The United Nations in a Turbulent World 9781685856267

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
1 Posing the Problem: Engulfed or Enlarged?
2 Turbulence in World Politics
3 The Sources of Global Turbulence
4 The UN as a Product of Change
5 The UN as an Agent of Change
6 Caution, Confidence, and Funding
Notes
About this Occasional Paper
The International Peace Academy

Citation preview

T H E UNITED NATIONS IN A TURBULENT WORLD

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

President of the Academy

Olara A Otunnu Editorial

Board

Marianne Heiberg, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs F. T. Liu, International Peace Academy Augustus Richard Norton, US Military Academy Henry Wiseman, University of Guelph

THE UNITED NATIONS IN A TURBULENT WORLD

JAMES N . ROSENAU

LYNNK RIENNER PUBLISHERS • B O U L D E R 8C L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU Published for the International Peace Academy 777 United Nations Plaza New York, New York 10017 © 1992 by the International Peace Academy, Inc. All rights reserved Statements of fact or opinion are solely those of the author; their publication does not imply endorsement by the International Peace Academy. The International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series is made possible by the support of the Ford Foundation and the Samuel Freeman Charitable Trust.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rosenau, James N. The United Nations in a turbulent world / b y j a m e s N. Rosenau. p. cm.—(International Peace Academy occasional paper series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-330-8 1. United Nations. 2. International relations. I. Title. II. Series. J X 1 9 7 7 . R 5 7 6 1992 341.23—dc20 91-45522 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

CONTENTS

1 Posing the Problem: Engulfed or Enlarged? 2 Turbulence in World Politics

7 11

The Micro Parameter: A Skill Revolution The Macro-Micro Parameter: A Relocation of Authority The Macro Parameter: A Bifurcation of Global Structures

3 The Sources of Global Turbulence

22

Proliferation of Actors Impact of Dynamic Technologies Globalization of National Economies Advent of Interdependence Issues Weakening of States and the Restructuring of Loyalties Subgroupism The Spread of Hunger, Poverty, and the Third World

4 The UN as a Product of Change The The The The The The

37

UN as a Beneficiary of Bifurcation Erosion of the Sovereignty Principle UN as a Locus of Authority Potential of Performance Criteria Consequences of More Analytically Skillful Citizens Impact of Subgroupism

5 The UN as an Agent of Change Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation Recommendation Global Service Recommendation Recommendation

1: 2: 3: 4:

Toward Attitudinal Change Toward Enhanced Authority Strengthening Bifurcated Structures Toward the Creation of a

5: Toward More Effective Leadership 6: Enlarging the Bully Pulpit

5

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6 6

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Caution, Confidence, and Funding

77

Notes About this Occasional Paper The International Peace Academy

80 86 87

1 POSING THE PROBLEM: ENGULFED OR ENLARGED?

The American Army is better than the United Nations because they have power and have a big say. The U.N. does what? It just has a name. —Nazar AJi, 21-year-old Kurdish refugee 1 In a resolution approved 10 to 3, the Council dismissed Iraq's objection that its handling of the Kurdish and Shiite Muslim Arab insurgencies was an internal affair, saying the wave of refugees flowing toward neighboring Turkey and Iran threatens "international peace and security." Never before has the United Nations Security Council held that governments threaten international security if their actions force thousands of their citizens to flee to other lands. — N e w s report 2

I n a t u r b u l e n t world of restless publics, f a l t e r i n g e c o n o m i e s , w i d e n i n g cleavages, a n d vast international transformations, w h e r e d o e s t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s (UN) fit? T h e two observations above suggest c o n t r a d i c t o r y answers, with t h e y o u n g Kurdish r e f u g e e a c c o r d i n g little significance to t h e UN, while the news r e p o r t implies t h a t the U N ' s role is c a p a b l e of c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p a n s i o n . As e x p r e s s i o n s of skepticism a n d o p t i m i s m a b o u t t h e U N ' s f u t u r e , t h e two q u o t a t i o n s s u m m a r i z e the tensions that presently beset i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations (IOs) a n d that are the c e n t r a l f o c u s of this occasional p a p e r . They also serve to h i g h l i g h t t h e e m p h a s i s given to the relevance of citizens, b o t h individually a n d collectively, to the global context in which the UN c o n d u c t s its affairs. U n d e r l y i n g t h e analysis are t h r e e overriding questions: W h a t have b e e n t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e UN of t h e p r o f o u n d

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transformations the world has undergone since its creation in 1945? Can it meet the challenges posed by an increasingly turbulent world? And can the UN respond to the challenges in creative ways that enable it to serve as an agent as well as a product of global change? T h e answers to these questions are not simple—as the ensuing pages demonstrate—but they are clear-cut. Among other things, the analysis leads to the unqualified conclusion that the UN is likely to b e n e f i t from the growing complexity o f world affairs, from the widespread c h a l l e n g e s to established national and subnational authorities, and from the global shift away from traditional criteria o f legitimacy and toward assessments based on the adequacy o f leadership performances. T h e thrust of the argument also develops a clear answer to the question posed in the title of this chapter: rather than engulfing the UN, the transformations at work in world politics are viewed as enlarging its roles in a number of ways. Six recommendations are offered for seizing the opportunities to expand the UN's salience and effectiveness in the emergent global order. I n q u i r i e s i n t o IOs have n o t focused extensively on the responsiveness o f the UN to the worldwide dynamics o f change. R a t h e r they have tended to p r o c e e d from the assumption that, whatever the effectiveness of IOs, they operate in an unchanging world bound by the immutable dictates of the sovereignty principle and that, therefore, the key to making IOs more effective lies in their d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s a n d institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s . Variability is thus attached to IOs and not the worlds to which they respond and seek to manage. 3 Obviously, however, the presumption of an underlying constancy in international affairs is no longer beyond question (if it ever was). T h e r e are too many signs o f extensive global change to allow for the luxury of approaching the UN as if its institutions and activities are independent of the ebb and flow of world politics. Several answers are possible to the question o f how a transformed world may be transforming the UN. O n e posits the changes as essentially peripheral to the ongoing interstate system and thus dismisses the UN as ephemeral, as destined to function as it always has. A second accepts the premise that the huge changes have altered the nature and structure of the interstate system, but at the same time sees the UN as unable to acquire sufficient control over the course of events to act as a major change agent. In this conception the UN is viewed as still constrained by the actions of states and o t h e r global dynamics, with the result that it will either a d a p t its g o a l s , tasks, s t r u c t u r e s , and p r o c e d u r e s to the

T H E U N IN A TURBULENT WORLD

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transformations in world politics or b e c o m e increasingly irrelevant. A third answer conceives o f the global transformations as offering the UN a number o f opportunities to function as an agent as well as a product of the change, thereby putting it in a position of having s o m e influence over the course o f events and the management of world affairs. My c o n c e r n h e r e is primarily with the s e c o n d and third p e r s p e c t i v e s . I will o u t l i n e a n u m b e r o f basic s t r u c t u r a l developments that militate against the expectation that the UN will continue functioning as it always has. T h e n , after indicating how the transformations presently at work in the world may be impacting on the UN, I will probe the major ways in which the UN has responded to the adaptive challenges. Finally, I will move beyond the processes of adaptation and explore the ways in which the UN might also serve as a significant agent o f change and thereby contribute to the e m e r g e n t structures o f global politics. In other words, the central c o n c e r n here is to assess the extent to which the UN can successfully and creatively adapt to a rapidly changing world. Tracing the capacity of the UN to function as an agent of change is not a simple matter. It is all too easy to construct a historical retrospective that attributes much of the evolution o f world politics since 1945 to the presence and activities of the UN. O n e inquiry, for example, concluded that the UN has had a "far-reaching" impact, that it was a prime reason why the years since World War II have witnessed the a b s e n c e o f general war, the democratization o f international relations, the achievement o f independence by former c o l o n i e s , the t r e n d toward e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , and the strengthening of international law.4 On the other hand, a year later observers were noting that the UN had "fallen upon hard times in the 1 9 8 0 s " 5 and that t h e r e was a "widespread impression that collective conflict m a n a g e m e n t by international organizations has f a i l e d . " 6 Only a little while later, however, it was possible to give voice to the view that "the UN is playing an increasingly essential role in peacekeeping and peacemaking in the Third World." 7 Such wide and quick fluctuations in assessments of the UN as a m a j o r c h a n g e agent suggest the difficulty of evolving a long-run perspective on global transformations and the roles the UN can play in them. We are inclined either to locate our empirical assessments in our value preferences or to attach significance to the latest trend and allow our j u d g m e n t s to fluctuate with shifts in the course of events. T o avoid these pitfalls and maintain a consistent long-term perspective that is also sensitive to c h a n g i n g realities, t h r e e

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conceptual steps need to be taken: (1) be clear about the sources, nature, pace, direction, and consequences of change in world politics, (2) have an explicit understanding of how and where these dynamics can impact upon IOs in general and the UN in particular, and (3) be sufficiently aware of the tensions between change and continuity in world politics to discern potential roles the UN can play as an agent of change. These three tasks serve to organize the discussion that follows.

2 TURBULENCE IN W O R L D POLITICS

While there is no dearth of indicators—such as the launching of wars by states and their efforts to negotiate postwar arrangements— that highlight the many ways world politics is marked by continuity, it is hardly less difficult to demonstrate that huge changes have been at work in the global system, changes that are of sufficient m a g n i t u d e to suggest the emergence of new global structures, processes, and patterns. T h e seemingly daily o c c u r r e n c e of u n e x p e c t e d developments and the numerous uncertainties that prevail in every region, if not every country, of the world are so pervasive as to cast doubt on the viability of the long-established ways in which international affairs have been conducted. It almost seems as if the anomalous event has replaced the recurrent pattern as the central tendency in world politics. This is not the place to e n u m e r a t e the many anomalous developments that point to p r o f o u n d and rapid change, but it is useful to recall the utter surprise that greeted the abrupt end of the Cold War. Pundits, professors, politicians, and others conversant with world politics were, literally, stunned, with none claiming to have anticipated it and with all admitting to ad hoc explanations. Since the s u d d e n collapse of the Communist world was the culmination of dynamics that had been subtly at work for a long time, the intensity and breadth of the surprise it evoked can only be viewed as a measure of the extent to which our understandings of world politics have lagged behind the deep transformations that are altering the global landscape. Anomalies indicative of p r o f o u n d change began to flow well before the end of the Cold War, 8 but the series of events that transformed Eastern Europe late in 1989 surely focused attention to the presence of powerful change agents. Indeed, more than a few observers and practitioners of world

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politics b e c a m e so sensitive to t h e dynamics of c h a n g e that they w e r e q u i c k to a n t i c i p a t e t h e e m e r g e n c e of a new g l o b a l o r d e r a n d to r e g a r d t h e 1991 Gulf W a r as t h e first m a j o r expression of that o r d e r . O t h e r s have b e e n m o r e cautious, p r e f e r r i n g simply to r e c o r d t h e i r awe at t h e e x t e n t of t h e c h a n g e a n d to leave o p e n how it m i g h t u n f o l d . As o n e analyst p u t it, Not only the configuration of great powers and their alliances but the very structure of political history has changed. . . . The very sovereignty and cohesion of states, the authority and efficacy of the governments are not what they were. Are we going to see ever larger and larger political units? . . . Or are we more likely going to see the break-up of several states into smaller ones? Are we going to see a large-scale migration of millions of peoples, something that has not happened since the last century of the Roman Empire? This is at least possible. The very texture of history is changing before our very eyes. 9

A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e q u i c k e n i n g flow of a n o m a l i e s p r e c e d e d t h e e n d of t h e Cold W a r a n d t h e advent of t h e Gulf War, what gave rise to t h e m ? W h a t u n d e r l y i n g dynamics were e r o d i n g t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g p a t t e r n s of w o r l d politics a n d f o s t e r i n g t h e e v o l u t i o n of n e w s t r u c t u r e s a n d processes? How can we b e g i n to u n d e r s t a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of a new global o r d e r at a level of d e e p c h a n g e t h a t is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n t h e a d v e n t of a G o r b a c h e v in t h e Soviet U n i o n , t h e r e f u r b i s h i n g of US military capabilities u n d e r R o n a l d R e a g a n , o r t h e s u d d e n s u r g e of East G e r m a n s i n t o t h e West G e r m a n E m b a s s y in H u n g a r y ? H o w d o we a c c o u n t , in s h o r t , f o r a n a c c e l e r a t i o n of t h e p a c e of c h a n g e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs t h a t has a l t e r e d " t h e very texture of history"? A full r e s p o n s e to these queries is o f f e r e d in my b o o k Turbulence in World Politics, which is only s u m m a r i z e d h e r e to identify t h e ways in w h i c h t h e U N has b e e n e n g u l f e d by t u r b u l e n c e a n d t h e p o i n t s at w h i c h its capacities may have b e e n e n l a r g e d , possibly e n a b l i n g it to s h a p e t h e s t r u c t u r e s a n d processes that are likely to e m e r g e w h e n t h e d y n a m i c s of global t u r b u l e n c e subside a n d new p a t t e r n s b e c o m e r o o t e d i n t o t h e ways of t h e world. Lest t h e r e be any t e r m i n o l o g i c a l c o n f u s i o n , h o w e v e r , I m u s t stress at t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e n o t i o n of t u r b u l e n c e is u s e d h e r e as m o r e t h a n a m e t a p h o r f o r g r e a t c o m m o t i o n a n d u n c e r t a i n t y . My p u r p o s e is n o t t o wax e l o q u e n t a b o u t c h a n g e , b u t r a t h e r to p r o b e its u n d e r l y i n g d y n a m i c s in a systematic way. P u t m o s t s u c c i n c t l y , t h e p r e c i s e m e a n i n g a s c r i b e d to t h e c o n c e p t f o c u s e s o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p a t t e r n s — w h a t I call t h e p r i m e

THE U N IN A TURBULENT WORLD

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parameters—that normally bind and sustain the continuities of international life. When these patterns are overcome by high degrees of complexity and dynamism—that is, when the number, density, interdependencies, and volatility of the actors who occupy the global stage u n d e r g o substantial expansion—world politics is viewed as having entered into a turbulent state. T h r e e global p a t t e r n s are conceived to be primary: t h e distribution of power in world politics through which states, IOs, and other key actors respond to each other (a macro parameter); t h e a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h r o u g h which g o v e r n m e n t s , multinational c o r p o r a t i o n s , e t h n i c groups, and o t h e r large collectivities are linked to individual citizens (a macro-micro p a r a m e t e r ) ; and the analytical and emotional skills of citizens t h r o u g h which they respond to the course of events (a micro parameter). All three of these parameters are j u d g e d to be greatly increasing in complexity and dynamism, thus leading to the conclusion that the world is presently experiencing its first period of t u r b u l e n c e since the era that culminated with the Treaty of Westphalia and the birth of the state system some 350 years ago. 10 Perhaps more to the point, the relative simultaneity that marks the impact of much greater complexity and dynamism on all three p a r a m e t e r s has given rise to what might well be the central characteristic of world politics today, namely, the presence of persistent tensions between tendencies toward centralization and those that foster decentralization. Viewed in this way, for example, it is hardly anomalous that even as Yugoslavia and some of its c o m p o n e n t republics aspire to admission to the E u r o p e a n Community (EC), so are several of those components seeking to break away f r o m their political union. As will be seen, these interactive centralizing-decentralizing tensions are especially evident in the transformation of each of the three prime parameters. Table 1 summarizes the changes in the three parameters, but the order of their listing should not be interpreted as implying causal sequences in which the actions of individuals are conceived to precede the behavior of collectivities. On the contrary, incisive insights into the turbulence of world politics are crucially dependent on appreciating the simultaneity of the interactions among the three parameters—on recognizing that even as individuals shape the actions and orientations of the collectivities to which they belong, so do the goals, policies, and laws of the latter shape the actions and orientations of individuals. Out of such interactions a network of causation is fashioned that is so intermeshed as to make it difficult to separate causes from effects. Indeed, much of the rapidity of the

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T a b l e 1 T h e T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of T h r e e Global Parameters

Micro parameter

Macro-micro parameter

Macro parameter

From

To

Individuals less analytically skillful and emotionally competent

Individuals more analytically skillful and emotionally competent

Authority structures in place as people rely on traditional and/or constitutional sources of legitimacy to comply with directives emanating from appropriate macro institutions

Authority structures in crisis as people evolve performance criteria for legitimacy and compliance with the directives issued by macro officials

Anarchic system of nation-states

Bifurcation of anarchic system into state- and multi-centric subsystems

transformations at work in world politics can be traced to the ways in which the changes in each parameter stimulate and reinforce the changes in the other two.

T H E M I C R O PARAMETER: A SKILL R E V O L U T I O N

The transformation of the micro parameter is to be f o u n d in the shifting capabilities of citizens everywhere. Individuals have undergone what can properly be termed a skill revolution. For a variety of reasons, ranging from the advance of communications t e c h n o l o g y to the greater intricacies of life in an ever more i n t e r d e p e n d e n t world, people have b e c o m e increasingly more competent in assessing where they fit in international affairs and

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how their behavior can be aggregated into significant collective outcomes. Included among these newly refined skills, moreover, is an e x p a n d e d capacity to focus emotion as well as to analyze the causal sequences that sustain the course of events. Put differently, it is a grievous error to assume that citizenries are a constant in politics, that the world has rapidly changed and complexity greatly increased without c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e individuals who comprise the collectivities that interact on the global stage. As long as people were uninvolved in and apathetic about world affairs, it made sense to treat them as a constant p a r a m e t e r a n d to look to variabilities at the macro level f o r explanations of what happens in world politics. Today, however, the skill revolution has expanded the learning capacity of individuals, enriched their cognitive maps, and elaborated the scenarios with which they anticipate the future. It is no accident that the squares of the world's cities have lately been filled with large crowds demanding change. It is tempting to affirm the impact of the skill revolution by p o i n t i n g to the many restless publics that have p r o t e s t e d authoritarian rule and clamored for more democratic forms of governance. While the worldwide thrust toward an expansion of political liberties a n d a diminution in the central control of economies is certainly linked to citizens and publics having greater appreciation of their circumstances and rights, there is nothing inherent in the skill revolution that leads people in more democratic directions. The change in the micro parameter is not so much one of new orientations as it is an evolution of new capacities for cogent analysis. T h e world's peoples are not so much converging a r o u n d the same values as they are sharing a greater ability to recognize and articulate their values. Thus, this parametric change is global in scope because it has enabled Islamic fundamentalists, Asian peasants, and Western sophisticates alike to serve better their respective orientations. And thus, too, the commotion in public squares has not been confined to cities in any particular region of the world. From Seoul to Prague, from Soweto to Beijing, f r o m Paris to the West Bank, from Kuwait City to Moscow, from Belgrade to Rangoon—to mention only a few of the places where collective d e m a n d s have recently been voiced—the transformation of the micro parameter has been unmistakably evident. Equally important, evidence of the skill revolution can be readily discerned in trend data for education, television viewing, computer usage, travel, and a host of other situations in which people are called u p o n to employ their analytic and emotional skills. And

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hardly less relevant, in a n u m b e r of local circumstances—from traffic j a m s to water shortages, from budget crises to racial conflicts, f r o m flows o f r e f u g e e s to threats o f t e r r o r i s m — p e o p l e a r e r e l e n t l e s s l y c o n f r o n t e d with social, e c o n o m i c , and political complexities that impel them to forgo their rudimentary premises and r e p l a c e them with m o r e elaborate c o n c e p t i o n s o f how to respond to the challenges of daily life. This is not say that people everywhere are now equal in the skills they bring to bear upon world politics. Obviously, the analytically rich c o n t i n u e to be more skillful than the analytically poor. But while the gap between the two ends of the skill continuum may be no narrower than in the past, the advance in the competencies o f those at every point on the continuum is sufficient to contribute to a m a j o r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the c o n d u c t o f world affairs. M o r e important for present purposes, the skill revolution highlights the question o f how the UN will be affected by the global expansion o f analytic skills at the micro level. As will be seen, the enhanced skills of citizens offer IOs new opportunities for extending their influence if they are able to seize upon them.

T H E MACRO-MICRO

PARAMETER:

A RELOCATION OF

AUTHORITY

This parameter consists of the recurrent orientations, practices, and patterns through which citizens at the micro level are linked to their collectivities at the macro level. In effect, it encompasses the a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h e r e b y large a g g r e g a t i o n s — p r i v a t e organizations as well as public agencies—achieve and sustain the c o o p e r a t i o n and c o m p l i a n c e o f their memberships. Historically, these relationships have been founded on traditional criteria o f legitimacy derived from constitutional and legal sources. U n d e r those circumstances individuals were habituated to compliance with the directives issued by higher authorities. They did what they were told to d o because, well, that is what o n e did. As a consequence, authority remained in place for decades, even centuries, as people unquestioningly yielded to the dictates of governments or the leadership of any other organizations with which they were affiliated. For a variety of reasons, including the expanded analytic skills o f citizens a n d the factors n o t e d below, the foundations o f this p a r a m e t e r have also u n d e r g o n e erosion. T h r o u g h o u t the world today, in both public and private settings, the sources of authority have shifted from traditional to performance criteria o f legitimacy.

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In o t h e r words, where authority relationships were o n c e in place, now they are in crisis, with the readiness o f individuals to comply with governing directives b e i n g very much a function o f their assessment o f the performances o f the authorities. T h e m o r e the p e r f o r m a n c e r e c o r d is c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t e — i n t e r m s o f satisfying needs, moving toward goals, and providing stability—the more likely they are to cooperate and comply. T h e less they approve the p e r f o r m a n c e record, the more likely they are to withhold their c o m p l i a n c e o r otherwise c o m p l i c a t e t h e efforts o f m a c r o authorities. As a c o n s e q u e n c e of the pervasive authority crises, states and governments have b e c o m e less effective in confronting challenges and i m p l e m e n t i n g policies. They can still maintain public o r d e r through their police powers, but their ability to address substantive issues and solve substantive problems is declining as people find fault with their performances and thus question their authority, r e d e f i n e t h e bases o f t h e i r legitimacy, and w i t h h o l d t h e i r cooperation. Such a transformation is being played out dramatically today in the Soviet Union, as it was only a few years earlier within all the countries of Eastern Europe. But authority crises in the former Communist world are only the more obvious instances o f this newly e m e r g e n t pattern. It is equally evident in every other part o f the world, albeit the crises take different forms in different countries and different types o f private organizations. In Canada the authority crisis is rooted in linguistic, cultural, and constitutional issues as Q u e b e c seeks to secede or otherwise redefine its relationship to the central government. In France the devolution of authority was legally sanctioned through legislation that privatized several governmental activities and relocated authority away from Paris and toward greater jurisdiction for the provinces. 11 In China the provinces enjoy a wider jurisdiction by, in effect, ignoring or defying Beijing. In Yugoslavia the crisis has led to violence and civil war, as some o f its c o m p o n e n t republics seek autonomy and independence. In the crisis-ridden countries o f Latin America the challenge to traditional authority originates with insurgent movements or the drug trade. And in those parts o f the world where the shift to p e r f o r m a n c e criteria of legitimacy has not resulted in the relocation o f authority—such as the U n i t e d States, Israel, Argentina, the Philippines, and South Korea—uneasy stalemates prevail in the policymaking process as governments have proven incapable o f bridging societal divisions sufficiently to undertake the decisive actions necessary to address and resolve intractable problems. Nor are t h e global authority crises c o n f i n e d to states

and

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g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e y are also manifest in subnational jurisdictions, international organizations, and nongovernmental transnational entities. I n d e e d , in s o m e cases the crises u n f o l d simultaneously at d i f f e r e n t levels: j u s t as the issue of Q u e b e c ' s place in C a n a d a b e c a m e p a r a m o u n t , f o r e x a m p l e , so did the Mohawks in Q u e b e c press f o r t h e i r own a u t o n o m y . Similarly, j u s t as Moldavia recently r e j e c t e d Moscow's authority, so did several e t h n i c g r o u p s within M o l d a v i a seek to establish t h e i r own a u t o n o m y by r e j e c t i n g M o l d a v i a ' s a u t h o r i t y . Similarly, to cite b u t a few c o n s p i c u o u s e x a m p l e s of crises in international and transnational organizations, U N E S C O , the PLO, a n d the Catholic C h u r c h have all e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e n t r a l i z i n g d y n a m i c s that are at least partly r o o t e d in t h e r e p l a c e m e n t of traditional with p e r f o r m a n c e criteria of legitimacy. T h e relocating of authority precipitated by the structural crises of states a n d g o v e r n m e n t s at the national level occurs in several directions, d e p e n d i n g in g o o d part on the scope of the enterprises p e o p l e perceive as m o r e receptive to their concerns a n d thus m o r e capable of m e e t i n g their increased preoccupation with the adequacy of p e r f o r m a n c e s . In many instances this has involved "downward" r e l o c a t i o n toward s u b n a t i o n a l g r o u p s — t o w a r d e t h n i c minorities, local g o v e r n m e n t s , single-issue o r g a n i z a t i o n s , r e l i g i o u s a n d linguistic groupings, political factions, trade unions, a n d the like. In s o m e instances t h e relocating process has moved in the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n toward m o r e e n c o m p a s s i n g collectivities that t r a n s c e n d national b o u n d a r i e s . T h e beneficiaries of this "upward" relocation of a u t h o r i t y r a n g e f r o m s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s like t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations like the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e of the Red Cross, f r o m n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s like G r e e n p e a c e to p r o f e s s i o n a l g r o u p s such as Médicins sans Frontières, f r o m multinational corporations like IBM to inchoate social movements that j o i n together environmentalists or w o m e n in d i f f e r e n t countries, f r o m informal international regimes like those active in d i f f e r e n t industries to formal associations of political p a r t i e s like t h o s e t h a t s h a r e conservative or socialist i d e o l o g i e s — t o m e n t i o n b u t a few types of l a r g e r - t h a n - n a t i o n a l entities t h a t have b e c o m e t h e f o c u s of legitimacy s e n t i m e n t s . Needless to say, these multiple directions in which authority is being relocated serve to r e i n f o r c e the tensions between the centralizing a n d decentralizing dynamics that underlie the t u r b u l e n c e presently at work in world politics. Associated with the crises that have overcome the macro-micro p a r a m e t e r is a n u n d e r m i n i n g of t h e p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l sovereignty. T o c h a l l e n g e the authority of t h e state a n d to t h e n

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redirect legitimacy sentiments toward supranational or subnational collectivities is to begin to deny that the state has the ultimate decisional power, including the right to resort to force. Since authority is structurally layered such that many levels o f authority may have a u t o n o m y within t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n s without also possessing sovereign powers, there is no one-to-one relationship between the location o f authority and sovereignty. Nevertheless, trends toward the relocation of authority are bound to contribute to the erosion of sovereignty. If a state is thwarted in its efforts to mobilize effective armed forces, then its sovereignty is hardly a conspicuous feature of its existence as an independent collectivity. If it c a n n o t prevent one of its subjurisdictions from seceding, then the reach of its sovereignty is certainly reduced. In view o f the centrality of Third World countries in the UN system, it is useful to note that the undermining of the sovereignty principle began with its redefinition in the decolonizing processes of the f o r m e r European empires after World War II. In using selfdetermination as the sole criterion for statehood, irrespective o f w h e t h e r a f o r m e r colony had the consensual foundations and resources to govern, a n u m b e r o f sovereign states were created, recognized, and admitted to the UN even though they were unable to develop their economies and manage their internal affairs without external assistance. As a result o f these weaknesses, the value o f s o v e r e i g n t y s e e m e d less c o m p e l l i n g o n c e the struggle f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e was won and the tasks of governance were taken on. Rather than being an obvious source of strength, sovereignty thus often seemed to be less a source of independence than an invitation to interdependence. 1 2 It follows that a central question in assessing whether the UN has b e e n engulfed or enlarged by global turbulence is whether the UN is a beneficiary o f the complexity and dynamism that has overtaken the macro-micro parameter and led to the relocation of authority. Or, if it is not a direct beneficiary in the sense of actually extending its authority, does it benefit indirectly from the weakening o f states and the accretions o f authority experienced by other types of collectivities? T o what extent, in other words, has the sovereignty principle been undermined insofar as the functioning o f the UN is concerned? Is the UN the last redoubt of the sovereignty principle or have its roles and capacities been altered as a consequence of the strains to which the principle has lately been subjected? Part of the answer to these questions lies in the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f global turbulence for the macro structures of world politics, to which we now turn.

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THE MACRO PARAMETER: A BIFURCATION OF GLOBAL STRUCTURES For more than three centuries the overall structure of world politics has been founded on an anarchic system o f sovereign nation-states that did not have to answer to any h i g h e r authority and that managed their conflicts through accommodation or war. States were not the only actors on the world stage, but traditionally they were the dominant collectivities who set the rules by which the others had to live. T h e resulting state-centric world evolved its own hierarchy based on the way in which military, economic, and political power was distributed. Depending on how many states had the greatest concentration of power, the overall system was varyingly marked at different historical moments by hegemonic, bipolar, or multipolar structures. T o d a y , however, the s t a t e - c e n t r i c world is no l o n g e r predominant. Due to the skill revolution, the worldwide spread of authority crises, and several other sources of turbulence ( n o t e d below), it has u n d e r g o n e bifurcation. A complex multi-centric world of diverse, relatively autonomous actors has emerged, replete with structures, processes, and decision rules o f its own. T h e sovereignty-free actors o f the multi-centric world consist o f multinational corporations, ethnic minorities, subnational governments and bureaucracies, professional societies, political parties, transnational organizations, and the like. Individually, and sometimes jointly, they compete, conflict, cooperate, or otherwise interact with the sovereignty-bound actors o f the state-centric world. 1 3 Table 2 delineates the main differences between the multicentric and state-centric worlds. In sum, and to reiterate, while the bifurcation of world politics has not pushed states to the edge of the global stage, they are no longer the only key actors. Now they are faced with the new task o f c o p i n g with disparate rivals from a n o t h e r world as well as the challenges posed by counterparts in their own world. T h e macro parameter is thus perhaps most incisively described as sustaining two worlds o f world politics. W h e t h e r this bifurcated global structure facilitates or complicates the tasks of the United Nations is an issue to which much of the ensuing analysis is addressed.

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T a b l e 2 Structure a n d Process in the Two Worlds of World Politics State-centric World

Multi-centric World

Number of essential actors

Fewer than 200

Hundreds of thousands

Prime dilemma of actors

Security

Autonomy

Principal goals of actors

Preservation of territorial integrity, and physical security

Increase in world market shares, maintenance of integration of subsystems

Ultimate resort for realizing goals

Armed force

Withholding of cooperation or compliance

Normative priorities

Processes, especially those that preserve sovereignty and the rule of law

Outcomes, especially those that expand human rights, justice, and wealth

Modes of collaboration

Formal alliances whenever possible

Temporary coalitions

Scope of agenda

Limited

Unlimited

Rules governing interactions among actors

Diplomatic practices

Ad hoc, situational

Distribution of power among actors

Hierarchical by amount of power

Relative equality as far as initiating action is concerned

Interaction patterns among actors

Symmetrical

Asymmetrical

Locus of leadership

Great powers

Innovative actors with extensive resources

Institutionalization

Well established

Emergent

Susceptibility to change

Relatively low

Relatively high

Control over outcomes

Concentrated

Diffused

Bases of decisional structures

Formal authority, law

Various types of authority, effective leadership

Source: Reproduced from James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Clmnge and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 250.

3 T H E SOURCES OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE

Given a world with the new parametric values represented by the skill revolution, the relocation of authority, and the bifurcation of global structures, it is hardly surprising that politicians, publics, and pundits speak of a new global order. For it is a new order—not so much because the Cold War ended or because a successful coalition was mobilized to oust Iraq f r o m Kuwait, but because t h e f u n d a m e n t a l underpinnings of world politics, the parameters that sustain it, have undergone transformation. Thus far, however, the discussion has been more descriptive than explanatory. We have defined turbulence and indicated the sites at which its consequences are likely to be most extensive and enduring, but we have not accounted for the dynamics that underlie the parametric transformations. What drives the turbulence? This question needs to be clarified, at least briefly, if we are to assess the implications of the new order for the United Nations. Although a variety of factors have contributed to the onset of turbulence, several stand out as particularly salient and worthy of elaboration. As can be seen in the enumeration that follows, some of these sources are external to the processes of world politics and some are internal to them. Together they go a long way toward explaining why what once seemed so anomalous now appears so patterned.

PROLIFERATION OF ACTORS

Perhaps few facts about world politics are better known than those that describe the huge increase in the h u m a n population since

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the e n d of World War II. Where the world's population was in excess of 2.5 billion in 1950, by 1990 the figure had passed five billion and it continues to grow at a rapid rate. This demographic explosion lies at the heart of many of the world's problems and is also a continual source of the complexity and dynamism that have overwhelmed the parameters of the global system. Ever greater n u m b e r s of p e o p l e have exerted pressure for technological innovations. They have m e a n t larger, m o r e articulate, a n d increasingly unwieldly publics. They have c o n t r i b u t e d to the u n m a n a g e a b i l i t y of public affairs that has w e a k e n e d states, stimulated the search f o r m o r e responsive collectivities, and hastened the advent of paralyzing authority crises. And they have created through the sheer weight of numbers new and intractable public issues, of which famines and threats to the environment are only the more conspicuous examples. But the proliferation of relevant actors is not confined to the huge growth in the number of individual citizens. No less important for present purposes is the vast increase in the number and types of collective actors whose leaders can clamber onto the global stage and act on behalf of their memberships. Indeed, to note that the m o u n t i n g complexity of world affairs springs in part f r o m the d e e p e n i n g density of the global system is to stress not so much the unorganized complexity fostered by the population explosion as it is to refer to an organized complexity consisting of millions of factions, associations, parties, organizations, movements, interest groups, and a host of other kinds of collectivities that share an aspiration to advance their welfare and a sensitivity to the ways in which a rapidly changing world may require them to network with each other. T h e dizzying increase in the density of actors that sustain world politics stems, of course, from a variety of sources. In part it is a product of the trend toward ever greater specialization, the hallmark of industrial and postindustrial economies, a n d the g r e a t e r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e those economies foster. In part, too, it is a c o n s e q u e n c e of w i d e s p r e a d dissatisfaction with large-scale collectivities and the p e r f o r m a n c e of existing authorities, a d i s c o n t e n t t h a t u n d e r l i e s the t u r n to less e n c o m p a s s i n g organizations that are more fully expressive of close-at-hand needs and wants. Relevant here also are the expanded analytic skills of citizens that enable them to appreciate how they can j o i n in collective actions that serve as avenues for expressing their discontent. Whatever the reasons for the proliferation of collective actors, however, their sheer number has been a prime stimulus to

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t h e evolution of the multi-centric world a n d to the authority crises that have wracked the state-centric world. As will be seen, the impact on the UN of this vast increase in sovereignty-free actors has b e e n considerable. But it is n o m o r e conspicuous t h a n the diverse ways in which the the UN has h a d to c o p e with an extensive proliferation of its own ranks. 1 4 O n a lesser scale, t h e s t a t e - c e n t r i c world has also u n d e r g o n e s u b s t a n t i a l e n l a r g e m e n t , with the n u m b e r of m e m b e r states in the UN having m o r e t h a n tripled since its inception in 1945. I n d e e d , this growth has c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e e x p o n e n t i a l increase of actors in the multicentric world, since each new state carved out of the f o r m e r colonial e m p i r e s s p a w n e d its own array of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l actors w h o c o n t r i b u t e d to the f o r m a t i o n of new transnational networks. T h e organized complexity a n d d e e p e n i n g density of the global system, in o t h e r words, has derived f r o m formal state-making dynamics as well as the multiplication of activities within societies.

IMPACT OF DYNAMIC

TECHNOLOGIES

With t h e c a n n o n b a l l having yielded to the ballistic missile a n d the t e l e g r a p h having given way to the fax m a c h i n e , the technological e x p l o s i o n s i n c e W o r l d War II is n o less impressive t h a n its d e m o g r a p h i c c o u n t e r p a r t . W h e r e the latter has led to the crowding of geographic space, the f o r m e r has fostered the narrowing of social a n d political space. In a wide n u m b e r of fields—from agriculture to transportation, f r o m communications to medicine, from biogenetics to artificial i n t e l l i g e n c e — t e c h n o l o g i c a l dynamics have facilitated h u g e leaps in h u m a n k i n d ' s ability to overcome constraints imposed by the laws of nature: physical distances have been s h o r t e n e d , social distances have b e e n contracted, a n d e c o n o m i c barriers have b e e n c i r c u m v e n t e d . And as peoples have thus b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , so have e n o r m o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s followed f o r the skills of individuals, t h e c o n d u c t of t h e i r relations with h i g h e r authorities, a n d the viability of their macrocollectivities. It is highly d o u b t f u l , in s h o r t , w h e t h e r w o r l d politics w o u l d have b e e n o v e r t a k e n by t u r b u l e n c e w i t h o u t the explosion of i n n u m e r a b l e technologies since 1950. Two of t h e s e explosions, the n u c l e a r a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s revolutions, stand o u t as especially relevant to the complexity a n d dynamism that have i n u n d a t e d the t h r e e p r i m e p a r a m e t e r s . T h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y advances in military weaponry s u b s e q u e n t to World

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War II, marked by nuclear warheads and the rocketry to deliver them, imposed a context on the conduct of world affairs that reduced the probability of a major international war. The nuclear revolution thus had the ironic consequence of inhibiting states in the use o f one of their prime instruments for pursuing and defending their interests. T o be sure, the arms race and events like the Cuban missile crisis infused global life with a high degree of volatility that often made it seem very fragile indeed. Nevertheless, even as the nuclear context emphasized the extraordinary capacities several states had acquired, so did it point up the limits of state action and thereby opened the door for challenges to the authority of states. It is no accident that as states added substantially to their nuclear arsenals, so did a series of transnational, large-scale, and powerful social movements—in the realms of peace, ecology, and womens' rights—acquire enough momentum to seriously challenge governments. T h e communications revolution is hardly less central as a source of global turbulence. The rapidity and clarity with which ideas and information now circulate through television, VCRs, c o m p u t e r networks, fax machines, satellite hookups, fiberoptic telephone circuits, and many other microelectronic devices has rendered national boundaries ever more porous and world politics ever more vulnerable to cascading demands. Events that once took weeks and months to unfold now develop within days and hours. Financial transactions that once were mired in long delays can now be consummated in seconds. Diplomats, adversaries, military commanders, and publics who once had to wait long periods before reaching conclusions are now able to act decisively. Today the whole world, its leaders and its citizenries, instantaneously share the same pictures and descriptions, albeit not necessarily the same understandings, of what is transpiring in any situation. 15 Examples of the cascading effects of the communications revolution abound. Most conspicuous perhaps is the impact of the Cable News Network (CNN), which is said to be on and continuously watched in every embassy and every foreign office of every country in the world and which during the Gulf War served as the basis for diplomatic and military action on both sides of the conflict. 1 6 Hardly less telling is the example of the French journal Actuel, which was so upset by the crackdown in Tiananmen Square that, having compiled a mock edition of the People's Daily that contained numerous accounts the Chinese leadership did not want their people to read, sent it to every fax machine in China in the fall

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of 1989. 1 7 O r consider the explosive implications of the fact that 5 p e r c e n t of Brazil's households h a d television receiving sets when its 1960 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n was h e l d a n d that this f i g u r e h a d swollen to 72 p e r c e n t at the time of the next presidential contest in 1989. Given the m a g n i t u d e of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s dynamics, it is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t p e o p l e everywhere have b e c o m e m o r e analytically skillful, m o r e ready to challenge authority, a n d m o r e c a p a b l e of e n g a g i n g in collective actions that press their d e m a n d s . T h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n may be skewed a n d their u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e stakes at risk in situations may be loaded with bias, but the stimuli to action are now ever present. Today individuals can literally see t h e a g g r e g a t i o n of d e m a n d s a n d how t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s e l s e w h e r e can have m e a n i n g f u l c o n s e q u e n c e s . Likewise, t h e availability of high-tech c o m m u n i c a t i o n s e q u i p m e n t has e n a b l e d leaders in the public and private sectors to turn quickly to t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p s a n d mobilize t h e m in s u p p o r t of t h e i r i m m e d i a t e goals in the multi- a n d state-centric worlds. 1 8

GLOBALIZATION OF NATIONAL

ECONOMIES

If the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s revolution has b e e n a p r i m e stimulus of the t e n d e n c i e s toward d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n t h r o u g h the e m p o w e r i n g of citizens a n d s u b n a t i o n a l g r o u p s , t h e dynamics at work in t h e e c o n o m i c s realm are equally powerful as sources of the centralizing tendencies. Starting in the technologically most advanced sectors of the global economy, a n d following the e c o n o m i c crisis of 1973-1974, a new kind of p r o d u c t i o n organization geared to limited orders for a variety of specialized markets began to replace the large plants that p r o d u c e d s t a n d a r d i z e d goods. Consequently, with the p r o d u c t s of n u m e r o u s semiskilled workers b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r in big plants n o longer competitive with the outputs of a large n u m b e r of small units t h a t c o u l d b e t a i l o r e d to s h i f t i n g d e m a n d s , business b e c a m e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t restructuring capital so as to be m o r e effective in world markets. And as capital became increasingly internationalized, so did g r o u p s of p r o d u c e r s a n d plants in d i f f e r e n t territorial j u r i s d i c t i o n s b e c o m e linked in o r d e r to supply m a r k e t s in many c o u n t r i e s , all of which f o s t e r e d a n d sustained a financial system global in s c o p e a n d c e n t e r e d in m a j o r cities such as New York, Tokyo, a n d Frankfurt. In short, capital, p r o d u c t i o n , labor, a n d markets have all been

27

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globalized to t h e p o i n t w h e r e financiers, e n t r e p r e n e u r s , workers, a n d c o n s u m e r s a r e now deeply e n m e s h e d in networks of t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y t h a t have s u p e r s e d e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l political j u r i s d i c t i o n s of national scope. Such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n was b o u n d to i m p a c t u p o n t h e established p a r a m e t e r s of world politics. A m o n g o t h e r things, it served to loosen t h e ties of p r o d u c e r s a n d w o r k e r s to t h e i r states, to e x p a n d t h e h o r i z o n s w i t h i n w h i c h citizens p o n d e r e d t h e i r self-interests, a n d to f o s t e r t h e f o r m a t i o n of transnational organizations t h a t could o p e r a t e o n a global scale to p r o t e c t a n d advance t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r m e m b e r s . T h e rapid growth a n d m a t u r a t i o n of t h e multic e n t r i c w o r l d can in g o o d p a r t be t r a c e d to t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y dynamism a n d e x p a n s i o n of the global economy. And so can the w e a k e n i n g of t h e state, which is no l o n g e r the m a n a g e r of t h e n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y a n d has b e c o m e , instead, an i n s t r u m e n t f o r a d j u s t i n g t h e national e c o n o m y to the exigencies of an e x p a n d i n g world e c o n o m y . T h e q u e s t i o n arises as to w h e t h e r the globalization of national e c o n o m i e s may n o t o p e n u p new roles f o r t h e UN to play in a f f e c t i n g t h e c o u r s e of world economics. As will be seen, this is o n e centralizing tendency that seems unlikely to extend to the UN, if only b e c a u s e it involves private activities in those sectors of the m u l t i - c e n t r i c world w h e r e the UN c a n n o t claim any legitimacy. Agencies of the UN f r a m e codes for the c o n d u c t of transnational business, g a t h e r d a t a o n the f u n c t i o n i n g of various e c o n o m i c sectors, study p r o b l e m s of d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d otherwise facilitate i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m e r c e , 1 9 but on such large questions as fluct u a t i n g i n t e r e s t rates, c u r r e n c y crises, a n d m a r k e t s h a r e s , its specialized a g e n c i e s a n d o t h e r IOs play only p e r i p h e r a l roles at most, a n d t h e r e is little reason to expect any changes in this regard. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , if t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the globalization of n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s a r e assessed in t e r m s of t h e n u m b e r , c o m p o s i t i o n , activities, a n d loyalties of collective a c t o r s , t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which t h e UN p e r f o r m s its tasks will surely b e affected.

ADVENT OF INTERDEPENDENCE

ISSUES

But the evolution of the world e c o n o m y is n o t t h e only s o u r c e of c e n t r a l i z i n g t e n d e n c i e s at work in global life. T h e r e a r e also a n u m b e r of new, transnational p r o b l e m s that are crowding high on

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the world's agenda and forcing the globalization of certain kinds o f issues. W h e r e political agendas used to consist o f issues that governments could cope with on their own or through interstate bargaining, now these conventional issues are being j o i n e d by challenges that by their very nature do not fall exclusively within the jurisdiction o f states and their diplomatic institutions. Six current challenges are illustrative: environmental pollution, currency crises, the drug trade, terrorism, AIDS, and the flow of refugees. Each of these issues embraces processes that involve participation by large numbers o f citizens and that inherently and inescapably transgress national boundaries—the winds at Chernobyl, for example, carried the pollution into many countries and intruded upon many lives, ranging from the immediate impact on Lapps in northern Norway who were unable to market reindeer meat, to the long-term impact on thousands whose lives may be shortened by that single nuclear disaster—and thus make it impossible for governments to treat them as domestic problems or to address them through conventional diplomatic channels. Since they are essentially the product of dynamic technologies and the shrinking social and geographic distances that separate p e o p l e s , such p r o b l e m s can appropriately be called " i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " issues. And, given their origins and scope, they can also b e regarded as i m p o r t a n t centralizing dynamics in the sense that they impel cooperation on a transnational scale. All six issues, for instance, are the focus o f either transnational social m o v e m e n t s o r ad h o c i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions f o r g e d to ameliorate, if not to resolve, the boundary-crossing problems they have created. T h e advent of interdependence issues has contributed to the present era of turbulence in world politics in several ways. First, as in the case of the economic changes, such issues have given citizens pause about their states as the ultimate problem solver and, in the case o f those who j o i n social movements, they have r e o r i e n t e d people to p o n d e r a restructuring of their loyalties. In so doing, i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e issues have also f o s t e r e d the n o t i o n that transnational cooperation can be as central to world politics as interstate conflict. Equally important, given their diffuse, boundarycrossing structure, these types of issues are spawning a whole range of transnational associations that are furthering the density o f the multi-centric world and, as a result, are likely to serve as additional challenges to the authority of states. In short, the structure and c o n t e n t o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e issues lend themselves well to the involvement o f IOs.

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WEAKENING OF STATES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF LOYALTIES I n a s m u c h as the United Nations was created by states and continues to b e viewed as an i n s t r u m e n t of states, it is important to be clear a b o u t what is m e a n t by t h e w e a k e n i n g of states a n d how t h e loosening of their controls has contributed to the onset of global t u r b u l e n c e . Since several times we have n o t e d that these primary political actors have suffered a loss in their authority, and since their relevance to world politics a n d the f u t u r e of the UN is so great, f u r t h e r precision on the matter can usefully be undertaken. But first it must be stressed that the changing role of the state is n o t self-evident. States have not become peripheral to global affairs. O n t h e contrary, they c o n t i n u e to maintain their world and its international system, and in so d o i n g they continue to infuse it with vitality and a capacity for adapting to change. More than that, states have been and continue to be a source of the turbulent changes that are at work. After all, it was the state-centric and n o t the multicentric world that created multilateral organizations, that developed the a r r a n g e m e n t s t h r o u g h which the nuclear revolution has been c o n t a i n e d , that r e s p o n d e d to the d e m a n d s for decolonization in such a way as to p r o d u c e the hierarchical a r r a n g e m e n t s that have e n a b l e d the industrial countries to d o m i n a t e those in the T h i r d World, and that f r a m e d the debate over the distribution of t h e world's resources—to mention only a few of the more obvious ways in which states have shaped and still shape the ongoing realities of world politics. T o discern a d e c l i n e in the capacity of states, therefore, is not to suggest or in any way imply that they are no longer relevant actors on the world stage. As will be seen, several of the policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s set f o r t h below may well f o u n d e r because states retain the capacity to resist as well as stimulate changes that affect the structures of world politics. I n d e e d , s o m e analysts see states as increasingly robust a n d explicitly reject the patterns highlighted here. 2 0 This reasoning posits the state as so deeply ensconced in the routines and institutions of politics, both domestic and international, that the erosion of its capabilities a n d i n f l u e n c e is unimaginable. T h e state has proven itself, the a r g u m e n t goes, by performing vital functions that serve the needs of people, which is why it has been a r o u n d more than three h u n d r e d years. In its longevity, moreover, the state has overcome all kinds of challenges, many of which are far more severe than the globalization of national economies and the emergence of new types of collectivities. Indeed, the a r g u m e n t concludes, there are all kinds

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o f ways in which states may actually be accumulating g r e a t e r capabilities. This is, of course, not the occasion to amplify a refutation o f such a perspective. Suffice it to say that it seems just as erroneous to treat states as constants as it is to view the skills o f citizens as invulnerable to change. States are not eternal verities; they are as susceptible to variability as any other social system, and this includes the possibility o f a decline in the sovereignty principle from which they derive their legitimacy as well as an erosion of their ability to address problems, much less to come up with satisfactory solutions to them. 2 1 Viewed from the perspective of vulnerabilities, the growing density o f populations, the expanding complexity of the organized segments of society, the globalization of national economies, the constraint of external debts, the relentless pressure o f technological innovations, the c h a l l e n g e of subgroups intent upon achieving g r e a t e r a u t o n o m y , and the endless array o f o t h e r intractable p r o b l e m s that comprise the modern political agenda, it seems e v i d e n t that world politics has c u m u l a t e d to a severity o f circumstances that lessens the capacity of states to be decisive and efficient. T h e i r agendas are expanding, but they lack the will, c o m p e t e n c e , a n d resources to e x p a n d correspondingly. Consequently, most states are overwhelmed, unable to relieve their systemic overload to the point where effective m a n a g e m e n t is possible. And added to these difficulties is the fact that citizenries, through the microelectronic revolution, are continuously exposed to the scenes o f authority crises elsewhere in the world, scenes that are b o u n d to give rise to doubts and demands in even the most stable o f polities and thus to foment a greater readiness to question the legitimacy o f governmental policies. T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence, for e x a m p l e , that the collapse of authority in East Germany in the fall of 1989 was stimulated by the televised scenes of authority being challenged in T i a n a n m e n Square several months earlier. 2 2 Accordingly, while states may not be about to exit from the political stage, and while they may even continue to occupy the c e n t e r o f the stage, they do seem likely to b e c o m e increasingly vulnerable and impotent. And as such, as ineffective managers of their own affairs, they also serve as stimuli to turbulence in world politics—as sources o f autonomy in the multi-centric world, o f internal challenges to established authority, and of more analytically skillful citizens demanding more effective performances from their leaders.

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But this a r g u m e n t for diminished state c o m p e t e n c e is subtle a n d d e p e n d s o n a lot of intangible processes f o r which solid indicators are n o t easily developed. P e r h a p s most n o t a b l e in this r e g a r d are s u b t l e shifts in loyalties that a c c o m p a n y the globalization of the national economies, the decentralizing tendencies toward s u b g r o u p a u t o n o m y , a n d the e m e r g e n c e of p e r f o r m a n c e criteria of legitimacy. Such circumstances seem b o u n d to affect loyalties to the state. T h a t is, as transnational a n d subnational actors in the multi-centric world b e c o m e increasingly active a n d effective, as they d e m o n s t r a t e a capacity to deal with p r o b l e m s that states have f o u n d intractable or b e y o n d their c o m p e t e n c e , citizens will begin to look elsewhere than the national capital f o r assistance. Examples a b o u n d . Most notable in t h e c u r r e n t p e r i o d are the difficult choices that citizens of the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n h a d to m a k e between t h e i r l o n g - s t a n d i n g o r i e n t a t i o n s toward the Kremlin a n d the "downward" pull of the p a r t i c u l a r r e p u b l i c s or e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s to which they also b e l o n g e d . With the Kremlin u n a b l e to halt a n d reverse a s t e e p d e c l i n e in t h e Soviet e c o n o m y , a n d with t h e i r s u b n a t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t s b e i n g t h e r e b y h e i g h t e n e d , individuals all over that t r o u b l e d land had to face questions about their distant a t t a c h m e n t s t h a t they h a d l o n g t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . Bankers in t h e Russian Republic, for instance, had to c o n f r o n t a difficult situation in 1990, when t h e republic's Parliament voted to cut its share of the Soviet b u d g e t : normally the taxes f o r the Soviet Union were d e p o s i t e d in the republic banks, which then transferred t h e m to the coffers of the central government; but in this instance the bankers were told not to t r a n s f e r t h e full a m o u n t s while g e t t i n g p r e s s u r e to d o so f r o m authorities in the ccntral government. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the loyalty p r o b l e m as c o n f i n e d to m u l t i e t h n i c systems. Relatively h o m o g e n e o u s societies are beset with the same dilemma. Consider the situation of Norway, whose p e o p l e have a d e e p emotional a n d historical a t t a c h m e n t to the idea of i n d e p e n d e n c e . In 1972 they voted, by a small margin, not to j o i n the E u r o p e a n Community, but by 1990 they were faced with the possibility of being the only West E u r o p e a n country outside the EC as Sweden, Austria, Finland, and even Switzerland either applied for m e m b e r s h i p or indicated a readiness to forgo their traditional neutrality a n d seek admission to the EC. Norwegian loyalties, in o t h e r words, are b e i n g p u l l e d in an "upward" d i r e c t i o n as t h e e c o n o m i c a d v a n t a g e s of m e m b e r s h i p in a s u p r a n a t i o n a l organization increasingly challenge the psychologically satisfying a n d historically d e m o n s t r a t e d virtues of b e i n g a m e m b e r of an a u t o n o m o u s national community.23 Or ponder the unfolding

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malaise in France, w h e r e a m o o d of pessimism is widespread a n d w h e r e "many F r e n c h m e n have d o u b t s a b o u t the capacity of t h e i r c o u n t r y to m e e t successfully t h e d a n g e r s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d u n c e r t a i n t i e s which the f u t u r e holds." Put even m o r e succinctly, F r a n c e is p r e s e n t l y m a r k e d by a pervasive i m p r e s s i o n t h a t " s o m e t h i n g is b r e a k i n g apart, that society is decomposing," a n d that, i n d e e d , "all the institutions built over the past 40 years are in crisis a n d are t h e r e f o r e incapable of responding." 2 4 This is not to say that traditional national loyalties are b e i n g totally a b a n d o n e d . Plainly, such a t t a c h m e n t s d o n o t s u d d e n l y collapse. Rather, it is only to take note of subtle processes whereby w h a t was o n c e well e s t a b l i s h e d a n d b e y o n d q u e s t i o n is now p r o b l e m a t i c a n d u n d e r g o i n g change. Even m o r e relevantly, it seems reasonable to p r e s u m e that the diminished c o m p e t e n c e of states to a c t d e c i s i v e l y , c o m b i n e d with t h e p r o c e s s e s of loyalty transformation, serve as a significant source of the dynamics that are r e n d e r i n g m o r e c o m p l e x each of the t h r e e p r i m e p a r a m e t e r s of world politics. Clearly, t h e viability of the multi-centric world, t h e persistence of authority crises, a n d the analytic skills of individuals are all intensified the m o r e the capabilities of states decline a n d the m o r e t h e loyalties of citizens b e c o m e problematic. W h e t h e r these subtle processes can also serve as a f e e d i n g g r o u n d for the United N a t i o n s to a c q u i r e m o r e authority a n d to b e c o m e the focus of loyalty f o r m o r e individuals is, obviously, a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n that needs to be considered in d u e course.

SUBGROUPISM

S i n c e t h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d i n c l i n a t i o n to r e f e r loosely to "nationalism" as a source of the turbulent state of world politics, it is p e r h a p s useful to b e m o r e precise about the collective n a t u r e of those decentralizing t e n d e n c i e s wherein individuals a n d g r o u p s feel r e a d i e r to c h a l l e n g e a u t h o r i t y a n d r e o r i e n t t h e i r loyalties. As previously n o t e d , t h e a u t h o r i t y crises t h a t result f r o m s u c h c h a l l e n g e s can b e e i t h e r of an "upward" or a "downward" kind, d e p e n d i n g on whether the aspiration is to relocate authority in more or less e n c o m p a s s i n g jurisdictions than those that o p e r a t e at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 2 5 In a n u m b e r of instances of b o t h kinds of r e l o c a t i o n , t h e motivation that sustains t h e m is n o t so d e e p l y e m o t i o n a l as to qualify as an "ism." T h e creation of s u b n a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e divisions, f o r e x a m p l e , can stem f r o m d e t a c h e d

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efforts to rationalize the work of a governmental agency or private organization, and the process of implementing the decentralized a r r a n g e m e n t s can occur in the context of reasoned dialogue and calm d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . O f t e n , however, intense c o n c e r n s a n d p o w e r f u l a t t a c h m e n t s can a c c o m p a n y the press f o r new arrangements—feelings and commitments strong enough to justify regarding the upward relocations as evoking "transnationalism," " s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s m , " or " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . " T h e d o w n w a r d relocations marked by comparable intensities are p e r h a p s best labeled with the generic term "subgroupism." Framed concisely, subgroupism refers to those deep affinities people develop toward the close-at-hand associations, organizations, a n d s u b c u l t u r e s with which they have b e e n historically, professionally, economically, socially, or politically linked and to which they attach their highest priorities. Subgroupism values the i n - g r o u p over the out-group, sometimes treating the two as adversaries and sometimes positing them as susceptible to extensive cooperation. Subgroupism can derive from and be sustained by a variety of sources, not the least being d i s a p p o i n t m e n t in— and alienation f r o m — t h e performances of the whole system in which the subgroup is located. Most of all perhaps, its intensities are the p r o d u c t of long-standing historical roots that span g e n e r a t i o n s and that get reinforced by an accumulated lore s u r r o u n d i n g past events in which the subgroup survived trying circumstances. T h a t s u b g r o u p i s m can be deeply implanted in the consciousness of peoples is manifestly apparent in the resurfacing of strong ethnic identities throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union when, after decades, the authoritarian domination of Communist parties came to an end. In those cases, the subgroups were historic nations, and the accompanying feelings can thus be readily regarded as expressions of nationalism. Not all, or even a preponderance, of these decentralizing tendencies attach to nations, however. Governmental subdivisions, political parties, labor unions, churches, professional societies, and a host of other types of subgroups can also evoke intense attachments, and it would grossly understate the relevance of the decentralizing tendencies at work in world politics to ignore these other forms of close-at-hand ties. Accordingly, it seems preferable to regard the emotional dimensions of t h e g e n e r i c d e c e n t r a l i z i n g t e n d e n c i e s as those of subgroupism a n d to reserve the concept of nationalism for those subgroup expressions that revolve around nations and feelings of ethnicity.

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THE SPREAD OF HUNGER, POVERTY, AND THE THIRD WORLD U n d e r l y i n g t h e b i f u r c a t i o n of world politics i n t o state- a n d multicentric worlds has been a n o t h e r split—between industrially d e v e l o p e d a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s — t h a t has also c o n t r i b u t e d substantially to t h e o n s e t of t u r b u l e n c e . I n d e e d , o n e c o u l d readily d e v e l o p a typology b a s e d o n a four-way division of i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs in w h i c h t h e First a n d T h i r d W o r l d s a r e e a c h c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of state- a n d m u l t i - c e n t r i c subdivisions. T h i s has n o t b e e n d o n e h e r e b e c a u s e t h e b i f u r c a t i o n a s s o c i a t e d with t h e m a c r o p a r a m e t e r is global in s c o p e , w h e r e a s t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e First a n d T h i r d W o r l d s is m o r e in t h e n a t u r e of a regional split. It is n o n e t h e l e s s i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that the advent of t h e T h i r d World, its t e r r i b l e p r o b l e m s a n d t h w a r t e d aspirations, has b e e n a m a j o r s o u r c e of t h e p a r a m e t r i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t a r e p r e s e n t l y r o i l i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs. A m o n g o t h e r things, the diverse a n d n u m e r o u s c o u n t r i e s of t h e T h i r d W o r l d have a d d e d to t h e c o m p l e x i t y a n d d y n a m i s m of global s t r u c t u r e s ; s h a r p e n e d p e r f o r m a n c e c r i t e r i a of l e g i t i m a c y ; e n r i c h e d t h e analytic skills of t h e u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d ; h a s t e n e d t h e t r a n s n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i e s , c o r p o r a t i o n s , a n d social m o v e m e n t s ; limited t h e a u t h o r i t y of First W o r l d states over t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n facilities; intensified t h e flow of p e o p l e f r o m S o u t h to N o r t h ; l e n g t h e n e d t h e list of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e issues; a n d s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e t e n d e n c i e s toward s u b g r o u p i s m . T h e i m p a c t of t h e split f o s t e r e d by t h e b r e a k u p of E u r o p e ' s colonial e m p i r e s is p e r h a p s most obvious with respect to t h e global d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r . N o t only did d e c o l o n i a l i z a t i o n result in t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of actors in t h e state-centric world, b u t it also i n f u s e d a g r e a t e r rigidity in t h e h i e r a r c h y of t h e s t a t e - c e n t r i c w o r l d . T h e process w h e r e b y ever g r e a t e r p o w e r a c c o m p a n i e d t h e e m e r g e n c e of industrial states in t h e First World was n o t m a t c h e d w h e n s t a t e h o o d c a m e to Africa a n d Asia. T h e newly established states of t h e T h i r d W o r l d a c q u i r e d s o v e r e i g n t y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n even t h o u g h they lacked the internal resources and consensual f o u n d a t i o n s to p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r own d e v e l o p m e n t , a c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t led o n e astute observer to call t h e m "quasi-states" 2 6 a n d led t h e states themselves i n t o a d e e p r e s e n t m e n t over t h e i r d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e industrialized world f o r trade, technology, a n d m a n y of t h e o t h e r p r e r e q u i s i t e s n e c e s s a r y to f u l f i l l t h e i r d e s i r e f o r i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t . T h u s , as previously n o t e d , t h e i r sovereignty c a n b e r e g a r d e d as " n e g a t i v e " in t h a t it p r o t e c t s t h e m a g a i n s t o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e b u t d o e s n o t e m p o w e r t h e m to address t h e i r p r o b l e m s

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s u c c e s s f u l l y . 2 7 T h e result has b e e n a pervasive global p a t t e r n in w h i c h t h e industrial world has c o n t i n u e d to p r o s p e r while the T h i r d W o r l d has l a n g u i s h e d , thus endlessly r e i n f o r c i n g the i n e q u i t i e s that u n d e r l i e t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e s o f world politics. A n d having l o n g r e m a i n e d at o r below t h e poverty line, m o s t quasi-states a n d most o f t h e T h i r d W o r l d have b e e n keenly aware o f t h e i n e q u i t i e s a n d have s o u g h t vainly to o v e r c o m e them in a variety o f ways. P u t in t e r m s o f the b i f u r c a t i o n m o d e l , t h e quasi-states legally e n j o y full m e m b e r s h i p in t h e s t a t e - c e n t r i c world, but politically, socially, a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y they have had to s e e k assistance in t h e m u l t i - c e n t r i c world. T o c o p e with these b i f u r c a t e d a r r a n g e m e n t s , for e x a m p l e , t h e states o f the T h i r d W o r l d have turned both to a n d on v a r i o u s a g e n c i e s o f t h e U N system. T h e y have t u r n e d to t h e G e n e r a l Assembly and the E c o n o m i c and Social Council ( E C O S O C ) f o r s u p p o r t in p r o t e c t i n g a n d advancing t h e i r collective n e e d s , a n d they have t u r n e d on the Security C o u n c i l f o r failing to m e e t t h e s e n e e d s , f o r h a v i n g b e c o m e an i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e i r d o m i n a t i o n by t h e First W o r l d . F o r many T h i r d - W o r l d e r s the UN is an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e system o f d o m i n a t i o n that m a r k s g l o b a l s t r u c t u r e s , a n d thus m a n y would doubtless react to t h e p r o p o s a l s derived f r o m t h e t u r b u l e n c e m o d e l ( b e l o w ) for m a k i n g t h e U N a m o r e e f f e c t i v e a g e n t o f c h a n g e as simply m o r e o f t h e s a m e , as m i s p l a c e d idealism that a m o u n t s to little m o r e than t e c h n i q u e s f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t i o n . As they see it, b i f u r c a t i o n m e a n s the p e r p e t u a t i o n o f h i e r a r c h y , a n d h i e r a r c h y m e a n s that power is c o n t i n u o u s l y a n d relentlessly b e i n g e x e r c i s e d against t h e m . 2 8 W h a t e v e r may b e t h e validity o f this p e r s p e c t i v e , it has also s e r v e d as a s o u r c e o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in t h e m a c r o - m i c r o p a r a m e t e r . T h i r d W o r l d r e s e n t m e n t s , the legitimacy p r o b l e m s o f quasi-states, a n d t h e i r attempts to use their majority in t h e G e n e r a l Assembly to alter t h e UN's a g e n d a a n d priorities have e x t e n d e d a n d d e e p e n e d t h e g l o b a l authority crisis. I n d e e d , the U N has b e c o m e a m a j o r site o f t h e authority crisis as t h e T h i r d W o r l d has c h a l l e n g e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f its a c t i o n s a n d as t h e First W o r l d , f e a r f u l o f d o m i n a n c e by the T h i r d World, has also q u e s t i o n e d its legitimacy by periodically failing to m e e t its financial obligations to the UN. E v e n as t h e a d v e n t o f t h e T h i r d W o r l d has r i g i d i f i e d t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the state-centric world, so has it a d d e d to the d e c e n t r a l i z i n g t e n d e n c i e s in the multi-centric world. C o m p o s e d o f tribes a n d e t h n i c g r o u p s artificially b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r u n d e r state b a n n e r s by First W o r l d d e c o l o n i z e s , b e s i e g e d by m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s s e e k i n g to e x t e n d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s a n d m a r k e t s , a n d p l a g u e d with i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s a n d massive s o c i o e c o n o m i c

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problems, T h i r d World countries have added greatly to the breadth and depth o f the multi-centric world. T h e i r quasi-sovereignty keeps them active in the state system, but the multi-centric world has been hospitable to their fragmenting dynamics and thereby contributed to the process wherein subgroup networks are proliferating.

4 T H E U N AS A PRODUCT OF CHANGE

Whatever may b e the limitations of casting the t u r b u l e n c e model at a high level of abstraction, it has the virtue of f r e e i n g us to ask a n u m b e r of s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s t h a t have n o t b e e n previously explored. Most notably, it frees us f r o m the assumption that the UN is so t h o r o u g h l y m i r e d in the sovereignty principle that it has b e e n a n d c o n t i n u e s to b e impervious to f u n d a m e n t a l change. T h a t is, at a time when authority relationships t h r o u g h o u t the world are in flux a n d u n d e r g o i n g r e l o c a t i o n , w h e n the capacities of states a r e d i m i n i s h i n g , it s e e m s u n i m a g i n a b l e that t h e UN has n o t b e e n affected. T h e questions follow: • Has the UN b e n e f i t e d f r o m the advent of bifurcation a n d the g r e a t e r a u t o n o m y of actors in the multi-centric world in the sense that it, too, has g r e a t e r autonomy, that its agencies a n d officials are now m a j o r players in the multi-centric world even as they r e m a i n products a n d agents of the state-centric world? • Has the d i m i n i s h i n g capacities of states fostered a relocation of some authority in the United Nations a n d a readiness on the part of its agencies to i g n o r e , circumvent, or otherwise c h a l l e n g e the sovereignty principle? • If legitimacy a n d authority now rest m o r e o n p e r f o r m a n c e t h a n o n t r a d i t i o n a l criteria, d o e s this n o t suggest c o n s i d e r a b l e potential f o r the UN if its activities are m a r k e d by success? W h a t does it imply if the UN's record is o n e of repeated failure? • D o e s t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of s u b g r o u p s a n d t h e e t h n i c a n d c o m m u n a l conflicts that divide t h e m serve to weaken i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions a n d r e n d e r the UN ever m o r e ineffective? O r has the advent of m o r e n u m e r o u s g r o u p s increasingly f r e e of state controls facilitated the work of UN agencies?

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• Will the e x p a n d i n g skills of citizens c o n t r i b u t e to a lifting of their own h o r i z o n s that e n h a n c e s the status of UN p r o g r a m s a n d p e a c e m a k i n g activities? • Will t h e analytic habits of UN p e r s o n n e l prove sufficiently flexible to e n a b l e t h e m to take advantage of the new o p p o r t u n i t i e s a f f o r d e d by t h e b i f u r c a t i o n of world politics, the e r o s i o n of sovereignty principle, and the o t h e r uncertainties that are the heir of global t u r b u l e n c e ? O r will t h e i r habits be too r o o t e d in old premises, with the result that the centralizing dynamics at work in the world will find expression in new i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s a n d regional institutions that, in effect, bypass the UN? • Could it b e that the world is o n the verge of a drastically new global o r d e r in which IOs are increasingly foci of i m p o r t a n t decisions as they move m o r e effectively on the world stage, i n t r u d e m o r e fully into the internal affairs of states, and thereby e n c o u r a g e the s p r e a d of global n o r m s in socioeconomic realms as well as in the field of h u m a n rights? • If it is c o n c l u d e d t h a t UN agencies a n d officials a r e well situated to seize the initiative a n d give direction to the m a n a g e m e n t of g l o b a l t u r b u l e n c e , w h a t policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s s e e m a p p r o p r i a t e to facilitate such an outcome? • In short, given a rapidly c h a n g i n g global system whose longestablished p a r a m e t e r s have b e e n assaulted and t r a n s f o r m e d — a n d replaced by a bifurcated world where authority is p r o b l e m a t i c a n d citizens are increasingly c o m p e t e n t — w h e r e does the UN fit? T o what extent has it a d a p t e d to the changes? T o u n d e r t a k e to answer these questions is not only to assume that the dynamics and changes induced by global t u r b u l e n c e have in fact o c c u r r e d a n d are still u n f o l d i n g ; it is also to break with old analytic habits, to break out of the conceptual jail that posits the UN as exclusively located in the state-centric world a n d b o u n d by the sovereignty p r i n c i p l e a n d its C h a r t e r to m o d e r a t e , even o p p o s e , challenges f r o m actors or situations in the multi-centric world. More than that, to p r o b e these questions is to escape f r o m the even m o r e sturdy fortress that treats deviations f r o m the sovereignty principle as merely occasions when it serves the interests of the superpowers to act in c o n c e r t or those atypical m o m e n t s in history w h e n it is c o n v e n i e n t f o r states, especially the p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of t h e Security C o u n c i l , to c o n v e r g e a r o u n d a c o u r s e of a c t i o n t h a t transgresses the p r o h i b i t i o n against i n t e r f e r i n g in t h e d o m e s t i c affairs of states. T o see t h e UN as always s u b o r d i n a t e to t h e sovereignty principle a n d always acting only at the c o n v e n i e n c e of

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states, in o t h e r words, is to assume that every situation is i n d e p e n d e n t o f prior situations, that learning does not occur, that precedents never get established, and that the memory bank of states is e m p t i e d after the c o n c l u s i o n o f each situation. Put m o r e concretely, to b r e a k from such assumptions is to entertain the possibility that members of the state system are being swept along by the t u r b u l e n c e that has e n g u l f e d world politics a n d by the e m e r g e n c e o f new norms that are u n d e r m i n i n g the sovereignty p r i n c i p l e to the point where it is reasonable to shift from a convenience-of-the-states explanation of concerted UN action to a states-sometimes-feel-obliged-to-go-along perspective. Difficult as it may be to proceed in this manner, there are good reasons to do so. T h e s e reasons can be readily discerned if o n e plays the mental game of imagining that the UN had resisted change since its inception, that it had compiled a record of maladaptation with respect to the e m e r g e n t global o r d e r wrought by the transformations o f the three global parameters. T h e game is easy to play: a maladaptive UN would be mired in the sovereignty principle, unable to engage in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcing, peace building, or other forms of humanitarian activities because o n e o r a n o t h e r state felt threatened by its intrusion and thus o b j e c t e d ; a maladaptive UN across the decades would not have allowed for the periodic expansion o f the Secretary G e n e r a l ' s activities and influence; a maladaptive UN would not have evolved an elaborate, if not always efficient, administrative machinery for undertaking social, e c o n o m i c , and developmental activities in a variety o f fields. N o n e of these imagined c o n s e q u e n c e s of maladaptation, o f course, have occurred. Notwithstanding e n o r m o u s obstacles, the UN has recorded a history of engaging in peacekeeping; its Secretary G e n e r a l has b e c o m e a primary a c t o r on the world stage; its administrative machinery has proliferated. T o be sure, these steps beyond the sovereignty principle have been slow and erratic, but the trendline is there. T h e UN has been responsive to change. Its institutions have been adaptive. Its decisionmaking procedures have demonstrated a "notable elasticity" in coping with situations that cannot be attributed to its Charter and that, indeed, have reached the p o i n t w h e r e it "is now difficult to f o r m u l a t e a p r e c i s e definition—or the limits—of what [the UN's] functions may be." 2 9 As will be seen, this is not to deny a real, powerful tension in the UN between its constitutional prohibitions against interference in the d o m e s t i c affairs of its m e m b e r states and the t u r b u l e n t circumstances that encourage its interference. It is only to assert that

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t h e t r e n d l i n e depicts t h e tension b e i n g increasingly resolved in t h e favor of i n t e r f e r e n c e . R e i n f o r c e d by this c o n c l u s i o n , it is r e a s o n a b l e to e x p l o r e t h e q u e s t i o n s set f o r t h above.

THE UN AS A BENEFICIARY OF BIFURCATION E v e n as t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of actors o n t h e w o r l d stage a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g e x p a n s i o n of t h e multi-centric world have p o s e d new a n d difficult p r o b l e m s f o r t h e UN, so have t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s served to e n h a n c e its status. For t h e m o r e d e n s e t h e global stage has b e c o m e , t h e m o r e t h e U N has s t o o d o u t as a r e f u g e for t h e unfamiliar, as the only a c t o r t h a t can a d d r e s s i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e issues t h a t fall outside t h e e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of states. T h e l a t t e r c a n r e s o r t to d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s a n d u n d e r t a k e to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t s with e a c h o t h e r o n s u c h issues, b u t s i n c e t h e s e a r e issues t h a t a f f e c t c o m m u n i t i e s everywhere, eventually they are likely to be b r o u g h t to t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e relevant UN agencies o r any o t h e r IOs that may have an interest in t h e m . 3 0 In the case of s o m e issues, moreover, t h e d e m a n d s of citizens may b e so difficult f o r states to m e e t that they s i p h o n t h e m off to IOs, t r e a t i n g t h e latter as, so to speak, d u m p i n g g r o u n d s f o r u n p o p u l a r p r o b l e m s f o r w h i c h t h e r e a r e n o easy solutions. T h u s , it is hardly s u r p r i s i n g that the UN has increasingly moved i n t o t h e multi-centric world as o n e of its m a j o r players, even t h o u g h it also c o n t i n u e s as a p r o d u c t a n d a g e n t of t h e state-centric world. A n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e m o r e central it b e c o m e s in the f o r m e r world, t h e m o r e a u t o n o m y it achieves in t h e latter. States d o n o t have t h e capacity to b e involved in t h e wide array of p r o b l e m s that c o m p r i s e t h e g l o b a l a g e n d a , so t h a t in a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e U N ' s capacity in this r e g a r d they have, p e r h a p s u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , allowed t h e U N to a u g m e n t its a u t o n o m y a n d centrality. Actually, t h e UN has l o n g h a d extensive links to the sovereigntyf r e e a c t o r s of t h e m u l t i - c e n t r i c w o r l d . Article 71 of its C h a r t e r accords them ("non-governmental organizations," or NGOs) a f o r m a l c o n s u l t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e U N , a n d in s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e s this r e l a t i o n s h i p has evolved to t h e p o i n t w h e r e N G O s can justifiably be viewed as " i m p o r t a n t p a r t n e r s of t h e UN, r a t h e r t h a n as second-class citizens o r p o o r relations." 3 1 It m u s t be n o t e d , however, t h a t t h e N G O s t h a t a r e formally tied to t h e U N system c o n s t i t u t e only a small f r a c t i o n of t h e sovereignty-free actors who p o p u l a t e the m u l t i - c e n t r i c w o r l d . T h e n u m b e r of o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h o s e

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relationship to the UN is formally approved by its agencies is not small, and the global influence o f many of them is not trivial, 32 but nevertheless they amount to just a tiny proportion of the vast array of s u b n a t i o n a l and transnational sovereignty-free actors who have swollen the density o f the multi-centric world. Indeed, in some respects t h e i n f l u e n c e o f the latter may be as great as that exercised by those in the UN system. NGO affiliation with the UN system normally requires consultation with, and thus approval by, t h e m e m b e r state where the N G O has its h e a d q u a r t e r s , a requirement that nests these NGOs deep in the sovereignty world of states and binds them closely to its agenda. Since the accreditation processes invoke the rule of sovereignty and, in effect, allow states to veto the admission o f NGOs they oppose, requests for N G O status have frequently precipitated intergovernmental conflicts over the merits of the applicants. O n the other hand, those collectivities that do not have to go through the approval process may be b e t t e r situated to press their own agenda and exercise i n f l u e n c e indirectly through their own governments or directly through j o i n i n g with social movements to mobilize citizens on b e h a l f o f their goals. All in all, in short, the growing density of the multi-centric world seems bound to make the UN and its agencies increasingly salient as an a r e n a for considering issues with which national governments c a n n o t cope. And in fact the UN has in this fashion compiled an admirable record o f moving into a n u m b e r of situations—from refugees to famine relief, from the eradication of disease to the setting o f work standards—that involve the kind of altruistic politics to which the state-centric world is not closely attuned and that might have otherwise been neglected.

THE EROSION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE W h i l e a steady d i m i n u t i o n o f the sovereignty p r i n c i p l e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the bifurcation of the global system enables the UN to move more autonomously in the multi-centric world, it does not necessarily follow that its agencies act more independently in the state-centric world. They are, after all, the creatures o f the statecentric world. T h e i r mandates and funds originate with states and their activities are monitored by states, and they are thus ever subject to the whims, preferences, and biases of states. T h e recent history of U N E S C O offers a vivid example of what can happen to a UN agency

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w h e n key a c t o r s in t h e s t a t e - c e n t r i c w o r l d m a k e f u r t h e r s u p p o r t c o n d i t i o n a l o n c o m p l i a n c e with t h e i r d e m a n d s . Yet, t h e lessened i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d g r e a t e r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ol states has o p e n e d u p t h e possibility t h a t they may b e s o m e w h a t w e a k e n e d in t h e i r capacity to m o n i t o r a n d offset t h e directives ol UN officials. O r at least t h e e r o s i o n of t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e has r e n d e r e d m o r e s u b j e c t to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h a t t h e U N ' s m a n d a t e s are. A v a c u u m , as it w e r e , has c o m e to s u r r o u n d t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e in t h e s e n s e that t h e b o u n d a r i e s that divide t h e affairs ol states a n d t h o s e of t h e U N a r e n o l o n g e r clear-cut. W h e t h e r UN a g e n c i e s d a r e to move i n t o that v a c u u m a n d risk t h e o p p r o b r i u m of s t a t e s d e p e n d s in l a r g e p a r t o n t h e p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s of t h e i r officials—on w h e t h e r Secretaries General are ready to i n t e r p r e t their role in situations as allowing t h e m to u n d e r t a k e actions that have the e f f e c t of m o d i f y i n g t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e , o r w h e t h e r they will c o n c l u d e it is m o r e d i p l o m a t i c n o t to i n t r u d e in t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g d o m a i n s of states. W h i l e s o m e past Secretaries G e n e r a l may n o t have even r e c o g n i z e d t h e availability of t h e f o r m e r o p t i o n , t h e a d v e n t ol t h e c h a n g e s w r o u g h t by t u r b u l e n c e s e e m s likely to m a k e f u t u r e S e c r e t a r i e s G e n e r a l m o r e c o n s c i o u s that a c h o i c e exists, t h a t they may b e a b l e t o m o v e i n t o t h e v a c u u m . 3 3 As will b e s e e n , t h e existence of this c h o i c e highlights t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e criteria a n d p r o c e d u r e s e m p l o y e d to a p p o i n t new o c c u p a n t s of t h e S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l ' s office w h e n it b e c o m e s vacant. It s h o u l d be a d d e d that the leaders of national g o v e r n m e n t s are also a w a r e of t h e v a c u u m s u r r o u n d i n g their sovereignty a n d that t h e r e f o r e t h e c h a n c e s of S e c r e t a r i e s G e n e r a l successfully m o v i n g i n t o it a r e likely to b e g r e a t e r o n those occasions w h e n chiefs of state may b e o p e n to s u c h a move. As o n e o b s e r v e r p u t it, u s i n g a d i f f e r e n t b u t a p t m e t a p h o r , " T h e vessel of sovereign s t a t e h o o d is leaky; t h e p u m p s still work f r o m time to time, but n o t consistently; t h e c a p t a i n is n o t s u r e w h e t h e r to b e a c h t h e vessel o r to j o i n a fleet of similarly d a m a g e d ships sailing u n d e r n e g o t i a t e d o r d e r s . " 3 4

THE UN AS A LOCUS OF AUTHORITY T h e e r o s i o n of t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e also highlights t h e b a l a n c e of a u t h o r i t y b e t w e e n t h e UN a n d its m e m b e r states. S o v e r e i g n t y involves t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of final a u t h o r i t y , a n d w i t h s t a t e s e x p e r i e n c i n g i n c r e a s i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s in e x e r c i s i n g t h a t k i n d of a u t h o r i t y , it b e c o m e s e a s i e r to e n t e r t a i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t

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s o m e part o f the resulting vacuum might be filled by the UN. O f course, it is o n e thing for the UN to have b e c o m e increasingly autonomous and influential in the multi-centric world and for the range o f discretion open to its officials to have extended into the domain of states, but it is quite another matter to conclude that the UN is acquiring greater authority—even if only incrementally at a slow r a t e — i n e i t h e r or both o f the two worlds o f world politics. Given the history of IOs and the constitutive presumption of sovereignty accruing to their members, it may seem naive, idealistic, or otherwise far-fetched even to explore whether the actions of the UN have begun to have an authoritative ring to them. As noted, t h e r e is no escaping that the UN is an organization legitimized, funded, and otherwise sustained by states and their governments and that its actions remain subject to negation by its members. Yet, at a time when authority structures around the world are in crisis, when the criteria o f legitimacy are undergoing redefinition, and when authority is undergoing relocation in diverse directions, scenarios that depict accretions o f authority on the part of IOs certainly b e c o m e increasingly plausible. T h a t the derivation of such scenarios from the course of recent events is n o n e t h e l e s s difficult, i n h i b i t e d by a fear of b e i n g interpreted as raw idealism, needs to be emphasized. T h e habit of treating the UN as above all a state-dominated organization is deeply engrained, and those who perceive evidence to the contrary are ever prey to a sense that they are allowing their values to govern their j u d g m e n t s . Indeed, there is a tendency to compensate for such perceptions by leaning over backwards to demonstrate one's proper credentials through an introductory observation to the effect that, without question, the UN is a creature of the states that sustain it. O n e thoughtful observer, for example, discerns that "the range of issues articulated by the UN system is astounding" even as he initiates his analysis with the caveat that state dominance o f the UN is "beyond dispute h e r e . " 3 5 Another long-time student of the UN expresses the contradiction between his established analytic habits and his m o r e recent empirical insights by noting at one point that "the ultimate outcome of the struggle over allocative authority is not now p r e d i c t a b l e " and then later makes, in effect, a prediction: "Although the picture is blurred and in many places hard to decipher, there has been a movement away from the decentralized system o f respect for sovereignty and toward a more centralized system o f d e c i s i o n that in some respects a p p r o a c h e s b e i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l g o v e r n a n c e . " 3 6 It is almost as if the ambivalence of

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observers leads t h e m to a reluctance to discern a slow accretion of a u t h o r i t y by t h e UN o u t of f e a r that to d o so is s o m e h o w to j e o p a r d i z e t h e process of accretion, as if state officials might read their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d be led to tighten their surveillance of UN words a n d actions. A g o o d part of the p r o b l e m is that the UN is n o t a unitary actor. It is m o r e accurate, rather, to refer to it as the UN system, which, like g o v e r n m e n t s , consists of executive, legislative, administrative, a n d j u d i c i a l a g e n c i e s at its c e n t e r a n d n u m e r o u s specialized agencies in the field that are relatively a u t o n o m o u s of its central o r g a n s . All told, a full d i a g r a m of the vast array of specialized agencies, programmes, regional commissions, functional c o m m i s s i o n s , special f u n d s , ad h o c b o d i e s , a n d offices t h a t c o m p r i s e the UN system would include m o r e t h a n fifty distinct units, s o m e thirty of which have executive heads that are subject to p e r i o d i c election or a p p o i n t m e n t . 3 7 T h e d e g r e e of authority that attaches to the various units, of course, differs considerably, varying inversely with the d e g r e e to which they are d o m i n a t e d by national g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e responsibilities of t h e U N ' s Secretary General and the veto powers of the p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of t h e Security Council are illustrative of the two e x t r e m e s of this c o n t i n u u m . R a n g i n g b e t w e e n the two poles are the issues t h a t v a r i o u s UN a g e n c i e s have b e e n m a n d a t e d to a d d r e s s a n d ameliorate. Some analysts c o n t e n d that an inverse relationship also prevails between the salience of an issue a n d the authority particular UN o r g a n s can exercise with respect to it, with national g o v e r n m e n t s b e i n g reluctant to a u t h o r i z e UN actions in situations they regard as of critical i m p o r t a n c e . 3 8 O t h e r s are not so sure, arguing that the UN is g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y to a d d r e s s s o m e high-salience issues w h e n governments have a need to resolve them but either lack the capacity to d o so on their own or f e a r getting e n m e s h e d in an intractable s i t u a t i o n . 3 9 T h e Suez crisis of 1956, the c o n t i n u i n g Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the 1991 civil war in Yugoslavia are quintessential examples of these practices. Clearly, t h e n , whatever may be the s o u n d n e s s of the law of inverse salience, the question of whether authority has shifted in the direction of the UN d u r i n g this turbulent period c a n n o t be treated as a simple matter. T h e flow of authority can be depicted by many trendlines, d e p e n d i n g on which UN agencies and which issue areas are b e i n g assessed. Viewed in this way, it seems clear that t h e a f o r e n o t e d ambivalence a b o u t discerning an accretion of authority by the UN focuses mainly o n those issues where the decisionmaking

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process is least centralized and states a d h e r e closely to a selfinterested view o f their role, vetoing or voting against UN authority w h e n it i m p i n g e s on t h e i r sovereign prerogatives. Put m o r e precisely, the fear of straying from a state-dominant conception of the UN has been most notable with respect to issues pertaining to t h e use o f f o r c e , p r o p e r t y rights, c o d e s f o r t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s , and sovereignty over resources, whereas the UN's history is m a r k e d by a m o r e discernible trend toward g r e a t e r authority with respect to social issues such as food aid, refugees, and human rights. In pondering such issue-area differences, it is useful to note that authority need not be linked to the capacity to enforce decisions. This link tends to come to mind in connection with the notion of sovereign authority, which entitles the sovereign to resort to force to bring about desired results. But such a conception is misleadingly narrow. M o r e often than not, political authorities are able to e x e r c i s e authority without explicating that their directives may ultimately be backed with force. T h e key to discerning the presence or absence of effective authority, in other words, is to be found not in the capacities o f those who wield authority, nor in the symbols and rituals that attach to their activities. Rather, it lies in the structure o f the relationship between the authorities and those to whom they issue their directives, in the readiness of the latter to comply with the preservation or moderation of their behavior sought by the former. T h e UN's authority relationships can thus take several forms and be distributed along several continua, all o f which can involve the modification o f the behavior of those toward whom the exercise o f authority is directed. One continuum distinguishes between formal and informal authority, between authority that is r e c o r d e d in Security C o u n c i l votes and the International C o u r t o f J u s t i c e decisions on the o n e hand and authoritative actions or words that are n o t written down but are no less effective in achieving c o m p l i a n c e . A n o t h e r continuum differentiates various forms o f authority in terms of the time that elapses between its exercise and the c o m p l i a n c e it evokes, with one extreme requiring immediate compliance and the other not being specific as to when a compliant action is expected. Still another focuses on the difference between authority that evokes compliance and authority that is not confirmed through a compliant response but at the same time is not rejected and is thus inferentially accepted. Equally important, there is the distinction between authority that is effective because its targets comply and authority that is effective because third parties d o not

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o b j e c t to it b e i n g exercised against the targets. As will b e seen, C h i n e s e a b s t e n t i o n s in t h e Security Council's votes o n the use of f o r c e against I r a q a r e clear-cut e x a m p l e s of this latter f o r m of authority. It follows t h a t the U N ' s authority to get a m e m b e r state to u n d e r t a k e or to desist f r o m a course of action is not the only basis for d e t e r m i n i n g its extent a n d effectiveness. Its agencies can exercise authority in a variety of ways that are so habitual that b o t h m e m b e r states a n d observers c o m e to take it for g r a n t e d . C o n s i d e r , f o r e x a m p l e , this listing of activities t h a t o c c u r w i t h o u t e v o k i n g controversy over t h e i r authoritative f o u n d a t i o n s : "UN agencies set agendas; d e t e r m i n e rules a n d procedures to be followed in r e a c h i n g decisions beyond what is specified in the constitutional instruments; create s u b o r d i n a t e organs, commissions, committees, inquiry missions, a n d p a n e l s of various kinds a n d fix t h e i r t e r m s of r e f e r e n c e ; organize international conferences a n d decide w h e r e they m e e t ; establish t h e principles a n d guidelines to b e followed in e m p l o y i n g s e c r e t a r i a t m e m b e r s ; c h o o s e executive heads; elect m e m b e r s of o r g a n s a n d subsidiary b o d i e s a n d n a m e o f f i c e r s of p l e n a r y a n d o t h e r bodies; a n d alter c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u ments." 4 0 T h u s far the analysis is as applicable to the period p r e c e d i n g the onset of t u r b u l e n c e as it is to the present era. How, then, might the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the t h r e e parameters affect the UN's authority? In part, we have o u t l i n e d an answer to the question in the a f o r e n o t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that the bifurcation of global structures has e n a b l e d the UN to a u g m e n t its a u t o n o m y in the multi-centric world. It seems clear that the m o r e a u t o n o m o u s the UN is in addressing the social a n d e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s of actors in this world, the m o r e likely it is to e n l a r g e its a u t h o r i t y in these spheres. T h a t is, as states a n d s o v e r e i g n t y - f r e e a c t o r s b e c o m e increasingly a c c u s t o m e d to UN agencies acting a u t o n o m o u s l y in nonmilitary issue areas, the m o r e likely they are to accord ever greater legitimacy a n d authority to such a c t i o n s . M o r e a c c u r a t e l y , as n o t e d below, this a t t r i b u t i o n of legitimacy is likely to be m a d e as long as the p e r f o r m a n c e s of UN agencies are within the framework of acceptable criteria. But t h e r e remains the war-and-peace realm where the sovereignty principle is deeply ensconced in the state-centric world. How might the advent of t u r b u l e n c e affect the UN's authority in this issue area? T h e answer involves a multiplicity of factors a n d complex processes of i n t e r a c t i o n . As the density a n d dynamism of world politics c o n t i n u e to e x p a n d , a g r o w i n g awareness of t h e ineffectiveness of war as an i n s t r u m e n t of national policy, as well as a

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d e e p e n i n g revulsion with respect to its horrors, has evolved. 41 More capable of appreciating that the aftermath of war can be as plagued with as many p r o b l e m s as the resort to military action was designed to solve, p e o p l e everywhere are increasingly resistant to policies that can c u l m i n a t e in the onset of p r o l o n g e d combat. T o be sure, the world is n o t f r e e of ideologues a n d jingoist war-mongers, b u t the greater analytic skills of citizens, the advent of global television that b r i n g s t h e realities of war i n t o t h e h o m e , a n d t h e correlative evolution of a worldwide n o r m s u r r o u n d i n g the values associated with h u m a n rights a n d dignity s e e m to have led to a pervasive w a r - w e a r i n e s s , to r e l u c t a n t p u b l i c s a n d i n v i g o r a t e d p e a c e movements. It is possible, of course, to cite exceptions, such as the Iraqi attack o n Kuwait a n d the s u b s e q u e n t response of the thirty-onenation coalition led by the United States, in which the use of force was widely c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t e . Yet, n o matter how violent a n d extensive these exceptions may seem, it is questionable w h e t h e r they express a c e n t r a l t e n d e n c y i n a s m u c h as t h e i r a p p a r e n t a p p r o priateness derives largely f r o m the fact that war-weariness could not set in b e c a u s e t h e military o p e r a t i o n s lasted only several weeks. I n d e e d , the p r e s e n t p e r i o d provides a m o r e conspicuous t e n d e n c y indicative of the growing awareness of the ineffectiveness of war: it was n o t sheer coincidence that six wars came to an e n d in 1988, 4 2 or at least the simultaneity of these similar outcomes strongly suggests how t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of global p a r a m e t e r s has i m p a c t e d o n the viability of war as a tool of statecraft. 4 3 If pervasive public d o u b t s a b o u t the wisdom of r e s o r t i n g to military action are p o n d e r e d in the context of states whose authority has b e e n w e a k e n e d and whose officials are thus m o r e hesitant about the readiness of their citizenries to make the c o m m i t m e n t s necessary to wage successful wars, it seems reasonable to p r e s u m e that new o p p o r t u n i t i e s are d e v e l o p i n g f o r the UN in the war-peace realm. This may be especially the case when wars begin with overt a n d unmistakable attacks that cross national boundaries. Unlike conflicts initiated t h r o u g h terrorism and infiltrated guerrilla movements, wars that start with the conventional movement of troops across b o r d e r s evoke all the emotions that attach to the sovereignty principle as well as those associated with war-weariness. Thus, it is hardly surprising that t h e two occasions when the UN Security Council a u t h o r i z e d a resort to military action, in Korea in 1950 a n d Iraq in 1991, were both distinguished by the overtness of their beginnings. T h e capacity of t h e U n i t e d States to mobilize thirty-one states to j o i n t h e UNs p o n s o r e d coalition against Iraq is also a logical c o n s e q u e n c e of the

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n e w p a r a m e t e r values t h a t are s u s t a i n i n g t u r b u l e n c e in world politics. I n d e e d , while the c o m m i t m e n t s of the thirty-one states to the war effort varied considerably, their n u m b e r is a good indication of t h e s p r e a d i n g n o r m t h a t rejects the legitimacy of overt a n d conventional military onslaughts. T h i s is n o t to c o n t e n d , however, that the world has m a d e an about-face with respect to the sovereignty principle. Doubtless that principle still remains as a core premise in the foreign offices of the state-centric world. I n d e e d , in the case of many f o r m e r colonial c o u n t r i e s , t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e is t h e i r p r i m e asset, since virtually all of t h e m acquired s t a t e h o o d without the e c o n o m i c a n d consensual f o u n d a t i o n s t h a t sustain effective governance. For such states to allow any i n r o a d s into their sovereignty would b e to d i m i n i s h g r e a t l y t h e i r l e v e r a g e in s e e k i n g e c o n o m i c a n d d e v e l o p m e n t assistance f r o m their industrialized counterparts in the state-centric world. 4 4 Nevertheless, as the Gulf War demonstrates, the inviolability of the principle has been u n d e r m i n e d . In acknowledging that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was n o t a domestic, local, or regional p r o b l e m , that it c o n s t i t u t e d a global challenge sufficient to justify collective action, state officials evidenced a readiness to ignore the sovereignty p r i n c i p l e when collective e n d e a v o r occurs u n d e r UN sponsorship. In this respect the Chinese abstention in the voting on the Security Council resolution a u t h o r i z i n g military action against Iraq stands out as a l a n d m a r k as m u c h as the majority vote itself. T h e Chinese r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r long-standing o p p o s i t i o n to i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e domestic affairs a n d b o u n d a r y disputes of states, a n d yet they could n o t b r i n g themselves to act on their own historic c o m m i t m e n t s . Since they could not also bring themselves to sanction what they r e g a r d e d as a n i n t r u s i o n on t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e , they abstained, a n d in that abstention o n e can see the balance starting to tip against the historic norms of the state-centric system p e r t a i n i n g to the use of force. S o m e might argue that the successful intervention of the antiIraq c o a l i t i o n was d u e to special c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t properly be interpreted as part of a movement away f r o m the sovereignty principle. Such an a r g u m e n t , however, is n e g a t e d by s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s : the e n d of the Iraq war o f f e r e d even m o r e impressive signs that t u r b u l e n c e has thrown the equilibrium s u r r o u n d i n g t h e sovereignly p r i n c i p l e i n t o d i s e q u i l i b r i u m a n d thereby o p e n e d the d o o r wider f o r the UN in the war-peace realm. C o n f r o n t e d with h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of Iraqi Kurds a n d Shiite Muslim Arabs fleeing Saddam Hussein's brutal repression at the

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war's end, the horrors o f which were captured and repeatedly displayed over global television, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 6 8 8 , which c o n d e m n e d the repression, and asked the Secretary G e n e r a l to investigate the plight o f the refugees. T h e Council dismissed Iraq's objection that its handling of the problem was an i n t e r n a l affair and that any UN action was " b l a t a n t i n t e r f e r e n c e , " asserting instead that the wave o f refugees flowing toward T u r k e y a n d Iran t h r e a t e n e d " i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e a n d security." T h i s a c t i o n was n o t merely an e x t e n s i o n o f the peacekeeping obligations that the UN took on at the end o f the war. On the contrary, it was an entirely new intrusion into the sovereignty principle. O n c e again, however, the breakthrough into uncharted areas of the sovereignty principle was not clear-cut and unqualified. T h e principle did not simply collapse. For Resolution 688 did not back the statement o f c o n c e r n for the refugees with action to protect them. T h a t c a m e from the United States, which was in large part moved by European pressures and by the television scenes of human suffering to undertake to establish, supply, and protect sanctuary sites for Kurdish refugees in n o r t h e r n Iraq. T h e United States c o n t e n d e d that the building of sanctuaries came under Resolution 688, b u t S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l J a v i e r Pérez de Cuéllar q u e s t i o n e d whether the United States could lawfully intervene on Iraqi soil without a new and explicit authorization by the Security Council. When the United States subsequently sought approval for a United Nations police f o r c e to replace its forces in northern Iraq, the Secretary G e n e r a l sent an envoy to Baghdad to ask for Iraq's approval of the idea. Iraq rejected the request, claiming it involved an illegal violation o f Iraqi sovereignty, and the Secretary General reiterated that new Security Council authorization was n e e d e d for the UN to take over the policing process. T h e United States was reported not to have sought the new authority on the grounds that both the Soviet Union and China opposed UN intervention without Iraq's c o n s e n t . T h e i r opposition had its roots in the multi-centric world, with the Chinese being fearful that the Tibetans could theoretically appeal for the same sort o f UN p r o t e c t i o n and the Soviets having the same fear with respect to the Baltic republics. So the tipping of the balance against the sovereignty principle has b e e n halting and spasmodic. But it has tipped. T h e global preoccupation with human rights provides ample and continuing evidence of the shifting balance. And so, more recently, does the a b s e n c e o f a worldwide outcry in d e f e n s e of the sovereignty

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principle a n d in opposition to the United States' actions in n o r t h e r n Iraq. Q u i t e to the contrary: the UN's inaction o n the issue was the focus of considerable criticism, with m o r e than a few editorials a n d columnists praising the U n i t e d States for its compassionate actions a n d d e n o u n c i n g t h e UN f o r b e i n g m i r e d in t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e . 4 5 H u m a n i t a r i a n imperatives, many a r g u e d , take p r e c e d e n c e over t h o s e a f f i r m i n g n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h u s j u s t i f y i n g relaxation of the sovereignty principle. While this a r g u m e n t has yet to be given expression t h r o u g h action resolutions by the Security Council, the fact that it has b e e n vigorously advanced in the multicentric w o r l d — a n d r e i n f o r c e d by television pictures of u n s p e a k a b l e h o r r o r — s u g g e s t s that t h e pressure on the UN to s u p p l e m e n t its words with action on such matters is likely to build in the f u t u r e . 4 6 If it is t h e case that the world's concern for h u m a n rights is e x p a n d i n g , surely it will n o t be long b e f o r e a worldwide p r e o c c u p a t i o n with h u m a n dignity takes root. T h e r e is, moreover, the fact that the circumstances s u r r o u n d i n g the ouster of Iraq f r o m Kuwait a n d the s u b s e q u e n t response to the plight of the Kurds is part of the memory bank on which actors in b o t h w o r l d s of w o r l d politics will draw in t h e f u t u r e . T h e incremental expansion of the authority of the UN may not have been clearly established by the Gulf War and its aftermath, but n e i t h e r has it b e e n reversed. An i n c r e m e n t did occur a n d , as such, it fits well into the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d trendline, the same pattern that has lately led to t h e UN supervising national elections in N i c a r a g u a a n d Haiti—to m e n t i o n only two of the more salient instances where "the work of h u m a n i t a r i a n organizations is p u s h i n g forward the ethics a n d logic of t h e right to intervene." 4 7 They are part of what o n e observer depicts as "a s e q u e n c e of episodes involving conflict a n d its a b a t e m e n t t h r o u g h the UN [that can] be e x p e c t e d to make actors aware of the fact that they are subject to constraints o t h e r t h a n their relative weakness vis-a-vis their o p p o n e n t s . Such constraints i n c l u d e the n e e d to justify themselves when attacked in a UN f o r u m , to be t h r e a t e n e d with boycotts or ostracism, to be m a d e t h e subject of p e a c e k e e p i n g against their will. T h e constraints also i n c l u d e the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t persistence in unilateral behavior can result in eventual isolation a n d even defeat." 4 8 In o t h e r words, the threat of o p p r o b r i u m m a t t e r s as states b e c o m e increasingly sensitive to h u m a n i t a r i a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In an age w h e r e citizens a r e m o r e analytically skillful a n d more ready to r e n d e r j u d g m e n t s f o u n d e d on p e r f o r m a n c e criteria, the m o r e g o v e r n m e n t s are subject to c a r i n g a b o u t their i n t e r n a t i o n a l esteem a n d the reactions of publics at home.

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THE POTENTIAL OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA I n a s m u c h as the UN is an actor on the global stage, presumably it is as affected by the shift from traditional to p e r f o r m a n c e criteria o f legitimacy as are states, public officials, and private organizations. Yet, a n t i c i p a t i n g and tracing the impact o f the shift on the UN is m o r e difficult than in the o t h e r cases. T h e problem arises out o f the UN's seemingly a m o r p h o u s identity. It is at o n e and the s a m e time an international actor, a vehicle for international actors, and a site at which interaction occurs a m o n g international actors. Unfortunately, it is all t o o easy to lose sight o f these distinctions and attribute c o m p e t e n c e to a vague and unspecified entity that is merely a locale, a c o l l e c t i o n o f buildings in which activities unfold. H e r e , however, the UN is c o n c e i v e d exclusively as an actor, as a collectivity greater than the sum o f its m e m b e r s in the sense that agencies and officials act in its name. U n l i k e states, g o v e r n m e n t s , and actors in the m u l t i - c e n t r i c w o r l d , t h e U N is n o t r e a d i l y l i n k e d to a s i n g l e l e a d e r , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , o r t e r r i t o r i a l l o c a t i o n . R a t h e r , it is a widely d i s p e r s e d system, t h e a c t i o n s o f which are e m b o d i e d in t h e resolutions o f its Security Council and G e n e r a l Assembly as well as in the n u m e r o u s agencies that implement its policies. N o n e o f these move a r o u n d on the global stage in such a way as to b e easily recognized or easily held accountable. T o be sure, at any m o m e n t in time the U N ' s S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l gives voice to its aspirations, problems, and plans, but the voice of the Secretary General is widely h e a r d m o r e as that o f a legislative spokesperson who cautiously articulates the minimal area o f a g r e e m e n t possible within a diverse and c o n f l i c t e d legislature than as that o f a decisive executive who speaks authoritatively for his organization. In s h o r t , it is by no m e a n s c l e a r whose p e r f o r m a n c e s are involved, o r o f what c o n c r e t e actions they consist, when p e o p l e undertake to apply criteria for evaluating how well the UN is doing in any given situation. T h e widespread n o t i o n that " t h e r e is no United Nations o t h e r than the collectivity o f m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s " 4 9 can serve to disperse responsibility so extensively as to paralyze a s s e s s m e n t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e very i m a g e o f t h e U N ' s a m o r p h o u s a n d dispersed structure puts it in a position o f b e i n g evaluated positively when a situation turns out well and not b e i n g blamed when things go astray. T h a t is, if circumstances are seen as having b e e n improved, o r at least not worsened, by virtue o f the UN's a c t i o n s , t h e n it will be viewed as having m e t a p p r o p r i a t e standards o f p e r f o r m a n c e . But if the circumstances are c o n s i d e r e d

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to have worsened, o r if they are regarded as a reflection of failure, then the UN's contribution can be excused on the grounds that its efforts were hindered by the sovereignty principle. This tendency to exonerate the UN is further reinforced by the authority crises that have beset states. Inclined to fault either their own o r o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s for the persistence of i n t r a c t a b l e problems, people are less likely to focus their doubts and criticisms on the UN. 5 0 T h i s is not to ignore the fact that the UN's history records m o m e n t s when its performances, especially votes in the Security C o u n c i l a n d G e n e r a l Assembly, have b e e n criticized, even c o n d e m n e d , by those whose interests were offended. Israel's a n n o y a n c e over the 1974 General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism and Third World antagonism to the thwarting o f its d e m a n d s for new information and e c o n o m i c orders are perhaps the most conspicuous examples in this regard. Indeed, t h e s e r e s e n t m e n t s have t e n d e d to linger and r e i n f o r c e the perception of biased majorities as international actors. On the other hand, o n e wonders how long the perception of a collective bias will survive in the event of offsetting performances in specific situations. Israel may long give voice to a distaste for UN involvement in Middle East affairs, and some Third World countries may long object to the d o m i n a n c e of First World concerns in UN deliberations; but it is possible to i m a g i n e a shift in these orientations if c o n c r e t e performances by the Secretary General or other organs begin to convey alternative perspectives. On balance, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that the UN benefits f r o m the shifting criteria of p e r f o r m a n c e . As p e o p l e b e c o m e increasingly performance-oriented and as they increasingly come to question the competence of states, the UN seems destined to gain. Its legitimacy is bound to undergo incremental enrichment as it b e c o m e s ever m o r e e n m e s h e d in the two worlds o f world politics and enjoys successes that are increasingly assessed in terms o f what happens rather than in terms of traditional criteria that delineate what forms o f action are constitutionally or politically appropriate. In an important sense the tendency to question the performance o f states is why the UN has survived for so long. T h e crises and setbacks that marked the first forty-five years of its existence were attributed to the superpowers, to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and to the sovereignty principle, thus diverting attention from the UN and enabling it to persist and mature as an institution. If the League of Nations came

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to an e n d b e c a u s e of a world war it could not prevent, t h e UN has e n d u r e d because such a war never o c c u r r e d a n d because it has n o t b e e n h e l d responsible f o r intervening crises. It m i g h t b e a r g u e d t h a t this e s t i m a t e of t h e i m p a c t of p e r f o r m a n c e criteria of legitimacy suffers f r o m t h e fact that only a small p r o p o r t i o n of t h e w o r l d ' s p e o p l e s have h a d occasion to observe t h e UN in action. So m u c h of the UN's work is r o o t e d in studies a n d c o n f e r e n c e s , this line of reasoning asserts, that only the tip of t h e i c e b e r g is available f o r evaluation. Unlike states, whose agents interface with citizens in a great variety of ways, UN p e r s o n n e l are p o s t e d at d i s t a n t t r o u b l e spots a n d thus n o t visible to most p e o p l e . O r , to t h e e x t e n t the work of the UN is readily o p e n to assessment by large populations, it is when the deliberations of its G e n e r a l Assembly a n d Security Council are televised, circumstances t h a t only d e m o n s t r a t e w h a t a s o v e r e i g n t y - b o u n d , d i s p e r s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n it is a n d thus n o t c o n d u c i v e to the a p p l i c a t i o n of p e r f o r m a n c e criteria. How, then, t h e a r g u m e n t concludes, can the UN possibly be the focus of favorable evaluations? While t h e r e is n o d o u b t that the UN could b e n e f i t f r o m m o r e effective e f f o r t s to i n f o r m a n d e d u c a t e publics a b o u t its diverse endeavors, the c o n t e n t i o n that it is essentially an invisible p r e s e n c e in world politics is flawed f o r several reasons. O n e is that o n e or a n o t h e r of its agencies has b e e n drawn into many of the situations f o s t e r e d by t h e o n s e t of t u r b u l e n c e . F r o m elections in divided polities to h u m a n i t a r i a n work in Africa, f r o m p e a c e k e e p i n g in L e b a n o n to p e a c e m a k i n g in the Iran-Iraq war, f r o m d e v e l o p m e n t activities in Asia to peace e n f o r c e m e n t in Kuwait, f r o m f o r m u l a t i n g a c o d e f o r t h e m a r k e t i n g of baby f o o d s to f o c u s i n g year-long a t t e n t i o n o n t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e e n v i r o n m e n t or the plight of children, the U N system is m u c h m o r e salient than it was in earlier eras. I n d e e d , t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of its agencies are located in thirtyf o u r c o u n t r i e s , a n d a r e c e n t perusal of its p h o n e book lists cable c o n n e c t i o n s to offices in 117 cities t h r o u g h o u t the world. 5 1 Second, t h e r e appears to be an increasing n u m b e r and variety of situations w h e r e the UN is viewed as a highly relevant actor. Most notably p e r h a p s , t h e Bush administration was impelled to get the approval of the Security Council at crucial stages in the campaign to oust Iraq f r o m Kuwait. Hardly less conspicuous is the large e x t e n t to which actors in t h e T h i r d World turn to t h e UN as a m e a n s of c o n t e s t i n g t h e d o m i n a n c e of t h e First W o r l d . As p r e v i o u s l y indicated, t h e i r inclinations to perceive the UN as having c o m p i l e d a history of a r t i c u l a t i n g First World interests can be offset by a recognition of t h e large extent to which their majority in the General

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Assembly has p r o t e c t e d a n d advanced their interests. T h e insistence of several T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s t h a t t h e UN be involved in s p o n s o r i n g a c o n f e r e n c e on Arab-Israeli tensions after the Gulf War is a r e c e n t instance of a readiness to turn to the UN as a m e c h a n i s m for addressing a n d resolving conflict situations. T h i r d , it is too simple to p r o c e e d f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t "whatever the U n i t e d Nations says or does . . . reflects the collective decisions of its m e m b e r governments." 5 2 This may be so in a variety of ways, b u t it is also the case that, like any collectivity, the w h o l e is larger than the sum of its parts, that the aggregation of its m e m b e r s ' inputs creates an entity that "says" a n d "does" outputs that stand o n their own, a p a r t f r o m those who contributed to their f o r m u l a t i o n . 5 3 C o n c r e t e evidence of the UN's separateness as an identifiable actor in world politics can be seen in the fact that it has a legal standing, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l bases, organizational p r e c e d e n t s , a flag, p r o p e r t y , b a n k accounts, a n d institutionally c o m m i t t e d executive heads a n d staffs. For all its lack of publicity, in short, the UN would a p p e a r to occupy m u c h m o r e of a spotlight on the world stage than it ever has previously.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANALYTICALLY SKILLFUL

MORE

CITIZENS

Since the UN is c o m p o s e d of states rather than p e o p l e a n d thus lacks t h e kind of constituencies that governments a n d s u b n a t i o n a l organizations have, it might seem far-fetched to p r o b e its o p e r a t i o n s f o r c o n s e q u e n c e s of the worldwide impact of e x p a n d i n g analytic skills. Yet, the impact of this dimension of global t u r b u l e n c e c a n n o t be d i s c o u n t e d . It may not directly i m p a c t on the UN b e c a u s e individuals t e n d to look to their g o v e r n m e n t s for the f r a m i n g of suitable policies or the redressing of noxious wrongs, but t h e r e are a n u m b e r of indirect routes t h r o u g h which the e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e of individuals can be traced. Foremost a m o n g these, of course, are the pressures that publics exert on their own governments to extend, contract, or otherwise sustain their relationships to the U N — t o pay the assessed dues, to comply with UN resolutions, to provide the resources a n d p e r s o n n e l n e e d e d for p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s , to intensify or downplay criticism of the Secretary General, a n d to cast or reverse particular votes in the legislative arenas of the UN. Such pressures are not irrelevant to the context within which the UN seeks to advance its collective goals. T h e votes its members' delegates cast, t h e decisions of t h e Secretary G e n e r a l , a n d the day-to-day field

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operations o f its agencies are all partially responsive to the climate of opinion that prevails at a given moment in time with respect to the general esteem in which the UN is held. T o be sure, publics are fickle and their moods can swing widely for and against the UN. But it is reasonable to presume that as people become more analytically skillful, as they b e c o m e m o r e and m o r e appreciative o f the complexity of world affairs, and as they b e c o m e more sensitive to t h e limits within which their governments must o p e r a t e , the fluctuations in their moods are likely to diminish and their grasp o f the roles the UN can play is likely to deepen. T h i s is not to imply that the UN may b e c o m e a focus o f loyalties. Quite to the contrary: the prospects for the tendencies toward centralization in world politics resulting in the UN emerging as the focus for the loyalties of people seem very remote indeed. S o m e day there may be a world government, and the UN may some day be that world government, but the bifurcation o f world politics is too hospitable to the sovereignty principle to imagine a time in the near future when the UN replaces states as a primary focus of primary loyalties. On the other hand, the foregoing is to say that individuals are not so wedded to the sovereignty principle that they are unable to lift their sights beyond the nation-state and attach significance to supranational actors. J u s t as the tendency to assess negatively the p e r f o r m a n c e of states leads people to search for subnational actors that can more effectively address their problems, so are they likely to be drawn to IOs that can serve their needs or values. Amnesty International, for example, appears to c o m m a n d the loyalty of a large and voluntary membership that responds to appeals for practical actions as well as financial donations. An i n d i c a t i o n that citizens can raise their sights to the supranational level is provided by the participation o f European voters in the three elections that have been held for the European P a r l i a m e n t . In 1979, 1984, and 1989 the turnout rates were, respectively, 62, 60, and 57 percent, figures that are especially impressive when it is appreciated that these were legislative elections that could not result in the selection of a chief executive. Indeed, all three percentages e x c e e d the proportion of those who vote in US presidential elections, and they far e x c e e d the p r o p o r t i o n o f Americans who participate in off-year elections for the Congress. Likewise, it seems reasonable to anticipate that more analytically skillful citizenries will b e c o m e increasingly capable o f discerning that the UN is more than the sum o f its parts, that its activities can ameliorate problems and serve useful functions, that its support offers t h e m a d e g r e e o f legitimacy, that it offers means for

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n e t w o r k i n g with c o u n t e r p a r t s elsewhere in the world, and that t h e r e are situations in which its efforts may be m o r e effective than any that g o v e r n m e n t s can u n d e r t a k e . It may be m o r e than a m e r e m o o d fluctuation, f o r e x a m p l e , that the American people, after years of negative orientations toward the UN, were recently f o u n d to favor by a 4-to-l m a r g i n the idea that all its m e m b e r states, i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i t e d States, s h o u l d provide m o r e tax m o n e y , n o t less, f o r p e a c e k e e p i n g forces." 5 4 Equally noteworthy, after the Gulf War the p e r f o r m a n c e orientations of the American p e o p l e were such that in o n e poll 70 p e r c e n t said they had gained respect for the UN, while only 4 p e r c e n t lost respect. 5 5 In still a n o t h e r poll an even h i g h e r 85 p e r c e n t said they p r e f e r r e d that the UN rather than the United States take the lead in combating f u t u r e aggression. 5 6 F u r t h e r m o r e , in those n u m e r o u s crisis situations w h e r e t h e UN's p r e s e n c e is unmistakable, the e n h a n c e d analytic skills of those involved surely facilitate the prospect for favorable outcomes. Such skills e n a b l e d people in Nambia, Haiti, and Nicaragua to feel f r e e to t u r n o u t a n d vote in fair elections. They enabled Greeks a n d Turks in Cyprus to m a i n t a i n t h e i r fragile p e a c e by respecting the UN p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s that s e p a r a t e d t h e m . T h e y facilitated t h e readiness of Kurds in n o r t h e r n Iraq to c o m e out of the hills a n d settle into r e f u g e e camps flying the UN flag. These are only a few of the situations w h e r e the work of the UN a p p e a r s to have b e e n s t r e n g t h e n e d by e n h a n c e d skills that allowed people to break out of their national or s u b n a t i o n a l habits a n d perceive the UN as also capable of serving their welfare. N o r is t h e r e any reason to believe that those who have had direct contacts with the UN have b e c o m e blind to its limits or naive about its potential. O n the contrary, the skill revolution includes a capacity to a p p r e c i a t e the relevance of power to the structure of situations a n d thus to recognize that a key e l e m e n t of many situations involves the sovereignty principle and the pitting of the UN's moral authority against the military c o m p e t e n c e of states. In the case of the Kurds' r e t u r n to n o r t h e r n Iraq, for example, the p r e s e n c e of US a r m e d forces was perceived as crucial to their security f r o m attacks by S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s a r m i e s . "If A m e r i c a n t r o o p s are h e r e [in D o h u k ] , the p e o p l e can come home," a 36-year-old driver, A h m e d Youssef, was q u o t e d as observing. "If not, t h e n they will n o t come. T h e United Nations is terrific, b u t the protection of the Americans is better." But such an attitude does not tell the whole story. UN security g u a r d s w e r e also b r o u g h t to D o h u k a n d m a d e "very visible"—in white Land Rovers flying the UN flag, with UN e m b l e m s on their u n i f o r m s — a s a m e a n s of reassuring p e o p l e a n d thereby

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swelling t h e flow of r e t u r n e e s . T o be sure, the flow grew because w o r d of t h e US p r e s e n c e s p r e a d a n d b e c a u s e Kurdish l e a d e r s w o r k e d o u t an a g r e e m e n t on regional a u t o n o m y with Baghdad; b u t surely it is also a measure of e n h a n c e d analytic skills, the relocation of authority, a n d the relevance of p e r f o r m a n c e criteria of legitimacy that the slow r e t u r n of the refugees a c c o m p a n i e d the arrival of UN officials m a k i n g much of their presence. 5 7 Put differently, the advent of t u r b u l e n c e in world politics has led to the U N s u p p l e m e n t i n g , n o t replacing, o t h e r dynamics that may be at work in present-day conflicts. T h e role of the UN in c u r r e n t situations may n o t be p r e d o m i n a n t ; but as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e basic p a r a m e t e r s of world politics, n e i t h e r is its role trivial. W o r l d politics derive f r o m m u l t i p l e sources, a n d increasingly the UN is o n e of those sources.

T H E IMPACT OF

SUBGROUPISM

As s u b g r o u p s b e c o m e m o r e n u m e r o u s , c o h e r e n t , a n d sensitive about their a u t o n o m o u s identity, and especially as many of t h e m are thus led into i n t e r e t h n i c a n d i n t e r c o m m u n a l conflict, t h e d e m a n d s for the involvement of UN agencies in the internal affairs of states seem likely to grow. Recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, C h a d , G r e n a d a , Haiti, a n d Nicaragua, for example, were p e r v a d e d with i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n s , b u t at base they s p r u n g f r o m d o m e s t i c conflicts, a f a c t t h a t did n o t p r e v e n t a t u r n to t h e UN f o r p e a c e m a k i n g a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g assistance. I n d e e d , t h e very p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the UN in such a wide array of internal conflict s i t u a t i o n s is t e s t i m o n y to t h e l a r g e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w r o u g h t by t u r b u l e n c e have swept away t h e b o u n d a r i e s that allegedly divide domestic f r o m foreign affairs. Put differently, t h e m u s h r o o m i n g of s u b g r o u p i s m , of d e c e n t r a l i z i n g t e n d e n c i e s that u n d e r m i n e the authority of states a n d f r a g m e n t the ties of societies, has a d d e d immensely to the workload of t h e UN. O f t e n f e e l i n g isolated within their historical locales, s u b g r o u p s t e n d to r e a c h o u t f o r all kinds of assistance f r o m a b r o a d t h e m o r e embattled they are at h o m e , a process that often leads t h e m to the doorstep of the UN where, they feel, legitimacy and s u p p o r t for their aspirations can be f o u n d . If t h e U N ' s w o r k l o a d grows as a c o n s e q u e n c e of r a m p a n t s u b g r o u p i s m , so of c o u r s e will t h e a f o r e n o t e d v a c u u m t h a t lies between t h e sovereignty principle of the state-centric world a n d the

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a u t o n o m y p r i n c i p l e of t h e multi-centric world. It s e e m s likely, t h e r e f o r e , that top UN officials will be increasingly faced with the c h o i c e of e x p a n d i n g the organization's p r e s e n c e in the domestic affairs of states. Given a solidification of the e m e r g e n t parameters of world politics, o n e can readily envision this process c u m u l a t i n g to the p o i n t w h e r e certain kinds of UN interventions, such as those involving c o n t e s t e d elections a n d refugee flows (if n o t p e n d i n g or actual internal wars), b e c o m e c o m m o n p l a c e a n d institutionalized. T h e extension of such patterns will, in turn, focus the spotlight of p e r f o r m a n c e criteria ever m o r e brightly on the way in which UN agencies s h o u l d e r these responsibilities. In sum, t h e r e is a whole range of reasons to c o n c l u d e that the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s at work in world politics are enlarging, a n d will c o n t i n u e to e n l a r g e , the UN's centrality in the e m e r g e n t global o r d e r . If the UN has been relegated to the sidelines for m o r e than f o u r d e c a d e s because states have b e e n reluctant to acknowledge its utility a n d potential, the conditions of world politics today allow f o r the UN to e n t e r vigorously o n t o the field of play. As its roles expand a n d b e c o m e increasingly institutionalized, the opportunities f o r the UN to move b e y o n d a d a p t i n g to c h a n g e a n d to serve also as an agent of c h a n g e seem b o u n d to multiply. This expectation highlights a vital policy question to which this analysis now turns: What can be d o n e to maximize the UN's chances of f u n c t i o n i n g as an agent of positive rather than negative change?

5 THE U N AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE

It is possible to conceive of t h e UN as p e r f o r m i n g i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s in world politics without p r e s u m i n g that it operates as an i m p o r t a n t source of c h a n g e . World affairs might n o t be the same today, a n d they might even be much worse, if the UN had not b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d in 1945. But to p e r f o r m key f u n c t i o n s t h a t m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e is not necessarily to o p e r a t e as an a g e n t of c h a n g e . During this period the UN's activities may have occurred largely as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the changes rather t h a n as a p r o d u c e r of t h e m . A b a l a n c e d view of the UN's record in this regard, however, suggests otherwise. While t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n has in many instances merely reflected the changes that have marked the decades since World War II, t h e r e are at the same time m o r e t h a n a few changes that can be traced in s o m e m e a s u r e to the deliberations of UN agencies, votes in the General Assembly, a n d actions of the Secretary General. Most n o t a b l y p e r h a p s , m u c h of t h e historic postwar move to e n d c o l o n i a l i s m a n d the s u b s e q u e n t stress o n the preservation a n d p r o m o t i o n of h u m a n rights can be traced to the debates a n d actions of the UN. Similarly, a wide array of UN decisions a n d actions in the ecological field d u r i n g the 1970s h e l p e d transform the way in which e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s were viewed by national g o v e r n m e n t s a n d raised high on the agendas of communities. I n d e e d , the s p r e a d i n g a w a r e n e s s of a d e e p a n d worldwide i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e l i n k i n g h u m a n k i n d to p l a n e t a r y c o n d i t i o n s — w h a t has b e e n called t h e "global p r o b l é m a t i q u e " — c a n readily be a t t r i b u t e d to a series of d e v e l o p m e n t s that occurred u n d e r UN sponsorship. 5 8 T o speak of the UN as a c h a n g e a g e n t is n o t to r e f e r to a u n i f o r m process or particular actors in the organization. T h e r e are a variety of ways in which diverse UN agencies can foster c h a n g e in d i f f e r e n t issue areas. In the environmental field, f o r e x a m p l e , the

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t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s h a d their origin in the leadership of a coalition of n o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n a n d m o d e r a t e T h i r d World countries in t h e G e n e r a l Assembly a n d o t h e r UN deliberative bodies, 5 9 whereas the changes b r o u g h t a b o u t in the peacekeeping realm were due, at least in part, to the work of the Secretary General and his subordinates in the UN Secretariat. 6 0 N o r , it must be quickly a d d e d , is the ensuing analysis of t h e UN's potential as a c h a n g e agent m e a n t to imply that it is capable of bringing a b o u t huge changes that will fundamentally alter the course of events. Sizable t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s are the product of many factors, a n d while the UN may be o n e factor, it would be e r r o n e o u s to tease o u t its c o n t r i b u t i o n a n d treat it as the sole source of c h a n g e . Accordingly, the discussion highlights noticeable but n o n e t h e l e s s m o d e s t changes, shifts in attitudes that are discernible alterations r a t h e r t h a n wholesale reversals, trendlines that reflect gentle upward slopes r a t h e r than steep curves, a n d cumulative processes that are i n c r e m e n t a l r a t h e r t h a n revolutionary. 6 1 What follows, in short, focuses o n the potential for marginal changes that may well a d d u p to significant transformations with the passage of time. T h e r e f e r e n c e , moreover, is to long stretches of time—to years a n d n o t w e e k s — t h a t are sufficient to allow for the s u r f a c i n g of trendlines. Such a time perspective takes the analysis b e y o n d the success or f a i l u r e of p a r t i c u l a r u n d e r t a k i n g s . T r e n d l i n e s a r e c o m p o s e d of both, of j a g g e d edges that move erratically in o n e direction if viewed across e n o u g h incidents to allow for a pattern to e m e r g e despite the peaks a n d valleys. T h e ensuing analysis, in o t h e r words, d o c s not deny that UN efforts are susceptible to failure. At least f o u r types of past failures have been identified—ranging f r o m destabilizing policies that discourage long-term solutions to those that intensify short-term disputes—and t h e r e is no reason to believe they will not o c c u r again in t h e f u t u r e a n d result in u n w a n t e d negative e f f e c t s . 6 2 W h a t e v e r may b e t h e s e t b a c k s a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s , however, the search h e r e is for potential ways in w h i c h t h e UN can c o n t r i b u t e as a c h a n g e a g e n t to c e n t r a l tendencies that depict positive a n d stabilizing patterns. Most analyses of what t h e UN can accomplish focus o n its internal d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s rather than on those points in the e m e r g e n t structures of world politics that are vulnerable to its i n f l u e n c e . H e r e , t e m p t a t i o n s to focus on organizational tinkerings that might improve the UN's work are resisted in favor of six policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t h a t will e n a b l e it to seize the o p p o r t u n i t i e s o p e n e d u p by t h e o n s e t of t u r b u l e n c e a n d the p a r a m e t r i c transformations that have followed. In so doing, mention is m a d e of

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t h e n e e d to s t r e a m l i n e and improve the UN's policymaking processes, b u t it must nevertheless be stressed that the ensuing proposals have been generated by the analysis of global structures and how they may enable the UN to induce change, rather than by a close examination of the UN's internal workings. Finally, what follows does not presume a zero-sum game in which the UN and nation-states are locked into an antagonistic contest that can result in only one of them winning. As has always been the case, challenges cannot be met and changes cannot be initiated if only single actors undertake such tasks. T h e world's problems lend themselves to nonzero-sum solutions in which the UN, national governments, and other agents of change collaborate in such a way that all concerned benefit from any positive outcomes that may be accomplished. Our focus is on the UN's contribution to such outcomes, but the policy recommendations set forth below do not preclude the cooperation of other actors. Indeed, their central thrust is on activities that will persuade the member states of the UN to approve, or otherwise to accept, steps that would enhance the authority and effectiveness of IOs in coping with the changes and challenges that lie ahead.

RECOMMENDATION TOWARD ATTITUDINAL

1: CHANGE

As previously implied, the sovereignty principle is not an absolute. It is, rather, a mental construction that has been expressed through constitutional instruments, historical precedents, and political actions. As such, as an expression of deeply held, unquestioned values about the structure of human affairs in the modern period, the sovereignty principle has become a given in the minds of leaders and publics as they interpret the UN Charter, subsequent G e n e r a l Assembly and Security Council decisions, a n d the international conduct of states. Nevertheless, despite its seemingly a b s o l u t e quality, t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e is s u b j e c t to r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , modification, and revision if circumstances in world affairs change sufficiently to make the unquestionable begin to seem questionable. It follows that if the foregoing assessment is correct—that large transformations have accompanied the onset of turbulence in world politics—leaders a n d publics can be e x p e c t e d to b e c o m e increasingly open to reinterpreting the sovereignty principle, to a p p r o a c h i n g all the documents and actions that u n d e r l i e UN

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policies a n d practices in a new c o n t e x t that is n o t limited by any d o g m a . Accordingly, it is r e c o m m e n d e d that stress b e placed on the virtues of a new mind-set relative to the sovereignty principle; that p u b l i c officials, l e a d e r s in t h e private sector, a n d citizens b e e n c o u r a g e d to p o n d e r a reconstruction of the principle such that it is viewed as subject to m o r e than o n e interpretation; that t h e r e a r e b r o a d as well as narrow conceptions of sovereignty; a n d that n o n e of the various c o n c e p t i o n s lies beyond the pale of modification. I n d u c i n g s u c h a t t i t u d i n a l r e o r i e n t a t i o n s can well b e g i n by e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t while t h e s o v e r e i g n t y p r i n c i p l e has b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d for forty years as favoring the rights of states vis-à-vis IOs as collective actors, this does not mean that the balance must forever be tipped so fully a n d forcefully in this direction. Like the Cold War, which c o l l a p s e d in n o time at all because it was s u s t a i n e d by obsolete pictures of international structure that leaders a n d publics c a r r i e d a r o u n d in their heads, t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e can be portrayed as susceptible to swift revision if the attitudes that sustain it are felt to be a p p r o a c h i n g obsolescence. Given t h e a d v e n t of a b i f u r c a t e d global s t r u c t u r e , t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of authority crises, the decreasing ability of states to cope with challenges originating both at h o m e and abroad, a n d the g r e a t e r skills of citizens everywhere, this would seem to b e an especially p r o p i t i o u s m o m e n t in world history to d e v e l o p a n d p u r s u e a new mind-set with respect to the sovereignty principle. T h e uncertainties of world politics are now so pervasive that a c o n c e r t e d effort to emphasize the i n h e r e n t flexibility of the principle, to stress the b r o a d range within which it can be r e i n t e r p r e t e d without being rejected, may well h e l p shape the n a t u r e of the e m e r g e n t global o r d e r a n d the roles the UN can play in it. T o facilitate stress o n the flexibility of the sovereignty principle, an empirical inquiry could usefully be l a u n c h e d into the e x t e n t to which the new mind-set has already begun to evolve. With the onset of t u r b u l e n c e having given pause to many people, it may well b e that the erosion of the sovereignty principle is greater than appears to be t h e case impressionistically. If so, a systematic study of this possibility could be used to hasten the evolutionär)' process. Whatever such a research project might yield, the effort to nurse the d e v e l o p m e n t of new political orientations should obviously not imply that t h e sovereignty p r i n c i p l e needs to be a b a n d o n e d . T o a p p e a r to be a r g u i n g for the r e p l a c e m e n t of states with some form of world g o v e r n m e n t would surely evoke resistance a n d rejection. Rather, the focus should be on the limits that c o n f r o n t states in the face of global t u r b u l e n c e , on the great variety of ways in which

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g o v e r n m e n t s are c a u g h t u p in a c o n f l u e n c e o f dynamics that are new a n d t h a t p e r f o r c e c o m p e l t h e m to b e r e a d i e r to e q u a t e t h e i r n a t i o n a l interests with t h o s e o f the l a r g e r g l o b a l c o m m u n i t y . T h e d i c t a t e s o f history, it c a n n o w b e easily asserted, are p r o p e l l i n g h u m a n k i n d t o w a r d a new g l o b a l o r d e r in w h i c h c h o i c e s n o l o n g e r n e e d to b e m a d e in terms o f values that posit states as e n s c o n c e d in a vast zero-sum g a m e . N o t e that t h e d e s i r e d attitudinal c h a n g e s d o not f o c u s o n the U N . P r o g r e s s t o w a r d n e w p e r s p e c t i v e s w o u l d n o t b e m e a s u r e d by t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h the U N is u p g r a d e d . O n the c o n t r a r y , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the role o f the U N n e e d not b e f l a g g e d . T h e y w o u l d f o l l o w o n c e t h e s o v e r e i g n t y p r i n c i p l e was s e e n as f l e x i b l e a n d s u b j e c t to revision. M o r e accurately, o n c e such a flexibility b e c o m e s o p e r a t i v e , the w o r k o f the U N w o u l d b e seen less in a c o n v e n i e n c e of-the-states c o n t e x t a n d m o r e in a states-sometimes-are-obliged-togo-along context. Evolution o f the r e c o m m e n d e d attitudes w o u l d b e s o u g h t o n the part o f all U N o f f i c i a l s w h o s e responsibilities allow a n d r e q u i r e t h e m to a r t i c u l a t e a c t i o n s that may b e a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n to u n d e r t a k e . Most notably, it is a m o d i f i e d mind-set that the S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l a n d his top aides in the Secretariat n e e d to b r i n g into their n e g o t i a t i o n s with the representatives o f n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s . T h i s will n o t b e easy f o r p e r s o n n e l w h o have l o n g b e e n accusLomed to i n t e r p r e t i n g the sovereignty principle in favor o f the m e m b e r states. For t h e m now to give voice to a perspective that calls o n states to yield s o m e o f their j u r i s d i c t i o n in c e r t a i n issue areas is to ask t h e m to q u e l l d e e p - s e a t e d habits a n d to b e less d e f e r e n t i a l in r e q u e s t i n g c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e y will n e e d to evolve an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the e x t e n t o f the c h a n g e s that have u n d e r m i n e d the s o v e r e i g n t y p r i n c i p l e a n d to be ready to take advantage o f the new c i r c u m s t a n c e s by c o n t e s t i n g c o u n t e r a r g u m e n t s they used to a c c e p t . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , w h e r e they o n c e saw t h e m s e l v e s as d i p l o m a t i c in t h e i r r e a d i n e s s to a c q u i e s c e to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s , n o w t h e y will h a v e to d e f i n e t h e m s e l v e s as a c c o m p l i s h e d d i p l o m a t s w h e n they use reason a n d tact to p e r s u a d e the s a m e o f f i c i a l s to b e m o r e f l e x i b l e in their a p p l i c a t i o n o f the sovereignty principle. Admittedly, some of those w h o lead the S e c r e t a r i a t may n o t s u c c e e d in m a k i n g an a p p r o p r i a t e attitudinal shift, w h i c h is w h y it is r e c o m m e n d e d b e l o w that flexibility a l o n g this attitudinal d i m e n s i o n be m a d e a crucial criterion in the f u t u r e r e c r u i t m e n t o f p e r s o n s to fill the U N ' s leadership positions. Clearly, h o w e v e r , the revised predispositions toward the s o v e r e i g n t y p r i n c i p l e must e x t e n d well b e y o n d officials h i g h in t h e

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U N ' s s t r u c t u r e . Administrative policies also n e e d to be d e v e l o p e d t h a t will lead to t h e inculcation of a revised o r i e n t a t i o n toward national sovereignty o n the part of those in the field responsible for carrying o u t the p e a c e k e e p i n g a n d other day-to-day tasks of the UN. Attitudinal m o v e m e n t along these lines by field personnel will also serve to a d d to their sense of mission as they begin to sense they are on t h e cutting edge of a large c h a n g e in their organization's place in world politics. N o r s h o u l d efforts to p r o m o t e the new states-sometimes-areobliged-to-go-along i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the sovereignty principle be c o n f i n e d to those o n the UN's payroll. Such efforts s h o u l d also be p u r s u e d a m o n g leaders in b o t h the state-centric and multi-centric worlds, with t h e U N ' s i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e Gulf War a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t creation of safety zones for Kurdish refugees in n o r t h e r n Iraq being cited often as precedents for a revised view of the delicate balance on which the sovereignty principle rests. Again, resistance to this new way of thinking will surely be considerable in foreign offices a n d t h o s e private c e n t e r s w h e r e the p r e r o g a t i v e s of n a t i o n a l sovereignty are given t o p priority. But if j o u r n a l i s t s , television c o m m e n t a t o r s , p a r t y c h i e f s , e d u c a t o r s , t h e clergy, b u s i n e s s executives, labor leaders, a n d others who are able to circulate their perspectives widely are p e r s u a d e d to i n t r o d u c e n u a n c e i n t o their p r e s u m p t i o n s a b o u t the n a t u r e of sovereignty in today's world, it s h o u l d be possible to initiate a m o m e n t u m that redefines the place of the UN a n d the way in which its p e r f o r m a n c e s are assessed. T h e m o m e n t u m toward redefinition may move slowly, but if the e n d of the Cold War is any indication, it could well accelerate at an ever m o r e rapid rate. In o r d e r to sustain a n d q u i c k e n t h e m o m e n t u m t o w a r d attitudinal change, a n u m b e r of small steps could be taken that may have significant consequences. Extensive lists could be compiled, f o r e x a m p l e , of historical s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e a slightly d i f f e r e n t , n o n t h r e a t e n i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the sovereignty p r i n c i p l e c o u l d have a l t e r e d o u t c o m e s . H y p o t h e t i c a l s c e n a r i o s c o u l d also b e constructed that d e m o n s t r a t e both the flexibility of the principle a n d the beneficial c o n s e q u e n c e s that can flow f r o m not treating it as an absolute. In short, while this is not the place to outline the kind of e d u c a t i o n a l p r o g r a m that could be l a u n c h e d on behalf of new a t t i t u d e s toward t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e rights of states a n d t r a n s n a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e r e would seem to be n o lack of schemes that could be i m p l e m e n t e d to seize this propitious m o m e n t f o r r e t h i n k i n g t h e limits of sovereignty in a world r a c k e d by turbulence.

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RECOMMENDATION 2: TOWARD ENHANCED AUTHORITY

While the e n h a n c e m e n t of legitimacy in world politics has become closely tied to the adequacy of p e r f o r m a n c e s , obviously the p e r f o r m a n c e s must be readily observable if their quality is to be evaluated. If m u c h of the work of the UN involves routinized activities unheralded by the mass media, there is little likelihood that its p e r f o r m a n c e s will be observed sufficiently for authority to be relocated in the direction of its policies and activities. Citizens may have increasingly refined skills for evaluating UN performances, but they can hardly be expected to exercise them if the organization's personnel and activities are inconspicuous except on those rare moments of crisis when events move them to front and center on the world stage. How, then, to take advantage of the uncertainties precipitated by global turbulence to enhance the probability of the UN acquiring greater authority by making its presence more visible and salient for people everywhere? In particular, how to enhance the UN's visibility in those instances when it engages in peacekeeping and other forms of preventive maintenance that constrain conflicts from escalating into violence, i.e., in those instances when the UN is both most successful and least visible? While many answers to these questions could doubtless be developed, here the recommendation is that every member of the UN be asked to donate property in its capital for the establishment of a p e r m a n e n t UN mission on its soil. The missions would not be called embassies or consulates because the intention is to make their services available to people and organizations in the multicentric world as well as to the host governments. To prevent each mission f r o m becoming too immersed in the affairs of the statecentric world, its personnel, tasks, and operating funds would be provided by the Secretariat in New York, which would also monitor its work and receive its reports. Each country would pay an annual tax to the UN for the services provided by the mission on its territory. T h e services offered by each mission would include information about its peacekeeping activities and the work of its various technical agencies of the UN, conferences relevant to the UN's programs in the host country, opportunities for employment in the UN system, educational and research materials p r o d u c e d by UNESCO a n d other agencies, and whatever special activities may be upcoming on the UN's agenda. In addition, each mission would be expected to sponsor lectures, art shows, and other presentations expressive of its

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activities t h r o u g h o u t the world. T h e UN flag would fly alongside that of the host country at a conspicuous place on the mission property, a t o p its b u i l d i n g or f r o m a flagpole on the g r o u n d s . A minimal security g u a r d , w e a r i n g UN u n i f o r m s , would p r o t e c t the mission f r o m vandalism. M u c h as is t h e case f o r embassies a n d consulates, c o u n t r y mission d o o r s would b e o p e n to all those who had occasion to turn to o n e o r a n o t h e r UN agency for assistance. T h e host g o v e r n m e n t might try to attempt to keep certain of its citizens—such as leaders of o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s — f r o m visiting the mission, b u t the p r i n c i p l e would b e immediately established that all citizens a n d groups would be equally e n t i t l e d to access to the mission. If the n u m b e r of persons seeking access was excessively high, it would be the mission a n d n o t t h e host g o v e r n m e n t that would d e t e r m i n e the s c h e d u l e t h r o u g h which access was provided. If the solicitations for assistance by the mission e x c e e d e d its c o m p e t e n c e or j u r i s d i c t i o n , it would advise those seeking admission to its offices where they would have to g o to obtain the desired help. As previously n o t e d , to s o m e e x t e n t a network of offices of various UN agencies does exist in some national capitals. While these have f u n c t i o n a l assignments and are not diplomatic missions in the sense b e i n g p r o p o s e d here, they often do p e r f o r m s o m e of the r e p o r t i n g a n d representing tasks of traditional diplomacy. W h e r e t h e r e a r e r e s i d e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e UN D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e , such officials may be c h a r g e d with c o o r d i n a t i n g the work of the various UN personnel in that country. In addition, some of the U N ' s offices a b r o a d fly the UN flag a n d are g u a r d e d by u n i f o r m e d UN p e r s o n n e l . Still, this network is uneven a n d does not e x t e n d to all t h e m e m b e r s of t h e UN. Equally i m p o r t a n t , t h e f u n c t i o n a l offices d o not enjoy the kind of status envisioned f o r the f o r m a l c o u n t r y missions t h a t would be established u n d e r this p r o p o s a l . P r e s u m a b l y t h e network of existing f u n c t i o n a l offices w o u l d b e a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e f o r m a l missions of t h e r e l e v a n t countries o n c e the latter were established. T h e r e is, of course, no g u a r a n t e e that a network of p e r m a n e n t UN missions l o c a t e d a r o u n d t h e world w o u l d e n h a n c e t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s authority. As previously n o t e d , some c o u n t r i e s go t h r o u g h p e r i o d s of r e g a r d i n g the UN as strongly biased against t h e m — a s Iran d i d b e c a u s e of t h e Security C o u n c i l ' s f a i l u r e to c o n d e m n Iraq f o r starting the war against it in 1980, or as the United States did d u r i n g the Reagan years when the majority in the General Assembly was arrayed solidly against many US policies, or as Israel has c o n t i n u e d to d o since the General Assembly passed a resolution

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in 1975 e q u a t i n g Zionism with racism. Any t r e n d t o w a r d e n d o w i n g t h e U N with m o r e a u t h o r i t y is likely to b e h a l t i n g at best, a n d even in c o u n t r i e s with favorable i n c l i n a t i o n s toward t h e UN, t h e t r e n d is u n l i k e l y to t r a c e m o r e t h a n a g e n t l e u p w a r d s l o p e . Given t h e historical c o m m i t m e n t s of t h e state-centric world, t h a t is, t h e g r e a t e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s e n c e of t h e U N is b o u n d to s t i m u l a t e r e s i s t a n c e a n d c o u n t e r p r e s s u r e s . S o m e c o u n t r i e s may n o t w a n t t h e U N ' s p r e s e n c e a m o n g t h e m e n h a n c e d . O t h e r s will say they are u n a b l e to b e a r t h e costs involved, a n d s o m e of t h e s e may in fact b e u n a b l e to b e a r t h e m . T h u s , while t h e r e a r e ways to offset the cost f a c t o r (see below), t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of UN missions in a n u m b e r of c o u n t r i e s w o u l d d o u b t l e s s e n c o u n t e r n u m e r o u s obstacles a n d take years to reach f r u i t i o n . Nevertheless, given t h e dynamics u n d e r l y i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y crises t h a t p e r v a d e w o r l d politics, in the l o n g r u n t h e g r e a t e r s a l i e n c e of t h e U N ' s p e r s o n n e l a n d activities w o u l d s e e m likely to a t t r a c t a t t e n t i o n a n d r e s p e c t , t h e r e b y s e t t i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a slow a c c r e t i o n of authority. A n d , a s s u m i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s r e p u t a t i o n for e v e n h a n d e d n e s s would grow t h r o u g h its m o r e extensive visibility as a n e u t r a l a c t o r c o m m i t t e d to t h e i m p r o v e m e n t of t h e h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , so w o u l d p e o p l e a n d s u b g r o u p s be increasingly i n c l i n e d to a c c o r d l e g i t i m a c y t o its a c t i o n s . P u t m o r e c a u t i o u s l y , t h e availability a n d o p e n n e s s of t h e U N ' s m i s s i o n s in t h e w o r l d ' s capitals, c o m b i n e d with g r o w i n g d o u b t s a b o u t t h e p e r f o r m a n c e s of the host g o v e r n m e n t s , c o u l d g e n e r a t e tangible o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t h e UN to e n h a n c e its r e p u t a t i o n f o r e v e n h a n d e d n e s s . 6 3

RECOMMENDATION 3: STRENGTHENING BIFURCATED STRUCTURES W h i l e t h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s to a s s u m e t h a t t h e b i f u r c a t i o n of world politics is n o t a transitory p h e n o m e n o n , 6 4 so can c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t s be m a d e f o r c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e s that sustain t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e multi-centric world a n d inhibit states f r o m p r e s s i n g for a r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e old a n d o u t m o d e d interstate system. T h e two worlds of world politics have e m e r g e d b e c a u s e t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s that m a r k life late in t h e twentieth c e n t u r y a r e n o l o n g e r c o n d u c i v e to t h e traditional a r r a n g e m e n t s , b u t t h e intensity of the tensions b e t w e e n the centralizing a n d d e c e n t r a l i z i n g dynamics at work o n a g l o b a l scale a r e such t h a t t h e e m e r g e n t b i f u r c a t e d s t r u c t u r e s a r e still f r a g i l e a n d s u b j e c t to b e i n g o v e r w h e l m e d by g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t resist t h e i r loss of a u t h o r i t y . T h e U N c a n t h u s

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fulfill its role as a change agent by maintaining the m o m e n t u m that has b r o u g h t a b o u t bifurcation. O n e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n for accomplishing this goal concerns the work of p r o p o s e d UN missions t h r o u g h o u t the world. While these must above all e n h a n c e the UN's reputation f o r e v e n h a n d e d n e s s by n o t f a v o r i n g a c t o r s in t h e m u l t i - c e n t r i c world over t h e h o s t g o v e r n m e n t s , they could nevertheless p e r f o r m a n u m b e r of services f o r t h e various private g r o u p s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t n e e d to establish contacts elsewhere in the multi-centric world. T h r o u g h its network of country missions the UN could serve as a crucial c o n d u i t f o r i n f o r m a t i o n a n d settings that e n a b l e sovereignty-free actors in distant parts of the world to learn of each o t h e r ' s existence a n d to s h a r e each o t h e r ' s expertise. O n e can even imagine this network facilitating t h e creation of new networks a m o n g disparate but likem i n d e d organizations and groups that would not otherwise know of each o t h e r ' s existence. In return, it is reasonable to expect that the m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s , social m o v e m e n t s , p r o f e s s i o n a l societies, a n d o t h e r private actors that may b e n e f i t f r o m this network-building activity could serve as a s u p p o r t base for the UN mission in their country when a n d if the host g o v e r n m e n t seeks to limit or eliminate the mission's activities. In a d d i t i o n to t h e services each mission could p e r f o r m f o r actors in the multi-centric world, t h e r e may be a n u m b e r of ways in which it could be used by UN h e a d q u a r t e r s in New York to convey i n f o r m a t i o n to a n d exert pressure on the host g o v e r n m e n t relevant to political issues u n d e r consideration by the General Assembly a n d the Security Council. Long-established practices of working with the country's mission in New York will, of course, c o n t i n u e to serve as the main m e c h a n i s m f o r e x c h a n g i n g information a n d p r e f e r e n c e s with the Secretariat, but the availability of the UN in the country's capital c o u l d o f f e r a n o t h e r c h a n n e l t h r o u g h which ideas a n d requests arising out of debates in New York might be b r o u g h t to the attention of foreign offices. O n e can readily imagine the UN mission in a country a n d that country's foreign office evolving routines for daily or weekly interaction over matters of mutual interest. I n d e e d , conceivably t h e embassies of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in t h e host capital could seek o u t the UN mission located there as a n o t h e r c h a n n e l f o r pressing viewpoints on the Secretariat in New York. T h e advent of a network of UN missions a r o u n d the world, in short, could be n o less v a l u a b l e to a c t o r s in t h e state-centric world as to t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s in the multi-centric world. A n o t h e r , p e r h a p s potentially m o r e c o n s e q u e n t i a l r e c o m m e n dation for s t r e n g t h e n i n g the structures of global bifurcation involves

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a long-standing proposal to add a people's assembly to the UN, in which the representatives would be directly elected rather than chosen by states to serve. 65 Although the idea has never generated wide enthusiasm a n d a n u m b e r of its dimensions remain obscure (such as how electoral districts would be constituted and delegates elected), conceivably some form of it could engender support as the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of this t u r b u l e n t era, the impulses of subgroupism to break free of state controls, and the power of the skill revolution become increasingly prevalent. And however the idea may be translated into a concrete proposal, a people's assembly would have the advantage of locating the processes of global bifurcation in a clear-cut institutional context. On the o t h e r h a n d , such a legislature might be counterproductive in the sense that it would encourage needless conflicts between the multi- and state-centric worlds. At present such conflicts tend to be confined to particular actors over particular issues, but an institutionalization of the b i f u r c a t e d s t r u c t u r e would in all likelihood give rise to circumstances that would pit the whole of both worlds against each other and thereby u n d e r m i n e the strong tendencies that presently foster cooperation across the boundaries that separate the two worlds.

RECOMMENDATION

4:

T O W A R D T H E CREATION OF A GLOBAL SERVICE

As the multi-centric world becomes more dense with relevant actors, as the variety and n u m b e r of issues in the state-centric world proliferate, and as these dynamics make the UN ever more central on the global stage, there is the clear danger that the organization will be inundated by system overload. And if the analysis presented here is correct and the authority of the UN expands to the point where ever greater numbers of contested domestic elections and violence-prone internal conflicts are brought within its peacemaking and peacekeeping orbits, the susceptibility to overload is likely to reach gigantic proportions; and the situation could become even more overpowering if the recommendation for UN missions in every member state were to be adopted. The need for an expansion of the UN's personnel, in short, is likely to be acute. How, then, to shoulder an expanding workload that can well be regarded as the price of success? Here it is recommended that the m e m b e r states, working with the UN missions located in their capitals, facilitate the recruitment of volunteers whose analytic skills

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a r e t e s t e d t o b e s u b s t a n t i a l a n d w h o a r e willing t o e m b a r k o n a c a r e e r t h a t involves a variety of rewards, n o t t h e least b e i n g a s e n s e of service t o t h e global c o m m u n i t y . T h e U N a l r e a d y has a m i n u s c u l e " p e a c e c o r p s " as well as m o r e n u m e r o u s m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l in p e a c e k e e p i n g u n i t s , b u t t h e s u g g e s t i o n h e r e is t h a t t h e f o r m e r of t h e s e services b e greatly e n l a r g e d a n d t h a t its tasks b e e x p a n d e d to c o v e r a n u m b e r of n e w activities. W h e t h e r t h e s e n e w tasks w o u l d i n c l u d e t h e military side of p e a c e k e e p i n g is a q u e s t i o n t h a t r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a b l e r e f l e c t i o n , especially as b o t h t h e U N a n d t h e m e m b e r s t a t e s m i g h t b e u n w i l l i n g , f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s , to h a v e a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r m y c o m e i n t o b e i n g . Aside f r o m t h e military issue, h o w e v e r , t h e r e c r u i t m e n t a n d f u n d i n g of a v o l u n t e e r service w o u l d b e f o u n d e d o n a p p e a l s t h a t d o n o t take n a t i o n a l loyalties f o r g r a n t e d a n d t h a t p r e s u m e a r e a d i n e s s o n t h e p a r t of p e o p l e e v e r y w h e r e to c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e e m e r g e n c e of a new, m o r e h u m a n e g l o b a l o r d e r . Given m o r e analytically skillful citizens, a r e a d i n e s s o n t h e i r p a r t to revise t h e i r h i e r a r c h y of loyalties, a n d an i n c l i n a t i o n to a t t r i b u t e g r e a t e r l e g i t i m a c y to t h e U N as its p e r f o r m a n c e r e c o r d i m p r o v e s , it is n o t u n l i k e l y t h a t a l a r g e a n d v a r i e d p o o l of a p p l i c a n t s c a n b e developed and continuously replenished.

RECOMMENDATION

5:

T O W A R D M O R E EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP

N o t only is t h e c o r e of t h e U N ' s administrative a p p a r a t u s legally a n d o t h e r w i s e r e s p o n s i b l e to t h e state-centric system a n d thus s o m e w h a t i n s u l a t e d f r o m t h e s h i f t i n g p a r a m e t e r s of w o r l d politics, b u t it has also b e c o m e s o s i z a b l e t h a t it is s u b j e c t to all t h e i n e r t i a a n d c o n s e r v a t i s m t h a t b e s e t s any l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e vast c h a n g e s at w o r k in t h e w o r l d t e n d to get filtered t h r o u g h a statec e n t r i c p r i s m t h a t resists t h e n o t i o n t h a t p r o f o u n d d y n a m i c s a r e t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e g l o b a l l a n d s c a p e . U N p e r s o n n e l in t h e v a r i o u s field a g e n c i e s a r e , of c o u r s e , k e e n l y a w a r e of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w r o u g h t by t h e skill r e v o l u t i o n , t h e crises of a u t h o r i t y , a n d t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of t h e m u l t i - c e n t r i c w o r l d , b u t t h e p a c e at w h i c h t h e s e c h a n g e s g e t i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e w o r k i n g k n o w l e d g e of t h o s e w h o s u s t a i n t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s b u r e a u c r a c y in New York is a n y t h i n g b u t r a p i d . 6 6 O n t h e East River t h e s o v e r e i g n t y p r i n c i p l e p r e d o m i n a t e s in a variety of ways, f r o m t h e s t a f f i n g p r o c e d u r e s b a s e d o n r e g i o n a l a n d n a t i o n a l q u o t a s to t h e processes by w h i c h t h e S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l is s e l e c t e d , f r o m t h e implicit p r e m i s e s u n d e r l y i n g t h e r e j e c t i o n of p r o p o s a l s t h a t e n h a n c e t h e U N ' s a u t h o r i t y to t h e

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avoidance of innovative steps that might offend one or a n o t h e r powerful bloc. Like any large bureaucracy, in short, the UN's is rooted into long-standing habits and cautious modes of decisionmaking. As such, as an organization p r o n e to inertia and predisposed to do only what its m e m b e r states allow it to do, restlessness over its history of caution can serve as a large reservoir of political will with which to seize the o p p o r t u n i t i e s offered by the dynamics of turbulent change. Given this reservoir, it is hardly surprising that proposals to reform the Secretariat and its procedures for generating i n f o r m a t i o n a n d m a k i n g decisions have b e c o m e increasingly salient. Some part of these problems will be resolved by the passage of time a n d the movement into top administrative posts of a new generation sensitive to the parametric transformations. The present cadre of top officials was socialized into the organization when the state-centric world was not seriously challenged and the c o m p e t i t i o n of the superpowers d o m i n a t e d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene. Presumably, u p c o m i n g administrators will evolve new perspectives m o r e a t t u n e d to the dynamics i n h e r e n t in the b i f u r c a t i o n of world politics. Likewise, the m o r e dense and a u t o n o m o u s actors in the multi-centric world become, the more will UN headquarters in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, and elsewhere become sites of a vast lobbying arena, thus bringing the winds of change ever more fully into the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. This is not the place to engage in a review of the proposed reforms and the obstacles they face. But an insight into the dilemma fostering more effective leadership can be developed by focusing on the position of Secretary General and the potential it offers for initiating the kind of attitudinal change that will modify the sovereignty principle and enable the UN to move more staunchly into the areas where states are excessively protective of their national interests. Although the reach of the Secretary General within the UN system does not extend to all of its agencies, many of which enjoy a great deal of autonomy, it is nonetheless the occupant of this position who infuses purpose, ideals, and overall strategies into the work of the UN. Thus it matters whether the individual who holds the post has the orientations to contest the paralyzing effects of the sovereignty principle and the bureaucratic resources to do so effectively. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, for example, could have gone either way with respect to whether the United States's actions in N o r t h e r n Iraq fell u n d e r Resolution 688. He

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chose to h o n o r the sovereignty principle and to seek a diplomatic solution in that context; but whatever the ultimate outcome of the situation, it is indicative of the many choice points where the orientations of the Secretary General, and the nature of the advice he receives f r o m his staff, can crucially affect the course of events and the UN's adaptation to the confluence of centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. Historically the selection of the Secretary General has been f o u n d e d less on merit and more on geographic distribution, more on being a h a n d m a i d e n to states and less on commitments to conflict resolution, m o r e on traditional criteria and less on p e r f o r m a n c e criteria. Thus the UN has witnessed few dramas in which s t r o n g Secretaries General are pitted against strong governments. Yet, as stressed previously, this may be an especially propitious time for such dramas to be played out, for the present and f u t u r e Secretaries General to give voice to an attitude change that posits states as having to yield on the sovereignty principle and as needing to recognize they are caught up in a tide of larger forces that can only leave them isolated if they resist it. T h e r e is no dearth of detailed recommendations on how the process of selecting future Secretaries General can be improved. Criteria for the skills required by the job, the appointment of a search committee, procedures for checking the credentials of those nominated, arrangements to avoid the principle of regional rotation in the position, and a host of other useful suggestions have been voiced that could well lead to future UN administrations that are more securely reflective of the transformations at work in world politics. 67 In none of these proposals, however, is mention made of the substantive orientations to which candidates for the j o b should be committed. Rather, there seems to be a pervasive presumption that the chosen candidate should be wedded to a give-states-thebenefit-of-the-doubt philosophy instead of a times-require-thatstates-go-along perspective. The desired attitudinal change set forth above is conspicuous by the absence of any traces favoring it, as if all the changes that have marked the years since 1945 have no relevance to the mind-set that Secretaries General should bring to the office. Hence, it is recommended here that at every stage of the process—in calling for nominations, in establishing the search committee, in interviewing candidates, and in selecting a nominee—the virtues of resolving the tensions between the centralizing dynamics represented by the UN and the decentralizing dynamics represented by the sovereignty principle in favor of the former be articulated and highlighted.

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T h i s is n o t to ignore the very real constraints within which Secretaries G e n e r a l and o t h e r UN executives must perform their tasks. T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , that t h e p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the UN system restricts the maneuverability o f Secretaries General through the requirement that they be elected and r e e l e c t e d by the UN m e m b e r states. And even if they are u n c o n c e r n e d about reelection, or if the system is adjusted to protect maneuverability by lengthening the term and forbidding reelection, S e c r e t a r i e s G e n e r a l will n o n e t h e l e s s n e e d the support o f t h e m e m b e r states if t h e i r p r o g r a m m a t i c initiatives are to b e a r fruit. F u r t h e r m o r e , even if a Secretary General's policies should prevail in o n e situation, there is always the danger that in future s i t u a t i o n s h e o r s h e will n o t receive t h e s u p p o r t o f key m e m b e r states whose interests had been thwarted in the previous situation. In s h o r t , t h e e x e c u t i v e heads o f UN a g e n c i e s a r e n o t comparable to the political leaders of governments. T h e UN Charter does n o t accord t h e m the leverage that chiefs o f state or prime ministers enjoy u n d e r national constitutions. Accordingly, as the case o f A m a d o u - M a h t a r M'Bow, a r e c e n t D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l o f U N E S C O , so plainly reveals, 6 8 UN executives must perforce press new policy initiatives and the idea of expanded UN roles gingerly, e x e r c i s i n g c a r e not to win a battle while losing the war. Put differently, the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between Secretaries G e n e r a l and s t r o n g g o v e r n m e n t s c a n n o t be so d r a m a t i c as to d i m i n i s h confidence in their leadership. B u t constraints are not the same as prohibitions. T h e UN Charter does not say the Secretary General c a n n o t be innovative in f o r m i n g s u p p o r t blocs, in playing interests o f f against each other, in mobilizing actors in the multi-centric world on b e h a l f o f policy initiatives, in using available bargaining chips to advance new p r o g r a m s , in e a r n i n g the c o n f i d e n c e o f states t h r o u g h f r e q u e n t and close association with their leaders, o r in locating himself or herself on the boards o f key NGO groups o f scientists, parliamentarians, and o t h e r relevant interest groups. All these activities are feasible. T h e C h a r t e r may not have c o n t e m p l a t e d any leeway in these regards, but the daily routines o f UN politics do allow room for a variety o f informal moves that the Secretary G e n e r a l can c h o o s e to pursue or not. T h o s e moves have to be i m p l e m e n t e d with c i r c u m s p e c t i o n and with a k e e n appreciation o f what can realistically be accomplished, but the c h o i c e to i n t e r p r e t e x e c u t i v e p r e r o g a t i v e s in this way is available.

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RECOMMENDATION

6:

ENLARGING THE BULLY PULPIT

But the Secretary General cannot, obviously, do everything that has to be done. Even if he or she is a gifted administrator, and even if the recommended expansion of the Secretariat's top-level staff were to occur, the burdens of the j o b would continue to be enormous, perhaps exceeding what any single official can effectively shoulder. Furthermore, there are certain tasks that only the official at the top of the UN structure can perform. Most notably, while o t h e r administrators can take responsibility for the expanded involvement in domestic elections, nascent conflicts, and the proposed new network of UN missions in foreign capitals, only the Secretary General is endowed with the moral authority needed to bring about the attitude changes called for in Recommendation 1. Clearly, however, it will require more than occasional and sporadic efforts to g e n e r a t e new o r i e n t a t i o n s toward the UN high in national governments. Envisioned here is a task that necessitates endless articulation, sustained attention, considerable travel, and prolonged discussions. Attitudes do not change easily. The old orientations must be continually challenged and expressions of the new ones must be continually reinforced. Although there can be no substitute for the Secretary General's authority in nursing the new attitudes into place, his or her efforts in this regard can be supplemented. The bully pulpit can be expanded, and the way to do this is by creating, say, five new Deputy Secretaries General (or UN Ambassadors-at-Large) whose sole task would be that of visiting national capitals and engaging chiefs of state, foreign secretaries, media executives, and other key elites in dialogues about the need to replace the outworn give-states-the-benefit-of-the-doubt a p p r o a c h with a vigorous times-require-that-states-go-along philosophy. Those appointed to these new positions would be drawn from the ranks of well-known and widely respected former chiefs of state and foreign secretaries who would find it compelling to tap off their careers on behalf of the UN. The activities of former US President Jimmy Carter since leaving the White House are illustrative of the decent energy that holding high office can generate. Or consider the impact of Eleanor Roosevelt during her years at the UN: a worldwide figure, she focused attention on the organization in ways that few others could or, one might add, have in subsequent years. T h e impact of former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as a special envoy charged with facilitating an end to Yugoslavia's civil war is another good example of how the talents of

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f o r m e r national leaders can be enlisted to advance the UN's goals. O f course, the new Deputy Secretaries General would probability not want to hold the office for very long, but a high turnover rate should not present a serious problem inasmuch as it ought to b e possible to build up a large pool of distinguished former officials drawn from every region of the world. If possible, the appointments o f these officials should result from a process where they are r e c o m m e n d e d by the Secretary General and approved by the General Assembly. T h e latter step would give the appointments legitimacy beyond that which would accrue if only the Secretary General made them. Furthermore, by involving the G e n e r a l Assembly in the process, the idea o f developing a new c o n c e p t i o n o f the UN would gain added momentum in the state-centric world. It is possible, of course, that this m o m e n t u m would be viewed by some states as threatening and t h e r e f o r e result in a sufficient n u m b e r o f negative votes to undermine particular appointments. Grievances accumulated while the candidates for the UN posts held positions high in their national governments might also serve to swell the total of nays. Whatever the o u t c o m e of the votes, however, the very controversy over such appointments would serve to focus attention on the bully pulpit and its central message. And if worst c a m e to worst, a back-up p r o c e d u r e that would allow the Secretary General to make the appointment independently could be used. T h e m o r e the new appointees could use the bully pulpit by casting the desired new perspectives in concrete terms, the more effective they would likely be. Clearly, not much would be a c c o m p l i s h e d if they spent their time j u s t calling on heads o f governments and urging them in abstract terms to raise their sights and adopt a times-require-that-states-go-along philosophy. Whatever may be the prevailing issues on the global agenda at any time, however, these could readily be interpreted in the context o f this philosophy as well as in conventional national-interest terms. Indeed, it may well be that the new Deputy Secretaries General could give voice to interpretations of specific situations that others dare not express, a function that is precisely one of the goals that a bully pulpit is well designed to serve. Consider, for example, the dilemma in which Germany and J a p a n found themselves during the Gulf War. Both governments were legally prohibited from an extensive military involvement in the conflict and both were faced with considerable domestic opposition to constitutional revision that would permit direct involvement. A compelling solution to this problem, one that would in the future

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serve both countries, the UN, and other interested parties, can be found in Article 43 of the UN Charter. It allows for member states to negotiate agreements with the organization whereby national forces are made available, on call, to the Security Council for cases like the Gulf crisis. No country has ever negotiated such an agreement, so that Germany and J a p a n could be the first to do so. Since they would then be fulfilling a solemn treaty obligation u n d e r the UN Charter, domestic o p p o n e n t s in both countries would be hard pressed to successfully contest the agreement and at the same time the two countries would be able to move more securely onto the world stage. But how to launch the idea and give it the kind of impetus that can take off and culminate in a major international development? As it stands, the idea surfaced in an op-ed piece by a distinguished student of the UN, 6 9 but it never got otherwise championed by politicians and journalists, with the result that it has yet to move onto the global agenda. Conceivably, the proposed new UN officials could provide the needed stimulus. They would have the status, the knowledge, and the perseverance needed to propel such items onto the global agenda. And even if they did not agree a m o n g themselves about the merits of the idea, their differences might have the same consequence, perhaps even stimulating enough controversy to generate worldwide pressure on Germany and Japan to negotiate an agreement with the UN. In short, at a time of rapid change, when new ideas and practices have b e c o m e acceptable and even commonplace, the potential of the bully pulpit—of voices that give meaning to longings f o r revised s t r u c t u r e s and new orientations—can easily be underestimated. And if it is institutionalized in such a way that distinguished world leaders are ready to mount its steps and exhort their former colleagues in national governments to elevate their sights, there is no guessing what it might accomplish.

6 CAUTION, CONFIDENCE, AND FUNDING

I return, in conclusion, to the c o n c e r n that the r e c o m m e n d e d policies intended to capitalize on the UN's potential as a change agent derive more from raw idealism than a realistic assessment of the underpinnings of world politics. Is it undue optimism, s h e e r naivete, to posit a t r e n d l i n e that ascribes g r e a t e r authority, c o m p e t e n c e , effectiveness, and status to the UN? T h e question is h a u n t i n g f o r those whose analytic a n t e n n a e tell t h e m that fundamental change is at work even as their deepest convictions tell them that this trendline ought to exist. T h e fear that convictions are driving analysis, however, is no reason to back away from the latter. O n e introduces caution, stresses that huge problems remain and can well divert the trendline in negative directions, reconsiders the evidence of where turbulent conditions are leading world politics, digs still deeper for signs that observations are not values in disguise, pauses o n e final time to make sure one's analytic skills are in full command, and then concludes yet again that such a trendline may in fact b e operative, that the UN has proven itself highly adaptive across nearly half a century, and that the onset of global turbulence has enlarged and not engulfed the UN. R e n e w e d c o n f i d e n c e in the central thrust o f the analysis, however, does not warrant avoidance o f the huge problems that persist. Not only is the sovereignty principle alive and well, still propelling officials and publics to define their interests in narrow terms, still tempting them to withhold support for international norms and organizations, but there is also the inescapable reality that the world is broke, that the funds needed to address the many g l o b a l c h a l l e n g e s t h a t t h r e a t e n to overwhelm individuals, communities, and nations simply do not exist. Indeed, o n e obstacle to the r e c o m m e n d e d proliferation o f UN missions and tasks is how

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they will be financed. To call on every member of the UN to donate the resources needed to sustain a mission in its capital, and to argue for a large expansion in the personnel of the organization, is to pile new requirements o n t o national budgets that are already u n d e r siege. And the UN's budget, too, has long been troubled by deficits derived f r o m a combination of e x p a n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t s a n d members unwilling to pay their share. 70 How, then, to generate the resources needed to implement the foregoing recommendations? In part, the question can be easily answered. Four of the recommendations (1, 3, 5, and 6) do not require f u n d s so much as they do shifted priorities and changed attitudes. These activities, of course, are not free of cost in the sense that there will be a need to pay for the time of those who undertake to inculcate the new perspectives; but relatively speaking these costs are minimal and are likely to diminish once the momentum toward reorientation gets u n d e r way. Recommendations 2 and 4, on the other hand, cannot be so readily bypassed. They entail charges that will be substantial f o r many countries and, if successfully implemented, they will continue as annual fees. Hopefully the task of paying for the recommended assumption of new tasks, missions, and personnel by the UN will be at least partially solved by a growing appreciation, reinforced through systematic educational campaigns, that the costs of the UN not expanding in these ways will be greater for each country than those associated with the expansion. It can be readily demonstrated, for example, that expanded peacekeeping operations by the UN that relieve tensionracked countries of maintaining security at their borders, or coping with the fallout of rigged, violent-prone elections, are far less expensive than relentless and endless strife. A n o t h e r partial solution to the f u n d i n g p r o b l e m can be developed through shifting some of the financial burden to actors in the multi-centric world. They, after all, would benefit indirectly from the attitude changes and greater authority that enable the UN to be m o r e effective, a n d they would b e n e f i t directly f r o m t h e establishment of UN missions in their state capitals and the recruitment of personnel to operate the missions. So there are good reasons to call for voluntary contributions from the sovereignty-free actors who interface with the UN or, if such a p r e c e d e n t fails to become entrenched, to charge them fees for the services provided by the missions. Assuming that the financial challenges can be met, t h e r e remains the underlying problem that, as the parametric changes continue to unwind and as the UN looms ever larger, more than a

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few leaders and publics around the world will cling to the assertion that the organization has deviated sharply from its original purposes a n d f u n c t i o n s . C h a n g e and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , s o m e will surely c o n t e n d , ought not be allowed to deflect the UN from its historic role as simply a forum in which the state-centric world can contain or resolve its conflicts. But let those who regret and resist the processes o f maturation whereby the UN becomes ever more fully woven i n t o t h e f a b r i c o f world politics be r e m i n d e d o f the primordial h u m a n condition wherein compliant children grow to be their own persons, often defying their lineage even as they retain some o f the original qualities with which they e n t e r e d the world. And let them reflect, too, on the goals and aspirations that gave birth to the UN; if they do, they will surely conclude that the founders envisioned an organization that would be both adaptive and creative, both in tune with changing times and able to steer the changes to the benefit of peoples everywhere.

NOTES

This paper was prepared with the encouragement and support of the International Peace Academy. A number of people have provided valuable feedback after reading earlier drafts. Hence I am pleased to express my appreciation, though it should be understood that I am solely responsible for the present draft and that none of its faults should be attributed to any of the following: Chadwick F. Alger, Alan Castle, Robert W. Cox, Mary H. Durfee, Giulio M. Gallarotti, Elizabeth Hanson, Daniel Holly, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Margaret P. Karns, Gunnar Nielsson, Augustus Richard Norton, Pauline Rosenau, J o h n Gerard Ruggie, and two anonymous reviewers for the International Peace Academy. 1. Quoted in Clyde Haberman, "U.N. Takes Over from U.S. at the Kurdish Camp in Iraq," New York Times, May 14, 1991, p. A10. 2. Paul Lewis, "UN Votes to Condemn Handling of Iraq Rebels," New York Times, April 6, 1991, p. 6. 3. There are, of course, noteworthy exceptions to the tendency to focus undue attention on the internal workings of IOs at the cost of neglecting the stimuli to which they are exposed by a changing world. See, for example, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). 4. Stanley Foundation, Report of a Vantage Conference: The United Nations' Impact on International Relations (Muscatine, Iowa: T h e Stanley Foundation, 1985). 5. J . Martin Rochester, " T h e Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study," International Organization, Vol. 40 (Autumn 1986), p. 797. 6. Ernst B. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Policy Papers in International AfTairs No. 26, 1986), p. 1. 7. Thomas G. Weiss, "Editor's Note," in T.G. Weiss (ed.), The United Nations in Conflict Management: American, Soviet and Third World Views (New York: International Peace Academy, 1990), p. 9. 8. An extensive enumeration of the anomalies that surfaced in the 1980s can be found in James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A

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Theory of Change and Continuity ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n University Press, 1990), passim. 9. J o h n Lukacs, " T h e S h o r t C e n t u r y — I t ' s Over," New York Times, February 17, 1991, Sec. 4, p. 13. 10. F o r t h e h i s t o r i c a l analysis t h a t u n d e r l i e s this c o n c l u s i o n , s e e R o s e n a u , Turbulence in World Politics, C h a p . 5. 11. Cf. Vivien A. S c h m i d t , Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1991). 12. For a n extensive discussion of how the sovereignty p r i n c i p l e g o t r e d e f i n e d — h o w " d e c o l o n i z a t i o n a m o u n t e d to n o t h i n g less t h a n a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l revolution . . . in which traditional assumptions a b o u t t h e right to s o v e r e i g n s t a t e h o o d were t u r n e d u p s i d e d o w n " — i n t h e processes of d e c o l o n i a l i z a t i o n , s e e R o b e r t H . J a c k s o n , Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1990), Chap. 4 (the q u o t a t i o n is f r o m p. 85). 13. F o r a n e x p l a n a t i o n of why t h e t e r m s " s o v e r e i g n t y - f r e e " a n d s o v e r e i g n t y - b o u n d " s e e m a p p r o p r i a t e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n state a n d n o n s t a t e actors, see Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, p. 36. 14. For a c o g e n t analysis of s o m e of t h e difficulties e n c o u n t e r e d by t h e U N as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of actors in b o t h t h e state- a n d m u l t i - c e n t r i c worlds, see H a r o l d K. J a c o b s o n , William M. Reisinger, a n d T o d d M a t h e r s , "National E n t a n g l e m e n t s in I n t e r n a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s , " American Political Science Review, Vol. 80 (March 1986), pp. 141-59. 15. N o r is t h e p a c e of t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e slowing d o w n . It is estimated that by t h e e n d of t h e century new g e n e r a t i o n s of s u p e r c o m p u t e r s will be c a p a b l e of calculating m o r e t h a n a trillion o p e r a t i o n s e a c h s e c o n d . Cf. " T r a n s f o r m i n g t h e Decade: 10 Critical Technologies," New York Times, D e c e m b e r 1, 1991, p. 18. 16. T h e first night of the Gulf War CNN's prime-time viewership went f r o m its n o r m a l 560,000 to 11,400,000. Cf. T h o m a s B. Rosenstiel, "CNN: T h e C h a n n e l to t h e World," Los Angeles Times, J a n u a r y 23, 1991, p. A12. 17. An a c c o u n t of Actuel's efforts can be f o u n d in Europe: Magazine of the European Community (April 1990), pp. 40-41. 18. For a n extensive e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e diverse ways in which t h e m i c r o e l e c t r o n i c revolution has i m p a c t e d o n the c o n d u c t of public affairs, see R o s e n a u , Turbulence in World Politics, Chap. 13. 19. F o r a n insightful a c c o u n t of how the U N can e n g a g e in productive i n t e r a c t i o n s with a c t o r s in t h e multi-centric world, see Kathryn Sikkink, " C o d e s of C o n d u c t f o r T r a n s n a t i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n s : T h e Case of t h e W H O / U N I C E F C o d e , " International Organization, Vol. 40 ( A u t u m n 1986), pp. 815-40. 20. See, f o r e x a m p l e , T e d R o b e r t G u r r , "War, R e v o l u t i o n a n d t h e Growth of t h e Coercive State," in J a m e s A. Caporaso (ed.), The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 49-68. 21. For discussions a l o n g these lines, see J a m e s N. Rosenau, " T h e State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering C o n c e p t , W i d e n i n g C o m p e t e n c e , W i t h e r i n g Colossus, or W e a t h e r i n g Change?" in Caporaso, The Elusive State, pp. 17-48, a n d Giulio M. Gallarotti, "Legitimacy as a Capital Asset of t h e State," Public Choice, Vol. 63 (1989), p p . 43-61.

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22. Tara Sonenshine, "The Revolution Has Been Televised," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, October 8-14, 1990, p. 29. 23. An a c c o u n t of the loyalty and membership problems faced by Norway can be f o u n d in William E. Schmidt, "Norway Again Debates European Membership, Rekindling Old Hostilities," New York Times, May 6, 1991, p. A3. 24. T h e quotes are taken from Alan Riding, "France Questions Its Identity as It Sinks into 'Le Malaise,"' New York Times, December 23, 1990, pp. 1, 7. 25. In some instances the movement can be both upward a n d downward. Present-day Croatia, with its aspiration both to secede f r o m Yugoslavia and to join the European Community, is a case in point. 26. T h e conception of Third World countries as quasi-states can be found in Jackson, Quasi-states, Chaps. 1 and 7. 27. For a useful delineation between positive and negative sovereignty, see Jackson, Quasi-states, pp. 26-31. 28. I am indebted to Daniel Holly for calling my attention, in personal correspondence, to the Third World perspective that the "entire United Nations system works mainly to the benefit of those states and groups at the center of the world system" and that therefore "the proposals contained in the last part of the paper are very idealistic . . . [in assuming] a world exempt from domination, a world in which the interests of every group will be taken care of." 29. Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World O r d e r , " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70 (Spring 1991), p. 70. T h e elasticity m e n t i o n e d in this quote refers to the UN's peacekeeping activities, but extending the observation to all of its activities does not seem inappropriate. 30. Perhaps because they are only marginal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e issues, those involving trade stand out as an exception in this regard. T r a d e relations, it seems clear, are moving steadily in the direction of bloc rather than global arrangements. 31. Chiang Pei-heng, Nongovernmental Organizations at the United Nations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 7. 32. T h e UN organ responsible for liaison with NGOs is the Economic a n d Social Council (ECOSOC), which has procedures and eligibility requirements for accrediting NGOs that accord them scaled rights of access to a n d participation in UN deliberations. I have been unable to locate authoritative statistics on the number of NGOs approved by all UN agencies, but some notion of their scope can be seen in the fact that ECOSOC accredited 2,696 NGOs in 1976. For one attempt to scale the importance of NGOs by the extent of their recognition by IOs, see Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 435-39. O t h e r assessments of their influence can be found in Chiang Pei-heng, Nongovernmental Organizations at the United Nations, and Peter Willetts (ed.), Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of IssueOriented Nongovernmental Organizations (London: Frances Pinter, 1982). 33. I am indebted to Lawrence S. Finkelstein for pointing out in personal correspondence that movement into the vacuum can occur in either of two ways: the Secretary General can respond to situations without the consent of the involved states or, alternatively, without the permission of a UN organ. Although a politically acceptable tradition has accumulated, started by Dag Hammarskjold and asserted by all his successors, wherein the

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Secretary General may respond to a situation without the authorization of a UN organ if invited to do so by a state, the vacuum nonetheless remains in the case of situations where neither a state nor the Security Council or General Assembly sanctions the Secretary General's involvement. 34. Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 181. 3 5 . J o h a n Galtung, "On the Anthropology of the United Nations System," in David Pitt and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 2, 14. 36. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Politics of Value Allocation in the UN System," in L.S. Finkelstein (ed.), Politics in the United Nations System (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 5, 30. 37. For one effort to pull together diagrammatically all the units of the UN system a n d the tenure specifications of their executive heads, see Brian U r q u h a r t a n d Erskine Childers, A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1990), pp. 90-91. 38. Robert W. Cox, Harold PL Jacobson, et al., The Anatomy of Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 420-23. 39. Finkelstein, "The Politics of Value Allocation in the UN System," p. 12. 40. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Comparative Politics in the UN System," in Finkelstein, Politics in the United Nations System, p. 450. 41. See J o h n Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 42. For an analysis of the juxtaposition of these six developments, see James N. Rosenau, "Interdependence and the Simultaneity Puzzle: Notes on the O u t b r e a k of Peace," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), pp. 307-328. 43. I u n d e r t a k e a full discussion of the diminishing probabilities of interstate war in "A Wherewithal for Revulsion: Notes on the Obsolescence of Interstate War," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 30, 1991. For a creative effort to measure the UN's success with respect to war-peace issues, see Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations, esp. Chap. 2. 44. A cogent discussion of the fragile nature of sovereignty in the Third World can be found in Jackson, Quasi-states, Chap. 2. 45. See, for example, Brian Urquhart, "Sovereignty vs. Suffering," New York Times, April 17, 1991, p. A15; J o n a t h a n Mann, "No Sovereignty for Suffering," New York Times, April 12, 1991, Sec. 4, p. 17; and editorial, "The U.N. Must Deal with Kurds' Plight," Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1991, p. B6. 46. For an account of one situation in which the UN did act on the basis of humanitarian imperatives rather than acceding to the sovereignty principle, see Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, "Do International Ethics Matter?: H u m a n i t a r i a n Politics in the Sudan," Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 5 (1991), pp. 197-214. 47. Mann, "No Sovereignty for Suffering." 48. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations, p. 68. 49. Sidney Dell, The United Nations and International Business (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. ix.

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50.1 am indebted to Giulio M. Gallarotti for pointing out, in a personal communication, at least o n e offsetting factor that may lead people to be increasingly critical of the UN. This involves a tendency of governmental leaders to avoid the costs of onerous tasks by shifting them to IOs, with the result that the performances of the latter are evaluated with respect to tasks that allow little room for unqualified success. T h e selection-of-task bias may load against the probability of outstanding performances. For an extended analysis of this point, see Roland Vaubel, "A Public Choice Approach to International Organization," Public Choice, Vol. 51 (1986), pp. 39-57. 51.1 am indebted to Chadwick F. Alger for these data. 52. Dell, T h e United Nations and International Business, p. ix. 53. For an e x t e n d e d analysis of the processes of aggregation that culminate in collectivities that are more than the sum of their parts, see Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, Chap. 7. For an analysis that, in effect argues that the UN does not add to a sum greater than its parts, that it lacks a unity of purpose and thus "is just one other context in which competing national interests are pursued," see Alan James, "The Security Council: Paying for Peacekeeping," in David P. Forsythe (ed.), The United Nations in the World Political Economy: Essays in Honour of Leon Gordenker (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 14. 54. Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990), p. 50. 55. Richard Marin, "The Winners in the War: Bush, Republicans and the U.N.," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 18-24, 1991, p. 38. 56. T o m Wicker, "What Kind of Order?" New York Times, J u n e 8, 1991, p. 23. 57. This account a n d the quotes are drawn from Clyde Haberman, "U.N. Enters a City to Assure Kurds," New York Times, May 20, 1991, p. A6. 58. For a cogent account of the UN as a c h a n g e agent in the environmental field, see Donald J. Puchala, "The United Nations a n d Ecosystem Issues: Institutionalizing the Global Interest," in Finkelstein, Politics in the United Nations System, pp. 214-45. An extensive but more general inquiry into IOs as both adaptive entities and agents of change can be found in Haas, When Knowledge Is Power. 59. Puchala, "The United Nations and Ecosystem Issues," pp. 225-26. 60. A r t h u r R. Day, "Conclusion: A Mix of Means," in A.R. Day and M.W. Doyle (eds.), Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 156-61. 61. In Turbulence in World Politics (pp. 32-33) I conceptualize change on this o r d e r in terms of JND's—Just Noticeable Differences—that are significant even if they are not necessarily substantial. Given the extraordinary complexity of world politics, changes that involve only one JND can hardly be discounted. 62. See Giulio M. Gallarotti, "The Limits of International Organization: Systematic Failure in the M a n a g e m e n t of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations," International Organization, Vol. 45 (Spring 1991), pp. 192-93. 63. It should be noted that the reputation for evenhandedness cannot be located exclusively in the hands of the UN's missions abroad. Even if the field personnel greatly enhanced the reputation for fairness, much would also depend on the political processes of the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the legislative organs of other agencies. If these membership

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bodies were consistently to exhibit an unyielding bias toward certain countries, then no amount of good will generated in the field would be sufficient to counterbalance a negative reputation. 64. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, Chap. 16. 65. This is not the first time this suggestion has been made. For more extensive formulations of it, see Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 346-50, and Richard Falk, "A Postmodern Presidency for a Postmodern World," paper presented at the Conference for a Postmodern World, Santa Barbara, 1989. 66. Cf. David Pitt, "Power in the UN Superbureacracy: A Modern Byzantium?" in Pitt and Weiss, The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies, pp. 23-38. 67. See, for example, Urquhart and Childers, A World in Need of Leadership, and Report of the 22nd United Nations Issues Conference, The United Nations: Structure and Leadership for a New Era (Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, 1991), pp. 13-16. 68. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Political Role of the Director-General of UNESCO," in Finkelstein, Politics in the United Nations System, pp. 385423. 69. J o h n Gerard Ruggie, "Use U.N. to Ease into a Global Role," The Japan Times, April 10, 1991. 70. For a discussion of the problems and processes involved in funding UN projects, see Alan James, "The Security Council: Paying for Peacekeeping," in Forsythe, The United Nations in the World Political Economy, pp. 13-35, and Susan R. Mills, The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis (New York: International Peace Academy, 1989).

A B O U T THIS OCCASIONAL PAPER

W h i l e s t u d i e s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s typically f o c u s o n its i n t e r n a l p r o c e d u r e s , r e s o u r c e s , a n d p r o b l e m s , this p a t h - b r e a k i n g i n q u i r y p r o b e s t h e U N ' s e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s — t h e diverse ways in w h i c h t h e r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c e n e is likely to b o t h p r o v i d e it with o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d i m p o s e c o n s t r a i n t s . R o s e n a u ' s b i f u r c a t i o n m o d e l of g l o b a l t u r b u l e n c e s u g g e s t s t h e e m e r g e n c e of a s e r i e s of p o w e r g a p s t h a t may well b e filled by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s in t h e y e a r s a h e a d . H i s analysis h i g h l i g h t s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , f a r f r o m b e i n g e n g u l f e d by c h a n g e , t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n s e e m s d e s t i n e d to b e e n l a r g e d by it. H e offers, as well, six s p e c i f i c r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r policies t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e U N c a n b e c o m e n o t only a r e c i p i e n t , b u t also an a g e n t , of c h a n g e .

JAMES N. ROSENAU is d i r e c t o r of t h e I n s t i t u t e of T r a n s n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s at t h e University of S o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a . A f o r m e r p r e s i d e n t of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Association, P r o f e s s o r R o s e n a u was a w a r d e d a G u g g e n h e i m F e l l o w s h i p in 1987 a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y w r o t e Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, w h i c h in t u r n gave r i s e t o t h e p r e s e n t m o n o g r a p h o n h o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t u r b u l e n c e h a v e a f f e c t e d t h e U N . H i s first play, Kwangju: An Escalator^ Spree, was p r o d u c e d in t h e fall of 1991 in Los A n g e l e s .

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T H E INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

The International Peace Academy is an independent, nonpartisan, international institution devoted to the promotion of peaceful and multilateral approaches and to the resolution of international as well as internal conflicts. IPA plays a facilitating role in efforts to settle conflicts, providing a middle ground where the options for resolving particular conflicts are explored in an informal, off-therecord setting. Other activities of the organization focus on public forums; training seminars on conflict resolution and peacekeeping; and research and workshops on collective security, regional and internal conflicts, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and nonmilitary aspects of security. In fulfilling its mission, IPA works closely with the United Nations, regional and other international organizations, governments, and parties to conflicts. The work of IPA is enhanced by its ability to draw on a worldwide network of eminent persons comprising statesmen, business leaders, diplomats, military officers, and scholars. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is a general awakening to the enormous potential of peaceful and multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts. This has given renewed impetus to the role of IPA. IPA is governed by an international board of directors. Financial support for the work of the organization is provided primarily by philanthropic foundations, as well as individual donors.

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O C C A S I O N A L PAPER SERIES

Available from the International Peace Academy, 777 N a t i o n s Plaza, N e w York, N e w York 1 0 0 1 7 (212-949-8480):

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The Future of Peacekeeping, Indar Jit Rikhye Paths to Peace in Afghanistan: The Geneva Accords and After, Selig S. Harrison The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis, Susan R. Mills United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations, F. T. Liu Negotiations Before Peacekeeping, Cameron R. Hume

Available f r o m L y n n e R i e n n e r Publishers, 1800 3 0 t h Street, B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o 8 0 3 0 1 (303-444-6684): The United Nations in a Turbulent World, James N. Rosenau United Nations Peacekeeping and the Nonuse of Force, F. T. Liu