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 9781447308317

Table of contents :
POLICY ANALYSIS IN TAIWAN
Contents
List of tables and figures
Tables
Figures
Acknowledgements
Notes on contributors
1. Policy analysis in a time of turbulence
Politics: from stable to uncertain
Discussion and conclusion
2. Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government
Introduction
The need for external policy advisors
Policy advisory committees: functions and values
Background of Taiwan’s policy analysis environment
Structure of standing advisory committees in Taiwan’s central government
Advisory committees in action
Conclusions
3. Analysis of innovative local government policies in Taiwan
Approach of Policy Analysis
Adopting innovation: risk and uncertainty
Policy analysis research for the process of adopting innovation
Case studies: how do practitioners adopt innovation?
Discussion
4. Policy analysis in the legislative body: the legislative process of the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act in Taiwan
Policy analysis in the legislative process
Agencies responsible for policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan
How policy analysis affects the law-making process: an example
Re-examining the function of policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan
Conclusion
5. Policy analysis in the local councils
The context in which local councils operate
The limited role of the local council in local policy analysis
Sources for local councillors to obtain policy relevant information
The future of policy analysis in local councils
6. Gendering policy analysis? The problems and pitfalls of participatory ‘gender impact assessment’
History of GIA in Taiwan
Practical problems in GIA implementation
Pitfalls of institutionalised gender analysis
Conclusion
7. The power of influencing policies, or getting their share and more: interest groups in Taiwan
Background and regulating interest groups
Types of interest groups in Taiwan
What they do and how they do it
Economic development and industrial relations since the 1980s
Interest groups and government since the late 1980s
The changing scene and trends in the twenty-first century
8. Think tanks in Taiwan
Research organisation and orientation
Methodology
The history of think tanks in Taiwan
The designated purpose and function of think tanks
The various orientations of think tanks
The policymaking process and think tanks
The role and influence of think tanks in public policy
Brief discussion and conclusion on think tanks
9. The development of public engagement in Taiwan
A framework to connect public engagement with policy analysis
Democratisation and public engagement in Taiwan
Recent experiments with public engagement in Taiwan
An exemplary case: the Lo-Sheng movement and its contribution to policy analysis
Lessons learned from Taiwan’s experience of public engagement
10. Social media and policy evolution in Taiwan
Social media and public policy: opportunities and challenges
Conclusion
11. Policy analysis by non-governmental organisations in Taiwan
Policy advocacy and policy analysis by non-governmental organisations
The development of NGOs’ participation in policy in Taiwan
How do NGOs carry out policy analysis?
Conclusion
12. Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan
Literature review
Research methods
Results and discussion
Conclusion
13. Public policy and administration research
Educational background of university faculty
Research output of university faculty
Publications in TSSCI journals
Conclusion
14. Too critical to ignore? A tri-dimensional relationship examination of policy analysis internship in Taiwan
A profile of policy analysis internship programmes
Internship implementation and programme coordinators
The relationships between students and host organisations
The relationships between departments and host organisations
Concluding remarks and future prospects
15. Policy analysis in Taiwan from an international perspective
Influence of internationalisation and globalisation on policy analysis
Evidence and discussion
Conclusion
16. Policy analysis education in Taiwan: a comparative perspective
Policy analysis in Taiwan’s universities
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

Taiwan

Edited by Yu-Ying Kuo

POLICY ANALYSIS IN TAIWAN

International Library of Policy Analysis Series editors: Iris Geva-May and Michael Howlett, Simon Fraser University, Canada This major new series brings together for the first time a detailed examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis systems at different levels of government and by non-governmental actors in a specific country. It therefore provides a key addition to research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies more generally.  Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis which offers a broad comparative overview with other countries as well as the country in question. In doing so, the books in the series provide the data and empirical case studies essential for instruction and for further research in the area. They also include expert analysis of different approaches to policy analysis and an assessment of their evolution and operation. Early volumes in the series will cover the following countries: Brazil • China • France • Germany • India • Israel • Netherlands • New Zealand • Norway • Russia • South Africa • Taiwan • UK • USA and will build into an essential library of key reference works. The series will be of interest to academics and students in public policy, public administration and management, comparative politics and government, public organisations and individual policy areas. It will also interest people working in the countries in question and internationally. In association with the ICPA-Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. See more at http://goo.gl/raJUX

POLICY ANALYSIS IN TAIWAN Edited by Yu-Ying Kuo

International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 5

First published in Great Britain in 2015 by

Policy Press North America office: University of Bristol Policy Press 1-9 Old Park Hill c/o The University of Chicago Press Bristol BS2 8BB 1427 East 60th Street UK Chicago, IL 60637, USA +44 (0)117 954 5940 t: +1 773 702 7700 [email protected] f: +1 773 702 9756 www.policypress.co.uk [email protected] www.press.uchicago.edu © Policy Press 2015 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. ISBN 978 1 44730 830 0 hardcover The right of Yu-Ying Kuo to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Qube Design Associates, Bristol Front cover: image kindly supplied by www.istock.com Printed and bound in Great Britain by by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Policy Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

Contents List of tables and figures vii Acknowledgements ix Notes on contributors x One

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence Chilik Yu and Yu-Ying Kuo

1

Two

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government Wen-Jiun Wang and Chang-Tay Chiou

23

Three

Analysis of innovative local government policies in Taiwan Chung-pin Lee

39

Four

Policy analysis in the legislative body: the legislative process of the Soil 53 and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act in Taiwan Tsuey-Ping Lee

Five

Policy analysis in the local councils Kai-Hung Fang

67

Six

Gendering policy analysis? The problems and pitfalls of participatory ‘gender impact assessment’ Yen-Wen Peng

81

Seven

The power of influencing policies, or getting their share and more: interest groups in Taiwan Wilbur Bing-Yan Lu

95

Eight

Think tanks in Taiwan Yi-jung Wu

111

Nine

The development of public engagement in Taiwan Mei Jen Hung

123

Ten

Social media and policy evolution in Taiwan Ling-Chun Hung

137

Eleven Policy analysis by non-governmental organisations in Taiwan Wen-Jong Juang

151

Twelve Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan Guang-Xu Wang

171

Thirteen Public policy and administration research Nai-Ling Kuo and Jay N. Shih

187

v

Policy analysis in Taiwan Fourteen Too critical to ignore? A tri-dimensional relationship examination of policy analysis internship in Taiwan Chun-Ming Chen

207

Fifteen Policy analysis in Taiwan in an international perspective Jun Yi Hsieh

219

Sixteen Policy analysis education in Taiwan: a comparative perspective Yu-Ying Kuo

231

Index

247

vi

List of tables and figures Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

List of identified advisory committees Frequency distribution of number of advisory committee members Frequency distribution of types of advisory committee members Frequency distribution of advisory committees that address the issue of balance of members 2.5 Frequency distribution of advisory committees that address the issue of conflict of interest 2.6 Recruitment method of advisory committees 2.7 Frequency distribution of period of service 2.8 Frequency distribution of meetings 2.9 Frequency distribution of types of remuneration for committee members 9.1 Purposes and contribution of participation in stages of policy development 9.2 The contribution of public participation to policy analysis in the Lo-Sheng Case 10.1 Statistics of three forums in National Policy Think Tank Online 10.2 Statistics of two forums in ‘Everybody Participates on Public Policy Discussions’ 10.3 A summary of the assessment of the National Think Tank Online 12.1 Interpretation of network plots 12.2 Centrality measures for individuals within networks – highest ranked 13.1 Where the highest-level degree was obtained (%) 13.2 Fields of the highest-level degrees obtained (%) 13.3 Research output of university faculty 13.4 Grants for publication in TSSCI and SSCI journals (Taiwan dollars – $NT) 13.5 Political science journals in TSSCI to 2012 13.6 Selected articles by journal 13.7 Number of publications by journal and year 13.8 Co-authorship 13.9 Research themes 15.1 Internationally oriented department or programme of public administration, public policy or public affairs 16.1 Development of Taiwan’s public administration and policy education 16.2 Taiwan master’s programmes in public policy and policy analysis 16.3 PhD programmes in public policy 16.4 Public policy in East Asian, North American and European universities

30 31 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 125 131 144 144 145 176 177 189 189 193 198 198 198 199 200 202 204 225 232 235 238 241

vii

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 5.1 5.2 7.1 10.1 10.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 13.2 13.3 14.1 15.1 16.1

viii

Taiwan Economic Growth Rate, 1952–2012 10 Taiwan’s Unemployment Rate, 1953–2013 12 Taiwan GDP per capita, 1951–2012 16 Taiwan debt (% of GDP), 1951–2013 16 Taiwan’s policy analysis environment and model 17 Evolution of Taiwan’s policy analysis in a turbulent context 18 Taipei City’s public, free wireless internet access policy adoption process 46 Taipei City’s Industrial and Commercial Carbon Emission 47 Reduction Self-Government Ordinance adoption process New Taipei City’s Public Childcare Policy adoption process 48 Taipei City Council’s organisational chart 70 Pingtung County Council’s organisational chart 71 Dynamic Relationship of Interest Groups’ Power to Influence Policy 107 and Legislation Opportunities and challenges governments face in the social media era 142 The goals of the National Policy Think Tank Online 143 Network plot information transmission relationship 178 (network centralisation = 51.163%) Network plot resource exchange relationship 180 (network centralisation = 16.662%) Number of published articles 1990–2012 201 The progression of co-authorship 1990–2012 203 Number of published articles in the most popular six themes, by year 205 Relationships among college internship coordinators, students 208 (interns) and host organisation supervisors Different types of public policy related to Taiwan from 1992 to 2012 227 Location of TASPAA members 234

Acknowledgements The editor would like to thank Dr Iris Geva-May and Dr Michael Howlett for supporting her in editing the book as part of the International Library of Policy Analysis series. The editor gratefully acknowledges the assistance from Policy Press at the University of Bristol and the coordination from Miss Yu-Tou Hsieh, Ph.D. candidate at Shih Hsin University. Most importantly, sincere thanks go to responsible contributors and reviewers for making the publication possible.

ix

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Notes on contributors Chun-Ming Chen is associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and Management and Director of International Master Program of Integrity & Governance of Shih Hsin University, Taiwan. He is one of the pioneers in the development of policy analysis internship program in the field of public administration in Taiwan. His research interests include bureaucracy and democracy, civil-military relations, and public sector integrity and governance. Chang-Tay Chiou is professor in the Department of Social and Policy Sciences and research fellow at the Innovation Center for Big Data and Digital Convergence at Yuan Ze University, Taiwan. His specialisations include public policy analysis, cultural-creative industries, and environmental policy. Kai-Hung Fang is assistant professor at the Department of Public Policy and Management, Shih Hsin University. His major research interests include local government, local public finance, and public policy. He has taught courses in public administration, local government, public finance and budgeting, and qualitative methods. Jung Yi Hsieh is associate professor, Department of Public Affairs, University of Taipei, Republic of China (Taiwan). His research interest focuses on performance management, local governance, public human resource management, policy analysis, and public health policy. His articles have appeared in many journals, including Public Administration Review, Administration and Society, Journal of Management & Organization, Public Administration Quarterly, Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice and Journal of Urban Affairs. Ling-Chun Hung is associate professor at Department of Public Policy and Management, Shih-Hsin University. Her research interests include political economy, election and market, and public policy analysis. Mei-Jen Hung is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. She received her Ph.D. degree from the American University at Washington, D.C. Her research interests include bureaucracy, public participation, e-government, government-business relation. Wen-Jong Juang is currently associate professor and chair in the Department of Public Policy and Management at the Shih Hsin University in Taipei, Taiwan. Dr. Juang is the editor of Competitiveness Review (Taiwan) and a research fellow of the Taiwan e-Governance Research Center supported by the National Development Council of the Executive Yuan, Taiwan. He is also a board member of Chinese Association of National Competitiveness in Taiwan. Dr. Juang’s research interests are in the areas of public policy analysis, public opinion research, performance management, nonprofit organisation study, integrity governance, and e-governance. He has published widely in these areas in Chinese and English academic journals.

x

Notes on contributors

Nai-Ling Kuo is assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of Public Affairs and Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan. Her research interests include public budgeting and finance, accountability, and good governance. Yu-Ying Kuo is professor of public policy and management and dean of Office of Research and Development at Shih Hsin University, Taipei, Taiwan. Her research interests include policy analysis, public policy, and government budgeting. She is coauthor of Policy Analysis (2014) and author of Research on Budget Process and Budget Accountability of Non-Profit Organization: Case Study of Foundations (2008), Cost-Benefit Analysis (2007), Macro and Micro Research on Government Budgeting (2002) and Public Policy: Decision Support Models and Cases Analysis(2002). Chung-pin Lee is currently associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Tamkang University and also a research fellow of the Taiwan E-Governance Research Center. His research interests are government innovation, policy diffusion and e-governance. Tsuey-Ping Lee is professor in the Department of Political Science at National Chung-Cheng University in Taiwan. Her recent areas of research focus on environmental governance, environmental policy analysis, brownfield public participation, brownfield redevelopment, and environmental justice. Wilbur Bing-Yan Lu is associate professor of the Public Administration Department at National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan. His research interests are public policy, maritime policy, and policy marketing as well as non-profit marketing. In addition to books in the field of policy marketing (2007) and non-profit marketing (2012), his latest published book, based on an empirical study of Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), is on public policy change (2014). Yen-Wen Peng is associate professor in Public Affairs Management at National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung. Her research interests include gender and politics, gender and technology, gender and management, participatory democracy, and interpretative policy analysis. Jay N. Shih is distinguished professor in the Department of Public Administration at National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. His research interests include human resources and performance management in the public sector, policy analysis, and comparative administration. Guan-Xu Wang is associate professor of public management and policy in the Department of Public Administration and Management at the National University of Tainan, Taiwan. Dr. Wang’s current research interests include social network analysis, health care and social policy, and community care for the elder under welfare mix. Dr. Wang’s recent research focuses on the use and integration of social network analysis methodology into public management and policy issues.

xi

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Wen-Jiun Wang is assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at National Taipei University, Taiwan. Her professional interests include policy analysis, disaster management policy, organisational theory, and public management. Yi-Jung Wu is assistant professor in the Department of Public Policy and Management at Shih Hsin University, Taiwan. Her research interests include policy information integration, policy planning, and policy marketing in the fields of social welfare and education, particularly for the applications to the disadvantaged students in the higher education system. Chilik Yu is professor in the Department of Public Policy and Management at Shih Hsin University in Taiwan. His major research interests include public policy, public administration, public management, integrity and governance.

xii

ONE

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence Chilik Yu and Yu-Ying Kuo

Introduction A quarter-century after peaceful democratic reforms and liberal economic development in the country, Taiwan is now entering an era of turbulence. To an extent, the challenges facing Taiwan today are part of a young democracy’s growing pains. Recent political uncertainty and financial difficulty in Taiwan have raised legitimate concerns about the Taiwanese government’s ability to form workable policies that benefit the people. This chapter examines and explains the current governance crisis affecting Taiwan on several fronts. Increasing financial austerity, incessant partisan disputes, greater electoral polarisation, and the growing clout of the news media have made the entire public policy-making process – from problem identification to policy evaluation – much more uncertain and unpredictable. Whereas the past authoritarian regime was able to impose policies without much opposition, today’s democratically elected government must learn to make policies in a politically and financially unstable environment, in the face of a raucous, fickle, and sometimes unforgiving public. The chapter ends with an analysis of the implications of the current turbulent era on the state of policy analysis in Taiwan. After its retreat from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) controlled almost every aspect of the country, and Taiwan came under a single-party authoritarian regime. There was an ongoing fight against this authoritarianism, but it was not until 1986 that the opposition was strong enough to form a political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and mobilise a nationwide challenge to the KMT. In 1987, one year after the DPP’s birth, President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law, and the process of democratic transformation in Taiwan officially started. During the democratic transition period, corruption issues were more visible and salient in election campaigns than any other political issue (Fell, 2002). In fact, the DPP’s anti-corruption campaigns of the 1990s were a critical factor in terminating the KMT’s over 50-year single-party authoritarian regime. In May 2000, when the KMT peacefully turned over the presidency to the DPP, Taiwan was considered as a model among third-wave democracies (Yu et al, 2008). As Rigger (2004: 285) argued: ‘Taiwan’s transformation from single-party authoritarianism to multiparty democracy came about with very little violence or bloodshed. Nor did it require wrenching economic or social upheavals. In fact, one might describe Taiwan’s experience as “best-case” democratization.’ How well does policy analysis evolve during democratisation processes? The study of policy analysis began in the 1970s in Taiwan, following US and European experiences. Although the basic skills of policy

1

Policy analysis in Taiwan

analysis seem universal, the study and practice of policy analysis must be tailored to local contexts. As Weimer (2012: 1) succinctly pointed out: The basic skills of assessing problems and structuring comparisons of policy alternatives in terms of relevant goals seem universal. However, the specific political, social, and economic contexts in which analysts work help determine the set of feasible alternative and appropriate tradeoffs among goals.

By the same token, Lasswell (1970, 6) stated: ‘Policy approaches tend toward contextuality … Contextuality calls for a cognitive map of the whole social process in reference to which each specific activity is considered.’ In order to understand the evolution of policy analysis in Taiwan, its contextuality, in terms of political and economic development, must be understood. The transition of Taiwan from an authoritarian to a democratic regime is clearly the most important political event of the past 30 years, but other events are almost as important, such as the thawing of cross-strait relations, the 1992 consensus, the first peaceful transfer of power in 2000 and the second transfer of power in 2008, and the trial and conviction of former President Chen Shui-bian. At the same time, the rise of an independent media, the use of public opinion polls to shape government agendas, the expansion of civil society organisations, and the shift toward getting citizens and other stakeholders involved in policy formulation have all, independently or together, made the task of effective policy analysis more difficult. The post-World War II Taiwanese economy has gradually, but dramatically, moved from a planned to a market economy, which has contributed to Taiwan’s Economic Miracle with significant economic growth and rapid industrialisation. Governmentplanned infrastructure construction, the Ten Major Construction Projects, and an agriculture-based economy have been replaced by a service-oriented economy, high levels of foreign trade, and innovative information technology, establishing the national market economy. Nonetheless, in the 1990s low economic growth, high unemployment, stagnant industrial transformation, and weak fiscal discipline led to a budget deficit and high public debt, making policy analysis politically and economically complicated. In short, this chapter takes a macro approach to consider the particular political and economic contexts of Taiwan that have had an impact on the craft of policy analysis and concludes with some suggestions for the Taiwanese public policy community at large.

Politics: from stable to uncertain Political development in Taiwan after World War II has been characterised by a movement from stable to uncertain politics, concurrent with Taiwan’s movement along the democratic path.

2

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

Stable politics: authoritarian political power Martial law in 1947 In the period after World War II, martial law was declared in Taiwan on three separate occasions: during the 228 Incident in 1947, on 10 December 1947 and on 19 May 1949. Martial law was declared for the third time by Chen Cheng in his dual role as Governor of Taiwan’s Provincial Government and Commander-in-Chief of Taiwan’s Garrison Command Headquarters. On 27 May, executive orders related to the martial law were promulgated, implementing a system of military control across Taiwan. When martial law was declared in troubled areas, all administrative and judicial authority was assumed by the military, with the highest ranking military officer in the area placed in charge. In this situation, even though defendants in many criminal cases (especially major cases involving sedition, espionage or gang robbery) tended to be civilians, they were still tried in accordance with the Armed Forces Military Justice Law (later renamed the Military Trial Law) and subject to military justice.1 Numerous executive orders during the martial law period adversely affected people’s rights and obligations. Examples include Measures for the Implementation of Regulations Preventing Illegal Assembly, Associations, Demonstrations, Petitions, Student Strikes, Worker Strikes and Shopkeeper Strikes During the Martial Law Period (1949), Measures for the Control of Newspapers, Magazines and Books During the Martial Law Period in Taiwan Province (1949), Measures for the Inspection of Post and Telecommunications During the Martial Law Period in Taiwan Province (1952), and Measures for the Punishment of Gangsters During the Martial Law Period in Taiwan Province (1955). In combination, these laws served to greatly undermine various constitutionally mandated freedoms and rights, including personal rights, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of private communication as well as freedom of assembly, association, and movement. This had a hugely detrimental impact on personal freedom because trials in military courts were conducted in accordance with rules that do not apply to civilian courts, for example they were usually held in private and concluded in a single trial with no right of appeal. The only possible redress was through retrial. Martial law regulations indicated that civilians subject to military trial would be able to apply for a second trial when martial law was lifted. However, when martial law was repealed, the regulations of the National Security Act were used to deny interested parties the right to seek legal redress, opting instead to pay compensation. Martial law remained in place for 38 years, until it was lifted on 15 July 1987.

Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in 1948 The Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion were in effect used to revise the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC). On 4 July 1947, faced with the intensification of the civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), National Government Chairman Chiang Kai-shek proposed to the Council of State ‘the introduction of a programme of national mobilisation to suppress the Communist rebellion’ (National Repository of Cultural Heritage, NRCH, 2014). 3

Policy analysis in Taiwan

The first article of the Temporary Provision states that: ‘With a resolution to that effect from the Executive Yuan, the President can issue Emergency Orders that are not subject to the limits detailed in Article 39 or Article 43 of the Constitution.’ This exempted Presidential Emergency Orders and martial law from the binding powers of the Constitution. At the same time, the Temporary Provisions also provided a constitutional basis for the System of Mobilization to Suppress Communist Rebellion in the Republic of China. In the 1950s, when Chiang Kai-shek wanted to serve a third term as ROC President, contrary to the Constitution’s two-term limit, the National Assembly representatives proposed revising the Constitution to make it possible. Magazines such as Free China argued that a constitutional amendment was unnecessary as the Temporary Provisions were already part of the ROC Constitution. However, the KMT regime consistently viewed the two as being separate and distinct. In March 1960, the Temporary Provisions were revised to allow the President to serve indefinitely. In February 1966, the fourth meeting of the National Assembly revised the Temporary Provisions again, this time authorising the President to establish agencies with the specific purpose of promoting mobilisation to suppress the Communist rebellion and make decisions on major related policies. The President was also given the power to reorganise the central government executive and personnel, which provided a legal foundation for the expansion of presidential power. At the same time, it also provided a legal basis to increase the number of central government representatives by allowing elections for new seats added on the basis of a growing population or for those seats vacated as a result of the sitting representative dying. This partially resolved the issues related to the long-term suspension of elections. After the ROC government relocated to Taiwan, the Emergency Orders detailed in the Temporary Provisions were used on three occasions: the floods on 8 August 1959, the US declaration that it was on the verge of recognising the People’s Republic of China in 1978, and the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988.

Land reform since 1949 During the 1940s, the Chinese Communist Party gained the support of peasant farmers by carrying out revolutionary land reform. When the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, its leaders understood that it was necessary to reform farmland ownership and use in order to weaken the local gentry’s power, secure financial and military resources and solidify KMT rule over Taiwan. During the 1950s, the US enthusiastically helped Asian countries carry out land reform. In Taiwan, the US provided technological and monetary assistance via the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). Chastened by the 228 Incident in February 1947, the government moved carefully. Government policies for farmland reform in the early post-war period included Rent Reduction to 37.5% in 1949, Sale of Public Land in 1951, and Land to the Tiller in 1953.2 The policy of Rent Reduction to 37.5% mandated that the land rent could not exceed 37.5% of crop revenue. The Sale of Public Land policy was to sell public farmlands directly to the tenant farmers who worked that particular farmland. Under the Land to the Tiller policy, the government took large private farmland holdings, and then sold them to the tenant farmers who were cultivating those parcels of land. The government has stressed that land reform achieved three goals: reduced the farmers’ burden, protected 4

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

landlord rights, and transferred the landlords’ capital to industrial enterprise. The land price under the Land to the Tiller policy was 2.5 times the annual harvest revenue, which was less burdensome than the old rental fees. Meanwhile, the land tax for the government, the biggest landlord, was calculated via taxation by production and included the mandatory purchase of farm products with the tax revenues. These acts weakened the farmers’ ability to make legitimate market profits. At the same time, the government repaid landlords with property bonds (70%) and shares in the four publicly owned companies (30%; Taiwan Cement Corporation, Taiwan Pulp & Paper Corporation, Taiwan Tea Corporation, and Taiwan Industry and Mining Corporation). Land reform increased the number of freehold farmers. Before 1949, the proportion of freehold farmers was only 30%; however, by 1953 it was 55% and by 1960 it had reached 64%. Further, the expansion of tenant rights placed pressure on the landlords to sell their remaining lands. Consequently, by 1986 the proportion of freehold farmers reached 83% (National Statistics, DGBAS, 1990). Since these independent farmers had the incentive to produce more, overall agricultural productivity increased substantially, which further stabilised the food supply. The government reaped large benefits from the price differential created by vastly overestimating the value of the public enterprises. In effect, the land reform brought about far-reaching changes to the land system and reallocation of assets. Further, it initiated the transfer of capital between agriculture and industry and shifted the land capital into the development of industry. Since the government and the landowners were from different groups, there seemed to be no conflict of interests and the land reform was introduced smoothly.

Withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971 The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 on 25 October 1971, recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations. The PRC took over the ROC’s membership in the United Nations, and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Taiwan lost its membership in the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council. In search of greater legitimacy within Taiwan, the National Government further revised the Temporary Provisions and drafted a system to increase the number of elected central government representatives, although it was also clearly stipulated that senior elected central government representatives would continue to exercise the power they already held. At this point, some viewed the Temporary Provisions as an integral part of the constitutional framework, while reformers continued to criticise them as illegally countermanding parts of the Constitution and demanded that they be repealed.

Cross-strait relations: military stalemate to diplomacy (1949–1979) In 1949, the Chinese Civil War turned decisively in the Communists’ (CPC) favour and the ROC government led by the KMT retreated to Taipei in Taiwan, while the CPC proclaimed the PRC government in Beijing. Since then, relations between Mainland China and Taiwan have been characterised by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the legitimate government of China. Following 5

Policy analysis in Taiwan

the breaking off of official relations between the United States and the ROC in 1979, the ROC government under Chiang Ching-kuo maintained a ‘Three No’s’ policy in regard to communicating with the Mainland Chinese government. The two governments continued in a state of war until 1979.

Uncertain politics: democracy The end of martial law in 1987 Martial law ended in 1987. Before the lifting of martial law, a new National Security Law was passed, which – while less harsh than martial law – still contained a significant number of restrictions on freedom of assembly and association, and political rights. Other existing laws effectively limited freedom of speech and of the press. The most important restrictions of the new National Security Law were contained in the three principles laid down in Article 2, which read: ‘Public assembly and association must not violate the Constitution, advocate Communism or the division of the national territory’ (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1987). After the National Government relocated to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT remained in power throughout the martial law period and controlled the unelected ‘Non-Reelected Congress’. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, elections for central government representatives were held in 1991 and 1992. The KMT managed to stay in power by winning the most votes in the popular elections. The Democratic Progressive Party, founded in 1986, is a progressive and liberal political party in Taiwan. The DPP is the first meaningful opposition party in Taiwan. It has traditionally been associated with strong advocacy of human rights and a distinct Taiwanese identity, including promotion of de jure Taiwan independence. The DPP and its affiliated parties are widely classified as liberal because of their strong human rights stance and endorsement of pluralistic democracy, while the Kuomintang has historically taken a defensive posture on such issues.

The end of temporary provisions in 1991 In 1991, President Lee Teng-hui began to push constitutional reform and the second provisional meeting of the first session of the National Assembly passed a resolution on repealing the Temporary Provisions. On 30 April, the President declared that the ‘Period of National Mobilisation in Suppression of Communist Rebellion’ would officially come to an end and the Temporary Provisions were repealed at midnight on 1 May 1991.

Direct presidential election in 1996 In 1996, the ROC President was directly elected for the first time. During the rule of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, this was one of the political reforms most often called for by opposition political figures and liberal academics in Taiwan, with a majority favouring a cabinet system of government. In 1988, after Lee Tenghui became President, the demand for political reform gradually changed in nature as not only elected DPP officials but also some in the KMT began to call for direct presidential elections. In 1990, the activities of the KMT’s non-mainstream faction 6

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

and an attempt by National Assembly representatives to expand their own power attracted fierce criticism from the DPP. On 18 March, more than 20,000 protestors gathered at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to demand the dissolution of the National Assembly and direct presidential elections. At a National Affairs Conference convened from 28 June to 3 July, the ruling and opposition parties came to a consensus on the need for the President to be elected by all citizens of Taiwan. At that time, the KMT party favoured a direct appointment system, but there was already a broad consensus on the need to change the way the President was elected, and the idea of a direct election continued to grow in popularity. While the DPP continued to insist on a direct presidential election, in March 1992 the Legislative Yuan’s secondary group Jisihui, as well as lawmakers and National Assembly representatives from the New KMT Alliance, also came out in support of direct presidential elections. In February 1994, a provisional plenary meeting of the KMT Central Committee passed a resolution supporting direct presidential elections. In July, a provisional meeting of the National Assembly passed the third reading of a constitutional amendment confirming that the ROC President would henceforth be subject to direct election. In March 1996, KMT presidential and vice presidential candidates Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan were duly elected, the first time the Taiwanese public had voted for a head of state.

Alternation of political parties in power in 2000 An alternation of political parties in power refers to the process by which political power is transferred from one party to another through elections, as happens in democratic countries. Following revisions to the ROC Constitution in 1997, Taiwan’s constitutional system of government has tended towards a dual executive presidential system and as such the presidential election makes it possible for power to pass from one political party to another. In 2000, when President Lee Teng-hui completed the maximum two terms in office, the KMT chose Lien Chan as its candidate for President. This led to a serious division in the ranks, and one of the most powerful and influential men in the KMT, James C.Y. Soong, left the party to run independently. As a result of this divided vote, when the results of the presidential election in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu were announced on 18 March 2000, Lien Chan had secured 23.1% of the vote, James Soong 36.84%, and the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian 39.3%. As a result, Chen Shui-bian was officially declared ROC President, in the first ever transfer of political power from one party to another in Taiwan. It is generally believed that beyond internal divisions in the KMT, the main reasons the KMT lost the election were its long-term policy of reunification with China and the division within Taiwanese society between Mainlanders and locals. Throughout the 1990s, the KMT’s first locally born Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui had followed a path of localisation and many came to view him as a covert supporter of Taiwanese independence. Although Lee proposed Lien Chan as KMT candidate for President, the KMT’s traditional supporters largely voted for ‘Mainlander’ James Soong. Soong lost the presidential election by just over 310,000 votes. Despite winning the presidential election, Chen was a minority President faced with a Legislative Yuan controlled by the Pan-Blue (supporters of KMT) camp, making it difficult to pass important laws, budgets, and other policies. Add to that the lack of clarity in the division of power as laid out in the Constitution and there 7

Policy analysis in Taiwan

was a great deal of confusion, which one political academic called ‘the premature alternation of power’ (Carothers, 2002). Despite this situation, and even though Lien Chan and James Soong united to contest the presidential election in 2004, Chen Shui-bian still won the popular vote with 50.11% to the KMT’s 49.89%, securing a second term as ROC President. A constitutional amendment in 2005 cut the number of legislative seats in half and created a single-district two-vote system which worked against the DPP by making it difficult for the Pan-Green camp (DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union) to concentrate support. In elections for the Legislative Yuan in January 2008, the KMT won an overwhelming victory, securing 72% of the seats, which had a knock-on effect on the presidential election a few months later. To make things even worse for the DPP, during President Chen Shui-bian’s last years in power there was a steady stream of reports on high-level corruption and kickbacks involving the Presidential Office and inappropriate relationships between politicians and businessmen. Against this backdrop, when the election for President was held on 22 March, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou secured victory with 58% of the popular vote, marking only the second transfer of political power in the history of the ROC. Parliamentary reform aimed at downsizing membership from 225 to 113 in 2008, together with an electoral system change from a single, non-transferable voting system to a single-member district system, reshaped the operation of the Legislative Yuan and accordingly affected the policy-making process (Huang and Tu, 2010).

Cross-strait relations Thawing of relations (1979–1998)

In 1987, the ROC government began to allow visits to Mainland China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their families in Mainland China for decades. This also proved to be a catalyst for the thawing of relations between the two sides. In order to negotiate with Mainland China on operational issues without compromising the government’s position, denying the other side’s legitimacy, the ROC government under Chiang Ching-kuo created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by the Mainland Affairs Council, an instrument of the Executive Yuan. The PRC responded to this initiative by setting up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), directly led by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. This system, described as ‘white gloves’, allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies. The 1992 Consensus was established, under which both sides agreed to deliberate ambiguity on questions of sovereignty, in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides. However, President Lee Teng-hui began to shift away from the One China policy and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan. Mainland China was also unwilling to compromise and attempted to influence the 1996 ROC election in Taiwan by conducting a missile exercise designed to warn off the pro-independence Pan-Green Coalition. By 1998, the semi-official talks had broken down.

8

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence Hostile non-contact (1998–2008)

Chen Shui-bian was elected President in 2000. He and his party continued to express the ultimate goal of Taiwan’s independence. Concurrently, the PRC continued its military missile buildup across the strait from Taiwan, while making threats of military action. Despite these provocations, in 2001 Chen lifted the 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with the PRC, which made the later Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) possible. Resumption of high-level contact (2008–present)

Since 2008, negotiations have begun to restore the three links – transportation, commerce and communications – between the two sides, cut off since 1949. On 22 March 2008, the KMT party won the presidential election. It also has a majority in the Legislature. A series of meetings between the two sides have followed. The CPC and the KMT have resumed semi-official party-to-party talks through organisations representing the interests of their respective governments. Dialogue through the SEF and the ARATS reopened on 12 June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Direct flights between the two sides began on 4 July. Taiwan allowed entrance of up to 3,000 visitors from Mainland China every day. The financial relationship between the two countries improved on 1 May 2009 as the ROC’s financial regulator, the Financial Supervisory Commission, announced that Mainland Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan’s money markets for the first time since 1949. In October 2013, during APEC Indonesia 2013 in Bali, Indonesia, Wang Yu-chi, Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, met with Zhang Zhijun, Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office, a ground-breaking historical meeting where for the first time in high-level government-to-government talks the two sides addressed each other by official titles. Both of them called on the establishment of a regular dialogue mechanism between their two agencies to enhance mutual understanding and facilitate cross-strait engagement. Wang was also invited by Zhang to visit Mainland China. In February 2014, Wang flew to Nanjing to meet with Zhang, the first high-level governmentto-government official contact between the two sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The meeting took place at the Purple Palace, Nanjing. In terms of cross-strait relations, questions around the legal and political status of Taiwan focused on the alternative prospects of formal reunification with the Mainland or full Taiwanese independence. The People’s Republic remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan. Economy: from planned to market

Taiwan’s economic transformation between 1949 and 1960, as Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist leaders turned away from a command economy to build a market economy, creating the so-called Economic Miracle. As mentioned, for Taiwan the first step towards industrialisation was land reform, a crucial stage in modernising the economy, as it created a class of landowners with capital they could invest in future economic endeavours. US aid was also important to stabilise post-war Taiwan, and it constituted more than 30% of domestic investment from 1951 to 1962. These 9

Policy analysis in Taiwan

factors, together with government planning and universal education, brought huge advancements in industry and agriculture, and rising living standards. Between 1952 and 1961, the economy grew by an average of 9.21% each year (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Taiwan Economic Growth Rate, 1952–2012 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 2012

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

1961

1958

-4

1955

-2

1952

0

Source: National Statistics, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.

Although US aid was cut back in the 1970s, it was crucial in the formative years, spurring industrialisation and maintaining economic security. Uncertainty about the US commitment accelerated the country’s shift from subsidised import substitution in the 1950s to export-led growth. Development of foreign trade and exports helped absorb excess labour from the decreased agricultural industry. Taiwan moved from cheap, labour-intensive manufactures, such as textiles and toys, into heavy industry and infrastructure in the 1970s, followed by advanced electronics in the subsequent decade. The Ten Major Construction Projects during the 1970s

The Ten Major Construction Projects were national infrastructure projects during the 1970s. Taiwan’s government believed the country lacked key utilities such as highways, seaports, airports, and power plants. Moreover, Taiwan was experiencing significant effects from the 1973 oil crisis. Therefore, to upgrade the industry and the development of the country, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo proposed ten massive construction projects, beginning in 1974, with a planned completion by 1979. There were six transportation projects (National Highway No. 1: from Keelung City to Kaohsiung City, with a branch to the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport, later renamed the Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport; Electrification of Western Line railway; the North-Link Line railway; Chiang Kai-shek International Airport; Taichung Port; Su-ao Port), three industrial projects (China Shipbuilding Corporation’s (CSBC) shipyard, Kaohsiung; China Steel Factory; an oil refinery and industrial park), and one nuclear power plant construction project, which ultimately cost over NT$300 billion in total. Taiwan was characterised as one of the newly

10

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

industrialised economies in the wake of the Ten Major Construction Projects since the 1970s. Agriculture-based economy to industrial and service-oriented economy since 1980

With technocracy-centred economic planning under martial law until 1987, real growth in GDP averaged about 8% during the subsequent three decades. Exports have grown fast since World War II, providing the primary impetus for industrialisation. Inflation and unemployment were low and the trade surplus was substantial, which created the world’s fourth largest foreign reserves in the 1980s. Agriculture served as a strong foundation for Taiwan’s Economic Miracle. After retrocession from Japan in 1945, the government announced a long-term strategy of developing industry through agriculture, and developing agriculture through industry. Thus, agriculture became the foundation for Taiwan’s economic development, while promoting growth in industry and commerce. Although only about one-quarter of Taiwan’s land area is suitable for farming, virtually all farmland is intensively cultivated, with some areas suitable for two and even three crops a year. However, increases in agricultural production have been much slower than industrial growth. Agricultural modernisation has been inhibited by the small size of farms and lack of investment in better facilities and training to develop more profitable businesses. Taiwan’s agricultural population has steadily decreased as the Council of Agriculture (COA, 2010) has introduced modern farm management, provided technical training, and offered advice regarding better production and distribution systems. Promotion of farm mechanisation has helped to alleviate labour shortages while increasing productivity; both rice and sugar cane production are completely mechanised. Taiwan’s main crops are rice, sugar cane, fruits, and vegetables. Although self-sufficient in rice production, Taiwan imports large amounts of wheat, mostly from the United States. Meat production and consumption has risen sharply, reflecting a higher standard of living. Taiwan has exported large amounts of frozen pork, although this was affected by an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 1997. Other agricultural exports include fish, aquaculture and sea products, canned and frozen vegetables, and grain products. Imports of agricultural products have increased following accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 2002, which has opened previously protected agricultural markets. In 2013, agriculture comprised only about 1.7% of Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP), down from 35% in 1952, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas, and water supply made up 29%, and the service sector 65% of the economy (National Statistics, DGBAS, 2014). During 1981–1995, the economy grew at an annual rate of 7.52%, as shown in Figure 1.1, and the service sector became the largest sector at 51.67%, surpassing the industrial sector and becoming a major source of economic growth. Taiwan has transformed itself from a recipient of US aid in the 1950s and early 1960s to an aid donor and major foreign investor, with investments primarily centred in Asia. Taiwanese investors and businesses have become major investors in Mainland China, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Investments in Mainland China spurred cross-strait trade, decreasing Taiwan’s dependence on the United States market. By the 1980s, the economy was becoming increasingly open and

11

Policy analysis in Taiwan

the government moved towards privatisation of government enterprises. Technological development led to the establishment of the Hsinchu Science Park in 1981. The Central Bank of the Republic of China’s conservative and stable financial policy and Taiwanese entrepreneurial strengths meant Taiwan suffered little from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1999 compared to many East Asian economies. Unlike neighbouring Japan and South Korea, small and medium-sized businesses make up a significant proportion of Taiwan’s businesses. Taiwan has recovered quickly from the global financial crisis of 2007–2010, and its economy has been growing steadily. Its economy faced a downturn in 2009 due to a heavy reliance on exports which in turn made it vulnerable to world markets. The unemployment rate was 5.85% in 2009, indicated in Figure 1.2, and the economy fell 8.36% in the fourth quarter of 2008 (National Statistics, DGBAS, 2014). In response, the government launched a US$5.6 billion economic stimulus package (3% of Taiwan’s GDP), provided financial incentives for businesses, and introduced tax breaks. The stimulus package focused on infrastructure development, small and medium-sized businesses, tax breaks for new investments, and low-income households. The economy has since slowly recovered; by November 2010, Taiwan’s unemployment rate had fallen to a two-year low of 4.73%, and continued dropping to a 40-month low of 4.18% by the end of 2011 (National Statistics, DGBAS, 2014). The average salary rose steadily for each month in 2010, up 1.92% from the same period in 2009. Industrial output for November 2010 reached another high, up 19.37% from a year earlier, indicating strong exports and a growing local economy. Private consumption also increased, with retail sales up 6.4% compared to 2009 (National Statistics, DGBAS, 2014).

Figure 1.2: Taiwan’s Unemployment Rate, 1953–2013 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0

2013

2010

2007

2004

2001

1998

1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

1971

1968

1965

1962

1959

1956

1953

0.0

Source: National Statistics, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.

Since the 1990s, the economy of Taiwan has adopted economic liberalisation through successive regulatory reforms (APEC Chinese Taipei, 2006). Traditional labourintensive industries are steadily being moved offshore and replaced with more capitaland technology-intensive industries. The economy of Taiwan is an indispensable partner in the global value chain of the electronics industry (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 12

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

2010). Electronic components and personal computers have been two areas of international strength for Taiwan’s information technology industry (Chen and Ku, 2002). Foreign trade since the 1960s

Foreign trade has been the engine of Taiwan’s rapid growth during the past 40 years. Taiwan’s economy remains export-oriented; thus it depends on an open world trade regime and remains vulnerable to downturns in the world economy. The total value of trade increased over fivefold in the 1960s, nearly tenfold in the 1970s, and doubled again in the 1980s. The 1990s saw a more modest, slightly less than twofold growth. Export composition changed from predominantly agricultural commodities to industrial goods (now 98%). The electronics sector is Taiwan’s most important industrial export sector and is the largest recipient of US investment. Taiwan also has successfully diversified its trade markets, cutting its share of exports to the United States from 49% in 1984 to 20% in 2002. The United States is Taiwan’s third largest trading partner, taking 11.4% of Taiwanese exports and supplying 10.0% of its imports. Taiwan’s dependence on the United States should continue to decrease as its exports to Southeast Asia and Mainland China grow and its efforts to develop European markets produce results (Skarica, 2010). Exports to the United States are mainly electronics and consumer goods. Mainland China has recently become Taiwan’s largest import and export partner. In 2010, the Mainland accounted for 28.0% of Taiwan’s exports and 13.2% of imports. This figure is growing rapidly as both economies become ever more interdependent. Imports from Mainland China consist mostly of agricultural and industrial raw materials. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with the People’s Republic of China was signed on 29 June 2010, in Chongqing. It could potentially widen the market for Taiwan’s exports. However, the true benefits and impacts of ECFA for Taiwan’s overall economy are still in dispute. The newly signed agreement will allow for more than 500 products made in Taiwan to enter Mainland China with low or no tariffs. The lack of formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and its trading partners appears not to have seriously hindered Taiwan’s rapid commercial expansion. In order to represent its interests, Taiwan maintains cultural and trade offices in more than 60 countries with which it does not have official relations. In addition to the WTO, Taiwan is a member of the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, reflecting Taiwan’s economic importance and its desire to become integrated into the global economy, spurring further economic liberalisation. Information technology

Industries have gradually moved from more labour-intensive industries to capitaland technology-intensive industries, with electronics and information technology accounting for 35% of the industrial structure. Industry in Taiwan primarily consists of many small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) with fewer large enterprises. Taiwan is the world’s largest supplier of contract computer chip manufacturing and a leading liquid-crystal display (LCD) panel manufacturer, dynamic random-access 13

Policy analysis in Taiwan

memory (DRAM) computer memory, networking equipment, and consumer electronics designer and manufacturer. Textiles are another major industrial export sector, though of declining importance due to labour shortages, increasing overhead costs, land prices, and environmental protection. Imports are dominated by raw materials and capital goods, which account for more than 90% of the total. Taiwan imports most of its energy needs. Taiwan’s information technology industry has played an important role in the worldwide IT market over the last 20 years. In 1960, the electronics industry in Taiwan was virtually non-existent. However, with the government’s focus on development of high-tech expertise, along with the marketing and management knowledge necessary to establish its own industries, companies emerged, including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), founded in 1987, and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), established in 1980. The industry used its industrial resources and product management experience to cooperate closely with major international suppliers to become the research and development hub of the Asia-Pacific region. The structure of the industry in Taiwan includes a handful of companies at the top along with many SMEs which account for 85% of industrial output. These SMEs usually produce products on an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or original design manufacturer (ODM) basis, and, therefore, research and development are less emphasised. The semiconductor industry, including integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing, design, and packing, forms a major part of Taiwan’s IT industry. Due to its strong capabilities in OEM wafer manufacturing and a complete industrial supply chain, Taiwan has been able to distinguish itself from its competitors. The sector output reached US$39 billion in 2009, ranking first in global market share for IC manufacturing, packaging, and testing, and second in IC design (MOEA, 2011). TSMC and UMC are the two largest contract chipmakers in the world. In 1987, TSMC pioneered the fabless foundry model, reshaping the global semiconductor industry. From the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)’s first 3-inch wafer fabrication plant built in 1977 to the founding of UMC in 1980, the industry developed into a world leader with 40 fabs in operation by 2002. In 2007, the semiconductor industry overtook that of the United States, making it second only to Japan. Although the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2010 affected sales and exports, the industry has rebounded, with companies posting record profits for 2010. Taiwan has the largest share of 300 nm (nanometer), 90 nm, and 60 nm manufacturing capacity worldwide. With the OEM/ODM model, companies are usually unable to make in-depth assessments for investment, production, and marketing of new products, instead relying upon importation of key components and advanced technology from the United States and Japan. Twenty of the top information and communication technology (ICT) companies have international procurement offices set up in Taiwan. In order to promote industrial research and development, the government began establishing science parks, economic zones which provide rent and utility breaks, tax incentives, and specialised lending rates to attract investment. The first of these, the Hsinchu Science Park, was established in 1980 by the National Science Council with a focus on research and development in information technology and biotechnology. It has been called Taiwan’s ‘Silicon Valley’ and has expanded to six campuses covering an area of 1,140 hectares (11.4 km2). Over 430 companies, employing over 130,000 people, are 14

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

located within the park, and had paid-in capital totalling US$36.10 billion in 2008. Both TSMC and UMC, the world’s largest and second largest contract chipmakers, are headquartered within the park. Since 1980, the government has invested over US$1 billion on the park’s infrastructure, and further expansion for more specialised parks has been pursued. The Industrial Technology Research Institute, headquartered within the park, is the largest nonprofit research organisation in Taiwan and has worked to develop applied technological research for industry. Following the success of the first park,3 the Southern Taiwan Science Park (STSP), consisting of the Tainan Science Park and the Kaohsiung Science Park, was established in 1996. In addition to companies, several research institutes, including Academia Sinica, and other universities, have set up branches within the park with a focus on integrated circuits, optoelectronics, and biotechnology. The Central Taiwan Science Park (CTSP) was established more recently, in 2003. While the CTSP was still under development, many firms (including AU Optronics) had already moved into the park and began manufacturing operations. These three science parks alone have attracted over NT$4 trillion (US$137 billion) worth of capital inflow, and total revenue within the parks reached NT$2.16 trillion (US$72.8 billion) in 2010 (MOEA, 2011). The e-Taiwan project launched in 2004 by the government seeks to use US$1.83 billion to improve the information and communications infrastructure in Taiwan in five major areas: government, life, business, transport, and broadband. The programme seeks to raise industry competitiveness, improve government efficiency, and improve the quality of life, and aims to increase the number of broadband users on the island to 6 million. In 2010, Taiwan’s software market grew by 7.1% to reach a value of US$4 billion, accounting for 3.3% of the Asia-Pacific region’s market value. The digital content production industry grew by 15% in 2009, reaching US$14.03 billion. The optoelectronics industry (including flat panel displays and photovoltaics) totalled NT$2.2 trillion in 2010, a 40% jump from 2009, representing a fifth of the global market share (China Post, 2011). Taiwan has developed an economy that ranked as the 20th largest in the world by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2013.4 The GDP per capita in PPP is US$39,580 (GDP per capita in 2013 was US$21,902, National Statistics, DGBAS, 2014) and was estimated to be US$41,581 by the International Monetary Fund in 2014 (National Statistics, DGBAS, 2014). Figure 1.3 indicates the GDP per capita from 1951 to 2012; it rose from US$158 in 1951 to US$20,386 in 2012. The economy of Taiwan has the world’s highest concentration of modern convenience stores (Taiwan Culture Portal, 2014). Nonetheless, Taiwan’s economy is facing a slowdown in response to world economic fluctuations. For example, in November 2013 Taiwan’s exports increased by 0.04% from the same month in 2012, while imports decreased by 0.5%. The annual growth rate of the industrial production index swung from positive to negative. The consumer price index (CPI) went up 0.67%, and the unemployment rate decreased to 4.16%. The November Taiwan Business Indicators showed the economic recovery remaining on a slow track5 (National Development Council, 2014). In addition to globalisation low pay for employees, and an uncertain outlook for personal promotion, human resource talents sought career opportunities elsewhere in Asia-Pacific. Businesses in Taiwan suffer from being small and medium-sized enterprises, hindering any attempt at economic transformation or further expansion. With the prospect of continued relocation of labour-intensive industries to economies with cheaper workforces, 15

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Figure 1.3: Taiwan GDP per capita, 1951–2012 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

1960

1957

1954

1951

0

Source: National Statistics, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.

Taiwan’s future development will have to rely on further transformation to a hightechnology and service-oriented economy. Since the 1980s, Taiwan’s low economic growth, high unemployment, and weak fiscal discipline have interacted with the global oil crisis, stagnant world economies and the financial crisis to create high levels of public debt. Figure 1.4 shows that the percentage of debt to GDP has increased over the last two decades.

Figure 1.4: Taiwan debt (% of GDP), 1951–2013 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0

Source: Ministry of Finance, 2013, 2012 Yearbook of Financial Statistics.

16

2011

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

1960

1957

1954

1951

0.0

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

Discussion and conclusion After World War II, martial law was declared in Taiwan. An authoritarian and powerful regime ensured stable politics and a planned economy, as depicted in Figure 1.5. During 1950–1980 the Economic Miracle improved financial conditions and moved Taiwan from I to II in the figure. With the end of martial law, direct presidential elections and alternation of political parties in power made politics uncertain and moved Taiwan from II to III. Public finances became worse due to low economic growth, high unemployment, stagnant industrial transformation, and weak fiscal discipline from the 1980s. The democratic movement, a pluralistic society, and scarce finances moved Taiwan from III to IV. As shown in Figure 1.5, the development of Taiwan’s policy analysis environment is: IIIIIIIV

Figure 1.5: Taiwan’s policy analysis environment and model Politics Stable

Uncertain

Public

Affluent

II

III

Finance

Scarce

I

IV Centralized policy

Compromised and

analysis: Easy to

deliberative policy

achieve political and

analysis: Difficult to

economic rationality

get political and economic rationality

Corresponding to the path of policy analysis, a centralised policy analysis model is feasible and desirable when the government has the power to initiate economic breakthroughs, yielding abundant public finances, and when one political party rules the executive and legislative branches. Both political and economic rationality of policy analysis is high since, under an authoritarian regime, a consensus and efficiency of policy decision are easily achieved. By contrast, in IV in Figure 1.5, Taiwan moves to a so-called turbulent environment with a divided government (Pan-Blue versus Pan-Green), a divided media, and a divided society from a political perspective, and with high government expenditures, low taxes, generous entitlements, and a lack of political will and power to uphold fiscal discipline. The power transfer from the KMT to the DPP in 2000 substantially increased the emergence of interest groups, which required policy analysis to take account of different voices and become decentralised (Huang and Tu, 2010). In the past decade, Taiwan has also witnessed rapid movement toward democratic consolidation. Engaging citizens in policy processes through opinion polls, online mechanisms, and deliberative citizen participation has become popular (Huang and Tu, 2010). At the same time, the rise of an independent media, the use of public opinion polls to shape government agendas, the expansion of civic organisations, and the drive to get citizens and other stakeholders involved in policy 17

Policy analysis in Taiwan

formulation has, independently or together, made the task of effective policy analysis much more difficult. It appears obvious that: No money breeds conflicts; no power breeds conflicts; no money and no power breed turbulence. With multiple and plural participants in policy-making processes, negotiated and deliberative policy analysis has been advocated and implemented. Deliberative public engagement for policy analysis tends to require effort and is time-consuming, though it does ensure democratic legitimacy. Consensus and efficiency of policy decisions might be mutual tradeoffs, difficult to define among plural and multiple actors. Overall, the evolution of Taiwan’s policy analysis in a turbulent context is summarised in Figure 1.6.

Figure 1.6: Evolution of Taiwan’s policy analysis in a turbulent context Martial Law in 1947

Withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971

End of Martial Law in 1987

Alternation of Political Parties in Power in 2000

Temporary Provisions in 1948

End of Temporary Provisions in 1991

Land Reform since 1949

Direct Presidential Election in 1996

Hostile non-contact cross-strait relation (1998–2008)

Military stalemate cross-strait relations since 1949

Thawing of cross-strait relations (1979–1998)

Resumption of high level cross-strait contact since 2008

Foreign Trade since 1960s Ten Major Construction Projects during 1970

Market Economy Affluent Finance

Centralized Policy Analysis

1940

18

Information Technology since 1980

Democracy

Authoritarian Planned Economy

Industry and Service -oriented E conomy since 1980

1960

Scarce Finance Compromised and Deliberative Policy Analysis

1980

2000

Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

This chapter began with an overview of Taiwan’s political changes, from authoritarianism to democracy, and economic transformation, from a planned to a market economy. The dynamic change in the policy analysis environment demanded that policy analysis move from a centralised model to a compromised and deliberative model. Facing the current turbulent policy analysis environment, Taiwan has been suffering from a divided government, media and society with low economic growth, high unemployment and high government expenditures, low taxes, generous entitlements, and a lack of sound fiscal discipline. Taiwan needs both policy analysts and the general public to recognise that a capable government under an authoritarian regime and a limited government under a democratic system cannot coexist, just as a low-tax government is incompatible with a high-expenditure welfare state. Policy analysts need to recognise these limitations and use their professionalism, knowledge, and skills to be more creative in finding money and more deliberative in procuring power. Policy analysts expect not only to consider economic efficiency as the primary goal in the evaluation of alternative policies (Weimer and Vining, 2011), but also to take advantage of campaigning coalitions to change policy beliefs (Sabatier, 2007). Furthermore, echoing Lasswell’s main idea of democratic governance (1970), deLeon (1997) argued that for the policy sciences to move toward democracy, they must accept a new analytic paradigm that draws heavily on critical thinking and post-positivism. Therefore, how to frame policy in a favourable social construction within groups targeted as deserving or undeserving affects the distribution costs and benefits and becomes an important task for smart policy analysts (Fischer et al, 2006; Dobuzinskis et al, 2007).

Notes The description of Taiwan’s political and economic development in this chapter relies greatly on data in National Repository of Cultural Heritage (NRCH), http://nrch.cca. gov.tw/ Ministry of Culture. 1

2

NRCH, http://nrch.cca.gov.tw/

The complete lists of industrial and science parks in Taiwan are: Central Taiwan Science Park, Hsinchu Science Park, Kaohsiung Science Park, Nankang Software Park, Neihu Science Park, Tainan Science Park.

3

4

www.photius.com/rankings/economy/gdp_purchasing_power_parity_2013_0.html

5

www.ndc.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0020483

19

Policy analysis in Taiwan

References APEC Chinese Taipei, 2006. Chinese Taipei’s Self-Assessment Report for the APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform. APEC-OECD Economic Committee Meeting. www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/200611/2006ChecklistReport.pdf Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5–21. Chen, Tain-Jy, and Ku, Ying-Hua, 2002. The Development of Taiwan’s Personal Computer Industry.” Working Paper Series 2002-15, The International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development, Kitakyushu. http://file.icsead.or.jp/ user03/927_208.pdf China Post, 2011. Taiwan’s Optoelectronics Industry Totals NT$2.2 tril.” www. chinapost.com.tw/taiwan-business/2011/01/06/286530/Taiwans-Optoelectronics. htm Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, 2010. Mechanization, http://eng.coa.gov. tw/ deLeon, Peter, 1997. Democracy and the Policy Sciences. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Dobuzinskis, Laurent, Howlett, Michael, and Laycock, David (eds.), 2007. Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Fell, D., 2002. Party Platform Change in Taiwan’s 1990s Elections. Issues and Studies, 38(2), 31–60. Fischer, Frank, Miller, Gerald J., and Sidney, Mara S. (eds.), 2006. Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Huang, T.Y. and Tu, W.L. 2010. Public Policy Processes and Citizen Participation in Taiwan. In Berman, Evan (ed.), Public Administration in East Asia: Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, New York, NY: Taylor and Francis, Chapter 24, 517–531. International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1987. Taiwan Ends Martial Laws after 38 Years. Taiwan Communiqué, 1–25, www.taiwandc.org/twcom/tc31int.pdf Lasswell, Harold D., 1970. The Emerging Conception of the Policy Sciences. Policy Sciences, 1(1), 3–14. Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Department of Investment Services, 2011. The Status of the Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan. http://investtaiwan.nat.gov. tw/eng/main.jsp Ministry of Finance, 2013. 2012 Yearbook of Financial Statistics, www.mof.gov.tw/ public/Data/statistic/Year_Fin/ National Development Council, 2014. Taiwan’s Economic Situation Summary. www. ndc.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0020483 National Statistics, DGBAS (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Executive Yuan). www.dgbas.gov.tw/ Rigger, S. 2004. Taiwan’s Best-Case Democratization. Orbis, 48(2), 285–292. Sabatier, Paul A., 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Skarica, David, 2010. The Great Super Cycle: Profit from the Coming Inflation Tidal Wave and Dollar Devaluation. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

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Policy analysis in a time of turbulence

Sturgeon, Timothy J., and Kawakami, Momoko, 2010. Global Value Chains in the Electronics Industry: Was the Crisis a Window of Opportunity for Developing Countries? Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank. http://unstats. un.org/unsd/trade/s_geneva2011/refdocs/RDs/GVC%20in%20Electronics%20 Industry%20(Sturgeon%20-%20Sep%202010).pdf Ta i wa n C u l t u re Po r t a l . w w w. c u l t u re. t w / i n d e x . p h p ? o p t i o n = c o m _ content&task=view&id=2391&Itemid=157 Weimer, David L. 2012. The Universal and the Particular in Policy Analysis and Training. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 14(1), 1–8. Weimer, David L. and Vining, Aidan R., 2011. Policy Analysis. 5th ed. Boston, MA: Longman. Yu, Chilik, Chen, Chun-Ming, Juang, Wen-Jong, and Hu, Lung-Teng, 2008. Does Democracy Breed Integrity? Corruption in Taiwan during the Democratic Transformation Period. Crime, Law and Social Change, 49(3), 167–184

21

TWO

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government Wen-Jiun Wang and Chang-Tay Chiou

Introduction As many policy scientists have indicated, contemporary policy problems are complicated because they are ill-structured in nature (Mitroff and Emshof, 1979; Radford, 1977). Policy makers often find themselves in a position where they must address policy issues that involve multiple stakeholders, who have various conflicts of interest, or policy problems that involve unknown or intertwined causal relationships. In such situations, policy makers must still make policy decisions, even though they lack complete information and the policy environment is awash with uncertainty. To help them navigate the decision-making process, policy makers often seek assistance from policy experts who possess the necessary knowledge and information. Policy making is the purposeful allocation of public resources by government. Public policies not only include the programmes and actions that are carried out by the government, but also those activities that the government decides to not carry out. These decisions influence who can receive resources from the government. While policy making is the exercise of governmental power, policy analysis and the issuance of policy advice is also the exercise of power to influence the policy-making processes used by the government (Wilson, 2006). Policy analysis activities provide the basis for policy making and lead to patterns of effective and desirable resource allocation. The institutional design of a policy advisory system influences the stakeholders, as well as the information and knowledge, present in the policy process. Since the 1980s, the government of Taiwan has faced the challenge of an increasingly complex policy-making environment due to the significant transition and development of social, political and economic factors. Taiwan’s political system has transformed from an authoritarian dominant-party system to a democracy. The country’s industrial activities have also grown and tightly connected to the global economic system. These political and economic developments inspired the citizens and interest groups demand open access to and participation in the public policymaking process. These developments have increased the complexity and diversity of policy issues under consideration, and the demands for responsive policies that meet the public’s needs. Policy advisors help policy makers to bridge policy-making activities and professional knowledge and to solve the policy problems government agencies face. As Wilson (2006: 154) stated, [p]olicy means the actions, objectives, and pronouncements of governments on particular matters, the steps they take (or fail to take) to implement them, 23

Policy analysis in Taiwan and the explanations they give for what happens (or does not happen). Policy advice means the advice which is given to governments in connection with these things, including how to achieve a policy goal, once it has been decided upon.

A policy maker may receive advice and intellectual knowledge from individual and organisational advisors such as academic institutes, think tanks, government-funded research institutes, scholars and interest groups. According to Huang, Liao and Chiou (1994), other than the advice provided by staff and research units within government agencies, advisory committees are the most frequently used external source by governmental officials who seek policy advice. Therefore, this study focuses on the roles played by standing advisory committees in the central government in Taiwan. By advisory committee, we mean those entities established by laws, executive orders, or announcement in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for agencies or officials of the government. Through a review of relevant literature, a content analysis of government documents and an observation as participants in the policy advisory process, this study probes three research questions. First, what are the structural characteristics of the current standing advisory committees in Taiwan’s central government? Second, what are the roles these advisory committees play in the policy-making process in the central government? Third, to what extent do the committees play their role effectively?

The need for external policy advisors As policy problems have become increasingly complicated and technical, there has also emerged an increased need for highly specific and professional knowledge that can help identify the causal relationship between policy instruments and outcomes. Government officials and their staff often do not obtain the knowledge needed to allocate resources and solve policy problems. Rather than establish a new organisation, government agencies may seek advice from external experts who could provide information on specific subjects during the policy-making process. The development of consultative relationships with external experts for policy advice can be seen as a management tool and the solution of the government to the problem of lacking specialised knowledge and expertise. The need for external knowledge is not the only reason for the development of the external advisory system. The nature of policy making is not purely rational, nor is policy making a value-neutral activity. In a democratic society, the allocation of public resources involves more than considerations of effectiveness and efficiency; policy makers must also consider the responsiveness and representativeness of their policy choices in order to secure votes in future elections. From this perspective, those involved in the policy-making process must engage the public in open dialogue. The democratic perspective recognises and emphasises the right of citizens to have access to the information on the governmental decision-making process. The role of external advisors in the policy-making process has been addressed from the technocratic and democratic perspectives (Jasnoff, 1990). However, both models are limited in their ability to identify how the quality and effectiveness of policy outcomes might be improved. The technocratic model operates with the assumption that there are effective and rational solutions for all policy problems. When 24

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government

government officials and their staff do not acquire the professional knowledge that is needed for making decisions on specific issues, external scientists equipped with the professional capacity can utilise their knowledge to help policy makers allocate resources efficiently and effectively. The democratic model rests on the assumption that the decision-making process ought to be open to the public, and that citizens are sufficiently educated on technical and professional issues to play an informed role in the policy process (Jasnoff, 1990: 16). These assumptions are not without critics. First, some argue that scientific knowledge is actually socially constructed (Jasnoff, 1990). This argument suggests that facts do not always represent an objective reality. Scientists may attempt to accept certain claims as better than others under certain circumstances. Moreover, many scientific facts are not always tested and established with reference to objective criteria of validity. A particular factual claim is regarded as truth, not because it accurately reflects what is observed, but because it has been accepted and certified as true by the community considered to have authority to make a judgement on the claim. The academic community usually performs peer reviews to evaluate and access the quality of scientific findings. However, the ‘boundary work’ that occurs in scientific communities often prevents new ideas from being considered valuable. Second, there is a gap between scientific groups and policy makers. Researchers (Caplan, 1979; Hoppe, 2009) have suggested that advisory units and governmental agencies operate with different goals, rules, structures and processes. These gaps make it difficult for scientists and policy makers to interact and communicate. Caplan (1979) used the ‘two communities’ metaphor to describe work that occurs on either side of the boundary, as well as the lack of interaction between research and decisionmaking communities. Caplan also indicated that scientists and policy makers operate according to different values, goals, motivations, time constraints and problem-solving perspectives. Thus, it is difficult for the communities to interact and to communicate, which also explains why policy makers make limited use of scientific research. Third, the public’s participation in the policy-making process also has an impact on the quality of scientific decision-making. According to the experiences of the United States, open access to government documents allows the public to challenge scientific conclusions, possibly leading to the intervention of the judiciary in the regulatory process. Through an empirical case study of the regulatory policy practices within the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Jasnoff (1990) found that the consequence of public participation in scientific policy making is that the judges, not policy experts, become the final arbiters of highly scientific disputes. Given the shortcomings of the technocratic model and the democratic model, Jasnoff (1990) proposes the social construction model as an alternative approach to understanding the policy advisory system. The social construction model encourages dialogue and interaction among scientists, governmental decision-makers and the public. The goal of policy advice is not merely to provide scientific information, but rather to create a bridge between the empirical and analytic knowledge and practical strategies for action. Successful scientific advice depends on acceptance of the decision-makers and the public. Based on Jasnoff’s argument, the scientists do not merely play the role of one-way information provider, but they should also play active roles as technical consultants, investigators, educators, policy advocates and arbiters of disputes. Therefore, the scientific advisory system should be equipped with the 25

Policy analysis in Taiwan

capacity to use appropriate language to communicate and initiate dialogue with the government and the public to build a consensus on policy issues.

Policy advisory committees: functions and values The advisory committee is a mechanism that has been widely used by government officials to meet and interact with external professional communities. While some advisory committees serve as ad hoc organisations, some have become stabilised and permanent. Bruce Smith (1992) has identified the different formats of advisory committees, which include peer review panels, programme advisory committees, ad hoc fact-finding or investigating committees, and the standing committee providing advice to the decision-maker on broad political–technical issues. To synthesise the discussions above, a policy advisory committee may serve one of the following functions in the policy-making process (Huang et al, 1994: 20–21). First, policy advisory committees can serve as policy analysts, helping decision-makers diagnose policy issues and identify key problems. Second, when a government faces a policy predicament or a conflict of interests among stakeholders, advisory committees can serve as dispute arbitrators. Third, policy advisory committees can play the role of policy innovator by helping officials to access ideas that lie beyond the boundary of the bureaucratic structure. Fourth, policy advisory committees serve the function of policy designers, providing policy makers with effective resource allocation and actionable plans to bridge between policy ideas and effective implementation strategies. Finally, policy advisory committees are also public interest aggregators who help policy makers to identify public needs and to promote the public interest. As policy advice can influence the government’s course of action and its decisions on the allocation of resources, it is important to ensure the fair design and operation of an advisory system. Smith (1992) analysed the debates and evolution of advisory committees in the United States and identified three key principles for advisory committee systems, ensuring that outside advisory groups would have fair, open and reasonably equal access to decision-makers, and to avoid the misuse of the advice process. First, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which was passed in 1972 and regulates advisory committees in the United States, requires open advisory committee meetings except in the case of national security or the discussion of sensitive personnel matters. This means that notice of the time and place of committee meetings must be published in the Federal Register in advance. Second, FACA indicates that the composition of committee membership must be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed. However, the concept of membership balance is difficult to implement. The balance can be defined in terms of geography, professional background, point of view, political ideology, gender or race. It is also a problem in science advisory committees in which the balance can be defined in terms of scientific disciplines, in terms of lay versus specialist members, or in terms of industrial versus academic scientists (Smith, 1992: 30). Third, as public awareness of government corruption increased, the potential conflicts of interest of committee members became a concern. Although FACA does not contain a provision to address concerns about conflict of interest, the government agencies have gradually paid closer attention to the issue in the practice of advisory committees (Smith, 1992: 31–35).

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Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government

However, the function and operation of advisory committees vary in different countries. The United States’ advisory system tends to open up the policy-making process to various professionals and advisory groups, so that democracy would thereby be best served. The principles of openness, balance of membership and conflict of interests are applicable to the United States’ advisory system, in which governmental agencies and advisory committees attempt to remain independent from each other. Advisory committees can provide their professional advice to government officials, but governmental officials obsess over the authority to make final decisions. Meanwhile, advisory committees should be free from the influence of governmental officials, and able to make decisions independently. Not all democracies rely as heavily on the use of outside advisors as the United States (Smith, 1992). In contrast, most Western democracies are typically more executive-centred and less open than the pluralist America (Smith, 1992: 8). In Britain and some European countries, citizens and interest groups gain access to the administrative decision-making process within a corporatist framework, in which a small number of peak associations participate formally in the administrative process. In Japan, as another example, the advisory committees are mostly composed by the political, business and academic elites and the citizens gain less access to the administrative process (Huang et al, 1994: 90). The differences in practice styles of advisory committees between the United States and other democracies indicate that the constitutional framework and bureaucratic culture may lead to different utilisation of external advisors in the administrative process. It is necessary to understand the features of the administrative system of a country when discussing its advisory system. Therefore, in the next section, we introduce the background of Taiwan’s policy analysis environment.

Background of Taiwan’s policy analysis environment From 1949 to the present, Taiwan has experienced a series of constitutional transitions. In 1945, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) took Taiwan over from Japan after World War II, and settled in Taiwan in 1949 after losing the civil war to the Chinese communists and retreating from Mainland China. In order to survive the harsh political and economic environment, the KMT integrated the Japanese colonial administrative system into its Nationalist government and ruled Taiwan as a single authoritarian regime (Tang, 2004). Given the evolution of the diplomatic situation and the international status of Taiwan, the KMT gradually shifted the focus from recovering Mainland China to economic development and political localisation in Taiwan. As the economy grew from the 1970s, it created pressure for political liberalisation in Taiwanese society. After 38 years of enforcement, martial law was lifted in 1987. This provided the Taiwanese people with freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the freedom to form political parties and association of voluntary groups, key elements of democratisation (Yeh, 2002). With these constitutional reforms, Taiwan’s people were empowered to elect the President directly in 1996. On 18 March 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party’s nominee, Chen Shui-Bian, was elected as Taiwan’s new president, marking the end of 55 years of KMT rule in the country (Yeh, 2002). The long history of authoritarian rule had led to a tradition of a strong administration. Under authoritarian rule, bureaucrats were composed of the ruling 27

Policy analysis in Taiwan

elite, with no legislative oversight of the bureaucracy, in which political loyalty took precedent over accountability (Tang, 2004). Policy makers were not directly under the pressure of responding to the public when making decisions. In 1955, the Executive Yuan established a special committee and recruited 22 professionals and scholars to conduct research that would identify organisations in the central government and their responsibilities; it was Taiwan’s first advisory committee. In 1958, referring to the Hoover Commission of the United States, an Ad Hoc Administrative Reform Commission was established in President Hall to provide advice to the President on administrative reform issues. A few years later, the Administrative Reform Advisory Task Force was formally established in the Executive Yuan to study how to enhance the administrative system’s institutional design, operational processes and administrative performance. As the economy improved, the government sought the participation of the private sector in economic planning and decision-making. Therefore, supra-ministerial advisory bodies, such as the Science and Technology Advisory Group, were created to conduct public–private joint research projects to develop high-tech industries (Tang, 2004). The democratisation and liberalisation of Taiwan’s society also facilitated the emergence of complex policy issues. Thus, the need for a policy advisory system within the administrative system increased. In 1979, the Executive Yuan issued the Guidelines for the Establishment of Advisory Committees of the Executive Yuan and Affiliated Agencies (GEAC), which served as the major administrative rule for the regulation of the advisory system (Huang et al, 1994). GEAC indicated that government agencies could seek for advice from standing advisory organisations, ad hoc committees, academic institutes, government-sponsored or private-sponsored think tanks, individual experts or scholars, and legislative or group leaders. In terms of the standing advisory committee, GEAC required that all committee members serve as unpaid part-time employees, and their terms of service were renewed on an annual basis. However, there was no indication regarding concerns about openness, balance of membership or conflicts of interest. Basically, GEAC only provided government agencies with the legitimacy to seek advice from external sources, but did not provide clear principles or rules about how best to utilise these external sources of advice. In April 2000, GEAC was terminated and governmental agencies were provided the authority to issue the individual establishment guidelines for each advisory committee.

Structure of standing advisory committees in Taiwan’s central government The number of standing advisory committees currently present in the central government (Huang et al, 1994). In this research, we identified the standing advisory committees present in the central government according to the following criteria: (1) advisory committees established within the Executive Yuan and second-level agencies affiliated with the Executive Yuan; (2) advisory committees with responsibility for the issuance of establishment guidelines; (3) advisory committees that contain nongovernmental members; and (4) advisory committees that only have advisory power but do not possess administrative authority. Using these criteria, we identified 43 policy advisory committees, which are listed in Table 2.1 (p 30). We reviewed the content of the establishment guidelines of each advisory committee, and analysed 28

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government

them according to size, type of members, period of service, recruitment, frequency of meetings, and the remuneration provided to members.

Composition and recruitment We analyse the composition of the identified advisory committees based on size, type of members, representativeness of members and recruitment methods. In terms of size, the advisory committees vary according to the number of their members, which ranged from 9 to 41. According to the data, more than half (27 out of 43) of committees are composed of 10 to 19 members (Table 2.2). The broad range of numbers of members indicates that advisory committees in the central government are flexible in terms of size. These advisory committees tend to contain five types of members: government personnel; scholars; experts; representatives of interest groups; and independent community members. As Table 2.3 indicates, 41 and 42 out of 43 advisory committees contain scholars and experts. This means that government agencies do approach scholars and experts when they seek external policy advice. The data also shows that 29 out of 43 advisory committees incorporate governmental officials from other agencies as committee members. When considering representativeness, the data indicate that 18 out of 43 advisory committees recruit representatives of interest groups to present their position in the advice-seeking process. However, only 10 out of 43 committees address the issue of balance of members by mandating the ratio of composition among different types of members (Table 2.4). For example, the Establishment Guideline of Wildlife Conservation Advisory Committee indicates that the number of external members in the committee should be no less than two-thirds of the total number of committee members. We also examined whether the establishment guidelines of each advisory committee contain provision against conflicts of interest. The results indicate that only 5 out of 43 committees address the issue of conflicts of interest (Table 2.5). One example is the Establishment Guideline of Religious Affairs Advisory Committee, which indicates that the committee members should avoid conflict of interest when the meeting agenda is related to their personal interests. We also examined the recruitment of committee members. According to the content analysis (as shown in Table 2.6), except the seven committees that have no information on the recruitment process, in most of committees (35 out of 43), the members are nominated by top-level agency officials. In these committees, the top-level officials have autonomy in the recruitment process. However, there is one exception. The members of Environmental Impact Assessment Committee are selected by a recruitment task force, who vet committee members with a preestablished selection criteria.

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Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 2.1: List of identified advisory committees Agency

Name of committee

Executive Yuan Ministry of the Interior

Professional Advisory Committee of Disaster Reduction Advisory Committee of Religious Affairs National Pension Supervisory Commission Advisory Committee of Tax Policy and Rules Public Welfare Lottery Supervisory Commission Alcohol Certification Technical Committee Review Committee of E-Invoice Promotion Advisory Committee of Government Scholarship for Overseas Study Advisory Committee of National Language Education Advisory Committee of Family Education Advisory Committee of Special Education Advisory Committee of Industrial Development Review Committee of Water Resource Policy Review Committee of Commodity Labelling Technology Advisory Committee of Remediation for Landslides in Li-Shan Area Advisory Committee of Wildlife Conservation Advisory Committee of Fisheries Review Panel of Natural Scenery Panel of Biological Resource Survey Advisory Committee of Labour Safety and Health Review Panel of Vocational Injury Prevention and Rehabilitation Subsidy Advisory Committee of Economic Planning and Development

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Education

Ministry of Economic Affairs

Council of Agriculture

Council of Labour Affairs Council of Economic Planning and Development Mainland Affairs Council Department of Health

Environmental Protection Administration Public Construction Commission Atomic Energy Council National Science Council Research, Development and Evaluation Commission Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics

30

Advisory Committee of Mainland Affairs Advisory Committee of Indigenous People Health Service Advisory Committee of National Blood Utilisation Advisory Committee of Nurse Practitioners Advisory Committee of Contagious Disease Prevention Advisory Committee of Genetic Health Advisory Committee of Healthcare Quality Policy Advisory Committee of Offshore Island Health Service Medical Ethics Committee Hospital Management Committee Committee of Liver Cancer Prevention and Therapy Review Panel of Controlled Medicine Committee of AIDS Prevention and Therapy Advisory Committee of Long-term Care Advisory Committee of Environmental Quality Advisory Committee of Promoting Carbon Footprint Labelling Environmental Impact Assessment Committee Investigation Committee of Engineering and Technology Advisory Committee of Radioactive Waste Safety Review Committee of Science and Technology Parks Advisory Committee of E-governance Information Security Advisory Committee of Census Survey

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government

Table 2.2: Frequency distribution of number of advisory committee members Number of members

Less than 10

10 to 19

20 to 29

30 to 39

More than 40

No Indication

Total

Frequency

1

27

10

3

1

1

43

Table 2.3: Frequency distribution of types of advisory committee members Types of members

Government personnel

Scholar/ researchers

Experts

Interest group representatives

Independent community members

Total

Frequency

29

41

42

18

7

137*

* Each committee may be composed of more than one type of members, thus the total of frequency is more than 50.

Table 2.4: Frequency distribution of advisory committees that address the issue of balance of members Balance of members

Mandate the ratio of composition of members

No indication

Total

10

33

43

Frequency

Table 2.5: Frequency distribution of advisory committees that address the issue of conflict of interest Address the issue of conflict of interest

Yes

No indication

Total

Frequency

5

38

43

Table 2.6: Recruitment method of advisory committees Recruitment method

Frequency

Nominated by top-level officials of the agency

Selected by recruitment task force

No indication

Total

35

1

7

43

Obligation and remuneration of committee members The nominated committee members, once they agree to serve, are obliged to attend meetings and provide advice to the government agencies. We analyse the committee members’ period of service, frequency of meeting, and the remuneration the members receive for their service. Table 2.7 shows the period of service for each term of the committee members. The content analysis result indicates that the period of serving of members in most of committees is two years. The members are obligated to attend the advisory meetings during their term. Table 2.8 shows the meeting frequency 31

Policy analysis in Taiwan

of the identified advisory committees, which range from once a month to once a year. Thirty-five percent (15 of 43) advisory committees meet every three months, which is the highest meeting frequency of all advisory committees examined. There are also five committees that do not require regular meetings, and advisory meetings are only held when needed.

Table 2.7: Frequency distribution of period of service Period of service Frequency

1 year

2 years

1–2 years

Until mission completed

No indication

Total

9

29

3

1

1

43

Table 2.8: Frequency distribution of meetings Frequency of meeting Frequency

Every month

Every 2 months

Every 3 months

Every 4 months

Every 6 months

Once a year

5

2

15

3

7

4

Depends on No need indication 5 2

Total 43

In terms of remuneration, as Table 2.9 shows, 34 of 43 committees provide no payment to their members. Only seven committees indicate in their establishment guidelines that non-governmental members would be compensated for transportation costs, attendance or for their service of reviewing documents or projects. This data shows that most of the external advisors serve on the committees without receiving financial benefits.

Table 2.9: Frequency distribution of types of remuneration for committee members Type of remuneration Frequency

No remuneration

Remuneration for non-governmental personnel only (transportation, attendance, or review service)

No indication

Total

34

7

2

43

These findings indicate that Taiwan’s central government agencies possess high flexibility in terms of utilising advisory committees to seek external advice. When establishing an advisory committee, government agencies have high autonomy in deciding the size, composition of members and frequency of meetings. The findings also indicate that Taiwan’s government agencies tend to seek advice from scholars and experts in related fields. This suggests that Taiwan’s policy advisory system has the features of the technocratic model that emphasises the function of the scientists who provide policy advice. Other than the establishment guidelines, however, there is no clear mechanism to hold the advisory process accountable. The issue of openness, the balance of members and conflicts of interest are rarely addressed in Taiwan’s advisory system. For example, none of the advisory committees are required to issue notice to the public that a meeting will occur. Except for a few advisory committees, the representativeness 32

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government

and balance of members are not of concern when government agencies establish an advisory committee.

Advisory committees in action After probing the structure of current standing advisory committees, we considered the extent to which these advisory committees improve the quality of policy making in Taiwan’s central government, which is the goal of establishing advisory committees. However, it is difficult to directly measure the performance of advisory committees. There are many factors and actors involved in the policy-making and implementation process (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994; Kingdon, 1995; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Advisory committees only play a partial role in the full decision-making process. The causal relationship between the advice of committees and the effectiveness of policy outcomes is not easily tested. Therefore, instead of measuring the performance of these committees, we aim to ask: what are the roles these advisory committees play in the policy-making process in the central government and to what extent do the committees fulfil their role effectively?

Roles of advisory committees According the discussion in the previous sections, an advisory committee may be established to serve multiple functions, such as problem analysis, dispute resolution, policy innovation, policy design and expression of public interest. Through examining the mission and tasks of the advisory committees identified in Taiwan, we found that each committee were established for a different purpose and may carry out one or more functions. For example, the Professional Advisory Committee of Disaster Reduction of the Executive Yuan was established in 2003 to perform the functions of policy design and problem analysis that related to disaster management issues. This advisory committee is composed of scholars and experts in the disaster management field and representatives of related government agencies. The advisory committee has designed and proposed the White Paper on Disaster Prevention and Protection for the central government. In 2009, after Typhoon Morakot caused significant loss of life and property, the advisory committee investigated and analysed the problems in the disaster response system in Taiwan and proposed ways to improve the government’s performance in disaster response for future events. Advisory committees are also employed by the central government as a mechanism for dispute resolution. Experts and scholars are often considered as professionals who can utilise their scientific knowledge and make rational decisions based on evidence. The advisory committees composed of experts and scholars play the role of arbitrator to make unbiased decisions in order to solve policy disputes. For example, the conflict between the values of economic development and environmental protection has been a challenge for government officials making decisions related to development projects. Environmentalists and the public often question the government when it makes decisions that favour business groups. Therefore, the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee (EIAC) of the Environmental Protection Administration of the Executive Yuan was established to review the environmental impact assessment report and decide if each economic development project has adopted appropriate measures to minimise its impact on the natural environment, and if the development 33

Policy analysis in Taiwan

project should proceed. The EIAC is composed of scholars and experts who fulfil certain selection criteria and are expected to provide advice based on scientific rationale, and to be free from the bias of self-interest.

Performance of advisory committees Given the high level of autonomy and flexibility the government agencies possess in utilising advisory committees, the operation and performance of these standing advisory committees varies. Governmental officials, who can decide the composition and agendas of advisory committee meetings, are often key to the function and operation of these committees. Based on our observation of practices, we propose three findings. First, the operation of current standing advisory committees in Taiwan’s central government shows the gap between the government agencies and their external committees. From the perspective of government agencies, the external scientists and professionals often do not provide feasible solutions to the problems agencies are facing. “Scholars are too idealistic. Their advice is often abstract or difficult to operationalise for government agencies which have to consider the political and administrative contexts”, as a government official stated. From the perspective of scientists and professionals, government officials do not take their policy advice seriously. Many of the advisory committees only meet twice or three times a year, and the external advisors do not have sufficient time to communicate and discuss the policy issues that government agencies are facing. With limited meeting time and interactions, scholars and professionals cannot accumulate practical knowledge or build trust with government agencies. Without trust between the two communities, the agencies often hesitate to reveal the critical data to scholars, and prefer to seek advice from internal research units. Second, advisory committee meetings serve as a venue for government officials to access information from various sources and perspectives, rather than to reach a consensus among members on policy solutions. As advisory committees are composed of members with different backgrounds, and only meet a few times a year, it is difficult for members to commit to particular policy issues and to work together as a team. Instead, each member attends meetings and provides opinions as an individual. More often, the committee members may present conflicting opinions. In committee meetings, government officials receive varied but not synthesised advice from advisors. Therefore, advisory committees do not appear to be the core tool that government officials would use when seeking important policy advice. When systematic analysis is needed on policy issues, many government officials continue to prefer to seek policy advice from internal research staff or trusted research teams rather than from advisory committees (Huang et al, 1994). Third, advisory meetings are sometimes held only to fulfil the legal mandate and enhance the legitimacy of policy making, rather than to solve real policy problems. With strong administrative authority, government officials may not have the incentive to open the policy-making process to the external experts and representatives. Advisory committee meetings are held simply because they are required by law. In some cases, officials tend to recruit external advisors with a personal connection or a certain level of familiarity in order to avoid unexpected arguments or conflict during meetings. Scholars, experts and interest group representatives who attend 34

Exploring policy advisory committees in the central government

advisory meetings with great enthusiasm for public policy issues may end up feeling frustrated and disappointed because their inputs have no impact on the policy-making process. Consequentially, in some cases, those external advisors and representatives who possess different opinions would be less likely to be recruited onto committees, and the perspectives and discussions in advisory committee meetings are therefore pre-filtered. Although recognising that their opinions may not have an impact on the decision-making process, there are still scholars and professionals who are willing to attend the meetings. These people may be motivated by other benefits, such as building connections with the government agencies or other members of the committee, which may increase their personal social capital. In order to stay included in the committee, some advisors tend to provide less radical opinions, or those that favour the preferences of government officials.

Conclusions This study analysed the historical background of the advisory committees’ development and found that the long history of authoritarian rule led to a strong bureaucratic system. Taiwan’s transition to democracy has increased the public access to the policy-making process. The values of democracy have also influenced the development of advisory systems in Taiwan’s central government. Government officials establish advisory committees and recruit external scholars, professionals and interest group representatives to express opinions and share knowledge. However, our analysis of the institutional design of Taiwan’s advisory committee system revealed problems related to openness and transparency, membership balance, and conflicts of interest. Apart from a few exceptions, most advisory committees do not reveal the composition of their members or release the content of meetings to the public. The consequence is that the operation of advisory committees greatly depends on the preference of individual government officials. Members of committees are preselected, and the public may not know what advice those members provided during committee meetings. Although advisory committees do not have the legal authority to make decisions on policies, the meetings are a process of expressing opinions and delivering messages to the authorities. The policy issues discussed in the meetings are closely related to the issue of public interest, such as labour safety, religious affairs, industrial development, and long-term healthcare. Thus, there is a need to ensure an open and fair advisory system to avoid misuse of the advisory process and to promote knowledge utilisation and democratic values, which are critical to the quality of the policy-making process. To improve the function of advisory committees in practice, we propose the following suggestions. First, we suggest advisory committees should be open to the public, including the lists of committee members and minutes of meetings. According to the Freedom of Information Act in Taiwan, issued in 2005, the public should have access to governmental information. The Act listed the ten types of information that the government agencies should make available to the public. However, information on advisory committee activities is not included in the list. Open access to information on composition of the committees and to the minutes of their meetings could facilitate the professional accountability of the committee members. External advisors do not possess the legal authority to make decisions on policies and to be legally accountable for their opinions. Ultimately, it is government officials who are responsible for 35

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their policy decisions, politically and administratively. With open information, the committee members will be held accountable for their arguments on specific policy issues by their peers in the professional communities they belong to. Advisory committee meetings allow the three communities – the public, scientists, and government officials – to interact and communicate with each other. Therefore, as our second suggestion, we encourage government agencies to seek additional ways to engage representatives from public interest groups by selecting them as committee members and inviting them to participate in advisory committee meetings. Although it may be more difficult to reach a consensus when engaging interest groups in committee meetings, external inputs from various interest groups will help government officials to identify the potential conflicts within policy issues before the decision is made. Theoretically, advisory committees are important in the policy-making process in terms of knowledge utilisation, democracy and social construction perspectives (Jasnoff, 1990). External advisors provide government officials with professional knowledge, while advisory meetings allow officials to interact with interest groups that promote democratic values. However, the role of advisory committees in the policy-making process in Taiwan’s central government is a black box that is still not understood. Since advisory committee members are not paid and do not have fully policy-making authority, the operation and performance of Taiwan’s advisory committees in the administrative system have rarely been discussed or assessed. More studies on the engagement of external advisors and the utilisation of professional knowledge in the policy-making process are needed to understand Taiwan’s policy analysis and public policy-making processes.

References Caplan, N., 1979. The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization. American Behavioral Scientist, 22(3), 459–470. Hoppe, Robert. 2009. Scientific Advice and Public Policy: Expert Advisers’ and Policymakers’ Discourses on Boundary Work. Poièsis and Praxis 6, 235–263. Huang, Jun-Ying, Liao, Da-Chi, and Chiou, Chang-Tay, 1994. The Institutional Design and Utilization of the Policy Advisory System. Taipei: Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan. Jasnoff, S., 1990. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policy Makers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kingdon, J.W., 1995. Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policy. New York: HarperCollins. Mitroff, I.I., and Emshoff, J.R., 1979. On Strategic Assumption Making: A Dialectical Approach to Policy and Planning. Academy of Management Review, 4, 1–12. Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Wildavsky, Aaron, 1984. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland. Berkeley: University of California Press. Radford, K.J., 1977. Complex Decision Problems: An Integrated Strategy for Resolution. Reston, VA: Reston Publishing. Sabatier, P.A., and Jenkins-Smith, H.C., 1994. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment. In Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (pp. 117–166). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Smith, Bruce L.R. 1992. The Advisers: Scientists in the Policy Process. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Tang, Ching-Ping, 2004. When New Public Management Runs into Democratization: Taiwan’s Public Administration in Transition. Issues and Studies 40(3/4), 59–100. Wilson, Richard, 2006. Policy Analysis as Policy Advice. In Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (pp. 152–168). New York: Oxford University Press. Yeh, J.R. 2002. Constitutional Reform and Democratization in Taiwan: 1945–2000. In P. Chow (ed.), Taiwan’s Modernization in Global Perspective (pp. 47–77). Westport, CT: Praeger.

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THREE

Analysis of innovative local government policies in Taiwan Chung-pin Lee

Introduction Policy analysis has been commonly acknowledged as one of the most important processes for avoiding policy failure, as well as for improving policy efficiency. This is especially true during the process of adopting highly uncertain new policy ideas. However, what are the analytical processes and assessment tools used by local governments to guide their adoption/rejection of innovative policies? By reviewing three cases of innovation adoption in Taiwan’s local government, this chapter not only addresses this question, but also integrates theories of policy analysis with the theories of innovation adoption. This chapter is structured around five sections: the first three identify the common theoretical basis for innovation diffusion literature and policy analysis; the fourth section describes the policy analysis of Taiwan’s local government innovations. The final section concludes the chapter and offers suggestions for the decision-making process regarding policy innovations.

Approach of Policy Analysis Following the separation of public policy research from political science and public administration in the 1950s, policy analysis became an important academic topic within a relatively short period of time. One of the main reasons for this importance is that such analysis is required in policy implementation. Both pre-implementation assessments and overall post-implementation outcome reviews require the participation of policy analysts. However, due to its vast scope of application and the divergent emphases placed on policy analysis by different scholars, policy analysis itself is broadly defined. Given its objective of analysing a targeted issue from an overall perspective, Dunn (1993) stated that policy analysis belongs to the applied discipline. It employs multiple investigation methods and policy argumentation methods to create and transform policy data so that it can be applied in a political environment in order to analyse policies. Williams (1971) believed that policy analysis generates policy proposals via integrated data, and in turn determines the future demand based on such data. It is therefore similar to pre-implementation and feasibility assessments. Dye (1995) placed the focus of his study on the causal inferences of a policy. He claimed that the function of policy analysis is to describe and explain the causes and effects of implementing a certain policy, and that therefore the policy analysis procedure requires objective and precise methods, so that its explanatory power can be enhanced. Burt (1974) also believed that policy analysis is a pre-implementation 39

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assessment of a policy. It is a systematic path to help decision makers select effective policies, and its primary aim is to identify the crux of a problem and subsequently develop a problem-solving solution. Policy options are compared based on results of analysis, and problems are solved based on analyses of theoretical frameworks, as well as the judgements and opinions of experts. Policy analysis can be applied to a wide range of topics. It affects research institutions, non-profit organisations, consultants and government institutions, regardless of their analytical focus. To adapt to an environment in which innovation is constantly accelerating, policy analysts need to upgrade their own abilities and possess crossdisciplinary knowledge rather than single-discipline perspectives. Academia generally divides the vast scope of policy analysis into two types of logical analysis. Of the two, logical-positivism is widely known. To maintain a rational policy analysis process, analysts adopt quantification methods, which include statistics, microeconomics, and econometrics in their analysis. For example, weaknesses and strengths of policies are compared from a social cost-effectiveness perspective, where policy input is counted as a cost and its results are counted as outcomes. In other words, to determine whether a proposed policy or plan is worth implementing, policy analysts analyse, assess, or recommend it based on its economic efficiency. The advantage of using cost-effectiveness as a means of assessment is that the policy can be quantified and thus figures and monetary values can be used to represent its actual status. However, policy analyses are conducted in various environments and supported by different resources, and the use of cost-effectiveness in policy analysis fails to take into account social justice, fairness, and public opinion. Finding a solution to this predicament presents a great challenge for policy analysts. Another type of logical analysis is associated with the rise of ‘postmodernism’ and ‘post-positivism’ in the 1980s. Policy analysts initiated the attempt to break the tradition of assessing a policy arbitrarily and rationally, and opposed the idea of quantification analysis. Instead, they emphasised the establishment of ‘policy dialogue’ and ‘public participation’ and the inclusion of multiple and diverse values in policy making so that the members of a society could choose policies for themselves. In short, in the ever-changing environment, policy analysis can no longer be represented by mere numbers or monetary values, as in traditional practice. There should be more dialogue with, and more participation from the public or bidding institutions. This will not only overcome the lack of justice and fairness in the traditional system, it will also alter the perspectives of reactionaries and create new options in policy making. Regardless of their paths, all policy analyses provide policy makers with important decision-making information. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to determine which path is the best. We can only say that all paths have their strengths and weaknesses. Under such circumstances, the most appropriate approach is to choose a path of analysis that is right for the particular timing. Unfortunately, recent studies rarely categorise policy analysis methods according to their features. Many decision makers have therefore been unable to respond promptly to a fast-changing public policymaking environment, which is increasing in complexity. Therefore, this chapter primarily aims to explore the implementation of policy analysis by policy analysts when faced with a new or ‘innovative’ policy that they have never encountered before. It is hoped that this study will overcome inadequacies in previous studies of analysis of innovative policies as well as serving as a reference for the practice of policy analysis. Both this chapter and chapter five, ‘Policy Analysis in 40

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the Local Council’ by Kai-Hung Fang, deal with issues of local government policy analysis. However, Fang’s chapter is primarily concerned with the role played by local councils as external supervisors of administrative organisations. Fang’s chapter concludes with criticism of the ineffectiveness of the local council’s role in policy analysis, when placed within the confines of the political environment. This chapter’s emphasis is on local government’s administrative structure. The perspective taken is intra-organisational, and is primarily concerned with examining the policy analyses conducted by local governments before the adoption of innovative policies. The conclusion reached is similar: there is still much work to do in the area of local policy analysis. An integration of the findings of both chapters would indicate the relatively weak state of Taiwan local government’s policy analysis capabilities. The negative consequences of such deficiencies have, nevertheless, been held in check by the very fact that most policies are dominated by the central government. However, in the long run the current state of policy analysis capabilities could place serious constraints on the development of local governments.

Adopting innovation: risk and uncertainty The reason for focusing on innovative policy is because it is a non-incremental policy with marked features of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’. The term innovative policy refers to a brand new government policy or plan that has never been adopted. Such a policy, however, may not actually be a new ‘invention’. Other organisations might have used it before. It just has to be new to the organisation in question (that is, our organisation) (Krause, 2010). In other words, any policies different from those used by an organisation in the past can be considered innovations. Innovation is a vital prerequisite for performance enhancement in an organisation and essential for improvement of its ability to adapt to a changing environment (Cooper, 1998; O’Connor et al, 2007; Walker, 2006; Rogers, 2003; Damanpour and Schneider, 2009). The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) deems innovation to be of enormous value to city management (Schilling and Youngberg, 1995). For example, the United Kingdom’s Office of Public Services Reform and the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit consider innovation a standard to measure the quality of service provided by the government (Walker, 2006). However, as opposed to policies generated under the traditional concept of incrementalism bureaucratic organisations are faced with growing uncertainty and risks when deciding whether or not to implement innovative policy (Rogers, 2003). Therefore, as J.Q. Wilson (1989: 221–222) said, ‘we ought not to be surprised that organizations resist innovation. They are surpassed to resist it … Stability and routine are especially important in government agencies … Thus the well-known bureaucratic adage: “Never do anything for the first time”’. Bason (2010: 16) believed that the public sector is born with anti-innovation DNA and Sheth (1981) thought that the risks of innovation policy arise from at least three areas: (1) adverse physical, social or economic consequences, (2) performance uncertainty, and (3) perceived side effects associated with the innovation. From the above discussion, it can be seen that although innovation policy is important, it bears risks due to the lack of information. Therefore, it would be easier to implement incremental innovation rather than radical innovation. In this respect, policy analysis of ‘innovative policy’ becomes critical. However, of the literatures 41

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and studies related to or on policy analysis and innovation adoption, to date none of them have examined both subjects in combination – that is, none has explored the method of performing policy analysis of innovation.

Policy analysis research for the process of adopting innovation There have been a lot of discussions in related studies about how an ‘innovation’ is adopted by the government. According to Wolfe (1994), there are at least three types of innovation-related studies involving different units and methods of analysis. The first type is research on diffusion of innovation, which generally explores the diffusion of innovation among potential users and the reasons for its diffusion. The unit of analysis is an individual and the method of analysis tends to be quantification. The second type is research on organisational innovativeness, which primarily studies the factors affecting the amount of innovation in an organisation and the differences in inclination to adopt the innovation. The unit of analysis of this type of study is the ‘organisation’ and the quantification method is usually employed. The third type is research on innovation adoption processes. This type of research is mainly employed in the tracking of the innovation adoption process within an organisation and it aims to determine the reasons for an innovation being adopted. The qualification method is usually employed in the analysis. From the perspective of public policy research, the third type of innovation research proposed by Wolfe (1994) is similar to the stage model involving planning, analysis, and implementation of a public policy, or the policy process research of Sabatier (1999), which emphasises the actions, considerations, and procedures experienced by the potential innovation practitioner during the process. Rogers (2003) deduced that stages involved in innovation adoption include agenda setting, matching, redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinising. ‘Matching’ refers to finding an innovation policy suitable for the organisation. Policy implementation follows successful matching. According to Utterback (1971), the innovation process involves three stages: (1) generation of an idea, (2) problem solving, and (3) implementation. In the first stage, a design concept or technical proposal is generated by integrating current information. In the second stage, a problem-solving solution is proposed or an invention designed. Lastly, the implementation stage puts the problem-solving solution into the actual environment. The idea generation stage aims to materialise official and non-official proposals and integrates necessary information with workable strategies so that the strategies achieve their objectives. This includes information associated with economics and technology. Therefore, the integration of strategy and demand is the key to this stage. Meyer and Goes (1988) believed that innovation adoption is in fact a combination of a three-stage decision-making process which includes: (1) a knowledge-awareness stage where members of the organisation become aware of the presence of an innovation, the importance of the innovation analysis to the organisation, and the possibility of members discussing and selecting the policy; (2) the evaluation-choice stage where finances and cost effectiveness are assessed and a proposal selected; and (3) the adoption-implementation stage where the innovation is promoted after it is adopted. From the above discussion, it can be seen that to ensure success of an innovation, comprehensive policy analysis is required during the adoption process. Not only is generation of a new idea required, but management capabilities are also necessary 42

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to materialise the idea (Bland et al, 2010). At its core is how a potential practitioner determines the suitability and feasibility of an innovation to and in the organisation. If policy analysis of innovation is not performed carefully, it is possible that the adoption of innovation may lead to an unfavourable outcome. Hatimi and Somers (2003) observed that most of the policy analyses used in innovation adoption processes employ logical-positivism and interpret innovation based on economic theories. It is believed that the choice to adopt an innovation is based on the relative value of the innovation, particularly its production capacity and profit yield. Innovation adoption is the outcome of rational thinking which has taken into account the benefits and costs of innovation, and the advantages of the selected project. The weakness of this method is that it assumes that the profit yield of such innovation is measurable, there is no obstruction of information flow among representatives, pre-adoption information can be collected via objective means, and all individuals are rational, conscious, independent, and not influenced by the social environment. Past studies have also shown that although there has been considerable research conducted on innovation adoption processes, when compared to research on traditional policy analysis, which discussed techniques and the logic or path of analysis in detail, most studies that focus on innovation formulated their descriptions from the perspective of normative and theoretical speculation. They focused on illustrating factors affecting whether or not a decision maker will adopt an innovation and the stages he/she goes through in such a process. These studies have made the mistake much criticised by scholars from the discipline of policy sciences of describing the policy stage model linearly. In short, what is much lacking in the current literature is the actual performance of ‘innovation’ policy analysis and the answers to questions such as: How many organisations have in fact performed such analysis? How do organisations practise innovation analysis, match the analysis to the organisation, and determine whether an innovation is suited for the organisation? What is the perfect means for performing the analysis? Are analysis methods and information dependent on data collected via policy argumentation, dialogues, or quantification analyses? This is the most debated issue among scholars from different disciplines studying innovation adoption. It is not known whether the practitioners share a common standard with regard to the value of an innovation and whether these standards are formed based on consensus among the practitioners or on external factors. Economists believe that the measuring standard of innovation is profit. Historians of science and technology believe that innovation can be measured with a scientific standard. Sociologists and anthropologists believe that even if innovation is considered a technology, it should have flexibility in interpretation. Innovation is measured with standards developed internally by innovation practitioners. This is an important stage where practitioners decide whether or not to adopt or resist such innovation and the measuring standard of value is socially constructed (Nelson et al, 2004).

Case studies: how do practitioners adopt innovation? The main objective of this chapter is to explore the actual policy analysis conducted prior to innovation adoptions by local governments in Taiwan. It should be clarified here that the innovative policies in this study had never previously been adopted by

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local governments in Taiwan. Therefore, as the first practitioner of a given policy, the local governments had to bear a relatively high level of risk and uncertainty. Results from Lee (2013) indicate that during the period from 1999 to 2010, a total of 750 innovations matching the definition used in this analysis were adopted by the 25 Taiwanese local governments. Due to the limited resources available to us, we were unable to analyse all 750 innovation cases. Thus, we have chosen three innovations which were recommended to us by a group of experts. These innovations are relatively large in scope and are significant to the cities that have adopted them. The three innovations are: Taipei City’s Taipei Free programme (free Wi-Fi in public areas), Taipei City’s Industrial and Commercial Carbon Emission Reduction Self-Government Ordinance, and New Taipei City’s Public Childcare Policy. We will provide an analysis of the adoption process for each of these three cases. Below is a description of the three innovations. The intricacies of the decision process involved in adopting the given innovation come from 1–2 interviews of public officials for each case. The literature has identified different stages in the adoption of innovations, such as awareness, evaluation, and adoption, and we hope to analyse how the innovations are pushed through these stages and processes, as well as what evaluative procedures were taken throughout the adoption of the policy.

Case 1: Service innovation – Taipei City’s Taipei Free Wi-Fi service The Taipei City government introduced the Taipei Free service on 1 July 2011. This service was the first of its kind in Taiwan. No other city had any similar service available when it was implemented. With the service, any member of the public, whether a foreigner or a Taiwanese citizen, equipped with a smart phone, laptop, or any other device with built-in internet access, can access the internet for free if they are within Taipei City’s jurisdiction. The provision of this service was divided into two phases. It was first implemented for indoor public areas, including Metro Taipei, underground shopping areas (Taipei Station K Underground Mall), Taipei City Hall, Taipei City hospitals, 12 city administrative centres, and the Taipei Public Library. The second phase saw the expansion of the service to include major streets and avenues, principal residential and commercial areas, public areas with high population densities, and over 500 city buses. In the end of the second phase, basically all regions of Taipei City had been provided with free Wi-Fi access. Interviews revealed that this innovation was first proposed and later adopted for two main reasons. The first was to fulfil a campaign promise made by the mayor of Taipei City during his re-election bid in 2010. During that campaign, the mayor’s campaign staff stated in a policy white paper that, due to changes in the social environment, the general population’s need for public internet access had substantially increased, and also pointed to the fact that various other governments in the world were already providing similar services to their citizens. Thus, the mayor promised to provide citywide internet access as a free public service. Upon his re-election to office, the mayor requested that the responsible government departments implement the policy (officially named ‘Taipei Free’) as soon as possible. The second reason was even more politically based, and is likely to have been even more significant than the first. According to the interviews, prior to the implementation of Taipei Free in 2011, a similar service had already been put in 44

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place. In 2004, Taipei City entered into a franchising agreement with a private telecommunications company for the purpose of creating a citywide wireless internet access infrastructure. As of 2004, this public–private partnership, called Wi-Fly, was in full operation, providing pay-per-use internet access throughout Taipei City. The mayor of Taipei City at the time, who is now the President of Taiwan, was tremendously proud of this policy, and went so far as to host a press conference in which he proclaimed that Taipei City had become the first Wi-Fi city in the world. However, Wi-Fly did not turn out to be a commercial success. Mainstream adoption of wireless technology did not grow as quickly as expected, and its usage by the general population was very low. One of the reasons behind this was the widespread deployment of 3G data services in Taiwan, which overshadowed Wi-Fi in popularity with wireless internet users. Although projections had estimated the annual number of users for Wi-Fly at one million, the actual number never exceeded 50,000, and by 2013 there were only 15,000 users per year. This resulted in significant losses for the operating company and drew heavy criticism from legislators, the media, and the general public. The city government was criticised for misjudging the needs of the general population and the trends in wireless communications technology. In order to compensate the operating company for its losses, legitimise the city’s earlier decisions, and find a way to extricate itself from political embarrassment, the city government began to consider the feasibility of buying the Wi-Fi infrastructure created for Wi-Fly. In other words, the city government would buy the infrastructure from the private company that had built it and use it to provide free internet access for the general public. This policy was approved and implemented, resulting in the service known as Taipei Free. In summary, the interviews conducted for this study reveal that in the case of Wi-Fly and Taipei Free, the adoption of the innovative policy only occurred as a result of formidable political pressure brought to bear by the mayor and other members of the government. This assertion of power and influence resulted in errors in judgement concerning projected public demand and trends in information technology development (Wi-Fi versus 3G). In other words, the innovation idea was adopted before a thorough and competent appraisal of its likely value to the general population was made. It was only after the adoption of the innovation that, in the course of internal discussions, the experiences of foreign cities and various costs associated with alternative policies were collected and evaluated. The choice was then made to purchase the internet service from the original private company instead of reconstructing the entire Wi-Fi hardware infrastructure from scratch. Subsequent stages, such as how much of the service to purchase and the terms of the purchase, were then decided. Concrete policy analysis tools implemented by the city government after the adoption were focused entirely on how to introduce and implement the innovation, and ignored the question of whether or not the policy should be adopted in the first place. The innovation adoption process described above is illustrated in Figure 3.1.

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Figure 3.1 Taipei City’s public, free wireless internet access policy adoption process

Decision to adopt

High uncertainties resulted from the adoption of the innovation. Uncertainties related to whether or not Wi-Fi would remain the trend for technological development. The driving force of the adoption of the innovation: political judgment and political demand. Adoption Process: top -down chain of command. Logic of policy analysis pre -adoption: subjective and biased to ward the social constructivism logic.

Analysis and Evaluation: (1) Collection of international implementation experiences (2) Budget evaluation and citizen level of demand analysis

Decision on the method of implementation

Implementation

Awareness of the demand for innovation: (1) Implementation by other nations (2) Increase of population needs (3) Election promises

Goal of policy analysis: alternative policy selection. Logic of policy analysis: quantitative, empirical (policy learning from foreign experiences)

Case 2: Regulatory innovation – Industrial and Commercial Carbon Emission Reduction Self-Government Ordinance The Self-Government Ordinance was implemented in August 2010 with the goals of promoting reductions in carbon emissions by industrial and commercial entities, encouraging responsible and effective energy use, reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, protecting the environment, and balancing industrial growth and development. Its regulations include various energy-saving provisions, such as the requirement that businesses and office indoor areas maintain their air conditioning temperatures at or above 26oC, and prohibiting industrial and commercial advertisements from using incandescent lights for illumination. In the case of violations of the new regulations, fines varying from NT$10,000 to NT$50,000 (around $330 to $1650) were authorised. Prior to its implementation by Taipei City, no regulation on air conditioner temperatures in public areas had been put into effect in Taiwan. Interviews of public officials conducted as part of this study indicate that the idea was first placed in the problem awareness stage in response to several external factors. International environmental pressures regarding the issue of global warming resulted in the mayor signing, in 2005, the San Francisco Urban Environmental Accords. A pledge was made to reduce Taipei City’s carbon emissions by 4% by 2012. Since the central government did not have laws concerning the issue of energy conservation, the city government made the decision to implement a mandatory self-government ordinance in order to achieve the targets agreed to under the international accords. Thus, it can be said that the Industrial and Commercial Carbon Emission Reduction 46

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Self-Government Ordinance was created as a result of the pressures exerted by both local environmental concerns and international agreements. Once the decision was made to adopt this novel ordinance (that is, the innovation idea) the particulars of its implementation had to be developed. During this process the Taipei City government first consulted various central government sources of information regarding the measurement of greenhouse gas emissions. The methods used by various foreign cities were also considered. Finally, advice was sought from experts and public hearings were conducted to collect and examine the views of different sectors of society on the implementation of the ordinance. After the collection of data was complete, the evaluation phase began. Cost–benefit analysis methods were applied to analyse the data. This included carbon reduction evaluations, an agency-by-agency implementation cost analysis, and other impact assessments related to implementation of the ordinance, after which a final regulation formulation and research session was convened. Following the completion of the preliminary content of the ordinance, the regulation entered into a trial phase, which allocated six months to the city government to promote public awareness of the new ordinance, and also allowed affected businesses to respond to and comply with the ordinance. Business and industry were given six months for preparatory work to bring facilities into compliance with the regulation. At the conclusion of the trial phase, the formal implementation phase began.

Case 3: Service innovation – New Taipei City’s Public Childcare Policy The problem of declining birth rates is more serious in Taiwan than in any other nation. According to statistics, Taiwan has for many years been ranked as having the lowest birth rate in the world. For this reason, all levels of the Taiwanese government have allocated significant resources for determining the causes of this problem and developing policies to address it. New Taipei City was first to implement public childcare for children aged 0–2 years in 2011. Certificated childcare workers (nurses and nannies) were hired to provide care for the children at special government-

Figure 3.2 Taipei City’s Industrial and Commercial Carbon Emission Reduction Self-Government Ordinance adoption process

Decision to adopt

Environment: the results of the innovation adoption (whether it is effective) would generate few uncertainties, and necessities for this innovation were well defined The driving force for adoption: mandatory obligations under international accords Logic of policy analysis pre-adoption: social construction model

Data collection, analysis and evaluation: (1) Collection of international experiences on implementation (2) Cost-benefit analysis, agency cost analysis, and impact assessment

Determination of the details and clauses of the ordinance

Trial and implementation

Awareness of the demand for innovation: (1) Deterioration of the earth’s environment (2) The lack legal mandates (3) San Francisco Urban Environmental Accords

Goal of policy analysis: the selection of implementation standards Logic of policy analysis: logic-empiricalism, deliberative approach Method of policy analysis: cost-benefit analysis, impact assessment

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established centres. To date, there are 16 childcare centres throughout the city. It was hoped that by satisfying the demand for safe and affordable childcare services, citizens’ willingness to bear children would be increased. Interviews reveal that the idea behind this policy came from a promise made by the mayor of New Taipei City during his election campaign in 2010. After the mayor’s successful campaign for office, the innovative practice was quickly adopted. Implementation planning rapidly followed the adoption of the policy. A re-evaluation of whether or not the innovative practice should be adopted was never undertaken. According to the interviews, the reason for the mayor’s initial proposal of this policy during his campaign was most likely due to calls by the public for the government to recognise the need for childcare facilities and to address the overall problem of declining birth rates. As with the policies discussed previously, this innovation idea was also driven to adoption by the influence of a powerful, intra-organisational top-down force. In effect, the policy had to be implemented no matter what. All intra-organisational policy analyses were conducted in order to solve issues associated with post-adoption implementation, promotion, and related matters. Upon the election of the mayor, city agencies were quickly tasked with the collection of data concerning the implementation experiences of similar policies in other countries. Due to the fact that northern European nations had implemented childcare policies many years earlier, their experience in this area is more complete. Thus, the city government was able to collect enormous amounts of data simply by browsing through magazines, books, and other publications. After the collection of data was completed, it was evaluated in order to select the most appropriate method of implementation. It is worth noting that the evaluation work itself was outsourced. Methods used included inviting outside financial analysts to perform cost–benefit analyses. Demographic evaluations of each district were also conducted in order to determine the number of childcare centres required to satisfy the estimated demand for a given area’s population so that neither a shortage of supply nor an oversupply (resulting in the waste of public resources) would occur. The process of innovation adoption is illustrated in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3 New Taipei City’s Public Childcare Policy adoption process

Decision to adopt

Environment: the results of the innovation adoption would generate few uncertainties, and subjective perceptions on the high level of necessity for this innovation The driving force for adoption: resolve social problems and deliver on election promises

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Data collection, analysis and evaluation: (1) Collection of international implementation experiences (2) Cost-benefit analysis, population potential analysis

Selection of the method of implementation and the number of centers to set up

Goal of policy analysis: selection of the method and the size of implementation Logic of policy analysis: empirical, quantitative Method of policy analysis: cost-benefit analysis and population forecast

implementation

Awareness of the demand for innovation: (1) Serious social problems (2) Election promises

Policy analysis of Taiwan’s local government innovation

Discussion Policy analysis is used to determine both whether or not a policy should be implemented, and the appropriate method of implementation. This is why the success or failure of a given policy analysis is closely related to the data available. Past academic research on policy analysis has achieved impressive results, but has neglected a close examination of how policy analysis is conducted in the case of an innovative policy. An innovative policy creates significantly more uncertainties and greater potential risk of failure, such that a public manager ought to carefully consider these important and critical factors in advance of moving to the adoption phase. In this research we examined three innovations adopted by municipal governments in Taiwan, and through interviews with public officials responsible for these policies we were able to understand the decision and analysis processes surrounding these policies through the adoption process. According to Jorde-Bloom (1986) the process of innovation decision making is a sequence of various stages: (1) awareness of an existing problem or need; (2) active information/possibility seeking; (3) assessment of the relative advantages of an innovation in light of existing circumstances (policy analysis): cost-effectiveness, social approval, efficiency, observability, complexity, trialability, or compatibility; (4) innovation adoption; (5) institutionalisation. In other words, the analysis of innovative policies should occur during the second and third stages, making it the pre-implementation assessment prior to the adoption of the policies. However, the findings of this chapter indicate that each of three innovations were adopted in an environment of strong driving forces, with very little opportunity for discussion. As to whether or not these innovation ideas should have been adopted, it was typical for such decisions to have been made without sufficient empirical analysis data and to have been heavily influenced by subjective judgements. A strong basis of empirical data was lacking in these decisions, and, as a result, they were disproportionately pushed forward by such factors as external environmental concepts, social climate, and campaign promises made in the pursuit of political office. In summary, the adoption process of the innovation ideas discussed in this chapter was found to be subjective, non-deliberative, and top down rather than bottom up. Traditional literature on innovation adoption postulates the effects of certain policy characteristics in the adoption of innovations (Rogers, 2003). However, in our findings on the innovation adoption process in the cases chosen for this chapter, we did not find any influence exerted by such innovation characteristics as relative advantage, observability, complexity, trialability, or compatibility. Instead, in the cases examined in this study, empirical analysis was incorporated into the decision-making process only after the adoption of the innovation idea and at the start of discussion concerning the details of implementation. The fourth stage of Jorde-Bloom’s (1986) process of innovation policy decision, in practice, actually occurs before the third or even the second stage. It is only in the subsequent policy analysis, after the decision to adopt the innovation, that empirical analysis logic is incorporated. For example, when considering which standards to implement, Taipei City’s Industrial and Commercial Carbon Emission Reduction Self-Government Ordinance utilised scientific figures to determine the air conditioner temperatures most suitable for human beings, and lighting conditions most suitable for generating the greatest energy savings. Taipei City’s free wireless internet policy utilised budgetary 49

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analysis, user habit estimates, and population density data to decide upon a solution that would be both affordable and able to satisfy most of the needs of the public. New Taipei City utilised population potential analysis, market analysis, and cost–benefit analysis to decide on the number of public childcare centres to set up and the user cost to be applied. In all three cases, empirical evidence was used as the basis for policy analysis. The characteristics of high uncertainty, lack of precedents, and the need to make immediate decisions all serve to justify the methods of various policy analyses described in this chapter. This is because the characteristics of innovations, as described above, all serve to limit the decision maker’s ability to obtain immediate objective data for policy analysis at the moment when the innovation is first proposed. Thus, these decision makers must rely upon arbitrary and subjective judgements to make their decisions. Of course, it can be argued that, at least from the sole perspective of the speed of adoption, this aspect may not be completely negative, since under the conditions described, the innovative policies were put into effect in a comparatively short span of time. However, from the bottom-line consideration of risk versus benefit, when policy analysis is overly influenced by subjective judgements, the potential risk of failure is inordinately high. A closer examination of the 70 local government innovation adoptions from 2010 to 2012 reveals that most of these have already failed and/or have been discontinued. We believe that the cause of this problem is the lack of competent policy analysis and discussion, and the failure to apply such established principles as relative advantage, complexity, and so on, in the policy development process.

References Bason, C., 2010. Leading Public Sector Innovation: Co-creating for a better society. Bristol: Policy press. Bland, Travis, Boris Bruk, Dongshin Kim, and Kimberly T. Lee. 2010. Enhancing Public Sector Innovation: Examining the Network-Innovation Relationship. The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 15(3): 1–25. Burt, M.R., 1974. Policy Analysis: Introduction and Application to Health Programs. Washington, DC: Information Resources Press. Cooper, Juett R. 1998. A multidimensional approach to the adoption of innovation. Management Decision, 36(8):493–502. Damanpour, Fariborz and Marguerite Schneider. 2009. Characteristics of innovation and innovation adoption in public organizations: Assessing the role of managers. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(3), 495–522. Dunn, William N., 1993. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Dye, Thomas R.. 1995. Understanding Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Hatimi, I.E., and Somers, H.E.C., 2003. Innovation Decision Making: Toward a Socio-economic Perspective. Cahier de recherche N, 24, 03. Jorde-Bloom, Paula, 1986. Early Childhood Administrators and the Innovation Decision Process. Child Care Quarterly, 15(3), 182–197.

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Krause, Rachel M. 2010. Policy Innovation, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Adoption of Climate Protection Initiatives by U.S Cities. Journal of Urban Affairs, 33(1): 163–175. Lee, Chung-pin, 2013. Types and Distribution of Local Government Innovation. Journal of Public Administration 44, 73–112. [in Chinese] Meyer, A.D., and Goes, J.B. (1988). Organizational Assimilation of Innovations: A Multilevel Contextual Analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 31(4), 897–923. Nelson, Richard R., Alexander Peterhansl, and Bhaven Sampat. 2004. Why and how innovations get adopted: a tale of four models. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(5): 679–699. O’Connor, Allan, Göran Roos and Tony Vickers-Willis. 2007. Evaluating an Australian Public Policy Organization’s Innovation Capacity. European Journal of Innovation Management, 10(4): 532–558. Rogers, Everett. 2003. Diffusion of Innovations. New York, NY: Free Press. Sabatier, Paul A. 1999. Theories of Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Boulder, CO. Schilling, Edward G. and Stone E. Youngberg. 1995. The Values of City Management, in H. George Frederickson (ed), Ideal and Practice in Council-Manager Government. Washington, DC: ICMA. Sheth, J.N., 1981. Psychology of Innovation Resistance: The Less Developed Concept. Research in Marketing, 4(3), 273–283. Utterback, James M. 1971. The Process of Technological Innovation Within the Firm. Academy of Management Journal. 14(1): 75–88 . Walker, Richard M. 2006. Innovation Type and Diffusion: An Empirical Analysis of Local Government. Public Administration, 84(2): 311–335. Williams, W., 1971. Social Policy Research and Analysis: The Experience in the Federal Social Agencies. New York, NY: American Elsevier Publishing Company. Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it. New York, NY: Basic Books Wolfe, Richard A. 1994. Organizational innovation: Review, critique, and suggested research directions. Journal of Management Studies. 31(3): 405–431.

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FOUR

Policy analysis in the legislative body: the legislative process of the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act in Taiwan Tsuey-Ping Lee1

Introduction Public policy analysis provides policy makers with important information and advice on how policy works in practice, and its political, social, economic, and environmental consequences, to help formulate policies that can improve public life. In the complex law-making process that occurs in the legislative body, policy analysis is even more important because this is the last location for reshaping a policy before it is formally implemented, and starts to affect the welfare of the public or policy target groups. Legislators need sound information and practical advice drawn from professional policy analysis to make better judgements on public budgets, policy changes, and legal approval. This chapter explores the function of policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, and examines how the results of policy analysis affect the law-making process, in addition to the content of the law, taking the first and only pollution remediation law as an example. On 12 January 1999, the Organic Law of Legislative Yuan (OLLY) had been amended for congressional reform in Taiwan, which laid the foundation for establishing policy analysis agencies dedicated to providing analytical reports to the legislator to improve the quality of the law-making process. However, we have found that in the past decade, since this congressional reform, policy analysis agencies in the Legislative Yuan do not seem to operate as expected by the OLLY. Legislators depend more on their own assistants rather than on the policy analysis agencies for information collection and policy suggestions. Through an examination of the law-making process of the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act (SAGPRA) of 2000 and the overhaul amendment to this law in 2010, this chapter answers the following research questions: (a) Which agencies in the Legislative Yuan are responsible for policy analysis, and how do they operate? (b) To what extent do the analytical reports and suggestions provided by policy analysis agencies affect the law-making process and the content of the law? (c) What are the factors that influence the significance of policy analysis agencies in the Legislative Yuan? By answering these questions, we intend to depict a clear picture of the operation of policy analysis and explore why analytical results produced by policy analysts are underused in the legislative body.

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Policy analysis in the legislative process The definition of policy analysis Policy analysis entails a series of professional and client-oriented activities of collecting comprehensive data, conducting scientific studies, and explaining the relationship between a policy alternative and its consequences to provide policy advice. Dror (1967: 201) regarded policy analysis as ‘one of the bridges between science and politics’. Policy analysis should be conducted in a scientific manner with consideration of the political context in which the policy is embedded. Dunn (1994) and Weimer and Vining (1992) argued that policy analysis cannot be conducted in a vacuum without involving the political context and social values. They stated that ‘policy analysis is client-oriented advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social values’ (Weimer and Vining, 1992: 1), whereas Dunn (1994: 4) contended that policy analysis is ‘an applied social science discipline that attempts to produce useful information for policy decision-making in political contexts’. Technically, policy analysis involves activities of data collection and prediction of a policy’s impact. As Ukeles (1977: 223) defined it, policy analysis is ‘the systematic investigation of alternative policy options and the assembly and integration of the evidence for and against each option. It involves a problem-solving approach, the collection and interpretation of information, and some attempt to predict the consequences of alternative courses of action’. Wildavsky (1969) affirmed that policy analysis is a tool for setting, modifying, and reaching organizational goals. For Wildavsky (1969: 190), policy analysis is equivalent to strategic planning, which is ‘a process of deciding on the objectives of an organization, on changes in these objectives, and on the resources used to attain these objectives’. Based on previous discussion, we summarise that the purpose of policy analysis is to help clients connect with political and social environments and further contribute to sustainable development for the client. In the field of public policy, the final goal of policy analysis is to improve the quality of policy debate, and accordingly enhance public interests. Weimer and Vining (1992: 1) contended that ‘the product of policy analysis is advice’, and Wildavsky (1969: 190) argued that ‘policy analysis aims at providing information that contributes to making an agency politically and socially relevant’. To provide information and advice relevant to the sustainable development of client organisations or people, the major product of policy analysis is a convincing report to explicitly present the problems and solutions, as well as the costs and consequences. Dror (1967: 202) contended that the aim of policy analysis is ‘to permit improvements in decision making and policy making by permitting fuller consideration of a broader set of alternatives, within a wider context, with the help of more systematic tools’.

Prerequisites for better functioning of policy analysis in the legislative process The legislative process is vital because the process determines public policies that affect the welfare of all people in a particular jurisdiction. Although the legislative process is noted as a political process involving diversified interest conflicts, political debates, and power games, the quality of a public policy cannot be improved without referring to information and advice provided by scientific, valid, and social-value-laden 54

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policy analysis. However, the prerequisite to improving the quality of policy making is that the result of policy analysis is valued by decision makers, and, accordingly, the advice provided by analysts can be referred to and further adopted. There are at least four requirements to make legislators value, refer to, and adopt policy suggestions provided by analysts during the legislative process. First, politics matter: for a decision maker, adopting a policy suggestion inconsistent with his or her ideology is a big challenge. Therefore, when policy makers formulate future policies or examine current policies on ideological grounds, they may not be interested in suggestions that challenge or question their impetus, ideological basis, or even authoritative knowledge. Weimer and Vining (1992: 13) suggested that analysts must understand political and organisational behaviour in order to predict and influence the policy-making process. Because policy analysis is client-oriented, understanding clients’ policy preferences and ideology help to predict if policy suggestions provided by the analysts will be adopted. Weimer and Vining (1992: 20) stated that an ethical issue is embedded in the relationship between policy analysts and clients. If policy analysts confront value conflicts, they can choose to voice their opinions, leave the client, become disloyal to the client, or adopt a combination of these three actions. Second, profession matters: policy analysis is a profession where anyone responsible for conducting analysis must undergo serious training. Wildavsky (1969: 199) suggested that people who have been working in a specific area are better candidates for good policy analysts following training. He contended that high-quality training cannot be achieved by taking three-day or three-month courses. One year, and possibly two years, would be required. Weimer and Vining (1992: 13) contended that policy analysts must be capable of developing strategies to gather, organise, and communicate information under time limitations, and that they ‘need technical skills to enable them to predict better and to evaluate more confidently the consequences of alternative policies’. Policy analysts should reveal their analytical skills in information gathering, data organisation, analytical report writing, and oral communication to earn trust from client groups. Third, institution matters: a policy analysis agency should be prestigious which means that the hierarchical level of policy analysts should be high enough so that suggestions made by them cannot easily be ignored. Wildavsky (1969: 199) suggested that ‘having the policy analysis unit report directly to the secretary or agency head would show that it meant to be taken seriously’. In addition, the budget scale and the number of staff deployed in the policy analysis agency relate to the quality of the analytical report produced. Serious policy analysis requires time-consuming efforts, but most of the time policy analysts must meet stringent deadlines. Therefore, a personnel shortage signifies an overload for each staff member, so that maintaining high-quality policy analysis would be difficult. Fourth, social values matter: public policies intervene in a citizens’ lives and have significant impacts on people’s welfare. Therefore, policy analysts should be able to analyse policies from a social perspective regarding what a ‘good society’ is composed of. When the analyst provides policy suggestions, public interest should be considered. A good relationship between the policy analyst and the client group is not established based on the analyst’s blind compliance to clients. The policy analyst may play an educator’s role to help clients clarify and focus on public interests. When the private interest of the client conflicts with the public interest, for a policy analyst,

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the public-interest-oriented social value should be the only standard employed to decide the next action.

Agencies responsible for policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan Support agencies partially or mainly responsible for policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan include the personal assistants of legislators, committee staff, the Organic Law and Statute Bureau (OLSB), the Budget Centre (BC), and the Parliamentary Library (PL). Personal assistants of legislators and committee staff are supposedly responsible for providing administrative support and professional consulting services to legislators and committees, respectively. They may need to select, collect, and analyse data and information, as well as provide analytical results. The OLSB, BC, and PL are professional agencies focusing more on data organisation, data analysis, policy evaluation, and policy analysis.

Personal assistants of legislators According to Article 32 of the OLLY, each legislator is granted a fixed amount of public funds for hiring 8–14 (no more than 14) personal assistants. Based on the 2012 budget of the Legislative Yuan, each legislator has NT$494,400 (US$16,684) including NT$82,400 (US$2,780) per month overtime pay for hiring publicly funded personal assistants. In addition, NT$618,000 (US$20,855) is available for year-end bonuses for all publicly funded personal assistants. In summary, each legislator has NT$6,550,800 (US$221,060) each year for employing publicly funded assistants.2 The number of personal assistants, the salary of each assistant, and employment standards are all decided by the individual legislator. Therefore, personal staff of legislators are not civil servants, although they work in government. Legislators who employ more than 14 assistants or use up public funding must pay out of pocket for hiring extra assistants. The length of service of publicly funded staff is decided by the individual legislator, but should end when the legislator finishes his or her term. A legislator’s personal assistants are mainly classified into three types: administrative assistant, policy analysis assistant, and assistant for constituency services. An administrative assistant mainly acts as a secretary responsible for managing the daily schedule of the legislator. Policy analysis assistants should focus their work on drafting bills, analysing the content of the bill under discussion, and drafting interpellation documents for the legislator. Assistants for constituency services are mainly responsible for providing services to the constituency when complaints or requests are made by the constituents (Chen, 2011: 15). In Taiwan, legislators may be busy with informal obligations such as attending funerals or wedding parties if invited because these activities are considered constituency services that are important for winning the electoral campaign for the following term.

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Committee staff In the Legislative Yuan, eight standing committees are responsible for reviewing bills including the Foreign and National Defence Committee, the Finance Committee, the Transportation Committee, the Social Welfare and Environmental Hygiene Committee, the Internal Administration Committee, the Economics Committee, the Education and Culture Committee, and the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee. According to Articles 18 to 20 of the Organic Law of Committees of the Legislative Yuan (OLCLY), the number of staff responsible for providing administrative support to legislators in each committee ranges from 90 to 98, but the real number is far less than stipulated by law. Until 26 February 2013, the number of staff ranged for each committee from 8 to 11. The Foreign and National Defence Committee has the least (8 staff), whereas the Finance Committee and the Economics Committee have the most (11 staff).3 Committee staff are all qualified civil servants. On each committee, the Senior Executive Officer and the Chief Secretary lead the committee staff. According to Article 20 of the Duty Regulation of Legislative Yuan (DRLY), the Senior Executive Officer on each committee is responsible for researching, editing, and drafting bills and petitions. This position is designed to provide a professional consultation to committee members when they review the bill. Article 21 of the same law stipulates that the Chief Secretary is responsible for providing administrative support, including routine administrative tasks, managing agendas for meetings , information exchange among committee members, personnel management, and so on.

Organic Law and Statute Bureau Before the abovementioned legislative reform of 1999, an agency in the Legislative Yuan named the Legislative Consulting Centre (LCC), responsible for research, analysis, evaluation, and legislative consulting of budget and other bills, was established in 1989 under the OLLY. At the time, the LCC was incapable of providing the expected consultation services because of a staff shortage and the limited size of the agency (Hsieh, 2011: 9). Therefore, in the 1999 legislative reform, the amended OLLY divided the LCC into two agencies, namely, the OLSB and BC, to focus on different tasks. According to Article 20 of the current OLLY, the OLSB focuses on research, analysis, evaluation, and legislative consultation of legislative policy and bills. In addition, the OLSB is responsible for the research and translation of legislative institutions and legislative cases of other countries. According to Article 25 of the OLLY, the OLSB can deploy 42 to 60 staff who should be civil servants. Thus far, 42 staff work in this agency.4 The members of the OLSB are divided into five teams in one office, which focus on different policy issues: domestic and judicial affairs; foreign affairs, defence, education, and culture, national economics, and institutions; finance and transportation; social welfare and hygiene; and lobby registration.5 Since its establishment in 1999, the OLSB has completed approximately 2,279 research reports, but access to the reports is limited to the legislators.6 The public can only access the summary of each report from the online OLSB database. According to this database, the majority of reports are research on specific policy issues (45%) and evaluations of bills (37%). The research on specific policy issues is produced 57

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through opinion gathering and analysis of particular policy issues. The evaluation of bills concerns those that have been sent to each committee for review. Basically, OLSB members are free to research any topic that interests them as long as the head of the OLSB provides consent (Hsieh, 2011: 9–10). The research reports drafted by the bureau are sent to relevant legislators and are available in the network within the Legislative Yuan.

Budget Centre Established in the same year as the OLSB, the BC is responsible for conducting research, analysis, evaluation, and consultation of the central government’s budget, final financial statements, and statutory bills on the budget according to Article 21 of the OLLY. Article 26 of the law stipulates the personnel arrangements of the BC, which are exactly the same as those of the OLSB, ranging from 42 to 60. However, the most up-to-date data show only 34 staff working for this agency.7 The bureaucratic arrangements and hierarchical levels of the BC and the OLSB are the same according to the OLLY, which means that these two policy analysis agencies in the Legislative Yuan are considered equally important. The research reports produced by the BC are open only for internal use in the Legislative Yuan. The public can access only the summary of each report on the online BC database. The analytical policy reports produced by both the BC and the OLSB are obviously not for public use. Although the Freedom of Government Information Law (FGIL) in Taiwan guarantees that the public has the right to access government information, the reports conducted by the two agencies are restricted from public view because these reports are considered ‘the draft for internal use or other preparatory works before the government agency makes a decision’ according to the first part of Item 3 of Article 18 of the law.8 However, according to the second part of Item 3 of Article 18 of the FGIL, ‘Such works can be made available to the public or be provided if deemed necessary to public interest’. This regulation means that the reports should be open to the public if the contents of these reports are considered relevant to the public interest. Therefore, using the FGIL to restrict the public from accessing these reports prepared by these two agencies is an illegitimate act because all public policies are related to the public interest. How can a report regarding public policy be unrelated to the public interest? To date, the public can only trace report summaries of the past three years from the online BC database. Of the 642 reports, 73% (468 reports) are budget bill evaluations, whereas 26% (164 reports) are evaluations of final financial statements of various agencies and special funds at the central level. The remaining 10 reports concern the study of specific policy issues, and some of them were conducted in cooperation with the OLSB. Compared to research reports conducted by the OLSB, reports produced by the BC emphasise budget and finance evaluations at the central level, and therefore analysts usually need to meet strict deadlines when conducting budget bill evaluations because the public budget is formulated, reviewed, and executed yearly.

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Parliamentary Library The Parliamentary Library has a long history dating back to the 1940s. In the NanJing period of the government during the 1940s, the Department of Compilation was founded along with a library to support the functioning of the Legislative Yuan. After the Republic of China (ROC) government moved to Taiwan, the size of this department was reduced to become the Library and Information Service (LIS), responsible for storing and providing an archive and data needed for legislators. In the 1980s, the LIS created new legislative reference services and a computerised Chinese information system, and has been dedicated to improving the efficiency of data references and usage in the Legislative Yuan.9 The 1999 legislative reform formally transformed the LIS into the PL.10 Article 15 of the OLLY stipulates the foundation of the PL, and the library was officially launched in February 1999 to provide high-quality information services to legislators, policy makers, and related government units. According to Article 22 of the OLLY and Article 10 of the DRLY, the major functions of the PL include the selection, collection, and management of legislative information, current news, and knowledge; analysis, research, and searching of legislative data, editing and exchange of legislative publication; interlibrary cooperation; and other tasks regarding library research, development, and services. Article 27 of the OLLY stipulates that the numbers of library staff range from 45 to 59, and they should be civil servants. The PL is also obviously understaffed according to the most up-to-date data provided by the Personnel Department of the Legislative Yuan. Currently, 40 staff are in the PL, but only 25 of them are qualified civil servants. The other 15 staff are contract-based,11 employed because they are skilled librarians. The bureaucratic rank of the head of the PL is the same as that of the head of the BC and OLSB. Although the PL is considered one of the three staff agencies in the Legislative Yuan, we can view it as ‘the staff agency of staff agencies’ because the PL is chiefly responsible for collecting and maintaining a comprehensive legislative database that is vital for policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan.

How policy analysis affects the law-making process: an example The SAGPRA is the most important environmental legislation of the past decade in Taiwan, and the law-making process was extremely time-consuming and complex because of various conflicting interests involved. This law was initiated by the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) in 1991 and passed by the Legislative Yuan on 13 January 2000. During the law-making process, the bill was withdrawn by the EPA in 1996 because it was considered by legislators unsuitable for managing complex pollution remediation affairs. The original version initiated by the EPA in 1991 focused heavily on the remediation of soil pollution; however, the legislators involved suggested broadening the scope of the law to include the remediation of groundwater pollution.12 Since the passing of this law by the Legislative Yuan in 2000, it has been amended twice, once in 2003 and once in 2010, with the first amendment being a minor alteration because of the change of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the second amendment was an overhaul. The 57 articles of the SAGPRA are divided into eight chapters. This law stipulates the responsibility of competent authorities at all levels to protect the public from 59

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the risk of soil and groundwater pollution; conduct investigations and assessments of the pollution status of sites suspected; and control the soil and groundwater pollution source from further expansion. According to Article 2 of the SAGPRA, pollution sites are divided into two categories: pollution control sites and pollution remediation sites. A pollution site is declared to be a control site when levels of soil or groundwater pollution exceed the set control standards. For a control site to be assessed as likely to seriously endanger public health and the living environment, it is to be declared a remediation site. In addition, this law stipulates how pollution sites should be remediated and restored, and who should be responsible for remediation and restoration costs. A Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Fund, in consultation with US Superfund, was established to pay for any emergency response and follow-up remediation activities undertaken by the government during and after any soil and groundwater pollution occurrence, and the polluters would pay their share of remediation costs. To examine how research reports conducted by policy analysis agencies in the Legislative Yuan affect the law-making and amendment processes of the SAGPRA, several databases were searched by the author. A summary-only online database of research reports compiled by the OLSB and BC were comprehensively searched to determine the number of SAGPRA-related research projects conducted in the Legislative Yuan. In addition, the database of minutes of meeting that record details of legislators’ statements was examined to determine if any legislator mentioned that he or she had consulted with policy analysts from the OLSB or BC, or if he or she had referred to research reports produced by them. The investigation was crosschecked by searching on databases provided by the PL, including the bill deliberation database, the parliamentary procedure database, the legislator interpellation database, the legislator bill-proposal database, and the legislator statement database.13 The key purpose of extracting from these databases is to identify with whom the legislator consulted and from where the legislators asked for help with information. For example, when legislators state in a sitting that they have ‘“discussed with several scholars about ...”, this means that they have consulted scholars. By investigating these documents retrieved from the databases, we can see how significantly the policy analysis agencies affect legislators’ statements and interpellation. However, such a survey is unable to deeply enhance our understanding of the true impact of policy analysis agencies on law makers’ thoughts and decisions because legislators not stating that they had consulted with these agencies does not necessarily mean that they did not use the information provided by them. The online data provided by the BC show five evaluation reports regarding soil and groundwater pollution remediation in the past three years. Among them, two reports related to the budget evaluation of various environmental protection funds of budget years 2012 and 2013 include short comments on the management of the SAGPR Fund. These comments and suggestions are highly similar and general, stating that hundreds of pollution control sites and remediation sites still required management, and some factories and gas station sites had to be further monitored and remediated because of serious pollution problems.14 These comments obviously focus on budget implementation rather than on policy formulation. From the research report online database of the OLSB, we found only four reports discussing the SAGPRA to date.15 This bureau was established in 1999, it was a year before the law was passed, and all four reports were completed after it passed. Of these, 60

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three reports were conducted before the overhaul of the act in 2010. By comparing the suggestions made from these three reports and the 2010 overhaul amendment of the law, we may at least gain a sense of how the suggestions made by the OLSB affect the 2010 amendment. One report completed in 2002 is a study comparing the US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and Taiwan’s SAGPRA, which suggests strengthening the mechanism of tracking down polluters causing pollution, broadening the definition of responsible parties, and forcing responsible parties to pay compensation costs to pollution victims. The amended act added ‘person potentially responsible for pollution’ to the original ‘polluter’ as responsible for the pollution, thereby broadening the range of responsible parties. One report completed in 2007 studied the difficulties for the government in forcing polluters to pay for pollution remediation costs. Because the long process of lawsuits for clarification of pollution responsibility and compensation gives polluters sufficient time to transfer property to other people in order to avoid property loss, the analyst suggested sequestration to prevent polluters from avoiding financial responsibility. This suggestion was obviously excluded in the amendment of 2010. In the new law, no preventive strategy is evident. The last report finished before the overhaul of the law assesses the draft of the amendment provided by the Executive Yuan. In this assessment report, several suggestions are provided, including the legal pollutant to be held responsible if pollution causes damage to people’s health, the competence of the government agency’s monitoring responsibility to be strengthened for sites with pollutants reaching a monitoring standard, a public report against pollution to be reserved, the government’s right to sequestration polluters’ property to be added, and several minor changes.16 This report was obviously conducted to provide suggestions for the significant amendment of 2010; however, the amended act does not include any changes suggested by these reports. To determine if legislators mention research reports conducted by the OLST and BC when they are communicating their thoughts or making interpellations, the author searched on various databases recording law examination and review meetings in each legislative session. We found that some legislators mentioned consulting scholars, but none of the reports produced by the OLSB and BC were mentioned by any legislator. Because the number of staff is limited, the research topics for one member of staff can be extremely broad, from social welfare policy analysis to environmental policy analysis. Therefore, they might not be considered experts in a particular policy field.

Re-examining the function of policy analysis in the Legislative Yuan From the previous analysis, we have found that the function of policy analysis in the law-making process of the SAGPRA is not evident. All policy analysis agencies are understaffed, and the number of reports regarding SAGPRA is extremely limited. Policy suggestions made by the BC regarding the SAGPRA Fund are general and seem indispensable. Advice regarding an overhaul of the SAGPRA made by the OLSB is not followed. Why is policy analysis unable to function as expected? There are at least four possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, as stated, a political issue is involved in deciding whether decision makers should adopt policy advice from analysts. Rationality, feasibility, and validity are insufficient conditions for the decision maker to adopt a policy suggestion, unless 61

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such a suggestion is developed from the same ideological line of thought as that of the decision maker. Because policy analysis is client-oriented, policy analysts should realise for whom they work. The key question here is, “Who is the client?” In Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, legislators decide the employment, salary levels, and length of service of their personal assistants. Therefore, these assistants realise to whom they should be loyal. However, although committee and other staff work in the other staff agencies, the BC, the OLSB, and the PL provide services to legislators, and they are not obligated to be loyal to any particular legislator because they are civil servants. Satisfaction of legislators regarding services provided by these staff does not decide the merit of the staff. Being loyal to the legislators and producing policy advice consistent with legislators’ private interests or ideology is difficult for these staff because of conflicting interests and different ideologies among the legislators. Therefore, the staff in these policy analysis agencies should stay neutral to avoid confrontation. For legislators, adopting policy advice from staff with inconsistent ideologies is risky. Therefore, they would rather trust the information and suggestions provided by their own assistants. Second, although policy advice may not be adopted by legislators because of the mentioned political concerns, the research results of policy analysis should be valued if the policy research is conducted in a professional manner. Here, professional has two meanings: (1) Research skills. The research method employed in policy analysis should be scientific. As Rogers (1988: 60) stated, for policy analysts, professional skill is valued because of its perceived scientific or technological basis. (2) Profession in a particular policy area. This means that policy analysts should comprehensively realise and have insight in their particular policy area. Wildavsky (1969: 199) suggested that training people in a specific policy area to be capable of policy analysis is better than training people in policy analysis to learn about a new policy area. In the Legislative Yuan, however, we found that each member of staff in the BC and OLSB had to conduct policy analysis in various policy areas because of a lack of staff. For example, one staff member who wrote two reports regarding the SAGPRA had completed 52 research reports in the previous 10 years (2003 to 2013).17 These research reports cover policy areas including, but not limited to, soil and groundwater pollution, aviation, government purchasing, handicap welfare, transportation, and mass media. Research regarding various policy fields is obviously needed in the Legislative Yuan because of various public services provided by the government. However, for any policy analyst, being professional in so many different policy areas is highly challenging because becoming acquainted with a new policy area is extremely time-consuming. Third, although the formal administrative structure of the Legislative Yuan shows that policy analysis agencies are as important as other administrative departments, the policy analysis agencies are obviously understaffed. The administrative structure of the Legislative Yuan is extremely flat.18 Despite eight standing committees and four ad hoc committees comprising legislators, the administrative structure is ranked on to three levels. The heads of the Legislative Yuan, the President and Vice President, are elected by and from among all legislators. Below the head of the Legislative Yuan are the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General, who are nominated by the 62

Policy analysis in the legislative body

President of the Legislative Yuan, referred to the sitting Yuan, and then submitted to the State President for a definitive appointment. According to the OLLY, the Deputy Secretary General, who is responsible for helping the Secretary General to oversee the administration of the Legislative Yuan, should be seated by a civil servant of the highest rank (14th grade of Senior Rank).19 The Deputy Secretary General oversees 12 administrative agencies, including the BC, OLSB, and PL. The heads of these 12 administrative agencies are at the same hierarchical level. In addition, the head of the staff in each committee is also at the same hierarchical level as the 12 administrative units. Although such a personnel arrangement may show that the policy analysis agencies are as important as other administrative units, as mentioned, policy analysis agencies are understaffed, and therefore the workload for each policy analyst is heavy. This explains why policy analysts in the Legislative Yuan must conduct research in various policy areas. Fourth, policy analysts’ social value cannot be apparent because analysts are civil servants and they are expected to be administratively neutral. One may argue that there is only one social value, which is the public interest, and that this should be upheld by civil servants. However, public interests can be formed in different shapes from varying perspectives or based on diverse ideologies. Therefore, it is difficult to judge whose conception of the public interest is better. Accordingly, civil servants in Taiwan are expected to be objective and not lean toward any particular ideology when they provide administrative services. Administrative neutrality seems to be overemphasised in the Taiwan government at all levels because of the severe conflicts of interest and competition between the two political parties, the KuoMing Tang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). However, social value is important for policy analysis because it connotes the analysts’ conception of a ‘good society’. Policy analysis cannot be purely objective because this conception determines what data is collected, how the data is analysed, what information is released, and what policy advice is provided. Policy analysts cannot conduct policy research without being guided by personal beliefs and a value system. When a policy analyst is requested to be administratively neutral, the passion for achieving a good society can be exhausted, and they can grow accustomed to providing general policy advice without too much insight.

Conclusion The congressional reform of 1999 intended to lay a foundation for policy analysis to play a more significant role in the Legislative Yuan, but the policy advice provided by policy analysis agencies seemed not to be reflected in the content of the law, taking the overhaul of the SAGPRA of 2010 as an example. Except for the legislator’s personal assistants and staff in each committee, three agencies dedicated to policy analysis-related missions in the Legislative Yuan are the BC, OLSB, and PL, with the BC and OLSB obligated to produce policy analysis reports. Staff in each committee, the BC, OLSB, and PL, should be qualified civil servants except for a few contractbased employees of the PL.20 This study employed content analysis to argue that the advice offered by analysts is not taken seriously in the law-making process. By analysing the meeting records of the law-making and amending process of the SAGPRA, this study found that the legislators rarely mentioned research reports or policy advice provided by the BC or 63

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OLSB when they addressed opinions, raised queries, or discussed policy content in the meetings. Regarding contrasts between research reports conducted by the BC and OLSB and the content of laws, this study also finds that the policy suggestions provided by analysts were not adopted into law. This study concluded that a lack of several supporting conditions has driven policy analysis to become less functional in the Legislative Yuan. Policy analysts, identified as civil servants, do not need to consider legislators’ private interests or ideologies when they produce policy advice because whether advice is adopted by legislators does not influence their promotion in the public sector. Institutionally, although policy analysis agencies are at the same hierarchical level as other units in the Legislative Yuan, the understaffing problem has forced analysts to become more involved in various policy areas and not be able to focus on a few particular policy areas in order to developa policy-related professional capacity. In addition, emphasizing administrative neutrality discourages analysts from developing and presenting their social value in policy suggestions. Therefore, the policy advice becomes extremely general and lacking in insight. To improve the quality of policy analysis and raise its contribution to the lawmaking process in the legislative body, public interest-oriented social values should be encouraged among policy analysts. A value-laden policy research report, rather than a routine report that is easily put aside, helps encourage deliberative discussions. In addition, policy analysts in the legislative body do not have to be civil servants. It is paradoxical that policy analysts, who are identified as civil servants and are supposedly accountable to citizens, produce policy research reports that are not open to the public. The research reports can only be accessed by legislators, who are not the ‘real’ clients of the analysts. This study suggests that professional contract-based policy analysts should be able to meet the need for policy analysis in the legislative body. Analysts’ survival in the public sector should be linked to the quality of the policy advice they produce, so that a real profession can be encouraged to develop and provide meaningful policy analysis in the legislative process.

Notes The author would like to thank the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of China, Taiwan for financially supporting this research under Contract No. NSC_1012410-H-194-052-SS3. 1

Legislative Yuan’s public budget of 2012, p 30, http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/ttsweb?@0:0 :1:ttskmbgt@@0.8899055993517164. 2

The most up-to-date staff numbers for each committee was provided by the Personnel Department of the Legislative Yuan on 26 February 2013, by email.

3

4

Ibid.

Organisational Chart of theOrganic Law and Statute Bureau. www.ly.gov.tw/02_ introduce/0203_unit/orgChart.action?unitcd=10&itemno=020700

5

64

Policy analysis in the legislative body Organic Law and Statute Bureau online database. www.ly.gov.tw/05_orglaw/search/ lawSearch.action

6

The most up-to-date staff numbers for each committee was provided by the Personnel Department of the Legislative Yuan on 26 February 2013, by email.

7

Q&A of Legislative Yuan, ‘Why are reports from Budget Center not open to the public?’ www.ly.gov.tw/en/09_answer/answerView.action?id=28&atcid=28 8

9

Library Briefs. http://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/eng/www/lb

Histor y of the Parliamentar y Librar y. http://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/ accVisitMenu?typeValue=history

10

The most up-to-date staff numbers for each committee was provided by the Personnel Department of the Legislative Yuan on 26 February 2013, by email. 11

Chapter 5 of Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation – Ten Years On. Environmental Protection Administration. http://sgw.epa.gov.tw/SGM/GenericHandler/NewsAttach. ashx?fileId=642 12

Think tank of the Legislative Yuan, Parliamentary Library of the Legislative Yuan. http://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homepage

13

14

Online database of the Budget Centre. www.ly.gov.tw/06_lyacc/search/accSearch.action

Online database of the Organic Law and Statute Bureau. www.ly.gov.tw/05_orglaw/ search/lawSearch.action 15

Summary of Bill Evaluation – Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act. www. ly.gov.tw/05_orglaw/lawView.action?no=8077 16

Online database of the Organic Law and Statute Bureau. www.ly.gov.tw/05_orglaw/ search/lawSearch.action 17

Administrative Structure of the Legislative Yuan. www.ly.gov.tw/en/01_introduce/ introView.action?id=7

18

The civil service in Taiwan is divided into 14 grades and further grouped into three ranks. They are, from highest to lowest, senior rank (10th to 14th grade), junior rank (6th to 9th grade), and elementary rank (1st to 5th grade).

19

20

Fifteen of 40 employees in the PL are contract-based.

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References Chen, Yong, 2011. Bao Shan Bao Hai, Guo Hui Zhu Li Hao Xin Suan [The heavy workload of personal assistants of legislators]. Congress Watch, 131, 15–16. [in Chinese] www.ccw.org.tw/p/4749 Dror, Yehezkel, 1967. Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government. Public Administration Review, 27(3), 197–203. Dunn, William N., 1994. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Hsieh, Dai-Rong, 2011. Li Fa Yuan De Qiang Li Hou Dun: Fa Zhi Ju [Strong staff agency of the Legislative Yuan: the Organic Law and Statute Bureau]. Congress Watch, 131, 9–10. [in Chinese] www.ccw.org.tw/p/4749 Rogers, James M., 1988. The Impact of Policy Analysis. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Ukeles, Jacob B., 1977. Policy Analysis: Myth or Reality? Public Administration Review, 37(3), 223–228. Weimer, David L., and Vining, Aidan R., 1992. Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Wildavsky, Aaron, 1969. Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS. Public Administration Review, 29(2), 189–202.

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FIVE

Policy analysis in the local councils Kai-Hung Fang

Introduction Traditionally, the perception of local councillors in Taiwan is often associated with terms such as vote buying, influence peddling, bribery, corruption, incompetence, and lack of professionalism. They devote the majority of their time and resources to constituent services and securing funding for their electoral district’s local projects. Accordingly, they play only a very limited role in non-budgetary policy decisions. After martial law was lifted in 1987, local governments were granted more authority and autonomous power to make decisions on providing local public services during the democratisation movement. However, the role played by local councils and their members in policy analysis remains limited. Based on this line of reasoning, this chapter will first provide contextual information on the development of Taiwan’s local government system, and a brief introduction on the duties and organisation of Taiwan’s local councils. Then the roles played by Taiwan’s local councils in local policy analysis will be analysed and the avenues through which policy-relevant information is provided to local councilmen will be explored and evaluated. Finally, the chapter will conclude by making recommendations on how policy analysis can be better conducted and utilised in local councils in Taiwan. The purpose of this chapter is not to conduct a case study on a particular local council in Taiwan. Rather, the aim is to to outline as comprehensively as possible the roles of Taiwan’s local councils in local policy analysis, and the avenues through which policy-relevant information is provided to local councillors. In order to provide such a overview of Taiwan’s local councils, the existing literature on local politics and case studies on various local councils in Taiwan are synthesised to provide evidence to supporting the observations and arguments presented in this chapter. Before we begin our discussion, it should be noted that special municipalities, county/provincial cities, and township-level governments are all granted local selfgoverning status in Taiwan based on the Local Government Act. However, townshiplevel councils will not be included in our discussion due to their limited role, if any, in local policy analysis. Therefore, in this chapter the term ‘local councils’ will only be used to refer special municipalities, and county/provincial city councils.

The context in which local councils operate In order to provide a basis for understanding the role of local councils in setting local policy and ways of conducting policy analysis, this section will first summarise the development of Taiwan’s centralised local government system. Then an overview of the duties of local councils will be provided. Finally, using Taipei City Council 67

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and Pingtung County Council as examples, the organisation of local councils will be discussed.

Development of Taiwan’s centralised local government system Before Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, the Kuomintang government imposed martial law, which was not lifted until 1987. The imposition of martial law made it possible for the Kuomintang government to regulate Taiwan’s local government system by issuing various executive orders rather than laws, and to restrict local governments’ power to design their organisational structure and set local self-governing laws (Fang, 2006: 36–37). The Regulation of Local Self-Government for Counties and Provincial Cities in Taiwan Province, an executive order of the provincial government, was enacted in 1950 by the Taiwan Provincial Government to become the fundamental legal basis for regulating the implementation of local self-government in Taiwan for the next 44 years, a period called the ‘Era of the Regulations’ (Su, 1999). During this period, the organisation and authority of local self-government was defined by various national and provincial executive orders, which are easily modified by Kuomintang-controlled national government through its power to adopt, amend, and approve these executive orders (Fang, 2006: 37–38). In addition, the administration of local programs was ‘guarded’ in the sense that it was closely monitored by the national government. The term ‘Guarded Self-Governance’ (Huang, 1995: 1–2) was used to highlight the fact that the national government often interfered with local affairs, and local governments only enjoyed very limited autonomy as local self-governance units (Fang, 2006: 37). The national government was the dominant player in making both national and local policies. Although called local self-governance units, Taiwan’s local governments during this period were not actively involved in the decision-making process and can be considered as de facto field offices, mainly in charge of implementing policies made by the national government. Local elected executives and representatives were willing to accept their reduced role in local self-governance because they needed nomination or the support of the Kuomintang to remain in office (Fang, 2006: 37–38). After martial law was lifted in 1987, the local government systems went through a series of reforms which redefined intergovernmental relationships by empowering local elected officials with more autonomy to appoint local officials, set local priorities, and administer local programmes. In 1999, the Local Government Act was passed to become the primary legal basis for regulating the local government system in Taiwan. Among other things, the passage of the law was believed to increase local elected officials’ autonomy in setting local policy priorities and to grant local councils more power to legislate on local affairs (Ji, 1999: 18–22; Y. Chen, 1999: 60–62). Although the local government system remains relatively centralised, the role of local governments and councils in setting local policies has been extended to a certain degree. The duties and organisation of Taiwan’s local councils will be discussed in the following sections.

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Duties of local councils The duties of local councils in Taiwan were regulated in the Local Government Act. The duties of special municipality councils and county/provincial city councils are similar although they are differently worded in Articles 35 and 36 of the law. These duties can be summarised as follows: 1 To pass resolutions on the self-government ordinances of a special municipality, county, or provincial city; 2 To approve the budget of a special municipality, county, or provincial city; 3 To approve special taxes, temporary taxes, and surtaxes in a special municipality, county, or provincial city; 4 To approve the disposal of property of a special municipality, county, or provincial city; 5 To approve the organic self-government ordinances of a special municipality, county, or provincial city government, and businesses owned by a special municipality, county, or provincial city; 6 To approve proposals made by a special municipality, county, or provincial city government; 7 To review the auditor’s reports on the final accounts of a special municipality, county, or provincial city; 8 To approve proposals made by special municipality, county, or provincial city councillors; 9 To listen to petitions from citizens; 10 To carry out other functions as prescribed by law or by regulations promulgated by superior government agencies.

Organisation of local councils Based on the Regulation on Governing the Organization of Local Councils, administrative divisions are established to provide administrative assistance to local councillors. It should be noted that the number of administrative divisions a council can establish is regulated by the national government in the Regulation. Councils in special municipalities can establish up to nine administrative divisions. As depicted in Figure 5.1, Taipei City Council has nine administrative divisions because of Taipei City’s status as a special municipality. The number of administrative divisions allowed to be established in the county and provincial city varies based on the total population of the county or provincial city where a council is located. According to the law, councils in counties/provincial cities with a population less than half a million can establish up to five administrative divisions. Councils in counties/provincial cities with a population of more than half million but less than 1.25 million can establish up to six administrative divisions. Finally, councils in counties/provincial cities with a population of more than 1.25 million can establish up to seven administrative divisions. Therefore, as we can see in Figure 5.2, Pingtung County Council can only establish six administrative divisions because of its status as a county with a population of approximately 852,000 people.

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In addition to the administrative divisions, local councils can also establish a small number of permanent committees and special committees. Unlike the number of administrative divisions, the number of committees is not specified in the Regulation. As depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, Taipei City Council has seven permanent committees and two special committees while Pingtung County Council has six permanent committees and two special committees. In other words, the Regulation gives local councils more flexibility to decide how many and for which matters they would like to establish committees. Local councils’ permanent committees are organised by policy area to review proposals assigned by the plenary session in order to facilitate in-depth deliberation on the policy issues. Special committees often include the Procedure Committee and Discipline Committee. The Procedural Committee is responsible for setting up the agenda of the plenary session while the Discipline Committee’s main responsibility is to review and investigate disciplinary cases involving councillors and recommending disciplinary action to the plenary session.

Figure 5.1 Taipei City Council’s organisational chart CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FINANCE AND CONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE EDUCATION COMMITTEE PERMANENT COMMITTEES

TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE POLICE AND SANITATION COMMITTEE

COUNCIL

PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE LEGISLATION COMMITTEE PROCEDURE COMMITTEE SPECIAL COMMITTEES

DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT OFFICE

SPEAKER

SECRETARY GENERAL

DEPUTY SPEAKER

PROCEDURE SECTION GENERAL AFFAIRS SECTION DOCUMENTS SECTION

DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE LEGAL AFFAIRS OFFICE INFORMATION OFFICE PERSONNEL OFFICE ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Source: www.tcc.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=82870DB96AE8D476

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Figure 5.2 Pingtung County Council’s organisational chart CIVIL ADMINISTRATION EXAMINATION COMMITTEE CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT EXAMINATION COMMITTEE PERMANENT COMMITTEES

SAFETY ASSURANCE EXAMINATION COMMITTEE FINANCE EXAMINATION COMMITTEE

COUNCIL

EDUCATION EXAMINATION COMMITTEE AGRICULTURE EXAMINATION COMMITTEE PROCEDURE COMMITTEE SPECIAL COMMITTEES DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE PROCEDURE OFFICE

SPEAKER

SECRETARY GENERAL

DEPUTY SPEAKER

GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE LEGAL DEPARTMENT

DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL

PERSONNEL OFFICE ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Source: Based on the information provided at www.ptcc.gov.tw/#

However, administrative divisions and committees discussed above only offer very limited assistance on policy analysis to councillors. In Taipei City Council, for example, the library, a subdivision of the Information Office, is the only administrative division mentioned as playing a role in assisting local councillors to conduct policy analysis by providing policy relevant information (Personal communication, 7 March 2013). Accordingly, in order to deliberate, vote, or take a position on various policy issues, local councillors need to produce the majority of policy relevant information through their own staff in the councillors’ offices. Based on the Regulation on Allowances for Elected Representatives and Subsidies for Village Heads and Wardens, councillors in special municipality council may appoint six to eight assistants to an amount not exceeding NT$240,000 (US$7,619) while councillors in the county/ provincial city may appoint two to four assistants to an amount not exceeding NT$80,000 (US$2,540). In other words, although the salaries of assistants are paid out of public funds, the Regulation sets the ceiling for the number of assistants to be hired and the total amount of salary to be paid. Based on the discussion in this section, we can conclude that although councillors are given greater power to perform a broader range of duties, the organisation of local councils and the resources given to each councillor are strictly controlled and regulated by the national government. With the constraints they encounter, local

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councillors’ role in local policy analysis is limited. In the following section, factors contributing to such a limited role will be elaborated upon.

The limited role of the local council in local policy analysis In addition to the constraints discussed in the previous section, there are other factors that negatively affect the ability of local councillors to perform better local policy analysis and have a greater influence on local policy making. These factors can be categorised into two broad themes: local factional politics and institutional settings of local governance systems. They will be separately analysed in this section.

Local factional politics In the era of its one-party authoritarian rule, the Kuomintang established strong patron–client relationships with local factions to maintain local political control. At that time, most local councillors won elections with the support of local factions, and had to represent the political interests of these local factions during their term in the office. As a result, Hong (2000: 13) asserted that local councillors are mostly influenced by local factions and political parties, while largely neglecting the interests of their constituents. In fact, Wang and Fu (2007: 46–47) studied factional politics in Taichung county from 1951 to 2005, and concluded that the authoritarian clientelism which emerged during the era of the Kuomintang’s one-party authoritarian rule should be called ‘bifactionalism’. This means that the Kuomintang usually established patron–client relationship with two local factions in one locality. These two local factions took turns to represent the Kuomintang in top local executive positions while their representatives on the local councils competed with each other to engage in rent-seeking activities. Research has shown that the impact of local factions on local elections has steadily decreased during an era when urbanisation, economic development, rising educational levels, and reform of legal and institutional systems have gradually changed the nature of the socioeconomic and political system in Taiwan. Nonetheless, local factions continue to exist and possess the ability to mobilise voters, especially in the less urbanised areas (Chao, 2004: 86). Therefore, local councillors supported by local factions will keep factions’ political and economic interests in mind when making policy decisions. In the context outlined above, the way in which factional politics affects local councillors’ role in policy analysis will be elaborated according to the following subjects: advancing self-interest and logrolling between local factions.

Advancing self-interest Politicians are primarily guided by their self-interest, which is to maximise their votes so as to be re-elected (Lewin, 1991: 60). Mayhew (1974: 5–6) described United States congressmen as single-minded seekers of re-election. Local councillors in Taiwan are not exceptional. Because the support of local factions is the key for local councillors to win re-election, they devote the majority of their legislative endeavours to meet local factions’ interests. In his research on local legislative behaviour in Kinmen County Council, Chang (2011: 36) found that local councillors in Kinmen are

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highly motivated by the needs and interests of local factions (in the form of kinship associations and brotherhoods in Kinmen) in performing their legislative duties. The impact of this behaviour is twofold. First, they will not maintain adequate capacity in terms of personnel and financial resources to conduct policy research. As discussed previously, local councillors in Taiwan do not have sufficient resources to perform their legislative duties. Therefore, when local councillors are concerned to address the interests of local factions in order to win re-election, they will devote their limited resources and personnel to providing constituent services and engaging in networking activities, rather than conducting policy research and searching for policy-relevant information. Second, they will not be practised in the acquisition of the professional knowledge and skills necessary to make informed policy decisions. In an interview conducted by Chun-Pin Chen (2003: 49), a local councillor admitted that, in general, local councillors neither pay attention to nor have the expertise to review and appropriate the budget. More specifically, they do not understand the administration of the local executive branch, the process of local policy making and implementation, and the costs associated with providing local services. In fact, as long as their legislative behaviour is guided by local factions’ interests, the need and motivation for local councillors to improve their professional knowledge and skills are minimal.

Logrolling between local factions As defined by Tullock et al (2002: 29–30), logrolling is vote trading, meaning a representative will agree to vote for legislation that another member wants in return for his or her vote on another issue. Tullock et al claimed that logrolling is a very common phenomenon in any democratic political system. For example, in the US Congress, logrolling is fairly open and above-board because people realise that the art of legislation involves bargaining, and efforts made to sweeten deals. Chun-Pin Chen (2003: 49) found that Taiwan’s local councillors can also be observed to engage in logrolling activities when they cast their vote in return for support they received from their colleagues. However, logrolling does not only occur among individual councillors. In fact, logrolling occurring between local factions has a greater impact on local politics and public policy making, especially when a city mayor or county magistrate’s affiliated local factions do not hold the majority of seats in the their respective local councils. For example, Wang and Fu (2007: 56) found in their study that logrolling occurred between two local factions in Taichung county from at least 1982 to 1990. As one of the key leaders of a local faction, the county magistrate would agree to support the legislation advocated by the council speaker, one of the key leaders of another local faction, in exchange for his support on spending or policy proposed by him. After an agreement was reached, both of them would mobilise councillors affiliated with the respective local factions to support the agreement. This form of logrolling has greater impacts because the involvement of a county magistrate means that the resources which can be mobilised by a county government will become chips on the trading table. Because local councillors affiliated with local factions have to show their loyalty by supporting the agreements reached by the county magistrate and council speaker, their autonomy to express their policy preferences shrinks. As a result, the need for them 73

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to conduct policy analysis and collect policy-relevant information becomes minimal. As long as these local councillors remain loyal to their respective local factions, they can continue to be elected with the support of those factions. Moreover, as their seniority in the local faction increases, they become leaders who enjoy more political power to advance their political and economic interests.

Institutional settings of local governing system As discussed in the previous section, the organisation of local councils and the resources given to each councillor cannot provide sufficient support for local councillors to conduct solid policy analysis. In addition to the lack of support each local council can provide to its councillors, three institutional settings of local governing system also play a role in limiting the role of local councillors in local policy making, and therefore reduce the need for them to conduct policy analysis. These local governing settings include the strong mayor system, short legislative sessions, and controloriented national regulations. More details are provided in the following section.

The strong mayor form Under the strong mayor form of local government, local councillors can play only a very limited role in policy analysis. Although the Local Government Act grants 10 functions to local councillors to influence the local policy process and check the power of the local executive branch, the Act gives the local executive branch greater authority and power in making and implementing local policies. As required by the Local Government Act, the strong mayor form is adopted by all local governments in Taiwan with local self-governing status. According to the Act, as long as they comply with the personnel-related requirements and restrictions regulated by various national statutes, mayors (or magistrates in counties) can appoint or dismiss all of their department heads without input from the council. It should be noted that these personnel-related requirements and restrictions are imposed by the national government, not local councils. Second, the budget of a local government is prepared and implemented by the mayor , although approval from the council is required; the council can only cut the budget, without authority to add new or additional spending, while reviewing the budget submitted by the mayor. Finally, the mayor can also veto the resolutions made by councils. By exercising these powers, a mayor enjoys greater power over his or her colleagues in local councils (Lu, 2000: 13). As local oversight agencies, local councils cannot effectively utilise their power to oversee the operation of their local government. According to the Local Government Act, the mayor is required to present policy reports to the council and to be questioned on the subjects related to the city-wide administration and policy making during the regular sessions. In addition, the heads of departmental-level agencies and their subordinate agencies are also required to present reports to and be questioned by the councillors on the affairs under their jurisdiction. Individual councillors may ask local executives to amend a local policy or administrative procedure during the process. However, as long as a resolution on the matter is not passed by the council, local executives are not required by law to act. Yang-De Chen (2003: 12) argued that intergovernmental relations between the local executive branch and the legislative branch continue to centre around the executive branch, and therefore the power of 74

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the legislature is constrained to a certain degree. That is to say that the local executive branch has more power to dominate local affairs and make local policy.

Short legislative sessions If local councils do not convene, they cannot exercise their power to pass resolutions, to approve budget, or to question local executives. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the power of the local council, and the frequency and length of the legislative sessions, which is determined by the types of local government and the number of seats on the local council (Chiang, 1999: 78–79). Based on the Local Government Act, legislative sessions can be classified into three types: regular sessions, extended sessions, and special sessions. Local councils convene for regular sessions every six months. The regular session varies from 30 to 70 days, including weekends, national holidays, and recess. For special municipality councils, the regular session cannot last more than 70 days. For county and provincial city councils with fewer than 41 seats, the regular session cannot last more than 30 days; for those with 41 seats or more, the regular session cannot last more than 40 days. In addition to the regular sessions, by meeting the criteria set by the Local Government Act, local councils can extend the regular sessions, or call for special sessions. In the special municipality councils, the extended sessions can last no longer than 10 days, including weekends, national holidays, and recess. In the county and provincial city councils, the extended sessions can last no longer than five days. The length of special sessions and the total number of times special sessions can be called for annually are regulated in the Local Government Act. A special municipality council can call for special sessions up to eight times annually and can meet up to 10 days in each of the special sessions, including weekends, national holidays, and recess. A county or provincial city council can call for special sessions up to six times annually and can meet up to five days in each of the special legislative sessions, including weekends, national holidays, and recess. Based on the above discussion, we have learned that special municipality councils can meet for up to 240 days. County and provincial city councils can meet for up to 100 or 120 days based on the number of seats. However, the actual number of days that local councils meet is less than the maximum number of days they are allowed to hold meetings because specific criteria have to be met before local councils can extend regular sessions or call for a special session. For example, the record (Taipei City Council, 2010: 111) shows that during its term from 2007 to 2010, the 10th Taipei City Council held eight regular sessions, and all of the regular sessions lasted for a maximum of 70 days. In addition, 19 special sessions were called for during the same period with a total of 166 days, and 15 of these special legislative sessions lasted for the maximum of 10 days. Therefore, the 10th Taipei City Council met on average 182 days per year, approximately 60 days less than the maximum. Yang-De Chen (2003: 19) argued that because the legal framework of local governance has improved and local autonomy continues to increase, local councillors need more room to exercise their power. Therefore, the limits set by the Local Government Act on the legislative sessions are unreasonable. In fact, before the Local Government Act was enacted in 1999, the national statutes did not limit either the length of each legislative session or the frequency that special sessions could be called 75

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for. In other words, the enactment of the Local Government Act can be viewed as centralising and strengthening the national government’s control over how local councils conduct their business. It seems contradictory that limiting the length and frequency of local legislative sessions is not consistent with the trend to increase the role of local governments in running local affairs. When taking the adoption of the strong mayor form of local government into account, it can be reasoned that the Act places strict limits on local legislative sessions in order to weaken the ability of local councils to check the power of the local executive branch, and influence the outcome of local policy making. The impacts of local factional politics on local legislative behaviour may be the reason why the national government intended to strengthen the power of the local executive branch while weakening the power of the local legislative branch. When the power of local councils weakens, their role in local policy analysis diminishes as well.

Control-oriented national regulations The organisational design and resources of local councils are regulated by highly control-oriented national statutes and executive orders. As discussed above, duties, organisations, resources, executive–legislative relations, and legislative sessions are all regulated by either the Local Government Act, the Regulation on Governing the Organisation of Local Councils, or the Regulation on Allowances for Elected Representatives and Subsidies for Village Heads and Wardens. In addition, the Local Government Act also specifies the rules for determining the number of seats in each local council, processing the budget review, and electing and recalling council speakers and vice speakers. Yang-De Chen (2003: 19) observed and argued that the functions performed by local councils are heavily influenced by the national government. In addition to setting their scope of operations, the national government also specifies the guidelines and procedures for local councils to perform their duties. Furthermore, it has the authority to interpret rules and arbitrate their disputes with the local executive branch. Moreover, through its authority to approve local self-governance ordinances, and to temporarily take over and act on local matters, the national government can intervene in the operations of local governments under specified conditions, and therefore, alter the policy decisions made jointly by a local government’s executive and legislative branch. By heavily regulating the organisation and operation of local councils, the national government seeks to control the behaviour of local councils. The idea is not to promote greater involvement of local councils in local policy making and analysis. Rather, the purpose is to control local councils and prevent corruption and abuse of local legislative power. At the same time, however, local councils and their members are constrained in exercising their power, including making policy decisions. As a result, the need for conducting policy analysis reduces, which further discourages local councillors from committing time and resources to improve their capacity to conduct policy analysis.

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Sources for local councillors to obtain policy relevant information Although local councillors in Taiwan play only a limited role in policy analysis, they nonetheless have developed avenues to obtain policy-relevant information in order to become familiar with the policy issues and take positions when necessary. These avenues include petitions from constituents, dialogue with local people, official documents obtained from the local executive branch, information leaked by whistleblowers, and news reported by the media. Local councillors will ask their staffs in the councillors’ office to collect policy information through these avenues, and analyse the information obtained to produce policy-relevant knowledge for them to take policy positions on various issues. The five avenues identified above will be further discussed in this section.

Petitions from constituents Petitions from constituents can be a useful source for local councillors to obtain policy-relevant information. In Taiwan, local councillors are expected to spend most of their time on constituent services requesting local government officials to address local problems, lobbying local executives to adopt specific policy alternatives, and proposing resolutions to meet constituent needs. Therefore, they receive a lot of letters, phone calls, and emails to inform them on a particular local problem (C. Chen, 2007: 84–85), or to advocate a certain local policy, with the hope that proper actions will be taken by local councillors. The information obtained from these petitions can be used as a starting point for identifying policy problems, investigating the conduct of the local administration, and collecting policy-relevant information. When sufficient policy-relevant information is collected, it becomes possible for local councillors to advise on policy.

Dialogue with local people Local councillors attend many events on a daily basis, and have a lot of opportunities to meet and enter into dialogues with voters, supporters, or local residents. In ChunPin Chen’s research (2007: 85), one local councillor said that the primary source of information he used to prepare his interpellations was the notes he made when people give him their suggestions, complaints, thoughts, or opinions during his attendance at local events. Local councillors may sense a local problem, notice administrative misconduct, or develop a policy alternative by piecing together these local residents’ real-life experience and reflections.

Official documents obtained from the local executive branch As local oversight agencies, local councils have the authority to request reports on the operation of local agencies, review financial statements of local governments, and be informed on the making of local policies. Due to the fact that local executive agencies have more information, resources, and personnel to prepare these documents, the reports provided by local executive agencies will not only be official statements which can be used to question and deliberate in the council meetings, but will also be more comprehensive compared to other information sources. A local councillor indicated 77

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that these official documents, including auditors’ reports and local top executive’s policy reports, are one of the key sources to obtain information for overseeing local executive agencies (C. Chen, 2007: 85).

Information leaked by whistle-blowers In addition to the official documents provided by local executive agencies, information leaked by internal whistle-blowers in the local executive branch, in most cases, is the only possible source to reveal administrative misconduct. Chun-Pin Chen (2007: 85) interviewed several local councillors who mentioned that only the internal staff would know the real problems and are able to provide correct in-depth information. If the information provided is sufficient, local councillors can verify and analyse the information provided in order to question officials in the executive branch or to publicise the case through a press conference. If the information provided is insufficient, local councillors will have to instruct their office staff to collect more information before in-depth analysis can take place.

News reported by the media News reported in the media, such as newspapers and magazines, can also be valuable pieces of information that local councillors can use to conduct policy analysis (C. Chen, 2007: 84). The information obtained from the media can be categorised into three broad categories, including administrative misconduct, leaked policy information, and claims from various policy stakeholders. First, a report on administrative misconduct will no doubt get people’s attention. As a result, a news report on the incident would lead local councillors to collect more information in order to uncover the whole story, to hold responsible officials accountable, and to reform the administrative procedure in order to prevent future misconduct. Second, policies or programmes at their initial stage of planning may be leaked to the media and draw public attention. Local councillors may be asked by the media or their constituents to express their opinion on the subject. As a result, local councillors use their oversight authority to collect more information from the executive branch in order to better understand the proposed policy and take a position on the issue. Finally, in order to provide in-depth analysis on a policy subject, reporters often try to collect policy claims or arguments from policy stakeholders who advocate or oppose policy on various issues. By collecting these policy arguments from people who support or oppose a certain policy, local councillors can better assess the pros and cons of policy issues before formally taking their respective positions.

The future of policy analysis in local councils Although special municipalities, provincial cities, and counties are given the status of self-rule in Taiwan, the duties, resources, and organisation of local councils are highly regulated, controlled, and monitored by the national government. Local councillors are neither expected nor enabled to play any significant role in local policy making. Accordingly, their role in conducting policy analysis is minimal. Looking forward, although the impact of local factions on local politics and elections has begun to decline, local councillors’ legislative behaviour is still shaped by local 78

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factional politics to a certain degree. It is expected that the role of local councils in local policy making and policy analysis will remain the same in the foreseeable future. Therefore, this chapter will not be concluded by outlining the possible reforms for improving the role of local councils in policy analysis. Rather, we should ask ourselves whether or not the role of local councils in local policy making and policy analysis should be expanded. It is argued that the power of local executive and legislative branches should be balanced to ensure the sustainable development of local self-governance. Local executive agencies need to be checked, and in theory local councils should fill that role. In addition, multiple and diverse stakeholders should be represented and be able to express their interest in the local policy-making process. Local councils are in a better position to involve citizens or groups with diversified policy interests in the policy process. According to this line of thinking, it is argued that the power of local councils should not be constrained. Instead, reform of the institutional design of local councils is needed to improve policy making. The goal of reform of local councils is not to eliminate politics from the councils, but to improve local councillors’ motivation to make better policy decisions and improve their capacity to do so. When local councillors are motivated to make better policy decisions, they will devote more resources to policy analysis and do a better job on it.

References Chang, Guo-Ding, 2011. The Evaluation on the Effectiveness of Kinmen County Council’s Legislative Behavior. Chinese Local Self-Governance, 64(11), 16–41. Chao, Yung-Mau, 2004. The Changes and Features of Local Fations Clientelist Structure – A Case Study of Neimen Township, Kaohsiung County in Taiwan. Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, 1(1), 85–117. Chen, Chun-Pin, 2003. The Motivations and Behavior of Budgetary Approval Among Local Legislators: A Case Study of Chi-Yi City. Journal of Social Sciences, 11(2), 37–69. Chen, Chun-Pin, 2007. “The Legislative Control and Oversight of Local Council: A Case Study of Chia Yi City.” Open Public Administration Review, (18), 63–104. Chen, Yang-De, 1999. “Probing into the Development of Taiwan’s Local Governments System.” RDEC Bimonthly, 23(3), 52–62. Chen, Yang-De, 2003. The Evaluation on Local Councils’ Legislative Quality – A Legal Perspective. Chinese Local Self-Governance, 56(4), 4–25. Chiang, Ta-Shu, 1999. A Preliminary Study of the Session System in Taiwan Local Councils. Taiwanese Journal of Political Science, (11), 73–102. Fang, Kai-Hung, 2006. Taiwan’s Officials Perceptions of Fiscal Decentralization: An Analysis Using Q Methodology. PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. Hong, Yun-Lin, 2000. An Analysis on the Duties of and the Effects of Resolutions Made by Various Levels of Taiwan’s Local Council. Chinese Local Self-Governance, 53 (11), 3–16. Huang, Jin-Tang, 1995. The Study of the Issues of Legislating Local Governments System. Taipei: YuanZhao. Ji, Jun-Chen, 1999. Streaming Provincial Government and New Local Governments System: History, Design, and Development Context. Taipei: Shi-Ying. 79

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Lewin, Leif, 1991. Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Lu, Yu-Cheng, 2000. The Intergovernmental Relations Between Local Government and Council – A Pluralism Perspective of the Combination and Operation Between Executive and Legislative Functions. Chinese Local Self-Governance, 53 (4), 3–17. Mayhew, David R., 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Su, Yong-Qin, 1999. Regulations of Local Self-Governance and the Rights and Obligations of People. Chinese Local Self-Governance, 52(4), 3–31. Taipei City Council, 2010. Taipei City Council 10th Commemorative Publication. Taipei City: Taipei City Council. Tullock, Gordon, Seldon, Arthur, and Bardy, Gordon L., 2002. Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Wang, Ching-I, and Fu, Hung-Der, 2007. The Influence of Factional Politics on the Administration–Legislature Relationships: A Case Study of Taichung County, 1951–2005. Taiwanese Journal of Political Science, (34), 45–70.

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Gendering policy analysis? The problems and pitfalls of participatory ‘gender impact assessment’ Yen-Wen Peng

Introduction Since the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action in the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, gender mainstreaming (GM) has arguably become the most popular innovation among national governments all over the world for promoting gender equality (Woodward, 2003). GM reflects two important ‘paradigm shifts’ in terms of international frameworks for improving women’s rights. One is ‘from women to gender’ – that is, the shift from efforts to eliminate discrimination against women, to targeting the gendered power structure in society (Taylor, 1999). The other shift is ‘from women’s units to the mainstream’– that is, demanding that all government departments (not just the traditional ‘soft’ departments) include gender considerations in their policies and plans. This is to be coordinated by a gender machinery that is placed at the highest level of the central government. In the GM process, a platform for public consultation or participation is often established under the highest-level machinery (such as a gender advisory committee under the President or at the cabinet level) to lead the direction of gender reforms. Many gender scholars, experts and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who advocate GM hence provide their support to and work collaboratively with the state. As Tiessen (2007) argued, GM is based on the social partnership established between the government and civil society actors. In Taiwan, ‘Gender Mainstreaming Implementation Plans’ have been implemented in all ministries and agencies of the Executive Yuan since 2006, and six gender mainstreaming tools – gender equality task force, gender impact assessment, gender analysis, gender statistics, gender budgets and gender-consciousness empowerment – have been developed to embed gender perspectives into all policies, laws and plans. These tools, as is the case in other countries, were developed mainly by gender experts and NGOs in collaboration with government bureaucrats, and hence were characterised by their participatory nature. These six GM tools can be considered policy analysis tools in a broad sense, as their ultimate purpose is to increase the gender sensitivity and inclusivity of all governmental policies and programmes. Among the tools, Gender Impact Assessment (GIA) is the most widely used having the most resources and legal authorisation. In addition to the Guide for Gender Impact Assessment published by the Committee of Women’s Rights of the Executive Yuan in 2008 as a resource book, Article 6 of the Guidelines for Review of Medium and Long-term Projects by Agencies under the 81

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Executive Yuan, effective since January 2009, also stipulates that ‘all medium- and long-term projects shall have gender impact assessment’. As of now, the 38 agencies under the Executive Yuan are required to fill out the Gender Impact Assessment Checklist for all medium- and long-term projects, as well as for all new or revised laws and regulations. Civilian women’s groups and feminist experts have participated proactively in the development and design of the GIA checklist and resource guide. They had high expectations of this tool because the procedural requirement of ‘external counselling’ included in the checklist ensures their continuing participation in most law, policy and programme formulation processes. On the other hand, the public officials also endorsed this standardised tool, because its step-by-step design is easier for them to follow, in contrast to the vague and abstract concept of ‘gender analysis’. However, can a standardised, checklist-style analysis tool really bring about the reform expected by many feminist advocates? This study will investigate the challenges and pitfalls that social reformers (including NGOs and gender experts) may encounter when trying to incorporate transformative ideas into the development of policies through collaborating with the state. In fact, as gender mainstreaming has been promoted in the world for almost three decades, similar reflections are growing among global feminists. Some feminists argue that GM is assimilated into the neoliberal governance paradigm without any significant impact on gender structures (Teghtsoonian, 2004), whereas others are more optimistic, believing that the opportunities provided by GM may to some degree improve gender equality (Verloo and Roggeband, 1996). The third faction of opinion lies between the previous two, and believes that gender mainstreaming may have opened a window of opportunity, but resistance as well as challenges from the gendered social structures and bureaucracy still have to be dealt with (Tiessen, 2007). Therefore, by investigating the bureaucrats’ responses and resistance to various gender mainstreaming initiatives, in particular to GIA, we will be able to better understand the challenges involved in initiating gender reforms and identify a strategy and solution for the future. The chapter is organised as follows: the next section reviews the development of GM and GIA in Taiwan, including the introduction of the standardised GIA checklist. The third section presents an evaluation of the problems and challenges in implementing a GIA checklist. The material is drawn from my long-term participatory observation as well as my interviews with various stakeholders. The fourth section reflects on the pitfalls of the seemingly ‘participatory’ approach to gender reforms, pointing out the underlying neoliberalist governance paradigm that may co-opt progressive ideals with ‘performance management’ techniques. Based on these reflections, the chapter concludes with a call to feminists to stay alert, despite the example of participation within the state, and it emphasises the importance of sustaining an oppositional force within civil society, which is an indispensable foundation for continuous gender reform and analysis.

History of GIA in Taiwan GIA is a tool for gender mainstreaming widely used around the world since the late 1990s; hence the idea of GIA originated in Taiwan when the government decided to develop tools for GM. The precedent of the Asia-Pacific Economic 82

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Cooperation (APEC) ‘Gender Criteria Checklist’ as well as the established practice of Environmental Impact Assessment in Taiwan also contributed to the recognition of GIA. The Women’s Rights Committee1 at its 20th committee meeting in December 2004 reached the resolution to develop this tool for mainstreaming a gender perspective in policy analysis. The development of a ‘local version’ of the assessment checklist was commissioned by one of the committee’s member, Dr Annie Lee. The Executive Yuan held a ‘Meeting to Establish Gender Impact Assessment Indices for Important National Policies’ in November 2006, which was a step forward in the institutionalisation of GIA. A resolution was reached during the meeting that the government must establish gender assessment indices and a tracking and control mechanism during the development of national policies, and that a perspective for encouraging gender equalisation should be included in policies from 2007 on. However, there were only a few months left before the resolution came into force. There was not enough time for preparation, and no instructional material or examples were developed due to the short notice. Even the agency in charge of monitoring, the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC), had no idea where to begin. ‘Chaos’ is an apt description of the implementation in 2007. Nothing could be done except ‘policy propaganda’. Frontline bureaucrats from various departments and agencies expressed their need to have a Standardised Operation Procedure (SOP) to assist and direct them through the process. In response to these complaints, the Women’s Rights Committee and Foundation of Women’s Rights Promotion and Development (FWRPD)2 invited gender experts, scholars and women’s groups for a series of discussions. Accordingly, the new Gender Impact Assessment Checklist was developed in 2008 along with the Guide for Gender Impact Assessment to provide examples showing how the checklist works. Meanwhile, FWRPD held four ‘gender analysis and impact assessment workshops’ in September and October 2008 to provide the basic training for frontline bureaucrats (Chen and Wang, 2011: 22). Civilian members of the Women’s Rights Committee, the FWRPD and RDEC bureaucrats who had participated in the development of this tool determined the necessity for further implementation after better preparation. Therefore, GIA was added as part of the required procedure in the development of ‘all medium- and long-term plans’ during the development of ‘Guidelines for Review of Medium and Long-term Projects by Agencies under the Executive Yuan’ (Article 6), which came into effect on 1 January 2009. Since then, the GIA checklist has been required for legislation proposals and medium- and long-term plans developed by all central departments and agencies. According to Chen and Wang (2011), almost 360 cases went through the gender impact assessment procedure in 2009 alone. The checklist consists of nine items (sections). The first five are the basic information on each project, including project name, name of agency, field(s), problem statement, and overview of project goal(s). The first five items are not necessarily linked to gender for most projects. Gender-related information is required from item 6 and onwards: Item 6, Beneficiary. The information in this section is used to decide whether to proceed with the gender analysis. The person in charge will check the answers for the following three questions: (6-1) the beneficiary of this plan includes persons of specific gender, sexual orientation or sexual identity; (6-2) the beneficiary of the plan is not singled out according to gender but the plan itself involves certain sexual stereotypes as commonly perceived, or there is a large gap in gender balance as shown in statistical data; and (6-3) the spatial planning and engineering design 83

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of public construction projects are related to the interests of persons of different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identity. Either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ can be the answer to any of these three questions. In the case that ‘no’ is the answer to all three questions and external consultants agree, the project has insignificant gender implications, and item 7, which is the most complex and crucial, is exempted. In other words, in the case that ‘yes’ is the answer to any of the three questions, item 7 must be answered. Item 7, Content of assessment: there are 12 assessment indicators in item 7 to help the person in charge to decide whether any gender issue is involved and how to modify the plan in order to increase its gender sensitivity. There are three dimensions among these indicators: (1) Resource evaluation: the indicators here include: (7-1) different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities are considered in distribution of budgets; (7-2) the urgency necessity to narrow the gap between different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities are considered at each implementation stage; (7-3) different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities are considered in information distribution and propaganda; and (7-4) other gender-friendly measures are considered to serve the needs of persons of different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities. The person in charge can choose ‘yes’ or ‘not related’ as answers and provide the reason for doing so. If the answers to all four questions are ‘not related’, the appropriateness of the project shall be reviewed and revised, since the extent of gender impact has been identified in item 6. (2) Benefits evaluation: the indicators related to the benefits of the plan include: (7-5) the needs of persons of different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities, as well as the needs of persons of different ages and ethnic groups are considered; (7-6) realisation of the fundamental principles set forth in the Constitution and laws; (7-7) compliance with the principles of international pacts, agreements or documents on gender/women; (7-8) prevention or elimination of stereotypes concerning gender, sexual orientation or sexual identity and of gender segregation; (7-9) increased opportunities for persons of different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities to access social resources equally, creating an environment of equal treatment. The person in charge needs to tick ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and provide the reason for doing so. As above, if ‘no’ is the answer to all questions, the appropriateness of the plan shall be reviewed. (3) Public space benefit evaluation: the final three indicators are designed specifically for projects involving public space or construction, and they are: (7-10) usability (including hardware and software): the configuration of space, facilities and equipment shall comply with the convenience and reasonability of different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities in their use; (7-11) security: the establishment of space and environment that is safe and free of fear and the elimination of potential threat or negative impact on different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities; (7-12) friendliness: consideration of specific needs and perceptions of different genders, sexual orientations or sexual identities in terms of the use of space. The person in charge needs to tick ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and

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provide the reason for doing so. Of course, the answers can be ‘not related’ if no public space or construction is involved in the project. The first seven sections mentioned above are to be filled out by the frontline planner in charge of the project. One of the most important items for GIA as a tool is probably item 8, ‘Participatory procedure’. It requires consultation of at least one gender expert or a representative of a women’s group for comments via fax, email or face-to-face meeting. The external expert will review the gender impact assessment filled in by the person in charge, and provide comments in writing on what is unsatisfactory and what can be improved. As the external comments are reviewed, the person in charge will state how the department/agency in charge has responded to the comments and how the expert comments will be incorporated into item 9, ‘Assessment results’. A reason is to be provided if a comment is not incorporated. After all the items are completed, the checklist is to be submitted, along with the revised project plan, to the auditing agency for review. There are three auditing agencies assigned for three types of medium- and long-term projects respectively. Projects in social development are submitted to the RDEC; those related to economic development to the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD); and those concerning technological development to the National Science Council (NSC). A review will be conducted by its respective auditing agency together with the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics before the proposal is approved and submitted to the Executive Yuan.

Practical problems in GIA implementation The overview above shows that GIA seems to be a useful tool that not only creates an opportunity for organisational learning and civic participation that meets feminists’ expectations, but also satisfies the administrative need for a SOP that is easy to follow and monitor. The data collected from observations and interviews during the implementation of the GIA, however, shows up several problems and challenges that have undermined the expected operation of GIA. These problems, in short, have made the practice of GIA no more than a kind of formality, as will be elaborated below.

Resistance or passive attitude of frontline bureaucrats For many bureaucrats, GIA is an unwelcome additional job. Resistance is often observed among bureaucrats at the basic level. However, after the ‘institutionalisation’ of the tool, resistance against this ‘additional job’ starts to decline. Instead, the bureaucrats look for a way of getting the task done as quickly as possible. For example, item 8 of GIA, ‘Participatory procedure’, requires the review of external experts. If there are too many comments or suggestions from an expert, however, the person in charge may have to revise the entire plan or look for more supplementary data. As a result, bureaucrats tend to seek consultation with experts that are ‘friendlier’ or ‘easier to work with’, but not necessarily specialised in this field. Some interviewees pointed out that they tended to consult those who did not usually make critical comments, in order to avoid the trouble of ‘nitpicking’. Another problem is that, since many government projects are outsourced for research or implementation, the person in charge of a government project can 85

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outsource the preparation of a GIA, along with the entire project, to an external consultant or contractor. Moreover, the person in charge usually has no time or energy to oversee how the consultant is doing, and just settles for ‘getting the job done’. Frontline bureaucrats have strategies to avoid practising GIA if they do not agree with the request to implement it. In other words, the effectiveness of GIA depends on bureaucrats recognising its implications and necessity. Yet educating these bureaucrats in order to change their attitudes or values is itself a highly challenging task, one that requires strong political will and a clear system of rewards and penalties. It is also crucial to provide sufficient resources and manpower, so that the persons in charge will not be overloaded. These preconditions are generally not available in the GIA implementing process.

Lack of discussion and communication It is generally difficult for a frontline bureaucrat or a contractor to identify what gender impact a project may have if they have had little or no gender sensitivity training. For this reason, an external consultation mechanism is designed into the GIA and provides representatives of women’s groups and gender experts an opportunity to participate in the assessment of a project or construction plan. In addition to providing suggestions for improvement of an individual plan/project, they are expected to help those in charge to develop their gender consciousness and analytical capacity. However, learning is interactive. One-sided comments with no chance for discussion or debate will not be sufficient to improve the sensitivity of those in charge. Thus, the person in charge needs to communicate and enter into dialogue with external experts and NGOs. However, the external consultation is often practised in written form. There are few opportunities for interaction and communication between the bureaucrats and gender experts. Once the expert has provided comments or suggestions via email or fax, her task is finished, and no one will tell her how her comments have been handled. Those in charge can ‘respond’ by filling in the last section of the checklist, making no changes to the original plan. If the external expert provides only stylistic suggestions, it will be easy for the person in charge to accept them all and revise the checklist accordingly. However, if the comments provided involve revision of the original proposal, indicators, budget or anything related to the project itself, the person in charge may just find an excuse to circumvent the issue without making any concrete revision, or promise to incorporate the comments but not do so. In a Maritime Weather and Disaster Prevention Technology Research Project commissioned by the Central Weather Bureau of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, for example, the external gender expert provided several concrete suggestions on the project plan, and the person in charge ‘accepted’ these suggestions and stated as much in the last section of the checklist. However, my follow-up examination of the revised and submitted project proposal revealed that the proposal was not revised as promised in the checklist. The point is that, due to the lack of two-way interactions and subsequent communications, the gender experts would not know how their comments are interpreted and incorporated into the projects. As seen in a study by Chen and Wang (2011), the interviewed experts

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often have questions regarding whether their comments and suggestions just “sink to the bottom of the ocean”.

(In)appropriate external consultants It is a concern that the comments of external experts are not valued as they should be. However, another (if not greater) concern in this regard is that the comments of the experts themselves are the problem. Due to the limited number of gender experts that the government agencies are familiar with and the tight schedule for review, they consider themselves fortunate to find a gender expert or scholar who agrees to do it, let alone checking whether or not the expert is really familiar with the specific field of the project. For example, a women’s group was invited to review a reservoir development project because they cared about environmental quality. However, those who are familiar with environmental protection are not necessarily familiar with reservoir building. There is a huge gap among different sub-fields. The frontline bureaucrats often literally begged for help. The frequent result of such a dilemma is comments that are not to the point. As Chen and Wang (2011) pointed out, there is a concern that gender dogma will outweigh the actual needs due to the experts’ unfamiliarity with the professional field involved in an individual project or legislation. A gender expert is not necessarily familiar with issues of a specific field. But, on the other hand, an expert in that specific field may not be familiar with gender issues or may even have no idea what ‘gender impact assessment’ is. An expert is invited probably because she is a female working for a university or a member of a women’s group in a broad sense. This raises doubts about how they can play the role of external consultants when many of them have no idea what GIA really is. Some bureaucrats in charge of auditing pointed out that they sometimes saw a GIA checklist – of a project that should have gender implications – submitted with ‘no’ (no impact) as the answer to all indicators, which was still approved by the external expert. There were also some cases in which gender experts who had excellent qualifications provided very simplified and condensed comments, or comments around the general principles, due to a tight schedule. Such comments occur quite often, and have limited the contribution of GIA to the improvement of projects. In the GIA checklist of a medium-term project named ‘Professionals Training Project for Adaptation to Climate Change’, for example, the project planner ticked ‘no’ for all the questions in item 6, ‘Beneficiaries’, which meant that the project was not related to any gender issue and therefore could be exempted from item 7. The project planner provided a single sentence as the reason: “Climate change is an issue related to all humankind, not just men or women” – showing a lack of gender sensitivity. In fact, there have been many discussions about the relationship between climate change and gender, in particular with an emphasis on incorporating female professionals and female experiences in the design of comprehensive adaptation programmes. The project planner, however, was apparently not aware of these issues, and hence simply answered ‘no (relevance)’ in the checklist. Unfortunately the invited external expert, a professor of sociology, also provided only a one-sentence comment to the checklist: “It is necessary to pay attention to the roles women can play in climate change education as the project unfolds.” The planner then replied, at section 9, by repeating the comment: “Attention will be 87

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paid to the roles women can play in climate change education when the project unfolds.” In short, no revision of the project was demanded, nor was any performance measurement added after implementation. This means that no one would follow and monitor whether the general reminder from the external expert would be enforced. These kinds of ‘general’ comments and responses were also common in other cases, which seems to show that the external consultants were either not up to the task or not serious.

Lack of basic gender-related data For external experts or NGO representatives invited for consultation, the indistinct picture regarding gender is one major reason that they were not able to provide appropriate comments. The lack of basic gender-related data may be due to three reasons. One is simply that the government did not have any relevant study or survey to generate basic data; the other is that the project planners, who often were not familiar with gender issues, did not know what ‘relevant’ gender statistics or data should be provided. The last possible reason is that the planners were reluctant to find or prepare related information. The last two reasons were highly related to the bureaucrats’ attitudes and/or the external consultants’ advice as discussed above; hence it is the first reason that will be addressed in the following discussion. Although ‘gender statistics’ has been one of the six tools for gender mainstreaming since its initiation, the basic statistical data in many policy areas (particularly nontraditional gender areas) is not necessarily gender-disaggregated. The lack of basic data makes it difficult for the external reviewer to identify whether there are gender issues or problems at present, let alone what gender impact there will be after the new project is launched. Mrs. Y, who was in charge of gender mainstreaming monitoring, confessed: ‘The situation is that the gender statistics in Taiwan are still unable to follow the issue to that much detail. That is to say that we simply don’t have enough and useful data. On top of that, the persons in charge of various projects in fact have no idea of how to collect these data … To tell the truth, those who prepare the projects are not those who do the statistics and they don’t know where to find or collect the needed statistics.’

All too often statistics and empirical research data were found to be inadequate. We found that many of the external GIA comments were addressing the basic statistical data that should be collected in the future. As such, it is not surprising that those in charge usually replied “data will be acquired from relevant departments in the future”, but there was no specific measurement or guarantee for this promise being kept. In short, the generation and management of relevant, useful gender-disaggregated basic data is a crucial foundation for successful GIA. There should be a more standardised way to compile and publish existing studies and statistics for gender analysis. Moreover, if a lack of basic statistics on certain policy problems is discovered in an ongoing GIA, there should be an effective feedback and reporting system that allows the concerned departments or agencies to collect and generate the required statistics.

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Poor auditing and monitoring systems Appropriate auditing and monitoring is the key to ensuring that comments are put to good use. Even the suggestions for collecting statistical data mentioned above should be incorporated through auditing and monitoring to ensure that they are accounted for and tracked. An auditing and monitoring system is in place for GIA, as mentioned in the second section, and RDEC, NSC and CEPD are in charge of the auditing and monitoring of different types of projects. However, that does not necessarily mean that the auditing and monitoring system really works. Chen and Wang (2011) pointed out that a large proportion of the GIA checklists they collected were poorly filled out – for example, lacking gender statistics, lacking explanation of why the answer is ‘no’, missing information concerning the participatory procedure, and so on (Chen and Wang, 2011: 19). The point is that the auditing and monitoring system failed to highlight the missing information, indicating that the system does not work. Moreover, the auditing and monitoring processes among the three auditing agencies were not consistent. The Ministry of Economic Affairs performed only procedural reviews and the content of projects was not examined. RDEC did examine whether there were any gender implications according to the GIA, but the people performing the examination were not necessarily familiar with specific gender studies, and hence the monitoring was still superficial. The NSC had the auditing and monitoring outsourced and the procedure was more rigorous. Still, there was no telling whether the organisation that won the contract would be capable of getting the job done, and whether the monitoring and evaluation would go back into the original project, resulting in revision when necessary. The inconsistency of auditing and monitoring procedures indicates that the importance of auditing and monitoring is not emphasised as it should be. It is merely a routine job to be completed. In time, the project planners learned that as long as they submit the checklists with every procedural requirement fulfilled, the actual content did not really matter. This also explains why the frontline bureaucrats’ opposition to filling out GIA checklists decreased, as they could be easily dealt with just like other paperwork. The five problems mentioned above reflect the practical challenges for GIA as an effective tool for gendering policy analysis. To resolve these problems requires not only more resources and manpower, but also a change of organisational culture. Some steps could be taken to deal with these changes, such as emphasising mutual communication between external gender experts and the project planners; establishing a better gender statistics database with flexibility to request statistical data or a survey of upcoming needs; and to put more manpower into the existing monitoring and feedback systems, so as to improve the influence of GIA on new policies and programmes. From a critical perspective, however, the improvement of such a tool might be the wrong target, because the neoliberal governance ideology underlying these GM tools is the problem that condemns any reform effort to failure. The experience of GIA practice in Taiwan to some extent echoes such criticism, as elaborated below.

Pitfalls of institutionalised gender analysis Gender mainstreaming, along with the various tools developed to promote it, have been criticised by many feminists for their neoliberal or ‘New Public Management’ 89

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ideology, which attempts to assimilate transformative ideas via standardised management and evaluation in the policy-making process. Under this ideological framework, however, are pitfalls that should be kept in mind in the institutionalisation of gender analysis.

The pitfall of ‘technocratisation’ and expert domination Much literature about the experiences of gender mainstreaming indicates that the tendency toward ‘technocratisation’ is a major issue. In theory, the development of gender mainstreaming should be established through the structural and political analysis of gender inequality. But in order to embed gender analysis into the formal, bureaucratic procedure, many tools and mechanisms that are developed – including the GIA discussed in this chapter – become the actual targets for performance measurement. As Squires (2007: 68) said: ‘Gender mainstreaming is the combination of (potentially) radical gender concepts and mainstreaming techniques.’ Most countries lean obviously toward the tool-oriented mainstreaming techniques (Beveridge and Nott, 2002; Daly, 2005). Lombardo (2005), for example, found in examining the European Union experience that frontline bureaucrats often emphasise that gender mainstreaming is a technical rather than a political project. When gender analysis becomes ‘technical’ and ‘professional’, the process of implementation is easily dominated by ‘gender experts’ and bureaucrats. Beveridge and Nott (2002) called this the ‘expert-bureaucratic model’. A model like this does not change the traditional procedure of decision making by elites. It is dangerous not only because it deviates from the principle of participatory democracy, but also because it may easily ignore the diversity and singularity of women’s experiences. Beveridge and Nott hence proposed the ‘participatory-democratic model’ as a replacement. The advantage of this model is the establishment of a participatory mechanism that allows women’s groups outside of decision-making elites to express themselves. The external consulting procedure required in Taiwan’s GIA practice mainly follows the ‘expert-bureaucratic model’, as the ‘external experts’ are either women scholars or representatives of established women’s NGOs that hardly do local fieldwork. Even if in the cases where the external experts are qualified and familiar with the various situations of grassroots women, moreover, the core principle of the participatory democratic model – interactive communication and dialogue – was missing, because the GIA consultation was mainly via email and paperwork, as noted earlier. The range of participation is always limited, if not dominated by elites (Squires, 2007). Some gender experts with better personal networks with the governmental bureaucrats – most of them members of the Women’s Rights Committee who already have many opportunities to influence policy – were evidently those most consulted, whether or not they have expertise in the specific policy subfields. A similar tendency was termed by Woodward (2003) the ‘velvet triangle’ phenomenon to describe that the state (feminist bureaucrats or legislators), gender experts and major women’s groups dominated the agendas of the EU’s gender mainstreaming initiatives. She pointed out that the same cross-border groups of experts, scholars, feminists and bureaucrats played the dominating roles in the United Nations, the EU and their own countries. They can achieve significant influence through supporting one another. The problem is that the communication and dialogue necessary for gender analysis occurs only within this homogenous triangle, lacking 90

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participation of grassroots groups. This has resulted in gender mainstreaming facing accusations of being exclusive. In light of the above, Squires (2007) proposed a model of deliberative democracy to make up for the weakness of the ‘participatory’ model. The deliberative model she referred to is that more groups and general citizens should have the chance to participate in the establishment and discussion of the gender mainstreaming agenda, rather than government bodies seeking consultation from fixed groups or experts. Doing so not only widens the participatory basis of gender mainstreaming, but also avoids the pitfalls of ‘technocratisation’ and expert domination mentioned above, because the goals and definitions of ‘gender equality’ will be challenged and deliberated through the participation of multiple actors (Walby, 2005; Verloo, 2005). In reality, however, the cost and preparation needed for solid and widespread deliberation and communication practices may deter the neoliberal state, which might see them as ‘ineffective’ or ‘too challenging’.

The pitfall of depoliticisation and integration Another obvious pitfall of GIA is its depoliticising nature, namely the lack of discussion and debate on the gender implications and goals of different policies and programmes, focusing only on the operation and implementation of established goals or procedures. As Bacchi and Eveline (2003) pointed out, many gender mainstreaming tools are ex post assessment of policy plans that have been proposed or are in progress, rather than ex ante analysis of the establishment of policy goals and contents. The GIA discussed here is an ex post tool that is used only to examine whether there is any gender impact in the government’s newly formed plans, policies or legislation. Even if there is a problem, adjustments are made mostly to wording or style but rarely to the project itself or the distribution of the budget. This tendency has made gender analysis nothing more than an add-on, coordinating approach to reform, instead of the agenda-setting approach that many feminists expected (Jahan, 1995; Lombardo, 2005). The depoliticising nature of gender analysis also implies a tendency to bypass controversial gender issues. For example, the legalisation of prostitution has been an issue simmering in Taiwan for a very long time, and certainly it is an important issue for gender/sexuality equality. However, the state has been ‘inactive’ on this issue and chooses only to focus on issues that are more ‘legitimate’ and less controversial, such as the prevention of human trafficking. Prostitution per se has never been dealt with in any medium- or long-term programme, and hence no GIA would have been performed on it. In the standardised procedures of GIA, gender perspectives are assumed to be ‘generated by gender experts and gender statistics naturally rather than confirmed through a democratic participation process’ (Squires, 2007: 70). The experience of Taiwan in the implementation of GIA tells us that what the frontline bureaucrats care about is whether they have fulfilled the SOP rather than whether any substantial result of gender equality is produced. Or even worse, they can just ‘outsource’ the GIA with the project as a package and have someone else do the assessment. They do not think they need to learn from the beginning. This defeats the goal that gender mainstreaming is performed to transform the frontline bureaucrats and the policies they make. 91

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The pitfall of co-optation by the neoliberal state The problems found in the GIA practices as discussed in this study are not unique to Taiwan. Many feminist researchers around the world have pointed out that the limited impact of gender mainstreaming is unsurprising in an era of neoliberal governance. A neoliberal government is market and management oriented, stressing efficiency and benefits and relying on quantified numbers for performance management. As such, many feminists believe the gender analysis ‘will have only a very limited impact … and may add the veneer of legitimacy to measures that do not contribute to women’s well-being’ (Burt and Hardman, cited in Teghtsoonian, 2004: 268). In addition to the limited progress that GIA has been able to make, a more serious consequence is that the feminists (experts or NGO representatives) involved in GIA practices might risk being co-opted by the neoliberal bureaucracy. After studying many countries’ experiences in the EU, for example, Edquist (2006) argued that the ‘collaborative governance’ model embodied in gender mainstreaming, which emphasises partnership and cooperation between the public and NGO actors, will weaken the resistance of feminists and force them to seek out interpersonal solutions or mutual consent to address issues of structural conflict. In other words, after becoming the government’s ‘partners’, feminists tend to be more sympathetic and understanding toward the bureaucrats’ ‘dilemmas’ or ‘difficulties’, which then results in more compromises and trade-offs that undermine the original transformative intention. This kind of compromise was shown in the ‘tolerance’ and ‘understanding’ of many Taiwanese feminist activists regarding the reduced scope of the national gender machinery. Neoliberalism is surely the ideology underlying the governmental reforms in Taiwan, as reflected in its emphasis on and efforts towards organisational downsizing, corporatist management, outsourcing, and so on. As a result, although the central government agreed to establish a first ‘national gender machinery’ at the top administrative level, since it was an unavoidable international trend, eventually it only established a ‘Department of Gender Equality’ affiliated to the Cabinet Office, rather than an independent, ministry-level institution like a ‘Ministry of Gender Equality’. The point is that many feminists who had built a kind of partnership with the government in the process of co-promoting gender mainstreaming initiatives (including GIA) did not oppose this reduced scope, even if not directly endorsing it. In comparison, feminists who did not frequently cooperate with the government continued to criticise the level and scope of the Department of Gender Equality. However, since the opinions among feminists were split, the government had sufficient legitimacy to proceed with the reduced plan. Another significant indicator of this co-optation effect upon feminists is the latter’s ‘tolerance’ of or sympathy to the formalistic implementation of GIA. Indeed, although the problems with GIA that are addressed in this chapter are common and evident, there was little reflection or criticism from the gender experts or NGOs that were often invited to act as external consultants. On the contrary, some of them became so familiar with the ‘checklist’ approach that they even endorsed the development of more checklists for monitoring performance and progress in other GM initiatives. They spent time and energy on the trivial and time-consuming paperwork of GIA, providing only rhetoric or common-sense suggestions that did not usually change policies or programmes in any significant way. This is something that those feminist

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activists who were not so involved in the GM have begun to highlight for more attention and discussion.

Conclusion British scholar Judith Squires (2007) argues that women’s movements around the world have taken an obvious lead over other types of egalitarian movements in the last three decades, and had significant influence on the system. With the full-scale initiation of gender mainstreaming engineering in the central government of Taiwan, including the implementation of GIA, it is safe to say that Squires’ observation is also valid in Taiwan. However, the formalistic initiatives and participatory mechanisms did not necessarily bring about substantial changes and transformation. This chapter has elaborated the many problems and challenges that exist in the current GIA practice in Taiwan. Feminists’ attempts to participate and collaborate with the state in gendering policy analysis have so far been limited to paperwork and formal procedures. What is worse, the ‘partnership’ and ‘relationship’ built during the collaborating process has seemingly made many reformers less critical and more willing to compromise. In this sense, even if the abovementioned five problems in the current GIA practice were solved – although that is not likely given that the neoliberal governance framework always produces formalistic performance –participants in collaboration with the regime should always be aware of the pitfalls of technocratisation, depoliticisation and co-optation. By revealing these problems and pitfalls, however, this study does not intend to discredit all the cooperative and participatory reform initiatives within the state. As Edquist (2006) argues, feminists should realise that many so-called ‘participatory’ governance tools have their limitations even while they provide more resources and channels for social movements. Yet this limitation can be overcome when social activists have the ability to use these tools yet at the same time maintain their autonomy to challenge the project goals. In other words, a strong civil society is needed to press for and monitor the reforms within the state, and to balance the problem of some participants being integrated into or co-opted by the neoliberal state. It is the critical and diverse grassroots insights from oppositional women’s movements that restore and sustain the transformative intention of gender policy analysis.

Notes The Women’s Rights Committee in Taiwan was established in 1997. It is a central-level consultative committee chaired by the Premier of the Executive Yuan, and consists of one-third women’s NGOs representatives, one-third gender experts and scholars, and one-third government ministers. 1

The Foundation of Women’s Rights Promotion and Development (FWRPD) is a government-funded foundation established in 1998. The supervisors and board directors are elected from among the members of the Women’s Rights Committee, Executive Yuan. Half of the board directors and supervisors are government representatives and the other half are civilian representatives. The Foundation serves as an intermediary between civilian women’s groups and the government, as well as an information exchange centre for gender-related policies. 2

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References Bacchi, Carol, and Eveline, Joan, 2003. Mainstreaming and Neoliberalism: A Contested Relationship. Policy and Society, 22(2), 98–118. Beveridge, Fiona, and Nott, Sue, 2002. Mainstreaming: A Case for Optimism and Cynicism. Feminist Legal Studies, 10(2), 299–311. Chen, Jin-Yen, and Wang, Hsiao-Tan, 2011. Reflections and Evaluation on the Implementation of Gender Impact Assessment. Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. Daly, Mary, 2005. Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and Practice. Social Politics, 12(3), 433–450. Edquist, Kristin, 2006. EU Social-Policy Governance: Advocating Activism or Servicing States. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(4), 500–518. Jahan, Rounaq, 1995. The Elusive Agenda: Mainstreaming Women in Development. London: Zed Books. Lombardo, Emanuela, 2005. Integrating or Setting the Agenda? Gender Mainstreaming in the European Constitution-Making Process. Social Politics, 12(3), 412–432. Squires, Judith, 2007. The New Politics of Gender Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Taylor, Viviene, 1999. Gender Mainstreaming in Development Planning. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Teghtsoonian, Katherine, 2004. Neoliberalism and Gender Analysis Mainstreaming in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Australian Journal of Political Science, 39(2), 267–284. Tiessen, Rebecca, 2007. Everywhere/Nowhere: Gender Mainstreaming in Development Agencies. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Verloo, Mieke, 2005. Displacement and Empowerment: Reflections on the Concept and Practice of the Council of Europe Approach to Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality. Social Politics, 12(3), 344–365. Verloo, Mieke, and Roggeband, Connie, 1996. Gender Impact Assessment: The Development of a New Instrument in the Netherlands. Impact Assessment, 14, 3–20. Walby, Sylvia, 2005. Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practices. Social Politics, 12(3), 321–343. Woodward, Alison. 2003. Building Velvet Triangles: Gender and Informal Governance. In Christiansen Thomas and Simona Piattoni (eds.), Informal Governance in the European Union (pp. 76–93). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

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SEVEN

The power of influencing policies, or getting their share and more: interest groups in Taiwan Wilbur Bing-Yan Lu

Introduction Interest groups are viewed variously in many different political cultures and policy environments, influenced by different historical traditions of thought and practice. The Americans talk mainly of ‘interest groups’, lobbying, and single-issue groups, whereas the British use the term ‘pressure groups’. The word ‘pressure’ has an unfortunate connotation in that ‘many groups operate without resorting to any degree of coercion’ (Watts, 2008: 257). They thus go by various names: interest groups, special interests, organised interests, lobby groups, political groups, and public interest groups. Their purpose is basically much the same: to influence government policies and actions. Truman (1951: 33) defines such organised interests as ‘any groups that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, make certain claims upon other groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by shared attitudes’. While a simple definition may serve as an introduction, many groups are highly organised, with formal constitutions, containing clearly stated aims and objectives, rules and procedures, including the election of officers and the management of resources (Leach et al, 2006: 131). In the British context, pressure groups have been defined as ‘an association of individuals joined together by a common interest, belief, activity or purpose that seeks to achieve its objectives, further its interests and enhance its status in relation to other groups, by gaining the approval and co-operation of authority in the form of favourable policies, legislation and conditions’ (Shipley, 1976: 3). Political scientists now consider pressure groups or interest groups ‘a normal and vital part of the political process, conveyors of the demands and supports fed into the political system’ (Cummings and Wise, 2005: 202–203). In Dye’s opinion (2005: 283), the interest-group system is organised to represent economic, professional, ideological, religious, racial, gender, and issue constituencies. But to British academics, the expression ‘pressure group’ is a comprehensive term which subsumes both sectional interest groups and more widely based attitudinal cause groups (Forman and Baldwin, 2007: 127). While interest groups are concerned to defend or advance the interests of their members (Leach et al, 2006: 133–135), cause groups are based on shared attitudes or values. In this chapter, there is a considerable overlap between the two types of pressure groups and interest groups. The author regards ‘pressure groups’ as a broader term for any groups in society, through political or other actions, seeking to achieve 95

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desirable or undesirable changes, and ‘interest groups’ referring to those whose basis of association is economic or social interests. Although many groups operate without resorting to any degree of coercion and try to influence public policies (Watts, 2008: 257–258), in the real world most groups represent some interests that are concerned to promote themselves to those who make policy. The author thus views politics as a struggle among interest groups over government policies. Before the transition to modern democracy from the 1990s, Taiwan had experienced 40 years of authoritarian rule. There had been three stages of political party development since the Nationalist Chinese takeover in 1945 (Schafferer, 2008: 1): (1) limited pluralist authoritarian party system (1946–1986); (2) pluralist party system with one dominant party (1986–2000); and (3) polarised pluralist party system. As is generally recognised, the democratisation since 1987 (the lifting of martial law) has been of the nature of a ‘peaceful revolution’ (Cheng, 2001: 120–121). There were many anxieties and concerns over Taiwan’s economic situation. Beginning from the 1980s, ‘the cry in Taiwan for liberalisation was loud and clear’ (Chu, 2001: 92), including the liberalisation of foreign exchange, liberalising the formation of new banks, and privatisation of public enterprises. Although Taiwan’s economic growth over the past decades had been powered by a well-educated and highly motivated workforce, the structural composition of labour has changed since the 1980s. The 1984 Labour Standard Act defines the legal framework of labour rights that delineates the rights and obligations of workers and employers, the minimum requirements for labour contracts, provisions on wages and work hours, and employment of women and children (GIO, 1998: 338). In the past decades, the face of interest group politics in Taiwan has been changing as quickly as laws and citizen participation allow. Although these groups vary tremendously in goals, targets, size, budget, and scope of interests, they often employ the same techniques to accomplish their objectives. In fact, one of the most powerful technique is lobbying – communication with legislators or other government officials in order to influence their decisions. Lobbying is just one form of interest group politics, yet one that ‘often gives a bad name to interest groups’ (O’Connor and Sabato, 2008: 582). While political parties seek broad support to win elections, interest groups do it outside the electoral process and are not responsible to the public (Roskin et al, 2012: 178). The term ‘lobbying’ thus arose from the practice of waiting in the lobbies of legislative chambers to meet and persuade legislators (Dye, 2005: 299–300). In Taiwan, interest groups have sought to influence public policy making in three ways since the 1990s (Chang, 2000; Liu, 2009: 208). First, they engage actively in various kinds of campaign activities. Second, they promote their beliefs through mass media or paid advisements. And third, to make or amend policy favourable to their interests, they lobby executive departments, legislatures, political parties, and public opinion. During the period of authoritarian rule from the late 1950s to the 1990s, most organised interests were partially or wholly excluded from the policymaking process. However, since the democratic consolidation of the late 1990s, as organised interests remain a key component of the political process in Taiwan, some major acts and statutes have been enacted and revised, including the Lobbying Act of 2007, Political Donations Act of 2004, and the 2011 amendment to the Civil Associations Act of 1992.

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Background and regulating interest groups The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and its Nationalist government relocated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. From 1949 to 1988, the Taiwanese people experienced the authoritarian rule of two political strongmen, Chiang KaiShek and Chiang Ching-Kuo. In the 1970s there was increasing political dissent in Taiwan, and the mobilisation of social movements in the 1980s loosened the grip of the authoritarian state on civil society. Those movements culminated in the official formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the first opposition party on September 1986, with the Martial Law of 1948 still in effect. In 1987, President Chiang Ching-Kuo ended the nearly four decades of martial law, relaxed government controls on the political rights of citizens, and took dramatic steps to improve respect for human rights and create a democratic political system, including ending almost all restrictions on the mass media. As active participation in party politics has continued since the 1990s, the involvement of interest groups, which has burgeoned in the past three decades, injects considerable vitality into contemporary Taiwanese politics. The ROC Constitution is based on the Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Well-being formulated by Dr Sun Yat-Sen, the founding father of the Republic of China. In addition to directives for formulating legislation and procedures addressing important government, economic, and social issues, Article 14 of the Constitution states some basic citizen rights, such as the freedom of residence and of change of residence, freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication, freedom of privacy of correspondence, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of assembly and association (Articles 10–14). Lobbyists in Taiwan share a common goal, to influence the making and enforcing of laws, and yet use various tactics to achieve their different goals. In addition to general norms of the Constitution, organising and operation of interest groups are regulated by some revisions of major statutes, including the Lobbying Act of 2007, the Political Donations Act of 2004, and the 2011 amendment to the Civil Associations Act of 1992. Public concerns over lobbying abuses led Taiwan’s national legislature, beginning in the early twenty-first century, to impose legal controls on interest groups. In July 2007, in order to create a system for scrutinising lobbying, Taiwan’s Lobbying Act was passed by its national legislature (Shih, 2007). Other than the USA and Canada, the Republic of China on Taiwan is the third country in the world that has enacted such legislation to regulate lobbying. According to the section on Laws and Regulations of the Ministry of Interior’s official website, the Act defines lobbying as any oral or written communication to legislative or executive branch officials regarding the formulation, modification or annulment of policies or legislation. According to its regulations, issues relating to national defence, diplomacy or Chinese affairs where national security or secrets are involved fall outside the scope of the definition. Officials covered by the Act include the President, Vice President, and high-ranking officials in central and local governments, and officials must reject the lobbyists if they fail to register with the office first. Under the Act, lobbyists are required to register their lobbying activities and officials, in return, must report their communications with lobbyists within seven days. Moreover, missions stationed in Taiwan on behalf of their governments or other intergovernmental organisations are exempted from the Act.

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Another important statute regulating lobbying is the Political Donations Act, which is enacted to normalise and manage political donations, promote the political participation of the citizens, and ensure the fairness and justness of political activities. The given definition of political donation refers to fixed or liquid assets, payment by unequal exchange of goods, exemption of debts, or other economic benefits provided to the individuals or associations engaged in campaigning or other politics-related activities. However, it does not include political party membership dues, association membership dues, or volunteer services. In the Political Donations Act, political associations refers to political associations established with the permission of the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Associations Act. In May 2011, a legislative committee approved an amendment that negates a ban on people advocating communism or the idea of splitting the national territory (Taipei Times, 2011). Before the amendment, groups that wanted to spread communist ideology or the idea of splitting the country could be denied a permit to operate. Two provisions in the Civil Associations Act that made it illegal to promote communism and ‘divide the nation’ were cancelled by the national legislature in that the Council of Grand Justices announced that those two articles were unconstitutional. The act’s article on the limitation of organisation and activities states that ‘organisation and activities of civil associations may not advocate communism or claim abruption of the country’. Another article regarding illegal establishment states: ‘An application for establishment of a civil association that violates the provision of Article 2 [the previous one] or other laws shall be rejected; if the establishment is permitted, such permit shall be abolished.’

Types of interest groups in Taiwan Interest groups differ considerably in their internal operations (Watts, 2008: 256), some being democratically structured, others led by a powerful elite. The origins of Taiwan’s interest groups could be explained by the following factors: protecting economic interests, seeking government benefits, responding to government regulations, and advancing social movements. There are hundreds of thousands of organised interests and non-profit organisations in Taiwan, many of which are very influential in their highly specialised fields. Some of them are large, others are small; some of them operate at a national level, others do so locally; some of them have popular appeal, others cater for minority needs. According to Coxall et al (2003: 137) and Jones et al (2007: 251), while sectional (or interest) groups are based on the performance of an economic function, cause (promotional) groups are based on shared attitudes or values. In Taiwan, trade and professional associations and business and occupational groups are the most common type, but unions, public interest groups, environmental protection groups, aboriginal groups, agricultural groups, consumer protection groups, religious and civil rights organisations, women’s groups, and single-issue groups recognise that they need to be ‘where the action is’ (Dye, 2005: 287). Examining their breadth and complexities may help us understand Taiwanese interest politics. When looking at interest groups in Taiwan, it is necessary to make a preliminary classification of groups. One simple distinction might be made about the level at which groups operate. Some are purely local, whereas others are national. Some national groups might have local branches, including the Republic of China 98

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National Federation of Teachers’ Unions, the National Training Institute for Farmers’ Organisations, the National Federation of Chinese Medicine Practitioners Association, the National Association for Real Estate Attorneys, and the National Taiwan University Alumni Association. Local examples include the Taipei City Zoological Foundation, the Kaohsiung City Digital Economy Development Association, the Ping-Tung Lifeline Association, the Keelung City Kids’ Story-Telling Association, and the Taichung City Universal Animal Protection Association. Traditionally, economic associations and large inclusive organisations, such as the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China, the Chinese National Federation of Industries, the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, and Taiwan Securities Association, have dominated interest group politics in Taiwan. To monitor closely the interests of their specialised memberships, specific business interests are also represented by many trade associations. Among the most powerful associations are the Importers and Exporters Association of Taipei City, the Taipei Computer Association, the ROC Bankers Association, the Taipei Pharmaceutical Agents and Distributors Association, the Taiwan Footwear Industry Association, the Securities Investment Trust & Consulting Associations of the ROC, the Taiwan International Logistics and Supply Chain Association, and the Taiwan Exhibition and Convention Association. Some professional associations rival business and trade organisations in lobbying influence – for example, The Taiwan Medical Association, the Taiwan Bar Association, the National Association of ROC Architects, and the National Association of Taiwan Chartered and Certified Accountants. Since Taiwan’s National Health Services (NHS) was initiated in July 1995 by the National Health Insurance Act of 1994, the National Federation of Chinese Medicine Practitioners Association, the Taiwan Dental Association, and the National Union of Nurses’ Association ROC and other related specialised groups have successfully resisted to efforts to budget distribution reforms of the Taiwan’s Second-Generation NHS Policy. Over the past several decades in Taiwan, organised labour associations have increased their membership and expanded their political influence. Labour unions, especially for the Chinese Federation of Labour and others, remain a major political influence in the national legislature. The development has occurred primarily as a result of changes in the economy: rapid growth of manufacturing, professional, managerial, financial, technical, sales, and service industry employment, where unions are much stronger than the era of authoritarian rule before the 1980s. Since the 1990s, with the growing membership, union influence is greater among government employees, including the ROC Veteran Association, the ROC National Civil Servant Association, and the ROC National Federation of Teachers’ Unions. Another approach distinguishes sectional (or interest) groups, as mentioned earlier, and cause (or promotional) groups. Cause groups come into existence to achieve objectives based on shared attitudes or beliefs (Forman and Baldwin, 2007: 129–130) and the aim is generally to advance other interests (the environment, children, animals) or the public welfare as perceived by its members. Rather than common economic interests, for example, there are groups dedicated to the cause of environmental protection, aboriginal rights and welfare, social protection, or social welfare. Some public interest groups claim to represent broad classes of people – consumers or the public as a whole – such as the Planned Parenthood Association of Taiwan, HelpSave-A-Pet Fund Taipei, the Consumers’ Foundation (Chinese Taipei), the TSMC 99

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Education and Culture Foundation, the Yang Ming Line Cultural Foundation, and the Taipei Fu-Bon Public Interest Foundation. Other groups with lofty sounding names, such as the Taiwan Association for Copyright Protection, the Women Awakening Foundation of the ROC, the Cross-Strait Legal Exchange Association, the Catholic Shepherd Social Welfare Foundation, the Chinese Christian Relief Association, the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, and the Justice Ministry for Victim Protection Association, perceive themselves as balancing narrow and other special interests. As the civic society has arisen since the late 1980s, the Taiwanese people gradually prefer to invest energy in groups, such as cause, protective, and single-issue groups, rather than in political parties. In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the number and appeal of those concerned with single issues in Taiwan. There is a wide range of cause groups which campaign on what have been called ‘moral’ causes, such as social inclusion and those arguing for or against smoking, for or against casinos and the gaming industry, and for or against construction of the Su-Hwa Highway in east Taiwan and the establishment of a petroleum refinery in central Taiwan. Examples include the Financial Group Legal Person of John Tung Foundation (against smoking), the Hualien Dream League (against construction of the Su-Hwa Highway), the Fair Tax Reform League (against tax rises), the Taiwan Rainbow Aboriginal Caring Foundation (welfare for aborigines), and other legally established social groups – the Da-Han River Ecological Protection Association, the Women’s Warm Life Foundation, the ROC Disability-Free Environment Promotional Association, the Association of Outstanding Farmers of the ROC, and the ROC Welfare Organisation for the Elderly. These groups generally lobby for greater government regulation of consumer interests, public safety, environmental protection, and so on. And as their names imply, some of them are single-issue groups concentrating their attention on a single cause and thus they have little incentive to compromise on their specific positions. For example, in September 2009, activists of the Anti-Casino Alliance led residents of the offshore Penghu County to win a local referendum on the proposition “Should Peng-Hu set up an international tourism zone accompanied by a casino?”, which was supported by the central government and Peng-Hu County Government, by a total of 17,359 ballots, or 56.44% of the total valid votes (China Post, 2009). In another local referendum in July 2012, however, residents of Lien-Chiang County approved a casino zone at Ma-Tsu by a wide margin, 57% to 43% (Jennings, 2012). Although the tiny island now largely depends on fishing, a military base, and a trickle of tourism, the Lien-Chiang County Government, which governs Ma-Tsu, proposed the casino resort area to boost local economic development. Following Peng-Hu, Ma-Tsu is the second outlying island to hold a referendum on the casino industry policy issue. A leading candidate for the resort development is a company led by former Sands Corporation president William Weidner, and Weidner Resorts has promised to construct an international airport and college town there, as well as a causeway linking Bei-Gan (north) island to the neighbouring island of NanGan (south), with a medium-sized casino resort and a suite of public infrastructure costing up to US$2 billion. Even so, through Facebook and other websites, several cause groups and activists, including the Alliance of Anti-Gambling Legalisation and the ROC Community Empowering Society, have maintained their position against any gambling industry in Taiwan. Gambling is illegal in Taiwan but an amendment 100

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passed in 2009 permitted casino resorts to be built on offshore islands (Master, 2012). The government, nevertheless, cannot issue a licence until a proposed Gaming Act is passed. The draft act, which borrows heavily from Singapore’s Integrated Resort model, was submitted to the cabinet at the end of 2012, before being sent to parliament for approval (Lee, 2012).

What they do and how they do it Interest groups become politically active when their members believe government policies threaten or affect their group goals. That is why some groups put their lobbying at the top of their agendas. According to Dye (2005: 299), any activity directed at a government decision maker with the hope of influencing decisions is a form of lobbying. Who do interest groups in Taiwan seek to influence? Clearly it may depend on potential targets – the Executive Yuan (including government ministers and civil servants), the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s parliament), political parties, and wider public opinion mainly through the mass media. Although these groups have strong motives to seek to influence government, a change in taxation policy, such as the Finance Ministry’s proposal of capital gains tax on stock transactions in 2012 or the Education Ministry’s 12-Year Compulsory Education policy initiated from August 2014, inevitably involves influencing public opinion, the Legislative Yuan, and political parties by raising public awareness of the issue through various means, such as submitting petitions to the core executive branch, introducing amendments to legislation, and winning over the local ‘quality’ daily press and weeklies (including the Taiwanese Commercial Times, Economic Daily News, Taiwanese Business Weekly, and Common-Wealth Magazine). Such professional media outlets may be more influential than interest group members or audience figures may suggest. By lifting the Emergency Decree, which had been the legal basis for the enforcement of martial law (Government Information Office, 1998: 73), and allowing more individual freedoms, including the establishment of newspaper agencies and political parties in 1987, the central government led the Taiwanese people to an insistent demand for economic and political liberalisation along with economic prosperity and widespread education that had been present since the 1960s. In an era of the mass media, the Taiwanese live with a mass media that is characterised by the widespread use and abuse of the various channels of communications for a broad range of political and other purposes. Successive waves of new media technologies, especially the constant political commentary talk shows from cable TV channels, and the twenty-first-century trend for TV viewers’ call-ins, have washed over the Taiwanese public and politics. These cable TV programmes turn news commentators, academics, legislators, and government ministers into celebrities and policy issues are framed ‘in terms of competing visualisations rather than by alternative verbal descriptions’ (Biggs and Helms, 2007: 86), whereas the prevalence of call-in political talk shows create a ‘can’t see the forest for the trees’ information bias (Bennett, 2001: 35). In the end, for interest groups and even political parties, effective communication of messages and potentially powerful persuasion, which call for policy issue selection, simplification, and graphic illustrations in the press and other media, may make the difference between winning and losing in many cases. 101

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In addition to mass media, organised interests continuously lobby the Legislative Yuan’s committees (Lu, 2009: 142–149), where expertise resides, where policies incubate, where most legislative proposals are written or refined, where necessary compromises are made, where the public can make its views known, and where law makers build influence and reputations. In the case of the controversial 2012 statute revision to the Act of Governing Food Sanitation of 1975, the battlefield of the US beef imports conflict is not just in the Legislative Yuan between the ruling party and the opposition parties, but also extends to a test of the relationship between the government and its citizens (United Daily News Editorial, 2012), and the ruling party and its influential members. The local beef manufacture associations and related industry stakeholders lobby legislators, in both the ruling and opposition parties, and try to develop issue advocacy coalitions. Moreover, in order to increase their power, they seek to build coalitions with city mayors and county magistrates of the ruling party, although this kind of coalition usually forms temporarily around a single piece of legislation in a major effort to prevent its passage. In another case, of the 12-Year Compulsory Education policy, which was implemented in August 2014, lobbying government ministers increased in importance and frequency following the second regime turnover in 2008. Interest groups, such as the National Association of Parents Organizations, the ROC National Federation of Teachers’ Unions, the National Teachers’ Association ROC, and the Secondary and Elementary School Principals Association of ROC, play a pivotal role by monitoring the policy implementation of the Education Ministry’s policy and working closely with the administration to influence decision making at the formulation and implementation stages of the policy. These groups target different levels of the executive branch because there are many potential decision points, including the President, the Premier, and staff of the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan. Some groups research the pros or cons of a particular issue that government ministers might not have the opportunity, time, or interest to gather on their own. However, the effectiveness depends on their ability to provide important information and a sense of where the public stands on this policy issue. Although think tanks as nominally independent policy voices can lend credence to the policy positions of politicians and policy makers (Biggs and Helms, 2007: 81), except for some economic think tanks such as the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, the Taiwan Institute for Economic Research, and the Bao-Hua Macroeconomic Research Institute, many policy think tanks in Taiwan cloak partisan beliefs in the mantle of scientific expertise. While several think tanks, including the ruling party’s National Policy Foundation, the pro-opposition party’s Taiwan Thinktank and Taiwan Brain Trust, and the Evergreen Marine Group’s Institute of National Policy and Research, have multiple opportunities to shape public opinion and public policy, most citizens find it difficult to gauge their competing claims and weigh their contributions to public discourse. An occasional though highly visible tactic used by some interest groups is protest activity (O’Connor and Sabato, 2008: 602–604). Whenever necessary, other than attending the political talk shows and criticising government policies or proposals, they occasionally employ demonstrations and protests to attract media attention and apply pressure on government officials. These groups engage in protests and demonstrations to lobby public opinion or government ministers and their goals are to persuade ordinary voters to serve as their advocates. 102

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For example, in the past several decades, anti-nuclear alliances and activists, including the Green Party Taiwan, the Kin-Shan Nuclear Monitoring Committee, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance, the Taiwan Radiation Security Promotion Association, the Society of Wilderness, the Wild at Heart Legal Defence Association, the Taiwan Environmental Information Centre, and many others, have tried to block the operation of Taiwan’s Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, which is administered by the cabinet-level Atomic Energy Council and was expected to start full operations at the end of 2011 (Lin and Hsu, 2010). Other than regularly inspiring their members to engage in grassroots activities, these organised groups seek the political support of the largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and spend considerable time and effort keeping informed of bill amendments and policy implementation affecting the public. At the end of 2014, the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant is still a politically controversial hot issue. In June 2011, the DPP presidential candidate signalled her clear anti-nuclear belief by pledging to make Taiwan nuclear-free by 2025 (Philippens, 2011). After Japan’s Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in March 2011, with the help of these groups, the DPP mobilised the press, providing news, articles, analyses, and statistics to the media and journalists, and organised Taiwan’s largest anti-nuclear demonstration and protest on 30 April 2011. The protest march by a million people ended peacefully, with a chant of “No to Nuclear Plant Number Four. Tear Down Nuclear Plants Number One, Two, and Three. Zero Fears of Nuclear Disaster” (China Times Editorial, 2011). These chants were of course a response to the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, the earthquake, the tsunami, and the radiation leaks.

Economic development and industrial relations since the 1980s When explaining the state and society of the ‘Taiwan Miracle’ from 1950 to 1984, Gold (1986) suggests three major periods as follows: the period of Rehabilitation and Import-Substitution Industrialisation (1950–1959), the period of Export Orientation and Political Quiet (1960–1973), and the period of Industrial Upgrading and Emergence of a Political Opposition (1973–1984). Two decades later, Berger and Lester (2005: 3–4) regard Taiwan’s rise as an example for developing countries of the possibilities of moving from authoritarian to democratic rule at the same time as a society pursues rapid economic growth. Taiwan’s social change and the role of interest groups in the political process are closely bound up with the distribution of power and the spread of democracy. Social movements arise from the effects that socioeconomic development has on prominent social divisions and marked inequalities in group resources and influence, including anti-capitalist protests and direct actions against transnational corporations, and some of the interests sense that they are outside the political mainstream under a KMT government. Major legislation includes the Social Order and Maintenance Act of 1991 and the 2010 amendment to the Labour Union Act of 1929. The causes of protest of the former include environmentalism, anti-consumerism, and the promotion of human rights, whereas the latter ranges from those who feel their interests are excluded since Taiwan became the 144th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 2002 and the preferential trade agreement (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ECFA) since 2008, which aims to reduce tariffs and commercial barriers between the Republic of China on Taiwan 103

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and the People’s Republic of China on Mainland China. Thus to trace the origin of business–government relations in Taiwan, the politico-economic and macropolicy environment has to be introduced. The economic liberalisation, political democratisation, and social diversification that have developed since the 1980s, as indicated by Wang and Mai (2001: 242–243), has been a direct result of a combination of government planning and private sector collaboration. By the early 1980s, the era of low-cost labour gradually faded away, Taiwan’s labour-intensive industries had already lost their competitive advantage, with the appreciating currencies of the ‘Asian Four Little Dragons’. Economic development nurtured the democratic movement, providing a catalyst for democratic transition (Cheng, 2001: 126). While the KMT government continues to implement its policies of liberalisation, internationalisation and privatisation, unionised workers and the largest opposition party, the DPP, launched several significant protests and strikes over privatisation. The DPP politicians argue that increases in public spending and taxation have been pushed by an alliance of unions of public sector servants, workers in state-owned enterprise, and dependent client groups with vested interests in higher spending, which is against the interests of the broader mass of voters and taxpayers. When mentioning the environmental movement’s reciprocal interaction and impact on the central government’s policy development, Hsiao (2001: 184–188) emphasised that the protests and demonstrations in the 1980s and 1990s can be divided into three categories: the localised anti-pollution protest movements in the 1980s and 1990s; ecological preservation movements in the 1990s, which ‘did not restrict itself to peaceful lobbying’ (Hsiao, 2001: 186); and the politicised antinuclear power movement since the late 1990s. Facing political, economic, and social challenges since the late 1980s, following the first world oil crisis in 1973, the Taiwan government established the Hsin-Chu Science-Based Industrial Park and the Industrial Technology Research Institute, with the support of the Statute for Upgrading Industries of 1991 (Mai and Peng, 1999). The Statute, however, was abolished in 2009 and was replaced by the Statute for Industry Innovation in 2010. The Nomura Research Institute (1995), one of the most prestigious Japanese think tanks, viewed the Taiwan government’s support policy, active entrepreneurship, the presence of resourceful manpower, and the high level of labour mobility as being the key factors which have enabled Taiwan’s high-tech industry to grow rapidly since the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the forces of global trade and investment have been hard on labour unions since the mid-1970s and they are often faced with the prospect of reducing wages and benefits or losing jobs to non-union workers at home and abroad (Jillson, 2008: 132). Business-friendly legislation favoured by economic associations creates an imperative for the business–government relationship. Sizeable business organisations and confederations ‘seek to co-ordinate activity and speak on behalf of all of them’ (Watts, 2008: 260–261). These self-interested bodies make their own regular and usually confidential representations to government, especially as the Taiwanese government faces years of sluggish economic growth following the 2008 global financial crisis. They bring resources to bear in pursuit of their goals and some of them have several hundred thousand members. Others, like the Taiwan Bar Association, have fewer members, but ‘the members they have are wealthy and have professional expertise upon which the government must draw’ (Jillson, 2008: 133–134).

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After the DPP won the presidential election in 2000 and 2004, the DPP politicians tried to transform industrial relations and foster independent trade unionism (Chen, 2010; Chen et al, 2003). During its eight-year rule, the DPP government aimed at mitigating workplace tensions, amending labour legislation and reinforcing the mechanisms for non-union worker representation, and legitimising the autonomous unions. When the KMT won the presidential campaign in 2008, the government tended to centralise and control the trade union system by helping the Chinese Federation of Labour to expand as the nationwide labour federation (Chang and Bain, 2006; Chen et al, 2003). While democracy and liberalisation have gradually transformed the industrial relations system and the voice of labour has emerged (Rice, 2006) in the past decades, both major political parties intervene in industrial relations (Chang and Bain, 2006) when they govern the nation. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, three major labour laws were modified: the 2008 amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act of 1930, the 2009 amendment to the Settlement of Labour Disputes Act of 1928, and the 2010 amendment to the Labour Union Act of 1929. These statutes updated Taiwan’s triptych of laws on labour rights and their entry into force provide a comprehensive shield of three basic labour rights – the right to negotiate, to organise, and to strike.

Interest groups and government since the late 1980s While the relationship between interest groups and government is not always adversarial (Jones et al, 2007: 253–254), government ministers and civil servants of the Executive Yuan frequently turn to the relevant representative organisations, in the stage of policy planning or policy evaluation, to look for defects in an existing policy and seek suggestions. They wish to influence government in order to see the implementation of policies favourable to their memberships. More important, as indicated in many cases above, many groups have realised the importance of the media as a means of bringing their cause to a significantly wider audience in Taiwan’s civil society, emerging since the late 1980s. Not surprisingly, their strategies can be seen on ‘a continuum running from peaceful methods to violent ones’ (Jones et al, 2007: 256), from letters, phone-ins, petitions, contacting local councillors and local government officials, writing to newspapers, joining action groups, contacting legislators and political parties, contacting civil servants of the Executive Yuan’s ministries and commissions, to marches and demonstrations, strikes, and noisy and occasionally violent demonstrations. In Taiwan, lobbying techniques and activities generally fall into several categories, including information, access, campaign support, protests and demonstrations, and grassroots mobilisation. Legal ways for lobbyists and organisations to influence the policy agenda include influential constituents and voters contacting legislators, approaching government officials at public hearings of the Legislative Yuan, talking to mass media by raising new issues or calling attention to previously ignored policy problems, endorsing candidates and providing political donations, helping law makers to draft legislation or attempting to reshape policy implementation. When government ministers and agency officials are major targets of lobbying activities, there is close consultation between the executive branch and group leaders, through a mix of formal and informal links. Business groups have an advantage at this level in that they play a crucial role in the economy as producers and employers. For 105

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example, ever since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign debt crisis, the Taiwanese central government had implemented a number of policies to alleviate the impact of the global financial turmoil, including monetary policies, financial stability measures and fiscal policies to increase domestic demand, stabilise the financial system, and maintain the momentum of economic growth. As indicated by Jillson (2008: 129), the business community has always been the most thoroughly organised part of the interest group system in that it has ‘natural advantages of money, organisations, and expertise’. In Taiwan, industrial and business confederations, including the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China, the Chinese National Federation of Industries, the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, the ROC Bankers Association, the Taiwan Securities Association, and the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Associations of the ROC, are major forums for discussion of their shared concerns and interests over economic and taxation policy. The policies of the government in such areas as taxation, interest and exchange rates, public spending and investment, trading policy, and industrial relations are important in providing the context for the economy. Such policy planning and design requires a politically feasible policy environment if it is to achieve its goals. Because power in Taiwan is concentrated at the centre, most activities of interest groups and lobbying about legislation is directed at the President, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan. Nonetheless, a good deal of public interest group activity takes place outside the political system, with fundraising to support the Presidential Campaign and General Elections as well as seeking influence upon political party leaders and political party manifestos. Although the growth of interactive cable and the internet offers more opportunities for public interest groups, it is still difficult to increase public awareness of their causes. On the one hand, business and occupational groups as well as professional associations attempt to bring pressure on political parties by running national campaigns. In terms of resources, business groups and labour unions possess an advantage over public interest groups and have considerable bargaining power. Based on Coxall et al (2003: 148–151) and Grant (1995: 48), Figure 7.1 summarises the dynamic relationship that interest groups may seek in order to influence policy and legislation, through policy formulation, agenda setting, public campaigns, political consultations in parliament, the passage through parliament (the Legislative Yuan), implementation and political feedback in a modern democratic Taiwanese political system.

The changing scene and trends in the twenty-first century While not long ago many political scientists in Taiwan were doing a great deal of research about authoritarian regimes and the state of democracy since the 1980s, more recently organised interests, along with the core executive, have been widely recognised as central to policy making in Taiwan. Economic development, social change, and the twenty-first-century era of mass media have altered the environment in which the Taiwanese people live, work, and govern. Although business interests, whose role is essential to the level of employment and the success of the national economy, continue to exercise political muscle in Taiwan, there have been significant changes in the number, campaigning methods, and effectiveness of various other types of groups. 106

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Figure 7.1: Dynamic Relationship of Interest Groups’ Power to Influence Policy and Legislation Problem recognition

Interest groups

/ Policy formulation

Preliminary consultation

The Executive Yuan

with interest groups in Parliament

Lobby about legislation Parliamentary scrutiny The Legislative Yuan

Economic Political party Party manifesto

Associations

Political party caucus

Labour unions

consultation in

Public interest groups

Parliament

Presidential campaign

Political party leaders Politicians

General election

Act of Parliament

Public opinion Public interest groups

ROC presidential promulgation

Government ministries

Interest groups Reactions / lobbying

Policy implementation

Economic associations

Sources: Coxall et al (2003: 148–151) and Grant (1995: 48).

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Since the first decade of the twenty-first century there have been far more active groups than ever before. The number of single-issue groups and other activist organisations has soared. The ecological concerns of the greens have been well represented, including by the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, the Taiwan NPO Information Platform, and the I-Mei-Foods Environmental Protection Foundation. Many social groups, including United Way of Taiwan, the ROC Disability League, the Genesis Social Welfare Foundation, and the Eden Social Welfare Foundation, have faced a harsher climate in which to operate over the past decade, as governments have been more stringent with the nation’s finances since the 2008 global financial crisis. Labour unions gained members and there are now more specialist associations. While the lobbying scene was once dominated by business and trade organisations, their influence has declined. Many groups have seized opportunities to lobby two major political parties, the KMT and the DPP. There are additional outlets where interest groups can target their campaigns, and some activists were on the list of political parties’ legislatorat-large seats, ranging over the fields of academia, disability, labour, social welfare, environmental protection, overseas Chinese/Taiwanese, and the rights of the underprivileged. By building coalitions with major political parties and expressing their opinions and gaining publicity through political talk shows, since the late 1990s interest groups in Taiwan have developed more effective ways to influence ‘pressure points’ (Watts, 2008: 276) in the political process. In fact, a number of groups and their leaders use more direct action and effective means of persuading legislators and government ministers to take account of their ideas. However, studies of the policy-making process are still hampered by the fact that important policy decisions are often made in the Taiwanese government’s ‘black box’ and are not analysed, even in the twenty-first century. To assess the role of interest groups and measure their influence over a significant policy issue is thus extraordinarily difficult. Do special interest groups in Taiwan obstruct the majority of citizens’ wishes on the public policy arena? Since the 1990s some groups have occasionally employed protests and demonstrations to attract media attention to their concerns and thereby apply pressure on government officials to take action, whereas Taiwan’s active opposition parties are more concerned with winning public office in elections than with influencing policies. In brief, the case of Taiwan, as a pluralist democracy with a multiplicity of interest groups, has followed Britain and America in the development and rapid growth of such groups’ activities in the past several decades.

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Lu, Bing-Yan, 2009. Taiwan’s National Legislature: The Legislative Yuan (1949– 2008). In Markus Porsche-Ludwig and Chin-Peng Chu (eds.), The Political System of Taiwan (pp. 130–157). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Mai, Chao-Cheng, and Peng, S.K, 1999. Cooperation vs. Competition in a Spatial Model. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29(4), 463–472. Master, F., 2012. Taiwan Island Votes Yes for First Casino Resort. Reuters, 8 July. Nomura Research Institute, 1995. Rapid Growth of Taiwan’s IC Industry through Joint Private Sector Efforts. Nomura Asia Focus. Tokyo: NRI. O’Connor, K., and Sabato, L.J., 2008. American Government: Continuity and Change. New York: Longman. Philippens, H., 2011. A Nuclear-Free Taiwan by 2025? An Unlikely Target. Global Asia, December. 18: 6(4): 89–94. Rice, J., 2006. The Emergence of an Industrial Relations System in Taiwan: Historical and Contextual Challenges. Asia Pacific Business Review, 12(2), 163–174. Roskin, M.G., Cord, R.L., Medeiros, J.A., and Jones, W.S., 2012. Political Science: An Introduction. New York: Longman. Schafferer, C., 2008. Political Parties and Electoral Politics. In L.N. Roberts and C. R. Lewis (eds.), Taiwan: Economic, Political and Social Issues (pp. 1–24). New York: Nova Science Publishers. Shih, Hsiu-Chuan, 2007. Taiwan Becomes Third Country to Pass Lobbying Act. The Taipei Times, 21 July, p. 4. Shipley, P. (ed.), 1976. Directory of Pressure Groups and Representative Associations. London: Wilton House. Taipei Times, 2011. Legislative Committee Removes Ban on Forming Communists, Splittist Groups. The Taipei Times, 19 May, p. 2. Truman, D.B., 1951. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Knopf. United Daily News Editorial, 2012. Vision Can Overcome the Three Great Obstacles. United Daily News, 26 June, p. 2. Wang, Jiann-Chyuan, and Mai, Chao-Cheng, 2001. Industrial Development Strategy and Structural Transformation. In Chao-Cheng Mai and Chien-Sheng Shih (eds.), Taiwan’s Economic Success Since 1980 (pp. 211–247). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Watts, D. (2008) Understanding US/UK Government and Politics. 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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Think tanks in Taiwan Yi-jung Wu

Introduction According to the 2012 Worldwide Think Tanks (WTT) Report (2013), there are about 6,545 think tanks currently operating worldwide. In McGann and Weaver (2002), think tanks are put into four typologies: (1) academic (university, excluding students); (2) contract researchers; (3) advocacy tanks; (4) party-oriented think tanks. From the aspect of funding resources, think tanks can be categorised as the following types: (1) government-funded; (2) partially government-funded; (3) Private sectorfunded; (4) International organisation-funded (Wu et al, 2009). Of all the think tanks worldwide, 52 are in Taiwan (McGann, 2013). According to the 2012 WTT report, four Taiwanese think tanks are among the top 40 in the world.1 The history of think tanks in Taiwan can be considered a reflection of the country’s political and economic path. Each think tank is set up in a specific era with specific missions reflecting the challenges and opportunities at that time. Their operations and activities are geared toward different research orientations based on their organisational missions, resources, and organisational structures.

Research organisation and orientation In order to enhance understanding of think tanks in Taiwan, the discussion is focused on the following aspects. The chapter begins with brief definition of think tanks, tracing their historical development in Taiwan. Based on the different defined typologies of think tanks found in current studies in the field, the different orientations of various think tanks in Taiwan are briefly introduced. This is followed by a description of the designated purpose and function of think tanks in Taiwan. Finally, this chapter focuses on the contribution and influence of think tanks to public policy in Taiwan, and discusses how think tank staff position themselves with regard to policy making in Taiwan.

Methodology Data collection approaches are through document analyses and interviews about these think tanks. Documents are downloaded from think tanks’ official websites.2 Five face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with current and former staff of relevant think tanks. Data analyses are based on the aforementioned designated research orientations.

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The definition of think tank Think tanks are public policy research institutes that provide research, independent analysis and advice on all aspects of policy-related issues. They are ‘independent, non-interested-based, nonprofit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policymaking process’ (Rich, 2004: 11). Moreover, they conduct public policy analysis and engagement that generate policy-oriented research, and offer advice on domestic and international issues, which enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues (McGann, 2013). Think tanks often have significant influence on the processes of problem identification, policy formation, agenda setting, and policy evaluation. The role of think tanks has been considered as providing a connection between the theoretical framework and the street-level policy implementation because think tanks usually recruit interdisciplinary experts from among academics and practitioners, hoping to provide the administration with adequate and comprehensive policy suggestions and recommendations. According to Stone (2007), think tanks link academics’ and practitioners’ knowledge with the modern democratic society. Think tanks are best able to ‘connect the dots’ between knowledge, power, science, and the state (UNDP, 2003). As a result, think tanks are also good representatives of the dichotomy between policy science and political art.

The history of think tanks in Taiwan The era of national security Think tanks started to emerge in Taiwan in 1953, much later than the origin of think tanks in the US. Due to the political and military tension between Taiwan and China, the first think tank in Taiwan, the Association of International Relations, was first funded by the government to collect data and provide policy recommendations in the fields of national security, international and diplomatic policies, particularly with a focus on cross-strait relations. The government relied heavily on the Association’s expertise and knowledge on China issues for relevant policy making. In 1961, it was renamed the Institute of International Relations. As policy making became a profession, calling for expertise rather than political propaganda, the institute was transformed again and located on National Chengchi University campus, employing experts from various social science disciplines to achieve its designated purpose (Lin, 2002).

The era of diplomatic challenge and economic growth As their expertise became better recognised and accepted, several major privately funded think tanks were established following the booming economic development in Taiwan in the 1970s. One of the think tanks originating then was the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER), funded in 1976. It was sponsored by a wealthy business group, using no governmental resources. During the mid-1970s, as the Republic of China (Taiwan) withdrew from membership of the United Nations and terminated its official relations with the US, Taiwan faced its most severe diplomatic conundrum in 112

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the history. Think tanks founded at this time were all aimed at maintaining economic growth in order to assure Taiwan’s reputation in the international community. The government’s major diplomatic strategy at that time was also to facilitate economic relations for the maintenance of its international reputation. In 1981, due to the continued diplomatic challenges encountered by Taiwanese officials, the government decided to sponsor an independent research institution, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), to sustain stable economic development and further growth (CIER, 2013). In the case of CIER, the government supported 90% of the seed money, and asked private business and individuals for the remaining 10% of funding.

The era of radical political movements In 1987, after almost four decades of strict political control by the government, the Taiwanese government finally removed the Martial Law. The Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) was founded in 1989, becoming the first completely privately funded public affairs research organisation of the new era in Taiwan. Later, in 1994, the Taiwan Research Institute was also established, with financial and professional support from the private business and academics. Both of these think tanks attempted to cover a comprehensive agenda in all aspects of public policies and strived to be non-partisan. In the late 1980s to 1990s, due to the radical political movement, think tanks with diversified political points of view sprang up. Some of them were funded by business persons with strong political ideology and others were supported by political parties. In addition to the lifting of major political restrictions, the process of a democratic political system has also been blossoming through regular direct elections of legislators, mayors and a president. The two major political parties on the island, Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), began their political wrestling in election competitions. The KMT has had its own research division since 1953, but it was reorganised as the National Development Institute in 2000. In 1999, the DPP set up its own think tank, the New Frontier Foundation, within the party system. After the presidential election in 2000, Taiwan experienced the first shift of power (from KMT to DPP) since the Republic of China (Taiwan) government moved to Taiwan. This important political milestone catalysed the birth and the transformation of more party-oriented think tanks. After the 2000 presidential election, many long-active political appointees stepped down and became the opposition party for the first time in history. However, the KMT decided that the party needed a platform for these appointees to continue contributing their wisdom and experience in order to win back the administration. The National Policy Foundation was in put place for the purpose of this specific mission. At the same time, the DPP also started to consider the think tanks within the party as an important policy-making mechanism. As a result, in 2001, Taiwan Thinktank was put in place to serve a similar mission to the National Policy Foundation. Although these think tanks were viewed as strongly party-oriented, they all officially claimed to be independent and non-partisan. The 2008 election resulted in another shift in power (from DPP to KMT), which led to another wave of rearrangements in the party-oriented think tanks.

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The era of participation in the international community In 2003, the government decided that it was important to become a part of the international community and establish unofficial relationships with other countries to share the Taiwanese experience on democratic transformation and join the advocates of democracy and human rights. To promote this idea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a proposal to set up the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy to participate in the international democratic and human rights community. This proposal was passed by the legislative branch in 2003. With this specific mission, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy has also become the coordinator for international scholars and informal political activities among relevant organisations. In this case, the Foundation acted as an informal ambassador to actively promote the Taiwanese experience and to serve as an international volunteer worldwide.

The designated purpose and function of think tanks In general, all the think tanks position themselves as performing multiple roles in the policy-making process. Some of the think tanks are activity oriented, and others are research oriented. In other words, think tanks bear the mission of being policy researchers, policy initiators, policy advocates, policy supervisors, and policy mediators. The less party-oriented think tanks, in particular, believe that they should hold firmly to the principles of neutrality and independence. Therefore, these nonpartisan think tanks usually have the following features: (1) they usually emphasise specific policy expertise (usually economic related) and set up long-term policy agendas (collect longitudinal data on certain areas of expertise); (2) their research positions and agendas are not easily dominated by the conventional political climate; (3) they usually try to bridge the knowledge between academia and the practitioners (Wu et al, 2009). The on-campus academic think tanks usually aim to: (1) set up interdisciplinary research models; (2) coordinate international research collaboration; (3) bridge knowledge between the academic community and practitioners. Activities such as international conferences, publication of books and research papers, and policy forums for academics and practitioners are all major venues for presentation of research. Therefore, academic knowledge exchange is considered an important indicator of productivity for academic think tanks. For political party-oriented think tanks and think tanks within political parties (all labelled as party-oriented think tanks in the following), their organisational agenda can be separated into two parts: one is the short-term reaction – the prompt response to current policy situations – and the other is long-term sustainability – the survival and advancement of the political party. Specifically, these think tanks serve the purposes of: (1) evaluation of contemporary policies; (2) providing policy proposals and recommendations to incumbent mayors and members of Congress; and (3) longterm policy formation and planning for government officials and party politicians (National Policy Foundation, 2013; New Frontier Foundation, 2013). One of the crucial missions of the think tanks of the opposition party is to offer strategies for a return to power. As a result, these party-oriented think tanks should play the role of policy advocates, as policy outcomes and performance are often the ‘scorecards’ for the public to decide on their vote choice for the next election. 114

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Most of the party-oriented think tanks also serve an important ‘unspoken’ but ‘widely known’ function in the public policy arena: the revolving door for politicians. Due to the concept of ‘professionalism’ in public policy practice, many political appointees are scholars in the field: scholars from academic think tanks are often appointed to serve the administration and apply their professional training and expertise to the practice of policy making. After the leader of the administration steps down, these scholars are still able to continue their academic careers. Moreover, these practical experiences in the administration can enrich the scholars’ research and teaching. Lastly, professionals in the opposition party-oriented think tanks usually form a ‘shadow cabinet’ in preparation for becoming the ruling party in the future. Partyoriented think tanks not only have the responsibility to pass on their administrative experiences to their colleagues, but also bear the duty of training the ‘seed politicians’ for the party. As a result, these think tanks function as professional training centres for the politicians.

The various orientations of think tanks The discussion now lays out the interactions between think tanks and policy-making processes. It is obvious and legitimate that the partially or fully government-funded think tanks serve governmental and policy goals. However, on-campus think tanks are still considered neutral and autonomous entities due to their academic nature. Under this definition, the Institute of International Relations is considered an academic think tank. It is a research institute with its own agenda based on the professional and academic expertise residing in the think tanks. The Taiwan Institute of Economic Research and the Taiwan Research Institute are both private sector-funded think tanks. TIER has focused its research in the field of economic development since its establishment in the 1970s, whereas the Taiwan Research Institute aims for a wider research agenda. Taiwan Thinktank and National Policy Foundation are the two typical examples of party-oriented think tanks. Although they attempt to detach themselves from a specific party image and become independent think tanks, it is not an easy task. After all, these party-oriented think tanks do serve some specific missions which have a direct influence on the party’s politicians. Lastly, think tanks within major political parties, such as the National Development Institute (KMT) and the New Frontier Foundation (DPP), play a unique role of self-implementation and self-examination in their own parties. Party-oriented think tanks are the focus of this chapter because they usually act as important catalysts in the policy-making process. Moreover, party-oriented think tanks are able to serve as coordinators and encourage stakeholders from different viewpoints to engage in direct, deeper and comprehensive exchanges of ideas.

The policymaking process and think tanks In the process of policy making, party-oriented think tanks are much more active than academic ones. Academic think tanks mostly do not become involved in the actual policy-making process. They attempt to stay independent from political parties and maintain their political neutrality. Therefore, academic think tanks are not usually 115

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actively involved in the direct and immediate decision-making mechanism. They usually serve as policy consultants and experts providing professional recommendations to the administration. In contrast to academic think tanks, party-oriented think tanks are able to have an impact on the policy-making process in four different ways: first, it is important to establish working relationships between think tanks and legislators; second, keeping continuous interactions with government officials is crucial; third, maintaining interdependent relations with the media is vital; and lastly, conducting regular dialogues with major interest groups is also necessary for successful policy formation.

Think tanks and legislators Think tanks and legislators with similar ideological orientations sometimes work as teams to promote their ideologies and policies. For legislators, in addition to their legal and policy assistants in the office, think tanks may become their policy consultants. A major difference between their own assistants and think tanks is the level and the scale of the recommendations. Legislative assistants’ policy recommendations usually focus on individual legislators’ interests and personal agendas. However, in order to maintain their professional integrity, think tanks provide relatively neutral and comprehensive recommendations. Regardless of their party-orientation, these think tanks still attempt to position themselves as institutions which bear some level of societal expectation and entertain a certain professional autonomy in the field of policy analysis. Moreover, these party-oriented think tanks help draft policy proposals and prioritise policy agendas for the party’s members of Congress. Before each legislative session begins, these think tanks call for meetings with the party’s members of Congress for several purposes: (1) to conduct discussions among major stakeholders on important policies; (2) to propose priorities for policy agenda setting; (3) to assure consensus among the party’s representatives in Congress. This shows the intertwined and complementary relationships between party-oriented think tanks and legislators.

Think tanks and government officials The opposition party-oriented think tanks not only bear the responsibility of supervising the current party in power, but also shoulder the burden of winning over the electorate in the next election. Therefore, they need to fill the roles of policy consultant, supervisor and advocate. It is important for these opposition party-oriented think tanks to partner with other policy stakeholders to promote and adopt their preferred policies, otherwise they will become isolated and powerless in the policy process. For the incumbent party-oriented think tanks, rather than going through the long petitioning process, their policy suggestions are sometimes able to be conveyed directly to the administrative officials for immediate adjustments to policy. Therefore, these think tanks become the friendly assistants and advisors to the current administration because they all hold the same vision of helping to the party stay in power. However, as the party is in power and holds the majority in the Congress, it is easier for it to obtain and use political resources to realise its aims without the assistance

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of think tanks. As a result, the incumbent party-oriented think tanks usually do not need to fight hard in advocating and amending policy. Staff indicated that think tanks tend to be more active and effective when the party with similar ideology is not in power. When a party is not in power, most of the political resources, including political connections, are withdrawn from its routine operation. In this case, the opposition party-oriented think tanks become the important coordinators which line up all the like-minded supporters to maintain their advocating power on preferred ideologies and solutions. Otherwise, the diminishing power of political resources will have a dampening influence on public policy. This may have negative impacts on efforts to return to the administration. As a result, not being in power increases the importance of opposition party-oriented think tanks because of their role in resource coordination.

Think tanks and the media Moreover, as they attempt to extend their level of influence to the public, opposition party-oriented think tanks rely on arranging regular or ad hoc meetings with their supporters and continue to make connections with the media to promote their ideologies. Maintaining regular contact with the media is essential to draw the public’s attention and to keep a watchful eye on issues of concern. In the contemporary policy arena, partnering with the media usually opens the policy window (Kingdon, 2002). The media’s unveiling of the ‘problem stream’ of the policy usually forces the alignment of ‘political streams’ among the public, interest groups and politicians which requires explanations from the experts in the field (policy stream). The media is considered the most powerful and influential tool in the policy-making process. Generally speaking, the opposition party-oriented think tanks partner with the media to assure their voice being heard by the public. Support from the public generates power and provides strong backing to raise the attention of the relevant policy makers. Without a close connection and partnership with the media, policy proposals fail and fall apart easily. It is the task of the incumbent party-oriented think tanks to help the administration organise information in order to enhance the public’s understanding of public policies. This task helps increase the level of acceptance of and satisfaction with newly implemented policies among the public.

Think tanks and interest groups Since each individual party has already established its particular ideology on certain issues, it is vital for political party-oriented think tanks to maintain support for the topics of interest. As a result, these think tanks usually set up platforms for conversations and information exchanges, and then partner with interest groups in the field for advocacy of the issue concerned. In this case, think tanks are able to keep themselves connected with the relevant group and obtain the most current update and opinions on the issue. This connection allows think tanks to form alliances with interest groups, hoping to push ‘their’ issues onto the policy-making agenda. Regarding their relationships with the media, think tanks are able to coordinate the attention of the public and related interest groups to ensure plenty of exposure for the issues. In this case, think tanks serve as important agents to organise the opinions of related interest groups. Although inviting stakeholders from different political camps 117

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is vital to hear diverse opinions, the ‘self-selective’ effect still exists. This effect may sometimes lead to the problem of one-sided statements. Regardless, the role of think tanks in serving as a communication platform is still key in the policy-making process.

The role and influence of think tanks in public policy The delivery of government-sponsored research Think tanks seek to gain attention to their research among relent decision makers and seek access to them in order to influence political outcomes (Rich, 2004). As more government-sponsored research is contracted out to academic think tanks, the research findings are able to address salient problems and propose policy recommendations to the administration. For think tanks, government-sponsored research serves as a double-edged sword. Taking on a government-sponsored project not only allows think tanks to deliver their research results and propose new ideas, but also helps think tanks become independent financially. From the aspect of service delivery on a research project, it is important for think tanks to demonstrate their professional capacity by conducting policy research and providing policy suggestions. Think tanks are able to communicate and convey their positions and opinions through these research projects. Many think tanks attempt to separate themselves from political interference so that they are able to build a good reputation in society. For political neutrality, it is even more important for think tanks to be financially independent. Once think tanks have removed themselves from political influence, they are able to focus on the core of the policy and provide appropriate suggestions.

Drawing focused attention from the public One of the most important tasks for the party-oriented think tanks is to draw public attention to issues of concern to the party. Especially for the opposition partyoriented think tanks, it is not always an easy task to get all the ‘right’ resources to promote their preferred policies. Regardless, think tanks are still able to organise the opinions of the attentive public. In countries that value the ideologies of pluralism and democracy, different opinions are usually expressed and respected by various groups. For new issues which take time to be introduced and become familiar to the public, think tanks play the vital role of policy educators and advocators. In this case, the media becomes think tanks’ important partner in getting the attention of the public. Think tanks also provide a platform for the public and relevant interest groups to communicate with one another. Therefore, getting the public attention on specific issues is the most important mission for think tanks, even though these issues may not be adopted immediately.

The reserve of political elites Think tanks recognise themselves as professional agents. In other words, they all hold some specific areas of expertise in the policy arena, including experts in academia and among the practitioners. For example, think tanks usually recruit retired politicians to assure the continuation of knowledge management, pass on their experience, 118

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and provide professional training to the younger generation of politicians. Because alternation in power is common in the political arena, it is important to maintain a ‘shadow cabinet’ in party-oriented think tanks. This group serves as a key member in think tanks. Furthermore, think tanks have many connections with scholars and researchers in the field, with whom they can consult on relevant policy issues. Think tanks also have a specific mission to become policy educators and promoters.

The formation of ‘political trial balloons’ No matter how ‘ideal’ the policy recommendations seem to be, no one can be certain whether or not it can be adopted by the administration (Abelson, 2009). In the practice of politics, political, economic, legal and social feasibility/desirability are always very important determinants in deciding the adopted proposals. In many cases, staff in political party-oriented think tanks claim that they usually propose policy recommendations based on ideal long-term planning and development. However, as long as the recommendations do not fit into the short-term political aims and public expectations, they are often either postponed or rejected. Therefore, even though think tanks are considered professional policy makers, there are vital concerns of political feasibility and desirability to be considered. The proposals are often treated as ‘political trial balloons’ before the policy is finally adopted and implemented.

Brief discussion and conclusion on think tanks Party-oriented think tanks act as policy initiators, advocates, researchers and lobbyists. They are committed to serve the public interest through policy research and proposals, particularly aligning with party ideology. Regardless, most professionals in partyoriented think tanks still believe in the idealism and altruism of their profession. They wish to be recognised for their professional efforts and capabilities, rather than their ideological party preferences. Unfortunately, in the practice of politics, once a political administration is overturned by a different party, it is difficult for the opposition party-oriented think tanks to retain their original services. Think tanks belonging to the party of the previous administration lose the resources and connections necessary to maintain their advantageous position in the policy-making process. As a result, many think tanks face the challenges of overworked staff, a high turnover of staff, the lack of financial resources to promote proposed policies, and uncertainty of the think tank’s long-term development . Therefore, a sustainable long-term development plan for think tanks becomes salient. Many think tanks provide proposals for their long-term ‘survival’. Several party-oriented think tanks propose that the remainder of the election campaign fund should be allocated to think tanks. If this were the case, think tanks would be assured basic financial resources to maintain their daily routines in the policy profession without relying on political parties/groups for financial contributions. Financial disconnection from political parties can result in an important vision long desired by many think tank staff . More specifically, many staff in party-oriented think tanks want to operate and be acknowledged as independent and neutral experts on public policies. Only when they are separate from specific party-oriented institutions can they be considered a neutral and legitimate third party in the policy-making arena.

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Political parties have all established formal or informal ties with think tanks (Stone, 2004). Unfortunately, these ties usually lead to a stereotyped image of think tanks. The acknowledgement of think tanks’ professionalism is not yet a widely accepted concept in policy-making processes in Taiwan. Based on comments from staff in think tanks, it is much easier for philanthropic organisations to ask for donations from the public than it is for think tanks. Philanthropic organisations usually have specific social missions and groups for service delivery, whereas party-oriented think tanks are usually stereotyped as the spokespersons for the party. Although these party-oriented think tanks attempt to wash away their negative and biased political image, it is not an easy task. Many think tanks in Taiwan are still not able to remove themselves from the influence of political parties and ideological orientation. Regardless, several think tank staff members believe that the expression of different opinions is key to the progress of democracy and mutual respect in a society. Therefore, even though party-oriented think tanks face the question of political neutrality, they strive to serve as a significant platform for opinion exchange and to promote diversified aspects of the policy-making process. Think tank staff expect to use their research and professional expertise to play a critical role in how issue debates take shape and are defined (Rich, 2004). Even though there are times when politics overrides scientific evidence and expertise, staff in think tanks still seek to retain policy neutrality. This may sound like an oxymoron. However, this commitment not only allows think tanks to maintain their role as advocates in policy making, but also to retain their professional reputation as experts in the research community.

Notes The four ranked in the top 40 are: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (8th); Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER) (17th); Institute for Social and Environmental Transition (20th); Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (25th). 1

Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER), Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), Taiwan Research Institute, National Policy Foundation, Taiwan Thinktank, New Frontier Foundation, National Development Institute. 2

References Abelson, D.E., 2009. Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutions. 2nd ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. CIER (Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research), 2013. History about CIER. www.cier.edu.tw/ct.asp?xItem=429&CtNode=24&mp=2 Kingdon, J.W., 2002. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd ed. Harlow: Longman. Lin, C.-b., 2002. From the Invisible Policy Consultant to the Vocal Policy Advocate: The Blooming Period of Think Tanks in Taiwan [in Chinese]. Taiwan Panorama (April), p 2–6.

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McGann, J.G., 2013. 2012 Global Go to Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice. Trans. TTACS. In Think tanks and civil societies program (ed) Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania. http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ docs/116/717703/2012_Global_Go_To_Think_Tank_Report_-_FINAL.pdf McGaan, J.G., and Weaver, R.K., 2002. Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. National Policy Foundation, 2013. Introducing the National Policy Foundation. http://old.npf.org.tw/english/main-eng.htm New Frontier Foundation, 2013. Organizational Mission [in Chinese]. www.dppnff. tw/about.php Rich, A., 2004. Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise. New York: Cambridge University Press. Stone, D., 2004. Introduction: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governmance. In D. Stone and A. Denham (eds.), Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Stone, D., 2007. Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes. Public Administration, 85(2), 259–278. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2003. Thinking the Unthinkable: From Thought to Policy. Bratislava: UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Wu, T., Chang, J.-S., Chen, T.-Y., Lai, W.-Y., and Hsu, L.-I., 2009. The Foundation in Public Administration [in Chinese]. Vol. 2. Taipei: Open University Press.

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The development of public engagement in Taiwan Mei Jen Hung

Introduction Active citizen participation is essential to a living democracy. Democratic governments use many mechanisms to solicit public input, ranging from one-way top-down communication to dialogue and two-way information exchange (Rowe and Frewer, 2000, 2004). Participation usually entails granting citizens the rights and opportunities to express their opinions, mobilise people and resources, and ultimately shape government decisions that have taken their interests and perspectives into account (Arnstein, 1969; Smith, 1993). Participation can enhance public opinion and ensure long-term commitment to collective problems such as the fight against terrorism (Kirlin and Kirlin, 2002). Participation, as a deliberative rather than a rational approach, is considered more effective for policy issues that involve diverse interests and perspectives (Box, 1998; deLeon and Denhardt, 2000; Frederickson, 1982; Roberts, 2002; Vigoda, 2002). Citizen participation engages stakeholders in management and public policy making. A stakeholder can be defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1984: 46). Stakeholders possess the power to influence policy making, give legitimacy to participation, call for the immediate attention of government or urgently demand government actions and policies (Mitchell et al, 1997). In the era of new governance, much attention has been paid to the development of new mechanisms to make sure that stakeholders’ voices are heard before government decisions are made (Bingham et al, 2005). Stakeholder representation has been proven to be positively associated with organisational accomplishments (Gazley et al, 2010). After all, as Crow and Baysha (2013: 304) argue, ‘policy making is not accepted as solely a government enterprise, stakeholders have begun to actively demand access to the policy process’. Even minority stakeholders can enhance their legitimacy and influence if they have the ability to mobilise collaboration and raise issues that are important to the majority (Drori and Weizmann, 2007). Despite the importance of citizen and stakeholder participation that has been documented in previous research, the practice of participation has serious limitations. Not every citizen can participate easily. Citizens who become involved in public affairs are usually of higher socioeconomic status (Almond and Verba, 1963). Motivation, skills, and network connections are needed for engagement in public affairs (Verba et al, 1995). Government bureaucrats have long dominated public decision making while citizens usually have only limited access to information (Kathlene and Martin, 123

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1991). As a result, the growing complexity of public affairs and the fragmentation of government authority make citizen participation increasingly difficult. Scholars doubt that meaningful participation really takes place (Abel and Stephan, 2000) and suspect that the influence of citizens on government decisions is limited (Silverman, 2003; Simmons, 2008). There is a significant gap between citizens’ expectations of how much they can influence government decisions and their actual ability to do so (Fiorino, 1996).1 In response to these doubts over the limited benefits of participation, it is argued that with appropriate participation strategies based on the purpose of participation and the nature of the policy issue involved, participation can help to improve the quality of public decisions (Walters et al, 2000). For example, Kathlene and Martin (1991), drawing from a citizen survey panel to develop a transportation master plan in Boulder, Colorado, offered a successful example of how policy analysts can help citizen participation to overcome representation issues and information costs, and to become meaningful and integrated into policy decision making. Public participation is a central value that promotes the rights of citizens and improves government decision making. However, there is a tension between public participation and policy analysis. Bardach (2003: 115) claims that ‘policy analysis has an uncomfortable relationship with the processes of democracy. Its conclusions – so often efficiency-oriented, cost-cutting, and skeptical of symbolism – are often at odds with one or another broad stream of public opinion’. To connect public participation with policy analysis, we need to turn to what policy analysis is and develop a framework to examine its contribution to policy analysis.

A framework to connect public engagement with policy analysis Dunn (2008: 1) defines policy analysis as ‘a process of multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, critically assess, and communicate information that is useful in understanding and improving policies’. It would be useful to see how the public can create, assess, or communicate policy-relevant information. The purpose and contribution of participation may be different in each policy stage. Walters et al (2000), built upon the work of Bardach (1996), Dunn (1994), and other scholars to specify the purpose of participation at each policy development stage. The purposes of participation are discovery, education, measurement, persuasion, and legitimisation (Table 9.1). This chapter uses this framework to discuss how participation can contribute of at each policy development stage and illustrate different kinds of contribution using cases of citizen involvement in the form of social movements and citizen conferences in Taiwan. Since the late 1990s in Taiwan, scholars have introduced models of participation in order to connect public participation with policy process. Lin and Wang’s (1999) study connects participation with policy implementation, arguing that participation helps to build a sound civil society by instilling a sense of responsibility, enhancing the government agency, and promoting harmony of implementation by increasing interaction and fostering understanding between government and society. Chiang and Tseng’s (2003) study introduces Box’s (1998) model of citizen governance, which emphasises expanding the role of citizens and communities in policy making. Kuo (2012) reminds us that the bounded rationality of decision makers along with diverse social values and interests prevents policy analysis from 124

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being rational and professional. From an economic perspective, Don-Yun Chen (2004) argues that citizen participation can reduce costs and improve the quality of decisions. Tze-Luen Lin and Liang-Yu Chen (2009), calling for deliberative policy analysis, emphasise the role of citizens in examining policy alternatives. Concerned with the development of new technology, Lei (2002) argues that participation could lead to technologies that realise social values and demands.

Table 9.1: Purposes and contribution of participation in stages of policy development Policy development stages

Purpose of participation

Possible contribution to policy analysis

Define the problem

Discover

Identify dimensions of the problem, the values of each dimension Target the groups involved

Identify criteria

Discover

Develop criteria Choose among several criteria, set priorities among several criteria Set bottom lines

Generate alternatives

Discover Educate

Develop alternatives Request or disseminate information about policy alternative Identify actors and processes involved in choosing alternatives

Legitimise Evaluate alternatives

Educate Measure Legitimise

Identify the weaknesses and problems of alternatives developed by government agencies Evaluate policy proposal based on perspectives of different target groups See how citizens respond to proposed alternative

Recommend on alternative

Educate Persuade Legitimise

Continue to see how citizens respond, monitor policy outcomes and changes after adoption

Source: Walters et al. (2000).

While scholars in Taiwan may have agreed on the importance of participation, they have also seen the potential tension between participation and policy process or analysis. For example, Tu (2012) finds that government agencies still rely on experts for environmental impact assessments. To what degree participation can influence public policy making and analysis depends on how the political system works. Participation has evolved as Taiwan moved from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. The first section provides some background information on Taiwan’s democratisation and discusses changes in forms of public engagement before and after democratisation. The second section examines citizen consensus conferences and other recent experiments with new forms of participation in Taiwan to see how they can contribute to policy analysis using the framework explained above. The third section focuses on the Lo-Sheng Movement, to see how participation contributes significantly to policy analysis. The concluding section summarises the experiences, contribution, and limitations of public engagement in Taiwan and suggests ways to bring more citizen input into policy analysis. Drawing upon Taiwan’s experience, this chapter offers evidence that connects policy analysis and public engagement and instils policy analysis with a more democratic spirit. 125

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Democratisation and public engagement in Taiwan After the Kuomintang (KMT) government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan lived under ‘hard authoritarianism’ before making the transition to democracy (Tien and Shiau, 1992). As the dominant party, the KMT developed and enforced martial law as well as economic and social regulations to maintain its control. Taiwan was able to realise significant economic growth and political stability. The middle and working classes emerging during the period of industrial growth and became the main social forces that pushed for government reforms (Hsiao, 1990). In the late 1960s, a series of political and economic challenges forced the KMT government to loosen its control. The economic downturn in the 1980s, along with corruption, and environmental disasters, eroded public confidence in government. The KMT government, which tried to win the support from the public by overseeing the Economic Miracle, lost popular support (Wang, 1999). Under Chiang ChingKuo, the KMT regime allowed more native Taiwanese to hold influential positions. Martial law was lifted in July 1987 along with bans on newspaper publications and opposition political parties. Under martial law, public participation was allowed only under the control of government. The Civil Associations Act of 1942 allowed only one organisation of each type to exist. Public demonstrations were prohibited. Freedom of speech and freedom of association were severely restricted. Education was meant to perpetuate the control of government over society. There was no meaningful public participation at that time (Ku, 1999). With the lifting of martial law, the government started to restore the rights of citizens. The amendments of Civil Associations Act in 1989 greatly expanded freedom of association. The Assembly and Parade Act of 1988 allows public demonstration as long as citizens apply for permission in advance. The police can still stop and arrest protesters. With the end of martial law Taiwan’s society gained strength, and with the economic resources made available during times of economic growth, emerging social forces were able to challenge the government and accelerate the transition from hard to soft authoritarianism (Winkler, 1984). Hsiao (1990: 165) labels the period from 1979 to 1990 as characterised by ‘social forces in mobilization’. Seventeen social movements emerged by the end of the 1980s,2 and with most of them feeling ignored and excluded from the decision-making process, they asked the government to grant them their rights and listen to their voices (Hsiao, 1990). Until the early 1990s there were 20–30 different types of social movement in Taiwan (Wang, 1999).3 These movements, combined with political opposition parties, helped to make Taiwan more pluralistic and democratic, as social movements have their own perspectives about and solutions to social problems. During democratisation, public engagement in Taiwan underwent major changes in its form, scale and nature. Ku (2005) points out that social movements were the dominant form of participation from 1987 to 1997; after 1997 the social movements became non-profit organisations that worked with the government to provide education or social services (Ku, 1999, 2005). These raised citizens’ consciousness (Lin and Ku, 2004). Hsung et al (2010) contend that citizen participation in associations peaked in the early 1990s. After 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took over government for the first time, participation dropped rapidly. Lin’s (2005) assessment of civil society in Taiwan states that citizen participation is limited to 126

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certain social groups or civil society organisations, and the interaction among these groups and organisations is weak. New types of participation are needed. The next section introduces some attempts to expand public engagement to individuals or groups that rarely become involved in discussions of national or local policy issues.

Recent experiments with public engagement in Taiwan In the early 2000s, deliberative democracy appeared in Taiwan.4 The government has worked with academia to create new opportunities for citizens to become involved in the discussion of national issues such as the death penalty and health insurance reform and local issues such as community development. The government had contracted extensive research on deliberative democracy worldwide,5 conducted citizen consensus conferences on capital punishment and sex work, designed and implemented several mechanisms to consult citizens, including an online platform (www.vision2020.tw), and world café (Sung and Huang, 2009). Some of the results of these initiatives are examined below. At the national level, citizen consensus conferences have become a means of public consultation. They are designed to enlist the input of citizens who rarely participate in public affairs. The citizen consensus conference for national health insurance reform, held in July 2002, was the first of its kind in Taiwan. Participants included housewives, private employers, taxi drivers, garbage collectors, students, and researchers (Lin and Chen, 2003: 35). Although the participants did not reach a consensus on major issues, they did establish principles. For example, social justice was a major concern of the participants and they suggested that the government offer disadvantaged people extra help if health insurance coverage was to be reduced. Participants also wanted the government to publish reports on the performance of health insurance administration and allow citizens to evaluate hospitals. They also requested that the government release information about drug prices and health insurance costs. Another breakthrough came in 2004, when Taiwan had its first citizen consensus conference on surrogate motherhood. Participants were not only concerned about whether or not to legalise surrogate motherhood; they were also concerned about treatments for infertility, the adoption system and wanted more government involvement. Participants weighed the benefits and costs of surrogate motherhood and agreed that it should be legal under some conditions. There was no consensus on whether or not surrogates should be paid; however they agreed that only Taiwan nationals could be surrogates in order to prevent poor foreigners from becoming surrogates for money. Although some activists questioned the conference’s procedures, the conveners argued that the conference was not intended to polarise supporters and opponents of surrogate motherhood. Instead, it was an opportunity for citizens to understand and debate the issues.6 Another citizen conference on surrogate motherhood was held in September 2012. Citizens gathered to discuss the benefits of surrogate motherhood and how to reduce its costs and negative impacts. Participants agreed that surrogate motherhood should be legalised to protect reproductive rights. Since people on low incomes cannot afford to hire a surrogate from overseas, their reproductive rights are limited. Participants also agreed that the government should legalise gestational surrogacy, in which the surrogate is not genetically related to the child, as soon as possible. The government should also consider surrogate motherhood for gays and lesbians, and also for single 127

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people who want children. As for traditional surrogacy, in which the surrogate’s own egg is used, participants believed that the social costs would outweigh its benefits and therefore it should not be legalised. The perspectives and opinions offered by participants prioritised the different types of surrogate motherhood and redefined the scope of the policy. The participants also raised questions about the costs of surrogate motherhood and who should pay for it. If the national health insurance plan covered some of the costs, it may help to increase the birth rate and bring benefits to the ageing society.7 Analysis of the policy on surrogate motherhood could take this point further and include it in cost–benefit analysis. In addition to citizen consensus conferences, deliberative pooling and surveys are used to encourage more participation and more input to policy making and analysis. Huang (2003) examined the experiences of deliberative polling in Taiwan. Using a quasi-experimental design with control and experimental groups, and group discussion on the policy issue as an intervention, he concluded that better information and discussion changed attitudes toward the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant in about 20% of the students in the experimental group. In another experiment of deliberative polling on national health care reform, his study revealed that after discussion about 63% of the citizens involved wanted to keep the existing coverage and raise premiums if necessary; only 47% of participants thought this before the discussion. Participation through deliberative pooling guided future policy and the data collected from the pooling helped the government to see how citizens would respond to policy change. Public surveys can also be a form of public consultation which the government uses to understand citizens’ values and evaluations of current policy. Liu’s (2008) study on the National Health Insurance Plan in Taiwan examines the ways in which citizens value their health insurance. The results show that citizens consider coverage, number of doctors available, services to disadvantaged people in remote areas, as well as transparency in the process of making any change in the health insurance plan as the most important criteria. Information like this helps health policy analysts to select and design policy evaluations. In the case of any policy change, analysts could evaluate the degree to which the policy change met the criteria important to the general public. At the local level, Wang (1995) points out that public engagement localises government community development plans, preventing identical plans being used in different communities and missing opportunities to preserve and make the best use of the local culture and heritage. Li (2009) argues that evaluation of community security policy can be based on the quality of participation rather than on the number of citizens involved. He takes community security as an example of how policy evaluation can be based on the quality of participation. The citizen jury at Chi-Yan community, aiming at developing an eco-community, is another good example of how public participation can inform policy analysis. The city government planned to build a new eco-community and a 14-member citizen jury was appointed in July 2007.8 Participants agreed with the idea of building an eco-community but questioned what it would look like and did not think the plan provided by the city government met their standards. In particular, participants argued that standards for green buildings in their community should be higher and should be enforced by formal contacts and rules. The information on local hydrology was found to be neither correct nor complete and needed to be revised before detailed

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local flood plans were made. In addition, participants worried about the negative impacts of the new community on the old community. Fan’s (2007) study of Heng Shan Township, Hsinchu County, found that local residents challenged the environmental impact assessments conducted by experts and government agencies. Their observation and knowledge of the local environment were necessary in the risk assessment of a waste facility. Public engagement in ChiYan community and Heng Shan Township clarified the policy goals or plans clearly, identified incorrect information, examined issues overlooked by the government, and determined whether or not expected outcomes would meet the needs of residents or harm them. Another example of the ways in which public participation can inform public policy and analysis is the scenario workshop on the restoration and improvement of Dan-Shuei River held in November 2007.9 Participants formed three groups representing the central government, the local government, and citizen groups. Each group deliberated ways to improve the Dan-Shuei River and submitted a proposal to a vote at the end of the workshop. The best proposals reflected suggestions that neither the government nor its experts had made.10 For example, to improve education on environmental issues, government employees and reporters on environmental affairs should take some courses on environmental management. Non-governmental organisations or citizen groups could make documentaries or films about the history and improvement of the Dan-Shuei River. Blogs and bulletin boards could be used by activists to record news and information about the restoration and improvement of the Dan-Shuei River. Local governments could make better use of their facilities, consider constructing wetlands, passing legislation requiring companies to reduce their pollution of the river, and encouraging consumers to buy more green products. Participation in this case takes the form of policy alternatives.

An exemplary case: the Lo-Sheng movement and its contribution to policy analysis The Lo-Sheng Sanatorium, built in 1930, was designed to care for patients with leprosy (Hansen disease). The Leprosy Prevention Law was designed to isolate people with leprosy by confining them to the Sanatorium. According to the 1968 Annual Report on Lo-Sheng Sanatorium, the number of patients peaked at 1,118. Many of these were young when admitted to the Sanatorium and spent the rest of their lives there (Fan, 2008). They were forbidden contact with their families or to have children, were forced to participate in medical experiments, and were abused by instructors and medical professionals (Lai, 2007; Shen, 2011). In the late 1990s, the land on which the Sanatorium stood was sold to the Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government for the construction of the Rapid Transit System in Xinxhuang. The residents of the Sanatorium knew nothing about it until the contractor started to cut down trees. It was clear that the government and politicians considered economic development more than the needs of people with leprosy (Lee, 2009). Politicians who supported the construction of a metro station turned the local residents against the Lo-Sheng Sanatorium (Lee, 2008). They were told that the Sanatorium had to be torn down in order to finish the construction of the metro station which would bring jobs and prosperity to the area. In a parade held in March 129

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2007, the mayor of Xinxhuang claimed that the city could not survive without the metro station and called for residents of the city to support the plan for the Rapid Transit System. Politicians and media portrayed the residents at the Sanatorium as resisting any change and as obstacles to prosperity in Xinxhuang (Yao, 2010). With the help of the Lo-Sheng Youth Coalition and cultural elites, residents at the Sanatorium were told that they deserved better treatment from the government. Students escorted residents to meet government agencies to make their representation and took them to demonstrations. They demanded that the government treat the residents at the Sanatorium with more respect and consideration (Lee, 2008). There were several policy alternatives for Lo-Sheng Sanatorium (Hung, 2009). Professors and cultural groups conducted their own analyses of the historic and cultural value of the Sanatorium and developed their policy proposal. Their efforts pushed the Council for Cultural Affairs (now the Ministry of Culture) to develop a plan to save 90% of the Sanatorium. The plan was backed by a technical consultancy company but unfortunately rejected by the Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation. Residents and their supporters asked the government to examine the plan. They also launched a fundraising campaign and collected enough money to put advertisements in the four largest national newspapers explaining the difference between the government’s proposal and the alternative proposed by the supporters of the Sanatorium. The conclusion was that the Rapid Transit System in Xinxhuang could be finished while preserving 90% of the Sanatorium (Cheng, 2013). Unfortunately, construction at the site continues. Opposition to the project continues. A report from the Public Television Service News Network shows that members of the HappyLoSheng Coalition have been monitoring the damage to the Sanatorium as a result of construction. An engineer has also expressed concern that heavy rain and earthquakes could put the residents at LoSheng in great danger because the construction work has destroyed its foundations.11 The Lo-Sheng movement demonstrates the problems of designing and implementing urban renewal programmes, such as lack of participation and insufficient attention to the potential impacts of the plans. Government agencies relied too much on experts to make judgements and did not seek consensus with affected citizens. After decisions were made, there was no appeal process (Zheng, 2009). Supporters organised another demonstration in 2012 to demand that the government stop construction. Although different groups and coalitions may disagree,12 those involved in Lo-Sheng case have learned a lot about the design of the metro station and how it would affect Lo-Sheng. Taken as a whole, other than holding demonstrations to call for more support, participants in the Lo-Sheng case formulated policy proposals, disseminated information, and engaged local residents, politicians, and government agencies. Public engagement drew the government away from economic concerns and forced it to look at human rights, and redefined the problems by instilling concerns for cultural preservation and public safety (Table 9.2).

Lessons learned from Taiwan’s experience of public engagement Participation by citizens and groups helped to transform Taiwan from a nondemocratic to a democratic regime. Participation not only realises the idea that citizens have the right to make decisions that affect their lives, it also increases legitimacy, and promotes dialogue and consensus. Public engagement in Taiwan has evolved 130

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Table 9.2: The contribution of public participation to policy analysis in the Lo-Sheng Case Policy development stages

Possible contribution to policy analysis

Define the problem

Define the problem as a human rights issue Educate the residents at the Sanatorium that they have the right to define the problem Define the problem as cultural issue Raise public safety issues about whether to keep Lo-Sheng

Identify criteria

Ask government not to ignore human rights, culture, and public safety in the interest of economic development

Generate alternatives

Consult experts outside the government to develop possible alternatives Raise donations to put ads regarding policy alternatives in newspapers, disseminating information about policy alternatives Confront government and corporation to discuss possible alternatives

Evaluate alternatives

Identify problems of the plan developed by the Taipei Rapid Transit System Evaluate policy proposals based on technical and public safety concerns

Recommend alternative

Continue to monitor changes after the construction has begun Demand that the Taipei Rapid Transit System stop construction and repair the damage Continue efforts to designate Lo-Sheng as a historical site eligible for cultural preservation

Source: based on the research cited.

with democratisation. Social movements were the dominant means in the 1980s and 1990s for outside groups to participate in government decision making. Since the late 1990s, groups and organisations that once participated in social movements have been transformed into non-profit organisations that collaborate with government to implement public policies. The change in political leadership has not brought an overall increase in participation; the interaction among groups and organisations is still weak. Recent experiments, including citizen consensus conferences, citizen juries, scenario workshops, deliberative polling and surveys, grant individual citizens new opportunities to learn about public policy and express their own opinions and perspectives on policy issues. Although government agencies and experts usually dominate policy analysis and cause citizens and groups to challenge their decisions, participation can contribute to policy analysis in several ways. Using the framework developed by scholars in the policy field, this chapter examines the contribution of public engagement to policy analysis. Public engagement defines a policy problem by looking at the policy from the perspectives of different constituencies. It also helps decision makers and analysts to think about different values. Deliberative pooling and surveys also help the government to understand the views and priorities of citizens. Criteria for evaluating different policy alternatives are based on several sets of values and priorities. Engagement with citizens, communities and experts outside the government can reveal problems and errors in policy alternatives proposed by the government. As we have seen in the cases of community development and environmental impact assessment, citizens possess local knowledge and, with help from outside experts, they were able to offer guidance and make recommendations about policy proposals. In the Lo-Sheng case, supporters were able to propose ways to save the Sanatorium. The public can also 131

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engage in monitoring policy outcomes or changes. Public engagement allows for participatory mechanisms to facilitate oversight. As we have seen in the discussion of national health insurance reform, participants want information about drug prices, about performance of hospitals and agencies, and want to evaluate hospitals and medical professionals. It is hard to say that citizen participation led directly to policy change. However, scholars have found evidence for the achievements of citizen participation in Taiwan. Li (2004), analysing local hearings and demonstrations from 1993 to 2003, found that public attendance at hearings and demonstrations did lead to some major policy changes or improved benefits to local residents. Yu (2002), citing an analysis of 549 public opinion surveys published from 1996 to 2000 in Taiwan, found that 48% of government policies are consistent with public opinion. Based on the surveys of elites and experts he also claims that government policies are actually not more consistent with elite opinion than with public opinion. Experiences of public engagement in Taiwan could be relevant to other democratising countries. Public engagement is of particular importance where citizens have been under authoritarian rule and accustomed to defer to authority. As Hu (1998) argues, political culture may not change with the transformation from an authoritarian to democratic regime. Most citizens can still be passive, do not challenge government authority and do not add their voices to the decision-making process. Besides, social, economic, political, and even gender inequality limit the practice of participation (Chen, 2006). Lack of trust often affects citizen participation. In Taiwan, citizens usually distrust political elites and government, and think that participation of small numbers of participants who are not randomly selected is easily manipulated (Huang, 2003). The development of a political culture that encourages trust and participation is critical. Last, if public engagement is going to make a difference in actual policy making, then people who have both power and knowledge need to value public participation. As Chen (2004) argues, knowledge itself does not dominate the policy process. The citizens have the power to use their knowledge to take control of the process. Decision makers need to understand the power of information and how it affects citizen participation. Meaningful participation must engage in the transformation of attitudes and beliefs of citizens and government officials.

Notes Discussion about previous research into participation here is from the author’s doctoral dissertation ‘Environmental Justice Communities’ Participation and Bureaucrats’ Involvement Efforts in Traditional Participation and Collaborative Processes’ (American University, 2009). 1

The movements are consumers’ movements, local anti-pollution movement, conservation movement, women’s movement, aborigine human rights movement, student movement, new Testament Church protests, labour movement, farmers’ movement, teachers’ rights movement, handicapped and disadvantaged welfare group protests, veterans’ welfare protest, political victims’ human rights movement, Mainlander’s home-visiting movement, Taiwanese home-visiting movement, anti-nuclear power movement, and Hakka rights movement (Hsiao, 1990: 167–177).

2

132

The development of public engagement in Taiwan Other than the movements mentioned in Hsiao (1990), there were the educational reform movement, car accidents victims’ movement, rescuing child prostitutes, and clean election movements (Wang, 1999: 436). 3

For a more detailed discussion of the concept and comparison of different modes of deliberative democracy, please refer to chapters 2 and 3 of Huang’s (2003) book. 4

The Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuen has the major responsibility for promoting participation in important policy issue at the national level. 5

Lin Kuo Ming’s perspective on the citizen consensus conference based on surrogate motherhood conference see www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/rte/myform_detail.asp?id=1159

6

7

Final report of 2004 Citizen Consensus Conference for Surrogate Motherhood, p. 242.

Information about the Chi-Yan community is from Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, 2008 The Practice of Administrative Democracy: Public Participation on Community Issues. Taipei: Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), pp. 77–103.

8

The information about Dan-Shuei Scenarios workshop is from Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, 2008 The Practice of Administrative Democracy: Public Participation on County and City Issues. Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). pp. 33–63.

9

Refer to the interview summary of a participant who works for local environmental protection agency, the Practice of Administrative Democracy: Public Participation on County and City Issues, p. 172.

10

11

The report was published on 24 November 2011 on the website of PTS News Network.

Hung (2009) points out the difference between people and groups involved in the Lo-Sheng Movement. Some were in favour of requesting government compensation for residents while others argued that saving the Sanatorium was the first priority. Some residents agreed to move to the new building while others considered it a betrayal of the movement and resisted moving. 12

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Liu, I-Chun, 2008. The Establishment of Evaluation Indicators of the National Health Insurance Program from Citizens’ Perspective. Taipei: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Executive Yuen, Republic of China (Taiwan) Mitchell, Ronald K., Bradley, R. Agle, and Wood, Donna J., 1997. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. The Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 853–886. Roberts, Nancy C., 2002. Keeping Public Officials Accountable through Dialogue: Resolving the Accountability Paradox. Public Administration Review, 62(6), 658–669. Rowe, Gene, and Frewer, Lynn J., 2000. Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation. Science, Technology and Human Values, 25(1), 3–29. Rowe, Gene, and Frewer, Lynn J., 2004. Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A Research Agenda. Science, Technology and Human Values, 29(4), 512–556. Shen, Ya-wen, 2011. Power and Resistance: A Discourse Analysis of Lo Sheng Sanatorium in Forced Segregation Era (1945–1962). Master’s thesis, Soochow University, Taipei. Silverman, Robert Mark, 2003. Progressive Reform, Gender and Institutional Structure: A Critical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Detroit’s Community Development Corporations (CDCs). Urban Studies, 40(13), 2731–2750. Simmons, Michele W., 2008. Participation and Power: Civic Discourse in Environmental Policy Decisions. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Smith, L. Graham, 1993. Impact Assessment and Sustainable Resource Management. Burnt Mill, Harlow: Longman. Sung, Yu-Hsia, and Huang, Tzu-Hua, 2009. Raising Government Effectiveness with Good Public Governance. Government Resource Planning, 33(5), 18–28. Tien, Hung-mao, and Shiau, Chyuan-jeng, 1992. Taiwan’s Democratization: A Summary. World Affairs, 155(2), 58–61. Tu, Wen-Ling, 2012. Expert Meetings in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process: The Framed Expert’s Rationality. Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, 9(3), 119–155. Verba, Sidney, Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and Brady, Henry E., 1995. Voice and Equality, Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vigoda, Eran, 2002. From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens, and the Next Generation of Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 62(5), 527–540. Walters, Lawrence C., Aydelotte, James, and Miller, Jessica, 2000. Putting More Public in Policy Analysis. Public Administration Review, 60(4), 349–359. Wang, Ben-Chaung, 1995. A Case Study of Conflict Management in the Process of Community Building. Journal of National Lien-Ho Institute of Technology, 13, 107–134. Wang, Fu-Chang, 1999. Social Movement. In J.H. Wang and H.-Y. Chiu (eds.), Sociology and Taiwan (pp. 501–536). Taipei: Chuliu. Winkler, E., 1984. Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism? China Quarterly, 99, 481–499. Yao, Yao-Ting, 2010. Rethinking Governmentality and Everyday Practices: The Boundary Work between Lo-Sheng Sanatorium and Hsin-Chuang City. Master’s thesis, National Taiwan University, Taipei. Yu, Chi-lik, 2002. Public Opinion and Public Policy: A Theoretical Deliberation and An Empirical Research. Taipei: Wu-Nan. Zheng, Zhi-Min, 2009. A Study on the Lo-Sheng Sanatorium Dispute – From Aspects of Vision and Mechanism in UD. Master’s thesis, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan. 136

TEN

Social media and policy evolution in Taiwan Ling-Chun Hung

Introduction The rise and development of online technology in the last several years has reshaped politics and policy making in many ways (Leighninger, 2011: 20). In the United States, President Obama used social media applications such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and YouTube during his presidential campaign in 2008 and 2012. In Arab countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social networking as a key tool in expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts committed by governments. In Canada, economists use Twitter to engage with the public, journalists, politicians, and each other regarding their opinions of public policies (Jeff, 2011). These new forms of online communication and social networking tools are sometimes referred to as Web 2.0 (Anttiroiko, 2010: 18) or social media applications. Although the names (social media, social networking tools, Web 2.0, and so on) are different, they all refer to the use of web-based technologies to create highly interactive platforms through which individuals and communities share, cocreate, discuss, and modify user-generated content, such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and online forums. These applications offer numerous communication, information, and public relations benefits to individuals and organizations (Cain, 2011: 1036). The interactive characteristic of social media allows governments and citizens to exchange information and ideas in a click at almost no cost. However, the government has to be alert to the impact of social media because these new, powerful communication tools are capable of influencing users’ opinions in the realms of politics and policy (Auer, 2011: 709). Nowadays, it is common for firsthand information to be released not in the traditional media but in private blogs, on Youtube or through other social media tools. For instance, during the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, a Singapore resident, Rick Von Feldt, who witnessed the tsunami while holidaying on the beach in Phuket, Thailand created a blog detailing his survival experience.1 In Taiwan, an increasing number of drivers upload videos taped by their GPS devices of car accidents or robberies. When people use social media tools to share their own experiences using words or photos of public events such as disasters without any pre-screening, this sharing can possibly cause unexpected panic if the information contains personal bias or emotion. This chapter discusses how social media changes the way governments interact with citizens. These new digital communication tools provide governments new opportunities to understand and engage citizens. Engaging and empowering citizens are approaches advocated by political scholars in realizing real democracy. However, at the same time governments also face challenges in this digital era because of some side effects created by these new internet applications. This chapter first summarizes 137

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the opportunities and challenges of social media tools for governments; following this, a website launched by the Taiwanese government that aims to promote policy discussion and participation online is examined in terms of opportunities and challenges a government faces; and finally, based on the results of the examination, conclusions are provided in the last section.

Social media and public policy: opportunities and challenges Social media makes two-way communication possible in public policy making. While it engages, motivates, and mobilizes citizens to participate in public issues, it also creates problems such as unequal and self-selected participation. This section discusses possible opportunities and challenges governments face when social media is involved in the public policy-making process.

Opportunities From previous literature, there are several main opportunities which social media creates for public managers in the public policy-making process: understanding citizens’ preferences and attitudes of public policy, enlarging citizens’ participation, encouraging democracy deliberation, and ultimately enhancing public services. First, social media provides users a platform to share their values and opinions. In an era in which most people have a blog, a Twitter or Facebook account, through the feedback and discussions from digital communities, values and opinions of the users are further shaped and shared. For example, during the 2008 American presidential election, around 20% of internet users posted their thoughts, comments, or questions about the campaign on a website, blog, social networking site, or other online forum (Smith, 2009). Likewise the sharing of political preferences, a policy function performed via social media, is becoming more significant. Auer (2011: 716–717) describes a process through which citizens use social media to share and shape their opinions towards public affairs: Whether the public recognizes its favorite Twitter and Facebook personalities as politicians, public administrators, pundits, entertainers, or some combination thereof, the devotees are tuning-in, sometimes with great frequency. Users obtain information about public issues that are important to them, including about the conduct of official U.S. actors abroad, and followers and friends voice their own demands. These expressed demands are followed by others.

By browsing the most discussed forum or highly visited blogs, government can obtain firsthand information of citizens’ concerns and preferences. On the one hand, social media helps government understand citizens; on the other hand, citizens ask more from governments in this digital age: they demand governments’ understanding and quick responses to social issues. Second, because of the development of the internet, citizens are used to acquiring information and shopping online in their daily lives. Therefore, our society has become a demanding, fast-moving one that hungers for immediate and accurate information (Renaud, 2010). For public managers, it is essential to provide 138

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government information through email, websites, and social media tools.2 This phenomenon provides public managers an opportunity to involve citizens in public policy-making processes relatively more easily and at lower cost. Due to the fact that the internet gives those people who have the interest and capacity a much greater ability to find the information, resources, and allies they need to make an impact on public issues or public decisions they care about (Leighninger, 2011), such citizens will tend to participate in public affairs. According to a survey in 2009, nearly onequarter (23%) of internet users in the United States participated in online debate around government policies or issues, with much of this discussion occurring outside of official government channels (Aaron, 2010: 2). Renaud (2010: 11) points to a new model of public participation: In the age of social media, public administrators must wipe clean their misconceptions and begin a new era of participation and interaction. No longer can they rely on newsletters, town hall meetings or community groups as an avenue to gain public support and relay their side of the story. In this new model, governments must use this opportunity to turn new media into a powerful tool to maximize public support behind their policies.

The new model in which governments earn support for their policies in the digital age is to involve stakeholders or even the whole public in the policy-making process by using social media applications. The internet has the potential to allow citizens to have a greater voice in naming and solving shared problems across boundaries. Bittle et al (2009) note that online engagement and participation has matured and produced a wide variety of methods and projects. They provide some examples of online participation: allowing citizens to set priorities, using citizens as fact finders; generating bipartisan buy-in; merging online and face-to-face engagement; helping experts and citizens to collaborate; and fostering local problem solving. Third, online participation is a way to make democracy real. In the past, because of the high cost of direct democracy, a system of representative democracy was adopted by most modern countries. However, representative democracy normally functions under educated and propertied elites. The debate over the balance between direct and representative democracy continues today (Robbins et al, 2008: 564). Roberts (2004) summarizes the advantages of direct citizen participation as being able to promote citizens’ active public spirit and moral character, educate citizens about democracy and democratic ideals, legitimize public decisions, and minimize delays in public policy making (Roberts, 2004: 323–324). On the other hand, Roberts (2004) also provides a summary of the arguments against direct citizen participation as: citizens unable to be rational or dedicated to democratic ideals; too expensive, slow, and cumbersome; and requiring the skills, money, and time that most citizens lack (Roberts, 2004: 324–326). The theory of deliberative democracy has been resurgent in recent years; however, it is impractical for public managers because of the difficulty of holding large-scale political discussions. The internet has been posited as a solution to this problem: it is seen as a tool by which the theory of deliberative democracy can be implemented through asynchronous discussion forums (Wright and Street, 2007: 850). The case in Berlin-Lichtenberg, Germany is an example of online deliberation of a participatory 139

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budgeting process. The Berlin-Lichtenberg participatory budgeting process consists of five-stages. By offering different channels for participation including face-toface meetings and online suggestions/votes, the participant numbers increased to approximately 4,000 people from all parts of the district in 2005/2006 (Bittle et al, 2009). Finally, in addition to heralding the use of social media in promoting transparency, participation and collaboration, governments ultimately wish to use social media applications to enhance public services. Bovaird et al (2009) argue that coproduction of public services is rapidly becoming one of the most talked-about issues in Europe, North America, and Australia. After demonstrating in their research the importance of coproduction for public services, Bovaird et al (2009) urged that collective behaviours need to be advocated, and social media applications offered platforms to encourage coproduction of public services because of the low cost of use and multiple formats of web-enabled communication. Moreover, the social media applications might also broaden their reach to a wider range of potential co-producers. The mass use of social media applications in public policy making can both ensure that services are more in line with users’ needs and are more fully resourced than they otherwise would be (Bovaird et al, 2009: 257–270).

Challenges This chapter argues that governments face various challenges when social media is used in public policy making. These challenges include digital divide problems, decreasing motivation for public participation, too many public voices, and necessary changes in traditional models of public service delivery. First, social media applications seem to resolve the problem that only elites or experts can participate in the public policy-making process because everybody can express their opinions on their blogs or participate in forum discussions as long as they can access the internet. This is why some supporters claim that the internet makes democracy real. However, can ‘everyone’ or ‘anyone’ really participate in the public policy-making process without any limitation? The citizens who are capable of following public issues online or writing their own blogs in order to comment on public affairs are usually well-educated and familiar with modern information technologies. Digital divide problems have been drawing attention in recent years.3 Governments need to recognize the inequality of participation in the use of social media tools in public communication due to the problem of the digital divide. Second, although social media makes it easier for the powerless to collaborate, coordinate, and give voice to their concerns, the fact is that the platforms of social media are built around weak ties. Twitter is a way of following (or being followed by) people you may never have met. Also, you may have a thousand ‘friends’ on Facebook but most of those friends are only acquaintances, not your close friends. Weak ties provide advantages of being the greatest source of new ideas and information; therefore, social media might be effective in helping find a bone-marrow match or getting a lost mobile phone back (Gladwell, 2010). Weak ties work well when you are not asking too much of your ‘followers’ and ‘friends’. When a task requires its participants to devote too much time and effort, such as high-risk activism, the online ‘friends’ probably lack sufficiently strong interest. Gladwell (2010: 47) provides an insight into this kind of online phenomenon: 140

Social media and policy evolution in Taiwan Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by motivating them to do the things that people do when they are not motivated enough to make a real sacrifice.

This might also explain why many people press the ‘like’ button on Facebook pages of public issues, but fewer people show up when an organizer asks people to join a street protest on a particular date. In addition, many public issues need citizens to devote time and effort to understand arguments and costs/benefits before citizens decide to support or reject policy proposals from governments. Therefore, governments should be aware that informing citizens is only the first phase of engaging citizens in the public policy-making process; the difficult but necessary task is to keep citizens mobilized during the whole policy-making process. As Leighninger (2010: 21) argues: Even the most internet-empowered leaders and activists are still up against one of the oldest political realities: Citizen’s influence on the political process is measured not only by the number of people you can mobilize but by the length of time you can keep them mobilized.

Third, because of the rapid development of social media applications, almost everyone on the internet could say something about public policies. Therefore, public managers are confronted with citizens who are far more expert and assertive on policy issues than their predecessors of a generation ago. On the bright side, public managers can have diverse sources of information and analyses for an individual policy. However, too much information might also cause an information-overload problem in the policy-making process. How to make a balance and derive useful information in this noisy age is one major challenge for public managers. Finally, some bottom-up social media projects challenge traditional models of public service delivery. Osimo (2009) gives some examples which seek to challenge, disrupt and improve traditional models of public service delivery from the outside, including PatientOpinion.org, FarmSubsidy.org, and TheyWorkForYou.com. These bottom-up social media projects share common characteristics: they emerge spontaneously out of a problem-solving attitude or for the simple pleasure of a challenge, and they also tend to address one simple goal (Osimo, 2009: 98). One amazing and well-known example is the citizen-generated government portal DirectionLessGov.com in the UK. The website was developed in one morning at zero cost, as stated on the website: We got so fed up with the general uselessness of the multi-million pound shambles otherwise known as the Direct.gov.uk portal, that we decided to build something better in under an hour. Sadly, we ran catastrophically behind schedule, but we still finished before lunch. (DirectionLessGov.com)

These websites focus strongly on usability. With very simple designs and clear communication they manage to make public data more meaningful and useful. These bottom-up projects are low-cost and quickly built up, in contrast to the websites that governments purchase under the limitation of government procurement regulations. In Taiwan, there was a very similar case in 2008 when typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan. From 8 to 10 August 2009, the typhoon wrought catastrophic damage in Taiwan, affecting a large portion of Southern Taiwan and leaving over 600 people 141

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dead, 76 missing and 24,950 displaced. The accumulated rainfall in parts of southern Taiwan reached 2,866 mm, breaking the Central Bureau of Weather’s historic record. This storm was the deadliest typhoon to hit Taiwan in the last 50 years and even now the economic loss is difficult to estimate. On the night of 8 August, web users began reporting the real-time situation on the forum PTT,4 one of the most popular internet social networks in Taiwan. On 9 August, an unofficial Morakot Online Disaster Report Center was established voluntarily by a group of internet users from the Association of Digital Culture Taiwan at no cost to taxpayers.5 They advised fellow internet users living near areas battered by the storms to gather information, such as sustained damage or assistance needed on popular social networking websites including Twitter or Plurk. This website was then integrated into local governments’ communication systems on 10 August and updated from the official disaster response centre (Huang et al, 2010). This case demonstrated that many internet users are willing to share information or even devote their technological skills voluntarily to build up an unofficial website with functions of social media in a very short time. This kind of action challenges governments’ bureaucratic models and slow reactions to public issues, especially in disaster situations. The opportunities and challenges discussed above are summarized in Figure 10.1, which is used in the next section as the basis for examination of a government-built website which is embedded with social media tools.

Figure 10.1: Opportunities and challenges governments face in the social media era Understand citizens’ preferences Enlarge citizens’ participation Opportunities Encourage democracy deliberation Enhance public services

Digital divide problem Decreasing motivation in participation Challenges Too much noise Necessary change of traditional models Source: the author.

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A case in Taiwan: National Policy Think Tank Online The National Policy Think Tank Online is designed to provide a platform for citizens, interest groups, and scholars/experts to communicate and interact with government officers online regarding public policy issues. The goals of the National Policy Think Tank Online are shown in Figure 10.2. The website was launched by Development, Research, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, Taiwan in October 2006. It contains ten functional areas. Three of them provide opportunities for citizens to interact with government. They are ‘Forum for All’, ‘Policy Pitcher’, and ‘Everybody is a Genius’. Only these three areas (functions) of this website are examined in the following discussion.

Figure 10.2: The goals of the National Policy Think Tank Online

Source: Chiang (2008).

In ‘Forum for All’, government departments provide official information about their future projects and development plans, and citizens/potential users can comment on these policy plans. In ‘Policy Pitcher’, in addition to government officers’ inputs, scholars and experts can initiate discussions regarding public issues. In contrast to the previous two areas, ‘Everybody is a Genius’ lets users lead discussions themselves – in other words, users can use this forum to set the public agenda, if the issues are popularly discussed. Following Chen and Pan (2009), the usage statistics of these three functions from 2006 to 2009 are shown in Table 10.1. 143

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Table 10.1: Statistics of three forums in National Policy Think Tank Online Function area

Content

Forum for All

Post count

Last post to June 2009

Data range

users discuss planned projects 11 for policy implementation

25 May 2009

2 July 2008– 25 May 2009

Policy Pitcher

scholars and experts can initiate discussions of public issues

84

9 June 2009

27 October 2006– 9 June 2009

Everybody is a Genius

citizens initiate discussions of public issues

119

21 February 2009

31 October 2006– 4 May 2009

Source: Chen and Pan (2009: 157).

After 6 June 2009, the functions of the National Think Tank Online were merged with the MyEGOV of Executive Yuan and renamed ‘Everybody Participates in Public Policy Discussions’. However, ‘Everybody is a Genius’ was removed in the new version. Also, the function of ‘Forum for All’ was redesigned so that users can vote for their favourite ongoing policies or planned policies, and users can download related survey results to help them understand the public issues. Most functions of ‘Policy Pitcher’ were retained in the new version. Users can comment on public issues raised by experts and scholars as well as on government policy implementations. They can even use RSS (Rich Site Summary) to subscribe to the latest discussions on the forums. Table 10.2 shows the latest statistics from these two interactive forums.

Table 10.2: Statistics of two forums in ‘Everybody Participates on Public Policy Discussions’ Function area

Content

Post count

Last post to March 2013

Data range

Forum for All

Citizens votes for their favourite policies

88

2 January 2013

8 June 2009–2 January 2013

Policy Pitcher

Scholars and experts can initiate discussions of public issues

252

25 March 2013

15 May 2009–25 March 2013

Source: http://thinktank.www.gov.tw/; the statistics are calculated up to 25 March 2013.

After giving the history and some basic information about the National Think Tank Online, the eight criteria summarised in the last section were used to examine the case. On the opportunity side, the National Think Tank Online was intended to provide an interactive channel for citizens to engage in public policy discussions. The three function areas equipped with social media tools indeed provided citizens with open forums to discuss ongoing public policies and express public concerns over issues which were not on the public agenda. The design is an improvement compared to previous tools such as ‘Mayor’s mailbox’,6 because social media tools have the advantages of speed and transparency which encourage open discussions. Moreover, the ‘Policy Pitcher’ provides instant click count statistics for all policy posts to indicate how popular a post is. The most popular post on the main page of ‘Policy Pitcher’ is about the retirement pension, with 144

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19,637 click counts.7 With the large click counts and the function of popularity ranking the posts, it is fair to say that the forum helps the understanding of citizens’ preferences on public issues. However, although many viewers click posts in viewing, few responses to those issues were posted. Among the 19,637 clicks, only 25 responses were posted to discuss pension issues. Besides, these 25 posts were written by only six users and one of them was the post’s author (9 of the 25 responses were posted by this author). Due to the low participation rate, it is hard to say that the forums encourage public participation or public deliberation, or furthermore enhance public services in this case. On the challenge side, since the discussion topics of two of the three function areas are defined/posted only by government departments or experts/scholars, this means the ‘elite’ still dominate the forum discussions. Second, because the three function areas are still in the stages of understanding preferences or encouraging discussions, there is not enough information to know whether citizens would participate in real world events if asked by their government. Third, the posts on the ‘Policy Pitchers’ forum are mostly responses to the original authors’ arguments. The real problem shown on the forum is not too much information or noise but too few responses regarding the issues posted. Finally, the management of the National Policy Think Tank Online was originally outsourced to the private sector to build and maintain the site. After three years of operation (2006 to 2009), some functions of the National Policy Think Tank Online were merged into MyEGOV. The main reason for this is that the project is a three-year government procurement contract. When the contract expires, unless the same firm wins the contract, the operation of the website by the same team is unlikely to continue. Furthermore, because the maintenance of the website is outsourced, it is not easy for an instant fix to be implemented for a reported problem. A user posted a complaint regarding a relatively simple and easily fixable issue. The suggestion was that the website manager change the font colour to provide a better contrast but the response was that the problem could not be solved quickly because the government needed to ask the design/maintenance firm to make the change. In this digital era, it is hard for users/citizens to believe that it takes much time or effort to change a font colour or size on a website. Table 10.3 provides a summary of the assessment of the National Policy Think Tank Online.

Table 10.3 A summary of the assessment of the National Think Tank Online

Opportunities

Challenges

Criteria

Result

Understand citizens’ preferences

Yes

Enlarge citizens’ participation

No

Encourage democracy deliberation

No

Enhance public services

No

Digital divide problems

Yes

Decreasing motivation to participate

N/A*

Too much noise

No

Necessary change of traditional models

Yes

*Not enough information. Source: Author.

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Conclusion All over the globe, agencies and departments at all levels of government are adding Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube buttons to their otherwise static, infrequently updated websites. For instance, in the United States, Federal agencies have been adapting commercially provided social media technologies to support their missions. Take General Accountability Office (GAO) in the United States as an example, with 23 of 24 major agencies using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to aid their work (GAO, 2011). Therefore, it is not a question of ‘should the government use social media tools?’ but rather a question of ‘how can government use social media tools efficiently?’ From the previous discussion of opportunities and challenges governments face in this social networking era and the case examined in Taiwan, there are three conclusions. First, it is easy for governments to add social media application buttons to their websites, but it is hard to maintain a large flow of users visiting these websites. The greatest challenge is that internet users usually have little or no intention to participate in something which needs more than a ‘like’ click on Facebook or a messageforwarding action. Therefore, online participation seems to give public managers a new hope in realizing true democracy, yet at the same time persuading citizens to visit these websites when they have so much to do on the web is a barrier that governments encounter. According to the 2012 report Digital Opportunity for All, 74.3% of Taiwanese internet users have used social media tools; however, although 50.1% of internet users looked for government information online, only 6.1% of them participated in the online debate around government policies or issues and only 2.3% of them participated in online mobilization (Development, Research and Evaluation Commission, 2012). This is the situation in the case of the National Policy Think Tank Online: although the click counts are large, few visitors are willing to post their responses. Therefore, governments need to pay attention to how to manage social media applications and develop strategies to encourage users to participate in these open forums and express their opinions. Next, governments need to realize that social media is only one of the tools which they can use to communicate with citizens. As the Berlin-Lichtenberg participatory budgeting process case indicated, governments need to use multiple communication tools in order to truly engage citizens. The large number of participants in the BerlinLichtenberg case is the result of multiple tool usage, including face-to-face meetings/ workshops and online discussion through social media. In the National Policy Think Tank Online case, the design for involving citizens in public policy-making is still in the first stage – mainly encouraging citizens to disclose their preferences (vote for policies) and respond to government departments’ ongoing projects. In order to encourage citizens to participate in the policy-making process, the Taiwanese government needs to plan for the next stage: inviting the users who frequently express an interest in policy subjects to join workshops or seminars for face-to-face discussions. In addition, the strategy of using multiple communication tools can help decrease the problem of the digital divide. In the past years, some bottom-up cases have demonstrated how social media can help bring about a real change in public policy. In these cases, internet users often gathered in the virtual spaces such as Facebook or Plurk or PTT in response to controversial public issues; they then set a date to protest on the streets in order to demonstrate the concerns of citizens. As long as these street demonstrations attract enough citizens, the government will pay 146

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attention to their arguments. For instance, the ‘White Rose’ movement, a campaign which advocated the improvement of the judicial system in Taiwan, was launched on Facebook and attracted 300,000 online fans. The movement transitioned to a real world protest on 25 September 2010. The movement brought the issue to the attention of the president and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in Taiwan.8 The ‘Sunflower Movement’, a protest movement driven by a coalition of students and civic groups between 18 March and 10 April 2014, is another example of the power of social media. On 18 March, hundreds of students occupied the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, to protest against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). A network of tech-savvy volunteers immediately began to use digital tools to broadcast their message to sympathizers and the public. Soon, thousands of citizens rallied on the streets outside the parliament to support the students inside. On 30 March, just 12 days into the movement, students organized a demonstration that saw more than 500,000 Taiwanese citizens taking to the streets in support of their cause. Finally, the government could not withstand the pressure.9 In a speech, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-Pyng agreed to the demands of the protestors. From the two cases, we know that citizens have already begun to use social media to affect public policies; governments need to follow up and learn how to use social media efficiently as soon as possible. Finally, because many internet users are very familiar with information technologies, they ask more of their experiences with government websites and challenge the traditional models which governments use to deliver their services. The citizengenerated government portal DirectionLessGov.com in the UK and the unofficial Typhoon Morakot Online Disaster Report Centre in Taiwan are two cases which demonstrate that there are skilled volunteers in the virtual world who are willing to help governments deliver their services, even without charge. Moreover, these volunteers sometimes act faster than governments do. In the National Think Tank Online case, as noted, one user could not understand why a government website manager could not make an easy change on the website. It is not easy for a hierarchical government to be available online 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for citizens. Having a partnership with private sectors which have expertise in information technologies might be a solution for governments. However, how to manage confidential government information and keep some flexibility in government procurement in forming a long-term partnership with the private sector (whether a non-profit organization or an individual) will be issues governments need to consider in promoting future collaborations.

Notes Source: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/01/0126_050126_tv_ tsunami_blogs.html

1

Recently, many government departments have even started to build their own applications for mobile devices, such as Taipei City Government has created many applications, and readers can find them here: http://apps.taipei.gov.tw/.

2

A widely accepted and repeated definition of digital divide is the one provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): ‘the term digital 3

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Policy analysis in Taiwan divide refers to the gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard both to their opportunities to access information and communication technologies and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities’ (OECD, 2001: 21). 4

http://pttemergency.pixnet.net/blog

5

www.adct.org.tw/archives/315

Mayor’s Mailbox is a citizen complaints mechanism provided by many local governments in Taiwan.

6

7

The statistics are accurate as of 25 March 2013.

8

www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/04/09-taiwan-yeh

9

http://flipthemedia.com/2014/07/social-media-taiwan/

References Aaron, S., 2010. Government Online: The Internet gives Citizens New Paths to Government Services and Information. Pew Internet and American Life Project. www.pewinternet. org/2010/04/27/government-online/ Anttiroiko, A.V., 2010. Innovation in Democratic E-Governance: Benefitting from Web 2.0 Applications in the Public Sector. International Journal of Electronic Government Research, 6(2), 18–36. Auer, M.R., 2011. The Policy Science of Social Media. Policy Studies Journal, 39(4), 709–736. Bittle, S., Haller, C., and Kadlec, A., 2009. Center for Advances in Public Engagement: Promising Practices in Online Engagement. Occasional Paper, 3, www.publicagenda. org/files/pa_cape_paper3_promising_mech2.pdf Bovaird, T., Elke, L., and James, D., 2009. Co-Production of Public Services and Policies: The Role of Emerging Technologies. In J. Gøtze and C.B. Pedersen (eds.), State of the eUnion Government 2.0 and Onwards, Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse. (pp. 257–274). Cain, J., 2011. Social Media in Health Care: The Case for Organizational Policy and Employee Education. American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, 68, 1036–1040. Chen, D.Y., and Pan, C.H., 2009. Web 2.0 and the Realization of e-Governance: An Evaluation on the National Policy Think Tank On-line. Taiwan e-Governance Research Centre. www.teg.org.tw/web_en/research/view.do?id=37&language=en Chiang, L., 2008. e-Participation Experience in Chinese Taipei. APEC Workshop on e-Governance, Lima, Peru, 27 February 2008. www.teg.org.tw/files/ intercoconference/4/970227_APEC_Workshop_Presentation.pdf Development, Research and Evaluation Commission, 2012. Digital Opportunities for All. Development, Research and Evaluation Commission: Taipei. www.ndc.gov. tw/att/0028380/0028380_54.pdf (in Chinese) Gladwell, M., 2010. Small Change – Why the revolution will not be tweeted. The New Yorker, October 4, 2010, 44–49. 148

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Government Accountability Office, 2011. Social Media: Federal Agencies Need Policies and Procedures for Managing and Protecting Information They Access and Disseminate. GAO-11-605. U.S. Govt. Accountability Office: Washington, D. C. Huang, C.M., Chan, E., and Hyder, A.A., 2010. Web 2.0 and Internet Social Networking: A New Tool for Disaster Management? Lessons from Taiwan. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 10(57). doi: 10.1186/1472-6947-10-57 Jeff, B., 2011. The Economists’ Election. Canadian Business, 84(8): 42. Leighninger, M., 2011. Citizenship and Governance in a Wild, Wired World: How should Citizens and Public Managers Use Online Tools to Improve Democracy? National Civic Review, 100(2), 20–29. doi: 10.1002/ncr.20056 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2001. Understanding the Digital Divide. Paris: OECD Publications. Osimo, D., 2009. A Short History of Government 2.0: From Cool Projects to Policy Impact. In J. Gøtze and C.B. Pedersen (eds.), State of the eUnion Government 2.0 and Onwards. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse. pp. 97–107 Renaud, J.P., 2010. New Media: A Path to the Future for Public Administrators. PA Times, 33(3), 11. Robbins, M.D., Simonsen, B., and Feldman, B., 2008. Citizens and Resource Allocation: Improving Decision Making with Interactive Web-based Citizens, Public Administrative Review, 68(3), 564–575. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00891.x Roberts, N., 2004. Public Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation. The American Review of Public Administration, 34(4), 315–353. doi: 10.1177/0275074004269288 Smith, A., 2009. The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008. Pew Internet and American Life Project. www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/6--The-Internets-Role-inCampaign-2008.aspx Wright, S., and Street, J., 2007. Democracy, Deliberation and Design: The Case of Online Discussion Forum. New Media and Society, 9(5), 849–869. doi: 10.1177/1461444807081230

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ELEVEN

Policy analysis by non-governmental organisations in Taiwan Wen-Jong Juang

Introduction Like all other organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or non-profit organisations (NPOs) vary greatly in terms of mission, size, target, mode of operation and social impact. They also differ in regard to policy involvement and relationship with government. Due to the diversity of NGOs, it is difficult for researchers to define the term precisely. As a result, there are various interpretations in practice. For example, according to the United Nations (UN), any kind of private organisation that is independent from government control can be termed a ‘non-governmental organisation’, provided it is not-for-profit, not criminal and not simply an opposition political party. The World Bank (WB) defines them as ‘private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development’ (World Bank, 1995: 13). The World Bank further identifies two broad groups of non-governmental organisations: operational NGOs, which focus on development projects, and advocacy NGOs, which are organised to promote particular causes. In fact, certain NGOs may fall under both categories simultaneously. One of the differences between operational NGOs and advocacy NGOs is that the former may accept aid from the government, while the latter tend to reject government subsidies, otherwise they might not dare to criticise the government directly. Although a lot of NGOs are devoted to delivering services to their clients – they are social service driven – policy advocacy is also an important activity for them. In this chapter, our discussion will focus on the development of policy analysis by advocacy NGOs in Taiwan. In the broadest meaning, the term advocacy NGOs is normally used to refer to any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ organisations which come together around specific issues and are independent from government. They promote the public interest and advocate social values. In other words, advocacy NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political participation through empowerment and provision of information. Their relationship with government differs depending on their goals, the services they provide, their sources of funding, strategies, regulation by government and so on. Policy advocacy is a communication and promotion process by an individual or organisation which normally aims to influence public opinions, public policies and resource allocation decisions during the public policy formulation and implementation 151

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process. Therefore, issue construction and policy analysis is a powerful instrument for NGOs to draw attention to social issues and communicate with government officials. However, despite recent strong interest in studying policy advocacy in NGOs, very little attention has been paid to exploring their work in public policy analysis. In short, although policy analysis is an important concept in public policy studies and is a basic task in the policy-making process, past research has seldom addressed why and how policy analysis operates in the third sector in Taiwan. One of the important reasons is that after the Lift of Martial Law, most NGOs focused on gaining support from the society and attention from the government by street protests and social movements. NGOs were seldom directly involved in the policy formulation and amendment process, which was under the reign of the government. As we know, Taiwan has experienced political authoritarianism in past decades, and power transfers have had significant impacts on the rise and development of the third sector in the country. Over the last three decades, a wide range of civil movements by NGOs have raised public awareness of the need for the third sector as a cooperative and complementary mediator between the state and the market, have encouraged the emergence of organisations to promote social change, and have contributed to social cohesion and integration. We can find today many NGOs and citizens actively participating in service delivery and policy making in Taiwan. An increasing number of NGOs consist of not only passionate advocates who plan diverse activities to make their voices heard but also sophisticated policy analysts who diagnose the causes and effects of societal problems to prompt governments to take action. Such a movement was also a driving force in the development of the third sector and civil society in the country. Since the formal concepts of policy analysis are well developed, the core task of this chapter is to describe and explain the practices and processes of policy analysis by NGOs in Taiwan. The chapter is framed as follows. First, the normative and practical reasons for and implications of policy analysis and policy advocacy by NGOs will be described. Second, viewing the evolution of NGOs’ involvement in policy processes over the last 30 years will be helpful to an understanding of the background and current situation of policy analysis by NGOs. Third, the observation and description of the types of and approaches to policy analysis by Taiwan NGOs will be summarised. Finally, the chapter will conclude with some implications of, and suggestions for, future policy analysis by NGOs in Taiwan.

Policy advocacy and policy analysis by non-governmental organisations Under the concept of public governance, actors in central and local governments and a multitude of private organisations – both for-profit and not-for-profit – work in many fields to establish policy parameters, implement policy ideals and craft programmatic responses to social problems. Scholars from political science, sociology, non-profit studies, and public management are actively grappling with how to conceptualise the complex policy environments. For example, increasing attention is paid to how NGOs work together in networks with their public and for-profit counterparts to address problems, implement public policies, and deliver programmes (Provan and Milward, 1995; O’Toole, 1997; Milward and Provan, 2000; Huxham and Vangen, 152

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2005; Stone and Sandfort, 2009). This has shown that the government now positively cooperates with NGOs, and this trend has made it possible for those organisations to work in administrative operations, and qualify as problem-solving organisations. Non-governmental organisations analyse, evaluate, discuss, understand, and ultimately develop strategies to influence public policies. From a public policy perspective, the policy process can be divided into five phases: identifying the problem, developing the policy, legitimising the policy, implementation, and evaluation and modification. Although some researchers define the function of NGOs as service delivery or policy advocacy, in fact they have diversified functions which are not mutually exclusive (Hsiao, 2004; Juang, 2006). In the policy process, NGOs function as value advocates, public consultants, political mobilisers, service deliverers, supervisors, and monitors. Before a policy issue is formed, NGOs can advocate certain values and ideas, and promote agenda setting and explanation of issues to attract attention from the mass media and the public. During development and legitimisation of the policy, experienced NGOs can provide consultation services for decision makers and participate in lobbying, thereby influencing the policy design and selection. In the policy implementation process, if the government lacks relevant experience or capabilities, NGOs can be contracted by government , and deliver services through public–private partnership. Even if the policy is implemented by the administrative organisation, NGOs can be external supervisors and evaluators to ensure policy effectiveness and to attribute responsibility for success or failure. In short, at the different policy stages, NGOs provide ideas, information, and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms, and help implement and monitor policies. For a better understanding of the complex structure and process of policy advocacy, we must utilise theories that cross analytical levels. Therefore, it is helpful to use macro and micro level theories to explain the reasons why NGOs choose their functions: service delivery or policy advocacy. On the macro level, institutionalism can be an explanation: function selection is related to organisation leaders’ knowledge of the structure of the current system. Some leaders believe that the organisation is embedded in the current system and that the service delivered by the organisation can make up for deficiencies in the existing structure. Thus they are unwilling to change the current system. Other leaders believe that the current structure has serious flaws, and that the problem can only be solved through reform of the system. As a result, they are devoted to new policy advocacy and seek to make policy change. On the micro level, neoliberalism explains that the situation of the disadvantaged is attributed to personal, social, or environmental factors. Where the unfortunate outcomes result from personal factors, persons should take responsibility for themselves. Meanwhile, NGOs may focus their activities on service delivery in order to help solve the problems. However, if the problem is rooted in social or environmental factors, and only the government can solve the problem, NGOs will then promote system or policy adjustments through policy advocacy activities (Valentinov et al, 2013). In fact, at both macro and micro level, NGOs use their two complementary functions (service delivery and policy advocacy) to solve social problems. The former can mitigate social problems, and the latter can lead social change. In order to clarify the real cause of social problems, and to find a suitable instrument to solve the problems, NGOs should conduct relevant policy analysis. Moreover, once 153

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organisations select policy advocacy as their major function, on the one hand they have to conduct objective, rigorous and in-depth policy analysis, and on the other they have to choose their own representatives and agenda, deal with the media, and plan their own strategies in order to get involved in governmental decision-making processes and to have an impact on public policies. Next, we further describe the implications of and relationship between policy advocacy and policy analysis, and elaborate on the importance of policy analysis by NGOs.

The relationship between policy advocacy and policy analysis Basically, the concept of policy advocacy can be defined as individuals or organizations arousing concern and debate of the public concerning the existing policies or bills in order to affect the direction of government policy or resource allocation for the purpose of common interests of special groups or organizations. Based on this definition, the scope of policy advocacy activities is rather broad. They include press conferences, speeches, lobbying, publishing research reports or polls, setting up social movements, mobilising people to vote, and so on. Hence, the advocacy process includes problem analysis, solution design, empowerment, establishing relationships, and creating networks. In order to advocate a policy more effectively, NGOs from different areas may form an alliance to advocate the policy. The ultimate goal is to lead public opinion and affect policy formulation. Take environmental policy, for example: the policy process involves not only complicated, rigorous, and accurate natural science assessment requiring specialised knowledge and technologies, but also many social and cultural risks which cannot be accurately calculated. Once these risks occur, society as a whole will have to face them. Hence, more citizens and citizen groups need to participate in decision making and work for the public interest (Kaw, 2011). Furthermore, effective advocacy can help individuals or organisations to develop their abilities in order to obtain maximum benefit for those they represent, enhance the public recognition of and identification with the objectives, increase social mobilisation, attract media attention, and promote government response and action. Policy advocacy uses direct communication, education, marketing, lobbying, litigation, and other channels to inform the public, targeted population, or policy makers about the opinions of individuals or groups regarding a certain issue, thus affecting the decisions made by policy makers (Chiang and Chen, 2000; Juang, 2007). Policy advocates should not simply criticise without voicing their arguments, raise questions without suggesting solutions, or promote slogans without taking any action. They must understand and clarify the context of these problems and the attribution of responsibility, propose workable solutions, analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the various solutions, confirm and discuss the viewpoints of different stakeholders, and undertake effective advocacy strategies in order to affect the design and implementation of policies. Policy analysis is key for the advocates in taking those actions. What is ‘policy analysis’? Weimer and Vining (2011: 24) define it as ‘client-oriented advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social values’. In Dunn’s (1981: ix) words, policy analysis is ‘an applied discipline which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to produce and transform policy-relevant information that may be utilized in political settings to resolve public problems’. Dye (2011) asserts that it is important to distinguish policy analysis from policy advocacy. Policy advocacy 154

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requires the skills of rhetoric, persuasion, organisation and activism. Policy analysis encourages policy analysts to tackle critical policy issues with the tools of systematic inquiry. According to Dye’s observation, policy analysis involves: 1. A primary concern with explanation rather than prescription. Policy recommendations – if they are made at all – are subordinate to description and explanation. There is an implicit judgement that understanding is a prerequisite to prescription and that understanding is best achieved through policy analysis rather than rhetoric and polemics. 2. A rigorous search for the causes and consequences of public policies. This search involves the use of scientific standards of inference. Sophisticated quantitative techniques may be helpful in establishing valid inferences about causes and consequences, but they are not essential. 3. An effort to develop and test general propositions about the causes and consequences of public policy and to accumulate reliable research findings of general relevance. The object is to develop general theories about public policy that are reliable and that apply to different government agencies and different policy areas. Each policy field involves laws and regulations, specific technical knowledge about the problem, and the viability of possible solutions. The advocates must identify where administrative authority lies and develop working knowledge through policy by policy analysis. This step forces the researchers to become familiar with the basic institutional context that affects the policy field in question. As mentioned above, policy analysis and policy advocacy are different but are inseparable. Individuals or groups conduct policy analysis with an aim to identify the cause of the problem and persuade the majority to support the desirable outcome so that policy makers can adopt the proposed policy solution. Hence, policy analysis often includes political feasibility assessment, which lays a foundation for policy advocacy. Besides, even though some NGOs are considered reliable and are respected for their extensive research and policy analysis in a particular policy field, they are still aware that to solve or alleviate the problems of concern, they need the joint efforts of other policy actors, including government agencies, professional organisations, the mass media, and the public. They need to build an advocacy alliance with a shared vision and interest, to inform the members of the alliance about the policy, and to share their own experiences and knowledge. Such a collaborative relationship will constitute the basis for successful political campaigns throughout the advocacy community. It is necessary to develop local, national, or international networks of well-informed and instantly accessible advocates to spread the policy message. In a summary of network studies, Klijn (1997) concludes that there are three central characteristics of networks: (1) they exist because of interdependencies between actors; (2) they consist of a variety of actors each with their own goals; and (3) they consist of relationships of a more or less lasting nature. These networks supply advocates with the necessary political communication skills and empirical data necessary for success. It also spurs the actors to establish a dialogue on the policy issues. Next, wide political support can be obtained through various advocacy strategies. In this way, the proposed solution can pass the legislative procedure and become government policy.

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Why is policy analysis important to non-governmental organisations? As stated above, in democratic countries, NGOs are service providers and are important policy advocates affecting decision making. In order to achieve organisational goals or facilitate social reform, NGOs should pay attention to policy analysis. However, government statutes and policies may affect every aspect of the third sector. These statutes and policies decide the rules on the use and distribution of revenues, and sometimes specify the details of organisational governance. To achieve formal recognition, legal protection, preferential treatment in the bidding process, tax breaks, and so on, NGOs must comply with the relevant statutes (Steinberg, 1994). Specifically, the main reasons for policy analysis by NGOs are: first, governmental statutes and policies may impact on their operation, as organisations are regulated; second, government decrees and policies may affect the interests of individual clients who are served by NGOs, and organisations should understand policy in order to be able to defend those interests; third, some NGOs need subsidies and support from governments to survive – they need to know the direction of relevant policy and have the chance to develop it. For example, in recent years the government has promoted culture and the creative industries and social enterprises, and has used policy incentives to encourage cooperation between cultural and arts groups and enterprises, or to introduce entrepreneurship into charities. Non-governmental organisations thus have greater space for development. Finally, for sustainable development or expansion of service delivery, NGOs must understand and participate in government policy. In other words, NGOs are not interested in all public policies. However, the operation of all organisations is influenced by government statues and policies, and no organisation provides services without considering government decrees and regulations. Steinberg (1994) indicated that non-profit organisations must also be sensitive to two other kinds of government policy that are outside the scope of this study – policies that do not discriminate between non-profit and for-profit organisations (such as the minimum wage, pension regulation, occupational health and safety laws, and environmental protection laws) and policies that affect the need for non-profit action (welfare, health services, public education, and the like). For example, most NGOs in Taiwan take note of the Civil Associations Act1 and the Charitable Donations Destined for Social Welfare Funds Implementation Regulations.2 On the other hand, besides general statutes and policies, NGOs of different types pay special attention to the relevant laws and policies, such as the People with Disabilities Rights Protection Act,3 the People with Disabilities Rights Protection Act,4 the Basic Environment Act,5 and the Environmental Impact Assessment Act.6 Environmental groups also discuss, study, analyse, propose, advocate, and lobby for policies related to the management of non-profit organisations and the interests of their clients. According to Weimer and Vining (2012), relevant social values should be fully considered in policy analysis. However, some interests are not voiced in the process of developing and implementing policy. In particular, the views of people with diffused interests or disadvantaged groups that may find it difficult to appeal are easily overlooked. Weimer et al (2001) state that any public policy may have three silent losers: (1) persons who cannot forecast that their interests may suffer; (2) persons who cannot know they suffer damage from the policy; and (3) the next generation. These disadvantaged groups may not recognise the existence of their interests, and 156

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lack political efficacy due to personal limitations, so they fail to participate in the policy process (Tang and Chiu, 2007). At this point, if NGOs can devote themselves to policy analysis, they can represent the disadvantaged, and thus the chance that their interests or views are considered in policy making will increase. At the same time, attention can be paid to different social values. In recent years, the concept of public governance has become popular. Greater focus is placed on citizens’ participation in the policy process. Non-governmental organisations can establish partnerships and policy alliances with government. Some organisations were invited to enter the policy system and participate in various committees within the government. For example, women’s organisation representatives are invited to join the Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights established by central and local governments. Representatives of environmental protection groups can attend the Environment Impact Assessment Audit Committee established by the competent authorities. In order to affect policy formulation by persuading the government to adopt their suggestions, these committees and the organisations represented by them prepare for the discussion of relevant issues prior to the meetings. They play various roles in the meetings, including as experts and as devil’s advocates; they set the agenda, draw conclusions, and provide possible results and goals to persuade the participants to choose the resolutions which meet their goals (Tu and Peng, 2008). In a friendly environment with much more open policy advocacy and more channels for public participation, policy analysis in NGOs has the following benefits: (1) it can provide a complete and in-depth understanding and explanation of the causes and results of issues; (2) it can provide responses or solutions to policy problems; (3) it can allow the direction of the organisation’s development strategies to be adjusted to improve the chance of survival; (4) emotional appeals can be replaced with rational discussion; (5) it can serve as a reliable source of information on media reports and increase NGOs’ social impact. Therefore, policy analysis can decide the process of advocacy, for NGOs need to analyse policy in order to advocate it successfully.

The development of NGOs’ participation in policy in Taiwan In the literature, the traditional economic theory of NGOs pays close attention to their role in service delivery, emphasising their function from the perspective of market failure. However, the policy advocacy functions of NGOs are seldom discussed. The studies by economists are not comparable to those by social and political scientists (Valentinov et al, 2013). In other words, more studies in the fields of social science and political science discuss policy advocacy by NGOs, and further suggest that policy advocacy by NGOs is conducive to the development of a civil society, democratic governance, and rational policies. On the one hand, policy advocacy is a way for NGOs to empower citizens to assert their interests and work together to promote social change. On the other hand, NGOs can contribute to social innovation through the government and policy making. With reference to the practice of NGOs, governments can obtain inspiration to solve public policy issues and problems. Regarding social functions, NGOs play an important role in civil society in the twenty-first century. They make up for the deficiencies of the government’s welfare policies, deal with consequences of the market economy, and re-establish a sense of trust among people through providing social services and care for disadvantaged 157

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groups, an indispensable mechanism to accumulate ‘social capital’. As for political functions, NGOs play an important role in public issues: agenda setting, planning and legislation, implementing and supervising policy. Non-governmental organisations can directly observe the influence of public policy on members of the public, especially socially or politically disadvantaged groups, when they contact their clients and deliver services. They can serve as important bridges for communication between policy makers and targeted populations. Thus, the belief that NGOs should not participate in political activities or policy lobbying is an outdated myth. The relationship between NGOs and the government is increasingly complicated, competitive, interdependent, cooperative, and conflictual, and is coupled with strategic alliances with other actors during the policy-making process. Dynamic policy networks are formed in regard to various issues (Najam, 2000; Ku, 1999; Kuan, 2001; Lee, 2005; Juang, 2006; Tu and Peng, 2008; Kuan et al, 2010). In Taiwan, due to political factors, some NGOs were unwilling to participate in the policy process before the 1980s; however, this situation has changed in the last three decades. Although NGOs have a long history in Taiwan, because of martial law and the authoritarian regime, in the 1950s to 1970s they comprised mostly charitable, religious, and community service organisations. During this period, it was hard for citizens and organisations to express their opinions in public. Most NGOs were closely monitored by the government because of the danger they might influence public opinion. They therefore focused on social aid and charitable work. In another words, the repressive political regimes placed restrictions on NGOs’ involvement in political activities which prevented them from acting independently. Few organisations campaigned on political issues and public policies; the characteristics found in a civil society were lacking. As Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao said: While Taiwan’s economy and society had already reached sophisticated levels of development well before martial law was lifted, restrictions governing the organization of civil groups still hindered the development of nongovernmental organizations. Although freedom of assembly and association were nominally protected by the Constitution of the Republic of China, under martial law such activities were tightly controlled. Charity organizations, religious groups and social service non-governmental organizations were fine, but those that might voice opinions that were different from the government had a hard time gaining approval.’

Prior to the early 1980s, Taiwan was still under the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang (KMT). Therefore NGOs had difficulty becoming involved in policy making. In order to be able to promote political reforms and policy change, some NGOs chose to collaborate with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a major opposition party in Taiwan, to work for constitutional reform, human rights protection, environmental protection, social welfare, and other issues, and they often supported each other in social campaigns and political activities. The political positions of NGOs were not formed in regard to the policy process during this period, and an institutionalised policy network was not yet established. Non-governmental organisations had few opportunities to participate during the policy-making process. Policy analysis by NGOs seemed unnecessary and was seldom undertaken.

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Following the lifting of martial law in the mid-1980s, Taiwan gradually relaxed its political and social control during the process of democratisation. Political obstacles to the development of NGOs were removed. For example, the Assembly and Parade Act was promulgated in 1988, and 1989 saw the enactment of the Civil Associations Act. Consequently, as shown by Ministry of Interior (MOI) statistics, the number of NGOs in Taiwan grew from 11,000 in 1987 to 60,000 in 2013.8 Not only the quantity but also the diversity increased. Take women’s organisations as an example, after martial law was lifted in 1988 such organisations mushroomed. The diversity of their concerns – for example, gender equality, safety, marriage, economic independence, health and medical insurance and political participation – broadened people’s views about women’s issues. This was truly a new era in the history of Taiwan’s women.9 After 1987, NGOs emerged that focused on political mobilisation and policy advocacy. Non-governmental organisations not only provided charitable services but also advocated public policies; they shared some of the public functions of the government. However, the channels for policy participation were still rather limited. Most of the organisations engaged in social movements as a way to show their concern for public affairs (Ku, 1999, 2004; Kuan et al, 2010; Hsiao, 2011). Non-governmental organisations engage in advocacy to defend or promote specific social causes by raising awareness, acceptance, and knowledge. They advance their agendas through lobbying, launching activist events, and working with the media. For example, Taiwan’s Consumer Protection Law, which was promulgated in 1994, has not only provided a legal framework that protects consumer rights, but has also improved the quality of Taiwan’s consumer environment. One of the most significant forces behind the law’s drafting and advancement through the legislative process was the Consumers’ Foundation, Chinese Taipei (CFCT).10 As democracy gradually consolidated, the political system developed multiple decision-making mechanisms where the government is responsive to civil society’s suggestions. The NGOs which serve as critics and supervisors of the government thus have the opportunity to participate in public policy. Since the transition of political power in 2000 political opportunities have created more space for public participation in decision making. In particular, some NGOs, consisting of scholars and experts, participate in government policy through researching and planning policies, consultation, and the auditing of plans (Tang and Chiu, 2007; Tu and Peng, 2008; Liu, 2011; Kaw, 2011). As Ku (2004) indicates, many groups that initiate social movements were transformed into formal NGOs around 1992. The ‘identity’ or ‘welfare’ movements that involved workers, farmers, women, and indigenous peoples, or the ‘issue oriented’ alliances of environmental protection, urban and neighbourhood issues, education reform, and legal reform were institutionalised, and further integrated into the current system. Most organisations still worked together with DPP on those issues. However, the relationship between the NGOs and the DPP as the new ruling party underwent ‘chemical change’ after 2000. Some organisations started to seek cooperation with the government, such as through public–private partnerships in social services and education, or to participate in bill drafting in government agencies. But some organisations chose to stand outside government in order to monitor it. Whichever the case, during this period political participation of NGOs and the policy influence of the ‘third sector’ can be seen in consumer protection, environmental protection, health and medical care, social welfare and public policy formulation in many fields. 159

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For example, the former Minister of the Environmental Protection Administration, Chang Kuo-lung, who participated in the environment protection movement, selected several environmental protection group representatives as committee members in 2005. The environmental impact assessment, which was regarded as formalistic in the past, has become the last line of defence against undesirable development plans (Tu and Peng, 2008). Moreover, the Peng Wan-Ru Foundation has long been devoted to the public care system, and when the second transition of ruling parties occurred in 2008, this NGO was even consulted by the new government (Cheng, 2011). At this stage of democracy consolidation, the policy process regarding the third sector under two main political parties is at the centre of attention since the DPP and the current KMT administration have a more positive attitude toward the sector. We can see that NGOs not only understand the government’s policy process, but also enter the government system and play an important role. Besides, although the laws in Taiwan set restrictions on contributions from NGOs to political parties or politicians, many NGOs still actively participate in political campaigns; and political parties and politicians also look for the support of NGOs. Thus, some NGOs, particularly those which deal with disadvantaged or marginalised groups of people, make appeals during elections. These organisations draw the attention of candidates and political parties to the issues of concern and obtain their commitment by mobilising their members and supporters. After gaining power, the candidates can carry out relevant policies. For example, women’s organisations can request that candidates improve women’s rights after gaining power, and the candidates will agree because they want to win more women’s votes in the elections. Chen Shui-bian was elected as mayor of Taipei in 1994, and fulfilled his commitment to set up the Taipei City Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights, and to invite women’s groups to participate in policy planning and offer suggestions. This move affected the central government, which established the Executive Yuan Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights in May 1997, promoting gender equality throughout Taiwan (Tu and Peng, 2008). To summarise, in the public policy network, actors defend their own interests through various channels and use various means to affect policy decisions. This is typical for a pluralistic society. Largely due to political restrictions, the voice of Taiwan’s NGOs was limited prior to the mid-1980s, when most organisations regarded service delivery as their major mission. Even though a few organisations attempted to affect governmental policy, they could not find an effective approach and remained excluded from the policy-making process. Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, the more open political environment has led to the founding of many non-governmental advocacy organisations and society has been revitalised. This revitalisation is crucial to the rapid development of third sector. The third sector and the government attempted to facilitate cooperation and provided an opportunity for NGOs to participate in the policy-making process. Since then, NGOs have not only delivered services and fostered social movements in order to influence public policy; they also unite to form alliances to lobby for various policies. They have even gained opportunities to enter the government system and deliver the voice of the civil society. In brief, the current policy environment offers a critical window for NGOs to influence and engage public policy making and implementation in Taiwan.

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How do NGOs carry out policy analysis? Public policy represents decisions made by government regarding public service or social control, and an authoritative distribution of social resources and dissemination of social values (Dye, 2011). With the diversification of social needs, scientific and systematic policy analysis should be conducted when the government provides services or makes regulations. Traditionally, the government is responsible for policy analysis. Interest groups and NGOs use social movements to pressure the government and attempt to affect its policies. However, with the development of democratisation and reduction of the government’s resources, and the principle of expanding public participation and emphasising dialogue and communication, more and more interest groups and NGOs are participating in policy analysis. They are making use of various research methods to explore the causes of social problems, and they use different analytical skills to evaluate various solutions to provide workable and effective policy solutions for administrative departments. They can also use bills presented by elected representatives and the results of evidence-based policy analysis to affect the formulation of and decisions on public policy. The two types of policy analysis in NGOs and diversified analysis approaches are described below.

Two types of policy analysis in NGOs Broadly speaking, individuals or organisations diagnose the causes of social problems and propose solutions to assist in public policy planning and implementation after considering different social values. This can improve policy feasibility, solve social problems or satisfy social demands, which are all considered categories for policy analysis. That is to say, policy analysis is a field of applied social science research in which analysts define and frame public problems, identify options for addressing these problems, use reason and evidence to evaluate the options, and sometimes recommend solutions. The purpose of policy analysis is to provide the means for influencing the choice of policies in order to improve society. Under this definition, if NGOs can offer proposals regarding the causes of problems as well as possible solutions, in addition to criticism or oversight of government policy during policy advocacy, that is considered as being policy analysis. In the traditional bureaucratic decision-making model, citizens and groups other than government departments are not considered to have sufficient professional knowledge and administrative skill, or the ability to conduct decision-making analysis, so that rational policies which meet public interests must be proposed by the bureaucrats and technical experts; as a result, the policies could not fully consider the diversified interests and values of stakeholders. However, postmodern policy analysis emphasises that public policy does not possess the qualities of ‘comprehensive rationality’ or ‘single meaning’. Policies are never absolute. Policies contain diverse viewpoints and multiple values. A space for participation in policy making is established through dialogue. Diverse values are injected into the policy (Liao, 2001). Citizens and NGOs are empowered by the opportunity to explain the causes and consequences of social problems, and discuss the policy options with government departments so that policy making can take account of citizens’ perspectives (Kaw, 2011). Policy analysis is a social and political activity which includes the framing and assessment of undesirable conditions as public policy problems, and the systematic 161

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comparison of alternative policies for addressing the problems in terms of the relevant social values (Weimer and Juang, 2004). Among these activities, identifying the problem and constructing possible solutions are the most important. Policy problems are subject to numerous interpretations; they are not inherently objective or factual. Problem structuring is the process of determining analytically, based on input from relevant stakeholders, the most appropriate definition of the problem being faced (Dunn, 2012). The problem definition stage is crucial to the policy process; how the problem is perceived dictates how it will be addressed (Vaughan and Arsneault, 2008). Therefore, every policy analyst, including NGOs, must, within a limited time frame, offer policy makers several suggestions for specific social problems: (1) how to ascertain possible causes of the problem; (2) how to establish correlations between the cause of the problem and the solutions; (3) social values resulting from the solution; and (4) possible consequences of the solution. However, due to limited resources and information, NGOs cannot propose a comprehensive report in line with the above suggestions, but rather only focus on some activities. Thus, policy analysis by NGOs differs in practice. On the one hand, some NGOs are involved in the work of developing new policies for government agencies and other organisations. They have to examine new problems and become involved in research designed to identify what needs to be addressed in public policy. They are also involved in formulating solutions to these issues. This work can include compiling statistics, reading reports and synthesising the information into a meaningful document, and helping government to formulate, implement, and evaluate the policies. On the other hand, they may focus on analysing existing public policy. They are looking for areas that need improvement, to help target populations to benefit from the policies, and to learn more about the political and social landscape in a community. Thus policy analysis includes not only examining existing policy, but also showing how that policy impacts on people, along with critiques of the policy from other organisations.

Various approaches to policy analysis for NGOs As mentioned above, policy analysis by NGOs involves an evidence-based policy advocacy strategy, and should not give the impression of evangelisation or moral appeal. Hence, NGOs must use various social science methods to conduct policy analysis, such as field studies, surveys, experiments, case studies, secondary data analysis, cost–benefit analysis, economic forecasting, system analysis and simulation. Due to limitations of space, we illustrate only common policy analysis instruments for NGOs in Taiwan. The practical application should not be limited to these instruments; they can be combined for practical use. 1. Field study: further exploration and broad investigation of specific policy issues is an important strategy for NGOs to obtain the right of representation and explanation of issues. Additionally, they also serve as an important channel for NGOs to acquire up-to-date information and accumulate knowledge. In particular, environmental NGOs often collect data on the seriousness of the problems, causes, and related evidence, and provide the information to stakeholders for reference to help them to make an independent judgement. For example, in order to promote wetland and ecological protection, Wetlands Taiwan conducted investigation and monitoring 162

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to determine the distribution and scope of Taiwan wetlands and the species living there, establish a wetland database and obtain legal protection for different wetlands in conservation areas, national scenic areas or parks, according to various acts (for example, the Wildlife Conservation Act and the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act) for future management and use (Juang, 2007). 2. Survey: when a policy issue is closely related to the lifestyles or values of the general public or specific groups, NGOs often conduct questionnaire surveys to collect the opinions or attitudes of stakeholders, and the information contributes to the design and evaluation of solutions to the problem. For instance, the Child Welfare League Foundation investigated 1,300 mothers who have children aged 0–3 years through a network questionnaire survey before Mother’s Day in May 2013. The report indicates that stay-at-home mothers are more fatigued than working mothers; they have no sense of achievement because they do not work; and they also have less money and hence suffer more economic pressure than working mothers. In addition, they lack assistance from their relatives or friends. Meanwhile, the application procedure for the childcare subsidies intended to increase the birth rate is too complicated; the payment is not prioritised and it fails to meet the needs of stay-at-home mothers. Only 15% of mothers filed an application. Due to these difficulties, 80% of new mothers have no plan to have a second child. The Child Welfare League Foundation recommends that the government provide child allowances to all families.11 3. Experiment: some policies have potential issues, while some have already caused damage. For the former, their consequences and impact cannot be reflected in the objective data. Thus, NGOs must obtain data through experimentation and testing for simulation or estimation. For instance, in order to enhance gender equality and solve childcare problems for women, the Peng Wan-Ru Foundation attempted to transplant a northern European public service programme to Taiwan. In 1998, the experimental Neighbourhood Babysitter Support System was launched to evaluate social needs and the probable expense. After the establishing a feasible model, it collaborated with other non-government sectors in policy advocacy. Finally, the Nanny and Childcare Policy was adopted by the government and implemented in 2008 (Cheng, 2011). For the latter, when a policy has caused harm, an investigation follows: affected groups can be identified through testing. For example, the Environmental Quality Protection Foundation used test data to demonstrate that the land surrounding the Tai-Chien Company’s An-shuen Plant was severely polluted by high levels of dioxine. The foundation requested that all changes and development plans be stopped until central and the local government completed the control procedures (Tang and Chiu, 2007). 4. Case study: many NGOs stand on the frontline of the implementation of social policy. They are aware of client demands and the core problems earlier and more accurately than the government departments. In fact, in service delivery they can satisfy the needs of clients, know the demands of individual cases, and explore the causes of problems (Cheng, 2011). They can thus evaluate whether institutionalisation of a service delivery process or design of a standard service is necessary. If the number of cases or demand for resources exceeds the capacity of the organisation, they may, through policy advocacy, request that the government departments take over the cases, or even provide the organisational services as advisors to the government departments. 163

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5. Secondary data analysis: in an era of information transparency, government departments regularly announce social and economic statistical indicators. By analysing the data, trends, correlations, and models, the potential social problems can be explored, and solutions can be proposed in advance. For instance, after the Taiwan Healthcare Reform Foundation analysed data relevant for implementation of health care policy, the number of hospital beds was increased by nearly 40% from 1995 to 2010 (112,379 beds to 158,922 beds), and the number of doctors per 10,000 persons was increased by 50% (from 16.1 to 24.1). However, the distribution of medical resources is still seriously unbalanced. For example, there are more resources in the urban areas than in the rural areas; National Health Index’s (NHI) payments for outpatients are more than those for emergency care; and more attention is paid to individual payments rather than medical insurance. After further analysis of other data, it was found that the distribution of medical resources meant that the ‘hospital’s business revenue is more than medical investment’, and that ‘the medical insurance resources provided by the government are better than the actual medical quality obtained by the people’.12 In addition to improving the efficiency of governance and expanding public participation, the government should reform the system of distribution of medical resources, and justify the amount assigned for medical insurance.

Conclusion Non-governmental organisations are voluntary, independent and non-profit bodies, and play many roles in various policy fields. They exploit resources from private and public funders to provide social services or to advocate public issues. They sometimes work together to promote new ways of understanding, change professional practices, share ideas, and develop new public policies (Scott et al, 2006). Non-governmental organisations represent the interests of their members or clients in their policy fields, and advocate policy change or system reform. Those organisations’ participation in policy making demonstrates policy democratisation. Non-profits can check and reduce the government’s bias towards certain interest groups or end the monopoly of advantaged groups. Thus, NGOs involved in both advocacy and services should clearly understand relevant government policies in order to adjust organisational goals or to deliver better service. In this way, government policy making can cater to diverse voices and conform to requirements of social equality and justice to improve government decision making (Chiang and Chen, 2000; Tang and Chiu, 2007; Kaw, 2011). The number of NGOs has gradually and constantly increased, and the range of their activities has expanded in Taiwan. It is also notable that there are unique and active organisations which are engaged in advocating policy as well as devising policy recommendations. In other words, policy advocacy in the third sector has come a long way in Taiwan in the last 30 years. After the lifting of martial law, NGOs in Taiwan gradually gained autonomy from government and more organisations which care about social issues appeared rapidly. They not only provided social services but also advocated social policies; they shared some of the public functions of the government. In fact, the participation opportunities for NGOs in policy decision making have been increasing since the first political power transition in 2000. Opportunities for participation are not exclusive to special interest groups (industrial and business groups). 164

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The motivation and capabilities of NGOs have increased greatly. Since the mobilisation of NGOs many disadvantaged groups, which had long neglected their own interests or had a low degree of participation in the policy process, have overcome their old habit of being free-riders, have resisted policies which failed to meet the needs of social justice and public welfare, and have promoted policy change (Tang and Chiu, 2007). Even NGOs that provide services have realised that service delivery cannot fully achieve an organisation’s aims. When they are in contact with government departments in public–private partnership service delivery they use the opportunity to exchange views with the officials in order to influence government policy. Thus, it can be seen that NGOs involved in service or advocacy must pay considerable attention to the development of social problems and trends in public policy. If the organisations want to participate in and affect the formulation and implementation of public policy, policy analysis will be important for them. Certainly, policy analysis is a skill as well as an art. Scientific methods and political skills are necessary for policy analysts to review the performance of NGOs in Taiwan with regard to policy analysis. The following aspects deserve further study. First, most NGOs defend values (Kramer, 1987). Before any action is taken, organisations should consider their aim and regard policy analysis as the basis of policy advocacy. Although policy analysis sometimes produces unexpected and even politically embarrassing findings, NGOs will, according to their purpose, accept, reject, or use those findings. Policy analysis does not necessarily work in accordance with the principle of coexistence and value neutrality. For this reason, if NGOs can include opposing arguments in policy analysis then the result can be more objective and persuasive. Second, employees in most NGOs do not have an academic background in politics or public administration; they are unfamiliar with public policy and lack training in policy analysis. The process and results of policy analysis tend to be rough and simplified. As policy analysis often uses social and scientific research methods, and combines theoretical perspectives and practical observations to analyse social problems and design solutions, it is suggested that NGOs should gain knowledge of public policy and receive related training on research methods, quantified analysis, and evaluation techniques before conducting policy analysis, in order to improve its objectivity and accuracy. Third, policy analysis often requires professional knowledge and relevant information; especially when complicated policy problems involve knowledge in different fields, it is necessary for NGOs to consider cross-disciplinary cooperation in policy analysis. On the one hand, they can cooperate with other organisations to make up for each other’s deficiencies, learn from each other and submit a complete policy analysis report. On the other hand, they can ally with academic communities to exchange theoretical knowledge, use professional equipment for rigorous investigation and analysis, and elaborate the policy after acquiring adequate information in order to increase its persuasiveness. Fourth, in a network governance model, the power of policy making is no longer monopolised by the government; individuals or groups express their views to government departments through direct or indirect channels of participation and extend political power through alliances in order to lobby government departments to consider their views or interests (Sabatier, 1988; Juang, 2006). In other words, policy making and reform need a coalition to form a political majority. Thus, NGOs 165

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should include political or stakeholder analysis in their policy analysis to identify those that share the same viewpoints and the those that hold different views in the policy network, thus forming advocacy alliances to promote policy change. Lastly, in various cases it can be found that NGOs exert their influence through strategies based on evidence of the direction and content of policy gained through policy analysis. However, not everyone has access to the analytical skills and evidence that NGOs use for policy advocacy. Fortunately, public accountability is now emphasised. Non-governmental organisations can use a network or web forum to present a complete report on their public policy analysis. More people will therefore be aware of the issues and NGOs can set the agenda and achieve the desired policy advocacy effect. Meanwhile, NGOs can collect different views, absorb opposing arguments, and supplement information gained from policy analysis. In sum, in order to promote public governance, it is worth encouraging NGOs to undertake policy advocacy using rational dialogue and evidence-based methods, and to participate in the policy-making process within the political system to achieve their preferred policy outcomes. As NGOs become increasingly professional and independent, with enhanced capabilities for policy analysis, they will be considered as taking a dominant and representative role on certain issues. This recognition will facilitate the promotion of their preferred policy solutions and as a result the goals of the organisation will be accomplished.

Notes The whole enacted text of 20 articles was promulgated by the People’s Government on 10 February 1942. It had been amended several times by the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China. 1

This act was passed by the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China on 17 May 2006. These regulations have been established for the following purposes: effective control of Charity Donations, to use societal resources in appropriate manners, to promote social welfare and to protect the rights of donors. 2

This act was passed by the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China on 2 June 1980. This Act aims to protect the legal rights and interests of people with disabilities, secure their equal opportunity to participate in social, political, economic and cultural activities fairly, while contributing to their independence and development. 3

This act was passed by the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China on 17 December 1984. It was enacted so that individuals with disabilities and/or giftedness would receive appropriate education, fully develop their potential, enhance their personality and empower social services.

4

This act was passed by the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China on 11 December 2002. It was formulated to raise the quality of the environment, advance the health and wellbeing of citizens, preserve environmental resources and pursue sustainable development by promoting environmental protection.

5

166

The role of non-governmental organisations in policy analysis in Taiwan[ This act was passed by the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China on 30 December 1994. It was formulated to prevent and mitigate the adverse impact of development activity on the environment in order to achieve the goal of environmental protection.

6

7

http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?ctNode=1446&xItem=216286&mp=1

8

http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?ctNode=1446&xItem=216286&mp=1

9

www.globalgender.org/en-global/status_page/index/7

10

http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?ctNode=1446&xItem=216286&mp=1

11

United Daily News, 7 May 2013.

12

www.thrf.org.tw/Page_Show.asp?Page_ID=1517

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Tu, Wenling, and Peng, Yenwen, 2008. Social Movement Groups’ Participation and Influence in the Policy Making Process: Experiences from the Environmental Impact Assessment Commission and the Commission on Women’s Rights Promotion. Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, 5(1), 119–148. Valentinov, V., Hielscher, S., and Pies, I., 2013. The Meaning of Nonprofit Advocacy: An Ordonomic Perspective. The Social Science Journal, 50, 367–373. Vaughan, S.K., and Arsenault, S., 2008. Not-for-Profit Advocacy: Challenging Policy Images Pursuing Policy Change. Review of Policy Research, 25(5), 411–428. Weimer, D.L., and Vining, A.R., 2011. Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Weimer, D.L., Chen, Don-Yun, and Kuo, Yu-Ying, 2001. Public Policy Analysis: Opportunities and Challenges in Democratic Polities. In Chilik Yu, Yu-Ying Kuo, and Don-Yun Chen (eds.), Public Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice (pp. 3–30). Taipei: Weber Publication. Weimer, D.L., and Juang, Wen-Jong, 2004. Institutionalizing Neutral Competence in Policy Analysis: Resources for Promoting Objectivity and Balance in Consolidating Democracies. Chinese Political Science Review, 37, 1–36. World Bank. 1995. Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations. Operations Policy Department, Washington, DC: World Bank.

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Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan Guang-Xu Wang

Introduction The structure of governance and management of networks have received increasing attention in recent years with the spread of policy networks aimed at describing policy processes in modern society. It has been argued that it is necessary to understand the internal functioning of networks in order to evaluate how different ties between policy stakeholders produce policy outcomes. Social network analysis (SNA), as a research tool of policy networks, can systematically characterise the power and positions of key players, describing the role stakeholders play in influencing various policy decisions. In addition, SNA adds value by enumerating the linkages between those actors, particularly in terms of how information and political resource are exchanged and who is included or excluded from the process. Moreover, drawing on graph theory and classical sociology (Luke and Harris, 2007), SNA has been widely applied in various public policy disciplines. More and more cases show that if SNA is applied to studying policy networks it can help the understanding of the nature of power pathways and influence in policy processes. This chapter attempts to shed light on this research area by means of a study of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance (NHI) reform between 2004 and 2012. The Taiwan government announced the termination of martial law in 1986, following which Taiwan quickly transformed into a full-fledged democracy (Aspalter, 2002: 4). Thus, the ruling party, Kuomintang, faced a challenge from the opposition party and civil society associations in the late 1980s. In order to cope with these challenges, Kuomintang shifted its attention to the construction of a universal welfare system by integrating the original four insurance systems and expanding coverage from 59% to universal (BNHI, 2007). After more than two decades of democratisation, Taiwan established a universal healthcare system responsible for the welfare of all inhabitants, which has become an important determinant of governmental legitimacy in Taiwan. As some significant research works indicate, healthcare is a social welfare policy, but one that is highly influenced by politics (Weissert and Weissert, 1996; Moran, 1999; Thomas and Gilson, 2004). In Taiwan as well, healthcare is a political issue (Wong, 2003, 2004; Lin et al, 2010; Wang, 2012). The NHI was designed to include characteristics such as compulsory enrolment, a single public player (Bureau of National Health Insurance, BNHI), and contributions shared by employer, employee and the government. Thus, the institutional design of the NHI also can be seen as triangular, with equal partnership between the BNHI, the insured and the providers. Maintaining healthcare systems efficiently and effectively 171

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by collaborating with the providers and insured is one of the most significant missions of Taiwan’s government. However, the government’s financial capacity has gradually declined since 1998, and the promotion of financial reform is a necessary strategy for the government to sustain the NHI system. The maintenance of the NHI operation has gradually increased political pressure on the Taiwan government since 1998. In order to solve financial problems and sustain the universal healthcare system, the government has introduced many proposals not only for increasing revenues but also for containing cost. One of the most important reforms was the promotion of the New Financing Scheme between 2004 and 2012. However, this reform faced huge political resistance from various interest groups and was dropped. It can be said that reform proposals should involve collaboration between a variety of stakeholders that may possess different levels of knowledge, interest and motivation regarding a new sustainable NHI system. The public sector also increasingly depends upon the knowledge, authority and resources of other parties – inside and outside government – for achieving policy goals. Policy formation and implementation has become a network-like collaboration rather than being dominated by the government. Thus, analytical tools and management strategies to reduce complexity and uncertainty in policy networks are very important for policy adoption, especially in the case of Taiwan’s reform of NHI financing. To understand how policy is made, this chapter treats Taiwan’s NHI domain as a policy network. The distribution of power among stakeholders is shown through the interactions of the policy actors, highlighting the relative influence of various stakeholders in order to provide insight into the reform process. In the remainder of this chapter, the extant literature on policy networks and SNA will be discussed briefly. Then, details of the data collection, analysis and results will be presented. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a summary of the implications that can be drawn from this study.

Literature review Policy network analysis: concepts and criticism The concept of the policy network is an appropriate vehicle to indicate patterns of relations between interdependent actors involved in the process of public policy making (Kickert et al, 1997: 6). Undoubtedly, interdependence is the most important characteristic of policy networks, and many theoretical foundations, such as the ‘power/resource dependence’ approach (Benson, 1975; Rhodes, 1988) and the ‘idea’ approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), indicate that the actors in a policy domain cannot achieve their aims without assistance from others through the sharing of resources and communication of ideas. The policy problem nowadays is frequently non-hierarchical and has become more complex in democratic countries. Complicated problems require a combination of various resources and ideas, often owned by different actors. Hence, policy games are created, with actors recognising that they are dependent on others for the realisation of their objects, and with mutual dependencies that are not equally divided across policy stakeholders. It can be concluded that mobilising resources and consolidating policy coalitions is the most important means to manipulate processes in policy networks.

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Policy networks can be found in almost every type of policy domain. Policy network theory aims to avoid excessive bias towards a state- or society-centred approach, and to better understand the complexity of the policy process embedded in the institutional and network structure (Rhodes, 1997; Marsh, 1998). The most significant developments in policy network studies have been through typologies of network structures and their characteristics. Such works have imputed causal power to networks (Hill, 2005: 144). Marsh and Rhodes (1992) highlighted the distinction between different types of policy networks, the most famous certainly being the policy community and the issue network. Policy communities and issue networks can be seen as lying at opposite ends of a spectrum, with a tightly integrated network with dense interactions at one end, and loose members and interactions at the other. The internal structure of a policy network is usually considered to be an independent variable, in that it helps determine policy outcomes (Sandström, 2008; Compston, 2009). In general, the structure of a policy community has more capacity than that of an issue network to steer policy agendas and outcomes. Hence, from an analytical perspective, determining which actors are at the centre of policy networks and which are located at the periphery is an important step in understanding the nature of the interdependent relationships and information sharing that goes on within them. Understanding the exchange relationships and relative positions that exist is also a basic requirement for identifying who has influence over the policy process. Despite the fact that the policy network approach has become one of the main streams among policy process studies, it also has its critics. First, despite having been used to research public processes for many years it is argued that policy network analysis offers a description of how policy processes are organised, but no explanation of why (Hill, 2005: 74). Due to the difficulty of measuring networks, policy network analysis has often been treated as a metaphor, a conceptual scheme, or a management technique (Dowding, 1995, 2001; König, 1998; Milward and Provan, 1998; Thatcher, 1998), and such criticism is quite widely accepted. In addition, policy network theory includes no well-developed research technique with which to identify network boundaries and stakeholders in the policy domain. In empirical applications, this can produce an ambiguous causal relationship between policy participation, policy networks and policy outcomes and has led to the criticism that the approach ‘includes everything and denotes nothing’. Due to policy network theory’s lack of exploratory power, Dowding (1995, 2001) and John (2004) suggest that a possible way to use SNA is as a formal method to improve the techniques used to measure the power pathways in policy processes (Carpenter et al, 1998; König and Bräuninger, 1998; Thatcher, 1998).

The application of SNA in policy network studies As noted above, it can be claimed that the exercise of power, or the influential pathways in policy processes, is absolutely identified by the network relationships between two or more policy makers, rather than by properties or attributes inherent in any individuals or groups. Power relationships can also be asymmetric actual or potential interactions, in which one social actor exerts greater control over another’s behaviour. If we are concerned more with communication and information exchange in the policy process, then we can see that influence occurs when one actor intentionally 173

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transmits information to another, altering the latter’s actions (Parsons, 1963; Knoke, 1994). This also means that influence is possible only when communication occurs between social actors. One actor must transmit a message to another, and the second actor must receive, decode, interpret and react to that message. In other words, influence can also be seen as the relational dimension of power because a communication channel must exist between the influencer and the influenced. The basic units of any complex policy network system are not individuals, but positions or roles occupied by social actors and the relations between these positions (Knoke, 1994: 3). With the structural properties proposed by the mathematical subfield of graph theory, and by sociometry (Moreno, 1941), the study of interaction and structure in social networks moved towards a more consistent theoretical framework and methodological toolbox (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). SNA provides scientific quantitative means and indicators to measure the pattern and structure of interactions between actors. It also provides useful tools for measuring the influence mechanisms or power pathways in an interactive structure. Furthermore, SNA is concerned with the idea of variations in the power of different actors, by mapping the structure of relationships, and especially with measuring ‘centrality’ and ‘prestige’ (Knoke, 1994; Scott, 2002). Research focusing on the influence mechanism of the policy domain has been carried out at both community and national levels (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al, 1996; Lewis, 2005; Wonodi et al, 2012). Based on the basic perspective of network analysis, it can be anticipated that some policy makers control scarce political resources that are highly valued by others. The resource-rich actors typically exchange information or resources for the collaboration and support of their action partners. In a relational perspective, an active actor who has more connections with others also has more opportunities to manipulate or intermediate the policy outcome. In a positional perspective, their central positions within communication and resource exchange networks allows these core actors to coordinate collective actions aimed at achieving their preferred policy objectives. Here the analytical tool of SNA will be helpful in systematically categorising these policy participants in the NHI domain. Considering activities between stakeholders in policy processes, influence relationships involve persuasive communications intended to change others’ receptions and beliefs regarding political actions and their potential consequences in a bounded domain. Over the course of their research on both local and national policy domains, Laumann and his colleagues have increasingly emphasised the flow of information about policy issues among elite actors as the primary social network for the resolution of issues (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Laumann and Knoke, 1987). Also, as the policy network perspective emphasises, actors in a policy network are interdependent because they cannot attain their goals by themselves, but need the resources of other actors to do so (Kickert et al, 1997: 6). Relationships of domination involve exchanges of sanctions intended to facilitate or restrain others’ behaviours as directed by the initiator. Hence, the analytical influence and domination relationships correspond to communication transmission and resource exchange networks, respectively. Here it can be hypothesised that the policy makers occupying important positions or involved in more connections in communication transmission and resource exchange networks are more likely to participate in dominant activities and to be seen by their peers as consequential in collective policy making in the NHI policy domain. 174

Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan

Research methods Data collection and identification of policy players The research into Taiwan’s NHI policy network is based on data drawn from a representative elite of policy participants, who could have an influence on policymaking and implementation processes. All of the samples are categorised according to Laumann and Knoke’s event participation methodology. The policy event of the new financing scheme promoted between 2004 and 2012 was selected to identify policy actors. There is no doubt that multiple significant stakeholders involved in the policy process include official and unofficial actors (Kingdon, 1995). The initial list of actors was made up of those involved in the policy event, and the snowball sampling technique was also used to include those who might not have been on the initial list. After careful estimation and consultation with experts, the preliminary sample consisted of 60 major policy participants. For the list and the participants’ stance regarding the reform proposal please see Appendix 12.1. In order to grasp an idea of the power structure in the policy network promoting the new financing scheme, access network matrices, especially valued information and political resource exchange, are necessary (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al, 1996). To identify the interaction between policy participants in the information transmission network, respondents were shown a list of important participants in their core policy domain and asked to indicate which of them most needed policy information from others. Then they were asked to indicate all of the policy actors from whom they had received information. Finally, they were asked to indicate those policy actors to whom they were most likely to send information. Similar procedures were used to measure political exchange networks.

Data analysis This study applied the software CUINET to measure each actor’s influence on this event, and also used a core/periphery model to map the interaction of information/ resource exchange between these policy stakeholders (Scott, 2002; Knoke and Yang, 2008). For the purposes of this mapping exercise, two different types of ties between the policy elites was used to indicate either stronger or weaker relationships and relative positions on the core/periphery network structure, in order to understand the power structure. The maps presented here are generated by Netdraw, which is one of the visualisation tools of the UCINET package. The actors’ reputation in one pre-existing bounded network structure is an important factor to determine the actors’ ability to access information and mobilise resources. In order to measure actors’ social reputation or prominence accurately, the indicator of degree of centrality was used to calculate the network’s degree of centralisation and individual’s degree of centrality. The network’s degree of centralisation score was calculated based on centrality scores for each individual in a bounded network. Degree of centrality simply counts the direct ties coming in and out from people in a network. Those with the most ties have the highest centrality score, which means their perceived importance in terms of informal resources possessed. The indictor ‘normalised in-degree centrality’ was applied to calculate the actors’ prominence within these complete networks (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 62). 175

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Network plots, or graphs, were developed for each of the network relationship measurements and based on the results of the centrality scores. The visualisation of relationships generated by mapping network connections between actors provides a useful pictorial means for describing links between people. Figures 12.1 and 12.2 show the two types of ties (information transmission and resource exchange) in the NHI domain, with the thickness of the lines between nodes (policy elites) reflecting the number of different types of ties. As Table 12.1 shows, the different shapes of the dots (policy elites) reflect which policy participant a sample is from. The different size of nodes illustrates who gets higher or lower centrality scores. In addition, different colours in network plots show different relative positions in a whole structure.The presence of a tie (arrow) represents interaction between two nodes as described above; the direction of the arrow indicates the direction of influence associated with the primary interaction reported. The arrow points to the node mean being influenced. For example, if the primary form of interaction between node 1 and 2 is provision of information/resource, and node 2 reports being influenced by node 1, then the arrow will point to node 2. Because the direction of influence was taken into account, the maps are ‘directed’ networks.

Table 12.1: Interpretation of network plots Category

Number

Code

Shape

Public sectors

10

A1-A10

Circle

Legislative sectors

9

B1-B9

Square

Employers’ associations

5

C1-C5

Triangle

Employees’ associations

8

D1-D8

Box

Welfare NGOs

4

E1-E4

Upside-down triangle

Medical associations

6

F1-F6

Circle-in-box

Intermediate groups

8

G1-G8

Diamond

Scholars

10

H1-H10

Cross

Source: the author.

Results and discussion As Table 12.2 shows, the information transmission network data is more centralised than the resource exchange network data (51.163%). This means that resource exchange networks are more dispersed than information transmission networks. The table also demonstrates individuals’ centrality measures and viewpoints on the reform proposal for the five highest ranked policy actors in each relationship. Some important differences can be seen between these two networks. First, there are seven policy actors (A1, A10, B1, F1, F3, F5, F6) ranked the top five in degree of centrality in the information transmission network, as against 13 policy actors in the resource exchange network. This reinforces the fragmented structure of the resource exchange network. Second, those who are ranked in the top five in 176

Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan

Table 12.2: Centrality measures for individuals within networks – highest ranked Information network

Resource network

Centrality

Ranking

Centrality

Ranking

Compromise

57.627

1

20.339

1

A10

Compromise

54.237

2

16.949

2

B1

Pros

18.644

5

11.864

3

B2

Cons

10.169

4

B3

Cons

11.864

3

B4

Cons

10.169

4

B6

Pros

11.864

3

B7

Cons

10.169

4

B9

Pros

10.169

4

D1

Pros

10.169

4

D2

Pros

10.169

4

E2

Pros

10.169

4

E3

Pros

8.475

5

F1

Cons

23.729

3

F3

Pros

23.729

3

F5

Cons

23.729

3

F6

Pros

20.339

4

Actor

Policy viewpoint

A1

Centralisation

51.163%

16.662%

Mean

7.316

3.955

Std Dev

10.943

4.669

Source: the author.

these two network structures show different patterns of influence and power. The medical association representatives, including F1, F3, F5, F6, play an important role in information sharing and discussion in the NHI policy network which shows quite a different pattern in the resource exchange network. It is also important that the actors from the legislative sector (B1, B2, B3, B4, B6, B7, B9) and some policy actors representing the employees’ associations and welfare non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (D1, D2, E2, E3) can provide essential political support in policy-making processes. Third, the legislative sectors are also important because of their position as veto players under Taiwan’s constitution. Fourth, in light of the normalised degree of centrality, the scores of the top five policy actors in information transmission networks are apparently much higher than those of the highest scoring policy actors in the resource exchange network. This shows that the five highest ranked policy actors in the information transmission network have more prestige than those in the resource exchange network. For instance, the actors A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI) in information sharing (A1 = 57.627, A10 = 54.234) are conspicuously more 177

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influential and highly regarded than they are in resource exchange relations (A1 = 20.339, A2 = 16.949). Finally, the most important feature is that the policy actors A1 and A10 obviously play a central role in both network structures based on their centrality scores. These two actors may be able to affect the actions of other players with regard to NHI issues. Above discussion briefly shows standing and power of actors in the NHI reform, but cannot give a clear picture of the positions of and interactions between these policy stakeholders. With regard to the interpretation of network plots, those policy stakeholders having the most connections with others are placed at the centre of network plots. The black node means that the policy elites have very close connections with each other in the core position of a policy network and the network structure of those core policy actors can be seen as a high-density policy community in which all participants share basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome. By contrary, the grey nodes occupying the peripheral positions can be seen as an issue network which is more likely not to be influential in policy processes. According to the literature on policy network studies, the structure of policy communities has more capacity than issue networks to steer or manipulate the policy agenda and outcome. It is worth noting that pre-existing stable communication and resource exchange relations are the condition for policy stakeholders to coordinate the campaign and collaborate in a policy domain. Figure 12.1 shows the structure of ties for each of 60 policy participants’ communication interactions in the financing reform. It primarily divides these policy actors into core and peripheral roles in order to demonstrate who is influential in

Figure 12.1 Network plot: information transmission relationship (network centralisation = 51.163%)

Source: the author.

178

Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan

communication relationships. The black nodes show an information transmission network with many strong and dense incoming and outgoing connections, particularly those to the DoH (A1) and BNHI (A10) which have authority in the NHI affairs, and most scholars (H1–10) and unsurprisingly centre around them. Furthermore, most welfare NGOs, including the Taiwan Health Reform Foundation (E2), the League of Disabled Group (E3) and the NHI Supervision League (E4), and some intermediate groups such as the United Daily News (G1), the Daily News (G2), the China Times (G3) and the Democratic Progressive Party policy section (G5) are also central in information sharing and exchange. The interaction between the DoH, the BNHI and some scholars with professional knowledge may form a close consultation platform for coordinating distinctive interests and resolving conflicts in the whole structure of the NHI information transmission network under the regulations of the NHI Act. The positional distribution shows that those who are located in core positions in the NHI information transmission network have a professional and problem-solving orientation. In contrast, the representatives of medical associations, most representatives of employees, the employers’ associations and some representatives of the legislative and the public sectors are not very active in NHI information sharing and exchange. These actors situated in the outer areas can be seen as peripheral, lacking close and strong reciprocal connections with others in the information transmission network. The figure also demonstrates that the actors A1 (DoH, 34 direct ties) and A10 (BNHI, 32 direct ties) share and receive information with numerous other actors in the NHI domain. It is obvious that the two public sector policy actors occupying the central institutional position in planning, promoting and implementing the NHI policies need to communicate frequently with other actors. Also shown in Figure 12.1 is that there are four isolated nodes (B9, D5, G6, G7) who have no communication with others. These four policy actors were quite inactive in information sharing and communication. Thus, a preliminary conclusion is that although the DoH and the BNHI may dominate in the strength and frequency of their communications with most policy stakeholders, other important policy stakeholders such as most employees’ and employers’ associations and some representatives of the legislative and public sectors, have no reciprocal connections with each another. This structure shows that it might be hard for the leading actors to resolve conflicts of opinion and reach consensus among these inactive policy stakeholders with different policy stances. The resource exchange network is illustrated in Figure 12.2, which presents the network structure using the core/periphery technique as in Figure 12.1. The most central policy actors here can be identified from three categories: the public sector (A1, A4, A10), the legislative sector (B1, B2, B3, B4) and all the medical associations (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6), represented as different shapes and sizes. They form a close, solid policy community and appear to have the most lines coming in to and going out from each of them, and calculations of the size of their networks show this precisely. This also means that most resource exchange activities took place in the triangle of interdependent relation between the public sector (the DoH and the BNHI), the active legislative representatives and all medical associations. However, most of them oppose the new financing scheme but the DoH and the BNHI. Thus, although policy actors A1 and A10 are still the two most influential core policy elites in political support relations, they have to compromise their policy interest with other core policy actors in promoting the new financing scheme. 179

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Figure 12.2 Network plot: resource exchange relationship (network centralisation = 16.662%)

Source: the author.

From an institutional perspective, parliament has legislative power under Taiwan’s Constitution and all amendatory bills must be submitted to and reviewed by the Legislative Yuan (the parliament). The BNHI and DoH have to depend on the agreement of the legislative power for policy formation and implementation. On the other hand, the medical associations providing healthcare services and gaining payment from the BNHI under the NHI Act are also very sensitive to any change in regulatory rules and resource allocation. The representatives of the medical associations, with their professional knowledge and huge resources, not only coordinate and collaborate with the BNHI and DoH for health service provision, but also lobby for their preferred policy outcomes in the Legislative Yuan. It can be seen that some ties between these three core policy actors are reciprocal – that is, these policy elites seek political support from each other in the scenario of NHI policy. So far, it seems reasonable to conclude that the policy elites of some legislators act as ‘veto players’ regarding policy formation in promotion of the reforms, both administrators (the DoH and the BNHI) and medical associations are the leading actors in the policy reform. Comparatively speaking, the policy actors placed in the peripheral area are very diverse, and most of them supported the reform proposal. Although some policy actors (B5, B6, B7, B8, B9, D1, D2, E2, E3) have some resource exchange connections with others, these peripheral policy actors hold a disadvantaged position in resource exchange and political support for policy formation. On the one hand, that means they might find it more difficult to build strong connections with the influential actors to affect the flow of resources and the policy outcome. On the other hand, the allocation might also reveal that these peripheral policy actors have less political resources to 180

Policy network of universal healthcare reform in Taiwan

exchange with others in the policy-making processes. In addition, 15 policy actors in the resource exchange network are isolated, including most intermediate groups and scholars. Compared with the core actors in the resource exchange network, these isolated policy actors who supported the reform proposal may be excluded from the NHI reform process. This demonstrates two things. First, these actors do not occupy any institutional position on any governing committees that might allow them to have an impact on policy outcomes under the NHI Act. They do not have votes to exchange or the ability to veto others. Second, these policy actors are not directly involved stakeholders concerning resource allocation and service provision. In comparison with other policy actors, they are active in information sharing and communication, but seem to be inactive in political resource manipulation and mobilisation. That is, they neither seek political support nor have the capability to provide resources to support others in the NHI policy domain. In sum, Figures 12.1 and 12.2 illustrate the usefulness of examining ties between policy actors in the NHI domain. The core/periphery model not only estimates the degree of centrality or closeness to the core of each actor but also visualises the structure of bounded networks. It is obvious that the resource exchange network presents a very different picture from the information transmission network. First, as expected, the density and centralisation of the resource exchange relationships are sparser than those in the communication network, with fewer incoming and outgoing interactions. Second, it is not surprising that the policy actors A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI) are the most central actors in both networks and it seems that these two actors with a high degree of centrality can not only share valuable information but also exchange political resources with others under the NHI Act. Third, in comparison with the members of policy community in the information transmission network, the core members of the resource exchange network construct a triangle of political resource exchange relations between the BNHI, the DoH, some active legislators and most medical association representatives. The alliance can be seen as a policy community with high density, excluding societal actors from reform processes. However, the policy community in the information transmission network was formed by the BNHI, the DoH, most scholars and welfare NGOs. The difference might indicate that information sharing and transmission relations are more related to consulting activities while resource exchange relations reflect the sustainable political mobilisation and lobby activities necessary for the sensitive policy processes for legalisation.

Conclusion Social network analysis was employed to describe the composition, interrelationships and perceived influence of participants in the NHI reform in Taiwan with the goal of understanding the NHI policy network. Some fundamental rules were found. First, the BNHI (A10) and the DoH (A1) are not only the most influential policy actors but are also well connected with most policy actors in information transmission and resource exchange networks in dealing with the promotion of the new financing scheme. These two policy actors with professional NHI knowledge also play the most important role in sharing information and exchanging resources with others. However, the new financing scheme has faced great resistance and has not so far been successful. Although the government plays an important role in NHI affairs, it 181

Policy analysis in Taiwan

is doubtful that the government is strong enough to manipulate the policy-making process in a policy network of fragmented interests. The second main finding was that the role of the medical associations is also important in this policy network. Although they seem not to have frequent mutual connections with the leading actors, the DoH and the BNHI, and are not influential in the resource exchange network, they hold a crucial position for reciprocal interaction with influential actors (the DoH and the BNHI and some legislators) in the resource exchange network. This means that they may be better able than other categories of policy stakeholders to mobilise and manipulate the political option of advocacy and reach their policy goals. It can be noted that a policy community with influence on policy processes is based on the triangular reciprocal interaction between the government, the legislative sector and the medical associations. The third main finding is that most insured participants such as the peak employees’ and employers’ associations, welfare NGOs, scholars and intermediate groups appear to be peripheral and minimally influential, with the exception of two employees’ associations (D1 and D2) and two welfare NGOs (E1 and E2) which were perceived to be highly influential in the resource exchange network but were observed to have infrequent reciprocal connections with the policy community in the policy network. Moreover, some of these policy stakeholders did not have resource exchange relationships with others, and they were not only inactive but were also excluded from the issue. The existence of political cleavages between the insured (the peak employees’ and employers’ associations and welfare NGOs) and the alliance between the government (single player), the legislators and the providers (medical associations) can also be noted. Moreover, the group of the insured lacks the appropriate channels to access and mobilise political resources for policy advocacy and interest intermediation. It seems that the peak employees’ association and the welfare NGOs play a necessary role without having influence in the NHI reform, because of their lack of access to other powerful policy participants. In addition, some legislators can be ‘veto players’ in policy formation processes. Thus, a more general aspect of the political system, election outcomes, which determines party control of the national legislature and administration, are crucial for understanding the role of interest intermediation and authoritative decision making in promoting the reform proposal. It can be anticipated that the interest intermediaries can be consolidated if the alliance between the public sector and the medical associations can gain political support from the majority of parliament. The result has crucial implications for public managers who are responsible for the operation of the NHI. The engagement of all policy stakeholders so they can participate equally in the policy process is a determinative factor for successful policy adoption in a democratic society. Under the regulations of the NHI Act in Taiwan, the triangular governance regime, with equal partnership between the BNHI, the insured and providers, is the core of the NHI operation. However, the current power structure of the NHI domain may obstruct the reform proposals. Although administrators (the DoH and the BNHI) are the leading actors in the NHI policy network, most other core policy actors were opposed to the new financing scheme. Thus, excluding most societal actors in the policy community, the promotion of the new financing scheme ended in failure. Even though the final policy outcome was viewed with scepticism by the policy community, the compromise result still faces profound resistance from the general public within a politically divided environment. 182

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In pursuing later-stage health reform in Taiwan, SNA can help to identify key players, or even key clusters of players, so that the management work of the actors can be more focused and efficient, enhancing the overall political feasibility of the reform. However, to work effectively in this complex political environment, one crucial issue is how the network manager can take action to balance the conflict of interest between the provider and the insured, especially not always to be in alliance with the provider and ignore the insured’s demands. The Taiwan government has now taken action to promote the new NHI system and institutionalise a new triangular governance committee which includes the public sector, the insured and the provider, to be seen as an adoption of collaborative partnership to increase social consensus and accountability, and the NHI’s sustainability. In the future, all reform proposals will be discussed and planned in this committee and the public sector would need more managers with strong collaborative skills to engage more social agencies to work together to achieve the policy goal. If the NHI is to be run by the NHI committee in the future, it is very important for the public sector to have ability to deal with uncertainties in the collaborative network of the NHI committee. Multiple stakeholders with various interests involving NHI affairs and their interactions may increase the complexities and uncertainties of collaborative management and collective decision-making in the committee. One of the most crucial missions is that public managers should be equipped with tools to regulate these. Thus, the findings demonstrate that SNA can be helpful for public managers who need to be skilful at spanning boundaries in order to reach consensus in a collective-action policy environment. Evaluating network management is a necessary strategy for the BNHI to limit interaction costs, build trust and achieve a win–win situation in promoting the NHI reforms in Taiwan.

Note The author would like to thank the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of China, Taiwan for financially supporting this research under Contract No. NSC_1002410-H-024-001.

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185

186

Stance CM P P C P P C P P CM P C C C C P C C P P C C P C

P

No. A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5

D1

Chinese Federation of Labour

Title Department of Health Ministry of Civil Service Ministry of the Interior Ministry of Finance Council of Labour Affairs Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics Ministry of Economic Affairs Taipei City Government Kaohsiung City Government Bureau of the NHI Legislator A Legislator B Legislator C Legislator E Legislator F Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Caucus Kuomintang (KMT) Caucus People First Party (PFP) Caucus Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Caucus The Chinese National Federation of Industries The Chinese National Federation of Commerce The Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises Association of Public Enterprises

D2 P Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions D3 P Chinese General Federation of Craft Unions Employees’ associations D4 C Taiwan Provincial Fishermen’s Association D5 P Taiwan Provincial Farmers’ Association D6 P Committee of Action for Labour Legislation Policy Stance: P – Pros; C – Cons; CM – Compromise

Employers’ associations

Legislative sector

Administrative sector

Category

Appendix 12.1: Policy participants and their policy stances

Scholars

Intermediate groups

Medical associations

Welfare NGOs

Category

H6 H7 H8 H9 H10

H5

No. D7 D8 E1 E2 E3 E4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 H1 H2 H3 H4 P P P P P

P

Stance P P C P P P C P C P C P C P C C P C C P P P C P Prof. F Prof. G Prof. H Prof. I Prof. J

Prof. E

Title Chinese General Labour League Taiwan Labour Union Consumers’ Foundation Taiwan Health Reform Foundation League of Disabled Groups NHI Supervision League Taiwan Medical Association The National Union of Pharmacist Associations China Dental Association The National Union of Chinese Medical Doctors’ Associations Taiwan Hospital Association Taiwan Community Hospital Association United Daily News Daily News China Times Liberty Times DPP Policy Section KMT Policy Section PFP Policy Section Alliance of Fairness and Justice Prof. A Prof. B Prof. C Prof. D

Policy analysis in Taiwan

THIRTEEN

Public policy and administration research Nai-Ling Kuo and Jay N. Shih

Background The first Chinese book on public administration, titled Theory and Practice of Public Administration and published in 1935, was written by the Chinese scholar Jinjian Zhang, considered the father of public administration in Taiwan. In spite of this early published book, the first Department of Public Administration in Taiwan was launched 28 years later in 1963. Before that time, the field of public administration was recognised as a sub-discipline of political science (Kuo and Kuo, 2012). In addition, public policy has been studied under the umbrella of public administration in Taiwan. Jan (2005) notes two sources that drove the development of policy research. The first was in the early 1970s when some academic programmes began to provide series of courses and lectures related to public policy, including Dr Derlad A. McBeath as a visiting professor providing public policy lectures at National Chengchi University, Professor Shuen-jang Tang providing public policy courses at the National Chung Hsing University (renamed National Taipei University in 2000), and Dr Wendell E. Scheaffer as a guest speaker providing several speeches on public policy at the National Chung Hsing University. The other source is associated with government activities in the late 1970s, such as the initiation of a research programme of public policy education developed by the National Science Council of the Executive Yuan, and the redesign of the Government Scholarship for Overseas Study that included public policy as an examination subject. Early publications in this field (hereafter, we do not distinguish the study of public policy from the study of public administration, as it is not easy to do so) were mostly textbooks for civil service examinations. During the 1990s, there was significant growth of public administration literature in terms of quantity and diversity. The rapid change in society along with economic development at that time meant studies about the government and policies were in demand. Meanwhile, a group of young scholars returned to Taiwan after completing their PhD degrees in associated fields in western countries, mostly the United States. They brought new energy to this field of study. Faculty performance evaluation was introduced to universities in Taiwan between the late 1990s and early 2000s. The evaluation programmes in almost all universities use bibliometric data to assess the faculty’s research performance at both individual and departmental levels. A university faculty has to publish as much research work as possible, for promotion, tenure, and even grants or salaries. Although it is intended to evaluate the quantity of research output more than the quality or impact of research, university presidents continue to use this evaluation tool. The evaluation tool is not all negative, however. It allows ‘research management’ to be operated (Moed et al, 187

Policy analysis in Taiwan

1985), and to some degree it avoids the appearance of favouritism in allocation of academic resources (Huang, 2009: 284). In addition, it forces faculty members to contribute to the field of study, and therefore increases individual faculty members’ research capacity. As a result, conducting research work, such as writing books, book chapters, journal articles, conference papers, and participating in government outsourced and sponsored research projects became the priority for university faculty.

Educational background of university faculty In Taiwan, some scholars contribute research in the field of public administration but are affiliated to institutes of political science, public finance, social sciences, urban planning, economics, and so on. On the other hand, some university faculty are in public administration or associated departments but their research mainly focuses on social work, law, or other fields of study. We include tenure-tracked professors and research fellows in member institutes of the Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (TASPAA) as scholars in this field, and glance at their research. According to Kuo and Kuo (2012: 396), TASPAA is an institutional membership organization which aims to promote excellence in public service education. TASPAA has been organized since 2003 to construct a platform for member schools to improve information exchange and education quality. It was established on June 21, 2003 and received official registration and recognition from the Ministry of the Interior on August 15, 2005.The executive council consists of 27–29 member schools and the president of TASPAA is elected every year ... To some degree, the establishment of TASPAA followed the analogous experience of National Association for Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, though TASPAA is not responsible for accreditation. Universities with programs in public affairs, public policy, public administration, and nonprofit management can join TASPAA. Currently TASPAA consists of 32 institutional members [34 in 2012]; among these, 17 institutions are located in northern Taiwan, nine in the middle, four in the southern, and two in the eastern.

The 34 TASPAA member institutes include not only public administration/policy (PA/PP) related departments but also some political science departments, such as the Department of Political Science of National Taiwan University. This is because those universities do not have PA/PP associated institutes but a PA/PP division or major instead. For those departments or institutes, we asked them to identify PA/PP faculty. Table 13.1 shows where those full-time PA/PP faculty obtained their highest-level degree. From the table it is not difficult to see that more and more faculty members have completed their highest-level degree in the United States (about 40.8%), compared to ten years ago when it was recorded at 35.2%. Four universities’ PA/ PP departments have more than 80% faculty obtaining their highest degree in the US. The first explanation could be that more people study abroad today, and the United States is often the first place they choose because of the cheaper living costs compared to European countries and the higher possibility of grants, waivers, or assistantships. On the other hand, it could also indicate that universities in Taiwan tend to hire more US PhDs than they used to. The current faculty performance 188

Public policy and administration research

evaluation system puts more weight on publications in Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) journals, and young professors obtaining PhD degrees in the US have more possibilities to publish their research works in those journals than those who finish their PhD studies in Taiwan. Nevertheless, we also find that PA/PP departments in Ming Chuan University and Central Police University have more than 80% faculty members obtaining their highest academic degrees in Taiwan.

Table 13.1: Where the highest-level degree was obtained (%) Where the highest-level degree was obtained Taiwan

United States

PhD as the highest-level degree

Other countries

2002

50.0

35.2

24.8

96.1

2012

43.5

40.8

15.7

96.0

Note: The 2002 data is from Chiang (2002), and the 2012 data is the revised 2002 data.

Table 13.2 shows the fields of those faculty members’ highest-level degrees. From the table we can see that faculty in PA/PP departments in Taiwan have diverse educational backgrounds. Nearly one-third of PA/PP faculty in Taiwan have their highest-level degrees in fields other than public administration/policy and political science. This implies that the research interests of Taiwan’s PA/PP scholars are diverse, and interdisciplinary research is not unusual. Nonetheless, we also acknowledge that more than 80% faculty in the Department of Public Policy and Management of Shih Hsin University obtained their highest-level degree in public administration or public policy.

Table 13.2: Fields of the highest-level degrees obtained (%) PA/PP

Political science

Social science

Others

36.8

29.8

9.4

24.1

Notes: The data is revised from Chiang (2002) and collected in 2012.

Research output of university faculty Methods In this section, we analyse the types of research work at the departmental level. We web-searched each of the 34 institutes, collected full-time public administration and policy faculty’s latest publication lists, and categorised those academic works as books and book chapters, conference papers, non-refereed journal articles, and peer-reviewed academic journal articles. There are still some practical journals, governmental periodicals, and journals or working paper series that do not undergo an academic review process before publication. These articles are interesting, useful, 189

Policy analysis in Taiwan

and practically important, but we believe they should be distinguished from articles published in refereed journals. A refereed journal is a ‘prestige journal’, which is exceedingly hard to get work published in (Miller and Sharon, 1984: 674; Turner et al, 1976: 173). In this sense, if a paper is peer reviewed and accepted for publication in an academic journal a certain level of research quality is assured. Actually, many PA/PP journals claim that they have peer-review mechanisms, but we observed that some have loose controls on the quality of accepted papers – some journals only ask the reviewer to check off ‘accept or reject’ and do not offer the ‘revision’ option. To make sure we included only the ‘true’ peer-reviewed journals, we adopted the narrowest definition for ‘refereed journals’ written in Chinese – we only counted Taiwanese Social Science Index (TSSCI) journals. The information gathering was accomplished in March 2012. We collected 268 university faculty publication lists; the result is presented in Table 13.3. We have to state that the information we used for the analysis is not perfect. There are at least three departments/institutes have very incomplete publication information on their websites. Also, we are not sure if all faculty keep their publication lists up to date. However, web-searching is the easiest and best way to obtain the maximum information within a limited period of time. In Table 13.3 we show the ‘per capita’ figure for each of the four types of publications, as well as the publication structure, at the departmental level.

Findings Regardless of the type of publication, there are seven departments/institutes with faculty having on average more than 70 publications. Five of the seven departments are in public universities (the name of these universities usually starts with ‘National’ or ‘Central’). Full-time faculty in a public university in Taiwan may have lighter teaching loads, less administrative work, and more academic resources such as access to more foreign digital libraries than those in a private university. This situation has changed slightly in recent years, as some private universities allow young faculty to teach fewer courses and focus on research. For example, new assistant professors in the Department of Public Policy Management at Shih Hsin University may teach only 2–3 courses per semester in the first two years of their tenure,1 and this might explain the fact that faculty in this department are the most ‘productive’ among all PA/PP departments in private universities. Conference papers are usually viewed as ‘preliminary material that will later be turned into rigorous, finished works and formally published as journal articles’ (Drott, 1995: 299). In addition, presenting papers at a conference is a way to increase a scholar’s visibility in the field, and even to develop or enlarge their research interests. The 268 PA/PP faculty shown in Table 13.3 had on average presented 32.7 conference papers up to March 2012. Again, among the seven departments which have faculty presenting more than 50 papers at conferences, only two are in the private universities. For departments with faculty presenting more than 32.7 conference papers on average, 12 are in public universities and 6 in private ones (in our analysis, half, or 18, departments are in public universities). In many cases, conference papers are ‘precursors’ to journal publications, but they have limited impact on individual faculty’s research performance evaluations in universities in Taiwan. Journal articles are obviously more important, especially 190

Public policy and administration research

publications in journals with a good reputation and influence. The 268 faculty in our study published 4,864 journal articles, or 18.1 per person, up to March 2012. Refereed journal articles go through a peer-review process, so it is harder to get published in them and they offer more ‘academic credits’ than non-refereed ones do. For the 4,864 published journal articles, only 980 or 20% were refereed. On average, each of the 268 faculty publishes 3.66 articles in refereed journals, and only the Department of Public Administration of National Chengchi University and the Institute of Public Affairs Management of National Sun Yat-Sen University have faculty publishing an average of more than ten refereed articles. The quantity of refereed journal articles again proves that public universities in Taiwan publish more research work than private ones, since for the nine departments with faculty on average publishing more than six refereed journal articles, only one is in a private university (I-Shou University). Table 13.3 (pp 193–197) also provides information about publication structure of the 34 departments or institutes. On average, 7.6% of the 268 publications are books or book chapters, 59.5% are conference papers, 26.3% are non-refereed journal articles, and 6.6% are refereed journal articles. Conference papers make up the most of PP/PA faculty entire publications, and refereed journal articles the least. This is not surprising, however, since it usually takes as long as two years to have a paper published in a refereed journal, if it is accepted. There are 11 departments or institutes with faculties’ refereed journal articles consisting of less than 3% of their entire publications; seven of them are in private universities.

Publications in TSSCI journals TSSCI Our second unit of analysis is journals in the field of political science that are listed in the Taiwan Social Science Citation Index (TSSCI), which was considered ‘a supplementary standard for SSCI [Social Science Citation Index] on an international scale’ (Huang, 2009: 284). The concept of SSCI was firstly inspired by Eugene Garfield’s idea of using objective standards to discriminate between articles from important academic journals and those from others (Huang, 2009). The SSCI was developed by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) and operated by the Thomson Reuters Corporation. It contains quality social science journals across more than 50 disciplines; almost all of them are English-language journals. Since its launch in 1973, many universities and research institutes have used it as the criterion to assess a researcher’s performance – and Taiwan is no exception. There remain some issues about the procedure for journal selection (Klein and Chiang, 2004), the lack of some important but not popularly cited journals and conference proceedings (Wright, 2000), and the American-oriented standards that may neglect other countries’ academic and practical influence (Huang, 2009). The last argument is essential. There may be no problem for natural science to reach a consensus on what is the contemporary issue in the field. On the other hand, research in social science to some degree reflects the matters of concern internationally and domestically. Hicks (1999: 202) stated that: because social sciences investigate society they are oriented to their social context and are inherently more national. Research agendas are influenced 191

Policy analysis in Taiwan by national trends and by policy concerns of the national government. Social science theoretical concepts are subtle, and without the unifying language of mathematics, are expressed in national languages and can often be fully appreciated only in the original language.

To promote the so-called ‘local value’ of social science, many countries develop their own standards to distinguish leading journals in a specific field of study from other journals, for example the Chinese Social Science Citation Index (CSSCI) in China, the Korean Social Science Citation Index (KSSCI) in Korea, and the TSSCI in Taiwan. The TSSCI is a database sponsored by Taiwan’s National Science Council (NSC) which first launched in 2000. It collects journals in anthropology, psychology, law, sociology, political science, regional studies and geographical science, education, economics, management, and other social sciences. There is an annual review process to ensure those journals are qualified to be a member of the TSSCI family. The selection of leading journals is subjective rather than objective. According to Huang (2009: 285–286), ‘it only collects the so-called top journals as determined by subjective evaluation, while SSCI determines the quality of journals only after it collects and analyzes them’. Since the development of the TSSCI database, almost all universities and Taiwan’s Ministry of Education have used it to evaluation the research quality of individual scholars and the research contribution of the university. A paper published in a TSSCI journal gives the researcher a higher ‘academic score’, used for performance evaluation and promotion purposes, and in some universities even ‘monetary rewards’ (see Table 13.4), than any other papers written in Chinese. Therefore, we used articles that are relevant to PA/PP research and published in TSSCI journals to analyse the research in this field from 1990 to the middle of 2012.

Methods The journals selected for analysis in this chapter have been consistently included in the TSSCI in the field of political science in the last five years. We chose ‘political science’ as a relevant field of study simply because PA/PP is considered a sub-field of political science by the NSC. As a result, 11 journals were selected for analysis (see Table 13.5). Although we selected 11 journals, we noticed that not all articles in these journals are about PA/PP research, except for the Journal of Public Administration published by the Department of Public Administration of National Chengchi University and Public Administration & Policy published by the Department of Public Administration and Policy of National Taipei University. Therefore, our next step was to select PA/ PP articles from the other nine journals. The criterion for the filtering was quite straightforward. We identified whether the (first) author is considered a PA/PP researcher. Thus, an article written by a university faculty in a PA/PP department/ institute/division (active or retired; part-time or full-time), a research fellow working in a PA/PP research institute, or a doctoral or graduate student in PA/PP graduate programme was selected. In total, there were 668 journal articles (see Table 13.6). For the nine non-PA/PP specific journals, Political Science Review published by Department of Political Science of National Taiwan University contributes nearly 14% of total PA/PP refereed articles, while SOCIETAS published by the Centre

192

Dept. of Political Science/1954 4

Dept. of Police Administration and School of Police Policy/1957

Dept. of Political Science/1963 7

Dept. of Public Administration/1963

Dept. Public Administration/1963

Dept. of Administrative Management/1963

Dept. of Public Administration And Policy/1967

Dept. of Public Management and Policy/1977

Soochow Univ.

Central Police Univ.

National Taiwan Univ.

National Chengchi Univ.

Tamkang Univ.

Chinese Culture Univ.

National Taipei Univ.

Tunghai Univ.

Number of faculty counted

11

25

2

16

14

12

Department/year founded

University

Table 13.3: Research output of university faculty

5.8

5.2

1.5

1.9

5.7

6.4

5.8

1.3

20.4

7.2

2.1

7.6

4.7

7.8

15.8

3.3

13.8

40.1

33.0

15.6

68.5

45.0

17.1

20.8

40.1

54.1

34.5

52.5

54.6

49.5

40.8

40.0

%

NPE

NPE

%

Conference papers

Books and chapters

8.0

20.0

36.0

5.3

35.1

24.6

12.3

11.5

NPE

23.6

27.1

39.9

17.9

28

27.2

29.7

23.8

%

Non-refereed journal articles

Research output

0.8

6.3

1.5

2.7

11.8

6.1

1.6

4.0

NPE

2.3

8.4

1.4

8.8

9.3

6.5

3.6

7.4

%

Refereed journal articles

28.5

71.6

72.0

25.5

121.1

82.1

36.8

37.5

NPE

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

%

Public policy and administration research

193

194 8

10

13

Inst. of Public Affairs Management/1992

National Open Univ. Dept. of Public Administration/1993

Dept. of Public Policy Management/1994

Dept. of Public Administration/1996

Graduate Inst. of Law and Government/1996

Dept. of Public Policy and Administration/1997

National Sun YatSen Univ.

Shih Hsin Univ.

Chung Hua Univ.

National Central Univ.

National Chi Nan Univ.

12

3

9

9

Dept. of Administrative Management/1991

Central Police Univ.

3

Dept. of Social and Policy Science/1989

Yuan Ze Univ.

Number of faculty counted

Department/year founded

University

Table 13.3: continued

5.0

0.3

6.7

5.4

9.0

4.1

3.0

2.0

8.8

2.2

10.8

7.3

13.9

4.3

8.8

2.9

32.9

9.3

33.2

52.4

33.5

65.3

13.6

50.7

52.8

26.3

48.5

65.7

47.1

62.8

34.3

53.8

%

NPE

NPE

%

Conference papers

Books and chapters

14.8

2.0

20.7

12.5

19.4

13.8

16.9

12.7

NPE

23.9

8.1

30.4

15.8

27.4

13.3

43.3

14.4

%

Non-refereed journal articles

Research output

4.1

3.7

0.9

3.4

2.8

11.8

0.8

3.7

NPE

6.4

13.3

1.2

4.2

3.8

11.2

1.8

4

%

Refereed journal articles

56.8

15.3

61.4

73.7

64.7

94.9

34.2

69.0

NPE

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

%

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Dept. of Public Affair Management/1998

Inst. of Public Administration and Policy/1999

Dept. of Public Policy and Management/2000

Dept. of Political Science/2001 3

Graduate Inst. of Public Administration/2001

Dept. of Polical Economy/2001

Dept. of Public Affairs/2002

Hsuan Chuang Unversity

Nanhua Univ.

I-Shou Univ.

National Cheng Kung Univ.

National Dong Hwa Univ.

National Sun YatSen Univ.

Fo Guang Univ.

Number of faculty counted

10

2

8

5

5

5

Dept. and Graduate Inst. of Political Science/1998

National ChungCheng Univ.

4

Department/year founded

University

Table 13.3: continued

2.8

10.5

6.4

4.7

1.4

1.8

4.0

1.8

7.1

15.2

7.6

6.8

2.3

8.4

13.3

5.3

26.9

33.5

56.6

50.0

45.0

12.0

16.6

19.0

57.7

34

60.6

52.9

58.9

35.8

38.8

39.3

%

NPE

NPE

%

Conference papers

Books and chapters

7.9

18.0

17.4

11.0

9.6

6.2

8.8

6.0

NPE

17.3

19.2

18.7

12.4

13

20.5

21.8

13.5

%

Non-refereed journal articles

Research output

1.6

7.0

3.9

3.0

5.4

1.4

0.6

6.5

NPE

3.4

6.8

4.1

3.2

7.1

4.1

1.3

13.6

%

Refereed journal articles

39.2

69.0

84.3

68.7

61.4

21.4

30.0

33.3

NPE

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

%

Public policy and administration research

195

Department/year founded

Dept. of Public Affairs and Management/2002

Dept. and Graduate School of Public Affairs/2003

Dept. of Public Affairs and Management/2004

Graduate Inst. of Hakka Political Economy/2004

Dept. of Social and Public Affairs/2006

Dept. of Public Administration and Management/2006

Graduate Inst. of National Policy and Public Affairs/2006

Dept. of Public Affairs and Civic Education/2007

University

Kainan Univ.

Ming Chuan Univ.

Toko Univ.

National Central Univ.

Taipei Municipal Univ. of Education

National Univ. of Tainan

National Chung Hsing Univ.

National Changhua Univ. of Education

Table 13.3: continued

196 8

5

9

8

3

2

9

11

Number of faculty counted

2.6

0.8

2.4

6.1

1.7

0.0

1.7

4.2

6.7

1.3

4

9.4

3.5

0

3.9

15.2

27.1

52.6

38.8

37.1

34.7

3.5

27.0

14.4

56

66.3

56.1

50.8

47.7

10

54.2

43

%

NPE

NPE

%

Conference papers

Books and chapters

8.1

5.4

15.9

17.6

9.7

2.0

12.4

7.8

NPE

17.3

7.1

23.2

24.3

14.9

18.2

25.5

23.8

%

Non-refereed journal articles

Research output

1.3

3.4

4.7

4.0

2.0

0.5

1.2

1.2

NPE

2.5

4.4

6.6

5.3

2.9

2.5

2.4

3.4

%

Refereed journal articles

39.1

62.2

61.8

64.9

48.0

6.0

42.3

27.5

NPE

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

%

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Graduate Inst. of Public Policy/2007

Graduate Inst. of Public Policy/2010

Feng-Chia Univ.

National Chaiyi Univ.

5

8

Number of faculty counted

2.8

1.4

6.3

5.3

16.8

12.6

31.7

38.6

%

NPE

NPE

%

Conference papers

Books and chapters

24.8

11.1

NPE

47.7

35.2

%

Non-refereed journal articles

Research output

0.0

1.0

NPE

0

2.8

%

Refereed journal articles

44.4

26.1

NPE

Total

100

100

%

Notes: NPE denotes number per faculty, which means the average number of that type of publication of faculty members counted by us in that department. % refers to the percentage of that type of publication against the total publications in that department.

Department/year founded

University

Table 13.3: continued

Public policy and administration research

197

Policy analysis in Taiwan

for Political Thought of Academia Sinica has not published any articles written by PA/PP researchers. Finally, we categorised all 668 articles into different themes. The study of public administration and policy contains a variety of themes. To identify important themes for PA/PP research, we followed Houston and Delevan’s (1990) and Wu et al’s (2013)

Table 13.4: Grants for publication in TSSCI and SSCI journals (Taiwan dollars – $NT) University

TSSCI

SSCI

Soochow University

30,000

50,000

National Hualien Teachers College

15,000

30,000

National Taipei Teachers College

10,000

30,000

National Chengchi University

15,000

20,000

Chinese Culture University

20,000

40,000

National Chiayi University

8,000

8,000

National United University

3,000

10,000

The College of Management, Shih Hsin University

10,000

10,000

Tung Hai University

20,000

30,000

Nan Hua University

20,000

50,000

National Chi Nan University

15,000

15,000

Da-Yeh University

5,000

10,000

I-Shou University

20,000

60,000

Notes: The exchange rate between US and Taiwan dollars has been around 30.5 in recent years. Source: The data is excerpted from Huang (2009: 285).

Table 13.5: Political science journals in TSSCI to 2012 Journal

First issue

First included in TSSCI

Issues & Studies

1956

2000

Political Science Review

1990

2000

Soochow Journal of Political Science

1992

2000

Journal of Electoral Studies

1994

2000

Chinese Political Science Review

1971

2005

Taiwanese Political Science Review

1995

2005

Journal of Public Administration

1997

2005

Prospect Quarterly

2000

2005

SOCIETAS: A Journal for Philosophical Study of Public Affairs

2002

2005

Public Administration & Policy

1968

2007

Taiwan Democracy Quarterly

2004

2008

Source: Journal websites and NSC website.

198

Public policy and administration research

Table 13.6 Selected articles by journal Journal

Number of articles

%

Journal of Public Administration (JPA)

230

34.43

Public Administration & Policy (PAP)

166

24.85

Political Science Review (PSR)

93

13.92

Soochow Journal of Political Science (SJPS)

53

7.93

Taiwan Democracy Quarterly (TDQ)

42

6.29

Chinese Political Science Review (CPSR)

24

3.59

Issues & Studies (I&S)

23

3.44

Taiwanese Political Science Review (TPSR)

21

3.14

Journal of Electoral Studies (JES)

10

1.5

Prospect Quarterly (PQ)

6

0.9

SOCIETAS

0

0

668

100

Total

articles and revised the themes to fit Taiwan’s context. As a result, we identified 56 different themes that may cover most of the 668 journal articles. We then classified the articles into the 55 themes, or ‘others’ if they belonged to none of the 55. Public administration and policy is considered to be interdisciplinary, so we did not limit an article to fit only one theme. Nevertheless, we also did not expect an article to include more than two themes since that would make the article too complicated. Classification of articles is not easy, however. The title or keywords of the article do not necessarily tell you the whole story. Also, classification can be very subjective, depending on the individual’s understanding of the article. We did this work separately and independently, and then saw if we could reach a consensus on every article in terms of its theme. We discussed all articles such that we had different points of view. Although it is not objective enough, we did what we could.

Findings The growing quantity of publications by year The incremental trend in terms of the quantity of PA/PP publications from 1990 to the middle of 2012 is obvious (see Table 13.7 and Figure 13.1). The peak of publication quantity (number of articles) occurred during 2007–2009, when more than 50 PA/PP articles were published in TSSCI journals. This may imply the maturity of public administration and policy as an independent field of study in Taiwan, and the importance of public administration research and policy studies has been largely addressed in the past decade. However, it is reasonable to argue that the increase in publications is a consequence of the performance evaluation system. Young scholars have to be more active in getting research results published in order to gain tenure. There has been slightly decline in publications since 2010. Many journals, even 199

Policy analysis in Taiwan

TSSCI journals, claim that they have had insufficient quality research manuscripts for review and publication in recent years. This may be because young professors prefer to submit their research manuscripts to SSCI journals, which usually help them gain a higher research performance score and/or more performance rewards (see Table 13.4 for the grants for publishing in TSSCI and SSCI journals).

Table 13.7 Number of publications by journal and year Year/ Journal

JPA

PAP

SJPS

TPSR

PSR

CPSR

I&S

TDQ

PQ

JES

Total

1990

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

3

1991

0

6

0

0

5

2

0

0

0

0

13

1992

0

10

7

0

3

1

0

0

0

0

21

1993

0

6

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

7

1994

0

5

0

0

3

1

0

0

0

0

9

1995

0

6

0

0

4

1

0

0

0

1

12

1996

0

5

0

0

4

3

2

0

0

0

14

1997

15

5

0

0

1

2

2

0

0

0

25

1998

9

8

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

21

1999

12

5

1

0

5

0

2

0

0

1

26

2000

14

6

0

0

3

2

2

0

0

0

27

2001

7

13

1

2

11

0

1

0

0

0

35

2002

11

15

1

2

2

3

2

0

1

0

37

2003

8

10

3

1

6

2

3

0

0

0

33

2004

16

8

4

0

5

1

1

8

1

0

44

2005

17

8

3

2

7

0

1

0

1

0

39

2006

18

9

3

2

7

2

1

5

0

1

48

2007

23

8

7

1

9

0

0

5

0

2

55

2008

21

8

9

3

4

0

2

4

0

2

53

2009

20

9

5

2

2

1

1

8

1

1

50

2010

16

8

3

3

0

0

1

3

1

1

36

2011

18

8

3

2

5

1

1

5

0

1

44

2012

5

0

2

0

4

0

0

4

1

0

16

Total

230

166

53

21

93

24

23

42

6

10

668

Note: For the codes of journals, please see Table 13.6.

200

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Figure 13.1: Number of published articles 1990–2012 60

50 JES PQ

40

TDQ I&S

30

CPSR PSR TPSR

20

SJPS PAP

10

JPA

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

0

Note: For the codes of journals, please see Table 13.6.

The tendency toward co-authorship Co-authorship indicates that the article was completed by more than one author. In academic terms, co-authorship also means the publication is credited to more than one researcher. Co-authorship increases the productivity of a researcher (Durden and Perri, 1995). Cooperation enhances the quality of the research output, since co-authors may have different specialisations and take care of that part in the paper (Barnett et al, 1988). Although there are still some worries about the ethical issues (Kwok, 2005), co-authorship has become a popular way to compose a research article, primarily due to its efficiency, as stated above. This is also true in PA/PP research in Taiwan. Table 13.8 and Figure 13.2 present the co-authorship of the 668 selected journal articles. Although writing as a single author gives the researcher the whole ‘academic score’, we still observe the trend toward co-authorship from 1990 (0%) to 2012 (62.5% recorded in May 2012). Coauthored PA/PP refereed papers appeared first in 1995, and since then the quantity of co-authored papers has increased. Since 2009, more than 40% of published PA/ PP TSSCI articles have been co-authored. In fact, there seems to be a ‘cooperation’ myth in some universities – in order to increase the quantity of publications, some scholars help each other by adding names of ‘partners’ as authors even if they do not contribute to the research at all. This type of ‘cooperation’ increases the number of publications, since the team member shares their own academic credits with others and gains more credits back without increasing their workload. That is, when joining this team, one can sometimes be a contributor and sometimes a free-rider if there are many team members. This gives rise to ethical problems, and its development should be treated with caution. 201

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 13.8 Co-authorship Year

Number of author(s) on an article

Co-authorship (%)

1

2

3

4

5

1990

3

0

0

0

0

0

1991

13

0

0

0

0

0

1992

21

0

0

0

0

0

1993

7

0

0

0

0

0

1994

9

0

0

0

0

0

1995

10

2

0

0

0

16.7

1996

12

2

0

0

0

14.3

1997

23

2

0

0

0

8.0

1998

19

1

1

0

0

9.5

1999

19

6

1

0

0

26.9

2000

21

6

0

0

0

22.2

2001

27

5

3

0

0

22.9

2002

34

1

1

1

0

8.1

2003

27

3

2

0

1

18.2

2004

36

7

1

0

0

18.2

2005

28

9

2

0

0

28.2

2006

30

7

6

5

0

37.5

2007

35

10

7

3

0

36.4

2008

38

12

1

1

1

28.3

2009

25

17

8

0

0

50.0

2010

20

11

3

2

0

44.4

2011

20

16

6

0

2

54.5

2012

6

8

2

0

0

62.5

Total

483

125

44

12

4

27.7

Co-authorship sometimes means cooperation between university faculty and graduate students. The first type of cooperation could be that of the graduate student as a research assistant in conducting the published research, and the main researcher (the faculty) includes the student as the non-first author. The second type could be that the graduate student composes a thesis under supervision of the faculty (advisor or committee member); when the thesis is turned into an article to be submitted to a journal for review, the faculty is/are included as non-first author. There are still some types of co-authorship between professors and students, and in some cases the lead author does not necessarily contribute more to the paper then the other 202

Public policy and administration research

authors. There are 144 (or 21.6%) articles out of the 668 selected articles that show co-authorship between professors and graduate students, and 30 (or 20.8%) of the 144 articles have the graduate student as the first author.

Figure 13.2: The progression of co-authorship 1990–2012 100% 90% 80% 70% 5

60%

4

50%

3

40%

2

30%

1

20% 10% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

0%

Research themes As stated above, each article was categorised into no more than two themes. For those articles tagged as having two themes, we did not weigh which one is more important than the other. Hence we focus on the ‘frequency’ of each theme addressed in the TSSCI article. Table 13.9 presents the results of our classification, the column ‘times’ indicates the frequency stated above. The total ‘times’ is 831, which mean there are 163 articles related to two research themes. Under this framework, the most prevalent themes in PA/PP research are public budgeting (40 times or 4.8%) and theory of public policy (40 times or 4.8%). Citizen participation (37 times or 4.5%), human resources management (36 times or 4.3%), local government (34 times or 4.1%), and information and e-government (34 times or 4.1%) are also popular themes. Twenty-six of the 163 two-theme articles are related to citizen participation, 20 are related to policy studies, and 19 are related to information and e-government. On the other hand, there are 27 themes that have appeared less (fewer than 10 articles) in our database, including competence of governance (0 times), innovation (1 time), strategic management (1 time), and benchmark learning (1 time). In fact, 94 articles could not be classified according to any of the 55 categories. This implies the breadth and diversity of this field of study, which might be harmful to research debates and exchange of ideas. In some years more articles are related to a specific area – for example, there were six articles related to ‘citizen participation’ in 2007 and 2008, while it is not so popular in other recorded years. However, we find no concrete evidence that there is a ‘contemporary research theme’ in each period of time (see Figure 13.3). 203

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 13.9: Research themes Themes

Times

%

Themes

Times

%

Administrative theory

26

3.1

Decision making

7

0.8

Institutional theory

14

1.7

General management

3

0.4

Administrative Law

2

0.2

NPM

9

1.1

Governmental structure

9

1.1

International reinventing experiences

15

1.8

Organisation

22

2.6

Reinventing in Taiwan

12

1.4

Bureaucracy

16

1.9

Institutional reform

7

0.8

Organisational behaviour

17

2.0

Privatisation

13

1.6

Leadership

5

0.6

Contracting

12

1.4

Organisational trust

2

0.2

PPP

13

1.6

Governance theory

25

3.0

Benchmark learning

1

0.1

Governance competence

0

0.0

Strategic management

1

0.1

Policy network

15

1.8

Human resources management

36

4.3

Social capital

12

1.4

Performance management

26

3.1

NGO

3

0.4

Knowledge management

11

1.3

NPO

26

3.1

Service quality

3

0.4

Community partnership

12

1.4

Marketing

7

0.8

Inter-organisational relationships

4

0.5

Innovation

1

0.1

Disaster rescue system

3

0.4

Risk management

2

0.2

Local government

34

4.1

Crisis management

8

1.0

Intergovernmental relations

20

2.4

Public budgeting

40

4.8

Theory of public policy

40

4.8

Information and e-government

34

4.1

Policy/programme evaluation

5

0.6

Administration under democracy

15

1.8

Policy implement

8

1.0

Citizen participation

37

4.5

Policy tools

2

0.2

Deliberative democracy

22

2.6

Policy planning

12

1.4

Administrative ethics

8

1.0

Policy studies

32

3.9

Corruption

6

0.7

Policy related to sustainability

9

1.1

Neutral competence

2

0.2

Regulatory policy

11

1.3

Others

94

11.3

204

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Figure 13.3: Number of published articles in the most popular six themes, by year 25

20 Information and e-government Local government

15

Human resources management Citizen participation

10

Theory of public policy Public budgeting

5

0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Conclusion In this chapter we investigated Taiwan’s PA/PP research. We analysed the number of publications at the departmental level, and found that faculty in public universities are in general more ‘productive’ than those in private universities. This may be due to the different requirements and expectations of a university faculty between the public and private universities. We also analysed the research content using PA/PP related TSSCI journals as our object. The quantity of published TSSCI PA/PP articles has increased compared to ten years ago – while some journals claim that there have been insufficient quality manuscripts for review and publication in the last two years. In addition, co-authorship has gradually become common in PA/PP publications. Co-authorship has a good side as well as a bad side; the free-rider problem and the ‘cooperation’ feature should be noted. Finally, we identified 55 research themes and categorised the selected TSSCI journal articles under them. There were still 94 articles that could not fit any of the themes. This implies that the interdisciplinary nature of PA/PP as a field of study may increase the diversity of PA/PP research, but it may also make research debate challenging.

Note A full time faculty member usually teaches 4–5 courses per semester in most private universities in Taiwan.

205

Policy analysis in Taiwan

References Barnett, Andy H., Ault, Richard W., and Kaserman, David L., 1988. The Rising Incidence of Co-authorship in Economics: Further Evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(3), 539–543. Chiang, Min-Hsiu, 2002. Rethinking Public Policy Education in Taiwan (paper presented at the Conference on Memory of Jinjian Zhang, 1/11/2002, Taipei). Drott, M. Carl, 1995. Reexamining the Role of Conference Papers in Scholarly Communication. Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 46(4), 299–305. Durden, Garey C., and Perri, Timothy J., 1995. Coauthorship and Publication Efficiency. Atlantic Economic Journal, 23(1), 69–76. Hicks, Diana, 1999. The Difficulty of Achieving Full Coverage of International Social Science Literature and the Bibliometric Consequences. Scientometrics, 44(2), 193–215. Houston, David J., and Delevan, Sybil M., 1990. Public Administration Research: An Assessment of Journal Publications. Public Administration Review, 50(6), 674–681. Huang, Arthur Hou‐ming, 2009. Science as Ideology: SSCI, TSSCI and the Evaluation System of Social Sciences in Taiwan. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 10(2), 282–291. Jan, Chung-Yuang, 2005. The Study of Taiwan’s Public Administration History: Theoretical Evolution and Practical Development [in Chinese] (paper presented at the Annual Conference of Chinese Society for Public Administration, 26/11/2005, Taipei). Klein, Daniel B., and Chiang, Eric, 2004. The Social Science Citation Index: A Black Box – with an Ideological Bias? Econ Journal Watch, 1(1), 134–165. Kuo, Yu-Ying, and Kuo, Nai-Ling, 2012. Taiwan’s Public Policy Education: USStyle? Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 14(5), 391–409. Kwok, L.S., 2005. The White Bull Effect: Abusive Coauthorship and Publication Parasitism. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31(9), 554–556. Miller, A. Carolyn, and Sharon, L. Serzan, 1984. Criteria for Identifying a Refereed Journal. The Journal of Higher Education, 55(6), 673–699. Moed, H.F., Burger, W.J.M., Frankfort, J.G., and Van Raan, A.F.J., 1985. The Use of Bibliometric Data for the Measurement of University Research Performance. Research Policy, 14(3), 131–149. Turner, Ralph H., Turk, Austin T., Stinchcombe, Arthur L., Schuessler, Karl, Psathas, George, Mueller, Samuel A., Poloma, Margaret M., Levinsohn, Florence H. and Hughes, Helen MacGill, 1976. Replies to Calvin Peters. The American Sociologist, 11(3): 168–179. Wright, Richard A., 2000. Recent Changes in the Most-cited Scholars in Criminology: A Comparison of Textbooks and Journals. Journal of Criminal Justice, 28(2), 117–128. Wu, X.U.N., He, Yan-Ling, and Tung-Wen Sun, Milan, 2013. Public Administration Research in Mainland China and Taiwan: An Assessment of Journal Publications, 1998–2008. Public Administration, 91(2): 261–280.

206

FOURTEEN

Too critical to ignore? A tri-dimensional relationship examination of policy analysis internship in Taiwan Chun-Ming Chen

Introduction Although there is widespread agreement among public administration and associated faculties that internship can contribute towards relating classroom learning to real-life practice, Taiwan did not witness its first internship programme until 1999. Despite a slow start, the growing number of internship programmes1 could be a positive sign for public administration education. Although literature on medical or educational internship exists, there is a paucity of public administration and management literature on the subject. More alarming is the fact that, with the exception of a single conference paper, there is no systematic research describing and assessing the achievements of internship programmes in Taiwan. This is most likely due to the fact that few coordinators of internship programmes at specific universities have presented their internships consistently, with coordinators ignorant of programmes at other universities. Furthermore, information presented on the homepages of various departments reveals little of value. Beyond the vague notion that the internship exercise aims to help students relate the theory taught in their course to what happens in practice there is a general lack of clarity about the objectives pursued as put forward by the various training documents released by individual universities. For this reason, there exists a pressing need to examine both the successes and limitations of Taiwan’s various internship programmes run by departments of public administration and related fields. More specifically, the chapter endeavours to identify: what internship programmes look like in general; what typical problems departments have to deal with in regard to internship; what observations supervisors of host agencies made of interns during their internship; how interns reflect what they have experienced. This study is based on analysis of six student internship journals of Shih Hsin University (SHU), as well as in-depth personal interviews with two agency supervisors (S) and three programme coordinators (C), and one intern (I) from another university. This chapter considers internship to be a form of learning which can contribute to effective public administration and management. To maintain a comprehensive perspective across various departments of public policy, public administration and public management and related fields, this chapter follows Chauhan (1977: 197–212) and Baker (2003: 233–238) by focusing on the identification of three dimensions of interagency relationships, namely, college internship coordinators, students (interns) 207

Policy analysis in Taiwan

and host organisation supervisors, concerning Taiwanese internship programmes. The coordinator, intern and supervisor relationship is shown in Figure 14.1.

Figure 14.1: Relationships among college internship coordinators, students (interns) and host organisation supervisors College internship coordinators

Students (interns)

Host organization supervisors

This study could prove helpful in revising internship experiences so that internship programmes are more beneficial to all three parties: the interns, the placement agency and the university. Research internship differs from work experience since the former students are required to conduct a research project with or within a political organisation through a couple of weeks of coursework on the policy process. In addition, unlike a field work assignment, internship gives the student a perspective from within a political organisation (Moon and Schokman, 2000: 170) Denhardt (2001: 526–534) took a human development process view of ‘The Big Questions2 of Public Administration Education’ in an attempt to determine the answer by offering a relatively more coherent framework. With this in mind, students in the early stages of their college education may need to read books, listen to lectures or conduct research projects, while learning intrapersonal skills by keeping journals, undertaking internships, or other world experiences will be helpful for juniors (2nd years) and seniors (3rd years) (Denhardt, 2001: 532). This is because, according to this particular perspective, intrapersonal skills give students the confidence to actually do what they have learned and practised. As such, Denhardt (2001: 532) argued as follows: Learning can take place in different environments, and many of the skills and knowledge fragments that successful administrators acquire come from a much broader range of experiences than those associated with our degree programs. Much of our students’ cognitive, interpersonal, and intrapersonal learning takes place outside the MPA experience – and that learning may differ with respect to the different levels of knowledge we have been discussing.

Along the same lines, Diambra et al (2004: 191–212) review the effectiveness of three developmental/chronological/linear internship stage models to measure interns’ degree of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Kiser’s (2000) model (pre-placement, 208

Too critical to ignore?

initiation, working and termination) considers it uncomplicated and progressive, but difficult, to track the emotional changes experienced by interns. As to the five-stage model (anticipation, disillusionment, confrontation, competence and culmination) proposed by Sweitzer and King (1999), the fluctuating sequence seems to challenge the model while feelings associated with each stage are apparent. A relatively more powerful predictor is Inkster and Ross’ (1998) six-stage model (arranging internship, orientation, reconciling expectations with reality, productivity and independence, closure and reality), which specifically discriminates evolution and emotive properties.

A profile of policy analysis internship programmes Duration and timing Almost all internship programmes in Taiwan are compulsory3 and take place during the academic programme leading to the attainment of a degree.4 Internship seems more popular at undergraduate level and during the third year in particular. The length or tenure of internship programmes may affect the development of a proper understanding of practical aspects of administration. However, there is no standard time for internships across internship programmes.5 Duration of tenure ranges from weekly attendance for 75 hours (SHU) to a 240 hour summer programme (National Chi Nan University, NCNU). A weekly internship puts greater time pressure on both management of the host organisation and practising interns.

Placement The majority of internship programmes focus on local government; this is partly due to many universities being located outside of Taipei City, but also partly due to the limitations of faculties’ connections. The only two exceptions are the National Taiwan University (NTU) and the Chinese Culture University (CCU). In the case of the former, interns’ perceptions of the roles of both central and local government play a key part: ‘They perceived local government as being less important in that they deal with trivial issues. They saw local government work as offering little prospect for career advancement because they can’t see much room for moving up in local government.’ (C-3)

In the case of the latter, an adjunct associate professor who is concurrently a member of the Examination Yuan has bridged the gap between academia and practitioners. Furthermore, industry placements are also available to students of the National Taiwan University. The Department of Public Policy and Management at Shih Hsin University allows students to be placed within the headquarters of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and offers several placements for interns interested in Taipei-based NGOs. Environmental groups are particularly accessible because of faculty members’ personal connections with organisations such as the Taiwan Environmental Information Association (TEIA), the Taiwan Society of Wilderness (TSW) and the Business Council for Sustainable Development –Taiwan (BCSD – Taiwan). 209

Policy analysis in Taiwan

At Shih Hsin University, although students have the right to refuse a placement, they may be advised by the internship coordinator to take a position offered even if it is not of interest. This is because the faculty is convinced that the purpose of internship rests with the learning experience rather than being exposed to an ‘organisational-bureaucratic environment’. Ultimately, almost all the abovementioned students turned out to be satisfied with what they achieved. Differing from the other internship programmes, interns of the Taipei City Educational University (TCEU) are scheduled to rotate weekly through Taipei City Government offices and agencies.

Feedback: reflective journals or papers Course coordinators and internship providers need feedback from interns to monitor and to modify related programmes. Following each week’s supervised assignment, most undergraduate interns in Taiwan are required to turn in some form of internship report or internship diary recording activities and indicating what has been learnt or accomplished; SHU and Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUE) are examples of universities employing this practice. In the case of SHU students are asked to do even more. They need to identify the host association with any concepts that are considered in the public administration and public management coursework. They are required to seriously address issues raised by the course coordinator. There is a diversity of perspectives on the success of this approach. On the other hand, as one of the first three pioneering departments which initiated student internship, the I Shou University (ISU) of southern Taiwan, along with National Cheng Chi University (NCCU), runs a different type of internship programme. What impressed us most is that their internship involves a project on a chosen topic under the supervision of a faculty member.6 Students are required to complete a research project conducted within a public sector organisation and to engage with policy questions from the inside. Interns regularly practise on-site, receiving an opportunity to observe from within the office. However, they may find it difficult to acquire enough essential data or source material for their projects. It is hoped that internships will impart research and writing skills to students, thus, paving the way for undergraduates’ applications for grants offered by the National Science Council in Taiwan. Interns are therefore encouraged to use their internships as an opportunity to develop thesis documentation. Evidently, there is no consensus on whether it is necessary for interns to prepare an academic paper.7 Some argue that the preparation of a report or diary of activities coupled with a separate and compulsory research project could be a burden since students need sufficient time for their other course requirements. A plausible solution is to distinguish graduates from undergraduates by requiring the former to complete a research report while placed within a public service or non-governmental organisation. Nevertheless, such a decision is the responsibility of each university or department. There is no need to be concerned that students might perceive an internship report as imperative to please the course coordinator since the host organisations and course coordinator share the grade given.

210

Too critical to ignore?

One matter deserving attention is that both diaries and journals are not only instrumental to the assessment of student performance but are also beneficial in determining the extent to which host organisations and supervisors in particular have kept to their schedules.

Internship implementation and programme coordinators In Taiwan, there are two ways of managing the selection of an internship coordinator. Taking convention and convenience into account, whoever chairs the department could inevitably be the major candidate for control of the internship programme. As a source allocator and distributor, the department chair is capable of taking care of all dimensions of the implementation with the help of other staff. Specifically, the chair can coordinate letter writing, liaison with host organisations, supervision, grading of student reports and the overseeing of seminars. Both the I-Shou University (2002–2007) and the National Taiwan University (2004–2008) are typical cases. Other departments of public administration and related fields identified a certain faculty member to take on the role of coordinator. The designated faculty member is responsible for not only internship programme planning, implementation and evaluation but also the administration and liaison with the public sector and nongovernmental organisations. Shih Hsin University (since 2002) and the National Taipei University (NTPU, since 2007) have utilised this model. For yet other departments, such as those affiliated to the I-Shou University (since 2008) and the National Chi Nan University(since 1999), management of internship programmes is implemented on a rotating basis with one coordinator handling administration and liaison with local government agencies while colleagues share intern supervision. All faculty members are involved with programme coordination and supervision of individual interns. The first and second models rely heavily on a single individual’s influence and connections and are at risk of a loss of control. According to NASPA guidelines, ‘Those in charge of such programs must make every effort to see that the internship is conducted in such a way that it is indeed a true learning experience’. Even so, at least one interviewee of a certain university’s intern complained: ‘We told our coordinator we had not been thoroughly supervised, and had actually been left on our own. But nothing has changed for weeks.’ (I-1)

Understandably, the insufficient commitment by faculty can be a problem in Taiwan. It may stem from the administrative demands of implementing an internship programme. In addition, a lack of motivation is another possible problem facing internship programmes. ‘It has been two years since I unloaded the burden of internship coordination. Nobody has picked up the stick yet. I have had a very good time with interns. However, as is fairly typical elsewhere, and probably even tougher here, the faculty in this department face tremendous pressure to get papers published in SSCI journals.’ (C-2)

211

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Under such circumstances, spreading or diversifying the burden via rotating internship coordination might prove worthwhile. Besides this, a professional association could be another solution. The fact that the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) proves fairly helpful in terms of supporting and promoting internship exercises as part of its professional development endeavours (Ayeni, 1996: 89–107) could be instructive for TASPA, as well as its member universities. Frankly speaking, an internship coordinator benefits from an internship programme. Increasing knowledge of local government acquired from reviewing intern journals enables faculty members, including this author, to provide a number of practical examples to accompany course materials. Unfortunately, it is frustrating that internship programmes enjoy relatively low status and little administrative support on campus. According to an interview with one of the internship coordinators, whether an internship programme survives is at least partly determined by the degree of financial support made available. ‘The distance between the site of students’ work experience and the location of faculty members can be a problem. At the very beginning our travel expenses for tracking internship were fully covered by the university. Later we were notified that they would pay only a limited amount of the expenses … God! What did they think we were doing? We did this for our students, for the university! … The main areas of funding should include: travel by faculty staff, compensation for supervisors, support for intern traffic expenses.’ (C-1)

The relationships between students and host organisations As students of public administration and related fields, most students are exposed to the practical functioning of government. The internship programme generally concerns agency-specific issues and processes, and broader government issues. Students have been informed about programmes and projects that are taking place within the city or county. Some of them have been very noticeably inspired and impressed by witnessing governance at boundary meetings and city council meetings, as well as learning about current issues in the workplace. As such, students have a better understanding of the policy process, organisational components and administrative management of the public sector and local government in particular. Although supervisors were considered generally supportive of the internship programme, students have consistently complained about the different treatment they had received. A number were disappointed by the fact that their supervisor had been busy with work and was unfamiliar with teaching. They had even overheard one of the supervisors admitting to spending no time on scheduling prior to the internship taking place. This seems to be reflected by an interview with a female supervisor: ‘It is impossible for a public servant to do nothing but take care of interns all day long. The heavy workload prevents me from tracking students’ involvement and performance. To be honest, I am less busy with supervising interns.’ (S-1)

212

Too critical to ignore?

She may have been critical of student performance and had urged students to behave well: ‘I do care whether students show due respect to us. Taking a more active role with a more favourable attitude toward the assignment is welcomed. Show us your willingness to learn. Don’t just keep complaining by saying “It is such a routine, I feel bored” or “I have no idea how to deal with it.” Tell us what you wish to gain from this agency.’ (S-1)

In fact, she found that some interns were enthusiastic about ideas and quite creative when given the opportunity. This has been beneficial to a street-level bureaucratic organisation: “When we hold informal discussions with students, often both my colleagues and I are stimulated by interns’ creative thinking” (S-1). Another male supervisor offered suggestions to improve the current internship programme. As far as increased support from agencies is concerned, he suggests focusing attention and energy on careful selection of both coordinators and supervisors, and improving the oversight and coordination of the agencies to ensure their support for the objectives of the internship programme. According to him: ‘A midlevel manager with an outgoing personality and enthusiasm can be expected to actively provide more assistance to interns. … It is important to establish reasonable expectations of what interns will accomplish during their stay at host agencies. Otherwise, the possibility that students will be exploited by the host organisations is higher than expected.’8 (S-2)

As far as this is concerned, supervisors must be aware that interns are supposed to be given definite work assignments involving meaningful participation in a variety of problems facing host organisations. One of the main reasons for internship is to allow students to personally experience work in the public sector and to test what they have learnt from their classes. While some interns in the United States have complained that their ‘coursework component lacked relevance as a preparation for the internship’ (Moon and Shockman, 2000: 174), most of the 2007–2012 Shih Hsin interns in Taiwan did not consider it essential for internship to be linked to coursework. Two explanations may be posited. First, in Taiwan, many undergraduates’ major may not be their first choice since college entrance examination scores play a large role. A public policy and management major is acceptable but may not be one of a student’s interests. In addition, the opportunity to become a government official is relatively slim, unless one passes the highly competitive Taiwanese civil service examination. All interns may meet previously unexperienced challenges while working in an unfamiliar setting. However, interns were actually divided on the question of the value of such challenges. Intern students received diverse types and varying amounts of supervision from their host organisations. Some students were satisfied with the fact that they were assigned to deal with subject matter not covered elsewhere in the curriculum. According to intern journals, these students have consistently judged internship to be one of their favourite parts of their semester-long training. They know how well their coursework had prepared them for internship positions within

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a given host organisation. The usefulness of internship as an educational experience is evinced in the following. ‘I learned SPSS PC in the statistics class, but it is working for the Taipei City Government Ethics Office that truly familiarises me with using that particular computer software.’ (I-2) ‘I thank them for giving me and my classmate the great opportunity to work with those hardworking ladies and gentlemen at the call centre, answering the calls made by average citizens. While I admit to being nervous about talking with strangers, sometimes even being scolded with insulting words, I learned a lot from this very important exercise. It was so much fun, too.’ (I-3) ‘Three more weeks and my internship at the Taiwan Society of Wilderness (TSW) will come to an end. It seems to me that the longer I stay, the more fruitful my internship can be. Life over there has always been busy. The tight schedule means I do nothing but try to get things done as soon as possible. I certainly don’t want to see the project delayed by my procrastination. Usually I go hungry after taking two required courses on campus and working at TSW all afternoon, but I am very pleased that I have received this wonderful opportunity to act as an intern. After three months of learning and practising at TSW, I believe I have become much more independent and have changed a lot in terms of my way of thinking.’ (I-5)

On the other hand, certain students have been unsatisfied with their assignments because they have considered them routine in nature. The following two statements by interns capture much of what many of them expressed: ‘A meeting was held this morning. I had accurately predicted what I was going to do without even needing to guess. It was recording minutes again. While they were enjoying snacks I was busy typing.’ (I-4) ‘In a small conference room, you just sit there wasting your life. They all have their work to do. None of them seems to care about your presence.’ (I-6)

The relationships between departments and host organisations A professor who works as an internship programme coordinator must explore, develop and approve all internship placements prior to students undertaking internships. Public and non-profit organisations are appropriate venues for internships. An internship with a business organisation may also be acceptable, “if a private sector organisation has significant public service involvement” (C-3). Generally, attention is mainly paid to interpersonal contacts between faculty and practitioners in relevant administrative agencies and non-governmental organisations. However, almost all interviewees reported that making connections could be the most difficult task facing an internship coordinator. To better prepare interns for the internship, the academic coordinator and host organisations should be able to provide internship overviews to help students envision 214

Too critical to ignore?

what acting as an intern might be like. Again taking SHU as example, enrolled third year students usually anticipate their internship through personal communication with fellow students and a three-hour intern plan briefing presented by host agencies. The briefing is followed by a distribution session during which students indicate their first three preferences of host organisation, according to their interest. Thirty to 40 students were placed in 8–9 organisations. About half of the students took their internship within city government departments and agencies. The others were distributed among 2–3 non-governmental organisations. Some universities, such as I Shou University, do allow students to identify their own host organisation, but this is subject to the joint approval of the course coordinator and the individual professor. Since students spend most of the semester experiencing internship in either administrative agencies or NGOs, host organisations are expected to provide mentors and offer regular supervision for the duration of the programme. Under such circumstances, department faculty have little or no control over internship in the host organisations and agencies. Usually, the leader of an organisation or agency designates an internship liaison officer who will formulate the number of tasks and means of assigning tasks, as well as choosing a supervisor. The situation may be compounded by a relatively widespread ignorance on the part of host organisations with regard to internship. Failure to prepare a well thought out timetable may make matters even worse. Feedback, suggestions or criticisms provided by the intern are essential for course coordinators and internship providers to improve their expectations of and learning for student interns. However, honest criticism can bring with it the fear of reprisals from internship provider; as a result, interns might be tempted to write more ‘benign’ final reports, in which the full extent of their criticism and suggestions are seldom expressed. As such, presentations of interns’ feedback during negotiations between course coordinators and internship providers must never reference specific individuals. Interns need to feel greater security in order to provide the necessary information.

Concluding remarks and future prospects In Taiwan, as elsewhere, organising and conducting an internship programme is no simple task. A preliminary examination of current internship programmes in Taiwan based on an intern-centred tri-dimensional perspective has illuminated not only the uniqueness of Taiwanese programmes but also similarities with those in the rest of the world. This short chapter has presented a general account of Taiwanese public administration internship programmes, quoting from student journals and personal indepth interviews with intern students, coordinators and supervisors. It is laudable that most faculties and supervisors devote their time and energy to internship programmes. However, frustration and disappointment is witnessed as well. Despite challenges, the opportunity to develop better communication among students, coordinators and supervisors is growing. With this in mind, the following points issuing from an intern-centred tri-dimensional perspective can be raised:

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First, in order to ensure faculty commitment is sustainable, departments are advised to develop ways to alleviate the burden of supervising internship programmes or to provide mechanisms for motivation. Second, a widespread university commitment to the concept of internship could create a balance between efficient management and coordination under a central administration. Third, consolidation of information, aided by host organisations or a professional association, with such information being made available to the coordinator, would prove useful in providing general categories of internship assignments prior to students undertaking internship. In addition, rotation through local government offices and agencies will encourage the interests of interns with regard to the diversity of services in local government, as well as being more likely to accommodate the interns’ interests and abilities. Fifth, faculty members should be able to visit students at least once during the internship period. The visit might further provide information on the way in which interns have been supervised. Sixth, interns are required to submit evaluations of their learning experiences. In addition, both interns and agency supervisors should assess the effectiveness of the internship programme. Finally, one conceivable way of determining the impact internship may have on individuals could be to track intern students’ career development after graduation by requesting the submission of further evaluations. Ultimately, internship is not ‘automatically valuable’ (Auth, 1990: 235). As a designated coordinator for the past ten years for the student internship programme of my department, I have come to believe it would be fruitful for universities and host organisations to form real partnerships so as to support the development of student interns. However, internships can be ‘disastrous’, as observed by John Baker (2003: 233), and which I would like to echo, due largely to students being assigned mere clerical tasks and there being insufficient supervision in the workplace, leading to students feeling uninvolved.

Notes In recent years increasing numbers of departments of public administration and related fields have initiated internship programmes to gain extra points in terms of performance ranking. 1

For Dehhardt (2001), there are four basic questions that public administration educators have debated for years, namely: 1. Do we seek to educate our students with respect to theory or to practice? 2. Do we prepare students for their first job or for those to which they might aspire later? 3. What are the appropriate delivery mechanisms for MPA courses and curricula? 4. What personal commitments do we make as public administration educators?

2

National Taiwan University identifies the Department of Political Science as offering a four-week compulsory course at postgraduate level called Administrative Practices to be completed during the summer vacation.

3

216

Too critical to ignore? Shih Hsin University stands out in its method of acquainting students with the operation of the public administration machinery. Unlike its counterparts, the third year undergraduate internship programme undertaken in Shih Hsin has not been attached to a compulsory course. Since 2002, a number of enrolled students, ranging from 29 to 40, have had 60% of the total study period of their third year taken up by internship.

4

According to NASPA guidelines (1979: 189–195),which was developed by the NASPAA Committee on Public Service Internships and approved by the NASPAA Executive Council, the internship should last a minimum of 10 weeks and a maximum of 12 months. 5

Unlike the case mentioned by Moon and Schokman (2000: 171), neither of the two universities mentioned that students were required to participate in any form of policy process seminars before commencing their research project, 6

Although NASPA (1979) lists ‘an academic paper based on student practical experience’ as one requirement, both SHU and NTU have not followed suit. 7

8

Marando and Melchior (1977) raised the same point.

References Auth, Mary L., 1990. Survey Report: The Instructional Practices of Graduate Level Public Administration Internship Programs. International Journal of Public Administration, 13(1–2), 235–255. Ayeni, Victor O., 1996. The Internship Program in University-Level Public Management Education in Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 62, 89–107. Baker, John R., 2003. A Lesson ‘In’ Government: Connecting Theory and Practice in the Study of Municipal Government. PS: Political Science and Politics. 36(2): 233–238. Chauhan, D.S., 1977. Managing Academic-Administrative Internships: A Perspective on Goals, Processes and Constraints. Midwest Review of Public Administration, 11(3), 197–212. Denhardt, Robert B., 2001. The Big Questions of Public Administration Education. Public Administration Review, 61(5), 526–534. Diambra, Joel F., Cole-Zakrzeski, Kylie G., and Booher, Josh, 2004. A Comparison of Internship Stage Models: Evidence from Intern Experiences. Journal of Experiential Education, 27(2), 191–212. Inkster, R., and Ross, R., 1998. Monitoring and Supervising the Internship. National Society for Experiential Education Quarterly, 23(4), 23–26. Kiser, P., 2000. Getting the Most from Your Human Service Internship: Learning from Experience. Pacific Grove, GA: Brooks/Cole. Marando, V., and Melchior, M., 1997. On Site, Not out of Mind: the Role of Experiential Learning in the Political Science Doctoral Program. PS: Political Science and Politics, 30(4): 723–728. Moon, Jeremy, and Shockman, Wykham, 2000. Political Science Research Internships and Political Science Education. Politics, 20(3), 169–175. Reilly, W., 1979. Training Administrators for Development. London: Heinemann. 217

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NASPAA, 1977. Public Service Internship Guidelines, Developed by the NASPAA Committee on Public Service Internships and Approved by the NASPAA Executive Council. www.naspaa.org/principals/resources/internship.asp Sweitzer, H.F., and King, M.A., 1999. The Successful Internship: Transformation and Empowerment. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

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FIFTEEN

Policy analysis in Taiwan from an international perspective Jun Yi Hsieh

Introduction Globalisation has become a necessary agenda item for policy arguments. Thus, infusing international elements into the description and prescription of policy analysis enhances understanding and evaluation of the policy’s causes and effects. Globalisation has substantially influenced development in many countries, including Taiwan: with an area less than 0.03% of the world’s land mass and a mere 0.4% of its population, Taiwan has grown into a high-ranked economic power and a leader in informational technology products and original equipment manufacturing (OEM). Faced with globalisation, Taiwan has adopted a strategy consistent with global trends of liberalisation, internationalisation, government and financial reforms. To gain an advantage in the world, Taiwan also follows the trends of ‘globalisation’ and learns from the experiences of other countries to modify its policies and thus promote the welfare of its people. The Taiwan government also emphasises international environments, and works to develop the people’s ability to adapt to globalisation so that Taiwan can improve its competitiveness and play a more prominent role in the world. This chapter focuses on policy analysis in Taiwan with an international perspective. That is, this research employs the PDCA (plan–do–check–act or plan–do–check– adjust) framework to look at the efforts in policy analysis by which Taiwan addresses global trends. For example, establishment of an international mechanism attracts foreigners to work and live in Taiwan and increases Taiwan’s global competitiveness. In Taiwan, policy analysis is frequently applied to the government, education and journal publications. To present a clearer picture, we firstly employ ‘ProQuest Information and Learning’ to search the peer reviewed journals and publications on policy analysis in Taiwan from 1990 to 2012, including on general policy, environmental policy, health policy, economic policy and educational policy. A trend graph is used to elucidate these policy analysis issues. Then we look at some of the think tanks in Taiwan that play a vital role in promoting the internationalisation of policy analysis, and review the goals and developments concerning internationalisation among 34 departments related to public administration and policy of the Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Administration and Affairs (TASPAA). Some emerging policy issues (nuclear policy, health insurance policy, e-governance policy) are selected to narrate their development. All of these are expected to advance the knowledge of Taiwan’s internationalised policy analysis.

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Influence of internationalisation and globalisation on policy analysis Policy analysis Previous research has revealed that public policy is more than laws and regulations; policy is also made ‘as the people who implement policy … make decisions about who will benefit from policies and who will shoulder burdens as a result’ (Birkland, 2001: 20). It involves ‘political decisions for implementing programs to achieve societal goals’ (Cochran and Malone, 1995: 1). It also indicates ‘the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the lives of citizens’ (Peters, 1999: 4). But such a definition, in the era of globalisation, can be further extended to account for the direction and definition on the international level. Doing so allows policy analysis tools or methods to be used that can reflect the current trends of internationalisation and globalisation. Thus, we are better able to consider the influences and avoid the waste of public sector resources (Lin, 1999). The superiority or inferiority of problem structuring determines the quality of policy discourse and outcomes. For example, in the study of global climate change, there are some policies whose problem construction belongs to both the international and domestic arenas. Although its policy discourse is often located in the field of domestic public policy, its implementation often involves international issues – for example, products exported to the European Union (EU) need to comply with the EU’s environmental norms. The policy analysis must also consider the laws and norms of the international environmental organisations. An important issue today is how to employ the research framework and methods of policy analysis to look at different policy stages. Other policies, such as those on the economy, information technology, and cross-strait relations, also reflect this phenomenon. Therefore, including globalisation and internationalisation in the elements of policy analysis has become necessary for governments. The purpose of policy analysis is to explain policies and their development from analytical and descriptive perspectives – for example, to understand and analyse the status of the economic policy. It can be prescriptive to formulate policies and proposals, such as those to improve the life of the poor (Bührs and Bartlett, 1993). Nagel (1999: 1) defined policy analysis as ‘determining which of various alternative policies will most achieve a given set of goals in light of the relations between the policies and the goals’. One of the aims of policy analysis is to identify individual problems and prescribe the most effective and efficient solution in technical and economic terms, such as efficiency and costs–benefits. However, the policy process always involves political factors and stakeholders. Therefore, the policy analysis needs to try to explain the role and influence of stakeholders within the policy process. Additionally, the power and influence of stakeholders sometimes change the professional reports of policy analysts. Policy analysis also seeks to explain the contextual factors of the policy process, For example, what are the political, economic and sociocultural structural factors influencing it (Nagel, 1999). The methodology in policy analysis usually uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. These include case studies, survey research, interviews and model building. The methodology and methods help to define the problem and evaluation criteria, identify all alternatives, evaluate them and recommend the best policy agenda. 220

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Spread of internationalisation and globalisation It has become increasingly evident that internationalisation and globalisation gradually increase interdependencies among the members of the world community. They are commonly used as a shorthand way to describe the spread and connectedness of production, communication and technologies across the world. The process is a complex blending of the economic, political, financial, technological and cultural activities that gradually reduce the spatial order of local and global relations (Giddens, 1993). That phenomenon increasingly influences our daily lives. For example, the spread around the world from the United States of such things as McDonald’s fast-food culture, Coca-Cola, Microsoft Windows, smart phones and information technology tools has rapidly changed people’s behaviour and social values, thus challenging the operation and scope of traditional public policy (Jan, 2001). Other forces also cross national boundaries: cultural and economic factors, such as computer crime, global climate change, nuclear safety, terrorist attacks and financial crises. Internationalisation and globalisation make localities, countries and global systems interdependent and thus international factors also become the main considerations of national policy making and policy analysis. For example, the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis seriously affect the global economy. Additionally, international organisations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), increase the force of integration. The theory and practice of policy making and policy analysis should strengthen the perspectives of internationalisation/globalisation and national competitiveness. If not, the government will lose its competitiveness in the globalisation trend.

Analytical framework Many models exist to analyse the creation and application of public policy. Analysts use these models to identify important aspects of policy analysis, as well as to explain and predict policy and its consequences. The models of policy analysis include the public process model, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) model (for example, Elinor Ostrom), social construction and policy design (for example, Helen Ingram, Anne Schnedier and Peter deLeon), the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (for example, Paul Sabatier), and the policy diffusion model (for example, Frances S. Berry and William Berry) (Sabatier, 2007). Although there are many policy analysis frameworks, there is no appropriate analytical framework to present the concerns of this chapter. Thus, this study employs the components of PDCA for the analytical framework. PDCA (plan–do–check–act or plan–do–check–adjust) is an iterative, four-step management method used in business for the control and continuous improvement of processes and products. The basic elements and conceptual definitions of PDCA are as follows:

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1 Plan. Design a policy that meets the needs of the internationalisation of public policy . Establish the policy objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in accordance with the expected goals of internationalisation. 2 Do. Implement the policy involving internationalisation. Implement the plan, execute the process, and produce the outcome. Collect data and document it for charting and analysis in the following ‘check’ and ‘adjust’ steps. 3 Check. Monitor the policy through implementation and ultimately find out if the policy has delivered results. Study the actual results and compare them against the expected goals (for example, internationalisation) to ascertain any differences. 4 Adjust. Keep the improvement in place once it has delivered results. Request corrective actions on significant differences between actual and planned results. The following section will present our findings and observations based on the PDCA framework, which shows where we are and indicates how the policy or programme develops. The evidence comes from official reports, archival data and official websites.

Evidence and discussion Creating an English-friendly living environment To increase public participation and enhance learning through internationalisation, government agencies, organisations and schools are encouraged to actively create an English-friendly living environment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also planned and organised the INFO TAIWAN, serving as a portal that supplies the information concerning knowing Taiwan, visa and Passport, invest in Taiwan, study in Taiwan, and visit Taiwan. To expedite the process of connecting Taiwan to the rest of the world, the Executive Yuan established its Task Force for Creating an International Living Environment to meet the challenges of globalisation, create an excellent international living environment, and increase the nation’s competitiveness. The Taiwan government also established the ‘Information for Foreigners’ website and the International Community Service Hotline that offers free English information services. Satisfaction surveys regarding the English environment have been conducted among foreigners on a yearly basis to evaluate the success of the plan. Building an English-friendly environment has become a cornerstone in the internationalisation of policy analysis. To integrate the resources of the government, private and non-profit sectors, several avenues were established to serve as an operational platform for coordination of work, such as think tanks and course design. By providing a quality environment for English, foreigners are able to better understand the policy in Taiwan, which will result in boosting investing opportunities and economic growth and improving Taiwan’s global competitiveness.

Think tanks Think tanks are proliferating. Although they are outside of government, a perception exists that many of these policy research institutes influence public policy and policy analysis. The think tanks develop ideas about policy networks, epistemic communities and policy learning (Stone, 2013; Rich, 2004). This section introduces some leading think tanks that are committed to serving the public interest and 222

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market their proposals for policy analysis to contribute to Taiwan’s development in an international perspective.

Taiwan Foundation for Democracy The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy was established in January 2003 with an interrelated, two-track mission. The government is the primary source of its funding; however, it is independently incorporated, non-partisan and non-profit. Domestically, the Foundation strives to play a positive role in consolidating Taiwan’s democracy and fortifying its commitment to human rights; internationally, the Foundation hopes to become a strong link in the world’s democratic network, joining forces with related organisations around the world. Its mission and activities include:  1 Building relationships with related institutions around the world, participating actively in the global promotion of democracy, and supporting the improvement of human rights conditions; 2 Supporting democracy promotion activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic institutions; 3 Promoting research and publications on democratic developments at home and abroad; 4 Holding seminars, workshops, conferences and other educational activities in the area of democracy and human rights (Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2013).

The National Policy Foundation The National Policy Foundation was founded by the Kuomintang (KMT) in July 2000, to help improve the public policy and decision-making processes through research and analysis. It is a non-profit institution for the sustained development of the nation and the wellbeing of its people. The Foundation’s mission is to advocate public policies and promote legislation. It performs rigorous and objective research and analysis, and also issues policy statements and proposals on a regular basis. Its research areas include interior affairs, national security, education and culture, constitution and law, economy and technology, monetary and public finance policies, sustainable development, and social security (National Policy Foundation, 2013).

Taiwan Thinktank Taiwan Thinktank was founded by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The mission of Taiwan Thinktank includes: 1 Monitoring the government administration through a constructive policy dialogue. It also has set up a Congressional Policy Centre consisting of eight research teams (including livelihood issues, tax reform, sovereignty and international monitoring, parliamentary reform, communications, education policy, social welfare and health environment, poll survey analysis) and held a public hearing and press conference that proposed the policy adjustments and amendments to the relevant administrative departments.

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2 Promoting the knowledge economy and developing countermeasures in response to the social impact of globalisation, efforts to enhance the standard of living in order to tackle the difficulties of industrial upgrading, unemployment, and the gap between the rich and the poor, the shortage of labour, and salary reductions. 3 Cultivating the think tank by exploring opportunities for dialogue with Europe, Southeast Asia and other international organisations, so that the international community is more aware of and supports Taiwan (Taiwan Thinktank, 2013).

Taiwan Institute of Economic Research The Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, the first private independent think tank in Taiwan, was established in September 1976. The goal of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research is to promote both domestic and international economic research and to advance exchanges and cooperation with other international institutions. As such, there is a growing need for large-scale professional research institutes to conduct research on the emerging issues and to provide decision makers with relevant information. The Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, possessing excellent professional and extensive experience, will continue providing high-quality economic advisory services to the government and private enterprises, including on economics and finance, law and politics, sovereignty and international relations, employment and social issues, cultural and educational studies, and communication (Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, 2013).

The Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research The goal of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research is as an international policy think tank for economic and industry-related research. Since its establishment, the institution has been serving as a policy think tank for the Taiwan government by making important recommendations. Its missions are as follows: 1 To orient the direction of the country’s sustainable development as well as its economic and industrial policies. 2 To help navigate and serve as a warning mechanism on important matters concerned with economic and industrial policy issues. 3 To serve as a platform for the exchange of local and international economic-related knowledge and to take the lead in policy formulation. Several research divisions have engaged in further consolidating the academic foundation of policy research by carrying out a careful policy analysis of issues related to policy making. For example, the research divisions related to economic development in Mainland China, the global economy, and economic issues and important economic policies relevant to Taiwan. There are several centres of policy analysis, such as economic forecasting, financial and economic strategies, energy and environmental research, science and technology policy evaluation and research (Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, 2013).

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Departments and programmes We also reviewed the website information from 34 departments or programmes related to public administration, public policy or public affairs of the members of the Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Administration and Public Affairs, if their mission or courses emphasise internationally oriented goals. If their programme has a clear emphasis on those goals, we use a tick mark: . If their internationally oriented goals are unclear, we use the mark: . Table 15.1 outlines the results and shows that about 69.23% (18 out of 26) of the bachelor’s degree programmes among the TASPAA members have an internationally oriented mission or course purpose. In terms of graduate programmes, about 63.3% (19 out of 30) have an internationalisation mission. Of the departments that set up a doctorate programme, up to 77.78% (7 out of 9) have highlighted the importance of internationalisation. We also found that when a department has undergraduate, graduate and doctorate programmes at the same time, all of them emphasise the importance of internationalisation. These departments or programmes need to put their missions into practice in the teaching, career planning and counselling of their students if they want to achieve a certificate of accreditation. The Higher Education Evaluation and Accreditation Council of Taiwan also evaluates the quality and performance of their programmes

Table 15.1: Internationally oriented department or programme of public administration, public policy or public affairs Department or programme

Bachelor

Master

Doctorate

Institute of Public Affairs Management, National Sun Yat-sen University

N.A.





Department of Political Economy, National Sun Yat-sen University



N.A.

Graduate Institute of Law and Government, National Central University

N.A.



The Graduate Institute of Hakka Political Economy, National Ce ntral University

N.A.



Department of Administrative Management, Central Police University





N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.

Department of Police Administration, Central Police University







Department of Political Science, National Chung Cheng University







Department of Administrative Management, Chinese Culture University



N.A.

Department of Public Administration, Chung Hua University





Graduate Institute of National Policy and Public Affairs, National Chung Hsing University

N.A.



Department of Social and Policy Sciences, Yuan Ze University





N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.

Department Public Policy and Management, Shih Hsin University







Department of Public Affairs Management, Hsuan Chung University





N.A.

Department of Political Science, National Cheng Kung University



N.A.

N.A.

Department of Public Affairs, Fo Guang University





N.A.

Department of Political Science, Soochow University







Executive Master of Public Affairs, Tunghai University

N.A.



Department of Public Management and Policy, Tunghai University





Department of Public Administration, National Dong Hwa University





N.A. N.A. N.A.

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Table 15.1: continued Department or programme

Bachelor

Master

Doctorate

Department of Public Administration, National Open University



N.A.

Institute of Public Administration and Policy, Nanhua University

N.A



N.A. N.A

Department of Public Administration, National Chengchi University







Department of Public Administration, Tamkang University





Graduate Institute of Public Policy, Feng Chia University

N.A



Department of Public Affairs and Management, Kainan University





Department of Public Policy and Management, I-Shou University





N.A N.A N.A N.A

Department of Public Affairs and Civic Education, National Changhua University of Education





N.A.

Department of Public Policy and Administration, National Chi Nan University







Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University







Department of Social and Public Affairs, University of Taipei





Department of Public Administration and Management, National Tainan University





N.A. N.A.

Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University







Department of Public Affairs, Ming Chuan University



V

Graduate Institute of Public Policy, National Chia Yi University

N.A.



N.A N.A.

Frequency of yes/total (yes + no)

18/26

19/30

7/9

Percentage

69.23

63.33

77.78

1.  indicates the department has an internationally oriented programme. 2.  indicates the department has a programme without a clear internationally oriented mission.

according to their missions, goals, self-evaluation reports and field assessments. Therefore, these departments or programmes will instil an international perspective into their students through courses, exchange students, and so on and the international trends will influence the students’ thinking and behaviour.

Publications To understand the English-language publications (such as journals, newspapers, books, reports, and so on) related to policy analysis in Taiwan over time, this study searched the related journal publications from 1992 to 2012 in the ProQuest database. We also narrowed our scope to general public policy, health policy, environmental policy, economic policy and education policy. Then we used the following keywords to search the publications in the database: public policy plus Taiwan, health policy plus Taiwan, environmental policy plus Taiwan, economic policy plus Taiwan, and educational policy plus Taiwan. The results, shown in Figure 15.1, indicate an increasing growth in those publications over the past 20 years. Among the publications found, economic policy and general public policy attracted more authors, scholars or reporters writing about or studying their status and developments than did environmental policy, health policy and education policy. The evidence indicates that internationalised public policy analysis related to Taiwan issues have gradually increased in publications. 226

Policy analysis in Taiwan from an international perspective

1,000 0

500

Frequency

1,500

2,000

Figure 15.1 Different types of public policy related to Taiwan from 1992 to 2012

1992

1997 Public policy Environmental policy Educational policy

2002 Year

2007

2012

Health policy Economic policy

Policy Examples This section chooses nuclear power, health insurance and e-governance policies as examples of the internationalised policies that attracted more attention than the other policy areas.

Nuclear power policy The analysis of nuclear power policy in Taiwan emerges in thematic discussions on strategy in energy policy, including nuclear plant safety, the impacts of nuclear accidents, and referendums. Before the mid-1980s, the development of nuclear power was regarded as essential to facilitate Taiwan’s rapid economic growth. Since the 1980s, the feasibility of utilising nuclear power has been intensively challenged. The policy impact of the rise of the anti-nuclear movement and environmental movement, in conjunction with democratising trends, is especially evident in the controversy over constructing the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) in Taiwan (Hsu, 2005a). Hsu (2005a) applied the advocacy coalition framework to explain and analyse advocacy coalition and policy change regarding nuclear power utilisation in Taiwan. The ACF could be more useful for comparative application if it took both political context and international influences into account in this case. Hsu (2005b) also integrates the termination literature with the punctuated-equilibrium (P-E) model of policy change into a broader framework of policy termination to examine the Chen Shui-bian administration’s abrupt decision to terminate Taiwan’s FNPP and to explore the evolution over a decade of agenda setting for the FNPP’s termination. The termination of the FNPP may be viewed as a result of interactions among the nuclear policy image, the institutional venue, and the political or policy strategy over time, as indicated in the integrated framework. As a consequence of Taiwan’s recent democratisation, the anti-nuclear activists were unsuccessful in terminating the FNPP due to insufficient political resources. Furthermore, besides domestic venues, 227

Policy analysis in Taiwan

international institutions also appear to be important not only to the creation and maintenance of the nuclear policy system but also to the dramatic reversal of the Chen administration’s termination decision in this case. Fan (2006) explored the controversy surrounding the storage of nuclear waste on Orchid Island, Taiwan, the homeland of the Yami aborigines. It provides a contextualised example which reveals that the Yami tribe and Taiwanese migrants have multiple understandings of environmental justice and explores the questions of how we might respond to these divisions and formulate environmental policy regarding nuclear waste dilemmas. Environmental pragmatism might provide a method for defusing tensions between groups with different ethical positions and could facilitate intercultural alliance building for dealing with nuclear waste problems.

Health insurance policy The current healthcare system in Taiwan, known as National Health Insurance (NHI), was instituted in 1995. NHI is a single-payer, compulsory social insurance plan that centralises the disbursement of healthcare funds. The system promises equal access to healthcare for all citizens, and the population coverage had reached 99% by the end of 2004. Taiwan started its health reform in the 1980s after experiencing two decades of economic growth. Even with all its success in the healthcare system, Taiwan has suffered some problems. The government is not taking in enough money to cover the services it provides, so it is borrowing money from banks (Reid, 2008). The revenue base is capped so it does not keep pace with the increase in national income. Premiums are regulated by politicians and they are afraid to raise premiums because of voters (Lu and Hsiao, 2003). Wu’s (2013) research provides a theoretical basis, based upon the human rights impact assessment in public health policies and a Rawlsian theory of justice, to decide whether or not the restriction on individual liberty imposed by Taiwan’s compulsory NHI is constitutionally justified. She examined the importance, legitimacy and content of the freedom to purchase or decline health insurance in social health programmes. She also clarified the NHI’s proposed policy purposes, evaluated likely policy effectiveness, and applied the ‘importance test’, based upon Rawls’ liberty and priority principles, to assess the trade-offs between the restricted liberty and the social benefits pursued in the case of NHI.

E-governance The Taiwan government’s work on a series of e-governance programmes is aimed at reducing the digital gap. E-government in Taiwan has been advancing since 1996 and the governmental network infrastructure has been successfully completed. The e-governance actions promote good governance and social inclusion and stimulate social and economic development, which have positive implications for digital opportunities (Chen and Chu, 2011). In terms of improving efficiency and service quality, high rankings have been awarded by international organisations (RDEC, 2012). The RDEC also created the Taiwan E-Governance Research Centre run by the Department of Public Administration, National Chengchi University. This centre focuses on the cutting-edge policy research on e-governance, the platform of knowledge in e-governance, exchanges and connections of internationalisation, and policy marketing and ideas of e-governance. The Taiwan government’s efforts 228

Policy analysis in Taiwan from an international perspective

that are brought into different aspects of e-government can be clearly seen by the prominence given to reducing digital divide problems. Chen and Hsieh (2009) utilised a framework that captures the institutional, organisational and technological drivers of e-governance performance. The results indicate that the United States and Taiwan excel in different areas but could improve in others and, thereby, learn from each other. Hsieh (2013) found that Taiwan’s government has offered several programmes and taken steps to ensure that disadvantaged groups will have access to more information. The evidence confirms that individual background and social status affects access to informational technology in Taiwan. Closing the digital divide will foster economic equality in addition to educational and earning potential.

Conclusion This chapter focused upon policy analysis in Taiwan from an international perspective. It employed the PDCA (plan–do–check–adjust) framework to review the examples of an English-friendly living environment, think tanks, departments and programmes, publications, and some policy examples in Taiwan. In the era of the globalisation, internationalisation of policy analysis has become the necessary driver of national growth and industrial development. This chapter has offered some information on policy analysis in Taiwan from an international perspective, and the evidence shows that Taiwan has taken steps that have yielded significant effects in this area. However, Taiwan also faces some difficulties. For example, it is not a formal member of the United Nations, and the cross-strait problems (Mainland China and Taiwan) limit the diplomatic space and the internationalised policy analysis. The governments also need to invest more resources to develop scholars’ ability to adapt to globalisation and internationalisation and to cultivate their expertise in policy analysis with a world vision and their effective international communication skills. Although there are still some difficulties, Taiwan continues to progress in its drive for internationalised policy analysis.

References Birkland, Thomas A., 2001. An Introduction to Public Policy. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Bührs, Ton, and Bartlett, Robert V., 1993. Environmental Policy in New Zealand. The Politics of Clean and Green. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chen, Yu-Che, and Hsieh, Jun Yi, 2009. Advancing E-Governance: Comparing Taiwan and the Taiwan and the U.S. Public Administration Review, 69(s), s151–158. Chen, Yu-Che, and Chu, P.-Y. (eds.), 2011. E-Governance and Cross-boundary Collaboration: Innovations and Advancing Tools. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, 2013. Introduction. http:// taiwanthinktank.org/ Cochran, Charles L., and Malone, Eloise F., 1995. Public Policy: Perspectives and Choices. New York: McGraw-Hill. Fan, Mei-Fang, 2006. Environmental Justice and Nuclear Waste Conflicts in Taiwan. Environmental Politics, 15(3), 417–434. Giddens, A., 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. Hsieh, J., 2013. A Trend Study of Closing Digital Divide and Its Causes: Taiwan Experiences. International Journal of eGovernance and Networks, 1(1), 69–88. 229

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Hsu, Shu-Hsiang, 2005a. Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Change on Nuclear Power Utilization in Taiwan. The Social Science Journal, 42(2), 215–229. Hsu, Shu-Hsiang, 2005b. Terminating Taiwan’s Fourth Nuclear Power Plant under the Chen Shui-bian Administration. Review of Policy Research, 22(2), 171–186. Jan, Chung-yuang, 2001. Theory of Globalization and the Research and Development of Public Administration. Journal of Civil Service, 25, 25–38. Lin, Shoei Po, 1999. Introduction to Public Policy. Taipei: Bestwise Publisher Company. Lu, Jui-Fen Rachel, and Hsiao, William C., 2003. Does Universal Health Insurance Make Health Care Unaffordable? Lessons From Taiwan. Health Affairs, 22(3), 77–88. Nagel, Stuart S. (ed.), 1999. Policy Analysis Methods. Commack, NY: New Science Publishers.  National Policy Foundation, 2013. Introduction. http://old.npf.org.tw/english/ main-eng.htm Peters, B. Guy, 1999. American Public Policy: Promise and Performance. 5th ed. New York: Chatham House Publishers. Rich, Andrew, 2004. Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise. New York: Cambridge University Press. RDEC (Research Development and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan), 2012. E-Government. www.ndc.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0059817 Reid, T.R., 2008. Taiwan Takes Fast Track to Universal Health Care. All Things Considered. National Public Radio (NPR), 15 April. www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyId=89651916 Sabatier, Paul A., 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Stone, Diane, 2013. Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis. Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, 2013. Introduction. http://taiwanthinktank. org/ Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2013. Introduction. www.tfd.org.tw/opencms/ english/index.html Taiwan Thinktank, 2013. Introduction. http://taiwanthinktank.org/ Wu, Chuan-Feng, 2013. Can Compulsory Health Insurance Be Justified? An Examination of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance. Journal of Law and Healthy, 26(1): 51–102.

230

SIXTEEN

Policy analysis education in Taiwan: a comparative perspective Yu-Ying Kuo

Introduction Public policy education, to some degree, shapes the direction and orientation of public policy development in theory and practice. The emphasis on good governance has aroused a lot of interest in examining current public policy programmes in many countries in recent decades (Geva-May and Maslove, 2006). Public policy and public administration education has been recognised as providing training in both academic and professional fields (Geva-May and Maslove, 2007). Existing literature concerning public policy education has involved in-depth case studies or cross-national comparisons. Although sharing many characteristics, the development of public affairs programmes in each country is highly influenced by different political contexts and regional cultures (Geva-May and Maslove, 2007). Most of the literature focused on the four big issues of public affairs education proposed by Robert Denhardt in 2001: (1) the development of public administration education; (2) the orientation of the training in Master in Public Administration (MPA) and Master in Public Policy (MPP) programmes; (3) the curricular designs of MPA and MPP programmes; and finally, (4) the future of higher education in public affairs. This chapter attempts to understand Taiwan’s public policy programmes in a comparative context and to provide an overview that identifies policy analysis in Taiwan in light of domestic and international developments. This comparative paper primarily discusses the orientation of Taiwan’s public policy and policy analysis courses, curriculums and practices in East Asia, North America, and Europe.

Policy analysis in Taiwan’s universities The development of public policy education in Taiwan came along with the development of public administration, which can be traced back more than half a century to when Soochow University first established the Department of Political Science in 1954. As indicated in Table 16.1, the Central Police University built up the Department of Police Administration in 1957, which is related to public administration, though focused on the education of police leaders and their decisionmaking abilities. In 1963, two public universities, National Taiwan University and National Cheng Chi University, and two private universities, Chinese Culture University and Tamkang University, set up departments of public administration. National Taiwan University established the Department of Political Science with a public administration division. National Taipei University founded a public 231

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 16.1: Development of Taiwan’s public administration and policy education University

Department

Bachelor Master’s

EMPA

PhD

1

Soochow University

Department of Political Science

1954

1991



1998

2

Central Police University

Department of Police Administration and School of Police Policy

1957

1998





3

National Taiwan University

Department of Political Science

1963

1957

2001

1976

4

National Chengchi University

Department of Public Administration

1963

1964



1989

5

Tamkang University

Department of Public Administration

1963

1999

2003



6

Chinese Culture University

Department of Administrative Management

1963







7

National Taipei University

Department of Public Administration and Policy

1967

1977

2000

1994

8

Tunghai University

Department of Public Management and Policy

1977

1986





9

Tunghai University

Executive Master of Public Administration





1999



10

Yuan Ze University

Department of Social and Policy Science

1989

2003

2003



11

Central Police University

Department of Administrative Management

1991

2000





12

National Open University

Department of Public Administration

1993







13

Shih Hsin University

Department of Public Policy Management

1994

2000

2001

2005

14

Chung Hua University

Department of Public Administration

1996

1999





15

National Chi Nan University

Department of Public Policy and Administration

1997

1996

2003

2006

16

National Chung-Cheng University

Department and Graduate Institute of Political Science

1998

1993

2000

2002

17

Hsuan Chuang Unversity

Department of Public Affairs and Management

1998

2001

2004



18

I-Shou University

Department of Public Policy and Management

2000

2007





19

National Cheng Kung University

Department of Political Science

2001

1993

2004



20

National Sun Yat-Sen University

Department of Political Economy

2001







21

Fo Guang University

Department of Public Affairs

2002

2001

2002



22

Kainan University

Department of Public Affairs and Management

2002

2003

2004



23

Ming Chuan University

Department and Graduate School of Public Affairs

2003

2001

1999



24

University of Taipei*

Department of Social and Public Affairs

2006

2014

2009



25

National University of Tainan

Department of Public Administration and Management

2006

2006





26

National Changhua University of Education

Department of Public Affairs and Civic Education, Graduate Institute of Political Science

2007

2003

2007



27

National Sun Yat-Sen University

Institute of Public Affairs Management



1992

1999

1998

28

National Central University

Graduate Institute of Law and Government



1996





232

Policy analysis education in Taiwan

Table 16.1: continued University

Department

Bachelor Master’s

EMPA

PhD

29

National Central University

Graduate Institute of Hakka Political Economy



2004





30

Nanhua University

Institute of Public Administration and Policy



1999





31

National Dong Hwa University

Graduate Institute of Public Administration

2013

2001

2003



32

National Chung Hsing University

Graduate Institute of National Policy and Public Affairs



2006

2006



33

Feng-Chia University

Graduate Institute of Public Policy



2007

2002



34

National Chiayi University

Graduate Institute of Public Policy



2010





35

National Taitung University

Department of Public and Cultural Affairs

2011

2011

2011



*Originally Taipei Municipal University of Education. Source: The websites of each department.

administration department in 1967 and Tunghai University founded one in 1977. Before 1999, eight universities had established a department of PA, and after 2000 nine undergraduate programmes were set up. Currently, there are 32 universities, 35 programmes, offering undergraduate PA and PP courses in Taiwan and one-third of them were established in the past decade. With respect to Master’s programmes, National Taiwan University first launched the Master of Political Science in 1954. National Chengchi University set up the MPA in 1964, National Taipei University in 1977, and Tunghai University in 1986. After 1990, 23 MPA programmes were established. Among these, six universities simply offered Master’s programmes, including the Institute of Public Affairs Management at National Sun Yat-sen University, the Graduate Institute of Law and Government at National Central University, the Institute of Public Administration and Policy at Nanhua University, the Graduate Institute of Public Administration at National Dong Hwa University, the Graduate Institute of National Policy and Public Affairs at National Chung Hsing University, and the Graduate Institute of Public Policy at Feng-Chia University. Unlike some MPA/MPP programmes in the United States, which last one to two years, all graduate programmes in Taiwan have a two-year course structure. Nineteen universities offer Executive MPA programmes (EMPA), starting with National Sun Yet-Sen University, Tunghai University, and Ming Chuan University in 1999. National Taiwan University first offered a PhD programme in political science with a PA focus in 1976, while National Chengchi University was the first one that offering a PhD degree in PA, in 1989. Currently, eight universities offer PhD degrees in PA in Taiwan, and Shih Hsin University is the only private university offering a PhD programme in public policy and management, since 2005. Table 16.1 presents the development of public policy and public administration education in Taiwan. The Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (TASPAA) is an institutional membership organisation which aims to promote excellence in public service education. TASPAA has been organised since 2003 to construct a platform for member schools to improve information exchange and the quality of 233

Policy analysis in Taiwan

education. It was established on 21 June 2003 and received official registration and recognition from the Ministry of the Interior on 15 August 2005. To some degree, the establishment of TASPAA followed the analogous experience of the National Association for Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA), although TASPAA is not responsible for accreditation. Universities with programmes in public affairs, public policy, public administration, or non-profit management can apply to be an institutional member of TASPAA. Currently TASPAA consists of 35 institutional members; among these, 19 institutions are located in northern Taiwan, nine in the middle, five in the south, and two in the east (see Figure 16.1).

Figure 16.1: Location of TASPAA members 1 Chinese Culture University Department of Public Administration and Management 2 Shih Hsin University Department of Public Policy and Management 3 National Taipei University Department of Public Administration and Policy 4 National Taiwan University Department of Political Science 5 Soochow University Department of Political Science 6 National Chengchi University Department of Public Administration 7 Taipei Municipal University of Education Department of Social and Public Affairs

1 National Open University Department of Public Administration 2 Tamkang University Department of Public Administration

1 Central Police University Department of Administrative Management 2 Central Police University Department of Administration Police 3 Kainan University Department of Public Affairs and Management 4 Ming Chuan University Department of Public Affairs 5 National Central University Graduate Institute of Law and Government 6 National Central University Graduate Institute of Hakka Political Economy 7 Yuan Ze University Department of Social and Policy Science 1 Chung Hua University Department of Public Administration 2 Hsuan Chuang University Department of Public Affairs Management 1 Tunghai University Department of Public Management and Policy 2 Tunghai University Executive Master of Public Affairs 3 Feng-Chia University Graduate Institute of Public Policy 4 National Chung Hsing University Graduate Institute of National Policy and Public Affairs

1 Fo Guang University Department of Public Affairs

1 National Dong Hwa University Department of Public Administration

1. National Changhua University of Education

1 National Changhua University of Education Department of Public AffairsDepartment and Civicof Public Affairs and Civic Education

Education

1 National Chung Cheng University Department of Political Science 2 Nanhua University Institute of Public Administration and Policy 3 National Chiayi University Graduate Institute of Public Policy 1 National Chung Kung University Department of Political Science 2 National University of Tainan Department of Public Administration and Management 1 I-Shou University Department of Public Policy and Management 1 National Sun Yat-sen University Institute of Public Affairs Management 2 National Sun Yat-sen University Department of Political Economy

234

1 National Chi Nan University Department of Public Policy and Administration

1 National Taitung University Department of Public and Cultural Affairs

Policy analysis education in Taiwan

Master’s programmes Table 16.2 shows that half of the Master’s programmes have public policy or policy analysis as required courses. In terms of the course content, first, all programmes require the submission of a Master’s thesis to fulfil the graduation requirements. Training on problem identification, qualitative and quantitative research methods, and data analysis is regarded as basic knowledge in all Master’s programmes. Some graduate programmes also provide additional and specific courses on policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Kuo and Kuo, 2012).

Table 16.2: Taiwan master’s programmes in public policy and policy analysis University

Department

Year

Course

1

National Taiwan University

Department of Political Science

1957

Seminar on Public Policy (R); Seminar on Institutional Analysis and Public Policy (E)

2

National Chengchi University Department of Public Administration

1964

Public Policy and Analysis (R); Policy Analysis (E)

3

National Taipei University

Department of Public Administration and Policy

1977

The Study of Public Policies (R); Seminar in Policy Planning (R)

4

Tunghai University

Department of Public Management and Policy

1986

Seminar on Policy Analysis (E); Seminar on Policy Planning and Evaluation (E); Seminar on Policy Implementation (E)

5

Soochow University

Department of Political Science

1991

Policy Analysis (E)

6

National Sun Yat-Sen University

Institute of Public Affairs Management

1992

Public Policy Analysis (R)

7

National Chung-Cheng University

Department and Graduate Institute of Political Science

1993

Seminar on Public Policy (E); Policy Analysis (E)

8

National Cheng Kung University

Graduate Institute of Political Economy

1993

Policy Analysis (R); Topics of Public Policy

9

National Chi Nan University

Department of Public Policy and Administration

1996

Seminar on Public Administration and Policy (R)

10

National Central University

Graduate Institute of Law and Government

1996

Seminar on Public Policy and Analysis (E)

11

Central Police University

Department of Administration Police

1998

Police Policy Analysis (E)

12

Tamkang University

Department of Public Administration

1999

Policy Analysis (R)

13

Chung Hua University

Department of Public Administration

1999

Seminar on Policy Analysis (R)

14

Nanhua University

Institute of Public Administration and Policy

1999

Theory and Development of Public Policy (E); Policy Analysis (E)

15

Central Police University

Department of Administrative Management

2000

Quantitative Analysis on Police Management (E)

235

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 16.2: continued University

Department

Year

Course

16

Shih Hsin University

Department of Public Policy Management

2000

Public Policy (R); Policy Analysis (E)

17

Fo Guang University

Department of Public Affairs

2001

The Study of Public Policy (R)

18

Ming Chuan University

Department and Graduate School of Public Affairs

2001

Public Policy Research (R)

19

National Dong Hwa University

Graduate Institute of Public Administration

2001

Studies in Policy Networks and Policy Management (E)

20

Yuan Ze University

Department of Social and Policy Science

2003

Special Topics on Policy Science Research (E)

21

Kainan University

Department of Public Affairs and Management

2003

Selected Topics of Public Policy (R)

22

National Changhua University of Education

Graduate Institute of Political Science

2003

Public Policy (R)

23

National Central University

Graduate Institute of Hakka Political Economy

2004

Public Policy (E)

24

National University of Tainan

Department of Public Administration and Management

2006

Seminar on Public Policy Analysis (E)

25

National Chung Hsing University

Graduate Institute of National Policy and Public Affairs

2006

Seminar on Policy Analysis(E)

26

I-Shou University

Department of Public Policy and Management

2007

Policy Analysis and Management (E)

27

Feng-Chia University

Graduate Institute of Public Policy

2007

Studies on Public Policy (R)

28

National Chiayi University

Graduate Institute of Public Policy

2010

Public Policy (R)

29

National Taitung University

Department of Public and Cultural Affairs

2011

Public Affair Policy: Theories and Practices (E)

University of Taipei

Department of Social and Public Affairs

2014

Starts in 2014

Hsuan Chuang Unversity

Department of Public Affair and Management

2001

Ended in 2010

Notes: Compared to Table 16.1, Chinese Culture University, National Open University, National Sun Yat-Sen University (Department of Political Economy) do not offer Master’s programmes; Executive Master of Public Administration in Tunghai University is not included since it is an EMPA programme; the University of Taipei is not included because it started a Master’s programme in August 2014; the Department of Public Affairs and Management at Hsuan Chuang University is not included since it stopped admissions in 2011. R refers to required; E refers to elective. Source: The websites of each department.

236

Policy analysis education in Taiwan

Second, understanding of the public policy environment is important for the professional policy analysts and prospective leadership to consider broadly and fit the policy context. As Geva-May and Maslove (2006) stated, the development of policy analysis courses in Canada, the US, and Europe is highly dependent on the governance context and its individual prevailing analytical culture. Similarly, Berman (2010: 22) pointed out that: Public administration in East Asia has common roots, ways, and tasks that are also regionally distinctive. … This stems from centuries of Confucianism and the modern day cultures that have been formed from it. East Asian cultures have strong orientations toward hierarchical relationships, group-based cultures, and harmony in relationships.

MPA and MPP programmes in Taiwan provide courses related to concurrent political, economic, social, and legal environments. Some MPA programmes are located in political science departments, such as the National Taiwan University, the National Cheng Kung University and Soochow University, where it is not surprising to find courses with an emphasis on the political and legal context. However, there are insufficient courses related to economic training, especially microeconomic or macroeconomic analysis on public policy (Kuo and Kuo, 2012), which corresponds to Wu et al’s (2012) finding that East Asia public policy training is underrepresentation of policy analysis in public policy courses.

PhD programmes There are 10 public administration or public policy PhD programmes in Taiwan designed to cultivate cutting-edge public policy theory and state-of-the-art professionals in academia and practice. Among them, Soochow University and Shih Hsin University are private universities. Three of them are located in political science departments, including in the National Taiwan University, Soochow University and National Chung-Cheng University. National Cheng Kung University combines training in political science and economics and offers a PhD in political economy. As shown in Table 16.3, the National Taiwan University offers the ‘Seminar on public policy’ in the public administration field as a core course. Soochow University and National Chung-Cheng University offer fewer courses related to public policy or policy analysis than the others. National Sun Yet-Sen University focuses on policy analysis and decision and judgement analysis. National Chengchi University, National Taipei University, Shih Hsin University, and National Chi-Nan University include public policy as a core course and offer elective courses, first on policy processes (Howlett et al, 2009; Sabatier, 2007), including planning, implementation, evaluation, and secondly on contemporary development trends, consisting of policy analysis, cost–benefit analysis, policy argument, policy networks, and thirdly on specific policy issues, such as social capital, sustainable development policy, distributive policy, and institutional analysis. The Central Police University offers a PhD programme in police policy and has established a series of course in policy planning, implementation, and evaluation with a particular focus on police policy.

237

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 16.3: PhD programmes in public policy University

Year

Public Policy Course

National Taiwan University PhD in Political Science

1976

Seminar on Public Policy (R)* Seminar on Institutional Analysis and Public Policy (E)

National Chengchi University PhD in Public Administration

1989

Seminar on Policy Theory (E) Public Policy Research (E) Social Capital and Public Policy (E) New Right and Global Public Policy(E)

National Taipei University PhD in Public Administration and Policy

1994

Seminar on Public Policy (R) Cost Benefit Analysis in Public Sectors (E) Methods of Decision Analysis (E) Public Policy Making Process (E) Seminar on Policy Argument (E) Seminar on Policy Planning (E) Seminar on Policy Implementation (E) Seminar on Policy Evaluation (E) Seminar on Theory and Practice of Policy Networks (E) Seminar on Election and Public Policy (E) Seminar on Sustainable Development Policy (E) Seminar on Distributive Policies and Politics (E)

National Sun Yet-San University PhD in Public Affairs Management

1998

Seminar on Public Policy Analysis (E) Advance Decision and Judgment Analysis (E)

Soochow University PhD in Political Science

1998

Public Administration Theory (R)** Policy Analysis (E)

National Chung-Cheng University PhD in Political Science

2002

Rational Choice (E) Policy Analysis (E)

Shih Hsin University PhD in Public Policy and Management

2005

Theory and Development of Public Policy (R) Seminar on Public Policy (E) Policy Planning and Analysis (E) Policy Implementation and Evaluation (E) Policy Argument and Critical Theory (E)

National Chi Nan University PhD in Public Policy and Administration

2006

Advanced Advanced Advanced Advanced

National Cheng Kung University PhD in Political Economy

2004

Political Economy of Development Policy (R)

Central Police University PhD in Police Policy

2006

Public Policy Analysis (E) Research of Police Policy Planning (E) Research of Police Policy Implementation (E) Research of Police Policy Evaluation (E)

Notes: R refers to required; E refers to elective. * Public administration field. **Administration and policy field.

238

Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar

on on on on

the Theory of Public Administration and Policy (R) Policy Implementation and Evaluation (E) Policy Models with Quantitative Technique (E) Policy Analysis (E)

Policy analysis education in Taiwan

Taiwan public policy analysis in a comparative context Taiwan public policy analysis and programmes have prospered over the last two decades in terms of the programmes offered and meeting the needs of the public sector, along with political democratisation, economic liberalisation, and social mobilisation. As summarised in Table 16.4 (pp 241–243), most public policy teachers in Taiwan hold a PhD in public administration and policy, while those in Japan trained as legal or economic professionals. Taiwan and Mainland China both pay attention to the policy process, policy planning, legitimisation, implementation, and evaluation, and, more significantly, Taiwan and Korea also focus on policy context, such as policy network, public opinion, and policy discourse, which are usually not included in Mainland China’s course design (Wu et al, 2012). After examining policy analysis syllabuses in East Asian, North American, and European universities (Kuo, 2013), the most frequently assigned policy analysis textbooks include: • Weimer, David, and Vining, Aidan R., 2011. Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 5th ed. New York: Longman. • Bardach, Eugene, 2008. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. • Stone, Deborah, 2001. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. • Sabatier, Paul A., 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. • Fischer, Frank, Miller, Gerald J., and Sidney, Mara S. (eds.), 2006. Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. • Dunn, William, 2008. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. In Taiwan, in addition to these popularly assigned textbooks, frequently assigned Chinese textbooks include: Chiu, C.T., 2008. Public Policy. Taipei: Ju Liu Press. Wu, T., 2008. Public Policy. Taipei: Wu Nan Press. Wu, T., 2013. Dictionary of Public Policy. Taipei: Wu Nan Press. Yu, C., Mao, S.L., Chen, D.Y., and Kuo, Y.Y., 2008. Public Policy. Taipei: Best Wise Press. • Lin, S.P., and Chang, S.H., 2012. Public Policy. 4th ed. Taipei: Wu Nan Press. • • • •

Wu et al (2012) identified leading public policy textbooks that show a dominant influence of Western literature. Nonetheless, theories and practices generated in Western countries need to be examined to assess their applicability in East Asian contexts. Second, most policy analysis courses in Taiwan, as in the US, apply economic analysis to public policies. Cost–benefit analysis tends to be one of the most frequent applications (Kuo, 2006). Schools focusing on an economic perspective or context by providing courses on ‘Economic Analysis of Public Policy’, ‘Public Policy: Economic Perspectives’, ‘Economics for Public Policy’, ‘Economic Analysis of Public Policy’, or 239

Policy analysis in Taiwan

‘Economic Foundations of Policy Analysis’ usually assign the textbooks by Weimer and Vining (2011) and Bardach (2008); while those that emphasise the political context of public policy, with courses such as ‘Political Institutions and Policy Processes’, ‘Political Science and Public Policy’, ‘Policy Making, Power and Politics’, or ‘Political Foundations of Policy Analysis’, tend to assign Stone (2001), Fischer et al (2006), Sabatier (2007) and Dunn (2008) as textbooks. Most North American and East Asian programmes focus more on empiricism, while European universities, especially those with social construction and interpretative paradigms, embrace post-empiricism. Jan (2010) noted that Taiwan has transformed from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system, and the values of administrative efficiency, accountability, and due process of law are emphasised. Accordingly, public policy processes have become more transparent and accessible. Participation of civic groups in policy negotiation contributes to ‘democratising bureaucracy’ (Tang and Tang, 2000). The administration has attempted to engage citizens in policy processes through opinion polls, online mechanisms, and deliberative citizen participation. Moreover, the application of information and communications technology (ICT) in service delivery and public consultation by government, and experiments with deliberative participation mechanisms, provide the general public and interest groups more political access for bottom-up participation in policy-making processes (Huang and Tu, 2010). In Taiwan, both empiricism and post-empiricism have gained importance and yield great impacts on policy analysis theory and practice. Third, corresponding to the experience of NASPAA, CAPPA (the Canadian Association of Programs in Public Administration), and EAPAA (the European Association for Public Administration Accreditation), public administration and policy programmes in Taiwan also endeavour to promote the quality of teaching and research through accreditation, though not by TASPAA, but by the Higher Education Evaluation and Accreditation Council of Taiwan (HEEACT). In Taiwan, the number of higher education institutions has increased rapidly, but the number of incoming students is decreasing drastically, due to the falling birth rate. The quality assurance (QA) and quality enhancement (QE) of higher education have drawn great attention. The HEEACT was established jointly by the Ministry of Education and all the higher education institutions in Taiwan on 26 December 2005. Since 2006, HEEACT has conducted higher education quality assurance evaluations to promote quality education and research in universities. The objectives of the evaluation include (HEEACT, 2014): 1 Understand the mechanism and practice of each programme in ensuring their student learning outcomes. 2 Judge and recommend the accreditation status and validation period of university programmes using the evaluation mechanism on implementing student learning outcomes. 3 Facilitate the mechanism to improve the quality of programmes. 4 Assist programmes to develop their own educational features, moving towards excellence; help in-service Master’s degree programmes to develop their own features and strengths to meet the needs of the business world. 5 Provide the government with the evaluation results for reference in mapping out their higher education policy.

240

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After the first round was finished in 2009, the second round particularly emphasised student learning outcomes. Most TASPAA members belong to the field of public affairs, set by the HEEACT, and were accredited through self-review and peerreview. All the undergraduate, Master’s, Executive Master’s and PhD programmes in each department have to be evaluated. TASPAA annual meetings have proposed and discussed the possibility of accreditation by TASPAA itself. Finally, research centres are usually attached to public policy programmes in the US and Canada (Geva-May and Maslove, 2006, 2007). Similarly, in Taiwan there are also many self-funded research centres attached to PA and PP programmes, for example, the Taiwan Public Affairs Centre at National Taiwan University, the Civil Society Research Centre, Sustainable Policy Research Centre, Local Government and Governance Research Centre at National Taipei University, the Intergovernmental Relation Research Centre at National Chi Nan University, and the Centre of Public Management at Shih Hsin University. Additionally, two government-funded research centres, the Taiwan Public Governance Research Centre at National Taiwan University and the Taiwan E-Governance Research Centre at National Chengchi University, gain their significance and influence by advancing Taiwan’s visibility and future development in public governance and e-governance. However, think tanks in Taiwan tend to be funded by political parties for in-house policy analysis. The KMT-funded National Policy Foundation and the DPP-funded Taiwan Thinktank are two typical examples.

Table 16.4: Public policy in East Asian, North American and European universities East Asian universities

North American universities

European universities

Global association International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA); International Political Science Association (IPSA) Regional association . Asian Association for Public Administration (AAPA) . Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Administration and Affairs (TASPAA) . Korean Association for Public Administration (KAPA) . Japanese Association for Public Administration (JAPA)

. National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) . American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) . Association for Public Policy and Management (APPAM) . Canadian Association of Programs in Public Administration (CAPPA)

. European Association for Public Administration Accreditation (EAPAA) . Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) . European Public Administration Network (EPAN) . European Group of Public Affairs (EGPA)

Common findings Three main challenges in Mainland China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan: insufficient attention to policy knowledge rooted in the local context, inadequate teaching capacity, and underrepresentation of policy analysis.

. The shared goals of policy programmes in Canada, the US, and Europe are to provide knowledge, skills, and understanding of the craft of policy analysis and to facilitate expert status in the profession. . Movement toward a more professional orientation and a more systematic approach in terms of educational goals and curricula. . Policy analysis materials utilised internationally are influenced by US methodology. . Policy analysis is craft and art rather than a precise science. 241

Policy analysis in Taiwan

Table 16.4: continued Particular findings Mainland China: . Courses on public policy analysis have been offered in over 100 universities across the country as a result of fast-growing professional training programmes in public administration. . Two-thirds of instructors are hold doctorates. . Two-thirds of courses did not include ‘political systems’ and ‘societal structures’. . Although the majority of Chinese instructors obtained their highest academic credentials from domestic universities, two-thirds of them required textbooks written by foreign scholars. Japan: Scholars trained in economics and law play a significant role in public policy training. Korea: . There are about 20 universities that offer Master’s degrees in public policy. . 100% of instructors hold doctorates. . Most Korean instructors (about twothirds) were trained abroad, but the vast majority of them (85%) only assigned textbooks written by Korean scholars.

242

Canada: . Economics training and strong representation of microeconomics in public policy programmes. . Model I: policy analysis programmes in departments of political science, quantitative and qualitative analysis, and survey techniques; Model II: policy analysis programmes in schools of business: management is generic; Model III: standalone schools of public administration or policy: methodologies and techniques from economics, politics, law, sociology, finance, and so on. . Careers in government: co-op or internship, executive programmes. . Universities house units conducting policy analysis either self-initiated or consulted. . Tighter finance and increased competition, universities have been more involved in planning and policy analysis. US: . Policy analysis programmes (undergraduate, Master’s and PhD), grounded in political science, are interdisciplinary. . Programmes are more connected to private support and less dependent on government funding than in Canada or Europe. . Internships on a regular basis, application of theory to practise, client organisations. . NASPAA accreditation establishes standards for training and publishes the Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE), which exports the American model to other countries. . Research centres are attached to policy analysis schools.

. Since the 1950s the need for harmonisation of EU members’ varied traditions and cultures . Many EU policy-oriented programmes focus on comparisons between countries within fields of public policy. . Only some European institutions offer policy analysis programmes, in schools of public administration, business, economics, or political science, but schools of public policy can be observed in the UK and Germany. Apart from the UK and Germany, few schools actually offer policy analysis courses per se. . Four types in Western and Central Europe: public management departments in business schools, schools of economics, departments of political science, and schools of public administration. . In most EU institutions, policy analysis is policy study without core course design. . Think tanks and research-oriented centres practise policy analysis in Western Europe and the EU. . Some German universities offer policy certificates. . Central and Eastern Europe faced the lack of public policy faculty. US and Scandinavian countries are dominant since they are the key advisers and donors in this region. . EAPAA attempts to set common EU accreditation. . The Network of Institute and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) is a platform for the exchange of ideas, skills, and relevant information. It promotes faculty training, curriculum development, conference and research, and the quality of the civil service.

Policy analysis education in Taiwan

Table 16.4: continued Comparison . Aside from Japan, the majority of instructors (about three-quarters) received training in the field of public administration or public policy for their highest educational credentials. . The policy process receives a high level of coverage among public policy courses in East Asia, especially in Mainland China and Taiwan, but is covered much less extensively in courses in Japan and Korea. . Instructors in Taiwan and Korea pay much greater attention to topics related to policy context, such as policy network, public opinion, and policy discourse.

Europe vs. US: Compared with US practice, most of the programmes do not train students in applied policy analysis and through internships, but through final dissertations with social science research methods applied in public policy. Europe vs. Canada: Unlike in Canada, European and US policy-oriented programmes offer a wide range of policy specialisations, such as science and technology, law, social policy, health policy, and urban planning.

Source: The East Asian experience is summarised from Wu et al. (2012), while the North American and European experiences are drawn from Geva-May and Maslove (2006, 2007).

Conclusion Public policy courses have increasingly become an indispensable part of professional training programmes in public affairs in East Asia in response to rapid changes in the political, social, and economic environment in East Asia (Wu et al, 2012).

Simultaneous globalisation and localisation Globalisation and localisation have been two concurrent trends surrounding the orientation and development of public policy education. Fritzen (2006) stated that faculty in Singapore ask themselves about the difference between ‘an Asian school of public policy’ and ‘a school of public policy in Asia’. In the Singapore case, he finally concluded that ‘all things international in this field is growing’’ (Fritzen, 2006: 12). Wu et al (2012: 343) indicated: public policy education in East Asia has been heavily influenced by theories, practices, and learning materials from Western countries. Textbooks written by Western scholars are often assigned as required textbooks in public policy courses, and the textbooks written by local scholars are also largely dominated by theories and practices from Western countries.

In a panel session at the 2006 conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM), European scholars also claimed that it is hard to discuss international policy events without the European context in a course. Therefore, global public policy education is facing similar policy problems, such as the financial crisis, healthcare, education, transportation, housing, or environmental issues, but at the same time creates each country’s local solution within its own context.

243

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Public policy education in Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore has been substantially influenced by the US experience. The US influence on policy analysis education in Taiwan cannot be overemphasised as most public policy scholars and educators trained in the US, brought back what they learned in the US, and designed curriculums or courses parallel to those in the United States (Kuo and Kuo, 2012). Policy analysis education in Taiwan is globalised in terms of textbook content, debates on empiricism versus post-empiricism, and accreditation, but simultaneously localisation is valued, as the Taiwan context was considered in designing the public policy curriculum. For instance, along with democratic politics, a liberal economy, and a plural society, policy analysis particularly relies on political, economics, and societal issues to consider benefits and costs to various interest groups, which also demonstrates the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary characteristics of policy analysis education and practice in Taiwan.

Mutual and reciprocal policy learning Many countries have been dedicated to the development of professional policy analysis in public services (Fritzen, 2006). In conducting sound policy analysis, there is a need to emphasise its art, craft, skills, values, and knowledge (Kuo and Kuo, 2012; GevaMay and Maslove, 2007). Core competences of policy analysis feature economics, leadership, and empirical analysis, especially state-of-the- art techniques and toolkits. Policy analysis education on real-world policy problems for real ‘clients’ has been emphasised. Public policy education in the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University can be viewed as benchmarks. There is shared optimism that the greater emphasis on public policy education can contribute to the quality of policy making and governance (Wu et al, 2010). As stated by Dwight Waldo (1980: 134), ‘reciprocal learning, mutual adjustment, institutional invention may be speeded, and a world unified but not unitary, harmonious but not homogenized, may develop’. Reciprocal learning and mutual adjustment within different countries can achieve a better design of public policy education. A policy learning process with beneficial lesson-drawing results in a progressive cycle.

References Bardach, Eugene, 2008. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Berman, Evan M. (ed.), 2010. Public Administration in East Asia: Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Chiu, C.T., 2008. Public Policy. Taipei: Ju Liu Press. Dunn, William, 2008. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Fischer, Frank, Miller, Gerald J., and Sidney, Mara S. (eds.), 2006. Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Fritzen, S.A., 2006. Public Policy Education Goes Global: A Multidimensional Challenge. LKY School Working Paper Series. http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/ uploads/2013/04/wp1806a.pdf

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Geva-May, I., and Maslove, A., 2006. Canadian Public Policy Analysis and Public Policy Programs: A Comparative Perspective. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 12(4), 413–438. Geva-May, I., and Maslove, A., 2007. In Between Trends: Developments of Public Policy Analysis and Policy Analysis Instructions in Canada, the United States, and the European Union. In L. Dobuzinskis, D. Laycock, and M. Howlett (eds.), Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art (pp. 186–216). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. HEEACT (Higher Education Evaluation and Accreditation Council of Taiwan), 2014, www.heeact.edu.tw/mp.asp?mp=4 Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., and Perl, A., 2009. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Huang, T.Y., and Tu, W.L., 2010. Public Policy Processes and Citizen Participation in Taiwan. In E. Berman (ed.), Public Administration in East Asia: Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (Chapter 24, pp. 517–531). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Jan, C.Y., 2010. History and Context of Public Administration in Taiwan. In E. Berman (ed.), Public Administration in East Asia: Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (Chapter 23, pp. 497–516). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Kuo, Y.Y., 2006. Cost–Benefit Analysis. Taipei: Hwa-Tai Press. Kuo, Y.Y., 2013. Where does Public Policy Education Go Regionally and Globally? (paper presented at 8th International Conference in Interpretive Policy Analysis. Societies in Conflict: Expert, Publics and Democracy. University of Vienna, Austria, 3–5 July). Kuo, Yu-Ying, and Kuo, Nai-Ling, 2012. Taiwan’s Public Policy Education: USStyle? Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 14(5), 391–409. Lin, S.P., and Chang, S.H., 2012. Public Policy. 4th ed. Taipei: Wu Nan Press. Sabatier, Paul A. 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Stone, Deborah, 2001. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York: W.W. Norton. Tang, C.P., and Tang, S.Y., 2000. Democratizing Bureaucrats: The Political Economy of Environmental Impact Assessment and Air Pollution Fees in Taiwan. Comparative Politics, 33, 81–99. Waldo, D. 1980. The Enterprise of Public Administration: A Summary View, Navoto, CA: Chandler & Sharp. Weimer, David, and Vining, Aidan R., 2011. Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 5th ed. New York: Longman. Wu, T., 2008. Public Policy. Taipei: Wu Nan Press. Wu, T., 2013. Dictionary of Public Policy. Taipei: Wu Nan Press. Wu, Xun, Lai, Allen Yu-Hung, and Choi, Do Lim, 2012. Teaching Public Policy in East Asia: Aspirations, Potentials and Challenges. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 14(5), 376–390. Yu, C., Mao, S.L., Chen, D.Y., and Kuo, Y.Y., 2008. Public Policy. Taipei: Best Wise Press.

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Index

Index A AAPAM see African Association of Public Administration and Management aboriginal peoples  100, 228 accountability  32, 33, 35, 36, 64, 166, 183 Act of Governing Food Sanitation 1975  102 Ad Hoc Administrative Reform Commission 28 Administrative Reform Advisory Task Force 28 African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM)  212 agriculture  5, 10, 11 Anti-Casino Alliance  100 anti-nuclear protests  103, 104 anti-pollution protests  104 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)  9, 13, 82 APPAM see Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management appeal process  3, 130, 156 ARATS see Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Armed Forces Military Justice Law (later Military Trial Law)  3 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation see APEC Asian Development Bank  13 Asian Financial Crisis 1997–1999  12 Assembly and Parade Act 1988  126, 159 Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM)  243 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)  8, 9 Association of Digital Culture Taiwan  142 Association of International Relations (later Institute of International Relations)  112 Atomic Energy Council  103 Auer, M.R.  138 authoritarianism exclusion of interest groups  96, 99 factionalism 22 hard to soft  126 leaders 97 and NGOs  158 policy analysis under  17, 18fig, 19 public engagement after  132 regime  1, 3–5, 6, 27, 28, 96

B Bacchi, Carol and Eveline, Joan  91 Baker, John  216 Bardach, Eugene  124

Bason, C.  41 BC (Budget Centre)  58 Beijing 5 Beijing Platform for Action 1995 81 Bennett, W.L.  101 Berger, S. and Lester, R.K.  103 Berlin-Lichtenberg, Germany  139, 140, 146 Berman, Evan M.  237 Beveridge, Fiona and Nott, Sue  90 Biggs, S. and Helms, L.B.  101 Birkland, Thomas A.  220 birth rate  47, 48, 128, 163, 240 Bittle, S., Haller, C., and Kadlec, A.  139 BNHI (Bureau of National Health Insurance)  171, 177, 179–83 Bovaird, T., Elke, L., and James, D.  140 Box, Richard C.  124 Britain 27 Budget Centre see BC Bureau of National Health Insurance see BNHI Burt, M. R.  39 Burt, S. and Hardman, S. L.  92 business organisations  104, 108

C Canada policy analysis education  237, 241, 242t–3t political lobbying  97 social media  137 Caplan, N.  25 carbon emission reduction  46–7, 47fig, 49 casinos see gambling CCP see Chinese Communist Party CCU see Chinese Culture University censorship 6 Central Bank of the Republic of China  12 Central Police University  189, 231 Central Taiwan Science Park see CTSP CEPD (Council for Economic Planning and Development)  85, 89 CFCT see Consumers’ Foundation, Chinese Taipei Chang, Guo-Ding  72 Chen, Chun-Pin  73, 77, 78 Chen, Don-Yun  125, 132 Chen, D.Y., and Pan, C.H.  143, 144t Chen, Jin-Yen and Wang, Hsiao-Tan  83, 86, 87, 89 Chen,Yang-De  74, 75, 76 Chen,Yu-Che, and Hsieh, Jun Yi  229

247

Policy analysis in Taiwan Chen Cheng  3 Chen Shui-bian  7, 8, 9, 160, 227, 228 Chiang Ching-kuo, President  1, 6, 8, 10, 97, 126 Chiang Kai-shek  3, 4, 9, 97 Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall  7 Chiang, Min-Hsiu and Tseng, KuanChiu 124 Child Welfare League Foundation  163 childcare policy  47–8, 50, 163 Chinese Civil War  3, 5, 9, 68 Chinese Communist Party (CCP)  3, 4 Chinese Culture University (CCU)  209, 231 Chinese Federation of Labour  105 Chi-Yan community  128, 129 CIER (Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research)  113, 224 citizen consensus conferences  127–8 citizen jury  128 citizen participation  123–33 ban during martial law  126 and democratisation  126, 127 influence of  124 limits to  132 and policy analysis  124–5 and policy implementation  124–5 and quality of decision making  25 requirements for  123 Civil Associations Act 1989  98, 126, 159 civil servants  57, 63, 64 climate change  46, 87, 88, 220 co-authorship 201–3 Cochran, Charles L., and Malone, Eloise F. 220 Collective Bargaining Agreement Act amendment 2008  105 Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights 160 Committee of Women’s Rights of the Executive Yuan  81 communism, advocacy of  6, 98 Communist Party of China (CPC)  5, 9 Communist rebellion  3, 4 conference papers  190 conflicts of interest  26, 27, 29, 31t, 183 Congressional Policy Centre  223 Consensus 1992  8 Constitution  3, 4, 5, 7, 27, 97 consultation  24–5, 26 consumer price index (CPI)  15 Consumers’ Foundation, Chinese Taipei (CFCT) 159 consumption, retail  12 corporatism 27 corruption  1, 8, 26, 76, 126 cost-effectiveness 40 Council for Economic Planning and Development see CEPD Coxall, B., Robins, L. and Leach, R.  98, 106

248

CPI see consumer price index CPC see Communist Party of China cross-strait relations  5, 6, 8 Crow, D.A. and Baysha, O.  123 CSSTA (Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement) 147 CTSP (Central Taiwan Science Park)  15 Cummings, M.C. and Wise, D.  95

D Dan-Shuei River  129 debt  16, 16fig debt crisis, European  221 decision-making, bureaucratic model  161 decision making, democratic  24 deLeon, Peter  19 deliberative democracy  91, 127, 139 deliberative polling  128 Democratic Progressive Party see DPP democratisation 17–18 after martial law  27, 67, 96, 97, 104 need for policy analysis  28 and public engagement  126, 127 Denhardt, Robert B.  208, 216n2, 231 Department of Compilation  59 Department of Gender Equality  92 Department of Health see DoH Department of Public Administration  187 Development, Research, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan  143 Diambra, Joel F., Cole-Zakrzeski, Kylie G., and Booher, Josh  208 digital divide  140, 147n3, 228, 229 Digital Opportunity for All (2012)  146 DirectionLessGov.com  141, 147 disadvantaged groups  156, 157 dispute resolution  33, 34 division of nation, advocacy of  98 DoH (Department of Health)  177, 179–82 domination, relationships of  174 Dowding, K.  173 DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) anti-corruption campaign  1 call for presidential elections  6, 7 courted by interest groups  103 effect of change to legislative system  8 election and interest groups  17 first opposition party  97 labour relations improved  105 protests re privatisation  104 reduction in public engagement  126 think tank  113, 224 victory 8 Dror,Yehezkel  54 dual executive presidential system  7 Dunn, William N.  39, 54, 124, 154 Dye, Thomas R.  39, 95, 98, 101, 154, 155

Index

E ECFA see Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement eco-community  128, 129 ecological preservation protests  104 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)  9, 13, 103 Economic Miracle  9, 11, 17, 103, 126 economy development 103 growth rate  10fig liberalisation  2, 9–10, 12, 104 slowdown  15, 104 stimulus package  12 world ranking  15 Edquist, Kristin  92, 93 e-governance  228, 229 elections 1991 6 1992 6 1996  6, 7, 8, 18fig 2000  7–8, 105, 113 2004  8, 105 2008  9, 113 lobbying  95, 96, 106, 107fig, 108 and local faction  72, 78, 79 NGOs  160, 182 presidential power  4 promises  24, 44, 46fig, 48, 48fig, 82 self-interest  72, 73 suspension of  4 think tanks  114, 116, 119 US 2008  138 electronics industry  12, 13–16 elites  130, 132, 139 Emergency Orders  4 empiricism 240 energy  14, 46, 49, 227 environmental impact assessments  29, 160 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (USA)  25, 59 Environmental Quality Protection Foundation 163 e-Taiwan project  15 evidence-based policy advocacy strategy  162 exchange relationships  173, 180fig, 181, 182 Executive Yuan advisory committee  28 gender mainstreaming  81–3 and interest groups  101, 105, 106, 107fig ‘expert-bureaucratic model’  90 exports  10, 12, 13, 14 external policy advisors  24–5, 26, 83, 85–92

F FACA see Federal Advisory Committee Act (US) Fan, Mei-Fang  129, 228

farmers see agriculture FDA (USA) see Food and Drug Administration Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (US) 26 FGIL (Freedom of Government Information Law) 58 financial crisis, global 2008  104, 106, 108, 221 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (US) 25 food security  5 Foundation of Women’s Rights Promotion and Development see FWRPD Fourth Nuclear Power Plant  103, 128, 227 Freedom of Government Information Law see FGIL Freedom of Information Act  35 Fritzen, S.A.  243 fundraising campaigns  106, 130 FWRPD (Foundation Women’s Rights Promotion and Development)  83, 93

G gambling  100, 101 Gaming Act  101 GAO see General Accountability Office (USA) Garfield, Eugene  191 GDP (gross domestic product)  11, 12, 15, 16fig GEAC see Guidelines for the Establishment of Advisory Committees gender equality  160, 163 ‘gender statistics’  88 and power structure  81 sensitivity 88 stereotypes  83, 84 Gender Impact Assessment see GIA gender mainstreaming see GM General Accountability Office (GAO) USA 146 Geva-May, I., and Maslove, A.  237 GIA (Gender Impact Assessment)  81, 82–93 assessment indicators  84, 85 attitude of bureaucrats  85, 86, 88, 89, 91 benefits evaluation  84 communication problems  86, 87 depoliticisation and integration  91 as ex post tool 91 external consultation  85, 86, 87, 88 history of  82, 83–5 implementation of  83, 85–9 lack of gender-disaggregated data  88 neoliberal governance  89, 91, 92, 93 outsourcing of  86 participatory procedure  85 poor auditing and monitoring systems  89

249

Policy analysis in Taiwan public space benefit evaluation  84 resource evaluation  84 Gladwell, M.  140, 141 globalisation  219–22, 243–4 GM (gender mainstreaming)  81–93 ‘collaborative governance’ model  92 compromise  92, 93 and controversial issues  91 feminists’ views on  82 lack of communication  90 as participatory  81, 90, 93 problems  89, 90–2, 93 ‘technocratisation’ and expert domination 90–1 Gold, T.B.  103 Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley  244 Government Scholarship for Overseas Study 187 Grant, W.  106 graph theory  171, 174 gross domestic product see GDP Guide for Gender Impact Assessment  81, 83 Guidelines for the Establishment of Advisory Committees (GEAC)  28

H Hansen disease see leprosy Hatimi, I.E. and Somers, H.E.C.  43 health insurance  127, 128, 132, 164 healthcare reform  171–83 research methods  175–6 social network analysis  171, 173–4, 181, 183 Heng Shan Township, Hsinchu County  129 Hicks, Diana  191, 192 Higher Education Evaluation and Accreditation Council of Taiwan (HEEACT)  225, 240, 241 Hong,Yun-Lin  72 Hoover Commission (US)  28 Houston, David J., and Delevan, Sybil M.  198 Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael  104, 126, 158 Hsinchu Science Park  12, 14, 15, 104 Hsu, Shu-Hsiang  227 Hsung, Ray-May, Chang, Feng-Bin, and Lin, Ya-Feng 126 Hu, Fu  132 Huang, Arthur Hou-ming  191, 192 Huang, Jun-Ying, Liao, Da-Chi, and Chiou, Chang-Tay 24 Huang, Tong-Yi  128 Hung, Wan-ling  133n12

I I Shou University (ISU)  210, 211 ICMA see International City/County Management Association

250

imports  10, 11, 13–14, 15 independence  6, 7, 8, 9 industrial output  12 industrial projects  10 industrial relations  105 Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)  14, 15, 104 industrialisation  2, 9–11 industry, labour intensive  10, 13, 15, 104 INFO TAIWAN  222 information technology  13, 14–16 information transmission network data  176, 177t, 178fig, 179 infrastructure, Ten Major Construction Projects  10, 11 Inkster, R., and Ross, R.  209 innovation 39–50 adoption processes  42 case studies  43, 44–8 decision making  49 diffusion of  42 economic value of  43 failure 50 measurement standard of  43 need for  41 organisational 42 policy analysis research  42–3 political pressure  44–5, 48 post-implementation appraisal  45 risks 41 stages of  42 INPR see Institute for National Policy Research Institute for National Policy Research  113 Institute for Scientific Information (ISI)  191 Institute of International Relations  115 interdependence  172, 173, 174, 179, 221 interest groups  95–108 actions 101 background 97 business organisations  105, 106 cause  99, 100 definition 95 ecological 108 economic development and industrial relations 103–5 and government  105–6 protest activity  102, 103 regulation of  97–8 single-issue 100 social groups  108 social media  100 types  98–100, 101 International City/County Management Association (ICMA)  41 International Monetary Fund  15 internationalisation  219, 220–2, 225–9 internship programmes coordinators 211–12

Index departments and host organisations  214, 215 duration and timing  209 feedback  210, 211, 215 industrial placements  209 placement  209, 210 policy analysis  207–17 relationships 208fig students and host organisations  212–14 supervisors  212, 213 USA 213 usefulness of  214 ISI see Institute for Scientific Information issue networks  173 ISU see I Shou University ITRI see Industrial Technology Research Institute

J Jan, Chung-Yuang  187, 240 Japan 27 Jasnoff, S.  25 Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) 4 Jillson, C.  104, 106 Jin-Pyng, Wang  147 Jinjian Zhang  187 John, S.  173 John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University  244 Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction see JCRR Jones, B., Kavanagh, D., Moran, M., and Norton, P.  98, 105 Jorde-Bloom, Paula  49

K Kaohsiung Science Park  15 Kathlene, Lyn and Martin, John A.  124 Kinmen County Council  72, 73 Kiser, P.  208 Klijn, E.-H.  155 KMT (Nationalist Party, Kuomintang) authoritarianism  1, 72 ‘bifactionalism’ 72 call for presidential elections  6, 7 choice of candidate for president  7 civil war  3 on Constitution  4 control of labour  105 electoral victories  6, 8, 9 factional politics  72 Japanese colonial administration system  27 land reform  4 local government system  68 National Policy Foundation  223 NGOs under  158 public support  126 relocation 97

re-unification policy  7 think tanks  113 universal welfare system  171 Ku, Chung-Hwa  126, 159 Kuo,Yao-Chang  124 Kuo,Yu-Ying, and Kuo, Nai-Ling  188 Kuo-lung, Chang  160 Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) see KMT

L labour associations  99 Labour Standard Act 1984  96 Labour Union Act amendment 2010  103, 105 labour unions  104, 108 land reform  4–5, 9 land tax  5 Lasswell, Harold D.  2, 19 Laumann, E.O., and Knoke, D.  174, 175 Laumann, E.O., and Pappi, F.U.  174 Lee, Chung-pin  44 Lee, Dr Annie  83 Lee Teng-hui, President  6, 7, 8 Legislative Yuan control of  7–8 interest groups  101–2, 107fig, 180 policy analysis  53–64 student protest  147 Lei, Sean Hsiang-Lin  125 Leighninger, M.  141 leprosy (Hansen disease)  129–30 Leprosy Prevention Law  129 Li, Tai-Ching  132 Li, Tzung-Shiun  128 Library and Information Service see LIS Lien Chan  7, 8 Lien-Chiang County  100 Lin, Shoei-Po and Wang, Chung-Pin  124 Lin, Teh-chang  126 Lin, Tze-Luen and Chen, Liang-Yu  125 LIS (Library and Information Service)  59 Liu, I-Chun  128 lobbying see interest groups Lobbying Act 2007  97 local councils  67–79 dialogue with locals  77 duties 69 factional politics  72–3, 74, 76, 79 future of policy analysis  78, 79 information sources  77–8 limited role in policy analysis  67, 72–6 local government system  67, 68–71, 72 logrolling  73, 74 mayoral veto  74 official documents  77 organisation 69–70 patron–client relationships  72 petitions from constituents  77 reform of institutional design  79

251

Policy analysis in Taiwan regulation  69–70, 71, 76 self-interest  72, 73 whistle blowers’ information  78 Local Government Act  68, 69, 74, 75, 76 local government system centralisation 68 control-oriented national regulations  76 ‘Era of the Regulations’  68 ‘Guarded Self-Governance’  68 institutional settings  74–6 legislative sessions  75–6 reform post Martial Law  68 strong mayor form  74, 75, 76 logical-positivism  40, 43 localisation  7, 27, 128, 243–4 logrolling (vote trading)  73, 74 Lombardo, Emanuela  90 Lo-Sheng movement  125, 129–30, 131, 131t, 133n12 Lo-Sheng Sanatorium  129–30 Lo-Sheng Youth Coalition  130

M Ma Ying-jeou  8 Marando,V., and Melchior, M.  217n8 Marsh, D., and Rhodes, R.A.W.  173 Martial Law declaration of  3, 18fig economy 11 exemption from Constitution  4 interest groups  97, 101 lifting of  1, 6, 18fig, 27, 97 local government system  68 NGOs  158–9, 160, 164 and public participation  126 trials 3 mass media, influence of  101, 105, 106, 117 Master in Public Administration (MPA) programme  231, 237 Master in Public Policy (MPP) programme  231, 237 Ma-Tsu 100 Mayhew, David R.  72 McBeath, Dr Derlad A.  187 McGann, J.G. and Weaver, R.K.  111 meat 11 Meyer, A.D. and Goes, J.B.  42 Military Trial Law see Armed Forces Military Justice Law Ming Chuan University  189 Ministry of Culture  130 Ministry of Economic Affairs  89 Ministry of Education  192 misconduct 78 Moed, H.F., Burger, W.J.M., Frankfort, J.G., and Van Raan, A.F.J.  187 Moon, Jeremy, and Shockman, Wykham  213 MyEGOV  144, 145

252

N Nagel, Stuart S.  220 Nanny and Childcare Policy  163 National Affairs Conference 1996  7 National Association for Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA)  234 National Chengchi University (NCCU)  112, 187, 191, 210, 228, 231 National Chung Hsing University (later National Taipei University)  187 National Development Institute  113, 115 National Health Index (NHI)  164 National Health Insurance Act 1994  99 National Health Insurance (NHI) reform  171–83, 228 network collaboration  172 New Financing Scheme  172 policy actors  181–2 research methods  175–6 National Health Insurance Plan  128 National Health Services see NHS National Policy Foundation  113, 115, 223 National Policy Think Tank Online  143–5, 146 National Science Council see NSC National Security Act  3 National Security Law  6 National Sun Yat-Sen University  191 National Taiwan University (NTU)  209, 211, 216n3, 231 Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) see KMT NCCU see National Chengchi University neoliberalism  82, 89, 91, 92–3, 153 network plots  176t, 178 New Frontier Foundation  113, 115 ‘New Public Management’  89 New Taipei City  47–8, 50 NGOs (non-governmental organisations)  126, 151–67 advocacy 159 alliances  157, 158, 159 benefits of policy analysis  157 case study policy analysis  163 compliance government statutes  156 consultation 153 current position towards  160 definition of  151 disadvantaged groups  160, 165 diversity of opinion  161, 162 field study policy analysis  162 government cooperation  153 government subsidies  156 implementation 153 increase in  159 independence  151, 152 institutionalism and  153 limited resources policy analysis  162 network governance model  158, 165, 166 operational 151

Index participation in policy  157–60 policy advocacy and policy analysis  152, 153–7, 165 policy democratisation  164 political functions  158, 159, 160 problem definition  162 public accountability  166 service delivery or policy advocacy  153, 154 social innovation  157, 158 social movements  159 social science methods  162 survey policy analysis  163 UN definition  151 NHS (National Health Services)  99 Nomura Research Institute  104 non-governmental organisations see NGOs non-profit organisations see NGOs NSC (National Science Council)  14, 85, 89, 187, 210 NTU see National Taiwan University nuclear power policy  10, 103, 227–8

O Obama, President Barack  137 objectivity 63 O’Connor, K. and Sabato, L.J.  96 oil crisis, global  104 OLLY (Organic Law of Legislative Yuan)  53 One China policy  8 optoelectronics industry  15 Orchid Island, Taiwan  228 Organic Law and Statute Bureau see OSLB Organic Law of Legislative Yuan see OLLY Osimo, D.  141 OSLB (Organic Law and Statute Bureau)  57, 58

P Pan-Blue 7 Pan-Green Coalition  8 Parliamentary Library  59 ‘participatory-democratic model’  90 peer reviews  25, 190 Peng Wan-Ru Foundation  160, 163 Penghu County  100 People’s Republic of China see PRC Peters, B. Guy  220 Pingtung County Council  69, 70, 71fig policy advisory committees  23–36 functions  26–7, 33, 34 need for  24–5, 26 performance of  34, 35 structure  28–32, 33 policy analysis aim of  220 decentralisation 17–18 definition of  124, 220

deliberative 18 departments and programmes  225–6 environment  17, 17fig, 27–8 evolution 18fig frameworks 221 international perspective  219–29 local context  2 and NGOs  161–4 PDCA framework  221, 222 publications 226 purpose of  161 training 55 types of policy  227fig policy analysis education  231–44 Doctoral programmes  233, 237–238t foreign universities  241t–3t Masters programmes  233, 235 mutual and reciprocal learning  244 Taiwanese universities  231, 232–8 policy communities  173 ‘policy dialogue’  40 policy networks  171–83 literature 172–3 research methods  175–6 results 176–81 SNA in  173, 174 political dissent  97 Political Donations Act  98 pollution  60–1, 163 post-empiricism 240 post-implementation outcome reviews  39 postmodern policy analysis  40, 161 post-positivism  19, 40 power relationships  173, 174 PPP (Purchasing Power Parity)  15 PRC (People’s Republic of China) claim over Taiwan  9 missile buildup  9 thawing of relations  8 trade with  13, 103, 104 United Nations  5 pre-implementation assessments  39, 49 presidential elections, direct  6, 7 pressure groups see interest groups prestige 55 privatisation  12, 96, 104 promotional groups  98 prostitution 91 PTT (online forum)  142 public access  64 public administration research  187–205 faculty background  188–9 methods  189, 190 national trends  191, 192 publications 191–205 research themes  203, 204t, 205fig public engagement see citizen participation public surveys  128 public welfare  55, 56

253

Policy analysis in Taiwan public–private joint research projects  28 public–private partnership  153 Purchasing Power Parity see PPP Purple Palace, Nanjing  9

R Rapid Transit System, Xinxhuang  129, 130 RDEC (Research, Development and Evaluation Commission)  83, 85, 89, 228 refereed journal articles  190, 191 Renaud, J.P.  139 representative democracy  139 Research, Development and Evaluation Commission see RDEC research centres  241 resource allocation  26 resource exchange network data  176, 177t, 180fig rice 11 Rich, A.  112 Rigger, S.  1 Roberts, N.  139 Rogers, Everett  42 Rogers, James M.  62

S Sabatier, Paul A.  42 SAGPRA (Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act)  53, 59, 60–3 San Francisco Urban Environmental Accords 46 scenario workshop  129 Scheaffer, Dr Wendell E.  187 science parks  12, 14, 15, 19n3 SEF see Straits Exchange Foundation Self-Government Ordinance  46–7 service sector  11 Settlement of Labour Disputes Act amendment 105 shadow cabinet  115, 119 Sheth, J.N.  41 Shih Hsin University (SHU)  189, 207, 209–10, 211, 213, 215, 217n4 Shipley, P.  95 small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)  13, 14, 15 Smith, Bruce  26 SNA (social network analysis)  171–4, 183 ‘social capital’  158 social construction model  25 social diversification  104 social justice  127 social media  137–48 Arab Spring  137 bottom-up projects  141–2 challenges  140–2, 142fig democracy 139

254

diversity of opinion and expertise  141–2 information  138, 139 Indian Ocean earthquake  137 lack of real participation  146 opportunities  138–40, 142fig personal bias  137 platform  129, 138 and private sector  147 and public services  140, 141 sharing of political preferences  138 weak ties  140, 141 social movements  97, 126 social network analysis see SNA Social Order and Maintenance Act 1991  103 Social Science Citation Index see SSCI sociometry 174 software market, value  15 Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act see SAGPRA Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Fund 60 Soochow University  231 Soong, James C.Y.  7, 8 SOP (Standardised Operation Procedure)  83, 85, 91 Southern Taiwan Science Park see STSP sovereignty 8 special municipality councils  75 Squires, Judith  90, 91, 93 SSCI (Social Science Citation Index)  189, 191 stakeholders  79, 123 Standardised Operation Procedure see SOP standing advisory committees  28–32, 33 composition and recruitment  29 conflicts of interest  29 frequency of meetings  32t and legitimatization of system  34, 35 multiple functions  33 obligation and remuneration of members  31, 32, 33 open access to  35, 36 performance 34–5 period of service  32t remuneration 32t role of  33, 34 statistical indicators  164 Statute for Industry Innovation 2010  104 Statute for Upgrading Industries 1991  104 Steinberg, Richard  156 Stone, D.  112 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)  8, 9 STSP (Southern Taiwan Science Park)  15 sugarcane 11 Sun Yat-Sen, Dr  97 ‘Sunflower Movement’  147 surrogate motherhood  127–8 Sweitzer, H.F., and King, M.A.  209

Index

T Taichung county  72, 73 Tainan Science Park  15 ‘Taipei Free’  44–5, 46fig, 49 Taipei City, carbon emission reduction  46–7, 47fig, 49 Taipei City Council legislative sessions  75 organisation  69–70, 70fig, 71 Taipei City Educational University (TCEU) 210 Taipei Municipal University of Education (TMUE) 210 Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Administration and Affairs see TASPAA Taiwan Business Indicators  15 Taiwan E-Governance Research Centre  228 Taiwan Foundation for Democracy  114, 223 Taiwan Healthcare Reform Foundation  164 Taiwan Institute of Economic Research see TIER ‘Taiwan Miracle’ see Economic Miracle Taiwan Research Institute  113, 115 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company see TSMC Taiwan Solidarity Union  8 Taiwan Thinktank  113, 115, 223, 224 Taiwan’s Consumer Protection Law  159 Tamkang University  231 Tang, C.P., and Tang, S.Y.  240 TASPAA (Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Administration and Affairs)  188, 219, 233, 234, 241 TCEU see Taipei City Educational University technocratic model  24, 25, 32, 90–1 Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion  3, 4, 6 Ten Major Construction Projects  10, 11 textiles 14 Theory and Practice of Public Administration (Jinjian Zhang)  187 think tanks  111–20, 222–4 academic  114, 115, 116, 118 definition 112 delivery of government sponsored research 118 early history in Taiwan  112 economic development era  112, 113 as educators  118 and focus of public attention  118 funding 111 and government officials  116–17 and interest groups  117, 118 international community  114 and legislators  116 and media  117 neutrality of  102, 114, 116, 119, 120

orientations 115 party policy-making  113–19 political elites  118, 119 purpose and function  114–15 role of  112 stereotype 120 types 111 Thomson Reuters Corporation  191 Tien, Hung-mao and Shiau, Chyuanjeng 126 TIER (Taiwan Institute of Economic Research)  112, 115, 224 Tiessen, Rebecca  81 trade associations  98, 99, 108 cross-strait  9, 11 diversification 13 foreign  2, 10, 13, 18fig trade unions  104, 105 transportation projects  10 Truman, D.B.  95 TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company)  14, 15 Tu, Wen-Ling  125 Tullock, Gordon, Seldon, Arthur, and Bardy, Gordon L.  73 Tunghai University  231 12-Year Compulsory Education policy  102 228 Incident  3, 4 Typhoon Morakot  33, 141, 142 Typhoon Morakot Online Disaster Report Centre 147

U UCINET 175 Ukeles, Jacob B.  54 UMC (United Microelectronics Corporation)  14, 15 understaffing  55, 57, 62, 64 unemployment  12, 12fig, 15 United Microelectronics Corporation see UMC United Nations  5–6, 112, 229 US advisory committees  26–7 aid  9, 10, 11 cultural exports  221 education faculty members  188, 189t investment  11, 15 logrolling 73 political lobbying  97 relationship with  6–7 social media and presidential campaign  137, 138 Superfund 60 support for land reform  4 trading partner  13

255

Policy analysis in Taiwan US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act  61 Utterback, James M.  42

V value-laden policy research report  64 ‘velvet triangle’  90

W Waldo, Dwight  244 Walters, Lawrence C., Aydelotte, James, and Miller, Jessica  124 Wang, Ben-Chaung  128 Wang, Ching-I and Fu, Hung-Der  72, 73 Wang, Jiann-Chyuan and Mai, ChaoCheng 104 Wang Yu-chi  9 Watts, D.  108 WB see World Bank Web 2.0 see social media Weidner, William  100 Weimer, David L.  2 Weimer, David L. and Vining, Aidan R  54, 55, 154, 156 Weimer, D.L., Chen, Don-Yun, and Kuo,YuYing, 156 Wetlands Taiwan  162, 163 ‘white gloves’  8 White Paper on Disaster Prevention and Protection 33 ‘White Rose’ movement  147 Wildavsky, Aaron  54, 55, 62 Williams, W.  39 Wilson, J.Q.  41 Wilson, Richard  23, 24 Wolfe, Richard A.  42 women’s organisations  159, 160 Women’s Rights Committee  83, 90 Woodward, Alison  90 World Bank (WB)  151 World Conference on Women 1995  81 World Trade Organization (WTO)  11, 103 Worldwide Think Tanks (WTT) Report (2013) 111 Wu, Chuan-Feng  228 Wu, Xun, He,Yan-Ling, and Tung-Wen Sun, Milan 198 Wu, Xun, Lai, Allen Yu-Hung, and Choi, Do Lim  237, 239, 243

256

X Xinxhuang  129, 130

Y Yu, Chi-lik  132

Z Zhang Zhijun  9

Vol 5 “This volume provides insightful accounts of how the styles and loci of policy analysis in Taiwan have evolved in response to economic development and democratisation.” David Weimer, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

The study of policy analysis in Taiwan began in the 1970s; however, while other countries have recognised the need for detailed examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis at different levels of government, Taiwanese studies have remained limited. This book brings together for the first time a team of experienced and highly respected researchers from across Taiwan with expertise in policy analysis theory and practice in specific areas of government as well as in non-governmental organisations. This is a well-structured volume that will be highly relevant for students and academics interested in understanding and analysing politics and policy making in Taiwan.

• a systematic study of policy analysis systems by government and non-governmental actors • a history of the country’s policy analysis, empirical case studies and a comparative overview • a key reference for research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies Recent volumes published and forthcoming • Policy analysis in Brazil, edited by Jeni Vaitsman, Jose M. Ribeiro and Lenaura Lobato (2013) • Policy analysis in the Netherlands, edited by Frans van Nispen and Peter Scholten (2014) • Policy analysis in Japan, edited by Yukio Adachi, Sukehiro Hosono and Jun Iio (2015) • Policy analysis in the Czech Republic, edited by Arnošt Veselý, Martin Nekola and Eva M. Hejzlarová (2015) YU-YING KUO is Professor of Public Policy and Management and Dean of Research and Development at Shih Hsin University, Taiwan.

POLICY ANALYSIS IN TAIWAN Edited by Yu-Ying Kuo

Features of the ILPA series

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

“A must for everyone concerned about the development of civic society in Taiwan, this enjoyable, fact-filled book is a rich source of scholarship and practical insights.” Luke Hsiao, Department of Public Policy and Management, I-Shou University, Taiwan

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES EDITORS: IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

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