph.

The Assembly adopted the first paragraph by a

vote of 37 to 5, with 11 abstentions.

2

The second paragraph

failed to obtain the two-thirds majority, for the Assembly re­ jected it by a vote of 29 to 16, with 8 abstentions.^

It ac­

cepted paragraph, three by a vote of 36 to 5, with 12 abstentions. The Assembly then accepted the resolution, without paragraph 2, by the same vote.

Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti,

Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela voted

for it while Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador abstained.

The others voted against it.

There were a number of changes in

the line up of Latin American nations.

Bolivia who had voted

for it in 1946 changed places with Cuba and Honduras who had ab­ stained before.

Ecuador, against it in 1946, abstained.

Para­

guay in 1946 voted for it, but in 1947 voted against it. After voting Arce of Argentina stated that the voting ~

J "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings," (1947), p. 1092. f Ibid.. p. 1095. Ibid., p. 1096. 4 Ibid.. p. 1096.

67 was not to solve International peace but a game of politics.^ He desired to know how, when the Assembly chose to reject re­ affirming the 1946 resolution, that some representatives con­ sidered the resolution still in force.

The Assembly1s vote,

he continued, proved that the majority wished to lay aside polxtics and let in all nations so that there would be peace.

2

During the third session of the General Assembly in Paris, in 1948, an attempt was made to obtain membership in the special agencies of the United Nations for Spain.

This move failed to

obtain the support it needed to bring it up for debate. In the second part of the third session in 1949, a Latin American bloc of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru headed by Brazil decided to restore partial membership in the community of Na­ tions to Spain.

They expected the support of Argentina, Costa

Rica, Ecuador, and El Salvador and the opposition of Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama.

Argentina, the Dominican Republic, El Sal­

vador, and Bolivia had already returned their ministers to Spain, while Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela indicated that they would return theirs.^ * The sponsers of this new resolution, which recommended that member nations should have full freedom concerning their diplomatic relations with Spain, contended that the failure of the 1947 Assembly to reaffirm the provision for a continued break in relations constituted a repeal.^ 1 2 ^ 4

They insisted that

f*General Assembly, Plenary Meetings," (1947), p. 1098. Ibid. ^ew York Times, May 1, 1949. Appendix M.

68

non-compliance had strengthened Franco.

The opponents declared

that Franco was no better than Hitler.^ The resolution introduced into the First Committee did not ask for the withdrawal of condemnation. sired to have the 1947 resolution kept.2

Those against it de­ After much discussion

the First Committee by a vote of 25 to 16, with 16 abstentions o sent the resolution to the Assembly. There it lacked a twothirds majority. Much work and talk behind the scenes went on while this resolution was being discussed.

The United Kingdom and the

United States tried to get Denmark and Norway to abstain in­ stead of voting against it.

Their excuse was the need of a

common stand of the North Atlantic pact countries.

Other

doubtful countries were Burma, Costa Rica, Iceland, Haiti, Afganistan, and Iran.

Burma and Costa Rica were considered

by both sides as the deciding factors.

The Burma vote the

delegates were trying to change from abstention to either yea or nay, and that of Costa Rica from nay to yea.

Israel, who

had just been admitted to the United Nations, decided to vote against it, and this made the supporters need two extra votes. Both sides were optimistic.

But at the balloting the resolu-

1 The bombing of the consulates of Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru in Madrid during May, 1949, indicated that there were still active opponents against Franco. 2 Gromyko made a remark referring to the four Latin Amer­ ican countries as f,that quartet11 and added that the quartet seemed to have grown into a full orchestra whose leader was the United States. ^ew York Times. May 8, 1949. Mexico, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala voted against it, while Chile and Haiti abstained and Cuba was absent.

69 tion met defeat by a vote of 26 to 15, with 16 abstentions. There were four changes in balloting on the Spanish question since it had been voted on in committee.

Denmark and Costa

Rica were absent; Iceland, formerly for it, abstained, and Israel voted,, gtgainst it*

This left the 1946 bill intact and

the Spanish problem still to be solved satisfactorily. Since 1945 many changes have taken place in the attitude of the United Nations toward Spain.

Near the close of the

Second World War feeling was extremely bitter against any country that had given the Nazi's aid.

Because of this the

Latin Americans both at Chapultepec and San Francisco made statements against theadmittance of Spain into the United Nations Organization.

These statements had been approved,

both unanimously and by acclamation. At the London meeting of the United Nations Organization in 1946, Poland and other nations believed that these state­ ments should be carried out.

To do this Poland put forth a

proposal for the severance of diplomatic relations with Spain. By this time much thinking had been done and the intensely bitter feeling toward Spain had been tempered somewhat by time.

Latin Americans began to use the argument that inter­

vention, whether individual or collective, was contrary to the United Nations Charter. determination for Spain.

Many Latin Americans believed in selfThis made it a national affair of

Spain which she alone should settle. ^ New York Times. May 17, 1949.

Argentina, Costa Rica,

70 Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru voted against the severance of diplomatic relations, while Colombia, Cuba, and Honduras were undecided. When in 1947 the resolution came up for reaffirmation, it failed to get a two-thirds majority vote.

Argentina, Brazil,

Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicara­ gua, and Peru were against it while Colombia and Ecuador ab­ stained.

Adolfo Costa du Reis of Bolivia pointed out that the

provisions had not proved useful and had worked as irritants. Spain was not the threat to peace for this threat came else­ where.*^

This was also echoed by Gracia-Sagan of Peru.

Brazil

also felt that since the 1946 resolution had failed in its pur­ pose a change of attitude was needed. Mexico, Guatemala, Panama, and Uruguay who had voted for the severance of relations held their ground and voted against admittance into the agencies of the United Nations in 1949 when that was proposed.

Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, however, who had been for severance of relations or had abstained from voting, now voted for Spain’s partial entrance to the United Nations.

p

These

nations felt that the failure in 1947 to reaffirm the provision for continued severance of relations constituted a repeal and showed the need for a change in attitude.

They also believed

that the non-compliance to the 1946 resolution had strengthened Franco.

Opposition had not yet diminished sufficiently, how­

ever, for this movement to succeed. 1 "Views on Franco Spain,'1 United Nations (Weekly) Bul­ letin. Ill (October 24, 194.8), p. 802. 2 Supra p. 36.

Chapter III INDIAN QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA The Indian question in South Africa is an old problem.

It

began about 1885, twenty years after the first Indians went to South Africa to work for the colonists.

When the Indians had

gone to South Africa, the Indian governemnt understood that its nationals would not be subjected to any special laws.

But many

discriminatory acts had been enacted against the Indians.

Each

time this had happened India had intervened in behalf of her nationals in South Africa.

Because only temporary relief had

been gained each time for these Indians in South Africa, India desired the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization to find a permanent solution to these discriminatory practices. India considered that discriminatory acts against minorities were a world concern, for each nation has its own minority groups that suffer some form of discrinination.

Through the

collective wisdom and moral sanctions of the whole world India felt that discriminatory practices in South Africa could be eliminated. In twenty years discriminatory measures had been passed that restricted the rights of the Indians to trade and own property.

An agreement Smuts and Gandhi had made in 1913 had

remedied the Indian grievances as they then existed and had also stopped immigration. India and South Africa had fought in the First World War and had signed the League Covenant.

After the war agitation

against the Indian in South Africa had appeared again, with a demand for segregation.

The Smuts-Gandhi agreement that had

■been made in 1927 was renewed in 1932 and had not been abrogated* Agitation had continued to reach a crisis in 1943.

At that time

the Pegging Act had been passed which imposed statutory prohi­ bitions and restrictions in respect to the rights of Asiatics to possess land, and again India had tried to help the South African Indian.^

In 1946 South Africa had passed a "ghetto law"

which demanded complete segregation of Asiatics in regard to property and trade.2

They had also passed the Tenure Act which

extended the legal incompacity of the Indian to a new territory and restored discrimination,2 and the Indian Representation Act which prohibited representation in the government.4

When this

happened India broke diplomatic relations with South Africa. The problem was held to be a violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter by India. had been born in South Africa.

The victims of these acts

What happened to these Indians

became the concern of India because through it they had gone originally to South Africa with the idea that.no special legis­ lation would be made against them.

India also claimed that

this was a political and not a legal problem due to the sev­ erance of relations.

Madame Vijaya Pandit stressed the idea

that this quarrel did not just concern two countries, but that consequences were a world problem and the only way to solve it "General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees, Second Part of the First Session," United Nations Official Records. (November 21-30, 1946), p. 2. Hereinafter quoted as "General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees," (1946). 2 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

73 was to use collective wisdom and moral sanctions* Smuts of South Africa rebutted India’s claims.

He stressed

"that the exploitation of domestic issues by foreign States as a political weapon would determine, to a large extent, the fu­ ture issues of peace and war, and that such foreign propaganda in alleged minority interests had already brought about disas­ trous results within the past d e c a d e . H e also stressed that Article 2 paragraph 7 embodied an over-riding principle on all other provisions of the Charter.

p

A state could not be sub­

jected to control from outside sources within the domain of its domestic affairs.

It could not be called in to be questioned

by another state unless the Security Council requested it under Chapter VII.

He also maintained that the Capetown agreement,

as Madame Pandit admitted, had never been abrogated and that the rights of the Indian had never been infringed upon.

This

Indian complaint was bringing back disputes that had ceased to be issues between the two governments*

He further stated that

he agreed that recommendations of the Assembly were interven­ tions, but he did not object to discussion of the question. After the discussion, he desired the Joint Committee to rec­ ommend that the matter be placed before the International Court of Justice, if it were a domestice matter.

Agreeing with

^ "General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees, (1946), p. 3. ^ "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the pre­ sent Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the appli­ cation of enforcement measures under Chapter VII•"

74 this, Brazil and Peru considered that it was an important enough matter to be referred to a proper committee. Both the Ukraine and Byelorussia desired general debate on the question, for the problem was subject to many treaties and the United Nations sanctifies all treaties.

Argentina de­

sired a committee to decide the competence of the United Na­ tions to discuss this problem first.

Guatemala insisted that

the question was in the competence of the United Nations, for certainly the United Nations couldn’t be indifferent to the fate of many human beings.

Both Canada and China wanted Smuts’

suggestion followed, as neither desired to have the domestic jurisdiction clause given extensive interpretation, while Vene­ zuela and Costa Rica did not want a too narrow interpretation, which might weaken the position of the General Assembly.

The

United Kingdom, the United States, Honduras, and Poland wanted a happy solution.

They believed that the United Nations should

not refuse to refer the legal aspect to the International Court of Justice.

The United States thought that since the Security

Council referred legal cased to the International Court of Justice| the Assembly should follow an analogous course.

The ad­

vantages to this were thought to be as follows: 1 South Africa was agreeable to it. 2 It would be difficult to reject appeal to the rule of law. 3 India would be taking a great step forward if the Court decided it had a case. 4 If it were within the United Nations jurisdic- ^ tion, no one could complain of the course taken. ’^General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees,” (1946). p. 16.

75 Heaton Nicholls of South Africa proposed at this point to deal with the facts of the Indian complaint.

He stated that

this problem would not have reached its present proportions if it hadn't been continually exploited by India.

India had painted

a false picture of conditions of the Indian in South Africa. He felt that India should not complain about the treatment of the Indian in South Africa because South African conditions were better than In India.^

He denied that a trade war existed with

India. The Indian had always been considered temporary residents, he also maintained.

p

When their indentured period had ended,

they had flocked into Durban.

Because of this, the 1924 meas-

ure against property owning had been passed. had never been registered as a treaty.

This agreement

In a round table talk

India had agreed to repatriation, but it had failed.

The

Pegging Act ahd been passed because the change in property ownership had endangered the European character of Durban. The Ordinance Bill which limited the sections in which the In­ dian could live, had also referred to Durban.

At this point

Maurice de Jean of France proposed a resolution to solve the situation which noted the impaired relations between India and South Africa and stated that the treatment of the Indian in South Africa should be in conformity with the agreements con3- Madame Pandit admitted this but held that India was quickly working toward a solution of this heritage of the past. 2 Madame Pandit denied this statement. She said the In­ dians had not gone to South Africa with the idea of repatria­ tion. She quoted a letter from the governor of Natal to re­ fute this.

76 eluded between the two governments and with the provisions of the Charter.

It requested the two governments to report at

the next session of the General Assembly the action taken to remedy the situation,^Mexico’s Bafael de la Colina declared the Indian problem did not concern just two nations but all nations.

The question

he deemed important was whether the pledges of the United Na­ tions were to be honored or evaded.

He quoted Article 1 para­

graph 3, Article 2 paragraph 2, Article 12 paragraph 1(h), Ar­ ticle 65 paragraph c, Article 56 and 60 of the Charter as a basis for discussing this question under fundamental rights, instead of ignoring them on a possible legalistic interpretation of Article 2 paragraph 7.^

He asserted that Smuts had left out

a human right that was at the basis of civilization; this was respect for the right and dignity of the human personality, and because Smuts had left this point out, he did not find it hard to argue that no violation had taken place.

Colina then ques­

tioned if South Africa recognized* international fundamental rights.

If South Africa did, then Colina said that “Every

effective international recognition of a fundamental human right...involved a corresponding limitation of the domain of essentially domestic matters.”^ Both Haiti and Venezuela expressed the same idea, and pro­ posed two changes in the text of the French resolution.

Para-

1 Appendix P. 2 Appendix T. 3 “General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees,” (1946), p. 23.

77 g*raph three was to read, 11the Assembly...if of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international.obligations under the agreements conclu­ ded between the two governments and in the provisions of the Charter.”^

The fourth paragraph was to read, **The Assembly.*,

therefore, requests the two governments to report at the next session to the General Assembly the measures adopted to this effect."

p

This was just a slight modification of the French 3 text, which Mexico supported. Uruguay approved of these amendments to the French resolution. Ecuador pointed out that both the political and juridical aspects were hard to distinguish one from another.

Viteri La-

fronte considered it hard to ignore the desire of South Africa to seek an advisary opinion.

If this would be done the case

would be clarified and a precedent in international jurispru­ dence set.

If the Indian case was justifiable it would be

strengthened by such anaction.

This did not imply taking the

case out of the United Nations1 hands* Colombian Alfonso Lopez insisted that discrimination of any kind ceased to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

Al­

though he felt the resolution submitted by India a logical step in the implementation of the problem concerning persecution and discrimination, Lopez submitted a resolution which he withdrew before the debate was over.

It recommended that the two gov­

"General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees," (1946), P • 24. 2 Ibid. 2 Compare with wording in Appendix P.

78 ernments obtained advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the following questions: 1 If Members of the United Nations are obligated to amend at once their legislation when it establishes racial discrimination incompatible with the text of the Charter? 2 If Members of the United Nations can in the future enact laws embodying racial discrimination? 3 If laws of racial discrimination constitute matters of internal jurisdiction on which the General Assem­ bly is debarred from making recommendations? Australia hestitated to refer the matter to the Court for merely a narrow legalistic interpretation. Court to take cognizance of the facts.

It desired the

Hartley Shawcross of

the United Kingdom submitted an amendment which asked an ad­ visory opinion from the International Court on whether South Africa had neglected to observe any international obligations in regard to the treatment of Asiatics.

2

It was not voted on.

J. Wellington Koo of China agreed with the French point of view, but reserved his opinion on the exact wording. Argentina considered that there were two sides to the prob­ lem: a legal and a social, side.

South Africa upheld the in­

violability of its national sovereignty and Argentina consid­ ered that it was essential to obtain an opinion on this point since South Africa considered it had been violated.

Argentina

supported the Swedish proposal to request an advisory opinion of the Court, and that this opinion should refer exclusively to this specific case and not to a general interpretation of Ar­ ticle 2 paragraph 7.

In regards to the social aspects of the

^ "General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees,,f (1946), p.- 33. 2 Ibid.. p. 4 3 /

79 case, Argentina would support any decision consistent with the Charter which would tend toward social^equality for the South African Indian, To Chile it was clear that South Africa subjected its Asiatic population to discriminatory practices.

The problem

had assumed international importance since it had been referred to the Assembly.

The primary concern was not to reach an agree­

ment on the nature of the problem but to obtain a peaceful solu­ tion in conformity with the Charter.

If the parties should not

be able to reach a solution in the near future the Assembly should reach one in accordance with Article 14 of the Charter.^* Guatemala stressed the idea that national sovereignty should never be allowed to hinder the Charter*s application, or the United Nations would not be able to protect human rights. Guatemala supported the Indian demand for remedying of the sit­ uation and also the Colombian proposal that referred the legal question to the Court. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Sweden then tabled their joint resolution which desired the Court to be asked to give an advisory opinion as to whether the matter was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa. Ecuador suggested a subcommittee to discuss the proposals but the Ukraine objected.

As India didn’t want to be vindictive

1 "Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair^the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provi­ sions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.**

80 and only wanted to create a situation in which the United Na­ tions could function and achieve objectives, it withdrew the Indian resolution in favor of the French and Mexican one.^ Hector Castro of FI Salvador stated that he did not think it was necessary to have India and South Africe on the subcom­ mittee*

He then asked Colombia if it would put its resolution

to a vote.

Colombia only desired to delete from its resolution

these words, "including the delegates for India and the Union of South A f r i c a . C a s t r o asked that Colombia*s resolution be put to a vote. After much discussion it was decided that the French-Mexiaran resolution be voted on first.

The Joint Committee adopted

it by a vote of 24 to 19, with 6 abstentions.*^

Chile, Colombia,

Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela voted for it while Ecuador, Honduras, and Panama abstained.

The

rest of the Latin American states voted against it.^ Viteri lafronte of Ecuador, rapporteur of the Joint Com­ mittee meeting, read the report of the action taken to the Gen­ eral Assembly.

Then Smuts restated his views, insisting that

it was the Court that should have the*say as to whether the Assembly had the legal competence and jurisdiction to deal with the matter raised in the documents submitted by India and South Africa. I"General Assembly, First and Sixth Committees," (1946), p. 47.

2 Ibid, 2 Ibid., p. 50. 4 Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru,

81 El Salvador again expressed its views on the resolution then before the Assembly.

Because it dealt with human rights,

El Salvador concluded that in order to eliminate from govern­ ments, provisions which established discrimination the United Nations Charter should give the Court compulsory jurisdiction. If the Nations did not do this, cases of this type would always find a barrier in Article 2 paragraph 7.^ was needed to deal with these matters.

Special jurisdiction

Because of this, El

Salvador gave its approval to an Egyptian proposition the Gen­ eral Assembly had approved on November 19, 1946: The General Assembly declares that it is in the higher interests of humanity to put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial persecution and discrimination and calls on the Governments and responsible authorities to conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end. South Africa was at the meeting that had given the above pro­ posal unanimous approval.

El Salvador thought that South Af­

rica should have taken steps to comply with it. Madame Pandit asked for approval of the French-Mexican resolution.

China also spoke for the same resolution.

In

giving the advantages and disadvantages of referring the prob­ lem to the Court Koo first pointed out that the Court could decide only one way or the other: ^ Supra p. 73. 2 f*General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Part of the First Session,11 United Nations Official Records, (December 7, 1946), p. 1015. Hereinafter quoted as ’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (1946).

82 1 If the Court decided it was in the competence of the Assembly, the situation would remain the same, causing delay. 2 If the Court decided it was not in the competence of the Assembly and in the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa, this would not make it easier to deal with and would not give the Indian the nec­ essary relief. 3 If the Court gave a divided opinion this would not help the Court*s authority and prestige.± Again Colina of Mexico put forth his argument made in the Joint Committee meeting.

He stressed restudy of the United

Hations Charter and insisted that the Assembly should not hide every step it took behind Article 2 paragraph 7.

These aims

the Members should cherish, he stated: 1 Co-operation towards the advancement of the in­ stitutions of human welfare and social justice. 2 Insistence that the General Assembly’s powers be used properly. 3 Re-affirmation of the principles which forbid degrading and unnatural distinctions.2 Ricardo Alfaro of Panama stressed the different passages that proclaimed human rights in the Charter, because of these, the Assembly should make recommendations that certain funda~ mental rights be respected.

Some held that Article 2 paragraph

7 kept the Assembly from intervening.

But Alfaro declared

that it was essentially within the jurisdiction of each State, in that at the San Francisco meeting human rights had been put in the realm of international law with both individuals and states subject to it.

Alfaro stated,,rIt is now constitution^

al law, conventional law, positive law, written law, and the 1 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,** (1946), p. 1021. 2 Ibid,, p. 1026. 2 Appendix W.

83 supreme law of humanity.1 1 He did not want the matter referred to the Court, for that was evading the issue.

Such actions con­

fessed that the words about dignity and the worth of the human person were lies, "a bauble with which we intend to conceal our own frustration."3

It meant that the United Nations had

written into the Charter seven useless, meaningless, sterile, fruitless mandates, and that those seven passages might well be scratched out, erased, and suppressed.

q

He asked the As­

sembly if they could say to the people of the world, "Brethren, we love you, but we are impotent to protect you because we tied our own hands with that clause on domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n . H e asked the Assembly to show the world that the protection of hu­ man rights was its real concern. Poland, the Philippines, and Uruguay approved of the FrenchMexican resolution.

Uruguay declared that the Assembly should

consider the question raised by India because; 1 -The cause of fundamental human rights constituted one of the original purposes of the United Nations. 2 The situation that had arisen had produced serious deterioration in the relations of two Member States. 3 Nothing in the case made it necessary to consult the Court. 4 The invitation to the parties did not constitute un­ justified interference in the domestic affairs of a State but conformity with the powers of the Assem­ bly under Article 14.5 The Netherlands, Belgium, Argentina, and the United King­ dom felt that the Court should pass on the question first. J "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,1* (1946), p. 1027. Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.« p. 1031.

84 Russia pointed out that South Africa no longer wanted the reso­ lution withdrawn but desired an amendment added referring the matter to the Court.

But with this Russia did not agree.

Rus­

sia considered that justice should be secured by an interna­ tional Court? but this international court was here, it was their own Organization which should deliver the verdict.^ At this time the Assembly’s president pointed out that they had to decide whether a two-thirds vote would be required.

This

came under Article 18 paragraph 2 of the Charter, where it sta­ ted that ’’Decisions of the General Assembly on important ques­ tions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting.”^

India, supported by Colombia, did not

feel a two-thirds vote was necessary but South Africa, suppor­ ted by Uruguay, Argentina and El Salvador insisted it was a matter for a two-thirds vote.

After a long discussion a vote

was taken to see if a two-thirds vote was necessary.

With a

vote of 29 to 24, the Assembly decided that a two-thirds vote was needed. A vote was taken first on the South African amendment, with the idea that if it should be accepted, it would replace the French-Mexican resolution.

The amendment was rejected by a

vote of 31 to 21, with 2 abstentions.^

For it were Argentina,

’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (1946), p. 1045. 2 Ibid.. p. 1049. 2 Ibid., p. 1057. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay voted for a two-thirds vote on the question, while Chile, Cuba, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Hondur­ as, Mexico, and Venezuela voted against it. 4 ’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (1946), p. 1057.

85 Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru, with Bolivia abstaining. tion was voted on next.

The French-Mexican resolu­

It passed with a vote of 32 to 15, with

7 abstentions.Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru voted against it while Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador abstained.

These had voted either for the South Af­

rican amendment or had abstained. Again in 1947 the South African problem came before the Assembly.

After discussion in the First Committee Denmark pre­

sented a report of the work done in the First Committee on the Indian problem and the resolution agreed upon.

The resolution

noted the steps the Assembly had taken the previous year on the Indian problem.

After studying the reports of India and South

Africa it asked these two governments to conduct a round table conference without delay and to invite Pakistan to take part. It also requested that the result of the discussions be reported to the Secretary-General who in turn would report it to the next Assembly*

p

Brazil presented to the Assembly a substitute joint reso­ lution of Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Denmark, and Norway.

This

resol\ition embodied the spirit of conciliation which prevailed during the debate in the First Committee on this problem. went a step further than the Indian resolution.

It

It stated that

if the two governments failed to reach an agreement at the "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,** (1946), p. 1057. the two-thirds majority was 32. 2 Appendix Q. Referred to as the Indian resolution.

86

round table conference, then the problem should be referred to the International Court of Justice.^"

Most of the representa­

tives expressed the opinion that the question should be ap­ proached in a very broad and conciliatory manner in order to arrive at a just settlement.

It should also be dealt with

in a concrete form and with complete understanding of existing realities.

The majority of the committee considered direct

negotiation between the parties the best method for the set­ tlement of their dispute, and the only way to make a just and all-embracing solution.

Both the joint resolution and India*s

resolution had the same approach, but India*s resolution rec­ ommended a round table conference or other traditional way of settling the problem, while the joint resolution was just an invitation to refer it to the Court. The difference between the two resolutions was that the • joint resolution went further than negotiation.

If a deci­

sion could not be reached then the two governments could sub­ mit to the Court the work done according to the agreement. This resolution was based on a compromise idea.

It recognized

the rights of the Indian government to submit its complaint to the General Assembly but did not ignore the difficulties that confronted South Africa.^ South Africa again stated that the matter was a domestic 1 Appendix R. 2 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session,” United Nations Official Records. (September 16-November 29, 1947), p. 1112. Hereinafter quoted as "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” 91947). 3 Appendix R*

87 problem and that the repatriation of* the Indian population was the essential feature of the Capetown Agreement.

After re-tell­

ing the Indian story in South Africa H. G. Lawrence emphasized that he would vote for the joint resolution.

Hector Castro of

Uruguay also felt that the joint resolution came closer to a proper solution of the problem.

The United States liked this

joint resolution because it called first for discussion, then mediation, and then conciliation.

If by then a solution had

not been reached as a last resort Court action could be applied. But Oscar Lange of Poland preferred the Indian resolution adopted in the First Committee and appealed to the delegations to vote for it.

He could not support the joint resolution be­

cause the dispute was essentially a political situation and the reasons stated last year still held. Madame Pandit of India stated she was in favor of the Indian resolution for it reaffirmed the resolution of last year and provided for a round table discussion at one.

It

was up to the General Assembly to decide upon what basis the question was to be settled.

Failure to reaffirm last year*s

resolution would be regarded by her as a change in position, and if it should not be reaffirmed it would undermine the prestige and influence of the Assembly.^* She considered the joint resolution as an invitation for South Africa to stand by and not to go to a conference but to compel reference to the Court. ice indefinitely.

This would put the matter on

She contended that since every problem has

"General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,11 (1947), p. 1137.

88

a legal point did it mean that all problems have to be viewed by the Court?

She intended to stand by her resolution as a-

mended by Mexico and passed by the First Committee.

Alexan­

der Galagan of the Ukraine also refused to support the joint resolution because it would not satisfy the lawful rights of the Indian people but the demands of Smuts.

He also consid-

ered it a retrogressive step. Luis Quintanilla of Mexico stated that he would vote for the Indian resolution.

At this time he read the second para­

graph of the Indian resolution that he objected to.

Quintanilla

wished this to be dropped out because he thought it implied un­ necessary censure of a great and noble country, South Africa. He viewed that it was an indisputable fact that racial equality was the principle at stake, and any time racial discrimination was denounced Mexico’s voice would be raised against it.

Quin­

tanilla also insisted that the joint resolution was a real in­ vitation to refer the question to the Court.

He claimed that

the joint resolution said ’or* and not ’and1.^

Because of

this the stages named would not necessarily be gone through before.the matter went to the Court.

Even if ’and1 was used

he believed that it provided a loophole to evade a solution. He couldn*t understand the change of stand of some represen­ tatives on this joint resolution, when they had pronounced in favor of the Indian resolution.

Haiti, China, and Yugoslavia

also spoke for the Indian resolution because it contained 1 ’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,” (1947), p. 1146.

89 everything the joint resolution had, except the objectionable clause that referred the matter eventually to the Court# Lawrence of the United Kingdom requested a vote by roll call.

Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, left the chair for Andrei

Gromyko, who announced the vote by paragraph#

The Indian

resolution which called for a round table discussion was voted on first.

The Assembly rejected it due to the lack of a two-

thirds vote, 31 to 19, with 6 abstentions.^-

Chile, Colombia,

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela voted for it while Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay abstained.

Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica,

El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay voted against it.

Be­

cause this resolution was defeated, the joint resolution which asked for a round table discussion and then Court action was then put to a vote.

This too was rejected by a vote of

29 to 24, with 3 abstentions.^

Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica,

Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 'Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay voted for it while Bolivia, Chile and Venezuela abstained. numerous changes.

The voting on both resolutions reflected

Cuba, Dominican Republic, Peru, Ecuador,

and Uruguay abstained* on the Indian resolution but voted for the joint resolution.

Chile and Venezuela voted for the In­

dian resolution, and abstained on the joint resolution. At the next meeting India had a new resolution for con­ sideration.

However, the president thought it would be too

J "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings,rf (1947), p. 1169. 2 Ibid., p.' 1170.

90 difficult to consider, and if there were no objections, the document would be circulated and considered in a coming meeting. With some discussi.on.lt was decided to accept the president’s suggestion. Not until the 1949 General Assembly was the African prob­ lem again discussed again.

M. C. Setalvad, chairman of the

Indian delegation, brought it up on the ground that he feared a serious conflagration in South Africa due to the deteriora­ tion of racial relations, and sought a United Nations’ in­ vestigation of the conditions under which three hundred thou­ sand South African Indians lived.

He charged that they con­

stituted a "helpless, voiceless, and voteless minority and were victims of an ever-increasing measure of racial suppres­ sion and hatred."^

He feared that the treatment the Indians

were receiving might lead to a renewal of the January, 1949, Indian revolt in Durban and spread throughout South Africa. He also stated that South Africa was ’’committed to practicing the most thorough-going racial suppression and discrimination the world has ever known. This was the second time that South Africa was asked to get together with India to settle the quarrel.

France and

Mexico put forth a resolution that took note of the Indian accusations and the legal arguments of South Africa.

It in­

vited India, Pakistan, and South Africa to hold a round table conference "taking into consideration the Purboses and PrinNew York Times. May 15, 1949. 2 Hew York Times. May 10, 1949.

91 eiples of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights.**^

The vote in the First Committee for the

French-Mexican resolution, in favor of a round table talk was 47 to 1, with 10 abstentions.^

This gave the resolution the

necessary two-thirds to pass in the Assembly.

It had come after

India had warned that resentment against racial discrimination might involve all of Asia and threaten world peace. India*s arguments were two-fold.

It accused South Africa

of violating the provisions of rights of the United Nations Charter and agreements between the two countries regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa.

South Africa insis-

ted to the end that racial law was a matter outside the ruling of the United Nations. When the matter was referred from the Committee to the General Assembly to insure the passage of the French-Mexican resolution, India withdrew its own stronger one that would have set up a commission to investigate the charges.

The

resolution was then approved by a vote of 47 to 1, with 10 ab­ stentions in the Assembly.

Finally, after three years of work,

a way to solve this problem was agreed upon. ^ New York Times. May 15, 1949. New York Times, 1949.

Chapter IV WORK OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL The idea of* an Economic and Social Council was new.

It had

been set up to help solve economic and social problems of* the world.

A great need was felt for this type of service.

Because

this was a new council, its organization took much time and the first session was spent in organizing.

As set up by the United

Nations Charter there were to be eighteen members appointed for ■v

a term of three years.

Latin America obtained four of these

seats through the election of Chile, Colombia, Cuba, and Peru. The first session opened with the executive secretary presiding.

Ramaswami Mudaliar of India presented Chapter Three of

the report of the Preparatory Committee, which concerned the election of officers.

Mudaliar, nominated for president by Co­

lombia and seconded by Canada, was elected by acclamation.

The

second vice president, Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia, a former professor of economic geography, political science and public finance, was nominated by Russia, and seconded by Chile with the support of Peru and Belgium.

As there were no other

nominations he was declared elected unanimously. held office in personal capacity only.

These officers

The substitutes held the

chair but not the office. Speeches were made by Belgium, China, the United States, Greece, Cuba, Chile, and Peru.

F. Pazos of Cuba stated that his

country was prepared to contribute its best efforts to the ac­ complishment of the necessary tasks by working for its own pros­ perity which was closely linked to world prosperity.

Cuba

93 would defeud the closest international economic co-operation, direct its efforts to prevent a post war depression in primary commodities, and aim at stablized production and market prices. Cuba would give carefpl attention to all recommendations re­ lating to the attainment of full and stable employment. The next problem was to establish commissions^

Canada con­

sidered that great care should be taken in the structure of the organization and warned against the danger of having an over abundance of agencies each going its own way.

These commissions

should function as expert bodies with geographical representa­ tion and not as bodies of government representatives.

A commis­

sion was formed on rules of procedure, on transportation and communication, on statistics, on human rights, on economics and employment, and on social problems. Pazos of Cuba asked permission to enlarge on a remark the French speaker had made.

He told Herve Alphand that Cuba was

fully aware of the problem of commodity shortages.

Cuba had in­

creased her sugar production two and a half million tons and was supplying this at fifty percent of the prevailing market price. He warned the Council that there were surpluses in some fields p such as wool, cotton, and metal. He pointed out that "in or­ der to increase production and in order to produce abundance, the very best means is to assure countries which may increase their production that there will be an ordered market and that 1 "Economic and Social Council, First Year," United Nations Official Records. (January, 1946), p. 42. g~Tbid.

94 there will be no depression or unemployment afterwards.1'^ Be­ cause the farmers in Cuba had not been assured that there would not be .a terrible depression, they did not produce more. To accomplish its aims the Council would have to become a world-wide policy-making body for the new economy, pointed out Alberto Parro of Peru.

It would have to make a clear statement

as to the lines along which the economic activity of each coun­ try should be developed. The first big problem brought up was the question of an in­ ternational health conference.

China presented the following

resolution: 1 Resolved that the Economic and Social Council approves calling of an international health conference and give consideration to an inter­ national health organization. 2 Members to be experts in public health. 3 To expedite preparations for the conferences each Member of the Council was to designate an expert to constitute forthwith a technical committee.2 This resolution was approved wholeheartedly by most of the Council.

Parro desired that the experts pay special attention

tc housing conditions.

He also desired that the nations that

did not belong to the United Nations should submit reports on their public health. Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia pointed out that ac­ cording to the discussion the health organization would absorb all existing agencies.

He would object to this if it would pre­

judice the position of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau.

Final­

~ T 11Economic and Social Council, First Year,11 United Nations Official Records. (January, 1946), p. 42. s Ibid.. pp. 54-5.

95 ly, he accepted the original wording of the resolution on the un­ derstanding that regional organizations would not disappear. China, Colombia, France, Greece, Canada, Russia, the United King­ dom, and the United States were placed on the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee made the following proposals for the Health Conference. 1 To call an international conference to consider the scope and appropriate machinery for interna­ tional action in the field of public health and the establishment of a health organization. 2 To send experts in health techniques to the con­ ference. 3 To set up a technical preparatory committee to prepare an annotated agenda. 4 The preparatory committee was to meet not later than March 15, 1946, and its agenda to be ready by May 1, 1946. 5 Secretary-General was to call the meeting not later than June 20, 1946. -*• Russia and Belgium objected saying it was too early for coun­ tries to make a study of health.

Russia desired to have the

decision postponed until the next meeting.

Parro of Peru con­

sidered the time between May 1 and June 20 too short to study the Preparatory Committee’s report and add suggestions.

Chile

requested that, due to the lack of co-ordination between the different countries and the danger of epidemics., a conference . should be called with the least possible delay. Peru desired Latin American experts on the Preparatory Com­ mittee and the United Kingdom wanted four existing health organ­ izations to attend.

Again Colombia wanted reassurance that the

existing health agencies wouldn’t be absorbed into this health ’’Economic and Social Council, First Year,” United Nations Official Records. (February, 1946), p. 89.

96 organization to be set up.

Finally, by a vote of 11 to 5 the

Council decided to call the health conference not later than June 20, 1946, in London.^ At the second session of the Economic and Social Council the Preparatory Committee's report on the health conference was read and discussed.

Parro declared the only way health aims

could be achieved would be through a system of social security. Chile also hoped that the drafting committee would discuss adding a sentence about national health insurance.

A drafting committee

of Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Peru, the United King­ dom, Russia, the United States, and Yugoslavia was appointed. Canada made a proposal that the Interim Commission, consisting of a representative of each government having signed the Convention, should appoint an executive committee which would in turn become the executive board when the Convention came into force. idea was accepted.

This

The drafting committee asserted that the re­

marks made In the general discussion would be communicated to the health conference.

Later the drafting committee's resolu^

tion was accepted. Colombia proposed before the Council the establishment of a Fiscal Commission.

The document was divided into two parts.

The first part contained general remarks indicating the urgency of establishing this commission to advise the Council on the technical aspects of taxation and public finance.

Part two con­

tained the draft resolution tentatively defining the terms of " ^ “Economic and Social Council, First Year,” United Nations Official Records. (February, 1946), p. 89.

reference and indicating certain aspects of its composition. This was needed very much because taxation touched all aspects of human life, for the effects of taxes depended not only on the taxes themselves but on what the government did with than. "Public finance was the economic basis of the life of the State, a powerful means to eradicate the evils of excessive economic and social i n e q u a l i t y . T h e League had recognized this need and had set up bodies to study it.

Colombia desired the com­

mission to be composed of men of recognized authority capable of dealing with legal, administrative, economic, statistical, and technical aspects of taxation and public finance and assisted by a secretariat. China approved this proposal, for taxation policies could cause trade barriers.

Also cumbersome fiscal structures were

obstacles to international investment.

In order not to dupli­

cate the work of other commissions, it was held desirable to confine the scope of the study to the technical aspects of pub­ lic finance. To save time the president suggested that the committee dealing with economic questions to report recommendations re­ garding such a commission.

This idea the Council approved.

At the third session, this question was again considered. Colombia put forward an amended proposal.

This Chile sup­

ported together with the United Kingdom and China.

Parro of

"Economic"and Social Council, First Year," United Nations Official Records. (June, 1946), p. 85. Z“Tbid.

98 Peru hoped the Colombian proposal would be adopted.

Due to the

close connection between financial activities and economic de­ velopment, he suggested the inclusion of a paragraph providing for the co-ordination of the work of the fiscal commission with that of other commissions and specialized agencies.-*States endorsed the Colombian resolution as it stood.

The United Both

Russia, and Peru suggested some minor changes in the wording of the Colombian proposal, but these they withdrew after some dis­ cussion and pressed for a vote on the Colombian proposal.

The

resolution was finally approved without amendment. In October, 1946, during the third session of the Economic and Social Council consideration of a population commission was suggested by the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Uni­

ted States considered that it would be a great assistence to the Council, its commissions, subcommissions and its special agencies. France did not desire the work of this commission to be just a compilation of statistical data but to be a study of age distri­ bution of population.

France also desired this clause to be in­

serted: the commission shall study “the effects of the differ­ ent age-structures on international relations, standards of living, and social security.”^

Parro of Peru approved of this

joint proposal and withdrew his former proposal.

He supported

the French amendment but he desired the number elected to the commission be reduced by one to allow the inclusion of the World Health Organization.

The United Kingdom opposed this on the

“Economic and Social Council, First Year,1* United Nations Official Records. (October, 1946), p. 100. STjbid., p. 102.

99 ground that the International Labor Organization and the Food and Africulture Organization were just as concerned in the work of this commission as the World Health Organization. Russia pointed out that too many commissions should not be started as it would be too costly for some countries to cover all these activities.

Russia preferred that establishment of

the proposed commission be postponed, and instead create one in the form of a subcommission under the Statistical Commission. Yugoslavia backed Russia's views, but the idea was rejected. Another proposal of Russia and Yugoslavia was that repre­ sentatives of the Economic and Employment, the Social, and the Statistical Commissions should not be full members of the Popu­ lation Commission.

Belgium offered a compromise suggestion,

that the representatives of commissions appointed to the Popu­ lation Commission should be members of nations not represented on the Population Commission.

Yugoslavia declared that the com­

missions had a right to decide which representatives should be appointed to the Population Commission.

The United Kingdom sta­

ted that representatives of other commissions in the Population Commission would represent their government.

Still Russia did

not agree, but insisted that members of other commissions in the Population Commission would have to represent the commission and not their government.

Yugoslavia pointed out that precedent

would be changed if other commissions could become members of a commission.

Other commissions could then do the same.

Carlos

Davila of Chile held Russia's view and supported its amendment. India suggested that the representatives of other commissions

should attend the meetings but not have a right to vote.

The

United Kingdom put this in a form of a motion which Russia and the rest of the Council approved.

This matter was then turned

over to a drafting committee. When the commission was finally accepted and began its work Parro served as chairman.

In his report to the Council he

paid tribute to the professional ability and co-operation of the members*

Discussions demonstrated the importance of demo­

graphic research in solving international problems.

The com­

mission realized too that it needed to approach the work real­ istically and not spread it too this.

It used these as guiding

principles: 1 That there was need for a sound technical basis of facts before more important work can be done. 2 That the Commission*s work should meet i,he imme­ diate practical needs of the United Nations. Its major interest was collecting important basic data for use of the other commissions.

The work would be considered un­

satisfactory until a new census was taken.

The 1950 census

would have more value if a comparable schedule were used.

Pro­

posals for this were going to be made. Parro demanded more money for additional personnel for demographic studies to furnish the raw material for the other commissions.

The real work of the future would be to form popu­

lation policies while the emphasis for the moment was on nec­ essary factual foundations. Jean Royer of France said it had been wise not to define 1 "Economic and Social Council, Second Year," United Nation Official Records. (March, 1947), p. 162.

101 the limits of the work of the Population Commission*

Some of

the work might over lap at first with other commissions hut time would solve this problem.

He approved.of the study of

population changes and the year book to be made.

The report

of the commission was accepted. During the fifth session Hernan Santa Cruz of Chile formal­ ly moved the creation of an Economic Commission for Latin Ameri­ ca. Santa Cruz stated that economic conditions in Latin America presented grave danger to the survival of democratic regimes.^* The need was great for these countries as they lacked diversifi­ cation as well as industrialization.

Illiteracy, malnutrition

deficiency, diseases, and the lack of equipment retarded prog­ ress.

Improved production Santa Cruz considered the first

problem. economics.

The war too had had repercussions on Latin America’s The successful work of the other commissions war­

ranted one for Latin America.

Both Guillermo Belt of Cuba and

Carlos D ’Ascoli of Venezuela supported this proposal as did the United States and Lebanon.

But Canada warned that too many re­

gional commissions might violate the spirit of a world-wide functional approach.^

Canada pointed out that the Inter-Amer^

ican Economic and Social Council could take care of the problem. Both the United States and Canada, backed by India, wanted a working group to study this question,

Russia was sympathetic

but felt that the proposal for the establishment of an Economic 1 ”Further Decisions of the Fifth Session”, United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. Ill (August 19, 1947), p. 252. ^ 11Economic and Social Council. Second Year,” United Na­ tions Official Records, (July, 1947}, p. 137.

Commission for Latin America was not dictated by necessity.-*Santa Cruz of Chile again insisted that a commission for Latin America be established in conformity with the creation of the other economic commissions.. He listed the three main objections against it: 1 That action should not be started on a regional basis but the Council1s work should remain on a world-wide basis. 2 That there was no proof that the Latin American countries wanted their problems studied. 3 That the commission would interfere in the work of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.2 He insisted that formation of a commission for Latin America should receive the same attention as the others had.

He

stressed that all governments for the past three weeks had known about his proposals and had discussed it since the se­ cond session.

The last objection he refuted, pointing out that

the scope of the work of the Economic Commission for Latin Amer ica would be much broader than the Pan-American Union because it did not have the technical or economic means to exert a de­ cisive influence. After more discussion Cuba suggested an ad hoc committee with these terms of reference: 1 The committee shall prepare an analysis regarding the establishment of an economic commission. 2 The Committee shall report to the Ninth Interna­ tional Conference of American States at Bogota. 3 If the Latin Americans state at the meeting they desire an economic commission then this will be reported at the next meeting of the Economic and Social Council. 1 "Economic and Social Council. Second Year," United Na­ tions Official Records. (July, 1947;, p. 138. 2 Ibid.. p, 146.

103 4 The members of the ad hoc committee are Chile, Cuba, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States.1 This was approved ‘by Norway and Venequela.

After some other'

proposals were withdrawn, the Council decided to set up a drafting committee to study Cuba’s proposal.

Perez Cisneros

of Cuba, chairman of the drafting committee, presented its report and resolution.

The Council by a vote of 13 to 0, with 5 o abstentions approved the drafting committee’s resolution* When the ad hoc committee met it found that Latin American

countries had a similar historical heritage of development but that they differed widely as to size, population density, re­ sources, and economic and cultural advancement.

In planning

a commission for Latin America the committee desired to avoid duplication of the work of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

After much study, on January 29, 1948, it rec­

ommended the establishment of the commission as the best way to deal with the problems of that region.

This was the diag­

nosis of the problem; not enough development; not enough diver­ sification; too high a dependence on more-developed economies. Because of this Latin America was extremely sensitive to world ecomonic fluctuations.

After hearing this report the Economic

and Social Council approved without dissent the establishment of the Economic Commission for Latin America. In June, 1948, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America held its first meeting in Santiago, Chile.

All

1 ^Economic and Social Council. Second Year,*1 United Nations Official Records, (July, 1947), p. 394. 2 Ibid.. p. 186.

104 the Latin American' countries, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the Netherlands, and all related agencies at­ tended. The main problem brought out by speakers concerned the following: 1 The need for an economic survey of Latin America. 2 The need for co-ordination with the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. 3 The need for solving agricultural problems and the expansion of food production. 4 Existence of bottlenecks in foreign trade. 5 The need of industrial development. 6 The labor suppl:/ and technical assistence. 7 Inflation. 8 Public health.1 It was decided to make a survey of the economics of Latin America.

This included a study of the current economic situa­

tion, analyzing of trade relations, and study of the main char­ acteristics and problems of the Latin American economic struc­ ture such as inflation, labor supply, technical assistence, and industrial equipment. To help in the agricultural problem a resolution was passed proposing the setting up of a Joint Working Party between the Secretariat of the Commission and the Food and Agriculture Or­ ganization.

It was to study co-ordinated action to increase

food production.

Another resolution passed concerned a study

of the movements of import and export prices, and the causes of such movements and their effect on the balance of payment. In regard to industrial development the greatest needs were found to be the lack of industrial equipment, sources of capital 1 "Economic Commission for Latin America,11 Department of Public Information, (1948), pp. 10-17.

105 investment, and transportation and communication facilities. A report of the -work done was given at the seventh session of the Economic and Social Council.

The Council discussed the

work and approved it fully, and it was thought that when the commission had its next meeting it would have enough informa­ tion on latin America to undertake positive steps toward solu­ tion of its important economic problems. At the Economic and Social Council meeting in the fall of 1948 the enlargement of membership on the Council was discussed. Argentina desired the membership increased to twenty-four. Eduardo Anze-Matienzo of Bolivia considered security the basis for world peace.

He was also aware of the growing lack of faith

in the United Nations on the part of the public.

The work of

the Economic and Social Council was less spectacular but more fundamental and constructive.

Moreno of Colombia pointed out

that a seat on the Economic and Social Council meant more to *f the small nations than a seat on the Security Council. The problems of the small nations were also more pressing than those of advanced nations.

He did not think that Argentina*s

proposal went far enough.

Argentina had put forward its reso-*

lution because it was convinced that the Economic and Social Council was a vital instrument for forging human welfare.

The

extension bill provided for no limitation in elections of mem­ bers.

As there were no permanent seats on the Council, those

held by the Big Five could be considered permanent.

This left

1 "Better Participation in the Economic and Social Council,f* United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin, V (November 15, 1948), p. 916.

106 only thirteen seats for rotation. Dr. Guy Perez Asneros of Cuba said the automatic re-elec­ tion of the Big Five was due more to apathy than to any inher­ ently valuable principle.

There was danger that it would become

a virtual conditions, even though they had no right or claim to automatic re-election.

The smaller nations were the ones that

had initiated the most valuable resolutions.

France pointed

out that as recommendations had to go to the Assembly, the smaller powers could cite their views there. Argentina then accepted the Peruvian proposal to keep this before the Assembly by communicating its views and suggestions to the Secretary-General.

To meet the views of the United

States and Belgium the resolution was re-drafted as follows: The General Assembly takes note of the interest shown by certain delegations for improving the work of the Economic and Social Council and for associating with the Council’s activities the efficiency thereof; recommends that members should consider this problem while taking account of the discussions held during the second and third regular session and communicate their sug- gestions to the Secretary-General. **■ It was then accepted by the Council and sent to the Assembly where it was approved 41 to 1, with 1 abstention*^ 1 "Better Participation in the Economic and Social Council," United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. V (November 15, 1948), p. 918.

Chapter V LATIN AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTIONS For a while in 1945 the world looked at Latin American na­ tions and wondered if* it had a heart*

Late in 1944 Dr. Eduardo

Santo had visited the Latin American countries asking for aid for UNRRA.^

The supplies promised were slow in coming and by

the end of 1945 only Brazil had given its promised share.

In­

flation: prevailing conditions in world trade; poorly developed manufacturing through lack of a good labor supply, technical assistence and industrial equipment; primitive methods of agri­ culture; and the general backwardness of the people made con­ ditions very difficult in most Latin American countries.

These

countries were finding it hard to meet their designated quotas. Because of Latin America’s poor response a mission was sent to describe the stark need of Europe and Asia and to obtain the needed supplies. Caribbean area.

The first stops of the mission were In the President Grau San Martin of Cuba promised

20,000 tons of sugar in 1945 and in 1946.

He also promised

$1,000,000 in cash besides shoes, rope, and relief goods.^ Cuba lived up to this promise. $2,000,000.

Colombia promised to donate

‘At the Dominican Republic the mission found it

had already given $340,000 but was talked into giving $1,500, 000 more when at first it was only willing to double the ori­ ginal amount.^ "

Little Panama made a contribution of one per-

^ Supra p. 7. 2 "latin America Has a Heart,” Christian Science Monitor Magazine. (November 2, 1946), o. 3. 3H T h i d . .

4 Ibid.

108 cent of its income in cash."*'

Part way down the Atlantic sea-

coast things became brighter.

In Brazil they obtained $10,000,

000 more in foodstuffs to be added to the $30,000,000 already given.^

Before, Uruguay had pledged $500,000 vrhich this mis­

sion now obtained with a promise of $1,000,000 more.^

At Ar­

gentina, not a member of UNRRA, the mission found it hard to contact any one.

After two days.the Minister of Foreign Af­

fairs, Juan I. Cooke, was contacted and he promised to call a cabinet meeting to discuss the request.

After much delay Ar­

gentina promised to give 150,000 tons of grain at the end of May and made a tentative promise of the same amounts in June, July, and August.^

It did not materialize.^

In Chile the legislature split and blocked the $2,000,000 gift proposed, arguing that Chileans needed help first.

Sena­

tor Arturo Alesandri’s support was obtained and he influenced the opposition party to respond.

It was finally agreed that

Chile’s donation should be $3,000,000. Latin America entered the United Nations Organization with a great desire, willingness, and eagerness to try to help set­ tle the problems of the world.

They believed that their future

nLatin America Has a Heart,11 Christian Science Monitor Magazine, (November 2, 1946), p. 3. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. | Ibid. 3 later developments indicated that UNRRA had to pay Argentina $.40 a bushel above the United States and Cana­ dian price for wheat plus a demurrage fee aggregating $500, 000 on ’donated1 wheat. This Argentina denied. 6 f,latin America Has a Heart,1* Christian Science Monitor Magazine, (November 2, 1946), p. 3. 1

109 was closely connected with the future of the United States. They also realized that agreement within the hemisphere was no longer an assurance of security.

The wise use of their

voting power, which was out of proportion with their political importance, was a thing they had to watch.

Unscrupulous coun­

tries could try to persuade them with favors and bribes for a vote that in time could do harm. As a whole the Latin Americans have not acted as a bloc. 1 In most cases they have acted freely and independently. There were, however, three important ways in which they acted unani­ mously: on the Argentine question, on the regional problem, and in opposition to the veto power given to the Big Five. Latin Americans also fought against the veto question be­ cause they felt that the veto was not for the best interest of the United Hations.

The Latin Americans believed that the Uni­

ted nations Organization should have a free hand to thwart ag­ gression.

They argued that, because a state by one vote could

turn down the desires of the world, it was not the best system and that in a few years those that were not world powers could lose this power and still have the right of veto.

The Latin

Americans also realized that the United Nations could not exist minus a great power. Latin America fought for Argentina’s admission to the United Nations at the beginning of the San Francisco Conference ~ ^ Galo Plazo, ’’Latin America’s Contributions to the United Nations Organization.” International Conciliation.-CDIX (March. 1946), p. 153. —

110 because countries could then become members with only a twothirds vote; later the Security Council's approval would be re­ quired and there ,was the danger of a veto by one ’of* the Big Five.

This could have divided the continent. When it came to regionalism, Latin America had a fight be­

fore it.

The Latin Americans argued that the regional system

was not cancelled out by a world organization but complemented it, for hetning-in the Charter precluded tne existence of re­ gionalism as long as it was consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.^

Latin America1s stand on this

view point eventually prevailed. At San Francisco Latin America worked hard for an Economic and Social Council-that would function.

Honduras wanted the

membership in the Economic and Social Council to be by rotation or some other established arrangement, while Venezuela wanted countries with a special interest in questions being considered by the Council entitled to a seat and a vote. These three offices were wanted as permanent organizations of the Economic and Social Councils An International Maritime Transportation Office, an International Migration Office and an International Education Office.

Panama drew the-attention of

the United Nations to the problem of migration.

Panama'- consid­

ered it of the utmost importance because it was closely allied to the solution of unemployment problems.

Supported by Argen-

Galo Plazo, ,fIatin America’s Contributions to the Uni­ ted Nations Organization,11 International Conciliation. CDIX (March, 1946), p. 155.

Ill tina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico the Office of Migration was proposed.

The setting up of the Migration Office had to wait

until the Economic and Social Council could be convened.

Costa

Rica desired the International Labor Organization to be incor­ porated into the Economic and Social Council. Many recommendations were made for the Economic and Social Council to work on when it convened.

Brazil and China recom­

mended that the Economic and Social Council set up a special conference within the next few months to establish an Inter­ national Health Organization.

Brazil desired the Economic and

Social Council to set up a special commission of v/omen to study the political, social, and economic status of women with special reference to discrimination and limitations placed on them be­ cause of their sex.

This received Ihe support of Mexico and

the Dominican Republic.

Both of these recommendations were

carried out in subsequent meetings of the Economic and Social Council. Cuba felt that the wording in the Dumbarton Oaks plan placed the Economic and Social Council in a subordinate posi­ tion to the Security Council.

Cuba worked for a redraft of

Chapter IX of the Charter to make the Economic and Social Council independent of the Security Council.

This idea was

gained. Brazil proposed that the Economic and Social Council be required to set up an Education and Cultural Commission. guay was against It.

Uru­

After much discussion Brazil withdrew its

proposal as it had gained little support.

Brazil had to be sat-

112 isfied with the words education and culture being mentioned several times throughout the United Nations Charter. As the United Nations opened Colombia’s Eduardo ZuletaAngel held the temporary seat of chairman* tained a vice-president’s seat.

Venezuela later ob­

Out of the seven committees

formed Roberto Jimenez of Panama and Roberto MacEachen of Uru­ guay each received a chairmanship.

For 1949 Hernane Santa

Cruz, Chile, and Ricardo J. Alfaro, Panama, were elected to Committees two and six respectfully.

Brazil and Mexico obtained

seats on the Security Council while Colombia, Chile, Cuba, and Peru took seats on the Economic and Social Council.

For another

three year term beginning in 1949 Chile and Cuba were re-elected. Brazil also received a seat at the same time.

Colombia, Argen­

tina, and Cuba have also served on the Security Council.

In

the International Court of Justice the Latin Americans won four seats of six and nine years duration. had one assistant Secretary-General.

In the Secretariat they Costa Rica and Mexico have

had a place on the Trusteeship Council.

On the Permanent Head­

quarters Committee Eduardo Zuleta-Angel ahd the chairmanship. Oswald© Aranha served two sessions as president of the General Assembly; Jose Arce held the presidency for one session. Many of the points the Latin Americans fought for were small but some were extremely important.

When the delegates

were shaping the United Nations Australia gave Peru valuable aid.

This concerned the obtaining of the general rule of prac­

tice that made the meetings of the General Assembly open to the public and press of the world.

113 It was hard to judge the role of* the two Latin American members of the Security Council.

Brazil usually took the con­

servative side while Mexico took a liberal position in the Council.1

As Mexico had only one year to serve a replacement

would be needed in 1947.

According to Dorothy Adelson Mexico

was spirited and forward looking in temperment and stood at p all times independent of the Anglo-American group. In the Iranian situation Mexico*s Najera took an active part in the debate from the first.

He defended the small na­

tions and became involved in sputtering exchanges with Gromyko. Brazil’s Velloso went three days without saying anything, and when he made a statement about Byrnes* resolution it was brief, q pointed and polished.*" He declared it stated *touching* argu­ ments adduced in support of a small state*s *rights* to with­ draw its complaint.^

Both Najera and Velloso blocked the Rus­

sian attempt to withdraw the case.

Russia believed these coun­

tries were acting as Anglo-American satellites.

This belief

was to be dispelled when the Spanish case came up. Out of this case came two schools, of thought. rigidly to Article 2 paragraph 7.^

One adhered

The second school among

the Latin Americans: consisted of those who supported broad ^ Dorothy Adelson, **Latinos on the Security Council,** Inter-American« V (June, 1946), p. 31. 2

Tbid.

3 Ibid.. p . 2 9 . 4 Ibid. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the pre­ sent Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the appli­ cation of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.**

1JL4

interpretation of collective action.

Dr. Alfaro of Panama made

this trail-blazing statement; he ’’declared without any ’ifs’ and ’huts’ that intervention is a ’fetish word',” and that it did not bar collective action by the community of nations.1 Mexico was for intervention while Brazil opposed it.

Najera

delayed his return to Mexico to deliver a forceful, impassioned appeal for ousting Franco.

He fought hard for this action.

Colina, who took Najera’s place, considered that a divided opin­ ion w'ould strengthen Franco.

When Colina saw that nothing could

be done toward intervention he supported the Australian resolu­ tion which provided for a subcommittee of five to check on Franco’s possible threat to international peace.

Mexico held

that intervention was a false issue in Franco’s case, but Bra­ zil declared that on the basis of intervention the Council would have to interfere writh a good many governments.

Mexico

declared that other ex-enemy governments had been barred by provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Mexico also insisted

that an ”international body to which the United Nations had delegated the job of keeping the peace must take action which by one country or a group of countries might be intervention, but in the Council’s case was legitimate fulfillment of respon­ sibility.”^

The Council placed Brazil on the subcommittee.

Brazil and Mexico doubted the Council’s efficiency; this was felt throughout Latin America.

Velloso also cited the veto,

1 Vera M . Dean, ’’Nations at Work,” Nation, C1XIII (December 14, 1946), p. 682. Dorothy Adelson, ’’Latinos on the Security Council,” Inter-American. V (June, 1946), p. 31.

115 lack of set rules which led to fumbling, and too many decisions by the chairman, as its chief faults. In the first Assembly, Latin America voted with the United States more than on their own initiative but when they fought the United States it was eloquently and effectively.

Most of

the credit for cohesive work went to Colombia*s Zuleta-Angel. The others looked to him for guidance for he had served on the Preparatory Committee and knew the situation.

The Latin Amer­

icans kept on excellent terms with everybody but if they had a point they made it.^

Formation of a Latin American bloc was

held good by one authority because it wasn*t Yankee manipulated, but it was bad because it sided with anyone who would compro­ mise with it.

Chile and Brazil scored hits in London while Ar­

gentina seemed to have the genius for antagonizing people. When Few Zealand proposed San Francisco as the United Na­ tions* home Carlos Salamanca of Bolivia promoted the idea. very little trouble he obtained Latin America*s support. it was put to a vote New York City won 21 to 19.2

With When

The voting

might have been different if five Latin American countries had not been absent.

The Latin Americans were disappointed and

Carlos Salamanca of Bolivia was inconsolable. On August 2, 1946, Cuba gave notice that it desired to call a conference to consider amending the Charter to eliminate the veto power of the Council.

It ended in a watered down resolu-

1 ’’Latinos in London,” Inter-American. V (April, 1946), P. IB, 2 Ibid., d . 19. 3 ibid. ‘

116 tion in the Assembly urging the Big Five to limit their special voting privilege.^ Early in the second part of the first session of the Assem­ bly Castello Najera said that the' United Nations Organization wasn’t making progress because it was just registering events that had gone on without its intervention.

He believed that

treaty negotiations should be undertaken within the United Na­ tions and that all countries should have an active part in dis­ cussions on matters that concerned peace. There had been two blocs of power in the United Nations at the beginning.

There was danger of a third bloc forming with

the leadership much further to the right and whose unity could become much tighter than the Western Bloc.

Dr. Jose Arce of

Argentina had been trying to line up the Latin Americans in a position that would make them reactionary on all issues.

Be­

cause of its developed economic superiority, Argentina hoped to win political influence over the Latin Americans. Argentina’s fight was two-fold.

It hoped to win a seat on

the Economic and Social Council and to increase the Assembly’s power at the expense of the Security Council’s power.

When

Arce noted that the political battles were being fought on a procedural level, he entered the fight and won.

He submitted

an amendment to the membership resolution in a procedural ma­ neuver, emphasizing the membership powers of the General Assem­ bly over those of the Security Council.

It carried by a vote

1 "’’Assembly Results: 71 Varieties,” Newsweek. XXVIII (December 23, 1946), p. 34,

117 of 20 to 14, with 15 abstentions.-*-

Fifteen Latin Americans

were for it while Panama voted against it: Venezuela abstained, and Mexico and Nicaragua were absent.^

In some cases the more

liberal Latin American nations' did not support Argentina. In the 1947 meeting of the United Nations Organization the Latin Americans took an active part.

Argentina proposed a con­

ference to amend the Charterfs provisions on voting procedure, which was withdrawn when the United States suggested that the Interim Committee should study it.

Argentina with Costa Rica,

the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Peru led the fight at this time to reinstate Franco.

All it eventually amounted to

was a vote of confidence that the Security Council would act if necessary.

Peru, at this meeting, requested that the Economic

and Social Council send a committee of experts to study in the Andean section the narcotic effects of coco-leaf chewing. Colombia had developed a policy within the United Nations. When Colombia was elected to the Security Council it took to the work the spirit of co-operation and enthusiasm.

Colombia

believed that the readjustment of the world on a new basis was a matter of years, not weeks or months*

It also recognized the

veto power, for it had always existed even under the League in the rule of unanimity.

But the restrictions on the use of the

veto should be respected.

Reasonable use might be interpreted

as a right which small states have granted to the powers to. in1 11The Third Bloc,11 New Republic, CXV (November 18, 1946), p * 657, Ibid.

118 able them to postpone the study of* any subject at a given moment, Colombia’s delegation had a definite attitude toward Spain. Colombia believed that if a more comprehensive attitude were taken toward Spain and its government, regardless of personal opinions of Franco and his political ideas, the results would be -■ o cr I

more satisfactory than the making of extreme recommendations which could be regarded as intervention.

Colombia wanted the

Assembly to propose that Spain find its own means of peacefully establishing new social and political conditions so Spain could become a member of the United Nations.

Colombia questioned the

value of severing relations, for the absence of ministers placed political negotiations in the hands of the charge d faffairs. Colombia also believed that the ,fkey to peace is in the na­ tions* ability to live together in harmony even when their cri­ teria differ,*1 and free expression of disagreements was needed until a solution could be found.^ Colombia considered the vote and veto were not ,guarantees of peace.

The stronger nations were fewer in number and were

forced to yield to the weaker ones.

Both hindered settlements.

India had Colombia*s support in the South African problem because Colombia*s Constitution gave equality to all before the law.

Colombia at first desired a decision of the International

Court on these points; 1 Whether the Members of the United Nations were obli­ gated to modify at once their internal•legislation ^ E. De Holte Castello, "Colombia, in the United Nations,*1 Annals of the American Academy. CCLII (July, 1947), p. 67. 2 Ibid.

119 where the latter establishes racial discrimination incompatible with the text of* the Charter* 2 Whether they could enact in the future laws estab­ lishing discrimination* 3 Whether such laws constitute matters which come within the international jurisdiction of the States regarding which the Assembly may.not make recommen­ dations to the States concerned.1 Later Colombia decided not to consult the Court and desired South Africa to abide by the Assembly's agreement and change its dis­ criminatory laws.

Colombia pointed out that the use of funda­

mental freedoms could not be achieved peacefully unless various factions agree to international conciliation to restore peace* Due to the Pan-American agreement, Colombia felt it would be drawn into a third world war, and because of this Colombia wanted its armament increased.

Colombia believed that if the

big countries would reduce theirs then Colombia's would be ade­ quate.

In studying armaments a country had to think about re­

lated problems.

Colombia proposed a subcommittee to draw up a

plan for the Commission of Conventional Armaments to submit to the Security Council.

Colombia did not wish to evade responsi­

bilities but considered the great powers were directly concerned in this matter. Through it all the Latin Americans tried to work out a bas­ ically sound and realistic policy, but one that would not be too much in conflict with the United States.

For underneath it all

the fear of this giant to the north still prevailed.

All in

all Latin America has played an active part in the United Na^ E. de Holte Castello, "Colombia in the United Nations," Annals of the American Academy. CCLII (July, 1947), p. 69.

tions, "but its future lies ahead in this great Organization in which it is to he expected its participation will grow as it develops more confidence and better leadership*

Chapter VI LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED NATIONS No organization could ever succeed without the hard and re lent less work done by the men in it.

Many Latin Americans have

become well-known through the Uhited Nations.

As time goes on

probably many more will step into the spotlight and add their names to the already long list of* notables. Pedro Leao Velloso of* Brazil was one of* the early leaders in the United Nations. long and notable.

His career in government service was

Velloso began his career in 1907 after being

graduated from law school.

He entered the ministry of foreign

affairs as assistant to the Brazilian-Peruvian Court of Arbitra tion.

Later he served at Brazil’s legations in Rome, Paris,

Berne, and Copenhagen.

Velloso also held the post of resident

minister to China and for four years was ambassador to Japan.-** At home Velloso had held various offices.

He was Secre­

tary-General of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Ex­ ternal Affairs; this last he relinquished for a post in the United Nations.

For over twenty-five years he had written ar­

ticles for Rio’s Correio de Manha.

He also established the

first school to train men for foreign service, called the In­ stitute Rio Branco.

Because Velloso had no affiliation with

any party or faction in Brazil, the people rated him more as a conservative than a liberal. ^Current Biography, (New York, 1946), p. 336. ^ Velloso, head of the cabinet during Vargas* fall, reques ted a transfer to Peking. Because of this move on Velloso’s part his colleagues declared he always remained outside of par­ tisan politics.

122 Passive, self-contained, deliberate Velloso was ftno man of action11 in the popular sense. ^

He lacked all qualifications for

the aggressive, blunt-spoken approach, for he acted with painstaking caution and reserve.^

His longest single speech in the

United Nations contained twenty-five words; he gave it before ’ the Security Council 5n support of Byrnes* resolution of April, 1946, during the Russian-Iranian dispute. "Some people live to talk.

Velloso once said,

I talk to live."3

Velloso was the chairman of the Brazilian delegates to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace.

At this

conference he made a bald assertion that the prime purpose of this conference was to line up a solid bloc of votes for the forth coming United Nations conference in San Francisco."^

Later

he made this declarations At the Mexico City Conference...what we had in view was to equip them" / our countries_7 better to fulfill the mission...in the organization of peace and in the re-establishment of the disrupted balance of the world ...desiring to give our frank and loyal co-operation ...we shall soon attend the San Francisco Conference. At the San Francisco Conference Velloso also headed the Brazilian delegation.^

(Octo

He was an active member of the co-ordin-

1 Thayer Waldo* "Sneaking of Brazil." Inter-American.V ------------->46), p. 17.

x'xcixjrC Gervasi, "United Neighbors," Colliers. CXVIII (July 20, 1946), p. 60. 4 Current Biography, (New York, 1946), p. 336. 6 Ibid 6 Because of his magnificent baldness a humorous incident occurred during this conference. A press photographer had lined up twenty-three Brazilian delegates on the Veterans Memorial Opera House stage to take a picture. Powerful floodlights were switched on, and the cameraman tried to-focus his camera from many angles. Soon he approached an attractive senhora and asked

123 ation committee and was particularly concerned with the regional problem.

He believed heartily in world organization but was

loath to see his country give up Pan-American unity.

Velloso

also helped in the drafting of* the memorandum concerning the ad­ mission of Argentina to the United Nations despite its fascist government and its negligent slowness in fulfilling the prere­ quisites for membership.

Privately he expressed regret that Ar­

gentina was permitted membership.2 Velloso was also a leading opponent of the veto.

When his

side lost he said, MWe are not disappointed, because we did not expect too much.

The important thing is to have a charter and

to keep unity among the Big Three (leVs be polite and call them the Big Five)."2 Twice in the 1945 meetings Velloso1s frankness was-the main factor in resolving international crises.

The first occasion

was at the Mexico Conference in March, 1945.

A resolution was

passed calling upon Argentina to put its house in order politi­ cally, as a prerequisite to re-entering the hemisphere bloc on an equal footing.

This action was widely approved, but the pre­

cise issue was in doubt.

Not long after the delegates returned

her for a powder puff. Surprised and puzzled the lady produced the desired article. The photographer turned to a gnome-like man with a glistening bald pate standing next to her and said, "I’m sorry, Mr. Minister but you111 have to let me powder your head a little; I just canft see a thing up there with that g l a r e . V e l l o s o complied, to his wifeTs amusement. 1 Thayer Waldo, "Speaking for Brazil,11 Inter-American. V (October, 1946), p. 17. 2 Frank Gervasi, "United Neighbors," Colliers. CXVIII (July 20, 1946), p. 60. 3 Current Biography. (New York, 1946), p. 337.

124 "home, discontent became apparent in several Latin American countries.

Velloso sensed this uncertainty, diagnosed it, and

reported the following to Edward Stettinius and Nelson A. Rocke­ feller: "We have fallen short.

The conditions which the Argen­

tine government must fulfill are not clearly defined. should be, and at once.

They

Let the terms be as hard and inflexible

as you like, but let us be specific about them.f*^

This resulted

in a conference of United States State Department officials, Latin American ambassadors, and Velloso, who presided.

From

this meeting came the now-famous memorandum stating the steps Argentina should take, and also listing the advantages it would secure in return.

Argentina did not meet all these conditions.

o

While Velloso received less public notice than any other Latin American, he played the part of a skillful moderator in private meetings at the San Francisco Conference.

In the fol­

lowing incident he "displayed...what close observers termed ’general ship* of a high order. The setting was an off-the-record meeting of seven men in Stettinius1 penthouse.

Present were Molotov, Eden, Soong, Pa­

dilla, Joaquin Fernandez, Velloso, and Stettinius.

The object

of this meeting was to solve a situation that had arisen in the Steering Committee.

It concerned the admission of new mem­

bers to the United Nations. jecting the Polish issue.

Molotov froze the meeting by in­ Molotov said Russia would support

^"Thayer Waldo, "Speaking for Brazil," In ter-American. V (October, 1946), p. 18. 2 IMd. 3 Ibid.. p. 19.

125 the Argentine bid for admission if* the United States and Latin America would agree to invite the Lublin Poles*

This was re­

jected coldly and unanimously and still Molotov persisted. Velloso then spoke.

He pointed out that the Argentine case

paralleled in some respects that of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. He continued that as Russia did not take in the "needs and as^ pirations of the Western Hemisphere...the Latin American repub­ lics would no longer consider themselves bound by their previous pledge to support the admission of those two Soviet States. Molotov was so surprised that he speedily suggested that the question be -referred to the Executive Committee. Velloso became the head Brazilian delegate at the United Nations.

He served in the General Assembly, in the Security

Council, on the Administration and Budgetary Committee, and on the Atomic Energy Commission*

He opposed the United Nations

break with Spain, but had to withdraw his objections when his government told him to do so. At the second part of the first session of the General As­ sembly Velloso made an interesting opening speech.

He declared

that the United Nations was in the process of organizing, and that it was premature to attempt to judge the part played by the United Nations up to then.

He had faith in it.

He stated

that the United Nations was based on far reaching principles. Unanimity among the great powers was an essential. nations had paid a heavy price for the Charter.

The small

Brazil accep­

Thayer Waldo, "Speaking for Brazil,11 Inter-American * V (October, 1946), p. 18.

126 ted it in a constructive spirit in order to get results.

He be­

lieved that the people of the world wanted peace and would not stand for the conflicts every generation— more horrible than the one before.3Possible further activity in United Nations affairs by Velloso was terminated suddenly by death on January 16, 1947. At the next meeting of the Security Council, where Velloso had served, President Makin of Australia informed the Council of Velloso!s death. that day.

Makin suggested that the Council adjourn for

All rose and stood for a moment of silence as a mark

of respect. Velloso had been one of the architects of the United Nations, for he had been a great worker at the Chapultepec Conference and the San Francisco Conference.

He brought-life and experience in

international affairs, close knowledge of problems surrounding the work of the United Nations, and an awareness of the difficul­ ties toward solving them.

He worked with full understanding and

great effectiveness for the Pan-American cause and with a broad, universal outlook strove to link up regional groups more closely to the United Nations.^

He had unshakable faith in the great

destiny of the United Nations and he believed that it could not fail to keep the peace. Dr. Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil took Pedro Leao Velloso*s ~ "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Part of the First Session,** United Nations Official Becords. (October 24. 1946). p. 716. ‘ 2 **Security Council,-Second Year,** United Nations Official Records, (January 17, 1947), p. 107.

127 place as permanent delegate to the United Nations.

Aranha was

in Cleveland attending a forum on international relations when President Dutra wired, asking Aranha to accept the vacant posi­ tion,

When Aranha accepted the post he stated that, "Peace is

not only necessary but possible.11^ Dr, Oswaldo Aranha, a tall, handsome man, was the son of a rich rancher.

He had attended military school in Kio de Janeiro

for three years but after that he had studied to be a lawyer. During the 1920fs he took part in five revolutions.

Aranha,

shot twice and nicked many time by machine gun bullets, spent so much time in bed recuperating from wounds that he remarked, f,My career was made in bed."^

At such times he studied, planned,

and came to important conclusions. His political career was long and distinguished.

He had

been a prefect of Alegrete, a state legislator, a federal de­ puty, and Secretary of State of Rio Grande do Sul.

Aranha was

a member of a political group called the Liberal Alliance, headed by Vargas.

o

He also held the positions of Minister of

Justice and Finance Minister.

It was as Minister of Finance

that he started the not-too-successful policy of dumping and 1 Hernane Tavares De Sa, "Aranha of Brazil,11 United Nations World. I (November, 1947), p. 28. o Current Biography. (New York, 1942), p. 25. 3 During the Second World War he became an active exponent of Pan-American unity and also a pro-democrat. In 1940 he al­ most resigned as Foreign Minister when Vargas in a speech seemed to welcome totalitarianism in Europe "as a .just triumph of the 1virile peoples1."4 He quickly explained that Vargas misunder­ stood. Then through Aranha!s efforts to unite the hemisphere, the United States became confident of Brazilian desire to co­ operate. 4 Current,Biography. (New York, 1942), p. 26.

128 burning coffee. When Aranha became ambassador to the United States he knew only two English words: Washington and wonderful* he made a passable.' speech over the radio.

In a month

In a year he was

negotiating reciprocal trade treaties with the United States. Aranha became the most popular diplomat in Washington due to his lavish parties, his friendship for Roosevelt, his warm personality, and apparent admiration for American institutions. He never lost the occasion to point out the fact that Brazil and the United States had never had a quarrel.

Hubert Herring

called him "the 'American front* of the Vargas regime."**-

At a

party in Washington his hostess had asked too many questions . about Brazil's economics, to which Aranha answered, "Brazil pro­ duces only orchids and diamonds for ladies as lovely as you."^ In 1938 Vargas recalled Aranha to Brazil because Aranha had become too popular.

Aranha, now Foreign Minister, wa,s very

decisive in keeping Vargas from leaning toward the Axis.

In a

visit to the United States he had advised the spending of money and the subsidizing of trade in Latin America.

He had also ob­

tained a loan of $120,000,000 from the United States.^

At a

Foreign Ministers' meeting in 1942 at Rio he persuaded Latin America to rally around the United States. ""

However, in 1944,

1 Current Biography. (New York, 1942), p. 25. 2 Hernane Tavares De Sa, "Aranha of Brazil," United Nations World,. I (November, 1947), p. 30., Supra p. 127. \ Current Biography. (New York, 1942), p. 26. 5 When Brazil was hedging on the subject of naval bases for the^United States, Aranha made a tour of several neighboring capitals, speaking against the Axis. In 1941 he proclaimed that all but in actual fact Brazil was at war.

129 because of* internal politics in Brazil, Vargas decided to scrap the pro-democrats from his cabinet and Aranhafs resignation was forced. When Aranha took over his duties in the United Nations, he found that the following month he had to execute the duties of the rotating chairmanship of the Security Council.

He presided

at the stormy sessions with genial firmness and then dashed home to study many documents and the United Nations Charter for back­ ground. nia.

His chairmanship ended with a severe attack of pneumo­

But he had made such an impression that when the special

session convened in April, 1947, he was elected chairman of the General Assembly* Oswaldo Aranha emerged as the f,man of 1947.

He possessed

the rare gift "for superlatively conducting an international g a t h e r i n g . T h e delegates re-elected him on September 16, 1947, to the chairmanship of the United Nations General Assembly. This re-election showed recognition of his talents by an over­ ruling of delegates’ natural reluctance to allow one country a monopoly in a high office. Aranha told the New York Herald-Tribune that his government did not think that Brazil should have that honor twice. supported Herbert Evatt. Latin American republics.

Brazil

But Brazil reckoned without the other These countries, in a secret session,

agreed to vote as a bloc.for Aranha whether he wanted it or not. Aranha was sincere in his desire not to run, but he would ^ Hernane Tavares Be Sa, "Aranha of Brazil," United Nations World, I (November, 1947), p. 28. ” Ibid.

130 have been less than human if he had not been completely delighted at the result.

Even the nations that voted against him conceded

that he was the best choice.

The United States had supported

Evatt but was secretly delighted at the outcome.

Gromyko said,

"He is anti-Russian, but he is also objective and impartial when p r e s i d i n g . T o the delegates Aranha appeared like a benign silver-haired patriarch presiding over a family gathering. It was a gruelling job to preside.

o

The chairman was faced

with a babble of languages: English, French, Spanish, Russian or Chinese for debate. Chinese and Russian.

Aranha had to use the translators only for The really exhausting feature was "the un­

ending procession of the most deverse mental backgrounds, dialec­ tical methods and legal traditions."^

He never let debates drag,

but at times he showed flexibility in interpreting the rules.

5

Since he knew that it cost the taxpayer one hundred thousand dollars a day, he kept the debates moving by cutting the exuber­ ance of the speakers and was able to cut the length of the 6 sessions•J 1 Hernane Tavares De Sa, "Aranha of Brazil," United Nations W orld. I (November,- 1947'), p. 28. 2 For example on September 23, 1947, a role call was deman­ ded to see if the Greek, Korean, and Italian peace treaties were to be a part of the agenda. Aranha explained patiently that those who wanted the item included would vote yes, and those who didn’t, would vote no, while those who didn’t want to vote would abstain. Then he added, "Is that plain to all of you school children?"^ 3 Hernane Tavares De Sa, "Aranha of Brazil," United Nations World, I (November, 1947), p. 28. | Ibid. 5 He let Ethiopia, when talking on the question of the Ital*an treaty9 to narrate movingly the rape it suffered under Italy. Hernane Tavares De Sa, "Aranha of Brazil," United Nations World, I (November, 1947), n. 29.

131 Aranha appeared dignified and unapproachable when presiding but otherwise he seemed friendly and convincing*

Where he was

serious and terse in public m.eetings he would become chatty and genial with friends.

His mannerism of vagueness was just a pose,

for he was constantly on watch, missed nothing, took in the most casual remark, and was sensitive to any change in mood.

His

modesty and informality made him beloved by the humblest.

This

did not mean that he had the common touch, but rather that he was interested in people regardless of their place in life. On April 12, 1949, Dr. Jose Arce of Argentina began his fight in the General Assembly, which ended in complete failure, 1 for the disposition of the Italian colonies. The day before he had had long but lively conferences with his Latin American colleagues to obtain their support. At midnight on May 17, thirty-six days later, the General Assembly had come to the final vote on the question of the Ital­ ian colonies and Arce was still fighting.

Everything went well

until action was taken on subsection (c) paragraph one, of this draft, which recommended that the trusteeship of Tripolitania be awarded to Italy.

At first it appeared that Italy would get

Tripolitania, but the final count v/as 33 to 17, with 8 absten­ tions.^

Ilie section was not carried for the lack of one vote

1 Dr. Jose Arce, unlike the other diplomats, was also a doctor and medical educator. He did all kinds of surgery from removal of appendices to brain tumors. He became especially well-known in chest surgery. His career took him to foreign countries where he attended almost every medical congress. From 1945-6, he was ambassador to China. 2 v. x. Madison, ,fInside the United nations," United na­ tions World. Ill (June, 1949), p. 61.

132 to make it a two-thirds majority. Suddenly the hall broke forth in boisterous impatience as speakers desired to talk.

Dr. Arce spoke in anger, saying,

"that if a single point in the compromise resolution falls, the whole agreement falls with it."'*' Long after midnight a vote on the whole was taken. chorus of nays followed ArceTs lead.

ITow a

This left the disposition

of the Italian colonies dangling in mid air.

Italy’s clumsy

handling, and Latin America’s high pressure tactics, under Arce’s guidance, and the attempt to force down delegates’ throats a compromise reached behind closed doors, doomed the resolution from the beginning*

o

In September, 3.946, Arce became Argentina fs permanent re­ presentative to the United Nations and chairman of the delega­ tion.

In 1948 he was elected chairman of the special General

Assembly.

In a speech before the General Assembly Arce stressed

arbitration as the means through which Argentina preferred to settle differences.

He thought the United Nations should use

this method more often for he personally thouglit that "those arbitration verdicts were just, because we believe in the jus­ tice of arbitration even when the verdict is against us,"^ r V. X. Madison, "Inside the United Nations," United Na­ tions World* III (June, 1949), p* 62* 2 in a speech in October, 1946, in the General Assembly Arce stated that he was no friend of unanimity, for it disguised improper and undesirable pressure. He also remarked that, "Politics are determined by circumstances."3 3 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Part of the First Session," United Nations Official Records (October 25. 1946). p. 723. 4 Ibid*, p. 726.

133 Arce took stands on many of the Important issues.

There

was much discussion in the Security Council over the admission of Pakistan.

Arce declared that Pakistan should automatically

become a member at the partition of India.

It would set a bad

example, if the Council could decide, which partitioned half of a nation would become a member of the United Nations.

On the

Palestine investigation committee he believed that the Big Five should be represented as they had more responsibility in this problem.

He led seven Latin American nations in demanding a

revision of the Italian Peace Treaty.

In the Spanish question

he believed Spain should solve her own problem. In Arce's opening speech in the second session of the As­ sembly he stressed the general problem of keeping peace.

He

believed that if minds were at peace and men freed of physical feah they might find a means to assure peace.

He insisted that

only through the solidarity of nations toward achieving peace could civilization exist and develop; and that all aggression whether territorial, political, or economical should be con­ demned so that the respect for the right of self-determination could be established. Arce also brought up the veto question and pointed out its

faults: 1 2 3 4

Some states enjoyed dual privileges. The veto was contrary to the principle of the Charter. Discrimination was glaring. The veto was used improperly.1

1 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session/1 United Nations Official Records. (September 16-November 29. 1947), p. 114.

134 To solve this misuse he thought a counter veto should have been placed in the hands of the nations lacking a veto power.

The

veto would defend the legitimate national interests of the Great Powers and the counter veto would defend the interests of man­ kind and peace.^ To break a veto deadlock, Arce wanted a resolution to be considered passed if it gained three-fourths of the votes re­ gardless of who voted for it.

But if a resolution obtained only

a two-thirds vote and a big power voted against it this power would have the right to object to this resolution.

The resolu­

tion would then remain pending until a permanent committee of the Assembly had ratified or rejected it.

This had to be done

within three days without debate after hearing two statements for and two against it. Guillermo Belt of Cuba has been very active in the United Nations.^

He was appointed the permanent delegate for Cuba and

also placed in charge of the Cuban delegation.

Besides serving

in the General Assembly he served on these committees: the Poli­ tical and Security, the Trusteeship (chairman), and the Economic and Financial Committees.

He was elected seventh vice-chairman

of the 1947 regular Assembly. Belt had served in many capacities for Cuba.

He was Secre­

tary of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, Secretary of the Coun~ ^ HGeneral Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session,11 United Nations Official Records. (September 16-November 29. 1947). p. 118. " Current Biography, (new York, 1947), p. 42. Informed sources state that Belt largely determines the foreign policy of his country*

135 cil of State, mayor of Havana, ambassador to the United States, minister to Russia and on the Governing Board of the Pan-Ameri­ can Union. Belt represented his country at many conferences.

At the

Inter-American Defense Conference at Rio he fought unsuccess­ fully for the insertion of the word economic in the anti-aggres­ sion clause of the treaty being drafted.

The result would have

been that laws (made by one American Republic and affecting any other) to restrict freedom of trade would be considered anact of a g g r e s s i o n . A s chairman of the Cuban delegation to the San Francisco Conference he worked on the Steering Committee.

He

headed his delegation at the Preparatory Committee in London and was chairman of the Trusteeship Committee.

He served on the

Economic and Social Council and at the Emergency Food Conference. Belt, too, had opposed the veto. when it was drafted.

He had been against it

He had declared that it was undemocratic

and unfair to the small nations.

Belt had made speeches against

it and has since introduced amendments in the Assembly to elimi­ nate the veto from the Charter, During the San Francisco Conference he had advocated a strong American bloc within the United Nations.

In May, 1945,

he submitted a proposal that would prevent the Security Council from interferring in disputes between the American nations pro­ vided that the disputes did not threaten world peace.

Belt de­

clared that, f,We feel that if the major powers retain for them-E Current Biography. (New York, 1947), p. 43.

136 selves the right to deal, militartly with enemy states in this war, which are located in the European sphere, then we have the right to settle our own problems in the inter-American system. Belt supported the admission of Argentina to the United Nations. In November, 1946, he presented to the United Nations a pro­ posal called Operation Hemisphere.

This would have placed the

problem of Franco Spain in Latin America’s care.

It called for

an appeal by the Latin American people to the Spanish people to overthrow Franco.

If this was not done Latin America would then

threaten diplomatic sanctions.

But when the United Nations

passed a similar resolution requesting all members to break di^ plomatic, sanctions, Belt said Cuba felt that such an action would be interference in another country and contrary to the Charter so they kept diplomatic relations with Spain. In Belt’s speech before the General Assembly, October 29, 1946, he stated three objectives to work for if the Charter should ever be revised.

One was a modification of the voting

system in the Sedurity Council by plain elimination of the veto. The other would give the International Court of Justice compul­ sory jurisdiction over disputes and do away with the acceptance of verdicts by certain states in a conditional way.

The revi­

sion of the article referring to the admission of new members to the United Nations would be the third objective.

This should

also include specific conditions for membership and others for continued membership.

He desired the removal of the ambiguous

1 Current Biography. (New York, 1947), p. 43.

137 and rediculous term peace-loving states.^Luls Padillo Nervo, the nephew of the poet Amado Nervo, at first had desired to be a poet but he had found it too diffi­ cult, to compete with his uncle.^ statesman.

He decided then to become a

He had served Mexico in Europe and in the Americas

as envoy and minister.

He had represented Mexico at’the Inter­

national Labor Conference at Geneva, at the General Assembly of the League of Nations, at the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, at the Chapultepec Conference, at the San Fran­ cisco Conference, at the Preparatory Commission, and at the Uni­ ted Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Nervo accompanied Castello Najera to the United Nations as his deputy, and served on the Security Council under Najera. When Najera was recalled to Mexico Nervo took his place as per­ manent delegate.

He worked on the Permanent Headquarters, the

Humanitarian and Cultural, the Political and Security, and the Trusteeship Committees. Short, stocky Luis Padilla Nervo was fully aware of the public pessimism over the United Nations* ability to keep peace.^ He became critical of the Big Five*s tendency to place their own personal interests above that of the world family of nations. He pointed out that it was hard to put national interests aside i "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Part of the First Session," United Nations Official Records. (October 29, 1946). p. 830. ^ He wrote "modern stuff with a philosophical flavor."3 3 Frank Gervasi, "United Neighbors," Colliers. CXVIII (September 7, 1946), p. 58. ^ Nervo picked his English slowly but without the inhibi­ tions of the professional diplomat.

138 for international ones.

For this international co-operation

would require much time and tenacity.

Nervo was confident that

Russia would not leave the United Nations.

The Security Council

continued to have problems, but Nervo felt that the more it solved the better chance there was for a warless world. Nervo was outspoken and lucid on the veto subject.

He re-

marked that the veto was to be used "to avoid the voting of any grave measure by a majority against a big power on a matter in which the big power was party to a dispute."'*' When Nervo served on the Atomic Energy Commission, he made a suggestion ,fthat the scientific and technical committee of the commission be charged with examining the technical feasibility of atomic control and with outlining the manner in which interp national control might be effected.” This was accepted. In October, 1946, he presented an atomic energy control plan which he hoped would settle the problem of inspection.

Nervo

proposed "that all key nuclear plants be placed in a closely guarded international zone, and that unsupervised individual na­ tions be permitted to use ’denatured fuel’ in plants for peace­ ful purposes."3

The plan was dropped when it was found to be

sci ent ific a1ly impos sible• Francisco Castello Najera,' ‘an army doctor in Mexico, had been a brigadier general when he had begun his diplomatic ca­ reer as minister to China.

He had held many posts in Europe

1 Frank Gervasi, "United Neighbors," Colliers. CXVIII (September 7, 1946), p. 58, | Current Biography, (New York, 1946), d . 450. 3 Ibid.

139 and had attended medical conferences and the League of Nations where he had once been president of the League's General Assem­ bly.

In the United States, as Mexico's Ambassador, he had

played his biggest role in the diplomacy connected with oil expropriations• Najera attended the Chapultepec and San Francisco Confer­ ences.

At San Francisco he fought for "the creation of a Gen­

eral Assembly with wider powers and a Security Council without permanent seats

He feared that the right to veto might re­

tard the use of the United Nations' principles, undermine una­ nimity, paralyze the best intentions of the organizations, and destroy the main hope of arriving at a permanent peace by jus­ tice.

He attacked the large powers on the veto problem in the

General Assembly.

He argued that the veto caused the big pow-

ers not to feel compulsion toward compromise.

Thus unanimity

was impo s sible. Najera feared that political considerations and not justice prevailed in the United Nations.

He noticed that the relations

of the nations fell far short of the ideals of living together in peace; meetings with ideas to carry on the principles of the Charter were not enough.

He mentioned two reasons for the un­

successful working of the United Nations • One was the difficul­ ty in consolidating the peace while the other was the system of voting.^

He wanted the United Nations strengthened.

It could

1 Current Biography, (New York. 1946). p. 102. s

ibid:

-----

2 A resolution passed by the General Assembly asked the Security Council to use the veto with discretion. The violent criticism of the veto did not match the timorous resolution.

140 be done by not letting it fall into discredit and by not just letting it register events. When Jaime Torres Bodet of Mexico, chosen as the new di­ rector of the UNESCO, made his speech of acceptance he poured a great deal of cold water on some of UNESCOfs illusions. the delegates that, it faced many obstacles.

He told

One was that there

were too many unworkable and academic schemes on the docket.

He

continued saying that masses wanted tangible and immediate under* takings and not promises. Torres Bodet!s election to the UNESCO was a surprise, for Mexico had not nominated him.

The committee had had a difficult

time getting a successor to Julian Huxley. ceived thirty of thirty-three votes.^

Torres Bodet had re­

When he took office he

told the delegates he favored less talk and more action.^ The direct, practical approach of an unexcitable Latin re­ placed the idealistic dreams of Huxley, a Briton.^

As he went

through the maze of global projects left behind by Huxley, Torres Bodet found some that would work.

These were put into

operation as quickly as possible. As Secretary of Foreign Affairs Torres Bodet had shown exceptional ability in ironing out conflicts between men of different races, nationalities, and outlooks as well as those arising between delegations of literal minded professors and J ""Monsieur le Director," Americas. I (March, 1949), p. 12 Xbid. "He is not like most Latins. Now, to him does not mean manana." 3 Ibid.

141 tempemental Intellectuals.

His developed technique consisted

of taking his nohle concepts to the firing line and then giving fair battle.

If necessary he would retreat until he felt he

couldn*t go any further.

If need be he would hold the fort sin-

gle handed waving his defeated colors as though victorious. In an opening speech in the General Assembly during the second session Torres Bodet told the delegates that ideals were being torn to bits by selfish people*s interest, and that har­ mony and progress was being paralyzed.

He foretold the follow­

ing consequences if peace remained hidden: 1 nations would seek incomplete, false solutions of their problems. 2 The United Nations would lose prestige. 3 Certain joint actions would be drawn up outside the United Nations which might be objectionable but would be the best under the circumstances. 4 If the United Nations should run against the vuorld struggle for survival, it would be broken down by world needs.^ According to Torres Bodet the reason for these difficulties and basic problems in the world today was man, for he has be­ come torn between the opposing forces of juridical and cul­ tural internationalism and political and economic nationalism.^ We insisted that the United Nations must consolidate its ef­ forts toward peace or all would be for nothing, and in for­ feiting the peace it would forfeit the victory.

The United

Nations could save itself only if it should decide to be the true expression of all the men of the earth.4 1 2 United 1947). 2 4

"Monsieur le Director," Americas. I (March, 1949), p. 44. "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session," Nations Official Records. (September 16-November 29 p. 14. Ibid.. p. 17. -Ibid., p. 19.

142 Jose Gustavo Guerrero of El Salvador, regarded by admirers as "the most prominent Latin American in world affairs,11 had been 1 president of the International Court of Justice. He also had held diplomatic and ministerial positions.

He had attended

meetings of the Council and the Assembly of the.League of Na­ tions and had been its president during the tenth session.

As

a member of the committee for codifying international law he be­ lieved that the basis for the coding of international law should be decisions of the International Tribunal and the World Court, not international treaties.

Guerrero represented El Salvador at

the United Nations meeting in London. Again in 1946, Guerrero was elected as the Court’s president. He would like to see the Court’s jurisdiction extended to the whole world; this would add strength to the Court and the United Nations.

Guerrero wished that nations could appeal directly to

the Court instead of having to go through eight United Nations’ bodies first. In a speech before the General Assembly in January, 1946, Guerrero stated that there was one question that needed an ans­ wer and on this answer depended the success or failure of the United Nations.

This was the question: ’’Will the men of tomor-

row be able to escape relapsing into former errors?”

Guerrero

explained it could be done if the men would carry on their work in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust and learn to ?• Current"Biography. (New York, 1947), p. 267. ^ ’’General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, First Part of the First Session.” United Nations Official Records. (January 16. 1946), p. 138.

143 put the common good "before selfish aims.-*These men have all become outstanding in the international field and have added many laurels to their names through their work in the United Nations.

Of course, they are not the only

men of note from Latin America serving in the United Nations. Many others have worked hard but have not as yet obtained full recognition, while the accomplishments of others have been mediocre and always will be. "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, First Part of the First Session,11 United Nations Official Records. (January 16, 1946), p. 138.

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146 w Davila, C., "Peace on the Anvil," Inter-American. IV (July, 1945). Dean, V. M., "Nations at Work," Nation. CLXIII (December 14, 1946). Dean, V. M., "San Francisco Conference," Foreign Policy Report, XXI (July 15, 1945). "Empty Chair," Inter-American. IV (March, 1945). " Enriquez, L., "A Latin Looks at Chapultepec," Inter-American. IV (April, 1945). Evatt, Herbert V., "Small Nations and the Charter," Rotarian. LXVII (September, 1945). "Family Reunion of America*s, Mexico City," Scholastic. XL (March 19, 1945). "Feeding a Hungry World," -Scholastic XLII (May 10, 1943). "Further Decisions of the Fifth Session." United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. Ill (August 19, 1947). "General Assembly of the United Nations," International Conciliation. CDXX (April, 1946). ^ Gervasi, Frank, "United Neighbors," Colliers. CXVIII (July 20, 1946); (September 7, 1946). ^

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^

"Latin America at Bretton Woods," Inter-American. Ill (September, 1944).

147 11Latin America Has a Heart,** Christian Science Monitor Magazine* (November 2, 1946). f,Latin America Plans Economic Progress,1* United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. V (July 15, 1948). "Latin America Reviews Her Economic Needs,1* United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. V (July 1, 1948). "Latinos in London," Inter-American. V (April, 1946) Madison, V. X., "Inside the United Nations," United Nations World, III (June, 1949). "Main Achievements," Atlantic. CLXXV (April, 1945). "Mexico Conference," Nation. CLX (February 24, 1945). "Monsieur le Directeur," Americas. I (March, 1949). "New Monroe Doctrine," Scholastic. XLVI (March 26, 1945). "New World, New Colossus," Time. XLV (March 12, 1945). "Panama*s Resolution on Spain." Nation. CLXII (February 16, 1946). -----"Personalities," United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. I (Au­ gust 12, 1946); (September 9, 1946); (September 23, 1946); (October 7, 1946): (October 28, 1946); (November 4, 1946); (December 3, 1946); (December 17, 1946); III (September 23, 1947). "Philadelphia Charter.". Christian Century. LXI (May 24. 1944). Plazo, Galo, "Latin America's Contribution to the United Na­ tions Organization," International ConeiIllation. CDXIX (March, 1946). "Positive Action Recommended Against Franco Spain," United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. I (December 17, 1946). "Recommendation on Franco Spain," United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin, I (December 23, 1946). Reid, H. D., "Regionalism under the United Nations Charter," Interna11.ona 1 Conciliation. CDXIX (March, 1946). "Relations with Spain," United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. I (December 10, 1946).

148 '-Rowe, L. S., "Regional Arrangements and the United Nations," Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, LXXIX (August, 1945), "South African Defeat Encourages Minorities," United Nations World, I (February, 1947). "Spain and the United Nations," Nation, CLXII (June 15, 1946). "Spain: United Nations* Big Problem," New Republic, CXV (December 9, 1946), "Spanish Issue," Nation, CLXIII (November 30, 1946), Tavores de Sa, Hernane, "Aranha of Brazil, United Nations World, I (November, 1947). "Third Bloc," New Republic, CXV (November 18, 1946). "United Nations* Conference on Food and Agriculture,*’ Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, LXXVII (August, 1943). "United Nations Subcommittee Report on Spain," Current History, XI (July, 1946). "Victory on Spanish Issue," Nation, CLXIII (December 21, 1946). "Views on Spain," United Nations (Weekly) Bulletin. V (October 15, 1948). Waldo, Thayer, "Speaking of Brazil, ” Inter^American.- V (Octo­ ber, 1946)• ^ Whitaker, A. P., "Latin America Post War Organization," Annals of the American Academy. CCXL (July, 1945). Miscellaneous Arne, Sigrid, United Nations Primer. New York: 1948. Thomas, Mrs. Harrison, We the People, New York: American Association for the United Nations, October, 1945. "Economic Commission for Latin America," Department of Public Information. New York: 1948. Current Biography. New York: 1943, 1946, 1947. The International Who *s Who. London: 1948.

149 Who1s Who in Latin America, Stanford University: 1940. Year Book of the United Nations, New York: 1947. New York Times, January 9, 1945-May 19, 1949.

• 150 Appendix A Report of* the General Committee to the Assembly on Spain. The General Committee, at its meeting held on 8 February 1946, considered the application by the delegation of Panama for the inclusion of the following draft resolution on the agenda of the General Assembly. 111 The General Assembly recalls that the San Francisco Con­ ference adopted a resolution according to which paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter cannot ap­ ply to the States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the Uni­ ted Nations so long as these regimes are in power! f,2 The General Assembly recalls that at the Potsdam Confer­ ence the Government of the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that they would not support a request for admission of the Uni­ ted Nations of the present Spanish government which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, in view of its ori­ gins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify its admission! n3 The General Assembly, in endorsing these two statements recommends that the Members of the United Nations should take into account the letter and spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations vn.th Spain.tfl 1 "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, First Part of the First Session,11 United Nations Official Records. (January 10February 14, 1946), up. 584-5.

151 Appendix B A resolution put forward by Poland in the Security Coun­ cil# The Security Council declares that the existence and ac­ tivities of* the Franco regime in Spain have led to internation­ al friction and endangered international peace and security. In accordance with the authority vested in it, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, the Security Council calls upon all Members of the United Nations who maintain diplo­ matic relations with the Franco Government to sever such rela­ tions immediately# The Security Council expresses its deep sympathy to the Spanish people.

It hopes and expects that the people of Spain

will regain the freedom of which they have been deprived with the aid and contrivance of fascist Italy and nazi Germany. The Security Council is convinced that the day will come soon when it will be able- to welcome the Spanish nation into the community of the United Nations#^ 1 "The United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Security Council; (1946), p# 549.

152 Appendix C Resolution made by Australia, Poland and France* "The attention of the Security Council has been drawn.to the situation in Spain by a member of the United Nations acting in ac­ cordance with Article 35 of the Charter, and the Security Council has been asked to declare that this situation has led to interna­ tional friction and endangers international peace and security. fTherefore, the Security Council, keeping in mind the moral condemnation of the Franco regime by the Security Council (in­ stead of tb y l, finf) the Security Council, in the resolutions concerning Spain which were adopted at the United Nations Confer­ ence on International Organization at San Francisco and at the First General Assembly of the United Nations and the views ex­ pressed by Members of the Security Council regarding the Franco regime, hereby resolves: To make further studies in order to determine whether the situation in Spain has led to international friction and does en­ danger international peace and security, and if it so finds, then to determine what practical measures the United Nations may take. To this end, the Security Council appoints a subcommittee of five of its members and instructs this subcommittee to examine the statements made before the Security Council concerning Spain, to receive further statements and documents (instead of *to call for*, the word *receive1) and to conduct such inquiries as it may deem necessary, and to report to the Security Council as soon as practicable.M (Changes to 'before the end of May1)*-*1 ,fThe United Nations, First Year,” Journal of the Secur­ ity Council* (1946), p. 623.

153 Appendix D Drafting Committee*s Amendment to the Second Polish Resolution. "Whereas the Security Council on 29 April 1946 appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the situation in Spain, "Whereas the investigation of the Sub-Committee has fully confirmed the facts which led to the condemnation of the Franco regime by the Potsdam and San Francisco Conferences, the General Assembly at the first part of its first session and by the Security Council by resolution of the date above mentioned, "And whereas the Sub-Committee was of the opinion that the situation in Spain is one the continuance of which is like­ ly to endanger the maintenance of international peace and se­ curity, "It is hereby resolved that without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly under the Charter the Security Council keeps the situation in Spain under continuous observa­ tion and maintains it upon the list of matters of which it is seized in order that it will be at all times ready to take such measures as may become necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Any member of the Security Council may

bring the matter up for consideration by the Council at any t ime." ^ "The United Nations, First Year," Journal of the Secur­ ity Council, (1946), p. 822.

Appendix E Second Polish resolution as adopted by the Security Council. "Whereas the Security Council on 29 April 1946 appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the situation in Spain, and "Whereas the investigation of the Sub-Committee has fully confirmed the facts which led to the condemnation of the Franco regime by the Potsdam and San Francisco Conferences, by the General Assembly at the first part of its session, and by the Security Council, by resolution of the date above mentioned, "The Security Council decides to keep the situation in Spain under continuous observation and maintain it upon the list of matters of which it is seized, in order that it will be at all times ready to take such measures as may become necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Any member of the

Security Council may bring up the matter for consideration by the Council at any time."** 1 "Security Counci1, First Year," United Nations Official Records. (November 4, 1946), pp. 491-2.

155 Appendix F The United States draft resolution on the Spanish question. The peoples of the United Nations*' at San Francisco, Pots­ dam, and London condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decided that, as long as that regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations. The peoples of the United Nations assure the Spanish peo­ ple of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial welcome await­ ing them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the United Nations. Therefore the General Assembly Convinced that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain, which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis powers and which gave material assistance to the Axis powers in the war, does not represent the Spanish people and by its continued control of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations in international affairs; Recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies set up at the initia­ tive of the United Nations, and from participation in conferences or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain. The General Assembly further. Desiring to secure the participation of all peace-loving peoples, including people of Spain, in the community of nations,

156 Recognizing that it is for the Spanish people to settle the form of their government. Places on Record its profound conviction that in the inter­ ests of Spain and of world co-operation the people of Spain should give proof to the world that they have a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed; and that to achieve that end General Franco should surrender the powers of government to a provisional government broadly representative of the Spanish people, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion, and assembly and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and intimidation and regardless of party, may express their will; and Invited the Spanish people to establish the eligibility of Spain for admission to the United Nations.^ 1 "General Assembly, First Committee, Second Part of the First Session,r* United Nations Official Records. (November 2December 13, 194.6), pp. 354-5, •

157 Appendix G Colombian amendment to the Polish draft resolution on Spain. Whereas the General Assembly, at the first part of its ses­ sion held at London, adopted on 9 February 1946 the following resolution ”1 The General Assembly recalls that the San Francisco Conference adopted a resolution according to which paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter 1cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the Uni­ ted Nations so long as these regimes are In power1. "2 The General Assembly recalls that at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union stated that they would not support a request for admission to the United Nations of the present Spanish Government, which having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, in view of its origins, its na­ ture, its record, and its close association with the aggressor States, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justi­ fy its admission: The General Assembly, in endorsing these statements, recommends that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain.” Whereas a great many of the Members of the United Nations does not maintain diplomatic relations with Spain and various others are prepared to suspend such relations, and

158 Whereas it has been proposed to this General Assembly that it should recommend to all Members of the United Nations which have not yet done so that they should sever their diplomatic and economic relations with tire Franco regime in Spain forthwith; and Whereas it is a fact that the political and social condi­ tions which gave rise to and justify the declarations made at San Francisco, Potsdam, and London are still prevailing in Spain; and Whereas* however, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations lays down that membership in the United Nations is open, not only to original Members of the Organization, but also to all those which accept the obligations contained in the Charter, and in the judgment of the Organizations, are able- and willing to carry out these obligations; and Whereas * in accordance with Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations shall promote universal respect for and ob­ servance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with­ out distinction of race, sex, language, or religion, Therefore the General Assembly resolves: 1 To express its wish that the Government and people of Spain should seek and find the method of bringing into being, by peaceful means, within the shortest possible time and in accordance with the principles and purposes in the Charter of the United Nations, the new social and political conditions necessary to enable Spain to be admitted as a Member of the Organi­ zation; 2 To recommend to the Latin American Republics that

159 they should offer to the Government of Spain their good offices, should the latter think them useful in order to achieve the pur­ poses of this resolution; 3 To defer until the meeting of the next General Assem­ bly the discussion and adoption of the resolution proposed by the delegation of Poland as well as the amendment proposed by the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.11^ ^""“General Assembly, First Committee, Second Part of the First Session,** United Nations Official Records. (November 2December 13, 1946), pp. 355-6.

Appendix H Amendment to the United States draft resolution on the Spanish question, submitted by Mexico, Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, and Chile. "And inasmuch as the United Nations, by the action they took in San Francisco, in Potsdam, in London, and more recently in Lake Success, have in fact, collectively refused to maintain relationships with the Franco regime, does hereby recommend that the Members of the United Nations take, individually, the same attitude they have taken collectively and refuse to maintain dip­ lomatic relations with the present Spanish regime. "The Assembly further recommends that the States Members of the Organization report to the Secretary-General and to the next Assembly what action they have taken in accordance with this rec ommendat ion•”^ ~~ 1 "General Assembly, First Committee, Second Part of the First Session," United Nations Official Records. (November 2December 13, 1946), p. 358.

161 Appendix J The resolution reads as adopted on Spain by the First Committee* "The peoples of* the United Nations, at San Francisco, Pots­ dam, and London, condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decid­ ed that as long as that regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations* "The General Assembly in its resolutions of 9 February 1946, recommended that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the latter and the spirit of the declarations of San Francisco and Potsdam. "The peoples of the United Nations assure the Spanish peo­ ple of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial welcome await­ ing them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the United Nations. "The General Assembly recalls that in May and June 1946, the Security Council conducted an investigation of the possible fur­ ther action to be taken by the United Nations.

The Subcommittee

of the Security Council charged with the investigation found unanimously: a) In origin, nature, structure, and general conduct, the Franco regime is a fascist regime patterned on, and estab­ lished largely as a result of aid received from, Hitlerrs Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist Italy; b) During the long struggle of the United Nations against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco, despite continued Allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy powers.

First,

162 for example, from 1941 to 1945, the Blue Infantry Division, the Spanish -Legion of Volunteers and the Salvador Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia on the eastern front.

Second, in

the summer of 1940, Spain seized Tangiers in breach of interna­ tional statutes, and as a result of Spain maintaining a large army in Spanish Morocco, large numbers of Allied troops were immobilized in Forth Africa; c)

Incontrovertible documentary evidence establishe

that Franco was a guilty party with Hitler and Mussolini, in the conspiracy to wage war against those countries which even­ tually, in the course of the world war, became banded together as the United Nations.

It was part of the conspiracy that

Franco*s full belligerency should be postponed until a time to be mutually agreed upon, *'The General Assembly, convinced that the Franco Fascistgovernment of Spain which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis Powers and which gave material assistence to the Axis Powers in the war, does not represent the Spanish people, and by its continued control of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the people of the United Nations in international affairs: "Recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be barred from membership in international agencies established by, or brought into relationship with, the United Nations, and from participation in conferences and other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain,

163 11The General Assembly further, desiring to secure the par­ ticipation of all peace-loving peoples, including the people of Spain in the community of nations: ’’Recommends that if within a reasonable time there is not established a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and intimidation and regardless of party, may express their will, the Security Council considers that adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation and, ’’Recommends that all Members of the United Nations immedi­ ately recall from Madrid, their ambassadors and ministers plen­ ipotentiary, accredited there. "The Assembly further recommends that the States, Members of the Organization report to the Secretary-General, and to the next Assembly, what action they have taken in accordance with this recommendation. 1 "General Assembly, First Committee, Second Part of the First Session," United Nations Official Records. (November 2December 13, 1946), pp. 304-6.

Appendix K Amendment to the United States draft resolution on the Spanish question submitted by the Belgium delegation.

It

added the following paragraphs. MRecommends that if, within a reasonable time, the politi­ cal conditions enumerated above are not realized, the Security Council considers the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation, and "Recommends that all Members of the United Nations immedi­ ately recall from Madrid, by way of warning, their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, accredited there.,,“*' ” ^ "general Assembly, First Committee, Second Part of the First Session,r* United Nations Official Records. (November 2December 13, 1946), p. 357.

Appendix L The First Committee recommends to the General Assembly this resolution adopted on the Spanish question. "Whereas the Secretary-General in his annual report has in­ formed the General Assembly of the steps taken by the States Members of the Organization in pursuance of its recommendation of 12 December 1946. "The General Assembly "Reaffirms its resolution adopted on 12 December 1946 con­ cerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain; and "Expresses its confidence that the Security Council will exercise its responsibilities under the Charter as soon as it considers that the.situation in regard to Spain so requires. -*■ "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session," United Nations Official Records. (September 16-November 29. 1947), p. 1080.

Appendix M Resolution introduced in the First Committee by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru on Spain, The General Assembly Considering that, during its second session in 1947, a pro­ posal intended to confirm the resolution of 12 December 1946 on the political regime in power in Spain failed to obtain the ap­ proval of two-thirds of the votes cast; Considering that certain governments have interpreted the negative vote of 1947 as virtually revoking the clause in the previous resolution which recommended the withdrawl of heads of missions with the rank of ambassador or minister plenipotentiary accredited to the Spanish government; Considering that, in view of the doubt regarding the valid­ ity of this interpretation, other governments have continued to refrain from accrediting heads of missions to Madrid, thereby creating inequality to their disadvantage; Considering that such confusion may diminish the prestige of the United nations, which all Members of the Organization have a particular interest in preserving; Considering that in any event the 1946 resolution did not prescribe the breaking of political and commercial relations with the Spanish Government which have been the subject of bi­ lateral agreements between the governments of several Member States and the Madrid Government* Considering that in the negotiation of such agreements, governments which have complied with the recommendations of 12

167 December 1946 are placed in a position of inequality which works to the disadvantage of economically weaker governments. Decides, without prejudice to the declarations contained in the resolution of 12 December 1946, to leave Member States full freedom of action as regards their diplomatic relations with Spain.^ New York Times, May 5, 1949.

168 Appendix N Indian Resolution* The General Assembly Having taken note of the application made by the Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa and having considered the matter, is of the opinion that: "a) The Union Governments discriminatory treatment of the Asiatics in general and Indians in particular on the grounds of their race constitutes a denial of human rights and fundamental freedom and is contrary to the Charter; "b) The Union Governments policy in general and the enact­ ment of the Asiatic Land Tenure and the Indian Representation Act of 1946, in particular, have impaired friendly relations be­ tween the two Member States, and unless a satisfactory settlement is arrived at immediately, these relations are likely to be fur­ ther impaired. "The General Assembly* therefore, considers that the Union Government should revise their general policy and their legisla­ ture and administrative measures affecting Asiatics in South Af­ rica, so as to bring them into conformity with the principles and purposed of the Charter and requests the Union Government to report at the next session of the General Assembly the action taken by them in this behalf."-*^ "General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Second Part of the Pirst Session," United Rations Official Records, (November 2130, 1946), p. 132.

169 Appendix P France’s amendment to the Indian resolution on the South African question. "The General Assembly having taken note of the application made by the Government of India regarding the treatment of In­ dians in the Union of South Africa, and having considered the matter; "States that, because of that treatment, friendly relations betx'sreen the two Member States have been impaired, and unless a satisfactory settlement is reached, these relations are likely to be further impaired "And of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa should be in conformity with the interna­ tional obligations under the agreements concluded between the two governments, due account being taken of the provisions of the Charter; "Therefore, requests the two Governments to report-at the next session of the General Assembly the action taken in this behalf."1 ” 1 "General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Second Part of the First Session, United Nations Official Records, (November 2130, 1946), p. 17.

170 Appendix Q The Sixth Committee's resolution on the South African problem* !tl Whereas is resolution 44 (I) dated 8 December 1946 the General Assembly, taking note of an application made by the Gov­ ernment of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, observed that because of that treatment friendly relations between the two Member States had been impaired and, unless a satisfactory agreement was reached, their relations were likely to be further impaired; “2 Whereas after careful consideration of the matter, the General Assembly was of the opinion that the treatment of the Indians in the Union of South Africa should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter, and f,3 Whereas the General Assembly requested the two Govern­ ments to report at the next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted to that effect, **4 The General Assembly , “Having considered the reports submitted by the Govern­ ment of India and the Government of the Union of South Africa to the aforesaid resolution, “Reaffirms its resolution dated 8 December 1946; “5 Requests the two Governments to enter into discussions at a round-table conference on the basis of that resolution without any further delay and to invite the Government of Paki—

171 stan to take part in such discussions; 116 Requests that the result of* such discussions be reported by the Governments of the Union of South Africa and India to the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall from time to time make inquiries from them and submit a report on the action taken on this resolution by the two Governments to the Assembly at its next session.If^1 ,fGeneral Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session,11 Uni­ ted Nations Official Records. (September 16-November 29, 1947), pp. 1111-2.

172 Appendix H Joint draft of Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Denmark, and Norway on the South African question* The General Assembly Considering the reports submitted by the Governments of India and of the Union of South Africa following upon the re­ solution of the General Assembly of 8 December 1946, which drew their attention to the desirability of their reaching an agree­ ment; Considering that in according to the opinion expressed by the said resolution, the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and the rele­ vant provisions of the Charter: that, in consequence if no di­ rect agreement should be reached between the two Governments it is, above all, necessary to determine the rights and obligations of the two States; that, according to the Charter and to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court is particularly designed to deal with such questions, Calls upon the two Governments, after inviting the Govern­ ment of Pakistan to take part in their negotiations, to continue their efforts as a view to reaching an agreement settling their dispute through a round-table conference or other direct means or, if necessary, by mediation or conciliation, and, should they fail to reach such an agreement, to submit the question of the extent of the said obligations under the agreements con­ cluded between them and under the relevant provisions of the

173 Charter to the International Court of Justice.^ I "General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Second Session, United Wations Official Records, (September 16-November 29, 1947), pp. 1616-7.

174 Appendix S Draft resolution concerning the establishment of a Piscal Commission.

These are just the points under debate.

1 The Piscal Commission shall: a) Study and advise the Council in the field of pub­ lic finance, particularly in its legal administrative and tech­ nical aspects; b) Advise the Council and other Commissions of the Council either upon their request or on its own initiative on the fiscal implications of the recommendations made by the Commissions in their fields, and, in general, co-operate in matters of common interest with other Commissions of the Coun­ cil and other organs of the United Nations, including the spe­ cial agencies. 2 The Piscal Commission is authorized to assist any Member government of the United Nations on the matters set forth in 1 (a) above upon the request of that government. 7 Shortly after its creation, and thereafter when appro­ priate, the Commission shall make, recommendations and reports to the Council with respect to its terms of reference, organ­ ization and programme of work.^ ~ 1 "Economic and Social Council, Pirst Year, Third Session,11 United Nations Official Records. (September 11-October 10. 1946), pp. 118-5;

175 Appendix T Articles taken from the United Nations Charter* Article 1 paragraph 3

To achieve international co-oper­

ation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encour­ aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; Article 2 paragraph 2

_ All Biembers, in order to ensure

to all of them the rights and* benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter* Article 13 paragraph 1 (b)

promoting international co­

operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Article 55 paragraph c

universal respect for, and ob­

servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with­ out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take

joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the

functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.