Policy Analysis in Colombia 9781447347729

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Half-title
Series information
Policy Analysis in Colombia
Copyright information
Dedication
Table of contents
List of figures and tables
List of abbreviations
Notes on contributors
Editors’ introduction to the series
Policy analysis in Colombia: an introduction
A primer on the Colombian context
Organization of the book
References
Part One Policy analysis in contemporary Colombia
One The policy analysis movement in Colombia: the state of the art
Introduction
Key milestones
The beginning of local capacity
Policy capacity and nation construction
Crisis of the state and the diffusion of policy ideas
A new framework for institutional capacity and New Public Management
The adoption of concepts and the generation of local knowledge about policy
The state of the art: a more complex and rich setting for policy analysis
Conclusion
Notes
References
Two Evolution of policy analysis as a field of study and instruction in Colombia
Introduction
The Colombian higher education context
Precursors to public policy education in Colombia
Public policy degrees in Colombia
Undergraduate education in public policy
Graduate specializations or certificates
Master’s degrees in public policy, public administration and management
Doctoral education in public policy
Conclusion
References
Three Policy analysis, bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms in Colombia
Introduction
Management reforms in Colombian public administration since 1991
The rearrangement of organizational structures and administrative procedures
Strategies for an efficient, flexible and high-quality civil service
Results-based management
Capacity as a condition for the implementation of public administration reforms
An exploration of islands of excellence in Colombia
Institutional designs
Human resources
Financial resources
External relationships
Organizational climate
Leadership
Autonomy
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part Two Policy analysis within national and subnational governments
Four Policy analysis inside central government in Colombia
Introduction
Key political actors
The President
Constitutional powers to legislate
Non-legislative powers
Sectoral line ministries
Administrative departments
National Planning Department (DNP)
Administrative Department of the Presidency (DAPRE)
National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES)
The policy-making process and the role of policy analysis
Planning and prioritizing
Budgeting
The execution stage
Monitoring and evaluation of public policy
The political economy of the policy-making process
Conclusion
Notes
References
Five Policy analysis and the legislature in Colombia
Introduction
The 1991 Constitution and its impact on the political regime
Dealing with a fragmented political party system
The key actors in the law-making process
The law-making process: an aggregate overview
Exceptional times, exceptional law-making processes? The peace process legislative disagreement
Overcoming congressional gridlock: the electoral success/legislative failure of the consulta anticorrupción
Conclusion
Notes
References
Six Policy analysis in the Colombian Constitutional Court
Introduction
The institutional instruments of the CCC
Public policy analysis in the CCC: the toolbox
Problem structuring
Forecasting expected outcomes and prescribing preferred policies
Monitoring and evaluation
Illustrating the CCC’s policy analysis: public health and the illicit drugs issue in Colombia’s peace agreement
Analysis of public health policies
Drugs policy in the peace agreement
Conclusion
Notes
References
Seven Metropolitan governance and policy analysis in Colombia
Introduction
Characterization of Colombian metropolitan regions and the problematic evolution of their forms of governance
Characterization of metropolitan governance in Colombia: limited success and extensive failure
Where has metropolitan analysis been missed in Colombia? The case of Bogotá
Where has metropolitan policy analysis worked in Colombia? The case of Medellín
The origins of metropolitan policy analysis in Colombia
The rise of the municipality and the downgrading of metropolitan policy analysis
Conclusion
Notes
References
Eight Policy analysis for decision making in Colombian local governments
Introduction
Local government effectiveness through policy analysis and performance management
Using policy analysis at the subnational level: who and when
Who?
When?
Policy analysis and PMDs in Colombia
Inputs for PMD formulation
Challenges for PMD formulation
Challenges for PMD disaggregation and implementation
PMD evaluation and integration
Discussion
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part Three Policy analysis in key policy domains
Nine Policy analysis in the education sector in Colombia
Introduction
Education policy in Colombia and the context of teachers’ reform
The problem
The new teachers’ statute: policy formulation and implementation milestones
Policy formulation: dynamic tension between technical and political solutions
Implementation
The (absent) role of policy evaluation
Conclusion
Note
References
Ten Policy analysis in the health sector in Colombia
Introduction
The role of the Ministry of Health and other national-level institutions in setting the agenda of the health sector
Case study: the case of MIPRES
The gap in the development of technical capacity between national and local-level health sector agencies
The disconnection between agenda setting and the implementation of public health interventions
Case study: the Health Situation Analysis
Outsiders play a role in policy design at the central level
Two examples of evolving national-level agencies
Opportunities and bottlenecks for policy analysis in Colombia
An opportunity for policy analysis: data sources for monitoring and evaluation of policy
Bottlenecks for policy analysis in health sector institutions
Discussion
Conclusion
Notes
References
Eleven Policy analysis and decision making in the military forces: the Havana experience
Introduction
The role of the military forces in peace processes
The peace process: the end of the conflict
Configuration, operation of COET and the technical sub-commission
Results of agreements, discussions and sub-commission inputs
Local zones and spaces for the political, economic and social reincorporation of demobilized combatants
Laying down weapons
Decision making and the end of the conflict
Conclusion
References
Twelve Technocracy, decision making and economic policy in Colombia
Introduction
The Colombian economic technocracy
Debt crisis: placing decisions in the hands of a group of experts (1982–86)
Institutional change and a new economic development model (1991)
Response to the economic downturn of 1999
The oil and mining bonanza in the 21st century: political economy in turbulent times
Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Notes
References
Thirteen Social policy, target populations and policy analysis in Colombia
Introduction
The enlargement of the Colombian state through basic welfare policies
The expansion of policy targeting after the 1990s
The lack of impact on income redistribution of social policies
A focus on pensions: zooming in on the problem of policy truncation
The lack of political representation: a path to understanding truncated policies
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part Four Policy analysis beyond the state
Fourteen Political parties and policy analysis in Colombia
Introduction
Policy analysis for political parties: what for?
The Colombian party system in historical perspective
The historical background
New political parties for the new century
Policy analysis by and for 21st-century Colombian political parties
Conclusion
References
Fifteen Policy analysis and NGOs in Colombia
Introduction
Defining the third sector in Colombia
The evolution of the third sector in Colombia
Third sector in the 2000s to present
NGOs in policy analysis: institutional spaces in Colombia
NGOs in policy analysis: CCONG
CCONG and post-agreement
The SDGs and organized civil society
Conclusion
Notes
References
Sixteen Media, evidence and policy analysis in Colombia
Introduction
Sources of evidence and public policy analysis
Government
Think tanks
Universities
The media and its restrictions
Three cases
Glyphosate
Asbestos
Taxes on sugary soft drinks
Comparing the three cases
Conclusion
Notes
References
Conclusion: Building capacity for policy analysis amid tensions and challenges in Colombia
Evolution and consolidation of policy analysis in Colombia
Policy analysis within national and subnational governments
Policy analysis in key policy domains
Policy analysis beyond the state
Final remarks
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES EDITORS: IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

Colombia

Edited by Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Nadia Rubaii

POLICY ANALYSIS IN COLOMBIA

International Library of Policy Analysis Series editors: Iris Geva-May, Simon Fraser University, Canada, Carleton University, Canada and the Wagner School, NYU, USA and Michael Howlett, Simon Fraser University, Canada This major series brings together for the first time a detailed examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis systems at different levels of government and by non-governmental actors in a specific country. It therefore provides a key addition to research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies more generally. Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis which offers a broad comparative overview with other countries as well as the country in question. In doing so, the books in the series provide the data and empirical case studies essential for instruction and for further research in the area. They also include expert analysis of different approaches to policy analysis and an assessment of their evolution and operation. Volumes in the series include the following countries: Australia • Brazil • Czech Republic • France • Germany • Japan • Israel • The Netherlands • Turkey • Ireland • Spain • Mexico • Taiwan • USA • Canada • Belgium and build into an essential library of key reference works. The series will be of interest to academics and students in public policy, public administration and management, comparative politics and government, public organisations and individual policy areas. It will also interest people working in the countries in question and internationally. In association with the ICPA-Forum and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. See more at comparativepolicy.org/about-jcpa-icpa-forum/ or at policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/international-library-of-policy-analysis .

POLICY ANALYSIS IN COLOMBIA Edited by Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Nadia Rubaii

International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 15

First published in Great Britain in 2020 by Policy Press, an imprint of Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1-9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: [email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2020 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​4473-​4771-​2 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​4473-​4839-​9  ePub ISBN 978-​1-​4473-​4772-​9  ePdf The right of Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Nadia Rubaii to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Policy Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Policy Press. The University of Bristol and Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press and Policy Press work to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Qube Design Front cover image: image kindly supplied by iStock Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Policy Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

This book is dedicated to the memory of Dr Maite Careaga-​Tagueña, Professor of Public Leadership, colleague and friend, in recognition for her inspiration and her endless efforts to educate better leaders for Colombia and Latin America. All her teachings and lessons are part of this book and of us.

Contents List of figures and tables List of abbreviations Notes on contributors Editors’ introduction to the series

Policy analysis in Colombia: an introduction Nadia Rubaii and Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido

ix xi xiv xxii 1

Part One: Policy analysis in contemporary Colombia one two

three

The policy analysis movement in Colombia: the state of the art Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido, Nadia Rubaii and Andrés Guzmán-​Botero Evolution of policy analysis as a field of study and instruction in Colombia Nadia Rubaii and Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido Policy analysis, bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms in Colombia María Fernanda Ramírez and Carolina Isaza

11 31

47

Part Two: Policy analysis within national and subnational governments four five six seven eight

Policy analysis inside central government in Colombia Luis Bernardo Mejía-​Guinand Policy analysis and the legislature in Colombia Mónica Pachón and Manuela Muñoz Policy analysis in the Colombian Constitutional Court Juan Carlos Rodríguez-​Raga and Santiago Virgüez-​Ruiz Metropolitan governance and policy analysis in Colombia Santiago Leyva, Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Enrique Rodríguez-​Caporalli Policy analysis for decision making in Colombian local governments Claudia N. Avellaneda and Ricardo A. Bello-​Gómez

65 81 99 113 135

Part Three: Policy analysis in key policy domains nine ten

Policy analysis in the education sector in Colombia Sandra García, Darío Maldonado and Sarah Muñoz-​Cadena Policy analysis in the health sector in Colombia Andres I. Vecino-​Ortiz, Stephanie Puerto-​García, Diego Lucumí and Janeth Mosquera-​Becerra

153 169

vii

Policy Analysis in Colombia eleven

Policy analysis and decision making in the military forces: the Havana experience Paula Lorena Mora-​Hernández, Juan David Gélvez-Ferreira, Michael Weintraub and Sebastián Bitar twelve Technocracy, decision making and economic policy in Colombia Marta Juanita Villaveces-​Niño and Carlos Caballero-​Argáez thirteen Social policy, target populations and policy analysis in Colombia Santiago Leyva and Carlos Andrés Olaya

187

203 223

Part Four: Policy analysis beyond the state fourteen Political parties and policy analysis in Colombia Sebastián Líppez-​De  Castro fifteen Policy analysis and NGOs in Colombia Susan Appe and Fabian Telch sixteen Media, evidence and policy analysis in Colombia Juan Guillermo Vieira-​Silva

241

Conclusion: Building capacity for policy analysis amid tensions and challenges in Colombia Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Nadia Rubaii

287

257 271

Index295

viii

List of figures and tables Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 8.1 10.1 10.2

Distribution of specialization programs in Colombia related to public policy Increase in Master’s-​level public policy programs in Colombia, 1998–​2018 Degree titles and type of institution Geographic distribution by city (department/​region) of Master’s programs in public policy and related fields in Colombia in 2019 (n=21) Fate of bills, by branch (1998–​2018) Proportion of bills introduced by committee in both chambers Fate of constitutional amendments, by presidential term Proportion of national bills introduced by committee in both chambers PMD as a policy process Principal–​agent problem for the health sector Data sources for monitoring and evaluation

36 37 38 41 86 88 89 89 139 171 178

Tables 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 14.1 14.2 16.1 16.2 16.3

Master’s degree programs related to public policy and public administration in Colombia, 2019 Analysis of required curriculum components (percentage of programs) PNDs, NPM principles and key practices Categories used to observe bureaucratic capacity Levels of capacity by category and organization Legislative peace initiatives approved between January and June 2017 Results of consulta anticorrupción by question Colombian metropolitan regions with more than 250,000 inhabitants Composite indicator of metropolitan pressure Undergraduate studies of the Minister of Finance, the Director of the DNP and the Governor of BR, 1958–​80 and 1981–​2016 (while in office) Graduate studies of the Minister of Finance, the Director of the DNP and the Governor of the BR, 1958–​80 and 1981–​2016 National policies based on target populations Colombian political parties’ seats in Congress 2006–​22 Colombian political parties’ think tanks as of 2019 Colombian media outlets, audience and owners Case 1: articles, general and specific sources Case 2: classification of technical sources

40 42 50 53 55 91 98 116 119 205 206 226 248 250 275 277 278

ix

Policy Analysis in Colombia 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8

x

Case 2: articles, general and specific sources Case 2: classification of technical sources Case 3: articles, general and specific sources Case 3: classification of technical sources The three cases compared

279 280 281 282 284

List of abbreviations AICO

Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia –​Colombian

Indigenous Authorities AL BPIN CCC CCONG

CID CIDER CNA CNP COET COLCIENCIAS

COLDEPORTES

CONACES

CONPES CNSC CRC DAFP DANE DAPRE

Legislative Act Banco de Programas y Proyectos de Inversión

Nacional –​Programs and Projects Bank Corte Constitucional de Colombia –​Colombian Constitutional Court Confederación Colombiana de Organizaciones No-​ Gubernamentales –​Colombian Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo – Center for Development Research Interdisciplinary Center for Development Studies Consejo Nacional de Acreditación –​National Accreditation Council Consejo Nacional de Planeación –​National Planning Council Comando Estratégico para la Transición –​Strategic Command for Transition Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación –​Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation Departamento Administrativo del Deporte, la Recreación y la Actividad Física –​Administrative Department of Sports, Recreation and Physical Education Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para el Aseguramiento de la Calidad de la Educación Superior –​National Commission for Quality Assurance in Higher Education Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social –​ National Council for Economic and Social Policy Comisión Nacional del Servicio Civil –​National Commission of Civil Service Comisión de Regulación de Comunicaciones –​ Communications Regulation Commission Departmento Adminstrativo de la Función Pública –​ Administrative Department for the Public Function Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística –​ National Administrative Department of Statistics Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia –​ Administrative Department of the Presidency xi

Policy Analysis in Colombia DNP DPS ESAP FARC

FARC-​EP

Fecode FEDESARROLLO GSCs ICFES

IDI ILPA JACs M19 MAIS MEN MHCP MIRA MPA MPM MPP NASPAA NBC NGO OECD

xii

Departamento Nacional de Planeación –​National

Planning Department Departamento Administrativo de la Prosperidad Social –​ Administrative Department of Social Prosperity Escuela Superior de Administración Pública –​Higher School of Public Administration Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común –​ Common Revolutionary Alternative Force (political party) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –​ Ejército del Pueblo –​Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –​People’s Army (guerrilla group) Federación Colombiana de Trajadores de la Educación –​ Colombian Federation of Education Workers Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo Grupos significativo de ciudadanos –​significant groups of citizens Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación (formerly Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de Educación Superior) –​Colombian Institute for the Evaluation of Education Índice de Desempeño Integral –​Integral Performance Index International Library of Policy Analysis Juntas de Acción Communal –​Community Action Committees Movimiento 19 de Abril –​April 19 Movement (guerrilla group) Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social –​Social and Indigenous Alternative Movement Ministerio de Educación Nacional –​Ministry of National Education Ministry of Finance and Public Credit Movimiento Independiente de Renovación Absoluta –​ Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation Master of Public Administration Master of Public Management Master of Public Policy Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs and Administration Núcleo básico del conocimiento –​basic knowledge core Nongovernmental organization Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development

List of abbreviations PMD PND POAI PRAP PTN SDG SGP SINERGIA

SNA SNIES

SUIP

TEs UP UTLs ZVTNs

Plan Municipal de Desarrollo – Municipal

Development Plan Plan Nacional de Desarrollo –​National Development Plan Programa Operativo Anual de Inversiones –​Annual Investments Operational Plan Programa de Renovación de la Administración Pública –​Program for Public Administration Renewal Puntos Transitorios de Normalización –​Transitional Points for Normalization Sustainable Development Goal Sistema General de Participaciones –​General Participation System Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Gestión y Resultados –​National Performance, Management and Results System Sistema Nacional de Acreditación –​National System of Accreditation Sistema Nacional de Información de la Educación Superior –​National Information System for Higher Education Sistema General de Información Administrativa del Sector Público –​General System for Administrative Information for the Public Sector Entidades territoriales –​territorial entities Unión Patriótica –​Patriotic Union Unidades de Trabajo Legislativo de los Congresistas –​ Congress Members’ Legislative Work Units Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización –​ Transitional Local Zones for Normalization

xiii

Notes on contributors Susan Appe is Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Policy at the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York, US. Her research focuses on government–​nonprofit relations; the dimensions and evolution of the nonprofit sector; and philanthropy in international development. She is co-​editor-​in-​chief of VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, one of the leading academic journals in third sector studies, publishing on topics related to civil society, nonprofit organizations, volunteering and philanthropy. Claudia N. Avellaneda is Associate Professor in the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. She specializes in governance and public management in developing countries, with an emphasis on local governments in Latin America. Specifically, she investigates the drivers of municipal performance by focusing on the role of mayors’ education, experience, networking and political support on local social service delivery, public finances, tax collection and decision making. Ricardo A. Bello-​Gómez is a PhD candidate in Public Affairs at the O’Neill School of Environmental and Public Affairs, Indiana University. He studies public management, intergovernmental relations and organization theory, with a particular interest in local government performance. His overall research agenda explores the institutional, organizational and managerial factors affecting ­government performance, often focusing on the provision of social services. Sebastián Bitar is Associate Professor in the Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo at Universidad de los Andes. In his latest publications he has studied Colombian foreign policy, security challenges in the Americas, human rights, US military bases in Latin America, the defense sector in Colombia, the internationalization of the Colombian economy, foreign investment in the energy sector and development in border areas in Colombia. He is the author of the books Los Primeros Pasos de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia (Ediciones Uniandes, 2007), US Military Bases, Quasi-​Bases, and Domestic Politics in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Spanish translation by Ediciones Uniandes, 2017) and he is co-​editor, with Arlene Tickner, of the book Nuevos Enfoques para el Estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales de Colombia (Ediciones Uniandes, 2017). He received a PhD in International Relations from the American University in Washington, DC. Carlos Caballero-​A rgáez is Professor of Economics and Government at Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. He has an MSc in Transportation Engineering from the University of California at Berkeley, an MPA from the xiv

Notes on contributors

Woodrow Wilson School of Government at Princeton University and an MA in History from Universidad de Los Andes. Professor Caballero-​Argáez has more than 40 years of experience, both in the public and private sector. He has been Minister of Mines and Energy of Colombia, Member of the Board of Directors of Banco de la República (the Central Bank of Colombia), President of the National Banking Association of Colombia, Founding-​President of Bancoldex (the foreign trade bank of Colombia) and Director of FEDESAROLLO, among other positions. Professor Caballero-​Argáez’s research interests cover Colombia’s economic policy, economic history in Colombia’s 20th century and business history. He is a columnist for El Tiempo newspaper in Colombia and has published several books on Colombian politics end economic history. Sandra García is Associate Professor at the School of Government at the University of Los Andes in Colombia. Her research focuses on social policy, children and adolescents’ wellbeing and education policy. Her research has been published in numerous international peer-​reviewed journals such as Review of Educational Research, International Journal of Educational Development, Child Indicators Research and Journal of Development Effectiveness. She is also co-​author of the book, Tras la Excelencia Docente: Cómo Mejorar la Calidad de la Educación para Todos los Colombianos (Fundación Compartir, 2014). She received her PhD in Social Work from Columbia University in 2007 and her MPA in 1999 from the same university. Juan David Gélvez-​Ferreira has a Master’s in Public Policy and BSc in Government and Public Affairs from Universidad de los Andes. His research focuses on illicit drugs, citizen security and development. He previously worked in the School of Government at Universidad de los Andes and at Fundación Ideas para la Paz, where he conducted impact evaluations as well as field work in coca-crops zones. Currently, he works in the Colombian National Planning Department as an advisor in citizen security issues. Andrés Guzmán-​Botero is an advisor to the Statistical Regulation, Planning, Standardization and Normalization Division Directorate at the National Administrative Department of Statistics of Colombia, and a teaching assistant at Universidad de los Andes. His research focuses on strategic issues of public and nonprofit organizations. He attained an MSc in Economics from Universidad de los Andes. Carolina Isaza is Professor and Researcher at Universidad Externado de Colombia and is the leader of the Research Group in Government and Public Policy. Professor Isaza has a PhD in Government and Public Administration from Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Her research specialties are corruption, accountability and public administration in Colombia. She is currently working on interpretive perspectives. She is also the editor of Opera journal on government and public policy published by Universidad Externado de Colombia. xv

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Santiago Leyva is Professor in the Department of Government and Political Science at Universidad EAFIT, Medellín, Colombia. He holds a PhD in Administration (Public Governance) from Lancaster University, and he is a member of the Sociedad, Política e Historias Conectadas research group which is hosted at EAFIT University. His research interests include public administration, public policy implementation and intergovernmental relations. Sebastián Líppez-​De Castro is Director and Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colombia, and a PhD candidate in Community and Public Affairs at Binghamton University, State University of New York. His research uses the largest and most comprehensive cross-​national evaluation of subnational governments’ authority to date, in order to unfold the relationship between intra-​state armed conflict and decentralization. His research interests include government decentralization, local government management, local governance processes and challenges, public affairs education and genocide and mass atrocity prevention. Diego Lucumí gained a PhD in Health Behavior and Health Education in the School of Public Health at the University of Michigan and is currently an Associate Professor in the School of Government at the Universidad de los Andes, Colombia. His research focuses on social determinants and prevention of cardiovascular disease, and public health services and systems at the local level. He is a member of the American Public Health Association and the Urban Health Network for Latin America and the Caribbean. Darío Maldonado is Associate Professor and Research Director of the School

of Government at Universidad de los Andes. His research focuses on public economics and social policy with emphasis in education and youth. He has been involved in several studies about the Colombian education sector that have been central to education reform discussions in Colombia. He has published in refereed journals such as Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, European Journal of Political Economy, Pediatrics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics and Journal of Public Economics. He is also co-​author of the book Tras la Excelencia Docente: Cómo Mejorar la Calidad de la Educación para Todos los Colombianos (Fundación Compartir, 2014). He received his PhD in Economics from Toulouse University in 2005 and his Master’s in Economics and Econometrics in 2000 from the same university. Luis Bernardo Mejía- ​G uinand has a Master’s degree in Public Policy from New  York University and a PhD in Public Policy from the University of Maastricht (Netherlands). He currently serves as Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. His work focuses on the organizational effects of the bureaucratic politics. His most recent publications, as co-​author, include “Agency loss and the strategic redesign of the presidential office in Colombia” in Latin American Politics and xvi

Notes on contributors

Society (Mejía-​Guinand et al, 2018a) and “Bait and switch? Cabinet ministers in Colombia (1958–​2014)” (Mejía-​Guinand et al, 2018b). Prior to his academic career, he worked in the National Planning Department and Ministry of Education of Bogotá. Paula Lorena Mora-​Hernández is an LLM candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles and Master in Public Policy in the School of Government at Universidad de los Andes. Her main research interests are international affairs, human rights, judicial systems and immigration law. Since 2016, she has worked as an advisor on international affairs for the Colombian government. Janeth Mosquera-​Becerra is Associate Professor at the School of Public Health at the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia. She is the Director of the Center for the Development and Evaluation of Public Health Policies and Technologies at Universidad del Valle. Professor Mosquera’s research specialties are health conditions in urban areas, focused on the relationships between urban environments, active transportation and access to food. She also works in the fields of racism and discrimination of black populations, and public health. She holds a Master’s in Social Service from the Federal University of Pernambuco and a PhD in Sociology from Portland State University. Manuela Muñoz holds an MA in Public Policy from Universidad de los Andes. She is currently a PhD student in Political Science at Texas A&M University. Her research focuses on political behavior and comparative political institutions. Specifically, she is interested in how different institutional contexts with competing information affect the political preference formation of citizens, and the origins and consequences of electoral rules. Sarah Muñoz- ​Cadena gained a BSc in Political Science with minors in Journalism, and Government and Public Affairs at Universidad de los Andes. Her area of interest is public policy analysis focuses on two main topics: education and post-​conflict. She has worked as a member of the research team at the School of Government at Universidad de los Andes. Carlos Andrés Olaya is a researcher and lecturer at Universidad de Antioquia (Faculty of Law and Political Sciences) and Universidad EAFIT (Department of Government and Political Sciences). He holds a Master’s degree in Government and Public Policy from Universidad EAFIT. His research interests include public administration and management, theory of state building, political economy (focused on social policy) and policy analysis. He is co-​author of Análisis para las Políticas Públicas. La Búsqueda de la Igualdad de Género en Medellín (EAFIT, 2018). Mónica Pachón holds an MA in Political Science from Universidad de los Andes, an MPhil in Latin American Studies from Oxford University and a PhD xvii

Policy Analysis in Colombia

in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego. She is currently an Associate Professor at Universidad de los Andes in the Architecture and Design Department. Her research focuses on executive–​legislative relations, organization and institutional evolution of the Colombian Congress, fiscal efforts and political decentralization, electoral systems and institutions and more recently political and voting behavior. She worked as Project Manager of Congreso Visible in the Political Science Department at Universidad de los Andes from August 2009 to August 2013, and was Associate Professor at the School of Government Alberto Lleras Camargo at Universidad de los Andes. She was Dean of the Faculty Political Science, Government and International Relations at Universidad del Rosario until December 2018, and Tinker Fellow at Columbia University from August to December 2018. Stephanie Puerto-​García is a social scientist consultant in the Red Criteria at the Inter-​American Development Bank, and researcher at Instituto de Salud Pública at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colombia. She has an MSc in Economics from the same university. Her work focuses on health economics and public policy issues related to the social sector, particularly on life-​course inequalities in health, childhood nutrition, economic regulation in medicines and medical devices and health systems in Latin America. She has worked extensively with policy makers and public health leaders across the Latin American region to provide sound technical advice in health systems issues. María Fernanda Ramírez is Professor of Public Administration and Political Science in the Department of Government and Political Science at Universidad EAFIT in Medellín, Colombia. Professor Ramírez has a PhD in Political Theory and Public Administration from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. Her research interests include new public management reforms, policy transfer processes and public administration in Colombia. She is currently working on participatory budgeting. Enrique Rodríguez-​Caporalli is Director of the CIES Research Center in the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at Universidad Icesi in Cali, Colombia. He holds a Master’s degree in Sociology with a research focus on Cultural Consumption and Urban Identity in Buenaventura and Tumaco, a project that was financed with a National Research Grant from the Ministry of Culture in 1997. He is also a PhD candidate in History and Civilizations at the University Paris 7 (Denis Diderot). His dissertation evaluates modernization and public socialization in Cali in the first half of the 20th century. His research interests focus on urban issues, especially those associated with urban culture, history, urban planning and public space. He is currently a co-​researcher in the Builders of Peace project “Strategies of young people and Afro-​descendant women for sustainable peace in urban Colombia (Cali, Buenaventura, and Puerto Tejada)”, financed by the International Development Research Centre of Canada. Professor xviii

Notes on contributors

Rodríguez-​Caporalli’s is co-​editor and author of the books Transforming the Public: Perspectives on the Administrative Reform in Santiago de Cali in 2016 (Editorial Icesi, 2018), Poder y Ciudad en Cali 1910–​1950 (Universidad del Valle/​Universidad Icesi, 2018)  and Percepción y Ciudad (Universidad Autónoma de Occidente/​ Universidad Icesi, 2016). Juan Carlos Rodríguez-​R aga holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-​Director of the Observatorio de la Democracia at Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia. His research interests and areas of publication include political institutions –​especially courts, electoral systems and political parties –​and public opinion. Nadia Rubaii is Professor of Public Administration and Co-​Director of the Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention at Binghamton University, State University of New York, and has a research affiliation with Universidad de los Andes in Colombia. She is the founding co-​editor of Gobernar: The Journal of Latin American Public Policy and Governance, and an associate editor of the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. She is past president of the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs and Administration and has served on the board of the Inter-​American Network of Public Administration Education (INPAE). She has had two Fulbright appointments in Colombia and one in Venezuela, and has provided consultancy to public affairs programs in Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the US. She was a contributor to the International Library of Policy Analysis volume, Policy Analysis in the United States (2018). Her current research focuses on assessing and improving the policies and practices of governments in Latin America related to protecting the rights of indigenous peoples as part of a broader strategy of preventing mass atrocities. Pablo Sanabria-​P ulido is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Programs in the School of Government at Universidad de los Andes, Colombia. He is also Affiliate Professor of the Public Administration Division of the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, Mexico. He holds a PhD in Public Administration and Policy from American University in Washington, DC and a Master’s in Public Policy from the London School of Economics (LSE). He has held various positions in public affairs and policy analysis with the government of Colombia, the private sector and think tanks. He has also served previously in academic and executive positions at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and Universidad Icesi, both in Cali, Colombia. His areas of interest are public management and policy analysis, organizational behavior and public employment, corruption and transparency, local government and public affairs education. His research has been published in key public administration and policy outlets, and he has published books on public employment and human resources in the public sector, public sector reform, local government and policy xix

Policy Analysis in Colombia

analysis. Professor Sanabria-​Pulido has received recognition for his research from the Association for Policy Analysis and Management and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. He has served as board member of the International Research Society for Public Management and INPAE, among others. He currently serves as a member of the executive committee of the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs and Administration, and sits on the editorial boards of the journals Public Administration, Public Administration Review and the Asia-​Pacific Journal of Public Administration. He is Associate Editor of the journal Gestión y Política Pública and co-​convenor of the Special Interest Group in Public Sector Human Resource Management of the International Research Society for Public Management. Fabian Telch is a PhD candidate in Community and Public Affairs at Binghamton University, State University of New York, US. He has extensive experience in the public sector in Colombia. His research focuses on national development planning, development administration and governance of public, nongovernmental and civil society organizations. Andres I. Vecino-​Ortiz gained a PhD in Health Systems at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and after holding different global health positions, he is currently a faculty member on the same program where his work focuses on health systems and health economics issues. He is an elected board member of the research society, Health Systems Global. His research focuses on the economics of prevention activities, and on the translation of scientific knowledge to solve health systems issues for decision makers. Juan Guillermo Vieira-​Silva is Professor of Public Policy at Universidad Autónoma de Manizales, Colombia. He is currently finishing a PhD in Political Science at the National University of Colombia. His dissertation studies the presidential policy agenda in Colombia, applying the codebook of the Comparative Agendas Project. His main academic interests are policy theory, policy analysis, comparative public policy, presidential studies and presidential–​ congressional relations. His most recent article, titled “La teoría del juego social de Carlos Matus y los estudios de políticas públicas: exploraciones teóricas”, was published in Revista Latinoamericana de Políticas y Acción Pública in September 2019. Marta Juanita Villaveces-​Niño is Associate Professor in the School of Economics at Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogotá. She has an MSc in Comparative Politics from the LSE and a PhD in Political Studies from the Universidad Externado de Colombia. Her research specialties are Colombian economic history and political economy of land in Colombia since the independence. She has written three books on Colombian economic history of the early republican period, as well as publications on land reform and land policy in the 20th century. She is currently Director of the School of Economics at Universidad Nacional de Colombia. xx

Notes on contributors

Santiago Virgüez-​Ruiz is a PhD student in Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst. He holds a JSM from Stanford University. His research focuses on law and courts and the cross-links between access to justice and state building. Michael Weintraub is Associate Professor in the Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo at Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, Director of the Security and Violence Area of the Center for the Study of Security and Drugs at the same university, and Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). His research focuses on crime, political violence and impact evaluation of security and justice policies in Latin America, particularly in Colombia, Central America and Mexico. He has published in the Journal of Politics, Journal of Conflict Resolution and Journal of Peace Research, among other outlets, and has received funding for his work from the National Science Foundation, Research Council of Norway, Innovations for Poverty Action and the United States Agency for International Development, El Salvador. He has a PhD in Government from Georgetown University.

xxi

Editors’ introduction to the series Professor Iris Geva-May and Professor Michael Howlett, ILPA series editors Policy analysis is a relatively new area of social scientific inquiry, owing its origins to developments in the US in the early 1960s. Its main rationale is systematic, evidence-based, transparent, efficient, and implementable policymaking. This component of policymaking is deemed key in democratic structures allowing for accountable public policies. From the US, policy analysis has spread to other countries, notably in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s and in Asia in the 1990s and 2000s. It has taken, respectively one to two more decades for programmes of public policy to be established in these regions preparing cadres for policy analysis as a profession. However, this movement has been accompanied by variations in the kinds of analysis undertaken as US-inspired analytical and evaluative techniques have been adapted to local traditions and circumstances, and new techniques shaped in these settings. In the late 1990s this led to the development of the field of comparative policy analysis, pioneered by Iris Geva-May, who initiated and founded the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, and whose mission has been advanced with the support of editorial board members such as Laurence E. Lynn Jr., first co-editor, Peter deLeon, Duncan McRae, David Weimer, Beryl Radin, Frans van Nispen, Yukio Adachi, Claudia Scott, Allan Maslove and others in the US and elsewhere. While current studies have underlined differences and similarities in national approaches to policy analysis, the different national regimes which have developed over the past two to three decades have not been thoroughly explored and systematically evaluated in their entirety, examining both sub-national and non-executive governmental organisations as well as the non-governmental sector; nor have these prior studies allowed for either a longitudinal or a latitudinal comparison of similar policy analysis perceptions, applications, and themes across countries and time periods. The International Library for Policy Analysis (ILPA) series fills this gap in the literature and empirics of the subject. It features edited volumes created by experts in each country, which inventory and analyse their respective policy analysis systems. To a certain extent the series replicates the template of Policy Analysis in Canada edited by Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Each ILPA volume surveys the state of the art of policy analysis in governmental and non-governmental organisations in each country using the common template derived from the Canadian collection in order to provide for each volume in the series comparability in terms of coverage and approach. Each volume addresses questions such as: What do policy analysts do? What techniques and approaches do they use? What is their influence on policymaking in that country? Is there a policy analysis deficit? What norms and values guide xxii

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Editors’ introduction to the series

the work done by policy analysts working in different institutional settings? Contributors focus on the sociology of policy analysis, demonstrating how analysts working in different organisations tend to have different interests and to utilise different techniques. The central theme of each volume includes historical works on the origins of policy analysis in the jurisdiction concerned, and then proceeds to investigate the nature and types, and quality, of policy analysis conducted by governments (including different levels and orders of government). It then moves on to examine the nature and kinds of policy analytical work and practices found in non-governmental actors such as think tanks, interest groups, business, labour, media, political parties, non-profits and others. Each volume in the series aims to compare and analyse the significance of the different styles and approaches found in each country and organisation studied, and to understand the impact these differences have on the policy process. Together, the volumes included in the ILPA series serve to provide the basic data and empirical case studies required for an international dialogue in the area of policy analysis, and an eye-opener on the nuances of policy analysis applications and implications in national and international jurisdictions. Each volume in the series is leading edge and has the promise to dominate its field and the textbook market for policy analysis in the country concerned, as well as being of broad comparative interest to markets in other countries. The ILPA is published in association with the International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum, and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, whose mission is to advance international comparative policy analytic studies. The editors of each volume are leading members of this network and are the best-known scholars in each respective country, as are the authors contributing to each volume in their particular domain. The book series as a whole provides learning insights for instruction and for further research in the area and constitutes a major addition to research and pedagogy in the field of comparative policy analysis and policy studies in general. We welcome to the ILPA series Volume 15, Policy Analysis in Colombia, edited by Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Nadia Rubaii, and thank the editors and the authors for their outstanding contribution to this important encyclopedic database. Iris Geva-May Professor of Policy Studies, Baruch College at the City University of New York, Professor Emerita Simon Fraser University; Founding President and Editor-in-chief, International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Michael Howlett Burnaby Mountain Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, and Yong Pung How Chair Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

xxiii

Policy analysis in Colombia: an introduction Nadia Rubaii and Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido This book represents the first comprehensive examination of policy analysis in Colombia, and it does so at a critical juncture in the country’s history when having government officials capable of making evidence-​based policy decisions –​and having nongovernmental actors in universities, the media, civil society and political parties supporting that –​is as important as ever. This volume includes a diverse array of chapters that describe and critically evaluate the role of different levels of government, institutions of government, and actors outside of government in the development, implementation and evaluation of public policy, with attention to the extent to which they engage systematically in policy analysis. The book also highlights the degree to which analysis informs key substantive policy areas, and how Colombian higher education institutions are teaching public policy and have policy analysis as a field of study. It will be apparent to the reader of the book or any individual chapter that public policy and policy analysis are relatively new academic fields and professional career options in Colombia, and the systematic application of policy analysis to government decision making also is a relatively new phenomenon. That said, there are a number of notable examples throughout this book of how governmental and nongovernmental institutions and actors have historically contributed to analysis of policy options and outcomes. We highlight those examples throughout the book. Colombia, as a country, exemplifies a particular path of development whereby, even with the presence of key institutional challenges, the country has been able to configure a relatively developed public administration apparatus.

A primer on the Colombian context The Republic of Colombia is structured as a constitutional, multiparty democracy per the terms of the Constitution adopted in 1991. It is a unitary, decentralized republic in which the national government includes executive, legislative and judicial branches. Although the Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and checks and balances, extensive policy-​making powers are vested in the President and, by extension, executive branch agencies. The capacities and inclinations of each branch of the Colombian government to engage in policy analysis are discussed within individual chapters within this volume. Colombia is the fourth-​largest country in South America as measured by land mass, and the third most populous in all of Latin America (around 50 million inhabitants), 1

Policy Analysis in Colombia

following only Brazil and Mexico, notably the only other countries in the region yet to be profiled in this series. The country is divided into 32 departments (provinces) and one capital district, as well as 1,103 municipalities. It is mostly an urban country, with roughly 78% of its population living in urban areas according to the 2018 census (DANE, 2020). Unlike other countries in the region, Colombia has an entrenched network of large cities/​metropolitan areas that have developed concurrently and somehow separated from each other (Barranquilla, Bogotá, Cali, Medellín). Another interesting trait is that the country has a significant number of middle-​level cities (between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants) that offer a certain ample supply of quality public goods to their citizens (Armenia, Bucaramanga, Cartago, Envigado, Manizales, Montería, Palmira, Pasto, Pereira, Santa Marta, Sogamoso, Tuluá, Tunja and Valledupar, among others). Reflecting the importance of the major urban centers and local governments, this book includes two chapters focused on the use of policy analysis at the subnational level of government. The Colombian public administration comprises more than 6,000 agencies, both at the national and subnational levels, with around 1.4 million public officials, although the number of personnel hired through fixed-​term contracts is said to be higher than such figure (Sanabria et al, 2019). The public administration system shows a particular combination of models, a hybrid system (Sanabria, forthcoming) that includes elements of the political patronage system, the bureaucratic model, the New Public Management (NPN) model and a series of post-​NPM practices such as open government, new governance and transparency. The political system of modern Colombia was established by the 1991 Constitution. Yet, it continues to be shaped by historical events dating to the earliest times, including, but not limited to, its lengthy and rich pre-​Columbian history of indigenous peoples dating back more than 20,000 years; its colonial legacy; and the efforts during both colonial rule and the early years of liberation to be part of a larger entity that would include modern-​day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama. These historical characteristics continue to influence internal policy debates as well as relations with its neighbors. Even though the country has been classified as one of the five most developed civil services by the Inter-​American Development Bank (Cortazar et al, 2014), there have been strong wicked problems that have challenged, and in some cases hindered, the institutional capacity of the state (drug trafficking, internal armed conflict, illegal groups, urban criminality and natural disasters, among others). One key determinant of the path the public administration apparatus has followed in Colombia has been the long-​term conflict with guerrillas and paramilitary groups. Also of importance to the examination of modern public policy analysis in Colombia is its experience with long periods of violence, including the period known as La Violencia (the violence), which raged for more than ten years from the mid-​1940s through the late 1950s and resulted in more than 300,000 deaths, related to the political patronage model of public jobs. For more than 50 years from the mid-​1960s until 2015, Colombia was engulfed in a series of insurgencies 2

Introduction

and counterinsurgencies, complicated by drug trafficking, which pitted the government against a series of guerrilla groups, including the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional –​ELN), April 19 Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril –​M19), People’s Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Popular) and most (in)famously the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –​People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –​Ejército del Pueblo –​ FARC-​EP). As important as these periods of violence are to understanding Colombia’s current policy environment, it is equally important to recognize the country’s resilience in maintaining democratic political institutions and processes throughout these periods. Throughout this book, the authors refer to the recent negotiations and agreement that influence all current policy debates. The negotiations that took place in Havana, Cuba, from 2012 through 2015 between the Colombian government and FARC-​EP resulted in an historic agreement intended to put an end to more than 50 years of armed conflict between the FARC-​EP guerillas and various Colombian government administrations. The process, the resulting agreement, and the implementation process have made Colombia the focus of considerable international attention from scholars and policy actors, most of whom view the situation with both great hope and considerable doubts about its prospects for lasting success. There are lessons we can learn from the Colombian example, both as a case study and in comparison with other countries. It is an interesting case for it success in economic development, its internal and external policy decisions, its processes of decentralization, its management of cultural diversity, its handling of large-​scale and long-​standing violence, and its ongoing efforts to transition to peace. The chapters explore how Colombia has been able to develop state capacity for policy analysis amid intense internal conflict and with a tradition of minimal state presence in several key areas. A quick note on terminology as it relates to the current status of the country. Given the contested nature of the ongoing process of implementation, chapter authors have been allowed the flexibility to refer to the current period using labels they consider most appropriate. As editors, we have not insisted on standardization because there is no consensus. Thus, throughout the book, readers will encounter references to post-​conflict, post-​agreement, or other terms. These variations remind us of the complexity and tenuity of Colombia’s situation today.

Organization of the book This volume is organized according to a similar design to the other books that comprise the International Library of Policy Analysis (ILPA) series, and it is intended to serve the dual roles expected of each volume in that series. Specifically, it provides both an in-​depth country study and the basis for comparisons across countries. Those interested in horizontal comparisons across the volumes in the series will observe some variations that represent the unique context in Colombia. Specifically, there are chapters dedicated to certain issues, which demand more 3

Policy Analysis in Colombia

attention, and for which there may not be comparable chapters in other volumes, such as the peace process and policies aimed at different populations. At the same time, there is less attention to other topics, such as the role of legislative committees, for example. We have prepared this book with a variety of audiences in mind, including policy actors and scholars within Colombia, in the region, and on a global scale. Within Colombia, it can serve as a teaching tool in the still small but growing number of public policy and public management programs. Within the Latin America region, policy actors and scholars are seeking more in-​depth knowledge about the successes of other countries as they consider signing trade and other agreements. Colombia is the third country in Latin America to be included in the series, joining Brazil and Mexico for that honor. Like Brazil and Mexico, Colombia has a strong reputation for the quality of its higher education institutions in terms of academic programs and research. Additionally, the Inter-​American Development Bank consistently ranks the Colombia within the top five countries in Latin America in terms of civil service development and public administration capacity. On an international scale, this book will facilitate comparisons of Colombia with other middle developed economies and other post-​conflict environments. The volume draws on the expertise of more than 20 authors, including faculty members from the leading research universities in Colombia, practitioners in key Colombian government agencies, and scholars based at universities in the United States who are Colombian by birth and/​or have extended, in-​country research and teaching experience in Colombia. In an effort to promote the future of the scholarship and practice of public policy analysis, several of the chapters bring together established scholars and practitioners with students and recent graduates. The authors include established and leading scholars, several of whom have substantial public sector experience in the country, and some of whom are collaborating with early career scholars who will be the future of the field in Colombia. The book is organized in four sections, each consisting of three to five chapters. In Part I, Policy analysis in contemporary Colombia, three chapters provide a context for understanding the subsequent sections and chapters. To get things started, in Chapter 1, Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido, Nadia Rubaii and Andrés Guzmán-​ Botero provide a broad overview and a big-​picture assessment of the “state of the art” of policy analysis in Colombia, tracing the policy analysis movement from the 1950s to the 1991 Constitution to the present. This is followed by a chapter by Nadia Rubaii and Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido, which documents the brief but intense period of development of public policy education in the country in recent years, and examines the characteristics of existing educational programs in terms of their potential to contribute to capacity building across actors and sectors. The first section concludes with a chapter by María Fernanda Ramírez and Carolina Isaza in which they critically assess the capacity of bureaucratic

4

Introduction

actors and institutions in Colombia to engage in policy analysis, and evaluate the extent to which bureaucratic reforms have contributed to increasing capacity. Part II consists of five chapters that examine the extent to which various national and subnational government institutions apply tools and techniques of policy analysis. Luis Bernardo Mejía-​Guinand starts this section by providing an overview of the structure and powers of the Colombian central government, with particular attention on the executive branch. He discusses the roles of the President and key agencies, such as the National Planning Department (DNP), the Administrative Department of the Presidency (DAPRE), and the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) in policy making and policy analysis. In Chapter 5, Mónica Pachón and Manuela Muñoz describe the operation of the legislative branch in Colombia and the challenges of applying evidence-​based analysis in the public policy process that occur within such a highly politicized environment. In Chapter 6, using a specific case example from the Colombian Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional de Colombia –​CCC), Juan Carlos Rodríguez-​Raga and Santiago Virgüez-​Ruiz provide insights into the phenomena of judicialization of politics and public policy. They not only explain the structure, powers and operation of the CCC, but also examine its decisions with respect to public policy on illicit drugs as part of the peace agreement. The remaining two chapters in this section examine the subnational level of government, an important focus for a country recognized for its decentralization efforts. Looking specifically at metropolitan areas in Colombia, Santiago Leyva, Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Enrique Rodríguez-​Caporalli illustrate the explanatory capacity of path-​dependency models for understanding the pattern of metropolization and, subsequently, to make the case for the importance of considering metropolitan institutions as key policy actors or tools. Applying a very different approach to examining policy analysis at the local level, Chapter 8, by Claudia Avellaneda and Ricardo Bello-​Gómez, asks which local government officials use policy analysis and under what circumstances. Reminiscent of the references by Luis Bernardo Mejía-​Guinand to the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo –​PND) and the DNP in Chapter 4, the evidence at the local level also leads Avellaneda and Bello-​Gómez to focus primarily on the application of analysis to planning process albeit, in this case, with a focus on municipal development plans. Part III includes chapters that examine policy analysis within the realm of five specific policy areas, namely education policy, health policy, defense and security policy, economic policy, and social welfare policies. These areas were selected on the basis of having met one or more of three important criteria. In identifying policy domains for attention, we sought to include those that, first, are featured in some other volumes in the series and thus would allow for cross-​national comparisons; second, provide concreate examples of the use of policy analysis tools and techniques; and/​or third, are particularly relevant to the current Colombian political, social and economic context. Notably, these characteristics are not mutually exclusive, and the policy areas in some chapters meet all three criteria. 5

Policy Analysis in Colombia

In Chapter 9, drawing on their extensive experience working with government officials in education policy reforms, Sandra García, Darío Maldonado and Sarah Muñoz-​Cadena present a detailed case study of policies governing the hiring, training, compensation and evaluation of school teachers. Tracing reforms over a period of two decades, they are able to identify key actors and competing decision criteria at each stage of the policy process. Health care is a universal concern and health policy has been the subject of chapters in several of the volumes in the ILPA series. In Chapter 10, Andres Vecino-​Ortiz and colleagues provide an overview of policy analysis within this sector across problem definition, policy development and implementation stages, and at the national, departmental and local levels of government. With information gathered through document analysis and interviews with key government officials, they identify four concrete examples of opportunities for policy analysis in the health sector as well as two substantial obstacles, or what they refer to as “bottlenecks”. While all chapters in this volume address to some extent how the peace agreement has influenced institutions, actors and policy domains, Chapter 11, by Paula Mora-​Hernández and colleagues, examines more directly the role of the Colombian military during the Havana peace negotiations in shaping policy decisions regarding demobilization of guerilla forces. Using semi-​structured interviews with individuals involved in the negotiations, including active and former military and government officials, this chapter provides the reader with an important glimpse into the behind-​the-​scenes policy negotiations that led to specific provisions in the agreement. Policy analysis has strong theoretical and practical connections to economic analysis and, as such, a chapter on economic policy is an important element of any comprehensive country study of policy; it is particularly relevant in the Colombian context given the country’s economic advances despite lengthy periods of violence. Chapter 12, by Marta Villaveces-​Niño and Carlos Caballero-​ Argáez, highlights how economic experts, or what they refer to as an economic technocracy, have played a crucial role in building the capacity for policy analysis in the realm of economic policy. They use several concrete examples of economic policy decisions informed by analysis. The final chapter in this third section of the book explores an issue of considerable importance in Colombia, that of persistent inequality and poverty for historically excluded groups despite dramatically increased expenditures in social policy, both overall and targeted to those groups. Here Santiago Leyva and Andrés Olaya illustrate how the truncated nature of the Colombian welfare system contributes to the problem, and document how even widespread use of targeted social policies for specific populations cannot attain the redistributive policy outcomes associated with a more general approach to welfare policy. The fourth substantive section of the volume, on policy analysis beyond the state, includes three chapters on key nongovernmental actors: political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the media. In Chapter  14, 6

Introduction

Sebastián Líppez-​De Castro traces the development of the political party system in Colombia, with attention to characteristics most directly related to their production or consumption of policy analysis. He cautions that as long clientelistic linkages prevail, political parties will not fully utilize policy analysis to guide their decisions and priorities. The third or nongovernmental sector is increasingly recognized as an important policy actor, or potential policy actor, in all countries, and Colombian is no exception. In their examination of third sector contributions to policy analysis in Chapter 15, Susan Appe and Fabian Telch document how, despite an increasingly restrictive environment for civil society actors, there continue to be windows of opportunity for them to exert influence in policy development and implementation, as illustrated by examples from both the peace process and planning decisions to promote Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In the final substantive chapter of the book, Juan Guillermo Vieira-​Silva examines another critical actor in Colombian society –​ the media. The power of the media to shape policy agendas and discourse is well documented, although its ability to do so based on analysis rather than politics is less certain. This is a particularly relevant topic of exploration in Colombia given the history of major media outlets being owned by elite political families or having other strong connections with political parties. Vieira-​Silva examines the extent to which journalists rely on technical sources, as well as political ones. He examines the use of government, think tank, and university sources, and then presents the results of an analysis of number and type of sources used to inform reporting in major media outlets on three specific issues. This book project, like the practice of policy analysis itself, is challenged by an ever-​changing environment. “Policy interventions unfold in large, complex, dynamic social systems … [and] There are systems effects on individual actors and the system as a whole, including emergent, indirect, and delayed effects, as well as unintended and unpredictable consequences from the interactivity of a system’s elements” (Prewitt et al, 2012, p. 5). When this project was undertaken, and the authors wrote their respective chapters, it was with special attention to the hopeful prospects under the then recently approved agreement between the government of Colombia and the FARC-​EP guerillas to put an end to more than a half century of violence. Many of the chapters in this volume are attentive to the role of policy analysis in getting to that accord and with an eye toward its importance in implementing the agreement and moving toward peace. At the time that this book goes to press, that same agreement and prospects for lasting peace are in jeopardy. In presence of such event, one can appeal to the historic contributions to the study of public policy, such as Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) seminal work, tracing the implementation of a domestic economic development policy. Thanks to them, we know now the need for so many pieces to fall into place and for many actors to do their part for policy implementation to be successful, but we also know that there are seemingly infinite possibilities for a single actor or event to derail a project. In this context, the role of policy analysis in “speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky, 1979) becomes ever more vital 7

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to understand how policy analysis can be instrumental to ensure that a promising country like Colombia can achieve all its institutional capacity and overcome several of its wicked problems through sound, evidence-​based, policy analysis and evaluation. References Cortazar, J., Lafuente, M. and Sangines, M. (eds.) (2014) Serving Citizens:  A Decade of Civil Service Reforms in Latin America (2004–​13). Washington, DC. Inter-​American Development Bank. DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística) (2020). “Proyecciones de población:  2018–​2023”, 31 January. Available from www. dane.gov.co/ ​ i ndex.php/ ​ e stadisticas- ​ p or-​ t ema/​ d emografia-​ y -​ p oblacion/​ proyecciones-​de-​poblacion Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. (1973) Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Prewitt, K., Schwandt, T. and Straf, M. (eds.) (2012) Using Science as Evidence in Public Policy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Sanabria, P. (forthcoming) “Modernización de la gestión pública en Colombia:  coyunturas críticas y dependencia del sendero en un proceso no lineal”. In P. Sanabria and S. Leyva (eds.) El Estado del Estado. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes/​Editorial EAFIT/​Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. Sanabria, P., Gonzalez, M. and Becerra, O. (2019) ¿Cómo Mejorar y Racionalizar la Contratación por Prestación de Servicios en el Sector Público en Colombia? Una Mirada desde la Calidad del Empleo, Nota de Política No. 35. Bogotá: Facultad de Economía, Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo, Universidad de los Andes. Wildavsky, A. (1979) Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

8

Part One Policy analysis in contemporary Colombia

9

ONE

The policy analysis movement in Colombia: the state of the art Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido, Nadia Rubaii and Andrés Guzmán-​Botero

Introduction Policy analysis in Colombia appears to be a relatively recent trend, both in scholarship and practice. Yet, revisiting policy analysis in Colombia, its approaches, and practices, implies the recognition of key challenges in describing its evolution. First, since the actual development of policy analysis, although short, stretches for more than 50 years of evolution, the act of identifying those milestones is thus far from straightforward. Considering that policy analysis involves a complex and cyclical process made of manifold moments, it has to be able to acknowledge the sociopolitical process of a particular country. Namely, it also needs to recognize the multiple intentions of organizing and rationalizing public actions and decisions in a particular country, even long before the terms “policy analysis” or “public policy sciences” were widely used. It should also take into account the actors involved in enhancing the adoption of a more technical perspective towards public policy. A second challenge that cannot be set aside while tracing the evolution of policy analysis in the country, and the particular ways in which it has occurred, is the fact that its development has been probably influenced by external forces, such as the evolution of the discipline or field of study abroad; the influence of policy transfer and the transmission of the different narratives from foreign governments and multilateral organizations; and the role of international epistemic communities and networks that have fed policy-​making processes in the country. Thus, there are both internal and external factors that need to be taken into account when analyzing the evolution of policy analysis in Colombia. In this way, this chapter proposes the examination of policy analysis progression in Colombia based on historical and analytical background by identifying key actors, and by defining three essential moments that allow us to better recognize the key, internal and external, actors and the major milestones along the road. Thus, in the first moment, we start by listing the first efforts whereby a “scientific” approach to public policy started to be proposed (and initially adopted) in the Colombian context. In particular, we consider the role of international missions in the second half of the 20th century as defining forces that laid the groundwork for the early institutional and organizational developments in the country’s public administration. Then, we analyze the consequent beginning of national planning in Colombia, as the expression of the arrival of policy analysis techniques to the 11

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country, and identify some local scholarship that reflects early efforts to adopt new policy analysis techniques and practices. Then, in the next part of our analysis, we address a second moment in which policy analysis started to develop key roots within the administrative apparatus of the country, particularly at the national level of government. This moment has been recognized by several authors as the formal emergence of a narrative of public policy analysis in Colombia: the late 1990s (Roth, 2002, 2016). At this point, not only do key academic works start to arrive and inform public policy for the first time, but an economic crisis in the continent triggers a process of administrative and state reconfiguration focused on results achievement. Finally, we focus on the current state of policy analysis practices in Colombia. In doing so, we develop a general review of practices, loci and modes of policy techniques. We discuss those developments in light of institutional capacity, the educational supply of public policy and administration programs, and the local scholarship that has developed in recent years around the subject. Hence, our analysis aims to cover a chronological account of the, far from linear, development of policy analysis abilities and skills in Colombia, both at the national and institutional levels.

Key milestones The origin: international missions and national planning in Colombia Initial efforts to adopt a more technical approach to public policy formulation and implementation in Colombia can be traced to the prominent role played by several international missions during the 20th century that aimed to provide recommendations to “modernize” the country (Sanabria, 2010, forthcoming). Particularly after the Second World War, the Bretton Woods conference established an international narrative on “developing” and “developed” countries, and started to identify a set of prescriptions for closing the gap between these two groups. In this order of ideas, public affairs in Latin America, and Colombia in particular, had from their beginning a wide international influence, embodied in different “missions of international experts” by foreign governments or multilateral organizations. As some argue, these postures had a key influence in the country’s administrative and economic design (Franco, 1994, p. 53). In Colombia, for example, the international mission of the World Bank in 1949, chaired by Lauchlin Currie, not only included key aspects of public administration within its recommendations, but also marked the importance of establishing planning activities within the country, for which reliable information was required to ensure that decision makers had the necessary elements to perform their task (Pinzón and Motta, 2011). In other words, it recognized that policy analysis and formulation ought to be based on evidence. A direct consequence of the World Bank mission was the creation of the National Planning Board (Junta de Planeación Nacional), in which Currie became an advisor (Sandilands, 2015). This particular moment can be identified as one of the initial efforts to adopt a more technical approach towards policy analysis. 12

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This pioneering influence would create a strong focus in the country to “plan” public actions and to make informed decisions, further enhanced by later international missions (for example, Wiesner-​Bird). The role of international mission is closely linked to the attempts to create a central planning agency in order to adopt a more planned approach towards social and economic development. For example, the Colombian government would create in 1958 the National Council for Economic Policy and Planning (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Planeación), which later became the Administrative Department of Planning and Technical Services, and which in turn would eventually, in 1968, become the renowned DNP,1 which has historically been considered the think tank of Colombia’s public administration. The middle of the 20th century marks the use of more evidence in policy formulation in the country. From that point onwards, the DNP would play a leading role in establishing key practices for policy analysis and evaluation of projects and investment decisions in the country. In fact, the issuance of Law 19, 1958 and a subsequent reform in 1963, aimed to grant the DNP (and other related councils and bodies) powers of a highly technical nature, in order to make its role more explicitly related to the study and recommendation of public projects and public investment programs in the country. This would eventually lead to the configuration of a singular planning structure, rare even in the Latin American context. Such reforms established the use of two strategic instruments that, even today, guide public policy planning in the country: the so-​called CONPES2 documents (a type of policy document of the Colombian government), and the PND, which defines priorities, programs and projects for each government and would become compulsory for each administration (national and subnational) in order to start its period in office. Both measures have been instrumental in adopting a planning approach in the country. Even today, the CONPES documents remain a key instrument for substantive policy formulation in different policy domains in the country. Likewise, the PND is key, not only for defining government priorities and foci, but in particular for setting policy goals and the policy instruments required for their execution (Alonso, 2018). A key aspect of the PND was that it aimed, for the first time, to imbue public policy goals with a wide perspective. It also considered the interplay between policy and public management (by including elements regarding capacity and resources), and recognized the importance of formulating public policy in stages with reference to the relevant policy field in terms of decision making, implementation, evaluation and so on. For instance, the first CONPES document (Documento CONPES 0) recognized that it was up to the political sphere to determine the social desired goals, whereas the technical sphere should limit itself to seeking the adequate means to achieve them (DNP, 1967, p. 3). Similarly, the first development plan suggested that government should not only concern itself with the design of relevant courses of action to meet social needs, but also with the importance of monitoring compliance, an essential stage 13

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in the actual policy analysis process. The importance of the different stages of the policy process is evident in the following excerpt: “It is considered essential that planning does not stop at the simple enunciation of a plan, but that it reaches the control of the execution of the different programs and projects that integrate said plan” (DNP, 1967, p. VII-​5). Nonetheless, in spite of such promising start, public planning in Colombia would only begin to be systematic until well into the 1970s and 1980s, with the constant publication of PNDs and CONPES documents. Some of these documents would become gradually more and more technical during the 1970s. As an example, in CONPES Document 1408 of 1976, the government not only proposed specific policy options, but also listed –​and systematically analyzed –​ different alternatives and policy instruments to address the problem at hand, while also discussing their prioritization and feasibility. This was, however, no different in other countries of the same development level, particularly because, during those years, the approaches towards policy analysis were more general than specific, and were usually based on assumptions of homogeneity at the political level, within a rather simple, stable and closed world (Aguilar, 1992, p. 26). To sum up, policy analysis in Colombia started to be adopted more strongly at the national level of government, thanks to the adoption of an agreed strategy towards national planning. Such strong emphasis on planning emerged in response to the recommendations and prescriptions of different international missions. Although it is hard to argue that these pioneer plans and formulations constituted, from the very start, policy analysis in its current form, they opened the avenue for the gradual development of institutional capacity in the Colombian government for policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. The succeeding decades would witness the emergence of technical capacity, particularly arising from key groups of professionals and experts, who would capitalize the legacy of the international missions and the reforming governments in the 1960s and the 1970s, even against a strong backdrop of cronyism and political patronage in the country. The beginning of local capacity Although there were some key developments in the 19th century (Dunn, 2012), the international emergence of policy analysis is usually attributed to the pioneering work of Lasswell (1951) and the later development of centers such as the RAND Corporation and different academic outlets such as Policy Studies Journal. But it seems that policy analysis also started developing, at least in practical terms, from the planning functions of the United States (US) government implemented during the Roosevelt administration through the National Planning Board (Dunn, 2012). Key professional groups such as economists, political scientists and anthropologists played a vital role in this process. As we show later, professional groups would be also key in Colombia in the emergence of a more technical approach towards policy analysis. 14

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This phenomenon can be enclosed in the notion of “epistemic communities”, a term coined by Peter Haas for describing the joint action of actors outside central government to develop a coordinated public policy analysis (Haas, 1989). In other words, this concept refers to a group of people or institutions who share a certain perception about public problems and try to promote a set of analysis and proposals to advocate a policy or regulatory change (Subirats, 2001, p. 262). The participation and feedback of key professional groups and epistemic communities, not only from outside, but also from within, would represent an important factor in the emergence and development of policy analysis in the Colombian context. Such epistemic communities based their development in spaces in which international ideas and approaches towards development started to become influential, particularly in universities and think tanks, as well as in the nascent government planning agencies. In particular, two initiatives clearly emerged in universities, out of international forces later joined by key professionals of the economics domain:  the Center of Economic Development Studies (Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Económico  –​CEDE), established in 1958 at the Universidad de los Andes close to the School of Economics; and the Development Research Center (Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo –​CID), established in 1962 at the National University of Colombia, School of Economic Sciences. Both centers, and schools, would become key spaces for the diffusion of methodologies and techniques in planning, budgeting and policy formulation/​ evaluation, and for the training of economists who would later join the higher ranks of public service. The two initiatives became key centers for analysis and policy formulation, developing characterizations of social problems based on economic analysis tools that would, in many cases, feed the policy alternatives in the country. For example, it is known that CEDE was responsible for conducting employment surveys in large cities before this was a function of the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística –​DANE). From these activities, at the end of the 1970s, key policy recommendations regarding structural unemployment in the country were designed (Fajardo et al, 2008, p. 85). Likewise, from the 1970s, the CID proposed academic works on social security, energy and income distribution that would later be instrumental in different policy domains.3 Outside the academic world, but strongly connected to it, particularly to the Schools of Economics, some nonprofit think tanks appeared as active centers for the study of development problematics. The Foundation for Higher Education and Development (FEDESARROLLO) appeared in 1970, as an initiative led by key economic actors and professionals. Its arrival was accompanied by other internationally originated endeavors such as the Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung (FESCOL) in 1979, and other academic initiatives such as the Higher School of Public Administration (Escuela Superior de Administración Pública –​ESAP) in 1958 and CIDER in 1976. Whereas FEDESARROLLO was recognized as having a focus on macro-​and microeconomic studies, FESCOL, on the other 15

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hand, showed a more social focus, and aimed at the study of human rights and democratic union activities. Finally, ESAP would contribute to the technical training of public servants, but also to the study of phenomena related to public affairs with the appearance of a related journal in 1962 (Administración y Desarrollo). CIDER, at Universidad de los Andes, would later become a key center in the country for the study of regional development and decentralization with strong links with Europe. Thus, although all these centers were hardly homologous in ideological stances, methodological approaches, and/​or emphases, they started to contribute from different perspectives to the development of policy analysis skills, through research, consultancy or professional training. Although access to international academic outlets was limited in the country during these decades, and the academic community was quite small and limited in terms of methodological resources and so on, two significant articles were published relating to public policy in Colombia. In 1970, an article in Policy Sciences used the the Colombian Health Department as a model to exemplify the importance of rigor in programming and execution of policy objectives (Ugalde, 1973). Likewise, in 1975 Albert Hirschman (who was participant in a mission of the World Bank to Colombia in 1952) wrote an article named “Policymaking and policy analysis in Latin America: a return journey”. This article, based on the author’s experience around the Carlos Lleras Restrepo’s Presidency (1966–​ 70), depicted the role of the planning office after the international missions and its importance in monitoring technical decisions and the quality of public expenditure and investments (Hirschman, 1975). To sum up, aside from the emergence of academic centers and think tanks that pioneered the development of technical analysis and academic studies in different policy domains, there was a group of professionals who played a key role. Economists in particular started to introduce international techniques and ideas to improve decision-​making processes, as well as planning, budgeting and policy formulation in Colombia’s public sector. Hence, the emergence of policy analysis in Colombia is strongly linked, not only to the role of academic centers, but also to the leading role played by professionals from the social sciences, particularly the economists.

Policy capacity and nation construction Condensing the arrival of the discipline of policy analysis, or at least its narrative, to a single moment or fact can be complex and even futile. Instead, we aim to identify a series of triggers and contextual factors that, in different moments and with different intensity, allowed the consolidation of policy analysis techniques and approaches in the country. Capacity building in Colombia emerged as a stringent need in order to avoid becoming a failed state and to create a new republic (Sanabria, forthcoming). In such a context, policy analysis techniques and instruments became highly valuable in order to allow for a more effective public administration, able to tackle an almost unique combination of national wicked 16

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problems. In this vein, in this section, we start by analyzing the geopolitical context of the events that enabled the arrival of the principles, techniques and practices that epitomized the initial moments of public policy analysis in Colombia. We then describe the different ways in which the Colombian state introduced such approaches and tools, and how such approaches began to be functional in such a complex context. Finally, we discuss the evolution of local knowledge, and the academic community, about policy analysis in Colombia. Crisis of the state and the diffusion of policy ideas The debt crisis in the Latin American region during the early 1980s opened the door to greater influence in internal policy from international donors and actors, particularly multilateral organizations. The Washington Consensus, a series of recommendations and prescriptions for several actors in the region, posed various challenges in terms of economic policy. It brought not only NPM practices, but also a whole ideological stance around the role of the state, with a specific focus on liberalizing markets, privatization and deregulation. Although these recommendations were adopted differently according to the country, they affected the policy agenda of national governments during the 1990s, as well as the design of public administration apparatus, and the way resources were allocated accord policy domains and organizations (Flórez, 2001; Castañeda and Díaz, 2017). Regarding public management and policy, the original text of the Washington Consensus reflected a particular posture about public sector, closely related to public choice approaches:  the inefficiency of public organizations and public management against its private counterpart, which supports the need for adopting a more competitive, private sector-​like, approach in public sector activities (Williamson, 1990). These assumptions and ideological stances towards the role of the state resounded intensely in moments of stringent fiscal pressures in Latin America. Thus, many developing countries looking for funding and financial support to overcome the crisis were certainly eager to adopt structural adjustment programs that included first-​generation reforms that aimed to reduce the role of the state and allow for more private sector participation, and to adopt a more managerial approach in public administration. Nonetheless, the intensity of reforms differed across countries in the region. Some countries advanced strongly in shrinking the state and its role, while others implemented a more customized combination of state versus market activities. Yet, a whole new corporative culture was arriving in Latin America’s public organizations. In order to break with bureaucracy, public administration must move from an emphasis on rules to one on results, and management and policy practices consequently started to pursue efficiency and effectiveness rather than unending processes and paperwork. Hence, in order to achieve greater effectiveness, a rather technical approach was beginning to be adopted, particularly changing the way in which policy problems were identified, formulated, monitored and evaluated. Thus, although not necessarily an intended goal of the 17

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Washington Consensus, policy analysis techniques and practices started to travel more easily thanks to the so-​called structural adjustment programs, whereby several governments in the region also enhanced their approaches and structures towards improving policy analysis, formulation and evaluation. As Roth (2016) mentions, the concept of public policy was disseminated more widely after the state reform that was concretized in the principles established in the Washington Consensus of 1989. Therefore, policy transfer took place through the channel of international donors and their conditions for loans and aid. In fact, it not only brought prescriptions about the role of state, but also enabled the dissemination of techniques and practices that were not necessarily available in developing countries like Colombia before the 1990s. The 1990s would epitomize, at least in the Colombian context, a dynamic time in which policy analysis ideas and techniques were more widely disseminated and put into practice. Yet, as an exceptionality of the Colombian case, the adoption of these reforms occurred in a context where the country also had to unravel a deep governance crisis within a lack of institutional legitimacy, with enormous precariousness in terms of guarantees to the basic rights of the Colombians (Flórez, 2001) and poor state presence across its territory (Sanabria, forthcoming). In fact, during the last half of the 20th century, Colombia had to deal with a set of wicked policy problems that almost no other Latin American country faced at the time: drug trafficking, narco-​terrorism, guerrillas, para-​militarism, frequent natural disasters, political violence, massive internal population displacement, prevalent poverty and urban insecurity, to mention but a few. As a result, in the midst of such economic, institutional and social crisis, the citizenry would demand a new form and structure for the state. Thus, in spite of international pressures to adopt fiscal austerity and state shrinkage, a country with such a complex social context as Colombia required a stronger and more legitimate state, a gap that the Constitution of 1991 would fill. A new framework for institutional capacity and New Public Management The consolidation of public policy analysis as a discipline, and as formal (and informal) practice, cannot be separated from regulatory changes and from the political conceptions about the relevance of technique in public action. In this section, we discuss the main elements that favored the consolidation of this field, from a practical perspective, in Colombia. One of the crucial institutional changes of the 20th century was the introduction of the National Constitution of 1991, with its participatory emphasis and its progressivism towards the configuration of a “rule of law” in Colombia. Additionally, in terms of the operation of the state and the importance of building a stronger institutional and administrative capacity to understand and address social problems, the Colombian Constitution managed to enshrine and prioritize the configuration of a meritocratic and egalitarian public administration (Sanabria, 2010), a key institutional trait whose failure was historically connected 18

The policy analysis movement

to political violence in the country (Sanabria, 2015, forthcoming). Thus, the Constitution aimed to set a new framework for public administration in the country, attempting to improve state presence and capacity, and the quality of public policy in the country. In contrast to the downsizing and managerialism prevalent in other developing countries, the 1991 Colombian Constitution aimed at creating a more capable, technical-​oriented state. New organizations in key policy domains were created by the new Constitution (for example, the Attorney General, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Environment). A more decentralized approach in public administration was adopted, granting more autonomy to Colombian regions and delegating to them the direct execution of social policy. Ideas relating to decentralization/​fiscal federalism also arrived to the country thanks to the role of key epistemic communities, particularly at CEDE and CIDER (or the Interdisciplinary Center of Regional Studies, as it was known at the time), both at Universidad de los Andes. Moreover, key aspects of budgeting and planning, related to NPM practices, emerged in a more technical fashion from the constitutional definitions. Here the role of international actors was predominant in conveying ideas to encourage states in developing countries to be more effective and efficient. For example, a results-​oriented management approach was enhanced at the national level as well as a whole process for the formulation and assessment of investment projects at the national and regional level. Both elements, which were strongly supported by the World Bank and the Inter-​American Development Bank (DNP, 2010), were specifically established and endorsed by the Colombian Constitution of 1991 (Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, art. 343 and 344). These measures reflect how, during the 1990s, the Colombian government pursued a combination of approaches that aimed to build a more capable and present state from the ground upwards, while also including some practices relating to NPM and efficiency. The process would continue later with the promulgation of a planning law (Ley Orgánica de Planeación –​Ley 152 de 1994, or Law 152, 1994) whereby the government’s interest in building capacity for formulation and monitoring of public initiatives would be explicit. The components of the law reflected key issues of public policy and public management theory and practice of the time. In particular, Law 152 detailed the procedures, institutions and mechanisms under which public decisions and actions should be designed, chosen, executed and evaluated. Its materialization would start in the National and Regional Development Plans and would include both planning and the participation of legislative, civil society and controlling bodies. As some scholars acknowledge, two key traits of this law were, first, that it brought a participatory approach to policy, enabling civil society representatives to participate in its elaboration, and, second, that it set the formulation and execution of the plans as mandatory for national and subnational government bodies (Rincón, 2009, p. 51). Thus, the law, as a spin-​off of the constitutional determinations, intended to generate 19

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institutional capacity at the subnational level, again starting from the planning actions of the government. The Colombian development of policy analysis is then, from its own beginning, clearly tied to the development of planning functions, and this would continue in the following years. Parallel to the promulgation of Colombia’s Law 152, CONPES, the highest planning authority at the national level, created a National Performance, Management and Results System (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación y Gestión de Resultados –​SINERGIA) within the DNP. The objectives of this initiative concerned both the follow-​up of the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration in the formulation and execution of policies, programs and projects, and the generation of adequate information for decision making for planning and allocation of resources (DNP, 1994). Among the implications for public management, it attributed to all agencies and entities of the executive branch the duty to elaborate, approve and adopt a Four-​Year Action Plan to specify the expected results of the programs, and the institutional management to be developed to achieve these results (DNP, 1994). These regulatory changes established the use of an evidence-​based narrative, at least in the documents, surrounding the importance of a technical and logical approach in public action. This also included key ideas and approaches of state-​ of-​the-​art authors of policy analysis and public management. For instance, the idea of policy cycle was adopted, including the phases of prioritization, formulation, decision making, implementation and evaluation (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). This allows us to see again the particularity of the Colombian case. Whereas some of these measures responded to the efficiency requirements and/​or recommendations of international donors and other actors (NPM-​like reforms), the Constitution created firmer ground for state capacity with a more active role and greater presence of the state. All in all, taking into account the strong prismatic characteristic of Colombian policies (Sanabria, forthcoming), these newly created regulations boosted the need for actual capacity building within public organizations in order to effectively carry out and implement them. Thus, the challenge was now to uphold a Constitution and to implement a somehow sophisticated legal framework. The commitment to consolidating the capacity of the Colombian public management apparatus would begin with CONPES Document 2790 of 1995, which made compulsory the orientation of Colombian public administration (its organizations and personnel) towards the achievement of results. This would identify the need for a National Training and Instruction Plan for the Public Service in order to internalize a results-​oriented management culture within public organizations (DNP, 1995). This aim would be more tangible with the publication of Decree 1567, 1998, which created a National Training System and Stimulus System for state employers, and reflected a commitment to provide formal and informal tools for public organizations to raise the level of employee commitment with respect to the policies, plans, programs, projects, and objectives of the state, as well as raise efficiency and effectiveness levels.4 20

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These attempts to train the public workforce were relevant for the execution of public policy analysis programs within the state. In particular, they reaffirmed that public managers’ training was essential, especially if they were to be considered as the inspirers, coordinators, managers and leaders of the comprehensive public policy process (Salazar, 1995, p.  233). This was in fact the beginning of the adoption of a performance management system that complemented the efforts made at the organizational level by the SINERGIA program (DNP, 2010) and still today faces important challenges in the adoption of a results-​oriented approach at the level of public personnel strategies (Sanabria, 2015). Another challenge was to create a similar ecosystem for results-​oriented management at the subnational level. The National Municipalities Training System (or Sistema Nacional de Capacitación Municipal) was developed in an agreement between the Government of Colombia and the European Union (signed in 1998). This project, which entered into force in 2000, attempted to articulate different spaces of socialization of practices and tools to strengthen local capacity –​ all this through the regional headquarters of the official government’s public administration university (ESAP). One of its components included the generation of knowledge and local public policy observatories (Castilla, 2002). However, the development of a more homogenously distributed institutional capacity at the subnational level is still one of the key challenges for the Colombian state. The adoption of concepts and the generation of local knowledge about policy The previous sections illustrated five key drivers of the development of policy analysis capacity in Colombia: the creation of capacity at universities and think tanks, particularly in the Schools of Economics; the role of international missions in introducing policy ideas and techniques; the configuration of epistemic communities, particularly those comprising economists; policy transfer through different channels (international donors and lenders); and the adoption of a new constitutional framework in the search for greater institutional capacity to deal with highly complex societal and policy problems. Those changes were accompanied by the relatively slow development of public affairs academic capacity in the Latin American region in general and in Colombia in particular. Yet, during the last two decades some regional developments awakened this process. Perhaps, the most relevant of these were the arrival in Latin America of policy literature translated into Spanish, the consolidation of specialized centers in policy analysis, and the appearance of the first education programs in public administration and public policy in Colombia. Since its emergence in the 1950s, policy analysis scholarship had come mainly from Anglo-​Saxon scholars and to a lesser degree from some Nordic European authors and institutions. Accordingly, most of such literature was written in English, delaying somewhat its arrival in Latin America. Thus, the concepts and narratives relating to public policy and administration in Latin America would only start to arrive decades later, thanks to the translations of some Mexican 21

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scholars such as Luis Aguilar Villanueva (Aguilar, 1992). The new Spanish translated versions of these international contributions allowed the introduction of a new whole array of works, concepts and terminology that could now be used by academics in the continent. This brought one anecdotal problem of the type that commonly arises when translating academic terms and concepts into other languages. “Policy” and “politics”, when translated, are the exact same word in Spanish: “política”. In other words, they are homographs, thus creating not only a language problem (since they are written and pronounced the same), but a conceptual one, since politics and policy are necessarily intertwined concepts in our field. In this way, the challenge was then finding a word in Spanish that would reflect the term policy in its entirety (Salazar, 1995) without confusing it with politics. That is why, when talking about public policy in Spanish, the term used is “políticas públicas” in plural, in order to avoid confusions with “política” or politics. Hence, it is in the 1990s that the first attempts at adopting and generating knowledge within the specific framework of public administration and public policy can be identified in Spanish-​speaking countries. With this, a contribution to the understanding of national realities from a local perspective was nourished. This is evidenced by the appearance of first specialized journals such as Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas [Policy Analysis and Management] in Spain in 1994, or Gestión y Política Pública [Public Policy and Management] in Mexico in 1992, as well as other journals in countries such as Chile, Argentina and Brazil (in both Portuguese and Spanish). In Colombia, aside from the ESAP journal Administración y Desarrollo journal created in 1962, other academic outlets under the name of, or related to, “policy analysis” or “public policy/​administration” would not yet appear. However, some works relating to public affairs started to appear in journals covering other, broader, topics, such as administration, sociology, political science, economics and/​or social studies. These included articles such as “Las políticas públicas: nueva perspectiva de análisis” (Salazar, 1992) and “El análisis de las políticas públicas: una disciplina incipiente en Colombia” (Hernández, 1999). In fact, the first academic articles on the topics could be traced, for instance, in the journals Universitas from Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, the Revista de Estudios Sociales and Desarrollo y Sociedad from Universidad de los Andes, Cuadernos de Economía and INNOVAR from Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and Sociedad y Economía and Cuadernos de Administración from Universidad del Valle, among others. In addition to the incipient work in scientific journals, the first academic texts on public policy and administration in the country would also appear at this time. They were certainly descriptive rather than analytical, and basically translations of other works in English. These include Salazar’s pioneering book entitled Las Políticas Públicas (1995), a text that exposed the elements and discussions behind public policy and written after the author finished his Master’s in Public Administration and Policy at the London School of Economics. Another key work is Wiesner’s (1997) La Efectividad de las Políticas Públicas en Colombia: Un 22

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Análisis Neoinstitucional. This work examined the institutionalism approach to the functioning of societies, and analyzed empirical evidence of the country in terms of institutional structure and capacity in different policy areas (environmental, telecommunications and transportation, among others). Before the end of the century, more specialized works appeared, such as that of Nieto (1996) on the design and formulation of citizen security and coexistence policies for Bogotá, and a publication proposing a “public policy analysis” of education and its relation with the state (De León, 1997). In particular, the works of Eduardo Wiesner were highly influential for the diffusion (and the practical adoption) of key concepts regarding public policy and administration in the country during the 1990s and the 2000s, such as decentralization and fiscal federalism. It is in only since 2000 that further local publication of books and texts regarding public policy and administration has started to advance (for example, Roth, 2002; Varela, 2006; Vargas et al, 2007; Lozano, 2008; Cuervo, 2012; Ordoñez, 2013; Guerrero et  al, 2018). Although recent publications are now more analytical than descriptive, there is still a lack of local knowledge and approaches about public policy. At the same time, different academic documents and publications from state organizations (such as the DNP, the Comptroller and the General Attorney’s Office, as well as some ministries) also were developed. These works were practical in essence, and focused more on substantive areas of public policy, in diverse topics such as health, education, security, demobilization development and other social variables. The evolution of more abundant local knowledge about public affairs has been accompanied the emergence and strengthening of different think tanks and research centers that address the subject, as well as the development of the first educational programs related to policy. First, key centers have continued to be closely involved in policy formulation and evaluation, particularly CEDE and CIDER from Universidad de los Andes, CID from Universidad Nacional and the nonprofit FEDESARROLLO. However, in the meantime other specialized public policy centers have appeared, such as the Observatory of Public Administration Policies, Execution and Results at Universidad Externado de Colombia in 1995, the Research Group in Management and Public Policy at Universidad del Valle in 1998, the School of Government of Antioquia (Universidad de Antioquia) in 2004, the Observatory of Public Policy at Universidad Icesi in Cali in 2006, and the School of Government at Universidad de los Andes in 2006, which is the first school to follow the US model of schools of public affairs in Colombia. Second, the first graduate programs to contribute to the generation of policy analysis capacity would appear in 1989, with the creation of the Graduate Program in Social Appraisal of Projects in the School of Economics at Universidad de los Andes, with the support of the Inter-​American Development Bank to train people across Latin America. Later, programs related to policy more specifically would appear in 1998 in CIDER’s graduate program in State, Public Policy and Development, in the form of a Master’s in Government and Public Policy at Universidad Externado in 1999, and a Master’s in Public 23

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Policy at Universidad del Valle in 2002 and at the School of Government of Universidad de los Andes and in 2008, respectively. As will be seen in Chapter 2, educational programs have continued to appear in the country, although they expose differences in terms of the approaches and tools they help to create for greater capacity for policy analysis in the country today. We explore these approaches in the following section.

The state of the art: a more complex and rich setting for policy analysis This section completes the general review of the evolution of policy analysis in Colombia, by analyzing the current state of practices and research in the country. In particular, it offers contextualization in terms of current institutional capacity to address the current challenges facing the practice of policy analysis and in terms of the role of societal actors and the citizenry. We also review the current state of policy analysis education and research in the country. A brief revision of the current state of policy analysis in the country should start by recognizing the beginning of the 21st century as the beginning of a more sophisticated role for policy analysis, both in practice and in scholarship in Colombia. The current context is characterized by more rapid dynamics of information, a more defined role of government/​state organizations in terms of policy analysis, formulation and evaluation, and more complex policy communities across several policy domains. In this context, more elaborate governance structures can be recognized (and addressed) in public policy and management (multilevel, collaborative, metropolitan, intersectoral and so on). The last two decades have also seen a greater role for non-​state actors, government’s boundaries in policy analysis and implementation are less defined, which brings new challenges and implications in terms of governance. A more complex governance scenario confirms that it is not only the Colombian public sector that has become more sophisticated in terms of policy analysis tools and techniques, but also civil society and other sectors (private, nonprofit). In this respect, it is relevant to recognize the role that key societal groups have had in policy analysis/​implementation, either for their own reasons or for the establishment of complex policy subsystems, or even empowered or commissioned by the state itself. Hence, the evolution in the role that the state plays in policy vis-​à-​vis the increasing role of other actors, shows more frequent state–​society interactions in policy deliberations in the country than previously. Today Colombia reflects the evolution towards a more technical state, particularly at the national level, with some islands of excellence (Bersch et al, 2017)5 in some policy domains (economic policy and social policy) and in the most developed regions (Bogotá DC, Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Atlántico, Cundinamarca). Government agencies are expected to comply with legal and administrative provisions that require high standards for the analysis and evaluation of alternatives prior to most public policy decisions. Technical strategies towards 24

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planning and budgeting are not uncommon in the national government, and key organizations are recognized as advanced hubs for technical policy analysis (for example, the Central Bank, the DNP and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, among others). Yet, key challenges remain in other policy sectors and regions and, as Sanabria and Avellaneda (2014) have claimed, in promoting more advanced and continuing training in public policy and public management for public officials in the country. Nonetheless, the advancement of the policy analysis narrative and its tools has also permeated, although with different intensities, other components of the state, such as the judiciary and the Congress of the Republic. As has happened in other countries, there have been effervescent internal debates in Colombia about the more active role that the courts and judges have played in policy since the 1991 Constitution. Accordingly, to avoid criticisms, the courts have aimed to rely more on expertise and concepts from policy experts in order to make better informed decisions. In turn, the legislature, at least in the case of some senators and representatives, has aimed to reinforce the different capacities within the Legislative Work Units that are responsible for writing bills, as well as the policy documents that are more frequently produced in order to justify normative changes.6 Although not the focus of this chapter, the evolution of policy analysis capacity in state actors in Colombia has been complemented by the increasing role of other sectors and actors in public policy. This is evidenced by the more active role assumed by civil society actors and citizen organizations and interest/​pressure groups in tackling public problems, in areas such as environmental issues, minority rights (for example, for Afro-​Colombians, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, women), and corruption and transparency, among others. Also, it is important to give credit not only to the actors that have contributed to the public debate by using evidence and providing analysis from outside the state, but also, to the active role of societal, private sector and nonprofit groups/​organizations/​ actors, which has led to the establishment of important policy networks at the national and subnational levels. The role of those actors is well documented in Chapters 13 and Appe and Telch 16 of this volume. Alongside the evolution of state and societal capacities, there has been a rapid development in public policy and administration scholarship in the country (explored further in Chapter  2). It is evident that the educational offer has evolved and has begun to be more evenly distributed, albeit slowly, across the territory. In order to understand the current offer of educational programs and research groups in policy-​related issues, we turn to information available on the platforms of the Ministry of National Education (Ministerio de Educación Nacional –​MEN) and the Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación –​ COLCIENCIAS). First, a review of the National Information System for Higher Education (SNIES) by the MEN indicates that there are currently 17 active programs that 25

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include the words “public policy” in their name, of which five are specializations and 12 Master’s degrees. Of this total, nine programs are offered by public sector institutions and eight by private institutions. Another relevant characteristic is that six of those programs are located in the capital city of Bogotá whereas 11 are in the regions, although mostly concentrated in big capitals. However, it should be remembered that there are other programs, as well as research spaces, especially in political sciences, government, economics and public administration, that provide qualifications and training in policy analysis related content. Second, we looked for the research groups recognized and classified in the country by the national authority on science and technology, COLCIENCIAS. In particular, there are 15 research groups that explicitly mention “public policy” in their name. Of this total, the most part is concentrated in the city of Bogotá (six), showing the continuing need for greater research at the regional level. Importantly, however, they are relative newcomers in the field, having appeared only since 2000. Thus, it is only in the past two decades that policy research has gained momentum, similar to the situation observed in the previous section where we analyzed scholarship and academic outlets regarding policy issues. To sum up, it is evident that current policy analysis in Colombia is characterized by a complex combination of policy deliberations as key societal actors, the citizenry and the public and the private sectors play more active roles. State actors and organizations, particularly at the national level and in some islands of excellence (sectoral and regional), operate in a context where evidence-​based analysis has become more common and rigorous. This has affected other branches of government and has generated some spillover from the executive towards the judiciary and the legislature. There is an increased offer in terms of educational programs and research groups in Colombia in the field of policy analysis, but they are still concentrated in the biggest cities and have been developing very slowly, only since the beginning of the 21st century. There are key challenges that remain for the development of policy analysis in Colombia, in order to establish a wider and solid supply of human capital, research and capacity in policy analysis knowledge and practices.

Conclusion This chapter provides an interesting account of the development of policy analysis as a field of study and as a practical activity in the country, a development that has grown in terms of practice since the 1990s, but only since 200 in terms of scholarship and educational programs. This is a process that can be traced back to international influences, and the role of missions and advisors, which defined guidelines towards capacity building in the Colombian state, particularly through national planning, and which set the ground for the adoption of an evidence-​ based focus in policy analysis and evaluation in the country. This process was accompanied by the emergence of nongovernmental think tanks and research centers in some universities, with the aim of generating 26

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knowledge to support decision making in the public sector. The 1990s reflected two crucial elements in the consolidation of policy analysis in the country as a practice in government, particularly evident in state reforms that focused on an NPM-​style results-​oriented and efficiency logic. The process was also reinforced by the policy transfer of specialized discourse and literature on the subject, first in practice and a decade later in scholarship. NPM ideas were influential in practices but were somewhat moderated by the emergence of a new constitutional framework in the 1991, which demanded a more present and capable state. In fact, the new Constitution required not only the creation of new agencies and capacities to nurture the already minimal state of the 1886 Constitution, but also the adoption of a rule of law approach in public administration and policy. The combination of such forces allowed the appearance of a more technical approach in the practices of planning, execution and monitoring in public policy. The chapter has identified the key drivers of the development of policy analysis capacity in Colombia as: the creation of capacity at universities and think tanks, particularly in the Schools of Economics; the role of international missions in introducing policy ideas and techniques; the configuration of epistemic communities, mainly economists; the policy transfer of efficiency-​oriented reforms through different channels (international donors and lenders); and the adoption of a new constitutional framework in the search for greater institutional capacity to deal with highly complex societal and policy problems. Since then, the past two decades have witnessed a more rapid development of the policy analysis field, both in practice and scholarship. Yet, development has still been rather slow and recent, even when compared with other Latin American countries. During this period, the first specialized research centers and educational programs in public policy/​management were created in the country, new outlets for policy research and knowledge generation appeared and a more solid professional/​academic community flourished. Yet the distribution of capacity is not evenly distributed across the country and sectors, and this remains a key challenge for the country. The current state of public policy analysis reveals a complex environment of collaboration and intersectionality between the public and private sectors, as well as with academia and other governance actors, reflecting an increasing sophistication in policy analysis in the country, not only for the state realm but also for the civil society as a whole. However, key challenges still exist for different policy domains and subnational governments (Sanabria et al, 2019), in which capacity remains an unattained goal, for instance in public employment (Sanabria, 2019, 2015). Another remaining goal is the need to achieve closer integration between public affairs scholarship and the practice of government at both the national and subnational levels. Notes 1 2

Congreso de la República de Colombia. Law 19, 1958. CONPES was originally created in 1958 but renamed after the reforms of 1963.

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6

Information available at www.cid.unal.edu.co/​resena-​historica Republic of Colombia. Decree 1567 of 1998. Available in Spanish at www.funcionpublica.gov. co/​eva/​gestornormativo/​norma.php?i=1246 The term islands of excellence has been used in previous literature on state capacity (Geddes, 1994; Evans, 1995) to identify a set of agencies and public organizations within a country that are characterized by their technical focus and their political independence. A more in-​depth analysis about the role of policy analysis in the legislature and the courts is provided in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.

References Aguilar, L.F. (1992) El Estudio de las Políticas Públicas. Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrúa. Alonso, G. (2018) “Sesenta años del DNP y la planeación en Colombia”. La República, 15 November. Available from www.larepublica.co/​analisis/​gloria-​ alonso-2​ 793634/​sesenta-​anos-​del-​dnp-​y-​la-​planeacion-​en-​colombia-​2793633 Arroyave, A. S. (2011) “Las políticas públicas en Colombia. Insuficiencias y desafíos”. Revista FORUM 1(1): 95-​111. Bersch, K., Praça, S. and Taylor, M. (2017) “Bureaucratic capacity and political autonomy within national states:  mapping the archipelago of excellence in Brazil”. In D.  Mistree (author) and M.  Centeno, A.  Kohli and D.  Yashar (eds.) States in the Developing World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–​183. Castañeda, V.M. and Díaz, O. (2017)” El Consenso de Washington:  algunas implicaciones para América Latina”. Apuntes CENES 36(63): 15–​41. Castilla, M.M. (2002) Observatorios de Políticas Públicas: Conceptos de Gestión Pública Municipal. Documento para Discusión. Bogotá: Proyecto Sistema Nacional de Capacitación Municipal. Cuervo, H.G.S. (2012) Gestión Pública y Políticas Públicas: Enfoque Investigativo en Estudios Socio Jurídico. Cúcuta: Universidad Libre-​Seccional Cúcuta. De León, A. (1997) Estado y educación en Colombia. Un análisis de políticas públicas. Santa Fe de Bogotá. Fondo Editorial Gobernar. DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) (1967) Documento CONPES 0. Bogotá: DNP. DNP (1994) Resolución 063 del CONPES. Bogotá: DNP. DNP (1995) Documento CONPES 2780. Bogotá: DNP. DNP (2010) 15 Años del Sistema Nacional de Evaluación y Gestión de Resultados –​ Sinergia. Bogotá: DNP. Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dunn, W. (2012) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction (5th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. Fajardo, M., Ospina, M.J., Bonilla, J.A. and Sánchez, F. (2008) Historia del CEDE. 50 Años de Investigación en Economía 1958–​2008. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Flórez, L.B. (2001) “Colombia tras diez años de reformas políticas y económicas”. Cuadernos de Economía 20(34): 31–​55. 28

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Franco, H. (1994) “Evolución de la planeación del desarrollo colombiano: una aproximación teórica”. Revista Universidad EAFIT 30(96): 45–​53. Geddes, B. (1994) Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Guerrero, J.A.C., García, S.S., Moyano, J.G., Cuéllar, T.A., Guzmán, J.M.M., Villarreal, J.A.T. and Cabal, S.M.M. (2018) Análisis de Políticas Públicas en Colombia:  Enfoques y Estudios de Caso. Bogotá:  CIDER, Universidad de los Andes. Haas, P.M. (1989) “Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control”. International Organization 43(3): 377–​403. Hernández, G. (1999) “EL análisis de las políticas públicas:  una disciplina incipiente en Colombia”. Revista de Estudios Sociales 4: 80–​91. Hirschman, A.O. (1975) “Policymaking and policy analysis in Latin America –​a return journey”. Policy Sciences 6(4): 385–​402. Jann, W. and Wegrich, K. (2007) “Theories of the policy cycle”. In F. Fischer, G. Miller and M. Sydney (eds.) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 43–​62. Lasswell, H. (1951) “The policy orientation”. In D.  Lerner and H.  Lasswell (eds.) The Policy Sciences:  Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 3–​15. Lozano, A. (2008) Aspectos sobre Política Pública:  Ejercicios e Instrumentos para el Análisis. Bogotá: Facultad de Derecho, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Ordoñez, G. (2013) Manual de Análisis y Diseño de Políticas Públicas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. Nieto, L. (1996) Diseño y Formulación de Políticas Públicas de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana y Definición de Indicadores para su Seguimiento y Evaluación. Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor. Pinzón, M.M. and Motta, D.N.P. (2011) “Laureano Gómez, la Misión Currie y el proyecto de reforma constitucional de 1952”. Criterio Jurídico 9(2): 7–​33. República de Colombia (1991) “Political Constitution of Colombia”. Available from www.registraduria.gov.co/I​ MG/p​ df/c​ onstitucio-p​ olitica-c​ olombia-1​ 991. pdf Rincón, C.A.G. (2009) “Desarrollo histórico y ámbito de acción de la planeación en Colombia”. Administración & Desarrollo 37(51): 39–​58. Roth, A.N. (2002) Políticas Públicas. Formulación, Implementación y Evaluación. Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora. Roth, A.N. (2016) “La enseñanza del análisis de políticas públicas en los programas universitarios de Ciencia Política en Colombia”. Estudios Políticos (49): 260–​83. Salazar, C. (1992) “Las políticas públicas:  una nueva perspectiva de análisis”. Universitas, 83: 35–​100. Salazar, C. (1995) Las Políticas Públicas. Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

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Sanabria, P. (2010) “Dos pasos hacia adelante y uno hacia atrás: Colombia y la configuración de un servicio civil profesional y meritocrático”. Boletín Política Pública Hoy, 7: 4–​8. Sanabria, P. (ed.) (2015) Gestión del Talento Humano en el Sector Público: Estado del Arte, Diagnóstico y Recomendaciones para el Caso Colombiano. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Sanabria, P. (2019) “Las capacidades institucionales de los municipios colombianos”. In E.  Grin, A.  Carrera-​Hernández and F.  Abrucio (eds.) Capacidades Estatales en Gobiernos Locales Iberoamericanos. Actualidad, Brechas y Perspectivas. Sao Paulo: Editora FGV, Fundação Getulio Vargas. Sanabr ia P (forthcoming) “Modernización de la gestión pública en Colombia:  coyunturas críticas y dependencia del sendero en un proceso no lineal”. In P. Sanabria and S. Leyva (eds.) El Estado del Estado. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes/​Editorial EAFIT/​Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. Sanabria P. and Avellaneda, C. (2014) “The training of senior civil servants in Colombia”. In M. Van Wart and A. Hondeghem (eds.) Leadership and Culture Comparative Models of Top Civil Servant Training. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 271–​87. Sanabria, P., González, M. and Becerra, O. (2019) ¿Cómo Mejorar y Racionalizar la Contratación por Prestación de Servicios en el Sector Público en Colombia? Una Mirada desde la Calidad del Empleo, Nota de Política No. 35. Bogotá: Facultad de Economía, Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo, Universidad de los Andes. Sandilands, R. (2015) “La misión del banco mundial a Colombia de 1949, y las visiones opuestas de Lauchlin Currie-​Albert Hirschman”. Revista de Economía Institucional 17: 32. Subirats, J. (2001) “El análisis de las políticas públicas”. Gaceta Sanitaria 15(3): 259–​64. Ugalde, A. (1973) “A decision model for the study of public bureaucracies”. Policy Sciences 4(1): 75–​84. Varela, E. (2006) La Mercantilización de lo Público. Ensayos de Gestión y Políticas Públicas. Santiago de Cali: Universidad del Valle. Vargas A., Quiñones, J.R., Roth, A.N., Lopez, J.A. and Lozano, A. (2007) Fundamentos de políticas públicas. Bogotá:  Departamento Ciencia Política, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Wiesner, E. (1997) La efectividad de las políticas públicas en Colombia. Un análisis neoinstitucional. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, DNP. Williamson, J. (1990) What Washington Means by Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

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TWO

Evolution of policy analysis as a field of study and instruction in Colombia Nadia Rubaii and Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido

Introduction The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive overview of the evolution and current status of public policy education, broadly defined, as a professional field of study in Colombia. In doing so, it will be clear that the study of public policy, and more specifically of evidence-​based policy analysis, is a very new undertaking in Colombia. A secondary objective of this chapter is to provide some context for understanding the discussions that follow in subsequent chapters regarding the roles of specific governmental and nongovernmental actors in policy analysis, and the application of policy analysis within various policy realms. To the extent that educational offerings in policy analysis for practicing and aspiring public service professionals are only recently available, the limited application of rigorous analysis in various contexts can be better understood. Public policy education in Colombia is delivered within the context of a larger system of higher education that both facilitates and constrains its development. The first part of this chapter provides some context for understanding the system of higher education in Colombia in terms of both its institutional structure and the mechanisms for ensuring quality. In the second section, we document the development of public policy programs, placing this discussion in the context of the similarly young field of political science within Colombia. We organize the discussion by level of education to provide an overview of the status of both undergraduate and graduate programs. The most detailed discussion is with respect to Master’s programs, with attention to the types of degrees offered, their institutional, disciplinary and geographic loci, and their curriculum content. The final section of the chapter reflects on the status of Colombian public policy education and its capacity to contribute to improved quality of public administration.

The Colombian higher education context As of 2017, the most recent year for which data are reported, Colombia’s higher education system consists of 292 institutions (MEN, 2018). Colombia categorizes these as falling into one of four categories: universities (n=85), technology schools and university institutes (128), technology institutes (49) and professional technical institutes (30). Each category may include both public and private institutions. 31

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Collectively, in 2017, they enrolled close to 2.5 million students, roughly evenly split between public (51%) and private (49%) institutions, and with more than 90% at the undergraduate level (roughly 60% in traditional undergraduate programs and 30% in technical programs). At the graduate level, Colombian universities award three types of degree: specializations, Master’s and doctoral degrees, with a correspondingly decreasing numbers of programs and enrollments at each successive level. In 2017, these programs represented four, three, and less than one half of one percent of total student enrollments, respectively at the specialization, Master’s, and doctoral levels (MEN, 2018). Colombia has an advanced and sophisticated system for ensuring quality of both institutions and programs. The framework for quality assurance in Colombia is grounded in the 1991 Constitution, which establishes education as an individual right and a social responsibility, and which mandates that the state “perform the final inspection and supervision of education in order to control its quality, to ensure that it fulfills its purposes” (art. 69). Rubaii and Lima Bandeira (2018) present an overview of the Colombian higher education regulatory system, grounded in Law 30 of 1992, and relying on a network of governmental and quasi-​governmental agencies, all linked in some way to the MEN and each other. The National Council of Higher Education (Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior  –​CESU) plans and coordinates policies regarding higher education and oversees the work of other organizations that comprise three distinct yet overlapping and interdependent systems for development, information and quality assurance. The quality assurance component –​the System of Quality Assurance in Higher Education (Sistema de Aseguramiento de la Calidad en Educación Superior –​SACES) –​consists of the National Commission for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para el Aseguramiento de la Calidad de la Educación Superior –​CONACES) and the National Accreditation Council (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación –​ CNA). Colombia’s system of quality assurance has two distinct levels: a mandatory review to ensure minimum quality overseen by CONACES and a voluntary accreditation process to recognize high quality coordinated by CNA. For institutions and most programs, the minimum quality process is referred to as the Qualified Registry (Registro Calificado), which must be renewed every seven years. Accreditation of High Quality (Acreditación de Alta Calidad) is a voluntary process that seeks to publicly recognize programs and institutions for demonstrated excellence. CNA began accreditation of undergraduate programs in 1998, institutions in 2003, and graduate programs in 2011. An independent indicator of increasing quality is the growing number and percentage of faculty teaching staff in Colombian universities with PhDs, albeit still few by US standards. In 2017, nearly 10% of the nearly 150,000 professors had doctoral degrees compared to fewer than 6% of the roughly 105,000 professors in 2010 (MEN, 2018). In addition to the national system of quality assurance, programs at Colombian universities have the option of pursing specialized accreditation

32

Evolution of policy analysis

from international accrediting bodies. These opportunities exist for Colombian degree programs in engineering, business and public affairs, among others.

Precursors to public policy education in Colombia As in many countries, formal public service education in Colombia traces its roots to the creation of a national school or institute for public administration. In the Colombian case this is the ESAP, which was established in 1958 and which falls into the category of a university institute within the Colombian higher education system. Modeled on the National School for Administration (École nationale d’administration) in France and designed with the help of experts from France, ESAP is charged with providing education and training for government officials. However, the Colombian version did not entirely mimic the French model, which aimed only to create a place for the training of the higher echelons of the state. In addition to offering professional development training workshops, and graduate programs, ESAP has developed a series of undergraduate programs in public administration which began in the capital of Bogotá, and have spread to regional centers throughout the country (Alvarez, 2010). During the 1970s and 1980s, private universities expanded their offerings in law, political science, administration and economics, and beginning in the 1990s some of these programs, particularly in economics and administration, included some material related to public management and public policy (Careaga et al, 2014), but this did not include designated degree programs. At the end of the 20th century, a mere 20 years ago, Hernandez (1999) noted that there were no public policy programs at all in Colombia and lamented the absence of spaces for developing policy analysis skills through formal study. At the time, most departments of social sciences, economics or political science lacked even a class in public policy analysis at the undergraduate level, with the exception of Universidad de los Andes. And at that time only two universities –​Universidad de los Andes and Universidad del Valle –​offered students options to study public policy analysis at the graduate level within other degree programs (Hernandez, 1999). In some respects, this should come as no surprise when one considers that even the discipline of political science is a relatively recent addition to the graduate-​ level academic offerings at Colombian universities. The evolution of political science as a discipline has been well documented by Santiago Leyva and María Fernanda Ramírez, both of whom are on the faculty of Universidad EAFIT and who separately contributed other chapters in this volume. Political science has existed as an undergraduate offering in Colombia since 1968 and in two Master’s degree programs established in the 1970s, but it was not until the mid-​1990s that the country experienced a rapid growth in the number of graduate programs in the field and a process of institutionalization as a discipline (Leyva Botero et al, 2013). Since the start of the 21st century, political science has solidified its position as a profession in Colombia through expanded academic offerings, the creation and 33

Policy Analysis in Colombia

growth of the Colombian Association of Political Science (ACCPOL), regular conferences, a growing number of students and graduates, and the recognition of Colombian political science journals among international ranking systems (Leyva and Fernanda Ramírez, 2015). In contrast to the emphasis on comparative studies and heavy reliance on quantitative analyses that characterize political science research in the US and Europe, Leyva and Fernanda Ramírez (2015) describe Colombian political science research as generally descriptive and qualitative in character. The relatively slow development of political science in Colombia, and its limited focus on evidence-​based research, might explain the greater role that schools of economics have played in creating capacity for policy analysis both in scholarship and practice. As shown in Chapter 1 of this volume, not only were some of the most influential research centers for policy in Colombia created in the Schools of Economics of Universidad de los Andes and Universidad Nacional de Colombia, but economists in Colombia have also played a predominant role in the adoption of ideas and techniques particularly in planning, budgeting, project appraisal, fiscal federalism/​decentralization and policy analysis, to mention but a few. Yet, as we also mention in Chapter  1 of this volume, the movement to incorporate public management and public policy in the Colombian higher education curriculum picked up steam in the 2000s with the creation of programs in public administration, public management and public policy in leading public and private universities (Careaga et al, 2014), but the offerings continue to be limited at all levels as noted in the following section.

Public policy degrees in Colombia At what levels and to what extent is public policy an available field of study in Colombia? In this section we document the development and current status of public policy and related degrees in Colombia, with particular attention on professional graduate degree programs at the level of specializations and Master’s degree programs. Data for this analysis were obtained through two sources:  the reports and databases of SNIES and the webpages of the universities offering programs. SNIES makes accessible to the public its comprehensive and searchable database for information on higher education institutions and programs in Colombia. To identify programs for inclusion in this analysis, we conducted multiple searches using various combinations of key terms, specifically the Spanish equivalents of “public policy”, “public management” and “public administration”. We also searched for the terms “public” and “policy” individually to identify programs with specialized titles. Because “government” developed as a discipline in Colombia specifically to overcome the low technical and methodological level of political science programs, we also searched for and included these programs in our analysis. The results generated from these searches required some data cleaning. Because “public” can be used in many contexts and the Spanish words “política” or “políticas” 34

Evolution of policy analysis

can have many meanings –​politics, policy, political and so on (see Chapter 1 for a note on this) –​we reviewed the results and made decisions to manually exclude programs outside the intended scope of the analysis, such as those degrees related to public opinion, public relations, public accounting and public health, as well as those degrees in international relations policy, taxation and tax policy, and communications policy, for example. The results from these searches were then cross-​referenced to eliminate duplicate listings, and sorted according to various criteria, including level (undergraduate and graduate) and type of degree (within the graduate level that includes specializations similar to executive education programs, Master’s degrees and doctoral degrees). Summary data for all levels and types of program are presented later, although the more detailed analysis of program content is limited to Master’s-​ level programs that are active as of the writing of this chapter. Undergraduate education in public policy Interestingly, there are an increasing number of undergraduate programs in public administration and government, but no programs currently listed in public policy. As noted earlier, public administration education began at the undergraduate level at ESAP in 1998 with a program focused on territorial (local) public administration; this program is currently offered through distance education. Since 2006, ESAP has offered an in-​person version with a more general public administration focus in the capital of Bogotá. Six other higher education institutions –​including three universities, two technology schools and one technical professional institute –​offer undergraduate programs in public administration. The most recent program added to the roster in 2018 is at the Universidad Autónoma Indígena Intercultural, an indigenous intercultural university that offers a unique degree program in Special Public Administration Technology for Ancestral Indigenas Lands. Although Colombian universities do not offer any undergraduate degrees in public policy, policy content can be found in programs in other disciplines. Students are able to pursue undergraduate programs in government (n=7), political science (n=18), political science and government (n=4), political science and international relations (n=4) and variations on those (including one program each in geopolitics, history and public management, politics and international relations, and law and political science), as well as the public administration (n=9) programs mentioned earlier. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to evaluate the curricula of those programs to explore the extent to which they include coursework in public policy or policy analysis. Graduate specializations or certificates One type of degree that is quite popular in Colombia for which there is no direct equivalent in the US system of higher education is what is known as an especialización. Literally this translates as specialization, but it is more than that. These are stand-​alone graduate degrees, often of a professional nature. These 35

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Figure 2.1: Distribution of specialization programs in Colombia related to public policy Public finance 5 Public administration 4

Government and public policy 2 Local government and public management 2 Public policy analysis 1

Public management 19

The state, public policy and development 1

Source: Authors’ own elaboration using data from SNIES.

degrees are sometimes offered in intense executive education-​like formats and are completed by students who continue their full-​time employment during their studies. They are usually completed within 12-​month period, requiring 20 to 30 credits of coursework. Some of them have names similar to Master’s degrees, while others are highly specialized. Cleaning the data for these degrees resulted in the removal from the analysis of programs in fields such as markets and land policies in Latin America, tax policies and legislation, public and private business responsibility, and management and planning of cultural policies. Figure  2.1 presents the specializations related to public policy and public administration in Colombia as of 2019. Of the 34 programs identified in the analysis, more than half are labeled as public management programs, only four explicitly mention public policy and, of those, only one is dedicated to public policy analysis. The first of the programs in public management and public administration were established in 1998; all of the others have been running since 2000, and many since 2010. The single program with an explicit focus on public policy analysis at Universidad Nacional was established in 2005. The majority of the programs are offered in traditional face-​to-​face format, but there has been a small online presence since the beginning. The first specialization program in public administration at ESAP started in 1998 in a distance format, and since then several others offered by universities based in Bogotá are offered online with the goal of reaching a wider audience. Specialization programs sometimes serve as the basis for Master’s degrees at a later date, as is the case for several of the Master’s programs included in the analysis presented in this chapter.

36

Evolution of policy analysis

Master’s degrees in public policy, public administration and management The discussion of Master’s degree programs builds on an earlier study of graduate public affairs programs in Colombia. Drawing on the work of Bozeman (2007) and Rainey (2009), Careaga and colleagues (2014) evaluate the ability of graduate public affairs programs in Colombia to instill professional public administration competencies via technical, ethical, personal and social competencies unique to public service. Of particular concern to Careaga and colleagues (2014) and Sanabria and Avellaneda (2014) is the lack of technical skills on the part of public officials, a problem that is not unique to Colombia but rather is endemic in developing countries. They note that building capacity among public functionaries requires attention not only to technical skills, but also to public service values such as equity, justice, representativeness, equality, due process and so on that are essential to combat corruption, clientelism and other entrenched problems. Programs in public affairs have a responsibility to their students and the general public to provide both technical and soft skills. Comparing the curricula of the ten public affairs master’s programs in existence at the time with the curriculum components common to the most prestigious Master of Public Administration (MPA) and Master of Public Policy (MPP) programs in the US, they found that a majority of the Colombian programs included content on the political environment, public budgeting and finance, and the legal context; roughly half included courses on public management and planning, politics and public administration; and a smaller number had content on public policy theory, quantitative methods of analysis, or policy evaluation (Careaga et al, 2014). This chapter builds on and expands their analysis. Using the search criteria and processes described earlier, we identified 21 Master’s programs provided by 15 universities. The first program, a Master of Government and Public Policy, was established in 1999 at Universidad Externado de Colombia as part of a collaboration that continues to this day with Columbia University in New York. Several programs were established in the first few years of the 2000s, and most have been created since 2010. Figure 2.2 traces the growth

Figure 2.2: Increase in Master’s-​level public policy programs in Colombia, 1998–​2018 25 20 15 10 5 0 1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

New programs

2012

2014

2016

2018

Total programs

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on SNIES data.

37

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Figure 2.3: Degree titles and type of institution 7 6

Total

5 Public

4

Private

3 2 1

en t( M PM an ) d m an ag em Te Pu en rri t bl to i S cp ria oc lg ol ia lp icy ov ol er an icy nm d de en ve ta lo nd pm pu en bl t ic Ec m an on ag om em ics en of t pu bl ic po lic y ol icy

Pu bl ic p

Pu bl ic m

in ist dm

an ag

ra

em

tio

n

(M PA )

en t rn m ve

go nd

en ta

Pu bl ic a

em

an ag

Pu bl ic m

Go

ve

rn m

en ta

nd

Pu bl ic p

ol icy

pu bl ic p

(M PP )

ol icy

0

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on SNIES data.

over time. A complete list of the programs in chronological order is provided in Table 2.1, and key characteristics are discussed in the following. Given the small number of overall programs, a surprisingly large variety of degree titles are used. Beyond the conventional MPP, MPA and Master of Public Management (MPM) degrees, there are several degrees that include “government” in the title and some which, reflecting their origins in specializations, have highly specialized titles. The distribution of degree titles across public and private institutions also illustrates several interesting patterns (see Figure 2.3). The MPA is limited not only to public institutions, but to one in particular, namely ESAP; private institutions use public management rather than public administration in their degree titles. The MPP is the most common degree title and is offered by both public and private institutions. The more specialized degree titles are more likely to be offered at private universities. In contrast to the specialization programs that typically carry 20–​30 credits and last for one year, the Master’s degree programs range from 36 to 62 credit hours. The three programs with the fewest credit hours can be completed in three semesters; all of the others require four semesters of study spread over two years. In keeping with the interdisciplinary roots of public policy and public administration, there is no clear pattern to the positioning of public policy and public administration programs within the Colombian system of categorizing degree programs or within the institutional organization of universities. Colombia groups all degree programs into one of eight broad areas of knowledge: agronomy, veterinary and related fields; fine arts; education sciences; health sciences; social sciences and humanities; economics, administration, 38

Evolution of policy analysis

accounting and related fields; engineering, architecture, urban planning and related fields; and mathematics and natural sciences. These broad areas of knowledge are further subdivided into 55 basic knowledge cores (núcleo básico del conocimiento or NBC) that reflect the common knowledge within more specific disciplines or professions. Public policy education straddles two of broad areas of knowledge, namely social sciences and humanities, and well as economics, administration, accounting and related fields. Nine of the 21 programs (43%) are identified by SNIES as falling in the knowledge area of social sciences and humanities, while the other 12 (57%) are identified as part of the economics, administration, accounting and related fields area. Even within each of these two broad areas, there are disparities in which NBCs the programs are expected to fulfill. Among those in the social science and humanities area, seven are associated with the NBC political science and international relations and two have the NBC of law and related fields. For those in the knowledge area of economics, administration, accounting and related fields, most (n=10) use the NBC for administration, although two are tied to the NBC for economics. Similarly, there is no consistency in the institutional locus of these programs. As Table  2.1 illustrates, across the 15 universities, these programs are located within colleges or departments of political science, government, administration, economics, or law. There is no apparent relationship between the degree title, the knowledge area/​NBC, and the department/​college where the program is housed. For example, among the six MPP programs, there is at least one in each of the four possible NBC categories identified earlier, and departments/​colleges in which they are located include: administrative sciences (two), business and social studies (one), economic sciences (one), government (one), and law and political and social sciences (one). The Colombian higher education system is often criticized for its institutions being heavily concentrated in urban centers and accordingly not accessible to the population in the vast majority of the country (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of how this impedes capacity). The location of public service Master’s degree programs follows this pattern. Figure 2.4 represents the geographic concentration of public policy and public management education across municipalities and departments (subnational levels of government between the central and municipal levels). Among the 33 major subnational units (32 departments and the capital district), the programs are located in just nine of them, with more than half in two departments, fully 70% in just four cities, and nearly 40% in the capital alone. Only one program is offered online. The program descriptions provided on university websites do not always include a formal mission statement, but they do provide sufficient information to identify program priorities, core values, and areas of emphases. The way in which each university describes its program corresponds in large part to the different degree titles, although these distinctions are not absolute. The MPP programs are more likely to reference rigorous analysis, empirical research tools, evidence-​based decision making and evaluation of public policies. The MPA and MPM programs 39

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Table 2.1: Master’s degree programs related to public policy and public administration in Colombia, 2019 (Listed in chronological order) University name, city (department/​region)

Institution Degree title type

Year established

Institutional locus (college or department)

Universidad Externado de Colombia, Private Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Master of Government and Public Policy

1999

College of Finance, Government, and International Relations

Universidad del Valle, Cali (Valle de Cauca)

Public

Master of Public Policy

2002

Administrative Sciences

Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Public

Master of Public Administration

2003

N/​A

Universidad Santiago de Cali, Cali (Valle de Cauca)

Private

Master of Public Management

2006

Business and Economic Sciences

Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Public

Master of Public Policy

2009

College of Law, Political and Social Science

Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Private

Master of Public Policy

2010

School of Government

Universidad de Santander (UDES), Bucaramanga (Santander)

Private

Master of Public Management and Government

2010

Economics and Administration

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Private

Master of Social Policy

2010

College of Political Science and International Relations

Universidad EAFIT, Medellín (Antioquia)

Private

Master of Government and Public Policy

2013

Department of Government and Political Science

Universidad Industrial de Santander, Public Bucaramanga (Santander)

Master of Public Management and Policy

2014

Economics

Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Private

Master of Economics of Public Policy

2014

Economics

Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín (Antioquia)

Public

Master of Public Policy

2015

Economic Sciences

Universidad Autonoma de Bucaramanga, Bucaramanga (Santander)

Private

Master of Public Policy and Development

2015

Legal and Political Sciences

Universidad Autonoma de Manizales, Private Manizales (Caldas)

Master of Public Policy

2015

Business and Social Studies

Escuela Superior de Administración Pública, National (Virtual)

Public

Master of Public Administration

2015

N/​A

Universidad del Valle, Pasto (Narinio)

Public

Master of Public Policy

2016

Administrative Sciences

Universidad del Cauca, Popayan (Cauca)

Public

Master of Government and Public Policy

2016

Law, Political and Social Sciences

40

Evolution of policy analysis

Table 2.1 (continued) Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Private

Master of Local Government and Public Management

2016

Political Science and International Relations

Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (Bogotá, DC)

Private

Master of Public Management

2018

School of Government

UDES, Cucuta (Norte de Santander)

Private

2018

Economics and Administration

UDES, Valledupar (Cesar)

Private

Master of Public Management and Government Master of Public Management and Government

2018

Economics and Administration

Source: SNIES and program websites.

Figure 2.4: Geographic distribution by city (department/​region) of Master’s programs in public policy and related fields in Colombia in 2019 (n=21) Valledupar (Cesar) 5%

Cúcuta (Norte de Santander) 5%

Virtual 5%

Popayán (Cauca) 5% Pasto (Nariño) 5%

Bogotá (Bogotá, DC) 38%

Manizales (Caldas) 5%

Medellín (Antioquia) 9%

Cali (Valle del Cauca) 9%

Bucaramanga (Santander) 14%

Source: Author’s own elaboration using SNIES data.

are more likely to refer to improving human capital, making good decisions, and leading and managing in the public interest. While the manner in which they do so varies, almost all of the program descriptions make some reference to contributing to the quality of public management and public policy in Colombia and/​or Latin America. Three universities offer multiple versions of the same degree either in different formats (as in the case of ESAP which offers the MPA in a face-​to-​face and distance versions) or in different locations (as in the case of Universidad de Santander and Universidad del Valle, which offer the same degrees in multiple municipalities located in different departments or regions). Two universities offer two quite distinct programs from within the same university unit. The School of Government at Universidad de los Andes offers both an MPP and an MPM, and the College of Political Science and International Relations at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana offers a Master of Social Policy and a Master of Local 41

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Table 2.2: Analysis of required curriculum components (percentage of programs) Category of required Number of MPP coursework programs (n=6)

Number of MPA and MPM programs (n=4)

Number of other programs (n=11)

Total number of programs (n=21)

Public policy (processes and actors)

83%

75%

73%

76%

Substantive policy areas

17%

25%

73%

48%

Public administration and management

83%

100%

73%

81%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Economics

66%

100%

45%

62%

Law Colombian context

17% 50%

25% 25%

45% 18%

33% 29%

Research methods and analysis

(Territorial) Governance and Public Management. In these latter examples, the missions and curricula are demonstrably distinct from one another. The distinct character of each program is also reflected in the curriculum in terms of the degree of structure or flexibility, the core or required coursework, the areas of concentration and applied research opportunities available to students, and the nature of the culminating experience. Along the flexibility–​structure continuum, one program stands out as quite distinct from the others. The MPP at Universidad Nacional de Colombia follows more of a European model or something more typical of a doctoral program. The program core consists solely of three research seminars and the rest of the program is individualized through the selection of ten elective courses and then completion of a thesis. At the other end of the spectrum are the programs at los Andes, Rosario, Cauca, and Industrial de Santander, which have a common curriculum for all students with the exception of two elective courses. The remaining programs allow students to select three to four electives as part of their program of study. An analysis of the curricula illustrates that there is considerable variation in the specific courses required among the various programs. Table  2.2 provides an overview of the core curricula by program type and category of course requirements. Note that this table does not reflect the number of courses or credits required in each category, but rather whether there are any required courses in those categories. While 100% of programs have some research methods or analysis component, it is important to note that this ranges from as little as a single course to as much as a six-​course sequence, including courses in quantitative methods, qualitative methods, mixed methods plus multiple research seminars. In evaluating Master’s programs within the US, Rubaii (2018) observed a lack of precision in terminology, and blurring of lines between the missions and curricula of 42

Evolution of policy analysis

MPA, MPP, and MPM degree programs. The Colombian programs appear to have maintained more distinctions among the degree titles. The MPP programs generally have multiple class requirements in public policy processes and actors as well as in research methods and analysis categories, whereas the MPA and MPM programs require only one or two courses in those areas. The programs with the more specialized titles are also more likely to have coursework linked to specific policy areas. None of the programs requires an internship, although several have opportunities or requirements to engage in applied research, often through partnerships with policy-​relevant research centers. Two universities offer dual degree options that allow students to either enhance their policy area expertise or their methodological skills. The culminating experiences and final projects also take several forms. Two programs require a thesis (Nacional and ESAP), most require a final project or research project, and two provide students with several options. The MPP at los Andes allows students to select among a group consulting project, research leading to a publishable document, or a case study. The Master of Government and Public Policy at Universidad del Externado accepts a publishable article, a capstone consulting project, or a thesis. Doctoral education in public policy As noted earlier, there are very few doctoral programs in any discipline in Colombia, requiring most Colombians who seek to earn a PhD to study in the US, Europe or elsewhere in Latin America. The need for external studies is particularly pronounced in public affairs. In the realm of public policy, only one program exists within Colombia as of 2019. Established in 2015, the PhD in Public Policy and Management Modeling at Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano in Bogotá articulates a goal of contributing to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration in the context of social, economic and political transformations of the country. As the name implies, the program has a strong emphasis in complex models, instruments and methodologies. The stated goal of the program is to prepare individuals with the ability to engage in in-​depth analysis for policy planning, policy design and policy evaluation. The program references public administration and policy administration issues at the municipal, departmental and central government levels, and lists several specific policy areas in which modeling can be applied (crime, education, planning, technology, environment, employment, research and development, energy and development). The multidisciplinary nature of the program is evidenced by its national registration as within the knowledge areas of economics, administration, accounting and related areas, while being institutionally based in the College of Natural Sciences and Engineering. Students are recruited to the program from the fields of engineering, planning, management, economics, and administration. Prerequisites include an interest 43

Policy Analysis in Colombia

in public administration, a Master’s degree, and mathematical or quantitative analysis capacity. The curriculum includes four substantive classes:  Fundamentals of Public Policy and Management; Public Policy and the Theory of Growth; Public Policy Modeling; and Public Management and Policy Modeling. Beyond that students must complete three additional research seminars, four levels of thesis credits, and two elective seminars. In total, the PhD requires that students complete 80 credits over six semesters. The program materials indicate that graduates are expected to find work in both academic and professional sectors in research positions related to the planning and management of companies and public entities, and generating innovative solutions based on modeling with rigorous theoretical and methodological grounding.

Conclusion Public policy education has the potential to build capacity in public policy actors. To the extent that public policy degree options are limited, capacity may suffer accordingly. There is a substantial cadre of public officials who have undergraduate degrees in public administration, principally from ESAP, but they often have lower technical and analytical skills that those with degrees in economics, management or engineering, and lack the bilingual and international competencies that are of growing importance (Hernandez and Dueñas, 2005). Using data from the Administrative Department for the Public Administration (Departmento Adminstrativo de la Función Pública  –​DAFP) and the Public Employment Information and Management System (Sistema de Información y Gestión del Empleo Público –​SIGEP), Careaga and colleagues (2014) and Sanabria (2015, 2016) illustrate that Colombian government functionaries lack graduate-​level education in general, and even more so lack specialized education in public management and public policy. When high level government officials do have this education it is from programs outside the country (typically, in the US) rather than from Colombian universities (Sanabria, 2018). Increasing the reach and the impact of Colombian degree programs in public policy and public affairs requires that they establish a reputation for quality. All of the programs discussed in this chapter maintain the Registro Calificado, which indicates meeting the expectations of quality. One program, the MPP at Universidad del Valle has the distinction of the higher-​level recognition (Registro de Alta Calidad). In recognition of the importance of international standards of quality, two Colombian institutions (Universidad de los Andes and Universidad Nacional de Colombia) are members of the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA), the US-​based international accrediting body for public service Master’s programs, as of August 2019. Careaga and colleagues (2014) identify NASPAA accreditation as a tool to strengthen Colombian public affairs education. In 2018, the MPP at Universidad de los

44

Evolution of policy analysis

Andes became the first program in Colombia to seek and receive NASPAA accreditation. Looking ahead to later chapters in this book, it is worth noting that MPP, MPA, MPM and related degrees are not the unique ways to ensure the widespread use of policy analysis tools and techniques. This preparation may also come from degrees in economics as documented in this volume in Chapters 12 and Chapter 1, which highlights the importance of those educated in economic analysis in the Colombian central government. In a different twist on how other fields might represent important areas for examination, Chapter 16, illustrates the negative consequences of not including public policy and policy analysis content within journalism programs. So, while this chapter has focused on degree programs focused on public policy, it is also important that skills of evidence-​based policy analysis be incorporated into other programs. Examining the extent to which that is being doing is beyond the scope of this analysis. Given the relative youth of public policy education, the small number of programs, and their concentration in select geographic areas, one can appreciate the challenge of having policy analysis widely applied in Colombia within or outside of government. When considered alongside the political, social and economic developments transpiring in Colombia, the importance of public policy education is clear. These programs can play a vital role in educating professionals capable of rigorous policy analysis, and the skills to manage and implement policies to advance the public interest. References Alvarez, A. (2010) Repensando la ESAP: Qué ha Sido, Qué es Hoy y Qué Debería Ser. Bogotá: ESAP. Bozeman, B. (2007) Public Values and Public Interest:  Counterbalancing Economic Individualism. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Careaga, M., Sanabria, P. and Caballero Argáez, C. (2014) “¿Servidores públicos más profesionales e íntegros vía educación más profesional? Retos y oportunidades en el caso de Colombia y la Universidad de los Andes”. In C. Pliscoff (ed.) Enseñanza y Aprendizaje de Administración y Políticas Públicas en Las Américas. Santiago: RIL Editores, pp. 149–​80. Hernandez, G. (1999) “El análisis de la politicas públicas: una disciplina incipiente en Colombia”. Revista de Estudios Sociales 4: 80–​91. Hernandez, I. and Dueñas, M. (2005) “Contribución al debate sobre la educación y el mercado laboral en la administración publica en Colombia”. INNOVAR Revista de Ciencias Administrativas y Sociales 15(26): 13–​32. Leyva Botero, S. and Fernanda Ramírez, M. (2015) “La ciencia política en Colombia:  una disciplina en continua expansión”. Revista de Ciencia Política 35(1): 71–​94. Leyva Botero, S., Fernanda Ramírez, M., Muñoz Yi, P., Preciado, A. and Antonio Fortou, J. (2013) “La ciencia política en Colombia: una disciplina en proceso de institucionalización”. Revista Debates 7(3): 31–​56. 45

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Lucio, R. and Serrano, M. (1993) “The state and higher education in Colombia”. Higher Education 25: 61–​72. Doi: 10.1007/​BF01384042 MEN (Ministerio de Educación Nacional) (2018) “Información Nacional, 2010–​2017 Educación Superior”. Available from www.mineducacion.gov. co/​sistemasinfo/​Informes/​212350:Resumen-​de-​indicadores-​de-​Educacion-​ Superior [Accessed 1 August 2019]. NASPAA (2018) “2016–​2017 Enrollment and other Trends”. Available from www.naspaa.org/​data-​center/​download-​naspaa-​data/​archived-​data [Accessed 1 August 2019]. Rainey, H. (2009) Understanding and Managing Public Organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-​Bass. Rubaii, N. (2018) “The status of the profession: the role of PhD and masters programs in public policy education”. In J. Hird (ed.) Policy Analysis in the United States, Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 319–​38. Rubaii, N. and Lima Bandeira, M. (2018) “Comparative analysis of higher education quality assurance in Colombia and Ecuador: how is political ideology reflected in policy design and discourse?”. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 20(2): pp. 158–​75. Sanabria, P. (ed.) (2016) De la Recomendación a la Acción: Cómo poner en Marcha un modelo de Gestión Estratégica del Talento Humano para el Sector Público Colombiano. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Sanabria, P. (ed.) (2015) Gestión del Talento Humano en el Sector Público: Estado del Arte, Diagnóstico y Recomendaciones para el Caso Colombiano. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Sanabria P. (2018) “Public service motivation and job sector choice: evidence from Colombia”. International Journal of Public Administration 41(13): 1107–​18. Doi: 10.1080/​01900692.2017.1320409 Sanabria P. and Avellaneda, C. (2014) “The training of senior civil servants in Colombia”. In M. Van Wart and A. Hondeghem (eds.) Leadership and Culture Comparative Models of Top Civil Servant Training. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 271–​87. Vanegas, P. (2003) “The northern influence and Colombian education reform of the 1990s”. In G. E. Fischman, S. Ball and S. Gvirtz (eds.) Crisis and Hope: The Educational Hopscotch of Latin America. New  York, NY:  RoutledgeFalmer, pp. 229–​65.

46

THREE

Policy analysis, bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms in Colombia María Fernanda Ramírez and Carolina Isaza

Introduction The Colombian government has undertaken numerous reforms in its public administration with the aim of enhancing bureaucratic capacity, effectiveness and efficiency (Younes, 2004; Restrepo, 2011). These reforms have taken place hand in hand with successive international public administration approaches, from the traditional Weberian approach to NPM, to the New Public Governance (as developed in Osborne, 2010). This chapter undertakes a policy analysis of administrative policies in Colombia in terms of both the design and characteristics of public administration reforms and the conditions for their implementation, in particular, the bureaucratic capacity of public organizations. The design of administrative policies in Colombia historically has been based on the global North’s approaches to public administration. Weberian approaches were influential in the 19th and 20th centuries, but NPM can be considered the main current approach in Colombian public administration. Some elements of New Public Governance can also be detected. The characteristics of these policies are identified in a timeline starting with the Constitution of 1991 and finishing in 2018. On a second level of policy analysis, the implementation of these administrative policies has not been as expected. The chapter argues that one of the foremost conditions for implementation is bureaucratic capacity. It is still perceived that implementation of the administrative reforms has not been satisfactory, and that the bureaucratic capacity of public organizations tends to be low (Echebarría, 2006). Organizations with a high bureaucratic capacity constitute islands of excellence in Colombian public administration and have implemented the reforms in a more consistent and successful way, leading to better performance as measured in national indicators. Considering this, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the different processes of administrative reform occurring in Colombia from 1991 to 2018, including implementation problems and main areas of progress, with an emphasis on the factors that determine high bureaucratic capacity in islands of excellence.

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Policy Analysis in Colombia

Thus, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents a description of the public administration reforms implemented in Colombia since the 1990s. The second section is centered on the review of some of the difficulties in the implementation of such reforms, mainly related to bureaucratic capacity. The third section presents an analysis of the bureaucratic capacity based on a study of islands of excellence, focusing on the factors and strategies that allow certain public organizations to reach a high capacity. Some characteristics of these islands of excellence are proposed as a possible model for the performance of public administration in Colombia. Finally, the chapter concludes by identifying the Colombian NPM-​type reforms, along with the implementation and capacity problems they have encountered. The islands of excellence appear to be a source of hope for capacity improvement.

Management reforms in Colombian public administration since 1991 NPM is a public administration approach that proposes the application in the public sector of tools, techniques and organizational principles used in the private sector, in order to reach better efficiency in the functioning of the former (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; McLaughlin et al, 2002). NPM appeared in the late 1970s and was applied to different extents in developed countries such as Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the US (Christensen and Laegreid, 2003, 2007; Ferlie et al, 2005; Cejudo, 2011). All of these practices contrast with the Weberian bureaucratic approach and propose a deliberate change in the structures and processes of public sector organizations, so that they operate in resemblance to the private firm. A process of structural change underlies the technical aspects of NPM, as it is linked to the welfare state crisis and, consequently, to the crisis in traditional public administration, which was hierarchical and centralized, with a great degree of deployment and overrepresentation of public apparatus and bureaucracy. As such, the NPM approach proposes the change towards a competitive state that meets only the basic societal functions with a smaller, more agile, flexible and decentralized organizational apparatus (Lane, 2000; Pollit and Bouckaert, 2002). The rationalization of structures and procedures and the quest for an increase in the productivity of public servants became central aspects of NPM, as well as the redefinition of citizens as clients or consumers. In Latin America there have been various attempts to implement the NPM approach since the 1980s, with Brazil, Chile and Argentina as forerunner countries (Lechner, 1992; Bresser, 1995; Ramírez, 2004; Thwaites and López, 2005). The adoption of divergent and singular sets of practices in each country was the predominant trend. However, in the great majority of these countries, the reforms have focused around strategic planning, the enhancement of budget and financial management systems, results-​based management and the professionalization of civil service, with uneven results (Bresser and Spink, 1999; Ormond and Löffler, 48

Bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms

1999; Gaetani, 2000; Ramió, 2001). It is possible to affirm that the initiatives introduced in Latin America by the NPM approach have been carried out randomly and unsystematically and without having achieved a Weberian state beforehand (Oszlak, 1997, 1999; Fleury, 1999; Nickson, 2002; Ramírez, 2009). Since the early 1990s, Colombia has been undertaking a series of restructuring initiatives of its public administration that can be catalogued as NPM reforms. It should be noted that the implementation of these reforms was based on the establishment of legislation derived from the new Constitution of 1991 (Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991), which included the principles that guided administrative activity. Also, the goals and direction that each successive government takes in the administrative restructuring are contained in their respective PND.1 To show whether there is any continuity between the different presidential terms regarding NPM reforms, seven PNDs were studied from the period between the 1991 Constitution and 2018. It can be seen that, some nuances aside, all of them consider aspects related to managerial reforms. Table 3.1 shows the key Colombian NPM practices, corresponding to each term. Based on this review, it is possible to claim that during the period under review, three main NPM key practices were introduced: the rearrangement of organizational structures and administrative procedures; strategies for an efficient, flexible and high-​quality civil service; and results-​based management. We now examine each of these in turn. The rearrangement of organizational structures and administrative procedures This practice proposes to enhance the efficiency and functional quality of public organizations, in order to optimize decision-​making processes and rationalize public spending, with the incorporation of information technologies. These actions were evident during the Samper Presidency with the Public Management Improvement Program (1995), which introduced new techniques in public management such as strategic planning, organizational change management, information systems and results-​oriented management, among others, alongside the rationalization of public spending and the elimination and fusion of public organizations (Law 344, 1996). During the Pastrana Presidency, the elimination and simplification of formalities in public administration (Law 489, 1998) and the incorporation of electronic government (E-​government) (Law 527, 1999) were implemented. Under President Uribe, the fusion of several public organizations took place and online government strategies were established (Law 790, 2002). A Program for Public Administration Renewal (Programa de Renovación de la Administración Pública –​PRAP) was introduced in 2002 to improve the efficiency and functional quality of public organizations, the optimization of decision-​making processes and the rationalization of public spending. PRAP showed continuity and was strengthened in President Uribe’s second term. The strategies of E-​government were also consolidated (Law 1341, 2009). In the same vein, during the two terms 49

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Table 3.1: PNDs, NPM principles and key practices Term

NPM principles

NPM key practices

César Gaviria Pacific Revolution (1990–​94) (Revolución Pacífica)

State modernization and institutional adjustment in the context of economic liberalization.

Initiative of civil service professionalization (Law 27, 1992). Establishment of internal control in public organizations (Law 87, 1993).

Ernesto Samper (1994–​98)

State reforms associated with the efficient use of public spending.

Public Management Improvement Program (1995). Rationalization of public spending, elimination and fusion of public organizations (Law 344, 1996).

Andrés Change to Build Peace Pastrana (Cambio Para Construir (1998–​2002) la Paz)

Decentralized and competitive state.

Sets the principles for civil service career (Law 443, 1998). Elimination and simplification of formalities in public administration (Law 489, 1998). E-​government (Law 527, 1999).

Álvaro Uribe (2002–​06)

Towards a Communitarian State (Hacia un Estado Comunitario)

Managerial state investing public resources efficiently and with austerity.

PRAP (2002). Fusion of public organizations, online government strategy (Law 790, 2002). SINERGIA (2002). Quality Management System (Law 872, 2003). Professionalization and flexibility in the public service organization (Law 909, 2004). SUIP (2004).

Álvaro Uribe (2006–​10)

Communitarian State Development for All (Estado Comunitario Desarrollo para Todos)

Managerial state investing public resources efficiently and with austerity.

Continuation and strengthening of the management programs of the first term. National Program of Training of Public Employees (2007). E-​government consolidation (Law 1341, 2009).

Juan M. Santos (2010–​14)

Prosperity for All (Prosperidad para Todos)

Good governance with citizen participation and fight against corruption.

Elimination, simplification or digitalization of various administrative formalities and red tape (2014).

Juan M. Santos (2014–​18)

PND

The Social Leap (El Salto Social)

All for a New Country (Todos por un Nuevo País)

Good governance with citizen participation and fight against corruption.

Continuation and strengthening of the management programs of the first term. MIPG (2015). Integrity code for public servants (2017). Declaration of compromise for an open government (2017).

Source: Authors’ own elaboration. Note: These NPM principles are based on Hood (1991); McLaughlin et al (2002) and Pollit and Bouckaert (2002), among others.

of President Santos, the elimination, simplification and digitalization of numerous administrative and bureaucratic formalities continued. Strategies for an efficient, flexible and high-​quality civil service There was an attempt to implement this practice under the administrations of President Gaviria (Law 27, 1992) and President Pastrana (Law 443, 1998), whereby the principles for civil service careers, performance evaluation, qualification, 50

Bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms

incentives, training and retirement of service were established. These efforts became more visible with the adoption of Law 909, 2004, emphasizing matters such as merit criteria, professionalization and flexibility in the public service organization, performance assessment and training, regulating the admission and promotion of public service administrative jobs, contests, withdrawal criteria and service contracts, among others. In Uribe’s second term, the National Program of Training of Public Employees (2007) was established. In 2017, during the Santos administration, an integrity code was introduced to guide the actions of public servants. Results-​based management The origins of results-​based management in Colombia can be traced to President Gaviria’s term, with practices relating to internal control in public organizations (Law 87, 1993). Moreover, the first term of Uribe’s government saw the creation of the SINERGIA program (2002). This consists of a set of instruments introduced in public management aimed at more efficient and transparent public resource allocation, fostering a management results-​oriented culture and a frame for accountability as well as considering greater citizen control. Along similar lines, in 2003, the Quality Management System for Public Organizations was introduced by Law 872, 2003 as a tool for evaluating institutional performance. Likewise, in 2004 the General System for Administrative Information for the Public Sector (Sistema General de Información Administrativa del Sector Público  –​ SUIP) facilitated the follow-​up and evaluation of public management within each organization. In addition, President Santos adopted the Integrated Model of Planning and Management (Modelo Integrado de Planeación y Gestión) in 2015, in order to plan, execute, evaluate and control the management of public organizations to generate results sought by the PNDs. Then in 2017, the President signed a declaration of compromise for an open government, aimed at ensuring that all branches of power share minimum standards in transparency, use of open data and information access. It should be noted that although the practices of NPM showed a degree of continuity throughout the two terms of the Santos Presidency, “good government” policies and their main principles (transparency, citizen service, fight against corruption, effective public management and so on) were also implemented (Restrepo, 2011). These measures appear to be more related to New Public Governance and institutional capacity building than to NPM. With Colombia’s willingness to become a permanent member country of the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) in 2011, a window of opportunity was presented to channel such policies in order to cover administrative action and state functioning, based on international practices. With respect to these measures, it can be said that the reformist efforts evidenced since 1991, particularly during the two terms of President Uribe, include numerous NPM practices, giving place to the “boom of the managerial 51

Policy Analysis in Colombia

government” (Roth, 2018, p. 50). However, these changes could not be fully implemented, mainly because of the particular characteristics of Colombian public administration, also shared by other Latin American countries, which include the dysfunctional overlapping of pre-​bureaucratic, bureaucratic and post-​bureaucratic elements, according to Ramió (2001). Thus, for example, the introduction of private sector tools for human resource management in order to make the civil service more flexible, such as the use of private contracts for long-​term recruiting, did not yield satisfactory results. On the contrary, while the bureaucratic approach was not fully developed because of the persistence of patronage and clientelism (Ramió, 2001), flexibilization practices had the opposite effect from what was intended. In other words, the Colombian merit system has never really been fully adopted within public administration, retaining instead a traditional system of public positions distribution based on political interests (González, 2010). Under these conditions, efforts to make the civil service more flexible by means of contracting out were undermined by further evidence of the political patronage system, whereby public offices were allocated by political parties to reward their supporters (Isaza, 2014). That is, it ended up reinforcing a practice that was intended to be mitigated with managerial tools.

Capacity as a condition for the implementation of public administration reforms The existence and persistence of an implementation gap has been identified in the literature (Robinson, 2015), in other words, a divergence between formulated policies and the way in which they are realized and made effective. Public administration in Colombia has a significant implementation gap, to the extent that there are norms and regulations that sufficiently cover most aspects of management, but in many cases they are not applied or their implementation is limited. Hence, there have been problems with implementing administrative reforms due to lack of bureaucratic capacity. As previously discussed, from 1991 to 2018, a degree of continuity is evident regarding the concerted efforts of different governments to introduce managerial reforms within the public administration. However, there is also evidence of certain difficulties relating to the implementation of the reforms. Bureaucratic capacity is understood as “the organizational capacity to provide public goods in an effective and/​or efficient manner” (O’Donnell et al, 2015, p. 19), or as the possibility to accomplish public administration goals, the creation of value and the successful administration of affairs on behalf of organizations and individuals (Morgan, 2006). This includes the professionalization of administrative personnel (Weberian bureaucracy, meritocracy and career opportunities) as well as the existence and use of other organizational resources (financial, information). Among other examples, Bersch and colleagues’ work on Brazil mentions the difficulties of studying the administrative capacity of the state in a unified form, 52

Bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms

since within the institutional and organizational structure of any state there are different levels of capacity to develop administrative tasks (Bersch et al, 2013). According to Bersch and colleagues (2013), bureaucratic capacity in Latin America is considered to be low. In the Colombian case there is also a perception of low capacity, which is partially supported by measurements from the DNP, such as the Integral Performance Index (Índice de Desempeño Integral –​IDI). Studies such as Leyva’s (Leyva, 2018) evidence low levels of bureaucratic capacity related to the predominance of politics over administration and the ensuing patronage and corruption. Drawing from this literature on bureaucratic and organizational capacity, we identified multiple aspects of capacity, from which we chose the following to measure the bureaucratic capacity of public organizations in Colombia: institutional design, human resources, financial resources, leadership, relationship with other actors, organizational climate and autonomy from external actors. The next section presents the results of an empirical analysis of capacity in some Colombian public organizations, using these aspects of capacity as analytical categories. The definition of each of these according to the literature is presented in Table 3.2. The category of relationship with other actors is not usually included in studies of capacity, but it was proposed by Morgan (2006) and was considered useful in the context of New Public Governance (Osborne, 2010). The concept of governance is strongly related to networks of public, private and social actors and their capacity to collaborate and cooperate. This is why we have included this innovative aspect of capacity in our study.

Table 3.2: Categories used to observe bureaucratic capacity Institutional designs

Formal and informal rules inside the organization, such as policies, procedures, norms and values.

Human resources

The people who work in the organization and the recruitment, personnel development and staff retention programs and policies.

Financial resources

This refers more to the capacity to manage and mobilize resources than to the allocated budget.

Leadership

The steering characteristics of leaders of an organization, who can influence, inspire and motivate people and determine other capacity aspects.

Relationships with other actors

The relationships of the organization with external actors in order to achieve joint objectives.

Organizational climate

The relations between public servants inside the organization and the way in which the workplace environment affects work performance, motivation and so on. A condition of relative independence of the organization. It refers to the degree of influence of external political or private actors with particular interests.

Autonomy

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

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Policy Analysis in Colombia

In the capacity literature, it is assumed that a strength in each of these categories leads to better organizational capacity and thus to better performance (Isaza et al, 2015). The islands of excellence approach changes the traditional emphasis from studying low capacity to focusing on strategies and elements that allow some organizations to reach high capacity. It appears that there is no unique way of achieving this, and that different configurations depend on organizational culture.

An exploration of islands of excellence in Colombia We argue so far that there are implementation challenges to public administration reform in Colombia. Low levels of bureaucratic capacity explain at least in part the difficulties of implementing reforms. However, this focus on low capacity is problematic in that it does not allow us to find solutions. For this reason, this section presents the findings of an exploratory study on high-​capacity organizations in Colombia in order to understand whether or not there are replicable practices that can help improve overall bureaucratic capacities. These high-​capacity organizations are called islands of excellence, by which we mean isolated organizations that are different form the general norm and level of capacity for that particular country, in that they perform much better than the mean (Bersch et al, 2013). This is explained by different paths and organizational cultures that result in high capacity. This study was conducted in 2014.2 The six organizations studied included two from the defense sector (the Ministry of National Defense and the Colombian Navy); three from the financial sector (the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the Financial Superintendency and the Superintendency of Societies); and one from the communications sector (the Communications Regulation Commission [Comisión de Regulación de Comunicaciones  –​CRC]). Using document reviews and interviews, the six organizations were classified according to three levels of capacity –​high, medium or low capacity –​in each indicator category. The interviewees’ answers were used as a base for the definition of these levels. These results are shown in Table 3.3. The main findings of this study confirmed that, according to public servants who work in them, the selected organizations have a high capacity in most of the indicators, with the exception of external relationships, in which all score low. The most interesting finding is th at not all organizations have the same formula for achieving high capacity. Some of them have a traditional Weberian public administration logic within a purely civil structure based on merit; others have a military culture with different characteristics from those with a Weberian civil approach, such as loyalty and a strong hierarchy; and yet others have an NPM style, oriented to value creation and performance measurement. The combination of indicators is different for each of them, although those in the same sector share many characteristics, which points to an explanation related to organizational cultures. Some highlighted results for each indicator are presented as follows. 54

Bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms

Table 3.3: Levels of capacity by category and organization Category/​ organization

Ministry of National Defense

Ministry of Navy Finance and Public Credit

CRC

Superintendency Superintendency of Finance of Societies

Institutional designs

High

High

Medium

High

High

High

Human resources

High

High

High

High

High

High

Financial resources

High

High

High

High

High

High

External relationships

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Organizational climate

Medium

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Medium

Leadership

High Medium

High Medium

High Medium

High High Medium Low

Autonomy

High Medium

Source: Isaza, unpublished.

Institutional designs The organizations analyzed all have clear rules and a defined structure. The two ministries believe that hierarchy, chain of command and staff levels within the organization allow orders to be followed and goals to be satisfactorily achieved. The Navy depends for its institutional designs on the structure common to the entire army, and so rates this trait with a medium score. Human resources All of the organizations point out that human resources is a crucial element for high bureaucratic capacity. The most prevalent elements are the personnel-​hiring modality, job stability, salary level and achievement and assessment of management tasks. It is clear that all organizations are highly meritocratic, with the exception of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, which ranks medium because of its heavy use of contracts as a form of hiring: it represents around 40% of the workforce in the sector, while other organizations as the Superintendency of Finance, Superintendency of Societies and the Commission of Regulation of Communications, represent less than 10%. Career civil servants usually work for the organization until the end of their professional life. This is common for both military and the administrative careers. Most organizations use management agreements (an evaluation tool) to evaluate their senior directives, except those belonging to the defense and communications sector. Lastly, the situation relating to salaries is not the same in all organizations. Some, like the Superintendencies of Societies and Finance, 55

Policy Analysis in Colombia

receive very competitive salaries while others, such as the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the Colombian Navy, do not consider salaries to be competitive, but they have other monetary and non-​monetary benefits that partly compensate for that. Financial resources This indicator related to the perception of executives and civil servants regarding the autonomy of the organization to define budget allocations, the accomplishment of goals through budget, and the capacity of the organization to manage resources. Despite wide differences in the allocated budget for each organization, the interviewees considered that their organization managed to fulfill its goals by means of the available budget. This is consistent with the literature on capacity, which repeatedly states that resources are not a factor in the capacity problem, since the public sector always operates under limited resources. External relationships This indicator was the most challenging for the organizations studied. The interviews show that the overall quality of the organization’s relationships with other actors (other public sector agencies, private sector and citizens) is poor. In all of the organizations, civil servants claimed to have good relations with other public sector agencies, but, nevertheless, only a few organizations have a good relationship with private actors. Lastly, with regard to relationships with citizens, all of the organizations studied were limited to passive responses to demands from the public in line with citizen service procedure and official channels of communication. Organizational climate All of the agencies in our study claim to have good internal relations and work environments. Interviewees reported high motivation, thanks to the human resource conditions mentioned earlier, understood as an “emotional salary” and including work benefits and the prestige of the organization. Several organizations recognized good teamwork and efforts to improve the working environment. In the Ministry of National Defense and the Colombian Navy, according to interviewees, the military culture and the chain of command determines the successful performance of the organization. Leadership Organizations identified two models of leadership that contribute to high capacity: the military and the management models. The military model is present in the organizations in the defense sector and characterized by a hierarchical 56

Bureaucratic capacity and public administration reforms

leadership demanded by the structure of the organization and the military culture. The interviewees considered that leaders inspired their subordinates to be better public servants every day, but that the agencies’ structure and the training they received did not allow for fast-​paced professional development. The remaining organizations are characterized by the management model. In this model, there is collaboration and a quest for consensus, which allows civil servants to participate in the decisions they make and grow personally and professionally. Likewise, in the case of the regulating authorities –​CRC and the Superintendencies –​interviewees point out that the directives are closely involved in the processes and that this is part of the success of the work teams. These three organizations highlight that leadership in their organization is more horizontal than vertical. In the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, it was pointed out that leadership is both hierarchal, collaborative and inspiring, in a mixed model. Autonomy Participants perceived a high level of autonomy in their organizations. This allows decisions to be results-​oriented and avoids conflicts of interest, and is facilitated by high levels of technicality and professionalization within the organization. When asked about the fundamental aspects that influenced high administrative capacity, interviewees pointed to the technical nature of each agency, which implies training and education within the organization, development of skills, job stability and a merit promotion scheme, accomplishment of tasks and duties and freedom from external influences. They also highlighted that there were lower risks of corruption within their organization. While this study relied heavily on insider perceptions, the conclusions matched the existing practical knowledge of the research team and confirmed that at least some public organizations in Colombia managed to incorporate administrative policies successfully and accomplish results, but the organizational cultures and the public administration approaches they used for that end were not the same. The main limitation exhibited by all cases was the low capacity to interact with other actors, which would be fundamental to implementing a New Public Governance model.

Conclusion Between 1991 and 2018, Colombia carried out several restructurings of its public administration, mainly based on the NPM approach. During the period studied, three main NPM key practices were introduced: the rearrangement of organizational structures and administrative procedures; strategies for an efficient, flexible and high-​quality civil service; and results-​based management. Despite the continuity between the different presidential mandates regarding these practices, they could not be fully implemented, mainly because of particular characteristics of Colombian public administration, shared by other Latin American countries, 57

Policy Analysis in Colombia

concerning an overlap of pre-​bureaucratic, bureaucratic and post-​bureaucratic elements (Ramió, 2001). Thus, the implementation of administrative reforms has been complex, due to the structural and historical characteristics of the civil service, ingrained mechanisms of corruption, and the system of patronage internalized in the organizational culture. As a consequence, and despite the reformist efforts evidenced during the study period, in general, Colombian public administration continues to have a low level of bureaucratic capacity, according to the available national indicators, such as the Open Government Index (Índice de Gobierno Abierto) and the IDI. However, there is room for hope. There are some public organizations, particularly at the central, national level, that have managed to become islands of excellence with high bureaucratic capacity. But there is no single formula to achieve this: these organizations have followed different paths, from very diverse organizational cultures, and have implemented different approaches to public administration. Some organizations have developed a Weberian civil model, characterized by meritocracy, a respect for procedures and sound institutional design. Others have Weberian elements within a military culture and rely on hierarchy, obedience, loyalty and the possibility of career progression. In yet other cases, with market-​ and results-​oriented cultures, NPM-​style policies resound. Thus, administrative policies are not implemented in the same way in all public organizations. While a high bureaucratic capacity is a condition for their implementation, the particular approach and combination of elements adopted depends on organizational culture and style. The organizations in the study represent only a few of those in Colombian public administration, so further work is needed to understand what happens in terms of implementation of administrative policies in other islands of excellence or in organizations with lower capacity. Notes 1

2

A PND is a document that the President presents to Congress at the beginning of its office, containing the main guidelines of its term. Once the Congress approves the PND, the executive develops the policies assuring its accomplishment. This work was done by Carolina Isaza with the collaboration of Ana María Avella, young researcher of Colciencias for Universidad Externado de Colombia. First an expert survey was conducted to identify possible islands of excellence in Colombia and this list was then filtered to achieve a sample of six (six) organizations. The research team then browsed norms and texts for mentions of these organizations and finally applied structured interviews to two public servants in each organization (one high official and one medium-​rank officer) with questions based on the previously described categories (see Table 3.2).

References Bersch, K., Praça, S. and Taylor, M.M. (2013) “State capacity and bureaucratic autonomy within national states:  mapping the archipelago of excellence in Brazil”. Paper presented at Latin American Studies Association Conference, Washington, DC. 58

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Bresser, L. (1995) “La reforma del aparato de estado y la constitución brasileña”. Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia 4: 1–​11. Available from http://​old.clad. org/p​ ortal/p​ ublicaciones-​del-​clad/​revista-​clad-​reforma-​democracia/​articulos/​ 004-​julio-​1995/​0025302.pdf Bresser, L. and Spink, P. (eds.) (1999) Reforming the State:  Managerial Public Administration in Latin America. New York, NY: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cejudo, G. (2011) “La nueva gestión pública. Una introducción al concepto y a la práctica”. In G. Cejudo (ed.) Nueva Gestión Pública. México City: Siglo XXI, pp.17–​47. Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (eds.) (2003) New Public Management:  The Transformation of Ideas and Practice. Aldershot: Ashgate. Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (eds.) (2007) Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms. Aldershot: Ashgate. Colombia, Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública (2017) Código de Integridad. Retrieved from:  http:// ​ w ww.funcionpublica.gov.co/ ​ eva/​ codigointegridad/​index.html Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (1991) La Revolución Pacífica, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Bogotá: DNP. Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (1995) El Salto Social, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Bogotá: DNP. Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (1998) Cambio para Construir la Paz. Bases 1998–​2002, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Bogotá: DNP. Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (2002) Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2002–​2006. Hacia un Estado Comunitario. Bogotá: DNP. Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (2006) Estado Comunitario Desarrollo para Todos, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Bogotá: DNP. Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (2010) Prosperidad para Todos, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Bogotá: DNP. Colombia, Presidencia de la República and DNP (2014) Todos por un Nuevo País, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Bogotá. Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000) “Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-​making”. Governance: An International journal of Policy and Administration 13(1): 5–​23. Echebarr ía, K. (2006) “Caracter ización empír ica de las burocracias latinoamericanas:  configuraciones y roles en el proceso de elaboración de políticas públicas”. Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia, 34: 1–​11. Evans, M. and Davies, J. (1999) “Understanding policy transfer: a multilevel, multidisciplinary perspective”. Public Administration 77(2): 361–​85. Ferlie, E., Lynn, L. and Pollit, C. (eds.) (2005) The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Fleury, S. (1999) “Reforma del estado en América Latina. ¿Hacia dónde?”. Nueva Sociedad 160: 58–​80.

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Gaetani, F. (2000) “La intrigante reforma administrativa brasileña”. Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia 16: 1–​14. González, E. (2010) “Situación del régimen de carrera administrativa en Colombia”. Prolegómenos, XIII(25): 147–​63. Hood, C. (1991) “A public management for all seasons?”. Public Administration, 69: 3–​19. Isaza, C. (2014) “Disfuncionalidades del servicio civil en Colombia”. Reflexión Política 1632: 6–​19. Isaza, C., Herrera Kit, P., Lozano, J.C. and Balanzó, A. (2015) “Capacity:  a literature review and a research agenda”. SSRN Electronic Journal. Available from https://​doi.org/​10.2139/​ssrn.2824486 Lane, J. (2000) New Public Management. London: Routledge. Law 27 of 1992 (23 de diciembre), por la cual se desarrolla el artículo 125 de la Constitución Política, se expiden normas sobre administración de personal al servicio del Estado, se otorgan unas facultades y se dictan otras disposiciones. Law 87 of 1993 (29 de noviembre), por la cual se establecen normas para el ejercicio del control interno en las entidades y organismos del Estado y se dictan otras disposiciones. Law 344 of 1996 (27 de diciembre), por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a la racionalización del gasto público, se conceden unas facultades extraordinarias y se expiden otras disposiciones. Law 443 of 1998 (11 de junio), por la cual se expiden normas sobre carrera administrativa y se dictan otras disposiciones. Law 489 of 1998 (30 de diciembre), por la cual se dictan normas sobre la organización y funcionamiento de las entidades del orden nacional. Law 527 of 1999 (18 de agosto), por la cual se define y reglamenta el acceso y uso de los mensajes de datos, del comercio electrónico y de las firmas digitales, y se establecen las entidades de certificación y se dictan otras disposiciones. Law 790 of 2002 (27 de diciembre), por la cual se expiden disposiciones para adelantar el programa de renovación de la administración pública y se otorgan unas facultades extraordinarias al Presidente de la República. Law 872 of 2003 (30 de diciembre), por la cual se crea el sistema de gestión de la calidad en la Rama Ejecutiva del Poder Público y en otras entidades prestadoras de servicios. Law 909 of 2004 (23 de septiembre), por la cual se expiden normas que regulan el empleo público, la carrera administrativa, gerencia pública y se dictan otras disposiciones. Law 1341 of 2009 (27 de julio), por la cual se definen principios y conceptos sobre la sociedad de la información y la organización de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones  –​TIC–​, se crea la Agencia Nacional de Espectro y se dictan otras disposiciones. Lechner, N. (1992) “El debate sobre estado y mercado”. Nueva Sociedad 121: 1–​12.

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Leyva, S. (2018) Un Paso Adelante y Medio Atrás: El Cambio del Estado en Colombia desde la Perspectiva de la Administración Pública (1957–​2017), El Estado del Estado, Documento No. 2. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. McLaughlin, K., Osborne, S. and Ferlie, E. (eds.) (2002) New Public Management. Current Trends and Future Prospects. New York, NY: Routledge. Morgan, P. (2006) The Concept of Capacity: A Contribution to the Larger Report “Capacity, Change and Performance”. Maastricht: ECDPM. Nickson, A. (2002) “Transferencia de políticas y reforma en la gestión del sector público en América Latina: el caso del new public management”. Reforma y Democracia 24: 1–​15. O’Donnell, G., Cárdenas, M., Mann, M., Ziblatt, D., Oszlak, O., Geddes, B., Kent Weaver, K. and Rockman, B. (2015) Capacidades Estatales. Diez Textos Fundamentales. Buenos Aires: CAF/​Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina. Ormond, D. and Löffler, E. (1999) “Nueva gerencia pública: ¿qué tomar y qué dejar?”. Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia 13: 1–​20. Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1993) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York, NY: Plume. Osborne, S.P. (2010) The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance. New York, NY: Routledge. Oszlak, O. (1997) “Estado y sociedad:  ¿Nuevas reglas de juego?”. Reforma y Democracia 9: 1–​34. Oszlak, O. (1999) “De menor a mejor:  el desafío de la segunda reforma del estado”. Nueva Sociedad 160: 81–​100. Pollit, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2002) Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis (1st. edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramió, C. (2001) “El problema de la implantación de la nueva gestión pública en las administraciones públicas latinas: modelo de estado y cultura institucional”. Reforma y Democracia 21: 1–​24. Ramírez, A. (2004) El Proceso de Reforma del Estado y Modernización de la Gestión Pública en Chile. Madrid: MAP-​INAP. Ramírez, M. (2009) “Las reformas del Estado y la Administración Pública en América Latina y los intentos de aplicación del New Public Management”. Estudios Políticos 34: 115–​41. República de Colombia (1991) “Political Constitution of Colombia”. Available from www.registraduria.gov.co/​IMG/​pdf/​constitucio-​politica-​colombia-​1991.pdf Restrepo, M. (2011) “La administración pública en la Constitución de 1991:  sincretismo involuntario entre la burocracia, el gerencialismo y la gobernanza”. Estudios Socio-​Jurídicos 13(1): 365–​88. Robinson, J.A. (2015) From Old Public Administration to the New Public Service. Singapore: UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence. Available from www.undp.org/​content/​dam/​undp/​library/​capacity-​development/​English/​ Singapore%20Centre/​PS-​Reform_​Paper.pdf

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Roth, A. (2018) Políticas de Gestión Pública: Desarrollos Conceptuales y Traducción en Colombia. Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. Thwaites, M. and López, A. (2005) Entre Tecnócratas Globalizados y Políticos Clientelistas. Buenos Aires: Prometeo. Younes, D. (2004) Panorama de las Reformas del Estado y de la Administración Pública. Bogotá: Centro Editorial Universidad del Rosario.

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Part Two Policy analysis within national and subnational governments

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FOUR

Policy analysis inside central government in Colombia Luis Bernardo Mejía-​Guinand

Introduction Colombia is a unitary republic, decentralized, with autonomy of its territorial entities. The government is composed of three distinct branches –​executive, legislative and judicial –​whose powers and duties are vested by the Colombian Constitution. The President and Congress are elected in separate time frames, and for fixed terms, directly by the primary voters. The President is the main public policy agenda setter. He and his cabinet are responsible for defining both the government’s priorities as well as the necessary resources to target them, which are laid down through a policy-​making process (Mejía-​Guinand and Botero, 2018a). This is a procedure that mobilizes both the technocratic resources of the executive, and various political forces of the country. The procedure materializes in the approval of the PND, a technical document that transforms the policy promises made by the President when running for office, into concrete policy goals and investment objectives for his four-​year term in office. This framework has been consistent since the enactment of the 1991 Colombian Constitution. This chapter describes the policy-​making process of the Colombian central government. It aims to identify the role of policy analysis in all the stages of the policy cycle, namely planning, budgeting, execution, monitoring and evaluation. For each of these stages, the chapter presents the efforts of the government to develop comprehensive tools to produce useful information for policy decision making. These tools exist and are broadly used; however, the chapter also looks at the institutional restrictions, political factors or lack of incentives in the use of information that constrain the capacity of policy analysis by the central government. In addition to this introduction, the chapter is organized in the following way. The first section presents the key political actors that participate in Colombia’s central government public policy making process. The second section explains how policies are planned, prioritized, budgeted, implemented and evaluated in Colombia, and the third section introduces the political forces that shape the policy-​making process and how such actions affect the policy analysis. Last section concludes the chapter.

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Key political actors The executive branch of Colombia’s central government is made up of the President, ministries, administrative departments and smaller bodies attached to ministries and administrative departments. The other two branches of power, Congress and the courts, are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this volume. The President The Colombian President is both head of state and head of government. The President plays a predominant role in the formulation of public policy and in the definition of the legislative agenda required to implement it. This role is guaranteed by the Constitution in the form of both legislative and non-​ legislative powers that either facilitate or restrain the strategic options that Presidents have to unilaterally alter the status quo, block changes in the status quo proposed by other actors, and create coalitions inside Congress (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). Constitutional powers to legislate Constitutional powers related to legislation are those that enable the President to orient the work in Congress in accordance with the executive’s priorities and policy objectives. Colombian presidents have the following key attributes: legislative initiative, veto power, capacity to legislate by decree, agenda control and emergency powers (Duque Daza, 2014). The legislative initiative refers to the President’s right to start a bill’s transit through Congress. In fact, Colombian presidents are granted, by the Constitution, with the exclusive right to initiate legislation in specific public policy areas such as the annual budget. Veto power entails the presidential faculty to block bills approved by the legislature. This veto takes two forms: total veto and partial veto. Total veto occurs when presidents reject the complete Act approved by the Congress, while partial veto takes place when the executive rejects pieces of the approved legislation. To overcome a presidential veto, the Constitution establishes that an absolute majority of 50% plus one additional vote of members of Congress is required. The Colombian President under extraordinary circumstances and with the prior approval of Congress also has the authority to legislate by decree, through what is known as emergency decrees. In addition, by delegation of Congress, the President has the power to reform the structure of the public sector, only in the first six months of government. Finally, Colombian presidents have yet other two powers that expand their influence in the policy agenda setting. First, they have the option of requesting a fast track venue in a draft bill’s transit through Congress, and second, the possibility of calling Congress to extraordinary sessions to take place outside the congressional calendar.

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Non-​legislative  powers Colombian presidents also have non-​legislative powers granted by the Constitution that are an important tool to strengthen the effectiveness of the government’s policies and to obtain political support from various parties. One of the most important of such powers is the President’s’ authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members without the approval of Congress. Therefore, cabinet allocation becomes a tool for creating legislative and governmental coalitions. Presidents with minority representation dedicate efforts towards organizing solid legislative support, thus seeking to build party coalitions (Chasquetti, 2001; Lanzaro, 2001). Sectoral line ministries Ministries are responsible for the design and the implementation of sectoral policies, plans, programs and projects. They build the technical regulation for the policy area to which they belong. Ministers are constitutionally required to be the liaisons between the President and Congress. In this context, they prepare bills in their areas of policy expertise and submit those bills to Congress. They must also attend committee or floor hearings as requested by members of Congress. As of 2019, 18 ministries make up the cabinet: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Mines and Energy, Commerce and Industry, Education, Housing, Culture, Justice, Defense, Agriculture, Health, Labor, Environment, Transportation, Communications, Sports, and Sciences, Technology and Innovation. Cabinet members differ in their political power across governments and may or may not be empowered by the President to lead policy making in their respective sectors (Eslava and Meléndez, 2009). The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit usually has a pre-​eminent role vis-​à-​vis other ministries due to its part in the preparation and presentation to Congress of the government annual budget and the administration of the fiscal rules adopted by the country. Administrative departments According to Colombian legislation, the administrative departments are technical entities in charge of directing and coordinating a given service and providing the government with relevant information for its decision making (DNP, 2010). These bodies are part of central government and hold the same level of hierarchy as the ministries, but they do not carry out legislative action. They are responsible for directing, coordinating and implementing technical support required by other agencies of the executive. They also formulate policies, plans, programs and projects specific to their policy domain. As of 2019, there are five administrative departments: DNP, DAPRE, DANE, DAFP and the Administrative Department for Social Prosperity.

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In terms of policy analysis and formulation two departments stand out: DNP and DAPRE. These two departments are at the core of overseeing and coordinating the formulation and implementation of the President’s agenda. National Planning Department (DNP) The DNP is a technical advisory body to the President in all activities related to the formulation and evaluation of public policies. The main task of the DNP is to outline the formulation of a strategic vision for the country in the social, economic and environmental fields. By presidential delegation, the DNP must design the PND and coordinate with all line ministries the design of economic and social policies. Regarding the annual budget, the DNP directs the allocation of investment resources (capital expenditures) and monitors its execution and results (Nieto Parra et al, 2013). Administrative Department of the Presidency (DAPRE) DAPRE is the set of agencies and close collaborators that make up the President’s office. It supports the President with information and strategic guidelines for the decision-​making process and helps the President to manage the pressures coming from ministers, bureaucrats and legislators. These agencies are part of the executive but do not constitute part of the cabinet. DAPRE’s administrative support area is responsible for security and logistics of the President. In turn, the mission area consists of a set of specialized units and advisors responsible for assisting the President in the exercise of his constitutional executive and legal functions (Mejía-​Guinand et al, 2018). National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) CONPES is the highest national planning authority and serves as an advisory body to the President on all aspects of economic and social development. It is headed by the President and it includes both the full cabinet as well as the directors of the DNP, DAPRE and COLCIENCIAS. The primary function of CONPES is to analyze and approve economic and social policies, and to coordinate the policy implementation by the appropriate agencies (Nieto Parra et al, 2013). The DNP’s Deputy Director is the Technical Secretary of CONPES, also responsible for preparing and presenting to CONPES all drafts of economic and social policy documents for discussion and approval. These documents contain the diagnosis of public problems that require government intervention as well as a set of proposed policies and concrete course of action to address such problems (Eslava and Meléndez, 2010). The policy discussion inside CONPES rests on the premise that competition of ideas and viewpoints is a good method of developing policy. It accepts the fact that among ministries there may be conflicts and rival perspectives over policies. Consequently, CONPES is structured to ensure that the 68

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President receives adequate information and different perspectives on any given policy issue. Once the recommendations of CONPES have been heard and the final actions approved by the President, an official policy document is produced.

The policy-​making process and the role of policy analysis This section describes the stages that take place during the policy-​making process of Colombia’s central government and the role of policy analysis. The process begins with the formulation of the PND and the subsequent construction of the annual public investment budget. It then entails the execution of public policy and it ends with the monitoring and evaluation stages. Planning and prioritizing The formulation of the PND begins when the elected President takes office on 7 August every four years. According to Law 152 of 1994,1 the President has six months after taking office, to present a development plan that outlines the strategic guidelines for the country’s public policies. In this regard, the PND is the navigation map that frames and orients public expenditure of each government while it is in office. The DNP, in accordance to the guidelines provided by the President, is the organization responsible for coordinating the necessary tasks for the formulation of PND. The DNP coordinates the input from sectoral ministries, administrative departments and territorial entities to build a diagnosis of the state of affairs in the political, economic, environmental, social, technological and cultural realms surrounding the functioning of the state. The population projections and sociodemographic statistics required for this process are provided by DANE. The public domain problems prioritized through this exercise become central in narrowing down government actions. Based on the resulting diagnosis, the DNP undertakes a technical exercise, together with the sectoral ministries, to define the specific programs and policies to be executed throughout the four-​year presidential term. For this purpose, the DNP uses quantitative analysis, linear programming, qualitative data and decision-​ tree methods. Likewise, the DNP estimates the financial resources needed to attain the public program goals. A strategic section and an investment plan form the basis of the PND. The strategic section outlines the general principles for sectoral policies as well as for the economic, environmental, technological and social domains, and establishes the national goals. The general guidelines and goals are then translated into programs, subprograms and projects ordered through an aggregation-​level method. At the higher level the objectives of the PND are defined; these in turn are accomplished through the strategic sectoral objectives of the ministries; subsequently unfolding into the objectives for public entities; and finally narrowing down to the investment projects2 to be executed. The second part 69

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of the document, the investment section, comprises the multi-​year budgets for the programs and public policies proposed in the PND, entailing both the costs projections and the financial sources required. To guarantee the financial viability and fiscal coherence of the PND, the DNP liaises with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit to match the plan to the Medium-​Term Fiscal Framework. This is an instrument that estimates, for a ten-​year period, the financial resources available to the government. It allows the central government administration to plan out national debt payments, investments and functioning expenses in agreement with income projections and macroeconomic stability modelled by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. Similarly, the DNP uses another tool known as Medium-​Term Expenses Framework,3 which breaks down the maximum value of expenses per sector (defense, infrastructure, social investment and so on) for the forthcoming four-​ year period (Cárdenas et al, 2010). Once the draft project of the PND is completed, the Director of the DNP presents the document to CONPES for its review. CONPES assesses the public policy proposals included in the project as well as the fiscal implications of the proposed PND. If CONPES approves the document, the consolidated project is presented by the President to the National Planning Council (Consejo Nacional de Planeación –​CNP) for analysis and discussion. CNP represents different segments of Colombian society, such as indigenous communities, Afro-​descendents, women, private sector representatives and so on, and aims to provide citizen participation input to the planning process. CNP reviews the project and submits its recommendations to the DNP. At this stage, the final technical and budgetary adjustments to the PND are made. Once this process is completed, the government, acting through the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, submits the PND to Congress for its consideration. This must occur before 7 February, which marks the six-​month deadline following the President’s inauguration. Congress has three months to discuss and approve the project as a law. As enshrined in Colombia’s Constitution, the law for the PND is an organic law, giving it superior status over other laws. Budgeting Given that resources to meet the goals established by the PND are limited, the DNP must prioritize the annual investment expenses. This process begins with the formulation by the central government offices and entities, with the guidance of the sectoral ministries, of the specific projects to be considered for public financing. According to Resolution 1450 (DNP, 2013), potential projects must be designed following specific methodologies required by the DNP. In general terms, these methodologies request that the entities analyze the relevance, efficiency, efficacy and possible impacts of the projects. The formulation of investment projects requires identifying the public issue that needs to be addressed; detecting alternative ways to respond to the problem; categorizing 70

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and measuring the beneficiary population; establishing the objectives, strategies, activities and outputs that support the project; and outlining the timeframe for the project (Dirección de Inversiones y Finanzas Públicas, 2011). As specified by the DNP’s Public Investment and Finance Direction (Dirección de Inversiones y Finanzas Públicas, 2006, 2017), this type of project assessment process requires entities to undertake problem-​tree and cost-​benefit analysis methods to determine whether the proposed project has the potential to truly address the underlying problem, balancing out the various costs and effects. Once an entity formulates a project following the DNP criteria, the project must be uploaded to the project website known as Adjusted General Methodology (Metodología General Ajustada). This is an information technology tool administered by the DNP, specifically created for the registration and management of investment projects. All projects and information annexes registered on this website are then migrated to the Programs and Projects Bank (Banco de Programas y Proyectos de Inversión Nacional –​BPIN) of the DNP where each project is allocated a unique identification code and accompanied by a project fact sheet (ficha de estadísticas básicas de inversión) that summarizes the central characteristics of the investment project (Dirección de Inversiones y Finanzas Públicas, 2017). The BPIN is therefore an information systems tool that brings together all investment projects eligible for public financing from the general national budget. Generally speaking, projects that are not included in the BPIN database and have not received viability pre-​approval from the DNP will not be implemented. There are four aspects to project viability, as follows. 1. Political viability. This focuses on assessing the strategic coherence of the project. Basically, this means that the investment project is adequately aligned with the objectives of the entity proposing the project, with the objectives of the sector it belongs to, and with one plan or program defined by the PND. 2. Methodological viability. This considers whether the project follows the methodological guidelines provided by the DNP. 3. Technical viability. This determines whether the project’s structuring is adequate. 4. Financial and economic viability. This analyses whether the project adequately considers the underlying benefits and costs related to the implementation of the project. The input of the BPIN at this stage is to match up the investment projects with the public policies agreed in the PND. For this purpose, the DNP uses an instrument for budget programming known as the Annual Investments Operational Plan (Programa Operativo Anual de Inversiones  –​POAI). According to Decree 111 of 1996 (Presidencia de la República, 1996), the objective of the POAI is to prioritize by sector the projects registered in the BPIN. Such prioritization is developed based on macroeconomic assumptions, fiscal projections and the expenses restrictions outlined in both the Medium-​Term Fiscal Framework and 71

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the Medium-​Term Expenses Framework. The resources budgeted each year in the POAI also need to consider existing inflexibilities in the national budget (for example, earmarked expenses and future appropriations). The POAI is presented to CONPES for approval. Once CONPES approves the POAI, the document is submitted by the DNP to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit incorporates the POAI, as the investment budget component of the General National Budget Law proposal, with two other components: the operational budget and the nation’s debt service provisions. The General National Budget Bill is presented by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit every year to Congress. The execution stage The policy execution stage is the process through which the objectives and goals defined in the PND are implemented through the actual delivery of goods and services to the citizenry. Decrees 019 of 2012 and 2482 of 2012 require all ministries and public entities to formulate action plans, indicative plans and strategic plans with the purpose of orienting their work and efforts towards accomplishing the sectoral objectives, collecting measurements and data for decision making, and assigning the budget to the entity’s priorities. These action plans help ministries and entities to visualize their commitments with the PND, establish measurable targets matched with their respective resources, and facilitate later evaluation of the sectoral policies. To undertake this type of strategic planning, ministries and public entities use various tools such as the Balanced Scorecard. This management instrument helps translate the organization’s strategy into a set of measurable and coherent indicators, allowing for a systematic monitoring of the progress made towards accomplishing the goals defined in the entity’s action plan. Strategic planning can also be undertaken using other methodologies such as the Program’s Logic Framework. The purpose of this tool is to outline the value chain of a given program or public policy. It sets up the sequential and logic process that joins the inputs, activities, products and results inherent in the transformation process. As part of central government’s effort to build institutional capacities to improve the execution of public policy, a new unit called the Delivery Unit was established in 2014. According to González and Acosta (2018), this unit was conceived as a team of people responsible for guaranteeing that government’s priorities translate into effective results. This unit was placed inside DAPRE with the following main objectives: constructing prioritization methodologies to allow government to focus its attention on the most pressing issues; setting up work plans for a more agile implementation; and bringing together the various entities responsible for delivering the goods and services in order to better harmonize government’s actions (González and Acosta, 2018). 72

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One of the key management instruments developed by the Delivery Unit is a control board for the President’s use. This board gives the user a quick overview, in a standardized and orderly fashion, of the priorities and goals established by the PND, together with early alert indicators on any shortfalls in their accomplishment (Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Públicas, 2017). The board uses a three-​color code system:  green for when 100% of the goal has been met; yellow for results in progress; and red for the failure to accomplish a goal (González and Acosta, 2018). This methodology has generated incentives to improve information flow and to reduce information asymmetries among various ministries and public entities and the President. Monitoring and evaluation of public policy Since the mid-​1990s, responding to a mandate in the 1991 Constitution,4 the national government has made efforts to create, standardize and strengthen a system to keep track of how goals are being accomplished (Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Pública, 2014). Within that context, the DNP created the SINERGIA system, which aims to improve the effectiveness of the formulation and execution of policies embedded in the PND, generate the necessary information for budget allocation, and strengthen social control by improving accountability towards citizens. SINERGIA structures its intervention in two main ways: by monitoring the results of the PND and conducting program and impact evaluations. Monitoring is a continual and systematic process of collecting, processing and analyzing information in order to assess the progress of public policy implementation. Through monitoring, SINERGIA validates the accomplishment of the objectives and goals outlined in the PND. This process is helpful for generating early alerts when facing shortcomings that may prevent accomplishing the ultimate goal; gathering information for timely decision making; increasing transparency and citizen accountability; and evaluating the performance of ministries and government agencies (SINERGIA, 2012). This monitoring process is based on the creation and use of indicators for quantifying information on public policies. These indicators measure the extent of progress in accomplishing the pre-​established goals of the PND. SINERGIA utilizes the process, output and results indicators included in the strategic and action plans developed by the ministries and public agencies. In this regard, the process of generating information for policy monitoring is linked to the program’s logic framework (value chain) described earlier. The information generated through the continual monitoring of the PND allows the DNP to assess results and make accountability progress reports for the President to present to Congress. This information is also an input for control boards and other management tools with which the President and/​or the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit make informed decisions for budget allocation and/​ or reprioritization of public expenses as needed. 73

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In turn, policy evaluations use empirical evidence to analyze, measure and value the performance of any given public policy (Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Pública, 2014). Evaluations use solid methodological techniques, both quantitative and qualitative, usually bringing together multidisciplinary perspectives into the analysis. The DNP has a set of four types of evaluation, as follows. 1. Operations evaluation. This analyzes the way in which a public intervention and its underlying processes are conducted to adequately deliver the intended outcomes. 2. Institutional evaluation. This studies a program or public policy, taking as its reference the specific institutional arrangement under which the program operates. 3. Results evaluation. This assesses the intentional and unintentional effects of a public intervention after the outputs have been delivered. 4. Impact evaluation. This helps identify the effects exclusively attributable to a specific public intervention. Through an impact evaluation, the causal relationship between the public intervention and the results is tested and quantified.

The political economy of the policy-​making process The main objective of policy analysis is to produce useful information for policy decision making (Guess and Farnham, 2000). In the case of Colombia, policies are analyzed, monitored and evaluated in regular cycles, as described in the preceding sections. However, this analytical process is not always put into practice; it may only be partially followed or occasionally altogether ignored when government decisions are taken. This departure from the process that uses policy analysis tools occurs as a result of institutional restrictions, political factors or lack of incentives in the use of information. As described previously, in Colombia the planning stage begins for each new administration with the construction of the PND and continues with the prioritization in the annual national budget. Given the hierarchical primacy that the Constitution grants to the PND law, in practice this provides the opportunity for politicians in the legislative and in the executive to try to include as many as possible reform proposals in the interest of various stakeholders, without having to pass through the regular transit of a bill proposal. For example, in President Santos’ first term (2010–​14), an article to reform the procedures for granting environmental licenses was introduced into the project bill of the PND. According to La Silla Vacía (2011), this article proposed that in cases where the environmental authority exceeded 90 days to grant or decline an environmental license, the decision process would automatically shift to an internal department of the Ministry of Environment. The article therefore transferred the decision-​ making power away from the highest environmental authority to an agency 74

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inside the Ministry of Environment, prone to regulatory capture by interest groups. Similarly, President’s Duque (2018–​22) PND project, named Pacto por Colombia, Pacto por la Equidad, included several articles that on their own would have required formal discussion and approval by Congress as separate bills. For example, article 148 planned to modify the alcohol tax structure despite this income belonging, by constitutional mandate, to local governments, whereas ordinarily any attempt at reform would be done through a separate bill proposal in Congress (Razón Pública, 2019). Politicians’ attempts to bypass the formal bill transit process in Congress have resulted in an increase in the number of such articles introduced over the past 24 years. The first PND, approved after the enactment of the 1991 Constitution and submitted by President Samper (1994–​98), contained 47 articles. This contrasts with the PND from the second term of President Santos (2014–​18), which included a total of 206 articles, and the current PND of President Duque (2018–​22), which has 336 articles. As discussed previously, the DNP in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, seeks to guarantee the financial viability and fiscal coherence of the PND, aligning it with the Medium-​Term Fiscal Framework, an instrument that estimates, for a period of ten years, the financial resources available to the government. In fact, the fiscal rules have become one of the distinguishing aspects of the Colombian economy, because they set spending restrictions on the executive. On occasions, however, governments confront unexpected situations that require an increase in public spending, thus departing from the fiscal rules. For example, the rising number of migrants entering Colombia from Venezuela since 2015 has created increasing demands on public spending in order to provide this population with basic education and healthcare. Other common circumstances that exert pressure on public spending, resulting in a departure from the fiscal rules, include requests from local government politicians for higher public spending in their regions (to which the President has a political commitment) and lobbying by powerful economic groups for tax exemptions or subsidies. During the budgeting and execution phases of public policy, other situations may arise that interfere with the role of policy analysis. Several of the inflexible items in the national budget that affect both current and future periods are the result of prior political negotiations in Congress (Echeverry et al, 2004). For example, Law 643 (2001) dictates that 7% of the revenues from the gambling monopoly business must go to research and development in health. Other revenue earmarking, and mandatory expenditure requirements such as intergovernmental transfers, affect a significant share of government’s budget and therefore its ability to prioritize spending through policy analysis. Strategic planning and the analysis of public policies can also become distorted as a result of the negotiation process between the executive and the legislative. As the literature acknowledges, presidents use targeted beneficial spending programs, known as “pork”, to overcome ideological or political resistance and build coalitions (Pereira and Rennó 2003; Pereira and Mueller 2004; Alston 75

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and Mueller 2006). According to Cardenas and colleagues (2010), many of the projects endorsed by legislators are not included in the BPIN before the budget appropriation process takes place in Congress. This basically means that these projects do not go through a cost-​benefit analysis before being introduced in the national government budget. For instance, Nieto Parra and colleagues (2013) show that during President Uribe’s first period of government (2002–​06), the strategic prioritization for roads infrastructure, included in the PND project, changed throughout the project’s discussion and approval phases in Congress. Congress included in the PND roads that were not originally considered in the proposal, and that varied by more than 20% the initial regional distribution of the roads’ budget allocation. The decision to include this investment in roads was taken without any policy analysis. The use of policy analysis by central government may also be affected by the personal leadership style of each President. For example, during both of his terms (2002–​06 and 2006–​10), President Uribe made use of a government management tool known as community councils. Each Saturday, he held a community meeting in one of Colombia’s municipalities to conduct an open dialogue with citizens in order to develop solutions to public issues. In these meetings, citizens had the opportunity to make their demands for public policies directly to the President (Mejía-​Guinand and Botero, 2018a), while he answered questions, made policy decisions, and even assessed the performance of his ministers, institution directors and closest collaborators. As such, the President assumed a leading role, giving the councils the impression that he was responsible for all policy decisions. Moreover, during these meetings, the President would commit to executing public policies and allocating expenses that had not been contemplated either in the PND or in the budget prioritization process, and had not undergone a social profitability or cost-​benefit analysis. Unlike his predecessor, President Santos (2010–​14 and 2014–​18) was more business-​like in his leadership, favoring existing institutional structures, delegation processes and teamwork. His tendency was to delegate all crucial topics to his ministers who were a mixture of technocrats and politicians. In this context, as described earlier, President Santos government established the Delivery Unit as a management instrument to hold ministers accountable for the execution of public policy and prioritization of the most pressing demands. Nevertheless, according to La Silla Vacía (2014), while the information provided by the Delivery Unit was useful for enabling the President to quickly visualize the budget execution outcomes (progress, delays or timely execution), it fell short in showing the impact of public spending. President Duque (2018–​22) adopts aspects of both the Uribe and Santos Presidencies. Like President Uribe, he attends community councils (now known as talleres construyendo país) to gather information for policy decisions, but he also respects the technical capacities of his cabinet and uses management tools, like President Santos. He strengthened the Delivery Unit with recommendations from the Inter-​American Development Bank, where he worked for over 12 years, and 76

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created an office inside the Presidency (Consejería Presidencial para Gestión y Cumplimiento) to assess the accomplishment of government policies (La Silla Vacía, 2019). Lastly, even though Colombia has made progress in the design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation systems such as SINERGIA, it is far from true that all budgetary and public policy decisions are taken based on the information provided by the system. Political economy restrictions persist, conflicting with the rational use of information for decision making. According to the OECD (2013), despite the performance indicators embedded in the PND’s four-​year strategic program, Colombian central government does not appear to use long-​term foresight as a matter of course. In other words, public officials operate in conditions of bounded rationality where information, time and resources are constrained. Immediate decisions are required, and these are made with little observance of the technical instruments for policy analysis.

Conclusion Policy analysis is a key tool by which the government gains strategic insight through examining and measuring the benefits, costs and effects of its decisions. After undertaking research and ensuring that all feasible scenarios have been taken into consideration, central government uses this information to increase the reliability of its decision-​making process. Colombia’s central government has established frameworks such as the National Planning Department and the fiscal rules to contribute to an evidence-​based decision-​making culture. However, the existence of these structures and institutions do not necessarily translate into informed decision making by the government, as there are political economy forces acting in parallel that help shape the public policy process. Notes 1 2

3

4

This law establishes and regulates the procedures and mechanisms for the formulation, approval, execution, monitoring and evaluation of the PND. Based on Decree 2844 of 2010, a public investment project monitors the development of activities in each period of time, financed completely or partially with public resources, with the aim of creating, increasing or improving the provision of goods and services by the state. According to CONPES Document 3837 of 2015, the Medium-​Term Expenses Framework is a public instrument of financial programming that permits linking public policies with medium-​ term macroeconomic and fiscal planning and with the annual budget programming. In general terms, the Medium-​Term Expenses Framework identifies the caps for the functioning and investment expenses for each of the sectors that make part of the general national budget. Article 343 of the 1991 Constitution establishes that the national planning entity is responsible for the design and coordination of management and evaluation systems for public administration.

References Alston, L. and Mueller, B. (2006) “Pork for policy:  executive and legislative exchange in Brazil”. Journal of Law Economics and Organization 22(1): 87–​114. 77

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Cárdenas, M., Mejía, C. and Olivera, M. (2010) “Como las instituciones políticas influyen en el proceso presupuestal”. In Eduardo Lora and Carlos Scartascini (eds) Consecuencias Imprevistas de la Constitución de 1991. Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO/​ Alfaomega, pp. 59–​78. Chasquetti, D. (2001) “Democracia, multipartidismo y coaliciones en América Latina:  evaluando la difícil combinación”. In J.  Lanzaro (ed.) Tipos de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, pp. 319–​59. Dirección de Inversiones y Finanzas Públicas (2006) Manual de Valoración y Cuantificación de Beneficios. Bogotá: DNP. Dirección de Inversiones y Finanzas Públicas (2011) Manual de Procedimientos del Banco Nacional de Programas y Proyectos, BPIN. Bogotá: DNP. Dirección de Inversiones y Finanzas Públicas (2017) Guía para la Construcción y Estandarización de la Cadena de Valor. Bogotá: DNP. Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Públicas (2014) Guía Metodológica para el Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas. Bogotá: DNP. Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Públicas (2017) Guía para el Seguimiento de Políticas Públicas. Bogotá: DNP. DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) (2010) Elementos Básicos sobre el Estado Colombiano. Bogotá: DNP/​Imprenta Nacional de Colombia. DNP (2013) Resolución número 1450. Bogotá: DNP. Duque Daza, J. (2014) “¿Presidentes legislando?: las facultades legislativas en el presidencialismo colombiano 1991–​2014”. Estudios Socio-J​ urídicos 17(1): 77–1​ 23. Echeverry, J.C., Fergusson, L. and Querubín, P. (2004) La Batalla Política por el Presupuesto de la Nación: Inflexibilidades o Supervivencia Fiscal, Documento CEDE No. 002943. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes. Eslava, M. Meléndez, M. (2009) Politics, Policies and the Dynamics of Aggregate Productivity in Colombia, Working Paper Series No. IDB-​WP-​101. Washington, DC: Inter-​American Development Bank. Eslava, M. and Meléndez, M. (2010) “Como los grupos de interés influyen sobre las políticas de productividad”. In Eduardo Lora and Carlos Scartascini (eds) Consecuencias Imprevistas de la Constitución de 1991. Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO/​ Alfaomega, pp. 115–​44. González, S. and Acosta, P. (2018) Coordinar para Ejecutar. Lecciones Aprendidas de la Unidad de Ejecución del Gobierno de Colombia, Technical Note No. IDB-​TN-​ 1472. Washington, DC: Inter-​American Development Bank. Guess, G. and Farnham, P. (2000) Cases in Public Policy Analysis. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. La Silla Vacía (2011) “Mico I del Plan de Desarrollo”. Available from https://​ lasillavacia.com/​queridodiario/​21558/​mico-​i-​del-​plan-​de-​desarrollo La Silla Vacía (2014) “El Consejo de Ministros de Santos, muy tieso y muy majo”. Available from https://​ l asillavacia.com/​ h istor ia/​ el-​consejo-​de-​ministros-​de-​santos-​muy-​tieso-​y-​muy-​majo-​49100

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La Silla Vacía (2019) “El sello BID del gobierno Duque”. Available from https://​ lasillavacia.com/​el-​sello-​bid-​del-​gobierno-​duque-​70025 Lanzaro, J. (2001) Tipos de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. Mainwaring, S. and Shugart, M.S. (eds.) (1997) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Mejía Guinand, L.B. and Botero, F. (2018a) “Del escribiente al super ministro: la evolución de la Casa de Nariño como organización”. In J. Lanzaro (ed.) Centro Presidencial: Presidencias y Centros de Gobierno en América Latina, Estados Unidos y España. Madrid: Tecnos, pp. 195–​236. Mejía-​Guinand, L.B., Botero, F. and Solano, A. (2018) “Agency loss and the strategic redesign of the presidential office in Colombia”. Latin American Politics and Society 60(3): 96–​118. Nieto Parra, S., Olivera, M. and Tibocha, A. (2013) The Politics of Infrastructure Transport Policies in Colombia, Working Paper No. 316. Paris:  OECD Development Centre. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) (2013) Colombia: Implementing Good Governance, OECD Public Governance Reviews. Paris: OECD. Pereira, C. and Mueller, B. (2004) “The cost of governing: strategic behavior of the President and legislators in Brazil’s budgetary process”. Comparative Political Studies 20(1): 1–​32. Pereira, C. and Rennó, L. (2003) “Successful re-​election strategies in Brazil: the electoral impact of distinct institutional incentives”. Electoral Studies 22(3): 425–​48. Presidencia de la República (1996) Decree 111 of 1996 (18 de enero) Por el cual se compilan la Ley 38 de 1989, la Ley 179 de 1994 y la Ley 225 de 1995 que conforman el Estatuto Orgánico del Presupuesto. Diario Oficial 42.692. Razón Pública (2019) “Grandes micos y algunos aciertos en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo”. Available from https:// ​ r azonpublica.com/​ micos-​y-​algunos-​aciertos-​en-​el-​plan-​nacional-​de-​desarrollo SINERGIA (2012) Guía Metodológica para el Seguimiento al Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y la Evaluación de Políticas Estratégicas. Bogotá: DNP.

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FIVE

Policy analysis and the legislature in Colombia Mónica Pachón and Manuela Muñoz

Introduction Despite the existence of formal working majorities in the legislature, Colombian presidents have struggled to fulfill their promises, as Congress waters down reforms, making it the job of the executive to constantly negotiate and find a middle ground between national and local constituency representation. This has been a constant during most of our republican history, characterized by a non-​stop electoral cycle (Posada-​Carbó, 2000), a highly fragmented and regionalized party system (González, 2014), and a highly centralized executive holding the agenda power. This chapter summarizes some of the previous findings of the research conducted on the role of Congress in the contemporary policy-​making process. With data for more than five presidential periods, we show that Congress has played an important part in reacting to executive bills, protecting constituency interests, leading public debates, and occasionally affecting the agenda impeding governmental action. The main insights of the chapter will cover the period after the 1991 Constitution, analyzing mostly the legislative output of Congress. Following the basic framework of Haggard and McCubbins (2001), the chapter is divided into five sections. First, we describe the rules establishing the “separation of powers”. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of the party system determining the “separation of purpose” among the branches and the legislative output. Thus, the first section describes the most significant institutions constraining the formal agenda-​setting powers in the legislature. We put particular emphasis on the committee system for its veto power. The second section reviews the recent changes of the electoral reforms on the party system, which leads us into the third section analyzing the patterns of legislative activity (coalition parties’ ability to control the legislative agenda) and the scope of the bills based on the incentives of legislators and the executive. Because we know that not all bills are equal, the fourth section discusses what happens when any of the actors tries to avoid the legislature. First, we discuss the role the legislature played in the bills introduced by the government after the failure to pass via plebiscite the historic peace agreement with the FARC-​EP, after 50 years of intense civil conflict. Then, we discuss the fate of the anti-​corruption agreement (a group of bills) after the “consulta anticorrupción” failed to be approved by 1% of the vote. The last section presents some closing remarks. 81

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The 1991 Constitution and its impact on the political regime After many failed attempts to change the 1886 Constitution and in the midst of a very complicated crisis, the 1991 Constitution became the response of the political elite to readjust the system and increase the regime of checks and balances and the presence of the state across the territory. In addition, administrative and political decentralization was consolidated with significant short-​term consequences for the nature of the executive and the legislative representation. The 1991 Constitution made a number of important changes to the political regime. To constrain presidential power, its decree power was severely limited. In the past, the 1886 Constitution allowed the President to issue decrees with no further requirement than the formal declaration of a state of emergency approved by all the cabinet members. Decrees could enact a new status quo, suspending current norms for as long as the state of emergency was in force. As Bermúdez and Taborda (2009) clearly show, before 1991, the average number of days for any of the constitutionally established state of emergencies was 276 out of 365 (75%). To break away from this tradition, the Constituent Assembly created an ex-​ante veto within the newly created CCC. From 1991 onwards, the average number of days went down to 55 (15%), making an important difference in the President’s capacity to circumvent Congress. Using Cox’s analogy (1997) when referring to parliamentary regimes in which agenda delegation to the prime minister was key for the system to work efficiently, Archer and Shugart (1997) called the previous arrangement the “inefficient secret”. In this setting, Congress delegated to the executive the national agenda and specialized in local politics, only to reclaim its power when reforms meant significant departures from the status quo (that is, constitutional reforms). Thus, with all limitations imposed on the unilateral power of the executive, the 1991 Constitution devolved national policy debate to the legislature as the only way to enact policy. Analyzing the composition of the plenary agenda from 1979 to 1998, Pachón (2008) shows that the limitation of decree power had an initial effect on the way the boards constructed the plenary agendas, changing the proportion of agenda items dedicated to national policy from an average of 57% of nationally oriented bills to 73% in the post-​reform period. To address the parochialism and clientelist practices of the political elite –​and following the successful experience of the Constituent Assembly election –​the Senate was transformed into a national constituency to further increase legislators’ incentives to go “national”, and promote the interests of larger and less geographically constrained constituencies. This, of course, increased political competition, but further fragmented the political game (Botero, 1998; Rodríguez-​Raga,  1998). Other reforms, while not as directly related to the law making process, had a significant impact on the power of the President to build working coalitions. Following Archer and Shugart (1997), besides losing its proactive powers, the executive also lost most of its partisan powers, making it difficult to generate the incentives to control co-​partisan political careers. Among the changes were 82

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the consolidation of political and administrative decentralization, the limitation of nominating legislators as part of the executive branch, and the elimination of thresholds for sign in candidates/​independents, making it difficult for partisan leaders to reward party loyalists. Equally, as the Constitution became longer, including policy areas that initially belonged to statutory politics, reform became even more difficult due to the struggle of passing through both the legislature and judicial review. Even though the Constitution established the lowest super-​majority in the region to approve a constitutional amendment, most policies became “constitutionalized”. This meant that the President needed to go through the constitutional reform process for his most important policy campaigns, losing his veto power along the way. Pachón (2008) shows, analyzing the pattern of constitutional amendment introduction in Congress, that when presidents opened up the “constitutional window” introducing reforms, legislators jumped right in, piggybacking on executive proposals. The combination of these changes of rules with the party system fragmentation brought about a new status quo in which the executive had a hard time getting proposals through Congress (Cárdenas and Pachón, 2010). Even if the process was meant to be inefficient, ad hoc negotiations as the default strategy to pass legislation resulted in high levels of clientelism and illegitimacy, which generated a lot of pressure for reform (Pizarro, 2002).

Dealing with a fragmented political party system In addition to the institutional vetoes, presidents needed to deal with the party system. As González (2014) has described in most of his work, the traditional political parties were born highly factionalized, with each of them having a very distinctive regional character. The depolarization of political parties resulting from the National Front,1 the significant personalization of politics and the use of clientelism became salient issues considered to be among the causes of the political crisis and violence of the 1980s. As a result, the post-​1991 era increased all incentives for politicians to run as independents, lowering all thresholds of political participation for new movements and parties. As mentioned in Chapter 15, the number of political parties participating in elections dramatically increased at the local and national levels after 1991. In the legislature, traditional political parties became the host of personalistic post-​ electoral coalitions that maneuvered their capacity to negotiate with the executive as they were able to control part of the legislative process (Pachón, 2003). As the country fell into a deep crisis, the war against drugs and criminal organizations threatened the state and the citizenry. Increasingly, frustrated with the state of affairs, voters replaced traditional parties with new ones –​forged by professional politicians whose progressive ambition was to control the presidency. In 2002, there were more than 72 parties competing for seats in the Senate, of which 45 obtained representation. 83

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The election of Alvaro Uribe Vélez  –​a former liberal with extraordinary popularity who ran an anti-​establishment campaign –​established a new cleavage in the Colombian political party system. In 2003, after many failed attempts of electoral reform and the threat of the President’s referendum proposal (Pachón, 2010), Congress approved a significant electoral system change that established a higher threshold of participation and the restriction of one list per party, open or closed. While personalized politics is and –​was –​still the norm, the creation of pre-​electoral coalitions reorganized the system and nationalized the most significant parties, increasing the potential for electoral accountability, as well as a more policy-​based negotiation (Pachón and Shugart, 2010). Other reforms followed, attempting to increase the role of parties, but their effect was rather limited (Ungar et al, 2008). Nevertheless, we can observe an incremental change in the negotiation to form majorities and a more stable coalition. Carroll and Pachón (2016) show, for example, using political elite surveys, that reforms have generated subtle ideological differences across parties at the national level (there still wide variation across party affiliates), even though these are not reflected in their nominal voting patterns. When observing roll-​call voting patterns, the evidence reflects the cleavage between the governing coalition and opposition/​independence of it. The next section explains in detail how the institutional setting interacts with the political actors involved in the policy-​making process in Colombia within Congress.

The key actors in the law-​making process As in other presidential systems in the region, the executive is the main agenda setter. The President has exclusive introductory powers, including the power to resume the legislative process by calling joint committee debates, use an urgency petition to freeze the floor agenda and call for extraordinary sessions to discuss specific bills (Carroll and Pachón, 2016). Consequently, despite significant fragmentation, the Colombian President acts as the head of the governing coalition, which oversees bills through the legislative process. As in all systems of separation of powers, bills are required to go through the legislature to be later approved by the President and become law. Within each chamber, the actors that play the most important role in the law-​making process are the Board of Directors and committees. Political party leaders need to control both so they can push through or stop proposals. Directing boards of the plenaries and committees are elected for one-​year periods, with no possibilities of re-​election. Regarding the law-​making process, they oversee the agenda and are responsible for choosing each bill’s rapporteur. Equally, the President of the Plenary chooses members of the conference committees that resolve differences between Senate and House versions of bills. Committees also play a very important role in the law-​making process.2 There are seven constitutional committees within each House. After a bill has been 84

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introduced, the Board of Directors of each House establishes the committee in which the bill will have its first debate. If approved, the bill goes to the floor. Studying the role of committees in Colombia, Pachón and Johnson (2016) find that bill characteristics and type of committee play a key role in determining when parties and coalitions work to set the agenda, as the traditional literature on legislatures posits. Specifically, the authors find that between 2006 and 2014, committee chairs assigned friendly legislation to co-​partisan or coalition partner ponentes (rapporteurs), and these ponentes wrote positive reports for their friends’ bills. Also, chairs used these same tools to block opposition legislation. After the Senate and the House approve a bill, conference committees become the last step in the law-​making process if the versions of both houses diverge. The use of conference committees is rather frequent, with more than 60% of bills ending with this procedure (Alemán and Pachón, 2008). This way, boards can “control” members of the coalition using their discretionary power to prioritize certain hearings, bills, and members to become key players in their relationship with the executive. If the bill is approved by the floor of both chambers, it is sent to the President. The President can enact the bill or veto it on grounds of inconvenience or unconstitutionality. Statutory bills require four debates for approval. Constitutional amendments differ in that they need eight debates for approval, in two separate legislative years, and the President cannot veto. The review of the CCC is a very significant step in the policy-​making process. Various studies have shown how active and frequent review affects the way in which the legislature reacts to the President, and how the strategic use of constitutional review counteracts the majoritarian consensus (Cepeda-​Espinosa, 2004, 2005). Consequently, if the President wants to push its agenda through Congress, it becomes a time-​consuming process, as there are several steps that need to be followed. Even if presidents can call for joint committees (House and Senate), or declare a bill an urgent matter, the legislature is autonomous and can take its time deciding on a particular matter. The process becomes even more cumbersome as legislators can propose amendments in any step of the process, making it difficult for the majority coalition to control the outcome and variations of the text.3 Due to gridlock and difficulties in getting bills enacted, several countries in the Andean region in recent decades have changed their bicameral legislature to unicameral (Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador), diminishing the power of legislative checks in the system. Following that trend, in the referendum of 2003, Alvaro Uribe also proposed the change to a unicameral legislature, arguing precisely against the usefulness of the process of getting things done. The referendum did not achieve the approval threshold, and the question of unicameralism was short of 2.15% of the votes to get through, with 93% of the votes in favor of the change. President Uribe had no choice but to accept the defeat and go back to Congress. Congress had no choice but to reform itself and organize around the presidential agenda. 85

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Overall, we show that for a bill to pass, the executive needs to align several institutional vetoes and deal with a highly fragmented political system. When compared to other presidential systems, and to itself from a historical perspective, the “potential dominance” of Colombian presidents is lower than might be expected given the extent of their constitutional powers (Saiegh, 2011).

The law-making process: an aggregate overview As illustrated in the previous sections, the Colombian policy-​making process involving the legislature is full of institutional and partisan veto points. Following closely the analysis made by Carroll and Pachón (2016), this section analyzes aggregate data produced by Congreso Visible, which allows us to describe the patterns of legislative activity and the role played by the executive and the legislators within the governing coalition and in opposition. We examine five legislative periods from 1998 to 2018, distinguishing the scope of the bills by branch and evaluating the role of each committee. Figure 5.1 differentiates the bills introduced in the legislature by branch for the presidential terms of Pastrana, Uribe (first and second terms –​Uribe I and II), and Santos (first and second terms –​Santos I and II). Bills were divided into four categories: those that died at the initial committee stage; those that passed one chamber and failed in committee in the second chamber; those that died at the plenary floor in either chamber; and those that were enacted. Differences between approval rates are significant. On average, during the presidential terms of Pastrana, Uribe and Santos, 60% of executive bills were approved, while for legislators’ bills the rate is only 10%. As expected from previous

Figure 5.1: Fate of bills, by branch (1998–​2018) Legislative

Executive

Pastrana 1998–2000

Pastrana 1998 –2000

Pastrana 2000–2002

Pastrana 2000 –2002

Uribe I 2002 –2004

Uribe I 2002–2004

Uribe I 2004 –2006

Uribe I 2004–2006

Uribe II 2006 –2008

Uribe II 2006–2008

Uribe II 2008–2010

Uribe II 2008–2010

Santos I 2010–2012

Santos I 2010 –2012

Santos I 2012–2014

Santos I 2012–2014

Santos II 2014–2016

Santos II 2014 –2016

Santos II 2016–2018

Santos II 2016 –2018 0

20

40 60 Percentage

80

Died in committee (1st Chamber) Died on the floor

100

0

20

40 60 80 Percentage

100

Died in committee (2nd Chamber) Passed

Source: Carroll and Pachón (2016), with added data for Santos II and data from Congreso Visible.

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research, presidents are the major source of national legislation in Colombia and the main agenda setters. In terms of the differences between the presidential periods, it can be seen that both for the Uribe and Santos governments, approval rates in their second terms are much lower than those of their first term. In the case of Uribe, the weakness of his coalition in Congress coincides with two events: the investigation of 73 of its members for possible links with illegal armed groups (Botero et al, 2010), and his second attempt at re-​election. For Santos, his second mandate was marked by the partial disintegration of his coalition, and the appearance of Centro Democrático as the main opposition party (headed by former president Uribe). Comparing the fate of bills, our analysis shows how most bills die in the first stage of discussion within the constitutional committees: a little more than 70% for the legislature, and 19% for the executive. This pattern across all administrations highlights the importance of committees as agenda setters in which party leaders and committee members develop rules to effectively allocate time in order to prioritize certain bills over others (Pachón and Johnson, 2016). Furthermore, unlike other countries in the region such as Mexico, which have more than 46 permanent constitutional committees, or Argentina where parliamentarians belong to more than four committees on average simultaneously, in Colombia there are only seven permanent committees and legislators can belong only to one at a time. Each committee specializes in specific aspects of the legislation, in addition to discussing the bills in the first and third stage of the law-​making process. Thus, committees also work as “informational brokers” that allow legislators to be experts in certain subjects to persuade others in their decisions on the floor (Krehbiel, 1992). This particular feature has led to claims that there exists a certain hierarchy within the Colombian Congress (Pachón, 2003) where the specialization and division of specific issues and jurisdictions within the committees lead legislators to prefer certain committees over others to consolidate their political careers (Escobar-​Lemmon, 2001; Botero and Rennó, 2007). That is why the first committee (constitutional reforms), and third and fourth committees (finance and general budget), are granted to parliamentarians with more seniority (Pachón and Ramírez, 2008). To analyze the legislative activity within the committees, Figure 5.2 displays the proportion of the total number of bills introduced by committee in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The general patterns among committees are stable across time. While the committee on Constitutional Affairs (First Committee) gets to discuss on average 30% of total bills introduced, the remaining committees discuss less than 20% of the total bills introduced over the last 20 years. This pattern is largely explained by the changes introduced by the 1991 Constitution, in which the new constitutional arrangement incorporated many specific, previously non-​constitutional, aspects of public policy areas (Cárdenas et al, 2008). Key policy components, such as fiscal transfers for education and 87

Policy Analysis in Colombia

0

.1

Total percentage of bills .2 .3

.4

Figure 5.2: Proportion of bills introduced by committee in both chambers

Pastrana

Uribe I

Uribe II

Santos I

Committee 1

Committee 2

Committee 3

Committee 5

Committee 6

Committee 7

Santos II Committee 4

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from Congreso Visible.

health, pensions, and electoral and administrative reforms require constitutional amendments, which in practice translates into the constitutionalizing process of public policy. Figure  5.3 shows the fate of the constitutional amendments introduced per presidential term. Since 1998, 657 constitutional amendment proposals have been introduced and only 6% (40) have passed. Of all introduced, around 37.5% of CAs seek to modify the rules of the political and electoral system. Following the pattern exhibited by statutory bills, around 80% of the constitutional reforms died at the committee stage. However, it is interesting to notice how both legislators and the executive are equally successful in the amendment process. Approximately 50% of the approved constitutional reforms are authored by legislators. Hence, it is clear how difficult it is for the executive, regardless of the size of its congressional coalition and the constitutional powers conferred to him, to increase his chances in order to carry out structural reforms to change the status quo (Carroll and Pachón 2016). Another important source of variation in the Colombian Congress, particularly within the committees, is whether the scope of the bills is national or local, which we would expect to vary depending on the issues related to the jurisdiction of each committee. Figure 5.4 displays the proportion of national bills debated by each committee between 1998 and 2018 in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The committees that spend the highest percentage (around 96%) of its agenda to discuss national type projects are the seven, six and first committee, while on average the third and fourth committees present an inverse pattern. As previous research has found, the fourth committee offers greater incentives to legislators to discuss regional bills that benefit their electorate in the distribution of local assets (Pachón and Ramírez, 2011). 88

Policy analysis and the legislature

80 60 40 20 0

Total percentage of constitutional amendments

100

Figure 5.3: Fate of constitutional amendments, by presidential term

Pastrana

Uribe I

Uribe II

Santos I

Santos II

Died in committee (1st Chamber)

Died in committee (2nd Chamber)

Died on the floor

Passed

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from Congreso Visible.

.8 .6 .2

.4

Percentage of national bills

1

Figure 5.4: Proportion of national bills introduced by committee in both chambers

Pastrana

Uribe I

Uribe II

Santos I

Committee 1

Committee 2

Committee 3

Committee 5

Committee 6

Committee 7

Santos II Committee 4

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from Congreso Visible.

While aggregated information is useful to understand the general trends, the next section goes into a deeper analysis of the role of the legislature when policy makers decide to overcome congressional gridlock by avoiding the legislature. Two cases are presented: in the bills related to the historic peace agreement with 89

Policy Analysis in Colombia

the FARC-​EP, after the failure to approve the deal in the 2016 plebiscite, and the group of bills of the “consulta anticorrupción” in 2018.

Exceptional times, exceptional law-​making processes? The peace process legislative disagreement President Juan Manuel Santos made an enormous gamble in deciding on a plebiscite as means to ratify the peace agreement with the FARC-​EP. This promise, made in his first mandate after going public with the negotiations in 2012, attempted to diminish the potential resistance against the talks and acted as a “guarantee” in which the citizens could evaluate the agreement and decide whether it was a viable and desirable solution for the ongoing conflict with the FARC-​EP. Consistent with the idea of participatory democracy established in the 1991 Constitution, the President believed that going back to the people would be a more effective strategy to move faster with the peace process legislative package compared to dealing with Congress, despite having a working majority. After four years of formal negotiations, on 20 June 2016, to enable a faster pace, the government majority approved a constitutional amendment (Legislative Act 1, 2016) that would temporarily alter the policy-​making process to fast-​track all legislation derived from the agreement.4 The approval of this piece of legislation had significant implications: constitutional amendments would now only require four, rather than eight, debates in order to pass. Statutory bills would need only three debates, with the first debate always in joint committees of the House and Senate. Furthermore, only the executive could introduce “peace” legislation, and bills had to be voted for in a block, without the possibility of amendment. To accelerate the creation of the legal framework of the agreement, the new constitutional amendment mandated that the President could issue decrees with the force of law for 180 days (Rodríguez-​Raga, 2017). The final chapter of the peace accord was agreed with the FARC-​EP on 23 June 2016. To ensure their success, the government launched an ambitious, nationwide “yes” campaign on the plebiscite. On 6 October, the government suffered an important defeat: the yes vote obtained 49.78% and the no vote 50.21%. To keep the agreement alive, the government had no option other than to renegotiate with the opposition leaders, going this time through Congress. Despite the efforts of the executive, the Centro Democrático and some Conservative party leaders explicitly opposed the new agreement, expressing their skepticism for the modifications and arguing for the need to respect the plebiscite results. The final document was signed by FARC-​EP and the government on 24 November and was voted in the Senate on 29 November (75/​102 votes in favor) and in the House on 30 November, with 130/​166 votes in favor. On 13 December, the CCC gave the go-​ahead for the Legislative Act 1 of 2016 (fast track), and the government proceeded by introducing seven constitutional amendments and 17 bills. Table 5.1 presents all legislative initiatives approved between January and June 2017. A  total of four bills and five constitutional amendments were enacted 90

Policy analysis and the legislature

Table 5.1: Legislative peace initiatives approved between January and June 2017 Bill

Issue

Chapter of the peace accord

Statutory Law 3 of 2017. The Statute of Political Opposition and some rights to independent political groups are adopted.

The Statute of the Opposition provides the general framework for the exercise of the right to opposition. It also describes mechanisms for its protection.

Chapter 2 (Political Participation)

Law 1830 of 2017. A transitory article is added to Law 5 of 1992.

Authorizes three spokespersons in the House and three in the Senate to follow up on the implementation of the agreement.

Chapter 3 (The End of Conflict)

Law 1865 of 2017. The National Protection Authorizes the expansion of the UNP personnel Chapter 3 (The End of Unit (UNP) is exempted from the provisions of plant, allows demobilized members of FARC-​EP to Conflict) article 92 of Law 617 of 2000. be trained as escorts and enter the UNP plant. Authorizes security for demobilized members of FARC-EP. Legislative Act 5 of 2017. Provisions are made Reiterates the legitimate monopoly of force to ensure the legitimate monopoly of force by the state; prohibits the creation, promotion, and use of weapons by the state. financing and other forms of support for illegal armed groups.

Chapter 3 (The End of Conflict)

Legislative Act 3 of 2017. The political reincorporation component of the final agreement is partially regulated for the end of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace.

Chapter 3 (The End of Conflict)

Establishes guarantees for the political reincorporation of FARC-​EP, creation of the political party FARC with legal status and legal guarantees.

Statutory Law of the Administration of Justice Develops the justice component by establishing in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). its principles; its material, personal and temporal competence; its structure; and the functions of the Court for peace.

Chapter 5 (Truth and Transitional Justice)

Legislative Act 1 of 2017. Transitory provisions of the Constitution are created for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace.

Chapter 5 (Truth and Transitional Justice)

Creates the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-​Repetition, which comprises the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Unit for the Search of Missing Persons and JEP.

Legislative Act 2 of 2017. A transitory article Provides legal certainty to the agreement and is added to the Constitution with the purpose obliges subsequent administrations to preserve of giving stability and legal security to the and fulfill the contents of the agreement. final agreement. Modifies the general royalty system to provide Legislative Act 4 of 2017. Article 361 is added funds for projects for the implementation of the to the Constitution. peace agreement and the amnesty.

Chapter 6 (Implementation and Verification Mechanisms) Chapter 6 (Implementation and Verification Mechanisms)

Source: Fajardo-​Heyward (2018).

during this time. Polarization increased as executive dominance diminished the role of Congress in the legislative process, and the opposition waited on the CCC’s decision on whether resumed legislative procedures were violating the Constitution (Fajardo-​Heyward,  2018). As if problems with the implementation weren’t enough, the final blow for the executive was the CCC’s decision to declare unconstitutional the fast track 91

Policy Analysis in Colombia

to approve legislation and the congressional limitation to amend the proposals. In the Court’s opinion, allowing this would allow the executive to substitute the legislative power, going against democratic due process. The executive had no choice but to deal with the frustration of leaving an agenda of unfulfilled promises in the hands of the President-​Elect of Centro Democrático, Iván Duque, leader of the opposition in Congress and responsible of the fast-​track demand before the CCC.

Overcoming congressional gridlock: the electoral success/​legislative failure of the consulta anticorrupción Like other countries in the region, corruption is a significant problem that not only has negative economic and social consequences, but also damages public perceptions about democracy and governing institutions. According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project survey waves 2017–​18, the perception of widespread corruption is held by most respondents across a large number of countries in the region. In Colombia, 75% of respondents think that more than half of all politicians are corrupt, and believe that the most serious problem faced by the country is corruption (19% of the sample). Frustrated with the ongoing corruption scandals and the reluctance of Congress to deliberate on their bills, the Green Party decided to spend their efforts and resources to be included in the legislative agenda. By using the mechanism of consulta popular, they could get media attention for their legislative proposals, force Congress to discuss them, and deliver results despite being in opposition to the government. To justify the immense expense that the consulta would imply, their promoters argued that the unwillingness of Congress to debate these initiatives meant that legislators could and did not want to change the status quo. The consulta popular is a mechanism through which citizens, by collecting at least 5% of the signatures of the electoral census, can go back to the people asking them to decide on important matters at national, departmental or local levels. Once the signatures are collected, the Senate should approve the consulta. If approved, the final consent is given by the CCC. The consulta can only succeed if it obtains at least 33% of all voters registered (Rodríguez, 2018). The Green Party leaders, both members of Congress at the time –​Claudia López (Senator) and Angélica Lozano (deputy of the House of Representatives) –​ collected more than three million signatures, which made it really difficult for the Senate to disapprove the proposal, despite immense criticism.5 A great number of legislators argued, for example, that the questions and legislation that would result from the consulta were already contained in other legislation.6 Equally, the idea of considering the consulta as a form of political campaigning or populism was also common, justifying legislators’ lack of support for issues such as the cost of the consulta popular and the question that asked citizens whether they would like to lower legislators’ wages. 92

Policy analysis and the legislature

After being successful in all the approval process within the legislature and with the CCC, outgoing President Santos decreed (Decree 1028, 2018) that the consulta would take place on 26 August 2018, three weeks into President Iván Duque’s term. This, of course, set the stage for a difficult situation for the incoming coalition, as President Duque and his allies had been against the initiative and had a history of personal attacks and disagreements with the consulta’s promoters. However, and given the risk of “losing” if the Green Party won the consulta, President Duque decided to timidly support the consulta, in an attempt to reduce the loss if it were to be approved. The consulta obtained 11.671.420 votes, equivalent to 32.04% of the vote –​ failing to obtain 12.261.314 votes, equivalent to the required 33% of the vote.7 While considered a great electoral success, the consulta promoters were left with the fact that they had to go back to Congress, through the ordinary statutory law procedure to get things done (Duque, 2018). After a great deal of media attention and negotiations with President Iván Duque, 25 bills were introduced as the “Pacto Anticorrupción”. Although President Duque explicitly said he would use the urgency motion to accelerate the bill package through Congress, the motion was effectively used to push only four of 25 bills, leaving most of the planned agenda without debate. When limiting the discussion to the bills explicitly dealing with the questions included in the consulta, three were filled (questions 1, 4 and 7), three passed (questions 3, the first part of question 6, and a watered-​ down version of question 5), while the rest were still being debated at the time of writing (February 2020). While legislative results cannot be read as a great success, the game-​changer occurred after former Senator Claudia López –​by far the consulta’s most prominent leader –​was elected as Bogotá’s first female mayor on an anti-​corruption ticket. This way, the consulta, paid off for all who were involved, although success in changing the status quo had mixed results at best.

Conclusion This chapter has summarized the existing research on the role of Congress in the policy-​making process, complementing this analysis with an examination of the patterns of legislative activity over the past 20 years. The aggregated analysis shows how presidents are the major source of national legislation and the main agenda setters. However, the work of the executive does not end with the introduction of bills to be discussed in Congress, since bills are subject to all kinds of modifications both in the committees and the floor. This implies that, although the executive enjoys important formal constitutional powers, presidents need the cooperation of the majority of their coalition to exert control over the law-​making process (Carroll and Pachón, 2016). In terms of the patterns of legislative activity within committees, our analysis shows how important committees are to the fate of bills. Most bills die in the first stage of discussion within the constitutional committees, which makes them 93

Policy Analysis in Colombia

gatekeepers of the legislative process. Thus, there exists a hierarchy in Congress in which some committees are more prestigious than others, and legislators select the most important ones to build up their political careers. One example is the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, which gets to discuss on average 30% of total bills introduced in Congress and dedicates the majority of its agenda to discuss national bills. Moreover, the fact that most of the bills introduced go through the Committee on Constitutional Affairs draws attention to two important features of the law-​ making process in Colombia. On one hand, since the 1991 Constitution, there has been a constitutionalization of key policy areas ‒ such as fiscal transfers and public expenditures. On the other hand, and probably as a partial consequence of the former, we have seen the incremental judicialization of politics. Through the procedure of judicial review, the CCC acts as a co-​legislator and can override the majoritarian consensus. This is clear from one of the substantive examples developed in the chapter, in which the end picture is the frustration of all efforts of the majority coalition to speed up the implementation of the peace agreement. Without limits on the time to deliberate, the CCC becomes the single veto player –​with the possibility of pausing indefinitely even the most important issues in the executive’s agenda. Attempts to override Congress have not been successful in the past and in the near present. Although direct democracy mechanisms exist, fulfilling all the prerequisites for these to work, and getting enough voters to make it happen, is still an enormous challenge, as was the case with the consulta anticorrupción. In the case of the peace agreement, even while President Santos was able to overcome the voting threshold by mobilizing all state resources available, the fact that he lost the vote made him go back to Congress and re-​establish negotiations, which left a frustrated agenda and great uncertainty for the success of the peace process agreement. Similarly, very popular leaders with an anti-​corruption agenda were very close to passing the consulta (as was former President Uribe with his 2003 referendum), but not enough to override the legislature in an attempt to modify rules that included, among other issues, legislators’ wages as well as term limits. This, of course, demonstrates the active role of Congress and its members to actively fight their jurisdiction, making it difficult for even the most influential actors to push Congress to legislate in certain subjects at a different speed. As a result, slow incremental change seems to be the only game in town. Notes 1

2

94

The National Front was a formal agreement, constitutionally mandated for 16 consecutive years (1958–​1974), which established an equally shared rule between the two traditional parties which have ruled since the beginning of the Republic: The Liberal and Conservative Party. The agreement was reached amidst intense partisan polarization, with the objective of returning to civilian rule and end widespread political violence across the territory. Since the number of committees is established by the Constitution, the Board of Directors cannot manufacture committees to buy off legislators (bureaucratic perks) or change jurisdictions. This

Policy analysis and the legislature

3

4 5

6 7

is the case in Argentina or Mexico, where the number of committees increases incrementally during terms, and committees often have overlapping jurisdictions. Unlike Brazil or Chile, where the process is dependent on high-​end technological resources, the amendment process becomes a great liability as bills later on can be declared unconstitutional, or need significant revisions to fulfill procedural requirements. This Constitutional Amendment was introduced in Congress on 15 September 2015. “¿Por qué la consulta anticorrupción ganó aunque no pasó?”. Revista Semana, 26 August. Available from: www.semana.com/​nacion/​articulo/​resultados-​de-​la-​consulta-​anticorrupcion-​ por-​que-​no-​paso/​580865 “Consulta anticorrupción: ¿necesidad o populismo?”, El Heraldo, 8 August. Available from: www. elheraldo.co/​politica/​consulta-​anticorrupcion-​necesidad-​o-​populismo-​528311 See Table 5.2 in the Appendix for the results by question.

References Alemán, E. and Pachón, M. (2008) “Las comisiones de conciliación en los procesos legislativos de Chile y Colombia”. Política y Gobierno 15(1): 3-​34. Archer, R.P. and Shugart, M. (1997) “The unrealized potential of presidential dominance in Colombia”. In S. Mainwaring and M. Shugart (eds.) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, pp. 110–​59. Bermúdez, F. and Taborda, J. (2009) “Los estados de excepción en Colombia ¿un diseño institucional adecuado para el balance de poderes?”. Undergraduate thesis, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá. Botero, F. (1998) “El Senado que nunca fue. la circunscripción nacional después de tres elecciones”. In A.M. Bejarano and A. Dávila Ladrón de Guevara (eds.) Elecciones y Democracia en Colombia 1997–​1998. Bogotá:  Universidad de los Andes, pp. 285–​337. Botero, F. and Rennó, L.R. (2007) “Career choice and legislative reelection: evidence from Brazil and Colombia”. Brazilian Political Science Review 1(1): 102–​24. Botero, F., Hoskin, G.W. and Pachón, M. (2010) “Sobre forma y sustancia: una evaluación de la democracia electoral en Colombia”. Revista de Ciencia Política 30(1): 41–​64. Cárdenas, M. and Pachón, M. (2010) “Cómo la Constitución de 1991 cambió los procesos de formulación de las políticas públicas”. In C.  Scartascini and E. Lora (eds.) Consecuencias Imprevistas de la Constitución de 1991: La Influencia de la Política en las Políticas Económicas. Bogotá: Alfaomega, pp. 33–​58. Cárdenas, M., Junguito, R. and Pachón, M. (2008) “Political institutions and policy outcomes in Colombia:  the effects of the 1991 Constitution”. In E. Stein, M. Tommasi, P. Spiller and C. Scartascini (eds.) Policymaking in Latin America:  How Politics Shapes Policies. Washington, DC:  Inter-​American Development Bank, pp. 199–​242. Carroll, R. and Pachón, M. (2016) “The unrealized potential of presidential coalitions in Colombia”. In E. Alemán and G. Tsebelis (eds.) Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 122–​47.

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Cepeda-​Espinosa, M.J. (2004) “Judicial activism in a violent context: the origin, role, and impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court”. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 3(4). Cepeda-​Espinosa, M.J. (2005) “The judicialization of politics in Colombia: the old and the new”. In R. Sieder, L. Schjolden and A. Angell (eds.) The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America. New York, NY. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 67–​103. Cox, G. (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Decree 1028 of 2018 (June 18), por el cual se convoca a una consulta popular y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial. No. 50.628. Duque, J. (2018) “La consulta anticorrupción:  una derrota con sabor a victoria”. Razón Pública, 27 August. Available from: https://​razonpublica.com/​ la-​consulta-​anticorrupcion-​una-​derrota-​con-​sabor-​a-​victoria E l H e r a l d o. ( 2 0 1 8 ) “ C o n s u l t a a n t i c o r r u p c i ó n :   ¿ n e c e s i d a d o populismo?”. August 26. Available from:  www.elheraldo.co/​ p olitica/​ consulta-​anticorrupcion-​necesidad-​o-​populismo-​528311 Escobar-​Lemmon, M. (2001) “Personal vote seeking and committee membership in Colombia”. Paper presented at the XXIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, 6–​8 September. Fajardo-​Heyward, P. (2018) “Colombia 2017: between implementation and the uncertainty”. Revista de Ciencia Política 38(2): 233–​58. González, F. (2014) Poder y Violencia en Colombia. Bogotá: Odecofi-​Cinep. Haggard, S. and McCubbins, M. (2001) Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krehbiel, K. (1992) Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Legislative Act 1 of 2016 (July 7), por medio del cual se establecen instrumentos jurídicos para facilitar y asegurar la imple-​mentación y el desarrollo normativo del acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera. Diario Oficial No. 49927.7. Pachón, M. (2003) “Explaining the perfor mance of the Colombian Congress: electoral and legislature rules, and interactions with the executive”. Master’s thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford. Pachón, M. (2008) “Cross-​avenue politics: the case of Colombia and Brazil”. Doctoral dissertation, PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego, CA. Pachón, M. (2010) “Reforma institucional en Colombia:  el vía crucis por el equilibrio entre la gobernabilidad y la representación (1991–​2006)”. In M. Tanaka and F. Jácome (eds.) Desafíos de la Gobernabilidad Democrática: Reformas Político-​Institucionales y Movimientos Sociales en la Región Andina. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, pp. 47–​78. Pachón, M. and Johnson, G.B. (2016) “When’s the party (or coalition)? Agenda-​ setting in a highly fragmented, decentralized legislature”. Journal of Politics in Latin America 8(2): 71–​100.

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Pachón, M. and Ramírez, M. (2011) “¿Qué tanta política nacional discute un congreso? Una comparación de las agendas de las plenarias y comisiones posterior a la Constitución de 1991”. Revista Latinoamericana de Política Comparada 4: 75–​98. Pachón, M. and Shugart, M.S. (2010) “Electoral reform and the mirror image of inter-​party and intra-​party competition: the adoption of party lists in Colombia”. Electoral Studies 29(4): 648–​60. Pizarro, E. (2002) La Atomización Partidista en Colombia:  El Fenómeno de las Microempresas Electorales, Working Paper No. 292. South Bend, IN:  Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame. Posada-​Carbó, E. (2000) “Electoral juggling:  a comparative history of the corruption of suffrage in Latin America, 1830–​1930”. Journal of Latin American Studies 32(3): 611–​44. Registraduría del Estado Civil. (2018) “Consulta Popular Anticorrupción Preconteo” August 26. Available from:  https://​elecciones1.registraduria.gov. co/​pre_​cpa_​20180826/​consultas/​html/​inicio.html Revista Semana. (2018) “¿Por qué la consulta anticorrupción ganó aunque no pasó?”. August 26. Available from: www.semana.com/​nacion/​articulo/​ resultados-​de-​la-​consulta-​anticorrupcion-​por-​que-​no-​paso/​580865 Rodríguez, C. (2018) “Consulta anticorrupción: ¿el primer triunfo de la iniciativa ciudadana?”. Razón Pública, 2 July. Available from: https://​razonpublica.com/​ consulta-​anticorrupcion-​el-​primer-​triunfo-​de-​la-​iniciativa-​ciudadana Rodríguez-​Raga, J.C. (1998) “Participación, sistema de partidos y sistema electoral. Posibilidades de la ingeniería institucional”. Análisis Político 33: 94–​108. Rodríguez-​Raga, J.C. (2017) “Colombia: país del año 2016”. Revista de Ciencia Política 37(2): 335–​68. Saiegh, S.M. (2011) Ruling by Statute:  How Uncertainty and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ungar, E., Londoño, J.F., Nieto, M.I., Lleras, G.V., Robledo, J., Manzur, J., Rivera, G., Orjuela, C.G. and Cristo, J.F. (2008) Las Bancadas en el Congreso: Ley y Praxis, Bogotá: Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo, Universidad de Los Andes.

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Appendix Table 5.2: Results of consulta anticorrupción by question Question

Total votes Vote share percentage

Do you approve reducing the salary of congressmen from 40 to 25 (COP) minimum monthly salary, setting a maximum limit of 25 as the maximum monthly remuneration of congressmen and high-​ranking officials of the state (article 197 of the Constitution)?

11,671,420

32.04%

Do you agree that persons convicted of corruption and crimes against the public administration must serve the totality of their sentences in prison, without the possibility of alternative sentencing, and that the state may unilaterally terminate the contracts with them and with the legal partners, without there being any compensation?

11,672,464

32.04%

Do you approve the establishment of bidding obligations for all public and territorial 11,669,195 entities to ensure that public sector organizations that issue contract notices have a well-​defined tendering process and have procedures in place to guarantee that the selection process is fair and transparent?

32.03%

Do you approve the obligation to hold public hearings so that citizens and corporations decide on the breakdown and prioritization of the investment budget of the nation, departments and municipalities, as well as on accountability for the hiring and firing of their personnel?

11,670,722

32.04%

Do you approve the obligation for congressmen and other representatives to report annually on their assistance, initiatives presented, votes, debates, management of private interests or lobbyists, projects, the items and public investments they have managed and public offices for which they have presented candidates?

11,666,541

32.03%

Do you approve the obligation for all the elected officials to make public their declarations 11,666,727 of assets, patrimony, income, payment of taxes and conflicts of interest, as a requirement to take possession and exercise office? Do you approve limiting members of the Senate of the Republic, the House of Representatives, departmental assemblies, municipal councils and local administrative boards 11,659,609 to three terms in office?

32.03%

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (2018).

98

32.01%

SIX

Policy analysis in the Colombian Constitutional Court Juan Carlos Rodríguez-​Raga and Santiago Virgüez-​Ruiz

Introduction Courts have increasingly become key players in the political arena and the policy-​ making process. Judicialization of politics, as this trend has been called (Vallinder, 1994), is the process by which issues that were traditionally in the realm of political bodies and decision makers, namely legislatures and the executive branch, are being increasingly decided in courts. Under certain conditions, in instances such as democratic settlings, demands for the protection of constitutional rights, and clashes between agencies and levels of government, judges have acquired a central role in the settlement of political disputes and the creation of new laws through the interpretation of existing constitutional provisions, whether by abstract review or by resolving concrete cases (Tate and Vallinder, 1995). The rise of a new constitutional order (Ackerman, 1997) has turned judicial tribunals into fora of political discussion, where different political agents, especially those traditionally excluded from traditional representative institutions, have found a place to advance their policy preferences (Epp, 1998; McCann, 2008). Constitutional courts, in particular, have come to make, or increasingly dominate the making of public policies over several social issues, previously the remit of representative bodies or administrative agencies. One of the reasons that explains this change in the policy-​making process, especially in Latin America, is the emergence of new institutional arrangements that have entailed the adoption of extensive rights catalogues and new legal mechanisms to enforce them. Legal claims “from below” (Sieder et al, 2005) regarding governmental policies have driven courts to analyze different public policies in order to establish whether or not governmental agencies have contributed to the neglect of individual and social rights, either by direct actions or by omissions in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of those policies. In case of negligence or omission, judges become guides and creators of new public policy. Due to this modern political phenomenon, the study of judicial politics is now a consolidated subdiscipline within political science, especially regarding the US and, to a lesser extent, the western European democracies. Authors in this area have attempted to explain the behavior of judges at various stages of the judicial process (Epstein and Knight, 1998, 2013; Segal and Spaeth, 2002), the interaction between the judiciary and the other branches of government (Stone 99

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Sweet, 2000; Vanberg, 2005), the relationship between courts and civil society organizations, including social movements (Epp, 1998) and interest groups, the links between judicial decision-​making and public opinion as well as issues related to the legitimacy of courts (Gibson et al, 1998), to mention some of the main subjects approached by the subdiscipline. Despite the growing interest in understanding the politics behind judicial decision making, both in consolidated and transitional democracies, and despite the undeniable impact of courts’ decisions on public policy, studies on how courts act as policy analysts are almost non-​existent.1 The main goal of this chapter is to contribute to filling this gap in the literature.2 More concretely, our aim is to describe the policy analysis toolbox at the disposal of the CCC, both in general and in further detail for cases concerning public health and, to a lesser extent, illicit drugs policy making. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional framework of the CCC. The second section introduces the toolbox used by the CCC in three different stages of its policy analysis: problem identification and structuring, policy forecasting and prescribing, and policy monitoring and evaluation (Guess and Farnham, 2011; Dunn, 2018). The third section analyzes a case study in which we show how the CCC draws from this toolbox in order to assess policy making regarding public healthcare issues in general. Relatedly, it also briefly addresses the way the court has recently dealt with one dimension of the illicit drugs public policy related to the peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and the now demobilized guerrilla group FARC-​EP, that is, the policy aimed at controlling illicit crops as a public health problem. The fourth section summarizes the highlights of the policy analysis toolbox used by the CCC and suggests a future research agenda.

The institutional instruments of the CCC The CCC has at its disposal two major instruments of constitutional review and, consequently, issues two types of decision: on the one hand, it exerts what is called “abstract constitutional review” to protect the integrity of the system of legal rules and its compliance with the constitutional provisions, which represent the “Grundnorms” or fundamental rules of that system. In other words, ordinary laws, statutes and executive decrees, among other types of legal rules, are required to be consistent with the Constitution; thus, the CCC has the power to review the content and law-​making procedure of those rules and, in the case that it finds them in contradiction of the constitutional provisions, it can (and should) overturn them. Such a review is a priori (that is, before the legal bill is signed into law by the President) and automatically addressed by the court in the case of statutory acts, international treaties and executive decrees of emergency. For other types or legal rules, the review is a posteriori (once the bill has been signed and published, and it can even be done after the law has been in place for years) and its motivated by a constitutional complaint filed by any citizen directly to the CCC. In either 100

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case, the CCC is expected to issue a decision on the constitutionality of the legal rule or rules under question, and it has no discretion over the selection of cases for abstract review. On the other hand, the CCC exerts what is called “concrete constitutional review”, which occurs when the CCC selects an individual case –​or a plural number of individual cases involving equal or similar facts –​involving alleged violations of constitutional rights. A  citizen or group of citizens who seek redress for those violations can file in a lower court what is called a “tutela”, an accessible legal mechanism that does not require legal representation from a lawyer and that demands a prompt decision by the lower tribunal. Unlike the abstract review cases, the CCC has the discretion to select a small proportion of tutelas in order to revise the outcome and the main arguments of the lower court’s decision. Although the vast majority of decisions in these concrete review cases have effects only for the parties involved in the controversy (inter partes decisions), and therefore have little impact on public policy, there have been a few instances in which several tutela actions are filed regarding the same specific issue and the CCC has then decided to declare the existence of an “unconstitutional state of affairs” (USoA).3 An example of this occurred in 1998 when several jail inmates filed tutela cases looking for protection of their basic rights given the extremely unhealthy conditions of Colombian prisons. The CCC considered that this situation deserved more than decisions made on a per-​case basis and issued the general an encompassing decision urging the government to put an end to this situation.4 The CCC made a similar decision in 2004 after many people who had been forced to leave their homes and became displaced as a consequence of the internal conflict filed tutela actions seeking the protection of their basic rights, mainly the rights to human dignity and housing (Uprimny, 2006).5 In these instances, the CCC made decisions with widespread policy effects.

Public policy analysis in the CCC: the toolbox William Dunn describes public policy analysis as a process including five main stages:  problem structuring, which consists of a phase of inquiry in which the analyst compares, contrasts and evaluates different formulations of a problem; forecasting expected policy outcomes, which entails the use of a set of procedures for creating information about futures states of society based on present information; prescribing preferred policies; monitoring observed policy outcomes; and evaluating policy performance, which differs from monitoring because it relies not only on facts but also on values (Dunn, 2018). Although the CCC has not established a methodical process to analyze public policy, it is possible to identify most of these stages in its operation and rulings –​particularly in cases involving USoA decisions –​as well as the actors and tools involved within those stages.

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Problem structuring Given that the CCC has a limited power of initiative in selecting issues of its preference, it relies mainly on tutela petitions filed by citizens to identify policy problems.6 As a first source of information, the tutela action conveys an adversarial view of the issue at hand with different representations of it from multiple stakeholders. At this phase it is even difficult to establish whether a real policy problem exists or whether a legal dispute between two or more actors is taking place. However, several numbers of petitions relating to the same subject and the same events leads the CCC to a structural examination of the situation and a logical division of the subproblems involved. There are three tools the CCC has used to delineate problem situations into substantive structural problems: amicus curiae briefs, analysis of governmental policy making processes and direct observation by the justices. An amicus curiae (friend of the court) is someone who is part of a case but, personally or on behalf of an organization, is able to provide assistance by offering information, expertise or insight related to the issues of the case. Amicus briefs or interventions (advisory opinions) are an important tool through which the CCC obtains several views on the situation at hand and saturates itself with a lot of information and other problem formulations, in order to identify a “meta problem” –​that is, a problem of problems –​that involves problem representations that are so numerous that the quantity may seem unmanageable (Dunn, 2018). Once the CCC has established the structural nature of the problem and has reviewed all the information gathered through the different views of the stakeholders and external actors, it proceeds to make an analysis of the governmental policy-​making process that underlies the case. This analysis may take more than one section in a ruling, splitting the evaluation into several parts. The most notorious instance of this process occurred in 2004 when the CCC faced a structural problem related to forced internal displacement. Following an exhaustive evaluation of the claims of several displaced persons,7 the CCC found a number of elements that allowed it to qualify the humanitarian situation of those people as a USoA. As a result, the CCC issued Decision T-​025/​2004, which analyzed the public policy regarding the governmental assistance to the displaced population in order to determine whether or not the state had contributed to the disregard of fundamental rights of the affected citizens. The ruling had one section dedicated to evaluating how the state had responded to the forced displacement crisis, another to analyzing the results of the policy implementation, a third one to the monitoring and evaluation of the policy execution management, and a final one to studying the lack of economic resources and its implications for policy results. As explained by Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco (2015), the CCC found a number of flaws in the creation and implementation of the government’s policy to assist the displaced population. Regarding the design phase, “the Court highlighted the absence of an updated plan of action for the National System 102

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for Assistance to the Displaced Population’s (SNAIPD) operation to provide a comprehensive overview of the policy, and bemoaned the lack of specific goals or indicators to measure the policy’s success or failure” (Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco, 2015, p. 78). The CCC also detected important shortcomings in the implementation phase, observing that “SNAIPD institutions had not created special programs for the displaced population despite their mandatory nature according to existing laws and policy documents” (Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco 2015, p. 78). In the last phase of the policy process, monitoring and policy evaluation, the main problems were an absence of an information system and the lack of policy evaluation systems to detect obstacles to the design and implementation (Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco, 2015). In order to delineate the formal problems, constitutionals justices can make direct observation by visiting the regions where the public policy problems have been located. Through basic qualitative methods such as interviews and brief ethnographies, court officials gather evidence about the reported issues and subsequently perform a logical classification of the different components of the problem, using information of their own or from external sources. For instance, prior to the declaration of a USoA in the Guajira region related to a problem of water and food scarcity that, from 2015 to 2016, caused the death of 266 children due to causes associated with malnutrition,8 the CCC visited the territory to document by itself the specific problems and their causal link with subnational public policy arrangements. Forecasting expected outcomes and prescribing preferred policies The CCC is known for what is has been termed “dialogic constitutionalism” or “dialogic judicial activism” (Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco, 2010; Gargarella, 2014), which refers to how the its structural intervention has opened judicial decisions and public policy making to a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental participants. USoA rulings and the structural problems addressed by the CCC have involved not only the main administrative agencies concerned with each case, but also other actors with related responsibilities at every level (international, national or subnational), as well as members of civil society with interests in the issues under discussion. In this way, the forecasting of expected policy outcomes and the prescribing of preferred policies are a product of a deliberative exercise in which judicial officials, experts, public officials and interested citizens take part to promote their views on how the problem should be solved. The main deliberative mechanisms through which the CCC develops this phase of the policy analysis process are public hearings and technical regional sessions. The public hearings are a mechanism to promote the government’s accountability and a space for debate on the expected outcomes and the best public policies to address the structural problems identified in the court’s rulings. Court justices, government delegates, NGOs and international organizations’ representatives, 103

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affected communities, the general public, and the media, among others, attend these hearings. The technical regional sessions are more private, smaller spaces for debate among stakeholders, for which the CCC typically summons technical experts rather than the directly affected actors. These sessions are held in territories outside the capital city, and the people who attend are mostly public officials at the departmental, district and municipal levels. Monitoring and evaluation To monitor the implementation of the prescribed preferred policies and to evaluate its outcomes, the CCC has relied on three main tools: compliance indicators, special monitoring chambers, and follow-​up reports from governmental and nongovernmental actors. One of the main obstacles that obstructs an adequate policy implementation is the lack of monitoring mechanisms and criteria for measuring policy management. To address this obstacle, the CCC has encouraged –​particularly for USoA rulings regarding structural cases on forced internal displacement, public health, massive incarceration, and the malnutrition crisis in La Guajira –​an indicator-​creation process involving the national government and civil society actors. This process aims at developing an evaluation mechanism that allows permanently measuring the advances, delays and reversals in the implementation of public policies and the effective enjoyment of rights by the affected population. These right-​based indicators, created through a deliberative exercise, have marked a shift in the logic of judicial decisions and the role of the CCC over policy issues. As Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco emphasize, “indicators are the paradigmatic example of the rights-​policy toolbox, as they are an intermediate point between economic and legal logics, between economists and lawyers. Clearly, indicators fit in the quantitative toolbox of economists, but as indicators of rights, they also constitute a tool that synthesizes the two approaches” (Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez Franco, 2015, p. 93). The indicators designed in cooperation with the stakeholders and civil society actors are outcome indicators because they seek to evaluate the policy’s results rather than its process. Indicators are created as a tool to assess the degree of enforcement of different rights and the impact of public policies as a means to achieve it. For instance, in 2018 the CCC reformulated its tracking guidelines issued in 2013 regarding the USoA ruling on prison overcrowding because the governmental agencies were reporting successful implementation indicators without referring to the real outcomes on the effective enjoyment of rights by prison inmates.9 In the same way as in the forecasting and prescribing phases, the monitoring and evaluation of public policy outcomes by the CCC have been dialogic processes involving several actors. Taking this into account, the CCC has created some ad hoc monitoring chambers in order to observe, during a certain amount of 104

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time, the effective fulfillment of the prescribed policies, in cooperation with civil society actors (organized in independent follow-​up commissions) who report advances and setbacks in public policy. These special chambers made the CCC a permanent watchdog of government actions. According to some authors, public hearings organized by these chambers have drawn the attention of the public and the media and have resulted in various governmental and regulatory entities acknowledging a poor level of compliance in certain areas. This accountability promoted by public hearings led the government to use these forums to commit to public policies aimed at fully complying with the orders (Lamprea, 2015).

Illustrating the CCC’s policy analysis: public health and the illicit drugs issue in Colombia’s peace agreement Two related issues illustrate how the CCC uses some of the tools of policy analysis described earlier. First, the CCC has been a key player regarding policy making related to the healthcare system in Colombia. Its interventions have shaped not only the way in which government has structured such policy but also the way in which society assesses it. Second, the CCC has recently been involved in the analysis of the illicit drugs policy within the framework of the peace agreement to which the Colombian government and the FARC-​EP guerrilla group have subscribed. In this section we describe how the CCC has drawn from the policy analysis toolbox, described earlier, in order to assess public health policies. We then explore how it has framed illegal crops eradication through aerial aspersions of the herbicide glyphosate as a public health problem. Analysis of public health policies As far as public health goes, the CCC has played a key role in drafting and ensuring the implementation of certain health-​related policies. A healthcare reform in 1993 involved a shift from a public system to a mixed system in which the state was in charge of ensuring the service but through private healthcare providers. Due to flaws in the implementation and the low regulatory capacity, the healthcare system was in crisis and citizen claims were piling up. By 2004, 25% of all tutelas filed involved violations of healthcare rights (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2004, p. 5).10 Colombia has one of the highest number of healthcare litigation claims in Latin America (Nunes, 2010). In 2008, the CCC decided over several cases filed by citizens with unheeded claims of medical demands and issued a structural ruling on healthcare reform and implementation. Decision T-​760/​2008, in which it first stated that the right to health was indeed a fundamental right, something that had not been clear in previous decisions and that meant that violations to this right could be claimed through tutela writs, was the first of many court interventions in public health policy. The ruling has 32 orders, half of which are given to different government agencies and directly concern public health policy. The CCC ordered the 105

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creation and publication of the procedures and services covered by the system, the standardization of mandatory health programs, and the publishing of companies that refused to provide mandatory services, among other provisions. Although the CCC was careful not to completely draft the new policies, it did set out the guidelines of what the healthcare system ought to be. The CCC then created a three-​justice special chamber within its structure to monitor the orders it issues. The special chamber was tasked with requesting information on compliance by government agencies. From 2008 to 2014, the panel issued over 2,000 orders in which it either requested information on compliance, provided information on the degree of such compliance, or convened public hearings (Lamprea, 2015). In fact, the CCC has played a fundamental role in guaranteeing citizen access to healthcare. Although Colombia currently has universal coverage, peripheral communities enjoy at best poor healthcare services. The CCC has ordered differential treatment for these communities, ordering several government agencies to modify the healthcare system in order to account for such disparities. For the CCC, universal coverage should mean that all communities are able to access healthcare services regardless of their location.11 For example, the CCC ordered the Ministry of Health to create a differential rate for government resources allocated for peripheral areas. In Colombia, the Ministry of Health calculates the cost of health services per person and creates a measuring unit accordingly (UPC). Then, according to the number of people affiliated per service provider, the state transfers the amount of UPCs required.12 However, by 2017 it was clear that providing healthcare services in large cities was very different from covering rural areas. Most private providers were refusing to cover citizens in rural areas with difficult access, and most people in those areas were unable to travel to places where the service was provided. In 2017, several cases involving violations to the healthcare right in Vaupés –​a department in Amazonia that has one of the poorest road systems and some of the worst health services in the country –​reached the CCC. The CCC visited the region and was able to frame the problem beyond just some claims for health services. It ended up ordering the government to create a differential UPC for remote territories, a community-​based system that recognized indigenous traditions, and the provision of quality healthcare services for vulnerable communities.13 Drugs policy in the peace agreement The agreement signed in 2016 by the Colombian government and the FARC-​EP guerrilla group encompassed the main factors involved in achieving peace: the need for comprehensive land reform, political participation for demobilized armed groups, ceasefire among the different parties in the conflict, solutions to the illicit drugs problem, and reparations for victims. It took the parties over four years to reach the entire agreement, and they spent more than seven months only in addressing the illegal drugs problem. Both parties recognized that although 106

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the armed conflict was older than the drugs problem, conflict had been fueled by the illegal drugs market. The drugs policy in Colombia has been a long-​standing problem at both the national and international levels. The US policies related to the war on drugs in Latin America, the emergence of international drug trafficking, and consumer criminalization have all been issues that have concerned Colombian policy makers. However, the peace agreement presented a different perspective on drugs policy. Both parties agreed that they needed to acknowledge the structural conditions that created the problem. As a result, they agreed on the fact that “the persistence of illicit crops is linked to poverty, marginality, institutional weakness, and to the existence of organizations dedicated to drug trafficking”.14 Once they recognized that any policy related to drugs had to be structural and all encompassing, they agreed on three main issues that needed to be addressed: drug trafficking, consumption, and illicit crop eradication and substitution. On the first issue, the agreement established measures to attack the highest members of drug-​trafficking organizations, seeking the decriminalization of the farmers and peasants involved in crop production who complied with crop substitution. On the second issue, the agreement stated that drug consumption needed to be treated as a public health problem. In turn, this meant that consumption should be tackled with two main programs: one for the prevention of drug consumption and one for the rehabilitation of consumers. Both programs are explicitly framed within the idea that consumers should neither be stigmatized nor prosecuted. It also entails differential policies for children, women and prison inmates. Finally, the agreement established a National Substitution Plan (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito), which seeks to work with communities in order to achieve voluntary substitution of illicit crops and to provide assistance aimed at guaranteeing food security for the affected communities. This program is linked in the agreement to the structural land reform plan and is framed as a bottom-​up approach where communities are supposed to assess their needs, build the substitution plans, and be an essential part of their execution.15 However, in case of no agreement between the communities and the government, the latter is expected to forcefully eradicate the crops. Although the Colombian government had stopped glyphosate aspersion before the peace agreement was reached, as a result of CCC decisions and recommendations made by international organizations,16 a key issue during the negotiation was how crops should be eradicated. While the government was not willing to commit to exclusively undertake manual eradication, the FARC-​EP guerrilla group pointed out the risks of glyphosate aerial aspersion. The first version of the agreement did not mention glyphosate or aerial aspersion, and only allowed for manual eradication. Nevertheless, this was one of the points that changed when the agreement was modified by Congress. The new –​and final –​agreement stated that in cases where agreements with the communities could not be reached, the government was entitled to proceed with eradication. Although in these cases priority was to be given to manual eradication as a way 107

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of ensuring respect for peasants’ human and health rights, as well as of preserving the environment, the government did not “waiver its right to use the mechanisms it considers effective, including aspersion, in order to guarantee the eradication of illicit crops”.17 Given the uncertainty about the possible side effects of the herbicide on the health of the inhabitants of the sprayed areas, the CCC has framed illegal crops eradication through glyphosate aerial aspersions as a public health issue. In order to identify the specific problem, the CCC has relied on the scientific interventions in amicus curiae briefs and the technical evidence provided by the stakeholders. Given the varying findings in scientific research on glyphosate aerial aspersions, the CCC has been changing its policy preferences. It has gone from a more “preemptive” view, by which it established that the potential toxic effects of glyphosate warranted the immediate suspension of all aerial aspersion, to a “softer” view by which the precautionary principle should be limited to cases where the causal relation between aspersion and the damage can be determined with certainty. In any case, a crucial CCC decision in 201718 set some specific and mandatory parameters for the use of glyphosate aerial aspersions to prevent negative side effects on the population’s health. In contrast to previous cases where it acted as a policy maker, ordering precise measures to be adopted by the stakeholders, in this case the CCC operated as an “advisor”, offering general guidelines and principles to influence policies adopted by the other branches. This approach did not preclude the fact that, a year later, the CCC convened a public hearing in order to track the fulfillment of its guidelines in the policy-​making process on glyphosate aspersions.

Conclusion The increasing involvement of courts in the political arena has deserved much scholarly attention. Several authors have conceptualized the general phenomenon of judicialization of politics and have empirically assessed such phenomenon in various case studies and in comparative analyses. It is clear now that courts are key players in the policy-​making process. How they act as policy analysts is a much less studied field. This chapter aims to contribute to filling this gap. The study of the CCC offers a promising approach towards this aim. During almost three decades since its creation, it has been prominently active in the protection of citizens’ rights. Moreover, in certain particular areas it has actually drafted public policy. How is this policy analyzed within the CCC? Although not explicitly acknowledged by the CCC, we have described the policy analysis toolbox used by the CCC at different stages: problem identification and structuring, where the CCC has used three main tools to delineate problem situations into substantive structural problems –​ amicus curiae briefs, analysis of governmental policy-​making process, and direct justices’ visits; policy forecasting and prescribing, where the 108

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forecasting of expected policy outcomes and the prescribing of preferred policies are a product of a deliberative exercise in which judicial officials, experts, public officials and interested citizens take part and promote their views on how the problem should be solved, through public hearings or technical regional sessions; and policy monitoring and evaluation, where the CCC has relied on three main tools   –​compliance indicators, special monitoring chambers, and follow-​up reports from governmental and nongovernmental actors. Furthermore, we have emphasized how this toolbox has been used in relation to Colombia’s healthcare public policy, both in general and regarding the treatment of illicit crops, as agreed between the Santos administration and the FARC-​EP guerrilla group. This opens a promising research agenda along at least three lines. First, other studies could focus on describing the CCC analysis in different policy areas such as prisons, internal refugees and so on. Second, future research could evaluate, rather than describe, the performance of the CCC as a policy analyst. Finally, there should be comparative studies on how the policy analysis toolbox is used by courts in different countries, focusing on the impact of the institutional, political or societal contexts on judicial policy analysis. Notes 1 2 3

4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12

Previous volumes in this country series contain no chapters devoted to examining policy analysis by judicial bodies. A somewhat policy-​analytical approach to the impacts of some of the CCC’s decisions can be found in Rodríguez-​Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco (2015, ­chapter 4) USoA rulings establish the structural intervention of the CCC in those cases in which the CCC identifies a massive and systematic violation of rights. When the CCC identifies an “institutional blockage”, that is, a situation deemed to have been generated by deficiencies in the institutional arrangements of the state that cause a violation of rights of a great magnitude, it declares the existence of a USoA. As a result, the CCC takes on functions of public policy making, resource allocation, and the implementation of rights that would pertain to the legislative branch in a conventional model of separation of powers (Ariza, 2013). Since its creation, the CCC has made a USoA ruling nine times. The first time was in 1997 and the last in 2004 (Rodríguez-​ Garavito and Rodríguez-​Franco, 2010, pp 441–​2). Decision T-​153/​1998. Decision T-​025/​2004. While the CCC depends completely on the problems proposed by the constitutional complaints filed by citizens when exerting its abstract constitutional review power, it has the discretion of selecting only those concrete (tutela) cases for which it may have a special interest in revising the lower courts’ decisions. The CCC reviewed 108 tutelas that were filed in 22 cities by 1,150 displaced families with an average of four members each (Rodríguez-​Garavito, 2009) Decision T-​302 of 2017. Order A-​121 of 2018. See Defensoría del Pueblo (2004, p. 5). Decision T-​357 of 2017. Before 2008, there was a differential UPC for low-​income and high-​income citizens. The CCC ruled this difference unconstitutional and ordered the Health Ministry to create a single UPC (Decision T-​760 of 2008).

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15

16

17

18

Decision T-​357 of 2017. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (2016) Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera [Online]. Available from www.alcaldiabogota.gov. co/​sisjur/​normas/​Norma1.jsp?i=69286 [Accessed 29 May 2020]. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (2016) El Acuerdo Final de Paz. La Oportunidad para Construir Paz [Online]. Available from www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/​sisjur/​normas/​Norma1. jsp?i=69286 [Accessed 29 May 2020]. Gaviria, A. (2015) “Suspensión del Glifosato es una decisión responsable Minsalud” [Online]. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​Paginas/​Suspensi%C3%B3n-​del-​glifosato-​es-​ una-​decisi%C3%B3n-​responsable-​Minsalud.aspx [Accessed 10 May 2019]. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (2016) Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera [Online]. Available from www.alcaldiabogota.gov. co/​sisjur/​normas/​Norma1.jsp?i=69286 [Accessed 29 May 2020]. Decision T-​080 of 2017.

References Ackerman, B. (1997) “The rise of world constitutionalism”. Virginia Law Review 83: 771–​97. Ariza, L. (2013) “The economic and social rights of prisoners and Constitutional Court intervention in the penitentiary system in Colombia”. In D. Bonilla (ed.) Constitutionalism of the Global South. New  York, NY:  Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–​60. Defensoría del Pueblo. (2004). La Tutela y El Derecho a La Salud. Bogotá: Defensoría del Pueblo. Dunn, W. (2018) Public Policy Analysis:  An Integrated Approach (6th edition). New York, NY: Routledge. Epp, C. (1998) The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Epstein, L. and Knight, J. (1998) The Choices Justices Make. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Epstein, L. and Knight, J. (2013) “Reconsidering judicial preferences”. Annual Review of Political Science 16: 11–​31. Gargarella, R. (ed.) (2014) Por Una Justicia Dialógica. El Poder Judicial como Promotor de la Deliberación Democrática. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Gaviria, A. (2015) “Suspensión del Glifosato es una decisión responsable Minsalud” [Online]. Available from www.minsalud.gov.co/​Paginas/​Suspensi%C3%B3n-​ del-​glifosato-​es-​una-​decisi%C3%B3n-​responsable-M ​ insalud.aspx [Accessed 29 May 2020]. Gibson, J., Caldeira, G. and Baird, V. (1998) “On the legitimacy of national high courts”, American Political Science Review 92(2): 343–​58. Guess, G. and Farnham, P. (2011) Cases in Public Policy Analysis (3th edition). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Lamprea, E. (2015) Derechos en la Práctica: Jueces, Litigantes y Operadores de Políticas de Salud en Colombia (1991–​2014). Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.

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McCann, M. (2008) “Litigation and legal mobilization”. In K.E. Whittington, R.D. Kelemen and G.A. Caldeira (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 522–​40. Nunes, R. (2010) “Ideational origins of progressive judicial activism:  the Colombian Constitutional Court and the right to health”. Latin American Politics and Society 52(3): 67–​97. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. (2016a) Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera. Bogotá: Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. [Online]. Available from www.alcaldiabogota. gov.co/​sisjur/​normas/​Norma1.jsp?i=69286 [Accessed 29 May 2020]. Rodríguez-​Garavito, C. (2009) Más Allá del Desplazamiento: Políticas, Derechos y Superación del Desplazamiento Forzado. Bogotá: Uniandes. Rodríguez-​Garavito, C. and Rodríguez-​Franco, D. (2010) Cortes y Cambio Social. Cómo la Corte Constitucional Transformó el Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia. Bogotá: Dejusticia. Rodríguez-​Garavito, C. and Rodríguez-​Franco, D. (2015) Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Segal, J. and Spaeth, H. (2002) The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sieder, R., Schjolden, L. and Angell, A. (2005) “Introduction”. In R. Sieder, L. Schjolden and A. Angell (eds.) The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–​21. Stone Sweet, A. (2000) Governing with Judges:  Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tate, N. and Vallinder, T. (1995) The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New York, NY: New York University Press. Uprimny, R. (2006) “The enforcement of social rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court: cases and debates”. In R. Gargarella, P. Domingo and T. Roux (eds.) Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor?. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 127–​52. Vallinder, T. (1994) “The judicialization of politics: a world-​wide phenomenon. Introduction”, International Political Science Review 15(2): 91–​9. Vanberg, G. (2005) The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Metropolitan governance and policy analysis in Colombia Santiago Leyva, Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Enrique Rodríguez-​Caporalli

Introduction The process of urbanization of Colombia has led to the configuration of a highly urbanized country with a large number of urban centers across most of its territory and four different cities as main development poles. Alongside these urban centers, greater urban agglomerations have developed, creating new scales of urban interaction but also a new scope for wicked problems. Namely, Colombia has nowadays at least four metro-​regions of more than two millions inhabitants, six metropolitan areas exceeding one million inhabitants and 24 metro-​regions with more than 250,000 in habitants, a rare situation in the Latin American context where most countries’ populations tend to be concentrated in the capital city, with the exceptions, perhaps, of Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico. This has put Colombia in a good position to experiment with policy instruments related to metropolitan coordination for more than 50 years, creating several natural policy experiments whose results are of interest to policy scholars around the world. Indeed, there are several policy areas such as environmental policy, transportation, land policy and zoning, and housing policy, where it is possible to witness a growing trend in the use of metropolitan instruments in order to address problems that go beyond municipal boundaries. In spite of these developments, formal metropolitan administrative structures, and greater use of metropolitan instruments to solve policy problems, are still unevenly distributed in Colombian cities. For instance, of the three larger cities, only one has a formal, solid, metropolitan government. Likewise, only six of the 24 metro-​regions with more than 250,000 inhabitants1 have a formal metropolitan government structure. The lack of coherence of these administrative structures has proven to be an obstacle for policy consolidation, since the few cases of metropolitan governments that are in place remain as isolated local experiments, with very little action on the part of the national government to create a national policy framework for learning from these examples and create an suitable approach to metropolitan governance and interjurisdictional collaboration/​intermunicipal cooperation. The low level of consistency in metropolitan policies in Colombia shows that although a legal framework for the constitution of metropolitan governments has existed since the late 1970s, very few processes have led to the eventual consolidation of a metropolitan government structure. This lack of unified 113

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direction in metropolitan urban policies has left many large Colombian cities in a state of administrative fragmentation without a metropolitan governance framework to generate horizontal coordination or collaboration practices among the several municipalities that comprise each of those cities. Moreover, the low priority that the government has given to issues of municipal collaboration and association has led to the decision to create formal metro-​governments down to each individual metro-​region contingent on the existence of certain rare voluntary processes of metropolitan integration. Thus, it comes with no surprise that without a national guideline to promote and coordinate urban municipalities in metro-​regions, responses to conurbation remain highly uneven and fragmented. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to explain precisely why and how such a long period of 50 years of experimentation along metropolitan lines has failed to lead to a solid national and homogenous approach towards metropolitan policy analysis. Moreover, the chapter aims to highlight why it has been so difficult to generate learnings and policy spillovers throughout the 24 conurbated regions that have developed naturally in the process of urbanization and conurbation of Colombia. In order to achieve these aims, the chapter first explores the 24 metro-​regions in terms of the challenges they face given their population, municipal fragmentation and institutional capacities, dividing them into four groups. All of them, regardless of where they lie in the spectrum, illustrate our main point, that is, that metropolitan governance reforms have not received sufficient attention on the Colombian policy agenda beyond a few local cases. Nevertheless, based on this explorative comparative public policy exercise, the chapter suggests that Colombian subnational governance policies are not the product of a deliberate central policy strategy that incorporates a multilevel governance perspective to address wicked policy problems that go beyond politico-​administrative borders. In the second part of the chapter, we explain why this is the case through a path-​dependent explanation of the trajectories and critical junctures (Pierson, 2003) that have shaped Colombian metro-​policies in this very problematic way, explaining through the use of historical institutionalism why metropolitan policies are characterized by their lack of consistency and by their low level of replication. The idea is to produce a time-​based analysis of the key identifiable milestones in the use of metropolitan policy instruments in Colombia since the first formal metropolitan area emerged in the country.

Characterization of Colombian metropolitan regions and the problematic evolution of their forms of governance The Colombian public administration structure allows for two main forms of subnational governments: departments (province level) and municipalities, which are the basic unit of the politico-​administrative division. There are other less frequent forms such as special districts and metropolitan areas that have 114

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developed slowly, particularly over the past two decades. The Constitution of 1991 defined Colombia as a decentralized unitary republic and provided greater role and powers at the metropolitan level than most other figures (Sanabria, 2019). Considering their foremost role, it is therefore not surprising that Colombian municipalities have been reluctant to explore more deeply other forms of collaboration, partnership and associative schemes. As mentioned earlier, there are only six formal metropolitan governments (these formal structures are known in Colombia as “metropolitan areas”). Moreover, most of them are still de jure arrangements, rather than actual governance structures. This number (six out of 24 metro-​regions) demonstrates that for most of the larger urban areas in Colombia, metropolitan or collaborative policy making is still infrequent. Thus, it seems that association, collaboration and other models of horizontal intergovernmental relations still appear scarce in Colombia in terms of policy making. Moreover, these few successful cases in Colombia seem to be consistent with the predictions of bottom-​up or regionalist metropolitan governance theories, which argue that successful cases of metropolitan governance are frequently born of the willingness of horizontal actors to deal with their collective action dilemmas (Feiock, 2013), rather than from hierarchical, imposed, top-​down policy decisions. Indeed, the extant arrangements in Colombia emerged out of local voluntary processes that were enabled, but not motivated or compelled, by a national law. For example, the case of the metropolitan area of Valle de Aburrá (Medellín and 11 surrounding municipalities), the oldest and perhaps the most solidly formalized metropolitan area of Colombia (Sanabria, 2017), originally appeared as a local response to the wicked problems of fragmentation, rather than because of a national initiative. Hence, the combination created by both the lack of national policy guidelines and the sporadic emergence of metropolitan horizontal arrangements have elicited a rather disorganized panorama in metropolitan governance in Colombia2 that is further explained in the second section of this chapter. In consistency with this observation of lack of policy coherence, Table 7.1 shows that metropolitan outcomes in Colombia display an unsystematic process rather than being the result of a deliberate national effort to adopt collaboration and metropolitan instruments in policy analysis. The table shows the year of creation of the metropolitan government (see column 4), the number of municipalities per region, and the total population, also per region. Browsing down the table, it quickly becomes evident that five of the ten largest urban concentrations, including those of Bogotá, Cali and Cartagena, do not have any formalized metropolitan government arrangement. It also becomes clear that some of metro-​ regions with a higher number of municipalities (namely, the most fragmented) do not have a metro-​government (also, Bogotá, Cali and Cartagena) (see Table 7.1, column 5). These 24 metropolitan regions comprise most of the total urban population in Colombia, with 30.9 million inhabitants of the country’s total population of 115

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Table 7.1: Colombian metropolitan regions with more than 250,000 inhabitants Metropolitan area

Municipalities

Formal/​ informal

Year of creation

No. of municipalities

Total population

Bogotá

Bogotá, Bojacá, Cajicá, Chía, Cogua, Cota, El Rosal, La Punta Facatativá, Funza, Gachancipá, La Calera, Madrid, Mosquera, Nemocón, Soacha, Sibaté, Sopó, Subachoque, Tabio, Tenjo, Tocancipá, Zipaquirá.

Informal

N/​A

23

9,749,983

Medellín –​ Valle de Aburrá

Medellín, Barbosa, Girardota, Copacabana, Bello, Itagüí, Envigado, Sabaneta, La Estrella, Caldas.

Formal

1980

10

3,909,729

Cali

Cali, Palmira, Yumbo, Jamundí, Florida, Pradera, Candelaria, Dagua.

Informal

N/​A

8

3,247,049

Barranquilla

Barranquilla, Soledad, Galapa, Puerto Colombia, Malambo.

Formal

1981

5

2,098,966

Cartagena

Cartagena, Arjona, Clemencia, Informal Mahates, María La Baja, San Estanislao, Santa Catalina, Santa Rosa, Turbaco, Turbaná, Villanueva.

N/​A

11

1,366,845

Bucaramanga

Bucaramanga, Girón, Piedecuesta, Floridablanca.

Formal

1981

4

1,150,993

Cúcuta

Cúcuta, Los Patios, Villa del Rosario, El Zulia, San Cayetano, Puerto Santander.

Formal

1991

6

880,513

Pereira –​ Centro-​Occidente

Pereira, Dosquebradas, La Virginia. Formal

1991

3

713,640

Montería

Montería, Cereté, San Pelayo, San Carlos, Ciénaga de Oro.

Informal

N/​A

5

694,937

Villavicencio

Villavicencio, Acacías, Guamal, Restrepo, Cumaral.

Informal

N/​A

5

629,029

Ibagué

Ibagué, Cajamarca, Alvarado, Venadillo, Piedras.

Informal

N/​A

5

623,171

Valledupar

Valledupar, Agustín Codazzi, La Paz, Manaure Balcón del Cesar, San Diego.

Formal

2005

5

571,000

Manizales

Manizales, Neira, Chinchiná, Villamaría, Palestina.

Informal

N/​A

5

559,433

Urabá

Apartadó, Turbo, Chigorodó, Carepa.

Informal

N/​A

4

510,000

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Table 7.1 (continued) Santa Marta

Santa Marta, Pueblo Viejo, Ciénaga. Informal

N/​A

3

507,000

Pasto

Pasto, Chachagüí, La Florida, Nariño, Tangua, Yacuanquer.

Informal

N/​A

6

504,600

Armenia

Armenia, Calarcá, Circasia, La Tebaida, Montenegro, Salento.

Informal

N/​A

6

504,000

Neiva

Neiva, Rivera, Palermo, Tello, Campoalegre, Baraya, Aipe, Villavieja.

Informal

N/​A

8

488,000

Popayán

Popayán, El Tambo, Timbío, Cajibío, Piendamó.

Informal

N/​A

5

447,820

Sincelejo

Sincelejo, Corozal, Morroa, Los Palmitos, Sampués.

Informal

N/​A

5

416,000

Girardot

Girardot (Cundinamarca), Ricaurte Informal (Cundinamarca), Flandes (Tolima)

N/​A

3

359,000

Oriente

Rionegro, Marinilla, La Ceja, Guarne, El Carmen, Santuario.

Informal

N/​A

6

350,000

Alto Chicamocha

Sogamoso, Duitama, Paipa, Nobsa, Informal Tibasosa, Santa Rosa de Viterbo, Firavitoba, Iza.

N/​A

8

323,000

Tunja

Tunja, Sora, Soracá, Siachoque, Informal Toca, Tuta, Sotaquirá, Cómbita, Motavita, Oicatá, Chivatá, Cucaita, Samacá, Ventaquemada.

N/​A

14

250,000

163

30,854,708

Source: DANE (2010).

49.8 million citizens. Interestingly, of those 30.9 million metropolitan citizens, more than 21 million live in conurbated areas with no institutionalized form of metro-​ government. Furthermore, of the total 1,101 municipalities in Colombia, only 163 municipalities (14.8% of the total) exist under any metropolitan collaborative arrangement. In other words, only 3% of the municipalities in Colombia exist under some formal metropolitan structure. These figures serve exemplify the relatively low level of importance conferred by national and subnational governments alike on metropolitan governance structures as policy tools. It seems that, in Colombia, mayors and local public administrators do not consider metropolitan level tools as useful in their policy-​making processes, in spite of the increasing presence of wicked trans-​municipal problems regarding environmental issues, security, mobility and transport, and social policy, to mention but a few. Furthermore, only until recently has the national government started including new associative schemes as an alternative policy tool in local government collaboration (DNP, 2013).

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Characterization of metropolitan governance in Colombia: limited success and extensive failure In this section, we outline a qualitative composite indicator that comprises metropolitan information derived from three variables. We aim to expose the variance in structures and tools of metropolitan governance across the 24 urban agglomerations in Colombia. Our analysis shows that metropolitan government forms in Colombia are unevenly distributed. This indicator allows for a streamlined measure of “metropolitan pressure” (that is, the need to respond to policy problems through metropolitan structures/​tools). The indicator (see Table  7.2, column 5) helps us to characterize the 24 cases in terms of the tensions that these cities experience in local governance due to the lack (or presence) of metropolitan arrangements. In order to operationalize the indicator, we assigned three scores in each of the following cases: metropolitan institutional strength (Table 7.2, column 2);3 the number of municipalities (Table 7.2, column 3);4 and the size of the city’s population (Table 7.2, column 3).5 We then summed up those three scores so as to get a composite indicator that works as a proxy of the level of metropolitan pressure. The lower the indicator, the more critical (and less institutionalized) the situation of the metropolitan region. This could be so either because the population is large, lacks a metropolitan government, or has many municipalities (or all three combined in the worst-​case scenario). Conversely, the higher the score, the lower the level of metropolitan pressure, either because the metro-​ region already has a metro-​government, because its population is moderate, or because it is concentrated in only a few municipalities. Although it could be argued that this index is extremely simple, it helps both to operationalize the concept of metropolitan pressure and to classify cities in a sort of typology according to their use of metropolitan policy structures and tools. For instance, group 1 (see Table 7.2) comprises those metropolitan areas that are legally constituted, are not fragmented in many municipalities, and do not have demographic tensions due to their small or medium size. Groups 2 and 3 include conurbations that either have a formal structure but face stringent population pressures, or that do not have a formal structure but compensate for this by exhibiting relatively low fragmentation. The index also allows us to distinguish the most acute cases that appear to demand collaborative arrangements with their surrounding municipalities in order to enhance the use of metropolitan policy analysis tools, namely those of Bogotá, Santiago de Cali and Cartagena de Indias (Table 7.2, group 4). In the next section, we explore some of these cases of interest in order to identify some aspects that may have hindered the institutionalization of a metropolitan area and the adoption of metropolitan tools of policy analysis.

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Table 7.2: Composite indicator of metropolitan pressure Metropolitan region

Metropolitan institutional strength

Indicator of municipal fragmentation

Indictaor of population pressure

Global indicador

Group

Pereira –​ Centro-​ Occidente

10

10

5

25

Grupo 1

Bucaramanga

10

10

–​

20

Grupo 1

Cúcuta

10

5

5

20

Grupo 1

Valledupar

10

5

5

20

Grupo 1

Girardot

0

10

10

20

Grupo 1

Medellín –​ Valle de Aburrá

15

0

–​

15

Grupo 2

Barranquilla

10

5

–​

15

Grupo 2

Urabá

0

10

5

15

Grupo 2

Santa Marta

0

10

5

15

Grupo 2

Neiva

0

5

10

15

Grupo 2

Popayán

0

5

10

15

Grupo 2

Sincelejo

0

5

10

15

Grupo 2

Oriente

0

5

10

15

Grupo 2

Alto Chicamocha

0

5

10

15

Grupo 2

Montería

0

5

5

10

Grupo 3

Villavicencio

0

5

5

10

Grupo 3

Ibagué

0

5

5

10

Grupo 3

Manizales

0

5

5

10

Grupo 3

Pasto

0

5

5

10

Grupo 3

Armenia

0

5

5

10

Grupo 3

Tunja

0

0

10

10

Grupo 3

Bogotá

0

0

–​

–​

Grupo 4

Santiago de Cali Cartagena de Indias

0 0

0 0

–​ –​

–​ –​

Grupo 4 Grupo 4

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

Where has metropolitan analysis been missed in Colombia? The case of Bogotá The presence of Bogotá, Santiago de Cali and Cartagena de Indias in group 4 is concerning in terms of the implications for solving wicked problems that affect

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several municipalities and high proportions of the population. The case of Greater Bogotá (with a population of almost 10 million inhabitants, 19 municipalities and one capital district) seems the most acute. This area is one of the most populated metropolitan regions in Latin America and shows a very high level of municipal fragmentation, and no formal or informal structures to deal with metropolitan pressure or with its wicked common problems (pollution, insecurity, traffic congestion, among others).6 The Bogotá case epitomizes the negative effects of lacking a national-​level metropolitan policy in Colombia, but also reflects lack of horizontal local will to cooperate among neighboring municipalities. These policy shortfalls to tackle wicked problems through collaborative metropolitan arrangements are very worrisome in a city that is classified as the most congested in the world and one of the most polluted. It is not surprising that many of Bogotá’s most stringent policy problems (transport and mobility, security and crime, environmental sustainability, among others) have historically been discussed with a distinct lack of metropolitan perspective. Throughout its history, Greater Bogotá has been the subject of several administrative reforms. One key structural change took place in the 1950s, when a military government consolidated six surrounding municipalities under a unified hierarchical government, an enforced, top-​down integration initiative that gave origin to the “special district of Bogotá”. Although for several decades this institutional design helped the city to cope with its rapid demographic growth, in the past 30 years the expansion towards the surrounding municipalities on the savanna of Bogotá has demonstrated the need for new metropolitan institutions that so far have not emerged. Thus, the continuous growth and expansion of the conurbated area to the surrounding savanna and its growing links to other Colombian departments (Cundinamarca, Meta and Huila), means that today the Bogotá metropolitan region exceeds by far the old “capital district” and that more stringent problems have appeared. Although under a new legal framework a special administrative region was created,7 most wicked problems at the metropolitan level, such as mobility and transport, security and crime, environmental risks and pollution, among others, remain high on the governmental agendas of all the municipalities surrounding the capital district of Bogotá. This all highlights that the adoption of a metropolitan governance structure in Bogotá appears to be one of the largest unachieved goals of policy making in Colombia. Where has metropolitan policy analysis worked in Colombia? The case of Medellín An interesting, contrasting, case to Bogotá is that of Medellín (a large city with a strong metro-​government comprising ten independent municipalities) and its metropolitan area, the Aburrá Valley. The Aburrá Valley Metropolitan Area (Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá –​AMVA) is probably the most successful case of metro-​government in the country (Sanabria, 2017). As 120

Metropolitan governance and policy analysis

opposed to Bogotá, this metropolitan region never experienced the kind of forced consolidation that Bogotá underwent during the 1950s. On the other hand, the consolidation of Medellín’s AMVA metropolitan area has been a bottom-​up institutional innovation from the municipal governments in order to cope with their problems beyond the resources of hierarchical management (Zapata, 2018). Moreover, as a result of widespread urban unrest in Medellín the 1980s, the city’s elites were more willing to explore new forms of metropolitan governance arrangement and subsequently more complex types of policy analysis. In this way, almost straight after the congressional approval of Law 61, 1978 opened a policy window for the creation of metropolitan areas, local political elites created Colombia’s first metro-​government, AMVA, in 1979. This case of metropolitan integration is remarkable for the country considering that, after almost 40 years since its creation, AMVA remains the central institutional arrangement for tackling key urban problems in areas such as planning, transport, public utilities and the environment, among others. Moreover, metropolitan policy analysis has been expanding in this metro-​region to cover newer policy areas where there is no specific delegation of top-​down authority and where all collective action depends on the horizontal willingness for cooperation (see, for example, Gallego et al, 2018, for the case of an interesting metropolitan security policy). Another cluster of interesting cases contrasting with the experience of unachieved metropolitan governance structures and tools are those in group 1 (Table 7.2, column 6). All these cases are located at the other extreme of the metropolitan governance spectrum. As seen in Table 7.2, they have institutional arrangements that are relatively developed, although they do not face urgent demographic pressures. This group comprises the medium-​sized cities of Pereira, Bucaramanga, Cúcuta and Valledupar8 (all of which have already formally created metropolitan areas), unlike the larger cities of Bogotá, Cartagena de Indias and Santiago de Cali. However, the former cities still appear to be at different levels of progress, particularly in terms of adopting metropolitan policy analysis as the de facto scale of policy analysis, and extending it to newer areas as has happened in the case of Medellín. The other groups in the typology, although reflecting other points on the spectrum and hence a certain level of metropolitan analysis adoption, confirm our main point, that is, that metropolitan governance reforms have not been given sufficient consideration in the Colombian policy agenda beyond a few local cases. This might allow us to argue that, since a metropolitan perspective has not appeared to be a key policy tool in Colombia, several wicked policy problems at the metropolitan level perhaps remain neglected and ill attended in a high number of urban agglomerations. All in all, this explorative comparative public policy exercise leads us to suggest that Colombian policies to address transborder problems at the municipal level have not been the byproduct of a deliberate central policy strategy that incorporates a multilevel governance perspective to address public problems. In the following pages, we explain the evolution of Colombian 121

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metropolitan policy analysis capacity, characterized by a lack of consistency and a low level of replication across the territory.

The origins of metropolitan policy analysis in Colombia In order to explain the evolution and current state of metropolitan policies in Colombia, we draw on historical institutionalism (see Hall, 2003, Pierson, 2003). In doing so, our goal is to explore the potential causal effects of different key moments, ranging from the institutional (regulatory) developments in the late 1960s –​which should have encouraged the formalization of metropolitan governance structures –​to more current regulatory and policy moves that have also aimed for similar changes, but have so far only delivered partial results. In this vein, this section of the chapter assumes that, in order to fully characterize and understand the development of an institutional trajectory, such the formation of metro-​governments in Colombia, it is important to disentangle the effects of “path dependence”. This is a useful construct for understanding the impact on policy results of earlier events, as Hall has asserted: “… a key development in the distant past often affects a case so deeply that it alters the impact of subsequent developments there …” (Hall, 2003, p. 385). But it also accepts that path dependence should not be limited to the trajectory created by an initial event, since in the road to the present time there could also be key events that affect, or most importantly, change such trajectory. Accordingly, as Hall (2003) suggests, these new changes “occur mainly at critical junctures that are broadly transformative in character or at multiple points in time, with effects that are initially incremental but increase over time” (Hall, 2003, p. 385). Applying such theoretical framework appears useful in analyzing the process of policy formation of metropolitan governance arrangements in Colombia. According to the evolution, it is possible to observe a strong path dependency towards centralization throughout the 20th century. Such a trend, manifested in the ways that the national government dealt with urban problems by prioritizing forms of direct top-​down intervention (such as national-​level agencies and subnational agencies) (Bejarano and Segura, 1996; Leyva, 2018). Indeed, despite the intense process of urbanization that Colombia experienced after the 1950s, the development of local institutions remained a neglected policy area, reflected in the fact that Colombian urban laws remained largely unchanged during most of the 20th century. Indeed, up until 1986, Colombian cities continued to be governed under the municipal code of 1913 (Law 4, 1913), which was designed for running small distant towns in what was then a mostly rural country. In this long trajectory, one of the critical junctures that altered the trajectory came, as mentioned earlier, with the consolidation under a single administration of Bogotá with six neighboring municipalities (Engativá, Fontibón, Suba, Usme, Usaquén and Bosa). The creation of the Special District of Bogotá in 1954 as part of the measures of the military government9 reinforced the idea that the

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perils of localities could only be solved by the central government, creating a new form of strong hierarchy. A decade later, from 1966 to 1968, the national government of President Lleras-​ Restrepo (1966–​70) advocated in Congress a very ambitious constitutional reform to redesign the state along strong lines of traditional public administration that emphasized presidentialism, hierarchization, burocratization and centralization. Such reforms somehow continued the path-​dependent trajectory of centralization, even though they brought some legal opportunities to adopt new forms for metro-​governments. An amendment to the 1886 Constitution involved the creation of the metropolitan level through the inclusion in the Constitution of article 198 with the following text: “In order to optimize the administration or provision of public services of two or more municipalities of the same department, whose relations create a metropolitan area, the law may organize them … under special authorities and regimes …” (Political Constitution of Colombia, 1886, Constitutional Reform of 1968). Although the reform kept centralization and hierarchization as defining traits, it delegated the power to provincial governors (who by the time were directly appointed by the President and acted under his direct instructions)10 to propose to the provincial assemblies the creation of metropolitan governments. This implied that both the central government and the President never really assumed such topic in the policy agenda, and accordingly never designed a national policy for it. Given this lack of interest of the national government, the metropolitan governance agenda did not advance much in the 1970s. Indeed, the priority of the national government in those years was to formulate and implement centralized policy changes at the national scale (Bejarano and Segura, 1996), creating new national agencies and expanding basic services such as education and sanitation, all of them based on the centralized action of national-​level organizations (Leyva, 2018). However, a critical juncture that would eventually alter such trajectory appeared in the late 1970s, as many cities experienced large civic demonstrations expressing citizen’s dissatisfaction with the state, including the famous 1977 strike that paralyzed all of urban Colombia for several days (Falleti, 2005). These urban protests originated in increasing popular mobilizations around the poor quality of public services (Collins, 1988). They were also related to the growing influence of guerrilla groups and social movements, particularly in the peripheries of cities where most displaced people from rural areas were arriving, demanding goods and services from the local public administrations. The demonstrations and the social unrest created pressure for the national government to delve into aspects of urban development, local government and social policy implementation in the territory, which certainly related to metropolitan issues. Accordingly, the government of President Turbay (1978–​82) led in Congress the discussion of an Urban Development Law (Law 61, 1978), which included a mandate “to improve the economic, social, cultural and ecological conditions of cities” (Law 61, 1978) in Colombia. This new law issued a mandate for the president to produce a code for “municipalities with the characteristics 123

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of a metropolitan area”, including “the procedures for their organization and administration” (Law 61, 1978, art. 3). To that end, this law assigned special powers to the President, allowing him to regulate directly the creation of such metropolitan governments (areas). Responding to this mandate, President Turbay issued the Decree 3104 of 1979. This decree ruled on the administrative structure of metropolitan areas,11 including the metropolitan board12, the fiscal structure, its responsibilities and controls, and the different policy functions (policies and plans in land development, public services, zoning, construction, land use, and tax matters). The decree also fixed the requirements for any metropolitan area to be created, demanding “that the group of municipalities have a population of more than 300,000 inhabitants and that the population of the main municipality is not less than 250,000 inhabitants” (Decree 3104, 1979, art. 2). All in all, the new rules did not define any specific function for the national government in terms of its actual policy role in the creation and implementation/​ management of new metropolitan government arrangements. Seemingly, this was an initial step in catalyzing their creation, but little attention was given to key implementing aspects such as the actual role of national and subnational governments in the creation of those areas and in the recognition and inclusion in the institutional agenda of wicked trans-​urban problems. Even less discussed was the need for designing/​appointing a national administrative apparatus with responsibility for promoting and strengthening these new metro-​governments. In fact, the Presidency only authorized the creation of the metropolitan areas of Medellín, Santiago de Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga and Pereira, although it left their actual creation to the initiative of the governor of each department. This was how, in response to local processes, the AMVA was created in 1980, followed in 1981 by the metropolitan areas of Barranquilla, Bucaramanga and Pereira (the latter known as the Metropolitan Area of the West Center). In fact, rather than clear policy orientations for structures that allow collaborative, horizontal processes of policy analysis and formulation, these reforms were made under the assumption that what it was needed was hierarchy and authority. In fact, these efforts aimed to reform urban policy making and administration through the advent of one powerful local mayor (and the subsequent weakening of the neighboring municipalities), under a top-​down, non-​collaborative vision of what a metropolitan area ought to be, whereby power was concentrated on the President and the mayor of the most populated urban area. Up to this point, Colombia was following a path of hierarchical consolidation of cities, omitting key aspects for urban, collaborative policy making such as horizontal integration and collaboration. Therefore, it is not surprising to observe almost 40 years later that such a legal framework only produced very partial results in five metro-​regions and, more importantly, failed to introduce policy analysis structures and tools at the metropolitan level in important city regions such as Bogotá, Santiago de Cali or Cartagena de Indias.

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The rise of the municipality and the downgrading of metropolitan policy analysis In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ideas of “centralization” and “hierarchization” gradually were eroded as the favored policy implementation traits. This was probably the result of other parallel trends that claimed greater regional autonomy and decentralization. As mentioned earlier, rapid urbanization and massive urban unrest created a critical conjuncture for urban reform in Colombia after 1975. In fact, the government of Alfonso López-​Michelsen (1974–​78) saw a new focus for the subnational government agenda in the country, aiming to provide greater autonomy for subnational governments. The Lopez administration launched an ambitious reform strategy for departments and municipal governments, with a clear intention to challenge excessive centralization and the reliance on the national government to address key policy issues. In order to provide municipalities with more power and autonomy, López initially promoted a Constituent Assembly that sought to reduce the responsibilities of the central and regional governments and to give more responsibility to municipalities, seeking to devolve national services such as “… local health services, primary education, urban road transit and street maintenance, local telephony, local energy distribution; construction of neighborhood roads and conservation of roads different from the main roads and cross roads, recreation and parks” (López, 1977, p. 38). Thus, as reported by Leyva (2018), the reform intended to bring “public choice” theories of government to Colombia. In brief, this implied that in some sectors the idea of ​​municipalism was gaining strength, while that of strong national bureaucracies was weakening. This was reflected precisely in López’s belief that municipalities should be the “basic territorial units” (López, 1977, cited in Botero, 1983 p. 39). Accordingly, the López reform in 1976 tried to merge the existing 899 municipalities “into 464 new municipalities” (Bird, 1984, p. 286). In addition, following the US model, López wanted to create new municipal districts of supra-​municipal character to provide “services such as primary education, local health services, and local roads” (Bird, 1984, p. 286). Moreover, in clear public choice fashion, the reform sought to abolish many national entities that had been created since the 1940s, while also transferring these responsibilities and resources to larger municipalities and districts. But against all expectations, the Constitutional Assembly was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice in 1977 (Botero, 1983). This legal obstacle meant that none of these reforms took place as new articles in the Constitution, although this did not mean that the reform ultimately failed. Indeed, López’s views of urban reform in Colombia were extremely successful in changing the imaginary of how urban policy and management ought to be conducted (Leyva, 2018). It is possible to argue that, from that moment on, the public agenda was filled with passionate, localist views of decentralization, which were very much biased in favor of municipalities over any other form 125

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of local government, including both departments and metropolitan areas, thus affecting the possibilities of the latter levels of governance to gain importance in the following decades. Those years also witnessed the arrival of the Mission of Intergovernmental Finance,13 chaired by Richard Bird, an American professor of public finance, then working at Harvard’s Law School. The mission provided a complete different narrative as to how Colombian urban policies should be implemented,14 helping to promote the ideas of localism and decentralization, and endorsing the idea that it was necessary to devolve many responsibilities and resources to local municipalities. Moreover, the mission advocated strongly for the adoption of democratic elections of mayors for cities with more than one million inhabitants. This facilitated in the following years the emergence of new local reforms in fiscal15 and political terms, including them as part of the constitutional reform of 1986 (Legislative Act 01, 1986), which enacted the general election of municipal mayors (the first local election took place in 1988). Yet, it quickly became obvious that the new political framework weakened the roles of existing metropolitan areas and that it made even more difficult to start new ones. Hence, instead of adopting the idea of the intergovernmental mission, which recommended that only the mayors of cities over one million people should be democratically elected, the reform expanded this decision to all municipalities, exacerbating the dangers of political fragmentation in a multi-​municipality metropolitan region. Moreover, Law 131 of 1994 established that the campaign proposal of the elected candidate of each municipality should become a legal mandate that guided policy formulation in each city or town. Thus, local democracy, and political fragmentation, was prioritized over metropolitan convergence or collaboration. Finally, after all these small incremental changes, the big critical juncture came in 1991 with the enactment of a new Constitution. It was designed under the assumption that the greatest urban problem in Colombian was the “excessive” centralization of the state, propelling the municipality as the most powerful cell of public administration (Sanabria, 2019), and sidelining the issues of metropolitan fragmentation. Moreover, the 1991 Constitution abandoned the idea of promoting municipal integrations and mergers (as the one planned under the López reform), and somehow encouraged the creation of new municipalities (dividing the existing ones). It also established Colombian municipalities as the axis for the implementation of urban and social policies, and devolved responsibilities and resources to municipalities to the point that Colombia moved from corner to corner in terms of intergovernmental relations. As Bird and Acosta (2003, p. 5) argue: “Colombia is not a federal country, but few countries in the world have changed from being essentially centralized to being largely decentralized in fiscal terms as rapidly as Colombia did in the latter third of the 20th century.” This meant that by 2004, Colombia had moved to be the third most decentralized country in Latin America in terms of subnational expenditure as a percentage of total national expenditures (Daughters and Harper, 2007) and one of the countries in the region with the most resources directly managed by 126

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subnational units (Sanabria, 2015). This implied that urban reforms after 1991 were shaped under a very fragmented and localistic perspective. In brief, the Constitution brought a series of reforms that imposed a more neoliberal type of urban policy, based on municipal decentralization, public choice and NPM ideas, creating a highly individualized municipal administration and ruling out alternative policy tools related to collaboration and integration. In addition to this, the 1991 Constitution foresaw a much weaker metropolitan government (area), with no constitutional protection, and much smaller capacity for guiding metropolitan development and policy analysis.16 In fact, Law 128 of 1994 gave a seat in the metropolitan board to all the mayors of the cities included under metropolitan jurisdiction. This change affected the development of the previous conception of metropolitan governments (areas), since it eroded the powers of the mayor of the largest city of the metropolitan area to exert direct control in the neighboring municipalities over issues relating to public utilities, zoning, construction, land use and tax matters. In terms of policy making, the reform also curtailed the capacity of the planning unit of the main city to subsume the tasks of all other municipalities in the metropolitan area. Moreover, the reforms also created the CNP, a planning council whereby all the planning secretaries of the member municipalities would advise the metropolitan authority on general planning. It also specified that all projects had to be approved by absolute majority of the board and CNP. It also created the figure of metropolitan manager (gerente metropolitano), appointed by the board from a list of three candidates presented by the mayor of the biggest city. Consequently, the reforms reduced the importance of the former figure of the metropolitan mayor, and totally eclipsed the importance of the director of planning of the biggest municipality. This implied that the issue of the 1991 Constitution, with its “municipalist” bias, weakened the metropolitan figure by the very changes that aimed to regulate metropolitan governance, but also by the strengthening of the position and constitutional importance of municipalities. Furthermore, in terms of planning and zoning, the reforms in the 1990s reduced the power of the metropolitan authority to only issuing general planning regulations. The new law also retained the faculty of defining the metropolitan infrastructure, but in the context of independent planning offices of each municipality. It also included the faculty of defining a metropolitan roads and highways plan, defining metropolitan projects (and reserving land for this purpose), and becoming involved in the provision of housing, public services and environmental issues. It also gave the metropolitan board the power to define “metropolitan ordinance” (hechos metropolitanos).17 However, it should be noted that Law 128 of 1994 did not give the metropolitan manager any power to sanction mayors not complying with the planning regulations. Moreover, as the metropolitan board itself was formed by the mayors of all the member municipalities, the new figure of the metropolitan manager acted more as an agent than as an authority.

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Furthermore, the 1991 Constitution did not confer any significant role on the metropolitan figure within the decentralized structure. In fact, the national government does not send any transfers to metropolitan authorities, with most transfers going to finance municipalities. Moreover, the 1991 Constitution reassigned the main source of metropolitan income (the surcharge on property tax) to the environmental authority (a separate entity from the metropolitan area in Colombia), thus seriously affecting the sustainability of metropolitan organizations. This change was confirmed by the CCC in 2001 (Constitutional Court, Ruling C-​1096, 2001), confirming that only when the metropolitan authority functioned also an environmental authority could it retain that source of income. This series of events could have implied the dismantlement of any metropolitan governance structure in Colombia. Yet, although the 1991 Constitution was a critical juncture that confirmed the pro-​municipal path in Colombia’s multilevel governance, it did not completely rule out the metropolization trajectory. First of all, all the metro-​governments created before 1991 have survived, although with less power and fewer resources. Moreover, two more metro-​governments were created in the early 1990s (Centro-​Occidente and Cúcuta) and one more in 2005 (Valledupar). But these changes imply that, since the 1990s, the central government has been even less interested in metropolitan issues than before. Indeed, intergovernmental policy problems related to fragmentation became old fashioned, and fragmentation itself started to be seen as the cure for many problems such as red tape, bureaucratism, lack of efficiency and weak democracy. Indeed, by retaining fragmentation and pushing forward a local government agenda, many believed that most urban problems could be solved. In this way, just as in previous years, the national government did not establish an office or a team of people in charge of metropolitan issues. This meant that the path dependence remained strong and, accordingly, the metropolitan areas that pre-​existed the reforms, and those that emerged with them, all had to survive by themselves. More recently, a new juncture emerged, although not a very strong one. After many years of neglect, the government of President Santos put the metropolitan issues on the agenda once again. Indeed, it promoted in Congress a new law to update that of 1994 (Law 1625, 2013). This new law extended metropolitan policy functions to 18 different aspects in the areas of transport, land planning, housing, utilities, public works and environmental issues such as air and water pollution.18 Moreover, the new law also provided the metropolitan board with the capacity to expand its functions to every conceivable issue with justifiable metropolitan underpinnings, by expanding the significance of what could be defined as metropolitan ordinance. But, as often happens with bottom-​up mechanisms that are given too many functions, it is difficult to transform these competencies into real policy implementation, since approval by the metropolitan board is required for any of these policy functions to be enacted. This implies that the mayors of the member municipalities have to align themselves with the regulations and interventions 128

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that could affect their own municipalities.19 Moreover, the new law in 2013 did not afford any new sources of income, nor did it consider the metropolitan areas as eligible for receiving any of the decentralization resources that in Colombia account for an significant portion of the national budget. This generosity in allocating functions, without any real concern for institutional strengthening and funding, casts doubt on the possibility of this later reform constituting a strong departure from a trajectory of erratic development of metropolitan governance in Colombia.

Conclusion In summary, although metropolitan policy discussions have been around in Colombia for nearly 50  years, metropolitan institutions have never been considered as key policy tools in multilevel governance in Colombia. Historically, metropolitan governance has been neglected and subjugated to the leading role of the nation (before the 1980s) and of municipalities (after the 1991 Constitution). Moreover, one could say that the approach to metropolitan issues has always followed a de jure path dependence, where some legal policy instruments are issued, but rarely move to the fields of public administration and public policy implementation. Although it is interesting that six metro-​governments still exist, it is important to notice that of the three larger cities, only one (Medellín) has a formal metropolitan government. This lack of consistency in the type of structure that deal with metropolitan policy processes reflects the absence of an urban metropolitan policy framework or national policy guidelines in order to help or encourage the formalization of metropolitan government arrangements in the Colombian case. Indeed, although the national government has been willing to regulate metro-​ governments on several occasions, it has not developed a capacity to coordinate a network of metro-​governments that could serve as a bridge between the national level and the 163 municipalities described in the part of the chapter. Moreover, at the last important policy juncture that came with the formulation of the 1991 Constitution, the trend towards municipalization implied that interest in metropolitan areas was even lower than before. These interesting developments actually imply that Colombia has been a fertile ground for institutional experimentation in metropolitan governance. Moreover, unlike many other countries where such issues remain hypothetical or completely evaded by the reforms of the 1990s, Colombia still has six metropolitan areas, some of which have existed for almost 40  years. Yet, considering the high level of municipal autonomy, one could say that the policy analysis benefits of metropolitan governance are still very limited in this country. Indeed, the main issue in the Colombian case is that metropolitan areas or governments have been understood as a figure of public law, rather than a policy tool. This implies that very little consideration has been given to intermunicipal wicked problems, to the

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intergovernmental relation across municipal authorities, and to other policy tools such as policy collaboration, integration and horizontal co-​creation, and so on. Moreover, we conclude that Colombia has not really learned much, in terms of policy analysis and formulation of integrated solutions to metropolitan wicked problems, from its experience of metropolitan forms over more than 50 years. Indeed, although there have been interesting developments such as the AMVA, such examples have not been conveyed nationally to improve metropolitan policy making. More worrisome is that all these policy lessons still cannot be transferred to help the other 18 metro-​regions, without proper metro-​governance structures at hand. This implies that Colombia has very limited policy analysis capacity at the trans-​municipal level, and continues to use a very casuistic approach (case-​ by-​case policy), through a very deep municipally fragmented model, to try to solve its wicked urban-​regional problems. Notes 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

We have assumed that a metropolitan region is a conurbated (or very closely located) group of municipalities, a total of more than 250,000 inhabitants. The first metropolitan government in Colombia was created in 1980 to coordinate planning efforts in nine municipalities around the Medellín region under the name Aburrá Valley. The second metropolitan area in Colombia, Centro-​Occidente, appeared in 1981, followed in the same year by two more metropolitan governments, Bucaramanga and Barranquilla, and finally, some years later those of Cúcuta (1991) and Valledupar (2005). After that, and despite the national metropolitan law being reformulated in 2013 (Ley 1625 de 2013), no further metropolitan areas have been created. Therefore, as is very common in Colombia, legal efforts were not matched by public policy efforts, meaning that very little change (in national terms) has taken place in the past two decades. Here we allocated 15 points to metropolitan regions with metro-​governments that were at the same time environmental, transport and planning authorities, and 10 points to those regions with only two types of competencies. Finally, we gave a score of 0 to all those other regions with no form of metro-​government. In this column, headed “Indicator of municipal fragmentation”, we assigned a score of 10 to those metropolitan regions with less than five municipalities, a score of 5 to those between five and nine, and a score of 0 to those with ten or more municipalities. In this column, headed “Indicator of population pressure”, we assigned a score of 10 to those metro-​regions with less than 500,000 thousand inhabitants, 5 to those with between 500,000 and one million inhabitants, and of 0 to any metro-​region with more than one million inhabitants. Another example, alongside Bogotá, of a big city without any metropolitan arrangements is Cali and its nearby municipalities, which is the third most populated metropolitan region in the country. This is despite some scholars strongly arguing the case for a metropolitan governance structure in Cali (Sanabria and Rodríguez, 2017). This is known as Special Administrative and Planning Region (RAP-​E) of the Central Region of Colombia, which includes the capital district of Bogotá and the departments (regions) of Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Huila, Meta and Tolima. In 1981, the respective departments created the metro-​governments of Barranquilla and Bucaramanga, which have also shown notable development of administrative capacity at the metropolitan level in areas such as environmental issues, mobility, public utilities, public space administration, economic development and housing, among others. Later on, in 1991, the

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9 10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17 18

metropolitan areas of Pereira, Valledupar and Cucuta appeared, which, although smaller than the previously analyzed areas, have also advanced in different issues of metropolitan governance. This was the only dictatorship that Colombia experienced in the 20th century, and it lasted for four years only. This reform to the 1886 Constitution included the following text:  “It corresponds to the departmental assemblies, under the initiative of the Governor, … to organize the metropolitan entities that are to be created” (Legislative Act 01, 1968). This reform also gave the mayor and council of the largest city (municipality in the metropolitan urban center) a great deal of power over their counterparts in other municipalities in the same area. The rationality behind ​​these new metropolitan areas was to bring more order and cohesion to urban development policies in Colombia. But the most important thing about this decree was that it gave the mayor of the main city (which in turn was directly appointed by the President) the role of metropolitan mayor and president of the metropolitan board. That is to say, the metro-​governments would have no director other than the mayor of the main city. In turn, the mayor of the main city would be the one regulating the decrees of the metropolitan board and carrying out the projects defined by it. In turn, the junta would comprise the same metropolitan mayor, a representative of the city councils of the member municipalities, a representative of the mayors (other than the main mayor), and one more representative of the council of the core municipality. In short, it was a board in which power was concentrated on the core municipality and its mayor. The metropolitan board also had responsibility for defining rules of territorial ordering for all municipalities, including “general zoning, urbanization and construction norms” (Decree 3104 of 1979, art. 6), as well as establishing instruments for the control of land use. The board also defined a road plan for public services in all municipalities and established their master plans, which could even result in the metropolitan authority becoming involved in the provision of public services. Likewise, the metropolitan area had the opportunity to become involved in tax matters, in the definition of tax statutes and in the collection of some types of taxes. Finally, the board could even set standards to force administrative coordination on the topics they defined. The Mission of Intergovernmental Finance was initiated at the end of President Lopez’s tenure, and delivered its results in 1981 under President Turbay (1978–​82). In brief, the mission suggested that “the level in which Colombia provides in a national basis what are essentially local services, has gone too far, even from an efficiency point of view” (Bird, 1984, quoted in Leyva, 2018, p. 32). It should also be noted that Law 14 of 1983, which intended to modernize local finances in Colombia, created a surcharge on the municipal property tax in those municipalities where metropolitan areas existed. That surtax could be up to 2 x 1000 of the property registry value. These resources could be used by metropolitan areas to finance “the various programs in favor of the municipalities that comprise them” (Law 14 of 1983, art. 17). This implied that the resources, which could be added to valuation taxes (for special projects), were freely available to the board, for any of its activities. The effects of these reforms have been barely studied in Colombia from the point of view of the effects that this had on the quality and capacity of urban policies. Indeed, the literature has ignored the fact that as a result of the reforms metropolitan areas ceased to be true supra-​ municipal authorities, and took on a new role, much like an agency of the type proposed by the NPM, as is indeed the case with their environmental functions. That is, policy issues in any field that have a metropolitan impact and that can be defined by the metropolitan board at will. This new law extended metropolitan policy functions to 18 different activities, including formulating a metropolitan plan, issuing a general zoning plan, coordinating the provision of public housing at the metropolitan scale, creating a land bank for future projects, intervening in public utilities both in regulation and provision, investing in public works of metropolitan

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19

scale, acting as the environmental authority, formulating metropolitan mobility policy, planning urban mass transportation policy, acting as the transportation authority, and formulating plans for parks and urban greening. As a novelty, the new law also included a representative of the national government on the board, but without capacity to vote.

References Bejarano, A.M. and Segura, R. (1996) “El fortalecimiento selectivo del Estado durante el Frente Nacional”. Revista Controversia 169: 9–​35. Bird, R. (1984) Intergovernmental Finance in Colombia: Final Report of the Mission on Intergovernmental Finance. Boston, MA: Harvard Law School. Bird, R. and Acosta, O. (2003) The Dilemma of Decentralization in Colombia, ITP Paper 0404. Toronto: University of Toronto. Botero, C. (1983) Propuestas sobre Descentralización en Colombia. Bogotá: CIDER. Universidad de los Andes. Collins, C. (1988) “Local government and urban protest in Colombia”. Public Administration and Development 8(4): 421–​36. Constitutional Court, Ruling C-​1096 (2001) 17 October [MP. Jaime Córdoba Triviño]. DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística) (2010) General Census of 2005. Bogotá: DANE. Daughters, R. and Harper, L. (2007) “Fiscal and political decentralisation reforms”. In E. Lora (ed.) (2007) The State of State Reforms in Latin America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press/​Inter-​American Development Bank, pp. 213–​62. Decree 3104,1979 (14 December 1979)  Por el cual se dictan normas para la organización y funcionamiento de las áreas metropolitanas. Diario Oficial No. 35.432. DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) (2013) Balance Preliminar de los Procesos Asociativos en Colombia. Bogotá: DNP. Falleti, T.G. (2005) “A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in comparative perspective”. American Political Science Review 99(3): 327–​46. Feiock, R.C. (2013) “The institutional collective action framework”. Policy Studies Journal 41(3): 397–​425. Gallego, L., Leyva, S. and Mesa, J. (eds.) (2018) Seguridad Ciudadana desde la Gobernanza Metropolitana: El Caso del Valle de Aburrá. Medellín: Editorial EAFIT/​ AMVA. Hall, P. (2003) “Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research”. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 373–​404. Law 4, 1913 (20 August 1913)  Sobre régimen político y municipal. Diario Oficial No. 15.012. Law 61, 1978 (8 December 1978) Ley Orgánica del Desarrollo Urbano. Diario Oficial No. 35.173.

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Law 14, 1983 (6 July 1983) Por la cual se fortalecen los fiscos de las entidades territoriales y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial No. 36.288. Law 131, 1994 (9 May 1986) Por la cual se reglamenta el voto programático y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial No. 41.351. Law 128, 1994 (23 February 1986) Por la cual se expide la Ley Orgánica de las Áreas Metropolitanas. Diario Oficial No. 41.236. Law 1625, 2013 (29 April 2013) Por la cual se deroga la Ley Orgánica 128 de 1994 y se expide el Régimen para las Áreas Metropolitanas. Diario Oficial No. 48.776. Legislative Act 01, 1968 (11 December 1968)  Por el cual se reforma la Constitución Política de Colombia. Diario Oficial No. 32.673. Legislative Act 01, 1986 (9 January 1986) Por el cual se reforma la constitución política. Diario Oficial No. 37.304. Leyva, S. (2018) Un Paso Adelante y Medio Atrás: El Cambio del Estado en Colombia desde la Perspectiva de la Administración Pública (1957–​2017), El Estado del Estado, Documento No. 2. Bogotá D.C: Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. López, A. (1977) Mensaje al Congreso Nacional. En:  Camila Botero (1983) Propuestas sobre Descentralización en Colombia. Bogotá: CIDER (UniAndes). Pierson, P. (2003) “Big, slow-​moving, and … invisible: macrosocial processes in the study of comparative politics”. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 177–​207. Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) 41st Edition, Bogotá: Ed. Legis. Sanabria, P. (2015) “Decentralization and intergovernmental relations in Colombia: issues for a state still in quest of structure and capacity”. Hemisphere 24: 32–​  35. Sanabria, P. (2017) “Construcción de gobernabilidad y capacidad institucional para la renovación urbana: análisis del modelo de gobernanza y descentralización de Medellín”. In E. Grin, J. Hernandez and F. Abrucio (eds.) El Gobierno de las Ciudades: Análisis de los Modelos de Gobernanza y Descentralización de las Metrópolis Latinoamericanas. Consejo Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, pp. 97–​116. Sanabria, P. (2019) “Las capacidades institucionales de los municipios Colombianos”. In E.  Grin, A.  Carrera-​Hernández and F.  Abrucio (eds.) Capacidades Estatales en Gobiernos Locales Iberoamericanos:  Actualidad, Brechas y Perspectivas. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Getulio Vargas. Sanabria, P. and E. Rodríguez (2017) Transformar lo Público: Perspectivas sobre la Reforma Administrativa de Santiago de Cali de 2016. Cali: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali/​Universidad Icesi. Zapata, P. (2018) “Entre local y lo intermunicipal: experiencias metropolitanas de planeación de la seguridad ciudadana en el Valle de Aburrá, 1990–​2017”. In L.  Gallego, S.  Leyva and J.  Mesa (eds.) (2018) Seguridad Ciudadana desde la Gobernanza Metropolitana:  El Caso del Valle de Aburrá. Medellín:  Editorial EAFIT/​AMVA. 133

EIGHT

Policy analysis for decision making in Colombian local governments Claudia N. Avellaneda and Ricardo A. Bello-​Gómez

Introduction The rise of decentralization in recent decades has resulted in the delegation of vast responsibilities and more, yet scarce, resources to local governments around the world. Colombia has not been the exception to this trend. Indeed, Colombia has become one of the most decentralized countries in Latin America, with 44.160% (Dirección General del Presupuesto Público Nacional, 2018) of the 2018 national budget being appropriated for transfers to subnational and local governments. These governments are responsible for providing education, health and basic sanitation, among other social services, as well as implementing a broad range of policies set at the national level. In this context, local administrations face policy decisions in different areas and at several stages of the policy-​making process. In making sound policy decisions to improve government effectiveness, local governments require the intensive use of administrative and technical capacity to gather and analyze rigorous evidence and information (Sanderson, 2002). The DNP has stressed the role of social science research to guide policy making and advise executive agencies’ decisions (See Chapter 4 in this volume). This guidance may take the form of advice, analysis, evaluation, research or planning. However, most of the administrative and technical capacity seems to reside with national agencies, which can afford to recruit capable and qualified bureaucrats with a background in social science research. Concentration of the labor market for policy analysts in Bogotá leaves subnational governments with scarce availability of qualified professionals and external consultants, thus affecting the type of policy analysis conducted at the local level.1 This chapter aims to explore the availability of policy analysis tools and techniques and their use by Colombian local governments by focusing on three broad themes. The first introduces policy analysis and performance management as tools to achieve local effectiveness. Second, we introduce a framework to understand “when and who” is expected to use policy analysis in local governments. The third section explains the use of policy analysis by local governments for the formulation, implementation and evaluation of their

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Municipal Development Plan (PMD), the most salient exercise of strategic policy planning at the municipal level. Finally, we develop some conclusions, and suggest some prescriptions to enhance local policy analysis in Colombia.

Local government effectiveness through policy analysis and performance management The evidence-​based policy and performance management movements are tools oriented toward improving government effectiveness. Both policy analysis and performance management rely on information and empirical evidence to guide decision makers in designing, funding, implementing and managing.2 The performance management movement, prescribed by the NPM doctrines, promotes the use of information on agency and/​or program’s results to assess government performance, holding managers accountable for their actions (Radin, 2006). To achieve targeted outcomes, governments use performance-​ contingent pay systems, bonuses and contracting (Heinrich, 2007b; Heinrich and Choi, 2007). Nevertheless, to produce timely performance reports, policy makers rely on information from different sources and might misuse or manipulate data in performance analysis (Heinrich, 2007a). Due to their questionable organizational capacity, local and subnational governments tend to face scarcity of high-​quality information and challenges to produce readily available reports. Both performance management and evidence-​based policy making (that is, policy analysis) have been increasingly used by local governments around the globe, (Julnes and Holzer, 2001; Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008). However, in the US, some works identify a mismatch between the extent of performance measurement and that of performance management  –​ that is, actual use of performance measurement to affect social outcomes. Julnes and Holzer (2001) found that formal adoption of performance management systems relates to technocratic factors, while actual implementation depends more heavily on cultural and political determinants. This relationship may also be moderated by the willingness of officials to rely on indicators, use them for comparison and integrate them into critical managerial processes (Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008). Performance management has also emerged in non-​US local governments. In these contexts, voluntary performance management programs have been more successful than top-​down enforcement (Kuhlmann, 2010). Moreover, localities with an institutional context characterized by transparency and accountability have achieved better results with performance management (Wollman, 2004). Although some scholars have assessed the role of participatory practices in the policy process (Devas and Grant, 2003; Andersson and Van Laerhoven, 2007), few studies have explored how managerial (Avellaneda, 2008) and organizational capacity (Gao, 2009) influence policy decision making at the local level. 136

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Using policy analysis at the subnational level: who and when The literature in public management and public policy suggests several factors that may influence the use of policy analysis by subnational and local governments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999; Teodoro 2009). One could classify these drivers into two large categories. On one side are actors who make decisions based on policy analysis advice. On the other side, the context interacts with such actors to lead them to use tools and techniques of policy analysis. Let us refer to these categories as the “who” and “when” of policy analysis. Who? The characteristics of mayors, cabinet secretaries and public officials in general may be correlated to the extent local governments use policy analysis (Avellaneda, 2008). Their educational backgrounds and their previous work experiences may affect the perception of public officials, regarding the relevance and need of using policy analysis. For instance, Chapter 1 in this volume explores the existence and role of epistemic communities in Colombia in promoting and encouraging use of policy analysis and evidence-​based policy making. As such, public officials trained in disciplines and at higher education institutions permeated by epistemic communities are more likely welcome policy analysis into their decision-​making process. Moreover, local public officials coming from outside an organization are more likely to promote policy innovation than those promoted from within the ranks (Teodoro, 2009). Thus, public officials with previous experience in organizations keen on policy analysis approaches are expected to demand and rely on policy analysis and evidence-​based policy making. The degree of professionalism in the local bureaucracy may also affect willingness to use policy analysis. Professionalism drives commitment to a certain code of conduct and a set of norms and beliefs (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999). Even if public officials are not in direct contact with the policy analysis epistemic community, they may perceive policy analysis as a required/​valued tool in their professional community. Hence, the use of policy analysis might be regarded as an innovative tool disrupting existing schemes and operations (Teodoro, 2009). Policy entrepreneurs inside bureaucracies may play a significant role in expanding policy analysis in local governments. To do so, policy entrepreneurs may use their resources, knowledge, strategies and networking skills to advocate for certain issues (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). When? Policy makers do not act in a vacuum. The national, organizational and environmental context in which they perform is expected to moderate their actions and performance (Meier et al, 2017). The municipal context in which local actors perform is expected to interact with their background characteristics 137

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(Avellaneda, 2008, 2009). For instance, in certain contexts, local stakeholders may be more active and demanding. In such cases, civil society, upper levels of government, international donors and political rivals may demand more information and evidence for making policy or program choices. Diverse stakeholders and decision makers bring different perspectives to the deliberation process, increasing the demands for use of policy analysis (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In highly deliberative environments, policy analysis may be regarded as an objective way to design, implement and/​or assess policies. Several ways exist to understand the influence of external context on organizational decision making that are worth considering in this case. From a resource-​dependence perspective, local governments’ need for resources could serve as everage for external partners to exert certain influences on decision making (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). External organizations engaged in cooperation with local governments, such as upper-​level governments, nonprofits and international investors, may require policy analysis as a condition to establish or continue partnerships. Conversely, local governments may engage in policy analysis to portray advanced technical ability and become more attractive to potential investors and/​or donors when pursuing external revenue strategies. Furthermore, the practice of policy analysis requires many technical, human, financial and informational resources, with varying availability across both local jurisdictions and policy areas. An institutional perspective of organizations offers complementary explanations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The current use of policy analysis could be the result of past organizational conditions that favored its implementation. For instance, dependence on the path and norms should keep local governments conducting policy analysis once it has become institutionalized (Selznick, 1966). In addition, adoption of innovations in terms of practices, processes, structures and products may be due mimetic isomorphism, as peers emulate other peers in response to coercion or normative compliance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). At the local level, municipalities may opt for relying on policy analysis to emulate peer organizations that have seen considerable improvements in funding, efficiency and/​or effectiveness after incorporating policy analysis in their decision-​making process. However, external influences may also trigger organizational decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and local governments may exhibit such behavior when pressed to use policy analysis. That is, local governments could formally comply with establishing procedures and methodologies involving policy analysis techniques, while conducting business and making decisions as usual on the ground. Although literature has addressed the role of timing in the use of policy analysis (Feldman et al, 2001), the times when policy makers use and rely on information from either policy analysis or performance measurement deserve more consideration. This is particularly true in the Colombian case, where subnational governments receive substantial amounts of information from central governments.3 Heinrich (2007a) states that different timings of performance measurement and evaluation may affect the findings and conclusions about a 138

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policy intervention. Likewise, whether subnational decision makers rely on this information for planning, designing programs, deciding course of actions and/​or implementing decisions should also matter for government effectiveness. Policy makers may use information for substantive purposes in the absence of a strong commitment to a specific solution, for elaborating on a specific solution and/​or for strategic reasons to advocate or reconfirm a position (Whiteman, 1985). The purpose of information use is determined by the political environment, which is measured by levels of group conflict and issue salience (Whiteman, 1985).

Policy analysis and PMDs in Colombia PMDs come from a tradition of strategic planning starting in Colombia in the 1960s at the national level. Since 1966, every quadrennial Colombian government has enacted a PND that portrays the strategic priorities of the national government, serves as a framework for policy formulation, and establishes an investment plan during the respective presidential term (see Chapter 4 in this volume). Law 152 of 1994, which advanced mandates of the Constitution of 1991, regulated creation of the PND and mandated the formulation of territorial development plans at the departmental and municipal levels. Copying the structure followed at the national level, departmental development plans and PMDs comprehend strategic and investment components to guide the work of the territorial government. The law establishes a four-​month term for incoming municipal governments to present the PMD proposal before the municipal council and one more month for municipal councils to approve them (Law 152, 1994). Figure 8.1 summarizes the PMD stages as a policy process. In the formulation stage of the PMD, municipalities are expected to produce a strategic plan in

Figure 8.1: PMD as a policy process FORMULATION

INPUTS Local (municipality) • Government platform • Needs assessments (participatory workshops) Intermediate (departamento) • Government platform • Preliminary planning process National • PND strategic lines • DNP guidance • ESAP training • Institutional pressure for strategic alignment

Mayoral role • Political leadership • Networking with governor, Congress, national government Planning office’s role • Technical coordination • Monitor consultants: risk of decoupling Approval by municipal council

DISAGGREGATION Project formulation • Lack of technical capacity • Reliance on contracting out and pre-formulated projects

IMPLEMENTATIONS Opportunistic prioritization • Funding timing • Emergent needs • Citizens’ demands National regulations • Lack of acknowledgment of local context

INTEGRATION MIPG • Inspection System • Administrative Development System • National Quality Management System

EVALUATION • Self-reporting of PMD implementation as input for evaluation at the national level

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

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which policy goals are defined and their respective policy programs are designed, articulated, budgeted and scheduled. At the implementation stage, municipalities are required to implement national programs according to established guidelines (Const. 1991, art. 315). At the evaluation stage, local governments may conduct, commission or use policy evaluation studies to assess the effectiveness of current programs. National agencies at every stage predicate a focus on performance management and evidence-​based policy making, yet local governments struggle to keep up with these demands. Inputs for PMD formulation When facing the task of formulating a PMD, incoming mayors receive a broad range of inputs from the national, departmental and local arenas. Identification of local needs, consequential from the nature of the PMD, constitutes the first and main source of information to build the plan. Local governments usually gather information on local needs through “mesas de trabajo” (workshops) around urban and rural areas of municipalities.4 Even though local needs are a valuable input for plan formulation, prioritizing the identified needs does not necessarily follow technical criteria, as it may depend on other stakeholders’ inputs, as well as on political and financial constraints. The constitutional mandate of programmatic vote, embraced in the same Law 152 of 1994, requires candidates for executive positions (that is, mayors, governors and president) to present a government platform during their campaigns and, if elected, to incorporate those platforms in the respective development plan. Although the formal intention of the norm is to enforce accountability on local executives and promote citizens’ election of programs, the programmatic vote mandate has failed to substantially affect the electoral behavior of Colombians (Rey Salamanca, 2015). However, the requirement to incorporate government platforms into development plans has affected the local policy formulation process. The policy process at the departmental level also influences the development of the municipal plan. Municipalities seek to align their strategic and investment priorities and their respective departmental governments, so that the latter can “concur”5 on supporting municipal needs. The relationship might be seen as symbiotic if one assumes the departmental government is also interested in correctly assessing people’s needs throughout the territory. Since 1994, governors and mayors are elected on the same day for concurrent terms. Therefore, departments and municipalities face the same calendar when formulating their development plans. Given this situation, both municipal and departmental administrations must work in parallel and with a certain degree of coordination to achieve consistency between their development plans. The department deploys officials to different municipalities, both to hold workshops with communities and to advise municipal governments in their plan formulation processes. In response, municipal governments take their respective governor’s platform and departmental development plan as input for establishing the municipal formulation 140

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process. That is, mayors adjust their programs and priorities, at least in part, to fit with the priorities of their incoming governor. At the national level, DNP provides methodological guidance for the plan’s formulation via online materials and training to local officials.6 Moreover, the publicly owned ESAP runs an intensive, short training program for incoming mayors, which includes the presentation of a broad range of governmental agencies and policy sectors at the national level (for example, ministries and national agencies). National governmental agencies not only offer a series of services to local governments, but also put pressure on them to incorporate goals and indicators of their interest in their respective municipal plans. Finally, through the PND, DNP serves as a fundamental framework for local governments when designing their own local plans. With the current electoral calendar in place since 2003, the PND was enacted about 18 months before the inauguration of new governors and mayors. Thus, to be more effective in acquiring national resources, local leaders ought to align their municipal projects and financial requests to the priority investment lines defined by the national government in the PND. Challenges for PMD formulation Local governments face the challenge of aligning diverse inputs from policy analysis (such as the identification and prioritization of local needs), as well as from political sources incorporated via the policy process (such as the priorities portrayed in the PND, and the governor’s and mayor’s electoral platforms). Political management by the mayor plays a significant role in acquiring funds at upper levels of government to form development plans. Often, mayors depend on their personal connections to the governor and/​or departmental assembly members or on promising political support in future elections to place themselves in a privileged position when departmental resources are distributed. At the national level, mayors also need the support of the governor, or more commonly, a Congress member, to lobby on behalf of their municipalities before national agencies and ministries. Although mayors lead and set guidelines for the PMD, it is common to delegate the formulation process to their planning departments or planning advisory offices. These offices are entitled by law to conduct the PMD’s formulation. However, they often lack the capacity and resources to do so. Consequently, a substantial number of Colombian municipalities contract out to consulting companies or individual consultants to develop the PMD. While the number of municipalities contracting out the formulation of the PMD is unknown to us, some data suggests this trend is salient for mayors. We conducted a survey with Colombian mayors attending the congress of the Colombian Federation of Municipalities in Cartagena de Indias in March 2019. When asked about the most influential person during the PMD formulation process, 93 out of 240 mayors (38.75%) named their planning secretary/​director/​advisor, thus attesting to the central role of planning offices in the process. Meanwhile, 33 out of 240 mayors (13.75%) 141

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responded that an external advisor or consultant played the most influential role in implementing the PMD. Therefore, at least 13.75% of surveyed mayors used an external consultant or consulting firm in their PMD formulation process. Others might have contracted out but assigned more relevance to the monitoring or coordinating role of their planning offices or other members of their administration (40 mayors, 16.67%). Alternative collaborations with NGOs or universities seem to be scarce. Only six mayors (2.5%) considered a university professor the most influential person in the process, and another six out of 222 cited an NGO as the organization with which they collaborated most to formulate the PMD. In some cases, the formulation of PMDs in a department is concentrated in a few consultants or consulting firms hired by several municipalities.7 While consultants possess expertise on the formulation process and the legal requirements to carry it out, the level of knowledge and information they have about the specific municipality substantially depends on the municipal government. Because of this, several municipalities and even departments have experienced decoupling of the planning requirements from actual government operation, as what is written in the PMD differs completely from what is executed. In some cases, subnational legislators have denounced proposed departmental development plans as being the product of plagiarism8 because jurisdictions copy or mirror other peers’ development plans or because a single consultant is commissioned to create development plans for several jurisdictions. Moreover, decoupling and plagiarism also have occurred in fulfilling other procedural requirements.9 Nevertheless, qualified technical support from the national government, and more stringent supervision by agencies such as inspector general, attorney general and comptroller general offices, have forced municipalities to take the planning process more seriously. In sum, the pervasive use of contracting out by municipalities for the elaboration of the PMD requires substantial monitoring in order to achieve cohesive policy formulation beyond the fulfillment of a legal requirement. Challenges for PMD disaggregation and implementation Despite the comprehensive, strategic approach of the PMD, municipalities must still disaggregate the plan into annual projections and formulate specific projects to meet proposed goals with budgetary resources. This part of the process also requires substantial technical capacity. The municipal planning office and finance department usually handle the disaggregation of the plan. However, most municipalities lack capacity to formulate specific projects and tend to rely on either contracting out the project formulation or receiving projects pre-​formulated by potential bidders.10 As with the case of the PMD overall, delegating the responsibility of project formulation outside of the core local administration risks a misalignment with local needs and priorities. Indeed, former health minister Alejandro Gaviria (2018) has pointed out the “lack of projects”, or the lack of capacity for project formulation, as the key concern for Colombian public administration.

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Project definition and implementation to meet the PMD’s goals rely less on consistent policy analysis and more on opportunistic access to funding alternatives and identification of urgent needs. In other words, selection of strategies and prioritization of projects to achieve the PMD’s goals may depend on the timing of funding, the emergence of specific needs, and citizens’ demands for solutions in different locations in the municipal territory. Moreover, national legislation regulates several aspects of the provision of goods and services to meet policy goals. However, local governments face hurdles in meeting national homogeneous requirements due to the geographic heterogeneity of the Colombian territory. Furthermore, there seems to be a widespread perception that national-​level officials who provide technical support to municipal governments fail to acknowledge that local conditions affect policy implementation. PMD evaluation and integration Official policy evaluation is conducted mainly at the national level by the DNP. However, municipalities are required to report progress on implementing their development plans. This information constitutes the main input for monitoring and evaluation efforts at the departmental and national levels. In several cases, municipal governments employ people specifically to monitor PMD implementation and report progress and results to the departmental and national governments. Despite this information being based on self-​reporting, the monitoring process provides basic information for policy and program evaluation, as well as for social accountability initiatives. As in the case of policy formulation, municipal governments also risk organizational decoupling when being monitored and trying to meet implementation requirements set by the national government. In addition to the PMD planning system detailed here, several pieces of legislation gave promulgated the creation of an Inspection System (Sistema de Control Interno, Law 87 of 1993), an Administrative Development System (Sistema de Desarrollo Administrativo, Law 489 of 1998) and a National Quality Management System (Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Calidad, Law 872 of 2003). Each of these systems, along with other national regulations, require municipal governments to produce manuals, documents and reports not necessarily incorporated into their day-​by-​day operations. The MIPG system has been devised for national agencies and local governments to consolidate the requirements of these various systems (DAFP, 2018). In structuring MIPG, the national government has acknowledged that the newly established systems pursue different but complementary goals. Therefore, a cohesive process is necessary to connect all elements of the management and policy cycle from strategic formulation (PMD) through implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Current local governments are the first ones experimenting with the integration of their different policies and managerial processes into the MIPG. It is yet to be seen to what extent local governments will effectively implement this

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new MIPG, and whether it will bring improvements in the needed articulation of administrative processes.

Discussion Some general ideas derive from our review of the use of policy analysis in Colombian municipal planning, implementation and assessment. First, although few mayors report relying on their key local officials for the elaboration of the PMD, there is a substantial trend to contract out the elaboration of the PMD to consultants. In addition, the relevance of potential substitutes such as academics and nongovernmental organizations is limited. Whether these consultants can gather or are provided with detailed statistics, demographics, needs assessments and features of the municipalities is still an empirical question. As this trend in contracting out the elaboration of the PMD has continued, the role of consultants and consulting firms in local policy making should be addressed both from academia and upper-​level governments. In one of the few comprehensive assessments of the “consultocracy” phenomenon, Ylönen and Kuusela (2019) identify that the pervasive use of consulting in policy making results in dependencies, inhibits capacity building and weakens the tacit knowledge basis in public organizations. Moreover, a principal–​agent relationship arises between mayors/​municipalities as principals and consultants as agents. In this context, mayors and consultants may not share the same goals due to self-​interest and incomplete information (Hölmstrom, 1979), thus allowing for an output that deviates from the principals’ optimal goal. In the face of such challenges, national, subnational and local governments should consider several strategies to reduce this imbalance and ensure quality in the formulation of the PMD, as this is the cornerstone of municipal administrations. For instance, national or department-​ level agencies could consider offering training and/​or requiring some kind of licensing to consulting firms. Local officials should also monitor consultants in an efficient way. While mayors are probably unable to do this, given their political and administrative responsibilities, such monitoring could be performed by, for example, the secretary or director of planning. By law and following isomorphism from the national government, planning secretaries/​directors are responsible for the coordination of making, controlling and following up proposals on investment projects, land planning and socioeconomic development, including the PMD. In our survey of Colombian mayors, not only 38.75% of respondents considered their planning secretary the most influential person for PMD formulation, but also 35.36% of respondents considered the planning secretary as the key official in the administration. In fact, the role of the planning secretary in the formulation stage becomes essential for municipal performance. This therefore suggests that mayors should pay considerable attention and scrutiny to the selection of their planning secretaries. The secretaries’ qualifications and technical capacities are expected to

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influence municipal performance through the formulation of a solid municipal strategy, the PMD and the achievement of goals established for such strategies. The evidence of use of policy analysis at the municipal level also suggests the need to reduce decoupling, which is a challenge for Colombian public administration. Local officials may appear to incorporate national recommended managerial practices just to comply with a national report without integrating these practices into daily municipal operations. The recently proposed MIPG system aims to help reduce decoupling by integrating overlapping requirements from different managerial systems and reports. The general expectation is that municipal governments will see MIPG as an advantage to their operations, rather than a burden, since the model helps reduce the number of requirements to which municipalities must comply. A presidential decree (Decree 1499 of 2017) establishes that municipalities must propose “differential criteria” under which they will implement their own version of MIPG. This type of soft approach, rather than a hard one, may generate desirable outcomes. In this way, the national government could also be more flexible with the implementation schedule and even offer monetary incentives for effectively implementing recommended policy and managerial practices. In settings where financial and administrative resources are very scarce, these incentives may contribute to substantial improvements in the operation of local governments. While opportunities for training are not necessarily scarce, they seem to focus on the needs of the national government rather than on those of the municipalities. This top-​down approach leads to training that highlights the fulfillment of requirements set nationally for policy and management, rather than the tools local governments need to become more effective. Training is a necessity given the high turnover of municipal personnel from one mayoral administration to the next one. Indeed, training offered by national agencies and organizations mainly targets mayors and other high echelons of the municipal government hierarchy who are political appointees, but it could be more effective if it incorporates mid-​level officials who are career public servants less subject to turnover. This is even more necessary in municipalities distant from their departmental capital, as access to technical support and resources is more challenging. Training even plays a role before the beginning of a mayoral term. Conversations with local officials highlight the importance of timing in the use of policy analysis. Potential mayoral candidates should have access to guidance and training to design government platforms before campaigning, given the significant input of such platforms in formulating the PMDs. It is unlikely that national government agencies can offer better focused training, given their own interest in aligning municipal governments to their goals. Universities, however, can play an important role in providing training that aims to contribute to local capacity building. Combining the expertise of national universities in economics, policy and management, with the local knowledge of regional universities might generate a promising arrangement. ESAP, which has

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presence throughout the territory and expertise in training public officials, could also play a key role in articulating an effective interorganizational arrangement.

Conclusion Despite efforts to promote performance management and evidence-​based policy making over the past two decades, Colombian local governments still face several issues in using policy analysis for decision making. First, local officials’ concerns suggest lack of capacity and the need for strengthening core public administration agencies and functions at the national, departmental and local levels.11 Second, top-​down approaches and punitive enforcing mechanisms might lead to organizational decoupling, rather than institutionalization of desired policy and managerial practices. Schedule flexibility and monetary incentives might work to smoothly incorporate the desired practices into the operation of local governments. Third, the contracting out by municipal governments of substantial parts of the policy process inhibits them from gaining technical capacity and achieving salient policy goals. Here, licensing consulting firms and careful selection of planning officials might reduce the problem of incomplete information faced by municipalities, vis-​à-​vis its consultants. Finally, training efforts by national agencies currently focus mainly on mayors and political appointees. Instead, developing managerial and analytical skill sets for career public servants could help long-​term capacity building. The process of formulating PMDs, the main tool for local strategic planning and policy design, is certainly complex. Municipal administrations struggle to match needs and demands at the municipal, departmental and national levels with their own policy priorities to build a cohesive government roadmap. For instance, the creation of several task-​and policy-​specific agencies at the national level has generated coordination challenges. In many cases, reconciliation of national-​level policy goals is left in the hands of mayors who have to deal with multiple conflicting demands. Indeed, mayors and local officials interviewed for this chapter12 expressed the urgent need for more/​better intergovernmental cooperation and technical capacity for the formulation and passing of development and investment projects. While this chapter has focused on the formulation of PMDs, municipal officials have also pointed to the Collegiate Bodies for Administration and Decision-​Making (Organos Colegiados de Administración y Decisión), which allocate resources from royalties to local projects, to illustrate lack of coordination, guidance and technical assistance. The process through which municipalities and departments gain access to these resources deserves its own analysis. Finally, future studies should compare the Colombian municipal case with other local governments in the region to identify differences and similarities in local governments’ use of policy analysis for decision making. For instance, are the barriers to, and boosters of, policy analysis use in Colombian local governments the same as those faced by other Latin American municipalities? Is organizational 146

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capacity the main barrier to policy analysis use or are elected mayors’ motivation and determination part of the explanation? Notes 1 2 3

4

5

6 7

8 9 10 11 12

Differences in policy analysts’ backgrounds and techniques between the national and subnational level have also been described, for instance, in the case of Canada (Howlett, 2009). Heinrich (2007a) highlights tensions between these two movements, as they diverge in their analytical methods, strategic purpose and timing. Interviews conducted with mayors and national government officials suggest that national agencies provide an excessive amount of information in a very short time to mayors in the training sessions offered at the beginning of their terms. We do not have information on the workshop participants’ profile. Yet, the literature in participatory budgeting suggests that these processes can succeed, avoiding cooptation by local governments, when mayors are invested in the process because of their political or ideological interests (Wampler, 2008), when civil society is strong and contentious (Wampler, 2010) or when governments face legitimacy crises (Holdo, 2016). Law 152 of 1994 defines concurrence (concurrencia) as the ability of different levels of government to coordinate work and investments to meet a policy goal when their policy competences are complementary. The Territorial Planning Kit tool is available from http://​portalterritorial.dnp.gov.co Several rounds of field research with local government officials in Norte de Santander and Huila over the past ten years evidence the influence of private consulting companies dedicated to the elaboration of PMDs. Members of Quindío’s departamento assembly denounced the proposed departamento development plan as the product of plagiarism in 2016 (El Tiempo, 2016). Government platforms (El Tiempo, 2011), handbooks (El Tiempo, 2003), and zoning plans (El Tiempo, 2013) have been subject of plagiarism controversy. Interviews with several mayors and municipal planning secretaries in the departamento of Huila, November 2018. The need to “strengthen the core”, that is to build administrative capacity, has been recognized by international organizations such as the World Bank (2017). Interviews with several mayors and municipal planning secretaries in the departamento of Huila, November 2018.

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Devas, N. and Grant, U. (2003) “Local government decision-​making –​citizen participation and local accountability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda”. Public Administration and Development 23(4): 307–​16. DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983) “The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields”. American Sociological Review, 48(2): 147–​60. Dirección General del Presupuesto Público Nacional (2018) Apropiaciones PGN Sept 2018. Available from http://www.urf.gov.co/webcenter/portal/ EntOrdenNacional/pages_presupuestogralnacion/presupuestogralnacion2018/ EjePresupuestal2018/octubre2018 El Tiempo (2003) “Demandan a Sogamoso por cátedra suamox”. El Tiempo, 17 October. Available from www.eltiempo.com/ ​ a rchivo/ ​ d ocumento/​ MAM-​1048381 El Tiempo (2011) “ ‘Es un completo plagio’: Fajardo”. El Tiempo, 20October. Available from www.eltiempo.com/​archivo/​documento/​MAM-​4907888 El Tiempo (2013) “Acusan de plagio a asesora del POT de Villavicencio”. El Tiempo, 6 June. Available from www.eltiempo.com/​archivo/​documento/​ CMS-​12851451 El Tiempo (2016) “Denuncian ‘plagio’ en plan de Desarrollo del Quindío”. El Tiempo, 16 May. Available from www.eltiempo.com/​archivo/​documento/​ CMS-​16594982 Feldman, P.H., Nadash, P. and Gursen, M. (2001) “Improving communication between researchers and policy makers in long-​term care: or, researchers are from Mars; policy makers are from Venus”. The Gerontologist 41(3): 312–​21. Gao, J. (2009) “Governing by goals and numbers:  a case study in the use of performance measurement to build state capacity in China”. Public Administration and Development 29(1): 21–​31. Gaviria, A. (2018) “Cinco ideas para reducir la corrupción”. In M. García Villegas (ed.) ¿Cómo mejorar a Colombia? Bogotá: Planeta. Heinr ich, C.J. (2007a) “Evidence-​b ased policy and perfor mance management: challenges and prospects in two parallel movements”. The American Review of Public Administration 37(3): 255–​77. Heinrich, C.J. (2007b) “False or fitting recognition? The use of high performance bonuses in motivating organizational achievements”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 26: 281–​304. Heinrich, C.J. and Choi, Y. (2007) “Performance-​based contracting in social welfare programs”. American Review of Public Administration 37(4): 409–​35. Holdo, M. (2016) “Reasons of power: explaining non-​cooptation in participatory budgeting”. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 40(2): 378–​94. Hölmstrom, B. (1979) “Moral hazard and observability”. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74–​91. Howlett, M. (2009) “Policy advice in multi-​level governance systems:  sub-​ national policy analysts and analysis”. International Review of Public Administration 13(3): 1–​16. 148

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Julnes, P.D.L. and Holzer, M. (2001) “Promoting the utilization of performance measures in public organizations: an empirical study of factors affecting adoption and implementation”. Public Administration Review 61(6): 693–​708. Kuhlmann, S. (2010) “Performance measurement in European local governments: a comparative analysis of reform experiences in Great Britain, France, Sweden and Germany”. International Review of Administrative Sciences 76(2): 331–​45. Law 152 of 1994. República de Colombia. Law 489 of 1998. República de Colombia. Law 87 of 1993. República de Colombia. Law 872 of 2003. República de Colombia. Meier, K., Rutherford, A. and Avellaneda, C.N. (eds.) (2017) Comparative Public Management: Why National, Environmental, and Organizational Context Matters. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977) “Institutionalized organizations:  formal structure as myth and ceremony”. American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340–​63. Mintrom, M. and Vergari, S. (1996) “Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs and policy change”. Policy Studies Journal 24: 420–​38. Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978) The External Control of Organizations:  A Resource Dependence Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Radin, B. (2006) Challenging the Performance Movement. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Rainey, H.G. and Steinbauer, P. (1999) “Galloping elephants: developing elements of a theory of effective government organizations”. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9(1): 1–​32. República de Colombia (1991) “Political Constitution of Colombia”. Available from http://www.registraduria.gov.co/IMG/pdf/constitucio-politicacolombia-1991.pdf Rey Salamanca, F. (2015) Voto Programático y Programas de Gobierno en Colombia. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario. Sabatier, P. and C.M. Weible (2007) “An advocacy coalition framework”. In P.A. Sabatier (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process (2nd edition). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 189–​220. Sanderson, I. (2002) “Evaluation, policy learning and evidence-​based policy making”. Public Administration 80(1): 1–​22. Selznick, P. (1966) TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Teodoro, M.P. (2009) “Bureaucratic job mobility and the diffusion of innovations”. American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 175–​89. Wampler, B. (2008) “When does participatory democracy deepen the quality of democracy? Lessons from Brazil”. Comparative Politics 41(1): 61–​81. Wampler, B. (2010) Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability. University Park, PA: Penn State Press.

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Whiteman, D. (1985) “The fate of policy analysis in congressional decision making:  three types of use in committees”. Western Political Quarterly 38(2): 294–​311. World Bank (2017) “DRC Establishing Capacity for Core Public Management”. Available from http://​projects.worldbank.org/​P117382/​ drc-​establishing-​capacity-​core-​public-​management?lang=en Ylönen, M. and Kuusela, H. (2019) “Consultocracy and its discontents: a critical typology and a call for a research agenda”. Governance 32(2): 241–​58.

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Policy analysis in the education sector in Colombia Sandra García, Darío Maldonado and Sarah Muñoz-​Cadena

Introduction The Colombian Constitution of 1991 shaped the development of the social sector in Colombia, particularly in the provision of education and health. The new Constitution declared Colombia a “social rights state” and established education as a right and a public service with a social purpose. At the same time, it declared decentralization as a fundamental principle. These two features led to a series of reforms during the 1990s in terms of the institutional and organizational arrangements for the provision of education services. Within this context, a new set of reforms in education took place. One of the most important was the teachers’ reform, an area that continues to have repercussions even 25 years later. This chapter looks at teacher policy to illustrate the practice of policy analysis in education policy in Colombia at the national level after the 1990s reforms. In particular, we use reform in policies regarding public school teachers as a case to analyse the process of policy formulation and implementation in the education sector in Colombia. We focus on teacher policy for two main reasons. First, it has marked the education sector over the past 20 years, defining several issues that have a direct impact on the quality of primary and secondary education (such as whether or not teachers are required to have professional degree, or whether or not teachers who do not perform well should stay in schools). Second, teacher policy involves several stakeholders and decisions in several domains, allowing illustrating the complexity of policy analysis in the education sector. The chapter has four main objectives:  to explain how education policy is constructed; to document the main criteria used in education policy design; to identify the main stakeholders involved; and to assess the extent to which technical and political factors weigh in the policy construction process. Teacher policy refers to policies governing the hiring, training (pre-​service and in-​service), compensation and evaluation of teachers in the public sector. Specifically, we focus on six key dimensions: pre-​service teacher training; selection and hiring of teachers; retention and promotion; performance evaluation; in-​ service training; and salaries. These dimensions follow the literature on education policy (García et al, 2014). To accomplish the chapter objectives, we relied on two main sources of information. First, we used written technical reports and legislation regarding 153

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teacher reform since early 1990s. Second, we conducted in-​depth interviews with ten key actors of teacher reforms since late 1990s, including two former ministers of education, three former vice-​ministers, four former technical officers, and one leader of the teachers’ union. For these interviews, and following the policy cycle framework (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003), we designed a semi-​structured questionnaire including different stages of the policy process: problem definition and agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legitimation, implementation, evaluation and policy change. The chapter is organized in seven sections besides this introduction. The first section briefly describes education policy in Colombia with a focus on policies related to teachers; the second section presents a description of the policy problem around teachers as viewed by different stakeholders; the third section describes the policy formulation process that led to what is called the “new teachers’ statute”; and the fourth section discusses the role of politics in policy design and the dynamic tension between technical and political solutions in decision making. The fifth and sixth sections are devoted to implementation and policy evaluation respectively, and the final section presents some concluding remarks.

Education policy in Colombia and the context of teachers’ reform The design of education policy in Colombia is responsibility of the MEN. The MEN sets the main policies, standards and objectives of the education sector and has responsibility for guaranteeing access to educational services. Within Colombia’s decentralized system (see Chapter  8), the provision of educational services is responsibility of the local governments. This decentralization is implemented by entidades territoriales (territorial entities –​TEs), which administer the resources transferred by the national government and deliver educational services from grade K to grade 11. In particular, TEs are responsible of managing personnel (selecting, hiring and promoting teachers under MEN rules1), administering payroll, providing or ensuring provision of school meals, and implementing strategies aimed at improving education quality (Barrera et al, 2014). There are two types of TE, operating at the level of departments (regions) or decentralized municipalities. The former are responsible for the administration of resources for small municipalities, while the latter are geared towards big municipalities that administer their own resources. The degree of autonomy of TEs is an ongoing discussion in Colombia since, as discussed later, they are heavily regulated by national level laws. Teachers’ policy encompasses norms and procedures related to the selection, hiring, training, retention, compensation and evaluation of teachers. In Colombia, rules for hiring, promotion, evaluation and compensation are set at the national level through what is called the “teachers statute”. Until 2002, there was no formal selection process for teachers and promotion rules were mainly driven by education certificates and years of experience. In 2002, a new statute was enacted that dramatically changed the teaching profession in Colombia. The new teachers’ 154

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statute established a merit-​based selection process for the teaching profession, and a merit-​based system for promotion based on a formal evaluation process (Decree 1278, 2002). These new rules have applied to all teachers hired since June 2002, leading to a “dual system” that regulates teachers: the “old statute” for teachers hired before 2002 and the new statute for teachers hired on or after 2002 (Figueroa et al, 2018). One of the motivations for establishing new rules was to allow increasing entry wages for teachers. The changes introduced by the new statute constitute a structural reform that was also part of a second generation of teacher regulations implemented in other Latin American countries such as Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru (Elacqua et al, 2018). The reform included strategic changes that are aligned with desirable attributes of a comprehensive system for strengthening the teaching profession (Cuenca, 2015; García et al, 2014; Elacqua et al, 2018). At the same time, this reform has been contested by the teachers’ union. In recent years, there has been particular pressure from the teachers’ union to “unify” both statutes to align hiring and promotion rules for all teachers and relax evaluation requirements. Although no radical changes have been made to the new statute since its introduction in 2002, and the merit-​based system for hiring and promotions is still in place, some adjustments have been made. The biggest change occurred in 2015 and concerned the transformation of the evaluation system for promotion. It changed from a written exam to a multidimensional evaluation that includes a self-​evaluation, the peer-​evaluation of a class video, and the evaluation of the school principal.

The problem No matter which model of decision making is used –​a rational-​comprehensive approach (Bardach, 2012) or an incremental decision-​making approach (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993) –​policy analysis is about problem solving. In this case, there are alternative accounts of what the main problem was at the time the new statute was proposed. Depending on who is the stakeholder involved in the process, there were two different problems to be resolved: fiscal deficit and teachers’ quality. Under the old statute, promotion was based on years of experience, not on merit. Therefore promotion of teachers (and salary increases) became “automatic”. This situation generated a growing demand for financial resources, and, consequently, modifying promotion rules was seen as a mechanism to control spending and reduce the fiscal deficit. This was the view of appointed officials, mostly outside the education sector, who were involved in the structural reform that regulates the transfer of resources from the central government to subnational government for the delivery of educational and health services (Law 715, 2001). For some stakeholders, there was a need for controlling spending, making education spending more efficient. For others, like the teachers’ union, decisions based on efficiency were detrimental to teachers’ job conditions and other investments such as infrastructure, and therefore to teaching quality. 155

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At the same time, there was concern about the low quality of teaching among a significant proportion of the labor force and how the rules at the time contributed to this situation. This concern was more the result of technocrats’ intuition than the result of a measurement process. At that time, there were no hard data on teachers’ performance or ability because no evaluation system existed. However, there was a strong perception about failures of the statute that regulated the teaching profession: candidates were hired as teachers without having professional credentials; there was room for politicians to intervene in the hiring of teachers; there were no meritocratic rules for hiring and promotion, and many teachers were promoted several levels at the same time; and entry salaries were low, generating few incentives to enter the teaching career. All this happened in simultaneity with a generous pension system that threatened fiscal stability and made it difficult to renovate teachers’ labor force: the replacement rate for teachers was higher than for most of the other public servants, they could start claiming pension rights at younger ages than most of the other public and they were allowed to start claiming their pension rights (once they had reached the minimum required age) and continue working as teachers in the public sector. As one former minister’s advisor put it: ‘The teaching career, as many careers in the public sector, was like jail because all incentives were put at the end of the career. Teachers entered the career to be promoted very quickly to the highest pay scale. And once they got there, the incentive was to stay there until they were 50 years old because then they were entitled to a pension, and then a double pension at age 55 […] no one wanted to leave because by leaving they lose everything.’ (Former minister’s advisor, semi-​structured interview, August 2018) In sum, the structure of teachers’ careers was the main problem to be resolved. However, depending on who was looking at the problem, it was either a problem of containing accelerated spending caused by a close-​to-​automatic promotion system, or a problem of designing a meritocratic system to ensure the high-​quality teaching force needed to guarantee student learning. The convergence of both views from appointed officials from the finance and education sectors, experts and technocrats contributed to place teachers’ policy on the agenda.

The new teachers’ statute: policy formulation and implementation milestones The policy formulation process for the new teacher rules passed through four important milestones. Two of them are meaningful antecedents and the other two are actual events related to the reform of teachers’ policy. The two antecedents were a first try by the government to introduce teachers’ evaluation and a new law to regulate the transfer of resources from the central to the local governments in 156

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2001 (Law 715, 2001). The two main milestones with major reforms to teachers’ policy were the establishment of the new teacher statute in 2002 (Decree 1278, 2002) and the reform of the teacher evaluation scheme in 2015. Between 2002 and 2015, and after 2015, important efforts had to be made by government officials in turn to implement the two reforms. Each of these four milestones is discussed in turn next. The first antecedent concerns the attempt to introduce teacher evaluations as a way to improve the quality of the teaching force. This initiative was included in the PND, but was not enacted because, although approved by Congress, it was turned down by the CCC. Still this was an important milestone because it was reached by the same government that modified the teachers’ statute in 2002, and several of the officials involved in the 1998 attempt were also involved in the 2002 reform. The second antecedent is the reform to the law that establishes the criteria for the distribution of resources for education, health and basic sanitation to TEs. In the late 1990s, Colombia suffered a fiscal crisis that caused a substantial reduction in financial resources transferred from the nation to subnational governments. To face this crisis, a series of reforms took place in order to generate fiscal stability (Bonet et  al, 2014). One of these reforms was the creation of the General Participation System (Sistema General de Participaciones –​SGP), which mandates the amount of resources that are transferred from central government to TEs to finance education, health, potable water and sanitation (Legislative Act 01, 2001). Discussions about this legislation took place against the backdrop of strong opposition, when the teachers’ union, the Colombian Federation of Education Workers (Federación Colombiana de Trajadores de la Educación –​Fecode), went on strike. The teachers’ union argued that the SGP reduced financial resources devoted to education and that this would eventually lead to the privatization of education (Fecode, n.d.; Martínez, 2013; Torres, 2002). Despite the strike, the government achieved the majority of votes in Congress, and the Legislative Act was approved. This is an important antecedent to teachers’ reform because the teachers’ union ended up much weakened after this strike. Not only was the law was approved against the teachers’ will, but the national government also enforced a rule that has existed since the 1960s that allows for the withdrawal of workers’ salaries if they do not show up: “no work, no pay”. As part of the implementation of the SGP, Congress provided executive powers to the President to issue a new teachers’ statute according to the new organization of subnational competencies within the following six months (Law 715, 2001). The law also mandated the creation of a commission conformed by two Congress representatives, two members of the teachers’ union, the Minister of Education and two experts designated by the President. Since the teachers’ union was debilitated by discussions of the overall SGP legislation, the capacity to influence the outcome of the reform was small. The introduction of the SGP was a clear opportunity for the national government to introduce structural adjustments to teachers’ policy, and this was 157

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the purpose of the 2002 reform. After the 2002 reform, the MEN was required to establish a system to evaluate and select candidates, and a system to evaluate current teachers and to set promotion rules. These were introduced by law, but left for implementation by other official instruments. The MEN also had to decide on teachers’ salaries in the new statute. All these were very sensible issues and the government managed to put them in place with little opposition from the teachers’ union. The MEN was required to implement the new rules in the period 2002–​10. During this time, it faced no meaningful strikes by teachers. Besides the fact that the union was weakened as a result of the defeat of its opposition to the SGP reform, a consolidation of power under the leadership of one person, Cecilia María Vélez, tilted political power towards the government. Between 1960 and 2002, no Minister of Education had held position for more than three years, but Vélez retained the post from 2002 to 2010 for eight consecutive years. She had been the Secretary of Education for Bogotá until 2002 and had already gained significant experience of negotiating with the union. Besides allowing some coherence in policy formulation and implementation, this also guaranteed stable terms for the relationship between the MEN and the teachers’ union. While the 2002 reform and the implementation of its modifications occurred against the backdrop of a weak union and a very stable MEN, the 2015 reform occurred when the union was strong and there were constant changes of personnel within the MEN. After 2010, “normality” returned to the education sector with three different people holding the position of Minister of Education in eight years. During that period, the relationship between the government and the teachers’ union again made it difficult for the government to make reforms to the education sector (as well as in other sectors). In fact, in the same period the government faced several strikes, some of them of significant duration. It was in this context that the reform of 2015 took place. This was not a major reform as it did not entail a law change, but it was an important one since it implied a significant change in the way teachers are evaluated.

Policy formulation: dynamic tension between technical and political solutions The design of the teachers’ reform in the early 2000s was predominantly a technical endeavor. A group of technocrats (from the DNP, the MEN and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit) was closely involved in the design of the teachers’ statute, using as input consultation from experts and international organizations, as well as previous experience of evaluation systems from other countries. In terms of policy analysis, two alternatives were considered: reforming the teachers’ statute and changing the rules for current and future teachers, or creating a new statute for teachers hired from 2002 on. Foreseeing potential opposition by the teachers’ union to new promotion rules, the decision was made to create a new

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statute that would only affect rules relating to newly hired teachers and leave untouched those for teachers who were already part of the labor force. A problem, however, was the lack of information to achieve an optimal design. For instance, there was no information regarding the high number of teachers on provisional contracts at that time. After the new statute was passed, a large proportion of provisional teachers participated in the new examination process for the selection of teachers and transferred to permanent contracts under the new system. In that sense, according to a former official, the objective of creating a new teaching force was not fully achieved; the pool of teachers was not fully renovated although the rules on promotion and evaluation would apply to those teachers who had entered the new system. The design of the statute of 2002 contrasts with the changes to the evaluation system that took place in 2015. Over a decade after the 2002 reform took place, the results were mixed. On the one hand, there was an improvement in the culture of professionalization within the teaching force, and entry into and promotion within the profession was clearly meritocratic. However, the quality of the pool of teachers as a whole was not outstanding and the mechanisms in place for the improvement of teaching skills were insufficient. For instance, the evaluation system was highly criticized for comprising a written exam that did not take into account the actual performance of teachers in the classroom and therefore did not contribute to teaching improvement. The evaluation was also highly criticized by the teachers’ union, which claimed that it was a high-​stakes exercise that punished teachers instead of helping them to improve their teaching practices. Moreover, the in-​service training was deficient, as it did not address teachers’ needs for professional development (see García et al, 2014). The new rules established in 2002 introduced enough instruments to modernize management of the teaching force in Colombia. These instruments seem to be technically adequate by international standards, regarding the management of teaching forces (García et al, 2014). However, the implementation of some elements of these new rules resulted non-​optimal procedures (for example, a written exam to evaluate and promote teachers, rather than a more comprehensive evaluation). These obstacles in the implementation process are perceived by government officials and advisors from that time as resulting from technical and administrative difficulties rather than from political struggle with the teachers’ union. For instance, the written exam was designed to address the need to evaluate thousands of teachers requesting promotion. During the period 2002–​10, the main agents engaged in negotiations with the MEN to maintain some power in the hiring and promotion of teachers were local governments whose political power was strongly dependent on their relations with teachers and local teachers’ unions. In this regard, local government officials were interested in keeping some of their power to hire teachers directly (presumably to pay for political favors). Although they were not able to influence the entry contest, they were able to retain control over teachers on provisional contracts.

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At the same time, over the decade after the reform, the teachers’ union (mainly comprising teachers regulated under the old” statute) insisted on the creation of a unified statute, and was mainly against the evaluation system. In 2014, Fecode strongly supported President Santos in his campaign for re-​election (this was a close win, so presumably the support was important). Once Santos won the elections, Fecode sought recognition for the support it had provided and took the opportunity to resume the debate on teachers’ working conditions, making two main demands: substantial salary increases and unification of the teachers’ statute (which would mean radically changing the current evaluation and promotion system, weakening the link between the two). This led to a teachers’ strike that ended on the negotiating table to settle an agreement on teachers’ pay and on the evaluation system. In contrast to the political environment in the early 2000s, whereby the executive had extraordinary powers to set the rules, this time, the power of the teachers’ union was such that the only option for the government was to negotiate. This power has increased since then, in part because a new decree enacted in 2014 (Decree 160, 2014) as a result of an agreement with the International Labour Organization, whereby the national government is obligated to negotiate working conditions (mostly salaries) every year with the unions that represent public servants. The 2015 reform that led to the change in the evaluation system was a clear combination of technical and political forces. On the technical side, the government had a strong technical team at the MEN, comprising highly educated professionals who were familiar with academic literature and looked for scientific research to better understand issues and come up with solutions. These professionals looked for help directly from scholars in Colombia and the US, and actively sought advice from governments of countries with high-​quality education systems. On the political side, the power of the teachers’ union was such that the main changes to the teachers’ evaluation and promotion system had to be negotiated. This led to rigorous negotiation without losing sight of the main policy purpose (from the national government perspective) of having a better professional development system for teachers as well as better teachers for students. Here it is important to note that officers from the national government had a very clear notion of the desired evaluation system and what was “non-​ negotiable”. This was key in the negotiations with the teachers’ union because while public officials were aware of the need for making adjustments in order to achieve a viable evaluation system, at the same time they were aware of the limits needed to guarantee a technically sound solution. This combination of technical and political criteria in policy analysis is clearly summarized in the following reflection from an interview with a former public official: ‘One thing is to make a design disconnected from the political reality, and then leave the political reality to mess it up. Another very different thing is to make a technical design, but that already considers the political reality … at the end the debate of the evaluation ended in 160

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a technical proposal that convinced the teachers’ union.’ (Former vice-​minister of education, semi-​structured interview, August 2018) At the end of this process, the MEN ended up with both an instrument and a system with which to evaluate teachers, which was very close to its best outcome. However, to arrive to this result it had to make important concessions to the teachers’ union in other respects, including a bonus for teachers on the final rung of promotion ladder under the old statute. More important was the concession that enabled teachers who did not succeed in the evaluation to be promoted after taking remedial courses without passing any further tests. Making promotions easier had been part of the union’s claims for years before the 2015 negotiation. This modification was introduced on only one occasion and only for those teachers who had not been able to ascend the scale on previous attempts. In sum, in both phases of teachers’ reform (in 2001 with the design and enactment of the new teachers’ statute and in 2015 with the new evaluation system), we observe a clear balance between technical and political solutions. However, depending on the political landscape and the level of power of stakeholders, political feasibility gets more relevance in the design process. Contrary to the essence of the rational decision-​making model (Bardach, 2012), there is no evidence in the case of either reform of a comprehensive analysis of different policy alternatives using clear criteria. One possible reason for this is scarcity of time. Officials have very limited time to take sensitive decisions and the idea of having a systematic analysis of costs and benefits of several policy options is sometimes a luxury they cannot afford. However, in both reforms we do see an input from technocrats and academia. For instance, the 2015 reform occurred after a wide-​ranging national debate about the needs of the education sector in the previous year, with an emphasis in teaching quality. The debate was led by one of Colombia’s most important entrepreneurs, Pedro Gómez from Fundación Compartir, with considerable input from, and controversy within, academia, and the participation of public sector officials and representatives from think tanks and education NGOs (Beltrán, 2014; Gallego, 2014; García et al, 2014; Méndez, 2014). Although imperfect, this was a substitute for the consideration of policy alternatives. Notwithstanding the absence of a comprehensive consideration of alternatives, there is clear evidence in the reform design of a desire for effectiveness (reaching the specific policy objective of improving teaching quality and student learning) and efficiency (spending wisely and not wasting resources that will not translate into improved quality) while guaranteeing political feasibility. Notwithstanding these technical objectives of effectiveness and efficiency, a political arena characterized by the participation of organized groups affects the way in which policy is designed. In particular, the teachers’ union can play a major role in the policy outcome, depending on its level of power. At the same time, since the teachers’ union is not a homogenous group and does not necessarily represent the interests of teachers regulated by the terms of new statute, part of 161

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the negotiation process can be unbalanced by rules favoring those under the terms of the old statute. This will likely change in the near future, as more teachers from the old regime retire, and the odds of having teachers in the new regime in the union increase.

Implementation The implementation of the teaching reforms involved several institutions at different levels of government. The examination process for the selection of teachers (concurso) was initially the responsibility of the MEN directly, and then delegated to the National Commission of Civil Service (Comisión Nacional del Servicio Civil –​CNSC). The examination was administered by the Colombian Institute for the Evaluation of Education (Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación –​ICFES), which also administers state examination of students at schools and colleges. The process of interviews and revision of antecedents, and the selection process itself, were carried out by education secretaries at the TE level. In terms of evaluation for promotion, promotion contests were managed by the MEN, with strong support from the National University, which designed and implemented the examination used for the promotion decision (until 2014). The MEN defined the cut-​off levels for promotion decisions based on the examination results, and increases in teachers’ salaries were then automatically updated. After 2014, once the evaluation system was redesigned, implementation was delegated to ICFES. Finally, the annual teachers’ evaluation (used to make decisions of tenure) is the responsibility of school principals. Overall, the intervention of several institutions in the implementation of the teaching reforms poses a clear challenge of coordination. How close the MEN is to these entities determines in part the rhythm of implementation. This is clearly seen, for instance, in the administration by the National University and ICFES of examinations needed for entry into the profession and promotion. In these cases, officials at the MEN worked closely with these institutions to make sure that the examination process was implemented on time. Having the implementation distributed across different organizations, however, implies that timing is not always under the control of the MEN and depends on the capacity of other organizations. When participants were asked about the main barriers for implementation, three common aspects emerged: financial resources, human resources and time. Money will always be an important barrier to optimal implementation. In the case of Colombia, the MHCP has considerable power, and the MEN must negotiate for resources to make implementation financially viable. This was particularly clear in the implementation of the second phase of teachers’ reform that included a more expensive evaluation system and the provision of training courses for those teachers who did not do well in the examination. The implementation of the reform implies putting in place a complex structure at many levels: an objective examination for entering the teaching profession, 162

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a transparent and robust system to evaluate teachers for promotion, a high-​ quality offer of pre-​service and in-​service educational training for teachers, and an information system able to map teaching needs in the country and to track teachers. The first version of this structure had to be in place in a very short time (the timing was negotiated with the teachers’ union in one of the strikes) and with very limited information. Some of the tasks were delegated to other institutions that had the technical ability but not necessarily the sufficient human resources to implement what was needed in a timely manner. This was clearly the case of the implementation of concursos when they were delegated to the CNSC. The CNSC is responsible for such merit contests not only in the teaching profession but in other sectors in the civil service. It was therefore understaffed for the purposes of conducting a massive selection process like that of the Colombian education system in a timely manner. Another key element in implementation is information. The lack of relevant and timely information needed to take daily decisions was identified as a barrier by some of the interviewees. In particular, at the early stages of implementation there was a lack of information about the needs of the teaching force at the local level, including information about student enrolment. Since the early 2000s, this issue has gradually been addressed by putting together a robust information system to track teachers and students. This system has been strengthened over time and is currently a critical input for educational policy design and implementation at the national level. For instance, the amount of resource that is transferred (through the SGP) for education is based on this information system. Finally, implementation ultimately depends on people, not only bureaucrats but also other actors that can facilitate or impede successful implementation of public policy (Scharpf, 1978; Goggin et al, 1990). Having engaged officials and convinced stakeholders “to move things” is key to sustainable implementation. For example, some interviewees recognized that the involvement of local governments (education secretaries from TEs) or even private nonprofit organizations devoted to the education sector, as well as a robust team at the central office, can contribute to a more permanent structure for implementation that remains over time and can maintain and defend policy initiatives, independent of who is in office. Unfortunately, the turnover of bureaucrats both at the local and national levels is so high that it is difficult to maintain such robust teams, and therefore sustained and effective implementation is highly dependent on who is in office.

The (absent) role of policy evaluation One of the theoretical elements of policy analysis is the use of evidence to design and improve policies. Evidence that is highly valued among scholars is that produced by rigorous evaluations in the form of impact evaluations or implementation evaluations (Morra-​Imas and Rist, 2009; Wholey et al, 2010; Gertler et al, 2011). Although some people involved in the design of teachers’ policies recognize the value of such evaluations, their use is scarce. In many of 163

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the interviews, participants identified the need of high-​quality information for policy design. However, there is a gap in the timing of results of evaluations and the need of information. For instance, in the case of teachers’ reform, there are two impact evaluations (Ome, 2013; Brutti and Sanchez, 2017) that are now available but are under “the radar” of most policy makers today and were actually mentioned only twice in our interviews (and only one participant recognized the use of this information to support moving ahead on policy design). Moreover, the design of rigorous impact evaluations as part of policy design itself was absent in this case. In general, we asked participants about the need and use of impact evaluations of newly designed programs and initiatives, and the perception in most of cases is that it is an academic exercise that takes too much time for those who are making decisions and running programs with limited time. However, some do recognize the relevance of this information and used results of previous evaluations to make some decisions. While we are not able to generalize this finding to education policy, it does raise a concern both for academics and policy makers on how to collaborate and communicate more effectively so that the design of impact and implementation evaluations can be planned from the policy design phase, so that a learning-​design cycle can be effectively put in place. This is not to say that “evidence” is not used in policy design. As mentioned previously, information and hard data are highly valued, and in many instances, high-​level officials used results from data analysis and academic research to incorporate ideas in the design of some of the initiatives described in this chapter, specifically in the case of the study from Fundación Compartir (García et al, 2014), which was a valuable input to the 2015 reform. However, prospective policy evaluation for future use is still not a common feature in policy analysis, at least in the education sector.

Conclusion Our analysis allows two main conclusions. First, although different government officials understood the problem they were facing at the time in different ways, either as a fiscal problem or a problem relating to the quality of education, they converged on a common solution that facilitated a reform of teachers’ policy that was adequate according to the standards at the time. Second, the political context and the balance of power between the stakeholders affect the tension between technical and political solutions and may affect how far the policy process is from the ideal process where policy alternatives are considered in light of evidence. On the one hand, the political context affects how much time officials feel they have for policy design. On the other hand, the strength of the unions makes a technically oriented policy process more difficult to achieve. In this respect, the Colombian education policy case shows that the ability to envision and profit from windows of political opportunities (Kingdon, 1984), such as the one that opened at the end of 2001 where the union was politically weak, was crucial for the reform of teachers’ policy. Years later, the opposite situation arose, and the 164

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teachers’ union made the discussion about the reform much more difficult for the government and much more inclined towards political solutions. This case also provides several important lessons. First is that public discussion may act as an (imperfect) substitute for the consideration of alternatives if public opinion influencers discuss academic results. Colombia’s education sector is still not systematically using policy evaluation as a tool for public policy design and adjustment. Fostering the role of academia and the use of impact evaluations is an important challenge for policy design and implementation in the education sector in Colombia; part of the challenge concerns timing and resources (evaluations take a long time to produce results and can be expensive) but another part is convincing policy makers to listen to scientific results (Ridde and Dagenais, 2015). A second lesson is the importance of communication and building trust between the government and teachers, and the power of language. On many occasions, the way negotiations took place with teachers was affected by how problems and solutions were framed. Sometimes the ideas are the same, but the use of different types of language to express them impedes reaching agreements. Moreover, the government often fails to fulfil the agreements reached after negotiating (mainly because promises are made about future commitments that have to be implemented by a different regime and the financial resources required have not been allocated), or the teachers’ union sometimes changes its interpretation of agreements to claim additional benefits –​this produces distrust and difficulties for future negotiations. Third, our analysis illustrates the risks of substantial change within the bureaucracy. Every time a new administration takes office, a large part of the personnel changes, and institutional and policy memory is somewhat lost. Thus, precious time is spent on problem diagnosis and analysis for policy design and implementation, rather than building on previous achievements and knowledge learned. This not only affects the lack of continuity of policies that, when successful, should continue, but also the capacity of public officials to negotiate with other stakeholder organizations that are more stable over time, such as unions. Finally, we illustrate the importance of taking advantage of policy windows for policy design. Here we identify two clear examples. In the first reform, a weakened teachers’ union and a teachers’ statute that did not apply to current teachers led to the approval of the new teachers’ statute. In the second reform, there was a clear policy window (Kingdon, 1984), with education and teacher quality on the public agenda, several stakeholders aligned with tackling the problem, and several policy solutions provided from the academia. The alignment of these policy, problem and politics streams facilitated the reform. However, in this case, the presence of a stronger teachers’ union forced the government to come up with a more negotiated solution than for the first reform. Note 1

While by law this is true, in practice the MEN performs/​controls some of these duties, in particular the implementation of the promotion system.

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References Bardach, E. (2012) A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving (4th edition). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Barrera, F., Maldonado, D. and Rodríguez, C. (2014) “Calidad de la educación básica y media en Colombia:  diagnóstico y propuestas”. In A.  Montenegro and M. Meléndez (eds.) Equidad y Movilidad Social. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, pp. 239–​328. Beltrán, C.E.G. (2014) “La McDonaldización, el currículo y la formación de docentes”, Enletawa Journal 7: 101–​14. Bonet, J., Pérez, G. and Ayala, J. (2014) Contexto Histórico y Evolución del SGP en Colombia, Documentos de Trabajo sobre Economía Regional, No. 205. Cartagena de Indias: Banco de la Republica, Centro de Estudios Económicos Regionales. Brutti, Z. and Sánchez, F. (2017) Does Better Teacher Selection Lead to Better Students? Evidence from a Large Scale Reform in Colombia, 2017–​11. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE), Universidad de los Andes. Cuenca, R. (2015) Las Carreras Docentes en América Latina. La Acción Meritocrática para el Desarrollo Profesional. Santiago de Chile: Oficina Regional de Educación para América Latina y el Caribe (OREALC/​UNESCO). Available from http://​ unesdoc.unesco.org/​ images/​0024/​002440/​244074s.pdf Decree 1278 of 2002 (19 de junio), por el cual se expide el Estatuto de Profesionalización Docente. Diario Oficial No. 44.840. Elacqua, G., Hincapié, D., Vegas, E. and Alfonso, M. (2018) Profesión: Profesor en América Latina ¿Por Qué se Perdió el Prestigio Docente y cómo Recuperarlo?. Washington, DC: Inter-​American Development Bank. Fecode (Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores por la Educación) (n.d.) “La reducción a las transferencias”. Powerpoint Presentation [Online]. Available from www.renovacionmagisterial.org/​boletin/​boletin5/​presentacion_​final_​ transferecias_​fecode.ppt [Accessed 14 December 2018]. Figueroa, M., García, S., Maldonado D., Rodríguez, C., Saavedra, A. and Vargas, G. (2018) La Profesión Docente en Colombia: Normatividad, Formación, Selección y Evaluación. Working Paper No. 54/​18. Bogotá: Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo, Universidad de los Andes. Gallego, A. (2014) “Los límites de la economía de la educación: abrir la mirada”. Revista Colombiana de Educación 67: 19–​46. García, S., Maldonado, D., Perry, G.E., Rodríguez, C. and Saavedra, J.E. (2014) Tras la Excelencia Docente: ¿Cómo Mejorar la Calidad de la Educación Para Todos los Colombianos? Bogotá: Fundación Compartir. Gertler, P.J., Martinez, S., Premand, P., Rawlings, L.B. and Vermeersch, C. (2011) Impact Evaluation in Practice. Washington DC: World Bank. Goggin, M.L., Bowman, A.O.M., Lester, J.P. and O’Toole, L.J. Jr. (1990) Implementation Theory and Practice:  Toward a Third Generation. New  York, NY: HarperCollins.

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Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (2003) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (2nd edition). Toronto: Oxford University Press. Kingdon, J.W. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Law 715 of 2001 (21 de diciembre), por la cual se dictan nor mas orgánicas en materia de recursos y competencias de conformidad con los artículos 151, 288, 356 y 357 (Acto Legislativo 01 de 2001) de la Constitución Política y se dictan otras disposiciones para organizar la prestación de los servicios de educación y salud, entre otros. Diario Oficial No. 44.654. Legislative Act 001 of 2001 (1 de agosto). Por medio del cual se modifican algunos artículos de la Constitución Política. Diario oficial No. 44.506. Lindblom, C.E. and Woodhouse, E.J. (1993) The Policy-​Making Process (3rd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Martínez, M.C. (2013) “Cartografía de una década de las movilizaciones por la educación en Colombia (1998–​2007)”. Educación y Cultura, 100. Méndez, P. (2014) “El estatuto del maestro”. Revista Colombiana de Educación 67: 67–​88. Morra-​Imas, L.G. and Rist, R.C. (2009) “Understanding the evaluation context and the program theory of change”. In R. Rist and L. Morra (eds.) The Road to Results: Designing and Conducting Effective Development Evaluations. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 141–​79. Ome, A. (2013) “El estatuto de profesionalización docente:  una primera evaluación”. Cuadernos Fedesarrollo 43: 1–​33. Ridde, V. and Dagenais, C. (2015) Enfoques y Prácticas en la Evaluación de Programas (Primera edición en español ed., Colección gerencia y políticas de salud). Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Scharpf, F.W. (1978) “Interorganizational policy studies:  issues, concepts and perspectives” In K.I. Hanf and F.W. Scharpf (eds.) Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control. London: Sage Publications, pp. 345–​70. Torres, J. (2002) “Política educativa de la administración Pastrana Arango 1998–​ 2002” Nación y Territorio, 117–​132. Wholey, J.S., Hatry, H.P. and Newcomer, K.E. (2010) Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation (3rd edition). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-​Bass.

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Policy analysis in the health sector in Colombia Andres I. Vecino-​Ortiz, Stephanie Puerto-​García, Diego Lucumí and Janeth Mosquera-​Becerra

Introduction In 1993, Colombia overhauled its health system, transitioning from a national health system to a social health insurance system. This change represented important improvements in the way healthcare was provided as it expanded healthcare coverage, enhanced private sector participation, increased the flow of resources to the system and improved quality of healthcare in high-​end urban hospitals (Giedion and Uribe, 2009; Vecino-​Ortiz et al, 2018). Nonetheless, the reform came at a cost. It placed a focus on healthcare at the expense of essential public health functions (Jaramillo Pérez, 1999, p. 100; Rigoli and Dussault, 2003; Yepes, 2010; Vecino-​Ortiz et al, 2018). The reform also worked under the expectation that formal sector participation would increase within ten years, and that competition among private insurers would work as in any competitive market (Ruiz, 2018). Some of these assumptions proved to be incorrect and the accumulation of unaddressed market failures, persistently high numbers of informal workers, and a generous plan of benefits led to an imbalance between health system revenues and costs (Gaviria et al, 2006; Calderon-​Mejia and Marinescu, 2012; Peñaloza et al, 2012; Vecino-​Ortiz et al, 2018), placing the system at a high financial risk. Both successes and challenges of the health system combined with increasing technical capacity in public sector institutions led the health sector to start approaching the policy process in a more formal fashion through policy analysis, to better inform policy options. In this chapter, we discuss the development of policy analysis studies in the Colombian health sector since the health reform in 1993, and the heterogeneity of such development across different health sector institutions in the country. The chapter assesses how policy analysis in the health sector evolved over time, highlighting the divergent development in national-​level and local-​level institutions (Collins, 2005). To develop the chapter, we conducted document reviews and six interviews with current and former high level officials from the Ministry of Health/​Ministry of Social Protection (a merger between the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labor between 2002 and 2011)  and its related agencies. We focus on the 169

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development of policy analysis studies in the health sector at the national, the departmental (equivalent to province or state in the political division of Colombia) and municipal (equivalent to county in the political division of Colombia) level. The chapter follows a structure following the stages of the policy process across institutions and time. First, we describe the agenda-​setting processes at national-​ level institutions, including a case study. Next, we present the root causes of the gap on technical capacity for agenda setting between national and local-​level health sector agencies. Third, we highlight the disconnection between agenda setting and implementation for public health programs, concluding with a case study. Fourth, we briefly assess the role of agents outside health sector institutions shaping the policy design and its implementation. Fifth, we provide examples featuring the development of institutional capacity to conduct policy implementation and evaluation in two institutions of the health sector. Sixth, we briefly highlight opportunities (data sources for monitoring and evaluation of policy) and bottlenecks (built capacity in local level institutions) for policy analysis in the health sector. Finally, we close the chapter with a discussion and a conclusion.

The role of the Ministry of Health and other national-​level institutions in setting the agenda of the health sector National-​level health sector institutions play a critical role on steering national health policy, and implementing investment plans in the health sector. Despite such a critical role, these government bodies have traditionally focused their efforts and resources on day-​to-​day crisis management rather than on long-​term strategic planning (interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), which is generally reflected in limited capacity to set strategic agendas. However, in recent years the Ministry of Health and other national level institutions have increasingly recruited personnel with high levels of technical capacity from both within and outside the institution to develop long-​term strategic plans (interviews 1, 2, 3, 5). By strengthening their technical units, national-​ level health sector institutions increased their capacity to conduct policy analysis. But there are also bottlenecks in the agenda-​setting and prioritization processes at the central level. Many technical officials are not in career systems and are hired as contractors, increasing their turnover rates and making them vulnerable to losing their jobs when the government changes (interviews 1, 2, 3). Moreover, general issues related to government employment, such as inflexibility in terms of hiring/​firing employees, difficult performance measurement, low salaries restricted by fiscal limits, and administrative barriers, reduce the ability of these institutions to retain skilled personnel (Bernal et al, 2018). Another issue is the fragmentation of the different units within the Ministry of Health and other health sector institutions, leading to work in silos that foster inefficiencies, gaps and redundancies on key issues (interviews 1, 2, 3, 5). This fragmentation may also partially explain the heterogeneity on technical capabilities across different units to conduct policy analysis. Recent efforts have been made to solve this issue within national level institutions in the context of specific programs. 170

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Figure 10.1: Principal–​agent problem for the health sector Sector of the economy (agent)

Market or institutional equilibrium for the agent

Agent’s market or institutional space

Health sector (principal)

The principal has no governance over the agent

Neg

o

ties t

ernali

ext ative

ctor

lth se

e hea

s th ward

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

One example (interview 3) is the development of the Integrated Health Care Model (Modelo Integral de Atención en Salud –​MIAS), which was expected to facilitate, in the context of this program, the integration of strategic planning activities across units within the Ministry of Health and across Local Entities/territorial entities, aiming at strengthening intra and extra-sectoral coordination. Since then, a different program, known as MAITE, has replaced MIAS, although both have similar objectives. MAITE was still in its initial implementation phase at the time of writing this chapter. The fragmentation in agenda setting for health is seen not only within health sector institutions, but also across other government agencies. Population health is a highly intersectoral issue, especially with the increase in the burden of chronic diseases and injuries (highly determined by intersectoral factors), which requires a joint approach across governmental offices (health, finance, transport, trade, and environment ministries, or the National Planning Department). In this sense, previous work has mentioned a marked weakness in the ability of the Ministry of Health to champion multisectoral issues that affect health (Ramírez et al, 2018), facilitating a principal–​agent problem where the health sector bears the costs of economic activities over which seldom has any control (Figure 10.1). Even though in recent years there have been examples in which the Ministry of Health has led the debate on intersectoral issues (for example, taxation, drug pricing and illicit drugs policy), this is not an institutionalized matter, and traditionally the health sector has been absent at the core of those discussions. The acknowledgment of such fragmentation across government sectors led to the creation of the National Council of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud, 2016). However, our interviews revealed that this body did not work as expected and the role of the health sector remains limited, as it has been unsuccessful in steering policy decisions from other sectors (interviews 1, 3, 5). Case study: the case of MIPRES The MIPRES platform (standing for “MI PREScripción” in Spanish, or “My prescription”) is a good example of the development of policy analysis within 171

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the health sector. In the Colombian health system, insurers claim reimbursements from a national government fund when health technologies used on healthcare are not included in the plan of benefits. As no systematic data collection on these reimbursements existed initially, no systematic evaluations were being done (interview 5). In 2014, the Ministry of Health retrospectively identified that these reimbursements were having an adverse impact on health sector financial stability. As a consequence, the health ministry developed MIPRES, a compulsory platform to request prescriptions for technologies and services that are not included in the health benefits plan. MIPRES now allows government agencies to conduct systematic audits on high-​cost technologies, and to streamline the prescription process, reducing the barriers limiting their access while also improving the information on which technologies outside the health benefits plan are being prescribed, and by whom. Some internal studies had been initiated to evaluate the impact of MIPRES at the time of the development of this chapter. The story of MIPRES is an example of strengthening policy analysis in the health sector in Colombia. Thanks to higher technical capacity at the Ministry of Health, reimbursements were identified as a threat to the financial stability of the system. This became an agenda priority, and a sound strategy was proposed using personnel and technical capabilities of the Ministry of Health.

The gap in the development of technical capacity between national and local-​level health sector agencies Despite the overall progress in the development of technical capacity at national-​ level institutions, departmental and municipal-​level health sector institutions have lagged behind in terms of technology acquisition and retaining high-​skilled human resources (Gleeson, 2009; Peñaloza et al, 2012).1 The divergence on built capacity between national, departmental, and municipal-​level health institutions is evidenced in the lack of skilled personnel who can conduct the prioritization, strategic planning, implementation, and evaluation and monitoring of local-​level health activities. Given that most of their functions are related to public health programs rather than healthcare (which is more centralized), the former are often more affected by the lack of capacity (Yepes, 2010). The reasons for this gap are multifactorial, but our interviews and document review revealed one potential root cause (Yepes, 2010). The decentralization process at the end of the 1990s was concurrent with a deep financial crisis (Lopez Murcia, 2017, pp. 1994–​2014). The decentralization of public health functions without enough local financial and technical capacity led to the direction of the limited resources to local hospitals with the expectation that they would effectively carry out public health activities (Guerrero et al, 2014). The overestimation of hospital capacity to carry out public health functions, the lack of personnel who could implement evidence-​based activities, and the high transaction costs associated to the control of corruption made the role of local-​level health sector institutions to conduct public health activities and programs increasingly difficult (interviews 3, 5). Moreover, the decentralization process affecting other government institutions also reduced the capacity of the health sector to design and implement coordinated 172

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intersectoral strategies to capitalize on the benefits of decentralization and mitigate its risks (Molina-​Marín et  al, 2006). In summary, a decentralization process was implemented without the underlying requirements to support local health governance from both a financial and a technical perspective, leading to a lag on the construction of capabilities at the local level until a four-​year National Public Health Plan (Plan Nacional de Salud Pública –​PNSP) was created in 2007 (Calderón et al, 2011; Roth-​Deubel and Molina-​Marín, 2013). Weak local-​level institutions are an important determinant of the poor implementation of public health programs and strategies at the local level compared with the national level. This issue has been evidenced further by the heterogeneity on the ­epidemiological surveillance that local health secretaries have done to the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. This gap is discussed in the next section.

The disconnection between agenda setting and the implementation of public health interventions As mentioned in the previous sections, policy analysis in Colombia is increasingly being used to inform policy in healthcare. However, policy analysis to inform public health policy has lagged behind. To start with, public health was not a priority explicitly laid out during the last health reform in 1993 (Jaramillo Pérez, 1999, p. 100). Although some public health actions were incorporated as part of the Basic Healthcare Plan (Plan de Atención en Salud), a rigorous policy analysis for public health issues was not conducted. Some local literature shows that the decentralization had a profound effect on the reduction of built capacity to implement public health activities (including the capabilities to carry out policy analysis) in local-​level institutions (Yepes, 2010). In 2007, a four-​year PNSP was adopted for the first time, incorporating sectoral and intersectoral targets with the aim of constituting a guideline for implementation. This was an advance as public health was for the first time an explicit item in the agenda (Calderón et al, 2011). Nonetheless, this plan was designed in a top-​down manner and was subsequently regarded as detached from the realities of local institutions, which are the ones conducting the actual implementation (interview 2). It was not until 2012 that, based on this previous plan, the Public Health Plan for the Decade (Plan Decenal de Salud Pública  –​PDSP) was designed to set strategic goals to be achieved in a ten-​year period. This plan facilitated the agenda-​setting process for public health functions of both national and subnational health institutions. The PDSP was innovative in the sense that it proposed to close the gap between healthcare delivery and public health functions through the strengthening of health sector functions at the local/​departmental government level. The PDSP used a bottom-​up approach plan, subject to more than 150 consultations with citizen representatives of around 90% of the municipalities of the country (interview 2). The participatory focus of the PDSP was instrumental to generate a better fit between the agenda that was being set, and the capabilities 173

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of local institutions in charge of the implementation process (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2018a) (interview 2). Even though the plan was comprehensive and aimed at providing guidance on sectoral and multisectoral strategies, the PDSP lacked enough strong advocates to spearhead its implementation, especially in institutions outside the health sector. This left the implementation of the agenda items to local healthcare institutions, with their limited technical and financial capacity. Governance in public health functions in Colombia is an issue that has been largely discussed in previous literature, but not structurally addressed (Roth-​Deubel and Molina-​ Marín, 2013). A significant issue of the PDSP is that despite the fact that an evaluation of the different components of the plan has been proposed, and that a mid-​term evaluation has been conducted by the Ministry of Health, no budget allocations were carried out to evaluate the implementation of the PDSP at the local level or by independent parties (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2013b). Before the PNSP and the PDSP, local and departmental governments were responsible for setting the agenda and designing and implementing strategies on public health issues. Yet, the goals and frameworks to do so were unclear. Both public health plans provided a framework to conduct policy analysis and to introduce locally retrieved data into the decision-​making processes. However, structural issues related to low local-​level capacities remained unchanged. For this reason, despite the guidance provided in the PNSP and PDSP, policy analysis at the local level, and particularly in public health, is scarce. Case study: the Health Situation Analysis The gap in the capabilities for agenda setting and evaluation at the local level is clearly evident in the example of the Health Situation Analysis (Análisis de la Situación de Salud –​ASIS). With the development of the PDSP, local and municipal governments were provided with guidelines to conduct policy analyses. Such guidelines included the generation of information through the development of the ASIS (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2014). Nonetheless, both appropriate information systems and technical capabilities built at the local level to assess the data produced by the ASIS were still lacking. The ASIS quickly became just another reporting requirement that the local and departmental health secretaries had to send to the Ministry of Health, rather than a source of information to conduct policy analysis at the local level (interviews 2, 3, 4, 5). The requirement of the ASIS by the Ministry of Health developed a new market for contractors who would develop the reports, so that municipalities and departments could comply with the requirement of sending the ASIS to the Ministry of Health. As a consequence, the intended objectives around ownership and uptake of the local data for evidence-​based policy became even more unlikely at the local level.

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Outsiders play a role in policy design at the central level Regarding policy design, the consensus across most interviews is that there is not a systematic approach to design policy in the Ministry of Health or in the local and departmental health secretaries. Even though specific aspects of the policy process have been increasingly adopted over time, the reactive nature of these institutions and the lack of personnel with the capabilities to conduct rigorous policy analyses leaves national and local-​level institutions with improvised systems of policy design vulnerable to outside players. Earlier in the chapter, we discussed how the Ministry of Health has traditionally lacked a leadership role in intersectoral issues affecting population health across government agencies. This also holds true when it comes to actors outside government. The improvised approach towards policy decisions without previous analysis facilitates the role of different actors outside decision makers on designing policy on health issues. Among them are civil society groups, lobbyists for the private sector, and public comptroller and judicial institutions (neither are government bodies). In some areas, private sector institutions invest in obtaining contradictory evidence, such as during controversial debates around sin taxes (alcohol, tobacco and sugary sweetened beverages) (interviews 1, 3, 5). Weak technical capacity in Congress has also been described as a factor that affects policy design for policy options that require legislative process. Poor understanding of health issues enables contradictory evidence and special interests to prevail in Congress (interview 5). Civil society has increasingly become more involved in recent years in the processes of agenda setting by facilitating the generation of data, the evaluation of health policy, and advocacy efforts in coordination with the Ministry of Health (interviews 3, 5). This is particularly related to the presence of international donors that have supported civil society institutions engaging in advocacy efforts focused on evidence-​based strategies. Other important actors are scientific ­societies, which have played a key role in agenda setting for health policy (interviews 2, 5). Nonetheless, this is not constant across all civil society groups and some associations, particularly medical organizations, are much more focused on advocating for labor force issues than for comprehensive evidence-​based policy change. Public comptroller and judicial institutions have also had a role in shaping policy decisions. One important example is the use of court-​based decisions, called tutelas in Spanish, which are protection writs for individual rights to rule on the right to health. Tutelas have been used to ensure individual rights for Colombian citizens through an expedited court-​based process in many positive ways. Nonetheless, the health system has increasingly seen judges ruling favorably on tutelas to authorize health insurers and providers to use new high-​cost technologies where the evidence on effectiveness and cost-​effectiveness is scarce or dubious, generating costs that are ultimately paid by general health system funds (Yamin and Parra-​Vera, 2009; Bergallo, 2011; González and Durán, 2011; Giedion et al, 2018; Cubillos et al, forthcoming). The case study on MIPRES earlier in the chapter highlights how this platform has the potential to reduce 175

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reimbursements authorized for technologies without enough evidence-based support through tutelas. Long-​standing institutional weaknesses and the lack of a systematic approach to policy analysis have opened the space for actors outside government to influence policy, sometimes advocating for evidence-​based policy, sometimes against it.

Two examples of evolving national-​level agencies Creating capacity to conduct policy analysis is an evolving process in the health sector in Colombia. In this section, we first feature a national-​level agency that strengthened is role at the local level to cope with the relative institutional weakness in local-​level institutions. Second, we describe the path that led to the emergence of a health technology assessment entity in Colombia. Previous sections of this chapter have highlighted the relevance of integrating local-​level health institutions in the decision-​making processes, and the barriers to do so. A case study worthy of mention on the provision of support to local-​ level institutions is the National Health Superintendence (Superintendencia Nacional de Salud –​SNS). In Colombia, the SNS is tasked with inspecting, surveilling and controlling health system institutions. SNS used to focus on enforcing compliance from a very centralized perspective, distant from the local and departmental levels, which made it difficult to mitigate systemic risks in a timely manner (Ramírez et al, 2018). In 2013, the SNS broadened its focus towards a more preventive role where, among other aspects, a new office of “auditing methodologies for monitoring and risk analysis” was created (Decree 2462, 2013; SNS and Oficina de Control Interno, 2017). This change in focus allowed the SNS to start playing an active role in developing technical studies, assessing financial and performance indicators, issuing early warnings, and suggesting mechanisms for prioritizing activities and assessing risk at both the national and the local level. Also, the SNS opened six regional offices to improve its functions at the local and departmental level. These regional offices are aimed at providing a better financial control of local insurers, healthcare providers and departmental health institutions, and strengthening the response to requests from health system users/​patients/​affiliates, among others (Superintendente Nacional de Salud, 2016). An evaluation on this expansion at the local level is still pending at the time of writing this chapter. Another example of institutional evolution is the rise and failure of the different governmental entities responsible for setting the insurance premium and the package of benefits, and how this led to the development of a health technology assessment entity. With the health reform in 1994, the National Council of Social Security and Health (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud –​ CNSSS) was created (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 1994). CNSSS was charged with defining the content of the plan of benefits, the health insurance prime, and other actuarial aspects of the system. Despite these functions, the CNSSS was a body representing stakeholders of the system without enough 176

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technical support on actuarial sciences. In 2007 came the realization that a more technical body was required. Inspired by a similar commission that existed in the energy policy field, the Health Regulatory Commission (Comisión de Regulación en Salud –​CRES) was born through Law 1122 , 2017 (Senado de Colombia, 2007). The CRES comprised five full-​time, supposedly technical, commissioners, but inertia stemming from the previous CNSSS led to the continued need for representation of stakeholders and other interested parties (interviews 1, 3, 5), hindering the constitution of the CRES as a legitimate technical agency. The CRES was closed in 2012, and the functions around health insurance premium pricing, as well as the benefits package definition, were transferred to the Ministry of Health. The dismantlement of the CRES and the delegation of its functions to the Ministry of Health were generally seen as a positive change. Nonetheless, stakeholders from the private sector felt that they had lost their grip on the decision-​making processes around health insurance premium pricing and the benefits package, and that perception eventually triggered distrust in the policy process. Conversely, public officials believed that transferring the regulatory role to the Ministry of Health increased independence in the policy-​making process (Suárez-​Rozo et al,  2017). After the demise of the CRES, and given the urgent need for a technical evaluation of new technologies entering the benefits plan, in 2012 a new institution was created, the Institute for the Evaluation of Health Technologies (Instituto de Evaluación Tecnológica en Salud –​IETS). The IETS was created as a public–​private organization focused on performing health technology assessments to provide recommendations and evidence to public health institutions (Giedion et al, 2018). Given its institutional structure and public–​private nature, the IETS was designed under a complex contractual relationship (interview 3), which, on the one hand, made it an institution with a more flexible structure, but, on the other hand, threatened its long-​term sustainability (Mejia and Muñoz, 2017). However, such flexibility also allowed the IETS to hire and retain highly skilled technical experts to conduct health technology assessments. In 2015, the agency started to work closely with some scientific societies gathering evidence on issues not necessarily related to the introduction of new technologies (interviews 3, 5, 6), and more broadly, on providing solid evidence for public policy, including the use of participatory processes with experts and others (Mejia and Muñoz, 2017). This section has presented two examples of health institutions whose capabilities to conduct policy analysis have evolved in recent years. First, we presented a national-​level institution that has excelled by reaching out to local-​level health agencies, fostering the transfer of capacity using ad hoc models that does not necessarily translate into long-​term sustainability. Moreover, the transition from the CNSSS, to the CRES and then the IETS is a reflection of the changes that have occurred in the national-​level heath sector in the years since the reform, from politicized health agencies to technical ones. The challenge remains to maintain a trend of increasingly technical institutions and ensure that these changes spill over to local-​level agencies. 177

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Opportunities and bottlenecks for policy analysis in Colombia An opportunity for policy analysis: data sources for monitoring and evaluation of policy Colombia has made efforts to improve health information systems through generating new data sources, and also improving and integrating previous sources (Bernal-​Acevedo and Forero-​Camacho, 2011). Our interviews (interviews 3, 5) point to the extensive amount of data available, from four main sources (see Figure 10.2). These four types of data can be summarized as follows. 1. Healthcare data. Healthcare data is collected through a platform called the Integrated Social Protection Information System (SISPRO). SISPRO is a tool that compiles multiple sources of data for monitoring and evaluation of individual-​level health insurance contributions and healthcare demand, health financing and drug pricing (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2019). For example, the System of Information on Drug Prices (SISMED), a database that has recently been integrated into the SISPRO tool, compiles national and international drug pricing trends2 to inform drug pricing policy in Colombia. Another high-​quality dataset included in SISPRO is the “High Cost Account”, where individual-​level financial and resource utilization data on high-​cost diseases is collected. These compiled data sources are a great resource for policy design and evaluation. In fact, they are used as the

Figure 10.2: Data sources for monitoring and evaluation Healthcare data

Population surveys

RUAF (health system users) RIPS (health care demand)

National Survey on Nutrition

PILA (contributions)

Oral Health Survey

SIHO (hospital finances)

Mental Health Survey

High-cost account

Survery on Psychoactive Substances

SISMED (Drug pricing) SinCan (Cancer registry)

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

178

National Health Survey

National Survey for the Senior Population

Surveillance data

Local-level data (ASIS)

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main input for the estimation of the government-​regulated health insurance premium. Despite the richness of these datasets, they are mostly fragmented, and their comprehensive analysis is difficult, in part because their design is focused on data reporting rather than on analysis. A chief criticism of some of these sources concerns the limited public access to anonymized versions of the datasets (Rivillas et al, 2014). 2. Population surveys. Population survey data have become a key tool for agenda setting in Colombia. In the past 12 years, surveys focusing on general health, such as the National Health Survey (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2007), the National Survey on Nutrition (ICBF, 2015), the National Survey for the Senior Population (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015a), the Oral Health Survey (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2013a), the Mental Health Survey (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015b) and the Survey on Psychoactive Substances Consumption (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social et al, 2014), have been carried out with the aim of improving the links between data generation and policy development. Maintaining these ongoing efforts over time is key to keep generating evidence-​based policy. Pending tasks involve improving the collection of health data at the subnational level; developing longitudinal surveys; improving reporting systems, including nudging those in charge towards better and more consistent reporting; improving the integration of data; and strengthening the collection of data from private providers and the ability to link it to other datasets. 3 . Surveillance system. Surveillance functions at the national level are performed by the Colombian National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Salud –​INS), which has traditionally focused on surveilling communicable diseases. More recently, the INS has had to cope with two new issues, the first relating to the surveillance of new communicable conditions such as Zika and other imported viruses (more recently COVID-19), and the second concerning the country’s epidemiologic transition towards noncommunicable diseases. On both fronts, the INS had to adapt quickly in order to monitor these conditions (interview 2) (Rubin, 2017; Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2018b). Surveillance functions at the local level are also key and had also been affected by financial, personnel and technological constraints (López et al, 2009). 4 . ASIS. These analytic reports, mentioned earlier, are generated by departments and municipalities every year with the aim of characterizing population health and its determinants. Local and departmental health authorities must sent an ASIS to the central administration. While producing a report for every department and municipality is considered a positive move, our interviewees reveal that these entities lack the capacity to produce the data and inform policy based on this information. Therefore, the ASIS reporting requirement has become a bureaucratic burden that local health authorities are starting to address by hiring contractors to develop the ASIS for them, leading to low uptake and ownership of the data, and their limited use in informing departmental and local level policy. 179

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All these data are public and available to health officials. Nonetheless, there are three main barriers to its use. First, there is limited knowledge inside the institutions (particularly the Ministry of Health) about data availability, timing and accuracy. This issue becomes even more problematic given institutional issues and distrust related to data sharing within institutions and with external entities (for example, universities). Second, not all units at the central level within the Ministry of Health, and at the regional and local levels have built capacity to analyze the data and design policy based on this information. Particularly at the local level, technical capabilities to assess epidemiological and economic data are limited, and personnel often lack the skillset to use such data to inform public policies in health. Third, the lack of continuity of care in the system is evidenced in the fragmentation of healthcare data for analysis, making it difficult to develop traceable indicators (Bernal-​Acevedo and Forero-​Camacho, 2011; OECD, 2015). Bottlenecks for policy analysis in health sector institutions A particular issue repeatedly expressed during our interviews was the low demand and supply of highly technical skills among public officials working at both the central and local levels (Peñaloza et al, 2012). The main concerns were as follows: 1. Supply of skills. Scarce training on analytical methods, low capacity to ascertain evidence and translate it into policy prescriptions, and limited understanding of government functions were all mentioned by interviewees (interviews 2, 3, 5). Previously published work has also identified this issue, particularly at the local level (Roth-​Deubel and Molina-​Marín, 2013). Interviewees mentioned that public health practitioners, particularly at the local level, often lack the epidemiological, biostatistical and economic methods to systematically gather, collect and analyze data. Public health practitioners often do not even have any training in public health or a similar field (Marím et al, 2016). Legacy systems in some public health programs could be an important reason for these gaps, whereby evidence generation methods and analysis are not prioritized. Curriculum change and a renovation of public health programs are pending tasks in Colombia (interview 2, 3, 5). 2. Demand for skills. Another issue is the political capture of health sector agencies and subsequent clientelism, whereby public officials are given a government position (sometimes a technical position) based on political affiliation rather than on skillset as a reward for their political support. This is an ongoing threat to improving policy analysis in all government sectors as it decreases the demand for skills among public officials and increases the turnover in those positions, making the management of public organizations more difficult (Sanabria Pulido, 2015). This is an issue that even though it is still being seen at the national level, predominantly occurs at the local level. 180

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Discussion In this chapter, we find, on the one hand, a remarkable evolution of the policy analysis capabilities within national-​level institutions, with increased technical capacity and an increasing demand for rigorous policy analysis, particularly in agenda setting but also at other stages of the policy process, including implementation. On the other hand, we find a consistent lack of such capabilities at other levels, especially at the local level. Since healthcare policy is mostly managed at the national level and public health policy is mainly a responsibility of the local health authorities, the lack of capacity in the latter has led to significant gaps between healthcare and public health services. The gap between required and actual capabilities to appropriately conduct public health policy at the local level is attributed partially to an incomplete decentralization process at the end of the 20th century, and partially to political capture of national-​level and local-​level health institutions. The enactment of the PDSP, in part, attempted to support the decision-​making processes and the development of policy analysis at the local level. Nonetheless, a lack of both appropriate information systems and technical capabilities to collect and analyze data at the local level remains a bottleneck. This contrasts with the richness of data at the national level (albeit in some cases poorly connected), which is presented in this chapter as an opportunity to improve policy designs based on data. We also find a lack of governance and leadership in health-​related topics, both within health sector institutions and across government sectors (including those not pertaining to health), and has discussed the role of non-​government actors in shaping health policy. This is relevant because most of the burden of disease (mortality and disability combined), especially when referring to injuries and chronic conditions, is associated with market and institutional factors from other sectors (food, trade, environment, transportation, urban development and so on). The health sector experiences a principal–​agent problem in relation to other sectors of the economy. While other sectors face market and institutional forces that shape them and lead them to work more or less optimally under their own constraints, the health consequences of those decisions are manifested in terms of negative externalities for the health sector, for example through the increased burden of disease and injuries, and its associated costs in terms of healthcare. Nonetheless, the health sector has no governance over the behavior of, or strategic decisions across, other sectors. The lack of institutionalized and binding participation of the health sector in multisectoral discussions is evidenced in the limited role the National Council of Public Health in shaping intersectoral policy. This is further worsened by the role that non-​government actors have in shaping health policy. Finally, the chapter describes the training of public health and healthcare practitioners at in-​country institutions, with officials working in national-​level and local-​level governmental agencies often lacking skills in epidemiological, biostatistical and economic methods to systematically gather evidence, collect and analyze data. This is in part associated with legacy systems in national public 181

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health schools that have resisted curriculum change towards a more evidence-​ based approach.

Conclusion This chapter describes how health policy analysis has evolved since the health reform in 1993, based on document reviews and interviews with current and former officials from national-​level health sector institutions. It describes such evolution by following the stages of the policy process as a framework while assessing different national-​level and local-​level institutions. Policy analysis in the health sector in Colombia is increasingly common, but that should not distract us from its multiple gaps, and the marked differences between national and local-​level institutions. Policy analysis in public sector institutions must be strengthened to improve population health and reduce its associated costs. This chapter has suggested some strategies and tools with which to achieve that aim. Notes 1

2

Capacities in three dimensions: individual competencies of workers in the health sector such as knowledge and skills; capactities at organizational level (structures, processes and culture); and systemic capabilities (political, economic and health systems, stakeholder interests and sector). These comprise the set of capabilities needed in the health system to support and promote “good policy making to achieve improved societal outcomes”, as Gleeson (2009) affirms. Countries with similar characteristics to Colombia.

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Mejia, A. and Muñoz, A.L. (2017) Institutos de Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias:  Recomendaciones para su Estructuración a Partir del Caso de Colombia. Washington, DC:  Inter-​American Development Bank. Available from https:// ​ p ublications.iadb.org/ ​ p ublications/​ s panish/​ d ocument/​ Serie-​de-​notas-​t%C3%A9cnicas-​sobre-​procesos-​de-​priorizaci%C3%B3n-​ en-​salud-​Nota-​5-​Institutos-​de-​evaluaci%C3%B3n-​de-​tecnolog%C3%ADas-​ sanitarias-​Recomendaciones-p​ ara-s​ u-e​ structuraci%C3%B3n-​a-​partir-​del-​caso-​ de-​Colombia.pdf Ministerio de Salud (2016) “Comisión intersectorial de salud pública”. Available from www.minsalud.gov.co/​salud/​publica/​epidemiologia/​Paginas/​comision-​ intersectorial-​de-​salud-​publica.aspx Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (1994) “Acuerdo 001 de 1994. Por el cual se adopta el Reglamento del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud”. Available from www.minsalud.gov.co/N ​ ormatividad_N ​ uevo/A ​ CUERDO%20 01%20DE%201994.pdf Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2007) Encuesta Nacional de Salud 2007. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​Documentos%20y%20 Publicaciones/​ENCUESTA%20NACIONAL.pdf Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2013a) IV Estudio Nacional de Salud Bucal. Bogotá:  MinSalud. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​sites/​r id/​ Lists/B ​ ibliotecaDigital/R ​ IDE/V ​ S/P ​ P/E ​ NSAB-​IV-​Situacion-​Bucal-​Actual.pdf Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2013b) Sistema de Monitoreo y Evaluación al Plan Decenal de Salud Pública 2012–​2021. PDSP COLOMBIA. Bogotá:  MinSalud. Available from https://​ w ww.minsalud.gov.co/​ Documentos%20y%20Publicaciones/​ S istema%20de%20Seguimiento%20 y%20Evaluaci%C3%B3n%20del%20Plan%20Decenal%20De%20Salud%20 P%C3%BAblica%20-​%20PDSP%20Colombia%202012%20-​%202021.pdf Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2014) Guía Conceptual y Metodológica para la Construcción del ASIS de las Entidades Territoriales. Bogotá: MinSalud. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​sites/​r id/​Lists/​BibliotecaDigital/R ​ IDE/​ VS/​ED/​PSP/​Guia%20ASIS%2028112013.pdf Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2015a) Encuesta SABE 2015. Bogotá:  MinSalud. Available from http:// ​ u rl.minsalud.gov.co/​ publicaciones-​encuesta-​sabe-​2015 Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2015b) Estudio Nacional de Salud Mental. Bogotá: MinSalud. Available from https://w ​ ww.minsalud.gov.co/s​ ites/r​ id/L ​ ists/​ BibliotecaDigital/​RIDE/​DE/​encuesta-​nacional-​salud-​mental-​ensm-​2015.zip Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2018a) “Evaluación de los Planes Territoriales de Salud (PTS)”. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​ salud/​publica/e​ pidemiologia/P ​ aginas/e​ valuacion-​planes-​territoriales-​de-​salud. aspx Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2018b) “INS lanza libro sobre sus cien años”. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​Paginas/​INS-​lanza-​libro-​ sobre-​sus-​cien-​a%C3%B1os.aspx 184

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Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social (2019) Sistema Integral de Información SISPRO. Bogotá:  MinSalud. Available from https://​www.minsalud.gov.co/​ salud/​Paginas/​SistemaIntegraldeInformaci%C3%B3nSISPRO.aspx Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, Ministerio de Justicia, and Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (2014) Estudio Nacional de Consumo de Sustancias Psicoactivas en Colombia 2013. Bogotá: MinSalud/​MinJusticia/​ODC. Available from www.unodc.org/​ d ocuments/​ c olombia/​ 2 014/​ Julio/​ E studio_​ d e_​ Consumo_​UNODC.pdf Molina-​Marín, G., Montoya, N., Rodríguez T, C.M. and Spurgeon, P. (2006) “Health sector decentralization in Colombia:  analysis of 91 cities”. Revista Facultad Nacional de Salud Pública 24(1): 48–​60. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development) (2015) OECD Reviews of Health Systems: Colombia 2016. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available from http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1787/​9789264248908-​en Peñaloza, E., García, M., Orozco, N., Puerto, S. and Ríos, A.M. (2012) Financiamiento del Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud. Seguimiento y Control Preventivo a las Políticas Públicas. Bogotá:  ECOE Ediciones. Available from www.procuraduria.gov.co/​portal/​media/​file/​Publicaci%C3%B3n%20-​ %20Finanzas%20en%20Salud.pdf Ramírez, J., Puerto, S. and Rodríguez, L.M. (2018) “De la regulación corriente a la rectoría constitucional”. In Instituto de Salud Publica –​Universidad Javeriana (ed.) Modelo Integrado para la Inspección, Vigilancia y Control de Riesgos de Acceso, Uso y Calidad de los Servicios de Salud, en el Ámbito Territorial. Bogotá: Pontificia universidad Javeriana, pp. 156–​217. Rigoli, F. and Dussault, G. (2003) “The interface between health sector reform and human resources in health”. Human Resources for Health 1(1): 9. Available from https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​1478-​4491-​1-​9 Rivillas, J.C., Huertas Quintero, J.A., Montaño Caicedo, J.I. and Ospina Martínez, M.L. (2014) “Progresos en eSalud en Colombia:  adopción del Sistema de Información Nacional en Cáncer”. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública 35: 446–​52. Roth-​Deubel, A.N. and Molina-​Marín, G. (2013) “Rectoría y gobernanza en salud pública en el contexto del sistema de salud colombiano, 2012–​2013”. Revista de Salud Pública 15: 44–​55. Rubin, R. (2017) “Profile: INS in Bogotá –​100 years improving Colombian health”. The Lancet, 389(10080): 1686. Available from https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ S0140-​6736(17)31143-​1 Ruiz, F. (2018) “¿Modelo Integral de Atención en Salud?”. In A.I. Vecino-​ Ortiz, M.  Villar, D.  Lucumí, B.  Llorente and S.  Puerto (eds) Agenda en Salud 2018: Para Definir el Rumbo del Sector Salud a los 25 Años de la Ley 100. Bogotá:  Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, pp.  9–​18. Available from https://​ www.javeriana.edu.co/​documents/​7590033/​0/​Agenda+en+salud+2018.pdf/​ 4dc8809c-​7093-​4181-​8258-​1f184c058ed0

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Sanabria Pulido, P.P. (2015) Gestión Estratégica del Talento Humano en el Sector Público: Estado del Arte, Diagnóstico y Recomendaciones para el Caso Colombiano. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Available from https://​egob.uniandes.edu.co/​es/​ component/​abook/​book/​2-​libros/​90-​gestion-​estrategica-​del-​talento-​humano-​ en-e​ l-s​ ector-​publico-​estado-​del-​arte-​diagnostico-​y-​recomendaciones-​para-​el-​ caso-​colombiano Senado de Colombia (2007) Ley 1122 de 2007. Available from http://​www. secretariasenado.gov.co/​senado/​basedoc/​ley_​1122_​2007.html Suárez-​Rozo, L.F., Puerto-​García, S., Rodríguez-​Moreno, L.M. and Ramírez-​ Moreno, J. (2017) “La crisis del sistema de salud colombiano: una aproximación desde la legitimidad y la regulación”. Gerencia y Políticas de Salud 16(32): 34–​50. Available from https://​doi.org/​10.11144/​Javeriana.rgps16-​32.cssc SNS (Superintendencia Nacional de Salud) (2016) “Inspección, vigilancia y control”. Powerpoint Presentation [Onine]. Available from www.minsalud.gov. co/s​ ites/r​ id/L ​ ists/B ​ ibliotecaDigital/R ​ IDE/​DE/​presentacion-​superintentende-​ a-​secretarios.pdf SNS and Oficina de Control Interno (2017) Informe de Seguimiento y Evaluación. Oficina de Metodologías de Supervisión y Análisis de Riesgo. Bogotá: Superintendencia Nacional de Salud. Available from https://​docs.supersalud.gov.co/​PortalWeb/​ ControlInterno/​InformesEstatutoAnticorrupcion/​SS-​Seg%20SDME%203-​ 2017-​004245%2017-​03-​2017.pdf Vecino-​Ortiz, A.I., Villar, M., Lucumi, D., Llorente, B. and Puerto, S. (2018) Agenda en Salud 2018: Para Definir el Rumbo del Sector Salud a los 25 Años de la Ley 100. Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Available from https://​ www.javeriana.edu.co/​documents/​7590033/​0/​Agenda+en+salud+2018.pdf/​ 4dc8809c-​7093-​4181-​8258-​1f184c058ed0 Yamin, A.E. and Parra-​Vera, O. (2009) “How do courts set health policy? The case of the Colombian Constitutional Court”. PLOS Medicine 6(2): e1000032. Available from https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​journal.pmed.1000032 Yepes, F.J. (2010) Luces y Sombras de la Reforma de la Salud en Colombia: Ley 100 de 1993. Bogotá: IDRC.

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Policy analysis and decision making in the military forces: the Havana experience Paula Lorena Mora-​Hernández, Juan David Gélvez-Ferreira, Michael Weintraub and Sebastián Bitar

Introduction In late August 2012, the National Government of Colombia and the guerilla group FARC-​EP signed a general agreement to engage in formal negotiations that would end the longest-​running conflict in the western hemisphere. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the agreement set forth a roadmap with three main objectives: to end the Colombian armed conflict, to establish the conditions for maintaining negotiations between the two parties, and to agree on the rules of the game during the negotiation process (2018). The negotiation agenda for the talks in Havana, Cuba would be divided into six main points: comprehensive rural reform; political participation; end of the conflict; solution to the problem of illicit drugs; rights of victims; and implementation, verification and ratification. Before defining each of these points, the interests and motivations of the conflict parties, their perception of conflict and their internal decision-​making processes had to be analyzed to explore viable solutions and align policies relevant to these issues (Conciliation Resources, 2009). Additionally, these aspects were to be negotiated separately, but would not be considered agreed until the full agreement was finalized. As President Juan Manuel Santos’ motto indicated during the negotiation, “nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon”, a common rule in negotiations (Herbolzheimer, 2016). In Havana, it was agreed that the principles, actions, and future of the Armed Forces would not be discussed. Likewise, the negotiations would proceed without a ceasefire agreement in place between the parties; therefore, combat operations would continue until a definitive ceasefire was reached. Even if the role of the military was not open for discussion, and military activities were not terminated, the role of the military was crucial in supporting and eventually implementing key components of the agreement. Active military and police officers were appointed as advisors to the negotiations, with the objective of creating an atmosphere of trust within the Armed Forces for whatever final deal would result. Within this context, the Strategic Command for Transition (Comando Estratégico para 187

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la Transición –​COET) was created, to be chaired by General Javier Flórez of the Colombian National Army. The COET advised the national government’s negotiating team during the conversations in Havana. Based on the experiences of the Havana negotiations, this chapter aims to analyze the role of the Colombian Armed Forces in the peace process, specifically in the decision-​making process and the strategies of public policy analysis ultimately adopted. We focus on the third point of the agreement (end of the conflict), in which the military had a key role in envisioning the logistics, the potential risks, and the ultimate implementation of the cessation of hostilities between two powerful and historical adversaries. While most Colombians focused on the political consequences of the negotiations, and the prospects for punitive and/​or transitional justice, the military had the enormous task of developing a strategy to build trust with their former enemies, with whom a war of 60 years had naturally created significant bitterness and mistrust. Indeed, the military was itself responsible for safely mobilizing thousands of members of FARC-​EP to pre-​established and well-​defined zones of mobilization where they would hand in their weapons and transition to civilian life. From the deepest jungles of Colombia, over mountains, through rivers, and across vast plains, the military was charged with performing a massive logistical operation to help the FARC-​EP transition from a deadly guerrilla army into “ordinary” civilians. Although largely underappreciated, this operation was a critical moment in the development of the peace process. One misstep in these areas where the military and FARC-​EP had previously clashed could have easily led to a collapse in trust and a return to conflict, ending the hopes for the successful implementation of the hard-​fought peace agreement. This chapter describes the role of the military in the Colombian peace process, with particular reference to an analytical model for the logistics of demobilization used by negotiators in Havana and the specific tasks undertaken by the military during and following the negotiations. A major analytical challenge at the core of the military’s task involved creating the conditions for a successful cessation of conflict activities and the safe mobilization of FARC-​EP combatants to the peace camps. While the scope of the agreement was, of course, wide-​ranging, we define narrowly the end of conflict operations –​ceasing military operations by the government and FARC-​EP and ensuring that ex-​combatants arrived at peace camps –​as a critical and necessary component of the process. In addition, this chapter seeks to serve as a point of departure for other peace processes; as other countries seek an end to their own armed conflicts, and include military forces in the active implementation of peace agreements, theory-​driven and empirically rich accounts of how decisions were made in other successful cases is essential to orient public policy. Likewise, the series of books published by the ILPA  –​of which this volume is a part –​creates a comparative opportunity to reflect on and inform the theory and practice of decision-​making processes elsewhere in the world. In other words, our aim is to draw conclusions from

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Colombia’s successfully concluded peace process in order to enrich and facilitate the consolidation of peace in other countries. Given these objectives, this chapter collects information from semi-​structured interviews conducted with a number of actors involved in the negotiation process in Havana, Cuba. These include former military commanders, active members of the Armed Forces, senior government officials who participated in the conversations, and an academic involved in the process. We conducted these interviews on a voluntary basis and as a means of gathering first-​hand information on the role of the Armed Forces before, during, and after the negotiations. It should be noted that information was collected both from the section of the Armed Forces that directly participated in the negotiations and from others that intervened indirectly, either through recommendations, communications, national security reports, or other means. This chapter is organized into five sections: the first deals with the role played by the Armed Forces in peace processes and the different forms their participation may take in the construction of peace agreements. The second section specifies the aspects related to the third aim of the Havana accords, dealing with the end of the conflict. The third section describes how the Colombian Armed Forces participated directly in the construction of the agreement through the creation of COET and the technical sub-​commission, specifying the roles, actors, protocols and the decision-​making processes within this body and their ultimate contributions to the process. The fourth section explains how the Armed Forces were decisive in defining the conditions for the laying down of arms by FARC-​ EP, the locations where FARC-​EP members joined the peace process, and the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. The final section describes the model of decision making used by the Armed Forces to reach the agreements regarding the third aim of the Havana accords.

The role of the military forces in peace processes The Colombian Armed Forces were decisive for the ultimate success of the peace process with FARC-​EP, even while some of its members, including retired officials, voiced their discontent. As of 2019, almost three years after the agreement, analysts of the Colombian conflict still lack a comprehensive and neutral account of the military’s participation in the process. It is generally understood that it was the military’s resistance to ending the conflict through negotiation in the 1980s and mid-​1990s that prevented its resolution through peaceful means (Isacson, 2015). The difficulty ending civil wars through negotiation is common to the literature (Licklider, 1993; Mason and Fett, 1996; Walter, 1997); however, military victory or surrender has become increasingly rare, with negotiated agreements now the dominant form of conflict termination (Valencia et al, 2012). Negotiations tend to fail when there is no third party to mediate among fighters and to verify compliance with the agreement given that the process requires opponents to do

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the “unthinkable”, relinquishing weapons to their adversaries (Walter, 1997). This challenge is particularly acute given that since the Second World War the prevalence of conflicts between states has decreased while the number of intra-​state conflicts has increased (Valencia et al, 2012). Among the various ways available to belligerents to resolve civil wars, the literature has recognized the following: negotiated settlements or peace agreements; military victory by one of the parties; and bilateral ceasefire agreements (without having reached an agreement on key aspects, such as the causes of the conflict) (Mason and Fett, 1996; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Valencia et al, 2012). Here we assess an example of a comprehensive peace agreement, which involved a series of conversations among official representatives of the government and FARC-​EP, along with support and advice provided by military forces, academics, ex-​combatants, members of the intelligence services, and the international community with guarantor countries and observers, among others. Beyond pointing out the causes associated with internal armed conflicts –​subject to a contentious debate regarding the role of poverty, inequality, past histories of violence, and so forth –​it is opportune to ask why states seem to prefer the high costs of war instead of signing a peace agreement, given that there appear to be clear alternatives to violence that result in lower costs (Mason and Fett, 1996). The barriers to civil war settlement include information asymmetries (including uncertainty regarding the real capacity of an adversary and the desire not to show weakness if the state faces other violent contenders), the credibility of the government (particularly in the presence of weak political institutions and high levels of political fragmentation), and the difficulty of sharing rights to control issues or goods over which rebel groups make claims (issue indivisibility) (Walter, 2009). Several of these factors are present in the Colombian case. Although it is difficult to argue that the government did not possess enough information regarding FARC-​EP’s military force and vice versa, given decades of direct confrontation between them, the extreme policy positions adopted by FARC-​EP and the government significantly narrowed the bargaining space that would have been available to enter into negotiations and to ultimately resolve the conflict peacefully. A history of mistrust, the result of failed processes in the 1980s and 1990s, the presence of another guerrilla group (ELN), and long-​standing grievances of the civilian population stemming from state neglect and repression all complicated the parties’ arrival to the negotiating table. At the same time, the Armed Forces and swathes of the civilian population were convinced that FARC-​EP had been effectively cornered by an increasingly effective Army. In spite of this, some fronts of FARC-​EP retained the capacity to challenge the state and to inflict significant casualties.

The peace process: the end of the conflict The third aim of the agreement –​an end to the conflict –​involved reconciling three crucial aspects of the peace process to put an end to the armed confrontations 190

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between the Armed Forces and FARC-​EP, as well as attacks on the civilian population. The first was to agree on how the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities were to be implemented; the second involved establishing how FARC-​EP would lay down its arms; and the third involved the process of the armed group’s reincorporation into civilian life. In this case, both the cessation and disarmament were subject to a United Nations (UN) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MM&V), a tripartite structure that, in addition to the participation of international unarmed observers, included members of the Armed Forces and FARC-​EP. Each of these aspects included ground rules and a timetable to ensure effectiveness. With regard to the abandonment of weapons, the entirety of the FARC-​EP stockpile was to be handed over to the UN, to be symbolically transformed into three monuments to peace. Likewise, in order to prepare for the reincorporation of ex-​combatants into existing institutions and civil society, 22 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización –​ZVTNs) and six Transitional Points for Normalization (Puntos Transitorios de Normalización –​PTNs) were established. The ZVTNs were located principally in remote areas and were conceived to be temporary. Their locations were agreed by the parties and they were initially expected to be the size of a village, yet were subject to extension or reduction by mutual agreement of both parties. The difference with PTNs was that the latter would be smaller with only one campsite, whereas the ZVTNs would have many. Regardless of their larger size, the ZVTNs represented less than 0.1% of the country’s total villages (OACP, 2018). Their creation represented opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it reflected the lesson that it was essential to connect national initiatives with local peace practices to strengthen local democracy and contribute to the creation of conditions for sustainable conflict transformation (Conciliation Resources, 2012). On the other hand, it represented a risk that local actors would transform the initial goals of the process into something quite different, given that policies by central actors are not merely smoothly translated but are instead iteratively modified through local capabilities, infrastructure and organizational practices (Sausman et al, 2016). Despite the challenge, in this particular case, local actors related to the ZTVNs and PTNs helped to secure the conditions for implementation. The schedule fixed the signing of the final agreement as “D-​Day”, and from that moment the parties envisioned a 180-​day countdown to ensure the ceasefire and disarmament of FARC-​EP. Thus, the day after D-​Day the Armed Forces would have as its first mission a reorganization of its troops, to ensure that the FARC-​EP could move safely to the agreed areas, and would even provide the means of transportation and route planning for their former enemies. Only after these steps were taken did FARC-​EP members bring their individual weapons and travel to these locations. At the same time, from day D+7 until day D+30 the accompanying weapons, grenades, ammunition and so on were transported to the  established areas, so that the MM&V could begin registering and 191

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identifying the weapons, which on D+60 would allow for the process of storing accompanying weapons, grenades and ammunition in containers, all under the exclusive custody of the UN. On day D+90, only 30 days later, MM&V had to store the first 30% of the weapons delivered and another 30 days later (D+120) an additional 30% was stored, so that on D+150 the remaining 40% would be delivered, and thus, 100% of the weapons would be under its control. Just after this deadline, the final 30 days remained for the completion of arms extraction by the UN and the grouping of combatants into the ZVTNs (OACP, 2016). This process, complex in itself, generated great challenges for the parties involved. This was the case not only because the most important sub-​goal in peace implementation is the demobilization of combatants and their reincorporation into civilian life, but because to be successful implementers must be willing to maintain strict standards of compliance with the demobilization agreements and to assess the motives behind violations. This is even more important in cases when, following demobilization, a party is left strategically vulnerable and there exists a high likelihood of cheating (for example, by fully demobilizing one’s troops) (Stedman, 2001). FARC-​EP saw a tangible end to a bitter armed conflict with few prospects of winning and an opportunity to channel its claims through political means. In the meantime, the Armed Forces abandoned attacks on the main irregular armed force they had combatted for more than 60 years. Yet this point of the agreement established rules that were difficult to comply with: specifically, for the Armed Forces, the ZTVNs represented a clear restriction on the exercise of Colombian sovereignty, since around them a security area was established that extended for a kilometer and prevented government forces from entering. Only members of the MM&V could be present in this area, along with police security, should circumstances warrant such a presence (OACP, 2016). Evidence of FARC-​EP’s criminal activities in an area ceded to them during the 1998 negotiations brought back humiliating memories for the Armed Forces. While these new zones were much smaller and harder to take advantage of, law enforcement was restricted, as any police procedure or events that required the presence of armed authorities in the area implied prior coordination with the MM&V, in accordance with the protocols agreed by the parties. As can be seen, this part of the agreement naturally restricted the most fundamental activities for the military, which led to a higher level of difficulty in its implementation. Additionally, suddenly acquiring responsibility for the physical integrity of former enemies was not easy to accept so soon after the end of active combat operations. However, these aspects of the agreement depended on the agreement of the Armed Forces, which was acquired during the negotiation process. The Santos government understood that involving the military in the decision-​making process at the negotiating table was far preferable to imposing an agreement on the military without consultation. In the following sections we address the particular role of the Armed Forces in the construction of the mechanisms to finalize six decades of war in Colombia. 192

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Configuration, operation of COET and the technical sub-​commission The Colombian Armed Forces are divided into four major groups:  National Police, National Army, Air Force, and National Navy. These last three are known as the military forces and are part of the Ministry of National Defense. Therefore, according to the constitution of Colombia, the supreme chief of the Armed Forces is the President of the Republic, followed by the Minister of Defense, the Commander of the Armed Forces and the commanders of each force. In spite of having the same director, operations and actions are carried out separately, since they have different functions according to the constitution. That is, an operation developed by the Police, in theory, would not involve the Army. In spite of this, the Armed Forces have sometimes joined forces to accomplish a common goal, generally in issues related to the persecution of drug cartels or organized armed groups such as the Clan del Golfo or dissident members of FARC-​EP who have abandoned the peace process. However, the peace conversations require another kind of cooperation among different branches of the Armed Forces. To be successful, academic literature shows that peace negotiations should include the most powerful military actors, to ensure that their interests are represented and to bind their hands (Carr, 2001 [1939]; Lanz, 2011). Despite this fact, in prior Colombian peace processes the Armed Forces were not fully integrated into the process; that is, they were not plenipotentiaries with the power to make decisions (Arias, 2008). Military officers in the past had played a role in the security issues, not as fully fledged members with a seat at the negotiating table. For this reason, during the conversations in Havana, a cross-​cutting group representing the different branches of the Armed Forces and the Police was created, a group without precedent in Colombian history. This was COET, which would be commanded by a general of the Colombian Army but with the participation of active and non-​commissioned officers of the different branches of the Armed Forces. COET had two main objectives:  to establish an advisory group to provide recommendations to government negotiators and to provide greater legitimacy to the negotiating team, with the participation of active personnel of the Armed Forces. To accomplish this, a technical sub-​commission for the end of the conflict and hostilities was created at the negotiating table, which initially comprised four colonels from each of the forces with extensive knowledge of the Colombian armed conflict and of FARC-​EP. Subsequently, this team added four generals –​ one from each force –​with the goal of closing the conversations and ending any doubts surrounding the legitimacy of the peace process. The technical sub-​commission for the end of the conflict was initiated in August 2014, reached an agreement in June 2016, and was operational until the signing of the peace treaty in November 2016. Its main objectives were to achieve a bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and create 193

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protocols for the delivery, disarmament and destruction of FARC-​EP weapons. For this reason, the uniformed personnel who were part of the sub-​commission underwent training designed by Georgetown University and Harvard University on political negotiations and peace processes throughout the world (using cases such as those in El Salvador, Spain, Ireland, Nicaragua and the Philippines). Based on these experiences and training, the group created an analytical model based on scenarios for policy implementation and potential challenges. The model described the logistics of FARC-​EP demobilization and transportation from the hearth of the forests and mountains of Colombia to the ZTVNs. This was a gigantic operation whereby thousands of former guerrilla fighters would have to trust the Armed Forces to take them from their war locations to the ZTVNs. In the model, the group identified specific routes, tasks, persons in charge, and logistical needs for each of the areas, a task that included analyzing terrains, modes of transportation, security, food, and all other components of a large military operation, only this time it was not to combat the enemy, but to safely transport it into civilian life. Likewise, the technical sub-​commission had a consultation protocol to analyze the policy design. As the policy literature argues, decision-​making processes should include a group that studies, recommends and determines the ideal next steps in the policy design (Halligan , 1995; Glynn et al, 2003; Mayer et al, 2004). These advisors should be focused in particular on political salience, credibility and the representativeness of each decision process (Veit et al, 2017). In the Colombian peace conversations, the technical sub-​commission  –​ although made up of delegates of the Armed Forces at the negotiating table –​ had a consultation group. Thus, once a point was discussed with the FARC-​EP representatives, the sub-​commission presented the results and consulted with two of its superiors on steps to follow. These superiors were, on the one hand, the plenipotentiary negotiators (who had decision-​making power for the government) and, on the other hand, part of the major command structure of the Armed Forces, which comprised the President, the Minister of Defense and the commanders of each of the forces. While the conversation with the plenipotentiaries was direct, the sub-​commission was to travel to Colombia every 45 days to present the results of the conversation with FARC-EP to the command structure. In this way, they returned to Havana with comments or adjustments and simply repeated this process.

Results of agreements, discussions and sub-​commission inputs The end of the conflict is perhaps the point of the agreement that requires the least explanation (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018). First, it is generally understood that a peace process must, by definition, end armed confrontations between a rebel group and the national government. Even so, this is no easy matter. The objective of the conversations was not only to end formal hostilities, but also to generate conditions such that no other group would resort to arms to achieve 194

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political objectives. This goal is especially relevant in Colombia, given that prior peace processes in the country failed at varying stages of maturity. For this reason, the end of conflict aim had four pillars at its core: disarmament, ceasefire, political and economic reintegration of ex-​combatants, and security guarantees. Each of these pillars arose from the review of cases at the negotiating table and the FARC-​EP delegation’s request to discuss them. They also aimed to provide a guarantee of non-​repetition to victims: that is, to ensure that FARC-​EP ex-​combatants did not return to arms and revictimize the civilian population. In each of these areas, the technical sub-​commission played a leading role. The end of conflict aim had a first agreement even before negotiations began. The parties –​both the plenipotentiaries of FARC-​EP and those of the high-​level government –​decided to leave the end of the conflict as the last item on the agenda. According to interviewees, this was because it was an extremely sensitive point; given the antecedents in 1998 and other previous failed negotiations, and given the mistrust many Colombians felt regarding FARC-​EP’s likely compliance with the agreement, it was necessary to ensure the group’s commitment to ending the conflict. If all other points could be agreed, there was an increased likelihood of compliance and the conversations would not be used as an excuse for the group to use the lull in fighting to gain strength. These actions required the creation of a specialized body to advance the discussion (the technical sub-​commission) that did not limit itself to defining a general framework for its enforcement but, on the contrary, helped establish a strict schedule for 180 days that would work hand in hand with 21 protocols to specify the technical procedures for what had been agreed with regard to the end of the conflict. The task was complex and critical: given that consideration of the end of the conflict goal began in November 2012, it took a little less than four years to discuss and agree upon the third point of the accord and incorporate it into the accord. In fact, between August 2012 and December 2015, there was agreement on the areas of comprehensive rural reform, political participation, solution to the problem of illicit drugs, and victims of conflict, while discussions on the end of the conflict lasted from December 2015 to August 2016, until finally being agreed along with implementation, verification and endorsement. As previously mentioned, this was the result of paradoxes and difficulties, as it implied the transformation of the FARC-​EP from an armed group to a political actor that would articulate its political demands within the context of a democratic political system, while also transforming the military into an actor that would now have a set of significantly reduced functions regarding the maintenance of public order within national boundaries. With the technical sub-​commission for the end of the conflict, a strategy was created to generate ideas for the bilateral ceasefire and disarmament. The 32 members of the sub-​commission, half from the government and half from FARC-​ EP, were divided into six work teams and began to make progress on the third point. Since it was challenging, in July 2015 Police General Oscar Naranjo created another group to discuss security guarantees for ex-​combatants, the Institute for 195

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Integrated Transitions (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018). Mechanisms for political and socioeconomic reincorporation were also discussed separately. We now discuss the sub-​commission’s contributions to the end of the conflict.

Local zones and spaces for the political, economic and social reincorporation of demobilized combatants As mentioned earlier, reintegration into civilian life for members of FARC-​EP implied the establishment of special areas that would allow for the safety and reincorporation of the demobilized. However, the determination of these areas was immersed in controversy, since the areas where FARC-​EP members were to gather could allow the group to strengthen its territorial control in areas of historical presence. This concern was acute and based on historical fact: in the past FARC-​EP had taken advantage of a large so-​called “demilitarized zone” during negotiations in the late 1990s to press its military advantage. In order to tackle this dilemma –​between the state’s obligation to withdraw its forces to allow ex-​combatants to enter and remain in areas where these former fighters would demobilize, and its constitutional commitment to countering threats to public safety and order –​the sub-​commission selected 30 variables to analyze the safety, viability and accessibility of ZVTNs and PTNs. Given the factors studied, and in order to mitigate risks, the sub-​commission also studied the collective territories of ethnic groups, the distribution of illicit crops and spaces with strategic infrastructure, all with the goal of preventing overlap with areas that would be used for demobilization (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018). The conditions of these spaces, in turn, went through a rigorous comparative study, which considered cantonment elements used in the experiences of Nepal, the Philippines, Guatemala and El Salvador. All of this was discussed with academics specializing in peacebuilding, who contributed to the formal language used in the peace process, as well as the definition of these variables, and the ceasefire conditions, among others. An agreement on whether these areas should be temporary or permanent also received input from the sub-​commission. Ultimately, however, FARC-EP members were never told what would happen to these areas after D+180, beyond suggesting that they wait for that day to discuss it again (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018). However, what was clear was the obligation of the Armed Forces not to enter these territories, to remain at a distance of more than 1 km (known as the “security zone”), and to help ensure the state’s commitment to implementing measures related to education (training sessions), health, the issuing of identity cards and productive economic projects within the ZVTNs. The idea was to provide ex-​combatants with long-​term wellbeing that would minimize the probability they would wish to take up arms again. As Bermúdez Liévano (2018) describes it, the problem going forward would not be access to weapons –​as they would be easily accessible –​but preventing ex-​combatants from regaining their desire to fight. These conditions required, in turn, that in the ZVTNs former 196

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guerrilla members would not be permitted to carry out actions of a political nature, that their exit from the camps would be always without weapons and in civilian clothes, and that they comply strictly with all the technical protocols for the ceasefire and abandonment of weapons (OACP, 2018). The incorporation of FARC-​EP members into civilian life, which involved a process of displacement of ex-​combatants to the agreed areas, and specifically their admission to having been members of the armed organization, was central to the discussions. The establishment of a list of FARC-​EP fighters would therefore be crucial. FARC-​EP commanders provided such a list to state authorities, and at the same time the High Commissioner for Peace, Colombian intelligence and members of the military forces were given the power to verify the “credentials” of each of the members of the list in order to prevent false admissions of group membership by those seeking to enjoy benefits specified in the agreement. It is clear that the location of the normalization zones and their ground rules (including their potential permanence and the membership lists about who would be eligible to receive benefits via the agreement) were agreed only after rigorous examination and consultation in which the sub-​commission participated fully.

Laying down weapons After decades of intelligence surveillance, military analysts were able to confirm that the number of weapons surrendered by the FARC-EP roughly corresponded to their stockpiles, amounting to approximately 9,000 arms, including 274 heavy machine guns, 266 mortars, and 40 tons of explosives. These were all handed over to the UN as part of the disarmament component of the agreement (Jaramillo, 2018). According to the interviewees and the accounts provided to the research team, the laying down of weapons was, along with the bilateral cessation of hostilities, one of the most complex points in the peace agreement discussions relating to the end of the conflict. There were a number of reasons for this. The first concerned language:  whereas for government advisors FARC-​EP members were to “surrender” their weapons, the guerrillas considered that the term “abandonment” was more appropriate, given that it did not imply military capitulation. This difference, which seems prima facie to be a minor and ultimately semantic one, produced differences within the technical sub-​commission. This was particularly the case given that the position of the Armed Forces was that successful military pressure forced FARC-EP to sit at the negotiating table, while for FARC-​EP the negotiations meant that the two were equals and that the message the “surrender” of arms should not be understood as the surrender of FARC-​EP to the state. The positions of the parties were divergent:  at the beginning of the talks, FARC-​EP was committed to maintaining weapons until they could prove that the national government was complying with the agreement, and they also sought the agreement of the Armed Forces to lay down their own weapons while this was happening. On the other hand, as commanders of the Armed Forces have attested, 197

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the government’s position was similar to what was ultimately agreed: FARC-EP would keep the weapons until shortly after the agreement was signed, and then verify and destroy the weapons, the melted remnants of which would become peace monuments. The laying down of arms therefore confronted different impasses throughout the negotiation process (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018). In the end, these were resolved via concrete steps: registration, identification, collection and storage of weapons, which also included the monitoring and verification of which former combatants possessed which weapons. Likewise, it was decided that the UN would be the international body that would coordinate the melting down of the weapons that would be used to construct the three monuments.

Decision making and the end of the conflict The task assigned to the technical sub-​commission implied the use of complex models of decision making. Even though its members had extensive knowledge of the Colombian armed conflict and FARC-​EP’s strategy, the decisions regarding the end of the conflict took much more time to finalize than the other points, and its discussion were left to the very end of the negotiation process. The main reason was that the negotiation regarding the end of the conflict implied two main problems: first, there existed informational asymmetries in the bargaining process (Walter, 2009; Nitta, 2014), especially in an environment characterized by mistrust between the parties, and second, there was the difficulty of dealing with the pressure to make high stakes decisions under significant time constraints. The decision-​making process made by the technical sub-​commission can be understood under a bounded rationality model (Simon, 1985, p.  294). This approach emphasizes the parties’ limited abilities to know in advance the different alternatives available to resolve a problem, as well as the most likely outcome for each potential solution, and instead recognizes that under cognitive limitations and complex circumstances, decision makers tend to generate possible courses of actions for satisfactory results without assuming precise knowledge of exact probabilities of success (Simon, 1990). Negotiators on the government’s side could never have considered absolutely all alternatives and possible outcomes in a highly volatile and unpredictable process such as a peace negotiation. Instead, the sub-​commission drew on likely scenarios with satisfying levels of outcomes to inform decision making. The lack of perfect information and the impossibility of evaluating all alternatives prior to making a decision not only became an opportunity to solve a problem via a satisfactory if imperfect alternative (Nitta, 2014), but also defies two foundational assumptions in mainstream rational decision-​making models (perfect information and the ability to make decisions that in expectation will maximize one’s own utility). In the end, the agreement on the end of the conflict shows that even despite the aforementioned constraints, the sub-​commission was successful in finding solutions –​even if they can be 198

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considered local optima instead of global optima –​through the use of innovative analytical models.

Conclusion Many aspects of the peace process are highly criticized today. Major debates around transitional justice, FARC’s participation in Congress and victims’ rights still polarize Colombians and continue to shape Colombian politics more generally. The implementation of the peace process has been difficult and controversial, as has been the case with most others peace agreements globally. However, the success of the termination of combat operations and the mobilization of FARC-​ EP forces to the new peace zones has been generally overlooked. This was a highly technical issue that demanded careful consideration of data and potential scenarios for destabilization, as well as a massive effort to build trust between former belligerents. Agreement on the point devoted to the end of the conflict would not have been achieved without the incorporation of the Armed Forces into the discussion, and especially the planning of the logistics and procedures for the implementation of the agreement surrounding the end of the conflict. The technical sub-​commission was critical in furnishing analysis that transformed the hopes of negotiators into real actions that produced massive logistical operations in the deep countryside. This process implied the symbolic transformation of the two belligerents and allowed for the generation of confidence for the definitive end of hostilities, a ceasefire, and the laying down of arms. The challenge was significant, since in the case of civil war even when the conditions for peace are met, the demobilization of a rebel group means the disappearance of its ability to defend itself and make additional claims on the government (Walter, 1997). Therefore, one of the major innovations of the Colombian agreement was the configuration of the tripartite verification mechanism, which enabled the belligerents and an impartial third party to verify compliance with the terms. This mechanism was the result of the great debates outlined in this chapter. This chapter is intended to inform analyses of conflict termination. We have highlighted the complexity of facilitating understanding between formerly warring parties in order to make the Colombian peace agreement a reality, and describe in detail the specific concerns of actors engaged in the negotiation and the agreement’s implementation. However, as mentioned at the outset, this is only a first step in understanding the role of these actors, and in particular the way that the Armed Forces engaged in discussions on the end of the conflict, but we expect that it will be sufficient to awaken interest in analyzing the role of other key individuals and interest groups engaged in the peace process, particularly as such an analysis pertains to other points of the agreement. This issue is especially crucial given the possibility that the Colombian government might resume peace talks with the country’s other large leftist guerrilla army, the ELN. Lessons learned from the peace process with the FARC-​EP –​which successfully led to that group’s abandonment of arms despite significant challenges with subsequent 199

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implementation –​and in particular how policy models informed the military’s decision making, will no doubt have continued relevance as Colombia seeks to leave behind generations of conflict and build a new, more inclusive and peaceful polity. References Arias, G.I. (2008) Una Mirada Atrás: Procesos de Paz y Dispositivos de Negociación del Gobierno Colombiano. Bogotá, Colombia: Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Bermúdez Liévano, A. (2018) Los Debates de La Habana: Una Mirada Desde Adentro. Bogotá: Institute for Integrated Transitions. Carr, E.H. (2001 [1939]) The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (2nd edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Conciliation Resources (2009) Ending War: The Need for Peace Process Support Strategies, Policy Brief. London: Coalition Resources. Available from www.c-​ r.org/​resources/​ending-​war-​need-​peace-​process-s​ upport-s​ trategies-p​ olicy-b​ rief Conciliation Resources (2012) Alternatives to War: Colombia’s Peace Processes. Policy Brief. London:  Coalition Resources. Available from www.c-​r.org/​ resource/​alternatives-​war-​colombias-​peace-​processes-​policy-​brief Glynn, S., Cunningham, P. and Flanagan, K. (2003) Typifying Scientific Advisory Structures and Scientific Advice Production Methodologies. Brussels:  Directorate-​ General Research, European Commission. Halligan, J. (1995) “Policy advice and the public sector”. In B.G. Peters and D.T. Savoie (eds.) Governance in a Changing Environment. Montreal: McGill-​Queen’s University Press, pp. 138–​172. Herbolzheimer, K. (2016) Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process. Oslo:  Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. Available from https://​ css.ethz.ch/​content/​dam/​ethz/​special-​interest/​gess/​cis/​center-​for-​securities-​ studies/​resources/​docs/​0e5206132095b3f2bdb7c3877690a538.pdf Jaramillo, S. (2018) “Lo que hizo posible la paz con las Farc”, El Tiempo, 24 July. Available from www.eltiempo.com/ ​ p olitica/ ​ p roceso- ​ d e- ​ p az/​ sergio-​jaramillo-​explica-​como-​se-​logro-​la-​paz-​con-​las-​farc-​247388 DeRouen, K.R. Jr. and Sobek, D. (2004) “The dynamics of civil war duration and outcome”. Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 303–​20. Available from www. jstor.org.ezproxyegre.uniandes.edu.co:8888/​stable/​4149746 I s a c s o n , A . ( 2 0 1 5 ) C o l o m b i a ’s M i l i t a r y :   S u p p o r t e r s o r S a b o t e u r s o f t h e P e a c e P r o c e s s ? Ava i l a bl e f ro m w w w. wo l a . o r g / ​ a n a l y s i s /​ colombias-​military-​supporters-​or-​saboteurs-​of-​the-​peace-​process/​ Lanz, D. (2011) “Who gets a seat at the table? A framework for understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations”. International Negotiation 16: 275–​95. Licklider, R.E. (1993) Stopping the Killing :  How Civil Wars End. New  York, NY:  NYU Press. Available from http://​search.ebscohost.com.ezproxyegre. uniandes.edu.co:8888/​login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1021060&lan g=es&site=ehost-​live 200

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Mason, T. and Fett, P. (1996) “How civil wars end: a rational choice approach”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(4):  546–​68. Available from www.jstor.org. ezproxyegre.uniandes.edu.co:8888/​stable/​174457 Mayer, I., Bots, P. and Daalen, E. (2004) “Perspectives on policy analysis:  a framework for understanding and design”. International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management 4(1): 169–​91. Nitta, K. (2014) “Decision making”. Encyclopaedia Brittancia [Online]. Available from www.britannica.com/​topic/​decision-​making OACP (2016) Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera. Available from http://​www. altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/​Documents/p​ roceso-p​ az-f​ arc-a​ cuerdo-fi ​ nal. pdf OACP (2018) Biblioteca del Proceso de Paz con las FARC  –​EP. Tomo VI. La Discusión del Punto 3 “Fin del Conflicto” y La Discusión del Punto 6 “Implementación, Verificación y Refrendación”. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República. Sausman, C., Barrett, M. and Oborn, E. (2016) “Policy translation through localisation: implementing national policy in the UK”. Policy & Politics 44(4), 563–​89. Available from https://​doi-​org.ezproxyegre.uniandes.edu.co:8843/​ 10.1332/​030557315X14298807527143 Simon, H. (1985) “Human nature in politics: the dialogue of psychology with political science”. American Political Science Review 79(2): 293–​304. Doi: 10.2307/​ 1956650 Simon, H.A. (1990) “Bounded rationality”. In J.  Eatwell, M.  Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) Utility and Probability. London: W.W. Norton, pp. 15–​18. Stedman, S. (2001) Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars:  Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers, IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation. New York, NY: International Peace Academy. Available from https://​peacemaker.un.org/​sites/​peacemaker.un.org/fi ​ les/I​ mplementingPeace AgreementsinCivilWars_​IPI2001.pdf Valencia, G., Gutiérrez, A. and Johansson, S. (2012) “Negociar la paz: una síntesis de los estudios sobre la resolución negociada de conflictos armados internos”. Estudios Políticos 40: 149–​74. Available from https://​dialnet.unirioja.es/​servlet/​ articulo?codigo=5263662 Veit, S., Hustedt, T. and Bach, T. (2017) “Dynamics of change in internal policy advisory systems: the hybridization of advisory capacities in Germany”. Policy Sciences 50(1): 85–​103. Walter, B. (1997) “The critical barrier to civil war settlement”. International Organization 51(3): 335–​64. Walter, B. (2009). Bargaining Failures and Civil War. The Annual Reviews if Political Science, 12:243–​261. Retrieved from: polisci.annualreviews.org

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Technocracy, decision making and economic policy in Colombia Marta Juanita Villaveces-​Niño and Carlos Caballero-​Argáez

Introduction Since 1980, the design and execution of economic policy in Colombia took place in the context of adequate institutional rules and a qualified group of professional economists. These conditions generated a positive environment for economic decision making, for addressing the volatility of the international economy and for strengthening economic rules and institutions. Furthermore, these particular factors facilitated a greater independence from political interests in the adoption of economic decisions. Based on a qualitative review of the past 40 years, we find that capacity building for sound economic decision making can be attributed to the presence of a technocracy, instrumental in the decision-​making process, and to the ability of public institutions to adjust to the changing economic environment by designing new rules without disregarding considerations emerging from the political forces. To assess this confluence of willingness to implement institutional change and well-​trained policy makers, we interviewed six policy makers, mostly economists, who held high-​level positions in the public sector and participated in policy decision making from 1980 to 2016. For the purpose of this chapter, we define institutional willingness for economic change as the capacity of public agencies responsible for the design and execution of economic policy to adjust and reform the rules and the organizations responsible for economic management, particularly at the main public agencies: the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the Central Bank (Banco de la República –​ BR). We define technocracy as the group of trained economists with graduate degrees in economics –​Master’s or PhD –​in the policy and decision-​making scenarios, something essential for building capacity in the economic policy area.1 In Colombia, economic decision making shifted from an “illustrated elite of lawyers and engineers” –​mainly experts in public finance and coffee sector policy who had the responsibility for the conduction of the economy before 1980 –​to this group of professional and highly trained economists with a more comprehensive understanding of economy policy, development and growth, and the capacity to make decisions at relevant public institutions (Álvarez et al, 2019). In this chapter, we discuss decision making in four key moments of the recent economic history of Colombia, in the context of institutional flexibility and 203

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the presence of the so-​called technocracy. First, we discuss the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, which challenged the creativity of policy makers given the international and political restrictions. Second, we discuss the institutional change that occurred with the new constitutional arrangement in 1991. Third, we examine the “sudden stop” of capital flows towards Colombia after the Asian crisis in 1997 and the devaluation of the Russian currency in 1998, in a situation of significant deficits in the external and internal accounts. in 1999, Colombia experienced the biggest contraction of its economy of the 20th century, when GDP decreased by 4.3%. Fourth, we discuss the mining and oil “bonanza” of the first half of the second decade of the new century, which allowed the economy to grow at high rates but ended in 2014 when the international oil price came down dramatically and the authorities had to proceed to adjust the economy to the new circumstances. We rely on interviews with decision makers and scholars who participated directly and indirectly in the four situations. We arrive at the conclusion that the role of technocrats in the design and execution of economic policy decisions improved the capacity of institutions to face critical events in such a way that the country was capable of responding to changes in the economic environment with an adequate combination of fiscal, monetary and foreign currency policies. It is worth recalling that the Colombian economy experienced significant changes from 1980 to 2018 associated with internal decision making, the strength of economic policy capacity, and the need to adjust to the evolution of the international economy and the markets for Colombian export products. Overall, at the end of the 1970s the perception of the economy was positive, with high economic growth and the undertaking of large public investment projects in the energy and mining sectors. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was USD 6,410, inflation was around 27%, imports were about 19% of GDP, and exports around 18% of GDP.2 The Colombian population was 28 million people and approximately 42% of the population lived below the poverty line.3 By 2018, the country had experienced significant improvement in its social conditions and its economy. In 2019, Colombia was formally accepted as a member of the OECD. GDP per capita doubled to USD 13,035, and the inflation rate has remained stable in the single-​digit range between 2% and 4% annually, within the specific target of 3% established by the BR Board of Directors. Total population increased to 48 million people in 2018 and 27% fell below the poverty line in 2017; less that 5% of the population fell below the extreme poverty line of USD 2 per day. In addition, imports and exports remain constant at around 17% of GDP. To a great extent, the economic achievements of the past 40  years are the result of the way in which the economy was managed when facing the several macroeconomic shocks during this period: the debt and financial crisis of the 1980s and 1990s and the commodities boom in the 21st century. This panorama led us to examine the reasons behind, and mechanisms to deal with, crises and 204

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booms, and the elements that may explain the consolidation of economic policy capacity over time.

The Colombian economic technocracy The group of high-​level officials in charge of the three relevant public entities responsible for the implementation of economic policy shifted in the 1980s from mostly lawyers and engineers without graduate-​level training in economics to professional economists with a Master’s or PhD in Economics. Engineers with graduate studies in economics also became part of that group, as shown in Tables 12.1 and 12.2. This shift took place mainly at the MHCP and the BR. The DNP has been, from its inception in 1958 but particularly since 1966, the technical arm of the President of the country, with significant input from economists since its creation (Urrutia et al, 2009). As a result, most ministers of finance, directors of the DNP, and members of the Board of Directors of the BR have been economists with PhDs from well-​ known international universities, with the ability to make decisions within a technical framework rather than a political one. As Álvarez and colleagues (2019) suggest, the formation of a group of economic technocrats was reinforced by the establishment of economic departments in Colombian universities in the 1940s and the provision of Fulbright and Rockefeller Foundation scholarships in the 1950s to continue Master’s and PhD programs, largely in the US.4 Since 1980, a new generation of economists had been trained to address the country’s needs, mainly through the public sector. In addition, the recently graduated PhDs returned to Colombia to work at universities and in public agencies such

Table 12.1: Undergraduate studies of the Minister of Finance, the Director of the DNP and the Governor of BR, 1958–​80 and 1981–​2016 (while in office) Undergraduate studies 1958–​80

1981–​2016

1958–​80

1981–​2016

1958–​80

1981–​2016

Minister of Minister of Finance Finance

Director of DNP

Director of DNP

Board Board Governor Governor of BR of BR

Bachelor in Economics

12%

78%

67%

78%

10%

80%

Bachelor in Engineering

50%

11%

14%

15%

–​

10%

Bachelor in Law Other Bachelor’s degree

38%

6%

11%

–​

90%

10%

–​

6%

–​

7%

–​

–​

Source: Curriculum vitae of each individual.

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Table 12.2: Graduate studies of the Minister of Finance, the Director of the DNP and the Governor of the BR, 1958–​80 and 1981–​2016 (while in office) Graduate studies 1958–​80

1981–​2016

1958–​80

1981–​2016

1958–​80

1981–​2016

Minister of Finance

Minister of Finance

Director of DNP

Director of DNP

Board Governor of BR

Board Governor of BR

PhD in Economics

–​

60%

20%

48%

–​

90%

Other PhD

–​

14%

–​

6%

–​

–​

Master’s in Economics

14%

20%

20%

42%

–​

10%

Other Master’s degree No Master’s degree or PhD

–​

6%

13%

4%

–​

–​

86%

–​

47%

–​

100%

–​

Source: Curriculum vitae of each individual.

as the MHCP, the BR and the DNP. Thus, a growing group of well-​educated economists with expertise and knowledge on economic issues has participated in capacity building and decision making over the past 40 years. The improvement of public institutional capacity and the development of technocracy are associated with the changes that the country experienced in the 1960s, first when the DNP was created during the Presidency of Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958–​62), and second when Congress passed a constitutional reform during the Presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–​70), which increased the intervention capacity of the executive in the economy and modernized the range of state institutions for that purpose. This expansion of state activities was necessary to face the requirements associated with rapid population growth, growing urbanization, demand of public services (electricity, water, communications and transport) and need to provide social services (education, health and housing). Simultaneously the development strategy was oriented towards industrialization, economic growth and export promotion (Misas, 1985; Caballero, 2009). The government of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–​1970) set up a number of important public entities. This included strengthening the capacity of the DNP and establishing the statistics department DANE, the Export Promotion Fund, the National Fund for Financing of Development Projects (FONADE) and several institutions for the execution of policies at the national level in the education, health, agriculture and transport sectors. In an interview, Gabriel Misas suggested that increasing the capacity of DNP illustrates the coincidence of public institution reform and the presence of an 206

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economic technocracy interested in improving the quality of economic decision making.5 He recalled that the lack of foreign resources –​private loans and private investment –​imposed a challenge for economists at DNP, who had to develop an advantage in structuring public investment projects that were acceptable for financing through loans extended by multilateral banks such as the World Bank and the Inter-​American Development Bank.6 He suggested that the need to obtain those loans was instrumental in consolidating a group of economists with expertise in designing and evaluating projects. As a result, the government created FONADE, annexed to the DNP, and, later, once the new external loans had been received, this group was concerned with monitoring the county’s macroeconomic conditions, further increasing knowledge, studies and information about the national economy.

Debt crisis: placing decisions in the hands of a group of experts (1982–​86) Colombia was the only country that emerged from the Latin American debt crisis without having to make a forced restructuring of the debt. (Junguito, 2018) In the 1980s, Latin America experienced a debt crisis, triggered by Mexico defaulting on its sovereign debt in 1982. This period is known internationally as the Latin American “lost decade”. In Colombia, the effect of the Mexican event was felt at the beginning of President Belisario Betancur’s government (1982–​ 86), when the country experienced a “sudden stop” (Calvo and Talvi, 2004), manifested in a screeching halt in access to capital markets, the dramatic reduction of BR’s international reserves, an internal financial crisis and unsustainable public spending (Ocampo, 2005). As a result of Mexico’s default, international banks stop lending and renewing loans to Latin American countries. In Colombia, the BR was forced to swap gold reserves for dollars with the Bank of England as an initial mechanism to tackle the crisis, as Roberto Junguito recalled in an interview.7 In 1983, it was very difficult for the country to obtain a loan of USD 210 million with a consortium of foreign banks. The bankers described Colombia as a “good house in a bad section of a city”, a well-​managed country in a bad region. It was then necessary to design a new economic policy in 1984. Technocracy played an important role, with adequate coordination between the MHCP, the BR and DNP. As a result, the debt crisis did not have the intensity and magnitude as the experienced in other Latin American countries (Junguito, 1986). At the time, the authorities had to operate within the existing framework of foreign exchange controls imposed by Decree-​Law 444 of 1967, with a “crawling-​ peg” mechanism as the exchange rate policy, which became a restriction for the free movement of currency in the presence of a balance of payments deficit (Najar, 2006). The coordination between the MHCP and the BR was crucial 207

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in tackling the crisis and moving the economy forward. In the interview, Misas clearly stated that the implemented policies were the result of the ideas and action of policy makers.8 He highlighted the relevance of the strategy developed by the Minister of Finance, Roberto Junguito, and his group of advisors, most of them economists. This group, at MHCP and BR, adopted unpopular but efficient decisions that, as Junguito commented, were the consequence of thinking as economists rather than as politicians.9 President Belisario Betancur supported the policy in spite of the short-​term political costs (unpopularity) incurred.10 The policies formulated by Junguito were quickly implemented. This in part happened because the Minister of Finance was a member of the Monetary Board, the institution responsible for monetary, credit and currency policies at the time, which met at BR and where short-​term economic policies was discussed with technical inputs from the bank and the ministry.11 Although the rate of depreciation of the Colombian currency was never discussed at the Monetary Board, devaluation during 1985 reached 53% and the inflation rate reached 22%, which necessitated a drastic recovery of the real exchange rate. As Junguito recalled in the interview, the assembled group of economic experts performed daily calculations of macroeconomic variables to achieve the goal of increasing the real exchange rate by 30% (Junguito, 2016).12 The devaluation of the peso was implemented simultaneously with very strict monetary and fiscal policies. Civil servant salaries were raised by only 10%, which contributed both to a reduction in the fiscal deficit and the contention of inflation. Thanks to the capacity and creativity of the individuals responsible for the management of the different policies, and their technical advisors, the very difficult macroeconomic imbalance was successfully eliminated. Devaluation and the implementation of sound fiscal policy were two elements of the package adopted to restore the external equilibrium of the economy. The other key element was the refinancing of the public debt owed to private international banks that was due to mature in 1985 and 1986. This involved the Colombian authorities presenting international banks and multilateral institutions with a macro-​strategy during negotiations over the new loan, including a program to monitor the economy that would be overseen by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Initially, the international banks involved in discussions about the requirements for refinancing the loan had asked the Colombian government to negotiate a “stand-​by” agreement with the IMF with significant additional conditions attached. The experience of the relationship between the government and the IMF in the 1960s, when Colombia did not accept the condictions imposed by the Fund, weighed heavily on President Betancur, who rejected any such conditional agreement. The Colombian negotiatiors were therefore forced to convince the IMF to design and approve an alternative in the form of a “monitoring” agreement, which involved a requirement for the BR to present quarterly reports to the IMF on the performance of the main monetary and international reserve indicators. With this compromise in place, the banks agreed a “jumbo” loan of 208

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USD 1,000 million in 1986, with no significant additional conditions other than that related to the quarterly monitoring reviews.13 To deal with the financial crisis that had affected the Colombian banking system since 1982, a new Minister of Finance, Hugo Palacios (who replaced Junguito in October 1985), proposed to Congress the passing of a law that would authorize the establishment of a new state entity: a fund to intervene the failing banks and manage a bank deposit insurance scheme. The law was approved in December 1985 and FOGAFIN started operations in January 1986, nationalizing the biggest bank of the country, Banco de Colombia. The participation of the economic technocracy was also key in accomplishing these institutional reforms, which became an important tool in the country’s economic armory, as was proved during the financial crisis of 1998–​2002. FOGAFIN substantially increased the capacity of economic authorities in Colombia to protect bank depositors and savers (reducing the shareholdings of the private investors in the troubled financial entities to zero) in situations of banking failure, since the previous rules had limited the scope of action by the state and assigned sole responsibility to the BR. To sum up, the period of debt and financial crisis in the 1980s revealed the importance of having a group of economists capable of designing a comprehensive policy package to tackle economic crises and a president willing to support the technical recommendations and overcome political restrictions to ensure the successful implementation of the chosen strategy. As a result, Colombia consolidated its decision-​making capacity without the direct interference of multilateral organizations but keeping an amical and strong relationship with them. In this way, Colombian policy makers could make autonomous decisions and, at the same time, obtain the required foreign loans from the international banks. In addition, the monitoring of macroeconomic variables became an established practice in the BR and the MHCP, contributing notably to the quality of economic policy in Colombia since the 1980s.

Institutional change and a new economic development model (1991) The good management of inflation must be a national asset; it is to take care of it. It’s a Colombian flag. (Calvo, 2018) The year 1990 was a crucial one for the Colombian economy and politics. After the assassination of three presidential candidates at the end of 1989, and the explosion of “narco-​terrorism”, elections were held in May 1990 and César Gaviria was elected to the Presidency. His government program included a series of institutional reforms and particularly the liberalization of the economy. It is important to remember that in 1989 the Washington Consensus had been reached between a group of US and Latin American scholars and policy makers who considered the importance of adopting some basic economic principles for the management of the Latin American economies after the “lost decade”, 209

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in order to restore economic growth in the region. Colombia adopted the recommendations of the Consensus regarding the opening of trade, capital and investment flows (Flórez, 2001). At the same time, and after the Supreme Court of Justice gave its authorization, the government called for elections of the members of a Constituent Assembly, which met during the first semester of 1991 and enacted a new Constitution for the country (Alarcón, 2015). The institutional change was of utmost importance for granting new legitimacy to the political system after the reincorporation to civilian life of the members of the M19 –​the urban guerrilla movement of the previous two decades –​and opened the political space to adopt much-​needed institutional, social and economic reforms. The role of the technocrats was again critical, both in the constitutional debate within the Assembly and afterward, in the implementation of the changes contemplated in the Constitution. To participate indirectly in the discussions before the Constituent Assembly, President Gaviria instructed the Minister of Finance, Rudolf Hommes, and the Director of the DNP, Armando Montenegro, to prepare drafts of the government’s proposals and to support the Commission of the Constituent Assembly in charge of economic, social and environmental changes.14 As such, the economic technocracy was highly influential in the design of institutional change. As Armando Montenegro pointed out in an interview, the government presented numerous issues to be considered by the Constituent Assembly, including public utilities reform, fiscal decentralization and competition in the markets.15 Once the new measures had been incorporated into the Constitution of 1991, the next step for the DNP was to implement them. For such task, Montenegro indicated, the DNP assigned one constitutional economic issue to each head of planning to fully analyse the mechanisms for implementing the reforms.16 Montenegro himself created a group of technical advisors and lawyers to help draft the presidential decrees that would implement the changes. This arrangement of “technopols” is recognized in the literature as a means of efficiently and effectively implementing economic reforms. According to Lederman (2005), the probability of success is higher if the government consolidates a group of economists with a shared and consistent view of what to do. This was the strategy of the DNP. The DNP was instrumental in enabling institutional change in several areas. First, with regard to the implementation of a comprehensive economic policy, it was involved in the consolidation of an anti-​trust policy and the granting of powers to the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce to enhance competition in the markets, which was seen as a priority for the workings of the economy in the liberalized environment. The DNP defined the anti-​trust policy with the support of a Canadian mission that worked together with national lawyers and experts. The DNP’s other achievements included implementing an institutional reform concerning the protection of the environment, which led to the creation of the Ministry of Environment; the creation of a household public utilities law (covering electricity, water, waste collection and communications), which opened up the market for the provision of public services to private companies; 210

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the creation of a planning law that defined the mechanisms to prepare and define planning programs and projects at the different levels of the public administration; and the introduction of a fiscal decentralization law involving changes in the fiscal, financial and political responsibilities of the intermediate and local levels of the government. In his interview, Montenegro stressed the relevance of these initiatives, which remain in place and have fostered many economic and social changes since their implementation.17 These reforms created the instruments of government intervention that enabled economic technocrats to make decisions, to improve and extend the Colombian market economy and, simultaneously, to plan for the provision of public goods. An emblematic change in the Constitution of 1991 was new regime for the BR (see Clavijo, 2000; Misas and Vásquez, 2002; Meisel, 2010; Cárdenas, 2013; Avella, 2014; Caballero, 2016; Junguito, 2016, among others).18 There is a consensus that the legal framework created in 1991 has been instrumental in the reduction of the inflation rate in Colombia.19 For the 20 years from 1970 to 1990, average inflation in Colombia was 20% per year. In the two decades of the new century, inflation has been under 10% and most of the time in the range between 2% and 4% established by the BR. It has also prevented swings in the formulation of monetary policy at the whim of different governments. Thus, one of the key institutional changes was the creation of an independent Board of Directors at BR, comprising five technical independent members designated in different years and whose terms in office are staggered over time. Under this mechanism, Colombia’s President can only appoint two members while in office (four years), thereby ensuring a certain level of stability in monetary policy, while preventing excessive closeness to the government, as not all members are appointed at the same time.20 Isidro Hernández stated in an interview that all presidents have privileged the appointment of economic technocrats, sending a positive signal to the markets regarding the support of the technical criteria in the decision making of the BR Board of Directors.21 In addition to the independence and autonomy of BR and the reforms implemented by the DNP, another institutional change involved the reform of the National Office of the Comptroller (Contraloría General de la República de Colombia –​CGRC). According to Professor Hernández, this involved the CGRC including in its remit for the first time a macro-​and a sectorial fiscal control, in addition to the traditional microeconomic control. Fiscal control therefore shifted from being an ex-​ante opinion of an institution’s budget to an ex-​post evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of fiscal policy. The evaluation is conducted by a group of experts and is presented to Congress with the aim of improving the availability of general information on public projects and investments. The group set up by the CGRC to perform these evaluations comprises experts of different disciplines, capable of analysing different policies and their impacts and implications. Hernández reported that, during the 1990s, this group was crucial for understanding and generating information on the impact of the different institutional changes adopted. Moreover, the CGRC worked with all public 211

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institutions at the national, regional and local levels to gather the most accurate information and data on fiscal and budged performance. In fact, Hernández pointed out that not even the MHCP has the quality and accurateness of CGRC’s data, which gives this institution a real capacity to analyse policies at the different levels of the Colombian state. In summary, there is a wide consensus in the literature that the reforms of the Constitution of 1991 had a positive effect on economic rules, the organization of the state and the role of relevant economic institutions (Clavijo, 2000; Misas and Vásquez, 2002; Meisel, 2010; Cárdenas, 2013; Avella, 2014; Caballero, 2016; Junguito, 2016). Thereafter, the inflow of foreign capital and the opening of economic trade and capital stimulated the economy. In terms of capacity, the independence of the BR and its autonomy in managing the exchange rate and controlling inflation created long-​run stability, which added to the consolidation of groups of economic technocrats in the main entities, providing the country with long-​term, economic policy-​making capacity. This has been shaped by two circumstances: the new institutional arrangements and the strengthening of a specialized economic technocracy in relevant national institutions.

Response to the economic downturn of 1999 From the financial crisis of the end of the 20th century we are getting out with a fiscal cost of about 1% of the GDP … To other countries the cost is about 30% of the GDP. (Juan Camilo Restrepo, in Gonzalez and Galindo, 2008) An economic and financial crisis exploded in Colombia in 1998, in the context of the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian currency devaluation of mid-​1998. The economy was experiencing difficulties in terms of excessive public spending, a high balance of payments deficit, increasing public debt and a slowdown in economic activity. At the time, the Minister of Finance, Juan Camilo Restrepo, undertook a plan to alleviate the fiscal situation, but it was insufficient to contain the crisis (Junguito, 2016). As Hernández pointed out in the interview, there was a debate before the crisis about the path of economic growth. Some experts at the MHCP predicted positive growth of around 3.5% during 1999, whereas others were sceptical (or realistic?) and expected positive growth of 1.8%. Nobody predicted the magnitude of the crisis: a negative growth of 4.3%. Although this event suggests a weak capacity to predict the magnitude and intensity of a GDP contraction in a crisis, once it began, and thanks to the built-​in capacity, it was possible to implement policies that enabled a recovery in economic growth, particularly because of the autonomy of the BR and the presence of FOGAFIN.22 According to Miguel Urrutia, the Governor of the BR at the time of the crisis and one of our interviewees, the first symptom of the crisis was a mortgage problem in 1996–​97, followed by a foreign exchange crisis.23 The mandate 212

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of the Governor and the BR Board of Directors was to focus on controlling inflation. During the 1990s, the Colombian experienced an investment boom in the oil sector after the discovery of substantial reserves at the beginning of the decade coupled with inflows of short-​and long-​term capital. In this context, the BR Board of Directors decided to allow for some exchange rate flexibility and, based on a paper by Paul Krugman, the BR established an exchange rate band.24,25 This system worked relatively well for about five years but, against Krugman’s recommendations, the Board of Directors adjusted the exchange band twice, which meant that the band lost credibility and effectiveness as a mechanism. In the middle of the crisis, in 1999, the Minister of Finance and the Board of Directors (of BR) adopted a drastic policy change with strong support from the academic community and President Andres Pastrana (1998–​2002). The minister and the Governor of BR initiated conversations with the IMF to negotiate an agreement that would allow BR to obtain foreign exchange liquidity if international reserves were required. A new program was presented to the IMF in terms of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy. With the approval of the IMF, the Board of Directors eliminated the exchange rate band and allowed for the free movement of the rate. Since that time, the rate has moved freely and there have been only sporadic interventions by BR in order to avoid extreme volatility of the rate without affecting its trend. This way, for the first time in its history, BR can take its monetary policy decisions freely without regard to the exchange rate. BR implemented an inflation-​targeting policy in much the same way, with external academic influence playing a significant role. As Urrutia recalls, in 1999 BR held an academic seminar with the participation of Ben Bernanke,26 the President of Bank of International Settlements and the President of the Swedish Central Bank, among others.27 As a result of the meeting, two important changes were implemented: inflation targeting and the establishment of a task group to permanently evaluate the situation of the financial sector, and to produce regular reports, coordinated by the BR. This group was created by Miguel Urrutia with the participation of the MHCP, FOGAFIN and the Superintendence of Finance. The inflation-​targeting policy has been very successful in Colombia. As mentioned previously, inflation came down at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2002, the BR Board of Directors’ long-​term goal was to maintain inflation in a range between 2% and 4% with a consistent target of 3%, and it rapidly succeeded. This result has been very positive for the Colombian population and for the financial markets since it has permitted long-​term public and private debt issuance at low rates of interest. The policy instrument used by the BR is a repurchase agreement rate for loans for one day to the commercial banks, which is announced several times during the year. The financial task group organized by Governor Urrutia is still in place and generates updated information about the behaviour of the financial sector as a whole and of specific banks in particular, so that the authorities have greater 213

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capacity to deal with any crisis than in the past. Moreover, the group of experts has expanded its scope and encompasses issues beyond monetary policy. In summary, as a result of the economic and financial crisis at the end of the 20th century, several important changes were implemented that significantly strengthened policy decision-​m aking capacity:  the consolidation of the independence of the BR in the execution of monetary, exchange rate and financial sector policy; the improvement of BR’s technical capacity; and the creation of several groups of experts to analyse financial sector data and deepen the research on economic issues. In the words of Miguel Urrutia, capacity was a mixture of autonomy and tradition, meaning that the consolidation of autonomy and independence in decision making went hand in hand with the tradition of relying on technical criteria for economic decision making.

The oil and mining bonanza in the 21st century: political economy in turbulent times Before being so optimistic and defining a Fiscal Framework at USD 80, because the change in the Price is not something structural, we should maintain good practices and attempt to minimize the risk, due to the fact that oil price is varying. (Cabrales, 2017) Colombia’s economy has historically relied on the export of commodities. The main export product in colonial times was gold. During most of the 20th century, the performance of the economy depended on the production and export of coffee. In the 21st century, oil replaced coffee as the principal export item of Colombia. Coal has been also important as an export product from the 1980s when the big mines in the northern part of the country, near the Caribbean coast, began to be developed. Thus the balance of payments of Colombia has been always affected by the international price fluctuations of gold, coffee, oil and coal. Policy makers had then to develop an expertise in the management of booms and busts of the external sector of the economy. In the 1980s and 1990s with the major discoveries of oil reserves –​Caño Limón and Cusiana-​Cupiagua –​in the eastern part of the country, Colombia not only became self-​sufficient in petroleum –​a status it had lost ten years before –​but began to export again in 1985. Politicians and economists considered at the time, especially in the first half of the 1990s after the discovery of Cusiana-​Cupiagua, that Colombia was rich in oil deposits and increased the government take in the contracts between the Colombian Oil Company (ECOPETROL) and the foreign oil companies. While oil production increased significantly in the 1990s, reaching a peak of 830,000 barrels per day in 1999, at the beginning of the new century production had started its decline and conditions for foreign investment were not attractive. In 2003, the government introduced a drastic institutional reform to enhance production and export of oil. Two new types of concession contracts were 214

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adopted, royalties were made flexible and related to production volumes, and the National Hydrocarbon Agency (Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos –​ANH), was created in order to administer Colombia’s subsoil hydrocarbon wealth.28 The Minister of Mines and Energy was to have responsibility for hydrocarbons policy making; ANH would independently manage the concessions and auction oil and natural gas resources through a transparent and competitive mechanism to national and foreign oil companies; and ECOPETROL was to operate as an energy company with no responsibility in the policy-​making area (Caballero and Bitar, 2016).29 The new institutional arrangement allowed the government to invite private investors to buy shares of ECOPETROL in 2007. The issuing of new shares reduced Colombian state participation in the capital of the company from 100% to 88.5%. The reform of 2003 was highly successful. In 2002, Colombia produced 578.000 barrels of oil per day, while in 2013 it had attained slightly more than a million barrels per day. It allowed for an increase not only in production and exports during a period of high international prices but also in foreign investment in the oil sector in Colombia. The reform also prepared the country for a period of low international prices –​since the government’s take is smaller than under the previous contracts, the oil companies can still receive positive returns on their investments (Caballero and Bitar, 2016). As mentioned previously, the international price of oil increased from a level of USD 30 per barrel in 2002 to USD 100 in 2008. It fell to USD 60 in 2009 because of the so-​called Great Recession in the US and Europe, but recovered rapidly and attained an average of USD 110 in 2011–​12 before descending in 2013 and 2014 and falling abruptly in 2015 to a level of USD 40 per barrel (see https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart). Colombia experienced a true oil bonanza between 2010 and 2014 and registered an average rate of economic growth of 5% during those five years. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics (De Gregorio, 2016), the result of the boom was an increase in oil’s share of GDP from 5.4% in 2004 to around 7.6% in 2014 and exports became heavily concentrated, with oil’s share of total goods exports increasing from 37.8 to 68.9%.30 As a result, the exchange rate appreciated substantially between 2003 and 2013. On the other hand, central government income from the oil sector (taxes and dividends) reached 3.3% of GNP in 2013, equivalent of 20% of the total tax revenue collected by the Treasury. The oil bonanza reinforced the external sector dependency on oil exports without ‘Colombia being an oil country but a country with oil’. Amylkar Acosta, an economist and politician who was Minister of Mines and Energy during the boom, told us in an interview that Colombia experienced a process of “re-​ primarization” or the return to an economy based on the primary sector, leaving aside efforts of diversification and industrialization of the economy, a fact that will imperil the long-​term growth opportunities of the country.31 During the boom years, the government increased its spending and had to obtain new loans to finance it, in such way that debt issuance also increased in 215

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2013 and 2014, taking the relationship between public debt and GNP to 35.4% in 2015, a higher level that those of the previous seven years. Furthermore, the collapse of international oil prices in the second semester of 2014 and in 2015 forced the government to undertake a deep fiscal adjustment process with an increase in revenue through a tax reform in 2016 –​the VAT was raised from 16 to 19% –​a reduction in spending, and a higher level of public debt. It was unfortunate that in the boom years the government did not increase its savings in foreign currency in order to prevent a situation in which oil prices would come down, affecting the exchange rate and the fiscal accounts. This explains the substantial depreciation of the exchange rate (80% in 2015) and the expansion of the fiscal imbalance due to the drastic fall of government revenues in 2016 –​the biggest of the past 35 years –​which increased the deficit to 4% of GNP that year. The rate of growth of the economy fell in 2017 to 1.4% but, thanks to the strong fiscal adjustment, Colombia was able to maintain its investment grade rating given by the international rating agencies. In his interview, Amilkar Acosta was quite critical of the management of the oil bonanza and, specifically, of the failure to plan for its reversal; instead, the government adopted economic decisions on the assumption that international conditions would not change. For Acosta, the near-​sightedness of considering that the positive effect of the boom would continue showed a narrow understanding of economic cycles and the mistake of seeking short-​term returns without taking into account the structural effects of the boom-​and-​bust cycle. He also suggested that theoretical knowledge does not always apply in the real word because political economy tensions influence the economic decisions adopted and, consequently, have an impact on results. In other words, in his view, the end of the boom could have been foreseen by the technocracy and a better policy route could have been taken. Unlike the other experiences documented here, the oil and mining export boom did not demonstrate sound ability to make decisions based on good economic judgment. In a downward situation, it was expected that counter-​cyclical policies would be implemented to avoid a fiscal crisis and to strengthen the export sector. As a result, there is a debate on what should have been the best way to manage the oil resources and on the government’s failure to strengthen the economy as a result of the boom. According to Mauricio Cárdenas (Cárdenas, 2016), who was the Minister of Finance responsible for managing the economy during the boom, the government increased public investment and reduced public debt. However, the increased public investment generated, as has already been shown, greater indebtedness over time. As Acosta suggests, during the boom, with the increase of investment in the hydrocarbons sector, the government decided to extend tax incentives for those investors –​particularly the stability tax regime –​which meant that business conglomerates obtained exemptions, deductions and tax discounts, which were to have a negative fiscal effect when international oil prices fell.32 In brief, during the oil boom economic policy was geared towards increasing the competitiveness of the oil and hydrocarbons sector, reinforcing the economy’s 216

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strong dependence on oil exports. In addition, contrary to the path of economic policy making in the past, the oil boom displayed the weakness of economic technocrats in addressing the gains of the boom and preventing the inevitable fall of oil prices. As Acosta says, this happened not because of economic incapacity, but because of the strong linkage between political interests and the design of economic policy.

Conclusion The interviews conducted for this analysis reveal a strong consensus on the relevance of well-​trained technocrats to economic policy design and decision making in Colombia since 1980. Despite internal and external shocks experienced by the economy and the imbalances created by both, the policy response definitely helped to successfully tackle the crisis and maintain a reasonably degree of stability and growth. Institutional changes were also important in achieving capacity building for economic policy. The main innovation was to give independence and autonomy to the BR in the Constitution of 1991. The policy objective of BR, according to the 1991 Constitution, has been the control of inflation. In 1999, when the economy went through its worst contraction of the 20th century, the BR Board of Directors adopted an inflation-​targeting regime, which has proved to be an adequate framework to lower the inflation rate and promote the expansion of GNP. On the other hand, in 2011 a fiscal rule was approved by Congress in order to limit the room for government spending and ensure the long-​term sustainability of central government finances. This rule defines an annual deficit goal according to the behaviour of the external accounts. The central government is, then, restricted in its actions by the monetary policy implemented by BR and by the fiscal rule imposed by law that has to be observed by the Minister of Finance. At CGRC, it is possible to perform ex-​post evaluation of public expenditures and public investment projects, helping to improve the quality of government spending and the processes involved in deciding public sector investment. In addition, DNP is concerned with the implementation of public administration reforms and strengthening of the general competitiveness of the Colombian economy. This is not to say that there are no weaknesses in the management of the economy and in the administrative and technical capacity of state entities. Coordination of the different institutions, in the different sectors, is a big problem for the timely and efficient implementation of sectorial policies. And, in recent times, political polarization has affected the relative power of the economic technocracy vis-​à-​vis that of Congress. The political environment is different from that prevailing during the debates of the Constituent Assembly of 1991 that resulted in the new Constitution. Notwithstanding the weaknesses, complexities and difficulties in economic policy making and implementation, it can be concluded that the formation 217

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of the technocracy in the past 50  years has been of utmost importance for the management of the economy and is, to a high degree, responsible for its performance and the respect that international institutions and investors show for Colombia and its authorities. Acknowledgments We would like to acknowledge the collaboration of our interviewees (Miguel Urrutia, former Governor of BR; Isidro Hernández, former advisor at CGRC; Gabriel Misas, former advisor at the DNP; Armando Montenegro, former Director of the DNP; Amylkar Acosta, former Minister of Mines and Energy, and Roberto Junguito, former Minister of Finance), for generously sharing their views on their participation in different moments of economic decision making. We also thank our research assistants, Alejandra Armesto and Alejandro Ruiz, both undergraduate students of economics at the National University of Colombia. Notes 1

2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10

11

12 13

14 15 16 17

As Estrada and Puello-​Socarrás (2005) point out, technocracy became increasingly necessary for making economic decisions around 1970 in Chile. In Colombia, the building of the technocracy started in the second half of the 1960s. What is distinctive in the Colombian case is the willingness for institutional change and the expansion of the technocracy. Constant Price of 2011. Poverty line: people living on less than USD 2 per day. The School of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes was created in 1948, the School of Economics of the National University was created in 1945, and Universidad Javeriana started in 1931 with a mixture of economics and law. See Montenegro (2017). Personal interview, 19 November 2018. Colombia had had very limited access to new loans extended by foreign agencies since 1931. Personal interview, 3 December 2018. Personal interview 19 November 2018. Personal interview, 3 December 2018 Devaluation is generally unpopular because of its effects on increasing inflation. Other measures were: the acceleration of the regularity of the “crawling-​peg” mini-​evaluations and rigorous import controls. As a consequence of these measures, even though it was not possible to maintain the growth rate of previous decades, Colombia had positive GDP growth. The Monetary Board of the BR, which had been created by law in 1963, was eliminated in 1991 when the new Constitution authorized the establishment of an independent monetary authority, the Board of Directors of the BR, composed of seven members: the Minister of Finance, the Governor of BR and five independent members, most of them economists. Personal interview, 3 December 2018. The chairman of Federal Reserve Bank at the time, Paul Volcker, played a very important role in the negotiations between the IMF and the Colombian authorities. Roberto Junguito received a note from Volcker with suggestions as to how to structure a proposal of a scheme that would allow the country to regain access to international credit (Junguito, 2018, p. 423). The Fifth Commission of the Constituent Assembly was in charge of economic, social and environmental issues. Personal interview, 22 November 2018. Personal interview, 22 November 2018. Personal interview, 22 November 2018.

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22 23 24 25 26

27

28 29

30

31 32

The reform established that the BR is a state body of constitutional rank, the monetary, exchange and credit authority, whose main purpose is to maintain the currency’s purchasing power. Articles 189, 371, 372 and 373 of Constitution of 1991. The longest period for a member of the Board of Directors is 12 years. Personal interview, 16 November 2018. In addition, since 1991, the BR has had new objectives, including managing the exchange rate, which was previously set by Congress, and the inflation rate. In 1999, the BR adopted the policy of an inflation target, which has been successfully implemented since then. This situation also occurred elsewhere, such as in the 2008 US crisis, when economists in the US and Europe were unable to predict the abrupt recession. Personal interview, 20 November 2018. Krugman (1991). Miguel Urrutia says that both he and the President of the Chilean Central Bank advocated this policy and defended the exchange rate band mechanism. At that time, he was a professor at Princeton University. In 2002, he served as a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and in 2006 he began two terms as chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board. Miguel Urrutia recalls that the President of the Swedish Central Bank asked about the economic situation in Colombia. The answer was simple: banks with little security give loans to individuals and companies that do not pay. The President of the Swedish Central Bank responded that in Sweden the crisis led to the creation of an analysis group coordinated by the Central Bank. The ANH was created in 2003 by Decree 1760. From 1974, private oil companies, national and foreign, had to sign association contracts with ECOPETROL if they wanted to explore and exploit hydrocarbons in Colombia. The Board of Directors of ECOPETROL were responsible for policy-​making decisions in the oil and the gas sectors. The high international prices for commodities also increased the value of coal and nickel exports from Colombia during these years so that the mining sector as a whole contributed to the expansion of GNP. Personal interview, 5 December 2018. In particular, the laws for contractual stability (Law 963, 2005 and Law 1370,  2009).

References Alarcón, Ó. (2015) “La séptima papeleta”. El Espectador, 29 June [Online]. Available from www.elespectador.com/​opinion/​la-​septima-​papeleta-​columna-​569151 Álvarez, A., Guiot-​Issac, A. and Hurtado, J. (2019) “La formación de una tecnocracia pragmática: los inicios de la formación profesional de economistas colombianos”. Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad 82: 41–​71. Avella, M (2014) “La independencia de la banca central en Colombia desde 1923: aspectos institucionales”. Revista de Economía Institucional 16(30). Caballero, C. (2009) “La impronta de Carlos Lleras en la economía colombiana de los años setenta del siglo XX”. Revista de Estudios Sociales 33: 91–​103. Caballero, C. (2016) La Economía Colombiana del Siglo XX: Un Recorrido por la Historia y sus Protagonistas. Bogotá: Penguin Random House. Caballero, C. and Bitar, S. (2016) “The liberal rarity of South America: oil and mining policy reform in Colombia in the 2000s”. In P.A. Haslam and P. Heidrich (eds.) The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 121–​41.

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Cabrales, S. (2017) “¿Cuál sería el future de la industria petrolera en Colombia?” Revista Dinero, 26 September. Calvo, G. (December 2018) Sudden Stop y el fantasma de la inflación crónica. Presented at Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá. Calvo, G. and Talvi, E (2004) “Sudden stop, financial factors and economic collapse: a view from Latin American frontlines”. Paper prepared for the debate “From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance”, Barcelona, 24–​26 September. Available from www.researchgate.net/​publication/​ 247670340_​Sudden_​Stop_​Financial_​Factors_​and_​Economic_​Collapse_​A_​ View_​from_​the_​Latin_​American_​Frontlines Cárdenas, M. (2016) Tasa de Cambio en Colombia, Cuadernos de Fedesarrollo 54. Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO. Cárdenas, M. (2014) “La red de apoyo social y el programa de familias en acción”. In C Caballero and D. Pizano (eds.) Punto de Inflexión: Decisiones que Rescataron el Futuro de Colombia, La Administración de Andrés Pastrana Arango 1998–​2002. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, pp. 179–​204. Cárdenas, M. (2013) “Economic growth in Colombia: a reversal of fortune?”. Ensayos sobre Política Económica 25(53): 220–​59. Clavijo, S. (2000) “Banca central y coodinación macroeconómica:  el caso de Colombia”. Available from www.banrep.org/​docum/​Lectura_​finanzas/​pdf/​ br0600.pdf De Gregorio, J. (2016) “For Latin America, disappointment but not doom”. In O. Blanchard and A. Posen, A (eds) Reality Check for the Global Economy. Peterson Institute for International Economics Briefing, 16(3): 31–​7. Estrada, J. and Puello-​Socarrás, F.J. (2005) “Élites, intelectuales y tecnocracia. Caleidoscopio contemporáneo y fenómeno latinoamericano actual”. Colombia Internacional 62: 100–​19. Flórez, L.B (2001) “Colombia tras diez años de las reformas políticas y económicas”. Cuadernos de Economía 20(34): 31–​55. Gonzalez, F. and Galindo, M. (2008) “Banrepública provocó en gran parte la crisis financiera: Juan Camilo Restrepo”. El Tiempo, 23 June. Hendrix, C. (2017) Kicking a Crude Habit: Diversifying away from Oil and Gas in the 21st Century, Working Paper 17-​2. Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Junguito, R. (1986) Memorias del Ministro de Hacienda, Julio 1984 –​Septiembre 1985. Bogotá: Banco de la República, Departamento Editorial. Junguito, R. (2016) Historia Económica de Colombia en el Siglo XX. Bogotá: Universidad Sergio Arboleda. Junguito, R. and Rincón, H. (2016) “La política fiscal en el siglo XX en Colombia”. In J. Robinson and M. Urrutia (eds.) Economía Colombiana del Siglo XX. Un análisis cuantitativo. Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura Económica/​Banco de la República, pp. 239–​312. Krugman, P. (1991) “Target zones and exchange rate dynamics”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(3): 669–​82. 220

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Lederman, D. (2005) The Political Economy of Protection: Theory and the Chilean Experience. Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press. Meisel, A. and Barón, J.D. (2010) Un Análisis Histórico de la Independencia de la Banca Central en América Latina: La Experiencia Colombiana, 1923–​2008, Cuadernos de Historia Económica y Empresaria No. 28. Bogotá: Banco de la República, Centro de Estudios Económicos y Regionales. Misas, G. (1985) “Acumulación y crisis en la economía colombiana”. Cuadernos de Economía 7(8): 133–​66. Misas, M. and Vásquez, D. (2002) Expectativas de Inflación en Colombia: Un Ejercicio Econométrico. Bogotá: Banco de la República. Available from www.banrep.gov. co/​docum/​ftp/​borra212.pdf Najar, A.I. (2006) “Apertura económica en Colombia y el sector externo, 1990–​ 2004”. Apuntes del CENES 26 (41): 85–​106. Montenegro, A. (2017) “Los albores de la economía colombiana”. Revista de Economía del Rosario 2012): 307–​24. Ocampo, J.A. (2005) Más allá del Consenso de Washington: Una Agenda de Desarrollo para América Latina, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas No. 26. Santiago: Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. Urrutia, M., Caballero, C. and Vélez, C. (2009) Cincuenta Años. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Bogotá: Una Tinta Medios.

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THIRTEEN

Social policy, target populations and policy analysis in Colombia Santiago Leyva and Carlos Andrés Olaya

Introduction In Colombia, in the 30 years that have passed since the constitutional change of 1991, a very high proportion of Colombians have gained access to policies such as health, primary and secondary education, and basic services. Moreover, over the past three decades of state growth,1 redistributive (equality) and identity (diversity) policies have become part of the government’s agenda. In this context, the needs of an ever-​increasing list of populations (young people, elderly people, people with disabilities, indigenous communities, Afro-​descendants, victims of armed conflict and so on) began to be addressed through expanding target population-​based policies. In policy studies terms, the Colombian state expanded its basic welfare and its policy targeting, as a substitute to a welfare state with universal coverage. The increase of basic welfare policies and policy targeting helped to reduce the rate of poverty and to improve the quality of life to many millions of people, particularly so in large Colombian cities. However, the results of these policies have been very marginal in terms of the general reduction of income inequality. For example, in the context of Latin American states, the case of Colombia seems one of the most serious in terms of the lack of impact of income redistribution of fiscal and social policy. This implies that the one of the most pressing policy questions in Colombia is why, after such an important institutional change (a completely new Constitution) that doubled the size of the state, so little has changed terms of income distribution. Addressing this puzzle, this chapter suggests that this can be explained through the concept of the truncated state (Holland, 2013).2 This notion refers to welfare regimes in countries where the construction of social security systems reflects the pre-​existing social stratification and the capacity of powerful pressure groups to create their own protection schemes. This chapter suggests that one possible explanation for this “truncated” type of social policy that exists in Colombia could be the limited political power and representation (in Congress, the judiciary and the executive) of the marginalized populations that have been targeted. All in all, this chapter has three main sections. The first section introduces the general changes to social policies, first looking into the expansion of basic welfare and then exploring the evolution of policy targeting. In the second 223

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section, it explores the limited achievements in terms of the redistribution of income through the concept of the truncated state. Finally, it suggests that the lack of representation of identity-​based groups and other targeted populations at least can be partly explained by the limited political power of some populations in relation to other privileged social groups.

The enlargement of the Colombian state through basic welfare policies The first modern social policies were created in Colombia in the 1940s, based on a Bismarckian model of contributions of formal workers. This early system excluded most of the rural population, domestic workers and all informal urban workers (Rodríguez, 2001).3 Moreover, this limited social policy system was characterized by the unequal treatment of population, as illustrated by the modest pension and health schemes that it created.4 Notably, beyond the protection given to those who had access to formal jobs, only a very limited number of citizens could access some social services such as health and education through clientelist networks (Duarte, 2001; Bucheli, 2015).5 After decades of slow growth in most social policies (except basic education), in 1991 the Colombian state underwent a constitutional change that replaced the 1886 Constitution.6 The new constitution “established … a system that sought to strengthen services and to guarantee rights considered to be essential for the participation of citizens as full members of society” (Steiner and Medellín, 2016, p. 35). So while the first article of the 1886 Constitution simply described Colombia as a “unitary republic”, the 1991 Constitution stressed that Colombia was a “social rule of law state” (emphasis added),7 a term that, despite its legalistic form and connotations, was also used in the 1990s to mean “welfare state” (Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991). Moreover, article 13 of the 1991 Constitution acknowledged the equality of rights to all the Colombian citizens, regardless of their socioeconomic condition: “All persons are born free and equal before the law and will receive the same protection and treatment from the authorities and will enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities, without any discrimination based on sex, race, national or family origin, language, religion, and political or philosophical opinion.” This clear mandate for the expansion of the “social state” has helped to double the size of the Colombian central government over the past 30 years in terms of its proportion of the GDP, passing from a mere 8.1% of the GDP in 1990 to a considerable 19.1% in 2013 (Steiner and Medellín, 2016, p. 35). Also, it led to the increasing presence of the state in many fields of economic and social life.8 Moreover, in comparative terms, this change moved the Colombian state from the lower leagues of social policy expenditure in Latin America (in terms of the size of its state), to a mid-​level ranking. General government expenditure (including central and regional governments, plus social security) rose to a level of 29.6% of GDP in 2015, which meant that the Colombian state ranked above 224

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that of “Chile (25.8% of GDP), Costa Rica (20% of GDP), Paraguay (24.4% of GDP) and Perú (22.6% of GDP), although still lower than the one present in most advanced economies and even in some countries of Latin America [Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay]” (CGIP, 2017, p. 55). These constitutionally induced policy changes also meant that basic social policies (albeit with universal pretentions) in the areas of education, health and sanitation became national priorities.9 This in turn helped to achieve important aims in these basic policy areas; for example, the gross rate for primary and secondary school enrollment reached 104% in 201010 (Steiner and Medellín, 2016). Also in the area of health, the country reached a level of coverage of 91% in 2012, illustrating that thanks to the institutions created by the 1991 Constitution, most Colombians now have access to non-​contributory healthcare through a system that currently combines the Bismarck and Beveridge models.11

The expansion of policy targeting after the 1990s Beyond the expansion of basic welfare, one of the notable characteristics of 1991 Constitution was its many references to grassroots participation and identity politics. This represents a significant shift from the top-​down, elitist and mono-​ cultural rhetoric of the 1886 Constitution, to a more liberal, society-​centered and democratically oriented Constitution. In political terms, this move was linked to the democratic origins of the 1991 Constitution, a condition that becomes clearer if we highlight that it was written by a democratically elected body, which included a third of its members from a former center-​left guerrilla group, as well as many members of the two traditional parties.12 Given this “identity turn”, in the aftermath of the 1991 Constitution, the Colombian state expanded its policies with the targeting of “new” populations. In this context, targeting became a crucial exercise “to identify those groups actually chosen to receive benefits and burdens through the various elements of policy design” (Ingram et al, 2010, p. 101). As Table 13.1 shows, since 1991 the Colombian state has created an ever-​growing number of national policies aimed at these identity-​based populations. Beyond the specific characteristics of each group, these policies can all be state responses to demands for redistribution (equality) and recognition (diversity) of populations. In addition to identity-​based strategies, policy targeting was also used to direct benefits to low-​income groups. This type of targeting emerged in 1995 when the country enacted the System for Identifying Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs (Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios Para Programas Sociales –​SISBEN) as the main mechanism for targeting social spending for low-​income groups. As Camacho and colleagues (2010) put it, “in its origin, SISBEN was conceived as an instrument for the application of the subsidized health regime. But since its regulation by the Law 60 (1993) (Article 30), the SISBEN also started to be used for the targeting of all social expenditure” (p. 1). So, from that moment onwards, SISBEN became the main form of bracketing 225

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Table 13.1: National policies based on target populations Year

Target group/​population

Laws/​policies

1993

Afro-​descendants

Black Communities Act –​ Law 70

1994

Rural women

Policy on Rural Women’s Development –​CONPES 23

1997

Young people

Colombia’s Youth Act –​ Law 375

1997

Victims of armed conflict

Law for prevention of forced displacement and socioeconomic stabilization of persons internally displaced by violence –​Law 387

2004

People with any type of disability National Disability Policy –​CONPES 80

2007

Early childhood population

National Early Childhood Policy –​CONPES 109

2007

Elderly populations

National Policy on Ageing and Old Age –​Resolution of the Ministry of Social Protection

2013 2013

Women Homeless populations

National Policy on Gender Equity for Women –​CONPES 161 Formulation Guidelines of Social Policy for the Homeless –​Law 1641

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on official documents.

the Colombian population into different income categories to decide how subsidies would be allocated. Moreover, in early 2000, SISBEN was transformed into a broad program of conditional cash transfers that was named “Familias en Accion” (Families in Action). However, despite all this growth in policy targeting, it is important to observe that programs such as SISBEN and other similar policies have created a welfare system that remains residual and is far from reaching universal status. In this way, the Colombian social policy approach assumes that most citizens are self-​ sufficient and can obtain the insurance and protection they need, either through the market or through the care of their own families. As pointed out by Mares and Carnes (2009), these targeted social policies cannot be seen as the equivalent of developing a universal welfare state, since their targeting aims to secure the risk of only the most marginal populations (those living in poverty, black and indigenous communities, peasants, rural women, poor urban youngsters and so on). This implies that even if these types of policy are widespread, the key question is whether they have really helped to improve inequality in Colombia.

The lack of impact on income redistribution of social policies After this quick glance at how social policies (basic welfare and target population policies) have expanded since the 1990s, the pressing question in the Colombian case is whether this enlargement has produced a positive effect in terms of poverty reduction and income redistribution. By answering this question, it is possible to observe that however positive these changes are in terms of reducing poverty, the truth is that Colombia remains a very unequal country. But before getting to income redistribution, it is important to recognize that poverty rates have decreased from 50% of the population in 2002 to 26.9% in 2017 (CGIP, 2017). This shows how Colombia has achieved a large reduction 226

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in “poverty”, which by no means implies that the battle has been won, since in a country of roughly 48 million people, 26.9% of the population still in poverty implies that around 13  million citizens still live under the poverty line and 3.5 million more under the extreme poverty line. Beyond poverty reduction, the results of social policies in Colombia have been a lot less notable. In fact, it is also important to go beyond the analysis of poverty reduction, by observing changes in inequality. In Colombia, inequality before state intervention is not much different from that of other OECD countries; the real problem is that, once the state intervenes with its fiscal and social policies, it does not reduce inequality at all. Addressing this question, the CGIP argued in its 2017 report that in Colombia one-​third of population and household subsidies were directed to upper-​and middle-​class groups rather than those on low incomes. Regarding this problem, Izquierdo and colleagues (2018) have suggested that: Inequality before direct taxes and transfers is only about 5.3 percent higher in Latin America (with a Gini of 0.515) than in advanced countries (with a Gini of 0.488), which is not that big a difference. Hence, the enormous difference in disposable income inequality between regions is due mostly to fiscal policy. In fact, for 16 Latin American countries, direct taxes and cash transfers reduce inequality by only 4.7 percent on average, while in a sample of advanced countries the decline is 38 percent. (p. 108) One interesting way of understanding this bias is through the concept of “truncated state” (Holland, 2013). As Holland argues, “the hallmark of truncated welfare states is expenditures that do little to redistribute resources in favor of the poor” (Holland, 2013, p. 5). This concept was first used to explain the type of social welfare that was available in some Latin American countries after the 1920s, and in Colombia in particular after the 1940s (Mesa-​Lago, 2008), and especially during the so -​called “National Front” period (1958–​74) (Leyva, 2018). As Holland (2013) explains for other “truncated” welfare states in Latin America, the construction of social security systems reflected the pre-​existing social stratification and the capacity of powerful pressure groups to create their own protection schemes.13 In the context of Latin American states, the case of Colombia seems one of the most serious in terms of the lack of impact of income redistribution of fiscal and social policy. Likewise, Holland (2013) finds that Colombia is among those countries in Latin America where inequality is left unchanged after state intervention. Addressing these regional differences, the CGIP pointed out in 2017 that: fiscal policy in Colombia (taxes, subsidies and transfers) reduced the poverty rate by 13 percentage points (measured on disposable income). Although this reduction is important, it is much lower than that observed in countries such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. The reduction of poverty in Latin America was 32.6 percentage points as a result of fiscal policy … more than double that observed in Colombia. (CGIP, 2017, p. 76) 227

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Furthermore, other Latin American countries have been able to develop bigger “post-​truncated” welfare programs for non-​contributory pensions and conditional cash transfers. For example, in average the region of Latin America experienced “an increase in non-​contributory social spending from 6.4% of total social spending in 1995–​1996 to 13,7%” (Izquierdo et al, 2018, p. 105). This illustrates that social policy in Colombia remains highly “truncated” in many sectors, even after the major policy changes of the 1990s, which is one of the most intriguing aspects of policy making in Colombia. Indeed, what is even more puzzling, as mentioned previously, is that in 1991 Colombia underwent a complete constitutional change that was designed to create equality. So, the pressing question is why is it that such an important change in terms of the “size” and objectives of the state has had such a small impact in terms of redistribution between classes and target populations (Ingram et al, 2010).

A focus on pensions: zooming in on the problem of policy truncation Of the many interesting examples of highly regressive policy targeting that favors the middle classes or even those on the highest incomes, perhaps the most striking is the distribution of benefits (including pensions) for elderly people. In this regard, the CGIP mentioned in its 2017 national report that: 72% of pension-​based subsidies are concentrated in upper income quintiles (4th and 5th). This contrasts with the low coverage of the pension system, which only covers a little more than 20% of the population of retirement age, and with the fact that the elderly in Colombia have one of the highest poverty rates in the region (OECD, World Bank and IDB, 2015). [This illustrates that] the inadequate targeting of subsidies granted to families and sectors, together with [policy] design problems, become evident in the great concentration [of welfare] in the wealthier sectors. (CGIP, 2017, p. 77) Indeed, in terms of targeting within this population bracket, one of the main problems of social policy in Colombia is the amount of resources that are devoted to honoring the deficit in contributory public pensions. This type of expenditure reached 3.9% of GDP in Colombia in 2017 (CGIP, 2017, p. 213), roughly 20% of the fiscal budget, although still well below the 9% average among OECD countries. The problem is that after spending such a large proportion of the GDP on pensions, Colombia only reaches a very low coverage in this policy area: Compared with other countries in the region, spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP in Colombia is higher than that of Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru, although less than that of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. This is always worrisome when low levels of coverage are taken into account … [Indeed] [p]‌ension 228

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coverage in Colombia is characterized by being excessively low. The high pension expenditures mentioned above only benefited in 2016 a little more of two million pensioners. According to household survey figures, only 24% of those over 65 have access to a pension. (CGIP, 2017, pp. 216–​17) Moreover, although the Colombian case is comparable to other Latin American cases in terms of “pro-​r ich spending” (Izquierdo et al, 2018, p. 109), with the exceptions of Argentina and Uruguay (Izquierdo et al, 2018), it is notable that Colombia spends large amounts on subsidizing the pensions of the wealthier population and that there is a conspicuous absence of a large (and adequate) program of “noncontributory pensions” with a universalistic propensity. Furthermore, as highlighted Steiner and Medellín (2016), “the first three quintiles of the income distribution receive only 2.5% of the resources allocated to pensions, while the highest quintile gets 86.3% of these monies” (p.  50). Those old and wealthy Colombians can be described, in the words of Ingram and colleagues (2010), as an advantaged group that is “likely to receive benefits in public policy (such as tax deductions or credits) and to be treated with respect ... [by policymakers]” (p. 109), as well as a group that is always capable of connecting its own interests “to broad-​based national interests” (Ingram et al, 2010, p. 109). So, if nothing about this truncated pension system changes, subsidies will keep growing as the public pension system remains open to middle-​and high-​income groups. Finally, it is important to highlight that prioritizing pensions over other social spending implies that more resources are targeted to older (in terms of the life course) and richer populations,14 which does little to improve the future prospects of the country.15 Indeed, as Urrutia (2016) notes, “in 2012, 24% of the national budget (29.5 billion pesos) was spent on pensions against 15% on education” (p.  34), which is problematic in a country with a large proportion of young people in its total population.

The lack of political representation: a path to understanding truncated policies This chapter suggests that one possible explanation for this “truncated” type of social policy that exists in Colombia could be the limited political power and representation (in Congress, the judiciary and the executive) of the marginalized populations targeted by such policies. Indeed, despite the fact that the 1991 Constitution gave voice in the political process to some previously excluded groups through affirmative actions and a quota system, this political experiment did not really empower all disadvantaged groups. According to Htun (2005), there are two types of quota, namely: “quotas in the candidacies of political parties and quotas reserved in congresses” (p. 19). The first type is frequently used to increase the participation of women, while the second has been more commonly used for the inclusion of ethnic groups. 229

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However, progress in terms of representation has been very limited for these groups. One example of this is the number of women representatives in Congress:  while it is true that there have been normative advances in the establishment of quotas, no one can deny that women’s participation in Congress has never exceeded 20%, and is far from the ideal of political parity. It is also the case that political representation of ethnic groups is still very limited; despite comprising 10.6% of the population, black ethnic people only represent 0.7% of Congress.16 All of this implies that advocacy for minorities remains highly disorganized, fragmented and discontinuous. Another strategy used by historically marginalized groups has been litigation. For example, LGBT groups have achieved important legal advances in civil, economic and social rights in areas such as property rights, marriage, adoption, protection against discrimination, social security affiliation, blood donation and so on (Castillo, 2018). But again, this strategy seems to be limited to those with high levels of legal capacity and education. In contrast, those who have been historically excluded on many fronts (for example, low-​income, illiterate indigenous women living on the periphery), the main instrument for exercising advocacy seems to be regional strikes.17 One should consider that the way these target populations are socially and politically constructed as an object of social policies is linked to the political power of those populations (Ingram et al, 2010). From this perspective, it is possible to suggest that the lack of influence of these groups perhaps has biased the expansion of welfare and policy targeting in Colombia against their interests. As Ingram and colleagues (2010) have noted, in the construction of a policy problem, political power influences how the public image of a given population is built. This in turn, leads both policy formulators and the general public to take a certain view of which populations deserve support from the state, and which groups do not require (or deserve) its assistance. In other words, political power helps to define which populations are included and excluded from public policies, which in turn helps to empower certain groups and disempower others. Moreover, Ingram and colleagues (2010) have also highlighted how politicians can reproduce stereotypes and traditional ways of portraying social groups, which ultimately get filtered into public policy making. So in Colombia, as in other Latin American countries such as Brazil, this has implied a “hierarchization of human rights”, which means that “the government gives more attention to some groups than to others” (Góis, 2013, p. 214). Indeed, the social construction of target populations “may be perceived by the legislature, executives, courts, and, ultimately, the citizenry to be so hegemonic that they are viewed as a ‘natural’ condition and seldom questioned” (Ingram et al, 2010, p. 102), so public policies remain static in their distribution of wealth. Gender equality is one example of how the rhetoric of population targeting and identity politics produces only “minor policy changes” (Sabatier, 2010) in a truncated policy situation. In Colombia, this is an area that has been evolving as a result of international pressure and increasing policy transfer from global multilateral agencies. For example, gender policies in Colombia have been 230

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strongly influenced by the four World Conferences on Women (Mexico in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995). An example of this influence can be seen in the way that the proceedings of the Beijing conference helped to create considerable interest in Colombia in the issue of mainstreaming as the main policy instrument to achieve gender equality.18 Nonetheless, is harder to see how a strong national movement, with significant participation in decision making, has had a real impact in wider social changes that could put an end to patriarchal power relations. In addition, the merely rhetorical approach has also hampered the implementation of policy targeting. In many cases, more and more populations have their own subsets of targeted policies, without much thought given in policy formulation to what this growing set of population-​based policies means for the intersectionality challenge (Crenshaw, 1991). Moreover, policy targeting is also blurred by the absence of reliable, consistent and comparable data. As Buvinić (2004, p. 8) observes: socially excluded groups are invisible in official statistics (censuses and government surveys). Latin America knows more about the diversity of its industrial production than about the diversity of its peoples. The numerical invisibility of socially excluded groups reflects and reinforces their exclusion. For example, less than a third of the countries in the region have official statistics on people of African descent, although they number between 80 and 150 million people. The reality is that power relations have left little space for the expansion of strong forms of policy targeting. Moreover, most interest has been placed in targeted policies such as conditional cash transfers and housing subsidies to the poor, which are both examples of policies that can accommodate traditional definitions of “rich” and “poor” and give ways for politicians to redistribute resources without getting entangled in the complications of identity politics. In addition, in truncated states, where universal welfare does not go to poor populations, Holland (2013) argues that “the poor favor more targeted benefits compared to the non-​poor” (p. 3). In this sense, this type of traditional targeted program “boosts popular support by giving the informal sector poor a stake in benefits” (Holland, 2013, p. 3). So, although they go against the idea of universal welfare and modern policy targeting, targeted clientelist policies at least constitute a “real” base that supports more redistribution to existing clienteles. Moreover, if one considers that policy targeting (as clientelism) is not universal, it becomes clear why it could be easily stigmatized as “minority and dependent welfare state” clientelism (Esping-​Andersen, 2003, p. 40) that could be hard to distinguish from old-​style clientelism, thus making it hard to distinguish between modern and old. In addition, targeted policies and identity policies do not seem to be the answer in a country where social policies function in a truncated way. The danger is that the development of targeted policies for poor populations postpones crucial reforms to the national welfare system by fragmenting advocacy coalitions and 231

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civil demands. In this sense, if identity demands are important to alleviate the biases of policies, they also run the risk of fragmenting wider discussions on global welfare.19 So questions of welfare, justice and “truncation” have to be given an important place when discussing policy design and policy implementation in Colombia. It is important to understand the problems of targeted population policies and identity politics within the context of the truncated Colombian state, so one does not run the risk of overemphasizing an identity or population demand without understanding the greater problems of Colombian social policy. Furthermore, this all implies that any analyst of policies in Colombia must be aware that targeting and identity politics run the risk of weakening the demands for social justice. So as Nancy Fraser (2008) argues, “the disappearance of communism, the strength of the ideology of the free market, the rise of the ‘identity politics’, both in its fundamentalist and progressive forms, have conspired to decentralize, if not extinguish, the claims of egalitarian redistribution” (pp. 83–​4). In this context, it is important to follow Fraser’s recommendation to maintain the linkages between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution, assuming, as she does, that targeting could be understood both in a specific sense (within the target population), as well as embracing the wider question of greater social macro-​differences. So, for example, when talking about feminist politics, one needs to understand first the particular conditions of inequality that affect women, specially due to the fact that they often assume unpaid jobs related to family care, thus affecting their own savings and pensions. However, if all these identity and gender-​based issues are valid and important, one should also consider in parallel the more general challenge of the pension system, specially its “uneven coverage, inequality bias, and segmentation” (Izquierdo et al, 2018), which affects all Colombians, but especially poor Colombians.

Conclusion After three decades of state growth, it is now possible to say that most Colombians have access to “universal” health, primary and secondary education, and basic services such as sewage and clean water. Moreover, although during the past 30 years “noncontributory social spending” has doubled as a proportion of GDP, these new resources are still badly targeted at richer groups in the population, helping little, if at all, to address issues of income redistribution. Indeed, in Colombia, inequality before state intervention is not that different from the situation in other OECD countries; the real problem is that, once the state intervenes with its fiscal and social policies, it does not reduce inequality at all. Despite advances, basic social welfare such as universal old age pensions, unemployment insurance, public childcare provision, and other subsidies and services that could remediate the huge variations in disposable income that exist in Colombia, are still highly incomplete. This results in a huge disparity in terms of access to social welfare, and despite all the advances, leaves untouched the main features of social policy in Colombia: fragmented, residual and clientelist. 232

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Indeed, this situation, whereby the state has doubled in size but is still unable to deal with the perils of inequality, leads to one of great puzzles of policy analysis in Colombia. This chapter has also shown that Colombia’s social policies have serious limitations in terms of targeting and redistribution. Not only it is clear that universal welfare coverage in the Colombia is limited, but also that the state has been slow to react to the demands of the politics of identity (diversity), despite the fact that the emergence of new policies in the wake of the 1991 Constitution helped the Colombian state to recognize many new target populations (including early infants, children, women, different ethnic groups and so on). The puzzling aspect is that after all these changes the Colombian state seems to remain as truncated as before in terms of its ability to redistribute disposable income and confer equal social status on these different groups. This shows that social policy in Colombia, at least when it comes to targeted population policies, is residual and not universal. In this way, the Colombian social policy approach assumes that most citizens are self-​sufficient and can obtain the insurance and protection they need, either through the market, or through the care of their own families. Finally, this chapter has shown that the Colombian state, although expanding its reach in many sectoral policy areas, still has very limited capacities to steer its policies in terms of target population and non-​sectoral objectives. In this sense, this chapter reveals limited policy success in terms of equality and recognition. Our proposed explanation for this can be summarized in the following manner: policy inclusion without political representation remains difficult, or even impossible. Notes 1 2 3

4

5

6

7

See the concept of target populations in terms of the public policy literature in Ingram et al (2010). See also Holland and Schneider (2017). Before the appearance of this social security system based on workfare (rather than welfare), at the end of the 19th century, a group of charitable and philanthropic institutions channeled “donations and official assistance to solve the misery situation of … sick, elderly, women and children” (Castro, 1996, p. 409) on the basis of Catholic mercy. In 1991, Colombia had more than 1,000 different organizations that paid pensions, operating within 305 different legal regimes, some of them with retirement ages of between 55 and 60 years and others of between 35 and 40 years (López, 1991). Within this limited welfare system, the possibility of political distribution of scarce welfare services by political brokers enabled access to electoral benefits, which in turn created a political system based on the distribution of scarce welfare resources. The first wave of social policy growth of the Colombian state led to a change in social expenditures (as a proportion of the national budget) from 13.4% in 1957 to 47.2% in 1974 (Bejarano and Segura, 2010; Leyva, 2018). Although this level of growth might seem sufficient to invalidate the claim that the Colombian state until the late 1980s had a very limited welfare policy offer, one has to observe that the whole state expenditure only accounted for little more than 8% of GDP by 1990. This is a direct translation of “estado social de derecho”, which is also frequently translated as welfare state. However, we have left the literal translation “social rule of law” to reflect the legal (rather than administrative) nature of the change. In other words, we use this term to illustrate

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8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

that in order to expand social policies and enlarge the welfare state, Colombians resorted to a legalistic strategy. According to Steiner and Medellín (2016), the main explanation for this outstanding growth was that the 1991 Constitution aimed to increase social expenditure in order to reduce exclusion, inequality and regional disparity. “The general welfare and the improvement of the quality of life of the population are social purposes of the State. The fundamental objective of its activity will be the solution of the unmet needs for health, education, environmental sanitation and drinking water. These objectives of public social spending will have priority over any other assignment in the plans and budgets of the Nation and territorial entities” (Constitution of 1991, art. 366). The results in terms of quality are still lagging, however, with a significant quality gap between public and private schools. What is most surprising about this change is that the percentage of health expenditure undertaken by the public sector reached a level of 76%, a proportion that “it is only surpassed by countries that historically have been characterized as having, so to speak, a ‘state of welfare’: United Kingdom (84%), France (78%) and Germany (77%)” (Steiner and Medellín, 2016, p. 44). Indeed, before the 1991 Constitution, the Colombian political system was characterized by clientelism (which can be understood as the political distribution of non-​universal welfare). In order to dismantle this clientelist political regime, the 1991 Constitution tried to dismantle the long-​existing bipartisan system. So the 1991 Constitution aimed to open up participation and foster the emergence of citizen groups with direct participation, especially at the local level. However, what in fact happened was that the two main political parties exploded, leaving the Colombia party system as the most fragmented in the world (Pizarro, 2002). These truncated states are typically described “by low levels of welfare coverage for the poor and by important benefits for non-​poor groups. Benefits often do not reach the poor in truncated welfare states because they are linked to formal employment. Major social programs in Latin America, such as those relating to pensions, healthcare, family allowances, and unemployment benefits, long excluded the mostly poor majority in the informal economy. Truncation also arises when transfers, such as those for gasoline, mortgages, tax-​exempt goods or public universities, disproportionately favor better-​off households. Accordingly, the hallmark of truncated welfare states is expenditures that do little to redistribute resources in favor of the poor (Holland, 2013, p. 5). These resources go mostly to the richer portions of the population because in order to have a pension in Colombia it is necessary to have been an employee of the formal sector for more than 20 years, a condition with which 50% (or less) of the job market does not comply. In the same way, one of the dangers is that the aging of population in Colombia will bring increased health spending, thus also enlarging the bias towards old age-​oriented spending. In this sense, the Inter-​American Development Bank (Izquierdo, Pessino and Volutin, 2018) highlights that although Colombia spent around 5.5% of GDP on health in 2015, it would need to spend around 11.4% of GDP by 2065 due to the higher healthcare cost of its aging population. All these groups representing minority ethnicities remain highly fragmented, however, even when taken individually. For example, the candidates who won the two seats destined for black citizens in the last elections were actually of “mixed parentage” and more importantly had no political relations with any of the black parties. A large proportion of Afro-​Colombians and indigenous Colombians are located in the region of the Pacific coast and in the south of country. These regions are paralyzed by strikes every two years or so, usually related to demands for public goods and infrastructure from the national government. Typically, after some days, a deal between the strikers and the central government would be reached, but many of the compromises would never be accomplished because of a lack of day-​to-​day monitoring. However, gender mainstreaming has represented an enormous challenge for the Colombian public administration, which is organized historically on the principle of sector-​based

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19

implementation (Muller, 2009). In many cases, despite all the language associated with identity politics and policy targeting, the truth is that its implementation structures are still based on sector (Muller, 2009). For example, feminist advocacy runs the risk of only rebalancing gender relations for those women who have access to formal policies and are part of the middle classes.

References Bejarano, A. and Segura, R. (2010) “El fortalecimiento selectivo del estado durante el Frente Nacional”. In L.  Orjuela (ed.) El Estado en Colombia. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, pp 217–​62. Buvinić, M. (2004) “Introducción: la inclusión social en América Latina”. In M.  Buvinić, J.  Mazza, J.  Pungiluppi and R.  Deutsch (eds.) Inclusión Social y Desarrollo Económico en América Latina. Washington, DC:  Inter-​American Development Bank. Bucheli, J.F. (2015) “Conditional cash transfer schemes and the politicization of poverty reduction strategies”. Análisis Político 28(83): 19–​31. Camacho, A., Conover, E., Espinosa, F., Flórez, C. and Sánchez, L. (2010) “El Sisben: su diseño y evolución”. Notas de Política 4: 1–​5. Castillo, E. (2018) No Somos Etcétera: Veinte Años de Historia del Movimiento LGBT en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones B. Castro, P. (1996) “Beneficencia en Medellín, 1880–​1930”. In J.O. Melo (ed.) Historia de Medellín –​Tomo II. Bogotá: Compañía Suramericana de Seguros, pp. 409–​14. CGIP (Comisión del Gasto y la Inversión Pública) (2017) Informe final. Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO. Crenshaw, K. (1991) “Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color”. Stanford Law Review 43: 1241–​99. Duarte, J. (2001) Educación Pública y Clientelismo en Colombia. Medellín: Universidad de Antioquia. Escobar, A. and Olivera, M. (2014) “Gasto público y movilidad y equidad social”. In A. Montenegro and M. Meléndez (eds.) Equidad y Movilidad Social: Diagnósticos y Propuestas para la Transformación de la Sociedad Colombiana. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, pp. 481–​530. Esping-​Andersen, G. (2003) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fraser, N. (2008) “La justicia social en la era de la política de identidad: redistribución, reconocimiento y participación”. Revista de Trabajo 4(6): 83–​99. Góis, J.B. (2013) “Policy analysis in non-​governmental organizations and the implementation of pro-​diversity policies”. In S. Draibe (ed.) Policy Analysis in Brazil: Emergence and Institutionalisation. Bristol: Policy Press, pp 205–​16. Holland, A.C. (2013) Redistributive Politics in Truncated Welfare States, Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University. Holland, A.C. and Schneider, B.R. (2017) “Easy and hard redistribution: the political economy of welfare states in Latin America”, Perspectives on Politics 15(4): 988–​1006. 235

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Htun, M. (2005) “Democracia e inclusión política: la región andina en perspectiva comparada”. In M.  León (ed.) Nadando contra la Corriente:  Mujeres y Cuotas Políticas en los Países Andinos. Quito: Flacso-​Ecuador, pp. 15–​40. Ingram, H., Schneider, A.L. and DeLeon, P. (2010) “La construcción social y el diseño de políticas”. In Paul Sabatier (ed.) Teorías del Proceso de las Políticas Públicas. Buenos Aires: Westview Press, pp. 99–​132. Izquierdo, A., Pessino, C. and Vuletin, G. (eds.) (2018) Better Spending for Better Lives: How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Do More with Less. Washington, DC: Inter-​American Development Bank. Law 60 of 1993 (12 de agosto), Por la cual se dictan normas orgánicas sobre la distribución de competencias. Diario Oficial No. 40.987. Law 70 of 1993 (27 de agosto), Por la cual se desarrolla el artículo transitorio 55 de la Constitución Política. Diario Oficial No. 41.013. Law 375 of 1997 (4 de julio), Por la cual se crea la ley de la juventud y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial No. 43.079. Law 387 of 1997 (18 de julio), Por la cual se adoptan medidas para la prevención del desplazamiento forzado; la atención, protección, consolidación y estabilización socioeconómica de los desplazados internos por la violencia en la República de Colombia. Diario Oficial No. 43.091. Law 1641 of 2013 (12 de julio), Por la cual se establecen los lineamientos para la formulación de la política pública social para habitantes de la calle. Diario Oficial No. 48.849. Leyva, S. (2018) Un Paso Adelante y Medio Atrás: El Cambio del Estado en Colombia desde la Perspectiva de la Administración Pública (1957–​2017), Documento No.2. Bogotá: Función Pública/​Gobierno de Colombia. López, C. (1991) “Los fondos de pensiones y de cesantías en Colombia”. Paper presented at Universidad EAFIT Seminario, 29–​30 August. Mares, I. and Carnes, M. (2009) “Social policy in developing countries”. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 93–​113. Mesa-​Lago, C. (2008) Reassembling Social Security: A Survey of Pensions and Health Care Reforms in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Muller, P. (2009) “Sector”. In L. Boussaguet, S. Jacquot and P. Ravinet Diccionario de Políticas Públicas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, pp. 402–​10). Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) Available from www.registraduria.gov. co/​IMG/​pdf/​constitucio-​politica-​colombia-​1991.pdf Pizarro, E. (2002) “La atomización partidista en Colombia: el fenómeno de las microempresas electorales”. In F. Gutiérrez (ed.) Degradación o Cambio: Evolución del Sistema Político Colombiano. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, pp. 357–​401. Rodríguez, Ó. (2001) “La difícil consolidación de un estado de Bienestar”. In G.M. Arango (ed.) Desarrollo Económico y Social en Colombia. Siglo XX. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, pp. 203–​30). Sabatier, P. (2010) Teorías del Proceso de las Políticas Públicas. Buenos Aires: Westview Press.

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Steiner, R. and Medellín, J.C. (2016) “Estructura y eficiencia del gasto público en Colombia” Revista Economía Colombiana 345: 35–​51. Urrutia, M. (2016) “Los retos fiscales para el desarrollo y la equidad”, Revista Economía Colombiana 345: 30–​4.

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Part Four Policy analysis beyond the state

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FOURTEEN

Political parties and policy analysis in Colombia Sebastián Líppez-​De Castro

Introduction The end of the 20th century was chaotic for Colombian political parties. The 1991 Constitution inaugurated a period of transition from a bipartisan towards a multiparty system, but after that milestone, several electoral and political reforms were required to organize the political landscape and to strengthen the role of political parties as critical democratic institutions. In that process, political parties’ use of policy analysis could play a role in helping these consistently discredited organizations (Caicedo Ortiz, 2015; Latinobarometro, 2017; Cifras and Conceptos, 2018) to gain some of the elusive trust from the public and to support their role in public policy decision making. In that sense, this chapter aims to answer the following question: what are the factors that either exhort or prevent 21st-​century Colombian political parties from utilizing policy analysis to transform their links with their voters and support their role in the policy-​ making process? Comprehending politicians’ and political parties’ behavior, in this case that associated with the use of evidence-​based analysis to support their activities, demands an understanding of the nature of political parties, their goals and forms of organization, the main political parties in the country, and the historical and institutional context framing their actions. In doing so, this chapter focuses on two of the fundamental activities or components of political parties: the “party in the electorate” and the “party as an organization”, which are largely conditioned by their corresponding party and electoral systems (Aldrich, 2011). Thus, the chapter observes Colombian political parties in one of their two main arenas of work, namely out of the legislature; their role in the second main arena of party action, that is, the “party in the legislature” (Aldrich, 2011), is further explored in Chapter 5 by Mónica Pachón and Manuela Muñoz, although some relevant aspects are also mentioned here. To address the aforementioned question, then, this chapter is organized in four sections. The first section presents theoretical underpinnings that locate the role of policy analysis as a congruent practice with programmatic party structuration. The second section describes the historical trajectory of the Colombian party system, its make-​up in the 21st century, and key institutional features affecting parties’ use of policy analysis. The third section identifies some of the mechanisms 241

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through which 21st-​century Colombian political parties produce or rely on policy analysis. Overall, the chapter acknowledges some efforts to promote practices of programmatic party structuration, policy analysis included, but it also warns that, as long as clientelistic linkages prevail, political parties still will not need, neither use, policy analysis as a regular source for their work.

Policy analysis for political parties: what for? From a minimalist but not simplistic approach, political parties can be defined as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-​free), candidates for public office” (Sartori, 1976, p. 63). As such, the relative interest of political parties in using evidence-​based analysis on policy issues and alternatives depends on the electoral and party systems defining the dynamics of party competition. Specifically, the use of policy analysis would arise as a relevant practice in the context of party systems with some institutionalization and programmatic party structuration as it is instrumental to maintain, similarly, programmatic linkages with voters. Each party system’s feature, namely the effective number of parties, the degree of polarization, and the level of institutionalization, influence party competition (Sartori, 1976; Giraldo, 2007; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005; Aldrich, 2011). Of special interest here is the level of party system’ s institutionalization, which suggests certain legitimacy of political parties, stability in party competition, constant voters’ identification and support to political parties, and the prominence of party leadership over personalistic figures (Kitschelt, 2000; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005; Mainwaring and Scully, 2008). As such, party system institutionalization and programmatic party structuration reinforce each other. For Kitschelt and colleagues (2010), programmatic party structuration consists of both programmatic coordination and programmatic linkages, that is, on the one hand the relative consistency with which fellow party candidates endorse collective policy alternatives and, on the other, voters’ support or punishment to political parties on the basis of their programmatic appeals and performance in past policy implementation. Kitschelt and colleagues (2010) argue that programmatic party structuration is a necessary condition of responsible partisan government and that, “at a minimum, it says that a democracy’s policy outcomes vary with the partisan composition of its government, which, in turn, is a function of voters’ choices among programmatic parties that announce different policy packages they intend to implement in the event of their being elected to government” (p. 3). As such, developing programmatic party structuration requires a level of party system institutionalization that allows parties to coordinate their ideology and policy appeals over time and, similarly, provides voters with the time and clues for distinguishing policy packages among political parties (Kitschelt et al, 2010). In that context of programmatic party structuration, it makes sense for political parties to pinpoint demands from the public and situations that need governmental 242

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action; in other words, they need to identify policy issues and propose potential solutions, that is, policy alternatives (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt et al, 2010). In doing so, political parties need to conduct or rely on research-​based activities designed to detect their constituents’ priorities and interests as well as to assess current and alternative public policies and programs. Such policy analyses, therefore, can inform candidates’ campaigning and enable elected officials to maintain their programmatic linkages with their voters as well as justify their decision making. On the contrary, proposing policy packages substantiated on evidence-​based analyses lacks relevance in situations where linkages between politicians and voters are clientelistic. In these cases, politicians compensate client-​voters with material and other direct benefits in exchange for their electoral support (Kitschel, 2000; Stokes, 2011). This can be exacerbated by electoral systems that encourage personalist over partisan leaderships as well as direct interactions between politicians and voters, although political parties at large can also engage in clientelism by relying on complex networks of brokers responsible for negotiating trades with voters on behalf of party elites. Presidential systems are also often associated with clientelism due to their emphasis on personalist and charismatic competition in presidential elections as well as the executive–​legislature relationship dynamic. Separate elections and legitimacy detach Congress members from the Presidents’ performance and survival, imposing separate needs to fulfill all sorts of campaign promises and, therefore, establishing separate accountability for Congress members and the President (Kitschel, 2000). The executive’s and legislature’s need of each other’s resources not only serves as a system of checks and balances, but also creates a situation of “mutual blackmailing” solved with the trade of public resources, replicating and stimulating clientelistic linkages. Overall, accountability in clientelistic linkages is limited to the fulfillment of the benefits promised and, therefore, does not involve considerations of policy preferences or evaluation. Therefore, politicians and parties engaged in clientelism do not need to produce, discuss and use policy analysis. Aside from clientelism, other criteria, such as logrolling, partisanship, regional origin and so on, can also explain politicians’ decision making while preventing their use of policy analysis (see, for example, Butler and Pereira, 2018).

The Colombian party system in historical perspective The 1991 Constitution enacted in the context of a peace process with several guerrilla groups marked the start of the Colombian party system’s transition from a two-​party schema towards a multiparty system. Since that milestone, several electoral and political reforms have been adopted and, almost three decades later, after a new peace agreement with the former FARC-​EP was signed in 2016, that transition continues. Some of the post-​1991 political and electoral reforms aim to encourage programmatic party structuration, but it is still premature to 243

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announce a new institutionalized party system or a fundamental transformation of political linkages and practices. The historical background For a century and a half, the Colombian political landscape had no room but for the Liberal and Conservative Parties. Their confrontation was consistently violent, and individuals’ and communities’ identification to one or other party was, in Leal Buitrago’s (2010) words, “quasi-​religious”. Between 1931 and 1982, in the vast majority of Colombian municipalities, one of the two traditional parties used to have consistent and overwhelming electoral majorities (Pinzón de Lewin, 2011). The middle of the 20th century was a period of intense political struggle succinctly called La Violencia (the violence) (1948–​60). As a result, a military regime (1953–​ 57) and then a consociational agreement between Liberals and Conservatives called “the National Front” (1958–​74) were established to minimize confrontation. The National Front alliance stipulated that Liberals and Conservatives rotate in the Presidency and share governmental power and bureaucracy. That arrangement, alongside the growth of the state apparatus and resources, facilitated the use of patronage and other forms of political clientelism as it forced local, regional and other political groups to channel their aspirations through the structures of the two traditional parties, making of clientelism not a mere electoral practice but a political system’s property (Leal Buitrago and Dávila, 1990). This two-​party hegemony and the pervasive political violence made it impossible for other groups to access state power. In this context, and the broader framework of the cold war, several leftist guerrilla groups were created in the 1960s and 1970s that were followed by the rise of drug cartels and paramilitary groups in subsequent decades. During that time, a few alternative political parties were created, such as the Popular National Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular  –​ANAPO), the liberal fraction New Liberalism, and the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica –​UP), which resulted from peace negotiations with the FARC-​EP. However, numerous leaders from all of these alternative parties were murdered and, after receiving notable electoral returns, the UP suffered a furious extermination campaign, a politicide. After a peace accord with the M19 and other guerrilla groups, and in the context of social demands to change the Constitution according to a strong sentiment of discontent with traditional political parties, a new Constitution was enacted in 1991 with the goal of opening the political system through facilitating minorities’ representation and establishing mechanisms for citizens’ direct participation. The 1991 Constitution adopted a unitary but decentralized government divided into 32 departments (intermediate level) and roughly 1,101 municipalities, districts and indigenous territories. The 1991 pact also replaced the election of senators, formerly conducted in 23 departmental districts, by creating a single national district to elect 100 senators, plus a special national district for new indigenous senators. Other special districts were also created in the House of Representatives 244

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for Afro-​Colombians, and for Colombians abroad. Then, the 1994 Basic Statute of Political Parties raised from 10,000 to 50,000 the number of votes or signatures needed to create parties and nominate candidates, but parties’ legal status could also be obtained by having a candidate elected to Congress, and political movements and significant groups of citizens (grupos significativo de ciudadanos –​GSCs) were also allowed to nominate their own candidates. For the first time the state was also responsible of providing the electoral ballot as well as partial public funding and access to public media for political parties (Giraldo and Muñoz, 2014; Losada and Liendo, 2015b). With these new spaces and rules, numerous party organizations were created, for example the Democratic Alliance-​M19 (Alianza Democrática-​M19 –​AD-​ M19) as well as a series of ethnic, religious and regional parties, although it should be noted that many of the new parties were actually endorsed by one of the traditional ones (Pizarro, 1997). A few multiparty systems appeared at the local level, but in most municipalities systems of one or two parties remained (Hoyos Gómez, 2005). At the national level, third parties were not able to maintain their presence in Congress, representation was considered disproportionate, and the party system experienced not only fragmentation but also atomization (Pizarro, 1997, 2001). More than 100 new political parties were created in a decade. Roughly 60 parties nominated candidates to the Senate in both 1998 and 2002, and parties endorsed multiple lists of candidates to the same corporations, often trading those endorsements. These lists were considered to be personal or isolated electoral micro-​enterprises that only aimed to obtain the minimum number of votes required to be elected and, therefore, candidates had little or no responsibility to the endorsing political parties (Pizarro, 2001; Losada and Liendo, 2015b). To cope with such chaos, an electoral reform was adopted in 2003 (Constitutional Amendment 01, 2003) aiming to encourage politicians and party organizations to cluster in a reduced number of political parties and, therefore, to produce a moderate multiparty system. Such a reform adopted the D’Hondt formula to allocate seats in Congress, department assemblies, municipal councils and local administration boards. The 2003 electoral reform also established legal voting thresholds for political parties to maintain their legal personality and access the allocation of seats, and limited political parties to nominating only one list of candidates per election as well as limiting the number of candidates in each list to the number of seats to be allocated. It also allowed political parties to choose between open and closed lists, and banned citizens from becoming members of more than one legally recognized party organization. In 2009, another constitutional amendment (01, 2009) raised the legal voting threshold for political parties to obtain or maintain their legal personality from 2% to 3% of the valid votes casted across the country in Senate or House of Representatives elections. Interestingly, the case of municipalities in the Department of Valle del Cauca (Milanese and Jaramillo, 2015) shows the differentiated effect of that electoral reform: while at the national level it kept a moderate number of parties, subnational settings transitioned towards fragmented party systems. 245

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These electoral reforms were supplemented with others intended to affect the party as an organization and the party in the legislature, specifically by reacting to the election of Congress members and subnational authorities associated with paramilitary groups, preventing personalist behavior in Congress and strengthening political accountability. The 2005  “bancadas” law” (Law 974, 2005), for example, encouraged discipline and coordination among fellow party members elected to the same body who were hereafter considered as part of one single bancada or caucus. The aforementioned 2009 constitutional reform required members of popular election bodies to make their individual votes public, established consequences for political parties endorsing candidates found responsible for crimes related to illegal armed groups, drug trafficking and crimes against humanity, and, most notably, banned political parties from replacing their elected officials formally prosecuted for these crimes, resulting in a seat permanently lost for the party known as the “empty seat”. The 2011 political reform (Law 1475, 2011) regulated political parties’ internal organization, defined criteria for allocating and using public funding for partisan organizations, and urged them to adopt democratic practices as well as mechanisms for minorities’ inclusion. Later, the Balance of Powers Act (Constitutional amendment 02, 2015) increased the opportunities for opposition groups by granting seats in Congress, department assemblies and municipal/​district councils for those candidates who finished in runner-​up positions in executive elections. New political parties for the new century The active period of electoral and political reforms initiated in 2003, and other political factors of the time, led to a process of accommodation in which the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties have experienced a dramatic decreased in their vote shares, forcing them to share the political scene alongside a reduced group of partisan organizations (Losada and Liendo, 2015b). A liberal faction that became the Cambio Radical Party gained prominence in 2006 by increasing the number of its Congress members approximately threefold. The 2006 Congress election was the first, but a successful one, for De la U Party, a coalition of regional leaders created around President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s re-​election campaign –​the first presidential re-​election. When Uribe and his co-​partisan successor Juan Manual Santos clashed over the peace process with the FARC-​EP advanced by Santos, Uribe created Centro Democrático to challenge Santos’ reelection in 2014. Centro Democrático failed in that instance, but obtained significant presence in Congress and later the Presidency in 2018. On the other side of the political spectrum, several left-​wing organizations grouped in 2005 around Polo Democrático Alternativo, which managed to have a limited but active presence in Congress, nominated presidential candidates with historical electoral returns, and gained Bogotá’s mayoral office twice. In 2009, some of its leaders, alongside others considered as independent, center-​oriented 246

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or even anti-​party leaders, transitioned towards Alianza Verde, which ever since has increased its presence in Congress and nominated competitive candidates to the Presidency. On the contrary, regionally based groups such as the Partido de Integración Nacional, later Opción Ciudadana, has notoriously reduced its presence in Congress amid complaints over links with paramilitary groups. Other, smaller, partisan organizations have managed to survive throughout this period of reforms, most notably the indigenous Social and Indigenous Alternative Movement (Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social –​MAIS) and the Colombian Indigenous Authorities (Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia –​ AICO), as well as the religious Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation (Movimiento Independiente de Renovación Absoluta –​ MIRA). Finally, after 11 years, the UP regained legal recognition in 2013 through a court decision that acknowledged the crimes against humanity suffered by this group. In 2017, as a result of the peace accord with the FACR-​EP guerrilla group (AL 3/​2017), its political party, later called Common Revolutionary Alternative Force (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común –​FARC), also received legal status and was granted dispensation to keep that legal recognition, receive public funding, and ensure its presence in Congress with at least five senators and five representatives –​less than 4% of Congress –​for a transition period ending in 2026. Table 14.1 summarizes the presence of Colombian political parties in Congress in the period 2006–​22. Table 14.1 shows the electoral and political reforms success of the 2000s in maintaining a moderate number of parties, although some old issues persist. Losada and Liendo (2015a) found that, from 1998 to 2014, electoral volatility in Senate elections remained very high under comparative standards (43% between the 1998 and the 2002 elections, 66% between 2002 and 2006 ones, and over 30% between both 2006 and 2010, and 2010 and 2014) (p. 153), which suggests that voters’ identification with political parties is still weak. Several factors play a role in this situation, including the very adoption of successive reforms, the lack of compulsory voting, low electoral participation, frequent irruption of new partisan organizations, the personal character of many political endeavors, and difficulties in distinguishing programmatic and coherent policy proposals among political parties. With a system that punishes small, partisan organizations, paradoxically new political parties and movements are constantly created, especially those defined as GSCs. Giraldo and Muñoz (2014, p. 376) note that 119 GSCs nominated candidates through the mechanism of collecting signatures in the 2014 legislative and presidential elections. This shows that politicians keep running outside of the main political parties, indicating that individuals’ aspirations, as opposed to partisan platforms, continue to be a relevant feature of the system. This, alongside the extensive use of open lists and the national presence of charismatic leaders with little attachment to parties, suggests that personalistic linkages continue to triumph over programmatic ones. As Losada and Liendo (2015a) highlight, in the context of successive transformations in the electoral and party systems, “the 247

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Table 14.1: Colombian political parties’ seats in Congress 2006–​22 Presidential term/​

Uribe II

Santos I

Santos II

Duque

Colombian political party

2006–​10

2010–​14

2014–​18

2018–​22

CR

CR

Sen

Sen

Centro Democrático

CR

Sen

CR

Sen

19

20

32

19

Cambio Radical

20

15

16

8

16

9

28

16

Conservador (or conservative)

30

18

36

22

27

18

22

13

Liberal

36

17

36

17

39

17

35

14

De la U

29

20

48

28

36+1

21

26

14

3

5

6

5

9

10

4+1i

8

3

5

2

5

2

4

1+1i

1i

1

1

1

3

4p

5p

Alianza Verde

1

Polo Democrático Alternativo

9

11

Coalición Lista de la Decencia Alianza Social Indígena, later Independiente

1

1

1

1i

UP MAIS

1i

Colombia Humana MIRA

1

2

1

3

2+1t

FARC Partido de Integración Nacional, later Opción Ciudadana AICO Others (one seat per election)

8

75

7

10

11

9

6

0

1i

1+1i

8+1a

5–​2a

5

1–​2 1i 2+2a

Source: Author’s compilation with information from Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (https://​www. registraduria.gov.co/​-​Congreso,3637-​.html, from Pachón and Hoskin (2011) for the period 2006–​10, and from www.camara.gov.co and www.senado.gov.co for 2014–​18. Notes: CR = Chamber of Representatives; Sen = Senate; i = indigenous communities district; a = Afro-​ Colombian district; p = peace accord seat; t = Colombians abroad.

rest of the system’s cultural characteristics have not changed significantly: high levels of clientelism, personalism, and absenteeism” (p. 147). Entering the 2020s, it appears that the Colombian party system is still under transition. It is not clear whether parties formed in the wake of the peace accord with FARC-​EP will survive, whether new fractions from other parties will become new parties, or whether government and opposition groups will consolidate themselves around the same brands. Additional reforms to the electoral system are considered as pending (Giraldo, 2012), and they could lead to new accommodations among political actors. 248

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Policy analysis by and for 21st-​century Colombian political parties Electoral and political reforms in the 21st century have certainly advanced some mechanisms to strengthen partisan organizations and have encouraged their programmatic structuration, including their production and use of policy analysis. Outide of the legislature, political party think tanks and other institutional incentives such as the ‘programmatic vote’ stand out as mechanisms to promote the use of policy analysis for campaigning and governing. Within the legislature, Congress Members’ Legislative Work Units (Unidades de Trabajo Legislativo de los Congresistas –​UTLs) play a principal role in producing policy analysis. There have only been a few think tanks related to Colombian political parties in existence since the second half the 20th century, but as Londoño (2009) explains, they have mainly been associated with personal rather than collective initiatives. As a result, these think tanks have had an intermittent presence and little or no funding or influence on programmatic structuration, legislative agendas or governmental action (Londoño, 2009). A survey by Londoño (2009) found that research centers affiliated with Congress members had only medium-​to-​low levels of influence on their legislative work, and that think tanks outside of political parties were more widely acknowledged as sources of information. It was with the 2011 Political Reform and the 2018 Opposition Statute that the creation of political parties’ think tanks gained some momentum. The 2011 Political Reform (Law 1475, 2011) mandated political parties to allocate at least 15% of state funding to their think tanks, as well as to assist parties’ bancadas, and disseminate their programs and policy proposals. As Table 14.2 shows, the existence of party think tanks was, therefore, ensured, at least in parties’ bylaws. The effective allocation of resources to, and operation of, these think tanks, however, has not been consistent across parties. In accordance with the law, state funding also should be used to fund parties’ regional, local and sectoral structures, to advance training and education activities, as well as to adopt democratic practices. The 15% of state funding oriented towards think tanks also covers activities such as training and the inclusion of women, young people and ethnic minorities, providing ample opportunities for parties to distribute resources besides funding their think tanks. Additionally, the amount of public funding received by political parties mainly depends on their presence in Congress and other elected bodies (Law 1475, 2011, art. 17), which ultimately means that bigger parties receive more public funding. Effectively, in non-​electoral years, bigger parties receive two to six times more state funding than that received by smaller parties, while in electoral years bigger parties may receive as much as ten times more state funding than smaller parties (e.g. National Electoral Council’s Resolution 1110, 2016). Political parties’ budgets are consistent with these proportions and their allocation of resources to their think tanks also varies according to the public funds received. In any case, parties’ think tanks budget are frankly modest; while a think tank in a bigger party may have funding for three employees, in the 249

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Table 14.2: Colombian political parties’ think tanks as of 2019 Political party

Think tanks

Centro Democrático

Escuela de Estudio, Análisis y Capacitación

Cambio Radical

Fundación Carlos Lleras Restrepo

Conservador (or conservative)

Academia del Pensamiento Conservador Humanista

Liberal

Instituto de Pensamiento Liberal

De la U

Instituto de Pensamiento Social

Alianza Verde

Escuela de Innovación y Centro de Pensamiento

Polo Democrático Alternativo

Secretaria de Formación e Investigación, e Instituto Carlos Gaviria Díaz

UP

Centro de Pensamiento de la UP

MAIS

Escuela Nacional de Formación MAIS

MIRA

Axioma, Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Independiente

FARC

Centro de Pensamiento y Formación Política

Opción Ciudadana AICO

Centro de Pensamiento No information

Source: Author’s compilation with information from political parties’ bylaws and websites.

case of smaller parties the budget is insufficient for even a single professional member of staff. Not surprisingly, as of 2018, some small opposition parties had no affiliated think tank or research center personnel. These and other issues around funding, accessing public information and exercising opposition were recognized in the 2018 Opposition Statute (Law 1909, 2018), which allocates an additional 5% from the National Fund for Political Funding to be distributed among opposition parties. These circumstances explain why, in practice, the role of party think tanks as providers of policy analysis largely varies. Cuervo (forthcoming) identifies three types of organization fulfilling the role as party think tanks. The first type corresponds to in-​house centers, that is units within the parties’ structures, such as De la U’s Instituto de Pensamiento Social after 2011, when it was established as part of of the party’s organizational structure. The second type corresponds to those organizations with more informal links to parties or factions of them, for example Cambio Radical’s Fundación Carlos Lleras Restrepo before it was formally recognized as the party’s research center. The third type are external organizations providing policy analysis and training for political parties, as in the case of the Conservative Party, which has established alliances with organizations such as the Foundation Konrad Adenauer, the International Republican Institute, and some universities. Despite their efforts, the work of party thinks tanks continues to be very limited, with scarce ouput and little or no influence on legislative and government work. Some good practices exist, such as MIRA’s 250

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Axioma efforts to produce policy briefs, the Instituto de Pensamiento Liberal’s publications on issues around victims of armed conflict and land grabbing, or the De La U’s Instituto de Pensamiento Social’s efforts to provide inputs for policy deliberation to its Congress members. Unfortunately, these are neither systematic nor abundant practices. Also worth noting is the role that think tanks may play in campaigning periods, especially in the context of the programmatic vote established by the 1991 Constitution, according to which candidates running for the post of department governor and municipal/​district mayor are required to submit government programs with their proposals that will inform territorial development plans for their four-​year terms if they are elected. This programmatic vote enables citizens and opposition parties to advance actions oriented to control and revoke the election of mayors or governors if they fail to implement their programs, for which policy analysis becomes an instrumental practice. In the yet scare attempts to revoke the election of subnational authorities, issues around the extractive industry, water protection and mass transportation, for example, have been vividly debated. In that sense, the programmatic vote has certainly facilitated discussion on local and regional issues and the development of policy alternatives, but the common drafting of government programs with ambiguous and general claims instead of specific policy packages, the limited scope of policies that can be implemented at the subnational level, subnational elections won by GSCs, and the politics of coalitions at subnational elections where rival parties in the national scene coincide around local candidates, do not help voters to distinguish among programmatic platforms but reinforce the personalist character of Colombian elections. Chapter 8 in this volume further discusses aspects of policy analysis in subnational governments. At the national level, policy proposals developed during presidential campaigns, when parties gather supporters with renowned expertise on varied policy areas, actually inform future parties’ policy agendas. These proposals do not result from systematic work at the parties’ think tanks, but respond to campaigning needs. For example, in the 2018 presidential race Cambio Radical gathered numerous policy proposals coordinated by Fundación Carlos Lleras Restrepo, but actually developed by experts in various policy areas who contributed their work with the goal of being appointed to governmental positions afterwards. Some of these policy proposals later informed Cambio Radical’s legislative agenda, although this is not the norm across political parties. In general, Colombian parties as organizations outside of the legislature are actually weak structures, with scarce resources for research-​based activities, and re primarily concerned with survival and campaigning issues. As Londoño (2009) found, Congress members mostly rely on their UTL staff to access information and develop policy analysis. Not surprisingly, as documented in Chapter 5, a higher amount of bills are proposed by Congress members, as opposed to the executive, which indicates the active work of former’s offices. However, in a presidential system like the Colombian one, bills authored by the executive concentrate most 251

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of the legislative attention. Additionally, UTL personnel are not always hired with the sole goal of producing policy analysis. As a former director of one of the main political parties confirmed (in a personal communication), UTL personnel also support Congress members’ “political work”. With some exceptions, then, their appointment and work are oriented towards maintaining and ensuring Congress members’ political networks and reelection, rather than fulfilling policy or research expertise. According to the aforementioned political party former director, in the case of government coalition parties, this situation is facilitated by the tight relationship with the executive as ministries and other government agencies are the actual authors of many bills endorsed and submitted by Congress members. In that context, much of the burden of producing alternative evidence-​based analysis relies on opposition parties.

Conclusion The 21st-​century Colombian multiparty system, which has left behind 150 years of bipartisan hegemony, has not eliminated pervasive political clientelism, personalism and low electoral participation. Although several electoral and political reforms have aimed to encourage party discipline, programmatic coordination and parties’ accountability, and even have oriented state funding for parties’ think tanks towards advancing policy analysis and programmatic platforms, these remain novel and timid attempts. Although successive electoral and political reforms have succeeded in maintaining a moderate multiparty system, Colombian parties still have little institutional capacity to permit the use of evidence-​based research as a critical resource. Although only a few political parties are able to elect their candidates, the larger Colombian political landscape includes an extensive number of partisan organizations nominating candidates in every round of elections, such as the aforementioned GSCs. Most of such endeavors actually correspond to individuals’ or small groups’ attempts that not only lack an organizational structure but also focus on campaigning issues. Although all candidates present proposals to their constituencies, relying on evidence-​based policy analysis and developing a consistent and congruent platform also demands an organizational structure able to persist across different electoral events, which is something these isolated endeavors lack. Among political parties able to elect their candidates, institutional capacity does not seem more promising. In keeping with the law, these partisan organizations must coordinate some of their actions in the legislature and act as bancadas; they also receive state funding, and they are even compelled to create their own think tanks. However, out of the legislature most of them are actually weak partisan organizations with scare resources and are primarily concerned with funding campaigning expenses to ensure the election of their limited number of representatives. Under those circumstances, producing policy analysis does meet the small parties’ priorities. Within the legislature, the burden of producing 252

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alternative policy analysis relies on small opposition parties, but still those structures are mainly devoted to electoral goals than to policy analysis. Bigger parties, on the contrary, could take advantage of greater state funding to strengthen their organizational structures, including their own think tanks. However, clientelism is still a pervasive practice, pushing programmatic efforts away. Overall, 21st-​century Colombian political parties are encouraged to produce and use policy analysis, specifically through certain institutional mechanisms such as the so-​called programmatic vote and the legal requirement to create their own think tanks. However, they are still weak organizations lacking the necessary institutional capacities to further advance extensive policy analysis to support their activities. More efforts are therefore required to continue strengthening political parties as organizations out of the legislature, although naturally electoral goals will be always their biggest concern. Under these circumstances, especially in the context of pervasive clientelistic practices, policy analysis will continue as the lowest priority for political parties’ in Colombia, considered neither a relevant or common practice nor a need. References Aldrich, J.H. (2011) “Political parties in and out of legislatures”. In R.E. Goodin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 196–​216. Butler, D.M. and Pereira, M.M. (2018) “TRENDS:  How does partisanship influence policy diffusion?”. Political Research Quarterly 71(4): 801–​12. Caicedo Ortiz, J.A. (2015) “Abstención electoral y voto en blanco en la consolidación democrática colombiana”. In F.  Barrero and M.  Batlle (eds.) Elecciones en Colombia, 2014. ¿Representaciones Fragmentadas?. Bogotá: Fundación Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp 45–​85. Cifras and Conceptos (2018) “Panel de opinión, resultados anuales” [Online]. Available from http://​cifrasyconceptos.com/​productos-​panel-​de-​opinion Constitutional Amendment 01 of 2003 (June 3), por el cual se adopta una Reforma Política Constitucional y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial No. 45.237. Constitutional Ammendment 01 of 2009 (July 14), por el cual se modifican y adicionan unos artículos de la Constitución Política de Colombia. Diario Oficial No. 47.410. Constitutional Ammendment 02 of 2015 (July 1), por medio del cual se adopta una reforma de equilibrio de poderes y reajuste institucional y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial No. 49.560. Cuervo, J.I. (forthcoming) Partidos Políticos y Políticas Públicas:  Los Centros de Pensamiento en los Partidos Políticos Colombianos. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad Externado de Colombia. Giraldo, F. (2007) “Partidos y sistema de partidos en Colombia”. In R. Roncagliolo and C. Meléndez (eds.) La Política por Dentro: Cambios y Continuidades en las Organizaciones Partidistas de los Países Andinos. Lima: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/​Asociación Civil Transparencia, pp. 123–​59. 253

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Giraldo, F. (2012) “Reformas electorales y ajustes institucionales pendientes en Colombia”. Papel Político 17(2): 497–​521. Giraldo, F. and Muñoz, P. (2014) Partidos Políticos en Colombia:  Evolución y Prospectiva. Bogotá: Fundación Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Hoyos Gómez, D. (2005) “Evolución del sistema de partidos en Colombia 1972–​ 2000. Una mirada local y regional”. Análisis Político 55: 45–​59. Kitschelt, H. (2000) “Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities”. Comparative Political Studies 33(6/​7): 845–​79. Kitschelt, H., Hawkins, K., Luna, J., Rosas, G. and Zechmeister, E. (2010) Latin American Party Systems, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Latinobarometro (2017) “Confianza en partidos políticos y confianza en congreso:  series de tiempo” [Online]. Available from www.latinobarometro. org/​latOnline.jsp Law 974 of 2005 (July 22), por la cual se reglamenta la actuación en bancadas de los miembros de las corporaciones públicas y se adecua el Reglamento del Congreso al Régimen de Bancadas. Diario Oficial No. 45.980. Law 1475 of 2011 (July 14), por la cual se adoptan reglas de organización y funcionamiento de los partidos y movimientos políticos, de los procesos electorales y se dictan otras disposiciones. Diario Oficial No. 45.980. Law 1909 of 2018 (July 9), por medio de la cual se adoptan el Estatuto de la Oposición Política y algunos derechos a las organizaciones políticas independientes. Diario Oficial No. 50.649. Leal Buitrago, F. and Dávila, A. (1990) Clientelismo: El sistema Político y su Expresión Regional. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores/​Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Leal Buitrago, F. (2010,) “Bipartidismo y configuración del clientelismo en Colombia (segunda parte)”. Razón Pública, 29 November [Online]. Available at www.razonpublica.com/​index.php/​politica-​y-​gobierno-​temas-​27/​1595-​ bipartidismo-​y-​configuracion-​del-​clientelismo-​en-​colombia-​segunda-​parte. html Londoño, J.F. (2009) “Partidos políticos y think tanks en Colombia”. In E.  Mendizabal and K.  Sample (eds.) Dime a Quién Escuchas… Think Tanks y Partidos Políticos en América Latina. Lima/​London:  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/​Overseas Development Institute, pp. 127–​56. Losada, R. and Liendo, N. (2015a) “Un sistema de partidos que se transforma”. In F. Barrero and M. Batlle (eds.) Elecciones en Colombia, 2014: ¿Representaciones fragmentadas?. Bogotá: Fundación Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 143–​67. Losada, R. and Liendo, N. (2015b) “El peso de los nuevos partidos en el sistema de partidos colombiano, 1986–​2010”. Papel Político 20(1): 91–​118. Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (2008) “Latin America:  eight lessons for governance”. Journal of Democracy 19(3): 113–​27.

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Mainwaring, S. and Torcal, M. (2005) “Party system institutionalization and party system theory after the third wave of democratization”. América Latina Hoy 41: 141–​73. Milanese, J.P. and Jaramillo, L.E. (2015) “The impact of institutional factors of the electoral system on party fragmentation: an analysis of local council elections in Valle del Cauca (1997–​2011)”. Colombia Internacional 84: 43–​70. National Electoral Council’s Resolution 1110 of 2016 (June 21), por la cual se fija la cuantía y se asignan entre los partidos y movimientos políticos con personería jurídica vigente, lso recursos estatales destinados a la financiación del funcionamiento de los mismos para la vigencia de 2016, período comprendido entre el 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre de 2016, se determina el porcentaje correspondiente a la deducción del costo con destino al sistema de auditoría externa y se ordenan deducciones por concepto de sanciones a los partidos políticos y movimientos con personería jurídica vigente, con cargo a la financiación del funcionamiento de acuerdo con lso actos administrativos del Consejo Nacional Electoral. Pachón, M. and Hoskin, G. (2011) “Colombia 2010: an analysis of the legislative and presidential elections”. Colombia Internacional 74: 9–​26. Pinzón de Lewin, P. (2011) “Características generales del comportamiento local y regionalización electoral”. In F. Botero (ed.) Partidos y Elecciones en Colombia. Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, pp. 227–​54. Pizarro, E. (1997) “¿Hacia un sistema multipartidista? Las terceras fuerzas en Colombia hoy”. Análisis Político 31: 82–​104. Pizarro, E. (2001) “La atomización partidista en Colombia: el fenómeno de las microempresas electorales”. In F. Gutiérrez (ed.) Degradación o Cambio: Evolución del Sistema Político Colombiano. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia/​ Norma, pp. 359–​401. Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems:  A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stokes, S. (2011) “Political clientelism”. In R.E. Goodin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 648–​673.

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FIFTEEN

Policy analysis and NGOs in Colombia Susan Appe and Fabian Telch

Introduction Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) exert substantial influence on social, political and economic spheres globally. These organizations represent diverse efforts of collective action, political intervention, social service delivery, and watchdog activity over government and business sectors. Since the 1990s, the rise of these organizations and their influence has been referred to as a “global associational revolution” (Salamon, 1994). NGOs are part of the third sector (that is, outside of government and market sectors) and considered self-​governing entities that do not distribute the excess of their revenues over expenditures among stakeholders. They are assumed to have a purpose for the public benefit that is agreed by associates of the organization (Vakil, 1997; Boris, 2006). This chapter focuses on NGOs in policy analysis in Colombia and is organized as follows. First, it reviews definitions and terms related to the third sector in the context of Colombia. This followed by an outline of Colombia’s third sector government relations over the past several decades. In the context of Colombia, NGOs provide many public services and advance many other important public goods through policy analysis and advocacy. In particular, the role of NGOs in policy analysis is important given the country’s transition into a post-​agreement period.1 Therefore, the chapter examines the role of NGOs in policy analysis in institutional spaces and through the lens of the sector’s umbrella organization, the Colombian Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations (Confederación Colombiana de Organizaciones No-​Gubernamentales –​CCONG) in the post-​ agreement and the peace process, and in the implementation and monitoring of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Colombia.

Defining the third sector in Colombia The third sector in Colombia is diverse as it includes unions, community-​based organizations, universities, religious groups and philanthropic foundations, among others. We focus on NGOs that are engaged in the provision of public goods and services, including direct service delivery, human rights promotion, and monitoring of government and corporate sectors. They operate in a complex context in Colombia due to the country’s history of violence and internal displacement, managing tense relationships with both national and local governments, and confronting recent challenges such as the Venezuelan 257

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migration crisis. The NGOs that we are most interested in are known legally as foundations and corporations/​associations in Colombia. Foundations are not-​ for-​profit, voluntarily created organizations that dedicate their assets to a public benefit and reinvest into the foundation any profits. They are distinguished from corporations and associations because their existence is based on organizational assets, which fund activities for the public benefit (CCONG, 2004). Corporations and associations are not-​for-​profit organizations and comprise groups of people with the objective of fulfilling the associates’ wellbeing. In contrast to foundations, they are not focused on the organizations’ assets but rather on their members (CCONG, 2004). Terms describing associational activity are not always the same as the legal terms. And terms are neither always clear nor standardized. In Colombia, given the heavy presence of human rights NGOs, the term NGO is often considered distinct from other organizations. Flórez (1997) explains that in Colombia: “the concept of ‘NGOs’ is a sensitive area. While some feel that the simple fact that an organization is not-​for-​profit qualifies it as a ‘NGO’, others feel that the type of work they develop and the identity of their originators should also be a factor” (p. 398).2 Colombia’s Civil Code is the framework from which all subsequent laws and decrees for the NGO sector have been drafted and implemented. It allows a foundation or corporation to operate with legal status. Besides this recognition in the Civil Code, there is no centralized institutional framework that covers all NGOs in Colombia (Villar, 1998). Oversight of NGOs is assumed by the Presidency, the Ministry of Interior and governors’ offices across the 32 departments and the capital district of Bogotá.

The evolution of the third sector in Colombia The political history of Colombia has no doubt influenced the development of organized civil society and third sector organizations. Until the late 1990s, the scope of the third sector in Colombia was very much unknown (Flórez, 1997). Studies of the sector had been based on small samples using telephone directories and conducted on a small scale by the Colombian Planning Department (DNP) (Flórez, 1997). In the late 1990s, the first comprehensive study was pursued through a partnership between the John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies in the US and CCONG. In many ways, this study contributed to the construction of the third sector in Colombia. Flórez (1997) identifies three phases in the evolution of the third sector in Colombia. First, was the foundation phase, created and supported by the Catholic Church. The second phase involved the development of associations by the state, and a third phase saw a continued and growing number of organizations dedicated to economic development and housing needs (Flórez, 1997). The work of Villar and colleagues (1999) also observes this trajectory. Indeed, the sector has been heavily influenced by the strong historical presence of the Catholic Church 258

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in Colombia. During the Spanish empire (1550–​1810), the Church, through government sponsorship and private donations, was the primary deliverer of services such as “education, hospitals, orphanages and hospices” (Villar, 1998) and Christian voluntary associations were also active during this period (Villar, 1998). To counter this, Colombia experienced a phase when associations were themselves developed by the state (Flórez, 1997). In the 1950s, the state began an important initiative called Community Action Committees (Juntas de Acción Communal –​JACs). Flórez (1997) observes that the JAC initiative actually became quite successful and inadvertently stronger than the state. JACs still exist today and there are about 45,0003 throughout Colombia. The Colombian Congress and the 1991 National Constituent Assembly implemented several institutional frameworks in the 1980s and early 1990s, in particular the 1991 Constitution, to further launch the third sector into the public space and dialogue (Villar, 1998; Appe, 2010). Before the Constitution of 1991, a first institutional provision was the passing of the 1986 Decentralization Reform (Villar, 1998). At the local level the 1986 Decentralization Law and subsequent complementary laws allowed the popular election of mayors and a strong framework for civil society participation through the creation of participatory bodies such as local planning councils, education boards, and health and public services committes, which were mediated by local administrations (Echeverry, 2002). The 1991 Constitution “lays out the institutional and legal conditions for the greater visibility and independence of nonprofit entities” (Villar et al, 1999, p.  425). In addition, several opportunities for civil society participation were launched via the Constitution. For example, article 103 “obliges the government to promote the organization and training of civil society organizations and emphasizes that this should be done without detriment to the organizations’ autonomy” (cited in Villar, 1998, p. 9) and article 355 establishes the possibility of “providing public resources to civil society organizations, under a scheme of contracts and with purpose of promoting public interest activities in accordance with development plans” (cited in Villar, 1998, p. 9).

Third sector in the 2000s to present Colombia’s contemporary third sector was indeed influenced by Colombia’s conservative right-​of-​center administration under Alvaro Uribe, who served as President from 2002 to 2010. During these years, the strengthening of the Colombian Army with the help of the US government (Plan Colombia) achieved the demobilization of 31,000 combatants of paramilitary groups as well as the military weakening of Colombia’s armed guerrilla movement. Uribe’s government did not concretize any peace negotiation and denied guerrilla movements’ political status. However, some indicators show that during the first several years of his Presidency, he was successful in reaching some level of peace: homicides decreased by 25%, kidnappings by 45%, and incidents of terrorism by 37%, according to administration officials (Moreno, 2004). Uribe became very popular among 259

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Colombians, particularly middle and high-​income Colombians, and this allowed him another term in Colombia (a move that required the Constitution to be amended). During his second term his popularity rose to over 80% (Semana, 2008). However, relations with organized civil society, particularly with human rights NGOs, were tense during Uribe’s Presidency and as President, he publicly discredited the third sector. On various occasions, human rights NGOs were critical of Uribe’s administration and its policies, particularly drawing attention to the administration’s doctrine of “democratic security” (Ruiz Restrepo, 2005, p. 2). In 2004, 80 human rights NGOs published the book The Authoritarian Spell: First Year Government of Alvaro Uribe Velez, which was highly critical of Uribe’s administration (Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 2004). Directly after the book’s release, President Uribe responded by publicly suggesting that some organizations had links with terrorist groups in Colombia and were actively aiding terrorists. Uribe’s remarks were covered in the Colombian media and incited concern among many in the third sector (Ruiz Restrepo, 2005). According to some accounts, Uribe accused organizations of providing direct services to terrorists (Pastoral Social, 2003). In addition to human rights NGOs, other types of NGOs had challenges during the Uribe Presidency. On 2 July 2008, the Colombian Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, announced the release of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and 14 other hostages as a result of a military operation carried out in the Colombian jungle (Padgett, 2008). The rescue involved government infiltration of the guerilla group FARC-​EP. Government officials deceived the FARC-​EP jailers by giving them a false order to take the handcuffed hostages to another camp. During the transfer, the soldiers disarmed the guerrillas and rescued those who were being held captive. A controversy emerged when images of the rescue were released showing one of the Colombian officers wearing the logo of the NGO International Committee of the Red Cross. This was problematic, as under the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols the unauthorized use of the Red Cross logo is prohibited. Any misuse or abuse of the emblem compromises the organization’s impartiality and neutrality and could endanger NGO humanitarian workers around the world (Reuters, 2008). Given the international attention the incident attracted –​some calling it a war crime  –​President Uribe was compelled to publicly apologize but remained steadfast in his insistence that the use of the logo had not been authorized by government (Tran, 2008). After Uribe’s administration, in 2010 Juan Manuel Santos was elected as President, representing the same party of former president Uribe. Santos sought the consolidation of peace in the country through the provision of more security and the effective implementation of services around human rights protections. As a result, the contentious environment surrounding NGOs and the national government in Colombia appeared to calm once Santos was in office. Reflecting this change, in July 2011 the Colombian National Meeting of Nongovernmental Organizations took place in the city of Medellín and centered around a national 260

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conversation about “constructive and effective public policy” for NGOs in Colombia, citing the government of Santos as a new chapter for third sector government relations (NGO leader, personal communication, 10 July 2011). The fight against illegal armed groups and the establishment of peace negotiations to stop the violence in Colombia have been at the center of the presidential agendas of the past three decades (Melo, 2017). Even though the fight of illegal armed groups has been linked to demands for better living conditions for marginal and poorer groups, the violence in Colombia has been connected to illegal and legal economic activities to exploit the country’s abundant natural resources. Perceptions of failure in terms of peace negotiations were associated with a long list of Colombian Presidents, including Belisario Betancur (1982–​86), Virgilio Barco (1986–​90), Cesar Gaviria (1990–​94), Ernesto Samper (1994–​98) and Andres Pastrana (1998–​2002), whose so-​called failures arguably pushed forward Alvaro Uribe as President (2002–​06 and 2006–​10), who would take an aggressive stance against rebel groups. The election of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–​14 and 2014–​18) perpetuated the fight against FARC-​EP and other rebel groups, although Santos also soon sought a peaceful solution to the conflict. After five years of peace negotiations, in November 2016 the Santos government signed a peace agreement with FARC-​EP. The following sections expand first on spaces and initiatives –​some created by government and others created by organized civil society itself –​where NGOs are able to and have engaged in policy analysis. Second, we look to CCONG’s role in policy analysis during the post-​agreement period in Colombia, and in the context of the implementation and monitoring of the US SDGs.

NGOs in policy analysis: institutional spaces in Colombia One of the most important spaces for the participation of civil society in public policy in Colombia are the national and territorial planning councils (CNP, 2018). The Colombian Constitution (article 340)  establishes the consultative role that national and territorial planning councils have in development plans. These councils are instituted with the participation of economic, social, communitarian, indigenous, minority and women’s groups, and are supported at the administrative level by the national and local governments. In addition, Law 152 of 1994 establishes the processes to design, approve, implement and evaluate national and territorial development plans. These planning councils constitute an important tool for the involvement of third sector organizations in the policy analysis process but arguably these spaces still not represent a bottom-​up approach to developmental planning policies in the country. During Santos’ Presidency (2010–​18), several institutional spaces were created –​ by government and organized civil society –​that brought the third sector and many other actors together in order to inform peace negotiations and engage in dialogue. These outlets provided venues for policy analysis by organized civil society. For example, the Colombian government established the National 261

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Guarantee Committee for Human Rights, a committee that aims to build trust among different public and third sector actors for the protection of human rights. The committee is an interorganizational effort of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, General Attorney’s Office, the Presidency of Colombia, the UN, the Catholic Church and representatives of NGOs and other organized civil society (El País, 2011). At the local level, Guarantee Committees for Human Rights were established to protect social and communitarian leaders threatened because of their work in the defense of human rights and the peace process with the FARC-​EP in local communities (IPC, 2017). These committees have been interrupted in the past due to political tensions between departmental governments and the lack of articulation among national and local actors. Even though there has been a political will of national and local governments to respond to human rights NGOs and leaders’ requests, a concrete collaboration among governments and civil society leaders has been hindered by strained relations between local public officials and social leaders. In addition, after ten years of dormancy, President Juan Manuel Santos reactivated the National Peace Council in October 2014, an advisory body on peace keeping for the Colombian government that encourages harmonious coordination among organized civil society and public organizations to ensure an enduring peace in the country. The council includes representatives from the executive and legislative branches and groups such as unions, indigenous and Afro-​Colombian organizations, human rights NGOs and universities. Its work is distributed among three entities: the National Peace Council gathers representatives of government and organized civil society to foster and sign peace agreements; the SDG Technical Secretary coordinates and supports peace agreement processes; and Regional Peace Councils, created by departmental and local assemblies, promote peace initiatives at the local level (Caracol Radio, 2014). In November 2017, the national government focused the work of the National Peace Council on the pedagogy of the peace agreement in order to foster a culture of peace in the country (Presidencia de la República, 2017) Civil society organizations were Organized civil society was also involved in the National Peace Pact itself (Pacto Nacional por la Paz, 2014). The pact sought to establish agreement among Colombian third sector actors on key subjects related to the internal armed conflict and to overcome the fundamental reasons behind the violence in the country. The pact looked to influence the peace negotiation process and help solve differences related to the peace negotiations. It involved social movements, community-​based organizations, the entrepreneurial sector, political parties, academia, religious organizations, journalists, indigenous and Afro-​Colombian communities, students, NGOs, women’s groups, and citizens in general. In particular, during the peace negotiations, the pact argued that the transition to peace would require the expertise and experience of organized civil society, in particular NGOs, which might bring about more complementary relations between the government and the third sector in Colombia (Appe and Layton, 2015). Out of this process, in April 2017, the National Pact for Life and 262

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Peace was initiated (Colectivo, 2017). This new pact seeks to build a regional-​ national-​international agenda across society, political parties and the national government for peace in Colombia.

NGOs in policy analysis: CCONG During the lead-​up to the peace agreement, and since the agreement was signed, organized civil society was, and continues to be, active. This exemplifies the sector’s role as an active player in policy analysis. One of the major third sector actors in policy analysis in Colombia is CCONG. CCONG was created to associate, strengthen and represent organized civil society. It promotes the visibility and consolidation of the third sector, fosters democracy and the construction of public goods, and seeks to overcome exclusion. It has eight departmental federations, six national associations and networks and nine national NGOs that work in different sectors of social development and represent about 850 NGOs in the country. CCONG defends the interests of its members and seeks to build a positive imaginary of organized civil society in Colombia and international spaces. It engages in analysis and advocacy around public policies, with special emphasis on design, execution, monitoring and evaluation in order to influence decision making. CCONG has had an important role in defining the third sector in Colombia. In fact, this has become a major objective of its work. In order to defend its interests and build a positive image, the provision of information to the public about the third sector has become a key function of the network. For CCONG, this starts with basic information about the nature of third sector organizations in the Colombian context. A 2016 report whose title translates as What You Should Know About Nonprofit Organizations seeks to “provide relevant and clear information” about NGOs and other third sector organizations (CCONG, 2016a, p. 1). This includes information about the third sector in order “to promote a dialogue among public and business actors … [as well as] the international community and society in general, around [NGOs’] nature and legitimacy as agents of development and to move towards a basic agreement of respect and recognition for what they are and do” in the context of Colombia (CCONG, 2016a, p. 3). CCONG plays key roles in policy analysis and provides a meaningful lens through which to look at the role of the third sector in policy analysis in Colombia. Here, we focus on two key policy areas where in particular CCONG has contributed analysis:  post-​agreement and the peace process; and the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs.

CCONG and post-​agreement Given Colombia’s transition into a post-​agreement period, CCONG has sought to maintain an active public role during the implementation phase. Its role has centered on outlining how NGOs can contribute to the post-​agreement period 263

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in Colombia as well as using this period in Colombia’s history as an opportunity to construct an enabling environment in which NGOs are able to fully participate in the peace process and development more generally. CCONG and its members argue that there is a need to create better normative, legal and institutional conditions for NGOs to ensure sustainable peace. In June 2016, CCONG published a report on the role of third sector organizations in local sustainable peace by outlining four concrete roles for NGOs in the peace process, country-​wide. First, the report situates NGOs as promoters of pedagogy and education for peace. This includes playing a role in the diffusion of the peace agreement, sharing lessons learned, and creating spaces of learning, among other areas, with a focus on shared and collective learning to produce new knowledge and new political processes in the new Colombian context. Second, it argues for NGOs to engage in the oversight and monitoring of the agreement. This is an important role for NGOs, and also links the peace process with sustainable development and the SDGs, discussed later in the chapter. Third, CCONG argues that NGOs must participate in the public policy process more broadly, and that participation should be collective and decentralized. Fourth, and finally, NGOs must call on the collective to guarantee political and civil rights for NGOs and social leaders more generally. Indeed, CCONG maintains that there is an absence of public policy that promotes and strengthens NGOs in Colombia. Concerns include issues with access to funding for NGOs (for example, when public funds are used, public contracts are complex and burdensome) and qualms over a clampdown by government on peaceful protest. Given these concerns, CCONG proposes several next steps that include strengthening the normative, legal and institutional conditions for NGOs, reforming the Police Code as related to protests, and guaranteeing and protecting the rights and security of social and community leaders (CCONG, 2016b). CCONG has been increasingly vocal in its analysis and criticisms of the draft versions of the Participation Law, which was included in the peace agreement. This has included releasing three formal public statements. The first statement, released in October 2017, criticized the draft law for not including concrete measures to improve the technical capacity of NGOs and funding mechanisms that include government contracts, official development aid and the opportunity to participate in other types of resource exchange (CCONG, 2017a). In November 2017, CCONG produced a second statement, which called on the national government to report clearly and transparently on the inclusion in the draft law of matters concerning the guarantee and promotion of citizen participation, a requirement that had been outlined in the peace agreement (point 2.2.1) but at the time had not been filed in Congress (CCONG, 2017b). CCONG was concerned that in the framework for the implementation of the peace process, the strengthening of NGOs was not fully being considered as a priority issue, even though it was established in the peace agreement. A third document relating to the Participation Law was released in December 2017 (CCONG, 2017c). This expressed the CCONG’s regret that the national government had not established 264

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the draft Participation Law within the timeframe established in point 2.2.1 of the peace agreement. To implement the peace agreement, particularly for the construction and strengthening of democracy more generally, CCONG’s analysis leads to its argument that NGOs need to be strengthened.

The SDGs and organized civil society In addition to the peace agreement, the adoption and implementation of the SDGs by the Colombian government has presented an opportunity for CCONG to consider the role of the third sector more broadly in terms of development. In 2015, Colombia became one of the 193 countries that have signed up to implement the SDGs, a worldwide effort to achieve specific development standards by the year 2030. Evidence suggests that these development goals have been introduced into the political and policy agenda of the country, operationalized through its inclusion in policy documents such as National Development Plans (NDPs), the peace agreement with the FARC-​EP, accession to the OECD in 2018, and agreements relating to climate change (World Bank, 2017). The NDP 2014–​18 (DNP, 2014) has strengthened the participation and role of organized civil society in the country’s sustainable development agenda. Consequently, the NDP calls for an active citizenry, as well as targeted alliances between private enterprises, academia, NGOs, foundations and media. These alliances look towards participating in the design, planning, implementation and monitoring of the SDGs, particularly in areas such as human rights protection, peace building, children and adolescents’ wellbeing, gender equity, and plurality and diversity, among others. In addition, the NDP calls for the creation of better information channels and spaces of participation for citizens, with the aim of improving the accountability of different phases of public funding expenditure, to make the public administration more transparent and fight corruption at all government levels. Alongside the implementation of the SDGs, organized civil society also has an important role in the monitoring of the instruments and mechanisms for the accession of Colombia to the OECD. In particular, CCONG provides a key role related to SDGs and their analysis (CCONG, 2015, 2016c). On the one hand, CCONG highlights that the national government has given formal responsibilities to national entities to incorporate the SDGs into their actions, mostly through their inclusion into national, departmental and local development plans. On the other hand, CCONG claims that there are several failures in the process due to the lack of an information system that measures these advances in a multidimensional way, and no holistic or concrete implementation at the national and local levels. It calls for organized civil society to be active participants in the design of the specific goals and actions, and urges government to provide reasonable incentives to promote social control and accountability of the SDGs as well as open public webpages and other online platforms that show the advances of decision-​making processes, projects and monitoring tools. 265

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In its most recent collective accountability report, CCONG analyzes the role of its members in the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs (CCONG, 2016d). The report seeks to understand the strengths and challenges NGOs have to strengthen its “offer of value” and the role of NGOs “as co-​responsible actors of the development and consolidation peace” (CCONG, 2016d). It does this by collecting and aggregating data about the role of NGOs in the implementation of the SDGs. In 2016, 138 CCONG members participated in the collective report. Most of these NGOs (93.3%) reported contributing to the first goal, which seeks to eliminate poverty. In addition, almost half (47.8%) were working on projects related to the fourth goal, which seeks to improve the quality of education, and 40.3% on projects related to the eighth SDG, which seeks to create decent work and economic growth (CCONG, 2016d).

Conclusion This chapter has outlined a phase in Colombia’s recent political history that has influenced how NGOs engage in the policy process generally. It has also included illustrative examples of the spaces that enable NGOs to engage in policy analysis more specifically. NGOs have experienced tensions with Colombia’s government but have also been at the heart of knowledge production and other initiatives related to both the peace agreement process and the implementation and monitoring and the SDGs. This is all against the backdrop of continued challenges for NGOs and organized civil society more broadly in Colombia. First, at the time of writing, Colombia’s civic space is observed by CIVICUS4 as one of the worst in the Latin America. CIVICUS defines civic space as freedoms associated with the fundamental rights to associate, assemble peacefully and freely express views and opinions. In its latest regional report, Colombia is ranked as “repressed”, second only to Venezuela in the region. This is related to an increase in the number of murders of leaders and activists. Between November 2016 (when the peace agreement was signed) and mid-​2018, more than 300 community leaders and activists have been murdered –​ most of whom were rural farmers, Afro-​Colombians and indigenous leaders (Diaz and Jiménez, 2018); it has been called the “the most violent period in recent history” (Semana, 2018). The government’s response to the increase in killings has been inconsistent; thus, NGO leaders, umbrella organizations such as CCONG and other third sector actors must to continue to draw attention to this. Second, NGOs are framing their potential role in the transition to peace and in accordance with the peace agreement. NGOs want their expertise and experiences to be recognized as adding value to the country’s transition. However, this is compromised when NGOs are implicated in scandals that question their legitimacy. In Colombia, scandals such as that surrounding the government-​ run School Feeding Program (Programa de Alimentación Escolar) challenge the public’s perception of the sector. This program was found to have contracts that had been awarded illegally to NGOs, and participating NGOs had failed 266

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to pay the required taxes (ElPoligrafo.co, 2016). This scandal –​in which NGOs were very much involved –​received a lot of press coverage in Colombia. NGO behavior in cases such as these threatens the legitimacy of NGOs of all kinds in Colombia as providers of public services and effective actors in policy analysis. Third, challenges exist regarding the implementation of actions and strategies to achieve SDGs (SDG Technical Secretary, 2015). These include the limited resources available to finance programs and strategies that address SDGs and this will likely hinder the government’s capacity to achieve results. The challenges of collecting data and the capacity and resources that the SDGs require pose real barriers for government and organized civil society alike. Additionally, the buy-​in by both political and civil society leaders at the local level throughout the country has not been completely consolidated, which poses a threat to the effective implementation of the SDGs. Still, even with these challenges, the peace agreement and the SDGs allow for what Appe and Barragán (2017) have observed as windows of opportunities for organized civil society, and NGOs in particular. Their research in Latin America has shown that third sector organizations are able to find opportunities in spite of the increasingly restrictive and challenging circumstances. Under this logic, there are growing roles for civil society actors such as CCONG, which since its inception in the 1980s, has consistently engaged in policy analysis to promote sustainable human development, eliminate poverty and exclusion, and advance human rights and democracy at the national, regional and local levels in Colombia. As an institutional and policy entrepreneur, CCONG can be a catalyst for positive social change as Colombia confronts the post-​agreement period and frames the NGO sector as a partner and leader in the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs. Such institutional and policy entrepreneurs must not only engage in policy analysis by remaining in public spaces and active in the production of knowledge, but must also “mobilize stakeholders, using argumentative stances” (Appe and Barragán, 2017, p. 1815). CCONG’s effectiveness as a sector leader in policy analysis will hinge on continuing to expand the voice(s) of organized civil society in Colombia. Notes 1 2

3 4

We use the term “post-​agreement” to refer to the period after the agreement that was signed at the Colon Theatre in Bogotá on 24 November 24 2016 with FARC-​EP. In fact, in many contexts in Latin America, organizations have begun to use the descriptor “civil society organization” due to what has been identified as the “criminalization” of the term NGO (Appe and Layton, 2015). See www.mininterior.gov.co See https://​monitor.civicus.org

References Appe, S. (2010) “Toward culturally democratic citizens:  Nongovernmental organizations and the state”. VOLUNTAS 21(1): 3–​21.

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Appe, S. and Barragán, D. (2017) “Policy windows for CSOs in Latin America:  looking outside the standard legal and regulatory environments”. VOLUNTAS 28(4): 1812–​31. Appe, S. and Layton, M.D. (2015) “Government and the nonprofit sector in Latin America”. Nonprofit Policy Forum 7(2): 117–​35. Boris, E.T. (2006) “Nonprofit organizations in a democracy: varied roles and responsibilities”. In E.T. Boris and C.E. Steuerle (eds.) Nonprofits and Government, Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, pp. 399–​435. Caracol Radio (2014) “ABC del Consejo Nacional de Paz”. Caracol [Online]. Available from http:// ​ c aracol.com.co/​ r adio/​ 2 014/​ 0 5/​ 2 8/​ n acional/​ 1401267240_​246896.html Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development (2004) The Authoritarian Spell: First Year Government of Alvaro Uribe Velez. Bogotá. CNP (Consejo Nacional de Planeación) (2018) “Normatividad”. Available from https://​www.cnp.gov.co/​Paginas/​Normatividad.aspx CCONG (Confederación Colombiana de Organizaciones No-​Gubernamentales) (2004) ABC de las ONG. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2015) Documento de Seguimiento a las Recomendaciones Presentadas al Gobierno Nacional para la Implementación de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible –​ ODS. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2016a) Lo Que Hay Que Saber de las Entidades Sin Ánimo de Lucro. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2016b) El Rol de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil –​OSC: Territorios con Paz Sostenible. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2016c) Documento de Seguimiento a las Recomendaciones Presentadas al Gobierno Nacional para la Implementación de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible –​ ODS. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2016d) Rendición Social Pública de Cuentas. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2017a) Primero Comunicado Confederación Colombiana de ONG. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2017b) Segundo Comunicado Confederación Colombiana de ONG. Bogotá: CCONG. CCONG (2017c) Tercer Comunicado Confederación Colombiana de ONG. Bogotá: CCONG. Diaz, F.A. and Jiménez, M. (2018) “Colombia’s murder rate is at an all-​time low but its activists keep getting killed”. The Conversation [Online]. Available from https://​theconversation.com/​colombias-​murder-​rate-​is-​at-​an-​all-​time-​low-​ but-​its-​activists-​keep-​getting-​killed-​91602 DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) (2010) Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2010–​2014: Tomo I. Bogotá: DNP. DNP (2014) Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014–​2018: Todos por un Nuevo País. Bogotá: DNP.

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Echeverry, J.C. (2002). Evaluación de la Descentralización Municipal en Colombia. Balance de una Década. Seminario Internacional de la Descentralización en Colombia. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Bogotá. El Pais. (2011) Gobierno da por restablecida relación con ONGs de derechos humanos. Available from https://​www.elpais.com.co/​colombia/​gobierno-​da-​ por-​restablecida-​relacion-​con-​ongs-​de-​derechos-​humanos.html ElPoligrafo.co (2016) “Empresas de alimentación escolar son fundaciones y ONG que no pagan impuestos”. ElPoligrafo.co [Online]. Available from www.elpoligrafo. co/​empresas-​alimentacion-​escolar-​fundaciones-​ong-​no-​pagan-​impuestos Flórez, M. (1997) “Non-​governmental organisations and philanthropy:  The Colombian case”. VOLUNTAS 8(4): 386–​400. IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) (2016) GRID 2016: Global Report on Internal Displacement. Geneva: IDMC. Available from www.internal-​ displacement.org/​globalreport2016 IPC (Instituto Popular de Capacitación) (2017) “Reinstalaron mesa de garantías para defensores de DD. HH. en Antioquia”. Agencia de Prensa IPC [Online]. Available from www.ipc.org.co/​agenciadeprensa/​index.php/​2017/​01/​28/​ reinstalaron-​mesa-​de-​garantias-​para-​defensores-​de-​dd-​hh-​en-​antioquia Melo, J.O. (2017) Historia Mínima de Colombia. Mexico City:  El Colegio de México. Moreno, L.A. (2004) “After a dark period, a better Colombia”. The Boston Globe, 19 August [Online]. Available from www.boston.com/​news/​globe/​ editorial_​opinion/​oped/​articles/​2004/​08/​19/​after_​a_​dark_​period_​a_​better_​ colombia?pg=full Pacto Nacional por la Paz (2014) Convocatoria a la Construcción de un Pacto Nacional por la Paz. Pacto Nacional por la Paz. Available from http://​pactonacionalporlapaz. co/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2014/​04/​21-​de-​marzo-​documento-​final-​PNP.pdf Padgett, T. (2008)”Colombia’s stunning hostage rescue”. Time, 2 July [Online]. Available from http://​ c ontent.time.com/ ​ t ime/ ​ world/ ​ a rticle/​ 0,8599,1819862,00.html Pastoral Social (2003) “Se deterioran las relaciones entre el Presidente Uribe y las ONG colombianas”. Cáritas Panamá –​Boletín Incidencia y Compromiso, 26 September [Online]. Available from https://​macondos.es.tl/​URIBE-​ATACA-​ LAS-​ONG.htm Presidencia de la República (2017) “Elegido Comité Nacional del Consejo Nacional de Paz”. Gobierno de Colombia [Online]. Available from http://e​ s.presidencia.gov. co/​noticia/​171103-​Elegido-​Comite-​Nacional-​del-​Consejo-​Nacional-​de-​Paz Reuters (2008) “Colombia usó mal un logo de Cruz Roja al rescatar a Betancourt”. Reuters, 16 July [Online]. Available from https://​es.reuters.com/​ article/​topNews/​idESTIS66635620080716 Ruiz Restrepo, A. (2005) “Active without recognition: obstacles to development of the Colombian third sector”. International Journal of Not-​for-​Profit Law 7(2): 17–​22.

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Salamon, L.M. (1994) “The rise of the nonprofit sector”. Foreign Affairs 74(3): 109–​22. Semana (2008) “El presidente Uribe bate récord de aceptación popular al registrar un 80 por ciento de favorabilidad”. Semana [Online]. Available from https://​www.semana.com/​on-​line/​articulo/​el-​presidente-​uribe-​bate-​record-​ aceptacion-​popular-​registrar-​80-​ciento-​favorabilidad/​90631–​3 Semana (2018) “¿De dónde vienen las balas?”. Semana, 7 July [Online]. Available from www.semana.com/​nacion/​articulo/l​ ideres-s​ ociales-a​ sesinados-c​ olombia-​ quien-​los-​mata/​574450 SDG Technical Secretary (2015) Colombia and the Sustainable Development Goals: “Learning by Doing”. High level inter-​institutional commission for the preparation and effective implementation of the post 2015 development agenda and its sustainable development goals. Bogotá. Tran, M. (2008) “Colombia apologises over use of Red Cross symbol in Betancourt rescue”. The Guardian, 16 July [Online]. Available from www. theguardian.com/​world/​2008/​jul/​16/​colombia Vakil, A.C. (1997) “Confronting the classification problem: toward a taxonomy of NGOs”. World Development 25(11): 2057–​70. Villar, R. (1998) Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Colombia. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies. Villar, R., List, R. and Salamon, L.M. (1999) “Colombia: a diverse nonprofit sector”. In L.M. Salamon & Associates, Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, pp. 411–​27. World Bank (2017) “SDGs targets used to focus Colombia’s local, global goals”. World Bank [Online]. Available from www.worldbank.org/​en/​news/​feature/​ 2017/​08/​23/​sdgs-​targets-​used-​to-​focus-​colombias-​local-​global-​goals

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Media, evidence and policy analysis in Colombia Juan Guillermo Vieira-​Silva

Introduction The media in Colombia is a fundamental political institution in the complex public policy process. Among other things, it exposes and helps define public problems, is a forum for public debate, shapes public opinion and influences government agendas. However, in order to do all this, and given the need for facts, information and interpretations, it needs to draw on key sources within the technical and political policy process. We know that its strength lies in the political, but what of the technical dimension? Both the informative and public policy processes are information-​intensive in all senses, and while often everything is important, regardless of where it comes from, when we look at government decisions in particular, public administration demands evidence in the form of information processed by serious, verifiable and reproducible methods that sustain and provide even a minimum level of security regarding the underlying causal theory of a measure proposed to solve an issue. Where, then, does this type of information come from in the Colombian public policy process? What factors (restrictions) come into play regarding the use of the information by the media? And how is information processed by the media in public policy discussions? This chapter answers these three questions in order. Regarding the first question, it argues that in Colombia there are three main qualified sources of policy information: the government, think tanks and universities. With respect to the second question, the chapter documents how the media generally face various difficulties that affect their functioning, particularly regarding the intensive use of evidence and policy analysis. These difficulties are generally of two types. On one hand, they are institutional, linked to the historical configuration of the country’s media system combined with the current realities of the sector that has been corporatized, and that is still unable to adapt to the challenges of a more digitalized world in which the media has largely lost its monopoly over the news. On the other hand, they are cognitive, which would allow for an understanding of the difficulties involved in managing their agenda spaces and to handle new or specialized information of the kind referred to in this chapter. In responding to the third question, this chapter illustrates how policy-​relevant information is processed by the media. Three technical knowledge-​intensive 271

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cases have been selected to examine whether media go beyond testimonies to include scientific studies and policy analyses from the sources mentioned in question one. In the cases of glyphosate and asbestos, the chapter demonstrates a greater imbalance between political and technical sources, with prevalence of the former, and only in the case of the tax on sugary soft drinks can we speak about a use that is close to the ideal. In all cases, the media show biases in favor of the powerful, whether politicians or businessmen. On this basis, the chapter argues that public policy journalism in Colombia is in its fledgling stage and that it is more complex than traditional political journalism mainly based on testimonies and media archives. It is also crucial that it learns from scientific and investigative journalism, from the role of evidence and knowledge in public policies (Cairney, 2016) and from journalism itself (Patterson, 2018), particularly regarding the dynamics of policy processes. The chapter begins with a consideration of the regime of information production for public decisions in Colombia, followed by a contextualization of the Colombian media system and the main restrictions it confronts. It then analyzes three media outlets and three examples of public policy that illustrate the way in which policy-​relevant information is used. This is followed by a comparative discussion of the three cases and a conclusion.

Sources of evidence and public policy analysis “Yes, they are used, but …” would be the initial response to the question as to whether the Colombian media uses scientific evidence and policy analyses. To this we would add that, based on the cases that discussed here, which include an important technical dimension, and despite the existence of many outstanding examples, there is still a long road ahead. Here we focus briefly on the biggest producers of scientific information and policy analysis in the country. Government Colombia’s central government is mainly involved in four types of public policy decisions: PNDs, CONPES,1 decrees and bills directed to Congress. In addition to DAPRE, it obtains its information support from the DNP and the ministries, which act as sources of technical knowledge and specialized support on a sectoral level. Among other functions,2 the DNP coordinates the formulation of the PND, and prepares the CONPES for discussion. Bills are usually structured within the ministries and are best formulated when they contain a technical justification and a proposal for articles. Decrees, of which there are many kinds,3 each with a different process, do not entail deliberations outside of the executive branch, unlike laws. Their written expression is limited to a legal format expressing decisions taken rather than arguments for how these were taken, although it is possible that these are discussed within the legal offices that develop them. 272

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Although the government may not always turn to scientific evidence or serious knowledge development processes, it is the largest consumer of information on policy. And while it is a producer of information, though not always with the same capacity in the different sectors, it also consumes information from many more sources. Think tanks According to the Global Go to Think Tank Index,4 in Colombia the number of think tanks increased from 40 in 2016 to 64 in 2018, occupying the 22nd position worldwide (McGann, 2017, 2019). This reinforces the idea that the country has a diversity of quality information sources that essentially affect public decision making. However, there is insufficient analysis of the effects of think tanks on policy formulation in the country. In most cases, their processes, products and impacts are generally still unclear, and, except for a few consolidated think tanks with sufficient networks to support themselves in complicated scenarios, they are poorly trained in the use of quality information for policy. If we compare some of the most important, we can see the diversity of origin, focus and quality of the Colombian think tanks. As established by various classifications, centers specialized in public policy research may be linked to the corporate world (Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo (FEDESARROLLO), Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP)), to political parties (Centro de Pensamiento Primero Colombia), and to universities (the Department of Ecology and Territory of the Faculty of Environmental and Rural Studies (FEAR), Development Research Center (CID), among other categories. While their differentiating characteristic may be that they all conduct public policy research, it is also true that they do not all have the same quality and transparency in the dissemination of their work. Finally, their work is mainly reflected in report-​type documents, studies, bulletins, public policy notes, situation analyses, policy briefs, working documents, books, short documents, and multimedia guides, among others. As will be seen in the empirical cases, the media do not always draw on all these types of documents. Universities Universities have the triple purpose of producing knowledge for knowledge’s sake, applied knowledge and knowledge relevant to public issues. This is not always achieved as a whole, given the perverse incentives derived from the pressures facing university funding in the country, and the lack of vision to do basic research that boosts the other two forms of knowledge. Nevertheless, and within a competitive and complex environment, Colombia has a university system that continues to contribute to science and influence the development of the country. In contrast to think tanks, a large portion of university research is basic research, not directly designed to influence short-​term issues or public problems. This does 273

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not diminish its relevance for policy, and thus it should be taken into account as a source of evidence in government interventions and in public policy journalism. The majority of knowledge generated in universities is published in research books and scientific journals and, keeping in mind the impact on professors of competition for rankings between universities, an increasingly growing part of that research (possibly the best) is published in English, in American or European journals with high impact factors. This further restricts access to specialized knowledge for many officials who do not speak English and prolongs timeframes while the knowledge goes abroad and returns to be available in the context for which it is most relevant.

The media and its restrictions In general, the development of the press in Colombia has been marked by three main moments, beginning with the birth and initial evolution of the media, linked to families with solid ties with one or another of the political parties that made up the traditional bi-​party system in Colombia. This is the case with El Tiempo, which has been linked to the Republican Union (Unión Republicana) party since its beginnings, and since 1921 has declared itself the daily paper of the Liberal Party, in the hands of the Santos Montejo family. El Espectador was founded by the Cano family in Medellín as a counterweight to the conservative Regeneration (La Regeneración5) governments, and the Gómez Martínez family acquired El Colombiano just after its creation, keeping a conservative tilt and growing after chasing out El Espectador in Medellín in the 1920s. The family tradition of ownership in the mainstream Colombian media has continued, combined with the second, more corporate, phase that became evident in the 1990s. Since then the media has been linked with large corporations and economic powers with businesses in multiple industries. This development was, in part, a natural survival mechanism in an increasingly globalized and competitive world, and also the result of changes in family structures. However, some of these family concerns ended up with their majority shares being absorbed by the conglomerates, as in the case of El Tiempo, owned by Luis Carlos Sarmiento since 2010, and El Espectador, owned by the Santo Domingo family since 1997. With this new reality, analyzing the media agenda implies understanding that the economic interests of its owners mediate its coverage. It could be argued that this imposes significant restrictions on the freedom of press in the country, along with the very use of public policy analysis, since many of the economic interests involved touch important policy sectors, such as banking policy, infrastructure, public contracts, public health, industry, housing and tourism, and other areas where the media’s owners have interests. While newspapers are no longer identified with specific political parties in Colombia, the connection between the press and political power remains, albeit with intricacies that are harder to disentangle. Economic and political power pose the greatest institutional restrictions to the functioning of the media. Politicians 274

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Table 16.1: Colombian media outlets, audience and owners Press El Tiempo

Television El Espectador RCN TV

Caracol TV

Radio La FM and RCN radio

Caracol Radio, la W, and Blue Radio

Olímpica Estéreo

13%, 8.7% and 6.2% Grupo PRISA and Blue Radio of Santo Domingo

21%

Audience 12.1%

3.2%

59.69% 72.18%

7.5% 6.1%

Owners

Santo Domingo

Ardila Lulle

Ardila Lulle

Sarmiento Angulo

Santo Domingo

Char family

Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from a study of media and research from La Silla Vacía.

and the media have a love–​hate relationship (Baumgartner, 2017); they need each other, their tasks are highly interdependent, but there is also a high risk of manipulation between them. The new development in the evolution of the relationship between the media and politics, true also in Colombia, is that politicians no longer control the press, not even through its owners, and, with multiple digital media outlets and the ability for almost any person to “make” news on social media, nor do the media control the transmission of news. This is the third stage, still in process, in the evolution of the press in Colombia. Table 16.1 shows the outlets with the largest audiences for each of the three principal types of media (press, radio and television). Basically, in each type, there is a duopoly, with two competitors that share the largest audiences. The table also shows the owners of the media outlets, the three richest men in the country –​Sarmiento Ángulo, Ardilla Lulle and Santo Domingo –​whose outlets together account for nearly 57% of the audience (Reporteros Sin Fronteras and Federación Colombiana de Periodistas, 2015). At the same time, these groups have varied interests in multiple economic sectors along with complicated relationships with political powers. They finance campaigns, lobby, choose candidates, and use their media as a currency of exchange for favors and support –​support that often comes in the form of favorable policies. In the midst of this, the media is often subject to the whims of forces beyond its control, in the framework of political and economic elites, where even economic groups sacrifice media to maintain good relationships with politicians, as was the case of Revista Cambio (FLIP, 2010). In addition to the restrictions created by the structures of the media system, dependent on large economic groups and under strong political pressure, we also find that the media companies’ own organizational factors can be an issue. On one hand, they tend to have a hierarchical administrative structure; on the other, financial pressure means that they tend to sacrifice journalistic principles in order to increase earnings. This casts, from time to time, strong doubts about the suitability of their work, since the independence many of them proclaim is dubious. 275

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Three cases Public policy journalism, like policy analysis, should not only represent the political dimension of its process, but also the technical one. It is here that evidence and policy analysis become necessary, requiring sources that go beyond political contacts. In fact, when considering the technical dimension, while experts, academics and other informed individuals play a key role, in many cases a variety of academic and scientific publications is even more important, although such outputs demand a much greater investment of time and capacity. Three cases have been chose with the aim of showing if and how the Colombian media uses technical sources. These examples not only reflect the importance of the technical dimension, but also represent different policy dynamics that show how reporting is done on these issues and possibly how sources are chosen. While these cases do not allow for generalizations about the use made of evidence and policy analysis by the Colombian media when reporting on public issues, they are suggestive of the general behavior of the media. These three cases, concerning glyphosate, asbestos, and the tax on sugary drinks, are now examined in turn. Glyphosate The use of glyphosate to reduce illegal crops in Colombia goes back 40 years. It has been an extremely disputed issue in terms of how conclusive the scientific evidence is on its harmful effects. Experts have been inclined to consider that the evidence suggests negative impacts on the environment and human health, so using it would mean experimenting with humans, which has no ethical justification. Between 2015 and 2017, the use of glyphosate in Colombia reached breaking point, first because the World Health Organization (WHO) increased its risk level, and second because of the effects of a historic CCC judgement (T237 of 2017) that ruled on the principle of precaution and ordered the suspension of the use of glyphosates until such point as the government has strong evidence that it is not harmful to human health and the environment. In the face of such a complex issue, and one with powerful economic, political and military interests behind it, the question arises as to what extent the media informed public opinion using evidence and policy analysis in this case. In order to answer this question, or to at least find elements for a possible answer, a search was done in the database of all articles published in the print version of Revista Semana6 from the beginning of Uribe’s first government (August 2002) to the end of Santos’ second government (August 2018) for texts that contained the words “glyphosate” and “fumigation” in their title. A total of 18 articles were found. Table  16.2 shows the number of articles, the sources used and the sources specifically related to evidence and policy analysis, for each. Eighteen articles were identified over a period of 16 years, on an issue that formed part of the presidential policies during that entire time. However, it is worth noting that the 18 articles, translating to a little more than one per year, are not comparable by quality nor by the sources of evidence and policy analysis. 276

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Table 16.2: Case 1: articles, general and specific sources Articles

# Sources

Policy analysis sources

1.

2

0

2.

4

3

3.

1

0

4.

2

0

5.

2

0

6.

0

0

7.

1

0

8.

1

0

9.

4

1

10.

5

1

11.

3

0

12.

7

2

13.

2

1

14.

1

0

15.

1

0

16.

9

3

17.

3

1

18. Total

1

0

50

12

Source: Author’s own elaboration according to the analysis of the 18 articles.

Fifty sources of all types were used for the 18 articles, an average of 2.77 per text. This is a relatively high number when considering the average of 1.33 that Mayoral (2005) found in Spanish newspapers. However, what is interesting is the number of technical sources of evidence, 12 of 50, or 24%. Given the nature of the issue and the period of study, this is a wholly insufficient number. This insufficiency is exacerbated when reclassifying these 12 sources by type of technical source. Table 16.3 shows all sources of evidence used in the case of glyphosate and groups them into six types. International organizations predominate, with five of the 12 sources in this category, followed by experts and non-​government state agencies, with two each. Strictly scientific sources are minimal. In this first example, the most commonly used instrument was reports, mentioned five times. These were produced by international organizations and non-​government state agencies. Finally, only one of the 18 articles was what would be expected of an issue considered to be a technical one and with various power dynamics in play. For the rest, the voice of those prejudiced was not sufficiently 277

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Table 16.3: Case 2: classification of technical sources Technical source

Category

Ombudsman report

State agency other than government

2

Official statistics

Survey and statistics

1

Doctor

Expert

2

Ministry of Health

Technical official

1

Colombian Medical Association

Institutes and scientific associations

1

WHO report

International organizations

5

Police report

Research by Universidad de los Andes (Uniandes) professor

United Nations (UN) report United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer Sandro Calvini, UNODC Source: Author’s own elaboration.

heard, while the dominant voice was precisely that of the government, clinging to the use of glyphosates, amid serious criticism and growing evidence against them. Asbestos Unlike glyphosate, in the case of asbestos there has been incontrovertible evidence regarding its harmful effect on human health for quite some time (Benarde, 2018). Asbestos first appeared on the congressional agenda as part of a set of international accords signed by the Columbian state dealing with job safety (Senate bills 83 of 1995 and 128 of 1996). In 2007, three bills were presented (Senate bills 35, 45 and 177 of 2007), though none succeeded in passing. It appeared again on the legislative agenda in 2015 with Senate bill 97 of 2015, which was also rapidly shelved. However, it reappeared with renewed energy, more congressional support and better odds, on 2 August 2017, with Senate bill 61 of 2017, called the Ana Cecilia Niño Law. To analyze the use of evidence and policy analysis in the media, we took into account the timing of this last bill and the coverage it received in the paper El Espectador. We chose articles from this paper’s platform that contained the word “asbestos”, using the search “allintitle:  asbesto site:www.elespectador.com”, between 2 August 2017, when the bill was introduced, and 29 May 2019, when this chapter was written and the bill was awaiting its final debate. Table 16.4 shows the total number of articles, their sources and the specific sources about evidence and policy analysis, for each. The search found 19 articles over a period of 22 months about an active proposed bill in Congress. 278

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Table 16.4: Case 2: articles, general and specific sources Articles

# Sources

Policy analysis sources

1.

4

2

2.

2

1

3.

3

2

4.

1

0

5.

4

1

6.

2

1

7.

2

1

8.

0

0

9.

4

2

10.

4

1

11.

7

3

12.

3

1

13.

2

0

14.

2

0

15.

1

0

16.

1

0

17.

3

1

18.

4

1

19. Total

1 50

1 18

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

In these 19 articles, 50 sources of all types were used (the same as for the glyphosate articles), for an average slightly lower than that for glyphosate, of 2.63 sources per article. The same tendency for high levels of reference to sources was evident, and there was a higher use of technical sources –​18, rather than 12 –​representing 36% of total sources. Although the time period was shorter and although the issue was still political, the technical nature in this case remains underrepresented. Grouping together the technical sources, the categories are reduced to international organizations in six instances, experts in three, non-​ government state agencies and databases in two, and other sources in one, as shown in Table 16.5. In terms of the private interests involved, the coverage left much to be desired. This is, first, because only two texts mentioned the companies that produce or sell asbestos in Colombia, and when discussing obstacles to the bill’s approval they only mention the lobby in general terms, except when the role 279

Policy Analysis in Colombia

Table 16.5: Case 2: classification of technical sources Comptroller

Non-​government state agency

2

Agency of Water Resources

Technical government agency

1

US National Library of Medicine (twice)

Database

2

Former vice-​minister

Ex-​staffers

1

Research by Uniandes professor

Expert

3

National Cancer Institute (3 times)

Scientific institutes and associations

3

International Labour Organization WHO (5 times)

International organizations

6

Comptroller’s report

UN Professor (report) Research by Uniandes professor

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

of Uribism and the National Association of Industry (ANDI) were mentioned. Second, none of the 19 texts presents the voice of the business community; businesses are not criticized, nor is it revealed what they are thinking or doing about the matter. With regard to the use of evidence and policy analysis, there is a prevalence of generic references to a single fact, piece of data or the opinion of a particular international organization, report, expert or staffer. The media agenda tends to respond to events as they occur in the issue, and for this they recycle what they have referred to previously and add the new events. Only very occasionally do they publish, review and contextualize the proceedings. Besides lacking the voice of the business community, there are few references to the substance of the bill, especially what is debated in Congress and who it will affect and how. On reading the 19 articles about this bill, three things become evident: in addition to banning asbestos, it includes measures of substitution that are not explained; it will come into effect in 2021 without stating why; and that there has been a discussion about whether the prohibition should include a ban on exporting asbestos. Taxes on sugary soft drinks The proposal for a tax on sugary soft drinks first appeared in the 2016 tax reform, without success. It showed up again in the following 2018 reform, with the same result. The public policy discussion about whether or not to set taxes on sugary drinks entails answering some questions. First, are they bad for one’s health? If they are, what illnesses do they lead to and to what extent? And third, will a tax affect their consumption and have an impact on public health or reduce their associated illnesses? 280

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Those promoting the taxes respond affirmatively to the first question, whereas opponents respond that there is not enough empirical evidence, and if it were to be true, it is not to the degree claimed by the tax advocates, given that diseases such as obesity, opponents argue, are produced by multiple causes. The second question is where those who oppose the tax seem to be on a firm footing, showing, from international experience, or at least some striking cases, first, that there is no causality between the tax and public health, and second, that a tax produces worse socioeconomic side effects, such as job losses and price increases, without reducing consumption. Opponents support their arguments with the case of Denmark where a similar tax imposed on saturated fats was later revoked, or the Mexican case, which according to soft drink producers in Colombia, resulted in shops being closed and jobs lost, without a reduction in obesity. In this case, we searched the web platform of El Tiempo with the phrase “sugary soft drinks”, using the search term “allintitle: bebidas azucaradas site:www.eltiempo. com”, for the years 2016 and 2018 separately, and identified a total of ten articles (four from 2016 and six from 2018). Only ten articles on an issue of such social importance leave doubts about the coverage of the source in question. In fact, doing the same search in El Espectador we found nine articles for 2016 and eight for 2018, which represents an interesting difference. However, comparing the three cases, this one is the most intensive in terms of reliance on technical sources. As seen in Table 16.6, we found 46 general sources in ten texts, for a total of 4.6 sources per article, the highest average of the three cases and clearly a high number compared with the international average of no more than two sources. Of the 46 sources, 22 (47.8%) were technical, doubling the percentage of technical

Table 16.6: Case 3: articles, general and specific sources Articles

# Sources

Policy analysis sources

1.

6

3

2.

1

0

3.

9

8

4.

2

0

5.

4

1

6.

9

6

7.

5

3

8.

6

1

9.

3

0

10. Total

1 46

0 22

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

281

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Table 16.7: Case 3: classification of technical sources Commission of taxation experts

Commission of experts

1

Econcept consultant

Consultant

1

Nutritional Situation Survey

Surveys and statistics

3

Popkin international study, among others

International study

1

Interior Secretary study

National study

1

Former minister

Former officials

2

Experts

2

Scientific institutes and associations

5

WHO

International organizations

1

British Medical Journal (twice)

Scientific journal

4

Think tank

1

National Tobacco Use Survey National Student Health Survey

Former vice-​minister Barry Popkin (international expert) Endocrinologist (expert) Colombian Association of Scientific Associations Colombian Association of Endocrinology Colombian Foundation on Obesity InterAmerican Heart Foundation World Cancer Research Fund International

American Journal of Preventive Medicine The Journal of Nutrition Dejusticia Source: Author’s own elaboration.

sources in the case of glyphosate. This is all the more notable given that the majority are robust sources. The number and nature of the technical sources in this case goes far beyond the average of the two previous cases –​of the 22 sources, the most numerous category is not that of international organizations, but of scientific institutions and associations, (five), followed by scientific journals (four), surveys and statistics (three), experts and former officials (two) and the rest with one, as seen in Table 16.7. On the issue of sugary soft drinks, for El Tiempo, the technical dimension is highly represented in number and quality of sources, especially academic documents. In general, this set of articles presents a good example of the hierarchy of technical sources, putting those that imply greater scientific backing (scientific institutes and associations, scientific journals, surveys and statistics) before statements and 282

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testimonial sources. While some context is lacking about the industry and how these policies would affect it and its owners, we get the impression that a concerted effort was made to present a variety of perspectives on the issue. This case also reveals biases in relation to powerful stakeholders, who should at least be mentioned, in relation to the size of the business they have and how the proposed measures affect them. When discussing how the industry has set up obstacles to the tax, reference is made to lobbying, and in terms of industry comment, ANDI Beverage Chamber is the only organization cited. The bias shows up in other ways as well. For example, in one of the articles the Beverage Chamber argues against the tax, using a study it commissioned from EConcept, a North American consulting firm (Suárez and Fernández, 2018) but there is no questioning of the nature of this type of report, with paid studies and scientific studies granted the same level of validity without reference to their origins or methodologies.

Comparing the three cases The comparison of the three cases allows us to partially illustrate how and to what extent the main Colombian media use evidence and policy analysis. For analytical purposes, we make the comparison on three levels: first, in terms of bias towards political or economic power in the coverage of the case; second, in terms of the balance of technical and political sources (including the type of evidence sources and policy analysis); and third, in terms of the concentration of technical sources within each case in a few articles. The analysis of texts illustrates the prevalence of a bias towards political power (governments in the glyphosates case) and economic power (asbestos companies and soft drink companies), not expressed explicitly by defending them, but negatively, by not mentioning them. This is a first element that we explain here as deriving from the restrictions imposed on the media by being in the midst of the economic and political powers discussed, and also by the indexation hypothesis. Paraphrasing Bennett’s (1990) opening statement in a well-​known article on the theory of press–​state relations in the US, one could say that in Colombia the media have the government as their main source of news, and we add the economic groups, which in terms of agenda setting means that in many issues the media agenda is set by their sources, mainly political ones. In relation to the second comparison, as shown in Table 16.8, although the total sources have a similar distribution between cases, this is not true for technical sources, and within these, the use of more robust sources. The case that differs the most is that of sugary soft drinks, with 22 technical sources out of a total of 46. Of the 22, contrary to the other two cases where sources from international organizations predominate, five are from scientific associations and institutions, four from academic journals and three from statistics and surveys. The differences between the first two cases and the third are considerable. In the third, the technical and the political were more balanced, demonstrating a more ideal processing of 283

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Table 16.8: The three cases compared Glyphosate

Asbestos

Tax on sugary drinks

Articles

18

19

10

Sources

50

50

46

Evidence sources

12

18

22

Articles without scientific sources Concentration of scientific sources

11 (0) 8 in 3

6 (0) and 8 (1) 9 in 4

4 (0) 14 in 2

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

scientific knowledge in order to set out issues that should potentially inform the public discussion and be taken into account by decision makers. On the third measure, we find that in all three cases there is a concentration of robust sources in a few articles. For glyphosate, out of 18 articles 11 have no scientific or policy analysis sources, while out of 12 sources of evidence eight are concentrated in only three articles. For asbestos six out of 18 have no scientific sources, and eight have only one, this being the case where the distribution is more regular among articles. Finally, for the tax on sweetened beverages, out of ten articles there are four that have no evidence at all, while out of 22 scientific sources 14 are concentrated on two articles. This shows the tension between the reactive demand for information production, with the need to provide contextualized information and better analysis, within which the use of evidence is usually framed. The variability in the use of scientific sources between articles on the same topic shows us that there are two main ways of informing. The first way, most common in the three cases analyzed, is reactive; it recycles sources, is oriented to the moment and is simplistic in nature. The second, less common, way involves research and analysis efforts, and therefore time and resources, and is focused on expanding and contextualizing the public problems involved; when this happens it is manifested in texts with a greater number of specialized sources compared with the average of the other texts on the same topic. Finally, we can answer questions about the percentage and use of sources of evidence in Colombian journalism. Indeed, there is an uneven use of evidence in all three cases, both as a percentage of the total sources used, and in terms of the type of evidence used in sources. Only on the issue of the sugary soft drinks tax did we find some articles close to what could be a model of news coverage of issues such as the three analyzed in this chapter. Regarding how science and policy analysis sources are used, the articles analyzed suggest that the rationale for the production of high-​quality information is compromised by the reactive and overly fluid logic of the news process, as well as by the restrictions of media outlets that operate in a context of political and economic tensions that impose several limitations on the news business. 284

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Conclusion The media is a key political institution within the public policy process (Boydstun, 2013; Russell et al, 2016) in terms of what it focuses on and how. It is key to understanding the relationship between government and society, as it influences how citizens perceive public affairs and how rulers respond with policies. As communicators of relevant information on public policy issues, the media are not always primary producers, but rather are, or should be, serious processors of specialized information, which, as ascertained in this chapter, is not always the case. In relation to the issues addressed, although the media made use of scientific evidence and systematic analysis of public policies, they did not do so with the regularity and accuracy expected for the analysis of public problems with a high scientific content. The use of specialized knowledge to improve written communication on highly scientific issues is not an institutionalized practice in the Colombian media. This is due in great measure to the implications of conducting quality journalism based on research and better sources, and to the restrictions inherent in the informative process. In the press, the effort to be rational and process scientific information proportionately comes up against the immediacy of daily demands, external pressures and the difficulties in having journalists dedicated to the best use of evidence when writing journalistic accounts of public policies. Unlike policy information from statements and declarations and daily news journalism, scientific information and policy analysis requires more time and additional skills. Scientific journalism and investigative journalism tend to have a greater sense of the time needed to investigate, to follow clues, and to read, digest and contrast evidence. These two fields have important experiences on which to base improvements in public policy journalism, such as the work of Alberto Donadio (Serrano, 2019) on investigative journalism, and the progress made in scientific journalism which is now represented in Colombia by a professional association.7 Notes 1 2 3

4 5 6 7

Documents from the highest planning authority in the country. Defined in Decree 1832 of 2012. For types of decrees, their situation within the Colombian regulatory system and examples of how they are used to violate legal reservations or elude constitutional review, see Quinche and Urrego, 2011. See www.gotothinktank.com/​global-​goto-​think-​tank-​index Regeneration was a political movement of conservative origin that emerged in the 1880s as a response to liberal dominance and its policies in the previous 20 years. Database built by the author for another project, with data for 1994–​2018. Colombian Association of Scientific Journalists.

References Baumgartner, F.R. (2017) “Foreword:  political actors and the media”. In P. Van Aelst and S. Walgrave (eds) How Political Actors Use the Media (1st edition). New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. v–​viii. 285

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Benarde, M.A. (ed.) (2018) Asbestos:  The Hazardous Fiber (1st edition). Boca Raton: CRC Press. Bennett, W.L. (1990) “Toward a theory of press-​state Relations in the United States”. Journal of Communication 40(2): 103–​27. Boydstun, A.E. (2013) Making the News: Politics, the Media, and Agenda Setting. Chicago, IL/​London: University of Chicago Press. Cairney, P. (2016) The Politics of Evidence-​Based Policy Making. London: Palgrave Macmillan. FLIP (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa) (2010) “Sobre el cierre de la revista Cambio como medio de actualidad y política”. FLIP, 10 February [Online]. Available from https://​flip.org.co/​index.php/​en/​informacion/​noticias/​item/​ 1285-​sobre-​el-​cierre-​de-​la-​revista-​cambio-​como-​medio-​de-​actualidad-​y-​ politica [Accessed 28 May 2019]. MacRae, D. and Wilde, J.A. (1985) Policy Analysis for Public Decisions (1st edition). University Press of America. Matus, C. (2007) Teoría del Juego Social (1st edition). Lanús: Ediciones Universidad Nacional de Lanús. Mayoral, J. (2005) “Fuentes de información y credibilidad periodística”. Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico 11: 93–​102. McGann, J.G. (2017) “2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”. [Online] https://​repository.upenn.edu/​think_​tanks/​12/​ McGann, J.G. (2019) “2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”. [Online] https://​ r epository.upenn.edu/ ​ c gi/ ​ v iewcontent. cgi?article=1017&context=think_​tanks Patterson, T.E. (2018) Informar las Noticias Hacia un Periodismo Basado en el Conocimiento (1st edition). Editorial CIDE. Quinche, M.F. and Urrego, F. (2011) Los Decretos Presidenciales en el Sistema Normativo (1st edition). Bogotá: Ediciones Doctrina y Ley Ltda. Reporteros Sin Fronteras and Federación Colombiana de Periodistas (2015) “¿De quién son los medios?”. Available from www.monitoreodemedios.co [Accessed 26 December 2018]. Russell, A., Dwidar, M. and Jones, B.D. (2016) “The mass media and the policy process”. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford Research Encyclopedias [Online]. https://​oxfordre.com/​politics/​view/​10.1093/​acrefore/​ 9780190228637.001.0001/​acrefore-​9780190228637-​e-​240 Serrano, J. (2019) Contra el Poder. Alberto Donadío y el Periodismo de Investigación (1st edition). Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Suárez, R. and Fernández, C.F. (2018) “La batalla pendiente por el impuesto a las bebidas azucaradas”. El Tiempo, 26 March [Online]. Available from www. eltiempo.com/​vida/​salud/​estudio-​que-​dice-​que-​con-​impuesto-​a-​las-​bebidas-​ azucaradas-​bajaria-​el-​consumo-​198402 [Accessed 3 June 2019].

286

Conclusion: Building capacity for policy analysis amid tensions and challenges in Colombia Pablo Sanabria-​Pulido and Nadia Rubaii

This book facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the progression and the current state of policy analysis in Colombia presented in four parts: its evolution and consolidation as a field of study; its relevance and use inside governmental instances; its application in key policy domains; and the role of participants beyond the state in policy discussions. Each of these parts has illustrated important elements that depict the relatively slow but firm progression of policy analysis as a field of study in educational institutions and as a practical realm in public organizations and policy actors in Colombia.

Evolution and consolidation of policy analysis in Colombia The first part begins with an exposition of the development of policy analysis in Colombia. Chapter  1, addresses the key milestones that have shaped the development of policy analysis capacity in the country. For the authors, a diverse combination of elements, and a particular institutional framework, explain the length and depth of the different phases that have brought the use of different tools of policy analysis and other technical approaches to public affairs in Colombia. The manner in which national planning has been adopted in the country, and its different international influences, explain the arrival of policy analysis tools and ideas. In general terms, the key drivers identified as later catalyzers of the process of adoption of policy analysis in the country are: the capacity created at universities and thinks tanks; the role of international missions; the configuration of local epistemic communities; and adoption and spillovers across different domains and government levels. The authors conclude that the current state of public policy analysis reveals a complex environment of collaboration and intersectionality between the public and private sectors, but also with academia and other governance actors, reflecting an increasing sophistication in policy analysis in the country, not only for the state realm but also for the civil society as a whole. However, the authors remark on key challenges that remain ahead for different policy domains and subnational governments, in which capacity remains an unattained goal, as well as the need to achieve a closer integration between public affairs scholarship and the practice of government at both the national and subnational levels. 287

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Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of educational offerings in the field of policy analysis within Colombia and the generation of knowledge in this field. The authors recognize that while there are already some specialized policy analysis programs, they are still very recent and few small in number, compared with other more traditional undergraduate and graduate programs in the country and even in Latin America. They observe that there is a substantial and growing cadre of public officials who have undergraduate degrees in public administration, but they often have lower technical and analytical skills that are of growing importance for the practice of public management and policy analysis. The authors also call our attention to how the combined effects of the relative youth of public policy education in Colombia, the small number of programs and their concentration in select geographic areas contribute to the challenge of having policy analysis widely applied in Colombia within or outside of government. When considered alongside the political, social and economic developments transpiring in Colombia, the importance of public policy education is clear. For the authors, these programs can play a vital role in educating professionals capable of rigorous policy analysis, and the skills to manage and implement policies to advance the public interest. Part I finishes with a comprehensive analysis of public administration reforms and the way they have affected bureaucratic capacity in Colombia and the policy analysis logic inside governmental organizations. Chapter  3 draws a powerful conclusion around existing differences in organizational cultures and styles that make implementation of reforms highly complex and challenging. In particular, the authors recognize both a general lack of bureaucratic capacity in public administration, with some recognizable exceptions, and a broad range of bureaucratic models in some organizations in Colombia (from Weberian civil models to those modeled on NPM). This disperse configuration, according to the authors, may be attributed to both structural and historical characteristics of the civil service and the institutional context of Colombia. In terms of prospects of this aspect of policy analysis, a more homogeneous implementation among public organizations is required, which also requires a higher level of bureaucratic capacity –​a pending priority for government and civil society.

Policy analysis within national and subnational governments Part 2 of this volume addresses policy analysis within national and subnational governments in Colombia, presenting the view from the central and local governments but also reporting on the important legislative and judicial presence in policy analysis configuration. First, Chapter 4 analyzes the central government perspective based on the PND as a strategic instrument for rational, rigorous and reliable decision-​making processes. More so than in many other countries, understanding Colombian policy analysis requires an appreciation of PND processes and outcomes. The chapter also underscores the importance of other existing bodies and tools for policy making in the country, such as the DNP and fiscal rules guidelines. According to the author, the formal existence of these 288

Conclusion

instruments and protocols, however, does not assure the correct or generalized application of rigorous decision-​making dispositions in central government, since there are other socioeconomic aspects that affect, and even disturb, the policy-​making process. Chapter 5 discusses the legislative aspect of policy development in Colombia in terms of the role that the national legislature plays. The authors conclude that, while Presidents are the major source of national legislation and the main agenda setters in Colombia, the work of the executive does not end with the introduction of bills to be discussed in Congress. Because bills are subject to all kinds of modifications, both in committees and on the floor, the legislature shapes policy and has an opportunity to engage in policy analysis. In terms of the patterns of legislative activity within committees, the authors show how important committees are in the fate of bills. Most bills die in the first stage of discussion within the constitutional committees, which makes them gatekeepers of the legislative process. Thus, there exists a hierarchy in Congress in which some committees are more prestigious than others, and legislators seek out these influential committees to build up their political careers. The authors argue that the active role in Congress of members who fight for jurisdiction makes it difficult for even the most influential actors to push Congress to legislate in certain subjects at a different speed. As a result, slow incremental change appears in policy analysis at the congressional level. Chapter 6 describes how the CCC, in its efforts to protect citizens’ rights and constitutional compliance, has become a very active policy actor, even drafting public policies. This ability, backed by the 1991 Constitution itself, has given the court an important role in defining how the state can and should tackle policy problems. Moreover, the authors identify a particular policy analysis toolbox used by the court in this process, including key aspects of problem identification, policy forecasting and policy monitoring. The analysis of the wide array of tools used in this context illustrates the key role of the court in public policy analysis in the country in defining tools and policy instruments, and in setting standards for policy formulation and implementation. The authors state that this invites a whole new line of research in order to analyze more deeply the effects and influences of the CCC in key policy domains in Colombia such as health and social policy. A first approach to the policy analysis within the subnational governments is identified in Chapter 7, which discusses metropolitan policy analysis. Metropolitan policy discussions have been very present in the Country for nearly 50  years but have not reflected a wider use of metropolitan governance as a policy tool in the country. In particular, the authors note that metropolitan areas have functioned simply as public law figures rather than creators of real, integrative policy instruments to deal with wicked problems at the municipal level This is due not only to the lack of a formal framework to help set the operative and structural aspects of these kind of governance environments, but also to political pressure since the introduction of the 1991 Constitution in the direction of greater 289

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fragmentation in municipalities. The experiences of the six formal metropolitan areas in the country indicate that there is still room for a more spatially integrated way of analyzing public policy problems and solutions through collaboration and multilevel governance. Chapter 8 provides a global look at policy analysis in local contexts and its importance for decision making. The authors illustrate the limited capacity for policy analysis in local governments in Colombia. Despite efforts to promote performance management and evidence-​based policy making over the past two decades, Colombian local governments still face several issues in using policy analysis for decision making. First, local officials’ concerns suggest lack of capacity and the need for strengthening core public administration agencies and functions at the national, department and local levels. Second, top-​down approaches and punitive enforcement mechanisms could lead to organizational decoupling, rather than institutionalization of desired policy and managerial practices, and schedule flexibility and monetary incentives could work to smoothly incorporate the desired practices into the operation of local governments. Third, municipal governments’ practice of contracting out substantial parts of the policy process inhibits them from gaining technical capacity and achieving salient policy goals. Here, licensing consulting firms and careful selection of planning officials could reduce the problem of incomplete information faced by municipalities, vis-​à-​vis its consultants. Finally, training efforts by national agencies focus mostly on mayors and political appointees. Instead, developing managerial and analytical skill sets for career public servants could help long-​term capacity building.

Policy analysis in key policy domains Part II of this volume addresses the evolution of policy analysis capacity in several policy realms Colombia, namely education, health, defense and security, and economic policy, as well as policies targeted to specific populations. Chapter 9 analyzes the traits of policy analysis in the educational sector and reveals certain issues relating to its application in Colombia. In first place, educational policy has historically been perceived as an environment where public opinion and the participation of stakeholders are determinants of policy outcome. The latter is evidenced in the role that the teachers’ union has played in events affecting both positive and negative policy configuration. In various instances in the past, key authors in Colombia’s educational policy converged into a common solution that facilitated, for example, a reform of teachers’ policy that was adequate according to the standards of the time. Second, the political context and the balance of power between the stakeholders affect the tension between technical and political solutions and may affect how far the policy process is from the ideal process where policy alternatives are considered in light of evidence. On the one hand, the political context affects how much time officials feel they have for policy design. On the other hand, the strength of the unions has made more difficult a technically oriented policy process. 290

Conclusion

Next, Chapter  10 provides an overview of the health policy domain in Colombia, highlighting incremental improvements in the technical capacities for policy analysis at the national level in terms of healthcare policy as well as identifying a path forward in terms of the local capacities for addressing health policies and tackling problems. The authors contribute to the understanding of existing gaps by discussing decentralization challenges faced in the past, continued political capture in the regions, and a lack of capabilities development in terms of information and technical management. These problems must be considered together with the difficulty of integrating into the analysis the connection between the health sector and other sectors, which, according to the authors, is characterized by a principal–​agent problem. The authors illustrate that policy analysis is increasingly being used in the health sector in Colombia, but that there remain many notable gaps and marked differences between national and local level institutions. Policy analysis in public sector institutions needs to be strengthened to improve population health and reduce its associated costs. The chapter provides some conclusions and suggests tools with that aim. Subsequently, in Chapter 11 studies the evolution of policy analysis and decision making in the military forces in Colombia by focusing on the case of conflict termination. The authors remark on the complexity of facilitating understanding between the parties in conflict, and they describe the challenges in terms of the multiple actors’ interests and strategies. The authors perceive the strategies and policy analysis mechanisms of the military as being key to ensuring the successful termination of the conflict in the country. Next, Chapter 12 analyzes the role of technocracy in influencing economic policy in Colombia. The authors identify the key role that the professional community of economists has played in the development of policy analysis techniques in Colombia. They use examples to illustrate how the strong consensus within the economic community contributes to capacity, as does the input of well-​trained economists who have adopted and implemented key analytical and decision-​making tools in the country. As a result of such capacity, even amid different internal and external economic shocks, the response of the decision makers has helped improve economic indicators and maintain a reasonably stable growth trend. The authors also identify key institutional traits that have enhanced the effectiveness of economic policy in the country, such as the independence of the Central Bank, the adoption of the fiscal rule by the MHCP, and the role of other key actors such as the Comptroller and the DNP. In turn, in Chapter  13 analyzes social policy, particularly the actions and programs targeted towards certain specific groups of population. The authors argue that although there have been improvements in several social indicators in the country, inequality remains one of the most stringent challenges for Colombia. The authors also discuss how social policy still faces key problems in terms of targeting and redistribution. For them, although the emergence of new policies after the 1991 Constitution helped the Colombian state to recognize many new target populations (including early infants, children, women, different ethnic 291

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groups and so on, it seems to remain as truncated as before in terms of its ability to redistribute disposable income and encourage the same social status to the different groups mentioned earlier.

Policy analysis beyond the state Part IV of the book explores the use of policy analysis techniques and knowledge by actors beyond state and government organizations. Chapter 14 explores the role of political parties in policy analysis in Colombia. According to the author, the 21st-​century Colombian multiparty system that left behind 150  years of bipartisan hegemony has not eliminated pervasive political clientelism, cronyism and low levels of electoral participation. In his account, the role and the use of policy analysis by political parties is poor and very underdeveloped, and this has seriously affected the quality of parties’ programs and political manifestos. The author argues that this has had an effect on the electorate itself; instead of distinguishing parties on the basis of their policy packages, voters continue to support individual politicians on the basis of their charisma or clientelistic exchanges. The chapter finishes by arguing that considering the analysis made in the chapter, policy analysis will continue at the bottom of political parties’ priorities in Colombia, considered neither a relevant or common practice, nor a need. Chapter  15 discusses the use of policy analysis by NGOs in Colombia. The authors observe that NGOs have experienced tensions with Colombia’s government but have also been at the heart of knowledge production and other initiatives related to both the peace agreement process and the implementation and monitoring of SDGs. However, they also show how Colombia’s civic space is observed as one of the worst in the Latin America by some international measures and standards, and explore some of the corruption scandals that have affected not only the image but the actual role of NGOs and nongovernmental actors in policy initiatives in the country. Nonetheless, the authors recognize the prominent role that NGOs can play in promoting substantive policy goals such as the termination of the conflict and in the achievement of SDGs. Finally, Chapter  16 examines the role of the media in both producing and using evidence and policy analysis in Colombia. The author uses text analysis of journalistic sources in order to illustrate the prevalence of a bias towards political power in media actors in the country. His findings indicate that in Colombia the media use the government and the major economic groups as their main source of information, which in terms of agenda setting means that in many issues the media agenda is set by their sources, mainly political ones. The author concludes that in order to play a more significant role in policy analysis, both the fields of journalism and of public policy must be improved in the country, in both practical and educational terms.

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Final remarks This book has been a great opportunity to understand the policy analysis capacities and challenges in a diverse and resilient country such as Colombia. Although the country has faced intense institutional challenges during its history and has exhibited problems in governing across a varied and wide territory, it has still been able to develop a certain level of institutional capacity, which has enabled interesting results and positive policy outcomes across different policy domains. Knowledge, instruments and tools for policy analysis have traveled in different forms from national to subnational levels, and across policy areas, but capacity still appears insufficiently developed in some areas and regions while being concentrated in other sectors, regions and epistemic communities. In fact, the supply of formal educational programs, applied research and generation of knowledge about public policy and administration appears to be very recent in Colombia, even compared with other Latin American countries such as Mexico or Brazil. This heterogenous distribution of capacity has led to the constitution of some islands of excellence in terms of bureaucratic and organizational capacity. Yet, other policy realms and, particularly most of the subnational levels of government in Colombia, still have wide room to advance the use of policy analysis and public management techniques for decision and public policy making. Policy analysis capacity in sectors such as economic policy, education, health and defense has been developing incrementally and the country shows evident achievements in such areas. Yet, the persistence of other wicked problems (for example, violence, inequality, poverty, crime and unemployment) demands even more sophistication and technical abilities in order to improve the quality of life in the country and, particularly, to maintain peace. The analysis of capacity of actors outside the state indicates that there is also considerable room for improvement, particularly in the poor use of policy analysis techniques by the political parties and the media, whereas better conditions are needed in order to fully ensure the impact and contributions to the public dialog of key actors such as NGOs. All things considered, this work provides an interesting and comprehensive account of a sui generis country like Colombia that has been able to develop state capacity for policy analysis amid intense internal conflict and with a tradition of minimal state presence across the territory. The Colombian case, in spite of the manifold challenges that remain, delivers important lessons about the generation of policy analysis capacity in highly challenging contexts and junctures. Colombia is an interesting case for its success in economic policy and development, its national planning and external policy decisions, its processes of decentralization, its management of cultural diversity, its handling of large-​scale and long-​standing violence, and its transition to peace. This volume allows an in-​depth exploration of how Colombia has been able to develop capacity for policy analysis even amid intense internal conflict and with a tradition of minimal state presence in several key areas.

293

Index 1991 Constitution  1, 2, 20 central government  65 education  32 institutional reforms  210–​212 law-​making process  87 legislature  82–​83 metropolitan governance  115, 126–​128, 129 PND (National Development Plan)  70 policy monitoring  73 political participation  225, 234n political party system  241, 243, 244 President  66 programmatic vote  251 public administration system  18–​19 social policy  224, 234n social sector  153 third sector  259 2018 Opposition Statute  250

A

abstract constitutional review  100–​101 Aburrá Valley Metropolitan Area (AMVA)  120–​121, 124 academic texts  21–​23 accountability  105, 140 ACCPOL (Colombian Association of Political Science)  33 accreditation  32, 44 Acosta, A.  215, 216 Acosta, O.  126 Acosta, P.  72 Adjusted General Methodology  71 AD-​M19 (Democratic Alliance-​M19)  244, 245 administrative capacity  see bureaucratic capacity Administrative Department for the Public Administration (DAFP)  44 Administrative Department of Planning and Technical Services  13 Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (COLCIENCIAS)  26 Administrative Department of the Presidency (DAPRE)  67, 68, 72 administrative departments  67–​68 administrative procedures  49–​50 administrative reforms  see public administration reforms alcohol tax  75 Alianza Verde (Green Party)  92, 247 Álvarez, A.  205

amicus curiae (friend of court)  102, 108 ANAPO (Popular National Alliance)  244 ANH (National Hydrocarbon Agency)  215 Annual Investments Operational Plan (POAI)  71, 72 anti-​corruption consultation  92–​93 anti-​trust policy  210 Appe, S.  267 Archer, R.P.  82 Argentina  87 armed conflict  2–​3 see also FARC-​EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –​Ejército del Pueblo) asbestos  278–​280, 284 ASIS (Health Situation Analysis)  174, 179 associations  258 autonomy  57

B

Balance of Powers Act  246 Balanced Scorecard  72 bancadas law  246 Banco de Colombia  209 Barco, V.  261 Barragán, D.  267 Bennett, W.L.  283 Bermúdez, F.  82 Bermúdez Liévano, A.  196 Bernake, B.  213 Betancourt, I.  260 Betancur, B.  207, 208, 261 bias  283 Bird, R.  126 black ethnic people  230 Board of Directors  84, 85 Bogotá  119–​120, 122–​123 BPIN (Programs and Projects Bank)  71 BR (Central Bank)  203, 205, 206, 207–​208, 211, 213, 219n Bretton Woods conference  12 budgeting  70–​72 bureaucratic capacity  47, 52–​54 islands of excellence  54–​57 Buvinić, M.  231

C

cabinet allocations  67 Cabrales, S.  214 Cali  130n Cambio Radical Party  246, 250,251 Cano family  274

295

Policy Analysis in Colombia capacity building  16–​24 concepts and local knowledge  21–​24 Constitution of 1991  18–​19, 20 Delivery Unit  72–​73 New Public Management (NPM)  19–​21 state crisis and reforms  17–​18 Cárdenas, M.  75–​76, 216 Careaga, M.  36–​37, 44 Carroll, R.  84 Catholic Church  258–​259 CCONG (Colombian Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations)  258, 263–​266, 267 Center for Development Research (CID), Universidad Nacional  15, 23 Center of Economic Development (CEDE), Universidad de los Andes  15, 19, 23 Central Bank (BR)  203, 205, 206, 207–​208, 211, 213, 219n central government  65–​77, 288–​289 centralization  122 key political actors  66–​69 policy information  272–​273 policy-​making process  69–​74 political economy of  74–​77 social policy  224 centralization  122, 123 Centro Democrático  246 CESU (National Council of Higher Education)  32 CGIP  225, 226, 227, 228, 229 CGRC (National Office of the Comptroller)  211–​212 Chile  225 CIDER (Interdisciplinary Center for Development Studies), Universidad de los Andes  15, 16, 19, 23 citizen organizations  25 citizen participation  265 see also political participation significant groups of citizens (GSCs)  245, 247 civic demonstrations  123 civic space  266 CIVICUS  266 Civil Code  258 civil servants  55–​56, 208 civil service development  4, 50–​51 civil society actors  25, 175, 262 clientelism  234n, 243, 244 see also policy targeting CNA (National Accreditation Council)  32 CNP (National Planning Council)  70, 127 CNSC (National Commission of Civil Service)  162, 163 CNSSS (National Council of Social Security and Health)  176–​177 coal exports  214 296

COET (Strategic Command for Transition)  187–​188, 193 technical sub-​commission  193–​194, 195, 197, 198 coffee exports  214 COLCIENCIAS (Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation)  26 Collegiate Bodies for Administration and Decision-​Making  146 Colombian Armed Forces  188–​200, 259, 291 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  end of the conflict  190–​192, 194–​196, 198–​199 role in peace process  189–​190 Strategic Command for Transition (COET)  193–​194 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (ZVTNs)  191, 192, 196–​197 weapons surrender  197–​198 Colombian Association of Political Science (ACCPOL)  33 Colombian Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations (CCONG)  258, 263–​266, 267 Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC)  82, 85, 99–​109, 289 consulta anticorrupción  92–​93 drugs policy  106–​108 glyphosate  276 institutional instruments  100–​101 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  90–​92 public health policies  105–​106 public policy analysis toolbox  101–​103 teacher evaluations  157 Colombian context  1–​3 Colombian Federation of Education Workers (Fecode)  157, 160 Colombian Health Department  16 Colombian Indigenous Authorities (AICO)  247 Colombian Institute for the Evaluation of Education (ICFES)  162 Colombian National Health Institute (INS)  179 Colombian Navy  56 Colombian Oil Company (ECOPETROL)  214, 215, 219n committees  84–​85, 87 Community Action Committees (JACs)  259 community councils  76 CONACES (National Commission for Quality Assurance in Higher Education)  32 concepts  21–​22 concrete constitutional review  101 concurrence  140, 147n conference committees  85

Index Congress  81–​94, 289 1991 Constitution  82–​83 anti-​corruption consultation  92–​93 law-​making process  aggregate overview  86–​90 key actors  84–​86 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  90–​92 political party system  83–​84 representation of ethnic groups  230 women representatives  230 Congress Members’ Legislative Work Units (UTLs)  249, 251–​252 CONPES (National Council for Economic and Social Policy)  68–​69, 70, 72 CONPES documents  13, 14, 20 Conservative Party  244, 246, 250 Constituent Assembly  125, 210 Constitution of 1991  1, 2, 20 central government  65 education  32 institutional reforms  210–​212 law-​making process  87 legislature  82–​83 metropolitan governance  115, 126–​128, 129 PND (National Development Plan)  70 policy monitoring  73 political participation  225, 234n political party system  241, 243, 244 President  66 programmatic vote  251 public administration system  18–​19 social policy  224, 234n social sector  153 third sector  259 constitutional amendments  85, 88, 89, 90 constitutional courts  99 see also Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) constitutional reform  123, 126, 130–​131n constitutional review  100–​101 consulta anticorrupción  92–​93 consulta popular  92–​93 consulting companies  141–​142, 144 contracting out  141–​142, 144 control board  73 corporations  258 corporative culture  17 corruption  92–​93 Costa Rica  225 courts  25, 99 see also Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) CRES (Health Regulatory Commission)  177 Currie, L.  12

D

DAFP (Administrative Department for the Public Administration)  44

DANE (National Administrative Department of Statistics)  15, 69, 206 DAPRE (Administrative Department of the Presidency)  67, 68, 72 data sources  178–​180 De la U Party  246, 250, 251 debt crisis  17, 207–​209 decentralization  19, 125–​126, 135, 153, 172–​173, 244 Decentralization Reform  259 decision-​making processes  194 decoupling  138, 142, 143, 145, 290 decrees  66, 82, 145, 272 degree titles  37–​38 Delivery Unit  72–​73, 76 Democratic Alliance-​M19 (AD-​M19)  244, 245 departments  2, 114, 140, 179 devaluation  208, 218n Development Research Center (CID), National University of Colombia  15, 23 dialogic constitutionalism  103 dialogic judicial activism  103 disadvantaged groups  229 displaced persons  102–​103 districts  244 DNP (National Planning Department)  13, 67–​68, 206–​207 budgeting  70–​72 institutional change  210 National Performance, Management and Results System  20 PDMs (Municipal Development Plans)  141 planning and prioritizing  69–​70 PMDs (Municipal Development Plans)  143 policy monitoring and evaluation  73–​74 social science research  135 doctoral degrees  32 doctoral education  43–​44 drug cartels  244 drug pricing  178 drug trafficking  3, 18, 107 drugs policy  106–​108 Dunn, W.  101 Duque, I.  75, 76–​77, 92, 93

E

economic change, institutional willingness for  203 economic decision making  203 economic growth  212, 215, 216 economic policy  203–​218, 291 economic downturn  212–​214 economic technocracy  205–​207 institutional reforms  209–​212 Latin American debt crisis  207–​209 297

Policy Analysis in Colombia oil and mining bonanza  214–​217 economic viability  71 ECOPETROL (Colombian Oil Company)  214, 215, 219n education  see public policy education education sector  153–​165, 290 new teachers’ statute  154–​156 policy evaluation  163–​164 policy formulation  156–​162 policy implementation  162–​163 school enrollment  225 El Colombiano  274 El Espectador  274, 278, 281 El Tiempo  274, 281 elderly people  228–​229 electoral reform  245–​246 electoral system  84 electoral volatility  247 ELN (National Liberation Army)  3, 190, 199 emergency decrees  66, 82 entidades territoriales (territorial entities, TEs)  154, 157, 162 environmental licenses  74 environmental protection  210 epistemic communities  15–​16 ESAP (Higher School of Public Administration)  15, 16, 21, 33, 35, 38, 141, 145–​146 ethnic groups  229, 230, 234n European Union  21 evaluation  74, 104–​105, 143–​144, 163–​164 evidence-​based narrative  20 exchange rate  207–​208, 209, 213, 216 excluded groups  231 execution stage  72–​73 executive  see President Export Promotion Fund  206 exports  214 external relationships  56

F

FARC-​EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –​Ejército del Pueblo)  3 infiltration  260 peace process  90–​92, 106–​108, 187–​200, 246 end of the conflict  190–​192, 194–​196, 198–​199 post-​agreement period  263–​265 role of military forces  189–​190 Strategic Command for Transition (COET)  193–​194 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (ZVTNs)  191, 192, 196–​197 weapons surrender  197–​198 298

Fecode (Colombian Federation of Education Workers)  157, 160 FEDESARROLLO (Foundation for Higher Education and Development)  15, 23 Fernanda Ramírez, M.  33, 34 FESCOL (Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung)  15–​16 financial crisis  212–​214 see also debt crisis financial resources  56 financial viability  71 fiscal crisis  157 Flórez, M.  258, 259 FOGAFIN  209, 212, 213 FONADE (National Fund for Financing of Development Projects)  206, 207 forced internal displacement  102–​103 forecasting of outcomes  103–​104 Foundation for Higher Education and Development (FEDESARROLLO)  15, 23 Foundation Konrad Adenauer  250 foundations  258 fragmentation  115, 128, 170–​171 Fraser, N.  232 Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung (FESCOL)  15–​16 friend of the court (amicus curiae)  102, 108 Fundación Carlos Lleras Restrepo  250, 251

G

gambling  75 Gaviria, A.  142 Gaviria, C.  50, 51, 209–​212, 261 gender equality  230–​231 General Participation System (SGP)  157 General System for Administrative Information for the Public Sector (SUIP)  51 Giraldo, F.  247 Global Go to Think Tank Index  273 glyphosate  107–​108, 276–​278, 284 gold exports  214 Gómez, P.  161 Gómez Martínez family  274 González, F.  83 González, S.  72 government employment  170 graduate programs/​graduate studies  23, 25, 33, 205, 206 see also doctoral degrees; Master’s degrees graduate specializations  35–​36 Green Party (Alianza Verde)  92, 247 gross domestic product (GDP)  204, 215, 216, 224 Guajira region  103 guerrilla groups  2, 3, 18, 123, 244 see also ELN (National Liberation Army); FARC-​ EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –​Ejército del Pueblo)

Index H

Haas, P.  15 Hall, P.  122 Havana agreement  187–​188 end of the conflict  190–​192, 194–​196, 198–​199 Strategic Command for Transition (COET)  193–​194 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (ZVTNs)  191, 192, 196–​197 weapons surrender  197–​198 health expenditure  234n health insurance  172, 177, 178, 179 Health Regulatory Commission (CRES)  177 health sector  169–​182, 291 coverage  225 data sources  178–​180 external actors  175–​176 national-​level health institutions  176–​177 national-​level institutions  170–​172 versus local-​level institutions  172–​173 principle-​agent problem  171, 181 public health interventions  173–​174 technical skills  180 Health Situation Analysis (ASIS)  174, 179 health technology assessments  177 healthcare  105–​106 healthcare data  178–​179 Heinrich, C.J.  137–​138 Hernandez, G.  33 Hernández, I.  211–​212 High Cost Account  178 higher education context  31–​32 see also public policy education Higher School of Public Administration (ESAP)  15, 16, 21, 33, 35, 38, 141, 145–​146 Hirschman, A.  16 Holland, A.C.  227, 231 Holzer, M.  136 Hommes, R.  210 Htun, M.  229 human resources  55–​56 human rights  230 human rights NGOs  260

I

ICFES (Colombian Institute for the Evaluation of Education)  162 identity politics  225, 230, 231, 232 identity turn  225 IETS (Institute for the Evaluation of Health Technologies)  177 impact evaluation  74 implementation  142–​143, 162–​163 capacity as a condition for  52–​54

income inequality  223, 227, 232 income redistribution  226–​228 Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation (MIRA)  247, 250–​251 indicators  104 indigenous political parties  247 indigenous university  35 inequality  see income inequality inflation  204, 208, 211, 213 information  see policy information information sources  271, 272–​274 media use  285 asbestos  278–​280, 284 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 restrictions  274–​275 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 Ingram, H.  229, 230 Institute for Integrated Transitions  195–​196 Institute for the Evaluation of Health Technologies (IETS)  177 institutional design  55 institutional evaluation  74 institutional reforms  209–​212 institutional willingness for economic change  203 institutionalization  137, 242 Instituto de Pensamiento Liberal  251 Instituto de Pensamiento Social  250, 251 insurgencies  2–​3 Integrated Health Care Model (MIAS)  171 Integrated Model of Planning and Management  51 Integrated Social Protection Information System (SISPRO)  178 Inter-​American Development Bank  2, 4, 19, 23, 76, 207 Interdisciplinary Center of Regional Studies (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes  15, 16, 19, 23 interest groups  25 international actors  19 international donors  175 International Labour Organization  160 international missions  12 International Monetary Fund (IMF)  208, 213 International Republican Institute  250 investment projects  70–​71 islands of excellence  54–​57 Izquierdo, A.  227

J

Johnson, G.B.  85 journalism  see public policy journalism judicial institutions  175 judicial politics  99–​100 Julnes, P.D.L.  136 Junguito, R.  207, 208 299

Policy Analysis in Colombia K

key political actors  66–​69 Kitschelt, H.  242–​243 Kuusela, H.  144

L

La Efectividad de las Políticas en Colombia (Wiesner)  22–​23 La Silla Vacía  74, 76, 77 La Violencia  2–​3 Las Políticas Públicas (Salazar)  22 Lasswell, H.  14 Latin America  debt crisis  17, 207–​209 social spending  225, 228 Latin-​American Public Opinion Project  92 law-​making process  aggregate overview  86–​90 key actors  84–​86 leadership  56–​57 Leal Buitrago, F.  244 Lederman, D.  210 legislative initiative  66 legislative powers  66 legislature  25, 81–​94, 289 1991 Constitution  82–​83 anti-​corruption consultation  92–​93 law-​making process  aggregate overview  86–​90 key actors  84–​86 peace agreement with FARC-​EP 90–​92 political party system  83–​84 Leyva, S.  33, 34, 125 LGBT groups  230 Liberal Party  244, 246, 274 Liendo, N.  247–​248 Lima Bandeira, M.  32 litigation  230 Lleras Restrepo, C.  16, 123, 206 local capacity  14–​16 local governments  135–​147, 290 actors  137 context  137–​139 educational services  154, 159 Health Situation Analysis (ASIS)  174, 179 performance management  136 PMDs (Municipal Development Plans)  139–​146 local knowledge  22–​24 local needs  140 local-​level health sector agencies  172–​173 Londoño, J.F.  249, 251 López, C.  92, 93 López-​Michelsen, A.  125 Losada, R.  247–​248 Lozano, A.  92 300

M

MAIS (Social and Indigenous Alternative Movement)  247 management leadership model  57 management reforms  48–​52 Master’s degrees  36–​43 Medellín (city)  120–​121, 129, 260 Medellín, J.C.  229 media  271–​272, 292 bias  283 ownership  274 restrictions  274–​275 use of policy information  285 asbestos  278–​280, 284 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 Medium-​Term Expenses Framework  70, 72, 77n Medium-​Term Fiscal Framework  70, 71, 75 MEN (Ministry of National Education)  25–​ 26, 154, 158, 160, 161, 162 methodological viability  71 metropolitan board  124, 127, 128, 131n metropolitan governance  113–​114, 129–​130, 131n, 289–​290 characterization  118–​122 evolution  114–​117 metropolitan ordinance  127, 131n metropolitan policy analysis  Bogotá  119–​120 downgrading of  125–​129 Medellín  120–​121 origins  122–​124 metropolitan pressure  118, 119 metropolitan regions  116–​117 see also Bogotá; Medellín Mexico  87, 207 MHCP (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit)  67 economic technocracy  205, 207–​208, 212, 213 human resources  55, 56 institutional willingness for economic change  203 leadership  57 policy monitoring  73 policy-​making process  70 teachers’ reforms  162 MIAS (Integrated Health Care Model)  171 migrants  75 military forces  188–​200, 259, 291 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  end of the conflict  190–​192, 194–​196, 198–​199 role in peace process  189–​190 Strategic Command for Transition (COET)  193–​194

Index Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (ZVTNs)  191, 192, 196–​197 weapons surrender  197–​198 military government  120, 122–​123, 130n, 244 military leadership model  56–​57 ministries  67 Ministry of Defence  56 Ministry of Environment  74, 210 Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (MHCP)  67 economic technocracy  205, 207–​208, 212, 213 human resources  55, 56 institutional willingness for economic change  203 leadership  57 policy monitoring  73 policy-​making process  70 teachers’ reforms  162 Ministry of Health  106, 170–​171, 172, 174, 177, 180 Ministry of National Education (MEN)  25–​26, 154, 158, 160, 161, 162 MIPG system  143–​144, 145 MIPRES  171–​172, 175–​176 MIRA (Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation)  247, 250–​251 Misas, G.  206–​207, 208 Mission of Intergovernmental Finance  126 monitoring  73, 104–​105 Montenegro, A.  210, 211 municipal context  136–​137 Municipal Development Plans (PMDs)  139–​146 municipalities  2, 114, 115, 117, 125–​129 see also local governments Health Situation Analysis (ASIS)  174, 179 political parties  244, 245 Muñoz, P.  247

N

NASPAA (Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration)  44 National Accreditation Council (CNA)  32 National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE)  15, 69, 206 national bills  88, 89 National Commission for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (CONACES)  32 National Commission of Civil Service (CNSC)  162, 163 National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES)  68–​69, 70, 72

CONPES documents  13, 14, 20 National Council for Economic Policy and Planning  13 National Council of Higher Education (CESU)  32 National Council of Public Health  181 National Council of Social Security and Health (CNSSS)  176–​177 National Development Plans (PNDs)  13, 14, 50, 58n, 65, 68, 69–​70, 139 political economy restrictions  74–​75, 76 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  265 teacher evaluations  157 National Front  83, 94n, 227, 244 National Fund for Financing of Development Projects (FONADE)  206, 207 national government  see central government National Guarantee Committee for Human Rights  261–​262 National Health Superintendence (SNS)  176 National Hydrocarbon Agency (ANH)  215 National Information System for Higher Education (SNIES)  34, 39 National Liberation Army (ELN)  3, 190, 199 National Municipalities Training System  21 National Office of the Comptroller (CGRC)  211–​212 National Pact for Life and Peace  262–​263 National Peace Council  262 National Performance, Management and Results System (SINERGIA)  20, 51, 73 national planning  12–​14 National Planning Board  12, 14 National Planning Council (CNP)  70, 127, 261 National Planning Department (DNP)  13, 67–​68, 206–​207 budgeting  70–​72 institutional change  210 National Performance, Management and Results System  20 PDMs (Municipal Development Plans)  141 planning and prioritizing  69–​70 PMDs (Municipal Development Plans)  143 policy monitoring and evaluation  73–​74 social science research  135 National Program of Training of Public Employees  51 National Substitution Plan  107 National System for Assistance to the Displaced Population (SNAIPD)  102–​103 National Training and Instruction Plan  20 National University of Colombia (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)  15, 23, 34, 42, 44, 162 nationalization  209 national-​level health institutions  170–​172, 176–​177 301

Policy Analysis in Colombia versus local-​level institutions  172–​173 Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA)  44 New Liberalism  244 New Public Governance  51 New Public Management (NPM)  19–​21, 48–​52, 57 new teachers’ statute  154–​156 policy evaluation  163–​164 policy formulation  156–​162 policy implementation  162–​163 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)  257–​ 258, 261–​263, 266–​267, 292 see also third sector Colombian Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations (CCONG)  263–​266, 267, 288 human rights  260 non-​legislative powers  67

O

O’Donnell, G.  52 oil exports  214–​215, 216 oil price  215, 216 oil production  214 oil reserves  214 oil sector  213 Opción Ciudadana  247 open government  51 operations evaluation  74 Opposition Statute of 2018  250 Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD)  51, 204 organizational climate  56 organizational structures  49–​50 organized civil society  262–​263, 265, 267 outcomes forecasting  103–​104

P

Pachón, M.  82, 83, 84, 85 Palacios, H.  209 Paraguay  225 paramilitary groups  2, 18, 244, 259 partial veto  66 Partido de Integración Nacional  247 Pastrana Presidency  49, 50, 213, 261 path dependence  122, 123, 128, 137 Patriotic Union (UP)  244, 247 PDSP (Public Health Plan for the Decade)  173–​174, 181 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  90–​92, 106–​108, 187–​200, 246 end of the conflict  190–​192, 194–​196, 198–​199 post-​agreement period  263–​265 role of military forces  189–​190

302

Strategic Command for Transition (COET)  193–​194 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (ZVTNs)  191, 192, 196–​197 weapons surrender  197–​198 pensions  228–​229 performance management  21, 136 performance measurement  137–​138 Perú  225 Peterson Institute for International Economics  215 PhDs  32, 43–​44 planning  12–​14, 69–​70, 127 see also National Planning Department (DNP) planning law  19 planning secretaries  144–​145 plebiscite  90 see alsoconsulta popular PMDs (Municipal Development Plans)  139–​146 PNDs (National Development Plans)  13, 14, 50, 58n, 65, 68, 69–​70, 139 political economy restrictions  74–​75, 76 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  265 teacher evaluations  157 POAI (Annual Investments Operational Plan)  71, 72 policy analysis concepts  21–​22 policy analysis movement  11–​27, 287 current state of practices and research  24–​26 key milestones  international missions  12 local capacity  14–​16 national planning  12–​14 policy capacity and nation construction  16–​24 concepts and local knowledge  21–​24 Constitution of 1991  18–​19, 20 New Public Management (NPM)  19–​21 state crisis and reforms  17–​18 policy centers  23 policy cycle  20 policy evaluation  74, 104–​105, 143–​144, 163–​164 policy execution stage  72–​73 policy implementation  142–​143, 162–​163 capacity as a condition for  52–​54 policy information  271–​272 media use  285 asbestos  278–​280, 284 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 restrictions  274–​275 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 sources of evidence  272–​274 policy literature  21–​23 policy monitoring  73, 104–​105 policy outcomes  103–​104 Policy Sciences  16

Index policy targeting  223, 225–​226, 228–​229, 231–​232 policy transfer  18 policy-​making process  69–​74 political economy of  74–​77 political actors  66–​69 political participation  225, 234n, 265 political parties  241–​243, 244, 245, 249–​253, 292 see also individual parties political party system  83–​84, 241, 252 historical perspective  243–​248 political patronage system  52 political power  230 political reform  249 political representation  229–​232 political science  33–​34 political system  2 political viability  71 politics of recognition  232 politics of redistribution  232 Polo Democrático Alternativo  246–​247 Pontificia Universidad Javeriana  41 Popular National Alliance (ANAPO)  244 population  204 population surveys  179 post-​agreement period  263–​265 poverty  223, 226–​227 poverty line  204, 218n PRAP (Program for Public Administration Renewal)  49 preferred policies  103–​104 President  65, 66–​67, 69, 70 see also individual presidents 1991 Constitution  82–​83 Central Bank (BR)  211 control board  73 law-​making process  84, 85 new teachers’ statute  157 Presidential systems  243 press  see media pressure groups  25 prioritizing  69–​70 prisons  104, 109n private healthcare providers  106 private sector institutions  175 private sector tools  52 private universities  33 problem structuring  102–​103 professional groups  14, 15, 16 professionalism  136 professionalization  159 Program for Public Administration Renewal (PRAP)  49 programmatic party structuration  242–​243 programmatic vote  140, 249, 251, 253 Programs and Projects Bank (BPIN)  71 project viability  71

protests  123 PTNs (Transitional Points for Normalization)  191, 196 public administration reforms  17–​18, 47, 48–​ 52, 57–​58, 120, 288 capacity as a condition for implementation of  52–​54 public administration system  2, 4, 18–​19 public choice approach  17 public comptroller institutions  175 see also National Office of the Comptroller (CGRC) public debt  208, 216 Public Employment Information and Management System (SIGEP)  44 public health functions  169, 172 Public Health Plan for the Decade (PDSP)  173–​174, 181 public health policies  105–​106, 173–​174 see also health sector public hearings  103–​104, 105 public management  17 Public Management Improvement Program  49 public policy analysis toolbox  101–​103 public policy education  31–​45, 288 higher education context  31–​32 precursors  33–​34 public policy degrees  25–​26, 34–​44 doctoral education  43–​44 graduate programs  23, 25, 33 graduate specializations  35–​36 Master’s degrees  36–​43 undergraduate education  33, 35 public policy journalism  272 asbestos  278–​280, 284 bias  283 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 public service values  37 public workforce  see also civil servants salaries  55–​56 training  20–​21, 51, 145

Q

quality assurance  32, 44 Quality Management System for Public Organizations  51

R

Ramío, C.  52 Registro Calificado  44 repression  266 reprimarization  215 Republican Union party  274 research centers  23, 249, 250

303

Policy Analysis in Colombia research groups  26 Restrepo, J.C.  212 results evaluation  74 results-​based management  51–​52 Revista Semana  276 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –​People’s Army  see FARC-​EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia –​ Ejército del Pueblo) rights-​based indicators  104 roads infrastructure  76 Rodríguez-​Franco, D.  102–​103, 104 Rodríguez-​Garavito, C.  102–​103, 104 Roosevelt administration  14 Roth, A.N.  18 Rubaii, N.  32, 42

S

salaries  55–​56, 208 Salazar, C.  22 Samper Presidency  49, 50, 75, 261 Sanabria, P.  25, 37, 44 Santo Domingo family  274 Santos, J.M.  anti-​corruption consultation  93 Colombian Federation of Education Workers (Fecode)  160 environmental licenses  74 FARC-​EP peace agreement  90–​92, 187, 192 law-​making process  86–​87 leadership  76 metropolitan governance  128, 131n nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)  261–​262 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  246, 260–​261 PND (National Development Plan)  50, 75 public servants  51 results-​based management  51 Santos Montejo family  274 Sarmiento, L.C.  274 school enrollment  225 School Feeding Program  266 School of Governance of Universidad de los Andes  23, 24, 40, 41 scientific evidence  media use  285 asbestos  278–​280, 284 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 restrictions  274–​275 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 sources  271, 272–​274 scientific societies  175, 177 sectoral line ministries  67 separation of power  82–​83

304

Shugart, M.  82 SIGEP (Public Employment Information and Management System)  44 significant groups of citizens (GSCs)  245, 247 SINERGIA (National Performance, Management and Results System)  20, 51, 73 SISBEN (System for Identifying Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN)  225–​226 SISMED (System of Information on Drug Prices (SISMED)  178 SISPRO (Integrated Social Protection Information System)  178 SNAIPD (National System for Assistance to the Displaced Population)  102–​103 SNIES (National Information System for Higher Education)  34, 39 SNS (National Health Superintendence) 176 Social and Indigenous Alternative Movement (MAIS)  247 social policy  223–​233, 291–​292 basic welfare policies  224–​225 income redistribution  226–​228 pensions  228–​229 policy targeting  223, 225–​226, 231 political representation  229–​232 social policy expenditure  224–​225, 233n social unrest  123 socially excluded groups  231 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 283, 284 sources of evidence  271, 272–​274 media use  285 asbestos  278–​280, 284 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 restrictions  274–​275 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 Spanish empire  258–​259 state employees  see civil servants; public workforce statutory bills  85, 90 Steiner, R.  229 stereotypes  230 Strategic Command for Transition (COET)  187–​188, 193 technical sub-​commission  193–​194, 195, 197, 198 strategic planning  72 strikes  123, 157, 160, 230 structural adjustment programs  18 sugary soft drinks  280–​283, 283, 284 Superintendence of Finance  213 Superintendence of Industry and Commerce  210

Index surveillance  179 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  265–​266, 267 System for Identifying Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN)  225–​226 System of Information on Drug Prices (SISMED)  178

T

Taborda, J.  82 target populations  223, 225–​226, 228–​229, 230, 232 tax reform  216, 280 teacher policy  153–​165 new teachers’ statute  154–​156 policy evaluation  163–​164 policy formulation  156–​162 policy implementation  162–​163 teachers’ unions  155, 157, 158, 160, 161 technical capacity  172–​173, 182n technical regional sessions  104 technical skills  180 technical sources  272–​274 media use  285 asbestos  278–​280, 284 glyphosate  276–​278, 284 restrictions  274–​275 soft drinks tax  280–​283, 284 technical viability  71 technocracy  203, 205–​207, 291 debt crisis  207–​209 institutional reforms  210, 211 terminology  22, 42 territorial entities (TEs)  154, 157, 162 territorial planning councils  261 think tanks  15–​16, 23, 249–​251, 273 third sector  see also nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 2000s to present  259–​260 definition  257–​258 evolution  258–​259 total veto  66 training  20–​21, 51, 145 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (ZVTNs)  191, 192, 196–​197 Transitional Points for Normalization (PTNs)  191, 196 translation  21–​22 truncated pension system  228–​229 truncated policies  229–​232 truncated states  223, 227–​228, 231, 234n Turbay Presidency  123–​124 tutelas  101, 102, 105, 109n, 175–​176

U

Ugalde, A.  16 unconstitutional state of affairs (USoA)  101, 102, 103, 104, 109n undergraduate programs/​studies  33, 35, 205 unicameralism  85 United Nations (UN)  198 Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MM&V)  191–​192 United States (US) government  14 Universidad Autónoma Indígena Intercultural  35 Universidad de los Andes  15, 16, 19, 23, 33, 34, 41, 43, 44 Universidad de Santander  41 Universidad del Valle  33, 41, 44 Universidad EAFIT  33 Universidad Externado de Colombia  37, 43 Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano  43 Universidad Nacional de Colombia (National University of Colombia)  15, 23, 34, 42, 44, 162 universities  15, 31, 33, 145, 273–​274 see also higher education context UP (Patriotic Union)  244, 247 Urban Development Law  123–​124 urban reforms  125, 127 urbanization  2, 113, 125 see also metropolitan regions Uribe Presidency  84 law-​making process  85, 86, 87 peace agreement with FARC-​EP  246 public administration reforms  49, 50, 51 roads infrastructure  76 third sector  259–​260, 261 Urrutia, M.  212, 213, 229

V

Valle de Aburrá  115 see also Aburrá Valley Metropolitan Area (AMVA) value-​added tax (VAT)  216 values  37 Vaupés  106 Vélez, C.M.  158 veto power  66, 85 viability  71 Villar, R.  258–​259 violence  2–​3

W

Washington Consensus  17, 18, 209–​210 weapons surrender  197–​198 welfare policies  224–​225 lack of impact  226–​228 pensions  228–​229

305

Policy Analysis in Colombia policy targeting  225–​226 welfare regimes  223 welfare state  224 wicked problems  2, 18, 115, 119–​120, 121 Wiesner, E.  22–​23 women  229, 230 World Bank  12, 16, 19, 207 World Conference on Women  231 World Health Organization (WHO)  276

306

Y

Ylönen, M.  144

Z

zoning  127 ZVTNs (Transitional Local Zones for Normalization)  191, 192, 196–​197

Vol 15 “An excellent contribution to the field of comparative policy analysis. This remarkable group of scholars help us understand the complexities of policy analysis in Colombia. Anyone interested in learning about public policy in Latin America must read it.” Mauricio I. Dussauge-Laguna, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas

Examining the historical development and current status of policy analysis as a field of study and in practice, it considers public policy analysis in government and the judiciary, and across domains including health, education and the military. Contributors also delve into Colombia’s notable success in economic regeneration, the management of cultural diversity and the resolution of long-term internal armed conflict. Not just an important summation of policy analysis in Colombia, this book also provides insights and lessons applicable elsewhere.

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

Leading Colombian academics and experienced policy practitioners cast new light on their country in this systematic overview of policy analysis for an international audience.

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES EDITORS: IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

Features of the ILPA series

Recent volumes published • Policy analysis in Mexico, edited by Jose Luis Mendez and Mauricio I. Dussauge-Laguna (2017) • Policy analysis in Belgium, edited by Marleen Brans and David Aubin (2017) • Policy analysis in France, edited by Charlotte Halpern, Patrick Hassenteufel and Philippe Zittoun (2018) • Policy analysis in the United States, edited by John A. Hird (2018) • Policy analysis in Canada, edited by Laurent Dobuzinskis and Michael Howlett (2018) • Policy analysis in Turkey, edited by Caner Bakir and Günes Ertan (2018) PABLO SANABRIA-PULIDO is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Programs in the School of Government at Universidad de los Andes, Colombia and Affiliate Professor at CIDE Mexico, Public Administration Division. NADIA RUBAII is Professor of Public Administration and Co-Director of the Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention at Binghamton University, State University of New York and Adjunct Researcher at Universidad de los Andes.

POLICY ANALYSIS IN COLOMBIA Edited by Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Nadia Rubaii

• a systematic study of policy analysis systems by government and non-governmental actors • a history of the country’s policy analysis, empirical case studies and a comparative overview • a key reference for research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

Colombia

@policypress @policypress PolicyPress policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

In association with

International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis

ISSN 2059-0326

Edited by Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Nadia Rubaii